For release on delivery
2:15 a.m. EDT (9:15 a.m. local time)
July 1, 2019
The Federal Reserve's Review of Its Monetary Policy Strategy,
Tools, and Communication Practices
Remarks by
Richard H. Clarida
Vice Chair
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at
"The Bank of Finland Conference on
Monetary Policy and Future of EMU [Economic and Monetary Union]"
Helsinki, Finland
July 1, 2019
I am delighted to be in Helsinki at this important conference on monetary policy
and the future of Europe's monetary union.1 Today I would like to discuss the broad
review of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy framework that my fellow policymakers
and I are undertaking this year. We are examining the policy strategy, tools, and
communication practices that we use to pursue our dual-mandate goals of maximum
employment and price stability. In my remarks, I will describe the motivation for and
scope of this review and discuss some of the events that are taking place. In our review,
we are being transparent and open minded, and we are seeking perspectives from a broad
range of interested individuals and groups, including academics, other specialists, and the
public at large.
Motivation for the Review
The fact that the Federal Reserve is conducting this review does not suggest that
we are dissatisfied with the existing policy framework. Indeed, we believe our existing
framework has served us well, helping us effectively achieve our statutorily assigned
dual-mandate goals. Nonetheless, in light of the unprecedented events of the past decade,
we believe it is a good time to step back and assess whether, and in what possible ways,
we can refine our strategy, tools, and communication practices to achieve and maintain
these goals as consistently and robustly as possible.2 I note that central banks in other
countries have conducted periodic reviews of their monetary policy frameworks, and
their experience has informed the approach we are pursuing.
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With the U.S. economy operating at or close to maximum employment and price
stability, now is an especially opportune time to conduct this review. The unemployment
rate is near a 50-year low, and inflation is running close to our 2 percent objective. By
conducting this review, we are ensuring that we are well positioned to continue to meet
our statutory goals in coming years. In addition, the Federal Reserve used new policy
tools and enhanced its communications in response to the Global Financial Crisis and the
Great Recession, and the review is evaluating these changes. Furthermore, U.S. and
foreign economies have significantly evolved since the pre-crisis experience that
informed much of the research that provided the foundation for our current approach.
Perhaps most significantly, neutral interest rates-or r*-appear to have fallen in
the United States and abroad.3 Moreover, this global decline in r* is widely expected to
persist for years. The decline in neutral policy rates likely reflects several factors,
including aging populations, changes in risk-taking behavior, and a slowdown in
technology growth. These factors' contributions are highly uncertain, but, irrespective of
their precise role, the policy implications of the decline in neutral rates are important. All
else being equal, a fall in neutral rates increases the likelihood that a central bank's policy
rate will reach its effective lower bound (ELB) in future economic downturns. That
development, in turn, could make it more difficult during downturns for monetary policy
to support spending and employment, and keep inflation from falling too low.4
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Another key development in recent decades is that inflation appears less
responsive to resource slack. That is, the short-run Phillips curve appears to have
flattened, implying a change in the dynamic relationship between inflation and
employment.5 A flatter Phillips curve is, in a sense, a proverbial double-edged sword. It
permits the Federal Reserve to support employment more aggressively during
downturns-as was the case during and after the Great Recession-because a sustained
inflation breakout is less likely when the Phillips curve is flatter.6 However, a flatter
Phillips curve also increases the cost, in terms of economic output, of reversing
unwelcome increases in longer-run inflation expectations. Thus, a flatter Phillips curve
makes it all the more important that longer-run inflation expectations remain anchored at
levels consistent with our 2 percent inflation objective.7
Finally, the strengthening of the labor market in recent years has highlighted the
challenges of assessing the proximity of the labor market to full employment. The
5
For evidence of a flattening of the slope of the Phillips curve in the United States and abroad, see, among
others, Simon, Matheson, and Sandri (2013); Blanchard, Cerutti, and Summers (2015); and Bank for
International Settlements (2017).
