Spencer Dale: Tough times, unconventional measures
Remarks by Mr Spencer Dale, Executive Director and Chief Economist of the Bank of
England, at the Association of British Insurers Economics and Research Conference,
London, 27 March 2009.
I would like to thank Rohan Churm, Alan Mankikar and Tim Taylor for their considerable help in preparing these
remarks. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of other members of the Monetary
Policy Committee.
* * *
The UK economy is in a deep recession. Output in the United Kingdom fell at its fastest rate
in nearly thirty years in the final quarter of last year, and a similar fall in output in the first
quarter of this year appears likely. We are in the throes of a synchronised global downturn,
which has spread far and wide.
But the darkest hour is just before the dawn. Although immediate prospects appear bleak,
the substantial economic stimulus that is underway means that there are grounds for thinking
that economic conditions may start to improve later this year. An important part of that
stimulus stems from the extraordinary measures taken by the Monetary Policy Committee
over the past six months, including our decision to start using unconventional policy
measures.
Today, I will describe my view of the economic outlook and outline the factors that I believe
will spur a gradual turnaround in our economy. And I will explain why, earlier this month, the
Committee voted to use unconventional policy measures: how they will work and how we will
monitor their effectiveness.
I am delighted to have the opportunity to discuss these issues at the Association of British
Insurers. The insurance industry is a key part of the UK economy and of the financial sector
in particular. Indeed, it accounts for a third of all the jobs in the UK financial sector. Your
industry, like virtually every other sector of the UK economy, is being affected by the
recession. And given your members' significant holdings of gilts and corporate bonds, it will
have a key role to play in the transmission of the unconventional policy measures recently
begun by the Committee.
1. The economic outlook
The causes of the current recession can be traced back to at least the summer of 2007. The
fallout from the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the resulting pressure on banks' balance
sheets led to a sharp tightening in the price and availability of credit. And the first stages of
what became a renewed and prolonged surge in oil and other commodity prices began to
erode households' spending power and eat into companies' profit margins.
As a result, the UK economy gradually slowed through the end of 2007 and into the first half
of 2008. But the economic outlook took a dramatic turn for the worse in the autumn of last
year. That deterioration followed the failure of Lehman Brothers, which triggered the most
severe banking crisis for almost a century. Confidence in the very essence of banking - as
well as in individual financial institutions - was shaken to its core and measures of financial
market risk and uncertainty ballooned. The resulting contraction in the supply of credit has
had a significant impact on the ability of households and companies to borrow and spend.
But the nature of the downturn over the past six months cannot be explained solely in terms
of the direct effects of the collapse of Lehman Brothers on the supply of credit. The impact of
changes in credit conditions on investment and consumption decisions tends to be gradual,
as existing loans mature and new contracts are negotiated. This contrasts with the dramatic
pace at which economic activity and sentiment turned during the final quarter of last year.
Output, orders and investment all fell precipitously in a matter of months. Moreover, the
downturn in economic activity was seemingly indiscriminate. Output in virtually every corner
of the world fell sharply, irrespective of a country's exposure to sub-prime loans, the state of
its banking system, or its level of indebtedness. The effects of the shock were also felt far
beyond its epicentre in the financial sector. Manufacturing output has been particularly hard
hit, with UK manufacturing output estimated to have fallen by 4.9% in the fourth quarter of
last year; the largest quarterly fall for over thirty years. Many other countries have suffered
even larger falls: Japanese manufacturing output is estimated to have contracted by over
12% in Q4 and German manufacturing output by over 7%. World trade is estimated to have
fallen by over 6% in January alone.
The pace, breadth and spread of the global downturn suggest that tighter credit conditions
were not the only force at work. It seems clear that a pronounced and widespread collapse in
confidence also played a major role. With the failure of Lehman Brothers it became all too
apparent that the problems in the financial sector were more acute than had previously been
thought. This was compounded by the realisation that even the largest financial institutions
were not "too big to fail". More fundamentally, the demise of Lehman Brothers may have led
to a questioning of policymakers' ability to deal effectively with such unprecedented financial
turmoil. The view that the impact of the financial crisis would be largely restricted to the
exclusive confines of the Square Mile and Wall Street was dispelled once and for all.
