SPEECH
DATE: 26 November 2024
SPEAKER: Deputy Governor Anna Seim
VENUE:
Sveriges Riksbank
Neutral interest rate - meaning,
limitations and assessment*
It is now just over six months since I joined the Executive Board of the Riksbank. It
was with great humility that I made the move from academia to practical
economic policy-making. One factor that greatly facilitated the transition was that
the principles of how best to design monetary policy are strongly anchored in
research.
Today's seminar will focus on a theoretical concept that is firmly rooted in
research but also has great practical significance - the neutral interest rate. The
neutral interest rate is a concept I have of course considered in my previous role
as a researcher, for example when I, together with Lars Calmfors and John
Hassler, wrote an ESO report on the interaction between fiscal and monetary
policy a couple of years ago.1 We then developed measures of whether economic
policy had been countercyclical, i.e. contractionary in an upturn and stimulative in
a downturn. At that time, estimates of the neutral interest rate were necessary as
a reference point. But never before have I had so much reason to ponder the
importance of the neutral interest rate as in recent months.
I will start by discussing the concept of the neutral interest rate, how it relates to
other similar concepts, what factors influence it, why it is important for a central
bank and what its limitations are as a benchmark for practical monetary policy. I
*
I would like to thank Mikael Apel and Liza Tchibalina for excellent help with the speech and Hanna
Armelius, Anna Breman, Aino Bunge, Vesna Corbo, Charlotta Edler, Per Jansson, Tanja Lind, Henrik Lundvall,
Åsa Olli Segendorf, Maria Sjödin, Ingvar Strid, Erik Thedéen, David Vestin and Anders Vredin for very
valuable comments. I would also like to thank Elizabeth Nilsson for the translation into English and Emelie
Nordeman for organising the seminar.
1
Calmfors et al. (2022).
Postal address: SE-103 37 Stockholm, Visiting address: Brunkebergstorg 11
will conclude by presenting the Riksbank's updated assessment of the neutral
interest rate.
What is the neutral interest rate?
It should first be noted that the definition of the neutral interest rate varies across
studies and depends on the exact question asked, the type of model used and the
choice of time horizon. There is also some ambiguity surrounding the two related
terms "neutral" and "natural" interest rates. The two terms are often used
synonymously, but sometimes they are assumed to mean different things.2 A term
that is also sometimes used, but is almost always used synonymously with the
neutral interest rate, is r* or r-star.
The most common definition of the neutral interest rate is the interest rate that is
neither expansionary nor contractionary. This means that the real economy is in
balance and inflation is stable. The real economy is usually represented by labour
market outcomes or total output. If the central bank sets a policy rate that is
lower than the neutral rate, this has an expansionary effect on the economy, as
households want to consume and businesses want to invest, which increases
aggregate demand in the economy. High demand makes it easier for companies to
raise prices and inflation rises. If the policy rate is higher than the neutral rate, the
effect is instead tightening, i.e. demand will be low, as will inflation. Somewhere
between these two states is a policy rate that has neither an expansionary nor a
contractionary effect on the economy, i.e. the effect on demand and inflation is
neutral.
I personally think it is most constructive to divide the neutral interest rate into a
long-term and a short-term component.3 Because the world's capital markets are
so interconnected, the long-term neutral interest rate is largely determined by
sluggish international factors and trends.4 The short-term neutral rate varies
2
The terms are considered synonymous in, for example, Boocker et al. (2023). The Swedish economist Knut
Wicksell is often credited with first introducing the concept of a natural interest in the late 19th century
(see Wicksell, 1936). He defined the natural rate of interest as the rate at which the demand for and supply
of capital are in equilibrium in a non-monetary economy - basically the marginal product of capital in
equilibrium under full employment and with flexible prices (see Obstfeld, 2023, p. 2). Woodford (2003) and
Galí (2017) define it similarly as the real interest rate prevailing in equilibrium with flexible prices and
wages.
3 For example, Platzer et al. (2022) make a similar breakdown.
4 Armelius et al. (2018) find that the Swedish neutral interest rate is largely explained by neutral interest
rates abroad, with the greatest influence coming from interest rates in the United States. Lundvall (2023)
also argues that the trends in Sweden's neutral interest rate are almost exclusively determined by structural
changes abroad.
around the long-term rate but may temporarily deviate from it, as shown in Figure
1. I will come back to what affects the two components in a moment.
Figure 1. Neutral interest rate in the short and long term
Per cent
The neutral interest rate is often referred to in real terms, i.e., excluding inflation.
