MONETARY POLICY REPORT
BEFORE THE
PRESENTATION
OF THE
FINANCE COMMISSION
OF THE
HONORABLE SENATE REPUBLIC
Mario Marcel
Governor
Central Bank of Chile
5 December 2018
Introduction
of the Senate's Finance
Mr President Commission, Senator Juan Pablo Letelier, senators members of
this Commission, ladies, gentlemen,
I am grateful for your invitation to present the vision of the Board of the Central Bank of Chile (BCCh)
on the recent macroeconomic developments, prospects, and implications for monetary policy. This
vision is contained in detail in our December 2018 Monetary Policy Report published this morning.
Its contents provide the background for the decision adopted by the Board at yesterday's Monetary
Policy Meeting, and consider the October Imacec1 that was released today.
At yesterday's meeting, the Board decided unanimously to keep the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR)
unchanged at 2.75 percent. At the same time, we reiterated that the evolution of macroeconomic
conditions make it possible and necessary to gradually reduce the monetary stimulus.
This decision is consistent with the analysis and baseline projection scenario I will be sharing with
you now. This analysis begins noting that annual inflation has risen throughout the year. After being
under 2% almost the entire second half of 2017, today annual inflation is around 3%. Although this
increase owes partly to the more volatile components of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the
depreciation of the peso, inflation of the items in the basket that are most sensitive to the activity
gap-ie. services and nontradables-has risen gradually, but steadily, over the course of 2018. This
is in line with the growth recovery that began more than a year ago, in a context of favorable external
conditions and a clearly expansionary monetary impulse.
This process took a pause in the third quarter due to specific factors affecting mining and
manufacturing, but it is estimated to resume in the fourth quarter. The October Imacec released this
morning is an indication, as it shows activity growing 4.2% annually, with the non-mining component
growing 5.1%. With this, the economy will grow 4% this year and between 3.25% and 4.25% in 2019.
Inflation will follow a similar path, slowing down for some months as a result of the fall in
international fuel prices, to then begin rising and converging to 3% towards the end of 2019.
Key factors in this outlook are the observed dynamism of investment and a vision of the labor market
that, once all the available information has been analyzed, and factoring in the impact of the
significant immigrant flow of recent years, shows that its dynamism is in line with the better
performance of the economy. Accordingly, the evolution of macroeconomic conditions makes it
necessary to reduce the monetary stimulus, a process that will continue to be implemented gradually
and cautiously, in a context where there is still high uncertainty coming from the external scenario.
Recent economic developments
As had been anticipated in a number of Monetary Policy Reports, in the third quarter GDP slowed
down its annual growth rate with respect to the first half of the year. This is consistent with a scenario
1
The Imacec (Índice Mensual de Actividad Económica) literally corresponds to the "Economic Activity
Monthly Indicator".
in which economic growth is closer to potential-estimated to lie in the 3% to 3.5% range-given
the progress made in the process of closing capacity gaps, the end of specific factors that had favored
growth in the first half and a more challenging comparison base in the second (Figure 1). In any case,
the deceleration of the last quarter was sharper than expected, highlighting the worsened performance
of mining and manufacturing. In the former, there were operational difficulties in some mines; in the
latter a significant and greater than expected effect from a string of holidays in September.
All of us who devote ourselves to analyzing the economy and its evolution should bear in mind how
difficult it is to draw medium-term conclusions from the observation of high frequency data. Time
and again, we have seen public discussions about the state of the economy that are based on a
particular observation, which shortly down the line has a significant reversal that renders lots of pages
of study useless. The case of last September offers a good example. The Imacec of that month was
strongly influenced by the so-called calendar effect, which is given by the number of working days
in a month and its composition (how many Mondays, Tuesdays, and so on). In Box III.1 of this Report
we note that in 2018 the month of September had two peculiarities that extended the calendar effect
beyond the estimate: two less working days than September of last year and a distribution in national
holidays that led many people to take the full week off. This produced a significant drop in
manufacturing activity, which also reflected in energy consumption and the hours worked in the
month (Figure 2). After some people attributed it to a more permanent economic phenomenon, the
October Imacec data, released this morning, shows the transient nature of the September calendar
effect on manufacturing. Actually, measured in twelve months, non-mining activity grew 5.1%,
where the higher growth is explained by the performance of manufacturing and trade, the two sectors
that appeared to have retreated in September.
