Is Germany's "business model" at risk?
Talk followed by a panel discussion ikf institut für kredit- und
finanzwirtschaft e. V.
05.06.2023 | Bochum | Joachim Nagel
Check against delivery.
1 Welcome
2 Industry key to Germany's "business model"
3 Recalibration of global value chains
4 Price competitiveness and profitability of the German economy
5 Impact of energy costs and demographic change on the potential output of the
German economy
6 Conclusion
1 Welcome
Ladies and gentlemen,
Thank you for your kind welcome and also for inviting me to Bochum. Here in Bochum
you will find both the old and the new. VfL Bochum is one of the country's oldest
sports clubs. Though the football department was only added just over a century later,
it plays a huge role within the club. And right now, following a fantastic three-nil
victory over Leverkusen, the team can look forward to playing in Germany's top league
next season. The city's Ruhr University, meanwhile, is fairly young by comparison,
having been founded during the era of structural change in the 1960s. Tradition and a
willingness to embrace change - both of these qualities are needed. And these two
things will pop up throughout my speech here today, which will be about what the
future holds for Germany's economy. My remarks today will centre around industry -
or, to be more precise, around manufacturing, to use the term from the economic
statistics.
"Is industry about to wither and die?" - that was the pointed headline used by the
German journal "Der Spiegel" late last year to fire up the debate surrounding industry's
prospects for the German economy. [1] That debate had gained increasing traction. Our
industry is indeed facing significant challenges, three of which I would like to highlight
today. First, supply chains. During the pandemic, these turned out to be much more
vulnerable than we had previously thought. Bolstering supply chains is of fundamental
importance for any firm. And for our aggregate economy as well, open as it is. Second,
the supply of energy. Even before Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine began,
German electricity prices were significantly up on the
OECD (Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) average. Gas
wasn't particularly low in price by international standards, either - despite the narrative
about cheap Russian gas. Over the past two years, but especially as Russia's war played
out, energy costs then skyrocketed at times. And the years to come will probably see
them persist at above pre-war levels here in Germany. Partly as a probable knock-on
effect of decarbonisation, because the price of carbon is likely to rise. And investment
will have to be made in order to become climate neutral by 2045. The third challenge is
demographic change. The German population is shrinking and getting older overall.
That's putting a strain on the labour supply and on trend economic growth.
Reflecting on these major challenges, the "Economist" magazine observed in an article
nearly three months ago that "Germany needs an economic-policy Zeitenwende (an
epochal turning-point) as much as it requires the one Mr Scholz has promised in its
military and foreign policy". [2] So is Germany - is the domestic economy - in need of
fundamental structural change? I will use my speech today to share my view on this
with you. And I am fully aware that I am speaking here in Bochum before a seasoned
audience of experts. And not only because many of you have studied, are studying, or
even lecture in business and economics. But also because Bochum has been no stranger
to the notion of structural change for decades now. How else could Bochum rank today
as a hub for IT (Informationstechnologie) security and a popular location for healthcare
firms - 50 years on from the closure of the last coal mine.
2 Industry key to Germany's "business model"
Let me kick off by highlighting one particular feature in Germany. The huge importance
of the manufacturing sector (see Chart 2). In Germany, the manufacturing sector
accounts for a distinctly higher share of gross value added than it does in most other
advanced economies. Manufacturing contributes just under 20% to German gross
domestic product; the equivalent share in the United Kingdom is not even half as high.
Only in Japan is the share slightly higher than in Germany. What is particularly striking,
however, is that this share has remained more or less steady in Germany since the
1990s. The other advanced economies, by contrast, have seen that percentage decline
notably, with a shift towards services.
As we can see, ladies and gentlemen, the manufacturing sector is hugely important in
Germany. That is a key aspect of what has been called, for the sake of simplicity,
"Germany's business model" - foreign trade is another factor I will be touching upon
shortly. But how are the three challenges I mentioned just now impacting on this
"business model"? That's what I will delve into next, starting with the supply chains.
