For release on delivery
8:00 p.m. EST (5:00 p.m. PST)
January 19, 2017
The Economic Outlook and the Conduct of Monetary Policy
Remarks by
Janet L. Yellen
Chair
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
Stanford University
Stanford, California
January 19, 2017
It is a privilege to be here today to discuss how the Federal Reserve is conducting
monetary policy to promote a healthy economy. For more than 30 years, research from
the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research has informed economic policy, and
events such as this one have helped foster debate among scholars, policymakers, business
leaders, and members of the public on critical economic issues facing our nation. I
appreciate the opportunity to participate.
In my remarks today, I will review the considerable progress the economy has
made toward the attainment of the two objectives that the Congress has assigned to the
Federal Reserve--maximum employment and price stability. The upshot is that labor
utilization is close to its estimated longer-run normal level, and we are closing in on our
2 percent inflation objective. I will then discuss the prospects for adjusting monetary
policy in the manner needed to sustain a strong job market while maintaining low and
stable inflation. Determining how best to adjust the federal funds rate over time to
achieve these objectives will not be easy. For that reason, in the balance of my remarks, I
will discuss some considerations that will help inform our decisions, including the
guidance provided by simple policy rules. I will conclude by touching on some key
uncertainties affecting the outlook.
Progress to Date
My assessment of progress to date will begin with the labor market. Since the
depths of the Great Recession, about 15-1/2 million jobs have been added to the U.S.
economy, on net. In 2016, job gains averaged about 180,000 per month, well above the
pace of 75,000 to 125,000 per month that is probably consistent with keeping the
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unemployment rate stable over the longer run.1 The unemployment rate is now close to
estimates of its longer-run normal level, and other measures of labor utilization have
improved appreciably. As shown in figure 1, a broader measure of labor
underutilization--the U-6 measure, which includes not only the unemployed but also
people working part time who would like full-time employment and those who would
like a job but are not actively looking--has retraced nearly all of the steep run-up that
occurred as a result of the recession.2
Other indicators also support the view that the labor market has largely recovered
from the severe downturn that occurred in the wake of the financial crisis. As illustrated
by the red dashed line in figure 2, the quits rate--an indicator of workers' confidence
about leaving an existing job to pursue new opportunities--is nearly back to its pre-
recession level. And some indicators, such as small businesses' assessments of the
difficulty of hiring, shown by the solid black line, as well as the average length of time it
takes firms to fill vacancies and the job openings rate, even suggest that the labor market
is a bit tighter than before the financial crisis. Of course, both the labor force
participation rate and the employment-to-population ratio are still much lower than they
were a decade ago. But the cyclical element in these declines looks to have largely
disappeared, and what is left seems to mostly reflect the aging of the population and other
secular trends.3 Based on this array of labor market indicators, I judge labor utilization to
be reasonably close to its normal longer-run level while also recognizing that estimates of
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the sustainable levels of the unemployment rate and the employment-to-population ratio
are inherently imprecise.4
In the coming months, I expect some further strengthening in labor market
conditions as the economy continues to expand at a moderate pace--a view that is shared
by most of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).5 Overall
economic growth has been driven by consumer spending, which has been bolstered by
substantial gains in household income and wealth. Business investment, in contrast, has
been soft. But recent readings on business sentiment and new orders for equipment are
consistent with the view that capital spending will likely strengthen modestly this year;
another positive factor is that oil drilling, which plummeted after oil prices fell sharply
back in late 2014, has recently begun to pick up. As we look to broader trends, gross
domestic product (GDP) growth has been restrained in recent years by a variety of forces
depressing both supply and demand, including slow labor force and productivity growth,
weak growth abroad, and lingering headwinds from the financial crisis. Although I am
cautiously optimistic that some of these forces will abate over time, I anticipate that they
will continue to restrain overall growth over the medium term, likely holding down the
level of interest rates consistent with stable labor market conditions.