In this way, the strong fluctuations that the calendar effect may cause in particular months underscore
the need to carefully analyze the evolution of high-frequency activity indicators. It is possible for a
month's activity data to show a steep drop that does not necessarily respond to economic factors and
that are later offset in subsequent months, without either being construed as a change in the
mediumterm trajectory of the economy.
On the domestic expenditure side, a development of the third quarter most worth noting was the
strengthening of investment which made up for a mild slowdown in consumption. By investment
components, special mention deserves gross formation of fixed capital in machinery and equipment,
as its rates of change in annual terms have remained high throughout the year (Figure 3).
Our 2018-2020 growth forecast
Turning to our projections, after growing 2.8% in the third quarter, we estimate growth for the full
year at 4%. This projection-which considers October data up to the statistical closing of the
Monteray Policy Report-is in the lower bound of the range estimated in September (4%-4.5%),
mainly due to the deterioration of mining activity. However, compared with what we foresaw before
September, the growth in 2018 is in the upper bound of the range (Figure 4). For the next two years,
we still estimate that the economy will grow around potential, gradually approaching trend growth.
Thus, the projection ranges considered in September are maintained: 3.25% to 4.25% in 2019; 2.75%
to 3.75% in 2020.
For spending, we anticipate a change in composition, to higher growth in investment and some
slowdown in consumption. Several antecedents point to investment significantly outperforming our
September estimate, including important upward revisions in the Corporation of Capital Goods'
(CBC) Project Survey, the behavior of capital goods imports, the evolution of more expansionary
conditions of credit supply and demand (Bank Credit Survey) and qualitative information from our
Business Perceptions Report (IPN). Thus, for 2019, our gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) growth
forecast rises to 6% (4.5% in September), and for 2020 the near 4% figures are maintained.
The case of mining investment is analyzed in detail in Box III.2 of the Report. According to the latest
survey of the CBC-released in mid-October-for the period 2018-2021 investment expenditure of
the mining projects it covers went from about 5.40 billion dollars to 10.60 billion. The greatest
differences are concentrated in the years 2019 and 2020, when the surveyed investment is about 3.5
billion dollars higher than previously expected. This leap is the result of including a small number of
projects that have advanced in their realization, but whose scope causes ripple effects in the baseline
scenario. For 2018, where the incremental effect of the new survey is more limited, it is expected that
Mining GFCF will increase 18% annually (just over 3 percentage points more than projected in
September). For 2019, its annual expansion rate is revised from 7% in the September Report to 16%
in our current estimate. By 2020, although the increase in level is notorious compared to the previous
projection, its rate of annual variation compared to 2019 is not so different, as it remains a little over
3% (Figure 5).
Regarding consumption, it has lost some dynamism most recently, but is forecast to resume growth
at a pace aligned with GDP. This is based on the growth shown by the wage bill, when considering
National Statistics Institute's
the (INE) revised salary information, the evolution of the hours
habitually worked and the employment growth obtained by inputting the effects of the immigration
flow of recent years. Plus, imports of consumer goods are still high. In the fiscal area, we use as a
working assumption that in 2019 the economy will receive a boost consistent with the approved
budget. From then onwards, we assume that the structural deficit will follow the path of gradual
descent defined by the authority (Table 1).
External scenario
On the external front, the baseline scenario expects a reduction in the next two years of the momentum
that the Chilean economy will receive from abroad, although it will remain positive. On the one hand,
after reaching the peak of this growth cycle in 2017 and 2018, in 2019-2020 the expansion rate of our
trading partners' activity will be reduced. On the other hand, in the last few quarters the relevant
financial conditions for the emerging economies began to normalize, a process that will continue in
the next two years. The baseline scenario admits new episodes of volatility in the international
financial markets, insofar as they do not escalate to a widespread negative shock on emerging
economies. Finally, the recent drop in the oil price means relatively stable terms of trade in 2019 and
2020. This considers an average copper price similar to September's: USD 2.85 in 2019 and 2.80 in
2020; and a Brent-WTI average oil price around USD 60 dollars in the period (Table 2).
