Star.
London, England, 1815-02-07 00:00:00

to contact the prexin»ty of the high read to the I
beach, when the morning ride of any of the Court.
w„u;,, have given flat contradiction to t`te a isertim?
0,1 the spot they would have known that the:
beach is Alm ist always smooth in summer ; and that ,
when it is n-t perfectly so, en one side of Cape Sd•
lup. it IS so oa the other. My object was to lay
before the Court every fact ; his to conceal. 'Wnen
he jsks if at all times you could carry on embarka-
tio to the bay of Tarrapmaxry eve. man who ever'i
I.w: the oast would' say, certainly not; but if to;
thow I;glYt upon "the tittestionhe had asked, could an
eau, kAtt•nt almost always take place in the Months:
of ja. se, July, and August,. and if not to the east-
war,' of Cape Salon, to the westward ? The answer
would have men, certainly, go Ye-I,''—and if, to evade
ti,e true statement of facts and things, he did not

(Till back such men as Williams" Thackary,. and
c.;iton—Euets men as Bathurst and Inglefield-11c

vi sely.
Sir J. Murray pays very litt'e compliment to the
army ; for while he is treating escpy en; of my 00.
nions with the utmost contempt, he accuses the army
of looking to them as the standard of military per-
fection. He can best settle this with his own pro.
fessions. It the utmost attention to their wants ; if
the most perfect respect to their rank and merits be
s crime in a naval commander, I,plead guilty. My
dente to do every thing for the army met a return I
am proud to acknowledge. I would appeal for the
truth of this to every cne of the °diem It have called;
and wzre it not for the very honourable testimony.
bane to my character by the ..Court,.l should have
brought ample proof, in allition to Sir John Mai-
ray's own letrers, to disprove this assertion.
shall now prxeed to rent4rk on the Third
Charge ; Sir J. Murray endeavoured to offer as an
excuse for the precipitate manner in which he raised
the siege ef Tarragona, dangers and difficulties.
which never existed ; he has endeavoured to establish
a Mkt; that he could not have got his guns and
stores on board before an enemy arrived, but he has
never yet been able to prove that the enemy was
nearer on one side than Villa Franca, or that any

force was ever as far as Perrillo on the other, when
he decided on leaving the guns behind. It appears
that Colonel Williamson pledged himself to Sir John
Murray that the guns and all the stores should have
been brou..lit down to-the beach ready for embarka-
tion on the night of the 12th, and I had pledged my-
scif that every thing should have been taken off.
Tice means I possessed were more than ample for the 'l
ese, ution of that service. That no enemy could have
been near is evident from Sir J. Murray's conduct on
our arrival at Balaguay on the 13th. Sir J. Murray
decided immediately on sending for the whole army
to land again. Surely if Sachet was not too power-
ful f,r him un the 146, when he had time to have
collected his'reinforcements, he would not have been
in sufficient force on the 12th to have created the
alarm be did; and so little. did Sir John Murray
think of an immediate advance of Sudan, that on the
evening of the 14th or 15th he-proposed to me the
re-embarking the troops at Bologna, landing them
at Canahrels, and thence to push on 5000 men, to en.
deovour to surprise 'Foregone.
The proposal w.as made in the latter part of the
afternoon, on the starboard side of the quarter deck.:
