Stephen S Poloz: Monetary/fiscal policy mix and financial stability - the
medium term is still the message
Text of The Doug Purvis Memorial Lecture by Mr Stephen S Poloz, Governor of the Bank of
Canada, at the 50th Annual Conference of the Canadian Economics Association at the
University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Montreal, 4 June 2016.
* * *
Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech.
The paper benefited greatly from the assistance of Stephen Murchison, as well as from José Dorich, Vadym
Lepetyuk and HanJing Xie, who performed the model simulations. All remaining errors and omissions are my own
responsibility.
Summary
Financial stability risks have become topical in the wake of the global financial crisis and the
subsequent extended period of very low interest rates. This paper investigates the significance
of the mix of monetary and fiscal policies for financial stability through counterfactual
simulations of three key historical episodes, using the Bank's main policy model, ToTEM
(Terms-of-Trade Economic Model). The paper finds that there is an intimate relationship
between the monetary/fiscal policy mix and the dynamics of both private sector and public
sector debt accumulation. No attempt is made to develop criteria for policy mix optimization,
since it is clear from the model simulations that the appropriate policy mix is highly
statedependent. This finding points to the need for a coherent framework for weighing the relative
financial and macroeconomic consequences of accumulating public sector versus private
sector debt. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that there are potential benefits to ex ante
monetary/fiscal policy coordination, and that Canada's policy framework - where the monetary
and fiscal authorities jointly agree on an inflation target while enshrining central bank
operational independence - represents an elegant coordinating mechanism.
1. Introduction
Doug Purvis was a friend of mine. I did my undergraduate degree in economics at Queen's
University from 1974 to 1978 and, in my fourth year, was lucky enough to be invited to take
Doug's graduate macro course. Doug was 30 at the time, only six years my senior, and already
he had serious stature. For some reason, he took an interest in me, in my undergraduate thesis
and my plans for graduate school, and we stayed in touch after I started work at the Bank of
Canada in 1981. Needless to say, I admired him greatly and was crushed when he passed
away in 1993.
Therefore, it is truly an honour for me to be asked to deliver the Doug Purvis Memorial Lecture
today. It is a unique opportunity to pay homage to someone special and, hopefully, to offer you
a new insight at the same time.
As I began to think about what I might discuss today, I found myself remembering an important
talk - the Harold Innis Lecture - that Doug gave at the meetings of the Canadian Economics
Association in 1985 in Montréal (Purvis 1985). I was in the audience that day. That lecture was
titled "Public Sector Deficits, International Capital Movements and the Domestic Economy: The
Medium-Term Is the Message." Doug certainly held that fiscal policy was an effective tool for
economic stabilization, but he drew us to a very important caveat - that stimulative fiscal policy
meant government borrowing, and the accumulation of debt through that channel would one
day have important side effects not captured in most macroeconomic models at the time. As
Doug showed, these cumulative debt dynamics would, in time, have both domestic and
international consequences.
Those important side effects would manifest themselves in the medium term. Many of you will
recognize Doug's subtitle, "The Medium-Term Is the Message," as a reference to the familiar
quote, "the medium is the message," penned back in 1964 by the Canadian philosopher
Marshall McLuhan, who may have been the most famous student of Harold Innis. This was
typical of Doug - always clever with words, but in a way that connected with a very broad
audience.
My hope today is to do something similar in Doug's memory, leveraging his work and that of
many others who followed. Back in 1985, Doug walked us through a series of theoretical
models, mostly extensions of the Mundell-Fleming model with debt-stock effects captured;
today, I will explore the same issues using a state-of-the-art policy model to simulate instructive
counterfactuals during key episodes of Canadian economic history.
Of course, I now find myself actually in the job I was dreaming of while sitting in Doug's macro
class 38 years ago. I'm quite sure Doug would never have forecast that. In fact, he was rather
hoping I would land in academia. But as a central banker, it would be unusual for me to give a
lecture on fiscal policy per se. In fact, what I will do is focus on the implications of alternative
mixes of monetary policy and fiscal policy for public sector and private sector debt, and for
financial stability.
The concept of a monetary/fiscal policy "mix" is itself not all that precise. For one thing,
measuring a shift in policy stance requires a definition of what is neutral, which is particularly
uncertain in the case of monetary policy. Further, while the change in nominal interest rates is
the most reasonable proxy for the change in the stance of monetary policy, as is the change
in the fiscal balance for fiscal policy, both variables are highly endogenous to the rest of the
economy. For example, a government may set out a balanced fiscal policy ex ante, but
because of an unexpected weakening in the economy, the fiscal balance turns negative, which
would be interpreted ex post as an expansionary fiscal policy when this was never the intention.
