Star.
London, England, 1815-04-29 00:00:00

• . .
>i-as mere whAt was neeinarily adequate to a
defence of a common interest in a common war. The
potion;i not proceed on any impracticable or wild
noti and if they stood fairly by each other, .this
cannery.would have no cause to complains They
were united to support the arrangements which had
ber')
grimed by the Treaty.of Peace, of. which Bo-
navete's abdication was a part. The. Hots. Mem-
bees object seemed to be to find fault withislinisters.
.....171e conjured the House to,-consider what might be
ex effects of an Address such as had been proposed.
Those who had concluded the Peace, must be quite
at sincerely disposed to preserve it as the Honourable
plumber. By passing such an Address, France could
(tar be deluded into the notion of an impression on
people of England different from that of the Cnn-
ti„ene With respect to the pecuniary support cot our
istees, a distinct proposition, at no very distant day,
uld be submitted on that subject, which would not.
be toned such as to give an undue facility to war
through our means. He trusted he should soon satisfy
the House, that the proposition was studiously calcu-
lated mgt to produce those effects which :some might
apprehend. Great Britain would net give assistance
to favour the motives of .war, but would act so as to
late the subject to the proper feeling of the danger
and necessity, by the other Nations of the Continent.
Lord A LTHORPE observed, that as to the in-
tercepted instructions 'Waded to by the Noble Lord,.
,t was impossible for the side of the Huse to argot,
rn it, as they could not be sure of its authe.nticity.—
iie doubted the policy or practicability of dethroning
Bohapare ; but felt confident that the personal cha-
racter ot that individual was not more danger• us to
the tranquillity of Europe than the military spirit
-.owprcvalent in France, and it certainly Wits a bad
way of putting down that spirit, by compelling the
nation to war. No one lamented more than he did
the return of Bonaparte to power—and no one would,
it necessary, oppose hitn with more vigours But at
present he did not think a war advisable, and he would
therefore vote for the Address.
Mr. PONSONBY rose and said, that he was one
of those who, on a former night, voted for the Ad-
dress, and had therefoie reason to complain of the
Noble Lord's conduct on that night, when having
the Treaty of Vienna two days in his paiession, et-
gaging this country to support our Allies in a war,
he yet told the House that an 'alternative still re-
mained, and tl-at the question was still open. Thi;
was not a fair P aiiamentary proceeding, and skewed
a desire of deceiving not justifiable even, io private
life. The Noble Lord had said; the war would not
be undertaken fbr the purpose _Of displacing Bona-
pan,es or restoring the Bourbons ;what could be the
motive of such conduct, except in the eipectation of
a division, lor the purpose of swilling hii majotities ?
This night, at least, the Noblekord was sufficiently
explicit, for the object of the war was acknowledged
to be the dethronement of Bonaparte. It has been
said, that the character of Bonaparte is such, as to
pr elide the possibility of-having, confidence in him.
Tie was aware of that would asks- may not cir-
cumstances be sufficiently powerftil to inside.. to
place a confidence sufficient "for our *pose ?- Such
circuustances now eti;t. "Me Noble Lord had said,
that unless proposals of peace were milk at Chatillon
to 11:-)napsrtu the Allie-. never would have taken
?atis. This was The Nam • Lord's statement ; and,
if it were comet, there mutt be a very great portion
of the population of France straitly inclined &peace.
Situated as 11 mapatte was, the niece military could
not enable him to maintain his power against thel
force about to be opposed to him. In this situation,
I.e /twit necessarily .appeal to the people—and nothing
could render that appeal mote effective than the
treans which were now made use of to crush him.—
The Noble Lord seemed-to think it impossible that
either the conduct or character of Bonaparte could be
changed. He (Mr. Ponsonby) was inclined to think,
that the characters of men were not very apt to
change, particularly when they had arrived at Bona-
parte's period of life. But the same remark could
:,ot be nppli..:d to their conduct. That was the crew.
