Star.
London, England, 1809-04-22 00:00:00

Mr',"

... .
, . .
scene of action. - His Lordship .
in kW* of resiftanee teithe aggreisions of P since, laid ; inked ; besidevAt • was ,to be reeelleeted lira eitl eldwismattaskith '' .
:pedition to Portugal, had it been lon his Majesty's Ministers as- heavy a responsibility ' way were not the only-horses sent with an army ;', .antielpitingahat he mist meet . '• • slain&
yas a first step ;as it tended to en., as any tawhich a Governmentvras perhaps ever sib- there• must be horses for the artillery, for the i nine took' i eery narrow viewof the cruse, whetettp-
cdoms. Ministers ought to have ' jected. On the part of his Majesty's Ministers he Wait Stag, .1" *Cs The next consideration was 'the ', pintad it would be over in one campaign ; that then"
plan, sprung from mature consi- anxious to declare, that the furthest wish from their country. in which cavalry were to act; the central 1 mild be no reverses, bet that all must'be success and
information. But how had they minds was to avoid inquiry into their conduct ; their. , provinces of Spain were cavalry countries; the two I victory. The whole speech of the Noble Earl had cost..
:s of this country? They had first , only desire was, that that conduct should be fairly in. i. Castiles, and a considerable part of Leon, 'Were i veYed an idea that the Spanish cause was over; buthe
with 11,000 men to Sweden, to I vestigated, and that no misrepresentation of the facts cavalry countries ; but the districts through which the II would mention,- that the French ruler had not yet sue.
igdom against the gigantic power ; should be substituted fqr,the facts themselves. . The British army marched were not so. Biscay, Asturias, I' seeded in subduing Spain. He had employed more
once, Russia, and Denmark. But 1 Noble Earl had cepsured his Majesty's Government. Gallicia, and even Portugal, were not so. Sir John- I thin 200,000. men, and the greatest part of his best
am Moore, scarcely knowing what 1 for Precipitation ; he.had declared it to be his opinion Moore was under the necessity on this account, and Generals. He had appeared there in person to give
saving him in total ignorance of ; that they ought to have waited to ascertain the proba- on this alone, of separating his cavalry from his main ,• additional spirit to his army ; and yet, notwithstand-
he disgracefhl result of that expe- ; bility of the 'success of the cause of patriotism in body of infantry, because in that which was the nearest : ing all his immense exertions, he possessed not at thit
mown. Another expedition had I Spain, before. they ofFered4he Spaniards assistance ;route for infantry, cavalry could not be adequately : moment more of the country than he did last year i
ler the command of Sir Arthur I This was a mostextraordinat y opinion. What ! when supplied. Let their Lordships look at other expedi- '• and the unity and firmness ofthe Spaniards, since them
I
-st intelligence of the Spanish Re- ! the feeling of resistance against oppression was. so tions, on the subject of cavalry. Let them look at i•idvantages had been obtained by die enemy, clearly
was its intent? To profit by the ; strong and so general in Spain, would it have been' the expedition to Egypt—an expedition which he had . evinced their spirit and fixed determination to resist
in, and tear from her weakened honourable to the British character, had his Majesty's I never heard arraigned. Egypt was a cavalry country. ! all the efforts of their oppressors.. He thought the.
of her South American territories.. Ministers toldthegallantSpaniards—oWewill not give : The French. cavalry were in great numbers, afford- i noble and spirited defence of Saragossa, though it .
