Harun R Khan: Indian debt market 2020 - the underpinnings & the path
ahead
Inaugural address by Mr Harun R Khan, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, at
the 17th Annual Conference of FIMMDA (Fixed Income Money Market and Derivatives
Association of India) - PDAI (Primary Dealers' Association of India), London, 15 April 2016.
* * *
The speaker acknowledges the contributions of Shri Vaibhav Chaturvedi and Shri N.R.V.V.M.K Rajendra Kumar
of the Reserve Bank of India.
1. Shri N. S. Venkatesh, Executive Director, IDBI Bank & Chairman, FIMMDA,
Shri B. Prasanna, Chairman PDAI, senior colleagues from the banking fraternity, delegates
from India & UK, ladies and gentlemen. It is my pleasure to be part of the Annual
FIMMDAPDAI Conference being held in one of the leading financial centres of the world. London is
home of one of the world's oldest central banks and epitomizes the intellectual churning that
has happened internationally about the role of central banks in the regulation of the financial
sector. From being a poster boy of the philosophy of central bank being divested of all other
responsibilities other than monetary policy, before the crisis, to the restorer of central bank
primacy in financial regulation, the experience of London, the pre-eminent financial centre,
offers valuable lessons for other countries. Going through the rich and intellectually riveting
debates in the House of Commons and the House of Lords on the Financial Services Bill,
which was enacted in December 2012, is an across the spectrum study in the philosophy of
financial regulation.
2. I have been associated with the area of market regulation long enough to have
mulled and struggled with different strands of the philosophy of regulation as it has evolved
over the past few decades. The financial sector in India has developed over the years in the
context of varying politico-economic considerations at different points of time. The program of
economic reforms initiated in the nineties was a seminal point in India's economic history.
For billion Indians, this was nothing short of revolution, opening huge opportunities. Due to
these reforms, we broke the shackles of low growth and recorded impressive growth rates.
India's entry in to the league of top economies of the world and a preferred investment
destination validated the success of the policy.
3. These changes were result of well-thought policies. Though the push can be
attributed to the precarious economic situation of 1991, the course was set by series of
calibrated steps. Reforms were carried out keeping in view the interests of all the
stakeholders, especially large sections that are economically weak. Steady reforms have
proved to be more stable and durable.
4. Financial sector reforms have been part of overall scheme of reforms and have
complemented the other components of economic policy. One notable feature of financial
sector reforms in India since they were instituted in the early 1990s has been the
maintenance of financial stability through a period marked by repeated financial crises across
the world. Our financial markets have emerged stronger; became deep and liquid during this
period. They also became more resilient in wake of challenging domestic and global events.
5. Our approach to "market regulation" all these years has evolved keeping the
systemic imperatives and institutional prudence at the center. The pace of progress may
have varied and, at times, discontinuous but that has more to do with the uncertain macro
environment. Policymaking can never be a linear, uni-dimensional process unless it is
ideological, which ours is not. But in terms of final outcomes, we have covered a tremendous
distance. I have in the past talked about what have been the key attributes and
achievements of our approach, so would not want to repeat that. I would just mention that
our approach has never been statist and the import of a lot of small things being discussed
and implemented does not fully register in the wider deliberations amid the din of absolutist
arguments.
6. Since we began the financial sector reforms, Indian bond markets have come a long
way. Bond market activity has grown rapidly. Government securities market (G-Sec),
corporate bond market and derivatives markets have become broad-based in terms of
participation. The debt and derivatives products that are available have grown in number and
complexity. The sovereign yield curve now spans up to 40 years. Primary market issuances
have increased resulting in large benchmark issuances. The volumes in secondary market
have surged. The bid-ask spread of on-the-run securities continues to be low and so are
impact costs. In case of corporate bonds too, trading volumes have increased but lag in
comparison with global peers.
7. There have been significant changes in market micro-structure and infrastructure.
Over the period of past two decades, the Reserve Bank of India has adopted a strategy for
creation of an efficient market infrastructure to enable safe trading, clearing and settlement.
