Star.
London, England, 1813-03-13 00:00:00

PRICE SIXPANCE-HALITENN r.

- T

might be assembled to act against the particular body
of „French force immediately opposed to it—the
French in the. ther parts of the country beiug kept-
in check by. proper diversions. For instance, the
Noble Lords opposite knew better than he, that Sonic,
in the South of Spain, with 17,009 men, was mist.
ed to a zertain degree by Sir Rowland Hill, with 4
or. 5000 British, and 14,000 Portuguese and Spanish,
and prevented from invading Portugal. :He repeat-
ed, therefore, that we might have had a force in one
quarter sufficient to act effectively against the force
that would then have been opposed to jt, keeping
down the force in other quarters by judicious diver:
sions. Under all the circumstances which he had
described of a dispersed French army, of a weak Go.
vernrnent, of divisions among the military, he put if
to their Lordships, whether if ever there was a crisis
more favourable than another, or one which offered
a more wellitrounded expectation of success Van
another, it was. not that which had recently occur-
red ? Even those who had originally diffaed the
most from him on the subject of the Peninsula, had
always admitted, that if ever a case occurred, in
which the cause of Europe should be evidently at
stake, the greatest exertions ought theit to be made
by us. What had been done in Spain, had afforded
Russia the opportunity which she had seised, and
' Great Britain stood pledged to Russia, to aid he.
-cause by the most vigorous efforts in the Peninsula.
It was a common sentiment, that at such a crisis
every nerve ought to have been strained by England.
He would now call the attention of theit Lordships
to what had actually been done. Had the exertions
and had the result been such as the crisis promised
' And first, with respect to the tato great events to
which be had already alluded-ealte teduet;on of
Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos—importeat as they
were, they were achieved more by the consummate,
skill of the British General, and by the intrepidity efl
his troops, than by any adequate means afforded by
the British Government. These successes, however,
gave to his Majesty's Ministers another e-
increase their exertions; they evinced ,
was arrived in which the ulterior design
Spain might be attempted with the r
a favourable result. It was not to
.such was the general feeling in Spain
proposition which he should endeavor
was, that the object of the campaign hi,
the British General, in consequence
cone y of his means, had been unable
Ita,le of the partial successes which had
by his own skill and genius, and by '
troops—and that a small addition to
British army would have prevented
would have rendered available every
would have terminated the campaign '
British in the military occupation in '
already stated, that the :eduction of .
and Badajoz was effected more by the
General, and the intrepidity of the .
any means afforded by the British Government.—
But, after the reduction of
.Badajoz, what was it
natural to conclude would be the object of Lord
Wellington ? He disclaimed all communication with
his illustrious relation on this subject. He had par.
posely abstained from it. He judged only from the
evidence which was before the Public at large.—
By that evidence, it was clistiactly manifest, that a:
the conclusion of the siege of Badajoz, such was the
state of Scull's army, that the British General mus
have felt it desirable, as he knew it to be practicable
if he had not been prevented by the state of thing
in the north of Spain, to have made an attack urn
Seville, in order to destroy the French magasines
and, in a great measure, the foundation of the Frencl
power in that quarter. He might have brough
Soult to action under such circumstances as mus
have insured a favourable result, andhaving obtainer
an advantage over the enemy in the South, he migh
$s due process of time have gone to carry on his fin
'thee operations in the North of Spain. It might ac
,pear to some, that it would have been more advise
able to carry on those operations first in the Nord
But a little consideration would shew the futility,(
this view of the subject. Would it not have bee
most advantageous, early in April (the season mot
favourable for the purpose) to have struck at th
great foundation of the resources of the French in ti'
South of Spain, even if the ulterior object had bee
in the North ? But, added to any speculation, thet
was the fact, of general notoriety, that Lord Welling
ton would have gladly gcte to the South if he ha
not been prevented be the necessity of repairing t
the North in order to check the army of Marmots
and to protect the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo at
Almeida. He well knew that these fortresses we
unable to resist the inconsiderable force df Marrno
—a force that had actually been repulsed by the m
litia of the country, and which a small addition
body, of British troops would have effectually kept
check. Thus did his Noble Relation fail in effectit
that which must have been his anxious wish, becau
he was under the necessity, for the trifling object
protecting two fortresses, of moving the main bat
of his army from a point where success and glo
would otherwise have awaited them ! if at that petit
there bad been in the North a sufficient British for
to keep Marmont in check, on the same principle
that on which Sir Rowland Hill had kept S uit
check, Lord Wellington would not have fount it r
cessary to .-we in that direction ; but would ha
been enabled to accomplish all his purposes in t
South. A very small additional British levee wou
' have prevented all that:. There then was the fi
failure in ilia campaign, arisin..... Sr. m iisufficis
means, and in alledgitig that it might have been r
vented by a small additional force, he W.IS n9l
I dulging in any fantastizal flourish, or any wild
jaionary opinion, but rnerels stating tee plain
Isimpl, fact as it stood; and which he ch 4all-nged il
iNubte Lord villa heard him to contradict.- Cu)
I pelled, in the first instance, to move his wholi al
to the Northward, Ica such' a comparatively trifl
operation as the defence of two f dtresses, tai' loic

,
other warning to
d that the period
sign of liberating
greatest hope of
be doubted that
pain itself. The
ivour to establish
had failed—that
e of the insutfi-
le to take advan-
ad been achieved
the valitir of his
3 the force of the
every failure—
ery success, and
n by leaving the
Spain. He had
Ciudad Rodrigo
the genius of the
troops, than by