Anand Sinha: Macroprudential policies - Indian experience
Address by Mr Anand Sinha, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, at the Eleventh
Annual International Seminar on Policy Challenges for the Financial Sector on "Seeing both
the Forest and the Trees - Supervising Systemic Risk", co-hosted by The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The International Monetary Fund, and The World
Bank, Washington DC, 2 June 2011.
* * *
Inputs from Dr. D P Rath, Muneesh Kapur and Rajinder Kumar are gratefully acknowledged.
Introduction
1. Good Morning. It gives me great pleasure to share with you our experience in
implementing macroprudential policies in India. The current global financial crisis has brought
to fore serious lacunae in the approach to regulation and supervision and put the issue of
systemic risk on to the regulatory agenda. A comprehensive definition of systemic risk is,
"The risk of disruptions to financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of
the financial system, and can have serious negative consequences for the real economy."1
2. There are two facets to systemic risk. One is in terms of its distribution within the
system at any given point in time and another is its evolution with time. The cross-sectional
dimension is how risk is distributed within the system at any given point in time. Systemic risk
in this dimension arises due to the inter-connectedness of institutions, balance sheet
entanglements, common exposures and, sometimes, even common business models of
financial institutions. The time dimension on the other hand deals with how aggregate risks in
the financial system evolve over time - the procyclicality issues in the financial system. The
dynamics of the financial system and the macroeconomy interact with each other increasing
the amplitude of booms and busts. The larger is the boom, the larger is the bust and larger is
the damage to the economy.
Systemic risk management and macro prudential policy
3. The set of policies which deal with managing the downside of systemic risk is known
as macro prudential policy. Macroprudential policies primarily use prudential tools to limit
systemic risk and thereby minimize disruptions in the provision of key financial services that
can have serious consequences for the economy by (i) dampening the buildup of financial
imbalances; (ii) building defenses that contain the speed and sharpness of subsequent
downswings and their effects on the economy; and (iii) identifying and addressing common
exposures, risk concentrations, linkages and inter-dependencies that are sources of
contagion and spillover risks that may jeopardize the functioning of the system as a whole2.
While the third objective of macroprudential policy [(iii) above] is concerned with the
crosssectional dimension, the first two objectives [(i) and (ii) above] are concerned with the
procyclicality issues. The second objective of building defenses, i.e., increasing the resilience
of the financial system is viewed as a narrow objective and is attained by build-up of buffers
during boom times which can be used when risks materialize during busts. The first objective
of dampening the buildup of financial imbalances is considered a broader objective and is
essentially "leaning against the wind" aspect during the boom phase for dampening the credit
and asset price boom. The buildup of buffers should achieve this objective by affecting the
cost of credit, though evidence is not unequivocal in this regard. A more ambitious
interpretation of the first objective would be moderation of credit supply through both booms
and busts i.e. ensuring stable credit supply. While the objective of dampening the credit
exuberance during boom and, thereby, moderate credit supply looks plausible, increasing
credit supply during busts by leaning against the wind i.e. by releasing buffers, does not
seem as plausible because of risk aversion that is likely to set in among banks and other
economic agents as well as the market pressure and expectation from banks to maintain
high levels of capital when risks are apparently highest. Thus macroprudential policy is likely
to have asymmetric impact from "leaning against the wind" during booms and busts. BCBS
and FSB are currently involved in developing a range of macroprudential policies to deal with
the procyclicality issues as also with systemically important financial institutions and other
aspects of systemic risk on account of inter-connectedness and common exposures.
4. Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has been using macroprudential polices, more notably
the countercyclical policies, since 2004 as a toolkit for ensuring financial stability though it
had used them sporadically even earlier. It would be useful to describe the broad structure of
the Indian financial system and the linkages between the monetary policy and financial
stability in India, to provide a backdrop for discussing the implementation of polices.
Structure of the Indian financial system
5. The Indian financial system is heavily dominated by commercial banks. Within the
banking system, public sector banks (majority shareholding held by the Government of India)
account for nearly 70 per cent of the banking system assets.
