Productivity puzzles
Speech given by
Andrew G Haldane, Chief Economist, Bank of England
London School of Economics
20 March 2017
The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I
would like to thank Sandra Batten, Shiv Chowla, Fergus Cumming, Adriana Fernandes,
Jeremy Franklin, Dena Jacobs, Gabor Pinter, Alex (Sasha) Naumov and Jessica Verlander for their
help in preparing the text. I would like to thank Omar Ahmed, Saleem Bahaj, Giuseppe Berlingieri,
Phillip Bond, Sara Calligaris, Greg Clark, Chiara Criscuolo, Angus Foulis, Peter Gal, Richard Harrison,
David Hendry, Bill Janeway, Casey Murphy, Lukasz Rachel, John Van Reenen, Michael Saunders,
Patrick Schneider and colleagues at the ONS Research Database for their comments and
contributions.
By common assent, economists do not agree on much. I have lost count of the number of jokes about
economists whose punchline ends "and they still couldn't reach a conclusion". That is why Harry S Truman,
when President of the United States, famously yearned for a one-handed economist. Whether or not this
critique is fair, the issue I will discuss tonight is one on which economists do agree: productivity matters.
At this point, it is customary to wheel out the following, now rather over-used, Paul Krugman quote:
"productivity isn't everything, but in the long run it is almost everything." Despite its
over-use, this quote does
have one important virtue, something not to be taken lightly in this post-fact, post-truth world: it is empirically
verifiable and appears to be factually accurate. Let me illustrate that with a simple example.
Since 1850 UK living standards, as measured by GDP per head, have risen roughly 20-fold, a huge gain.
How much of that gain can be attributed to higher productivity? Well, if productivity had flat-lined over the
period, UK living standards would only have only doubled. Or, put differently, in the absence of productivity
growth, UK living standards would be an order of magnitude lower today, stuck at late-Victorian levels.
A more refined way of reaching the same conclusion is to decompose growth into the contribution from
- -
inputs into the production process labour and capital and the contribution from improvements in the
efficiency with which these inputs are used - so-called Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Chart 1 does that for
the UK since the Industrial Revolution. This suggests movements in TFP have accounted for the lion's share
of both the growth and variation in living standards since at least the mid-18th century.
Saying that productivity matters is not the same as saying we understand its determinants. The past few
years have served to underscore just how partial economists' understanding of productivity remains. As one
illustration, Chart 2 plots successive forecasts by the Bank of England of UK productivity growth since 2008,
while Chart 3 shows IMF forecasts of productivity across advanced economies over the same period.
These charts point to a string of material and serially-correlated forecast errors over recent years.
Productivity growth has consistently underperformed relative to expectations, since at least the global
financial crisis. This tale of productivity disappointment, in forecasting and in performance, has been
extensively debated and analysed over recent years. Some have called it the "productivity puzzle".1
With each year that passes, and as each new turning point in productivity has failed to materialise, this
mystery has deepened. This has led some to conjecture that the world may have entered a new epoch of
sub-par productivity growth, an era of secular stagnation.2 Various possible causes of this stagnation have
been posited, including adverse demographic trends and diminished rates of innovation.3 The secular
stagnation hypothesis is striking in its gloomy implications for future growth in living standards.
1
For example, Barnett et al (2014), Bryson et al (2014) and Weale (2014)
2
For example, Gordon (2014) and Summers (2013).
3
Gordon (2014).
It is striking, too, because of the starkness with which it contrasts with a second topical hypothesis. This
posits that we may be on the cusp of a Second Machine Age or Fourth Industrial Revolution, an era of
secular
innovation.4 This might arise from the rise of the robots, artificial intelligence, Big Data, the Internet
-
of Things and the like. Because of its impact on future living standards, the winner of this secular struggle
-
stagnation versus innovation carries enormous societal implications.
distribution
A second issue, every bit as topical and important, concerns the of gains in living standards.
Specifically, there has been mounting concern over a number of years about rising levels of within-country
inequality across a number of countries.5 Candidate explanations for this widening dispersion in fortunes
include failings in the educational system, the impact of technology and globalisation, anti-competitive
practices and weaknesses in corporate governance.6
-
Both of these great debates innovation versus stagnation, the widening dispersion of income and
opportunity across society - have a causative link to productivity. A household's income depends largely on
wages and these wages depend, in turn, on the productivity of the company at which households work. So
falling productivity growth among firms, and widening dispersion of productivity across firms, could in theory
have contributed to stagnant household incomes and widening dispersion in these incomes.
