Sayuri Shirai: Have demographic changes affected Japan's
macroeconomic performance? Some implications for monetary policy
Speech by Ms Sayuri Shirai, Member of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, given at the
Bank of Finland, Helsinki, at the Sveriges Riksbank and at the Stockholm University,
Stockholm, 3-7 September 2012.
* * *
I. Introduction
Hello everyone. My name is Sayuri Shirai, and I am a Policy Board member of the Bank of
Japan. I am delighted to be giving a talk today on the theme of demographic changes and
their impact on macroeconomic performance with some implications for monetary policy. I
feel that it is important to be addressing you and exchange views with you about this issue
here in Europe, especially in the Nordic countries, for two main reasons.
First, after having undergone a process of rapid industrialization, many European countries
encountered a rapid decline in their fertility rates, beginning in the second half of the
nineteenth century. This promoted active debate on population-related issues in Europe,
including those related to neo-Malthusianism and the conservative view of encouraging both
a traditional family style and childbirth. By the 1930s, Sweden was faced with the lowest
fertility rate in Europe. The Swedish Nobel Laureate Karl Gunnar Myrdal was concerned
about the consequence of this declining rate - namely, an eventual decrease in the total
population and its medium- to long-term impact on macroeconomic performance, such as a
decline in investment and living standards, a rise in unemployment, and the prevalence of
Crisis in the Population Question i
poverty. In his influential book (Kris Befolkningsfrågan)
which he published together with his wife Alva Myrdal in 1934, and in a number of other
associated papers, he stressed the importance of social policies to reverse the declining
trend in the fertility rate and promoted the concept of socialization of consumption related to
childbirth and childcare, while respecting women's choices in this matter. These policies
included free services to all child-bearing households, and would be financed by a
progressive income tax system. This idea of using social policies to mitigate any negative
externalities caused by depopulation contributed to the creation of the contemporary
Swedish welfare model. Today, the Nordic countries, including Sweden and Finland, are
famed for their distinguished universal, comprehensive social welfare systems, which have
generated some successful outcomes, such as the maintenance of reasonably high total
fertility rates (TFRs),1 high levels of human capital, and high labor participation ratios for
women.
2012 Ageing Report
Second, the published by the European Commission provides long-term
macroeconomic and budgetary projections for the period of 2010-60, and it stresses the
challenges posed by population ageing. Assuming that the TFR in the European Union (EU)
will moderately increase from the current rate of 1.59 to 1.64 by 2030 and further to 1.71 by
2060, and assuming that net migration inflows as a percentage of the total population remain
at about 0.2 percent throughout the 2010-60 period, the report projects that the total
population will decline only after 2040. However, the size of the working-age population
(aged 15 to 64 years old) is projected to decline after 2012.
The simple fact is that both Japan and Europe are facing a common structural issue -
population ageing. Japan is taking the lead with demographic and associated
macroeconomic issues. It is widely known that Japan has already witnessed a reduction in its
working-age population in absolute numbers since the mid-1990s. About a decade after this
time, the total population declined in 2005 and 2009, and it is projected to decrease
constantly from 2011 onward. As a result, Japan has become the most progressed ageing
society: the share of the population aged 65 and over was 23 percent in 2010 - the highest
level in the world. The rapid pace of decreases in the growth rate of the working-age
population and total population appears to be unprecedented globally. This has certainly
generated various unfavorable impacts on Japan's macroeconomic performance, thereby
also affecting the environment related to monetary policy management.
Given that Japan and Europe face similar phenomena (i.e., increases in life expectancy and
the relative size of their elderly populations), it is necessary to deepen our understanding of
the impact of demographic changes on macroeconomic performance and possibly also about
the environment surrounding monetary policy management. However, these issues are not
yet being actively debated among central banks around the world.
Let me outline the sequence of my presentation. It comprises four sections. In Part II, I will
briefly examine demographic changes in Japan in the post-1945 period. Part III will focus on
the impacts of these changes on macroeconomic performance. Then, the issues of the
longstanding output gap and mild deflation, which are partially influenced by demographic
changes, will be discussed in Part IV together with monetary policy management. In Part V, I
will present concluding remarks.
II. Demographic changes in the post-1945 period
I would like to begin my presentation by making an overview of Japan's demographic
changes in the post-1945 period.
