Inflation targeting in New Zealand:
an experience in evolution
A speech delivered to the Reserve Bank of Australia
conference on central bank frameworks, in Sydney
On 12 April 2018
By Dr John McDermott, Assistant Governor
and Rebecca Williams, Economics Advisor
2 The Terrace, PO Box 2498, Wellington 6140, New Zealand
Telephone 64 4 472 2029 Online at www.rbnz.govt.nz
Introduction
It is a pleasure to discuss an issue that is especially pertinent for the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand at present - the evolution of central bank frameworks. As many of you will be
aware, the New Zealand Government is in the process of changing our monetary policy
framework, to add employment to our existing mandate of price stability and formalise a
decision-making structure based on a committee. This would bring us closer to a framework
like the one here in Australia, and in the United States of America.
This paper is in a section titled Twenty Years of Inflation Targeting, but in New Zealand it
has actually been much closer to thirty. The RBNZ Act came into effect February 1990,
making New Zealand the first country to formally adopt inflation targeting as we now know it.
New Zealand's experience has been one of evolution. As the Bank established its credibility
- by which I mean it became clear that we could and would meet our price stability objective
- we were able to develop a more flexible approach to inflation targeting, consistent with the
literature and with developments in other inflation-targeting countries.
We are about to enter the next stage of that evolution. I believe this next step is indeed an
evolution, which builds on the flexible approach we have been taking for some time, rather
than a revolution. That said, it is still too early to determine precisely what effect the new
framework will have on the implementation of monetary policy. The New Zealand framework
has changed significantly over thirty years, reflecting lessons learned and the changing
economic and political environment. And it is likely to continue to evolve as we are faced
with new developments.
You may be very familiar with our pioneer's tale, and want me to cut to the chase - our move
towards a dual mandate and formalised committee. But before I touch on where we are
going, I want to provide you with some context - where we started, and where we have
been.
The origins of inflation targeting: a need for credibility
As I have noted, inflation targeting as we now know it was pioneered in New Zealand.1,2
Other countries had been pursuing disinflationary monetary policy since the late 1970s, and
by the early 1980s most OECD countries were announcing some form of money or credit
target in an attempt to convince public and markets that they were taking the challenge of
controlling inflation seriously (Reddell, 1999). But the focus internationally was on these
'intermediate' targets - the quantity of money or credit - rather than targeting inflation itself.
Intermediate targets were thought to be informative for monetary policy as they were
susceptible to a degree of central bank control. However, the extent to which intermediate
targets were connected to the objective of price stability was subject to debate.3
In the 1970s and 1980s, New Zealand had a very poor track record of price stability. Annual
inflation had been around 10 to 15 percent since the early 1970s (figure 1), and was
considerably higher than inflation in our main trading partners. A key driver of high inflation in
New Zealand over this period was government spending, accommodated by generally loose
monetary policy (Grimes, 1996). There had been episodes of tight monetary policy over this
period. But successive governments had been unwilling to face the short-term costs to
output and employment that disinflation brought with it, and had loosened policy again.
Figure 1: Annual CPI inflation (target range shaded)
Source: Statistics New Zealand.
Bringing high inflation under control was a key priority for the Labour Government that came
into power in New Zealand in July 1984.4 In 1986, the then Minister of Finance Roger
Douglas invited officials to explore options for reforming the monetary policy framework,
aiming to reduce the scope for political influence that had seen past attempts to control
inflation fail so badly.
The framework that evolved over the next four years was the culmination of various strands
of economic thought and the principles that were underpinning the wider reform of New
Zealand's public sector at the time.5,6 At its core, the framework that emerged provided the
Bank with a means to establish credibility that we would bring inflation down and keep it
there.
3
See for example Friedman (1984) and Friedman (1990).
4
Then Reserve Bank Governor Spencer Russell (1984) discussed the new Government's commitment to
bring inflation under control: "We have had periods of tight monetary policy in the past. But by backing
off at the eleventh hour, money and credit growth rates have been allowed to expand excessively again
and the benefits from the temporary period of tightness have been lost. The Government has made it clear
this will not be the case again".
5
Reddell (1999) contains a detailed discussion of the origins and early development of the inflation
target; Grimes (1996) also provides a comprehensive summary of monetary policy developments within
the wider reform environment.
