Star.
London, England, 1801-02-20 00:00:00

IFItROL EXPiDITION.

Mr. Sruer rofe, and obferved that he fhould
take the liberty of fubmitting to the Houfe
motion, which he conceived to be not merely his
duty to propofe, but that of the Houk to foßer
and adopt. Ile was not acenflonted to trouble
them, lie was no orator, had no pretenfions to
die honour of it, and thuret.ore [rutted tp their
indulgence in hearing him with patience and with
attention ; he Lal nu perfonal enmity to any man
living, much lets to the Noble Gencrai who com-
manded that Expedition, or the Right Hinrour.
able Gentleman who pliancd it and he fhould
matt carefully avoid raying any thing in the comic
ofwhat lie fhould offer that could give offence to
either. The objeel, however, was W importance,'
and he would proceed on it. This country had
ciPtipped a peddigiotia armament fur a particular
pAkisofe. and •tiut: a; *anent was dilconigted.
Ttus was a tuat.tc: that use country bad a ri;ht to

uarinire h-do. a_a all 1 i'',l:ci•.‘l.,tls
too. lie ked, thai ::•i !de lmoral (
j.tmcz Pi& ) l• .:.! i. that 'ld,
motion had bee's on r I irm.r oecalion pod
on the ground thiA the iiiooer it wit docmied
!boner would the pliblie calah!el to
favour of his honour and eh trai-tei. for his part
he winked that would turn but to be the cafe, ahil
that alfo was a fat:staaion the eventry required.-
13nt fill lie thringlit it caraordihary that fuch an
armament Gould Co fail, and flu:it-fore he Was
convinced that blame lying Chi thhere, that alone
was a eaufe fur invelLgation. This armament lay
three months at Qtiiheron, on the coact of Fraziee,
as a diverfion, he iiippolcd, againft the enemy ;
but he believed the enemy were never diverted
with it (a /.!:c )--From thence it proceeded
to Ferrol, where it was difcimtited.—Upon that
difcomfiture differences of opinion ;mole among
the leaders of that expedition, and Milliners
thcmfelves felt regret and difniay on its failure.
—.The fleet that conduacd the troops was com-
manded by brave and experienced officers; and
thofe who had the command of the army were
equally gallant and brave. It confined altogether
of eighty fail of men of war and tranfports, with
tesoo difciplined soldiers. On the 25th of Au.
gull they made good their landing near Ferrol, in
high spirits, without molellation, and were all
afliore in the Ilion !pace of three hours. A body
of feamen and marines, who volunteered their
cervices, foon reached the heights that commanded
Ferrol, without any refinance. The Noble Ge-
neral, in his official difpateh, fated, that he ac-
complifhed the object of his enterprize ; and yet,
ftrange to relate, Ferrol was not taken. This was
the more odd and the more ftrange, when it was
admitted on all hands, that woo men would take it.
There was nothing but flight fkirmilhing; and at
that the enemy fled in every diteaion, till they al-
lowed our troops to overlook tile town,and the lea-
men offered themfelves to fetch up cannon to batter
it. So rapid was our fuccefs, and fo unexpeacd,
that the officer commanding the engineers de-
clared, that if his fuggeftions Were adopted, they
would be in polleffion of the town in two hours,
together with the port, the ileips, the (lore% and
the arfenal. The opinion of that -officer was lye]]
known. It was, that the town *Quid he eerily
efcaladed, that there was not a wall of more than
four feet high, no cannon, no (litchi and not more
than so in the fort of St. Philip that commands
the harbour. The 52d regiment wifhed to attack
the fort ; they earnellly de;:red it, and were fent
on the enterprize ; they proceeded, and drove
every thing before them ; but they had not got
further than an old wall, where they were com-
pelled to remain expofed to a galling fire from the
enemy ; another officer, Colonel Stuart, who un-
fortunately was wounded very early in the affion,
would have taken the fort and the town itfelf, hadi
he been permitted—he did not intend to make any.
