Star.
London, England, 1815-10-09 00:00:00

BMI tHI7IhA.D MARKET, OC I'OBER 9.

Ded. 49. 04 to 5s Y.l Veal 5. 0.: eti• th 01
Mottm 4o td to So rat 5s 41 os tab
(Seams 4340...5heep and Lambs 15,370—C.dves 110-11 p 4W

HAY AND SiRAW, PER LOAD.

Meadow Hay 41 Os to 51 Os Clover 51 dap aOs
Straw set Ists to XI I6as

Cony EXCHANGE, OCTOBF 9.—Having a largo
supply.of Wheat this morning from Etter, Kent,
and SufFolk, and the demand bet Moderate, caused
exceedingly heavy. sale at a reduction of full 2c. per
quarter upon all descrlptions.''ne arrivals of B.rler
were also considerable, .and as but fete if our malt.
stets have yet begun, the trade was dull at a de line
of 2s. per quarter. White Peas are ready sale At list_
week's prsces, but Grey ones are lb* p• r comer
lower, the supply being large. Beans are Is per
quarter dearer. In Gtats and others, no violation.

I‘.

- - .
FROM Thr. AlißiVl4.l iieRCURT.

IHE CONTEST OF Pr)LIVICAt. OPINIONS IN PAM
The views of the Russian Caliinet may he decidedly
collected from a Memoir if the date of July 16, ati.
which has been since circulated in Paris. Its sub=
stance is nearly the following :
The European league and the war, terminated by
the battle of Waterloo, had for object,
1. To deliver France from Napoleon and the re-
volutionary system which had resealed him on the
thi one.
2. To replace that state in the internal position
and 'ht: external relations, such as they were restored
by th,. Treaty of Paris.
3. To secure to France and Europe the unalterable
maintenance of the resolution of agreement, founded
on the Peace of Paris, and ratified by the acts of the
Vienna Con? Jess.
Bonaparte and his adherents are in the power of
the Allies, the army is subdued, and will be disband-
ed. Louis XVIII. in Paris, will he recognised by
the nation as a mediator for the tranqiiillity of Eli-
rise ; the armies of the Allies overspread France,
:rod will be miintained at her expense. The first
and weightiest object at the war is already attained.
It now remains to attain the second object of the
league, viz. by great and efficacious measures to se-
cure the tranquillity of France, and with it that of
the rest of Europe. This tranquillisation can, in
France, be grounded only on an order of things,
which may for ever render the return of revolutions
impossible. On these principles, all the questions in
relation to the securities which the Allies can require
of France are intimately connected with the state of
the public mind and the compact of the 25th March.
These securities are moral or physical ; the one to
tranquillise opinion, the other force. A constitution
in which the power of the government is founded on
a representation of the people, and which binds the',
interests which have sprung up during a twenty-five
years revolution, with those of royalty, can abuse
afford a complete moral security. The direct or in-
direct diminution of the power of the French nation,
the temporary or continued presence of foreign armies
in France, constitute generally the physical security.
The question is, whether the one or the other, or
both, shall be required of France ; and when this is
decided, in what way the Allies must proceed to
attain it regularly in a way corresponding to their
principles.
in regard to physical security, it must consist-
-Ist, In the circtinwripron of the boundaries assigned
to France by the Treaty of Paris 2d, In the taking
away her line of defence, or the demolition of her
fortresses : 3.1, In the seizure of her materials for
war, or the ruin of her resources : 4th, In the impo-
sition of a heavy war-contribuiiiin, which may fur a
long time render it impossible lot the nation to rise
from its present situation.
The Powers, however, when they took up arms
against France, did not consider it as a hostile coml.
try ; (Declarations of the 15th of March, and the
I lth of May, Compact of the 25t0 of March) nei-
ther can they now regard it as a conquered country.
The ground of the war was the maintenance of the
Treaty of Paris, as the basis of the decisions of Con.
gri ; the ch,se of the war cannot require the change
of that treaty, or of the measures which necessarily
therefrom resulted. Sir uld the Powers wish to set
up the right of conquest, then a new convention must
set toith the grounds of their change of system, and
establish its principles; both, however, grounds and
.plinciples, would contradict those which were conse-
crated at Paris and Vienna.
All the negociations have had for object to restore
the different Powers to a regular state id just equili-
brium. It toe integrity of France is attacked, then
au that was agreed upon at Vienna must be unset-
tled, new territorial divisions must be proceeded in,
and a new system of equilibrium combined. This
operation, difficult and little corresponding to the
liberal political principles of the great Powers, would
occasion a deviation from that equitable deportment
which they have hitherto maintained, and fiom which
ell nations expect their tranquillity.
The Allies having at an earlier period acknow-
ledged the King of France, and nu reinstated him
by force of arms, they owe it to justice, and their
lawn interests, to confirm his throne, and to fix his
power on general and national interests. But it
wool l be to destroy the princil.le of the restoration
of the monarchy, were the Allies to compel the King
to make cessions, which would give to the French
people that me,:sureot distrust with which the Powers
of Europe would see the existence t (their own work.
To weaken Frarice, in order to make it acknowledge
the governineut which Europe gives it, would, they
down say, be making their legitimate government
calamity, and might perhaps be preparin.g, for pos-
terity a renewal of all the evils of the revolution ;
Trance would be compelled to believe that the seat
was not yet ended, and the Bowers would be bound
to hold themselves in readiness to follow up its con-
seqnences. These considerations afford a criterion
sit the political value of all the guarantees which be-
long to this class.
In regard to moral guarantees, it may be said, that
no imaginable system of government can of itselt af-
ford an absolute security for its existence. • This is
nut the place to enquire what form in France would
at present best secure the -government, but it may be
asserted, that since Bonaparte and Ins pernicious in-
fluence has been tar removed, the King can and will
so establish his constitutional authority, that the
better part and the great majority of the people shall
be most strongly attached to his dime. Should,'
however, the Powers not be inclined to confine the
sesult of their Minikes to such hypothetical circum-
stances, which have no other security but abstract
opinions and probable comb i4en ir• =jot be
advisable to wit tor this security in the union of ow-
fal with phf.al guarantees.
Leis% it down, in the first place, that if the King
of Fiance shall succeed so to rtaeseeblish the Mo.
narchy, that the interests of all parties shall unite in
one, that of the Govetntaentand National Represen.
tation, then would this moral security of thetermitia-
tion of the .revolition in France become a real one,
that order and tranquillity would nu more be dis.
tnrbed by an internal re-action, such as that which
re-seated Napoleon on the throne, without France
nom drawing foreign armies on her territory. The
Freuch people know this from experience, and were
ttl parties convinced Of it, then would they be indi•
racily itllluxaced to *ek Lb& welfare itt the oppeer

