Benoît Coeuré: The international role of the euro - concepts, empirics
and prospects
Speech by Mr Benoît Coeuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank,
at Saint Joseph University, Beirut, 2 October 2015.
* * *
I would like to thank Johannes Gräb and Arnaud Mehl for their contribution to the speech. I remain solely responsible
for the opinions expressed herein.
Introduction
M. Dean, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Thank you for the opportunity to address you today and to testify to the trust and friendship
between European institutions and Lebanon.
The international use of the euro and the evolution of the international monetary system have
attracted renewed interest from academics and policy-makers alike since the onset of the
financial crisis.
The euro is used not only as legal tender by the 340 million residents of the 19 euro area
countries.1 It is used in private and official transactions outside the euro area, too.
The euro is used inter alia to settle international transactions, to issue debt in international
financial markets and to store value in the form of official reserve holdings or private
international bank deposits. For instance, about 25% of foreign currency debt securities issued
this year in Lebanon were in euro. The euro is well established as the second most important
currency in the global monetary and financial system.
That the euro could play an important role internationally, alongside the US dollar was, in fact,
considered by some observers as one motivation underlying the creation of the single
currency.2 I would not, however, regard this reason as the most important one: completing the
single market was arguably the most important motivation, and promoting the international role
of the euro is nowhere to be seen in the Treaty.
Sixteen years after the euro's creation, and seven years after the start of the global financial
crisis, developments in the global monetary and financial system in general, and in the euro's
international status in particular, give rise to two related paradoxes.
The first paradox is that the global economy has just been hit by the most severe shock since
the Great Depression. The Great Depression led to the collapse of the gold standard. But the
sub-prime crisis did not deter investors from holding US dollars, nor did the euro area crisis
deter them from holding euros. The roles of the US dollar and the euro in the global monetary
and financial system remain broadly unaltered across various dimensions of international
currency use.
The second paradox is that prospects of the evolution of the system towards greater
multipolarity, i.e. a system in which the US dollar, the euro, and the renminbi would all play
significant roles, have been increasingly discussed by both academics and policy-makers. But,
so far, the US dollar has remained clearly the leading international currency, with the euro a
distant second, and the renminbi still lagging far behind.
Solving these paradoxes and peering into the future requires us to review some of the
conceptual and empirical issues that underlie international currency status. This is what I will
be doing in my speech today.
1. Theoretical definition and determinants
Consider first the definition of an international currency and the theoretical determinants of
international currency status.
We have learned from Benjamin Cohen and Paul Krugman - who studied the cases of
the pound sterling and the US dollar, respectively - that an international currency fulfils
the standard Aristotelian functions of money (medium of exchange, store of value and
unit of account) for private and official transactions between residents and
nonresidents.3
An international currency can thus be a medium of exchange, for instance a vehicle to transact
two other currencies in the foreign exchange market. It can be a store of value, for instance as
the currency of denomination of financial assets held by central banks, sovereign wealth funds
or international private investors. And it can be a unit of account, for instance to invoice
international transactions in goods and services, which will be particularly unsurprising in this
country.
The Phoenicians, who owed much of their prosperity to international trade, were after all
among the first peoples in antiquity to mint coins, which gained international status across the
Mediterranean world and the Middle East. The parallel use in the Achemenid period of
Phoenician shekels and Athenian tetradrachms is an example of what would now be called a
"multipolar international monetary system".4 The European citizens can remember this period
when looking at the image of Europa, daughter of the king of Tyre, which is featured in the new
series of euro banknotes.5
Economies of scope suggest that these functions tend to reinforce each other. But an
international currency does not need to fulfil all of them necessarily. For instance, the use of
the Chinese renminbi as a store of value, i.e. in official foreign reserves and private financial
holdings, or as a funding currency in international debt markets, remains limited to date, but it
is already significant in the invoicing of international trade transactions.6
Several determinants buttress the international status of a currency.
One such determinant is inertia. In international currency use, inertia effects may have a
variety of causes, including habit formation, sunk costs, network increasing returns or a lack
of credible alternatives. The idea that these effects may be important rests, in turn, on an
observation based on the work by Robert Triffin, according to which there was a lag of more
than 70 years between the United States overtaking Britain as the largest economy (in 1870)
and the US dollar overtaking sterling as the leading international currency (in 1945).7
A number of recent studies have challenged this conventional wisdom, however. They use
new data to show that the US dollar had already overtaken sterling in the mid-1920s. This
suggests, in other words, that inertia effects are less strong than previously supposed and that
the advantages of incumbency are not insurmountable.8
Another determinant is economic size. The currencies of the largest economies in global
output and trade, with the deepest and most liquid financial markets, tend to be used
internationally.
