The Statesman.
London, England, 1815-01-30 00:00:00

~:: ~_.

THE STATKSMAN.

COURT-M4RTI4L.

TRIAL OF LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR J. MURRAY.

• SATURDAY—EIGRTH•DAY.
• Sir John Murray proceeded in the reading of his
defence. Having already detailed the numbers arid
strength of the enemy, he should now come to the
consideration of the force and equipment of the army
under his orders. Returns had already been present-
ed to the Court, which greatly exaggerated his force,
including some corps that never were in Spain at all,
and adding considerably to the effective strength of
the regiments tinder his command; while, at the
Same time, the force of the enemy was considerably
underrated. He, on the other hand, should produce
the official returns made by the Quarter-Master'
General of the effective force of his army. It would I
appear by those returns, that the whole of the allied
larmy, which landed before Tarragona, amounted to
12,810 infantry, and 698 cavalry, including some
non-combatants, which %sere necessarily attached to
every army. The whole loss before Tarragona, and
at the taking of St. Felippe, did not exceed 56 men,
killed and wounded. He shouldi therefore, state
his force generally at 13,500 men. As to their corn-
pocition,
in point of effective strength, 3910 were
British, 1710 Germans, 1332 Italians (many of
them dt,serters or prisoners), 980 Sicilians, 490 Cala. !
'biese and the remainder consisting of General i
' '
Whittingham's Spanish corps. With this hetero.
genenus mass, he debarked on "the 3(1 of June, and
from the time of his debarkation received no rein-
forcements whatever. Had his' whole force consisted
of British and Germans, it would nut have been able
to 'contend with the force which the enemy could
bring against it, consisting of 20,500 of the best
troops of France,- without including the garrison of •.
Tarragona. Of his army, the British and Germans
were all that he could depend on as perfectly effec-
five : and although he placed as mach confidence in
the gallantry of the greater part of his remaining
force as any other officer would do, yet he must say,
that there were some parts of it of which he could
not speak so favourably.. As to General Whiffing-
ham's Spanish corps, great difficulties were found in
provisioning it. He had received the express orders
of Lord Wellington that he was not to furnish'
any Spanish corps with provisions; and it could hardly'l
be expected that General Copens would provide bet• i
ter for that corps than for his own army, who were
often in want of provisions.

