Star.
London, England, 1809-01-16 00:00:00

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no Mans conlitbe pro4ura,
ig ialer quantity uo bed
f, tad pirocnred in 41.;.ficitintcf Vii.j9rultt,f
Fict, I believe, that excepting a tow, tpc usa, ;VicTs
of bread left behind by, the rxench.at igfqbact4C4.
das, awl Torres Vedrm, Wifrt given t.
the Portuguese troops, the country supplicd, ?A a
gle:ration, from the time the troops -landed, till r
came away, on the 20th SepteMber. .
It was obvious then, that When Sir Johns-Moßrets
corps should land- at Marcrlri; and shOnld nearly,
double the consumption of the army, withont increas-
ing the means of yrocuring and conveying its sup-
ply* these was a risk of its being in want,
Sir John Moore's corps could not be exp4Cle4 to,)
on slfore, and in a situation to commence its 9004 k,
tioneitill the end of August, during which .periOd di
enemy would have fortified his positions at Casa,
an in the rear ,towards Lisboa; and it week( l=ave-
been unremovable ,to expect to be able to.. fgrcq or
twin them in less than ten days. During khe. I,v)nlq,
of this period, as well as during the time thncivould
be employed in landing Sir John Moore's corps, the;
-whble army would have subsisted, a:nd would hive
depended upon the means which had been collected
and. provided for the subsistancf of half of it ; auct
it would have been certain of a supply only at the
tune it. should reach and be in possession of the river

Tus, so acto admit the transports.
After we should have obliged the enemy to cross
the Tagus, and we should have possessed ourselves of
the forts on that river, and of the Russian. fleet, ap4
ve should have crossed that river witli thei)riti*lsarolys
we must have plated ourselves in a..situation to in-
vest Elvas for a blockade, or a regular, siege. In
either case, the army. would have. been exposed to the
effects of a bad climate in the worst season of the
year ; and in the latter cape, they would 'have had.
to move the meansfpr,the siege from Abrantes, be-
youd which place tbe„Tagius would nothare cart.ied.
them to the scene of action, a disuoic otsioi kis,
than sixty miles. • .
11 this -

. _
After haviog Peri 91144 x- !_oPergiqop tLICIFIZE
mould haye. Egep szoliged to renew it, is orner:tl) 00•
taro posseseiou prAl!peecla.
I am, convinced that we should-not h-a.yo had pq;
-sesion of Elvas till late in December; and I think it
snore than probable, that we should have beta.
to allow the French to evacuve Portugal in that
month, instead of August, if. we had persevered,,
after having,sustained a loss of a great part of. our
army by sickness, and of three months of most Valn:
able time with reference to further operations.
I conceived drat the objects of his Majesty, and 0(.1
the. Spanish nation were, that the British army should
co-operate with the Spanish armies. I believed that
the only mode in which the operations of the Spanish.
corps could be.brought to bear upon the same object,
WAS by the influence which the co-operation °fa
tish army would.give to the government : and I be..
lieve that it was important to the Spanish nation, tb
have the so-operation of 30,000 British soldiers in
Spain, to receive the assistance of 4000 Spanish so!.
diers, who were prisoners to the French, and of about.,
WOO who werremployed in Portugal.
I considered these objects to be so important, its yt
counterbalance the disadvantage of throwing 4000
additional French troops, at no very remote period,
upon the Pyrenees ; that the Spanish nation would
gam even upon a comparison of numbers, not less
than 16,000 good troops ; but if I was not mistaken
in my political speculations upon thii subject, they
would likewise acquire strength in their own union,
the amount of which could not be estimated ; which
strength I well knew they could acquire from no
other source excepting Portugal, if a British army
was to give it them : as I knew that this country
could not afford to send out another army of suffi-
cient strength.
I may have-been mistaken in my speculations upon
this subject ;' but in point of fact, the Spanish nation
do now enjoy the very advantages from the convention
to which I have above referred, and which Lhad in

contemplation at the time the armistice was negotia-
ted; and besides these advantages they have acquired
nether, viz. the service of the army of Estremadu-
ra, consisting of between 14 and 16,000 men, a part
oithem ravalry,. which had been emplgyed on the
frontiers of Portugal, and have been equipped
_from
the stores of Elvas, and are on their inurcli towards
the frontiers of France ; and not a man ofAhe Fonds
trmy which evacuated Portugal under 41te cpuven-
lion, has yet been brought, or can be brOught, for
some time upon the frontiers of Spain..
In reference to political and military objects: thrb
at least in my view of them, the measure cif,ill4wwg
the French to evacuate Portugal was an a4vaTittAge,e,*
111 was mistaken in my view of this aklyantaga,At,
'was a mistake into which I fell with this.Spaiisektil,s;
themselves ; for the army of Duponts yhich was,
really in a situation to be obliged to surrender, was
allowed to avacuate Andalusia by sea. and to -r.erve
again under the Convention made by the Spanish Ge;
aeral Castanos.
however, it was an- ge, advanta is Ana-
44re•
they question attending it, which is, was. it disgracees,
ful pr se T lam not slow discussing the detail •of
the Convention, but the mere measure °fallowing the
French to evacuate Portugal.
Those who argue upon this partof the Illtidecta
tend that the French army-Aitzht to have been f
to lay down its arms, It: is certainly a very desirable
object, at all times, to oblige the enemy to lay down
their arms, but the question, here, was one of means.
I wish that those who think that the French ought
to have been obliged to lay down their arms, had re-
viewed the history of all or any of the armies which

have been forced. to adopt that extremity, and had
cozipared their situation with that of the French
'stray in Portugal. Those armies halt been invari-
• ably surrounded: by bodies superior in numbers, in
equipments, or in efficiency. ; and have been distres-
*. sed;or in the utmost danger of immediate distress for
• themant.of prov,isions, and witlsout hope, of relief.. I
•••• peed not point out to this Board, that the French
army in Portugal were not.in that situation:And we=
• not likely to lie in such a situation. In tact, they-had
the• military posstssion of Portugal ; they had their
magazines in the county, the fortresses, and the hor-
hours • and they incurred no risk.oldistress !roan she
want of provisions ; • but we who were to oblige tb,gin:
to lay 'down their artr.s, did incur that risk till we
should obtain possession of the Tagus. But_thj is
itot ail • Let tbe•rneasure of allowing the Ergs& to
svacyate Torture] kr compared N‘itia other siasuns
•

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• f. yin day% and
of moving a target' qu