Star.
London, England, 1805-06-21 00:00:00

with a powerful armament, of which, though We ire
ignorant of the &dilation, we are almod certain
that it will go to tome quarter Where we byre not an
adequate force to oppok it. The circumfianees ata
tending the failing of the Toulon fleet) and its junc-
tion with that of Cadiz, are of themfelves fufficiently
extraordinary to call for inquiry. The Toulon fleet
failed twice without being met by our fleet in the
Mediterranean, which not only thews our want of
intelligence, but the want of a convenient Ration in
that fea from which to obferve the movements of the
enemy—a cirentridance by the way which may ferve
to &tame the importance of Malta, to which, at
the beginning of the War, fo much was attached.•-•
' It failed twice, however, without interruption, and
having effefted a junction with the Spaniards at Ca•
die on the gth of April, proceeded to fea again.—
And is it not an extraordinary circumflance that
now, on the aoth of June, we fhould be ignorant of
the definition of fo large an armament, which failed
from Cadiz on the gth of April, to Rrike a blow at
forme of our foreign fettleantents ? Indeed, fo ettraor-
&nary is this affair, that the Houfe ought not to [o-
perate till it be inveßigated. I mutt add too, that
the cocduft of the Officer who commanded our fleet
off Cadit when the French appeared, on the face of
it calls for inquiry. I do not mean to fay -that Sir
John Orde marnot be able to juftify hinifelf. He
certainly was greatly inferior in point of numbers.
We trud, on many occafions, to the fuperiority of
our navy under great inequality of numbers, but no-
thing has more tended to create that excellence,
which judifies the confidence, than the found difere•
tion exercifed in the appointment of naval comman-
ders, a difiretion on which the public opinion ought
to have no inconfiderable weight, becaufe that opinion
calls forth the merit it rewards. 1 do not blame Sir
John Orde hecaufe he inßantly put to fea as loon as
the French fleet appeared. He was inferior to the
enemy doubtlefs ; but there are occafions when high
fpirit, a Arcing feeling of the public mule, will in
duce men to run great ricks for great objeas, and it
is on fuch occafions when bold attempts are often
crowned with tuccata, or at lead find the bed conk-
lation far difappointment. The firiking fad is, that
Sir John Orde made a retreat from Cadia at the mo-
ment when a junction was to be effeided, from which
the mad important confequences, and probably great
difatlers to this country, were likely to collie. Sit
John Orde, however, may be perfealy judiiable. I
only fay that the affair calls for inveftigation. The
Rate of his fleet may have been Inch as to make it
improper for him to do that which' with a fleet in
fuitable order, he would have attempted. I have fees
a Paper which gives an account of the whole fleet,and
of each [hip refpeetively of his fleet. The Glory is
Rated to have been hurt in her malt, and otherwife
out of lepair ; the Defence was leaky, and is fines
gone into Dock; the Agamemnon was likewife de.
[alive in various points, fo the Polyphemus and Re-
nown. If this reprefeatation be correft it involves a
moil ferious charge upon the Admiralty ; but why
the fhips thould have wanted water, which might bays
been had from the coat of Portugal or from Gibral.
tar, I am at lots to fay. At any rate, however, why
did not Sir John Orde leave behind tome veffels to
moth, and to trace the enemy, and to give fuch in.
formation either to Lord Netfon when be came down
the Mediterranean, or to Government at home,
that the foe might have been purfoed with a proba-
bility of oveitaking him? Why did not Sir John Orde,
if be thought himfelf unequal in any manner to ea.