3 Recalibration of global value chains
Global value chains experienced considerable change in the 1990s and early 2000s. The
reason for this? Rapid globalisation during this period (see Chart 3). The main forces
driving this trend were the dismantling of trade barriers, the fall of the Iron Curtain, and
China's integration into the global trading system. Plus the revolution in information
and communication systems and shrinking transport costs. As a result, supply chains
were made ever more global: finished goods weren't the only items that saw ever
stronger global trade - inputs and intermediate products did, too. For an economy that
was already open, like Germany's, this opened up a wealth of opportunities. German
industry capitalised on this potential. And so it happened that exports and imports as a
share of gross domestic product continued to rise steeply in Germany. The German
economy became increasingly open, far more so than countries like France, Italy and
the United Kingdom.
The foreign trade ratio dipped briefly during the global economic and financial crisis.
But it bounced back relatively quickly and has been charting an increasing, albeit flatter,
trajectory ever since. One factor here is that globalisation has lost traction. Increasingly
protectionist tendencies are one reason for this. This was the case in the United States
during the Trump Administration, for example, where additional tariffs were imposed
on China and other trading partners. Hopes that these might bolster the
US (United States) economy were dashed. But global flows of goods thinned out. [3]
Brexit also put the brakes on trade. In recent years, trading activity between the euro
area and the United Kingdom has been much less brisk than it has between the euro
area and the rest of the world.
One country has been key to the rapid growth seen in German foreign trade over the
past two decades: China. That country has grown in importance for Germany, both as a
supplier and as a sales market (see Chart 4). Trade between Germany and China has
seen brisker growth since 2005 than trade within the EU (European Union) and with the
United States. That holds true for both imports to Germany and exports from Germany.
Overall, China ranked as Germany's most important trading partner in 2022, for the
seventh time in succession. Zooming in on individual product groups, this means, for
example, that: German car makers sell around one-third of their vehicles in China. And
more than two-thirds of the laptops or smartphones bought here come from China. [4]
Having strong ties is a good thing, to begin with. You see, sharing the workload
internationally can boost welfare. However, interconnectedness can go hand in hand
with dependencies and thus also with risks. In this regard, it is worth taking a look at
commodities and intermediate goods imported from China that are used in Germany as
inputs for industrial production. These deliveries from China account for a significantly
smaller share, in terms of value, than is the case for many final products. These
commodities and intermediate goods, though, are often very costly indeed to replace in
industrial supply chains. Just take rare earth elements, say. These are essential
components in the construction of engines for electric vehicles and wind farms, for
example. China accounts for around 90% of the global market in the processing of rare
earth elements. [5] This means that Germany sources its imports of rare earth elements
almost entirely from China. [6] German industry faces much the same situation when it
comes to specialised intermediate goods. In extreme cases, these are sourced from just
a single Chinese supplier. The sector of the German economy that is most reliant on
China is the chemicals sector. The ifo (Information und Forschung) Institute has found
that just under 27% of imports of critical industrial goods from China are chemical
goods. [7]
In Germany, the risks inherent in strong global interconnectedness are now coming
increasingly into focus and being given greater consideration. Firms report in surveys
that they are looking for ways to make supply chains more resilient. A diversification of
supply chains is one possible lever here. But operating this lever is easier said than
done. Rare earth elements can also be found in other parts of the world, for example,
such as Australia and Greenland. There, however, these elements would first need to be
tapped and extracted, which is a costly and time-consuming endeavour. A different
approach to inventory management would be another way of mitigating supply chain
risks. The aim, then, is to strike a new balance between efficiency and resilience.
In the event of a fundamentally changed risk situation, for example due to geopolitical
tensions, restructuring supply chains would also seem to make economic sense in terms
of efficiency. There is sometimes talk of "friendshoring", i.e. preferentially sourcing
intermediate products from countries regarded as allies. And of "nearshoring", in which
deliveries from nearby countries play a greater role. Fundamentally overhauling supply
chains would be a time-consuming and cost-intensive process. In principle, however,
government intervention in international trade beyond laying down general rules
requires special justification and should remain the exception. It should be borne in
mind that restricting trade always entails welfare losses. These can be considerable,
depending on the trading partner's importance. [8] Regional free trade agreements
could play an important role, as they can make it easier for European enterprises to
diversify their trading partners.
