Star.
London, England, 1802-05-04 00:00:00

new Kingdom, or Prefidentfhip, call it what you
will, fI:4W of itfelf have operated as a fufficient rea•
fun for either of the Ccntrading Parties to fay—
, Here is a queftion which changes the whole
ft ate of the tranfadion, and the Treaty necera-
illy affurnes a new face." Was there ever, at
any former period, an event like that which would
nut have been the caufe of a new war, or of new
ftpulations ? If it has not produced a new coali-
tion, it is owing only to the loft !late of Europe,
and to the depreffion from which the powers of the
Continent have not yet recovered. If Aufiria
was fo very defirous of eftablifhing a barrier be-
tween her and France, by the Treaty of Lune-
ville, what mutt the think now ? She feels all her
danger, but fhe thinks it at the fame time too
much to venture the attempt of extricating her-
!elf from the perils by which the is threatened.—
The difpatching of a fleet and army to the Weft
Indies is, no doubt, very different ; but I do not
think I go too far in laying, that it may prove a
fubjed of great and awful confideration. The
power of France in that part mull be re-eftablifhed
at a much earlier period than it would have other.
Rife been. Delay was, with regard to us, a molt
material poiat, and I may pronounce the contrary
conduct one of thole political reaches calculated to
injure its authors. Under the third head are com-
prehended thole points of the Definitive Treaty,
which may be confidered as departing from the
preliminary Treaty ; and firft, Sir, permit me to
advert to the Article which relates to the prifo-
ners here, for whom a very large fum was due to
this country. We have heard that this money
was to be paid—we have heard that French iflands
vacre to be mortgaged for it , but the fad is, that
the prifoners have been reftored, and the debt in-
curred by France remains unpaid. I fuppofe, for in
in thisinflancc Ifpeak by conjedure,that France was
determined not to pay it;and a new expedient was
rcforted to. We are now not only to pay for our
prifoners in France, but alfoto pay for the cloathing
and arming of the Ruffian prifoners, deftined to ad
there agamft ourfelves. I'he idea was thrown
out by the French Government with the view of
flittering the weaknefs of a late unfortunate Mo-
narch, by making his fubjeds, who were prifit-
tiers in France, the inftrurnents of his refentment
againft this country. Thus, inftead of kiffing the
rod, we ate called upon to pay for the rod. For
I feel I am not wrong in laying that the Puflian
troops were cloathed and equipped for the purpofe
of being employed in an attack upon this country.
—We next, Sir, come to the queftion of Malta :
An expel:: ftipulation was made, that Malta
fhotild be made independent of both Powers, and
p: -rai under the protection of 'a third Sovereign.
,I:l.ffia was underftood ; but it is now put into the
hands of a third Power, without the power of
proteding it. After all this hocus-pocus, this con-
veying and re-conveying, this tranflation and re-
tranflation, I am convinced, that every one who
views this fubjea %rich candour mull fee we are com-
pletely oufted. The fate that awaits that ifland
is but too evident. Our firft objett is to afcertain
how this new order of Knight', is to exilt. The
revenues are certainly inadequate to their fupport.
The whole of the territorial and commercial reve-
nues of the Mind of Malta is not more than
30,0001. all of which is ahforbed in charitable par.
poles, and in maintaining the dignity of the Order.
No provifion whatever is made for keeping the
garrifon and repairing the works. In France, the
property of the Knights is entirely confifcated ;
in Spain the fame forfeiture will fhortly follow ;
in Italy it is at no great diftance ; and,
indeed, in font: places, has already taken place;
and in Bavaria, as well as on the Banks of
the Rhine, the revenues of the Order are al-
nsoft completely gone. So that here is a new
order of Knighthood to be supported by the
if of Malta, and if four-fifths of its revenues,
out of the ifLaad, have been confifcated, I am
furely warranted in taking by what means ? What
a curious and difgraceful situation is it reduced
to, when the Nobility, which conftituted its fup-
port, arc •.vithdrawn, and a kind of a noble demo-
c-atical race fubftituted in their room I (hall not
dwell upon the folly of this fame, but merely ex-
pole the abfurdity of making that Order indepen-
dent which mull be chiefly compofed of the fubjeCts
of the French Government—l mean from Italy.
