The Statesman.
London, England, 1810-03-27 00:00:00

Tfts

worm his letter to the Commander in authorities %shoo opinions were on the iehle.--
iit Ithe •Aeulkst, with respect to the Commander in CAW
the 29th of June, to Liiiig - .
ei4.4 dated
. an issue. In his own mind he was, iolbiFExperlitilitte he ;admitted that hisotilnlon was'
sleet al to.eall upon Government to pause and'
iset.i''oin to the diffieultiee in the one castecoeld. /.,
ro
ounitel,andthatiti the other they %ref:: ion- elehlierate• triton it; but he could not admit (and
sishol for the opinion of tie:Coin. in all The Conversations with the Commander in
14eilie: but be
liable' Chief to put that matter to reel. - ad. Chief Which he had held, divested of all respnitei- '
Joie '
eel
,e his Majesty's Government well.. knew bility, he had never understood), that he bail die.'
pour, . course pursued. 'tiactly protested against the proposed ' ' '
outlaw whichever might be theoperattotis
i 0 side expectations of certain mace's& as impracticable, and consequently impolitic. He
1.,.,,1 ow difficulties, and, witheneeleing. oesuldenad a single sentence of the short letter of'
Tie hat. n
914111• • h• d '
le saa.;ume.as to t 0 result, were estrous..per *his Lotelahip on the subject. 66 The advetree
Vis'iY i I- n which presented the .less risk..! through Flanders would be attended with 'great
i
Alooibtow that eelosi the supposed ohllie. stem that Government difficulty, and at any rate the' attack by the
drr to call for 'Dietary opinions in writing, Scheldt would be preferable." The Command-
eer.' I''''
i.entered his caveat. He appealed to an • Hon. • er. in Chief' would • not have Assisted Goveru-
ft"„oonen opposite, whether such had been the ment by .pointing out the best means of at-
"' lee 0( Government ? Had it been the prac- tainieg 'the object, had he considered the ob-•
Fa' •the sins that Memorable Gentleman ject to ,be wholly unattainable. lie pro.
oaf's:mg
igki the Military Administration of the coon- ceeded.. '" In whatever way Antwerp is to be ap-
try
the merits or preached or taken, the service will he. one of
;een
• Whatever might have b
wait, of that HotsouribloeGeratleman's mie great risk, as the enemy will soon he enabled to
re; he (Lord C.) krie%v very well, assemble from every part of the Netherlands,
, tee masa s
itias'n, attack them woold not be to justify his and even from France." This statement was
Ea. Its would nut even allude to them invidi. merely an explanation of the 'circumstances
rooy, jet that %Tenet he a bad return to the Ho- which induced the Commander in Chief to be.
potable Gentleman, w'.,), whatever difference of neve, that the enierpriie was attended with coh.
'..ilee, might exist between them, was a generous siderablc risk. Whether the peril existed or not
,ewe Leek to the National Glory amidst pa. belonged to-another pert of the argument.—
t. eal easiest, esee ' and he did justice to the weird- The Commander in Chief never pronounced an
his country, although the Government of opinion against the operation except contingent
Mks of
was nu longer in his hands. eVith- on the amount of force with which the enemy
i,t tSeterofe meaning any
liereentry
attack tie that lio- might be prepared to resist. With respect to
ie-
peal& Gentleman, he would ask him, if he the opinion of Col. Gordon, he trusted, that in
urc caled un to justify the Expedition to the commenting upon it, he should not be considered as
DeJeleiee, whether he could produce a writ- depreciating the judgment of that Officei, for'
le, teeitei e authority to that purpose ?—. whom he entertained a high respect. But when
eeet le: produce the written authority of the Colonel Gordon stated in his opinion the exe
eseitivider in Chief that a naval equipment with. trerne hazard and risk to which the Expetlitiod.
outlay army
.was the hest calculated to secure would be subject, he did so in the contem.
edeert in Tien ? Could he produce military leaden of circumstances wholly inappliceibli.—
splices witirrespect to the Expeditions to South In the passage to which- he alluded, Colonel
teet? These were large military questions.. Gordon declared, that. he considered an attack
nekel never heard that the lion. Gent. had ob. by troops in launches as highly dangerous :
land the previous sanction of any high military nothing could be more true; it was even physicr
newel to them. No such documents weee in ally impracticable from the natnre of the dee
tiv afire over ;chief, lie had had the honour to pre. fences; but then such a mode of attack
.was not
Fee entitle believed that no such document existed. contemplated. Sir Willies* Erskine, id his opi.