of a Govetnment a bleb Franey had Own herslr,
rder to r:r again from the state of humiliation inoo
which her own extravagance had brought her.
The Powers may. in a twofold way, accompli"
'this weighty object : 1. By mutually renewing the
reompact of the 25th March, for ever to banish Na-
p 'Aeon and his family from France. by a resolution
' aanctioned by all Europe. They may also replace in
force for 'a definite time the defensive part of the.
treaty of Chaumont, against every attack which
France may make in future on the security of other
states. '2. By taking up, in agreement with the go-
vetnment, a military position in France, and main-
a;ning it until rise complete tranquillization of that
country. "At the same time France must be bound
to pay a contribution to cover the expences of the
war, and for the erection of the necessary fortresses
in the btirtieting countries. Thus such a war ennui-
tuition n'tiglit he levied with 0/Ake, as a means, on
the part of France, of uniting the integrity of its
territory with what it owes to the general security ;
and France. while subjected to it, would thereby
find its welfare ensured, without its political exist-
ence being endangered by the nature and severity of
the means of general safety. The military occupa-
tion of a line in the country must also continue until
the complete payment of this contribution, and the
Allies will thus have gained the indirect advantage
of submitting to the test of time and experiment,
that moral guarantee which the reform of the Con.
stitutiln may give.
But whatever system be adopted, the only eligible
form of proceeding would be, by means of a friendly
understanding with the French government. Europe
was, and is, allied with this government ; and as it is
again at the head of the nation, so the general rela-
tions of peace are again restored. It this govern-
ment doss not yet approach the Allies with full con-
fidence, if all France, and especially the party most
interested in the ReVolution, have not yet cordially
attached themselves to it, it is because the Allies have
not yet declared the intentions with which they have
occupied France, and there mean to maintain them
selves. The nation knows the compact of the 25th
of March, and the declarations. Bonaparte is in the
hands of the Aires, the King reigns legitimately,
and yet the armies are taking up cantonments, and
labouting upon a system of administration which
may secure their maintenance for a long time. Mo-
mentary divergences, occasioned by the severity of
military administration, make it to be presumed that
mine of the Allied armies thought themselves in an
enemy's country. The silence of the Cabinets be-
numbs the minds of men, excites distrust, renders
trains a people intoxicated with pride and silt-love,
doubles its sufferings, and may chive it to despair.
Hence it is imperiously requisite, that the Cabinets
come to an understanding with the french Govern-
ment respecting the secutities required. It therefore'
seems necessary, 1. To unite without delay for the
consideration of the subject, and by common agree-
' ment to decide as to the guarantees. 2. To
mence a formal negotiation with the French govern-
ment, to pave the way fur its acceptance of them.
3. To form the result of these negotiations into a
Convention, and then to issue a declaration by which
the people may ascertain the termination of the war,
and which may regulate the relations of France with
the Powers who were parties to the Convention of
the 25th of March.
It may be insinuated, that it is dangerous to handle
such questions, at a time when many foe tresses are
in the hands of the garrisons, and the army not yet
disbanded. This objection rests evidently on the fear
of a counter-action on the part of the army, the go-
vernment, or the people. The army and the people
will accommodate themselves to the wishes of the
Allies, when the latter satisfy themselves with giving
a lasting constitution to France, and then only will
the gov.rnment be able to favour their views. No
counter-action will take place, provided the Allies
regulate their claims on the principles upon which
their alliance rests. How indeed can it be expected,
that the Government will give up fortresses to the
Allies, so long as it is ignorant of their political sys-
tem ? Will it disband the army, to reduce itself to
a state of absolute nullity, and thus be forced to
subscribe to any conditions which power might dic-
tate ? • . •
From all these coosiderations it is manifeit, that
while the Allies maintain a profound silence, Which
excites and justifies alarm, they will not attain what
they appear to wish, viz. to have at their disposal the
means of all, and to attain every thing, without en-
dangering the security of their armies, .and the free.
tom of their communications.

