Ben S Bernanke: Fostering sustainable homeownership
Speech of Mr Ben S Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the US Federal
Reserve System, at the National Community Reinvestment Coalition Annual Meeting,
Washington DC, 14 March 2008.
* * *
This audience, the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, is certainly aware that
mortgage delinquency and foreclosure rates have increased substantially over the past year
and a half. This increase reflects significantly, though not exclusively, a sharp deterioration in
the performance of subprime mortgages, particularly those with adjustable-rate features. At
the end of last year, more than one in five of the roughly 3.6 million outstanding subprime
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) were seriously delinquent, meaning they were either in
foreclosure or ninety days or more past due.1 That rate is about four times higher than it was
in mid-2005. Lenders initiated roughly 1-1/2 million foreclosures last year, up from an
average of 950,000 in the preceding two years. More than one-half of the foreclosure starts
in 2007 were on subprime mortgages. Behind these disturbing statistics are families facing
personal and financial hardship and neighborhoods that may be destabilized by clusters of
foreclosures. These realities challenge us to find ways to prevent unnecessary foreclosures.
And, looking toward the future, they challenge us to ensure a regulatory environment that
promotes responsible lending and sustainable homeownership.
I would like to briefly discuss how we arrived at where we are today. Then I would like to
share with you what the Federal Reserve is doing to reduce foreclosures, to protect aspiring
homeowners from unfair and deceptive practices, and to equip them to choose wisely from
among the often confusing array of mortgage options. In particular, I would like to highlight
the new regulations we have proposed under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA).
Origins of the subprime mortgage turmoil
Over the past quarter century, advances in information technology, the development of
credit-scoring techniques, and the emergence of a large secondary market, among other
factors, have significantly increased access to mortgage credit. From 1994 to 2006, subprime
lending increased from an estimated $35 billion, or 4.5 percent of all one-to-four family
mortgage originations, to $600 billion, or 20 percent of originations (Inside Mortgage Finance,
2007). Responsible subprime lending expanded credit to borrowers with imperfect or limited
credit histories. More renters became homeowners than would have otherwise. Though few
subprime mortgages are being written today, I believe responsible subprime lending has
been helpful, and at some point will be again, in fostering sustainable homeownership.
However, far too much of the lending in recent years was neither responsible nor prudent.
The terms of some subprime mortgages permitted homebuyers and investors to purchase
properties beyond their means, often with little or no equity. In addition, abusive, unfair, or
deceptive lending practices led some borrowers into mortgages that they would not have
chosen knowingly.
The current crisis has many roots. The drop in home prices in many once-hot markets is
among the most significant. In a recent survey, nearly 30 percent of homeowners reported
that their houses decreased in value over the past year.2 The decline in home equity makes
it more difficult for struggling homeowners to refinance and reduces the financial incentive of
stressed borrowers to remain in their homes. Mortgage performance data show a strong
correlation between adverse house price changes and subsequent increases in mortgage
delinquency and foreclosure (Avery, Brevoort, and Canner, 2007; Gerardi, Shapiro, and
Willen, 2007). Investors who purchased homes in the hope of price appreciation seem
particularly likely to walk away from "underwater" mortgages. Indeed, the role of investors in
the housing market has increased markedly over time. According to data collected under the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), lending to non-owner-occupants has risen from
about 5 percent of the home-purchase loans in the mid-1990s to about 17 percent of all
purchases in 2005 and 2006 (Avery, Brevoort, and Canner, 2007). Mortgage delinquencies
are also tied to local economic conditions; notably, several midwestern states struggling with
job losses and slow income growth have seen increased delinquencies.
The deterioration in underwriting standards that appears to have begun in late 2005 is
another important factor underlying the current crisis. A large share of subprime loans that
were originated during this time featured high combined loan-to-value ratios and, in some
cases, layers of additional risk factors, such as a lack of full documentation or the
acceptance of very high debt-to-income ratios. In 2006, for example, the HMDA data suggest
that nearly 40 percent of higher-priced home-purchase loans involved a piggy-back loan or
second mortgage.3 Indeed, many defaults are occurring within the first few months of
origination, well before payment resets occur on subprime ARM products.