Rapidly reduced fertility rate and working-age population
In the aftermath of World War II, Japan enjoyed a period of so-called "population dividend,"
which helped produce higher economic growth. This refers to a period when the total
dependency ratio (defined as the youth and elderly population over the working-age
population) decreases drastically with a decline in the number of children. In Japan, the total
population rose rapidly in the second half of the 1940s with the first postwar baby boom in
1947-49; this was followed by the second-generation baby boom in 1971-74 (Chart 1). This
trend helped Japan become one of the most populous nations globally - with a total
population of 128 million in 2011, or the 10th-largest country by population size as of 2010.
Starting with a very high TFR at around 4 in the late 1940s, the TFR dropped to around 2 - a
rate much lower than before but still close to the replacement rate (the rate enabling natural
population growth) - by 1958. Thereafter, the TFR remained at a still high level of 2 or above
(Chart 2). During that period, Japan enjoyed a growing working-age population.
Since then, the situation has changed dramatically. First, the number of childbirths started to
show a constant decline after the second-generation baby boom in the 1970s. In parallel, the
TFR began to decrease sharply from over 2 in the 1970s to 1.39 in 2011 - notwithstanding
that a moderate recovery in the TFR is currently in progress. The declining trend could be
attributed to such factors as rising income, a growing focus on work and education among
women, the rising cost of child care and education, the decreasing size of families, and a
growing number of unmarried people (resulting in a smaller number of children given that few
unmarried couples in Japan have children). Second, about 20 years after the decline in the
TFR, a decrease in the working-age population occurred. The size of the working-age
population started showing a clear decrease from the mid-1990s.
According to official projections, the total population will decline from the current level of
127.8 million to 120 million by 2026, to under 100 million by 2048, and further to 86.7 million
by 2060. The working-age population is projected to decrease more drastically - from the
current level of 81.3 million to 44.2 million by 2060.
Emergence of the most progressed ageing society
One of the most structurally important challenges for Japan is dealing with the progressive
ageing of the population. The pace of ageing accelerated as life expectancy at birth
increased rapidly from 50.1 years in 1947 to 79.6 years in 2010 for men, and from 54.0 years
to 86.4 years, respectively, for women. This has put Japan among the nations with the
highest longevity in the world (Chart 3). This could be the consequence of such factors as
medical advancements, higher living standards, universal public health insurance, and
elderly care systems. As a result, the ratio of the population aged 65 and over to the total
population rose steadily from just 4.8 percent in 1947 to about 23 percent in 2010. This
percentage is the highest in the world, being followed by that of Germany (20.6 percent) and
Italy (20.3 percent). The pace of increase in the elderly ratio accelerated after the 2000s.
Reflecting expected increases in life expectancy over the period of 2010-60 (from 79.6 to
84.2 years for men; from 86.4 to 90.9 years for women), the proportion of the elderly
population is officially projected to grow further to 25 percent in 2013. Thus, elderly people
will comprise one-fourth of the total population. According to projections, this proportion will
reach 33.4 percent by 2035, giving rise to a society in which one in three people will be
elderly. This ratio is projected to rise to about 40 percent by 2050. By this time, the
population aged 75 years and older will account for a quarter of the total population.
III. Demographic changes and macroeconomic performance
Having outlined trends in Japan's demographic changes, I would now like to move to Part III
of this presentation and show some impacts of demographic changes on the Japanese
macro-economy. Though a large number of studies have investigated the supply side (i.e.,
the impact on potential economic growth), shedding light on the demand side is equally
important.
Impact of demographic changes on economic growth
Japan achieved high real GDP growth of 10.4 percent in the 1960s, which enabled it to catch
up with a number of advanced countries. This period was followed by moderately
highgrowth rates of 5 percent in the 1970s and then 4.3 percent in the 1980s. Following the
collapse of bubbles in real estate and stock prices in the early 1990s, however, Japan
entered a prolonged period of low economic growth. Real GDP growth rates dropped to
1.5 percent in the 1990s and further to 0.6 percent in the 2000s (Chart 4 [1]).
First, the impact of population developments on economic growth can be observed by
decomposing the real GDP growth rate into (a) the population growth rate and (b) the per
capita real GDP growth rate. Chart 4 (2) shows that population growth made a positive
contribution until the 1990s, even though the scale of that contribution dropped in the 1980s
and 1990s. The positive contribution virtually disappeared in the 2000s.