6
One potential contributor to the flattening of the Phillips curve is a change in the conduct of monetary
policy since the 1980s toward greater stabilization of inflation and economic activity; for evidence of such
a change, see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000); Boivin and Giannoni (2006); and Boivin, Kiley, and
Mishkin (2010). As discussed in Roberts (2006) and Bullard (2018), greater stabilization on the part of a
central bank can lead to the estimation of flatter Phillips curves in reduced-form regressions. Similarly, the
adoption of an explicit inflation objective, along with greater certainty regarding the conduct of monetary
policy, can help anchor longer-term inflation expectations and stabilize actual inflation in response to
shocks.
7
See Yellen (2015) for a discussion of inflation dynamics and monetary policy; see Erceg and others
(2018) for a quantitative exploration of the monetary policy implications of a flat Phillips curve in an
uncertain economic environment. Since the mid-1980s, movements in both realized inflation and measures
of longer-term inflation expectations have been somewhat muted, complicating the task of extracting the
precise role of inflation expectations as a determinant of realized inflation. Faust and Wright (2013) review
the literature on inflation forecasting and present evidence in support of the conclusion that measures of
inflation expectations help predict the trend in inflation. Cecchetti and others (2017) showed that while the
level of realized inflation and four-quarter-ahead inflation expectations are positively correlated, changes in
these variables have been largely uncorrelated since the mid-1980s. These authors suggest that, in a low
and stable inflation environment, policymakers should pay attention to a wide array of other indicators in
determining the implications of movements in realized inflation and measures of inflation expectations.
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unemployment rate, which stood at 3.6 percent in May, has been interpreted by many as
suggesting that the labor market is currently operating beyond full employment.
However, the level of the unemployment rate that is consistent with full employment is
not directly observable and thus must be estimated. I believe the range of plausible
estimates extends to 4 percent or below. For example, in the Summary of Economic
Projections submitted in conjunction with the June meeting of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), the range of estimates for the longer-run normal unemployment rate
is 3.6 to 4.5 percent.8
The decline in the unemployment rate in recent years has been accompanied by a
pronounced increase in labor force participation for individuals in their prime working
years.9 These increases in prime-age participation have provided employers with a
source of additional labor input and have been one factor restraining inflationary
pressures. As with the unemployment rate, whether participation will continue to
increase in a tight labor market remains uncertain.
The strong job gains of recent years also have delivered benefits to groups that
have historically been disadvantaged in the labor market. For example, African
Americans and Hispanics have experienced persistently higher unemployment rates than
whites for many decades.10 However, those unemployment rate gaps have narrowed as
the labor market has strengthened, and there is some indication of an extra benefit to
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these groups as the unemployment rate moves into very low territory.11 Likewise,
although unemployment rates for less-educated workers are persistently higher than they
are for their more-educated counterparts, such gaps appear to narrow as the labor market
strengthens.12 And wage increases in the past couple of years have been strongest for
less-educated workers and for those at the lower end of the wage distribution.13
Scope of the Review
In the Federal Reserve Act, the Congress assigned the Federal Reserve the
responsibility to conduct monetary policy "so as to promote effectively the goals of
maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates."14 Our
review this year takes this statutory mandate as given and also takes as given that
inflation at a rate of 2 percent is most consistent over the longer run with the
congressional mandate.
Our existing monetary policy strategy is laid out in the Committee's Statement on
Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy.15 First adopted in January 2012, the
11
See Aaronson and others (2019) for evidence on the relative behavior of unemployment rates by race and
ethnicity in a strong labor market. The authors find similar patterns for labor force participation rates and
for employment-to-population ratios.
12
Disparities in labor market outcomes are also evident between urban and rural areas of the United States.
However, these gaps have not narrowed as the labor market has strengthened. The box "Employment
Disparities between Rural and Urban Areas" in the Board's February 2019 Monetary Policy Report
examines these disparities in more detail; see Board of Governors (2019, pp. 10-12). See also Weingarden
(2017).
13
Wage gains for workers with different wage levels and with different levels of education can be
calculated using data from the Current Population Survey from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The
Economic Policy Institute (2019) provides convenient tabulations of these data.
14
Even though the act lists three distinct goals, the Federal Reserve's mandate for monetary policy is
commonly known as the "dual mandate." The reason is that an economy in which people who want to
work either have a job or are likely to find one fairly quickly and in which the price level (meaning a broad
measure of the price of goods and services purchased by consumers) is stable creates the conditions needed
for interest rates to settle at moderate levels. For a discussion, see Mishkin (2007). Quoted text from the
Federal Reserve Act is in 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2000),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/section2a.htm.
