From Lender of Last Resort to Market Maker of Last Resort via
the dash for cash: why central banks need new tools for
dealing with market dysfunction
Speech given by
Andrew Hauser, Executive Director, Markets
Reuters, London
7 January 2021
I am grateful to Tim Taylor for his assistance in writing this speech; and to Andrew Bailey,
Imane Bakkar, Yuliya Baranova, Charlotte Barton, Alex Brazier, Jon Bridges, Alice Carr,
Geoff Coppins, Ed Denbee, Johnny Elliot, Gerardo Ferrara, Bernat Gual-Ricard, Jon Hall, Sarah Hall,
Nicholas Jackson, Joshua Jones, Anil Kashyap, Nick McLaren, Ankita Mehta, Matt Roberts-Sklar and
Andrea Rosen for their comments and guidance.
1
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Introduction
Increasingly we look to financial markets, rather than banks, to care for our savings or provide credit.
Millions save via pension, investment or exchange traded instruments. Companies and local authorities hold
cash in money market funds. And firms, large and small, borrow from capital markets or non-bank lenders.
Taken together, fully half of all financial assets are now held outside the banking system.
These trends aren't new -
and to the extent that they bring broader access to cheaper, faster, and more
diverse financial services, they're good news. But they do pose novel challenges to financial stability. In
particular, as its usage grows, market-based finance seems increasingly prone to liquidity shocks. Some of
that reflects vulnerabilities in business models and practices of specific market participants: including
liquidity mismatch in funds; leveraged and trend-following investment strategies; or insufficiently
forward-looking margining practices. But it also reflects a growing imbalance between the size of key
markets, and the balance sheet capacity of banks and dealers who have traditionally helped transfer risk
smoothly between investors and borrowers (Chart 1).1
Chart 1: Stock of US & UK government bonds relative to bank/dealer balance sheets
Sources: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/WP62_Duffie_v2.pdf; UK Debt Management Office; Bank of England
Regulatory Returns and Bank calculations.
(a) Total assets for the holding companies of Bank of America, Bear Sterns, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Lehman
Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo.
(b) Based on quarterly averages available from 2008, excluding assets of banking entities authorised to operate in the UK through
branches. Gilts outstanding as of end-March 2020.
1
These issues have been discussed in successive Bank of England Financial Stability Reports. For the most recent assessment, see
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-report/2020/august-2020.pdf.
2
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The nature of these vulnerabilities, and the need to consider stronger measures to safeguard financial
stability, have been extensively discussed in recent years. But last year's Covid 'dash for cash' was a
wake-up call as to the scale and urgency of this work.
It is unsurprising that the initial wave of lockdowns last Spring caused a surge in demand for precautionary
liquidity. But the implications of that shift were greatly amplified by a breakdown in the functioning of markets
core to the maintenance of monetary and financial stability. Many of those longstanding vulnerabilities I
mentioned a moment ago were in play. Liquidity imbalances between asset maturities and redemptions in
money market and other open-ended funds exacerbated moves in asset prices. Gaps in liquidity planning
meant some firms had to scramble to meet margin calls. And sharp disruptions in government and corporate
bond markets raised questions about the role of leveraged investors, and the willingness and capacity of
dealers to intermediate at times of stress.
To avoid an even deeper economic collapse, the functioning of these markets had to be restored rapidly.
And that was achieved through swift and decisive central bank action, using large-scale asset purchases and
other tools capable of tackling both the economic shock and the market dysfunction. Since March of last
year, G10 central bank balance sheets have risen by over $8 trillion.
-
This was an appropriate response to a truly unprecedented situation just as powerful anti-inflammatory
medicines are the right solution to a sudden and massive flare up. But such drugs are less well suited to
-
treating long-term conditions and there is every reason to believe that, absent further action, we will see
more frequent periods of dysfunction in the very markets increasingly relied on by households and firms, if
business model vulnerabilities persist and intermediation capacity remains strained. The public authorities
cannot afford to ignore such dysfunction if it reaches a scale that threatens financial stability. But equally we
cannot rely on central bank medicine of the scale and duration seen in 2020 every time we see an
inflammation. The costs, in terms of bloated public sector balance sheets and mispriced private sector risks,
will be too high. And the policy actions needed to secure monetary and financial stability may not always be
as well aligned as they have been during the current crisis.