To be clear up front, I do not have a simple explanation, much less an oven-ready solution, for these
-
productivity puzzles. My aims here are more modest to draw together some of the available data on
productivity to shed light on the puzzles. Specifically, I will look at historical data for the UK, at international
data from a cross-section of countries and at sectoral and firm-specific data for UK companies.
This empirical evidence suggests a long tail of countries and companies with low, slow productivity growth.
These productivity laggards have been unable to keep-up, much less catch-up, with frontier countries and
companies.7 At the same time, an upper tail of companies and countries has maintained high and rising
levels of productivity. These productivity leaders are pulling ever-further away from the lower tail. Or, put
differently, rates of technological diffusion from leaders to laggards have slowed, and perhaps even stalled,
recently.
This empirical pattern sheds light on the two great macro-economic debates. It helps explain why we might
see the co-existence of secular innovation (among leaders) and stagnation (among laggards). It helps
-
account for the fall in productivity growth rates namely, slower rates of diffusion of new innovation to the
long lower tail of companies. And it helps explain the widening dispersion in households' incomes, as the
mirror-image of widening productivity differences across firms.
4
For example, Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011, 2014).
5
For example, Piketty (2014), Milanovic (2016).
6
Stiglitz (2016).
7
This has been a key theme of recent work by the OECD, for example Andrews et al (2015).
This empirical prognosis also helps when devising policy measures to tackle these productivity problems.
Even marginal improvements to productivity among the long tail of low-productivity companies - or,
-
equivalently, a speeding up of rates of technological diffusion to these companies could make significant
inroads into the productivity puzzle. I will discuss possible policies to do so at the end.
Explaining the Productivity Puzzle
Before diving into the data, it is helpful to set out some of the candidate explanations that have been used to
explain the productivity puzzle, in the UK and internationally. These hypotheses include:
(a) Mismeasurement
There is a fairly widespread perception that the productivity puzzle may, at least in part, be no more than a
statistical mirage. It certainly seems likely that official statistics underestimate economic activity to some,
perhaps significant, degree and with it potential productivity gains.8 For example, a recent review concluded
that productivity growth in the UK might be under-estimated by around 0.5 percentage points per year, as a
result of the failure fully to capture elements of the digital economy.9
That said, most studies have also found that mismeasurement alone is unlikely to account for the majority of
the productivity puzzle, whether in the UK or internationally.10 Many of the mismeasurement problems
already existed long before productivity started slowing. These problems would need to have increased
dramatically - and probably unrealistically - to explain fully the productivity slowdown. Consistent with that,
the slowdown in productivity appears to be largely unrelated to the penetration of information technologies
across sectors and countries.11
(b) Crisis-related scarring
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that financial crises can have a permanent, or certainly persistent,
This time's crisis, the largest in at least a
scarring effect on output and productivity in economies.12
generation, is unlikely to buck that historical trend. There are several channels through which financial crises
might permanently damage corporate sector productivity.
First, a collapse in credit availability is likely to constrict the financing of both new and existing companies
and hence constrain their investment plans. It may hit particularly hard young companies, without access to
alternative sources of finance, for whom productivity growth is often fastest. Empirical evidence from the
8
For example, Feldstein (2016), Baily and Montalbano (2016).
9
Bean (2016) discusses the potential mechanisms for the underestimation of GDP.
10
Syverson (2016), Byrne et al (2016).
11
Syverson (2016).
12
For example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel (2013).
crisis suggests these channels were potent, in the UK and internationally.13 As credit conditions have eased
recently, however, this has become a less compelling explanation for persisting productivity problems.
A second financial channel through which the crisis may have affected firms' investment is asset prices.
Specifically, many small firms are reliant on property collateral to back their loans. A fall in property prices
tightens their collateral constraint and credit conditions. Recent Bank of England research has suggested
this may have been a potent crisis propagation channel for smaller businesses during the crisis.14 As asset
prices have recovered, however, this channel cannot explain the persisting productivity puzzle.
A third channel through which the crisis might have slowed productivity is by hindering resource reallocation
between firms and across sectors.15 Flows of capital and labour between companies are one of the key
channels through which technology and ideas are diffused.16 Since the crisis, rates of labour market churn
between companies have been low and the dispersion in rates of return across sectors has been high.17
Both are consistent with lower rates of factor reallocation having contributed to low productivity.
