The Liverpool Standard and General Commercial Advertiser.
Liverpool, Merseyside, England, 1843-02-10 00:00:00

GENERALS NOTT AND POLLOCK

(From the Bombay Monthly Times for December.)
A discussion has of late been going on in Calcutta as to the
relative merits of Generals Nott and Pollock. The subject
appears to furnish so few grounds for controversy that it dis-
plays considerable ingenuity to discover what are the points
on which any comparison whatever betwixt the two can be
instituted. The simplest mode, perhaps, of coming to any,
definite or intelligible conclusion, is to take a short review of
the actions in which the two commanders have been more
immediately engaged, endeavouring, by this means, to de-
termine the merits of each. From the time of the commence-
ment of the insurrection. in November, till the final retire-
ment of our troops, there are only four actions in which
General Nott appears to have commanded—that of the 12th
January, where each side numbered 5,000 men, we having
the ark ;.ntage of 16 guns, the enemy having none ; the series
of skirmishes betwixt the 6th and 13th March, where num-
bers were once more equal, and about the same as those
above stated, but where the Afghans out-generalled us, got
into our rear, and nearly succeeded in burning our canton-
ments ; and those of the 29th August and 9th September,
where Shumsooden, with 12,000 irregulars, was beaten by a
British force of 7,000, with 18 guns. To proceed in detail,
however. The first opportunity on which General Nott had
occasion to act after the insurrection of November, 1841, was
that of the 12th January, when Mahommed Atta, the insur-
gent chief, and Prince Sufter Jung, moved down the Urgun-
dah valley in the direction of Candahar, with an army of
about 5,000 men. General Nott's force at this time con-
sisted of 7.200 men, with 18 pieces of artillery. Leaving a
sufficient force to defend the city, he marched out to meet
them with 51 regiments of infantry, 16 guns ,and 1,000 horse,
a force probably about equal to that of the enemy. Having
drawn up his men in proper order in front of them—an
operation which seems to have occupied some couple of hours
—he at length opened fire ; it is needless to add that before
such a battery, the wild and irregular troops of Affghanistan
broke and fled. 150 were found dead upon the field, and
about 200 more were reported to have been wounded. With
1,000 horse and 16 pieces of ordnance on the field, no attempt
whatever appears to have been made to take the enemy in
flank or rear, or cut off his retreat. Her Majesty's 40th and
the Bengal 39th were so galled by the matchlock fire, before
the veteran general got them "in order duly set," that they
are said to have broken their ranks and rushed upon the Aff-
ghans. Surely there was nothing in this " victory," which
the Europeans of the force with a couple of guns could
readily have effected, calling for our special commendation.
It is not very marvellous that 5,000 British troops, with 16
guns, should beat a similar number of Affghan irregulars
without any guns at all. The next affair of which we read in
the despatches is that of the 6th of March. The general once
more moved out with a force of about 5,000 men and four
pieces of artillery, to attack the enemy, who approached Can-
dahar about 6,000 strong. He appears to have suffered him-
self to have been decoyed by them 30 or 40 miles from the
city ; when, leaving 2,000 of their troops to keep him in occu-
pation, the remainder got into his rear, and made a dash
upon his quarters. They succeeded in setting fire to the
Herat gate; and, had their fortunes been as.much better as
their generalship was more skilful than ours, they would to
a certainty have succeeded in destroying our ammunition and
commissariat stores, compelling us to fall back upon Quettah,
150 miles in our rear. From 600 to 1,000 men are said to
have fallen on this occasion in the attack upon the city. Nott
had then less than half the requisite number of baggage cat-
tle. Over a part of the 150 miles he would have had to tra-
verse, the snow lay thick, and the whole country was bleak
and barren. It was his luck, not his skill, that saved his
army from a fate a few shades less disastrous only than that
of Cabool. It was during the seven days' absence, from the
into
use to the 13th of March, that General Nott brought
use the village-burning system, afterwards so highly pa-
tronised as a noble innovation in the art of civilised war !
We pass over Col. Wymer's affair of the 10th of April,—it
appears to have been a brilliant one : with 1,500 men under
his command, he left 300 of the enemy dead upon the field ;
but this was none of the general's doings. By much the most
spirited and triumphant fight in which the Candahar force ap-
pears to have been engaged was that of the 29th of. May.
The enemy were about 6,000 strong, and we had about 3,000
in the field, with a park, however, of 12 guns. The Aff-
ghans were not only beaten and dispersed, but pursued to
their camp, with a loss of upwards of 400 men. In this,
Col. Stacey appears to have had all the merit : when the
fight was brought on, he was sent out to reconnoitre. Gen.
Nott does not appear to have been in the field. The desul-
tory, village-burning, orchard-destroying expedition which
concluded the campaign, appears also to have been well-ma-
naged; but the arrangement of the troops sent out for duty
on this occasion was all the share the general possessed in it.
We now come to the preparations for the advance on Ghuz-
nee. It was of such sovereign importance that General Nott
should keep open a line of forts in his rear connecting him
with Quetta, in case of accident, that we should have no
hesitation in affirming that Kelat-i-Ghilzie ought, from its
position and strength, to have been re-occupied and main-
tained by, say 1,000 men, notwithstanding its previous aban-
donment. This could, however, most readily have been
accomplished-7,000, the force which moved on Ghuznie
was in fact superfluously strong for the work to be per-
formed,
and troublesomely numerous for the state of the
commissariat. In this case he would have had Quetta as the
base of operations, connected by Killa Abdoolla, Candahar
hna tve ohfeethheih enemy's
the
most and Kelat7i-Gbilzie, along the route of the main army, main-
tang
country,
perfectnt ry, and
condition w e re
to
oh
maintaintroo ps
taming a line of no less than 230 miles running right into
wthoeuldee re
themselves till the approach of winter made it convenient to
retire. They would have proved a check to all annoyance
from the rear, and kept that part of the country quiet • and
as the distance from Ghuznee round by Quetta, and across
the country by Dejerat to Jellalabad is less than' 100 miles,
and may be traversed in eight or ten days, instead of Gen., Pollock being kept entirely in the dark as to the nature of
their progress and operations, the most perfect concert might
have been maintained betwixt the armies. Kelat-i-Ghirzie
is 320 miles, or little more than a month's march from
Dadur : so that, so soon as it was ascertained that the ar-
mies had met at Cabool on the 17th September, the forts
_.ave been abandoned in succession, and successive de-
.cnments falling back upon each other, and all been in
Scinde in the month of November. The abandonment of
all these forts, leaving the advancing force in a state of utter
issoration, seems one of the most inexplicable and censurable
measures with which even the Affghan war has supplied us.
'Jr] the 30th of August our army met with the troops of
3humsooden, mustering about 12,000 strong, with a couple
,f field pieces. A battle ensued—we, of course, were victo-
ions. General Nott, on this occasion, employed but one-
alf his force. Why he reserved the other half is not ex.
lained : an hour more of day-light would have enabled

