Star.
London, England, 1815-01-28 00:00:00

THE DEFENCE.

However oppressive, he said, the situation of an
officer called on after a long career of service, to an-
swer accusations as painful to his feelings, as inju-
rious to his military reputation, he congratulated him-
self most sincerely that he was at length permitted to
appear before the Court. Amidst the clamour from
popular disappointment, and every species of misre-
presentation and abuse invented by private animosity,
:ee originating- in ignorance of fcts, he .knew not
what could have supported him, but the prospect of
at length presenting himself before the Court, and
tls• knowledge that his cause would be heard by a
tribunal of officers, whose experience would enable
them to judge, and whose honourable lives were
guarantee to the world and to himself, that that judg-
ment would be given which a conscientious discharge
of public duty stepuld dictate. It was this, and the
consciousness of having discharged his duty to the
utmost of his ability in the service of his country, that
had supported him against a tide of prejudice, he
had almost said persecution sufficient to overwhelm
the strongest mind, and had enabled him to appear
before them with firmness and confidence. If any
thing could add to the satisfaction with which he
hailed the long wished-for opportunity afforded him
for explaining his conduct, it was the contemplation
of the honourable men by whom he was to be tried,
and the conviction that rank and talent and eve.:
rience had been combined to administer justice, to
speak peace to the feelings of the Bildtls army, and
tarry conviction-to the minds of the British people..
For the selection and formation of this Court; most
devotedly did he offer his humble tribute of gratitude
to his Sovereign. With these feelings, he would not
'dwell on the length of time which bad elapsed since
,a public trial was determined on ; nor would he ad.
vert to the peculiar hardship of delay at a period
when popular clamour gained fresh strength every
hour, from the determination of his Majesty's Mini.
stets to subject his conduct to public inquiry. But
these were hardships that would naturally occur to
the Court, which though unavoidable, could not but
be felt and lamented by the individual who suffered
from them. But was this all that he had to cons.
plain of, it would never give birth to lasting tumuli
ness. Uafortunately, however, it was combined with
other circumstances which bad affected him moat;
deeply, and on which, with their permission, boa
would dwell more at large. He alluded to the crud
manner in which the public clamour bad been raised.
fomented, and increased by misrepresentation*
founded on mis-statements of individuals, whose
high rank and public situation had given weight to
their assertion—had carried premature conviction al
the public mind.
The clamour, Sir, continued General Murray, of
a free people, ardent for honour, and impatient of
disappointment, may be violent, but it is not lasting.,
The British nation more particularly has been accus-
tomed to unite generosity with enthusiasm f and al-
though the first burst• of popular feeling, in cases of
failure of military expeditions, has been always
marked by the tumult of disapprobation, yet has the
spirit of prejudice usually subsided with the ferment
of disappointment, and yielded to the moderated feel-
ings of fair and impartial'inquiryt I appeal toevery
Member of this Honourable Court,. whether this has
been the case in the present instance, and whether the
violence of the attacks upon me has been the mere re-
sult of popular resentment, and the simple conse-
quence of honest though misguided disapprobation I
He intreated them •to recall to their recollection
the succession of abusive paragraphs with which the
Public Prints had teemed, is which exaggerated ac-.

