Star.
London, England, 1801-11-05 00:00:00

. .
&plat. We are under the paw of the Bin, but
infteae of turning round to tear us to pieces, be
mo feel a defire for a while to treat us with kind-
nefs, with forbearance, and with mereyi This,
Sir, was pretty much what I think might be cot-
letted from what paired iu the debate of laft night ;
this was on the whole the refolt of what I could
infer from the arguments in Favour of the Peace.
This apathy to the dangers in which the country
is placed, this coldnefs of regard for the national
dignity and charafter, ferves only to encreafe my
defpair of the future condition of this empire.—
Certainly we are not yet by any means come to
the Taft extremity; but I fee nothing to flop the
fpeedy approach of out final deftruflion. If any
man is under the power of another to fuch a de-
grec that he can go on without controul only for
a certain period, and when that other has the
power of arrefting his career whenever he feels fo
difpofed, that man is to all intents and purpofes
his mailer. To me, by the terms of this peace,
this country appears to be preeifely in fuch a fitu-
ation. As long as France chafes to forbear we
may be fafe, but we have no adequate means of
refilling any attack the might be difpofed to make
againft us. We are in reality in a Rate as bad as
that of General Menou when Phut up within the
walls of Alexandria. In confidering this mullion,
the negociation at Line has been more than once
alluded to, and in my opinion without the leaf
degree of propriety. The queftion has in fad no
thing more to do with the negociation of L4le,
or any other negociation, than it has with the ,
Peace of ta6. The Peace ought to be confidered
merely as it is good or bad, without the fmalleft
reference to the termsof other treaties. This mode
of confidering the fubjeft, kems however ilefigned
as an argil:wawa ad Imminent, in particular to me,
and to the opinions I have on the fubjeft of the
prefent Peace thought it my duty to exprefs. I
am willing to admit, then, that I did give my
confent to the Treaty of Lille, and if any incon
fiftency exits betwixt the opinion I then held, and
that which I naw fupport, let Gentlemen, if they
are difpofed, enjoy all the advantages of fuch incon-
tinency. In forming an opinion of this Peace it be-
hoves os now to reflea, not merely what was the
profped we have of concluding Peace upon better
terra, but what chance we had of gaining this oh-
jcil from the changes infeparable from a (late of
war. We ought to confider whether there was
not a chance of a change of the preterit Govern-
ment, a chance that the life of the Chief Conful
might be attempted, a chance of a fuccefsful
in-
furreftion againft his authority, all of which cir-
ctunflances might have produced a mot impor-
tant alteration in the flotation of this country and
of Europe. Ido not think, nor do I mean now'
now to alien, that the death of Bonaparte would
produce any change in chore views of aggrandife-
ment which France at prefent entertains, or any
alteration in thofa opinions from which danger to
this country may be reafonably apprehended; but
I do fay, that if filch an event did happen, France
would in all probability fall into piece.., and infur-
rations might break out in other countries now
fubjett to her power. I do fay that the enormous
power which we have now to dread might be
weakened, and the immenfe empire of Bonaparte,
like the empire of Alexander, might be torn in
pieces by inferior mailers. Prom the manner,
however, in which this queftion has been argued,it
teems that we are to hope nothing from the chances
of War, but every thing that is good we are to ex-
pel from the chances of Peace. We are to conclude
Peace on the chance that France will maintain
every relation of peace and amity in a peaceable
manner; we are to make the greateft ceflions on
the chance that the French Government will dif- '
tinguifh itfelf by the moderation and the juftice of
its conduit ; but we are to build nothing what-
ever on the chances of War, though neceflarily tub-
jell to conftant viciffitude. We are to truft all
to the chance of Peace, but we are to be pre-
cluded from trailing in the fmalleit degree to the
revolution of a conceit liable to be affeeted by fo
many contingent eircumftances. The manner in
which the Peace has hitherto been viewed does not
teem to me to be at all a fair flatement of the
queftion. The queftioa now before the Houle is
not, whether the peace is good or bad, honourable
or difhonourable, adequate or inadequate? Thefe
art undoubtedly parts, and I allow very important
parts, of the queftion ; but the tote queilion is
this, whether the Peace you have-concluded is pre-
ferable to a continuance of the war; whether by
prolonging the conceit, you had a chance of faring
work or better than you do at the pretiatt mo
ment ? fo be entitled to give a derided opinion
on this quenion thus Rated, you are to take into
your confidcration, not merely the ettlions which
have been made by die Peace, but the cad which
it has had on the national charader. If I were
merely to confider the chances of our fituation by
a prolongation of the War. I might perhaps admit
that it was better to ftop than to go on with the
contell ; at lead I will fo Rate the cafe now fur
the fake of argument. Bat if a Peace has been
concluded which lowers the charther of this great
nation—if in concluding it we have betrayed any
tymptoms of weaknefs—if we have been fern to ad
on the idea of any difafFeffion in our internal kite,
a is, Sir, I do contend, might very fairly induce
The to change my opinion. It has been often flared,
Sir, and perhaps it was Rated with truth that the
fupport of national honour was almoft :he only
legitimate caufe for one nation to go to war with
another. The polfeffion of the Falkland Mends,
formerly the ground of a molt ferious difpute be-
tween this country and Spain, was a thing of it-
felf unworthy of any national interference. The
fpot in contention was fit only for a contention be-
twi t fcals and fea-gutls. Estt coninfted with theho-
nour of the national charafter, the difpute afTtimed
a much more important afpeft, and became a le-
gitimate fubjeft of diplomatic interference. Na-
tional charade?. Sir, is fomething of a moll deli.
cats nature. The lealt touch of violence injures
its form, and the flighteft attack on it becomes a
eagle of complaint and a ground of refentwient.
—[Here the Honourable Member alluded to the
view which Junius entertained of this fobjeft, and
quoted a very beautiful paffrge, in which that cc-
writes compares the punt-tattoos delicacy