Karolina Ekholm: Role model or warning example? Swedish experiences
of taking indebtedness into account in monetary policy decisions
Speech by Ms Karolina Ekholm, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to a meeting at
the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, Stockholm, 14 March 2014.
* * *
The views expressed in this speech are my own and are not necessarily shared by the other members of the
Executive Board of the Riksbank. I would like to thank Carl-Johan Belfrage for his help in writing this speech,
along with Mikael Apel, Marianne Sterner, Ulf Söderström and David Vestin for their views on earlier versions.
Today I shall talk about what has been the actual source of dissension among the Executive
Board of the Riksbank for several years, namely to what extent household indebtedness
should be taken into account in the monetary policy decisions. It may appear unnecessarily
retrospective to focus on the earlier dissension when the Executive Board has actually been
unanimous on the monetary policy assessments made since December last year. But I
believe that there are important lessons to be learnt both by us in Sweden and those abroad,
with regard to how the policy conducted may have brought us to where we are now.
Swedish monetary policy has recently been one of the clearest examples of a policy that has
tried to counteract the build-up of debt with reference to high indebtedness being a threat to
financial stability. This type of monetary policy is known as leaning against the wind, and in
this case the wind would be growth in household debt. Household indebtedness has affected
the monetary policy assessment in Sweden in earlier periods, too, but it is primarily since
autumn 2012 that it has explicitly been cited as a reason for a higher repo rate than is strictly
justified by the prospects for inflation and resource utilisation.1 Although other central banks
have also referred to high indebtedness and mentioned financial stability risks in connection
with monetary policy decisions, few central banks have faced such a clear conflict of
objectives as the Riksbank. What this entails is either to keep the repo rate higher to slow
down the build-up of debt, or to keep it lower to bring up an inflation that has long been below
target at the same time as resource utilisation has been low.
Personally, I have been sceptical of the policy conducted, which has meant that I entered
reservations against the decisions over a long period of time. Now that inflation has recently
moved even further away from the target, the Executive Board has been able to agree on the
monetary policy decisions. The repo rate was cut most recently in December last year and
the repo-rate path was lowered.
Why inflation has been so low is something of an open question. I believe that the policy
conducted has been an important contributory factor. At the same time, I believe that its
effects on household indebtedness have been minor. In my view, the experiences of
including indebtedness in the balance when making monetary policy decisions in Sweden
are therefore not particularly positive.
Swedish monetary policy leaning against the wind
The Riksbank has recently been much clearer about how the risks linked to housing prices
and household indebtedness have affected the monetary policy decisions.2 The risks have
been allowed to justify a higher repo rate than the prospects for inflation and resource
utilisation would have indicated. Thus, one can say that the Riksbank has practised what is
known in central bank contexts as leaning against the wind, to counteract a potentially
harmful growth in debt.
The advantages and disadvantages of this type of monetary policy stance have been
discussed at length, both in academic circles and among central bank representatives,
particularly after the global financial crisis. Some say that the experiences from the financial
crisis provide support for a monetary policy that is adjusted so that it counteracts financial
imbalances such as price bubbles and excessive indebtedness, while others say that
monetary policy is normally unsuitable for these purposes and should instead focus entirely
on inflation and resource utilisation.3 My own opinion is closer to the latter perception than
the former. I believe that while of course there may be situations in which it is justified to try
to dampen a general credit boom, it is better to use other tools than monetary policy to
influence indebtedness among households and developments on a specific market, such as
the housing market.
In the case of Sweden, one can claim that the repo rate has for several years been set
higher than is strictly justified by inflation and resource utilisation.4 But household
indebtedness was not explicitly mentioned as a reason until the repo-rate decision in October
2012. The repo rate had then been gradually cut from 2 per cent at the end of 2011 to
1.25 per cent in September 2012. In October 2012, the repo rate was then held unchanged
and household debt was for the first time treated as a factor in the monetary policy
deliberations, both in the Monetary Policy Report and the press release on the repo-rate
decision. However, the repo rate was cut further, to 1 per cent in December 2012. It then
remained at this level for one year, until December 2013, despite low inflation and an inflation
forecast that had been revised down substantially, as well as unemployment that seemed
stuck at around 8 per cent. In December 2013, the repo rate was cut further to 0.75 per cent.