lie merely

him to have destroyed their infantry ;" as it Iv, ,
drove them off the field so little affected by defeat, that they
were able to meet him on his way to Cabool, ten days after-
wards, in similar strength as before; on this occasion, again,
he was merAy able to clear the heights, and push thorn out
of his way, without the slightest manifestation of general-
ship. The preparations for the assault on Ghuznee appear
to have been very judiciously managed, though not called
into use; but these seem to have been attributable to Major
Sanders and the engineer and artillery officers alone. We
know little of the share General Nott had in the arrange-
ments for descending the pass. The correspondents of the
time spoke very generally of the contempt with which the
Candahar army regarded the crowning of the heights, and
other essential precautions so ably carried out in the ad-
vance; and if it be so that such were their views, they were
any thing but creditable to them. There has since then so
much acerbity, and consequently uncertainty, crept into the
communications of the writers of the different forces, that
we shall not pursue our examination further than Cabool.
We see no reason to doubt that the whole of the retiring
army conducted themselves like British soldiers, and we can
say no more

We have confined our observations to the
military character of General Nott, whom we believe to be a
brave man, who would lead a regiment as gallantly into the
fight as any one, without the fear of personal consequences,
but who would always like to see at least twice as many
troops around him as there was any real occasion for. This
is the sort of person who is called a " safe officer"—he is un-
ilkely to lose a battle, because he will never fight where there
is any chance of success for the enemy, but he is incapable
of discharging the proper duties of a general. His despatches
indicate an intellect of the narrowest calibre. Ho had under
him as fine and well-appointed a force as ever took the field
—who, when on separate duty, as under Brigadiers Wymer
and Stacey, always distinguished themselves ; and who only
failed to do so under General Nott because they were never
furnished with opportunities. This last is the only point on
which they have reason to complain of their unhappy fate.

