Rakesh Mohan: The growth record of the Indian economy, 1950-2008 - a
story of sustained savings and investment
Keynote address by Dr Rakesh Mohan, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, at
the Conference "Growth and Macroeconomic Issues and Challenges in India", organised by
the Institute of Economic Growth, New Delhi, 14 February 2008.
Assistance of Michael Patra, Janak Raj, Dhritidyuti Bose, Binod B. Bhoi and Muneesh Kapur in preparing the
speech is gratefully acknowledged.
* * *
I deem it a real privilege to visit the Institute of Economic Growth to deliver the keynote
address at this prestigious conference on growth and macroeconomic issues and challenges
in India. I am particularly happy that this Conference is being organised by the Institute as a
part of its Golden Jubilee celebrations. The Institute has established a long and creditable
track record of contributing to economic research consistently over its 50 years history. Its
research has greatly enriched the debate on the conduct and formulation of economic policy
over the years.
The theme selected for the conference is befitting in the present context as we grapple with
issues and challenges for sustaining the elevated growth momentum that we have now
achieved. This has assumed added contemporary significance in the wake of expected
moderation in global growth due to a projected slowdown in the US and some other
advanced economies. Whereas emerging markets, including India have so far not been
greatly affected by the financial turbulence in advanced economies, the increasing global
uncertainties need to be watched and guarded against appropriately. Although our growth
process continues to be dominated by domestic factors, we need to recognise some
changing global patterns, which could have implications for the macroeconomic prospects of
the Indian economy. Accordingly, in my address, I would first review the overall
macroeconomic performance in India since independence, then draw likely prospects for the
coming five years and finally conclude with some issues that need to be addressed for
sustaining the growth of the Indian economy.
I. A review of the Indian growth process
Growth acceleration over the decades
It is widely believed that the Indian economy witnessed near stagnation in real GDP growth
till the late 1970s. A closer review of the performance of the Indian economy, however,
suggests a continuing increase in real GDP growth over each decade since Independence,
interspersed with an interregnum during the 1970s (Table 1). Interestingly, growth of
manufacturing production, in terms of decadal averages, was roughly constant at around
5.65.9 per cent in the first five decades after Independence, except for the 1970s. There are two
other features of our growth history that are notable. First, agricultural growth has been
subject to large variation over the decades. The 1970s interregnum is particularly marked by
the severe deceleration in agricultural growth, followed by a marked recovery in the 1980s,
and a slowdown thereafter. Second, until the 1990s, little note had been taken of growth in
the services sector. A glance at the growth record suggests that it is the continuing and
consistent acceleration in growth in services over the decades, that had earlier been ignored,
that really accounts for the continuous acceleration in overall GDP growth, once again,
except for the 1970s interregnum. There is nothing particularly special about service sector
growth over the last decade.
The slowdown of growth witnessed during the 1970s was reversed during the 1980s; the
pick-up benefited from the initiation of some reform measures aimed at increasing domestic
competitiveness. Since the early 1990s, growth impulses appeared to have gathered further
momentum in the aftermath of comprehensive reforms encompassing the various sectors of
the economy. There was some loss of the growth momentum in the latter half of the 1990s
which coincided with the onset of the East Asian financial crisis, setbacks to the fiscal
correction process, quality of fiscal adjustment, slowdown in agriculture growth affected by
lower than normal monsoon years, and some slackening in the pace of structural reforms.
The slowdown could also be attributed to the excessive enthusiasm and optimism in regard
to investment plans in domestic industry following deregulation, which was followed by
significant problems experienced in viability and competitiveness. Monetary tightening in the
face of inflationary pressures is also believed by some to have contributed to the slowdown
over this period.
Since 2003-04, there has been a distinct strengthening of the growth momentum.
Restructuring measures by domestic industry, overall reduction in domestic interest rates,
both nominal and real, improved corporate profitability, benign investment climate amidst
strong global demand and commitment rules-based fiscal policy have led to the real GDP
growth averaging close to 9 per cent per annum over the 4-year period ended 2006-07;
growth in the last two years has averaged 9.5 per cent per annum.
