The Liverpool Standard and General Commercial Advertiser.
Liverpool, Merseyside, England, 1842-09-27 00:00:00

ALGERIA.

The Governor-General of Algeria has just published a
pamphlet on the means of preserving and rendering useful
the conquest of Algeria.
General Bugeaud's pamphlet is divided under several heads.
The first is, " On the necessity of dominion over the country
for the purpose of colonization." On this point, he says,—
" France has resolved that her flag shall be the only one in
Algeria, and that a grand colony shall be formed there. The
first question to be resolved for the success of. this vast en •
terprise was the subjection of the Arabs. With such a po-
pulation there is no such thing as insinuating oneself into
power. They must be conquered in order to obtain posses-
sion of, and colonize, a portion of their territory. France
then has acted wisely, having once resolved on establishing
herself in Algeria, in being also resolved to conquer it en-
tirely. This work is certainly one of difficulty; but it would
be still more difficult to preserve upon the defensive system
any portion of the coast, for in that case the enemy would
be left in full enjoyment of the country, viz., the resources
of taxation and recruitment, and would be able to keep us in
a continual state of blockade, and to attack us whenever he
should become strong, or we should have embarrassments to
contend with in Europe. Not only is the system of conquest
less difficult than this shameful system of defence ; it pre-
sents immense advantages for colonization. It has been
frequently and truly observed, that no colonization is possible
without cheap labour, or, what is the same thing, cheap
provisions. There are a number of objects, such as cattle,
horses, mules, asses, forage, vegetables, poultry, wood,
charcoal, &c., with which colonists could only supplied by
sea at enormous prices. Cheap labour, supposes, therefore,
the freedom of internal communication, which can only exist
by means of a peace always precarious with the Arabs, or by
the military possession of the whole, or nearly the whole, of
the country. In the rude war which we have made upon the
tribes, they have lost in the razias two-thirds of their cattle,
and, nevertheless, butcher's meat, which was a few months
ago 2f. 50c. the kilogramme (21b. French) at Algiers, is now
sold at only 50c. The reason of this is the supply of our
markets from the interior. Here is one of the first benefits
of conquest. Many others will manifest themselves with time
and when we shall have set seriously about colonization."
General Bugeaud then proceeds to consider the means of
effecting and securing the conquest which he recommends.
He says, " Ido not hesitate to assert that the same, or nearly
the same, amount of force as will have effected the conquest
will be indispensable for its maintenance. The Arabs are
proud and warlike. The war of tribe against tribe is their
normal state ; from their infancy all the males, without ex-
ception, are trained to the use of arms and the management
of horses, and they are incessantly engaged in hazardous en-
terprises. We cannot think of diminishing our force in pre-
sence of such a population. We should soon suffer from
such an act of imprudence. The history of the Arabs shows
how prompt they are to revolt, and their antipathy for us
and for our religion will last for ages. Let us then remain
strong in the midst of them, if we do not wish to lose in a
few days the fruit of all our exertions. This course is im-
posed upon us the more by the consideration, that it is the
only way to prevent our occupation from becoming an
onerous one to ourselves. With an army of sufficient
strength, we can govern the country, collect the taxes, and
promote commercial speculation. The contributions of the
interior, the revenues of the customs and the, octroi, and the
resources which the troops will be able to create In they
stations by the cultivation of a portion of the rich soil, will
in a few years defray the expense of occupation. Such is
the conviction that I have acquired by the experience of the
results already obtained, and the observations that I have
made in visiting all parts of the country. A weak army
would only be able, when it had not to contend with revolt,
to collect a slight amount of taxes from the tribes nearest to
us and most accessible to coercion. In a word, a powerful
army would have dominion over Algeria, would exist in it
and be paid by it ; whereas a weak army would be almost
constantly a burden to the French treasury." After pro-
ceeding at some length with the same line of argument, the
author gives his opinion of the amount of permanent force
necessary in Algeria, and the mode of distributing it. "We
ought," says he, " to have two lines of occupation ; one in
the interior and parallel with the sea, the other on the coast.
