Star.
London, England, 1823-04-15 00:00:00

FRANCE AND SPAIN.

Mr. Secretary CA N Ni N G czlhol upon by ti.c Speaker,
=id he had PaytTs which by the ccrarilaite. of his Alajesty he
had to 1:;‘• on the Table of t:lr Ilcu,e.
The l'opers were the:. ti.c Table.
Mr. Secretary CAN:,:INC3 spoke tc. the f0110....ing
efrect:—" In moving tl:at the Titles of these Papers,
which I, by the command of his Majesty, h lye had
to present to the souse be rend, I shall take advan-
tage by permission of the House of the opportunity .
which 'that forinal motion affords to me, to redeem a
pledge is-bich I gave to the House some weeks ago,
and to state succinctly the course of policy pursued
by Lis Majesty's Government, and the principles
n high have guided it in die important and complicated
negotiations which it bad lately fallen to its lot to con-
duct. I teel that in doing so, I hieve as awfully im-
portant a 'duty to perform as ever fell on the servant
of a great Monarch, and on the Minister of a free peo-
ple; as I have to account to the llouse for the manner
in which the honour of the Crown has been supported,
and the interests of the country consulted, in a crisis
of unexampled di6cult7-.—a crisis, the consequences
of which are as yet not ascertained. I state this last
circumstance as of importance, because if the event
of the war were certain ; if it were known which of
the evil consequences which it threatened would be
a-calmed, I might shape my explanations and de-
fence to that issue ; but I feel, in 'the present state
of the world, the unexampled difficulty of my situa-
tion more strongly, because I am bound to justify
the condoct of the British Government.as against all
imaginable consequences, and all anticipated dangers.
In a crisis beset with so many possible and different
calamities, teeming with so many dangers, there is
but owe consciousness which could sustain any man
under its difficulties; it is, that of having pursued one
intelligible object—of having acted on one set of
invariable principles. The object we have had in
view is the preservation el the peace of the world ;
the principles which have guided us are those which
were well described by an Honourable and Learned
Friend of mine, whom I lament that I do not now
see in his place (Sir James Mackintosh)—respect for
the faith of treaties, respect for the independence of
nations, respect for that established line of policy
known by the name of the balance of power in
Europe; and last, though not least, a regard for the
honour and interests of England—(Hear, hear).—
Before 1 proceed to the narrative of the transactions
ill question, I mutt briefly call to recollection what
the state of Europe, and of this country in regard to
it, was befote the month of September last, ashen
these negotiations originated. A meeting of some of
the Sovereigns of Europe, similar to several other
meetings which had previcusly taken place, was an-
.nounced as about to be held, for consultation on some
special affairs, and generally on the preservation of
peace in Europe. I must here explain a statement
which I formerly made as to the policy which I had
then to pursue.. I mention it frem no desire to dis-
connect myself from my predecessor in office, but I
think it necessary to explain the expressions, which
have been much narrowed by some, and extended by
others. I said that 1 found in the records of my
office (and it was not in the records of that office
ErertAy, fir it was known to the House and to all the
world), a :-.2.1-.te Paper laying L'own the ptinciple cf
non-interfet..oce in all its ex:ent, and with all the
quaroriczaioas that belonged to it ; and when it was
attributed to me, that I had applied a new principle
to a new case, it was due to my predecessor to refer
to that document in which he had stated the princi-
ple of non-interference as clearly and definitely,
And with the necessary qualifications as well ex-
pressed, as any Statesman had ever laid it down.--
1 must also state that the question which, after all,
turned out to be the most important one at Verona, ,
the question as to the affairs of Spain, was not anti-
cipated as a subject of discussion. So completely
was this the case, that the first in number of the pa-
pers which I gave laid on the table, was a dispatch
the Duke of Wellington, written on his arrival
in Par is, in which he stated that he was under the ne-
cessity of asking advice as to Spain. It was on
his arrival at Paris that the Duke of Wellington
found, in conversation with the French Minister, that
:he case of .Spain was to occupy a leading part of
toe deliberations of the Congress, lad he applied kir
specific instructions as to the language be should
hold, and only in the case of the instructions and of
a part of the concluding paper should he beg leave
to read any of the documents which be now corn;
inunicated. The request of the Duke of Wellington
was dated September 21, and the instructions which
I shall now read were dated September 27 (Paper
No. 2). With this instruction the Duke of Wellington
left Paris for Verona—an instruction not doubtful or
overloaded with qualifications, but positive and pe-1
remptory, and from which, in the slightest degree,
his Grace on no occasion ever swerved. in this state-
ment I have anticipated an objection, which was
stated with great force, as well as ingenuity, by an
llonourab:e Gentleman opposite, viz: That, when
England went to a Congress on the affairs of Spain,
England was bound to take care that Spain was a
party to the deliberations of that Congress. So far was
the British Government from anticipating that any
hostile propositions ss ould be brought forward against
Spain by Prance, that the F: cnch Government had,

