Hermann Remsperger: Enlargement of the European Union and European and
Monetary Union: Maastricht meets Copenhagen
Speech by Prof Hermann Remsperger, Member of the Directorate of the Deutsche Bundesbank, at the
annual meeting of ELEC, Frankfurt, 7 December 2001.
* * *
I. Introduction1
The accession of ten central and east European countries as well as Malta and Cyprus presents the
European Union with one of the greatest challenges in its history.2 In June 2001 the Gothenburg
European Council clearly stated that the process of European enlargement is irreversible. It has
already been foreseen that the first of the accession countries will participate in the European
Parliament elections in 2004. What currently looks possible is that there will be a "Big Bang", an initial
major enlargement involving ten candidate countries. The new EU member states also commit
themselves to adopt the euro at a later date. Contrary to the United Kingdom and Denmark there will
be no "opt out" clause. This means that two to three years after enlargement of the European Union
there could already be a far greater number of countries participating in European Monetary Union. In
my opinion, however, it is actual progress in convergence rather than pressure to keep to a political
date which should be the prime focus of the ongoing process of integration.
I would like to start today by describing some fundamental economic facts concerning EU
enlargement. I then propose to outline the challenges for the candidate countries and the current EU
member states in the enlargement process.
II. Economic background to EU enlargement
The accession of twelve candidate countries to the EU first of all means that the population of the EU
is set to rise by more than 100 million, in other words by more than one-quarter. However, gross
domestic product would not increase by anywhere near as much. The aggregate nominal GDP of the
accession countries is currently less than 5% of GDP in the EU as a whole. In terms of purchasing
power parities, the weight of the accession countries would be roughly twice as much. Even if this
measurement method is used, however, there are considerable differences between them and the
current member states.
major structural differences
The candidate countries also demonstrate with the EU. The share of
agriculture in the gross value added is on average more than twice as high as in the EU, where it is
around 2%. Sectoral employment also points to the existence of structural discrepancies. In Poland,
for example, agriculture contributes over 3% to the gross value added, whereas almost 19% of the
workforce is employed in this sector. Increasing rapprochement with the EU is likely to result in a
major reallocation of resources even if full structural harmonisation is not likely.
At this point I should add that the accession countries generally have large current account deficits.
Although such deficits are thoroughly defensible for countries that are in the process of catching up,
persistent current account deficits make the economy more vulnerable to internal and external
disturbances, especially if these are relatively severe and are financed short term and in foreign
currency.
When painting the external picture of the economy, it needs to be said that the average degree of
openness in the candidate countries is significantly higher than in the EU. This is partly due to the fact
that most of the candidate countries are fairly small. Nonetheless, the figures range from 29% in
Poland to 109% in Malta.3 Trade liberalisation and the prospect of EU accession, together with the
geographical proximity of some of these countries to the present EU member states, have led to a
considerable intensification of trade integration with the EU. Imports from and exports to the EU on
average account for around two-thirds of the candidate countries' total imports and exports.
In addition to the differences with current EU member states, account also needs to be taken of the
heterogeneity amongst the accession candidates. With a population of more than 38 million and
around 40% of the total output, Poland is by far the largest accession economy. GDP in both the
Czech Republic and Hungary, the second and third largest economies, is less than one-third that of
Poland. Most of the other candidate countries are relatively small economies. As well as size and
economic strength, the standard of living varies considerably. If purchasing power parity is taken as a
basis, the figures range from 24% of the EU average in Bulgaria to 82% in Cyprus. Nine of the twelve
candidate countries show less than 60% of the average EU income. It can therefore be assumed that
real convergence will take some time.
