Financial and Settlement Systems as Social Infrastructure:
Disaster Management Perspective
Impact of Natural
Opening Remarks at the Symposium "The
Disasters on Financial Markets and Financial
Institutions"
Held at Nagoya City University Graduate School
Masazumi Wakatabe
Deputy Governor of the Bank of Japan
I. Introduction
I am delighted to be given this opportunity to speak to you at this symposium.
Japan is at risk of various natural disasters -- wind and flood damage caused by typhoons or
heavy rain, volcanic eruptions as well as earthquakes, such as the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake and the Great East Japan Earthquake. This year again, typhoons such as Faxai
and Hagibis inflicted serious damage. The probability that a massive earthquake may occur
in the Nankai Trough off the Pacific coast within the next 30 years is estimated to be 70-80
percent. Disaster prevention measures have also been updated in preparation for cases where
earthquakes occur consecutively with a certain time lag after the initial event in the Nankai
Trough, something which has been experienced in the past.
Many other countries seem to be vigilant of the risks of terrorist attacks, cyber attacks, or
widespread power outages triggered by transmission equipment malfunction. Growing
attention, however, is being paid to natural disasters worldwide. According to statistical data
on natural disasters compiled by the Université catholique de Louvain's Center for Research
on the Epidemiology of Disasters, the number of cases has recently been in the range of 300-
350 a year, which is larger than in the past1 (Chart 1). Although different countries put
priority on different risks, climate change risk has increasingly been recognized as a global
issue, especially among European countries This could also be related to
in recent years.2
unusual weather, including concentrated heavy rains frequently experienced in Japan lately.3
1
The increase since the 1970s seems to partly reflect an improvement in the accuracy of statistics.
Tomohiko Inui, "Shizen saigai to keizai seichō," Keizai Seminā, no. 706, February/March 2019 issue:
25.
2
Growing attention is being given to the impact of climate change on the real economy and financial
system among financial supervisory authorities and central banks. This topic has been increasingly
discussed at international conferences, including the Network for Greening the Financial System
(NGFS). The Bank of Japan announced today (November 28) that it has joined the NGFS. For
examples of central banks' initiatives on this issue, see Margherita Giuzio et al., "Climate Change and
Financial Stability," Financial Stability Review, May 2019,
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financialstability/fsr/special/html/ecb.fsrart201905_1~47cf778cc1.en.html#toc1; and Lael Brainard, "Why
Climate Change Matters for Monetary Policy and Financial Stability," speech at "The Economics of
Climate Change," a research conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
November 8, 2019, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20191108a.htm.
3
According to a report compiled by Japan's Ministry of the Environment and others, there is no solid
How we should respond to climate change has been discussed from various perspectives thus
far, but will be treated as a more practical, more global issue going forward.
Looking back at natural disasters in postwar Japan, many severe disasters are called to mind.
In particular, Typhoon Vera, also known as the Isewan Typhoon, struck in September 1959,
becoming a turning point for Japan in developing disaster countermeasures.4 The extensive
damage caused by the Isewan Typhoon led to the Basic Act on Disaster Management, which
stipulates the basics underlying Japan's disaster management and control measures, being
enforced in 1962 (Chart 2). In response to this, the Bank of Japan formulated its disaster
management operation plan in 1967.
The theme of this symposium is "The Impact of Natural Disasters on Financial Markets and
Financial Institutions." Today, I would firstly like to describe the Bank's role and function in
the context of Japan's disaster management, and then, referring to past actions, talk about the
importance of maintaining "financial and settlement systems as social infrastructure" in times
of disaster. In normal times, we tend to assume that social infrastructure, such as
transportation, water, sewage, electricity, gas, and telecommunication, is naturally available
like air. Once a large-scale disaster strikes, however, we become aware that whether such
social infrastructure will continue to work or not is critical to our lives. Financial and
settlement systems are also part of the social infrastructure. Facing a large-scale disaster,
financial institutions play various roles as social infrastructure over time -- from the recovery
phase to the reconstruction phase, for example (Chart 3). In the next part, I will first elaborate
on the expected roles of financial institutions shortly after a disaster strikes.
Moreover, disaster management can be considered as a cycle of actions. The cycle is
comprised of two parts: (1) post-disaster actions for minimizing the spread and prolongation
evidence that the frequency and strength of cyclones have increased in the long run, except for the
North Atlantic. Ministry of the Environment et al., Kikō hendō no kansoku yosoku oyobi eikyō hyōka
tōgō repōto 2018: Nihon no kikō hendō to sono eikyō [Synthesis report on observations, projections
and impact assessments of climate change, 2018: Climate change in Japan and its impacts] (February
2018): 54, http://www.env.go.jp/earth/tekiou/report2018_full.pdf.