6. RBI regulates banking sector, non-banking financial companies (NBFCs), as also the
money, forex and Government securities markets which are dominated by banks. Thus, the
interconnectedness channels, both from the institutional and market perspectives, come
within the regulatory ambit of RBI. There are separate regulators for capital markets,
insurance sector and pension funds. With many Indian banks having expanded into the
above mentioned activities through subsidiaries, associates or otherwise, there has been a
need for coordination among sectoral regulators which has been ensured through
interregulatory bodies within the umbrella of a high level committee chaired by the Governor, RBI
and with representatives from Ministry of Finance. This institutional arrangement has recently
undergone a change with the establishment of the Financial Sector Development Council
(FSDC) chaired by the Finance Minister.
Role of RBI in maintaining financial stability
7. The Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 provides a broad legal mandate to RBI to
secure monetary stability and generally to operate the currency and credit system of the
country to its advantage. In practice this meant the dual objective of growth and price
stability, the relative emphasis being dependent on the context. Since 2004, RBI has added
financial stability as an additional objective in view of the fast growing size and importance of
the Indian financial sector3. It is in this setting that RBI has been using macroprudential
framework in both time and cross-sectional dimensions for quite long without christening
these policies as macroprudential policies as is the case with some other countries, notably
some Asian countries. Operationally, while pursuing multiple objectives, multiple indicators,
including growth in credit and money, are used to track the macroeconomic conditions. India
being a bank-dominated economy, the bank credit becomes a key monetary policy
transmission channel. Thus, the aggregate bank credit growth has always formed an
important variable in the conduct of monetary and countercyclical policies.
Elements of macro-prudential framework in India
Overview
8. RBI's countercyclical policies have focused on banks due to the centrality and
criticality of the banking system in the Indian economy. In any case, application of
countercyclical policies to the shadow banking system i.e. the Non-Banking Financial Companies
(NBFCs) is extremely challenging. These policies have aimed at increasing the resilience of
the banking system. The instruments used have been time varying risk weights and
provisioning norms on standard assets for certain specific sectors wherein excessive credit
growth, in conjunction with sharp rise in asset prices, has caused apprehension of potential
build-up of systemic risk and asset bubbles. In the process, the policies have "leaned"
against the wind and have had the desired effect of moderating the credit boom in the
specified sectors both through signaling effect and affecting the cost of credit. Evidence,
though limited, suggests that the leaning against the wind has been more effective in
dampening the lending exuberance in the boom phase than in the downturn in ensuring a
stable credit supply. Several measures have been taken to reduce the inter-connectedness
among banks on the one hand and between banks and NBFCs on the other, and limits have
been placed on common exposures to address the cross-sectional dimension of systemic
risk.
Objective of counter-cyclical policies
9. The objective of these policies is best stated in the words of Dr. Y.V Reddy, former
Governor RBI. "The RBI articulated its approach to countercyclicality in its policies by
indicating the criticality of the banking system for large segments of the population and for
the economy as a whole. Hence the RBI adopted a precautionary approach to essentially
protect the banking system from a "bust" were it to occur for any reason."4 This was amplified
in October 2005 in the Mid-term Review of Annual Policy for the year 2005-06, while
increasing provisioning on standard assets across the board (except for SMEs and
agriculture):
"Traditionally, banks' loans and advances portfolio is pro-cyclical and tends to
grow faster during an expansionary phase and grows slowly during a
recessionary phase. During times of expansion and accelerated credit growth,
there is a tendency to underestimate the level of inherent risk and the converse
holds good during times of recession. This tendency is not effectively addressed
by the prudential specific provisioning requirements for the impaired assets since
they capture risk ex post but not ex ante.
The various options available for reducing the element of pro-cyclicality including,
among others, adoption of objective methodologies for dynamic provisioning
requirements, as is being done by a few countries, by estimating the
requirements over a business cycle rather than a year on the basis of the
riskiness of the assets, establishment of a linkage between the prudential capital
requirements and through-the-cycle ratings instead of point-in-time ratings and
establishment of a flexible loan-to-value (LTV) ratio requirements where the LTV
ratio would be directly related to the movement of asset values."
10. It is apparent that the policy does not specifically mention ensuring stable credit
supply though this would certainly be a collateral objective. It is also notable that while other
available options i.e., dynamic provisioning, through the cycle ratings for capital purposes
and time varying LTV ratios have been discussed, the policy prescription preferred was
increasing provisions on standard assets which is somewhat akin to dynamic provisioning
though not exactly similar. Moreover, RBI never used cap on LTV ratios till much later in
2010 but in a different context.