-d

by heir professions, given every reason. to liliesii
fifth* intentions were iei •the isiost pacific kird. '
Liptak +articular', of the Speech of the King of
Fiance„Ain uie closing of the Session of the Cl;:im-
fie?rs on the sth of June, 1822. In that-Srerch, in
1 apeaking .of _the Cordon Sanitaire, his Most...Chris-
tiatilVrajFity -stated, " that the season of the year,
and the danger of the return of the fever, triode it
" essary--ior him to continue the line of troops near
the Pyrennees, and that malveillauce alone could find
in those measures a pretext to give a false impression
as to his Majesty's intentions"—(Hear, hear).—Un-
doubtedly this led the British Government to expect
anything rather than warlike intentions cn the parr
of .France—(Hear)—and 1 state it.to accourt for the
instructions of the British Government to its Pleni-
potentiary at the Congress, not being framed on any
idea of such a proposition. When the prepositions
of France were first brought forward at the Congress,
they were riot in a hostile shape, but defensive, con-
ditional, and hypothetical. The French Plenipo-
tentiary asked, what would be the conduct of the
Great Powers in certain events, all of which sup-
posed some act of offence on the part of Spain ?
The three Continental Powers, in reply, gave assu-
rances of their cOuntenance, and, in terrain cases. of
their assistance to France; however, the British Pleni-
potentiary was disposed to give no such answer, and
in the answers of the Allies, when communicated, he
could not express any degree of concurrence—he
would not consent to enter into conditional obliga-
tions as to undefined contingencies which might com-
mit the country which lie represented to hostilities on
unknown grounds—and he demanded, befo:e he en-
tered on such an 14pothesis,- to know what grounds
of offence Spain had actually.given, and whatspecific
j dangers were.threatened or anticipated? .(Hear, hear).
In the conferences at Verona the language of the Bri-
tish Minister, from the first to the last moment of
discussion, was positive in declining to afford any
encouragement to the demands of France—positive
in the refusal to have anything to do with the inter-
ference with Spain ; and when the Continental Powers
determined to transmit to Madrid papers, in which
they declared changes in the Spanish Constitution to
be the condition on which Spain could preserve
their friendship, the .British Plenipotentiary 'declared
that all his Britannic Majesty amid do was to con-
tinue his Minister at Madrid to allay the ferment
and irritation which the communications of the
other Powers must necessarily occasion there, and
" to do all the good in his power"—(Hear, hear.)—
The British Plenipotentiary went to Paris to renew
the attempts which had been ineffectual at Verona,
and to demand from his own Government instructions
for our Minister at Madrid to disavow all participa-
tion in the projects of hostile interference, and to
counsel them against any excesses which might afford
what would be deemed a retrospective justification
for the hostile denunciations of the Allies. The Duke
of Wellington returned to Paris at the beginning of
December. At that time the French Government,
far from being more hostile, shewed itself more pa-
cific, and had at one time determined to send back
the dispatches which had been prepared at Verona,
to pray the Soveieigns, who were yet there, to recon-
sider them before they were forwarded to. Madrid.
This is the substance of the first report of the Doke
of Wellington from Paris. Up to this time no com-
munication had taken place on the.subject of the
negociations at Verona, between this country and
Spain, and the cause of this I will shanty- eiplain.-L-
-.
In the last Session of Parliament the clamour, the just
clamour, began to be heard through this country of
the impediments thrown in the way. of our. commer-
cial navigation in the West Indian seas. . An arma-
ment was fitted out, by which this country Was to
take into its own hands that redress which had been
in vain sought at Madrid. Orders had been given to
Commodore Owen, in the event of the Pirates agaitf
Ending refuge on the coast of Cuba, to effect a land-
ing on the coast of Cuba, and to root °kit the Pirates
from their holds. 1 hope it is unnecessary to-say that
the British Government thought it right to commu-
nicate its intentions to the Court of Madrid. About
the same time pretensions were renewed by some
of the Spanish Commanders -on the Spanish Main,
to c'eclare in a state of constructive blockade the
whole of the Continent of Spanish America, and to
capture all vessels which shOuld presume to violate it.
'l'lle mission on which Sir W. A'Court was first em-
ployed was in urging these remonstrances, atsd in
communicating the instructions which had been sent
to our Commanders in the West Indies. Redress was
promised by the Spanish Gavel nment, and, I believe,
with the fullest idea of faithfully performing it. It
was not at the moment when we were ourselves pre-
ferring claims in behalf of American grievances, that
we could assume the best attitude in defending The in-
dependence of Spain against European invaders, and
it was well to reserve our communications with Ma-
drid, on the transactions at Verona, till the time

