Lawrence Schembri: The long-term evolution of house prices - an
international perspective
Remarks by Mr Lawrence Schembri, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada, to the
Canadian Association for Business Economics, Kingston, Ontario, 25 August 2015.
* * *
I would like to thank Don Coletti, Jason Allen, Brian Peterson, Greg Bauer and Denis Gorea for their help
preparing this speech.
Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech or on the Bank of Canada's website.
Introduction
Thank you for the invitation to speak here today. Every August since 1961, when John
Diefenbaker was prime minister and you could buy a house for $15,000, business and
government economists have gathered here in Kingston to discuss issues of the day. CABE
has carried on this tradition of convincing economists to attend a conference while everyone
else is on vacation. The promise of a good chart is probably all the convincing most of us
need. I've got plenty of those for you today.
I want to talk to you about the evolution of house prices and the underlying determinants of
their long-term movements. As you know, developments in the housing sector and the
related mortgage market are important, for both the Canadian economy and its financial
system. My presentation, then, is part of our ongoing effort at the Bank to promote an
informed discussion of housing and house prices.
In our quarterly Monetary Policy Report and our biannual Financial System Review we
usually take a "here and now" perspective. But today I want to provide more context by
stepping back and looking at house prices in two dimensions:
• across time, over the past 40 years; and
• across countries - in particular, across a group of countries that share economic
circumstances and policy frameworks similar to Canada's.
I'll begin with a quick look at some stylized facts about the evolution of house prices. Then,
I'll examine their long-run determinants from both the demand and supply sides. Finally, I'll
comment on the implications of house prices for financial stability and the recent experience
with macroprudential housing-related policies, including their complementary interaction with
monetary policy.
House price trends
Let's start with trends in house prices. Chart 1 shows indexes of real house prices since
1975 for two sets of advanced economies. Chart 1a shows Canada and a set of comparable
small, open economies (Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden) with similar macro
policy frameworks and similar experiences during and after the global financial crisis.1 In
particular, they did not have sizable post-crisis corrections in house prices.
For comparison purposes, Chart 1b shows a second set of advanced economies that did
experience significant and persistent post-crisis declines in house prices.2
Three points about these charts.
First, there are notable variations across countries. While there is some common movement,
local circumstances clearly matter.
Second, broadly speaking, real house prices across both sets of countries experienced no
material upward trend from 1975 to 1995.
Third, a generalized upward movement in house prices began in the second half of the
1990s and is continuing today, even after post-crisis corrections. Real prices remain well
above 1995 levels for almost all countries.
These trends suggest that there are common factors at the global level or simultaneously in
each country that have arisen over the past 20 years and have pushed up real house prices.
Understanding these common and idiosyncratic determinants of house prices is important for
both macroeconomic outcomes and financial stability and thus the conduct of monetary and
macroprudential policies.
A framework for analyzing house price trends
To analyze these trends, let's start with some basics. A house is simultaneously both a
consumption good and an asset. It delivers a stream of non-financial housing services and,
at the same time, is also a store of wealth. For most of us, it is the largest asset we own.
A household's decision to purchase a house depends on the utility of the services it provides,
its price, and its ongoing user cost. The user cost includes depreciation, maintenance and
interest costs, less the expected price growth. In the housing market, the price is determined
by the total demand for housing services and the stock of houses. The equilibrium house
price thus depends on the user cost, which includes the expected price appreciation, and
this, in turn, depends on the expected evolution of demand and supply factors.
To complicate matters, a number of other dimensions influence the choice of the data being
analyzed:
• Housing can be owner-occupied or rented.
• Housing units can be single-family houses or multiple-unit dwellings.
Housing is a composite good consisting of both a structure and land.
•
• Housing prices can be for existing or new houses, or both.
For my purposes today, I'll focus primarily on owner-occupied houses, the total of singles
and multiples and the composite price for existing houses measured at the national level.3
Demand factors
Four broad sets of demand factors have likely contributed to rising real house prices across
advanced economies since 1995:
• macroeconomic - rising disposable incomes and lower long-term interest rates;
• demographic - population growth, driven in part by migration, and shifts in age
structure and family size;
• credit conditions - broader access to and more efficient funding of mortgage credit
due to financial liberalization and innovation; and
• other factors - improvements to the macro-policy framework, international
investment, preference shifts and regulatory and tax changes.