The heterogeneity amongst the accession countries can also be seen from the fact that there are a
number of different exchange rate regimes in operation. Most of the countries have seen their
exchange rate regime change at least once, if not more often, during the transition process. This can
be partly attributed to the fact that exchange rate policy has to fulfil different tasks in the various stages
of development.4
The current exchange rate regimes can be roughly divided into three groups. At one end of the
spectrum are Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and, to some extent, also Latvia and Malta. These countries
have reduced their monetary policy flexibility significantly by adopting a currency board arrangement
or a relatively narrow currency peg. At the other end of the spectrum are the countries which allow
their national currency to float on the foreign exchange markets and primarily pursue an inflation or
monetary target. Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic fall into this category. The third group
comprising Hungary, Cyprus, Slovenia and Romania5 peg their exchange rates to the euro while at the
same time allowing the external value of the currency to fluctuate somewhat.
III. Three-stage accession process
The increase in heterogeneity brought about by EU enlargement is frequently perceived as a risk for
the single market and the single currency. It must be noted, however, that the candidates have to meet
a whole range of requirements before they can accede to the EU or EMU. These go far beyond the
nominal convergence criteria so often cited. For this reason, I think we need to take a closer look at
the complex three-stage integration process. At the moment we are in the first phase, which will last
until EU accession. Then comes the second stage, a period of transition characterised by two issues:
entry into the exchange rate mechanism ERM II on the one hand and the convergence test for
membership of EMU on the other. The third stage begins when the accession countries adopt the
euro. The complicated issues involved with the third stage are not covered in this paper.
First Stage: Preparations and conditions for EU accession
In 1993, when the Copenhagen European Council decided that the European Union would be
enlarged to include the twelve candidate countries, it also established the terms of their accession.
The Copenhagen criteria require new member states to demonstrate a sufficient degree of political,
institutional and economic stability, to comply with the obligations arising from membership and to
identify fully with the goals of European integration. Of particular relevance to the Eurosystem are the
economic criterion and the criterion on the adoption of the acquis communautaire, as the body of EU
law is known.
The economic criterion established in Copenhagen requires new EU member states to have a
functioning market economy that is able to cope with competitive pressure within the Union. This
requires, among other things, functioning property rights, competition, free price formation and a
well-developed financial sector. The European Commission's progress reports clearly show that so far
only Malta and Cyprus fully meet the economic criterion. Although Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia are functioning market economies, further efforts
are needed to differing degrees before these economies are able to cope with market forces. In
Bulgaria and Romania the reform effort must be intensified considerably. While great progress has
already been made in terms of liberalising trade and the foreign exchange market and in the
privatisation of business enterprises, prime consideration must be given to economic competitiveness.
If a country is to be able to cope with international competition and if capital is to be channelled
smoothly within a country, it is of paramount importance for the domestic banking and financial sector
to be efficient. This requires a high degree of financial intermediation, liquid capital markets, the banks
having a sufficient capital base, a functioning system of banking and securities supervision and sound
payment systems.
The financial sector in the accession countries is in need of further development. All in all, the banks
have a fairly low level of financial intermediation. This primarily reflects the relatively limited
development position of former transition countries that are still undergoing a restructuring process.
For instance, banking expertise is not yet developed enough in some areas and some banks remain
insufficiently geared towards making a profit.
All this is also reflected in loans to the private sector. Here, the candidate countries display, on
average, only around 30% of GDP or less than one-third of the figure for the EU. The occasionally
very large spreads between loan and deposit rates - which are on average roughly twice as high as in
the EU - point to a risk premium. Some observers interpret this spread as an indication that the
banking system is not yet efficient enough.
On the whole, securities markets do not yet play a major role in the accession countries. Although the
equity markets have grown steadily in importance since 1994, market capitalisation remains small by
comparison with the EU. The bond markets are dominated by government bonds. Corporate bond
markets scarcely exist. None of this is unusual for countries that are in the process of catching up.
However, it does indicate problems with regard to the competitiveness of business enterprises.
If the major significance of the financial sector is taken into account when allocating resources, it
becomes apparent that the accession countries need further structural reforms. The framework
provided by the Copenhagen criteria is intended to ensure this structural convergence. It is a
necessary precondition to accelerating the process of real convergence in the accession countries.
