Star.
London, England, 1809-01-31 00:00:00

THE LATE CAMPAIGN IN SPAIN.

The following particulars are communicated by
an officer attached to the British army, during its re-
treat to Coruna :

" The whole of the retreat, from the rapidity of it,
from the badness of the roads, from the frequent want
of provisions, and from the inclemency of the weather,
was extremely harassing. As far, however, as Villa
Franca, the troops kept very well together. From
Villa Fianca to Lugo, nearly seventeen leagues (a
league is rather more than four English miles) the
army marched, it may be said, almost without halt-
ing ; at least they halted only for a few htiurs ; the
cavalry were only 26 hours in effecting it ; out cf
which time they were 22 hours on horseback. This
occasioned gre-it straggling in the infantry, and the
loss of an immense number of horses to the cavalry.
The enemy's cavalry constantly hung on the rear-
guard, and made prisoners great numbers of the
stragglers. In some cases, they either shot or sabred
them. Whenever the army halted to rest,.a skirmish
generally ensued, which, of course, added greatly to
the fatigues of the rear guard, and indeed the army
in general ; for a skirmish was generally soon fol-
lowed by a movement of the whole. On arriving at
Lugo, Sir John Moore found his army in such a com-
plete state of disorganization,
.that a halt was abso-
tely necessary ; a brisk skirmish having taken place
the day after his arrival there, Sir John concluded
it was tl forerunner of an attack on the following
day, and on the 7th of January he took up a position
with his army, in which on the Bth he expected the
enemy to give him battle. But, it is supposed, from
their not feeling themselves strong enough (although
they had a considerable number of infantry up, asl
was easily seen, the armies being posted on opposite
hills in sight of each other) they declined it. On the
night therefore of the same day,the army again porn-i
menced their retreat ; and from hence to Corunna, I
the straggling became excessive. The men were al-
most
worn out when they commenced the march ;
io many instances they had wantedprovi!,iens ; some
regiments had even received no bread for one, two,
or three days ; the roads .were ancle deep in mud,
and nearly half of the soldiers were without shoes.—
Many were falling sick from these causes, and from
their having been constantly exposed to the bad
weather, and there were no means of bringing thcsc
poor fellows on.. The consequences of all this ivere,
that every Louse and every village on the road became
full of these poor wretche!-.. Threats and entreaties
on the pat t of the cavalry, that formed the rear-
guard, were equally in vain. Whether they died by
the road side, or by the hands of the enemy, they
said, was the same to them, and some thousattds were
consequently left to their fate. ( Lieutenant General
Frazer's division suffered most particularly in conse-
quence of having marched from Lugo, eight leagues
on the road to ,Vigo, where it should seem as if the
army were at first intended to embark, and where
every arrangen;eut was made for that purpose, and
which determination was, it was supposed, given up
on account of the bildnesr of the roads for extillery.)
Tke :oss in this way iS'said during the retreat to have
amounted to four or five thousand. No words can
describe the scencC of misery that presented them-
selves. Men, women, and children, worn out with
fat igtie ; some at:mall: dead, and others dying by the
road side, and many sharing the same fate in houses,
whilst at every ten yards horses and mules dead and
dying presented themselves These evils might pes-
s;bly, in a great measure, have been prevented, had
the retreat been less rapid ; and the roads in the
mountains been broken up, so as to impede the March
of the enemy ; had the engineers succeeded in de-
stroying the tridgrs, in doing t-hich they failed in
most instances ; and had the strong passes been dis-
puted. This, however, is only matter of opinion, and
the information received by Sir John Moore respecting
-the force of the enemy, must have decided him in his
movements. He was himself indefatigable ; he had
great difficulties to contend with ; and whatever were
the misfortunes of the army, it may be with truth as-
serted, that his great anxiety was to do that which he
thought would most contribute to secure its re-em-
barkation, which was of course become his sole ob-
ject, from the commencement of his retreat,
" With respect to the force of the enemy folldwing
the army, great differences of opinion were entertain-
ed. Some thought it but inconsiderable, whilst
others, who knew the French better than to suppose
,they would trust a small corps in a mountainous coun-
try, thought otherwise. The statements of the priso-
ners were, that two corps d'armee under Soult and
Junot advanced from Carrion and Saldanha, whilst
INey, with his corps, accompanied by Napoleon in
person, advanced from Madrid. Some asserted,
there was a fourth •corps following Junot.. A corps
d'armee consists of from twenty to twenty-five thou-
sand met). Some are even stronger. Ney's was