If financial markets are to support the increasing reliance placed on them safely, we must do more to reduce
the scale of inherent vulnerabilities ex ante, and build better-targeted tools for dealing with financial instability
caused by market dysfunction ex post. And that, in turn, requires work in three separate but self-reinforcing
-
areas as illustrated in Chart 2.
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Chart 2: Strengthening market functioning
Step 1: reforms to strengthen the
resilience of private non-bank financial
institutions to liquidity shocks
Step 3: Better
targeted
Step 2: strengthened
central bank
market-wide
backstops
infrastructure
- -
Step 1 ensuring that non-banks active in financial markets are more resilient to future liquidity shocks is
under way, co-ordinated by the Financial Stability Board.2 If successful, this should both reduce the
likelihood of instability arising in the first place, and improve the private sector's ability to deal with it, if it does
occur.
Step 2 relates to the potential for market participants, acting on their own or in concert with the authorities, to
reduce vulnerabilities by strengthening market-wide infrastructures or practices. The recent proposal by
Darrell Duffie to mandate central clearing of US government bonds is an example of this type of work.3
But my topic today relates to Step 3: the role that central bank balance sheets should play in dealing with
market dysfunction. I deliberately come to this last, because, while it is central banks' job to restore financial
stability where self-insurance is too socially costly, they should be backstop providers of liquidity, not a first
port of call. In that sense, their tools should complement, not substitute for, the other vertices of the triangle.
Outside of pandemics, massive doses of system-wide anti-inflammatories do not meet that design brief.
Long-term protection requires a more targeted remedy, as the Bank's Financial Policy Committee concluded
last October.4
2
https://www.fsb.org/2020/11/fsb-acts-to-address-issues-highlighted-by-march-market-turmoil/
3
https://www.brookings.edu/research/still-the-worlds-safe-haven/
4
'The FPC
considers it important to examine whether central banks should have facilities to provide liquidity to the wider financial
system in stress, in order to support market functioning. Any such backstop of liquidity would need to be provided in a way that is not
just effective and efficient but that also, through appropriate pricing and accompanying regulatory requirements, reduces incentives for
excessive risk taking in the future'
(https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-policy-summary-and-record/2020/october-2020). See also
Box 7 of the August 2020 FSR (https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-report/2020/august-2020.pdf) and
the Governor's remarks at Jackson Hole
(https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2020/andrew-bailey-federal-reserve-bank-of-kansascitys-economic-policy-symposium-2020).
4
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In the remainder of my remarks today I want to look, first, at the evolving role of central banks as liquidity
providers; second, at the lessons from the dash for cash episode; and, third, at some possible design
features and challenges for a 'new' generation of central bank tools aimed at market dysfunction. I put 'new'
in inverted commas because in many cases we are building on the substantial foundations provided by past
thinking, given new urgency by our recent experience.
I) The evolving role of central banks as providers of public liquidity insurance
According to Ralph Hawtrey, one of the doyens of early twentieth century economics, the defining feature of
central banking lies in taming the 'inherent instability of credit'.5 And the canonical description of how to
achieve that is given by Walter Bagehot's description of the 'Lender of Last Resort' (LOLR), which
(in essence) recommends stemming financial panics by lending freely, to sound institutions, against good
collateral, and at rates materially higher than those prevailing in normal conditions.6
For much of their lifespan, central banks have provided LOLR primarily to commercial banks. Banks
specialise in lending to households and firms, but are inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, given the maturity
mismatch between their long-term assets and their short-term liabilities. Over time, and the experience of
successive banking crises, LOLR has been supplemented by an extensive prudential regulatory regime,
requiring banks to take greater ownership of managing their own risks, and setting quantitative minima for
liquidity buffers. In short, a banking version of Chart 2.7
But while LOLR may have been primarily focused on banks, there are also historical precedents for central
banks stepping in to restore broader market functioning at critical moments. In July 1914, for example, the
Bank of England made large-scale purchases of bills of exchange after the uncertainty caused by the onset
of World War 1 brought the market to a halt, threatening widespread contagion (the bill market was at that
time the engine of global trade finance).8 The Federal Reserve took similar actions in the US Treasury bond
market in 1939 (at the start of World War 2), 1958 (following a regime change in government funding
arrangements) and 1970 (amidst unrest over the Vietnam war).9
By degrees, these and other actions show a gradual broadening in focus by central banks from backstopping
the funding liquidity of banks to backstopping market liquidity,10 when severe dysfunction threatens financial
stability.
