The Statesman.
London, England, 1810-02-23 00:00:00

MINUTES OF icribtrict,
I
•
TAKEN BEFORE THE COVVITTEE OF THE
WHOLE HOUSE, APPOINTED TO CONSIDER
OF THE POLICY AND CONDUCT OF THE LATE
EXPEDITION TO THE SCHELDT.

e..•••••••

•
Lone 190 die Febrgartl. 1910.
The Right Hatt. :Air Jana Anntontra, Bart. in tlte Chair.
Rear-Adatural Sir RICII•110 Blears called it. .

Examined by the Committee.
Were you consulted with by any, of his Ma.
jesty's'Ministcts previously to the sailing of the.
Expedition ? I was not consulted by any of his
Majesty's Ministers, but I had
,a conversation
with Lord Castlereagh at Deal, Which, I did nut.
consider to be otbbial, it was merely accidental.
Did that conversation regard the, EsPetliti6ol
It (lid.

Have the goodness to state the substance of that
conversation, and thesdate of it t—lt first related.
to the state of the weather, which 1 represented as
a very uufavourable batch of weather at that sea.
son of the year ' • the date I believe was the 24th of
July, the day before I received my orders to pro.
ceed off Walcheren. Ilia Lordship mentioned to
me then the object of tiserEapedition, and spoke of
the measures to be pursued. I observed to his
Lordship, that if the fleet of the enemy at Antwerp
was considered the great object of the kixpetlitiou,
thit I toped **should not find ourielees involved
in the siege of Ifjushing,,nr the operations in Wal,..
elteren, but 'ffipeittsithbuld proceed on to the
ultimate *get wi*lkt delay. On his Lord-
.ship gatadillalat sae as to as; knowledge of Wel-
chered, I iaformed him that 1 bad nu other
than what I procured fronf.the charts, add that 1
conceived from that knowledge, that the better
way probably
.vroald be top up the East Scheldt;
his Lordship replied, that that had been in con.
temptation, but that it had been given op on a
further consideration. 1•010 represented, from
the veryebad batch of smOer we had it that time,
I much feared, vales 'a ilvourable changq took
place, that we ran great risk by carrying a fleet so
very numerous epos that coast, for that certainly
the weather was of $ worse stamp than we might
reasonably have expected at that season of the
year. That war the substance of tile conversation
that I had with Lord Castlereagh. .
Can you state what further conversation took
place, in consequence of your suggestion that no
time should be Ist in the attack of Walchereti
and Flushing ?—Lord Castlereagh rather heard
what I bad to• say, than eppeared desirous, I
thought, of asking me particularly, not do I re.
member if he made any observation upon tbat
subject.
Do you know whether any plan was concerted
for 'the attack of Antwerp ?—No, I do not.—
I knew that Antwerp was the ultimate ob.
ject of the Expedition, brit as to trip plan, I
knew not of any, except that I utideretood
part of the fleet 'were to have gnhe up the
West Scheldt, ,but tho mode of attack upon An..
twerp I did not know, nor did I even know at
that time the plate at which it. was ithetsded to
disembark the army. In the first question I was
asked, whether I was consulted by his Majesty's
Ministers; I should state, I was sent for to town,
and was informed by the First Lord of the Admi.
ratty that I was to go upon the Expetil'ion, but I
was net °molted ; I was nets, Wormed that I was
tugs, and what the object of the Expedition was,
and the Officers that were going, but I woo asked
no question.
[A great part of the remainder of the Evidence
relates to the piogress of the Naval part of the Ex-
pedition, which has already been fully detailed.
We.shall extract the most interesting passages.)
Were you acquainted with the state of Lille,
and the boom across the rivet it that place ? 1
,had the advantage only of seeing Lillo within a
few miles from the chip in which my flag was
hoisted, and on my approaching nearer it in veal-
ler vessels, I was never nearer I presume than
three miles and a heifer four mile," ; the boom was
early thrown across, I am not certain of the day,
for I am not sure that we perceived it immediately;
but I think it must have been thrown across the
14th of August.,
' . Dofou mean that it was not thrown across the
river earlier than the 14th of August ? Their
flotilla retired to Liltu on the 11th, on the arri-
val of our flotilla, and, I think, en the 13th went
above the boom. I think on the 13th or the 14th
the boom wet thrown across, when their flotilla
was all above the boom.
It was then that the boom was closed ; probap
bly it had been • constructed some timetefore ?—I
presume it is always in construction ready to be
thrown across.
Were you consulted with respect to the poisi-
bility of forcing the passage ?...I was present at
a conversation on the subject of Lille and Lief.
kenshoeik with my Lord Chatham, Sir Richard I
Sseacban, *and ieterel. geoerol_ Officer!, on the
26th of August. .1
State what took place in that conversation ?
It respected the advance of the army, and the
measures to be taken for getting possession of
Lillo and Liefkenshoeik ; but the navigation be.
ins open to where the river narrows, a little
below Doel, it Was considered by Sir Richard
Strachan that no farther measures could be taken
in prosecution of the ultimate object but in con.
junction with the army.
Was it your opinion that the boom could have
been forced ? If the boom could have been
forced, I see no possible good that could have re-
sulted from it, except the forts of Lillo and. Lief.
kenshoeik could have been taken possession of.
Supposiqg it possible for the shipping •to have
proceeded up tkeScheldttOwiteds Antwerp, in case
the army were compelled to retreat, would it have
been possible for the large vessels to have effected
their retreat except with a very favourable wind?
I hold it impossible for the fleet to have passed up
the Scheldt, unaccompanied by the army. Their
return in the event of the army retreating, in that
narrow navigation, must have been greatly depen.
_a _La --- .L.... ....:...... r-..- T I._ s!-__ AL— —L.----11