15
The statement is available on the Board's website at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC_LongerRunGoals.pdf.
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statement has been reaffirmed at the start of each subsequent year, including at the
FOMC's meeting this past January with unanimous support from all 17 FOMC
participants. The statement indicates that the Committee seeks to mitigate deviations of
inflation from 2 percent and deviations of employment from assessments of its maximum
level. In doing so, the FOMC recognizes that these assessments of maximum
employment are necessarily uncertain and subject to revision. According to the Federal
Reserve Act, the employment objective is on an equal footing with the inflation
objective.
As a practical matter, our current strategy shares many elements with the policy
framework known in the research literature as "flexible inflation targeting."16 However,
the Fed's mandate is much more explicit about the role of employment than that of most
flexible inflation-targeting central banks, and our statement reflects this by stating that
when the two sides of the mandate are in conflict, neither one takes precedent over the
other. We believe this transparency about the balanced approach the FOMC takes has
served us well over the past decade when high unemployment called for extraordinary
policies that entailed some risk of inflation.
The review of our current framework is wide ranging, and we are not prejudging
where it will take us, but events of the past decade highlight three broad questions.
Three Questions
The first question is, "Can the Federal Reserve best meet its statutory objectives
with its existing monetary policy strategy, or should it consider strategies that aim to
reverse past misses of the inflation objective?"
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Under our current approach as well as that of most flexible inflation-targeting
central banks around the world, the persistent shortfalls of inflation from 2 percent that
many advanced economies have experienced over most of the past decade are treated as
"bygones." This means that policy today is not adjusted to offset past inflation shortfalls
with future overshoots of the inflation target (nor do persistent overshoots of inflation
trigger policies that aim to undershoot the inflation target). Central banks are generally
believed to have effective tools for preventing persistent inflation overshoots, but the
ELB on interest rates makes persistent undershoots more likely. Persistent inflation
shortfalls carry the risk that longer-term inflation expectations become poorly anchored
or become anchored below the stated inflation goal.17
In part because of that concern, some economists have advocated "makeup"
strategies under which policymakers seek to undo, in part or in whole, past inflation
deviations from target. Such strategies include targeting average inflation over a
multiyear period and price-level targeting, in which policymakers seek to stabilize the
price level around a constant growth path.18 These strategies could be implemented
17
These risks could be exacerbated if households and businesses expect monetary policy to be
insufficiently accommodative because of proximity to the ELB. For related discussions, see Reifschneider
and Williams (2000); Adam and Billi (2007); Nakov (2008); and Hills, Nakata, and Schmidt (2016).
18
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) provide an early discussion of how optimal monetary policy at the ELB
entails a commitment to reflate the price level during the subsequent economic expansion. Nessén and
Vestin (2005) discuss the relationship between average inflation targeting and price-level targeting. There
is a dearth of empirical evidence on strategies seeking to make up for inflation deviations. Central banks
that pursue an inflation goal generally seek to achieve a specific rate of inflation by some time horizon-
typically a couple of years ahead or over the "medium run"-without regard to past inflation deviations.
One exception is the Reserve Bank of Australia, whose inflation goal is specified as a range of
"2-3 per cent, on average, over the medium term" and thus might embed some notion of history
dependence. However, Ruge-Murcia (2014) argues that the drift in the price level in Australia is
comparable with the drifts observed in economies with purely forward-looking specification of the inflation
goal. The only known historical example of price-level targeting occurred in Sweden from 1931 to 1933
when the country abandoned the gold standard and attempted instead to maintain its price level. The
temporary adoption of price-level targeting is credited with helping Sweden avoid deflation, an outcome
that contrasted with that in countries that stayed on the gold standard. See Berg and Jonung (1999).
