For release on delivery
1:30 p.m. EST
November 15, 2016
Is There a Liquidity Problem Post-Crisis?
Remarks by
Stanley Fischer
Vice Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at
"Do We Have a Liquidity Problem Post-Crisis?" a conference sponsored by
the Initiative on Business and Public Policy at the Brookings Institution
Washington, D.C.
November 15, 2016
Market liquidity is the ability to rapidly execute sizable securities transactions at a
low cost and with a limited price impact.1 The high degree of liquidity in U.S. capital
markets historically has contributed to the efficient allocation of capital through lower
costs and a mix of bank- and market-based finance that supports the flexibility of these
markets.2 Regulatory changes may have altered financial institutions' incentive to
provide liquidity, raising concerns brought into sharp relief by several "flash events" over
the past few years. At the same time, any changes in observed liquidity are also likely
accompanied by other related changes--such as in technology--and a more complete
assessment of these shifts is important when we think about the effects on liquidity of
changes in financial regulations that were induced by the global financial crisis.3
This afternoon, I will first review some of the concerns raised by market
participants and others about market liquidity as well as highlight the challenges
associated with finding clear evidence that substantiates these concerns. I will then
discuss whether potential impairment of liquidity might exacerbate problems related to
fire sales and leverage. Finally, I will make the case that any changes in market liquidity
resulting from regulatory changes should be analyzed in the broader context of the
overall safety of the financial system. This perspective naturally emphasizes potential
tradeoffs between the possibly adverse effect regulations may have on market liquidity
and their positive effect on the stability of the financial system.
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Market Participants' Concerns
1. Decline in dealers' inventory
Market participants have cited a decline in dealers' inventories as a possible source of
decreased liquidity. Figure 1 shows that primary dealers' inventories of fixed-income
securities, which are predominantly used for market making, declined sharply after the
Lehman Brothers failure, from about $1.3 trillion to about $800 billion, and have since
fallen further to about $700 billion. The recent decline might be due in part to
regulations, such as the Volcker rule and the Supplementary Leverage Ratio, aimed at
making the financial system safer and sounder, as well as to changes firms may have
made on their own, perhaps in reaction to the experience of the financial crisis.
Regardless of the causes of the change, market participants have expressed a concern that
the decline in inventories reflects in part a reduced willingness or capacity of the primary
dealers to make markets--which may in turn lead to lower liquidity. However, whether
markets are in fact less liquid depends on both the degree to which the decrease in
primary dealers' inventories affects their willingness to provide liquidity and the extent to
which nonbank firms such as hedge funds and insurance companies fill any lost market-
making capacity.4
2. Decline in trade size and turnover
Market participants also often cite the decline in average trade size and
turnover--the volume of trades relative to the total amount of bonds outstanding--as
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evidence of reduced liquidity. Figure 2 shows that average trade size in the corporate
bond market has indeed declined since 2006 but has been relatively stable in the past four
years. Nevertheless, this decrease may reflect a number of factors, including changes in
technology or the types and preferences of institutions engaged in trades, so it may not
indicate a reduction in market liquidity. Certainly, the length of this trend, roughly a
decade, seems on its face more consistent with a secular trend such as technological
change. Turnover in the corporate bond market has declined as well, though this
evidence is also not a definitive sign of reduced market liquidity. The decline in turnover
is not driven by a reduction in trading volume, but it is the result of a robust growth of the
denominator, debt outstanding.
3. Liquidity during times of stress
Market participants further express concern about the potential for market
liquidity to become less resilient during times of stress, when it is needed the most.
However, evidence on this front is difficult to gather. Some argue that market liquidity is
resilient because financial markets appear to have functioned fairly well during recent
episodes of high market volatility, such as following the Brexit vote or earlier this year,
when oil prices were low and stock market volatility was high. Others argue that it is not.
According to a recent study, the cost of trading distressed corporate bonds appears to be
higher now than in the recent past.5 Specifically, the authors find that, before the crisis,
the cost of a $1 million bond transaction increased about 0.7 percent following a
downgrade, but--after the Volcker rule--the cost following a downgrade rose 2.4 percent.
5
See Bao, O'Hara, and Zhou (2016).
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This analysis, however, is limited to episodes of distressed borrowers rather than a
systemwide stress.
