Jaime Caruana: Implementation of Basel II and other key issues relating to
banking supervision in Latin America and the Caribbean
Opening speech by Mr Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, at the joint meeting of the FSI and ASBA, Miami, 25 April 2006.
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Introduction
First of all, I would like to thank Rich Spillenkothen and Josef Tošovský for inviting me to participate in
this joint meeting of the FSI and ASBA, during which we will be able to discuss various key issues for
banking supervision in Latin America and the Caribbean over the next few years.
Two things are evident from the agenda. The first is that there are a large number of key topics to
discuss today and tomorrow, which demonstrates the importance and timeliness of this meeting, which
I am sure will be fruitful for all concerned. The second is that Basel II continues to be a central and
priority topic for supervisors and the banking industry alike, as evidenced by the presence here today
of major banking representatives, whom I would also like to thank for attending.
It is well known that the Committee has devoted a large part of its efforts over the past few years to
first developing and then implementing the revised Capital Framework. Today, we have the
opportunity to debate different aspects relating to its implementation and application. Once the phase
of theoretical debate and standards drafting had been completed, the Committee's activities, in
particular through its Accord Implementation Group (AIG), focused on implementing the Framework.
The time has therefore come to confront this practical reality, with all its difficulties and problems,
through a dialogue with the industry and the global supervisory community.
This is a major task, given that the aim is to strengthen banking systems and the international financial
system, rendering them more robust, more stable, and thus more capable of contributing effectively to
the growth and stability of our economies.
Despite the importance of Basel II, the proposed agenda also shows us that this is not the only topic
currently of interest to the supervisory community. Tomorrow, we will be discussing one of the
Committee's key projects, which, I am convinced, affects all these supervisors gathered here today. I
am referring to the Basel Core Principles.
With these introductory words, I would like to provide a general overview of the Committee's work in
these areas. First, I will focus on the revision of the Basel Core Principles, before moving on to talk
about the implementation of the revised Framework. I will be referring to the necessary collaboration
and coordination between supervisors, and will briefly touch on the other implementation-specific
issues that the AIG is currently working on.
Revision of the Basel Core Principles
Looking at recent press headlines, one could easily conclude that the Committee's activities over the
last few years have been almost exclusively focused on Basel II. Yet during this entire period the
Committee has been devoting considerable efforts to drawing up recommendations that we consider
to be key from a supervisory perspective, but which have not received as much attention as Basel II.
The Core Principles revision is a case in point. Perhaps the fact that they are recommendations aimed
specifically at supervisors, centred around the effectiveness of supervision without imposing direct
requirements on the banking industry - although they obviously affect that sector's activities indirectly -
explains why this has not generated the same glut of headlines as other initiatives. However, I believe
that we would all agree on the important place that the Principles have occupied and continue to
occupy, and we know that compliance with them is a priority for virtually all supervisors.
The aim of the Core Principles is to establish a set of minimum requirements to be met in order for
banking supervision to be considered adequate. This permits the identification of areas in need of
improvement and facilitates planning to achieve these improvements. The passage of time has shown
that the Core Principles have satisfactorily met these objectives since they were first issued in 1997.
Moreover, they have permitted the establishment of an internationally accepted benchmark with which
to evaluate the supervisory approaches of different countries. In so doing, they have helped to
improve and encourage the convergence of banking supervisory standards, thereby contributing to
global financial stability.
So why revise them, even if the changes are only minor? For one thing, are all familiar with the
changes that have taken place in the banking sector, in financial systems in general and in banking
supervision since 1997. New challenges have emerged or existing ones have grown in importance,
and this has often led to new recommendations being developed by the Basel Committee and other
international bodies. In addition, experience has been gained in applying the Core Principles in
different countries. The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), a joint initiative by the IMF and
the World Bank, has become the main source of information on their application, with over 100 FSAP
missions completed to date.
Second, when the Methodology was published in 1999, the Committee already envisaged that the
formulation of these principles should be regarded as an iterative process, with advances in regulation
and supervision being incorporated as experience was gained in applying them. The Committee
therefore decided that, in order for the Core Principles to remain a fully effective, flexible and globally
applicable standard, the time had come to update its content.
Of course, the changes that have taken place since 1997 also include Basel II. However, I would like
to point out that the Committee has explicitly stated that, despite the advisability of moving towards
Basel II, full and strict implementation is a decision that rests solely with the authorities in each
country, and that it may not be the first priority for some countries. Consequently, it is not the
Committee's intention to use the update of the Core Principles as a way of dragging countries towards
Basel II implementation. The revised Framework is in no way a necessary prerequisite for compliance
with the revised Core Principles, even though, as I have just said, I think there are powerful reasons
for holding Basel II up as the direction in which regulation and supervision should be moving.
The revision followed two basic directions. The first was to limit the changes to those aspects that
were essential and key to maintaining the effectiveness of the Core Principles without removing the
continuity and comparability with the previous standards.