Domestic financial conditions
At home, financial conditions are still favorable. On one hand, domestic long-term interest rates and
risk indicators have remained relatively isolated from external events, while shorter interest rates have
risen in line with monetary policy developments. In turn, the cost of credit has remained low and
loans-mainly the commercial and consumer segments-show somewhat higher growth in a context
where lending standards have relaxed somewhat (Figure 6). The stability of the local financial
markets contrasts with those of other emerging countries in recent months. This is based to a large
extent on the cushioning role of our exchange rate float and the substantial availability of domestic
financing. Thus, the exchange rate has shown major ups and downs in the past few months, fluctuating
between CLP 660 and 690 most of the time. Compared to November last year, the peso has
depreciated close to 7% against the dollar, consistently with the global strengthening of the US
currency. The real exchange rate level is near its averages of the last 15 to 20 years. As a working
assumption, we estimate that it will oscillate around these values throughout the projection horizon.
Inflation
As I mentioned at the beginning, after being under 2% annually almost the entire second half of 2017,
headline inflation has been rising this year, to approach 3% in recent months. Although part of this
rise is explained by the more volatile CPI items and the peso depreciation, inflation of the basket
components that are more sensitive to the activity gap (ie. services and non-tradables) has increased
gradually but steadily over the course of 2018 (Figure 7).
In terms of projections, the drastic fall in fuel prices results in a downward revision to CPI inflation
this year and next, ending 2018 and 2019 barely below 3%. Towards 2020, once these effects fade
out, the CPI inflation will be around 3%. The CPIEFE-total CPI excluding food and energy
componentes-inflation, in turn, will approach 3% in the first half of 2019, to later stay in the
neighborhood until the end of the projection horizon (Figure 8).
Monetary policy
About monetary policy, the same as in September, the Board considers that the evolution of
macroeconomic conditions makes it necessary to gradually withdraw the current monetary stimulus.
Key in this judgment is our assessment of the size of the capacity gaps compared with the magnitude
of the monetary stimulus: while the former has decreased, monetary policy is still very expansionary.
The baseline scenario uses as a working assumption that the monetary policy rate will continue to rise
in the coming months to approach its neutral level of 4% to 4.5% in the first half of 2020. The Board
has stated that it expects to adjust the MPR in a gradual and prudent manner. In particular, the
implementation of monetary policy will be conditional on the effects of incoming information on the
projected inflation dynamics, making the necessary adjustments to policy measures if faced with
significant deviations in either direction.
Risk scenarios
As usual, there are internal and external elements that may alter the projections I just presented you.
Like in the past several quarters, the risk balance of the external scenario relevant to Chile remains
biased downward.
The main risk continues to be a drastic deterioration of financial conditions facing emerging
economies, which could result from some of many elements. On one hand, whatever happens in the
US is important to us, because of its effects on inflation as well as its monetary policy and economic
outlook. On the other hand, major geopolitical risks persist. The trade conflict has tended to refocus
on the US versus China, in a context where the Chinese economies have activated several stimulus
measures, but financial risks remain while the economy rebalances. In any case, the meetings held by
the two nations during the G-20 convention seems to indicate that this conflict will not escalate any
further, at least for some time. In Europe, the uncertainty surrounding Brexit and the complex
situation in Italy has taken on greater force. Finally, although we believe that the drop in the oil price
responds primarily to supply-side factors-which reduces short-term inflationary pressures-it
remains to be established to what extent this could be reflecting more permanent demand-side factors.
Recent months have seen a substantial adjustment in financial asset prices in the developed world
that could be signaling a change in risk premiums, consistent with a scenario of uncertainty that has
prevailed for quite some time.
On the domestic front, we estimate that risks for activity are unbiased. The economy has decelerated
with respect to early in the year, which had been long expected. However, this deceleration could be
more persistent if consumption fails to recover its expected dynamism. Meanwhile, the rebound of
investment could be stronger as other large-scale projects progress.
As for inflation, we estimate that risks are unbiased. Various indicators suggest that the economy will
further consolidate the process of closing the capacity gaps, while others show the reaction of the
more sensitive CPI components. Thus, expectations two years out are aligned with the policy target.
It should be noted that this new Monetary Policy Report features greater insight of the implications
of risk scenarios for monetary policy. This will allow having a better appreciation of the Central
Bank's reaction to deviations from the baseline scenario. This reflects the Board's purpose of
enhancing transparency in the conduct of monetary policy and provide guidance to the markets and
the community on its possible future evolution.
