August 31, 2023
Bank of Japan
Economic Activity, Prices,
and Monetary Policy in Japan
Speech at a Meeting with Local Leaders in Gifu
NAKAMURA Toyoaki
Member of the Policy Board
I. Economic and Price Developments at Home and Abroad
A. Recent Developments and Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices
I will begin my speech by talking about recent developments in overseas economies. The
pace of their recovery has slowed, weighed down in part by the situation in Ukraine; inverted
yield curves have been seen in eight countries using the Group of Ten (G10) currencies, with
inflationary pressure remaining on a global basis and continued policy interest rate hikes by
central banks (Chart 1).1 The U.S. economy has been affected by price rises and continued
policy interest rate hikes, but private consumption has been resilient on the back of wage
growth continuing to exceed 4 percent since the latter half of 2021. There are growing
expectations that the economy will be able to avoid recession, as real GDP for the April-June
quarter of 2023 was higher than expected, at 2.4 percent on an annualized quarter-on-quarter
basis.2 Although concern over energy supply has eased, European economies have slowed in
reflection of continued policy interest rate hikes, with the impact of the situation in Ukraine
and the widening inflation gap across euro area economies. As for the Chinese economy,
services consumption has increased, whereas goods consumption has been weak. Although
the economy is projected to continue picking up, partly with policy support, there is concern
over a decline in growth expectations and a slowdown in economic recovery due to a
prolongation, for example, of the sluggish real estate market, the high youth unemployment
rate, weaker exports, the U.S.-China tension, and a decrease in foreign investment. As I have
explained, the risks to overseas economies are skewed to the downside on the whole.
Let me move on to recent developments in Japan's economic activity and prices. The economy
has recovered moderately. In the corporate sector, although exports and production have been
affected by the slowdown in the pace of recovery in overseas economies, they have been more
or less flat, supported by a waning of the effects of supply-side constraints. In addition,
corporate profits have been at high levels due to strengthening of firms' earning power and
improvement in their pricing power. In this situation, firms' appetite for fixed investment has
increased, as growth expectations have risen and the government's policy measures have
become more predictable, so as to avoid the harm caused by budget formulation that focuses
only on a single fiscal year. With regard to the household sector, private consumption has
increased moderately, along with improvement in the employment and income situation. For
example, the pressure to raise wages has continued due to tighter labor market conditions,
and the surge in import prices has peaked out. Turning to prices, the year-on-year rate of
increase in the consumer price index (CPI) for all items less fresh food has slowed from the
latest peak of 4.2 percent for January 2023, mainly due to the effects of pushing down energy
prices from the government's economic measures. Nevertheless, it marked 3.1 percent for
July, significantly exceeding 2 percent (Chart 2).
As for the outlook, despite being under downward pressure stemming from the slowdown in
the pace of recovery in overseas economies, Japan's economy is likely to recover moderately
for the time being. This is mainly due to the materialization of pent-up demand, supported in
part by household savings that accumulated as a result of COVID-19 pandemic-related
restrictions, accommodative financial conditions, the government's economic measures, and
firms' efforts to strengthen their earning power. Thereafter, with overseas economies picking
up, the economy is projected to continue growing at a pace above its potential growth rate as
the virtuous cycle from income to spending gradually intensifies. Regarding prices, the year-
on-year rate of increase in the CPI for all items less fresh food is likely to decelerate, with a
gradual waning of the effects of a pass-through to consumer prices of cost increases led by
the surge in import prices (Chart 3).
B. Risk Factors for Economic Activity and Prices
The outlook just described is subject to uncertainties; specifically, I am paying attention to
the following two factors.
First is the sustainability of wage growth. Looking at the final results of firms' responses
regarding the 2023 annual spring labor-management wage negotiations released by the Japan
Business Federation, or Keidanren, the wage growth rate was the highest for the first time in
31 years for major firms, at 4.0 percent, and in 29 years for small and medium-sized firms, at
3.0 percent. Furthermore, the Keidanren's final results showed that summer bonuses and
lump-sum payments of major firms, after having risen at a high rate of 8.8 percent in the
previous year, continued to increase this year, marking 0.5 percent year on year. Nevertheless,
by industry, the number of those experiencing increases in summer bonuses and lump-sum
payments was almost the same as those experiencing decreases. It is necessary to carefully
monitor the progress in active initiatives taken by firms, including small and medium-sized
ones, such as strengthening of their earning power and wage system reforms, which are
imperative to sustainable wage growth.
