Star.
London, England, 1813-04-22 00:00:00

to the north of Ge'nitani by het line of neutrality.
Holland conquered, „received, at the same moral:
the form of government, and the conditions of
which were dictated by France.
The Kings of Spain, Sardinia, and the two Sick-
lies, followed the example of Prussia, and made a
separate peace—Spain even renewed her ancient al-
liance with France. Several Princes of Germany
and Italy were compelled to rurchase their repose at
an exorbitant price, almost without knowing if they
had really been at war with France. At length, in
1797, there remained no other combatants but Eng=
land and Austria. England negotiated, and Aus-
tria concluded the treaties of Campo Formic.; but
the Directory speedily conjured up new wars. They
attacked Switzerland, which had been respected even
by Robespierre—they drove the King of Sardinia
from the States which were left him on the continent
of Europe—they led the Pope into captivity, drove
the Court of Naples into exile, and dividehtaly into
petty republics—they consented to the expedition to
Egypt, and thereby irritated Turkey, and afforded
a new motive for war to England. All these aggres-
sifts, made in the course of a single year, broke the
Congress of Rastadt. Russia, which, till then, had
dealt only in promises, at length seriously entered into
the coalition, and the campaign of the allied Aus-
trians and Russians in 1799, rescued the whole of
Italy from the French armies, much more quickly
than it had been conquered.
Never since the commencenient of the war had the
military situation of France been worse. The flat-
terers of Bonaparte had not failed to ascribe the sal-
vation of the French republic to his return from
Egypt : it has been his constant practice' to appro-
priate to himself the successes which were prepared
for him by other-a. The revolutions which took place
even in the interior of the directory, had disorgauised
the armies, and caused their reverses. A man, who
has since been called to higher destinies, by his ge-
nius and activity, succeeded, in a ministry of two
months duration, in reforming the disorders, the di-
lapidations, and abuses of every kind, which were Ott
their height.
The armies were reinforced, provided with every
requisite, and, as it were, created again—in this man-
ner General Bernadotte secured, as a Minister, the
victories which he knew how to gain as a soldier. As
a consequence of the re-establishment of the armies,
the English were driven out of Holland ; Massena
resumed the offensive in Switzerland against the
Russians, and Moreau made head against the Aus-
trians in Italy,. before Bon iparte had done any thing
more for the Republic than to seize upon the su-
preme power.
As the Emperor Paul had assisted Austria from
motives of generosity, he abandoned her from ca-
price ; once more thrown -upon. her own exhausted
resources, the brilliant successes of Moreau and Bo-
naparte, in 18(X), constrained her to sign the treaty
of Luneville at the beginning of the following
year. England, after the cession of Belgium, having
lost all hopes of preserving this province for Aus-
tria, in pursuance of the dictates of her maritime in-
terests, tranquillized by her victories in Egypt, and
the consequent security of her eastern possessions,
consented the following year to the most extraordi-
nary peace which was ever made after such a war.—
Always victorious at sea, always the conqueror in
the East and West-Indies, she recognized all the rob-
beries of France in Europe, and gave back nearly all
her own conquests is the other three quarters of the
globe without any compensation.
The fate of arms in the wars terminated by this ge-
neral pacification had often varied, but in the.end
the result was advantageous to France, beyond even
the most extravagant hopes of her partisans ten years
previous. She had acquired the countries of Avig-
non and Venaissin.• in Italy, Savoy, Niece, and MT>
naco ; Geneva, duhlhausen, and the Bishopric of
Basle were torn from Switzerland. In Germany,
all the states of the Rhine from Alsace and Lorraine
to the frontiers of Holland ; the Austrian Low Coun-
tries, with Dutch Flanders, and the other possessions
of the united provinces connected with it—she had
the mouths of the Scheldt, the Rhine, Mount Jura,
and the Alps, for frontiers. This immense aggran-
dizement, which increased by almost one-fourth the
population of the ancient kingdom, was not the most
important of the advantages which she acquired. The
military consideration of- France, which had fallen
in repute under the latter reigns, bad risen to an
equal if not to a greater height than it had been in
the days of Lewis XIV.
Spain was also attached as firmly to the French
Republic as she had been to the monarchy. The new
governments of Holland, Switzerland, and the Cisal-
pine, and Ligurian Republics, were entirely devoted
to the power which had created them, and without
which support they would have dwindled into no-
thing. These Republics formed so many bulwarks
around the Mother Republic. In a word, France
had ail that was requisite for her glory, the corn-
ph tion of her wishes, and security for the future;
her preponderance on the European continent was
such, that it became doubtful from that moment
whether any system of equipoise could exist, or if
there was any other guarantee against her universal
empire than her own moderation. •
Ten years of fruitless experiments had disheartened
the ancient governments from any attempt to repair
their losses. War, since the revolution, had assumed
a character totally different from that which it wore
in the former century, It was, what had never been
seen in Europe since the extinction of the religious
wars, a war of opinion. But in the wars occasioned
by the reformatipn, the two parties were inspired by
an equal degree of enthusiasm, one for the defence of
the established religion, and the other 'for that of the
new doctrines. In tl'e wars of the revolution, on the
contrary, that moral elasticity which is inspired by
an implicit faith, was manifested only by the Repob-
lican warriors ; while the troops of the ancient go-
vernments fought as usual from motives of duty, and
as a point of honour.
Those who governed France could, in the name
of liberty, command immense sacrifices; they had
the entire disposal of persons and property. The
governments of the coalitions had only their usual
resources ; and even these they were obliged to ma.
nage with caution, lest they should augment the
langerous fermentation which threatened their States
with the must v'olent explosions, The abolition of
abisses„the reign-of jtsstioe, reason and humanity,
were the imams promised by France, at first, to her
ow?) pcofle, and which she afterwagda held out to

