BANK OF UGANDA
Key Note Address by
Louis Kasekende (PhD)
Deputy Governor, Bank of Uganda
at the 7th Annual International Leadership Conference organized by
Makerere University Business School (MUBS)
Governance in the Financial Sector: Is the Financial Sector Over
Topic:
Regulated?
Entebbe, Uganda
November 29, 2017
Heads of Regulatory bodies within Uganda's financial sector,
The Principal, Makerere University Business School (MUBS)
Invited Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Good morning.
I would like to begin by commending the Makerere University Business School
for organising this International Leadership Conference and by thanking the
Principal of the Business School, Prof. Balunywa, for inviting me to give a
keynote address. The theme of my address this morning is financial regulation.
I want to explore the objectives and the economic rationale for regulating the
financial sector. I will then address the question of whether the financial sector
is over regulated in Uganda.
What is the rationale for regulation of the financial sector?
Throughout the world, in both developed and developing countries, the financial
sector is one of the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy. Many types
of financial institutions are subject to a raft of regulations, such as capital
requirements, restrictions on their business activities and financial disclosure
requirements which are not applied to most other types of business.
For the most part, non-financial sector businesses, such as manufacturing,
construction or agriculture, are subject to health and safety standards to protect
their employees and some minimum product standards to protect their
customers. However, apart from that, the governance of their business activities
is left to the market and is not subject to regulation by a public agency. Why is
the financial sector different?
There are two fundamental reasons why the financial sector is much more
highly regulated than other sectors of the economy: leverage and information.
The combination of high levels of leverage in financial institutions and
informational imperfections provide a prudential rationale for financial sector
regulation which is not relevant for non-financial sector businesses.
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Many types of financial institutions are highly leveraged; their borrowings
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their debt liabilities are a multiple of their capital, in contrast to most non-
financial sector businesses. The Ugandan business sector as a whole has equity
and reserves which are almost as large as its debt liabilities.1 In contrast, the
Ugandan banking industry has debt liabilities (mainly deposits) which are
almost five times larger than its equity and reserves. This means that if a bank
fails, the consequences in terms of losses to its creditors are likely to be much
greater than would be the case if a non-financial business were to fail.
Furthermore, the creditors of a bank are mostly the general public who have
deposited their savings in the bank, whereas the creditors of a non-financial
business are mostly other types of businesses, including financial institutions.
Hence the social consequences of a bank failure are much more serious than
those of a non-financial business.
The pioneering research of economists such as Joseph Stiglitz into the
economics of information has shown that financial markets are characterised by
problems of information - what economists refer to as imperfect or asymmetric
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information which prevent purely market determined outcomes being optimal
for all participants in these markets. In essence, these problems arise because
financial assets, such as loans, deposits and equity, are claims which will be
realised at some point in the future, and the future is inherently uncertain.
Therefore, the value of financial assets is also inherently uncertain.
However, information is not equally distributed among all market participants.
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The insiders who control financial institutions their controlling shareholders
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and managers usually have access to better information about the factors
which will influence the value of financial assets than do the creditors, mainly
depositors, of these institutions. As such, there is an informational asymmetry.
Informational asymmetries also occur in equity markets; the owners and
managers of firms which issue equity on stock markets have more information
about the future financial prospects of their firm than do the investors who buy
equity on the stock markets.
Asymmetric information offers opportunities for the owners and managers of
financial institutions to exploit their informational advantage at the expense of
their depositors. High leverage exacerbates the incentives on financial
institutions to exploit informational asymmetries, because in highly leveraged
financial institutions the upside rewards of high risk investment strategies
accrue to the owners of these institutions, whereas the downside risk is borne by
their creditors.
Consequently an unregulated financial system will contain incentives for
excessive risk taking, at the expense of creditors such as depositors and of the
stability of the financial system. This is not because the owners and managers of
financial institutions are inherently crooked or incompetent, but because their
interests are not aligned with those of the creditors of their institutions and
because asymmetric information impedes the ability of the creditors to
adequately safeguard their own interests.
It is this which provides the primary rationale for the regulation of the financial
system by a public agency. This regulation is prudential in nature; it is intended
to ensure that financial institutions are soundly manged and thereby to protect
their depositors, or other customers such as holders of insurance policies, and
also to protect the overall stability of the financial system.
The regulatory framework in Uganda
Uganda has four separate financial sector regulators which each regulate and
supervise a specific set of financial institutions or financial markets. These four
regulators are the Bank of Uganda, the Insurance Regulatory Authority, the
Capital Markets Authority and the Retirement Benefits Regulatory Authority
which regulate, respectively, deposit taking financial institutions, insurance
companies, the capital markets and the pension sector.
