Yutaka Harada: Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan
Speech by Mr Yutaka Harada, Member of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, at a
meeting with business leaders, Nagano, 12 October 2016.
* * *
Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech or on the Bank of Japan's website
Introduction
Thank you for giving me this opportunity to exchange views with people representing
Nagano, who have taken time to be here despite their busy schedules. It is indeed a great
honor to be here today. Please allow me to express my gratitude for your great cooperation
with business operations of the Bank of Japan, particularly of the Matsumoto Branch and the
local office in Nagano.
Three and a half years have passed since the Bank introduced quantitative and qualitative
monetary easing (QQE) in April 2013. Most recently, in September 2016, it released
"Comprehensive Assessment: Developments in Economic Activity and Prices as well as
Policy Effects since the Introduction of Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE),"
and at the same time decided on a new framework for strengthening its monetary easing
policy.
Today, I would like to offer my assessment of the Bank's monetary policy to date. First, from
a somewhat longer-term perspective, I would like to discuss developments in Japan's
economy since the 1980s in order to examine why the economy, which had experienced high
growth among advanced economies, became stagnant from the 1990s. Then, I will elaborate
on the recent economic developments and monetary policy in Japan.
Following my speech, I look forward to hearing your views on the economic situation, and to
your candid opinions on the Bank's monetary policy.
I. Economic developments in Japan and monetary policy since the 1980s
Until 1990, Japan had been considered the country that could achieve the highest growth
among advanced economies. However, it is well known that its economy then stagnated over
the long term and simultaneously fell into deflation.
Let us first look at Chart 1, which shows Japan's nominal GDP, real GDP, and the GDP
deflator since the 1980s. Japan's economy, in terms of the real GDP growth rate, had seen
steady growth until the beginning of the 1990s, but shifted to low growth thereafter. At the
same time, prices became sluggish and began to decline. The GDP deflator then flattened,
and when excluding the effects of the consumption tax hikes in 1997 and 2014, it declined
almost consistently from 1995 (Chart 1 excludes the effects of the consumption tax; for the
method of adjustment, see the Note to this chart). Naturally, the growth rate in nominal GDP
also had been sluggish. Nevertheless, since the 2013 introduction of a bold monetary easing
policy - namely, QQE - nominal GDP and the GDP deflator have seen recovery. Note that
the GDP deflator is an index that shows the underlying trend in prices and does not reflect
effects of global price fluctuations, such as crude oil price movements. Since the 2013
introduction of QQE, the GDP deflator has been rising stably at an annual rate of 0.9 percent,
having bounced back from an annual rate of minus 1.2 percent for the ten years prior to the
introduction (for this past year, however, the rate of increase has been at 0.6 percent). For
the past ten years, the rate of change in the GDP deflator was 0.8 percent lower on average
than that in the consumer price index (CPI). Thus, simply put, if the rate of change in the
GDP deflator becomes 1.2 percent, that in the CPI will be calculated as 2 percent.
Let me now examine the economic stagnation in Japan by comparing its economic
developments with those in other advanced economies.
Chart 2 shows real GDP of Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and
France, with the level in 1990 set as 100. We can see from this chart that Japan's economic
growth rate - which had been high among these five advanced economies until the 1980s -
has fallen to the lowest since the 1990s.
Some argue that a low growth rate in Japan is unavoidable because the country has been
facing a decline in its population, and more importantly, a decline in its working-age
population of those between 15 and 64 years of age. Taking this argument into account, let
us look at Charts 3 and 4, which show real GDP per capita and real GDP per working-age
person, respectively. In terms of real GDP per capita, Japan's growth rate has been the
lowest among five countries - namely, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and France. Nevertheless, in terms of real GDP per working-age person, Japan
does not appear to be as bad off among these economies since 2000.
Let us now turn to developments in nominal GDP, as shown in Chart 5. Since the 1990s, the
nominal GDP growth rate in Japan has been decelerating while the rates in the other four
advanced economies have been rising steadily. This also applies in terms of nominal GDP
per capita and nominal GDP per working-age person (not shown in the chart). This is natural
because the change in nominal GDP growth is larger than that in population growth.
II. Did deflation cause the decline in the real GDP growth rate?
So far, I have referred to the fact that Japan's economy fell into deflation and its real GDP
growth rate became low compared to other advanced economies. So, is there a connection
between the two factors? In other words, did deflation push down the real GDP growth rate?