Consistent growth in savings and investment
In analysing the growth record of the Indian economy, various scholarly attempts1 have been
made to identify the turning point from the "traditional" low growth to the modern high growth
since the 1980s. The simple ordering of the data presented here provides a somewhat
different picture of continued slow acceleration in growth except for the 1970s decade. What
can explain this continued acceleration? The secular uptrend in domestic growth is clearly
associated with the consistent trends of increasing domestic savings and investment over the
decades. Gross domestic savings have increased continuously from an average of 9.6 per
cent of GDP during the 1950s to almost 35 per cent of GDP at present; over the same
period, the domestic investment rate has also increased continuously from 10.8 per cent in
the 1950s to close to 36 per cent by 2006-07. A very significant feature of these trends in
savings and investment rates is that Indian economic growth has been financed
predominantly by domestic savings. The recourse to foreign savings - equivalently, current
account deficit - has been rather modest in the Indian growth process. We may also note
that the two decades, 1960s and 1980s, when the current account deficit increased
marginally towards 2 per cent of GDP, were followed by significant balance of payments and
economic crisis.
The long-term upward trends in savings and investment have, however, been interspersed
with phases of stagnation. In particular, during the 1980s, the inability of the Government
revenues to keep pace with the growing expenditure resulted in widening of the overall
resource gap. Accordingly, the public sector saving-investment gap, which averaged (-) 3.7
per cent of GDP during the period 1950-51 to 1979-80, widened sharply during the 1980s
culminating in a high of (-) 8.2 per cent of GDP in 1990-91. The resultant higher borrowing
requirements of the public sector led the Government to tap financial surpluses of the
household sector through enhanced statutory pre-emptions from financial intermediaries at
below market clearing interest rates. As fiscal deficits widened beginning in the 1970s,
periodic increases in the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) were resorted to to finance the rising
fiscal gap, indicative of the financial repression regime in place. The SLR was raised from 20
per cent in the early 1950s to 25 per cent by 1964, and it remained at this level for the rest of
the decade. Beginning in the 1970s, the SLR came to be used more actively and it was
raised in phases reaching 34 per cent by the late 1970s. The process continued during the
1980s as fiscal deficits expanded further, and the SLR reached a high of 38.5 per cent of net
demand and time liabilities (NDTL) of the banking system in September 1990.
The growing fiscal imbalances of the 1980s spilled over to the external sector and were also
reflected in inflationary pressures. Along with a repressive and weakening financial system,
this rendered the growth process of the 1980s increasingly unsustainable. The external
imbalances were reflected in a large and unsustainable current account deficit, which
reached 3.2 per cent of GDP in 1990-91. As the financing of such a large current account
deficit through normal sources of finance became increasingly difficult, it resulted in an
unprecedented external payments crisis in 1991 with the foreign currency assets dwindling to
less than US $ 1 billion. The financing problem was aggravated by the fact that the deficit
was largely financed by debt flows up to the late 1980s, reflecting the policies of the time
which preferred debt flows to equity flows. Indeed, equity flows were almost negligible till the
early 1990s. Moreover, a significant part of the debt flows during the late 1980s was of
shortterm nature in the form of bankers' acceptances; such flows could not be renewed easily in
view of the loss of confidence following the balance of payments crisis.
Growing fiscal imbalance and correction
With the increase in the SLR being unable to meet fully the fiscal requirements, the burden of
financing the Government had also to be borne by the Reserve Bank which led to high levels
of monetized deficit. As Reserve Bank financing is inflationary beyond a limit, the increase in
the Reserve Bank support to the Central Government was accompanied by an increase in
cash reserve requirements (CRR). The CRR was raised from 6.0 per cent of NDTL in 1979
to its peak of 15.0 per cent by 1992 (in fact, 25 per cent if incremental reserve requirements
are also taken into account). However, even this order of increase in the CRR to impound
liquidity was insufficient and broad money growth continued to remain high and spilled over
to inflation. The high order of statutory preemptions in the forms of SLR and CRR along with
the direction of credit to priority sectors at concessional interest rates resulted in higher
lending rates for the non-concessional commercial sectors and thereby crowded out credit to
the private sector.
As we all know, in response to the balance of payments crisis, a programme of
macroeconomic stabilisation and structural adjustment was put in place. Fiscal consolidation
constituted a major plank of the policy response to the macroeconomic crisis; however,
public sector savings continued to deteriorate during the 1990s, and even turned negative
over the 5-year period 1998-2003 owing to sharp deterioration in savings of the Government
administration.
The progress on fiscal correction was mixed during the 1990s, both at the Central and State
levels (Chart 1 and Tables 2-3). While there was some reduction in the Centre's fiscal deficits
upto 1996-97, the process was reversed over the next few years under the impact of the
industrial slowdown and the Fifth Pay Commissions' award. Furthermore, fiscal
consolidation, which was envisaged to be achieved through revenue enhancement and
curtailment in current expenditure growth, was, however, brought about instead through
compression of capital expenditures from 5.6 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 to 3.1 per cent in
1996-97, with consequential effects on growth and infrastructure constraints in ensuing
years.
