Star.
London, England, 1815-05-24 00:00:00

greed and decided as to the line of policy to be
adopted, he trusted that the British Government
would not have is bring upon itself the iespensibi:
lity, nay, the odidm,
,by its conduct, of counteract-
ing the decision and that line of policy, which. he
trusted, would eventually tend to the establishment
of that state of things which would ensure the gene-
ral peace, tranquillity, and happiness 'of Europe.—
The Noble Earl 'concluded by moving an Address to
the Prince Regent, corresponding with his most gra.
cious Message ; and assuring him of the cordial con-
currence of their Lordships in enabling his Royal
Highness to adopt those measures which rn:ty he ne-
cessary, in conjunction with his Majesty's Allies,
against the common enemy. On the question,
Earl GREY commenced, by observing, the Noble
Earl seemed to address the House -as feeling a confi.
dent anticipation of success, without taking into his
view the necessary consideration, at the other side of
the question ; and at the same time, lie seemed to re-
solve the whole into a question of feeling. He
thought it rather too much to come to such a vote as
was proposed, when the House did not clearly, from
any thing that had fallen from the Noble Earl, know
yet exactly in what state the country was placed as
to the actual relations of war. The Address pro-
posed calling upon the House to pledge itself to sup-
port an interminable war, except in case of the de-
struction of the present Government of France. He
then proceeded to discuss the question of the right of
war with France on the part of this-country, which,
he argued, could not exist, without a proof of its net
cessity, which alone constituted the right ; and on a
principle advanced by the Noble Earl himself, .repa-
ration or satisfaction should be demanded for real or
supposed injuries, and that satisfaction refused,' before
a right ie war could exist—a line of procedure which
he observed was not adopted in the question between
this country and France. In support of the principles he
advanced, the Noble Earl quoted largely the authorities
of Giotius, Vatel, and oche: writers on the law of na-
tions. Whot did Bonaparte say in his first proclama-
tion ? He clearly and expressly asserted, that from the
breaches towards him of the Treaty ofFontainbleau,
he, felt himself absolved from all obligations on his
part, and that these violations had restored him to
his throne and his rights. And he added, that he
had known is to be in the contemplation of the Allies
to 'seize him ui his asylum, and remove him to some
other e• • • of safety. He ( Earl Grey) had no doubt
that if such a project had been contemplated, the
British Ministers were no parties to it, and that they
would not have countenanced such a breach of the
Treaty: but could they take upon themselves to as.
sert that no such breech was in the contemplation of
the Allies? In a. proclamation issued by General
Des-Iles on the Bth of March, twelve days before
Louis left France,'he sta:ed distinctly, that one of the
causes which had precipitated this desperate attempt
of Napoleon Bonaparte was his knowledge of what
was in agitation towards him.—(Grin of Rears hear!)
This assertion had been made under the authority of
Loins himself, and had never been contradicted.
We must therefore admit that such a measure had
been proposed by the Congress, and that Bonaparte
WAS justified in takipg any steps to relieve himself
from such a predicament. Seeing, then, that there
was this strong justification for his conduct, the gum-
tion ought to be considered deeply before we coin.