(c) Forbearance and monetary policy
Some have contended that productivity may have been held back by the actions of the authorities, in
particular regulatory forbearance and accommodative monetary policies. By supporting low-productivity
companies who would otherwise have failed, policy actions may have prevented the "creative destruction" of
firms.18 Certainly, the level of company liquidations and firm exits has remained low in many countries since
the financial crisis, probably lower than would have been expected given the path of GDP.
A number of studies have considered the evidence on the impact of regulatory and monetary policies on firm
death and productivity.19 For instance, Arrowsmith et al (2013) examine the prevalence of bank forbearance
across the small to medium-sized enterprises (SME) sector, finding the effect to be small. The same study
finds a potentially larger impact of monetary policy on company failure and productivity.20 That said, it is
important to note that employment was also higher as a result of looser monetary policy, with potentially
smaller crisis-related scarring effects on labour markets.
13
Chodorow-Reich (2014), Greenstone and Mas (2012) and Edgerton (2012) for the US, Amiti and Weinstein (2013) for Japan,
Paravisini et al (2015) for Peru, Bentotila et al (2013) for Spain and Franklin et al (2015) for the UK.
14
Bahaj et al (2016).
15
Riley et al (2015), Barnett et al (2014).
16
For example, Newman et al (2015), Hoekman et al (2004).
17
Barnett et al (2014), Broadbent (2012), Hseih and Klenow (2008), Calligaris et al (2016).
18
For example, McGowan et al (2017) and Pessoa and Van Reenen (2014).
19
Cette et al (2016), Reis (2013), Gopinath et al (2015) and Gorton-Ordones (2015).
20
See also, Broadbent (2012).
(d) Slowing Innovation
Some economists believe that the type of technological progress behind productivity growth over the past
two centuries may not continue at the same pace in the future.21 One argument is that the current wave of
innovation, grounded in ICT, does not have the same potential as past innovations.22 A second is that the
ICT revolution is already quite mature and that future progress is likely to be slower.23 A third is that, with
world population expected to peak this century, so too might the pace of innovation.24
These arguments are contentious and have been the subject of lively debate.25 Some have argued that the
ICT revolution has already had a greater impact on productivity than the steam engine.26 Others have
argued that the ICT revolution is still in its infancy and has vast potential for further disruptive innovation.27
And a third contends that there are many emerging technologies with the potential to revolutionise the
economy, such as robotics, artificial intelligence, Big Data and the human genome.28
(e) Diffusion Dynamics
An alternative way of accounting for slower productivity growth is that it arises, not from slower rates of
innovation, but from slower rates of diffusion of innovation to other companies and countries.29 For example,
recent empirical work by the OECD has highlighted the possibility of the technological diffusion engine
having slowed, or even stalled, over the most recent period, with a widening in dispersion between the
fortunes of those companies operating at the technological frontier and those operating inside this frontier.30
There are a number of possible explanations for such a phenomenon. Stifled competition in certain sectors
and for certain products may have prevented the trickle-down of innovation.31 For example, restrictions on
patents and intellectual property (IP) might restrict new entrants and retard replication. A related hypothesis
is that, in today's globalised markets, network economies of scale and scope are more potent, generating
natural monopolies in which single or small sets of players dominate market share.32
A third hypothesis is that the emergence of a long tail of non-frontier companies, failing to keep pace with
innovation, is the result of management failings. For example, Nicholas Bloom and John Van Reenen have
shown that weaknesses in management processes and practices go a long way towards explaining the long
21
Gordon (2012) and Cowen (2011).
22
Gordon (2012).
23
Decker et al (2016) argue there has been a fall in entrepreneurship in high tech sectors over recent decades.
24
Gordon (2014). Jones and Romer (2010).
25
See Tuuli and Batten (2015) for a summary of this debate.
26
Craft (2004).
27
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011).
28
Mokyr (2014a and 2014b) and Baily et al (2013).
29
Comin and Hobijn (2010).
30
Andrews et al (2015).
31
Andrews et al (2015).
32
For example, Haskel and Westlake (2016).
tail of low productivity manufacturing companies.33 These poor practices are most pronounced in sectors
where competition is weak and in family-owned firms where management control rests with the eldest son.
The data presented below do not, in the main, allow a direct empirical test of these competing hypotheses.
