COVID-19 and the
Reserve Bank's Balance Sheet
A speech delivered to 2020 KangaNews New Zealand Capital Markets Forum in Wellington
On 20 August 2020
By Christian Hawkesby, Assistant Governor1
General Manager, Economics, Financial Markets and Banking Group
Chair, Assets and Liabilities Committee
Introduction
E nga mana, e nga reo. E nga karanga maha o te wa.
Tēnā koutou katoa.
It is great to be able to participate in this conference that was originally scheduled for late February,
albeit still remotely due to COVID-19 restrictions.
The last time I spoke to a financial markets audience in person was in late-January at a conference in
Sydney. I recall being struck at the time that I had never seen a conference organiser so happy to see
me arrive at a venue. Turns out it was nothing personal. All the rest of the keynote speakers were
part of a world tour and had got stuck in Hong Kong in self-isolation. Travelling from Wellington, I
was the only one that had made it in person.
In my mind, that was a moment when COVID-19 became something very real and tangible,
spreading to our part of the globe. Of course, the world has changed remarkably since late January
in response to this global health crisis. One of those ways is that the Reserve Bank's balance sheet
has increased from around $25 billion to $60 billion (Figure 1), and growing.
Figure 1: Size of the RBNZ Balance Sheet
NZDbn NZDbn
60 60
Thousands
50 50
40 40
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
For a long time, the Reserve Bank has been seen primarily as an institution that makes
announcements on interest rates every six weeks.
However, periods like the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and COVID-19 serve as stark reminders that
we are ultimately a bank - the bank to the banking system and the bank to the Crown (the New
Zealand Government).
In recent years, we have used the story of Tāne Mahuta to illustrate to the general public this
broader perspective of the role of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand - Te Pūtea Matua -in the
financial system.2 Just as Tāne Mahuta is part of the forest and the guardian - kaitiaki - of that
forest, the Reserve Bank is both a part of the financial ecosystem and kaitiaki.
Figure 2: Tāne Mahuta
Last month, my colleague, Geoff Bascand, spoke about the Reserve Bank's role as the regulator and
supervisor of the financial system, the actions taken during COVID-19, and the agenda ahead.3 The
branches and leaves and roots of Tāne Mahuta.
Today, I would like to focus on how we have utilised our balance sheet flexibility to support the
economy and financial system throughout COVID-19. That is, the roots, sap and vascular system of
Tāne Mahuta. Specifically, I will:
 describe what the Reserve Bank's balance sheet looks like;
 outline our approach to managing it before COVID-19;
 explain our actions taken through the crisis; and
 share some reflections on that experience and the way ahead.
While I am also a member of our Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), I am speaking mostly as the
chair of our Assets and Liabilities Committee (ALCO), responsible for the internal governance of our
balance sheet. While the MPC sets monetary policy, our ALCO oversees its implementation and our
activities in financial markets.
There are two key messages that I want to leave you with today about our role as a central bank.
 First, our goal is not to maximise our profits or dividend from the activities on our balance
sheet. We use our balance sheet to achieve our ultimate policy objectives of monetary and
financial stability. In an environment where the Official Cash Rate (OCR) is nearing its lower
bound, the size and composition of our balance sheet will inevitably become a more active
tool, particularly for our monetary policy decisions.
 Equally, it is not our goal to minimise financial risk on our balance sheet. Rather, our
approach is to manage risk within a clear risk appetite framework, across the dimensions of
operational, legal, financial, and reputational risk. In environments like the GFC or COVID-19,
central banks need to take financial risks to succeed in achieving their objectives for
monetary and financial stability. But these risks need to be very well-understood,
wellexplained, and managed on a no surprises basis.
Balance Sheet Pre-COVID-19
To appreciate the fundamental changes that happened to our balance sheet during COVID-19, it is
useful to first touch on what it looked like before the crisis.
Like any bank, our liabilities include deposits and our assets are a combination of loans, bonds and
other assets.
Liabilities
The Reserve Bank's liabilities predominantly consist of three core parts, which line up with three key
roles that the Reserve Bank plays in the financial system: the sole issuer of currency, the bank for the
banking system, and banker to the Crown.
i) Currency in circulation
The Reserve Bank has the trusted position of being the sole supplier of legal tender New Zealand
dollar banknotes and coins. Currency is a liability on our balance sheet because it acts as an IOU
from the Reserve Bank to the holder. Banks that hold physical currency can return it in exchange for
a deposit in their account at the Reserve Bank. This liability is the sum of the 'physical cash' on issue.
