Star.
London, England, 1809-01-03 00:00:00

•
It appears, that on the 12th Jal)
neral Sir A. Wellesley sailed from
men, (under instructions of the 30th
to aid the Spanish nation, and the r
attack the French in the Tagus ; t
he understood, to pursue any other
likely to teltrau... to the benefit of reborn.--
And (of the 15th July) to endeavour, if possitle,
not only to expel the enemy from Lisbon, but to cut
off their retreat towards Spain. Ile arrived at Ca
runt:a the 20th, communicated with the Gallician
Junta, who wished the troops to be employed in .:x-
-pelling the French from Portugal, and recommended
him to land in that countrq, (this wason the 26th corzp'
Inunicated to General Spencer). Sailed from Co.
tunna the 22d, went to Oporto, (leaving the fleet o
'Cape Finlsterre) ; arrived the 2411, desired'by Sir
Charles Cotton to leave the troops at Oporto or Mon-
dego Bay, and come to the Tagus to communicate
Had a conference with the Generals and Bishop, at
Oporto, about; the disposal of their force. The
Bishop promised mules and other means of carriage,'
and also a sufficiency of slaughter cattle.
It appears that Sir Arthur Wellesley sailed from
Oporto the 25th July, ordered the transports to go
to Mondego, proceeded and joined the Admiral off
the Tagus the 26th. Letters were received from
General Spencer at Cadiz, who had returned, and
where the Spaniards pressed him to remain, and he
expected orders from Sir Arthur Wellesley. Agreed
with Sir Charles Cotton, that landing in the mouth of
the Tagus was impracticable, and unadvisable, as
there was great risk from the state of the surf, from
the defences and adverse nature of the coast, and from
the neighbourhood of the enemy's whole disposable
force, to whose attack we should be exposed in land-
ing, probably in a crippled state, certainly not in a
very efficient one. Peniche fortress was in possession
of the enemy. Mondego Bay was therefore agreed
on• as most eligible to land at. Thinking it most im-
portant to drive the French from Portugal, he or-
dered General Spencer to embark (with his 5000
men), and join off that coast. By his information
of the 24th June, the French had more than 20,000
men in Portugal. The, Admiral's account made
them less. Sir A. Wellesley thought they had laot
less than from 16 to 18,000.
It appears, that Sir Arthur Wellesley quitted the
Admiral off the Tagus, on the 27th, and joined the
trancports off Mondego, on the 30th. He there re-
ceived information from Government (dated 15th
July), that a reinforcement of Brigadier-General
Ackland and 5000 men was intended for him, and
eventually 10,000 more men, under Lieutenant-Ge.
neral Sir John Moore : that Sir Hew Dalrymple was
to command the army: That Sir Arthur Wellesley
was also to proceed on the instructions he had re-
ceived, viz. the attack of Lisbon, if his force was suf:
ficient. Dupont having surrendered, General Spen-
cer's arrival was now considered as certain, and also
that of General Ackland very soon. The insurrec-
tion ix Alertejo was a fortunate occurrence at this
time, and Sir A. Wellesley also received information
from the Secretary of State, dated 15th July, that Sir
Hew Dalrymple was appointed to the command of
the forces in Spain and Portuial, and Sir Harry
Burrard second in command. And if, in the mean
time, he was joined by any Officer, senior in rank, he
(Sir Arthur Wellesley) was to serve under him. Of
the same date, Sir Harry Burrard was also ac-
quainted by the Secretary of State, that operations are
intended to be directed, in the first instance, to the
reduction of the Tagus, and secondly, to the security
of Cadiz, and destruction of the enemy's force in An-
dalusia:

It appears, that Sir Arthur Wellesley was induced,
from various strong reasons, as stated in his narrative,
to' disembark in Mondego Bay. This commenced on
the Ist of August ; but the surf occasioned great diffi-
culties, so that his corps was not all landed before the
sth. General Spencer arrived on the .sth, and his
corps on the 6th. They landed the 7th and Bth.
