'Financial integration and inclusive development -
a view from the Mediterranean countries'
Banco de España, IEMed, OECD conference
Panel on
'Central banks, financial integration
and capital flows'
Remarks by Luigi Federico Signorini
Deputy Governor of the Bank of Italy

It is a great pleasure to be here. The topic of this session is among the most
challenging for central banks today.
My contribution will be in four parts. I shall start with some observations on
monetary policy and financial spillovers in a financially interconnected world,
before moving on to consider the role of the euro area, followed by the implications
for the Southern Mediterranean countries. I shall conclude by discussing policy
implications.
The debate on monetary and financial spillovers in a financially interconnected
world
Global financial integration has been increasing rapidly over the last twenty years.
Cross-border asset and liability positions have doubled as a share of global GDP
since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. The pace of growth has been faster in
advanced economies (AEs) - partly reflecting the disproportionate rise in the gross
assets and liabilities of financial centres1 - but it has also been remarkable in emerging
economies (EMEs), where the average level of gross external assets and liabilities has
reached 60 per cent of GDP, up from less than 40 per cent in 1997 (Fig. 1).
Greater financial interconnectedness allows for more risk sharing, increasing each
economy's ability to absorb idiosyncratic shocks; however, it may also intensify
the transmission of global shocks, especially those originating from core countries.
Capital flow volatility and the cross-border correlation of asset price movements and
credit growth have increased in recent years, in connection with unconventional
monetary policies put in place in major AEs and with the intensifying search for
yield. This has revived the debate over the risks posed by international spillovers,
not only to financial stability but also to monetary policy autonomy, particularly
in EMEs with less developed domestic financial markets.
The classical 'trilemma' of international macroeconomics has been called into
question. According to this 'trilemma', to preserve monetary autonomy, more
open capital accounts require more flexible exchange rates. In a well-known paper
presented at Jackson Hole in 2013, Hélène Rey contested the validity of the
'trilemma'.2 She argued that the existence of a global financial cycle, essentially
driven by US monetary policy due to the dominance of the US dollar in the
international monetary and financial system, has increasingly undermined the
usefulness of flexible exchange rates for insulating an economy from external
shocks. On the contrary, the financial implications of exchange rate changes
may well dominate their real implications, so that exchange rate movements may
even exacerbate spillovers (I shall come back to this issue later). According to the
'dilemma' view, the only way out is to resort to the management of capital flows,
either through explicit controls or by means of macroprudential measures aimed
at reducing boom and bust cycles of asset prices.
The debate is still very much alive today; indeed, this was one of the key topics
at the 2019 Jackson Hole Economic Symposium.3 The question then is which
domestic policies and country fundamentals still matter, and how they can be
used to tame the impact of volatile capital flows. On the one hand, the empirical
literature has provided some evidence that capital controls, in combination with
macroprudential regulations, can be effective in reducing the volatility of capital
flows.4 Furthermore, studies have found that capital inflows tend to be both larger
and more stable in countries with sounder financial systems and better institutions.5
On the other hand, recent research,6 including some conducted by staff at the Bank
of Italy,7 has found that, in a more financially interconnected world, exchange
rate flexibility helps in mitigating monetary and financial spillovers to EMEs,
but it does not provide full insulation. This is true not only for small countries
with weak economic fundamentals, but also for advanced economies and large
monetary regions.
The euro area: a dual role
Turning to the euro area, let me focus briefly on the international transmission
mechanism of monetary policy.
Despite being a large economic area, the euro zone is not immune to international
spillovers. The relative importance of global versus local shocks is increasing as
globalisation and financial markets' integration advances. US monetary policy,
the key driver of the global financial cycle, also influences euro-area financing
conditions.
At the same time, given that the euro is the second most important currency in
the international monetary system, the ECB's monetary policy is itself potentially
a source of spillovers (Fig. 2). In recent years, extraordinary monetary stimulus
has also been provided through unconventional monetary policy measures;
international spillovers have been sizeable.
Traditionally, monetary policy is thought to have cross-border effects mainly
through the implied exchange-rate movements. Recent experience, however,
has shown that the monetary policy international transmission mechanism
may have several dimensions. The international environment is now much
more deeply integrated; portfolio substitution by global asset managers acts
as a powerful additional mechanism for transmitting financial shocks across
monetary areas. Moreover, with policy rates close to their effective lower
bound and the Eurosystem's balance sheet greatly expanded, the entire
macrofinancial environment has been transformed. Accordingly, the theoretical
framework to study the international transmission of the ECB monetary policy
stance has been enriched to take into account the role of the increased global
integration of financial markets and the distinctive traits of non-standard
measures.
Unconventional monetary policy can have significant effects abroad through two
relatively new channels. The first is the so-called portfolio rebalancing channel of
asset purchase programs, which is likely to impact financial conditions beyond
currency area boundaries to the extent that domestic and foreign long-term bonds
are substitutes. The second channel - the international bank lending channel -
is likely to be even more important across the Mediterranean. The ECB's
accommodative monetary measures, especially those aimed at making credit more
abundant, can spur the growth of euro-denominated loans outside the euro area,
especially in economies with a significant presence of euro-area based banks.