During the period between December 2012 and December 2013, I felt that the consideration
given to household indebtedness was preventing the further repo-rate cut that I considered
justified.
Others also lean, but under different circumstances
We in Sweden are far from alone in feeling that rising indebtedness driven by rising house
prices poses a threat to financial stability. Other central banks have also given explicit
consideration to such threats when formulating their monetary policy. Of those countries that
are comparable with Sweden in the sense that they are developed economies with inflation
targets, Norway, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are the ones that can be said to have
conducted a monetary policy that to some extent leans against the wind. Sweden does
however stand out in that inflation has been clearly below the target in recent years, at the
same time as unemployment has been relatively high.5
Policy Update published in April 2013 states that the monetary policy conducted "is expected to stimulate
economic developments and inflation at the same time as taking into account the risks linked to households'
high indebtedness". An article in the Monetary Policy Report published in July 2013 presents a conceptual
framework for taking into account financial imbalances in the monetary policy assessment.
3
For a review and categorisation of various points of view on the question of how monetary policy should give
consideration to financial stability, see Smets, Frank (2013).
4
See Svensson (2011).
5
In Canada, inflation has also been below the target for a period of time, but before this situation arose,
unemployment had fallen back to its pre-crisis average. New Zealand had an inflation rate in the lower end of
its target interval of 1-3 per cent during a few quarters before they began to say in early 2013 that they did not
want to see increased financial stability risks as a result of developments in the housing market. They have
not, however, expressly spoken of a trade-off between bringing up inflation and subduing developments in the
The situation in Norway has been similar to ours, in that inflation has also been clearly below
the target for a relatively long time, from the beginning of 2011 until the middle of 2013. Since
spring 2010, Norges Bank has often discussed the build-up of imbalances linked to a low
interest rate as a factor that is included in its monetary policy deliberations. But there are
clear differences here, too. Throughout this period they have had a resource utilisation that
was close to or even above the normal level. Unemployment has been close to a low
historical average.
Although it is of course difficult to compare and assess different central banks' deliberations,
the repo-rate decisions in Sweden during most of 2013 would appear to be one of the
clearest examples of a monetary policy that leaned against the wind. When the prospects for
inflation fell, the repo rate was held unchanged with explicit reference to household debt.
This makes it interesting both for us in Sweden and for central banks in other countries to
assess how successful the policy has been. It is far too early to make a complete
assessment. But as there is a substantial need to manage financial imbalances in some
countries, and there is a discussion on the role of monetary policy in this context, it may
nevertheless be useful to make a preliminary assessment of the policy.
Swedish inflation moving further from the target
CPIF inflation was around 2 per cent in 2010, when the increases in the repo rate began
after the record-high cuts in connection with the global financial crisis. But since then inflation
has fallen and CPIF inflation has been around 1 per cent for a couple of years. Last autumn,
inflation fell further. It is now very low; in February CPI inflation was -0.2 per cent and CPIF
inflation was +0.4 per cent. We have been able to observe that it is a broad-based decline in
inflation, to the extent that all major components are affected.6
Low inflation has come to be a widespread phenomenon and many countries and regions
have recently reported inflation rates clearly below their targets. Inflation has fallen
particularly sharply in the euro area. The fact that this happens in a situation where there is
plenty of spare capacity - which is the case in large parts of the euro area - is not
particularly surprising. However, the downturn in Swedish inflation is larger and has been
going on for longer than in other countries. And the question is why...
One possible reason, which was also discussed in an article in the latest Monetary Policy
Report in February, is that Swedish companies have not been passing on their cost
increases to consumers as much as is normal.7 They have thus not increased their prices to
the extent that one might expect, given the historical relationships with unit labour costs and
import prices faced by producers. There may be several reasons for this, but one is that
margins may decline when economic activity is weak, which is also noted in the article.
Current research using US data implies that price mark-ups vary positively with the business
cycle.8
Another reason may be that the weak development in the euro area has hit Swedish exports
hard and that this has contributed to resource utilisation being lower than normal over a long
period of time. With low resource utilisation one can expect that inflation will be pushed down
as the pressure on wage and price increases will be low. The weak international demand is
of course one factor that is beyond the Riksbank's control and in this sense monetary policy
cannot be blamed for the low inflationary pressure. At the same time, it is the role of
monetary policy to counteract this type of downward pressure to stabilise inflation around the
target.