It appears, that from the Ist August till the Bth,
when the whole was disembarked, measures were
taking for the immediate movement of the army to-
wards Lisbon, and horses and carriages were solicited.
Sir Arthur Wellesley armed the Portuguese troops,
offered money to assist in equippins, them for the
field, which was declined by the General Officers,
whom he met on the 7th, and arranged a plan of
operations-and march; which was delayed, at their
desire, and for their convenience, till the 10th. He
also left full information of his situation, intentions,
and other circumstances, for Lieut.-General Sir Harry
Burrard, on his arrival at Mondego (and for whom
he had previously left advices at the Berlings, off
Peniche, in case of his making that point), and re-
commended a plan of operations for Sir John Moore's
corps on its arrival, to act towards Santarem and the
Tagus. On the Bth, he renewed his communications
to Sir Harry Burrard, leaving them at Mondego.
It appears, •for the many substantial reasons enu-
merated in Sir Arthur Wellesley's narrative, and with
the aid of 6000 Portuguese, from whose co-operation
he had reason to expect great advantage, but in which
he was subsequently disappointed, that he determined
to proceed .(without. waiting for his expected rein-
forcements, of which he had been apprised) with his
own army. 13,000 men (British) against an enemy
who, he knew, could not well produce a greater
number in the field. He advanced by the toast road
towards Lisbon, for the substantial reason among
others, of _preserving his communication with the
shipping, from which alone he could dekive his bread.
Wine could be found in all the villages, 'occupied by
the army, and slaughter cattle were furnished by
contractors. -

It appears, that the army marched on the 9th and
tOth of August, from Mondego, having horses, al-
Though indifferent, for 18 pieces of cannon, for ammu-
nition great and small, a considerable store of bread,
and a moderate hospital establishment. The cavalry,
about 400, including 200 Portuguese.
On the 10th and 11th, they arrived at Leyria.
On the 13th, marched to Calveria.

On the 16th, to Alcabaca, -where they received
bread and oats, landed at Nazareth.
On the 15th, to Caldas, and halted the 16th, re-
ceiving timber supplies from Nazareth.
It appoors, that hitherto the Portuguese had moved
on his left, extending towards the 'ragas, but they
now raised such dhlicuhies about subsistence and pro-
ceeding in the manner Sir A. Wellesly thought most
advisable, that he dispensed with their co-operation,
on condition they would send him 1600 men, to be
at his dispo4 and to whom he was to furnish bread,

would attack
light in the
strengthen.
attack, frurn

post left, about
coneiderahle loss. . - that
a small previous action cost us about 480 men. _ ......, attack wow.- ___ _ s ad,
___,
army was that night at Valde Verde, and on the vanced guard before Vimeira--the Mishit* of the
morning of the 18th heard of the arriVal Of-General great* putt Or atin was immediately changed
Anstruther's brigade on the toast. . by an extensioa to the left. The action commenced,
manaerdeitnailaedlviinatohreyEhxo:
bnOtinle the
19
thI8t"o Vthimee artnira, Ywtnhearree heit hdaltoteLd "linhon thea'arthd.' tarnatrrinarcy"Ociatsdeamdf,inantd terminated
d ile
his day Brigadier-General Anstruther's brigade, nourable and glorious to the British arms.
tion from, or communication with Sir Arthur Wel.
1 2100 men) joined, and Lieutenant General Sir H. It appears that Sir Harry Burrard had no informa.
urrard arrived off Maciera in the afternoon.
'On the 21st, early in the morning, Brigadier- lesley, during the night of the 20th—but on the morn.
General Ackland's brigade (1750 men) landed and kg of the 2lst, about nine o'clock, just as he was
joined the army. approaching the shore, he met an officer, sent by Sir A.