attack on the Hon. General : this left him an oppor-
tunity of vindicating himfelf, if even fuch were his
intentions—but the information that fpread itfelf
every way among the public, both from perfons of
rank in the army and in the navy upon that ex-
pedition, rendered this motion neceftery, and the
enquiry urgent; the more particularly fo, as that
General had avoided demanding, in the manly
way that became him, a Court of Enquiry, the
eftabliihment of which would have rendered a
Parliamentary inveftigatiou unneccifary after fuch
reports. It was known that there was not
above 2000 men in the town, and yet 51,500
Britifh troops were thought, by their Com-
mander, unable to oppofe them. Good Goo I he
exclaimed, how extraordinary this mutt be to a
thinking man, when he races on a French army
overcoming every peril, croffing the Alps up to
their fhoulders in (now, braving every danger''
and every horror, then encountering their enemy
and defeating him ; and yet a Britilli army, flufhed
with fuccefs, fired with zeal for the objed of their
enterprize, but a few dirty hills to pals, and not
even a defeated and frightened enemy in view,
were:diverted and dragged from their purpofe,
and coolly commanded to return and retire. This,
as it might naturally be imagined, produced dif-
content and divilions ; this became the &nation
of that army. Inftead of flattering fuccefs and
victory, cold diimay and difappointment. Thefe
were matters to excite enquiry.. Confidering the
rank of the officer who offered his fervices; confi-
dering that they were not morc than a rnile from the
town, on the heights commanding it ; the muni-
cipality aßually affembled for the purpofe of de-
viling and propofing terms of capitulation; he Paid
thefe put together afforded abundant ground '
for enquiry; the more fo when it was known alto
that notwitlifiand;ng the fituation of Ferrol, the
Honourable general never fummoned it to fur-'
render. How unlike the proceedings of our Ge-
neral commanding the expedition againft Cadiz;
there was no attack made, and yet there was a
Commons fent in. For his part he was not very
fanrinc that the Houfe would he perfuaded to
go into the enquiry, yet it was a juffice due to
every man in the army, :end in the navy, that
was upon that expedition, a ftigma was calf, and
it ought to fall in the right place. Every officer
fpoke in the ftrongeft terms of the failure, and
they all exprellid thernfelves at a lots how to ac-
count for it ; tlic officer of engineers undertook
to carry it with the lots of very little more than
two hundred men, probably not fo much, yet
that officer was not even permitted to attend
the Council of War; this alto was a ground of
enquiry; added to that, the cirmunfiance of ail.
abling the navy of the enemy, getting Fair-
fion of their Ibipping, their (tom, and arfenal,
In fall, however, it appeared, that on the even-
ing of the 25th, we were every where firecefsful ;
and on the morning of the 56th, the cad Regi-
ment gave three cheers, certain of fuccefs and of
getting pdfelion of Fort St. Philip, where boats
fay ready to carry off its dender garrifon, and that
garrifon and fort commanding the harbour, and
not more &Mica%) yards diftaat ; yet, notwithftand-
ing all that, to delift from our enterprize in the
moment of viuury, and tamely delkrt it. For all
this the nationdemands inveftigation, and will not
be emoted tridi paapingsditto ports, and fending
*sets mid armies ex)editiceamatiog over the tie

.:1 But CCII mire ext..-atrdinar7
app encittii ~vent \‘,ll
and three millions 11,:d h,.n e• i
ct eqn;pping this vaLi armaraent.Hllei Mr. 1'1:t
lied t& 11ilte his-IL:ad), Mr. Stint iemarke,:,
that by ke of the Right lion. Geirleinal.'s
Bead, he anticipated there no fucce;,, tend
• Its motion. But, laid lie, it coil more than two
uc three When our fueecs had `has foc-
i:ceded is every point that gave them command
th•s: town, the Hon. General ludltated thin
lhout.l continue his operations, Islam an ()nicer
oirerea with tyro men, failors and marines, to take
Fort St. Philip in 25 minutes. lie trailed the I /mi.
General would be able to aflign thong realons
Hi), he with-held his affent, and that alum: lie
thought a ground for inquiry. When the army
heard that the enterprize was given up, indigia-
tion burl} forth in a variety oft Ihapcs, and it ap..
proached alined/ to the extremity of mutiny : and;
therefore, when a body of nearly 2o;coo foldiers,
failors, and marines exhibited fuch fymptoms of
dilapprobation, was not that a fubjett for enquiry;
nay, even if 5000 or 2030 to expreflzd them-
(elves? After this dialler the troops proceeded
to Vigo, and, under its walls, one of our men of
war fent out-its boats and cut out a French priva-
teer ; and the tailors did it the more to ferve as an
example to our General, they obferved, to c mvince
him what Britons were capable of performing ; and
more, the Captain of the privateer laid, hearing of
our difcomfiturc, that if a French General had been
fent out on the fame expedition with but ;oo men,
add failed in his enterprize, he would n:ver have
dared to return to France. Alter all this, however,
the Hon. General at the moment of quit!'n • Fen,'
charg,ed his men not to be difmayed, "for the w : e
only departing to reap new laurels." But u :,at the
laurels were they never heard of from that hour to
this.—ln rapport of all thefe circumfiances, the
Hon. Gent. mad three letters he received from
different Navy Officers commanding upon that
occafion, all of which expreifed, in the ftrongek
terms of indignation, lurprize; and regret, the
failure of the attempt at Ferrol, and detailed
all the occdPrences as Rated throughout the Hon.
