José De Gregorio: Economic growth in Chile and copper
Speech by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the CESCO
conference "1984-2009, 25 Años de la Industria del Cobre y su impacto en Chile", Santiago,
1 September 2009.
I thank Mariana García for her valuable contribution in preparing this work.
* * *
I want to begin by thanking you for inviting me to this Conference celebrating the copper and
mining research center CESCO's twenty-fifth birthday. It is an honor to have the opportunity
to speak about the impact of the mining industry, and of copper especially, on Chile's
development, given its importance for the country and in which I have great professional
interest.
Chile is abundant in natural resources. One of the most distinctive characteristics of our
economy is its large mining sector, particularly of copper, which places it as the world's main
copper producer. As a country we were blessed by nature with this enormous treasure. But
as with every benefit, there can be related costs and risks that must be assessed.
For a long time, natural resources have been part of the discussion about economic
development. Many years ago, natural resources were thought to be destined to a path of
permanent price decline, which served as an argument to push forced industrialization. Such
a vision proved to be based on wrong grounds. Nonetheless, development-related problems
within the context of natural resource abundance have made their way back to the academic
discussion in recent years. There are those who claim that natural resources are bad for a
country's development. They find that the abundance of natural resources has been
associated with a poor growth performance. This finding leads them to the conclusion - a
wrong one in my view - that natural resources are hazardous to a country's development.
As I will be asserting over this presentation, natural resources are a blessing, but their
abundance in a scenario of institutional and economic weakness may turn it into a curse. I
will also comment that, in the case of Chile, solid bases have been in place to take
advantage of the copper industry, very different from what occurred with nitrate in the early
twentieth century.
I will begin with a review of the international evidence on the relationship between natural
resources and growth, to then focus on Chile's specific case and the relationship between
abundance in our mining resources and our development. Then I will talk briefly about the
current economic scenario and how copper price fluctuations are no longer a source of
instability, as used to be the case in the past or still is in some large commodity exporters.
This is attributed to the significant advances we have made in our foreign exchange, fiscal,
and monetary policies. The importance of this cannot be overemphasized, because said
progress in macroeconomic policies has allowed us to implement unprecedented
expansionary policies that should help Chile to overcome successfully the international crisis
that hit the world at large in recent months. I will end with some final remarks.
Economic growth and natural resources
One paramount issue in our country's development is its concentration of natural resources
and, very specially, of copper ore. The world evidence shows that there are major differences
in growth rates among natural resource abundant economies. One example is Botswana,
rich in diamonds, which early this decade could account for nearly 40% of GDP (Acemoglu et
al., 2003). This country's per capita GDP grew by an average 6.6% per year between 1960
and 2007, which meant that in 2007, its per capital GDP was 19 times the one in 1970. An
example to the contrary is the case of Nigeria, rich in oil, yet virtually stagnant. Its per capita
GDP increased by an average 1.2% per year over the same period, which meant that in
2007 Nigeria had barely 1.5 times its per capita GDP of 1960.
It has been found that, on average, countries rich in natural resources grow less than those
that are not (figure 1). Based on this evidence, much research effort has been devoted to
unraveling the link between economic growth and natural resource abundance, and that is
what I intend to briefly cover now.
International evidence and discussions on the relationship between natural resources and
economic development are varied. Some economists, mainly Sachs and Warner (1995,
1997, 2001), have argued that rather than a blessing, abundance of natural resources is a
curse. The reasons for this are that natural resources can lead to rent-seeking activities
diverting scarce resources such as human and physical capital away from activities that favor
growth. At the same time, natural resource abundance may cause a persistent real
appreciation that may weaken the rest of tradable goods sectors, which is known as the
Dutch disease. A natural conclusion of these works is that in countries that prevent
rentseeking, with human capital abundance, access to credit and macroeconomic policies that
promote stability, these damaging effects can be avoided. Subsequent studies have been
oriented in that direction.
Several studies have explored new links between natural resources and growth, controlling
for the strengths of each economy. For example, Arezki and van der Ploeg (2007) find that
this negative relationship between natural resource abundance and growth is heavily
affected by the country's openness to international trade. They find that, the more open the
economy, the less likely for natural resources to have a negative contribution to growth.
Therefore, trade openness can change the curse into a blessing. Meanwhile, Mehlum et al.
(2006), using the same data as Sachs and Warner (1997), include an interaction between
the quality of institutions and natural resource abundance to examine its effect on growth.
They find that the critical element behind the natural resource curse is bad institutions. In
other words, if the country has good institutions, natural resources allow them to grow
faster.1
The interaction with the human capital endowment is also important. Bravo-Ortega and De
Gregorio (2005) state that, whenever natural resources draw the scarce human capital away
from growth favoring activities, the development of natural resources might reduce growth.
Thus, countries with high endowment of human capital can more than offset the negative
effect of natural resource abundance on growth. Still, while growth can be slower, abundant
natural resources do result in higher income, which is what ultimately matters from the
standpoint of the welfare of the population.
