Star.
London, England, 1806-10-18 00:00:00

M. D'OUBRIL.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OP M. D'OUBRIL,
OM THE
OF JULY.•ND THE ItIFUS•L OF THC lIMPERoI
OF RUSSIA. TO RATIFY IT.
It was expeeed that Bonaparte would become
fu-
sinus as foon as the refufal of the Emperor of Rullia
to ratify the Treaty concluded by M. D'Oubril was
Imam
The organs of his paffions, thofe naves of Jour-
habil', ought to have prepared thiir calumnies and
their infults at the moment that the fignature of this
Treaty had been obtained from the weaknefs or the
pet fidy of this fubaltern negnciator ; for Bonaparte
man have been Cure that M. D'Onbril was exceeding
his powers, and betraying the confidence of his au-
gur' Mafler. He mull have forefeet], and, in fat,
he has fence experienced, that the Treaty could not
be ratified. It was at this moment that thofe wretch-
ed perfons, condemned to defile their pen by under-
taking his defence, and their perfons by receiving his
protalion, ought to have drawn up thofe abafive
and abfurd calumnies with which he chutes to
amok his Grooms of the Chamber, and fatigue his
Slaves.
Bat it is now reguifite for us to eflablifh the fails,
and to dare him and his accomplices to deny a Jingle
affertion, or to attack one of our rearms : for if he
Mould venture to contradie our fats, we (hall reply
by fupporting them with hells evidence : if he difcufs
our arguments, we will putties him by unveiling the
abfurdity of his fophifms, and difplaymg the turpi-
tude of his calumnies.
Let us, in the firfi place, meet an ob,jeflion which
naturally prefents itfelf to the mind. 'I he incredible
condo& of M. D'Oubril—the crime of having ex-
ceeded the ;nitrations of his Mailer—the fingular
fituation in which he bad placed himfelf, of being
obliged to coofefs himfelf either a traitor or •a cow-
ard, and of being accufed perhaps of hath—thefe
colleted circuraliances caufe it to be afked, with a
pardonable degree of aftoninsment, " how the Rol.
flan Government could recommend fuch a man to
the confidence of the Emperor 1"
We prefume that we (hall have anfwercd all ob.
dillipated all doubts, rind annihilated the im-
pollures of Bonaparte, if we prove—
r ft, That the choice of M. D'Oubril viz., in the adtual circum.
fiances, fuch an one as appeared, and which with tufon appear.
ed, the beg that could be made.
s, That M. D'Oubril had never any other pcwcrs than thole
granted for ages to every Negotiator.
3d, That thofc formal powers were Rill Gal,,ft to his inflruc-
dons.
4th, That be has neither followed his it:Moe:lions nor Marled
bit powers.
stb, That be declared to M.Talle. rand and lord Yarinnntbs
and that he wrote at the (+rue time to Erg!and and h.. I..terf•
burgh, that he bad co power to fi,n what Bonaparte r:quired
at him.
6th, That Bonaparte bad, Th. re o.crtara
great Summit in cousin-Bing the boat are ,of M. L) Jubrel.
yds, That he did obtain this Ilsnatu: e from the coward., e cf the
negociator, knowicg. at :he fame time, the aldolute ineffac.:ncy of
k for It. apparent otWeel, a treaty.
Etb, That ht abfolutely made the very tuft of It fur which it was
d.nuaded.
gth, That if be has talk d la the refults that he yrarnif,d him.
klf from it, it was not his fault, but the happy tacit of the firm.
web of England.
There are the fa.% that we are to enahlin.. Let
Bonaparte anfwer us, and be 'ball he fatitf,cd with
the degree of evidence that we promile to bring to
this d.feuffi.in.
It was in enntemplation, at the time of fending M.
D'Oubril to Patio, to charge a Sub M. •ler with
minion, that he might hear, report, and conclude
nothing t that the tenor of the inflruaions, which
limited his powers, might be more arid and (every,
and that en inch a dubious oesociatior a eharatler
mote impofing than it delimit might not be givea.