Before COVID-19, currency in circulation was around $7 billion.
ii) Settlement accounts
As the bank to the banking system, we hold deposits from settlement banks. Settlement balances in
these accounts are a liability as banks can draw on this cash to make inter-bank payments to each
other through a trusted intermediary - the Reserve Bank. There are currently 13 settlement banks in
New Zealand out of the 27 banks registered here.4 These deposits with us can be thought of as
'electronic money' rather than physical currency. These settlement accounts cannot be overdrawn.
Before COVID-19, there was typically $7 billion-$8 billion in aggregate across these settlement
accounts, to facilitate the smooth functioning of the money market and interbank payments.
iii) Crown settlement account
Lastly, we act as the banker for the New Zealand Government. Like a normal bank, the Government
can deposit surplus funds in their bank account with us, their Crown Settlement Account (CSA). It
creates a liability on our balance sheet as it is money the Government can draw on. When the
Government receives taxes, or sells a bond or bill, it produces an inflow into its bank account.
Conversely, payments of welfare benefits, interest on Government bonds or repaying the principal
of a bond as it matures, produces outflows from the CSA. Before COVID-19, the CSA typically had a
positive balance up to $6 billion to manage the Crown's cash flows.There was an overdraft facility
available up to $5 billion, which has primarily been used by the Crown under normal circumstances
to help manage very short-term mismatches created by large Crown cash flows, such as around a
bond maturity.
Liquidity management and other assets
Before COVID-19, the asset side of our balance sheet consisted of two main categories to achieve
our policy objectives.
i) Liquidity management and monetary policy implementation
The first was liquidity management, where we were a net lender to actively influence conditions in
money markets, to ensure that overnight interest rates in the market traded near the OCR set by the
5
MPC. In short, from 1999 the Reserve Bank operated a type of "corridor system" to implement
monetary policy.6
Banks received the OCR on their settlement balances with us, up to a certain amount. If they held
balances above this level, they received OCR less a penalty rate. Similarly, if banks found themselves
with insufficient balances at the end of the day, they could borrow from us but at OCR plus a penalty
rate. By ensuring it was costly for a bank to have insufficient cash and also offering a poor return if
settlement balances were too high, it incentivised banks to manage their balances carefully. It also
encouraged borrowing or lending in the inter-bank market.
The main role for the Reserve Bank in this framework was to be a net lender into short-term money
markets to ensure there was enough settlement balances in aggregate in the system so that banks
could collectively operate within this corridor, where there wasn't too little or too much liquidity.
An important feature of the amount of aggregate settlement balances - electronic central bank
money - is that, alongside physical currency, it is a closed system. That is, one bank can reduce its
settlement balance by paying another bank, but this only shifts the balance within the system, it
doesn't reduce the amount of settlement balances in total. The only way that the amount of
aggregate settlement balances can change is through payments to or from the Crown or the Reserve
Bank, who are outside the system.
Therefore, the main role of our domestic market operations team before COVID-19 was to forecast
the Government's cash flows in and out of the CSA and look to offset the impact of those flows with
our Open Market Operations (OMOs) in money markets, injecting or withdrawing liquidity.
The tools we used to inject liquidity were reverse repurchase agreements (reverse repos) and
foreign exchange swaps (FX swaps). These feature as assets on our balance sheet. The tools we used
to withdraw liquidity were repurchase agreements (repos) and issuing Reserve Bank Bills. These
feature as liabilities on our balance sheet.
Before COVID-19, lending via FX swaps was the largest asset held by the Reserve Bank for liquidity
management purposes, with around $7 billion outstanding.