mined ourselves and our posterity by entering into
new hostilities. The Noble Lord had told us to re-
collect " what the extent of the obligation was, which
we had a right to enforce by the Treaty of Paris
against the Government of Bonaparte." But he
(Earl Grey) would say, that the right of nations to
choose. their own Corm qf Government is generally
considered and spoken or as a sacred right, and does
not abrogate a Treaty with any State, unless done
in violation of the terms of such Treaty; and then
the contravention of it must be precise and accurate'
to authorise hostilities, and must not be inferred from
construction: Now, on looking at the Treaty, 'did
we find any guarantee for die exclusion of any partis
cular form of Government in France, or any demand
for the proscription of any particular man ? Cer-
tainly not : therefore the people of Paris were left to
choose whatever Chief or Government they pleased
with the single exception of Bonaparte. In framing
the Treaty of Fontainbleau, which was. virtually
the same as .the Treaty of Paris, it was expressly
stated,. that in consequence of the change that had
taken place in the Government of France, the gue-
rantees which ,had been demanded-of the Govern-
ment that had just been overthrown had been dispen-
sed with. Thus, then, whatever form of govern-
ment the French people might choose, we had no
right to interfere with them. The next question was,
how far we had a right to interfere in making Bona-
parte an exception ? 'He conceived that the extent of
right, and no more, was to re-demand those metal-
ties which would have been taken from him before
his exclusion. We had no right to go farther, by all
the principles of the laws of nations. The Noble
Earl had already admitted, and in this he exactly
coincided with what had been said b_y Mr. Burke,
that there could be no jestification of war but the
ground of necessity. Was it than worth while to
plunge the country into all its horrors under the cir-
cumstances that now existed, with oar wounds still
bleeding from the unparalleled and olisartrous con-
test of the last twenty years, a contest which had
been maintained with such unexampled severity
Before we entered into it we ought at least to consider
the grounds upon which we adopted it, and the means
we had for carrying it on. When the famous De-
claration of the 13th of March had been adverted
..s a resolve upon a war of extermination, the
Notele Lord had stated, that it bore no such cons
ate action, and that it, did not go beyond legitimate
war. But the Treaty which their Lordships were
this night called on to approve of, expressly refers to
particular article of that Declaration, in which it
is distinctly stated, that by violating the Treaty, in
quittnig Elba, Bonaparte had destroyed the only le-
gal title on which his existence depended, and the
Allied Powers in consequence declared, that he had
thereby put himself beyond the pale of civil and so.
cial relations,,and had rendered himself liable to
public vengeance. Was this not letting loose against
teolaparte any thing but the ordinary practice of le-
gitimate war ? lie was anxious to relieve the coun-
t, y trom the horrible disgrace of pronouncing a war
oi extermMaiiiin against that individualt What was
tee meaning of that Declaration, when it stated biro
tu be put baited the pale of doll a ase4lrelatioas

Was this nothing more theft to declare War in the
ordinary sense ify.lwliich-he would be subject to all
-those privilegls au& mitigations which modern times
haveintroduced. But when vengeance was denoun-
ced against him, it was not easy to know, what
lt-
m could be put to- hostile severities against him.
He was exposed not only to the sword of the warrior
but to the dagger of the assassin. He (Earl Grey)
wished the Noble Lord would prove that this was
not a fair explanation of the meaning of the Decla-
ration. In fact, we were giving to Bonaparte all
the advantages that he would derive from knowing
that we have declared a war of extermination against
him and his Government. And what a condition
should we be in, if, in such a war, we were not suc-
cesstol, but were obliged to submit after defeat, to
acknowledge him and his Government. No such
principle as this had ever before been proclaimed to
the world, that there exists at the head of a great
nation a person who must be overthrown ; and we
committed ourselves by declaring that we never
would make peace or truce with him. But when
our Allies deserted us, as they had done on former
occasions, and when those who now supported Minis-
ters in- that House would support them n.) longer.
then they would come to the other alternative, and
incur the humiliation and disgrace of making peace
with the man they had proscribed.—(Bear.)—
If such a man should ultimately triumph, though he
might not be actuated by all those bad passions that
had been attributed to Bonaparte, what hope could
they have of favour from him? It would then be
thought that it would have been much better to have
confined ourselves to the taking of such securities as
wete demanded. But he had never yet heard what
these securities were; and 'he was prepared to con-
tend, that the most perfect
.security we could have
eras to be obtained by leaving France confined to the
limits of her ancient power, and by the reduction of
the power of Bonaparte, as her chief, by such a
Treaty as that of Chaumont. If this were denied,
he would ask if it had-been proved that with France,
reduced to her ancient limits, we could no longer be
secure against the effects of her ambition ? Respect-
' ing the state of France at the present time, it was
not possible even for Ministers themselves to obtain
accurate information, considering the intelligence!