Economists within academia say that there is basically no connection between the two. Here
is the logic, using two examples. First, the levels of both real wages and real consumption
will remain the same for the two cases where there is no change in those of prices and
wages, and where nominal prices and wages increase by 1 percent. Second, for both cases
where the inflation rate and nominal interest rate are 0 percent, and where these rates are
1 percent, the levels of real interest rates and firms' investment also should remain the same.
As a result, with the levels of real consumption and real investment staying the same in these
examples, real GDP growth rates also should stay at the same level.
However, does this logic hold? Firms' profits in terms of accounting and return on equity
(ROE) - which shows how efficiently stockholders' funds are invested - are concepts in
nominal terms. ROE calculated for the purpose of accounting is not a ratio in real terms.
Recently, in Japan, firms are encouraged to aim at achieving ROE at a certain level; for
example, 8 percent. This 8 percent is in nominal terms, and the higher the inflation rate, the
easier it is to achieve. A 1 percent rise in the inflation rate will bring the same margin of
increase in ROE.1 It seems that there is no actual effect in achieving ROE of 8 percent, but
many corporate managers consider this as crucial and that may bring about some changes
in firms' behavior.2
Nonperforming loans are also an issue discussed in nominal terms. Losses incurred from
past investment failures will decline in real terms if sales and profits increase owing to
inflation. Nonperforming loans were a major problem for Japan's economy in the 1990s.3
Based on what I have just mentioned, deflation and the consequent reduction in sales
represent a failure.
The government budget is another issue discussed in nominal terms. An increase in nominal
GDP means a decrease in past fiscal deficits in real terms. It seems strange that economists
within academia who claim fiscal deficits as an issue do not emphasize the importance of
nominal figures. If the argument holds true that people do not increase their consumption
based on the assumption that the government will increase taxes due to fiscal deficits, the
decline in the ratio of government debt to nominal GDP should increase consumption.4 This
means that the sluggishness in nominal GDP will restrain real consumption.
Stock prices and exchange rates are also nominal figures. Profits in nominal terms affect
stock prices and exchange rates influence firms' profits. I believe that nominal figures do
affect real figures.
In addition, there is a problem that the economic growth rate has declined and the natural
rate of interest has fallen to close to zero. The natural rate of interest refers to an optimal
interest rate that will neither depress nor overheat the economy. If the natural rate of interest
is close to zero, it is difficult to stimulate the economy through lowering interest rates. In this
situation, if the inflation rate is in positive territory, economic activity can be stimulated by
lowering interest rates to zero and reducing real interest rates to negative territory. However,
if the inflation rate is in negative territory, it is difficult to lower real interest rates. Then,
bringing economic conditions to normal by stimulating economic activity will become difficult.
I think this is the channel recognized by many economists within academia as a reason why
deflation causes economic stagnation.5
Many argue in Japan that, rather than pushing down interest rates forcibly through monetary
policy, the natural rate of interest should be raised by increasing the real GDP growth rate
through growth strategies and structural reforms. However, of those making such an
argument, few have yet provided specific indicators in terms of defining what kind of growth
strategy could be used and to what extent such strategy could raise the natural rate of
interest. However, an exception here is the effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) on
Japan's economy; some analyses suggest that, if Japan participates in the TPP, real GDP
will increase by 0.66 to 2 percent.6 This does not mean that the economic growth rate could
Companies and Investors," August 6, 2014, pp. 40-41. In this report, it is stated that ROE targets should be
set at 8 to 10 percent for firms in general and around 15 percent for firms with global operations.
3
There are many documents that refer to the point that nonperforming loans cause stagnation in the economy
through (1) the bank's reluctance to lend and the consequent sluggish investment or (2) an extension of
additional loans to inefficient firms and a decline in macroeconomic productivity. See Ryuzo Miyao, "Ginkou
Kinou no Teika to 90 Nendai Ikou no Defure Teitai (Deterioration in Bank's Functioning and Continued
Deflation since the 1990s)" in Koichi Hamada, Akiyoshi Horiuchi, and the Economic and Social Research
Institute (ESRI), eds. Ronsou Nihon no Keizai Kiki (Debates on the Economic Crisis in Contemporary Japan),
Nikkei Publishing Inc., May 2004 (available only in Japanese).