• ••

,

comets of the army under his command had been un-
generously contrasted with mutilated statements of
that of the enemy and his positions, and in which
motives had been assigned for his conduct, with the
sole object of prejudging his cause, and influencing
the worst passions of the British people against him.
This unmanly course- was pursued down to the pe-
riod when the hour of trial was fixed ; and not gads.
tied with attacking his reputation as an officer, his
feelings as a man were wounded by ungenerous ob-
servations upon a departed relative. To these unge-
nerous attacks be never had condescended to give an
answer ; and he noticed them merely to show the
practised by his enemies to give strength to po-
pular disappointment, and prematurely to influence
the decision of the British public. But though he
Win silent towards his anonymous accusers, he could
dint pursue the same course with regard to the con-
ct of his avowed accuser, Admiral Hallowell, be-
eiuse to his letter be owed not only all the illiberal
abuse with which he had been assailed, and his sus-
'pension from military command, but the necessity of
justifying his measures in the fate of a public tribu-
nal. 'He alluded to the public dispatch addressed by
Admiral Hallowell to Sir Edward Pellew (a copy of
which was at the same time forwarded to his Ma-
jesty's Government,) containing a. direct attack on
his military reputation, and not only condemning the
past, but condemning also in advance, every military
measure which he might afterwards plan or execute.
In this dispatch he was found guilty before being
judged, and condemned before being heard, and held
up to his sovereign and country as having degraded
the British army. OE the contents of this letter he
was ignorant till some months after it was written,
when it was too late to counteract hs effects. He
could not have suspected the transmission of such a
letter; for, previous to forwarding his own, of the
same date (the 14th of June), he read it to Admiral
Hallowell, and distinctly asked him if there were any
points in it incorrectly stated, or in which he differed
from him in opinion ? Admiral Hallowell answered,
that the only thing in which he differed with him
WAS, as to the possibilityof bringing off the guns, a
difference which he (General Sir John Murray)
had already distinctly stated. This conversation
passed on board the Malta, on the morning of the
14th of June, when they were alone ; but this would
be an additional reason with Admiral Hallowell for
recalling the circumstance to his recollection. It
would be useless to point out the difference between
the two documents in question—nothing could be
more opposite ; and yet when the ink was scarcely
dry on his (General .Murray's) dispatch, did the
Rear-Admiral declare that he perfectly coincided
with him as to facts, and only differed with him as
to the consequences which ought to have immedi- '
ately followed. In the temper of mind in which the
Admiral then was, be did not look for the frankness
'of former cordiality ; but something should have
whispered to his mind that a more candid line of
conduct might not have prejudiced his cause, for on
the 22d of July, something like the communication
was made by him (General Murray) to the Admi-
ral, to which lie had called as a proof of his candour
in the opening to the third charge. But this was S 7
days after the dispatch was written, when he knew
that long before it must have reached its destination,
and produced its desired effect, and at a moment too
when he was even intimating his regret that Gen. M.
should seem to raise any personal feeling in a point
where public duty was alone concerned. Even this
scanty and verbal communication was the effect of
accident. Very unexpectedly he touched at Vime-
ros, where the Admiral and army then was. on his
passage to Sicily, and after he was actually in the
boat to depart, and when the Admiral saw that he
had no longer the power of writing home, he reques-
ted to speak to him (General Murray) and merely
lold him that he had written to gngland, strongly,
very strongly indeed, respecting the Tarragona Ex-
pedition. Little was he led to conceive .that the Ad-
miral had controverted facts which he had previously
admitted, or been the author of charges of such a
heavy nature against. hint. He was even taught to
believe, that however strongly the Admiral might
bave.written General Murray's share of the censure
would not be great; for the Admiral distinctly told
him, that he was not the person whom he blamed ;
and that the misfortune of the army could no further
be attributed to him, than in listening to the advice
of those who,' by their counsel and information,' had
sought to mislead him. And yet General Murray
ass then almost the only person in that army igno-
sent of the aspersions against its Commander ; for a
publicity was given to the whole proceeding by a na-
val officer having been dispatched with a copy of
this letter to the Duke of Wellington and the Admi-
ralty...a measure unprecedented in the annals of mi-
litary operations. Beery Newspaper of the country
was in possession of it, immediately on its reaching
England ; and it was commented on with all the
asperity which naturally arose from the countenance
of such high authority given to the public disappoint-
ment.

It was not the bunt of honest feeling, or the delu-
sion of popular enthusiasm, of which he complained,
but of the efforts which were used both in conversa-
tion and by correspondence, to keep alive the flame
of public disappointments. He was grateful, bow.
ever, that the day had arrived, which afforded him
an oppOrtunity of justifying his character against the
aspersions by which it had been assailed. He had
said that it was to Rear•Adiniral Hallowell that he
owed all the prejudices which had been excited against
him, and be felt warranted in making this observe..
tion, for as far as his Majesty's Government was con-
cerned, he had it from the Secretary of State himself,
his conduct was unimpeached. Lord Bathurst, how-
ever, thought that be (Sir John Murray) would be
most anxious to have the circumstances adverted to
by Admiral 'Hallowell, minutely examined, and
hence did he encourage the proceedings which bad
taken place. The Judge Advocate, in his statement,
had distinctly confirmed this remark, by the comes

