Sustainable investment choices: emergencies and transition
Speech by Luigi Federico Signorini
Senior Deputy Governor of the Bank of Italy
Centesimus Annus Pro Pontifice Foundation
Venice 11 June 2022
Καὶ τὸ τρίτον τῆς γῆς κατεκάη, καὶ τὸ τρίτον τῶν δένδρων κατεκάη, καὶ πᾶς χόρτος χλωρὸς
κατεκάη.
A third of the land was burned up, along with a third of the treesand all green grass.
Revelation 8:7
Your Most Reverend Excellency, Ladies and Gentlemen,
A few months ago, when, at the kind insistence of your Chair, I accepted the invitation to take part
in this event, the topic I had indicated was 'Climate transition: the role of finance and of financial
supervision'.
Times have changed. Over the last hundred days, we have seen the horrendous daily spectacle of
indefensible aggression and war play out before our very eyes. We have seen, albeit from far away
(now that every part of the world is, whether it likes it or not, an eyewitness to what happens in
every other part of the world), human suffering and material destruction on a scale that we no
longer believed was possible in Europe after the days of Sarajevo and Srebrenica. The economic
consequences of the conflict, while indirect, have been felt here at home too: a slowdown in GDP,
a surge in prices, and supply chain insecurities.
I therefore felt it necessary to change the topic of this conversation as well so that it better reflects
current developments. And you will forgive me for also choosing to add a verse from Revelation as
an epigraph, to symbolise the anxieties of today and tomorrow. Indeed, the emergency situation of
the last few months has blended with the emergency of the century - climate change and the need
for a transition towards sustainable development. If the Book of Revelation speaks of the mystery
of the end of time to a believer, to a secular person the verse that I have quoted serves as a dramatic
and quite literally effective reminder of the challenge threatening humanity and the planet, its
'common home', for which it must care.1
Provided we are farsighted in discerning the ends, and wise in choosing the means, a reaction is
possible and, therefore, necessary. Contrary to what is often heard, the consequences of the war,
especially the issue of energy supplies, must not cause us to stray from the charted course - or at
most only for short stretches. They should actually strengthen our resolve to walk this path to the
very end. If sound individual and collective choices are made, the economy and finance can prove
to be powerful instruments for leading us forward.
I shall try to tell you what criteria economic policy choices should follow, in my opinion. But I would
like to start with a brief outline of the current situation. Given the limits to my knowledge, the point
of view of this speech will be above all ours, that is to say Italian and European. I shall defer to
another occasion - should it arise and should I feel able to seize it - to elaborate on how the
perspective that I put forward could be extended to the rest of the world, above all to those 'peoples
and countries which have little weight in the international market, but which are burdened by the
most acute and desperate needs'.2
The economy during the emergency
Global imbalances between supply and demand are subjecting energy prices to pressures not seen
since the 1970s. In May of this year, oil prices in the world markets rose by 65 per cent
year-onyear. In Italy, electricity and gas prices in the wholesale market had more than doubled. There were
similar trends in other European countries, which share our dependence on Russian gas. While fossil
fuel prices have risen everywhere, the rise in gas prices was less pronounced in the United States,
though it has been accelerating in the last few months (with year-on-year increases of 53 per cent
in February and 175 per cent in May).
These developments, which stem from the difficulties that fossil fuel supply is encountering in
keeping up with the rapid growth in demand following the exit from the pandemic crisis, were
exacerbated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the resulting fears of a contraction in the world
supply of energy commodities. Russia is one of the world's main producers of hydrocarbons: in 2020,
it accounted for 17 per cent of the supply of natural gas, 12 per cent of crude oil, and 5 per cent of
coal.
Following the outbreak of the war, the economic outlook has worsened, although the vigorous
growth recorded in Italy in 2021, which intensified progressively, ensured that 2022 started at a
relatively high level, and the economic system has so far shown considerable resilience. Based on
the latest data, another very small increase was recorded in the first quarter.