Even fuppofing the Neapolitan Government inde-
pendent of France, what are the provifions made
for delivering the Island into hands in which we
cannot confide ? At all events, we mull evacuate
it at the end of three months; but then we are to
deliver it to the Order. And as fome fecurity,
there is an article by which the neutrality of the
Order is to be proclaimed. Let us then fee how
this equal neutrality would operate, should each
power have the right of fending an equal number
of (hips into the ports of Malta. In the cafe of
war with France, the mutt have Spain and Hol-
land for her allies ; confequently, if we pares the
privilege of fending in fix !hips, each of them will
exercife the fame right, and this equal neutrality
will give to France eighteen (hips to our flu. An-
other point of no inconfiderable importance is the
Cape; and here, Sir, the article is extremely dif-
ferent from that in the Preliminaries. In the Pre-
liminary Treaty it was ftipulated, that (hips of all
nations ()multi be admitted without diftindion.—
But now we find the Cape is given over to Hol-
land in full Sovereignty, a word that in itfelf fur-
flats a copious index for alarm. If it be given in
full Sovereignty, there certainly is nothing which
can bind Holland with refped to future difpofitions
and regulations, fince in making fuch difpofitions
none can fairly object to the eaercife of the a& of
Sovereignty. When we recolleft that Tufcany
was made over to the infant Duke of Parma in full
fovereignty, and that he exercifed that fovereignty
by furrendering Porto Ferrajo to the French, is it
not a fair fuppofition that Holland will all° fur-
render the Cape ? I come now to the fourth head,
the omiffion of all commercial treaties e•:ifting pre-
vious to the war. In this orniffion there is Come-
thins of a gigantic nature which no man can con-
template without pain and dread. It is the firft
inuance I ever knew or heard of, in which the
ronew3l of commercial relations bas been itudionf-

is that we {hall gain as much as we &all lofe. I
do not well underftand what thofe onerous obli-
gations are, which thould induce us to give up
certain for uncertain advantages. France hasever
been our greatelt rival in this refpett, and chore
treaties which did exift were made to guard agninit
the dangers likely to refult from that rivallhip.—
But by palling them over, what we do by this
kind of diplomatical analyfis is to let things revert
to their original Rate before the formation of any
of the treaties. Why not enter minutely into this
fubjea, for there certainly has been fufficient time?
We were not treating as at Lige in a lump; we
were not treating with a perfon with a watch in
his hand limiting us to a Tingle minute. Yet what-
ever doubts may have been ftarted on this very
important topic,it is at leaft the duty of the Houle
to examine and afcertain, with every poffible de-
gree of precifion, the fituation in which we Rand.
There are alto other confiderations of weight which
fhould not be negle&ed, and in certain parts of
this empire, in which we have tome intereft—l
mean the EaR Indies. There were, with refpat
' to this point, two great epochs of which we fhould
not have loft fight, the Treaty of 1783, and the
IConvention of 1787. In the former we confidered
ourfelves entitled to certain privileges, and we af-
terwards had the good fortune to obtain the con-
firmation of them. The latter fettled on a firm
bafis what was before uncertain, and became to us
a pledge of future fecurity ; but we have now loft
what we gained by the Treaty of 1783, and by
the Convention of 1787. We are thrown back to
the !pot where we were difadvantageoufly placed,
and confequently fubjea to go over all the old
grounds of litigation. The claims of both Powers
are unfettled, and mug prove the fource of new
disputes. We have indeed what an attorney would
call a good caufe ; but I mug fay, that while I
had the thing itfelf, full poffeffion or good fecu-
rity, I would rather keep it than Irow the titles
into the fire for the purpofe of re-difputing my
claim. Among the Articles not contravening
I the Preliminary Treaty, but coming new to us, is
the fituation of the Houfe of Orange. When we
talk of immenfe power, of van extent of terri-
tory, of great commercial profperity, they are
held out as fatisfadory pledges and fufficient fecu
rities of our welfare ; but what is become of the
principles by which thefe have been acquired ?
Where is our good faith in proteQing thofe to
whom we promifed proteaion—where is that
quick and jealous tenability of honour, tholi.
proud and honourable feelings which have railed
us to our prefent opulence and power ? They are
all paft, all dgf„asi #4O, they have made us rich
and powerful, and we now give them up. What
has been done for the houfe of Orange ? Not a fin-
gle provifion has been made for the Stadtholder,
either in his public or private capacity. At the
very moment that we are ftipulating at Amiens for
compenfations for the Houfe of Orange, in the fame
room, and at the end of the fame table, is the Dutch,
Plenipotentiary firing a defeance. We talk, in-
deed, of indemnities, and require them, and Citi
:en Schimmelpenninck kindly gives his affent, fti-
pulating, however, that they fhall not come from
Hullata I iball pals over, without that notice
which it dderves, the cafe of the King of Sar-
dinia; yet I cannot help remarking, that while in
private life official points of honour, and perfonal
points of honour, are attended to with the moll
fcrupulous exaanefs, a flap on the national face, or
a kick upon the public pofteriors goes for nothing.