Ilery and strong bodies of cavalry you aid while you are most in want of it ; while your ef- ing them the only chance which they possessed of re- I might have its equal, had not its superior in history,
h America, where no regular and forts at emancipation are in infancy; but we will defer i sisting the British troops, yet the whole of the cavalry ! and shewed the Spaniards would effectually. defend
iy would be met. In Portugal our assistance until you are in full strength, and need it i landed in Egypt amounted only to 150, and them were . their country, though they may sometimes. err from
:ontrary, objects of the first neces- : not?" He was convinced that he should be able satisfac. :no horses for the artillery, which the men were obliged too much zeal and enthusiasm. He begged their
them, Sir Arthur sailed for South torily to prove to their Lordships two things ; the first, :to move themselves. Having stated these general pro- Lordships to recollect what had been done in Arne-
order of his destination being that the plan adopted by his Majesty's Ministers with • positions with respect to the difficulty of sending cavalry rica. In the outset we gained every battle, took Bose
nly repaired to the latter court- respect to Spain, was the most wise and expedient ! abroad, he would boldly say, that there was not an in- , ton, Philadelphia, New York, and seemed to be se-
:erly experienced their want.— I that could have been adopted, and that it was pm-- • stance on record in which such an effort had been made. , cure of subduing them, till General Burgoyne and his
ne the 21st, that Ministers sent sued with the utmost steadiness and firmness ; the :By the documents on the-table it appeared, that dur- ' army were surrounded and taken prisoners at Sara-
Portugal, to examine the state second, that , had _any other plan been adopted it ing the last few months eight or nine thousand horses toga. Their systen was that of protracted .war ;
I the dispositions of the people ; ' would probably not have been more successful than , were sent to Spain and Portugal, and that that num- ', that of the Spaniards "mild now be the same : and
of th 6 same month, they or- ? the plan adopted by them. As a general principle her would leave been augmented to at -least 12,000, ! when we looked to the ascent and natural situation of
iVellesley to proceed to the Ta- ihe might safely contend that it was impracticable, had it not been for advices from Sir David Baird.— 1 that country, to their population, strength, and mai-
learnt that Lisbon was garri- and that if practicable, it was not wise to send a large With respect to the supposed operation of this alleged ! tary talents, he could not see there was any reasonable
) French. It was true that Gene- t British army into the interior of any continental coin- . deficiency of cavalry in the production of the armistice T
cause to doubt of their ultimate success in the struggle,
irds stated that the French force try, without the previous attainment of the means by • and convention, he totally denied it. On the 22d of arduous as itwas, in which they were now engaged. He
•ds of 20,(X)0 men; but what could which that army would be rendered secure. These August, the day on which the armistice was conclud- -had the consolation aokeow, that they felt themselves
irudence of men, who, on so slight means were wholly wanting on the N. W. Coast of ed, the British cavalry in Portugal was considerably t bound by every tie of gratitude and affection to this •
le former, bad hazarded the fate Spain, recommended by the Noble Earl. No security . superior both in quality and number to the Freneh country ; and that notwithstanding the unfortunate.
and the lives of so many brave could there be found for re-embarkation of troops— :army, for the moment that the destination of Sir A. event of the campaign, the heart of every true Spa-
did they learn the truth, than all no facility there existed for extensive operation. Wellesley was fixed for Portagal, an adequate supply 1 niard beat as highly and warmly in favour of Great
igades of Generals Anstruther and The provinces there were worse supplied with prove- :of cavalry was sent to hint. With respect to the Britain, as at the moment'when they first asked and,
lipped off to support Sir Arthur sions than any other in Spain. If.any confirmation ' question whether it was politic or not to allow Junot received the assistance which we gave them. No man
,ordship reprobated the alterations of these assertions were wanting, it would be sound to evacuate Portugal, that ?Mist in a •great degree could answer for events to corm!. Submission may
the army, which was placed sus- in the opinion of the Marquis de Romana, who, depend on considerations of which military men were eventually be weir lot ; bat should that unfortunately
hands. He then gave a descrip- having to be sent with his limited force to St. the best judgait. He confessed that he did nut sonsider be the case, he had the satisfaction to know they could
it in Portugal ; reproved the Con- Andero, where he had every inducement tp wish in :1:e same point of view as others the supposed faci- not impute that submission to any want of assistance
the blame of which ought to he for the neighbourhood of a British army, dis?inctly . lity with which the French might have crossed the on our part. Whatever might be the result, we had
rs: the campaign in Spain, under declared, that we might have an elan-pot at Cm-Liana,: Tagus, had the Convention nut bean concluded:— doneour duty; we had made every exertion in our
id Sir David Baird ; and expressed at Vigo, at Ferrol, at Lisbon ; but at no port on Yet, if the French could even have maintained them- power ; and by contineingihe same course, we might
'tat the Noble Secretary of State the N.W. of Spain. Thus far it was proved that : selves in Lisbon fora manth or two longer, it must reasonably suppose that our joint efforts w.uld be
;aid that it had been productive of such a measure would be militarily impracticable. have materially delayed the operations of the British crowned with success. His Lordship co .eluded
this country. He compared the It remained to shew that had it not been militarily army, and might have eventually cttused the loss of 5 a very long and able speech (of which neither our
rte, who in three short weeks had an- impracticable, it would have been politically inex- :or 6000 more men. As to the steps taken by the Bri- time or limits will permit us to, giveat greater length)
,anish armies, who were to co-ope- pedient at that time to have sent a large British . tish army after the evacuation of Lisbon by the French, by giving his decided negative so the motion.
had readied Burgos, the point army into Spain. Spain rose by separate provinces ; they appeared to him to be highly prudeat. The Bri!ish Earl MOntA took an extended view of the cam-
were to unite themselves, before these separate provinces had separate Juntas, sepa- , came not as conquerors, but as deliverers. They csuld paign from its origin, kind contended that Ministers'
mad begun his march from Corms- rate armies, and separate Generals. There was no only restore that power which the Prince Regent left, had- acted without any fixed plan, and without con-.