Monetary policy may have contributed in different ways
Personally, I believe that the monetary policy conducted is an important contributory factor to
the fall in inflation. The fact that household indebtedness is taken into account in the
monetary policy decisions - and the repo rate is thus held somewhat higher than the
prospects for inflation and resource utilisation have justified - has probably made the krona
stronger than it would otherwise have been and also held back domestic demand. When the
krona appreciates, this has both a direct effect on inflation, which is pushed down when
import prices fall, and an indirect effect in that the demand for Swedish-produced goods and
services is affected negatively.
Strong krona contributes to low inflation
The possibility for monetary policy to steer the exchange rate is limited, but there is
nevertheless reason to believe that the krona has become stronger than it would otherwise
have been because of our leaning against the wind. If foreign exchange market participants
see an increased difference between the yield on a Swedish treasury bill and the yield on
foreign equivalents, the Swedish treasury bills and thus the Swedish krona will be more
attractive and therefore more expensive - that is, the krona will appreciate. Although it is
difficult to see clear links between observed exchange rates and interest rate differentials, a
positive interest rate differential usually coincides with a strong krona (see Figure 1). The
difficulty in seeing clear links is due to expectations having considerable significance for
trade on the financial markets. The market rates and the krona rate do not change when the
Riksbank makes its repo-rate decisions, they change when market participants' expectations
of future repo-rate decisions change.
Figure 1.
Interest rates and exchange rates
Percentage points and index, 18 November 1992=100, quarterly average
4 130
Interest rate differential (left scale)
KIX index (right scale)
3 125
Weaker krona
2 120
1 115
0 110
Stronger krona
-1 105
-2 100
The effect on the krona has thus arisen when expectations of the repo rate have changed,
rather than when repo-rate decisions have been made. The expectations have probably
been affected gradually, as the significance of the indebtedness for the decisions has
become clearer. Moreover, exchange rates are at the same time affected by several factors
that are connected with both expectations and market functioning. This makes it difficult to
see with the naked eye how a particular monetary policy stance will affect the krona rate -
unless it entails a large, sudden and unexpected deviation from earlier patterns. But
nevertheless, consideration to household indebtedness and developments on the housing
market have entailed a larger interest rate differential in relation to other countries, and thus
probably a stronger krona, than we would have had otherwise.
Between spring 2010 and autumn 2013, the interest rate differential in relation to other
countries measured in terms of the KIX9 index increased by around one percentage point.
During this period the krona strengthened by around 10 per cent and we were forced to
revise our exchange rate forecasts in a stronger direction on several occasions. One
possible explanation is that the forecast did not fully reflect the large interest rate differential
that monetary policy entailed.
One consequence of the strong development of the krona is that Swedish import prices have
fallen in absolute terms and fallen more than other countries' import prices (see Figure 2a).
This puts downward pressure on inflation. Another consequence is that the international
competitiveness of domestically-produced goods and services deteriorates. This could be
reflected in lower sales volumes and, to the extent the firms instead prefer to guard their
market shares, lower price mark-ups. A strong krona, combined with weak demand from
abroad, has meant that the situation for the export industry has been particularly hard
pressed, which has probably led to low wage increases in the manufacturing sector. As this
sector is traditionally a wage leader, the low wages may have spread to the rest of the
Swedish economy and in this way have contributed to the low inflationary pressures.
Figure 2a. Figure 2b.
Import prices Services prices
Annual percentage change Annual percentage change
15 15 5 5
Australia
USA
United Kingdom
10 10
4 4
Norway
Canada
5 5
Sweden
3 3
0 0
2 2
-5 Australia -5
USA
United Kingdom
1 1
-10 Norway -10
Canada
Sweden
-15 -15 0 0
10 11 12 13 14 10 11 12 13 14
Note. In Figure 2b, the data for Australia is quarterly, while the data for other countries is monthly. For Sweden,
Norway, the euro area and the United Kingdom, the data refers to services prices in the HICP and for others in
the CPI.
Sources: National sources and Statistics Sweden
Slower domestic demand and low inflation expectations also contribute
The impact of monetary policy via the exchange rate can be primarily observed in prices of
internationally-traded goods. However, a monetary policy that leans against the wind also
has effects on inflation in that it dampens domestic demand. Such effects probably leave a
mark on the development of service prices, as services are not traded internationally to the
same extent as goods.
