Star.
London, England, 1813-01-29 00:00:00

LAIC !M7ELLIQBNL►.

The Judges met yesterday
7rectsury Chamber, and chose their Circuits as under:
Man...ND—Lord EL lAN SOILOUGH and Mr. Justice Glass.
L Sotto mc—Lord Chief Janice MAN STI g LD, Mr. Justice
csoss• •
Hutu—Lord Cunt Ozabw and Mr. Justice Hr.trs.
Mier IR N—Mr.BaronTnousoN and Mr. I tisticeLt BLANC.
WIEST cas—Mr. Justice Cuassaaa and Mr. Baron WOOD.
Osroau—Mr. Baton GRAHAM and Mr. Justice BAILEY.

in the King's Bench

ARCHES COURT, DOCTORS' COMMONS, JAN. 20.
COLE 11. CORM& . I
This was a suit at the instance of Mrs. Jane Cole,
of Bedford-place, Bloomsbury, against Mr. John_Cor.
der, a Quaker, of the parish of St. John, Horslydown, '
Surrey, for defamation ; originally instituted in the
Commissary Court of Surrey, but appealed from
thence to this Court.
It appeared from the evidence, that the defamation
complained of took place at a meeting of the credi.
ton of a bankrupt, to whom the defendant was as-
signee ; upon which occasion, he animadverted upon
an article in the bankrupt's accounts, charging a sum
of money as paid to the plaintiff, and observed
" This is the way the money has been expended,
upon a woman who is a common w—e, a strumpet,
and connected with a set of swindlers," or words to
that effect. The pleading, charging the fact, al-
ledged the words to have been " damned w—e," &c.
and upon this variation between that and the evi-
dence, and a supposed deficiency of proof of the iden-
tity of the person defamed, the Judge of the Coth-
missary Court rejected the complaint, and dismissed
the defendant from the suit. From this decision the
plaintiff appealed to this Court, and no new matter
having been introduced on the appeal, it came on
for a hearing upon the evidence already adduced, to
prove the complainant's case.
The respondent's Counsel, in support of tile de-
cision appealed from, urged the necessity of requiring
in cases of this nature, strict proof by the must re-
spectable witnesses of the precise words charged to
have been uttered, or at least very simi:ar ones. He
then commented upon the present evidence, which he
described as that of a bankrupt and his accountant
general ; and contended for the insufficiency of proof 1
upon the two points of the words spoken, and the
'identity of the person they alluded to. The appel-
lint's Counsel contended, that the objections to the
-sufficiency of the proof were not well founded it re-
ferred to the whole of the evidence, being supported
.lry
partial extracts only ; neither did the circumstance
§t• one of the witnesses having had the misfortune to
itess bankrupt, and the other being. concerned, in the
course of his professional duties, in an investigation
of his accounts, throw any of that stigma upon their
evidence which his learned adversary • wished to
Fatted' to it. The words uttered, though not proved
precisely in the manner charged, were, nevertheless,
sufficiently so for the purpose of the suit, by the ut-
terance of that defamatory word, which was the only
one this or any other Conn could take notice of ;
and the identity of the complainant was the more
particularly fixed, by the defendant's having followed
up his defamatory allasion with an observation, that
she had formerly gone by the name of Carter, which
ittewitnesses deposed they remembered her to have
. In the case of Robinson v. Mills, decidedby
rair William Scott, not long since, the evidence was
much slighter than this ; but that Learned Judge
held, that it the words were proved upon any one
occasion, as applied to the complaining party, to the
conscientious satisfaction of the witnesses who heard
ahem, it was sufficient to sustain the suit. This doc-
itrine, however, must have been e4ther utterly un-
known to the Learned Judge on the other side of the
water, when he gave his decision upon the present
case, or else at utter variance with some preconceived
doctrines of his own ; he, therefore, trusted the sen.
tence would be reversed with costs.
Sir JOHN NICHOLL recapitulated the evidence, and
observed, it had been thrown out, that an unusually
strict proof was to be required in cases of this nature,
In order to discourage them as much as possible. It
was, undoubtedly, very desirable, where the parties
are in that inferior situation of life in which language
of this nature is in too common use, that a disposi.
*ion towards an unnecessary litigation, the costs of
which would frequently produce their ultimate ruin,
ill ould operate in as small a degree as was consistent
with the ends of justice ; but in the present case the
parties were not so circumstanced ; they were in a
situation of life in which injuries of this kind are
more keenly felt, and these suits are the only remedy
the law, as it now stands, has provided for an attack
upon female reputation. It is not necessary to prove
the words precisely as charged ; that would encou-
rage evasion, and protect malicious slander from the
only punishment that now awaits it in this respect.—
A Jury, in cases of libel at common law, had only to
be conscientiously satisfied of the truth of the facts
charged, to justify their verdict ; and the doctrine
alluded to, as laid down by Sir William Scott, was
founded upon the same principle. He then exami-
ned the points in question, as detailed in the evi-
dence, and being of opinion that they were sufficient
to satisfy the requisites of the law, he preppluiccsi for
the appeal, enjoined the defendant the unal penance,
and condemned him in costs.
The defendant then addressed the Court, stating,
that he had not made use of the words alledged,
having been brought up not to use oats ; and as he
had not succeeded in that Court, he must seek jus-
tice in another.