Star.
London, England, 1815-01-28 00:00:00

FIRS r CHARGE.

He new came to the consideration of the charges.
Two prosecutors had appeared against him, contend-
ing on principles in direct opposition to each other.
The Judge Advocate had felt this difficulty ; and
had adduced no proofs except the documents origi•
ashy famished to him. In his observations upon
this evident inconsistency, he veiny truly stated that
Admiral Hallowell might so conduct his Can as to
mike the charges correspond with each other ; and
that General Murray was open to animadversion for
haying continued the siege too long, as well as for
the precipitate manner-of its abandonment. This in-
continency did not seem to be wrathy of Admiral
Hailowell's notice ; for he had made no observations
on thosubjett, and instead of eo.opwating with the
[-ledge Advocator he had contented himself with an
ettestipt to pritvelhat no enemy was near.
In the Ise charge—he began to sin on the 7th
Ids crime was of course increased on the Bth.—'fo
have continued on shore on the 9th, 10th, and I I th,
mum naturally bon augmented the sum of his of-
fences, as the advance of the enemy rendered the
dowser more. Framing ; and yet en the 12th the re-
Irina ef tbe,piatere wee thbyleyeds and the Court
wart informed that the enthariestion was them not
say preaipitiek bat unneeessawy. Should-he atcempt
10 prom that obe Beath was at all times safe and
plastic-41w they proofs might be urged against him
in the 3d Charge, in which he was accused of a pre.
cipitate desiaiest to entbark..Haniing Mee these ge-
neral obserratiess upon the three charges as con-
toasted .witb -dad) ether, he would now poriceed to the
first miliWareffenne, vit. " For landing, or cond-
om* en:share when landed, between the 7th and
lihh June/meow Tarrsigme, alarge quantity ef heavy
Mainly wismuaidoo, and stores, when he bad good
remen to believe that no till benefit could be derived
fettlo or days as tie producing the fail of Tarn-
=by, *kw imam% end when he had received iro-
ned which he believed, that los% before that
time itimperier force woad be near huh, and was
*Wert that the siege must then be abandoned, know-
ing at the maw tame the great difficulty and dangers
mending a sodden embarkation."
It was not emy to meet this charge Malian enter-
ing; into some details Wee first seeing this charge,
he had cineladed that he might rot satisfied with
&frying thaterevione to the I tth.st might, any ince'.
• ce whajever had reached him, on which, an his

opinion, under all the circumstances of the ea-e, lie
should have been warranted in abandoning the eirt. &-
prize committed to his charge. He expected that to
establish theeriilitary offence against him, the Judge
Advocate would have attempted to prove that he
'had landed unnecessary stores, &c. ; and farther,
this.she artillosy,. anutruaition. and gams,. remained
on shore unnecessarily, after he had* received tr.Ti.r!
station, which he believed, :liat.long before the pus-
...gilds eaplttre of tine piece, * superior force of the
enemy wools' cettainly be near him. la addition to,
. this he repeated that it toold have Wen proved that
no advantage could: accrue from tisis,delay, and that
it would have been pointed out in what manner he:
had deviateti from the spirit of hit instructions. Thu
whole crimes alleged. against him appeared to hhige
upon his belief—that no real benefit could be eartra,
ed after the 7th in continuing en shore. Heti: 110
could have wished that the charge had been men:
general, that his belief and information had been
omitted,' and that he had been broadly charged with
having remained unnecessarily before Tarragona.—
In this way the tab of the Judge Advocate would
have been much more simple. It would then only
have been necessary, so prove these tact% and it
would not have been expeeted of bins to dive into the
recesses of his breast so dlicovee what he did or ad
not believe. No .:moor had bee:sailed& lb. !Rabb al t
the charge by any stab evidence. Nothing was pro-
duced but By letters to esrahlish his belief of die ap.
proach of the enemy, and constructions were put ura
ahem wholly unwarranted. When lie first saw the
charges, he was at a loss to conjecture why the 7th
was expressly pitched on as the Jae when he ought
to have desisted from the siege; but his difEcul'irs
oa this subject bad been siege removed by the pro-
dection of his letter of the 7th et June to aae Duke
of Wellington. • This letter, with the permission of
the Court, he would at present read :
Cillasp before Tarragona, June 7. 181 s.