4 Tt would, indeed, have been dangerous for it to se.'
quire an importance in the public opinion from the
re
rank of the perfon charged with it, as it might have
weakened on the Continent that energy and vigilance
which are fo neceffary. It was efTential, however,
that the perfon, charged with this ncgociation, fhould
be well acquainted with the Renal !late of political
affairs ; that he fhould have a clue to all the negoci-
ations, and underfland the inure°s of alTthe Allies.
M. D'Oubril, then. having been principally employ-
ed in the Chancery of the Prince Czartorinfki, mull
neceffarily unite all this knowledge, fince it formed
the very elements of his employment. Talents were
neceffary, and it was known he poffeffed them. Prin-
ciples were neceffary, and he was thought to be in-
fluenced by the bell. It was proper that the New,
ciator fhould have the confidence of the Allies, and
not be odious to the French. M. D'Oubril nuked
in this perfon chore qualities which were neceffary for
the Negociator. What was expelled from him, be
appeared to promile by lit Joe condo& and that it the only
meant by which men have to form their judgment of the fa-
tore. The Prince Czartnrinfki, then, in prefenticig
M. D'Oubril to the confidence of his Mallet, did
what was his duty. and the confidence with which he
honoured him was founded on, and influenced by
circumflances. Neverthelefa it remained for the
Prince Minifler, after having made this choice, to
guard againll the sveaknefa or diflbyalty of the Neg.).
ciator, as if he had fufpelled him, and to conciliate
thefe wife and political precautions, (whatever con-
fidence a Negociator may deferve) with the will of
the Emperor. which ought to be the fupreme law.
On the one hand, the Emperor of Ruflia mull de-
fire peace, becaufe he is jull, and the Father of his
people ; peace being the only objelt of a wife Go-
vernment ; becaufe Kings only reign for the purpofe
of enablifhing and maintaining peace ; and becaufe
it is the !lability of peace alone which they look for
in the necemsy and continuation of war.

But the Emperor is too well known to Europe and
the world, for any honeft man, even in France, to
believe that he would give the name of peace to a
treaty incompatible with his dignity ; for his dignity
is the fafety of the State, and the undeniable pledge
of the confidence of nations.

But there can be no affociation of his dignity with
any treaty of peace that does not folfil the engage.
ments which he had contraaed with his Allies ; which
does not eaablifh in Europe !itch a political lunation
as would fecure the balance of power, In needier' to
its exillence ; becaofe the exiflence of Europe is eon-
neited with the fecurity of his dominions. Betides,
if every war has for its objea the fecurity of the State
that is forced to undertake it, the Sovereign can only
terminate it when he has acquired that fecurity for
which he trent to war. Such were the intentions of
the Emperor.
The Minifier conformed himfelf to them, by giv.
ing to M. D'Oubril powers, fuch as for many ages
hive been given to every negotiator; but, at the
fame time, regulating the oft that he was to make of
thofe powers, by infiruaions that were to fix the ex-
tent of them, and to circumfcribe them within the
neceffary limits. The initiations of M. D'Oubril
were, to Wien to propofitions, to prepare for thole
the Emperor of Rutlia might chute to make, and to
await the orders of his Court.

In addition to thefe, his Mt inftrultions and
powers were flill farther reflrained, after M. D'Ou-
bril had arrived in Paris.

During the refidence of M. D'Oubril at Vienna,
the Prince of Crartorinfki, aware of the projeCts of
Bonaparte agalnfiGermany,had the prudence to fend
to Vienna new orders, to refrain fill more ftrifly
the powers he bad received, and to regulate the ufe
of them.

In thefe new inftrnetiens, he was enjoined to con.
fine himfelf in the negociation to the preparing a
treaty on the bafis which had been approved by the
Emperor, his mailer ; but was exprefsly forbidden
to conclude any thing without frefh orders. Thefe
new inftruetions placed M. D'Oubril in that ihbordi-
nate rank which the Emperor wilted him to poffefs
through the whole of this negociation. Whatever,
therefore, might have been his firft inftrultions, thofe
given at Vienna were the foundation of his powers,
and the rule for his conduit. Thefe were the cir-
cumflances older which he arrived at Paris.

