Economic Activity, Prices,
and Monetary Policy in Japan
Speech at a Meeting with Business Leaders in Kanagawa
Goushi Kataoka
Member of the Policy Board
I. Economic Activity and Prices
A. Recent Developments and Outlook for Economic Activity at Home and Abroad
I would like to start my speech by looking at global economic trends affecting Japan's
economy. I expect the global economy to grow moderately in 2018, accompanied by
improvements in business fixed investment and exports.
The U.S. economy has been favorable, underpinned in part by fiscal policy, and the
inflation rate is expected to be at around 2 percent for the time being. As for the European
economy, although the rapid growth in the second half of 2017 came to a halt, private
consumption and corporate investment have been solid. The Chinese economy has
continued to see stable growth on the whole, and other emerging economies have generally
maintained their moderate recovery trend.
According to Chart 1, which shows the economic outlook released by international
organizations, growth rates of the global economy for 2019 are projected to remain more or
less unchanged from 2018. Although growth rates of major advanced economies for 2019
are likely to weaken somewhat compared with those for 2018, the weakening is expected to
be offset by growth in emerging economies.
As I mentioned, international organizations have projected that the global economy is
expected to continue on a steady expanding trend in 2019. Nonetheless, I am convinced that
there is an increasing possibility that the pace of expansion in the global economy will
decelerate somewhat from next year, considering the recent gradual heightening of
uncertainties such as U.S. monetary tightening and its impact on global financial markets,
protectionist moves and their effects, and negotiations on the United Kingdom's exit from
the European Union (EU).
In particular, trade friction has become increasingly severe and the situation requires caution.
Chart 2 shows the economic impact of trade friction estimated by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Under certain assumptions, the direct influence of raising tariffs is
said to be limited. However, if tariffs placed on automobiles and auto components are raised,
the economic influence exerted through exports and imports will be large. Moreover, the
impact on the global economy cannot be ignored if intensifying trade friction leads to
stagnation in business fixed investment or to a decline in stock prices through a
deterioration in the sentiment of firms or investors. In a situation where uncertainties are
gradually increasing, developments in overseas economies require further attention.
Next, I would like to turn to developments in Japan's economy. The real GDP growth rate
for the April-June quarter of 2018 recovered to positive territory after a decline in the
previous quarter. This was supported by moderate growth in the global economy and the
rebound from sluggish domestic demand due to factors such as severe winter weather. Chart
3 shows the real GDP growth rate and the breakdown by component. The contribution of
domestic demand to total growth became larger as business fixed investment accelerated
and as private consumption started to increase on the back of improvements in the
employment and income situation. On the other hand, the contribution of external demand
declined in response to a decrease in exports of services. Although exports of goods for the
April-June quarter were firm, the influence of developments in trade friction warrants close
attention.
Turning to the outlook for Japan's economy, as shown in Chart 4, the medians of forecasts
made by the Bank of Japan's Policy Board members for real GDP growth rates presented in
Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices
the July 2018 (Outlook Report) are 1.5 percent
for fiscal 2018, and 0.8 percent for both fiscal 2019 and 2020. My view, however, is that the
pace of growth will be somewhat more moderate than these forecasts. Specifically, the real
GDP growth rate for fiscal 2018 is likely to be around 1.0 percent, mainly due to an
increase in business fixed investment reflecting improvements in corporate profits and
business sentiment, and to a rise in exports reflecting the expansion of overseas economies.
The rate for fiscal 2019 is likely to slow and move in the range of 0.5-1.0 percent as the
pace of expansion in the global economy will probably decelerate and as domestic demand
is likely to deteriorate mainly reflecting the effects of the consumption tax hike scheduled to
take place in October 2019. Moreover, the rate for fiscal 2020 is likely to be only around 0.5
percent.
