The Statesman.
London, England, 1815-01-28 00:00:00

THE STATESMAN.

r.

rad% as the evening of 11. e l2th, and that this rezoio.
Wit ti Id been expressed in innginige not remark-
able for its decorum. W!,e, hat himself, "was
t!,,' proper person to communicate to Lord %Vet-
linglon the events which had jest then taken
place? Admiral Hallonell must have been aware of
this ; hut then he was also aware that an adherence
to this principle would deprive him of the opportu-
nity of standing forward the uninvited champion of
the honour and interests of the army. lie hoped
he had been mistaken in the motives in which he had
ascribed the premeditated secrecy of his accuser's
proceedings ; and he believed sincerely, that in a
dispassionate hour he would not have thus acted, but
on the contrary, would have been among the first
and loudest to condemn it in others. Jt occurred,
1114 ever, at a time when every angry feeling was in.
flamed, and when the little circle who looked up
with blind devotion to their chieftain were employed
in cherishing and strengthening those prejudices
which he had already admitted into his mind. Ad-
miral Hallowell had pot in his claim to the credit of
candour. Let those admit it who were unacquainted
with the studied concealment which he had now de-
scribed. It was to a dispatch planned in secret, at:d
irtstigated by personal enmity, and dictated by a de-
sire to blast for ever hia military reputation, that he
had to trace not only his tatesent situation, but all
the 'Nile, calumny, and prejudice under which he
had since been a patient but an indignant sufferer.
Ile would venture to say that no paper ever was
sent home more calculated to mislead the Govern.
Meat Of a country, or to fix erroneous impressions
ou the public mind.
Here Sir John Murray himself continued the
Ifilitement.

