Star.
London, England, 1815-02-02 00:00:00

his instructions. VielienNoreiti Cn search of Sir John
Murray, and met hint coming from Villoseep. I
translattellieletter' id bhti verlatins, and after he had
considered it welle heigitin expressed his intention of
raising the siege, and added, that it must be carried
into execution immediately. I requested hint to give
me such orders as he should choose to have conveyed.
It was then desired by Sir John Murray to send to
General Clinton to desire him to call on General
Whittingliam'S corps, and send them down to the
beach. General Clinton was then to put his division
in movement tucover this march of General Whit-
tingham's corps. He was previously to call in his
pickets, destroy the gun carriages, anal spike the guns.
As I felt the importance of this order, I repeated it,
word for word, to Lieutenant Drew, in the presence
of Sir John Mori ay, and asked him whether it was
correct ? Sir Jahn told me it was, and I then direc-
ted Lieutenant Drew to proceed with these orders to
General Clinton.. • •
Q. Did you send Lieutenant Drew to General
Mackenzie vith similar instructions as to spiking the
guns in front of his position ? A. I do not believe that
I sent Lieutenant Drew with any such orders. I
have no recollection of Lieutenant Drew carrying
any orders but those that I have stated, to be sent to
General Clinten.
Q. Did you receive any further orders relative to
the embarkation, and what were they ? A. I did.
Sir J. Murray desired me to go down to the beach,
and request of the neval officers that the embarkation
might be conducted in the following manner:—that
the troops should be embarked first, and the horses,
mules, and stores afterwards. This request was re-
peated by me to the naval officers, twice or thrice to
the course of the day.
Q. Have the goodness to state what occurred on
the 12th, subsequent to your receiving this order ?--
A. Sir John Murray having perceived that the order,
he bad pointed out for the embarkation was occasio.l
nally deviated from, sent me twice or three times
down to the beach to repeat his request. In convey-
ing the request of the Commander of the forces. I
thought it right to acquaint some of the naval officers
to whom I spoke, that they were mistaken in think-
ing, as they did, that the army was retiring before
5000 men only. I told them that Sir John's reasons
for repeating the request were founded on the proxi-
mity as well as the force of the enemy that was com-
ing down. Sir John Murray sent him in the evening
to Captain Bathurst, requesting him to discontinue
tlhre embarkation of the horses and mules at the west-
ern extremity of the bay, and send off his boats to
the centre of the hay, to take off the troops. Having
delivered my official communication to Captain
lia-
thatrsc, I then informed hint of the latest intelligence.
He then asked me what was to become of tile horses
and mules ? I answered that they were to be em-
barked after the infantry, if there was time; if not,
(*course they would be destroyed. I also added,
that if Decaen's corps continued moving on that day
at the same rate that it had done on the preceding
day, it might reech Tarragona that afternoon. The
embarkation continued the whok evening, and to a
late hour in the night. •
• Q. Do you recollect being present at an interview
between Geaeral McKenzie, Colonel•Thackery, Colo-
nel Adams, and myself, on the 12th. If so, state
what took place at that interview ?—A. Having met
those officers at the door of Sir John Murray's house,
they asked me to return and accompany them, which
I did. The aject of their calling on Sir John was
to speak about the propriety of fighting Decaen. Co-
lonel Adams addressed Sir J. Murray at very consi-
derable length, and stated a variety of reasons for
marching that day to attack Decaen. When he had
finished, Colonel Thackery also addressed him to the
same effect, but not at equal length. After Sir J.
Murray had listened to both of them, be answered,
44 I will do no such thing. Besides, if I were inclined
to attack Decaen, be would not fight me. He would
naturally fall back on Barcelona, and leave me no
choice but that of following him or net. If r fol-
lowed him, I should lease: Tarragona open in the rear
for Marshal Suchet to enter; and I should find my-
- sell between Tarragona and Barcelona, with all my
communication to the shipping cut off. If I should
stop short, and return in rime to prevtnt MarslialpSu-
chet from trite-rm., Tarragona, I should still have
failed in my object bringing Decaen to action, and
return against a new enemy with harassed troops."
In addition to this, Sir John said that he would give
them another reason, and produced a paper,of which
be remembered one passage to be relative to not corn-
mining the safety of the army. On hearing this, Ge-
neral M'Kenzic, who had not spoke before, said
dc there is no answering that." Those gentlemen then'
retired, and he went with them.
Q. Did the cadets given you on the day of the 12th
appear to have been sent in endless succession ? A.
1 can curly recollect two orders that were given tome
on that day. The first was with respect to the re-
treat of the troops to the beach ; and the second was
for their embarkation. This latter order was repeated
. twice or thrice, but without any variation.
Q. Did you see Admiral Hallowell on the evening
of the 12th, and did he say any thing to you relative
tot dispatch ? A. I had no official communication
with • Admiral Hallowell on that evening; and I.
. must decline-giving any account of what happened on
thit day, except what was in the course of my official
duty or of communications.
General Donkin being then asked about the num-
bers of the French army, produced the official state-
ments which he had made from the best information
which he could collect, when at the head of the de-
partment of secret intelligence. In July, 1812, he
had estimated the army of Catalonia at 30,800 in-
fantry, of which 7,000 afterwards marched into Va-
lencia to join' Suchet. This statement of his agreed
within a few hundreds of the estimate that Colonel
Cabanes had made of their force from other sources
of information. The French disposable force in the
Province of Catalonia appeared from both those state-
ments.to be about 13,000.
-He was then asked,—Did he, front his knowledge
oldie situation and equipments of the army, conceive
it to be in a conditicin for active operations in the field
in the month of Jane, 1813 f--. Not for any distant
operations, from having few or no mules attached to
the Comm•ssar bit, for carrying provisions. The ar-
tiacry also were inndequatele-horsed, and they had
be .a small propoition of , eloussonition waggons.
Above 600 artillery horses and mules were left be-
Ilia et-Meant, for want of stifficiihst transports' All
the Commissariat tinier were-kit behied for thosame