House prices and income
First, let's look at house prices and income. Since 1995, house prices in Canada and the set
of comparable countries have increased faster than nominal personal disposable income
(Chart 2a).4 During this period, all of these countries experienced solid income growth, with
the strongest growth in Norway and Sweden (Chart 2b).
During the global financial crisis, these countries also experienced house price corrections.
This caused the ratios of house prices to income to decline temporarily, after which they
continued climbing.
So why did house prices rise faster than income?
Demographics
There are a number of possible explanations. Consider population growth. Chart 3a shows
population growth rates in our set of comparable countries over two periods, 1975 to 1994
and 1995 to 2015. Population growth rates were the highest in Australia, Canada and New
Zealand over the entire sample. Moreover, growth rates increased in all countries, except
Canada, in the post-1995 period relative to the pre-1995 period. Therefore, population
growth could help explain the rise in house prices relative to income for most countries over
the latter part of the sample.5
One of the factors that has affected population growth rates is migration. Net migration was
highest in Australia and Canada over the entire sample. In addition, net migration increased
importantly in all five countries in the second half of the sample period (Chart 3b).6
In Australia, Canada and New Zealand, the rate of population growth of the approximate
house-owning cohort of those aged 25 to 75 declined in the second part of the sample
period. This likely reflects the aging of their populations as the postwar baby boom
generation moved from youth into middle age (Chart 4).
Nonetheless, the growth rate of this cohort still remains well above 1 per cent for these three
countries.
In Canada, it is noteworthy that the average family size decreased from about 3.5 in 1976 to
below 3.0 in 2011, a decline of approximately 20 per cent.7 Partial evidence suggests that
this pattern is similar in the other advanced economies in our sample. This decline in the
average family size has supported the rate of household formation, and thus, has partially
offset the impact of the lower growth rate of the house-owning cohort on the demand for
houses in Australia, Canada and New Zealand.8
It is also important to consider where population growth is occurring. Chart 5 shows that over
our sample period, the pace of urbanization, measured by the change in the urbanization
ratio, has increased since 1995 in all of the countries in the comparable group, except New
Zealand.9 Australia and Canada are notable for the size of the shift, which could be
explained by a number of factors. These include the well-known agglomeration economies of
scale provided by urban areas and the location preferences of home-owners, especially
younger-age cohorts and recent immigrants.10
The urbanization of the population in Norway also stands out. This could potentially explain
why house prices have grown faster in Norway than in Canada, even though population
growth in Canada has been higher than in Norway.
To sum up, population growth and the shift in demand for housing toward urban areas have
exerted strong upward pressure on house prices.
Credit conditions
A third demand factor affecting house prices is the improvement in mortgage credit
conditions. Lower long-term interest rates and financial liberalization and innovation have
improved housing affordability in advanced economies, especially since the mid-1990s. I'll
say a few words about each of these changes that have influenced the availability of credit.
Since 2000, real 10-year government bond yields have trended downward across all
advanced countries, including those in our comparison group, with a slight increase during
the recent financial crisis (Chart 6).
The decline in yields has been attributed to higher global savings and stronger monetary and
fiscal policy frameworks, which have credibly reduced inflation and risk premiums by
increasing macroeconomic stability in the roughly 15-year period (known as the Great
Moderation) that preceded the global financial crisis.11 Since the crisis, persistently weak
global demand - especially real investment - coupled with sustained low central bank policy
rates and large asset purchases has helped to lower long-term interest rates and, in turn,
reduce financing costs for financial intermediaries and mortgage rates for households.12
Other things being equal, this decline has helped improve the affordability of home
ownership and support demand for houses.
7
"Fifty years of families in Canada: 1961 to 2011," Statistics Canada.
8
In Canada, the evidence indicates that much of the increase in home ownership is among the older cohort of
the population, which suggests that longer and healthier life spans may have supported house demand in
recent years.
9
For example, the urbanization ratio in Canada increased from 75.61 per cent in 1975 to 77.68 per cent in 1995
and 81.65 per cent in 2014. New Zealand is the most urbanized country in the sample; its ratio was already
above 80 per cent in 1975.