Sir John informal me, that although we had differed'
respecting the raising the siege, he had only °hero,
his orders; but that every thing be -did nostr"svaatri"
as of his own, and he wished to submit his 'ideas to
me, and to have my opinion on them ; he then made
t'T above proposal, stating that he knew the enemy
I.ad leceieed no reinforcements, and supposing he
going away they were off their guard. 1 gave
Liar my opinion, tl.at as he did not feel himself equal
to such an enterprise when he was there with his
whole lcrce, and his batteries erected, that I did not
tllinic him equal to it now with 5000 men. ILtie he
asked- my advice ; I g.tve it, and he followed it. .
.As a further proof that there was no occation to
ram the siiige in the manner it was !one, I will state
that Str John Murray diet, on the 15th, land all his
troops
again,except a part of General Whitting,ham's
division, with an intention of taking the field to fight
Bucket." His artillery and the remainder of the 20th
dragoons were landed on this day. On the 16th I
received an application from him to have 200 m 'rind I
in readiness to put in the Fort of Baliguay, to enable
him to sake the field with all his force, which he had
proposed doing. The marines were paraded and
kept in constant readiness to land the moment they
should be called, and in the afternoon I landed two
12-pounder carronades, with fifty seamen, to serve
with the army.
And here I heg to call the attention of the Court to
Colonel Willt.misosi's evidence, by which it appears
on the mi;,iiks of the Court, that the letter from Co-
pnns only informed Sir J. Murray that the column of
the enemy at VW.* Franca was in motion, and re-
quested the British General would give him orders
respecting the line of conduct he was to pursue ; but
it does not tell him what way the enemy were point-
ing. The vet front Colonel Lauder, which is b!.-
fore the Court, statet, that on that evening the enemy
returved to Barcelona. The statement of Colonel
Villamil will he seen in Colonel Williamson's evi-
dence, wherein he relates the force of the enemy, dt
that time, to be between .5 and 6000 men at Villa
Franca. Colonel Williamson is not mistaken in the
time of the Spanish officer's arrival. 1 was on the
beach with General Donkin at half-past twelve,
where he was speaking to me of the movements of
the enemy. This induced me to lot lt at my watch,
and I informed him of the hour, which makes me po-
soive as to the time. We then went together to the
General's headquarters, where we met the Spanish
oficer. I ace •mpanied them front thence to look for,
And after we met, Sir J. Murray decided, to embark
the troops iin In diately, and leave the wins behind.
I mention this circumstance to shew that I could not
be mistaken in the time the officer arrived ; and that
General Donkin has not been correct in the statement
has made of its being between eight and nine ill
the morning, when he met that officer. instead of oae
P. M. As to the indecision of Sir John Murray,
day Alid not psi without instances. He seemed to
act from the spur of the moment—from the last ad-
vice or opinion he had received ;—one while, all
gc,ur—neat, all doubt ;—one while to fight—one
'otile to withdraw;—and had he either made up hii
mind to fight or re-embark, all might have been well i
hut his constant vaccillations made every measure
useless, and the odors and coatitkiordare follatrred so
ta3 upon ono another, that moneetwtheitWas