Second is developments in overseas economic activity and prices. In advanced economies,
the effects of policy interest rate hikes have become unclear, mainly because of post-
pandemic pent-up demand and of wage growth due to tighter labor market conditions. In this
situation, the CPI for all items less food and energy has remained elevated, and the risk of
economic overkill through continued policy rate hikes is also of concern. In addition, a 1
percentage point change in China's GDP is estimated to affect the GDP of other Asia-Pacific
regions by about 0.3 percentage point.3 Depending on the extent of deceleration of overseas
economies, this may have a significant impact on Japan's exports and production, and
therefore careful monitoring is warranted of changes in the situation overseas.
II. Conduct of Monetary Policy
In light of recent economic and price developments, I would like to share my views on the
conduct of monetary policy for the immediate future. I believe that the Bank of Japan needs
to patiently continue with the current monetary easing for the time being in view of the price
stability target of 2 percent, primarily for two reasons.
The first reason concerns achieving inflation accompanied by wage increases. A major
problem facing Japan's economy is that there has been almost no increase in the three key
economic and financial indicators of prices, wages, and interest rates since the second half of
the 1990s (Chart 4). The distribution of selling price changes has clustered near 0 percent for
many years (Chart 5). Firms have curbed investment given the difficulty of recovering it. This
led to declines in their capacity for innovation and earning power, thereby causing a slump in
labor productivity. To propel a change in this economic activity stagnation, the Bank has
continued with monetary easing. As a result, coupled with the government's policies, Japan's
economy is no longer in deflation. However, with setbacks such as the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC) and the COVID-19 pandemic, the deflationary mindset has not yet been dispelled.
Considering that the principle of monetary policy is to achieve price stability, thereby
contributing to the sound development of the national economy, it is important for a virtuous
cycle to take shape in which wages increase on the back of stable price rises, economic
activities such as investment and consumption become aggressive, and interest rates rise
accordingly. For this to happen, the country's economic and wage structures need to change
so that wages increase alongside economic growth, as is the case in the United States and
Europe. Monetary policies in these economies aim to curb demand and subdue high inflation,
in the context of their present economic and wage structures. In the case of Japan, however,
the structures of sluggish economic activity and wages need to be changed, and the price
stability target seems to serve as a barometer for gauging the progress of this change. The
year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI for all items less fresh food has exceeded 2 percent
for 16 consecutive months, and labor shortages have also exerted greater pressure on firms to
raise wages. Nevertheless, developments in the GDP deflator -- which measures the change
in prices of value-added generated in the domestic economy -- show that, unlike in the United
States and Europe, a substantial increase in unit labor costs has not been observed in Japan
(Chart 6). Thus, the current inflation in the country seems to be due mainly to the effects of
the pass-through to consumer prices of cost increases led by the surge in import prices with a
lag, and inflation accompanied by wage increases has not yet been achieved.
The second reason I believe the Bank needs to continue with monetary easing concerns
boosting the earning power of firms, including small and medium-sized ones, which allows
for wage growth that can keep up with inflation. The June 2023 Tankan (Short-Term
Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan) shows that the diffusion index (DI) for output
prices has been positive for nine consecutive quarters, and that the gap with the input prices
DI has been narrowing since its peak in the January-March quarter of 2022.4 This points to
firms' ongoing efforts to pass on higher costs to selling prices. Furthermore, a virtuous cycle
appears to be emerging in which wage growth strengthens employee engagement, leading to
creation of innovative products and services that allow firms to reflect value-added in their
prices, bringing about a boost in the earning power. That said, the earning power of Japanese
small and medium-sized firms -- which represent almost 70 percent of the country's
workforce -- is not as strong as that of large firms (Chart 7). By contrast, it appears that the
situation for German small and medium-sized firms differs significantly, in that they have
continued to grow while maintaining their profitability at a level comparable to that of large
firms.5 Partly owing to the progress in the pass-through of cost increases to prices, the latest
Tankan shows that the current profits of small and medium-sized firms in Japan marked an
increase of 3.9 percent for fiscal 2022 from the previous fiscal year, which was higher than
the forecast presented in the March Tankan. Nonetheless, the forecast is for a decline in the
profits of such firms for fiscal 2023, and progress in boosting the earning power to secure
funds for raising wages remains uncertain among small and medium-sized firms. Therefore,
achievement of the 2 percent price stability target cannot be assumed with confidence yet.