6
Don Brash, who was the first Governor of the inflation-targeting era, once said of the origins of inflation
targeting in New Zealand "I will simply note that history can be surprisingly confusing, even for those
who were there" (Brash, 1998).
And why does credibility matter? If policymakers are able to convince firms and workers that
they will set policy to achieve the inflation target, this anchoring of inflation expectations
makes it more likely that prices and wages will be set in a manner consistent with the target,
even in the face of shocks to the economy. This naturally makes the target itself easier to
achieve.
Picture the New Zealand inflation-targeting framework as a newly-planted tree. In the 1970s
and 1980s, several seedlings of low inflation had been planted, but none took hold. The
ground conditions - a highly regulated financial market and economy - were not conducive
to growth, and the winds of politics kept blowing the seeds of low-inflation away before they
had a chance to flourish.
By the mid-1980s, ground conditions were much improved. New Zealand had gone through
a dramatic period of financial market reform in the nine months between July 1984 and
March 1985. The float of the New Zealand dollar and the commitment of the government to
fund the fiscal deficit via issuance of public debt to the private sector freed up the Bank to
pursue domestic monetary policy (Kamber et al., 2015). To ensure that inflation-targeting
could establish credibility and take hold, four highly-related aspects of the framework were
provided as stakes in the ground to support the new sapling.7 These stakes were:
operational independence; transparency; the single objective of price stability; and the
Governor as sole decision maker, which I will now discuss in turn.
(i) Operational independence (RBNZ Act Section 13)
Firstly, operational independence. The Reserve Bank Act (1989) provided the Bank with its
operational independence and its monetary policy objective.8 It was heavily influenced by
the literature on the time inconsistency of monetary policy and the experience during the
1970s and 1980s, in which successive governments had been unwilling to endure the
shortterm effects of disinflation for the longer-term gains of price stability.9 The specific monetary
policy target of the 1989 Act was to be publicly agreed in a Policy Targets Agreement (PTA)
between the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Reserve Bank. Prior to the
late1980s, Reserve Bank independence had been non-existent: the 1973 Amendment to the
RBNZ Act had stated that the Bank was to "give effect to the monetary policy of the
7
It is worth noting that the Act does not specify that there must be targets for inflation itself. The Act
specifies only "policy targets for the carrying out by the Bank of its [price stability objective]", which
leaves open the possibility of specifying targets such as nominal GDP consistent with medium-term price
stability.
8
Except as otherwise provided for in the Act: Section 12 allows for the Bank to be directed by the
Governor-General to implement policy for a different economic objective than the one in Section 8, by
Order in Council on the advice of the Minister. This Section was included primarily for use in times of
emergency (such as wartime) and has never been used. Any temporary redirection of policy would be
well publicised since Orders in Council must be published in the New Zealand Gazette. The Reserve Bank
Act (1989) can be accessed at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1989/0157/latest/DLM199364.html.
9
The time inconsistency problem is that authorities have an incentive to promise low inflation in the
future, but then renege in order to boost activity (in order to obtain more votes, for example). As firms
and households begin to anticipate this behaviour, their expectations of inflation increase and so they set
prices and demand wages accordingly. The economy then ends up in a worse position with higher
inflation and (potentially) higher unemployment (see, for example, Barro and Gordon, 1983).
Government".10 The RBNZ Act (1989) provided the Bank with credibility in meeting its
objective by no longer being subject to concerns or incentives regarding the electoral cycle.
(ii) Transparency (RBNZ Act Section 15)
Monetary policy operates with significant lags and in an inherently uncertain environment,
and therefore naturally requires a great deal of judgement and discretion. To ensure that
operational independence was used appropriately, the Act also specified a high degree of
transparency in how the Bank formulated policy. The Act requires the Bank to publish
regular statements on its monetary policy decisions and for these to be laid before
Parliament. The Governor's deliberations were also to be monitored and assessed by a
Board consisting of members appointed by the Minister of Finance.
(iii) Single objective (RBNZ Act Section 8)
Providing the Bank with one objective, rather than a list of objectives - production, trade, full
employment and price stability - as had been the case previously, made it more credible that
primary function of the
the Bank could actually achieve its mandate. The Act states "The
Bank is to formulate and implement monetary policy directed to the economic objective of
achieving and maintaining stability in the general level of prices." It acknowledged that price
stability was the greatest contribution monetary policy could make to New Zealand's
economic wellbeing. It recognised the limitations of monetary policy over the medium term,
and provided the Bank, financial markets and wider public with a clear objective for policy.