Indeed, one of the key events for Japan's economy when making growth rate projections is
the consumption tax hike scheduled for October 2019. The direct burden on households of
the upcoming consumption tax hike could be small since the rate increase -- from 8 percent
to 10 percent -- is smaller than that of the April 2014 hike, and because a reduced tax rate is
scheduled to be applied to some items. However, as shown in the left-hand graph of Chart 5,
even after four years since the 2014 hike, household consumption has at last recovered to
the level of April in the year prior to the hike. Moreover, I believe that household
consumption remains vulnerable, as seen in real private consumption by type in the
consumption activity index (CAI) shown in the right-hand graph of Chart 5; although
consumption of durable goods and services has been increasing, albeit with fluctuations,
that of non-durable goods including food, beverages, and clothes has continued to be
sluggish. As long as such weakness remains, we must not underestimate the effects of the
tax hike on consumption. Furthermore, I consider that economic growth for fiscal 2019 and
onward is likely to decelerate, taking into account the following factors through fiscal 2020:
(1) the possibility that the expanding trend of domestic business fixed investment will come
to a halt, mainly due to the dissipation of Olympic Games-related demand, and (2) the
possible materialization of the aforementioned risks surrounding developments in overseas
economies.
B. Recent Developments and Outlook for Prices
Next, I will move on to price developments in Japan. The year-on-year rate of increase in
the consumer price index (CPI) for all items less fresh food for July 2018 was 0.8 percent,
as shown in the left-hand graph of Chart 6. However, it should be noted that the
contribution of a rise in energy prices to the CPI was significant at 0.5 percentage point, and
the rate of increase for all items less fresh food and energy, which directly reflects
supply-demand conditions, stood at only 0.3 percent year on year. In assessing prices, it is
important to grasp underlying developments, excluding those CPI items with large
fluctuations. The right-hand graph of Chart 6 shows some indicators that represent the
underlying developments in consumer prices. These have been on a downtrend since March
2018, and I would therefore argue that the trend momentum of inflation has weakened.
The important indicators that affect underlying price developments are the output gap and
medium- to long-term inflation expectations. The output gap, as shown in the left-hand
graph of Chart 7, has moved further into positive territory, reflecting improvements in the
capital stock and labor markets. Nevertheless, the trend momentum of inflation has been
weakening. This inconsistency between a widening output gap and weakening inflation may
be the result of a number of factors. The July 2018 Outlook Report showed that households'
tolerance of price rises has not been increasing and that firms' wage- and price-setting
stance has not strengthened enough, even amid rising costs.1 Economic activity based on
these conditions is not sustainable in the long run, although it is difficult to change in the
short run; thus, if the expanding trend of the output gap continues to strengthen, economic
activity will gradually become proactive, and the burden of price stagnation will be
lessened.
Meanwhile, inflation expectations have been somewhat weak. I am convinced that this is
attributable to the adverse effects of prolonged deflation in the past and recent weak price
developments. In addition, I believe that the weakening of the Bank's commitment to
achieving the 2 percent price stability target is also affecting expectations.
Turning to the outlook for prices, the medians of the Policy Board members' forecasts for
the year-on-year rate of change in the CPI (all items less fresh food) presented in the July
Outlook Report are 1.1 percent for fiscal 2018 and, excluding the direct effects of the
scheduled consumption tax hike, 1.5 percent for fiscal 2019 and 1.6 percent for fiscal 2020
(Chart 4). In contrast to the April Outlook Report, the latest price projections have been
revised downward, reflecting the current weak price developments, but the Bank's principal
view is that the momentum of prices toward the 2 percent price stability target will be
maintained. However, I dissented from the relevant description in the July Outlook Report
as I think the possibility of the inflation rate rising toward 2 percent is low at the moment
and that the momentum of inflation has weakened. I would like to explain this in relation to
the Bank's conduct of monetary policy.
II. Conduct of Monetary Policy
Let me first explain the Bank's current monetary policy framework, including the decision
made in the July 2018 Monetary Policy Meeting (MPM). I would then like to touch on my
opinion about the policy measures necessary to achieve the price stability target.
A. Framework of Monetary Policy Conduct
As shown in Chart 8, the Bank conducts monetary policy under the framework of
Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) with Yield Curve Control, aiming to
achieve the 2 percent price stability target. This current framework consists of three major
components.
