The Sun.
London, England, 1845-03-01 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, SATURDAY EVENING, MARCH 1 1P45.

independence, or the independence of any other man
who may have sat, or may sit., on this side of the House, But
again I repeat, that being in the position which I hold, I will
pursue that. course which I believe to be for the public interest,
And if in pursuing that object mys,lf, I shall have the Hon.
Gentleman's vituperation, arid even the loss of the confidence
of this side of the House as a penalty, to that. penalty I shall
be ready to how, and to submit to the consequences:—(Cheers.)

Strangers were then ordered to withdraw, and tho Ilouse
divided, when there appeared:-
-

For the motion.
Against it lt3B
Majority against the motion
SUGAR DUTIES.

On the motion for going into a Committee of Ways and
Mean?,

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER stated, in
answer to a question put by L,.,rd John Russell, that various
difficulties always arose when it was proposed to make a reduc-
tion or duty. With regard to those persons to whom the Noble
Lord had referred—namely, those who had sugar in bond, and
their claim for an allowance, he (the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer) could really see no difference between them and
thoseiwho paid the duty and took away the sugar to their own
warehouses. But, however, he thought it fair on reflection to
limit the commencement of the new duty to the 14th of March,
so that the parties might be able to get rid of their stocks by
that time.

the average prices of sugar in Calciatta, that this was not
quite so profitable a trade as it was supposed, fur he un-
derstood that there was a vague idea abroad that
sugar could be made for nothing in India. He
was well aware that those who exported sugar from India, from
the year 1636 and several years after, if they did not lose by it
they certainly made very little. Perhaps lion. -Members did
not know that sugar in India was grown in a manner very
different from that of the West Indies. In the one the cane
grew on the plantation where the sugar was manufactured,
while in the latter the saccharine juice was conveyed away in
pots to a considerable distance, and at considerable expense.
He would not dwell longer upon the subject, but he trusted he
had shown what the elect of the proposed measure would he
on the manufacturer, the retail dealer, and on the public. If
the House should determine that those discriminating duties
should be continued, let them at least have them administered
fairly, and not entrust to subordinate officers the means of as-
certaining the quality, material, and strength of the different
sugars.—( Hear, hear. )
Mr. HUME said he had never heard more complete or
convincing arguments than those used by the Hon. Member
who had just sat down, for he had had many opportunities of
witnessing the truth of his statement during the time he had
been in India. It did appear to him that it would greatly
tend to the public benefit, if the Hon. Member's views could
be carried out, and effect more real good than all the meddling
the trade had undergone, year after year, for a long time past:
He did think that the Right Hon. Baronet ought to deal with
those differential duties, for if he did not, the time might come
when he would be driven to a more abrupt cessation of them.
Let there be a time limited for the alteration, a time stated,
so that those who had embarked their capital in the business
might not be injured, without in any degree lessening the
advantage which the consumer was led to expect. Last session
the Right Hon. Baronet had led them to expect that the
subject of differential duties would this year have been set at
rest forever. Let them look at the conduct of Holland. Holland
was in possession of the finest sugar colonies in the world, and
n the management of those colonies she was excelled by no
country in the world. They had attempted to apply these
differential duties, but had found the attempt unavailing. So
it was with the East Indies. Let them give the growers of
sugar the opportunity of applying their capital to other
objects. Let not the Right Honourable Baronet attempt
again to impose the strong fetters which had been struck off a
few years ago. There was no dOubt but that the difference
between brown and Muscovado sugar was difficult to ascertain.
But he must say that the motion of his lion. Friend had ex-
hausted the subject, and had suggested the best adjudication,
in his opinion, between the Government and the country.
The motion was then put, when

