The Statesman.
London, England, 1810-10-16 00:00:00

,• • •
•'I enjoin to pop the greatest care and promptitude itt the
cxecutiou of tkiioder. • • ". • • •
• " The DIRECTOR IN •CUMF."
• /

.;„

The blarning rapers; 'of. This day, differ le:a in
their res'iiiictive opibious con cersilpg. tire true Au*.
ter of the aetiou of. ti;e ieithi''bo the Sisire
Busaco, than-it was natural. to • sissieer. Even•the
Printi do not welder into very
expectations of the 'results ;' at least; die
utmost hope they eXpress is not very confident-
ly' uttered. AS t9' `the affair' of the 27th, as
it 'stands by weir, sit attack of one part •of
the position of ' the Allied Amity by. the French;
with a superior' ',twee, brought' 'to bear upon
that point; there 'Could ''ntot• he two opinions
es • . the ehareeter 'of that Nothing could be
enure brilliant than 'rho repulse given* the enmity
and scarcely say thing More is wanting, to prove'
that the French woild assuredly be driven but of
Portugal by en *tiny mieh Troops, 'sufficient in
number, arid lase kept up sufficient in number, to
meet the enemy. every where with equal numbers,
and with good military combinations. We have al.
way. maintained, 'thatno troops can beat the Eng:.
equal numbera, and a competent mill.
Mary 61611 in the English Couiniander ; and now the
Portuguese have given an examplo.of their Courage,
a acipline; and steadiness, that does 'faiily itivito`
enotidetter in- than. ' The glorioutisChira'eter. of 'the
vieloiy id the action of Buteco (far tve have no
4

_~.
~-~~ _

dMi.I

y»,~

THE 4142

objection to call it such, taken in itself)—and the
splendid merits of the troops in that contest, are
therefore out of the question, when the battle is to.
be considered as a part of largely combined more.
omits, attii aorta( thuresiski of atpsticuier.gcligne
of a campaign. ii t4O u • f siasito Ansiintain,
that it not only thoesjiet p laapy of ope• cornier'
reasonings on the subject, ut hat it does materially
flor.A.Mll

migrate midi, iiroAairitie-not•to _
my Lord %V rt. ta novo .4 rrtnikett
the enemy, on one of Isis nzsiticteuwVit koom;
parative ease that fins se ens been knoVini tool
with a daughter of the tifolo,ll4ilteat
own lots.. But whag. hat, ha milted by IWO-
tory ? A retreat iyashitoldraimareety in theposier
of chattiest.,.44'--*4/4111 *g°" tiny
thing
el".
Supposing .to hare beet; at Sertlao,,
where Lord Wimaticerost wished him to be, **All
adding to that soppositiOn the far* one, that Co.l
tenet TRANT in that position costbilloitre stopped thei
• 3. 1
progress ?of the, whole
.of Maseaxes vinyl mid.
prevented hie Niko; the ground he did after the ac.'
nun of the 2.7 th, is It probable that the French
would hive abandoned their attack upon the Sierra
de Busuco ? It is impossible to iniagiue that. The
veyy •systcm of the French, by which they have
ion more battles than by any other means, is this
jolan of renewed attack upon..one point ; and they
blivaes have the opportuni4;of that, when their
enemy fights on a system of Waiting for the attack.
-.4itetiewed attacks, therefore, With still more
strongly increased advantage of numbers would
have been Masszsa's course, bad be not found
an opporttigity (which, no 'doubt, he sought)
to prefer another. On this plan, Inuit have
carried the post at last, and then follows the neces.
sity of retreating with disridtantage, or fighting
with your posts turned, and tin-whole advantage of
the position lost. To illustratolurther this leading
idea of our feeling respecting my Lord;' WELLING.
votes system of the campaign, we have only to ob-
serve, that the victory of the ./7th was as complete
as valour and skill (as applied to that single point)
could render it. Lord Weraaacerote gains a victory
overhis enemy, in a partial action, and he can kill no
more, nor take more prisoners, without he moves out
of his position to pursue, and that he could not do
because of the superior force of the enemy. Of what
use can such a victory be ? To stop the enemy for
a day or two ? That will never be proposed as a
alluded object for such sacrifices as we are mak.
kg., Of no use, as to the general, the ultimate rc.
Wei can sueh A victory be. You have repulsed your
enemy with the brightest glory to yourselves. But
he is left, with still superior force, unmolested (for
you .are not to perste him) to come on again
svit4 ettw•f4rie‘ttad'to .4o:wahine new movements
for thit purpose, if necessary. Such must be the
n'Oty-fissiTt Of ilia prima in.
atitsc, the 'rout 13-arc fart and fay* frr, from pro-
toiling, an their face . Lord Wut.t.tecToN has quit-
." • • . •
tad' thd' position he had.itaken to stop the enemy
from advanelng to tolniSrti, end the enemy, with.
out that retreat of LOrd WELLINGTON, would have
gained Coialbra,..andAl {lad en the lied Army in the
rear, and cut it off froth tialion, and; in fact, the
whole coast. It is well to 1;4 plainly at this.
111Ash'in.t. has gained what he -wanted for the
present: He wanted to compel Lard
,Virel.r.tlse-
Too successively to retire from position to posi.
lion, till he (Masao:o cuuld bring his troops
into' a plentiful country, where he might take.
his leisure to bring the Allied Army to a ge.
neral action, in an open and unprotected country ;
or compel `them to t retreat under every disadvau.
.•
tar of such a situation. He, in all probability,
has' Coimbra, Oporto, and the whole north of
Portagal'•open to him it this moment. But if not,
the road to Coitnbra is open to him, and, OportO
and the North are uncovered and open to his-Wants.
But 'is this . nothing' to have gained ?—Has ho
fought the battle 'of the Sierra de Bunco for
,nistking And 'wit( any military man say, that
biltie hatiwo'thiag`to' do with the movement which
\ his led !Wassail* to literates of Coimbra ? Ire has
1.0,"000. rrien—let that be taken for granted....
Willtienot Worth while, reckoning upon (he 'cold,
blooded pratck of conqueror', to inicrigce 10,000,
Man, to get' into a country of Assty, to compel
hie enemy to retire (rota his poiltlea'to tlie last of
his strong positions, and to put him to every dis:.
'advantage that his PoSitious were to protect him
from ? On the whole, we deem this a epleildid
'achievement of the Allied Army, taken in*
bet- a victory of no fruils—a victory
:that 'may- prepare , the way to disaiter—:
and we' apprehend, there is 'little' difference of
'opinion about ibis. Even the Ministerial prints.
dwell. upon the splendour of the victory, rather
tlsoti',. its utility.—As to the mistake respecting
I.loltitielttsaser's division,e it would afford flinch.
rutin' for observation. My Lord Wir. NGTON'
should have taken etre that Colonel TR A NT'S divi.
sion was where he wished it to be, to fill up the
chaio of his combinations. But Colonel Tit tNT is
'in the North, wheti he should be in the South. My
Loitl NVELtataeTom made this species of mistake in
the affair.,er Talavera. Ono of the ..reasons as.
signed ..Lo,• his being overwhelmed hy a superior
faeca) unflreing compelled to retreat after a victory
gained by' him, losing hishospitals,-titidhis sick and,
wounded, and Abandoning everythi;ig. bu Laic aim


Ma

,ltsmAx.