" My dear Lord Wellington-1 am mach afraid we have un-
dertaken More than We are able to perform ; but to execute
your Lordship's °reef% t Win persevere as king as prudence
will permit. I have as yet no certain :ate :nation of :uchet's
movements, nor of De Caen to the eastward ; hut there are re-
ports of both, and if they /stove true, 4n five or six days I linty
be attacked by a force infinitely superior, without the hope or
chance of a tetreat in case of misfortune. I calcohate that Su-
cliet can bring ireo the field 24 or 25,000 men without tltificul-y,
and my force, suppo.ing the. Spaniards really have what they
say they have. wdf not exceed, elan sorts, 19,000, of iviskk I
must leave 4000 at the leas to cover out guns anti mask tits
garrison. To secure our kit flank; and prevent Suehet's direct
march upon 'Tarragona, I have attached the Col de Balaguer.
and I expect it to fall to-morrow or twat day. With realistic to
the first army. I can say nothing farther at present but that they
seem very willing, but very weak Your Lordship has directed
that they should garrison Tarragona in case it should Ca.
will diminish Vat ir numbers very considerably, and snake than
unfit for any thiog. f venture, therefore, to propose to your
Lordship that 3000 turn i.houtd be sell for that purpose. and if
you could send some recruits for their rt gunects, I think it
.would be of service, as the Canal miens desert so. much. C'l:!-
atl gives me every ass'stanee in his power, but I per-
ceive his too little assistance in raft officers ; three or four more
would be wen employed, and are Feces's:try ; money and clothes
are both much required, at least they tell me so. The Admiral
proposes sending a ship to Ahearn to-day, I bel=eee. I &lave just
had time to. write those kw Itnesetisl have, Stu.
('isited) lain morutat."
—Was there in this letter one word of the admission
of the march of superior fortes of the enemy f Wa;
not the whole of the latterpart of the letter founded
aspon the contiugency,of the fall of Tairagona ? The
(reports alluded to had been in circulation from the
day of the disembarkation. Colonel Prevost, besieg-
fag the fort San Philippe, reported by express on the
44th, that he expected to be attacked by Marshal Su.
chet in person next day ; and Admiral Hallowell, as
early as the 7th, misled by these reports, actually
sent an !additional naval force to check the immedi-
ate approach of the Marshal at the Bridge of Ant-
posts on the Ebro. The consequences predicted in
this letter were the same as what bad been stated in
a letter to the Duke of Wellington, from Castalla, of
the llth of May, and were even anticipated by his
Grace in his answer of the 23d of May. He did
then in the most direct terms assert, that on the 7th
no event had occurred upon which he was in the
smallest degree authorised to abandon the enterprise.
That he was never sanguine of success was must
true, for before he sailed he did not expect that Ta-
ragoea would fall unless directly assaulted ; but no.
thing had occurred up to this period to diminish his
expeCiations, It became evident that nothing but
some fortunate chance or some deviation from the
direct line of operations, could put us in possession
of the place; but these chanter. then so far front.
being diminished, were materially increased in our
favour ; for on that day the fort ::.an Philippe
fell, the possession of which sealed the direct
march of the enemy from Tortosa.—'The dif-
culty of relieving the place increased, and the
knowledge of this difficulty might be n rArally ex-
pected to produce a corresponding efl...ct on the
midds.of the garrison. On that day he first enter-
tained a ray of hope, not so much of the capture of
;Tarragona, but that the expedition would prove an
effective diversion in favour of the allied army in VA.
hecia. Without this acquisition of the Col de Bala-
goer, made on the 7th, he could not have remained
after the 9th. On the Bth they were still in the same
alenatioreas on the Ttli. The reports of- the 6th had
been found to be false, and on the Sth many of those
alluded to in the letter of the 9th bad been also found
to be entirely without foundation. There was every
reason to believe that these reports were invented by
the enemy himself, and propagated by his partizan)
and numerous spies in the camp. Yet such was tl e
only foundation for assuming his belief of the advance
of a superior ehenty. Those who were not respco-
sible. and who bad no authentic source of informa-
tion, :night be under the influence of such commu-
nicatient ; but it was the business of the General to
calculate, combine, and compare these rurnours, itts
his. more authentic sources of intelligenee. Ih alt
armies the practice was common of labricatieg
intelligence with due view of deceiving the easter-
-In the late war this stratagem was pushed far-
ther by the French Commanders than ever before.