Second, the impact of population ageing on economic growth can be traced by decomposing
the real GDP growth rate into (c) the growth rate of the number of employed workers (or the
growth rate of employment) and (d) the real GDP growth rate per employed worker.
Population ageing tends to reduce both the size of the working-age population and the labor
participation rate for the whole economy, thereby reducing total employment. Chart 4 (3)
indicates that the contribution of employment to economic growth turned from positive to
negative in the 2000s.
Third, the labor market has transformed drastically over the same period, and this has
contributed to a decline in the total number of working hours. The number of part-time and
non-regular workers has increased relative to that of regular workers, reflecting the
increasing rate of female labor participation. In addition, the number of hours worked per
regular worker has decreased in accordance with global trends and the growing
sophistication of society. Although these developments have no direct links with
demographic changes, the increasing number of female and elderly workers is likely to
reduce the total hours worked for the whole economy. Thus, it may be useful to examine the
impact of working hours on economic growth. This can be achieved by decomposing the real
GDP growth rate into (e) the growth rate of hours worked and (f) the real GDP growth rate
per hour (or the growth rate of labor productivity per hour). Chart 4 (4) reveals that a
decrease in hours worked after the 1990s contributed negatively to economic growth.
Charts 4 (2)-(4) indicate that both demographic and labor market changes have contributed
directly to a declining trend in economic growth (these changes are referred to as the
population effect, the labor force effect, and working hour effect). At the same time, the per
capita, per worker, and per hour growth effects shown in the same charts all revealed
declining trends over the same period. The per capita real GDP growth rate is a good proxy
for measuring the average living standard of a country. The growth rate per employed worker
is a useful indicator related to labor productivity or supply capacity. The growth rate per hour
is valuable when one wants to see the impact of changes in hours worked. In the future, this
hourly based indicator may become even more important in measuring a country's efficiency;
this is because further efforts to raise the labor participation rates for women and elderly
people - in addition to a decline in the absolute number of full-time workers - are expected to
reduce the total number of hours worked in the whole economy.
Generally speaking, the per capita GDP growth rate tends to become lower than the real
GDP growth per employed worker when the working-age population declines or the
population ages. In any case, the overall declining trends based on the three indicators could
be explained by (a) a decline in the TFP growth rate (which could be explained by, for
example, a completion of the catching-up process and a shift in the industrial structure as will
be described later) and (b) a decrease in the growth rate of capital stock. Nonetheless, it is
important to note that Japan's real GDP growth rate per hour has been comparable to those
of the United States and the United Kingdom, and it has been higher than those of Germany
and France (Chart 5). At the same time, this implies that Japan needs to raise the per hour
growth rate to a level far higher than those of other advanced countries just to maintain the
same per capita economic growth rates.
Impact of demographic changes on fixed asset investment demand
The declining working-age population and ageing population may contribute to sluggish
demand for residential housing and fixed-asset investment. In this regard, Dr. Myrdal already
thought through the impact of these factors in his 1940 book Population: A Problem for
Democracy. According to him, a decrease in the population is expected to produce a
negative impact on (aggregate) demand, particularly investment (Fujita [2010]). The growth
rates of demand are projected to decline mainly because of (a) an increase in
investmentrelated risk (or the heightened possibility of causing over-supply and associated loss) for
firms as well as (b) a decrease in investment incentive (for example, a decline in new
residential investment owing to a reduction in the working-age population and a drop in
replacement demand due to falling housing prices).
The impact of demographic changes on housing investment was also pointed out by Bakshi
and Chen (1994). According to their life-cycle investment hypothesis, investors in their 20s
and 30s enter the family-building stage, and so housing becomes a desirable investment.
During this period, a higher portion of their wealth is allocated to housing and other durable
goods. As investors grow older, the demand for housing will stabilize or decrease; instead,
the demand for financial assets will rise. This hypothesis was demonstrated to be applicable
to the United States, and it implies that an ageing population is associated with declining
housing prices. Mankiw and Weil (1989) also showed that the baby-boom generation
contributed to the U.S. housing boom in the 1970s.
I believe that some of the impacts discussed by Dr. Myrdal and other researchers are already
being felt in Japan. During the bubble period in the second half of the 1980s, for example,
the growing size of the working-age population stimulated residential investment demand.