To obtain the nominal neutral interest rate, the inflation rate when the economy
is in balance, i.e., when the inflation target is met, is added. Today, I will mostly
focus on the nominal neutral interest rate.
The long-term neutral interest rate
The neutral interest rate cannot be observed and there is therefore uncertainty
about its level at any given time. But what we do know for sure is that it started
trending downwards about three decades ago and reached historically low levels
in the early 2020s.
In parallel with the fall in the neutral rate, general interest rates have fallen. This
can be illustrated by the fact that long-term interest rates worldwide have been
falling for a long time (see Figure 2). In recent years they have risen again, but it is
unclear to what extent this reflects a rise in the neutral rate. I shall return to this
shortly.
An interest rate is essentially determined by how much actors in the economy
want to save in relation to how much they are willing to invest. If many people
want to save and few want to invest, the equilibrium interest rate will be low, and
vice versa. The long-term neutral interest rate is no exception, but is determined
in much the same way by savings relative to investment at the global level.
Figure 2. Long-term decline in interest rates worldwide
Per cent
Note. 10-year government bond yields for each country.
Source: Macrobond Financial AB.
There is no single explanation for the decline in the neutral rate and different
factors have most likely played different roles in different phases.5 One factor that
most agree has had a major impact is how demographics have changed. In many
countries, especially in advanced economies, the population has become older
and is expected to live longer. This leads to an increase in saving as people expect
that they will have to financially support themselves for longer. In China, saving
has been high due to, among other things, a rapidly ageing population, declining
effective remuneration levels in the public pension system. Institutional factors
that have restrained private consumption in favour of high investment and rapidly
growing exports have also contributed. When a country's population grows more
slowly, the labour force does not increase as quickly as before. As a result, there
have been fewer workers to supply machinery and other inputs, leading to lower
investment demand.
Some studies have pointed to increased income inequality as an important driver
of the trend towards lower interest rates. The idea here is that the propensity to
save is generally higher among high-income households and if their share of total
income in the economy increases, so does saving.
Weaker productivity growth and the associated deterioration in the long-term
growth outlook for the world economy may be another explanation for the
5
For a more detailed discussion of the driving forces, see, for example, IMF (2023), Lundvall (2023) and
Obstfeld (2023).
decline in the neutral interest rate. If people expect the economy and incomes to
be weak in the years and decades to come, the incentives to save increase.
Weaker productivity growth is also generally associated with lower investment
opportunities, which reduces the demand for capital and drives down interest
rates.
Furthermore, one explanation for the decline in interest rates focuses not only on
the magnitude of saving relative to investment, but also on the composition of
savings. It is based on the observation that firms' required rates of return seem to
have remained at a high level even when interest rates have fallen.6 This may
seem strange, as one would expect a close link between the interest rate and the
required rate of return. If the required rate of return has remained high, this may
explain why investment has not increased more than it has. If global investment
has been held back by elevated required rates of return while saving has
increased, this may have contributed to the decline in the neutral rate.
There are thus several possible explanations for the fall in interest rates, and
different studies assign them different weight.
The neutral interest rate in the short term
If one considers that the neutral interest rate is mainly driven by sluggish trends in
the global supply and demand for savings, it is natural to think of the neutral
interest rate as a long-term phenomenon. But if one considers the very definition
of a neutral interest rate - that it is the policy rate that has neither an
expansionary nor a contractionary effect on the economy - it becomes clear that
it must be able to change even in the shorter term.
One example of what can produce such short-term variations is fiscal policy. We
can imagine a situation where the policy rate is at the neutral level, where the real
economy is in balance and the inflation target is met. In this situation, let us
assume that the government temporarily pursues a more expansionary fiscal
policy that increases general demand and pushes up inflation. As the neutral
interest rate is the policy rate at which the economy is in balance and inflation is
stable, the neutral interest rate is also affected by the stimulus package. In other
words, there has been a change in the economy that has caused the neutral
interest rate to rise temporarily and, in order to stabilise inflation and the
economy, the central bank needs to raise the policy rate. The reduction of the
6
There are several possible explanations for the high yield requirement. One possibility is a reorientation of
savings as a result of households becoming more risk-averse, which pushes up risk premia and sustains the
required rate of return at a high level, see for example Lundvall (2023).