He was aware that, in point of fact, the motives
by which his accuser was actuated, would neither
condemn nor acquit h'ca, yet he would ask whether
the dispatch of Admiral Hallowell was w:itten
coolness and without passion ? • If it betrayed no
symptom of personal animosity—if it bre:abed only
zeal in his country's cavic:, and was only a statement
of facts for the guidance of his Majesty's Government
at home, it was naturally-entitled to every attention ;
but when the very contrary was the case, the Court
would no doubt view it with a jealous eye, and admit
its assertions with caution. is Deeming it," said Ad-
miral Hallowell, 48 of the greatest importance that
Lord Wellington should be made early and certainly
acquainted with these &Nordic prcceedings, I have
sent Captain Carroll, in the Hyacinth, to land at Ali.
'cant, and make his way across the country to li,s
Lordship's head-quarters." Was it to snake his
Lordship early acquainted that he sent a Naval M-
eer, when a courier would no doubt have performed
the task sooner? Wasit to give the Doke of Wei.
lingtoo early and certain intelligence that a copy, of
this dispatch was sent home without passing through
the hands of Sir E. Pellew, who was the Rear-Ad-
miral's commanding officer ? No, it was to make
the whole circumstances more public, and to excite
illiberally and irregularly a strong prejudice against
him (Sir John Murray). He would ask *lto had
constituted Admiral Hallowell a judge of the neces-
sity of apprising the Duke of Wellington of the si.
tuation of the army ? Was he the person that was
to do so, admitting that the necessity existed ? Could
the Admiral take upon himself to say that the Duke
of Wellington had not foreseen the situation in which
the army might be placed, and had not given the re-
quisite orders to meet such an emergency ? The true
motives of his conduct, however, were too evident
to be mistaken, and the Court, as well as the public
at large, would no doubt put upon them the proper
construction. Bat if Admiral Hallowell had not
been actuated by illiberal feelings, why did he attempt
to conceal the whole from the person whose interests
and whose honour was so deeply implicated ?
The dispatch of the Hyacinth, he (air John Mur-
ray) was led to believe, was a sudden determination
on the morning of the 14th ; but he would be enabled
to prove, by incontrovertible evidence, that Admiral
Hallowell's resolution, not only to send this ship to
Alicant, but to send home to the Duke of Welling-
ton a copy of his dispatches to Sir Edward Pellew,
was formed on the evening of the 12th. This he
would prove by the evidence of an officer who was
informed of it by the Admiral himself, in terms such
as would, no doubt, be considered by the Court con-
clutive as to the spirit by which his Prosecutor was
influenced. It might perhaps be urged as an excuse
for Admiral Hallowell, that every angry feeling was
influenced by a little circle he had long assembled
,about him, who looked up to him and his opinions as
the standard rules of military perfection. They had
long-been accustomed to bow to his decisions; and
on this occasion they appeared to have heightened his
raentment by the re-echo of his own mistatements,
which the blindness of their devotion, or their igno-
ranee of passing events, prevented them from being
able to detect.

Admiral Hallowell had repeatedly put in his claim
to an admission of the candour and fairness by which
his proceedings on this occasion had been charac-
terised. Those, however, Who were now acquainted
with the studied concealnient exercised by bim
throughout the transaction, would be best able to
judge how far that claim was deserving of attention.
On the dispatch of Admiral Hallowell itself, it was
scarce necessary to state that it merited reprobation.
No paper under the name of an official document was
ever transmitted to Government, which was more cal-
culated to deftly, hie Majesty's Moisten, and to in.

