SPEECH
DATE:
6 May 2022
SPEAKER:
Cecilia Skingsley
VENUE:
Handelsbanken
High inflation and a rising repo rate -
what happens to the Riksbank's balance
sheet?1
As you know, inflation in Sweden is now at the highest levels in several decades.
We have entered a period in which the repo rate needs to be raised - and much
more than we expected earlier. 'The inflation map has been redrawn', and this is a
situation we share with many other central banks worldwide (see Figure 1).
However, as you also know, the Riksbank implemented strong monetary policy
measures during the coronavirus crisis, where an important element was asset
purchases. The question then arises: Now that we are starting to raise interest
rates - what happens to the assets on our balance sheet?
When I answer that question, I would first like to go back in time a little and
explain how the assets originally got there.
Background - why we purchased debt securities for
SEK 700 billion.
In my speech a year ago, I said that one of the great lessons of the global financial
crisis in 2008 and, not least, the coronavirus crisis in 2020, was that the repo rate,
our policy rate, is not sufficient as a monetary policy tool to stabilise inflation at
around 2 per cent.2
The global financial crisis in 2008 and the years thereafter showed that the
socalled lower bound for the policy rate was not only an interesting fact, but also
real constraint on monetary policy. A further lesson from the crisis was that the
turbulence on the financial markets could entail the monetary policy steering
rate quite simply not having an impact on the interest rates charged to companies
and households.
Asset purchases can address both of these issues. They can contribute to further
stimulus when it is not possible to cut the policy rate. And they can reduce the
difference between the policy rate and the interest rate charged to households and
companies when there is financial turbulence.
The outbreak of the coronavirus crisis in the spring of 2020 caused enormous
financial turbulence, including the biggest stock market fall in one day so far in
Sweden.3 All bond rates rose to a varying extent. The new motto for investors was
'dash for cash', as they abandoned unsafe assets in favour of safer ones with high
liquidity.4
During the crisis, the Riksbank's monetary policy focused as far as possible on
maintaining interest rates at a low level and maintaining the supply of credit so
that the real economy could function.
A key element in our response to the crisis was extensive purchases of bonds (see
Figure 2).5 The very fact that all bond yields rose to varying degrees made a broad
palette of asset purchases necessary to hold interest rates at a low level. The
Riksbank purchased government bonds, covered bonds, municipal bonds and
6
corporate bonds. We took framework decisions for the total asset purchases, which
we then distributed over the different asset classes through regular decisions at
the monetary policy meetings held. Initially, the framework was set at SEK 300
billion in March 2020 and then expanded to SEK 500 billion in June and to SEK 700
billion in November of the same year. In connection with the decisions in June and
November 2020, we extended the purchases from the end of 2020 to first the
middle, and then the end, of 2021. And at our meeting in June last year we
decided to use the full framework, which meant that our asset purchases ended at
SEK 700 billion. Our plan was then to merely maintain the holding, by
compensating for principal payments. I will return to our most recent decision later on.
Broadly speaking, the Riksbank's monetary policy response followed the same
pattern as the major central banks, the ECB and the Federal Reserve, as is
illustrated in Table 1. This is not so strange, given that the crisis affected many
countries roughly at the same time and in the same way. Figure 2 shows our holdings
of securities, while Figure 3 shows how much of the outstanding stock we have
purchased in each respective market. On the whole, we now own roughly the
same nominal amount of government bonds as covered bonds. Nevertheless, we
have bought a considerably smaller share of the outstanding stock of covered
bonds compared to government securities. This says something about the size of
the market for covered bonds.
We have described the motives for the purchases in many different contexts. But
it is still relevant to ask: Why such a focus on covered bonds?
And the answer is: To ensure the interest rates charged to households and
companies would remain low throughout the crisis. As the major Swedish banks fund
a large part of their lending by issuing covered bonds, the Riksbank's purchases
have had a direct effect on the banks' funding costs and, ultimately, also on
interest rates charged to households and companies.
I believe that our measures during the crisis have essentially functioned as
intended: keeping interest rates low and maintaining the supply of credit. The
financial system was in this way able to assist in absorbing the macroeconomic shock,
rather than posing a further problem - a financial crisis - on top of the health crisis
and the economic shock that ensued. As I see it, these measures were entirely
necessary to attain our monetary policy objectives: to attain an inflation rate of 2
per cent and to support the development of the economy.
But we now find ourselves in a new situation.
Current monetary policy - how do we manage the
asset portfolio when the repo rate is raised?