—Could he be guilty ut a military offence in
not having blindly run into the snare laid e..)
entrap him, and in not having followed a delusion
too e. idently raised dith a view of misleading ?rim
The reports in question bore every mark of Fvnefr
fabrications they were contradicted by his more,aa-
&laic intelligence, and the nett day brought with it
theittotnplete refutation. He returned to the me ti •
its of the seeds between the 7th widths 12th. His
observations had been hitherto directed .to the first
interpretation which might be put ors theta,' nanvly•

fiat t 4;„ 7,h was the:eitsirtist dell/hen he discovereJ
4,,d saw the impossibility of 'access. To the second,
tl,it the intelligence which he wits StOUCV accesed'of
h, liev•itg and disregarding, vas reeeieed between the
7,h 3nd the lt2th, he begged leave m draw the auto-
eidit of the Court. • It was important that the time
should be more correctly and precisely stated, because
f!i: degree of guilt must naturally depend not only
on the length of time which he remained, but on the
distance of the enetny. ror instance, supposing the
intelligence to have reached hint on the 7th, he might
be found guilty of lying idle for four days, and if the
authentic intefirgetsci readied hibt on the' 1 lth at
right, by deferring•Oideri for embarltatkm A next
morning, no great degree of blame could be attached
to him. But he needed not this indulgente s for he
+could prove, not only that he gave the necessary
..:rdas for embarkation On the night of the llth, but
;,e could prove by the Return et Lieutenant-Colonel
Williamson, that so far from being. idle, twenty-six
p;cCCS of artillery were re-embarked during that
right and the morning of the 12th. As the Jittlge
Advrcate had not had it in .his power to put the
Court in possession of the first authentic intelligence
of the movemmts of the enemy, he would now give
this information, and tallow to the view of the Court
the %%hale grounds of bit conduct at that period.
)!e knew to a certainty, even before the 7th, that
strong detachments of the enemy bid arrived at Tot.
toss ; but this proved nothing, at that placerequired
reinforcements. On the Bth, all doubt as to Mar-
shal Sorbet's march to the northward was removed.
On the =Tiling of that day a messenger arrived Irons
Valencia, dispatched by one of our most confidential
agents, with the certain intelligence that 9000 men
horn San Phelippe, and the banks of the Xucar, had
quieted Valencia, and that the Marshal himself on
the 7th, had followed them. The late political change
in Spain fortunately enabled him to mention the name
of the meritorous individual who furnished the infor-
mation, Don Vicente Larente, Inspector of the Bota-
nic::) Garden under the French Government, at Va.
leneia. The original note was still in his possession,
and would be laid before the Court, together with _a
cert;ticate of the payment of the boat conveying this
impost int messenger. With respect to the Irench
army, under General De Caen, it was rumoured, 'in-
deed, to be in movement, but could he ever have ex-
pected that it would not be united, and that his move-
able columns would have remained divided at Ge-
rona, Poizcerda, and Barcelona, unconcerned spec-
tators of the arrival of an army in the province He
knew, however, that it was not assembled on the Bth,
and that it had not reached Ilarcelona on the evening
of the 9th ; on the evening of the 10th, be learned,
that by forced marches it. had reached the Lelbregat,
and that it was advancing with rapidity. This in-'
telligence was given himby General Cowan. whose
division he found in movement at Reuss, about four
o'clock on that day.
In one of his dispatches he had said that the expecta-
tion of reinforcements was one of the reasons which
induced him to continue the siege; this expatiation
certainly had some weight, and had the reinforce-
ments arrived, the result might bare been different.
This reinforcement, promised by Lord W. Bentind
in his letter of the 9th, w.O to sail in ten days, cow
sisted of the 44th regiment, and 'the kith battalion of
the German Legion, together 2000, besides a c
derable numbereffihe 4tali m LAW/ aid
troops; upon the whole, nearly 3000, and a regiment'
of cavalry, which 1 thought would have augmented•
niy force. Lord W. Bentinck had good grounds to
change his intention, but of that change he (Sir J.