Gentleman's fpeech. [Whilft reading one of there
letters, he was called to order by a Gentleman un-
der the gallery, who fubmitted to the Houfe the
impropriety of reading letters of that nature with.
out avowing their authors; but he was allowed to
be in order, and proceeded accordingly.] Thc
Hon. Gentleman laid, there were letters from Gen-
tlemen of the navy, whole charaderiflic was blunt-
nefs, not inflammatory. But it was nut his inten-
tion to fubmit any letter there whole author he
would not announce if the inquiry &mid he in fti-
tuted, and thefe officers claim it, in that they are
confirmed by thofe of the army; both parties de-
mand it, and it fhould be granted.—Mr. Sturt
then was proceeding to read a letter from an Offi-
cer in the army on the fubjed, when he happened
to mention the name of Major General, the Earl
of Cavan, when Colonel Gafcoigne Paid, that cor-
dially as he agreed in the general principle of the
inquiry, yet be could not fubmit to hear the names
of particular perfonages mentioned in that way.
Mr. Sruar obferved, that he meant nothirg
perfonal to that Noble Lord (a cry of hear, bear;
go on, go on, prevailed, aid he procee&d.)—He fa;ci,
without any imputation to him, officers, on ac-
count of the variation of their fituations, might
form different opinions, without meaning ill to
any other officer. and yet be right in their conjec-
tures, and therefore he was not blameable is
merely reciting their opinions, whether wrong or
right. He again declared that he neither meant
or intended any thing perfonal, even to the Ho.
nourable General who commanded, much lefs to
the Noble Earl who was under him in command.
Upon the whole, as there citified fuch rumours,
filch variety of opinions on the fame fubjed, fo
capable an armament for the enterprife under-
taken, fo complete a failure, and no apparent caufe
for it, the Houfe was bound in duty to inrefligate
it, and that with as much (peed as the nature of
the object would admit. lie thanked the Houfe
for the indulgence they (hewed him; and having
mentioned a circumftance that never appeared in
a Gazette, vit, the lots of aoo men, and the tranf-
pert that conveyed them near the harbour of
Fetrol, he concluded with moving, 6, that this
" Houle do refolve itfelf into a Committee of the
".whole Houle, to enquire into the mules of the
" failure of the expedition to Ferrol."
The quellion being put and (wooded;
Sir JAMES PULTSNEY then role, and (poke to
the following effect truft, Sir, that it will he
needlefs for me, upon the prefent occafion, to make
any apology to this Houfe, for taking the very
earlieft opportunity of offering myfclf to your no-
tice. However difinelined I might feel myfclf
on any other occafion to trouble this Houfe, on a
fubjea in which I was perfonally interact!, I fair-
ly
_own I feel no fuels difinclination at prefent.—
Mier what has been laid, Sir, within tl:efe doors,
on the fubjed of the prefent motion ; after all the
clamour which has been railed upon it without
doors after all the vague and unfounded inln
tious that have been fpread abroad, the Houle
cannot be ailonifised that I fhould be anxious to
embrace the firft opportunity of hating to it the
real grounds on which I acted. For giving me
this opportunity I therefore feel under the moll
ferious obligations to tho. Honourable Gentleman
who brings forward the motion. But, however
anxious I-naturally feel to Rate to the Houk my
ideas on the prefent occafion, thould fuch a hate-
ment lead to any difelofure of his Majeftr's
flrudions to me, or Ilsould it in the linalleft de-
gree tend to a difclofurc of any of the important
political oiled, with'which there infhodions were
naturally connected, I humid have found it my in-
difpenflle duty to have fubmitted with patient
fortitude to the imputations that have been thrown
out, and to all the clamour that has been railed.
But, as after mature confederation, I am clearly
of opinion that what I mean to offer to the Houfe,
can -have no fuch tendency, I feel midi' enabled •
'to hate- it in the fullea manner. I think I 'hall
' rafter no amtradi.ftiou when I Rate, that all expe-
ditions of a nature foam to that againft Ferrol,
are undertaken eider eircumlances of greater
difficulty sad Laud, dim any other sue a mai.

