Anand Sinha: Regulation of shadow banking - issues and challenges
Address by Mr Anand Sinha, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, at an event
organized by the Indian Merchants' Chamber, Mumbai, 7 January 2013.
* * *
Inputs provided by Ms. Reena Banerjee, Ms Archana Mangalagiri, Ms Sindhu Pancholy, and Mr. Jayakumar
Yarasi are gratefully acknowledged.
Mr. Hiranandani, President, Indian Merchants' Chamber (IMC), Mr. Thakkar, Co-Chairman,
Finance and Banking Committee, IMC, Mr. TT Srinivasaraghavan, Managing Director,
Sundaram Finance Ltd., Mr. K V Srinivasan, CEO, Reliance Commercial Finance, Ms. Usha
Thorat, my erstwhile colleague in the Reserve Bank, currently the Director, CAFRAL and the
Chairperson of the Working Group that examined the issues and concerns in the Non
Banking Financial Companies (NBFC) sector, and all other distinguished guests; It is a
pleasure to be here among you in this seminar on NBFCs, to discuss the recent guidelines
issued by us based on the recommendations of the Working Group on NBFCs chaired by
Ms. Usha Thorat.
The recommendations of the Working Group have generated a lot of debate in the industry,
and as I observed from the presentations of other speakers, the issues continue to elicit
considerable interest, if not apprehension. My aim during this talk would be to put the issues
in perspective. As a backdrop to my comments on Indian NBFC sector, I would briefly touch
upon the global shadow banking sector along with the recent international initiatives in the
regulation of the sector. Then I would trace the genesis and development of the NBFC sector
in India as well as the evolution of its regulatory framework, and finally the thought process
which led to the setting up of the Working Group. I would like to focus on the big picture and
elaborate the rationale behind the recent guidelines which is the agenda of this seminar.
All of you must be closely observing the global developments in the context of financial crisis
which shook the entire world, and the consequent overhaul of the regulatory framework. Both
the regular banking system and the shadow banking system have come under greater
regulatory focus on account of gaps in the respective regulatory frameworks and also, most
importantly, on account of inter-linkages between both the systems. The shadow banking
system that had burgeoned in the run up to the global financial crisis was one of the major
causes of the global turmoil and quite understandably, the regulators are revamping its
regulation to ensure financial stability. Before I dwell further on the regulatory developments,
let me touch upon some underpinnings to the conceptual framework.
What is shadow banking?
The term "shadow banking system" was first used in 2007, and gained popularity during and
after the recent financial crisis, as it highlighted the bank-like functions performed by entities
outside the regular banking system. The more comprehensive definition, as adopted by the
Financial Stability Board (FSB), i.e., "credit intermediation involving entities and activities
(fully or partially) outside the regular banking system" has been globally accepted. This
definition has two important components: First, non bank financial entities or entities outside
the banking system that engage in the "bank like" activities of maturity transformation,
undertaking credit risk transfer and using direct or indirect financial leverage. Second,
activities such as securitization, securities lending and repo transactions that act as important
sources of funding for non bank entities. Thus, shadow banks comprise entities which
conduct financial intermediation directly, such as finance companies or NBFCs, and entities
which provide finance to such entities, such as mutual funds. Globally, shadow banking
entities could be covered under the broad heads of (i) Money Market Funds, (ii) Credit
investment Funds, Hedge Funds, etc, (iii) Finance Companies accepting deposits or deposit
like funding, (iv) Securities brokers dependent on wholesale funding, (v) Credit insurers,
financial guarantee providers and (vi) Securitisation vehicles.
Such nonbank intermediation, when appropriately conducted, provides a valuable alternative
to bank funding and supports real economic activity. But experience from the crisis
demonstrates the capacity of some non-bank entities and transactions to operate on a
significantly large scale, in ways that create bank-like risks to financial stability (longer-term
credit extension based on short-term funding and leverage). Such risk creation may take
place at an entity level but it can also form part of a complex chain of transactions, in which
leverage and maturity transformation occur in stages, creating multiple forms of feedback
into the regulated banking system.
Like banks, a leveraged and maturity-transforming shadow banking system can also be
vulnerable to "runs" and generate contagion, thereby amplifying systemic risk. Shadow
banking can also heighten procyclicality by accelerating credit supply and asset price
increases during upswings and exacerbating fall in asset prices during downswings. These
effects were powerfully revealed during the global financial crisis in the form of dislocation of
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) markets, the failure of an originate-to-distribute
model employing structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and conduits, "runs" on MMFs and a
sudden reappraisal of the terms on which securities lending and repos were conducted.