One might flop here, now that this infamous treaty
is known, and fay, Here is what M. D'Oubril ought
to have done ; this• is what be has done ; let the
whole world judge of him.
One might ant, what Prince has ever ratified Inch
a treaty ? and if it depends on the treafon or cowar-
dice of a MinUler, to defirny the dignity of his Maf
ter and the fccurity of his dominions, and to make
him violate his engagements ? Has it ever been faid
that a Negotiator can difpofe of the Throne of hib
King ? For he who can difpofe of the honour of
Kings, may alto difpofe of their States, and even of
their exillence.

But, although what we have fail will donhilefs be
fufficient fully to expofe the abfurd declamations of
Bonaparte, as tranfcribed by his jgurnalifts, we have,
howe vcr, not yet compleated the circle which we have
here traced for ourselves.

We atm that Bonaparte, in fnatehing from the
weaktiefs of M. D'Oubril this degrading fignature.
knew the invalidity of the meafure which difgriced
him i and that he had a different objea in extorting
from him the figning of a treaty which he knew could
not be ratified.

He knew that it could not be ratified, becaufe he
knew that M. D'Oubril was fenfible he mull, at the
fight of what he was commanded to do in NSW, fee,
that he was acting contrary to his inlinflions. He
declared it to the French Negotiators ; he declared
it to Lord Yarmouth : he wrote this account to Eng,
land, and he alerted it at St. Peterlburgh. He
has declared that, in thus ailing contrary to his
initrations, he had been furrounded, circumvented,
wearied, and provoked: that many threats were tli.
feted; that a harib and infulting tone was uled to-
wards him : that the Negotiators were affembled at
two o'clock in the morning ; that the conference had
'ailed for fisteen hours ; that he was alone againa
number, who relieved one another ; that he had be-
come feveritb ; that his head was bewildered t—and
that it was under thefe circumilances he figneti."—
Certainly it might be alkyd how it was pollible that
a Misiller of Alexanderjbooldly intimidated say fewer
sid believe, ? One naturally ails, what menace toffy

frighten a fubjet of Alexander the Firlt ? M. D'Ou-
bril Ihould Rawer thole quenions.

He alone has proved the poiTibility of a feet incre-
dible in itfelf. He has realized what no Ruffian
before him conceived poffible. It is his bonnets to
explain the mires of this phenomenon. It is fufficient
for us, that the faa is confirmed by bis own (tate-
ment at Paris, to Lnrd Yarmouth. in his letters to
England, and his avowals at St. Peterfbutgli.
Can it then be believed, that Bonaparte relied on
the ratification of fuch t treaty, extorted from the
wealtnefs of the negotiator by Arch ftrange means.
Let people read this treaty, and it will be imme-
diately teen whether Bonaparte could expel it to be
ratified ! But it-will be Paid then, what motive could
have made him feel fo interefted to obtain it ?

His motive was lo terrify England by the defcrtiln
of fuch an ally : to incpire England with fufpie.ons
of Rußia ; to increafe his a'ts of violence againft
Germany, and to extinguifh all reliflat -e, upon the
appearance of the Emperor of Raffia having abfo-
lutely abandoned Germany, Italy, and all his allies;
to fnatch from England a lhameful treaty ; to mul-
tiply without ceafing her hofiilities on the Continent,
and to accufe Roma of re-kindling the war. This
was his projed ; this was the reafon he witted firfl to
perfuade Paris, and then Europe, that he was lure
of the treaty being ratified. He himfelf ratified it
fix hours after he had extorted the fignature from
M. D'Onbril. He caufed it to be publifhed three
hours after he had ratified it. He went farther—he
wifhed to appear to proceed immediately to its exe-
, cation, as if he had received the ratification of the
Emperor of Ras. For this motive alone, be pub-
lifhed the order to the French marine to treat the Ruf-
fian !hips as friends ; an order which was illufory, and
of no value the prefent Rate of the French navy.
But on the other hand, he counted In little on the ra-
tification of the treaty, that in publilhing this order,
to convince the public that it could not be refnfed, he
fufpended the exchange of prifoness, becaule that
fuch a Rep had fome real value.

