The Sun.
London, England, 1842-01-14 00:00:00

(Before Vioe•Cbsncellor WIGBAIL)
THOMPSON V. DERHAM.

This was a motion for an injunction heard in private
previous to the Christmas vacation.
his lloNoua gave judgment at great length this morn-
ing. The question turned upon the construction of the
will of a testator named William Hindu. In the month
of June, 1829, the testator had entered into partnership
with three other persons as a worsted spinner,
and wool stapler ; and by the 28th article of the deed,
it was agreed that if Wm. Hinde should depart this life
before the expiration of the term limited for the partner-
ship. he should be at liberty to nominate any one or
more of his sons to succeed him in five of the shares, and
the profits arising from them. The bills ought to have
the trusts of Wm. Hinde's will executed, and prayed a
lien upon the bankrupts' property to the amount of the
shares. It appeared that the surviving partners having
become bankrupt, the Commissioners of Bankruptcy
were about to enter a fiat upon the bankrupts'
estate, when the plaintiffs opposed the proceeding,
and prayed that no dividends might be received
till their claim had been adjusted. That application,
however, was refused. His Honour was of opinion that
according to the true construction of Wm. Hinde's Hill
his executors were not authorised to make over the
whole of his estate to the partnership. The retaining
the testator's estate was unlawful, and constituted a debt
from the partnership to Wm. Hinde's estate. He could
not, however, grant the injunction then sought, because
he would be deciding that it was the duty of that Court
to examine very decision of the Court of Review at the
instance of any creditor against whom its decision had
been pronounced.—The injunction was therefore refused.
NORTH UNION RAILWAY COMPANY V. THE BOLTON
RAILWAY COMPANY.

This case, which was a motion for an injunction to
restrain the defendants from erecting certain works on
the plaintiffs' line of railway, was concluded this morn-
ing. His Honour said there was no proof that any in-
jury would be sustained, and the motion, therefore, must
stand over generally, with liberty to apply.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, Jan. 13.

IRZACII OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE.-DARBON V. ROSSER

Mr. TEESIGER moved in this case for a rule to show
cause why the verdict should not be set aside, on the
ground of the damages being excessive. The case was
tried before Mr. Justice Wightman, at the sittings after
last term, and a verdict had for the plaintiff for 1,6001.
There were various promises assigned, and the defendant
pleaded the payment of a sum of money in satisfaction
and acquittal of these promises.
Lord DENmAN said the Court generally knew what-
the case was, and Mr. Justice Wightman had an opinion
upon it ; but, without being taken to pronounce any
opinion at present, the Court would suggest whether it
would not be advisable that the parties should confer to-
gether, and the case could be mentioned again in the
course of the week.

Mr. TIIESIGER assented to this suggestion.
KEMP V. GARLAND, ADMINISTRATOR.
Mr. PLATT said this was an action of assumpsit, tried
before Mr. Justice Wightman at the last Guildhall sit-
tings. The declaration stated that Charles Garland, de-
ceased, was indebted to the plaintiff in his lifetime in the
sum of 3301., and for which the deceased had given his
warrant of attorney to confess judgment for the sum
therein mentioned, with a defeasance indorsed upon the
warrant of attorney. By that defeasance the sum of
3301. was to be paid by instalments, of which five were
paid, and eight remain unpaid. To that the defendant
pleaded-Ist, that he did not promise ; 2d, that he did
not execute the warrant of attorney ; 3d, a set off ; and
4th, the statute of limitations. All the issues were found
for the plaintiff, except that with regard to the statute of
limitations, on which a verdict was entered for the
defendant, with liberty to the plaintiff to move to enter a
verdict for 741. Is., if the Court should be of opinion that
the plea of the statute of limitations did not apply.
The warrant of attorney was given in 1832, and it was
admitted that all the instalments except the• last three
did not come within the statute of limitations, and the
contest was with regard to these three instalments. The
objection made at the trial was that the statute of li-
mitations had run as against these three instalments, be-
cause by the terms of the defeasance the party had a
complete right of action more than six years ago. He
submitted, however, that that did not bar the right of
the plaintiff to recover the instalments in dispute, and
having quoted some authorities on the subject,
The COURT said it would be necessary to look into
the case.

THE QUEEN V. KENRICE AND ANOTHER.