which represents France to be in a state of distraction,
tomes from persons who are interested in the over-,
throw of the present Government, and who were
thus induced to believe much more than the real
state of things would warrant. The Noble Earl was,
old enough to remember the beginning of the French
Revolution, and how we were buoyed up with hopes,
that the people of France would rise against the dif-
ferent Governments that oppressed them ; yet though
wars of the most formidable nature had broken out
'against the Government of that country, from the
discontents of the people, these were the very periods
when the greatest military exertions were made by
France against the general enemy, by calling out
all the energies of the State, and applying them to
the most vigorous action. This was no new pheno-
menon. Tie Republics of Greece and Rome, when
most disturbed at home, displayed the greatest vi-
gour ai4ainst their external enemies; and the same
had happened in this country at different periods of
her history. France was now in the same situation
as she had been before ; if then, this spirit which the
Noble Lord stated to exist, should be turned into a
new direction by the most triffling act of a war of
aggression, like that in which we were now going to,
enter, it would be likely to produce an effect very
different from what was apprehended. From all the
infprmation which he (Lord Grey) .had received,
the effect of the re-appearance of Bonaparte was
such as to lend a belief that the people, and not
merely the military, were adverse to the Government
of the Bourbons; and that so great was the danger
before Bonaparte's return, that the general impression
of the persons who visited France in the last summer
was, that if that Government existed during the life
of the King, it would be as long as it possibly
could exist, and a new revolution would be the
,con-.
sequence of his demise. M. de Chabannes has:.said
that the Clergy and Nobles were for the
but the military, and those who had acquired na-
tional property, were against him, because they
were convinced of the insecurity of their property;
and, considering the great proportion of people who
were connected with the revolutions in the government
and in favour of Bonaparte, he (Lord Grey) was not
of opinion that it was a military revolution. The ra-
pidity of Bonaparte's march through such a vast extent
of country was another proof of this important fact.
He bad every whereletsented himself to the popu-
lace, and was received with universal acclamation,
which could not have been possible it there had not
been a general disposition in his favour, and an im-
pression adverse to the Government of the Bourbons.
The Noble Earl then alluded to the promising field
that the career of Bonaparte bad opened for the na-
tural military ambition of the French, by entering
the army, which had produced the military spirit that
had been attended with 'such wonderful effects; .it
was no wonder, be said, that fathers of families
should not object to their sons embarking in a pro-
leSsiou that might lead them to principalities and
fortune. The return of the old and disbanded sol-
alien was a power of strength ; and Bonaparte proved
his confidence in the partiality of the people by put-
ting arms into their hands, without any apprehension
that they would be turned against hirfi. This was a
strong argument as to what would be the fate and
character of the war, and ought to impel us to give
it the deepest consideration before we embarked in it ;
,as it might again produce what Mr. Pitt denomi-
nated the resistance of an armed nation. There was
not any thing which could shew the disposition on
the part'of France to favour The attempts of the Al-
lied Armies, but the reverse, by oppressing and ex-
tinguishing the very spirit that was hoped for by the
measutes they were about to adopt. His Lordship
then alluded to the extreme apathy of the people of
France towards the Bourbons, while they were last
in power, and repeated that aggression and attack
would be likely to cause oppression and destruction,
while moderation and respect for the rights of the
people could alone effect the wished-for object. We
ought to consider how far our resources for carrying
lon war were better or worse than they were before.
He took a view of Bonaparte's proceedings from the
commencement of his campaign in Russia, in 1812,
and tracing his career to the battles of Dresden and
in Silesia, and argued, that b' his disasters in 1812,
and 1013; the Trench Government had never found

itself in such straits. When .the Allies entebtl Prance
it had been stated, and he believed correctly? that
.not lets than a force of 225;000' men had been cut
off from affording any assistance, and that the whale
'defence of France was confided to about 165,d00.