Traditionally, regulation of banks has assumed greater importance than that of their
non-banking counterparts. One reason, of course, is that protection of depositors has been
traditionally an important mandate of banking supervisors. Banks are at the centre of
payment and settlement systems and monetary policy transmission takes place through
them. Banks play a critical role in credit intermediation through maturity transformation,
i.e. acceptance of short term liabilities and converting them into long term assets viz. loans
and advances. Along with economic value, this function also creates potential liquidity risk.
Moreover, banks also operate on a significantly higher leverage compared to non-financial
entities which could amplify their vulnerability. For all these reasons, banks are subject to a
detailed and a rigorous regulatory framework. However, when non bank financial entities,
which are subject to no regulation or light touch regulation, undertake bank-like functions,
large risks are created which could potentially be destabilizing for the entire system. The
global financial crisis demonstrated many ways in which shadow banking can have an impact
on the global financial system, both directly and through its interconnectedness with the
regular banking system, prompting the move to overhaul the regulation of shadow banking
system.
The importance and benefits of shadow banking
Shadows do not necessarily mean dark and sinister. In fact, shadow banking activities
constitute a very useful part of the financial system. The main advantages of shadow banks
lie in their ability to lower transaction costs of their operations, their quick decision-making
ability, customer orientation and prompt provision of services. In India, we have always
maintained that Non Banking Finance Companies (NBFCs),1 a significant segment of
shadow banking system, play a crucial role in broadening access to financial services, and
enhancing competition and diversification of the financial sector. While NBFCs are,
sometimes, seen as akin to banks in terms of the products and services offered, this
comparison is strictly not accurate, as more often NBFCs play a range of roles that
complement banks. They have carved out niche areas of businesses, such as auto financing,
which enables them to address specific needs of the people more efficiently. In addition to
complementing banks, NBFCs add to economic strength to the extent they enhance the
resilience of the financial system to economic shocks. They can act as backup financial
institutions should the primary form of intermediation come under stress, thereby constituting
an important avenue for risk diversification away from the banking system. Other
non banking finance entities such as mutual funds, insurance companies, etc, provide
alternatives to bank deposits and constitute alternative funding for the real economy, which is
particularly useful when traditional banking or market channels become temporarily impaired.
Risks of shadow banks2
Notwithstanding the complementary role played by shadow banks to the banking system,
their activities, on the flip side, create risks which can assume a systemic dimension, due to
their complexity, cross jurisdictional nature, as well as their interconnectedness with the
banking system. The risks emanating from shadow banking could be primarily of four types
viz., (i) liquidity risk, (ii) leverage risk, (iii) regulatory arbitrage and (iv) contagion risk
•
Liquidity risk - This is one of the most common risks faced by shadow banks, as
these entities undertake maturity transformation i.e., funding long term assets with
short term liabilities. The risk of ALM mismatch leading to liquidity problems is quite
high. In India, we had a situation during the height of global crisis in 2008 when
some NBFCs ran into severe liquidity problems as they were using short term
liabilities such as CPs (commercial paper) and NCDs (Non-Convertible Debentures)
to fund their long term lending or investment. I will be discussing this issue in detail a
little later.
•
Leverage risk - As shadow banks do not usually have prudential limits on
borrowings, they can become highly leveraged. High leverage exacerbates the
stress in the financial system and the real economy during the downturn adversely
affecting financial stability.
•
Regulatory arbitrage - Credit intermediation is, traditionally, a banking activity.
Regulations applied to banks in this regard can be circumvented by transferring
components of the credit intermediation function to shadow banks which are subject
to less stringent regulation. Transfer of risks outside the purview of banking
supervision played an important role in the build-up to the global financial crisis.
•
Contagion risk - Shadow banking entities have close interlinkages with the
banking sector both from the asset as well as the liabilities side, and also with other
segments of the financial system, which can lead to contagion risk in times of loss of
confidence and uncertainty.
