Joint session
of the V Committee (Budget, Treasury and Planning)
and the XIV Committee (European Union Policies)
of the Chamber of Deputies
Testimony on the functioning
of the European Stability Mechanism
and the prospects for its reform
Given by Ignazio Visco
Governor of the Bank of Italy
Rome, 4 December 2019

Presidents, Honourable Members of Parliament, I am grateful to the Fifth and
Fourteenth Committees of the Chamber of Deputies for this invitation to debate
the proposed reform of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM). The proposal is the result of a provisional agreement reached last June,
based on the Euro Summit understanding of December 2018. As with the Treaty
currently in force, it will only take effect once it has been signed and ratified by all
Member States.
The ESM was introduced in 2012 to bridge one of the gaps in European
economic governance: its core function is to grant conditional assistance to
euro-area countries that are experiencing temporary difficulties in raising funds
on the market, despite having sustainable public debts. Alongside this function
the proposed reform introduces a backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF),
within the bank crisis management framework.
In the talks leading to the agreement and in the accompanying debate, in-depth
discussions were also held on the rules on financial aid to Member States and, in
particular, the related risks. In this respect, the reform addresses the prerequisites
for granting financial assistance and the tasks carried out by the ESM; overall, the
proposed changes are limited in scope. The reform makes no provision for, nor
does it foresee in the future, any sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. As with
the Treaty in force today, there is no quid pro quo between financial assistance
and debt restructuring. An assessment of debt sustainability before the granting
of aid is already envisaged under the Treaty in force. This is a clause designed to
safeguard the ESM's resources, to which Italy is the third biggest contributor.
1. The origins of the European Stability Mechanism
The ESM is the response to part of Europe's 'incomplete' economic
governance. Up until the sovereign debt crisis, the European fiscal framework was
based on crisis prevention through compliance with fiscal rules that were designed
to keep deficits and public debts within the limits considered prudent. It did not
provide for a toolkit capable of managing the sovereign debt crises; indeed, the 'no
bail-out clause' of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, at least
in its most restrictive interpretation, seemed to prohibit any measures in support of
countries in difficulty.1
The tensions that emerged on the European sovereign debt markets starting
in 2010, as a result of the global financial crisis and the considerable imbalances
in Greece's public accounts, strongly affirmed the need for adequate European
economic governance. Specifically, the absence of mechanisms for managing
a severe financial crisis of a euro-area Member State generated uncertainty,
lengthening the timeframes involved in providing support, increasing its cost and
feeding the risk of contagion.
The first response to the sovereign debt crisis was necessarily of an urgent
nature. In spring 2010, financial support to Greece was provided through bilateral
loans on the part of euro-area countries (Greek Loan Facility). Shortly thereafter, as
the crisis extended to other countries, two common mechanisms were established
for the disbursement of financial support: the European Financial Stabilisation
Mechanism (EFSM), which is limited in size (€60 billion) and is financed by the
European Union, and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which
has greater lending capacity (initially equal to €250 billion, then €440 billion), is
temporary in nature, and is guaranteed by the euro-area Member States.
The intervention strategy changed abruptly at the end of 2010 with the
agreement between France and Germany and with the Council of the European
Union's decision in the summer of 2011 on private sector involvement (PSI) in
restructuring Greece's debt. Following this decision, in the autumn of 2011 the
European Banking Authority (EBA) published a recommendation asking the
main banks to create 'exceptional' and 'temporary' capital buffers to address their
exposure to sovereign debt.
The Council's decision and the EBA's recommendation came before the
establishment, in 2012, of the ESM and the specification that private sector
involvement would be limited to exceptional circumstances and would not be
triggered automatically. Outright monetary transactions (OMT) by the European
Central Bank were also introduced in 2012. These were conditional on the presence
of an ESM assistance programme. It is likely that, had the sequence of events
been different (introducing the ESM and OMT before the PSI announcement and
EBA recommendation), the effect on the financial markets would have been more
contained.
The ESM's subscribed capital amounts to €704.8 billion, of which €80.5 has
been paid in; its lending capacity stands at €500 billion. In addition to having
provided bilateral financial support and having participated in EFSF programmes
(committing a total of almost €44 billion), Italy's subscribed capital in the ESM
amounts to about €125 billion and its paid-in capital is more than €14 billion.
