Manuel Sánchez: The effects of monetary divergence
Remarks by Mr Manuel Sánchez, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Mexico, at the symposium
Jornadas Económicas, organized by the Banco de Guatemala, Guatemala City, 7 June
2016.
* * *
Accompanying graphs can be found at the end of the speech.
I would like to thank the Bank of Guatemala for the invitation to participate in this symposium,
now in its 25th year, which has become an invaluable forum for discussing substantive
economic issues in Latin America. On this occasion, I will devote my comments to the
divergence of monetary policy stances in advanced nations and the potential impact this may
have on emerging economies.
As usual, my remarks are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Bank of Mexico or its Governing Board.
Monetary policy divergence
Central banks guide their actions according to the developments and outlook of their own
economies. Most of them hold as a primary objective a low inflation rate, commonly two or
three percent in annual terms, but they also take into account economic growth, either as an
explicit objective or as an essential piece of information for pursuing price stability.
At any moment, economies could find themselves in different cyclical stages and confronted
with particular challenges. Thus, it should not be surprising that monetary policies among
nations do not coincide.
Not only can monetary stances vary internationally, being tighter or looser than their neutral
references could be, but also, these differences can widen over time. One example of
discrepancy occurred in the 1990s between the United States, which began to tighten policy
in a context of economic growth, and Germany, which started to do the opposite in the face
of higher unemployment stemming from political unification.
Notwithstanding such particular cases, there does seem to exist a certain tendency in the
medium term toward the international synchronization of economic cycles, especially among
high-income countries. Additionally, in recent decades inflation rates have been persistently
declining in advanced as well as non-advanced economies. Consequently, a propensity
towards convergence among monetary policies has become evident, particularly among
developed nations. See Graph 1
In a world in which economic and financial integration has become tighter, it is difficult to
conceive of domestic monetary policies as completely isolated, including those of large
economies. By way of illustration, the U.S Federal Reserve has repeatedly stated that it will
continue to consider global economic and financial developments in its decision-making
process.
The aforementioned output and monetary synchronizations are far from perfect. Since 2013,
which brought us the taper tantrum, the matter of international monetary divergence has
captured the attention of market players in the face of the Fed's monetary normalization and
the foreseen continuation or amplification of loose policies by other key central banks.
However, monetary policy divergence should be put into perspective. While the use of
unconventional monetary tools makes historical comparisons difficult, the widespread nature
of unusually expansive monetary postures leads us to conclude that current and expected
monetary divergence is considerably less pronounced than in the past. The reasons are at
least threefold.
First, the starting point for divergence is unprecedented monetary looseness among
advanced economies. Accommodation to date encompasses the following: policy interest
rates near zero and in some cases negative; further stimulus from considerable enlargement
of central bank balance sheets through large-scale asset purchases; and forward guidance
to orient market expectations.
Second, anticipated U.S. monetary policy normalization, as foreshadowed by the Fed,
includes gradual hikes in the fed funds rate, which would continue to be below the level
consistent with full employment, even after this condition is achieved. Third, the Fed plans to
maintain the size of its balance sheet until interest rate normalization is well advanced.
However, despite the foreseen measured pace, monetary policy divergence has sparked
concerns over possible impacts on other nations, particularly emerging economies. Worry
has increased perhaps because central banks find themselves in unchartered waters.
Indeed, monetary differences across countries have arisen many times in the past. But less
experience with unconventional monetary policy instruments and the intensity of their use
make the present situation unique.
In any case, the dangers are hard to assess, including the complexity of timely withdrawal of
monetary stimulus without violating central bank mandates, and the risk of unleashing a
chain reaction of financial instability. The latter is particularly important in the face of growing
monetary looseness in many countries and continued consideration of additional
accommodation options, such as negative or even more negative policy interest rates,
longer-term interest rate targeting, and monetization of public-sector deficits.1
Possible impacts
To examine the potential effects of monetary divergence in a context of generalized loose
policy in advanced countries, two hypothetical scenarios bear analysis and contrast. The first
is based on an economy which reduces monetary stimulus in a preemptive way for "good
reasons." For example, in a context of anchored inflation expectations, the central bank could
seek to avert aggregate demand pressures coming from an economic upswing.