Global approach to regulation of shadow banking
The developments during the global crisis reflected the gravitas of the risks I have
highlighted above. The light touch regulation enabled the shadow banking system to have
high leverage. The liquidity risks faced by the shadow banking system quickly got transferred
to the banking system due to its interconnectedness and interlinkages with the regular
banking system, largely through committed liquidity facilities and reputational concerns. The
contagion that followed, prompted the policy makers to review the regulation of the shadow
banking sector to ensure and preserve financial stability. As such, at the November 2010
Seoul Summit, the G20 Leaders highlighted the fact that, after formulation of the new capital
standards for banks i.e., Basel III, "strengthening regulation and supervision of shadow
banking" was one of the remaining issues of financial sector regulation that warranted
attention. As you are aware, the FSB has the mandate to develop and promote the
implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies in the
interest of financial stability. Therefore, the G20 requested the FSB to develop
recommendations to strengthen the oversight and regulation of the shadow banking system
by mid-2011 in collaboration with other international standard setting bodies. The FSB
formed a task force to develop initial recommendations for discussion that would:
•
clarify what is meant by the "shadow banking system";
• set out potential approaches for monitoring the shadow banking system; and
•
explore possible regulatory measures to address the systemic risk and regulatory
arbitrage concerns posed by the shadow banking system.
The FSB felt that the objective of regulation is to ensure that shadow banking is subject to
appropriate oversight and regulation, to address bank-like risks to financial stability emerging
outside the regular banking system, while not inhibiting sustainable non-bank financing
models that do not pose such risks. Their approach was activity specific rather than entity
specific, as they focused on identification of those activities that can affect systemic stability,
particularly those that caused or exacerbated the crisis. The approach also included
monitoring the shadow banking system so that any rapidly growing new activities that pose
bank-like risks can be identified early and, where needed, those risks are addressed.
The activities identified by FSB can be divided into 5 broad categories
•
management of client cash pools with features that make them susceptible to runs
(e.g. credit investment funds with stable NAV features, leveraged credit hedge
funds);
• loan provision that is dependent on short-term funding (e.g. finance companies with
short-term funding structure or that accept deposits);
• intermediation of market activities that is dependent on short-term funding or on
secured funding of client assets (e.g. securities brokers whose funding is heavily
dependent on wholesale funding);
•
facilitation of credit creation (e.g. credit insurers, financial guarantee insurers); and
• securitisation and funding of financial entities (e.g. securitisation vehicles).
The FSB advised that monitoring and responses be guided by a two-stage approach.
• Firstly, authorities should cast the net wide, looking at all non-bank credit
intermediation to ensure that data gathering and surveillance cover all the activities
within which shadow banking-related risks might arise.
•
Authorities should then narrow the focus, concentrating on the subset of non-bank
credit intermediation where maturity/liquidity transformation and/or flawed credit risk
transfer and/or leverage create important risks.
The FSB, working with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), has, therefore, examined
and developed recommendations in five areas where financial stability risks from shadow
banking have arisen. Work streams were created for analyzing the issues in greater detail
and developing effective policy recommendations in these areas, viz,:
•
to mitigate the spill-over effect between the regular banking system and the shadow
banking system -( BCBS);
•
to reduce the susceptibility of money market funds (MMFs) to "runs" - (IOSCO);
•
to assess and mitigate systemic risks posed by other shadow banking entities -
(FSB sub group) ;
•
to assess and align the incentives associated with securitization - (IOSCO and
BCBS); and
•
To dampen risks and pro-cyclical incentives associated with secured financing
contracts such as repos, and securities lending that may exacerbate funding strains
in times of "runs" - (FSB sub group).
The policy recommendations have been guided by the following five general principles for
regulatory measures:
•
Focus: Regulatory measures should be carefully designed to target the externalities
and risks the shadow banking system creates;
•
Proportionality: Regulatory measures should be proportionate to the risks shadow
banking poses to the financial system;
•
Forward-looking and adaptable: Regulatory measures should be forward-looking
and adaptable to emerging risks;
•
Effectiveness: Regulatory measures should be designed and implemented in an
effective manner, balancing the need for international consistency to address
common risks and to avoid creating cross-border arbitrage opportunities against the
need to take due account of differences between financial structures and systems
across jurisdictions; and
•
Assessment and review: Regulators should regularly assess the effectiveness of
their regulatory measures after implementation and make adjustments to improve
them as necessary in the light of experience.
Size of the shadow banking sector
Efficient oversight of any sector requires monitoring which involves data collection and
analysis. Given its growing significance, monitoring of the global shadow banking system is
being very vigorously pursued. The FSB committed to conducting annual monitoring
exercises to assess global trends and risks in the shadow banking system through its
Standing Committee on Assessment of Vulnerabilities (SCAV) and its technical working
group, the Analytical Group on Vulnerabilities (AGV), using quantitative and qualitative
information. The FSB's second annual monitoring exercise, which was recently concluded,
covered 25 jurisdictions and the euro area as a whole, thereby bringing the coverage of the
monitoring exercise to 86 per cent of global GDP and 90 per cent of global financial system
assets. The primary focus of the exercise was on a "macro-mapping" based on national Flow
of Funds and Sector Balance Sheet data, that looks at all non-bank financial intermediation
to ensure that data gathering and surveillance cover the areas where shadow
banking-related risks to the financial system might potentially arise.