Chart 6 shows a clear positive correlation between the (inverse) total dependency ratio and
real land price level. This real demand, fueled by speculative investment activities,
contributed to higher real estate prices and a credit boom. The number of housing starts has
since dropped constantly, partly because of a decrease in the working-age population - the
generation that builds families.
Moreover, Japanese firms increasingly focus on outward foreign direct investment (FDI), and
they especially target emerging economies, where the returns on investment are generally
higher than in Japan and other advanced countries (Chart 7). Firms continue to invest
domestically but not to a great extent, as evidenced by the declining trend of new business
fixed investment as a percent of GDP (and cash flow) (Chart 8). In line with this, the main
investment incentives for companies are concentrated on upgrading, earthquake-proof
strengthening, and energy saving or clean-energy production - rather than bolstering their
production capacity.
One plausible consequence of reduced investment demand is weak demand for credit by
firms and households, as pointed out later. For example, even though the fund-raising
conditions of firms and households have generally been favorable, the loan officer opinion
survey on bank lending practices consistently reports weak diffusion indices (DIs) of demand
for loans by both firms and households. This result is consistent with the low
loans-todeposits ratios - amounting to only around 70 percent in Japan, which is far below the
200 percent of Sweden and over 150 percent of Finland. And yet the banking sector in Japan
still faces an increase in deposits; thus, the issue of how to raise profitability out of ample
liquidity is becoming one of the main challenges for this sector. In recent years, the banking
sector has increasingly allocated funds toward Japanese government bonds (JGBs) and
overseas lending, which reflects the deteriorating fiscal position of the government and the
higher potential economic growth in emerging economies.
Impact of demographic changes on consumption demand and employment
Population ageing may induce a demand shift from manufacturing (and other traditional
areas) to nonmanufacturing sectors. This is because the elderly population tends to demand
more services (such as medical and nursing care, tourism, and social services) and fewer
durable goods (such as cars and home electronics). Given that households whose heads are
60 years and older already account for over 40 percent of total consumption, this shift in
preference by ageing is gradually affecting the structure of private sector consumption in
Japan, and it is predicted that there will be further expansion of the service-related industry in
the near future (Chart 9). A number of studies have identified the possible impact of
demographic changes on the demand structure in Canada, Germany, and the
United Kingdom (Börsch-Supan [2003]; Fougère et al. [2007]; Lührmann [2008]; and
Rausch [2009]).
Naturally, this change in the demand structure has also brought about a shift in the
employment structure - a growing proportion of workers in the nonmanufacturing sector and
a reduced proportion of workers in the manufacturing sector and other traditional areas. At
the same time, a shift in the demand structure may result in an increase in structural
unemployment unless a smooth relocation of labor resources from manufacturing to
nonmanufacturing sectors takes place. Katagiri (2012) points out that a rise in structural
unemployment in the 1990s - and the subsequent sustained high level - could be associated
with various labor market frictions, triggered by a shift in the population ageing-induced
demand structure.
Impact of demographic changes on labor productivity
I have already noted that the growing demand for services brings in a greater number of
workers engaged in the nonmanufacturing sector. However, this may lower the level of labor
productivity for the whole economy. This reflects the fact that, as in Japan (Chart 10), the
level of labor productivity per employed worker tends to be lower in the nonmanufacturing
than in the manufacturing sector. This is mainly due to the nonmanufacturing sector being
more labor-intensive and more regulated while having limited opportunity for exercising
economies of scale. Of course, it is possible to raise labor productivity in the
nonmanufacturing sector in such ways as intensifying the use of information and
communication technology (ICT), improving the quality of services, offering innovative
services that stimulate potential demand, and promoting competition through deregulation.
However, the fact that the nonmanufacturing sector tends to produce lower labor productivity
than the manufacturing sector is a globally observed phenomenon. A low level of labor
productivity and sluggish growth could be referred to as the Baumol effect, which focuses on
limited growth in productivity in certain nonmanufacturing sectors (public services, such as
public hospitals and public colleges).
Thus, population ageing may affect economic growth not only directly through a reduction in
the working-age population and employment (as indicated by the labor force effect in
Chart 4 [3]), but also indirectly through a constant decline in labor productivity caused by a
continuous demand shift - as illustrated by the per worker growth effect in the same chart.
