Star.
London, England, 1815-01-30 00:00:00

s, JO)!

-.--.

;iffrigl#4lo/O}E•bAY, SATURDAY, JAN. 1111.

General MURRAY resumed the Leading of his De-
fence, where he broke off yesterday, in the middle
of ilie answer to the third charge.
The next point to be atseuded to (he said) was the
strength and equipment of the allied army ; on this
subject great misrepresentations had gone abroad.
Returns had been published, including corps which
were never in Skiain, and other corps which, previous
to the embarkation at Tarragona, had been sent back
to Sicily.' The anntrOf Catalonia under his corn•
wand, had been 'made as large as that under the Duke
of Wellington himself. While , the numbers under
hiiiit had been heightened; on the other hand, the
'ntfribers of the enemy had been diminished. But
Ilte'ben contradiction of iheie tnisostatements would
be afforded by returns from the Adjutant-General's
uMcei,'' Aids could not be called in question. From
'these teitifhte.h sinilld appear, that' the Anglo-Siei- '
lien %troy inkii(tited i'n xu
3 ts infantry, and 698 ca.-
tklrY.'% 'at 14f6 •Men or both ;armies,. of all de.
seriptiaitC'arid' c'onigeed br troops
.of-an 'nations.
The numbers at ernbitkintbn *arid re:embarkation
*ere &Fairly the;eitrieutrat hot more than'46 men in
rill were killed daring the liege. Thu total included
the servants, and all; ttioti -Who -*fee In the depart-
men% ethehosiiitils, acivitiniSsaeibt, &s '. But the
coMposition ot• this evilly &Waved less then its Mini.
hers. lib felt it thettlbte netesulty•toldtetarthe man.
nor in which the *toy erasiretiiiillyebospisseil. •• The
Brit igi - amounted to 8,-910, die Gleason to 4,710, -wed
in then, rinltt weVe men of allissitions. "there Wei'
two regiments of Italian dtsetteti ifrdnii the :FrOidli
I
'amotrntiatto`l,96o, the Sieilaneiniscrinited to;
die Calabrese •• to 490, end 'die remainder re 4',1
'4loaniiirtl4'in Spsniitt littd-Brithh 'ply, mark ht Wart
gi befireitated, lAllloitifintry The tairery '
• _ ,_ • -
,