The main findings from the 2012 exercise are as follows:
•
According to the "macro-mapping" measure, the global shadow banking system, as
conservatively proxied by "Other Financial Intermediaries" grew rapidly before the
crisis, rising from USD 26 trillion in 2002 to USD 62 trillion in 2007. The size of the
total system declined slightly in 2008 but increased subsequently to reach
USD 67 trillion in 2011 (equivalent to 111 per cent of the aggregated GDP of all
jurisdictions). The global estimate for the size of the shadow banking system has
increased by some USD 5 to 6 trillion since last year.
•
The shadow banking system's share of total financial intermediation (which includes
banks, insurance and pension funds, public financial institutions and central banks)
has decreased since the onset of the crisis and has remained at around 25 per cent
in 2009-2011, after having peaked at 27 per cent in 2007. In broad terms, the
aggregate size of the shadow banking system is around half the size of banking
system assets.
• There is also a considerable diversity in the relative size, composition and growth of
the non bank financial intermediaries across jurisdictions. For example, the size of
the shadow banking system in US and a number of other jurisdictions continues to
be large relative to the regular banking system. The US has the largest shadow
banking system, with assets of USD 23 trillion in 2011, followed by the euro area
(USD 22 trillion) and the UK (USD 9 trillion).
•
There is also considerable divergence among jurisdictions in terms of: (i) the share
of non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) in the overall financial system;
(ii) relative size of the shadow banking system to GDP; (iii) the activities undertaken
by the NBFIs; and (iv) recent growth trends.
•
Even during the period immediately following the global financial crisis (2008-11),
the shadow banking system continued to grow, although at a slower pace, in
seventeen jurisdictions (half of them being emerging market and developing
economies undergoing financial deepening) and contracted in the remaining eight
jurisdictions.
•
Among the jurisdictions where data is available, interconnectedness risk tends to be
higher for shadow banking entities than for banks. Shadow banking entities seem to
be more dependent on bank funding and are more heavily invested in bank assets,
than vice versa.
Shadow banking in India
Notwithstanding the data constraints in actual evaluation of its size, the shadow banking
sector in India is still small in size compared to its counterparts in advanced economies. In
2011, assets of Other Financial Institutions (OFIs) in India were USD 375 billion vis-a-vis
bank assets of USD 1518 billion and GDP of USD 1766 billion. The assets of the shadow
banking system accounted for 21 percent of GDP as compared to bank assets which were
86 percent of GDP.3 Apart from the fact that the sector is not significant in terms of size, the
activities carried out by these entities are also limited.
In India, the shadow banks have been brought under progressively tighter regulations and
many of the activities which contributed to the global crisis are either not allowed, or, if
allowed, are allowed in a regulated environment with appropriate limits. Illustratively, the
concern expressed by the FSB regarding Money Market Funds and Credit Investment Funds
including ETFs etc. was in the context of the practice in some countries, including the US,
regarding maintenance of constant NAVs, which led to runs on these funds. On the contrary,
in India, Money Market Funds, investment funds and ETFs form part of Mutual Funds and
are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) under its Mutual Fund
Regulations. SEBI has been gradually mandating a shift from NAVs valued on amortization
basis to mark to market. (In February 2012, SEBI reviewed the valuation norms to ensure fair
treatment to all investors based on the principles of fair valuation i.e. valuation shall be
reflective of the realizable value of the securities/assets). The entire Assets under
Management (AUM) of Mutual Funds stood at ₹. 5872.17 billion as on March 31, 2012 which
was 6.6 percent of GDP. Of this FIIs had a holding of 0.9 percent and NRIs 6 percent. Thus,
cross border linkages and the consequential impact are also not seen as very high on such
funds.4
Hedge Funds are not significant players in India. Moreover, comprehensive guidelines
(Alternative Investment Fund Guidelines) have been put in place by SEBI to regulate all
funds established in India, which are private pooled investment vehicles raising funds from
Indian or foreign investors.
