Geoff Bascand: Communication, understanding, and credibility
Speech by Mr Geoff Bascand, Deputy Governor and Head of Operations of the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand, to the Admirals Breakfast Club, Auckland, 6 December 2013.
* * *
I'm just a soul whose intentions are good
Oh Lord, please don't let me be misunderstood
The Animals
Central bank communication is again a renewed topic of interest. Internationally, the
expanded use of and debate about the efficacy of "forward guidance" - i.e. words that
foreshadow the future timing of monetary policy actions - has attracted much attention.
Locally, the introduction of restrictions on low equity housing loans and the prospect of rising
interest rates have been widely featured.
Central banks' communication strategies and their ability to communicate effectively have
been challenged enormously by the events and consequences of the Global Financial Crisis
and by the emergence of new technology and social media. Complexity increased,
audiences expanded, and the immediacy and saturation of news coverage has turned the
volume control on full. But as any parent of growing children knows, greater volume doesn't
always mean greater clarity!
While arcane in some respects (some will recall United States Federal Reserve Governor
Alan Greenspan terming his communication approach as "constructive ambiguity"1), central
bank communication is not an abstract topic. Central bank pronouncements, their absence,
and their tone, have economic and social impact.
The Reserve Bank is extending its communication with the various groups that our activities
impact. "Communicating on a broader front" is one of our strategic priorities2 - both in
imparting our messages and engaging with and listening to our many stakeholders. This is
because communication is critical to the Reserve Bank's success, with its actions and its
communications symbiotic.
In my speech today I will outline why clear communication of our policy thinking is so
important, and the forces that shape the way we communicate. I will also discuss how our
approach to communication has evolved, and the tools we use to reach our audiences. And
finally, I will proffer some thoughts on where to from here.
Why, when and how should the Reserve Bank communicate?
Broadly speaking, the Reserve Bank seeks to achieve price and financial stability and protect
the value of your money. Our communications are ultimately geared to this purpose. These
are important and sensitive matters, so understanding of, and confidence in our actions and
messages - and indeed in the institution itself - is essential. This requires that our
communication is seen as objective and credible.
The why of monetary policy communication
Much of the literature regarding central bank communication pertains to the operation of
monetary policy. Three principal rationales exist for the transparency of monetary policy
communication. First, is the need for accountability, with accountability supported by
transparency? With central banks often having significant autonomy or independence in how
they pursue their objectives, Parliament, its agents (e.g. the Minister of Finance and the
board of the central bank) and the public must be able to assess whether they are fulfilling
their responsibilities.
The public debate sometimes appears to confuse independence of objectives with
independence of operation. In New Zealand, the overriding objectives are set by the
legislature; the autonomy extends only to the operational decision-making necessary to
achieve the democratically set objective.
There are multiple accountability mechanisms, including Reserve Bank Board monitoring of
the Bank's and Governor's performance, public reporting via quarterly Monetary Policy
Financial Stability Reports Annual
Statements, six-monthly and the Report, appearances
before the Finance and Expenditure Select Committee, media, financial market, and public
scrutiny. A recent study by Dincer and Eichengreen (2013) reported the RBNZ as the second
most transparent central bank in the world, just behind Sweden.
The second rationale is promoting understanding. The credibility and effectiveness of
economic policy is enhanced by public and financial market understanding of how an
economy is performing, and how the central bank's operations and policy settings are likely
to affect it. All economic decisions, such as investment, spending, savings, employment, and
price-setting decisions are affected by uncertainty and expectations of the path ahead.
The Bank does not claim more accurate foresight than other analysts, but it can educate,
inform, and explain its own decision-making approach, and thereby minimise one potential
source of uncertainty. It can help make more predictable what would otherwise be less so.
Doing so also provides important benefits for the Bank. Widespread understanding of the
goal and operation of monetary policy makes it easier for the Bank to achieve its objective of
price
stability3, by better anchoring low inflation expectations. This means that wage and
price setters are more confident that the focus of the Bank will be on achieving and
maintaining low and stable rates of inflation. This, in turn, means that the Bank is able to
respond to economic shocks by adjusting interest rates less than would otherwise be the
case.
Several studies find benefits from transparency in terms of reduced volatility of interest rates
and smaller movements in market rates for a given change in central bank actions (e.g. see
Blinder, 2008). Along similar lines, Drew and Karagedikli (2008) demonstrated that New
Zealand's short-term interest rates move more predictably and long-term interest rates and
inflation expectations are more stable in association with greater transparency.