tore of circumstances, and must change according to
their influence: But it would be asked, has Bona-
parte given any pioof that circumstances have at All
operated to alter his course of prdteedings ? What
was his conduct, in giving liberty -to the Duke of
Angouleme—id rescuing him from captivity ? Was
not this a proof that his conduct was changed
(Lord Castlereagh, °MIS Me table, " No.") No I. (re.
iterated Mr. Ponsonby) did he ever act on such ar
principle before ? In ne former instance was he
known to proceed in this manners surely ke did not
so demean himself towards the Duke D'Enghien, or
to any other person, who had opposed his interest, and
whom he had got within his power. This, he con-
ceived, was a proof that they ought to consider Bo-
naparte as a man, whose conduct, like that of other
Then, was altered by circumstances. But, was Bona-
parte the only man in the world on whom the lessons
ofsexperience were lost ? Hew did be formerly lose
that power which fie had stow regained ?":He lost it
by the immeasurable extravagance, by the blind insa-
nity of his ambition. Because, if it were not that the
intoxication of success—the vanity of hewing arrived
at a height of power, widish, in his 'early years, he
never co;ild have hoped to obtain—led him to make,
the Russian campaign—to advance to the walls of
14 qscew—no reasnnable hope of his overthrow could
171 ye been entertained. Then, if he lost everything
1,
iydulging in a wild and lawless ambition, were
ttity rot now to suppose, since he had again ascended
the throne, that he would endeavour to preserve his
authority, by pursuing a contrary course ? There
'fluid be no good reason for thinking, that he was not
fond of power, of net to be anxious to rant those
',ems which seemed best calculated for securing it I
Cot there was another circumstance, to which he
'emits of necessity, bend—to which he was compelled
'0 rend—that was the power of nature herself. Bo-
tiparte was not now at a petiod of life, when tune
'n°l4o remained to him to realise those wild. and,
mid sch.mcs of conquest icith"which he set.out. lie
vas levy fusty-five or forty-sin years el age—ea period
lifr—theogh one hi itself that had nut perhaps
finch impaired his actual rawers at this moment, yet
most inevitably, in the course of a few tears, render
imPoSsible for him to make those exertions which
me had heretofore done. Therefore, if he were not
hr more insane than he was ever before supposed
n
hes he must limit his ambition and his views of ee-
l" power, to that bisundary which natdre herself
imPineds He ( Mr. Ponsonby) would not rely on
Faith,
moderation, or rnannatsimity of

Bonaparte -..snd the Noble Lord coOld nit Ergs,
him with ever having spoken in favour of that state;
Of thingsswhich it was the object, of Bonaparte's am-
bition to produce. But suppose none of the circum-
stances which affected ordinary men had any weight
with him—suppose he was determined to follow the
line of conduct which the Noble Lord had described—
then it appeared to him (Mr. Pensonby) that the
most effectual means to enable him to carry his- pro.
jects into effect, would be afforded by adopting the
course pursued by the Noble Lord. (Hear, lesar,,)—
Did the Noble Lord mean to say, that Bonaparte had
no support 'but that of the military ?. Was not a great
portion of the people of France devoted to him ? The
Noble Lord observed, that he was kept in check by a
large party in France, who were desiroui of peace,
and who wished to see a better state of things est--
Wished in that country. He asserts (and it was the
most extraordinary assertion ever made), that Napo-
leon at present complied with the views of that party,
in order to extract from France such an army as was
necessary to carry on his projects. The Noble Lord
said this, after telling the House that all Bonaparte's
hopes depended on the present malt-try force. After
ibar declaration, he informed them, that Bonaparte
was obliged to throw himself into the arms ot those
lovers of peace and constitutional liberty, in order
that they might enable him to get a sufficient army
about him. Let him, if he can, reconcile this con.
