The Statesman.
London, England, 1815-02-06 00:00:00

THEATERS.

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woad*
-..,essoorsct. lie could conceire that oue,plaiz •
and dried answer might• have been given to both
those charges. suppose that Sir John Murray. bad •
been in a condition to give this answer, 64 preflotii,
to the 11th. I had not heard of the advance of Su-'
diet, hut only of I)ecaen, whom I was prepared to
fight : on that day, however, I was informed.of the'
rapid advance and protimity of SAchet, and saw
that it was not possible to save the whole, if I had.
staid, without giving battle to a superior erresnyll
which Would have risked the whole." Serb, an ass..
ewer 1,44, in his opinion, have been perfectly ea-
Vattotz. I'f Marshal Suchet had desseaded front.
the Perillo, on the 12th of Jane, with •
1.99000 men,. when Sir J. Murray • had_ every realms.
to .believo hiM on the Zucar, . ralencia, that
woeld have been a sufficient justification for tetiwii-
ing at that particular time, and for .Peeving the guns
behind. Sir J. Murray had, however,.proied, both •
by his own It tters, and by the evidence he* brought
forward, that he did know of the advance or Suchet
long before the 11th. It was therefore his-duty to
have calculated, Previous to that time, on the ,-tans
of saving his army, with its guns nod stores, in the,
very probable case of his being obliged to raise the
siege of Tarragona.
Sir J. Murray had stated, that he had ,brought no
evidesswe in, support of the first and second, charges. ' •
He 60414 however, that Ire 04 bre Oght sir leas
evidence, in producing Sir 'John% ewe letters.
case was, that after Sir John had rij) ed a deellirtit
opinion that Tarragona ciuld not,be taittp, he stU .
continued to land guns anti stores. Allithst were
exposed to risk, after this conviction wst for 9 x -
his mind, was .ea in vein. Pr/Rick •
of Dccaen, Sir John appeared' to be perfectly•stelt
informed of it; and by his letter of.. he-'lll4,:he , • '
stated that Siichet: had left the Zucitr Aft
and arrived at 'rotiosa on the Dth. Whito he ita:f'
heard of the actual arrival of WOO at TortOsa,- and
of 2000 at Lerido, he could have no doubt but that
those were advanced corps of Sachet's coming 0,
raise the siege of Tarragona. By the oth, all doubts
of the movement of Suchet to the North were re-
Toyed from Sir John's mind. What other object
could Suchet have in this movement but to relieve
Tarragona; and when Sir John was well informed of
this movement, and firmly believed the Information,
why did he not sooner calculate 'the time that Sachet
would 'probably arrive, and carry off his army with
all their guns and stores ? While there was a chance
of taking Tarragona, the stay of Sir J. Murray in
Catalonia might have been excusable: but why
should he stay there when every rational prospect of
taking it had vanished? Previous to the 10th,
enough had been done to draw Decaen from his posi-
tions in Catalonia. Enough had been done also to
Make a diversion in favour of the Duc del Parque
in Valencia. He could not see any practical or mu.
ral effect that was produced by continuing the siege
longer. Ile could really nut discover nor imagine
any bad moral effect that was to result from pursuing
a different line of conduct. But Sir John Murray
had endeavoured to show, and as he thought fella-
cloudy to show, that he had no. other alternative
than that of pushing on the siege as late as the night
of the 11th, or of suddenly abandoning it. If he (the