should Come when we might avoid the appearance
of at once attacking and protecting her. I have Am
in various quarters, and heard that some offence Wes'
found in our sending Sir W. A'Court to represent, at
the Court of Madrid, the British Qcrvernment. Now.'
it happened, whimsically enough (be had set out for
Spain before my appointment) that the Ministers
of the three Allied Powers called on rile in Down-
ing-street, to represent against the sending SirWilliasn
A'Coutt, as calculated to encourage the Spaniards.
, It was certainly diflicult to steer between objections so ° e.
I can well imagine that as the character in which Sir Tilrititam
A'Court was first employed was that of an obdurate debtor
galling for payment—that as the Spanish Government was suf-
fering under his daily demands, it might entertain an unfavour-
able idea of Sir William A'Court in his infidel character. }lot
as soon as the hope orinducing the Allies to abandon altogether
the idea of interfering With Spain was extinguished, information
was sent to Madrid of the whole course of the negoeiations of
Verona. It was then known that while Sir Wiliam A'Court
had been ahewiug the obdurate character of a creditor, his Go-
vernment had been acting towards Spain the part of unsolicited
friendship. Since that time the feeling towards Sir William
A'Court has been considerably changed, and that Gentleman
himself has displayed as earnest endeavours, and as Spanish
a feeling to do good to Spain, as any one could. possibly shew.
While Spain was yet uncertain as to the course of the negocia-
dons at Verona, an application was made by the Spanish Ministers
ta the British Government—to induce this country to use its

good offices in the maintenance df peace. In this, which was a I
written application. care was taken by the Spauibh Minister that ,
nothing.thould be requested that might be inconsistent with the
nun; strictly conceived system of neutrality. • After the receipt
of this communication kis blajesty's Government did not hesitate
a moment to write to the Duke of Welling:on to offer the me-
4iation of his Majesty to accommodate the differences between
France and Spain.- The French Government declined the prof-
fered mediation. as the differences between the two countries
were ant of that specile and practical kind that a medLition could
remove them, but hall grown out of the state of things in the