4
The possibility of people not increasing their consumption based on the assumption that the government will
increase taxes due to fiscal deficits is analyzed in Masumi Kawade, Arata Ito, and Toru Nakazato, "1990
Nendai Ikou no Zaisei Seisaku no Kouka to Sono Henka (The Effects and Changes in Fiscal Policy since the
1990s)," Chapter 5 of Toshihiro Ihori, ed. Nihon no Zaisei Akaji (Japan's Fiscal Deficit), Iwanami Shoten,
December 2004 (available only in Japanese).
5
Ben S. Bernanke, "Deflation: Making Sure 'It' Doesn't Happen Here," remarks before the National Economists
Club, Washington D.C., November 21, 2002.
6
Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, "Kanzei Teppai Shita Baai no Keizai Kouka ni Tsuite no Seifu Touitsu Shisan
(The Government Estimate on the Economic Impact of Tariff Elimination)" and "PECC Shisan no Gaiyou
be increased by up to 2 percent, but that the size of the economy could be increased by
2 percent over, for example, a decade. An increase of 2 percent in a decade suggests that
the economic growth rate will rise merely by 0.2 percent on an annual basis. This tells us
how difficult it is to produce effects from a growth strategy.
Meanwhile, monetary easing and a growth strategy do not conflict with each other. Hence, it
would be effective if they are implemented together. The primary purpose of a growth
strategy is to improve efficiency - or to raise labor productivity by eliminating wasteful areas
- and therefore, in the process of pursuing a growth strategy, employment problems could
arise. In the meantime, if the economic conditions become favorable through monetary
easing and the employment situation improves, it will become easier to implement structural
reforms.
Furthermore, rather than not seeing any rise in nominal wages during the course in which
deflation affects economic activity, I think that people's sentiment will be more upbeat if
prices and wages rise at the same level, though I am not certain that this will be the case.
Developments in indicators in nominal terms
Let us now look at movements in indicators in nominal terms.
Chart 6 shows the local currency-denominated stock prices and the ratios obtained by
dividing these prices by nominal GDP of each country. They are both converted into indices
with the level in 1990 set as 100. Compared with the level in 1990, stock prices in Japan
have fallen to 70 percent while those in the other four advanced countries have risen by
seven times for the United States and Germany and three times for the United Kingdom and
France. However, relative to nominal GDP, stock prices in these countries compared with
those in 1990 have increased only by three times for Germany, two times for the United
States, and 1.3 times for France, stayed at the same level in the United Kingdom, and
dropped to 60 percent of the 1990 level in Japan. Hence, differences in the extent of change
in stock prices between Japan and these other advanced countries narrow significantly. It
can be said that one factor behind the sluggish stock prices in Japan was that nominal GDP
did not grow due to deflation.
Chart 7 shows the exchange rate movements of major currencies against the U.S. dollar.
The yen and the U.S. dollar, which is represented in terms of the nominal effective exchange
rate, are on an appreciating trend (in the chart, drops in the lines indicate the appreciation of
currencies), but the British pound sterling and the euro do not show such a trend. If the yen
did not depreciate after the introduction of QQE, its appreciating trend would have been
clearer. The yen's appreciation causes sluggish sales of exporting firms and
importcompeting firms, leading them to inevitably reduce their prices, and this consequently lowers
prices in the overall economy. Price declines eventually may lead to a recovery in the
competitiveness of firms, but adjustments until then impose serious difficulties. For example,
firms that had been making fixed investment based on the assumed exchange rate of
120 yen against the U.S. dollar would incur substantial losses if the yen were to appreciate to
80 yen against the dollar. In view of such a painful experience, firms may refrain from making
investments, and this will result in a prolonged decline in investment.
One reason for the appreciating trend in the U.S. dollar in terms of the nominal effective
exchange rate is that major trading partners of the United States - namely, the countries in
Central and South America - have been under rampant inflation. If such an appreciating
trend did not exist, the United States might also be in an inflation situation similar to that in
Central and South America.
Chart 8 shows fiscal deficits relative to nominal GDP. While Japan has been facing a
massive fiscal deficit compared with the other four advanced countries, it has narrowed
during the period of monetary easing and increase in nominal GDP. That is, the narrowing of
the deficit owes to improvement in the economy led by monetary easing and the ensuing
increase in tax revenue and the expansion in nominal GDP, the denominator in calculating
the figures in this chart. As I have mentioned, if people truly do not increase their
consumption based on the assumption that the government will increase taxes due to fiscal
deficits, the decline in the ratio of government debt to nominal GDP should increase
consumption. However, this is not the real case.