Increases in services prices have been small in Sweden since the end of 2012 - both
compared with normal developments and compared with other countries (see Figure 2b).
A further explanation for the abnormally low price increases could be expectations of an
abnormally low future inflation rate. In monetary policy analysis one usually assumes that
there is a forward-looking element in the pricing, as it may be perceived as costly to change
prices. If one is expecting weak demand and thus low price increases in the future, one will
not want to increase one's prices very much today. Expectations of a low future inflation rate
can thus become self-fulfilling and this is something we would prefer to avoid, as it makes it
more difficult to attain the inflation target in the future.
According to surveys of inflation expectations among money market participants, employers'
and employees' organisations as well as purchasing managers, expectations for 1 and
2 years ahead have declined recently, which may have significance for pricing behaviour.
Inflation expectations 5 years ahead are fairly well anchored around 2 per cent, but it is
important that the development of the past couple of years does not continue so that the
longer-term expectations also end up far from the target (see Figure 3).
Figure 3.
Expected inflation
Per cent
4 4
5 years ahead
2 years ahead
1 year ahead
3 3
2 2
1 1
0 0
Resource utilisation remains lower than normal
Resource utilisation has been lower than normal for in principle the entire period since the
end of 2008, when demand for Swedish exports fell heavily in connection with the global
financial crisis. At the same time, developments on the labour market have been better than
expected in some aspects. Although unemployment has remained around 8 per cent since
the middle of 2012, employment has increased and the employment rate has risen around
half a percentage point since then.
One question that sometimes arises is whether it is actually possible to bring down the
current unemployment rate of 8 per cent with the aid of monetary policy. Matching on the
labour market appears to have deteriorated and a larger percentage of the unemployed
consist of groups that are on the periphery of the labour market. This could mean that
structural unemployment is higher than before, and structural unemployment cannot be
affected by monetary policy.
However, my impression is that one can at least partly determine how much of
unemployment is structural by looking at wage increases. Since the wage increases are
small, it is reasonable to assume that there is spare capacity in the labour market. This
means there is also scope to use monetary policy to try to reduce unemployment.
Household indebtedness nevertheless remains high
The actual purpose of a monetary policy that leans against the wind is to counteract a
buildup of debt that is perceived as risky. When one assesses whether the policy conducted has
been appropriate, one wants to know how far one has succeeded in this.
In this context, it is important to note that the household debt ratio has remained relatively
stable since autumn 2010. In 2010 three things happened that may have affected
developments; the mortgage cap was introduced, the Riksbank began to raise the repo rate,
and after a period of silence there were suddenly lots of statements and initiatives from the
political side referring to the housing market and household indebtedness.10
It would have been interesting to be able to distinguish the separate effects of these events
on indebtedness, but this is of course very difficult. One piece of the puzzle is
Finansinspektionen's conclusion that the mortgage cap has had an effect. They note in their
Mortgage Report in March 2013 that the mortgage cap is continuing to work and that the
loan-to-value ratios for new mortgages are no longer rising.11
For me as a monetary policy-maker, the decisive question is to what extent monetary policy
has contributed to limiting household debt recently. If one looks at the estimates of the
determinants of indebtedness used as a basis for our forecasts, one sees that the effect of
the repo rate on households' debt ratios (that is, their debts in relation to disposable income)
is very small.12 A repo rate that is 0.25 percentage points higher during one year is expected
to reduce the debt ratio by at most 0.3-0.4 percentage points (see Figure 4).
Figure 4.
Household debts
Percentage of disposable income
182 182
Lower repo rate 2013
Main scenario
180 180
178 178
176 176
174 174
172 172
170 170
12 13 14 15 16 17
Note. The experiment with a lower repo rate in 2013 assumes a repo rate cut from 1 per cent to 0.75 per cent at
the monetary policy meeting in February 2013 and a repo-rate path that from December 2013 follows the path
published in December 2013 and again in February 2014.
Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank
One would need to raise the repo rate substantially, perhaps by several percentage points, to
have a tangible effect on the risks linked to indebtedness. But the effect would then also be
much higher unemployment and a much lower inflation. Such a monetary policy stance does
not appear appropriate, and would in any circumstance not be compatible with an inflation
target.