Each member's share of the ESM's capital is based on the ECB's capital keys, which reflect the
country's share in the total population and gross domestic product of the euro area. The portion of the
ESM's capital that is subscribed but not paid in is 'callable' at any time if needed, meaning that ESM
members are asked to provide the corresponding funding with little advance notice.
2. ESM governance and functions
The ESM was established by an intergovernmental agreement, outside the
judicial framework of the European Union. It is headed by the Board of Governors,
which consists of the 19 Ministers of Finance in the euro area. Unanimous approval
is required for all important decisions (including those relating to disbursements
of financial assistance and the approval of memoranda of understanding with the
countries that receive it).
The Board of Governors chooses whether it is chaired by the President of the Eurogroup (as is
currently the case) or by a President elected from within the Board itself; terms last two years and may
be renewed. For the purposes of ensuring the efficacy of the ESM's decision-making system, the ESM may
operate with a qualified majority of 85 per cent of capital if, in the event of a threat to the economic and
financial stability of the euro area, the European Commission and the ECB ask it to make urgent decisions
concerning financial assistance. The voting rights of Board members correspond to the number of shares
assigned to the respective countries. Germany, France and Italy have shares that exceed 15 per cent and,
therefore, may also veto urgent decisions.
The ESM's executive body is the Board of Directors, consisting of 19 members each of whom is
appointed by a Governor and has extensive experience in economics and finance. It is headed by the
Managing Director who also serves as the ESM's legal representative.
As I mentioned, the fundamental purpose of the ESM is to provide financial
assistance, subject to conditions, to member countries experiencing temporary
difficulties in accessing the markets, despite having a sustainable public debt. It is
not a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism but instead tries to avoid it; as stated
in the current version of the Treaty and as reiterated in the proposed amendments
thereto, restructuring may only be considered in exceptional circumstances.
The Treaty contains a single reference to debt restructuring in recital number 12, which states that 'in
accordance with IMF practice, in exceptional cases an adequate and proportionate form of private sector
involvement shall be considered in cases where stability support is provided accompanied by conditionality
in the form of a macro-economic adjustment programme'.
The Treaty provides for the possibility of the ESM working in conjunction
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The ESM may open credit lines,
disburse loans or purchase government securities issued by the state receiving
assistance. Its intervention is never in the form of non-repayable transfers.
Support is provided subject to rigorous conditionality and an analysis of the
sustainability of the public debt which, according to the rules set out in the current
version of the Treaty, is carried out by the European Commission in liaison with
the ECB (where possible, also with the IMF). The level of conditionality varies
according to the nature of the instrument used: for loans, it is in the form of a
macro-economic adjustment programme, described in a dedicated memorandum;
it is less stringent with precautionary credit lines to countries with fundamentally
solid economic and financial conditions that are suffering the effects of an adverse
shock.
There are two types of precautionary measures, accompanied by a Memorandum of Understanding
that sets out the conditions: the precautionary conditioned credit line (PCCL), for countries meeting the
requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact that do not have excessive macroeconomic imbalances or
financial stability problems, and the enhanced conditions credit line (ECCL), for countries that do not fully
meet the above prerequisites and that are therefore asked to take corrective measures. It should be borne in
mind that the ESM may also purchase government securities in the primary and secondary markets.
The ESM currently finances itself by issuing debt instruments on the market
with maturities that range from one month to 45 years. The ESM has the highest
credit rating (AAA) awarded by Fitch and by DBRS, and just below the top rating
awarded by Moody's (AA1, with a 'positive outlook'). ESM loans benefit from
a credit status that is second only to that of the IMF. These conditions make it
possible for the ESM to take on debt under highly advantageous conditions.
Since 2010, the total amount of financial assistance that has been disbursed through the various tools
to euro-area countries in difficulty is equal to more than €480 billion, of which more than €80 billion were
provided by the IMF (Table 1). There have been five beneficiary countries: Greece was the main recipient
accounting for almost 60 per cent (just under €290 billion), followed by Portugal (more than €75 billion),
Ireland (more than €65 billion), Spain (more than €40 billion) and Cyprus (about €7 billion). Spain is the
only one of the five countries to have benefited from financial support that was exclusively dedicated to
shoring up its banking system.