A common plaifter, a little diaculum, is fufficient
to cure it. What. Sir, than the country give up
all without one tingle effort to preferve its honour
and magnanimity ? Does France think that we
have not forfeited both ? Does Holland think fo ?
Of the fentiments of the latter on this fubjea, fo
intimately connetted with the feelings of the na-
tion, we find cogent proofs in the Haerlem Ga-
zette • and if I had a mind to produce a voucher
for the fenfe of the former, I have it in my poc-
ket, in a French paper of a recent date. It (peaks
of the advantages gained over this country in the
Treaty, and of our degradation, with confidence
and precifion. It applies fo clofely to the prefent
fubjea, that were t to read it to the Houle, I
fear I fhould find it difficult to exculpate myfelf
from the charge of plagiary. It roundly and
truly aliens that fo long as the Cape and Malta I
are in the hands of the Dutch and Neapolitan Go-
vernments, fo long they mull be in the hands of
France, and argues in the fame way on all the
other points.* The statements, Sir, which I have

• The following is a Tranflation of the Papa alluded to :
" France, reconciled with all other Governments will never
be able to difarm the ankadity of thofe men who are irritated
by the fpedade of her *reamers, and blinded by the fplendour
of her glory. When fix months ago they faw ha in fifteen days
conclude four Trades of Peace, and reftene tranquillity to fea
and land. !bussed by fansuch facets, they attempted to con-
teft the brilliant cannot the Peace with England. They opened
op a molt extenave range to the lovers of conjedure. They
pretended that Garet articles balanced the advantages of the
public affiliations. Time has Dawn that there were no fecret
conditions.
" hefting on, !know not what uptakes of the Englifh
Minifters in Parliament, they contended that the merit of this
peace could not be decided by the Preliminaries; that we lbould
wait for the DelinidveTreaty, and then the fuperiority of Great
Britain would be fan.
" . • • . . The Definitive Treaty has at length been
aped, and it is found to be more advantageous, more glorious
to France, than the Preliminaries.
" At the time when this lirft Convention appeared, it was
critieffed on different grounds. Men confidered the benefit
which England might derive from the cinnamon forefts of Cey-
lon, and particularly from the fupab port et Trincomalee, the
true bulwark of India, commanding the Malabar and Coro.
mandd, and all the Archlpelagonf that Oeeau.
was calculated too, not what Trinidad was worth, but
what it might be rendered by the fkilhd inauftry of the Englith,
Ids interefted, perhaps, about the praiser of their own foil,
than eager to monopolise all the commerce et the Oronoquo,
and the countries adjacent. In addition to there eltimates, fo
flattering for England, were adduced the dela/ lbe was to ac-
quire in the Myfore. conquered during the wie of the Raolu-
don ; and people were inclined to believe that the &With had
carried to the strnoft extent of their willies, their naval and

commercial ;restarts.
" With this &nation of England was oppofsd that of France,
mgrandifed by Belgium, Savoy, Piedmont, and pOrt of Ger-
many ; dEpofing without contrail of Holland, Svritan land,
and Italy; fortifying heed' in the Mediterranean, by the ac-
quifition of Porto Ferrajo—openizt in the Wyk a Sliver fa-
mous for its ancient commerce, a port **bled. bi its S-
nation, to become the emporium of Europe t recovering Mar-
to. Fn.lilh raoital : Obtallnirerie SPaeilh Part

brought forward, will, I Ma, be thought fuffi.
ciently llrong to juilify the propofed enquiry,
which, exclulively of all other confiderations,
ought to take place, were it only on the ground
that it is neceffary to have fome information from
the proper papers and documents ; many of them
are not known, and many of them have not been
yet laid upon the table. This country begins al-
ready to recover from its indifference and apathy.
