Star.
London, England, 1815-05-26 00:00:00

WAR AGAINST BONAPARTE.

The Order of the ply Tor taking into considera.,
tion the Message ot the Prince Regent having been
moved, and the Message read ;
Lord CASTLEREAGH saich in rising to call the
attention ot the House to the Prince Regent's most
gracious Message. and to submit to them that propo-
sition which appeared to Lim necessarily to grow out
of it, he was sure it was unnecessary for him to say,
that it was impossible for any man to have a more
deep, more awful sense of the consequences of that
vote, to which he felt it his duty to endeavour to
persuade the House to come. He thought he might
assume, as unfortunately the House had been too
much in the habit ot considering questions connected
with war, not. to have decided on the bearings ot
many of the points which otherwise would-have been
comprehended in the discussion, that it was not nece.- ,
sary tor him to go into the subject on that extended
scale which, under other circumstances, would have I
been expected. If he should omit any thing in ar-
gument or explanation wkich,should appear of un-
portance to the House, hi hoped he might be per-
mitted to supply it in closing tie debate. However
important the question now to he considered might
be, stripped of ail that extraneous matter which had
been connected with it, but which, in fact, fOrmed no
part of it, be flattered himself that no branch of the
qutistien on which the Houle would that night be
called upon to decide, would either appear' so Cote*

plicsted as some imagined, nor the difficulty in com-
bo; hi 'a conclusion so great as had beer stipptised.—
The Or* topic Which he .felt it necessary to separate
from the preceot discussion,. was the doubt which had
been raised oitli respect to the conduct of one great
power on the Continent, Austria, from whom the ra-
tification of the Treaty of the 25th of March had not
been received, though her assent to it had been oil
chilly noticed, when the subj.:el =vris last wuclied
upon. He had felt this might start a ditlicolth, hot
he was happy to say in the course of that day fie had
been enabled to remove that difficulty altogether, for
that morninghe• had etchang, eel with the Ambassa.
dnr of the Emperor of Austria the ratification of the
Treaty. the substance of which had been laid before
the House, which Treaty was now technicallp as
before in solidity, a complete document.; being or-
mally ratified by the three great confederated powers.'
He might, perhaps, now be allowed to react-the note
which had been transmitted from the Austrian Go-
vern,ment, on the declaration which had accompanied I
the ratification of the Treaty by the Prince Regent.
which note be Proposed to Lay OA the table of the
House to-morrow. and he tliought it right to state,
the declaration of the Prince Regent had been ac...
ceded to iu the same terms by the Sovereigns of
Russia and Prussia. The paper in question was
'signed by the Austrian Minister Prince Metternich,
and ran as follows :—" The undersigned Minister
Of State to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria,
having informed his August Master of die note corn
*summed by Lord Castlereagh from his Royal High-
ness the Prince Regent on the Bth article ot the treaty
of the 25th of March; has received orders to de-
.clare that the interpretation put upon that Article
by the British. Government, is entirely conformable
to the principles on which Imperial Majesty pro-
poses to regulate his policy during the piesent war.—
The Emperors though irrevocably determined to di-
rect all his efforts, as bound by treaty, in concert
with his Allies, against the power of Napoleon Bona-
parte, is nevertheless convinced that the duty he owes
his subjects, and the principles of the Confederation it-
self, would notperniit him to engage in a war to dictate
any particular forth of government to the French peo.
ple. Whatever wishes the Emperor may have formed
to see his Christian Majesty on the theone of France,
and solicitous as he is to contribute with his Allies to
'the accomplishment of so desirable an object, his Im-
perial Majesty, nevertheless, thiiiks it right to accede
by this declaration to the explanation transmitted by
the English Government, an the exchange of the ra-
tifications which the undersigned is awhorized to ac-
cept accordinAly."—The House could now no longer
pause on entering upon the discussion of this question,
on tie ground that the policy of Austria was not suf-
ficiently known. But it was objected that tbe House
ought not to proceed to dispose of this question, till
the whole of the negociations which had tans place
were laid iselore them. He contended that it had
been ifie invariableproctice of 'Parliament, ors receiv-
ing such a Message, to take it into consideration the
very next day of. business, which was not a day of
supply, and to receive those explanations which the
Minister was prepared to offer. This he shewed to
have been the constant course from the time of Queen
Anne up to the present period ; and -he maintained
that the House could come to a general resolution to
support the Sovereign in the war in which he was en-
gaged without going into all the negociations which
preceded it, and without expressing approbation or
disapprobation of the treaties which might have been
concluded. He admitted that the treaties themselves
could not be disposed of till the whole were laid be-
fore Parliament; but the common sense of the case
proved that they might support the Crown in a war,
without first rectainng information connected with
the events,which preceded it, which could not, per-
haps, be communicated without injury to the public
service. This consideration was sufficient to prove,
that if they could not decide on the treaty recently
Concluded, they were not precluded from giving their
support to one particular branch of it. He wished
this principle ot separation to be admitted, because
he wished the Treaty of Vienna to be thrown out of
their consideration in the debate of that night. He
desired this should be done, in order to miaow the
question ; as their vote would not necessarily be con-
nected with that-Treaty, which was perfectly distinct
from the subject ot debate. It was quite impossible
that in a Treaty two objects of concert might be
agreed upon s one of them might be a war against
the power of Donato-ate—the other to take measures
for mointaining the Treaty of Paris, which, or the
Treaty founded on its basis at Vienna, ought to go.
vein affairs of Europe. Whatever then might
bi said by him on the. subject of these Treaties in the,
course of his statement, the House would still be left
perfectly master of its own opinions respecting them.,
He was only anxious that, in stating what he had '
now submitted to the House, he sheuld not be consi-
dered at all to shriek from meeting, the question
which might he raised on them. He believed in his
conscience, that after such a war as the last, and after
all Europe had been thrown into that state of dislo-
cation which .had grown out of it, that the arrange-
ments which had been made were the most fortunate
for her peace and happiness that could have been de-
vised. In putting them aside then, tor this night, he.
trusted it would not be supposed that he shrunk from-
their defence. When the proper period arrived, he
'was prepared to justify them, as carrying into execq.
tiop, not only in substance, but almost la all the de-
tails, that plan which had been 'I Tined by a states-
man fur whom hei and those who acted with him,
must ever feel the highest deference iind admiration.
Mr. Pitt. He (Mr. Pitt) when contemplating the
possible_ success of a great confederation :pima
France, had considered :hat general arrangement
Which had been in a great meaoire carried into effect
to be that Which would prove guest conducive to ti.e
happiness of Europe. He (Lora istlereagh) was
prepared to chew, when the yin:stints cone IlefOre the
House, that the decisions which laid L...•:n made with
respect 49 the immediate interes.:s of this cpuatry