Many of these hypotheses are, in any case, complementary explanations. The data do, however, lend
greater weight to some, and less to other, of these explanations when accounting for the productivity puzzle.
Historical Productivity Trends
Let me start by placing the UK's recent productivity performance
in a broader historical context. That is
useful for determining just how unusual the recent period of sub-par productivity performance really is.
Since the Industrial Revolution, GDP per capita in the UK has risen almost without interruption, at an annual
average rate of 1.2% per year. In lockstep, there has been a near-monotonic rise in UK productivity. UK
TFP growth since 1750 has averaged 0.8% per year. Since the Industrial Revolution, GDP per capita has
doubled roughly every 65 years and productivity roughly every 85 years.
The implications for living standards have been profound. Each generation has, since the Industrial
Revolution, been around 25% better off than their parents. This is a story of secular improvements in living
standards. It is also a story of secular innovation, with the two typically going hand in hand. At least over
recent centuries, secular stagnation in living standards and innovation has simply not fit the historical facts.
This is not, however, the whole story. For a longer-term perspective, Chart 4 shows an estimate of UK TFP
back to 1 AD, alongside GDP per head. The measurement problems in GDP and productivity were probably
more acute then than now. Nonetheless, the profiles of both GDP and TFP
"hockey-stick" are striking, both
in their own right and in their similarity. Over the long haul, GDP and TFP have moved in lockstep.
For many centuries prior to the Industrial Revolution, productivity and GDP growth in the UK averaged only
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around 0.01% per year. Each generation was only around 0.3% better off than their parents a scarcely
noticeable improvement. Secular stagnation in living standards and innovation persisted for many centuries.
History suggests both secular innovation and secular stagnation have, at different times, been the norm.
Although productivity growth has picked up since the Industrial Revolution, it has still been subject to
significant twists and turns. Chart 5 plots UK labour market productivity since 1760, decomposed into the
contribution from additional capital per worker ("capital deepening") and TFP. Both have fluctuated
significantly and have made substantial contributions to UK productivity growth over time.
33
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007).
Chart 6 looks more closely at the historical evolution of UK TFP growth. Trends in TFP have been far from
constant, with decadal spans when productivity has averaged little more than zero and others where it has
averaged close to 2%. The latter episodes have typically been associated with periods of rapid technological
change, as after the three industrial revolutions of the mid-18th, mid-19th and mid-20th centuries.
In each case, there was a significant lag between the arrival of new technologies and their impact on
productivity. Rates of technological diffusion were relatively slow and sedate. This is typically felt to have
reflected the time it takes for new technologies to find widespread use and become General Purpose
Technologies (GPTs).34 After the first Industrial Revolution, it took around 70-100 years for technological
diffusion to occur, GPTs to emerge and TFP and living standards to rise.35
Subsequent industrial revolutions have also seen a lag between the emergence of new technologies and
their impact on productivity. But there is evidence this diffusion lag may have shortened. Comin and
Mestieri (2014) estimate the diffusion lag during the industrial revolutions of the late 19th and 20th centuries to
have been 20-30 years, roughly a third of that during the first industrial revolution. This may have reflected
increased flows of labour, capital, ideas and information between firms, regions, sectors and countries.
Table 1 looks at average rates of UK TFP growth over the past 2000 years. It tells a tale of long waves of
productivity stagnation and innovation. The historical data do not reject either hypothesis. Table 1 also puts
into historical perspective the UK's recent productivity slowdown. For the past decade, average productivity
growth has been negative. This is unusual, if not unique, historically. You would have to go right back to the
18th century to see a similarly lengthy period of stagnant productivity.
Global Productivity Trends
If UK productivity patterns are unusual relative to the past, how unusual are they relative to other countries?
To assess that, I draw on a panel of around 116 countries, advanced and emerging, going back to 1950,
using data from the Penn World Tables.36 Chart 7 plots average TFP growth across the whole sample of
countries, while Chart 8 does so separately for advanced and emerging economies. Several interesting
features emerge.
First, the slowdown of productivity growth has clearly been a global phenomenon, not a UK-specific one.
From 1950 to 1970, median global productivity growth averaged 1.9% per year. Since 1980, it has averaged
0.3% per year. Whatever is driving the productivity puzzle, it has global rather than local roots.
34
Helpman et al (1998).
35
Comin and Mestieri (2014).
36
Feenstra et al (2015).