We also typically held around $3 billion of NZ Government Bonds on our balance sheet before
COVID-19. These assets gave us the capability to withdraw liquidity via our repos. They were also
available to lend to banks, thereby helping to avoid settlement failures if a bond became scarce in
the secondary market. In addition, when a specific NZ Government Bond was within a year of
maturity, we would typically start a repurchase programme to increase our holdings of that issue to
help smooth out the impact of a large maturity on settlement balances.
ii) Foreign reserve management
Finally, we hold foreign currency assets, made up largely of liquid US, European and Japanese
government bonds. Around 70 percent of these foreign assets are hedged against foreign exchange
risk. These provide the capability to intervene in the foreign exchange market in response to
disorderly conditions. Varying the size of our foreign exchange position also provide a tool to
manage the level of the NZ dollar exchange rate if it was deemed exceptionally high or low,
unjustified, consistent with MPC's Remit and the timing was opportune.7
Before COVID-19, we typically held around $12 billion in foreign currency reserves.
In summary, Figure 3 brings together how the Reserve Bank's balance sheet was structured at the
end of 2019 - back in the days where the OCR was our primary monetary policy tool and the balance
sheet was smaller and less dynamic.
Figure 3: Balance Sheet Pre-COVID-19
Dec-19 Dec-19
Assets (NZ$ million) Liabilities (NZ$ million)
NZ Government Bonds 3,760 Notes and coins in circulation 7,557
Foreign Reserve Management assets 12,383 Crown settlement account 3,048
Foreign Investment Assets using FX
7,302 Bank settlement accounts 7,493
Swaps proceeds
Reverse repurchases 600 Reserve Bank bills 1,225
Other assets 554 Repurchase agreements -
Other liabilities 2,524
Equity 2,752
Total 24,599 Total 24,599
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand
7
For a detailed explanation, see Eckhold and Hunt (2005).
Balance Sheet with COVID-19
Conditions in global economies and financial markets deteriorated dramatically through February
and early March.
On 16 March, after an extraordinary meeting the MPC decided to provide further monetary stimulus
and cut the OCR by 75 basis points to 0.25 percent, and indicated that a Large Scale Asset Purchase
(LSAP) programme of NZ Government Bonds would be the next tool deployed if required.8
It is hard to overstate the strain on global markets through this period.
Unlike many past crises caused by a vulnerability within the financial system, this was foremost a
health crisis. This made it particularly hard for financial markets to judge how quickly or how widely
COVID-19 would spread, the policy response, and the combined impact on economies. Equity
markets experienced some of the largest daily falls of all-time (Figure 4a). Credit spreads widened
sharply and government bond yields were also extremely volatile (Figure 4b). In response, liquidity in
many secondary markets dried up as intermediaries withdrew to limit their risk. Internationally,
financial markets were becoming dysfunctional.
Figure 4a: Largest daily falls of the S&P500
% Change
-25% -20% -15% -10% -5% 0%
19-Oct-1987
28-Oct-1929
16-Mar-2020
29-Oct-1929
6-Nov-1929
12-Mar-2020
18-Oct-1937
15-Oct-2008
1-Dec-2008
GFC
COVID-19
20-Jul-1933
-25% -20% -15% -10% -5% 0%
Source: Bloomberg and Reserve Bank of New Zealand
8
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2020e): OCR reduced to 0.25 percent for next 12 months.
Figure 4b: Equity and Bond Market Implied Volatility
Index Index
90 300
VIX Index MOVE Index (RHS)
80
250
70
60 200
50
150
40
30 100
20
50
10
0 0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Source: Bloomberg and Reserve Bank of New Zealand
Note: The VIX Index measures the expected volatility of the S&P 500. The MOVE Index measures the volatility
of interest rates on US Treasury bonds.
Asset side of our balance sheet
To continue to achieve our policy objectives, these conditions led us to take a number of actions
across New Zealand's money markets, term lending market, government bond market, and
corporate bond market that fundamentally transformed our balance sheet.
NZ dollar money markets
Our initial and primary concerns were around New Zealand's money markets.
The FX swap market had become extremely stressed. The global dash for US dollar liquidity had
influenced our local money markets through its impact on the FX swap market. Pressure had begun
to build in February, and by March the implied interest rates to borrow NZ dollars in the FX swap
market were rising rapidly (Figure 5). Despite cutting the OCR to 0.25 percent, the implied NZ dollar
interest rates had risen to nearly 2 percent to borrow for one week and had spiked to around 20
percent to borrow overnight. This was spilling over into the bank bill market and other indicators of
short-term wholesale funding costs in New Zealand money markets.