THE MURDER OF LIEUT•COLONEL STODDART

AND CAPT. CONOLLY, IN BOKHARA

The fate of that distinguished officer, Lieutenant-Colonel
Stoddart, distinguished alike for his talent, character, and
enterprise,—massacred in the meridian of life by the mandate
of an Asiatic despot, has excited a very general interest to
become acquainted with the circumstances of his original de-
tention, his long captivity, the varied forms of insult and
cruelty to which he was exposed, and the c-use of the last act
of the bloody tragedy which closed his existence.
It is of especial importance to the memory of Colonel
Stoddart that some reports, which have originated without
the slightest foundation, and been circulated without inquiry,
should be contradicted—namely, that after his duties as
military secretary to Mr. Ellis, our ambassador at the court
of Teheran, were terminated, Colonel Stoddart remained in
Persia on his own account, and without any official authority
from the British government, and afterwards proceeded
simply as a traveller to Bokhara, the capital of Asiatic
Tartary. We are enabled to furnish from authentic sources
the following facts :—Upon the return of Mr. Ellis, Colonel
Stoddart remained attached to the mission in Persia under
Sir J. M'Niell. Those conversant with eastern affairs will
remember the activity and efficiency of Colonel Stoddart's
services in inducing the Shah of Persia to raise the siege of
Herat in 1838. From Herat he was despatched by orders
from government on a friendly mission to the Ameer of
Bokhara. For a few days after his arrival in Bokhara he
was treated with a show of hospitality. At this period many
false rumours prevailed in Toorkestan respecting the designs
of the English in marching an army to Affghanistan, and
probably occasioned the object of his visit to be suspected.
Colonel Stoddart was treacherously seized in his host's house,
with his attendants, stripped and thrown into a pit, where he
was left for two days witnout food ; from thence he was taken
and strictly imprisoned for nearly two years, during which
time, but for the kindness of the Meershub, a police-master,
and one Futoollah Beg, the gaoler, who took compassion on
him, he would have perished from starvation. After months
of imprisonment the state executioner was sent to put him to
death, unless he would become a Mahomedan, and his grave
was dug before his eyes, but he evinced no fear, and ap-
peared to have calmly resigned all thoughts of life, when the
Meershub and Futoollah Beg, the kind gaoler, most earnestly
besought him to avert so foul a murder by repeating the form
required by the Ameer, saying, " It is well known to all that
your faith will remain unchanged," and on their solicitations
the disguise was adopted. On the arrival of despatches from
the Indian government the Ameer was convinced of the
authenticity of Colonel Stoddart's commission, and releasing
him from prison treated him with the highest consideration
during eight or ten months, making repeated promises alas!
but delusive ones, of release. During the time of his libera-
tion from restraint, Colonel Stoddart laboured most de-
votedly to promote the interests of his country and the
enlightenment of the barbarians. At one period the inter-
vention of Russia in behalf of his liberation was declined,
from a chivalrous feeling of honour that he should await
despatches from his own country, but the arrival of applica-
tions for his release, both from our government in England
and India, as well as others from Russia, Constantinople,
Khiva, and other neighbouring states, were. equally disre-
garded, nor were the hopes which were entertained in
consequence of her Majesty addressing a letter to the Ameer
destined to be realised.

In consequence of the intelligence which reached Bokhara
of the disasters which had befallen our troops in Cabool, the
tyrant threw Colonel Stoddart a second time, together with
Captain Conolly, an English officer recently arrived at Bok-
hara, into confinement. in the house of Topshee Bashee,
where they remained until June. At that period a letter ar-
rived from Akhbar Khan and other chiefs at Cabool, inti-
mating that if the Bokhara chief feared to put the two English
officers to death, as they had done those at Cabool, he had
better deliver them up to the writers of the letter. Thus
stimulated, the Ameer no longer hesitated. On the 13th of
June, 1842, both the officers were seized and removed to the
common prison. In stripping Colonel Stoddart, a pencil
and some papers were discovered round his waist : the Ameer
insisted upon knowing from whom they were received. Upon
Colonel Stoddart's resolutely refusing to betray another to
the despot's fury, he was beaten with heavy sticks, and this
treatment repeated for two or three days. but in vain no re-
velation escaped him. On the 17th of June the Ameer gave
orders that Colonel Stoddart should be put to death in the
presence of Captain Conolly. They were both led into a
small square near tee prison, where Colonel Stoddart's head
was cut off, and on Captain Conolly refusing to embrace
Mahomedanism, he also fell under the headsman's knife.
Their bodies were buried on the spot, in the graves which
had been dug in their presence.

From ColOnel Stoddart's earliest career to the time of his
death, whether pursuing his studies at the Royal Military
College, as an officer in the royal staff corps, in which he ob-
tained his eommission in 1823, and served in New South
Wales and Canada in his post as secretary to the Naval and
Military Museurri, secretary to the Institution of Civil En-
gineers, or as a member of the mission in Persia, it is not
too much to assert that he gained general esteem. He was
indefatigable in the pursuit of general and professional know-
ledge, and was present within the French lines at the siege of
Antwerp. Deeply devout in his principles and conduct, un-
shaken under his severe trials, and even acknowledgmg in
them a spiritual blessing, after a short but eventful career his
arduous duties are closed at the age of 36, beloved and
mourned, not only by his relations, but by a large circle of
friends, as a sincere christian, and a soldier devoted to his
sovereign and country.