Star.
London, England, 1822-11-14 00:00:00

LAW INTELLIGENCE.

COURT OF CHANCERY, NOVEMBER 15.
THE PORTSMOUTH CAUSE.
The LORD Cita:mamma, in the course of his ob-
servations yesterday upon the letter sent by Lady
Portsmouth to Lord Portsmouth, did not threaten to
commit her Ladyship at represehted in some reports.
His. Lordship only expressed a wish that the circum-
stance would he explained in Lady Portsmouth's affi-
davit, and added, that if certain attempts were made
to obtain possession of Lord Portsmouth's person, it
would be a contempt of Court, such as had in other
cases been visited with commitment to the Fleet.
The LORD CHANCELLOR this morning ordered that
Dr. Ainslie might visit Lord Portsmouth in com-
pany with any of the four medical men who had for-
merly visited his Lordship. But Dr. Ainslie must
previously have `read all the affidavits in the cause;
end for that purpose it was necessary that it should
be known how early the affidavits to be sworn on the
part of the defence would be filed.
Mr. HORNS said, he thought they.would be filed
in the course of to-morrow.
The LORD CHANCELLOR said, it might be arranged
between the parties, whether the cause should be
proceeded in on Monday, or on what other day.
In the course of the day Dr. Ainslie's consent to
visit Lard Portsmouth was obtained, and Sir George
Tuthill is to accompany him.
CONTEMPT.—LEES V. AINSWORTH. -
Mr. WAKEFIELD stated. that the defendant in this I
case had not been aware that Miss Lees was a ward
of that Court ; and that now he was ready to make
a suitable settlement upon her.
The Loan CHANCELLOR said, that if he meant only
to settle her own fortune upon her, that was no more
than the Court would have provided for in any cir-
cumstances. The case must stand over until Mr.
Ainsworth should advise with his fiiends, and ascer-
tain what settlement he could make besides the
Lady's fortune.
The ca:e was ordered to stand over accordingly.
'Moe was no interest in the bankrupt petitions
which were heard during the rest of the day.
VICE-CIIANcr.T.LOR'S COURT, NOVEMBER 13.
ItUTI.V U. LATHAM.
This was a suit iii,titmed by the plaintiff, Mrs.
Rutly, and her four children, for the production of a
deed in the possession of the defer.d.int. The circtini•
stances of the case are these:—The plaintiff had for-
merly col,abited with The defendant, and borne.four
child' en to him. The defendant, who was a married
man, executes! a deed in which he made a provision
for the pla'ntiff and her children. This deed was
placed in the hands of a third party, who had since
delivered is up to the defendant, who insisted on
retiiiing it.
Mr. BELL, en the part of the defendant, said that
his client had put in a demurrer on the ground that
the transaction upon which the deed was founded was
of an immoral character ; and that the Court would
not enforce any agreement which rested upon an Hi-
moral consideration.
Mr. Lovt rr, who was on the same side, cited the
case of Priest and Bullock, in Vesey 2, the circtim•
stances of which. he said, were similar to those of the
present suit. Lord Hardwicke, before whom the
cause was argued-, declared that a Court of Eptity
would never enforce the execution of a deed made by
a married man in favour of a woman with whom he
. bad cohabited, if it should appear that the woman
knew at the time that he was married.
The Vi c-Crtocet.t.oa could not understand the
equity of Lord Hardwicke's decision. Surely it could
sot be maintained that it was not equitable for a man
to make provision for a woman whom he had ruined,
after cohabitation had ceased. Ile asked whether it
was meant to be asserted that a married man had
sever been a party in any of the cases in which. the
Court had enforced the execution of deeds drawn
bp under similar circumstances to that at present
in question?
Mr. Lovrry saki he had carefully searched for all
the cases of the present description which had come
under the consideration of the Court. Most of the
cases had come before the Court upon applications to
have the deeds cancelled. The Court had always re-
fused the application, alleging that the plaintiff's
. improper conduct rendered him undeserving of relief.
In no case, however, from the first to the last, that
had come to his knowledge, and he had searched
carefully, had the Court ever held that a deed exe-
cuted by a married man under such circumstances as
that in the present case was valid. Lord Hardwicke's
decision was quoted by Sir Samuel Romilly and Mr.
Bell in the liouse of Lords, in opposition to a Bill
similar to the present. The Lord Chancellor alluded to
it. without impugning its doctiines, which was backed
by the opinion of the present Master of the Rolls.
The VICE-CHANCELLOR observed, that he had been
looking at the case allud.:d to, and thought that it
was not analogous to the present. In the former case,
immediate relief was prayed, and the Court refused
it on the ground that the deed was void at law. In
the present case, inirr.e.!iate relief was not prayed,
but only that the deed might be ordered to be deli-
vered up. Before the decision of Lord Hardwicke
could be made applicable here, it must be shewn that
the deed in question was void at law. It was to be
regretted that such a suit had ever been brought be-
fore the Court.
Mr. LOVITT said, that his client was disposed to
act with fairness: he had offered to take the childreu
and maintain them.
The VICE-CHANCELLOR observed, that he had no
doubt the defendant acted according to his conscience;
but he thought few persons would choose to have
their consciences measured by his. The principle
upon which Lord Hardwicke's judgment proceeded
was, that the Court would not encourage immora-
lity ; but the Court never hesitated to carry into exe-
cution a deed by which a single man made provision
for a woman whom he had formerly cohabited with.
It was singular that the Court would encourage those
transactions with respect to a single man which they
reprobated with respect to a man who was married.
There certainly was a shade of difference in the mo-
rality of the two.cases; but they were both immoral,
and he appfehended the Court did not sit there to
define shades of. immorality. His Honour then di-
rected thecase to stand over, on the understanding
that the general demurrer would be overruled, with