Star.
London, England, 1815-05-29 00:00:00

establishment on the throne sulfite to constitute tbis

legal title. • •
The question for the powers to examine may be
stated as follows : Can the consent, reel or factitious,
explicit or tacit, of the French nation, to the re-es.l
tablishment of Bonaparte's power, operate a legal
change in the position of the latter, in regard to fo-
reign powers, and form a title obligatory on these
powers ?
The Committee are of opinion that such cannot by
any means be the effect of such consent: and the
following are their reasons :
The Powers know too well the principles which
ought to guide them in their relations with an inde-
pendent country, to attempt (as it is endeavoured to
accuse them) “ to impose upon it laws, to interfere
in its internal affairs, to presciibe to it a form of go-
vernment, to give it masters according to the interests
or passions of its neighbours. (1) But they also
know that the liberty of a nation to change its sys-
tem of government must have its just limits, and
that if foreign Powers have not the right to preurik
to it the exercise which it shall make of that liberty,
they have at least indubitably the right of trots:ling
against 'the abuse which it may make of it at their
expence. Impressed with this principle, the Powers
do not deem themselves authorised to impose a go-
vernment on France ; but they will never renounce
the right of preventing the establishment in France
of a focus of disorders and of subversions to other
States, under the title of a Government. They will
respect the liberty of France in every way in which
it shall not be incompatible with their own security
and the general tranquillity of Europe.
In the existing Case, the right of the Allied Sove-
reigns to interfere in the question of the internal go-
vernment of France is the more incontestable, inas-
much as the abolition of the power which now claims
to be re-established there, was the fundamental con-
dition of a treaty of peace, on which rested all the le.
lations which, op to the return of Bonaparte to Paris,
subsisted between France and the rest of Europe.—
On the day of their entrance into Paris, the Sove-
reigns declared that they would never treat of peace
with Bonaparte (2). This dedication, loudly ap-
plauded by France and by Europe, produced the ab-
dication of Napoleon, and the convention of the 11th
of April ; it formed the principal basis of the neko.
ciation ; it was explicitly pronounced in the preamble
of the treaty of Paris. The French nation, even sup-
posing it perfectly free and united, cannot with.
draw itself from this fundamental condition, without
abrogating the Treaty of Paris and all its existing re•
lations with the European system. The allied powers,
on the other hand, by insisting on this very condition,
only exercise a right which it is impossible to contest
to them, unless it be maintained that the most sacred
compacts can be perverted, as suits the convenience
of either of the contracting parties.
It hence folloWs that the will of the people of
France is by no niearis sufficient to re-establish, in a
legal sense, a Government proscribed by solemn en.
gagements, which that very people entered into with
all the Powers of Europe ; and that they cannot, un-,
der any pretext, give validity as against these powers
to the right of recalling to the throne him whose ex.
elusion was a condition preliminary to every pacific
arrangement with France t the wish of the Ftench
people, even if it were fully ascertained, would not be
the less null and of no effect in regard to Europe to-
wards reestablishing a power, against which all Eu-
rope has been in a state `of permanent protest from
the 31st of March, 1814, up to the 13th of March,
1815 ; and in this view the position of Bonaparte is
precisely at this day what it was at the last-mentioned
periods.

SECOND QUESTION.