Aradiction. The Noble Lord next stated, that our
Allies considered their safety to consist rather in a
state of war with France, under existing circum-
stances, than of peace. He was one of those who
conceived that this country ought to bind up its in-
terests, as much as possible, 'with those of the great
Continental Powers; and this feeling would in-
duce him to go very far with them, if the course they
were now about to adopt, was not one which, in, his
soul and conscience, he thought most likely io defeat
'the object (that ot giving permanent tranquillity to
Europe) which they had now in view. The Noble
Lord said, " If the French people support Bonaparte
the war must be waged against them ; hostilities must
be carried into France." But perhaps the war would
not be carried into France—( Hear, hear.) Was it so
very clear that the Allied army could penetrate into
France? He conceived that their progress in that
quarter was extremely doubtful. But suppose the
experiment was made, and that it filed—what would
then be the situation of Europe?— (Cties of Hear, hear.)
He had heard persons, in private conversation, ob-
serve, that peace could be made after the experiment
was tried. But let no man flatter himself with
such a hope—let no man think, that a short ex-
periment could be made on this subject. If the
effort failed, let no man suppose that Europe would
return to the same state in which it was before the
exertion was made. Then, indeed, the power of
France • would be most formidable—then, indeed,
surrounding nations would have just cause to dread
it. For. if the Allied Powers avowedly made war
against France, to compel them to abandon the exist-
ing Government, what mould prevent them, in the
event of a failure, from retaliating ? What would
prevent them from visiting, on other nations, as far
as their means would permit, the same system that
bad been acted on towards them ? The picture of
Europe, under such circumstances as these, would be
the most melancholy shot could -Rai* he imagined.
The Noble Lord had stated one thing, for the pur.
pose of consoling them, which he could not pass over
in silence. He stated, that the assistance which this
epuntry would be called on to give to the Allied
Powers, was of such a nature as would prove, that no
att.tmpt had been made to goad them into the con-
test-=which they had agreed to undertake, with their
oven free will,as the best way of securing their interests.
He was very glad to hear this—but let the House
mark the possible consequences. Those Powers were
to make their utmost efforts. Now, undoubtedly, to
a certain degree, they were sustained and put in
motion by the application of the resources of
this coontry ; and, it their efforts failed in the
first instance, how would those powers be able to
continue the contest afterwards ? They would, in
that event, be utterly incompetent to maiutain
their armies on foot, without great- financial exer-
tions on the part of this country. The Noble Lord
stated, that this was not an effort to replace the
House of Bourbbn on the throne of France. No man
regretted more than be did the change that had
taken place in the situation of that family—no man
would be more happy to see them at the head-of the
French Government. Ile said this, not from any
motive of personal affection, for he was not acquainted
with any of them—but because he thought all Eu-
rope had an interest in their remaining. ThitTreaty,
did however, contrary to the statement of the Noble
Lord, bind the contracting parties, in effect, to place
the House of Bourbon on the throne of France.
(Hear, hear.)—To destroy the power of Bonaparte,
and to restore the Bourbons, was declared to be a
most desirable and eligible object—one to which all
*the efforts of the Allies were to be directed.—although
it was said that it would sot be made the sine qua
non of peace with' France. No—but the French
nation mould come to this conclusion..." If we are
obliged to abandon the power of Bonaparte, we
shall be compelled to accept the House of
Bourbon in his piste." Whatever the Noble Lord
might say • On • this point, there was not a man in
France who would not consider the placing of the
Bourbons on the French throne, as the inevitable
consequence of banishing Bonaparte from it. Now,
was it prudent to undertake a war in Etarope, forthat
which the people of France must consider a double
cause—to place the Government under the Bourbons,
and to withdraw it from Bonaparte ? He was by no
means a •triend to the character of' Napoleon. "His
talenrs and fits abilities, every man must admit, were
of a very extraordinary, of a very formidable descrip-
tion. Certainly he never had displayed those moral
qualities, without which no man could be considered
truly great—or could conciliate the esteem of man-
kind. But was he the only individual that ever vio-
I4ted treaties? Was he the only person who had ever
broken public promises ? By the stipulations of the
Treaty now before the House, this country was bound
to maintain all that the Congress had done, and all
that they might hereafter do, with respect to Europe,
(Near, hear). —This was the contract, this was the ex-1
pm stipulation of the Treaty. We must maintain
the cession of Genoa(Hear, hear),—we must main.
tan) the alterations made in Germany—we must
maintain the new division of Italy.--t Hear! hear).