THE gTATFSMAN.

r"itii,

Vittfilie •SO the army ?' I think, with I
areateely winds,-the Fleet might not have
*Witte have got down but with a change of
Is 'lt your Opinion, that the Fleet conk
have proceeded. up to Antwerp, unless the A,
were in possession both of Lillo and Lief ki
ihoeitk ? It is. •
Supposing the Arniy in possessioti if
forts, could the Fleet hirdoproceeded and retnt,
with safety if the Feineh"were in possessiolv"
one bank of the river between the forts and .
weep ? I think there Would have been. cotiside,
able risk, but with such 'an object in view,
of opinion Sir Richard •Strachan vvotAd hat
tempted it. 7 p,,....
Have yogi any reason to believetbaithe fu
Lila and Liefkenshoeik were not in t state
fence when the armament sailed from Engl at
I incline to the opinion that there were feet
in the country on our first arrival ; but I d,
*Dow that those forts were not perfectly
Sailed.
Hare you any reason:to think that the far
Botts of Lilio and Liefkenshoeik wet, tiol
state of defence, and that they were net per
with a sulficient number of guns at the time
sailing of the Expedition ?—No, I have no,
meant to allude to troops, which I was of op;
the country was almost destitute of at the tit
our first arrival. p '. ~
Then you have no reason to think that th
were not in a perfect state of defence witb h
to their works at the time•of your first •art
No, certainly not. • .
From the extent of the works of Liftu
Lilt kenshocik, do they require many men tr
Ilion them ? Idb not know the extent of
works, but I should apprehend they mu!
quire some' hundred men at least to gai
them.
Supposing there were some hundred men
risen those forts, would it not have been ii
sible, ontil•those fort, had been reduced by
for the fleets to have co-operated in any 1
upon Antwerp.? The fleet could not hal
operated, in an attack upon Antwerp /thou
and Lief kenshoeik until they were redueetL
Had you arty knowledge of the st ite of 0
lifications of Antwerp at the time you arri,
South Beveland ? I' had not.
Had you any knowledge of the amount of
in Antwerp on. the sth of August ?—No.
wore various reports as-to the state of Ant,
some stating Antwerp to be destitute, othl
reverse. . ,
D,) you recollect having shifted year Reg
14th of August to the Cantina, is the
Safi& ? Perfectly. i :i. .
~,,
Do you recollect what wat the spate or t'
tills which was with you at that time? • One
gnn ship, ten sloops, seven gun brigs, 0110 .
ship, three divisions of goo-boat*, and 30
'boats, armed with earronatles.
Did you consider yquiselt at that time in
to proteed to the ulterior objects of the E;
lien, H the army had been ready to cp.o,
with you ? Ni,, I did, not consider that 0,
cal foresees sufficient at that time to have jurnificat'
me, had the Army been ready, to have entered
into any operations.
For whist purpose did yen write to Lord
lyn on the 17th of August ? In consequew
my having received orders from my Comm;
In Chief to forth my . plan, and to act wit;
Lord Rosslyn for thfuccomplishMent of' 0
tenor object,- nestlilt; the-destruction of the
at Antwerp. . -,
Did you ccrnt.lo*.;tittetlifitt then .under
command sufficient-to Bate induced you to pra
if the Army had been rearif to co-opereti
would hate gone, but I katu'at thalami wl
my Lord Rosslyn that the Army was not re;
had everr.reason to belie t they ware not ;
seen my Lord Rosslyn on the 15th, and I woe
expectation every tide of men of war, ships-or
lino and frigates, . and that I must have had
ficient naval force before any plan could-havr
formed to act upon.
Do you mean to be underitood, that if the.
bad at that time been `ready to co-operate with
you hail not a suffieientillaval force? No: I
It would have been my duty to liavegoue on
Army had been ready. .
Do you consider that you had at that 1
sufficient force to co-operate with the Army,
had been ready ? I had not; I had no other
boats than what I brought with me from the
tern Scheldt, the fiat boats from the Wt
Scheldt had not arrived ; I could have tratispoi
at that time but a comparatively small bor
men ; if the qUestion is in' allusiou to naval k
in the situation of the Enemy at Antwerp,,Aed
.nith their boonr across witkeryself in possessir
of a 'very formidable Flotilla and eighteen frig,
or stoops, I should ha* considered it my duty
have gone •on, knowing also that a much
coliniaafireliatalldrce WI'S infitrpgrarge eve,
Are not westerly winds the most preval
winds iu the Scheldt during the time when the
!rectifier' was in that river ? At'that season ,
year, I think westerly winds generally pre,
and I think they prevailed in: the Scheldt.
When you were asked., on a former part
your examination, your opinion as to the p,,
cability of breaking the boom, you said that
had the-boom beet broketOrou did nut thin'
ships could pass txp'whbotrt the occupation
torts of Lillu. and Liellkosidtoeik. Do you ,
that, considering the' bend Of this river, and
oblique position of the booms it was likely
your ships could have had heed-way stiffleimit ,
have broken the boom ?..I think 'it very doubt.
ful ; but the preferabia, y, perhaps, of breaking
the boom would have by approaching
gun-boats. 'I think it 'Mee been difficult _
, the ships to have broit'a9' tlik 14)66E, hod indeed
extremely difficult in itilWlit# • wittfott WA*
possession of those forts. rs.' . ' •
IVoulll tout the vessels, selaltifem-'''' ...
which Med iftempted to '
_A k -111 _aA ..I • a •