Moreover, the initial PTA clearly defined price stability with a numerical target band of 0 to 2
percent. This clear numerical target provided a nominal anchor against which the Governor's
performance could be assessed and around which inflation expectations could converge.
(iv) Single decision maker (RBNZ Act Section 9)
The final stake in the ground was the assignment of authority and responsibility to an
individual - the Governor. This 'single decision-maker' model was highly influenced by the
principles underpinning the reform of the wider public sector at the time, which gave
individual public sector managers the authority to manage but made them directly
accountable for outputs (Reddell, 1999 and Sherwin, 1999). The employment contract
between the Minister of Finance and the Governor evolved into the PTA. The legislation
made it clear that the Governor could lose his or her job for "inadequate performance" in
meeting these objectives.11
In summary, the inflation-targeting framework established in the late 1980s was planted
under conditions that increased its likelihood of success. The four stakes of operational
independence, transparency, the single objective of price stability, and the single
decisionmaker model provided essential support to a new framework, and encouraged it to take root
and establish its credibility. And why have I taken you on this history lesson? To provide you
with some context on the New Zealand framework, and to introduce some aspects of the
framework that remain as critical today as they were in 1989, and some that are about to
change. But I will come back to that shortly.
10
Graham and Smith (2012) provide a history of Reserve Bank of New Zealand independence.
11
Donald Brash (2002) recalls the response of the Minister responsible for the Reserve Bank legislation
to his initial surprise that the PTA would be between the Government and Governor, rather than the
Government and the Bank "We can't fire the whole Bank. Realistically, we can't even fire the whole Board.
But we sure as hell can fire you!"
The evolution of inflation targeting: increasingly flexible
Since being planted in the late-1980s, New Zealand's framework has evolved significantly.
As pioneers, it was always unlikely that we could introduce a framework that got everything
'right' from the start, especially given that the environment in which policy operates has itself
developed a lot over the years (Sherwin, 2000).
The evolution of the inflation-targeting framework in New Zealand can be characterised as
one of increasing flexibility, consistent with the academic literature and with developments in
other advanced economies. As our tree grew taller and its roots grew deeper - as we gained
credibility by actually meeting our target, and anchored inflation expectations - we could be
more confident that our tree could bend in the wind, without being uprooted.
What exactly do I mean by flexibility? Over the past three decades, monetary policymakers
and academics have learned that there is a trade-off, not between inflation and output, but
between the volatility of inflation and output. Monetary policy that is set to offset short-term
movements in inflation away from target - referred to as 'strict' inflation targeting - will result
in more volatility in output and other economic variables such as employment and the
exchange rate.12 As the Bank established its credibility in achieving its inflation target, we
could allow some volatility in realised inflation in order to offset some volatility elsewhere in
the economy. In practice, this means that interest rates have generally been adjusted more
slowly. And in this sense, the Bank has increasingly paid regard to the wider economy
despite having a consistent overall objective of price stability specified in the Act. This
increasingly flexible approach has, however, been reflected in the evolving content of
successive PTAs over the past thirty years.
The PTA - which you will remember provides the Bank with its specific target in meeting its
overall objective - must be renegotiated with the Minister of Finance each time a Governor is
appointed or reappointed, and has also tended to be updated on the formation of a new
government. This process naturally lends itself to incremental adjustments, influenced by the
economic and political environment at the time. Since 1990, there have been 13 PTAs, with
some alterations more significant than others. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has seen
more changes to its target than most other inflation-targeting central banks, and the process
of renegotiation also provides more opportunity for government direction than is the case in
some other countries (Wadsworth, 2017).
In some ways, the number of changes has been less than ideal, as it has the potential to
undermine the public's faith in the policy target. But since these changes have formalised
things that we have learned in the process of operating policy, and reflected the underlying
goals of the public via the political process, they have been entirely appropriate.
There are several highly-related dimensions of flexibility, and I will now take you through
some key developments in New Zealand's inflation-targeting framework along these
dimensions, which are summarised in table 1 below.
12
See for example Svensson (1997).
