Star.
London, England, 1815-05-26 00:00:00

rangements of one Country did threaten the peace
and security of others, it appearecrto him as cleat as
the light, that interference was justifiable. If it were
asked whether any tleug in the personal character of
a ruler would justify other nations in not treating.
with him ? he should answer by taking a supposed case.
Supposing, then, that any nation should, in time of
peace, put itself into on extraordinary state of prep.
ration for War—if that nation should orgardze itself
in such a manner as to be perpetually prepared for
commencing offensive war, if that nation should em-
body itself under the command of a military chief of
great talent and experience in the art of war, if for 15
years Europe had experienced that the efforts of that
nation were uniformly directed to aggression con-
quest, and spoliation—if Europe had been obliged
in self-defence to carry its arms into the heart of that
country, it the capital of that country was taken, it
the conquerors in their magnanimity and moderation
offered a peace which was accepted with gratitude,
if that treaty was accepted with gratitude by that in-
dividual who abdicated the Throne, and it, after ten
months, that guilty individual was to be recalled by
a licentious soldiery, for the purpose of fresh aggres-
sion, was he then to be toad in that House, that neither
we or the otherientions of Europe had any right of inter-
ference with the internal arrangements of such a nation?
How did it happen that the just and legitimate So-
vereign of France had been driven from his ahrone ?
It was because that his unambitious virtue made him
appear to the soldiery, not to be a proper instrument
to wield the unsocial and unnatural energies of the
French empire. If it were said that personal cha-
racter had nothing to do with the question, he should
ask why was the Treaty of Paris ever entered into
That treaty turned entirely on personal character,
and those stipulations were considered satisfactory
when made with the lawful Sovereign of France,
that would not have been entered into with Bonaparte.
If we were to take the common feeling of mankind
upon this subject, we must recollect how universally
the abdication of Bonaparte was hailed in this coun-
try, as an event more important than the most brilli-
ant victories. Our question was not now merely with
Bonaparte, but it was with France. She had pur-
chased the benefits of the Treaty of Paris, by giving
up Bonaparte, and taking her lawful Sovereign, in
whom Europe had confidence. If we were now to
declare that we were ready to treat with Bonaparte,
it would at once put an end to the coalition. Once
we profess to be ready to treat, nothing remains but
a mere question of terms, and then the different na-
tions of Europe would urge their separate interests.
If we were to tell the French people that we were.
ready to negociate with Bonaparte as their ruler, it'
would at once destroy all the hopes that might now
fairly be entertained of the co operation of a conside.
rable portion of the nation. When, however, we saw
the situation in which Bonaparte now stood ; when
we saw him reduced to make professions contrary to
his very nature; when we saw the vessel in which
his fortunes were embai ked labouring with the storm,
and its mast lowed down to the water's edge, it
would be the height of impolicy and absurdity to
hesitate on tile cause that we had to pursue. We had
now a most powerful combination of Allies, not fo-
mented by us, but acting from the moral feeling which
pervades all Europe. It we were foolish enough to
throw away those means, we could never recal therm
Those of his friends who had talked the most about
husbanding the resources of the country, had oonfee-
sed, that when an occasion should arrive, when some
important blow could be struck against the enemy,
that system should no longer be persevered in. That
important crisis had now arrived. It was vain to ex-
pect that a more favourable oppportunity would ever
arrive. All the gteat powers of Europe were now
with us, and a considerable portion of the population
of France. It had been said that invading France
' would be the way to unite the population of that
country. The fact, however, was directly the re-
verse. The not invading France would be the sure
means of reducing the whole population under. the
power of the present ruler. He considered that we
had, in faCt, no option between peace and war. As
for peace, we could have no more than a feverish,
unrefieshing draeine of peace, still haunted by the
spectre of war. In point of finances me should find
a peace syith a war establishment, an evil much
greater than war. If we did net now go to war in
conjunction with all the great powers of Europe, we
would soon be reduced to a war single handed against
France. It we did not now irieade France, and carry
on the war upon her teiritories, the time might come
' when our country would become the seat of war, and
we would fall unpitied and despised. If we were
now to turn our hank upon the great powers that.
were our allies, we would deserve that all nations
should turn their backs upon us, when we began to
feel the consequences of our impolicy.—[Mr. Peen.
!crier's speech was cheered for several minutes
after he had sat down.) - ••
Mr. TIERNEY thought it a most unwise thing,
and unprecedented in the history of the world, to
commence a war for the mere purpese of getting rid
of one man. When the Allies last year talked of
giving better.terms to France in consequence of the
restoration of the Bourbons, they by that very an.
gouge implied that s Isle term* would have been
granted to Bonaparte, and certainly did not sanction
the idea that there could he no peace with that
indi-
vidual. Bonaparte had committed no new atrocities
since that period. He did not believe, indeed, that
his character was at all changed; no dpubt he would
wish to be at the head of a powerful army, to wipe
away what he considered a stain. on hi; military re-
potation ; but for that very reason this country should
, not be anxious to put him into such s situationo—
At present he firmly believed, that the popular feel-
ing in France was for peace; nor did he think that
Bonaparte had the disposal of the army. Carnet,
and the constitution-mongers, as they were called,
had immense intinence over the military, aid it cer;
tainly was not their object to have a military Gevern-
merit. As the Allies it was very evident did not stir
without the-stimulue tit our subsidy, Bonaparte would
have a strong cas.r to urge against what he would call
the restlessness and amtntion of this country. hut our.
selves, though we might not now be in the situation
to want rate oa any terms, yet he sincerely believed
that in two years we might be in soch a condition.
He feared' that the, real object of:the war was to 3e-
place the Bourbons, thOugh indeed the Ministers dio
not venture to avow such an intention, for they knew
.that not even in that Home, and otuch less in the
country, would elicaeruiet'with support it they openly