. • • •. •.... .. .
.. ..-
I
•• : . •„..-- , , '
_______......................
L.
..,..
si
..
strong not precisely answer for the sitaititfivt- - s
a been they might bete been throWni cortaioty di.*:" ;
r wind. tuation would .have been t,4
tery•auk„4. 't 0.".
!Arm .not What *es the natal Neve which the enemy t' •
y"' immediately behind the boom? There le 44 .
ef keth. assay small veteek .ai the navigation Wouldc:,,,,e 4 . •
d• 1.1 ialthboeing there, Ind. A believe at bne II r 'll
Ilene the
.)`ttilnel,
sttft&l tivere
boats. forty of different sites; Mostly hti
Pt hoicks
gua. •
sioWbc4. Had the defeebes of the berim hews forced
,
0
d• Alit.' 'tfieregefother forts upon the Scheldt a Ittcliir'„re
Adder. sitipa must have -passed before they could hu,-'
,I am reached -Antwerp.? There is one marked in ..,:e 4 '
no at. chart, Idu out know that they bad c ''". I onstreetui,
a new one. /el
Oct! of In point of fact, opposite that one marked ja •
lof de. the chart, were there nut two sail of the line ' 0
Ind r— boned to priktect the 'reach of the river leadi 14";
mt., 1
'troops 'trot fort ? There *ere three frigates ; h i *.
but s thi,,t
do nut on the t4th there was no ship of the line helm„ a p
• 'garei. Antwerp ; there were t woline.of.battle ship, (Mete
'e*
some time, which tfibved-up to Antwerp ,eh Av.,
i') i cis, .- '
Irtifica. tint recollect the precise day. Mt
,st in a Wheu you Isy of Baths, was a ford discovered
retitled across the Berguii.o ii-Zoom channel ?--A ford -
sin 111
:of the early discovered. - I early learnt from Sir juh 111
not ; I I
(lope, that the passage was fordable in som c
PIN 4 Tits
.111- opinion froto South Haveland to the opposite land. •
cli'l
tinie of Did you esantine that ford yourself Ti
to he examines! ? —I did. , or 01.41.4
,Pi
he.forts' I For how many hours, at any period of the tide' "--t'-.
I•
kespect ' was it prat able fur infantry ?...--1 beliettfur as,, ' fit
rrlail ? 'hour.
~. What was the width of that ford ? There 1,11) e
rs
to and only an old part, which would; have taken s_ ,
s i es., the
to gar. lieve, about twelve or fourteen men abreast, aideki, 111
il
if their appeared to have something hard at bottom, 4s it AV '
I
us t re- stones bad
wbpaeae.stinsi.litul ideAdoytw, I:hi:di:oi wohtitea.rd
itiziorbiteeslsi,ettiv:ettilitiwtwiterat4ei
440
01
l's
;airlson afoordeanbelieenat
-to ga.r. was of considerable extent; but what the dilliro. the
im pose ties to be met with on the Bergen-op. Zoom side, ii,
I ei
to
y siege, going from, that ford to the dyke might he, 1 •„
attack lam not informed. I mention that circutnstanctel eft
ive co. because on the I;4:rebind side there were thlfitui, it
rc 'Lilco ties in getting upon the- land When a persec ,is,
I. came close to it, although Mu met with nu groat I
the for. dilTiculty in coming a
over the stream; there we 'lli
rived at water courseri in the land which would hate v . -.
muoh impeded, and perhaps stopped• an army en.' • V