5
'Currency and Credit' (1919) and 'The Art of Central Banking' (1932), by Ralph George
Hawtrey.
6
'Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market' (1875), by Walter
Bagehot.
7
These tools have been further supplemented by deposit insurance, macroprudential and resolution frameworks, though these are
typically more focused on solvency than liquidity considerations.
8
https://bankunderground.co.uk/2019/04/30/the-great-war-and-the-bank-of-england-as-market-maker-of-last-resort/
9
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2020/08/market-function-purchases-by-the-federal-reserve.html
10
-
Ie the ability to transact in reasonable size at or close to mid-market prices prevailing prior to the trade as discussed, eg in
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability-paper/2015/the-resilience-of-financial-market-liquidity
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But it wasn't until 2007, in the foothills of the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC), that Willem Buiter and Anne
Sibert coined the phrase now widely used for this activity: 'Market Maker of Last Resort' (MMLR).11 Buiter
and Sibert believed that central banks, acting as MMLR, should be ready to tackle dysfunction in securities
markets relevant to monetary or financial stability, by making two way prices to buy and sell those securities,
or lending against them. Risk would temporarily be transferred off dealers' balance sheets, freeing up
capacity to return market liquidity to more normal levels.12 In all other respects, they recommended following
Bagehot's principles: ie standing ready to operate at scale, but only at prices, rates and collateral haircuts
that would protect public money and avoid moral hazard. Such terms, they believed, would also ensure that
the central bank's financial exposures naturally unwound as market conditions normalised, with purchased
assets being sold back to the market, or repo exposures maturing.
Many historical central bank operations in securities markets, including some undertaken in the 2008-9 crisis,
involved one-way purchases, and hence did not have this self-liquidating feature. One exception was the
Bank of England's Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme, introduced in 2009, and from 2010 offering
daily two-way prices on a wide range of high-quality sterling corporate bonds issued by non-financial
companies, to aid secondary market liquidity. These prices were determined as a spread around the market
price (so moved up and down with the market), and set at levels that incentivised market participants to sell
to the Bank when market functioning was poor, and buy when market functioning returned to normal. The
implications for the public sector balance sheet were modest: even at its peak, the scheme only owned
about 1% of eligible bonds. But the existence of live two-way backstop prices helped liquidity to return to the
-
market and delivered a natural unwind in the facility, with bonds being sold back to market participants as
functioning normalized (Chart 3).
11
See for instance https://voxeu.org/article/subprime-crisis-what-central-bankers-should-do-and-why and
https://maverecon.blogspot.com/2007/08/central-banks-in-time-of-crisis.html.
12
to be done on a basis
In practice, effecting full risk transfer through central bank repo requires it 'non-recourse' (ie relying solely on
the collateral provided for risk mitigation in the event of default). The principles of such operations are discussed in
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2017/07/10/Central-Bank-Emergency-Support-to-Securities-Markets-45012, and were
put into practice by the Federal Reserve in its Money Market Fund facilities provided during the GFC and the Covid crisis.
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Chart 3: Holdings in Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme
Source: Bank of England
The review of the Bank's liquidity framework carried out by Bill Winters in 2012 recommended formalising the
Bank's approach to MMLR, setting out public principles under which future interventions might occur.13
- -
Various proposals on these points had been made in the wake of the GFC, by amongst others
-
Paul Tucker, Perry Mehrling, Michael Dooley and Stephen Cecchetti.14 But in the event, the Bank
-
in common with other central banks chose to say relatively little in public. That reflected a number of
factors, including the practical challenges of determining in advance the markets in which central banks
might operate, the terms on which they would do so, and the consequences for public money.