•.
the ethers& The people every where believed,
therefore, that the time was come when they were to
be released from all* their troubles ; every where phi.
landiropistsobadly versed in history and superficially
acquainted with human nature, dreamed of a new gol-
den age ; every where intriguers, under the mask of
philosophy, rehearsed the parts of demagogues. The
Governments which had hitherto been considered as
the most free, s;ere described as despotic, merely
because they had been sanctioned by the hnery head
of time. The known excellence of a constitution
which had stood the test of ages did not save it from
a revolutionary storm. Not only were Holland and
Switzerland convulsed—not only did the disaffected
Irish conspire to deliver up their country to France ;
but in England itself there existed a friction which
boldly announced the project of recasting the consti-
tution in the crucible of theory. And, what was
most formidable, chimerical ideas and teal passions
every where produced a similar delirium, at whatever
period they burst forth for the first time. Although
in France they had returned from their first errors,
every dew republic began precisely at the same ori-
gin. Long after the chief actors in the great drama
of the revolution in France had disappeared from the
scene, in Italy and Switzerland democratic puppets
strutted about on their Lilliputian stages, to perform
the hacknied parts of republicans. In short, the re-
volutionary opinions of the age seem to have been to
nations what contagious diseases are to individuals,
each carrying the germ about with him, and which
must go through all its stages before he can be radi-
cally cured.

In addition to this popular opposition which the
Sovereigns had to encounter, the events of the last
ten years had unveiled the deformities inherent in
coalitions, and disclosed their insufficiency to meet
such extraordinary circumstances; the cabinets which
maintained the ancient laws of nations-in Europe had
also retained their old prejudices. They thought
that the perfection of diplomacy consisted in finesse;
they would have been ashamed not to•have always
some secret mental reservations behind, or not to
hive an eye to ulterior objects besides that for which
they openly laboured.
The system of equilibrium demanded from all na-
tions mutual vigilance. Petty shifts, resorted to in
order to disguise views of aggrandisement from other
powers, were, to a certain degree, innocent in the
peaceful era which preceded the revolution, and
which could never go great lengths. Every thing
was changed, and yet there was no possibility of con-
vincing statesmen of the fact, and that a disinteres-
ted, open, and generous policy could alone cave the
independence of Europe. The successes of •one of
the coalesced powers excited the jealousy of the rest.
The reverses which befel one in particular were re-
garded with indifference, nay, with satisfaction, by
ancient rivals. They approached each other coldly,
and separated with disgust.
The ancient Governments of the Continent, which
kept their ground in spite of the double shock of
French invasion and republican principles, had there- I
fore the greatest interest in the maintenance of peace,
and the greatest aversion from war. For three years
none of them could bring themselves to the resolu-1
tion of recommencing it, although Bonaparte, as we
shall see, gave them every provocation.
On the one hand, France had great reason to wish
for peace with England. Her colonies were wrested
from her, or rendered useless, her nationa: manufac-
tures and her commerce were ruined ; in fact, the so-
lemn acts and decrees of her own legislature had con-
tributed as much to her misfortunes as the maritime
war.- Nevertheless, as the naval power of France
had constantly decreased since the war ; as the na-
vies of Holland and of Spain, since they became her
allies, experienced nothing but reverses, a long re-
pose at sea was the only method of repairing these
losses. •

In spite of all this, the peace of Amiens lasted only
a year. The negociations which preceded the rup-
ture are known to the whole world : they bring to
our recollection the observation of an ancient histo-
rian, namely, that we ought carefully to distiqguisli
between the true causes for a war, and its pretexts it
alledged motives. The restoration of the sterile
rocks of Malta to the order of St. John, exacted on
the one hand, and refused on the, other, seems of it-
self to have been too insignificant an object to coun-
t♦ rbalance the evils and the dangers of a war between
two powers so formidable in every respect. But 111.
terior views presented themselves in the occupation
of this island.

England wished to secure a station in the Medi.
terranean, in the event of her ships being again ex-
cluded from the ports of Italy ; her Ministers suS•
petted the projects of Bonaparte upon Egypt and
the Levant, for both of which Malta was the requi•
site place of rendezvous. We shall not decide, whe-
ther England was right in point of form in main-
taining that she had only promised a conditional
evacuation; she was at all events right in the essence
of her conduct. It has been remarked, that the
English government, after glorious and successful
wars, has frequently made a bad peace, and great
haste. has been made in repairing the imprudence
colt:rakes]. Hence it wa3 easy to perceive, that the
dangers of England ccntisted not in war but in
peace ; that Bonaparte considered the latter as an
useful respite to augment and exercise his navy ; that
if England prevented him, he would call forth the
immense resources of France and her dependencies,
with all the energies of absolute power; and, with
that prodigious activity of disposition which is pecu-
liar to him, that he would thus create, in a few years,
a maritime force capable of keeping the seas against
that of England, who would then see her territories
threatened with invasion.

The projects of Bonaparte were but problematical
as to their ultimate success ; but his actions, during
the skort interval of peace, were more than sufficient
to justify the resumption of hostilities on the part of
the English government. Bonaparte has always
boasted of his moderation in making peace, and, to
a certain extent, he is entitled to this merit. It is, in
fact, one of the most artful calculations in his policy.
---,conditions, too severe, might drive an adversary,
when half crushed, to the resolution of perishing in
the contest, a resolution in which alone there is any
thing likc security from such an enemy. But when
a government, after serious misfortunes, has regained
a situation somewhat Supportable, the remembrance
of past dangers, the conviction of its weaknesses, in-
duce it to consent to every thin; which does not im-
mediately affect ith caigeacet This Bonaparte