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tary.operation ; .that they are of .2 nature, hew.
ever ,
hazarclaus, frequently connected with the
•WS of this country, and abfolutely necelfary to
b attempted on many occafions, I am thoroughly
convinced I but at the fame time that. I feel the
neceffity and propriety of fuch attempts, 1 nine
be permitted to fay, that he would indeed ill ere-
cute his duty to his country, whodid no: feel in
the ftrongell manner, the danger of the ferviee on
which he was embarking, anti the rick of the en.
terprize he was about to undertake. The nature
of this rifle, and of that danger, is a.point upon',
the prefent occafion in be mow ferionfly attended
to. It will not be conceived that I mean in the
froallefl degree the danger, or rick of losing a cer-
tin number of men, mare or LA, which, how-1
ever to be lamented, is the inevitable fortune of
-ear ; but what I allude to, applies to that eaten-
tire view f the fable& which falls to the confide-
ration of the Commander in Chief, who mutt re-
gard the danger and rifle as connected with the
general prefervation of his corps, and confider
whether the obje& to be gained is of fufficient
magnitude to warrant that rifle. Had I conceived
that the chance of taking. Ferrol came within any
fair calculation, and had refrained from the
attack merely from a contidcration of the lois of
zoo men, fpoken of by the Honourable Gen-
tleman, or even of a much greater number, I
fhould have felt that I had been wanting in my
duty to my country, and I deferred much of the
imputation which has been fpread abroad... But
when, after mature deliberation, I found that an
attack prefented no rational chance of fuccers, and
that a failure involved not Merely the lora of thofe
who might fall in any attack or liege, but even-
tually the lots of a confiderable part, if not the
whole, of the corps under my orders, I certainly
found it my duty not to hazard an enterprise,
where the chance of fuceefs appeared to be defpe.
rate, and the event of a faihre would have com-
promifed the general fafety of the corps 1 had the
honour to command. For without entering into
the tenor of my initrnetions, Gentlemen may eafily
imagine, that it never could be the intention df any
Government, to expofe to imminent Inward abody
of troops, the lots of which would net only:have
defeated every other object tifthe campaign, but
would have been a revere blase to the country, and
a material diminution of Its effettive force. The
grounds upon which I formed this opinion, I oin
explain in a very few words, and in a manner
which I troll will be clearly underflood by every
Gentleman, however little he may have turned his
mind to military fubjeas. In to doing, I 'Gall
only mention notorious fa&s, or in every thing
material rill upon fuch documents, and ufe Inch
means of information as are in the power of every
Member of the Houle, without claiming the
finallell credit for any affertion of-my own. It
will be needlefs to Rate to the Houih the forcers
with which our landing was effeeted ; that has been
already mentioned by the Hon. Gentlemant for
the fame reafan it is needlefs to Rare,
!hat all op-
polition in our progrefs to the heights above Fer-
rol was defeated by the gallantry of his Majelly's
troops. The poffeffion ofthofe heights gave me a
full opportunity next morning of obferving the
whole fituation, and the refult of that obfervatinn
was, decidedly, not to hazard any attack, as I
found that the works of the place were of a nature,
in my opinion, to defeat the poffibility of a coup de
wain, and I found that the troops to defend there
works were more numerous than I had expelled.
The number of troops which I myfelf ohferved,
and from the reports of other officers, and infor-
mation of prifoners, afcertained to be oppofed to
ns, in the morning, I mean in and out of the town,
uncounted to at leall 6uoo men a nuMber
much greater than was neceffary, completely, to
defend the works round Ferrol. This was the
number I mentioned in a private letter written to
the Right Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Dundas), the
day after we re-embarked. As to my oblervation
of thc town, I law that it was covered on three
tides by the lea, or arms of the lea the fourth
fide, which has an extent of only i6OO or iSoa
yards, is regularly fortified in mafonry, having in
that face fix ballions, and as many finall ravelins,
or rather rfdans. The haftions have a great eleva-
tion, and upon the curtain which conneas there
works is railed a parapet of mafonry, or rather a
tione wall of confiderable height. There works are
in the belt order, haling been lately conftruacd.
Although upon thole fides which are covered by
arm: of the lea, the (bore is formed by a ridge of
fleep rock which fermi to make all precaution Ull.
necefrary, yet the rock has bean (carped away, and
every opening built up with the utmoß labour and
attention. I mention this circumflance, though
not very important in itfelf, becaufe it may ferve
in forming a judgment of the tell of the works, and
what every one had an opportunity of obferving.
Such being the aCtual fituation of Ferrol, and the
force to defend it amounting to the number I
have mentioned, independent of other corps which
could have been thrown in before night, there ap-
peared to me, morally rpeaking, no chance of file-
eels in any attempt again ft it. Perfealy convinced,
Sir, as I was at the time of the accuracy of the
obrerratians I then made, I have had thc oppor-
tunity fine of having my opinion confirmed in
every point by authorities from perftins wholm•no
Ilan can fuppefe to he deeply inturelled, either in
Lapp offing the charafter of his Maielly's arms, or
:Uilaining my individual reputation. -1 mean
I. Ni..jelly's enemies. I allude to an official 're-
ran publithed in France, Signed by the Officer
:vim gave it, and connterfigned by the Maritime
l'refeit at Brea. It begins thus
" sate of the place at tie montane of debarkation.
