Andrew G Haldane: Risk off
Paper by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, of the Bank of
England, 18 August 2011.
* * *
The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Financial Policy Committee. I would like to
thank Aashish Pattani, Ben Broadbent, Srishti Chhabra, David Gregory, Priya Kothari, James McBride, Lewis
Webber and Nicola Worrow for comments and contributions.
Four years on from the start of the Great Recession, the world economy is cloaked in
uncertainty. The story so far is well understood. Over-extension of private sector balance
sheets - in particular among banks - sowed the seeds of the crisis. Those private sector
risks have since been socialised, either directly through support for the financial sector or
indirectly through lower aggregate output in the economy at large.
That socialisation has caused balance sheet risk to migrate from the private to the public
sectors. Today, these public sector balance sheets strains are most visible in Europe where
a number of countries remain under the sovereign searchlight. But outside Europe, two of the
world's three largest economies - the United States and Japan - have been the subject of
ratings action. And sovereign CDS spreads among advanced countries are at their
highest-ever levels.
Four years on from the start of the Great Depression, the world economy was also cloaked in
uncertainty. In his inaugural address in 1933, newly-elected President Roosevelt famously
captured the mood of the moment: "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself". That fear
factor is once again pervasive today. But do we have nothing to fear? And what role might
policy - in particular macro-prudential policy - play in allaying those fears?
Emerging from the Great Recession
The path out of recession is invariably a bumpy one. This time's Great Recession is unlikely
to be an exception. Chart 1 compares the recent path of UK GDP with that following previous
GDP dips: the Great Depression of the 1930s and the UK recession of the early 1990s. To
date, GDP has steered a middle path, somewhat stronger than in the 1930s but weaker than
in the early 1990s recovery.
If past recessionary experience is any guide, the UK's GDP trajectory might be expected to
pick up pace from here. Most external forecasts remain broadly consistent with that view. But
the risks around this path are considerable, as recent indicators of slowing global activity
attest. This is not altogether surprising. Crisis-induced recessions are deeper and longer, on
average taking up to three years to return to their pre-crisis peak (Chart 2).
Some take longer still. Following the Great Depression, UK GDP only recovered its pre-crisis
level after 5 years. The US recovered its pre-crisis level after 7 years (Chart 3). Having
reached this point, the US economy then lurched downwards again in 1937; it double-dipped.
Roosevelt had been wrong in 1933. With hindsight, there had been plenty to fear.
As in 1933, the fear factor is rife in today's financial markets. The prompt has been sovereign
debt concerns in parts of Europe and the United States. This is but the latest - and most
severe - in a series of waves in sentiment since the onset of the crisis. Risk appetite has
yo-yoed. In the language of the market, it has alternated between periods of "risk on" and
"risk off". Having been indecisive, financial markets are now not so sure.
That is reflected in surveyed measures of market participants' risk appetite (Chart 4). These
were at above-average levels between 2005 and 2007 at the height of the boom. During
2008, risk appetite dramatically tailed-off. At its low-point in early 2009, it was more than two
standard deviations below normal. Since then it has ebbed (risk off) and flowed (risk on).
Today, it is around one standard deviation below normal and falling. Risk is "off".
Market metrics corroborate this story of acute risk aversion. The demand for safe assets has
risen significantly. At a 10-year maturity, US government benchmark bond yields are at
around their lowest levels in over two centuries (Chart 5) - despite the recent scare over
US debt ceilings and subsequent downgrade. Long-term UK bond yields are also close to
historic lows, as are investment grade corporate bond yields.
The price of gold has risen even more dramatically. Real gold prices have more than doubled
since 2008, edging towards their previous high-water mark after the oil price shocks of the
late 1970s (Chart 6). Safe-haven flows to the Swiss franc have boosted its value by over
30% against both the euro and the dollar since September 2008. The reach-for-return,
familiar at times in the past, has flipped into a scramble-for-safety.