Inflation is now very high in many places, including Sweden (see Figure 1).
Tightening of monetary policy is on the agenda for most central banks around the
world, and, as you know, for the Riksbank as well (see Figure 4). There is also a
consensus among central banks that policy rate increases are the most
appropriate tool for dealing with unexpectedly high inflation.
However, it is far from clear how assets are to be managed. In the international
discussion about the holdings of securities, there are a lot of concepts that may
appear mysterious and which I would therefore like to try to explain and put into
context before I begin to discuss how we at the Riksbank have thought about the
management of our assets in the future.
From "QE" to "tapering", reinvestments and "QT"
Figure 5 shows a simple outline of how central banks' monetary policy has looked
in recent years. As I mentioned earlier, the crisis has affected many countries in
the same way. And, as you are probably aware, many central banks are currently
struggling with inflation far above the targets. In this way, the illustration can be
said to be quite general.
We can imagine that the figure starts at the outbreak of the coronavirus
pandemic. At that time, many central banks bought assets so that their holdings grew
- this is usually referred to as quantitative easing or QE. Purchases were made at
a predetermined pace, usually with the aim of achieving a certain level of holding.
The logic behind calling this easing is that one assumes that as long as the holding
grows, monetary policy becomes more expansionary. One can compare it with
cutting the policy rate.
Gradually, the pace of purchases is reduced so that the assets grow more slowly,
which is commonly referred to as tapering.8 But monetary policy then remains
more expansionary. This can be compared with lowering the policy rate, but at a
slower pace.
Once the central bank has reached the desired holding, it maintains it by
reinvesting maturing bonds. Not surprisingly, this phase - which the Riksbank is now in -
is known as the reinvestment phase. Monetary policy will then be more or less as
expansionary as before.
But if one can talk about buzzwords in the world of central banking right now, QT
is one of them. It stands for quantitative tightening and means that the holding is
reduced by the cessation of reinvestment. It is also possible to consider that the
holding declines by selling the securities before they mature. However, the need
for this is partly determined by the maturity of the securities, something I will
come back to later.
A reader with a good memory may recall, however, that this is not the first time
that quantitative tightening, or QT, has been discussed. In the years before the
coronavirus crisis, there were also some discussions, especially with regard to the
Federal Reserve, which also raised its policy rate substantially in the years before
the crisis.9 The Federal Reserve is the only major central bank that, following the
financial crisis, has practical experience of QT to any great extent.
The relationship between the policy rate and the asset holdings:
"Reinvestment-rate increase-QT"
In Figure 5 the policy rate is also illustrated. In the international discussion there
has emerged a consensus that it is appropriate to start raising the policy rate at
some point during the reinvestment phase, that is, before the holding starts to
decrease. The monetary policy tightening will thus begin with interest rate increases,
followed by a reduction in the asset holdings. A summary of the strategy is
"reinvestment-rate increase-QT". If you think this sounds abstract, I can give you a
practical example of how we ourselves reasoned a few years ago, before
describing how we are thinking now.
"A traditional exit"
Let's go back in time a little once again. During 2014-2015, inflation was so low
that there was a risk that confidence in the inflation target would be undermined.
At the same time, the ECB reoriented its monetary policy in a more expansionary
direction, which risked strengthening the krona exchange rate at a time when
inflation was already too low.
We then expanded our monetary policy measures: On the one hand, we lowered
the repo rate below what was previously considered the lower bound of zero, and
on the other hand we purchased government bonds (thus using quantitative
easing). As the financial markets were functioning normally, the measures had the
desired impact on the interest rates charged to households and companies. After
some time, inflation began to rise toward the target.
Toward the end of 2017, we envisaged policy rate increases and a gradual
normalisation of monetary policy.10
The strategy followed the "reinvestment-rate increase-QT" approach, which
meant that the Riksbank would first start a reinvestment phase - keeping the
holding at a constant level by reinvesting maturing bonds. After that, when
monetary policy was to gradually become less expansionary, the repo rate would be
raised slowly, while the reinvestment phase would continue. When the repo rate
had been raised to a level at an acceptable distance from the lower bound, the
reinvestments would be tapered or terminated, so that the holding would decrease
when the bonds matured, i.e. what we call QT today.
As you can see, the 'exit strategy' in Figure 5 follows this pattern very well. But, as
you know, we did not get very far in the process of normalisation. The repo rate
was raised twice in December 2018 and December 2019 to zero per cent, and the
holding of government bonds remained in principle at the same level as before.
