Mr. Bäckström elucidates the problems Sweden went through in the early
1990s, and considers whether other countries might draw lessons from the Swedish
experience Talk given by the Governor of the Swedish Riskbank, Mr. Urban Bäckström, at the
Jackson Hole symposium organised by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City on 29/8/87.
First a word of thanks to the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City for the
invitation to discuss the financial problems Sweden went through in the early 1990s. I shall also
try to draw some conclusions from our experiences that may be relevant for other countries.
Before I came to Sveriges Riksbank I was State Secretary at the Ministry of
Finance and involved among other things in the management of Sweden's financial crisis. While
there had, of course, been a good many indications of mounting problems, I was personally
made formally aware of the acute and severe financial crisis by a phone call. At the beginning of
October 1991, I had been in the job just a few days when I got a call from the head of the
Financial Supervisory Authority (banking supervision in Sweden is performed by this authority,
not by the central bank). He wanted to inform the Government that a large Swedish bank had
more than exhausted its equity capital and would have to go bankrupt if a reconstruction could
not be arranged.
While working at the Ministry of Finance on the initial problems in the banking
sector we started to study historical and international records of financial crises. Irving Fisher's
well-known paper in Econometrica, "The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions," from
1933 provided inspiration. We also came across a new volume, "The Risk of Economic Crisis",
edited by Martin Feldstein and containing interesting contributions by, among others, Benjamin
Friedman, Paul Krugman, Lawrence Summers and our chairman today, E. Gerald Corrigan. The
conclusion from these sources was that a fall in asset prices, such as we had in Sweden, may
create problems for private sector balance sheets, affect the supply of credit and result in
payment system disturbances. Step by step this may affect spending decisions by households and
firms, thereby impinging on general economic activity. A destabilised financial system can bring
the economy into what Fisher termed "debt deflation", that is, a situation where the financial
crisis may become very serious and protracted.
Thus it was important both to avoid a widespread failure of Swedish banks and to
bring about a macroeconomic stabilisation. The two are interdependent. The collapse of much of
the banking system would aggravate the macroeconomic weaknesses, just as failure to stabilise
the economy would accentuate the banking crisis.
But here first is a brief account of the Swedish crisis.
The Swedish crisis - what happened?
The economic problems in Sweden in the early 1990s should be seen in their
historical context. For several reasons, economic growth in Sweden has been relatively weak
ever since about 1970. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system the creation of a
stable macroeconomic environment turned out to be difficult. Wage formation functioned badly,
fiscal policy was unduly weak and this was gradually compounded by structural problems.
Credit market deregulation in 1985, necessary in itself, meant that the monetary
conditions became more expansionary. This coincided, moreover, with rising activity, relatively
high inflation expectations, a tax system that favoured borrowing, and remaining exchange
controls that restrained investment in foreign assets. In the absence of a more restrictive
economic policy to parry all this, the freer credit market led to a rapidly growing stock of debt
(see Fig.). In the course of only five years the GDP ratio for private sector debt moved up from
85 to 135 per cent. The credit boom coincided with rising share and real estate prices. During the
second half of the 1980s real aggregate asset prices increased by a total of over 125 per cent. A
speculative bubble had been generated.
The expansion of credit was also associated with increased real economic
demand. Private financial saving dropped by as much as 7 percentage points of GDP and turned
negative. The economy became overheated and inflation accelerated. Sizeable current-account
deficits, accompanied by large outflows of direct-investment and other long-term capital (once
exchange control had been finally abandoned in the late 1980s), led to a growing stock of private
sector short-term debt in foreign currency.
Step by step the Swedish economy became increasingly vulnerable to shocks.
During 1990 matters came to a head. Competitiveness had been eroded by the relatively high
inflation in the late 1980s, resulting in an overvalued currency. This caused exports to weaken
and meant that the fixed exchange rate policy began to be questioned, leading to periods with
relatively high nominal interest rates. Moreover, the tax system was reformed in order to reduce
its harmful economic effects, but this also contributed to higher post-tax interest rates. Asset
prices began to fall and economic activity turned downwards. Between the summers of 1990 and
1993 GDP dropped by a total of 6 per cent. Aggregate unemployment shot up from 3 to 12 per
cent of the labour force and the public sector deficit worsened to as much as 12 per cent of GDP.
