Star.
London, England, 1809-01-03 00:00:00


I

-hristilfues,' thawsaat the French,cctild dotatimilif
Bit
' as die ..Eiregiiiievinoolved, and in fact' est*.
klished the whole principle Of 'the Convention I cast.
not separate it froM the latter; ,
iir A. Wellesley has siatede. that he considered
his force, at the cprnmincetnetit.of 'the march from
the Mondego River, as sufficient te'arlie the Fritts ch
from their positions on the Tagus. That' force is sub.
sequently joined-by above 4000 British troops, under
Generals Anstruther and Ackland. The French
make an attack with their whole disposable- strengtlt,
and are repulsed with heavy loss, thihigkliut'fa pa:
of the British army is brought into action, rt
ficult to conceive that the prospects which'Sir Arthur
Wellesley entertained could he unfavourably altered 1
by these events, even had not the certainty. of speedy,
reinforcements to the Britisharmy'existed.
It is urged, that had the French been puihed to'.
extremity, they would have crossed the Tagns, and"
have protracted the campaign in such a manner as'to
have frustrated the most important view of the British'.
Generals—namely, sending succours into Spain.
This measure. must have been equally feasible for
the 'French irno victory had been obtained over them,
but I confess that the chance of,such an attempt seems
to me assumed againit probability. Sir Hevi Dal;
rymple notices what he • calls the critical and em-
barrassed state of Junot," before that General has
been pressed by the British army,. and, in explanal.;
tion of that expression, observes, that the, surreodv,
of Dupont, the existence of the' vlctoriotis .Ipan)iti4
army in Andalusia, which cut off retreat of this
French-in that:direction, and the universal hostility.
of the Portuguese, made the situation of Junot one 010
great distress. No temptation for the translation,or
thEswit irito-Alentejo presents itself fronvhis picture, -
nor does any other representation give ground to sup-'
pose that Junot could have contemplated the measure
as holding forth any prospect brit ultimate ruin, after'
mutt} preliminary distress and disgrace. The strongest
of all proofs as to. Junot's opinion, arises.from his
sending the very morning after the battle of Vimiera,
to propose the evacuation ofPitirtue • a#tep
sufficiently indicated that ,satisfied he could not
only make no effectual defence, but could -not even
prolong the contest to take thechance-ofaccidtnts. He
seems, indeed,' to have been without any real resource.
It appears in evidence,-thif of the troops left by.
him in 'Lisbon -and' the forts; a considerable propos'
tion were of very doubtful quality. Those Troops on'
whose fidelity he could confide, had been dismayed
by at signal defeat, and they were sensible that they,
had no succour to look to from abroad. To the,
British Generals it was known, when the Armistice
was granted, that 10,000 men under SirJ. Moore,
as well as the 3d and 42d regiments of foot, with the
18th dragoons, might be immediately reckoned upon ;
and although much advantage had not been drawn !,
from the Portuguese troops, their support and the
general violence of the country against the French,'
cannot be laid out of this calculation.
The disparity of force and of circumstances was,
then, such as could . leave no doubt that the. issue: •
must be favourable to us. Ido not omit' advertence,
to the difficulties urged as possible 'to occur in fur.,
nishing. the British army with bread. But, put•
ting aside the obvious solution, that suck a tom'
porary privation is not ruinous to an army where
tattle ,can be procured in the country,. this
fiaulty cannot be well pleaded, if admission is to.
be given to the speculation, that the heivy cannont
necessary for battering forts St. Julien and Cascaes
were to be got ashore in the Bays of the Rock of Lis:
bbn.—The question then comes to this,: whether thi.
Convention did (as has been asserted) soecure all t
objects which were proposed, in the Eli&ditien ? I
it. did not, it was not what his Majesif Was entitle
to expect from the relative situation of the two aiMies:
I humbly conceive it to have been erroneous to re-
gard the emancipation of Portugal from the Frenchl
as the sole or the principal object of theexpeditiori.l •
Upon whatever territory we contend with the French,
it must be a prominent object in the struggle to de.'
stroy their resources, and to narrow their' means Oft
injuring us, or those whose cause we are supporting.
This seems to have been so little considered in the •
Convention, that the trims appear to have extricated
Junot's army from a situation of infinite distress, •
which it was wholly out of play, and-to hairebrenght
it in a state of entire equipment, into immediate 'cur:
rency, in a quarter too, where it must interfere with
our most urgent and interesting concerns.
Had it Been impracticable to reduce the French
army to lay down its arms unconditionally, still an ob.:
ligation not to serve for a specified time mighth avebeen
insisted upon, or Belleisle might have been presciitied
as the place at which they should be landed, in order
to prevent the possility of their reinforcing (at least
for a long time) the armies employed for the subjuga-
tion of Spain. Perhaps a stronger consideration than
the merit of those terms presents itself. Opinion re-
lative to the British arms was of the higheSt impor-
etance, as it might influence the confidence of the-.
Spaniards, or invite the nations groaning under the
yoke of France, to appeal to this country, and co-ope.;
rate with it for their deliverance. The adiantagei •
ought, therefore, to have been morethan gteat,, •
which should be deemed sufficient to balance the ob:
jection of granting to a very inferior army, hopeless
in circumstances, and broken in spirit, such terms
as might argue, that, notwithstanding its disparity . -
in numbers, it was still formidable to its-victors.'
—No advantages seem• to have been' gained' that'
would not have equally followed from forcing the
enemy to a more marked submission. The gain of
time as to sending succours into Spain cannot be act•
witted as a plea; because it appears that no arrange.
ments for the reception of our troops In Spain hid-
been undertaken-previous to the Convention.; and thill
is without reasoning on subsequent facts.-
- The Convention in Egypt, which has been advanced
as a parallel case, appears to rue inapplicable. No ob-
ject beyond the dislodgment of the Freneli from Egypt,;
was there in question. In the present instance, the
operation of the Convention upon the affairs of Spaittl '
was a considei ation of primary interest';' and in that's • -
view, the inevitable effect of rune of the aeticlea •
fers itself to my mind as liable to material objection,
I trust that these reasoni will vindicate me' froth':
the charge elptesumption, in maintaining nn opinion'
contrary to that professed by to-m-any most respecta--
i hie Officers ; kw; even if the reasons be essentially
erroneous, it they are conclusive to my mind (as Im!:!st
conscientiously f,tirm them to.be),
.. it is a, necei serf •
enrislq'
o 4 uenee:7. .
-thioat9ol-
,nicst-disayprouveolie ,
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