Risky assets tell a similar tale. The compensation investors demand for risk - the so-called
risk premium - in advanced economy equities and investment grade corporate bonds is
above or in line with its long-term average value. Bank lending spreads, which embody a
compensation for risk, are materially higher for all classes of borrower. And measures of
equity market uncertainty, such as the VIX, are at levels not seen since early 2009 (Chart 7).
Not for nothing has the VIX become known as the "fear index".
Some risky assets have fared better. Since their trough in late 2008, global high yield debt
prices have risen by two-thirds, emerging markets equities have roughly doubled, while
commodity prices have risen by even more. But even these assets have recently fallen from
their peaks. Investors have concluded this is not a time for bravery. For much of this century,
risk was cheap. Today it is expensive.
Market participants' willingness to put risk capital to work can be seen in measures of
financial market liquidity. Those have also yo-yoed (Chart 8). Excess liquidity during the first
half of the century gave way to plummeting liquidity during the depths of the crisis. Today,
despite rock-bottom global interest rates, market liquidity remains below normal levels. Risk
capital is parked on the sidelines.
Balance sheet repair
So what explains this continuing aversion to risk? Two factors are central: balance sheet
disrepair and psychological scarring. In other words, both balance sheet fundamentals and
market perceptions, perhaps detached from fundamentals, appear to be weighing on
risk-taking.
Since the start of the crisis, balance sheets have been a good news/bad news story. The
good news is that balance sheet repair is underway in many sectors and countries. The bad
news is that this process appears to be far from complete, providing a continuing strong
headwind to risk-taking. Consider in turn the balance sheets of banks, households,
companies and governments.
Pre-crisis, banks' balance sheets were furthest out of kilter. Average leverage in the global
banking system - the ratio of banks' assets to their equity - rose to highs of over
40 (Chart 9). At the height of the boom, every $1 of bank assets was financed with $98 cents
of debt. The global banking system was financing itself with a 98% loan-to-value mortgage.
Since then, global banks have raised their equity by around $500 billion and shrunk their
assets by $3 trillion. As a result, global banks' leverage has halved to around 20, close to its
long-run average. Today, every $1 of bank assets is financed with $95 cents of debt - a
more modest, though still racy, 95% loan-to-value mortgage. Banks' liquid assets have risen
even more dramatically. UK and US banks' cash ratios are at their highest levels for several
decades.
But this balance sheet adjustment appears to be far from complete. Banks are midstream in
their adjustment to new regulatory standards and, in some cases, new business models.
That is reflected in expectations of banks' future profitability. These remain weak. Recent
results for the major global banks delivered returns to equity well below target and closer to
average levels from the previous century of around 10%.
Weak profit prospects are mirrored in equity prices. Today, the average market price of
global banks' equity is slightly below its book value, having traded at a significant premium
for much of the past 20 years (Chart 10). Around three-quarters of the world's 20 largest
global banks have price-to-book ratios below one. Equity prices for these banks are, on
average, back to levels last seen in 1998. For long-term holders of global bank equity, this
has been a lost decade (and a bit).
As equity prices have fallen, market-based measures of bank leverage - the ratio of bank
assets to the market value of their equity - have risen. During the crisis, such market-based
measures of leverage did a much better job of identifying problem banks than conventional
risk-weighted capital ratios.1 So measured, the world's largest 20 banks are at present
around 36 times levered. That is a loan-to-value mortgage of around 97%.
The household sector, too, has been repairing its balance sheet. On average across the
US, UK and euro-area, households are running a financial surplus of around 2.5% of GDP
(Chart 11). As recently as 2006, they were running a financial deficit of 1% of GDP. Since
2007, around £100bn has been repaid each year by UK households. Deleveraging is
underway.
Yet this aggregate picture masks some important distributional differences. There remains a
sizable tail of over-indebted households vulnerable to a worsening of financial conditions. In
the UK, the proportion of households in negative equity is 1 in 14. In the US, it is 1 in 4. With
house prices falling in both countries, that fraction may rise further.
The tail of "vulnerable" households (those with limited or no equity in their property and
reporting problems servicing their debt) is high and rising. So defined, vulnerable households
in the UK account for 15% of household secured debt and 35% of unsecured debt
(Chart 12). These shares have risen over the past three years, by around 5 and
10 percentage points respectively, despite interest rates being at rock-bottom.
