Jean-Claude Trichet: Achieving maximum long-term growth
Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium, Panel: Setting priorities for long-term
growth, Jackson Hole, 27 August 2011.
* * *
The title of our panel today is Setting Priorities for Long-Term Growth. Given all of our recent
struggles to regain our reference growth paths, it may strike some as something of a luxury
to think about the long run; central bankers and policy makers have had to devote
unprecedented attention to higher-frequency economic developments. Many new lessons
have been learned; many policy and institutional innovations have been introduced.
The recent financial crisis has produced a large and persistent downturn in our economies; a
downturn, moreover, that threatens our long-run growth potential. It is therefore entirely
natural that policy makers do not lose sight of the prerequisites for stable sustainable growth.
This is especially so for most of the advanced economies, including the euro area,
characterized (as it has been in recent decades) by declining potential growth rates. In the
face of any economic predicament, one should ask oneself two questions - what got us here,
and what can get us out? In the wider case of sustainable growth for the euro area, what
matters is a commitment to structural reforms and sound macroeconomic policies. In the
case of the financial matters, a robust macro prudential and supervisory framework is key. I
will address both these issues in my coming remarks.
Likewise, some may consider it unusual to solicit views on matters of long-run growth from
the President of a central bank. After all, pick up just about any growth-theory textbook and
you'll find few references to inflation and fewer still to monetary policy. Monetary policy is
fundamentally viewed as neutral over the long run.
And indeed, inflation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon. Growth, in turn, is ultimately a
real one reflecting, in particular, technology, education and training, capital accumulation,
institutional quality.
Nonetheless, monetary-policy institutions can play and have played a fundamental role in
supporting long-run, sustainable growth. In many ways, I see a parallel between the theory
and practise of monetary-policy making and the shaping of modern growth analysis which
emphasises the role of sound/proper institutions.
That achieving high and sustainable growth matters, however, is easy to motivate. On the
subject of growth differences across countries, Lucas (1988) memorably wrote: The
consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are simply staggering:
Once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else.
I. What drives growth in the long run?
So let's start to think: what does drive growth in the long run? In fact, growth theory - much
like central banking - has come a long way. As everyone knows, Solow's work in the late
'50s produced two startling insights.1 First, that smooth factor substitutability could rid us of
the Harrod-Domar boom-bust cycle. This, in fact, paved the way for a proper analysis of
sustainable growth.2 His second insight was that growth was driven not only by factor
accumulation but also by technological progress.
Fundamentally, technological progress and innovation are, over the long run, the prime
drivers of economic growth and also important reasons for differences in international
economic performance, even though demographic differences are also very relevant. Higher
growth rates of technical innovation raise output and can lower the non-inflationary rate of
unemployment.
But what is technical change? Cracking open the Solovian black box of technical progress
has taken us from theories of learning-by-doing, to the impact of R&D on product variety and
quality. The latter theories being underpinned by Paul Romer's reflection on the fact that
ideas are fundamentally non rival.3 This concept, by the way, was not really new. The famous
letter of Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson expressed it very clearly in 1813.4 The
bottom line in all of this is that knowledge spillover between open, dynamic economies could
benefit everyone. Not surprisingly, these new developments in growth theory came replete
with policy prescriptions.
A more recent but allied literature suggested the following: how close an economy is to the
technological frontier and whether its institutions facilitate convergence to that frontier are
vital considerations.5 In effect, a laggard country gains by implementing (or jumping to)
frontier technologies.6] But an economy near the frontier - or with an appetite to define that
frontier - should increasingly favour innovation over imitation.