It appears that when Sir A. Wellesley was at Ley- Wellesley, with information that latent belies of the
via, the enemy had the two considerable advanced enemy had been seen moving towards our left.--e Sir
corps of Laborde and Loison in their front, which ! Harry Burrard proceeded toseards Vimeira, with as
(as he moved on with a Portuguese corps on his left, much expedition as an indifferent horse would allow,
as far as Alcabaca) fell back towards Lisbon, and . on a hilly road ; being two and a half miles from the
joined Junot, who had assembled by the 20th, from ; landing place. He arrived there before ten, at a time
12 to 11,000 men, at Torres Vedras, about eight miles ! that the advanced corps (Anstruther's and cane's
from Vimeira. Calculating probably, that the wea. : brigades) were vigorously attacked. The Officers
ther might disappoint the landing of Anstruther's : conducting Sir Harry Burrard passed through the
and Ackland's brigades, whom he must have espied village, and brought him to Sir Arthur Wellesley,
in the Offing on the 19th and 20th, he determined .on the heights behind .the villages, where the left of
to attack Sir Arthur Wellesley's army in its situation the army had been originally posted. Mere he Was
at Vimeira, on the 21st, before the junction of so informed, saw, and approved of the atept taken by
considerable a force. In this enterprize, General . Sir Arthur Wellesley to repulse the enemy, and di.
Junot completely failed. His attack was repelled in rected him to proceed in the execution of an opera.
the most gallant manner, and with great loss he was .tion he had so happily and so well begun.
obliged to retreat upon Torres Vedras, and Cabeca de . By this time it vas evident that the attack upon
Monte Chique, where he endeavoured to re-assemble the village and advaaced corps was not meant to be
his troops. The detail of this honourable action, in . further supported ; it was completely repulsed, and
which we lost 70') men, is given in the Extraordinary :.the enemy retired in considerable confusion. They
Gazette of September.l6, published on this : were not followed by the infantry, as the troops bad
It appears that Lieutenant-General Sir H. Burrard, ' receives! orders not to qUit their position, w ahout
having on the 21st July received notice of your Ma- ; particular orders from Sir Arthur Wellesley. The
jesty's appointment of him as Second in. Command ofi detachment of the 20th light dragoons alone pursued,
the Forces placed under the command of Lieutenant- I but, falling in with a superiOrcavalry, were soon (:!:ii.
General Sir Hew Dalrymple, and having also re- j ged to retell' with considetable loss. This order had
ceived all necessary instructions, went immediately to ; been-vary properly givenaon. a consideration that the
Portsmouth, embarked on the 27th, and sailed on the I principal effort of the enemy would still be made en
31st, in the Audacious, together with the fleet of 1 our left, and upon this point the enemy had just open-
transports, containing a- corps of 10,000 infantry;! ed his cannonade, and the brigade under Major-Ge-
commanded by Lieuteeant-General Sir John Moore. I neral Ferguson was already engaged at distant Inns.
After a continuance of contrary wind and had wea•:.! ketry. As support arrived, he advanced, and the
ther, the fleet was near Cape FinistetteaM the 16th I enemy gave way, abandoning three pieces of cannon.
August ; and it having been recommensed•to-liin, I.Major-General Ferguson still advanced, and a mile
that before he proceeded to the Southward of Oporto, ! from where the first battery was taken, another also
he should himself go there, or send another perlou to i was taken: The enemy finally made an attempt to
collect information, and meet the fleet at sea,. he i• regain their. last battery, but were repulsed by the
shifted, with several. officers of-his staff, to the Brazenl7lst.ansa 8 24.-igitheuts, and obliged to retire with
..,....,
sloop, and, arriving at Oporto on the 17th, learnt ;great loss.-- -.
that Sir Arthur Wellesley had landed at Mondego, I Soon after.twelve, the firing had.ceasecl, and the
and proceeded along the coast-road to-the-Southward.. : enernyii caialiy were seen from our left, in bodies of
On the 18th, he arrived off Mondego, and there about 20 0; by General Ferguson ; and about the same
found dispatches from Sir Arttur Wellesley, recom- ; time General Spencer saw.i line formed, about .hree
mending that Sir John MOore's toms s'houl'd land at : miles in front of our centre.. •
`Mondego, and march upon Sabtarero, to cdtifine tint; I, About half-pest twelve, Sir-Arthir-Wellesley pro.
movements of the enemy on that -side ; and also ; posed to Sir Harry Burrard to advance from his right,
stating that the army must depend on the transports (with three brigades upon TorreiVedras, and with the
for bread, and that reliance could not be placed on I other five brigades to follow the enemy, who had been
the resources of the country. - ' . defeated by our left.