Transferring of risk off balance sheet by banks by using SIVs/ conduits is not a model
adopted in India. Apart from this, complex and synthetic derivative products which were at
the core of the global crisis are also not presently permitted in India. Further, explicit
regulations have been put in place to ring fence NBFCs from the adverse impact of cross
border linkages and minimizing the financial contagion.(For example, NBFCs can take equity
and fund based exposure while investing overseas within a limit liked to NOF). They are not
permitted to provide implicit support such as guarantees or letters of comfort.
NBFC sector in India - evolution of regulation
Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) in India are defined as companies carrying out a
range of financial activities such as making loans and advances; investing in shares
/bonds/debentures/and other securities; asset financing including leasing, and hire-purchase
finance. The recent additions to this sector have been (i) Infrastructure Finance Companies
(IFC), (ii) Infrastructure Debt Funds (IDF), (iii) Micro Finance Institutions (NBFC- MFI) and
(iv) Factors. In India, NBFCs quintessentially epitomize the shadow banking system as they
perform bank like credit intermediation outside the purview of banking regulation. Apart from
this, where the entire OFI assets account for approximately 24 percent of bank assets as on
March 31, 2012, assets of the NBFC sector alone account for 12 percent, denoting the
significance of NBFCs in the Indian shadow banking system.
As a background to the setting up of the Working Group on NBFCs chaired by Ms. Usha
Thorat, let me briefly touch upon the evolution of regulation of NBFC sector in India. Steps
for regulation of NBFCs were initiated as early as in the sixties. Regulation of NBFCs was
found to be necessary for three reasons viz., ensuring efficacy of credit and monetary policy,
safeguarding depositors' interest and ensuring healthy growth of Non-Banking Financial
Intermediaries (NBFIs). Thus, the Banking Laws (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1963 was
introduced to incorporate a new chapter (i.e., Chapter III B) in the Reserve Bank of India Act,
1934 to regulate the NBFIs. Subsequently, to enable the regulatory authorities to frame
suitable policy measures, several committees were appointed from time to time, to conduct
in-depth study of these institutions and make suitable recommendations for their healthy
growth. These include the Bhabatosh Datta Study Group (1971), the James Raj Study Group
(1974), and the Chakravarty Committee, 1985. Thereafter, the Narasimham Committee
(1991) outlined a framework for streamlining the functioning of the NBFCs, which would
include, in addition to the existing requirements of gearing and liquidity ratios, norms relating
to capital adequacy, debt-equity ratio, credit-concentration ratio, adherence to sound
accounting practices, uniform disclosure requirements and assets valuation. The Joint
Parliamentary Committee (JPC), appointed in connection with the irregularities in the
Securities Transactions, had also recommended that legislative framework should be
strengthened to vest in RBI more powers to effectively regulate NBFCs. The extant
regulatory and supervisory framework as it stands today is based on the recommendations of
the Shah and Khanna Committees (1992 and 1995).
The growing significance of NBFCs was also recognized by the second Narasimham
Committee (1998) as well as by the RBI in its Discussion Paper on Harmonisation of the
Role and Operations of DFIs and Banks. Recognizing the increasing significance of the
sector, the Working Group on Money Supply (Chairman: Dr. Y.V. Reddy) in 1998 proposed a
new measure of liquidity aggregate incorporating NBFCs with public deposits of
₹. 0.20 billion and above.
There was a significant increase in the nature of NBFC activities in the nineties. NBFCs grew
sizably both in terms of their numbers as well as the volume of business transactions. The
number of NBFCs grew more than seven-fold from 7,063 in 1981 to 51,929 in 1996.
Accordingly, based on the recommendations of the Shah Committee, the RBI Act was
amended in January 1997 to provide a comprehensive legislative framework for regulation of
NBFCs by effecting changes in the provisions contained in Chapter III-B and Chapter V of
the Act and vested more powers with the RBI. The regulatory framework was based on the
three pillars viz., onsite supervision, offsite monitoring and exception reporting by auditors.
Though the amended Act provided for registration of all NBFCs, the focus continued to be
the protection of depositors' interest thus covering the deposit taking NBFCs, while keeping
the non-deposit taking NBFCs subject to minimal regulation. These measures resulted in
consolidation of the sector, reduction in the number of deposit taking NBFCs, reduction in the
quantum of public deposits and increase in the number of non-deposit taking NBFCs. The
number of deposit taking NBFCs, including Residuary Non-Banking Finance Companies
(RNBCs), decreased from 1,429 in March 1998, to 273 in March 2012. The deposits held by
these companies (including RNBCs) decreased from ₹. 238 billion to ₹. 101 billion during the
same period.5
With the consolidation of the sector and stabilising of deposit taking NBFCs, the focus in
2006 widened to include non-deposit taking NBFCs which were growing in number as well as
in size. Considering the issue of systemic importance of large NBFCs in view of their size,
their enhanced risk taking capabilities, growing complexity of their activities, and the financial
market interlinkages, a comprehensive regulatory framework was introduced for these
NBFCs. To begin with, non deposit taking companies having asset size of ₹. 1 billion (100
crore) and above were classified as systemically important non deposit taking NBFCs
(NBFCs-ND-SI) and subjected to capital adequacy and credit concentration norms.
