SPEECH
SVERIGES RIKSBANK
DATE:
2021-05-20
SE-103 37 Stockholm
SPEAKER: (Brunkebergstorg 11)
First Deputy Governor Cecilia Skingsley
VENUE:
SEB (digitally)
Tel +46 8 787 00 00
Fax +46 8 21 05 31
registratorn@riksbank.se
www.riksbank.se
Adapting to new conditions - monetary
policy freedom with responsibility*
19 March, 2020. It's 6.30 am. I am standing waiting for a connecting bus at
Danvikstull, on my way to the Riksbank at Brunkebergstorg. The telephone rings. It
turns out to be Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Riksbank. He says that the Federal
Reserve is offering dollar loans to us and a number of other central banks.
We Executive Board members had already had many conversations both in the
office and over the phone during the preceding days.
Both in Sweden and abroad, the pandemic quickly led to a fall in economic activity
of historical proportions. It was necessary to ensure as soon as possible that the
financial system could manage to maintain credit granting at very low interest
rates. A financial crisis on top of a health crisis and the rapidly emerging real
economic crisis must be avoided. On the previous Thursday, 12 March, the Riksbank
had decided to offer up to SEK 500 billion in loans to Swedish banks for onward
lending to companies. On 16 March, the Riksbank decided to begin broad asset
purchases for up to SEK 300 billion.
And what happened with the dollar loans? The same evening, 19 March, the
Riksbank was able to publish the information that new dollar loans would be available
with effect from the following week. Stefan's telephone message was a small, but
clear glimpse of light in the first weeks of the pandemic. Belonging to the narrow
group with back-up from the US central bank, the Federal Reserve, regarding
dollar liquidity was of central importance during the financial turbulence.
The Riksbank, like other central banks, had taken a number of measures during
the coronavirus crisis to manage the economic effects of the pandemic. But the
number of measures also raises new questions. I would like to talk about one of
these today, namely how one can combine the Riksbank's strong independence
with accountability in monetary policy.1 My points can be summarised as:
• Our current monetary policy framework reflects a clear target, strong
independence and a large measure of openness.
•
Experience shows that our toolbox needs to develop over time.
•
To manage our statutory task of maintaining price stability, we need
considerable room for manoeuvre in monetary policy.
• But a strong independence and plenty of room for manoeuvre entails
freedom with responsibility - we have an important analytical and
educational task to explain what we do and how this helps us attain our
objectives.
I want to start by going back in time around 350 years.
The motive for our independence - creating long-term
stability
Every central bank reflects its time and its country, but some tasks are common to
all of them through history, for instance, issuing means of payment in the
domestic currency, and ensuring the means of payment can be used and retain its value.
And this also applies to the world's oldest central bank - the Riksbank. Monetary
policy has always focused on maintaining the value of money. Historically, the
Riksbank has tried to do so by having a nominal anchor.2 The establishment of the
Riksbank can be dated back to Stockholm banco, Sweden's first bank. This also
became Europe's first banknote-issuing bank. The value of the banknotes was based
on it being possible to exchange them for coins. But when an abundance of
banknotes were issued, the general public began to question their value and
demanded to redeem them. The nominal anchor gave way. And a bank crash was
unavoidable. Riksens ständers bank emerged from the ashes of this in 1668,
becoming what we know now as the Riksbank, as an authority under the Riksdag,
the Swedish parliament. Since the Swedish krona was introduced as currency in
1873, the most common nominal anchor has been a fixed exchange rate for the
krona.
Let me now rashly jump 100 years forward in time. The background to the
monetary policy regime we have now can be found in the developments during the
1970s and 1980s. Following the collapse of the Bretton-Woods regime in 1973,
there was a long period of unstable macroeconomic development. Sweden was
part of a number of fixed exchange rate systems. But inflation in Sweden was
higher than that abroad, and our competitiveness weakened. This was met with
devaluations, which only resolved the short-term problems and led to higher
inflation in the longer run. Confidence in the nominal anchor was undermined.