thirty, of which ten thousand were of the. Imperial
Guard. Their cavalry, it was supposed, amounted
toneatly ten thousand. Ney's corps, however, was
thought not to have advanced further than Benevente,
and to have detached the force ai,present marching
into' Portugal. fo that the number altogether
~ fol.
lowing the British, was probably froiarthirty to tkirty-.
five thousand men ; the British army did not amount
to twenty or tWenty-tivo thousand effective and fit
for duty, evert at Astorga. On the retreat, they were
considerably reduced, as before stated, and Major Ge-
neral: Alton, with four thousand men, had been de-
tached by Orense to cover the flank of
,the army in
retreating, and embark at Vigo. So that on the ar-
rival of the British at Corunna, the effective force
could not have exceeded twelve or thirteen thousand
men. No support whatever could possibly be expec-
ted from the Marquis de Romana; and his army, or
rather armed mob ; he passed the British rear guard
at Astorga, with, it was said, upwards. of twenty
thousand men, and marched upon Orense. Low
little the British trusted to the exertions of this
force, is to be discovered by its being thought necessary
to send General Alton by nearly trie same route. In
effect, nothing could be hoped for from the. Spanish
army, and it was very early perceived how much
Government had been deceived by the representations
yespecting.it, and the state of the country in general.
6, The day following that, on which the army
reached Corunna, a sharp skirmish took place at the
1 bridge of Burge, where the Reserve was posted under
Major-General the Honourable E. Paget. On the
it
same evening, be retired and took up a position about
two miles in front of Comma, to which General Sir
David Baird's and General Hope's divisicins advan- '
ced. General Frazer, with his division, was posted
to protect the right of the whole, and rather in the
rear; and the reserve, the next day. were quartered
in cottages in the rear of General Sir David Baird
and General Hope. The cavalry and artillery had
commenced embarking, leaving a few men only for
piquet duty, and two brigades of guns. On the 15th
a general attack on the British outposts took place,
il
probably for the sake of drawing out the army and
observing their position and force ; which might he
easily done, as the heights occupied by the enemy
immediately commanded those on which the English
were. In consequence of this affair. a general at-
tack was expected early on the following day ; hut
no movements were visible in the enemy's lines, to
the great surprise of all. The attack was the more
to be expected, because an Englishwoman arrived in
the town, who had been a prisoner with the French
army. She brought a message; she said, from Gene-
ral Junot to Sir John Moore, to say that he was ar-
rived with the army from Portugal. About one
o'clock, a general bestle was perceived, and shortly
after the outposts were forced, and a heavy discharge
of artillery commenced. Every one immediately
saw that a general attack was at hand, and the whole
army was accordingly drawn out ;t whilst the French
artillery were answered by the British, but not with
such effect as might have been wished fbr ; owing in
the first place to the commanding position of the
French ; in the second, to the principal part of the
British guns having been embarked, and their places
having been supplied by Spanish, for which, through
some mistake, there was a want of proper ammuni-
tion. The British infantry, however, were regard-
less of this superiority of the enemy, whose attack
was chiefly directed against Sir David Baird's divi-
sion, where was the weak part of the British line, an&
against which they advanced is three columns, two
of which were very strong. To these were opposed
the .4th, 26th, 42d, ,oth, and Slst regiments and
the Guards. Nothing could exceed their gallantry,
in receiving and repelling the attack. The enemy
were soon driven from the hill occupied by the Bri-
tish, up which they had in part advanced, and were
followed half way- up that occupied by themselves,
where their guns were posted ; at which the 50th and
42d immediately dashed, and which were saved only
by being withdrawn. .
" A village at the foot of a hill, full of French in-
fintry, was three times attacked by the 50th, sup-
ported by the Guards, and at length carried with
immense slaugher to the enemy, and not without a
loss to the 50th of two Majors and three Itieutenants,
with nearly an hundred men killed, and several an:.
cers and a considerable number of men wounded. t
On the right of this village, the 52d and rifle corps
had been engaged, and 'had actually followed the'
enemy up the 11111. The British left being very
strongly posted, had not been attacked, otherwise
than by a cannonade. In the evening, however, the
14th foot posted there, finding the French had oc-
cupied a village in their front in considerable force,
gallantly dashed into it with the bayonet, and drove
them from it. Night coming on, put an end to this
affair, in which the enemy were decidedly defeated
in their purpose of turning the British right, and with
'a loss infinitely greater than that of their opponents.
The advance of the British remained nearly a mile in
front of the position they had occupied previous to the
attack ; a fact which must speak for itself, in spite of
any lying assertion that may be made in future Bul-
letins.