were more advantageous than those fondly co:,t.lm-
plated by Mr. Pitt as the consequences of successful
war. He had not hepA that such good conditions
could be obtained for Holland as had been secured
at the Congress. Mr Pitt had considered it neces-
sary to extend the power of Prussia beyond the Rhine,
and the annexation at Genoa with Piedmont was a
part of his plan, much as that arrangement had of
kite been censured by those h opposition to the pre.
sent Government. .At an early period of the lite
war, at least when the successes of the Allies had first
given a prospect of the seccessfel termination of the
strugele against France, soon after the Ituscian army
het crowd the Vistula. he (Lord Castlereagh) had
transmitted a L-.•lpy 4 the lisp itch of Mr. rice to the
Amb.iss Ont. of the Emperor Alexander, eel desired
to bt appriz!d if any, end what alteration, had taken
place in the views if Russia with respect to that plan,
in the event ot the cootest being brought tea success-
issue ? The answer to this comnunicltinn in-
formed him, that " the E:np:ror of AILSSIA had no-
ziliotT to sum in departure Pram the principles of
the arrangement laid dowa by Mr. Vitt in the year
MK." This we sortie proof of their solidity, and
oa these principles England bad gore into the cc;n-
test, closely united in the views with her Aliies.—
rietiag on these feelings which had rcgulmed hi . con.
duct, boreev.ir he might be sensible, that it se is not
p issible an air.riigernrin with Roy p .riicl:;:y power
could fir the rt.litions of all EUrne ; aGd
he did, ti ,t as ell Europe most co-ceer e- in t!:e great
work, it could only be ear cted in et sprit o! e'en-
promise; yet was it ne small satislaeti ei to him,
and to all who reverenced the poi .its ot, that great
Statesman, Mr. Pitt, as he did, ihai they had lived
to see that reduced to practice Inch 1.1,, great mind,
when given to the condd ration et thus imp tilt
question, had fondly imagined in chi ab- ract as the
utmost object of his wi.hes. His plan tor checking
the power of France had been embodied inah it-
rangement which had beet attache id, as tee (Lord
Castkr..agli) must always titin!i, un;airly, at a tuna
when the House had not been regularly informed on
the subject, and fur this it was that it had been endea-
• voured to heap obloquy on the present Government.
Wishing then to narrow the question, he would call
for no opinion on the Treaty of Vienna. That, when
completed, would be laid before them, and it wonki
be for them to pronounce their judgment on it, but
in the present state of things it would be idle to main-
tain that they ought to shut their ey passing
events, and was in altale of comparatirinactivity
till information of all that had taken place at Vienna
had been laid before the House. He wished at once
to bring the House to the only point, at present sub-
mitted to their consideration. He should call upon
them to give their support to the Crown in the war
in which we were engaged—( Ifear).—tor the question
was not now whether or not we should go to war, bet
whether, being at war, we should treat for peace with
France, separate from the Allies, by departing from '
those principles on which they had determined on en-
tering into a new contest ? In the debates which had
incidentally taken place on this subject, it had not
been denied, that it it were considered espealint to
take such a course, just grounds existed for going to
war. Nothing could be more obvious than that Eng-
land and the Allies had a right to go to war with
France it the French'people supported the power of
Bonaparte. In proportion as it might be contended
that every nation has a right to choose its own Ge.
vernment, so much stronger was the right of the Al-
lies to make war on Fiance. In the choice of a Go-
vernment, so that choice did not affect the salety of
others, no man was disposed to admit, in the largest
sense, the right of every nation to act for itself mote
than he was. In proportion as the restoration of Bo-
naparte was made the act of the French nation, the
offence of France against the Allies was the greater.
It u could he proved, which he did not be,ieve it
could, that Bonaparte was at present at the head of
the nation with die consent of the people, the it:frac-
tion of the Treaty of "Paris would be greater, as by
that solemn act they were bound (and this was in
fact the basis of it) to establish another Government.
And really we should be in a situation somewhat
ludicrous with respect to that individual who now
presumed he was at the head of the French nation,
it it were attempted to make the Treaty of Paris a
Treaty between England and him. Whit. was that
treaty I The first article in it stipulated that he
should not reign over France. What, then, was he
to become the conserviuor of this Treaty ? Could
the Allies confide to 'him the execution ot it, when
the first article, and indeed the whole substance of its
went to exclude him from the Sovereignty of France,
and greater benefits were given to that country than
would have been given had he remained at the head
of it, as it was supposed that under another Govern-
ment France would be more disposed for peace than
it was reasonable to expect she could ever be under
him. .The question was fiot now, whether the Allies
should declare war, but whether they sit'onld 'open
negotiations with Bonaparte, as the head of the
, French, whom they by a solemn Treaty had esclnd.
sdetioni that situation ? They had now to consider,
whether they would recognize, es the Saveice.o of
France, a person so proscrib,rd—whethet they would
admit him into all the complicarions ot the idEtirs of
Europe, and leave him to make the most ot his re-
serves, so that he might go to war wi.h them at that
period when to do so might best suit his ambition ?
We (the Allies and England.) were then in a :tate
of war with Bonaparte, and consequently with
France, it he were the head of it. Howcver the si-
tuation ot those individnals might be lamented who
were not friendly to his Government, but would be
involved in the calamity which his unprincipled con-
duct brought on the nation (though the Antes must
be desirous to soften the rigours ef it as much as
possible') no consideration tor them could alter the
general relations between France and the A.lies. H.
certainly telt that nothine but a cafe ti! extreme lit-
craity ought to urge one country to eia to .w.r t n
account or the personal character of the. kkivereizs

.~.~

C :~....

of another. He felt that in proportion as every couu:
try clahned the right of settling their own internal
affairs, it was possible the motives of the 'Allies
would be misrepresented, and they would be de-
scribed to have departed from those principles which
first united them in arms against Bonaparte. In a
case. however, so extreme as the present, they could
not separate the Government from the nation, and
the conduct of the individual who was placed at the
head of the former, was sufficient to justify that ap-
peal to the sword which was about to be made. The
case was however strengthened by the consideration
that he had been placed at the head of the govern.
ment by the French army, who considered it as es-
sential to their interests that their Chief should not
be of a pacific disposition, and inclined to abide by
those Treaties which Louis was disposed to maintain.
The n hole course of events which had marked the
esti aordinai y career of Bonaparte, proved that peace
was not to be expected with him. Admitting his ta-
lents to he great, these but increased the danger, and
went not only to affect the interests, but to endanger
the safety of this country. if they watched him
through his whole career, it would be seen that in
war or peace, in prosperity or adversity, still the
same perseverance and unrelenting system of policy
was distinguishable. A wish to govern all countries
seemed constantly to actuate him, and led him to at-
tempt to extend the dominion of France over all sur-
rounding countries. This object, it would be seen,
he hart constantly pursued, even in what he called a
state of peace, and greater acquisitions had been
made by him while protessecily at peace, than had
ever been gamed by war. It was timing peace that
he had procured the annexation of Holland, of the
Ligurian Republic, and virtually, though nut actu-
ally, Switzerland to France. The thirty-second mi.
lirary division was thus added to France; and it was
in peace that the greatest and most malignant acts of
aggression of his whole system had been ventured
upon—lie meant his attack upon the independence of
Spain anti Portugal, in contempt of Treaties, and
%%line bound to them by positive stipulations. It Was
at Fontailibleau, a place fated to be celebrated for
Treaties concluded to be annulled and neglected,
that he, concluded those Treaties which preceded his
entrance into the Peninsula. Adn,i'ted into Spain
by a base Minister, lie had thus acquired a footing in
that country, which gained, he had net hesitated to
attempt to subject it to the dominion of France.
This war his conduct to n country whose only fault
had been that of unqualified submission to his will.
Thus constantly he. had pursued the objects of his
ambition, in peace as in war, and more successfully
in the former than in the latter. In all circumstances
the restless amlitition of this extraordinary man had
been unreleptingly the same. Ever seeking a new
object, it appeared that he WAS destined to run a
course against the happiness of all nations. If they
looked at him, the very acme. of his fortune imme-
diately after the peace of Tilsit, when all Europe
seemed incapable of affecting his security —when he
became allied with one of the most ancient families
or the Continent—when in short every thing seemed
to conspire to meet his wishes, instead of sitting down,
satisfied with his good fortune, he remained as dis-
contented as ever. Nay, as if to skew how impossi-
ble it was for him to be at rest, when his hands were,
as it would be thought, sufficiently full with the war
in Spain, that moment bad he selected for the most
gigantic of all his projects, that which.had ultimately
turned to his ruin, the expedition to Russia. Then,
though the peaceful disposition of the Russian Mo-
narch had inclined him to abstain from war, so long
as it was possible to avoid it. Bonaparte, notwith-
standing the difficulties with which he had to contend
Spain, had marched to annihilate the independence
of the lain country that remained in Europe which
bad not felt the yoke of France. If they followed
his course through this contest—when. they saw him
swept from' Russia, driven out of Germany, beaten
la France, .and forced to fly before the Allies in his
own country, still it would be found that his dispo-
sition was the same, and that when he treated with
the Ministers of the Allied Powers at Chatilion. Ins
cungiut.t was marked by Iris accustomed sacrifice of
every principle, and the sanction of every diplomatic
fraud that could disgrace a Sovereign. On a former
night, be (Lord Castlereagh) had adverted to a do-
cument which had come into his possession, and
which, however it might be called in question, he
firmly believed to be genuine, and had therefore no
hesitation in subrilitting it to the House. In this it
would clearly be seen, that the object of Bonaparte,
instead of giving peace to the world, was only to gain
time, that he might be able to break the engagements
which he 'might enter into. What his ultimate intend
tions were, might be collected from his anxiety to
preserve those three places which opened to him an
eatrance into the heart of Germany, into the heart
of Daly, and into the North of Europe, especially
that part of it most connected with cur interests.—
When such a man Was restored to the Government
of France, by an army who felt the pacific disposi,
tinn of Louis XVIII. to be incompatible with its in.
terests, he a ()aid ask, whether, from, the character of ,
the individual, if it was not necessary to resist his
retensions, if we viished to preserve our own jade-
pendence ? His Lordship then read the document to
which he had referred, 'itemising, that the defence
which it contained for the breach of faith contem-
plated by Bonaparte, by comparing it with what had
taken plate at Dantzic and Dresden, whose garrisons
had capitulated, but the capitulations had not been
ratified by the Commanders, whose approbation was
necessary, threw a strong light on the character of the
mm, since, on these, he could feel himself justified
in concluding a treaty, which he proposed to violate,
though it was worthy of observation, that at Dantzic
and at Dresden, the commanders concerned had
taken all possible care to place the garrisons in the
same situation in which they were before they surren-
dered, notwithstanding their sense of duty forbid them
to ratify the conventions concluded without their con-
eurrence. This course of reasoning, on the part of'
Bonaparte, it was the more important to notice ; as,
when it was seen, that on his military power he did
not hesitate to annul and break any engagement he
might make, how hopeless wouhrbe our situation if
. our dependence was upon any thing which lie might
call an engagetnent. The paper was dated 19th of
March, .1814, was addressed by the Duke of Bassano
to the Duke of Vicenza, and consisted of instructions
from Bonaparte to the)atter. In this paper, which
was written at the time'when . Bonaparte was placed