The estimated effect of the repo rate on the debt ratio is very uncertain, so it is not
impossible that the actual effect is much greater. At the same time, it is also possible that the
actual effect is zero, or even that it would go in the opposite direction so that the debt ratio
rises when the interest rate is raised.13 This could be possible, as the interest rate not only
affects indebtedness, it also affects disposable incomes through its impact on economic
activity and inflation. A higher interest rate is expected to have a negative effect on both
indebtedness and disposable incomes. The ratio between them can therefore in principle rise
or fall, even if it appears to be the latter in practice.
Although I consider that indebtedness in the Swedish household sector comprises a risk to
macroeconomic developments in Sweden, I am extremely doubtful about managing this risk
by means of a monetary policy that leans against the wind. The cost appears to be high:
inflation is pushed down in a situation where it is already low and unemployment becomes
unnecessarily high. On the other hand, the benefit appears small, quite simply because the
effect on indebtedness appears small.
Risks linked to household indebtedness should instead be managed by means of measures
taken in other areas. The mortgage cap probably already has some impact.
Finansinspektionen has also introduced a risk weight floor for mortgages and notified that it
intends to raise this, which in practice will increase the banks' costs for mortgages. The
Swedish Bankers' Association's recommendation to draw up amortisation plans in line with
Finansinspektionen's notified requirement may also have an effect.14 Nor is there any
shortage of ideas for further measures, including the introduction of countercyclical capital
buffers, which they now use in Norway.
Underneath all this is a problem of a more structural nature, namely a supply of housing that
has grown slowly and a housing market that is not functioning efficiently. This has most likely
contributed to pushing up the price of housing and consequently indebtedness. Neither
monetary policy nor measures in the field of macroprudential policy can resolve this type of
structural problem; they must be managed with entirely different measures.
Do marginal differences in the repo rate play a role?
In the same way as one can question whether a repo rate that is a few tenths of a
percentage point higher or lower plays any role with regard to risks linked to household
indebtedness, one can also question whether it has any significance for inflation and
unemployment. During the period between December 2012 and December 2013, when the
repo rate was unchanged at 1 per cent, I advocated interest rate cuts of 0.25 percentage
points. Is it reasonable to believe that such a small cut would have any tangible effect on
developments?
Of course, we cannot know with any great degree of certainty what would have happened if
monetary policy had been different than it was, but we can use economic and statistical
models to assess the consequences. An analysis using the Riksbank's macro model
Ramses15 indicates that a repo rate that was 0.25 percentage points lower during most of
2013 would have meant that inflation would have been a couple of tenths of a percentage
point higher today (see Figure 5). This may not seem much, but it corresponds approximately
to the downturn in inflation we have observed since the start of 2013 and these are important
tenths of a percentage point in a situation where inflation has already been low for a long
time.16
The effect could be greater if one took into account the fact that a lower repo rate in 2013
would probably have affected expectations of future monetary policy during 2014 and
onwards. Moreover, I was not merely advocating a lower repo rate, but also a lower repo-rate
path during this period. A lower repo-rate path should have affected expectations of future
monetary policy in an expansionary direction and thereby contributed further to higher
inflation.
Figure 5.
Alternative scenario for CPIF inflation and unemployment
Annual percentage change and percentage of labour force, seasonally-adjusted data
3 9
CPIF, lower repo rate 2013, (left scale)
CPIF, main scenario, (left scale)
Unemployment, lower repo rate 2013, (right scale)
Unemployment, main scenario, (right scale)
2 8
1 7
0 6
12 13 14 15 16 17
Note. The experiment with a lower repo rate in 2013 assumes a repo rate cut from 1 per cent to 0.75 per cent at
the monetary policy meeting in February 2013 and a repo-rate path that from December 2013 follows the path
published in December 2013 and again in February 2014.
Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank
The analysis can also be applied to unemployment. We see then that a repo rate
0.25 percentage points lower would have entailed somewhat lower unemployment now. The
effect on unemployment is a clear economic cost of a monetary policy that leans against the
wind. This must be traded off against the benefit one can expect, that is, potentially less
negative consequences of a crisis caused by households' high indebtedness.