This is also what the historical record suggests. Sterling was the leading international currency
in the 19th century when the UK was the world's largest economy and the City of London the
dominant financial centre. The dollar was the leading international currency in the 20th century
when the United States was the world's largest economy and New York the dominant financial
centre. Some observers argue that the international use of the renminbi will increase still
further, as China's economy grows larger, along with the roles of Shanghai and Hong Kong as
financial centres.9
This is also what theoretical models of random matching games predict, insofar as they see
the emergence of international currencies as the solution to a "double coincidence of wants"
problem. The incentive of an agent to accept the currency issued by a particular country
depends on how often he or she trades with a resident from that country.10
A third determinant of international currencies is credibility. Stable currencies, from an
internal and external perspective, are attractive to non-residents as stores of value.11 The
ECB's independence and its commitment to maintaining price stability in the euro area over
the medium term is therefore a supportive factor, albeit an indirect one, in the euro's
international status. I doubt that a currency can gain international status if investors do not trust
its issuing central bank to be free from political interference.
Other policies can have a bearing on a currency's international role. The rule of law and the
enforcement of financial contracts support a currency's role as medium of exchange and store
of value. Financial market infrastructures contribute significantly to a currency's liquidity, which
is a key determinant of its international standing. Various challenges may also exist in
processing cross-border transactions. For example, the absence of common or interoperable
technical standards leads to higher failure rates and costs. The recent setting up of renminbi
clearing arrangements in several euro area financial centres will facilitate cross-border
payments in euro and renminbi, with benefits for corporates and financial actors, both in the
euro area and in China.12 The October 2013 currency swap agreement between the European
Central Bank and the People's Bank of China is based on this prospect.
Capital account openness and regulatory policies more broadly are important, too.
Given the economies of scale and network externalities arising from the international status of
a currency, regulatory changes can be the "push factor" from one equilibrium, involving a
dominant currency, to a different equilibrium.13
II. Recent developments
Consider now the developments since the start of the global financial crisis. The roles played
by the US dollar and the euro in the global monetary and financial system have remained
broadly unaltered since 2007-2008, despite signs of a gradual ascent of the Chinese
renminbi. This was also true, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, during the acute phase of the
European sovereign debt crisis in 2011-2012. This stability testifies to the importance of inertia
effects, to the size of the US and euro area economies, to their deep and liquid financial
markets, and - well, if I dare say - to the credibility of their central banks' policies.
The US dollar remains the leading international currency, accounting for 50 to 60% of
international transactions across various metrics of international currency use. The euro
remains the second most important currency internationally, accounting for 20 to 25% of
transactions. Its role is particularly significant in countries neighbouring the euro area. All other
currencies, the renminbi included, remain well behind the US dollar and the euro, although the
rise of the renminbi as an international payment currency - which reflects the leading role
played by China in global merchandise trade - is notable.
There is therefore evidence that, despite the euro area crisis, economic players all over
the world have maintained their confidence in the euro. And this holds true for the euro's
use as a reserve, financing and invoicing currency.
At constant exchange rates, the euro's share of global foreign exchange reserves has
remained broadly unchanged since 2007-08. The decline in 2014 in the share of the euro at
market exchange rates was a reflection of the depreciation of the euro. There is therefore no
evidence that global foreign exchange reserve managers actively rebalanced their portfolios
away from the euro in 2014, or in 2011-2012 for that matter. This year the euro has been
increasingly used as a funding currency by international borrowers, owing to the historically
low interest rates in the euro area. Investment-grade corporations in advanced economies,
mainly the United States, were particularly active issuers of international bonds denominated
in euro, whose proceeds are swapped back into dollars. In April 2015 Mexico became the first
sovereign state to issue a bond denominated in euro with a maturity of 100 years.14 Moreover,
the share of the euro as an invoicing or settlement currency for extra-euro area trade remained
broadly stable again last year. Finally, the euro is used as a reference currency for the
anchoring of exchange rates, mainly in countries neighbouring the euro area and countries
that have established special institutional arrangements with the EU or its Member States.15
III. Welfare implications
Those are the recent developments. But to what extent do they matter? What are the
implications of international currency status? In other words, what are the benefits and costs?