The second involves the case in which monetary tightening takes place for "bad reasons,"
such as misaligned inflation expectations, high inflation pressures and, possibly, an output
contraction. In both scenarios, transmission channels to other economies are twofold: one
financial and the other real.
The two scenarios would tend to generate opposing effects. In the favorable case, the
financial impact would include an adjustment in international portfolios benefiting assets
denominated in the currency of the country beginning the divergence. Some reversion of
capital flows from economies perceived as having weak fundamentals could also be
expected. The real effect would operate through greater external demand from the leading
country, favoring especially its key trade partners.
The adverse scenario would have contrary effects. In particular, the adjustment of portfolios
would not favor the country leading the divergence, and real support to the rest of the world
economy would be difficult. In both scenarios, the effects could be amplified or weakened by
other non-monetary factors.
Current monetary divergence should be placed within the first scenario, with the United
States as the epicenter. Anticipated monetary decoupling, at least since 2014, has resulted
in a stronger U.S. dollar versus other major currencies. Presumably, the dollar has
strengthened in the face of wider interest rate spreads and better economic performance
from the United States with respect to other developed nations.
Indeed, expectations of normalization in this country have resulted in higher short- and
medium-term market interest rates, giving rise to a flatter yield curve. This, in turn, has led to
wider spreads between U.S. Treasuries and European bonds, such as those of German
bunds at various maturities. See Graph 2
Moreover, in the last two years, financial volatility, as measured by the VIX for instance, has
become more acute at times. Transitory spikes have also been associated with
nonmonetary factors, such as declining commodities prices and jitters over the health of the
Chinese economy. See Graph 3
To date, the financial impact on emerging markets has been relatively moderate. It has
included a slowdown in net portfolio capital inflows and temporary outflows of foreign funds.
See Graph 4
At the same time, external interest rates, as reflected in JP Morgan's EMBI global index,
have seen upward pressures, beginning with the taper tantrum, although access to foreign
financing under still reasonable conditions has continued. Furthermore, domestic interest
rates, which have traditionally followed the path of U.S. rates, have recently gone their own
way, with an upward tendency and widening spreads. See Graph 5
By far, exchange rates have been the most affected financial variable, with generalized
depreciations of emerging-market currencies against the U.S. dollar on a trade-weighted
basis. Flexible exchange rates have served as a valuable buffer against deteriorating
sentiment toward emerging markets. See Graph 6
The positive real effect from U.S. economic recovery has not yet emerged. This is because
the United States has been affected by a downsizing of its energy sector in the face of lower
international oil prices, among other issues, restraining industrial production and external
trade.
The absence of a positive real effect has been particularly noteworthy in the case of my own
country, Mexico, an economy highly linked with that of the United States. In spite of
significant peso depreciation, low U.S. external demand has dominated as a drag behind
declining growth for Mexico's total manufacturing exports, a high percentage of which goes
to its northern neighbor.
For several years, global monetary accommodation has had a spillover effect on monetary
policies in emerging economies, with postures generally looser than what would be dictated
by Taylor rules. The beginning of the withdrawal of U.S. monetary stimulus has led to higher
policy interest rates in some countries, partly closing this gap.
Moreover, during recent years, some economies have used capital controls, with generally
lower-than-expected results, and direct exchange market interventions, in order to preclude
larger currency depreciations. Motivations for the latter vary across countries, including
protection of inflation expectations and fear of floating.2
Challenges and outlook
Advanced and emerging economies face considerable challenges. For developed nations,
the following possible difficulties can be identified. First, incipient monetary divergence could
butt up against domestic or external limits. For example, the Fed could decide that dollar
appreciation or deterioration of international conditions could detain U.S. economic recovery.
In this case, one cannot rule out interruption in normalization or even a return to greater
stimulus in the United States.
Second, continued orderly unwinding of lax monetary policy, including eventually smaller
central bank balance sheets, could prove to be complicated. Third, the prevalence of the
dollar as a safe-haven currency could weaken the credit channel through which loose
monetary policy works in other economies.
Fourth, given diminishing returns from accommodation, further attempts at easing could
damage the credibility of monetary policy. And finally, the tendency toward cyclical
convergence could lead to the re-synchronization of monetary policies at some point.
In this context, the panorama for emerging economies could deteriorate significantly.