tottiiiitied of 427 Bfltislir brio 978rdr the BrutieWlck
hustafs, in-1011. '668. t nth- Wei the - hiteingeneOus
miss of which the AnglinSiiiiiittl-ariny Ivey corn.
posed. Noreinforceftients took place fronithe period
of these returns,' and comiequently the numbers were
never increased. This circumstance would render
any-observations on-his part unnecessary. Meanly
part of this force on which any reliance could be
placed, was. the British and Germans ; but their
numbers it would be seen, were not great. Had
their numbers been even doubled, it might be doubted
whether he would have been on a par with the French
who had an army of 20,500 at least. But indepen-
deatly of. What must be apparent to every .one on a
first inspection of this statement, there were other
circumstances which increased the inefficiency of these
troops. Success could only be expected from well
equipped and steady troops. But there was no part
of this army which, fully answered this. description.
The British part was even not altogether efficieat, and
none of the others were effstient. He had as much
confidence in the gallentry of this army as any Offi-
cer possibly could lsave ; bat this was no reason why
he should have been blind to ice &feat& To many
of the corps be was willing to pay testimony to their
gallantry whenever they had an opportunity of show.
wg it; but even these corps were deficient in the ne-
cessary equipments. To the conduct of other parts
of the army be could not speak in the same terms.
The only other argument on this suhject which he
should trouble the Court with, was the difficulty of
provisioning the division of Gen. Whittinghani. On
—alit point, he had-teoeived .an -expeess prohibitory
order from the Duke-of Wellington. The difficulty
which .thia occasioned had been -often keenly telt by
him; but by this pruhibitioe, it could only be pro.
witted far in the same manner with General Co ohs'
army. The-nen point was the- equipment of this
army. • When he took the command of this army at
Alicant, he might say that it was immovable. One
. great difficulty then was, the low state of the military
chest. Previous, however, to the embarkation for
Tirragona, thedeficiencies of this army weremuch
removed:- . The artillery department had -been well
equipped with horses and mules ; and the chief .de.
ficiency was in the commissariat department. When
• the anny landed at Tarraguea, it was in an incom-
plete. and inefficient state in every part. Of the com-
missariat equipments, little or nothing was- taken
with them, as would appear by a letter Iron Mr, Da.
niel, of the Commissariat. As there was a deficiency
of room, preference was properly given to those
things which were most essential .foe the immediate
object of the expedition. It was impossible for him
to increase the number or enlarge the size of the
transports. There were left behind at Alieann.63ll
horses and mules, and only 845 were brought with
the army, being only about one third of the comple.
anent. The number of tumbrils for, the guns, the
_Vehicles for the conveyance of ammunition, camp
•kettles, &c. were extremely deficient ; and with re.
npect to waggons for the removal of the sick and
wounded, and the hospital utensils, no provisioa what.
ever wee made. On theispproach of an enemy, all
hopes of.supply whatever loathe army vanished, for
, tam had not an open annovria -their rear. He was
isensibleaf the groat advaatages which he bad in the
composition of the Coeliac the members of which
,Iritew the. great importance Of themarticles to anew.
With such disadvantages, • and with- soolviefonna.
rains as be wails possession etrespecting the number,
of the enemy, would it have beets prudan_ hie
ad
alive met the French Commander in tho fields Ihseili
adequate advantage could have been gained to com-
pensate fur the hazard, -and whets defeat-on his part '
would have been followed with absolute destruction
The Duke of Wellington had expo-May stated to bid
'that the maces, of the campaign depended on din
. safety of the whol• of the armies, and that he would
pardon any thing sooner than the defeat or dispersion
of any of the corps. It bad been said, that besides
the Anglo-Sicilian army, he bad at his disposal ibe
Spanish Catalonian army. The merits of this army
••lbaal been very highly stated by some of the evidence.
,gyp order to strew what little stress was to be laid on
• /jig evidence, he would give, not his own opiaion
,Alsah respect to the composition of that army, but the
~pinion of its own commander. Surely it could not
be supposed that it would be represented in a more
~,w4avourable light from this quarter than it deserved.
It would be seen how far the ?pinion of its own offi.
cers corresponded with that given by General Mac.
kenzie. He would lay before the Court a memorial,
dated the'l44ll March, 1813.1 drawn up by Colonel
Cabanesp the chiernf GerlawCopons' staA In this
Report he stated, that It was hnoossible nut to s ak
',ably of 04 bravery, of
')Malt "the

