The Statesman.
London, England, 1810-02-22 00:00:00

ML

'ES OF EVIDENCE.

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TAKE* B ORR TII E COMMITTEE OF THE
WHOLE OHO% APPOINTED TO CONSIDER
Oh THE OLICY AND CON DUCT OF THE LATE
EXPEDITION TO TILE SCHELDT.

IItTIVITII DAY-t6l. 15.

REAR-ADMIRAL siR R. ETRACHAN CALLED IN
AND EXAMINED VT THE COMMITTEE.
I was seat fur about the 191 h of June to the Admiralty.
ben I sat, Lord Nlnl,trave, Sir Richard Bickerton' and Mr.
Wellesley Poly $ Fief *nape eturvenAtion: Cape:sin Plampin
Ii:6• sent for, and pion afterwards Lord Castlereagh came in.
After we had cnnsersed upon oho subject, particularly thou,
the landing at Sartslict. Lord Mulgrave promnsed to send for
Sir Home Popham. In the previous convermtinn, I ob-
served, that I thought there would he snoserlifficalties in get-
ting to the ulterior objects at the Expedition, ns there might
be greater difficulties in the navigation of the Scheldt than at
present appeared. When Sir Hume Popham CUM' in, he
was enmulted about a hnding at Simtvliet. I do not recol-
' lect any thing else particular.
What nag the nature of these difficulties ?-1I conceived,

