Star.
London, England, 1815-05-24 00:00:00

to be the fundamental part and basis upon which all i 1
these arrangements were built; every one of which i
he, without any adequete pretence of necessity, fun-
damentally violated on his part. The Allies were
therefore absolved froth the conditions of those trea-
ties,
and if they, chose to avail themselves of the con- I 1
sideration, were placed in a state of war with the now
existing Government of France, so far as the poilit
related to a mere question of justice. He admitted, i
however, that k was not enough to -satisfy the House
as to the jestice of the case as it referred to the enemy. 1
1 He was called upon farther to prove, that the alter-
native of war was just with respect to these coun-
tries who were to, ormay be, the other parties in it;
and he trusted, on this head, he could !hew, that
under all the circumstances of the case, there was a
paramount call upon them, in the views of a true
sense of their own security, the conservation of their
dearest interests, and a sense of imminent and evaes.
Mel danger, to enter into a state of war. In girl :4,
part of the question, the first consideration Iva:— c
Was there any prospect of this country, or of Europe
remaining at peace w:th France, as long as the per-
son now at the head of its Government remained in
that situation ? If there was no such prospect, there
could be no safety in delay. In arguing this position,
they had the melancholy advantage of the experience
of fourteen or fifteen years, which shewed to them
that there was no engagement ever concluded with
that person that was not grossly violated by hint—
that his system was one of general spoliation and
universal aggrandisement; to be regularly and posi-
tively attached by conquest and force of arms. When
at one period of the Resolution the vanity of the
French was flattered by the novel principle of extend-
ing their country to what was called its natural limits
—such as the Alps, the Pyrennees, and the Rhine ;
about tint time the present Ruler of Frince obtained
the power of the Government, and by the Treaty
of Lunevilk, he was enabled to achieve that which
WAS contemplated by the antecedent Government.—
All reasonable men in Europe at the time looked with
alarm at such an increase of the territories. But in
subsequent Treaties, various small states were recog-
nized independent republics, as the Ligurian, Helve-
tian, sled others ; but these existed not long, lot every
one of these Treaties were violated, and the territo-
ries of each were successively either incorporated with
France herself, or placed in a state of vassalage or
subjugation to her controul. Every one saw what
little reliance was to be placed on treaties formed with
the Ruler of France ; they afterwards saw what
Switzerland, what Holland, and various other coun-
tries had suffered. No devotion, no submission, on
the part of any stare, sufficed to prevent its becom-
ing the victim of his ambition. Let them more par-
ticularly look to what the conduct of that person
was with respect to a country whose state occupied
many home of their discuss:au-1w meant !pain.--
Spain, which was not only the ally, but in habits of
the most entire submission to France. Let the con.
duct of its Ruler towards that country, its King; and
its Nobility, be considered. There was no limits to
his unprincipled aggrandisements, his insatiable am.
bition. Let them look to, and consider the grounds
and objects, as well as the pretences of his invasion
of Russia. - No man who considered those could en-
tere4in a doubt of Bonaparte's lust of universal rule
and boundless dominion. A state of peace with one
who throughtut and uniformly manifested himself to
I be actuated by such a principle, was not to be expected
for any leneth of time. By some it might possibly
beheld, that since his return to power, or previous to
it,' a change in his principles and objects rn?y be in-
duced : but even the circumstances under which that
return took place, were such as should give alai m and
anxiety to every Government of Europe. The na-
tion at large were, at the time, satisfied and happy
under the government of their King ; whence did the
change arise ? The at my were discontented, and the
present Ruler .of Trance came back, encouraged
merely by the power of the army, who felt, perhaps,
their glory had been in tome degree tarnished ; but
they felt their dissatisfaction., and they wished for the
government of a military chief—Why ? because they
wished for a military government, whose ruling prin-
ciple they knew would be war—a state of things they
wished for from motives of personal interest and feel-
ing. (Hear, hear.) Under such circumstances, could
they look with indifference at such a state cf things ?
could they consider the course of events which had
occurred in Europe itself in consequence of the ag-
gressive ambition of the French Ruler. and not fear
fully anticipate what must ensue, if not checked and 1
1 counteracted Could they imagine—could they put
any faith in the professions of a persen, who had so
retently seized the Government of fiance at the head
of a military power, that the love of peace would be
the ruling principle of his conduct ? But they had '
heard further, of a prospect of the establishment of a'
limited Monarchy in France, and which would. go to
afford some security for the maintenance of peace.—
He must doubt, however, on viewing the course of
things for the last twenty-five years in France,
whether in time of peace, a limited Monarchy or a
free Government could exist in that country together
wits such a large military establishment as would be
kept up t and he would undertake to say, that a free
Government could not exist in France with a Chief
who owed his title to the sword—whose fame and
power were founded on conquest alone. Could they
so absolutely shut their eyes—divest themselves of all
observation and reflection—or be so blind to all that
pised for the last 15 years, and imagine or believe
that a state of repose and tranquillity could be en-
joyed by Europe end this country chile the Go-
vernment of France was in the hands of its present
Ruler ? Notwithstanding these views of the ques-
tion, the risks and difficulties of war were duly con-
sidered by him ; and there were some who may
advise, contrasting the evils of war with the bles-
sings of peace, that the latter should be tried with
the individual now at the head of the French Cre.
vernment, before the awful alternative should be de-
. cided. In seeing. this he was endeareuring to state

the argument fairly, and in a way which sonsi4would
prehebly meet it. He was ready to adroit, that the
alternative of war, all circumstances conaiciered, was
of so dreadful a nature, that if any eational.pteemeet
of peace existed, it would be better to ettsbraca; it :---
hut on that peint he had already stated his (:*.ica,'
The circumstances under which wat maybe t*ert....t
epona with a view to its rational prospect of emcee.,
then naturally conic under cons.i,.eretieft, tine in ea:
view he held it to be a favourable circerastaace, ti, .-
the present Ruler of France should have : e"ir med.