We have separate regulators rather than one single multi-sector financial
regulator mainly because there are qualitative differences between the four main
types of financial markets in terms of the objectives of regulation and especially
with regard to the supervisory methodologies and techniques employed by the
regulators. Consequently, there would be little to be gained by combining the
regulation of, for example, banks and financial markets, within one single
regulatory agency. This is the case in most countries, where banking regulation
and supervision is separate from that pertaining to non-bank financial
institutions and markets.
Each regulator in Uganda conducts its supervisory and regulatory operations
according to the requirements of a specific piece of legislation. Deposits taking
financial institutions are regulated under the Financial Institutions Act, 2004
and the Micro Deposit Taking Institutions Act, 2003; insurance companies are
regulated under the Insurance Act, 2017; Capital markets are regulated under
the Capital Markets Authority Act and its subsequent amendments; the pensions
industry under the Retirement Benefits Regulatory Authority Act, 2011.
Hence all of the four financial sector regulators conduct their operations within
a legal framework which has been legislated for by Parliament, and which sets
out their statutory responsibilities, objectives and powers.
The primary objectives of each regulator depend on the characteristics of the
financial market that they regulate. For example, the majority of the liabilities of
banks are customer deposits. Banks also dominate the financial sector and
perform crucial functions in the economy, such as transacting payments.
Consequently the primary objectives of the bank regulator, the Bank of Uganda,
is to safeguard the interests of depositors, so that they do not lose their savings
as a result of reckless bank management or fraud, and to protect the overall
stability of the banking system; i.e. to prevent a banking crisis which would be
extremely disruptive for the economy.
In contrast to the banking system, the main participants in capital markets are
wholesale investors which are relatively sophisticated in terms of their financial
acumen; these investors consist mainly of financial institutions such as pension
funds. Moreover, the capital markets are not large enough in Uganda to pose
any systemic dangers to the wider economy. Consequently, the regulatory
priority of the Capital Markets Authority is market conduct, so that all investors
are treated fairly by issuers of securities and brokers and that they have accurate
information on which to base their investment decisions.
Is the Financial Sector in Uganda Over-regulated?
I will now turn to the question posed in the title of this address; is the financial
sector over-regulated? How should we attempt to answer such a question?
The approach that I will adopt is to acknowledge that bank regulation has costs
as well as benefits for the economy, and that regulation is optimal, in the
economic sense of maximising welfare, when there is a balance between costs
and benefits. The potential costs of regulation are that it might stifle growth and
risk taking, especially lending to the private sector, whereas the benefits are
soundly managed financial institutions which do not put their depositors funds
at risk or jeopardise the overall stability of the financial system. I will
concentrate on the regulation of the banking system for two reasons; first
because it is more straightforward to identify indicators for the costs and
benefits of regulation in banking than in other financial markets and second,
because the banking industry is by far the most important component of the
financial markets in Uganda, with commercial banks accounting for around 80
percent of the total assets of the financial system.
I will start by discussing the benefits of banking regulation. As I noted earlier,
funds
the primary objectives of banking regulation are to safeguard depositors'
and to prevent a systemic financial crisis, so we should evaluate the benefits of
regulation in terms of those objectives.
regulator aim to safeguard depositors' funds? The BOU, in
How does the bank
common with other bank regulators around the world, does not aim to prevent
every single bank failure. In principle it would be possible to do this, by
restricting banks to invest only in safe assets, but that would prevent banks from
making one of their most important contributions to the economy, the extension
of credit to the private sector. Extending credit is inherently risky, because not
all borrowers will be able to repay their loans. Consequently, bank regulators
accept that banks must incur some risk if they are to perform their proper
functions, and that optimal bank regulation, therefore, cannot prevent all bank
failures. Bank regulation aims to ensure that banks do not take excessive risks
and also that they properly manage their risks, for example by adequate
diversification of their loan portfolio, so that bank failures are the exception
rather than the norm.
One of the most important tools of bank regulation is the minimum capital
adequacy requirement, which is based on the globally agreed approach set out
in the Basel Capital Accords. Capital adequacy requirements stipulate that
banks must hold a minimum amount of regulatory capital as a percent of their
risk weighted assets. In Uganda, banks must hold total capital which is at least
12 percent of their risk weighted assets. The purpose of these capital adequacy
requirements is to ensure that banks hold a buffer which can absorb losses and
thus protect their deposits. If a bank suffers losses because of, for example, bad
loans, these losses are first absorbed by the bank's capital. It is only if the losses
exceed the bank's capital that the bank's depositors or other creditors will incur
losses.
To safeguard depositors, the BOU is mandated under the Financial Institutions
Act, 2004 to implement prompt corrective actions, which are triggered by a
failure of a bank to comply with the capital adequacy regulations or by other
indicators of financial distress. These prompt corrective actions are designed
either to restore the bank to a sound financial condition, for example through
recapitalisation by its owners, or if that is not possible, to trigger intervention by
the BOU to resolve the failing bank in some way, for example by closure or by
selling it to another bank, before significant losses to its deposits can occur.