Households and businesses cut back on their spending as it became increasingly apparent
that the effects of the financial crisis on the real economy were likely to be deeper and more
widespread than previously envisaged.
The impact of the tightening in the supply of bank credit and of the widespread collapse of
confidence was compounded by developments in the supply of trade credit. In previous
recessions, many large businesses in the UK were able to support smaller companies by
reducing payment times to companies further up the supply chain and by extending credit to
those further down. But pressures on corporate cash flows and the reduced availability of
bank credit may have limited the scope for larger companies to behave in this way in this
downturn. The Monetary Policy Committee, via its network of regional Agents, is monitoring
closely developments in the demand for and availability of trade credit.
The reduction in the availability of trade credit has been accompanied by a tightening in the
supply of credit insurance. This is at a time when the demand for such insurance is at its
highest. Similarly, heightened uncertainty about the global environment has increased the
demand for letters of credit from UK exporters.
These developments are understandable and predictable: the economic environment has
deteriorated markedly and as insurers you need to protect yourselves against future losses.
There is a limit to how much insurance premiums can be raised before they exceed the profit
margin associated with a particular transaction. Higher prices can have the same effect as
the complete withdrawal of supply.
I know that members of the ABI are working hard with Government and with business to
agree how best to meet these challenges. It is vital for the long-term success of both your
industry and our economy as a whole that a workable solution is found.
Where next for the UK economy?
The Monetary Policy Committee set out its latest economic outlook in the February Inflation
Report. That Report went to great pains to stress the considerable uncertainty surrounding
the prospects for the economy. Nobody can predict with any certainty how the UK economy,
or indeed the world economy, is likely to fare over the next year or so. So beware of anyone
that suggests otherwise.
With that warning in mind, let me outline my central economic outlook, which is broadly
similar to that described in the February Report. Near-term prospects are bleak. Output is
likely to contract further in the first half of this year, as a weakening labour market and
concerns about job prospects weigh on consumption, companies run down their stocks and
scale back investment spending, and the synchronised slowing in world demand restrains
export growth. But as we go through 2009, I believe it is most likely that the pace at which
output is contracting will ease and that we will see some signs of recovery by around the turn
of this year.
This view is based on the substantial stimulus that is already starting to flow through the
pipelines of our economy. There has been a marked easing in global monetary and fiscal
policies; authorities around the world have also enacted substantial initiatives to revitalise the
global banking system; the sharp falls in commodity prices will boost households' purchasing
power; and the marked depreciation in sterling should support demand, both at home and
abroad, for domestically produced output. The scale of this stimulus is significantly greater
than that seen at comparable stages of the recessions in the 1970s, 80s or 90s.
But to repeat, there is huge uncertainty about the precise form and timing of the recovery and
so this central path should be treated with a healthy degree of scepticism. In particular, I
think the risks around this central path are weighted to the downside, reflecting the possibility
that the actions taken by the authorities around the world to improve the availability of credit
and to restore business and consumer confidence are slow to take effect. So there may still
be more to do.
Learning from past recessions
When considering the likely scale and duration of this recession, it is natural to examine the
experience from past recessions. And simple comparisons with recent recessions are not
encouraging. For example, taking account of developments in Q1, output appears likely to
have fallen by more in the first few quarters of this recession than in any of the preceding
ones. But when making these comparisons, it is important to recognise that the parallels are
far from perfect. The causes of this downturn are very different from those of most recent
recessions and, as I have just described, the policy response on this occasion has been
much quicker and more decisive. There is also a third factor that needs to be borne in mind
when drawing lessons from history.
This is the first recession in the UK for nearly 20 years. The structure of our economy has
changed significantly since the early 1990s, and even more so since the early 1980s and
1970s. The UK economy has undergone extensive reforms and deregulation, and
businesses have been transformed by the implementation of new technology and the effects
of globalisation. It is hard to quantify precisely the various ways in which the structure of the
economy has changed. The appropriate data are not always available and it may be a long
time until the effects are discernible in aggregate economic statistics. Importantly, the
significance of some of these structural reforms may not be fully apparent until the economy
is subjected to a substantial shock.
