Mr. Heikensten discusses inflation and the interest rate in Sweden Address
by the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr. Lars Heikensten, at a conference arranged
by the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and Veckans Affärer on 29/1/97.
I should like to begin with a word of thanks for the invitation to talk about
economic developments, inflation and the conditions for monetary policy. It is beginning to have
the feel of a tradition.
Today I shall start by considering the course of events since we met here a year
ago. Then I intend to take a look at the future and paint a picture of the outlook not just for 1997
but for the somewhat longer perspective that is relevant for monetary policy. Finally I shall draw
some policy conclusions.
Growth but not employment
Before considering 1996, however, I shall look further back. Since the summer of
1993, when the dramatic fall in production was broken, the annual growth rate in the Swedish
economy has averaged about 2.8 per cent. This is considerably higher than the rates we were
accustomed to in the 1970s and 1980s. In that capacity utilisation was so low initially, it is
hardly surprising that growth as such has been high. What is surprising - and very troublesome
is the weak development of employment.
Sweden is not alone in Europe in having problems with the creation of new jobs;
rather the reverse. But in the United States the situation is very different and even in Europe
there are exceptions; one is Holland in the past decade (Diagram 1). The differences from
Sweden are appreciable.
Today in Sweden the issue of unemployment is being discussed more and more. It
is important that the premises for this discussion are correct. At the Riksbank we believe that in
the coming two years production in Sweden will pick up again, although growth is unlikely to
reach the average level of the past three to four years. This should generate some increase in
employment. But a radical improvement in employment calls for more than economic growth;
above all it requires that the labour market and wage formation function better.
Markedly lower interest rates
When I spoke at this conference a year ago the repo rate was 8.66 per cent. In the
course of 1996 we lowered the rate 25 times. At the end of 1996 the repo rate was 4.10 per cent
as against 8.91 per cent at the beginning. In the industrialised world, the Riksbank's reduction of
its instrumental rate is accordingly one of the largest and steepest. Moreover, the current level of
the repo rate is the lowest in Sweden for more than thirty years.
The cuts have been gradual and as far as possible predictable. As the outlook for
inflation improved and interest rates declined, market perceptions of how far down the repo rate
might move were also revised (Diagram 2). Our intention was to bring the repo rate down
without any loss of confidence in monetary policy, as expressed in such price variables as the
exchange rate and long bond rates. It worked; at no time did the market react so wildly as to
disturb the picture.
There are good reasons for underscoring that such a monetary policy realignment
presupposes that many factors are favourable. That was the case in 1996. The conditions in
international financial markets were stable and positive for Sweden. Economic activity abroad
and in Sweden was comparatively weak and implied a good outlook for inflation. Sweden's
fiscal policy was perceived as increasingly credible as the budget outcome improved and both
the Government and the Riksdag (Sweden's parliament) demonstrated a determination to fulfil
earlier commitments.
Better outlook for inflation
In Sweden the outlook for inflation improved on several counts:
-Economic activity became somewhat weaker. Export growth slackened as
a result of the krona's appreciation and slowdowns abroad. This was accompanied by a
reduction of industrial stocks. The domestic economy was relatively weak, though activity does
seem to have picked up, particularly last autumn. GDP growth probably amounted to between 1
and 1.5 per cent (Diagram 3). In terms of long-term balance, the composition of growth was
favourable, with strong increases for net exports and industrial investment (Diagram 4). There
was also a large surplus on current account.
-The inflation propensity seems to have decreased. The conditions for
persistently low inflation improved in a number of respects. The expected rate of inflation fell
from survey to survey (Diagram 5). Bond pricing shows a similar picture. Most of the surveyed
groups now expect a rate of inflation, even in the longer run, that is well in line with the
Riksbank's target. In parts of the economy it also looks as though pricing behaviour has
changed; conceivable explanations for this include increased competition as a result of
deregulations and EU membership. These tendencies are difficult to confirm for certain but the
indications are clear.
-Temporary effects have also been at work. The krona's appreciation
accounted for approximately 0.4 percentage points of the fall in inflation from 2.6 per cent in
December 1995 to -0.2 per cent in December 1996. For the CPI, the part played by decreased
interest rates has been even greater; the downward effect on the inflation from falling house
mortgage rates totalled 1.4 percentage points. It is because of the temporary effects that the
average level of the inflation in 1996 is outside the Riksbank's target interval. As a rule, the
interval surrounding the target figure should suffice to absorb changes of this type in the
composition of inflation. That this was not the case in 1996 had to do with the marked
reappraisal of the situation in Sweden. Both the rate of inflation generated domestically and the
ways in which the Riksbank measures underlying inflation show a fall that is less dramatic
(Diagram 6).