When he tookthecommand of the army at All.'
cant, he found it immoveable, on account of the 19w
state of the military chest, and because the officers
expected daily to be superseded. The CoMmissariat
also required additional arripagemeuts ; and for that
reason, the army landed before Tarragona in a sot.'
which was incomplete and insufficient with respect to
its equipment. This was not his fault. He could
neither build transports, nor enlarge the dimensions
of those in whichhis army was to be embarked. Al-
though as many horses and mules were •brought as
room could be found foi, yet many would have
been wanting for the service of .tite- asety.• • They
did not land a singid tumbril, many of • the corps
were without mules, and as to, waggons for the sick
and wounded, and for the necessaries of the hospi-
tals, there were none. It was well known by most
of his Officers, that there was necessarily s great de-
ficiency in the equipment of his artily ; and the in-.
structions of the Duke of Wellington were most pre-
cise upon this point, that '° he would pardon every-
thing, except the suffering one of the corps of the
army to be defeated and disperSed." As to the con.
dition of the first Spanish army, under Gen. Copons,
that was to co-operate with him, instead of loose
calculations, as had been made by his Prosecutor, be
should show its real strength and value, from the
official memoirs of Col. Cabanes, the Chief of its
Staff. The report of that O:licer was, " It cannot
be denied that the troops are brave, and that many of
the Officers have considerable knowledge ; but, to
say the truth, from their having been generally em-
ployed on the mountains and in small detachments,
they have not acquired that subordination and disci-
pline which was so necessary in battle. They were
not fit for the operations of a siege, and could only
be relied on for maintaining a strong position. The
cavalry was full of zeal, but not well instructed ;
and the artillery, though competent from their know-
ledge to support the ancient honour of that corps,
were without the means of being terri:,,le to the-
enemy. They had no magazines, and were often in
want of ammunition." Such was the account which
Col. Cabanes himself gave of the composition of that
army, ten weeks before the siege of Terragona. The
real state of the case was, that till infantry, from want
of discipline and subordination, were neither fit for
battle, nor to assist in the siege, and could only be em-
ployed among the mountains, or in very strong
positions. Unfortunately, however, it was in a flat
country, and to assist in a siege, that their co-opera-
tion was wanted. Their cavalry was so inconsider-
able in number, and so deficient in instruction, that,
whatever might be their zeal, they could • not be
reckoned as of any service. Their artillery (which
wanted the means of being terrible to' the enemy)
had not in fact a single field-piece. Atthombise bed
no written documents from General' Copons, as to'
the slate-of discipline of his corps, yet that Gomel
expressly informed him that they could not manoeuvre,
Ibut that if they were placed in a strong position their
courage might be depended on, He also added, that
unless he was so posted as to have a retreat to the
mountains, he would not put himself into line. This
precaution on the part of the Spanish General was
very reasonable, as in case of any disaster he could
have no other safe retreat but to the mountains.—
The consequence, however, of this would he, that
this corps must be always placed on the north of the
line, whether the ground was such as they were fit
to defend or not. General Whittingham's corps was
in a similar situation. ' At the battle of Castellar, he
was obliged to trust them wish the defence of what
might be considered as the key of our position, mere-
ly because it was strong ground, where Spanish
troops could best be depended on. By another do-
cument from Colonel Cabanes, dated the 11th Jerre,
it would appear that the real effective force of Gen.
Cepons' army amounted to 6031 men. Ile had al-
ways estimated it at about 6000. As to the obseri
(ions which he had found it necessary to make re-
specting the Spanish Miens, the state of a gal
Ltloni so long overrun by toitilt troomand

of its Government, was a st!ffic'Pnt anotogy
them, but it was no npolog) lor his Pro,ecutor

exaggernfittg thA numbor, quality, and efficiency.
those troops. Weak nod ineffi:lent, however,
the corps of General Copoos was, it could net :.110.
been kept togethertor more than two or three -da
longer.

The next point that he shoted come to, woul.l het,
consi(leration of thr, great improp►iet he would, ha,
committed, if he had followed the advice of Admit
Hallowell. In the course of his defence, he I;

more than once reminded the Court, that the t
great objects which he had in view' in remit kiting
long before Tarragona, were, Ist, to draw Suchet
far from Valencia as possible; and idly, to take ft,
chance of any favourable events putting him in pos.
session of Tarragona. By the night of the ItO
however, Suchet had advanced to that point, frok
which one day's march might hare brought him befort
our lines. His next duty then was the preservation
of the army ; and the preservation ( f it in all its ef,
ficiency. The Judge-Advocate seemed to cottsi.k
that the general instructions of the Duke of Wel.
lington, sa)in„a " that he would pardon every thing
except the saffering one of the corps of the army '
be defeated or dispersed," applied prhirlealty to t!
Commanders of other corps, end not to him. He
differed widely from that opinion; ..and considered
these directions to be more pointed to hini than '
any other General. As the AtiglOAirilinn army w:
I by far the most important 'of any carps ou the eau
of Spain, its defeat or dispi+sion would have pri
duced consequences much more fatal Clan any
dis-
aster that could happen to any other corps. Stieliet
might, in such a case, have detached 18 or t 0,030 men
to act upon the flank of the Duke of Wellington
when he was engaged in the siege of St. Sebastian
• and Pamplona; and such an operation might hay
destroyed the fruits of his Lordship's brilliant ' Tic-
. tories, and interrupted that career, on %%Well not.enlr
the fate of the Peninsula, but of Europe, &pendia.
In fact, the.army on the east of Spain could never. 14
considered as any thing but an army of diversion in
favour of the great operations of Lord W. If that army
!had run the risk of total defeat and destruction, that
I risk would have been run at the ex pence of the Duke
1.01. Welliegtou,and in defiance of his instructions. He
' had a right to calculate on the Anglo-Sicilian army
't for keeping Marshal Suchet in check, and preventing
it from acting against him. If, however, he had re-
! solved on giving a battle, whether that battle had
i been successful or not, the public would probably
have been silent. What would Lord Wellington,
however, have said, if, by the total defeat of his
army, Suchet gas left at liberty to detach a strong
force to act upon his Lordship's flank I If he had
resolved to give battle, he must have left at least
• 3000 Spanish troops to mask Tarragona ; and if the
remainder of his army had been beaten by the eine-
?my., what retreat would have been left him ? The
diffict ies of re-embarking an army exposed to the
i'attacks of a superior force, were well known to be
fir greater titan that -of an ordinary retreat. The
expedition to. Ostend was
,not yet. farget,,ner the
m circeetandes- or (he re-embarkation at Carmine.; •
although in thelatter case, our troops hod fought a
successful battle the day before, and had a castle to
protect •their embarkation.-- A retreat. 'rear.
the beach at Tarragona, under the fire. of that
forts, would be likely to be much more disastrous,
if :tali& in the presence of a superior enemy.—
if he had overlooked all those dangers, and the
uncertainty of the winds and waves, what advantage
could he have preposed to himself by. remaining
!longer ? Unless Suchet saw some advautagein mak- .
ing the. attack, he would never have given him an
' opportunity of engaging him.
It was certainly meant by Admiral Hallowell to