The criterion on adopting the acquis communautaire obliges the accession candidates to implement
and enforce all the European legal acts and regulations. In terms of the later adoption of the single
currency, this relates particularly to the central bank acts, movement of capital, the banking system
and the stability of the financial system.
By virtue of their accession, the central banks of the new EU member states become part of the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). Central bank legislation must therefore be in line with the
relevant provisions of the EC Treaty. The accession countries must accept the primary objective of
maintaining price stability, ensure the institutional, personal and financial independence of their central
banks and prohibit direct public sector financing by the central bank.
In addition, EU accession is conditional upon the liberalisation of capital movements. Nine of the
twelve candidate countries have already been able to conclude provisionally the relevant chapters in
the accession negotiations. However, there are still pronounced differences. Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania have removed all foreign exchange controls and are therefore fully liberalised in this respect,
although there are still some restrictions to the purchase of property or land by foreigners. The Czech
Republic and Bulgaria have also been able to fulfil the relevant capital account provisions of the
acquis to a large extent. In Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia there are restrictions on
shortterm movements of capital, in particular. There are still a considerable number of restrictions in
Cyprus, Malta and Romania.
While the liberalisation of capital movements is essentially non-negotiable, the timing and the
scheduling of the liberalisation steps should be dependent on the macroeconomic facts and the
stability of the financial sector. Free movement of capital actually represents an additional challenge
for the economies concerned. Particularly as their financial sector is not yet fully developed and
reforms in banking supervision have still some way to go, it is best to adopt a step by step approach -
especially if the accession countries are tying their exchange rate to the euro. It is not possible for
monetary policy to be autonomous if the movement of capital is completely liberalised and if the
exchange rate is targeted (impossible trinity6).
Second Stage: The transition period
The period of transition following EU accession is geared to enhancing the convergence needed for
adoption of the single currency. The countries which accede to the EU commit themselves to adopting
the euro at a later date. There is no "opting out". The preparations for EU accession as laid down in
the Copenhagen criteria establish basic rules for later adoption of the euro. Central bank
independence constitutes the institutional basis for increasing harmonisation of exchange rate policy.
Free movement of capital is essential to a meaningful monitoring of the exchange rate criterion. The
reforms relating to the structure and stability of the financial markets speed up the process of real
convergence. At the same time, the process of catching-up by the new EU member states will, of
course, continue after accession.
When acceding to the EU the candidate countries commit themselves to regard economic policy as a
matter of common concern and to submit to the EU mechanism for coordinating and monitoring
economic policy. The objective is for all EU member states to have a stability-oriented economic policy
that is geared to increasing convergence. The Stability and Growth Pact is especially geared to fiscal
policy and establishes the medium-term objective of a balanced public-sector budget.
(a) Participation in the exchange rate mechanism ERM II
In the period of transition exchange rate policy is also a matter of common concern. In accordance
with the Treaty, it is not possible to accede simultaneously to the EU and EMU. Rather, the
convergence criteria require a country to have participated in ERM II for at least two years without
severe tensions. Only then can it join EMU. Whether an even longer transition period would appear
necessary or whether participation in ERM II can take place immediately after EU accession is
dependent on the particular situation of the country in question or on its progress in the convergence
process and in achieving macroeconomic stability.7
With regard to the question of what exchange rate regime would be appropriate, in my view particular
attention must be paid to the following three aspects:
1. EU accession and liberalisation of capital movements could lead to capital flows becoming
more volatile. It is therefore likely to be more difficult to maintain "rigid" exchange rate
regimes.
2. As a result of the catching-up process, the accession countries will probably find their
equilibrium real exchange rates increasing in the years ahead.
3. As inflation rates in some accession countries are still considerably different from those in
the current EU countries, the exchange rate regime must also take account of the risk of
higher current account deficits and of competitiveness.
In the transition period from EU accession to joining EMU, efforts must therefore focus on the
consistency of exchange rate strategy and macroeconomic policy. Participation in the exchange rate
mechanism is only appropriate if pegging the exchange rate more closely to the euro is in line with the
general macroeconomic situation.