State-of-the-art primary issuance process with electronic bidding and
straight-throughprocessing (STP) capabilities, an efficient, completely dematerialized depository system
within the central bank, Delivery-versus-Payment (DvP) mode of settlement, Real Time
Gross Settlement (RTGS), electronic trading platform (Negotiated Dealing Systems - Order
Matching) (NDS-OM) and a separate Central Counter Party (CCP) in the Clearing
Corporation of India Ltd (CCIL) for guaranteed settlement are among the steps that were
taken by the Reserve Bank over the years. The system makes G-Sec trading practically risk
free and efficient.
8. Today, I would try to present the big picture emerging a few years from now as
many of the small pieces we are currently pursuing finally coalesce into the larger theme.
Both as a result of studied re-assessments within as well as convergence with globally
accepted best principles several far-reaching initiatives have been announced in the recent
past. It may, however, be contextual to understand the underpinnings of this process, at
times criticized of not being able to deliver.
The critique and the response
9. The state of markets and market regulation in India has been often criticized for not
achieving an efficient bond-currency-derivatives (BCD) nexus. A seemingly logical but
misleading conclusion drawn from this is that the current institutional structure is to be
blamed for this. The argument is that by changing the institutional structure, by itself, would
succeed in reversing the public policy consensus relating to financial markets. This is at best
a very facetious argument and completely belies the shared views among all the regulators
and the Government regarding the broad philosophy and objective of financial sector
policies.
10. The other fallacy is to believe that BCD nexus can be enforced only through
exchanges, which perhaps is an extension of the earlier argument. While it is true that
exchanges play an extremely important role in furthering development of efficient markets
and price discovery, and more importantly address counterparty risk issues which are there
in the OTC market, much of the risk transfer in the most developed markets happens in the
OTC market among large institutional players. With the post crisis focus this segment has
received, many of the earlier weaknesses have been addressed.
11. While the phrase "BCD Nexus" sounds intellectually impressive, what it simply
means is that there are certain restrictions regarding participation of various economic
entities in the currency and interest rate markets and the related derivatives. Yes, there
indeed these markets are tightly regulated. But what is the underlying philosophy behind
these regulations? Instead of talking about market regulation in abstractions, it would be
useful to understand what it actually entails.
12. Let us take currency markets. The markets have traditionally been OTC, seeking to
cater to the genuine hedging needs of the entities. Given the capital account management
framework, obviously there are guidelines of who can participate in what kind of products.
These guidelines have been significantly liberalized over the years and newer products have
been introduced on the exchanges. Now, the question here is at what stage do we move to a
completely open capital account which would, in turn, result in freeing up the restrictions on
participation in these markets. The latter follows from the first, not the other way round. This
is institutional-structure agnostic.
13. Another structural factor with regard to an efficient BCD nexus is the nature of
institutional market. In a bank-centric financial system, it has been the experience that even
the task of developing non-bank channels, particularly through market-based mechanisms,
falls ultimately on the banks themselves. Whether it is expecting banks to provide credit
enhancement for bond markets or acting as market-makers in various market segments, the
role of banks becomes critical. This reflects the underlying structural makeup of the financial
system and implies that any attempt at relaxing market regulation ultimately comes unstuck
at the altar of prudential regulation. The same, to a lesser extent, applies to other regulated
entities as well, such as, insurance companies, pension funds, etc. which are seen as natural
participants in some market segments, such as, corporate bonds, interest rate derivatives,
credit default swaps but the prudential regulatory framework, perhaps for very valid reasons,
is more conservative. Again, it is a matter of regulatory philosophy than the institutional
structure.
14. As regard debt markets, the regulations essentially entail specification of broad
product features and participation norms. While the considerations behind regulating interest
rate markets are different form exchange rate markets, the objective still remains systemic
stability. Large sovereign borrowings impact the yield curve through the expectation channel.
Apart from direct balance sheet effects on the financial sector, interest rate volatility has a
critical bearing on sovereign balance sheet which could translate onto financial sector
balance sheets. It, therefore, becomes imperative to be watchful of volatility in interest rates
on account of activities of various market players.
15. Active, unfettered repo market is one of the critical elements of such BCD construct.
Repo markets were one of the most active funding markets globally before the crisis.
Postcrisis, however, several work-streams under FSB, IOSCO, etc. are working internationally to
tighten the regulation of repo markets, including regulations on re-use of securities, margins
and haircuts, leverage built-up through repo markets, etc. These are not market conduct
issues but prudential issues, being discussed in the context of systemic stability.