So what will happen next? At a time like this, making predictions is even harder than usual. In April's
Economic Bulletin, in the Annual Report published at the end of May, and in the recently released
projections conducted as part of the Eurosystem coordinated exercise, the Bank of Italy formulated
scenarios - updated as the situation evolved - based on developments in Ukraine. The most
optimistic scenario in April's Economic Bulletin assumed a rapid conclusion to the conflict, which
unfortunately did not materialise. The central scenario formulated at the time and its successive
refinements continue to project positive growth in both 2022 and 2023. Compared with the
prewar forecasts, however, the new growth projections are down by almost 1 percentage point per
year. A more adverse scenario takes into consideration a temporary interruption in the flow of
natural gas from Russia, to be offset only in part by other sources: the impact on GDP is projected
to be significant, and activity in some very energy-intensive sectors could be affected by
interruptions in production.
The sharp acceleration in imported fuel prices has considerably widened the deficit in the energy
balance of the balance of payments, which in turn led has led to a worsening in the current account
balance. For now, the energy balance deficit remains smaller than in the early 1980s.3 In any case,
the strong positive net international investment position that Italy has built up over the last decade,
thanks to the enhanced international competitiveness of its production system, means it is less
vulnerable than in that earlier period.
The impact of the crisis on prices instead remains significant. Inflation, measured according to the
EU's harmonized definition, exceeded 8 per cent in the euro area and 7 per cent in Italy in May. The
dynamics of energy prices directly account for about half the change in the consumer price index
observed since the beginning of the year.4 However, it also pushes the prices of other goods
upwards, owing to the energy costs incurred by firms across all sectors. Medium-term inflation
expectations, both those obtained through surveys and those implied by market trends, are largely
consistent with the Eurosystem's objective for the time being, but they have increased, and are the
focus of intense scrutiny.
Italy's energy supplies and the measures adopted
Russia is Europe's main hydrocarbon provider. In 2021, the European Union's imports from Russia
accounted for 27, 40 and 46 per cent of its total consumption of crude oil and other petroleum
products, of natural gas and of coal respectively.5 Italy's dependence on Russian gas (39 per cent) is
in line with that of Europe; that on Russian coal is higher still (56 per cent), but coal plays a limited
role in the energy mix of our country.6 Gas instead meets 52 per cent of residential demand (mainly
for heating) and 84 per cent of thermoelectric power generation, i.e. 50 per cent of total electricity
production.7 The impact on the energy costs borne by final consumers, and particularly on poorer
households, is therefore greater than for countries with a more diversified electricity production
mix.
A complete interruption of Russian exports to Italy would mean substituting about 30 billion cubic
metres of gas every year (just under half of the country's total imports) by relying on other providers.
Alternatively, it would mean reducing demand, which is dominated by thermoelectric power
generation (44 per cent) and, for the remaining part, is divided almost equally between residential
and non-residential uses (the latter encompassing both industry and services)
Most Russian gas comes to Italy via pipelines and is therefore difficult to replace. Importing gas by
sea, which is more flexible, requires regasification plants, of which there are currently not many.
The Government is trying to increase both the supply of gas from other providers linked by pipelines
(Algeria and Azerbaijan) and Italy's ability to import liquefied natural gas from Qatar, Egypt and, in
the longer term, the Republic of Congo and North America, by building new floating storage and
regasification units, which are easier to make operational compared with land-based terminals.8
Moreover, some coal power plants could be reactivated, reversing the decision to close them all
down by 2025. In the longer term, this would also be accompanied by an increase in the number of
renewable energy power plants.9
In addition, as early as the second half of 2021, the Government adopted measures to limit price
growth by reducing excises and other measures specifically targeting vulnerable households (e.g. by
increasing the amount of 'energy bonuses' to be paid and expanding the range of those eligible for
them). To contain demand, temperature limits for air conditioning and heating have been set for
public buildings, although they are not always easily to implement and check. More drastic
provisions to reduce demand have not been adopted for now, such as those proposed by the
International Energy Agency (IEA) in April.10 Such measures include stepping up the use of remote
working, limiting air travel, and also measures reminiscent of those adopted after the first oil shock
(reduced speed limits on motorway and car-free Sundays11).
What to do now
There are four objectives: reducing the excessive dependence on energy supplies; mitigating the
financial consequences of rising energy prices on households and firms, especially the most
vulnerable ones; averting inflation; and doing all of the above while, as far as possible, staying the
course on the climate transition.