Methodology
11. Ideally, a sound macro-prudential policy should be based on the determination of
the economic cycles, assessment and measurement of the build-up of systemic risk and also
the effect of the stance of other public policies like monetary policy, fiscal policy etc., on the
risk taking behavior of the financial sector. Since the development of a framework is in
infancy, RBI's methodology has not been based on extensive statistical analysis or modeling
or on determination of build-up of asset bubbles. It is largely judgmental based on trends in
aggregate credit and sectoral credit growth in the macro-economic settings. For this reason,
it has not been rule bound which will require either some model or at least some
measurement of systemic risk and its sensitivity to the prudential parameters. While
undertaking counter-cyclical measures during the high GDP and high credit growth period of
2004-08, there was no explicit attempt to determine the deviation of the credit to GDP ratio
from its long term trend, though the GDP growth and the macro-economic setting were kept
in view. Similarly, the possibility and not the absolute proof of asset bubbles was explored in
terms of broad indicators and possible threats5. Some evidence from Annual Financial
Inspections of banks carried out by RBI, together with market intelligence on possible
loosening of underwriting standards due to aggressive lending, was also factored in.
Dimensions of RBI's macro-prudential policies
Counter-cyclical policies
12. Implementation of countercyclical capital and provisioning regulations in India during the
period from December 2004 to December 2010 is reflected in Table 1 below.
13. Table 2 indicates the movement in monetary measures as well as the movement in
the provisioning norms and risk weights of the specific sectors during the three phases of
implementation of the countercyclical policies.
14. The period covered in Table 2 is divided into three distinct phases from monetary
policy perspective which correspond to three phases from countercyclical policy perspective.
The monetary tightening and easing phase corresponds respectively to increase in sectoral
capital and provisioning requirements (build up phase) and easing of these requirements
(release phase). The period wise classification from this perspective is: - (i) Build-up phase:
September 2004-August 2008, (ii) Release Phase: October 2008-April 2009, and
(iii) Re-build-up phase: October 2009 till date. It may be noted that the monetary and
countercyclical measures have always been in the same direction i.e. have been
complementary so far.
Build-up phase: (September 2004-August 2008)
15. During 2004-08, the Indian economy exhibited high real GDP growth, of around
9 per cent per annum. Given the high growth and inflationary pressures, monetary policy was
in a tightening mode to contain aggregate demand and inflation. During this period, India also
received large capital flows, which were intermediated by the banking sector. High growth
created a huge demand for bank credit. While the overall bank credit growth accelerated
sharply (to over 30 per cent), credit growth to certain sectors such as real estate accelerated
much more sharply (reaching more than 100 per cent, year-on-year, for an extended period
April 2005-July 2006 and remained above 50 per cent till later than mid-2007).
Concomitantly, asset prices, especially those of real estate, rose sharply. This exposed the
banking sector to huge risks. In view of the rapid credit expansion in the period 2003-06, it
was explicitly indicated by the RBI in April 2006 that growth of non-food bank credit, including
investments in bonds/debentures/shares of public sector undertakings and private corporate
sector and commercial paper, would be calibrated to decelerate to around 20 per cent during
2006-07 from a growth of above 30 per cent. Inflationary expectations had also started
firming up and as a part of monetary management, the repo rate was increased by 300 basis
points in stages to 9 per cent by August 2008 from its level of 6 per cent in September 2004.
Further, the Cash Reserve Ratio was also raised by 450 basis points in stages from 4.5 per
cent in September 2004 to 9 per cent. In order to protect banks' balance sheets against such
risks, the Reserve Bank tightened prudential norms in the form of provisioning norms and
risk weights in specific sectors beginning October 2004 (Table 1).
16. Noticing the steep increase in bank credit to the commercial real estate sector in
conjunction with that in the prices of real estate, risk weights for banks' exposure to
commercial real estate were increased from 100 per cent to 125 per cent in July 2005, and
further to 150 percent in May 2006. The risk weights on housing loans extended by banks to
individuals, were increased from 50 to 75 per cent in December 2004. Subsequently, while
the risk weights on smaller size housing loans (priority sector) were reduced from 75 to
50 per cent, the risk weights on larger loans and those with LTV ratio exceeding 75 per cent
were increased to 100 per cent. When there was a boom in consumer credit and equities,
risk weights for consumer credit and capital market exposures were increased from
100 percent to 125 per cent. The provisions for standard assets were revised upwards
progressively in November 2005, May 2006 and January 2007, in view of the continued high
credit growth in the real estate sector, personal loans, credit cards receivables, loans and
advances qualifying as capital market exposures and loans and advances to the NBFCs. The
provisioning requirement for all other loans and advances classified as standard assets,
namely, direct advances to the agricultural and small and medium enterprise sectors and all
other loans and advances were kept unchanged.