peteahle,*-0 i 6 active and intelligent an of eer es
Lieutenaot-General Clinton found it impossible to
keep pace with their rapidity, was •it likely they could
generally have been complied with ?
If Sir John Murray meant to fight Decaen; did he
take any proper measures to do so • and if he did not.
when he had made up his mind to re-embark, whit
not take proper measures to re-em!yark ? But waver.'
jug between these two measures, he did neither as k
ow* to have been done. If hfirshal Suchet was so
momentarily expected, what but insanity could hive
inclined Sir John Murray to send hit artillery and ca-
valry to Maguey separately, and each unaccompa-
nied by infantry What but the. most unwarrantable
neglect could have given rise to such extreme igno•
rance of the distance of the en •my, as to produce an
assertion, at ten o'cl:,ck in the morning, that the
enemy might be hourly expected tinder the wells of
'Tarragona ? But bad as the indecision was at Tar-
ragona, it was nothing to that at Balaguay. The
debarkation and the re-einharkation, continually going
on, was enough to confound any operatioes •in the
world. Every mast-head was covered with his sig.,
nals, and four fast-rowing gigs were hardly sufficient
to convey his orders. As Sir John Murray has re-
peatedly, in his address, alluded to the contempt in
which he held my opinion on military subjects, it may
not be amiss before I conclude my reply, to adduce
one more instance of his appal to that opinion, when
he considered himself in a case of difficulty.
Sir John Murray cannot have foigotten when the
deserters arrived at Balaguay on the 16th, with the.
account of the enemy's approach, that .he immedi-
ately came off to ask my opinion of the line of eon-
'duct he should adopt. On our going on shore he di-
rected the Chief Engineer to point out the positions
he should occupy; and having made his arrangements,
he decided •on waiting for the enemy. On his ex-I
pressing this determination, I took the liberty of
telling him that I was sure he had an army that would
do him credit—that they would do more than any
army of the same number in the King's service, be-
cause there was not a single man tinder him uhe did
' not feel that he had something to recover, and the
only thing he had to guard against was, being per.'
suaded to change his determination again—his reply
was, that he would not change. Colonel Thackery
was preaent at this conversation, which circumstances
now ca upon me to mention to state a new act of
indecision, he decided the next morning toembark again.
I must now beg leave to offer a remark on the evi-
dence of Captain Milner, of the 18th Hussars. Sir
John Murray asks him if he has the means of knowing
that his dispatch was written in a great harry ? Cap.
tarn Milner in reply states, it was written in a greet),
hurry, it only came on board as I
.was going to send.,
a vessel away, there was no time to copy the disc
patch. Who could have believed that an officer,
holding the high and honourable rank of a Lieutenant,
General in the Army, possessing the fortune, and•
moving in the high circles in which Sir John Mur.
ray is in the habit of doing—who could have believed
that he would have permitted his Military Secretary
to have 'fallen into such a snare for the purpose of •
criminating me ? who could have supposed that be
could have allowed hint to give the' answer he has
givers on oath, without attempting to set him right.
when he knew that the original letter was in his Men
band writing ? No one could have believed it, had
not the transaction been recorded on' the minutes. of
Ws Ocoee Mania* end k--tit nefft beintottert.--,
Captain Milner was warned by me to'he on his guards
it was, therefore, after mature deliberation that he
:bas stated oa oath, 'that he had' not time to take a
copy of the letter sent away, and it is afterwards
proved by his own evidence, that the very dispatch.
Which wits forwarded to Lord Wellington was a copy,,
' transcribed by himself from the original drawn up by.
Sir John Murray. As to the expressions . imputed to
me by Captain Milner, I do not .admit that I ever
oade we of them ; but admitting thet Laid, what.
hove they to do with the charges against Sir John
array ? •If they were uttered, it was atter the
troops had left Tarragona, and I could scarcely be-
' here, that an officer who was sleeping in my cabin,
and living as a guest at my table, as Captain Milner
was, could, at the same tinie, be making remarks of
my conversation, to bring forward as a charge against
me at a future period. Ido not envy either Sir John
Murray or his Military Secretary Captain Milner,
the consolatidn they may derive from their reflections
on this occasion.
The attack made upon my military witnesses can.
ttot have escaped the observation of the Court—of
Colonel Williamson he says his evidence is but re-
petition ; I trust it will be noticed his was given be-
fore the evidence was canvassed in the newspapers.
'General MtKenzie's evidence, it is said, wati given
with precipitation. With respect to General Clin-
ton's evidence, which Sir John Murray has thought
fit to term an evidence delivered with asperity, and
winch, by the concluding question on die Lieutenant-
General's first examination, it was most unjustifiably
endeavoured to stamp with the impression of having
been uttered in a spirit of personal animosity against
Sir John Murray. I feel qm yse 1 I warranted in saying
that Sir John had no right to put such a construction
on that evidence. Circumstanced as Sir John Murray
found himself, such an evidence should have been
met by a disproof, mot, by an attempt to delay it
'merely, which argues a bad cause. Nor is Sir John
Murray more ccrrect when he observes that General
Clinton was the last man from whom he had a right
.to expect such evidence. In this instance ton, I have
reason to know that I am warranted in saying, that
at an early period after the termination of the unfor-
tunate expedition egeinst Tarragona, Sir John Murray
was told at Alicant by Lieutenant General Clinton,
that he did not think that the measure of abandoning
his ordnance at Tarragona could tie Instified.
Consistent with the feeling which 'dictated that
opinion, has been the evidence given by Licetenant.
General Clinton, and had lie been so questioned, I
am confident that with the same consistency would
Lieutenant-General Clinton have spoken to any fact,
or even to any opinion he might recollect to helm
held at that period, which might have been deemed
advantageous to the defence of Sir JOhn Murray:.
I must. therefore, beg again to repeat that Sir PAM
Murray was not warranted In putting such a con.'
struction as he had endeavoured to mikess on tke,
minds of the. Court and public, with respect to Lieu-
tenant-General Clinton's evidence.
must now beg the serious attention of the Court
relative to the first order seat to Lieutenant-G
Clinton on the morel% of the 14th of June,.•