Much of the weakening in underwriting standards appears to have happened outside of
institutions regulated by the federal banking agencies. The HMDA data for 2006 show that
more than 45 percent of high-cost first mortgages were originated by independent mortgage
companies, which are institutions that are not regulated by the federal banking agencies and
that sell almost all of the mortgages they originate. In this instance, this originate-to-distribute
model appears to have contributed to the breakdown in underwriting standards, as lenders
often found themselves able to pass on the credit risk without much resistance from the
ultimate investors. For a number of years, rapid increases in house prices effectively
insulated lenders and investors from the effects of weaker underwriting, providing false
comfort.
Another concern is the substantial number of borrowers with subprime ARMs whose interest
rates are scheduled to reset upward--about 1.5 million in 2008.4 The problem posed by
resets is serious, but it may be mitigated somewhat by lower short-term interest rates and by
the efforts of servicers, including those working with the Hope Now Alliance, to find solutions
for borrowers facing resets, including interest-rate freezes (Hope Now Alliance Servicers,
2008). In addition, the FHASecure plan, which the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
announced late last summer, offers qualified borrowers who are delinquent because of an
interest rate reset and who have some equity in the home the opportunity to refinance into an
FHA-insured mortgage. Recently, the Congress and Administration temporarily increased the
maximum loan value eligible for FHA insurance, which will allow more borrowers access to
this program.
The current high rate of delinquencies and foreclosures is not confined to the subprime
market. In 2007, about 45 percent of foreclosures were on prime, near-prime, or
governmentbacked mortgages. Across market segments, delinquencies are rising fastest on the
morecomplex loans originated over the past few years. In part, that trend seems to be due to the
fact that such loans were made to borrowers in weaker financial condition. In some cases,
borrowers may not have fully understood the details of their loans, including the potential for
large payment increases.
Federal Reserve responses
Effective responses need to build on an informed understanding of this complex picture.
Thus, as these problems in housing emerged and deepened, the Federal Reserve System
engaged with a wide array of market participants--including lenders, community groups,
servicers, consumer advocates, public officials, and other regulators--to properly diagnose
the problems and work toward sustainable solutions. The Federal Reserve System alone, of
course, cannot resolve all of the problems in the marketplace, but we have responded thus
far through our regulatory, supervisory, research, and community affairs functions.
Regulation and supervision
As part of a periodic review of our regulations under HOEPA, the Federal Reserve Board in
2006 began a systematic look at changes in the mortgage industry. Four public hearings held
around the country confirmed evidence that we were gathering from other sources that the
mortgage market was undergoing the significant changes with which we are all now familiar.
Our concerns led us in 2006 and 2007 to issue, along with other federal and state regulators,
a series of guidances to the institutions we supervise that covered nontraditional mortgage
loans, subprime lending, and servicing practices. Those were good steps, but we also
recognized that many of the problems we were beginning to see were a result of actions by
companies and individuals not subject to our supervisory oversight. Thus, we conducted an
additional HOEPA hearing, focusing on four specific areas: assessment of repayment ability;
low- and no-documentation lending; escrowing for taxes and insurance; and prepayment
penalties. As a result of a careful review of available data and information, we proposed new
rules under our HOEPA authority in December, banning practices that we found to be unfair
or deceptive. Significantly, bans on such unfair or deceptive acts and practices would apply
to the entire mortgage industry, not just to institutions directly regulated by the Board.
Our goal was to produce clear and comprehensive rules to protect consumers from unfair
practices while maintaining the viability of a market for responsible mortgage lending. The
rules would apply stricter regulations to higher-priced mortgage loans, which we have
defined broadly so as to cover substantially all of the subprime market.5 The regulations
would be enforceable by state and federal supervisory and enforcement agencies as well as
by consumers themselves, who could recover statutory damages for violations above and
beyond actual damages.
The proposed rules cover a range of practices. First, the rules would prohibit a lender from
engaging in a pattern or practice of making higher-priced loans that the borrower cannot
reasonably be expected to repay from income or from assets other than the house. Of
course, appropriate attention to the borrower's ability to repay is a fundamental feature of
good underwriting.