Turning to inflation, we are now much closer to the FOMC's 2 percent objective
than we were just a year ago. Prices, as measured by the index for personal consumption
expenditures (PCE), rose nearly 1-1/2 percent in the 12 months ending in November, as
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compared with only 1/2 percent during 2015. Moreover, core PCE inflation--a better
indicator of the underlying inflation trend--picked up 1/4 percentage point, to a little over
1-1/2 percent. This rise in inflation was anticipated and largely represents a fading of the
effects of earlier declines in energy prices and the prices of non-energy imports. In
addition, slack in labor and product markets is no longer placing downward pressure on
inflation, in contrast to the situation only a few years ago when the unemployment rate
was still quite elevated. Barring future major swings in oil prices and the foreign
exchange value of the dollar, inflation is likely to move up to 2 percent over the next
couple of years, aided by a strong labor market.
In light of the progress that has been achieved toward our employment and
inflation objectives and the Committee's assessment of the outlook, the FOMC raised the
target range for the federal funds rate at its December meeting by 25 basis points, to
between 50 and 75 basis points. The Committee judges, however, that the stance of
monetary policy remains modestly accommodative, and so policy should support some
further strengthening in labor market conditions and thus the return of inflation to our 2
percent goal.
Maintaining Sustainable Growth in a Context of Price Stability
With the unemployment rate near its longer-run normal level and likely to move a
bit lower this year, a natural question is whether monetary policy has fallen behind the
curve. The short answer, I believe, is "no." It is true that many employers report
difficulties in finding qualified workers in selected occupations, and that more workers
are comfortable quitting jobs to take or look for better positions. But this is to be
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expected in a healthy labor market and not evidence that the economy as a whole is
experiencing a serious worker shortage.
The recent behavior of wages provides additional evidence pertaining to the
degree of labor market slack. As shown in figure 3, increases in average hourly earnings,
the employment cost index, and compensation per hour remain subdued, picking up only
modestly of late.6 Again, these data do not seem consistent with an overheated labor
market. Moreover, signs of overheating in the broader economy are also scarce. For
example, capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector is well below its historical
average. Most importantly, although core inflation is rising gradually from a low level,
this increase mainly reflects the waning of the effects of earlier movements in the dollar,
not upward pressure from resource utilization.
Of course, even if the labor market is not overheated currently, one might worry
that overheating could rapidly emerge as labor market conditions strengthen further,
causing inflation to surge. I consider this unlikely for several reasons. First, the pace of
labor market improvement has slowed appreciably in the past couple of years: For
example, average payroll gains moderated from 250,000 per month in 2014 to 180,000
last year, and the unemployment rate declined 1-3/4 percentage points cumulatively over
6
An exception to this pattern is the Atlanta Fed's Wage Growth Tracker (WGT), which does show a
noticeable acceleration in hourly wages as self-reported in the Current Population Survey. Like average
hourly earnings, the WGT excludes benefits costs and so is less comprehensive than the ECI or
businesssector compensation per hour (CPH). In addition, the WGT is based on a smaller sample than the measures
shown in Figure 3 and it only covers a sub-set of the workforce--specifically, employed individuals who
were also employed a year ago, and whose earnings are less than $150,000 per year. Finally, because
average hourly earnings and business-sector CPH are measured as total wages divided by total hours, an
increase in wages for high earners has a larger effect in those measures than a similarly proportioned
increase for lower-wage workers, and this is not so for the WGT.
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2014 and 2015, compared with only 1/4 percentage point last year.7 Second, economic
growth more broadly seems unlikely to pick up markedly in the near term given the
ongoing restraint from weak foreign demand and other factors that I mentioned,
particularly in an environment in which monetary policy is likely to become gradually
less accommodative. Finally, figure 4 illustrates the relationship over the past several
decades between labor market pressures and core inflation. Note that during periods
when the unemployment rate fell below the Congressional Budget Office's estimate of its
normal long-run level, shown by the yellow shaded regions, core inflation, the solid red
line, rose little, if at all. This stability is especially marked since inflation expectations
became anchored during the mid-to-late 1990s.8
That said, I think that allowing the economy to run markedly and persistently
"hot" would be risky and unwise. Waiting too long to remove accommodation could
cause inflation expectations to begin ratcheting up, driving actual inflation higher and
making it harder to control. The combination of persistently low interest rates and strong
labor market conditions could lead to undesirable increases in leverage and other
financial imbalances, although such risks would likely take time to emerge.9 Finally,
7
Many other labor market indicators also improved more slowly in 2016 relative to the pace seen in the
prior two years, including the U-6 measure of labor utilization, the rates of job openings, hiring and quits,
survey readings on net hiring plans and the difficulty of filling vacancies, and the average duration of
unemployment. A notable exception to this general pattern is the labor force participation rate, which
declined fairly steadily from 2007 through 2015 but then flattened out last year despite continuing
downward pressure from the aging of the population and other factors. However, improvements in labor
market conditions along this dimension arguably reflect an increase in potential output, and so they are
probably not a source of inflationary pressures.