We must be ready to support many other novel ar-

. .
rangemmts. of le/siciti sty '
yeti we kat* nothings.
Di the Noble Lord beieve, that there were no per.
sons, in those countries, thus partitioned, who had as
great reason to complain of breach of faith, as those
individuals had who were wronged by Bonaparte ?
But, in point of fact, the Treaty entered Into with
him was first broken. No than could deny it. In
Vie discussion on the Treaty of Fontainbleau, it was
stated by many, it was admitted liy all, it was denied
by none, that Several of its stipulations were not ful-
filled. It was observed, as a matter of praise to the
British Government, and he joined in considering it
a praise-worthy act, that the English Minister re-
monstrated with the Government of France on one
breach of the stipulations. Therefore, let the charac-
ter of Bonaparte be ever so perfidious, he could not
consider that a *legitimate reason for making war
against him. The Noble Lard observed, that the
French people were a party to the contract, entered
into by the Treaty of Paris, and, if they did not per-
form what they had stipulated, they deserved to be
punished. If they loved war, they should have it—
but not as they pleased and when they pleased.
They should not carry hostilities into the neighbour.
ing countries, but war should be brought to their own
doors. This, however, would depend on the success
of the war. But let the House look to the situation
in which they were about to place the country ? They
were undertaking to dictate to the French people
rho; conduct they should pursue—what Government
they should obey. This was clearly what was meant.
For they could. not avoid seeing, that the Declara-
tion, which said they would not interfere with the in-
ternal concerns of France (and he did not mean to
speak it offensively) was mere nonsense. How could
it be contended that no interference was meant, when
war was declared against that person whom the French
people desired to be their Ruler? This was a most
untenable principle on which to found hostilities.
It was one, in opposition to which, if it were exer-
cised against this country, every man who heard him
would sacrifice his fortune and his life. But it would

he said, England is a virtuous nation,- and sacredly
regards every promise—but France is a vicious na-
tion, and does not keep faith with any power, He
knew of no instance, in the history of mankind,
where a war was carried on to make a nation more

moral and less vicicus than it was—and, he was
sure, if a contest were undertaken for that purpose,
it would be unsuccessful. He was not competent
to say, what the power of the Allies was, nor what
force Bonaparte could oppose to them. But if the
people of France were as much attached to him as
they seemed to be, it was infinitely more probable
that the Allies should fail than that they should
succeed. ' The Right Hon. Gentleman then touched
on the advantages which this country might derive,
even from a peace of short duration (for he denied
that it would be useful only to Jsooapirte) and con-
clueed by expressing his concurrence in the Address
of his Hon. Friend.

Mr. W. ELLIOTT opposed the Address. He
was not sufficiently informed on the subject to recom-
mend war—neither was he ready, and he hoped the
House would join with him in the feeling, to recom-
mend a negociation with Bonapute, and a with-
•drawal from that confederacy which the country was
pledged to support. The Right Hon. Gentleman
then divided the questiod into two points—first, our
right to go to war—and, secondly, the expediency of
that measure. To prove that a right existed, under
certain circumstances, to interfere with the Govern-
ment of another country, he referred to the Grand
Alliance, to prevent the Crowns of France and of
Spain being placed on one head—to the 'Triple
Alliance—to the Qiiadruple Alliance—and, finally,
to the Pragmatic Saqction. With respect to the ex-
pediency of war, he argued, with much ability, that
direct hostilities were to be preferred to a feverish and
unsettled peace.