6titent that order Was with what hia appeared int
evidence* namely, that on the night of the lltican
prospect of getting hold of Tarragnaa had teased,
and the embarkation'of the army lad been decided
upon ; but sitting the inconsistency aside, what will
be the astonishment of the Court when they lee Sir
John Murray asserting, as he did in the statemenehe
made on SAturclay last, in reference to this order
of That his motive in giving this order had been to
cover a retrograde movement of the division of Ge-
neral Corms army on the great road, but that the
movement had been effected during the night : and
the troops from Lieutenant•Caneral Clinton% division
were not required to assist it, and the order became
nnil from this circumstance." I ask Sir John Mut..

ray, whut movement had General Capons made dur-
ing the night to warrant such a statement on his
part Why none. Is it not in clear evidence thewn
that Captain Stoddsrt and Lieuten ►nt Bowie tvcre
both in communication with General Capons at Al-
tafulla and at Torre del Barra, until sun-set on t:1e•

evening of the 12th June, and that Sir John Murray
himselt had been waited upon during the 12th by an
officer, Colonel Villamill, with a letter from General
Copons, dated from Torre del Barra, then requesting
Sir John Murray's directions how to proceed ? 1)
not this, I would ask the Court, disqualify the state-
ment Sir John Murray has made as to his motive in
having given this most inconsistent order, and it
having become null: from the circumstance of Gene-
ral Copons' pretended movement ?
Sir John Murray states. in another part of his al
dress, tha: the Duke of Wellington was fortunate in
acting alone—that he had no naval coadjutor to im-
pede or thwart him, and fan the flame of discontent
in the army ; and states also, that I was (compara-
tively speaking) little more than a spectator of events,
in which my own honour was no way committed ;
my own responsibility was in no way compromimd ;
my own safety, by which, of course, I mean to un-
derstand, of those under my command, was no way'
endangered or concerned. This is the first instance
I ever heard of an officer, in the command of the
naval part of a conjunct expedition, having no respon:
sibility attached to his situation, or that his honour
was no way committed in the expedition; I must
confess that I felt differently. I felt my honour cm-
mined in the late transactions, and with those feel-
ings I considered it aurduty to write the letter I did.
Sir J. Murray denies his having made any charge
against me; let the world read this, and then judge
of the truth of such an assertion. Every one has
heard it, and is his ipse dixit to contradict the voice
of all ? He writes a public letter, ocknowledsing
:the cordial en-operation of the fleet ; and a privacy
letter to Lord Wellington, that the delay and irregu-
larity of the transports was the cause of the batteries
not being opened 24 hours sooner than they would
have been. This I deny in lobo. The transport so-
vice was carried on to my most perfect satisfaction,
and the Commanding Officer of Artillery has ac-
knowledged that his wants were even anticipated.
I was in hopes that Sir John Murray would have con-
fined his reienttnent to me alone. Seeing with how
little candour he has directed all his attacks against
me, I have learnt to bear them without emotion ; but
when he ventures to attack the whole profession, I
am called fat-ward to vindicate its character against
so foul, so malignant a charge.
What does Sir John Murray mean by saying that
theme-seri-4W tindir me Were not exposed to daiigei,
when he knows there was scarcely a day passed that
they were not employed in boats under fire of the
enemy's batteries ? there was ao work on shore which
required assistance from the ships that was not in-
stantly granted ; and in all working patties during
the night, as well as day, they shared the same dan-
gers as the soldiers who were employed with them.—
The conduct of the boats could not have escaped his
lobservation ; and if Sir John Murray or any of his
Staff had been present with the working parties at
the battery, he and they-would have been convinced
that their conduct merited adiff.rent representation ;
and if Sir John Murray considered there was any
danger from an enemy on the night of the 12. h, when
he was abandoning every thing to its fate, the officers
and seamen of both men of war and transports wet e
left to share it, while the General who thus calumni-
ates them was enjoying his repose in bed.
I trust it will appear by the evidence of those offi
cers who have been examined, that many instances
have occurred of Sir Nut Murray's indecision at
times, and on occasions where prompt measures and
a decisive conduct weie necessary, and consequently
that I had pin reason for expressing my apprehen-
sions that the future movements of the army under
his directions would add to its disasters. I presume
it will also appear from the same evidence that no
measures were adopted towards raising the siege of
Tarragona previous to the order which was suddenly
given on the night of the llth, to commence the em-
barkation, and that Sir J. Murray did precipitately or.
der the embarkation of the troops under hi: command,
and abandoned his guns and stores without necessity.
This wi:l appear evident, from a letter from SirJ•li
to me, dated on board the Malta, June 19, 1813, in
which he says—" Upon the late business, however
anxious I was fbr this cordial co-operation, the heavy
responsibility which I had, and the dangers which I
saw in delaying, prevented me from adopting your
opinion, which, as events have proved, might have
been safely followed."
That there was no necessity, I trust will appear on
the evidence buffire the Court.
Ist. Because the enemy was not nearer than Villa-
franca, (a distance of more than SO miles) at the time
he adopted this measure.
%fly. Because at the time our troops were embark-
ing, and we were destroying our guns and carriages,
and at the time such alarm was expressed on the
beach of Tarragona for the safety of our army—the
Spanish division under General Copons was nine
miles in our front remaining at their post, without
any apprehension for their safety.
An lastly, Because the enemy was not in suffi-
sient force to oblige us to raise the siege in the man-
ner we did, even if he had advanced against us.
Sir Joha Murray has attacked my character, not
met my charge, and every thing I have heard in this
Court, convinces me that your decision will be such
as will vindicate the honour of the service, and satisfy
the expectations of the Sovereign and the nation.
On the Admiral concluding his Reply, the Court
was immediately ordered to be cleared. The Sen.
truce will not of course transpire till it receives the
lopprobotion of the Palifft &NEM