Like many close to European policy7, I find this an attractive framework. Indeed, following
World War II, the European economies were remarkably catching up in productivity and
technological terms and today are leaders in many fields, in particular as concerns the
embedding of technological innovation in manufacturing processes.8 Yet, there is still an
enormous potential to tap, to reform our economies and boost their growth potential and job
creation.9
II. Growth patterns in the euro area and us
Debates about the US versus the euro area have become common place in recent years. To
my mind, though, such debates often fall short of a careful, nuanced analysis required. Some
international comparisons are indeed informative and yield important insights. Others - given
lack of harmonized data, data concept or data unit - are more suspect. The crisis, though,
has taught us that growth is only meaningful if it is sustainable and balanced. Growth that is
not sustainable but follows boom-bust cycles, carries enormous costs in terms of economic
well-being. These costs go far beyond pure GDP numbers; the deepest of these costs is that
they, in some cases, put a strain on the fabric of our societies. For that reason alone,
2
For contemporary discussions see La Grandville (2009), Klump et al. (2007 a, b).
3
Romer (1990).
4
"... He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his
taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely spread from one to another over
the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been
peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature ...", Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson,
13th August 1813.
5
Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006).
6
This is the so-called advantage of backwardness, Gerschenkron (1962).
7
Sapir et al. (2003), Kok (2004).
8
Gomez-Salvador et al. (2006).
9
See for example, the discussion in Sondermann (2011).
sustainability is a key qualification to associate to growth. The second key term is the
balance of growth, both in domestic and external terms. Domestically balanced growth
implies a broadly acceptable distribution of economic well-being within societies in terms of
income and wealth as well as the avoidance of misalignments especially of asset prices; and
externally balanced implies the need to avoid excessive international disequilibria.
Since the introduction of the single currency in 1999, the euro area has experienced a
per-capita growth rate that, at around 1% a year, is comparable to that in the United States
(1.1%). This is the first fact that is often overlooked in international comparisons. In such
comparisons, we often look at headline growth numbers; yet, demographics are very
different. Adjusted for population growth, there has been virtually no difference between US
and euro area growth over the first decade since the introduction of the single currency. The
euro area, though, has created more jobs: 14 million compared with 8 million in the US.
Further, over recent decades differences in country and state dispersion rates of growth and
inflation in the euro area and US are remarkably similar. On employment, moreover, it will be
interesting to compare our different evolutions in the coming years. What we all want to avoid
is excessively volatile employment where human capital is all too easily lost and inequality
deepens.
shows a detailed comparison of the euro area with the US over recent decades. This
Table 1
makes the standard growth accounting of contributions into employment and labour
productivity. Labour productivity itself can be further decomposed into changes in labour
composition, Information and Communication technologies (ICT) and non-ICT usage per
hour and (residual) TFP growth. The interest in the distinction between ICT and non-ICT
reflects recent evidence that the ICT sector has been strongest where most growth has
emerged across the world economy.
Looking over the contributions, we note a significant difference in labour productivity (1.7 for
EU13 vs. 2.9 for US). The main drivers in this comparison of labour productivity are ICT
capital services per hour (0.4 vs. 1.0) and, perhaps more significantly from our standpoint,
economy-wide TFP (0.5 vs. 1.1). Although having said that, there turns out to be quite some
heterogeneity among countries.
Moreover, see Table 2 analysing the sectoral decomposition of TFP growth. TFP in the
production of goods is slightly larger in the euro area than in the US. Rather, the higher
overall TFP growth in the US is driven by stronger TFP growth in services, in particular in
distributive trade (0.2 vs 0.5).10 Although, in passing, we should remember that productivity
and technical improvements in Services are plagued by measurement difficulties.
But of course TFP numbers always represent a rough metric.11 The TFP residual will be
contaminated by measurement errors, erroneous assumptions about market structure, or the
nature and existence of the aggregative production function. The residual will also be a
catch-all of neglected factor utilization, factor quality improvements over time, statistical
complications associated in calculating factor rewards (appropriate tax and depreciation
allowance for capital income etc).
But the wider perspective is: (1) the services and distributive sector is now a dominant and
growing part of the euro area economy's output (around 60%) and employment share; (2) the
Service sector typically more regulated and thus less flexible to changes and open to
innovation12 although certainly recently there has been progress in the deregulation of
network industries and progress through the new Services directive; (3) evidence is mixed
but the Service sector in general is often thought to have inherently lower productivity and
employment generation mechanisms relative to the more open manufacturing sector.