Summing up, we continue to assume that capacity gaps have been decreasing in recent quarters and
will continue to do so in the next two years. In these circumstances, for inflation to converge to the
target in the policy horizon, it is necessary that the monetary stimulus continue to be gradually
withdrawn in the coming months. With this, we reaffirm our commitment to conduct monetary policy
with flexibility, so that projected inflation stands at 3% over the two-year horizon.
A new supplement to the Monetary Policy Report: The labor market
The labor market plays a central role in the functioning of the economy, and is particularly important
for monetary policy. In the short term, the way this market responds to shocks and adjusts
employment and wages, is key in the behavior of variables such as activity, consumption and prices.
In the long term, the labor market plays a crucial role in trend growth, because of both the evolution
of the labor factor and its contribution to productivity growth.
Accordingly, the analytical framework of monetary policy has always paid special attention to the
twists and turns of the labor market. In fact, this is a central axis in the conceptual framework modern
monetary policy is based on, from the different notions of the Phillips curve to the Neo Keynesian
models of general equilibrium that today sustain our forecasting and analysis. With this in mind, we
have attached to our December Monetary Policy Report a special study on the functioning of the labor
market. It is based on the analysis of new databases that allow us to understand some of the clues to
how this market operates, that were beyond our reach in the recent past.
The analysis of the labor market, even if done with the intention of drawing macroeconomic
implications, must pay attention to its structure and to the way in which the individual decisions of
millions of workers and employers-that differ from each other in more ways than one-determine
how the aggregates behave. However, studying this diversity empirically is no easy task, and is often
absent from the macroeconomic debate. Most labor market indicators that are regularly reported and
discussed in the public scene, including wage indexes, unemployment rates or job creation, are not
only highly aggregated, but also represent net movements. This implies that much relevant
information, such as differences in the behavior of different groups or changes in the composition of
the flows, is not present in the analysis or public debate. The omission of this information has more
weight in economies such as Chile, where the composition of the labor force and employment is very
heterogeneous and can change in quite short periods as part of its very process of economic
development.
Fortunately, advances in data processing capacity have greatly increased the possibilities of going
beyond the aggregate indicators, complementing them with the use of microdata associated with the
behavior and characteristics of individual workers and employers. In the case of Chile, access to new
databases from administrative records, together with the ability to process that volume of information
in an analytical manner, is especially valuable. The use of disaggregated information is necessary to
better characterize and understand these developments, as well as to make sense of apparent puzzles
and paradoxes in the labor market in recent years.
The labor supply movements of recent years provides a good example of how important it is to have
alternative sources of information. While several indicators suggest that during the last year the
Chilean economy has been closing its capacity gaps, traditional labor market statistics taken from
different surveys rather show a weakening in the creation of employment, stirring reasonable doubts
about how much of the recovery of growth has been transmitted to employment and what explains
the apparent lag between both variables. This, in a context in which sources of administrative
information-such as the number of pension fund affiliates or of contributors to unemployment
insurance-tend to show an improved performance of the labor market (Figure 9).
In the case of employment, the statistics traditionally used in Chile are built by extrapolating the
results of surveys to the population, using expansion factors, which in turn are based on population
projections that are updated at every Census. Thus, between one update and the next, the surveys do
not have the capacity to reflect exogenous changes in demographics. Therefore, a phenomenon of
immigration of the magnitude that our country has experienced in recent years cannot be represented
correctly until the expansion factors are updated.
So, information about levels in the labor force such as employment and other aggregates delivered by
the different surveys do not necessarily provide a faithful representation of the reality whenever
substantive changes occur in population aggregates. As you can see in Box III.3 of the Report, using
different sources of information a revision can be made of the evolution of employment, factoring in
the impact of the migrant inflows we have seen recently in Chile. In particular, this exercise shows
that between 2016 and 2018 employment would have grown between one and two percentage points
annually more than shown by the surveys, that is, between double and triple the data obtained from
the surveys over the last few years. The difference in growth originates in the assumptions made
regarding the new immigrants that entered the country in the last year, which are not available as yet.