16. Market regulation cannot remain a value-neutral term. Different markets have
different dynamics and inter-connections with the real sector and broader macroeconomic
stability. To argue that regulation of equity markets is same as regulation of currency markets
is facetious, ignoring the massive work going on internationally towards reforming the
financial sector. Yes market mechanics can be same and market micro-structure can be
convergent across asset classes but in terms of systemic spillover, approach to regulation of
these markets can be very different.
17. So the point I am trying to make is that the debate needs to be on the nature of
financial regulation and the underlying structural imperatives rather than the institutional
structure. Various models have been tried internationally pre-crisis and post-crisis and it's the
contextual imperatives which have driven the changes.
The path ahead
18. Planning towards future, I can cite the policy direction provided by our Governor
Dr. Raghuram Rajan. While talking about the Five Pillars of RBI's Developmental Measures,
Dr. Rajan identified 'broadening and deepening financial markets and increasing their
liquidity and resilience' as an important pillar. The objective is to help allocate and absorb the
risks entailed in financing India's growth. He had observed that markets are complementary
to development of banking sector. The tasks ahead are:
Building liquidity and improving market access;
•
• Developing Government bond market domestically in terms of investor class,
instruments, infrastructure, intermediaries and innovations and opening up to foreign
investors in a calibrated manner to broaden the investors' base without unduly
exposing it to the risks of sudden stops; and
• Better communication of the debt management policy to avoid uncertainty in the
minds of investors.
19. Going forward, by the year 2020, I would expect macro-economic management to
become more robust, large scale fiscal consolidation resulting in optimal debt structure, bond
markets becoming more liquid and deep, host of reforms in derivatives space and central
bank communication becoming more robust and effective. I would like to share some of my
thoughts on the issues.
I. Debt management: medium term debt strategy
20. Recently we have articulated, in consultation with the Government, our medium term
debt management strategy (MTDS). The move was designed to benchmark our debt
management practices with global sound practice and foster transparency and
accountability. MTDS comprises objectives, various benchmarks and portfolio indicators and
yearly issuance strategy (external and domestic funding, instruments, maturity structure,
etc.). It provides requisite information, transparency & certainty and enables market
participants (investors) to plan their strategy for investment in Government bonds market.
21. The MTDS has been articulated for a period of three years and it will be reviewed
annually and rolled over for the next three years. The scope of debt management strategy is
presently limited to active elements of domestic debt management, i.e., marketable debt of
the Central Government only. Over time, the scope would be progressively expanded to
cover the entire stock of outstanding liabilities including external debt as well as General
Government Debt including State Development Loans (SDL).
22. The debt management strategy revolves around three broad pillars, viz., borrowing
at low cost over a period of time, risk mitigation and market development. The intended
process as part of MTDS entails the following:
Carrying forward transparent issuance process by providing clear information on
•
borrowing programme to investors and having continuous investor interactions and
appropriate consultation;
• Building up benchmark issues by issuing significant volumes and taking advantage
of liquidity premia;
• Elongating the maturity of the debt portfolio;
• Building a balanced maturity profile and supply along the yield curve;
• Issuing a variety of instruments, such as, inflation linked bonds that would help the
investors to manage their portfolio more efficiently;
• Undertaking switches / buybacks for effective liability management;
• Expanding the domestic investor base by encouraging retail and mid-segment
investors' participation in G-Sec market and calibrated opening of the government
securities market to foreign investors and retail investors; and
• Continuing passive consolidation with large benchmark issuances and active
consolidation through buy-backs / switches/ conversions.
23. An important risk mitigation measure aimed at alleviating the pressure at short-end
was undertaking switches/buybacks from proximate maturities in order to reduce the
redemption concentration and create space for further issuances that may be needed to
meet the demand of market participants. During the past three fiscal years, switches
amounting to about Rupees one trillion were undertaken by the Reserve Bank in consultation
with the Government. The operations have eased gross borrowing numbers and enabled
effective borrowings.
24. The aim of the Reserve Bank has always been to conduct market borrowing
operations in a smooth manner without undue disruptions. The strategic and tactical
approaches of debt management are meant to ensure the same. While the strategic
parameters are set in MTDS and anchored to achieving the main objectives, the tactics are
not only linked to the objectives but also to ensuring stability of operations. A recent example
would bring out this approach. The market participants were expressing apprehensions
about the potential elevated supply of government bonds due to the issuances by the state
governments under Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana (UDAY).