Second, we found that the prevalence of "stated-income" lending led to many borrowers
receiving mortgages that they could not afford. Consequently, we would require lenders to
verify the income or assets they rely on to make credit decisions for higher-priced
loans-standard industry practice, in fact, for most lending until quite recently.
Third, our proposal would require higher-priced loans to have an escrow account for
realestate taxes and hazard insurance. This rule would help ensure that borrowers can afford
their payments and avoid the cases in which borrowers, especially first-time borrowers, did
not understand that the monthly principal and interest payment was not the only financial
obligation associated with homeownership. Escrowing has become standard practice in the
prime market, and our proposal would make it standard practice for this part of the market,
as well.
Fourth, the proposed rules would ban prepayment penalties in situations in which the
borrower may be especially vulnerable. For example, prepayment penalties would be
prohibited where the borrower's debt-to-income ratio exceeds 50 percent and, when
permitted, would be required to expire at least sixty days before a scheduled increase in the
loan payment. The rule would also ban prepayment penalties that could enable a "loan
flipping" scheme, in which a lender or its affiliate refinances the lender's own loan at adverse
terms for the borrower.
In seeking information and opinion about these four issues, the Board determined that
additional problems needed to be addressed as well, and for all loans, not just higher-priced
loans. Among the practices addressed by our proposal is the use of yield spread premiums
(YSPs).6 Many consumers use mortgage brokers to guide them through a complex process
and shop for the best deal. Unfortunately, consumers may believe that the broker has a
responsibility to get them that best deal, which is not necessarily the case. In fact, the design
of YSPs may provide the broker a financial incentive to offer a loan with a higher rate.
Consumers who do not understand this point may not shop to their best advantage.
Therefore, we would prohibit a lender, for both prime and subprime loans, from paying a
broker an amount greater than the consumer agrees to in advance. Brokers would also have
to disclose their potential conflict of interest. The combination of stricter regulation and better
disclosure will not solve all the problems. We do believe, however, that this proposal will give
consumers much better information and raise their awareness of brokers' potential conflict of
interest while reducing a broker's incentive to steer a consumer to a higher rate.
To protect consumers and promote competition, our proposal would also ban seven specific
advertising practices deemed unfair or deceptive. Under our rules, for example, mortgage
originators would not be allowed to advertise a mortgage as having a "fixed" rate unless the
advertisement also states clearly how long the rate or payment is fixed, and they could not
advertise loans in one language but have important consumer disclosures in another. The
proposal would also require that consumers receive loan-specific Truth in Lending Act
disclosures early in the application process, when they can use the information to shop more
effectively. The proposal also addresses certain practices in loan servicing that can cause
problems for consumers, such as delays in posting payments to a consumer's account, and it
acts to prohibit coercion of appraisers by lenders or brokers.
We believe these proposed rules will help protect mortgage borrowers from unfair and
deceptive practices. At the same time, we did not want to create rules that were so
openended or costly to administer that responsible lenders would pull out of the subprime market.
So, our proposal is designed to protect consumers without shutting off access to responsible
credit. We anticipate vigorous discussion through the public comment process that ends on
April 8, and we will, as always, carefully consider this input before issuing final rules.
In addition to regulations, strong uniform oversight of different types of mortgage lenders is
critical to avoiding future problems. Regulatory oversight of mortgage lending has become
more challenging as the breadth and depth of this market has grown over the past decade.
Other changes, such as the increased role of nonbank mortgage lenders, have added
complexity.
To achieve more uniformly effective supervision, the Federal Reserve, together with other
federal and state agencies, launched a pilot program last summer to conduct reviews of
selected nondepository lenders with significant subprime mortgage operations. These
reviews will evaluate the companies' underwriting standards as well as senior management
oversight of compliance with state and federal consumer protection regulations and laws. We
will take corrective or enforcement action as warranted. We plan to use this joint project as a
vehicle for strengthening cooperation and coordination among federal and state agencies.
