The Statesman.
London, England, 1810-03-03 00:00:00

. ,
meltaneous operation. with the descent on the
island of Walchereu I It eet*itily. was.
Did not that Memorandum Also give a genefal
'description of the information. of which his Ma-
jesty's Government et that time'were in possession
with respect to the defences of the Scheldt, in.
eluding the works of Antwerp? I think it did, as
well as I recollect.
Did it not contain a general reference to certain
military obstacles that the 'army might expect to
meet on their arrival before Antwerp, to impede
the complete execution of the service, and did it
not particularly contemplate the, possibility of the
enemy's being enabled to avail himself of the pro-
tection of the guns of the citadel to secure either
the whole or a part of tho ships afloat; and did not
your Lordship understand that the decision upon
the policy of the Expedition was formed, having
those difficulties in view ? I did.
Upon the information that Lord Castlereagh
was enabled to lay before your Lordship. before
you left England, what degree of hope did you
feel yourself justified in entertaining, that the ul.
tenor objects of the Expedition might be success.
fully accomplished, supposing the fleet arrived at
Santvliet upon the 3d of August ? I think that
if the intelligence turned out to he true, and that
every other circumstance also turned out favoura.
bly, I should have entertained (as I believe I said
when I was before examined) a confident hope of
success as to the result of the Expedition : by
circumstances turning out favourably, I meao,.
the fleet could Ave arrived by thsts 2d or 3d of
August at Santvliet.

.Slate to the Committee in a general way what
number of days you apprehend would have been
necessary, after the corps arrived at Santvliet, to
disembark and advance it to Antwerp in a state to
storm the town, if the situation of the works ad-
initted of sack. an operation ? 1 cannot possibly
state how long it would have taken to have landed
the army, as it must have depended entirely upon
the nature of the beach, and, the naval moans there
were for that purpose ; but I conclude that it
might have been done in the course of two or
three days.
When did the first appearance of sickness to
any extent shew themselves in the army.? a think
towards the 20th of August, to any considerable
degree.

had the army been healthy prior to that period ?
It had, been very healthy.
Supposing the army had been carried up at once
to Santvliet, and disembarked there fur carrying
on operations against Antwerp, has your Lordship
any reason to suppose that the health of the army
Would have been exposed to suffering from the
same disease that affected the troops in Walcheren
and South Bevelanti ? I believe that the vicinity
bf Antwerp (but I cannot speak from my own
:knowledge) is certainly healthier than the islands
of South Bpvelansl and Walcheren, and that whilst
the troops remained embarked they certainly
would not have been exposed to any sickness.
Your Lordship having stated that you, did not
conceive that the Expedition to the Scheldt
posed either the army or the navy to imminent ha.
'ard, will your Lordship have the goodness tb
state generally to the Committee the grounds ilson.
which that opinion is formed, so far as relates to
military operations ? There might be inure or less
,loss, but I did not consider that there was any
very great risk in the expedition against IValche-
ren, or in taking possession of South Beveland,
or in the subsequent landing. of the army, record.
ing to theintelligeneelvceived of the strength of
the enemy ; and I was confirmed in that opinion
by the intelligence I afterwards received ; there
was no force collected at Antwerp that I could
consider as exposing the army to immitteut dam.
ger.

Is the Committee to understand your Lordship's
opinion to be, that in case the feet had arrived on
the 31 at Baths, the army might have been diseni.
barked, and continued oil shore from the 3d down
to the 25th, without prejudice, in your Lord.
ship's judgment, to its secure re-embarkation ?
The army might certainly have continued to that
period, had it been collected in the field ; but I
am by no means sure it could have remained in
security, embarked in any operations to that pc.
riod, that would necessarily have divided the army
very *Rich, and not placed it in a state to make
bead against the enemy.
Prom the information your Lordship received,
what do you conceive to be the composition of the
'enemy's force, in a military point of view ? There
was certainly a very large part of that force,
which, though applicable to garrison duty, would
not have been formidable in the field.
' Does your Lordship recollect information re.
ceived by Sir Jahn Hope, which bears date the 23d
Of August, and which states the enemy's force on
both sides of the Scheldt, including the garrisons
of ituegen.sp. owe and Antwerp, to emolint to
21,780 men, exclusive of the workmen of the 'ar.
'senate and the crews of the ships ? I think there
was such intelligence received, that accords very
much with all the rest of the intelligence, which
made the whole number about
.35,000 men, at the
time of our arrival at Baths..
Supposing your Lordship had found yourself in
a situation to land yonr army at Santvliet, at the
beginning instead of the close of the month of Au.
gust, what hope do you now feel yourself justified
in entertaining with respect to the prospects you
shouW have had, of accomplishing the ulterior ob.
Meets of the Expedition ? If the intelligence,
ethich I am not able to speak positively to, had
-been true, respecting the state of Antwerp,
which I had received in the communications from
the Secretary of State, I could • certainly have had
considerable hopes of success ; but if "Antwerp
was in a state that the works were completely re.'
paired, I should certainly have thought that such
cess, even if we had lauded at the early period
named, to have been very doubtful indeed.
, [Here follow several questions respecting for.
mcr assaults upon Antwerp.)
Is the Committee to understand your Lordship
sailed with the Expedition from Deal believing
you should Bud the situation of Antwerp ace*
with the information your Lordship had received?
I knew nothing whatever of the truth of (Mink'.
ligence; crime I could only know whether it -

•

THE STATESMAN.


