Star.
London, England, 1830-10-09 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE JOURNALS.

CHRONICLE.—We have to observe, that there can be no question as
to the right of interference on the pan of the Powers, and we arc sure
that if they possess the power they possess the will. If the Great
Powers, as they are called, do not now endeavour to put down the Bel.
glans, it is because they dare not. When Spain and Piedmont and
Naples were endeavouring to improve their institutions, the Powers did
not hesitate one motnent.We may rest assured, that it is not from any con-
sideration of what is due to the Belgians, that the Powers have not marched
an army in toßrussels long ere this.Theßelgians would have found, to their
coat, and they attempted a rising before the consummation of the French
Revolution, that no modification of resistance would have been accept-
able to the Powers. The Belgians would have been to them like the
drummer who could not please the soldier he teas flogging, either by
striking high or low. The Belgians, too, know this ; they know exactly
what they owe to the love, and what the fears of their neighbours. They
know that they cannot conciliate the Powers ; that the Powers will act from
considerationshaving reference exclusively to their policy ; and that they
fear a war,not on account of the Belgians, but on account of themselves.
It is always bud policy to shape your conduct, not with reference to
what suits yourself, hut what suits your neighbout's conduct cannot be
determined by anything you can do. If the Powers have any disposi-
tion to interfere, they will, in spite of all deference to them, act like the
Wolf to the Lamb accused of disturbing the stream. Deference to
then; would only tend to lead the people of Europe astray as to the real
motives of the Powers, and thereby create a belief, that if they had
chosen they might have put down Belgium.
HIE am.n.—Wr hope that, whatever may be the issue of the quarrels
between Kings and their subjects on the Coatinent, this country will
not embroil Itself in their disputes. Severely has England suffered al-
ready for her officious interferenee on behalf of the Bourbons; and
what has been the result of all the blood and treasure which she
expended in their cause ? Only this—that, after twenty years of
the roost terrific and desolating war with which Europe was ever
visited, and during the course of which the very existence of Eng-
land, as an independent nation, was more than once in cx.
trestle • peril, a restoration of the cashiered family was effected.
only to lead to another sanguinary convict between the sovereign power
and the people, and another revolution It would be well if the enor-
mous addition which that war made to the National Debt could be ex.
Punged as easily as the dynasty for which it was undertaken has been
extinguiehed. The latter was but a three-41as s work—but whole bold
enough in calculation to speculate upon the number of years in which the
former will be accomplished ? For :Al years England paid her hard gold
to put the armies of the Continental despots in motion against Franc•.
who, with all their hatred of popular rights and revolutionary move-
ments, would not march a single regiment to effect what they called the
restoration of order and of legitimute government, without ascertaining
that England was to be the paymaster, and that their empty coffers
were to be filled by the same process that drained the British Trea-
sury. The same despots are ready, we have no doubt, to undertake
a similar crusade at present, upon the same terms; but the gotoen
Pactolus of England has run dry. If they raise armies to take the field
against the " fierce dettmeracy " of France, they must pay them ;
and we suspect that, much as they love legitimacy, they love their
money more. Thus either their cupidity, or their poverty, is likely to
act as a wholesome check upon their anti-democratic knight.errantry.

Trxze.—The injudicious zeal of two parties, in commenting on the
King of France's ordinance for adding 108,000 men to the army, has
been pretty equally on both sides calculated to mislead the public. One
class dpoliticians insist upon it, that such an addition made by one
stroke of the pen to the numbers of any European army, except that of
Russia,—and more especially to the regular troops of a State,
the stationary and defensive force of which comprises one million
of combats:ult.—that such an augmentation, we say, at such
a moment, when the passions of men are every where inflamed
on behalf of liberty or of power, mud be held to indicate a
resolution by no means favourable to the continuance of peace in Europe.
But, say their opponents, this new levy of troops is not mote than suf-
ficient to make good the lose occasioned by the expedition of 30,000
men to Algiers, and by the dismissal of the Royal Guard of 25,000
more% on the secession of Louis Philip. Both these speculators
we look upon to be in the wrong. France need not of necessity
.desire a war because she reinforces bee army; nor is a key of more

than 100,000 men the mere matter•of•course measure of a Govern-
ment eatistieti to leave things u it find* them : France professes (we
believe, truly) to maintain a pacific pohcy, but 4.t. wialw. to teach
other POWetS also the expediency of acting OP a similar prin.
cipl.• : and, undoubtedly, there would be no guarame whatever lot tire
endurance of peace, even from week to week, if other States of the Coo •
tinent, besides France, were not convinced that they could no. betray a
warlike spirit with impunity. The purpose of France, rherefere, is not
fairly repre•enied, when she is described as resting sati•fiLd v rib a treble
army : with •tieli an army neither she nor Europe could reckon en the
bone fide o:nocrtrance of the duties and relation* of good ri.-ighboorlmal
by some of the great Powers, either toward.. Belgium or towards Prance
hirself We theretoreyegard the ordinance as'Alentily to pure, in the
•
extent of making is the interest of surrounding eyates to consider well
before they provoke France to hostilities.

POST. —lt requires no gift of prophecy to foresee that the Proclama-
tion of the Prince of Orange will utterly fail to accomplish any other
purpose than that of placing the Belgian rebels, in the estitratisei at all
the reasoning pan of mankind. completely in the wrong, and of divert-
ing from their cause the few adherents of that deset:ption it can at pre-
sent boast. By the revolutionary party or the Fteucli party--tur in Bel.
giant politics these terms, notwithstanding all theattempts at mystification
have plainly the same meaning the Proclamation will be revived as P.
confession of weakness on the pan of the Pritutc, and as proof
that he has abandoned the hope of foreign aid. Tie confi-
dence of this party will accordingly rise, and its final intentions. be the
more speedily and clearly developed. Front the creation in Belgium of
an Independent republican government, the monarchies of Europe would
have nothing to fear. This event would merely present to their subjects
the example of a distracted and imposerished people—of a people
distracted and impoverished by the triumph of democracy. and would
thus :teach them, is: lesson the most impressive and effectual that
an be imagined, the value of peace, order, and loyalty. It
the establishment of a Belgian Republic were the natural consunith I.
tion of the revolt agaMst the authority e the House of Orange, the
vereigna of Eumtte would have no interest (apart front the amsitlera.iss
of federal obligations) in leading them to impede its progress. Tie:
cessity or policy of t..terference on the part of other Powers, dep.rd.
whorl); sp.,on the ittolEtt:ity that the original intention or the t.a
consequene: of tne Ittvolution in Belgium is the incorporatioti at tltat
country a tth Fr.:rec.