Figure 5: New Zealand Money Market Rates
% %
2.0 2.0
1.5 1.5
1.0 1.0
0.5 0.5
0.0 0.0
-0.5 -0.5
1 week FX Swap Implied Rate OCR 90-day Bank Bill
-1.0 -1.0
Aug-19 Sep-19 Oct-19 Nov-19 Dec-19 Jan-20 Feb-20 Mar-20 Apr-20 May-20 Jun-20 Jul-20
Source: Bloomberg and Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Given the crucial role that the FX swaps market played as our primary tool for managing NZ dollar
liquidity, we started lending in scale into this market in an attempt to lower these implied borrowing
rates, and then drained excess liquidity using other tools to offset the impact on settlement
balances. However, this was only having a marginal effect in stabilising interest rates.
As a result, on 20 March, we announced a decision to lend at a much larger scale and not drain the
impact on settlement cash.9
This was a fundamental decision in our crisis response. It marked the end of a target for settlement
balances and discarded the 'corridor system'. The penalty rate on excess deposits in settlement
accounts was removed, moving us to a so-called 'floor system'. All settlement balances would be
remunerated at the OCR. This gave us a much better chance to anchor short-term money market
rates near the OCR.
This decision resulted in a dramatic expansion of our balance sheet. Within a week, our lending in
the FX swaps market in maturities from overnight to six months rose to $20 billion, contributing to
the amount of settlement cash in the system quickly rising from $8 billion to over $30 billion.
New Zealand dollar bank term funding
Longer-term funding for banks remained a key consideration through this period.
While we had confidence that the New Zealand banking system was well-funded for many months
ahead, globally the primary issuance market had ground to a halt, creating uncertainty about when
this channel of funding would reopen. As a result, we launched a number of facilities to ensure that
banks were confident they could access term funding to continuing supporting their retail,
corporate, and business customers.
 On 20 March, we announced the Term Auction Facility (TAF), offering regular access to
collateralised loans for 3, 6, and 12 month terms.10
 On 30 March, we launched the Corporate Open Market Operation (COMO), designed to
11
support the functioning of the corporate paper market.
 On 2 April, we introduced the Term Lending Facility (TLF), to provide banks funding for up to
three years based on lending to businesses under the Government's Business Finance
Guarantee Scheme (BFGS). The BFGS offered a partial Government guarantee on loans
12
banks made to eligible small and medium-sized businesses.
While none of these facilities have been drawn on in significant size to date, they are an important
part of stabilising market conditions by providing an assurance that we were willing to provide term
funding options for the banking system to access.
New Zealand Government Bonds
Through this period, government bond markets were also becoming strained globally.
A combination of factors were at play locally. Government borrowing requirements were increasing
rapidly, as the Government announced a large fiscal package as a policy response to COVID-19. At
the same time, many fund managers and global investors were looking to liquidate holdings of NZ
Government Bonds as a precaution against client redemptions in other asset classes. Crucially,
intermediaries such as bank dealers were also beginning to withdraw their services, to reduce their
risk as volatility rose.
Bid-offer spreads on government bonds are one measure of market liquidity (Figure 6).13 While
these rose dramatically through this period, they understated the problem. In practice, holders of
Government bonds could not find an intermediary to provide a bid, for even small parcels of NZ
Government Bonds with only a few months left until maturity. The secondary market had become
almost completely illiquid.
Figure 6: Bid-offer spreads on NZ Government Bonds
bps LSAP Announcement
bps
16 16
NZGB 2-year
14 14
NZGB 10-year
12 12
10 10
8 8
6 6
4 4
2 2
0 0
1-Jan-2020 1-Feb-2020 1-Mar-2020 1-Apr-2020 1-May-2020 1-Jun-2020 1-Jul-2020 1-Aug-2020
Source: Bloomberg and Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
There were three main measures we took in response to assist market functioning.

First, we increased our early repurchases of maturing government bonds. We already had a
programme in place to repurchase early the NZ Government Bond due to mature on 15 June
2020. On 30 March, we extended this programme to also include the NZ Government Bond
maturing on 15 May 2021, beyond a year to maturity.14 This provided an additional avenue
for dealers to reduce their inventories, and freed up their ability to intermediate other flows
in the market.