lle had now come to the consideration of the spe-
cific charges which had been brought forward re-
specting his conduct in conducting the operations of
the British army on theeast coairrief Spain,inJune,lBl3.
lie should not attempt here to' dispute the principal
proposition efAdreivalltillowelyhat the eitemy never
hid more than b'tX)U men at VillafraLca, as the refu-
tation of this point would properly come under the
consideration of the third charge, but bait:mid not for-
ben r making some slight allusion toit. 4.was true the'
Admiral had Hot rested it entirely nn his own opi-
nion, but ILA endeavoured to support it by the in-
formation derived by Captain Stodhart from a Cate
lonian iseasmit ; and the Berne information was relied
on by Captain Bowyer, with the addition that the
enemy had only five guns. Then came the letter
from Colonel Loder, Is hich IPlter, however, Admiral
Ilallowrll had not received when he dispatched the
11varirsilt. Under arty other circumstauces,iiii Pro-
secutor's good sense would probably have cautioned
him against giving credence to such stories, and II
making hinge if the medium of French fabrications.'
T-he fge,t;seii of Tarragona had been represented as
at the ientest 12 or Itiai men. He had every reason
to believe, and he could prose that it Was also the
opinion of General Clinton, that it was at the lowest
1600, but most probably 2000 men. Ile knew that
there were two regiments of 700 100 ;a tottery-
men, e.:;,)'....patti,:t troops, besides the crews of two
.pt levee' s employed iu working the guns. Ile knew,
too, that Marshal Sachet had thought the garrison
strong enough to resist Any attack. The Admiral
had aid, our gong is ere taken by the enemy into
his fort, and that he had counted the number of melt
employed in this work, as if the whole of the garri-
son was certainly so occupied, and the enemy
to eellibit to hint whatever strength they
Lad at their disposal. lie should not, hoe ever, go
into all those cii:enstnittial details, as to the num-
ber and even the calibre of the gong so Mm-
dieted, the object of which to ..:eatiy was to dis-
guise in false colours the true history of those trans-
steeiens, but coaline himself to the main assertion,
that at the period when tae siege of Tarragona was
raised, the approach of the coltimu of 5000 was
Nut a word was here said of the ad-
-414.1CY from the other side of the force ~der Mar-
shal Sachet, and when it was at length introduced,
it was ia such a way, ns completely to produce the
tlesired elf Pct in misleading the put,f..c mind, prone
to receive impressions, without much exact enquiry
ineo circenistances or eases. The Admiral knew,
aid lie affirmed it in his presence, that he knew it
WAS tip probable junction of Stlelit't anti the column
at Vdlafranca, that alone induced him not to attack
the latter force. Was this proceeding, then, just ;
or ought net hi. Prosecutor, if lie thought proper
to report of all, have reported faithfully ? If on
the I Ith he hurl forgotten conversetion ou the 1 lth,
in which the adsance het, with `25,000 men,
was positively communicated to him, of what value
was his opinion ? But was his inemnry so extremely
fiethle as not to recollect, that even on the 13th a
part of the British troops had been engaged nearly
the whole day with the heedmost division of Marshal
Suchet's army ? Admiral Halleisell stood, therefore,
convicted either an unfaithful or on ignorant re-
potter. lie had, however, succeeded, both in mis-
guiding public opinion, arid in injuring him in the
estimation of Government. There were other mis-
representations as to the disembarkation of the
whole army at Balaguer, which belonged rather
to the second Charge. Ile might, by risking a
general action have undoubtedly gained a a little tem-
porary tequila' ity ; but he trusted he should be able
to convince the Court, that lie had acted much more
advantageously for the interests of the British army
committed to his charge, by adopting the judgment of
those offices in is horn he conceived he could repose
the greatest confidence. Jn the letter which he re.
ceived the day previous tu the retreat, he could dis-
enver no such undertaking on the part of Admiral
Ilallowell as he had stated, that he could get off the
guns; and if such an offer had beet made, he cer-
fitinly should an have attended to it, knowing, as he
did, its physical impossibility. [Here Sir John Mur-
ray lead the letter, dated June 11th.] And
now he would ask the Court, whether the letter to
Lord Wellington was justifiable on any pretest, or
whether it was not one of the most indecorous mea-
sures ever taken by an officer, and that could origi-
nate only in the most violent personal animosity?
iiihether it could have for its object any other view
than by effecting his removal from command, to re-
move the great obstacle to the Admiral's requjring
.that unbounded authority over military measures and
,rete,sels which it was well known he was ambitious to
exercise? Every Member of the Court knew the
lance of the Quarter- Muter- G enerars Office)

and how necessary it 'Was that he should receive all
possible assistance from the tiara! branch of the
service. Instead of facilitating his purposes, how.
ever, he should prove that the Almiral hail or-
dered the M iSIOI to anchor near Halagner, with no
other view than teat of preventing General Dunkin
from repairing to heifl-quarters. As to the charge
of surrettdvrit,g his own judgment to the advice of
that ()Meer, active anti intelligent as he was, he ut-
terly denied it; it had no foundation; he had never
consulted him tiil latterly. lie impeached no man's
judgment; he accused no man's errors ; he stood
there Feint-ea to stand or fall on his own responsi-
bility. lie had himself laboured under someaisadvan-
tagesin having to concentrate the minds of the 4dmiral
and the Quarter-Master-General. Previous to the
embarkation he had communicated, however, to Ad-
miral Ilallowell the intelligence which he had received
from General Copons of the advance of the French
force, and that the measure of raising the siege,
which was before prudent, had now become indis-
pensable. Their relative situations were very dif-
ferent : the Admiral had only to superintend details ;
he had himself to watch over the movements of the
enemy, to guard against possible contingencies, to Col-
lect and balance contradictory information, and in the
face of a superior force. Was it for Admiral Hallo-
well to sit in judgment over him, and keep a diary,
without the power of accurate registration, of creels'
and transactions in which his own respectability, elite
racter, and interests had too concern ?. He trusted dot
if they did differ in opinion, he should nt least staid
' excused for preferring his own conclusions to the.
proffered counsels of his accuser. The fact was, as
almost confessed in the charge itself, that it was an
uneasiness arising from the rejection of his advice
' that led Admiral Hallowell to the proceeding in ques-
tion, and had caused him to transmit a disputch which
could serve no other purpose than those of private
injury.and public deception. Had the Admiral, in-
stead of sending criminating charges to Lord Wel-
lington, at once brought the getternl question to issue
befor a proper tribunal, he should at least have ad-
mitted
his candour, and have allowed that his conduct