8
During the late 1960s through the 1970s, however, inflation did rise noticeably whenever the
unemployment rate moved below its longer-run normal level, primarily because the Federal Reserve did
not adequately check persistent movements in inflation by tightening monetary policy, thereby allowing
inflation expectations to drift. This experience illustrates the importance of keeping inflation expectations
anchored through systematic policy actions.
9
The Federal Reserve closely monitors a wide range of indicators of financial stability, which currently
provide little evidence of significant increases in leverage or rapid growth in credit. However, some asset
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waiting too long to tighten policy could require the FOMC to eventually raise interest
rates rapidly, which could risk disrupting financial markets and pushing the economy into
recession. For these reasons, I consider it prudent to adjust the stance of monetary policy
gradually over time--a strategy that should improve the prospects that the economy will
achieve sustainable growth with the labor market operating at full employment and
inflation running at about 2 percent.
Evaluating the Appropriate Stance of Monetary Policy
Achieving these goals could prove challenging, however, even if the economy
manages to avoid being hit with adverse shocks over the next few years. To sustain a
strong job market with inflation at our 2 percent objective, policy must gradually shift
toward a neutral stance, where "neutral" is defined as a level of the federal funds rate that
is neither expansionary nor contractionary when the economy is operating near its
potential. But what level of the federal funds rate is neutral at the present time? How
quickly should the funds rate target move up to this neutral level? And how will the
neutral rate itself evolve over time?
To help answer such questions, the FOMC considers a voluminous amount of
information concerning many factors, including financial markets and credit availability,
labor market conditions and overall economic activity, wages and prices, and foreign
economic developments. The FOMC also evaluates forecasts from a range of economic
models, assessments of key risks to the outlook, and detailed analyses of how different
monetary policy strategies would affect projected outcomes and risks. Among the
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strategies routinely considered by the Committee are the recommendations of a variety of
simple monetary policy rules. In addition, FOMC participants prepare individual
projections on a quarterly basis of the most likely paths of key macroeconomic variables
under their own assessments of "appropriate monetary policy," together with their
estimates of the normal longer-run values of the federal funds rate, the unemployment
rate, and GDP growth.10 Armed with this wealth of information, the Committee as a
whole then decides on the most appropriate policy action to adopt at each of its meetings.
Such a comprehensive, forward-looking approach to policymaking is similar to that
employed at other central banks.11
Figure 5 shows a plot of FOMC participants' most recent assessments of the
appropriate path for the federal funds rate through 2019. The black solid lines show the
median value of the federal funds rate at the end of each year. To understand the
considerations that likely underlay these judgments, I will contrast participants'
assessments with the recommendations of some simple policy rules commonly used to
help gauge the appropriate stance of policy. As I noted, the Committee routinely reviews
policy recommendations from a variety of benchmark rules, and I believe that their
prescriptions can be helpful in providing broad guidance about how the federal funds rate
should be adjusted over time in response to movements in real activity and inflation.
That said, I will emphasize that the use and interpretation of such prescriptions require
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careful judgments about both the measurement of the inputs to these rules and the
implications of the many considerations the rules do not take into account.
Consider first the well-known Taylor rule, which embodies key principles of good
monetary policy. The rule calls for systematic adjustments in the federal funds rate
longer-run
relative to its expected neutral level in response to movements in inflation and
the output gap, defined as the percentage difference between actual output and the
economy's productive potential.12 To implement the rule, one must decide on the
appropriate definition and measurement of its inputs. Should inflation be defined using
the latest noisy quarterly reading on headline PCE inflation or a measure intended to
smooth through transitory price movements? What technique should be used to
approximate the output gap, given that different approaches often yield materially
different estimates? And what assumption should be made about the neutral value of the
federal funds rate in the longer run?