In the years that followed, the topic received little active attention, either inside or outside central banks.
II) Covid, market dysfunction and central bank interventions
The experience of Covid has changed that.
This is not the place to review the actions taken by central banks since last Spring in detail: many have
covered that elsewhere.15 Instead, I want to pull out a number of lessons from that experience that, directly
or indirectly, can help inform future tool design.
13
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/news/2012/november/the-banks-framework-for-providing-liquidity-to-the-banking
14
See for example https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2009/last-resort-lending-market-making-and-capital,
on
https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691143989/the-new-lombard-street, and the papers from the 2014 workshop
'Rethinking the lender of last resort' held at the Bank for International Settlements (https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap79.pdf).
15
My own remarks are available at
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2020/andrew-hauser-speech-hosted-by-bloomberg-viawebinar.
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The first highlights limitations in our existing liquidity provision toolkit, which is focused primarily on lending to
banks.16 The Bank of England provided extra liquidity to banks through a wide range of facilities, at
-
favourable rates, in the early stages of the March crisis including FX lending backed by dollar and euro
swap lines, and sterling lending through both our standing Indexed Long Term Repo facility, and the
specially-activated Contingent Term Repo Facility. Other major central banks took similar steps.17 Using
these facilities, banks did play a part in channelling liquidity to the wider market, materially increasing both
their borrowing from central banks, and their on-lending to their own counterparties. But they by no means
-
exhausted the extra central bank liquidity on offer and their on-lending was insufficient to meet the
explosion in liquidity demand from non-banks, driving term repo rates and government bond yields sharply
higher.
With the normal central bank antibiotics struggling to reach the source of the infection, it was time for
stronger medicine.
The huge asset purchase programmes unleashed in Spring 2020 had a dramatic and immediate calming
effect, 'getting in all the cracks' of the liquidity shortage amongst
non-banks, and taking duration risk off
dealers' balance sheets. Central banks made it clear their operations were aimed, in part, and at least
initially, at restoring market functioning. The Bank of England said it would complete its asset purchases 'as
soon as is operationally possible, consistent with improved market functioning'.18
The Federal Reserve said
it would
'purchase Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities in the amounts needed to
smooth market functioning'.19 And the ECB framed its decisions in the context of 'severe strains in
support
the financial markets' posing risks 'of the ECB's monetary policy transmission becoming significantly
impaired'.20
Asset purchases have accounted for all of the net increase in Bank of England and Federal
Reserve balance sheets since last Spring, and about half of the ECB's. Many other central banks took
similar actions.21
16
The Bank of England expanded its own lending facilities to include broker dealers and CCPs in 2014, in response to the
recommendation of the Winters Review: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2014/november/widening-access-to-the-smf.
17
Lorie Logan of the New York Federal Reserve, for example, set out the US approach in a speech last October:
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/log201023
18
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-summary-and-minutes/2020/monetary-policy-summary-for-the-special-monetarypolicy-committee-meeting-on-19-march-2020
19
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200323b.htm
20
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/accounts/2020/html/ecb.mg200409_1~baf4b2ad06.en.html
21
See for example 'Central bank bond purchases in emerging market economies' by Yavuz Arslan, Mathias Drehmann and Boris
Hofmann, BIS Bulletin no.20 at: https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull20.pdf.
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Chart 4: Central bank balance sheet responses to the Covid-19 shock during 2020
Changes in components of central bank balance sheets since end-Feb 2020 (as % of 2019 nominal GDP)
Sources: Bank of England, Bureau of Economic Analysis, European Central Bank, Eurostat, Federal Reserve Board, ONS and Bank
calculations.
(a) Bank of England lending operations shown here: Indexed long-term repo, Contingent term repo facility, US dollar repo operations,
Liquidity Facility in Euros, Term Funding Scheme and Term Funding Scheme with additional incentives for SMEs. Bank of England
asset purchases shown here: Asset Purchase Facility and Covid Corporate Financing Facility.
(b) ECB lending operations: Lending to euro-area credit institutions related to monetary policy operations denominated in euro. ECB
asset purchases: Securities held for monetary policy and other purposes.