' troops tirely .;
so that-I think the oqy part %inch could • ,
There , have been depended upon, was that fordable pang', C
twerp ; which would take about 14 men abreast. If ihs :
less the
~. impediments ware as groat on the opposite side 4.
1,-s
On aeveland, the trusx would hate found. them.
; on tltc selved deceived, but I do nut know whether there'
s West were the difficulties ;We could fever ascerthiti. ' sll
.. -
ss
.
the'flo- . . Sl'A 7'E 1'..4 PE RS. p
)rie ,20- —..i....... . le
,•
rocket EXTRAerS'FROIt NUMMI itEto&l'l 0 Afildfatt AC+ . ia
3() flail PRI:SENTSD To TUC UOUsE ui tullMoiks; ..'
;1;
.--- . .- • • in,
a state . , -
INCIP• I. is
tees,
1. X pedi- . tfiT a ACTS rouse Annum, cosistVOttetlttitl,iriNkntil. .. c
operatd consiuncttschs or sonteLitlaffi.-
‘ 0
.. It is to be suispOied that the troops id SW as mile
the ne- the fleets in the ItteJitereaneau are esentualt• *greeted* get
mbtifwd aid the military operations in ;eat gooier. WluNin dii-
entered positions to this etfect may, be mad*, even yellg:toddyil*Sat•
of the grentdat utility.
•II
7. The first eveats of the war Will be dleciide M is Mit
i Ross. lany.he dome or .hopeci fur in theldeirti •of (knout"-, sus , 1
ItiiiiieryEoltiagnida,sowoiltiliasdovmineilluviuliary force. of carstrywadok 1 '
nice of Lou sty meutribute, to the mom .1.
mander of the operatious carry log dn in that miiarter, which, eat.
id'
it h my
1 urge,
lof uti:e4ltitioht•e„g•reit.idselenrcefaucPiV of
wieullid"liskll.
h t le enemy's Um, fen, e
the ui4 'hoot parts, a detachment of this description, a itholdiridee il
he beet any risk, might he sufficient, in the Inn instant-11. birllnglit he
pave the way for the successful issue of the groviast olio's its
• euterprizes. •• I,
•
r yoor
.
''
' roceed, • No. 11. . ,
s. -
ts
ite ? I EXTitAtrtOr A NOTE FROM PEIRCE lITAIREMREEC TO - t
'rote to ISA. SECRETARY CANN 'NG, DATED Lpitams, Itito
HAY, liitil, IIEcIEIVEIJ THE SAME DAY. to
i eady, " The divcrAtins which the urstlersukOal had the hoar a
; I had seine out to Mr. tannilig, and especially that which repent sti
was! !XI uutiiiiNtyotrsithioufstriiiseFit nbibutli; iswc°ll:eidatiltill raredTeLonbraeospoaf writ at .11
roe the out loss -of time, and that its exeeution should immediately
d a Rd. . follow the detenhiontion." WI
re beim 11-
' No. iii. ' •
..
artaacir OP A COMMUNICATION FROM TUE AUIMI ST
^Artey GOV EINMENT, OATLI) OLRVTZ, AUG. Y., ISO&
th you, "By the lust letters from ,,..1 learn, that Mr. tia-
i think thurst has brew enabled to Idiom his t:ourt, somewhat is dr-
tail, of the urrangeweuts which, his Imperial Majesty 111 l •
n if the made for again koqLeotratilig our forces, collecting Ter •
means, and pitking Ms iu a situation sufficiently sonst To
time a and respectable to prevent the apprehension of our ht... IM
mg overwhelmed. by the unfavourable art up:stances olute r
y, if it base succeeded One another, from the beginning. to the Mt