Examples of these essential changes are the inclusion of a new "umbrella" principle recommending
that banks have integrated risk management systems, which covers all the aspects common to the
various types of risk. In the same vein, the emphasis has been placed more on risks that received less
attention in the existing version of the Core Principles: interest rate, operational and liquidity risks.
Finally, it should be noted that the criteria on the prevention of money laundering and terrorism
financing have been updated.
Thus the revision does not call into question the work carried out on the basis of the 1997 Principles,
or indeed the planning of reforms on that basis. Neither is there an urgent need to update the
assessments; in this respect, one should stress the validity of the self-assessments carried out by the
countries themselves, as a complement to the assessments performed by the Fund and the World
Bank during their FSAP missions.
The second general direction followed by the Core Principles revision was to keep their character of a
single universal standard for assessing the quality of banking supervision, independently of the
complexity of each country's financial system. To maintain this universality, on the one hand, it was
decided to place greater emphasis, throughout the text, on the idea that the Principles should be
applied proportionally, always taking into account the material impact of the risks or the complexity of
activities, which allowed application to be adapted to less sophisticated financial systems. On the other
hand, the new Principles, by taking into account the most advanced practices, have gained in validity
as regards the assessment of complex financial systems which were previously outside the scope of
many of the established criteria.
I would like to express my view that this universal character is one of the most positive aspects of the
Principles. To achieve this, the Committee worked closely with a very large number of supervisors.
Thus the initial drafts were prepared using groups made up of equal numbers of representatives from
Committee members and non-members, involving both the IMF and the World Bank as interested
parties.
The drafts having initially been approved by the Committee in October last year, they were then
submitted for consultation to a limited audience comprising only other international standardsetting
bodies and regional supervisors' groups. In this regard, I would like to take this opportunity to
acknowledge the important contribution made by ASBA, which, together with other regional groups,
was responsible for numerous improvements to the documents that were finally issued for public
consultation on 6 April.
Finally, I wouldn't want to move on to the next topic without first pointing out that the Core Principles
revision is a fine example of how collaboration with the maximum number of supervisors and
international regulatory bodies can be not only possible, but also clearly beneficial in terms of the
quality and applicability of the resulting recommendations, and this is definitely a method that the
Committee has earmarked for the future.
Basel II implementation: cross-border cooperation between supervisors
Another area in which collaboration between supervisors is absolutely vital, and which we will have the
opportunity to discuss in depth today, is the implementation of Basel II in a cross-border context. In
this respect, the banking sector has come up with a number of requests and proposals. We are aware
of the importance of this topic as regards ensuring the consistent cross-border implementation of
Basel II and reducing the burden of work on industry and supervisors alike. The work has been, and
continues to be, intensive and I believe that it is necessary to keep moving forward pragmatically.
Many of the issues raised by the banks cannot be regarded as arising directly out of Basel II
implementation; rather, they have always existed in connection with the supervision of internationally
active groups, although obviously these are genuine problems. Cooperation between supervisors is a
complex process which takes time and cannot be resolved by decree; I think that the way to move this
process forward is by focusing on real topics and real cases, and that the time for discussing
hypothetical or theoretically possible situations with no practical relevance has passed.
However, we should recognise that Basel II implementation in international banking groups poses new
challenges and requires a greater degree of coordination between the actions of home and host
supervisors, especially as regards the adoption of advanced approaches.
Having accepted the need to keep moving forward on coordination, I would like to voice some concern
that these difficulties might be used to justify the tendency, on the part of international banking groups
that are moving over to the advanced approaches, to use less sophisticated approaches in host
countries, including in those that allow advanced approaches. Indeed, some observers are reporting,
without justification in my opinion, that the low level of implementation of advanced approaches in
subsidiaries may stem from the lack of coordination among supervisors. We run the risk of ending up
with international banking groups in which the advanced approaches tend to be used almost
exclusively by the parent company. I think that this outcome is neither optimal nor desirable, and falls
short of the goals of improving the stability and efficiency of the international financial system, to which
Basel II can make a much more effective contribution if it is applied appropriately.
Problems also arise over how to consolidate the capital of these subsidiaries. Take, for example, a
bank applying an advanced approach at group level with subsidiaries outside the home country that
use a standard approach. This bank will have to perform a double calculation: first, using the method
applicable under the approaches adopted by its subsidiaries; then, it must recalculate those same
subsidiaries' requirements using the approach for the group as a whole, ie that of the parent company
in the home country, for consolidation purposes in order to calculate the overall capital requirement.
This double calculation can impose a heavy burden - although a necessary one in some instances -
and will in any case require close collaboration between home and host supervisors to ensure that the
entity's overall system adequately takes account of the characteristics and sensitivity of the local
market.
