The Liverpool Standard and General Commercial Advertiser.
Liverpool, Merseyside, England, 1833-02-01 00:00:00

THE LONDON PRESS.

STRAY; THOUGHTS ON TILE BALLOT..

IF the ballot would secure secrecy, it would• take. away
Ike responsibility of electors, and stifle public opinion.
If it would not secure secrecy, its great protective object
would be unattained.

{n every county, city, and borough, there.will be found,
under all conceivable circumstances, a number of electors
who will state openly to whom they give their votes.
Personal intrepidity, public interests, and private feelings,
will always ensure publicity to a certain extent. In
eourse of time, the electors who avow their opinions
would come to be considered the independent class ; and
those who vote in secret would loss their moral influence
with the rest of the community y by degrees, the system
woldvin tipwa.,z,-Ihe likely to wear itself out, but not
without engendering suspicion, distrust, and feud.
Local influence, in many places, is so clearly ascertain-
ed, that the numerical strength of a candidate or a family
can be counted with accuracy. That strength we will
suppose sufficient to constitute a positive majority to
carry the election. If, under the vote by
.ballot, the can-
didate who heretofore wielded that numerical power were
throvvn out, he must see that he is thrown out by the fall-
ling off of a portion of those who are within the reach of
his personal control. Taking it, for granted that lie can-
not distinguish those who voted against him from those
who voted for him,'but that he is still determined to as-
sert his improper claim over their consciences, what is to
prevent him from depriving them all of their tenements,
and so punishing friends and enemies alike for the sake
of maintaining the family principle? We are told at
once that he could not do this—that, however he might
act towards a part, he could not treat the whole with such
dangerous despotism. But if that be the case, as no doubt
it, is, why may not the whole unite now publicly with as
much efficacy as they could combine secretly under the
ballot ? If the landlord cannot contend with the whole
when leagued in private against him, can he contend
more effectually with the whole when it is sustained by
public opinion ?
That the Duke of Newcastle has no right to do what
belikes with his own is an established fact. The advo-
cite for the ballot is the very man of all the world to prove
it to demonstration. But let us apply the same principle
to electoral rights, and see how it will work. Has the
elector a right to do what he likes with his vote ? Just
as much right as the Duke of Newcastle has to do what
he likes with his property. The vote and the property
are equally held in trust, and the elector has no more
right.to do what he likes with his vote than the Duke has
to burn his house, or do any other thing tending to out-
rage the good of the community at large. They are both
responsible for the discharge of their trust; but take
away the responsibility, which would be effectually done
by the ballot in the case of the elector, and there is no se-
curity for the public interests involved in the execution
of the trust. _ _

Would not the ballot, if it succeed in the working as
its friends anticipate, give the preponderance at all popu-
lar elections to numbers over property and talent? We
think it very plain that such would be one of its effects.
:Would
.snch preponderance be adapted to our scheme of
rnm goveent, which is of a mixed mode, and _endeavours
to adjust the fair proportions of property, talent, and
numbers ? If numbers carried all we ought to have a de-
mocracy at once. If the three denominations of power
are to have a share, and, as nearly as, possible, an equal
stiare, is not the ballot inconsistent in its application, and
ealCulatedto Work an alteration, not in the purity of the
legislature, but in its form.? We apprehend, that the far-
ther the inquiry is pursued, the more reason we shall find
for believing that the ballot is really not so well calculated
toimprove the constitution as it is, as to substitute a dif-
ferent constitution in its place. The advantages of a new
system remain for after-discussion; but it is right it
should be seen that such consequences would be likely to
lbw ultimately from the adoption of secret voting.—