We also announced our willingness to support liquidity in the secondary market for NZ
Government Bonds,15 implementing a separate Bond Market Liquidity Support (BMLS)
scheme. This involved us placing bids for NZ Government Bonds in the wholesale broker
market in conventional sized parcels of $5 million to $20 million, where no other bids were
being offered by market participants. This small-scale intervention was designed to provide
the market with confidence there was as a bidder of last resort, and enable price
transparency in a market that had become illiquid and opaque.
 On 25 March following an extraordinary meeting, the MPC decided that the Reserve Bank
would undertake a LSAP programme of up to $30 billion of NZ Government Bonds, to
provide monetary stimulus by lowering interest rates across the yield curve.16 Operational
decision-making around the implementation of purchases was delegated to staff in the
Financial Markets Department. This allowed us to purchase larger amounts initially, both to
keep yields low and to support market functioning by introducing a buyer in large scale
across the yield curve. The size of this LSAP programme was increased at subsequent
Monetary Policy Statements. By early August, our holdings of NZ Government Bonds had
risen to over $20 billion.
The combination of these actions helped restore market functioning and contributed to the yield
curve of NZ Government Bonds becoming lower and flatter (Figure 7), consistent with the MPC's
immediate objective of softening the blow from COVID-19 on the New Zealand economy.
Figure 7: New Zealand Government Bond yield curve
% %
2.5 2.5
3-Jan-20
20-Mar-20
2.0 2.0
5-Aug-20
1.5 1.5
1.0 1.0
0.5 0.5
0.0 0.0
2021 2023 2024 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2037 2041
Maturity
Source: Bloomberg and Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
New Zealand dollar corporate bonds
Finally, despite our actions in other interest rate markets, by early April the NZ dollar corporate bond
market was becoming increasingly dysfunctional.
As had occurred earlier in the NZ Government Bond market, given heightened uncertainty and
volatility, intermediaries were withdrawing from the secondary market, resulting in a lack of bids, a
widening of spreads, and an absence of price transparency.
We had a particular concern about the lack of liquidity in bonds issued by the NZ Local Government
Funding Agency (LGFA), which was the largest and most liquid issuer of non-government bonds in
normal times, and a key benchmark for other issuers in the NZ dollar corporate bond market. A
continued absence of secondary market liquidity was creating a real risk that primary issuance in
New Zealand's debt capital market - a key channel of monetary policy - could be closed for a
prolonged period.
On 6 April, LGFA bonds were added to our BMLS scheme, and we began asking wholesale market
17
intermediaries for offers to sell LGFA in conventional sized parcels of $5m to $20m. On 7 April,
following another extraordinary MPC meeting, LGFA bonds were also added to the LSAP
18
programme, enabling purchases up to $3 billion. In May this was reformulated as a cap of up to 30
percent of LGFA bonds on issue.
These actions saw benefits across the NZ credit market, even to issuers not included in the BMLS or
LSAP programmes. The corporate bond spreads of LGFA and other issuers narrowed (Figure 8a and
8b), secondary market liquidity returned to more normal conditions, and primary issuance has been
undertaken by both the LGFA and some other non-government issuers.
Figure 8a: LGFA and Kāinga Ora spreads to NZ Government Bonds
%
% LGFA LSAP Announcement
LSAP Announcement
1.0 1.0
0.9 0.9
2025 LGFA spread
2025 Kāinga Ora spread
0.8 0.8
0.7 0.7
0.6 0.6
0.5 0.5
0.4 0.4
0.3 0.3
0.2 0.2
0.1 0.1
0.0 0.0
1-Jan-2020 1-Feb-2020 1-Mar-2020 1-Apr-2020 1-May-2020 1-Jun-2020 1-Jul-2020 1-Aug-2020
Source: Bloomberg and Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
17
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2020f): Offer to purchase Local Government Funding Agency bonds.
18
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2020l): Reserve Bank to extend Large Scale Asset Purchases.
