Star.
London, England, 1807-01-03 00:00:00

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,4'ptltell
ff canon& we had made in the gook ot
now—uay.even by the/4mi fica of confiderahle por.
lion nr/3ritith arersrh. of Blitlfb. e-nnanieree, nnd'
of Dritiffi interellr, tt w.s his opinion that this coun-
t" mould bed onnfolt its tree 'Meat, by.,fubmit-
tin to fuch facrifices. Bait if that could not be slat-
"ed, if Naptes cent; not be recovered. there was AO-
thiag lathe fituation of this country with tripe& to
France, whiehfhoukt induce- it to Mate th"fe
ef.
ffons which the enemy verprired in the courfe of the
negociation. With refpett to Sicily, the cafe wet
quite different. That illand was occupied by 1,14
with the permiffion of the King of Naples, and held
.by an invincible ar)rrin troll for gun. Wereave,
he avould ark, under there.eirciimitances, to likens*.
chit peopefals of the enemy.endlarter it for-an equi-
valent, for outfelve. ? He was perfuaded there was
not a man in the corroftY ;obi) c,
probe fo difgraceful a proceeding. With ret.peit
tO
„.i„.i.l), (mina to ap.
the Eledorapf Hanover, it was net the with of his
Majelly, that the intereas of his .people thould be
expofed to, the fmalfeft inconvenience upon Ns ac.;
cospt, as the Sovereign of that country ; but if them;
weeca debt of honour duefrom the country to. Swe•
am. of Hanover. Hanover was
sten and Sicily., it, was much moreelue to lois Ma jetty
in his quality of gle
attondicstfolely on account of England. At the time,
the French took poffe(lion of that Eleflorate, there
was no war with any of the Powers .on the Conti,
. nem. The enemy attaoked h ; why ? beersuk the?
-perceived England was invulnerable naiad any dr
red effete on their part, and that it" wad- only to be
wounded through Hanover. Under thefe thane-
ltance4, hewas ccnfident there was not oue of 'their
Lorcithips who would not fay that this country art a
bound to fee that the intet efts of Cie Eleitor of )Ha-
nover fhould not be neglated. A great Ilatefman,
(the late Lord Chatham) who had often fpoken
againil Continental connation., and particularly the
emulation with Hanover, has yet been brown to
declare, that he would as loon defend Hanover at
finmpfhire, if Hanover were attacked on account of
any difpute between this country and any of the
Continental Powers. But the fait was, .the negocia-
tion was not broken off on ace. unt of Hanover.—
The enemy hadno oblation to rettore that country
"—there was nut the kalt difficulty in the arrange-
ment refpatino it. In the leading principle which
pervaded the tegociation on the part of the enemy.l
would be found the confirmation of that policy which_
was obferved by the Government of this country.--
Its interefts required that it nmuld never feparate it-
felf from the Continent. The great principle in tbel
condn4t of France was to difunite this country froze,
its allies on the Continent. This he had no doubt
was fufficiently evident to their Lordfhipa, from thel
examination of the pdpers laid before them by his
Majefly's command. He would, however, with their
fermiffinn, take a cnrfory view of the progrefs of the
negociation, which obviouny refolved ittelf into foor
diftinit lieges. In the fiat every effort was made
on the part of France to induce this country to
enter into a kpat ate negotiation. Large offers were
I made, but upon the condition that the treaty .fhould
proceed independently of Runia. Thefe were tejett ed.
:What next was the conduit of the enemy E Why,:
feeing that you were determined to adhere Itrittly to
your engagement* with Ruda, he caft about, end
next applied to the Miniller of Ruffle to make peace.
in which this country fhould not be included. In
obis, partly by menaces, partly by hopes and pro-
miles, he lucceeded, and M. D'Oubtil was fent to
Ruffia with the molt tempting and deceitful offers, in
order to obtain. he ratification of the treaty. During
this interval the. third nage of the negociation begun.
The powers of die Plenipotentiaries having been ez
changed, the negotiation commenced between Eng-
land and Prance ;,and, in the very first conference,
it was perceived that the enemy had railed his terms.