Research and community affairs
The Federal Reserve is addressing the foreclosure crisis in capacities other than that of a
regulator, leveraging our strengths in research and data analysis, our regional presence, and
the many contacts we have developed with local community groups, lenders, policymakers,
and other stakeholders in this issue. Community affairs officers at the Board and the twelve
Reserve Banks work with Federal Reserve research economists to anticipate and, where
possible, mitigate foreclosure problems. They share detailed reports and information that
help community organizations, nonprofits, state regulators, and others identify regions and
neighborhoods most vulnerable to foreclosure and respond accordingly. For instance,
NeighborWorks America recently used the Board's analyses to help identify geographic
areas and neighborhoods in most critical need of $130 million in emergency funds provided
by the Congress to increase mortgage counselor capacity.
Solid analysis of available information is critical to crafting appropriate policy remedies, and
the Federal Reserve has invested considerable resources into such studies. For example, a
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston working paper has analyzed the factors that predict
foreclosure, finding a particularly important role for declining house prices (Gerardi, Shapiro,
and Willen, 2007). The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia is conducting a five-year study
of pre-purchase homeownership counseling. That study will provide important information on
the benefits of counseling services in fostering sustainable homeownership and help us
understand the long-term effects of financial-management skills on the credit worthiness of
low- and moderate-income homebuyers.
In addition to this ongoing research, the Federal Reserve is supporting efforts to reach
troubled borrowers and to raise awareness in communities about ways to prevent
foreclosures. Since July, the community affairs offices across the Federal Reserve System
have sponsored or cosponsored more than fifty events related to foreclosures, reaching
more than 4,000 attendees including lenders, counselors, community development
specialists, and policymakers.
There is also work to be done in mitigating the impact of unavoidable foreclosures on
consumers and communities. Families who cannot sustain homeownership will need to find
new places to live, highlighting the critical need for an adequate supply of affordable rental
housing. Consumers going through foreclosure typically will see their credit scores drop,
raising longer-term questions about their ability to rebound financially and perhaps pursue a
more sustainable home purchase at some later point. High numbers of foreclosed homes in
some communities also raise challenges, and perhaps opportunities. Because vacant
homes, in particular, impose real costs on neighborhood and communities, forward-looking
strategies to keep these homes occupied are important (Apgar and Duda, 2005). Some
efforts are underway to prevent vacancies, as well as return vacant properties to active use;
some of these efforts may also help preserve the supply of affordable housing in areas that
have experienced shortages.7 The Federal Reserve has recently undertaken a joint effort
with NeighborWorks America to help communities develop strategies for neighborhood
stabilization.
Conclusion
It is clear that rising home foreclosures and delinquencies significantly challenge many
consumers and communities, and I hope I have conveyed today that the Federal Reserve is
strongly committed to fully employing our authority, expertise, and resources to help alleviate
their distress. We will continue to collaborate at the national, regional, and local levels with
other stakeholders in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to help to avoid preventable
foreclosures and to address the consequences of the foreclosures that occur. In the longer
term, through our regulations and oversight, we seek to promote responsible and sustainable
lending that will allow more Americans to achieve their goal of homeownership.
References
Apgar, William C., and Mark Duda (2005). "Collateral Damage: The Municipal Impact of
Today's Mortgage Foreclosure Boom (246 KB PDF)." Minneapolis: Homeownership
Preservation Foundation, May.
Avery, Robert B., Kenneth P. Brevoort, and Glenn B. Canner (2007). "The 2006 HMDA
Data," Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 93, December, pp. A73-A109.
Gerardi, Kristopher, Adam Hale Shapiro, and Paul S. Willen (2007). "Subprime Outcomes:
Risky Mortgages, Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosures," Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston Working Paper 07-15. Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, December.
Hope Now Alliance Servicers (2008). "Prime and Subprime Residential Mortgages: 2007
Loss Mitigation Activity (7.8 MB PDF)." Washington: Financial Services Roundtable,
February.
Mortgage Market Statistical
Inside Mortgage Finance (2007). Annual. Bethesda, Md.:
Inside Mortgage Finance Publications.