Meaning of the rise in the unemployment rate
Although it has no direct connection to discussions of nominal indicators, let us now look at
the unemployment rate, my last choice of indicator for international comparison. The
unemployment rates shown in Chart 9 are different from those normally seen, in that they are
compared to the level in 1990 set as 100. The chart indicates that the unemployment rate in
Japan has risen from 1990. The rates in the other four countries, meanwhile, have fluctuated
in line with economic cycles and eventually returned to around their original levels. The high
unemployment rate in Japan must have meant that production had been sluggish, and that
tax revenues and social insurance revenues had been low. Since the middle of the 1990s,
Japan has suffered many losses.
These losses go beyond economic matters and social issues. Not being employed makes
individuals feel unwanted in society and creates stress for them. In fact, there is a study
indicating that the number of suicides increases in line with the rise in the unemployment
rate.7 Today, with the fall in the unemployment rate, the number of suicides has declined by
more than 10,000 from its peak of around 34,000 in 2003.
During the first decade of the 2000s, the acronym NEET - which stands for "Not in
Education, Employment, or Training" - was commonly used in Japan. This acronym was first
used in the United Kingdom amid increased awareness of how to socially include young
people facing various difficulties such as coping with poverty, having a low level of education,
and being racial minorities. Meanwhile, in Japan, NEET began to convey the image of a
weak mentality among young people who have grown up in a wealthy society and either do
not have the will or are unable to work for some reason. Nevertheless, the number of young
people in Japan who were categorized as NEETs - while the category in Japan is broadly
interpreted, as I just noted - gradually increased during the economic recession since the
1990s. If they are the product of economic recession, the number of NEETs should decline
with the fall in the unemployment rate.8 Currently, the acronym NEET is hardly used in
Japan. Searching through articles in The Nikkei, it appeared 138 times at its peak in 2006 but
19 times for this past year - that is, from September 2015 through August 2016.
In recent years, on the other hand, the term black companies (burakku kigyou) has become
widespread. This refers to firms that force employees to work at low wages for an
exceedingly long period of time, without receiving any corresponding rewards that these
firms promised. A question then arises as to why people choose to work at such firms. This is
because, amid considerable disparities in employment conditions between regular and non-
regular employees in Japan, it became difficult for many young people to work as regular
employees. In this circumstance, burakku kigyou won over anxious young people by hiring
them as regular employees. This situation occurred largely because of the prolonged
economic recession, in which the employment situation had deteriorated. Recently, firms that
have been labeled burakku kigyou have been struggling to secure employees as the rise in
the ratio of non-regular employees to regular employees has leveled off after the end of 2013
in a situation where labor market conditions have eased with a fall in the unemployment rate.
In line with the fall in the unemployment rate, the numbers of suicides and NEETs also have
declined, and it has become difficult for the harsh working conditions under burakku kigyou to
continue.
Based on the observations made so far, I would like to assert that Japan's deflation and the
decline in its real economic growth rate are connected. There is a powerful argument against
this, which runs as follows: even if prices decline, nothing will change as long as the levels of
wages and interest rates fall by the same margin, and therefore deflation cannot cause a
decline in the real GDP growth rate or a rise in the unemployment rate. However, I think that
the actual economy is more complex, in that there is a channel in which deflation causes a
decline in real GDP. Almost all economists within academia recognize the channel in which
deflation affects economic growth when there is a low natural interest rate.
In my view, the loss of employment due to the deflation since the 1990s led to the
deterioration of human capital, and this might have caused a decline in labor productivity, as
well as a decrease in the economy's growth rate for an extended period.
I believe that we must learn from the failures experienced during the 1990s and conduct
monetary policy so as to overcome deflation.
III. Japan's economic developments after the Introduction of QQE and the Bank's
comprehensive assessment of September 2016
Now, I would like to elaborate on economic developments in Japan after the introduction of
QQE. I believe that QQE has been conducted to improve the situation that I explained
earlier. So, was it effective in overcoming failures experienced in the past?
To illustrate, let us look at the GDP deflator in Chart 1. Following the introduction of QQE, it
started to rise stably (please note that the GDP deflator excludes the effects of the crude oil
price movements). QQE has worked to change deflationary mindset of the past. However, as
described earlier, the deflator has been increasing merely by 0.9 percent, which is not
enough to reach the Bank's target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in
the CPI (all items less fresh food). In order to achieve that target, a 1.2 percent increase in
the GDP deflator is necessary, based on the relationship between the CPI and the GDP
deflator mentioned earlier.