that notwitts•tandinz the Government had remise to betiere
the enemy had very few 'rani» in Flanders ne in Holland.
that in a very short time, lime before we mild get to Ant-
werp to accomplish the object of the Eapedition, the plow:
latino of the country, and the troops in the diferent gartiebde•
would be collected ...palter in suet numbers that the retreats
of the army might be rut or if it passed above Antwerp; I
also thought it wint'll be accessary. to ennble the army to get
up to Antwerp, to take the forts of Lillo and Liefketo
shoeike; at the same time I believed the intelligenre that the
Goverumetit had teceived, that there were very few troops
in Flandersor in Holland ; but I could hnrdly believe it pm-
sible tin army could penetrate so far as Antwerp without
• briar es powd to lease their retreat cot oh; for in the time it
would take to destroy the basal arsenal:, and-to get at_ the
enemy's ship*, which I concluded would, to save t .basadves, i
• go above Antwerp, the away would have an oppeffseity
of collecting all his farce from the garrison towns in frame. 1
Flanders. and Holland; and at that time it was runtawited
there would be a cessatiiin of hostilities between France and
Austria; these were my principal doubts of the success €lO.l
the ulterior objects of the Expediting. a
Did you find Sir Mane Popham accurately acquainted
with the navigation of the Schel,h, fir were you obliged to-
sound as you advanced ?—Sir Home Popham bad a general •
• motion cur the Scheldt. but be dial not treaty know where
every shoal lay, nor the marks for avoiding those shoals; it
• was, therefore, neremary to have the difereotshosh pointed
out by buoys, at vessels stationed as buns.
Do you loam what part of,lle I putt was latendettai
act agalmt Ant werp ? A t the eanaterereactly my
'hire proportion ; bat it will appear.% the, orders that Went
glom and the nrmagernents that were made for use p
. of the army. that the division of it under 'Sir Eyre •
was intended for 11 Icheren ; the other part of the" -.
ander lAN !testily's- (and with that part I concluded
Chatham prepaseid to Igo), was intended for Antwerp,
as
would have Amite Joined by Lord lluntley's and Si, Jo
Hopes divisktes. •
Do you imagine that the force which you bare staled. to-
gether weds the proportion of artillery and artillery horses,
Could with safely have been conveyed up tbeWestern Scheldt
without waiittlibi to buoy the p image T—l have already gives
my 'Anion • 4bakkend, that, if every thing bad been fa.
yourable as t evatsallirst Imeadled for our entering the WIN.
era Scheldt, we should eerlalidy pave endeavoured topelsoreg
op without the delay ..f binyingthe Pular!) 1119411 "IID
qu•mce of air being under ebb necessity ur.gefegg ails.ltminepot for security. ow irta twilit blowii‘'wfither; the
Originnl title of the Espeditiao was directed to another.
Amami, which was the reason me took time to beny the
Western Scheldt. •
Waal length tif time do you think it would hays labia la
favourable weather to lye proceeded with that allaniut if
forte, from tfie mouth the Scheldt to Sant flirt /--1111111ak
in Iwo ne dirge days after they had passed Flualtioga Ihyllus
third day the whole might have been up.
Do yam thiok they could have passed with the winkle
the farte, including transports, both Waheherea mil Gill.
sand, 'idiom occupying either?—lt is itossible collate to.
pass. but I tbbik a very considerable loss, sed um/ acd-
tltts would hare happened. if such an MIMS SW Wm
made.
Do you think it would have been practicable with Maw
' parts ? It is practicable, under similar circumstances of vest
tins.
Would it not have requir:d considerable time to have di.-
embarked the troop., the heroes, and the artillery in the
wighboorlsood esf S *malice ? I think it would Out longer
than a disembarkation at any other place.
Whatlength of tine would it prehably have taken ?—I
think lir whole of the intoury, and the artillery belonging
to the Infantry, world have been Leaded in one day, and a
. treat part of the cavalry, if ma the trawler is ith regard to
the battering train. I cannot exactly state how lung it might
be, bat not more et two days.
Would the time pi Ate Air that disembarkation have de-
winch Spot; the slii of the weather and the surf ?
retitdhealit part of the river bolds, near Santvliet, the weather
would hare verb little river
etfered with us, but of course it
would have setsracd us a little; we may say about half a
day.
' •Do you know what number of men could disembark nt one
time from the whole of your Oret ?—I understood from Sir
Richari Kea% .0 ith whoa the arrangement for disembark-
ing the tromps was left, that lie could have landed between
ten and twelve 'toms and men ip the course of a few hours.
Were sou provided with the number of boats, eat-boats,
titc. mentimwd in the memo, andum, of the Admiralty, No. 1,
dated the 9th of June?—We had more (Lir boats than are
!mentioned in that paper. I recollect Mr. Pole shewiug me
this paper is the Secretary's rtmin at the Admiralty, and I
think. to the best of my recollection, I remarked that would
d. very well, supposing we had the whole together, and that
it would not do to put the troops in the gun-boats, although
some of the gun-boats might be made ase of for that_perpose.
Isoniider that the means which the Admiralty furnished
were must ample, and that nothing was wanting to forward i
the success of toe Expedition on the part of the Admiralty;}
if I had thought these had been any thin: Wanted, I sboold
have stated it, and I ant sure it would have beets complied
with immediately ; I believe all the flat bottomed boats in
the country went with the Expedition. and beAdm that, a
great number of rowing and sailing boats were hired at Deal,
and added to • the means of landing the troops, as well as
buns Mg tar passages of the Scheldt.
Did either Lord Castlereagh or Lard Mulgrave make any
observatinin upon the sentiinent you mule of the dilliculties
that would attend the magi...anon to Antwerp ?—I do not re-
eolleet that they did; I know that Lord-Mulerave was ex-
tremely 'Dalian about the Expedition, and upon my remark-
ing lit him that I thought all we should do would be taking
Wakheren, be said that the country would be very little sa-
tisfied with such an expeisive armament doing nothing more
than taking Waleberen; I remarked to his Lordship that I
was reedit' it woad turn out so, that for my part I knew
mithing of the navigation,. but that I would do my best to
accomplish all the objects of the Expedition, and that I
should be mody-so serve _under any °leer they bad more
emfidetice in than me; Lord Mulgrave observed, that be hid
the fullest confidence in me, nod that be had reason to think
we should do very well.
Did you understand that there was a ford found between
the island of South Beveland and the main land near Bergen-
op-Zoom ?—1 knew of that ford, it had been there many
years.
Was not the possessioa of Flushing considered in a patrol
and military polio of view, as of the greatest importance to
this country; ?—I thought no, and thlnk'so still.
What number of line-of-battle ships is the basia of Flush-
ing capable of containing ?—I believe twenty sail of large
s'iips might be mowed in the basin.
What depth of water was there in the basin at high water
and spring tides?— I cannot positively say, but I believe 11:1
• feet.
Ist') feet water, could 43 sail of the line, baying their Wei
and stores on board. and having two months provislune, go
out by the Scheldt in sue tide?—Nu, it would be
to lighten the ships to enable them to go out of lie biro
there is a bar at the entrance of the basin, therefore I believe.
the ships cammt go into the basin or come out of the basil
with their guns, for I know, in the manna of March or Aprils
when the enemy had reason to think it was Wooded by this.
Government to attack Walcheren, they hurried their ship,,
est without either their gum or stores, and Obey went up kir
Tensaw to take theieguns mad stores in, which wore mad ow
them le miters. The great advantage that the enc., AMC
derived from the book, was, that their ships could Ile 14:1:,
pity from the ice,sad being at the mouth of the river
could sealer go In scathes they would have beets able abbey i
Semi eat at Antwerp; sed.l have beard, that is
• of air wren yossessitm of Waltheren the's:lra:t:
obliged to make slijs fel their ships above Antwerp, Mai
(bey owlet clot" of the lids, so that it would be very dill-
oat. if mug improctlitabk,ffint the enemy to at oat a squadron
In the wieder.
Would it net be fiellifienely dasgerom to keep an Sitali,le
arei spies are seratity'e Oust, *About baying any port or ail_
..1.;..... • :..;...---