10
See, for example, Agglomeration Economics, edited by Edward L. Glaeser, National Bureau of Economic
Research Conference Report (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
11
For more on the decline in real long-term interest rates, see C. Wilkins, "Monetary Policy and the
Underwhelming Recovery" (speech to the CFA Society, Toronto, 22 September 2014).
12
For example, in Canada discounted 5-year mortgage rates have declined by about 470 basis points since
2000, from just above 7.25 per cent to 2.55 per cent.
Credit conditions have been positively affected by financial liberalization and innovation.
Recent work by the International Monetary Fund has catalogued the related effects of these
two factors on access to housing market finance and mortgage market development across
countries.13
The trend in advanced economies from the mid-1990s until the crisis has been toward higher
maximum loan-to-value ratios, longer amortizations for mortgage borrowers and more
flexible funding arrangements for mortgage lenders in terms of covered bonds and mortgage
securitization. The assessment and diversification of mortgage credit risk have also
improved. As a consequence, a broader set of borrowers and lenders has become involved
in obtaining and providing mortgage finance.
Chart 7a shows a positive relationship between a summary index of mortgage finance
conditions, constructed by the IMF, which captures both financial liberalization and
innovation, and the depth of the mortgage markets across several advanced economies.14
Although data for New Zealand are not available, the chart indicates that the other four
countries in our comparison group have mortgage finance conditions in place that generate
deep mortgage markets and foster broad and often less procyclical access to mortgage
finance. Again, other things equal, this supports demand for owner-occupied housing and
higher house prices.
Chart 7b shows that home-ownership rates in Canada and Sweden (over a shorter sample
period) have risen, suggesting that these changes to mortgage finance have had a positive
impact on housing affordability. In Australia, the rate of home ownership has declined. This
may be due to a more modest change in mortgage credit conditions. Or, more likely,
affordability has been eroded by rapidly rising house prices, which have increased the most
in Australia among the comparison group. For Norway, there has been no material change in
the home-ownership rate over this limited time period.15
As I noted earlier, important innovations have fostered deeper, more efficient and diversified
mortgage financing. I'll comment on the two most significant: covered bonds and
securitization.
Covered bonds have been popular in Denmark for a long time. They were introduced and
have become more widely used in Sweden and Norway and, to a lesser extent, in Canada,
Australia and New Zealand (Chart 8a).
These bonds have played a growing role in mortgage finance in the post-crisis period
because they are generally viewed as safer than private-label securitization. They give
investors access to dual collateral: the mortgages securing the bonds as well as other assets
on the issuer's balance sheet should the mortgages prove insufficient.16
Securitization of mortgages also increased significantly in the pre-crisis period in some
countries, especially private-label securitization in the United States (Chart 8b). While these
vehicles were successful in raising large amounts of mortgage funding before the crisis, they
were an important source of financial vulnerability during the crisis because the incentives to
originate and securitize subprime mortgages were misaligned and the related risks were
opaque and not well priced.
Since the crisis, we have seen a dramatic decline in private-label securitizations of residential
mortgages, which has not recovered, despite global financial reform efforts led by the G-20
to address the serious weaknesses in their design.
Publicly supported securitization has continued to play an important role in funding
residential mortgages over this period, however, especially in the United States and Canada.
Other factors supporting demand
A number of other related factors have likely supported the demand for houses in our
comparison group and in advanced economies more generally.
All of the countries in our comparison group had solid macro and financial policies
characterized by
• monetary policy frameworks comprising explicit and credible inflation targets and
flexible exchange rates;
• sustainable fiscal positions; and
• effective financial regulatory and supervisory frameworks.17
As a result, these countries achieved a high degree of macro and financial stability over the
post-1995 period; in particular, they kept inflation low. This stability had a number of
important consequences. It reduced uncertainty for households and firms. As noted, it also
lowered risk premiums and long-term interest rates.18 And it fostered financial and mortgage
market development.
These countries all coped with the crisis and its aftermath relatively well. Economic and
financial stability strengthened the demand for houses because it enhanced the perception
that they are safe, high-quality assets.19 Consequently, households may have decided to
shift more of their wealth into housing and consume more housing services as their income
increased by buying more owner-occupied dwellings over time. This trend was supported by
government policies (although not widespread in our comparison group) to promote home
ownership, especially for younger and lower income households.20
Supply factors
Now let's look at the supply factors that have influenced the prices of houses, in particular,
regulation and geography. Such supply constraints tend to be most binding in urban areas.