was what became one British officer towards another,
although he could no longer consider him as a v.ise
or prudent Commander. Of the disposition, how.
ever, by which his Prosecutor was animated, it would
be superfluous to give any further convincing proofs.
He should refer only to one other circumstance. When
the vessel arrived supposed to have Lord W. Bentitick
on board, the Admiral expressed his sentiments in
the face of the whole army by this signal—" we are
all delighted."—Of the propriety and decorum of
this conduct, he should say nothing, but leave it to
the comments of. the Court.—Here Sir J. Murray at
some length defended himself against the first Charge
in not having sooner raised the siege, and remarked
its inconsistency with the third, supported by Admi-
ral Hallowell. Ile considered still that the success
of the plan which he was instructed to execute de-
pended ou his maintaining the siege as long as possi-
ble; nor could he procure any authentic intelligence
of the enemy's movements, amidst the opposite ru-
mours in content circulation previous to the 11th.—
He expressed himself extremely grateful to the I!09-
puty Judge-Advocatp for thy handsome and lihe4.l
manner in which Itelsia discharged. his part of the
prosecution. He ought, however, to have proved
that guns, stores, and ammunition were landed, af-
ter every prospect of success had disappeared, and
not to Live left it to inference from his (Sir John
Nlur#,i's) supposed belief. Ile could show, that as
early as the 27th of May,. Lord Wellington had writ-
ten to him expressing his opinion that Sachet's force
would be too much for him. Though not sanguine,
he had not, however, despaired, till the 11th, and
to that period he therefore protracted the siege.—
His hopes were somewhat encouraged by the cap-
ture of Fcrt St. Felippe, which obstructed the
road from Tortola. Twenty-six guns were safely
embarked when his final resolution was taken. It
was winecessary to impress on the minds of such dis-
tinguished officers the necessity of distinguishing
good from had information • or to apprise them of

the extent to which the French in the last war had
carried the system of communicating false iateiligence
through the instrumentality of spies and peasants.—
It was on the Bth only that he had received informa-
tion of the movement of Sachet from Valencia, and
it was not until the 10th that he had any certain in-
formation of the movements of Decaen. He had re-
solved to march against the latter, and to attack
Puerto Real on the 1 lth ; but when the certain in-
formation had been received of the arrival of Sachet
at Tortosa, then all hopes of the capture of Tarragona
vanished. It was at the time, as Marshal Suchet
expresses it, " that the fire from the heights sur.
rounding us, informed the garrison of his arrival,"
that the siege. was abandoned ; and when circum.
stances made it necessary to re-embark the army, be
preferred risking the loss of a few iron guns to com-
promising the safety of the army. His instructions
rrkatked oklt two objects for the expedition :—the
first was the capture of Tarragona, if possible; the
second was, to make a diversion in favour of the

Duc del Parque in Valencia, by obliging Suchet
to return into Catalonia. 'Phis object had been
completed by his continuing the siege to the last
moment that it could safely be continued ; but-would
not have been accomplished, if he had given up the
siege sootier; as Suchet would have been then able
• to fall back within six days upon the Duc del
• Parque's force, whereas (including the time taken up
in embarking and disembarking an army, and the
average passage to Meant) it would have required
14 or 15 days for him to join that General. If
Suchet, instead of coming to Catalonia, had chosen
first to attack and defeat the Dec de Parque's corps,
be could not have arrived at 'Tarragona before the
Ir:di. It was clearly advisable to r'draw Suchet as
far from Valencia as possible, and it was by continu-
nuing the siege to (he last moment that this object could
be ellected. Ile bad also expected the co-operation
which took place by Lord Exmouth arriving in the
Ray of ltosas. If he had not persisted in the siege
to the last, but embarked sooner, it would have been
easy for Decaen to fall back upon any division of
, soldiers or marines landed by his Lordship, and
taken or destroyed them ' • while on the other hand,
Suchet was too good a General to advance a step
farther than was necessary, if he should learn that
the siege was raised and the army re-embarked.—
He bad another reason lot continuing the siege to
the last moment. From the promise of Lord W.