sence the minds of the pecplc. The evidence wbielt
be Would submit, however, would best dispri‘o4lol
ssertions of the Admiral. He would not, therefoalli
at this moment, attempt to confute the asnotions'it
Admiral Hollowell, that there never was glkfund td
believe, -that theenesnes columns. rui*wing front.
' Barcelona exceeded five thothiigilien., In -ffie- 99d'
charge BriwOuld preiVedWeifffiffielfitiirit.: He would
Doer only content himself witirsbareing lbe-ettentiow
of, the Court to the mows of din sainok. bp which it
was intended tobe undeestood, that- neither Admiral
Hallowell, the General in .command, rearany other
officer whatever, had any infoomoaion thet a gnu'
of greater atzength was approaching: hum ei COO*
sequence to Admiral Hallowellm establisivielp weak-,
nese of this column, because be entleavuunnfolorough-
out the whole of his dispatch, to prove, that it wits to
the approach of, this column Orme,. the precoadingv
which he described, were attributable: -, • ...
It Vfai true the Admiral hid nOt resale Illiff•intpOr•
taut point on his own assertion; he.progned se aglow
quent proof of these numbers And what leas Ow
nature of this 'goof ? "Captain' Stpdslart Ow a:pea-
sant at Torre Deinbara, of whose character hefty..lm
knowledge, who told hint two things—the one that
the enemy's force consisted only of five thousaod wren
and five guns : the other that be had quitted the
enemy's camp at Villa Franco, ot half-past seven
o'clock on the morning of the 13tb, when they had
no appearance of advancing." The Admiral Lid said
that he had other proofs of fact, but whet bedbe
produced ? Captain Bowen, it was true. saidltel4.
received the same information; but it appeased shist
it was derived from the same source. There was eauproof, however, that he had reported the cirri)*
stance to the Admiral, when the dispatch is question
was written.
A letter from Colonel Lauder had, indeed, been
submitted, and, as far ,as numbers went, this OVA
be good; but it could form no ground for the At- 1
ral's assertionos it had not reached him.tillthe
.Haya-
duds was dispatched. He should. iave coeceivad
that the .good sense of Admiral Hallowell Would
have induced him to pause before lie embodied so.'
vague a report, in the form of a public dispatch;
but when in opposition to probability, as well as to
communication absolutely made to him, from head-
quarter's, his qondoct becomes indeed unaccoontabk.
'The Rear-Admiral was not content with reporting
once to. the world; that the British army had fled to
their ships from five thousand men, but reported twice,
and twice did he state, that the garrison of Tarra-
gona consisted of but from twelve to fifteen hundred
men. He (Sir John) would, however, call an Officer
before the court, who would state, that from those,
who had quitted the town after he had appeared
before it, intelligence was obtained that the garrison
consisted of two thousand men—and who would prow
that Sir William Clinton himself bad deilared, dial
the calculation ought not to be founded upon walker
numbers. The Admiral, however, wished it to, be
believed, that the garrison was insufficiently defends
ed, and that, consequently, it was in.his ( Sirdolm Mur.
r.:y's) power : whether the garrison was sufficient for'
a long and vigorous defence, or not, was a matter of
no importance. It was certainly of sufficient strength
to sustain an attack of one day, les Ito hatier.sere
the batteries open against the place. 'Allis, .however,
was a point of little moment, and he would not have
noticed it, but to shew the Admiral's perseverance in
stating every thing which might tend to exasperate
the public mind. lliothing had been omitted by him
which could attain this object, and in his anxiety, be
could not avoid an exaggeration of our losses ; and,
as a greet of his accuracy, even descended to.deseribe
the calibre of the guns. The Admiral donna merit
for having corrected this, error, but it was a jint
groundofecopplaint thin he had made stich statements
with cool and laudable inquiry.
'The principal leatire of the Admiral's dispatch
was, that the Allied Arm Y had embarked solely, and
had abandoned their artillery solely on accosts( of the
distant approach of 5000 men: That such was the
impression Admiral Hallow& wished :17a: onshe
Court, cquld not be giristakkn,- and tht *Pig-
ments of Marshisl.lllAeheXhadno share in :ng the.
re-embarkation. Tile approach of teat office; Was
never hinted at till the own ofl tragonaWasclosed,
and the operation at Col de. • eraninencedi
'lke Marshal's name eras ter. Mentiomd, and,
throughout, all adculations of his. foroswas ntudiously
t
voided, 14i (Sir John murr4.o.‘loodAisopisithe
Admiral's presence, however, de. he knew. that it
was the combined, movements of .two cqlumns ad.
vancing.en both flanks (and not single and. *un-
sopprirked advance of Crenerat.-de coca) Which in-
duced him to emhark the. army." Adrultil Hallo.
wi„II knew that he hid decided: upon attacking this
latter column, which he stated as 5000 men, and he
kager; for he (Sir John) told him .so himself; on the
night of the I.lth, Marshal Sachet would pot only pre.
vent. him from carrying the plan into effect, but that
it had decided him to raise the sieges and to embark
the troops. Could apy man, alter this statement, call
the repert which, he made fair and unprejudiced ii--.,"
1 itr (mid Sir John Murray) the Admiral chose to
taper' on the subject at all, he was bound, if not in
justice to me, at leag in this faithfbl amnion. of the
• duty he had prescrilsod to:himself, to mention avery
44twe ; but, above all, the viol CPUS. of the events
op in,. wbich he though: himself called upon to address
rocs Majesty's ltsSraistess. ThO Admiral. could not
hare forgotten, on the, morning of the 1444 the con-
versatioo I bad.wiah him, to Oa WY point,. on the
.
ovesieg of the I ltb, and.yet I cast in, soother way
acconot for the conissiOn, Bet if he wasiguorant of
the approach of .Marahal Boehm, oi ,wkat valet, 1
..sk, is his aklaricaor Isis opioioe ?"
Supposing aP enemy Cifgr 01 5400:joes neat. the
lifitiiii,focces, .Adiniraliclallogell, _ought, if he had
been asked, recommend that the ilritiihtspops shoal*
not. leitainliafki4 i bilk !tad he *lawn!: than 20400
voilioiddt smkiler, divines* ill. tilcir ti tar, were. ape,
putia chin& ..nfeyeJiit ie.. counselnztlavo . beanolassause- ?—..
_
-itirt

