Folk Wisdom
Speech given by
Andrew G Haldane
Chief Economist
Bank of England
100th Anniversary of the Bank of Estonia
Tallinn, Estonia
19 September 2018
The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy
Committee. I would like to thank Shiv Chowla, John Lewis, Jack Meaning and Sophie Stone for their
help in preparing the text and to Nicholas Gruen and Matthew Taylor for discussions on these issues.
I would like to thank David Bholat, Ben Broadbent, Janine Collier, Laura Daniels, Jonathan Fullwood,
Andrew Hebden, Paul Lowe, Clare Macallan and Becky Maule and for their comments and
contributions.
I am delighted to be here to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Bank of Estonia. It is a
in the Bank's "Independence Hall" -
particular privilege to be giving this lecture the very spot where, on
Estonia's
24 February 1918, Provisional Government was formed. The founding of the Bank of Estonia
on the Republic's first birthday in
followed 1919.
Reaching your first century is a true milestone for any person or institution. In the UK, when you reach your
100th birthday you receive a signed card of congratulations from the Queen. I am afraid I have no royal
-
birthday card for you today. But I have the next best thing another speech from another central banker.
Times are tough in central banking. Central banks have borne much of the burden of supporting the global
economy as it has recovered from the global financial crisis. In some advanced economies, such as the UK
and US where the output gap has largely been closed, that extraordinary monetary support is now being
gradually withdrawn. In others, such as the euro area, a gradual withdrawal has been clearly signposted.
The gradual withdrawal of exceptional monetary stimulus is unlikely by itself, however, to remove entirely the
central banks' shoulders. Many have acquired new powers and
weight from new responsibilities since the
crisis, particularly in the regulatory sphere. At the same time, the crisis has dented trust in the financial
sector, including in central banks. In combination that has raised expectations, but also some doubts, about
the role of central banks in serving society.1
Central banks have, over the course of the recent past, undergone a revolution in their degree of
transparency and accountability. This has delivered huge gains. By improving public understanding, it has
helped stabilise the economy and the financial system. And by improving public accountability, it has allayed
concerns about central banks being over-powerful and under-accountable to the societies they serve.
But time has moved thing on and, as in the past, central banks will need to move with the times. In response
to greater levels of responsibility, but more fragile trust, I will argue a second revolution in central bank
practices may be needed. This would need to be every bit as radical as the first, but would require central
- "folk wisdom" -
banks to engage with, and draw on, the general public their as never before.
Central banks were put on earth to serve the public. The second revolution is about putting the public more
firmly into public institutions. At a time of raised expectations and lowered trust, a reinforcement of central
banks'
social contract with society could make them even more effective in the period ahead, whether you
are the Bank of England (into its fourth century) or the Bank of Estonia (commencing its second).
Let me start by saying a word about the central bank revolution of the recent past, before turning to the
present and the future and the challenges and changes that may lie ahead in engaging the general public.
The Bank of England has already begun taking important steps towards increasing its engagement. Some
1
For example, Tucker (2018).
of the steps taken by central banks may have relevance to other public institutions, many of which face
similar challenges of raised expectations and diminished trust among the general public.
A Central Bank Revolution
revolution, unless the "r" is silent. Yet I do not think it is an
You do not typically associate central banks with
exaggeration to say that, over the course of recent decades, a revolution has swept through pretty much
every central bank on the planet. That revolution has come in the area of external communications,
openness and accountability.
It came neither quickly nor easily. It was only a generation ago that, when asked by Mervyn King for a
piece of advice, Paul Volcker replied "mystique". To that point, opacity rather than
one-word transparency
coursed through central bankers' veins. That bloodline ran from Montagu Norman a century ago
("never
to Alan Greenspan a generation ago ("I've learned to mumble with great
explain, never apologise") through
incoherence").
Historically, the case for central bank secrecy was deeply rooted. It rested in part on custom and practice, in
part on theology. Central banks historically were rarely subject to external scrutiny, at least by the general
public. And central bankers were generally perceived as the high priests of finance. It was said that central
bankers, like faith, were better understood by their deeds than by their words.2
That was just as well because central bankers rarely uttered any words at all. A century ago, public
utterances by the Governor of the Bank of England amounted to one after-dinner speech each year to a
well-watered set of City of London bankers. Heroically, attempts were made by some academics to
rationalise this monetary mystique as a necessary means of central banks exerting influence over the
economy.3
Times have changed. The central bank secrecy doctrine has been over-turned, in part for conceptual
reasons, in part for practical ones. Within academia, economic theorists began constructing models where
policy credibility was absolutely central if people's expectations were to remain anchored and the economy
kept stable.4 Establishing credibility called for clear policy targets and policy actions.