Murray) was not aware till afterwards —3OOO men
at that period would have been invaluable : he had a
right to expect them, and, in case of their arrival, he
had determined on an actiOn, and, indeed, was ready
to seek it with either of the enemy's columns with the
force he then had ; and though the reinforcements
would not have placed him on a. par with both the
ct.lumns, it would have given• him a superiority over
c;:leer, and enabled him to prevent the junction of the
two forces.

Sir .1. Murray apologised for the length of his ea.
dress, but begged permission to re-state the, points he
had endeavoured to establish. He then recapitulated
the chief points of his defence, sold proceeded to state
that he was aware at the time, of the risk he incurred
in continuing operations after.the Sth, and asked what
military operations were free from them Every battle
is a risk, and the expedition itself was nothing more
than a risk. The greateit act of a good General is
to risk with jadvitent, taking care de; the risk is not
arpal to the object attempted; he applied this to the
c.be in question, and said he had only risked a few
stores and some hoe gnni, her the chance of accom.
plidiing two of the objects of the Duke of
,Welling.
ton, besides other objects of inferior importance,
the ugh by no Means trivial. He bad run this risk,
wtetlier with judgment •or not the Omit wield de-
termine, but at all events he did it with deliberation,
and with a perfect sense Of the dtingey to which he
vas exposed—but if such a consideration could have
influenced his conduct, he shankd richly have deserved
the censure of tbeCourt ; such mete his views of the
11)ject, and the line of conduct he bid adopted, in
his hatable opinion, with a view less to the success of
an individual object than to the accomphsheseat of
the plan of the Duke of Wellington; Ind therefore
be contended that his conduct was not unmilitarb
anJ to far from being in opposition to his 111111ftled000)
it was not only in the Spirit, bet even is conformity'
to the very letter of those instructions- Although
lie felt satisfied that he Stood fully acquitted, and
that the charge Was entirely disproved, yet the deft.
nceheielt due to the Court, and the regard due to
li;s own character, induced him to enter more at
length into the subject, and to state the motives
,ch he was actuated throughout the operation.--
''inn his instructions, it *as evident that the siege
I.nragona had two objects in view—first, the cap-
!re ( i the place ; and, secondly, such a diversion in
foray of the Duke del Parque, es would enable Mien
11) hare the line of the Xucar, and front thence pods
llitristlf of the kingdom of Valencia. Such being his
'n'w (1 the case, he had no difficulty in landing with
41 Ow expedition Which the weather would permit;
4nd he believed that every thing that was lost was on
shnre before the lOth, even if ,it had beenproved tkot
e then despaired of success. . The charge wai " for
I4l'd!n, and permitting to remain on shore when
i
nded " The latter pail of the charge he had ne
.esitation in admitting ; but no evidencehad been ad*
doted to prove that any guns had been landed thee-
the 101 h. 11e would confine himself, therefore; le

.. •
permlft. . ngi • the skillet& and street to reel • ' Sh '
:He hoped be had 'stile iently dentonsteaatedin ,ontharlte;
never easy. till the nigheof tWe 11th, any physical
impossibility of success, *ad, no necessity for em-
barkation could therefore, till then, occur to him.
It was only on the morning of the 6th that the first
batteries were opened on the Puerte Real. On the
7th, in the evening, another battery was constructed,
which opened its fire on the morning of the Bth ; and
on the evening of that day the first batteries, which
were to play upon the body of die place, consisting of
ten pieces of cannon, were commenced. They opened
their fire on the morning of the 11th. Here, then,
were no marks of desponding ; and while theie works
were going on, it would hardly be that auy of
theßuns should be embarked. On the night of
(he siege being raised, even fresh works would have
been began, and probably completed. In fact, pros-
pects or success were held out to the last. He ac-
knowledged that he had been taught to expect Same..
thing from the character of the Governor ; but it
was but justice to that officer, however, to state, that
the information which he received upon this sub-
ject was false, no reasonable hopes of success being
deducible from that officer's conduct. .
