Alan Bollard: Coping with shocks - a New Zealand perspective
A background paper by Dr Alan Bollard, Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, and
Dr Chris Hunt, Economics Department, for an address by Dr Alan Bollard to the Canterbury
Employers' Chamber of Commerce, Christchurch, 25 January 2008.
* * *
1. Introduction
All economies face "shocks" - unexpected events provoking some sort of response. Shocks
affect households and firms at the micro level, and the path of economic growth and inflation
at the macro level. For a small and open economy like New Zealand, many of the shocks
shaping economic activity have an international dimension, and this turbulence is part and
parcel of the economic landscape. New Zealand's economic institutions and policymaking
frameworks recognise this volatility, and over time, they have responded in a manner which
has improved the overall resilience of the New Zealand economy to most shocks. Indeed, the
last ten years has been a period of relatively stable inflation outcomes both in New Zealand
and globally, due in no small manner to the efforts of monetary policy in pursuing the
mandate of price stability.
Fig 1: Price stability (5-year moving average of annual CPI inflation).
Source: Statistics NZ & IMF.
However, the challenges confronting a central bank in maintaining price stability in the face
of shocks should not be understated. Real-time policy decisions are made in the context of a
great deal of uncertainty about shocks. Firstly, shocks, by definition, are not foreseen.
Secondly, the likely magnitude and effects of emerging shocks on inflation are often unclear.
Moreover, economies are complex and dynamic systems in which the transmission of shocks
can change over time.
This is particularly relevant to international shocks and their effects on the New Zealand
economy. Over the past decade the rapid industrialisation of China and other emerging
markets has radically changed the structure of the global economy, as well as global inflation
and growth dynamics. China's thirst for raw materials, for example, has underpinned higher
prices for oil and a number of non-fuel commodities. Moreover, globalisation - the
"annihilation" of geographic distance through increasing trade and financial integration - has
affected both the speed and strength with which international shocks hit the New Zealand
economy. Recent financial market instability emanating from the US sub-prime housing
market and percolating through to a wider range of financial markets is testimony to how a
shock in one economy can quickly feed through to the other parts of the global economy.
To date, monetary policy in New Zealand has been able to manage the many shocks that
have occurred reasonably well. Inflation over the past decade has averaged 2.2 percent.
However, over the past three to four years, inflation has tended to track in the top half of the
Reserve Bank's target range of 1 to 3 percent. This result reflects accumulated demand
pressures in the late stages of an economic expansion, and also a number of supply-side
cost shocks.1
This paper discusses a number of these important demand and cost-side price shocks that
monetary policy has had to deal with over the past five years, or that will pose key policy
challenges going forward:
•
the surge in oil prices;
•
the more generalised commodity price boom;
•
the synchronised global housing market boom;
•
the shock to personal consumption from the run-down in household savings across
the advanced economies, and;
•
efforts to mitigate the risks of climate change.
These shocks are large. They also share an important international dimension - they are
either sourced from abroad, or are local shocks experienced by a range of key economies
across the globe. Before looking at these shocks individually, we will take a step back and
examine how the macroeconomic impact of shocks has changed over time. This provides a
useful backdrop to our consideration of the current crop of shocks.
2. Some stylised facts about shocks and economic volatility
So what exactly do we mean by "shocks"? For our purposes, in an important sense, "shocks"
are the essence of economic activity - shocks define the course of prices and output. Shocks
can increase or decrease price pressures; shocks can boost or depress economic growth. A
shock is a change in the economic environment in which agents - firms, households and
governments - make their decisions. Shocks continuously hit the economy.2
Shocks operate at many different levels. Shocks can originate from the actions of other
economic agents or from the physical environment (e.g a natural disaster, drought etc).
Some shocks may only have a marginal impact on economic behaviour in aggregate, while
others have more pervasive macroeconomic consequences. Shocks can be short, sharp
disturbances to economic activity which may dissipate quickly, while other shocks could be
more enduring or permanent. The frequency of shocks can range from things that affect
decision making on a daily basis, to longer term shocks, such as those associated with
technological change.
One way of looking at the impact of shocks to prices and output is through the volatility of
inflation and economic growth, and how this has changed over time. The volatility of both
inflation and growth has declined significantly since the 1970s - we now live it seems, in a
more stable economic environment. This has been labelled the "Great Moderation" by
economists.