A tidal wave of bankruptcies was a heavy blow to the banking sector, which in this period had to
make provisions for loan losses totalling the equivalent of 12 per cent of annual GDP.
While this course of events stemmed, as I have indicated, from a variety of
factors, it was no doubt the financial vulnerability that helped make it so dramatic. The Swedish
economy was steadily approaching a situation that entailed both a banking and a currency crisis.
Matters were most acute in the fall of 1992 in conjunction with the European currency unrest.
The crisis in banking was triggered, not by a classic bank run but by a loss of international
confidence and difficulties with international financing. In many respects the crisis in Sweden
resembled what has happened in a number of other countries.
By the summer of 1993 the economy was becoming more stable and the problems
in banking receded. Fiscal and monetary policy contributed to this and so did a deliberate policy
of handling problem banks.
The private sector's financial balance underwent a dramatic change, moving from
a deficit of about 8 per cent of GDP in 1990 to a financial surplus of over 11 per cent in 1993.
This was a swing of almost 20 percentage points of GDP in the course of only three years. A
good deal of the swing no doubt came from private sector adjustments to cope with insufficient
solvency. Falling asset prices in conjunction with high debt levels lead to balance-sheet
problems in the private sector.
The automatic stabilisers in the government budget probably helped to lessen the
contraction of GDP. This meant that business profits and household disposable income were
sustained relatively well. But it also entailed a massive increase in the budget deficit and this in
turn generated new problems. The government debt trend became unsustainable and economic
policy's credibility was weakened.
In the early stages of the crisis, monetary policy was directed to maintain the
fixed exchange rate. This line had broad support among the general public as well as in the
political system. The aim was to establish a low-inflation policy once and for all. But in spite of
major efforts, both political and economic, the international currency unrest in November 1992
meant that the fixed exchange rate had to be abandoned. It was replaced by a flexible exchange
rate and an explicit inflation target. This resulted in a considerable depreciation of Sweden's
currency, but during 1993 the continued fall in international bond rates meant that Swedish
interest rates also moved down to levels that were comparatively low. Together with the
Riksbank's reduction of its instrumental rate, this gave the monetary conditions a stimulatory
turn. It also helped to stabilise both the economy and the banking system. Lower market rates
eased the fall in asset prices, lightened the burden of servicing private sector debt and mitigated
the negative impact on the financial system.
Rescuing the banking sector was necessary to avoid a collapse of the real
economy. There is no evidence that a credit crunch developed, though anecdotal information did
suggest that creditors became more restrictive. I shall be returning shortly and in more detail to
how the banking problems were tackled.
In 1994, the major budget problems and the expansionary monetary conditions
rebounded. Inflation expectations began to move up in many parts of the economy and when
interest rates increased worldwide in the spring of 1994, bond rates in Sweden rose much more
than in other countries - from just under 7 per cent to over 12 per cent in a few months. This was
accompanied by a further weakening of the exchange rate to levels that were appreciably below
any reasonable assessment of the real equilibrium rate.
The situation called, in other words, for an economic policy realignment -- for
what we can call aftercare -- once the acute financial crisis had been checked. A major
consolidation of government finance was launched, accompanied by a tightening of the
monetary stance which demonstrated that the 2 per cent inflation target was to be taken
seriously.
In time, this course has enhanced economic policy's credibility and led to more
permanent economic stabilisation.
Management of the bank crisis
To those of us who were working on the initial banking problems it was soon
clear that the crisis in Swedish banking could become very serious. In spring 1992, preparations
were therefore made to cope with a variety of conceivable situations. Later we found that our
worst-case scenario was on the verge of happening.
Looking back, one can see that in the course of the crisis the seven largest banks,
with 90 per cent of the market, all suffered heavy losses. In these years their aggregate loan
losses amounted to the equivalent of 12 per cent of Sweden's annual GDP. The stock of
non-performing loans was much larger than the banking sector's total equity capital and five of
the seven largest banks were obliged to obtain capital contributions from either the State or their
owners. It was thus truly a matter of a systemic crisis.
