Masaaki Shirakawa: International banks amid global financial crisis
Address by Mr Masaaki Shirakawa, Governor of the Bank of Japan, at the Information Forum
of the International Bankers Association, Tokyo, 27 January 2009.
* * *
1. Introduction
I am honored to be given the opportunity today to address the Information Forum of the
International Bankers Association (IBA). I was told that this is the first time for the Governor
of the Bank of Japan to address the Forum of this Association. And it might be an opportune
moment, perhaps the most appropriate in your 25-year history, when the turmoil in global
financial and capital markets remains and financial institutions and central banks are faced
with various challenges.
As an association of international financial groups, commercial banks, securities firms and
representative offices in Japan, the International Bankers Association was established 25
years ago. Since then it has been making efforts to exchange views between member
financial institutions and to enhance their dialogue with the Japanese authorities. Through
those activities, the association has contributed substantially to the development of Japan's
economy and financial markets. Before starting my speech, I express my respect for the
efforts you have been making over the years.
In my speech today, I will briefly refer to the roles that international banks including other
financial institutions play in Japan. I will, then, look back on the developments in financial
markets at home and abroad since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, followed by policy
responses by the Bank of Japan and lessons for the activities of international banks,
especially the importance of liquidity management. In conclusion, I will touch on the roles and
challenges of the Bank of Japan to ensure financial system stability.
2. Roles of international banks in Japan
I begin with talking about the history of international banks in Japan. While the National Bank
Act was enacted in Japan in 1872 and the Bank of Japan was established in 1882,
international banks first operated in Japan in 1863, five years before the Meiji Restoration.
Last year marked a memorable 150th anniversary of treaty of commerce between Japan and
western countries, and for Japan that started international trade at the end of the Edo era, a
means of trade settlement with overseas countries was needed first. At the time, it was the
international banks in Japan that carried out the trade settlement functions by way of foreign
exchange. Yukichi Fukuzawa, who is on a ten thousand yen bill and the leading educator
toward the end of the Edo era and the Meiji era, sailed across the Pacific Ocean to the
United States in 1860 as a member of an official mission of Japanese government. In his
autobiography, he referred to an episode that cash bags filled with travel expenses were torn
in a great storm and greenbacks were scattered inside the cabin. Only four years later, on a
government's mission to Europe in 1864, the international banks in Japan prepared foreign
exchange money orders so that the mission members could cover their travel expenses
without physically carrying cash. While it is only a small episode in the beginning of the
modern banking system in Japan, it demonstrated that international banks were the pioneers
of modern financial services in Japan.
Since then, international banks have played important roles in Japan's financial markets in
various aspects including adoption of new financial techniques, discovery of new markets,
and introduction of advanced risk management. In fact, while the share of international banks
in loans and deposits only accounts for about one percent, the latest survey conducted in
April 2007 showed that, the share of international banks was 67% in foreign exchange
transactions and 68 % in derivatives transactions. The share is also high in call market
funding and, especially before the outbreak of the subprime mortgage loan problem in the
summer of 2007, it amounted to about 40%.
The presence of international banks is also evident in terms of the banking operations of the
Bank of Japan. The Bank currently has current account transactions with 64 banks and 18
securities firms which are from other countries. The international banks' settlements using
current accounts of the Bank are about 17 trillion yen in value and about 13,000 in number of
transactions per business day, which are 13% and 25% of the total, respectively.
Furthermore, international banks play a key role in daily open market operations by the Bank.
For example, in the Bank's primary funds-supplying operations against pooled collateral at
the head office, there are 17 international banks in 39 eligible counterparties.
At the same time, the increased presence of international banks suggests that the
developments in overseas financial markets and the activities of overseas financial
institutions are exerting a stronger influence than in the past on the host country's economy.
A good example is the recent developments in Central and Eastern European countries. In
those countries, European banks outside the region have recently played important roles in
the financial systems. However, amid the current crisis, those European banks' lending to
local firms declined rapidly and that partly accounted for the deterioration of economic activity
in that region.
Such situation is, to some degree, also relevant to Japan. International banks have been the
dominant liquidity provider to Japan's real estate market for the last several years. However,
since around autumn 2007, real estate business of those international banks rapidly shrank,
which led to a decline in transactions in the real estate market. In addition, international
banks have been showing a strong presence in the field in which Japanese financial
institutions have not been necessarily involved enough, such as securitization business,
private equity business for bad loans, M&As, and long-term lending to local governments.