Second, this global productivity slowdown is clearly not a recent phenomenon. It appears to have started in
many advanced countries in the 1970s.37 Certainly, the productivity puzzle is not something which has
emerged since the global financial crisis, though it seems the crisis has amplified pre-existing trends.
Explanations for the productivity puzzle based on crisis-related scarring are likely to be, at best, partial.
Third, the productivity slowdown has been experienced by both advanced and emerging economies. The
slowdown in median productivity growth after the 1970s among both advanced and emerging market
economies is around 13⁄4 percentage points (Chart 8). Indeed, looking at country-specific trends, it is striking
just how generalised the productivity slowdown has been (Chart 9).
Fourth, one way of understanding this global productivity slowdown comes from decomposing it into changes
in rates of innovation among countries operating at the productivity frontier and changes in rates of diffusion
from frontier to non-frontier countries. Growth theory would predict that, over time, technological diffusion
should lead to catch-up between frontier and non-frontier countries.38 And the greater the distance to the
frontier, the faster these rates of catch-up are likely to be.
-
So what explains the 13⁄4 percentage point slowdown in global productivity growth since the 1970s slower
innovation at the frontier or slower diffusion to the periphery? If the frontier country is taken to be the United
States, then slowing innovation can only account for a small fraction of the global slowing, not least because
a 20% weight in world GDP. In other words, the lion's share of the slowing in global
the US only has about
productivity is the result of slower diffusion of innovation from frontier to non-frontier countries.
To illustrate that, Chart 10 plots the distribution of levels of productivity across countries over a set of sample
periods, where productivity is measured relative to a frontier country (the United States) indexed to one.
Comparing the distributions in the 1950s and 1970s, there is a clear rightward shift. Cross-country
productivity convergence or catch-up was underway, as the Classical growth model would suggest.
In recent decades, however, that pattern has changed. Comparing the 1970s with the 1990s, there is a
small leftward shift in the probability mass. And in the period since the global financial crisis, there has been
a further leftward shift in the distribution and a widening of its range. Today, non-frontier countries are about
as far from the technological frontier as they were in the 1950s.
Another way of illustrating the same point is by looking at differences in productivity between frontier and
periphery countries over time (Chart 11). In the decades immediately following the Second World War, the
Classical growth model was operating effectively, with catch-up in productivity underway and at faster rates
among emerging market countries with furthest to travel to the frontier.
37
Gordon (2014).
38
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Rodrik (2011).
Since the 1980s, however, that convergence process appears to have stalled, perhaps even to have gone
into reverse, in both advanced and emerging economies. The gap to the frontier has failed to close and, in
particular for emerging market countries, has widened. Classical growth dynamics appear for some reason
to have stopped operating, with the gap to the frontier widening the more so the greater the distance to it.
It is possible to quantify this slowing in convergence using a similar approach to that used to measure output
Specifically, a country's productivity growth can be
convergence in the cross-country growth literature.39
linked by a convergence parameter to its productivity gap to the frontier country. This parameter can be
estimated econometrically and tracked over time.40
Chart 12 shows a time-series of this convergence coefficient estimated using a rolling regression. In the
1980s, this coefficient averaged 0.8. That is to say, every 10 per cent productivity gap relative to the frontier
country resulted, on average, in productivity growth being 0.8 percentage points higher than in the frontier
country. By 2000, that convergence coefficient had roughly halved. By the end of the sample, the coefficient
is statistically insignificant from zero. Convergence had not just slowed but stalled.
One of the key determinants of international technology transfer has been found to be cross-border flows of
goods and services, people and money and capital.41 While they have waxed and waned historically, all of
these have tended to rise rapidly since the middle of the 20th century. Other things equal, that would have
been expected to increase the speed of diffusion of innovation across countries over that period. In practice,
the opposite appears to have occurred.
Taken at face value, these patterns are both striking and puzzling. Not only do they sit oddly with Classical
growth theory. They are also at odds with the evidence of history, which has been that rates of technological
diffusion have been rising rather than falling over time, and with secular trends in international flows of
factors of production. At the very time we would have expected it to be firing on all cylinders, the
technological diffusion engine globally has been misfiring. This adds to the productivity puzzle.
Sectoral Productivity Trends
Some further insight into these puzzles comes from looking at the productivity data in more granular detail.42
We start by considering sectoral patterns of productivity among UK companies.