4. Flash events
In addition, recent flash events--such as the sharp movement in Treasury prices on
October 15, 2014; the rapid rise and decline of the euro-dollar exchange rate on March
6
18, 2015; and the swing in sterling on October 7, 2016--have led some to assert that
market liquidity has become less resilient. Researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York have argued that spikes in volatility and sudden declines in liquidity have
become more frequent in both Treasury and equity markets.7 The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission also points out that flash events are more common now.8 Market
participants suggest that the rapid growth in high-frequency trading in equity, foreign
exchange, and U.S. Treasury markets, along with broader concerns about less resilient
liquidity, potentially explains these flash events. Nevertheless, a report on the October
15, 2014 event by the staff of the Treasury Department, Federal Reserve, and market
regulatory agencies found no single factor that caused the sharp swing in prices.9
A Broader Review of the Evidence
1. Trading costs are low
Even though flash events appear to be more common, it is certainly too soon to
declare that a broad reduction in market liquidity has occurred. Figure 3 plots realized
bid-ask spreads for investment-grade corporate bonds over time (the black dashed line)
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and speculative-grade corporate bonds (the red solid line). Prior to the financial crisis,
the cost of trading corporate bonds was low--on average, bid-ask spreads were about
1 percent of the price of the bond for investment-grade bonds and about 2 percent for
speculative-grade bonds. This measure of trading costs skyrocketed during the financial
crisis but has returned to the range seen in the few years prior to the crisis. Alternative
measures of trading costs, such as price impact measures, which attempt to capture the
effect of transactions on market prices, follow a similar pattern.
Transaction costs seem to suggest liquidity has improved. One caveat, however,
is that measures of aggregate transaction costs in the corporate bond market may
underestimate embedded liquidity costs. In preliminary work, Choi and Huh suggest that
transactions in which dealers act simply as brokers, rather than as intermediaries that hold
assets on their balance sheets, could reflect price concessions that dealers make to entice
counterparties into the other side of a trade so that the dealers will not need to hold the
traded assets.10 Price concessions, in turn, lower traditional measures of trading costs,
making trading seem inexpensive, when in reality these concessions are fees the dealers
pay to some investors for providing liquidity. Moreover, as dealer inventories have
declined over the past few years, this downward distortion to aggregate trading cost
measures may have increased. To address this problem, Choi and Huh try to isolate
transactions in which corporate bond investors are looking for liquidity (in other words,
are looking to trade) and then construct measures of transaction costs for only such
trades. The paper's results are preliminary but appear to suggest transaction costs have
increased somewhat in recent years.
10
See Choi and Huh (2016).
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2. Trading volume is high
Another commonly used measure of liquidity is trading volume. Figure 4 shows
trading volume in the corporate bond market. This measure is important because low
trading volumes may indicate that high transaction costs have deterred investors from
making trades, a phenomenon that transaction cost measures would clearly miss because
they are calculated from actual trades. The trading volumes depicted in the figure show
no obvious signs of a current problem with market liquidity. In 2006, investors traded an
average of $12 billion a day. During the height of the financial crisis, trading volume
decreased to $8 billion a day, but, by 2009, volumes appeared to have fully recovered.
Today trading volumes are at about $19 billion a day. On balance, the evidence
presented in these two figures seems to suggest that market liquidity has not deteriorated
in recent years--subject, of course, to the caveat I just discussed about the possibility that
our measures of bid-ask spreads could be distorted by the increasing role of investors as
suppliers rather than demanders of liquidity.11
As an aside, the market liquidity figures shown are only for the corporate bond
market, but we see similar patterns in the equity and Treasury markets.12 That is, we do
not find convincing evidence that liquidity has markedly declined in those markets.
Policy Issues Related to Market Liquidity
While the evidence for changes in market liquidity does not point clearly to a
reduction, I have highlighted some recent research that indicates the possibility that
market liquidity has fallen. To date, observed changes in liquidity do not suggest that
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shifts in liquidity are having a notable effect on the cost of trading. Nonetheless, the
potential for liquidity to evaporate in times of stress deserves careful scrutiny--along with
broader risks to financial stability associated with changes in markets.
One area where policy concerns have arisen is related to the potential for fire sales
in bond markets, which could compound the risks associated with leverage in the
financial sector. Bond markets have grown considerably, and market-based finance has
intensified over the past years, making market liquidity even more important.13 In
addition, mutual funds that offer daily redemption rights hold a greater share of bonds
than investors who buy and hold. As shown in figure 5, the share of investment-grade
and high-yield corporate bonds held at mutual funds (the solid blue area) has hovered
around 25 to 30 percent in recent years, up from about 15 percent before the crisis.