25. The yields had hardened in anticipation, especially for state government borrowings.
We have acted in a calibrated manner planning issuances to banks that have DISCOM dues
directly so that the supply will not enter the market. Selective regulatory forbearance of
categorizing the bonds as 'HTM' was accorded to subscribing banks. The bonds issued to
pay dues to the central public sector undertakings were offered through private placements.
The pressure on the yields also moderated by modulating the issuance strategy to limit
issuances at long tenors announcing the same in the borrowing calendar for first half of the
fiscal 2016-17. This was possible because we had over time elongated the maturity profile of
the Government bonds; weighted average maturity of 10.50 years as on end-March 2016 is
one of the highest among the peers. This flattened the yield curve bringing down yields at
15 years and above, thereby increasing attractiveness of the state bonds issued under
UDAY.
26. The timing of issuances was planned keeping in view absence of supply at end of
fiscal year. The issuances were successful and UDAY bonds of about ₹ 990 billion were
successfully placed. The Fixed Income and Money Market Dealers Association (FIMMDA)
played an important role here in co-ordinating with banks for smooth issuances. The market
behavior in this case, however, bears scrutiny. The markets exhibited serious negativity,
mostly as a response to imaginary stress. There is also evidence of uni-directional bias, i.e.,
the market was unduly pessimistic impacting yields. It also brings forth need for better
communication from the issuers. There are lessons to be learnt from the episode.
II. Secondary market trading
Enhancing liquidity of the debt market
27. In the recent past, concerns have been raised globally about both a decline in
current market liquidity, especially for fixed-income assets, and its resilience, as brought out
in the IMF Global Financial Stability Report, 2015. In this context, it may be mentioned that
liquidity in the Indian G-Sec markets, as indicated by trading volumes, improved significantly
across markets along with increase in net borrowing. One of the reasons for the improved
liquidity in G-sec and Repo is due to the electronic platform based trading (Charts 1 & 2).
28. The above was also borne out by a study undertaken by the Centre for Advanced
Financial Research & Learning (CAFRAL) which found a strong positive impact on market
efficiency through the introduction of NDS-OM and its associated transformational impact in
the secondary market for government bonds, namely:
• Ten-fold rise in daily trading volume;
• The enormous shift to NDS-OM platform at the expense of OTC brokered
submarket;
• Lower trade execution search costs; and
• Real-time reporting of trade book and order book information leading to real time
public dissemination as well.
29. Liquidity as measured by bid-ask spread shows that market liquidity dried up in
second half of 2013. Market volumes, however, remained high. Since then, the bid-ask
spread has compressed significantly suggesting improvement in liquidity (Chart 3).
30. Various measures have been taken to enhance the secondary market liquidity in
Government bond market. Consequently, the average daily trading volume has increased
more than six times in the last five years. During the taper tantrum, investors could exercise
the option to sell securities in an orderly fashion and exit without market disruption. This
improved credibility of Indian markets and the investors returned. We have tweaked
shortsale limits, opened "when issued" market and started buy-back operations based on the cash
position of government. We have initiated switches that would ease redemption pressure as
well as aid consolidation. We are also discussing with the Government a suitable market
making scheme for illiquid and semi-liquid Government securities. There is, however, work
still to be done.
III. NDS-OM version 2 enhancements
31. NDS-OM, RBI's Anonymous Order Matching System for dealing in secondary
market outright trades in G-Sec was launched in August 2005 based on an internal
assessment of the need for a screen based dealing system as recommended by the
R. H. Patil Committee appointed by Reserve Bank of India. All trades concluded on NDS-OM
flow within an STP framework to the CCIL, which acts as the CCP for all these trades, within
the provisions of its bye-laws, rules and regulations.
32. From a relatively simple system when initially launched in August 2005, over time
various functionalities have been added to NDS-OM. The application facilitates trading in all
kinds of Central Government/State Government/Treasury Bill instrument in standard and
non-standard (odd) market lots. It also facilitates trading in "When Issued" (both re-issues
and new issues). Other important system capabilities include short-selling and limit
monitoring, stock balance monitoring, 'When Issued' limit monitoring, web-based module for
client dealing, etc. The system has been widely accepted by market participants and its order
matching segment now consistently accounts for 80 - 85 per cent of total G-Sec market
volumes. The average daily volumes on NDS-OM have increased from ₹ 50 billion in 2005-06
to over ₹ 400 billion in 2015-16.