Improvement in government finance
Perhaps the most pronounced swing in the past year (actually since the summer of
1995) has occurred for government finance. Confidence grew in the ability of the Government
and the Riksdag to reverse the crisis. A number of factors contributed to this.
-The budget outcome successively improved in relation to earlier official
estimates (Diagram 7). As regards the budget deficit for 1997, current estimates suggest that
Sweden will do well in a European context. And although Government debt is still high, here,
too, the turn seems to be more distinct than expected.
-Another factor behind the swing is the Government's clear adherence to
the convergence programme from the summer of 1995. When it seemed that the budget target
was in danger in the spring of 1996, additional measures were presented to fulfil the ambitions.
This had favourable effects on interest rates and credibility.
Developments in recent years prompt two distinct warnings. Building up the
credibility which characterised the past year took a long time and was very costly. The
announcement of extensive measures in the winter of 1994-95 did not suffice. It was not until
the budget outcome started to turn that we could reap the positive effects on bond rates, etc. It
must also be borne in mind that a part of the budget's reinforcement is tied to the stronger
exchange rate and the lower interest rates. Sustained confidence is therefore a sine qua non for
budget consolidation.
In view of the political debate, there may be cause to underscore fiscal policy's
importance for monetary policy. A tighter fiscal policy normally implies a better situation for
inflation; it makes it easier for the Riksbank to fulfil the inflation target in conjunction with low
interest rates. In addition, a fiscal policy that lacks credibility creates problems for monetary
policy - as was the case during much of the period 1990-95. The radical lowering of interest
rates during 1996 is something for which our thanks are very much due to fiscal policy.
Continued economic upswing
So much for history. In discussing tendencies for the coming years I shall start
from our inflation report last December.
In the report, conditions for exports in the coming years were judged to be good.
Nothing has occurred to modify that assessment. Industry's competitive position is favourable.
To an increasing extent, export growth seems to be coming from rapidly expanding regions, not
least Asia. The international upswing last autumn is expected to become somewhat stronger in
both 1997 and 1998.
Judging from order inflows and other business tendency figures, the growth of
exports is likely to be modest. The most recent figures may perhaps indicate that international
developments will generate somewhat weaker growth than expected, but the difference would be
marginal. This is countered, moreover, by an exchange rate that, at present at least, is weaker.
The conditions for increased demand for consumption were also judged to be
favourable (Diagram 8). Neither has the picture in this respect changed at all substantially.
Increased consumption is indicated by low interest rates and a level of household saving that,
historically, is relatively high and is expected to show some fall. To this can be added an
accumulated need to renew the stock of durable goods. The main factor in the opposite direction
is unemployment, which is persistently high and even tended to rise in the autumn. Neither are
the increments to household income in the period 1997-98 expected to be as large as in 1996.
Then there is the uncertainty that stems from weak government finance and the changes that
have been made and may be called for in the social security system, including pensions. All in
all, however, it seems that the subdued but stable increase in consumption may continue.
In view of the above, we adhere to the growth scenario that featured in the last
two inflation reports. This implies an accelerating growth rate that for 1996 and 1997 combined
totals almost 4 per cent. Development in 1996, however, seems to have been marginally weaker
than we counted on. Some further acceleration of growth is then foreseen in 1998. The
conclusion in the inflation report therefore holds good: it is not likely that in the coming two
years economic activity will rise above the level of potential output at which inflation is liable to
pick up (Diagram 9).
Wage development a key factor
The wage increases during 1996 exceeded what the Swedish economy can
manage in the longer run. The underlying rate of wage increases moved up to more than 5 per
cent. The rate of wage increases on top of collective agreements also accelerated in
manufacturing.
For price formation in 1996, the consequences of these tendencies were limited.
As long as domestic demand remains subdued, firms have difficulty in passing through the
increased wage costs to prices. The outcome is more likely to be rationalisation, increased
productivity and, in certain cases, decreased employment.
The starting point for the Riksbank's assessment of the future rate of wage
increases is that a downward adjustment will be achieved. At the time of the settlements that
were reached in much of the labour market in 1994-95 the expected level of future inflation was
considerably higher than it is today (Diagram 10). The present credibility of the inflation target
did not exist. Moreover, employment was rising relatively fast in parts of the economy and
profits were higher than they are today.