Sir John Murray then proceeded to contend, that
from the opinion of Colonel Thackery, as well as
front other circumstances, he was perfectly justified
In not despairing of success....-a feeling - ill which be
was upheld by the letter of his instructions, from
which he was expeited to posh the experiment, as to
time, to the utmost extremity, "censistently with the
safety oT the army. With these facts in view, he
would ask, if he had given up the siege en the 7th,
or even the 9th, how he could have answered to hii
Excellency, or to the country, for not having made
the experiment ? He had then no certain knowledge I
of the advance and near approach of Marshal Suchet;
and he, therefore, could not on those days have
adopted so unwise and so pusillanimous a line of
conduct.; he could have no motive for it but the fear
of clamour, and a dread of the responsibility which
such elamour might occasion. He hoped he was
above such fears; and that he had, in the conscien-
tious discharge of his duty, unhesitatingly exposed
himself to all the illiberal and unfounded attacks
which had been made upon
shim, was now clearly
established. It appeared that Marshal Suchet, knoW-
ing the importance of the positions be occupied, clung
to them to the last ; that he did not quit Valencia till
the 7th, and his troops did not reach Tortosa.till the
10th. Now if he (Sir John Murray) had commen-
ced embarkation on the 7th, or even on the Bth or 9th,
what would have been. the conduct~ of Marshal Su-
ebet ? He Wight boldly affirm, that he would in-
stantly have retraced his steps, and again have esta-
blished himself at Megente and San Pbillippe.—
This, however, would not have been the only misfor-
tune : for the Duke del Parque would have been
immediately opposed to the whole weight of the
enemy's force. If be defended the position of Cis-
calla. he would 'inevitably have been defeated, and in
all probability would have had great difficulty to
(stoma the total dispersion of his army.
Under all these circumstances, the importance of
drawing Marshal Suchet's army to the wettest pos-
!ibis distance from the Spanish corps, was most evi-
t ; in fact, the further the Marshal could be drawn
1 the Xucar, the geeater..egm.he
_prebalehty aid
En
' Allied Army returning ti time to support the
Duke del Parque—whilst the more harassing the
March became, and the longer Suchet was detained
0 Catalonia, the less chance was there of his having
either the inclination or the power to retire from it.,
-lifting the advanced position which the grand army
under the personal command of his. Excellency the
_Commander of the Forces, was daily acquiring on
his flank. A precipitate abandonment of the siege
might have produced consequences no less unfortu-
nate, in the eastern extremity of the province—inas-
much as the co-operation of Lord Exmouth had been
required, to make a diversion in favour of the forces
;At Tarragona. by an attack upon the .Bay of Roses.
And as his Lordship had been engaged in this expe.
dim., he (Sir John Murray) felt himself bound in
honour, as well as in duty, not to expose him to ha-
esard, which could be avoided ; and he felt it no less
prudent to await the event, and to profit by the con-
tequences, which he conceived, must infallibly have
resulted from this operation. Had Lord Exmouth's
force been crippled, then indeed would the clamour
have been formidable, and it would have become more
forcible as his (Sir Jogn's) conscience would have told.
him it was just.
Had the plan been his stern, he Might have acted as
he pleased ; but as that was not the case, and as the
success of the plan depended on his rem7ining.aa
long as possible before Tarragona, he had no choice
of action *left. Up to the 1 lth, there was no phy-
sical imereeticability in conducting the siege, al-
though there might be something
dto apprehend, but
there was nothing to excite despair : the enemy was
in march only on one flank, end, under such cir-
cumstances, he would -not
,have beet justified in
abandoning the siege. later the assurance that he had
, given the Duke oflVellington, thit he Would perse.
ievere till the last; besides clue advance of the enetny
was not unexpected, or calculated to excite his alarm-
From the advance of the enemy there was cause of
anxiety, but be would not admit that it was ground of
despair. While Marshal Suebee was on his march, he
{Sir J. M. ) determined to attack the column of Decatch
and took steps for the Measure. Despondency formed
no part of his feelings, or he should hot have cons.
milted himself in such decisive operations. At nine
he
o'clock on the night of the I ith, obtained infor-
mation that Suchet was on his march from Tortosa,
and then, and not till then,' lie thought it would he
~the height of temerity and folly to perseyere,in the
siege. The physical iitiP°Well ty thee, became ap-
parent, and ail hope of fti#ineser thee,
va-
nished. Nothing more was to'be Cemewith Suchet,
aiio then he gave the necessary yet** for the em-
barkation. lf
necessaryit should be
orders that he afterwards
lie
xtOpps and 'torch he must bit foetid guilty of the
proved
or steps to save the
char e. S 9 long as he considered
,himselt op..
only to Decaen's force, he determined to
the, intentioe. on hear-,
attack it, and only gave up _...,. ,
1 Suchet., He did not abett-
ing of the march OSu .
f " the
don the siege till, in the words' 9 Suchet,
.i
fists of his army covering the heights, conveyed. rs
illigence of.his approtch. ' Tin then the elliedartni
'had not hive abandoned the siege without diseahri
the Cbondabder atftd alit whole &tip

I a, ..o, .. ,_ Ift.:o fib CH AO..
