Yves Mersch: European economic governance - early lessons from
the crisis
Keynote speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central
Bank and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank, at the Conference
"The Werner Report, 50 Years on", organised by the Luxembourg Centre for Contemporary and
Digital History in cooperation with EUI, 8 October, 2020.
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Introduction
In my remarks today, I will focus on three elements which I believe could outlast the EU crisis
response - and could perhaps form Pierre Werner's legacy.
A substantial crisis response at European and national level with a threefold legacy
Europe's historic response to today's unprecedented crisis not only coincides with the 50th
anniversary of the Werner Report. It also puts the report's economic reasoning into practice.
In Werner's view, monetary integration had to be accompanied by a partial Europeanisation of
fiscal policy. Such Europeanisation does not necessarily imply full harmonisation. As set out in
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, it means that countries coordinate and
conduct their national economic and fiscal policies in a manner that contributes to maintaining
the stability of the EU as a whole.
The policy responses to the pandemic respect these principles and hold important lessons for
the future.
The European-level response has been substantial. The ECB has taken far-reaching exceptional
monetary policy decisions. The pandemic emergency purchase programme, targeted
longerterm refinancing operations, and pandemic emergency longer-term refinancing operations have
provided over €2 trillion in liquidity since March - and we also decided on changes in the
collateral framework. We estimate that, by the end of 2022, all of these measures will have
increased real GDP growth in the euro area by around 1.3 percentage points and inflation by
around 0.8 percentage point. Our crisis-related supervisory decisions are freeing up some €120
billion of bank capital which could be used to absorb losses or potentially finance up to €1.8
trillion of lending.
The European Commission and the Member States in the Council took decisive measures to
support national governments, firms and workers, helping to cushion the immediate impact of the
crisis (especially through three safety nets, namely the European Stability Mechanism Pandemic
Crisis Support instrument, the European Investment Bank pan-European Guarantee Fund and
the European instrument for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an
Emergency (SURE), which together amount to up to €540 billion in loans.
Moreover, in late July, the European Council agreed on a recovery plan to secure a more even
and sustained recovery across EU economies (comprising a frontloaded multiannual financial
framework for the years 2021-27, reinforced by a €750 billion recovery fund raised through
common borrowing).
Although these measures have yet to be implemented, they have had a crucial impact on the
markets.
In line with the EU's institutional framework, national governments have done most of the initial
heavy lifting. Euro area governments have so far adopted measures worth about 4.5% of GDP
and loan guarantees equivalent to another 20% of GDP.
Ad hoc fiscal reinsurance
I see the historic nature of the EU response not in the sheer size of EU spending - which is
indeed unprecedented -but rather in the organisation of governance in Europe. For the first time
in its history, the EU is taking on common debt to help finance a recovery.
Some might see this as establishing a precedent enabling the EU to issue debt in potential future
crises. But this does not mean that outside of crisis times and the 2021-27 multiannual financial
framework, common debt issuance should become the norm. The debt issuance under the
recovery fund is legally designed to be temporary. While demonstrating European solidarity, it is
an ad hoc fiscal reinsurance supporting national governments in their crisis response. It signals
that fiscal policy remains largely national and subject to control by national parliaments, reflecting
that budgetary policy is their key prerogative, in other words, their "Königsrecht".
New space carved out for EU policies
My second observation is that the crisis response has carved out potential new space for EU
policies, an effect that is, of course, not unique to this crisis. The response to the coronavirus
(COVID-19) crisis has underlined the importance of a common approach to common problems.
Take the "Next Generation EU" recovery fund which provides financing to fulfil the EU's priorities,
notably the green and digital transitions, thereby helping to avoid economic divergence and to
increase resilience and potential growth. The recovery fund is disbursed to national governments
on condition that it is used for making commonly agreed investments and reforms. This
arrangement could lay the groundwork for common EU policies in areas of collective interest
which are underpinned by direct EU spending.
Against this background, I would welcome a serious discussion about EU public goods so as to
identify where the case for them is strongest and how they may be in part financed through the
EU budget. This is precisely what the principle of subsidiarity prescribes: policy measures should
be taken at the most local levels of governance unless they can be implemented more efficiently
at a more central level.
Opportunity for a clearer delineation of responsibilities
Such a debate - and this is my third observation - could also extend to a broader review of the
allocation of competences across the different governance layers in our supranational
community. Clarity on which policies should be European would help bring clarity on what should
be kept national, allowing Europe and its Member States to establish a greater sense of the
necessary alignment of liability and responsibility across the different layers of government.
