The Statesman.
London, England, 1815-04-08 00:00:00

TO THE NOBILITY.

REAL TREBLY DISTILLED
WATER, patronised and recommended
of pertain of she first rook *ad fashion.—
r she above inelanble odoriferous Auld are so
•rinr fragronee, that they respeestally solicit

that hiive noltried it ..sill do theilithe

'oltle by nay of trial. and if it dues nut ca-
ddie's% they pledite them‘rlves to return the
Wisps on a handkerchief will imbintly dikuiver
it retalni its delightful fragrance a length of
hing.
'toil and Co.'s Medicine end Perfumery Shop.
Iptsurareel, High Holborn, at the very re-
the pint bottle.
?My JAM ES'S ineitirnable PE R U•
1W I)ER, reenmm.soiled by %mend Phy,i.
eminitice. ac tif hest Preparation fur the
'ye!' di-cuverert.
and 51. Gd. risch.
owl) app.evrd ROSR WATER, possessing
;ranee of the fresh Mit, at la. 4d. Ike plat

DPERIOIt ADVICE.
first ronstlinence to ascertain on
ioiroity 14 firm reliance may be
Heirs. CU RR I Is: nod Co., Surgeons of
profesAnnnt otininntrovr. Members of she
London and Edinburgh, present to the Pub-
%ear+ r xperresoce 411. he Cure of Venoval
)•se Dciii:iinss and Deficiencies which riot
it or embitter she austrimuniad state. In the
. fst m teeeni infection to confirmed
isomnito:3 very °Aron speetty, and always sr
dubious cases, their long and well•arrangyd
them a promptitude of decision that senates
ring mei cutiolized out of existence, or hay-
under:oined, hod the vita; principle destroy-
insidlaus disease, or a blind and final coma-
pretenders.
sebility, Vascular Relaxation, and Atony of
log from excessive indulgence. insalubrious
.tary sensuality, their practice givesoew life and
system, even in cases u'uch are verging on de-
mand other derangements of the Urethra they
' and effectual manner. Slight and recent ease'
iectiou are cured Its the short period of two

Sex h will be camolitary to Itaaw that they
'how Dehititle, which defeat eatieeptlua. &ad
of connubial felicity.
with Casa oar, delicacy, awl iatialahle se

E and Co. may be coovolred every day, 11l
fniton•g:l rtt
rails the Gantry. rtosing mirwteiy the cow,
and encio.ing a rernittot.re for Advice and
rented with stutiLtus tittrottwa.
•gardru.

of the situation in which the Allies then stood to
demand any thing which might be dishonourable. for
France to grant, the Allies were aware, that by that
coarse they would have been sowing the seeds of fu-
ture wars, that the first opportunity would perhaps
be taken to infringe the Treaty, and that its nature
might furnish some excuse, though not a just ground
for the infraction. It was, therefore, the policy of
the Allies to act with a wise liberality. Perhaps
there were some concessions with respect to which
there might be a doubt whether they were necessary
or advisable ; but this, at least. was clear• L-that the
character of the Treaty was, under the circum-
stances, that of an arrangement highly honourable
to France. It was a Treaty with which the people
of that country had every reason to be satisfied—
one which had studiously rendered consistent with
every feeling which they could justly entertain as
Frenchmen and good subjects. Such being the gene-
ral nature of that treaty, he was desirous also to
call their Lordships' attention to the Treaty of Fon-
tainbleau and to the circumstances under which it
was concluded ; and he was the more desirous to do
so, because he believed that some misapprehension
had prevailed on that subject. The part which this
country had taken in that treaty rendered it neces-
sary to say something on that point. Whatever
might have been the•wish of the Government of this
country as to the matters which formed the subject
of that treaty, there was in truth, no alternative for
them. They were obliged to give a qualified assent
to it : but in justification of the Sovereigns, the cir-
cumstances under which that treaty was made ought
to be considered in all their bearings. These cir-
cumstances were very different from what they were
supposed by many persons to have been. When lu
March-last year the Allies advanced to Paris, a de-
claration was issued by the Emperor of Russia and
King of Prussia, that they would not treat with the
person then at the head of the French Government.
After the attack upon the French troops. near Paris,
and the entrance of the Allies IntO that city, a reso-
lution took place: the Conservative Senate was as-
sembled, and a Provisional Government appointed
to negotiate with the Allies. Under these circum-
stances it was proposed to grant a place of retreat
for the person who was their Ruler of France; and it
was represented in support of this proposition, that
it atordecl the only means of avoiding a civil war in
France; and of bringing over the Marshals, who
probably would not accede to the new arrangement
unless that point were.secured. At that time the
only Marshal who had acceded to the new order of
things was Murmoirt. None of the others had then
notified their adherence. In addition for this, it
ought to be considered, that Bonaparte was at the
head of 30,000 men, on whom he could depend—
' that there was au army of 50,000 men in the South