The cordial drop of Peace was grateful to the
public feeling; but fomething deleterious has at
length been difcovered in the cup. The poifon-
ous mixture has not been entirely drank, and let
us Rill attempt to find an antidote. Let us exa-
mine what yet remains of the fatal draught,and by
adminificring an efficacious remedy to counteratl
what has been too rafhly taken, recover our health
and vigour. It was my with, Sir, to mention an
early day for the difcnffion of this important fub-,
jai ; but as it will be neceffary to give Come time
for the production of the papers which may be re-
erne, I beg leave to name tomorrow fortnight.
1 therefore move that this Houfe will take into
confideration to-morrow fortnight the Treaty be-
between his Britannic Majeßy, the French Re-
public,
his Catholic Majefty, and the Batavian
Republic, concluded at Amiens on the 27th of
March, 1802.
Mr. ELLIOT feconded the motion.
The Cukr c s t.t.ott of the Ex c fro xgyta Paid it was

tt Between theft two Odom of two States which may cede
to be enemies, but acme re be rivals, it was not dillicult to pro-
nounce which of the two had gained moft by the war. It was
dentonftrated that France had obtained an irreditible prepon,
&ranee upon the continent; and that in Coffering her maritime
power to fall off, the had not loft the elements of it, which
conftft in her population and her territory.
" Such was the dud of things Which the Preliminaries of-
fered ; and as they have formed the bads of the Treaty of
Amiens, it may be Paid that the latter was tried by anticipation.
Let us now examine whether it does not fecure tome new ad-
vantages to France and her Aria; whether it does not con-
tain certain great features (Wildcat to render it rernarkahle in
hiltory?
" The French were juftly alarmed at what was due to
England for advances made for the maintenance of more than
ao,o:>o prifoners. The ad Article of the Treaty of Amiens
diminithes the debt of Franca k is agreed that, in the ac-
count of the refpettive advances than be stated, sot only the
expellees of ad the prifooen of the two nations, but alfo thole
of the foreign troops which, before being taken prifoners,
were in the pay and at the &pold of either of the Conned-
ing Parties. Thus the expences laid out upon the 7000
pri-
toners given back to Rutßa will be dated is deduction from
that which France owes to England. The 7th Ardele fecures
to France in Guiana an sggrandlfement which the 6th Ar-
ticle of the Preliminaries left at lead doubtful, ash guaranteed
to Portugal the integrity of her poffedions.
" In the cooditions relative to Malta, that important for.
trefs, which the friends of England had fo often aligned to her,
every thing is favourable to France both in the portend re-
gulations and the definitive arrangements. As nag as the And
u Ifliefelitess it will be Prestb P and to make it cede to be to
will require the concurrence of all the great powers. If at
one day the Maker* Lawn &add become dominant, the pa-
tina, the wants, the temper, the =lure of that Langue would
bring it under the Influence of the French Government.
" Such the* are feveral poddve Conventions which render
the Treaty preferable in point of advantage for France to the
Preliminaries. But It Is not what the Treaty expreires that is
molt advantageous; it Is particularly what it lets as caneds
which ought to form the &Ned of joy to the French and their
allies.
" in all former negotiations England bad fatted on the re-
newal of ancient Treaties, efeending upwards as far as that of
Weftphalla. With t &Turkus attention did the always CfIU.
merate them, date by date, and elk gave them new forte.—
Every body knows that abnolkall their Treaties were onerous
to the maritime powers of the Continent, and that they even
contained ftipuladon. humiliating for the allies of France.
There were cosht le which the Dutch were obliged, in fign of
fubmilloo, to lower their leg to &mot England f. This &ame-
nd Mange bad never been assefted widest podndog a war.
The reigns of Cromwell sod Charles 11. afoed ensng . of this
truth. This fpecies of uffshge is abolithed; end what is more
important to commerce, the abrogation of ancient Treaties
has removed the fatiguing inconveniences which they oeca-
frayed to France and her allies in their navigation, In the ad-
mktiltration of their colonies, in their whole commercial
fyitem.
" If it were neceffary to give an idea of the constraint
im-
poled by theft treaties on the States which then received the
Law tram England, it would be fulkient to state thofe of 1667
and 1670 between that Power and Spain, it would then be
teen how greatly the navigation of the Enid& was favoured,
how greatly the authority of the power veldt which they traded
was limited as to the contract of its own mesons and dudes.
If we were, then, to compare the advantages enjoyed by the
Emilia in their relations with the Continental Powers, with
the diieltia oppofed to the latter by the famous Ad of Na.
viption, we Should not any longer be furprifed at the degrada-
tion into which their marine had fallen even before the war.