• The Garrifon was eompofeil of part M. a kutallon of the
nyintent of Africa, and of madam of lanora. :AO fuliliers
tb 111..1ini. midi a battalion of chentilitia of itenfj. . If we
to this fmall number of troops, thofe compollng eAC try log
"TIP of Soria, amountin7 to lOC/ nun, and that of Ares.
*minket of a bsttallqo of tbf resins at. Ithtnanorisl dd Ref.
•'.l another of thefc two camps arc Amsted,
learnt aoJ a h4f trnm kerrll,) we Oral for Orr the total tithe
'coops which could be collected ittnnintc.l to 4o:c) or ayoo
nuts It we take away %hut were woreary to card the forts
tart the town, there will r. =la about ISco a:pufable men."
The concluding part of this paragraph is aline
fnificient to decide the whole quellion, as to any
farpaCed facility of raking the place. 4. 11
t ,ke attar what is secctrary to guard the forts and

the town,' there will remain about i Soo difirerelde
men." That is, the enemy had xBOO men more
than were neceffary, and more than they wanted
for the defence of the place. This was the hate
of the troops at the moment of our landing. Now,
Sir, the account proceeds to inform us, that there
waeaftenvards landed from the Spanifit fleet, an-
other regiment, that of Aflurias, and the refl of.
idle marines, of which only zoo were reckoned be-
. fore.—The above mentioned account alfo after-
wards makes mention of a third camp, that of ?ilia,
whirit might have been drawn into the town if
wanted. Its firength is not mentioned, but the '
grenadiers and chalk:us arc fah{ to have made a
very formidable aopearance. 'chef,: reached the
neighbourhood of the town about two o'clock:
probably, like the others, it confifted of woo or
tgoo men. Betides this, we kern from another
account published at Madrid, that i battalion of
the regiment of Africa, and the Volunteers of A r-
ragoir, came from Corunna. Thefe battalions
were quite dillina from all the other troops; they
arrived about i i o'clock on the forenoon of the
26th. It appears that making the loweft calcifie-
d= for thefe corps, the enemy mull have had, in
and dole to the town, upwards of 7000 men.
The account publifbed at Madrid enters into no
detail of numbers. The letter of the French Am-
balcador who tranfitits it, talks of 4303 difpotable
men, and Come Militia, which clearly means the
number of Men beyond lsofe neceffary to guard the
town and forts ; -aad the account itfelt lays, the
gerrifon of the'place amounted to 3000 men, which,
if-there is any thing to be drawn from it at all,
gives the fame refult u to numbers with thc for-
mer account. This account in another mine&
confirms the former one, by mentioning the Ge-
neral of Filing Camps, although it takes r.o no
floe of the camps themfelves. I hope after this
I shall not hear it faid that the town of Ferrol was
defencelefs, or deficient in point of garrifon. 1
truft it will not be argued. here, or hated without
doors, twat the:place was affailable by a couneie-
main, which even the enemy, with all their natu-
ral folicitude to diminifirtheir numbers and means of
defence, have acknowledged to have be..n over-gar-
'Limed. .And, Sir, there is the firongell confirma
lion poffible of the moil material part ofshis ac
canoe in the condua of the enemy. For there
awnless who came to oppofe :or attack us, were
notifortnedftsetween us and the town, but were
feed round brwater, Co as to put us in Come degree
between thelovverrand them which•clearly fhew,cl
that the enemrehotight ;hemfelves fafilciently
Wong to defend .the town without the allifialice of
that corps.—..-So much for the numbers of the ene-
my. Now, Sir, was Feirol defencelels in point of
works? ltis queltion• is in point of fa& deckled
with the former one by the enemy themfelves. If
ificso men could be fpared, and looked upon as
difpofable out of. goo, or even ggoo, it follows
In
that the place wits in itfelf; It therefore ap-
pearsthat the eteeniy emfelves confirm in the
a gett 'dinner my idea of the nature of the
workseand of the force to defend thole works, and
that of murk it cannot be laid I either proceeded
on grounds lightly.taken up, or which have proved
ultimately erroneous. • Before' I leave this fubjoft
there is one cireumflance More which may de-
mand a fhort explanation. It has been Paid by
the Honourable Gentleman, and it • is hated in
one of the accounts, that the enemy were unpre-
pared in many refpeas, and had not a cannon
mounted. 'Phis affertion, allowing it to be true,
applies only to the 'situation of the enemy the even-
ing of the 256, via. the moment the corps under
my orders were landing. That landing was not
completed, and the troops ma, chest to the heights,
till five next morning, and I troll no one will ar.