Finally, it is worth to make the distinction between the abundance of and the dependence on
natural resources. This issue has been analyzed in Cerný and Filer (2006), who find that
natural resource dependent countries are the ones associated with low economic growth, not
natural resource abundant ones.2
When studying the case of Chile, it can be argued that there is no evidence of the problems
that associate natural resource abundance with bad economic performance. On the one
hand, we can observe that our country is more and more open to international trade (figure
2). This integration not only brings benefits because of the traditional gains from trade based
on comparative advantages, but it also induces better practices and technologies, as well as
more competition in the markets, all factors that enhance economic growth.
On the other hand, we know that Chile is rich in natural resources, especially mining ores,
but our dependence on them is ever smaller. Actually, mining exports contribute every year a
large amount of resources to the country, but their share of total exports has steadily
declined over time, with the exception of the last few years due to the soaring price of copper
(figure 3).
Another critical element mentioned in the literature, that for Chile is a strong one, is the
quality of its institutions. Sound institutions, including fiscal discipline, have prevented the
"voracity" effects. A well educated labor force and full access to international capital markets
have kept investments in other activities free of barriers, and the real exchange rate,
although widely fluctuating, has not been detrimental to the development of the exporting
sector.
By way of example, and to see the good position we are in now as compared with previous
years, let us recall what happened with nitrate. As we all know, there was a "golden era" for
nitrate between the years 1880 and 1930, where thanks to our resources and the external
demand, Chile increased strongly its international trade, obtained large amounts of fiscal
resources and was able to take a leap forward.
Our economy's nitrate dependence is visible in the proportion of fiscal resources that came
from this sector (figure 4). This is the typical case where high earnings coming from natural
resources create incentives to reduce the other taxes, placing the economy in great fiscal
vulnerability, as it later occurred. Thus, when the golden era ended, the public external debt
skyrocketed (from 28% of GDP in 1929 to 221% in 1932) and the economy suffered a severe
contraction (figure 5), which was also fostered by the Great Depression.
We can also see the negative effects of natural resource dependence if we compare the
behaviors of nitrate, copper, and output. The fluctuations of nitrate output value had an
enormous effect on GDP, with a correlation of 0.66 (figure 6). This is quite different
nowadays, with a correlation between growth in copper output value and GDP of 0.05 (figure
7).
Summing up, the review of the international evidence allow us to state that our abundant
copper has been a positive contribution to the Chilean economic growth and welfare, which
is reinforced by institutional and economic strengths that prevent the distortions that natural
resource abundance could have on the economy. Continuing on this subject, I will next talk
about the way macroeconomic policies have helped in the context of the large swings of the
price of copper.
Macroeconomic policies and copper in the current scenario
To make economies less vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations, having an adequate
macroeconomic policy framework is imperative. As will be argued in this section, this is the
case in Chile today.3
It is common knowledge that in Latin America, cycles have historically been very
pronounced. Global economic downturns have triggered strong adjustments in the countries
in the region. This is largely due to the destabilizing effects of terms of trade fluctuations on
public finances (Gavin and Perotti, 1997). Due to the importance of copper for fiscal income,
a positive shock on its price should be expected to prompt destabilizing policies. This does
not occur, however, because Chile's fiscal policy is countercyclical, and is based on a
structural fiscal balance rule. To determine the structural balance, a key element is the
estimated long-term copper price. This rule began being applied in 2001 with a target of 1%
of GDP; last year it was brought down to 0.5% because of a large accumulation of resources
in sovereign funds, and this year, to provide an extra fiscal impulse, it was reduced to 0%
(figure 8).
Although the structural balance policy was launched in this decade, fiscal efforts to smooth
the copper price fluctuations began in the 1980s, with the copper stabilization fund. In fact,
throughout most of the 1990s, the structural balance was near 1%. This countercyclical fiscal
policy makes the effective fiscal balance highly correlated with the price of copper. Thus, our
fiscal policy has been contributing for more than 20 years to stabilizing the Chilean economic
cycle.
As a result of the application of the rule, a large amount of resources has been saved in
sovereign funds when the price of copper has been high.4 In the period 2007-2008, 22 billion
US dollars were placed in these funds, of which 20 billion - the equivalent to 12% of GDP -
came from the accumulation of new funds, and the difference was the funds' net financial
gain. This has had significant implications in the current economic scenario.
Since last year, particularly as from September, the world has been enduring the worst
recession in the last 60 years and our country, despite being in an excellent position to
address these shocks, has not been spared its consequences. But today, our fiscal policy
has been able to make an important reactivation effort, thanks to the prudence with which the
years of high copper prices were managed.
The other critical elements in our macroeconomic policies that favor stabilization are
monetary and foreign exchange policies. Although they play a somewhat more subtle role
than fiscal policy, they are no less important. In the first place, a credible inflation-targeting
regime ensures the proper reaction of monetary policy to significant deviations of output from
its full-employment level. In particular, negative demand shocks that may come from
worsened external conditions should be accompanied by a reduction of the monetary policy
rate to prevent a deanchoring of inflation expectations and allow the economy to stabilize
without suffering unsustainable, and costly to revert, contractions. This is especially visible
today that the Central Bank board has reduced the monetary policy rate by 775 basis points,
placing it at its minimum level of 0.5%, and has complemented this reduction with additional
measures to boost the monetary impulse.