Table 1: Evolution of flexible inflation targeting in New Zealand 1990-2017
Early to mid-1990s Late 1990s & 2000s 2010s
Initially, target to be Time to target implicitly Explicit medium-term
achieved by a set date lengthened; Bank to focus has remained
respond to general
Dec 1990: Annual inflationary pressure
inflation to remain inside
the target band, and the List of shocks that could
Time to target
Bank to calculate and result in deviation from
explain deviations due to target became illustrative,
shocks outside the rather than exhaustive
Bank's control (explicit
'caveats') 2002: medium-term focus
made explicit
1999: Bank shall seek to 2012: Bank to have
avoid unnecessary regard to the efficiency
instability in output, and soundness of the
interest rates and the financial system; Bank to
exchange rate monitor asset prices
Secondary
considerations
Other secondary
considerations (stability
of output, interest rates
and the exchange rate)
have remained
Initially, 0-2 percent 2002: 1-3 percent 2012: 1-3 percent, with a
Target
focus on the 2 percent
definition
1996: 0-3 percent target midpoint
Early to mid-1990s
The initial inflation target of 0-2 percent originated primarily as a communications device - a
way for Minister Roger Douglas to refocus expectations and convince the public that the
anti-inflation drive would continue (Reddell, 1999).13 Inflation was within the target by 1991,
and stayed there until June 1995 when adverse weather pushed up the prices of fruit and
vegetables and saw inflation increase to 2.2 percent.
13
During a televised interview broadcast on 1 April 1988, Roger Douglas said that policy was to be
directed to reducing inflation to "around zero to one percent" over the following couple of years. By the
June 1988 RBNZ Bulletin the Bank felt confident enough to describe the ultimate goal as being "price
stability by the 1990s" and that "in terms of the CPI, this objective is likely to be consistent with a small
positive measured inflation rate, in the order of 0-2 percent, as a result of several problems in the
construction of the index." (Reddell, 1988).
Over the next few years, inflation remained at the top of or marginally above the target
range.
With hindsight, the Bank was slow to recognise the pace of acceleration of the economy in
1992/93, and relied on the transmission of policy via the exchange rate to a greater extent
than was ideal given the structural changes we later learned were underway (RBNZ, 2000a).
The Bank learned that keeping inflation within such a narrow range could likely only be
achieved at the cost of undesirably high volatility in the real economy, and began talking
about the target as something that we would constantly aim for rather than something we
could - or should - deliver every quarter (Brash, 2002).
Since December 1990, PTAs had contained some allowance for actual inflation to deviate
from target. These were in the form of explicit 'caveats' or 'principal shocks' recognised as
being outside the Bank's control. We were required to calculate and publish the direct effect
these had on inflation outcomes. In practice, we found it increasingly difficult to determine
which items to include or exclude, and were exposed to (although never received much)
criticism that we could manipulate the calculation in order to meet our objective.
In 1996, the target was widened to 0-3 percent, reflecting the new National/New Zealand
First Coalition Government's preferences (RBNZ, 2000b). The Bank was comfortable with
this widening as we felt it was unlikely to materially affect monetary policy credibility or
adversely affect inflation expectations.14 By allowing slightly more inflation variability it
enabled policy to offset volatility in the real economy to a greater extent. The 1996 PTA also
modified the explanation of the Bank's overall objective to be more explicit that price stability
was the best contribution that monetary policy could make to economic growth and
employment, rather than simply being an end in and of itself (RBNZ, 2000b).
Late 1990s and 2000s
As the Bank learned more about the transmission of monetary policy in the New Zealand
economy during the 1990s, we put increasing weight on real economy channels and less on
direct exchange rate effects (Brash, 1998). Specifically, we found that the pass-through of
nominal exchange rate changes into local prices had become more muted over the 1990s.
This meant that the slower part of the monetary policy transmission mechanism - via the
real economy - was given even greater prominence in meeting our objective (RBNZ,
2000a). This change in emphasis effectively lengthened the horizon over which policy was
formulated, which in itself encouraged less variability in interest rates, the exchange rate and
output.
In 1999, the incoming Labour/Alliance Coalition Government initiated the modification of the
PTA to state that "In pursuing its price stability objective, the Bank... shall seek to avoid
unnecessary instability in output, interest rates and the exchange rate". The Bank viewed
these changes as largely confirming the flexible approach we had been taking for most of
the inflation-targeting period (RBNZ, 2000b). It reflected that several policy paths could be
chosen in order to meet our inflation target, and the effect of these paths on the real
economy and other variables was influential in determining which path was ultimately
selected (RBNZ, 2000c).