In my opinion, the European exchange rate mechanism is an adequate way of preparing for adoption
of the single currency.8 This mechanism can help to limit exchange rate fluctuations in a credible
multilateral system, without preventing a certain degree of exchange rate flexibility.
However, it should be noted that there may be cases, in which even the broad bands of ERM II may
not be wide enough to accomodate the necessary exchange rate adjustments during the integration
process. This may be due, for example, to liberalisation measures or persistent changes in the relative
6
See Frankel, J. (1999), "No Single Currency Regime is Right for All Countries or At All Times", NBER Working Paper No.
7338, Cambridge.
prices. It is therefore best to wait until the initial impact of EU accession is over before taking part in
free
ERM II. This is the best way to avoid speculative attacks. This is particularly true of the present
floating currencies, whose proponents consciously stress exchange rate flexibility or the advantage of
an autonomous monetary policy. Premature participation in the exchange rate mechanism could
prompt the foreign exchange markets to "test" this mechanism.
In countries which have already maintained a fixed exchange rate peg to the euro for some time, it is
argued that the current high degree of integration is "relaxed" by accession to ERM II, in other words
by adopting an exchange rate band. This could lead to the risk of distortions. But in this context it
should be taken into account that in certain circumstances exchange rate bands narrower than +/- 15
percentage points or even currency boards can also be sustained within the framework of ERM II. In
the case of a currency board, however, this would merely involve a unilateral decision by the country
concerned. The Eurosystem would not be under any obligation to intervene in order to support the
currency board.
Other exchange rate systems, such as free floating, crawling pegs or currency boards using reference
currencies other than the euro, are essentially incompatible with ERM II. Neither would the unilateral
introduction of the euro as legal tender (euroisation) be in line with the way to participation in monetary
union foreseen in the EC Treaty. The Treaty requires all candidate countries to adopt the acquis
communautaire in its present form. This means that all candidates must comply with the stages
leading to adoption of the euro provided for in the Treaty.
In any case, euroisation would probably be worth considering, if at all, for those accession countries
that have already had a well functioning currency board or a fixed currency peg for some time. After
euroisation, however, the countries in question could not count on the support of the Eurosystem.
Consequently, they would renounce monetary sovereignty completely without benefiting from the
confidence-building effect of participation in the Eurosystem.
In addition, it should be remembered that a decision to allow a country to participate in monetary union
only makes sense if the economy concerned has proved able to cope with the pressures of the single
market without contravening the convergence criteria of the EC Treaty. The credibility of the whole
Eurosystem is ultimately dependent on the sustained convergence of all participants. The multi-stage
integration process is intended to ensure that this convergence is indeed sustainable. Early adoption
of the euro would simply undermine the integration process.
(b) High degree of lasting convergence before adoption of the euro
The long and carefully planned process of integration culminates in the adoption of the single
currency. Accession to EMU is only possible if the accession countries can show a high degree of
lasting convergence. Pursuant to Article 121 of the EC Treaty, a high degree of convergence has been
attained if the Maastricht convergence criteria have been fulfilled. A clear benchmark is thus set for
attainment of this target. Sustainability of convergence, however, is very difficult to assess. The criteria
do not merely have to be met once at the time of the examination; they also have to be maintained
after that time. Both aspects are important if monetary union is to function smoothly.
A high degree of convergence
The convergence criteria make considerable demands on the accession countries in terms of
macroeconomic stability. The inflation criterion requires a high degree of price stability backed by
market economic conditions. This is necessary to avoid longer and more persistent delays to the
competitiveness within EMU and to allow the development to be as tension-free as possible within the
framework of a single monetary policy. Stable prices create an atmosphere of accountability, increase
transparency and allow resources to be allocated efficiently. They are thus a vital precondition for
growth and employment.
Most candidates have made distinct progress in recent years in terms of macroeconomic stability.
However, counter-developments, especially in prices, have been observed recently; in addition to
internal influences, such as wage developments, these have been the result of external factors - such
as oil prices and the exchange rate of the euro.9 Great efforts are still needed to take the double-digit
rates of inflation in Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Poland back to an acceptable level. In 2000 only
Lithuania and Malta had a rate of inflation which would have been in line with the inflation criterion.