III. Diversity within the United States and the euro area
Allow me, next, to take a closer look at the developments both across US states and euro
area Member States.
For the euro area it is very common to look at the level of its constituent countries and focus
on the diversity among individual states, because a number of economic policy choices that
affect productivity are national.
For the US, this exercise is rarely done. It is often conjectured that relevant policies are
federal, and therefore by definition uniform at the level of the federation; and that, as a
consequence, differences at the state level play much less a role. In essence, it is therefore
often assumed that the US economy would be significantly more homogeneous than the
economy of the euro area.
Looking more closely at the regional dispersion across US regions and euro area economies
does not confirm this. In fact, the dispersion of many of the key indicators is surprisingly
similar.
Let me share with you some findings from our analysis that we started some months ago and
begin with inflation.13 Before the crisis, the dispersion of HICP inflation in euro area countries
had remained broadly stable since the late 1990s, at a level similar to the 14 US Metropolitan
Statistical Areas.14 During the crisis we saw a temporary increase in inflation dispersion in the
euro area but this has been reversed over the past 12 months. (Chart 1.)
The picture is similar for the dispersion of GDP growth. Before the crisis the dispersion of
growth rates was around 2%, in both the euro area and the United States. Dispersion rose
somewhat during the crisis in both currency areas but remained broadly in line with pre-crisis
patterns overall.15 (Chart 2.)
Going one step further, investigation of the sources of this growth dispersion in the US and
euro area economies reveals parallels even in the root causes of dispersion in economic
performance and productivity. On the one hand, both currency areas comprise regions that
experienced a significant boom and bust cycle over the past decade. On the other hand, both
also contain regions that are facing significant structural challenges of a more long-term
nature.
In the United States, for example, Nevada, Arizona, Florida and California experienced
increases in house prices that outpaced the national average by a wide margin. The steep
house price increases accompanied above average growth in these states. This could
probably be explained, at least in part, by the impulse that these states received from the
housing-related sectors such as construction, which saw its share in terms of value added
increase at the national level during the years of the housing boom. In the crisis, the sharp
fall in house prices in Florida and the south-western US states turned boom into bust. These
states experienced the harshest recession among the US states.16
Similarly, in the euro area some countries experienced asymmetric boom-and-bust cycles.
Several euro area countries had higher than average growth in the pre-crisis years. In Ireland
and Spain particularly, strong growth was accompanied by strong increases in housing
prices.
At the same time, other US states, particularly the former manufacturing powerhouses in the
"Great Lakes" region, have seen a long episode of below average growth. Below average
performance of the region - and particularly weaker growth rates in the states of Michigan
and Ohio - are related to strong reliance on manufacturing. Structural shifts in the
US economy towards services have gradually reduced the value added of manufacturing
relative to GDP, with implications for areas with a high concentration of companies in
manufacturing industries other than information and communications technology. During the
crisis, GDP growth in the "Great Lakes" region, which was below average before the crisis,
remained below average.
Similarly, other countries in Europe - Portugal, for example - have experienced growth
persistently below the euro area average for the past decade due to structural rigidities that
are now being addressed.
Just a few years ago, the low-growth group of countries included Germany - labelled the
"sick man of Europe" at that time. Yet Germany is now an example of how big the dividends
of reform can be if structural adjustment is made a strategic priority and implemented with
sufficient patience.
The effect of the crisis on the different euro area economies follows a similar pattern to those
of comparable US states. The countries in the euro area that have been hit hardest are those
in which either large asset-bubble driven imbalances unwound or structural problems were
left unaddressed before the crisis. Those countries that have yet to implement more far
reaching structural reforms also have relatively low growth prospects after the crisis. These
relatively low growth rates are linked to a deterioration of competitiveness, driven, for
example, by persistent above average unit labour costs.
Precisely as regards the evolution of unit labour costs, that are so important for growth,
dispersion both ahead of the crisis and during the crisis was quite similar in the euro area
and the United States. (Chart 3.)