gage the, enemy, Rand away to Ferrol, and joining
that fluadron, °Miro& the failing of the enemy's ar-
mament, and perhaps defeat it > Or might he not
have taken a middle Ration, to watch them till joined
by fome other fquadron Thefe are all very impor-
tant circumßantes ; the public expects the elucidation
of them ; and it is the duty of the Houfe to lead the
Way in the inquiry. As to the dellination of the fleet,
Jamaica appears to me the mod likely objeft, and
there is a rumour in town, which at leaf may be true,
that it has been attacked. After that, Brazil appears
the omit probable objea, and it is one every way of
walk importance.. As a military Ration it would give
the enemy eie e emend of our India trade. We
could not blockade Rio Janeiro; and oar India fleet
mutt go tinder a convoy as lirong as the enemy ot;
that Ration might be. As auxiliary to ultimate views
in India; it would be of vaft confequence, and it Would
fapply Chip timber it Would afford immenfe: wealth,
and it would affeft our intently by depriving ps of
the Brazil cotton fo (Wendel to our manufallures. If
their objea, however, be the Eaft Indies, I [tall re-
joice, becaufe there, I am perfuaded, that though they
. may do conftderable injury, they will lead a&a our
permanent interells, and will hi the end mod certainly,
be overcome f and with fuch officers as Sir Edward
Pelle* and Sir Thomas TroW bridge in that quarter,
there would be little chante of their acquiring any
afkandency by fee. In every quarter to which they
may gr, however, they can meet with no force
adequate to tipple them, and the queflion appears
to be only this, Where are they likely to do the lead
damage ? /Ewe efeape we can afcribe it only to Pao-
ynaeaca, unlefs we calculate on the fame mifmanage-
ment in this that has been confpicuous in their for-
mer naval expeditions, which, however, in the pie-
fent circumftances, is not fe likely as on other occa-
lions. Stash then is the flotation of the war, the
war that was to limit the ambition, and rgduce the
power of France. But we hive refilled the threaten-
ed invafion ! This appears to' Me a very futile
boaß. The ineafion was threatened as the beginning
of the war, and it is threatened now. If it has not
hitherto been attempted : this may be afcribed, not
fo much to our domellic preparation, as to the fupe-
riority of our navy. I, for one, never believed that
the invation would immediately be attempted. It
has, in a great mature, anfwered what probably was
its end. It has kept the nation in perpetual alarm,
and tippled us to immenfe expence, without at all
advancing the objefts of the war, and all the prepa-
rations for the deign are, according to the info, ma-
tion in the King's fpcech, Rill continued. That one
great objed of the enemy was to diftraft our atten-
tion, is highly probable ; but, if invafion ever vita
the objeit, there is no reafon whatever to believe
that it is abandoned. Whatever Bonaparte's cha-
raCier in other retpefts may be, we have not leen that
as a foldier he is labial to paffion ; he it not to be
inticed by taunts, to an attempt for which things
arc not ready ; but if affairs here are conduded as
they have been, when cur sects are fcattered in pin.-
fuit of the enemy,. when our troops are difperfed in
foreign Settlements, that attempt for which the prc-

pmatiees beet never been relaxed antrimeni, may
mita beitied ; and that Bonaparte fees all there
omnbinatiollithere can be no doubt. The boati of
teat betel invided, is one of the molt idle and abfurd
which it is poffible to conceive.
Thus I. have fltewn, from anqueltionable fags,
that no material improvement has taken place in our
Military and Nave/ flaw; that none of the objeds of
the War have been attained ; and that no progreft
elhatextr has been made towards them. or is likely in
f*ure. In this fiteation it is the imperious duty of the
Hoof; to call upon Miniflers to give us fatale rational
profped of pnrfuing:the War with fnccefs, or of ex-
pladning to us that Peace on equitable and honour-
able terms is not to be obtained. This leads me to
notice the Rate of our Continental Alliance, as allud-
ed to in the Speech from the Throne, in the Speeches
of the Minifter, and in other coatimmications. Oa
this head too I fear there is nothing on which we can
congratulate ourfelves. While Bonaparte'a power
on the Continent remains unimpaired.: he exercifes
over his neighbours an influence of policy or intimi-
dr- tion which at reknt leaves little roam to hope for
efficient cooperation. At the beginning of the Scc
•
Pion we were told,
Notwlehltanding there teadadteet fo twosome! to evert fen-
daunt of modetatlon and Jahn, I have recently 'calved a Com-
munication from the French Onvertunent, containing istofe&oas
of a Pacific Difpoittion.