2014 marks 25 years since our inflation targeting regime was introduced - and over 20 years
since low inflation was accomplished. Pretty much a whole generation of New Zealanders
has not had to experience the distortions and inequities of high inflation that characterised
the 1970s and 1980s.
When seeking to build understanding of monetary policy goals and its operation, we also
need to communicate the costs and benefits of proposals to change the framework around
monetary policy. An example is the debate around the exchange rate and its relationship to
monetary policy. The Bank has conducted research, published analysis and, together with
the Treasury, convened a conference towards understanding of monetary policy and the
exchange rate. Assistant Governor John McDermott recently gave a speech summarising the
findings of this work (McDermott, 2013).
The third and most potent rationale for transparency is to use communication as a
fundamental tool for signalling a monetary policy action. In this context, statements and
analysis by the Bank are designed to inform and shape expectations about future monetary
policy settings. Indeed, when used in this instrumental manner, the words of the central bank
are themselves monetary policy actions (see Holmes, 2009).
Achieving this impact requires considerable central bank credibility. The institution needs to
be perceived as a responsible and credible manager of its designated policy goals in order to
successfully influence economic behaviour. As Janet Yellen, President Obama's nominee as
next Chair of the US Federal Reserve Board of Governors said: if the Fed's communication
is "to have its maximum effect, it must be understood and believed" (Yellen, 2012, p.7; my
emphasis).
One test in this respect is whether our statements yield the market responses we seek. The
potency of words is also their danger. Market sensitivity to language is acute, and it is
important to avoid misinterpretation4. Prior to the final sign-off of the Monetary Policy
Statement or Official Cash Rate (OCR) statement, the draft communication is assessed by
the Financial Markets Department of the Bank for expected market impact, and we
subsequently monitor and evaluate its "success" in achieving the desired response.
Reaching one audience effectively does not guarantee we have reached another. A recent
foray into the "public audience" via an opinion article explaining the LVR policy, that repeated
our monetary policy expectations, appeared to reveal substantial public surprise about our
interest rate projections. While unintentional, it therefore possibly enhanced the projection's
impact. Achieving both accessibility and credibility, while simultaneously communicating with
both the general public and financial markets, can sometimes create tensions5.
The why of financial stability communication
The arguments around transparency of central bank operations with respect to financial
stability are less well traversed in the literature, although studies are increasing.
Accountability is again a key reason for transparency about the regulator's conduct, along
with economic benefits from reducing asymmetry of information, improving the operation of
financial markets, and helping people to understand financial risk (e.g. Born et al, 2012)6.
The primary communication instrument for accountability and transparency around the
Bank's financial soundness responsibilities is the Financial Stability Report. Published every
six months, this report sets out our assessment of trends in system risks, lending growth and
standards, and policy changes. The report enables the Reserve Bank Board, Parliament and
other commentators to evaluate our system-wide responsibilities and policy approach to
financial soundness.
Transparency around financial stability is achieved both by the central bank's own reporting
and perhaps more importantly by the disclosure requirements it imposes on financial market
participants, enabling investors and depositors to assess lending risks.
A number of authors have argued that the Asian banking crisis of the late 1990s was
exacerbated "by the lack of transparency and disclosure in the banking system, making it
difficult to gauge the severity of the situation or propose timely solutions" (Rosengren, 1998,
p2).
Since then there have been moves by central banks to impose greater disclosure on
commercial banks and to ensure standardisation and definitional clarity around disclosed
information. The Reserve Bank has required all banks to publish quarterly disclosure
statements since 1 January 1996. Markets function better with transparency of information
(e.g. Mehran and Mollineux, 2012), causing the cost of funds to financial institutions to better
reflect their underlying financial strength.
Transparency is especially important when financial stability risks may be building, as
"communications can serve to align agents' incentives, to coordinate their expectations, and
to steer their behaviour in a way that helps to prevent crises" (Born et al (2012, p252).
There may be occasions where complete transparency may work against the interests of
financial stability, for example if a problem at a bank precipitated a run before the bank and
the authorities had a chance to correct or at least clarify the problem.
There are strong grounds, therefore, for seeing financial stability communication in normal
times as different from that applying during times of crisis. In the event of an institutional
failure or rescue, our decisions can of course be reviewed after the event. No rescue
operation would be undertaken without wider public sector involvement, since taxpayer funds
are at stake. Normal public sector accountability mechanisms (annual or ex-post reporting,
audit, select committee examination, etc) operate in such a case.
Transparency of the Bank's financial stability activity is also limited by the requirement on us
as a supervisor to maintain confidentiality of information that institutions provide to us7. This
means that, generally speaking, we cannot reveal the nature of discussions or
correspondence with a supervised entity, both to protect commercial confidentiality and to
ensure entities feel safe in talking with us.