in a most critical situation between the armies of Bln-
cher and gehwartzenburg,
.Caulincourt was orefero4
not-to come to a final adjustment, but to keep things
dams le bas, that he (Bonaparte) might have an oppor-
tunity of breaking through,: whatever arrangethents
might have been agreed to. The translation of the.
letter from the Duke, of Bassano to the Duke of Vi-
, =flea, in the cypher of the Emperor with his Mini-
sters, was as follows : -
" MAlteir
" Sta—Your Excellency will have recelved,orwdr' 14.
doubtless,i
in the course of to-day. receive the dispatch from Rheims, of
which M. FrUCllOt was the bearer, and whisk was accompanied
a letter from the Emperor. i ,
" The Emperor desires that you fouls, avoid explaining year-
self deal ly upon every thing which may rotate to delivering sip
the fortresses of Antwerp, Mayence, and Alexandria; if you
should be obliged to consent to these cessions. His Majesty in-
tending, even though be should have ratified the Treaty, to be
guided by the military situation of affairs. Wait eft the last mil-
mint. The had faith of the Allies in respect to the capitulations
of Dresden, Danizic, and Corcum, authorises as to endeavour
tot to be duped. Refer, therefore, questions to a military
arrangreent, as was done at Pres gh, Vienna, and Tilsit.—
His Majesty desires that you will lose sight of the disposi-
tion which lie will feel, not tode r iver up those three keys of
France, if military events, on which be is willing still to rely,
should permit him not to do so, even if he shouldisave signed the
cession of all those provinces. in a word, his Majesty wishes
to bei,able, after the treaty, to be guided by existing circumstan-
ces to the last moment. He orders you to burn tins letter as soon
as you have read it
He fully believed this letter to be genuine. That it
would be 'denied by the enemy was a thing to be ex-
pected as a matter of course. Thii was a part of
Bonaparte's system which was incorporated with
falsehood. Fabrications and false statements were
things that occurred in the ordinary course of his
affairs. When he was at Lewes, on one occasion,
French Papers came to hand, and lie read them to
the people at one of their coffee-houses, which de-
scribed the enthusiasm of the people, and the great
efforts which they had made in behalf ni Bonaparte's
Government, though the greatest apathy had prevail-
ed there during the whole contest. These forgeries,
howeviT, sere quite regular, and were constantly its-
serted in the Journals, even though the departments
.troin which it. was pretended the news had come
were in the possession of the Allies. But he was I
aware what lie had advanced would not justify a war,
unless it should appear that it might be. commenced
with a rational prospect of success. The grounds on
,which success was to be looked for, he would briefly
state, and it might be right to mention, that with re-'
spect to economy, a war which might be short, was,
to be preterred to an armed peace, which might be
succeeded by a war of longer duration: But it was
thought the forces of the Continental Powers had
been diminished since last year, and he admitted that
if this were the case, or that there was a division in
the councils of the Continental Powers—that, in fact,',
if they had any doubt cf , its being their interest, at
once to have recourse to atms, the line of conduct
•which it would be wisest for this country to pursue
in that case, would be to wait for the danger, and
resist it when it came. Assuming this to be the'
•course which England ought to pursue, he could
state, that the Allies had no doubt, for he could
assure the House that England had done nothing to
excite, to persuade, or to Provoke the Allies to en-
gage in the contest. England being the country
least menaced by the danger, and possessed of the
most undoubted resources to meet it, it was not for•
her to incite them to action. Her language had
been—" du that which you think best liar your own ,
interests ; if yin' determine on war we are ready to
embark with you, and will never leave you ; but
above all, do not divide your strength, nor look on
the contest as but the struggle of a day, hut consider
it as likely to be attended with great difficulties."—
This was the language which had been held to the
Allies on the part of this country, and they had deli-
berately decided on war as necessary to their exist-
ence. The result of all their deliberations had been
this, that no safety for the world was to be hoped
from negotiations with Bonaparte. There then, in
these decisions, were the strongest proofs of the
greatest unanimity amongst the great Powers of the
Continent, perhaps, that the history of Europe had
ever disclosed. AU were united •in this sentiment,'
that where Bonaparte was concerned, safety could
only be found in resistance. He now came to speak
of the means with which the Allies were about to
commence the war. To say that contest was not in
the hands of PROVIDENCE, and that in this, as in other
wars, the result might not baffle all calculation,
would be idle, but speaking of the relative means of
the parties, if success on the part of the Allies were
probable in the former contest, 'that probability was
now greatly increased. No man was more disposed
than himself to admit the mighty efforts which a
great country united, and considering itself fighting
for its own. soil, might make to repel a foreign in-
vader. Of this they had the example of France her-
self, but making allowances for the success with
' which the delusions there practised might in some in-
stances have been crowned, he contended the situas-
tion of that country was not such' as to lead to those
exertions whieh might formerly have been expected
from • her. there was something in the state of
France sus distinct from that in which she was placed
ar the commencement of the former war, that any
man who would infer that the conduct of the people
in opposition to the confederation would be what it
was then, would draw a most unwarrantable info.
fence. After recalling their legitimate Sovereign,
whose reign bad been one of mercy, and who had
not been unmindful of the liberties of the people, a
great portion of them had become sincerely attached
to him, and this; notwithstanding the imposing pre.
sence of the army of Bonaparte, had been manifested
in a variety of instances. It was plain they were not
attached to Cie present Government, and the revolu:
tionary spirit on which some calculated had almost
wholly died away—had perished through the horrors'
to which it had given birth: From all the informs.'
tion he had received, lie was satisfied that France,
with all her faults, had not turned from the Monarch
to whom she had sworn allegiance, sincerely to attach
herself to that man, and that army by whom his
power had been subverted.' France in former wars
had been accustomed to calculate, not only on the
extent of her own means, but on what were called
her " external resources," the spoils of other nations.
She could reckon on these no longer, and was there-
fore now in a situation widely differing from that in
which she stood at the period when all her great
conquests were made, and in a situation not at all
better than that which she held in the last campaign.
Whatever the issue of the present campaign might