This brings me to the second major challenge facing German industry: the change in
energy supply. This may entail considerable costs, especially in the transitional period
until enterprises have got to grips with the elimination of nuclear energy and Russian
energy sources and switched to green alternatives.
4 Price competitiveness and profitability of the German economy
But what scope do German enterprises have to bear these burdens? In this context, it is
worth looking at two indicators: price competitiveness and profitability. Price
competitiveness is one of the key factors affecting Germany's export performance. If
we compare the price competitiveness of the German economy with 27 selected
industrial countries, we see a positive, longer-term development - the price
competitiveness of German suppliers has exceeded its long-term average for around 12
years now (see Chart 5).
A second important indicator of enterprises' resilience is their profitability, i.e. the
annual result before taxes as a percentage of turnover (see Chart 6). Earnings in the
manufacturing sector are more volatile, meaning that in times of crisis, earnings fall
much more sharply, but also recover more quickly afterwards. This is what happened
during the financial and economic crisis as well as the coronavirus pandemic. On the
whole, the profitability of German enterprises recovered remarkably rapidly in each
case. Before Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the profitability of the
economy as a whole and of the manufacturing sector climbed to a high level by
historical standards.
Of course, the war and the associated rise in energy prices will not have left profitability
unscathed (see Chart 7). This applies to industrial enterprises in particular. [9] Gas was
already more expensive in Europe and in Germany than in the United States before the
war. However, it has become considerably more so as a result of the reduction in the
supply of Russian gas, which already began in 2021. Gas is likewise expected to be
more expensive in Europe than in the United States in the medium term. This applies to
end customers, too, and the same is true for electricity. For the time being, the impact
on profitability can only be estimated in a cursory manner or using simulations.
By contrast, the impact on price competitiveness can already be quantified (see Chart
8). In 2022, the relative rise in energy prices, up to its peak in September, had a marked
impact on Germany's price competitiveness, reducing it by around 0.9%. [10] Sectors
with an above-average share of energy costs in production, such as the chemical and
paper industries, were, of course, affected to a greater extent - and still are. However,
in the same period, exchange rate developments benefitted German businesses, with
the euro depreciating by 12.5% against the US (United States) dollar. This, in turn,
improved Germany's price competitiveness by 1.9%. This temporary depreciation of the
euro against the US (United States) dollar is likely to be due to the strong policy rate
hikes by the Federal Reserve, which started earlier than in the euro area. The euro has
since regained most of the lost ground.
On average, the price competitiveness of the German corporate sector appears robust
overall. However, energy-intensive industries have been disproportionately affected by
the rise in energy prices, becoming less competitive. Thanks to good earnings and
financing conditions, enterprises should generally be in a good position to absorb the
rise in energy prices. [11] However, all other things being equal, there is likely to be an
incentive for energy-intensive industrial plants to tend to invest in countries where
energy costs are comparatively low and will remain so in future. Of course, simply
looking at current energy costs doesn't go far enough here. As decarbonisation is a
global necessity, it is imperative to look at the costs of future energy. This means risks
and opportunities for Germany as an investment location.
Ladies and gentlemen, let us now turn to the third challenge facing the German
economy, namely demographic developments. One concern is that demographic
change limits our ability to create prosperity - as does the at least temporary rise in
energy prices. This is because demographic change diminishes the growth prospects of
the German economy. And this applies both overall and per capita. I am talking here
about the potential output we can expect in future years. How will it be affected by
demographic change and, at least temporarily, by higher energy costs?
5 Impact of energy costs and demographic change on the potential output
of the German economy
Taken in isolation, permanently higher energy prices would temporarily weigh on the
growth path of potential output. The growth path for potential output between 2022
and 2025 projected by our experts in June 2022 was much steeper than the one
anticipated in December 2022. [12] The resulting difference is essentially due to the fact
that higher energy costs are expected to be higher (see Chart 10). We can differentiate
between two adjustment processes here. First, higher energy costs weaken productivity.
This is because at a given level of labour and capital input, higher energy input costs
mean that less value added can be generated. And second, enterprises restructure their
production processes. They write off energy-intensive plants that are no longer
profitable at higher energy prices. This puts a strain on aggregate capital input.