Strong reasons for greater independence
24 September 1992. Thursday. There was scope for around four hours' sleep
between the final negotiations between the Government and the Social Democrats
and the following day's press conference. As press officer at the Ministry of
Finance I had a lot to think about. The announcement of the so-called general bank
guarantee to be given was very comprehensive. The Riksdag was being asked to
authorise the Government in principle unconditional drawing rights from the state
budget to consolidate the banking sector. If this measure did not succeed in
calming interest rates, we would ultimately need to make use of a loan programme
from the IMF.
Finally, the situation in Sweden became untenable, and the fixed exchange rate
had to be abandoned on 19 November 1992. The nominal anchor had completely
collapsed. However, inspired by New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom,
the Riksbank considered adopting an inflation target as a new anchor.3 No sooner
said than done: As of 1993, we have a floating exchange rate and an inflation
target of 2 per cent, which still applies today.4
The results of academic research indicated that the conditions for attaining low
inflation increased if one delegated monetary policy to an independent central
bank. This reduced the so-called time inconsistency problem in monetary policy,
where the long-term objective of low inflation is not compatible with the
shortterm motives for high inflation.5 Empirical studies showed that countries with
more independent central banks had lower inflation, without a deterioration in
the real economy.6
I think that an independent central bank is not merely useful in addressing overly
high inflation. Independence is also important to avoid inflation being too low, as
it facilitates a more long-term focus in decision-making. 7But I will return to this
shortly.
In the new act of 1999, the Riksbank was given greater independence from the
political system. The new act was also needed to adapt the Riksbank's activities to
the requirements ensuing from Sweden's membership of the EU.8 How was the
increased independence felt by the Riksbank?
When one talks about central bank independence, one usually distinguishes
between goal independence and instrument independence. This may sound cryptic,
but goal independence means that the central bank determines its own
operational target, which is to be attained to meet the legislator's intention of price
stability, for instance an inflation rate of 2 per cent. Instrument independence means
that the central bank determines how its tools are used to attain the goals that
have been set. There are also other ways of making the central bank independent
of the political system. Personal independence concerns how the bank's
management is appointed. If the board members have long terms of office, are not
politicians and cannot be dismissed for political reasons, then there is considerable
personal independence. Financial independence means that the bank can take
measures without relying on financial support from the Government.
One can say that the new act in 1999 gave the Riksbank a large measure of
9
independence according to all of the four varieties above (see Figures 1 and 2). The
Riksbank decided itself, through its Governing Council, on the introduction of the
inflation target in 1993, and in 1999 price stability was introduced into the act as
objective for the Riksbank. Goal independence was thus strong, as the Riksbank
can itself determine how the target will be attained in operational terms. One sign
of this was that we much later, in 2017, decided ourselves to change the target
variable from the CPI to the CPIF. We were also given a mandate to decide
independently on how the monetary policy instruments would be used to attain our
inflation target and in this way we gained a high level of instrument
independence. The Instrument of Government states that the Riksbank is responsible for
monetary policy and that no authority has a say in the Riksbank's decisions on
10
monetary policy. A ban on the Executive Board members seeking or accepting
instructions when carrying out their monetary policy tasks was written into the
Sveriges Riksbank Act.
The composition of the new Executive Board with six members outside of the
political system and with long periods of office was also an important part of the
increased independence (see Figure 2). Personal independence was strengthened,
as "a further step away" from the politicians on the General Council to the
deciding body was created. The members of the Executive Board would be appointed
by the General Council, which would in its turn be appointed by the Riksdag (see
Figure 2). However, the members of the Executive Board would not be politicians
and nor could they be dismissed on political grounds. The terms of office
11
exceeded the period of time between elections to parliament. Financial
independence was already considered to be strong and was not extended. But the TFEU's
prohibition on monetary financing, which was written into the Sveriges Riksbank
Act, contributed to strengthening the Riksbank's independence in relation to the
Government. The prohibition means, for instance, that the Riksbank may not
purchase debt instruments directly from the state.
In international measurements of central bank independence, the Riksbank is
usually placed among the top 10.12 I think that the main benefit with the new act was
that monetary policy could be conducted on a more long-term basis, which
becomes clear when one compares with the 1970s and 1980s, when the problems of
excessively high inflation were managed with the aid of repeated devaluations.