A major drag on public finances was the decline in the gross tax-GDP ratio of the Central
Government from 10.3 per cent in 1991-92 to 9.4 per cent in 1996-97 and further to 8.2 per
cent in 2001-02. The reduction in tax-GDP ratio over this phase could, inter alia, be attributed
to the reduction in tax rates. As a part of the reform of the taxation system, indirect taxes -
excise duties as well as customs duties - were cut substantially from their existing very high
levels and this had an adverse impact on indirect tax collections. The rationalisation of the
direct tax structure also did not lead to any positive impact on revenue collections during this
phase. The compliance response to lower tax rates presumably took some time; and lower
economic growth also contributed to the lack of growth in direct taxes over this period. It is
only in the recent years that we have witnessed the beneficial impact of the rationalisation of
the direct tax structure on the revenues.
The process of fiscal correction could also not be sustained due to the pressures from the
Fifth Pay Commission award. As a result, by the year 2001-02, all the major fiscal
parameters, viz., revenue deficit, fiscal deficit and public debt rose to levels higher than those
prevalent at the beginning of the reform process. Capital outlays continued to bear the
burden of fiscal adjustment, with the ratio of capital outlays to GDP reaching their lowest
levels during the period 1997-98 to 2002-03, both at the Central and State levels. Reflecting
the worsening of the fiscal situation, the public sector savings rate deteriorated in the second
half of the 1990s, culminating into unprecedented dissavings during the period 1998-99 to
2002-03. This also pulled down the aggregate saving and investment rates in the economy.
Other major components of domestic savings - the household financial savings rate (at
around 10 per cent) and the private corporate sector savings rate (around 4 per cent) - also
stagnated during this period at the levels reached during the mid-1990s. Consequently, the
investment rate also came down from the peak of about 26 per cent in 1995-96 to around 23
per cent in 2001-02. Concomitantly, the growth process suffered a setback with the real GDP
growth decelerating to 3.8 per cent by 2002-03.
BIS Review 18/2008
Public sector savings
In view of the deterioration in fiscal deficits over the period 1997-98 to 2002-03 and rising
public debt, and its adverse impact on public investment and growth, a renewed emphasis
was laid on improving the health of public finances on a durable basis. In order to achieve
this objective, fiscal consolidation has been guided by the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget
Management (FRBM) Act, 2003 at the Centre and similar fiscal responsibility legislations at
the State-levels. Since 2002-03, significant gains have been witnessed in the fiscal
consolidation process, both at the Centre and the States, partly as a result of the
implementation of the rule-based fiscal policies at the Centre and the States.
A major factor contributing to the durability of the fiscal consolidation process underway in
India in recent years has been the buoyancy in the revenues accompanied by some
reprioritisation of expenditure with a focus on outcomes, unlike the expenditure compression
strategy in most other countries as also the experience in India in the 1990s. The revenue
augmenting strategy encompassed moderating the tax rates and broadening the tax base
through expansion in the scope of taxes, specifically service tax, removal of exemptions,
some improvement in tax administration with a focus on arrears recoveries. Reflecting these
measures, the tax-GDP ratio of the Centre has steadily risen from 8.8 per cent in 2002-03 to
11.3 per cent in 2006-07(RE) and 11.8 per cent in 2007-08 (BE). The entire increase in tax
revenues was mainly on account of the buoyancy in direct taxes.
On the expenditure front, while the total expenditure of the Centre declined from 16.8 per
cent of GDP in 2002-03 to 14.1 per cent in 2006-07 (RE), the capital outlay rose from 1.2 per
cent to 1.6 per cent of GDP. The movement in key deficit indicators reflects the progress
made so far in fiscal consolidation. Fiscal deficit of the Centre and the States taken together
has declined from 9.2 per cent of GDP in 2002-03 to 6.4 per cent in 2006-07 led by reduction
in revenue deficit from 6.7 per cent of GDP to 2.1 per cent. Apart from the quantitative
improvement, a salient feature of the fiscal consolidation underway has been some
qualitative progress made as reflected in the reduction in the proportion of revenue deficit to
gross fiscal deficit. As a result, the dissavings of Government administration declined from
5.2 per cent of GDP in 2002-03 to 1.3 per cent in 2006-07. The savings of the departmental
enterprises improved marginally from 0.5 per cent in 2002-03 to 0.6 per cent of GDP in
200607.