There is however, a variety of explanations as to why we seem to be living in a more stable
economic environment. It could be luck, in the sense that there may be fewer major shocks
buffeting the global economy (Stock and Watson 2002). However, as the IMF (2007) has
recently emphasised, the decline in volatility is likely to be a result of more flexible economic
institutions and macroeconomic policy, which now tend to act effectively to mitigate the
shocks to prices and output, rather than inadvertently accentuating these shocks as at times
in the past.3
The volatility of inflation:
The average rate of inflation in the advanced economies has remained low and stable since
the early 1990s at between 2 and 3 percent (IMF 2006 April, p. 98). This is a reflection of the
recognition of the deleterious effects of high and unstable inflation in the 1970s and 1980s,
and of subsequent efforts by central banks across the world to achieve and maintain price
stability. Central banks now target inflation outcomes, either as a primary objective (in
inflation-targeting regimes such as New Zealand's), or alongside other objectives (as in the
case of the US Federal Reserve). This approach has been successful in keeping inflation
outcomes within a narrow target range, resulting in lower inflation volatility (figure 2).
Other explanations for the current period of low and stable inflation, aside from monetary
policy, include the role of China and other emerging market economies in exporting cheap
manufactured goods, thereby lowering imported inflation; the associated heightened state of
global competition which has helped to contain cost pressures; and institutional and
technological changes leading to greater flexibility in labour and product markets.
Fig 2: The decline in inflation volatility (rolling 5-year standard deviation of annual
inflation).
Source: RBNZ Calculations.
The volatility of output:
In New Zealand and most other developed countries, the volatility of output has declined
from the 1970s onwards. That is, economic growth is more stable today than during the oil
price disruptions and stop-go macroeconomic policies of the 1970s.4 Economies are also
spending less time in recessions, while expansions are longer. Indeed, the current economic
expansion is New Zealand's longest in the post-WWII period (figure 3).
Fig 3: New Zealand's Post-War economic expansions.
Source: RBNZ Calculations.
Figure 4 shows that although growth in New Zealand has become more stable over time,
output volatility remains higher in New Zealand than elsewhere, reflecting the small and open
nature of our economy and the relative impact of shocks to economic activity.5
The IMF (2007) highlights the important role that better monetary policy has played in
stabilising economic growth since the 1970s. Other factors contributing to this more stable
growth outcome include improved fiscal policy, lower terms of trade shocks, and structural
changes associated with the shift to a service sector economy, just-in-time inventory
management techniques and more flexible labour and product markets. Some of these
factors were, as noted above, also influential in reducing the volatility of inflation.
Fig 4: The decline in output volatility (rolling 10-year standard deviation of real GDP
growth).
Source: RBNZ Calculations; Datastream.
Why is this Great Moderation in both prices and output important?
There is a well-developed body of literature arguing that low and stable rates of inflation are
beneficial for economic growth since such an environment provides greater certainty for
households and firms to make decisions. There are also reasons why lower volatility in
output may have positive effects on the underlying trend rate of growth of an economy -
however, the evidence here is somewhat more circumspect than in the literature on the
linkages between inflation volatility and economic growth.
The reduced volatility in both prices and output should not be taken for granted. New
Zealand knows only too well what happens when the "golden weather" comes to an abrupt
end, as it did in the early 1970s. Back then, a terms of trade driven economic boom came to
a halt following the collapse of our export prices, and the inflation shock associated with
higher oil prices in the wake of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the formation of the
oilproducing cartel OPEC. As a consequence, New Zealand entered a prolonged period of high
inflation and low growth, which eventually precipitated a painful, but necessary period of
major economic restructuring.
The abrupt end to the price stability of the late 1960s and early 1970s provides a cautionary
tale of "what can happen if policies do not respond to risks and new challenges in the global
economic system as they arise" (IMF 2007, p. 67). Policymakers have to be alert to the
nature of emerging shocks to the economy, and how they might threaten price stability. One
should note also at this point that policy itself can be a source of shocks, as was the case in
the 1970s and early 1980s when an inappropriate approach to monetary policy exacerbated
the effects of the supply-side oil shock and contributed to the high and volatile inflation of that
period.