Freedom with responsibility
Independence is accompanied by requirements for evaluation and follow-up:
freedom with responsibility. One question that rose in connection with the new
Sveriges Riksbank Act was whether the independence was "undemocratic". This
was discussed, for instance, by the then Deputy Governor of the Riksbank Villy
Bergström.13 One point he made was that the reason why monetary policy has
been increasingly delegated to independent central banks was to address the
shortcomings of the political system with regard to attaining low and stable
inflation. Clear accountability and strong transparency are therefore essential factors
in maintaining the legitimacy of the central bank.
It is no coincidence that the international trend of increased independence among
central banks has gone hand in hand with increased transparency and clarity. For
instance, it was written into the new act that the Riksbank must provide a written
report to the Riksdag twice a year. It should be easy to evaluate monetary policy.
This is also made easier if we are aiming towards a clearly quantified target, in our
case an inflation rate of 2 per cent. To delegate monetary policy with, for
instance, the task of contributing to "high welfare" would leave too much scope for
interpretation.
As you probably know, the Riksbank has made major efforts along the way to
increase openness and clarity regarding monetary policy, in a dialogue with the
Riksdag Committee on Finance (FiU). Every year we compile an account of
monetary policy for the Committee, which in turn then provides its comments in a
report or a statement on monetary policy, not just to "grade" us, but to provide
feedback in advance of the next report with regard to questions that require
further illumination (see Figure 2). Hearings in the Committee are also a part of their
scrutiny of the Riksbank. Moreover, larger external evaluations are made around
once every five years.14 With regard to the analysis of monetary policy, the
Riksbank chose to begin publishing its own forecasts for the repo rate in 2007. I think
that the experiences of all of these measures have been good.15 International
rankings of central bank transparency usually place the Riksbank near the top.16
The framework functioned as intended
In many ways, the inflation-targeting regime has functioned as intended. Inflation
has been much lower and more stable since the target was introduced and the
new Sveriges Riksbank Act came into force in the 1990s (see Figure 3).
Having said that, the good target attainment would not have been possible
without an overall reform of the entire stabilisation policy framework. As the 1990s
crisis was a sovereign debt crisis, a foreign currency crisis (or monetary policy
crisis if one prefers) and a financial crisis, there was a lot of homework to be done.
Both monetary policy and fiscal policy came to be reformed in the direction of a
more norm-based framework from the 1990s.17 Wage formation was also
significantly improved.18
For a long time, we were also aided by strong growth under low inflationary
pressures. The period from the middle of the 1990s up to the global financial crisis was
marked by what is known as 'The Great Moderation'. Combined with the new
framework, the stable macroeconomic environment had clear consequences for
how monetary policy was conducted in practice - in the direction of a more
'minimalist' system, where the Riksbank controlled the repo rate with the aim of
attaining the inflation target. This made accountability relatively simple. There was
namely a clear link between a tool - the repo rate - and a target - an inflation
rate of 2 per cent.
The Riksbank gradually developed so-called flexible inflation targeting - we took
into account developments in production and employment without neglecting
price stability. This in turn became easier when the credibility of the nominal
anchor had been established. The flexible policy meant in practice that inflation was
to be close to the target, and as a subordinate target, economic activity was to be
stabilised. This was also in line with the preparatory works of the new act, which
stated that we should attain price stability and - without neglecting this objective
- contribute to supporting the economic policy objectives of sustainable growth
and a high level of employment.
Lessons from the global financial crisis - the policy rate
is not sufficient for attaining the targets
11 September 2008. It is four am. I am woken by my telephone ringing. One of the
evening papers is calling to ask what is likely to happen on the Stockholm Stock
Exchange the next day. As head of analysis at Swedbank, I was expected to have an
opinion on this. The attempts to save the US investment bank Lehman Brothers
had failed. No one had any idea of the scope of the chaos that was heading for us
and how much damage there would be. Only one thing was certain: All of the
countries that were able to, needed to implement massive support measures.