This was an indictment for a conspiracy to defraud
one George William Featherstonhaugh of a valuable se-
curity for 1681., by unlaWfully, knowingly, and design-
edly pretending that a certain carriage, and a certain
mare and gelding, were the property of a lady deceased,
and since then of her sister, and that they were not the
property of a horse-dealer. The defendants had also
alleged that the horses were quiet to ride and drive, with
intent to defraud. The case was tried before Lord Den-
man at the sittings after last term, and the Jury found
the two defendants guilty.
Mr. BYLES now moved for a rule to show cause why
there should not be a new trial, or why the judgment
should not be arrested, and why there should not be a
venire de novo. With regard to the arrest of judgment,
perhaps it might be convenient to mention the point
which :Arose upon the record. The indictment con-
tained two sets of counts. One for false pretenees, in
representing that the horses were quiet, and the property
of a lady, and the other for a conspiracy, by fraudulent
representations, to sell the horses and obtain the money.
Now, he submitted that the count for false pretences was
liable to two serious and fatal objections. It alleged
that the defendants had fraudulently represented the
horses to be quiet, &c., for the purpose of fraud, and had
thereby obtained a valuable document or cheque for the
su:n of 1681. The first objection was,: that the indict-
ment did not state whose order or cheque it was that
the defendant had; the consequence of that would be,
that it would be extremely difficult to plead that indict-
ment in bar to an indictment for a felony for the same
order or money. The money was :not laid to be the
property of any person, but there were several authori-
'tics to which he would refer the Court, which would
establish the fact that it was necessary that the money
or valuable consideration obtained should be laid to be
the property of some party. The second objection was
that a false warranty was not the subject of an indict-
ment -
Lord DENMAN said it was clear the Learned Counsel
must have a rule for the first objection, but he wished to
know the authorities for the latter objection.
Mr. BYLES said there was Weekes's case, Pye's case,
and Codrington's case, which all bore upon the point be-
fore the Court. Then with regard to the counts for the
-conspiracy, it was laid down in the case of the Queen v.
Beck, 9th Adolphus and Ellis, that counts for conspiracy
were bad for being too extensive. The words • were
" Counts for a conspiracy to defraud, not stating the
means, is bad, not showing that the conspiracy was for a
purpose was necessarily criminal." Ile had another
objection also, that the younger Kenrick, who.. was in-
dicted with his father, had died after the,commencement
of the action, and there was no statement to that effeot
upon the record. After going through the evidence at
the trial,
The COURT granted a rule upon that point also.
JOHNS V. SIMMONS.
This was an action brought to recover a sum of 101.
advanced by the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant,
who was the owner of a vessel called the Phcebe. The
case was tried before the Under Sheriff of Glamorgan,
and a verdict had for the plaintiff, and a rule for leaa e
to enter a nonsuit having subsequently been obtained,
Mr. CHILTON now appeared to show cause against the
rule. It appeared that the vessel was lying in the port
of Swansea, and the master being in want of money
wrote to his owner, who resided at a distance of eleven
miles, and the answer was that he had no money
to send him, but to try and sell the barley
that was on board at five shillings per bushel. The
master not being able to obtain more than 3s. 6d. the
bushel, applied to the plaintiff's agent, residing in Swan-
sea, who advanced him 10/., which the owner refused
to pay,. alleging that the master had no right take
up money on his account. The Learned Counsel
having referred to the law, as it bore upon cases of the
description before the Court, submitted that the verdict
ought not to be disturbed.
The COURT was of opinion that the verdict ought to be
set aside, and the rule for a nonsuit made absolute.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER, Jan. 13.
RICKETTS V. NASH.

Mr. ERLE and Mr. PRIDE lux showed cause against
a rule to set aside ."a release granted by the plaintiff' in
this case, whereby the plaintiff's attorney had been de-
frauded of his costs. It appeared that the plaintiff was
an insolvent, and having been run over and injured by
the defendant, brought his action to recover damages.
The trial was had in August last, and lasted two days,
the result was a verdict for the plaintiff with 50/. damages.
The costs incurred were upwards of 1201. Tho attorney
for the defendant intended to move for a new trial, but
on the 30th of October some mutual friends interfered,
The plaintiff and the defendant met, and it was arranged
that the former should accept the amount of the ver-
dict, and settle the dispute. The money was paid, and a
release given, the plaintiff's attorney being ignorant of
the whole matter. The Learned Gentleman on behalf
of the defendant contended that, according to the cases in
the books, as it was clear that the oiler to settle came from
the plaintiff,the had a right to enter into the arrangenient;
there was no colluOon on his part to defraud the plain-
tiff's attorney, for he bona fide intended to move for a
new trial, and his attorney swore that he had good
grounds for supposing that he would obtain a new trial,
and eventually get the verdict ; therefore be thought the
arrangement a fair one.
Mr. KELLY and Mr. BURT, in support of the rule,
contended, that as everything had been done behind the
back of the plaintiff's attorney, the Court must -infer
fraud and collusion, for both the defendant and his at-
torney knew al,,the time the arrangement was entered
into that the cegts to which he was liable were enormous,
and that the plaintiff was not in a position to pay them.
The COURT were of opinion that the rule must be dis-
charged, as a plaintiff had a right at any time to put an
end to any litigation in which he was engaged. In this
ease the offer for an arrangement came from the plain-
tiff—there was, therefore, no collusion on his part.
Rule discharged without costs.
ADAMS, ADMINISTRATOR, V. GARRARD.
This was an action for work and labour done by the
husband of the plaintiff. •It was tried at the sittings
after last term before Lord Abinger, when a verdict was
found for the plaintiff, damages 3901.
Mr. CRESSWELL now moved for a rule nisi to reduce
the verdict. The facts of the case were these. A cora--
pany, of which the defendant made one, was formed to
work a marble quarry at Limerick, and the deceased,
who was the proprietor of a, wharf in London, Was en-
gaged by them as their agent at a salary of 300/. • It was
also sought to recover upwards of 100/. for wharfage,
70/. 10s. of which was alleged
to have been paid to
Wyatt, Packer, and Co., while the evidence showed that
the money was paid, not in full, but at the rate of los.
per pound, and that also not by the deceased but by the