Another drag on the German economy's potential output is the country's aging and
declining population. Provided the underlying conditions do not change, this will weigh
heavily on economic growth in the medium term (see Chart 11). The total number of
hours worked in our economy is declining, mainly as a result of the considerable
reduction in labour force participation. As the share of older workers in the labour force
increases, the labour force participation rate decreases. This is because older people
generally work less than younger people. Pre-retirement part-time work and early
retirement are having a noticeable impact here. This age structure effect will lead to a
decline in the total hours worked in just a few years' time.
As far as the working-age population is concerned, the situation is changing
fundamentally. The working-age population has grown in recent years. Strong labour
market-oriented net immigration has more than offset the decline in the domestic
labour force, at least in terms of numbers; recently, people who have fled Ukraine have
played a major role in this regard. However, from 2026 onwards, net migration will
probably no longer offset the effects of the baby boomers leaving the labour market.
That said, there are ways to bolster the total number of hours worked. One option
would be to increase the immigration of skilled workers. A well-designed policy in this
regard is currently high on the political agenda, and rightly so. A first step was taken
with the Skilled Immigration Act (Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz) of 2020. However,
its impact has so far been modest. And so further steps, such as a points system, are
desirable in order to make it easier for qualified foreigners to enter the German labour
market. This would send an important message to the potential countries of origin,
namely that there are ways to enter the German labour market beyond the asylum
route. Faster processes are also necessary: for recognising foreign vocational and
academic qualifications and also for processing visa applications in the German consular
missions abroad.
In addition, here in Germany, the EU (European Union) Blue Card for highly-skilled
workers could have an even greater impact. For this to be the case, it should be
transposed into national law and offered to individuals with secondary school leaving
certificates. This will take some effort, no doubt, because Germany as an immigration
country faces a great deal of competition for labour. Looking ahead, emerging market
economies such as Mexico and China are likely to be competing for migrant workers,
too, as they are also economically reliant on immigration - something the World Bank
recently pointed out. [13]
An additional approach would be to make more people who are able to work into
people who do work, integrating women and older individuals in particular into wage
labour to a greater extent than before. Improved childcare services and nursing care
could be beneficial here, for example. However, as emphasised by the Federal Statistical
Office of late, increased labour force participation alone will not be enough to fully
offset demographic change. [14]
Experts from a range of institutions are suggesting that, for various reasons, an increase
in the statutory retirement age should also be discussed as an option. [15] If, for
example, it were to be tied to life expectancy, labour supply and thus potential output,
too, would be strengthened over the coming years (see Chart 12). The idea behind this
is that as life expectancy increases, the years of life gained will prolong both an
individual's retirement period and their employment period. Today, the average person's
retirement period is just over 40% as long as their working life. One approach would be
to stabilise this relationship.
Ladies and gentlemen, I have explained that higher energy costs and demographic
change are likely to put a strain on potential output. Could productivity gains
counteract this? Yes, possibly so. This would require the framework conditions to be
improved. For example, older employees and lower-skilled immigrants would need to
be given consistent training and professional development. The potential offered by
digitalisation should be tapped just as consistently.
Looking back at the past 25 years, it can be seen just how remarkable the efficiency
gains in the digital sectors have been compared with those in the rest of the economy
(see Chart 13). Here I'm referring not only to the information and communication
sector, but also parts of the manufacturing sector, which produce goods such as
computers and other electronic products and equipment. Despite their limited
economic size, the digital sectors have thus made a considerable contribution to overall
productivity growth. Aggregate productivity effects have not only been driven by
investment in digital equipment, but are also largely due to digital inputs, which are
incorporated into many final products. However, these effects have been on the decline
since 2014 - a trend that can also be observed in other advanced economies.