Secrecy about policy actions, whatever its potential shorter-term benefits, came at a potentially significant
longer-term cost. Monetary policy "surprises" might provide a short-term jolt to the economy. These
surprises were especially likely when policy was in the hands of politicians, perhaps seeking re-election.
But these actions nurtured longer-term suspicions that policymakers might neglect inflation, causing inflation
expectations to rise and policy credibility to fall.
2
discusses this era of the Bank of England's
Kynaston (2017) history.
3
Brunner (1981).
4
Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983).
If so, monetary surprises could prove self-defeating even in stimulating the economy. They would instead
the academic jargon, an "inflation bias"
merely stoke expectations of higher inflation. In would emerge.5
This theoretical story found empirical support in the behaviour of a number of advanced economies during
"Great Inflation".6
the 1970s, who experienced a so-called
In part in response to the Great Inflation, a number of central banks began to be given new policy
responsibilities to reduce the potential for electorally-driven monetary surprises. Perhaps the most important
of those was operational independence for the setting of monetary policy. This was an institutional attempt
to avoid the temptation to stoke the economy in the short-term, and to anchor inflation expectations in the
longer-term, thereby building policy credibility.
With these new policy powers came, reasonably enough, new responsibilities for central banks. For the first
time in their histories, central banks needed to be far more open and transparent about their policy targets
and actions. Why? Because it was through greater transparency that policy suspicions among the public
could be allayed, thereby helping anchor inflation expectations in the economy.
unelected technocrats acting on society's behalf,
As operational independence also called for new means of
central banks' feet to the flames
ensuring central banks were sufficiently accountable to society. Holding
called for greater public transparency and greater public scrutiny than ever previously. Trust in central banks
could not be endowed by statute. It needed instead to be earned through experience and societal scrutiny.
These forces brought about a revolution in central bank practices regarding transparency and accountability.
Over the course of the past century, the number of Bank of England appearances before Parliament has
risen around 20-fold; the number of publications issued has risen around 600-fold; and the number of words
You don't need Tracy Chapman to tell you I'm talkin' 'bout
uttered has risen around 1,000-fold. a revolution.
Elsewhere around the world, the pattern has been much the same. We have seen a rising tide of speeches,
publications and parliamentary appearances by central banks. The Bank of Estonia has been at or close to
the frontier of this revolution. Today it provides a rich daily diet of reports, forecasts, working papers,
speeches and tweets.
The 20th century may yet be seen by historians as a Golden Age for central banks. Central bank numbers
rose from under 20 at the start of the century to over 175 by its close. Those with operational independence
for monetary policy rose from fewer than 40 in 1971 to over 150 today. And the numbers of central banks
with responsibilities for regulatory policy has risen sharply too, especially since the crisis.7
5
Barro and Gordon (1983).
6
For example, Nelson (2005).
7
Haldane (2017a).
The rise in central bank numbers in part reflects the greater numbers of nation states in the 20th century. But
this, too, is revealing. Establishing a central bank has increasingly been seen as an essential building block
of nation state-building, a crucial element in the fabric of democratic statecraft. Indeed, that was precisely
the Estonian experience, as events in this very room a century ago testify.
The Age of Innocence
This Golden Age of central banking has persisted for a century. As best we can tell, it has served economies
and societies well. Prior to the crisis, the global economy entered a golden period of its own with steady
known as the "Great Moderation".8
growth and stable inflation, Mervyn King, Bank of England Governor at
-
the time, gave this period a different name the NICE (Non-inflationary consistently-expansionary) decade.9
It is not difficult to see why. Growth in advanced economies averaged 2.5% and inflation 2.2%. The volatility
of inflation was around 80% lower, and the volatility of output 5% lower, than in the preceding two decades
(Chart 1). With the economy performing NICE-ly, public trust in central banks was running high. Approval
ratings for the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank and Bank of England were all at healthy levels.