The difficulty of equipping and supplying Sir John it appears that the situation of the- army at this
Moore's corps for an interior operation at a distance moment was—on the right, Major-General Hill's bri.
I
from the rest of the army, and thinking that if thus gade, which had not been engage'., was on the height
acting separately, towards Santarem, he must havelbehind Vimeira, and .tit a distance. of above three
been inferior to the enemy if they chose to push that miles from those of C-enerali 'Ferguson and Nightin.
way ; and, on enquiry, not having been able to hear i gale on the left. In front, 'of Vitneita, and in the
of 150 mules promised by the Bishop of Oporto, Sir centre were the brigades of Anstruther and Fane,
H. Burrard was induced for the present to decline which had been warmly engaged. Brigidier-Gene-
the proposed operation. rals Bowes's and Ackland's brigades were advanced
• Sir IL Burrard proceeded in the Brazen to the 911 the heights, towards the left, in support of Gene-
, southward, and in the evening of the 19th received rals Ferguson and Nightingale. Brigadier-General
' information of the action of the 17th, near Obidos.— Craufurd's brigade was detached rather to the rear
He immediately sent back Lieut. Colonel Donkin to of the left, about half a mile from Major-General
meet Sir J. Moore, and directed him to land in the Ferguson, to support the Portuguese troops, making
sMondego Bay ; and under a knowledge of Sir A. front in that direction.
'Wellesley's former dispatches (which he transmitted) It appears that although the enemy was completely
to act as he thought most beneficial to the service, in repulsed, the degree of expedition with which a pur-
his support. He also sent off Lieut. Colonel Carey suit could be commenced, considering the extended,
to land at St. Martine's, and to communicate with Sir position of the army at that time, and the precaution..
A. Wellesley. . to be taken against thesuperior cavalry of the epeme
It appears that Sir 3. Moore did arrive at Mon. must have depended on Various local circiunstances
dego on the 20th—that he began to disembark—that only to be calculatedly), those upon the spa. ,
on the 22d he received an order from Sir H. Burrard, .1 his very circumstanceof a superior. cavalry re-
to re-embark such as he had landed, and proceed to tarding our advanti,N.-ould allow the enemy's infan-
Maciera—that he arrived on the 24th at Mitciera try, without WIT degree of risk, to continue their re-
Bay, and that he disembarked his corps onthe days treat in the Most rapid manner, till theY.should at-
from the '2sth to the 29th, the several. divisiens join- rive at .any given and advantageouspoint of rallying
ing the army as they landed. - ;and formation ••I nor did Sir Arthur. Wellesley, on the
. .
..
It appears that on the evening of the 20th OtAti. 17th of August, when, the -enemy had not half the
gust, when Sir Harry Burrard arrived off the landing cavalry as onthe 21st, pursue a more inconsiderable
place of Maciera, he was going to land when Sir A. and beaten army.with any marked advantage ; for
Wellesley came on board, gave an account of the ihe says (Gazette Ex2raor.;inary)
general state of things, and ended by saying, that he t " The enemy retired with the utmost regularity,
had intended to march the next morning, by five i 44 and the greatest celerity ; and, notwithstanding the
o'clock, by the Mafra road, the enemy having assem- r " rapid advance of the British infantry, the want of
bled his forces at Torres Vedras. " a sufficient body of cavalry was the cause of his
On detailing the mane difficulties to be encounter- " suffering but little loss in the, plain"—and, again.
ed, such as the impossibility of leaving his victuallers " He succeeded in effecting his retreat in good order,
and the shorefor any considerable distance, the inferior ' 66 owing principally tomy want of cavalry."
