The Statesman.
London, England, 1809-10-11 00:00:00

THE STATESMAN.

rionsly presented themselves, cross the channel of
I3crgen.op.Zuum, stretch out beyond the inutsda-
tion of Lillo, and march against Antwerp.; the
Duke of Cornegliano woill.l have preceded to-
wards the Head of Flanders, and whilst the Eng-
lish would have been making their dispositions In
iniest Antwerp from Fort Lillis to the citadel,
t Prince of PunteCorvo and the Duke of Cerne.-
Aeon, protected by the inundations ana by the
immense works of the town, would have waited
for them, and on the day agreed upon, would
have stretched out upon the right ; aril then the
English army would have terminated iih destinies :
the Duke of Istria would during that time have
proceeded to the Island of Catlsand. Ois the Ist
of September, there were between Flinders apil
Scheldt and Maestricht, the enty thousauil wren un.
der arms. They were nut all regulars, but they
were all commanded by men who had served; they
were all volunteers, and consisted, for the most
part, of hornier ander-officers, and former soldiers
who had obtained their discharges, and who had
run to arms on the first signal.
Lord Chatham, therefore, charged himself with
asenseless operation, and those, therefore, who
projected it, chewed themselves to be as ignorant
of the climate as of the localities. Lord Chatham
saved the English army by determining to re-em.
bark it ; but every day that he delays to execute
this determination, heightens the misfortunes of
and if he is culpable, it is not in
having ordered the retreat, it is in having so long
delayed to re-embark ; fur (luting this del ey, the
English troops contract fresh diseases, and become
infected with fresh seeds of destruction.

Get it suffice to say that the Etnperur, when ho
learned that an English army hid been landed upon
that point, recommended that it should not be at.
tacked, and that we .hould lea's the destruction
of it to the diseases, which, in that .dangerous
climate, most do the enemy more injury than the
cannon, without its costing any thing to France.
The English, in landing in Flanders,
therefore, a thing contrary to the rules of Nar
Ist, Because tl►ey took for the theatre of their
operations a country so unwholesome, that they
had to presume that a month's stay in it would de-
stroy their army ; that the country is covered
with strong places, such as Flushing, I3crgen.op-
Zoom, Baths, and ; and on the side of the
island of Cadsand, the new Fort Napoleon, &c.
&c.

2d. Because their principal object appeared to
he to capture the sqloadron, they ought to have
imagined that the squadron depended upon Ant.
werp, and Antwerp was impregnable, tor its
communications with France could nut be cut off,
except by immense armies, against which the
whole population of France would hate time to
march.

The result of all which is, that the English have
been fur so many years shut out of the Continent,l
that they are no longer acquainted with it. Every
thing has changed, except their hatred against
Frasee.
With regard to the island of Walcheren, it Is
said, that they mean to keep it. We should have,
wily 'mime to applaud this resolution fur many
reasons : Ist, The Ruglish, although they had
110,(XXI men in the Wood ..f Walcheren, could not
prevent it from being attacked and re-taktm ; 2d,
10,000 Engli.h, exposed to the inivence of the
climate, would eaperience so much loss, that it
would be necessary to be continually reinforcing
them ; that, us tite course of the year, 80,000
men Would as necessarily been ne victims to the
climate, and it would cost them inure to guard the:
marsh, than to preserve the East Indies—but it is
probable that time would not be left fur them to
suffer such losses. Tho channel between the two
islands is so narrow, that bombs can reach from
the one to the other. The twenty ships of the'
line, and the flotilla which w e have in the Scheldt,
would soon make ns masters of that river. It
would not be forgotten, that four year. ago, and
with our flotilla alone, we were masters of all the'
coasts; can it be doubted, that we should soon be
,nasters of a closed see? and can it, at the same
time, be supposed that the English would arte:rpt
to keep Flushing without being masters of the
Scheldt ? Besidcal a lutilla is too dangerous a war
fur them. Such a war is nut carried un with
boats alone, it is conducted with excellent troops,
that is to soy, with means which do not allow the
English any advantage over us.
We well know that men exist who, although
completely ignorant of the art of war, have, not.
withstanding, the silly habit of taking and endea-
vouring to give coyotel to those who arc masters in
it 1 Those people, yet more skilful than the public
speaker who introduced the subject of the war
before Hannibal) tell you that the English, by
preserving the island of Walcheren, will make it
a second Gibraltar, or another Malta ; in fine, a
commanding point which will render them masters
of Flanders, of Holland, isc. Poor madmen
they cannot perceive that If the English persist in
keeping the island of Walcheren, that circnr .
stance would be as advantageous for Ls as if they
were embarrassed io the heart of Spain.
Ingeneral, whenever an English army lands on
the Continent, every real Frenchman ought to re.
joke.—Such a contest is completely in our favour:
a nation of three millions of men cannot meet man
fur man a nation of forty millions. A new army,
all the elements of which are in the navy, cannot
keep the field against the veteran forces which
have occupied two.thirds of Europe ; in tine, an
army which can only arrive by sea, has neither ar.
tillery, cavalry, nor equipages, at least it has a
very great inferiority in all these means, and Lord
Chatham really could not mount more than 2000
cavalry ; well, before 15 days were elapsed, the
French effective cavalry, which were assembled on
the Banks of the Scheldt, anissaisted to 4000 1
" When we nontomer relied, that the British troops are
not led on by • Alai lboreach, or a Wolfe, or eveu a Welko.
le", we mites'. thil even a the rententplasion of objects
parelt national, anl eaessanected whit the fate of Amine, we
see much wore ground of apprehessiaa than object of well-
founded hope."
NOTE BY TUE Momirroa.—We here see what
the spirit of party is capable of. It is a pity that
Sir Arthur Wellesley had not the command instead
of Lord Chatham. The
.hitter saved the English
army ; the other would probably have test it, as

he has lust that which he commanded in Spain—
where he hail the imprudence to entangle himself
with 30,000 men, without reflecting that he thus
es posed his left wing to the different corps of the
Dukes of Dalmatia, of Elcitingen, and of Tre-
viso, why had 70,000 men under arms. Ile has,
it is true, drawn himself out of this critical situa-
tion, by a precipitate flight, sad by abandyning
his hospitals, his wounaled, his horses, and a part
of his equipages. It was thus that Gen. .here,
_in his ridiculous expedition, in the month of Nu.
'ember last, fled from Benevento to Corunna,
Ibandoning his allies, his horses, his ammunition,
end his equipage. •Neither the one nor the other
i-of these Generals has displayed that foresight,
which is a characteristic so essential in war, and
which prompts to do only what can be supported,
and to undertake only w hat presents the greatest
number of chances of success. Sir Arthbr Wel-
lesley lies not evinced more talent than the tnen"
who direct the Cabinet of St. James's. To wish
to support Spain against France, and to contend
upon the Continent with France, is forming au
enterprise which will cost dear to those who
have undertaken it, and who will meet in it only
disasters. Conflagrations, it is true, may be
kept up—misfortunes may be brought on peace-
able inhabitants—risers of blood may fl iw—the
people, the protectors of whoa) they call them-
selves, may be ruined—but any other results arc
impossible.