The ESM has granted loans to three countries, totalling about €110 billion (€61.9 billion to Greece,
€41.3 billion to Spain and €6.3 billion to Cyprus; Table 2), with fairly long average maturities and relatively
low interest rates (a maximum of 1.2 per cent for Spain and Cyprus and 1.6 per cent for Greece).
All the support programmes have come to a close: the beneficiary countries are once again able to
access the markets for financing. The support disbursed by the EFSF, the ESM and the IMF has already
been partly repaid. More than €170 billion are yet to be repaid to the EFSF, approximately €90 billion to
the ESM, and less than €10 billion to the IMF. Figure 1 illustrates the repayment plan for the loans issued
by the ESM, whose residual lending capacity is currently just over €410 billion (Figure 2).
3. Financial assistance in the proposed reform of the Treaty2
The reform proposal before us covers three main areas: the ESM's governance
and tasks regarding financial assistance to member countries, the conditionality
for granting such assistance and the ESM's function as a backstop for the Single
Resolution Fund (I will focus on this last point later on). The proposal also provides
for an amendment to the collective action clauses (CACs) included in government
securities.
The ESM's governance and tasks regarding financial assistance to member
countries. - The reform proposal establishes the independence of the ESM's
Managing Director and staff (Article 7.4 and recital 16) and at the same time
strengthens the provisions requiring the ESM's activities to be compliant with
European Union legislation; it also entrusts the European Commission with the
related control tasks. Voting rights and procedures remain unchanged.
At the end of 2017, the European Commission had put forward a proposal to integrate the ESM
into European Union legislation; a solution of this kind would greatly simplify the management of ESM
activities and the coordination with the Commission.
The ESM is to play an active role in crisis management and in the process for
disbursing financial assistance, as well as in the subsequent monitoring thereof; in
line with this, the Managing Director is given greater responsibilities, and becomes
the reference point for the ESM in all activities connected with granting financial
support. This is a new role for the ESM and means that it will flank the European
Commission. How the two institutions cooperate will be set out in an agreement to
be signed when the amendments to the Treaty come into force (Article 13.8). The
terms of the provisional agreement reached between the two institutions in 2018
are echoed in the text of the reform proposals,3 which contains safeguards designed
to avoid any duplication of tasks between the ESM and the European Commission.
The agreement reaffirms the Commission's exclusive responsibility for the
overall assessment of the economic situation of countries and of their position
vis-à-vis the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact and of the Macroeconomic
Imbalance Procedure. The reform establishes that the ESM may follow and assess
their macroeconomic and financial situations - including the sustainability of their
public debt- so that it can intervene promptly as needed (Article 3.1). Therefore, 'the
ESM should not serve the purpose of economic policies coordination among ESM
members for which European Union law provides the necessary arrangements'
(recital 15A). Lastly, it is confirmed that 'the post-programme surveillance will
be carried out by the European Commission in liaison with the ECB, and by the
Council of the European Union within the framework laid down pursuant to Articles
121 and 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union' (recital 18).
In the event of a request for assistance, the reform provides that the ESM's
Managing Director, together with the European Commission (and in liaison with
the ECB), assess the sustainability of a country's public debt and, to better protect
the member countries in their role as ESM financers, the capacity of a country to
repay the loan. In the event no agreement can be reached on these assessments, the
Commission will have the last word on the sustainability of the debt, and the ESM
on the capacity to repay the loan (see recital 12A).
In addition, the ESM's Managing Director, again together with the Commission
(and in liaison with the ECB), will take part in the negotiation with the requesting
country on the conditionality attached to the financial assistance programme, and
in the assessment of compliance with these conditions over time (Articles 5.6.g
and 13.7).
The conditions for granting financial assistance. - The reform more clearly
describes some of the principles for the disbursement of funding that are already laid
down in the current text of the Treaty and in the guidelines adopted by the ESM.