England is the firiL power which made him feel
that his plan had failed. He could neither terrify
her, nor impofe upon her—and in her refersl to ac•
cept a difbonourable peace, we pleale end-elves with
the thought that fhe has rendered to the Emperor
Alexander the homage due to his virtues—and that
the never doubted his fidelity.
We know that all Rurna will be afionned at the
coeferlion of M. D'Oubril, that he has been me-
naced, and that he yielded to menaces. The pi:A-
bility of loch a phenomenon will not be believed—
bet one mull believe real rafts, although their exit•
tcnce might have appeared incredible.

There are, however, other fans which M. D'Oubril
has not difclofed. He has not told us, that Bona
parte, according to his What pm/lice, held out temp-
tations to him as well as threats, and had pointed out
to him the fituation of Ruffian Ambaffador at Paris,
as a reward for his docility and a confequence of the
treaty ; that he had made him hope that France her-
felf would alit this thuation for him from Ruffia, as
the bell means of confolidating peace, and of obtaining
from it all that could be defied.

To this temptation, which onr information Rates
was employed, we muff add the following retleFlions :
M. D'Oubril, on quitting the Prince Czartorinfki,
could not be ignorant, and was not ignorar., that
the Prince was determined to obtain from the juffice
of the Emperor leave to reign his lineation ; he knew
all the mt.tives of that Prince retiring from office.—
There motives were, that the political fyltem followed
by the Prince op to that time, did not appear to have
obtained the approbation which he wiffied, and that
it was propofed to adopt meafures of lefs energy than
filch as he conceived to be abfolutely neceffary. This
M. D'Oubril well knew. He thought, then, that a
new Miniftry would adopt different views, and that
he might hazard a Rep which would be favourably
received by them, as it would be potable to throw
whateverodium attended loch a treaty on that Miniffer
who had been his benefaffor, and who had honoured
him with his confidence.
Thefe are the motives which we are allowed to be.
lieve were as powerful as the menaces of Bonaparte.
—ln this cafe what a rnifetable calculation has M.
D'Oubril made I

Miniflers may be changed in Ruffia, but the Em-
peror is not changed ; and the choice that he made
of a fucceffor to Prince Czartorinfki did not announce
to M. D'Oubril, that any motive could fecure the
approbation of M. de Lindberg to a Treaty which
would pollute the honour of his Mailer and of his
country.

Does not he know the force of public opinion in
Ruilia ? A firanger may be allowed to be ignorant
of this circumilance ; but can a Ruffian deceive him.
fell in this point? A Ruffian knows that there does
etia fuck a thing as public opinion in Rullia f be
knows that the Emperor, who has every thing to
expee, and nothing to fear from it, has endeavoured
to create, dire t, and fupport it; and that in circum.
Rance& of fuch importance, the Emperor (however
great his power) knows how to Wien to it, and avail
Woe& of it.

Let us conclude then, at prefent, that Prince Czar-
torin&i, in prefenting M. D'Oubril to the confidence
of the Emperor, made a proper choice; that he gave
him the cnkimary powers, and that he limited the
extent of them by fucceifive orders at St. Psteriburgh
and Vienna.

That M. D'Oubril, after his arrival at Paris, de-
clared, that what was demanded from him was be.
Lond the limits of his power; that he declared fo to
rd Yarmouth ; that he wrote the fame to London
and coafeffed it at Bt. Petedburgh ; that Bonaparte,
well stinted that atreaty figned by M. D'Oubril would
be null, yet wishing to extort that fignature ; and that
M. D'Oubril himfelf confeffes that it was extorted by
menaces, and by overwhelming him with labour and
fatigue.
That the ufe which Bonaparte.willed to make of
this treaty, which he knew could.sot be ratified, was
to obtain a peace that fhnuld be dishonourable to
England, and to enflave Germany. Let us then
agree that, thanks to H , the flume of this in-
famous treaty remains exclufively bib own, without
having derived from it any of the advantages whisk
he espoSed.