Media reports suggest that a considerable number of major firms have already resolved to
raise wages next spring. That said, it is necessary to monitor whether firms, including small
and medium-sized ones, are making steady headway in boosting their earning power to enable
them to raise wages to keep up with inflation.
Current inflation in Japan is still largely characterized by import-driven cost-push factors
(Chart 6). Given this, making a shift to monetary tightening before the increases in selling
prices translate to those in wages runs the risk of suppressing demand and weakening firms'
earning power again. This will also lead to another lowering of people's growth expectations
and require considerable costs and time to recover. Therefore, the Bank needs to thoroughly
grasp the situation and make cautious judgment before revising its monetary policy. There
are extremely high uncertainties about economic activity and prices, as evidenced, for
example, by the significant upward revision to the median of the Policy Board members' CPI
forecasts for fiscal 2023, from 1.8 percent to 2.5 percent. Taking account of such uncertainties,
the Bank decided to conduct yield curve control with greater flexibility. At present, however,
sustainable and stable achievement of the price stability target of 2 percent, accompanied by
wage increases, has not yet come in sight, and my view is that the Bank needs more time
before making a shift to monetary tightening.
III. Reforms of Economic and Wage Structures
Drawing from my experience in the private sector, I would now like to talk about the
importance of changing Japan's economic and wage structures and of strengthening the
earning power of firms and households to this end. I believe that these are needed to achieve
the 2 percent price stability target in a sustainable and stable manner.
A. Structural Challenges Facing Japan's Economy
Japan's economy, after having grown in line with an increasing population, experienced
stagnation due to delayed responses to a subsequent population decline and changes in the
economic environment. As a result, there has been almost no increase in the three key
economic and financial indicators of prices, wages, and interest rates.
When the population was increasing, Japan's economy achieved high growth under an
efficiency-oriented business model of mass production and vertical integration, through
which a large volume of low-priced, quality products was provided. The yen then appreciated
sharply following the 1985 Plaza Accord, spurring major firms to step up their overseas
expansion. Many small and medium-sized firms, however, could not expand their businesses
overseas and instead faced fierce competition in a domestic market that was experiencing
sluggish demand and price competition with firms from emerging economies. Furthermore,
firms fell behind in transforming their existing business model into one involving a horizontal
division of labor, which focuses on creating added value and adapts to globalization and a
population decline. With every wave of recession, many firms made all possible efforts to cut
costs, because this measure had proved effective in the past. While the global economy grew
steadily due to, for example, the rise of emerging economies and advances in digitalization,
Japan's economy saw sluggish wage growth amid the situation of a declining and aging
population. This was because businesses were sustained with a rise in the labor force
participation rate, especially among non-regular employees such as married women and the
elderly. There was also the issue of a so-called salary ceiling -- that is, part-time workers try
to adjust their working hours so that their salaries stay under the ceiling for tax exemption.
Moreover, due to cost-cutting reforms in all possible areas, firms restrain not only fixed
investment but also investments in human capital and in growth areas including research and
development (R&D), which are the key to creating innovation that is vital to sustainable
corporate growth (Charts 8 and 9).6 Digitalization was also delayed. As a result, Japan's per
capita labor productivity fell to 29th among the 38 Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries, suggesting a decline in its international competitiveness
(Chart 10).7 Since prices did not rise during the prolonged deflationary period, firms were
able to rely on the goodwill of their employees, knowing that they would continue to work
even if wages and investment in human resource development were restrained. The current
economy characterized by low growth, low inflation, and low wage growth -- stemming from
a declining and aging population and low labor productivity -- presents a structural challenge
for Japan.
In the wake of the GFC and the COVID-19 pandemic, reform efforts to address such
structural challenge have progressed. For example, Japanese firms have channeled greater
management resources, mainly through mergers and acquisitions (M&As), including
business succession to the next generation, and through sales of businesses (Chart 11).
Furthermore, with structural labor shortages becoming acute in Japan, firms find it difficult
to recruit and retain workers unless they raise wages. As in other economies, Japan is seeing
an upsurge in "survival of the fittest," and therefore firms need to shift from management that
relies on the goodwill of employees to one that increases employee value.