17. The tightening of prudential norms made the credit to targeted sectors costlier
thereby moderating the flow of credit to these sectors. There is evidence that moderation in
credit flow to these sectors was also in part due to banks becoming cautious in lending to
these sectors on the signaling effect of RBI's perception of build up of sectoral risks. For
instance, these measures helped moderate the flow of credit to the commercial real estate
sector. The credit growth decelerated to around 50 per cent by 2008 from a very high level of
around 150 per cent (Y-o-Y basis) in late 2005 as shown in the graph below.
18. Simultaneously, as indicated earlier, monetary policy was also in a tightening mode to
contain demand pressures. Thus, while monetary tightening helped in containing the overall
credit growth, prudential norms moderated the credit growth to the specific sectors. Thus,
monetary policy and prudential norms complemented each other. That is, we deployed both
interest rates and prudential instruments during 2004-08 to ensure both price stability and
financial stability.
Release phase: 2008-09 (October 2008 to April 2009)
19. The Indian economy was also impacted by the global financial crisis, though a major
part of the impact was felt indirectly through channels of trade and cross-border capital flows.
In order to mitigate the adverse impact of the global financial crisis on the Indian economy,
the Reserve Bank aggressively eased the monetary policy. During this period, prudential
norms were also relaxed in a countercyclical fashion, again mainly following a sectoral
approach (Tables 1 and 2). The relaxations focused primarily on real estate and NBFC
sector as these were the segments which had been most severely hit due to the downturn. In
addition to easing of risk weights and provisioning norms for standard assets, RBI's
prudential framework governing restructuring of advances (corporate workouts) was also
temporarily modified to facilitate restructuring of greater number of units which had potential
viability but had been affected in a most unexpected manner. However, despite the easing of
monetary policy and aggressive relaxation in prudential measures in a countercyclical
fashion, the credit growth slowed down substantially due to, among other reasons, subdued
credit demand and risk aversion among banks as is clear from Table 3.
Table 3
Credit to select sectors during September 2008 to September 2009
(Per cent)
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
20. The credit growth, overall as well as to the target sectors, decelerated. During
October 2008 to September 2009, the credit growth to commercial real estate (CRE)
decelerated from 45 per cent to 34 per cent on a year-on-year basis, to NBFCs from 61 per
cent to 30 per cent, and to housing from 11 per cent to 6 per cent (Table 3). The total
nonfood credit during the same period decelerated from 29 per cent to 13 per cent.
Re-build phase: October 2009 onwards
21. By late 2009, domestic growth began to recover from the slowdown induced by the
global financial crisis. However, while the overall credit growth continued to remain subdued,
credit growth to the commercial real estate sector remained high well above the overall credit
growth (Table 4). As indicated in para 19, in the wake of the global financial crisis, the
Reserve Bank had temporarily modified its prudential guidelines for restructuring of
advances. However, the extent of restructured advances to the commercial real estate sector
was relatively high. Accordingly, provisioning norms on standard assets were increased for
the commercial real estate sector in November 2009. This was the period when the Reserve
Bank began exiting from crisis-driven expansionary monetary policy as India was confronted
with an upturn in inflation - a rising wholesale price index (WPI) inflation and stubbornly
elevated consumer price index (CPI) inflation. The exit began by reversing the immediately
reversible unconventional measures such as, restoring of export credit refinance facility to
pre-crisis level, and discontinuation of special refinancing facilities extended to scheduled
commercial banks, etc.
Table 4
Deployment of gross bank credit by major sectors
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
22. In December 2009, as the economy had just emerged from the crisis, there were
apprehensions about asset quality on account of exuberant lending during the boom phase.
Since banks were still making good profits, it was decided to prescribe a Provisioning
Coverage Ratio (PCR) of 70 percent of gross non-performing advances, as a
macroprudential measure, with a view to augmenting provisioning buffer in a counter-cyclical
manner. Banks had to achieve this by September 2010.