It was raid, that peace with Ruflia was equal to any
victory they could have obtained. On the next con-
ference,
the demands became more extravagant; and
we were told by our Plenipotentiary, that from the
day the Ruffian Minifler left Path, the terms of the
French Government continually increafed. As tom
as a fufpicion was entertained r efpating the ratifica-
tion of the treaty, or more probably when aftual in
telligence had been obtained that it was rejeEled, the
French negociatnts then began to lower their tone.—
When they found you would not feparate your havens
from thefe of Rutile, they then accepted tire terms
that had been previoufly offered, but upon what con-
ditions? Why, that you fhould cede. Sicily, which
did not belong to you, and rslinquifh thole objects on
the part of Ruffia for which the had always contend-
ed. What, he would ark, would be thought of us,
if. after Raffia had refuted to ratify the treaty, we
had undertaken to conclude Inch a trio ty for him as
France was wilful to impofe upon We ikewed
that iert would urit facrifice an Ally who had refuted
to facrificat as. There 'IFS nothing in this conduit
which entitled this crinntry to particular praife. We
• could not accept the offers of France without incur.
ring a dffgrace which could never be oisliterated. If
it had been offered to us to retain every .conqueft we,
bad made, he would not hefitate to fay that fuck a
propofition fhould not be.entertained for a moment,
.if the Condition were annexed to it, that Ire fhould
'forrender*hettay the finallen interest of onr Ally.
SOI this was not the cafe. . What were the terms of
fered by the enemy Fitt', Malta, which never could
be taken from us, but. n confequence of a Naval
fuperimity. Next; the Cape of Gond Hope, the
poffeffion of which was alfo dependent on our naval
preponderance ; and which, were it to fall by any
chance into the imam of the enemy to-morrow,
could not be retained by him for fix months. The
third was India, which he hoped it would never de.
?end upon the power. of France to deprive us of.
the fourth and loft was, Hanover. There were the
mighty cnneeffionswhich the enemy were difpofed to
make in favour of peace. He forgot—there was alfo
-smother ceffion, Tobago, which was fo unimportant
that it had not occurred to him. For there confidera-
.
' Lions, we were tidied upon to reflore every other con-
quell that we had made upon rite enemy and' his Al-
lies, to cede SiCily, and to confirm the French in klat
poteffion of Dalmatia, thereby abandoning Raft.
The difficulty attending Dalmatia was one of titsl
igreatift cautes of the rupture of the negociation..--
The purpofe for which the enemy held it was obvious
—it via. no/ for a commercial—it was not for a m*
ritime purpofe ; it wa.s for the purpofe of Offence-1
and being able to penetrate from that quarter co
for the purpofe of flanking Aultria, of overawing it;
Vienna, in cafe of any difpute with that pewee.—

Ruffle required Dalmatia (tumid !:e evicnated ; not
itfelf, lot it had nothing to hpprthend from a
French army in that province ; but that it wifhed tn
teethe barriers for thole two powers againft which
du views of the enemy teemed to be more particular-
ly directed. Were we not bound to Ilitailate the
evacuation of Dalmatia, for an ally, whole obje is
requiring it was to difinteretted ? There was only
one point mere ippon which be thought it nece(fary
to fay any thing. It was this : that although he was
of opinion that the Plenip nentiarks ailed properly,
in waiting to fee whether the enemy was difpofed is
offer any terms, yet, in his mind, the fate of the ne-
gociation was deckled as loon as the Chief of the
French Goverpment•left Paris. It was impoffible he '
enuldhe defirous of peace -with this country, at the
time he was preparing to renew the war upon the
C ,ntinent. Had even peace been made, the Ger-
nam,Confecieration molt have, endangered its conti.
nuance. That monstrous aftociation contained in
itielf the feeds and germ of perpetual far. When
he fir* thole extravagant defigns trot only avowed,
bat matured and executed, he concluded in his owed
mindthat ft was impoffible any peace betweenriance
gad this country -could be permattent.• There• was
one expreffion in 'the correfpnndefice to which .'e
thought it neceffary to dire° their Lonlfhips' atten-
tion, on account cf its tnanifelt inconfittence. It
was Rated by the French Minifter, that the German
Confederation would' trot be figned, or at kali rain
publifbea, if England would content to make peace,
.when it mull be obvious to any one who will take the
trouble of comparing the dates, that the arrange-
meat was.aaually figned before the Englilh Pknipo-
tentiary could, by any polfibility, receive theinttruc-
tidns of -his Government on thispoint. The Confe-
&maker in 4a, was Road bef)re the clifpatch re-
hting to itorfent at 'die preffing inflance of the French
Minitliti to shistbutitry, was received. The rupture
of the negoeiation, as he lad before mentioned,
might be dated from the departure of the Chief of
the French Government to make war againft Praia.