The global financial crisis has ushered in a new era. Great Moderation gave way first to a Great Recession
and then a Grudging Recovery. Advanced economy growth over the past decade has averaged only 1.5%.
The volatility of inflation has risen by 40%, and the volatility of output growth by 60%, relative to the pre-crisis
decade (Chart 1). The NICE decade has given way to a VILE (Volatile-Inflation Less-Expansionary) one.10
It should perhaps come as no surprise that one of the casualties of the crisis has been levels of public trust in
the financial system, banks and central banks. Measures of satisfaction or confidence in central banks fell in
the UK, US and euro area at the time of the global financial crisis.11 They have yet fully to recover and may
reflect diminished trust. The situation in Japan is similar, except their crisis came sooner and the bust in trust
has lasted longer.
Explaining this increasingly fragile trust in central banks is, in part, a story of the crisis. Pre-crisis, central
banks were seen as stewards of the financial system. A failure of that system inevitably then caused some
central banks'
questioning of stewardship role. The financial crisis was the catalyst for some loss of faith in
the stewards in much the same way the expenses scandal was for British political stewards a few years ago.
But there are also deeper-seated changes underway in the nature of the public's trust, not specific to central
"Trust Shift".12
banks, what Rachel Botsman calls the Once upon a time, public trust was endowed on public
institutions rather than needing to be earned. Trust was anonymous and centralised. The public did not ask
8
Stock and Watson (2003).
9
King (2003).
10
"VILE" was coined by my MPC colleague Michael Saunders (see, for example, Giles and Atkins (2008)).
11
Haldane (2017a).
12
Botsman (2017).
difficult questions and public institutions, by and large, did not feel the need to provide answers. For public
institutions, this was the Age of Innocence.
As centralised and largely anonymous institutions, central banks surfed on this wave of blind trust during
their early years. During the Age of Innocence, there was no public expectation of openness or
accountability or need to build bridges with the public or parliaments. When quizzed for an explanation by a
"I don't have reasons, I have instincts".
Parliamentary Committee in 1930, Montagu Norman replied:
But the public's attitudes
towards trust have altered and so too has the trust-building process. Faith in public
institutions is no longer blind. Trust is no longer endowed anonymously. Instead it is built through direct
connections, often personalised and localised. Trust is no longer centralised in institutions. Instead it is built
on a distributed basis, peer-by-peer, across the network. In short, the Age of Innocence is over.
the public's trust has
As shape-shifted, central banks and other public institutions have faced new challenges
to their trust. Indeed, this helps explain the first revolution in central bank transparency practices. But the
crisis has added cyclical push to this structural fall in trust. Central banks are no longer surfing a wave.
They face instead a retreating tide. For them, too, the Age of Innocence may be over.
While some loss of trust in central banks might have been expected, it is disappointing that the pre-crisis
revolution in transparency practices did not provide a greater degree of insulation against it. Why was
central banks'
stock of reputational capital, built steadily through various transparency initiatives, inadequate
to protect them from the crisis storm? I think there were two factors at play.
First, central banks have tools, such as interest rates and banking regulations, which support the whole of
affect people's lives
the economy and financial system. They greatly, supporting jobs and incomes, a stable
cost of living, an adequate supply of credit, confidence in money. But the impact of central banks' tools is
often indirect and lagged; it is difficult for people to observe these benefits in their everyday lives.
When people get a job or a pay rise or a loan, they tend to attribute this to their own good luck or good
management. Rarely do they link it to actions taken by central banks, months or perhaps years earlier. The
benefits of central bank actions are, for most people, articles of faith rather than fact. These days, with trust
needing to be earned, this puts central banks at a natural disadvantage.
We see this pattern in other professions. In surveys, the general public are typically mistrustful of politicians
local
and bankers, who appear close to bottom of their trust league table. Yet their trust scores for MPs and
because of their closer connection with people's
local bank branch managers have remained high lives.
Central banks, operating economy-wide, perhaps face some of the same challenges as bankers and
politicians.
The second reason trust proved fragile is because its foundation is public understanding. Once public trust
is lost, public understanding becomes crucial to restore it. The hope was that the revolution in central bank
transparency initiatives had provided that improved public understanding of the economy and central banks.
improving the public's
In practice, the evidence suggests progress towards understanding of the economy,
finance and central banks has been slow and patchy, despite these initiatives.