4
Dead or missing nationwide totaled over 5,000 people. Particularly serious damage was experienced
in Aichi, Mie, and Gifu Prefectures due to storm surge.
of damage and (2) pre-disaster actions for preventing damage and forecasting future disasters
based on lessons from the past. It is important to view these two parts as an interrelated
sequence, or a cycle (Chart 4).5 Toward the end of this talk, I would like to describe disaster
management from this perspective.
II. The Bank of Japan as a Designated Public Institution
The Bank is listed as a designated public institution in the Basic Act on Disaster Management,
together with the Japanese Red Cross Society and electric power companies, for example.
Along with the national and local governments, designated public institutions are required to
make necessary arrangements to protect "the lives, bodies, and property of citizens from
disaster." The Bank not only issues banknotes and conducts monetary policy, but also
provides a system to settle funds smoothly among financial institutions. For example, let's
consider the situation, shown in Chart 5, where you pay for goods and services by a bank
transfer from your account at Bank A to the merchant's account at Bank B. Transaction
information, such as the amount of transferred funds and the payee's account number, is
notified to Bank B through the Zengin System, a nationwide online network system for banks.
The net settlement position is calculated for each financial institution and notified to the Bank
of Japan Financial Network System (BOJ-NET). Funds are then settled through
financial
In a situation where a firm makes a bank transfer
institutions' current accounts at the Bank.
for salary payment from its account at Bank B to your account at Bank A, funds are settled in
the opposite direction. The Zengin System is affiliated with the Japanese Bankers Association,
and the Bank monitors such major private payment and settlement systems at all times to
ensure their stable operation. The BOJ-NET is a system developed and operated by the Bank,
settling funds among financial institutions while preparing for various risks. The Bank
prepares for necessary business continuity, aiming at fulfilling its mission of ensuring stable
operation of payment and settlement systems in addition to issuing banknotes even in times
of disaster.
III. Experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake
What would you do if a severe earthquake strikes and an alert warning of massive tsunamis
is issued a few minutes later? Those who are near the coast would evacuate to higher ground
immediately with the bare minimum of belongings. What would you do if you return home
after the tsunami recedes and find your cash muddy or burnt and stuck together at home?
What if your passbooks or registered seals are washed away by the tsunami? What if your
payday is next week but the bank branch at which you have an account is swept away by the
tsunami? When the Great East Japan Earthquake struck in 2011, these problems actually
occurred extensively in the affected areas, causing anxiety for many people.
At that time, financial institutions in the affected areas themselves were damaged, but
continued to make strenuous efforts to fulfill their mission. To help us consider today's topic,
let me briefly look back on the financial institutions' actions at the time.6
1. The Bank of Japan's Experience
At 2:46 p.m. on March 11, 2011, the Bank's Sendai Branch experienced a strong quake.
Objects fell from the ceiling and the branch was shrouded in haze created by dust. When the
quake finally subsided, a voice resounded in the branch, "The BOJ-NET is functioning
properly." Triggered by this call, the staff resumed their work to continue business operations.
Financial institutions make massive fund transfers with each other via the BOJ-NET every
day.7 If you compare money to the blood of Japan's economy, the shutdown of the BOJ-NET
means the absence of blood flow in the economy.
The Bank made the following responses at the time. Firstly, 15 minutes after the earthquake
occurred, it set up a disaster management team headed by the Governor. The team gathered
information concerning the damage, coordinated with government and other relevant parties,
and disseminated information domestically and internationally on the operational status of
the Bank's offices and financial markets.
As March 11 was a Friday, the Bank's branches and offices in the affected Tohoku region
continued to supply cash to financial institutions by opening service counters during the
weekend. This was to meet the increased cash demand because, once a disaster occurs, people
seek to hold more cash on hand out of a need to secure funds for immediate living expenses
and out of fears about the future. In times of disaster, demand for cash tends to increase
sharply as it performs the two-fold functions of money: a medium of exchange (i.e., a means
of payment) and a store of value.8
A few days after the disaster, a massive amount of damaged banknotes and coins were
brought to the Bank to be exchanged for clean ones. The Bank met these requests by sending
staff from other parts of Japan to help branches in the affected areas. In Iwate Prefecture,
where the Bank does not have a branch, we set up a temporary counter at a local financial
institution to provide the exchange service.
