Star.
London, England, 1813-03-13 00:00:00

Relation su4tquently found himself involved in other
difficulties. - He had scarcely entered into Spilin
when he was encountered by the insuffidency of his
own means and by the superiority of the enemy. So
hardly was he pressed, that that which was at first a
'vigorous and offensive operation, assumed, and wisely
assumed the character of a retreat. Marmont, joined , Spanish _ ..... simply as 11%...-
by other troops, appeared in such force that it re- endangered, and might have been more so were there
gaited the ablest exertions of military skill to disen- not at the head of our army a man who, however he
gage the British army from its embarrassments. In might prize theglory consequent ,ai military achieve-
addition to all this, his Noble Relation heard nothing ment, yet had won that glory cheap when the inte-
of that on which he (Lord Wellesley) was sure that rests of bis country required its sacrifice. The dan-
'he must have relied—the arrival of the Sicilian ex- ger which appeared to arise from the want of disci.
:pedition. Under these circumstances he commenced pline consequent on the retreat of the troops, which
his retreat., He would not enter into the details of he felt himself called upon •to repress, went far to
this retrograde movement ; it was sufficient to say show the imperfection
that a combination of events rendered this retreat not of the system which it had
been asserted had .been acted on. It was well known
a matter of mere wisdom or prudence, but of actual what disorders were generally consequent either on
necessity. Lord Wellington commenced his retreat
system of his
systematically, by reversing the whole the advance er retreat of an army, how much disci-
pline was impaired by it, and, therefore, gratuitous
advance. ' It was not a feigned retrear,—it was no movements were of all lings the least expedient.—
deceptive movement, resorted to for. the purpose But the fact he would repeat was, that the army had
of ensnaring the enemy. It was an actual retreat,
which the superior force of the French, and the ab- been compelled to retire : with respect to that, there
could be no question. The only question was, whe-
sence of all tidings of the Sicilian expedition im- thee this compulsory retreat was owing to a deficien-
,aously dictated. And here •he would state it as cy in our resources, or those being not inadequate to
is firm opinion—an opinion, the soundness of
a mat-administration of them ? A Noble Lord might
which he was persuaded could be established by
proof, that had Lord Wellington received an addition
laugh, but in his apprehension there was much more
to his means of 15,000 British troops (which would cause for lamentation than merriment ; and he would
have been but a very moderate reinforcement, con- have been lost to every feeling of honour and of
that duty which he owed his country, if he had not
sidering the resources of the country), instead of
retreating; he would have been enabled to advance endeavoured to show in its proper light the system of
opinions to which he conceived it was owing that an
in perfect confidence and security, even had he re-
mained doubtful as to the co-operation of the Sicilian arduous campaign bad effected ,not our approxima •
force; don, but our removal from its object. Most certainly
and still more so had that force arrived, and
had he been apprized of its arrival. To this point we had not approximated to it, for what was it ? If
nothing but what was honest, great, and generous
be begged the particular attention of their Lord- mingled in it, was it not the reduction of the French
ships ; because it was applicable to all that followed. power in Spain, with an ulterior view to the se-
lf his Noble Friend bad received such a reinforce- curing our own freedom and independence, and
intent, an opportunity would have been afforded, of the attainment of a general and honourable peace ?
which his great military genius would, no doubt, have He would now trespass on the indulgence of their
gloriously availed itself. He, however, was compelled Lordships while he would risk a few statements, by
'o retreat ; and in the course of that retreat he achiev- which he hoped to throw much light on the subject
' distinguished victory, the character of which before them. He had stated, that a force of 15,000
well appreciated by the country to render it men, consisting of 12,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry,
necessary for him to say any thing upon it. But of re
c-oits of this victory his Noble Relation had been would have sufficed to ensure the ultimate success of
the campaign, and he had sbewn that if this force was
to take advantage. It had been well said by not sent out in proper time, it was not because our
ale Lord opposite, in moving the Thanks of
rnent to Lord Wellington for his great and resources were too confined to admit of it; it was
not then a question of submission to necessity between
- exploit, that he had converted retreat into the two Noble Lords, but simply a question of po-
But able and skilful General as be was, it lacy : and lie would endeavour to throw such
possible for him to convert at once a system of light upon it, as would greatly assist them in deci-
into a system of advance. To do that, he must ding it. It was ;,-st very difficult to _perceive the ad-
