Star.
London, England, 1815-02-06 00:00:00

both those charges. Suppose 'that Sir Yobs Murray
bad been in a condition to give this 111111WOr, W pre-
vious to the Tltis, I had not heard of the advance of
"Sachet, but only of Decaen whom I was prepared to
light; on that clay, however, I was informed of- the
rapid advance and proximity of Suchet, and saw
that it was not possible to save the whole, if I had
.staid, without giving battle to a superior enemy,
which would have risked the whole." Such an an-
swer would, in his .union, have been perfectly.satis-
factory. /f Marshal Suchet bad descended from the
clouds at Perak; on the 12th of June, with twelve
thousand men, when Sir John Murray had every
reason to believe him on the Huccar, in Valencia.
that would have been a sufficient justification for re-
treating at that particular time, and for leaving the
guns behind. Sir John Murray had, however, proved
both by his own letters, and by the evidence he
brought forward, 'that he did know of the ad-
vance of Suchet long before the 11th. It was there-
fore his duty to have calculated, previous to that
iime, on the means of saving his army, with its guns
sachem's, in the very probable case of his being ob•
liged to raise the siege of 'Tarragona. S:r J. Murray
had stated, that be had brought no evidence in sup-
port of the first and second charges. He thought,
however, that he bad brought suificient evidence in
producing Sir John's own letters. His case was, that
after Sir John had .formed a decisive opinion that
Tarragona could not be taken, he still continued to
land guns and stores. All that were exposed to risk,
after this conviction was formed is his mind, were ex-
posed in vain. As to the approach of Decaen, Sir
John appeared to be perfectly well informed of it; ,
and by his letter of the 23d be stated that Suchet had
left the Huccar on the 7th, and arrived at Tettosa
on the 9th. When he had heard of the actual arrival
of one thousand at Tortosa, and of two thousand at
'Lerido, he could have no doubt but that those were
advanced corps of Suchet, coming to raise the siege of
Tarragona. By the 9th, all doubts of the move-
ment of Suchet to the North were removed from Sir
John Murray's mind. What other object could Su-
chet have in this movement but to relieve Tarragona,
and when Sir John was well informed of this move-
ment, and firmly believed the information, why did
he not sooner calculate the time that Suchet would
probably arrive, and carry off his army, with all
their guns and stores I—While there was a chance of
taking Tarragona, the stay of Sir John Murray in
Catalonia might have been excuseable k but why
should he stay there when every rational prospect of
taking it had vanished t Previous to the luth enough
had been done to draw Decaen from his positions in
Catalonia. Enough had been done also to make a
diversion in favour of the Due del Parque in Valen-
,cia. He could not see any practical or moral effect
that was produced by continuing the siege longer—he
could really not discover nor imagine any bad moral
effect that was to result from pursuing a different line
.of conduct. But Sir John Murray had endeavoured
to show, and as he thought fallaciously to thew, that
he had no other alternative than that of pushing on
the siege as late as the night of the II th, or of sud-
denly abandoning it. If he (Mr. Larpent) were re-
duced to make his choice as to which of these *mea-
sures he approved, he should certainly choose the lat-
ter, and refer to the evidence of General Donkin for
an ample justification of this opinion. But there was
another and a third course which in his view of the
question ought to have presented itself to the judg-
ment of Sir John Murray. Why was the siege con-
tinued till the 12th, after all hopes of success had va-
nished, and the certain approach of la superior enemy
had been known for several days before ? During
these proceedings on the eastern coast of Spain, an
enterprise was going on in the west, precisely similar
in its objects, and in all its circumstances, except the
conduct of the different Commanders. The siege of
St. Sebastian had been brought to that crisis when
- preparation was matured for the assault. The
French General, the Duke of Dalmatia, selected this
period for the purpose of making a desperate effort to
relieve Pampeluna, by turning the right of the Allied
army; well knowing that if he succeeded in that ob-
ject, the left, which supported the investment of St.
fiebastian's, must be compelled also to fall back.—
What was then the conduct of the Duke of Welling-
ton, admitted to be one of the first Generals of this
or any other age ?—He immediately ordered all his
heavy ordnance to be removed to a place of safety,
lest he should be obliged to abandon the siege; and,
although it considerably retarded his operations, he
did not deem it adviseable to expose to possible loss
or capture any part of his battering train: and yet,
if ever there was a Commander justified in calculat-
ing on the favours of fortune, or in drawing on that
ample stock of character which he bad previously
acquired, it certainly was the Duke of Wellington,
who telt that be dared not do that at St. Sebas-
tian's which Sir J. Murray had done at Tarragona.