In this sense, the mix of monetary and fiscal policy ex post is only partly a matter of plan or
prior choice. In what follows, therefore, I use the term "policy mix" with the understanding that
it is not truly a control variable, although of course it is possible for the monetary and fiscal
authorities to exercise some degree of coordination of the policy mix ex ante, even if all they
do is make clear what each is intending to do.
Meanwhile, financial stability issues have become top of mind since the global financial crisis
of 2007-08 as persistently low interest rates have been blamed for various financial
imbalances, including rising household debt and hot housing markets. Indeed, the experience
is spawning a new literature on how best to incorporate financial stability risks into monetary
policy decision making (e.g., Poloz 2014). I will argue - and illustrate with concrete examples
- that the issues of financial stability and the monetary/fiscal policy mix are intimately related.
I will begin by reminding you of some important policy history and then bring us to the present
day, where I think the issues Doug loved to debate remain highly relevant.
2. Some history
To fix ideas, it is worth spending a few moments describing the policy setting in which Doug
found himself in the mid-1980s. In fact, it is better to start the narrative a bit earlier. When I
was Doug's student in 1977, inflation was perceived as the paramount macroeconomic
problem since it was fluctuating in the 8 to 12 per cent range (Chart 1). The Bank of Canada
had deployed targets for the growth of the money supply as a means of reducing inflation over
time. Experiments with wage and price controls had not delivered much. By 1980, breaking
the inflation trend would take hikes in interest rates to around 20 per cent - first by the
Chairman of the US Federal Reserve at the time, Paul Volcker, and followed by then Bank of
Canada Governor Gerald Bouey. After a severe recession in 1981-82, inflation fell to the
4-5 per cent range and remained there for the next decade or so. Real interest rates stayed
elevated throughout the 1980-95 period (Chart 2).
Given this array of developments, fiscal deficits ballooned in the run-up to Doug's Innis Lecture
in 1985 (Chart 3). The 1970s had witnessed persistent fiscal deficits of 2 to 5 per cent of GDP,
but the deficit expanded during the 1981-82 recession and continued to widen even as the
recovery gained traction, hitting 8 per cent of GDP in 1984. Doug's message was that the
implications of those deficits for debt accumulation would someday matter.
As it happens, deficits began to shrink in 1985, but it would take a full 10 years for budget
balance to be achieved. As a consequence, the stock of fiscal debt continued to build over that
period (Chart 4). The macroeconomic situation was made even more difficult by a significant
decline in Canada's terms of trade (the ratio of export prices to import prices) during the
1984-87 period, driven mainly by a significant drop in global oil prices (Chart 5), which made
the process of fiscal consolidation doubly challenging.
As the fiscal debt ratio rose through the mid-1980s and early 1990s, consternation in global
financial markets also grew. In 1994-95, federal debt as a share of GDP reached a peak of
67 per cent. Today, such a government debt ratio sounds high but certainly not catastrophic.
Importantly, though, real interest rates were much higher in the mid-1990s, making the relative
burden of servicing debt much greater than it is at today's rates. In any case, markets came to
look negatively on Canadian sovereign debt, even describing the weakening Canadian dollar
as "the northern peso" in early 1995 (Chart 6).
Both monetary and fiscal policy-makers responded to this souring of investor sentiment with
renewed urgency. The Bank of Canada had committed to inflation targets in 1991, and interest
rates had been on a declining path, along with inflation. However, interest rates increased
again during 1994-95, despite a slow economy caused in part by weak oil prices; to some
extent, interest rates rose because markets perceived that the associated exchange rate
depreciation would loop back into inflation pressures, forcing the Bank to tighten policy
eventually. With the benefit of hindsight, it is likely that this market dynamic reflected the fact
that domestic inflation expectations had not yet become anchored by the Bank's new
inflationtargeting policy, which in turn made it difficult to keep one-time relative price effects on inflation
distinct from the underlying trend in inflation. This is in sharp contrast to our most recent
experience, where well-anchored inflation expectations have enabled the Bank to "look
through" the temporary increase in inflation caused by a weaker currency and actually cut
interest rates to cushion the blow to the economy from falling oil prices.