Climate transition, emergencies and energy security
Let us begin with the latter, which remains the fundamental compass for steering medium-term
action. I believe I am preaching to the choir when I say how important this is. The environmental,
economic and human risks linked to rising temperatures are well known, and it is not an issue that
can be deferred to future generations.12 We have recently been reminded of the urgency of taking
action by, among other things, the extreme heat wave that hit vast areas of India and neighbouring
Pakistan in March and April, exposing more than one billion people to temperatures well above
40°C, with the hottest part of the year still to come. Even though our climate is more temperate,
the rising trend in the temperatures of our major cities, borne out by Istat data, is easily confirmed
by our daily personal experience.13
To counter the rise in temperatures due to the greenhouse effect, humanity must reduce net
greenhouse gas emissions, first and foremost those of Ever more ambitious and binding
CO2.
objectives have been proclaimed over the years at European and international level.14 To achieve
them, three elements are necessary: well-designed rules, targeted (public and private) investment
decisions, and consumption choices consistent with these goals. Underpinning all this, in a country
based on a democratic system and a market economy, is an awareness of the problem on the part
of citizens and consumers, 'a growing ecological sensitivity',15 without which the right incentives
cannot be created, either for public authorities or the private economic system.16
The investment needed must be borne largely by the private sector, on account of both the amount,
which is presumably well above the public sector's spending capacity, and of the tendency of market
mechanisms to promote its efficiency. Hence the question of 'green' finance and the rules needed
to make it a reality, the original topic of my talk (which has in any case been addressed by other
speakers here today). About this I will only say, very briefly,17 that - in addition to investors'
acceptance (and there seems to be no lack of this, given the rapid development of 'green'
investment instruments in recent years) - for environmental finance to expand in a sustained
manner, access to data of sufficient quality (taxonomies, audits and so on) is essential; the lack of it
would undermine efficient selection and lead to a considerable risk of greenwashing. It is also
important that banks and institutional investors become aware of the need to manage
environmental risk effectively, among others. Efforts are being made on both fronts, especially at
European level.18
Let me make an observation on this point, however, that I think is fundamental. In a market
economy, even more than taxonomies and prudential rules, what really counts are relative prices,
a key tool for allocating resources efficiently. As is now widely acknowledged, it would be quite
difficult for a transition strategy to work without carbon pricing: without, that is, incorporating into
the price of fossil fuels the damage that they cause to the 'common good',19 i.e. in economic jargon,
the negative externalities associated with their use.20 Rendering human activity 'climate neutral' -
a prerequisite for limiting the temperature increase to 1.5-2°C, pursuant to the solemn commitment
made with the signing of the Paris Agreement21 - means setting prices that encourage a more
efficient use of energy, and, in particular, choosing a relative price that makes fossil fuels less
affordable than alternative fuels, thereby favouring the development of low-emission technologies.
We would ideally like carbon pricing to follow a gradual and predictable path, the result not of
exogenous and unpredictable factors, but rather of explicit economic policy decisions (rates, grants,
market rules), carefully evaluated, credible and (not least) consistent at global level. A gradual and
predictable path will make it easier for investment and consumption decision makers to further the
transition. A fiscal component (which is only one of the possible ways to achieve carbon pricing22) is
useful for redistributing the cost of the transition and mitigating its impact on households, firms and
the worst affected areas.23 Global cohesion is important in order to avoid unfair competition and
the leakage of emissions from one jurisdiction to another: carbon knows no borders.
Clearly, we cannot realistically wait for anything but an imperfect approximation of the ideal path I
have outlined: this must not distract us from our goal, but should rather make us aware of the
obstacles to be overcome. In particular, there have been numerous experiences of how difficult it is
to reach a global agreement; not even in the course of Italy's G20 Presidency, during which a great
deal of progress was made nonetheless,24 was it possible to reach agreement on a series of specific
and detailed measures. Hence the proposals for a 'climate club' composed of those countries most
determined to proceed, for countervailing duties at the borders, and other similar measures. Nor
can we forget that it is a lot to ask of any system of government, democratic or otherwise, to make
a credible commitment for decades to a strategy that in theory offers great long-term advantages
but, by considerably raising prices, could prove to be unpopular in the short term. All the more
reason, bearing in mind that the same optimal price, that which correctly incorporates the
externalities associated with emissions is subject to uncertainty in its calculation, while the technical
instruments to achieve it give rise to differences of opinion, and it is therefore inevitable that we
will have to move forward, at least in part, by trial and error.
