Stefan Ingves: Introduction on monetary policy and financial stability
Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, before the Riksdag
Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 5 November 2009.
* * *
A little more than a year has passed since the financial crisis swept over the Swedish
economy with full force. A dramatic year, which, despite vigorous measures by central banks
and other authorities around the world, has led to the worst economic recession for many
decades. But now the economy is beginning to recover, although it will take time before we
are on firm ground again. So where in the crisis cycle do we stand today? How should the
Riksbank act to attain the inflation target and to provide support to the economic recovery in
the best possible manner? It appears as though the Swedish economy will land on its feet on
this occasion, but it is also necessary to keep our balance in the future. This is in many ways
a global challenge and a process of change, in which Sweden should play an active role.
When we met here at the Committee on Finance hearing about a year ago, the global
financial crisis had quite recently had its major impact on Sweden. The problems mainly
originated abroad - through the now cross-border financial markets and through the
downswing in the world economy hitting an export-dependent economy like ours particularly
hard.
In the very turbulent and uncertain situation prevailing at that time, the main focus was on
quickly making a diagnosis and implementing more or less acute measures - "intensive care"
if you like. It was necessary to take rapid and forceful action to safeguard financial stability
and to minimise the negative effects of the crisis on economic developments in general. For
the Riksbank and many other central banks the "normal" tools have not been sufficient to
achieve this. But we have adapted quickly, taken out a whole range of complementary tools
from our workboxes, and even constructed some new ones!
Now, one year later, the most acute phase of the financial crisis is now hopefully behind us.
Although we have not yet climbed out of the trough that turned out to be the worst economic
downturn since the war. But there are many indications that we have passed the turning
point.
In my speech today I intend to provide a brief status report of where we stand today and how
we should to proceed. Are we about to land on our feet? How does the economic situation
look today from a monetary policy perspective and what lies ahead of us? What is the
outlook for the financial system? Have the "extraordinary" measures taken had an effect and
how should they be phased out? Even after we have landed properly it will be necessary to
keep our balance. But the road ahead may be difficult to negotiate. So how do we create a
better and more sustainable structure for the financial markets both nationally and globally?
I do not have the perfect answers to all of these questions. I doubt that anyone has. But I
shall spend the next 20 minutes trying to answer them to the best of my ability. And I hope
this will provide a good basis for the coming hearing.
Monetary policy and the economic situation
The downturn in the world economy has been very rapid and severe - in this way the worst
in many decades. Sweden is an export-dependent economy and has been hit hard partly
because of this. It will take time before the economy is back at the same level as prior to the
crisis. But now we have come so far that the recovery has begun. One important component
to which I shall also return is that the conditions on the financial markets have improved.
Several indicators are also showing that confidence in the future among both companies and
households has become much stronger, an important factor in the economic recovery
(Figure 1).
Figure 1. Confidence indicators, net figures, seasonally-adjusted data
40 40
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
-10 -10
-20 -20
Househoulds
-30 -30
Total business sector
-40 -40
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Source: National Institute of Economic Research
The recovery will take time
But although growth will recover during the final two quarters of this year, we believe that
GDP in Sweden will fall by more than 4 per cent in 2009. And it will take a long time before
the economy is back at the same level as prior to the crisis. 2009 will be the first year since
the 1940s in which GDP falls in the world as a whole. But, all in all, there are many
indications that the growth rate abroad and in Sweden has bottomed out and will rise in the
years ahead (Figure 2).
Figure 2. GDP level, index 2007 Q4 = 100
110 110
USA
108 108
Euro area
106 106
Sweden
104 104
102 102
100 100
98 98
96 96
94 94
92 92
07 08 09 10 11 12
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eurostat, Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank.
With regard to the labour market, we are assuming that it will remain weak and that
unemployment will continue rising until the end of next year. Employment will not increase
until the beginning of 2011. Historically, it is usually the case that employment recovers with
some time lag after production has picked up. The weak labour market is expected to hold
back wage increases in the central wage bargaining rounds during 2010, which should
contribute to lower cost and inflationary pressures. And even if economic prospects look
better than we anticipated in our earlier forecast in September, we will have more spare
capacity than normal in the Swedish economy throughout the forecast period.