Next, let us look at the CPI. Chart 10 shows developments in the CPI in terms of all items
less fresh food and that for all items less fresh food and energy, both of which exclude the
effects of the consumption tax hike. After the introduction of QQE that followed the
inauguration of the second Abe Cabinet, the inflation rate - which had been negative until
then - turned positive. Specifically, the year-on-year rate of change in the CPI for all items
less fresh food and energy, excluding the effects of the crude oil price movements, rose to
0.9 percent in February 2014, from minus 0.8 percent immediately before the introduction of
QQE. The 0.9 percent figure includes the effects of the front-loaded increase in demand prior
to the consumption tax hike in April 2014. After the hike, however, the pace of increase
slowed. Accordingly, the Bank decided to expand QQE in October 2014, and with this
expansion, the increase in the CPI for all items less fresh food and energy accelerated again.
Nevertheless, since around the end of 2015, the rate of increase has continued to slow. The
Bank introduced QQE with a Negative Interest Rate in January 2016 and enhanced
monetary easing in July, almost doubling the amount of the Bank's exchange-traded fund
(ETF) purchases. However, the price stability target of 2 percent has not yet been achieved,
although at least the economy is no longer in deflation.
Moreover, the growth rate of Japan's real GDP does not appear to have accelerated even
after the introduction of QQE. However, as shown in Chart 4, the rate of real GDP per
working-age person - excluding that for 2014, which was affected by the consumption tax
hike - seems to have been realizing an acceleration in its growth, albeit slightly.
Improvement in the employment situation - which I already have explained - is not only seen
in major cities but is spreading across Japan. In June 2016, the active job
openings-toapplicants ratio marked a figure above 1 in all prefectures. Needless to say, the active job
openings-to-applicants ratio for "All Japan" has risen, registering 1.37 times in August 2016 -
the highest level since August 1991. The ratio also has risen here in Nagano, registering
1.42 times.
The Bank's comprehensive assessment
On the basis of the fact that the price stability target has not yet been achieved, the Bank
conducted a comprehensive assessment of the developments in economic activity and
prices, as well as on policy effects, since the introduction of QQE at the Monetary Policy
Meeting (MPM) held on September 20 and 21, 2016. At the same time, the Bank also
decided on a new framework for strengthening its monetary easing policy. In what follows, I
will explain these two topics.
The Bank's comprehensive assessment is divided into the following five aspects: (1) the
transmission mechanism in which QQE affects the real economy; (2) factors that have
hampered achieving the 2 percent price stability target; (3) the mechanism of inflation
expectation formation; (4) pushing down of the yield curve; and (5) the effects and impact of
the decline in the yield curve. I will explain each of these.
First of all, the transmission mechanism of QQE functioned efficiently and lowered interest
rates for Japanese government bonds (JGBs) for all durations, as evident from the yield
curve that I will touch upon later. Many indicators reveal that inflation expectations have been
in positive territory. Thus, real interest rates have declined to levels well below the natural
rate of interest, and have stimulated the economy. As a result, economic activity improved,
and Japan's economy is no longer in deflation, which is commonly defined as a sustained
decline in prices.
Second, I would like to describe factors that have hampered the achievement of the
2 percent target. In terms of the mechanism that I have just described, a rise in inflation
expectations is crucial. However, the rate of increase in the observed inflation rate - i.e., the
CPI - continued to decline due to (1) the fall in crude oil prices, (2) the weakness in demand
following the consumption tax hike in April 2014, and (3) the slowdown in the global economy
and volatility in global financial markets. The decline in the observed inflation rate weakened
inflation expectations adaptively, and this decline then pushed down actual prices.
Here, understanding the mechanism of inflation expectation formation - the third aspect -
becomes important. Since the observed inflation rate is likely to remain subdued for the time
being, it seems that a further rise in inflation expectations through the adaptive mechanism is
uncertain and may take time. This highlights the important role played by the forward-looking
expectation formation mechanism. The expansion of the monetary base, together with the
commitment to achieving the price stability target, by bringing about a regime change in
monetary policy, has led to a rise in inflation expectations. The relationship between the
monetary base and inflation expectations seems to be of a long-run nature. Therefore, what
is important is the Bank's commitment to expanding the monetary base in the long run.