Coupled with the observed shift in demand related to population growth in urban areas,
supply constraints may have put significant upward pressure on house prices in urban areas
in advanced economies.
17
All of the countries, except Sweden, are significant commodity exporters. From 2002 until 2014 they benefited
from rising commodity prices.
18
Credibly reducing expected inflation also contributes to lower nominal mortgage rates. The effect of this is to
spread the real burden of servicing a mortgage more evenly over its term.
19
Foreign investors also perceived these countries as attractive locations to invest in real estate, although the
impact of their investment on house demand and prices in the countries is unlikely to be widespread. A recent
survey of international real estate investors found that Australia, Canada, Sweden and several other countries
represent the "most stable and secure" environments for real estate investment. (See Foreign Investment
Survey, Association of Foreign Investors in Real Estate, January 2013.) The IMF, in a review of existing -
albeit scarce - evidence, concluded that the impact of foreign investors on real estate prices is not pervasive,
but is limited to certain urban markets and at higher price ranges. (See H. Ahir, H. Kang and P. Loungani,
Seven Questions on the Global Housing Markets, IMF Research Bulletin, September 2014.
20
Examples of such policies include favourable tax treatment (mortgage interest deductibility, reduced capital
gains, tax deferred home-ownership savings programs) and public mortgage guarantees.
The regulatory factors include land-use or zoning restrictions that specify, for example,
minimum lot sizes or maximum development density; the establishment of greenbelts around
urban areas, which represent a more sweeping land-use restriction; and development fees.
In terms of geographical constraints, the most common are bodies of water and landscape
features such as mountains, wetlands and other terrain not suitable for residential
development.
To what extent are these sorts of constraints affecting house prices in urban areas? Chart 9
provides some suggestive evidence on the impact of land-use regulations on median
priceto-income ratios. Many of the cities with higher ratios also have obvious geographical
constraints - Hong Kong and Vancouver are good examples - so the two sources of supply
restrictions likely interact to put upward pressure on prices.
To examine the implications of these supply constraints, it is useful to consider the impact of
urban population density on house prices.
Chart 10 indicates that, over the period from 1995 to 2014, there was a strong positive
relationship between increases in population density and house prices in Canadian urban
22
centres.21,
Greater population density, combined with regulatory and geographical constraints, creates
price incentives that cause shifts in the available housing mix.23 In particular, as the prices of
single-family homes rise, condos become a more affordable alternative.
In Vancouver, bounded on three sides by water with coastal mountains as a backdrop, condo
development has dominated housing starts since the early 1990s. We are now seeing a
similar shift to condos in Montréal and Toronto (Chart 11).24 In recent years, Toronto and
Vancouver have seen price growth in single-family houses outpace multiples (mainly condos)
by a factor of two to three. About a third of the Canadian housing stock is in Toronto,
Montréal and Vancouver so this change is significant. Outside of Canada's big three cities,
condos are only now becoming as important as single-family homes.
Given these supply constraints, the increasing urbanization of Canada's population is putting
upward pressure on Canadian house prices.
Policy implications
In view of these demand and supply factors, which have tended to work together to cause
house prices to rise faster than income since 1995 in advanced countries, especially in urban
areas, what are the implications for monetary policy and, perhaps more importantly, for
financial stability policy?
21
Given recent rises in house price, the increase for Vancouver shown in Chart 10 is lower than might be
expected because the starting point of the sample (1995) was a significant peak for prices in Vancouver.
House prices shot up 34 per cent from 1990 to1995 while other Canadian cities had either negative or minimal
growth of less than 10 per cent. From 1995-2005, house prices in Vancouver rose by 48 per cent, but that
was outpaced by price increases in other Canadian cities that ranged from 65 to almost 140 per cent.
Winnipeg's decline in population density is, in part, due to a 30 per cent increase in its municipal boundaries
over this period.
22
This relationship is also true for U.S. cities. See "Urbanization & Canadian REITs," CIBC Institutional Equity
Research Industry Update, April 2012.