The push towards digitalisation during the COVID (Coronavirus Disease)-19 pandemic
could bolster future productivity growth. Corporate surveys support this preliminary
assessment. [16] However, it is mainly large enterprises that seem to have achieved
productivity gains. According to the survey of firms, digitalisation hardly picked up
speed at all in smaller, less productive enterprises. There is, therefore, a digital divide
running through the corporate landscape. Aggregate productivity gains could be
greater if firms were to invest more uniformly in digital technologies. [17]
6 Conclusion
Ladies and gentlemen, a country like Germany obviously does not have a "business
model", but it does have many individual enterprises, each of which has its own
business model. Overall, however, it is clear that the German corporate sector is facing
challenges. I have discussed supply chains, energy costs and demographic change in
detail today. But I could also have talked about environmental sustainability and climate
change - factors which go beyond the energy transition. Digitalisation holds a great
deal of potential to manage the necessary structural change. That said, it also poses a
challenge for the German economy.
It is clear that German industry, in particular, will have to undergo an adjustment
process. Support in this endeavour will likely be most welcome. And rightly so, because
state-designed framework conditions also play a key role in ensuring a successful
future. These include, for example, efficient administrative processes, a good
infrastructure, and a reliable and consistent climate policy with goal-oriented carbon
prices and rapid approval procedures for renewable energy sources and network
expansion, as well as good conditions for labour force participation and economic
migration.
As President of the Bundesbank, I would add that stable prices evidently belong on the
list of crucial conditions, too. According to provisional figures, the harmonised inflation
rate for May most recently stood at 6.3% in Germany and 6.1% in the euro area as a
whole. It is still too soon to speak of stable prices, even if these rates are considerably
lower than they were last autumn. The underlying price pressures are also far too high,
and have hardly receded at all to date. In May, the core inflation rate (excluding food
and energy) is likely to have stood at 5.1% in Germany and 5.3% in the wider euro
area. Monetary policymakers therefore cannot and will not falter in the fight against
inflation. We need to be even more stubborn than the current rate of inflation.
I will do my utmost to ensure that this period of high inflation is soon behind us. I
believe three things are needed to achieve this, the first being a sufficiently high interest
rate level. As things stand, several interest rate steps are still needed. In my view, it is by
no means certain that interest rates will reach their peak as early as this summer.
Second, once interest rates are high enough to overcome high inflation, this interest
rate level needs to be maintained until we can be sure that we will achieve our 2%
inflation target in a timely manner. And third, in order to support this interest rate
policy, we must run down the bond holdings on our balance sheets. This balance sheet
reduction will run parallel to our interest rate hikes. As from July, we plan to increase
the speed of this shrinkage - a step that I am very much in favour of. Measures such as
this will help us to leave the wave of inflation behind and return to a stable framework.
For German firms, particularly in industry, a reliable, employment-friendly and
investment-friendly climate is vitally important. Market adjustment processes are likely
to deliver optimal results in such an environment. After all, firms are no strangers to
change. In the past, they have confronted and mastered change time and time again.
Herbert Grönemeyer impressively portrays this state of constant change in his
song "Bleibt alles anders", or "Everything stays different". The German economy has
demonstrated its ability to adapt on numerous occasions: during the peak of
globalisation, for instance, as well as in the face of structural changes in global demand
for goods, and, more recently, in the energy crisis.
It's true that, according to the latest figures from the Federal Statistical Office, the
German economy has contracted over the past two quarters, burdened by steeply
increasing energy prices and high inflation. It is therefore in a technical recession.
However, the decline in economic output is of the same magnitude expected in the
Bundesbank's December 2022 forecast. Intermittent signs that the German economy
might have emerged from the winter in better shape than expected have thus
ultimately proven illusory, unfortunately. Yet there were also far worse fears of a severe
economic slump resulting from a gas shortage - neither of which materialised. And,
with regard to the remainder of the year, our economists are cautiously optimistic.
Things should start to pick up again soon, then.
After all, Germany, as an attractive corporate investment location, traditionally has a lot
to offer: a well-trained workforce, a good infrastructure, and consensus-driven trade
unions. I am therefore in no doubt that the German economy will be able to rise to the
challenges ahead.
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to hearing your thoughts.
Footnotes:
1. Book, S. et al., Die Panik der Bosse, Der Spiegel, 17 September 2022, p. 24.
2. The Economist, 18 March 2023, Germany is at last tackling its long-standing
economic weaknesses (economist.com)
[https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/03/15/germany-is-finally-tackling-itslong-standing-economic-weaknesses]
.