.it Rest be admitted the Allies were in sufficient
force' to occupy a considerable portion of France.—
All those places to which they might be enabled to
advance would be nullified to the treasury of France,
and as funds wereindispensible to the support of such
a contest, every place thus occupied, or every place
'where, from the vicinity of the Allies, the inhabitants
.
might be encouraged to withhold the payment of the.
imposts required of them, would tend to cripple the
means of Bonaparte, and many he knew there were
who were far from being disposed •to support his
power, though they were not brave enough to attempt
its overthrow. Under these circumstances, to com-
' pare the present situation of France with its former
state, was to reason most hillaciously. On the other
hand, a great moral feeling was spread throughout
Europe. Not only the Government of all the coun-
tries on the Continent, but the population of each,
felt that as all the misfortunes which they had had to
deplore proceeded from the. ambition and wickedness
of the French Government, all their hopes depended
on the war being so closed, that the resources of
one of the greatest countries in Europe, should no
longer be left at the disposal of Bonaparte.—
He (Lord Ca.tlereagh), had anxiously inquired into
the spirit of the Confederation, and he found that :it
no period had they ever been disposed to put forth
their hostilities against France with more ardour.—
Since the Treaty of Paris, circumstances had tended
greatly to augment the forces of the Allies, nut only
in numbers, but in every thing that could make them
effective. Similar augmentations of the French ar-
mies had not taken place, for France being less af-
fected by Arrangements to be made subject tJ the
signing of the Treaty, and Louis anxious to abide
by his engagements, had been the first to give his
nation the advantage of a state of peace. Not only
were the armies of the Allies consolidated on a higher
scale than eyes they had been before, but most im-
portant measures had been resorted to in the event of
failure to guard against the recoil of the blow which
they meditated against the power of Bonaparte. In
the whole of the countries on the Rhine, and indeed
throughout the whole of Germany, the militia,
Called
the Landsturm, had been called out to form a de-
fensive force for the protection of each country. The,
allied armies were on such a scale during the pro-
ceedings of the Congress, that he had some times
trembled to reflect, that their deliberations were car-
ried
on in the midst of one vast camp, the armies of
which, independent of those of France, he was sure
he did not exaggerate in stating them to contain not
fewer than a million of men in arms, all regular sol-
diers, under the several Potentates there assembled.
These things stated, it must be felt, that if the great
struggle must be made at some period or other, a
time could not arrive when it could be ventured upon
with less hazard. I-lad Bonaparte delayed his return
' but a single month, he believed it would have made
a vast difference in the attitude of the Allies, and
instead of her applying now in their hands, they
' would have to recreate their armies at an immense
expense, as France was now compelled to do by Bo-
naparte,'-from small establishments. There was no
reason to suppose the military power of Europe op-
posed to France in a moral and virtuous cause, as
the Allies thought would not be able to act with suc-
cess. Such a force as they possessed must appear
adequate to strike the great blow, and such arrange-
ments were made as would secure its being always kept
up to its full complement. The population of each
country, organized as it was, would be sufficient to
guard against their being again overrun by Bonaparte
in the event of reverses being experienced by the Al-
lies, and a sudden rush attempted by the French.—
If the Allies were not now prepared for war, there
were no grounds for thinking they would be prepared
at any future period, and therefore the only alterna-
tive was to wait till their present means were dimi-
nished, or the confederation, now unanimous, should
be divided in opinion—till the French Ruler, not only
directed by his own armies, but encouraged by some
event which for a time might alienate the Allies from
each other, take advantage of such a circumstance
again to fill Europe with war. He was ptepated to
admit that some might consider that it was wise to
go to war with France, and yet be indisposed to sup-
port that war by granting subsidies to foreign powers.
However unsound lie might deem their policy, yet
they might vote in favour of the Address to-night,
without binding themselves in any manner to the
other part of the question. They might differ with
him on every other point, and even on thC,Treaty of
Vieeaa, and yet might conscientiously vote with
him. The House, he conceived, would tail in its
duty, if it did not support the Continent. The amount
of the subsidies he intended to-morrow to pro-
pose, would shew whether the war was ours, or that
of the Continental Powers ; whether it was a con-
test in which they thought fit to engage, provideJ
we should pay the expenses ; or whether they took
the greatest part of those upon themselves, and what
we gave was only a matter of assistance and encou-
ragement. The House would then have a pledge
that the efforts which they made were their own, to
secure their own interests, and not the consequence
of our subsidies. It was not necessary, howzver, that
he should now enter into those details. They formed
no part of the vote of this night, and it would be
taking a most extraordinary view of the sttbject to
engage in the present war, and to starve its opera-
tions. It had thus been his endeavour to open the
general ground of the war, trusting much to the mind,
the intelligence,
of e House, which had o
tli e experience andfr
25 years
extensive
ledge
dwelt
oh passing events. Although painful to his feelings
to make a proposition of this nature, instead of it-1
alining those brilliant prospects of peace and security 1
which, atter so many exertions; the country had al
nu.o.etstoodncomparingowciohiolttutacirgne
niolgsseutrnits:tJesoioTu.arfotiromn
right to contemplate, yet he felt much consolation in
e.rvii‘4'Sl'larst.liatMin'ew‘i:•ecriel I
power o e
of isialefeteyn,ewn•iiyti.muLteat
sthinegHleoualset‘il recollect,
ity.iathireeqp urti)rs hunt
ed !
00 erni
oef
Portugal
oaortut
urtgh
aaoltwn4
dmoment,moral wilihteyn,
engaged
Spain.—
We had not hesitated to interpose our strong hand
—we had felt bold in thenjustice of our cause, and
became the protectors of other countries. • This re-
solution had been pursued with a degree of perseve-
rstarnucgegwlehdictlhirdouidghhotzoeusrtotrom_the country.
we
survived thVberperhiodd
e --a—
of calamity, and had the satisfaction of seeing
those two nations freed, and the whole of Europe
confederated against Frances instead of being com-

limed against us. It was, therefore, evichnt, that we
now started from a different point. We were doer,
fighting against France, and the whole powel of Eu
rope.—All Europe was now 'contending with u..
against France ; nay, a strong combination in Fran:c
itself was pro!)airly termed on our side, so that "
were fighting with the Powers of the Continent and
a portion of France, against the ustiviiittiOn ot-lLua-
parte and of the army. Every thing, therefore, wit
calculated to pninidte and encont rge,rutr.effcrts to
preserve that pence which 04 arms bad en, noe7:•d
from the individual who once more wielded the

veteign authority. It WAS on these grounds that 1,
wished the House to support the Crown in it, er,r.

tinns against the conanii;n enemy, and lir.: ••
question whether the Treaty of Vienna w..:s
consequence of that of nois ? Nn one c,.;;!d
approach the Powers of Europe with c.inl!:•.) r•• •
alter they had pronounced their dccidcd srs lc
with any thing wh;ch tended to diseoo:a e r
efforts. In Liet the queiti:ln would 'Ts-4ft Us( ii i.r ,

this, whether it ►old be thloght ►wise
ourselves from the comrooit cLL,rts trade•. by e
powers of rEuropi., atid recommend peaci± instea
of ►w.tr ? The Noble Lord concluded by moving ait
Address to the Prince Regent, thanking his
Highness for the commuo7cation of the Treatie.,c,
responding with his gracious Islessare. and
him of the concurrence of the Conimons irn etre;:.i•i
his Royal Ifighne►s t!i adopt those measuri.s
might be necessary, in conjunction w.th his Maje,t;-'s
Allies, against the common enemy at this is:porta:A
crisis.

