Haruhiko Kuroda: How to sustain economic growth in Asia
Speech by Mr Haruhiko Kuroda, Governor of the Bank of Japan, at the Amartya Sen Lecture,
organised by the Cambridge Society of Thailand, Bangkok, 21 July 2015.
* * *
Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech or on the Bank of Japan's website.
Introduction
It is a great honor to give a presentation in front of such a distinguished audience, especially
Mr. Anand Panyarachun and Professor Amartya Sen. I have admired Professor Sen ever
since I became acquainted with his work when I studied economics at Oxford, about
45 years ago. At that time, I was fascinated to read not only his elegant theoretical papers on
social choice but also his research on poverty and inequality, which has had a huge impact
on development economics.
Today, I have chosen a topic which is inseparable from the subject of development, and that
is economic growth. More specifically, I would like to discuss how we can sustain economic
growth in Asia. As Robert Lucas has correctly pointed out, "Once one starts to think about
economic growth, it is hard to think about anything else."1 Therefore, I will take off my central
bank governor's cap for a while, and there will be no mention tonight of either
"unconventional monetary policy" or "quantitative and qualitative monetary easing."
In recent years, the question of how to sustain economic growth has become an increasing
preoccupation both within academia and among policy makers. The debate on the "secular
stagnation" of mature economies is one manifestation of this.2 Given the tendency of
regression to the mean, even rapidly growing emerging economies may eventually face
similar challenges.3 In the light of these discussions, whether Asia can sustain its robust
economic growth over the coming decades may not be a particularly comfortable question,
but it is nonetheless a question worth asking.
In the following presentation, I will first consider a number of stylized facts regarding
economic growth in Asia. Then, I will move on to a discussion of how economic growth in
Asia might be sustained.
I. Three stylized facts
The first stylized fact that I want to consider is that Asia has grown almost constantly at a
very rapid pace over a number of decades. Chart 1 shows per capita GDP by region. It is
quite impressive that Asia, which was at the lowest level in 1950, has outperformed the other
regions in terms of growth. In this long-term context, the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 seems to
have been just a slight hiccup. The average growth rate over the last 60 years or so is about
4 percent per year. Thanks to the power of compound interest, this makes Asian per capita
GDP now 12 times as large as that in 1950. No wonder Asian economies are often
characterized as "dynamic Asia."
The second stylized fact is the large degree of heterogeneity, or diversity in plain English, in
the level of per capita GDP. As illustrated in Chart 2, the Asian NIEs (Hong Kong SAR,
Singapore, Taiwan and Korea) and Japan enjoy very high levels of income, whereas most
Asian countries - and in fact most of the population of Asia - belong to the middle-income
group.4 Even within the middle-income group, individual countries differ considerably in their
levels of per capita GDP.
Economists studying economic growth rely primarily on estimates of GDP, but they
sometimes check these statistics against data from other sources. One simple and visually
impressive yardstick of economic prosperity is the amount of artificial light that can be seen
at night from space.5 Chart 3 shows such an image for Asia. This not only confirms the
aforementioned heterogeneity across Asian countries, but also shows the heterogeneity
within a country. For instance, coastal China is as bright as Korea and Japan, but light
becomes sparse as you move inland. Likewise, the area around Delhi in India, or Bangkok in
this country, is quite bright, but there are plenty of darker areas as well.
The third stylized fact relates to the heterogeneity in growth rate of per capita GDP. As I said,
Asia as a whole has maintained a growth rate of about 4 percent for more than half a
century, as shown in the left-hand-side panel of Chart 4.
However, once we plot the growth rates of individual economies, the diversity in the nature of
the region's economic development becomes immediately apparent. The graph also reveals
that there were shifts in the region's "rising stars." Japan recorded double digit growth in the
1960s, but its growth rate became subdued thereafter. Instead, the Asian NIEs took over the
position of very rapid growth economies, followed by China more recently.
If we redraw the picture, not against time horizons but against income levels, as shown in the
right-hand-side panel of Chart 4, there emerges a pattern of development stages. Growth
rate tends to become higher once a country makes the transition from the low-income to the
middle-income stage. The growth rate reaches its peak when an economy is at the
middleincome stage. After that, it tends to become slower, especially once a country enters the
high-income stage.
II. Three traps for growth
Can Asian countries sustain their rapid economic growth for the foreseeable future? If history
is any guide, we could expect another rising star to emerge in Asia. It is by no means
guaranteed, however. Even if it is the case, we cannot entirely count on one single rising
star. The growth rate of relatively high-income Asian economies needs also to be sustained
at a reasonably high level if the prosperity of the regional economy as a whole is to be
maintained.