The AIG is attempting to pinpoint which criteria would be acceptable at the consolidated level,
assuming the - fairly frequent - scenario of a bank with subsidiaries governed by local requirements
that differ from those of Basel II. On this and other topics, the AIG is recommending that a certain
degree of flexibility be applied, always taking into account both the material effect of these differences
in terms of capital and the regulatory burden for the entities. This implies accepting, where
appropriate, one single calculation for specific subsidiaries, resolving the question of the group
calculation through aggregation rather than consolidation. However, this flexibility must be limited,
strict and responsible; it must provide the smoothest and least costly transition possible, but it should
not give rise to arbitrage problems. As I have said, this is a hot topic, and it is not easy, but given the
advisability of the principle of having the entire group use a single approach in, I repeat, both
subsidiaries and the parent, while ensuring that the overall risk culture and systems remain adapted to
the sensitivities of each market, it is also advisable to ask host countries to make additional efforts to
study and allow, to the extent possible, the application of this principle.
This is just one example of the questions on which the AIG is actively engaged. As regards the
distribution of tasks and the necessary coordination between home and host supervisors on the
efficient implementation of the revised Framework, the AIG, together with the CPLG - the Core
Principles Liaison Group, which includes 16 non-member countries as well as the IMF and the World
Bank - has prepared a paper on information sharing between supervisors. This document, which we
hope to be able to publish shortly, once we have incorporated a number of comments received during
the public consultation period, does not resolve all the problems, but it does represent a significant
step forward in improving coordination and the distribution of tasks between supervisors.
We are also keeping a close watch on how cooperation is being handled in practice between countries
with supervisory responsibility for institutions belonging to international banking groups. In this respect,
the AIG is gathering and sharing information and experience on the functioning of bilateral agreements
and of supervisory colleges. In my view, either of these two collaboration methods can be fully valid,
depending on the size and complexity of the group concerned.
Over the years, these kinds of agreements on the exchange of information and reciprocal cooperation
have been established among supervisors as a means to perform effective crossborder supervision.
Time has shown that such agreements are more effective when the relations between home and host
supervisors are based on mutual trust.
In this regard, I believe that we as supervisors should steer clear of excessively formalist and legalistic
approaches and try to be pragmatic. I think that the questions which need answering are more
operational than legal in nature. It is a matter of finding a way of cooperating that makes us all more
efficient in the use of our resources, reduces the supervisory burden for the banks and improves the
stability of the financial system.
Finally, it is my view that, over and above the formal standards and protocols, the really important
thing is cooperation and communication in good faith between supervisory colleagues. Cooperation is,
therefore, a two-way street, and I believe that we all understand that we need to accept a minimum
level of flexibility, based on mutual trust and reciprocity, if we want cooperation between supervisors to
be effective.
Basel II implementation: other aspects
Turning now to the other topics currently being discussed, I would like to mention Pillar 2 of the revised
Framework as an aspect which is receiving increasing attention. Concretely: the Group is currently
exchanging views on how this pillar can and should be applied consistently within an international
banking group. As we can see, the question of cooperation among supervisors is not limited to the use
of advanced models under Pillar 1, and it is thus necessary to be able to exercise this degree of
flexibility as regards the nature and scope of such cooperation.
There are also certain topics on which it would be desirable that both banks and supervisors move
forward more decisively. For example, as regards operational risk and the so-called hybrid approach -
which sets out how the capital requirement for operational risk calculated as an aggregate using
advanced models (AMA) can be distributed or assigned within a banking group - we as supervisors
find ourselves in a situation where it would be advisable for us to take steps to clarify some aspects of
this approach, but where we need the industry to make clearer progress in developing concrete
assignment models.
There are other eminently practical topics that are being discussed by the AIG. Without wishing to
provide an exhaustive list, I would just like to mention that it is examining the material effect, in terms
of capital, of the differences that continue to exist in some jurisdictions on subjects such as the
definition of default. The Group is also engaged in an exchange of views on how to interpret "user
testing" and so-called "LGDs in stress situations". The AIG is attempting to establish the
circumstances in which all these differences may be acceptable, when they affect different entities
within the same banking group, and under what circumstances it would be appropriate to standardise
the treatment of some of them.
Another practical aspect of implementation relates to the growing use by a number of institutions of
external models and databases, known as "vendor products". The Committee has recently published a
newsletter clarifying supervisors' expectations in terms of the requirements to be met in order for these
types of models and databases to be accepted under IRB approaches.
Conclusion
As we can see, there are a fair number of open topics on the table as regards Basel II implementation.
Many of them already existed under Basel I, but now we have a much better idea of their size and
nature, and have created better structures and processes to address them. Since work started on the
application of the new capital recommendations, the Committee members and the supervisory
community as a whole have made considerable progress in understanding and resolving difficulties,
and along the way we have improved the level of cooperation and trust between supervisors, as well
as the level of communication and mutual understanding with the banking industry on such sensitive
subjects as the management of risks and capital.
The reality we supervisors are facing was already complicated even before the introduction of Basel II.
But now the quality of our knowledge and the way in which we handle the risks and challenges have
improved thanks to the revised Framework's introduction. I would say that all of this is, in my opinion,
positive.
I would like once again to extend my thanks to ASBA and the FSI. I have always found it very useful,
instructive and a genuine pleasure to participate in the events organised by both of these institutions,
so today is a double pleasure, and I would like to thank everyone for the excellent collaboration that
we have built up over the past few years.
Thank you very much.