We Mould be rather aftonilhed that the Emil& navy had not
borne down every thing.
" The Treaty of Andean removes all irregularity, all oppref-
don, all rclizaint. The old Law is deftroyed ; a new public
Law commences. The French and their allies have gained their
naval independence : they will have the (cote to make life of it ;
they will not fall into the snare of a new Treaty of Commerce ;
and they may one day have their Ad of Navigation !
" It is this which diftinguithea the Treaty of Amiens from
all the old tranfadions of the fame kind. It is this that would
render it fo advantageous fur France, even though it did not put
the bit feel to that kende of Coctinental power, which ren-
ders her fo formidable, and which already obliges England to
[well her expenditure by augmenting her militia.
" There are likewife other features which charaderife the
Treaty of Amiens, end which will rave to fignalife the prefect
epoch. Tbc new Conftitution of Matta, happy for France. as I
have already remarked, is of Welt a political phenomenon, which
doubticfs would excite much eftonftaent. if the faculty of af-
tonifhment were not in fame fort worn oat. It is an alliance of
ariftocracy and democracy, of ancient opinions, and of new
ideas, of chivalry and philtiophy. k is a coalition of two poli-
tical fyftems, whiclnhad kindled the mad crud war, jult as in
the Treaty of Weftphalls, we fee an secommodatko between
two religions which had been the peovoa.don or the pretext for
long and fatal Mentions. If Come years ago there had been a
State whole chivalrous fpirit could have been fuppoted capable
of excluding an ands to the revolutionary principle, Malta
would, beyond all doubt, have been pitched upon as that State ;
and yet It is at Malta, that the revolutionary (pi* eitablilhes
Mel( after it is weakened every where rife .. . To add to the
whimlleal sir of thefts combinations, England has contributed,
as well as France, to maintain it there. It appears certain at
tuft, that having received from the inhabitants of Malta fence!
plans of a Republic, the Eoglith have given tared to the pro-
patinas of theft !dander. in the Treaty of Amiens. Thu
democratic principles have found protedion from the power
that went to war to oppofe them !
" But the organization of this new Republic and its future
figure cannot have any conMerable inn:Tett, except for France
and England. There is in the Treaty a Bogle line reipeaing
the States of Barbary, which produce a more weave, a more
general inteivit for all Europe. It intimates the deign of put-
ting an end to the fyftens of hoftilides which fubfitts between
civilized Governments and thole Governments of Africa which
the fupinencfs of the former could alone have railed to the rank
of powers. Religion formerly endeavoured to repair in this
rcfpedt the negligence of policy. At length policy cultivates
the duty of protettion. Its happy intentions are not perhaps
very esfily realized. but they cannot fall into oblivion. The
fiend is given. It adds to the importance of the Treaty of
Amiens. It honours the negotiators whore work that Treaty
is, and the Government whole cotiddence they hive juftified."
" From Cape Finitterre al far no the Coat of Norway,

proper and becoming in his Right Hon. Trieia,
when he propofed a deviation from the etablithed
praßice, to Rate the grounds upon which he felt
himfelf induced to propofe filch deviation. Into
thofe grounds the Right Hon. Gentleman had no
doubt entered very minutely ; he had (toted them
with great particularity and precifion ; but as the
°hied of his motion only was to fix a day for the
full difcuffion of this fubjea, be (Mr. A.) did not
now think it incumbent on him to follow the Right
Hon. Gentleman through the whole feries of his
detail. He was ready to admit, that the conduct
of his Right Hon. Friend was confiflent and can-
did—the communication of his purpofe wa. flank
and ample. He could affure him that Minifters
felt towards him no other fentiment than that of
gratitude, and that they would be happy to give
him any explanation or information as to the ne.
gociation of the Treaty, which thould be c-aliftent
with their duty to furnifh ; and they had reafon
to hope from the charader of the Right Hon.