Katagiri (2012) demonstrated that the decrease in labor productivity, together with a rise in
the structural unemployment rate, contributed to the lowering of Japan's real GDP level. As
for the future, the ratio of nonmanufacturing to manufacturing workers (and the ratio of value
added in the nonmanufacturing sector to GDP) is projected to rise constantly; thus, the
downward pressures on labor productivity may be further enhanced (Sakura et al. [2012]).
Possible impact of demographic changes on the financial asset structure
According to the previously mentioned life-cycle investment hypothesis of Bakshi and
Chen (1994), investors gradually shift from housing investment to financial investment for
retirement as they get older. These authors showed that when people of the baby-boom
generation reached the stage where they changed their asset composition from housing
investment to financial asset investment, they helped raise stock prices in the 1980s and
1990s in the United States. At the same time, Bakshi and Chen demonstrated that population
ageing tends to raise the market risk premium. This is not only because elderly people are
unwilling to take on a lot of financial risk since they have fewer opportunities to use their
labor income to cover potential losses, but also because uncertainty related to their
remaining lifetime discourages them from accepting such risk. This suggests that population
ageing may raise investors' preference toward cash, deposits, and bonds when they are
close to or already at retirement age. These demographic movements possibly bring about
fluctuations in asset demand on capital markets.
Currently, the size of households' total financial assets in Japan amounts to about
1,500 trillion yen (19 trillion U.S. dollars) - the second largest total in the world after the
United States. Despite nearly zero-interest rates, the share of deposits (and cash) accounts
for about half of total assets. In general, young households start to accumulate financial
assets in the form of deposits. As they become older, they may gradually shift their financial
asset allocation toward life insurance and securities (setting aside housing investment). As
they become much older, households with extra financial resources may increase their share
of relatively safe assets, such as deposits and bonds (for example, JGBs). This makes sense
since elderly people are more concerned about the stability of the valuation of their financial
assets and thus tend to be more risk-averse than younger people. Regarding stock
investment, elderly households hold much larger assets than any other generation, and so
they may allocate part of their assets to stock holdings while keeping the ratio of stock
holdings at a reasonably contained level. However, if the future elderly generation has
readier adaptability to ICT, greater use of online securities trading may promote the
investment demand for stocks.
Impact of demographic changes on fiscal balance
A natural impact of Japan's demographic changes is deterioration in fiscal balance. It is clear
that the rapid pace of population ageing in Japan, especially since the 2000s, has been the
single driving force behind growing social security-related expenditure (i.e., public pension
benefits, elderly care, and medical services) (Chart 11). Meanwhile, population ageing,
together with sluggish economic performance, has contributed to low growth in tax revenues.
Population ageing tends to reduce not only the income tax base, but also tax income as a
result of the downward pressure on economic growth, while raising government expenditure
through increased social security costs. It is expected that population ageing will raise the
cost of the social security system while reducing the amount of insurance premium
contributions paid by the working-age population. This will increase the burden on fiscal
balance, which suggests the need for some kind of reform in the future.
IV. Demographic changes, the output gap, and mild deflation
My broad view regarding the impact of population ageing on macroeconomic performance is
summarized in Chart 12. Based on this, I would now like to focus on the issues related to the
output gap and mild deflation, which will be followed by a brief description of monetary policy
conduct.
Presence of the long-standing output gap
Japan's output gaps have remained negative for almost the entire period since the
mid1990s, although the magnitude varies depending on the methods employed to assess them
(Chart 13). Some argue that the output gap has deteriorated following a series of domestic
and external shocks, such as the collapse of the asset bubbles in the early 1990s, the
Japanese financial crisis and East Asian currency crises in the second half of the 1990s, the
collapse of the IT bubble in the early 2000s in the United States, the global financial crisis of
2008, the European sovereign debt crisis since 2010, and the Great East Japan Earthquake
of 2011. Looking at this issue from a more academic standpoint, there appears to be
consensus among researchers regarding the presence of a long-lasting output gap in Japan.
By contrast, little consensus has emerged as to which factors contributed to the
phenomenon.