her fiat die of last month. The orders of our August Sovereign or 0.,
In this re pest executing with activity, Mid have ise bale 11
te EIS- tint that before the term of the :umisfite with tho, Fuld be is
.
sestern expirt•d, we shall be capable of siseeting any chimes which 4
'II ;ported may present theillselhes.-"
4ie
may of ---,..-r• •- , • e
....„
4*. .
.1 force No.
i EXTRACTS OW • cOmittilitempv smolt suis ssetrattl ell
I's 'Attu GO V ERN blEter, COUNUNICATiriti 0141 TUE hitt OCTORSTI
session IWI9. • •. '
.rtgates
on" I
thebope the letters: sb.7lt I 141,fresstid to you sercenis*Y..
throughshechasselsf •
inty to hate
at that
and suiticidedy is
~
1 more you of the situation as Rah at that time, to prevail year
leaving the British Ministers is suspedre respeqing the Iran:
:nti.e";l;ruinncnisenn of the Botport/r, Sillils too willterrote't° tier .r - ••J
va
U) thepeitiouorft ofwbboaa. ,a
ictitjes were
.
lie Ex. As to the oder itions ofthe British Cabloetaglia.t Fl,eM c
of the ing,and the port of Autsvetp, I wilt slot repeat the observe- Ts
.charged to carry Ibe assurances - ii,
revail/ thin, that a ilesCent effected a inbuilt br sit weeks rigger it ,:,
the mouth of the Weser or Mite, wad& Mee operated lore J
, promptly,and elEcaciously for the booths of the,caaPisiP,:w in
Part of' But whatever we may thiak of the reasons that may oaten: ,
terroinolt the British Minister to prefrr Alireetaid am Bate 1042:
)cacti-
against' Skpoiiits they 'lava-chases, it Islas header hi
tt etch
dwell upon't4T-m, and the question aicTi tan .only he, hor ~,, a
ok'the. turn to the best advantage what has hitherto been stone? 3'•.'
pawl ,beclanitid, that if Ihe.Bnilish armies lieceed ie tort- . I.)]
of the tag, wittt,,,activity the first ;Wrenn:rs. width .lhey 1117
I think gamed in tbai_iiattrter this diversion will titCoute vrilet,
tud the harramink to mpoiecia, because the French territory nr"
at Hilled
wiU hove bean swilled, his nary and his Come/tree* , r
y that and the theatre of was being so neat; his capital, lac kit
Usk iti sul it cannot he concealed from its iababitants. The rte'. a'
doe- t,,c, prize, moldered in Otis point of via*, appears ta big
.11 it
IN
, . 'r
paresutticient4y, important-so lible, um to try MI y ,r; It
'eaxhig umpeitiesconsminds that you should no , r urge ''.7 I
' iroia" whleli has 01° lel"' I
nig: the
itiwitaleg4ersielteutettite-dhtort
to.
iiduce bils, ii maw
:We for 4
time,l.titly every.to' rt"all that israpp. ticabse, to coattuulll4
indeed
Lthe greatest ogoar the operations on this part of the Pl= I
',mom; „ territory, and to pursue therm Witt all the oetiVlty anti
i7B. ,
-"7 6. city which cirmintstuacetwill permit. It rtimeli!evellotiftel, i
~. . pato, if after' all that has brew .duoe on the. backs
i bpezr, rkheidt, the British Cdbittet were Sr
Id fail- from that point, with a- view or etitplityiste tbes,Vo276/ I
other stunner, for the COttseanraca singe be Moss eieu"n,
__.
to withdraw the_
_....