The acute global financial crisis, which was triggered by Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy in September 2008, entailed many lessons for monetary policy. It was
obvious that the global financial markets had integrated over the years. A disruption
to the US mortgage market soon had global consequences. And during 'The Great
Moderation', a trend had been happening off the radar, namely that global real
interest rates had fallen (see Figure 4). This means that the neutral policy rate,
that is the level of the policy rate that neither stimulates nor slows down the
economy, had fallen.19 And this became significant now that the enormous
economic downturn created a very substantial need for monetary policy stimulation.
It became clear that the lower bound for the policy rate was not merely an
interesting fact, but a real limit for monetary policy. In many countries, the policy rate
was cut to close to zero (see Figure 5). Estimates indicate, for instance, that the
policy rate in the United States would actually need to have been cut to -4 per
cent.20 This gave rise to a discussion on which new monetary policy tools could be
used to attain further stimulation. Quantitative easing in the form of purchases of
government bonds or other securities and forward guidance became two of the
most known tools that were used to enable the central banks to meet their price
stability objectives.
A further lesson from the financial crisis was that the turbulence on the financial
markets could entail the policy rate quite simply not having an impact on the
interest rates charged to companies and households. In this context various forms
of credit easing became appropriate.
The Riksbank cut its policy rate by 4.5 percentage points to 0.25 per cent between
October 2008 and July 2009, at the same time as the forecast indicated that it
would not be raised again until the middle of 2010. Other measures taken by the
Riksbank included the fixed-rate loans, loans to the banks with longer maturities,
which contributed both to raising the credibility of the interest rate forecast and
to improving the impact of the policy rate on the interest rates charged to
households and companies. However, unlike other central banks, the Riksbank did not
make any asset purchases.21
As you know, the global financial crisis was followed by a debt crisis in Europe. For
the Riksbank, the need for further general stimulation became relevant during the
aftermath of the European debt crisis. During 2014-2015, inflation was so low that
there was a risk that confidence in the inflation target would be undermined (see
Figure 3). As I mentioned earlier, it is just as important to prevent inflation from
falling too low as to prevent it rising too high if one is to retain price stability.
When the ECB made its monetary policy even more expansionary in spring 2015,
we extended our monetary policy measures by both cutting the repo rate below
the previously assumed lower bound of zero, and purchasing government bonds
(that is, using quantitative easing). As the financial markets were functioning
normally, the measures had the desired impact on the interest rates charged to
households and companies. Inflation began to rise towards the target (see Figure
3).
Developments during the financial crisis and the European debt crisis that
followed made it perfectly clear that a flexible monetary policy toolbox is useful both
in times of financial unease and in normal circumstances, to safeguard target
fulfilment. I will return to this issue later on.
Discussion on central banks' mandates and tools
In the wake of the financial crisis, financial stability quite naturally became a
standing point on the agenda. One of the main effects of the crisis was the
emergence of a new policy area: macroprudential policy. In many cases, responsibility
for this policy was given to the central bank. But in Sweden, the political majority
chose in 2013 to give responsibility for macroprudential policy to
Finansinspektionen, which meant that the Riksbank's mandate remained unchanged.
After the financial crisis a discussion arose regarding central bank independence
and what tasks they are best suited for.22 Had the central banks been overloaded
with new tasks in some cases, causing a threat to their independence?23
Immediately prior to the appointment of the inquiry into the Sveriges Riksbank
Act in 2016, I gave a presentation which discussed these issues, among others.24
The discussion started from Figure 6, which shows how the mandate of the
central bank is related to the degree of independence. As I mentioned earlier, one
motive for making central banks independent was the desire to attain low and
stable inflation. In this way, independence was linked to a clear and limited
mandate. The broader the mandate a central bank has, the greater the number of
general policy issues that tend to crop up on the agenda, which could be a reason
to limit central bank independence.
Although my focus today is on monetary policy, I would like to take up an
25
interesting question that Andy Haldane at the Bank of England has brought up. The
Bank of England has been given a very broad mandate through its responsibility
for both microprudential supervision and macroprudential policy. And there are
good grounds for this, according to Haldane, who points out that the time
inconsistency problem could be just as great with regard to financial regulation and
macroprudential policy as for monetary policy. Just as an overly clear political
control of monetary policy could give rise to an inflation bias, an overly political
control of macroprudential policy could give rise to an instability bias, as the policy
would be too short term.