At the same time, it is worth noting that both currency areas include regions with persistently
above or below average unit labour cost growth. Again leaving aside the countries to join the
euro area most recently, here, Greece, Portugal and Ireland, in particular, had progressively
lost competitiveness vis-à-vis their main trading partners in the euro area. They are now
engaging in catching-up, adjustment strategies. Germany, which had lost competitiveness in
the reunification process, by contrast, has been able to restore this competitiveness over the
same period of time. (Chart 4.)
Similar persistent losses and gains in unit labour costs are also observed in the United
States. Taking a look at the upper and lower bound of the spectrum of US states over the
same period as the euro area reveals that some states have experienced large or persistent
increases in unit labour costs, currently exceeding the national average by as much as 20%.
Other states have been improving their labour cost competitiveness vis-à-vis the national
average over the past decade. (Charts 5, 6 and 7.) In summary, there are strong indications
that economic diversity in the euro area and the United States has not been significantly very
different over the past 12 years.
The observation that very large, continental economies of the size of the US or of Europe are
probably necessarily diverse should not be reason for complacency. The fact that advanced
economies of the size of more than 300 million people have a tendency to be significantly
diverse calls for a solid economic governance framework and explains why the ECB
Governing Council has been so vocal in this ground since the inception of the euro area.
And this inherent diversity of advanced economies of large size is an additional reason to
resolutely engage in the structural reforms that would permit to accelerate the completion of
the European single market in all sectors, and to enhance the growth potential of each
individual European economy and of the euro area as a whole.
IV. Setting priorities for long-run growth
Let us get back to our central theme - Setting Priorities for Long-Run Growth. Let me make
some suggestions - three to be precise. A first, and overwhelming, priority - notably for the
euro area - is the vigorous implementation of A second, but by no
structural reforms.
means unrelated priority, is the continued attention to external and internal imbalances. A
final priority is greater flexibility on the part of policy institutions. Let's take them one by one,
with a particular emphasis on the euro area.
First, structural reforms. We earlier noted the primacy of institutions in modern growth
theory. Sound institutions are essential to encourage a flexible, cutting-edge,
knowledgebased economy. There is substantial evidence from industry-level studies on regulation as
well from firm-level studies on the dynamics of firm performance that confirm the need for
such a conducive environment to generate productivity growth.17
Douglas North defined institutions as ... the rules of the game in a society ... the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction.18 And being "humanly devised constraints"
(rather than exogenous geographical or climactic constraints), their major impact was
through the setting of incentives.19
And one can see the remaining challenges for many advanced economies as follows:

Employment regulation needs to help more proactively outsiders, low-skilled, young
and older workers.

In Europe, the single market needs to be advanced especially in the area of
services.20
 Tax, benefit and pensions systems should not discourage labour participation and
create weak incentives for investment and innovation.
 The distribution of wealth and general economic well-being needs to ensure some
acceptable social balance.
Several remedial policy proposals have been suggested and implemented in the recent past.
The most well known is the European Council's Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs,
followed by the Europe 2020 Strategy.21 The latter is the Agenda that the European Union
and its Member States have decided to help Europe recover from the crisis and come out
stronger, both internally and at the international level.22 The Agenda sets targets for the
European Union in 2020 in terms of employment, research and development, energy and
education.
The Agenda puts particular emphasis on structural reforms in the labour and services
markets. These two markets are still over-regulated and not directly subject, given their
largely non-tradable dimension, to the competitive forces originating from within and outside
the single markets.23 At the EU-level, the necessity and shape of structural reforms is
acknowledged, but the gap between awareness and implementation is far from closed.
That said, we would do well to understand why political systems abide distortionary,
inefficient structures and resist more efficient alternatives. Do structural reforms imply a
J-curve of long-run gain but short run pain that sits ill with the decision making process in our
democracies? Do vested interests strategically and systematically block change?
A second priority is I spoke at the last Jackson Hole
vigilance against imbalances.
symposium of the risks of chronic global imbalances and costs involved in unravelling the
excessive private leverage, unsustainable fiscal and trade positions. Establishing more
reasonable borrowing, restructuring and strengthening the balance sheets of firms,
households and governments in an orderly manner remain key to smooth and continuous
global growth. In all this, central banks are not immune. Tensions in financial markets and
severe global imbalances deepen uncertainty and, therefore, profoundly challenge
monetarypolicy setting.