fert that either there was a moment loft in the
landing or in the march of the troops. We then
had only an opportunity ofobferving the place ortthe
26th in the morning, at which time I can affureihe
Honourable Gentleman, that I myfelf law cannon
upon the ramparts, the enemy were bufily bring-
ing up more, and there could not be the (mailed
doubt that before night, (for it is to be kept in
view that there never was an idea of efcalading
the town in the day time,) they would be amply
provided in this refpea. It appears from the Ma-
drid account, that the nceelfery preparations for
the defence of the town were made, and the 1800
men above-mentioned detached by nine o'clock in
the evening of our landing. Though I take the
whole refpofibility of the retreat on myfelf, hill I
fhould have thought myfelf much to blame, if I
had not attempted to profit by the knowledge and 1
advice of the relPeffahle General Officers who AC•
cempanied .me. I therefore (poke With them in-
dividually and colleiftively on the fubjec. They
approached and .attentively viewed the place, and
they were of opinion that an attack offered no ade-
quate profpea of (betels, with the exception of one
General Officer, who had not at that time fuffici
ently made up his mind on the fubjea, but who
has informed me that from what be then few, and
what he has force learnt, he is confident that the
attack would have failed. The Hon. Gentleman
has (poke much of an Officer of Engineers of high
rank—him alfo I confulted, and he laid, that he
thonglit the place might be taken by crealade
in the night ; that there was no doubt confider-
able Mk of failure, but that fuip an attempt
might iheiced.
NOW, Sir, it is not at all my intention to argue
this point, particularly as there is no one hen: to
argue it with me; I have only to fay, that my
opinion was, and is entirely different, and • that
Ferrol did appearto me to be, though certainly
not a 'throng fortified place, as much in fafety
agitinil what is called a map Jr Labe, or immediate
&Muth, as any &linger fortified town, particular-
ly when it is .eositldered, that the girrifon was
doable what was sectary to defend the wm.ks,
and that we could not be fupplied with the means
for inch an stnempt ; whickun army making a re-
hatar campaign on the Continent would naturally
ve pmvided. It may not be improper to oh.-
reeve upon this occafion, that if any env,ineer of
rank had propofcd any plan for a ficge, if he had
offered a calculation ache time fuch an operation
would take, or of the means necelfary to be em-
ployed, his opinion es an eng:neer would un-
doubtedly have hatkeeat weight ; but an ercalatle

is an operation of a very different nature, and one
of which any other officer of experience molt be
jult as good a judge as an engineer.—l do not
therefore mean to detrain in the (lighteft degree, .
from the merits of the officer then with me at the
head of that department—when I fay, that upon
,a queftion of that nature, the opinion of any other
officer of rank ought to have equal weight with
his. We have all of us, I believe (fpeaking of
the perfons into-cited), had the benefit of as much
experience, and of more general fervice, than that
officer, mot in regurd to the particular point of an
clealade, we were certainly upon a footing, nor
do I believe that there is an officer in the IBlritilh
army who ever Ikw fuch au operation attempted,
except perhaps in the all Indies, or on tome
trifling fcale of no extent whatever. Having no
profpeet of fuccefs in an immediate affitult, the
only other thing to be coon:l:red was, whether it
was pollible to get poffeffion of the place by a re-
gular liege ? As no one at the time ever propofed ;
fuch a meafure, (and as ftr as I have Lunt,
it has never become a fobjed of auimadverfion
lime) it will not be neceffiry for ma to take -up i
much of the time of the Houfe, in explaining why
I judged fuch.an attempt at the time, and why I
(till confider it, as totally impracticable. I mutt in 1
the firft -place, have got poffelhion of the f:veral ;
forts commanding the entrance of the harbtoir on I
both fides, but principally of Fort Sr. Philip,
which could not be done without bringing heavy'
cannon, and opening batteries againft it. And in
this point, the opinion of the principal Enineer,
fo often alluded to by the Honourable Gentleman,'
coincided with that of every other officer of rank
who tow it. From the nature of the coat}, which
is formed of deep mountains, without roads of
any kind, at lean far ca;oiages, the tranfoorts of
heavy cannon molt have been a work of confider.
able time, and until we had poffefilon of the Forts,
the Fleet mull have lain in an open bay, or rather
on the open coall, in a fituatim fo hazardous,
that it could not have remained there a moment,
whenever the wind, which was then along fhore,
changed to the weftward, as was obvious to thole
:he lean acquainted with naval affairs.