A second key element in this scheme is the floating exchange rate. This policy favors
stability, allowing the real exchange rate to adjust to internal economic conditions and
minimizing output adjustments. Oftentimes, persistent attempts to prevent the exchange rate
to adjust to market conditions may encourage excessive capital flows and abrupt foreign
exchange adjustments that may complicate the conduct of monetary policy (figure 9). Thus,
the flexible exchange rate we have in place facilitates the adjustment as long as it is
combined with a consistent macroeconomic policy and a solid and resilient financial system,
as we have in Chile. If fiscal and monetary policy were inadequate, exchange rate
fluctuations could occur that would exacerbate macroeconomic swings. In any case, our
current foreign exchange scheme contemplates the possibility of intervening in the market
under exceptional circumstances, which we have done in the past.
In summary, the combination of a flexible exchange rate, a prudent fiscal policy, a solid
financial system and a monetary policy based on inflation targeting, contribute to stabilize the
economy, and particularly to reduce the impact of copper price fluctuations on domestic
activity.
Conclusions
The effect on economic growth of natural resource abundance has been at the center of the
world's economic debate throughout the years. This issue is also greatly important for Chile,
especially because of our mineral resources and copper ores. As international research
studies have found, natural resource dependence may have destabilizing effects on the
economy, and, hence, result in reduced growth. The critical connection between these two
variables is institutions. When weak, the abundance of natural resources may have negative
effects on macroeconomic stability and growth. But when the institutions and the policies are
adequate, natural resources are an enormous source of benefits for the country, as copper
has proven to be for Chile.
The fiscal rule, the inflation targeting regime, and the floating exchange rate have cushioned
the impact of copper price swings on the domestic economic cycle. Therefore, it is no
surprise that in the past few years economic growth was slower compared to previous
copper price booms. This same stabilizing effect allowed the economy to grow by an average
of over 3% in the early 2000s, when the price of copper was at is lowest level since the Great
Depression. Naturally, our economy is affected by international events, as shown by the
current scenario. However, the recent experience also shows something that is not only
predictable in the current policy framework but also desirable: less dependence of the
Chilean economic cycle on copper price fluctuations. Thank you very much.
Figure 1
Development and natural resource dependence
7%
6%
5%
4%
growth,
average
Chile
3%
GDP
2%
1%
capita
1960-2007
0%
Per
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6
-1%
-2%
Natural resource dependence*
* Measured as commodity exports as a percentage of 1970's GDP
Sources: Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006); World Development Indicators.
Figure 2
Trade openness over time
(percentage of GDP)
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005
Argentina Chile
Latin America and the Caribbean Middle Income
World
Source: World Development Indicators.
Figure 3
Mining exports
(percentage)
0,7
50
0,6
40
FOB
0,5
30
USD
0,4 exports
of
0,3
20
Goods
0,2
%
Billions
10
0,1
0
0
1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008
Mining Exports/
Mining exports
Goods exports
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Figure 4
Earnings from nitrates-iodine and from copper
(percentage of total fiscal income)
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
t t+6 t+11 t+16 t+21 t+26 t+31 t+36 t+41 t+46 T
1880 1930
Nitrates and iodine earnings Copper earnings
1959 2008
Sources: Jeftánovic, Jofré, and Lüders (2000); Central Bank of Chile.
Figure 5
Government spending, exports and GDP
(index, 1880=100)
500 1,200
1,000
400
800
300
600
200
400
100
200
0 0
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940
Government spending GDP
Exports
Source: Braun, Braun, Briones, and Díaz (2000).
Figure 6
Growth in nitrates' output value and real GDP
(percentage)
100% 25%
80%
15%
60%
40%
5%
20%
-5%
0%
-20%
-15%
-40%
-60% -25%
1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930
Growth in nitrates' output GDP growth
value in US dollars
Source: Braun, Braun, Briones, and Díaz (2000).
Figure 7
Growth in copper's output value and real GDP
(percentage)
100% 25%
80%
15%
60%
5%
40%
20%
-5%
0%
-15%
-20%
-40% -25%
1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Growth in copper's output GDP growth
value in US dollars
Sources: Braun, Braun, Briones, and Díaz (2000); Ministry of Mining; Central Bank of Chile.
Figure 8
Copper price and fiscal balances
10 3,5
8 3
6 2,5
4 2
GDP
US$/lb
%
2 1,5
0 1
-2 0,5
-4 0
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Actual balance Copper price
Structural balance
Sources: Bloomberg; Budgets Bureau, Ministry of Finance.
Figure 9
Real exchange rate and copper price
120 4
3,5
110
3
100
2,5
90
1986=100
US$/lb
2
80
1,5
index,
70
1
60 0,5
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Real exchange rate Copper price
Sources: Central Bank of Chile; Bloomberg.
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