his whole system of depots and magazines.— vantages that would have resulted from a reinforce-
, himself ignorant of a subject of this kind, ment being sent out in sufficient time to enable Lord
spoke in the presence of many Noble Lords Wellington, after the siege of Badajaz, to keep in
would correct him if he was in error. As it was' check the French army that was advancing to im-
inctly understood, that although his Noble pede his operations. It was true, indeed, that the
could convert retreat into victory, he could landing of the Sicilian army had in some degree
Ally convert a system of retreat into a system caused a diversion in his favour, had prevented Sts-
'once. By this time the French corps, under chat marching against him • but this, in.the event of
Bonaparte, had been rendered efficient b
y the troops he had mentioned having been sent nut,
aachments from Suchet in Catalonia, sent after Su- would have been complete ; as it was, Joseph had
,w of the arrival of the Sicilian expedition at advanced, having been reinforced by a detachment,
It was true that Suchet did not move his from Suchet's force, while the Sicilian expedition had
corps, but he marched a sufficient force to retired into Alicant without having by their landing
Joseph to hang on the flanks of the British produced a single advantage save the very inade-
and to deprive Lord Wellington of all the quote one he had already noticed. Now the discus=
' the victory of Salamanca. If the Sicilian sion turned principally upon two points--whether we
ion bad arrived at an earlier period—if Lord could spare the number of men necessary for the re-
;gton's army had been augmented even by a inforcement, and whether our finances admitted of
•.ce, what m ight not have been the consequences their being sent out ? It would hardly be asserted
glorious achievement ! The subsequent fai- that the crisis was not such as called for the greatest
the attempt on Burgos was also attributable sacrifices, and that a fortunate result would not
insufficient means in Lord Wellington's pos. have been well purchased by any we could have
What ought to have been the reasonable made ' • yet strange as it might appear, the Noble
.ion of the country had the presence of ade- Lords had acted as if the opportunity which then
means rendered that operation successful ! His presented itself, would have been sure to present it.'
'relation had distinctly stated that the fate of self at all times. They said it was wrong to make a
ipaign depended upon it. Thus it appeared flourish in one campaign such as they should not.be
a hae before Burgos, a sufficient reinforce- able to repeat, and they prudently determined to,
id reached him from England, the reduction make such a reserve of the resources entrusted to
,oi tress might have decided the fate of the their management, as would enable theme to put forth
An. The object of the campaign was to corn- an uniform and equal mass of strength in all the
French w evacuate the South of Spain—an campaigns which they might have to conduct, and
lt object, in whatever way considered—im- this system they adopted at a time when they were,
as a military operation—important, as a perfectly aware of the certainty of hostilities between
Insideration. In the North and central part Russia and France—aware of "the temper in which
the terror of French doMinion operated in Russia was about to engage in those hostilities-
-but in,Andalusia and the other Southern aware that the resources of France were in the hands
a that feeling had a good deal worn out by of a man, he would not say of the only one able to
possession of the French ; and it was there- draw forth such an army as its Ruler had lately led
Ily desirable that possession should be termi- to destruction, but certainly of the only one who,
Instead of effecting this object, however, the having drawn it forth, would hazard it as he had
were compelled to evacuate the whole of done. They were aware of,,the all-grasping ambition,
but the frontier towns. Was it politic, or was
French call it) moral to allow this ? Such, of the violence of this man—aware of the eagerness
with which he would rush forward to the attain-
had been the result. By the want of suf.
means on our part, the French had been able ment of any object, however small, which could in-
:t and concentrate a powerful army, de- crease his power or flatter his vanity ; and yet, hav-
es of all the advantages of victory, and cow-
ing reason from all these considerations to hope for
ig us to retreat, and to end the campaign as we the most efficient diversion in the North of Europe,
it. But in addition to the evils of this disap- they reasoned about distributing their resources in
just sub-divisions to each future campaign, and missed
le in a military point of view, let their Lord- the golden opportunity which but too probably was
consider it as affecting the sentiments of the never to return—too short-sighted to perceive the ob-
niards towards the English. After having seen vious consideration that one bold effort might have
drive the French triumphantly before us, the Spa. precluded the necessity of any effort in future, and
is, in a period of time so short as hardly to be ' thus most beneficially spared those resources, the hus.