Then the crisis struck, and we decided on the measures that have given us today's
portfolio.
Time to rethink in the current situation?
There are several reasons why one might think differently now in relation to the
way we reasoned at the end of 2017.
Greater element of private securities
A major difference compared with before is that the Riksbank has purchased large
amounts of private securities during the coronavirus crisis, like many other central
banks.
This measure should be regarded in the light of the fact that monetary policy is
about influencing the financial situation in such a way that inflation stabilises. In
countries where credit is granted via the banks, the central bank naturally aims its
measures at them. However, in countries such as Sweden, where credit is also
market-based, that is, credit is also provided through debt securities, a broader
toolbox is needed for the central bank to be successful in its monetary policy and
to stabilise inflation around the target. My conclusion is therefore that QE will be
needed from time to time. It is also interesting to note that the monetary policy
toolbox, when regarded over a longer period of time has to some extent been
cyclical. The fact that the Riksbank owns Swedish securities is nothing new, as my
colleague, Governor Stefan Ingves, has observed.11 Further back in time, the
Riksbank had a large portfolio of Swedish securities, which eventually was sold off
around the turn of the millennium, since it was not considered necessary for
conducting monetary policy.12
As shown in Figure 6, the Riksbank's assets currently represent a large proportion
of GDP in an historical perspective. However, as a percentage of the total financial
assets in the Swedish economy, the proportion is barely visible.
Kristin Forbes is professor at MIT and was a member of the Bank of England
Monetary Policy Committee 2014-2017. In her speech at Jackson Hole last year, she
pointed out, among other things, that the purchase of private assets was largely
motivated in terms of 'credit easing', i.e. measures aimed at alleviating turbulence
in financial markets.13 Therefore, she believes that an 'exit' should not be
determined by how well the central bank's inflation target is met, but by the problems
that the measures were aimed at, namely frictions and concerns on the financial
markets.
I think she has some good points, but, as I have mentioned, I do not think it is easy
to make the division into normal quantitative easing and credit easing. There is a
simple reason for this. Both the level of the policy rate and different types of risk
premiums in the market determine the interest rates that 'customers', i.e.
households and companies in Sweden, meet. When the financial markets are
functioning normally, there is a good correlation between the policy rate and the interest
rates charged to customers. But this is not the case in times of financial
turbulence. The central bank must then both be active and show long-term
commitment. Otherwise, if market participants suspect that the central bank's
commitment is not long-term, there is a risk that the transmission mechanism will remain
damaged, and the operation will have failed, so to speak.
However, I do not think there is any reason why the central bank should have
large holdings of private assets when the financial markets are functioning
normally.14 I will return to this issue later on.
We are not in a normalisation phase but a tightening phase...
The 'exit plan' at the end of 2017 was based on normalisation, where inflation and
the real economy would approach long-term levels in a calm and orderly manner.
If we move forward to today, a significant difference is that we are now trying to
halt very high inflation that is way above the target (see Figure 1). It also means
that we need to think again - it is not an 'exit' to normalisation, but a monetary
policy tightening. A direct consequence of this is that the pace of the process is ac-
celerated. However, this does not necessarily mean that the order of the
increases in the policy rate and QT changes. This is also reflected in the way that
many central banks around the world are reasoning.15
... which means "reinvestment-rate increase-QT" but at a faster pace
The consensus that can be seen internationally is for central banks to manage the
tightening phase by following the principle of "reinvestment-rate increase-QT"
but at a much faster pace than was seen before. Let me give some examples.
The Federal Reserve has now raised its policy rate twice by a total of 0.75
percentage points and plans to start reducing its asset holdings on 1 June, making the
'reinvestment phase', which started in March, very short compared to the period of
almost two years preceding the previous QT period prior to the coronavirus
crisis.16
The Bank of England specified its plan at the beginning of the autumn.17 This
involved QT beginning when the policy rate had reached 0.5 per cent, which it did in
February this year. As they concluded the QE phase in December, when they
raised their policy rate for the first time after the crisis, it also means in this case
that the 'reinvestment phase' has become very short. The plan from the beginning
of the autumn also meant that consideration would be given to selling securities
before maturity, once the policy rate had reached 1 per cent, which it did in
connection with the most recent monetary policy announcement on 5 May. At that
time it was also announced that the bank was planning to follow the previously
presented plan and start considering selling securities.18
The Bank of Canada began QT in connection with the most recent monetary policy
decision on 13 April, when it also raised the policy rate by 0.5 percentage points.