(c) Federal Reserve lending operations: Repurchase agreements, Loans and Net portfolio holdings of TALF II LLC. Federal Reserve
asset purchases: Securities held outright. Section of chart lying below the zero line from mid-2020 reflects a decline in repo
outstanding relative to end-February.
Despite their success in the unparalleled circumstances of Covid, these actions provide only limited guidance
as to how central banks might best respond to future instances of market dysfunction driven by the more
structural trends I outlined at the start of my remarks:
-
- They were one-way purchase operations of relatively long-duration assets so they were not pre-
programmed to unwind or self-liquidate when core market functioning returned, as it did by the late
spring of 2020. Central banks were 'buyers of last resort' more than 'market makers of last resort'.
- Purchases typically took place at prevailing market prices: ie the Bagehot principle was not
While not charging an 'insurance premium' to market participants for an extended period
applied.22
may be understandable in a severe unexpected pandemic, it would be harder to justify providing
22
Arguably this was not true at the very height of the dysfunction, when central banks were buying at prices well below pre-stress levels.
But this behaviour was not expected by the market ex ante, and prices of government securities in most markets bounced back rapidly
following the initial central bank interventions.
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market participants with an expectation of similarly-priced public support if market dysfunction
occurred because of well-understood vulnerabilities.
- A key part of the success of the Covid asset purchase programmes was that they took large
quantities of risk off private sector balance sheets, meeting the heightened demand by non-banks for
cash and allowing intermediaries to return to providing finance to the real economy. At the same
time, of course, that means more risk on public sector balance sheets. 'Whatever it takes' may apply
in a global pandemic. But public authorities will be more sensitive to the cost to the public purse if
future episodes of market dysfunction emerge because of vulnerabilities in the system.
- The Covid response was unanticipated and discretionary. While that was fully justified in this
instance by the unprecedented nature of the shock, the use of ad hoc tools risks embedding
inappropriate expectations about how central banks might behave in future cases of market
dysfunction.
- Finally, and perhaps most profoundly, the fact that the economic shock and the market dysfunction
-
were both caused by the same exogenous event meant that a single tool large scale, discretionary
-
purchases of duration assets at market prices could effectively restore both monetary and financial
stability. In different circumstances, however, the optimal policy response for the two goals could
diverge.
III) Central bank tools for market dysfunction: some design considerations
Drawing together the unfinished business of post-GFC thinking, the Covid experience, and the expectation of
continued reliance on financial markets by households and companies, let me identify a number of tentative
conclusions for the future design of central bank tools. The key points of this section are summarised in
Table 1.
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Table 1: Lessons from the dash for cash for future market dysfunction tool design
Positives Challenges Future design questions
Banks did not meet all non- Whether central banks need
-
Standing liquidity Regular, well bank liquidity needs so the ability to reach a wider
understood not a fully effective conduit range of market participants
facilities for banks
for central bank liquidity directly (and, if so, who)
Operations typically one Whether there should be more
way ('buyer of last resort') targeted two-way or self-
and much longer duration liquidating tools better aligned
than the dysfunction with term of dysfunction
Ability to 'go
big and go
fast' necessary
Operations conducted How to deal with market
in the face of
using tools also aimed at dysfunction in periods when
the Covid easing monetary policy the optimal policy response
pandemic
Special market differs from that required for
wide operations monetary policy purposes
using large scale
asset purchases
and other Operations were ad hoc or Whether more permanent
preexisting tools
discretionary standing facilities might better
shape expectations
No explicit 'insurance Whether to adopt Bagehot
premium' in facility pricing -
Effectiveness pricing/terms: eg buying at
- 'got in all the risks fuelling moral hazard below pre-stress prices but
cracks'
if expected to prevail in above stress prices and/or
future pricing / haircuts
Took risk off How to judge appropriate risk
private sector Added risk to public sector sharing, and set bounds on
balance balance sheets public sector exposure
sheets
The first is that central banks are likely to face increasing calls to provide public liquidity insurance for
instances of severe financial market dysfunction in the years ahead, as the reliance on those markets grows,
vulnerabilities to liquidity shocks persist, and intermediation capacity remains constrained. Clarity will be
required as to whether, and if so how, such activities fall within their formal remits. In some cases they may
be able to use existing tools designed for monetary policy purposes, as they did in the Covid crisis. But in
others, those tools may prove poorly suited to the task, and new ways will be needed to achieve those ends,
whether through outright purchase and sale operations, repo facilities or other means.