The changes were also a reflection of economic developments. The Bank initially
underestimated the combined effect of the Asian financial crisis and the droughts that
affected rural New Zealand in the summers of 1997/98 and 1998/99, which led to recession
in New Zealand. We operate in an uncertain world, and monetary policy would never have
been able to completely offset the effect of these shocks. Yet the way we implemented
monetary policy over this period - via the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI),15 which was
introduced in mid-1997 - shaped the response in a way that probably contributed to the fall
in output and added unnecessary interest rate volatility (RBNZ, 2000a). The Bank
recognised this, and we replaced the MCI with the Official Cash Rate (OCR) as the
instrument of monetary policy in March 1999. The MCI was a branch that we lopped off fairly
quickly.
In May 2000, the Minister of Finance invited Professor Lars Svensson to review the
operation of monetary policy in New Zealand. He found the framework to be "entirely
consistent with the best international practice of flexible inflation targeting, with a
mediumterm inflation target that avoids unnecessary variability in output, interest rates and the
exchange rate" (Svensson, 2000). He did recommend a move from the single-decision
maker to committee model, but the Government chose not to support this recommendation
at this time (see Government's response to Monetary Policy Review, 2001).
But during the early 2000s, concern continued to grow among politicians, industry
representatives, commentators and the wider public that the economy's trend growth rate
had been unnecessarily constrained by the performance of monetary policy (RBNZ, 2002).
Those expressing concern suggested that this constraint resulted from a target that was too
low and policy that was too aggressive. It was argued that these factors had resulted in
interest rates that were too high on average, and in interest rates and the exchange rate
being too volatile.
The Bank noted the long-held and internationally-accepted view that monetary policy was
unlikely to have a large influence on the long-run performance of the economy, and that
there was no evidence that policy in New Zealand was more aggressive than elsewhere. But
we also had not found any clear evidence that trend inflation of 2 percent would produce
better or worse outcomes for trend growth than trend inflation of 1.5 percent. In the end, the
target (and therefore midpoint) was changed to 1-3 percent in the 2002 PTA. Recent Bank
research has found that this change was accompanied by an immediate increase in long-run
inflation expectations (Lewis and McDermott, 2016).
The 2002 PTA also made the medium-term focus of monetary policy explicit, and firmly
embedded the flexible approach (see, for example, Hunt, 2004). It changed the target from
"12-monthly increases" to "future CPI inflation outcomes... on average over the medium
term". This medium-term focus has been an enduring feature of PTAs to this day. The Bank
15
The MCI was a weighted summation of the exchange rate and short-term interest rate, with weights
reflecting each variable's medium-term effect on aggregate demand and thus inflation. The MCI was used
to identify the overall stance of monetary policy and to communicate the likely direction and extent of
change in stance going forward.
has interpreted this target to mean that it should set policy in order for inflation to remain or
settle comfortably within the target band in the latter half of a three-year horizon (Bollard and
Ng, 2008).
During the mid-2000s, economic developments reignited concern about the monetary policy
framework. Although New Zealand had been one of the faster-growing OECD economies
since the early 1990s, this growth had been accompanied by the emergence of
macroeconomic imbalances: a relatively large current account deficit, high house price
inflation and household indebtedness, and a real exchange rate that had risen to levels
sometimes regarded as unjustified by medium-term fundamentals (RBNZ, 2007b). In early
2007, the Government requested another inquiry into the monetary policy framework.
The Bank reiterated that there was no compelling evidence to suggest that these features
had arisen from the design of the monetary policy framework. We recognised that with the
benefit of hindsight, we had been slow to fully recognise the strength of demand and
housing market pressure on inflation over the cycle. However, this was a feature of having to
operate policy under uncertainty (RBNZ, 2007a and Chetwin and Reddell, 2012). We noted
that solutions to New Zealand's imbalances were likely to lie in other policy domains, and
suggested several 'supplementary stabilisation instruments'.16 Following the review, the
Government decided not to make any changes to the RBNZ Act or the PTA,17 nor introduce
any of the suggested instruments (see FEC, 2008 for the full report).