The Bank delegates some services to private financial institutions to make payments for
public pensions and government workers' salaries, as well as to provide services related to
receipts and payments of treasury funds, including receipts of taxes. Since many of the
delegated agents, or financial institutions' locations, were also damaged at the time,9 the
Bank itself took over part of the work that was delegated to them. A timely response was
required, partly because the payday for self-defense officers involved in relief and rescue
operations in the region was scheduled in the week after the disaster.
With regard to payment and settlement systems, the BOJ-NET continued to operate in a stable
manner without a halt even during the time of the disaster. The Bank also continued to
monitor the operational status of the payment and settlement systems run by private
organizations, working in cooperation with them as necessary to effect smooth settlement of
transactions, including salary payments, which increased toward the end of the month.
2. Impact on financial institutions and their response
Let me turn to the impact on financial institutions in the affected areas immediately after the
disaster. As of March 14, about 280 locations were closed following the evacuation order in
response to the tsunamis and the nuclear accident. This was more than 10 percent of all the
locations of the 72 financial institutions headquartered in one of the six prefectures of the
Tohoku region or Ibaraki Prefecture. This fact alone is enough to tell you that financial
institutions found themselves in a difficult situation along with the affected population. How
did financial institutions fulfill their roles as social infrastructure in this situation? Let us look
back on their actions in details.
First, financial institutions in the affected areas sought to secure more abundant cash on hand
than usual immediately after the disaster to meet increased cash demand from affected
customers. These institutions withdrew cash from their current accounts at the Bank and
delivered it to their headquarters and branches in the affected areas. Since there were traffic
network disruptions and restrictions as well as a lack of cash-delivery vehicles, financial
institutions in neighboring areas sometimes shared them. On the back of such actions, cash
totaling about 310 billion yen was withdrawn from the Bank by financial institutions in the
Tohoku region during the first week after the disaster. This is about three times the amount
in the same period in the previous year.
Financial institutions conducted their business in a flexible manner to enable affected
customers to withdraw their deposits as long as their identification was confirmed, even if
they had lost their passbooks or registered seals. This response incorporated requests made
by the Financial Services Agency and the Bank to financial institutions to treat affected
people favorably.10 Disaster victims who had lost passbooks or other relevant documents
were able to withdraw close to 6.0 billion yen from financial institutions by April 2011, even
in the three affected prefectures alone (Chart 6). Moreover, when those affected brought
waterlogged or burnt cash to financial institutions, they were able to exchange it for new cash.
Damaged cash brought in by financial institutions and disaster victims was also exchanged at
the Bank's service counters, the amount reaching 470,000 banknotes (3.5 billion yen) and
4,220,000 coins (0.14 billion yen) by March 2012 (Charts 7 and 8).
Even when financial institutions found it difficult to restore their affected branches, they
remained available for affected depositors as much as possible by, for example, setting up
temporary locations. Among the bank locations closed immediately after the disaster, about
40 percent resumed business by the end of March. During that time, 41 temporary locations
were also set up (Charts 9 and 10).11
Meanwhile, the BOJ-NET and core payment and settlement systems in the private sector
maintained stable operations as a whole. Even at the end of March, when there was a
concentration of a large number of payments for salaries, public utility services, and others,
there was no serious disruption in payments and settlements in the affected areas. Behind the
scenes, the Zengin System, which processes transfer data, and the BOJ-NET extended
operating hours for consecutive days to complete as many scheduled transactions as possible
within the day.12 In addition, various other measures were taken to maintain the clearing
function of financial institutions. They include some clearing houses covering the work of
other clearing houses which had had to be closed due to damage to their buildings or other
reasons.
At the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake, foreign media often reported that Japan's
public order was maintained even in an extreme situation.13 I believe that ensuring the
payment and settlement functions of financial institutions as well as the circulation of cash
on the whole contributed to social stability in the affected areas.
11
In addition, some financial institutions organized information-sharing arrangements among
themselves so that affected persons who evacuated to distant locations would be able to withdraw cash
at financial institutions other than those where they have accounts.
12
A system failure at a financial institution on March 14 significantly delayed its submission of
transfer instructions to the Zengin System. The Zengin System and the BOJ-NET dealt with the
situation by extending their operating hours.