while the Allied Sovereigns were still asatenbled at
Vienna, and before several of the armies of E:iroe e
were reduced to peace establ:,,hmerts ; whale teea
were in a state of concert, and in a ganeral sere of
preparation, which enabled them the int re elf.. ea' '-
to meet the difficulties. Such wen tie situ tti, n i t
which they were placed. They knew that in ali
£ulope, and among the Allied•Severeiges, but one
il lifArer `tom .e-ed on tbe subject. They:relt krrsigaioa,
i
'the Ma ado exiatcat; ..: aa 'AI title/ i+-'f: :. sa ar- I. "g`
effect to %how resolves. But were the, to ch I n . Re A,:-...
adopt the policy of peace—to let Benap.ste estabhse
his power and recreate his armies—let ti.e Allied .So-
vereigns return home, and put thee. ernees on 4
peace establishmeet, and the mornant wouid never
return when the blow could be struck
.witir so merit
advantage as under the present cireuinstesicas. Let.
the history of Europe be looked to, and see ia what
length of time so grand a confederacy of its leadiog
Powers was formed, as was to be found at presele.
—The talents and powers of some of tee
stet a (..sc
Statesmen that ever directed the affairs of this coun-
try, were in vain exerted to form such a cotecalar icy
as now existed—that great object could net be ce,-
tained till the year ISIS. With such experience and
such an example before them, why should they not
avail themselves of the present advent:roes ?—if these
were now relinquished, what prospect had the, of a
like return ? We hare against Fr arse a just cause
of war, from a violation on the part of the enemy ,e.
every fundamental principle on void) the peace w. s
formed, and a Government was reit,' zateci which ex-
perience proved to be inconsistent with the peace and
tranquillity of Europe. Bet it may possib:.y be ob-
jected to him that the Allies were prepared totteat
with the present Ruler ot France so iate as the 17th
of March, at Chatillon ; a few remarks oe that pomc
may be necessary : the individual was then in iodise
puted possess' of the Government of Freace.-e-
Though the Allies had advanced stone easy hen that
country, the far greater panel' it was yen in the
possession of Bonaparte ; in his hands were also ail
the fortresses of Italy, as Mantua, Genoa and Tnrire
He had been master of every fortress on the Rhine,
and of many on the Elbe. On the side of Helena
and the Netherlands, he had Antwerp, Luxembourg,
and Bergen-oP.Zoorn—in short, all the places. of
:• west wellitary ,strength in that quarter of kleropta—
Those who looked coolly and deliberately on !hat
transaction—who saw the dangers to which the Al-
lied Armies might hive been reduced, it any reverse
had occurred, the difficulties to which, in such a case,
they would have been retleced without a single fr.
tress in their possession, when Bonaparte would bases
been able to dictate the peace, or carry on with in-
creased advantage his own operations. It was thee
itolged better to sacrifice the lesser consideration wire
a view to ensure a greater. Such were the causes
that-led to that negotiation. Upon the whole, under
the existing circumstances, there .:as no hope of ob-
i taininoea that state of tranquillity and repose which
I was alp net synonimons with peace in the ancieut ac-
cept dim of that word. 4 state of praperetion, a
species of armed truce, attended with a feverish ap -
pratention of being attacked or compelled at no
great distaoce of time to engage with manifold dis-
advantage in a state of war, would evidernly he
much more disadvantageous than engaging in wet-
under suds encouraging airenmstances as presented
themselves—but still more would it be preferable.,
when we were conscious of the sentiment that per-
vaded our Allies, when we knew we poseessed tl:c
means of striking the blow effectually now, an op-
portunity we had little prospect of seeing return
again—on a ground of economy also, the eneatong
in such a state now would be few the more prefe-
rable; the preparation which already esistad pre-
sented a great advantage, while tae disadvantage
of being compelled to Increase ottr forces Ifiam a
state of peace establishment to a scare adequate
to the prosecution of hostilities, would operate in-
calculably against us. Every thing favourabie
now presented itself: the daoositions of the Allies
were such as could be svishedo--(Hear, kbr.)—
It was not, 2s he had already stated, the object of the
Prince Regent's Government to induce the Allies to
at more extensive line of policy, than in their own de-
liberate view of the subject they should think proper
to adopt. This principle was most emphatically
acted upon, and the necessity of the alternative of
war was a point oh which their recataideration wait
' repeatedly urged, and their most deliberate and re.
reetedly-considered opinions led to that deciaion
which was communicated to l'arliement. With re.
snect to the late Government of fraoce, it was his
decided opinion that a great majority of the people
of France were in favour of the return ot their :orrnt r
• legitimate Government. He firmly believed that
.such a sentiment prevailed in the .tiouth, West, erred.
Northern parts of France ; and this he jedged tr. in
every information that came to his knowledge on tee
subject. It was also his full conviction that such a
restoration, would the best tend to the general secu-
rity of Europe ; and he should be ashamed if he he-
sitated to avow that opinion. At the same titre, the
object was not to interfere with the choice of the
people of France in constituting their form of Go-
vernment; though he must observe, we had se far a
right to interfere, under general circumstancess as to
endeavour to set aside a Government which may be
incompatible with the security of others. We had nor,
• on such a principle, the right to say what should be,
• but what should not be, the particular Government.
1 The Allies and the Confederacy being now perfectly