under Souit, with respect to
which, it
might
'rate be said, that there was no reason
tosuppose
ny
that it' might not have been depended on. There
was, besides, a formidable army in Italy, clearly in
Lis favour, and superior to that which was opposed
to it. All the fortified places in France, in Italy
in Holland, and on the Rhine,
were nomina • ll y, at
least, under the power of the chief of the army ; how
far the existence of the Provisional Government
might have severed these from the person ut the head
of the military was another question: Whoever at-
tended to these facts would see that there mere good
reasons for the concessions made by the, Allies on
that occasion. The probability, no doubt; ares 4 that
they could subdue him by force ; but still, under the
particular circomatances it was proper in them to
consider whether it would not be better to accede to
the proposal when that accession would at once
secure the great object for which they contended, and
secure that object without further effusion of blood,
which was always a most material consideration ; and
above all, without raising a civil war in France.—
Under these circumstances, then, the treaty was
made by the Sovereigns. A Noble Friend of his
then on the Continent immediately proceeded to
Paris on hearing of the events which had put the
Allies in possession of it ; and when this part of the
treaty was communicated to him, as would appear
by some of the papers now produced, he strongly ob-
jected to it : but he was told, that it had been in-
sisted on by the Provisional Government as the only
means of preventing a civil war,—that the Sovereigns
had acted in the manner which appeared' to them on
the whole to be most conducive to' the general in-
terests—that they had pledged their word for the
arrangement, and could not recede. His Noble
Friend, therefore, did not feel himself justified in
refuting to concur with the Allies, and a qualified
accession was given to the treaty ;—he said a quali-
fied accession, because this country had never recog-
nised the person in question as the Emperor of
France. Some particular articles were objected to
by his Noble Friend, but it had been consi-
dered as,, under the circumstances, the most wise
and prudent course to give a qualified assent as far as
the giving up of Elba to Bonaparte, and the grant of
Panne and Placentia to the Emperor of Austria's
daughter. He stated these things in order to impress
upon their Lordships' minds the peculiar situation in
which the Soveregias were at that time placed, and
the fact that the treaty was concluded with a person
whO' had arms in his hands, and that he had an option
whether to secede to it or still eontinue the contest ;
and the arrangement having been, made on eve',"
priuciplo of honour and good faith, 'the parties were
bound toeabide by it. Whether the treaty was WWI
or not, after it had been concluded, they were I .
bound to respect that treaty. ' It had been asked
why had not Bonaparte been closely watched in Elba?
The reason was, that Bonaparte was not there as a
prisoner. Ile was in a place which had been assigned
to him in sovereignty ; so that to have subjected him
tnamy restraint in that place would have been a con-1
travention of the treaty. Ile.did not think it neces-
sary to go into the other particulars of that treaty :
but it had been said, that Elba was an improper
place for Bonaparte; but in what view was it stated
to be improper ? Not as connected with any thing
relating to France, but on account of the superior
means of escape which it afforded. He did not know i
whether it did afford such means in a superior de-
gree • but if they adverted to the circumstance, that
in whatever situation he was placed, he must, sc-
cording to the treaty, be at liberty, they would see?'
that in whatever place he was put, he might have
escaped from it. As,j,o the means of guarding the
island, he believed that every naval person was con-
vinced that the whole British navy would not be
sufficient to blockade Elba so as to prevent the escape
of an individutti. who chose to leave it. That object
had not, however, been neglected ; and an under- !
standing had existed between the officer on that sta..!
tion, and his Noble Friend, as to the circumstances ,
under which measures of prevention might be taken, '
without the violation of the treaty. The officer had
been accidentally absent at the time, but still em-'
ployed in his duties ; and even if he had not been so
employed, a temporary absence would have signified
nothing; for suppose he had been on the island at
the time of the escape, it would have made no differ-
ence. Bonaparte had the command of the military
and police of the island, and would, as he in fact had
done, in one or two instances, have placed the offi-
cer under restraint till his purpose was accomplished.
He had laid an embargo on all the vessels for'a day
or two before, and had placed two persons under re..
straint, till he had carried his scheme into esecutior.
It was impossible that the escape of an individual
who had the command of the military and civil
powers in the island, Could, under these circum-
stances, have been prevented. He thought it neces-
sary, also, to say a few words as to the supposed ,
breach of the treaty by the King of France. He po-
sitively denied that there was any breach whatever
by the French Government. An arrangement had
been made with a view to the liquidation of the debt
created by that treaty, though there had been corn-
plaiots that Bonaparte himself had, in some minor
circumstances, violated it. But on looking at the
treaty, it would be seen that, according to the literal
terms'of it,• there was no violation whatever by the
King of France. The payment was to be annual,
and until the year had elapsed, there was no literal
breach of the treaty. But suppose it had bon yin.
lated, the proper course was to have called upon the
Allies to see it fulfilled, and it was not until redress
was refused that he could be justified in acting as tie ,
had done. But he need not go further into that, as'
Bonaparte's own proclamations afforded flue best'
answer to any argument of this kind. Bonaparte ;
did not come into France on the ground that the I