Sir J. NEWPORT contended, that all the dangers
which his Right Honourable Friend apprehended,
would be infinitely aggravated, by that state of war,
to which he appeared to have made up his mind. It
was most clear, that it was intended to place the
Bourbons ei the throne of France. But, when that
object was accomplished, how was it proposed to
secure it Did the Confederated Powers mean to
keep up an army in France fot that purpose The
Right Hon. Baronet argued at great length, to prove
the iMpolicy of plunging this country, with dilapi-
dated resources, into a war with France—and con-
cluding by stating' his Concurrence in the Address,
which did not recommend peace, but proposed nego-
tiation, as far as was consistent with the security and
honour of the country.
Mr. WILBERFORCE declared that he saw so
many difficulties and dangers on each side of the
question, that he never found• himself so much at a
loss to make up his opinion. He felt the full advan.
tage of acting in co-operation with the great mass of
strength to which we were allied, and he felt the
danger of a systeni which would place .a great mili-
tary leader on the throne of Frances At the same
time, the long experience he had bad of the uncer.
tainty of the results of war, made him apprehend
that the prospects which now appeared so promising
might be overcast. After all that had been supposed
toave been achieved by the allied forces, we now
found that all the work was to be dose over again.
He certainly did not place much faith in what was
said about the alteration of Bonaparte's principles.
He believed there was still in his mold a fund of mis-
chief unexhausted, and which was capable if pro-
ducing the greatest calamities. He thought that any
peace with lionaparte would only be a peace in name.
He, nevertheless felt serious apprehensions, when he
considered the uncertainty Hof all wars. As to the
particular question, he supposed that his Honourable
Friend (Mr. Whitbread) would not be anxious to
press it. ‘l.l. had probably brought the motion for-
ward, merely. to give the House an oppectunity of de.
littering their sentiments on the general question of
peace or war.
Mr. TIERNEY said, that if it was a proof of wis.
dom to balance the difficulties on all sides, without
coming to any conclusion, the Hon. Gentleman who
spoke last had given abundant' proof of that wisdom.
It certainly would be of great advantage to any Gen.
&mark who came late into the House, to have heard
the Hon. Gentleman stating all the arguments both
for and against the question. He regretted to say,
that in all the experience he had of the parliamentary
conduct of that Hon. Gentleman, the leaning of his
mind appeared always to incline to the Opposition,but
his vote was afterwards given to the Government, (a

•
leso).Ai to Our right of going to war with Bonaparte, • .
that was a question • that he should not now enter
into; but as to its expediency, he must trouble the
House with a thew 'observations. He must, however,
confess in the grit Place, that the breach of the treaty
of Fontainebleau appeared to him to be by no means
the greatest of his offences. He had been driven
from his throne by bayonets at his throat, and it was
very natural for hi' to wish to get back again. He
was sure the Honourable Gentlemen at the other side
of the House must confess that if they were removed
from power and from office, it would be very natural
for them to wish to get back again. (.//augh.)—lie
was not convinced that France was at present a mili-
tary Government, nor did he know that it was by
the military alone that he had been brought back to
power. He admitted that there might be some danger
in peace, from the character of Bonaparte ; but as he
thought there was equal danger in war, he should
rather try the chances of peace than the chances of war.
—Ti was well known that our Allies were perfectly
exhausted in their finances, and that we were so much
reduced as not to be able to go on long at a war ex-
penditure. 'lf, then, the war should prove unsuccess-
ful, after we had exhausted our resources, he could
not see what was to save the country from absolute
ruin. When the Bourbons were on the throne of
France, the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed a
peace establishment of ndt less than 19 millions.—
Now, it did appear to him worth trying, whether
such a peace might not be made with Bonaparte, as
would not require so large an establishment. France
might, perhaps, be induced to diminish her armies,
and enable other Powers to do the same. He en-
treated the House to consider that this might, per-
Imps, he their very last opportunity of expressing their
opinions on this great question, and of averting the
calamities with which this country was threatened.