!outwit the system on whichthe Government had nion, did not estimate the risk of landing so
istiertobeot conducted, and thereforeereenght not highly as the subsequent tisk. Gen. Hope stated,
,be overwhelmed and borne down becauselee had that if the Expedition wired early in August, the
se „a acted it. At the same time, he certainly troops might have advanced to Antwerp, and since
eurcrtainA great defeeence to the Military Autho. I commenced operations. Such was also the opi.
tee, the declaretions of which were on fhe oleo of General Browurigg, and that of Colonel
tele of the blouse.; 'and when in his Majesty's Gordon. The House would see therefore, that so
esvernment he should have ceueeived. himself 1 far were the cluments of these opittions from be.
pity of a great dereliction of duty, had he not I tug adverse to the policy and pricticability of the
Aped himself to be influenced by them. En. 1 Expedition, that they gave it great countenance.
pre as he was, in moving away the collateral ' Two of those opinioes seppurted that particular
1
pists which obstructed the access to the main at.. operation, a coup-de-main, in which the lion.
pow, he woul,l take the opportunity of ado'. Gentlemen opposite had so entrenched themselves;
is; another caveat against the doctrine that bad i bet the meaning of which, in the larger sense in
Lest ioc.ilcated in this diseussien. He denied that which he understood it, lie would explain before he
get ere bounden duty of Government to ab- sat down. Government were bound to obtaia all
ei.n from sending out an e.:eperlition, not only theinfurmation on thembject which they could re-
eks the object of it were declared easily prac. cure: and, upon w review of that iafermetion, they
,•:ISie by.military men, hut also, unless the pre- were bound to come to a decis'ion. lf the'
/se nature of the required operations could be House would allow him to explain fully the
t,tinetly anticipated, and the details of the resist- I grounds am which they had been induced to adopt
:we dee was to he expected minutely ascertained. the measure under consideragon, he was persnad.
qlear, !wadi Had the ion. Gentleman opposite ed, with all due deference 'and humility, that They
it minister knowledge of the state of the arse. would declare, not only that Government had
said Conetantinopte when he sent his Expedition I been justifiable in' the step which they had taken,
odic Dardanelles ? lie had not the least dispose. 1 but that they were bound by a paramount duty,
Leto eareat the forbearance of the opposite side i not to let slip an opportunity which' -appeared
of the Ilutiq., because their practice when in go- 1 to ifford an excellent mode of annoying the enemy.
irturaeat was similar to that of his. Ile never I lie would not argue ' the question on the narrow'
enler,tood that it had been the practice, at the ;grounds upon which it bad been argued by the ep..•
s3t times, to restrict Government to those military I poeite side of the House. It bad been assumed by,
weettions only, the nature of which vas precisely I them, that the destriction of the ships .at Ant.
Wren, and the result of which could not be ails- i were was the sole object of the Expedition. That'
ftitly foreseen. Ile world beg leave to read a • was not the ease. It was certainly a principal
~,art pAss ige fro;nAre instruetionaliven by 'Wel- feature of the Expedition, but it was connected with
hen, Ea: I of 'CtiliThen, to Sir J. Mortfiettf;Vie other objects. In proceeding, he would observe,-
Cairn miler of Ili! fhtpettition scot to Rochefort, that the subject had been disengaged of several tee.
shiei leapeteoiou raiioc- The Parlia,aent of that pies which had. been urged in accusation of his.
day, ia:4eail of reptekeltine I. iril Chathhtu for the Majesty's Gsverssisseest ots former occasions. Tips'
miuplettrfailere of tim Exiedition, bestowed ap. I House had nut • beets told by the Noble Lod that
plAii,Q ;11,4 o,:liiratieit tin him for the effort. Was l the operations could have been commelteed'at 11,1
iteleelie• to sitiipose that Lord Chatham had re. earlier period. The evidence bacon
~ .
troeot
trivet! the fullest information. on the subject—that proved, that the utmost diligence and en
hie woule nut allow the troops toeinbark without had been ust.4. He appreheuded also, that it Lit.'a
102411cEnitical demonstration of success—that lie been distinctly ascertained b.. the evident, that
1.441 not Clint: tee mole' etieo of the enemy was there was ,no other woke weed* creek! be -put
tie pritteilit •on wisie:, he was bound unweariedly into competition with. the service tetidertrikeet.
to act? The instructions to which 'he `alluded This was at- Most' iteportant co ; ---.-
mere under the !iign Manual. After some lines He piit it- `to lose .Individeals who' 4104141114
'47 proceeded thes : •" And whereon nothing doubts with reilieet 'to the etwlig otthe Ow
ref so speedily and effectually annoy the enemy sure, whether 'theta &NMI 4M. Sae Proceed
nan enterprize against Rochefort, our will and fronton's& two causes ; either etc sitebvitte fhat .we
pleasure is, that you attack, its far as it is practi- had timed oes bestows tistaNlMieseohlv 'track wel
relee," for on the practicability it appeared the were bouid tedefen4 with ellf-endiTided NOM, sir
elm was left to decide, " thlettemy, by making *opirrion; tlmt biassed by self-interest we turned
a descent on the French coasts near Rochefort, our backs'ou the North of Germany, where ostr
ii make, if practicable, to attack the force there, army would have been aided in its eifterlsb! (elite.