t~~~

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that army... It was tieceuary, however, to speak the
truth. The army, however well adapted for the spe;
cies of warfare carried on in Catalonia, displayed
want of subordination and of discipline which unette
it for meeting airegular army -in the field. From
individual bravery of the men, and their fitness four
executing rapid movements, this want of diacipliner
was not so much felt when the wit was carried on its
mountains. But the infantry were not instructed its
manoeuvring, the cavalry were not sufficiently nume-
rous, the artillery wanted the means of serving with
effect, the sappers were yet in their infancy, they pos-
sessed no magazines, and they were in want of clo-
thing and ammunition. Such was the state of 'hit
army according to Colonel Cabanez, only ten weeks
previous to the disembarkation at Tarragona. He
was ready to admit the bravery of the individuals,
and the skill of their commander, but from what be
had stated, it must be evident to the Court, that they
wanted two of the most indi.pensible requisites to in.
sure victory—subordination and discipline. They
were only fit for a war carried on in mountains or in
detached parties. The services which could be pees
formed by such an army amounted, to nothing morn
thin this, that the infantry could b employed in CO:
Tering the siege. The cavalry possessed enthusissisW
but they were in no number.' 'With respect to theie
artillery, little could be expected from than; 'thel
wanted the means of, being terra*, teixikeir enemies;
The department of uppers was *y, an its crecille-4
bat this was not the moment to Wait fair its maturityi
The army was so composed that it had wither met
Eines, clothing, nor arnmnaidon, norinopey ; a$
, soldiers had pq food but 'what. they Am4d pure
se. He had introduced no obse)evotions of hii
own on this subject, but confined himself to the state.,
%ems of this memorial. He had no written opinion
?Of General Copons himself with tespect- to his army;
:%but 'this memorial might be considered as having
been drawn up by his orders; and -if he had not
approved of it, it certainly would never have been
communicated to General Mutray. In the different
conversations -which General Murray had with Cie.
neral Copons, the latter always expressed himself hi
nearly the same term as those of the memorial. He
always stated that his army could not manoeuvre—
that if they were placed in a strong position they
would stand ; but unless they were placed so, or that
a retreat was open for them to the mountains, he
could not think of allowing them to be brought into
action. He could not blame General Copoos for
this precaution, for they must haire been exposed to
the hazard of complete destruction on the embarks.
tion of the Anglo-Sicilian army, if their retreat was
cut off from the Northern part of the province. It
therefore became necessary that the Spanish army
should always be kept at the northern extremity of
the allied army, to secure their retreat in case of raj,.
sing the siege. General Murray saw the impossibi.
lity of the Spanish army ever affording that co-ope-
ration necessary to insure success in case of attack.
Another Spanish division, that of General 'Whit.
tingham, was nearly in the same situation. Witt
respect to the strength of the Spanish Catalonia,
army, he would refer to a return which would accons.
pany his address, signed by Colonel Cabanez, of the
date of the 11th of June, 1813. The numbers really
efficient, it appeared, only amounted ep. 5933 men,
including the two regiments of the Col de Balaguer.
•He had always taken Capons' army at six thousand
men: The state of a gallant nation, so long over-
run by an enemy, was a sufficient apology for the state
of this and other Spanish armies ; but it was no apos
logy -for those who wished him to perform impossibiti.
ties with such armies.' He only begged it to be recol.
lected, that weak. as this army was, it could only be
kept in force for two or three days, and that no caope-
ration could have been expected from any other armies
in Spain. With respect to the state and composition of
-the allied army, he had no other information to offer.
—He had already pointed out the consequences
which would have resulted from following the ad-
-vice of Admiral Hallowell. In the course of his
defence he had shown that. one great object of re.
maining before Tarragona was to draw Marshal Su-
chat from Valencia—a plan which had been particu.
larly directed by his Excellency the Duke of Wel.
liqgtoo. The second motive was the hope that some
chance of war would have thrown the garrison into
his power; and the last was, that he had reason to
,hope the operations of the enemy would have been so
confused as to prevent them making a deCided move-
ment in anyway. All these prospects, however, teased
to exist on the night of the 11th, Suchet having an.
rived within one day's march of the lines of the Al.
lied Army. No accident bad occurred.which af.
forded a chance of the fall of Tarragona. No rein-
' forcement had reached them, and the intention of
'the enemy-to advance seemed decided. Under tech
circumstances, the preservation of the army entrus-.
ted to his-care in that state of effectioepeee which
would enable it to act in any sphere, became his first
care. If his own judgment had not pointed opt this
course, the instructions of his Excellency were too
plain to be mistaken. The importance of the Anglo,
Sicilian, army to the grand plan of the Drake of Wel-
. goin was in fact too manifest to be overlooked.
It. existence put in activity the second and third Spa-
nish armies, and prevented the -first from defeat:
Had these forces been dispersed or paralized, Mer-
lla' fincbet would have been enabled to oppose, in
.Bille most decisive way, the arraargements of the
Commander in Chief, in whose oar he would have
ron
moved, and thereby interrupted the suer of St. Se-
bastian's, and the not }eta impottant..opera.tions at
Pampeluna. The army th.Alicant, in fact. would
never be considered in any other light theft -ace a di.
version in favour of his Excellency, whose plant 'cue
alone to be considered. He lair .Idbiz Stireetinhid
no plan of his own to ciansidee,;: and behad no right
to put the army placed under Ms command in a si-
tuation to be beaten without his Excellency's orders.
With these itapressions on his mind, it would ill be-
come him to have listened 10 tho Weide of Admiral
Hallowell, and to have beguiled' the desteuctien .61
an army upon, which so ma& -choreeded. Had be
suffered his own personal feeling. 'ohm's got dieter.
ter of his brudence, which, had 'be obeyed 'OM im-
pulse of the moment, might bare Wit the case, li{
should have indeed deserved reprobation. The pub.(
lit, it wax true, might be silent; but what apolo6
could he make to the Commander in Chieff,'"ohrisei
positive orders he had received ? What excise
be offer for having lost the Sower of MI army, sit
for the sake of saving a few guns, have heal.ther
bona of the cavalry slaugbeenei on she beiVilo34l
-. . ... „..-;, T :• .4 . ;•)1.....•