Mr.' ROBINSON believed that those who in
France had once been the strongest advocates for
liberty, had afterwards been the basest sycophants
to Bonaparte. He did not attach much value to
the support-they now gave, as he supposed they
would be again ready to change, if circumstances
changed. It had ben asked, wliy we should not now
be content with the peace of Paris This peace
of Paris had only been concluded on the supposi
lion that Bonaparte had for ever abdicated his
pretensioni to the Throne of France. There un-
doubtedly was much uncertainty in the results of
any war ; but if this argument was now relied on,
it might as well be urged on the occasion of
any other war. If this argument was to be Conclu.
sive, the country must never make any efforts at aU.
If we were to have been terrified by the uncertainty.
of the result, we should not have defended Portugal,
supported the =Se of the Spaniards, or assisted in
the successful campaign of last year. It was true that
many coalitions had failed ; but all had not failed,
'ls was proved•ln the last year. The present coali-
tion had at least as much chance of success now as it
bad then. Between forty and fifty fortresses, then
garrisoned by French troops, were now in the posses-
sion of the Allies. This circumstance would give
the Allies a very considerable advantage now, which
then they did not possess. He saw no reason for de-
spairing of success.
• Mr. PHILLIPS deprecated the want of precau-
tion upon our part to prevent the return of Bonaparte
to France, and censured the general policy of Minis- •
ten throughout.—(This stretch was occasionally interrufs.
fed with cries of Question ! Question 1)
Mr. WELLESLEY PULE, at that late hour,
had only one appeal to make to the Hon. Gentleman
opposite ( Mr. Whitbread), and one declaration to
communicate to him, which, he hoped, would give as
much satisfaction to that Hon. Gentleman as to every
man else. In the animadversions on the declaration
of the 15th March, repeated to-night, lie had stated
it as sanctioning the murder and assassination of 80.
naparte; and be had lamented that the name of Wel-
lington should have been disgraced by signing such a
paper. He happened to be with the Duke of Wel-
lington when the report of the Honourable Gentle-
man's speech reached him ; and never was a man so
shocked as he then was; that one of his countrymen,
one who had either 'known, seen, or heard of him,
should have supposed that lie had signed a paper,
bearing such a construction, or suppose that he
could possibly give it such a construction. —(Hear !)
His only understanding was, that Bonaparte had for-
feited all his political rights. At the time it was not
known whether it was Bonaparte's intention to en.
deavour to regain the throne of France—or whether
he had put himself at the head of a banditti to dis-
turb any other country ; and he never thought that
any man, much less a British Senator, could have
suspected that he would have signed a paper with .
such a meaning. They conceived that he hat) for-
feited his political rights, and that he was a rebel and
a traitor ; but they never intended to sanction hire's-
sassination. [This speech was received throughout
with loud cheers.]
Mr. QUIN had yet heard nothing to persuade him
that the people had any share in the return of Bona.
parte ;—he had seen an active army and a passive
people. —Mr. GORDON supported the motion.
Sir FREDERICK FLOOD had never consulted
on this iubject with Ministers, inside or outside of the
House. He was for peace, if peace we could have
on fair and honourable terms ; but a rebel and ad
outlaw could 'support no peace, but in waria;V
lauzli.)—This was a delicate question.—(A )
—Yes, a terrible war was, to be sure, a delicate goes-
ind then, in GOD'S ;Dames let us
gtioonh—an(difiti lav eih—
ad),
with all hearts, into it.—(Laughing).
Mr. COKE (of Norfolk) thought that those who
were abettors of the war with France, on the present
•occasion, were the enemies, and not the friends of
their country.
Mr. WHITBREAD, in reply, said, notwith-
standing the explanation of the Right Honourable
Gentleman (Mr. W.. Pole), he confessed that he was
still of opinion that it would have been Lot more to
the credit of the Duke of Wellington net to have
signed the Declaration. in question, even with the in.
terpretation which had been given to Ina Friend, and
by him communicated to the House. The character
of the Duke of Wellington was part of the property
of this country I Who was not proud of the name
And no person had ewer shewn himself more willing
to pay the tribute of applause which was due to
his great actions than Himself; and when he had
so expressed himself he hardly thought that his
sincerity could be called in question —(Near, hear.)
—Dut was it because the Duke of Wellington had