Sectoral shifts in the economy could plausibly account for some of the fall in productivity growth. There has
been a secular shift over time away from manufacturing and towards services, with the employment share in
39
Rodrik (2011).
40
- = + ∗
Based on the following equation: Pit Pft ai ai GAPi where Pit is growth in TFP for country i in year t, Pft is the growth in TFP
for the frontier country (US) in year t, is the gap between the level of TFP in country i and the US as a percentage, is a constant
GAPi ai
capturing the average pace of convergence and bi captures how much of the speed of convergence depends on the TFP gap.
41
For example, Hoekman et al (2004), Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012) and Newman et al (2015).
42
See McCafferty (2014) for a discussion of productivity from a sectoral perspective.
manufacturing having fallen from 17% to 7% since 1990. Because productivity growth in manufacturing is
higher than in services, this shift could plausibly account for some of the fall in aggregate productivity growth.
Even if we correct for this compositional effect, however, the slowdown in UK productivity growth remains.
UK sectors' productivity, while Table 2 looks at the contributions of
Chart 13 looks at the evolution of different
various sectors to UK productivity growth in the decades either side of the global financial crisis. Pre-crisis,
the strongest rises in measured productivity were in manufacturing, information and communication and
financial services, all of which experienced annual growth of over 4%. But growth was not confined to these
sectors, with virtually all sectors making a positive contribution to productivity growth.
In the period since the crisis, those pre-crisis trends have changed dramatically. Virtually every sector has
seen productivity flat-line. The contributions of all sectors to productivity growth have fallen and most are
tightly bunched around zero (Table 2).43 Whatever has caused UK productivity growth to fall, it has done so
on a generalised, cross-sector basis.
It is sometimes asserted that, without the collapse in financial services output associated with the financial
crisis, the UK's productivity performance would
have held up. It is certainly true that financial sector
productivity was probably over-stated in the run-up to the crisis.44 Nonetheless, the subsequent sharp fall in
point fall in the UK's
financial services productivity is plainly not the whole story. Of the 1.7 percentage
productivity growth since 2008, less than a third can be accounted for by financial services (Table 2).
One sectoral story that could account for this generalised slowing is a reduced rate of factor reallocation
across
between sectors.45 Consistent with that hypothesis, the dispersion of productivity industries has
increased significantly over the last 40 years. And the variance in sectoral productivity gaps, relative to
pre-crisis trends, also increased sharply after the crisis (Chart 14).
Nonetheless, this pickup in the dispersion of productivity across sectors is dwarfed by the increase in
productivity dispersion within sectors (Chart 15). This suggests that any obstacles to the movement of
resources within the economy have been more important within sectors than across them. With that in mind,
it is firm-by-firm data to which we now turn.
Firm-level productivity trends
A more granular lens still comes from looking at firm-by-firm productivity data. The OECD has recently
undertaken extensive analysis using company-level data to assess global productivity patterns.46 We draw
on two datasets for the UK that can prospectively shed light on firm-level trends.
43
See Billet and Schneider (2016) for an interactive tool for examining sectoral productivity trends.
44
Haldane et al (2010).
45
Bank of England (2016), Barnett et al (2014).
The first is based on the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) Annual Business Survey and employment
surveys.47 The ONS combines these surveys in the form of the Annual Respondent Database (ARDx). The
sample covers around 40,000 companies per year, accounting for around 80% of UK GDP. The data covers
the period 2002 to 2014. This survey is stratified to match the UK population of companies and so should be
broadly representative of aggregate UK trends.
The second is the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) FAME database, compiled from UK company accounts. Whereas
larger firms are required to submit full annual accounts, there are exemptions for smaller firms. So the
sample is smaller, at around 20,000 firms per year, and is biased towards larger firms. However, it contains
detailed data on firm-level characteristics which are useful when exploring the determinants of productivity.
These data enable us to examine the distribution of productivity across firms. Chart 16a plots this
distribution in 2014, based on the ONS data.48 It is wide and elongated, with a long, thin upper tail of
high-productivity firms and a short, fat lower tail of low-productivity firms. This shape means that modal
productivity among UK companies is around 50% lower than mean productivity.49
One interesting question is how this distribution has evolved over time. Chart 17 looks at different
percentiles of the firm-level productivity distribution over time, both in levels terms and indexed to 2002=100.
There has been a widening dispersion in the distribution of productivity across companies over time. In
particular, there is a striking and widening divergence between frontier firms (say, the 99th