would toils eat to be•true or not when I ar.
rived at my dostination ; I had no ground for be.
,lieving ur disbelieving It ; I had uo means of
knowiat whether th'e intelligence was from good
sources sir otherwise.
Did pair Lordship believe that die nitimate atm.
ccss of the Expedition against Antwerp depended
upon the fleet arriving at Santvliet by or about
the 3d of August, according to thd intelligence
which your Lordship had received ? I think it
depended very much on the early arrival of the
army at Santvliet, as of course the enemy would
be in a state of less preparation.
Then, as your Lordship sailed from Deal, hay.
ing received information that the fortifications of
Antwerp were in a state of decay, and that there
was but a very small garrison there, and as your
Lordship believed that the object of carrying An-
twerp was only likely to be attained by the speedy
arrival of the armament at Santvliet, did your
Lordship make any arrangement, and what, for
disembarking the army, in the first instance, at
Santvliet ? That arrangement could only be made
on the arrival of the armament at Santvliet, iu
concert of course with the Admiral.

I Is the Committee to understand that your Lord.
ship sailed from Deal without making any ar-
rangement •fur landing the army at Santvliet ?
%Without any decided arrangement for that 'pur-
pose—certainly none could possibly be made,
from the nature of thu circumstance.
Did your Lordship upon your sailing make any
arrangement at all fur the landing.of the army at
Santvliet ? No detailed ai.rangement certgittly ; I
did not conceive it was a thing that could be
made; before I sailed I had no precise knowledge
where we should be able to land, or the nature of
the landing-place, tilt it was reconnoitred, or
whether the corps would arrive together or sepa-
parately.
Did your Lordship receive any directions from
the Secretary of State to make such arrangement
I do not recollect any.
In consequence of the Admiral's communication
to your Lordship on the Bth of August, relative
to naval co-operation in the reduction of Flush.
ing, did any thing pass between your Lordship
and the Admiral upon that subject ? I had some
conversation I think with the Admiral at that time
upon the subject.
If the fleet could have gone up the Scheldt
sooner, would your Lordship have proceeded to
attempt the ultimate object of the armament, with.
out•waiting for the reduction of Flushing ; I mean
after the originally projected plan of operations
vias frustrated by the necessity .of carrying so con.
siderable a part of the armament into the.anon..
pot after the enemy had reinforced Flushing to so
consihrabte an extent, and after additional troops
had been landed to accelerate the reduction of that
fortress ? I certainly should.

Is the Committee to understand that the reason
your Lordship remained so long on Walclieren,
and allowed those troops that were landed in ad.
tjition to Sir Eyre Coote's'original corps to do su,
was, that until the whole armament exclusive of
Sir Eyre Coote's force should arrive in' the neigh-
bourhood of Bath; no operation against Antwerp
could be undertaken ; that the forwarding 'of the
armament to that point depended 'solely upon the
Navy, and that the anxiety Which your Lordship
felt upon this subject, arising from a sonviction of
the infinite itnpurtance• Jf celerity towards final
seems, was from time to timeConimrinicated to the
Admiral in the wrgent manner in which it was the
instispensible duty of the Com Mender in Chief of
the land forces to make such, representation ? The
corps und..q. General Grosvenor, which was the
additional corps landed, necessarily remained un-
til the transports could arrive to carry them up
the Scheldt; it was impossible for-any operations
early sort to be undertaken till the armament was.
collected, particularly the cavalry and ordnance
shipirend the ships with the ammunition and with
the provisons : and therefore until the whole was
collected at Bathz, unquestionably I should sly it
was impossible for any operation whatever to have
been-undertaken, and therefore I remained for that
reason at IValcheren ; the corps which had been
landed remained on shore alsoTur the same reason :
with respect to any communication I had to make
to the Admiral on the subject of expedition,
urged to him the necessity of expedition, and I .
had every reason to believe he was impressed with
the same sentiment.
'Did your Lordship ever give any authority or
instructions to Lord ltoisly'm or Sir John Rope, to
concert and undertake any operation with the
navy before you shoulttarrive in person on South
Beveland ? Sir John HOpe was landed for the ex_.
ecution of .a particular service, which w:is merely
to take the batteries, and to open a way for the
fleet, and to *collect the resources in provisions,
cattle, and horses : I certainly never gave any or-
ders to Lord Roselyn, vheioemmandeci then) after-
the landing of Lord tluntly's division and hii own;
because it was impossible any operation of any I
sort or kind whatever could be undertaken till
the ordnance ships with the ammunition and pro.'
visions could have
.been carried up the river.
Did the Admiral communicate to your Lord-
ship the order he sent le Sir Richard Keates to
concert operations with Lord R,osslyn, arid request
your Liardship to give orders of a similar de.
scription to that General'? No, he did not ; the"
fetter from Sir R. Keates to Lord Ross() n wai
copiniunicated to am by his Lordship.
Was every possible arrangemeirt for the speedy
execution of the projected plan of operations made
by your Lordship antlyour Staff ita,stieli a man.
der, that it the naval means could have been ern,:
ployed, no delay would have happened on the part
of the army ? There certainly was.
After the whole of the army had assembled at
Bath; did not all the intelligence your Lordship
received represent the works of Antwerp to be ire
such a state, and the garrison so strong, as to
make it impossible to take the place without a
siege ? I think all the'intelligencc went to that
etreet.
Did not the intelligence at this period also state
that the enemy had already collected between 30
and 40,000 men, in Antwerp, Bagen-op-Zoom,
Breda, and that ueighbourhood, including the
force in Cacisand ; that this fvroa was daily in.