The quality of governance at the relevant responsibility level would benefit in three ways. First, a
clearer delineation of responsibility could lead to better economic outcomes, as policies that have
been designated as a national competence can then be better tailored to local circumstances.
Differences in economic circumstances and institutional settings, as well as national
preferences, can be taken into account.
Second, national sovereignty over the design of certain policies naturally allows multiple
approaches to compete with each other, potentially spurring innovation and accelerating the
identification of best practices.
The EU offers a unique space for such policy competition, not just because of the diversity of its
Member States, but also because of its common institutional framework. To be fair and to
produce welfare-enhancing outcomes, competition needs to be subject to common rules.
Positive policy competition in national domains thus needs to rely on a rules-based framework of
commonly agreed boundaries such as those provided by the EU. And our framework even goes
one step further: it is underpinned by supranational institutions such as the European Court of
Justice. It guarantees a level playing field for all Member States, big and small, so that the best
policies can succeed.
Beyond rules and institutions, another way of preventing competition from drifting into destructive
rivalry is to delegate some policy areas to the EU level. I can think of several aspects of financial
markets which would benefit from this kind of delegation, which - in the absence of a treaty
change - would need to be taken by unanimous decision. In the fight against money laundering,
for example, a European agency to supervise and coordinate country-level efforts would offer
powerful support, thereby closing loopholes arising from differences in national regimes. A proper
EU capital markets union would lead to deeper and more diversified sources of financing for
European businesses and households. For that to happen, financial market regulation first needs
to be further harmonised. However, applying the rules of civil law should not be mistaken for
financial regulation .And the completion of the banking union, notably through the creation of a
European deposit insurance scheme, would make the euro area banking system safer while
promoting healthy competition among banks.
Third, a clearer understanding of the delineation of responsibilities between the national and EU
levels would improve political accountability and legitimacy all round. This is well reflected in two
important political principles identified in the Werner report. Werner argues that the degree of
European integration should be proportionate to the objective, and that any transfer of power to
the EU level should go hand-in-hand with a corresponding transfer of parliamentary responsibility.
So far, the political dimension of the EU's integration has been the most neglected. Shifting
competences to the European level needs to be accompanied by further political integration and
democratic accountability.
Ensuring that everyone plays by the same rules is an important component of our European
democracy. The EU is built on the principles of equal and fair participation in economic and
political life, which can only be guaranteed through strict enforcement of the rule of law.
Any shift in powers to the European level must not come at the expense of the representation of
EU citizens. In particular, democratic participation at the national level cannot simply be replaced
by indirect participation at the EU level. If public risk-sharing, for example, is to become a
permanent feature, the roles of the European Parliament, the European Commission and the
Council would have to be reviewed.
These are constitutional issues that would - if we were to go down this road - require a rethink of
the fundamental structure of the EU and would ultimately need to be reflected in the Treaty.
The fact that the crisis response has been designed within the EU institutional framework shows
that our framework is flexible. It leaves the EU and its Member States scope to tailor policy
responses to specific situations. But it also leaves a grey area of blurred responsibilities between
the national and EU level. This ambiguity may undermine the EU's full potential.
A Treaty change, if there were appetite for one, would be an opportunity to incorporate in our
common framework the tools used in the last crisis, such as the European Stability Mechanism.
It could also confirm whether the instruments used in this crisis - such as the possibility to issue
common debt in exceptional times - would be at the EU's disposal in the event of future adverse
shocks. Moreover, a Treaty change could allow for a review of which responsibilities are national
and which are European.
The envisaged Conference on the Future of Europe offers a chance to obtain people's views and
input on these issues. This could help structure future debates and form a good example of how
to enhance democratic accountability. Such debates should touch on issues that are especially
important to people's lives, such as internal and external dimensions of security, a common
border policy and a more responsive foreign policy.
Conclusion
Let me conclude.
Werner was aware that some Europeanisation of fiscal policy was an important element for the
currency union. In response to the COVID-19 crisis, such Europeanisation has reached its peak
in common debt issuance. Such crisis measures are justified by the pandemic, but they should
not be taken beyond crisis times without parallel deepening of the institutional functioning of
democracy at the Union level.
What we can and should take beyond the crisis are our common principles that have served us
well, such as a common approach to common problems. And we should use this opportunity for
a clearer delineation of responsibilities and competences among the different governance layers
in our supranational community.
Jean Monnet famously stated "Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions
adopted for those crises." Let's keep striving to ensure that the legacy of this crisis is a positive
one.