However, the presence has been changing as international banks' liquidity constraints have
become acute.
3. Financial and capital markets since the collapse of Lehman Brothers
Global economy and global financial markets
Now let me turn to the developments in global financial and capital markets. Since the
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the global economy and financial markets have changed
dramatically. The fourth quarter figures for GDP, industrial production, and exports have
started to be released in various countries, and a sharp decline that could be indeed
expressed as "jump off a cliff" has been witnessed simultaneously worldwide. The Bank of
Japan released last week the economic outlook, and the median forecast of Japan's
economic growth for fiscal 2009 among Policy Board members was substantially revised
downward from 0.6% as of end-October 2008 to -2.0%.
The principal factor behind the simultaneous and rapid slump of the global economy since
autumn last year was the mounting global financial crisis triggered by the collapse of Lehman
Brothers.
The first phenomenon after the collapse of Lehman Brothers was the growing concern for
counterparty risk in funding markets and associated malfunctioning of those markets.
Consequently, the volume of transactions plunged and market liquidity declined not only in
uncollateralized markets, but also in collateralized ones such as foreign exchange swap
market. Against such a backdrop, the functioning of credit market declined, and private
economic agents suffered in their fund-raising. Banks faced liquidity concern in addition to
the losses and the capital shortage, and their lending stance became cautious. The declined
functioning of the financial system exerted a negative impact on economic activity, which in
turn adversely affected the asset quality of financial institutions and investors. What is
happening now is the adverse feedback loop between the financial system and the economy.
The global economy is facing difficult challenges, and such a situation is attributable to the
phenomenon that leverages markedly increased around the globe in the periods preceding
the current financial crisis. Consequently, what is necessary now is the unwinding of
excessive leverages, or de-leveraging, so to speak. Without that, it is difficult to expect
fullfledge recovery of the global economy. At the same time, if de-leveraging evolves rapidly and
the provision of credit to private firms and household sector shrinks substantially, economic
activity contracts sharply. To bring the global economy back onto a sustainable growth path,
a delicate balance would be required between encouraging unwinding of excessive
leveraging and preventing that unwinding from evolving too rapidly within a short period of
time.
Domestic financial markets
The turmoil in global financial markets also had a substantial impact on Japan's financial
markets. Before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, both the short-term money market and the
credit market in Japan were relatively stable, reflecting the fact that Japan's financial
institutions' exposure to structural products was relatively small. Rather, such relative stability
increased the attractiveness of Japan's financial markets internationally as fund-raising
markets, and yen funding by non-residents became active during the preceding periods up to
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, as shown in issuing samurai bonds 40 percent more
yearon-year basis. However, situation of domestic financial markets literally changed dramatically
by the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
The first change was the funding difficulties of international banks in the yen money market
due to growing concern for counterparty risk. In the uncollateralized call market, funding by
international banks became difficult amid declining market liquidity, and the two-tiering of
interest rate emerged that the funding rates of international banks became higher relative to
domestic financial institutions. Also in the collateralized money market, such as the repo
market, the tendency to avoid transactions with international banks became widespread.
After the burst of the bubble economy, concerns were expressed about the creditworthiness
of Japan's financial institutions in overseas markets and they faced a so-called Japan
premium in dollar funding in late 1990s. The opposite took place this time.
The second change is the distortion of pricing, or dislocation, due to the decline in market
liquidity. That is obvious at a glance by looking at JGB's yield curve, the pricing of the floating
rate JGB and inflation-linked JGB, and swap spread which is the difference between the
swap rate and JGB yield. Before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, international investors
including hedge funds played a role of market liquidity provider through arbitrage
transactions. However, after the collapse, their arbitrage transactions became inactive due to
the decline in risk-taking capability, and market liquidity declined substantially.
The third change is the declined functioning of domestic CP and corporate bond markets. In
the CP market, issuance suddenly became difficult and the issuing rate has risen to a level
above that of the financial crisis in 1998. In the corporate bond market, issuance by firms
rated single A or below has virtually been suspended. In addition, the new issuance of
samurai bonds, which had been steady up to last summer, remained almost suspended.
4. Policy responses by the Bank of Japan
In response to those rapid changes in conditions, the Bank has been promptly taking various
measures since last autumn.
The measures taken by the Bank are classified broadly into three categories. The first
category is the cut of the policy rate. The Bank lowered its target for the uncollateralized
overnight call rate last October and December by 0.2 percent, respectively, to 0.1 percent.