• Bentinclti he had reason to expect daily and hearty
the arrival of a reinforcement from!Sicily, amounting
to 3000 men. This reinfoiement would at that time
have been invaluable. It would have given him such
a decided superiority over either of the armies of
Suchet or Decaen, as probably to enable him to pre-
vent their junction. In the course he had pursued,
he must contend that he had acted up to the spirit,
and even according to the letter of the instructions
of the Duke of Wellington.
As to the second Charge, which accused him of
positive disobedience of orders, this charge shocked
and surprised him much more than any charge Which
Admiral Hallowell had thought propr to bring.—
He should first say, that there was no express or-
liters given to him, and that, therefore, there could
ibe no express disobedience. The D,Ae of Welling-
) ton had stated in his instructions the general objects
which he had in view ; but he had not taten from
him all discretionary power of altering his conduct
in consequence of unforeseen local circumstances.—
By remaining in Catalonia as long as it was possible
fni. him to remain, he bad attained the object of
ILord ‘Vellington, in drawing Suchet nut of Valen-
cia. and probably saving the Duke del Parque's
ar:4 ; for it afterwards appeared that this army's-as
so little able to cope with that of Suchet, that it
could not even gain any important advantage over
the division of General Ilarispe, after Suchet had
left 'Valencia. if a (avowable opportunity had oc-
curred for striking a blow in Catalonia against either
General.Decaen, or any division of Suchet's army,
it could not be within the meaning of Lord Welling-
ton's instructions that it was not to be done. As
' long, however, as he had been able to keep Marshal
Suchet on the left bank of the Ebro, so long he was
acting up to the spirit and meaning of Lord Wel-,
lington's instructions. The order of the immediate
i return of the army was not imperative, and the 2241
I paryraph of the instructions clearly gave him a dis-
cretionary power. As to the many instances of in-
decision which he had been charged with by Admiral
nallowell, he would show that he had not ordered
the raising the siege, until by a letter received from
General Copons, lie had received intelligence of the
advance of Decaen, knowing at the same time that
Sachet was advancing from Tortosa. From the mo-
ment he gave that order, the embarkation was re-
' Wady carried on ; and as to the re-landing at Bala-
guer, that was in consequence of fresh information
of Decien's having fallen back. Ile thought him-
self in a condition to stand against either of the ene-
my's armies separately, but not if they were united.
Decaen, however, returned afterwards, and Lord W.
Bentitirk, who succeeded him in the command, sa.w
clearly that the Allied Army could not stand before
the united force of Suchet and Decaen, and therefore
i the army was re-embarked from Balaguer.
Ile came now to the third Charge brought against
I him by Admiral Hallowed!. The Admiral stated that
I lie had promised to re-embark every thing in safety
if he would stay anotile dry. It was his duty,
however, to consider what means Adtniral nolloss ell
had for carrying this proposition into execution.—
! It was he and not the Admiral, wit° was responsible
tsox. the safety of the army. All the information
itwkiclt be bad 4fteivegi, state 4 -the Iledleebittty of the
enemy coming into contact with him on the 13th.--
1 With such information, how would he be justified in
remaining, according to the Admiral's proposition,
I till the night of the 12th, before he attempted to re.
embark the army ? The Admiral had stated positively
the force of Decaen to be only 5000, and chose to
say nothing at all about Sachet. From this state-
ment, it would appear as if he had only raised the
siege on account of the advance of those 5000.
He should, however, show, both from memoirs ad.
dressed to him by General Copons, Colonel Ca- :
banes (the chief of his Staff), and Colonel Monso, '
,that the disposable force of the French in Cate-
' lonia was not less than thirteen thousand men (after!
deducting [ten thousand in garrisons); and that
10,000 was the force that they supposed the French
column marching from Barcelona would consist of. ,
Ile would show by the evidence of Gen. Whitting- i
ham, that it did actually amount to about 8000, and '
that they had actually advanced beyond Villa franca,
at the time the peasant, on whose information Ad-
miral
Hallowell so much relied (and who was pro-
bably a spy of the enemy) stated them to be in Villa- ;
francaland not advancing, or showing any disposition
to advance. Ile could ;bow, from a variety of of-
ficial
documents, that the army of Arragon, with
which Marshal Suchet entered the province of Va-
lends, was always estimated at from '2B to 30,000
men, and that of this force at least 12,500 men did
march with Suchet towards Tarragona. When the i
disposable force of the two French armies of Arragon ,
: and Catalonia were united, their total force was so
considerable, that on the 14th dry of August follow- i
hie°, the Allied Army before Tarragona being then!
33,000 strong, fouod it necessary to full back at their
approach. In all his calculations of the force of the I
French, he had made every allowunce for exaggeration,
and bad taken the lowest accounts that lie had re-
, ceived. The Duke of Wellington, however, had
, observed that in all the engagements he had had with
the French, their numbers were always greater than
he had been led by preceding accounts to suppose
them. When the official returns had been given
from agreat variety of quarters of the actual dispos-
able force of the French armies of Arragon and Ca.
tatonia, would the Admiral himself suppose that
Marshal Suchet was so deficient in judgment as a Ge-
neral, as to leave a great part of this force idle and
unemployed ? He had a right to believe that Marshal
Suchet would bring the greater part of his disposable
force against him, and the fact was that he did do so.
lie was the more surprized at Adm. Hallowell's not
saying a word about the advance of Sachet's troops,
as the Admiral must, from his ship, have seen and
heard the fire of our troops engaged with them on the
14th.
The reading of Sir J.
Murray's defence was not
finished at three o'clock, when the Court adjourned.