It STA'

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ler far oar. Isell mid* ltd lost it might be
morretry.
Wossia ma the_
_pnldeation of Fluebing have ready law"
that dangers—lres, with regard to the ships; bat the ri-
pener of keepino Flashing, sail the great low of men that
would atteed it. makes it a more advisable thing sot to keep
the i.laad of Watchmen.
What did you Cuosider as the jilt haste and most material'
object of the Eipettkiim?—l considered the destruction Ist
the enems's beet. and the etatrosing the dork-s arth and ars
serial at Aut weep, the great object of the Expedition, cams
pined it* the destruction of the d0i.4.-yard, basin, sad kits
. I
serial at Waleheren.
Did you consider the destruction of the docks and arsenals
at Antwerp a material object of the Expedition ?—1 did.
Do you know whether the last anchorage occupied by the
enemy's fleet was under the protection of the gum of the ci-
tadel at Antwerp ?—A part of the enemy's fleet lay aa the
sea face of Antwerp, and of course they were within the
• range of the guns of the citadel but I doubt if the enemy
bad any batteries organs mestere on the wharfs at Antwerp;
the enemy had Antwerp on their right, and the Tete de
Flandre on their left.
Had you rearm to he satisfied with the professional jag-
mew and resources of Sir Home Popham, while acting soder
your order in the Scheldt T—Mott fully so.
From your communications with Goveniment, did you sup-
pose titers to know w ;tether the Scheldt was navigable fee'
ships of the line above Aut weep or ?—ln conversations I
had with Lord Mulgrave and some of the Members of the
Board of Admiralty, I think they did not seem to under-
stated that ships of the line could go above Antwerp.
was always of opinion myself that they could, and it hassinte
tensed oat that they have game above Antwerp. nod that was
one of my reasons for thinking that we should find it a difil-
icult matter to destroy the estemy's fleet if they should go
above Antwerp, add our army not be able to pin possession
of that plater.. ,
At what time were you enabled to pet that part of your in-
structions into eseeution, to posh up a sufficient amount of
y'mr force above tire town of Flushiog, to preset* the escape
i of any vessels in Flashing, or the vielaity &hip the Scheldt?
—I 1110 k it was the 24 or 9d of August that a teasiderahle.
part of the flotilla girt into the West Scheidt; it was not ne-
cessary to posh any part of the larger ships mto the Scheldt,
in cos Rance with that part of my orders because the
enemy had no force at Fleshing that the gin-boats could not
intercept ; balked at that thee they had net eararmed vessel
• lathe mouth of the Scheldt. A part of the squadron would
have been ordered into the Sebeidt. if I bad not received in-
telligent* that the enemy's fleet had got above the hoes at
Lille; I therefeee did not consider it was proper to expose
thiships unnecessarily when iso Object could be obtained
by it.
-'llsen the Committee is to leritaptd, ame could, have
pushed a prepaid's', of your ffiart the Scheldt sootier, but
for the renegers, have glee*? ' se. certainly we might:
Theo the Committee is to onderstead there wits no part of
of your betdadwas in a situation to go up the &Arbil, no
. your lest of the Scheldt P—Theite was 'mit ; but
et was that Lord Gardner should have gone into the
Scheldt. as It hare wild before, after the batteries of Cadsand
were taken, anted orden were given to him, in conformity to
the orders I hod received from the Admiralty, upon the Idea
that the enam fleet 'lrk in a situation to be attacked by,
.out's; but w 1 llfototd that the teeny's fleet bad gone
again up the Scheldt., it did not appear to no of se much im-
portance plashing and eiskiag oar barge tips throw* the den-
gereas 'hoop at the entrance of that river, fad therefore I
countenauced L ad Gardner In rensehtiog al anchor in the
West Putt, that is, of West CaPpel, is by 'that means he
was in a siosation to assist Commodore Owen MO Ms boats,
in case we had found let necessary to land *ea Cadsand, or
to posh in through the Duertoe or Vfeilan passages, where
.tre_tould get pilots to take citeSge of the ships.
Did yea not write a letter on the 27thof August to the Ad-
miralty ?---Yes. I did.
Was that letter of a public or private store?—Any; let-
ter that I wrote fb the Secretary of the Admiralty (and that
letter I believe was published) was of a stabile imearta '
Did you ever express a come* that that letter was pub-
lished —When I wrote the letter, it was with as impres-
sion that the cisuntry would he very mach diswtis>fed that,
more was not done, and I thought et was due to myself and
the navy, to state to that branch of the government that I
was under (the Admiralty) that we were des to gar oe•' or.
that we had taken all tbe Iwasaki thOontawy M Anon; and
therefore I *rote this letter; I teetotal, idtisa,l.Wellte the
letter did not think it would bellishileived, but I was was
in thinking so; if I bad thought it freight bap been pato
listed, I should have hero more cantle* la wording it, that
it might sotconvey a reisetiou apse Lord Chatham or the
army. What I saw the 'Meer atteretanis in the paper. it
struck see pay-terribly that It ovoid be the meaaeof making