As responsibility for macroprudential policy has been given to Finansinspektionen
in Sweden, the discussion of an extended mandate has not had the same
overtones here as in other countries. But we at the Riksbank have wanted to make
sure that the mandate and tools for macroprudential policy in Sweden are
adequate and that Finansinspektionen is able to take the necessary measures to deal
with household indebtedness without being dependent on Government
approval.26
The importance of freedom of action was reinforced
during the pandemic
Although the financial crisis and its repercussions have entailed the Riksbank
needing to use new instruments in its monetary policy toolbox, it was primarily
during the coronavirus crisis that the lessons were learned. One such lesson
concerned the financial markets constantly developing, and thereby changing the
funding situation for companies. The environment in which monetary policy was
now to be conducted was thus different than during 'The Great Moderation'. We
therefore needed to review the arsenal of measures that can be used in a crisis
situation.
Many measures during one week in March last year
We are now back where we started in my story, that is to say in March last year.
What we saw then was a very rapid and dramatic sequence of events. The stock
markets began to decline as early as late February, when the coronavirus began to
spread increasingly quickly outside of China. The WHO declared COVID-19 to be a
pandemic on 11 March. On 12 March we saw the largest stock market fall in one
day in Sweden so far, when the index fell by 11 per cent. This meant that the
index had fallen by 30 per cent since 20 February. The fixed-income markets were
also affected to an extremely large degree (see Figure 7). All bond rates rose to a
varying extent. Investors' new motto was 'dash for cash', as they abandoned
unsafe assets in favour of safer ones with high liquidity.
Corporate bonds market under scrutiny
When Swedish companies have needed to finance themselves with loans, they
have traditionally used bank loans. But in recent decades, there has been a
structural transformation, which means that they increasingly finance themselves via
interest-bearing securities (see Figure 8). At present, interest-bearing securities
account for one third of their loan financing. However, the market also has some
inherent weaknesses, as it is undeveloped and illiquid, at the same time as many
companies lack credit ratings.
The weaknesses came up to the surface in March last year, as the pandemic
entailed a crisis that directly affected companies. This caused their financiers to
review their holdings of commercial paper. Last spring, some funds were forced to
stop trading for a period.27 Yields on corporate bonds soared (see Figure 7). At the
same time, there was a risk that the crisis would spread to the covered bonds
market, as these were easier to sell when liquidity was needed. We also assessed
that there was a risk that the problems on the corporate bonds market would
make larger companies reduce their bond borrowing and turn to their banks to
borrow instead. In this way, the banks' lending to larger companies risked
squeezing out lending to smaller companies.
The large toolbox has been a decisive factor.
As we have seen events, it was a question of retaining the level of stimulation in
monetary policy rather than increasing it. This meant that the monetary policy
conducted earlier, with a policy rate at zero and purchases of government bonds,
needed to be supplemented with new measures to reach companies and
households in the desired manner.
We thus needed to take a number of new measures to attain two aims: hold
interest rates unchanged as far as possible, and maintain the supply of credit to keep
the real economy going.
We basically decided on all of the measures we have now in place in the space of
a week. After that, we have modified and extended the existing programme. For
instance, we have purchased debt securities in the form of government bonds,
municipal bonds, covered bonds and commercial paper in the form of corporate
bonds and certificates (see Figure 9). Like many other central banks, we have seen
our balance sheet total grow (see Figure 10).
I consider that the measures have functioned as we intended.28 All bond yields on
higher risk assets have fallen (see Figure 7). Corporate bond yields, that is yields
on the market that had the greatest problems last spring, have fallen the most,
despite the fact that we only purchased equivalent to around 1 per cent of the
outstanding stock. We can also see that lending rates to companies and
households remained stable during the crisis (see Figure 11). As I see it, these measures
were entirely necessary to attain our monetary policy objectives: to attain an
inflation rate of 2 per cent and to support the development of the economy.
