Edward Robinson: Central bank communications - evolution in
theory and practice
Opening remarks by Mr Edward Robinson, Deputy Managing Director (Economic Policy) and
Chief Economist of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the IMF High-Level Peer-to-Peer
Forum on "Central Bank Communications in ASEAN-5 Countries: From Principles to Practice",
Singapore, 4 December 2019.
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1. INTRODUCTION
May I extend warmest greetings and welcome to all visitors and overseas participants. MAS is
very pleased that the IMF is organising this conference on a most pertinent topic in Singapore.
2. MONETARY POLICY COMMUNICATIONS-FROM OPACITY TO TRANSPARENCY
Since the 1990s, there has been a clear trend in central banking circles towards greater
transparency. This marked a significant turnaround from previous decades that prized monetary
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policy-making as "an arcane and esoteric art best practiced out of public view". Former BOE
Governor Montagu Norman (1920-1944) reputedly had a personal motto of "Never explain, never
excuse."
The change has much to do with the growing recognition that monetary policy is essentially
about managing expectations. The increasing adoption of inflation targeting also spurred
advances on the transparency front, with its communication-heavy requirements of policy
targets, forecasts and outlook.
The shift towards greater transparency is generally held as desirable for two broad reasons.
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First, transparency can enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy.
By helping to anchor long-term inflation expectations, transparency improves policy
efficacy and facilitates the overall pro-equilibrating tendencies of the economy.
Central bank communication increases the predictability of central bank actions. So,
it raises the "signal-to-noise" ratio, which reduces uncertainty faced by private
agents and strengthens the pass-through from communication to market
expectations.
Second, transparency is a mechanism for democratic accountability, in a world of policy
discretion and central bank independence.
Transparency makes it easier to judge whether a central bank is committed to its
announced policy, and acts as a check on possible temptations to base policy on
short-run or political considerations.
In short, communication demystifies and democratises monetary policy.
The empirical literature finds that better information about central bank actions can lead markets
to do the central bank's work for it.
Blinder et al. (2001) was an early study which found that the US bond market's
ability to forecast Fed actions improved from around 1996 onwards, a few years
after the Fed started announcing policy changes and publishing minutes of its
meetings. Relatively small changes in the Fed's policy rate were amplified by
complementary movements in the bond market, which helps to stabilise the
macroeconomy.
The rich literature that followed affirms the benefits of central bank announcements
in guiding market outcomes, with a number of papers showing that market interest
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rates have tracked policy rates more closely since the 1990's.
Separately, communication was also shown to reduce the size of central bank
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interventions required to achieve desired policy rates.
Further, effective communication from central banks on the future path of monetary policy, or
forward guidance, can potentially be a powerful tool in a global environment of low nominal rates
and reduced policy space.
The seminal paper by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) demonstrated that changes
in the expected future conduct of monetary policy can have a substantial effect on
the macroeconomy, even when the economy is at the zero lower bound and
conventional monetary policy has lost potency.
Subsequent empirical research also show that forward guidance can help
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macroeconomic stabilisation efforts.
Nevertheless, despite the clear trends and benefits of greater information dissemination, central
bank transparency has evolved cautiously including in the region, reflecting in part the
irreversibility of communication initiatives. From the perspective of preserving policy integrity and
effectiveness in a second best world, more is not necessarily always better. At each step along
the way, central banks therefore need to take account of the potential costs against the perceived
benefits of greater transparency.
Several considerations could be pertinent. First, too much information may crowd out the
formation of private sector beliefs.
Giving more information may induce not more, but less, clarity among market
participants, as there are limits to how much information can be digested
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effectively.
The public may not easily understand the uncertainty and conditionality surrounding
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central bank forecasts.
Or worse still, agents might come to realise how uncertain the central bank is about
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economic conditions.
Sometimes, it is just not feasible to provide that degree of clarity out in the public.
Second, central bankers need to think about the potential interaction of greater transparency with
the path of future monetary policy decisions.
Policy expectations engendered by communication may unduly constrain policy
action.
Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that there can be too much of a good thing, although
anchoring the optimal degree of central bank transparency still proves elusive.
A number of studies have found diminishing returns to central bank transparency on
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market expectations.
Others also found that disseminating specific and detailed information, such as full
meeting transcripts, provides little marginal value over more concise
communication, such as policy meeting minutes, in terms of guiding market
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expectations.
There are a set of papers showing that more information can result in destabilising market
expectations.
First, given that monetary policy relies on, and influences market signals, the
circularity between monetary policy and market reactions may amplify a bad
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signal. Increased transparency in the central bank's policy rule may fuel this
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circularity, and destabilise the macroeconomy.
Second, too much information from the central bank may result in conflicting
signals about the policy path, a situation Blinder (2007) refers to as a "cacophony of
voices" that may increase uncertainty for private agents. Market participants are
also more likely to react to exogenous disturbances in such a scenario, further
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heightening uncertainty.
Third, more transparency may not help to align market expectations if the additional
information lacks credibility. Central bank forecasts of longer-term interest rates
have been found to have little effect on market expectations, suggesting that
uncertainty about future developments reduces the credibility of longer-term
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forecasts.
3. CURRENT MONETARY POLICY COMMUNICATION CHALLENGES
Let me sum up with some comments on monetary policy communications in the current
conjuncture.
Central banks, in deciding on the appropriate approach and calibration to transparency, must
take into account the greater complexity of the operating environment confronting monetary
policy.
These are well known and I will just highlight three:
Policy rates near the zero lower bound and the turn to various unconventional
monetary policy tools.
The reality of multiple objectives and instruments, straddling the price and financial
stability mandate of the central bank.