13
Nicholas Kristof, "Sympathy for Japan, and Admiration," New York Times, March 11, 2011,
https://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/sympathy-for-japan-and-admiration/. Kyung Lah,
"Amid Disaster, Japan's Societal Mores Remain Strong," CNN, April 10, 2011,
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/03/16/japan.cultural.order/index.html.
3. Developments in financial markets and policy response
The Great East Japan Earthquake also had a significant impact on financial markets. When
uncertainty about the future heightens due to a disaster or other reasons, financial institutions
and firms seek more proactively to secure cash on hand, or liquidity. This is similar to
households increasing their cash demand after the earthquake as I mentioned earlier.
In response to such developments, the Bank judged that it had to take all possible measures
to relieve concern about funding immediately and ensure financial market stability. It
provided funds totaling a record high of 21.8 trillion yen through funds-supplying operations
on March 14, the first business day after the earthquake. The Bank continued to offer same-
day funds-supplying operations for six consecutive business days through March 22 (Chart
11). With the Bank's provision of ample funds, there was no notable turbulence in money
markets, where financial institutions lend and borrow funds with each other.
The Bank also decided on April 28, just about a month after the disaster, to introduce the
funds-supplying operation to support financial institutions in disaster areas. Although this
was quite some time before funding needs for recovery and reconstruction gained momentum,
the Bank aimed to make funding by financial institutions easier there both in the initial and
subsequent phases after the disaster.
Meanwhile, looking at the developments in the stock and foreign exchange markets, the
Nikkei Stock Average, for instance, declined sharply as the damage became apparent,
eventually falling by 1,015 yen, or 10.6 percent on March 15 from the previous business day
(Chart 12). This rate of decline is still the third largest in history, following only those
recorded on Black Monday in 1987 and after the Lehman Brothers failure in 2008. In the
foreign exchange market, amid the yen's appreciation, concerted foreign exchange market
intervention was conducted by the authorities of Japan, the United States, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and the European Central Bank on March 18.
IV. Initiatives after the Great East Japan Earthquake
Over eight years have passed since the Great East Japan Earthquake. Based on lessons from
the disaster, initiatives to enhance disaster management have been taken at various levels
from Japan's government to individual firms, and are still under way. Financial institutions
have also enhanced their disaster management programs, as can be summarized in the
following three points (Chart 13).
The first is self-help initiatives. Many financial institutions faced risks of a power shortage
and traffic network disruptions at the time of the earthquake. Such experiences highlighted
the importance of having backup arrangements for computer systems and headquarters'
functions at places remote from their headquarters -- for example, in Osaka when the
headquarters is in Tokyo -- in order to maintain the payment and settlement functions even
in times of disaster. In fact, financial institutions have striven to set up such sites and enhance
their functions. Recently, an increasing number of financial institutions have introduced dual
operation, under which not only main offices but also backup offices conduct part of their
business operations even in normal times.14
The second is mutual assistance initiatives. Financial institutions have recognized that, given
the expected magnitude of damage by a possible Nankai Trough Earthquake or other disasters,
an individual institution alone cannot make adequate preparations, or even if it tries, it will
be too costly compared to their management resources. Some of these financial institutions
created regional councils, making arrangements where participating financial institutions will
provide needed cash to each other in times of disaster. On the level of financial markets,
including money markets, securities markets, and the foreign exchange market, initiatives
have been pushed forward to enhance the framework of a market-level business continuity
plan (BCP). This will enable financial institutions participating in the market to immediately
share their damage situation and, based on that assessment, discuss possible changes to
trading practices for the market to function smoothly.15
The third is public assistance initiatives. Since the Great East Japan Earthquake, Japan's
national and local governments have revised upward their estimation of damage that can be
caused by possible large-scale earthquakes, floods due to heavy rains, and other disasters, and
have also updated hazard maps. This imposed challenges on financial institutions, especially
those located near the coast, but it added momentum to the progress of detailed considerations
and preparations from the viewpoint of business continuity and employee safety. Specific
measures based on local circumstances have also been advanced; for example, the
improvement of priority roads that are supposed to be restored sooner as well as the
registration of emergency vehicles -- both of which will be useful for cash delivery in times
of disaster. Meanwhile, the Bank introduced a framework enabling financial institutions to
receive cash from another nearby branch of the Bank when a branch of the Bank or an office
of a financial institution which has a current account at a branch of the Bank is affected.16
V. Continuous Review and Enhancement of Business Continuity Arrangements
Of all the financial institutions in Japan, how many have already prepared business continuity
arrangements? According to the Bank's survey in 2014, 85 percent of the financial institutions,
including banks and securities companies, answered that a companywide business continuity
management framework had already been put in place and regularly reviewed.17 Financial
institutions run their businesses while assessing various risks such as the credit risk of
borrowers and market risk associated with bond holdings. Operational risk, including that for
computer system failures, also needs to be considered, and therefore, upgrading business
continuity arrangements is an important managerial issue in disaster preparation. Given this,
financial institutions take it for granted that such arrangements should be in place, but there
is also a need to advance them further. From my perspective, with a view to serving as social
infrastructure even in times of disaster, three things are expected of financial institutions
going forward (Chart 14). Each contributes to the enhancement of resilience against disasters
-- that is, the capability to minimize the damage, achieve prompt recovery, and continue
business operations.