In connection with a serious financial crisis it is important first and foremost to
maintain the banking system's liquidity. It is a matter of preventing large segments of the
banking system from failing on account of acute financing problems.
In September 1992, the Government and the Opposition jointly announced a
general guarantee for the whole of the banking system. The Riksdag, Sweden's parliament,
formally approved the guarantee that December. This broad political consensus was I believe of
vital importance and made the prompt handling of the financial crisis possible.
The bank guarantee provided protection from losses for all creditors except
shareholders. The Government's mandate from Parliament was not restricted to a specific sum
and its hands were also very free in other respects. This necessitated close cooperation with the
political opposition in the actual management of the banking problems. The decision was of
course troublesome and far-reaching. Besides involving difficult considerations to do, for
example, with the cost to the public sector, it raised such questions as the risk of moral hazard.
The political system concluded that in the event of widespread failures in the
banking system, the national economy would suffer major repercussions. The direct outlays in
connection with the capital injection into the banking sector added up to just over 4 per cent of
GDP. However, it is now calculated that most of this can be recovered.
One way of limiting moral hazard problems was to engage in tough negotiations
with the banks that needed support and to enforce the principle that losses were to be covered in
the first place with the capital provided by shareholders.
A separate authority was set up to administer the bank guarantee and manage the
banks that landed in a crisis and faced problems with solvency, though the crucial decisions
about the provision of support were ultimately a matter for the Government. A clear separation
of roles was achieved between the political level and the authorities, as well as between different
authorities. Naturally this did not preclude very close cooperation between the Ministry of
Finance, the Bank Support Authority, the Financial Supervisory Authority and the Riksbank.
It was up to the Riksbank to supply liquidity on a relatively large scale at normal
interest and repayment terms, but not to solve problems of bank solvency. Collateral was not
required for the loans to banks, neither intraday nor overnight. The banking system was free to
obtain unlimited liquidity by drawing on its accounts with the central bank. The bank guarantee
meant that the solvency of the Riksbank was not at risk. In order to offset the loss of foreign
credit lines to Swedish banks, during the height of the crisis the Riksbank also lent large
amounts in foreign currency.
Banks applying for support had their assets valued by the Bank Support
Authority, using uniform criteria. The banks were then divided into categories, depending on
whether they were judged to have only temporary problems as opposed to no prospect of
becoming viable. Knowledge of the appropriate procedures was built up by degrees, not least
with the assistance of people with experience of banking problems in other countries.
The Swedish Bank Support Authority had to choose between two alternative
strategies. The first method involves deferring the reporting of losses for as long as is legally
possible and using the bank's current income for a gradual write-down of the loss making assets.
One advantage of this method is that it helps to avoid the bank being forced to massive sales of
assets at prices below long-run market values. A serious disadvantage is that the method
presupposes that the bank problems can be resolved relatively quickly; otherwise the difficulties
compound, leading to much greater problems when they ultimately materialise. The handling of
problems among savings and loan institution in the United States in the 1980s is a case in point.
With the other method, an open account of all expected losses and writedowns is presented at an
early stage. This clarifies the extent of the problems and the support that is required. Provided
the authorities and the banks make it credible that no additional problems have been concealed,
this procedure also promotes confidence. It entails a risk of creating an exaggerated perception
of the magnitude of the problems, for instance if real estate that has been taken over at unduly
cautiously estimated values in a market that is temporarily depressed. This can lead, for instance,
to borrowers in temporary difficulties being forced to accept harsher terms, which in turn can
result in payments being suspended.
The Swedish authorities opted for the second method: disclose expected loan
losses and assign realistic values to real estate and other assets. This method was consistent with
other basic principles for the bank support, such as the need to restore confidence. Looking back,
it can be said that in general the level of valuation was realistic.
Since the acute crisis had been triggered by difficulties in obtaining international
finance, great pains were taken to give a transparent picture of how the crisis was being
managed, so as to gain the confidence of Sweden's creditors. This applied both to the account of
the magnitude of the banking problems and to the content of the bank guarantee. Various
informative projects were arranged for this purpose throughout the world. In Sweden, too,
considerable efforts were made to legitimise the measures and their costs.
