Star.
London, England, 1809-04-15 00:00:00

to be two modes of acting with this view, one which I
you state justly to be of greater hazard, in as much
as we place ourselves effectively in the power of the
Spaniards ; but, as you observe at the same time
with great truth, this may be worthy of risk, if the
people of Spain and their Government have sufficient
energy to recover from their late defeats. Of the
people I have no doubt; the Government are new,
but they are resolute, and, I believe, every man de-
termined to perish with their country. They will
not at least set the example of weakness and timidity
which the ruling powers and higher orders in other
states of Europe have exhibited. The military sys-
tem is certainly defective, but I am persuaded that
your representation on this, as well as all other points,
would be listened to with the greatest deference.
If you should determine to march into Spain, exclu-
sive of the importance of covering the capital, there
are, I think, these advantages which would result
from hastening the measure. We have now in Cas-
tile an army of 20,000 men, upon which Castanos is
falling back. The reinforcements are daily passing
through from the provinces, and the addition of the
British would give a force, very much;l should think,
superior to any thing which the French would be
able to assemble by that time, especially having a
strong country in arms against them on their left, the
whole way from the Pyrenees. There is, besides, at
present a great delay in the arrival of the reinforce.
ments which were promised them, and which, if they
had been sent, would, by this time, have composed
an enormous force. There are reports that the resis-
tance to the conscription has been much more obsti-
nate than usual, and the pastoral letter of the Bishop
of Carcassone seems to imply as much.
Every great effort on the part of France has been
preceded by an interval of weakness or internal distur-
bance; an advantage therefore which should be ob.
tained at this moment would be of double importance,
inasmuch as it would render a conscription for a third
attempt upon Spain infinitely difficult. If, on the
other hand, the French with their present forces are
allowed to maintain their present advantages, and to
await the completion of their conscription, they would
pour into Spain with a number of troops which would
give them the immediate possession, of the capital,
and the central provinces. The war would then be
reduced to an absolute competition between the two
countries, in standing out against the waste of popu-
lation, enormous as it would be on Lo h sides. I can-
not but think, then fore, that considerations both of
policy and generosity call upon us for an immediate
effort.—lf, however, this view of the subject should
not appar sufficiently clear or conclusive to induce
you to take a step, which would, I am convinced
(since you do me the honour to refer to me on that
subject), ni,,s2t with the approbation ef his Majesty's
Gcorenum.nr. I would venture to recommend retaining
the pos:tion Astorga. The retreat from that place
to Corunna would, as far as an unmilitary man may
be allov.;ed to judge, be a matter of less difficulty than
through l',,rtugal to Lisbon ; and we might in that
poition \v.:it for the reinforcements of cavalry from
England, which would enable the army to act in the
flat country, which opens immediately from that
})oint, and extends through the whole of Leon and
Old Castile.

I have already troußled you with my political rea-
son on this head ; I mention this, however, in my
humble opinion only, as the least objectionable of
two modes of retreat ; the object, I should con-
ceive, would be, to unite a force capable of re-
pulsing the French before they receive reinforce.'
znents. The covering and protecting Madrid is
surely a matter of great moment for effect in Spain,
and much more in France and in the rest of Europe.
It would be a point of the utmost importance for Bo-
naparte to be able to publish a decree, or to date a
letter ft-4m Madrid. The people of the town are full
of resolution, and determined to defend it in spite of
it. situation, which is judged to be an unfavourable
one. This determination ought surely to be encou-
, raged by a shew of support. The siege of Madrid by
a pretender to the throne, would be a circumstance
decisive against his claim, even if in other respects it
had been a just one.—(To le continued.)