Low inflation is also a risk
In my view, there may very well be situations where it is justified to conduct a monetary
policy that leans against the wind, that is, to make the policy tighter than is justified by the
prospects for inflation and resource utilisation. This may be the case when there are signs of
a strong general credit boom in the economy and credit assessments appear to be less and
less prudent.17 However, one condition is that inflation is stabilised at least to some extent
around the target. If, on the other hand, inflation is far below the target and has been so for a
long period of time, such a policy may create new risks.
One such risk is that confidence in the inflation target may be undermined. If long-term
inflation expectations fall and begin to deviate too far from the target, it may be difficult to
stabilise inflation not just in the short run, but also in the long run. If actual inflation becomes
very low, there is a greater risk of new negative shocks to the economy leading to actual
deflation, which could entail substantial real economic costs. It is important to show with
one's actions that it is the inflation target that is the central focus for monetary policy
decisions.18
I therefore think it was very welcome that a unanimous Executive Board was able to agree
on an interest-rate cut in December after the weak inflation outcomes in the autumn.
Moreover, we lowered the repo-rate path, that is, our own forecast for the repo rate, quite
substantially. However, there is some element of leaning against the wind even in the current
repo-rate path. As described in the most recent Monetary Policy Report, an even lower repo
rate is expected to bring inflation back on target sooner and steer unemployment towards a
long-run sustainable level faster.
Given this, I felt at both the monetary policy meeting in December 2013 and the one in
February 2014 that the alternative of an even lower repo rate needed careful consideration.
My one reason for not advocating an even lower repo rate was that I felt the timing was
wrong. Increasingly strong international developments and rising resource utilisation here in
Sweden were nevertheless expected to lead to inflation rising gradually. It is unusual for
central banks to cut their policy rates substantially or repeatedly during an economic upturn.
However, there is a risk that inflationary pressures will prove to be even weaker than we
have assumed. Inflation in January and February proved to be somewhat lower than we
were expecting when we made our decision in February. If we see clear signs that
inflationary pressures are weaker than expected, we must continue to show through our
actions that we take the inflation target seriously, by making monetary policy even more
expansionary. Personally, I would be prepared to cut the repo rate even further, even if we
were in the midst of an economic upturn.
Is a monetary policy that takes indebtedness into account compatible with an inflation
target?
What conclusions can one draw from the Swedish case of monetary policy that takes into
account indebtedness and housing prices? I would claim that the experiences so far argue
against this type of monetary policy strategy. Inflation has been remarkably low and has
moved further away from the target in a situation where the economy nevertheless appears
to be in an upturn. Although there have been positive developments on the labour market,
unemployment has remained around 8 per cent for a long time. Household debts have grown
at around the same rate as disposable incomes, which mean that the debt ratio and the
potential risks it entails are in principle unchanged. For me, it would appear as though the
benefits have been small, while the costs have been high.
However, it is of course difficult to draw any far-reaching conclusions on the basis of what we
have been able to observe so far. We quite simply do not know how the Swedish economy
would have developed if the Riksbank had conducted a more expansionary monetary policy.
However, the fact that inflation has been so low has changed the conditions for monetary
policy. The unexpectedly low inflation was the reason why the repo rate was cut in December
last year by a unanimous Executive Board, at the same time as the repo-rate path was
revised down substantially. At the most recent monetary policy meetings there has been
greater focus than before on inflation.
Perhaps the lesson here is that a monetary policy that leans against the wind is difficult to
combine with an inflation target. Although there may be justification for slowing down credit
growth in some situations, it may be difficult to use monetary policy for this purpose if there is
an explicit inflation target. In practice, one tries to attain two targets with one single
instrument and there is then a risk that one will not be particularly successful in attaining
either of them.
References
Adolfson, Malin, Laséen, Stefan, Christiano, Lawrence, Trabandt, Mathias, and Walentin,
Karl, (2013), Ramses II: Model description, Occasional Paper no. 12. Sveriges Riksbank.
Swedish Bankers' Association (2013), Stärk amorteringskulturen (Strengthen the
amortisation culture). Press release 14 October 2013.
Borg, Anders (2010), interview response in radio programme P1-morgon 30 November 2010.
Radio Sweden.
Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni, Igan, Deniz, Laeven, Luc, Tong, Hui, Bakker, Bas and
Vandenbussche, Jérôme (2012), Policies for Macrofinancial Stability: How to Deal with Credit
Booms, Staff Discussion Note 12/06. The International Monetary Fund
Finansinspektionen (2013),