The stations for the first appear to me to be clearly pointed
out; they are Tlemcen, Mascara, Milianah, Medeah, Setif,
Constantino, and Guelma ; on the coast, Oran, Moataganem,
Tenes, Cherchell, Algiers, Philippeville, and Bona. I have
not spoken of Arzew, Bugia, Gigelly, or Calle, for these
localities are generally of slight importance, and I think we
should evacuate Bugle and Gigelly if we are not decided upon
bringing under subjection the Kabyle mountains which sur-
round them. It would be sufficient for the commands of the
port to have a post of 150 men. But it is probable that they
will not be evacuated; I shall therefore reckon their gar-
risons in my calculation. We will begin with the Wert. The
division of Tlemcen should; in my opinion, be composed of
3,000 infantry, and 1,000 of other arms, of whom 500 should
be cavalry d'elite, making 4,000; the division of Mascara
should also consist, of 4,000; Milianah, 2,600; Medeah,
3,600; Setif, 3,600; Constantina, 6,000; Oran, 7,000;
Mostaganem, 4,000; Tenes, 3,200; Cherchell, 2,150; Al-
giers, 10,000; Bugia, 1,000; Gigelly, 850; Philippeville,
4,000 ; Bona, 4,000; Gnelma, 2,600 ; making altogether a
force of 63,000, to which we should add, at least, 12,000, to
allow for sickness and other casualties, giving thus a grand
total of 75,200, and if we would do these things securely and
speedily we must really have 80,000."
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to arguments to
show that, considering the extent of territory to be held, the
number is not overrated. The following chapter is on colo-
nization. The General is a strong partisan for military colo-
nization. On this point he observes—" Military colonies
would be powerful auxiliaries to the army, and would gra-
dually enable us to reduce the amount of it, for they would
furnish soldiers for a campaign, and occupy certain points
where we are now compelled to have garrison. In my opi-
nion we ought to have carried on the establishment of mili-
tary colonies at the same time with the war, for then we
could have fixed them in favourable localities without having
had to pay anything to the Arabs, whereas, now that we are
at peace with the tribes who have made their submission, we
cannot take possession of their territory without offering an
indemnity."
The system of government recommended by General Bu-
geand is military. His argument is as follows :—" If there
were in Africa a European population of 400,000 or 500,000
persons, then I could understand to a certain extent the idea
of a civil government ; but in the present state of things, I
confess I cannot conceive how the idea can exist in the minds
of certain statesmen and public writers." The General com-
bats this idea with a variety of arguments, and adds, "There
is another reason which militates powerfully in favour of mi-
litary government—namely, the necessity of governing the
Arabs. We have subdued them by force of arms, and by
force of arms we must keep them in subjection."
Under the head of " Resources of the Country," General
Bugeaud says :—" In the short visits that I paid to Algeria
in 1836 and 1837, I conceived but a poor idea of the fertility
of the soil, so much vaunted by the ancients. Having passed
over only the worst portion of the province of Oran, I thought
the Roman historians had dealt in hyperbole when they called
Africa the granary of Rome. But sincel have penetrated
into the country in almost every direction, my convictions
have changed, and I have ascertained that Algeria produces
already a great deal of corn, and an immense quantity of
cattle, and that it is capable of producing much more, end
also of adding several other sources of wealth, such as silk
and oil." In another part of this chapter, the General says:
—" There are vast surfaces cultivated by the Arabs, without
having received any kind of manure, and yet they produce
an average per hectare (n acres English) of from 50 to 30
hectolitres (from 70 to 85 bushels English) in wheat, and
from 40 to 50 in barley."
On the sources of taxation, we read—" The ordinary and
religious tax is the tenth of the grain and the twentieth of
the cattle. If this were regularly collected, as it would be
with-a good government, backed by a strong force, it would,
I have no doubt, produce sufficient to feed the army, and
provide in a great measure for its general support. I come
to this conclusion on considering the enormous expenses that
Abd-el-Kader has gone to carry on the war. He not only
formed and kept up an army of 12,000 to 15,000 men, but
also purchased an immense number of horses, and constructed
five small fortresses, a cannon-foundry, two powder manu-
factories, and several manufactories for arms, besides pur-
chasing from foreign countries large quantities of muskets
and ammunition, and yet he is said by the Arabs to have been
still in possession of a large amount of treasure at the time
when his power was overthrown. Add to this the manner
in which be levied the taxes, and which is so different from
our own. All the public functionaries paid themselves with
their own hands, and it rarely happened for the Emir to re-
ceive more than one-half of the amount really collected.
The functionaries were not satisfied with retaining the larger
half ; they pressed upon the population in a thousand ways—
a strong proof of the resources of the country."
We conclude our extracts with the following table of the
revenue of Algeira, from 1831 to 1841 inclusive.