The numerical.force of the Allies united; 'could hot
have been less than /1410,1:060 ; thisvas stated at the
time to be their amount,without including the Swedes
or Landwehr, as well as other troops left behind in
garrison. But supposing this statement to have been
erroneous, as calculations on paper generally are, it
was fair to bell ye, that there was nt.t of the Allied
Armies in France more than 34.0,0(X), wlych would

be a fair deduction for exaggerations ; hut this in-
vading army was composed of victotious troops,
against only 165,000 French, who were harassed avid
worn out by the long and disastrous warfare-of the
two preceding campaigns. Yet though France was
attacked on all sides by mare than double her num-
bers, whoever recollects how much anxiety existed in
this country as to the result of the invasion, and that
it was by a mere accident at last that the Allies ob-
tained success, and esc rped from destruction, and
that even after the capture of l'Atis, the Allies had
suffered so much by desertion and treachery, that he
could not look at the renewal of the contest, even

with the same means as it had been conchuled, with-
_

out the deepest apprehension ? But the fact was, that
we never could expect to see it renewed under cir-
cumstances equally favourable. The prisoners re-
turned to France from.this country. alone, were not
less titan 170,000, and those who had returned from
the garrisons might be taken at 100,000; so that
there was this vast addition at once to the available
force of France. This fact was prove 4 by the official
statements, while it was evident that Bonaparte had
found tremendous means of recruiting his army
during the two months that had elapsed since his re-.
turn. He would therefore, unquestionably have a
regular army of at least 20,000 men, exclusive of
the 172,000 stated by M. Chateaubriand to form the
National Guard. What hopes,' then, had we, that
the same success could attend our efforts against such
a formidable arm, as had resulted from our attacks
upon it when diminished and disheartened ? It ap-
peared horeever, that Spain,Partugal, and Sweden had
:Aso- signed this Declaration, but it did not appear that
either of these Powers could produce any troops.—
We were to give five millions of subsidy to be divi-
ded between the three principal Powers ; but the
Noble Lord had made no statement this night as to
what farther accession of force we were to derive
from these minor Powers. It teas certain, however,
that we could not have their assistance without-pay-
ing them. All, indeed, wield be ready enough to_i
share in those golden eggs which the great Goose of
Europe had so long been in the habit of producing,
but which, he feared, she would not he able to. pro-
duce much longer. The necessity of el:aiding her
new acquisition of Norway might probably prevent
Sweden from participating in .the war on the Conti-
nent. Portugal might certainly furnish 20,t;o0 brave
men, but they: could not fir prodiev•ei ter Ow are
campaign ; and as to• Spain, her troops, who had'
done so little on their own soil, could be little calcu-
lated upon when withdrawn from it. But was the
British army in the state in, which it was at the con-
elusion of the late contest ? Was the Duke ot Wel-
lington
,any longer at the head of those brave and in-
vieeible legioas which had enabled him to gain such
imperishable laurels for himself, and such immor-
tality for his country ? No ; they were dispersed and
exhausted by the impolitic war with America; and
we were not able to produce under that illtearious
leader more than 20,000 or 30,000 British troops,
while even those were of a very different description
from the heroes of the Peninsula. The army from
America, after being incessantly harassed by being
taken from Spain to America, might indeed be sent
to Belgium ; but this wou'd mot be doing justice to
such brave troops, after the fatigues they had under-
gone.—(Ther, /war ).—Could we again raise our stan-
dard in the plains of Saxony, and call on the Saxons
who so gloriously contributed to the successes of
the last two campaigns, to come forward again, after
the fate their country had experienced ?—( Hear, /war).
There were not less titan O,OW ot these brave peo.,
ple who participated kettle invasion of France. How
did it happen that those troops were now in a situa;l
tion, that Marshal Blucher had been obliged to con-
demn some of them to military execution, and send
the rest to the rear of his line ? What assistance also
could we expect from Italy, where the violation of'
the promises and assurances held out to the people
had rendered them disgusted ? MI these circum-'
stances would cause the confederacy in France to be
stronger than it was before, and those against her
weaker. Who then could assert, that the allied forces
could come again into the contest with the saute con-
fidence in each other as they possessed last year ?
As to Austria she was, to all appearance, so much
occupied on the side et Italy, that even if Murat
were to be destroyed, as he thought it likely he.
would be, still the state of Italy would. require such a
diversion on the part of Austria, that she might not
be able to advance again to the invasion of France ';
and the allies altogether could not proceed a ithont
being influenced jealoussaa, and appeetiensions to-
wards each other. The Noble Earl then ailusled to
the letter of Lord Castlereagh to Prince Hardenberg,
respecting the partition of Saxony, and accused his
Lordship of setting himself up, as second Minos, to
judge and proclaim justice towards whole countries,
according to his own ideas of political morality, with.