a breach %Nivea" the; two seevidet gad them of coarse I ex-.
pressed be* verjaaory IWM that I bad worded letter I.
that manner at tie atone tease rillierved.l9 Lend
and indeed to many' Officers of the army; that J mostxte -
written a similar letter. for it was only a statesseat of i ;
but I might have pet' it together in such itamorter as not le
be offensive, fir in the way it was worded,it Ripener* like
casting a reflection upon Lord Chatham and tar principal'
officers of the kroty, and Lam very glad to hileitithit .ppet-
lenity of exploandig !ix Ir, because l did sot Intalalle Mit
any reflection upon Lord Chatham; or the otiverior Olden of
the army, fur lam not a judge of military miters. At the
same time I could net help regretting, and I del at this mo-
ment regret most sincerely, that having been brought up as
we were to the point of attack upon the enemy, old haying
worked our people op to the highest pitch of entliusiasds, we
should have been under the necessity of retiring. Fro. what
happenal since, in consequence of the sickness of the
army, I am convinced that it was the wisest measure that
the Commander in Chief of the army could pursuer fur I
doubt very mach whether • his Lordship would have been
able to acco•nplish the fall of Antwerp.- considering the sea-
son of the year, the-very sickly state of the troops, and the
increasing force of the enemy; but as we'did not see much
force, I thought, and still do think, that we ought to have
attacked Lillo and Liefkeinhoeilc, which might leave open-
ed a field to some enterprise or other, and might have uren
the means 'of ear getting hold of the enemy's fleet ; and it
was with this impression I wrote my leuer.
Did you ever consult with the Commander in Chief of the
Army about attacking forts Lille and Lief kenshoeik, and
going forward ?-06 the thlt elf Asp*, Sir Home Popham
and nytelf weM to head-quarteav to sake with Lord Chat-
ham, sad at that time hi a Lordship did ore speak at. all as if
be had flushes about going on: at the saute (Imelda Lordship
tneatimied-thot the enemy were increasing in Aare. Sir
How Popham spoke a good deal in favour of the beach
fat bodies the okay on, and this was the gcoeval 'coeversit-
tikethat *Wed at that time. However, his Lordship pro -
tedoesniag to Bathe ou the following day, which was the
251*, hod there, in conversation with see' he first spoke of
retie*, aleodoning the increased force of the enemy, the ed-
vented lesson (and we had certainly very bad weather), and
the sickly state of the troops the army was -just then begin.
sing tobe sickly, and keseemed to hint to me, that be wish.
ed fee.esthe letter from me upon the subject. Accordingly,
lathe meet day I wrote ta his Lordship, and that letter ac-
mine to the Admiralty of the with of August, and
re the Committee :in that letter it will p)• r, that
pssposed an attack ,upoo LiUo and Lief kenshoya, with a
view of opening a field to farther enterprise; this was the
-only conservation or correspondence I had with his Lordship
oportahat subject;. I think that letter was timed the Both
Atwut.- - •
Locate the proposition of attacking Fort Lille had been
.ffilitihkedell. do you think the fleet might have gone up so as
Wiesare attacked Amwerp, or in what way, to have Likes
ion of the French lettl-.lf Lille and Lierkeasheeik
06.5 nc
ecit taken, the fleet would certainly have gone up; that
-is. the frigates and flatilla would. and probably some of the
line, and it would have reinaineitto be discovered whether
the works at Antwerp would prevent
.our passing Antwet p-
to attack the French Sect I thitei, to the best of my recol-,
lei-lion. by ;be time the French fleet aas brought down before
Antwerp, five sail of the line had heea up shove it. When ee
Conversed on the propriety of attacking Lilla and Lief ken- ,
shoeik, Sir It. Keats was in compaby with me, and most of
the Lieutena..i-Geuerals of the keen'. except Lord 'react
and Lord Ilmitley I then stated that I thought Lilt.— might
he attacked with a large preportiim to. Um army, and that a
small proportion of It might he landed on the boel side to
attack, Liefkenshoeik, and that I thought it ueeessary that the
army should occupy the Sykes on both banks of the river.
We bad a great deal of conversation otaibis subject, amid it
k was the opinion of the officers of the army then lament, that
we should have little prospect of suceeeding in the ulteekr
objects of the Expedition, esen if we succeeded u taking
Lillis and Lief henshoeik, and that rousidedug the state of
swap, It Would be injudicious to make the attempt bat I
Ind no *tube of our haven it in Aar power to pass the fri-
4istes Mid 'event! ships of the line, indeed we 'should have at.,
1
Mode if; up towards Antwerp, if Lillo and Lief ken(
IMaibeeu taken.
You %hl* there was no impediment by thehoma or chain
qbas wagged to have been laid across?—Yes, the beam and
abate was an impediment, hut U iniehtbave been forced.
' Wilkie what space of time, reckoning from the dity saw
milled frau; the Howie, do you thiuk Chet 20,0110 meta atoll,
',have bet* hustled at Siolvliet, reckoning for eireircetestances
'of wind, weather, shoals, and oppusithek Baia -OM y.,?
—With the wind asel'aeather lee had. led the isu/edt