Reduced market liquidity might exacerbate fire sale risks from leverage at
financial institutions or from first-mover advantage at mutual funds. Leveraged
institutions are more sensitive to changes in asset prices. Adverse movements in asset
prices, margin calls, and higher haircuts may force them to sell assets to obtain cash and
delever, affecting other market participants through declining asset prices and increased
margin calls.
In addition, leverage may closely interact with liquidity risk at mutual funds.
Open-end mutual funds are characterized by the so-called first-mover advantage:
Investors can redeem daily from the funds that hold assets that are less liquid, while
liquidation costs are borne by investors remaining in the fund. If a decline in bond prices
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leads to sizable fund withdrawals, the first-mover advantage could accelerate
redemptions and second-round price declines. In addition, investors may perceive
leveraged funds that experience stress as riskier, possibly becoming more inclined to
redeem from these funds. This situation could be worse than in the past if market
liquidity deteriorates and dealers are less willing to buy and hold bonds in inventory to
cushion the price decline induced by fire sales. However, thanks to recent regulation and
supervisory changes, including higher capital requirements and stress tests, leverage at
the largest intermediaries is much reduced relative to pre-crisis norms--and, as a result,
vulnerabilities from potential fire sale risks are less significant. From this perspective, a
small reduction in liquidity from regulatory changes--even if present, which is not
obvious--may be a reasonable price to pay for greater safety. I will now place changes in
liquidity into the broader context of financial stability.
Tradeoff between Liquidity and Regulations to Achieve a Safer Financial System
It is possible that regulations aimed at correcting vulnerabilities in the financial
system--like the Supplementary Leverage Ratio, together with other factors--have altered
the business model of dealer firms and, thus, liquidity. While the evidence for a
reduction in market liquidity is far from clear, let us for the moment accept this
possibility and consider the potential effects on financial stability.
Regulatory changes, even those that may have reduced market liquidity, likely
have enhanced financial stability on balance. Recent evidence indeed points in favor of
enhanced financial stability. Regulatory capital ratios for banks and insurance companies
remain high, which, as previously mentioned, would mitigate fire sales and their effect on
the solvency and functioning of these institutions. Leverage at intermediaries is much
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reduced relative to pre-crisis norms, and gross leverage at hedge funds, based on the
partial information available, has not changed much in recent years. Research from
economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York shows that the decline in leverage,
among other factors, has substantially reduced potential fire sale externalities in the
banking and broker-dealer sectors.14 Thus, the regulatory changes appear to be having a
positive effect on financial system stability, and these benefits may outweigh the
potential costs of a possible reduction in liquidity.
Regulatory changes are in train for the asset management industry, whose
vulnerabilities have been under examination by the Financial Stability Oversight Council
and the Financial Stability Board.15 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
recently approved rules to modernize and enhance the reporting and disclosure of
information by registered investment companies and to enhance liquidity risk
management by open-end funds, including mutual funds and certain exchange-traded
funds.16 The SEC has also proposed rules that would put new limits on registered
funds' gross notional derivative exposures, enhance the requirements for asset
segregation in derivatives transactions, and include new risk-management requirements
for the use of derivatives.17
Conclusion
Overall, liquidity is adequate by most measures, in most markets, and most of the
time.18 Bid-ask spreads and price-impact measures point toward liquidity that is good by
historical standards, and we have not observed declines in market liquidity in recent
episodes of high market volatility. Nevertheless, the market structure is changing, and
trades in certain situations and in certain market segments might have become more
costly. Also, flash events may be more frequent today, and the dynamics of a system
with frequent flash events are likely to become complicated. Moreover, some regulatory
changes are only now being phased in. In light of these changes and the evolving
structure of financial markets, it will be important to monitor and continue to analyze the
state of market liquidity. As we monitor, we should continue to emphasize how the
evolution of market liquidity interacts with broader changes to affect the efficient
allocation of capital and financial stability. And we should always bear in mind the
possibility that new financial developments could change the dynamics of market
responses to unanticipated economic developments.
References
Adrian, Tobias, Michael Fleming, Daniel Stackman, and Erik Vogt (2015). "Has
Liquidity Risk in the Treasury and Equity Markets Increased?" Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics (blog), October 6,
http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2015/10/has-liquidity-risk-in-thetreasury-and-equity-markets-increased.html.