To start with the positives, there is concrete evidence of the improved central bank communications having
improved the functioning of financial markets, the forecasting performance of economists and even the
reporting of the media on the economy.13 The transparency revolution improved understanding among those
-
whose day job it was to understand the economy and the role of central banks within it the experts.
-
The revolution appears to have had far less impact on understanding among the public the non-experts. In
1999, the Bank of England began surveying the public to gauge their understanding of the economy and the
Bank's
Bank.14 Back then, only around 7% identified the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) as responsible
for setting interest rates. 19 years and one transparency revolution later, the same survey earlier this year
suggested around 6% of the general public had heard of the MPC.15
The failure to boost understanding of the economy and central banks among the general public helps explain
why trust in central banks proved more fragile than expected after the crisis. It is for these reasons I have
spoken about central banks facing a "twin deficits" problem -
a deficit of public understanding and a deficit of
public trust.16 These twin deficits are clearly complementary and mutually-reinforcing.
These twin deficits have not, so far at least, had especially serious consequences for central banks. There
has been no de-anchoring of inflation expectations. There has been no rolling-back of central bank
responsibilities nor systematic retreat from central bank operational independence on monetary and
regulatory matters. If anything, central banks' sets of responsibilities have recently been added to.
At the same time, more questions are probably being asked about the role and powers of central bank than
at any time in a generation. That is in part a reflection of the increased responsibilities central banks have
been handed; in part a reflection of the higher expectations being placed on central banks' actions; and in
part a reflection of the dent in trust in institutions the crisis has delivered. This is a triple challenge.
A year ago, the Bank of England hosted a conference to mark 20 years since it was granted operational
independence for monetary policy. At that event, I was struck by the number of speakers calling time on the
13
For example, Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005), Gürkaynak, Levin and Swanson (2010), Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher
(2011).
14
Bank of England Inflation Attitudes Survey, currently run jointly with TNS.
15
"Bank of England" as option
The same survey also gives the to the question of which group sets interest rates. More respondents
identify the Bank of England as being responsible for setting interest rates (around 30%) than the Monetary Policy Committee, but this
too has been broadly flat over time.
16
Haldane (2017b).
Golden Age of central banks, speculating on whether "peak central bank"
had been reached. Some asked
openly whether central bank independence was appropriate, at least on financial stability matters.
I am not as pessimistic or as fatalistic as that. But I do think some of those concerns about understanding,
trust and legitimacy are real. In response to them, new efforts may be needed to close the understanding
and trust deficits and bridge the transparency and accountability gaps. Doing so would, I believe, leave
central banks even better-informed and better-placed to deliver their core mandates in future. Here is why.
Correcting the Deficits
My answer comes in two, inter-related, parts. Let me take these in turn.
First, building understanding among the general public in the economy, financial system and central banks.
Most people would think an improved understanding of the economy among the general public is desirable.
It makes for improved decision-making by people on important everyday decisions on spending, saving,
borrowing and working. The better those individual decisions (the micro), the more stable the economy and
financial system are likely to be (the macro). Improved public understanding of the economy is in that sense
win-win, benefitting policymakers and the public alike.
But it is possible the benefits of improved public understanding in stabilising the economy and financial
system have been underestimated. "Popular narratives" among the public might be more important in driving
macro-economic behaviour than in the past. And these narratives may be more prone to destabilisation than
in the past. If so, too little may have been invested historically, by both the public and policymakers, in
informing these narratives and hence stabilising the economy.
Public understanding of the economy and finance starts from a low base. You do not have to take my word
for it. That is the strongly-held view of the public themselves. In surveys, almost half of the public say they
believe they lack an adequate understanding of economic and financial issues when making crucial
everyday decisions.17 This is a weak endowment.
We now know quite a bit about the costs to individuals of this weak endowment, which appear to be large
and long-lasting. For example, poor levels of financial education have been shown to have large and lasting
effects on individuals' health - financial, physical and mental.18 Financial illiteracy is a recipe for debt, default
and depression, whose effects appear to feedback on each another in a vicious spiral.
17
FCA (2017).