Lord GEORGE CAVENDISH thought that
the Allied Powers bad now altued thud. langua,:z.
They had origin illy disclaimed any lute... Jon .1 ~,_
tethering with the internal Government of Fr4l.c.f.
bHt it was now clear that their sole object was to os
throw Bonaparte, and to restore the bourbons—

(Near, hear.) Tui was proved by the Sth article
the Treaty of Vienna. No one could have more rt.
spect than he had for the fallen great, and terse.
quently for Louis XV lIL but whether througli.the
inability of their Minister s, or some Other cause, he
thought the Bourbons had but very little chance ti
be restored; but even supposing they should hare
had that chance, it would be greatly impaired, it rasa
destroyed by the interference of Foreign Powers. It
we looked to the spirit of that country, to' tin it jea-
lousy of external i:;;erlerence, it would be seen 1.!...t
nothing but what arose from the interior could ttr....t
an alteration in the Government. He could u: t,
therefore, 7,ive his consent to such an interference
pleb a war. Experience ought to have instruct:•d
better. When our blood and finimc‘s h.a.l
hau,:ted by twenty-Eve years of war, he
see much hope of success, especially when even
itself had not be:n as:e to secure us all the
cages which it was i had obtainel 11,
should therefore cot:clude by proposing an A
ment to the pre r.ent Address, expressiog the film J.-
tarmination of the House to concur in such nie.vt.ii;
as might be necessary to enable his k
the Prince Regent to sustain the honour vt
Crown, to maintain the 'safety of his dominiocs, a.:I
to preserve an intimate concert with the 1' a, ot
Europe—assuring him that they were ready to
effect to any Treaty which he might have c.: ;ehrte,i,
but that, uninformed as they were, btoh as to the
principle and the object of the blipavioni entervl
into at Vienna, they snottld not couc6ve themschies
justified in sanctioning those stipulatina.; suggesting,
that to commence a war with France for the put-pt.-se
it excluding an tedividual from the Gorel!latelit of
that country, al:pc:Lica to them unwise, ai,d souirig
that they could nut approve of the cogagiratin
which it was stipulated that the country would no:
! lay down its aims until that purpose had been atcr,r...
plished ; as a war so undertaken wonid zlits
• nation to the nece,sity of either protracting !.v. ~•
test beyond the just txtent of its means. er
the disgrace of submitting to treat eith an it.di%•-'
with whom it had declared it would mate I.t.
whatever.
Mr. JOHN S'n-IITH rise to second the antc;t:.
ment. He 'agreed that the French orniy v..,
only a band of banditti, directed by that toii;;;:1
spirit which had ravaged ail Europe; but this c .•
rupt military body was not to be corrected by s
but by peace, during which the military fix...A'.
would abandon their system of pioneer. Ili!
convinced that nothing f •it a period of peace cm!,l
correct their mise!ievutis dispositions. Was it
possible, and even probable, that peace might co:::-•
nue in France for the spas of three or tour
and in that One, the military power of France
decay ; duriv7, that peace our own country wont,:
increase rapidly in strength. It the Noble L.-7J
nould give to his own nauve country (fr:land) tko:e
rights which a portion of its inhabitants a
the Uni!ed Kingd.l) would be placvd.on a
of honour and of glory it never experienced bt-tme•
He conttncied, that the situation of Bonaparte wr+
much more favourable :rod much stronger at t:ai
moment than it v..as at the time when he
the Mine. He had got back a great part
prisoners from Russia, he had got Wei; an le,
soners from England ; nor could it be suppit.—l.
the Allies would meet with any support ironi
pie of France. They vane the must national pecri.::,:
the world, and it was a principle with thane i.eva
join a.ny foreign army against their own
He wished to hear tram the Noble Lold whit
reason was for having a confidence in tie
our Allies: it any of them should meet witlt a
ter, what security had we that such ally woui,l n.t
desert us ? 'rue Noble Lord must have .a
in favour of war, froal the many personal disappoi-
menu he had experienced mace the march at the Al-
lies to Paris. but he would ask the Noble Ll'
whether he supposed that our finances would core
sufficient to carry us through this war, partcu rly
the war should be protracted beyond a year, of
there was g•eat probability ? A Right HonourabK
Gentleman, n. .w at the head tire finance d?l''
ment, had not long since, declared, that, his 01':
neon, tatcatt. n lead arrived at Its Utinest•iiMll6l.ll44
ti IIIC3S we adopted some plan of economy, it wawastes.
possible we could go • n much longer—he Delie!
the Right Hon. Vs ntieman had then fired ila
the peri;
':A
at two or those years. lie was tree to corfos ,
ce
knew hot tauntwhat wince new taxes could Le had.
d
He certainly consuleted that it would he A most e.
Bitable ding to pm Bonaparte down,
be
if it coul d
done—(Hear, hear!)—but was that probable?
shotui
lies one say, that at the cad of three years wt.

- ir.;)

011"