Labor shortages are a global issue. The Talent Shortage Survey -- a survey of employers in
41 countries carried out by U.S.-based ManpowerGroup -- released in March 2023 found that
a record-high 77 percent of employers worldwide faced labor shortages on average, which is
an increase of 37 percentage points from when the survey first began in 2006. Meanwhile,
wages have remained sluggish in Japan (Chart 12). In 2022, a major firm based overseas
announced that it would hire new workers at a high starting salary as it made inroads into the
Kyushu region, and this attracted significant interest. In light of this incident and further
tightening of labor market conditions, there is a growing awareness across the country of the
need to reform the current business structure so that firms can raise wages (Chart 13).
B. Boosting Labor Productivity: Strengthening Firms' Earning Power
Since wage growth has become indispensable to securing human capital, strengthening firms'
earning power has become an urgent management issue. For a long time, many Japanese
firms have found it difficult to raise selling prices, instead offsetting the impact of higher
costs mainly by reducing costs and developing new products and services. As a result, despite
their sophisticated technology, these firms have tended to fall into a structure in which the
benefits of new product and services development do not feed into wage growth for their
employees. In order to make a shift to a business structure in which firms can raise wages
after experiencing the COVID-19 pandemic, they have been developing and providing
innovative products and services that customers recognize as having value. They have also
been pursuing initiatives to create value across the entire supply chain, which includes small
and medium-sized firms.
As a result of the 2023 annual spring labor-management wage negotiations, many firms have
raised base pay and nominal wages have recently marked relatively high growth on a year-
on-year basis. Offered wages also have shown high growth, reflecting acute labor shortages
(Chart 13). These developments in Japan suggest that now is a golden opportunity to
transform the entrenched deflationary mindset into a growth mindset. In fact, I sense that a
virtuous cycle of growth and profit sharing is starting to operate (Chart 14 gives a simplified
representation). That is, firms are developing innovative products and services with strong
pricing power, and this in turn is driving growth in their profits. As firms are pursuing more
aggressive investments and higher wages, firms and households are starting to raise their
growth expectations. By strengthening management resources, including through business
succession and M&As, and by boosting employee engagement, firms are improving their
productivity and capacity for innovation. As a result, coupled with consumers' increased
appetite for spending, they are heightening the value of their products and employees as well
as raising their sales, thereby strengthening their earning power and realizing sustainable
growth. This in turn is leading to bolstering of both the supply and demand sides by further
raising wages and expanding consumption, suggesting the start of a virtuous cycle of growth
and profit sharing. In order to maintain this virtuous cycle, it is crucial for firms targeting
growth to keep strengthening their earning power. For this reason, I think that changes to
Japan's business and economic structures are needed to realize wage growth that can keep up
with inflation. This will come about through various supply-side reforms, including firms'
efforts to proceed with identifying and concentrating on their core competencies, accelerate
realignment of their business portfolios, make active investment in technological advances
that drive innovation, improve corporate metabolism, and increase the number of startups and
unicorns (private startups valued at over 1 billion U.S. dollars) in line with the government's
Startup Development Five-Year Plan.
In order to assess the progress toward achieving an economic structure in which wages rise
along with economic growth, I am attentive to growth in nominal GDP, which closely reflects
the actual experience of various economic entities. From fiscal 2001 to 2011, which was
during the deflationary period, the nominal GDP growth rate relative to the previous fiscal
year contracted by 0.6 percent in terms of the simple arithmetic average, whereas real GDP
increased by 0.6 percent (Chart 15). Over this period, the nominal consumption of durable
goods declined by about 10 percent, from 25 trillion yen to 22 trillion yen, indicating that
household consumption was in fact shrinking. The real value of consumption of durable
goods, however, increased by about 90 percent, from 11 trillion to 21 trillion in chained 2015
yen. Since nominal GDP is representative of the sentiment of firms and households, I believe
that it is a familiar and vital indicator in terms of stimulating growth expectations of each
economic entity and changing the deflationary mindset. The Bank therefore will continue
providing accommodative financial conditions to support efforts to seize this current golden
opportunity so that the economy will achieve growth in nominal GDP and a rise in nominal
wages that can keep up with inflation.