The financial stability policy development process is more open and consultative than the
operational, supervisory process. Public engagement in prudential policy development is a
cornerstone of our approach - we consult regularly with the public and financial sector on
major policy innovations before finalising our intended policy approach, which we publish.
For example, we have consulted in recent years on the prudential liquidity framework, Basel
III, the macro-prudential policy framework, insurance solvency standards and payments
oversight proposals.
Our Act requires us to consult with the banks before we impose Conditions of Registration,
and also requires us to publish Regulatory Impact Assessments of proposed (financial) policy
changes. The Act identifies these as accountability statements.
The public (and financial sector) are engaged in decisions about our policy framework before
they are made, and we can and do modify our approach in response to feedback.
How do we compare?
The Bank puts considerable communication effort into promoting understanding, and
accepting the ensuing challenge and debate.
This year we have given 17 on-the-record speeches (including this one), up from eight last
year; 90 off-the-record addresses (c.f. 93 in 2012); on top of many other forms of
Monetary Policy Statements
communication, from our formal quarterly and six-weekly Official
Cash Rate (OCR) announcements to research reports, webcasts, videos, newspaper
articles, parliamentary committees, academic engagement, business talks and regional
presentations.
We make analysis and research accessible to wider audiences through such vehicles as the
Reserve Bank Bulletin, and publish specific analytical pieces of work underpinning our
decision-making via analytical notes.
Quarterly monetary policy statements set out our analysis and understanding of the economy
and its expected future path, as well as the risks of variation from that path. Other
commentators may make different judgements and come to different views about likely
economic behaviours, but we would be disappointed if they were not able to understand the
reasoning behind our own monetary policy decisions.
We have been communicating with increasingly wide audiences via expanding channels; yet
demand for more engagement continues to grow. The news media and political appetite are
extensive8.
Table 1 compares New Zealand against a number of other countries on a range of measures
of (monetary policy) information disclosure. There is much similarity in practice, with a few
notable differences.
New Zealand, along with Sweden and Norway, is in the small minority of central banks that
publishes an interest rate projection. Many other central bank economic forecasts are
reported under unchanged monetary policy settings, on the assumption that if achievement
of the policy target demanded a change in settings within the forecast horizon it would have
been declared.
Reflecting our institutional regime, which is essentially the same as Canada's, there is no
voting result or publication of policy committee minutes9. Minutes are also withheld by the
ECB, Switzerland, Norway and Singapore. The ECB has been very explicit that it would
regard their release as reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy by potentially reducing
consensus decision-making and placing pressure on voting members to be seen to reflect
the interests of their own country interests. It would be akin to having individual Cabinet
members' votes identified in a Cabinet minute.
The UK and the USA both publish minutes and votes and are notable - especially the USA
recently - for multiple individual expressions of view about the appropriateness of monetary
policy, notwithstanding considerable arguments against the noise this generates.
Australia publishes anonymised and summary minutes that they point out are not verbatim or
transcript but rather a record of decision and the key contributing factors (Stevens, 2007).
There the minutes largely serve the purpose of explaining the rationale for the monthly
interest rate decision.
Worldwide, financial stability reporting has increased considerably over the past 15 years or
so. According to Oosterloo (2007, p94), 40 countries produced an FSR in 2005, up from only
one country in 1996. New Zealand commenced its FSR in 2004. While less complete than
IMF reporting recommendations, New Zealand's FSR is in the top half of countries'
measured by comprehensiveness of indicators.
The banking prudential regime, including its review processes and its transparency, was
assessed by Treasury in 2010 as very good practice against OECD best practice
guidelines10.
What has changed?
The arguments for open communication are now well-established. What is new, one might
ask? I would point to four factors.
i. Unconventional monetary policies affect New Zealand
First, post-GFC, we are operating in a world where many advanced economies have
deployed unconventional monetary policy. With policy interest rates near zero, quantitative
easing and forward guidance have become instruments of choice. These policies and their
communication lessons have important spillovers for New Zealand.
Forward guidance seeks to create greater certainty for households and firms in respect of
future policy actions by the central bank. It does this by more explicitly linking future policy
changes to either (or both) economic conditions (state contingent policy) or a specific time
period (time contingent policy)11.
In both the USA and the United Kingdom, central banks have foreshadowed policy interest
rates remaining extremely low through 2015. Determining and communicating New
Zealand's monetary policy conditions requires us also to understand and communicate the
impact of international economic and policy settings. With New Zealand further advanced in
the economic and financial cycle, our short-term interest rate differentials are likely to widen.