Gentleman, he would be incapable of demanding
any other. The Right Hon. Gentleman had di-
vided his arguments into four principal heads.—
As to the fiet point, namely, things exifting at the
time of figning the Preliminary articles, but not
then known—He begged to remind the Houfe,
that he had timed at the outlet, that he did not
mean to enter at any length into the matter of the
Right Hon. Gentleman's fpeech ; he withed mere.
ly to do away the impreffion which fome of his
ftatements were calculated to produce. Thc first,
which related to the furrender of the Eland of
Elba to the French, in direk contradidion to the
Treaty of Luneville—He would alk the Right
Hon. Gentleman, did he mean that as a charge
on his Moiety's Minifters, which was the ad of
the King of Etruria, who thought proper to ab-
rogate that part of the Treaty of Luneville ; and
who was a Prince fully competent to make fuels
change ? Surely it would not be contended that this
was an event in which the Britills negociator thould
interfere ; or, at leaft fuch a ene as would jullify
any interruption of the negociation but thole
points would be more fully difcuffed on a future
day. The Right Hon. Gentleman next adverted to
the extenfion of French Guiana—that however, it
would be remembered, did not exceed the terms of
the Treaty of Badajos, and not according to that
of Madrid, as it was fo often aliened in that Houle,
when to much firers had been laid on the fuppofed
different conftrudion of the preliminary articles on
that head in this country and France. The fad
was, that Portugal fo much eftimated the condi-
tions of the Treaty of Badajos, that the profetled
to think that it would be an extremely fortunate
eircumftance, if we could be at all inttrumental in
fettling the limits of Guiana as prefcribed in that
Treaty. This had been done, and to in that in-
Rance the obfervation of the Right Hon. Gentle
man did not apply. In commenting on the code-
quences of the probable eltablithment of France in
Louifiana, the Right Hon. Gentleman rote to a
climax. Undoubtedly theindependence of America
was materially conneeted with the interefts of this
country, and with that of all Europe ; but could
it be pretended that that independence was to be
aided by the French being in poiliffion of Loui.
flan; ? If the French Government was capable of
entertaining the gigantic ambition of fubjugating
America,had the not opportunity of attempting the
execution of her plans thro' the medium of Guiana
—could the not pour in her troops there i—Or when
St. Domingo fhould be tranquil, would the not be
enabled to turnthe facilities of that importantfettle-
meat to the atchicvment of this great enterprize, if
America herfelf thould be incapable of firm refill-
once or if Great Britain and all the powerscould fit
tamely by, the pat ve obfervers of the conteft. The
fettlement of the French in Louifiana, was fuch an
event as certainly could not be looked at without
anxiety, but what he meant to argue was, that that
was not the only point from which the could at-
tack America, if the really meditated the projeds
imagined by the Right Hon. Gentleman. The
fame obfervations applied to the poffetfion of Flo-
rida, by the French. The fecond point dwelt
on by the Right Hon. Gentleman was, the events
which have occurred fence the figning of the preli-
minary articles. Among them the moil confpicu-
ous was, the acceflion of the Firft Conful to the
prefidency of the Cifalpine Republic ; that he
would fairly admit was an event that could not
be contemplated without anxiety and folicitude, by
any perfon anxious for the independence of En-
rope, and for the interefts of this country; but the
quettion to confider was, would it have been pro.
per on that account to interrupt or break off the
Negotiations at Amiens ? Upon the principle on
which the Preliminary Articles were figned•
it certainly would not—Ministers could not hold
themfelves juftifiable to that Houfe, or to the
Country, to attempt it ; for he did not think there
was an impartial individual in the empire—any one
of (Ober judgment—whore feelings were not as
mite/ involved in this queftion as thole of the
Right Hon. Gentleman—who would think the re-
commencement of hoftilities even excufable for ail
fuch circurnftance. The Right Hon. Gentleman
Rated that this event, in times of profound peace,
would be fufficient to roufe the attention of all
the Powers bf Europe ; but did thofe powers ode-
ally feel Orly impreffion of alarm or jealoufy upon
the occafion? On the contrary, they almoft
ftantly recognized and approved the a. t; they did
not even wait to fee what drat it might have on
the progrefs of the negotiation at Amiens. He
would dun ask ninety-nine out of an hundred in
the country, what condud ought Ministers under
filch circumftances to purfue? and he would be con•
fident of receiving an anfwer recommending that
which they had adopted. Much had been laid, in
that Houfe, of the policy of Minifters in acceding
to the French Armament's failing from Brett four:
time fence for St. Domingo, but he would now
appeal to the plain common fenfe of the couniry
at large, whether it would not have been culpabte
to have thrown any obflacle in the way—to live
created any delay in the failing of that fleet .
From the difficulties which bad occurred in t.l:
way of that expedition, it mutt be obvious w 113:
aggravated mifchiefs would have refulted from
farther delay. Every man who valued the co r.