The first is yield curve control, in which the Bank controls short- and long-term interest
rates. Specifically, the Bank sets the short-term policy interest rate at minus 0.1 percent and
purchases Japanese government bonds (JGBs) so that 10-year JGB yields remain at around
0 percent, thereby achieving accommodative financial conditions and stimulating economic
activity and prices.
The second component is purchases of assets such as exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and
Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REITs), which are conducted with a view to exerting
positive effects on economic activity and prices through lowering risk premiums such as on
stocks.
The third component is the commitment regarding the future conduct of monetary policy.
Under the inflation-overshooting commitment introduced in September 2016, the Bank
continues to expand the monetary base until the year-on-year rate of increase in the
observed CPI (all items less fresh food) exceeds 2 percent and stays above this target level
in a stable manner. With this commitment, the Bank aims to increase the credibility that it
will achieve the 2 percent price stability target by ruling out the possibility of a change in
the direction of monetary policy at an early stage when achievement of the target comes in
sight.
In this situation, as I explained earlier, the CPI forecasts of the Policy Board members were
revised downward again in the July 2018 Outlook Report, on the view that it is taking more
time than expected to achieve the price stability target of 2 percent. Nevertheless, although
it will take time, it is necessary to maintain and strengthen the momentum of prices toward
achieving the price stability target. Based on this recognition, the Bank decided at the July
2018 MPM that it was desirable to maintain the output gap within positive territory as long
as possible by persistently continuing with the current monetary easing, thereby ensuring
the price developments toward achieving 2 percent inflation.
As a result of the discussion, the Bank decided on a statement titled "Strengthening the
Framework for Continuous Powerful Monetary Easing" to address two challenges that
could arise from the continuation of monetary easing. The first is to further strengthen
confidence among the public regarding the Bank's current policy stance that aims at
achieving the price stability target. The second is to strengthen the sustainability of the
current monetary easing so that the effects of monetary easing will not weaken, while taking
care of the possible negative effects on financial markets.
Chart 8 provides a comparison of the key features of "Strengthening the Framework for
Continuous Powerful Monetary Easing" with those of the previous policy framework. The
first feature is enhancing the sustainability of yield curve control. Specifically, the Bank
decided to allow some degree of fluctuation in the long-term yields, depending mainly on
developments in economic activity and prices, while maintaining the target level for 10-year
JGB yields at around 0 percent. This aims at continuing with powerful monetary easing
while alleviating concerns about a possible decline in the functioning of the JGB market.
The second feature is the Bank's announcement that it might increase or decrease the
amount of ETF purchases, depending on market conditions, with a view to enhancing the
sustainability of the policy, while maintaining the guideline that the amount outstanding of
ETF purchases by the Bank will increase at an annual pace of about 6 trillion yen.
The third feature is the introduction of forward guidance for short- and long-term interest
rates. Specifically, the following commitment was announced: "[t]he Bank intends to
maintain the current extremely low levels of short- and long-term interest rates for an
extended period of time, taking into account uncertainties regarding economic activity and
prices including the effects of the consumption tax hike scheduled to take place in October
2019." By announcing its intention regarding the guideline for controlling interest rates, in
addition to the inflation-overshooting commitment that has been in place since September
2016, the Bank aims to strengthen market confidence and expectations regarding monetary
policy.
B. Measures Necessary for Achieving the Price Stability Target
I dissented from "Strengthening the Framework for Continuous Powerful Monetary Easing"
considering that (1) taking account of the current sluggishness in prices and risk factors
going forward, it was desirable to strengthen monetary easing itself, and (2) controlling the
long-term yields in a flexible manner would make their target level of around 0 percent
unclear. In relation to this, I would like to raise three issues.
First, I consider that additional monetary easing -- rather than strengthening the framework
for continuous easing -- should be implemented in a situation where the Policy Board
members' forecasts are being revised downward. To justify the assessment that it is
appropriate to persistently continue with the current monetary easing, the degree of the
current easing needs to be strong enough to achieve the price stability target. The key to
making such an assessment is whether, under the current policy, the momentum for inflation
has strengthened or is likely to strengthen going forward.