The present challenges to monetary policy derive, in part, from structural changes in the
world economy and the concomitant role of emerging market economies in shaping global
price dynamics. Emerging markets are also implicated in what, at first glance, might be
thought of as purely domestic shocks such as the rundown in household savings and the
housing boom in New Zealand. These shocks can be linked to "global excess liquidity" - or
the easy credit conditions the global economy has enjoyed for much of the last five years.
Emerging markets have helped sustain this excess liquidity via central bank reserve asset
accumulation. The purchase of USD assets by emerging economies has helped keep US
and global interest rates lower than otherwise would be the case. Finally, large, rapidly
industrialising emerging economies such as China's and India's will be the dominant
contributors to increases in greenhouse gas emissions in the near future. It must be said,
however, that much of the damage from climate change is likely to be due to the build up in
emissions to date, primarily from the advanced economies.
3. The oil shock
The price of crude oil recently hit $100 a barrel in intraday trading, some $80 higher than at
the start of 2002. This is close to the highest level ever recorded in real terms measured in
US dollars (figure 5).6 Traditionally, oil price spikes of this magnitude have tended to augur
economic downturns, if not recessions. Oil is a key input into the production process, while
households spend a significant fraction of their disposable income on petrol. Uncertainty
about the future price of oil prompts households to consider delaying consumption on a
range of other goods and services and firms to delay investment in major projects. An oil
price spike therefore can have significant implications for both prices and economic activity.
Fig 5: Real Oil Prices (West Texas Intermediate).
Source: RBNZ Calculations; Datastream.
As Keith Sill of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia notes, five of the last seven US
recessions have been preceded by an increase in the price of oil.7 However, he also notes
the power of oil price shocks in explaining economic recessions diminishes dramatically from
the mid-1980s onwards. And indeed the global economy has appeared relatively immune to
the current run-up in oil prices. This is mainly attributed to the fact that the recent oil price
rise originates in strong growth in the demand for oil, rather than in supply disruptions of the
sort underlying previous oil price spikes in 1973 and 1979-82.8 Moreover, the world has
become more efficient in using energy. For example, primary energy consumption has fallen
from 11.3 percent of GDP in 1980 to 8.3 percent in 2005 across the OECD, while the share
of oil in primary energy consumption has fallen from 55 percent to 41 percent.9
Nevertheless, while robust global economic conditions and the rapid industrialisation of
China and other emerging markets, together with a weak supply response, might largely
explain the run up in oil prices, for oil importing countries like New Zealand, the current oil
spike still represents a cost shock to the economy. The challenge for monetary policy is how
to respond to a cost shock of this nature. Cost shocks, unlike demand shocks, move output
and inflation in opposite directions, thus posing somewhat of a dilemma for policy. For
example, policymakers could respond to an increase in headline inflation arising from higher
oil prices by tightening policy firmly to slow the economy and reduce inflation. However, this
strategy would also exacerbate the negative output effects of the shock itself.
Another approach - the one adopted by the Reserve Bank - is to look through the first-round
direct impacts of oil prices on CPI inflation (via retail petrol prices), but to respond to the risk
of more generalised inflation pressures arising from the shock, such as rising inflation
expectations.10 Expectations effects might be associated with higher wage claims from
workers in compensation for reduced real disposable income, or with a tendency for firms to
build a margin for generalised inflation into their own prices.
It is not necessarily a straightforward exercise to forecast what the generalised inflation
pressures from any given cost shock might be. Reserve Bank calculations suggest that the
direct effect on inflation from the oil price spike has so far been to add around 0.3 percentage
points per annum to annual CPI inflation since 2004, when New Zealand petrol prices started
to rise steeply. Indirect effects, for example through higher taxi charges, account for another
0.2 percentage points per annum. Survey measures of inflation expectations have also
increased over this period, suggesting there may be expectations dynamics at work, though
it is difficult to identify the specific oil price effects as distinct from the effects of the other
shocks discussed below.