23
As cities grow, the price of housing in the urban core typically rises faster than in the periphery. This
steepening of the "rent curve" reflects the agglomeration economies as well as the higher opportunity cost of
commuting. See D. Capozza and L. Helsey, "The Fundamentals of Land Prices and Urban Growth," Journal of
Urban Economics, 26, no. 3 (1989): 295-306.
24
City authorities have also encouraged condo development to achieve higher densities in certain areas and
control infrastructure costs.
The advanced economies in our comparison group had similar experiences during and after
the global financial crisis. They suffered sizable declines in exports to their major trading
partners that were more severely affected by the crisis. Their domestic financial institutions
and markets were adversely affected by spillovers from global financial stresses. Liquidity
and credit conditions tightened severely.
In response, they loosened monetary policy, with sharp declines in policy interest rates. Their
credible inflation-targeting frameworks, flexible exchange rates and resilient financial
systems meant that such countercyclical monetary policy easing was effectively transmitted
into lower real interest rates along the maturity spectrum. This easing supported the
economic recovery by boosting domestic demand, notably in sectors sensitive to interest
rates, such as housing, and caused house prices to recover from declines experienced
during the crisis.
But, to date, the global recovery has been weak, so global and domestic interest rates have
remained at historically low levels. This has underpinned the demand for, and the prices of,
houses in the post-crisis period.
Since elevated house prices have important implications for financial stability, the Bank of
Canada is closely monitoring the housing market. In particular, as we noted in recent issues
of our Financial System Review, rising house prices contribute to two material vulnerabilities
that can affect financial stability:
1. Higher house prices are generally associated with higher levels of household
indebtedness and leverage.25
2. Higher house prices represent a potential source of asset-price misalignment if
influenced by expectations of price appreciation not consistent with evolving
fundamentals.26 Such misalignment could suddenly correct and create financial
stress.27
The likely trigger for both vulnerabilities would be a major global shock that generated a
sharp increase in unemployment and possibly in interest rates as well. If these vulnerabilities
were triggered, the adverse impact on the financial system and the economy would be
amplified by the exposure of banks and other intermediaries to them.
Now, when we look at the post-crisis experiences of the countries in our comparison group,
they have similar levels of household leverage, measured by household debt as a ratio of
GDP (Chart 12).28 Household leverage has risen along with house prices, as households
have taken advantage of low post-crisis interest rates. The one exception is New Zealand,
where a modest degree of household deleveraging seems to have occurred. For Canada,
the ratio of household debt to GDP has risen since 1975, although the growth of this ratio
has notably declined since 2010. For Sweden and Norway, the ratio also grew at a modest
pace in the post-crisis period.29
25
See, for example, A. Crawford and H. Faruqui "What Explains Trends in Household Debt in Canada?" Bank of
Canada Review (Winter 2011-12): 3-15.
26
Extrapolative house price expectations may arise during periods of strong house price growth driven by shifts
in demand and supply factors. See E. Cerutti, J. Dagher and G. Dell'Ariccia "Housing Finance and Real-Estate
Booms: A Cross-Country Perspective," IMF Staff Discussion Note, June 2015.
27
The December 2014 and June 2015 issues of the Financial System Review examine various estimates of the
degree of overvaluation of Canadian houses.
28
The household debt-to-GDP ratio is more consistently measured across countries than the household
debt-todisposable income ratio and is thus more useful for comparison purposes.
29
While the significant reductions in interest rates in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis increased
house affordability in these countries, this gain has been offset by the ongoing increases in house prices. For
The inflections in the rate of leverage growth that we see in the chart after the crisis may be
due to the macroprudential measures these countries implemented. Such measures have
allowed stimulative monetary policy to flow through to households with the capacity to
borrow.30
Chart 13a and b draw on recent work by the IMF, which shows that macroprudential policies
in the form of maximum loan-to-value (LTV) or debt-to-income (DTI) ratios have tightened
across a broad range of countries over the past 10 years.31 The IMF's research, as well as
that of other economists, has found evidence suggesting that the tightening has helped to:
• reduce the procyclicality of household credit and bank leverage;
• moderate credit growth;
• improve the creditworthiness of borrowers; and
• lower the rate of house price growth.