Let us first examine the momentum based on developments in two indicators: the output
gap and inflation expectations. The output gap might stay in positive territory, but with the
prospect of economic growth decelerating from 2019, the pace of the widening of the output
gap will likely slow down. Amid relatively weak inflation rates, inflation expectations are
likely to remain somewhat weak through the adaptive formation mechanism. Therefore, I
believe there is little likelihood of the momentum increasing under the current policy.
Another way to assess the momentum in inflation is the pace at which price rises will lead
to achievement of the price stability target of 2 percent. Chart 9 shows a statistical estimate
of the probability of Japan's inflation rate reaching 2 percent within two years.2 Based on
the assumption that the average of the changes in the monthly inflation rate over the past
year will continue, the 2 percent-passage probability has declined since May 2018. This
suggests that the momentum in inflation has weakened somewhat. Moreover, the 2
percent-passage probability calculated using the CPI for all items less fresh food and energy
has been almost 0 percent since mid-2016, indicating that the momentum over the past year
or so was mostly attributable to energy prices. In other words, it is possible to conclude that,
under the current monetary policy, the momentum in inflation has not strengthened enough
to achieve the price stability target as soon as possible.
Second, I believe that it is unnecessary for the Bank to conduct policy changes so as to
allow some degree of fluctuation in the long-term yields, at a time when the CPI forecasts
of the Policy Board members have been revised downward. Personally, I am concerned
about this policy change, in that it is possible that the long-term interest rate target level of
around 0 percent will gradually lose significance if expectations of a rise in long-term yields
heighten in financial markets. The timing of achieving the price stability target may be
delayed if interest rates rise, whether temporarily or not, in a situation where inflation
expectations and prices have not risen sufficiently. Furthermore, one advantage of
yield-curve control is that it strengthens the monetary easing effects by maintaining
long-term interest rates at around 0 percent when they are subject to upward pressure;
however, controlling long-term yields in a flexible manner is thought to weaken such
effects.
Third, as for the Bank's commitment regarding future monetary policy changes and forward
guidance for policy rates, my view is that, taking into account the current situation in which
the observed inflation rate is still evidently far from the 2 percent price stability target, it is
important for the Bank to make clear the influence of its monetary policy on prices and to
show its strong determination to achieve the price stability target. It is true that enforcing
the Bank's commitment is desirable, given the continued relative weakness in inflation
expectations. Nonetheless, I believe that the description of forward guidance introduced by
the Bank in July -- "[t]he Bank intends to maintain the current extremely low levels of
short- and long-term interest rates for an extended period of time" -- is just the natural
conclusion to be drawn from the Policy Board members' CPI forecasts and the observed
inflation rate clearly being far from the 2 percent price stability target. I am not sure
whether the description does anything other than merely acknowledge the current situation.
Rather, the Bank should design its forward guidance by clarifying the relationship of that
guidance to the inflation rate, inflation expectations, and the output gap, with a view to
strengthening its influence on prices.
As I have explained, my view is that the current monetary easing measures are not strong
enough to achieve the price stability target as soon as possible, and if the Bank allows
long-term yields to rise when the inflation rate and inflation expectations have not risen
sufficiently, the timing of achieving the price stability target may be delayed. As presented
in the joint statement by the Bank and the government, the Bank's mission is to achieve the
price stability target at the earliest possible time. Instead of strengthening the framework for
persistently continuing monetary easing, it is important to strengthen monetary easing itself
so that the easing will not be so persistent. Given that prices are sluggish and there are
concerns over increasing uncertainties, it is important to exert a stronger influence over
economic activity and prices. Specifically, I believe that the Bank should introduce a
measure to further lower yields on JGBs with maturities of 10 years and longer, thereby
accelerating the pace of widening of the output gap. Such a measure would create a more
significant change in the behavior of firms and households in terms of setting wages and
prices. Regarding the Bank's commitment to future monetary policy, I am of the view that
the Bank needs to make clear its stance of not tolerating sluggish inflation expectations. In
doing so, the Bank at this point needs to encourage inflation expectations to rise by making
a commitment to taking additional easing measures if it revises downward its assessment of
inflation expectations.