I have in motequaree eleprelfed my carnet: defier to embrace the
firß opportuakyof Teem* the damp of Peace, on fuch grounds
as may be confiftan with the permanent fafety and littera. of
my domioions—but I am erfident you will agree with me, that
thofe Ojeda are daftly cormotted with the general fecurity of
Europe. I have therefore not thought it right to enter into any
more pastieskr explanation, without previous conunuecation With
thole Powers on the Centigent with whom lam engaged in con-
fidential intercourfe and cooneEtion, with a view to that hopor.
tint °llea, and dpeciany with the Emperor of Ruffle, who has
given the (hong& proofs of the wife and dignified fentiments by
which he is aolmated, and of the warm intereits he takes in the
rfefety and independence of Europe.
'flier* is no inftance, I believe, of the Houk being
dtus left Co much in the dark, not of the aaual Rate
of things, but of the views and °Weds of Govern-
ing*. The former it may be proper to conceal ; but
'of the latter, Can it be fit that the Houle should be
Ignorant. when the public is to undergo the burdens
they any involve ? The communications on Inch
fair& during the war have been generally of three
kinds: Either they Rate, that peace through the fpi-
rit and ambition of the enemy is unattainable; or
that pr Goons have been received, but not loch as
to jullify relaxation in the coodnd of Government,
or preparations for the war ; cir, laftly, they have
announced negotiations, the ref Ult of which would
in due time be laid before Parliament. Bat his Ma-
jelly's fpeech merely fays, that in anfwer to an over-
ture, on the face of it fair and open, no anfwer can
be given, becaufe his Majefty is engaged in confiden-
tial intercourfe with other powers. No views what-
ever of the policy to which that intercourfe is direa-
ed ; no hint, whether it is an intercourfe pointing to
arrangement for peace or for war, is given. Such
was the ignorance of Parliament at the opening of
the Seffion. From Come of the principles Mated in
another part of the fpeech, of which I have read an
extras, I am Co far from diffenting, that I am hap•
py to take this opportunity of expreffing my concur-
rence in them to any fair confequences to which they
can be carried. The fpeech lays, that the intereft of
this country is connefted with that of the Continent;
and that propofition is peculiarly true in the prefent
circumitances of Great Britain and of Europe. I
therefore diftindly avow my affent to this propotition,
becaufe without a great and powerful cooperation
on the Continent there can be no chance of reducing
the power of France ; and becaufe, nnlefer, failing
that, the great Powers take a part in Negeciation in
one (lupe or other, my hope of permanent peace will
be much weakened. But in faying this I mutt fay
too, that unlefs the co-operation of the Continental
Powers be fuch as to afford a rational profped of fix-
ed's, it would not be deferable. In that cafe too it
appears to me that a feparate peace on moderate
terms, would be preferable to a mere defenfive war.
If, indeed, the enemy were to be fo unreafonable es
to reject all equitable terms, the nation would then
not only fubmit to a defenfive war, but to every fa-
aifice and privation, rather than fall down at the
k feet of France. Then, indeed, it would be proper
to make no peace, and the fpirit of the country would
make none tilk every refource had been exhautted and
every exertion tried I till we could fay in the words
formerly quoted by the Right Hon.- Gentleman—
Paha qun plurisna Wynn, ace.