This already complex situation was made even more difficult by the sudden, sharp rise in fossil fuel
prices between 2021 and 2022, following the economic and political tensions with which we are all
familiar. A rise that was neither desired nor foreseen, and certainly not 'optimal' in its timing,
manner or extent, and with such a heavy and unexpected impact on households and firms.
Various governments, including Italy's, have taken action to mitigate the immediate effect on
citizens' well-being. Energy services are, in many respects, a primary asset; an increase in their prices
weighs more heavily on the budgets of less well-off households, exacerbating 'energy poverty';25
and, in any case, it is not easy to adjust for in the short term. This latter point is also true for
energyintensive companies, which, in the face of a shock that impacts different economies asymmetrically,
would find themselves, in the absence of any relief, having to tackle at least a temporary crisis of
competitiveness.
With all this, it would be rather short-sighted not to recognise that the price shock, along with
uncertainties concerning supply chain security, is triggering a reaction that, in a more or less short
space of time, could result in energy savings and/or a conversion to alternative resources. Raise your
hands those of you who, if you have had the chance to, have not thought in recent weeks about
reducing your future consumption of fossil energy sources at home or in the office, for example by
installing solar panels or using other renewable sources? How much will be saved and how long it
will take, we do not know; but it would be surprising if the effects were insignificant.
In the years following the two great oil shocks, Italy became one of the most energy efficient
countries in the OECD: between 1970 and 1995, the energy intensity of Italian GDP fell by almost
30 per cent. After the exogenous shock, energy prices remained high in Italy, in part due to it
having among the highest taxes on energy products in the EU.26 The prices were a key signal for
improving energy productivity, which had stalled prior to the oil crisis.27
There are certainly some differences between now and then; among other things, the energy
component of GDP has continued to fall over the last thirty years, in part due to the growth in
services to the detriment of manufacturing; moreover, at this moment in time, we do not know how
permanent the increases that we are experiencing will be. The example of the 1970s cannot
therefore be interpreted as a qualitative estimate of the possible effects of the current shock.
However, there are also more than a few similarities; qualitatively speaking, the effects could be
considerable.
All this, provided that it is recognised that, aside from emergency measures taken to smooth
temporary 'bumps', public intervention aimed at mitigating the effects of the crisis should, more
than it already has, take the form of income relief for those most affected and of support for the
transition, rather than fighting price increases. We must certainly help those in difficulty, but we
should also leave the signal of relative prices to function to the extent reasonably possible, just as
we essentially did in the 1970s. We must also remember, and we should remind the public, that in
order to achieve the climate transition goals, fossil fuel prices still have to rise, and rise a lot, no
matter how much the estimates of the exact end point may vary.
This action must be accompanied (as we have already started to do) by every possible incentive,
including regulatory ones, to turn to alternative sources, with a view both to accelerating the
transition and making it affordable for everyone. Looking ahead, it would be good to help
households that are or are at risk of being in a situation of energy poverty, not by offering
permanent subsidies for the use of fossil energy sources, but by giving them a real opportunity to
reduce energy waste and switch to renewable sources. It is not an umbrella to shelter ourselves
indefinitely from higher carbon fuel prices that we need, but rather a sturdy pair of boots for making
the leap towards decarbonisation as soon as possible.
Mitigation actions are also limited by the need to keep the public finances stable. All the more
reason to avoid generalised relief and focus on subsidies for those who really need them.
The climate transition strategies and those for eliminating energy dependence do not conflict with
one another; on the contrary, they are mutually reinforcing as they both presuppose a sharp
decrease in the use of fossil fuels and a sharp increase in renewable energy.
The only exception to this convergence of goals could be a temporary increase in the use of coal,
the most polluting of the fossil energy sources. It may be an acceptable compromise if limited to the
short term: 'until greater progress is made in developing widely accessible sources of renewable
energy, it is legitimate to choose the less harmful alternative or to find short-term solutions'.28 Some
economists fear that an increase in the consumption (and the price) of coal may encourage
excessive future investment in this form of energy production, which would then affect future
choices. We must certainly be careful to avoid any conduct, especially public conduct, that pushes
us in this direction; but, all things considered, it seems to me an unlikely scenario. That coal is
considered unsustainable in the long term, also because of its serious effects on local pollution, is
something we all know; it is therefore difficult to believe that substantial long-term private
investment in this sector can be decided on the basis of expressly, credibly temporary measures.