Divergence is already reflected in portfolio adjustments and asset prices. However, as new
information on monetary stances in advanced countries becomes available, new changes
may ensue. In this regard, only surprises would carry weight.
Possible effects could include more portfolio re-composition, decompression of interest rate
term premiums, as well as further currency depreciations. The most adverse effects will likely
be concentrated in those countries viewed as suffering from financial imbalances and fragile
economic fundamentals. Thus, policymakers should focus on correcting deficiencies and
solidifying strengths, including sound fiscal stances, opportune monetary policy actions, and
the implementation of structural changes to foster long-term productivity growth.
Concluding remarks
Incipient monetary divergence has sparked concerns for market players as the current
begins to shift slowly away from unprecedented monetary expansion. Advanced economies
face an arduous task in managing the withdrawal of extraordinary stimulus, however gradual
it may be. In particular, historically unequaled use of unconventional monetary tools makes it
hard to know just how this scenario will eventually unfold.
Until now, negative financial impacts on emerging markets from the beginning of this new
phase have been relatively moderate. At the same time, however, the real positive expected
effect of the U.S. economic recovery has not yet materialized. This is due in part to factors
such as severely diminished oil prices. Given all the uncertainties in the present context, the
outlook for emerging economies could easily deteriorate, and thus they should concentrate
on fortifying their fundamentals as never before.
Graph 1
Advanced economies: Cyclical component of GDP1
% deviation from the trend
4
United States
Japan
3
United Kingdom
Germany
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
*2016
1/ Trend component extracted by Hodrick-Prescott filter.
*/ First quarter.
Source: Own calculations with data from Haver Analytics.
Graph 2
The United States and Germany: Interest rate spreads1
Basis points
200
3-month
160
5-year
10-year
120
80
40
0
-40
June 2
-80
-120
Jul-10 Jul-11 Jul-12 Jul-13 Jul-14 Jul-15
Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
Apr-10 Oct-10 Apr-11 Oct-11 Apr-12 Oct-12 Apr-13 Oct-13 Apr-14 Oct-14 Apr-15 Oct-15 Apr-16
1/ U.S. Treasuries minus German Bunds.
Source: Bloomberg.
Graph 3
The United States: Volatility in the options market (VIX)1
%
50
June 3
40
30
20
10
0
Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
Sep-10 Sep-11 Sep-12 Sep-13 Sep-14 Sep-15
May-10 May-11 May-12 May-13 May-14 May-15 May-16
1 Volatility implied by S&P 500 index over the next 30 days, calculated by taking a weighted average of the
implied volatility of eight call and put options. Source: Bloomberg.
Graph 4
Net portfolio capital flows to emerging economies1
Billions of dollars
160
120
80
40
0
-40
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2*
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2015
1/ Net purchases by non-residents of stocks and bonds in emerging economies. Emerging economies are
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, South Korea,
Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand,
Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. */ Includes estimates for April and May. Source:
IIF.
Graph 5
Emerging economies and the United States: 10-year interest rate
%
8 4
1
Emerging economies
June 2
United States
7 3
6 2
5 1
Jul-10 Jul-11 Jul-12 Jul-13 Jul-14 Jul-15
Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
Apr-10 Oct-10 Apr-11 Oct-11 Apr-12 Oct-12 Apr-13 Oct-13 Apr-14 Oct-14 Apr-15 Oct-15 Apr-16
1/ Unweighted average of interest rates in Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Romania,
Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela.
Source: Own calculations with data from Bloomberg.
Graph 6
Emerging economies: Local currencies versus the U.S. dollar1
January 2007 = 100
100
90
80
70
60
Jul-10 Jul-11 Jul-12 Jul-13 Jul-14 Jul-15
Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
Apr-10 Oct-10 Apr-11 Oct-11 Apr-12 Oct-12 Apr-13 Oct-13 Apr-14 Oct-14 Apr-15 Oct-15 Apr-16
1/ Trade-weighted average of values against the U.S. dollar of the following currencies: the Chinese yuan,
Russian ruble, Turkish lira, Korean won, South African rand, Brazilian real, Indian rupee, Polish zloty,
Hungarian florin, Malaysian ringgit, Thai baht, Chilean peso, Indonesian rupee, Philippine peso, Colombian
peso, and Peruvian sol.
Source: Own calculations with data from Bloomberg.