In coming months, the future path of the exchange rate will also be influenced by the Federal
Reserve's decisions on tapering of their quantitative monetary expansion.
The Reserve Bank Act of 1989 required us to provide (a type of) forward guidance by
publishing policy statements that set out how the Bank intends to achieve its explicit policy
target. Since June 1997, we have published interest rate projections that are conditional on
various assumptions e.g. about the paths for output, employment and prices.
The communication challenge with forward guidance - which equally applies to publishing
interest rate projections - is how to reduce uncertainty about the likely path of policy while at
the same time conveying its conditionality and the possibility of change in policy settings.
Achieving this depends crucially on the private sector believing the Bank's unwavering
commitment to the inflation target.
Forward guidance, therefore, has not transformed the fundamental requirements of effective
communication. Recent experience has demonstrated this vividly. Having established an
expectation of tapering in September 2013, the Federal Open Market Committee then
confounded expectations by not doing so. Interest rate volatility, particularly in longer-term
bonds, was exaggerated, along with spillover in exchange rate movements for a number of
countries.
In the words of Michael Woodford (2013, p 5), "The use of forward guidance is not some kind
of magical tool where the mere fact that the central bank says something means that people
will then think exactly that. A central bank needs to give people a reason to think something
new or different about what it is going to do".
Words can lose potency and indeed result in confusion if overwhelmed by their own
frequency and noise (see Buiter, 2013).
Clarity is crucial. We have to take particular care to avoid any financial market confusion
caused by muddled or partial communications. Speaking with a single voice is essential. We
take considerable care to ensure the Bank's policy communications are consistent, are what
the Bank wishes to say, and avoid any sense of the Bank saying different things through
different channels or personnel.
ii. The introduction of macro prudential policies
Secondly, many central banks have adopted new macro-prudential policies in response to
lessons from the financial cycles preceding and succeeding the GFC. We have recently
introduced new capital requirements against high loan-to-value ratio (LVR) lending and also
limits on the share of new high LVR lending. These new moves required a fresh
understanding and enhanced communication12.
New policy frameworks pose special challenges to build understanding of their efficacy,
conditionality, and operation. Faced with rising house price inflation on top of seemingly
already over-valued house prices, the Bank moved quickly to institute new policy measures.
We set the scene for these measures in a number of on-the-record speeches in advance, as
well as remarks at press conferences, and in Monetary Policy Statements and OCR
statements about our concerns with easier lending standards and house price inflation. We
published analyses of their potential impact, as well as comparisons with regimes in other
countries. Following their introduction, we have carried out sustained communications about
their operation, rationale and objectives in further speeches, media interviews, and the
November Financial Stability Report.
The introduction of LVR restrictions has attracted significant commentary from many different
quarters. Some analysts feel there has been a blurring of financial stability and monetary
policy objectives. Others have questioned the Bank's operational policy design, its
distributional impacts, and the legitimacy or autonomy of its decision-making. Some have
credited the Bank with policy innovation and the willingness to act before a crisis eventuates.
We have reiterated that LVRs are targeted at the primary objective of financial stability, but
that there is also a potential benefit for monetary policy if they reduce the spillover of house
price inflation into stronger consumer demand and higher price inflation for goods and
services.
Explaining important inter-dependencies with other policies - our own or wider government
ones - is vital. It is well-known that monetary policy "needs friends", as the saying goes,
particularly supportive fiscal policies. Macro-financial (or macro-prudential) policies can also
benefit from supportive micro-economic policies (e.g. productivity, housing, tax, regulation,
etc) whereby these reduce risks and enhance the economy's growth capacity and
performance. In these circumstances, we endeavoured to support policies that promoted
housing supply, as a goal, without commenting on specific policy proposals (Spencer, 2013).
iii. The expansion in regulatory responsibilities
Thirdly, we have acquired new, expanded regulatory responsibilities, in particular regulating
nonbank financial deposit takers (NBDTs) and licensing and supervising insurance
companies13. The Bank's stakeholder engagement has changed significantly, whilst
expectations upon it and its public persona as a guardian of financial soundness and
efficiency have been magnified considerably.
In terms of expanded regulatory responsibilities, the communication challenges to date have
been more stakeholder management related (understanding the regimes' operation and
building trust in our regulatory relationship) rather than widespread public discourse.
Taking on additional regulatory responsibility for insurers and non-bank-deposit takers
means we are dealing with everyone from bank chief executives to building societies to small
mutual insurers.
These regulatory responsibilities were assigned to the Bank out of a concern to avoid
financial failings, such as we saw with finance companies and in the insurance sector. The
challenge here is that public expectations may well be at odds with regulatory and
supervisory responsibilities and realities.