The picture in the corporate sector is, in some respects, not dissimilar. Companies in the
main advanced countries are running significant financial surpluses, on average of around
2.5% of GDP (Chart 13). Pre-crisis, companies were running financial deficits of around
1% of GDP. The cash position of the corporate sector is even more striking, with large
UK corporates' stock of cash up by over 40% since 2006.
But as among households, this picture of aggregate health conceals a long tail. A number of
companies appear to be struggling to meet interest payments even at ultra-low interest rates.
The fraction of companies whose profits do not cover interest payments has actually risen
slightly since the crisis; it is currently around one third (Chart 14). Within some sectors, such
as property, debt-servicing capacity has deteriorated sharply.
Despite these balance sheet headwinds, the macroeconomic situation today is far better than
at the time of the Great Depression - with one exception. The exception is government
finances. Despite the much smaller fall in GDP, UK government debt-to-GDP ratios have
deteriorated more than in the 1930s (Chart 15). This pattern is mirrored across advanced
economies. The IMF expect debt-to-GDP ratios in the G7 economies this year to breach
100% of GDP for the first time since the Second World War (Chart 16).
There is no magic number for debt ratios. But the historical record is revealing. Historically,
ratios in excess of 90-100% of GDP have been found to exert a lasting drag on growth,
perhaps of around 1 percentage point.2 At these levels, government debt has in the past
been growth-sapping - and fear-enhancing. That adds to pressures on debt sustainability,
which depends importantly on the wedge between interest costs and GDP growth.
Psychological scarring
These balance sheet scars are real. But in financial markets, risk perceptions are as
important as reality. Behavioural economics tells us that financial crashes can leave lasting
psychological scars on risk-taking. These mean that perceptions of risk can be systematically
over-stated - the fear of fear itself.
One potent psychological factor is disaster myopia. Psychologists know from experimental
evidence that, faced with uncertainty, people base their judgements on simple rules of thumb
or heuristics.3 One such rule of thumb is the "availability heuristic". This states that agents
base probabilistic assessments on the ease with which an event can be brought to mind:
how recently it has occurred, how severe are its effects and how personal is the experience.
Car crashes are the classic example. These often arise from disaster myopia, as drivers
systematically under-estimate the probability of a pile-up and drive too fast. The longer the
period since the last crash, the greater the risk-taking. After a lengthy stretch of clear
motorway, risk appetite may become too healthy, and risk-taking too great, relative to the
true probability of disaster. In other words, drivers are disaster-myopic.
Should a crash occur, however, risk-taking incentives go into reverse gear. Their closeness
to a disaster event causes drivers to move more slowly than might be justified by the
underlying risk. The experience heuristic leads to an over-weighting of recent, severe,
personal events. Risk appetite then switches from too high to too low relative to the true risk.
The result is traffic congestion.
Financial crashes and car crashes have common psychological roots. One of the causes of
the crisis was an under-pricing of risk. That was rooted in disaster myopia - an
under-estimation of risk during the so-called Great Moderation. Memories of financial
disaster had faded, with the Great Depression in almost no-one's experience sample. The
upshot was an over-healthy appetite for risk-taking.
The subsequent crash has turned these behaviours on their head. Memories of financial
disaster are now fresh, as after the Great Depression, causing an over-estimation of the
probability of a repeat disaster. In these situations, psychological scarring is likely to result in
risk appetite and risk-taking being lower than reality might suggest. Risk will be over-priced.
Today, the very disaster myopia that caused the crisis may be retarding the recovery.
Disaster myopia may be more potent in the markets than on the motorways. Asset prices are
guesses about the future. Faced with uncertainty about the future, market participants form
these guesses using their own heuristics. One such heuristic is the "popular narrative" - a
simple story that aims to make sense of reality. Risk on/risk off is precisely such a popular
narrative.4
The effect of popular narratives is to increase psychological contagion in financial markets.
Simple stories generate market mood swings. The greater the uncertainty, the more
compelling the simple story and the greater the amplitude of these mood swings. These
swings in turn result in a detachment of risk perceptions, and hence asset prices, from
reality.