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sly
•
we sort with, 'doubt it weal& bait bola *runt& 'slate. ;rrii%. -.4ffiaallit a ailaalgstribit was " 'Manta-
smile a pniper lauding ea Sasitvliet till the Oth tof 416 A • err lot rtamlik,
Argent, if so soon as that,
catty in getting the transports which had the heavy
because we &mad a great dill-
sests"ludteki *ewe Aram
tavevanytwieshiage4l....__74,---ak,ere.tt.
of the army, and provisiain and other stares, tiwoo.r:ThlaitiC eve', PithAtideT egthhareggi Yeas sod that ene"flaw
lion y weu with the skrs
Sion* Passage hen the West Scheldt, molter to *Wit Mina potter to „oda. dim mesa
obliged to pram through a waskway the Galen-aboal. & the wind „ad
ins
which was under the lire of Flushing: it was not till after the 4_Ser'eseburdrewerePartotieuberhiudi.ea unamtilaraspilled. bi eat that aame,hl7.......2stiets,
fall of flushing that the heavy ordnance and all the cavabal •
I gut thrmigla.ood, therefore.. if the army did land at Sant-
'Het. which it certainly might have dons before, it must have
gone without the artillery and Many stores circa-eery to a
siege. t beg leave to correct niyseif in my answer, that 1.1
do not wow to say we bad 10.000 men to land, because a great '
part of the army was employed in investing Flushing, there-
fore there was not that number of men to be landed, as well
as I can recollect.
la what seamier did you propose to Lord Chatham to at-
tack Fort Lillo ? —With regard to the 111:01ner of attacking
Fort Lille no the land side, I conid make no proposititua to
his Lordship with propriety, as it was a military operation;
bet 1 did say that the ships of war could attack the fort at
the same time that the army did.
What plan did you propose for the attacking of Lief ken-
shoeick ?—A similar one to that of attacking Lillo ' • we in-.
tended to have lightened'
ghtened two ships of the line, and placed
one against each of their forts, and with a thircLand fourth
ship to have attempted to force the boom, but it would have
been neressery to have a favourable wind for this purpose,
and the river is very winding about that part; but I did not
eider into this detail -before Lord Chatham, it was only a
matter of conversatine with the Sea Officers. I barely
tinned to his Lordship,-that if the army attacked the forts,
he should hare every naval assistance it was is my pewee to
ofer.
In the event of the ships not breaking the boom, was not
that boom so constructed as to bring the ship Immediately
under the battery of Liefkrialioeik ? -1 think it was, and I
think the undertaking would have been very hazardous.
In the ignorance of the width of the Scheldt, and with the
unctetninte whether it would have been sak to pass between
the etadel of Antw.lp and the Tete do Flaudre, would you, if
LI knishoelk and Lille had been taken, have still ventured
up the Seb ids with the English fleet ?-1 should have gone
as far up the Scheldt as the aruty could have gone to co-ope-
rate with us, and I should have taken uo more ships with
me that% was necessary; and if I discovered that it was not
practicable with any prospect of success to pass Antwerp and
the Tete de Flandre, I should have returned back again.
When you talk of the field for further enterprise that
Would have been opened by taking Lino and Lief keithoeik,
had you any other object en view than an attack on the ships
at Antwerp?—The capture or destruction of the enemy's
flotilla, and the ships that were below Antwerp, and to dis-
cover whether there was a probability of success in going fur-
ther on.
Can you form any judgment of the probable loss of the
army in its attack upon the two forts of Lillo and Lief ken-
shneik 1— I think both the army and navy must have lost
many Inca, as both services would have been very hatch ex-
posed.
Supposing the army to have suffered very much, which you
think probable, in its attack apon those forts, would it have
been in a condition to have reached along either bank of the
Scheidt, if the enemy land a considerable force in Antwerp
US oppose them ?—I think it would nut have been prudent to
have advanced if many men were lost, and the enemy were in
great force; but it is impossible to say whether many men
would have been lost or not, and it could have depended a
good deal upon the General whether he thought he should be
justified in running the risk of advancing along the dykes.
You have statedahat you would have approached Antwerp
with the ships, and that if you had found it necessary you
would have withdrawn them again; what is your (minim as
to the manner in which the army, which was to have accoins
pa 6.41 the fleet on both sides of the Scheldt. could have made
iV retreat, if the enemy had had a superior force at Ant-
warp 2—lt was epos the supposition that the enemy were in
rattle force, that I thought the army should not em-
barrels itself. by ening too far inland ; and that incase it was Pr
likelss to be assailed by a superior rune they could always - I)') v _
retreat from the dyke into the vessels ilia; would accompany
them up theriver, and the army could be furnished with am- " 0 she aatis Foos, .-
1 munition and provisions from the vessels going up the river;
if the General,. Conight it necessary to retreat. I should of
course lave given hinsoU the assistance that was necessary,
and fallen back with the army. J. H. a.,
•IS the event of forts Leif kenshoeik and Lillo being taken, J'lll°- C.