I believe there are three traps which we must avoid falling into if we are to sustain economic
growth in Asia. Despite the heterogeneity which we have observed, these three traps are
relevant to many countries in the region, albeit to varying degrees, depending on the
circumstances.
The first trap is the "middle-income trap."6 History shows that many economies have faced
difficulties in advancing beyond the status of a middle-income economy once they have
exploited the growth opportunities provided by imported technology and abundant labor force
from rural areas. Such an inflection point is known as the Lewisian Turning Point. Up to that
point, growth accounting analysis generally indicates that a country tends to register high
economic growth through vast capital accumulation, rapidly rising total factor productivity and
continued increases in labor input. Once such a point has been reached, however, growth is
likely to decelerate. Nevertheless, it is still possible for a country reaching the Lewisian
Turning Point to continue growing, although at a somewhat decelerated pace, through
technological advances and cultivation of new markets.
In the region, Japan and the NIEs managed to overcome this trap and join the group of
highincome countries in the 1970s and the 1990s, respectively - as you can see in the right-hand
panel of Chart 4 again. China and some ASEAN countries, including Thailand, have already
reached the upper middle-income stage, which means that they have great opportunities to
advance further toward high-income status. Moreover, there are many other countries in the
region that are still at the lower middle-income stage, but with great potential for continued
growth for years to come.
The second challenge is the "demographic trap." A number of economies in the region,
particularly those at the high-income stage and, to a lesser extent, at the upper
middleincome stage, are experiencing, or about to experience, population aging: the result of longer
life expectancies combined with lower fertility rates. From the view point of per-capita income
growth, which I believe is an appropriate measure of "living standard," what really matters is
the proportion of the working-age population to the population as a whole. Population aging
implies a continued decline in the proportion of the working-age population, which in turn
poses a challenge to sustaining per-capita income growth, as a given income earner has to
transfer a larger share of his or her income to the retirees.
Chart 5 shows how diverse the region is in this context, with some countries already facing
serious challenges. In this chart, the horizontal axis is changes in working-age population,
and the vertical axis is the proportion of the working-age population to the total population. A
rise in this proportion is often called a "demographic bonus," while the opposite is called a
"demographic onus." And the size of the bubble is proportional to the absolute number of the
working-age population.
As you can see, over such a long period of time, even glacial demographic changes seem
dramatic. Japan has already entered deep into the period of demographic onus, with the
absolute number of the working-age population declining at a significant pace. The NIEs,
China and some ASEAN countries are about to follow Japan in this regard in the
not-sodistant future. Meanwhile, India and other Asian countries are expected to enjoy a favorable
demographic environment at least until the middle of this century.
The third challenge is what I call the "Malthusian trap." In Malthus' original work, the
existence of a limited resource - land in his case - constrains growth. Likewise, limitations in
the supply of natural resources, such as oil, are thought to threaten global growth in the
longrun. A problem arises even with water, seemingly abundant resources at least for Japanese.
As a matter of fact, water scarcity is often discussed as an important constraint on
industrialization as well as agricultural development in the global economy. From this point of
view, the slowdown in commodity-consuming emerging economies in recent years may
suggest that an automatic stabilizer - or an appropriate policy reaction toward this constraint
- is actually affecting the economic growth over the cycles. Environment issues such as
global warming can be thought of as a variant of this Malthusian trap.
III. Productivity growth
It is generally acknowledged that the key to avoiding these three traps is productivity growth,
or more precisely "total factor productivity growth." In a recent speech, Janet Yellen, the
Chair of the Federal Reserve Board, stated that, "The most important factor determining
continued advances in living standards is productivity growth."7 I could not agree with her
more.
Take an example of the Malthusian trap. Malthus' dismal prophecy did not materialize
because dramatically high productivity growth in the agricultural sector in the 18th century
enabled countries to feed vastly increasing populations and hence sustain growth. For
instance, when the potato, a plant native to the Americas, was introduced into Ireland, a field
of potatoes could feed two or three times as many people as a similar field of grain, so the
introduction of the potato resulted in a significant rise in Ireland's agricultural productivity.
Likewise, in the modern world, higher productivity enables an economy to grow even with a
smaller working-age population, and hence to avoid the demographic trap. If a country can
maintain a decent productivity growth even after it has exploited imported technology and an
underutilized labor force, that country is likely to succeed in growing its way out of the
middle-income trap.