Financial trauma, like personal trauma, can increase this detachment from fundamentals. For
those who lived through it, the Great Depression had a lasting effect on financial risk-taking.
"Depression Babies" have been shown to seek less risky capital structures and to avoid
financial stocks.5 The scarring effects of the Great Depression on risk attitudes help explain
the excess premium demanded by equity investors during the previous century.6 The Great
Depression left risk-taking scars that lasted a lifetime.
The Great Depression has now been lost from most investors' experience sample. Indeed,
that fact might help explain another popular narrative from the past - the Great Moderation.
But the Great Depression has recently been replaced in investors' experience sample by the
Great Recession. Whether this will spawn an era of "Recession Babies", with a permanently
lower appetite for financial risk-taking, remains to be seen. But past evidence suggests that
any recovery in risk appetite might take time - more time than fundamentals would imply.
All of these behavioural elements have come together in today's financial markets - disaster
myopia, intrinsic uncertainty and deep trauma. This may help explain why risk-takers have
their foot poised on both brake and accelerator, why risk capital is in stop-start mode. That
implies a risk of heavy and persistent financial congestion in the period ahead. With
hindsight, Roosevelt's fear (of fear) in 1933 was well-founded, economically and
psychologically. It may also be being repeated.
The role of macro-prudential policy
As long as aversion to risk-taking is causing financial congestion, growth (like traffic) will
remain sluggish. The public policy question, then, is whether anything can be done to allay
the fear factor, speed the repair of balance sheets and stimulate risk-taking.
Experience during the Great Depression taught us a great deal about the role of fiscal and
monetary policy in these situations. Indeed, in many respects the Great Depression was the
birthplace of activist monetary and fiscal policy, today's conventional arms of
macro-economic policy. For different reasons, however, these arms are at present close to
fully stretched. In countering the fear factor, that begs the question of what else might be
done?
With fortuitous timing, there is a new tool in the box, a third arm of macro-economic policy.
This is so-called macro-prudential policy. As its name implies, this policy tool is intended to
meet macro ends using prudential means. The UK has recently put in place an explicit
macro-prudential regime. In July of last year, the UK government announced a new Financial
Policy Committee (FPC) to execute macro-prudential policy.7 The FPC is housed in the Bank
of England and met for the first time in June this year.
The FPC's objective is to protect and enhance the resilience of the UK financial system
against risks including "unsustainable levels of leverage, debt or credit growth". Therein lies a
key FPC challenge. There is evidence of unsustainably high levels of leverage in some
sectors. But elsewhere, there is evidence of credit growth being unsustainably low. Some
companies remain over-leveraged. Yet others are suffering a credit shortage, with bank
lending to companies continuing to contract over the past 12 months.
In framing macro-prudential policy today, both these factors need to be weighed: on the one
hand, enhancements to the risk-bearing capacity of the financial system to repair balance
risk-taking
sheets; on the other, encouragement for the capacity of the system to boost credit
supply. These factors can sometimes point in subtly different directions. The first might point
to higher buffers to boost banks' risk-bearing capacity, while the second might point to lower
buffers to boost their risk-taking capacity.
Faced with that balancing act, one of the FPC's recommendations in June was for banks to
raise their levels of capital opportunistically. That meant banks should retain, rather than
distribute to shareholders or staff, any windfall profits. Additional retained profits could then
be used either as insurance against future risk (risk-bearing) and/or to finance extra lending
(risk-taking). In other words, opportunistic capital-raising could help banks hit the twin
objectives of risk-bearing and risk-taking with a single stone.
Looking ahead, the balance of these forces may tilt again. Risk-taking is in retreat. And past
crisis experience suggests that the contraction of lending internationally may have further to
run (Chart 17). The FPC, like the MPC, needs to act symmetrically in response to these
developments. Its job is to cushion the fall as well as arrest the rise in credit and debt.
One practical role for macro-prudential policy in these situations is to communicate about
risks to the system to better enable these risks to be priced. If risk is over-priced, and agents
over-pessimistic, communicating that might help in correcting overshoots in risk appetite.
