Svein Gjedrem: From oil and gas to financial assets - Norway's
Government Pension Fund - Global
Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the
conference "Commodities, the Economy and Money" in Calgary, Canada, 20 June 2008.
* * *
Introduction
Good morning and thank you for the invitation to this highly topical conference. I have been
asked to talk about the "objectives and experience of the Norwegian oil fund". In doing so, I
will try to explain the set-up and purpose of the Fund and draw some preliminary conclusions
about the outcome so far.
Since Norway became an oil nation some 40 years ago, the petroleum sector has grown to
become an important part of our economy. Today, petroleum accounts for approximately 25
per cent of Norway's gross domestic product (GDP).
And even though the production of oil is declining after peaking around the turn of the
millennium, total petroleum production will remain high for many years to come.
The economic challenges posed by petroleum extraction were widely recognised early on.
As early as in 1974, the Norwegian parliament discussed these challenges in depth, and in
the early 1980s, the idea of a fund that would stabilise petroleum revenue spending was
launched. Due to domestic economic turmoil and financial crisis in the late 1980s and early
1990s, it took time before the idea of a fund was turned into actual savings.
Why a Pension Fund?
The Government Petroleum Fund was formally established in 1990. In 2006, the name was
changed to the Government Pension Fund - Global. In spite of the name change, the Fund
is more similar to an endowment than to a pension fund.
Since the first transfer of some USD 400 million was made in 1996, the Fund has grown
rapidly in size. Its assets are currently valued at around USD 400 billion. One third of the
portfolio, about USD 130 billion is invested here in North America. The Fund is expected to
grow rapidly in coming years, and may double in 5-10 years.
The Fund was established as a tool to support prudent management of Norway's petroleum
wealth. One purpose is to shield the non-oil economy from price fluctuations (see Chart 3).
The Fund is also a long-term savings instrument. It will help to cope with future financial
commitments linked to an ageing population.
Accumulation of capital in the Fund reflects the depletion of a non-renewable resource, which
is exchanged for financial assets through the Fund's investments. By setting up the Fund, it
became possible to establish a path for production of oil and gas that is independent of the
profile for petroleum revenue spending.
Furthermore, to effectively shield the non-oil economy, and to make sure that private sector
investment decisions could be made independently of the public sector's saving of petroleum
wealth, the Fund is only invested abroad. This also enhances the expected return on
government wealth and reduces the risk.
The alternative to a fund would have been to directly regulate production by putting a
conservative upper limit on annual extraction. This was attempted in the 1970s and -80s. At
that time, we had a production ceiling of 90 million standard cubic metres per year. This
approach was abandoned in the 1980s. Today, the government steers exploration activities
and awards production licenses, but has no explicit production target. Since the mid-1990s,
total petroleum production has been around 250 million standard cubic metres per year.
The Fund mechanism
The Fund is by law fully integrated with the government budget, and the same priorities are
imposed on spending from the Fund as on any other government spending. This means that
the entire petroleum revenues are transferred to the Fund. An amount equal to the non-oil
budget deficit is then transferred to the fiscal budget. The mechanism ensures that the
accumulation of capital in the Fund is equal to government net financial savings. There is no
corresponding increase in liabilities.
Furthermore, legislation prohibits use of Fund money for purposes not prioritised in the
regular budget processes. There is no hidden use of oil money, or any use for special
purposes. The Fund is strictly and effectively "out of bounds" to special interests.
In 2001, the Norwegian parliament approved new fiscal policy guidelines stipulating that the
annual transfer from the Fund to the fiscal budget - that is annual spending of oil money -
should correspond to the expected real return on the Fund. The expected real return is
estimated at 4 per cent. The point of reference for the spending rule is a normal cyclical
situation. In the event of particularly high capacity utilisation, spending should be lower than
4 per cent, whereas in a cyclical downturn, somewhat higher spending may be appropriate.
The intention is for this wealth to be transferred to future generations, and that each
generation should only spend the returns. The rule gives weight to long-term considerations
when addressing current economic policy challenges. The rule also helps stabilise exchange
rate expectations.
The fiscal rule has the advantage of having intuitive appeal, and it is easy to check whether it
is being followed over the business cycle.
In line with the rule, the transfer from the Fund was higher than the expected real return of 4
per cent in the cyclical downturn in 2003 and the following two years. Since 2006, however,
the transfer has been lower. It should also be noted that the target for the rule is the cyclically
adjusted transfer, shown by the solid line in Chart 6. Automatic stabilisers are allowed to
work, thereby reducing actual transfers during upturns and increasing them during
downturns, as illustrated by the broken line in Chart 6.