This extreme cafe is not likely to occur, but if redu-
ced to the neceffity of that defenfive war, which is
only not worfe than an adequate peace, it would be
the alatt of the Houle to fee that it was not Co con-
Cinaed as to be even more dangerous than peace, and
to take care that every elf- nt Mould be well direded,
and every expence applied with economy. The other
alternative I have mentioned is a feparate peace, in
cafe the co-operation of the Continent, or the concert
of other Powers in negotiation were unavailing. I
hope filch a Peace will not take place. It is impoili-
ble to fay before-hand, however, what fuch a Peace
might be, but it might be better than a mere defen-
five war. A great refponfibility would be on' thofe
who concluded it, as to the time and the terms of it,

and (-braining the bell fecurities which.circumftances
would admit. But at any rate they ought to be fuch
as, if violated, would at once thew, in the ftrongeft
light. the injuftice and violence of the enemy. Upon
there points I Droll aor dilate, as it is impoffible to
anticipate either the eiremitilanees that would juftify
or condemn fuch a tranfattion, whether Peace were
negotiated in conjuuaion with our Allies, or tinder
tare mediation or guarantee of other Powers. Lot
us now, then. examine the anfwer Cent by our Go-
'era:rent to Bonaparters overture. Had we at that
time been engaged in alliance with Raffia, or had
negotiations with that Power been fo far advanced,
as to be on the eve of conclution it would have been

highly proper to 'decline any neg ociation till Rufila it
v>as confulted. If the negociations for alliance were
in an advanced progrefs, furely they ought now to
have been brought to a condemn. if they were not,
might not Mindless have anfwered Bonaparte, and
pointed out a sego ciation with other Powers, as.that
molt likely to lead to Peace. As far as appears,
there was not fulficient reafon, a. far as our inter.
cburfe with Ruflia was concerned, for not giving a
more direa anfv:er to; dire& overture. Tlfere is a
want of information on the fubjeft, I confeft, which-
leaves us much in the dark in this difcufflon ; but it
is to fupply that information, that the prefent motion
was in part intended. Since the opening of the Sef-
Lion. however, We have rectived another comatuniCa.

tion—the Me/age now on Om TAIC, We ore mil,
44 That the communscations taken plate,
" and ire fill depending between his M ti •Iy. and
"4 fume of the Powers of the Corti nenr, have ous
44 yet been brought to fuch a point as to enab:t
I his Najaf), to Jay the re felt .o( than :before the
is Houle, or to enter into any fartlsin explaaatior.
r. with the French Government, confillcotly will.
* the fetstiments expretTed by his Majelit', at the orat-
as ing of the prefent ref on." I have raid that tit-.
Speech at the opening of the fetlion left us ignnrar
of the fate of the intercourfe with Ruffii, and we re.
ceived no information till on the opening of flit.
Budget, the Right Hon.. Gentleman Rated. that fist
millions he propofed to roCerve to be voted aftcrwares
Its Subfidies to Foreign Powell, if circomliances
deresl it expedient. Five months have clapfed fince
that time, and fill we hay? no ittformAtion, tither or.
the Ritual fate of the negotiation, of the objefi
its except as far as it may be gathered from the Sob-
fidy we are called on to vote. The tooee of proceed.
ing at the beginning of the legion aoitearcd unpra-
codented, and this Hill more fo; for we are called oo
to vote money for objeCts we do not know—ignorant
whether the money is io be in the Foil infante op-
plied to profecute the war, or only in cafe the ene-
ary refute reafonable terms of peace, which it may
pow be intended to propore. This indeed would be
to leave a large difcretion with Ministers—fuch as
never before was claimed. Laf war, indeed, aOn
was left at the difcretion of Minium, but it was oittr
Steobjca was thoroughly known, the power to which
it was granted afcertained, not to mention that the
amount, a ;thing of no (mall pratlical importance,
was fo
.much left. But here the caufe, the meant'
the profpeet of co-operation. its value, its applica-
tion are beforehand unknown, and it is to be left to
the difcretion of the Minifter to apply five milli ns in
any manner, to any puipofe, and to any paver he
may think fit. Surely the Houle will octal) far ab-
dicate its functions, as thus blindly to vote away its
effential right of controuling the application of the
public fupplies ? Subfidies undoubtedly may fume-
times be expedient, but the policy of granting them
will depend on the object to which they are :tired-
ed, the power that is to receive them, and its abi-
lity and difpofition to render a fair equivalent of
fervice. The time of granting them ouyht to be
confidered. But at prefent how do we know who
are the powers to be fublidifed ? Can we expedt
an efficient co-operation without one of the great
powers, Anfria or Pruffia ? Without them, would the
co-operation of Ruflia, even the greatelt of the other
powers, not to fpeak of Denmark or Sweden, be
worth purchafing? And what is the time ? If Ruflia
be the principal power to be fubfidifed, (ball we be
told in the end of June that it is neceffat y to to
this vote for any efficient co operation this feafon.