yes bsrro stated that it capcapnecessary for the army to take Daniel Rossiter.
poessidon of both sides of. the river before the fleet could ad- Thomas Macredie, tit.
vanes- to Antwerp; whei you gave that opinion, were you David W. Pearce, Ge
awarirthat the part of the army oethe left bnk would be Sidney Chapatis, Gent.
exposed to the whole force the enemy could collect in French One. M'Ss'uei Gent •
Fiapdess?—Yes, I was: and I coaclide that this was one of BARRACKa
the reasoas that Lurd (Asthma did out agree to second my •'har BaXat"'
fro
tadtiois. raritml.
Yea have spatial of taking or destroying the esseasy'sships
' of woe; supposing the enemy's ships of war to have gone up
abote Aotwerp, would it not have been a great ',Neel to de.
stray the doek-yard and the ships that were huildiow at
Antwerp?—Yes. certainty; It was part of our instructions
to do so, and we shouldhave attempted to do it if it had ap-
peared practicable when we came to the place.
If the army bad been able to tab: the town of Antwerp at
as early.petiod, do yuu know of any reason why the dacha
'yard and ships building there might not have been destroys*
without the assistance of tie Davy P—No, certainly, if the
army had taken wegs, the dock-yard and slipping fig& I
have been destroyed without the assisMactof the natty. _
Supposing the armyto have taken pessesion of Cadsandlakr
your opinion could the batteries of the island of. Walellarmi
have opposed any obstacles to vessels passing up or dotes the
Scheldt 2—No, they could not.
Whets you stated that they thought, in case of the army hay-
ipg possession of Antwerp, the ducks and arsenals anaht have
been destroyed, did you mean the possession of the citadel of
Antwerp 1-1 conceived that the army could notiJOituel4 Ant-
werp without having possession of the citadel. I believe the
citadel commands the dock-yard.
' Do you not consider the weather to have been extremely
unfavourable, particularly to the ulterior objects of the Ex-
pedition, from the time of your arrival of Walcherenl—l
certainly do.
Was it not more unfavourable than at that season of the
year might have been reasonably expected?—Most ear
tainly ; and from the bad weather we experienced in the be.
ginning of the Expedition the delay in proceeding up the
Scheidt arose.
Had it not been for the unfavourable state of the wealta*
' are von not of opinion that the operation upon Ca _dts*
would have succeeded P—l think it would.
What knoll of time would it have taken to have carried up'
the fleet to Santyllet, supposing Cadsand to have bees aillutos
and the wind reasonably fair?—lf Cadsand bad .betilultrilas
and that dividon of the Stet which was intarbalktalfm4
'gone up the Scheldt, bad not gone into the • It
might very shortly have got up to Santyliet ; think in oar'
days the wholearmament might have beentip, allowing the
wind and weather to be favourable. ,
Hod you any information of the number of the enemy's-
force at Cadsaud, at the time it was proposed to land there?
—No; when the Expedition was formed' Cadsand was not
a part oT it, but afterwards it was agreed that it wit neces-
sary to take.Cadsand, far tba pupae of passing up the
Sebeldt with more facility, and not to wait for the capture of
Fts:l4Z at first a regiment was thought Sufficient after that
li
was *semitone& millet last it Came to ailieisina of
theanny, then our squadron was increased in proportion; 1
do not believe that the Cove; ninent thought the enemy could
send any coatiderable force to Cadsand; I do not think so
myself, mid I thought that the force that was ordered for Out-
ten& both on the part of the army and eery, fully sufilcieat
far the purposa ; jest before the It %pedalo* sailed, it ta rock me
that there might be a Want of boats, and then I ordered the
division of Lord Gardner to place itself in. readiness to assist
with his boats to ensure the l utollrjg, and I considered at that
sink, and 1 row do consider; that t made the most ample
provision for that service, fur I could not conceive, with
the intelligence that e had, that the enemy could collect
such a force as to resist that tibial Was sent to Catiamd, and
therefore I aas much surprised w bra. we arrived in the Stone
Deep, to hear films Coutinodore Owen that the enemy were
in considerable force, and ns the weather was so very bad that
we were obliged to go into the Floompota frees the appre-
bemina that many of our transports would drive on shore,
mid that great part of our if not the whole, might be
sunk; after etuasiting with Lord Chatisatn, it wow agreed to
direct Commodore Gwen to map* his landing, and I be-
lieve there were-very few days, if thole orders bad not been
givce; that the commoddie mai Mire lataled the troops; if
be had nut bad those orders, and had succeeded illiandse4 the
tamps and destroyiog the bait ries upon Cadsand, we Aland
still leave found a daticulty an getting the transports out of (he
East Scheldt into the West Scheldt; ins seesaw Of the wind
blow jug in, and geuerialy,blowiesevemfresli-
' Supposing the fleet to have pencil op the Scheldt, -
case of failure, re hare been Staid to cetera, could
dose so without n shift of wind 2-allo, it could' -
base tided it dwelt-
LORD GARDNER'S E'
Thb related to the refieisition for
*he goodness to state to it Committee yoar
whether it would ve been posdble,
"he alai .aat. ataubce, la jag sfr-