18
Richardson et al (2017), Earwicker (2016).
people's
These individual costs are amplified when they are aggregated up to the macro level. How
- -
expectations evolve their degree of optimism or pessimism, exuberance or depression is crucial for
determining their individual decisions. It has long been recognised that these expectations can be shaped
narratives" can emerge which shape
importantly by others' expectations. For example, "popular collective
- -
expectations among the public optimism or pessimism, exuberance or depression and which can then
drive aggregate economic fluctuations.19
Recent research has demonstrated just how powerful those emergent popular narratives can be,
economically and financially. As one example, the work of Nick Bloom and co-authors has constructed
businesses' degree of
various measures of uncertainty around key issues, based on the words used in
media reporting.20 These narrative-based measures of uncertainty have been found to be important for
explaining the investment behaviour of companies over time.
David Tuckett and co-authors have constructed measures of the popular narratives used by participants in
financial markets.21 They find that these narratives can play an important role in explaining asset price
dynamics, over and above the impact of macro-economic fundamentals. In a similar spirit, the work of
Michael Bailey and co-authors has found, using Facebook data, an important role for shared social
narratives in explaining behaviour in the housing market.22
At a macroeconomic level, the work of George Akerlof and Robert Shiller has looked at the popular
narratives which emerge during periods of boom and bust.23 Using words extracted from newspapers, they
find the prevailing popular narratives about the economy have played a significant role in accounting for the
heights of the peaks and depths of the troughs during macro-economic booms and busts. Public
expectations, embedded in the stories they tell, are a key macro-economic driver.
The common theme in all of this research is the importance of the public's "narratives" in shaping their
- hence "popular narratives" -
behaviour. That is true individually but especially collectively with shifts in
collective expectations helping account for the width and depth of macro-economic fluctuations. As well as
begun using these "narrative"
contributing to this research, the Bank has approaches itself to help
understand behaviour. Let me give you a topical example.
Agents
The Bank's around the UK have a wide network of company contacts who they visit regularly to
discuss the economy. These visits are then written up. These write-ups enable a semantic search to be
carried out to identify the key themes or narratives emerging in companies' conversations. You will be
unsurprised to hear that a key theme among companies over recent quarters has been uncertainty
surrounding Brexit.
19
Shiller (2017).
20
Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016), Bloom (2009) and Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen (2007).
21
For example, Tuckett (2011) and Tuckett and Nikolic (2017).
22
Bailey et al (2016).
23
Akerlof and Shiller (2009) and Shiller (2017).
Figure 1 plots a word cloud extracted from those company write-ups. The size of each word connotes the
frequency of its use in relation to mentions of "uncertainty". For a word that did not exist as recently as five
years ago, it is striking how Brexit is now dominating companies'
conversations. Currently, it crops up 10
than the word "customer" and times more often than the word "staff"
times more often almost 7 in proximity to
uncertainty.24
of the incidence of the words "uncertainty" and "Brexit/referendum" in Agents'
Chart 2 plots a time-series
company write-ups. The two, unsurprisingly, are positively correlated after the referendum. Indeed,
mentions of Brexit have outnumbered mentions of uncertainty by a factor of around 3 since the referendum.
While mentions of Brexit have fallen from their referendum peak, it is notable that they have picked up
sharply over the past few months, with measures of uncertainty following suit.
This new research strengthens the case for improving public understanding of the economy. An improved
understanding could result in better-informed popular narratives, and more stable expectations, among the
general. And that, ultimately, would make for a more stable economy and financial system.
In practice, there may be structural factors which could be acting in the opposite direction. The great trust
shift may mean people are less willing than in the past to trust expert opinion (such as through mainstream
media) and more willing to trust non-expert opinion (such as some parts of social media). Around half of
those in the EU use social media as a news source and, among those aged 18-24 in the UK, around a
quarter use it as their main news source.25
Yet we know that information from social media sources is typically filtered and personalised.26 That fits
people's (personalised, localised)
preferences. But it also results in news narratives which are more likely to
be self-reinforcing and self-referential than in the past. The echoes in this chamber are louder, reach further,
last longer. They are also less likely to be balanced and objective. More powerful, but less balanced,
popular narratives are a potentially destabilising influence on expectations and the economy.