out any compunctious visitings of conscience at the
acts to which he presumed to give his fiat. He
then recapitulated many of his former observations,
and trusted he had said enough to shew that after the
danger from which we had escaped in France, we.
ought seriously to reflect whether the situation of the
new confederacy was such as to enable us to enter
again into war with any hopes of similar advantages
to those we had lately gained. He condemned
the intemperate language so generally used towards
Bonapuacrhilte,aeabdtuecidsel
goat
soundnesst
atsl
aiprevalenceo
airsinrf
coapwtein(litiolidt'lltgeb
wasarie he
mtroifi
cstooauressmeist the ambition of Bonaparte ; but as we could
not see into the heart of man, we could not say that
a change in his moral conduct was impossible..—
He was nu believer in the moderation of his desires ;
burif there was no change in his disposition, was it
the causes not possible that there might be some change in his
turn ? policy,
wHielen (Lord Grey)
reflecting
h not thinkses
of
so Iris
sigl uly asformer
others of his advanced age; the period could not be

tar simo'red when he could command the armies it
petson, and this would be a considerable security fe
peace. A frame of adamant must have suffered Iron
a life of activity like his. He would not have then
'go about asking, like the Athenians, Is Philip sk;
but he would have them give due weight to probabl
casualties. Did not Banaparte's wish for peace pray,
*pacific temper, not only in the people but in the
army? He did not rely muck uponconstitutions fro med
a itrieri, like that now preparing in France; but Still
bethought the Minister: of Bonaparte were so at-
tacked to certain principles as necessarily io exercist
a controul over him. is not Bonaparte~ union %vita
Carnot a proof' of his sincerity ? (land Gray;
believed that at peseta Bonaparte alai his Minata,
were somewhat disgusted with each. other; bat tia
desire of the latter to use lam to resist invasion, :ea.
his desire to conciliate the nation, would mete tfaa.
Was it hot nearly impious to say peace Was irtia .
sible ? And was it not absurd di use defensive pie.
paration as argument, when that would he Let-essay
only until the consolidation of peace, w!:erair
be reduced as law asunder the reign of Latta
Eighteenth ? The country would, as an a former
occasion of a mot glorious war, with but a jai!. tit
reduced system, be still able to meet war, if ec:a..
sary. Wh it Power had ever been reduced 100 ;r
than Prussia in the year I I '2, or more splen.!,,* i 3
her military exertions in tile aears 1813 amid Is; le
Let France be restrained within her ancient iiraa-,
and alliances he formed again,' aaaression, and a
country would have a suflici.ut :,:•curity for peace.
Let the confederacy act upon honest principles, :tnd
not think, as they do now, of what each may gain,
and let them abandon the wish, as well as the de.
Lag% to restore the Bourbons—a design now an.
practicable, when the Bourbon dynasty was in Aso.
lute repulsion to the interests of society in Fiahaa_
(Hear, hear.) Was a permanent peace with Flax,:
expected even last year under Louis the Eighteenth ?
But this military system, says the Noble Lord, ne:.t
be put down—what, by war ? This wauld cherie ,
not extinguish it, unless, as declared in another place,
it is resolved to exterminate the whole army and fig:lt.
ing population of France. But would the Noble Lord
contemplate a failure, of which there was at least Ra
equal chance ? What sort of peace roust he then
submit to ?—a peace, endangered and embittered ay
success, by ambition, and by revenge. Was it tea
probable that a war with France would agai::
involve a war with America ?—(larear, hear,. 11,6 r.)
The abolition of the Slave. Trade, to which lie ( Leal
Grey) most sincerely rejoiced, proved that Bonaparte
had no Colonial designs. lie depreCated a laar as
likely to create difference,of sentinient tErougi..
out Great Britain,' as well as in the present use:ea:ea
and•discontented state of Irelaad, whose people oar!.l
not expect a single act to be done by the Governeitat
of this country to remove the disqualifications uncle:
whiclrthey laboured, and lay die foundation or tram.
quillity and affection in that pal tof the Empire.--
All those circemstances,lie repeated his here, woual
induce- the.Hoobe to pans: before they resolved ea
plunging the country tea. .reee.--seiieable arta in-
terminable war. He regretted having trespassed so
long tipon.their Lordships—( hear)—but differ.
ing as he.now did from his Noble Friend near h;in
(Lord Grenville); who was equally distinguished ihy
pure and elevated principles, splendid talems, tieep
:end varied- kaotrltclge, and.. long calm knee in the
first rank of the publiccouncils during the mast ar.