. _
The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said that his
Hon. Friend was justified in bringing forward this motion.
He was sensible of the full value of the East Indian colonies.
He was sensible of their value in the consumption of articles of
commercial value ; and he believed, that if additional means
were supplied, that power of consumption would largely in-
crease. Nor was it the least evidence of their value that
India had offered the opportunity to men of rising to eminence
by the exercise of their ability, and through the force of
honourable character. Nor did he feel this value decreased,
when he saw these men returning home to fulfil the functions
of legislators with equal ability.—( Cheers. ) For himself
personally, he might say that he did not wish to impose any
duty on the sugar of the East Indies, different from that im-
posed on sugar from any other of the possessions of her Ma-
jesty. An imputation had, he believed, been thrown upon
him, from the circumstance of his connexion with parties who
had property in the West Indies, but he did trust that, from his
position, he would be the last man in the House to act is this
matter from interested motives. His Right Hon. Friend had,
last session, proposed a differential duty on foreign produce,
but an equal duty for the sugar of all the British posses-
sions. '1 here e• was, then, a distinctive duty only
given to the produce of British possessions. But
it was improbable, if not impossible, to carry this
scheme of differential duties into effect. There was such a
slight difference between the clayed sugars of Java and
Manilla, that it was impossible to levy the duties rightly, and
they felt themselves almost obliged to refuse admission to these
sugars. If the suggestions contained in his lion. Friend's
speech were to be followed, those difficulties would be doubled.
This he thought was worthy of consideration. He was aware
that the imposition of differential duties was always an encou-
ragement to the inferior article. They had endeavoured to
encourage the manufacture of sugar both in the East and the
West Indies, by removing the prohibition of refined sugars
and admitting sugar in a state fit for use without any further
process. With respect to the observation of his Hon. Friend,
he felt bound to deny that colour was the only criterion for
ascertaining the quantity and regulating the duty.—( Hear.)
The standard taken was what was called the Java sugar, which
he had been informed was a safe one, a point below which a
lower duty might be established when the sugar was of an in-
ferior quality, and vice versa. The same difficulty of making
distinctions existed before as well as now. The term " white
clayed " might be termed a fair test of quality. Ile did not
mean that this standard should be solely applied to white sugar,
but sugar by any process rendered equal to the Javan. Colour
would not be a distinguishing character. For a long period, up
to the year 1825, the duty had been imposed on the principle
that Muscovado and clayed sugars should pay a different duty.
In 1821, in addition to the higher duty, a differential duty was
established between clayed and brown sugar. If they adopted
the resolution as it stood of taking the quality of white clayed
sugar as the test, they would take a practical and a useful
test, and one which would confer equal justice on all. He did
not believe that the basis of the calculation of the Hon. Gen-
tleman would be found to be correct.—( Hear, hear.)
Colonel SIB I'HORP rose amidst loud cries of " Order,
order," and " Hear, hear," but he ultimately gave way to
Mr. HAWES, who said that he was inclined to coincide
with the mover.—(Hear.) It was, in his opinion, quite vain
to think of establishing distinctive duties ad valorem., between
the products of the East and West Indies. Those very duties
were adverse to their principles, as they endeavoured to exclude
the finer sugars. That, he believed, was the main object of
their differential duties. He trusted the Right Hon. Baronet
would re-consider this question.
Sir R. PEEL said they all had but one common object in
view. The Government did not wish to subject the East
Indies to any new disadvantage. They did not wish
to benefit the West Indies Et the expense of
the East Indies ; for the East Indies were as much
entitled to consideration as the West. The question the Go-
vernment had to consider was, whether they would adopt
a uniform duty of 15s. or 165., or a discriminating duty. They
were of opinion that words were introduced which would de-
scribe what Oars of sugar should be admitted at the 14s. duty,
and what at the 16s. But if there was to be no discrimiminat-
ing ditty with regard to their own colonies, he would object to
a discriminating duty with regard to foreign sugar.—( clear,
hear...) He should say that the best course to pursue would
be to allow the resolution to pass, to ascertain if they could
find words which would make the quality of the sugar known
to the trade themselves ; and for this purpose they were in
communication with the Custom-house officers. Then, if they
could not agree to the views of his Hon. Friend, his Hon. Friend
motion, when the sense of the
cHoouilidsei in
might Com bmeitttaefernenuepw hison
it
Mr. F. BARING said that he came to the House to express,
as we understood, an opinion favourable to the scale of duties,
but after what had passed he would not enter into the subject.
He did not suppose it was the intention of the Right Hon.
Baronet, in asking to have the resolution passed, to prejudice
those who had other motions to make.
Sir R. PEEL replied in the negative.
Mr. GLADSTONE thought that the words to be intro-
duced would have very little effect in altering the sense of the
resolution. But he rose for the purpose of correcting two
mistakes. His Hon. Friend near him (Mr. Hogg) had said
that he said that the East Indian interest were not entitled to
any favour. Noe. he said no such thing. What he said was,
that the principle on which the West Indian interest
justified the 108. duty was wholly inapplicable to
the case of the East India interest. That was all he said.
The other point to which he referred was that it had been
stated in the newspapers, that he had said that the editor of
the Economist newspaper had made certain statements from
an intention to deceive, or from misconception. He supposed
that what he had said was not heard distinctly, but as he was
in
intention of of throwing the slightest moral givenimpu-
he :thpoluin to an
thought
it rightindid
ivtuoal
sayinw
reflectionth
on that gentleman. As to the question of
ahtfaoisat°srtinie mfilceoladli'rtcai classification aoahtde
ei admitted that the Hon. Member for Lambeth
had raised it fairly ; he admitted that there would be a difficulty
in working-out such a system, but he did not think that
the Honourable Member for Lambeth was aware of the
extent of the difficulty. The only way of getting out of that
difficulty was to say that raw sugar and double refined should
pay the same duty. Ile had never said one word against classi-
fication. _ .