For example, one consequence of globalisation is that supply chains around the world are far
more integrated. This is likely to have played an important role in the speed and
synchronisation of the world downturn, as the effects of falling demand in a few countries
were translated into lower orders and production in many in a matter of weeks. That
increased integration is also likely to affect the speed and nature of the recovery.
Similarly, the technology used to control and manage inventories has changed substantially
over the past twenty or thirty years. This may have enabled companies to run down their
stocks earlier in this recession than in previous downturns. And indeed there is evidence that
firms have already cut back aggressively on their stock levels. A corollary of this sharp
correction is that the stock cycle may be shorter lived than in previous recessions.
The behaviour of the labour market may also have changed. I have been struck by the
number of business people who tell me about the array of measures they have already taken
since their orders starting falling sharply last autumn. Wages have been frozen or even cut,
hours have been reduced, working practices have been adjusted. To the extent that wages
and hours are now more flexible, the adjustment in employment may be less. But if it is
easier for companies to vary their labour force than in the past, much of this adjustment may
come through more quickly than in previous downturns.
It is hard to know at this stage how significant these structural changes will be in determining
the depth of the recession and the speed of the recovery. But the possibility that there has
been a material structural change in our economy highlights a further danger of viewing the
current recession through the prism of previous ones. The latest economic data on world
trade, output and unemployment are unmistakeably grim, but we must continually challenge
ourselves about how to interpret these and the economic data to come. They could be telling
us something about the causes and size of the downturn, the impact of the policy measures
taken so far, or how changes in economic structure are affecting the response of output and
employment.
Let me now say a little about the role the Monetary Policy Committee is playing in addressing
the challenges posed by the global economic downturn.
2. Unconventional policy measures
The MPC responded to the marked deterioration in the economic outlook with an aggressive
easing in monetary policy. We reduced Bank Rate from 5% to an historic low of just 0.5% in
a matter of months. Moreover, at our policy meeting earlier this month, the Committee
agreed to finance £75 billion of asset purchases by the issuance of central bank reserves, in
order to boost the supply of money and improve the functioning of corporate credit markets.
The purchase (and sale) of assets by central banks is nothing new; central banks have
always implemented monetary policy by changing the size and composition of their balance
sheets. Nor, importantly, has the objective of monetary policy changed, which is to hit the
Government's 2% target for CPI inflation. What is different, however, is the range of assets
being purchased by the Bank and the scale of those purchases. Given those changes, I want
to explain the rationale for large scale asset purchases in the current economic climate. In
doing so, I will address two key questions. First, how will asset purchases help us meet the
inflation target? And second, how will we monitor the progress of the policy and assess its
effectiveness?
How will asset purchases help us to meet the inflation target?
The objective of the asset purchase programme is to boost nominal spending in order to hit
the inflation target. The tightening in the availability of credit and the collapse in confidence
has led to a sharp slowing in the growth of nominal demand. The four-quarter growth rate of
nominal GDP sank to a record low in the final quarter of last year. The weakness in nominal
spending has been accompanied by a sharp slowdown in the growth of bank lending to firms
and households and in the growth of money holdings of the non-financial sector. At our policy
meeting earlier this month, the Committee judged that without the additional stimulus
provided by the asset purchase programme, the growth of nominal spending would be
insufficient to meet the inflation objective.
The MPC instructed the Bank to use the additional reserves to purchase two types of assets:
gilts and high-quality corporate debt. This twin-track approach allows for asset purchases to
stimulate nominal spending in a variety of different ways. Such a pragmatic strategy seems
entirely sensible given that this in the first time these unconventional tools have been used in
the UK.
I find it helpful to summarise the different mechanisms through which asset purchases may
boost nominal spending into three broad channels.
First, the purchases of gilts will act to increase their prices and reduce their yields. This
change in the relative attractiveness of holding gilts is likely to cause investors to reallocate
their portfolios into other assets, such as corporate bonds, which in turn will tend to reduce
the yields on those assets. In so doing, the borrowing costs faced by firms and households
should fall. As of today, the Bank has purchased £13bn of gilts from investors.