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either permanently or as a temporary response to extraordinary circumstances. For
example, the central bank could commit, at the time when the policy rate reaches the
ELB, to maintain the policy rate at this level until inflation over the ELB period has, on
average, run at the target rate.19 Other makeup strategies seek to reverse shortfalls in
policy accommodation at the ELB by keeping the policy rate lower for longer than
otherwise would be the case.20 In many models that incorporate the ELB, these makeup
strategies lead to better average performance on both legs of the dual mandate and
thereby, viewed over time, provide no conflict between the dual-mandate goals.21
The benefits of the makeup strategies rest heavily on households and firms
believing in advance that the makeup will, in fact, be delivered when the time comes-
for example, that a persistent inflation shortfall will be met by future inflation above
2 percent. As is well known from the research literature, makeup strategies, in general,
are not time consistent because when the time comes to push inflation above 2 percent,
conditions at that time will not warrant doing so. Because of this time inconsistency, any
makeup strategy, to be successful, would have to be understood by the public to represent
a credible commitment. That important real-world consideration is often neglected in the
academic literature, in which central bank "commitment devices" are simply assumed to
exist and be instantly credible on decree. Thus, one of the most challenging questions is
19
See Bernanke (2017) for a discussion of such a strategy. See Hebden and López-Salido (2018) for a
quantitative assessment of that and other strategies. See also Kiley and Roberts (2017) for a strategy in
which policymakers aim for inflation higher than 2 percent during economic expansions to compensate for
below-target realizations of inflation during economic downturns.
20
See Reifschneider and Williams (2000) for a strategy in which a central bank following a Taylor rule
makes up for shortfalls in policy accommodation during ELB episodes by subsequently keeping the policy
rate lower than otherwise. The box "Complexities of Monetary Policy Rules" in the Board's July 2018
Monetary Policy Report contains an application of such a modified rule; see Board of Governors (2018b,
pp. 37-41).
21
See English, López-Salido, and Tetlow (2015) for applications of flexible price-level targeting and
nominal income-targeting strategies to a quantitative model of the U.S. economy.
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whether the Fed could, in practice, attain the benefits of makeup strategies that are
possible in models.
The next question the review will consider is, "Are the existing monetary policy
tools adequate to achieve and maintain maximum employment and price stability, or
should the toolkit be expanded? And, if so, how?" The FOMC's primary means of
changing the stance of monetary policy is by adjusting its target range for the federal
funds rate. In December 2008, the FOMC cut that target to just above zero in response to
financial turmoil and deteriorating economic conditions. Because the U.S. economy
required additional policy accommodation after the ELB was reached, the FOMC
deployed two additional tools in the years following the crisis: balance sheet policies and
forward guidance about the likely path of the federal funds rate.22
The FOMC altered the size and composition of the Fed's balance sheet through a
sequence of three large-scale securities purchase programs, via a maturity extension
program, and by adjusting the reinvestment of principal payments on maturing securities.
With regard to forward guidance, the FOMC initially made "calendar based" statements,
and, later on, it issued "outcome based" guidance. Overall, the empirical evidence
suggests that these added tools helped stem the crisis and support economic recovery by
strengthening the labor market and lifting inflation back toward 2 percent. That said,
estimates of the effects of these unconventional policies range widely.23
In addition to assessing the efficacy of these existing tools, we will examine
additional tools to ease policy when the ELB is binding. During the crisis and its
aftermath, the Federal Reserve considered but ultimately found some of the tools
deployed by foreign central banks wanting relative to the alternatives it did pursue. But
the review will reassess the case for these and other tools in light of more recent
experience in other countries.
The third question the review will consider is, "How can the FOMC's
communication of its policy framework and implementation be improved?" Our
communication practices have evolved considerably since 1994, when the Federal
Reserve released the first statement after an FOMC meeting. Over the past decade or so,
the FOMC has enhanced its communication practices both to promote public
understanding of its policy goals, strategy, and actions and to foster democratic
accountability. These enhancements include the Statement on Longer-Run Goals and
Monetary Policy Strategy; postmeeting press conferences; various statements about the
principles and strategy guiding the Committee's normalization of monetary policy; and
quarterly summaries of individual FOMC participants' economic projections,
assessments about the appropriate path of the federal funds rate, and judgments of the
uncertainty and balance of risks around their projections.24
effects of balance sheet policies, see Gagnon and others (2011), Joyce and others (2011), Hamilton and Wu
(2012), D'Amico and King (2013), and Swanson (2017). For discussions of the macroeconomic effects of
these policy actions, see Chen, Cúrdia, and Ferrero (2012); Baumeister and Benati (2013); Engen, Laubach,
and Reifschneider (2015); Chung and others (2019), and the references therein. For related assessments of
forward guidance, see Campbell and others (2012); Engen, Laubach, and Reifschneider (2015); Campbell
and others (2017); and Swanson (2017).