Precisely these dangers underpin the Mutual Assessment Process of the G20 framework.
The indicative indicators - agreed in February this year - identify imbalances in public,
private and external positions as the key culprits preventing balanced global growth, and a
key input in shaping corrective policies. Seen in that light, a country's economic success
should be judged also on these indicators and not only on its last few years' growth figures.
However, another imbalance - which has gained currency following the financial turbulence -
income
is imbalances. Naturally, extremes of income inequality and restricted opportunity
challenge our values and strain the fabric of our societies.
In short, growth skewed towards the few (or absent for a large minority) risks social tensions,
undermines institutions and encourages policy failures of one kind or another. Structural
reforms, particularly in the form of re-training, improving job matching, providing flexibility and
incentive for job creation and innovation remain the best policy options for encouraging
wellbalanced growth, and an environment of low and credible inflation the best environment to
encourage matters from a central-banking perspective.
Finally, a priority for medium and long-run growth is that our policy institutions remain
We have seen in recent years the near-Knightian
attuned to an ever-changing landscape.
uncertainty policy makers endured and how boldly they responded. The ECB was among the
first central banks to react to the outbreak of the financial turmoil in August 2007 in providing
liquidity to distressed institutions. Another example of flexibility by ourselves and in the wider
central banking community is in the swap agreements with other central banks as an
example of internationally co-ordinated means of swiftly responding to the crisis.
Since then, we acted with what I have previously (here in Jackson Hole) called "credible
alertness".24 This includes implementing both non-standard monetary policies and our
interest rate policy. Interest rate policy depends on the outlook for price stability. The use of
non-standard measures depends on the functioning of the monetary policy transmission and
must be commensurate with the level of malfunctioning or disruption of money and financial
markets and segments of markets. Our non-standard measures do not in any way impinge
upon our capacity to design our monetary policy stance to deliver price stability in the
medium term.
Despite all the ups and down of recent years, our key challenge remains as it has always
been: to create strong, sustainable, balanced, non-inflationary growth. Credibility and the
medium-term orientation in monetary policy allows, where needed, scope and flexibility to
address various types of severe shocks. Over the long-term a commitment to price stability
anchors expectations, improves the workings of the price mechanism, reduces transaction
costs, protects savers and reduces uncertainty. This is what I meant at the outset when I said
that the theory and practice of monetary policy making paralleled developments in growth
theory - namely, both are now seen to hinge on institutional quality.
V. Conclusions
Let me conclude. Ultimately growth is driven by technical progress. This is especially
important where there are limiting demographic factors. In the euro area, there is ample of
scope to realize efficiency gains from existing and prospective technological changes given
structural reforms and more vigilant implementation of the existing policy agenda. The
remarkable resilience of the German labour market in the last few years25, where wage
moderation and flexible time accounting shielded the economy from excessive job
destruction, illustrates admirably the promise of well-structured reforms.
Although there have been improvements in the euro area in recent years, there is still
evidence of regulatory and market-based barriers to entry in selected professions which have
to be actively corrected.
Structural reforms - re-training, improving job matching, providing flexibility and incentives for
job creation and innovation - remain the best policy options for encouraging well-balanced
growth, and an environment of low and credible inflation the best environment to encourage
matters from a central-banking perspective.
Likewise, alertness against savings and trade imbalances across the global economy is a
fundamental concern. Such imbalances - if unchecked or conveniently rationalized away -
make our entire, inter-connected economies more fragile and more risk prone. We have seen
how rapidly negative financial impulses can transmit through the global economy and pull
down economic activity. Alertness means alertness. I have learned whilst discussing global
imbalances and financial transmission channels - much of it done here at Jackson Hole -
that appropriate improvements in regulation and multilateral surveillance frameworks can
yield large gains. We should work hard to maintain momentum.
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