Repo rate low until autumn 2010
The Riksbank has cut the repo rate very substantially over a fairly short period of time, from
4.75 per cent last autumn down to 0.25 per cent in July this year. The largest cuts were
made mainly during last autumn and winter. Since February the repo rate has been lower
than ever before during the period we have conducted inflation targeting (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Repo rate forecasts, per cent, quarterly averages
7 7 7 7
90% 90%
Greater Greater effects effects of of support support measures measures
75% 75%
6 6 6 6
Confidence Confidence strengthened strengthened more more quickly quickly
50% 50%
Outcome Outcome
5 5 5 5
Forecast Forecast
4 4 4 4
3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
-1 -1 -1 -1
Phasing Phasing out out of of support support measures measures
Higher Higher productivity productivity
-2 -2 -2 -2
04 04 05 05 06 06 07 07 08 08 09 09 10 10 11 11 12 12
Source: The Riksbank
We are currently expecting to hold the repo rate unchanged at a low level for a further period
to come, until autumn 2010. This is necessary to contribute to a stable recovery and to attain
the inflation target of 2 per cent. Moreover, we Executive Board members decided at the
most recent monetary policy meeting that further measures were necessary to contribute to
interest rates on loans to companies and households remaining low. We therefore decided to
offer the banks the opportunity to borrow from the Riksbank at a fixed interest rate and a
maturity of around 11 months. The loan auction was held on Monday this week and the final
amount lent was SEK 95.3 billion. We expect the loans to the banks to complement the repo
rate tool in a way that enables monetary policy to have the desired effect.
Once economic activity has recovered, we are intending to raise the repo rate to more
normal levels. This is necessary to ensure a balanced economic development and an
inflation rate in line with our target. Our repo rate forecast is exactly that - a forecast, not a
promise. But it is nevertheless important that anyone borrowing money to buy a home or for
other reasons should include a sufficient margin, taking into account that today's low interest
rates will not last for ever. Let me linger a bit with the housing market and interest rates as
these subjects have much discussed recently.
Monetary policy and house prices
One issue that has been taken up, not least in the media, is that the policy we are now
conducting could possibly contribute to a further rise in house prices, despite the weak
economic activity. This could in turn increase the risk of imbalances arising in the housing
market. It is true that the Riksbank's policy, by affecting interest expenditure, has significance
for the way housing prices develop, although many other factors are also important. But the
policy we are currently conducting is what we consider to be necessary to attain the inflation
target and to provide sufficient support for the recovery in the Swedish economy. We cannot
adapt monetary policy on the basis of individual markets as long as we do not regard this as
something that affects our ability to meet the inflation target and to safeguard financial
stability. But this does not mean that we do not care about house price movements. On the
contrary, we closely follow developments in the housing market.
Figure 4. House prices and lending to households, annual percentage change
16 16
12 12
8 8
4 4
0 0
-4 -4
-8 -8
House prices
-12 -12
Household lending
-16 -16
91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09
Source: Statistics Sweden
In the long term it is hardly sustainable that house prices should continue to rise as quickly
as they have done since the mid-1990s (Figure 4). Since 1996 house prices have increased
by around 8 per cent a year. But in the shorter term, our assessment is that there is no
reason for the Riksbank to give greater consideration to house prices than we already do in
our forecasts for the economy.
Let me just add something that may not arise very often in the general debate on these
issues. Although interest expenditure is one of the factors that has significance for the way
house prices develop, the responsibility for sustainable growth with regard to lending and
house prices is largely beyond the Riksbank's control. Monetary policy can probably only
function as a complement to effective regulation and supervision. And there are many factors
that are important in ensuring a balanced development in the housing market. One
fundamental factor is that households endeavour to make realistic calculations of how much
interest expenditure and amortisation they can manage in the long run, not only when
interest rates are as low as they are now. Something that can be said to be the flip side of
the same coin is that the banks make responsible credit assessments when lending money.
If these two basic components are in place, there is a good chance of avoiding an
out-ofcontrol situation further ahead, although as I said before there are many other factors that
may be important. Finansinspektionen (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority) carries
out very important work here in that they monitor developments in the banks and credit
institutions and are prepared to take action if they consider it necessary.