Bao, Jack, Maureen O'Hara, and Xing (Alex) Zhou (2016). "The Volcker Rule and
Market-Making in Times of Stress," working paper, September.
Bessembinder, Hendrik, Stacey Jacobsen, William Maxwell, and Kumar Venkataraman
(2016). "Capital Commitment and Illiquidity in Corporate Bonds," working
paper, July.
Choi, Jaewon, and Yesol Huh (2016). "Customer Liquidity Provision in Corporate Bond
Markets," working paper, September.
Duarte, Fernando, and Thomas M. Eisenbach (2013). "Fire-Sale Spillovers and Systemic
Risk," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports 645. New York:
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, October (revised February 2015),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr645.pdf.
Market Making under the Proposed Volcker Rule,
Duffie, Darrell (2012). report to the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and submission to the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Stanford, Calif.: Graduate School of Business,
Stanford University, January,
www.darrellduffie.com/uploads/policy/duffievolckerrule.pdf.
Financial Stability Board (2016). Proposed Policy Recommendations to Address
Structural Vulnerabilities from Asset Management Activities, consultative
document. Basel, Switzerland: FSB, June,
www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/FSB-Asset-Management-Consultative-Document.pdf.
Financial Stability Oversight Council (2016). Update on Review of Asset Management
Products and Activities. Washington: FSOC, April,
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/news/Documents/FSOC%20Update%20
on%20Review%20of%20Asset%20Management%20Products%20and%20Activit
ies.pdf.
Massad, Timothy (2015). "Remarks of Chairman Timothy Massad before the
Conference on the Evolving Structure of the U.S. Treasury Market," speech
delivered at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, October 21,
www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-30.
Powell, Jerome H. (2015). "Structure and Liquidity in Treasury Markets," speech
delivered at the Brookings Institution, Washington, August 3,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20150803a.htm.
Trebbi, Francesco, and Kairong Xiao (2015). "Regulation and Market Liquidity," NBER
Working Paper Series 21739. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic
Research.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
and U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (2015). Joint Staff Report:
The U.S. Treasury Market on October 15, 2014. Washington: Treasury, Board of
Governors, FRBNY, SEC, and CFTC, July,
www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/Joint_Staff_Report_Treasury_10-15-2014.pdf.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2015a). "Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk
Management Programs; Swing Pricing; Re-Opening of Comment Period for
Investment Company Reporting Modernization Release," proposed rule and
reopening of comment period, releases 33-9922 and IC-31835, files S7-16-15 and
S7-08-15. Washington: SEC, October,
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9922.pdf.
-------- (2015b). "Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies and Business
Development Companies," proposed rule, release IC-31933, file S7-24-15.
Washington: SEC, December,
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/ic31933.pdf.
Figure 1. Primary Dealers' Total Securities Positions
Note: Total includes U.S. Treasury securities, agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and non-MBS securities, and
corporate securities. The Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy date is September 15, 2008.
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Form FR2004A, Weekly Report of Dealer Positions,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/reportforms/reportdetail.aspx?sOoYJ+5BzDZq2f74T6b1cw==.
Figure 2. Average Size of Trades That Are Greater than $100,000 in Par Value
for Investment- and Speculative-Grade Corporate Bonds
Note: Only use trades of bonds that have been issued for 60 days or more at the time of trading are included.
We exclude 144a bonds.
Source: BTDS Data provided by FINRA's TRACE System; Mergent Corporate FISD Daily Feed (FITF);
Moody's Analytics: Default and Recovery Database (DRD).
Figure 3. Corporate Bond Bid-Ask Spreads
Note: We compute the measures using nondefaulted bonds that have traded at least 10 times between 10:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m.
We exclude 144a bonds.
Source: BTDS Data provided by FINRA's TRACE System; Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum; Mergent Corporate FISD Daily Feed
(FITF); Moody's Analytics Default and Recovery Database (DRD).
Figure 4. Corporate Bond Trading Volume
Note: Only use trades of bonds that have been issued for 60 days or more at the time of trading are included.
We exclude 144a bonds.
Source: BTDS Data provided by FINRA's TRACE System; Mergent Corporate FISD Daily Feed (FITF); Moody's
Analytics: Default and Recovery Database (DRD).
Figure 5: Mutual Funds and ETF Ratios of AUM to Corporate Bonds
Outstanding