Given that the relative magnitudes and rates obtained from the surveys, including the unemployment
rate, should not change much, this means that in the last three years the Chilean labor market has been
able to accommodate between 120 and 190 thousand migrants per year more than what the surveys
indicate, without a significant increase in unemployment.
Both the revised remunerations figures and the estimated revisions for employment are in line with
recent administrative files and clearly above what would be obtained if adjustments to employment
growth, remunerations and hours actually worked were not considered.
This does not mean that labor market gaps are closed or nonexistent. Full absorption of the increase
in labor supply can take longer, so this increase in employment growth does not imply that more
unemployment does not exist. In fact, wage indicators-both the revised INE figures and
administrative records-show low growth rates, consistent with a labor supply increase, a vision that
coincides with the contents of our IPN.
This special study on the labor market, however, goes beyond the review of current indicators, as it
seeks to understand the characteristics that shape its behavior over the course of the business cycle
and at longer terms. In particular, it presents a characterization of the labor market in Chile from an
empirical perspective, using diverse sources of information to provide the broadest view possible.
of Chile's labor force show an increase in
The main stylized facts revealed by this analysis (Table 3)
the participation of women and a reduction in that of the youth, which is consistent with the increased
coverage of college education for the new generations. Also, human capital has grown significantly,
but lags behind developed countries in terms of coverage and especially quality. The return on the
working experience of Chilean workers is low by international standards, with marked differences
across individuals with different levels of education.
About the characteristics of the labor market, we observe that although informal work has decreased
in Chile it is still high (around 30% of total employment), well above the standards of developed
countries. At the same time, our labor market is very dynamic, with a high turnover relative to other
countries and with a significant incidence of fixed-term jobs. Meanwhile, salaried employment is
increasingly concentrated in big companies. Real wages have grown strongly for all income levels,
but high dispersion persists. The wage differences are correlated with differences in the duration of
employment (turnover). Finally, the aggregate unemployment rate shows a downward trend, partly
due to the fall in the relative participation of younger workers, and the hours worked have fallen
systematically during the last twenty years.
Regarding female employment, the data confirm that women receive a lower pay for the work than
men, even controlling for such characteristics like education, specific occupation and expertise.
Furthermore, women's income growth profile over the life cycle is significantly lower than that of
men, women are less likely to keep their jobs and are more likely to go from unemployment to
inactivity. Still, the increasing weight of services in overall economic activity, in line with the
country's development, has helped in the insersion of women in the labor
market.
The study also examines how diverse features of the labor market influence the evolution of the
economy's aggregate productivity
(Table 4). On one hand, the human capital that is accumulated via
experience and seniority at the job allows to boost total factor productivity. On the other hand, the
labor market allows to relocate workers to jobs where they can be more productive and obtain a better
pay. In that sense, transitions between jobs contribute to aggregate productivity, to the extent that
those flows go generally in the direction from the less productive to the more productive companies.
However, for a large group of workers the greater mobility does not necessarily mean better pay or
enhanced productivity. In particular, in 46% of cases, turnover does not come with wage
improvements. This phenomenon is more present amont high-turnover, low-income workers. Those
staying in their jobs longer have significantly greater wage gains over time. In the long term, this
phenomenon links wider wage inequalities with slower productivity growth, a topic that merits a more
in-depth examination.
The study goes on to review how the Chilean labor market responds to economic fluctuations (Table
5). The analysis reveals that, in general, there are multiple margins for adjustment that allow to
cushion macroeconomic shocks and moderate the effect on employment that would exist absent those
margins. These include changes in the composition betwee salaried and self employment, changes in
participation rates, high turnover and rapid transitions between salaried jobs, the creation of jobs in
new firms, and wage flexibility in hired work.
At the same time, evidence has it that the costs associated to such adjustment, both for the workers
and for the economy's aggregate productivity, can be significant. The results presented also have
implications on how the shocks hitting the economy can affect the evolution of wages and inflationary
pressures, information that is of particular importance for monetary policy. Thus, despite the labor
market's capacity for adjustment, the weak periods entail important costs.
In particular, the process
of realocation to quality jobs and more productive enterprises, with the consequent impact on
aggregate productivity and the workers' purchasing power, is diminished in the lower phase of the
cycle. For some workers, especially those in the early stages of their working lives, the effects can be
very persistent.