OLD DiILEY, FEB. V.

gsrw
convicted to,
and other articles The Sessioa commenced this day, before
Woon and Mr. Justi
property of George
William lienicy was capitally
stealing aapcpuaareti, nt.haeistic)La
Uudy
son. The Prosecutor and Prisoner were serroci„
it a livery stable, and the property wasscalpitoni the bed-chamber of the former.
Thomas Passmore was capitally indicted tot
feloniously breaking and entering the doellini
house of William Winter, in .the parish of Mar;
'la-Boone, in the day time, and stealing there'll':silver watch, and bank-notes to the aluouot
X. 17, the property of William Williams.
It appears that the Prisoner was einployed
labourer in the vault of the house of Mr. %inn
in Cumberland-street, Portmais-square. The pry:
secutor was entrusted with the care of the ho
whale it was undergoing repair; upon the 16thoi
January the Prosecutor went oat, after twin,
locked the door of the garret where he slept.
on. his return, hu. perceived that the dour w"ii
broken open, as also was his box, and tit
property specified in the indictment stoles,.,
The Prisoner . was at this time absent f,
work, but. returned neat morning, and wan
eight days after apprehended by a Row.,strld
Officer, at the instance of the Prosecutor.
Mr. Winter said, that he went, on the 16th
January, to his house, to inspect the conduct
his workmen, and, met the Prisoner walkiaiden‘
stairs from thegarret, with much confusion in
appearance ; his work being confined to the
he could not possibly havo any occasion la. 41'
the top of the house. The Prisoner had
ously asked the Prosecutor fur the loam eta
note, and stated, that his wife WKS in much
tress for money to pay a bill.
- A tailor was • then called, who said, that alai
days after the robbery, the prisoner beughtamay
two waistcoats, and breeches, and other Artie*
for which he paid him with a five pound note;
also wanted gold for a twenty pound note.
The Prisoner was convicted of Larceny. •
From the LONDON GAZETTE, Fas. to.

MILITARY PROMOTIONS.
War-Of fire, Fob. 20, 1810.•
BREVET.
Captain John Campbell, of the 78th Foot, to be Bajallk
Army.
HOSPITAL STAFF.
To be Hospital-Mater for General Serrke,
J. H. Ludlow, Gent.
John. C. Yeoman, Gent.
Daniel Romiter,
Thomas Macredie, Gent.
David W. R. Nam, Gent.
Sidney Choppln, Gent.
Giles M‘Baine, Gent.
BARRACKS.
Charles Baynton. Gent. to be a BarrittkvYaster is Cent
Britain, vice William Cnrbyo, promoted.
' • the King's Germain Legion.
7th Battalion of the Lige, Hospital-Mats William Sudan
be Atabtant-Surgeon„ vice Suffers. who retiree,
blcsionanuust.
The Appointment of Lieutenant Twits*, Stqemie to he
Captain oe,n Company, by purchase, iiithe `.%h Font, siee
Curry, as stated in the Gazette of the 13th Febrazry,lBUS,
has out taken place. •
'1 he undermentioned 01Seen are superseded, being &bat
without leave, viz. •
Lieutenant Laroche, of the lath Light Dragoons.
Captain Muller, of the Skilian Regiment.