If inflation expectations are to be kept as low as possible and the appropriate underlying conditions for
a stability-oriented monetary policy secured, deficit and debt ratios need to be low. Sound public
finances also ensure that national fiscal policy remains flexible even in times of cyclical downturns.
This room for manoeuvre becomes even more important for the participants in a monetary union since
they no longer have recourse to the instrument of exchange rate adjustments.
With regard to the criteria on the sustainability of public finances, the countries made improvements by
and large up to last year. On average, in 2000 the accession candidates virtually attained the
benchmark of 3% established by the Maastricht convergence criterion. Malta and the Czech Republic,
in particular, still have very high public deficits. Especially against the background of an economic
slowdown, however, some candidate countries are likely to experience a marked deterioration of their
budgetary position in 2001. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the deficits are based on
definitions that are not always fully consistent with those of the EU. Government debt in all the
countries - with the exception of Bulgaria - is around 60% or less.
The interest rate criterion requires an adjustment of the long-term nominal interest rates. In liberalised
capital markets differences in the nominal interest rates primarily reflect expectations with regard to
the development of the rate of inflation, public finances and exchange rate stability. Viewed in this
way, the interest rate criterion provides an assessment, in line with market conditions, of whether the
convergence progress can be sustained over the long term. However, in the run-up to monetary union
it became apparent that interest rate differentials were declining sharply as confidence in accession
grew ("convergence trade").
Sustainable convergence
In terms of EMU accession, the Maastricht criteria are intended to ensure not only a high degree of
convergence, but also its sustainability. Structural discrepancies and differences in the standard of
living could, however, lead to the economies drifting apart again after accession. It is consequently
important to ensure that convergence is sustainable. This is of particular importance for price
performance, to which I shall return in a moment. First, though, it must be said that sustainability is
also vital to fiscal policy. The Treaty states that persistent excessive deficits are to be avoided (Article
104). The Stability and Growth Pact gives concrete expression to the obligation to ensure a
government budget that is in balance over the medium term. The stability programmes stipulate how
and when the objective is to be achieved. The aim is to ensure that the stability orientation of
European monetary policy is not undermined by a lack of fiscal discipline.
The Balassa-Samuelson effect,10 as it is called, means that above-average growth rates in catching-up
countries are accompanied by higher rates of inflation. This is the result of major increases in
productivity in traded goods. In the case of the small open economies of the accession countries, the
resultant improvement in return does not always lead to price reductions and may, instead, lead to
calls for higher wages. The corresponding wage claims in the non-tradable goods sector, which does
not generally show the same progress in terms of productivity, are accompanied by higher unit labour
costs in this sector. The outcome is higher prices in the catching-up countries.
In this connection there have been frequent calls for the definition of price stability in the euro area to
be increased.11 This is intended to prevent inflationary tendencies in the faster growing economies
having to be counterbalanced by deflationary developments in other countries. Several aspects are
problematic.
First, relaxing the objective of stability would undermine the credibility of the ECB in the early stages of
its development. Second, the impact of the Balassa-Samuelson effect needs to be qualified. Estimates
put it somewhere in the range of 1%-3% p.a.12 Given the relatively small economic weight of the
10
See Balassa, B., (1964), „The Purchasing Power Doctrine: A Reappraisal", Journal of Political Economy, Nr. 72, S. 585-596
and Samuelson, P., (1964), „Theoretical Notes on Trade Problems", Review of Economics and Statistics, Nr. 46,
S. 145-154.
candidates, the effects on the European aggregate would therefore be fairly minor. For fundamental
considerations major shortfalls in convergence should not be compensated by relaxing the stability
objective. Fairly minor inflation differences, however, are completely normal in a monetary union and
can be accommodated by the ECB's stability objective of up to almost 2%. They have so far not
jeopardised monetary policy in Europe.