This is said, because in the 21st Bulletin, ten
men only of the chasseurs of the Imperial Guard, are
said to have been taken at Benevente, when it is a
fact, that there were upwards of 70 of that corps
made prisoners. In -these Bulletins it is also stated,
that the French cavalry of 400 only, were opposed to
2000 British. Will General Lefebvre, who com-
manded, and who is now at Reading, say this ? if
so, why did he pay the hi hest possible compliments
to the British Cavalry ? Why did he say, .‘ On/tar-
/era teaucoup ije moose, de vctre savalrie Angleterre ?"
Did Genera Duresnel, with the officers of the chas-
scurs of the linperial Guard, report this ? If so--
why did they, after the affair, also pay the British
high compliments, a*d say, Nous n'avons pas etc
accontum?: de corns attre contre de gens commie vows ?". All
this was not necessary, hid there been the disparity
of numLers stated ; for it could reflect no credit on
2000 men to defeat 400.
The real fact is, that the French were from five

t Tits reason why the attack commenced so late, was after-
wards discovered to have been owing to the French waiting for a
reinforcement of 7000 men and 8 pieces, who arrived on the
morning of the 16th.
t. During the battle one of the Imperial Eagles was taken by the
50th regiment. They are made to screw into a short pole, and
correspond with our standards. When in danger of being lost
they unscrew them, and they are easily hidden or made away
with. It is a curious circumstance, that at the battle of Vanden.,
this rtgiaaent wok a pale, and at that of Corannat an eagle.

•

. . .
to 600, and that they were opposed by the Britsla
piquets, consisting only of about, at the utmost,
219, and at first not above IV. That on the alarm,
of course, the regimmt turned out, but not a. single
raa.n excepting those on piquet, and some few oldie 3d
Germans, * ever drew a sword. Thc-Trench officers
themselves know, and admitted all this : and Bona-
parte must have known it—for he m-rived soon after
the enemy repassed the river. But he sent for Ward
his favourite chasseurs to make a rev/ t-ontre les An-
glob; they wet* defeated, and he was piqued, and
in order to dissemble this he has not hesitated to dis-
grace himself by asserting, that which he knew to be
directly contrary to the fact.
66 The stories of General Lefebire being taken as
stated in the Bulletins are false, he was taken on the
field by a private of the '7th and one of the 10th hus-
sars. They discoveied him by his two orderly trust':
peters. But Mien e Bonaparte contradicts himself, it
is hardly necessary to contr,dict him. From the
Specimens here produced, the general veracity of these
BUlletins may be estimated.
" To return to the affair of the 16th. Of the actual
loss of the British in it no correct account can pro-
bahly ever be received. It is supposed tohave amount:
ed to 7 or 800 or even more. That of the enemy was
considerably greater. The army commenced its, re-
treat for embarkation at eleven o'clock that night,
bringing off all such of the wounded as were in a
state to be moved. The others, with the French
wounded, remained on the field.

" Sir John MoOre received his wound during the
heat of the action, when near the 50th regment.--
It was from a cannon shot in the left breast, which
laid it open and shattered his shoulder. He fell
immediately from his horse, and did not alter a mus.;
cle of his countenance, but coolly looking at the
wound, remarkeLl that assistance was useless ; and
desired an officer standing by, who had proffered it,
to send to General Hope—Sir David Baird, the 2d
in command, having been previously wounded. Sir
John was soon after carried off the field in a blanket,
by six soldiers. Whilst thus conveying to his quart.
ters, he enquired if the enemy were repulv..-1 artd
being informed they were, he said, .‘ Y am happy—it
is of little consequence vrlethir I live or die." After
his arrival at Corunna, he gave some directions as to
his papers, &c. and he remarked, that he had always
served zealously, and he hoped his country wouid ap-
prove of what he had done, and that he should die
as he had always wished to do. He soon after observed
that he felt so strong, he feared his sufferings would
last long, but in less than three minutes from that
time,. he breathed his last. It is remarkable, that his
perfect composure of countenance, and calmness of
manners in conversation, never forsook him ; although
his sufferings;as was evident to all around him, must
have been very great. He died as he had always
lived, a truly gallant and brave soldier. Sir David
Baird's wound was in the left shoulder, from a grape
shot. He suffercd amputation at the socket, shortly
after, on board the Ville de Paris. He bore this
dreadful operation with the most unexampled forti-
tude; never uttering a complaint ; and he is doing as
well as possible.
4‘ Of the other officers killed, Lieutenant-Colond
M'Kerizie fell itt the affair of the 15th ; Lieutenant-
Colanel Napier of the 92d, Majors Stanhope and
Napier of the 50th ; on the 16th, the brigades particu.
larly engaged, were those of Major Generals Lord
Wm. Bentinck, Leith, Manningham, and Warde ; and
part of the reserve commanded by Major General the
Hon. E. Paget. Of these the brigade of Lord Wm.
Bcntinck suffered most.

,4 The whole army, with the exception of Major-Ge-
neral Hill's brigade, and General Bet esford's, em-
barked on the night of the 16th, thoSe retired into
Corunna. On the 17th, the French having possession
of the heights which commanded the inner harbour,
commenced about the middle of the day a cannonade
on our shipping, which occasioned their cutting their
cables and getting under weigh in some confusion, and
with the loss of four or five transports that got on
shore, but from on board of which the troops were
removed. The whole of the men of war also weighed,
with the exception of the Barfleur, Sir Samuel Hood's
ship, which remained at anchor, and near whi.ll the
Resolution, Captain Burlton, brought up, and durng
the night the remainder of the British troops em-
barked, principally on board these ships, leaving not
a man behind."

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