imply, that he ought to have staid longer before Tar.
regent ; he, however, trusted, that he would con-
vince the Court, that a further delay would have
been inexcusable. Information had been received on
the night of the 11th, that the French were at Vll-
iafraeca on the east, and at Perillo on the west.--
Those two places had already been proved to be only
two days' match front Tarragona. If he delayed
longer, the probable result would be, that the army
would have been engaged on the beach undery every
disadvantage. By delay, he would have lost the op-
portunity of sending off the cavalry and field artil-
lery to Balaguer, where they were safe. If he had
chosen, with 11,000 troops, composed as his army
was, to give battle to 20,000 of the best troops of
France, then, indeed, Suchet might have fulfilled
the boast of " driving the British Army into the
sea." The stake which he would have to hazard,
was the whole army committed to his command ;
and, if he could himself have any doubts how he
should act, he had nothing to do but to look at his
instructions. The safety of the Nita. of Welling..
ton's army, or, at least, of the operations in whirl'
it was engaged, depended in a great measure upon
the safety of. the Eastern army. It was true that

Decaen's army did retreat oii the night of the
.12th.. This was a circumstance, however, which he
could not calculate upon' or extant. nto could
appear more improbable, than that an army which
had arrived by forced marches to the point from
which iher4ould commence their attack, should re- '
treat illthrut any visible caose ? . Even now lip
tenki not'eoneeire any reason for this retreat, on.
lets it'itfas that General Denaew had received infer.
_elation: of Lord Exmouth's arltival in the Bay Of
'Roust The movements of New had beforeasp..
peered to be so connected wit& thiadvince or Se.,'
chet's corps from Valencia, that tk•anati:lnipiseak.
ble to have foreseen that he wog tilt have
fallen bark. . .
Ile vettetted-acmuch as any man read* do, the
loss of the cartilon and stores that were left behind.—
M to the trophies that were thus acquired by the
enemy, he mast, however, observe that they wet,
gales!! trophies. The loss of those guns could not .
.he said in any degree to cripple the army under his
notamsnd ; se out of 91. pieces of cannon, it was only
INLarricenble heavy guns, and one unserviceable,
that were left behind. If, however, in consequence '
of a battle, the enemy had captured many of our
pieces of field artillery, many standards, or thou..
sands of our troops, then indeed Alarslint SJehet
could have boasted of the trophies of 144 victory,
If many of the dead bodies of our soldiers', or slaugli.
tered horses, remained on the beach, then, indeed,.

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!lent na. would he have pointed them out in triumph as trn. ;
depriied Was of victory. Such an event would have brought
:
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