DESPERATION OF AN AMERICAN SLAVE.—A letter
from Norfolk (Amirica), dated July the 20th, says,
One of the most singularly shocking circumstances
within our recollection was witnessed in this town on
Friday evening last. :Cesar, a young negro fellow
belonging to Captain West, having been detected in
committing a robbery, was taken before a Magistrate,
who sentenced him to be publicly whipped. As the
constables were escorting him to the place of punish-
ment, he contrived to break away tram them, and
ran up Fenchurch-street, where, being closely pur-
sued, he took to the creek ; one of the constables, a
'remarkably active and persevering officer, by the
name of Flood, dashed in after him, when the fellow
conceiving there was no chance of escaping, pulled
up a stake, placed himself in a posture of defence,l
and as Flood approached to seize him, struck him a
severe blow on the head ; Flood then attempted to
knock him down with his cane, but the negro &ate-
rously avoiding the stroke, grappled him by the
throat, plunged his head under water, and held it
there till he had completely suffocated him. A cid.
zen by the name of Cherry, who had at first perceiv.
ed the perilous situation of the constable, ran home
and brought his gun, with which he fired at the
negro while he was in the act of holding Flood under
the water, and wounded him so severely that he re-
linquished his hold on the unfortunate constable ;
but it was too late, for he floated along the tide a
lifeless trunk. Some persons then went off in a canoe
to secure the murderer, but, like a stag at bay, he
resisted all their attempts; until rendered totally in-
sensible by numerous blows of sucks, paddles, Ike.--
A number of persons were at the creek's side in time
to have prevented the horrid deed, but, shame on
them, they stood like idiots, gaping at a fellow crew.
tune struggling in the grasp of a murderer,. without
making a single don to save Igor.


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