rant of the tlaal tittle/5,W thitibigny, erAdittolier,
it.-11 . GesiArs tie MA! *Ma be co of
!goielvtitte. . .
14eAdmitti 14_1' iatt4iii,4eck the ene4
*ln Act, Or the sine side. and" lie
altilierrof tetttre;on tbs. othte...;.;
of which Admits'. Hallo.

.Under these cisounstasserao.!-
ielreotird not pTead ignorant,' it vielTdiiiite-30:
come him to have stated eathely, apt!`-nut
grounds upon which-his (Sir Jahn hierray'el pro-
ceedings were founded: •
In another part of Admiral Hallowell 's statement,
le asserted that he had promised to embark the whole
of the guns, provided he was allovied until eight..
this offer I have no knowledge or recollection :
btit,even, if I had, I should have no hesitation in
saying, that it was utterly impossible for him to have
performed such an engagement.
[Here a letter from Admiral Hallowell, to Sir J.
Murray, was r.eed upon the above subject.]
It contained, however, only advice as to the dispo-
sition of the troops to cover the embarkation, and
did not contain any offer to carry off the guns. The
wildness of the advice contained in this letterthe (Sir
John Murray) sit.i.f he should prove in his defence to
the third charge.
The gallant General went on to state an extraor-
dinary instance of interference upon the part of Ad.
miral Hallowell, in the arrangements of the ariny..-
It consisted in the Admiral, instead of, as he was
bound to do, facilitating the junction of the Quarter..
Master-General, with- the General Commaroding,in
Chief, haiing actually, by signal, repeated with a
Lim, ordered the Bristol to anchor at a great distaece
from the landing place at the Col de Balaguer, witb
ao other view, as be (Sir John Murray) was expressly,
informed ; and, as he could prove, from his own ac-
knowledgment, than to prevent the Quarter-Master-
General repairing to head-quarteris #4 Well, in-
deei, (said Sir John Murray) predict misfortune, if
he proposed by this exertion of his authority,' to de-
prive the army of the services of one of its most ac-
tive and intelligent officers. and to cripple the most
important of the departments by the absence of its
chief 1 The fact is notorious, and I call upon Admi-
ral Hallotsellto assign any other reason for ordering
the Bristol to anchor on the 14th of June—than that
of keeping General Deakin at a distance from head-
quarters."
Sir John Murray next remarked, that the infloence,
which war ascribed to General Donkin, over his
councils, by Admiral Hallowell, bad never existed.
He bad no hesitation in saying, that in no one lead-
ing operation of the army under his orders, had Ge-
neral Donkin been consulted, till after his decision
was formed ; and that in many instances, and parti-
cularly in the transactions which Were under consi-
deration, be proceeded in direct opposition to his opi-1
:lion. He stood alone on this occasion, and by his
own responsibility was he content to stand or fall.—
With respect to the general character of indecision,
with which the Admiral had thought proper to ac.
cute him, he should be silent. Those who best knew
him, would be best able to appreciate the value of
such a charge.
He did give orders to suspend the embarkation of
the troops till the receipt of additional information ;
and after directing that the stores and ordnance should
continue to be embarked, he rode out towards the Col