That was precisely the role played by Roosevelt's inauguration speech in 1933. It provided
an alternative, more optimistic, popular narrative for financial markets. It aimed to reduce the
risk of psychological contagion. It worked. Risk appetite and real activity recovered between
1933 and 1937. A more optimistic popular narrative might have a role to play in helping
correct today's market pessimism.
A second practical role for macro-prudential policy is to make recommendations for how
regulation might contribute towards moderating the credit cycle. The Basel Committee has
recently developed guidelines for one potential macro-prudential tool - banks'
counter-cyclical capital buffer. This guideline is based on deviations in the ratio of
credit-to-GDP from its long-term trend. This has been shown to be a reliable early warning
indicator of future crises across a wide range of countries. It is akin to a Taylor rule for
macro-prudential policy.
Chart 18 plots the path of the UK credit-to-GDP guide-path over recent years. Unsurprisingly,
it suggests that UK banks' capital ratios should have been tightened in the run-up to the
crisis, with credit-to-GDP above its long-term trend by up to 10 percentage points. That
disequilibrium has since been completely eliminated as credit growth has collapsed.
Currently, the guide-path is close to cycle-neutral. Any further fall would put credit below its
cycle-neutral level, implying a loosening to support risk-taking.
Setting regulation to boost risk-taking may feel like a new and radical departure from the
past. But in fact it is neither as radical nor as new as it might first appear. In 1938, the
US was facing a double-dip recession. Criticism of banks' unwillingness to lend to the real
economy was rampant. Fear in financial markets was mounting. The situation was eerily
reminiscent of today.
At that point, Roosevelt turned macro-prudential. In the Uniform Agreement on Bank
Supervisory Procedures, a relaxation of prudential and valuation standards was announced
for US banks. This aimed explicitly to support lending and activity in the real economy, "the
activist goal of liberalizing bank examinations to make them dynamically adjustable to current
economic policies".8 It worked. Lending and growth resumed.
In the period since, the first two arms of macro-economic policy - monetary and fiscal - have
been used actively. The third - macro-prudential - has been tied behind policymakers' back.
The crisis of the past few years has highlighted the need to free the macro-prudential arm of
policy. As in the 1930s, macro-prudential policy may have a role to play in shouldering the
heavy burden of damaged balance sheets and diminished risk appetites.
References
Akerlof, G, and Shiller, R (2009), "Animal Spirits: How Human Psycology Drives the
Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism", Princeton University Press.
Barro, R (2006), "Rare Disasters and Asset Markets in the Twentieth Century", Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 121 (2006),
pp. 823-866.
Cogley, T, and Sargent, T J (2008), "The Market Price of Risk and the Equity Premium: A
Legacy of the Great Depression?, Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 55, Issue 3,
pp. 454-476.
Graham, J R, and Narasimhan, K (2004), "Corporate Survival and Managerial Experiences
During the Great Depression", Working Paper.
"Capital Discipline", available at
Haldane, A (2011),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2011/speech484.pdf.
HM Treasury (2010), "A new approach to financial regulation: judgement, focus and
stability", July, available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/consult_financial_regulation_condoc.pdf.
Malmendier, U, and Nagel, S (2011), "Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences
Affect Risk-Taking?", Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2011, vol. 126(1),
pp. 373-416.
Reinhart, C M, and Rogoff, K S (2010), "Growth in a Time of Debt", American Economic
Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pp. 573-78, May.
Simonson, D G, and Hempel, G H (1993), "Banking Lessons from the Past: The 1938
Journal of Financial Services
Regulatory Agreement Interpreted", Research, pp. 249-267.
Tuckett, D (2011), "Minding the Markets: An Emotional Finance View of Financial Instability",
Palgrave Maxmillan.
Tversky, A, and Kahneman, D (1974), "Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases", Science, New series, Vol.185, No 4157, pp. 1124-1131.