Looking back at the speed at which nominal GDP recovered from the past shocks, during
Japan's deflationary period, it took 19 years to recover to the level seen in fiscal 1997. In
contrast, during the COVID-19 pandemic, nominal GDP surpassed the fiscal 2019 level in
three years, setting a new record high in fiscal 2022. Moreover, nominal GDP is expected to
reach a new record high for two consecutive years in fiscal 2023, growing by more than 4
percent.8 In terms of corporate profits, the Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations
by Industry, Quarterly shows that current profits for a January-March quarter reached a record
high in 2023. The June Tankan also envisages a high level being maintained throughout fiscal
2023. I sense that these are signs of progress in structural reforms and of a rise in growth
expectations. In addition, business fixed investment plans for fiscal 2023 in the June Tankan
show an increase of 12.3 percent on a year-on-year basis, indicating a strong appetite for
investment.9 The DI for employment conditions in the same survey also indicates more acute
labor shortages. Furthermore, in addition to the materialization of high wage growth for the
first time in about 30 years as a result of the 2023 annual spring labor-management wage
negotiations, the national average of minimum wages was raised to 1,004 yen, increasing by
4.5 percent from the previous fiscal year. As evidenced by these developments, investment
and wage growth are gaining momentum, and I therefore expect firms to continue with their
efforts to strengthen their earning power.
C. Strengthening Earning Power of Small and Medium-Sized Firms
To realize wage growth that can keep up with inflation, it is crucial that small and medium-
sized firms boost their earning power. Currently, the ratio of exports to sales for such firms in
Japan is low relative to large firms, at only 3 percent (Chart 16). In this situation, while
employees at small and medium-sized firms account for almost 70 percent of the overall
workforce, the current profits of such firms comprise only about a quarter of the country's
total and one-fifth or one-sixth of large firms in terms of per employee, suggesting limited
capacity for raising wages (Chart 17). Their pricing power is also weak because of fierce
competition in the domestic market, giving rise to a structure in which these firms easily
become trapped in a vicious cycle of being unable to raise wages (Chart 14). For instance,
the domestic market that most small and medium-sized firms target tends to get caught up in
price competition not only among themselves but also with imported goods. Such firms
therefore have continued to face difficulty in strengthening their earning power. I hope that
the number of growing small and medium-sized firms will increase, as with the case in
Germany, as they tap into demand from various regions of the world that are growing in line
with a population increase.
Small and medium-sized firms in Germany have distinctive characteristics, in that they have
technology, competitiveness, and pricing power in niche markets, mainly through using a
scheme to support strengthening of competitiveness provided by the German government and
other institutions. This can be seen in these firms' exports accounting for 20 to 30 percent of
their sales, and their pre-tax profitability being at about 6 percent.10,11 Meanwhile, for Japan,
it seems that many small and medium-sized firms have delayed putting in place measures to
strengthen the competitiveness of their products and services and export strategies, due to a
dearth of management resources and severe competition. Nevertheless, firms such as startups
and small and medium-sized firms engaged in generational changes and business succession
have in recent years begun taking on the challenge of growing by seeking to augment their
management resources and technologies. I expect that small and medium-sized firms and
startups will enhance their R&D capabilities and responsiveness to the market down the road,
and they will also be able to take advantage of support measures provided by the national and
local governments, universities, and other entities to strengthen their ability to grow. These
developments are then expected to pave the way for highly autonomous management.
Supporting such firms and startups as they take on these challenges requires the backing and
guidance of regional financial institutions familiar with their respective regions.
D. Boosting Households' Earning Power
To realize sustainable growth of Japan's economy, in addition to boosting the earning power
of firms, it is necessary to steadily increase the disposable income of households by
strengthening their earning power. Labor income accounted for 94 percent of Japanese
10
For the ratio of exports to sales, see Tanaka, N., "International Expansion of German SMEs:
Corporate Behavior in Exports and Investments," Quarterly International Trade and Investment
published by the International Institute for International Trade and Investment, Spring 2017, no.107.
Small and medium-sized firms in Germany in terms of the ratio of exports to sales are those with
annual sales of 500 million euros or less.