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Second, central banks will need to decide which marketable assets should be in scope of any new tools.
The most obvious candidate is government bonds, which lay at the epicentre of the dash for cash. For other,
riskier, assets to qualify, a case would need to be made both that they are sufficiently core to monetary and
financial stability, and that central banks can price and risk manage them effectively. It is notable that many
central banks bought a range of assets beyond government bonds during the 2008-9 and Covid crises,
including corporate bonds and commercial paper.
Third, central banks will need to reflect on whether the use of their balance sheets to address market
dysfunction should remain primarily discretionary, or whether at least aspects of that role should be
formalised into standing facilities, the terms of which are known in advance. The case in favour of such an
approach is that a known 'reaction function' allows market participants to organise their affairs and price risks
in advance of episodes of dysfunction, avoiding over-optimism about the circumstances in which public
support will not be forthcoming (incentivising appropriate self-insurance), and over-pessimism about when it
would (allowing safe business to thrive). It may also provide confidence that the system is backstopped
against operational or other idiosyncratic market-wide events, such as systemic IT outages. Similar
arguments have been used to rationalise standing facilities for banks.
Fourth, careful consideration would need to be given to who should have access to these tools, either
directly or indirectly. Restricting such access to banks alone is unlikely to prove sufficient to stabilise core
markets, given the increasing importance of the sorts of non-bank participants I discussed earlier. But
-
access criteria would still be needed to limit the financial risks to which public money is exposed; to ensure
public insurance is not provided to firms who have not first taken steps to provide for their own resilience, or
that of the wider system; and to ensure the sheer operational feasibility of any new tool.23 The quid pro quo
between central bank access and meeting robust prudential standards is one of the key reasons why these
discussions need to happen in parallel with those taking place at the Financial Stability Board.
Fifth, and finally, the terms and conditions of such facilities will also need to be carefully calibrated to ensure
those same risks are effectively managed. In particular that will mean:
- Ensuring that prices, rates and collateral haircuts are well aligned to the Bagehot principle to ensure
any facilities remain strictly backstops that are used when conditions become materially
dysfunctional, but leave the burden of ensuring safe operation during a wide range of normal and
less-normal market conditions with market participants, and the regulatory regimes they are subject
to; and
- Ensuring facilities are naturally self-liquidating, in that they build up exposures when markets are
-
dysfunctional, but run them down when functioning returns to normal delivering sufficient risk
23
Investment funds, for example, outnumber banks by several orders of magnitude.
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transfer to kick start private sector activity during periods of dysfunction, while limiting the scale and
persistence of risks to public funds.
These are not straightforward tradeoffs, and different jurisdictions may choose different points along them,
depending on the relative importance of banks and financial markets in their local economies, their central
bank mandates, and their risk preferences. But given the multiple institutional, technological and cross-
border linkages that characterise our core markets, we have a strong common interest in setting out the
choices. A recent Brookings paper by Nellie Liang and Pat Parkinson touches on a number of these issues
as they relate to the US Treasury market.24
Conclusion
It is sometimes said that hard cases make bad law.
We should certainly be wary of drawing overly direct conclusions from the Covid pandemic, given how truly
unique the circumstances have been.
But many of the vulnerabilities in financial markets exposed last Spring have been staring us in the face for
-
some time and will only grow in importance in the years ahead, as households and firms come to rely ever
more closely on such markets to care for their savings, and fund investment.
So we must seize this opportunity for reform.
The primary focus lies in strengthening the resilience of those active in financial markets, through the vital
work underway at the Financial Stability Board. Prevention is better than cure.
But central bank tools have a part to play too. I have discussed here today some of the design features that
a new generation of such tools might have. I look forward to the debate to come.
Thank you.
24
https://www.brookings.edu/research/enhancing-liquidity-of-the-u-s-treasury-market-under-stress/
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