! The' Wow u .the Second .Cliaxge. was
I toed into. The accusations contaiturd re this Cho get
rpriseil atmuch as they, astpnishill General Matra).
!
het First Charge was -more of . a pUblic nature, as
related to what might be deemed- a faaure irl
Judgment. But this Charge morel immediately
applied in a personal point of view, as it charged
him ,with direct disobedience- of orders—an im-
putation of error might be borne, but the charge
a disobedience of positive orders could not be
admitted. It was a charge which had never en-
tered in his mind--in vain bad he perused over
find-over again the instructions, of the Duke of 'Wel-
lington, to discover in what part he had. neglected or
disobeyed them—stilt he found no order there which
he bid disobeyed. The charge accused hint of a ne-
Ikact of duty, and with dis ibedience of orders, in not
soambarking the troops after the taking of the Col de
adapter, and going to the relief of the armies in VA-
fiencia. These charges he most peremptotily denied ;
there was no order to embark the army even after the
siege of Tarragona should be raised. Before those
charges could be proved against him, it was neces.
sary to prove
that the written orders of the Duke .of
Wellington had been disobeyed. To those charges
his :defence would be made on three grounds, al
tholigh it would be a good legal defence if he only
proved that he had not disobeyed any written ordeis ;
but; defence he did not consider as sufficient to
satisfy his own mind; and thetelore he would prove,
seeciadly. that he did give orders for the embarkation
of the troops, as soon as the siege was raised ; and
in the third place, that be so acted as to assist,,
as tar as was possible, the armies in Valencia.—
He then went into a detail of facts and arguments
thereon, to prove what he had stated, and in parti-
cular read the seventh paragraph of his instructions,
to shew that the Duke of Wellington saw the difficul-
ties of his (Sir John Murray's) situation, and expressly
said, that the siege of Tarragona was a question* of
time and means. lie then adduced a variety of argu-
ments,. founded on the strength and positions of the
enemy, to prove the prudence of remaining so long
before Tarragona ; and urged that by so doing he
had an opportunity of esercising that discretional
power which was given to him by the Duke of Wei-
lington's instruction*; from the fifteenth paragraph
of those instructions, it was clear that no time for
embarkation was fixed ; and by the 22d paragraph,
it was also evident that a discretionary power, was
. given, and indeed as long as Sachet was kept on the
left bank of the Ebro, those instructions might be
considered as obeyed.
Those paragraphs were al} that applied to the re-
turn of the army to Valencia, and it was therefore
appOrent that no disobedience of written orders had
been proved. With this he might conclude the de-
fenee.to the second Charge, but this was not enough
to satisfy his own honor,-, he should therefore pro-
ceed to the two remaining grounds. And when per-
sonal animosity. and misguided feeling should have
subsided, he hoped his defence would be found to
'contain principles of action which would be consi-
. dered as worthy of approbation and imitation..
—General Clinton, in his evidence, informed the
Court, that he came to head-quarters on the night of
the I I th, and found that orders had then been issued,
' for raising the siege. This circumstance could aloe
.beleavedrhy,all. les Soff cifficersk to *hoar 4e outs.'
municated hie intentions. However peremptory ifie
Judge Advocate might have construed his orders for
embarkation to be, yet surely he would not deny
that the place where the embarkation was to take
place was to be left to his (General Murray's) dis-
cretion. It was not necessary for him to state to'
the Court his i auras for embarking the cavalry and
artillery at Balaouer. It was enough that he con,i
tiered this the most safe measure for the army which
he could adopt. In consequence of information he
afterwards received, that a column of the enemy
was at Bandillos, he foresaw that infantry would
be necessary to cover the embarkation of the ca-
valry. Up to the I.4th of June no imputation of
delay in the embarkation could be imputed to hint.