Mr. HOGG expressed himself satisfied with the course
proposed to be adopted by the Government, and withdrew his
amendment.

The House then went pro forma into a Committee of Ways
and Means, the resolution was agreed to, and the report was
ordered to be received on Monday.
The other orders of the day were then disposed of, and th•
House, at One o'clock, adjourned to Monday.

RAILWAY DEPARTMENT OF THE
BOARD OF TRADE.

REPORT OF TILE RAILWAY DEPARTMENT OF THE 110ARD OF TRADE
ON THE MANCHESTER AND LEEDS DISTRICT.
Railway Department, Board of Trade, Whitehall.
The Board constituted by Minute of the Lords of the Committee
of Privy Council for Trade, for the transaction of railway business,
having had under consideration the different schemes deposited
with the Railway Department for extending railway communica.
tion in the Manchester and Leeds district, have determined on
submitting the following report thereon for the consideration of
Parliament.
In this case, the question of preference between schemes proposed
for completing the railway communication, of a district in con-
nexion with an existing trunk line, and schemes similar in their
general object, proposed by independent companies, is so deeply in-
volved, that we think it desirable to commence our report by
quoting the following passage from our previous report on the
south.eastern district, in which the principles by which we have
been guided in such cases are fully stated :
" The list of schemes In this district shows that on the one
hand a very extensive and comprehensive system for the accommo.
dation of the whole Kentish and South-Eastern district, is pro.
posed by the south-eastern Company, in connexion with their
existing lines; while, on the other hand, the same or nearly the
same objects are proposed to be mtained by a number of new and
independent schemes.
" This
roefntdheer spirti
nncei epel
ess s awr yh
itchha th
awyee s h
guidedo l buesg,iiisn bt
hy
sa na
nedx
ml
cit
statementlar cases, in forming an opinion whether a preference ought er
ought not to be given, and if given, under what conditions and to
what extent, to lines for completing the accommodation of part l-
ector districts, which lines are in connexion with existing railways
in those districts.
"In this, as in every other case, we heee endeavoured to keep
steadily in view the attainment of the greatest amount of public
advantage. We have not recognised the existence of anything
like a vested right in existing Companies to be protected from the
same description of competition which they have themselves in-
flicted on canals and other existing modes of communication. Be-
yond, perhaps, a bare preference, in cases of absolt to equality,
due to the interests of shareholders, who themselves constitute a
portion of the public, we have not considered that an existing
railway Company could claim any preference over other parties
proposing to effect the same objects, beyond that which might re.
suit from an identification of interest with the public.
" Considering the subject in this point of view, it appears to us
that, as a general rule, the most important point for the interest.
of the public, is to secure the best permanent lines of railway
communication fee the country at large and for the wants of the
district. To sanction an inferior or unnecessarily circuitous line
proposed by an existing Company, or to reject one of decided public
and local advantage, proposed by a new Company, for the sake of
any terms that could be offered by an existing Company, would, in
our opinion, be, except under peculiar circumstances, unfair to-
wards the local interests thus sacrificed, and unwise as regards the
general and permanent interests of the public.
"We have, therefore, as a general rule, considered it as
an essential preliminary requisite, before entering upon the
question of giving protection to existing Companies by al_
lowing them to complete the railway communications of
particular districts, that the lines proposed by them shall be,
in all substantial respects, sound in themselves, and not inferior to
those proposed by any other parties.
" Assuming this to be the case, the question is at once raised
whether the public are likely to derive most benefit from competi-
tion, or from arrangements with the existing Company.
" With regard to the general principles which regulate compcti.
tion in the case of railways, we have little to add to the reports of
the Select Committee on Railways of last session, by whom the
subject was fullyinvestigated. The Committee state, in their Fifth
Report :
" When the lines are very short, the probability is, that unless
charges be moderate, road traffic will revive, and in such cases the
public have a great degree of security. Again, as respects the car.
riage of goods, it is found in practice that by other channels of con.
veyance, such as canals, an effective control may, under certain
circumstances, be placed upon railway charges. But in considering
the case of passenger charges, and in all classes of lines, except
those which are so short as to be effectually checked by the ordi.