33. As part of vision of the Reserve Bank of India for providing state-of-the-art
infrastructure to market participants, Reserve Bank has initiated an upgradation of the
NDSOM platform. The new system is expected to have faster through-put, enhanced
functionalities, rich user interface, internationally compatible message formats, etc.
Access of demat account holders to NDS-OM
34. One of the major factors said to be hampering trading interest in G-Sec is the
difficulty in access to NDS-OM by non-institutional investor class. There is the gilt-account
route but a large number of investors holding demat accounts cannot directly access NDS-OM.
As already announced in the First Bi-monthly Monetary Policy Statement, 2015-16, Reserve
Bank is working, along with CCIL and depositories, to give demat account holders direct
access to NDS-OM. This is expected to open up a large investor base, hitherto untapped, for
investment in G-Sec. Even though G-Sec are globally institutional markets, this step is one of
the most significant ones to facilitate retail investment in G-Sec.
IV. Integration at the depository level
35. Currently though intra-depository transfers of G-Sec take place seamlessly between
two beneficiary owners within a depository, there is no facility to transfer G-Sec seamless
across depositories. Further, at present, there is no linkage between the RBI SGL system
and the depositories. As a result, transfer of securities between SGL and demat accounts
involves a manual process. The manual process involves delays and inhibits seamless
movement of securities between SGL and demat accounts. As announced in the First
B-monthly Monetary Policy Statement, 2015-16, Reserve Bank is working along with the
depositories to implement a seamless transfer of securities among depositories and RBI SGL
which would effectively lead to an integrated depository system for G-Secs. This would
greatly facilitate transaction on the exchanges between a SGL-account holder and non-SGL
account holder.
V. New products
36. Permitting introduction of new products in OTC as well as exchange traded space
has always been a mutually consultative process between the Reserve Bank of India and the
market participants. However, the approach adopted for introduction of interest rate options
(IRO), I can, say, marks a fundamental departure. While the final guidelines are expected to
be issued shortly, I can share that the guidelines would be truly principle-based and not
prescriptive. It is proposed to permit a broad range of instruments including simple call and
put options, caps, floors, collars and swaptions on both exchanges as well as in the OTC
market. While the Working Group on Introduction of Interest Rate Options (Chairman:
Prof. P.G. Apte) had recommended standardized contracts in the OTC market, the feedback
received is that this may not be feasible. Another issue that has been flagged in the feedback
relates to allowing users to hedge their foreign currency interest rate exposures using options
on foreign currency interest rate benchmarks with Authorised Dealer banks in India on a
back-to-back basis. This needs to be examined separately and may not be included as part
of Rupee IRO guidelines.
37. Broadly, the same approach will be followed while finalizing guidelines on all new
products - both OTC as well as exchange traded.
VI. Regulation of electronic platforms
38. Electronic platform trading has the benefits of improved transparency, reduced
transaction times, efficient audit trails, improved risk controls and enhanced market
monitoring. In the aftermath of the last financial crisis, internationally, there is a move to
promote trading of financial instruments on electronic platform.
39. In India, as mentioned earlier, we can be considered pioneers in creating
anonymous electronic platforms for trading. NDS-OM, an anonymous electronic platform for
trading in Government securities was created a decade ago. Most trades in G-Sec now gets
executed on NDS-OM. Similarly, "Clearcorp Repo Order Matching System" (CROMS), an
STP enabled electronic anonymous order matching platform to facilitate dealing in market
repos in G-Sec is also available. The availability of electronic trading platform with robust
clearing and settlement mechanism has been instrumental in the phenomenal growth
observed in the outright and repo market in G-Sec.
40. Taking into account the experience of NDS-OM and CROMS in G-Sec, there is a
need to introduce electronic trading dealing platforms for other financial instruments like
corporate bonds, CPs, CDs and derivative products. Reserve Bank of India has also been
receiving requests from various entities to introduce electronic platforms for these
instruments. Accordingly, it is now proposed to prescribe a framework for authorization of
electronic dealing platforms for financial instruments regulated by the Reserve Bank of India.