surplus target to a balance target that has now been announced could thus push
up the neutral interest rate in Sweden somewhat during the next review period.7
It may be worth adding that this example is not to say that monetary policy should
always counteract fiscal stimulus. On the contrary, there is currently a discussion
about how important it is to achieve a good policy mix in stabilisation policy, and
that monetary policy and fiscal policy should interact more than has been the case
in recent decades.8 But it illustrates that it is important to consider the overall
stabilisation policy and also to keep more transitory factors in mind when
9
discussing neutral interest rates.
These shorter-term deviations from the long-term neutral interest rate can of
course vary across countries. Therefore, although the long-term trend is
essentially global, the neutral rate may periodically differ quite a lot, depending
on the country-specific shocks that have occurred. This may also require different
monetary policies in different countries.
The significance of the neutral interest rate for
monetary policy
The neutral interest rate is a reference value for monetary policy, indicating
whether monetary policy is expansionary or contractionary. The distance between
the neutral interest rate and the current policy rate (monetary stance) thus also
indicates how expansionary or contractionary the policy is. At least that is how it
works in theory. But when it comes to translating this principle into practical
policy, it becomes much more difficult, as is often the case. The main problem is
that it is difficult to assess with sufficient precision the level of the neutral rate at
a given point in time.
Although the neutral interest rate is conceptually important, precise point
estimates of it are therefore unlikely to play a particularly central role in practical
monetary policy. The American economist John H. Williams described the
problem well in the early 1930s (Williams, 1931):
"The natural rate is an abstraction; like faith, it is seen by its works. One can only
say that if the bank policy succeeds in stabilizing prices, the bank rate must have
7
See, for example, Calmfors (2024).
8
See, for example, Calmfors et al. (2022) and the Long-Term Survey (2023).
9
Other temporary changes, such as in productivity, are assumed to have a similar impact on the short-term
neutral interest rate.
been brought in line with the natural rate, but if it does not, it must not have
been."10
Mr Williams describes quite well how I see it, and probably how many others
involved in practical monetary policy do too. At each decision point, the central
bank assesses how the economy will be affected by the interest rate decisions it
makes, and it is of course possible to conduct monetary policy without having an
idea of exactly where the neutral interest rate is at the moment.
The further the policy rate is from the neutral level, the easier it is to determine
whether monetary policy is expansionary or contractionary. For example, it was
clearly contractionary during the inflationary peaks in recent years, which was of
course the intention. But the closer it gets to the neutral level, the harder it is to
determine whether you are on the right track. This means relying on
forwardlooking indicators and models and continuously trying to assess the impact of
policies on the economy using incoming statistics as much as possible. The
important thing here is that the central bank monitors developments closely and
does not lock itself into a preconceived view.
Nevertheless, it can be said that the downward trend in the neutral interest rate
has had rather large implications for monetary policy. The benchmark for what
constitutes an expansionary or contractionary policy is quite different today than
in the past. A policy rate that was clearly expansionary in the mid-1990s was
instead contractionary a couple of decades later. For monetary policy to keep
inflation on target, policy rates around the world have therefore had to be
reduced to lower and lower levels with each economic cycle. It also explains why
many central banks, including the Riksbank, set their policy rates at zero or
negative values before the period of higher inflation in recent years.
For various reasons, policy rates cannot be cut too far below zero before further
reductions become ineffective. We thus speak of an effective lower bound for the
policy rate. Before the 2021-2022 inflation surge, there was therefore an
international discussion on whether monetary policy was running out of steam
and, if so, how best to deal with it.11 This problem was perceived as less acute
when inflation went up worldwide. The international debate today centres on
10
This statement has been referred to by, for example, Orphanides and Williams (2002), Powell (2017) and
Obstfeld (2023). It is worth noting that the author is thus a different John Williams than the one who has
become renowned in recent decades for, among other things, his estimates of r*. The latter, Mr John C.
Williams, is President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
11
For example, the problems of persistently too low inflation played a central role in both the US Federal
Reserve's 2020 monetary policy review and the European Central Bank's 2021 strategy review, see Powell
(2020) and ECB (2021).
whether the neutral interest rate is still low or whether it has risen, or will do so in
the future.
