The Statesman.
London, England, 1812-09-25 00:00:00

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of his forces, and some alight"attempts en etiect
this passage' to Polio', a polot Wale' for Mtn,
witted be ver; aiivantageitus. The tiuotei woo I
had disposed, and a few .csention shot, were suf-
ficient to make him immediately give up his en-
terprize. In continual expectation of receiving sue.
emirs from the Army of the North, st4rich heti betels
promised in so solemn and reiterated a mennet,
endeavoured to add, by my own industry, ,twx the
',teens of the army. M.'s' cavalry was much inferior
to that of the enemy. The English had nearly srx
horse, English or German, without eounting'rhe
Spaniards formed into regular troops. .had no
more than woo. With this disproportiOn, in what
manner could one reatneuvre his enemy heath
one's self of any advantage that might he Obiteittpd r
had but one means of Augmenting my cavalry, fuel
that was by taking the useless horses for the service
of the army, as such as belonged to lediekluals. Who
Mad nu right to have them, of latch irt:o ha 3
greater-number than they are:etre-Wed. I ilia not
hesitate making use of this Means, the imminent in-
terest of the army and the success of the operations
being at stake. I therefore ordered the seizure of
such horses as were under this predicament, and I
likesvise seized a great number, which were with it
cenvoy coming from Andalusia, all upon estimation
of their value, and making payment for them. This
measure, executed with security, gave us, in the
space of eight deys, 1000 more horsemen, and my
cavalry united amounted to more than 3000 comeas
tante. Meanwhile, I no less hoped to receive suc-
cours from the army of the North, which toutinued
its promises, the performance of which appeared to
have commenced, but of which we have not hitherto
seen any effect.
" The Bth division of the Army of Portugal oc-
cupied the Asturias; these troops were completely
isolated from the army ; by the evacuation of the
provinces of Leon and Bnarente they were without
succours, and without any communication with the
Army of the North; because on the one .side the
Tritladores, who should have coma from Bayonne,
could not be sent to Gijon; and, on the other side,
the General in Chief of the Army of the North, al-
though he had formally promised so doing, had caused
himself tehe dispensed with, throwing a bridge over
the Deba, and there to establish posts. This division
had been able to bring only very little ammunition,
'for want of means of carriage, and this Was in part
consumed ; nor did they know how to replace it:
its position might evety moment become more criti-
cal, and the enemy seriously occupied himself with
It, inasmuch as if it were still thus isolated, it would
remain entirely ignorant of the importent ettents
which were taking place In the plains of Castile.—
' Gen. Bonnet, calculating on this state of.mattere, and
considering, according to the knowledge he has of the
country, that it is much easier to eats-, than depart
out of it, according as the enemy might oppose the
entrance or departure, he decided en evacuating this
province, and on taking a position at Reynosa thorn
having learnt that the-Army of Portugal was in pre-
mence of the English Army, and that they were eta
the point of engaging, he did not hesitate on putting
himself in motion and rejoinine it.
" Strongly impressed a ith this important succour
and the augmentation which my cavalry was about to
receive, not haring learnt any thihg positive further
'concerning the Army of the North, and being besidee
informed of the marcli of the army of Galicia, vvhiett
in the course of a feW days would necessarily fore!!
me to send a detachment to repulse them, I thought it
!my duty to act without delay. I had to fear that my
I situation, which was become much ameliorated, might
change by losing time, whilst teat of the enemy
would, by the nature of things, become better every
moment, I therefore resolved on repnssing the DourA,
' but this operation is difficult and deliitte, it cannat
be undertaken without much art and circumspection
in presence of an army in condition for battle. 1 em-
ployed the days of the 13th, 14th, 15th, and lOth of
July in malting a number of marches and counter-
marches, which deceived the enemy. I feigued an
intention to turn by Toro and turned by Tordesillas,
making an extremely rapid trerch. This movemewt
succeeded so well that the wholearmy could pass the
river, move to a distance from it, and form itself
without meeting a single enemy.
44 On the 17th, the army took a position at Na.
varre del Rey. The enemy, who was in full march
for Toro, could only bring two divisions with cele-
rity to Tordesillas de la Orden ; the others were re-
called from different parts, to recruit themselves.—
On the 18th, in the morning, we found these two
divisions at Tordesillas de la Orden. M tbey did
not expect to find the whole army joined, they thought
they might, without peril, gain some time. Neter-
theless, when they saw our masses coming forward,
they endeavoured to effect their retreat to a plain
which commanded a village to which we were march-
ing. We had already reached them. If I had iced
a csevalry superior or equal to that of the eneinv,
these two divisions would have been destroyed. We
did not, however, pursue them the less, and with ail
possible vigour, and during three hours march, thoy
were overpowered by. the fire of our artillgrye which
I. caused to take them in the rear
sand flankottid
Which they could with difficulty answer, and' pr f-
tected by their numeroui, cavalry, they divided them-
selves to re-ascend the Guarena, in order ba.pass it
with greater facility.
" Arrived upon till heights of the valley of Gus.
rena, we saw* that a portion of Idle English ariny
was formed upon the left bank of-, that river. ki
that place the heights of that valley are very rugged,
and the valley a Middling breadth. Whether. it was
ry for the troops to approach the.weiteems
t ',feint excessive . hest, or whgther. it .Wes
41i other cause of 'Which I am ignorant, ate
itederit had plOcid the greater part of Om

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