de Balaguer, on which road he was aware that it was
possible the army might be in motion. On his way
bask he received a letter (ions General Copons, stating
the enemy to be in motion directly 'in his front, on
the road from Villa Franca, and confirming the con-
tinued advances in that direction. Not a moment
was now to be lost in embarking the troops, which
becathe an act of paramount necessity. lt was sin-
gular that the suspension of his fist intentions, in
complinient to the Admiral himself, should now be
aground of accusation against him, It was natural
to yield something to the Admiral on an occasion
'where his hopes of bringing off the guns corresponded
IA entirely with his (General Murray's) own earnest
wishes ;and this consent was a proof of his desire to
'co-liperate, as far as possible, with the Admiral, while
'his subsequent conduct on the advance of the French,
was a 'woof of the military principles on which he
cued. This, however, formed no part of the charges
before the Court; but if he had gone out of his way
in observing upon it, it was to stew that he had no
'feeling on the subject which be was desirous of eon-
,cealing. 'He believed that he could easily answer the
:principal contradictions charged against him; and if
-he could not at this distance of time answer some
!. en of a trifling nawir, he hrped he would not on
that account be condemned. lt the object he pur-
sued was uniform, and the result corresponded with
!it, any apparent iatonsistency in the details, must De.
cessarily have arisen out of events beyond his ow
troul. The critical position of the armies under his
commend, and the ware of his instructions, wholly
occupied his mind. To receive pad understand re.
ports, to distinguish between truth and fobobOodr, to
act on new contingencies every hour in presence of
;superior enemy, and to watch over the safety es well
as the honour of the army, Ira; .100. pesticide, pro-
.vinca. But what Was AdmirakldallaiVrell's W
:to make Minutes of the Misuses parts of his
'hiss (for this diary wa not a jog), without-. nowUW
the events which gave thew blrtbl whoa fin..wes &tie
mar* than a speeustut of owlet% in, which hikOwti how
ncur tvas worcoolitee4? !,oliospirit:which hit
ilieeoeset Admiral, wee Aro evident os, that
eery ISM Of. Chit prOd“111111r? lig* if Itikistesa
Bathiist was not an addititanial proof of die fells.
With directed it, Oen every dooloodotftemseuekto
effect Wpm AS as ene. But it wesnet became the A 4
:urinal hmeself cascaised duals. (Genteel hiurrelif
was indtatisia4tlset this Arrogation brad ham hrougbh
for seltr,d, hoe . because his owo moot wee itlipoolio
sod that of biejee-tutors! Deolobee).. es. be Illingbio
acted, ea to pefeeswee tic it., Mot this was *imam
the Ates of Admiral 1121100.11 b himmeif
WV* tbld the Coin!, Whtilltindltiossii davit *epee
woe "Bud) and sint =triage* Wu* neseithseted.
I ifg lusaspinicisairtdcadrice to west till deglit. Meek
-Wawa exhibited by tlk Admiral. This! web
Wr bbierbeconte lebtrwete. •
Murat *tied 611 the epheies tl6 (auto
oi.lifioseXleeeetA betweeowlicovaoll Mom* time..
Issompribit s Tbiisiwomeuebeegove
arb4ogooreeiebbs stria t* loot
ity if ie4lll. lot -Amy eheidisokrof dclift•
oesees. sitipltiopa. elowbel for CISSeW
fkitltSia NIL SA OOP
Of -individuals, ',boss