Can economic policy influence the neutral interest rate?
As noted earlier, the neutral interest rate is driven by factors over which
monetary policy has no obvious influence. The long-term trend in the neutral rate
is affected by global saving and investment patterns, which in turn are affected by
factors such as demographics and productivity trends.12 As I mentioned earlier,
more short-term movements are affected by, for example, the stance of fiscal
policy.
The neutral interest rate - and in particular its trend decline - has often been
neglected in the Swedish media debate on monetary policy.13 As a result,
monetary policy has been criticised for circumstances over which it has little
influence. A common argument in the Swedish debate is that monetary policy has
been systematically too expansionary and that this is the root cause of the rise in
housing prices and household indebtedness. This ignores the fact that housing
price developments depend to a large extent on the functioning of the housing
market, but also that the decline in the neutral interest rate has played a key role
in this context.
The rise in housing prices and indebtedness in the Swedish economy has taken
place parallel to the trend decline in the neutral interest rate since around the
mid-1990s. If general interest rates in the economy trend downwards, households
may borrow more to finance their house purchases, often leading to higher
indebtedness and higher house prices. This prolonged decline in general interest
rates is therefore one explanation for the trend of rising debt and housing prices.
But it is also not a law of nature that lower interest rates always lead to higher
housing prices. The decline has been international and there are examples of
countries that have experienced the same trend decline in interest rates, but
where house prices have risen much less than in Sweden. These countries are
usually characterised by a better functioning housing market than in Sweden. An
example often mentioned here is Finland. In Finland, the economy has been
governed by the European Central Bank's policy rates. If anything, they have been
12
It is worth mentioning that there are theories that global long-term real interest rates are influenced by
the monetary policies of major central banks rather than by global saving and investment patterns (see, for
example, Borio et al., 2022). Even if this were to be the case, the development of the neutral interest rate
would be exogenous for central banks in small open economies, such as the Riksbank.
13
This is something that others on the Executive Board of the Riksbank have also pointed out, see for
example Jansson (2023).
lower than those of the Riksbank during the period in question, but despite this,
housing prices have not increased in the same way.
Over the past year, the concept of a neutral interest rate has begun to attract
more attention in the Swedish media debate as well.14 Awareness of the
importance, but also the limitations, of the neutral interest rate improves the
conditions for a nuanced discussion of monetary policy.
Future development of the neutral interest rate
There is thus a broad consensus that the neutral interest rate fell over a number
of decades, reaching historically low levels in the early 2020s. But what can we say
about future developments? There are a number of challenges here. To begin
with, it can be noted that there are no clear-cut answers as to how important
various factors were in the decline in the neutral rate, although some
explanations are more plausible than others. This means that it is even more
difficult to predict how the neutral interest rate will develop in the future. It is not
enough to have an idea of how important different factors are for the neutral
interest rate. It is also necessary to try to forecast how these factors will develop.
As I noted earlier, there is a lively international discussion on the likely
development of the neutral rate. Because this is such a central issue, it has
engaged many well-known economists, who often have different views.15 My
interpretation of the discussion is that it is still unresolved. Some argue that the
forces that contributed to lowering the neutral interest rate have not really
abated and that the effective lower bound for the policy rate will continue to be a
recurring challenge for monetary policy.16
Others argue that the neutral rate has risen slightly, or will do so in the future.
Here one often refers to the need for major investments to cope with the climate
transition and the need to increase defence spending in an increasingly uncertain
world. These investments are thus seen as more long-term and structural, which
means that they may push up the neutral interest rate for a long time. These
investments are thus different from the more short-term fiscal policy stimulus I
used in the previous example. This view has also left its mark, albeit a rather
limited one, on various numerical assessments of the neutral interest rate.17 A
14
See, for example, Carlström (2024) and Munkhammar (2024).
15
One example is the debate between Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Summers at the Peterson Institute
for International Economics 2023, see Peterson Institute (2023).
16
See, for example, IMF (2023) and Obstfeld (2023).
17
For example, the Bank of Canada has revised its estimate of the neutral rate marginally upwards from
2.00-3.00 per cent to 2.25-3.25 per cent; see Adjalala et al. (2024). The National Institute of Economic
Research has also made a marginal upward revision to what it considers to be a neutral policy rate ten years
cautious summary of this discussion is that there is little to indicate that we are in
a completely new world where the neutral interest rate has risen sharply, or will
do so in the near future.