The downward adjustment we foresee is, however, a gradual process and slower
than would be desirable. As far as inflation in the next two years is concerned, the slow
adjustment is not seen as a problem, at least as long as the situation agrees with the Riksbank's
main scenario, where the growth of consumption is subdued. For employment the problem is
greater. Lower wage increases might be accompanied by a faster increase in labour demand.
The new information about the rate of wage increases since the December report
supports the assessment that some retardation should be feasible during 1997. The wage
statistics for the most recent months show signs of some improvement. Future wage formation is
being discussed by the labour market organisations. Apart from this, lower wage increases in
future agreements are indicated by a number of factors. Profit levels in export companies are
lower and there is little possibility of passing through costs to consumers. To date in the 1997
negotiations, wage demands have been lower than in the previous round, though still high in
relation to the low inflation expectations.
Inflation in line with the target
Over the last six months, markets have tended to focus on the latest figures for
inflation. In a way, this is hardly surprising - the figures during the autumn have been
unexpectedly low. It should be emphasised, however, that the Riksbank's policy refers to a
longer period. Figures for "yesterday's" inflation are therefore relevant only in so far as they say
something about the future. To some extent that has been the case in the past six months; the
figures have suggested a somewhat lower inflation propensity. In the main, however, they have
reflected the strength of the transient effects.
Inflation expectations, as measured in surveys and forecasts, have been stable, in
some cases with a fall during the autumn and winter. The expected rate of inflation one year
ahead is around 1.5 per cent and the average rate in the next five years is around 2 per cent.
What about the inflation forecasts for the coming years? There are many
indications that the 12-month change figure for the CPI reached a low in December, with the
prospect of gradually rising figures during the spring as the transient effects that pushed price
increases down last year come to an end. At the beginning of 1997, moreover, prices have also
been affected by, for example, changes to indirect taxes and subsidies; these changes are
expected to raise the price level by about 0.5 per cent. On the other hand, house mortgage
interest costs should continue to have a downward effect on prices, at least during 1997.
An upward tendency in inflation is therefore something that the Riksbank counts
on in the next two years. Consequently it will not come as a surprise, at least as long as it is
moderate. In the inflation report we envisaged that during 1997 the CPI would rise by an
average of just under 1.5 per cent. For 1998 it was considered that inflation would be somewhat
higher, around 2 per cent, which included an increase in the price level of about 0.5 per cent
from further changes in taxes and subsidies (Diagram 11). The assessment accordingly pointed
to a rate of inflation that would be in line with the Riksbank's target.
Same conclusion
The picture I have outlined does not warrant any change in the conclusions
presented in the December inflation report. Our main scenario suggests that at present the
monetary stance is relatively well balanced.
The new information about economic activity and price movements points to a
picture of inflation in 1997 that is marginally more positive. In the opposite direction, the
exchange rate has been somewhat weaker than we counted on. While this does not stem from
what are commonly referred to as economic fundamentals, the fact remains that a weaker
exchange rate - which Sweden has now had for a quarter or so - has effects on the picture of
demand and inflation.
The Riksbank will continue to evaluate the effects of the interest rate cuts that
were implemented during 1996. As pointed out on many occasions in the past year, we will also
be keeping a close watch on the future development of economic activity. The ongoing
construction of monetary policy will depend on our assessment of inflation's future course, for
instance in the light of incoming information.
1.
Real GDP and employment in
Real GDP and employment in
Sweden, Netherlands and the
Sweden, Netherlands and the
United States
United States
1980-1996
1980-1996
150
140
United States
130
120
110
Sweden
100
Netherlands
90
80
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
125 125
United States
120 120
115 115
110 110
Netherlands
105 105
100 100
95 95
Sweden
90 90
85 85
80 80
80 80 81 81 82 82 83 83 84 84 85 85 86 86 87 87 88 88 89 89 90 90 91 91 92 92 93 93 94 94 95 95 96 96
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Dec. '96
Forecast data for 1996
- 7 -
2.
Actual and expected repo rate
Actual and expected repo rate
10 10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
Jan . . '95 95 Ju ly y Dec. Mar. . '96 96 Ju u n n e e Sept. Nov . . F eb. . '97 Ju ly y
Settlement t date
Repo 19 1995-08-29 19 1995-09-26 19 1995-12-27
19 1996-03-25 19 1996-06-25 19 1996-09-24 19 1996-12-10
Source: The Riksbank
3.