The Taylor rule is often implemented by assuming that the real, or inflation-
adjusted, value of the longer-run neutral interest rate--which I will call R* for
12
Formally, the rule originally published by Taylor (1993) can be written as = RR∗ + +
RRtt ππtt
- ππ∗) +
where R is the federal funds rate, R* is the level of the real federal funds rate that on
0.5(ππtt 0.5YYtt,
average is expected to be consistent with sustaining maximum employment and stable inflation in the
longer run, π is current inflation, π* is the central bank's inflation objective (2 percent, in the case of the
Federal Reserve), and Y is the output gap, defined as the difference between the current level of real GDP
and what it would be if the economy was operating at maximum employment. Importantly, the rule
embodies three key principles that central banks take into account when setting policy to stabilize inflation
and the overall economy. First, a persistent movement in inflation requires a more than one-for-one
response of the policy rate to stabilize inflation. Second, monetary policy should raise real interest rates
above their normal longer-run level whenever inflation is above its desired level and resource utilization is
higher than normal, and lower them when the opposite holds. (Note that implementing this latter principle
requires estimates of both the economy's productive potential and the longer-run level of the real policy
rate that would be consistent with keeping the economy operating on an even keel.) And, finally,
policymakers should respond in a systematic manner to changes in economic conditions in order to help
financial market participants and others better understand how policy is likely to respond over time to
current and future events, thereby influencing expectations in a way that promotes economic stability.
convenience--is equal to 2 percent, roughly the average historical value of the real federal
funds rate prior to the financial crisis. For inflation, we can use the 12-month change in
core PCE prices, a measure of the current underlying rate of inflation. And the output
gap can be reasonably approximated as twice the difference between the estimated
longer-run normal rate of unemployment and the actual unemployment rate.13 The
dashed red line in figure 5 shows the resulting recommendations for policy over the
medium term, based on the medians of the unemployment and inflation projections
submitted by FOMC participants in December but assuming--in contrast to the median of
participants' December assessments--that R* equals 2 percent. As figure 5 shows, this
version of the Taylor rule prescribes a much higher path for the federal funds rate than
the median of participants' assessments of appropriate policy.
One important factor explaining this divergence is the FOMC's growing
recognition that the longer-run neutral level of the real federal funds rate has likely
declined below 2 percent, contrary to what is often assumed in implementations of the
Taylor rule. As illustrated by the left-hand panel of figure 6, since 2000, both FOMC
participants and respondents to the Blue Chip survey have markedly reduced their
projections of the level of real short-term interest rates expected to prevail in the longer
run. Presumably, these revisions were made in response to accumulating evidence that
lower real interest rates than those seen on average in the past would be needed
permanently to keep the economy operating on an even keel. In addition, the right-hand
panel shows considerable changes over time in estimates of the normal longer-run rate of
unemployment, with corresponding implications for estimates of the economy's
productive potential and the output gap. Such revisions would imply shifts in the level of
the Taylor rule's prescriptions by as much as 1-1/4 percentage points, holding other
factors constant.14 Clearly, sensible implementation of policy rules requires adjustments
to take such changes into account, as a failure to do so would result in poor monetary
policy decisions and poor economic outcomes.15
Figure 7 illustrates the policy implications of alternative revised assessments of
the longer-run neutral real rate of interest. As before, the short-dashed red line shows the
prescriptions of the Taylor rule using the standard 2 percent assumption for R*. The
solid red line, however, shows the rule's prescriptions with R* equal to 1 percent, the
median of the longer-run projections of the real federal funds rate made by FOMC
participants last month. This adjustment appreciably reduces the rule's policy
prescriptions.
Even with this downward adjustment of the longer-run neutral rate, however, the
Taylor rule's prescriptions are arguably still too restrictive. The problem is that the rule
ignores the likelihood that it will likely take many years before the forces now restraining
14
Additional complications arise in the measurement of economic slack because the difference between the
unemployment rate and its estimated normal level is not always a complete gauge of overall labor
utilization. Such was the case in the current expansion until recently because the labor force participation
rate was unusually low and involuntary part-time employment unusually high, given the level of the
unemployment rate. Moreover, although movements in resource utilization for the economy as a whole are
generally proportional to changes in labor utilization, the relationship varies somewhat over time. Partly as
a result, contemporaneous estimates of the output gap can deviate markedly from subsequent estimates for
the same period calculated using revised data. For example, in early 2010, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimated that the output gap in 2009:Q2 was negative 7.7 percent, but the CBO has since
lowered it to negative 6.3 percent--a large revision with important implications for assessments of the
deviation of actual policy from the prescriptions of simple policy rules.