. . . • •
two kienennia, wed 1 re get i-t-• a state of ir-I:Sition the
war would be preferable as affordirg vette claret- ontlrstqogone
it was added, however, that his most Chebtian D 1 ssty %Moll
willingly accept of a recipe ',cation or good *Fee*, and .:mrappcb "IL
Britannic Slajesty to c intitute his tool of es at Paris and
Madrid. Bete I admit was a case ia which it rneybe said, that
utiless.sinnething tangible was brought forward, we should have
begged to withdraw frosts further jinn-If-reeler, but at the same
st:m- that the mediation was declined, this step was accompa.
stied with the most solemn assurances of pacific intrntions, and,
as an alirm beyond example. prevailed as to the .1 an; er cf :he war,
not to Spain only, but to France, and througl• her to all F.econe,
while there was a chance of peace, and while it was tbrough :he
exertions of this country only that the chance could be taken
....'...-antage of, I think.it was our duty to try what couil
be Zone, by the good offices which were a.lniired.—( I fear.;
The question was now reduced to a simple ore bens een France
and Spain, and we at least bad the certainty before us, if we failed
to prevent the war, that our interference coulu neither hasten it
nor render it more dangerous. We did thnsenuent"y use our
good offices, and in doing so we took the to no,: nat: net ut.:y
to distinguish our conduct from tliit of the Certirenta!
Powers, find our principles from those which Frenee avowed
in the dispatch to her 'Minister, but to gnatd against
the supposition of any thing like urf!i-rd:y interference.—
The Duke of Wellington had stittainee !;.,,ntish liberty against
the attacks of France, and had ultimately made it triumphar.t.
If ever there was a man entitled to hennur in Spain, ft was the
Duke of Wellington. Nothing, therefore, could be less invidious
than that the man who had earned a Spanish character by gra-
titude and by adoption, should speak what ':any f)r his private
friends at Masirid knew to have teen long his real sereirrents.
The Duke of Wellington, therefore, sent his friend to ;dad:id
—the partner of Lis teuls of th_. Peeinsular war—nit:l his opi-
nion of the course which it would be prudent for Spain to pur-
sue. This opinion was given in a paper delivered at Madrid,
honestly and plainly, and was given after Spain bad asked
for our interference and our counsel—(Eleer, hear, bear!)—lt
was not asking anything fur ourselves, not making this or that
form of constitutional reformation the condi:lop of our friead-
ship, or even of our exertions, but suggesting what we thouglu
for the advantage of Spain, and echoing the voice of the Spa-
niard", that the advice of the Duke of Wellington was sent to
the Spaniards. Looking on this proceeding at the distance of
three months, with a full knowledge of what had been its suc-
cess, with the chance of all the misconceptions and all the hazard
which attended it, I know not, if I bad to decide again, how it
might be decided; but this I know, that if I had declined to
take that step, and war had ensued, I should have had cliificulty
in sheeting to England and to the world a satisfactory reason, hav-
ing the powers I possessed, why I declined to avail myself of them.
Lord Fitzroy Somerset arrived at Madrid on the 20th of Ja-
nuary ; and not long after an event occurred calculated to shake
the determination of his Majesty's Government, and to remove
almost every hope of a pacific result—l mean the extraordinary
Speech with which the French Government thought fit to open
the Session of the Chambers—(Hear, hear).—Of the principles
avowed in that Speech with respect to the Spanish Constitution,
no
one can think with morepain, to use no stronger expression,
than I do—(Hear, hear).—When it was broadly stated that
Spain could only hold her institutions from the King, that she
must reinstate him in absolute power, that he might divest
himself of as small a portion of it as be thought St, this was
putting the proposal in a shape which no Spanish Minister
could be expected to admit, and ,which certainly no British
Statesman could ever be found to recommend—(Hear, bear).
Under such circumstances, it was necessary to tell thetn
that if such was the meaning of the Speeth, there must be an end
of all negotiation through us, and that it could proceed no further;
that this principle was one which no British Statesman could re-
commend ; it was ! principle which struck at the British Consti-
tution—(Hun, bear), and which we could never submit to ac-
knowledge. It was added, that whlieon the one band Great Bri-
tain did not pretend to put forward her own political institutions
as the model on which the world was bound to reform their