1
number of his cavalry, and the state of his artillery and . It may also be considered, that as'the attack on our
carriage horses and mules, the strength of the ground 1 centre had been repulsed long befote that On, cur left
he had to go over, which presented many difficul- t had, the attacking corps, which, as hasbein observed,
ties, and the very little dependence there could be i was not pursued (but by the. 90th dragoons, not ex-
placed on the Portuguese assistance, Sir Harry Bur- I ceeding 150), had ti n -('stbote an hour) to re-assem-
rand, on due consideration of all circumstances, de- f ble, and to occinsf such ground as might afterwards
cided, that it was more advantageous to wait for Sir ; facilitate the retreat of their right, and that the enemy
J. Moore's reinforcement, than to run any risk of de- were actually and visibly formed in one or mete laws
fearing the great object, or of sacrificing a great many .it about three miles in front of-the centre.
men without its complete accomplishment. From these. and other fair military grounds, as al-
[ln this determination Sir Harry Burrard states, loweci by Sir A. Wellesley ; from those that occurred
he was confirmed by the opinions of Brigadier-General ; in:Sir H. Burrard's first interview with Sir A Welk's-
Clinton and Colonel Murray, his Adjutant and 'Quer- 1 ley t from the utmost certainty of the inmedia:c
ter-Master•Generals.] I rival •aabir john Moore's corps, which; if they 1.-2-
He therefore gave orders to Sir A. Wellesley' ac- I not stoprat Mendego Bay, would have been at Ma-
cordingly, that the army was not to proceed on the I cei?k on the 21st ; sir H. Burrard, declined maki,,,,,
morning .of the 21st, and, more especially, as the I any further pursuit that day, or ordering the army !I
landing and junction of General Auckland's brigade ! march next morning early.—[ln this opinion Sir Ij.•
on the night of the 20th, was yet unaccomplished I.Burrard states Brigadier-General Clinton and Culaial
and necessarily uncertain. . . Murray concurred.]
.It appears, that Sir A. 'Wellesley returned to Vi. On the 22d, Sir H. Dalrymple arriveand assumcJ
meira, and Sir H. Burrard remained on board ship_i the command of the army. . ' •
i ieut.-General P:- H.

the night of the 20th, to complete his necessary dis- It appears that Lii Sir. _ DalryinPl,
patches by the return of the Brazen sloop. having on the 7th of August, received your Majesty'
During the night of the 20th, and on the Morning , commands of the. 15th•Jady, to take the command a
of the 2lst, our patroles gave intelligence of the move- ) the forces toes employed in Poznial and Spain, a•D
ments of the enemy—but being inferior. in cavalry, i that Lient..eseiteral St H. Bn was to be sane
they could go to no distance, and their reports were i in command, he sailed with' the first fair wind fro?
vague. As Sir A. Wellesley thought it probable, if - Gibraltar on the 13th of August, communkated sa

. .
ly, Lieu ' • •
.".....,, ll"recommemled to their erefie4, id itiftl4,l he did not attack the enemy, that they wonld attl
m Cork v.l . Velety, to remain about Caws, withdt they him, he preposed to receive them at daylight in
)th June) er , titer the battle of Vimeira. morning, by posting the 9-pounders and strengtl,
principal abject . Ott the 17th, there was a very consicitrable ection Mg his centre, where he expected the attack, fr
but authorized, as, itear Obidos, with a carps of dOOO men, under Gette-i.the manner of the enemy's patroling.
ler object, if more rAI Laborde, who had taken post in the defiles, and The enemy first appeared in force on our left, sb
the two nations.— was forced to,tetirewith considerable loss. This and eight limas morniag, and it was soon obvious t
!r• —___:l_l- 4 ..:,nit nrovinns action cost us about 480 men. The their attack would be made on our left, and at awttt
__.