Meanwhile, fiscal policy was tightened sufficiently to generate a surplus, and fiscal debt as a
share of GDP began a long decline that would be interrupted only by the global financial crisis
and the ensuing global recession. As a consequence, federal government debt as a share of
GDP is around half what it was at its peak in the mid-1990s.
Accordingly, at the risk of oversimplification, we can characterize the history of Canada's
monetary/fiscal policy mix as follows. When Doug was preparing his Innis Lecture, we had tight
monetary policy and easy fiscal policy. Over the following 10 years, fiscal policy gradually
tightened, and monetary policy took this trend into account while pursuing its inflation targets.
Then, from the late-1990s until the global financial crisis, fiscal surpluses were generally the
norm, and monetary policy remained focused on keeping inflation close to target.
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, of course, the G20 countries undertook a
coordinated fiscal easing, with many easing monetary policy as well. Starting in 2010, however,
with the worst effects of the crisis behind us, Canada's fiscal policy gradually moved back into
consolidation mode. Even so, the legacy effects of the financial crisis have lingered in many
countries, and Canada's export recovery has been halting at best. Accordingly, monetary
policy has remained very easy in order to keep inflation near its target.
Thus, in broad strokes, over 30 years, Canada's policy mix moved from tight monetary/easy
fiscal to neutral/neutral and then to easy monetary/tight fiscal, until the fiscal adjustments made
in 2016, just at the time of writing.
This quick historical sketch raises some obvious questions about the mix of monetary and
fiscal policies and the consequences for debt dynamics, for both governments and the private
sector. Intuitively, a tight monetary/easy fiscal policy mix means a relatively slow accumulation
of private sector debt and relatively rapid accumulation of fiscal debt; an easy monetary/tight
fiscal policy mix would deliver the opposite dynamic. Either dynamic can eventually give rise
to financial stability risks, as was the case for rising government debt in the mid-1990s and for
rising household imbalances over the past few years. In the following sections, we explore
these linkages in greater depth.
3. Some counterfactuals
In this section, we use the Bank of Canada's core policy model, ToTEM (Terms-of-Trade
Economic Model) to investigate the significance of the policy mix for some key macroeconomic
episodes.
ToTEM is a large-scale, multi-sector, dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) model
that reflects the consensus view of the key macroeconomic linkages in the Canadian economy
(Murchison and Rennison 2006; Dorich et al. 2013). In particular, ToTEM captures the
stockflow dynamics for both government debt and household wealth (and therefore debt) that so
preoccupied Doug Purvis.
ToTEM represents some 30 years of research effort, beginning (not coincidentally) at about
the same time that Doug began to work on these issues. ToTEM is essentially the grandchild
of SAM (Small Annual Model) (Rose and Selody 1985), which was developed in the mid-1980s.
SAM incorporated for the first time fully articulated household and government debt dynamics,
endogenous potential output and model-consistent (i.e., rational) inflation expectations. SAM
was later made quarterly and elaborated in a number of respects to produce QPM (Quarterly
Projection Model) (Black et al. 1994; Armstrong et al. 1995), which was the Bank's projection
model from the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s. As its name suggests, ToTEM is the first model
of its kind to have a fully developed commodity sector that captures economic and financial
interactions with the terms of trade. This investment in modelling more than paid for itself in
2015, when the Bank was able to reach an early understanding of the plunge in global oil prices
that took place in late 2014 and early 2015.
I have no doubt that Doug would have enjoyed using ToTEM to explore the issue of the
monetary/fiscal policy mix in Canada. Although his preference was to gain his insights from
tractable theoretical models, the literature has progressed with more elaborate models mainly
by going numerical. In what follows, we seek insights by examining alternative scenarios in
known macroeconomic episodes constructed using ToTEM.
3.1 Counterfactual 1: Purvis's 1985 warning is heeded immediately
As discussed above, Doug expressed considerable concern in 1985 about the medium-term
debt implications of fiscal policies in place at the time. Although budget deficits began a slow
decline around that time, these efforts really became aggressive after the emergence of
international financial market pressures in 1994-95. As noted earlier, the headwind of declining
oil prices posed a significant challenge for fiscal policy during the 1980s.