Chart 1: Chart 2:
Changes to UK real GDP Recessions and recoveries
in crisis periods
cumulative % change
1929 crash Interquartile range financial recessions
since start of recession
Mean time to trough
Financial recessions
1990 recession
16
Normal recessions
Mean time to trough
2008 financial crisis
Index: GDP peak= 100
12
106
8
104
4
102
100
0
98
-4
96
-8
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Years from peak in output
years since crisis
Sources: Office for National Statistics, Thomson Sources: International Monetary Fund and Bank calculations.
Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations. (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/index.htm )
BIS central bankers' speeches
Chart 3: Chart 4:
Changes to US real GDP Risk appetite(a)
in crisis periods
cumulative % change
Standard deviations from mean (b)
1929 crash
since start of recession
2.5
1982 recession 40
2
2008 financial crisis
30 1.5
1
20
0.5
10
0
-0.5
0
-1
State Street
-10
-1.5
Credit Suisse
-20
-2
-2.5
-30
04 05 06 07 08 09 10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
years since crisis
Sources: Global Financial Data, Case-Shiller, Federal Sources: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse and Bank
Reserve, US government bodies (Department of calculations.
Commerce, Department of Labor, Council of Economic
Advisers) and Bank calculations.
(a) Indices are adjusted so that positive numbers
indicate increased risk-taking and negative numbers
indicate reduced risk-taking.
(b) 90-day moving average of standard deviations from
mean. Mean and standard deviation calculated from
28 July 2004.
Chart 5: Chart 6:
Long run government bond yields(a) Long run gold prices(a)
Per cent US dollars per troy ounce (1980 prices)
800
16
US
700
14
UK
600
12
500
10
400
8
300
6
200
4
100
2
0
0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1800 1840 1880 1920 1960 2000
Source: Global Financial Data. Sources: Bloomberg, Global Financial Data and Bank
calculations.
(a) US yields are on 10 year bonds. UK yields are on
consolidated stock up to 1957; 10 year bonds after (a) Deflated using US CPI. CPI for July and August
1957. 2011 is projected.
Chart 7: Chart 8:
VIX Index(a) Market liquidity
Index (a)
Per cent
90 1.5
1.0
80
0.5
70
0.0
60
-0.5
50
-1.0
40
-1.5
30
-2.0
20
-2.5
10 -3.0
-3.5
0
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Source: Global Financial Data. Sources: Bank of England, Bloomberg, Chicago Board
Options Exchange, Debt Management Office, London
Stock Exchange, Bank of America Merrill Lynch,
(a) S&P 500 implied volatility (daily closing prices).
Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) 90-day moving average of index. Index represents
number of standard deviations from the mean of a
range of market liquidity measures, incorporating prices
and volumes, normalised on the period
1999-2004. The indicator is more reliable after 1997 as
it is based on a greater number of underlying
measures. See also Box 1 of the April 2007 Bank of
England Financial Stability Report.
BIS central bankers' speeches
Major UK banks' and LCFIs' Major UK banks' and LCFIs'
leverage ratios(a)(b) price to book ratios(a)
European LCFIs
Ratio
Maximum-minimum range
US LCFIs
4.5
Weighted average
Ratio
Major UK banks (b)
120 4.0
US LCFIs European Major UK
LCFIs (c)
banks
3.5
100
3.0
80
2.5
60
2.0
40
1.5
20
1.0
0
0.5
08 09 10 11 08 09 10 08 09 10
2007 2007 2007
Adj. Adj. 0.0
Q1
(d) 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11
(d)
Sources: Bank of England, published accounts and Sources: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters Datastream
Bank calculations. and Bank calculations.
(a) Leverage ratio defined as assets divided by capital. (a) Chart shows the ratio of share price to book value
Assets are adjusted for cash items, tax assets, per share. Simple averages of the ratios in each peer
goodwill and intangibles. Capital includes total group are used. The chart plots the three-month rolling
shareholders' equity adjusted for minority interest, average.
preference shares, goodwill and intangibles.
(b) Excludes Northern Rock (from end-2007),
(b) Assets are also adjusted on a best-efforts basis to Nationwide and Britannia.
achieve comparability between US GAAP and IFRS
with respect to derivatives and off-balance sheet
vehicles.