rated by the imagination, saw us driven in our banding of which was deemed so material The
before the French, and found themselves sud-
French might have been thus driven behind the Ebro
exposed to the return of the evils from which
_their power might have been prevented from taking
fondly flattered themselves they had been deli-
1. He hoped that the lesson thus inculcated on that route in Spain, which, it was much to be feared,
it would soon be found to have taken. The faith,
Spanish mind ii :gilt be wiped out by the future
!saes of the British Army ; but enquestionably the generous zeal we owed the Spanish people, which
we owed to Russia and to the world, would have I
in;preWon must be very strung and very unfa-
be
arable to us. The Noble Marquis then proceeded been evinced ;we should have been entitled to every
praise for our magnanimity, and riot less for our eco-
aenttrid, that the plan of operations which it was nomy, if economy were rightly understood. But it
~.ee had compelled the enemy to raise the siege
was not only in false economy we had erred, we had
Cadiz, and abandon Andalusia, had also expel-
contemplated danger, when not a shadow of it ex-
-1 the british force from Spain, and enabled the isted, and were I 'via: in expense at home, while our
aerny to take possession of the capital under circum-
:diva s higl,l) favourable to the confirmation of his 1 by
security at home was to be most effectually obtained
'lamer, taut the fact was sufficiently obvious that spirited exertion abroad. The soundest statesmen
who had ever contemplated the subject were unani-
ite view was one adopted subsequently to the result I mous in opinion that England were best defended by
operations which Undoubtedly were meant to be foreign warfare ; a most unloultedrfor and desirable
f.aiaa ed up by other; of a similar nature, if i
- m'sma" ' oportunity or carrying on such warfare had occurred
p tet.:nent had not prevented it. Had Lord Wet- I —we had a field now where we could meet our enemy
lington retired as a further inducement to the army hand to hand, and foot to foot, and yet our statesmen
to evacuate tile South of Spain ?—certainly not— could talk about the inexpediency of making a flou-
we had his (min statement that he had retired be- i_
risii, and advocate 4 long-protracted system which it
cause Sir Renland Hill's army was in such a situae could be scarcely hoped would he no' more Chap Ise.
lion the t the junction of the Army of the North gauvely Mischievous in placing that serene and ho,
was necessary to prevent its being cut olf. % The _

o distanee. . W ;jai re-
convinced that a misiresumesut of
and above that arising from the or-
'd em would have enabled Lord
his menses, proticjed it had
the battle of Salamanca, or
ave derived no rime advan-
tage from the SiciNen expedition than he actually
did derive ; and his chance of success would have
been materially enhanced, had it reached him pre-
vious to the siege of Badajoz. He would now
proceed to skew how easily such a reinforcement
could have been sent out ; so far as the number
of men was in question. We had at home forty.
five battalions of infantry, and sixteen regiments
of cavalry to supply it; and that it could be well
spared without hazard to the country must be ad-
mitted, when it was considered that we bad besides
70,000 militia, 200,000 local militia, and a volunteer
force of 68,000 men, in additioa to the force which
he had-shewn to be disposable. There was also the
garrison of Gibraltar, amounting to between 4 and
5000 men. Was it too much to say, that under these
circumstances a force, to the amount he had stated,
should have been sent to the Peninsula, at a moment
when the enemy was so employed in another quarter,
that no adequate means of resisting the accession of
strength they would bring to Lord Wellington's
army was in his power, and when there was no
sible reason for withholding . them? For he could.
state, upon competent autkorsty, that the disturbed
districts were principally, and effectually, occupied
by militia. But what was not the least singular fee.
cure in the whole business was, that there actually was
a greater number sent out, by a departure of the No-,
ble Lords from theirown system, than he had stated
to be requisite ; on the lowest calculation 18,000,
men had gone out, of these there were 4000 recepits,
who reached the army previous to the battle of Sala-
manca, as did also a reinforcement of cavalry and
infantry, to such an amount as gave a reinforcement
of 10,000 previous to the battle of Salamanca—the,
remainder did not reach the army till subsequent to
that engagement ; and the point at issue was, why
they did not reach it before ?—why, they were net
present at it, but withheld till intelligeoce of its bay-
ing been fought had been received. The reason, they
alfedged, for pursuing this line of conduct was, that
Lord Wellington had himself declined having any
reinforcements till March, the most favourable scows
for sending them out. They might have Lord Wel-
lington's authority for withholding them, if no refe-
rence was to be had to circumstances. If Lord Wel-
lington gave the advice, he could never.suppose that
it would be followed spite of any circumstance that
might arise to render it expedient to swerve from
it. Was it possible that they could ndt discern that
his advice was only given in the abstract, or thatahey
could imagine, that from Christmas to Lady-day to
March, was the only time when troops could-be seat
out with propriety, however pressing the necessity
for them, produced by victory or any other cause ?
A rule might be very just- in ordinary cases, which
would be extremely inapplicable in extraordinary
ones. But why did they not observe their own rule i
, why did they not send out troops in the early part of
the year 1812, particularly when they were aware of
the strenuous resistance with which the Russians .
were about to meet the, aggressions of Bonaparte?
And again, he would ask, why they departed from
it when a departure from it was now useless, and
send out troops after the battle of Salamanca ? As
soon as the intelligence of that battle had reached
them, their observance of times and seasons was no
more. The troops were immediately embarked at a
most unfavourable season of the year—at a season
when the transports in which they were stowed could
not even lie at anchor without suffering very severely.
