Star.
London, England, 1813-03-13 00:00:00

year, and, it bad iseeiiol;letved, it _
easy to have forwarded that number of, men: Small
reinforcements had been sent ; but they fell short of
the Noble Lord's calculations : and the troops for-
warded subsequently to the battle of Salamanca,
ought to have been sent there early in the last year.
To shew the correctness of this statement, he would
observe, that had she Noble Lord examined into the
fact, he would have found, that the regiments sent
out subsequently to the battle of Salamanca were
not fit nor sufficiently strong earlier in the year.—
(Hear, hear, hear.)—So much for the correctness
of the Noble Lord's facts. But the circumstances
of the campaign, he said, bespoke the deficiency
of the means of the Noble General. How
;:ad this been proved ?—by a reference to the
glorious proceedings at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz,
and Salamanca, coming to the conclusion that the
circumstances of the campaign had been so very dis-
astrous that inquiry was absolutely necessary 1 Wily
then, what was the result of this disastrous campaign?
the possession of Ciudad Rodrigo, of Badajoz ; the
raising of the siege of Cadiz-20,000 French priso-
ners and 80-pieces of cannon taken from the enemy ;
and the glories of Salamanca. Had nothing else
been effected, could these things have been termed
disastrous ? Did the Noble Lord really forget that
this was most effectual support to jhe general cause,
but more particularly to the cause of Russia, by
creating a powerful diversion in her favour ? Surely
the instance of Badajoz could. not be proof of the de-
ficiency of our means, as it had been taken after the
commencement of the siege much sooner than had been
expected. The consequences however tharmight have
followed the capture of Badajoz had been done away ,
by being compelled, instead of proceeding to Seville,
to fall back on Ciudad Rodrigo. Had there been a
small force, said the Noble Lord, to oppose Marmont,
there would have been no occasion for so falling back,
and Marmont was so weak that a few regiments
would have given the desired check. But he would
tell the Noble Lord, that Marmont had happened to
be so strong, that had the additional 15,000 "been
there, their efforts must have been unavailing, had
not Lord Wellington assisted and co-operated. So
much for the first instance of the deficiency of our
means. The Noble Lord next said, that Lord Wel-
lington had advanced to Madrid in pursuance of the
instructions of Ministers, not in pursuance of his own
plan. The contrary, however, was the fact. Lord
Wellington had never said that he could not advance
to Salamanca without further means : he had done it
in the completion of his' wn plans. It was then said,
that Lord Wellington had calculated on assistance
from Sic4y.- He would shortly state to their Lord-
ships how.far Lord Wellington could have calculated
on any such assistance. Instructions had been sent
to Lord W. Bentinck, that it would be materially
advantageous to Spain, if he could spare any portion
of his forces from Sicily; but the forwarding of any
such assistance dtus left completely to the discretion
t.f. Lord B.: that he was not to sgnd any portion of
the troops under his command, if such a proceeding
would be inconsistent with the 'safety of Sicily. Such
was the character of the instructions sent to Lord
13entinck, and Lord Wellington bad been made ac-
quaiesed with them, so that he had been given to un-
derstand not positively to calculate on the advance
of Lord Besumck. He had been informed of the
cootingencics on which such advance depended.—
The Nople• Marquis had, however, concluded that
this was a complete failure—that it had enabled Sa-
chet to send forces on Madrid. But what were the
circumstances attending that fact ; &Prather, what
-vas the fact itself? Why, that one regiment only
had ventured to advance on Madrid.
Lord WELLESLEY here remarked, that he un-
derstood the force which marched on Madrid in that
instance, to lie of much greater amount.
Earl BATHURST, in continuation, observed,
that he did not know how that might be—he had re-
red on the dispatches of Lord Wellington, and he/
thought the Noble Lord himself had stated the force'
to consist of one regiment ! (Hear, hear).—But this
additional force—this one regiment, enabled Joseph
to remain in Madrid: How was this fact ? This
regiment arrived in Madrid on the 30th of July, and,
notwithstanding this additional force, on the 31st t)r.
August Joseph determined to leave the city, for Jo-
seph, in fact, had determined on leaving Madrid
when he found that Lord Wellington was advancing
on Salamanca. Well, then, what good had this
mighty detachment effected ? It had not- enabled
Joseph to keep Madrid—it had not effectually added
to the strength of the Retiro. The next instance of
ill?: deficiency of our. means was Burgos; and here
he would observe, that it was completely impossible
that Lord Wellington should have known any thing
of the great strength of that place previously to the
19th of September. The assault of the 22d of Sep-
tember might have succeeded, had not the Officer
unfortunately fallen who led on the attack, during
its progress. In the pocket of that Officer were the
plans of attack, the disposition of the forces, Ste. ; the
body fell into the hands of the enemy, and the French
of course profited by those documents, Indeed they
had enabled the enemy no doubt' to foil our efforts.
As to affording assistance after the battle of Sala-
manca, it *as not precisely known to'the Govern-
ment what course Lord Wellington would pursue
:•übsequently to that battle, and therefore it was not
Inown which way Teinfcriements should be forward-
ed. It WAs absolutely necessary to wait for informa-
tion on this' point. Having obtained information
that could be_ proceeded on; the men were forward-
ed, but they had not arrived quite so soon as was ex-
pected, though they had left England at the ear-
liest possible period. The Noble Lord maintained
that nothing effective could be considered to have
been done, except the French had been deprived of
the military possession of Spain. But was it no-
thing that the South of Spain should have been
Cleared of the French--were the successes of 11a-
dajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo of no consequence ?
!Something had been effected, if the views of Eng-
land now were what the Noble Lord had power-
fully described them to be at the beginning of the
war in Spain, Ist, to create a diversion in favour of
bur Allies,• 2dly, to encourage resistante in other
countries, by abewing its effects in Spain, and idly
to prevent the commercial and military means of that
country' from falling
.into the hands of our enemy.
Those had been the views of England—Those were
the views of the present Government—andtbose views