24
Starting in 1979, the Federal Reserve published a summary of individual economic projections from
various Board members, FOMC members, or FOMC participants in the semiannual Monetary Policy
Report. With the introduction of the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) in 2007, the FOMC
increased the frequency of the releases of policymaker projections, expanded the set of economic variables
included, and extended the forecast horizon. Because the SEP includes individual contributions of
As part of the review, we will assess the Committee's current and past
communications and additional forms of communication that could be helpful. For
example, there might be ways to improve communication about the coordination of
policy tools or the interplay between monetary policy and financial stability.
Activities and Timeline for the Review
Let me turn now to our review process.25 The Board and the Reserve Banks are
conducting Fed Listens events, during which we are hearing from a broad range of
interested individuals and groups, including business and labor leaders, community
development professionals, and academics.
One of our Fed Listens events was a research conference at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago in early June, with speakers and panelists from outside the Fed. I would
like to give a brief summary of what we heard there: Janice Eberly, James Stock, and
Jonathan Wright provided a thorough and thoughtful evaluation of the Federal Reserve's
monetary policy strategy, tools, and communications since 2009. Lars Svensson
evaluated the pros and cons of several monetary policy strategies that have makeup
features, and argued that average inflation targeting could be more likely than price-level
targeting to be understood by the public and garner credibility. Cynthia Wu and Eric
Sims used a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to analyze the efficacy of
several policy tools at the ELB-forward guidance, negative interest rates, and asset
purchases-and the interactions between them. Stephen Cecchetti and Kermit
Schoenholtz assessed the Federal Reserve's communication practices and offered
suggestions for improving our most important communication vehicles.
In other sessions, Katharine Abraham and John Haltiwanger developed an
innovative search-and-matching model to estimate labor market slack-which
complements the standard estimates based on unemployment gaps and Phillips curve
relationships. Maurice Obstfeld examined the ways that global economic integration
affects inflation and the neutral rate of interest, and the role played by the U.S. dollar in
transmitting the Federal Reserve's monetary policy to other countries. Anil Kashyap and
Caspar Siegert spoke about the interplay between financial stability considerations and
monetary policy.
Our conference also included two sessions with national and community leaders.
A panel discussion moderated by Fed Governor Lael Brainard provided a valuable
perspective on the labor market that could not otherwise be gleaned from the aggregate
statistics we often consult. Another panel discussion moderated by Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston President Eric Rosengren offered valuable perspectives about how the
monetary levers we pull and push affect communities, credit availability, and small
businesses.
In addition to the Chicago conference, 7 of the 12 Reserve Banks have hosted Fed
Listens sessions, and other events are planned for later this year. From these listening
sessions, we have heard about innovative partnerships involving employers, workforce
development groups, and community colleges to fill training gaps, and about greater
flexibility in the workplace around entry requirements and working arrangements. This
innovation and flexibility are coming when the labor market is tight and qualified
workers are scarce, and so are welcome developments from the perspective of job
creation and retention. All of our Fed Listens events are being conducted with a high
degree of transparency. (You can view videos of the events or read the summaries on our
website.)
In coming regularly scheduled FOMC meetings, we will begin our own
assessment of our monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices,
informed by what we heard at the conference and during our listening sessions in the
Federal Reserve Districts and by the work of our staff. When the Committee tackles
important issues, we take the time for wide-ranging and candid discussions, and so I
expect our deliberations will continue over several meetings for the remainder of this
year. We will share our findings with the public when we have completed our review,
likely during the first half of next year.
Concluding Thoughts
The economy is constantly evolving, bringing with it new policy challenges. So it
makes sense for us to remain open minded as we assess current practices and consider
ideas that could potentially enhance our ability to deliver on the goals the Congress has
assigned us. For this reason, my colleagues and I do not want to preempt or to predict
our ultimate finding. What I can say is that any refinements or more material changes to
our framework that we might make will be aimed solely at enhancing our ability to
achieve and sustain our dual-mandate objectives in the world we live in today.
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