(ore Sir John Moore had entered common centre of union, and although he did not : and the extent of the discretion which they thought cert with Spain. They had neglected the proper mo-
hought the second advance of the state this as an objection to sending a definite force : themselves justified in using, was to exclude some meat of sending troops tq Spain, and when they did
:n not a single Spanish sword was for a definite object ; yet he contended that, conside-a members to whom suspicion was attached, and to send them, had established no plan of operations with
;ore,. and thesgreatast part of the ring the unavoidable jealousies which must have ex- '. substitute others in whom the public confidence was the Spanish armies. Had our troops, on leaving this
lied by the enemy. whose cavalry isted among so many authorities of equal rank and ' placed. lie now came to the question respecting tine I country, gone directly to the North of Spain, and
unresisted, and raised contribu- power, it would have been highly imprudeaj to have ; march of the British army into Spain.. The Noble t co-operated with the Spanish force in that quarter,
measure, which, although digni- vested a British army in the heart of Spain, until ; Earl had said, that after having accomplished the to prevent any succours arriving from France to the
Secretary of State with the appel- some ope of those authorities obtained a predominating ' object of their expedition to Portugal, if it were th aught 1 French army then on the Ebro, had they taken a po-
ets, as its result had proved, de- influence. The Noble Earl had stated, that his Ma- , expedient that they .should go into Spain, that they i siien on the north_ frontier of Spain, something might
et troops, and fatal to the interests jesty's Ministers had sent a force to seal without any should be sent only to the South of Spain ; and that have been expected from their operations. This,
• John Moore retired to a situation definite object. But what would he or any other he was sure that at Cadiz or at Andalusia they would.. (said his Lordship) Ministers might have effected, as
,ake a stand, the dispersed patriots man have thought of his Majesty's Government if , have been received with great satisfaction. To Anda- i they must have been able to calculate nearly the time
;red around him, and raised once they had delayed their operations, and risked the loss lusia t There was no danger there ; the danger was in when the French troops, who were collecting and,
)1 freedom. The frontiers of Por- of an important object, by waiting for precise details, the North. The Andalusian% had even sent their whole preparing during the summer, were likely to enter
la would have afforded him a safe possessed as they were of general information respec- ; army to a distance.—There was not, a single French- i Spain. But instead of anticipating the entrance of
le latter, the impregnable fortress of ting the occurrences in Spain ? They knew that they ' man, nor the cle,ince that there would be one in the the French troops into Spain, and of making any at
mave secured his safe embarkation. could safely trust the gallant Officer at the head of : whole province. Had such a step been taken, the Spit- tempt to prevent it, the Ministers, after the dep_ar.
:ary of State had asserted that this that expedition with the discretion vested in him ; niards would indeed have thought we were shr:nkine, ture of the expeditition, write two letters, one after
made in consequence of Mr. Frere's t they knew, that even as a diversion alone, the expe-1 and not in earnest. For the delay in marching the another, to direct' it to land in Portugal, while the
was incredible. The fact was, that dition would answer a most important object. Were : army into Spain, his Majesty's Ministers were not numerous French armies were pouring into Spain.
iserably deficient in information.— their Lordships aware of the advantages which might answerable. Before they knew of the evacuation of No advantage that could have been obtained in Portu
id rendered him unworthy of being ' have been derived from that force, even had it not Portugal, or of the probability that such an occur- gal, would have compensated for this criminal neglect.
lyed in the British service. For who proceeded to the place of its destination, by diver. ' rence would take place in so short a time, his Majesty's Though the defeat of Junot had been complete, which
a. an English Minister at Madrid sions upon the coast ? In the state of Spain and • Ministers sent out instructions to the British Ulm- it was far from being, it was a mere loss of that time
th of November, when the French • Portugal, such diversions would have been most set- menders to prepare to assist Spain the moment that only which ought to have been employed in precaue.
ihilating the Spanish armies, had 1 viceable. It was to the diversion of General Spell- their immedamte object was accomplished. These in- 1 tionary measures. Ministeis ought to have calculated
of Somosierra, have been so totally ; cer at Ayamonte that the speedy defeat of Dupont ' structions were sent on the 20th ' of August; and on; I when it was likely that additional French troops would
had happened, as to request Sir John i was attributable. In his opinion, it was the duty of . the 2d of September, when the news of the battle of join those on the Ebro.