The first is to enhance disaster preparedness. Referred to as the "6 Ps" -- Proper Planning and
Preparation Prevents Poor Performance -- it is essential to repeatedly review and improve
business continuity arrangements by taking the opportunities of coping with actual disasters
and by conducting periodic emergency drills. The Bank practices an emergency drill every
September, involving its disaster management team headed by the Governor. We have
continued to update the way it is conducted, for instance, by implementing the drill scenarios,
including the details and extent of damage, without advance disclosure to the participants,
but presenting them with the information on the spot. To improve our existing business
continuity arrangements, we have reflected on lessons learned from each drill. It is essential
for each financial institution to get their business continuity framework entrenched in its
organization and keep working toward increasing its feasibility in times of disaster by, for
example, updating the content of emergency drills and reviewing their experience under
management leadership.
The second is to enhance inter-organizational cooperation. When a disaster strikes,
controlling the damage is key. In this connection, cooperation among related organizations
matters to minimize the impact of the damage and achieve a swifter recovery. One option is
to build relationships in normal times with local governments, financial institutions, utility
firms as well as monetary authorities, including the Bank's branches, to be able to cooperate
in times of disaster as necessary. It is also important to confirm that there is no significant
gap with the counterparts in their business continuity arrangements and assumed emergency
situations.
The third is to enhance flexibility and imagination. Changes in circumstances and the
emergence of new risks take place constantly. As I mentioned earlier, climate change risk has
been increasingly recognized worldwide. Moreover, although it is not a natural disaster, we
have also observed increasing cyber security threats on a global scale in recent years. In the
financial sector, cyber drills are conducted both at an international level, such as under the G-
7 framework, and at a domestic level, among financial institutions. National governments
18
have also taken the lead in developing cyber countermeasures. Such cyber security
measures have become even more important with the increasing use of mobile payments.
Japan's national and local governments may revise their disaster damage estimation again in
the future, and public expectations of services provided by social infrastructure may also
change. It is vital to pay due attention to changes in circumstances and the emergence of new
risks, reviewing with flexibility and a fertile imagination to see whether there is any room for
improvement in business continuity arrangements.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Thus far, my discussion has focused on the role of financial institutions in times of disaster,
while looking back on their response to the Great East Japan Earthquake. In times of disaster,
it is critical that financial institutions ensure cash circulation and maintain their payment and
settlement functions as social infrastructure underpinning financial and economic activities.
Even if we are prepared for disasters, we are often required to take different measures in times
of actual disaster. After a disaster winds down, it is essential to reflect on the experience,
serving as a starting point toward more advanced preparation for possible future disasters. In
this sense, risk and crisis management never ends.19
I heard that the Central Japan Economic Federation published a report on the current situation
and challenges of the social infrastructure in preparation for the Nankai Trough Earthquake,
one of the anticipated natural disaster risks particularly feared in this region.20 I expect
financial institutions to further advance the reviews of disaster management and actions to
cyber risk are proposed mainly from the perspective of macroprudential policy in Anil K. Kashyap
and Anne Wetherilt, "Some Principles for Regulating Cyber Risk," AEA Papers and Proceedings 109
"Kin'yūshijō infura to saibā
(2019): 482-87. For the Bank's publications, see: Shigehiro Kuwabara,
Kessai Shisutemu Fōramu, February
rejiriensu," remarks at Dai-18-kai 6, 2018,
https://www.boj.or.jp/announcements/press/koen_2018/ko180206a.htm/; and Bank of Japan Financial
System and Bank Examination Department, "IT no shinpo ga motarasu kin'yū sābisu no aratana
kanōsei to saibā sekyuritī,"
Financial System Report Annex Series, March 2016,
https://www.boj.or.jp/research/brp/fsr/data/fsrb160302.pdf.