The major component of public sector savings, i.e., savings of non-departmental
undertakings, has, interestingly, exhibited a steady improvement since the 1970s and this
process has continued during the reforms period (Table 4). Thus public sector enterprises
have exhibited continued and steady improvement in their commercial functioning since the
early 1990s. Consequently, since 2003-04 onwards, total public savings have turned positive
again. The savings rate of the overall public sector improved from (-) 0.6 per cent of GDP in
2002-03 to 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2006-07. Notwithstanding the striking improvement over
the past few years, it may be noted that the public sector savings rate at 3.2 per cent during
2006-07 was still less than the peak of over five per cent touched in 1976-77. Nonetheless,
the turnaround of 5.2 percentage points of GDP in public sector savings - from a negative
2.0 per cent of GDP in 2001-02 to a positive 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2006-07 - has been a
key factor that has enhanced domestic savings from 23.5 per cent to 34.8 per cent over the
same period. The public sector investment rate increased from 6.9 per cent of GDP in
200102 to 7.8 per cent in 2006-07, but this level is still significantly lower than the public sector
investment rates of the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. Despite this increase, this sector's
saving-investment gap has narrowed down from 8.9 per cent of GDP to 4.5 per cent during
2001-2007, reflecting a turnaround in the public sector savings (which rose from (-) 2.0 per
cent to 3.2 per cent) enabled by the implementation of the fiscal rules.
Performance of the private corporate sector
The reduced requirement by the Centre for meeting budgetary mismatches, and for overall
public sector financing has improved the availability of resources for the private sector
considerably. Furthermore, the corporate sector has responded to increased global
competition by improving its productivity and efficiency through increased application of
technology. The economic reform process has helped greatly in making the policy
environment more conducive for more efficient entrepreneurial activity. The corporate tax
rate was steadily reduced from 45 per cent in 1992-93 to 30 per cent by 2005-06 and was
kept stable thereafter. The peak rate of customs duty on non-agricultural goods was reduced
gradually from 150 per cent in 1991-92 to 10 per cent in 2007-08. Monetary policy has
contributed to the sustained moderation in inflation leading to reduction in nominal interest
rates. Financial restructuring of firms has also led to the reduction in overall debt equity ratios
in the corporate sector. The substantial reduction in debt servicing costs has thereby added
to the corporate sector's competitiveness and profitability.
Profits after tax recorded an annual average growth of around 47 per cent per annum over
the 4-year period ended 2006-07 (Table 5). Profit margins have recorded large gains, while
the interest burden has witnessed a significant decline. In fact, the ratio of interest
expenditure to sales revenues fell from around 6 per cent in the 1990s to about 2 per cent
now, thereby contributing greatly to the enhanced profit growth. The profit after tax (PAT) to
net worth ratio, after declining from 14.4 per cent in 1995-96 to 5.1 per cent in 2001-02,
increased to 16.6 per cent 2005-06 (Table 6). Another notable feature of performance of the
corporate sector in the recent period is the progressive increase in retained profits, which as
a share of PAT, increased from 30.9 per cent in 2001-02 to 73.6 per cent in 2005-06. The
improved profitability, reflecting improved productivity and lowering of tax rates, enabled
corporates to deleverage their balance sheets. This was reflected in the sharp decline in the
debt-equity ratio. The improved corporate financial performance resulted in doubling of the
private corporate sector saving rate (from 3.9 per cent in 2002-03 to 7.8 per cent in 2006-07),
which has also contributed to the pick-up in the overall savings rate.
From the long-term perspective, it is interesting to observe that the rate of savings of the
private corporate sector has increased from around one per cent in 1950s, 1.7 per cent in
1980s and 3.8 per cent in 1990s, to almost 8 per cent now. Higher retained profits along with
availability of resources from the banking sector facilitated by the lower financing requirement
of the Government and the increased access to the domestic and international capital
markets led to a sharp increase in the investment rate of the corporate sector from 5.7 per
cent of GDP in 2002-03 to 14.5 per cent in 2006-07. Thus, despite the increased savings
rate, the saving-investment gap of the corporate sector widened from 2.1 per cent of GDP in
2001-02 to 6.8 per cent in 2006-07.