Underlying inflation stable around target of 2 per cent
The impact of monetary policy on households' living costs is something that creates large
fluctuations in CPI inflation during the forecast period (Figure 5). The fact that the repo rate
has been cut heavily over the past year has contributed to a rapid fall in CPI inflation, as
changes in households' mortgage expenditure are included in this index. With effect from
autumn 2010, however, the repo rate is expected to rise relatively quickly, which will
correspondingly mean that CPI inflation will be close to 4 per cent at the beginning of 2012.
On the other hand, one can use a measure of underlying inflation, the CPIF, which excludes
the direct effects of the repo rate on mortgage rates. Measured in terms of the CPIF, we
expect inflation to be much more stable and to be close to 2 per cent for most of the forecast
period.
Figure 5. Inflation measured in terms of the CPI and the CPIF, annual percentage
change
5 5
CPI
4 4
CPIF
3 3
2 2
1 1
0 0
-1 -1
-2 -2
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank
There is still considerable uncertainty surrounding future developments (Figure 3). It is
possible that the improved situation in the financial markets will contribute to a faster
recovery in the world economy than we are expecting in the main scenario of the Monetary
Policy Report. On the other hand, the recovery may be slower than expected when the fiscal
policy stimulation packages around the world are gradually phased out. There are many
potential risks along the way. But our forecast is that if we hold the repo rate low up to
autumn 2010 and then begin raising it, this together with other measures will contribute to a
stable recovery and mean we attain the inflation target of 2 per cent.
Figure 6. GDP with uncertainty bands, annual percentage change, seasonally-adjusted
data
6 6
4 4
2 2
0 0
-2 -2
90%
-4 -4
75%
50%
Outcome
-6 -6
Forecast
-8 -8
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank
I and my colleagues on the Executive Board want the growth curve to look like a "v" when the
economy recovers after the recession, as in the figure with our forecast for GDP growth, and
not a "w" (see Figure 6). Having said that, let me just briefly comment on my own view of
monetary policy as expressed in the minutes of our most recent monetary policy meeting. As
I see the situation with regard to the Swedish economy, it is more important to allow some
safety margin for a weaker outcome than for a stronger outcome. In my opinion, it would be
more problematic if the recovery ground to a halt because we had provided too little
stimulation than if we were later forced to put the brakes on a little harder than expected.
So where do we stand with regard to the financial system?
Where we stand in terms of the economic cycle is to some extent connected to
developments in the financial markets. The second part of my status report therefore
concerns where we stand in the crisis cycle with regard to the financial system, how the
socalled unconventional measures we have taken appear to have worked and how we look
upon them in the future. But, before we go on to this - let me give you a brief summary of the
"extraordinary" or "unconventional" measures taken as a result of the financial crisis and its
effects.
"Extraordinary" or "unconventional" measures...
When the international financial turmoil escalated into a worldwide crisis in September last
year, many countries found it necessary to dig much deeper than usual into the economic
policy toolbox to find partly new methods and tools. Governments, central banks and other
authorities around the world have taken extensive measures to recreate confidence in the
financial markets, to maintain financial stability and to counteract the negative effects of the
crisis on economic activity. The central banks' measures, such as lending to the banks, are
reflected in the fact that their balance sheets have increased substantially during the crisis,
as can be seen in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Central banks' balance sheet totals, percentage of GDP
30 30
The Riksbank
25 ECB 25
Federal reserve
20 20
15 15
10 10
5 5
0 0
Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eurostat, Statistics Sweden and the respective central banks
As we have discussed earlier, the Riksbank has also implemented unconventional measures
- measures in addition to the policy we would probably have conducted under more normal
circumstances. The effects of these measures are in many cases similar, which means that it
is difficult to compartmentalise them. However, even if the boundaries are not razor-sharp, it
is possible to divide them up according to their basic purposes. There are measures which
are explicit monetary policy measures with the aim of stimulating demand in the economy
further - since the repo rate is close to zero, the possibilities to use the "traditional" interest
rate tool are limited. There are also measures that have been implemented to safeguard
financial stability.
...to attain the inflation target...