nary road, the Committee think that little can be permanently ex-
pected from the mere multiplication of railways in the way of secu.
rity for moderation of charge. There may be, indeed, indirect and
accidental competition between railways, which may cause cheap-
ness, and there may even be direct and brisk competition, with
great reductions of fare, for short periods. But in such cases of
competition, somewhat modified, as have hitherto occurred, the
themselves, the Committee cannot in all cases repose implicit faith
in it.'
" With regard to the check of competition by railways among
result has generally been Increase of charge by mutual arrange
ment or positive amalgamation of the competing Companies. The
experience of the past is, however, limited, and might not, if taken
alone, warrant any conclusive opinion ; but in looking to the
nature of the question itself, the Committee feel this difficulty,
that they cannot, in case of railways, anticipate any such facilities
in the introduction of new competitors as to check the proceedings
of the Companies actually in possession of the traffic ; that in fact
there is no district in which the traffic will support any consider-
able number of railways; that there is no case in which they can
imagine a likelihood of more than two, or at the very utmost, three
lines of railway communication, which could be so situated as to
compete with one another, and they cannot conceive that two
bodies, or even three, acting by compact executive boards, and
secure against the entrance of any other party into the field, will
fail to combine together. It is, therefore, their apprehension, that
in such cases, either the different railways will continue to be
worked, and then that extreme measures will be taken in con.
cent for the purpose of paying very moderate dividends,
and it may be found that several capitals have been ex-
pended for performing the business which could have been
equally well, or perhaps even better, performed by one;
or a closer combination will take place among the Companies—
they will choose the line upon which they can roost profitably
carry the traffic, and will leave the rival line or lines unoc-
cupied.'
"The principle here stated,that competition loses more or less
of its value as a security for the public, when from the nature of
the case it is limited to two or three parties, who are constantly
urged by mutual interest to combine, has received abundant cor-
roboration from the experience of what has already taken place in
the history of railways.
" The following instances may be mentioned where railway
Companies, in a situation to compete, have, after a short time,
either amalgamated or combined together, so as to put an end to
competition :
" The Leeds and Selby with the York and North Midland ; in
this case the former line being virtually for several years shut up.
" The Birmingham and Derby with the Midland Counties.
"The Chester and Crewe with the Grand Junction.
"The Manchester and Birmingham with the Grand Junction,
" The Bolton and Preston with the North Union.
"The Northern and Eastern with the Eastern Counties.
" On the other hand, we are not aware of a slight instance
whirls can be pointed out, in which the public are now deriving
any benefit from direct competition between two railways.
" In addition to the instances of combination between directly
competing Companies, recent experience has furnished numerous
instances of the tendency of smaller lines, originally sanctioned as
independent undertakings, to resign their independence into the
hands of powerful neighbours. We may mention, among other
instances of this tendancy, the amalgamation or lease of the Shef-
field and Manchester to the Midland and Manchester and Bir-
mingham.
" Of the Bristol and Exeter, and Cheltenham and Great Western,
with the Great Western.
" Of the Mull and Selby, and Manchester and Bolton, with the
Manchester and Leeds.
" Of the North Union with the Liverpool and Manchester and
Grand Junction.
" Of the Greenwich with the South-Eastern.
" Of the Sheffield and Rotheram with the Midland.
" Of the Chester and Birkenhead with the Chester and Holy-
head.
" Of the Bristol and Gloucester with the Birmingham and
Gloucester. Beside others that might be quoted.
" The same principle has received further elucidation from the
inquiries of Parliamentary Committees on former occasions, as
well as from the great body of evidence collected by the Commis.
sioners of Inquiry into the Sanatory Condition of Large Towns, in
regard to the operation of the principle of competition as coin.
pared to that of well regulated monopoly in the analogous cases of
water and gas companies. Indeed it is too evident, as a general
proposition, to be disputed ; although great caution may be re-
quired in its application, and in discriminating those cases where
the competition is of a pure and simple nature, such as must even.
tually lead to a compromise, from those where a certain degree of
indirect and incidental competition may exist, from which the