One starting point here is the striking diversity of policy positions towards currency
internationalisation across countries and over time. In the 1970s, Germany and Japan
maintained tight controls and regulatory restrictions to limit foreign holdings of their
currencies.16 In contrast, the United States has always been open to the international use of
the dollar. China is now promoting the global role of the renminbi, an objective which it also
uses as an anchor for domestic reforms.17 And the ECB's position is one of neutrality. We view
the international role of the euro as being primarily determined by market forces and we neither
hinder nor promote it.
One reason for such diverse approaches is that the benefits and costs of international currency
status differ from country to country and are difficult to measure.18
Take the benefits first. One benefit is seigniorage, i.e. interest-free loans to the issuing
central bank from non-residents who hold the international currency. In the current
environment of low interest rates, this benefit is arguably very limited.
But international currency status also creates efficiency gains in financial
intermediation and lowers transaction costs. For instance, size and liquidity effects lead to
the emergence of new financial market segments denominated in the international currency.
Bid-ask spreads in wholesale and retail foreign exchange markets are lower for international
currencies than for other currencies, and this phenomenon is self-reinforcing, which gives rise
to the vehicle role of such currencies.19
The "exorbitant privilege" - an immensely popular phrase, albeit one with somewhat
mysterious origins, since it has been alternately ascribed to Charles de Gaulle, Valéry
Giscard d'Estaing and Jacques Rueff - is yet another benefit. International currency
issuers can issue debt to non-resident investors at lower interest rates than other issuers (to
the extent that the currency is perceived as safe and liquid) and moreover they can invest the
proceeds in higher-yielding foreign assets.20 The magnitude of this differential remains a
subject of heated debate, however.
But what we have also learned since the global financial crisis is that international
currency status provides partial insulation from external disturbances, in particular
those arising from exchange rate movements. Recent studies suggest that exchange rate
pass-through to import prices and domestic prices declines significantly, even at distant
horizons, if a significant share of imports of goods and services is invoiced in the domestic
currency.21
For instance, one study by ECB staff found an economically large link between choice of
invoicing currency and exchange rate pass-through. According to the study, an increase in the
share of the euro as an invoicing currency for extra-euro area imports of 10 percentage points
lowers the degree of exchange rate pass-through to import prices by almost 7 percentage
16
Japan moved on eventually to encourage the international role of the yen for some time.
17
As re-emphasized by Premier Li Keqiang on 9 September 2015 "The continued devaluation of the yuan is
definitely not conducive to the currency becoming internationalized. This is not our policy preference."
18
To paraphrase the first ECB Monthly Bulletin article on the international of the euro: "The list of potential benefits
and costs for euro area residents is for the time being of a rather speculative, forward-looking nature. Many
benefits are difficult to measure with precision." (Monthly Bulletin, August 1999, p. 43;
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/p.31_53_mb199908en.pdf).
19
See Krugman (1980).
20
Gourinchas et al. (2010) estimate that the United States earned a positive return differential on its external
balance sheet of about 2% per year in real terms over the period 1952-2009; other studies find smaller effects.
Moreover, it can be disputed as to whether this "privilege" also holds for countries with a currency with a status
less important than the US dollar.
21
For instance, Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon (2010) find large differences in the extent of long-run exchange
rate pass-through to US import prices between US dollar-priced goods (25%) and non-US dollar-priced goods
(95%).
points.22 This might be particularly relevant in circumstances when importing deflation might
create risks to price stability over the medium term.
At the same time, low pass-through may exacerbate real exchange rate volatility as relative
prices adjust less strongly, thereby failing to dampen movements in the nominal exchange
rate. International currency status may therefore partly hamper the benefits of having a flexible
exchange rate.
Currency internationalisation may generate costs, too. It may make monetary
developments more difficult to interpret, with shifts in non-resident demand for banknotes and
deposits having a direct impact on money aggregates. It may complicate the conduct of
monetary policy if money demand and capital flows become unstable as a result of external
shocks, as the experiences of the Deutsche Mark and the Swiss franc after the demise of the
Bretton Woods system starkly illustrate.
The outbreak of the global financial crisis has even added some new dimensions to the debate.