Discussion of the myth of Asian miracles also highlights the importance of total factor
productivity. Well before the Asian currency crisis of 1997-1998, Paul Krugman argued that
the rapid growth of the NIEs or Asian tigers was not sustainable because their high growth
was not sufficiently supported by total factor productivity.8 History vindicated his assessment:
the Asian currency crisis was in part an inevitable transition toward more sustainable and
balanced growth.
Let me confirm this point using data, with the usual disclaimer regarding the large uncertainty
associated with estimates of total factor productivity. In graph 6, the vertical axis is per capita
GDP growth, while the horizontal axis is total factor productivity growth. In the left panel,
which describes the period preceding the Asian currency crisis, the dots representing high
growth Asian economies are generally located well above the regression line. This means
that their economic growth could be explained relatively more by expansion of inputs, such
as demographic bonus and investment boom, than by total factor productivity growth.
The right hand panel, which describes the situation in recent years, after the Great Financial
Crisis, shows that Asian economies are much closer to the regression line than they were in
the 1990s. This looks encouraging in terms of balanced growth. One caveat, however, is that
Asian dots are located closer to the zero-vertical line as well: total factor productivity growth
is generally lower than it was in the 1990s. In other words, economic growth appears to be
more balanced, but it may have also lost some strength. This is a bit disturbing because
population aging is about to accelerate in some countries, with stronger demographic
headwinds therefore to be expected. Remember that once a country falls into demographic
onus, it needs to offset negative demographic forces with higher growth in total factor
productivity just to maintain per capita growth, and hence living standards. This is exactly
why total factor productivity growth is the crucial issue for a number of Asian economies.
The next question then is, how do we raise total factor productivity growth? The answer may
be a pessimistic one if we think that productivity growth is only exogenously determined. If
this is the case, all we can do is hope that some exogenous shock, or just pure luck, will
raise productivity. We would have to admit that there is an element of truth in this explanation
if we look at the history of prosperous cities, as highlighted by Enrico Moretti, an expert in
urban economics.9
For instance, the reason why Seattle, Washington, became a high-tech industry hub
depended to a large extent on the fact that the founders of Microsoft had grown up there and
wanted to relocate their company to a place familiar to them. Similar stories can be found for
other U.S. high-tech cities. If these cases provide a complete explanation of productivity
growth, all we can do is wait and hope for a genius like Bill Gates or Steve Jobs to be born
by chance in our country.
Fortunately, however, economic literature is much more hopeful in this respect: productivity
is largely endogenous.
IV. How to raise productivity
In the economic literature, there is a long list of factors that are thought to have a positive
impact on productivity growth. I do not intend to go through all of them but, instead, I would
like to focus on three things that I think are of particular importance.
The first is human capital. Measuring human capital is a difficult task, but one of the simplest
indicators often used is the number of school years. In Chart 7, the greater the number of
years spent in school, the darker the green in which the country is colored. In Asia, there are
a number of dark green areas, such as Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Sri Lanka. As you would
expect, Hong Kong and Singapore also belong to this group, although it is not shown clearly
on this map. One may get the impression that Asia as a whole is not as green as North
America or Europe, and is more or less similar to South America. This would seem to
indicate that there remains significant potential for further accumulation of human capital in
the region.
At the same time, there are some interesting figures relating to U.S. universities, which are
generally acknowledged as providing the highest standard of education, attracting talented
people from all over the world. If you look at the data for U.S. university students by their
country of origin, you can see that students from Asian countries dominate, as shown in
Chart 8. Those students returning to their home countries will no doubt have a profound
impact on the human capital there. It is well known that Bangalore, the IT hub of India,
benefited from returnees from Silicon Valley. Moretti's study shows that innovative, highly
skilled workers contribute not only directly to the higher quality of human capital, but they
also have a positive effect on the skills of those around them - a sort of positive externality.10
It is also encouraging to see that an increasing number of Asian universities have become
recognized as top-tier at a global level. According to some recent university rankings, more
than ten universities in Asia are among the best 100.11 Remember that the success of
Bangalore also lies in the fact that local IT firms were able to recruit many highly skilled
graduates from nearby universities.
Against these backdrops, Asian has made larger contributions to the development of
science. For instance, the share of Asian born Nobel prize winners in scientific fields doubled
to more than 10 percent after the turn of the millennium.12 These truly top academic scholars
have influenced the development of human capital in their own countries in various forms as
exemplified by Professor Sen himself in front of us.