Implications for the Southern Mediterranean countries
The issue is quite important for Southern Mediterranean countries. In fact, while
capital controls are still stringent in many of them (Fig. 3), the region has become
increasingly integrated into global financial markets. Gross external financing
needs have grown fast, with few exceptions, and for some countries lie above the
emerging and developing countries' average (Fig. 4).
Capital flows to the Southern Mediterranean countries have been quite resilient
overall since the global financial crisis and the so called 'taper-tantrum' episode
in 2013 (Fig. 5), helping to finance 'twin' (current account and fiscal) deficits in
those countries (Tab. 1).
However, the more volatile components of capital inflows (portfolio and banking
flows) have become larger than foreign direct investment (FDI). A sizeable share
of these inflows has gone to financing the government sector's large fiscal deficits
(Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan). At the same time, the reduction of FDI inflows in the
region may also reflect weak fundamentals (feeble growth prospects and policy
uncertainty, as well as geopolitical tensions).
Portfolio and banking flows are notoriously more volatile than FDI flows, as
they are more sensitive to global push factors, such as global risk aversion and
real interest rates in core countries, exposing recipient countries to sudden stops.
A recent study conducted by the IMF shows that portfolio inflows to the Middle
East and North Africa are almost twice as sensitive to changes in global uncertainty
as those to other countries.8
Another worrisome feature concerns the currency composition of debt flows.
Foreign currency debt has expanded rapidly in many countries over the past decade
(Tab. 2), making the financial channel of the exchange rate especially important.
For countries with sizeable net foreign currency liabilities, this channel will have
the opposite sign to the traditional trade channel and may more than fully offset
it (i.e. a devaluation can be contractionary).
Moreover, for many countries in the region trade integration is primarily with the
euro area (Tab. 4) while exchange rates are mainly anchored to the US dollar (with
the exception of Tunisia; Tab. 5). This creates potential currency mismatches,
especially if export proceeds are mainly euro-denominated while debt obligations
are in US dollars.
Policy implications
Given the interdependencies across the Mediterranean countries that I have just
described and the ongoing integration with the euro area, it is natural to ask:
how should policies be designed in order to promote sustainable capital flows
in the Mediterranean area? The issue of how to deal with undesired spillovers
from policies conducted in the euro area and in the US remains a controversial
one. I would like to use the remainder of my time to discuss this question from
three perspectives: that of the country (or area) generating the spillover effects
('originating country'), that of the country impacted and, finally, the multilateral
approach.
Should the central banks in originating countries internalise the spillovers
of their monetary policy to the rest of the world? The textbook answer to that
question is that central banks pursue domestically-focused mandates: thus, they
take into account the adverse effects of volatile capital flows only insofar as they
negatively affect global financial stability, and through this channel may generate
spillback effects to their domestic economy. Both conceptually and empirically,
the measurement of these spillbacks is very challenging as they depend in part on
the policy response of the countries affected.
However, central banks can limit adverse monetary policy spillovers, notably
through transparency and clear communication of their monetary policy
decisions and intentions. The 2013 'taper tantrum' episode exemplifies the
potentially destabilising effects of policy communication mishaps. In addition,
central banks can contribute to the resilience and soundness of their own financial
systems with monetary policies designed to support economic activity and with
macroprudential policies, as well as in their capacity as financial supervisors where
they have such responsibility. This, in turn, contributes to global financial stability,
with favourable spillovers to the rest of the world.
From the perspective of the countries affected, the question is how can
they shield their economies and financial systems from adverse spillovers?
Experience shows that having strong domestic fundamentals and sound policy
frameworks is essential. This usually includes sustainable budgetary positions;
a business environment capable of stimulating investment and attracting FDI; a
policy framework that ensures effective regulation and supervision of the financial
sector; and the monitoring of private and public debt in foreign currency. Deep
and developed domestic financial markets are a necessary condition for building
up resilience to external shocks. The consensus nowadays is that exchange rate
flexibility might help, but it is no silver bullet. Economies need to have good
fundamentals and a comprehensive set of policy tools, including macroprudential
and capital management measures, to protect themselves adequately from adverse
spillovers.
Finally, from a multilateral perspective, it seems that the interdependencies
between the policies of both the originator and destination countries call for
enhanced cooperation. While formal monetary policy coordination would not be
feasible in view of central bank mandates, there is scope for enhancing multilateral
efforts to deal with adverse spillovers. Having a platform for the exchange of views
is extremely valuable in this regard. I am thinking about this high-level policy
dialogue between the Eurosystem and the Mediterranean countries' central banks.
I believe that this is the right forum in which these issues can be framed and
discussed on a regular basis.