The consequence was such as might have been ex-
pected : they arrived at Lisbon in November, and
found the roads so bad as to render it extremely diffi-
cult for them to reach the army ; accordingly none
of them did reach it till December ; and as to die
Horse Guards, after suffering most dreadfully at
Portsmouth, where they embarked, they arrived at
Lisbon with more of horse-hairs than horse-tails.—
(A largh.)—After this they, like the rest, reached
the army after the campaign was concluded, and
it was utterly impossible that they could do other-
wise. Now what was the reason that the latter
reinforcement did not go out with the first? and
what was the reason that to the aggregate they would
have composed was not added the number which
• would have made up the force he had stated to be
,
necessary ? It was incumbent on the Nobly Lords to
assign sufficient reasons, for if their Lordships would
grant him (Lord Wellesley) the Committee of In-
quiry for which he should move, he was prepared to
shew, upon the authority of the most competent and
skilful military officers, that if the reinforcements had
been sent, toe results would have been such as would
have satisfied the most sanguine. The resources of
the country, he would contend, rendered it a matter
of no difficulty to send it. The resources, in point of
men, had grown out of the alarm of the country....
an alarm which did honour to those who, alive to the
danger of their native land, had adopted such effec-
tual means for its defence, as the high state of the
regular army, in point of discipline and every other
requisite of a military force, reflected the greatest ho-
nour upon the illustrious Person whom he now saw in
his place, and from whose indefatigable exertions for
so desirable a purpose, the country, and he might
say the world, had derived such signal benefits...
(Hear, hear.) —But, happily, we no longer looked foe.
ward to that dreadful moment, when resources so
judiciously prepared were to be used in the imme-
diate defence of the country : the danger was re.
moved from our own shores, and it now became the
duty of Ministers to use those resources in the manner '
that would be most conducive to prevent,a recur-
rence of that danger. Whatever force could have
been spared should have been sent to the Peninsula.
Now that which he had stated to be absolutely nears.'
sary, would be but a trifling draft from our ordinary 1
sources. How little, then, could it be felt, when
taken from those ample ones which circumstances
had placed at our disposal ? How, when such an op-
portunity lay before tlsem, could dinisters devote 4
sum of £400,000 to calling out the Local Militia,
when that win, with a small addition, would have
enabled then to tape advantage of it to a yrry irn•
porta* extent; it might be thought that be wits
attributing too much to the aid of so small a sum,
but ,he would desire their 14ordsha4b 10 cOniklets

which the
sence of
periously I
'his firm
: which he
proof, Ilia
to his me
have beet
sidering I
retreating
in perfect
trained 4
force ; an
had he bi
he begge
ships ; be
If his Nol
itnent, an
which his
glorious!]
to retreat
ed that 41
was too v
necessary
the fruits
unable to
the Noble
Parliamei
glorious I
victory..
was impo
retreat ini
change hi
Be was 11
but he sp
',.. who woul
he distinc
i Relation
' not so ens
of advanc
Joseph 13
, detachme
chet knev
Alicant.
whole cor
enable Jo
army, an
`I. fruits of t
cxpeditrin
... Wellingtc
t, srnallforc
'i, of that gl
• lure in the
to the insi
session.
expettatic
quate me,
Noble Re
the camp
that if, v.
ment had
of that foi
campaign
pel the Fi
impertanl
i poi cant,
moral cor
of Spain i
full force-
provinces
the long 1
fore hip]
nated. 1
. British w
Spain, bu
it (as the
however,
ficient .me
to collect
priving ui
i pelting us
! began it.
, pointmem
• ships cons
Spaniards
us drive tl
lards, in
separated
turn, bete
•enly cip
hey fond
vered. f
th.: Spann
SUCCesSes
the inipre
vourisble I
i 1 to tonttni
1 boabte,l h
I;
4) of Cadiz,
led the 1
, .
! fur ru yto
' staiact shi
pp..cr,
tile view
tit operat
f,,iiimed
n Age.:nell
hug ton r
' • to evacu

Mi

not been attended With 's grace to toe General anxiety, an incekulable
and his troops, but, on.. the contrary, with au- peat, was convener
peradded glory; but had either glory or adieu, 13,0001nen over and above
tae been the result to the nation ? Hid 1$ dinerpsystem of reeruitirisi
' safety or that of Europe been increased by it?. It Wellington to follow up his
was materially diminished, but still more materially reached him previous to the
was the Spanish cause, considered simply as such, even though he should hal
A• n • nit