The second key to higher productivity is a market-friendly business environment. For
example, a critical precondition for market functioning such as property rights protection, or
the rule of law more generally, is an indispensable ingredient for an innovative environment,
which in turn is the basis for productivity growth. I firmly believe, as many economists do, that
healthy competition and appropriate incentives are essential for a well-functioning market
mechanism, through which sustainable and robust economic growth is made possible. On
this score, deregulation is to be strongly encouraged as well. I think that Asian economies
are making steady progress in this regard, although I also believe that much more needs to
be done.
While the importance of market mechanisms cannot be exaggerated, it does not mean that
we can turn a blind eye to income inequality. As a matter of fact, some academics argue that
inclusiveness is conducive to economic growth in the long-run.13 Furthermore, a recent
empirical study shows that lower inequality is correlated with faster and longer economic
growth.14 Chart 9 compares inequality in income across countries. According to Thomas
Piketty, inequality in the United States is alarmingly high and hence colored in dark red in this
Chart.15 Compared with the United States, inequality in Asia is generally low, albeit with
some exceptions.
The third element which plays an important role in raising productivity is a strong financial
sector. I am completely convinced by arguments for creative destruction as a source of
productivity growth.16 As pointed out by Joseph Schumpeter, financial intermediation is an
important catalyst to support innovative entrepreneurs and value creators generally. A
modern example of this can be found in venture capitalists, who provide not only financial
resources, but also business advice for growth-oriented companies. Of course, the role of
financial intermediation is not limited to supporting start-ups. As a matter of fact, the
seamless availability of a wide range of financial functions would best serve innovation-led
economic growth.
In the Asian context, channeling the region's abundant savings to the vast demand for
infrastructure is also an important challenge in which I myself was deeply involved when I
was President of the Asian Development Bank. Developing bond markets has been one of
the successful initiatives in terms of intra-regional matching between savings and
investment.17 Bond markets in Asia, especially those denominated in local currencies, have
grown significantly since the mid-2000s, thanks to the efforts of the relevant financial
authorities and other bodies. At the end of 2013, outstanding bond issuances amounted to
3.5 trillion U.S. dollars, which is about five times the figure for 2005.
Turning to retail financial services, inclusiveness, which I mentioned a little while ago, is
again an important issue. We should note that a significant number of people in Asia still do
not have their own bank accounts.18 Less than half the population in India has a bank
account. China fares better, with the proportion of account holders being two-thirds of the
population, but that is still far from the situation in advanced economies where almost
everybody has access to a bank account. I believe that the Asian financial landscape, and
13
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty,
Crown Business, 2012.
14
Jonathan D. Ostry, Andrew Berg and Charalambos G. Tsangarides, "Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth,"
IMF Staff Discussion Note, SDN/14/02, 2014.
15
Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Belknap Press, 2014.
16
Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit,
Interest, and the Business Cycle, Harvard University Press, 1934. See also Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt,
"A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction," Econometrica, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 323-351, 1992;
Katsuhito Iwai, "Schumpeterian Dynamics: An Evolutionary Model of Innovation and Imitation," Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 5, pp. 159-190, 1984.
17
Hiroshi Nakaso, "Asian Economy: Past, Present, and Future," Speech at Securities Analysts Association of
Japan International Seminar, April 24, 2015.
18
The Wall Street Journal, "Asia Seeks to Reach the 'Unbanked'," March 18, 2015.
therefore the prospects for further strong economic growth, will be completely different once
the issue of limited availability of banking services is addressed.
Conclusion
In my presentation today, I have emphasized that productivity growth is crucial to sustaining
hitherto robust economic growth in Asia. Among many other things, in my view, the
continued accumulation of human capital, market-friendly institutional setups and strong
financial sectors, all play an important role in productivity growth. We have seen many
positive developments in this respect in Asia, but much more needs to be done.
What I have discussed today could be broadly categorized as structural reforms. Generally
speaking, structural reforms are always and everywhere difficult to implement in the face of
vested interests. Depending partly on where you are in the business cycle, there is often a
strong temptation to defer them to a later date. This is because of concerns about short-term
negative impacts on the economy. Despite all those downsides, however, I still believe that
there is no better time than now to put necessary reforms in motion. Short-term negative
impacts are often overstated. They should not be used as an excuse to oppose reforms. If
structural reforms are well designed, they will increase rather than decrease current demand,
because they improve the prospects of future profits for businesses and hence permanent
income for households.19
That's all from me tonight. Once I have completed my assignment to talk about growth in
Asia, I need to put on my central bank governor's cap again. If I may use Professor Lucas's
quote again with a slight modification, "Once one starts to think about deflation or inflation, it
is hard to think about anything else." Therefore, please give me your comments and
questions before I put my central banker's cap back on.
Thank you.
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