The challenges to monetary policy independence amongst open economies, in the
context of global financial cycles and spillovers arising from overtaxing monetary
policy.
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A recent Economist article even asked, "Can central banks talk too much?"
It essentially argued that forward guidance on interest rates could complicate price
dynamics in the bond market as the central bank simultaneously signals its
intentions to the markets, while taking its cue from them.
As policy decisions are ultimately a judgement call made against an inherently
uncertain backdrop, there is naturally a limit to how much transparency can do to
make central bank action predictable.
Communication is also context-specific, where a standard rules-based approach will not work.
Discussions at forums like this are extremely valuable because they provide the opportunity to
share experiences from real-life settings, including what has worked and what has not, as well
as the pitfalls and the nuances. Hopefully, some general guiding principles can emerge, that will
prove useful for practitioners gathered here today.
In conclusion, the guidelines for monetary policy communications are probably due for a refresh
given the increased complexity facing the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. For
sure, central banks must continue to talk, engage, and be accessible and accountable. How we
do it could evolve, and this high-level seminar serves to help us do just that and hone our
communication skills.
I wish you a most productive session. Thank you.
References
Bernanke, B S (2007), "Federal Reserve Communications", Speech at the Cato Institute 25th
Annual Monetary Conference, Washington, D.C., 14 November.
Blinder, A S, Goodhart, C, Hildebrand, P, Lipton, D, and Wyplosz, C (2001), How Do Central
Banks Talk? Geneva Reports on the World Economy 3, International Center for Monetary and
Banking Studies and Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Blinder, A S (2007), "Monetary Policy by Committee: Why and How?" European Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 23(1), pp. 106-23.
Blinder, A S, Ehrmann, M, Fratzscher, M, De Haan, J D, Jansen, D J (2008), "Central Bank
Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence", Journal of Economic
Literature, Vol. 46(4), pp. 910-945.
Chehal, P and Trehan, B (2009), "Talking about Tomorrow's Monetary Policy Today", FRBSF
Economic Letter, 35.
Cruijsen, Carin A B v d, Eijffinger, S C W & Hoogduin, L H (2010), "Optimal Central Bank
Transparency", Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 29(8), pp. 1482-1507.
Demiralp, S, and Jordá, O (2002), "The Announcement Effect: Evidence from Open Market Desk
Data", Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Vol. 8(1), pp. 29-48.
Dincer, N N and Eichengreen, B (2014), "Central Bank Transparency and Independence:
Updates and New Measures", International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 10(1), pp. 189-259.
Eggertsson, G and Woodford, M (2003), "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal
Monetary Policy", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2003(1), pp. 139-233.
Gaballo, G (2018), "Price Dispersion, Private Uncertainty, and Endogenous Nominal Rigidities",
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 85(2), pp. 1070-1110.
Goodhart, C and Lim, W B (2011), "Interest Rate Forecasts: A Pathology", International Journal
of Central Banking, Vol. 7(2), pp. 135-171.
Hayo, B and Neuenkirch M (2018), "Central Banks' Predictability: An Assessment by Financial
Market Participants", International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 14(4), pp 163-185.
Hubert, P and Labondance, F (2018), "The Effect of ECB Forward Guidance on the Term
Structure of Interest Rates", International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 14(5), pp 193-222.
Kahnemann, D (2003), "Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics",
Amercian Economic Review, Vol. 93(5), pp. 1449-1475.
Kohn, D L, and Sack, B (2003), "Central Bank Talk: Does It Matter and Why?", Finance and
Economics Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2003-55.
Lange, J, Sack B, and Whitesell, W (2003), "Anticipations of Monetary Policy in Financial
Markets", Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 35(6), pp. 889-909.
Mishkin, F (2004), "Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far", NBER Working Paper No.
10829.
Moessner, R (2013), "Effects of Explicit FOMC Policy Rate Guidance on Interest Rate
Expectations", Economics Letters, Vol. 121(2), pp. 170-173.
Morris, S and Shin, H S (2018), "Central Bank Forward Guidance and the Signal Value of Market
Prices", AEA Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 108, pp. 572-577.
Samuelson, P (1994), Panel remarks, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference, Conference
Series 38, Jeffrey C Fuhrer (ed) "Goals, Guidelines and Constraints Facing Monetary
Policymakers".
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Bernanke (2007)
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Blinder et al. (2008)
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Lange et al. (2003) showed that T-Bill yields track movements in the fed funds rate more successfully since the
1990's, while Kohn and Sack (2003) found that statements released by the FOMC significantly affect market
interest rates.
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Demiralp and Jorda (2002) found that a smaller quantity of open-market operations have been required for the
Fed to achieve its desired policy rate since 1994.
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Hubert and Labondance (2018) found that the ECB's forward guidance announcements persistently reduced
rates across the yield curve, with the strongest effects at the longest maturities. Moesser (2013) found greatest
effects for the US at the three-year horizon. However, Chehal and Trehan (2009) found little evidence that the
Bank of Canada's forward guidance in April 2009 significantly affected market expectations of interest rates.
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Kahnemann (2003)
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Mishkin (2004)
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Cruijsen et al (2010)
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See Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). Cruijsen et al (2010) also found diminishing returns in reducing
dispersion of inflation expectations, with expectations dispersion declining initially as transparency rises but
rising beyond a certain level of transparency.
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Hayo and Neuenkirch (2018)
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Samuelson (1994) famously likened this problem to a monkey looking at a mirror. The monkey reacts to its
mirror image, unaware that it is looking at its own reflection.
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Morris and Shin (2018)
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Gaballo (2018)
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Goodhart and Lim (2011)
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Free exchange: A little less conversation, "Can central bankers talk too much?", The Economist, 26 Oct 2019.