Late in the evening of that night the complexion
of things changed. He then received information
that the detachment ofsDe Caen's army, which ad-
vanced to Vitlafratica, had retired to the Lobregat.
Now he found himself opposed only to Marshal Su-
chet ; and with the view of cutting off the division
'of his army stationed at Bandillost he immediately
gave orders for attacitieg it. Here he had a better
prospect of forcing Sachet to retire float the 40wer
Ebro, than by any other possible measure. This could i
be easily proved by calculatioo, if necessary. Up to
the 17th of June, his army was constantly in pre-
sence of the enemy, which, of course, prevented the
embarkation. After that, When the embarkation
Gould be safely entered on, in less than three days the
artillery horses and cavalry on shore were embarked.
To disembark so large an army, not less than four
days were requisite s and it was impossible to join
the Duke del Farque in less titan seven days. It
was impossible for him, therefore, to reach the Spa.
nish army in less than fourteen days ; whereas it was
possible tor Marshal Suchet to reach St. Philippe
in seven days.
There was another circumstance which prevented
the embarkation from taking place on the lath, and'
that was the sudden and rapid return of the enemy
from the Lobregat. Notwithstanding the roads were
ma:spied by General Copoos, General Murray heard
*thing of his return till theenemy was before Tar-
ragona. The only conclusion that could be draws
from this return was, that a combined attack wait
Meditating on the Allies; but the enemy retired agora-
ume night. It was his duty, however, to provide
gainst this attack. On the 17th Lord W. Bentiuck
pie
arrived, and in consequence of the arrival of Lord
Exmouth with 12 or 14 sail of the line, which afford-
old great additional means of•embariation, the army
was all earbarked at twelve o'clock cf the 19th.—
t.-Wheat it was said that be might have resorted to
'more expeditious means of embarkation, he would
state, that by the retreat of one of the armies of the
poemy, he considered himself equal to the other ; and
'that there *as oproweet of,eutting off the column
of the enemy at Balt4illos phut their retreat in the
p*ltt frustrated that objeCt. To conclude, be denied
to its principle and the
fhtppsucchaarguoiet.obtogiwt
pkihrinrcCirlec .t These was nothing in
his instiaktions b *bit% it was warranted; and
he rippecations,, even supposing his instructions to
new bees diferest, was Warr.
kis 'opt ,left to prow do* live of ming whisll be

ea•

safety sot the
was in direct
In arthwer,
_ embark Ain't
t embarkation
umstances. when it
'"he siege could
of the aroy
.rizer unneces-
sarily, andranother to extend an important operation,
when such extension was required by prudence. Here
be was left to the exercise of that discretion which
was vested in every commanding officer, except lie
was tied dawn by positive instructions.

'nil= CHARGE.
General Multiuse rose to rea4 the Third Charge.
Mr. Litarmer Glaser*, ask p*ably Admiral
Hallowell was not led to expect that the Defence on
the Third Charm would be entered on before the evi-
dence on the othee Urn charges had been gone into.
Admiral Haunwina. said be was not.
General M. then proceeded--It was no wonder that
a feeling of discontent prevailed in the army under
him, respecting the manner in which the siege had
been raised. The army of Catalonia were desirous of
rivalling their brethren in arms; and they felt keenly
,the disappointment of the espntation which they had
been led to torm, however unwarranted such expec-
tations might have been. But was it astonishing that
the disappointment should have become general,
when it was considered that the oft:er at the head of
the naval part of the expedition had told them there
wit& no geese for the-precipitate retreet which had taken
place, and that he had made an offer *bight if ac-
cepted, would have prevented the loss of part of the
equipinent. Before, however, he could admit the Ad-
miral's responsibility in this c Ise, he had to consider
how far it would have been admitted by others. If
the offer of embarkation had not been then made and
ante persisted in till now as possible, he could got
have believed that the idea would ever have been en-
tertained by an officer of Admiral Hallowell's expe-
rience. With only two line-ol•battle ships he under-
took to have all embarked in the course of the night.
Admitting that he could hive so emb irked every
thing—hoer did Admiral Hallowell propose to ac-
complish this? He said, if the army had been permit-
ted to remain on shore till Right, it might liav been
done; but this involved Gen. Murray is the hazard
which, by his instructicns, he was to avoid. He knew
very well that the guns might thus have been saved ;
but from all the intelligence rectived, Cen. Mutter
was led to suppose that the enemy would be in son-
tact with hisp on the lath ; and this proposal was nei-
ther more nor less than to allow the army to reniten
on shore at the hazard of its sarety."—Admiral Hal.