Thank you for your attention.
Economic Activity, Prices,
and Monetary Policy in Japan
Speech at a Meeting with Business Leaders in Kanagawa
September 6, 2018
Goushi Kataoka
Member of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan
Chart 1
Global Economic Outlook by
International Organizations
y/y % chg.
IMF OECD
2017 2018 2019 2017 2018 2019
World 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.9
Japan 1.7 1.0 0.9 1.7 1.2 1.2
United States 2.3 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.9 2.8
Euro area 2.4 2.2 1.9 2.6 2.2 2.1
Germany 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.1 2.1
Advanced
Economies
France 2.3 1.8 1.7 2.3 1.9 1.9
United Kingdom
1.7 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.4 1.3
China 6.9 6.6 6.4 6.9 6.7 6.4
Brazil 1.0 1.8 2.5 1.0 2.0 2.8
India 6.7 7.3 7.5 6.5 7.4 7.5
Emerging
Economies
Russia 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.5
Chart 2
Impact of Trade Friction on Economic Growth
(Simulation Analysis by the IMF)
Japan's Economy
Global Economy
%
%
Scenario 2
Scenario 1
Scenario 1
Scenario 3
Scenario 3
Scenario 2
Scenario 4
Scenario 4
years elapsed
years elapsed
Notes: 1. In both graphs, vertical axes show deviation of real GDP level from baseline in percent, and horizontal axes show years elapsed from the
imposition of tariffs.
2. "Scenario 1: adopted tariffs" incorporates tariffs that have already been implemented by the United States, with retaliation of equivalent size.
"Scenario 2: additional tariffs" adds to Scenario 1 an additional 10 percent tariff on US$200 billion worth of U.S. imports from China, with
retaliation of equivalent size. "Scenario 3: car tariffs" adds to Scenario 2 a 25 percent increase in tariffs on U.S. imports of vehicles, with
retaliation from all affected regions on an equivalent amount of U.S. exports. "Scenario 4: confidence shock" introduces a temporary global
shock to confidence on top of Scenario 3. It is assumed that advanced economies see risk premiums increase by 30 basis points -- about half
the increase observed during the "taper tantrum" -- around two years after the additional tariffs, while emerging economies would face a shock
that is twice as large.
Source: IMF, "G20 Surveillance Note, July 21-22, 2018."
Chart 3
Real GDP Growth
and Breakdown by Component
ann., q/q % chg.
15
Private consumption Private business fixed investment, etc.
Government spending Exports
Imports Change in inventories, etc.
10
Real GDP
5
0
-5
-10
-15
CY 13 14 15 16 17 18
CY 2013 14 15 16 17 18
Chart 4
Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices
(July 2018 Outlook Report)
medians of Policy Board members' forecasts, y/y % chg.
CPI
Real GDP (all items less
fresh food)
Fiscal 2018 +1.5 +1.1
Forecasts made in April 2018
+1.6 +1.3
Fiscal 2019 +0.8 +1.5
Forecasts made in April 2018
+0.8 +1.8
Fiscal 2020 +0.8 +1.6
Forecasts made in April 2018
+0.8 +1.8
Chart 5
Household Consumption Before and
After Consumption Tax Hikes
Consumption Before and After Tax Hikes Real Private Consumption by Type
Apr. 1996 and Apr. 2013 = 100
Apr. 2013 = 100
106
125
104.9 122.3
Tax hike in fiscal 2014 (from 5% to 8%)
Durable goods
105
Tax hike in fiscal 1997 (from 3% to 5%) 120
104.6
Non-durable goods
104
103.9
Services
115
103
110
102
106.9
106.3
101 105
100.5
103.0
100
100
99.4
99
95.8
95
98
92.8
90
97
87.7
96.8
96
85
年度
13 14 15 16 17 18
FY 1996 97 98 99 00 01 13 14 15 16 17 18
FY 2013 14 15 16 17 18
FY 2013 14 15 16 17 18
Notes: 1. The latest figures are as of June 2018.
Note: The latest figures are as of June 2001 and June 2018.