The second category is various measures to ensure financial market stability. The substantial
provision of yen liquidity and US dollar funds-supplying operations fall into this category. The
third category includes measures to facilitate corporate financing. Those include the
expansion of eligible collateral related to corporate debts, and special funds-supplying
operations to facilitate corporate financing, which are low interest rate funds-supplying
operations against corporate debts as collateral. In addition, while extraordinary for a central
bank, the Bank starts outright purchases of CP from the end of this month. While the
measures I have just mentioned are all important, let me explain in more detail about the
policy measures to maintain financial market stability and outright purchases of CP.
Substantial liquidity provision to ensure stability of financial markets
What is crucially important in a financial crisis is to maintain financial system stability. In that
regard, Japan has a bitter experience. In autumn 1997, the default of a mid-sized securities
firm in the interbank money market triggered rapid shrinking in market transactions. Once the
confidence, which is basic premise of financial market transactions, collapses, its recovery
takes time, resulting in substantial damage to the economy. The developments in global
financial markets and the global economy since the collapse of Lehman Brothers bring me a
sense of deja vu of what happened in Japan 10 years ago but on a worldwide scale.
To maintain financial market stability amid financial crisis, substantial liquidity provision by a
central bank is indispensable. In that regard, the Bank has taken various measures.
First, the Bank has been striving for aggressive liquidity provision to maintain the stability of
the domestic yen fund market. The introduction of a facility to pay interests on the reserves in
October last year enabled the Bank to aggressively provide yen liquidity, without affecting the
level of the call rate that is set based on monetary policy considerations.
Second, the Bank started US dollar funds-supplying operations in Japan. The US dollar
provision by central banks of countries other than the United States had been conducted by
the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank since the end of 2007. Given that
functioning of foreign exchange swap market also declined in Japan since the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, the Bank started the US dollar-supplying operations, in close coordination
with the U.S. and other major central banks. The Bank obtained necessary US dollars
through swap transactions with the Federal Reserve. In the current global financial crisis,
swap transactions between central banks have been used for securing non-dollar currencies
as well, and, as a temporary measure until the end of April 2009, the Bank of Japan and the
Bank of Korea increased the maximum amount of the bilateral yen-won swap arrangement
from three billion US dollars equivalent to twenty billion US dollars equivalent. The temporary
increase strengthened the Bank of Korea's capacity to immediately supply yen funds when
Korean financial institutions urgently need the yen.
Measures to facilitate corporate financing
For central banks, those liquidity provisions are orthodox responses to a financial crisis. By
contrast, the outright purchases of CP entail an effect of facilitating corporate financing and
containing the contraction of economic activity through mitigating the fear of liquidity dry-up,
which firms worry. In fact, since the announcement of the measure in December, the issuing
environment of CP has somewhat improved. However, the outright purchases of CP are an
extraordinary measure in that a central bank directly shoulders credit risk of individual firms.
The premise of free market economy is that central banks provide liquidity at large, and
private financial institutions and financial markets perform the function of individual resources
and credit allocations. For that reason, it is essential to clarify the basic principles in what
cases a central bank carries out such extraordinary measures. The first principle is that a
significant decline in the market functioning of corporate financing is observed, leading to
tight corporate financing conditions on the whole. The second principle is that the outright
purchases of corporate financing instruments are judged necessary in light of the Bank's
mission to ensure price stability and financial system stability.
Even in the cases in which a central bank's outright purchases of corporate financing
instruments are judged as necessary, based on the principles I have just mentioned, very
careful design is required in actual implementation. Deep involvement of a central bank in
credit allocation of individual financial markets and individual firms might lead to a
paradoxical consequence, such that markets which are functioning relatively normally would
be impaired by the central bank's own action. In that regard, it is not the case that more
purchases are more effective. In addition, if the central bank incurs losses, it might
undermine confidence of general public in the central bank's policy conduct and ultimately in
the currency. Keeping those points in mind, the Bank has laid out three elements to be
considered. The first element is a perspective of neutrality, which prevents discretionary
credit allocation to individual firms. The second is to conduct the purchases for a necessary
period and on an appropriate scale. That would ensure that the purchases are a bridging
measure until the market function recovers. The third is to ensure the Bank's financial
soundness. Since the losses of the purchases impose costs on taxpayers, it is important to
avoid the concentration of credit risks in a specific firm.