23. PCR was intended to be an interim measure and it was hoped that it would be
replaced by a forward-looking counter-cyclical provisioning methodology being developed by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) or by a methodology similar to Spanish dynamic provisioning
framework we are working on. Since in the absence of a calibrated methodology it would be
difficult to allow banks to use the countercyclical provisions built up under PCR freely and
there were certain design issues too, it was decided to freeze the PCR with reference to the
gross NPA position in banks as on September 30, 2010. The buffer (surplus of provisions
over specific provisions) will be allowed to be used by banks for making specific provisions
for NPAs during periods of system wide downturn, with the prior approval of RBI. It may be
added that the banking system has already exceeded the 70 per cent PCR though some
banks have yet to reach that level.
24. By November 2010, the Reserve Bank had raised the policy rate by 150-200 basis
points on account of concerns about high and stubborn inflation. During this period,
residential property prices had risen sharply and had attained the pre-crisis level. Some
banks had come out with certain residential housing loan schemes (teaser loans and 10:90
scheme) where RBI had apprehensions about asset quality going forward. Moreover, it was
felt that these schemes were creating artificial demand for housing loans which could push
up the housing prices further (which had already reached pre-crisis levels) with the potential
of putting housing beyond the reach of many. In November 2010, therefore, the Reserve
Bank initiated the following measures: (i) the provisioning norm for "standard" teaser housing
loans was increased from 0.4 per cent to 2.0 per cent in November 2010; (ii) for the first time
a cap on Loan To Value (LTV) ratio was prescribed at 80 per cent in December 2010 for
loans above Rs.2 million and at 90 per cent for loans up to Rs.2 million; and (iii) the risk
weight for residential housing loans of Rs.7.5 million and above, irrespective of the LTV ratio,
was raised to 125 per cent. These measures are, however, intended to serve more a
microprudential rather than a macro-prudential objective.
25. Concluding observations on countercyclical policies
(i) View regarding the implementation of countercyclical policies was based on tracking
of various indicators in the economy, notably the general credit growth and the
sectoral credit growth. This was complemented with market intelligence and some
feedback from the Annual Financial Inspections of banks. No detailed statistical
analysis or modelling was used. The decisions were judgmental based on constant
monitoring of macroeconomy and were not rule based.
(ii) RBI, being the monetary authority as well as the regulator and supervisor of banks,
NBFCs and important segments of markets i.e. forex, Govt. Securities and money
markets, had the necessary information and overall view of the risks building up in
the system. It was, therefore, well placed to operate the countercyclical policies.
(iii) Monetary policy and the countercyclical policy were in the same direction (Table 2).
Such a coordinated response was facilitated due to RBI's wide regulatory ambit. If
policies are not well coordinated, the costs of implementing such policies may be
high.
(iv) It was important to deal with sectoral exuberance through countercyclical policies
even as monetary policy, while dealing with inflation scenario, dealt with generalised
exuberance. Interest rate alone, being a blunt instrument, would not have been able
to handle the sectoral exuberance, or else, the cost to the economy would have
been higher.
(v) Combination of risk weights and provisioning requirements for standard assets were
used as countercyclical policies. It would appear, however, that varying the
provisioning requirements may have been more effective than varying risk weights
in moderating credit flow to the specific sectors. This is because, since the average
capital adequacy ratio of banks operating in India has been well above 12 per cent
for the last many years (as on December 2010, it was above 14 per cent), risk
weights may not always be effective in dampening the growth of credit as banks can
continue to finance riskier sectors yielding higher returns by allowing their capital
adequacy ratios to fall by a few basis points and still remain much above the
regulatory requirements. To the extent higher risk weights translate into increase in
interest rates, demand for credit may come down. On the other hand, varying
provisioning requirement would be potentially more effective as it would impact the
Profit and Loss account of banks to which banks are more sensitive.
(vi) The countercyclical policies were able to dampen exuberant credit growth in the
targeted sectors. However, their effect was asymmetrical during downturn. Despite
aggressive easing of monetary policy and prudential measures in a countercyclical
fashion, the credit supply did not increase adequately. The credit growth slowed
down substantially due to, among other reasons, subdued credit demand and risk
aversion among banks.
(vii) Since the monetary policy and countercyclical policies have operated in tandem, it is
difficult to isolate the effect of countercyclical policies from that of monetary policy.