Prices and inflation
The 1970s saw a marked reduction in the energy intensity of GDP, but also a period of high and
variable inflation, which did not abate for many years and only with great difficulty. Inflation is in
the headlines again at the moment, after several years of being seemingly moribund, and
households are beginning to feel its effects. Do we need to push the analogy with those days to the
point of believing that a hike in the inflation rate is inevitable? Not at all; but two clear conceptual
distinctions are required, as are consistent choices.
The first distinction is between relative and absolute prices. The energy transition calls for an
increase in the relative prices of fossil fuels; the general level of prices is (at least as an initial
approximation) entirely indifferent.
In fact, the increase in fossil fuel prices is actually leading to generally higher prices: in part (as I said
at the beginning) directly, because of the proportional impact of energy prices on the general index,
and in part indirectly, through the sectoral interdependencies in production, which mean that
energy prices are incorporated into the cost of products that use energy as input, and the increase
thus spreads to other components of the index. So?
Here we need the second distinction, between a one-off increase in prices and prolonged inflation.
We need to start from the point set out very clearly by the Governor in his Concluding Remarks a
few days ago. The external rise in energy prices is a kind of 'unavoidable' tax that weighs on the
economy of importing countries, technically through a worsening in the terms of trade. The
Governor said that 'government action can redistribute the effects of inflation between households,
factors of production, and present and future generations, but it cannot wipe out the overall
impact'. For this reason, this tax is reflected in a one-off increase in price levels; given the same
nominal income, everyone comes out poorer.
Inflation would be unleashed if, under the illusion of being able to recoup at individual level the
purchasing power that the community as a whole has lost, everyone (households, firms) tried to
redefine their nominal income from time to time, thereby causing what the Governor defined as a
'pointless wage-price spiral' while talking about European monetary policy. Pointless, because by
impacting firms' costs, also affected by higher energy costs, a wage increase would in turn spark a
new round of price rises, and vice versa, in a symmetrical way. There is a risk that this process, once
started, will not stop.
The experience of the 1970s shows that prolonged inflation is not an unavoidable consequence of
an external shock to input prices. It is what happened in Italy at that time, because we were unable
to protect ourselves against the monetary illusion. It was different in other European countries, and
the effect of the oil shock seemed more like a one-off increase in prices than the triggering of an
inflationary process that was then difficult to tame.29 We must build on that experience, both
because of what it teaches us to do because we did it right (letting the mechanism of relative prices
work) and because of what it teaches us not to do (unleash a 'pointless spiral').
The premises are there. One thing that needs to be considered in the specifically Italian context is
that, unlike then, wage negotiations now use inflation forecasts calculated net of the effect of
energy goods (the 'unavoidable' tax) as a parameter, thereby reducing automatic mechanisms; as
the Governor stated, the protection of the most vulnerable can and must be compatible with
maintaining price stability. The medium-term inflation expectations are still close to the target of
European monetary policy, but they are growing, and require our attention. Nowadays, monetary
policy not only has its traditions of independence, but also institutional guarantees for that
independence, intended to pursue price stability, explicitly as their first objective. It has now left
behind those long drawn-out periods when deflation was the enemy. It cannot do anything about
the increase in the prices of energy commodities that comes from outside, but it must take care that
the risk of a one-off growth in prices does not turn into an inflationary spiral. Here I refer again to
the Concluding Remarks: 'the economic outlook has therefore changed [...] the negative key rates
policy can now be left behind ... The Governing Council stands ready to adjust all its instruments to
pursue its medium-term inflation aim'.
The four objectives I have set out (energy security, mitigating the effects of the crisis, monetary
stability and climate transition) can therefore all be pursued at the same time, as long as the
collective choices are well thought out.
* * *
Ladies and gentlemen,
The challenge posed to humanity by climate change is immense, and requires a response at
planetary level. There are many and varied instruments to be used to meet it. In this conversation,
as befits my profession, I have given you some arguments of an economic nature to consider and
judge. Others have made technical, administrative and corporate contributions. Nevertheless, I
believe that none of us are under the illusion that the problem can be solved at a purely technocratic
level. The natural laws, those laws in which the legal system is embedded, and also the laws of
economics, albeit far less precise, cannot be ignored; and yet, especially in an open society such as
ours, the essential prerequisites for effective and long-lasting action are, above all else, the
awareness and willingness to act of civil society: of citizens, voters, consumers, investors and those
who influence public opinion.
