Star.
London, England, 1823-04-12 00:00:00

for exclusive of the .official obligation, the Public.
Fouctionaries, who tease all ,displayed more or.]
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ten seal in =ppm.* of the rOnlitlfUtienal Siltealt
lONlebay 111111tsfaily *boa* that tlleir personal se-
euth„ 7 areas on the seeress or' tjair rotations.—
it thellitory probable; that thir levies decreed by
the Cones are completed; for the poverty' of the
country h more than ceintedralansed by the revolu-
tionary energies. The resources of a nation in a state
of revolution confound ordinary calculations, parti-
cularly when it is threatened with invasion. We,
therefore, treat with contempt the statements that
have appeared in the French Ultra Pipers, respect-
ing the amount of force which the Spaniards have at
this time. Those statements are made to encourage
the French troops, and to keep down the disaffected;
and, it should be recollected, that the authors of the
war have left themselves no retreat; and that, in this
desperate situation, they must adopt, from necessity,
corresponding expedients.

We havesaid that if the possession of Cuba forms
part of the designs which France entertains against
Spain, that fact will alter entirely the relation in
which England stands with respect to the question of.
war—We are of this opinion not because Cuba can
be an object of envy to England; whiCh is in no want
•of any addition to her foreign settlements ; but because
the occupation of Cuba would doubtless be a pre-
lude to the seizure of every other Spanish Colony in
South America which it is in the power of arms to'
recover;-because French influence might thus, by un-
fair I,
means, and to the prejudice of . British interests. I
be spread over a large plrtion of the globe with
which they have hitherto had little or no connection.
The means we pronounce to be unfair; for such
schemes of foreign advantage are wholly at variance
with the objects which the French Government pro.
fess to have only in view in making war on Spain.
How can Cuba, or Buenos Ayres, or Peru, or Chili,
affect in any way the internal tranquillity of France,
or " separate Spain," as it is said " from Europe ?" Os
how could the occupation of them by France assist in
preventing the spread at horse of those doctrines and
principles at which it affects to be so alattned ?
It is easy to see, however, that the French Govern-
ment may have, for delusive purposei merely, held
out die hope of being "able to give pence to the Colo-
nie.“ of Spain—that is, to bring them again tinder
the subjection of the mother country. The Spanish
people have, it is well known, viewed generally with
deep regret the loss of their Colonies; and -it .may
have been thought that it would gain many of these
over to the French party, were they led to expect the
restoration of these Colonies, by means of French'
ascendancy. The merchants of France, too, have shewa
themselves strongly opposed to the war, which t:thits*,.
in its. first effects, be otherwise than• extremely.*
jitrious to them ; and the French Government- may
hope to conciliate them, by holding ont the expoetnion
of procuring for them hereafter such prefereneet in
the West Injies and South America as
.m 4-01107
indemnify them fur present
,sacrifices. Let us hope,
therefore, that while the French Government has such
feelings and interests to propitiate, that all this talk
about colodies, wily in troth have nothi - be,
yond the purpose of the present aumear

course matters may take; it• is