These situations explain the need to have a wider toolkit with indicators to monitor the behavior or
the labor market over the short term. In particular, it is useful to complement survey data with
information from administrative data bases and traditional aggregates on occupation and
unemployment with statistics on resignations, firings and hirings.
Anyway, the BCCh has made progress on these matters. The evidence presented is largely based on
ongoing research within the Bank and it naturally supplements some of the main topics discussed in
our 2017 Trend Growth Report. It also attests to the generosity of multiple institutions that, through
covenants, have cooperated by sharing this information, including the INE, the Internal Revenue
Service, the Civil Registry, the Labor Directorate and the Ministry of Education.
Final remarks
Before I conclude this presentation, I would like to mention the materialization of an initiative that
before the Senate's
we anticipated when we presented the September Monetary Policy Report
plenary. On that occasion we announced that the Bank will seek an external evaluation of its
performance in complying with its Organic Law's double mandate, that is, to safeguard price stability
and financial stability. For this purpose, a panel of renowned world experts in central banking will be
convened.
I want to take this opportunity to inform you that we have appointed the five foreign economists that
will make up the aforesaid panel of experts: Dr Karnit Flug (Chair), former governor of the Central
Bank of Israel, and professors Dr Petra Geraats, from the University of Cambridge, UK; Guillermo
Calvo, from Columbia University, US; Enrique Mendoza, from the University of Pennsylvania, US;
and Donald Kohn, Senior Researcher at the Brookings Institution and who formerly served as
ViceGovernor of the US Federal Reserve Board.
We selected the panel on the basis of these experts' vast professional experience and knowledge of
central banking, all renowned economists at the world level. The group will act with complete
independence to gather information and interview local and foreign experts. The topics that the panel
will be evaluating include the analytical framework and the powers available to the BCCh, its policy
communication and results, with special emphasis on the entity's most recent
formulation process,
years of operation.
The final evaluation report will be presented in the institutional account the BCCh is due to submit to
the Senate plenary in September 2019, which acquires a special connotation as the year marks the
30th anniversary of its granted autonomy. We hope that the panel will not only contribute a technical,
independent and well informed opinion of the Bank's performance in the areas entrusted it by law,
but also generate concrete proposals for improvement that we can include in our institution's
agenda.
With this, I believe that we demonstrate our commitment to fulfill our responsibilities before the
country on three levels. First, conducting an analysis as objective as possible of the prospects of the
economy and their implications for monetary policy. Second, applying our resources to deepen the
analysis in an area of crucial importance for the economy, while at the same time producing
information that may be of deeper interest to public opinion, the academic world and public policies.
Third, by generating mechanisms to strengthen our accountability before the citizens, through this
Senate, and identify new possibilities for improvement in our work.
Thank you.
***
4 4
Total
2 2
Non-mining
0 0
-2 -2
14 15 16 17 18
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Figure 2
Manufacturing output index Private salaried hours worked (*)
(annual change, percent) (seasonally-adjusted levels, weekly average)
12 12 43 45
8 8 42 44
4 4 41 43
Habitual
(right axis)
0 0 40 42
Effectivas
-4 -4 39 41
-8 -8 38 40
14 15 16 17 18 10 12 14 16 18
(*) Black dashed lines show annual centered moving average of respective series.
Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).
Figure 3
Domestic demand GFCF
(real annual change, percent) (real annual change, percent)
18 18
9 9
GFCF
Machinery &
12 12
6 6
equipment
Private
consumption
6 6
3 3
0 0
0 0
-6 -6
-3 -3
Construction
& other
-12 -12
-6 -6
works
-18 -18
-9 -9
14 15 16 17 18 14 15 16 17 18
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Figure 4
2018 growth forecasts (MP Report)
(real annual change, percent)
5.0 5.0
4.5 4.5 4.5
4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
3.5 3.5
3.25
3.0 3.0 3.0
2.5 2.5
March June September December
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Figure 5
Real annual contributions to gross fixed capital formation GFCF (*)
(percentage points)
16 16
12 12
8 8
4 4
0 0
-4 -4
-8 -8
-12 -12
-16 -16
09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Housing Other Mining Non-mining
(*) For 2017 mining investment is estimated using information available from companies' uniform coded statistical report
FECU. Housing investment uses household investment figures