Household savings
A remarkable feature of the Indian macroeconomic story since independence has been the
continuous rise in household savings over the decades (Table 7). As might be expected, this
rise has been characterised by continuing increases in financial savings as a proportion of
GDP. The spread of the financial sector, of bank branches in particular, post office savings
and the like, helped in mobilising household financial savings. Their financial liabilities did not
grow correspondingly since there were few financial products available for household credit.
This situation has changed in recent years with the introduction of new private sector banks,
who introduced retail credit for housing and for consumer durables in large measure. The
public sector banks have followed suit.
Hence, while gross financial savings of the household sector have continued their upward
trajectory in the recent few years, households' financial liabilities have also been increasing
rapidly, albeit from a low base. Illustratively, gross financial savings grew from 13.8 per cent
of GDP in 2004-05 to 18.3 per cent in 2006-07, while their financial liabilities rose from 3.8
per cent of GDP during 2004-05 to 6.8 per cent during 2006-07. The ongoing financial
deepening is facilitating larger access of bank credit for the households. As a result,
household financial savings (net) have increased only marginally in the current decade -
from 10.9 per cent of GDP to 11.3 per cent during 2001-2007. On the other hand, with
increased availability of housing finance, household sector's investment rate (physical
savings) increased from 10.5 per cent in 1997-2003 to 12.7 per cent in 2003-07. Thus, the
widening of S-I gaps of the public and private corporate sectors combined was partly
financed from household financial savings and partly by foreign savings. This is reflected in a
widening of the current account deficit from 0.4 per cent of GDP in 2003-04 to 1.1 per cent of
GDP in 2006-07. Among the major sources of finance from abroad for the corporate sector,
external commercial borrowings witnessed a turnaround from (-) 0.3 per cent of GDP in
2001-02 to around 1.7 per cent of GDP in 2006-07.
Reflecting the improved finances at the sectoral levels, the gross domestic saving rate, after
varying in the range of around 21-24 per cent of GDP during the 1990s, has steadily risen to
34.8 per cent in 2006-07. The investment rate also picked-up significantly from 22.9 per cent
of GDP in 2001-02 to 35.9 per cent in 2006-07. With the ICOR hovering around 4, the real
GDP growth accelerated from 3.8 per cent in 2002-03 to 9.6 per cent in 2006-07.
Estimation of savings and investment
In view of the key role played by investment in the growth process, it is important to have
reliable and timely estimates of domestic savings and investment. In India, methodologies of
estimates of savings and investment have evolved over the years in tune with the
international guidelines and improvements in the domestic statistical system in India;
nonetheless, there is a need to critically review the available estimates of savings and
investment in the Indian economy with respect to data base, methods of estimation, reliability
and interpretational significance. The compilation of savings of the household sector
continues to pose a challenge in view of the heterogeneity and residual character of this
sector in the national accounts. In respect of the household financial savings, there is a need
to assess whether current state of financial deepening is being accurately reflected in the
data across the various financial instruments. In this regard, the timely compilation of the flow
of funds accounts would go a long way in accurately estimating household financial savings.
The feasibility of directly estimating household savings through integrated income and
expenditure surveys also merits consideration. In respect of the private corporate sector,
there is a need to examine whether it would be appropriate to make their savings estimates
on marked to market basis or the present value book method. In respect of the public sector,
the savings and investment estimates can be further strengthened by improving the
coverage to include municipalities, city corporations, gram panchayats and other local
governments on the one hand and increased private participation in public investments on
the other. In recognition of these issues, the Government has recently appointed a High
Level Committee on Estimation of Savings and Investment (Chairman: Dr. C. Rangarajan).
The Committee, set up in December 2007, is expected to critically review the existing
methodologies to review estimates of saving and investment for the Indian economy.
Efficiency in the use of resources
Not only has there been a consistent upward trend in India's investment rate since the
1950s, there is evidence that capital has been employed productively. Barring the decade of
the 1970s, the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) has hovered around 4. There are
some signs of improvement in domestic productivity in the post-reforms period.
Crosscountry comparison indicates that ICOR has been amongst the lowest in India. This is
especially true of the period since the 1980s onwards (Table 8). Various reform measures
aimed at increasing the competitiveness appear to be having the desired impact on the
productivity of the Indian economy.
As noted above, improvement in public finances and public sector savings has contributed
significantly to the step-up in domestic savings and investment rates since 2002-03 onwards.