With regard to the enlargement of EMU, I would like to point out that efforts to increase the flexibility of
the labour markets could take account of the sectoral and regional productivity differentials in the
accession economies. Moreover, intensifying competition in the non-tradable sector and a restrained
fiscal policy may be ways of avoiding higher rates of inflation. In any case, such efforts would seem to
make a lot more sense than relaxing the European Central Bank's stability objective.
To ensure the sustainability of convergence, it is vital that not only nominal convergence but also an
appropriate level of real convergence be achieved before accession to EMU. In this connection,
attention should be drawn to the importance of the Copenhagen criteria and the concomitant structural
prior to EU
reforms which lay the foundation for swifter real convergence accession. Nominal and real
convergence are two sides of one coin and should therefore be pursued simultaneously. To put it in a
nutshell, Maastricht meets Copenhagen.
Nonetheless, the desire to achieve monetary stability is often seen to be at odds with the real process
of catching up. It is argued that a monetary policy geared to the objective of stability puts an
unnecessary brake on growth. This is, however, to overlook the fact that, if at all, this could happen in
the short term; over the longer term a stable monetary environment is absolutely essential to price
stability, a healthy investment climate and sustainable growth. This has also been borne out by
numerous empirical studies. The IMF, for instance, shows that most progress is made by precisely
those transition countries that are determined to push forward with monetary stabilisation.13
The criteria laid down in the EC Treaty represent a comprehensive set of rules for enlargement of the
EU and European Monetary Union. If the rules are respected, it will be possible to sustain the degree
of nominal and real convergence that is essential to ensure that European Monetary Union functions
well. With regard to measuring convergence the EC Treaty therefore also refers to the need to take
account of the results of the integration of markets, the situation and development of the balances on
current account and the development of unit labour costs and other price indices (see Article 121 (1)).
The EC Treaty subjects all members to the same criteria, thus avoiding the formation of a two-class
monetary union. To sum up, neither the introduction of new hurdles nor the relaxing of existing criteria
appear economically necessary or politically judicious.
IV. Conclusion
I would like to close by summarising my deliberations with five comments.
1. Accession of central and east European countries as well as Malta and Cyprus to the
European Union represents an unprecedented integration process. Owing to the large
number of candidates and their heterogeneity, not to mention the differences between new
and existing member states, all those involved are faced with major challenges.
2. There is general consensus that the integration of the candidate countries represents both a
political necessity and an economic opportunity. It is perfectly understandable that the
candidates wish to benefit from the prosperity of this large economic area as quickly as
possible. Particularly after the introduction of the single currency, an integration-related
reduction in transaction costs, greater price transparency and a consolidation and expansion
of the capital markets can be expected. In addition, the accession countries stand to benefit
from the ECB's track record. A further decline in inflation rates, capital market rates that are
tending to fall and improved investment terms can be expected.
3. If one considers the major significance of the financial sector for the allocation of resources,
it becomes clear that further structural reforms are needed in the accession countries before
they are ready to join the EU. The framework provided by the Copenhagen criteria is
intended to ensure this structural convergence. It is a necessary precondition to advance the
process of real convergence in the accession countries.
4. Accession to EMU before sustainable convergence has been achieved could prove to be
disadvantageous both for the candidate countries concerned and for the Union as a whole.
For example, forgoing the possibility of using the exchange rate as an adjustment instrument
would be problematic if an insufficient degree of convergence has been attained. The
competitiveness of the candidate countries could even be jeopardised. It is therefore vital
that the Copenhagen and Maastricht criteria for enlargement are actually fulfilled. Before
central and eastern European countries, Malta and Cyprus can participate in EMU, it really
needs to be a case of Maastricht meeting Copenhagen.
5. The unilateral introduction of the euro as legal tender (euroisation) is out of keeping with the
route to membership in monetary union foreseen in the EC Treaty. The Treaty requires all
candidate countries to adopt the acquis communautaire in its present form. This means that
all candidates must comply with the stages leading to adoption of the euro provided for in the
Treaty.