By sharing information and views on the global and domestic economic outlook
and on the frameworks within which policy decisions are taken, central banks
of the Eurosystem and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries can
develop a better understanding of the respective monetary policies. Enhanced
transparency makes policy actions more predictable and facilitates discussions on
the mix of policy options to anticipate and address risks in the countries affected.
FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1
International financial integration: gross external assets and liabilities
(per cent of GDP)
300 70
60
250
50
200
40
150
30
100
20
50
10
0 0
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
AE EME (right scale)
Sources: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017) and IMF.
Figure 2
Snapshot of the international monetary system
(percentages; data at 2018 Q4 or the latest available)
US dollar Renminbi
Euro Yen
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Foreign exchange International debt International loans Foreign exchange Global payment currency
reserves turnover (SWIFT)
Source: 'The international role of the euro', ECB (2019).
Figure 3
Capital controls restriction index
(2017)
1.0 1.0
0.8 0.8
0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4
0.2 0.2
0.0 0.0
Algeria Egypt Lebanon Morocco Tunisia United
States
Inflows Outflows Overall
Source: Fernandez et al. (2016), update.
Note: The dataset considers capital control restrictions on both inflows and outflows of 10 categories of assets. It is based on the analysis of
the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The index ranges between 0 (no restrictions)
and 1 (total restriction).
Figure 4
Gross external financing needs
(per cent of GDP)
40
35 Algeria
2018-06
30
needs,
25
20
Tunisia
Lebanon
financing
15
10
Egypt
EMDE Average
external
Turkey
5
Morocco
gross
0
in
-5
Jordan
Change
-10
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Gross external financing needs, 2018
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2019.
Note: Gross external financing needs= current account deficit plus short-term debt.
Figure 5
Net capital flows
(per cent of GDP)
Algeria Egypt
5 12
10
4
8
3 6
4
2
2
1 0
-2
0
-4
-1 -6
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
FDI Portfolio Other investments Net financial flows FDI Portfolio Other investments Net financial flows
Jordan Lebanon
24 45
22
40
20
35
18
30
16
14
25
12
20
10
15
8
10
6
4
5
2
0
0
-5
-2
-4 -10
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
FDI Portfolio Other investments Net financial flows FDI Portfolio Other investments Net financial flows
Morocco Tunisia
9 10
9
8
8
7
7
6
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
0
0
-1 -1
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
FDI Portfolio Other investments Net financial flows FDI Portfolio Other investments Net financial flows
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2019.
Note: Net flows are given by inflows minus outflows.
Table 1
Current account balance and general government deficit
(per cent of GDP)
Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Tunisia
Current General Current General Current General Current General Current General Current General
account gov't account gov't account gov't account gov't account gov't account gov't
balance deficit balance deficit balance deficit balance deficit balance deficit balance deficit
2015 -16.4 -15.3 -3.7 -10.9 -9.0 -8.5 -19.3 -7.5 -2.1 -4.2 -9.7 -5.3
2016 -16.5 -13.1 -6.0 -12.5 -9.4 -3.7 -23.1 -8.9 -4.0 -4.5 -9.3 -6.2
2017 -13.2 -6.6 -6.1 -10.4 -10.6 -3.7 -25.9 -8.6 -3.4 -3.5 -10.2 -5.9
2018 -9.6 -4.8 -2.4 -9.4 -7.0 -4.8 -25.6 -11.0 -5.4 -3.7 -11.1 -4.6
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2019.
Table 2
Current account position and foreign exchange debt exposure
Current account % of GDP Share of foreign currency debt*
(2018) (in %)
Algeria -9.6 n.a.
Egypt -2.4 33.6
Jordan -7.3 39.5
Lebanon -25.6 n.a.
Morocco -5.5 38.6
Tunisia -11.1 40.5
Sources: IMF External Sector Report, July 2019 and World Economic Outlook, October 2019.
Note: *Foreign exchange weights on foreign liabilities.
Table 3
Destination of exports and origin of imports
as a share of countries' total exports and imports
Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Tunisia
% share of exports to
Euro Area 50.6 27.9 2.6 11.0 58.5 68.6
USA 9.4 8.5 26.4 1.9 5.5 2.8
China 1.3 1.3 1.6 3.1 0.9 0.7
Other 38.7 62.4 69.4 84.0 35.1 27.9
% share of imports from
Euro Area 27.7 19.7 16.8 34.2 47.0 48.8
USA 0.4 5.0 8.7 7.1 8.0 3.4
China 15.8 9.0 13.6 10.1 9.9 9.6
Other 56.1 66.3 60.8 48.5 35.1 38.3
Source: IMF, Direction of trade statistics.
Table 4
Exchange rate regimes and anchor currencies
Exchange rate regime Anchor currency
de facto de jure de facto
Algeria Other managed arrangement basket USD (since 1999)
Egypt Stabilised arrangement USD USD
Jordan Peg USD USD
Lebanon Stabilised arrangement USD USD
Morocco Peg basket 60% USD; 40% EUR
Tunisia Crawl-like arrangement EUR EUR
Sources: IMF, AREAER 2018 and Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2016).