4. The non-fuel commodities boom
The robust global demand that has underpinned higher oil prices has also contributed to a
more generalised boom in commodity prices. This has been starkly evident in metals prices,
which have increased 200 percent in nominal terms since early 2002 (based on the IMF's
Primary Commodity Price Index up to December 2007). Other non-fuel commodity prices
have also increased, but not to the extent of metals prices. Food commodity prices have
increased 86 percent, and prices of agricultural raw materials (including timber, cotton, wool,
rubber and hides) have increased a more modest 36 percent.11
In real terms, non-fuel commodity prices remain well below historical peaks. For the past five
decades most non-fuel commodity prices have fallen relative to consumer prices by an
average of 1.6 percent per annum, reflecting large productivity gains in the metals and
agricultural sectors relative to other parts of the economy (IMF 2006, October, p. 141).
The driver of the current surge in nominal prices of non-fuel commodities has been increased
demand from emerging markets, and in particular China, together with idiosyncratic supply
side factors in particular commodity markets. According to the IMF (2006), China contributed
78 percent of the total world growth in metals consumption between 2002 and 2005. This
compares with a contribution of 35 percent between 1993 and 2002.12 China's contribution to
growth in demand for agricultural commodities has been no less impressive. Between 2002
and 2005 China contributed 103 percent of the total increase in world consumption of beef;
90 percent of growth in demand for cotton; and 26 percent of growth in sugar consumption.
China's demand for agricultural products has proven a boon for New Zealand's dairy farmers
in particular. Dairy prices, as measured by the ANZ Commodity Price Index, have increased
290 percent since mid 2002 in world price terms, and 150 percent in New Zealand dollar
terms. Higher dairy prices are also related to higher fuel costs, as the development of
alternative energy sources such as biofuels has increased the demand for corn. Corn is a
major food source for livestock in the Northern Hemisphere. Switching land use towards corn
production has probably also driven up the prices of other food commodities.
Higher export prices have outweighed any negative effect on New Zealand's terms of trade
from the run-up in oil prices. Since late 2002 New Zealand's terms of trade have increased
20 percent and are at their highest level since 1974. However, the current level of the terms
of trade pales by comparison to the commodity price boom of the early 1970s, and the wool
boom induced by the Korean War (figure 6).
Fig 6: New Zealand's terms of trade.
Source: Statistics NZ.
Nevertheless, the higher terms of trade are a significant development which brings with it an
improvement in New Zealand's economic welfare. However, by boosting export incomes,
they could have an inflationary downstream effect, depending on the spending impacts of
this windfall. Monetary policy will take into account the pressures on food price inflation
arising from the boom in agricultural commodities, together with inflation pressures from
other imported commodities.13 As with the oil price shock, the appropriate monetary policy
response is generally to look through the first-round effects, but respond to the second-round
expectations consequences.
Reserve Bank calculations suggest that the recent run-up in dairy prices and food prices
more generally will add about 0.4 percentage points directly to the CPI over the next year.
The inflationary effects from higher incomes (in the absence of a policy response) are likely
to be at least three times the direct effects.
5. The global housing boom
Since the late 1990s housing markets around the world have gone from strength to strength
in both advanced and developing economies (key exceptions among advanced economies
being Japan, Germany and Switzerland). Over the past decade, real house prices have
grown 5.3 percent per year on average for advanced economies (Fitch Ratings, 2007). In
New Zealand average annual real house price growth since the start of 1997 has been 5.7
percent.14
The current increase in global house prices is unprecedented in terms of its strength,
synchronicity and duration. The global boom in housing markets is largely explicable by fairly
benign financial conditions with low interest rates worldwide, together with financial
liberalisation and deregulation which have increased the access to credit for most
households (IMF 2007 October). Overlaying these common global drivers are factors specific
to individual economies.
In New Zealand's case an important driver of the housing boom was the surge in immigration
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, which came on top of an already
strengthening domestic economy. Since 2001, nominal house prices have more than
doubled, while real house prices have increased 85 percent. Concomitant with the run-up in
house prices since 2001, the ratio of house prices to disposable income has also increased
sharply over this period. The 2001 immigration shock specific to New Zealand accentuated
developments common to other countries that experienced housing booms, such as lower
real interest rates associated with lower inflation from the early 1990s onwards, financial
deregulation that eased credit constraints for households, and sustained household income
growth. In the New Zealand context, the specific tax treatment of rental housing may be an
additional idiosyncratic factor influencing the demand for house and hence house prices.
Fig 7: Real house prices in New Zealand.
Source: Quotable Value Ltd.