To attain the inflation target, it has been necessary to make use of new tools to get the
financial markets functioning better, to increase the access to loans and to try to bring down
various interest rates and risk premiums that have counteracted monetary policy. One
example is that we have clearly communicated that we assume that the repo rate will remain
at 0.25 per cent for a fairly long period of time. In our most recent forecast the repo rate
remains around this level until autumn 2010. Another measure is that the Riksbank lends
money to the banks at longer maturities than normal. The purpose is to contribute to
continued lower interest rates on loans to companies and households. As I mentioned when I
described the economic situation, we decided at our monetary policy meeting two weeks ago
to supplement the low repo rate with such a loan.
...and to safeguard financial stability.
The measures implemented to safeguard financial stability have similar effects, but the
fundamental aim is different. The intention has mainly been to make it easier for the Swedish
banks to manage their short-term and medium-term funding. Particularly during the most
intense phase of the crisis it was difficult for the banks to borrow other than at very short
maturities. It may also be necessary to help financial markets that have suffered serious
disruptions to function more smoothly. One can say that the Riksbank has functioned as an
intermediary in the bank system - a function that the market does not normally require. One
example in this area, too, is the loans offered to the banks at longer maturities, in both
Swedish kronor and US dollars. Another example is that the Riksbank has entered into what
are known as swap agreements with the Fed and the ECB, which means that if necessary
we can borrow dollars or euro in exchange for Swedish kronor. This type of swap agreement
is, put simply, an agreement to buy a currency at a particular time and to sell it back at a later
date. A further measure is that we accept more types of security as collateral when the banks
borrow money from the Riksbank. Moreover, the Riksbank has in different contexts extended
the list of eligible counterparties so that more financial agents will have the chance of easier
management of liquidity and funding.
Need to coordinate?
"Exit strategy" is a buzzword that has been used for a while now. There is currently much
discussion on how and when the measures taken around the world during the financial crisis
are to be phased out. One question that is highlighted is that international coordination might
be necessary for some of these processes.
Some of the discussion concerns timing and how "aggressive" one can be when slowing
down the powerful stimulation from fiscal and monetary policy. If one eases up on the
stimulation too soon and too hard, it may jeopardise the economic recovery. If one instead
eases up too late and too little, there is a risk that inflationary pressures will be too strong.
Here I believe that every country must make its own assessment, as conditions differ in
different countries. One factor that could become important is that the stimulation from fiscal
policy has put a lot of pressure on government finances in many countries. It might well be
that countries with a high national debt will be forced for budget reasons to change their
fiscal policy sooner than they desire. This could be a risk that hampers the economic
recovery, in the worst case for the world economy as a whole.
There are also individual differences to take into account when coordinating the phasing out
of the extraordinary measures taken to safeguard financial stability. The situation looks
different in different countries and it is not certain that everyone is prepared to throw away
their crutches at the same time. When it comes to phasing out the support to the bank sector,
however, there is reason to coordinate the measures as far as possible. Otherwise the
competition between banks in different countries may be distorted, which was an issue
discussed when some countries introduced support measures at an early stage.
Phasing out measures not so complicated for the Riksbank
So how does the Riksbank intend to phase out its extraordinary measures in the cases
where the changes should not become permanent solutions? Some measures will in
principle phase themselves out. The loans in US dollars from the Riksbank to the Swedish
banks have actually already phased themselves out to some extent. The demand for dollar
loans from the Riksbank has disappeared as the market has begun to function better. The
mechanism is largely the same for the loans in Swedish kronor at longer maturities, which
are offered at the repo rate plus a certain premium. By regulating the premium the Riksbank
determines how attractive the loans will be compared to the conditions prevailing in the
market.
The diagnosis that a measure is no longer needed may be difficult to make. Although, for
instance, the demand for a particular type of loan may have disappeared, the fact that there
is still a possibility to borrow may have a stabilising effect. We will not be in too much of a
hurry. And there are at least two items we need to be able to cross off the list before we
begin phasing out the measures. We must be able to say with a good degree of certainty that
the situation in the financial sector is stable and that it can function normally without support.
We must also be in a situation where we expect to be able to attain the inflation target and
stimulate the economy sufficiently without the unconventional measures.