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And who could be rash enough to doubt 'that such
woad hairelbeen the ease, vaiin the force at the Ene-
my advancing, independent of the garrison of 'rim;
tons, was known to be 14,000 of the best troops of
France ? Defeat would have been almost certain,
but its probability could not be doubtedi The ex-
pedition to Ostend had not been forgotten, and the
events at Coronae were still fresh in our recollection.
The period was critical, and it was incumbent on
him to avoid a delay which might have been pro-
ductive of the most fatal consequences. If he had
remained, and attempted to take off the guns at all
hazards, might not Marshal Suchet have arrived on
the beach and if he had, would he have permitted
the Allied Army to embark ? And it this was pre-
vented, he would have become master of the field, and
a decided blow would have been given to the hopes
Of success on the eastern coast of Spain. A few hours
'ought have been of the utmost consequence; an'd
therefore his refusal to meet the wishes of Admiral.
Hallowell, to wait till night, was, be trusted,. satis-
factorily accounted for. The enemy was on one side
at Villafranca, ' and on the other at Perella ; and
Irons what there-appearettlere was nothing to pre-
via% Them from 'Mein' at the beach *t the very me-
anest the embarkation Isad-ceimminced.a circum-
stance which would have insured them almost infal-
lible success. By the. operations, as they did take
place, he (Sir John Murray ) wes enabled to send the
cavalry to the Col de BAragoer, an Opportunity
stfilch, by the delay 'oft'a few houti more, would
have been lost. Upon the whole, when the import-
:ince of the trust reposed in him was taken into con-
sideration, as teeli •as,the irreparable injury which
~
would have remised from any misfortune occurraingl
to the army wader his command, he was satisfieddse
Court would agree with him in thinking, that he
would not have been justified in playing so desperate
a game as that which bad been suggested by his pro-
secutor. 'lt only, in fact, required .to refer to his in-
structions, which painted consequences of his defeat,
to find the measure of his punishment. The interest
of Europe was interwoven in the success of the plans
of the Duke of Wellington; and these operations de.
pended, in a great measure, in the safety of the Sin-
tan army.
It was not his part to calculate That the enemy
would, but what he could do—their approach seemed
unquestionable, from all the wakes of information
which he had; and be could only account for their re-
treat by ascribing it to the arrival of Lord Exmouth
in the bay of Rosas. Upon this he had no light to'
calculate, and nothing could be considered less pro.
bable than that the enemy would retreat, after hav-
ing made forced marches for the purpose of obtain-
ing an object which seemed to be perfectly within
their reach.
He had embarked his troops entire, had not
and
left one man or one horse behind, neither had he left
any one piece of field artillery, seventeen serviceable
and unserviceable, nut of ninety-one pieces of ord-
nance, having been above lelt behind. It was true,
the enemy might boast of this, to their useless price,
but how much more galling would have been their
boast, if they had the opportunity of proclaiming the
number of the dead bodies of our soldiers, the carcases
of our horses, and the list .of our artillery in their pos.
session, to which trophies might be added, the colours
of the Allied Army.' It such had been the case, bias.
ted, indeed; Would have been the hopes of victory-in
Spain ; aid well merited would have been the con-
demnation of the unfortunate Commander, who,
tening to the advice of shallow advisers, had, in agree-
ing to a proposition for delay, sacrificed his own judg-
ment, and disobeyed the orders of his Commander.
Befofe he concluded, he was desirous of correcting
two errors which had crept into the former part of his
defence ; the one was the statement that the British
had achieved on the 14th. This should have been
the 13th, and the other was attributable to the trans-
action. The other was, that he should have stated
his officers to have seen the canny on the 17th, and
not the 6th, at Vendrilla.
' The gallant General then proceeded to comment
on the evidence for the prosecution ; that of Captain
Withers, Stoddart, and Inglefield, all tended to the
same point, and therefore only a single observation
was necessary; they proved his intention .to continue
the attack on the fortress up to the night of the llth,
to which time, according to their evidence, the land-
ing of stores and guns did not cease. From the evi.
dencq of Lieutenant-Colonel Williamson, the fact ap-
peared that the rockets ordered to be landed were
lying in the boats for two days ; a circumstance which
:hewed that the beach was not always practicable for
landing or embarking: This made for case; and
Captain Withers' evidence relative to the requisition
for boats on the morning of the 12th, proved his
anxiety to accelerate the embarkation when once it,
had been determined on. It was also in proof 'than
General Don kin spoke from himself when he an-
nounced the speedy arrival of the enemy ; and it was
equally proved that the enemy's advance could not
have been checked on the beach roads by the fire of
gun-boats. He was moat anxious to rebut the charge
of indecision, and be most positively denied that such
a charge could be inferred from his conduct. Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Williamson's evidence relative to the
position of the enemy, was. only a repetition of the
story of the peasant, which had previously Monad
to be false. ; -v.% •
The General here compared the evidame
oi. 010-
eel Williamson with that of Generals Mackenzie an&
Clinton, and said, from it was to be gathered that his
orders to spike the guns were, contingent and condi-
tional. Colonel Thackery was the next witness called;
be proved that the attack on the Puerto Reale was
'continued to the last moment that any chance existed
of subduing Tarragona.' He also proved that the
enemy could advance by two roads ; and, in opposi-
tion to the opinions of the Naval Officers, he gave it
minis belief that it was impossible, by marine force,
'to intercept the enemy on those roads. In all this
witness's testimony the General found nothing in
,support of the prosecution, except that the witness
knew of no reason for raising the siege, and indeed it
was impossible he should, unless he had possessed
more information relative to the movements of the
'them/ ; but this by no means proved that no reason
'inlaid.. General Mackenzie's opinion of the brilliant
inecissio be expected, in case of a conflict with the
enemy, was founded on his knowledge extending only
fo 'the advance of De Caen's column. He had ne
libbviledge of the advance or even movements of Su-
eltei.' idadtted that the embarkation had been
-condirOtd Witthout loss or confusion, which as proof
uc
' •
•:(.1