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and direct answer might• have been given to. both
s• those charges. suppose that Sir John Murray. bad
. . • ..
been in a condition to give this answer, 64 pre,loa,
. v.
to the 11th. I had not heard of the advance of Su.'
•
the Chet, hut only of Decaen, whom I was prepared to
im. fight : on that day, however, I was infosmed of the 4
ion rapid advance and proximity of SAchet, and saw
to that it was not possible to save the whole, if I had ~tit
an staid, without giving battle to a superior enembh
1 Id, which Would have risked the whole." Soch, an ass., .
~ ,
•
ne, mei Timid, in his opinion, have been perfectly ea- .
tad- tlifeetory. 0 Mnrshal Suchet had dessamded fount,
ow the cloud's. at Perillo, on the 12th of Jour, With •
~1
ich 1.2.3000 mess, when Sir J. Murray •Isad_every moo&
ote to .believe hilt on the Zucar, ..ie ralesscia, that
ort woald have been a sufficient justification for retreat- ,
or- ing at that particular time, and for leaving the guns.
Ile behind. Sir J. Murray had, however,, proved, both • •I
or. by his own otters, and by the evidence he' brought
he forward, that he did know of the advance of Suchet If
so- long before the 12th. It was therefore hisduty to
hat have calculated, Previous to that time, on the sotans i
to of saving his army, with its guns nod stores, in the,
,:k. very probable case of his being obliged to reit!! the •
as siege of Tarragona.
on Sir J. Murray had stated, that he had
,brottgbt no
led evidgw in, support of the first and second, Algot. ' •
the Het°4,l4 however, thet he 04 broiXist seirsageot
ell evidence, in producing Sir 'John% ewer totters. Via '
sn- case was, that after Sir John h
He opinion that Tarragona cauldiitrteedltep a ,
derheilistinklk .
in continued to land suns snit stores. All
,thst were
ea- exposed to rkk, • after this conoiction visit for I;1 - - !" •
It his mind, was .exposed in vials. "fa PrOich. • ' go
the of Dccaen, Sir John appeared' to be perfectly welt
clan informed of it ; and by his letter ier- heltlii.„he . . : li!
mi. stated that Sorbet' had left the ZuCar qlt . ._
.i , I
so- and arrived at 'fortosa on the Oth. Wiiin Fit.tt has ' •.-
sd. heard of the actual arrival Of 1000 At Tortesa; and
vas of '2OOO at Lerido, he could have no doubt but that •
da- those were advanced corps of Sachet's coming
hat raise the siege of Tarragona. By the 91h, alt doubts • si.
, if of the movement of Suchet to the North were re- Alia,
no moved from Sir John's mind. What other object -,
could Suchet have in this movement but to velieve \
ave Tarragona; and when Sir John was well informed of /
. this movement, and firmly believed the information,
our why did he not sooner calculate 'the time that Sachet
his would *probably arrive, and carry off his army with
the all their guns and stores ? While there was a chance
be of taking Tarragona, the stay of Sir J. Murray in
rer, Catalonia might have been excusable: but why
rse, should he stay there when every rational prospect of
taking it had vanished? Previous to the 10th,
an- enough had been done to draw Decaen from his posi- . i
rer, tions in Catalonia. Enough had been done also to
ons Make a diversion in favour of the Duc del Parque
his in Valencia. He could not see any practical or mo.
ace rat effect that was produced by continuing the siege
ear longer. He could really not discover nor imagine
.:
[led any bad moral effect that was to result from pursuing
,it a different line of conduct. But Sir John Murray
of j had endeavoured to show, and as he thought fella.-
Sir I cloudy to show, that he had no other alternative .
Jch !than that of pushing on the siege as late as the night
sad jof the 11th, or of suddenly abandoning it. If he (the ' o-
raw I-Judge Advocate) were /educed to make Ms choice ow' -- -• ~- '4
in to which of these measures he approved, he ;bestir , ,
'er, I certainly choose the latter, and refer to the Int..' --
. , .
he ' dence of General Donkio for an ample justification, • 4. k
ion lof this opinion. But there was another and a • '
the ' third rousse which in his view of the question ought. 4.
Sir ' to have presented itself to the judgment of Sir John ~
do Murray. Why was the siege continued till the 12th,
hat I after all hopes of success had vanished, and the ces -
did ! tarn approach of a superior enemy had been known
ing for several days before ? During these proceedings ~
not 1 on the.eastern coast of Spain, an enterprise was
;ed ' going on in the west, precisely similar in its objects,
ten . and in all its circumstances, except the conduct of
wn !the different Commanders. •The siege of St. Sebas-
be. than
.had been brought to that crisis whets every pre.
thil paratlon was matured for the assault. The French
lat General, the Duke of Dalmatia, selected this period
urt for the purpose of making a desperate effort to relieve
ten Pampeluna, by turning the right of the Allied
om j Army ; well knowing that if he succeeded in that
ter object, the left, which supported the investment of
ire St. Sebastian, must be compelled also to fall back.
ith What was thee, the conduct of the Duke of Welling..
01. j ton, admitted to be one of the first Generals of this
tat ; br any other age ? He immediately ordered all his
w. heavy ordnance to be removed to a place of safety,
1e.., lest he should be obliged to abandon the siege; and
although it considerably retarded his operations, he
me did not deem it advisable to expose to possible loss
ich 'or capture any part of his battering train. And yet
ice if there was a Commander justified in calculating on
et- the favours of fortune, or in drawing on that ample
it stock of character which he had previously acquired,
ras it certainly Werth@ Duke of Wellington, who felt
/ht that he (tired not do that at St. Sebastian's which' Sir .
rag J. Merray had done at Tarragona. Gen. D.'4 testimony
he foreished ample confirmation of the indecision of Sir
ice J. Murray;for bow could he have been induced,
4. ,unaccustorned as he was to disclose his intention to
others, to have communicated his design of raising the
liege so early as the 9th to Gen. D., asters his mind had
actually been Acii• up as' to that saiasare, which r
he he, nevertheless, delayed carryiit Into execution .
lit until the morning of the 12th ? How cold he have
hn ; contemplated such's proceeding, Mess assured of •
:a- I the certain approach of Marshal Suchrt's &city, it'
le, I being his resolution not to raise the siege, as stated
:e, ' in his defence, in consequence of Decaest's advance,
or but to risk in this event an engagement witlithat co. .
sts lupin of the enemy ? General Dunkin, It appear.
Id ed, had also then forwarned Sir John Murray re-
in specting the possible loss of the guns ; and yet no i
ass preparations were made, no steps taken, no precau-
ty tions used up to the morning of the 12th, to guar l
as against that disaster. On the I.lth, Marshal Suchet
tit was known to be at Tortosa ; but his certain ad- ,
I- trance in force for the obvious purpose of relieving
a- Tarragona had been known three days before by • .
id confidential and authentic communications, and Go 7,
w time at which he might arrive was therefore a merit 1
sy matter of calculation by the Quarter-Master-Gene. ? 0 ;
.
se rat's office. Why, then, did Sir J. Morray act as • : tfif
f. if he was totally destitute of issformation ; or where t i 7•'•
lig was the difficulty of calculating the ordinary rapids. (''';
t- ty of a French army so as to prevent the necessity of • '
st leaving any thing behind ?' Why iss cue case give
as the enemy credit for au almost pretertsaturalactivit), • .
t
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