public may expect to derive lasting benefit, either in the shape of
reduction of charge or of extension of accommodation.
" When an existing railway Company proposes schemes which,
although only partially sufficient for the fall accommodation of the
district, may yet be sufficient to prevent other parties from enter-
ing the field with further or improved projects in that district, the
arguments against the creation of a monopoly acquire additional
strength. The simpler case is, when, as in the present instance,
the existing Company comes forward with a complete and com-
prehensive scheme, and the question is reduced to this : whether
the existing Company is able and willing to offer guarantees for the
public advantage superior to any that can be afforded by a new
Company.
" Of the ability of the old Company to offer such guarantees
there can, generally speaking, be little doubt.
" Istly. An established Company, which has a valuable pro.
perty and large available income independent of the new scheme,
can, of course, offer a guarantee for the fulfilment of all that it
it undertakes to accomplish greatly superior to that of any new
Company, however respectable.
" This consideration derives great weight from the experience
which has been already afforded of the failure of many new Corn.
panics to accomplish the objects for which they were incorporated.
We need only refer to the instances of the Eastern Counties
Company, which was incorporated as a line from London to Nor-
wich, and has never yet been carried beyond Colchester; of the
Northern and Eastern, which for many years stopped short of
Cambridge ; and of the Great North of England, which abandoned
the portion of its line between Darlington and Newcastle.
" 2dly. The traffic of a system of lines connected with one
another can always be worked more economically and con-
veniently under one uniform management than by independent
Companies. The Company which works the main trunk line, and
possesses the principal terminal stations, can run more frequent
trains, and make better arrangements for forwarding the traffic of
the cross lines, than it could afford to do if two or three separate
establishments had to be maintained, and the harmony of arrange.
ments depended on two or three independent authorities. Under
each circumstances a conflict of feeling and interest has almost in-
variably grower up, from which the public has suffered the most
serious inconvenience. When the traffic is large, this conflict has
frequently led not only to increased inconvenience, but to increased
danger; and where the terminus or a portion of the rails of one
Company have been common to the other, these results have been
greatly aggravated.
"idly. An established Company can always, if so disposed, offer
guarantees and advantages for a greater extent of railway than the
new Company, viz., for the existing as well as the projected lines.
When the existing Company is already in possession of the princi-
pal trunk of the district, the advantage of securing such guarantees
for the whole system, rather than for only a small portion of it, is
rendered more apparent.
" The Select Committee of last session, for reasons which are
fully stated in their report, attach great importance to the obtain.
ing of guarantees from existing companies, by voluntary arrange-
ments similar to those which they recommended, and which Parlia.
ment subsequently adopted in the case of new railways; and ex-
press a strong hope, that among the existing companies there
may be those which will be disposed to accede to arrangements,
resembling, in their general principle and effect, those which are
now proposed for new railways.'
" ethly. Whatever guarantees may be thus offered by existing
Companies, possess the double advantage, as compared with simi-
lar offers from new Companies, of coming into immediate opera-
tion, and of being more certainly rendered effectual. An offer
from a new Company to hind itse:f to charge fares considerably
lower than those usual upon other lines, might readily be made,
in the hope of thereby securing their Bill: but the fulfilment.
of it would depend almost entirely upon the eventual success of
the line, and its ability to perferm its engagements. No Act of
Parliament could compel an insolvent concern to carry at as low
rates, and afford as ample accommodation, as a prosperous under-
taking might be able to do. A moderate offer from an established
Company, who can be relied on to fulfil their engagements, is
therefore preferable to ono apparently more advantageous from a
new Company.
" For these, among other reasons, we conclude that the policy
indicated by the Committee of last session, of giving a preference
to the schemes of existing railway Companies for supplying their
x
be required to should
protect the public again et the possible abuses of Inv-
own districts, when such schemes arc as good or better than that
I:tses
as
exist
may which
reasonably
h
induce us to look for advantage from competition, and where the
oo
lf d airy
Company otheri
or ui ens t il
y where o
offers
s specialuc such
g rueaarsacil
guarantees