Dealing with cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk
26. To address systemic risks arising out of inter-connectedness among banks and
between banks and NBFCs (shadow banks) and from common exposures, some of the
important measures taken are as under:
27. Prudential limits
(i) For limiting interconnectedness of banks, prudential limits have been put on
aggregate interbank liabilities as a proportion of their net worth
(ii) In order to ensure that inter-bank market functions in a non-disruptive manner,
access to un-collateralised funding market is restricted to banks and primary dealers
and there are caps on both lending as well as borrowing by these entities.
(iii) Investment in the capital instruments of other banks and financial institutions is
restricted to 10% of investing banks' capital funds, in addition to the stipulation that a
bank cannot hold more than 5% of other bank's equity. Though these cross-holding
limits are primarily designed to ensure that the capital of banks and financial
institutions is contributed largely by investors outside the financial system, reduction
in inter-connectedness is also a collateral objective.
(iv) In order to contain regulatory arbitrage, banks' exposure to NBFCs is subject to tight
limits and NBFCs have been increasingly subjected to more stringent prudential
regulations. Systemically important NBFCs are closely monitored.
(v) Investments in liquid schemes of Debt-oriented Mutual Funds (DoMFs) by banks are
subject to a prudential cap in relation to their net worth. This limit has been placed in
the backdrop of banks' investments in liquid schemes of DoMFs having grown
manifold. The liquid schemes rely heavily on institutional investors such as
commercial banks whose redemption requirements are likely to be large and
simultaneous. DoMFs, on the other hand, are large lenders in the over-night
markets such as collateralised borrowing and lending obligation (CBLO) and market
repo, where banks are large borrowers. DoMFs also invest heavily in Certificates of
Deposit (CDs) of banks. Such circular flow of funds between banks and DoMFs
could lead to systemic risk in times of stress/liquidity crunch. Thus, banks could
potentially face a large liquidity risk.
Restrictions on exposure to complex activities and products
28. Banks' large involvement with complex products such as exotic derivatives and
other risky activities like private equity, venture capital funds, etc. is disfavoured by RBI.
Additional capital requirements are also prescribed in certain cases where reputational risk is
considered to be high.
Monitoring of financial conglomerates
29. Financial conglomerates represent domestic systemically important financial
institutions. While there is no differential prudential framework for these banks, they are
subject to more intense supervisory oversight. Since Indian financial system is bank
dominated, banks are the holding companies for most of the financial conglomerates. Since
2004, a mechanism for close monitoring of the financial conglomerates has been put in place
through offsite surveillance, regular interaction with the CEOs of parent companies and other
entities in the group and periodic reviews by College of Supervisors having members from
sectoral and financial market regulators. The focus of the supervisory process is on
management of group-wide risks, intra-group transactions and corporate governance. There
are prudential regulations regarding Group capital adequacy, exposure limits and intra-group
transactions.
Monitoring of common exposures
30. Banks' exposure to capital market is subject to a regulatory limit of 40 per cent of
their net worth, both on solo as well as Group wide basis. Banks' exposures to sensitive
sectors such as real estate are closely monitored. Exposure of systemically important NBFCs
to sensitive sectors is also closely monitored.
Enhancing transparency and risk mitigation in OTC transactions
31. Recognising the risks associated with OTC transactions, considerable emphasis has
been placed on their transparency and risk management. While the regulatory reporting on a
periodic basis was already in place for these transactions, electronic reporting platforms were
set up, about a decade ago, to enable online capturing as well as real-time information
dissemination. The electronic reporting platform was setup in 2002, to start with, for the
secondary market transactions in government securities. Such reporting arrangements have,
subsequently, been extended to other important segments of OTC market and, currently,
cover transactions in corporate bonds (both outright as well as repo), CPs, CDs, call/notice
money and interbank rupee interest rate derivatives. The recently permitted CDS
transactions also are proposed to be reported to the trade repository to be set up for this
purpose. There is a proposal to set up a single point reporting mechanism for all OTC
interest rate and forex derivative transactions.
32. As regards the issue of CCPs, CCP settlement of OTC trades in certain segments
commenced as back as in 2002. CCP system for Government securities transactions was
put in place in April 2002 while Forex (spot and forward) transactions were brought under
CCP settlement in Nov 2002. CCP settlement of IRS and FRA trades is under advanced
stage of finalization. With the setting up of mandatory reporting and the guaranteed
settlement of OTC transactions across various segments of the financial markets, the
transparency and counterparty risk management issues have been considerably addressed.
However, keeping in consideration, the concentration of