The overarching philosophy behind the framework would be to permit more than one
electronic platform subject to eligibility and demand. The transactions on such platforms
could be piped to the related settlement agency for post-trade processing, etc.
VII. OTC derivative reforms
41. In response to concerns about systemic risks in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives
markets, the G-20 leaders agreed in 2009 to a comprehensive reform agenda to improve
transparency in these markets, mitigate systemic risk, and protect against market abuse. All
the jurisdictions, including the Emerging Market Developing Economies (EMDEs) have
progressed substantially on the above as brought out in the last Financial Stability Board
(FSB) progress report on implementation. Implementation is almost complete for trade
reporting and higher capital requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives. As observed
in the Report, the authorities, however, continue to report challenges concerning the quality
and completeness of the data being reported to Trade Repositories (TRs) and the ability to
access, use and aggregate this data. FSB's Thematic Review on OTC Derivatives Trade
Reporting which came out in November 2015 identified several recurring issues that are
posing challenges including concerns over data quality, capacity to effectively aggregate
information across TRs, existence of barriers to reporting complete data to TRs, and barriers
to authorities' access to TR-held data.
42. From an EMDE perspective, the cross-border reporting and access to TR data has
come out as a major issue which, as recommended, needs to be addressed legally. While
the imperatives behind this are appreciated, their implementation would require navigating
the existing privacy provisions nationally which may be challenging. As an alternative, to
achieve early compliance, cooperative arrangements may also be considered pending legal
frameworks. As the legislative process is usually long drawn and requires political support,
the approach should not mandate legislative changes for all aspects of the reform agenda.
43. One of the biggest challenges for EMDEs remains meeting recognition/ equivalence
requirements of major financial centres in OTC derivatives. While the concerns relating to
uneven implementation of reforms may be an issue, forcing home country jurisdictional
requirements onto host country entities, particularly financial market infrastructure entities
could become a sensitive subject. From an EMDE perspective, this also comes in the way of
achieving other objectives, such as, mandating central clearing for certain standardised OTC
products. If the CCP is not recognised, participation of banks from other jurisdictions could
be hampered affecting market development adversely. Some segments of the contributors to
market liquidity may be forced to withdraw from the market thereby making the markets
shallower. This could impact the longer term market development. This will also have an
adverse impact on ability of market participants to hedge various risks using these derivative
instruments.
44. Such an approach defeats the very purpose of an internationally-coordinated
approach. Once any entity is recognised as compliant with the internationally accepted
principles, subject to all the review mechanisms, additional bilateral requirements are difficult
to justify. We are aware that the regulators in respective countries requiring this recognition
are bound by the legal provisions in their jurisdictions but it is best to address such issues on
a multi-lateral basis. The Report of the IOSCO Task Force on Cross-Border Regulation,
which was published in September 2015, examined various issues comprehensively. There
is an urgent need to agree on a broad set of equivalence principles internationally and not to
insist on introduction of country specific requirements over other jurisdictions. Mutual reliance
among the regulators within the framework of agreed global best practices and sound
principles should be the ideal way to resolve avoidable frictions.
45. Beyond the above agenda, there are several other work-streams whose
recommendations have a bearing on the functioning of the markets. For instance, the FSB
work-stream on resolution of financial entities requires host country jurisdictions to allow
bailin clauses for all deposit liabilities raised by home country entities. The implications of such a
sweeping mandate could be serious for the interests of domestic depositors. The challenge
would be to strike a balance of the interest of various stakeholders.
46. In India, a Standing Committee under the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) on
Financial Markets has been constituted to assess, on a continuing basis, the implications of
recommendations of various international standard setting bodies, through different
workstreams, on domestic OTC markets. The Committee would also help in formulating
appropriate policy response in this area.
VIII. Corporate bonds
47. Based on recommendations of a Working Group set up under the aegis of
FSDCSC, certain measures have been announced in the Union Budget for 2016-17 for
development of the corporate bond market:
• Setting up of a dedicated fund to provide credit enhancement to infrastructure
projects by the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC);
• Issue of guidelines by the Reserve Bank of India to encourage large borrowers to
access a certain portion of their financing needs through market mechanism instead
of the banks;
• Expansion of investment basket of foreign portfolio investors to include unlisted debt
securities and pass through securities issued by securitisation SPVs;
• Introduction of electronic auction platform for developing an enabling eco system for
the private placement market in corporate