The Riksbank's assessment of the neutral interest rate
Over the years, the Riksbank has repeatedly discussed the neutral interest rate in
speeches and reports, not least in the annual accounts of monetary policy. In
these reports, which we compile as a basis for the Committee on Finance's
assessment of monetary policy, we have often discussed the trend decline in the
neutral interest rate and the implications for monetary policy.18
However, the Riksbank has not presented any estimates or made any statements
about the probable level of the neutral interest rate in recent years. In an article
in the Monetary Policy Report in February 2017, the Riksbank assessed that the
repo rate, the then equivalent of the current policy rate, could be expected to be
between 2.5 and 4 per cent in the long term.19 This assessment thus refers to the
long-term definition of the neutral interest rate, the trend in Figure 1. This was a
downward revision of previous estimates, reflecting the fact that Swedish
domestic interest rates are largely influenced by international factors and that
interest rates had trended downwards globally. The Riksbank then communicated
in 2019 and 2022 that it was likely that the level was in the lower part of, or
slightly below, the range from 2017, that is, that the neutral interest rate had
continued to fall since then. Analysis presented in the March Monetary Policy
Report this year suggests that the structural factors that had caused the neutral
interest rate to fall have not changed significantly in recent years and that any
changes in the neutral interest rate are likely to be small, relative to the trend
decline that has already taken place.20
However, there are reasons to be more precise than that. Based on what I have
covered so far, it should be clear that no single estimation method can be
expected to provide a reliable and precise answer. One needs to weigh up the
information from different sources and make an overall judgement.
ahead (2.6 per cent), although it also considers that the uncertainty surrounding the estimate has
increased, see Österholm (2024).
18
See, for example, Chapter 4 Sveriges Riksbank (2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024a).
19
Sveriges Riksbank (2017).
20
Sveriges Riksbank (2024b). See also Flodberg (2024), who develops the reasoning.
We have therefore reviewed international studies, assessments by other central
banks and information from financial markets, both from pricing and surveys.21
During the autumn, we have also used Swedish data to estimate various models
that feature prominently in the literature on neutral interest rates.22
Based on our analysis, we assess that the long-term neutral interest rate, and thus
the long-term normal policy rate, is probably between 1.5 and 3 per cent. This is
one percentage point lower than the range we published in 2017.
Figure 3. The Riksbank's and other central banks' assessments of neutral
interest rates
Per cent
Source: The Riksbank and the respective central bank.
Note. The assessment for Norges bank is from the article "Anslag på nøytral realrente"
(Estimates of the neutral real interest rate), in the Monetary Policy Report 2/2023. For the
Bank of Canada, the estimates are retrieved from the publications "Potential output and the
neutral rate in Canada", "The neutral rate in Canada" and "Monetary Policy Report". For the
Federal Reserve, the range is calculated as the difference between the highest and lowest
assessments of the long-term policy rate made by the members of the Federal Open Market
Committee (the so-called "dot plots"), with the three highest and the three lowest assessments
excluded. The Riksbank's earlier estimates come from the articles "What is a normal level for
the repo rate?" 2006:2, "What is a normal repo rate?" February 2010 and "The repo rate in the
long term" February 2017.
21
The pricing information refers to the so-called "5Y-5Y forward inflation expectation rate", which shows
the average expected inflation rate over the five-year period starting in five years' time. The survey
information refers to money market participants' expectations for the policy rate in five years' time
according to Prospera. These two series have a similar evolution.
22
The models of which we have estimated variants are Laubach and Williams (2003), Berger and Kempa
(2014) and Armelius et al. (2018).
Figure 3 shows how the assessment compares with those of other central banks,
in this case Norges Bank, the Bank of Canada and the US Federal Reserve. The
assessments are fairly well aligned. Estimates of the neutral rate tend to be
slightly higher in the United States and Canada than in Europe, which is usually
attributed to the assumption that these economies are more flexible. The US also
tends to have slightly higher productivity and trend growth.23 As the assessments
for the other countries have been made more continuously, it also appears that
they reached their lowest levels in the early 2020s in the context of the pandemic.
After that, there is a tendency for them to have risen slightly, but the change is, as
I noted earlier, marginal.