One cost which has now become more apparent is the "exorbitant duty" of international
currency issuers, the flipside of "exorbitant privilege". International currency issuers
provide insurance to the rest of the world in times of global financial market stress, which gives
rise to potentially large financial transfers between economies.23
Moreover, we are now even more aware than in the past that with international currency
status come greater responsibilities and challenges at the international and domestic
level.
At the international level, one challenge is about global liquidity risk. For instance, central banks
in major advanced economies have been called upon by emerging markets to establish a
structured network of currency swap agreements to mitigate the risks of international currency
liquidity shortages. Such agreements are however possible to the extent that they are in line
with the domestic mandate of the central bank of issue, i.e. in case of concerns that liquidity
stress in global markets could materially impair the pursuit of domestic policy goals. Further
progress in global and regional financial safety nets would help overcome this limitation.
At the domestic level, another challenge is about foreign exchange risk. In this respect, the
marked rise in foreign currency-denominated borrowing since the financial crisis, in particular
in US dollars and more recently also in euro, could lead to increased demand for currency
swap agreements. Currency mismatches may create financial stability risks in some emerging
market economies in the event of a significant appreciation of the international currency, and
the central bank of issue may be called to the rescue as "hedger of last resort" of foreign
currency risk, which falls clearly outside of its domestic mandate.24
IV. Prospects
Let us go back to where we started and refocus our attention on the future. That the roles of
the US dollar and the euro have remained broadly stable since the global financial crisis is one
thing, but whether or not the global monetary and financial system will remain frozen in its
current state is quite another.
In particular, it has been suggested that the global monetary and financial system could
become more multi-polar in the years ahead in the light of the growing global importance of
the Chinese renminbi.
As we have learned, historical evidence suggests that a multi-polar system is feasible.
For instance, while half of identified foreign exchange reserve holdings in 1913 were in sterling,
holdings of French francs and German marks were substantial.25 Even in cases as extreme as
markets for homogeneous goods, such as the oil market, where network effects are believed
to be so strong as to naturally lead to the dominance of one settlement currency, multiple
currencies were used in the past. European oil import settlements around World War II, for
instance, were split evenly between the dollar and non-dollar currencies, mainly sterling.26
But, from a normative standpoint, is a possible evolution towards multi-polarity
desirable?
Some view it with concern.27 They fear that a multipolar currency system would increase
global financial instability. They argue that the likelihood of self-fulfilling runs on reserve
currencies would increase, insofar as investors could switch more easily from one currency to
another, seeking to convert their holdings first for fear of suffering losses down the line.28 These
concerns might be overblown, however. First, the extent of price adjustments would depend
significantly on the degree of substitutability between reserve assets and on whether reserve
currencies would be seen by investors as substitutes or complements. Second, official reserve
managers have a longer time horizon than private market participants and are therefore more
likely to act as stabilising rather than destabilising investors.29 Third, the sub-prime and euro
area crises showed that, even when large shocks occur in reserve-issuing countries,
rebalancing in reserve portfolios may remain limited.
Others argue, in contrast, that multi-polarity would create global benefits. They argue
that it would help address potential shortages in global safe assets to the extent that their
supply could respond more elastically to the growing needs of the global economy and to the
demand from emerging market economies. They argue that it would have a stronger
disciplinary effect on the policies of reserve currency issuers, which would need to address
swiftly any worsening in their fundamentals in the face of competitive pressures created by the
existence of other reserve currency issuers.
In any case, from a positive standpoint, a possible evolution towards multi-polarity is a likely
evolution, given the increasing importance of emerging market economies in the global
economy.
Finally, the question remains of how the euro's international role will develop. In an
evolving global monetary and financial landscape, the euro's international status will be
determined primarily by market forces, although European authorities may indirectly contribute
to it, too, as I will now explain.
The euro area crisis exposed weaknesses in economic governance and uncovered fault
lines in European capital markets. Paradoxically, it may have improved the euro's
prospects as an international currency. Completing our Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) in the spirit of the Five Presidents' Report may have indirect consequences for
the euro's international status.30 Deeper and better connected European capital markets,
and moving towards genuine financial union, may buttress the depth and liquidity of these
markets and, as an indirect result, buttress the euro's international role.
In the light of this, a stronger international role for the euro, while not being an objective per
se, would be an indicator not only of the continued confidence of the rest of the world in the
single currency and in the euro area, but also of the success of the EU in completing EMU.
And vis-à-vis the latter outcome the ECB is definitely not neutral.
Mr. Dean, Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you for your attention.
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