rot be obliged to make peace With him ender &-
on/ounces of great humiliation Besides, he asked
would our finances even be sufficient to carry us
though a war of three years ? For all these reasons
Le ,!iould support the amendment.
Mr. GRATTAN fully concurred in every semi.
re.o which had been uttered relative to the miseries
calamities of 'war. He haerconsidered the ques-
tion in all its bearings ; the amendment came forward
all the advantages and great force which it were
cioable of receiving from the illustrious rank and
thrracter of the individual who brought it forth,
and whose modest sense set off the value of his
I.,:gh station. In rising with great diffidence to ad.
the House upon the present occasion, he (Mr.
f;,. ran) rather meant to excuse the vote which he
„bla to give, than to hope for any chance of
• . able to alter the opinions of others. He could
„,, cniaine himself to a silent vote, knowing that
ins view of the question, he widely differed from
ILA of his oldest, dearest, and most strongly at-
tidied friends. In entering upon this subject, he
tsould admit that they ought to avoid, as much as
•ssible, the evils of war; but there was another and
3 gru.tter evil to be guarded against—a peace without
security, and a war without allies.—(Hear, hear.)
With the immediate question of peace or war, they
Lad nothing to do; that point was decided at Vienna;
but the plain fact which remains for their considera-
ian was simply this—would they contend against the
Rul-r of France, with the Allies in their van, or
would tht•y wait until these powers were disbanded,
and nice' the clash single-handed ? As to the pie-
sent form of Government in France, and the pros.
pee: tit security it afforded to Europe, they need only
look to its composition for a refutation of any such
chan:e. It wes an Elective Stratoeracy, composed
ot a rapaci,,us boldiery, who du not fight to conquer,
but conquer to tight. The constitution of Franci is
war, and the object of that. war the conquest of Eu-
rope.—(Hear.)—What reason was there to suppose
th it Bonaparte would not again attempt that to
which iiis whole life had been firmly applied ? Were
they blind to his character and. forged ul of his deeds?
lied he not almost succeeded in his gigantic plan ot
seizing all Europe? He banished the Sovereigns Of
Spain and Portugal s to the former, throne he gave
Lis brother—his son became King of Rome : he con.
trended the power of Prussia—and he prepared an
Army to take the King of England. But the great
trident of. Britain preserved her station, and shook
his Empire. The British Navy saved the land:—
Bonaparte cried out, " Your maritime laws ::re ty-
ranny;" but what he meant to say was, that this
monument of our strength, and his weakness, had
teemed Europe's being enslaved.—(Hear, Isear.)—
lie then SSW that, to conquer England, he most at-
tack her marine, by piercing her commerce—this he
attempted in two ways ; one was, to shut her out
nom Continental interviurse by the force of his arms.
The attack on her commerce was great ; it affected
leer station exceedingly. This country, placed by
I. store between the New and the Old Continents, and
formed to be the mediuin of communication between
both, now stood between two fires. On the one side
Continental Europe was in a blase, from the force of
• 1 his arms—and, on the ether, the New World, from
the influence of his intrigues. Between both this
country was ;Makin. but ;he maintained her ascen-
dancy. His ambition then led him to pierce the
faitzets regions of Russia: in th icy progress for
northern rapine and desolation,.he encountered Au-
stria and Prussia. They paused for a moment ;—at
lentil a common sense of resistance to aggrandize-
:mut unized them for self-defence ; the name of
Li gland was then cast into the scale, and Eiirope
pas saved from spoliation. When the tide of for-
tune at leng; turned to its natural course, in retribu-
hution for the evils which had been inflicted, two of
the coalesced Sovereigns:conquered the way to thr.
capital Of their...direct enemy ; at the gates of his
citfthey stood- the umpires of his fortunes, as they
1.4 d lowly Ikea the victims of his ambition ;—they
Lae did an Wee Which in the eyes of prsterity will
absolve Owns from whatever errors they elsewhere
committed. In the noble generosity of their views,
t: ey •t•) Men France,. liberty and life; to Bo-
naparte-, life-and'Elba. (Cheers.;) This was an act as
hunourebk to them, as it was undeserved by the ob-
ject whom they sheltered. 'The one gave to France
ruin and disaster, the other a King and Constitution,
framed upon enlaigedt liberal, and unexcluding prin-
ciples—a form of charter well suited M England,
hut no' deserved by France—one far diffe.rent from
t!.at wnica her weak muddy philosophers, in the hey-
day of their greaten:. tried to balance in the flimsy
ro..chine of their scanned invention--a better one
than ever issued from the staring councils of their
e:onornistr, Svh;ll 'they endeavoured to est'ablish that
sysiein which ha 4 metbo,i, in its madness, and mad-
ness in its methlid, who in their political worship
towed to the goddess of liberty, until their incanta.
lions converted'her istto thatoildess of fury—who set
taeir political machine in motion at one moment with
Lie bleat;r of liberty, at another. with the stormof,
anarchy, until its wheels at length took fire from the
force of their own veloeity.—(Ztud dueri)— —The
events to whidh lie (Mr. gyration) had referred, at the
walls of Paris, remodelled the tfagments of this in-
congruous system, and caused them to sutyside into a
form of Government not dis.imitar to that of England.
This system was now usurped. What was to be done?
IVere they to listen to the revival of a new system, or
ti any system from Bona/sine r Was. he who broke
teTreaty of Fontainbleau, which gave him amnesty
and station, to come forward and call upon them to
:ibis:e 14y the Treaty of Paris, which formed the very
basis of his own ekelusivpn? Were they sane to talk of
Nib. and listen to such a propositioo?—(Heir, hear);
lirliat was the language he field t 5 his army?—" We
t t atatliiiii a throne by new cencptests. It is true
I signed an abdication, but that was nothing without
use consent of the people. Withoot this my conven-
tion was invalid." His Ministers and Court say the
&Imes—they rr.echo this monstrous abandonment of
rrinciple ; and yet. in the same breath, they call upon
)ou to trust him !--Will-you take him now who has
*inlatect the very principle of affiance, in preference
to accepting*that, compact of five powers, whose faith
is unerringly pledged ? What hesitation can there
he as to• the come they ought to take ? Can they
itqubt, armed as they are with every moral and poli-
tical engine at their disposal, of their power to beat
&awn this system in Frame...to beat down an oppo-
neat. who is not fittn in his government, and who
sand; wholly withOtlt claim or title fot his political