Let us at leaf be informed of the grounds and olo-
jea of the alliance with Ruffia. If the negotiation,
after fo long a delay, be not ready, furely its confum-
motion cannot be difant, if it be at all probable.—
Then let the Houfe fit till the affair be adjulled ; and
whatever inconvenience might arife to individuals
from a protracted feffion, it is the duty of all to at-
tend the bnfinefs of their country, on an occafion of
fuel: magnitude, involving the higheß privileges, and
molt important fumfions of a Houfe of Commons.
1 have thus laid before the Houfe at greater length
than I could have wilhed, a few general outlines of
the fituation of the county. critical in the opinion of
all, beyond any example. Every fact which is before
us, every confequence to which the lefts evidept",y
lead,* fmpofe upon us the duty of invefligatiog our
Rate ; and Pardanient e4oaht not to feparatt till it has
afcertained the fafety of the country. If the motion
of which I gave notice, Appeared to me necelfary a
few days ago; it appears more fit and feafonable, in
confequence of the 'hleffage prefented yelterday; and,
when called upon to vole a rum of five millions, with-
out information of any kind, I (tuft the Houfe will
helitate hefore they pledge their own credit, and the
money of their constituents, in a marner fo unufual.
I therefore move, 44 That an homble Addrefs be pre-
fented to his Majefly, that he toould be gracioufly
pleafed not to prorogue his Parliament, till he is ena-
bled to lay before them, the refult of the Communica-
tions now dePendiwg betwaen his Majefy and other
Powers, and Oro Views and Giles% of the fame."
Lord CASTLEREAGH replied at confidetahle
length to the arguments which had been urged by
the Honourable Gentleman who had juft fat down.
There was much of his fpeech that he l.ad the foil-
faition not to differ from. Whatever he had thought
fit to fay of the Rate of the array or navy, he was
happy to find that the Hon. Gentleman placed a
fufficient degree of confidence in the financial admi-
nittration of the country, not to objea to any fingle
at of that department, except what he fpcke of as
the addition'of thirty millions of debt ; hut he put ;t
to the candour and fairnefs of that Honourable Gen-
tleman to fay whether this was not merely a nominal
addition to that amount, which could be paid off
for about half that rum. The numbers of out army
had confiderably iacreafed in the difpofable force for
.general fervice, both by the ordinary means of re-
cruiting and by the volunteering from the Militia ;
and from the returns on the tableuf thole railed with-
in the firft four months of the year, it may be fairly
calculated that if we continue to increafe ia the tame
proportion fi,r the other eight months, we (hail at
the end of this year have a more numerous army fur
the defence of Gieat Biirain, than we ever had at
any former period. As to the naval force felonging
to the country, it was to he cot Cilci ai, without -my
refieetion upon the condtrEt of any one, that ftveral
fhipa were become old and unfit for vice, during'
the pet iods that he had chofen fur hi. companion ;
and 'that, nom iihilaiiiiing this, we ha.! at_pretent
tact fail of Ihipi:ing in hill We Ho-
! nourabit. Gentleman 11.4.1 in another p,r of his fpeech
crititifed on the mode of cex.do:ft;ng the war. But,
the Bottle wool(' oblerve, that the war on the part of
the enemy had changed its charaaer, from neglect-
ing all Colonial (+lens, even the defence of their
own colonies, fot the: fake of thre.:tening deltruc-
lion upon u, at li -me, the y had turrtd to ichemes of
foreign expeditions and attempts at cetenial warfare;
they had dune this. hi:v:ever, in a wet y fin comp-
rative degree, when ss contidered the wart fleets that
we had engaged in the blockading of the different
Fitts of the enemy. If they had fuccetoled by elt
coping from bl ,ekade Gentlemen would male I
that though it might be rendered tor:madly ufeful i
defeating the projeth of the ener.:f, the lyttem con( i
not be carried iit:o certain effect again!! Mete tLa