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•

din it Was not so precipitate as had been &set
his opinion that twelve hundred rrp. it
would be sufficient to mask the garrison of Tana.
gone,. was sufficient to shew the court how precip..
tately his opinions had been formed; And how little
they deserved the serious attention of the Court.
Of the complete state of the army and equipments
he would not go the length that General Mackenzie
had done, in speaking its praise; some pot of it he
was well aware could ni.t be spoken of in too high
terms, either as to gallantry or discipline; but this
was not the case with all the troops, as might be col-
lected from the letters of General* Mackenzie and
Ciinton, from the latter of whom he had been in-
lormed that the ni the batteries bad thrown away
their ammunition as SOOtl as they were exposed to the
fire of the enemy. Lord F. Illitinck's evidence only
went to one point, and on that point he was certainly
very ill informed. ‘Viien he (General Murray) saw
Lord F. Bernina at hirpost he had been at the head-
quarters of General Copons, eight miles in advance
of Lord F. Deutinck, Whose memory did nut appear
to be very perfect, for ;bough he considered the ea-
' valry completely covered by Copons' army, yet he
sent to Lord F. It to keeptout a stronger picket. The
last witnesi.called wax Ltetitenant•General Clinton,
oldie asperity of whose evidence he had ample reason
to complain. The tone and manner in which it was
delivered equally shocked and surprised him. Gene-
ral Clinton was the last man from whom he had a
right to expect such evidence; bus if the General
'complained of theendlessehange in the orders given
to General Murray, he could only account for that
continual change, by the lrttle attitity displayed by Ge-
neral Clinton in obeying and executing those orders.
—lf the.Graferal complained of a want of confidence
in him, Air (General Murray) was sorry for the
existence-41116th a feeling ; 'but his duty was not to
conciliate theprivate feehngs of individuals, bat' to
attend to poWie iertila I.a service which WAS no:
alvetifti advanced ill:WO liberal • :end indiscriminate
communication of secrits; The injury done by the
opinions give* by iib•high a:character as General
Clinton, mustlYeattlio*Fedjted, and would be deeply
; thikjilAry; JioitieXari. Woad ottlY extend to the
f.PlAntt7*. it Aroid4i not ppm, that Court; hut
libel the day came, .as he was sure it would, Olen a
Ifltirjudgment would he formed upon the whole case,
theo the acrimony of the witness would become visible,
hii want of information would be appal ent, and the
public would learn how to estimate such evidence,
evett•thoogh coming from such a character as Sir W.
Clinton. But if General Clinton thought at the time
thatsthe embarkation had the appearance of a dis-
gtaceful flight, he would ask, was it not the duty of
the General to have sought Lord William lientincit
'the moment he arrived, and have called on him tb
institute a Court Martial upon the spot ? It was not
enough to sat, that from Admiral Hallowell's letter,
he saw that-au investigation would take place ; and,
indeed, he had no right to know of that letter ; but
in any case he should upon such an opinion have de-
manded inquiry, and if he (Sir John Murray) had
not done his ditty, General Clinton was the person
to step forward—he was the only legitimate cham-
pion of the army. . •