15
If monetary policy persistently followed the prescriptions of a Taylor rule that assumed that R* was
2 percent when it was in fact 1 percent, then employment would run persistently below its maximum
sustainable level and inflation would run persistently below 2 percent. Under such circumstances, inflation
expectations might begin to fall, creating a risk of deflation.
the economy dissipate to the degree envisioned in participants' estimates of the longer-
run normal level of the real federal funds rate. Because overall growth has been quite
moderate over the past few years despite an accommodative stance of monetary policy,
some recent estimates of the current value of the neutral real federal funds rate stand
close to zero.16 If the neutral rate were to remain quite low over the medium term, as
would be expected if the global economy does not materially strengthen and productivity
growth remains anemic, then the appropriate setting for R* in the Taylor rule would
arguably be zero, yielding a yet lower path for the federal funds rate, as shown by the
long-dashed red line. These considerations illustrate that there is now no obvious "right"
setting for R* because we do not know how rapidly the forces restraining the economy
will abate, and there is a significant risk that it could be very slow. When the economy
has been hit with unusually persistent shocks, the Taylor rule, for this reason, provides a
problematic benchmark.
Simple policy rules also typically neglect information with potentially important
implications for the economic outlook because they focus only on where conditions are
today. For example, simple rules ignore such important factors as fiscal policy, trends
affecting global growth, structural developments influencing the supply of credit, and
overall financial conditions. One special factor at the moment pertains to the Federal
Reserve's balance sheet. The downward pressure on longer-term interest rates that the
Fed's asset holdings exert is expected to diminish over time--a development that amounts
to a "passive" removal of monetary policy accommodation. Other things being equal,
this factor argues for a more gradual approach to raising short-term rates.17
Lastly, simple rules ignore important risk-management considerations that have
influenced the Committee's decisions in recent years. With the federal funds rate still
near zero, the Committee recognizes that, should the economy unexpectedly weaken in
the next year or two, there would likely be only limited scope to respond by lowering
short-term rates. But if the economy instead began to overheat, threatening to push
inflation to an undesirably high level, the FOMC would have ample scope to respond
through tighter monetary policy. Such asymmetric risks arguably call for a more gradual
path of rate increases than indicated by the prescriptions of a simple policy rule.
The academic literature on policy rules has studied many alternatives to the
Taylor rule, and the FOMC regularly reviews a number of them.18 These rules embed
differing but valuable perspectives, and there is no consensus among central bankers or
academics about the relative utility of various rules. One such alternative is the
"balanced approach" rule, illustrated by the purple short-dashed line in figure 8. This
rule differs from the Taylor rule by being twice as responsive to movements in resource
17
Based on estimates generated using the term-structure model developed by Li and Wei (2013) and the
procedure discussed in Ihrig and others (2012) and extended by Engen, Laubach, and Reifschneider (2015),
the Federal Reserve's holdings of Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities continue to
put considerable downward pressure on longer-term interest rates. However, this pressure is estimated to
be gradually easing as the average maturity of the portfolio declines and the end-date for reinvestment
draws closer. Over the course of 2017, this easing could increase the yield on the 10-year Treasury note by
about 15 basis points, all else being equal. Based on the estimated co-movement of short-term and
longterm interest rates, such a change in longer-term yields would be similar to that which, on average, has
historically accompanied two 25 basis point hikes in the federal funds rate.
18
For example, prescriptions from seven different rules, calculated using forecasts of economic activity and
inflation from different sources, are regularly posted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland at
https://www.clevelandfed.org/our-research/indicators-and-data/simple-monetary-policy-rules.aspx.
utilization.19 The prescriptions of the balanced-approach rule in this figure, as with the
solid red Taylor-rule plot, assume that R* equals 1 percent, consistent with the medians
of the latest FOMC projections. Because participants on average anticipate a modest
undershooting of the unemployment rate below its estimated longer-run level, the
balanced-approach rule calls for a slightly faster pace of tightening over the next several
years than the Taylor rule.