Subsequently, liquidity and disclosure norms were made applicable to them. Presently, as on
March 31, 2012, there are 375 NBFCs-ND- SI with a total asset size of ₹. 9213 billion.
The NBFC sector has been the fastest growing segment in the Indian financial sector today
with year on year growth higher than that of banking sector as seen from the figures below:
NBFC sector during the 2008 crisis
The NBFC sector came under pressure during the 2008 crisis due to the funding
interlinkages among NBFCs, mutual funds and commercial banks. NBFCs-ND-SI relied
significantly on short term funding sources such as debentures (largely non convertible short
term debentures), and CPs, which constituted around 56.8 percent of the total borrowings of
NBFCs-ND-SI as on September 30, 2008. These funds were used to finance assets which
were reportedly largely a mix of long term assets, including hire purchase and lease assets,
long term investments, investment in real estate by few companies, and loans and advances.
These mismatches were created mainly as a business strategy for gaining from the higher
spreads. However, there were no fall back alternatives in cases of potential liquidity
constraints. The ripple effect of the turmoil in American and European markets led to liquidity
issues and heavy redemption pressure on the mutual funds in India, as several investors,
especially institutional investors, started pulling out their investments in liquid and money
market funds. Mutual funds being the major subscribers to CPs and debentures issued by
NBFCs, the redemption pressure on MFs translated into funding issues for NBFCs, as they
found raising fresh liabilities or rolling over of the maturing liabilities very difficult. Drying up of
these sources of funds along with the fact that banks were increasingly becoming risk
averse, heightened their funding problems, exacerbating the liquidity tightness.
Measures taken by RBI to enhance availability of liquidity to NBFCs
RBI undertook many measures, both conventional as well as un conventional, to enhance
availability of liquidity to NBFCs such as allowing augmentation of capital funds of
NBFCs-ND-SI through issue of Perpetual Debt Instruments (PDIs), enabling, as a temporary
measure, access to short term foreign currency borrowings under the approval route,
providing liquidity support under Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) to commercial banks to
meet the funding requirements of NBFCs, Housing Finance Companies(HFCs) and Mutual
Funds, and relaxing of restrictions on lending and buy-back in respect of the certificates of
deposit (CDs) held by mutual funds.
31. In addition to these measures, a Stressed Asset Stabilisation Fund viz., IDBI SASF, was
set up to provide liquidity to NBFCs through purchase of securities of NBFCs which would in
turn be refinanced by RBI through purchase of Govt. guaranteed securities issued by the
SASF.
Notwithstanding the market reports, the actual condition of NBFCs was not so alarming
inasmuch as only one NBFC availed refinance from the SASF and no NBFCs went under.
However, this dichotomy between perception and reality serves to show how susceptible the
sector could be to reputational risk. Thus, the significance of the above measures lies also in
their ability to create confidence in the sector.
The crisis did, however, highlight some regulatory issues concerning the non-banking
financial sector, particularly risks arising from regulatory gaps, arbitrage and systemic
inter-connectedness. A need was, therefore, felt to reflect on the broad principles that
underpin the regulatory architecture for NBFCs keeping in view the economic role and
heterogeneity of this sector and the recent international experience. It was felt necessary to
examine in depth, the risks in the NBFC sector in the changed scenario and recommend
appropriate regulatory and supervisory measures to address these risks with the aim of
creating a strong and resilient financial sector which is vital for all round economic growth of
the country. Accordingly a Working Group (Chair: Ms. Usha Thorat) was constituted to
suggest reforms in various important areas relating to NBFC sector. The Working Group
comprised representatives from the industry and co-regulators like SEBI.
Recommendations of the working group
The Working Group in its report submitted in August 2011 made various recommendations
both to ensure the resilience of the NBFC sector and also to contain risks emanating from
the sector in the context of overall financial stability. The recommendations of the Working
Group can broadly be divided into four categories, comprising issues relating to (i) Entry
Poi