The Liverpool Standard, and General Advertiser.
Liverpool, Merseyside, England, 1854-10-31 00:00:00

THE WAR WITH RUSSIA,

WHILE the public interest with reference to the
War has been almost centered in the operations
against the fortress of Sebastopol, with the almost
certain consequence of the expulsion of the Russians
from the Crimea, it is desirable that we should not
lose sight of the object for which the War has been
undertaken. Not the slightest doubt seems to be
entertained of the success of the Allied forces in
the Crimea, and even the ultimate possession of the
shores of the Black Sea, but then will come the
question how far have we progressed towards
attaining those material guarantees for the future
peace of Europe, for which the Western Powers
have joined their armies to those of Turkey. It can
hardly be supposed that the Emperor NICHOLAS,
who has already displayed so much obstinacy in
order to carry out the leading principle of Russian
policy, will consent to forego his ambitions projects
of universal empire for such a loss as the Crimea,

great though it may be. Secure in the vastness of
his sterile dominions, he may bide his time, and
bid defiance to Europe ; nor, after the experience
of the brief campaign from the victory on the
heights of Alma to the ,assault on Sebastopol, can

we anticipate any iniportant results from carrying
the War, under so many disadvantages, into the
territory of Russia Proper. The Allies, with all
their vast resources, may well pause before ven-
turing on an expedition which may forcibly remind
them of the annihilation of NAPOLEON'S mighty
armament in the celebrated retreat from Moscow,
and yet the end must be achieved, or all that has
been accomplished will be rendered comparatively
futile.

It must not be forgotten that Russia, for her
sources of wealth, depends mainly, if not solely, on
her large exports of agricultural produce, and that
without the custom of civilised Europe she would
be shut up in her own poverty, and possess
few of those means for aggression which she has
hitherto used with so much crafty ingenuity. To
deprive her of her export trade would, therefore,
be to inflict a far heavier blow, and one that would
be more severely felt, than the capture of a fortress
or the occupation of a province. It might have
been supposed that this damage to her commerce
would have been effected by the blockade of her
seaports in the Baltic and the Black Sea ; but two
circumstances have been permitted to prevent it.
Refining upon former experience, a proclamation
was issued at the time when the War was com-
menced, declaring goods in neutral vessels to be

free of capture. This was error the first, as it gave
Russia an opportunity to continue her export
trade through neutral ports ; and, notwithstand-
ing the restrictions against trading with an enemy,
there can be no doubt that much English gold has
found its way to Russia through Russian inter-
vention. In the next place, though the German
Powers were called upon to take part in a quarrel
which was essentially European, Prussia has been
allowed to play the coquet to her own advantage,
and virtually to the rendering nugatory the opera-
tions of the Allied fleets in the Baltic. On the
one hand she has professed great interest in the
success of the Allied Powers, while on the other
she has courted peace with Russia, and allowed
her ports to be used for carrying on that trade
which it was the especial object of the blockade of
the Russian ports to prevent. There ought to be no
alternative but that Prussia should be imperatively
called upon to declare herself with us or against us.
If she declare for the alliance, then she should at
once assume a hostile attitude towards Russia,
seize all Russian property within her dominions,
and put an immediate and effectual stop to Russian
trade through her ports. Her refusal, on the
other hand, should be met by prompt measures.—
War should be declared, her ports blockaded—
which could be effected with little difficulty—and
the rest of Germany called upon to act with
efficiency against the common enemy. If this
were done, and it is far more easy of accomplish-
ment than any incursion into:the Russian territory,

we might have more reason than we have at
present to hope that the northern despot would
be compelled, by a pressure which he could not
withstand, to succomb to that public opinion which
"demands the freedom of Europe.
There is, however, a further mode of attack,
which, if pushed with vigour, might also prove
seriously detrimental to Russian ambition. The
Allied Powers should take measures to restore the
nationality of Poland, and by this means impose a
barrier between Russia and Germany. There are
many Poles scattered over Europe, who profess to
be thirsting for liberty, and if they receive
,the

countenance and support of the Great Powers,
would bring all the enthusiasm of their long-
cherished cause to do battle iu its behalf. By far
the greater part of the territory of Poland was
seized by Russia in the division of the spoil ; and
though Austria and Prussia came in for a small
share, the former State might receive an equivalent
for the surrender in one of the Danubian provinces,
of which she has already taken possession : and the
latter State is deserving of no consideration, from
her complicity with Russian intrigue. Little
reliance can be placed at any time on the gratitude
of nations ; but Poland, on her own account, would
prove antagonistic to Russia and Russian interests.
We may remark, in conclusion, that however
desirous we may be for peace, it is most unwise to
declare such an opinion in the hearing of an enemy.
For this reason we consider that the public decla-
rations of the. PREMIER, of his anxiety for a return
to peace, have been most injurious, as tending to
confirm the Emperor NICHOLAS in his obstinate
refusal to concede the terms demanded of him, and
consequently to prolong the struggle.