Figure 8b: Bank spreads to NZ Government Bonds
% %
LGFA LSAP Announcement
LSAP Announcement
1.8 1.8
2024 ANZ spread
2024 ASB spread
1.6 1.6
2023 BNZ spread
2024 Westpac spread
1.4 1.4
1.2 1.2
1.0 1.0
0.8 0.8
0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4
0.2 0.2
0.0 0.0
1-Jan-2020 1-Feb-2020 1-Mar-2020 1-Apr-2020 1-May-2020 1-Jun-2020 1-Jul-2020 1-Aug-2020
Source: Bloomberg and Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Liabilities
The rapid expansion of assets on our balance sheet was matched by an equally fundamental change
in the size and composition of our liabilities.
Crown Settlement Account
It was an unprecedented time for the management of Crown liquidity through the CSA.
The largest immediate pressure was the Government's Wage Subsidy scheme that has paid out over
$13 billion to date. From the start of Alert Level 4 lockdown in March, this involved upfront
payments of three months' worth of subsidy covering around half of New Zealand's labour force.
At the end of March, we agreed with New Zealand Debt Management to temporarily increase the
overdraft facility on the CSA from $5 billion to $10 billion for three months. This was designed to
assist the Crown in managing significantly higher short-term uncertainty around fiscal flows and to
afford the Crown more flexibility in its design and implementation of funding activity, as well as any
associated NZ Government Bond issuance.
The CSA went briefly into overdraft in mid-April. Since then the balance in the CSA has grown
steadily as the Government has raised funds through its weekly bond and T-bill tender programmes
and large syndications of new bond issues. It has also been assisted by better-than-forecast fiscal
outcomes in the near-term. At the end of July the CSA balance had grown to $18 billion.
Settlement balances
Since COVID-19, the settlement balances of the banking system have increased from around $8
billion to between $20-30 billion (Figure 9).
Under the previous corridor system, Government cash flows had to be offset through our OMOs to
maintain the target amount of aggregate settlement cash in the banking system. This has not been
required since the shift to a floor system, where all settlement cash balances receive the OCR. Since
then, we have only partially smoothed out the lumpiest government cash flows.
Rather, our influence on the level of settlement cash has come through two main actions.
 Open Market Operations: Our initial liquidity injections in March to support the functioning
of the FX swap market lifted the level of settlement cash considerably. Since then, we have
let some of these maturities run off as conditions in NZ dollar money markets have returned
to normal.
 LSAP: The purchases of bonds from banks in the LSAP programme are funded by increasing
banks' settlement accounts. With purchases of up to $100 billion authorised by the MPC
announced in total through to June 2022, this will be an ongoing upward influence on
settlement balances and our overall balance sheet.19
Figure 9: Settlement Cash Level and Reserve Bank Influences
NZDbn NZDbn
35 35
Other RBNZ Operations
Thousands Thousands
30 30
LSAP Cash Influence
25 Settlement Cash Level 25
20 20
15 15
10 10
5 5
0 0
-5 -5
-10 -10
-15 -15
-20 -20
Jan-20 Feb-20 Mar-20 Apr-20 May-20 Jun-20 Jul-20 Aug-20
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand
Note: Other RBNZ Operations includes OMOs and the TAF.
Currency in Circulation
The final component of our balance sheet I'd like to touch on is currency in circulation, coming back
to our core role as the monopoly provider of legal tender in New Zealand.
Many retailers chose contactless payment methods as a preference during the height of COVID-19,
to reduce the amount of physical contact required to make payments.
However, in practice we have experienced the very opposite of a decline in cash. Physical currency in
circulation rose by around $800 million over the month of March.20 Around a year's worth of normal
demand for $50 notes was put into circulation by banks in the days leading up to the start of Alert
Level 4 lockdown on 25 March. As a result, annual growth in currency in circulation rose to 18
percent, from its more normal average closer to 5 percent (Figure 10).
Figure 10: Rolling annual growth of currency in circulation
% %
20 20
15 15
10 10
5 5
0 0
-5 -5
Dec-02 Aug-04 Apr-06 Dec-07 Aug-09 Apr-11 Dec-12 Aug-14 Apr-16 Dec-17 Aug-19
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
This increase in cash in circulation through COVID-19 is both consistent with international
experience and our own recent engagement with New Zealanders on the Future of Cash.21 The key
message of that consultation was that while as a society we are using cash less, we are not becoming
cashless. Cash still plays an important role for many people, including as a store of value outside the
banking system or in its role as a contingency back-up method of payment. For some, particularly
those financially or digitally excluded, access to cash remains an essential component of engaging in
society.