The reinvestment phase began in November last year and the policy rate was also
19
raised in March this year.
This brings me to our latest monetary policy decision in April and how it fits into
this discussion.
Our plan
In our decision in April, we judged that the repo rate and the repo-rate path are
the most effective tools for dealing with the high inflation (see Figures 7 and 8).
The repo rate was raised much earlier than we were expecting in February, while
the repo-rate path was substantially revised up. As far as assets are concerned,
we also want to adjust our holdings down, but to a less dramatic extent. Our plan
is that the holding will gradually decline in the future, and we decided the
purchase sum for bonds would be half as much during the second half of the year as
the first half of the year. Depending on the Executive Board's future decisions, the
holding is expected to decline as securities mature. This means that our
reinvestment phase lasts about six months, and that we raised the policy rate
approximately in the middle of that phase.
Table 2 compares the effects on the economy of raising the policy rate compared
to using QT. Increases in policy rates have more direct effects on the economy
and dampen inflation more. I see before me that the securities portfolio will be
able to decline in the coming years, provided that the current inflation and
economic assessment hold. The table indicates that one could envisage further fine
tuning of the portfolio holding to affect different parts of the fixed income
market. However, I think that such an approach works primarily in crisis situations, in
other words in the introduction of the QE phase, when problems in certain
markets need to be dealt with using particular tools. This was particularly clear in the
spring of 2020.
Should we sell securities?
Let me now come back to the question of how we reduce our holdings when
monetary policy is made less expansionary. Why do we not sell bonds before they
mature instead of reducing the holding 'passively' through maturities? For example,
the Bank of England has announced that it is considering actively selling certain
securities before maturity when the policy rate has reached 1 per cent.20
An important difference in relation to the Bank of England is in the maturity of our
bond holdings. The UK government bond has a long maturity term of on average
around 15 years.21 This means that it will take a very long time before the holding
decreases to any great extent if a representative sample of the bond stock has
been purchased, as the Bank of England has done. The Bank of Canada, on the
other hand, has a short maturity on its holdings, which means that selling them
has not been judged to be appropriate.22 The Federal Reserve has a very long
maturity on its holdings of mortgage bonds, which has led the Monetary Policy
Committee to begin discussing active sales of those assets in the future, to achieve the
long-term goal of primarily owning government bonds.23
Figure 9 shows how our aggregate holdings of securities would develop if no
further purchases are made after 2022. Please note that this should be seen as a
simple projection and not a forecast. As early as the forecast period up to the second
quarter of 2025, the holding may well have been halved through maturities. This
means that we do not have to consider active sales in the same way as, for
example, the Bank of England to reduce the holding at a relatively rapid rate.
I mentioned earlier that there are no reasons for the Riksbank to have any major
holdings of private assets as the financial markets are functioning normally. Figure
10 shows the distribution of the securities held by the Riksbank. It is clear, for
instance, that the maturity of the covered bonds is considerably shorter than that of
the government bonds, which means that most of the holding will have declined
within five years through maturities, should the Executive Board decide not to
make any reinvestments after 2022.
Thoughts regarding the future
In conclusion, I would like to talk about the lessons we can learn for the future.
During the coronavirus crisis we made extensive purchases that we are now
planning to phase out in a predictable manner. We believe that the purchases have
worked well. But as you know, no two crises are the same. What strategies are
available in the future?
Go big and fast, buy a little at a time or take a middle way?
One alternative is what Andy Bailey and others at the Bank of England have
discussed, namely to 'go big and fast' and then fairly quickly dismantle the holding as
soon as the situation improves, to have your ammunition ready for the next crisis
or economic downturn.24 I think that the holding should be phased out when it is
politically motivated and I am not keen on dismantling it to increase our
purchasing scope. This is a variation on the theme of raising the policy rate just to be able
to lower it later.
Another option is to buy a limited amount of assets when the need arises,
combined with a commitment to buy more if the situation deteriorates. I am very
sceptical about this strategy, as it could turn into an indirect yield curve control,
which is not the intention.25 There is a considerable risk of misunderstanding
between the central bank and market participants.
I think that the experiences of the coronavirus crisis clearly indicate a middle way.