so4porlida

*initial to the interested *IF /*dee: Ptexi
iAstatil goo moment. he'-intra
lieheeterceived Wit* lib hatelnce of the oneaty'ts
:tspetie.Nrich given toliletters Murray oh die fostnoan
712th by General Thilkin so fir m svolgOing
with him en that oecatirdnerettli no
dluteeledhint to pur-
.it quite different measures. Having said thus much,
:laud ito hesitation in admitting that he did not pre.
titbit to beef s) positive a disposition that his opinions
or bie• plant were never to be changed. by any coun-
sel, however Admiral Hallowell was not per-
haps aware traldtbhe operations of an army must de-
pend On. the movements of the enemy, and the- intelli-
gence received : andmiserably would it be conducted,
were a blind adherence to any particular line Of con-
duct to forest the principal feature of the Comman•
der's character. It welidd ble useless to bring further'
proofs of the Admiral's disposition. Without ad-
verting to the general tenor of his conversation to
every rank that would listen to him, enough had been
said to prove how little reason there was to expect a
fair consideration or impartial representation of the
case from Admiral Hallowell on this OCCASitoI. The
AdMinil would wish the Court to be persuaded that
hit dispatch was penned with an the deliberation and
impartiality which so grave a subject required ; that
his mind was divested of every personal feeling, and
that he was merely anxious to give an accurate end
consistent history of the events which then occurted.
Why then, he would ask, was there so much vioreace,
he might say, id much virulence in his dispatch ? Why
*4 so dspgerous a precedent, destructive of all hap
Mani .bettient the two services, introduced—the
sending to General Mutray's Commanding Officer
the copy of a criminatiug dispatch, nomutally ad;
dressed .to his own Commander ? Why was an this
done without General Murray's knowledge, and, he'
might almost say, published to the officers under his
immediate command ? He would admit the pro-
priety of reporting to Sir Edward Pcllew the issue
of the expedition, and the share borne by the naval
force in the service, and that it wall likewise equally
incumbent on Admiral Hallowell, from a regard to
his own character, if he conceived there was criminal
neglect or misconduct on the part of General %tr.-,
ray to have preferred cliarges against him through
his commanding officer, Sir Edward Pelkw. This
would have been at once regular and judicious, con-
sistent with the rules of the service, and sufficient for
all the ends of national justice. Had he acted thus,
he (General Murray) might have lamented the blind.
ness with which he had undertaken the accusation,
the preference which lie had given to the weakest
sources of inforniation, and the ignorance of the
true purposes of the expedition which had led him so
*far out of his depth ; but he would have had to
ac-
knowledge that hii conduct had been candid, and
consistent with the usages of the service i • and how-
ever much these proceedings might have lessened the
Admiral's claim to the character of a wise and pru-
dent commander, yet he (General Murray) has been
the first to applaud the fair and honourable manner
of his proceeding. In discussing this curios dimity
document he requested the Court to observe, how
widely the Admiral had travelled from the exercise
of his duty in his representation. Other proofs 01
personal hostility were not wanting. He should con-
tent himself with laying before the Court the hot act
of the Admiral's hostility. A very short time after
he liad rejected the Admiral's proffered counsel of
continuing the operations at the Col de Balsguer, the
cemmenceenent of which he had so earnestly de.
plured. He alluded to the signal made from the
Malta by his orders, when Lord William Berstinck's
vessel appeared in the offing. After enquiring whe-
ther his Lnrciehip was on board, in the face of the
fleet, in the presence of the arary still under General
Murray's command, the signal was made-5, We are
all delighted."--As an Admiral he was at liberty to
make what signals he might choose, but lie left it to
the Court if this instance was not an unbecoming
abuse Of his authority, and if it had not a strong ten-
dency to .countenance discontent and clamour in the
army still under his-command, and in which, after
the arrival oq.aord Wm. Bentinek, he still continued
to hold the second place ?

7 ~.
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