(c) Excludes Northern Rock. Data for Co-operative
Bank are used for Co-operative Financial Services.
Pro-forma data are used for RBS from 2007 to 2009.
(d) Revisions to US GAAP accounting rules on
consolidation from 1 January 2010 are applied to
end-2009 data giving a clearer measure of leverage.
BIS central bankers' speeches
Household financial surplus(a) Illustrative estimates of debt held by
vulnerable UK households(a)(b)
Per cent
Per cent of unsecureddebt Per cent of secured debt
UK USA Euro Area
8
40 40
NMG unsecured
35 35
6
(LHS)
BHPS unsecured
30 30
4
(LHS)
25 25
2
20 20
0
-+ NMG secured
15 15
(RHS)
2
10 10
BHPS secured
4
5 5
(RHS)
0 0
6
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
00 02 04 06 08 10
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, ECB and Bank Sources: British Household Panel Survey (BHPS),
calculations. NMG Consulting survey and Bank calculations.
(a) Per cent of GDP. (a) Vulnerable mortgagors are those with housing
equity below 5%, or housing equity below 25% and at
least one characteristic suggesting debt-repayment
difficulties. Vulnerable unsecured debtors are those
with less than 25% housing equity (including renters)
and at least one characteristic suggesting
debtrepayment difficulties.
(b) Based on historical BHPS data and more timely
information from the annual NMG survey. Differences
in survey questions and sample size mean the
estimates from the two surveys are not directly
comparable.
BIS central bankers' speeches
Chart 13: Chart 14:
Corporate financial surplus(a) Percentage of firms with interest
payments greater than profits(a)(b)
Per cent
United Kingdom
Firms with turnover > £1 million Per cent
10
United States
60
Firms with turnover < £1 million
8
Euro area
6
Real estate firms with turnover > £1 million
50
4
40
2
0
-+
30
2
4
20
6
10
8
10
0
00 02 04 06 08 10
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, ECB and Bank Sources: Bureau Van Dijk and Bank calculations.
calculations.
(a) Percentage of companies in each category with
(a) Per cent of GDP except Euro area which is as a interest payments greater than their profits before
per cent of GVA. interest.
(b) Data include firms reporting turnover, profit and
interest paid. These firms may not be representative of
the population. Total sample size varies over time,
ranging from around 14,000 in 1990 to over 90,000 in
2000. Changes in the composition of the data set may
reduce comparability over time. Subsidiaries, as
identified from company structures, are excluded.
Company accounts are assigned to calendar years
according to the statement date. The real estate sector
is identified using SIC (2003) and SIC (1992) codes
(the sample ranges from around 450 to 1,600 firms).
BIS central bankers' speeches
Changes to UK gross government debt Public debt ratios in G7 countries
ratio in crisis periods
Percentage of GDP
1929 crash cumulative pp change
since start of recession
140
PPP
1990 recession
weighted
30
2008 financial crisis
120
25
100
20
80
15
60
10
40
5
20
0
0
-5
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
years since crisis
Sources: Office for National Statistics, Thomson Sources: IMF Historical Public Debt Database, IMF
Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations. World Economic Outlook (April 2011), Angus Maddison
historical statistics and Bank calculations.
BIS central bankers' speeches
Real lending growth rates UK credit-GDP gap(a)(b)
percentage points
Percentage changes on year earlier
35
Norway (1988=0) 30
Sweden (1990=0)
25 30
Finland (1990=0)
20
25
United Kingdom (2007=0)
15
20
10
15
5
+
0
10
-
5
5
10
0
15
3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-+ -5
Years from start of crisis
-10
80 85 90 95 00 05 10
Sources: Bank of England, central bank financial
Sources: IMF and Bank calculations.
stability reports, Thomson Reuters Datastream and
Bank calculations.
(a) Based on the guidance variable for the Basel III
countercyclical buffer. Credit is defined as M4 lending.
The credit-to-GDP gap is calculated as the percentage
point difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its
trend, where the trend is based on a one-sided HP
filter with a smoothing parameter of 400,000.
(b) L