maintenineet ? Ness'Otity now Ito 'sai. that, wit • h
Austria's immense 'force, and. Russia's- incalculable
ones-with Prussia's strength, and England's coun-
sels—with a forCe of 5 or. 600,000 men ready to take
the .field at the onset, France could not resist the
attack is-How could she do it ► Her population of
100 millions was now reduced to twenty-five, besides,
she had lost her fascination—her spell was gone.—
The career of Bonaparte had been developed to the
nations of the Continent in its naked colours; his
hand of enfranchisement was the grasp of slavery ;
to every country that force of arms nr influence laid
at his feet, he gave a worse government than the
worst that ever previously cursed then: : his army,
like the Roman legions under. Attila, carried devas-
tation and ruin in their train, and could now form
no encampment in Europe except within the circle of
their enemies. Of all external resources they were
bereft. What were their internal ones ? In the first
place, the leader of this stratocracy had no cavalry,
at least nothing that hole the name of comparison in
the scale ; secondly, he had no money; thirdly, no
credit; and fourthly, no title--(Hear, hear.) At to
the people, if they identified themselves with his
cause, where were they when the Treaty of Paris was'
signed ?—not upholding his rule, but parties to his
deposition.—(lleor, hear.)—lt is impossible there can
exist any such feeling for a man who imposed on
France the stain of subjugation by a foreign yoke, the
spoliation of her national wealth, the plunder of her
money by contributions, and the annihilation of her
children by conscriptions. Could they cordially attach
themselves to tilt man who brought the enemy to
the gates of their capital, and fled from.its defence ?
He was estranger, selected by thearmy, and unknown'
to the people. 'There was no community of interest,
if there was, the safety •of Eur Ope required there
should be a community of fate. Can it then be as-
serted, that removing a foreigner from the Throne of
France would impose a foreign yoke on that country,
Or that the object of the war was for the violation of
'her territory ? The Declaration cf the Allies was a
document which ensured her integrity, and the Treaty
bf Paris, in 1814, was a perfect ratifi..ation of its
principle, and a security from the oppressions of a fo-
reigner. Are Frenchmen, he asked, so devoid of
faith, so blind to their own interest, so neglectful of
the solemn ossuranees they have already given, as to
rise against the combined Powers of Europe, in order
to support a stranger on their Throne ? Was it from
pride that they would.act so ? and should the Allies,
from delicacy to France, suffer her to ensure the eter-
nal damnation of a military despotism ? (Hear, /tear.)
Gentlemen had asserted that the French nation were
favourable to Bonaparte—in the sincerity of his heart
he believed it to be no such thing—the sceptre was
consigned to his hands by the mere act of the military :
an examination of the entire process would manifest
the truth of the position. Bonaparte landed in France
with 1,100 met), his force on arriving at Grenoble'
amounted to SOOO ; but at Lyons he Was hailed by the
acclamations of au accumulating army, whose shouts
nothing could equal but the reserved silence of the pet,
ple. Every circumstance proclaimed it a military elec.
tion—a complete triumph over a prostrate and de-
pressed nation, subdued even in sense—who. ex-
hausted by long-continucd struggles, and deterred by
the imposing aspect of the military force, dare not
rise in opposition to the man tlsey nitro abhor—and
the same reasons which prevented the declaration of
their sentiments against Bonaparte, will account Los
their not rising in favour ot. the. Bourbons. Fear
operated in both cases, and the result was,
eonse-
quently, similar. The constittoion given by Bona-
parte has been the theme of panegyric, as the certain
appearance of liberty to France. But how could it
be expected that such a blessing should proceed from
Bonaparte ? Liberty was 113 t a gift he in general be-
stosved, and as to the efficacy of the constitution, 80-.
wane had already destroyed the directorial,. the
consular, and that' founded on the. basis ef the Eng-
lish ; and, having destroyed Wee; could any person
promise himself the issorance of a igurth,and that in
conjunction with a set of men callenacObins ? (Hear.)
Nor was the nature of this union the circumstance
toast remarkable at preient, for there was a man who
could bear no liberty joined with a party virtho could
bear no Government. —( Luel alirlduse. )—He ( Mr.
Grattan) had seen that constitution, in which no
power was intrusted to the people ; but, Indepen-
dent of its professed principles, the meaner of intro-
ducing the constitution was the most deceitful that
could be imagined. , It was to be received by sub-
scription, and above all, the nation were to swear
against even the proposal of a Bourbon to the throne;
rso that they are to give their oath against the Bour-
bons, and take his word for their public liberty.—
There was no reason to believe that England was
not able to cope with Bonaparte, notwithstanding
his resources, -his army, his understanding, or his
genius ; for the question was not now, whether we
had a right to oppose him ? We are actually at
war, in consequence of his breach of faith, in con-
..equence of his having broken the Treaty of Fun-
taiahleau. This, however, was considered as no-
thing. " To be sure," said Bonaparte," I saved my
life by means of it, but I am no further bound by
it; the entire proceeding was invalid, as dons against
my engagements with France; I can do nothing
without the concurrence of the people—my Conseil
tell me ro !" (Laughter and much applause.) —Mr.
Grattan then took a view of the justice and policy
of the war, and -contended that all the great war
alliances which: had been made in Europe, went on
the principle of preventing.the bad effects of the in-
ordinate ambition of some Sovereigns or the viola-
tion of 'Treaties by others. lie contended that we
should go to war or keep up an armed peace, for it
would tae most absurd to suppose that any Minister
could think of disbanding his forces at the present
crisis ; an armed peace then would be as expensive as
a war, without having any of the good effects which
the present war is liken to produce. Fer it would be
utterly impoisible ever to earn any thing from Napo-
leon but by absolute force, that alone would have the
effect of overpowering tie tyranny of a man who,
with the inclination,•hael the ability to disturb the
repose of Europe. War would have the effect of
repressing the tyranny of k man who, by his false
promises -wished to enslave a fine •nation ; this
man, who gave an apparent liberty to the press,
whilst he threatened death to those who should
*rite any thing against his system of government.
A great deal had been said about his lioerality and
justice in having abolished the Slave Trade, but. care
Mould be taken that whits lit gave freedom to the

••,•• • • .• •
Africani he did not enslive the
.Europeans. (itear.)
As to the character
not wish
to say
oileon, he would only say
a few words, he did otl.
any thing coarse
of him, btit he was one in whom very little confidence
could be placed, for he was known not to keep scru-
pulously any treaty which was made with him. .11.
man, as he was, stained with the blood of million‘
should be looked on with dread and horror, hut it
very often happened that vice in moderation was des-
pised, . whilst gigantic cruelty and oppression con-
quered bur understandings, and by its unnatural '
Liars hid its real deformity. (Hear, hear.) Napo-
leon was a man who had something of theatrical
pomp, and certainly was a great actor is the tragedy
of European tyranny ; he Was formed for acquiring
the government of a country but not for keeping it,
his principles were violent, his talents great, hot mis-
guided and led away by the most uttgoieruable
ambition. (Crier of Hear.) The conduct of Mr.
Fox had been alluded to, as a statesman who did not
wish to go to war with France. No dottht, Mr. fox
WAS an abld statesman —one who, from his great
knowledge of history, was almost a political prophet ;
but the circumstance; of France, in Mr. Fox's time,
were quite different from what they were now. At
that time Napoleon had been recognized by the people
as their ruler—at present by was an Usurper, seeking
absolute dominion over them against their consent,
and, in violation of the most solemn Treaty, seeking
to establish a worse than Eastern. despotism, which
threatened the repose of Europe despotism setting
at defiance every moral and religious tie which
be supposed capable of binding man. Under such
circumstances as the present, Mr. Fox would not think
of making peace, nor should the present Governmer!
be more inclined to it. England, who had been the first
to oppose that thirst for universal sway which governed
Bonaparte's actions, and deluged Europe with blood
England, who more than once had captured the int-
penal eagles, and snatched invincibility from the
imperial standard, should not be the first in the re-
treat from that cause which she had successfully
espoused lieretolore.—( Loud applause; f.r several gne.
noler.)—No, she should continue in her glorious
career, and by a timely exertion finish the work she
had so bravely begun. The Honourable Isleinbet
concluded by commenting on what had been s.t d
to the subsidies which this country should pay to-
wards the war ; he said, though he knew that its re-
sources were not inexhanaible, yet the sum required
was not so much to be looked to, as the object which
it was likely to procure—a speedy and permanent
peace.—(hear, hear.)—lf England acted that pie:
which her situ &don required, she would be ever!.
thing, it not, she would be nothing in the scale ot
nations.— ( Hear, hear, hear.)
Sir FRANCIS BURDETT said, lie rose miler
great embarrassment, but he felt the necessity of.
giving his vote in favour of the Amendment. He
,had listened with admiration to the appeal made•to
the passions of the House, and could not be otherwise
than struck with the great and brilliant powers dis-
played by th.! Right Hon. Gentleman who had just
sat down; yet_ he was not certain in his own mind
that many ot kis statements were not greatly exagge-
rated. Though he could not doubt the sincerity of
the Right I+ n Gentleman, it appeared to him that
he had not taken a fair view of• the real state of the
question. He had not convinced him that there was
an expediency in, or necessity for engaging in a war
whivb seemed only to have for its object the restoring
again to the throne of France, the family who had
been lately proscribed. It was like saying to the
French people, You shall have this person for your
Sovereign, and no other." But without we had the
power of conquering France, we had not the power
of thus dictating her population. It was absurd
to say that Bonaparte had been restored against
the wishes of the people. He had been reinstated
by the inclinations of a very great majority of that
people, greater indeed than that by which any other
man had ever .been received by a country.—
He would, therefore, deny that it was by the mili-
tary alone that he had been restored. There was less
proof that King William was received in this country
by the unanimous voice of the people, than there
was of such an unanimity in France with regard to
the reception of Bonaparte. The indignation of our
forefathers, and their successful resistance of the pre-
tensiont of the proscribed monarch James 11. and his
family, should be recollected, when we attempted to
impose a Sovereign upon another country. We car-
ried our indignation, indeed, to an unreasonable ex
tent, by putting a price on the head of the Pretender ;
but this most detestable principle had been revived
by the Declaration issued at Vienna, which designated
the French people as rebels, and the French Emperor
as a fit subject for the dagger of an assassin. It was
impossible to get rid of this declaration, it would poi-
son the whole proceedings of the Allies, and would
not have in the eyes of Europe any other effect than
that of holding up such a principle to their detestation.
Respecting the character of the French Emperor,
however, the Riglit Hon. Gentleman had stigmatised
it, he had certainly been extremely lenient towards
those of certain other great persons, who have
,hewn as little faith in their public proceedings, as it
was possible for mortals to chew. They had broken
their faith over and over again with this country. It
was said that Bonaparte seized Spain, and establish.
ed the worst of despotism. What had happened in
Spain ? Good GOD We had engaged in treaties
with her, which if not literally binding us to her free-
dom, leagued us with the Patriots. We took them
by the hand, praised their valour, fought side. by side
with them, for an object common to English and
Spaniards, had all their resources at commando and
they submitted to an English Commander. How.
did we perform our engagement, such at least as they
ought to have been ? We abandoned them, and even.
gave money to the odious and contemptible tyrant 1
Ferdinand VII. to subvert the constitution, and he
had persecuted the Patriots, one of whom was even
denied refuge in an English fortress. Had not the
Emperor of Russia entered into an alliance with Bo-
naparte, and seconded IA views against this country?
Had not the King of Prussia received from Bonaparte ,
that territory which belonged to the Sovereign of this
Country ? In short, he need only ti' ask where any
proof was to be found of the liberal system and good
faith of these Governments, with whom we were in
alliance. But it now seemed that it was too late to
deliberate ; and that we were actually at "war.—
He therefore wished to call the attention of the House
to the many offences committed by these Allied So.
tereigni,mbielt ought not !o be blurred over, because