For the purposes of granting any form of ESM assistance, the current Treaty
already provides for a prior assessment of debt sustainability (Article 13.1.b). The
reform reiterates this provision and, as previously mentioned, introduces alongside
it the criterion of the requesting country's loan repayment capacity (recital 12A
and Article 13.1.b of the reform proposal), so far only used in post-programme
surveillance. At the same time, the reform clarifies that these preliminary checks
are in no way automatic: despite being based on 'transparent and predictable'
criteria, the authorities that carry out such checks have a 'sufficient margin of
discretion' to do so (recital 12A and Article 13.1.b of the reform proposal).
The reform to the Treaty also reviews the criteria and procedures for obtaining
precautionary credit lines.
Collective action clauses. - The reform to the Treaty envisages introducing
- from 2022 - an amendment to the current collective action clauses that, if a
country decides to proceed with a debt restructuring, a single vote by government
security holders would be sufficient to amend the terms and conditions of all the
bonds ('single limb' CACs), instead of dual votes (one for each issuance and one for
the bonds as a whole; see recital 11 and Article 12.4). This amendment is designed
to make any debt restructuring more orderly, thereby reducing the costs linked to the
uncertainty over how it will be done and how long it will take. As already happened
following the introduction of the current CACs in 2013, this amendment - which
does not increase the likelihood of a default but reduces the uncertainty surrounding
its outcome - could lead to a fall in sovereign debt risk premiums.4
There is no amendment to the reference in the current Treaty to private sector
involvement, which remains strictly limited to exceptional cases and is in no way
a precondition for obtaining financial assistance from the ESM (recital 12B of the
reform proposal). It is in light of the PSI being confirmed as an exceptional case
that we should interpret both the amendments to the collective action clauses and
the possibility that the reform gives to the ESM to facilitate dialogue between a
country and private investors, only if the country so requests, 'on a voluntary,
informal, non-binding, temporary and confidential basis' (recital 12).
To conclude this discussion of the amendments that the reform intends to make
to financial assistance procedures, I would like to point out that a country with high
public debt, especially a country with great economic weight in the euro area, must
first of all create a situation in which there is no need to turn to the ESM; how to
obtain funding is not irrelevant but should not be the focal point. The way forward
is to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio by maintaining an adequate primary surplus,
increasing economic growth, and keeping confidence high and the average cost of
debt low. The existence of the ESM makes this last task easier because it limits
contagion risks, thereby helping to preserve orderly market conditions.
4. The backstop for the Single Resolution Fund
The ESM Treaty is also being revised to address the need for a backstop to the
Single Resolution Fund (SRF), namely the option of supporting the SRF should its
resources prove insufficient to finance the measures it must take.
Under the current European bank crisis management framework, the main
function of the SRF, managed by the Single Resolution Board (SRB), is to finance
the application of resolution tools while minimizing the use of public resources.5
In addition, if needed to avoid contagion risk, the SRF will also be able to absorb
the losses directly and help recapitalize the bank under resolution, for a maximum
amount equal to 5 per cent of the bank's liabilities and only after a bail-in equal to
at least 8 per cent of the same liabilities.
The SRF is funded by annual contributions from all euro-area banks (not just
those classified as 'significant' for supervisory purposes). The contributions are
paid in and gradually mutualized according to a schedule that will see the scheme
fully in place by the end of 2023, when the SRF will have reached its target level
(at least 1 per cent of the total amount of covered deposits in the euro area, a share
that the SRB estimates to be around €60 billion).
The private financial resources available to the SRF could prove insufficient
in the event of a systemic crisis. The importance of a public backstop was already
acknowledged in the late 2013 ECOFIN Council's conclusions on the Single
Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Its establishment was also deemed a priority in
the 2015 Five Presidents' Report on Completing the European Economic and
Monetary Union.6 Since the very outset of the negotiations on the SRM, Italy has
been one of the most active supporters of the need for a backstop to the SRF,
especially one involving the ESM.
The reform of the ESM now being discussed introduces such a backstop,
whose size is aligned with the actual level of the SRF (as indicated in the Terms
of Reference agreed in December 20187 and referred to in Recitals 5A and 15B,
as well as in Annex IV of the proposed reform); it therefore goes in the direction
of bolstering the credibility of the SRF and its effective ability to intervene and, in
doing so, reduces the risk of a disorderly management of a crisis at a large bank,
which could impact overall financial stability.