Com position of growth
Com position of growth
Percentage contributions
Percentage contributions
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
C onsum ption G ross capital form a tion
S tockbuilding N et exports
-4
199 1993 199 1994 199 1995 199 1996 199 1997
S ource s: S ta tistics S we de n ; 1996 - 97 fore ca st in N ov . '96
by N a tiona l Institu te of E con om ic R e se a rch
4.
E xports and industrial
E xports and industrial
investm ent
investm ent
25 5 0 0 V V olum olum e e index, index, 1992= 1992= 100 100
20 0 0 0
In du stria l
in v e s tm e n t
15 5 0 0
E xports, goods a n d se rv ice s
10 0 0 0
50
0
19 9 9 9 2 19 9 9 9 3 19 9 9 9 4 19 9 9 9 5 19 9 9 9 6 19 9 9 9 7 19 9 9 9 8
S ou rce s : S ta tistics S w e de n ; 1996 - 97 fore ca s t in N ov . '96
by N a tion a l In s titu te of E con om ic R e se a rch
5.
Inflation expectations of
Inflation expectations of
money market agents
money market agents
per cent
per cent
4.5 4.5
Jan. '95
4.0 4.0
3.5 3.5
O ct. '95
3.0 3.0
Aug. '96
2.5 2.5
2.0 2.0
Nov. '96
1.5 1.5
CPI
1.0 1.0
0.5 0.5
0.0 0.0
-0.5 -0.5
1994 994 1995 995 1996 996 1997 997 1998 998 1999 999 2000 000 2001 001
Sources: Statistics Sweden and Prospera R esearch
CPI com ponents
CPI com ponents
Percentage Percentage 12-m 12-m onth onth change change
15
15
10 10
D om estic ( 66% )
5 5
0 0
Im port ( 24% )
-5 -5
H ouse m ortgage
-10 -10
inte rest costs ( 10% )
-15 -15
1990 90 1991 91 1992 92 1993 93 1994 94 1995 95 1996 96
S ource s: S ta tistics S we den a nd the R iksba nk
7.
National Debt Office forecasts of
National Debt Office forecasts of
government borrowing reqirement
government borrowing reqirement
for 1996
for 1996
S E K bn S E K bn
80 80 80 80
70 70 70 70
60 60 60 60
50 50 F orecast and 50 50
interval
40 40 40 40
30 30 30 30
20 20 20 20
10 10 10 10
8.
P rivate con su m ption
P rivate con su m ption
Seasonally adjusted, SE K bn
Seasonally adjusted, SE K bn
2 2 1 1 0 0
2 2 0 0 0 0
1 1 9 9 0 0
1 1 8 8 0 0
1 1 7 7 0 0
1 1 6 6 0 0
1 1 5 5 0 0
8 8 4 4 8 8 5 5 8 8 6 6 8 8 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 2 9 9 3 3 9 9 4 4 9 9 5 5 9 9 6 6 9 9 7 7 9 9 8 8
S ou rce s: S ta tistics S w e de n; 1996 - 97 fore ca st in N ov . '96
by N a tiona l In stitu te of E conom ic R e se a rch
9.
Output gap calculated with
Output gap calculated with
three alternative methods
three alternative methods
Per cent
Per cent
6 6
4 4
2 2
0 0
-2 -2
-4 -4
-6 -6
-8 -8
80 80 81 81 82 82 83 83 84 84 85 85 86 86 87 87 88 88 89 89 90 90 91 91 92 92 93 93 94 94 95 95 96 96
S ource: T he R iksbank
Inflation expectations of
Inflation expectations of
labour m arket organisations
labour m arket organisations
per cent
per cent
5 5
Ja n. '95
4 4
3 3
2 2
C P I
N ov. '96
1 1
0 0
-1 -1
1994 94 1995 95 1996 96 1997 97 1998 98 1999 99 2000 00 2001 01
S ource s: S ta tistics S we de n a nd P rospera R e se a rch
11.
Inflation assessm ents for 1997 and
Inflation assessm ents for 1997 and
1998 in the D ecem ber inflation report
1998 in the D ecem ber inflation report
per per cent cent
3.5 3.5
3.0 3.0
2.5 2.5
A ssessm en t 1998
A vera ge 1995
C P I
2.0 2.0
A ssessm en t 1997
1.5 1.5
1.0 1.0
0.5 0.5
A vera ge 1996
0.0 0.0
-0.5 -0.5
19 1995 19 1996 19 1997 19 1998
S ource s: S ta tistics S w e de n a nd the R iksba nk