.The direct course certainty'
the French before they had received ; Government, as it was their effort, to equip the best ! Vimeira had just arrived, instructions were again bent would have been to have sent our troops there. The
The Noble Earl then alluded to the I force they could, :Ind to direct it against the object ! out not to wait for any detailed orders before the idifficulty our troops experienced in effecting . their
ipondence of Mr. Frere, to the false which it seemed to them most material to attain, but ' army was set in motion. He had' no reason to be- junction, might have been seen, and dught to have
amined in which he attributed al- I without such a final determination as should pre- . lieve however, that the delay which took place was been prevented. Should the Spaniards ultimately
if the unfortunate events that had ; elude all discretion on the part of the Commander. : avoidable. Armies could not fly, nor could they live triumph in this contest for their independence, we
British Army. He remarked I This force, under Sir A. Wellesley, called at Corinna ion air. Great preparations must neeessarila- be made- . certainly as yet could claim no share in that tritimph
monymous person who was sent :at a very critical moment. The Gallician Junta de-' He had no reason to believe that the delay was occaai We have lost some of the best blood of the country ;
t n Moore and the Council of ; cured, that the first object of the British ought to he ' sinned either by Sir Hew Dalrymple or Sir David i cne of our best and bravest Generals had fallen a sa-
ir, he said, to conclude, that his 1 the expulsion of the French from Portugal. At that Baird, or subsequently by 6it John Moore. If their crifice without producing any satisfactory equivalent.
irri peeled by that contained in a !time such an operation was obviously the sins:. ad- Lordships looked at the correspondence of Lord The Noble Secretary had talked much of the energy
. faithful patriot Morla, were the i yantageous, both for Spain and Portugal. General William Bcntinck, they would find that the delay of the Spaniards,
,but that General who had been on
'ans adopted for trepanning Sir John !Dupont was in a state of resistance. .The contest originated in those embarrassments under which a the spot, and who had laboured under so many dig&
Avance, to which it was known lie lin the south was undecided. But even after the sur-- • Government newly formed, like that of the Central culties from this very cause, had stated their disunion
'erse. Having stated the princi- render of Dupont, there could be little doubt of the Junta, mist naturally labour. He now came to the and general want.of attachment to the cause. Mr.
Lich he founded his charges against i policy of expelling the French from Portugal, and - general plait of the campaign. In his ramatks on bill Frere was not the person who aught to have been sent
misters, he should not enter now into ' thus enabling the Spaniards to direct all their atten- subject, the Noble Earl had omitted to state that to Spain, considering what had taken place before
.cations of this important question, j tion to tie Pyrenees. In compliance with the wish that plan so adopted was in strict ciad,ormity to the with respect to that Gentleman in that country. That
vlach he imputed blame to his Ma- .of the Gallician Junta, Sir A. Wellesley proceeded to sentiments of the highest military authorities is Spain. there had been a greats deal of,enthusiasm in Spain he
‘nt. 1 the rl: taus, and determined to attack the French there. Casamos and the Marquis de. komana laid given it admitted, but the measures of this country, he con,

~ . ..
He would not repeat an eulogy on the victories ob. ' as t:lvir opinion, that the British army ought to act
tamed in Portugal ; he would only observe, that in 13 in one corps in the north ; that Corunna ought to be
days Sir A. Wellesley beat the French army in one the entrepot for the tro Ts from England ; that the
general and two partial engagement;, and compelled British troops from Portugal ought to match by land
them to an armistice, and to an ultimate evacuation into the North of Spain, and that that line of march
of Portugal. With respect to the supercession of Sir w Lich was subsequently adopted, was the best
A. Wellesley, it was impossible that any Member of for the purpose. To Sir John Moore was. left the
Parliament should say who ought, or who ought not option whether to proceed to the North of Spain
i•.:(ler: bound to represent to his Majesti,
to.command an army. Sir Hew Dalrymple was at by land, or to go to t.'orunuau by mm. He d...-ter-
,,,is examination, we have seen with morti •-
divrace brought on iii; Majesty's Councils, i Gibraltar whet, first communications and the elm- mined to march through Portugal and Spain, and to.
tea by t:le iliitish Empire from the want of tions in Spain arrived, and had conducted himself run the chance of forming a junction in the North of
fight which have been aw:nced is every part ; with distinguished ability.—To proceed with the Spain with Sir David Baird. The policy of pro-
s Majesty's Ministers. "[kat no rational '
accusations of the Noble Earl, the next was the ceeding to Spain at all could nut be quest:oned.