The specifics of the CP purchasing scheme is as follows. From the first perspective of
neutrality for credit allocation, the Bank will purchase from financial institutions that are the
counterparties of the Bank by fair and transparent means of competitive auctions. In addition,
from the second perspective, the purchases will be conducted for a limited time up to March
this year, and the Bank uses an auction in which somewhat a high minimum bid rate is set.
The minimum bid rate is set to be more favorable than the market interest rates when the
market is malfunctioning, but not more favorable than the market interest rates of normal
times. With this setting, bids will naturally decrease in number as the market function
recovers. In addition, from the third perspective of ensuring the Bank's financial strength, the
Bank will purchase a-1 rated CP that are eligible as the Bank's collateral, with setting upper
limits by each individual firm. Keeping in mind that the outright purchases could be a means
of meeting firms' funding needs including the redemption of corporate bonds toward the end
of a fiscal year, the total amount to be purchased is set so as not to exceed three trillion yen
and will be temporarily conducted until the end of March this year. The actual purchases of
CP will start this month. In addition, the Bank is now considering the outright purchases of
corporate bonds with a remaining maturity of up to one year.
5. Lessons for financial institutions' international activities: importance of
liquidity management
Next, by changing the subject, in light of the impact of the current global financial crisis on
financial institutions' businesses, especially on international activities including those of
overseas bases, let me consider what kind of lessons should be drawn. Here I focus on the
importance of liquidity management, which is deemed particularly important.
The importance of liquidity management
The first lesson is that, it is necessary to keep remembering that a notion "liquidity is always
there" would not hold. In retrospect, a situation that could be characterized as "abundant
liquidity" continued for several years preceding the current crisis. Here, "abundant liquidity"
does not only mean the level of cash, but also includes a sense of reassurance that one can
obtain funds anytime and a sense of reassurance for market liquidity that financial assets can
be sold anytime at prevailing market price. However, as the current financial crisis has
shown, liquidity could suddenly dry up. Once liquidity concern arises, the forced selling of
assets occurs as market participants rush to obtain fund liquidity, and the market price will
diverge from the value of cash flow that the corresponding assets generate. That suggests
that profits and capital position will be affected by the extent of liquidity as well. In designing
business models, financial institutions need to recognize the possibility of liquidity dry-up.
Liquidity management in overseas bases
The second lesson is the importance of establishing a liquidity management system of
international banks that conduct businesses at bases other than home countries. As
mentioned before, liquidity cannot always be obtained, which reassures the importance of
retail deposits that are relatively stable funding source. In that regard, for internationally
active financial institutions, it would not be easy to take such retail deposits from customers
in countries they operate. In terms of funding structure in Japan, international banks rely their
funding on foreign exchange swaps, repo transactions, and fund transfer from head offices in
home countries through intra-office accounts. In any event, the funding in currency other than
home currency eventually depends heavily on funding conditions in the market. Such line of
thinking suggests that it is extremely important that the foreign exchange swap market, which
converts home currency into another country's currency, is operating normally. The striking
change in global financial markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers was the decline in
the functioning of not only the uncollateralized fund market but also of the foreign exchange
swap market, which made it difficult to obtain funds in foreign currency, regardless of
individual financial institution's creditworthiness.
Smooth liquiditiy management by a financial institution cannot be achieved only by using its
own cash, deposits, and borrowing capability. It also depends on the condition of market
liquidity of financial assets. However, if a financial institution tries to secure its liquidity level
sufficient enough to cope with an extreme stress situation, the financial institution has to hold
sizable amount of risk free and short-term financial assets and thus cannot pursue its
intrinsic function of financial intermediation. In that context, liquidity management by a
financial institution itself, market-level efforts to maintain market liquidity, and proper exercise
of the lender of last resort function by a central bank, would be the three indispensable
factors. With respect to liquidity management by a financial institution itself, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision released a guidance paper on liquidity management last
September, and there it presented sound practices for enhancing liquidity management by
conducting appropriate liquidity management, including that of foreign currencies, according
to the characteristics of each market in which financial institutions operate.
Importance of improving market infrastructure
The third lesson is the importance of improving the infrastructure of the market and the
payment and settlement system, which is derived from the aforementioned perspective of
maintaining market liquidity. The sudden collapse of Lehman Brothers brought a state of
turmoil into the Japanese financial markets. In particular, the number of settlement failures
increased in the JGB repo market, which contributed to declining liquidity in the JGB market.