3. Deutsche Bundesbank, Consequences of increasing protectionism, Monthly Report,
January 2020, pp. 45-66.
4. IfW (Institut für Weltwirtschaft) Kiel, Institute for the World Economy, Policy Brief
No 164, February 2023, pp. 8 f.
5. International Energy Agency (2023), Energy Technology Perspectives 2023, January
2023, Paris, p. 177, available at https:/ / iea.blob.core.windows.net/ assets/ a86b480e-
2b03-4e25-bae1-da1395e0b620/ EnergyTechnologyPerspectives2023.pdf
[https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/a86b480e-2b03-4e25-bae1da1395e0b620/EnergyTechnologyPerspectives2023.pdf]
.
6. Foreign trade with China decreased by 10.5% in the first quarter of 2023 compared
with the same quarter of the previous year - Federal Statistical Office (destatis.de)
[https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2023/05/PE23_182_51.html]
7. Baur, A. and Flach, L. (2022), German-Chinese Trade Relations: How Dependent is
the German Economy on China?| Publications | ifo (Information und Forschung)
Institute
[https://www.cesifo.org/en/publications/2022/working-paper/german-chinese-traderelations-how-dependent-german-economy-china]
, EconPol Policy Report 38/2022, June 2022.
8. Dorn, F., L. Flach, C. Fuest and L. Scheckenhofer (2022), Langfristige Effekte von
Deglobalisierung und Handelskriegen auf die deutsche Wirtschaft
(ifo (Information und Forschung).de)
[https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/sd-2022-09-dorn-etal-effekte-deglobalisierung.pdf] ,
ifo (Information und Forschung) Schnelldienst, 2022, 75, No 9, 14 September 2022.
9. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2023), Impact of higher energy costs on the profitability
of German industrial enterprises, Monthly Report, March 2023, pp.69-70.
10. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2022), Rise in energy prices, the exchange rate of the
euro and Germany's price competitiveness, Monthly Report, December 2022,
pp. 45-54.
11. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2023), Impact of higher energy costs on the profitability
of German industrial enterprises, Monthly Report, March 2023, pp. 69-70.
12. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2022), Rise in energy prices, the exchange rate of the
euro and Germany's price competitiveness, Monthly Report, December 2022,
pp. 45-54.
13. World Bank Group (2023), World Development Report, Migrants, Refugees, and
Societies, WDR_FullReport.pdf
[https://favis.inet.bundesbank.de/csdav/nodes/477962819/WDR_FullReport.pdf] ,
pp. 70ff.
14. Federal Statistical Office (2023), Arbeitskräfteangebot: Erwerbsbeteiligung unter
den 25- bis 59-Jährigen 2022 mit 87 % bereits auf sehr hohem Niveau, 27 April
2023.
15. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2022), Rentenversicherung: Long-term scenarios and
reform options, Monthly Report, June 2022, pp. 47-61; Deutsche Bundesbank
(2019), Long-term outlook for the statutory pension insurance scheme, Monthly
Report, October 2019, pp. 53-81; Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy
(2021), Vorschläge für eine Reform der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung, Gutachten
des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (
BMWi (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie)), 22 April 2021;
International Monetary Fund (2019), Germany: 2019 Article IV Consultation - Press
Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Germany,
IMF (International Monetary Fund) Country Report No 19/213, July 2019;
OECD (Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) (2020),
OECD (Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung)
Publishing; German Council of Economic Experts (2020), Corona-Krise gemeinsam
bewältigen, Resilienz und Wachstum stärken, Annual Report 2020/2021, 10
November 2021.
16. Deutsche Bundesbank (2022), Productivity effects of reallocation in the corporate
sector during the COVID (Coronavirus Disease)-19 crisis, Monthly Report, September
2022, p. 55.
17. Deutsche Bundesbank (2022), Productivity effects of reallocation in the corporate
sector during the COVID (Coronavirus Disease)-19 crisis, Monthly Report, September
2022, p. 55.
Presentation

Is Germany's "business model" at risk?
Talk followed by a panel discussion ikf institut für kredit- und finanzwirtschaft e. V.,
Ruhr University Bochum
05.06.2023 | 2 MB, PDF
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