at any tini_ been formed by them either for :
nvn exertions, or for combining them with
alledged want of cavalry in t'ortugal, and the as- , Would it have been wise for the British Govern-
•
Lnd l'ortugueLe nations ; unjust view taken ' sumption, that to that supposed deficiency the mont to confine their operativihs to the dcf.ice of
:i of either country, nor any due attention , Armistice and Convention were to be ascribed.— . Portugal, and to have made no effort for the deli-
:hose means which alone could have enabled He wished to enter at some length on the subject of verance of Spain ? It was the duty of the British Go-
act with a reasonable hope of success.
,roots before us, it would not be consistent the British cavalry which bad been sent to the Con- : vernment, having driven the French out of eortug,d,
ihot.t from his Majesty a declaration a our tinent. Had the Noble Earl ever inquired what the 'to make a powerful effort in favour •of L'ip.iin.—
ussiii,7, to the rashness and mismanagement proportion of tonnage for cavalry bore to that of If that effort had not, been so completely suc;:essful
iters, the hopes which the nation had been tonnage for infantry ? For infantry (and for a short as could have been wished, it was to be ascribed not
: been disappointed; a large and useless ex-
as and resources of the country.bas been distance) a ton per man was considered as sufficient ;.to a want of plan—not to a deficiency of judgment
danzerous accession of political, naval, and for every horse transported, not less than nine or ten or foresight in the British Government, but chiefly
already been obtained by the enemy, and tons were allowed. Thus it would appear, that it ito contingencies which attend all military occupations,
Majesty's brave troops, together with their vrhuld take as much tonnage to carry 5,000 cavalry, I which no human power could'controul. 'ln the con-
hlieo been saciificed without advantage in
!au, combination, or foresight, and equally as 40,000 infantry. But the amount of tonnage was , versations which had passed between his Majesty's
ecrtd." a small part of the question. —The quality of the : Ministers and the Spanish Deputies and Officers .in
LIVERPOOL rose in reply. He transports was a more material consideration. A ! this cotmtry,. the former made no Attempt to instill
tg with the Noble Earl, that the feel- horse transport. must be a vessel of a certain de- : into. the latter
.too sanguine expectations. On the
fence in the executive department of. scTiptiorp,' 'hiiiiirg a certain height between the'. contrary, they represented to them the uncertaitt issue
had been expressed by almost every decks, &c. The quantity that Government could of the contest iu which 'they would
i723cage. Indeed it
• .
try, when the first prosrt appeared_ at any time roc*, of such vends, was very li.
..1 ; was impossible to contemplate the . . nary character
. ,

.41 then read the following Address,
•J for adoption :
Address be presented to hi; Majesty to re-
that we have considered with attention the
'complete as they are, which have been laid
,he efforts made by his Majesty during the
Tort of the resistance of the people of Spa,in
unjust agwession and usurpation of the

tended, had contributed as much as any other cause
to diminish it. The acknowledgment of Ferdinand,
instead of his father, she wed clearly that theSpaniarde
wished a reform in their system of Government, and
that it was their design to stipulate with the new
King for this purpose. This spirit, however, had
been suppressed, ansi all the defects of the former Go-
vernment professedly countenanced, Which he had no:
-doubt had operated much in cooling the ardour and
zeal of the Spanish nation. He did not expect muck
from any fixture campaign on our part in that coun-
try, and thought that nothing, in short, could be ex.
petted from the plans of our present ministers, hay..
ing already discovered themselves so incapable of ei-
ther projecting or executing any great movement of
this nature.
Lord SIDMOUTH
Portuguese and Spani'
.Ministers, and to them
which wets the lamentai
roismz He did not de:
less_ it v:,as. longer emu
nish:d stichrocis of
He .supported the mot
dew to Spain and to Co
that it would prove ar.
. LOrd MULGRAV
merits of the Calipai
to abew that the utinl
gOired, or iihisit the./
haA been allkhrded 'to
'Lard ERSKINE,

H took an able review of the
iish Campaign, and imputed lo
n alone, the failure and disgrace
table result evelt of ilritish he-
espair of the cause of Spain, ur-
',mated to those who had fw
imbecility and mismanagement.
tion, from a sense of what was ti
areat Britain, and with a hope ; 41.
•
a admonition to Ministers.
VE entered at length into the
n in Spain, and endeavoured
af),.. aid V, :.:ch the 3paniards t
nature of the case a4.lrnitted of,
them.
in an eloquent speech, of whieb