Accordingly, in our first counterfactual, we ask what the implications for the economy might
have been had Doug's warning been heeded immediately, with the federal deficit brought into
balance over the five years from 1985 to 1990, about five years earlier than when it actually
occurred. The historical and counterfactual budget deficits are shown in Chart 7, along with a
number of other simulation results. In this ToTEM simulation, monetary policy is modelled
using a reaction function estimated on historical data that aims to keep inflation and therefore
aggregate demand (or real GDP) close to their actual historical paths. Since neither fiscal nor
monetary policy is modelled as truly optimal, we are abstracting from the possibility that
different policies might have offered a different, potentially superior, set of macroeconomic
outcomes. We are also abstracting from a key monetary policy issue at the time, namely, the
lack of a well-defined policy target, as inflation targets were not formally introduced until 1991.
ToTEM is built on a credible inflation target and a mixture of rules of thumb and rational
expectations. Despite these caveats, the simulation is instructive.
The shock we analyze is a series of cuts to government spending beginning in 1985 that brings
the federal budget into balance by 1990 and holds it there. Notice that, given the importance
of debt servicing to federal spending at the time, this would have meant a significant surplus
of 4 to 5 per cent of GDP measured in primary terms (i.e., net of interest payments). Obviously,
since we are basing our counterfactuals on actual history, starting points will matter to the
simulations. According to our model, under this assumption of aggressive fiscal consolidation,
the federal debt would have peaked at about 50 per cent of GDP in 1986-89, instead of around
67 per cent in 1995. Indeed, the federal debt would have declined over the next several years,
falling into the high 30s as a percentage of GDP, some 30 percentage points lower than
actually occurred.
Under this tighter fiscal scenario, interest rates would be lower by between 1 and 2 percentage
points, since monetary policy would be cushioning the economy from the downside shock of
lower fiscal spending. This lower interest rate profile would have had a significant impact on
the Canadian dollar, which would have been lower by as much as 8 cents US. The currency
would have peaked at around 80 cents US (measured in annual average terms), compared
with the actual peak of more than 87 cents US on average in 1991.
Canadian households would have responded to this lower interest rate environment by
purchasing more durable goods and houses and therefore borrowing more. Household debt
would have been higher in 1995, by more than 3 per cent of GDP. Clearly, with less
government demand in the economy, there would have been more private sector activity,
including consumption spending, housing construction and, given the lower Canadian dollar,
more exports.
What this counterfactual illustrates is that a shift in policy mix along the lines suggested by
Doug in 1985 would have had predictable implications for the Canadian economy. Notice,
however, that the lower trajectory for government debt would have had a mirror image, albeit
more modest in scope, in household debt. Thus, even from this modest experiment, it is clear
that the stocks of fiscal debt and household debt are interrelated.
As for the desirability of one policy mix over another, hindsight is always 20:20 and such a
discussion would have little meaning here. The Canadian economy was going through a very
challenging period - recovering from the trauma of very high interest rates, falling oil prices
and unanchored inflation expectations - and monetary policy and fiscal policy were both trying
to achieve very important objectives. Here, and in subsequent sections, we will refrain from
evaluating the pros and cons of alternative policy mixes.
3.2 Counterfactual 2: fiscal policy in primary structural balance from 2000
Having examined an interesting but fairly arbitrary counterfactual adjustment to fiscal policy in
the late-1980s, we now turn to a more rigorous experiment around the policy mix. In our
remaining counterfactuals, we hold fiscal policy in balance (moving the primary structural fiscal
balance to zero) and allow monetary policy to adjust to produce the same level of economic
activity that was observed in the historical data. The primary structural fiscal balance (Chart 8)
is estimated by adjusting budgetary components of revenues and spending to account for the
effect of the output gap and the trading-gain gap, as estimated by the Bank of Canada (see
Pichette et al. [2015] for information on the output gap and Barnett and Matier [2010] for
information on the trading-gain gap). This approach is similar to the one used by the
Parliamentary Budget Officer (Barnett and Matier 2010). Having estimated the primary
structural balance, we then add fiscal spending shocks to the model to force that definition of
fiscal balance to zero while constraining real GDP to follow its original historical path through
a corresponding adjustment to the path of short-term interest rates. This allows us to
investigate the policy issue purely in terms of a monetary/fiscal mix. The simulations are
summarized in Chart 9.
Because the government ran persistent fiscal surpluses prior to the global financial crisis, this
counterfactual would have implied considerably easier fiscal policy during the 2000-07 period,
with additional fiscal spending of about 3 to 4 per cent of GDP in primary terms in most years.
Federal debt would have risen steadily throughout the 15-year period, including a sharp rise
during the Great Recession of 2008-10. By 2015, federal debt would have been around 70 per
cent of GDP and still rising - a higher level than the one that prompted market angst in the
mid-1990s. Clearly, therefore, this counterfactual simulation could have tested the limits of
policy mix flexibility. Indeed, such a policy might have proven technically unsustainable, given
the starting point.