It may be perceived as frustrating that the assessment is not more precise. There
is of course a difference between a policy rate averaging 1.5 per cent over a
number of decades and a rate of 3 per cent. But it reflects the uncertainty that we
believe exists and that we cannot ignore.24
I would like to emphasise that the assessment refers to the neutral interest rate in
the long term. As I said earlier, the neutral rate can also be affected by more
temporary factors. These may be covered by the range, but there is no guarantee
that this is the case. We report a range because of the uncertainty in the
assessment of the long-term neutral rate, not because we are trying to ensure
that we also capture short-term variations. Estimates of the long-term neutral
interest rate provide the Riksbank with information on what a normal interest
rate situation is likely to be in a number of years. But as I noted earlier, the effects
of monetary policy on the economy need to be monitored on an ongoing basis,
both to assess where we are today and to be able to identify more precisely
where we are heading.
Will we get back to interest rates as low as they were
before the high inflation?
One should be aware that the policy rate can be both significantly higher and
significantly lower than the range. If the policy rate is normally somewhere
between 1.5 and 3 per cent, one cannot rule out the possibility that it may need
to be reduced to zero or even negative levels again. In the event of an economic
slowdown or deep recession, a policy rate cut in the order of 1.5 to 3 percentage
points is not particularly exceptional.
23
For estimates indicating a higher neutral rate in the United States than in the euro area, see, for example,
Williams (2024).
24
More details on this assessment will be published in a staff memo shortly.
One aspect of this, which could be important here, but which has been discussed
somewhat less than how the neutral interest rate might be affected by structural
factors such as demographics and productivity developments, is how it is affected
by underlying inflationary pressures.
Before the pandemic, phenomena such as globalisation and digitalisation were
said to have a dampening effect on world inflation - an assessment I share. They
thus contributed to lower inflationary pressures without being clearly linked to
the structural factors affecting the neutral interest rate.25 Nevertheless, they
probably contributed to the need to keep policy rates lower than otherwise.
In recent years, there has instead been talk of a trend towards less globalisation,
including an increase in trade barriers and so-called reshoring or nearshoring, i.e.
moving production back to one's own country or regions that are closer. The
outcome of the US election is also likely to lead to the implementation of various
trade barriers, which could create some inflationary pressures due to supply
constraints. Digitalisation is more difficult to predict, but it is conceivable that the
most obvious benefits of digitalisation have already largely been reaped and that
its dampening effect on inflation is starting to fade.
All in all, this could imply that monetary policy will be conducted in an
environment of stronger underlying inflationary pressures going forward. In
practice, this means that the neutral interest rate will be slightly higher than in
recent decades. This could indicate that going forward it will be less common to
have long periods when central bank policy rates need to be kept exceptionally
low for inflation to reach the target. But whether this will actually happen is
something that is difficult to predict. As with regard to so many other things, the
future will have to tell.
References
Adjalala, Frida, Felipe Alves, Hélène Desgagnés, Wei Dong, Dmitry Matveev, Laure
Simon (2024), "Assessing the US and Canadian neutral rates: 2024 update", Staff
Analytical Note 2024-92, Bank of Canada,
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2024/04/staff-analytical-note-2024-9/
25
There is of course a link between, for example, digitalisation and productivity growth, but it is
nevertheless reasonable to imagine that digitalisation may also affect inflation via other, more direct
channels. For example, digital developments have led to an increase in e-commerce, which has increased
competition and made it more difficult to raise prices.
Armelius, Hanna, Martin Solberger and Erik Spånberg (2018), "Is the Swedish
neutral interest rate influenced by other countries?", Sveriges Riksbank Economic
Review, no. 2018:1, Sveriges Riksbank.
Berger Tino and Bernd Kempa (2014), "Time-varying equilibrium rates in small
open economies: Evidence for Canada", Journal of Macroeconomics 39, pp.
203-214.
Boocker, Sam, Michael Ng and David Wessel (2023), "What is the neutral rate of
interest?", Commentary, The Brookings Institution,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-hutchins-center-explains-the-neutralrate-of-interest/
Borio, Claudio, Piti Disyatat, Mikael Juselius and Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul
(2022), "Why So Low for So Long? A Long-Term View of Real Interest Rates",
International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 47-87.
Calmfors, Lars (2024), "Nu är det dags att höja inflationsmålet eller öka
statsskulden" (Now is the time to raise the inflation tar