19
There are similarities between natural disaster management and financial and economic crisis
management. See PHP Research Institute, Nihon no kikikanri-ryoku, ed. Masazumi Wakatabe (Tokyo:
PHP Institute, 2009).
20
Central Japan Economic Federation, "Nankai Torafu Jishin tō ga Chūbu keizaikai ni ataeru eikyō o
saishōka suru tameni: Torimaku shakai infura no genjō to kadai shita kēsu
(Aichi-ken o moderu to
sutadī)," May 2019, http://www.chukeiren.or.jp/policy_proposal/pdf/190517_Nankai_Teigen.pdf.
ensure the safety of their employees and play the necessary roles in their respective business
areas. The Bank will continue to provide firm support for their efforts.
Let me close my presentation by citing a brief episode I heard about. After the Great East
Japan Earthquake, a student found muddy banknotes in a chest of drawers at the back of a
room, when he, as a volunteer, helped an affected family to clean up their house after being
flooded by the tsunami. The student visited a branch of the Bank with the family, and they
had the muddy banknotes exchanged for clean, new ones. The student now works at the Bank.
It is among the missions of the Bank to make sure that cash will be provided and circulated
even in times of disaster.
Thank you for your kind attention.
Financial and Settlement Systems as Social Infrastructure:
Disaster Management Perspective
November 28, 2019
The Symposium "The Impact of Natural Disasters on Financial Markets and
Financial Institutions" Held at Nagoya City University Graduate School
Masazumi Wakatabe
Deputy Governor of the Bank of Japan
Chart 1
Number of Natural Disasters
Japan
World
Chart 2
Past Disasters and Development of Related Laws
195020002010-
2001
September 11 attacks
1959
2011
Isewan Typhoon
2004 Great East Japan Earthquake
Disasters in Japan
The Mid Niigata
1995
and abroad
Prefecture Earthquake
2016
Great
2009
Kumamoto Earthquake
HanshinAwaji Earthquake
Outbreak of a new
strain of influenza
2013
Act on Special Measures Concerning
1962
Countermeasures for Tokyo Inland
Basic Act on Disaster
Earthquake
2004
Management
Amendment of the Act on Special Measures
Enforcement of
Civil Protection Law
Concerning Countermeasures for Nankai
laws
1978
Trough Earthquake
Act on Special Measures
Concerning
2013
Countermeasures for
Act on Special Measures Concerning
Large-Scale Earthquakes
Countermeasures for Novel Influenza, etc.
2014
1967
Bank of Japan's 2006
Operational plans for dealing with
Disaster management
Civil protection business plan
response pandemic influenza and new infectious
operation plan
diseases
Chart 3
Phases of Post-Disaster Actions
National and local governments
Rescuing human Restoring roads, Formulating reconstruction
lives, etc. facilities, etc. plans, taking budgetary
measures, etc.
Emergency
Recovery Reconstruction
Disaster
responses
Ensuring safety and Resuming operations, Supporting
business continuity (cash providing financial reconstruction (through
circulation, payment and services (emergency consulting services),
settlement functions), etc.
loans) in consideration arranging public-private
of disaster situations, etc. partnerships, etc.
Financial institutions
Chart 4
Disaster Management Cycle
Pre-disaster actions Post-disaster actions
Disaster
Emergency
responses
Preparedness
Recovery &
Prevention &
Reconstruction
Mitigation
Source: Prepared based on Cabinet Office, "Heisei 17-nen-ban hakusho" [White paper on disaster
bōsai
management 2005], 2005, http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/h17/index.htm.
Chart 5
Process of Payment and Settlement
and Role of the Bank of Japan
Sales transaction
Consumer Consumer
Firm Firm
Provision of goods and services
Request for
Notification of
fund transfer
fund transfer
Transfer
Transfer
message
message
Bank Bank B B
Bank Bank A A
Zengin Zengin System System
Consumer's deposit account Firm's deposit account
Notification of net
settlement position
BOJ-NET BOJ-NET
Fund transfer Fund transfer
Chart 6
Cash Withdrawals by Depositors
Who Lost Passbooks
2011
Note: Figures are cumulative and for regional banks (I and II) and banks headquartered in Iwate, Miyagi, or
shinkin
Fukushima Prefectures that were able to respond (3 regional banks I, 1 regional bank II, and 8 banks).
shinkin
Source: Bank of Japan.
Chart 7
Examina