The Statesman.
London, England, 1815-04-13 00:00:00

4

could, if it were doubted, bring witnesses to their
Lordships' bar, who were at Fontainhleau at the
time, to prove that Bonaparte was not in a situation
so commanding as to entitle him to demand any thing
like the terms which were elven him by this arrange-
ment. But suppose there had been some risk, and
they had been forced to continue the struggle a little
Integer ; w hen Con a—they expect to carry it on un-
cles! more favourable circumstances ? Why did they
not expose themselves to a little further risk,
looking at the great results that might be expected
from some present sacrifice ?..---Was not that
the policy of their Lnrdships ? Was it not the
tory of their Lordships, of Parliament, and of the
country ? But even in point of risk, the risk of
continuing the contest a little longer was but small
indeed, when compared with the risk of acceding
to an arrangement like this. The allied troops in
the neighbourhood amounted to 140,000 men. Bona-
parte was surrounded on all sides—all the positions
on the Seine were in the power of the Allies—they
had 30,000 cavalry, and the force which Bonaparte
had with him (lid not much exceed 20,000 men; and
if it were rated at 30.000 men, it would certainly be
rated very high. In addition to these advanteges, the
Allies had that glorious and triumphant army in the
South, under the command of one of whom it might
be said that, high as his military talents were, they
constituted in that situation the least of his merits,
of one who by his probity, magnanimity, and wise
conduct, endeared himself beyond measure to his
army, and even to the people in the south of France.
Never was a Commander more adored than he was by
the people of the south of France during the period of
his power in that country; never was a wise, brave,
just, and beneficent Prince more endeared to his
people than he was to those over whom circumstances
had given him the temporary authority. With all
these advantages, where was the necessity for such
en arrangement ns this ? Look at the risk you ran
by such arrangement ! Look at it, did he say?—
feel it—they knew it. Could they he confident that
to.umrrnw world not bring a declaration of war ?
Notwithstanding the contemptuous manner in which
the Noble Fial I treated the matter, he repeated, look
at the risk of such an arrangement. Why did not
Ministers send instructions to hint whom they em-
ployed on the Continent, firmly to contemplate the
whole of the circumstances, and insist upon a proper
securitv against the renewal of disturbance? They
tad advantages which, if he might use that expres-
sion, it might be impossible to remount. They were
in possession of Paris, supported by great and com-
manding armies,—and they had the Swedish army to
reckon upon, if there had been occasion ; and above
all, they had that glorious and triumphant army in
the south of France. But notwithstanding all these
advantages, they absolutely treated with Bonaparte
as an independent Sovereign. The act of abdication
was not a separate independent act ; it was con-
nected with the engagements then forming, and was
taken as a concession on his part. lie maintained,
that this was emit rary to every principle of policy:—
there was no necessity for it ; and yet the engages
meets were exactly of that description which enabled
him with the greatest facility to escape, to return and
become the instrument of fresh miseltlef and dis-
turbance. There was a radical defect in the whole
proceeding : fit it prime* was wrong ; it was en-
tirely a work of supererogation; there was no neces-
sity for it; and without any thing to justify the ex-
posure of the tranquillity of Eureee to so great
hazard, they conscsited to this arrangement, which
was so likely to be the source of new mischief. He
would be the last man in the world to blame any
generosity that could he shown on such an occasion,
consistent with the great object then to he attained—
security for Europe against a renewal of the calami-
ties under which it had groaned so long. But this
transaction did not at all proceed on a principle of
generosity. There was no such thing in the papers;
kind, indeed, t hey contained neither generosity, justice,
nor policy. It would have been perfectly proper to
have been as generous as was consistent with secu-
rity : but the great object ought to be, security
against the return of that person to power. There
might, perhaps, have been difficulties in drawing such
an engagement ns would answer this purpose, without
rendering the Bourbon cause by itself aground of war:
but he was convinced the difficulty might have been
got over. Well, the moment the change took place,
the moment the great object of all this sinister precau-
tion had escaped, the Government was all abroad, I
the world was all before them, they were obliged to
run to Congress to know what was to be done in
this new emergency. For the subsequent measures,
he (Lord Wellesley) trusted some solid reason was to
be given. lie had a high respect for the Bourbons,
he had all the consideration that could be given to
the fallen fortunes of honourable men, and above all
for those of the head of that House whom, from his '
personal observation, lie felt every reason to honour;
but he could not bring himself to think of going to
war for the mere naked sake of the Boubons. He
would now come to the articles:—one of them related
to the crown jewels, and on this point be must ob-
se: ve, from the absurdity of the translation, how
little a keowlelge of the French language was re-
quisite for diplomatic excellence.—[A laugh.]—The
original was, 'roux les diamants collronne rPstanl
ala Trance; daubtlea,. that the jewels
were to belong to the monarchy. The translated ar-
ticle had it, however, that all the jewels were to
remain in Fiance: a condition which, ,if lie was to
believe in some of our late importations, we
should find it hard to fulfil ; and the probability
was, that if we were to have a Treaty with Bonaparte,•
an attic!? would insinuate itself into it, that we should
provide bine with a new crown.—[it laugh]—But
there were more serious objections. Our pecuniary
arrangement was the height and extreme of diplo-
matic improvidence. We had agreed to guarantee
him the payment of monies, not for his own per-
'mud support, but fur three or four separate purposes.
There was thus, a sum for himself, a sum for his fa.
mily, smother for his followers, and a fourth for the
discharge of his debts. Observe the monstrous ins•
providence of this. We were thus actually smooth*
ing his way to the Crown of France; we were sup-
plying hjm with followers in France; and, by the
payment of his debts, keeping up the liveliest re-*
membraece of him among his late subjects. As to
the payment, the Noble Lord (Liverpoo!) had ar-
gued, and he (Lord Wellesley) thought it a very
poor argument, that the term fur the payoseut bad

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