Through COVID-19 we have worked with banks, security companies, and the New Zealand Defence
Force to activate a number of emergency contingency measures to ensure that NZ dollar cash is
ready and available in all regions of the country, and resilient to further disruptions in supply chains
and distribution if the COVID-19 pandemic escalates.
We have also reiterated the message that cash is just one of a number of frequently touched
surfaces - much like a debit or credit card, phone or watch - and reinforced the need for good hand
hygiene regardless of the way payments are made or accepted.22
Balance sheet with COVID-19
Bringing the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet together, Figure 11 illustrates the evolution
so far through 2020.
Figure 12 provides a more detailed background by each new scheme, programme and facility
launched since COVID-19, against our balance sheet at the beginning of the year.
All this information is updated each month on our website.23
Figure 11: Balance Sheet with COVID-19
Assets Liabilities and Equity
NZDbn
NZDbn
60
60
Thousands
50 50
40 40
30 30
20 20
10 10
- -
Dec-19 Jan-20 Feb-20 Mar-20 Apr-20 May-20 Jun-20 Jul-20 Dec-19 Jan-20 Feb-20 Mar-20 Apr-20 May-20 Jun-20 Jul-20
LSAP Early Bond Repurchases
Notes and coins in circulation Crown settlement account
Other NZ Government Bonds LGFA
Bank settlement accounts Liquidity Management
Cash Lending Facilities Liquidity Management
Other liablities Equity
Foreign Reserves Other Assets
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Figure 12: Balance Sheet with COVID-19
Programme/ Programme/
Assets (NZ$ Liabilities (NZ$
Dec-19 Jul-20 Max Dec-19 Jul-20 Max
million) million)
Purpose Purpose
Notes and
LSAPs -
- 25,496 25,496 7,557 7,928 8,088
coins in
Nominal bonds
circulation
Crown
LSAPs - Index Payment
- 1,086 1,086 settlement 3,048 19,917 19,917
Linked Bonds System
account
NZ
Bank
Government
BMLS - 140 141 settlement 7,493 23,927 28,737
Bonds
accounts
Early Reserve Bank Liquidity
248 2,946 2,946 1,225 - 1,225
Repurchases bills management
and monetary
Repurchase
policy
Other 3,512 3,333 3,512 - 71 166
agreements
implementation
LSAPs - 1,167 1,167 Other liabilities - 2,524 3,393 5,054
LGFA
Revaluation
BMLS - 140 140 Equity 2,752 3,157 3,157
gains/losses
TAF - 861 1,244
COMO - - -
Cash lending
TLF - 27 27
CSA overdraft - - -
Foreign
Investment
Liquidity
Assets using 7,302 9,854 18,668
management
FX Swaps
and monetary
proceeds
policy
implementation
Reverse
600 - 600
repurchases
Foreign
Reserve Foreign
12,383 12,595 13,907
Management Reserves
assets
Other assets - 554 748 1,489
Total 24,599 58,393 Total 24,599 58,393
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Note: Max is the maximum value of the month end figures since Dec-19.
Reflections, next steps and conclusion
While New Zealand's financial markets have been functioning again, with the global COVID-19
pandemic ongoing it feels far too early to claim victory. However, I think it is worthwhile to make
some initial observations, reflections, and comments on next steps from here.
Risk Appetite Framework
As outlined in the narrative of what we have done through COVID-19, our goal has not been to
maximise our profits or dividends from the activities on our balance sheet. Rather, it is to achieve
our ultimate policy objectives of monetary and financial stability. However, we still need to anchor
our balance sheet decisions within a clear risk appetite framework, across four key dimensions:
 Legal risk: meeting our mandate, operating within our legal powers, and working with others
where additional powers are sought.

Operational risk: designing, implementing and executing our plans.

Financial risk: taking on additional credit, interest rate or liquidity risk from the assets and
liabilities on our balance sheet.
 Reputational risk: explaining to all our stakeholders what we do, why we have taken certain
actions, and where we see the limits of our capabilities and responsibilities.
As a central bank, we have a very low appetite for legal and operational risk.
However, we do understand that in situations like the GFC or COVID-19, we need to have a high
appetite to take financial risks in order to successfully achieve our