Should the ?Fr to 'sanction the Treaty of Paris change the
disposition of the Power; ?
France has had no reason to complain of the
Treaty of Paris. This Treaty reconciled France with
Europe; it satisfied all her true interests, secured all
her real advantages, all the elements of prosperity and
glory, which a people called to one of the first places
in the European system could reasonably desire, and
only took from her that which was to her, under the
deceitful exterior of great national eclat, aft inexhaus-
tible source of sufferings, of ruin, and of misery. This
Treaty was even an immense benefit for a country,
reduced by the madness of its chief to the most disas
trous situation. (8)
The Allied Powers would have betrayed their in.
terests and their duties, if, as the price of so much
moderation and generosity, they had not, on signing
the Treaty, obtained some solid advantage but the'
sole object of their ambition was the peace of Europe
and the happiness of France. Never, in treating with
Bonaparte, would they have consented to the condi-
tions 'Which, they granted to a GovernMenr,
a while offering to Europe a pledge of security and
stability, relieved them from requiring from France
the.guarantees which they had demanded under its
former Government" (4). This clause is insepara-
ble from the Treaty of Paris ; 'to abolish it, is to
brook this Treaty. The fornial consent of the French
nation to the return of Bonaparte to the throne would
be equivalent to a declaration of war against Europe :
for the state of peace did not exist between Europe
and France, except by the Treaty of Paris, and the
Treaty of Paris is incompatible with the power of
Bonaparte.
If this reasoning had need of further support, it
might be found in the very offer of Bonaparte to ra-
tify the Treaty of Paris. This Treaty had been
scrupulously observed and executed : the transac-
tions of the Congress of Vienna were only its supple-
ments and developements ; and without the new at-
tempt of Bonaparte, it would have been for a long
series of yeks one of the bases of the public right of
Europe but this order of things has given place to
a new revolution ; and the agents of this revolution,
although they proclaim incessantly " that (5) nothing
has been changed," conceive and feel themselves that
all is changed ground them. The question is no
longer the maintenance of the Treaty of Paris, but
(1) -it is this that Bonsparte's Council of State express them •
selves in their geport on the intentions of the rowers.—See Mo•
faker of the isth of April.
(2) Declaration of the 31st of biTarch, left.
(3) The Emperor, cenv;tic.d of the critkal situation lo which
he I his placcel France, and of the impossibility of savlno it him-
self, appeared to resign !dowel( and consent to an entire and un-
conditional abdkat uu. latter of Marshal Nei to the rrittgie of
Renevent.
(4) Preamble of the Treaty of
(5) This idea vesurs perpetestirt the mon of the Ceenel•
et State-of tnniapane, published in the Mentteer, AprO 13, fof 8

the tesshiaz of it afrah. The Powers find themielves,
with respect to France, in the condition in which
they were on the 81st of March, 1814. It is not to
prevent war, for France has in fact rekindled it, it is
to terminate it that there now offers itself to Europe
a state of things essentially different from that on
I which the peace of 1814 was founded. The ques-
don, then, has ceased to be a question of right : it is
no more than a question of political calculation and
foresight. in which the Powers have only to consult
the real interests of their people and the common in-
terest of Europe.
The Committee thinks it may dispense with en-
tering here into an exposition of the considerations
which, under this last view, have directed the mea-
sures of the governments. It will be sufficient to
recall to notice, that the man who, in now offering
to sanction the Treaty of Paris, pretends to substi-
tute his guarantee for that of a Sovereign, whose
loyalty was without stain, and benevolence without
measure, is the same who during 15 years ravaged
and laid waste the earth, to find means of satisfying
his ambition, who sacrificed millions of victims, and
the happiness of an entire generation, to a system of
conquests, whom truces, little worthy of the name
of peace, have only rendered more oppressive and
more odious ; (1) who, after having by mad enter-
prizes tired fortune, armed all Europe against him,
and exhausted all the means of France, was forced to
abandon his projects, and abdicated power to save
some relics of existence ; who at the moment when
the nations of Europe were giving themselves up to
the hope of a durable tranquility, meditated new ca-
tastrophes, and by a double perfidy, towards the
powers who had too generously spared him, and
towards a government which he could not attack
without the blackest treason, usurped a Throne which
he had renounced, and which be never occupied
except for the misery of France and the world. This
man has no other guarantee to propose to Europe
than his word. Mier the cruel experience of fifteen
years, who would have the courage to accept this
guarantee ; and if the French nation has really em-
braced his cause, who could any longer respect the
security which it could offer?
Peace with a Government placed in such hands,
and composed of such elements. would only be a per-
petual state of uncertainty, anxiety, and danger. No
power being able effectually to disarm, the people
• would enjoy none of the advantages of a true peace ;
they would be overwhelmed with expenses of all
kinds ; confidence not being able to establish itself
any where, industry and commerce would every
where languish ; nothing would be stable in political
relations ; a sullen discontent would spread over all
countries ; and f um day to day, Europe in alarm
would expect a new explosion. The Sovereigns have
certainlj not misunderstood the interest of their peo-
ple, in judging that an ()p.m war, with all its ;nconve.
nienctes and all its sacrifices, is preferable to such a
state of things, and the measures which they have
adopted have met the general approbation.
The opinion of Europe on this great occasion is
pronounced in a manner very positive and very so-
lemn ; never could the real sentiments of nations have
been more accurately known and more faithfully in-
terpreted than at a moment when the representatives
of all the powers wele assembled to consolidate the
peace of the world.