There are other measures that require more active decisions by the Riksbank to be phased
out. For instance, the number of counterparties allowed to participate in fine-tuning
operations and the list of securities accepted as eligible collateral for credit from the
Riksbank. However, it is not self-evident that these measures will actually be phased out.
These are questions of a more technical nature that we will examine further before it is time
to make a decision.
Have the extraordinary measures had an effect?
So have the extraordinary measures had an effect? It is difficult to say exactly what has
affected the economy and in what way during a period when so much has happened, and so
quickly. But certainly there are signs that the situation has improved.
A more general observation is that lending in the Swedish economy does not seem to have
been tightened more than can be expected in a recession. The fact that confidence between
different participants in the financial markets more or less completely drained away at the
beginning of the crisis raised concern over a potential credit crunch. If the banks themselves
experience funding problems, this could ultimately lead to a much more severe contraction in
the supply of loans to households and companies than would normally occur in an economic
downturn. This could in turn further worsen the economic situation, which we neither wished
nor wish to see.
But it appears as though the measures taken to restore confidence in the financial markets,
together with the substantial cuts in the repo rate, have had the right effect. The opportunities
to borrow in the market are relatively good, both for large companies and for banks. The
Riksbank's company surveys and the National Institute of Economic Research's Business
Tendency Survey also indicate that the funding situation has improved. Financial market
statistics show that lending to households via banks and credit institutions is increasing, but
at a slower rate than before (Figure 8). Lending to companies is declining, but not by very
much considering that we are in a recession.
Figure 8. Households' and non-financial companies' total borrowing from credit
institutions, annual percentage change
20 20
Households
Companies
15 15
10 10
5
5
0 0
-5 -5
-10 -10
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank
If we look at the conditions in the financial markets from an interest rate perspective - in
terms of price instead of volume - they have become less strained during 2009. This can be
seen, for instance, if one looks at what are usually known as TED spreads - the difference
between the interbank rate, where the banks lend to one another, and the government bond
rate, both with a maturity of three months (Figure 9). The TED spread can be regarded as an
indicator of confidence between the banks. One can say that this is a premium that reflects
liquidity risk, credit risk and the demand for safer assets. The demand for government
securities tends to increase during times of financial market turmoil.
Figure 9. TED spread, basis points
500 500
Sweden
45 0 450
Euro area
USA
400 400
United Kingdom
35 0 350
Coordinated policy rate cut
30 0 300
Lending by central banks
25 0 250
Lehman Brothers
20 0 200
15 0 150
100 100
50 50
0 0
Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09
Sources: Reuters EcoWin and the Riksbank
Both in Sweden and in other countries the TED spread rose substantially when the crisis
became acute in connection with Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy last autumn. Since
then it has gradually fallen, although it is still above the levels that prevailed prior to the crisis.
This indicates greater confidence between the banks. The total measures have probably had
considerable significance. In particular, the large injections of liquidity that come from the
central banks still lending large amounts to the banks should contribute to reducing the TED
spread.
Yes, although we are not yet on solid ground!
For part of my professional life I have come to work with managing financial crises in different
parts of the world, both here in Sweden and for the IMF. I know that it is difficult to say
exactly where in the course of the crisis an economy is at a particular point in time and how
fast the recovery will be. The financial system is functioning better, but we cannot say with
any certainty to what extent the recovery is still dependent on support measures from various
authorities. We still have, for instance, outstanding loans to the banks of around SEK 385.3
billion. The financial markets are approaching normality. It is actually difficult to say exactly
what can be regarded as "normality", but I would like to emphasise that in several cases it
should mean a situation where the price of risk is higher than it was prior to the crisis. It is
fairly natural that someone investing their money should want compensation for taking a risk.
And the price of risk was unrealistically low in many cases prior to the crisis. The same
applies to the investors' impression of how much risk they were exposing themselves to. It is
therefore possible that what is counted as normal in the future with regard to risk will entail
slightly higher interest rates with a given repo rate.