General Donkin's testimony furnished ample confir-
mation of the indecision of Sir John Murray; for how
could he have been induced, unaccuubmed as he was
to disclose his intentions to others, to have communi-.
cated his design of raising the siege so early as the
9th to GeneralDonkin, unless his mind had actually
been made up as to that measure, which he, never-
theless, delayed carrying into execution until the
morning of the 12th ? How could he have contem-
plated dich a proceeding, unless assured of the cer.
taw approach of Marshal Sachet's army, it being his
resolution not to raise the siege, as stated is his de-
fence, in consequence of Uecaen's advance, but to
risk, in this event, an engagement with that column
et the enemy ? General Donkin, it appeared, had
also then forwarned Sir John Murray respecting the
possible loss of the guns ; and yet no preparations
were made, no steps taken, no precautions used, up
to the morning of t e 12th to guard against that dis-
aster. On the Ilth, Marshal Suchet was known-to
be at Tortosa; but his certain advance in force, for_
the obvious purpose of relieving Tarragona, bad
been known three days before by confidential and
authentic communications, and the time at which he
might arrive was therefore a mere matter of calcula-
tion for the Quarter Master General's Office. Why
then did Sir John Murray act as if he was totally
destitute of information I w where was the difficulty
of calculating the ordinary rapidity of a French ar-
my, so as to event the necessity of leaving any
thing behind ? Why in one case give the enemy cre-
dit for en almost preternatural activity, and in the
other act on the supposition of a dilatoriness not to
be expected from the most sluggish foe. Instead of
rOtilpetlinle bar ry nition4l calculativat

of probabilities, Sir John kftwray seemed to rely
together on chance; and lie who chose to comn.t'
himself to such direction must stand the hazard ty.
the die. Another ground taken in the defence was,
that all this was done from an excessive care for
Edward Pellew, and a fear that his operations in tl
Bay of Rosas might be impeded by not leaving Li!:
guns behind at Tarragona. if this really was cm
of the motives, he must really say, that it was pa.,
ing too high a compliment to Sir Edward Pellew, .1
the expense of the honour and character of the coin:
try. He had been not a little surprised in the cow:,
of the defence to hear a British General speak of ti•
loss of his.guns as if it were merely the loss of
much old iron, and as if it seas a matter of peci
nary value, and not the wound inflicted on the r.a.
tional honour, which was alone in question. Hs,
now came to the second charge, at which Sir Join
Murray had described himself to be equally shocked
And astonished. The charge consisted of two part:_.
first, with respect to the disobedience of instructive,;
and secondly, of a neglect of duty. Sir John Mia.
ray had overlooked this distinction, and confined hi,
defence to the accusation of disobedience. He had
considered it to involve merely a question of policy,
which question was not at all before the Coart.—
From this doctrine he must beg leave entirely to
sent. He denied too that the ease was made out, ad.
mitting the trustszommitted to Sir John Murray t:,
have been as discretionary as he represented. It ha 1
been urged, that there was no precise time fixed ..1
Lord Wellington's instructions -for proceedmg witli
the army to Valencia, and that it wai left ta his owe
judgment as a question of time and means. lin
would put it, however, to any General present, arli,
ther, if he were ordered by the Prince Regefit to take
the command of an expedition for the accomplish-
ment of a specific object, he would not conceive it t
be his duty to proceed to execute it with all possible
dispatch ? or whether he would feel himself jos-
iifictl in staying some time on the way to try a little
experiment of his own.? That the question was
one of means, or in other words, of practicability, he
could understand ; but he did not see the force of the
logical distinction between means and time on this
occasion. The fact was, any positive time was ut.