The General concluded his defence with a commen-
'Vary on the last document produced by Admiral Hal-
lowell, and said he had only then to l.'y the documen-
tary evidence before the Court, which for evident
twee' of convenience he should arrange as follows :
he would produce in regular order all the infor-
mation he had received and acted upon—.secondly, he
wotald lay before the Court the orders he had receivt
did given—and lastly, he would bring forward the
general evidence applicable to the whole case. He
irould begin with the information, as the first in order.
'Sir John Murray then submitted to the Court a great
variety of documentary evidence, referred to in the
course of the defence; consisting of information re-
ceived from Spanish Officers, Magistrates, and pea-
sants, together with orders and instructions given and
teceived by himself, and correspondence between the
Duke of Wellingthn, Sir John Murray-, Admiral Hal-
lowell, and other British and Spanish Officers. Those
cloinnients were not read, but merely pdr in ; the dates,
signatures, and translations being proved by Captain
Milner, Colonel Kennalt, Capt. Sharp ( Royal Navy),
Colonel D'Aguila, the Judge Advocate, General
Dunkin, and 'General Whittingliam. The greater
part of them was rekeivtirhy the Court, though some
were suspended fur the future consideration of the
Court. Among the hater was one from Admiral Hal-
Weir% dated the 9th of Julie. When all the docu-
*lents were produced;
Admiral HALLowat.r. asked permission to lay before
ibe Court the answer to the letter which which had
been presented, as addressed by him to Sir John
Mira,. He wished the anstrer to be 'plated 'tithe
mac situation as the letter itself.

Sir.ionu MURRAY objected to the production of this
letter, or any other document from the prosecutor,
after the --Anion was closed.

prosect
"lih;;;JuDoa Anvocata said, that Yuffonfy
the practice of Courts Kirtial, but of every other
Court, to admit evidence from the prosecutor after he
had closed his case, when that evidence went to op-
pose pone new matter or evidence introduced in the
course of the defend% and of which the prosecutor
could have no previous knowledge. If the present
was deemed to be a case in point, the letter of Admi-
ral Hallowell would be admitted by the Court.
Admiral HALLOWELL said, the letter he offered
came under the description of the Judge Advocate ;
it was to be opposed to the lettered evidence by Sir J.
Murray, which was new matter in the defence.
Sir J. MURRAY did not abject to the letter offered,
from its nature, but be objected too the admitting of
evidence after the Prosecutor had closed his case.
The JunintAnvocare said, where new matter was
introduced into a defence loosely, it was customary
to reply to it merely; but where den matter set/
supported by evidence, then the prosecutor was
lowed to answer such new matter by evidence; for
instance, there was a case in the books on this subjoc:.
When a soldier was charged with mutiny, and the
charge was proved, if the prisoner in his defence gave
'evidence to prove that he was forced by others to
commit the act, and that it was not done of his own
voluntary agency, then the prosecutor was at liberty
to produce new evidence to disprove such a statement.
-General MONTRESSOR said, that the mere statement
of a defence was of no importance, and made no inn
peessi3n on the Court, except so far as it was sup.
ported by evidence. -

..

Admiral liaunwm.r. said, so many and such grh ye