During the initial phase of the crisis, economic uncertainty was monumental. We
decided to go big and fast, as illustrated, for instance, by the fact that most of the
measures were decided within a week of the WHO declaring a pandemic on 11
March 2020. The rest of the measures were adjustments or additions to an
existing plan. As decision-makers, we did not have the luxury of awaiting detailed
research results on what would be the best response, but acted to avoid the real
economic crisis developing into a financial crisis. Both the Swedish Coronavirus
Commission and the external assessment of monetary policy by Flug and Honohan
concluded that such an approach was favourable to economic developments in
Sweden.26
So much for big and fast. However, I am very doubtful about the rapid phasing out
of assets on our balance sheet through active sales. One reason I have already
mentioned is that the maturity of our assets is relatively short. But another reason
is that the aggregate international experience with QT is very limited, and there
are very few data points for estimating the effects. The precautionary principle
also applies here pending further research results. And here I think there will be a
lot to learn in the future.
In recent years, we have made a considerable analysis of the effects of asset
purchases.27 Looking ahead, I am convinced that research can help the central banks
with new results, which can more accurately estimate the effects of both QE and
QT on the economy. I shall be very interested to see the results. After all,
monetary policy needs to develop in pace with the times. A historical parallel to the
phase we are in now is when the inflation target regime was established in 1993.
The first pioneers had rather limited experience of practical inflation-targeting
policy to rely on, and a limited knowledge of which indicators could guide
monetary policy.28
The communication challenge
One very important issue that we must develop before the next economic
downturn is communication regarding asset purchases. I discussed this in my speech a
year ago.29 How can we clearly link asset purchases to the capacity to attain the
inflation target? Here there is a lesson to be learned for many central banks,
including the Riksbank.
I believe that the repo-rate path will remain by far the most important tool when
we communicate with the public about future monetary policy. An ideal scenario
would be if decisions on the asset portfolio could be converted into policy rate
changes and added to the existing repo-rate path. However, while we are still
learning more about the effects of changes in the asset holding on interest
ratesetting, my aim is to ensure that the public continues to have confidence in our
monetary policy. One of the main elements of our monetary policy throughout
the period of inflation targeting has been our desire for transparency and clarity:
What we are doing and what we achieve with our measures. By continuing along
this path, the public should be able to rely on us at the Riksbank doing our job and
maintaining price stability, that is, keeping inflation so stable that you do not
really have to think about it.
Thank you for listening!
References
Bailey, Andrew (2020), "The central bank balance sheet as a policy tool: past,
present and future", speech at Jackson Hole, published on 28 August, available at The
central bank balance sheet as a policy tool: past, present and future - speech by
Andrew Bailey | Bank of England.
Bank of Canada (2022), "Economic progress report: Controlling inflation",
available at Economic progress report: Controlling inflation - Bank of Canada.
Bank of England (2021), "Box A: The MPC's strategy for the mix of monetary policy
instruments to deliver tighter policy", article in the Monetary Policy Report,
September, available at the Bank of England Monetary Policy Report August 2021.
Bank of England (2022), "Monetary Policy Summary and minutes of the Monetary
Policy Committee meeting, published 5 May, available at Bank Rate increased to
1% - May 2022 | Bank of England.
Breman, A. (2021), "Monetary policy after corona - we need to think in new
ways", digital speech at Swedbank, available at Breman:Monetary policy after
corona - we need to think along new lines | Sveriges Riksbank.
Brookings (2021), "What does the Federal Reserve mean when it talks about
tapering?", available at What does the Federal Reserve mean when it talks about
tapering? (brookings.edu).
Cunliffe, Sir J. (2022), "Learning from the Dash for Cash - findings and next steps
for margining practices", speech at FIA & SIFMA Asset Management Derivatives
Forum 2022, published on 9 February, available at Learning from the Dash for
Cash - findings and next steps for margining practices - speech by Sir Jon Cunliffe
| Bank of England.
Di Casola (2021), 'What does research say about the effects of central banks'
balance sheet measures?', Economic Commentaries No 2, Sveriges Riksbank,
available at What does research say about the effects of central banks' balance sheet
measures?(riksbank.se).
ECB (2022), "Monetary Policy decisions: Press release", published 14 April,
available at Monetary policy decisions (europa.eu).
Federal Reserve (2022a), "Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement", published on
May 4, available at Federal Reserve Board - Federal Reserve issues FOMC
statement.
Federal Reserve (2022b), "Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee March
15-16, 2022", available at Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee,
March 15-16, 2022 (federalreserve.gov).
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2022), "The Global Dash for Cash: Why
Sovereign Bond Market Functioning Varied across Jurisdictions in March 2020", Staff
Reports no. 1010, available at sr1010.pdf (newyorkfed.org)
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (2019), "What Is Quantitative Tightening?",
available at What Is Quantitative Tightening? | St. Louis Fed (stlouisfed.org).