Today I have responded to the invitation of an association that is inspired by the social doctrine of
the Catholic church. For the broad swathe of humanity that identifies with religious principles, the
teaching of those who interpret them is of enormous importance in shaping shared values; by which
in turn, in the ways and forms of every religious tradition, it is influenced.30
The Holy Father made his authoritative voice heard in the Laudato si' encyclical, which is cited here
several times. Among other things, I was struck by its references to the teaching of exponents of
other denominations and religions, especially Patriarch Bartholomew.31 The emergence and
consolidation of an active concern for the fate of the 'common home' is not confined to the Christian
religion, nor is it limited to the Abrahamic religions (Judaism and Christianity always have to
contend, among other things, with the Biblical mandate to 'subdue the earth',32 and with the need
to understand this expression differently from twenty-five or thirty centuries ago, when it was
impossible to conceive of a 'subduing' of creation that would seriously call into question its
equilibria33). To give a completely different example, the strengthening of an 'ecological' vision of
the world has certainly been no less natural in the Buddhist tradition, which does not place man at
the heart of a divine project, but more strongly emphasises the links with other living beings and
nature as a whole (esho funi, the non-duality of life and its environment, 'two but not two').34
Each in their own language, religions put the emphasis above all on a personal 'conversion'35 or
'enlightenment'.36 As I said, widespread awareness is essential; society as a whole will not change
its course if the tiller of its people does not move. Yet this is not enough. For the individual approach
to trigger incisive collective action, collective tools are required. There are two main pathways:
politics and economics.
It is not my place to talk about the former. As regards the latter, I notice that religious figures who
proclaim the need for a social good sometimes view the market with a certain diffidence: 'When
nature is viewed solely as a source of profit and gain, this has ... serious consequences for society'.37
What then is left? The integrity of personal conduct, 'giving things up' and 'sobriety'.38 Without
taking anything away from the moral and social value of responsible individual behaviour, I believe
that, in order to respond to the challenge of our society, it is useful, indeed indispensable, to
leverage market forces as well.
The market is a means, not an end. It has no 'vision of nature'; it should be neither hypostatised nor
'idolised'.39 We are the market, we consumers and entrepreneurs; its values are ours. It has laws
that should not be cast aside if we truly want to pursue the common good; yet at the same time it
represents a method, the least imperfect that has been invented so far, for allocating resources
based on individual preferences, as well as on the rules and incentives instituted by the State.40 It
responds powerfully to the price system and it should be exploited.41
Just as the opening of the emerging countries to the market economy (the Governor recalled this a
few days ago, somehow echoing, if I may say so, the Centesimus annus42) has made it possible for
humankind to take giant steps towards 'eliminating poverty',43 wise and farsighted policies for
tackling the new challenge of the century should see the market as a powerful ally to be recruited,
not as an adversary to be defeated. Thus, in answer to the noble-minded appeal 'that we may
protect the world and not prey on it, that we may sow beauty, not pollution and destruction',44 we
can give an increasingly effective response, thanks to the work of willing men and women.
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Notes
1. Encyclical letter Laudato si' of the Holy Father Francis on care for our common home
(2015), paragraph 164.
2. Encyclical letter Centesimus Annus of the Holy Father John Paul II on the one hundredth
anniversary of Rerum Novarum (1991), paragraph 58.
3. C. Giordano and E. Tosti, 'An assessment of Italy's energy trade balance', Banca d'Italia,
Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Working Papers), forthcoming
4. F. Corsello and A. Tagliabracci, 'Assessing the pass-through of energy prices to core and
food inflation in the euro area', Banca d'Italia, 2022.
5. European Commission, 'In focus: Reducing the EU's dependence on imported fossil fuels',
20 April 2022.
6. G. C. Blangiardo, 'Attività conoscitiva preliminare all'esame del Documento di economia e
finanza 2022: audizione del Presiente dell'Istat', (Preliminary fact-finding inquiry relating to
the examination of the 2022 Economic and Financial Document: testimony by the
President of Istat), 14 April 2022 (only in Italian).
7. Ministry of Ecological Transition, 'La situazione energetica nazionale nel 2020' ('The
nationa