We have communicated that we do not operate a no-failure regime (see Fiennes 2013), as
well as explaining our responsibilities vis a vis the Minister of Finance and other institutions
such as the Financial Markets Authority.
I suspect we have many communication challenges ahead to reach public understanding that
the Reserve Bank's regulatory and supervisory oversight does not represent a "no failure"
regime, and that there are no guarantees that insolvencies and other forms of business
failure will not occur. This extension in regulatory and supervisory responsibilities will
demand new channels, new audiences and new messages.
iv. Taking advantage of new technologies
Fourthly, generational change, media technology and the scale and immediacy of
communication require new approaches too.
Living in a hyper-connected world, with increasing access to computers, smartphones and
tablets means that anyone around the world can learn what we do, connect with us, ask
questions, challenge us or offer critique.
Mobile users make up about 10 percent of all visitors to our website. We've developed a
responsively designed site so it functions on any device, no matter how small, and where
users are. The 24-hour news cycle means there is increasing demand for new and easily
accessible information at all hours of the day.
Where to from here?
We are implementing changes to our communication strategy. We are lifting our speaking
engagements and our business connections14. Our speeches convey our messages, while
we have a strong focus on listening to the business community. For example, the Reserve
Bank Board will meet outside Wellington five times this coming year in Auckland,
Christchurch, Dunedin, Rotorua and Palmerston North, holding business functions in each of
the five centres and conducting question/answer sessions. We are continuing our regular
business visits where we meet with about 50-70 businesses each quarter to understand
current business dynamics. Our supervisory staff have extensive interactions with banks and
insurers.
We are developing a broader business engagement programme to liaise better with business
people and leaders. We have expanded the number of on-the-record speeches, and are
extending the 80-100 annual off-the-record briefings to achieve greater geographic
representation and diversity of audience.
We maintain a strong programme of engagement with the economics community through
academic and public policy links. For example, the biennial monetary policy conference will
be held in Wellington in two weeks with Professor Barry Eichengreen the distinguished
visitor.
Perhaps where we have most to do is in respect of the public audience. Here we are seeking
to deploy new media channels, with greater use of videos (e.g. on our website and via
YouTube) explaining what we do and why, and telling stories in pictures (e.g. infographics).
We use Twitter as a messaging system but have not adopted the new Bank of England
experiment of interactive discussion.
We developed with Young Enterprise Trust a board game ("Skint to Mint"), which we rolled
out across secondary schools in New Zealand to educate the next generation about sensible
financial planning, and we sponsor other financial literacy initiatives through Young
Enterprise Trust.
Addressing the public directly requires us to use plain English more effectively in our
communications. Generally the Bank has relied on business journalists to convey messages
to their audiences from the Bank's business sector speeches, and the press conferences
following the Monetary Policy Statement and Financial Stability Report and the subsequent
discussions in the Finance and Expenditure Committee of Parliament. However, we are also
using the opportunities posed by media interviews. Generally, the interview channel has
been used sparingly when sensitive policies have been under development.
One of the key steps in our communications strategy will be the introduction of a regular
stakeholder survey. The Swedish central bank (Riksbank) has a long history of conducting a
two-yearly stakeholder survey and we can benefit from following their practice. The survey
will help us understand whether we are sufficiently clear in our communications, and the level
of credibility attached to them. It will also help us assess whether we prioritise the right
communication channels. A key benefit will be the constructive broadening of our audiences,
as stakeholder analysis will require us to gear our communications to a multiplicity of
stakeholders.
Conclusion
Our communications approach is informed by theory, experience and best practice around
the world. There is much that works well, but we are continually seeking ways to improve.
The refresh of our communications strategy recognises significant questions confronting the
Bank, in terms of policy settings, policy objectives, tools, and governance. We are expanding
our regulatory reach into insurance and the wider finance sector, and have introduced a new
macro-prudential policy regime.
With these changes afoot, our communication strategy is more than old wine in new
wineskins. Longstanding policy frameworks are being scrutinised more closely by political
and economic commentators. The policy landscape is changing and so is the
communications domain. We will maintain our credibility and interaction with the academic
and policy communities, continue to lift our business sector engagement, and become more
engaged with general public audiences, using a range of channels.
The Reserve Bank is deeply committed to transparency - of policy objectives, policy
proposals, economic reasoning, and of our understanding of the economy, and of course of
our policy actions and intent. Clear communication and strong public understanding make
our policy actions more effective.
We are working to enhance the openness and effectiveness of our communications. I hope
that this contribution will be seen in that spirit.
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