THIRD QUESTION.
Is it necessary to publish a new Declaration ?
The observations which the Committee have just
presented furnish the answer to the last question which
remains to be examined. It considers,
1. That the Declaration of the 13th of March was
dictated to the powers by reasons of such evident
justice and such decisive weight, that none of the so-
phistries by which it is pretended tee be atucked can
at all affect it :
2. That these reasons remain in all their force, and
that the changes which have in fact occurred since
the Declaration of the
,13th of March, have produced
no alteration in the position of Bonaparte and of
France with regard to the Allies.
3. That the offer to ratify the Treaty of Paris can-
not on any account alter the disposition of the Allies.
Therefore, the Committee is of opinion that it
would be useless to publish a fresh declaration.
The Plenipoteotiaries of the Powers who signed the
Treaty of Paris, and,who as such are responsible for
its execution with regard to the acceding Powers,
having taken into consideration, and sanctioned by
their approbation the preceding report, have resolved,
that there shall Isz made to the Plenipotentiaries of
the other Royal Courts a communication of the mi.
nutes of this day. They have further ordered, that
an extract of the said minutes shall be made public.
Here follow the signatures in the alphabetical order
of she Courts :
AUSTIIA. PORTUGAL.
Prince MET TERNICH, The Count de PALMELLA,
Baron WESSEERG. SAIDANHA,
SPAIN SPAGN a).
P. COMES RADOR. PRUSSItt.
FRANC& Prince HARDENERRO,
Prime TALLEYRAND, Baron HUMBOLDT.
Duke of DALBERO, Russia.
Count ALEX de NOAILLES. Count RASOUMOUSKY,
GatAl BRITAIN. Count STAKELBERO,
CLANCARTY, Count NESSELRODE.
CA THCART, SWIDDM.
srawAit r. count LOEWENHIELM.
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, approving the
whole of the principles contained in the present ex-
tract from the minutes, have affixed to it their sig.
natures,

Vkima, May 12. lei 5.
BAVARIA.

SARDINIA.
The Marquis de 8 LMARSAN.
DINMASR. Count ROSSI.
C. BERNSTOREF. SARONT.
I. BERNSTO!'F. Count SCHULEMBURO.
UANOVIS. TWO SICILIES.
Count MUNSTER. The Commander RUFF°.
Count HARDEN BURGH. lIVURTIM3IIIIO.
DIZTIILRLANDS. Count WIN ZINOSIAODL
Baron SPAEN. Baron LINDEN.
Baron UAOERN.
(I) The Committee here think It right to add the impertant
obssrvatkri, that the greater part of the Invasions, and forced
unions, of which Bonaparte formed successively what he called
the Great Empire, took place doting those perfidious intervals
of peace, more de/aro:tier to Europe than even the wan with
which it was tortnented. It was thus that he took possoseleo of
Piedmont, Yarns', Get on, I. tete, of the States of kerne, of Hol-
land, of the countries ompo .ng the Nd Military Division. It
was thus at a pv:led of peace ; tt least with all the Continent),
that be struck the first . low e/ 41st Portugal and Spain, am%
thought to have finished t. e eon is of those cwpakies by nips
ning and audacity, iv hen t. o patrio MU and energy of the people
of the peninsula drt w kiln nip 114 luinary war, dal camminee.
'pun t$ hie %mu 4uw4(4:1, old pI c .c salvation of Europe.