Second, purchasing assets with central bank reserves will significantly increase the amount
of liquidity in the system. This expansion in the supply of money may in itself encourage
greater levels of lending and borrowing. Bank deposits are likely to increase, providing banks
with a ready source of funding to finance additional lending. Similarly, as the additional
liquidity permeates through the economy, companies may feel less constrained by the need
to hoard liquidity and more able to undertake investment projects.
Third, purchases of high-quality corporate debt should help to improve the functioning of
corporate credit markets. Strains on financial institutions' balance sheets, combined with
heightened levels of uncertainty and risk aversion, have impaired the liquidity of key
corporate credit markets. Firms' access to some of these markets has been restricted and
the cost of credit inflated. By purchasing assets in a targeted way, the Bank can aid liquidity
in these markets and so improve the availability of corporate credit. The Bank has been
purchasing commercial paper for over a month now. It made its first purchases of corporate
bonds this week. And we are reviewing the case for intervention in other corporate credit
markets.
Importantly, the objective of the Bank's operations within corporate credit markets is not to
purchase a specific quantity of assets; rather it is to improve the functioning of those
markets. The scale of purchases required to improve market liquidity may in fact be relatively
small: the very knowledge that the Bank stands ready to purchase assets may be as
beneficial as the actual asset purchases themselves. Moreover, the required scale of
purchases is likely to diminish over time as liquidity improves and private investors return to
the market. It is important not to judge the potential significance of this channel by the scale
of asset purchases.
How can we monitor the effectiveness of the purchases?
It is much too soon to come to a firm judgement about whether this programme of asset
purchases is having its desired effect. In particular, the impact on the growth of broad money
and credit will not begin to be discernible for several months yet. There are, however, some
encouraging signs. Since the MPC's announcement, yields on gilts have fallen by 40-60bp at
the horizons at which the Bank is making purchases. This has been accompanied by falls in
yields on non-financial corporate bonds of up to around 30bp. And since the Bank started to
operate in the commercial paper market, spreads have tightened and issuance has
increased. These developments have been mirrored in the positive feedback the Bank has
received from issuers of commercial paper.
Over the coming weeks and months, the MPC will be monitoring a wide range of indicators
as we form an initial assessment of the likely effectiveness of the asset purchase programme
in stimulating nominal spending. A critical issue will be the extent to which movements in
asset prices and market spreads are translated into lower borrowing rates faced by
businesses and households. Equally important will be the extent to which the additional
liquidity and lower borrowing rates act to spur the growth of broad money and credit.
I am confident that increasing the supply of money will eventually lead to an increase in
nominal demand. But there is considerable uncertainty about the relative importance of the
different channels through which it may work. As such, I welcome the eclectic, twin-track
approach adopted by the Committee. There is also considerable uncertainty about the
overall size and timing of the impact of the monetary expansion on nominal spending and on
the prospects for inflation. That is why in the minutes of its March meeting, the MPC
indicated that, just as with its decisions on Bank Rate, we would review the appropriate scale
of the asset purchase programme each and every month.
3. Conclusion
The extraordinary developments in the global economy since the autumn have been
matched by the magnitude of the policy response. Monetary policy continues to play its part,
with Bank Rate set at a historically low level and the launch of a large-scale asset purchase
programme. Throughout these dramatic developments, the objective guiding the
Committee's decisions has remained the same: the need to keep inflation on track to meet
the Government's 2% inflation target. It was that objective that underpinned the decisions to
reduce Bank Rate to unprecedented levels. And it was that objective that drove the MPC to
adopt unconventional policy measures.
The inflation target will also dictate the rate at which the stance of monetary policy is returned
to normal as economic prospects recover. The outlook for inflation relative to the inflation
target provides the natural guide to exiting from this period of exceptional monetary stimulus.
Importantly, this exit strategy is clear, transparent and open to public scrutiny. Openness and
transparency have been the cornerstones of UK monetary policy since the Monetary Policy
Committee was established in 1997. That has never been more important than now.
The inflation target is symmetric. That requires the MPC to set policy in a symmetric way.
The Committee adjusted monetary policy boldly and decisively on the way down in order to
meet the inflation target. And, let me assure you that, when the time comes, we will be
prepared to respond with equal vigour on the way back up.