t

• _ .
they would not bear. the test Pf inquiry. The div
Aim; of Poland, in 1792, was II memorable .!monk •
Of their injustice; acid, loaded with its. spoils and 45
blood, they marched to play the same gain*, over
again in Prance, which they would have crone if they
had had the power: They were now tryilg to do the
sink thing, but, as it appeared, with much less per
than they had then. o,ving to die tnthusiasrn of the
French people, their united efforts. were defeated,. al-
though the French Itsd lesi arms, less trwnry, and
fewer men than they have now. 'll%n Prince kva
vlbs.:quently deprive,' of the convests the had gained,
was in consequence eatirsly of physic.' circumstance,—
Bonaparte was overturned fin4lly by the I; reaches
of treaties with chow Powers wi h tvhcrn we were

it alliance, but .selfcli they avf,lci not have
.kept
any longer than sui ed theti Purpose. Thus, then,
it was absurd to u a :e the breach of a treaty by NA.
Nicola Bonaparte the c use cf a war with lorn.---
Bzsides, the bre Ich ot tread-s wa, crlor.prices with
Ole %try name of the Lo.irho:is and Le could not
bast rant With sorrow, that the peace made with Bo-
naparte, the peace of Amiens, seat not lroken by
hint. We agreed to give up Malta, aed we did not
give it Ur; till Bonaparte agreed that we should keli
it for some years, and we might have kept, it for
ever. Bonaparte had been accused of sanctioning
murder ; but were nut the French Ambassadors atro-
ciously murdered when drip •1 out film: kastadt by.
Austria, though they were urido- the pr..tection of
hit power. Hz o:tly mentioned th:s t > sheer that we
could not attribute to Bon spite c, rues which had
not been committed by the Allies. By A t :011th% to
set up Louis XVI. in opposition VI the people who
had deposed him, we bad ci.Si that unfortunate
Monarch his head, and had compelled France to
become a great Military Nation. ( tleareasear, how.)
;laving, however, by good fortune, and an unes.
coincidence ot ciicuosstances, reduced France
to her forma limits, the Allied Powers were not con-
tent to leave her in this condition, but wete aim.
luta), pursuing the same arnbitioul system which they ,
had opposed in her conduct; handing over millityns
of people from one master to another, and calling
this the deliverance ot Europe. He then repeated
the cessions that had been ordained by the Congress
at Vienna, and stigmatized their regulations as at-
tempts to obliterate liberty from the face ot the
world. Wherever these retulatio.is had been made;
Bonaparte, he contended, would find friends and
Allies. He would fi,.d them in Saxony, in Poland,
in Holland, in Sicily, in Genoa, and in I.aly 1 He
would find their. in every quarter where the Allies
had violated the faith ot Treaties. He would not
pretend to be a prophet, but he would say, that suc-
cess or no success, an incalculable burthea would be
entailed on this country. Sir Francis thzn proceeded
to repeat all his former invectives against the S ive-
reigns of the Continent ; and concluded by 0b,...rv.
Lig, that as it was a principle which admitted cf no
modification, that every people had a .right to c!tense
their own form of government, and as we were 'n-
delarottring to oppose this right, it was impossible,
under suede circumstances, that ti:c war conl,t be
either just or necessary, and th..refore he shutld vutt.
against the motion.
Mr. LAW imagined that the Honourable Baronet

had referred to an 7 journals but those of the Hour,
and had argued from any principles but those recog.
nisnl by the legislature on so many occasions. Ilc
could not cmicuive at what period it was that
enemy dated his triun.phi in itegaciation, because the
merits of every negociazion could at last only by
judged of by a successiAn of evens : boy lookin'y at
the future errurse.of ev.ents, as far as it was permitted
for us to see, he thought we might reasonably and
naturally entertain the hope that so great a course of
success as had lately accused, had not occurred in
vain. He could not but hope, that looking at all
t tat was admitted by the Noble Lo. d, (apparently
without the suspici )n that it was connected with
doubtful questions) was matter indeed of evidence
highly imp .rtant. It was important not only that
the question connected with so ma ay interests, and
deserving of being placed in s z m any views, should
meet with a full, solemn, att.i grave discussion, and
he therefore hoped that the House, fully aware of its
important duties, would proceed to a decision on the
present question. .
Mr.W.W MINE argued at considerable length, that
the past history of Bonaparte fully proved him to be
incompetent to any thing like the spirit of an honour•
able engagement; the conduct ol his government after
the Treaty of Amiens, the usurpation of the Spanish
Crown, the attempt to subdue that mootrehy, all
were overt acts, and preliminary proofs of the Mis-
chief he intended. He was not easily to'be taught,
after so much experience, that what was called moo
derate terms, were terms at all reconcileable with
any principles of prudence, much I:ss with any terms
that were alike due to France and to the rest of
Europe.
Mr. PONSONBY could not bring his mind to
agree to the sy.tem of policy which the Minister and
his Right Hon. Fiend (Mr. Grattan) recommended
to the House. It Ministers had relied upon their own
*powers, he thought that he should have been able to.
answer the Noble. Lrrd, .but he must own chit he
found it almost impossible for him to stand before
the eloquence of his Right Honourable Friend. The
question beforc.the House appeared to him to be,
whether they were to sanction by their votes the sti.
pulations of the Treaty of Vienna ? The Noble Lord
now said, that we had been in a state of war for a
considerable time. He, hoWever, appeared to have
made that discovery very lately, for In answer to a
question put by himself, he had distinctly stated that
we were not at war. At the time tLit hip Lordship
moved the Address, he told the House that he did not
pledge them to war, but only to a star: of preparatien
He had now, however, discovered and informed the
House, that they had been for a long time is a state
of war. If the House were to vote the present Ad-
dress, it appeared to him that they would he precluded
from afterwards objecting to tip^ stipulations of the
Congress. Was the House then prepared to vote for
the arrangements about Saxony and Genoa, and per-
h ips for giving up Poland to the Emperor of Russia
He would freely adobit that the violation of the trea-
ties
of Paris and Fontainbleau gave this country ;
just right of war, if war was expedient. As to the
personal character of Bonaparte, -however, he thought
that that was not a sufficient ground of war. Aucrto
had compromised her first war with him, by swat•!
loi up Venice, the most ancient Republic so Ea.

11

50. lowing up Venice, toe most ancient zucputpui; us Jcm.
use rope, as an exchange tot the Low Countries, wbic
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