However, without the efforts in recent years by the market participants and the central banks
to improve the infrastructure of the market and the payment and settlement system including
the establishment of clearing mechanism in the securities market such as the Japan
Government Bond Clearing Corporation (JGBCC), default in the repo market might have had
a contagion effect on the entire JGB market and the market turmoil could have been much
more severe. A good example is the scheme for foreign exchange settlement, which is called
"CLS," or Continuous Linked Settlement. The CLS links the payment systems of countries
and makes a simultaneous payment of a pair of currencies associated with foreign exchange
trading, which reduces foreign exchange settlement risk.
While it is hard to win understanding in normal times, the experience since the collapse of
Lehman Brothers suggests the importance of a scheme to properly manage counterparty
risk. Given the current situation, its importance is recognized anew. At present, in order to
reduce counterparty risk in the OTC derivatives trading, the discussion on establishing post-
trading arrangements for derivatives has also started in Japan. The Bank expects private
financial market participants to tackle those issues, and will also actively keep supporting the
efforts of the market participants to improve the infrastructure of the market and the payment
and settlement system and to review the market practices.
6. The role of the Bank of Japan toward financial system stability
The current financial crisis has highlighted various issues and challenges about the conduct
of monetary policy by central banks, and the role of financial institution supervision and
regulation. Let me mention three points about the role of the Bank toward the stability of the
economy and the financial system.
A macroprudential perspective
First is the importance to have a macroprudential perspective in the conduct of policies, be it
monetary policy or regulation and supervision of financial institutions. To ensure financial
system stability, the main premise is that financial institutions themselves manage risks.
However, the risks inherent in the financial system do not necessarily equal the sum of the
risks of individual financial institutions. Let me take an example of residential
mortgagebacked securities (RMBSs), securitized products that have residential mortgages as
underlying assets, which triggered the global financial crisis. For individual investors, the
risks seem to be diversified, thanks to securitization technology, but, if housing prices decline
on national basis, the risk diversification effect will not work. In addition, it cannot be ignored
that market liquidity is supported by the entry of many investors attracted by the continuing
increase in housing prices. In other words, in recognizing necessary amount of capital,
financial institutions need to take into account liquidity as well. In that context, it is extremely
important not only to monitor the individual risks of financial institutions or products, but also
monitor the risks inherent in the financial system as a whole from a macroprudential
perspective. In such recognition, the Bank has been recently making efforts to conduct
research from a macroprudential perspective and disseminate information, and part of the
efforts is contained in our Financial System Report. The Bank would like to continue to
strengthen and exercise its macroprudential function.
On-site examination and off-site monitoring
Second is the importance of grasping precisely the conditions of individual financial
institutions, together with holding a macroprudential perspective that I have just mentioned.
Economic growth eventually materializes by combining labor and capital equipment in an
optimal way and utilizing the fruits of technological innovation. The function of financial
intermediation supports that process from the financial side. Given this line of thinking, it is
important to steadily understand how funds are used for what purposes and, in doing so,
whether financial institutions are conducting proper liquidity management. The Bank of Japan
conducts both on-site examination and off-site monitoring, and for the central bank as a
lender of last resort, the current crisis obviously showed the importance that the central bank
has hands-on knowledge. In that regard, close liquidity monitoring by the Bank has been
effective in maintaining the relative stability of Japan's financial markets.
In the case of international banks, the Bank's on-site examination and off-site monitoring are
conducted for their Japanese branches. However, to find out the potential risk factors and to
properly evaluate their impact, the Bank needs to deepen the understanding of the financial
groups' entire management policy and risk management strategy, the status of the bases in
Japan within the group, and the governance structure. For those who are here today, I would
like to seek your understanding and cooperation, more than ever, on the importance of the
Bank's on-site and off-site monitoring.
International cooperation
Third is the importance of international cooperation. Major central banks have been closely
exchanging views and information not only at Governor levels but also at staff levels with
respects to various areas such as market operation, financial supervision, and settlement
system. Such cooperation has become greater in the current crisis. The close cooperation is
not only with the United States and Europe, but also with Asian countries. As expressed in
the word "globalization," it is true that financial markets are heading toward standardized and
seamless ones. At the same time, it is also another fact that plenty of seam and lumpy
factors remain. For that reason, the importance of information exchange and cooperation in
the area of central banking business would be increasing further.
The Bank of Japan would like to communicate closely with you, conduct appropriate policy
responses, and actively support market participants' efforts toward financial system stability.
Your cooperation is highly appreciated. Thank you very much.