It is important that we have sufficient tools to attain our objectives. Our
instrument independence - that we ourselves have been able to choose among our
tools to attain our objectives and to use them quickly - has been essential in
alleviating the effects of the crisis and contributing to good economic developments. I
personally think that perhaps the most obvious monetary policy conclusion from
the coronavirus crisis is that the repo rate is far from adequate in maintaining our
price stability objective.
Although I am discussing monetary policy today, I would also like to emphasise
that the fiscal policy measures in Sweden and abroad have been a decisive factor
in the special type of crisis in which we have found ourselves - some sectors have
needed extensive support.
Proposal for new Sveriges Riksbank Act too limiting
with regard to monetary policy toolbox
We at the Riksbank consider the proposal for the new Sveriges Riksbank Act
presented in December 2019 to be good in several aspects. But when it comes to the
monetary policy toolbox, we think the proposal is far too restrictive. I do not
believe that it sufficiently reflects the lessons I have just described.29 There is thus a
risk that it will become more difficult, not just for us, but also for future Executive
Boards to make a good contribution to socio-economic developments.
A central element of our independent position in monetary policy is our
instrument independence, that we ourselves can decide over these instruments. The
monetary policy toolbox develops as a result of new experiences. For instance, we
implemented many measures within the space of one week during the initial
phase of the coronavirus pandemic. I therefore find it difficult to see the value of
restricting the tools in advance, as proposed by the inquiry. It wishes, for instance,
to divide the Riksbank's toolbox into different parts and micro regulate which
tools should be used when, where and how. I understand that this may seem like
a good idea, but having to motivate and classify possible measures will be very
complicated and will encourage passivity and delay the monetary policy response
in future crises. The developments in connection with the WHP declaring
COVID19 to be a pandemic meant that a full-scale financial tornado blew up within the
course of a couple of days.
Important to facilitate democratic scrutiny of monetary
policy
As I mentioned initially, our strong independence entails freedom with
responsibility. An extended monetary policy toolbox entails further challenges for us. If we
return to Figure 6, we have found ourselves in a situation where our objectives
and mandate remain unchanged, but our toolbox has grown. This was a situation
that was not so easy to foresee, and it makes new demands of the Riksbank.
One challenge in the new environment concerns the link between the monetary
policy tools and our objectives having become less clear. One example of this is
that during earlier periods we could see directly the effect of a 0.25 percentage
points lower repo rate on the inflation forecast. Here it is exemplified by two
figures from the Monetary Policy Report published in July 2014, at the end of the
period when we only used the repo rate and the repo-rate path as tools (see Figure
12). Based on estimates in a macroeconomic model, we could clearly read the
expected effect of the monetary policy alternatives on our target fulfilment.
But with the extensive toolbox we have used during the coronavirus pandemic we
can in principle agree that the measures give the 'right sign' as my colleague,
Governor Stefan Ingves has put it. It is much more difficult to evaluate the effect on
target fulfilment quantitatively. Although many attempts have been made to
estimate the effects of the asset purchases on inflation, they are not as certain as the
effects of the repo rate.30 The obvious explanation is that the channels have not
been as fully investigated, and the number of observations to estimate the effects
is so small.
Here we have a challenge ahead of us. Our independence with regard to
monetary policy presupposes openness and clarity to enable accountability. One can
summarise this by saying that we need to better understand, clarify and explain
the effects of new monetary policy tools. We are far from alone when it comes to
this challenge. The Bank of England recently had to relate to an investigation that
emphasised that these elements needed to be developed with regard to QE
programmes.31
We are working continuously on developing our analyses and communication of
monetary policy. As I mentioned earlier, I think that the proposal for a new
Sveriges Riksbank Act is good in several aspects. This includes the extended scope for
the political system to examine our activities. Information, scrutiny and evaluation
are central conditions for our strong independence.
The world has changed a lot since 1668, but the Riksbank's monetary policy task
has remained a common denominator over the years. If we are to supply a
monetary policy with price stability as objective, we need to accept that the conditions
change over time and that the tools need to be updated when these changes
occur. Independence is a large measure of confidence to hold in trust. Continued
freedom with responsibility will enable the Riksbank to contribute to good
economic developments going forward.
Thank you for listening!
References
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