Governance structure and management model
Now, let me turn to the Fund management model. The governance structure is based on a
clear division of responsibilities between the political authorities and the operational
management.
•
The Ministry of Finance is the owner of the Fund. The Ministry defines the mandate
and monitors and evaluates performance.
•
The management of the Fund is delegated to Norges Bank. The Bank's task is to
implement the investment strategy and exercise ownership rights. Norges Bank also
provides professional advice to the Ministry on investment strategies.
The Fund's investment strategy is to maximise financial return with moderate risk. The
longterm strategic allocation is defined in terms of a benchmark portfolio, which consists of
equities and fixed income instruments. Equities account for 60 per cent of the Fund's
strategic benchmark portfolio. The size of the Fund implies that it currently owns about 1 per
cent of listed European equities and 1⁄2 per cent of listed equities on a global basis. Fixed
income instruments account for 40 per cent.
Furthermore, the Ministry has recently decided that the Fund should prepare the ground for
investing in real estate at 5 per cent of the strategic benchmark portfolio. In time, this will
reduce the fixed income share to 35 per cent.
Norges Bank has built an organisation with emphasis on investment returns and based on
three fundamental principles: Accountability, transparency and professional standards.
Norges Bank manages parts of the funds internally, while parts are managed by external
managers appointed by the Bank on a commercial basis. Active management has become
an important part of our investment operations. We believe that the search for excess return
has had a strong disciplinary effect on the organisation.
Transparency and disclosure of information is a key feature of the Fund. All investment
principles and guidelines as well as strategic advice and second opinion reports are made
public. We publish quarterly reports on Fund performance, which are presented at press
conferences. The Fund's annual report discloses a list of every single investment held at the
end of the year, and also provides an overview of corporate governance work, including
voting at general meetings.
Initially, transparency was aimed at building confidence among Norwegians, but we have
also seen that our policy of transparency is highly appreciated internationally.
The challenges for the Norwegian economy
The risk of "Dutch disease"1 is often cited when discussing the impact of natural resource
windfalls.2 Dutch disease occurs when the basis for internationally exposed industries is
eroded and fluctuations in economic activity are amplified.
In our case, we can say "so far so good". The economy has been fairly stable and oil price
fluctuations have only had a moderate impact on our currency.
Furthermore, while it is difficult to know how the economy would have developed without oil,
we have a sort of "control group". The other Nordic countries - Denmark, Finland and
Sweden - are comparable in size and structures, but are mainly non-oil economies.3 Three
indicators may be relevant in this context.
First, there is no evidence that our productivity growth has been eroded. In fact, Norway has
generally managed to sustain high productivity growth compared with most other advanced
countries.
Second, there is no evidence that labour force participation has been impaired. In fact, labour
force participation is now high, after having lagged behind our neighbouring countries up to
the mid-1980s.
A third indicator is welfare spending. Here, there is evidence that developments have been
less favourable. Norway has seen a sharp increase in sickness absence and a steadily
higher share of the working-age population is on disability benefit or rehabilitation schemes.
Over the past decade, Norway has underperformed on this score compared with the other
Nordic countries. The growing number of people outside the labour force and on benefits is
increasingly becoming the Achilles' heel of the Norwegian economy.
On balance though, the picture is fairly positive: We have managed to keep macroeconomic
developments on a steady course, we have avoided dramatic changes in industry structure,
and we use our resources fairly efficiently. It is, however, too early to draw definite
conclusions. We probably have to wait another generation or two to see the long-term impact
of this huge windfall.
The debate on sovereign wealth funds
Let me wind up with a few words on the sovereign wealth funds debate.
Typical features of many sovereign wealth funds are long investment horizons, no leverage
and no claims for the imminent withdrawal of funds. This differentiates such funds from for
instance the rising number of leveraged funds and investors with short time horizons. Hence,
sovereign wealth funds have a strong risk-bearing capacity and an ability to accommodate
short-term volatility. Sovereign wealth funds may reduce volatility in asset prices and
increase efficiency. Again, transparency and disclosure of information is an important tool in
building confidence. This runs both ways, of course.
It should also be noted that the separation of spending of petroleum revenues from the
current revenue stream through a fund mechanism allows oil producers to extract petroleum
at a higher rate than would be appropriate if all the proceeds were to be redeployed in the
domestic economy. Hence, the petroleum funds do not just offer an attractive way of
recycling oil producers' revenues in international financial markets, they can also have an
indirect stabilising effect on the oil market.
In my view, sound management of oil-producing countries' petroleum wealth is in everyone's
interest.
Thank you for your attention.
BIS Review 81/2008
BIS Review 81/2008
BIS Review 81/2008
BIS Review 81/2008
BIS Review 81/2008