Wednesday last, two genteel looking men went
into the Adam and Eve, near St. Pancras Church, and
had a glass of gin and water in the parlour. After
some lime one of them went to the bar to get some
trifling change and pay for it, during which the other
walked off with an eight-day clock that was screwed
to the wall, over the chimney-piece ; it was not
missed until they had been some time gone.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.
We have receive:l nn interesting Communication from the I.
of M 4N, shall hav Aan early insertion.
The Letter from Liverpool of an OPPONENT if the Fir)! C.
Bail, shall appear the first opportunity.
OIKLINNITIJS ls ill lint he neglected.
A, Put/acne from a Dorsetslti re Man shall he attended 10.

11: ICE OF VTUCKS THIS
Bark
3 per ('ent. Red. 6534
i„., cm% Cw0.654¢
4 per Ce.lts.
5 per 0-111. N:tvt

DAY AT ptir,. li(401
Lent. Ann. IG 7-Ifil
India Month 18 19 p
Excheruer li;:i 3 6
Oinninut d
Consols 1')? Acc 65Ne

7'll E S 1 7'E S: 'r_.l

ONDON:

6ATUR3AY, JANUARY 28, IRIS.

Three !lamb Jrgli Mails, Brussols, and Frank.
Gazelles, and French Papers to the 26th instant, at.
rived thisforetwon. 'file latments.and
as to the course of 14Tairs at the Congress hay. their
usual variety. Our pace he7nz occupied .witi
tails iehoive to iiiti•rest,. more' at home, we are pr,.
cludcd from much r-Nnaik in this piare. We. tiler,.
fore leave the,bleade... to form his judgment of their.
telligenre thus furnished from the extracts we make.
'f he follow-nig are from the French I'apers :

VIENNA, JAN. 10.—The answer of Au trip, con•
celled between that Power, •Englund, and- Francs,
to the Note of Prussia, relative to Saxony, is hourly
expected.