Forbes, K. (2021), "Unwinding Monetary Stimulus in an Uneven Economy: Time
for a New Playbook?", speech at Jackson Hole, published on 27 August, available
at Forbes_Unwinding_Stimulus_in_an_Uneven_Economy.pdf (kansascityfed.org).
Forbes, K. (2022), "Central banks must reduce their balance sheets more
aggressively", debate article in the Financial Times, published on19 January, available at
Central banks must reduce their balance sheets more aggressively | Financial
Times (ft.com).
Gustafsson, P. (2022), "An event study of the effects of asset purchases on
financial prices during the pandemic", Staff memo, March, Sveriges Riksbank, available
at An event study of the effects of asset purchases on financial prices during the
pandemic (riksbank.se).
P. Gustafsson and T. von Brömsen (2021), "Coronavirus pandemic: The Riksbank's
measures and financial developments during spring and summer 2020", Economic
Review, No. 1, available at Coronavirus pandemic:The Riksbank's measures and
financial developments during spring and summer 2020.
Hansson, D. and J. Birging (2021), "The Riksbank's asset purchases during the
coronavirus pandemic", Economic Commentaries No 12, Sveriges Riksbank,
available at The Riksbank's asset purchases during the coronavirus pandemic.
Hauser, Andrew (2021), "Bigger, broader, faster, stronger? How much should
tomorrow's central bank balance sheets do - and what should we leave to financial
markets? Some principles for good parenting", speech at the International
Finance and Banking Society (IFABS) 2021 Oxford Conference on "The Financial
System(s) of Tomorrow", available at Bigger, broader, aunt, stronger? How much
should tomorrow's central bank balance sheets do - speech by Andrew Hauser |
Bank of England.
Ingves, S. (2020), "The monetary policy toolbox", speech at the Swedish
Economics Association, published on 10 June, available at Ingves: Central bank balance
sheets increasingly important for monetary policy | Sveriges Riksbank.
Jonung, L. (ed.) (2003), "På jakt efter ett nytt ankare. Från fast kronkurs till
inflationsmål" (Hunting for a new anchor. From fixed exchange rate to inflation target),
SNS förlag.
Melander, O (2021), "Effects on financial markets of the Riksbank's government
bond purchases 2015-2017", Economic Review No 1, Sveriges Riksbank, available
on Effects on financial markets of the Riksbank's government bond purchases
2015-2017.
Office for Budget Responsibility (2021), "Debt maturity, quantitative easing and
interest rate sensitivity", article in Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March, available
at Debt maturity, quantitative easing and interest rate sensitivity - Office for
Budget Responsibility (obr.uk)
Sellin, P. (2018), "The Riksbank's operational frameworks for implementing
monetary policy, 1885-2018", Economic Review No. 2, available at The Riksbank's
operational frameworks for monetary policy, 1885-2018.
Skingsley, C. (2021), "Adapting to new conditions - monetary policy freedom with
responsibility", Digital speech at SEB, published on 20 May, available at Skingsley:
Adapting to new conditions - monetary policy freedom with responsibility |
Sveriges Riksbank.
SOU 2022:10, "Coronakommissionens slutbetänkande" (final report of the
Coronavirus Commission), published on 25 February, available on Slutbetänkande SOU
2022:10 (coronakommissionen.com).
Sveriges Riksbank (2017), "The Riksbank's strategy for a gradual normalisation of
monetary policy", article in the Monetary Policy Report, December, available at
The Riksbank's strategy for a gradual normalisation of monetary policy.
Sveriges Riksbank (2020), "How the Riksbank's measures have worked during the
corona crisis", article in the Monetary Policy Report, September, available at How
the Riksbank's measures have worked during the corona crisis.
Sveriges Riksbank (2021), "Foreign central banks' plans for a gradually less
expansionary monetary policy", article in the Monetary Policy Report, September,
available at Foreign central banks' plans for a gradually less expansionary monetary
policy, article in the Monetary Policy Report September 2021 (riksbank.se).
Sveriges Riksbank (2022), "The coronavirus crisis and the Riksbank's asset
purchases", article in the Account of Monetary Policy 2021, available at Account of
Monetary Policy 2021 (riksbank.se).
The Swedish Parliament (2022), "the Riksbank's monetary policy 2015-2020 has
been evaluated", published on 31 March, available a