The reform envisages the introduction of the backstop no later than the end
of 2023. The possibility of introducing it earlier is made conditional on further
progress in reducing banking risks, something that will be assessed next year. Such
progress, however, refers only to building up sufficient buffers to meet the minimum
requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL; that is, the minimum
amount of liabilities that can be used for loss absorption or recapitalization of a
bank under resolution) and to reducing the NPL ratio (against benchmark ratios
of 5 per cent gross of write-downs already booked and 2.5 per cent net of them).
However, no mention is made of other types of assets that are risky because they
are illiquid or lack transparency regarding their valuation (such as so-called Level
2 and Level 3 financial instruments).
Introducing the backstop to the SRF is not the only change that we believe is
necessary to complete the current European crisis management framework. As I
have emphasized many times, including very recently, mechanisms are also needed
to facilitate the orderly exit from the market of small- and medium-sized banks
that cannot access the resolution procedure and therefore cannot receive support
from the SRF even though they contribute to it. To this end, we should take a
close look at the experience of the US's Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), which during the global financial crisis effectively managed the crises of
hundreds of small- and medium-sized banks without adverse effects on overall
stability. In fact, the German Finance Minister referred to the example of the FDIC
in his recent proposals on completing the banking union.8 Experts at the Bank of
Italy have proposed measures that could help to address the current problems.9
We stand ready to provide technical support to the Government in the discussions
under way at EU level on this issue.
* * *
The creation of the ESM has strengthened the economic governance of the
monetary union and - all other things being equal - has reduced the risks of financial
instability for each country and for the area as a whole. It was part of a comprehensive
reform whose salient points were already set out in the first report of the four
Presidents released in June 2012.10 Made gradually less ambitious in successive
official documents, today this original plan remains uncompleted.
The proposal to reform the ESM marks a step in the right direction, especially
because it introduces a backstop to the Single Resolution Fund. On the issue
of assistance to countries in crisis, it does not alter the substance of the Treaty
currently in force. It confirms the absence of any automatism in decisions on the
sustainability of public debts and rules out any debt restructuring mechanism.
As I recently underlined, this confirmation is important because 'The small and
uncertain benefits of a debt restructuring mechanism must be weighed against the
huge risk that the mere announcement of its introduction may trigger a perverse
spiral of expectations of default, which may prove to be self-fulfilling'.11 I made
similar observations on the risks of sovereign crises in my Concluding Remarks
delivered in May 2019 and even prior to that on a number of occasions, when the
idea of introducing an automatic debt restructuring mechanism for the Member
States of the euro area had not yet been fully discarded.12
The proposed changes in financial assistance to Member States reassert principles
of common sense that are already inscribed in the Treaty. For the ESM, as for any
other lender, it would be nonsensical to grant credit to those whose debt is not deemed
sustainable, given that this would constitute a non-refundable transfer. The safeguards
in terms of ex ante conditionality and ex post monitoring that flank the financing
mechanisms of the ESM have always been, and still are, duly rigorous. They are
safeguards that protect the resources that euro-area countries 'invested' at the time of
the ESM's establishment and, as I recalled earlier, Italy is the third largest contributor.
The proposed reform is, of course, the result of a compromise - between the
fears of those who have always rejected any further mutualization of risks and
the opposing fears of an unjustified postponement of progress towards 'genuine
economic and monetary union'. The best way to convince everybody of the
usefulness of the reform is to see it as a starting point for the purposeful resumption
of the path to European integration. A first step could be to announce the intention to
incorporate the ESM in European legislation in the medium term. What continues
to be lacking is a comprehensive plan for the completion of monetary union, one
that introduces a centralized fiscal capacity and a safe asset in the euro area, as well
as the completion of banking union.
The possibility of introducing a common fiscal capacity capable of flanking
monetary policy in the task of stabilizing the euro area must be examined anew;
this would enable us to deal with sometimes pronounced cyclical fluctuations,
without thwarting the efforts made up to that point in each country to reduce its
debt-to-GDP ratio.
The process towards completion of the capital markets union must be speeded
up including - I would even say primarily - by introducing euro area sovereign
bonds, which could replace a portion of national securities in circulation and play
the role of safe asset assigned to sovereign bonds in all the other major economies.