The banking problems did arouse a lively debate in Swedish society, but the work
could still be done in broad political consensus, which was a great advantage. The bank
guarantee was terminated in 1996 and replaced with a deposit guarantee that is financed entirely
by the banks.
Conclusions
The problems in the Swedish banking system at the beginning of this decade seem
to have been more extensive than those which arose in Sweden in the early 1920s. The two
periods also differ substantially in the management of the crisis. This may have had a bearing on
the very different course of events in these two crises. In the early 1920s, the fall in GDP
totalled 18 per cent and the price level dropped 30 per cent in the course of two years. In the
1990s the loss of GDP stopped at around 6 per cent and the price trend did not become really
deflationary.
Allow me now to summarise what I consider to be the most important lessons
from Sweden's financial crisis:
1. Prevent the conditions for a financial crisis
The primary conclusion from our experience of Sweden's financial crisis is that
various steps should be taken to ensure that the conditions for a financial crisis do not arise.
- Fundamentally it is a matter of conducting a credible economic policy focused
on price stability. This provides the prerequisites for a monetary policy reaction to excessive
increases in asset prices and credit stocks that would be liable to boost inflation and create the
type of speculative climate that paves the way to a financial crisis.
- Looking back, it can be said that if various indicators that commonly form the
background to a financial crisis had been followed systematically, then incipient problems could
have been detected early on. That in turn could have influenced the conduct of fiscal and
monetary policy so that Sweden's financial crisis was contained or even prevented. In spite of
the evident signs, few -- if any -- in the public discussion warned of what might happen. Martin
Feldstein offers an interesting explanation in his introduction to "The Risk of Economic Crisis"
from 1991. At that time, the industrialised world had not experienced an outright financial crisis
since the 1930s. As a result, economists had devoted relatively little work to the analysis of this
subject, being more concerned to understand the more normal economic world. This symposium
is a positive sign that matters have changed in that respect. The conclusion drawn by the
Riksbank is that various indicators must be followed systematically with the aim of detecting
any signs of potential financial problems and systemic risks.
- In Sweden's case the supervisory authority was not prepared for the new
environment that emerged after credit market deregulation. This meant that during the 1980s the
banks were able to grant loans on doubtful and sometimes even directly unsound grounds
without any supervisory intervention. In addition, in many cases the loans were poorly
documented. The lesson from this is that much must be required of a supervisor operating in an
environment characterised by deregulated markets.
2. If a financial crisis does occur
In a sense all major financial crises are unique and therefore difficult to prepare
for and avoid. Once a crisis is about to develop there are some important lessons concerning its
handling that can be learnt.
- If an economy is hit by a financial crisis, the first important step is to maintain
liquidity in the banking system and prevent the banking system from collapsing. For the
management of Sweden's banking crisis the political consensus was of major importance for the
payment system's credibility among the Swedish public as well as among the banking system's
creditors throughout the world. The transparent approach to the banking problems and the
various projects for spreading information no doubt had a positive effect, too.
- The prompt and transparent handling of the banking sector problems is also
important. The terms for recapitalisation should be such as to avoid moral hazard problems.
- Automatic stabilisers in the government budget and stimulatory monetary
conditions can help to mitigate the economy's depressive tendencies, but they also entail risks.
Economic policy has to strike a fine balance so that inflation expectations do not rise, the
exchange rate weakens and interest rates move up, which could do more harm than good. In this
respect a small, open economy has less freedom of action than a larger economy.
- It is important both to avoid a widespread failure of banks and to bring about a
macroeconomic stabilisation. The two are interdependent. The collapse of much of the banking
system would aggravate the macroeconomic weaknesses, just as failure to stabilise the economy
would accentuate the banking crisis.
References
Feldstein, M., (ed.), (1991), The Risk of Economic Crisis, NBER Conference
Report, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.
Fisher, I., (1933), The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions,
Econometrica, vol. 1 (October), pp. 337-357.
Ingves, S. and Lind, G., (1996), The management of the bank crisis - in
retrospect, Quarterly Review, No. I, pp. 5-18, Sveriges Riksbank.