reason. Thera TzeritAout .34amulsisittaohs4berst,
department Wore Tatrigohai but they. ibtro
hired in dinUotintry .3! •vc I .1"..
Being theri.questicined.about the number tibial,
q(4ut Toads between Tortola and Tarragona by die
vale of the Ebro, he replied, that he knew of west
roads, besides a carriagcable road by Mont Blanc.
The shale of the seven roads were practicable for ca-
valry and infantry. Six of them were, however, not
practicable for artillery, unless for light and die
mounted guns. He then described the roads Ircrn
Villa Franca to Tarragona, of which there were seve-
ral practicable for carriages.
He was then questioned as to the embarkation.
Q. Was the embarkation conducted with order and
regularity ?—A. It was with as much order as an em-
barkation on an open beach, with some surf on it,
could be effected.
Q. Did you perceive any disorder or confusion that
could bear the appearance of being discreditable or
disgraceful to his Majesty's service ?—A. None.
Q. Do not you conceive that it would have been
highly imprudent to have left 4000 troops on the beach
during the night of the 13th, for the purpose of pro-
tecting the guns ?—A. I should conceive it imprudent,
as such a force on an open beach, without any advan-
tage of positiOn, might be harassed and checked by
the garrison of Tarragona, until the enemy could come
up in force.
General Donkin then stated, at pretty considerable
length, his decided opinion, that inferior as the army
was both in number and quality, it would have been
highly imprudent to have risked a battle with the
enemy, who were in possession of the fortified place
of Tarragona, within a mile and a half of the place
of embarkation. He could conceive no other way of
carrying off the heavy guns, but for the whole army
to have stopped until they were brought doWn to the
beach—He was then asked

Q. Would he have advised the risking the loss of
any pat t of the army or its equipments, in preference
to abandoning 17 spiked guns, the army having still
74. pieces of cannon in their possessirn ?-.-A. He
should not have advised its he considered that it
would have been highly imprudent so to do : I.e
thought, besides, that it was not only a part of the
army, but the whole that would have been risked.
At three o'clock the Court adjourned till to-mor-
row (this day).

4.IIERIC.IN SIME PiIPERS.

(No. IV. CONTINUED.)

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