hasty measures? Certainly not ; but to keep
whole of these circumstances and the situation

which the country stood before their eyes, nod

consider that they had only one of alternatives-
armedtwo, defence or active war. But tne tin alternatives,
however, of armed defence or active war, he did iv
at present call upon their Lordships to decide [lles
hear !], and he did not iequest any decisions up,
the question, for this reason, that the subject
volved Many circumstances and considerations n.
now before them ; that it was a question which con,
cerned not merely this country but Europe in get
ral ; that it was not only a British but an Europea,
question, and that almost every thing must depen,
on the concert between this country and its Alli
He should feel, therefore, that he should act imps
petty, if he were to ask at present for any oth,
opinion than theionswer to the Message necessari
required. But whatever might he the views of d,
ferent persOns on this subject, there was one poi
on which, he presumed, all were now egreed,-41
the best and the only means of establishing the gen,
ral security was a grin resolution to promote
most intimate connection between this coutitry
its Allies. This was.a principle upon-whicti. the Go,
vernment was resolved to act, and he was misfit

there would he every disposition on the part of t,
Allies to regulate their proceedings in the mann,
best calculated to promote the security and best ii
terests of all. But whatever might be his judgment
as to what was most fitting to be done, there was or
point on which he had no hesitation in exp'resih
a clear and decided opinion ; and that was, that them
ought to be no disposition manifested by the Govern.
ment of this country to drive the Allies into IF
adoption of a more extensive policy and course.,
action than they saw consistent with their own vie,
and security. Under these circumstances, then, al
with these qualifications, he, trusted their Lordshil
would agree to the Address which 'be was about
propose. When they considered that the only alter
natives now left to this country were, armed defer
or active war, and that the resolution of the Alli
was not as yet fully known, he hoped they %nip
hare no hesitation in declaring their approbation
the precautionary measures erliich bad been roloPtost.
In the mean time there was full reason tolielievettit
every disposition existed among all Mit differetsi
branches ef the alliance to act in concejt, and '

view the subject In the way which would benioit con.
docive to the interests of this country, as well as t!

general interests of Europe.
Lord GRENVILLE, fully ekreeing es be ld .
the cautious language and general ohjectsor the

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