This result can also be achieved with the simultaneous introduction of some form of
European-wide public debt insurance, for example through the creation of a European
debt redemption fund (ERF), financed by dedicated resources of the participating
countries determined in a way that prevents systematic intra-country transfers.13
Banking union must be completed with a more effective mechanism for
managing crises at any intermediary, including small- and medium-sized ones, and
with a proper European deposit insurance scheme that guarantees equal protection
for depositors, irrespective of where their bank operates. This is where measures to
curtail risks such as the ones often proposed by, on the one hand, those who wish
to revise the prudential treatment of banks' sovereign exposures and, on the other,
those who stress how important it is not to take a selective approach to banking
risks (with the sole focus on non-performing loans), could be usefully inserted.
Looking ahead, some thought could also be given to the possibility of introducing
limits on the concentration of sovereign bonds in bank portfolios, without
distinguishing among sovereign debtors and in any event with a sufficiently high
initial 'exemption', but only if the euro area simultaneously decides to introduce
a common safe asset. Failing this, among other things, the diversification of bank
portfolios of sovereign bonds could not take place in an orderly fashion.
As I have already mentioned, it is imperative that the consolidation of the
public finances of highly indebted countries remains a credible process, one in
which every opportunity provided by the current low interest rate environment is
seized without hesitation. If everyone plays their part, it will become apparent that
all the Member States hold dear the success of monetary union and, above all, the
prosperity and well-being of all European citizens.
TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1
Financial assistance disbursed to countries in difficulty
(billions of euros)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total
Greece
ESM 21.4 10.3 8.5 21.7 61.9
EFSF 108.2 25.3 8.3 141.8
Bilateral loans 21.0 31.9 52.9
IMF 10.5 9.6 1.7 6.7 3.4 31.9
Total for Greece 288.5
Ireland
EFSF 7.6 4.4 5.7 17.7
EFSM 13.9 7.8 0.8 22.5
Bilateral loans 0.5 2.5 1.9 4.8
IMF 12.8 6.4 3.3 22.6
Total for Ireland 67.6
Portugal
EFSF 6.9 11.3 6.6 1.2 26.0
EFSM 14.1 8.0 2.2 24.3
IMF 13.0 8.2 3.4 1.8 26.3
Total for Portugal 76.6
Spain
ESM 39.5 1.9 41.3
Total for Spain 41.3
Cyprus
ESM 4.6 1.1 0.6 6.3
IMF 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 1.0
Total for Cyprus 7.3
Total assistance: 31.5 110.2 197.9 59.7 18.9 22.4 10.4 8.5 21.7 481.2
of which ESM: 39.5 6.5 1.1 22.0 10.3 8.5 21.7 109.6
Sources: For the bilateral loans to Ireland, National Treasury Management Agency and Macro-Financial Assistance to EU
Member States, State of Play - November 2019, European Parliament; for the assistance provided by the EFSF, ESM
and EFSM, their respective websites, from the pages on the beneficiary countries; for the support programme for Greece,
European Commission, The second economic adjustment programme for Greece, March 2012 and, for IMF loans
disbursed to Greece between 2012 and 2014, IMF press releases published at the time of each loan.
Table 2
Financial assistance disbursed by the ESM and related repayments
(billions of euros)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total Net
Total
disbursements 21.4 10.3 8.5 21.7 61.9 59.9
Greece
repayments 0.0 2.0 2.1
disbursements 39.5 1.9 41.3 23.7
Spain
repayments 1.6 4.0 1.0 3.0 8.0 17.6
disbursements 4.6 1.1 0.6 6.3 6.3
Cyprus
repayments
Total
disbursements 39.5 6.5 1.1 22.0 10.3 8.5 21.7 109.6
Total
repayments 1.6 4.0 1.0 5.0 8.0 19.7
Source: Based on ESM data available at: https://www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/programme-database/programme-overview.
Figure 1
Residual debt towards the ESM
(billions of euros)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Greece Cyprus Spain
Source: Based on ESM data available at: https://www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/programme-database/programme-overview.
Figure 2
Financial assistance (net of repayments) disbursed by the ESM
by country and residual lending capacity
(billions of euros)
59.9
410.1 89.9
6.3
23.7
Residual lending capacity Greece Cyprus Spain
Source: Based on ESM data available at: https://www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/programme-database/programme-overview.
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