The Liverpool Standard, and General Advertiser.
Liverpool, Merseyside, England, 1854-08-01 00:00:00

aided by the scanty means

possession of the small rural populat
cure Scottish village, the world has been in a
at degree indebted for the successful establish-
nt of book-clubs, those admirable m

of an

of intellectual wealth, and for pro-
I culture.
_ln the propriety of t"--

observations with which Mr. Knight concludes the
above quotation all must agree. To elevate the

reality,

iprove the people

d t-sroughout most A Military Tour in European Turkey, the Cri-
incipal object of the mea, and on the Eastern Shores of the Black
vindicate the Sea. By ➢lajor-General A. F. Macintosh

hich leads a man t

A very casual reader would soon discover the
opinions contained in these two volumes to be the
ents and views entertained by a soldier.
military and practical in their charac-
d to the points of operation on which

t that ex-

Eminentl
ter, and di

Mr. Collis

es of all Europe are intently fixed, the cogi-
tations of General Macintosh acquire an interest
and importance which, under other circumstances,
they would have solicited in vain. With the clear

ith a singl

~t and s;

itv wi

the military strategist, our author perceives at a
glance the military capabilities of the country over
which he casts his experienced eye, and having
once taken measure of those capabilities,
_he traces

caLata GAin eazi v 151111pin:iv
suggestions being unincumbered by non-profes-
sional speculations, and equally undisturbed by
extraneous associations or sentimental reveries. In
a few brief sentences he disposes of the carpings
which have been bestowed on the expedition to
Gallipoli, by showing that secure possession of the

which it is situated, is of
importance to the safety of Constantinople,
ie free navigation of the Dardanelles by the
fleet, if the Russians should be able to mus-
force at Adrianople.

that t

atmg enjo;
cv of M

ce, they still

od, -misrepr

le of pur-

s, at the neck a

The General's note; have the great merit of
resulting from personal knowledge and recent
inspection of the various places referred to ; indeed,
they come down to the spring of last year, and are
therefore possessed of a double value ; they are
both fresh and practical. He has carefully consi-
dered the defensive capabilities of Sebastopol, and
is of opinion that any attempt to reduce that
stronghold by a coup de main would prove ineffec-
tual and disastrous. He thus describes the posi-
tion and

LTS OF AN ATTACK 08 SEBASTOPOL

town and inner harbour lie on the south side of the
south of a small arm of the sea, about three-and-a-half
tiles in length, and varying in breadth from one to
ree-quarters of a mile. Several branches from the main
‘ek indent the shore, and two of these enclose Sebas-
east and west, so that it is only connected
with the land to the

:opol to the

newhat resembli

south—a situation in this respect
the city and port of Malta. The

eastern branch, which is upwards of a mile in length,
forms the inner harbour, and, close to the shore, is of suffi-
cient depth to allow of first-rate vessels lying at the
wharfs, their crews passing at all times between the
vessels and their barracks without using a boat. During
the severe winter they live altogether in the barracks.
The north side of the main arm is flanked by heights
which command its entry, and here I observed a fort,
which was not then a strong work, being of some age, and
of faulty construction. On both sides of the inlet, how-
ever, there were strong stone towers with batteries close
to the water—a fieur d'eau. Some of these had two tiers
of heavy guns, and have since been raised still higher.
The entry is very deep, and rather narrower than the
basin immediately above it. Flag-staffs on each side
pointed out small shoals, and a lighthouse of a peculiar

the main harbour, upwards of three miles from the town;
while another of precisely the same form and colour was
visible behind it, about three miles further up the country,
and ought to be hid from view by the first as vessels enter
the harbour from the Euzine. These structures, if the
Royal Navy plans are correct, still remain.

The landiiig-places near the monastery of St. George
are too precipitous to be surmounted in the face of a de-
fending force prepared for such an attempt, and any force
landing on the level shore between Cape Kherson and
Sebastopol would most probably find itself at once engaged
in a general action, and would have to fight for a space
large enough to encamp upon. I am, therefore, certainly,
of opinion that a descent made in the immediate neigh-
bourhood of Sebastopol, even with a strong and well-
appointed force, especially after so much time has been
allowed to Russia to erect fortifications there—though
these may be only field-works—and to collect forces for
their defence would be a very bold and indeed hazardous
undertaking, and that while a subsequent hasty re-
embarkation, should it occur, without any object having
been attained, would, in itself, be inglorious, a great loss
in men and materiel would hardly fail to attend such a
repulse. When we consider the great scale on which
arrangements must be made for attacking even an imper-
fectly-fortified place, the heavy and cumbrous cannon and
siege stores which it would be necessary to land here, the
great quantity of provisions requisite for the support of
the besieging corps, to last possibly some months, and
which must be collected in a secure situation ; and when
we take into calculation what a large force ought also to
be kept in front to resist attempts to raise the siege: when
we consider further that the army must land on a level
shore, commanded at no great distance by heights of very
considerable strength, and that the area, where it would
have to make all its preparations, is too confined for the
operations of so large a force as would be required for such
an attack, I feel persuaded that my view of the subject
will be admitted to be just by all who have had experience
in such matters, though it may not meet the wishes of
many who are too impatient that a blow should be struck
at any cost in that direction.

In the supposition that permanent possession of
the Crimea is one of the objects aimed at by the
allies, General Macintosh points out, at consider-
able length, a plan of the operations which he
considers most suitable to effect the attainment of
that object, together with the means for reducing
Sebastopol with certainty, although he does not
seem to calculate on either end being accomplished
without protracted labour and extensive operations.
He recommends that landings should be effected
simultaneously at Kaffa, or, as it is frequently
called, Theodosia, and at Kertch, and suggests the