BIRTHS
Oa Thursday lastpatlieigate, Lady Geo►gina Barnes its
- •
00 Sunday Marningt tie 1 lth testis*, at Hemsted, in Kw,
Lady Darley, widow delve late Sir Wm. Darfty, am

MARRIED. -
Saturday, at Afll Priors,. Langley St. Albyn, Esq. sf Al.
faxton, t • Mint Caxton, only daughter of the Res. L.
' Lurton Minister of tin; parish and Taunton St. James.
The Duke of Orleans to the Princess t Amelia, weld
daughter of the King and Queen of Naples nod Sicily.
DIED.
On the 20th Inst. In Rand-street, Master Edward INtil
Marten, second son of G. S. Marten, Esq. of Sank*
Lodge, Hens, aged eight.
Friday morning last, Mrs. Peacock, wife of Mr. Pamir
Salisbury-Nuare Fleet-street •
Lately, at Da;ttan-house. Scotland, in the 74th vearofkk
tyre, the Rev. Henry Grieve, senior Minister- of the Old
Church of Edinburgh.
Ou Tuesday, at St. Martin's states-house the celebrated
and well-known character, Sir Harry Diinsdale, many wan
representative for the ancient 'borough of Garrett.

A PROOF of the EFFICACY' of that 'most excelled

_ ---- -- - ---- _ _
' • MUICINE
THE CORDIAL BALM, OF QUITO, '
Which is an infallible Ctire for all Nervous Disorder.
To Mr. WITHERS, Chemist, Stroud, London. '
SIR—My Wife was afflicted with a severe Nets
roes Fever, attended with ; violentbeating of the heart,
lownewaf spirits, and a dreadful sick head-ache, which tr.
doced her so Latch that she became unable to speak or walk
for several weeks, and would frequently Lunt, and rem:tisk
that state fora emisislentisle times together with a sear
II the neck ; all of which gave way to the CORD
BALM OF QUITO. "Miring her illness, I had the advice
and attendance of several Medical Men, who, after tryirg
every means in their power, gave beg over as iottwabe, sr.
T expected every hour would have been her last, when s hr- •
tonately saw your B elm ofQuito advertised in the tilago
Courier d
s and as the last resource, I resolved that lima
make a trial of it, and. therefore bought e. same
lot.
Messrs. Rutter and Co. and gave it &ceased's( to the
time, and, astonishing to relate, before she had takes Ihr
whole of the luittle, I Rerceived a wonderful champ OW lt
better and hy. Irer tektite three more bottles, two sell 10°
one la:If-guinea Roes, she recoserel her speech aid wattle
to gee whom; as wool 0 and I have no doe* but that lifile
more bottles will restore her to her former state of brill,
You are at liberty So publish this letter for the boa 4
others ; and any Sir, year obliged bitable servant,
MURDOCK. M•DONALD.
Glasgow, March 30, 1808.
P. S. Farther partieolats day be twirls by applicatios to
Mtn. Baxter and Cu. Glasgow. -
WITH ERS's CORDIAL. BALM OF QUITO, iiiiiitil
is a most cooreniet.t, safe, and infallible Remedy for Nerma. •
Bilious, Gouty, and Itheum,itic Disorders, and every hint of
Debility or Itelaration in Persuto, of Other 4ex, MN 6(
old, whether hereditary, natural; or occasioned by a red-
deuce in hot or nohealthyelimistes, the immoderate use elan;
spirituous liquors, or other potions fluids, teosralcatary al*.
or too chive an application to study, eicesisivegrief; loilliki,
hint • tater( vy, dissipation, .-* - lollir.`.'
head:;

I
11
•I
I
;

awed en the seheidt, and in ihm adin rat 00 0 macury, unipation, excess, imp or
to 'retain, could it have practicer, fainting dui 'intent incadlnenv, cold
--Nu, it could' not—it must lonqlS invcatt wisstilw,, trembling or *linking of haft g
ham sbortotss of breatb, tonsonsptive
• -
andivohl hy W. Wittier., Chemist, 1019;
E. V I DAN CE. kr". maw bit au aaspeawbicyadicine yeidsit fie.
r for lubma so 'laud. &Mips on 2:ltd. "I. pee woe. .
11psi Commence yosir
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1111181ilice, p• Joie matiusea ••lisansiodaaVitsicar.gi,