2. "Durable goods" includes household appliances and automobiles.
"Non-durable goods" includes food, beverages, and clothes.
Source: Cabinet Office, "Synthetic Consumption Index."
3. The weights in the Consumption Activity Index are 9.4 percent for
"Durable goods," 39.1 percent for "Non-durable goods," and 51.5
percent for "Services."
Source: Bank of Japan, "Consumption Activity Index."
Chart 6
Consumer Prices
Consumer Price Index Measures of Underlying Inflation
y/y % chg. % points
y/y % chg.
2.0 1.0 50
1.5
1.0 0.5
0.5
0.0 0
0.0
-0.5
-1.0 -0.5
Trimmed mean
Weighted median
CPI (all items less fresh food)
-1.5
Diffusion index (right scale)
CPI (all items less fresh food and energy)
-1.0 -50
-2.0
CY 2011 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
CY 2011 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 CY11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Note: Figures are adjusted for changes in the consumption tax rate. Note: The diffusion index is the share of increasing items minus that of
decreasing items. The share of increasing/decreasing items is the
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, "Consumer
share of items in the CPI (all items less fresh food) whose price
Price Index."
indices increased/decreased from a year earlier.
Source: Bank of Japan, "Measures of Underlying Inflation."
Chart 7
Output Gap and Inflation Expectations
Synthetic Indicators of Inflation
Output Gap
Expectations
y/y % chg.
%, % points
y/y % chg.
2.0
8 4
Firms, households, and experts (Consensus Forecasts)
5.10%
1.83% 2.09% 1.71%
Firms, households, and experts (QUICK Survey)
(1990/4Q)
(1997/1Q) (2007/4Q) (2018/1Q)
6
Firms, households, and markets (inflation swap rate)
1.5
4 2
2
1.0
0 0
-2
Labor input gap
Capital input gap
-4 -2 0.5
Output gap
-6
Reference: CPI (all items less fresh food, energy, and
consumption tax hike; right scale)
-8 -4 0.0
CY 10 2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
CY 1985 85 88 91 94 97 00 03 06 09 12 15 18
Notes: 1. The data of the output gap in the left-hand graph are the estimates as of July 4, 2018.
2. In the right-hand graph, semiannual data from the Consensus Forecasts up through 2014/Q2 are linearly interpolated. Figures for the Bank's
Opinion Survey on General Public's Views and Behavior exclude inflation expectations by respondents whose annual inflation expectations were
±5% or greater. The output prices DI in the Tankan represents the difference between the share of firms that raised prices in the preceding
three months and the share of firms that lowered prices.
3. In the right-hand graph, inflation expectations of firms are taken from the Tankan and those of households are taken from the Bank's Opinion
Survey. For experts' and markets' inflation expectations, data from the Consensus Forecasts, the QUICK Survey, and the inflation swap rate are
used as indicated by their respective lines.
Sources: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, "Consumer Price Index"; Consensus Economics Inc., "Consensus Forecasts"; QUICK, "QUICK
Monthly Market Survey (Bonds)"; Bloomberg; Bank of Japan.
Chart 8
Strengthening the Framework for Continuous
Powerful Monetary Easing
(1) Yield Curve Control
Short-term rate : minus 0.1%
Long-term rate : around 0%. The yields
Short-term rate : minus 0.1%
may move upward and downward to
some extent depending mainly on
Long-term rate : around 0%
developments in economic activity
and prices.
(2) Asset Purchases (Target Amount of Net Purchases)
ETFs : 6 tril. yen per year
ETFs : 6 tril. yen per year J-REITs : 90 bil. yen per year
The Bank may increase or decrease
J-REITs : 90 bil. yen per year
the amount of purchases depending
on market conditions.
(3) Commitment (Future Monetary Policy Commitment)
Chart 9
Inflation Momentum
(Measured by 2 Percent-Passage Probability)
1
1
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5 0.5
0.4 0.4
0.3
0.3
0.2 0.2
0.1 0.1
0 0
CY 2013
CY 1991 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 13 14 15 16 17 18
CPI (all items less fresh food)
CPI (all items less fresh food and energy)