terly out of the question; but Sir John Murray har.
ing been compelled to raise the siege of Tarragona,
which was the first object of his expedition, had only.
to refer to his instructions to discover that his next
and immediately consequent object was to land the
army at Valencia. If in not thus acting Sir John
Murray was not guilty of positive disobedience, he
was still liable to the charge of a neglect of duty. If
it was said that any advantage was to be derived
by remaining, why was the embarkation from before
Tarragona so hastily executed ? and why were the
guns abandoned lest an action with the enemy might
be hazarded ? What, when this was once the state
of things, was left to Sir John Murray but to proceed
immediately to Valencia, and carry into effect the
other object of the expedition ? In not so doing, it
WAS evident that the plan of Lord Wellington was
frustrated, and every end of the campaign on the
eastern coast of Spain so fat counteracted. Sir John
Murray has supposed a case in his own exculpation ;
which case was, however, not founded in fact. He
had supposed the possibility, that after the battle of
Vittoria, which happened to occur-at this period, Sa-
chet's retreat into France might have been intercep-
ted by the army under his command. He coull
hardly suppress a smile when he thus heard this little
army, which was unable to remain at Tarragona, or
to move any way except towards their transports„ by
a species of pantomimical metamorphosis suddenly
converted Into a force competent to fight Sachet, with
an army swelled in its numbers by the united strength
of all his garrisons. Without, however, adverting
further to any such sanguine hopes or schemes of
visionary success, he should proceed to another to-
pic of the defence. It had been said, that a great
latitude of construction had been left to Sir John
Murray, in order that his discretion might remain
unfettered, and his judgment dependent on events
and circumstances. This was described as what in
law would be called a condition precedent. 1.711,
doubtedly, Lord Wellington never had supposed that
Sir John Murray possessed any dominion over the
elements—that he was endowed with any superna-
tural attributes, or that he could achieve impossibili-
ties. Had the elements, however, interfered to pre-
vent him from embarking his cannon I Was it so
imperiously oecessarr to leave his' guns behind him
on account of the near approach of the enemy, and
yet to send his cavalry forward to the Col de Bala.
goer, on the very road on which that enemy was ad-
vancing, to be exposed, as cavalry must always be,
when contending without support against a column
of infantry ? Sir John Murray had represented the in-
struction to proceed to Valencia as only a kind of anti.
cipation of what was probable by Lord Wellington.—
This construction he differed from altogether,_ and
was satisfied that a simple =fertilee to the letter of
his Lordship would justify his interpretation. Here
the Judge Advocate remarked on Sir J. Murray's
observation, that the seeontf charge would never have
been framed but for Admiral Hallowell's letter.
This statement was she incorrect, the charge bairn*
been framed without any reference whatever to the
complaint or opinion of that Aar on the subject of
'the embarkation. Sir John Murray seemed to have
forgotten that his letters expressly stated the object of
embarking the whole of the Infantry to be to cut off
a *vision of Sachet's army at Vandillos. That at-
tempt appeared to him to Isnanest idle and hopeless.
He must contend that Air J. Murray had acted con-
-wary to the instructions of thi Duke ark Wellington, ;
to embark and return to Valency, and immediately
join the right of the Spanieh army there, in case of
failure on Tarragona. He submitted to thetCourt
that the word immediately must apply to Pepe, and
not togsis place in the Spanish line, as Sir John Mur-
ray had construed it. In that sense,' the word-would
have been quite superfluous and void acne:ming.' Sit
John appeared to rely in his defame, oft the word
" express written orders" being -lneroduced in the
charge. If the Court were, however" of *Qin that
the word " express" could not be proved to be the
proper deseription 'of those orders, they might find
him guilty on part lithe -Charge- If even no waits
had been disobeyed, they would have another part of
the charge to consider, and thatwas 44 neglect ofduty."
Sir John-kfurray's successes in Catalonia and Valencia
were certainly not of that description that could have
warranted him in ng from the meaning of the
Duke Wellington's instruction,. it essululy did