Fourth, the combination of the negative interest rate policy and JGB purchases proved to be
an effective means for the central bank to push down the entire yield curve.
As for the fifth aspect, the decline in the yield curve and the change in its shape affect the
economy as a whole in various ways. Let me note three points. First, short- and
mediumterm interest rates have a larger impact on economic activity than longer-term rates. At least
until now, the stimulative effects on the economy of the decline in short- and medium-term
interest rates were larger than those of the decline in super-long-term interest rates. Second,
however, the link between the impact of interest rates and the shape of the yield curve may
change as firms are now exploring new ways of raising funds, such as issuing
super-longterm corporate bonds. And third, an excessive flattening of the yield curve may have a
negative impact on economic activity by leading to a deterioration in people's sentiment, as it
can cause uncertainty about the sustainability of financial functioning.
The first and second points can be understood as common sense. Most firms make
investment decisions based on a strategy for the next several years. Thus, a decline in
interest rates on 20-year JGBs does not immediately cause a large increase in investment.
Firms that consider profitability over 20 years have mainly been those engaged in
infrastructure business so far. Such firms tend to be not much affected by recent short-term
developments in interest rates, because they conduct investment in line with their medium-to
long-term business plans. Firms including those engaged in other than infrastructure
business, however, are experiencing positive developments through issuing super-long-term
corporate bonds.
Financial institutions' business conditions and flattening of the yield curve
I would like to talk further about business conditions of financial institutions and the flattening
of the yield curve. Namely, long-term interest rates are higher than short-term ones, but the
differential between the two rates has become smaller. The reason behind this flattening is
that short-term interest rates tend not to decline due to difficulty in lowering deposit rates into
negative territory. Also, since interest rates have become negative, long-term bonds have
been bought by many investors in search of a positive yield.
The profits of financial institutions decrease with the flattening of the yield curve because
they make long-term investment by raising short-term funds. Thus, after the introduction of
the negative interest rate policy, financial institutions' profits in terms of those from the
differential between long- and short-term interest rates have been decreasing.
However, financial institutions gain profits only after they get their loans paid back, and
therefore this does not mean that they can earn more simply with the steepening of the yield
curve. Financial institutions' profits have been stable at high levels since the introduction of
QQE. This is because the upturn in the economy has improved the business conditions of
borrowing firms and thereby has reduced default costs and credit costs. A decrease in
default costs is desirable, but what matters is to ensure sustainable profits. That seems to be
the reason why there might have been considerable concern that the flattening of the yield
curve could have a negative impact on the sustainable increase in financial institutions'
profits, and could decrease their future profits.
However, from a long-term perspective, financial institutions can gain profits only when they
have borrowers. Firms are hoarding their surplus and not making investment mainly because
the prolonged deflation has reduced their incentive to do so. When Japan's economy moves
out of deflation, firms are expected to regain such incentive, and this in turn will increase
demand for borrowing funds from financial institutions. That is to say, financial institutions are
expected to increase their lending and their profits will eventually rise.
Furthermore, the current low interest rate environment has been brought about by the
prolonged low economic growth and deflation since the bursting of the bubble in 1990. Thus,
it is not necessarily the case that the Bank's current policy has caused such an environment.
Looking at the saving-investment balance of the corporate sector, saving has been
exceeding investment on the whole recently, and thus there is no need for firms to borrow
money. This inevitably will cause a declining trend in interest rates and profit margins.9 After
the introduction of the negative interest rate policy, however, the extent of the decline in
interest rates and profit margins became larger than before. This seems to be the reason
why there has been considerable concern over the effects of the negative interest rate policy
on financial institutions' profits.
Chart 11 shows developments in the JGB yield curve since the Bank's introduction of
quantitative easing (QE) policy. The chart indicates that, comparing the yield curve of
December 30, 2000 - just before the introduction of QE on March 21, 2001 - and those just
after the introduction on March 21, 2001, the curve has declined on the whole, but the extent
of the flattening is very marginal. Comparing interest rates for the two dates, while those on
one-year JGBs declined by 0.4 percentage point, those on 20-year JGBs declined by
0.7 percentage point. However, comparing interest rates just before the introduction of QQE
on December 28, 2012 and just before the enhancement of monetary easing on July 28,
2016, while those on one-year JGBs declined by 0.5 percentage point, those on 20-year
JGBs declined by a wider margin of 1.6