Monetary policy in the scenario would have been much tighter under this easy fiscal policy
profile because the central bank would be working to achieve the same path for real GDP as
occurred in history, despite much higher government spending. In other words, monetary
policy would be working to offset the fiscal stimulus. Short-term interest rates would have
fluctuated between 5 and 10 per cent during most of the period, except during the aftermath
of the global financial crisis when rates would have fallen to as low as around 2 per cent. But
rates still would have risen to around 7 per cent again by 2012-15.
Not surprisingly, the Canadian dollar would have been much stronger under this scenario.
Already being pushed toward parity by the steady rise in prices for oil and other commodities
during 2002-12, the dollar would have averaged about 6 cents US higher than its actual
historical level but would have averaged around 10 cents higher during 2012-15. This would
have meant even more long-term damage to the export sector and an even more laborious
recovery from the global financial crisis.
Clearly, this alternative scenario strains credibility in various ways, but our objective is not to
derive a preferable policy path but rather to consider the implications of the shift in policy mix
for debt and financial stability. While the federal government would be racking up a historically
high stock of debt under the fiscal assumptions in our counterfactual, Canadian households
would be doing the opposite. By 2015, household debt as a share of GDP would have been
more than 20 percentage points lower than it is today, while government debt would be nearly
40 percentage points higher.
Notice that there is not a 1:1 inverse relationship between the debt stocks of the public and
private sectors. This reflects the empirical finding that household indebtedness is only
modestly influenced by monetary policy, a characteristic embedded in our simulations. It also
reflects the overall impact of monetary policy on real GDP, which extends well beyond its
influence on household borrowing. The trade-off between the two debt stocks is highly
dependent on the array of shocks hitting the economy at a point in time.
3.3 Counterfactual 3: fiscal policy in primary structural balance from 2011
Our third counterfactual scenario looks at the post-crisis period. After a significant easing of
both monetary and fiscal policies from 2008 to 2010 across most of the G20, there was a fairly
synchronized return toward neutral or tighter fiscal policy in the next couple of years. Monetary
policy remained easy in many countries, particularly advanced economies, and in some cases
was eased further as recoveries faltered. This has given rise to a debate around the
monetary/fiscal mix - essentially asking what would have happened had fiscal policy remained
easier for longer. In particular, the issue of rising household imbalances and the associated
risks to financial stability have come to the fore.
Accordingly, we use ToTEM to conduct a simulation with the primary structural fiscal balance
constrained to zero, starting in 2011. The results are shown in Chart 10. Because Canada's
primary structural fiscal balance actually moved into surplus in 2011 and rose to about 2 per
cent of GDP by 2015 (Chart 8), this counterfactual would have entailed rising fiscal spending
and persistent fiscal deficits through the 2011-15 period. By 2015, federal debt would have
risen by about 6 per cent of GDP, to about 37 per cent.
To therefore achieve the same level of real output, monetary policy would have been
somewhat tighter, with interest rates fluctuating around 2 to 3 per cent instead of around 1 per
cent, as actually happened. The Canadian dollar would have been stronger as well, by about
3 cents US, on average. It would be fair to argue that, in the context of a soft economy,
monetary policy might not have been tightened as the scenario describes, especially since for
most of 2012 and 2013 core inflation was around 1 per cent, about 1 percentage point below
target. By forcing our model to replicate the historical GDP performance, monetary policy would
have necessarily been tighter and would have clearly offset some of the effects of the
increased fiscal spending in the counterfactual - an unlikely outcome, given the situation.
With the higher profile for interest rates, household debt would have been lower than it actually
was in 2015, by some 7 per cent of disposable income, or 5 per cent of GDP. Notice that the
trade-off between private sector debt and fiscal debt in this shorter simulation is close to 1:1.
Even if the financial vulnerability associated with household debt had been lower throughout
the period, it would still have begun to rise again, beginning in 2014. Thus, although the
counterfactual shift in policy mix would have mitigated financial stability risks, they would still
have figured prominently in monetary policy deliberations by 2015.