The most effective macroprudential policies to date appear to have been the imposition of
maximum LTV and DTI constraints.32 Increased capital weights on bank holdings of
mortgages have also had an impact.33 While long-term evidence on these instruments is not
yet available, permanent measures that address structural regulatory weaknesses and that
are relatively straightforward to implement and supervise will likely be the most effective over
time.
In Canada, we have had four successive rounds of macroprudential tightening, primarily in
terms of the rules for insured mortgages (Figure 1). I'll mention just a few of the highlights.
The maximum amortization period for insured loans has been shortened from 40 years to
25.34 LTV ratios have been lowered to 95 per cent for new mortgages, and 80 per cent for
refinancing and investor properties. These latter two changes effectively eliminate new
insurance for refinancing and investor properties. Qualification criteria such as limits on the
total debt-service ratio and the gross debt-service ratio, as well as requirements for qualifying
interest rates, have also been tightened.35
Recent evidence suggests that these measures have resulted in higher average credit
scores, which have improved the quality of mortgage borrowing (Chart 14a). With respect to
household credit growth, Chart 14b, shows that the trend growth of mortgage credit declined
example, Chart 6 in the December 2014 Financial System Review shows that the affordability of houses in
Canada has been relatively unchanged since 2008.
30
Evidence in "Debt and (Not Much) Deleveraging" (McKinsey Global Institute, February 2015) suggests that
much of the debt in countries in the comparison group is held by relatively high-income households.
31
E. Cerutti, S. Claessens, and L. Laeven, "The Use and Effectiveness of Macroprudential Policies: New
Evidence," IMF Working Paper WP/15/61, March 2015.
32
Ibid.
33
Mortgage underwriting standards have also been tightened recently in many countries, as they have
implemented the Financial Stability Board's Principles for Sound Residential Mortgage Underwriting Practices,
April 2012.
34
Uninsured mortgages are still available with longer amortizations; the normal maximum is 30 years.
35
The total debt-service ratio is the percentage of gross annual income required to cover annual payments
associated with housing and all other debt obligations. The gross debt-service ratio includes only
housingrelated payments. Other changes to insured mortgages include a minimum credit score, with limited
exceptions; stronger loan documentation standards to ensure the reasonableness of the property value and of
the borrower's sources and level of income; mortgage insurance eliminated for non-amortizing home-equity
lines of credit; and mortgage insurance now limited to homes with a purchase price of less than $1 million. In
addition, mortgage and mortgage insurance underwriting principles have been made consistent with
international standards. See Guidelines B-20 and B-21issued by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institution.
from 14 per cent in 2007-08 (3-month growth, annualized) to around 5 per cent in
2013-15.36
Conclusion
Let me conclude with a few key points from the mountain of facts, graphs and analysis that I
have reviewed with you today. As I mentioned at the outset, the purpose of my presentation
is to help provide more context for an informed discussion about housing and house prices
given their importance to the Canadian economy and the financial system.
First, real house prices have been rising relative to income in Canada and other comparable
countries for about 20 years. There are many possible explanations, mostly from the demand
side, but also from the supply side.
Second, in terms of demand, demographic forces, notably migration and urbanization, have
played a role in the evolution of house prices, as have improving credit conditions through
lower global real long-term interest rates and financial liberalization and innovation. There
are, of course, other demand factors that warrant more data and analysis, including the
impacts of foreign investment and possible preference shifts.
Third, in terms of supply, the constraints imposed by geography and regulation have
decreased housing supply elasticity, especially in urban areas. This reduced supply elasticity
has interacted with demand shifts toward more urbanization to push up house prices in major
cities.
Fourth, the credible and effective macro and financial policy frameworks in place in Canada
and the other countries considered here have contributed to a high degree of
macroeconomic and financial stability. Consequently, in the face of a protracted global
recovery, their countercyclical policies successfully underpinned domestic demand in the
post-crisis period. The resulting strength in the housing market has increased household
imbalances, but the risks stemming from these vulnerabilities have been well managed by
complementary macroprudential policies.
The experience in these countries therefore suggests that macroprudential policies that
address structural weaknesses in the regulatory framework are best suited for mitigating
such financial vulnerabilities. They reduce tail risks to financial stability and enhance the
overall resilience of the financial system.
Thank you. Enjoy these last few days of summer.
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