This research points in one direction. The case for improved public understanding of the economy and
financial system has always been strong. But in a world where popular narratives are even more important
in driving economic behaviour, and where these narratives may be even more susceptible to destabilisation,
the case for improving public understanding is significantly reinforced. This is one blade of the scissors of
public engagement.
24
by the Bank's Agents themselves, rather than contacts so is of course only a
This analysis uses company visit write-ups produced
proxy for the latter's views.
25
Newman et al (2016).
26
For example, Papacharissi (2002).
building central banks' understanding of the
The second blade is economy and financial system through the
general public.
This is newer, but I believe fertile, ground for central banks. Central banks pride themselves, rightly, on their
technocratic skills and economic expertise. There are limits to that knowledge, as there are to knowledge in
every domain and discipline. Those limits and uncertainties need importantly to be recognised when
understanding the economy and when setting policy.
Nonetheless, it would be a false step to dispense with that expertise. No one seriously questions the need
for heart surgeons or car mechanics, the need for specialist knowledge and experienced decision-making
when repairing hearts or car parts. Human bodies and car engines are complex environments. But so too is
the economic and financial system. It too needs specialist knowledge and experienced decision-makers.
It does not follow from this, however, that expertise cannot be augmented or improved on by drawing on as
wide a set of opinions as possible, expert and non-expert. Non-experts can provide a different lens on
problems and solutions. This diversity of thought has been found to be especially useful in complex decision
Colloquially, that is why we call it
environments. "folk wisdom". Back in 2004, James Surowiecki gave it
- the "wisdom of crowds".27
another name There are now many examples of collective wisdom at work.
century English statistician Francis Galton's
The most celebrated is 19th amazement at the accuracy of the
average guesses about the weight of an ox among visitors to a county fair. Less celebrated (though, as it
turns out, more accurate) was English magician Derren Brown's attempt to predict the UK National Lottery
results in 2009 using the wisdom of crowds. The wisdom of crowds is not magic. Subsequent research has
found that it relies instead on two factors: diversity and deliberation.
To take these in turn, the value of diversity in complex decision-making is fairly well-understood. Diversity of
thought simultaneously increases the chances of creative solutions being found, while reducing the chances
of terrible solutions being adopted. It fattens the upper tail, and thins the lower tail, of the insight distribution.
Diversity delivers higher return for lower risk.28
These benefits arise, in part, from having a wider pool of ideas in which to fish and a deeper pool in which to
dilute risks. But they also arise from the collective benefits of having these new ideas and risks challenged
and filtered by a group. The benefits of diversity arise as much from interactions within the group, as from
the new ideas each person brings. But both are important for good ideas to emerge and for bad ideas to
submerge. And it is this which fattens returns and slims risks, whatever the decision.
27
Surowiecki (2004).
28
Haldane (2016).
These benefits have been demonstrated in a number of real-world settings. In his book The Difference,
"Diversity Trumps Ability" theorem.29
Scott Page goes a step further with a This states that the
highest-performing team is very unlikely to arise from bringing together the individually-best experts.
Instead it comes from combining insights from diverse sources, expert and non-expert. It comes from a
cocktail of experience, some specialist, some generalist.
The returns to diversity are not limitless. When choosing the optimal asset portfolio, most of the benefits of
diversification come from the first few assets. The same is true when the assets are people. The diversity
benefits in moving from 2 to 4 people are large compared with the diversity benefits of going from 102 to 104
people. There are probably diminishing returns to diversity.
The second factor important for the wisdom of crowds is deliberation. Complex decisions require an
investment of time, a period of deliberation. This is needed to understand a complex problem, consider it
from different angles, to test it with different solutions. Solving complex problems does not in general call for
"fast thinking" of the type described by Daniel Kahneman in his famous book, Thinking Fast and
instinctive,
It instead calls for "slow thinking", for System 2 rather than System 1 thinking.
Slow.30
Time is also important when harvesting the benefits of interactions within a diverse group. It takes time for
groups to explore and test their ideas, winnowing out the winners and filtering out the losers. It takes time for
people to change their minds. As with diversity, there are decreasing returns to deliberation time. Research
suggests that spending as little as 1 hour on a complex problem can improve performance by 10%.31 These
benefits are likely to be smaller when moving from 100 to 101 hours spent on the same problem.
While diversity and deliberation are the cornerstones of the wisdom of crowds, it is cle