What is the record of Uganda with respect to bank failures and losses of
deposits? The current legal framework for bank regulation was put in place in
2004 when Parliament enacted the Financial Institutions Act, legislation which
strengthened bank regulation following the bank failures that had occurred in
the 1990s. Since the enactment of the Financial Institutions Act, 2004, there
have been three bank failures in Uganda: two very small banks in 2012 and
2014 and one larger one in 2016. The combined deposit market share of the
three banks, at the time that each one was closed, was about seven percent.
Because the BOU intervened in these banks in a prompt manner, in line with the
mandatory prompt corrective actions stipulated in the Financial Institutions Act,
depositors did not lose any of their money. In all three cases, the BOU was able
to transfer the failed banks' deposits in full to other
banks through Purchase of
Assets and Assumption of Liabilities transactions, using the powers conferred
on the BOU by the FIA. Had the BOU delayed its interventions in these failed
banks, the losses which they incurred would have grown much larger and as a
consequence it would have been much more difficult to ensure that depositors'
funds were repaid in full.
Consequently, in terms of the objective of safeguarding depositors' funds, I
think that it is fair to argue that bank regulation has been successful, in that bank
failures have been few in number and that, when banks have failed; prompt
regulatory intervention has protected their deposits from losses. In addition,
given that the banks which failed collectively comprised less than 5 percent of
the banking system's deposits, Uganda has not come close to suffering a
systemic banking crisis. Hence the second strategic objective of the BOU's
bank regulation, that of preventing a systemic financial crisis, has also been
achieved.
Let me now turn to the potential costs of bank regulation. As I noted earlier, the
more stringent are bank regulations, the more difficult it will be for banks to
incur risks (i.e. by investing in risky assets) and this in turn will impede the
growth of bank lending and stifle the overall dynamism of the banking system.
Does the performance of the banking system since the enactment of the
Financial Institutions Act, 2004 offer any evidence that bank lending has been
stifled by over regulation?
In September 2004, the total loans of the banking system amounted to 37
percent of its deposits. At that time the Ugandan banking system was still a
relatively low intermediation banking system. Since 2004, however, rates of
intermediation have risen markedly. In September 2017, the loan to deposit
ratio was 64 percent. This ratio had been as high as 78 percent in 2011, during
year. Most of the increase in the banking system's rate
the credit boom of that
of intermediation took place in the five years immediately following the
enactment of the FIA, 2004, which does not suggest that the more stringent
prudential regulations embodied in the FIA have impeded bank lending to the
private sector.
Another approach to assessing whether regulation has impeded bank lending to
the private sector is to ask whether specific regulatory provisions have been a
binding constraint on lending. As a mentioned earlier, banks are required to
hold a minimum amount of capital as a percent of their risk weighted assets.
Loans are the main component of risk weighted assets, with a risk weighting of
100 percent. If a bank is only just able to comply with the minimum regulatory
capital adequacy ratio, it cannot increase its holdings of risk weighted assets, for
example, by expanding its loan portfolio, unless it also mobilises more capital.
In such circumstances, the capital adequacy ratio will be a binding constraint on
the growth of bank lending. Has this been the case in Uganda?
In the period since the enactment of the FIA, 2004, the statutory minimum
requirement for banks' total capital has been 12 percent of their risk weighted
assets. Over that period, the banking systems' actual levels of total capital
averaged 18.8 percent of its risk weighted assets and it was never lower than
16.4 percent at any point during this period. Hence at the level of the banking
system, which is what is relevant for lending to the overall economy, the capital
adequacy requirement has not been a binding constraint to bank lending.
Of course, at the level of some individual banks, the statutory capital adequacy
requirement has been a binding constraint on lending and other forms of risk
taking in circumstances where banks have been suffering from financial
distress. This is the purpose of the capital adequacy ratio; when banks are
suffering financial distress, their risk taking must be curtailed to protect their
deposits. As I discussed earlier, bank capital provided a buffer which helped to
protect deposits in the three cases of bank failure which have occurred in recent
years. Hence I would argue that our capital adequacy requirements have not
curtailed bank lending at the aggregate level but have made an essential
contribution to safeguarding depositors' funds in the few instances when banks
have incurred financial distress.
Conclusion
Financial regulation in Uganda is based on well-established global principles,
such as the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Regulation, and which
have been incorporated into the legislation which governs regulation in the four
main segments of the financial system; banks and other deposit taking
institutions, insurance companies, pension funds and the capital markets.
There are sound economic reasons for subjecting the financial sector to greater
regulation than other sectors of the economy, but I would argue that there is no
compelling evidence to suggest that the banking sector is overregulated in
Uganda.
No system of regulation is perfect, but the record of banking sector performance
since 2004, when the current banking legislation was enacted, indicates that the
primary objectives of bank regulation have been realised and that this has been
achieved without significant negative impacts on lending growth and
intermediation.
Thank you for listening.