4. The appropriate policy mix depends on the state of the economy
These counterfactual simulations offer a practitioner's glimpse into a difficult problem - how to
define a guide for a monetary/fiscal policy mix that, if not optimal ex ante, at least works well
on average ex post. The literature on this subject has employed increasingly complex DSGE
models (see, for example, Gnocchi and Lambertini 2016). Despite those complexities, such
models remain far more simple than the sort of elaborate model a policy-maker generally relies
on, such as ToTEM. Thus, one can learn only so much from the conclusions that have been
reached to date.
A key finding in this literature relates to monetary policy's "commitment," or, in common
parlance, inflation targets. In a model with government debt, the higher the level of that debt,
the more incentive there is for government to create some surprise inflation, because surprise
inflation erodes the real value of outstanding debt and reduces the need for future taxation.
Such inflation surprises, of course, erode the value of private sector savings and, in time, lead
to a de-anchoring of inflation expectations. Clearly, an inflation target committed to by the
central bank (and, in the case of Canada, agreed to jointly with the federal government) can
help offset this incentive. Accordingly, models with inflation commitments tend to predict a
lower stock of government debt. As well, the credible inflation commitment gives both monetary
and fiscal policy the ability to offset macroeconomic fluctuations. Because inflation stability
emerges only when the economy is sustainably at full capacity, the coordination problem
between monetary and fiscal policy is highly simplified when there is such a joint commitment
to inflation targets.
Where the issue of monetary/fiscal policy mix comes more to the fore is when the economy is
far from equilibrium, and persistently so. As we saw in our simulations, starting points matter,
and persistent disequilibrium gives rise to accumulating debt stocks in either the public sector
or the private sector, or both. As is well known, so-called Ricardian effects are likely to become
increasingly apparent as private sector debt rises - households know full well that they will
have to pay the money back someday, so they will not accumulate debt ad infinitum. There is
every reason to expect similar reactions to high and rising public sector debt: since households
know that they will someday have to pay higher taxes to cover the debt the government is
incurring, they might respond to increased government spending by increasing their savings
today and, in so doing, partially offset the government's stimulus efforts.
This suggests that there is a meaningful trade-off in the policy space between the
mediumterm consequences for debt of monetary and fiscal policies. An easy monetary/tight fiscal
policy mix will lead to higher private sector debt and lower public sector debt, all other things
being equal. Similarly, a tight monetary/easy fiscal policy mix will lead to lower private sector
debt and higher public sector debt. In effect, for a given macroeconomic situation,
policymakers have the ability to choose the dynamics of those two debt stocks - they can't influence
the two debt stocks independently, but their policy choices have simultaneous implications for
both variables.
What we lack at this time is a coherent framework for weighing the relative macroeconomic
consequences of private sector debt versus public sector debt. For a given economic situation,
what combination of public sector debt and private sector debt represents the best outcomes
from the point of view of financial stability? On all counts, this trade-off is likely to be extremely
complex, highly dependent on the economic situation and therefore likely to complicate
significantly the choice of policy mix.
The next generation of policy models will hopefully be enriched in this dimension, capturing
the complexity of the underlying linkages between economic behaviour and financial variables
in much the same way that ToTEM made such a significant advance with respect to
terms-oftrade shocks. In addition to the stocks of debt, these enriched models would include other
dimensions of financial stability risk, such as overvalued property or stock market prices, and
the feedback these elements can have for consumers and financial intermediaries. A better
understanding of the medium-term trade-off of private sector versus public sector debt will be
helpful in developing stronger guidance around the monetary/fiscal policy mix. No doubt, over
the next few years in Canada, we will learn more about this trade-off at a practical level.
5. Conclusion
We have seen a lot in the 30 years since Doug Purvis gave his Innis Lecture. We have learned
that there are limits to how much government debt financial markets will tolerate, as Doug
thoughtfully predicted. We have also learned that, in unusual circumstances, private sector
debt can reach levels that can similarly strain the tolerance of financial markets. These strains
inevitably feed back into monetary policy deliberations, either because they have real effects
on the economy or because central banks see the danger of making financial stability risks
worse while trying to lessen macroeconomic risks. Central banks are actively engaged in
determining how best to incorporate such financial stability concerns into the conduct of
monetary policy. The analysis presented here has demonstrated that there is an intimate
connection between the debt stocks embedded in financial stability issues and the
monetary/fiscal policy mix.
Objectives for monetary policy, such as monetary or inflation targets, have historically been
seen mainly as a recipe for staying out of trouble; in other words, they are meant to manage
macroeconomic risks in the face of uncertainty, while delivering a less uncertain environment
for economic decision making. While experience shows that inflation targets have improved
macroeconomic perf