The need for the authorities' measures will decline as conditions in the financial sector
improve and the world economy shows clearer signs of a recovery. But the risk of further
complications arising cannot be ruled out. One example is the uncertainty over how the
severe recession in the Baltic countries and eastern Europe will affect the Swedish banks'
loan losses. However, if all goes well and the situation remains stable, then it is time to move
on without support. But we are not there yet.
How shall we keep our balance in the future?
In a financial crisis most of what is not built on stable foundations and does not have a robust
structure is washed away. But when the situation has calmed, we have the chance to build
up something new that will work better than that which failed the trials. We have this chance
now.
We must take part in the change work
Keeping our balance once we have landed on our feet will require reforms with regard to
legislation and supervision. Difficult and important challenges lie ahead of those of us who
work with these issues - the central banks, the financial supervisory authorities and the
legislators. Here Sweden must take on the challenge and play an active role in the
international discussion. And it is necessary to act quickly. The reform work has already
begun. Within the EU a new supervisory structure is being built up with regard to banks,
insurance, securities and systemic risk. The new body, the European Systemic Risk Board,
ESRB, will play an important role in this.
Change is required in a number of different areas. The most recent crisis has demonstrated
how a liquid market can very quickly dry up and become illiquid under certain conditions.
Tougher rules are required regarding liquidity and the buffer that banks and credit institutions
need to be able to withstand shocks. Further consideration is required here before we find a
good solution. It is also necessary to develop further the analysis of asset prices and how the
financial markets can be better integrated into our models and forecasts. This applies both
with regard to the work on financial stability and the work on monetary policy.
The supervision map is being redrawn
A further area for reform concerns the supervision of the financial system as a whole, and the
possibility to take measures when risks to the stability of the system are detected. The
central banks often have both the responsibility and the best resources to analyse such
systemic risks, as they are called. But they usually do not have particularly sharp tools for
dealing with them. In most cases the central banks must rely on being able to affect
unsatisfactory states of things by providing information and warning of risks. But when times
are "good" on the financial markets, it may be difficult to get anyone to listen to this type of
warning. Before the crisis broke out, for instance, the Riksbank warned in several speeches
and reports that there were risks regarding developments in the Baltic and risks connected
with low compensation for risk in the financial markets. And we were not the only ones to
point out these risks. But the market participants did not pay sufficient heed to the warnings.
The crisis has shown that there must be an opportunity to put greater force behind the words
if warnings are to have any effect.
The tools for exercising greater pressure may entail, for instance, changing the requirements
regarding an individual bank or several banks if necessary. But such tools are not usually at
the disposal of the central banks; they are held by the financial supervisory authorities. The
problem is that these supervisory authorities often do not have the task of supervising banks
and other financial agents from a system perspective at "macro level". They more often
examine the individual participants at "micro level". This task is of course very important.
However, there may be systemic risks that need correction, but which are not evident when
individual banks are examined separately.
The recent crisis has clearly shown that supervision is necessary, and also the opportunity to
take measures at both micro level with regard to individual participants and macro level from
both a national and an international systemic perspective. The financial supervision map is
being redrawn. Bearing in mind the experiences of the recent crisis, I believe for instance
that the Riksbank and Finansinspektionen will work more closely together than before.
Greater cooperation between the authorities is one part of the solution, but I believe that the
central banks also need to have slightly "sharper teeth" - more and sharper tools in this area.
Cooperation and trust
When it comes to handling and preventing a global crisis like the one we are currently
emerging from, something more is needed, namely trust. This is required to improve
crossborder crisis management and to create effective cooperation between authorities even in an
emergency. Trust can also be a key factor in preventing a crisis from occurring at all. It is not
enough for individual authorities and countries to take action when the banks' playing field is
the entire international arena. The scope of the crisis on this occasion was connected to the
financial markets' national boundaries largely being erased. But the cure in this case
concerns, as I see it, meeting globalisation with globalisation. More cross-border cooperation
is required, and perhaps using different methods than before.
Landing on our feet and keeping our balance in the future
Let me conclude by saying that I have every hope that we will land firmly on both feet when
this crisis is over. There are many things that have been out of balance around the world.
And the longer the imbalances are allowed to continue growing, the larger the fall will be
when one finally loses one's footing. We have been hit by a financial crisis that is without
precedent in a global con