and to harp and destroy the docks, arsenal, and amn= st
ions of a brave population ? lie hid. it ss
t!iipping. After the attack of Rochefort, should , duty durito, the progress of tbs Gonandetee to
circumstances admit of further operationsi yen must i bring these two points ender • consideration, and
consider L'Oricnt and Bourdeaux as your next ! to she w. that the dee:meals ofd. . _.,
..44,'P•iii:inte;tilyti
object., and our will aid pleasure is, that you 1 ferreted to another objime
Proceed to one or both of those places as may ale.: he incurred the 'reepoeffibilett of *Wing Me '
Pear advisable." Thus it seemed that this Officer wishes. Ile had.satiikd the L'Emnitkials9 with 1
I
went without a distinct knowledge of the recise rest to the inadequscrid the peceniary ' Penal*.
object entrusted to him, but with a discretion pee
of the country in that respect.; and, however be
elect' he was to exercise as circumstances offered. I might bo accused of ameasiontag disclemerre pre-
Sir J. hionlaunt wrote a letter to Lord Chatham; judicial to the-national credit end prostallitb its
in which he stated, that Sir E. !holm and Vice- trusted that nu such evil would accrue, sifted. the
Admiral Knowles were desirous of more specific inconvenience which bail existed had been hi! u.P.
""lens. TI) this letter Lord Chatham replied, foraier occasions. He acitnowledeed that he was
" that he was commanded by the King to judge etcessively anxious to satisfy the blouse end 'Eit-
el the practicability of any operation on the rope Beat his Majesty's Government tad Proceed'
'pet - ' elm* the 'object; boOthat they
irr, - principles ha which
iotortisked

seat

sties attendant ma its failure, the eompellance s.
the army to -perform great and berpaawee services
was generally admitted. The Noble Lord dwelt
at ;nine length on the question of the diversion
which -this Expedition afforded to Austria, -and.
had contended Butt it could not aid did .not
create any such diversion. Uucmostiesebly they,
hope of creating -a diversion had entered very
' largely into the views of his Majesty's Govern.,
mentj when preparing the Expedition. So slosh,'
were they impressed frith the necessity of distract-
ing the attention of the enemy, that had the at.
tack on Antwerp been considered impractis
cable, they should have thought it their duly
to make a descent upon some other part of
the meat, even had such a descent been wholly
unconnected with any British object whatever.
Let the situation of the Continent, when the Er-
pedition was only in contemplation, and when it
sailed, be compared ; the opposite side of the
House took a very unfair view of the power of this
country, when they asserted that a British army
of near 40,000 men were not likely in the then
Istate of- the Continent to create a favourable
diversion. What was the state of the great
contest on the Danube? Abotit four days be.
fore he hail taken his Majesty's pleasure on
the subject, information arrived of the battle
of Asisern. What, was the force of the con.
"tending Votes ?Aim et Aisieja, by her of-
ficial report on that day, which promised so
much for Europe, was 75,000 men. The Aus-
trians estimated the French at 100,000 men. What
number did the French lose in the battle ? Lit.
Ale short of 60,000. At such a moment could {
we have such a mean and contemptible feeling to.
wank ouraelves as to tell Austria that 40,000 Bri.
tish troops were of so little worth, that we would
keep them at home, and leave her to decide the
contest singly ? France had drained the Lew
Countries even before the battle of Asperne. On
the QV of June a French order was issued that
the troops at Antwerp should proceed to As:
'write. After a.pause in the fate of France of
six weeks or two months (a pause during which
the opposite side of the Houle would have
wished hie Majesty's Government to remain
timid and inactive), the battle of Wagrant was
fought. The news of that battle arrived only the
day before the sailing of the Expeditioe. Though
there war enough of British interests and 'Collateral
inducements still to make it the bounden duty of
Government to send out the armament, yet cer.
tainly the question of diversion had undergone
some change. iI e had been called on to prove that the
British Expedition had occasioned the return of any
regiments from the Manioc to Antwerp—this was
not necessary. A force might have been retained
at Antwerp in consequence of the Expedition
which would otherwise have quitted it, at a time
%hen the contest on the Danube was not deter-
mined, and when the French did not• know bet
that the whole 'North of Eeropo would rise
jgainst them. If ho were asked why the Expedi.
hew were•not tent thither, he would-answer, that it
was impracticable. It would kayo been necessary
' lelteet'elealesl.alt Stew among the inhabitant' •
that arrayiwould; boweveri reqtaillinftd of-the'
British. By rcinaitriog there in 'winter; the Bd.