When we plot the relationship between demographic data (e.g., growth rate of the
workingage population) and the output gap, we usually do not see a strong direct correlation. This
may reflect the fact that the impact on the output gap may be felt indirectly through various
complex channels. For example, a number of researchers point out three main factors as
having contributed to the negative output gap: (1) a decline in the natural rate of interest and
a resultant interest rate gap caused by the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate;
(2) a decrease in economic growth expectations caused by a reduction in potential economic
growth; (3) banks' risk-averse lending behavior. Of course, these factors are not necessarily
mutually exclusive.
Regarding factor (1), it is possible that population ageing may result in a decrease in the
natural rate of interest through various channels - for example, a decline in demand for
loanable funds by firms and households, while a lower expected permanent income induces
households to accumulate more savings (Ikeda and Saito [2012]). And when the natural rate
of interest falls below the actual real interest rate (namely, an interest rate gap emerges), the
monetary condition becomes relatively tight and contributes to deterioration of the output
gap. Since the natural rate of interest is non-observable, researchers often use (per capita)
potential GDP growth as a proxy for the natural rate of interest. Various estimates point to a
decline in the potential growth rate over the period of 1985-2011, but none of them show a
constantly negative potential growth rate except for a brief interval caused by the 2008 global
financial crisis, for example, as shown in Chart 14 (Watanabe [2012]). Therefore, it is not
certain whether the natural rate of interest has turned negative on a permanent basis. In
addition, Saito et al. (2012) indicated that the effects of the zero lower bound of the nominal
interest rate are rather small (based on the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium [DSGE]
models, where the estimated monetary policy shocks are assumed to capture the effects of
the zero bound). Thus, whether factor (1) provides a convincing reason for the presence of
the long-standing output gap remains debatable.
As for factor (2), the declining trend in potential GDP growth, which partially reflects
population ageing, may worsen the output gap through a long-term reduction in growth
expectations (Chart 15). Provided that growth expectations affect both the supply and
demand sides, there could be cases where an adverse impact on demand may be stronger
than one on supply - for example, in the case of a permanent negative shock on productivity
(Saito et al. [2010]). Another example is the case of a slow adjustment of the supply side in
response to a demand shift caused by population ageing, as suggested in Part II. This
process may exacerbate the output gap in the existing (manufacturing) sector. The services
sector is unable to fully exploit the potential demand for services targeting the elderly
population owing to inadequate supply of innovative and potentially highly demanded
services by firms. The lower potential growth and resultant decline in growth expectations
could provide a reasonable explanation for the presence of the negative output gap.
On this matter, I would like to mention the view of Dr. Myrdal, as described in his previously
mentioned 1940 book. Although he did not appear to have considered the concept of
expectations, I was pleasantly surprised to find that he had already thought through the
impact of demographic changes on both the supply and demand sides. According to him, a
reduction in the population caused by declining fertility rate would be expected to provide a
negative impact on the demand side much earlier than on the supply side. This is because
(1) the negative impact on supply capacity could be temporarily offset by technological
progress and (2) the impact of the decreased fertility rate on supply capacity will cause a
decline in the working-age population with a time lag of about 15-20 years.
Factor (3) sheds light on banks' lending behavior, which could be affected by such factors as
tighter financial regulation and the value-at-risk constraint. Those constraints may induce
banks to prefer investment in JGBs or other bonds rather than financing the private sector,
thereby worsening the output gap (Aoki and Saito [2012]). I am not sure how important this
impact is in reality since the DIs of lending attitudes of financial institutions have been very
accommodating for large firms and neutral for small and medium-sized enterprises.
Moreover, there is a view that the depressed collateral value may have affected the behavior
of the banking sector. The collapse of the real estate price bubble in the early 1990s together
with population ageing may have resulted in a permanent decline in the collateral value,
thereby reducing banks' incentives to lend. Based on a balance sheet analysis, it has been
pointed out that newly established firms tend to possess a limited amount of real estate while
holding a relatively large amount of receivables and movable properties. Thus, for new firms,
the constraints they face could likely be mitigated if a new lending method or asset-based
lending (ABL) were promoted. This would involve a financial institution taking receivables
and movable properties that were closely tied to the firm's business cash flow (e.g., accounts
receivable and goods in stock) as collateral for a loan. On this issue, the Bank of Japan has
been providing funds to financial institutions that undertake ABL in order to promote lending
without depending on real estate as collateral, as will be pointed out later.
Pres