He had nothing further to troohle their Lordthips
with. The count!) and Eurtn;e had a right to fome
d:claration on the part of that Houfe refpelllng the
negociation. He would proptife it in the firm; of
an Addrefs to his Majefly. His Lordfhip then read
the Addict's, which was in the ufual (lilt on fuck
oecalions—" 'narking his Majetty for his conunu-
nication, acknowledging that he had tiled every'
effort to obtain peace, conlitient with the honour of
the council, and fidelity to his Allies, and that the
difaopoiturnent of his expeelations was folely to be at-
tributed wile cat. aragai t amb4ion of the enemy."
Lord HAWKESI3URY laid, that though be
might differ on tome points refpeBing the mode of
eonduaing the Negotiation. he fhould Rill be read:
to concur in any aderefs which fhould exprefs to his
Majelly the-determination of that Houfe to (*.ippon
his Majelly in the ardnons conteß in which we are
engaged, till Inch time as a peace may be obtained
fuit the dignity, the honour. and the in-
rereits of this country,. In al:renting to the Addrots,
he completely concurred v.ith his Majefly's Govern-
ment as to ail thole points which had canted the Ne•
gotiation to be broken off, and moU particularly fo
on that ehich mulled on Dalmatia being given up by
-the French Government ; for if there was one pant
mom effential and more defirable to be carded than
another, it certainly was that tibia and Dahnada,
which formerly belonged to the Venetian Rates, Ihouhi
be difunited from the power of the French CROYCLIV.
-men!, which was thereby enabled to flank, as karate,
the domininns of the AuftrianMonnechy,'and torso►
der its poffdlion of a great part of its territories very'
infecure and uncertain ; aid in tfie fame way alfo did
they operate to the infecurity end uncertainty of part
of the poffellions belonging to the Turkith empires
and he therefore drought his Idajedy's Govetnmeuc
deferred the greateft praife for the firmnefs pith
which they had Witted on there provinces being
ceded by the French. There was, however) one part
of the conduet of Government of which be could not
(peak fo favourably. --The declaration of his Kajear
exprefily Rated, that the negotiation began by alt
offer of peace made by the French Government,
and that nn the barbs of amial pojffioas wheras,
in his opinion, the papers, inttead !hewing that to
be the cafe, proved the dirca contrary ; for after thu
molt careful perufal of them, he was not able to find
any thing which Could Ibew that the Rate of :lanai
poffeflion was ever in the contemplation of the French
Government as the hells cf the negociation. In the
firß letter of M. Talleyrand to Mr. For, there is no
mention made of any fuels balm, nor does it appear
io any of the papers on the table, except as to the
communication made.to Lord Yarmouth. . The idea
that he entertained of a negociation was, theta con-
fitted of written and figasd docoments. of die
hers employed by the twu contending power% Rating
the definite points op each fide which were meant to
be infilted on; and if any one thing more than ano-
ther required tobe liars particularly definite, it was
certainly that oh the. barbs 'of a association, for by
that every degree of perplexity is done away, and
there is no room left lot doubts and cavils. He had
no doubt but Lord Yarmouth thought, sod walla
his own mind perfuaded that the French government
meant to treat on the bafit of the ea poifideas ; but
they deny they did s have uniformly denied it ; which
thews that he ought 'to have demanded a particular
nffurance in writing, which would bade avoided all
that uncertainty in which the Wile& now remaines
involved, for he could by nn means be *Waded ko•
think that tht bats conte.nded for was made ant ‘r
the met?. He agreed therefore with the Addeo I`,.
as far as it expreffes an approval of the rapture of
the negotiation; for on the terms do•fretich waste.
to conclude a peace; it was impollible it could have
been feCUIC or permanenb. With vtfpea to peace it.
Pelf, no one could be more ready or eager than him..
leaf to grafp at it, were there a proMea of obtaining it
onterms (Diced to the honour and interefts of the coon,
try, and with any thins like a fair profpelt of its
being tecure and permanent. Though he though it at
all times a material confederation what enriquefts
fitould be retained and what glven up, yet be was not
one of thole who thought it to be the true policy of this
country to extend her foreign [KRA/iris too much.
We ought to confider their distance, their magni-
tude, and the number of troops it would be neciffary
to employ for their defence and proteaion t and' it.
ought never to be our aim or with to keep ditlant cos,'
lonics and political; beyond what we are abluto
protect and defend with reafonable facility. Tire
great cluellion however with 'him was, could peace