Monetary policy during the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008/09 demonstrated the
flexibility of the inflation targeting framework. Despite CPI inflation being driven well above
the target band by higher oil prices over 2008, the Bank reduced the Official Cash Rate
(OCR) by 575 basis points between June 2008 and June 2009. Our tree remained firmly
planted, anchored by its roots of credibility, despite the largest global storm since the Great
Depression. Longer-term inflation expectations remained within the target range, and the
reduction in the OCR helped support the New Zealand economy at a time of global distress
(see, for example, Chetwin, 2012).
2010s
The GFC led many central banks to focus more heavily on how financial system
developments should be treated by monetary policy. The Bank had always monitored asset
prices and taken them into account in both monetary and prudential policy (see Bollard,
2004), and the Reserve Bank Act had long contained a requirement for the Bank to have
regard for financial stability when setting monetary policy. However, the 2012 PTA made this
explicit by adding asset prices to the list of prices the Bank was directed to monitor, and
including the requirement that the Bank "have regard to the efficiency and soundness of the
financial system" (see Kendall and Ng, 2013).
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is unusual internationally, although not unique, in having
both monetary policy and prudential responsibilities. In October 2013, the Bank introduced
restrictions on high-LVR mortgage lending.18 While these macroprudential tools were
introduced for financial stability purposes, they clearly interact with monetary policy's goal of
price stability - particularly given the strong relationship between house prices and domestic
demand we have observed in previous economic cycles in New Zealand. Although they
have different objectives, our macroprudential policies were complementary to monetary
policy when first introduced; the LVR restrictions were acting to reduce growth in house
prices at a time when the Bank expected inflationary pressures to build (see Williams,
2017a). But as the outlook for inflation weakened, the policies began to have opposing
implications for the business cycle. The PTA is clear that monetary policy must have regard
to financial stability but it does not - and probably cannot - specify exactly what trade-offs
should be entertained. The optimal balance between price and financial stability remains an
area of ongoing research in New Zealand and abroad.19
An explicit reference to the target midpoint was also incorporated into the 2012 PTA, so that
it now read "keep future CPI inflation outcomes between 1 per cent and 3 per cent on
average over the medium term, with a focus on keeping future average inflation near the 2
per cent target midpoint". This was motivated by the desire to anchor inflation expectations
more firmly to 2 per cent, as they had been close to the upper end of the target band for
most of the inflation targeting period (Kendall and Ng, 2013).
In recent years, inflation in New Zealand has been persistently low, as in many countries
around the world. We have undertaken a great deal of research to better understand why
this has been the case, and what characteristics of this expansion have differed from
expansions before it (see Williams, 2017b, for a summary of this work). Some features have
simply been revealed with the passage of time, and some reflect our evolving understanding
of how the economy operates. But we have not found any features that imply that the
framework itself should be revolutionised - that the Bank has been confronted with new
developments is an unavoidable fact of life, not just monetary policy.20
Where to from here? The next stage in our evolution
Our increasingly flexible approach to inflation targeting outlined above has been made
possible by the achievement and maintenance of credibility regarding our framework. There
are two key aspects of the framework - two of our stakes in the ground - that remain as
important today as they were in 1989. These are operational independence and
transparency.21
Changes to the PTA have tended to reflect actual Bank practice at the time, but have also
often been initiated by the government of the day. The Bank has seen several government
reviews of its framework, often in response to macroeconomic developments. And this is
18
See for example Rogers (2013) and Dunstan (2014).
19
Kamber et al. (2015) note that while the importance of coordination depends on the magnitude of the
externalities that each policy has on the other, how large these effects are is currently not well
understood. Since the Bank is jointly responsible for both policies, these trade-offs should necessarily
influence the settings of both monetary and macroprudential policies.
20
See a speech I gave in 2017, on "The value of forecasting in an uncertain world" (McDermott, 2017).
21
See Blinder (1998) for an excellent discussion of central bank independence and transparency.
within
how it should be - while operational independence the framework is critical for
credibility (and therefore effectiveness), the framework itself should be designed by the
government to maximise the wellbeing of New Zealanders. Over the course of thirty years
we believe the framework has served New Zealanders well - most of the graduates we have
hired in recent years have never known anything other than low and stable inflation.
Transparency also remains a critical aspect of the framework. Being transparent about our
assessment of the economy and our plan to meet our objective has an influence on
expectations, and helps us achieve our objective. The Reserve Bank was the first central
bank to publish its interest rate forecast, starting in 1997.22 And crucially, transparency aids
in the assessment of our actions, and allows us to be held to ac