But, Sir, copiloting us to have .get the forts, and
to have brought the fleet into a place of greater
fafety, it is felt evident I mutt have occupied both
tides of the harbour to protea ir, 1%-itotit enter-
ing into any nice calculation, I am fore I do not
over-rate the detachment neceffary for this purpoie '
when 1 fay, that after covering the Beet, and
keeping up the nectflary communications, I eculd
not have had above 7000 or 8000 men to ferve as
a belieging and covering army. i have (hewn that
this was nearly the number eh:: enemy had in or
clofe to the town the day alter we landed. The
whole force of the province, perhaps of other pro-
vinces, was naturally in movement; I know as a
fatt that the troops from Vigo, which I believe is
the moll remote garrifon in Gallieitt front Ferrol,
were adually upon the murch, and i am confident
that.l fptak within bounds when I fay, that they
could have Rambled to,ooo or i 2,0n0 men, in ad-
dition to the garrifon, beferel thoutd haveadmon
Opened the tionches. Toon:rapt a liege againft
equal numbers is a very unufual operation in war.
The calculation in common cat.., is to hive three
times the number of the garrifon, but to attempt
it againft 'lnch a fuperiority as this, is entirely out
of the qucflion. After all, hlr. Speaker, there
has been as you arc well aware, much clamour on
the fubjea of Ferrol, the greater part confining,
as one might naturally fuppdfe, of general and
vogue language, • proceeding from the • ignorance
of ft queftirm,,whish fe* indeed had the means of
undernanding The place was defencelefs ; there
were only aao men; the governOr came running
out with tut keys ; the admiral offered to take it
with the marines and fenmen only. It is far from
my intention to take up the time of the Houfe' in
attempting to refute fuch palpable nonfenfe ; but
there arc one or two points, to which I beg leave
'hardy to advert.
It has been Ctid that an univerfal panic and eon-
ninon prevailed among the enemy. Gentlemen
are extremely apt to nreteh points fo as to fop-
port the opinions they may adopt., As fariehnw-
ever, as the enemy Mewed themfelves in the field,
no one rani fay they difplayed any fymptom of
panic or confufion. In the town they fecund
to be extremely bury in making arrangements for
their detince, which we had the rare opportunity
of tieing, as we took the whole of the work in
reverie. Could the flrongel town in Europe, un- I
der fimilareircumnances, be obfcrvcd from a cont.
mending height, and taken in reverie, the fame
appearances might load officers of zeal, but in-
experience, to judge that to be panic, which in the
eyes of thofe of real experience, molt appear to be
occalioned by the very contrary rcatoa, a de.
termination to ufe every means of defence. The
march of troops, the dragging of guns, and the
. univerfal movement in every quarter, we all know
mull be the natural confequence of an apprehend-
ed attack, but how k is to be conftrncd into the
tired of panic and confufion, I own I had not then,
nor have I now, ingenuity. to difcover. The
frightened merchants,, who had fled to Lifbon,
whom the Hon. Gentleman had mentioned, might
indeed have fo defcribed the difPofition of the in-
habitants of Fermi, in confufion and fear, not
unwilling to furrender, but that could have no
material conneflion with the defence of the gar.
rifon, particularly as the works were detached
from the town, and neither officers or foldiers
Were fo liable to be influenced by the temper of
the inhabitants. It has been Paid that Fort St.
Philips was not occupied by the enemy on our firft
landing, and might therefore have been taken pof.
feffioa of. It happens that we landed upon the
oppofite fide of the mountain from Fort St. Phi-
lips, that the troops which difputed the heights
with us in the evening came from Fort St. Philips,'
and retired to it again, and were thofe troops no
doubt for whom the boats, mentioned in the naval
officer's letter produced by the Hon. Gentleman,
were in preparation, in order to carry them actors
the harbour. It has been fait that the Admiral
remonnrated grit& the retreat, and, that the na-
vy offered to do theme with the flair, if I would
only take the forts. The Adnifrat um". made the
(lighten ohjetion to the =mat, oor did? c, or any

other naval officer, mike to the at mirtinte,:any
1,, 0pol:el wha:ever to •mike 'Le attack with the
fleet, nor did any converlation I had held with the
Admiral before, nor any thing which paffecLat the
time, convey to me the kart idea that he could
have any fuch intention. The Houle may be af-
lured that I am far from vvithing to throw the
fmalleft refleCtion on the di flin guilbed Officer who
commanded the- fleet, who I am confident was
right in the line of condo& he adopted-on the
cation, of making nooproporal to the on the tub.
kid. There is another report, which ought neut-
rally to have been clatled with thole unworthy-cf
reply, but I am induced to tihe particular notice
of it from my refped for the iiluftrious perfon
whole name has been moll improperly introduced.
It has been raid, that I retreated in coal-sequence
of private orders from the Commander in Chief.