Figure 8 also reports results for a "change" rule, shown as the green long-dashed
line. As its name implies, this rule does not prescribe a particular level of the federal
funds rate at a given time but rather how the existing rate should change from quarter to
quarter based on two gaps--the difference between inflation and its desired level as well
as the difference between the unemployment rate and its longer-run normal level.20 In
contrast to the other two rules, the change rule does not take a stand on the value of the
longer-run neutral level of the real federal funds rate, thus avoiding a potential source of
error. Instead, it moves interest rates up and down until both gaps close, an approach that
in theory enables it to perform well when the true value of R* is unknown. Because both
gaps are relatively modest at the moment and are projected to remain so, the change rule
calls for fairly gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy over the next few
years given the current outlook.
The FOMC, for reasons that I have discussed, does not base its decisions on the
prescriptions of any specific policy rule. Nevertheless, the three benchmarks I have
described--the Taylor rule, the balanced-approach rule, and the change rule, appropriately
calibrated--have historically provided useful guidance about appropriate adjustments in
the general direction of monetary policy over time. This guidance is illustrated by
figure 9, which compares the path of the federal funds rate since 2000 with the
prescriptions of the three rules, based on the actual rates of inflation and unemployment
observed at each point in time, along with contemporaneous Blue Chip projections of the
longer-run unemployment rate and R*.
As the figure shows, the rules clearly signaled that a major reduction in the
federal funds rate was appropriate in 2008 given the marked deterioration in economic
conditions. In addition, all three rules signaled that monetary policy needed to provide
more stimulus during the recession and the subsequent recovery than could be provided
by keeping short-term interest rates near zero. For this reason, the Committee turned to
asset purchases to help make up for the shortfall by putting additional downward pressure
on longer-term interest rates. The FOMC also sought to compensate for its inability to
push the federal funds rate below zero by indicating that the funds rate would need to stay
unusually low for longer than would otherwise be expected and simple policy rules
would prescribe.21 Under this "make up" strategy, and taking into account the reasons
for deviating from the Taylor rule that I discussed a moment ago, the Committee kept the
federal funds rate near zero for longer than two of the rules would have prescribed. But
as labor market conditions continued to improve over time, the rising trajectories for the
federal funds rate prescribed by all three rules signaled that the time was drawing near to
begin gradually reducing monetary accommodation. Consistent with this advice, the
FOMC suspended its asset purchase program in mid-2014 and began raising the federal
funds rate in late 2015.22
To sum up, simple policy rules can serve as useful benchmarks to help assess how
monetary policy should be adjusted over time. However, their prescriptions must be
interpreted carefully, both because estimates of some of their key inputs can vary
significantly and because the rules often do not take into account important
considerations and information pertaining to the outlook. For these reasons, the rules
should not be followed mechanically, since doing so could have adverse consequences
for the economy.
Conclusion
My remarks have focused on the policy trajectory that the Committee now
considers likely to be appropriate to sustain the economic expansion while keeping
inflation close to our 2 percent goal. In concluding, it is important to emphasize the
considerable uncertainty that attaches to such assessments and the need to constantly
update them.
In particular, the path of the neutral federal funds rate, which plays an important
role in determining the appropriate policy path, is highly uncertain. For example,
productivity growth is a key determinant of the neutral rate, and while most forecasters
expect productivity growth to pick up from its recent unusually slow pace, the timing of
such a pickup is highly uncertain. Indeed, there is little consensus among researchers
about the causes of the recent slowdown in productivity growth that has occurred both at
home and abroad.23 The strength of global growth will also have an important bearing on
the neutral rate through both trade and financial channels, and here, too, the scope for
surprises is considerable. Finally, I would mention the potential for changes in fiscal
policy to affect the economic outlook and the appropriate policy path. At this point,
however, the size, timing, and composition of such changes remain uncertain.24
However, as this discussion highlights, the course of monetary policy over the next few
years will depend on many different factors, of which fiscal policy is just one.
References
Aaronson, Stephanie, Tomaz Cajner, Bruce Fallick, Felix Galbis-Reig, Christopher
Smith, and William W