Lowell could not have been responsible for this. Had
any thing been wrong in his own department, for that
he would of course have been responsible; but it w tut('
have been no excuse for General Murray, with his
Majesty's Ministers, that he had failed in coasequznce
of his listening to the advice, and the proffered respon-
sibility of Admiral Hallowell, who might in some
Measure be considered as an iiidiff!rent spectator, and
whose honour was no ways implicated in the issue.
But Admiral Hallowell erred from ignorance of the
truth; he knew only of .5,000 men of the enemy, but
had he been aware that there were more than twenty
thliusind, instead of five thousand, pressiag fat ward ,
tOLaUslakialla Alied arils ? Tint pxygmal nfAx.
viral la oiled the minds of part of the army agft
General Murray; but this Court would see that . he.
could not %Lin to it. It appeared, that he was in this
charge accused of making no preparations. previous
to embarkation. He kritsv of no preparations which
the army wanted. If any were necessary for the fleet,
he could not be Warned for any defiziency in that de-
partment, for Admiral Hallowell knew as early as
the 9th how probable it was that the embarkation was
to take place, and on the 11th it was determined on
in so far as related to die army. The transports which
brought the troops were still there, and all that was
necessary was to order the boats to repair to the beach. -
What was the consequence of General Murray's ,ad-
hering to his own determinatioa? Why, the artillery
horses and cavalry were all brought on board, and
nothing was left on shore but such things as were not
immediately necessary. Fortunately it was not ne-
cessary for him to make arty great preparations, for
had any such preparations been necessary, the/ would
not have been made. The precipitation of which he
was accused arose from the determination of adhering
to the last moment to the object
t entrusted to him,
which necessarily brought w: ► it the loss of some ar-
tillery and stores. This measure was necessary to
render the operations of the Duke del Parque as com-
plete as possible. For wa:t of judgment he might
be condemned but of want of foresight he stood ac-
quitted.
He bad only to justify his 'retreat by proving the
superior force of the enemy against him. When the
Duke of Wellington retreated to Torres Vedras, was
this measure condemned ? Was the retreat from Bur-
gos ever considered degrading ? And yet in those cases •
much of the equipment of the army was lost : and it
was only necessary for the General to say that he was
not equal to the enemy in force to stand acquitted.
Butahat General was happy in being alone I He had
no naval co operation to impede and thwart him.
When Lord William Bentinck afterwards retreated
from before Tarragona, was it considered degrading ?
The enemy was so superior, that prudence forbade
him to hesitate a moment as to hiseoutse. The
su-
periority of an enemy depended more on its compo.
salon than its number. What crime had be com:
mined, that the same credit was not to be given to
his statements which had been given to other Gene-
rals, and that his reports were not to be believed?—
The cause was evident. He had only to cast his eye
to the place where his accuser, Admiral Hallowell,
was sitting, and the source of all this was ev;dent.
To prove the superiority of the enemy, was a difficult
platter, from the care which they always took to con.
ceal their numbers, and their activity in detecting and
punishing spies. He did not mention this difficulty
as an excuse for not establishing his case, but in order
its bespeak the indulgence of the Court.
The gall ant General now proceeded to state, that
he would call the best evidence in his power of the
strength of the enemy. He would first call Gener
Dookins from whose report, founded upon the best'
authorities, it would appear that the army of Amason
amounted to 2,4000 men. Front subsequent accounts
reteiVed, Itoskever, through" the medium of an inter.
cepted luny of BOthetiti it ttiztald Medlar dre
and Bth hot& bad Nan added to ember carper

.entipeiveadopyg 4lettlareti tufrlsitits tLe
•
army, Ar4,tbat. which Acty4lly porvied
enisost.svidt thewirit of his, initructions.
tbe,fiss,ll,o the charge 4 delaying the i
fg tile.araw,,sp stnuld state, that tb .t
Was intempted by irnporious
soitld anion* gp nn with safety. The
eat be said. to be kaisefri till the s•hole
was sailboard. It wos one thing to liaj