Higher savings and investment rates, in turn, have led to a higher growth trajectory of the
Indian economy. It is apparent that fiscal consolidation in the Indian context has led to
acceleration of growth. The conventional view holds that fiscal prudence might lead to
contraction of domestic demand and growth. However, as the Indian experience suggests,
fiscal prudence can lead to higher domestic savings and this could increase resources for
domestic investment. Accordingly, it is of utmost importance to adhere to the fiscal
consolidation process of the past few years so as to sustain current savings/investment rates
and the ongoing growth momentum.
While containment of fiscal deficits is important, the quality of fiscal adjustment is also critical.
It is necessary to persevere with the process of reprioritising public expenditures towards
public investment vis-à-vis subsidies. While subsidies may provide short-term benefits, they
tend to hinder long-term investments as well as encourage inefficiency in the use of
resources. These issues are important in the context of agricultural development, especially
in the context of domestic demand-supply gaps of major crops, and elevated international
prices. Public investment in agriculture declined from 3.4 per cent of agricultural GDP during
1976-80 to 2.6 per cent during 2005-06, while budgetary subsidies to agriculture increased
from three per cent (1976-80) to seven per cent of agricultural GDP (2001-03). Therefore,
greater emphasis on stepping up public investment and containment of subsidies, while
adhering to the fiscal consolidation, is likely to pay rich dividends. It would not only engender
current growth impulses but also contribute to food security and domestic price stability.
Financial sector reforms
The higher order of investment activity in the country over the past few years has also been
mirrored in strong demand for credit from the banking sector since 2003-04 onwards. In this
context, reforms in the financial sector have played a key role (Mohan, 2006a; 2007b).
Financial sector reforms, initiated in the early 1990s, encompassed introduction of auctions
in Government securities, deregulation of interest rates and reduction in statutory
preemption of institutional resources by the Government was carried forward with the phasing
out of the system of automatic monetisation of fiscal deficits from 1997-98. These measures
along with developments in the Government securities market, by making the yield
marketdetermined, formed the backbone of financial market reforms. Apart from making the interest
rates largely market determined, reforms included a market-determined exchange rate
(though accompanied by RBI forex intervention), current account convertibility, substantial
capital account liberalisation and deregulation of the equity market. The financial sector
reforms designed to improve cost efficiency through price signals, in turn, facilitated the
conduct of monetary policy through indirect market-based instruments through improved
fiscal-monetary coordination. This process was further strengthened through the
implementation of the FRBM Act, 2003, under which the Central Government targets to
eliminate the revenue deficit and reduce its fiscal deficit to 3 per cent of GDP by 2008-09 and
the Reserve Bank was prohibited from participating in the primary government securities
market from April 2006. Overall, these reforms have led to better price discovery in both
interest rates and exchange rate, thereby contributing to overall efficiency in financial
intermediation. The increase in financial deepening in recent years and the attainment of
overall efficiency in the use of resources suggest that financial intermediation in India has
been relatively efficient.
Public investment has started increasing since 2003-04, reversing a long-period of declining
trend that began in mid-1980s. Since 2003-04, private investment has also witnessed a large
rise (Chart 2). Thus, it is apparent that higher public investment may crowd-in private
investment, leading to a virtuous circle. In view of this, it is important that the current fiscal
consolidation process needs to be persevered with so that higher public investment is
possible, which may further attract larger private investment.
As a part of the financial sector reforms and in order to reduce financial repression, the
required SLR was reduced to the then statutory minimum of 25 per cent in 1997. The
reduction in the required SLR, in the presence of an auction system for the Central
Government's market borrowings, was expected to facilitate an increasing proportion of the
fiscal deficit through borrowings at market-related rates of interest. Although the envisaged
reduction in the required SLR was expected to enable banks to expand credit to the private
sector, banks continued to make investments in Government securities much in excess of
the statutory minimum stipulated requirements. The SLR holdings of commercial banks
reached almost 42.7 per cent by April 2004. The relatively lower order of growth in credit flow
observed during this period, in retrospect, could be partly attributed to reduction in demand
on account of increase in real interest rates, and turn down in the business cycle. In view of
the various factors, extension of credit was perhaps perceived as risky by the banking
system; risk-adjusted returns appeared to favour excess holdings investments in
Government securities vis-à-vis bank credit. Significant business restructuring and corporate
deleveraging could have also reduced the need for bank credit to some extent.
Since 2003-04, there has been a significant jump in credit growth, which could be partly
attributed to the step-up in real GDP growth, decline in interest rates, intensive policy
initiatives to improve flow of credit to sectors like agriculture and, finally, strong demand for
retail credit, particularly housing. The buffer of excess SLR securities built up by banks
during the period 1997-2003 provided the banks an op