How or with what intention any one could hTzard
an infinuation fo wicked, lb falfe, and in abfurd,
I ihail not pretumc to fay. If doue with a view
to apologize for my conilue, I want no loch
apology. If with a vier., to throw oditim on the
charader of the iiluili ions per' n alluded to, the
: uniform tenor of his lite offers the molt unanfwer.
able tellimotry,* that he never could give any
1 orders to any Officer *hieh did not tend to the in-
, terefls of his cerantry, and to fitprort the charatler
lof his Majefty's arms. I have' heard the names
• of Offi-ers quoted on the ..albjed of Errol, who
-
I am confident have not given loch opinions as
! thole which are imputed to them. But the reports
which have been tpread did probably originate
with tome of the Officers who were prefent on the
occafton, by whom the letters produced by the
Hon. Gentleman were written ; but they muff
have been written by inferior Officers."----[Mr
sturt role, and repeated " inferior Oflicers !"]—
Sir James returned, I mean Officers below the
rank of General Officers or Admirals. In regard
to the Navy, from whom it is well underflood that
thefe reports principally proceeded, lam fortunate-
ly not called upon to examine whether the Officers
belonging to that fervice, are or ate not the belt
judges of military operations, becaufe it fo hap-
pens, that, with the exception of one Officer of rank,
who never has, and cannot be quoted on the occa7
lion, not one ofthern ever law the place, cr came
near it, or could pefilhly have a fingle idea upon
roe fubjeCt. The Officers of the Navy were pro-
perly employed in attending to their own bufinefs,
which they executed, as I have Dated in my public
letter, and as I again repeat, extremely well, cer-
tainly without meaning to infer from thence, that
they are competent judges of the military point of
defence of any place, far lets of the Or, ngth cf a
place they never faw. The fituation of the Offi-
cers of inferior rank in the Army, in refped to the
means of forming a judgment upon this Operation,
differed from that of the Officers of the Navy more
in appearance titan in reality. They undoubtedly
law or might have fen the place, but alrnoll all of
them at a conliderable unfuriiffied with
any plan, information, or previous notibix bra the
(Wiled, and occupied in the fubordinate duties cif
their fituations, could only have a view of it, as
lit-
tle to be relied on as their previous information
mull have been it:interred. No man can, or might
to be more unwilling than myfelf, to dere& from
the merits of the gallent and high-fpirited Offi-
cers of the Army; but I may undoubtedly fay,
that they are not universally judges either of the
management cf a large body of troops, or of
the nature of the attack and defence of forti-
fied places; and it is at all events quite certain,
that under the circumfthnces I have before
Dated, it is impoffible they could from any found
judgment on the fubjed. I have not made there
remarks from fuppofing that many Officers of the
Army have given into the fort of clamour which
hat been made about Ferrol ; but I think it right
to thew upon every fuppofition how little that
clamour ought to have been attended to. I began
by (biting how the queftion flood in point of fie,
and I have now (laud how it refits, if it is to be
derided ler authority. 'That is, whether the high
and experienced Ofdcers of the Army, having ap-
proached the place with a view of examining it,
fumiffied. with previous information, and taking
all the eircumftances of the cafe under confideta.
don, are or are not better judges than thofe of a
different profeffion, who never law the place at
all, or than thofe of inferior rank and kfs expe-
rience—.if lush have given any opinion. who net
being called upon to dr c ide, ntot totally unfumillicd
with the material. Kant which a indiment was to
be formed, (peal: (torn a ditiant and calital view of
the town. Now, Sir, it will naturally be Mkt:,
how came reports In unfounded to be generally
believed ? and that idea may perhaps leave aline
of floating doubt in the minds of thole who have
not turned their thoughts to fubjcas of this kind.
I think I can explain this in a few words, and
thcfe will not be in other refpcds inapplicable to
the cubic& I may without any difelolure of
the &teas of Government, fairly affert what
is publicly known, that the Expedition spina
Ferrol was not the only fervice on which the corps
under my orders wits defined to be employed t a
confideration which undoubtedly did, as it ought,
weigh much with me throngii the whole bonnets,
and a confideration of ifreat magnitude, that mien t
nearly in itfelf have induced me to adopt the
line I followed, had even the nature of the
works, and the force of the place been to a certain
degree of a different Complexion from what I found
them to be. This conlideration particularly
tended to confirm me in what ought to he the fixed
deterMination ofevery officer upon fueb a Cervices
to attack the town if I thought it asiviiible
fo to do, but if not, to re-embark without a mo-
ment's delay. Unneceffary and lots, merels
for the fake of oppear.tace., I was determined to
avoid—Being convinced in my own mind, that
there was little or nn chance of comfy I Amid
have thought rnyfelf highly culpable if 1 had hcfi-
tated a moment about re-embarking the troops.—
In the tirft place, every hour's delay might Lave
rendered the re-embarkation impoffible by change
of wind. Secondly, every movement of the troops
might have been attended with tome lots, twilit
to that we had experienced; and leafy, the place
of re-embarkation was the moll unfavourable that
can be imagined for that purpnfe, and where ss