However, the increases in both nominal and real house prices seen recently are not
unprecedented in New Zealand's history. House prices surged in both the early 1970s and
early 1980s (figure 7). However, the current cycle does stand out in the context of broader
price stability in the inflation targeting era. Moreover, a key feature of the current housing
cycle has been the extent to which New Zealand households have leveraged up in order to
purchase their major asset. Household debt as a percentage of disposable income climbed
sharply from 2001 onwards and now stands at 160 percent. This increase in debt levels and
run-down in household savings does raise questions about the sustainability of the current
high level of house prices.
The question of what central banks should do about asset prices in the event that a "bubble"
develops is somewhat of a vexed issue. The standard approach is not to target asset price
inflation per se, but to respond to the generalised inflation pressures from the wealth effects
that are associated with revaluations in the asset. If the bubble should burst, the central bank
should stand ready to clean up the mess, by easing monetary policy and thereby stimulating
demand.
House prices are not included in the New Zealand CPI regimen. Rather, it is construction
costs of new dwellings that is directly measured in the CPI basket. Construction costs have
increased 37% since 2003, adding an estimated 0.5 percentage points per annum since
2003 to annual CPI inflation.15
In the current cycle it has been the indirect effects of increasing house prices which have
also been an important driver of inflation. In effect, households have been able to withdraw
the increase in the equity of their house to finance consumption, by banking the capital gains
when selling a house, or refinancing their mortgage. It is difficult to quantify these indirect
wealth effects given their diffuse nature. However, they are likely to have been very
significant.
While the Reserve Bank has been responding to housing related inflation pressures, among
other things, with increases in the OCR, monetary policy appears to have worked with a
longer lag than usual, reflecting the role of low global interest rates that have influenced
mortgage interest rates here in New Zealand, as well as competition among mortgage
lenders. This has prompted discussion of possible alternative tools specifically directed at the
housing market as a means to dampen inflation pressure from that source, alleviating
pressure on short-term interest rates and therefore the exchange rate.16
The extent to which the current run-up in house prices in New Zealand reflects fundamental
drivers, versus a degree of irrational exuberance and a misperception on the part of
households and investors about future house prices, will influence any subsequent downturn
in the housing sector and have flow-on implications for economic activity. This concern is not
limited to New Zealand. Traditional valuation metrics such as the ratio of house prices to
income and of house prices to rents are looking increasingly stretched across a number of
countries, raising fears of a possible sharp correction in house prices. Correction in the US
housing market has been well underway for over a year now, while a number of European
housing markets currently appear vulnerable to correction.
6. The personal consumption boom
New Zealand's strong economic growth performance over the past decade has been driven
by a boost in personal consumption, which has sustained domestic demand and generated
underlying inflation pressures. This strong personal consumption growth can be attributed, in
part, to the propensity of New Zealand households to consume more out of their income than
more
in the past. Indeed, New Zealand households have been consuming than their income
for many years. The household saving rate has been negative since the early 1990s, and
strongly negative since 2002.
Why have New Zealand households been able to run down their saving rate to the point of
substantial dissaving? The answers echo the reasons identified in the previous section: lower
interest rates which have enabled households to service a higher level of debt; financial
innovation which has eased credit constraints; and generally buoyant employment
net wealth
conditions.17 In terms of household balance sheets however, (the difference
between assets and liabilities) has increased, despite the negative saving rate. This is
because the revaluation on the asset side (the gain in house prices) has outweighed the
increased borrowing secured on housing (the increase in household liabilities).
New Zealand households are not alone in consuming more than they earn. Both in Australia
and the US household saving rates are negative (figure 8). Household savings rates in other
advanced economies are also falling, but are not yet negative. However, at -14.6 percent,
New Zealand is clearly an outlier. The decline in household saving also accounts for a large
part of the decline in total national saving (household + corporate + government savings)
across the advanced economies.18
Fig 8: Household saving rates (percent of disposable income).
Source: OECD; Statistics NZ.
To what extent is this ability to consume more out of income and the associated decline in
the national saving rate sustainable? In one sense lower national saving implies lower
standards of living in the future. At the moment, our national saving is lower than current
investment, and the shortfall is funded by borrowing from overseas.19 This situation is
unlikely to persist indefinitely as the budget constraints on households will at some point start
to become binding, or if the terms at which foreigners lend to New Zealand become
prohibitive.