11
For profitability, see the data from the extrapolated results of the Financial Statement Statistics
released by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Small and medium-sized firms in Germany are those with sales
of less than 50 million euros.
households' disposable income as of the end of 2019, so much higher than the proportion for
the United States (Chart 18). Moreover, dividend and interest income is small, at 4 percent,
suggesting that households' income is highly susceptible to the earning power of the firms
where they work. Almost 70 percent of Japanese workers are employed by small and medium-
sized firms and stay at the same firm for a long period of time. However, about 60 percent of
such firms operate at a loss and expectations for sustainable wage growth are low.12 Many
households tend to have a higher preference for holding on to their cash and deposits so as to
be prepared for future expenses. To boost their earning power, an effective option is to hone
capabilities by reskilling, or acquiring new skills, seek to earn higher wages commensurate
with ability, and change jobs, as is the case in the United States and Europe (Chart 19). The
job-switching rate in Japan has remained lower than those in the United States and Europe
(Charts 20 and 21). However, labor market conditions are tight, as evidenced by the
unemployment rate being at a historically low level of 2.5 percent for June 2023 (Chart 13).
If a smooth migration of labor is made to growing industries, where wages are higher and
aggressive investment in human resource development is made to boost the value of
employees, this will enhance the added value of entire regions and accelerate the virtuous
cycle of growth and profit sharing. My view is that this will turn hope about wage growth
that can keep up with inflation into confidence. In the Guidelines for Integrated Three-
Pronged Labor Market Reforms that it announced in May 2023, the Japanese government has
committed to compiling various models for job-based pay according to the actual
circumstances of individual firms by the year-end. At the same time, the government is
planning subsidies and tax reforms in terms of facilitating diverse working styles and labor
mobility. I am paying attention to the positive responses from firms and households in this
regard.
Another key to strengthening households' earning power is increasing their dividend and
interest income. In Japan, cash and deposits make up 54 percent of household financial assets,
while equity and investment trusts make up 15 percent. Compared to the United States and
Germany, there is a higher preference in Japan for holding on to cash and deposits (Chart 22).
If there is progress with a shift in the deflationary mindset of holding money to a growth-
oriented mindset of using money effectively, this will lead households to reallocate some of
their savings into investment in financial assets focusing on the long term, on regular
contributions, and on risk diversification. This will boost households' earning power through
the acquisition of dividend income from many listed firms that they have invested in, and at
the same time promote future asset formation through the growth of firms that they have
invested in. Simply keeping cash and deposits drives households far away from the benefits
of growth in Japan's economy, which has been achieved through the business activities of
many firms. Developments in the Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX) and dividend yields from
2001 onward show that asset values have risen in tandem with the growth of listed firms even
after significant shocks such as the GFC, and dividend yields have remained at around 2
percent since that crisis (Chart 23).
The economy continues to grow through activities of a large number of firms. During the
Showa Era, from 1926 through 1989, Japan's economy realized growth driven by exports,
and industrial clusters were formed, bringing about a society in which almost all Japanese
people considered themselves to be middle-class based on income earned from the firms
where they work, a concept widely shared during the 1970s when Japan's population
exceeded 100 million. As a result of firms' earning power weakening accompanied by the
yen's appreciation following the 1985 Plaza Accord, as well as a population decline, and also
of sluggish wages, it is now necessary for households to change the structure for boosting
their earning power. It is important that households invest in equity and investment trusts as
a means of linking to multiple listed firms, transforming the structure for strengthening their
earning power to one that promotes not only sustainable and stable increases in wages and
financial income accompanying nominal GDP growth but also asset formation.
Thank you.
Economic Activity, Prices,
and Monetary Policy in Japan
Speech at a Meeting with Local Leaders in Gifu
August 31, 2023
NAKAMURA Toyoaki
Member of the Policy Board
Bank of Japan
Chart 1
IMF Projections in the
World Economic Outlook Update
(July 2023)
y/y % chg.
16
14
12
IMF projections
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
Japan United States Euro area
-6 China World output
-8
CY
80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20
Source: IMF.
Chart 2
Consumer Prices
Japan United States Euro Area
y/y % chg. y/y % chg.
y/y % chg.
11
11 11
Energy <7%> Energy <10%>
Temporary factors
Energy <7%> Housing rent <33%> Housing rent <6%>
Housing rent <19%>
Services (less housing Services (less housing
rent) <30%> rent) <38%>
Services (less housing rent) <31%>
Goods <30%> Goods <46%>
Goods <40%>