Star.
London, England, 1815-01-23 00:00:00

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„AVOW-, taffiv. saware
.7:*:BATUTaii DAT.
TSUCTir
ThiADVOCATE-GINLRAL stated, that the Coact
had eoasidered whethekthei ihould call back Captain
Ingle* to bl 4 eiatnined isitain on the additional ques-
tions which Admiral Hallowell wished to put to him,
and they had determined, trader all circumstances,
that he should not be again examined. After thus
communicating the -determination of the Court, he
would-observe to Admiral Hallowell, that those ques-
tions had in fact been answered by some of his other
witnesses.
General Sir NV. Clinton was then sworn and examined.
Q. Was you not second in command at the siege of
Tarragona ?—A. I was the next senior officer to Sir
John Muiray, bnt wig.% the command if a' division.
Q. Did you receive directions in the morning of
the tlth of June, for-the -storming of Puerte Beale
on that night?--A. -*arlylon the morning of that
day, 1 received orders' inigo to head-quarters, and to
have my it:Alines' to march. On my ar-
rival there; tftsund Stir' Min *array, who was just
going out. He informed me that he was going to
look fur p0511401.'61/1' the'binks of the Guitra, to
meet the eneary,;,whn went advancing from the side
cf Barcelona. „He- kft me in the temporary com-
mand of the pass, and told me that if Maks-
Thickertreportedthe breach practicable in the Pu-
erta Reale, it shnuld be stormed that night.
Q. Did Major. Thackery -report the breach practi-
cable on that day )_4. Soon after 12 o'clock in the
day, he reported it to be practicable.
Q. Had you any conversation with Sir J. Murray
about eight o'clock in that evening?—A. Having
made all arrangements at head-quarters, when I was
going to my post at Oliva, I met an Officer of the
Staff, who told me that Sir John Murray was on his
Way to head-quarters, and that he should probably
meet him. I requested the Officer to tell Sik John
that all arrangements had been made for the attack
of Puerte Reale ' • and that at ten o'clock.the signal
would be given for the attack, unless orders should
arrive to the contrary. As I was going on to my
post, I met Captain Mills, of the 27th, and request-
ed him to go to head-quarters, and inform the Com-
mander of the forces that every thing was prepared
for the attack. Captain Mills returned in about half
an hour, and brought word that the attack would be
made. Having then made every arrangement, and
given directions that the signal rockets should be fired
precisely at ten, I rode to headquarters, to report
the details of the arrangements made; and to receive
any further orders f; cam the Commander of the forces.
On my arrival at head-quarters, Sir John Murray in-
formed me that the attack must be given up, and
that, from the information he had received of the
movements of the enemy, the siege of Tarragona
must be abandoned. I then informed him, that as
it was then half-past nine, I feared that the signal for
the attack would be made, unless orders had been
sent to the contrary. He acquainted me that he had
&ready countermanded the attack. I then informed
him, that if the signal was made, the false attack to
Le made by my division and the Spaniards. would
still take place. He observed that all the officers at-
tached to him were absent on other duty. 1 then in-
formed him that Captain Castemar, who attended
me, was ready to take his orders. That officer was
then ordered to go wult all speed to Oliva, to prevent
the signal being given, and he arrived j uet in tittle to
prevent the firing of the rockets.
Q. Did you receive any information on the morn.
ing of the 12th, of the enemy's approaching, and in
what direction ?—A. By the first order I received on
the lfth, I was led to imagine that Sir John Murray
expected the enemy on the Guiara. I proceeded with
my division: to head-quarters by the shortest road I
could take, outiif the fire of the town. I then hardly
kneW on what side I was not to apprehend an attack.
Q. Previous to that order, had you not received an
order to go with six battalions in support of General
Copons ?—A. I bad. It was to cover a movement
about to be made by General Copens, who was then
at Alta Fulls.

Q. Did you receive orders to spike-the guns, and
when ?—A. I did receive orders to that effect. I
think it was about ten o'clock. I was also directed
to march with my division to the beech.
Q. Was that order countermanded before there
was time to carry it into execution ?—A. It was coun-
termanded, but not before there had been time to
carry it into execution.
Q. Was it countermanded before it was actually
carried into execution ?—A. Certainly it Was j except
with respect to the guns on the six-gun battery, which
were spiked in error.
Q. Had the guns been allowed to remain, would
there have been any difficulty in bringing them down
to the beach for embarkation after it was dark ?—A.
I apprehend that certainly there would not. I was
at the mortar battery about twelve o'clock, when the
officer commanding there was actively employed in
:,
preparing to evacuate it. I told 'm that I would
furnish him with a working party f .50 men from
my division to assist him. The o cer informed me,
that:with that assistance, he would answer for it, that
not one piece of ordnance on the batter/ should be
lost, but that they should be all safe for embarkation
by ten o'clock that night. .
Q. How long did you remain at your post at
Oliva ?--A. Till nearly five in the afternoon of the
12th.
Q. Do you know of any enemy's force appearing
between Balaguer and Tarragona, before the 16th of
June, or even as late as •that day ?—A. I think it
was the 14th or 15th : but as I have not my notes in
Court which I took at that time, I cannot speak po-
sitively as to dates.
The witness then left the Court, and returned with
his notes. After lovking at them, he said that it WAS
not till the 18th of June that he enemy shewed
themselves in that direction. As he was stationed
with his troops to defend the pass of the Col de Bet..
laguer, he saw nothing of the enemy, but understood
that they had turned the hill by a mountain road.
Q. Do you know of any cause which obliged us
to raise the siege of Tarragona in the precipitate
mannerme did, leaving our pins, stores, and provi-
sions behind us ?—A. Totally uninformed as I was
of the instructions that the Commander of the Forces
might have (or his guidance, or what might be* tke
jamination which he might hive received with re-
spect 40 the situation or movements of the enemy, 1
can only say- that I knew of 'no reason that could
render itecessarLM,gadreas change of measures,
-'4bs!'.':ic,'-. -