Monetary policy has had to deal with the inflation consequences of debt-financed
consumption spending over the last decade. Reserve Bank calculations suggest that the
increase in personal consumption could have contributed about 0.5 to 1 percentage points
per annum to annual inflation from 2003. This includes the indirect wealth effects from house
price gains mentioned in the previous section and the increased consumer spending from the
run-down in household savings specifically, together with the healthy conditions in the labour
market which have underpinned income growth.
Looking ahead, as household spending growth moderates, demand-driven inflation pressure
will abate. However, if this adjustment occurs abruptly, precipitated by a sharp fall in house
prices or a sharp increase in unemployment for example, there may be financial stability
issues. In this case it will be the systemic stability remit of the Reserve Bank, rather than
monetary policy which will come into focus.
7. Climate change and the carbon emissions trading scheme
Climate change arguably poses one of the most important policy challenges in the years
ahead. There is now an emerging consensus that man-made climate change is occurring
although its magnitude and ramifications are much debated. The emission of greenhouse
gases is a global (negative) externality, where the cost of climate change is not borne fully by
those emitting the gas. Being global in scope, there are major coordination challenges in
bringing together countries to combat climate change. In addition, the benefits of mitigation
efforts directed towards climate change are likely to accrue far into the future, while the costs
have to be borne by current generations. Moreover, much of the damage will occur from the
already accumulated stock of greenhouse gas emissions (mainly from the advanced
economies), while it is the emerging market and developing countries that will contribute
most to emissions in the future (figure 7).
Fig 7: Carbon Emissions (millions of tonnes of carbon per year).
Source: IMF WEO October 2007 Dataset.
There are two broad approaches to dealing with this profound shock - adaptation and
mitigation. Adaptation involves changing behaviour to reduce the economic and social
impacts of climate change (e.g building flood defences, or planting more weather resistant
crops). Mitigation involves actively reducing greenhouse gas emissions. And to overcome the
free-rider problem implied by this negative externality there are two key policy approaches -
taxes on greenhouse gas emissions, and emissions trading schemes.
New Zealand, as part of its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, has elected an emissions
trading scheme. The scheme is designed to reduce annual greenhouse gas emissions from
various sectors of the economy to 1990 levels over the 2008-2012 reference period. From
2008 the scheme will be phased in gradually for different sectors. For any producer/sector
which emits more than its greenhouse gas allocation, additional emission units will have to
be purchased, either from other producers or from overseas. Much of the cost of purchasing
additional units will initially be borne by government, with the amount of government support
varying by sector. From 2013 the amount of government support will progressively decline
with assistance to be completely phased out by 2025.
The phased introduction of the scheme implies higher prices for liquid fuel (from 2009) and
electricity (from 2010). The Reserve Bank estimates that both the direct and indirect effects
of these higher energy prices will add 0.25 percentage points to inflation in 2009 and 0.35
percentage points in 2010.20 In addition to these first-round effects, there may well be
second-round inflation expectations effects of the scheme. As with other cost shocks the
Reserve Bank stands ready to respond to the more generalised inflation pressures from the
scheme. However, the implications for monetary policy are somewhat clouded by the
magnitude and speed of any second-round effects, the price of emission units and the effect
on economic activity.
8. Conclusion
Over the past half decade demand-side inflation pressures in New Zealand have been
significantly influenced by the shock to personal consumption from the run-down in the
household saving rate, and the related increase in household net wealth from the housing
boom. This has helped reinforce the underlying strength of the economy and associated
pressure on resources. More recently, the increase in global dairy prices has added to these
demand side pressures by boosting incomes at the farm gate. Increases in commodity prices
such as oil and other imported raw materials have also added to inflation pressure by
increasing the cost structure of the production process. The New Zealand government's
decision to adopt an emissions trading scheme as part of its Kyoto Protocol obligations will
add additional cost pressures onto the economy over the coming years.
To date, New Zealand has weathered these shocks reasonably well. Inflation remains low by
historical standards, and within the mandate to keep future inflation between 1 to 3 percent,
on average, over the medium term. But this relative stability should not be taken for granted.
Good policy today does not necessarily guarantee good policy tomorrow, particularly when
there is considerable uncertainty when confronting new shocks. New shocks can often
necessitate new ways of confronting a dynamic economic landscape.
Many of these