Governments' it could not on the other (at the same time not
goestioning that the people of France enjoyed considerable hap-
plasm under their Government) tolerate that France abated im-
pose its form of Government on Spain, and make it binding on
that country, by virtue of the consanguinity of the Sovereigns.
`that
the total failure of our hopes,l took an opportunity of frankly
.station that circumstance to the House. Nothing remained for
the British Government but to state to both patties the
wourse it intended to pursue in so deplorable a crisis ;
and nevei for a moment, from the beginning of our inter-
' cow se with Spain, respecting the Negotiations at Verona, never
far a stogie Moment bad the Spanish Government been led to
tbetieve--.nevii had the conduct of Great Britain been such as
.to encourage a hype that this course would be any other than
that of strict neutral.4y—(Hear, hear!)—We had always acted
on the principle of doing all in our power to avert war, but had
always declared, should it ensue, that i• was our determination
to take no part in it. Prom the doczn! ems laid on the table it
"Amid be evidint, that when it was asaatained what the coo-
duet of •Fratith would be, it was thought necessary to speak out
pialnlK."Ai.in evidence of this, Sir, I shall read only one of
the Papers laid on the table. It is the conchs:gin of the last dis-
patch atinreeifit by me to his Majesty's Ambassador at Paris,
wad communicated by hint to the French Goverannert. The
Right ilonourakie Secretary bete -read the latter part of the
Dispatch No: 43. The Right lion. Gentleman then continued.
These were the only points on which it appeared to item that any
danger could be apprehended for Great Britain; and on these
Voisin, be had endeavoured. to guard her interest as carefully
and specifically as he could (liar, hear). He would woo
ilya new words with respect to the Treaties which existed bo.
tween this country and Portugal : and there never bad been a
single moment in which the Ministers of France had not
been aware that any attack wantonly made by them on Por-
',engal.would bring Great Britain Jaw the field with all her force
Os support the independence of her ancient and her faithful Ally.
England was bound to protect Portugal, if Portugal were at-
tacked, but not if Portugal attacked others. He thought it
'tight to make this statement, because Ragland had never yet
made any arrangement, or entered into any treaty, which she
had not, when called upon, fulfilled to the very letter.(Heaf).—.
With regard to the independence of the Spanish colonies in
America, be also wished to say a few words by way of explana-
tion. As long as peace prevailed on the Continent, and Spain
had no enemy In Europe to contend with, it was a matter of dis-
cretion with the British Government, whether it would or wou:d
not call the attention of Spain to the undeniable fact that
she- had lost all her influence in her American provinces—
'and that her wisest policy was to emir as soon as possible into
an accommodation with them, reeognihdog their independence,

- - -
spa inalliodimigh any advantages which the mother country
VWA pro* to stipulate. Indeed, advice to that edict
damilly been given to her by this country(llears hear).—
At proem, however, the ease was entirely changed. As fain
bed now . an aerie, and say powerful European away, ft
became necessary rpr Great Britain to declare in what fight
she looked upon the struggling Provinces of South America;
for as Spain still retained the dominion drjare over them, though
had lost the domiciles it facts, as France might send forth 1
fleets and armies to seise and conquer them, and as at the
agonclusion of the war arrangements might be made between the
tens nations regarding the conquest or the cession of them, the
Habit 'Government bad felt Itself cilled upcin to state, that it'
.sissmidered the separation of the Colonies from Spain to have
Wen effected to such a degree, that it would not tolerate for an
scant any cession which Spain might snake of Colonies over
which she did not exercise a direct and positive influence (!fear).
He was aware, that to whateier deterrnin.ition the House
Might come regarding the conduct of Ministers in the Late sego-
stations, many individuals in this country thought that the inva-
i
of Spade by a French force ought to be considered by
gland as a declaration of war against herself. That
opinion, he linen-, was held by many persons of the first
tank and the utmost respectability ; but of that opinion he would'
'Rate, that it could not reedve any support from eitherjustice or
Ee
'cr. When he said that it could not receive any support from
dee, he did not mean to say that such a war would be abso-
ly unjust on our part, but that there would he no ad0..,1
legate gicund on which we could be called to interfere in it.—'
ar, in the responsibility of those who had to make it, ought
to be well and duly weighed; the cause of it should not merely
be urgent, Tut absolutely consistent with the interest and!
welfare of tht country which first declared it—Hear, bear ! I
1 —The Right Hon. Gent. then adverted to tbe preteit of
1 France far attacking Spain. He would ask, what bad Spain ever
done that -was at all analogous to the celebrated decree of
. the 19th November, made by the French republicans? What
country had Spain ever attempted to seize or to revolutionize ?
What independent state had she invaled in any manner that
could be compared with the invasion of Geneva, of Say.:y, and of
Avignon by France, before their inhabitants had even time to
draw a sword in their own defence? There was, or; analogy
between the use of Spain and that of the French republic • and
of ail the Lowers whidrooglat to thin.L of IC4lllp l.ch a I,:s.ea