'shnts timesr.:thus chairing froni his Noble Frienia
he telt it his duty to-suite his views alias fully to th .r
Lordships. He iuterfered • befeeini the Goverian ..t
and a war doubtful :tad dang,:roes la its teat,
Why _prefer the, ceasaisacale mints. Of war, ivtri tit a t
Uncertain peace ? Who cin calculate without pr:-
sumptiou upon certain success ? %Who can anticipa e
what tremendous disasters a war may pioduse, and
what benetits.might possibly result from peace ?
What hope the never ending flight
Ot future days may bring—wbat chance, whit change
Worth teat. log, since our present lot appears,
For happy, though but il, for di not worn,
If we procure not to our...lv...mute woe?
—The Noble Earl concluded by moving, as ra
Amendment—
" To thank his Royal Highness for his most startlers M;'
sage, and to assure ins Royal Highni!ss of :IA firm deter:ll'4i-
tion of the House to support all rwcit ittya,ures as Lis Roy 1
Highness might think it necess.ry to enter it:to for the sate y
and honour of the Crown, and the preservation of an intimate
concert with his Allies to protect tit.: rights of all ; and that Ce
House would, as far as possible' enable his Royal Higllnt,s
make good all the engagements his Royal Hisborts nthilit yew
into with such view.; but that it woted riot be justified it; :iv...g
its approbation to those measures witch had been adtptesi ir:
sequence tit the new:cations at Vienita,, and of which the li
is totally uninfortmd. That while they were wilhug to ay, !
the views of his Royal Highoras la any esertton to toata...:i
equilibrium of Europe, they felt 1)9U(Al to plole t 1g a:
principle of a war, cAttnieuced upon the grounds of dicia!:l 't
France who should he het Ru.kr, as unj :s:, fraught with 0....
ger, and admitting of no altitnative. but the utter dt street:owl
Napoleon's power, or a huniiliatlng abanaanment of the obi lt
of the war. f iwt the Houni lett great tspisfac:lon to t:•1 tat
standing that hostinies had not yet been comintlwed, and 1.0
his Royal sequld open new neguciat:oas wirt
hes fur the put of butter secariog-the safes to of the !.wet
anithe interests of thy „AlLes, than by ilea: Vie:Tel:too pct.,:
13th 9f Match, or the. Treaty cauCtsJed conssqueirly cia ti.:
V.Sthof the sante moot h."

Earl . BATH U RST Ontencle,i; as an opinion was
not called for on the eugagemcntscntcred into hi lo'
Royal Highness the Pt ince Regcnt, the Antoci:oat
proposed by the Noble. Eittl opposite, Was in tae
present instance unnecessary. As it went to piquet
the principle of proscribing an individual as the
ifeteign of France, it was still more olijectionable.—
Such a prnposition, it agreed to, must cause thee,
&ete dissolution of the alliance now formed iteaci-
Disnaparte. 'L'he great Powers had &elated ci
Peace cont.! not be made with France so long as I?
remained at the head of her Goverment ; t. 5
country, in departing friun dui principle, w"0"
part from its Allies. Waft respect to what had
said of hostilities not having yet commenced, lie;
ters of marque issued, and the reference thence di
that the country was not in a stee of war, Le Il..:1!;•
tained the statement of his N,ible hiirnd had not t
shaken by the circumstance of hostilities not hasi,
yet broke out, and the issuing of letters of 1"4"V".
though a measure frequently resorted to in the
stage of war, was not necessarily a part of war. 11.
the present situatirn of things, their Lordships nu'••
consider the country in a state of war;
.and the
tion now submitted to their decision was simply i''ll"
whether or not Ministers had done right to advise t,
ie
Prince Regent to place it in that state. lie p",
ceeded to shew that just grounds for war liatl
ci i,it
and he denied that Any of the Treaties entx rm. •••

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