fish army would have been completely committed,
and by ceasing away it would have disgraced it.
self, sad would hare injured those whom it was
sent to assist. However cheap the opposite side
of the House might held the Expedition, the
French Government did not do so, for they ordered -
the evacuation of the fuer principal forts in the
Prussian domitiieas, in order to avail themselves of
that force against ns. But in fact the tendency of
. the Opentlidil to produce a diversion was too ob.
viouslo vaquise farther comment. The whole of
the Noeth` of Europe was in movement, and
the elect of withdrawing, the French troops
might have been,. th*t 4 tbc whole would have
exploded. • So far from having inclined to British
objects, all the dispositiens that bad been made by
his Majesty's Government leaned to general and
not to selfish interests. He was yeti however, to
learn,; het it was a reproach to Government that
it allowed the interests of its own country•to min.
gte with those of other nations. Ile was yet to
learnt that for the impose of disclaiming any self.
isb view, a Government ought to prefer a less ad.
vantageons to a more advantageous operation. lie
was justified, therefore, in considering the de-
struetioe of the naval means of the enemy in the
Scheidt as a principal feature, though not the sole
feature of that enterrize. Commodore Owen,
than whom a more gallant and well.infurmed
officer did not exist, had distinctly declared
that be always considered Flushing as a se.st
formidable post, and had said, that to watch
the enemy's force there, it would bieuedeesary to i
her an equal fleet at two different stations. It
was rather too much to contend that a Govern.
me ett were nut actuated by national policy in any
measure, irthatioessere was not accomplished to
its tallest extent. The Governor of Bathe bad
emcee:o that Owe. Why was there not as greet'
a probability thattlneGovernor dAntwerp might
have evacuated Antwerpt Of those contingen.
. tics, unconnected with military Alines, military
1 men'were not competent to judge. When Gene-
ral Crawford %as asked a question involving ta,
contemporary; he replied• very justly, 46 that it
was a political consideration." If a man
,bent the
title deeds of so estate -which be wainffered to le.
gal men to examine,,theywould seed them back; say
they Vire bad, and purchase thi estate the Wet
Wads* : Whets a question oar put to a mint*
latte,-a mffiteryansirer was bepected ; when putto
a eye pm, a legal answer was expected ; hut in
neither of these cases could any thing rational be
'A rsiorka There were many iaterme-
t needs strong

. . •
''Pots a: contingent events might arise, the re- ed.- on no narrow view of the selgieeti wow" Liu"
m ex—post—ed. iiraigha There were many taterme. .v.vw„-Tki
!e of which main the King judged highly had gone to the Scheldt 'on the PriviciPill"biCk 'fd • reset( setting *hieb were stroeg enough end oT,
pre jqd,ciat. to the public genial." Itsppear- the Condoms& wets pat tit mach iill.olMall
of
s.a.e. ikiiiGe'veadoeur au undertake a service, ,oromerf
!11, therefurt that the Government to which Great Britain. IVith respect to the puseibiliny to gi," mh. ii tio emt tit. saltory coutine„des uski had i
to (Lord eastlereagh) bad had the honour neat igeg se large *force to one poi
.....1 istikil°44:l lehliwrite la. ' . 411. .4100111*. Taking it however ass agaial
to Wong, was sot the first Government thatkad a one to the Peninsula it cusped agdyliti-..e ------
v g
vat est an &polities wittiest as•vrtaining its oh- gitiation• of those who tewpar ial• '11111104.11". 114 • t. - " •to gtia, edisqlsese. all Fttech ar
nee with twalltarniatirel precision. The only ra:- discussions, in coalPfetelo4lo"___.4l.,Liibi ••- . L- ,
____. ' ,_ .:
- ..
litilall, 114411111 r alt the conquest of • Wal... not. intent
news •sittich bad firkesees,
tunsf.alcaletina that cook* be made by statesmen of the country. There wo• oww""7, --•'-r4 iimpitogoimVic -be "sigweeittg he d44s6l‘ force they
"s, by balancing the chances of means With the against, his • Majesty's Got erosset, w " - k wielwaseterliplibk es it bad been as- bad forty
Seardfaiinte,a ealculatiaswhich most bematie nothing hat bore Ong eightt boas Art . . • iferilrigooore Willebete., inwaTed' thirty $h
, .
. i, a .
`elf tbe pee of fisiking, and` , ceesit of I
•1.......••........ and not In safari men atone.- the leedeginey of the force omit 41111.... ' ' vatipsfave
.• . . ~._ 4:4lLossre-ihr- WWI* '6° t" . . 4.l,saw*lssaai Among •Im C411&1104 itit. 004 th
libltalum...—__ • -