The reports circulated yesterday are cot Indic:
to-day. The Prince Albert of Saxe- fesch.ss s
here. The partizans of Prussia affirm, ttsat the
Northern Powers will abate nothing of the principles
expressed in their Note of the 22cl Decembe►) gels.
tire to Poland end Saxony.

Them) will be a fresh conference to-morrow—very
probably it will produce more positive results. It is
to be hoped that at the end of the south these Nego.
dations will be brought to a close.
The affairs of Germany are in a state of perfect
stagnation. Although they are perpetually talking
of a new Constitution, it is yet merely matter of
conversation, and nothing is decided upon. Msay
points are agreed upon, but in carrying them into
effect difficulties will ari.e, which will overturn the
very basis on which they rest.

GENOA, JAN. 10.—On (he 30th of last month
they published here a decree of our new Sovereign
the King of Sardinia, containing, among others, tie
fallow in; dispositions :
The Genoese shall be assimilated to oar other sob.
jects; they shall be admissible to civil employment!,
rod to all military, judicial, and diplomatic posts,
and the Genoese Nobility are on a fooltag loads Ow
other Nobility of the Court.

The Genoese nrtny is incorporated with our other
troops, holding their respectiv.• rank.
The Genoese arms shall be added to ours, and em.

blazoned in our colours.

'l'he free port of Genoa shalt be re-establisbed)
it wasumier t6o late Government.

The Maximum of taxes which we shall import
(without thc consent of the Genoese), shall not ex.
ceed its proportion of what our other subjects pay.
'The public debt Is guaranteed.
A corps of Town Guards shall be established at
Genoa, consisting of 40 Noblemen, 40 indepeudent
citizens, and 20 of the principal merchants, we will
ourselves appoint the Commandant.

The other articles are mere regulations of no int.

portance.

FRENCH FUND 9.-5 per Cent Consols 78 f. 50 C.--
Bonds of the Batik of France 1170 f.
Daesaus, J.Y. 12.—The Prussian *fitriseet of
Finance, M. de Bulow, arrived here from Berlin, on
his way to Vienna. Ills short residence here gave
rise to a thousand conjectures—the most contradic-
tory reports are circulated relative to our future
destination. The amusements of the Carnival have
commenced, but nobody seems disposed to enter into
them. The Cassino Ball,.given at the Hotel of Po-
land on the 9th, was a.perfect desert. The inhabit.
ants of this city shut themselves up entirely in their
houses, and there are no amusements but private
ones.

The King of Saxony finds the utmost consolation
in the attachment of his subjects to him and his
family. They enter into the most familiar conversa-
tion every Saxon %%lin goes to Fredericsfield.—.
The Count of Einsiedel, who has always been near
the parson of the King, until his late absence, re-
mained but a short time in Saxony, and . re-
turned some days ago to his AlAjesty.—The
King's two brothels are in Austria. Prince An•
long and his %sire (3ister to the Emperor Francis),
are at Vienna, and Prince Maximilian at Prague.—
This last, although.living with the utmost economy,
is literally in uant of money. The Princess Anne,
the li:ng's sister, who is also a sort of prisoner at
Prague, has taken the misfortunes of her family so
to heart, that she has actually wept herself blind.
The misfortunes of these Princes, and their cruel
treatment, is without parallel.

VIENN J. 14.—llaily conference are nnw
he bet wet n the Allied Monarchs, and it is general!),
belieird that every thing will end in peace. The rt.
port is revived that the King of Saxony is to be re.
:anved nearer the seat of Congress. Many people
believe that this Prince will consent to make very
considerable o-ocrifices to the general tranquillity of
Europe, and that the two I..Liatias, as well as other
cot. ni; devolve to Prussia.

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