The Sun.
London, England, 1842-11-25 00:00:00

which had been provided for by the deed establishing
the Company, in which was a proviso that when the
losses of the Company should have exhausted the sur-
plus fund, and should exceed one-fourth of the subscribed
capital, then any shareholder might call a meeting
and propose the dissolution of the Company. His
Learned Friend had said that the persons presiding
over the meeting, and proposing such dissolution,
were not authorised to do so by the 16th rule of the
Company, but that defect, he contended, had been
cured by the 17th rule, to which his Learned Friend
had not drawn the attention of the Court. At the
time of the dissolution of the Company, Messrs.
Bevila and Dunn were the public officers of the
Company. Mr. Graham was not appointed until
after the time of the meeting—that is, not until after
the Company ceased to exist. There was no minute
whatever in the books of the Company of the appoint-
ment of Mr. Graham as public officer. It was cer-
tainly true that he was returned to the Stamp-office
by Mr. Dunn, in 1840, as the public officer of the
Company ; but in the return of 1841, Mr. Dunn
stated that the said Company had ceased to trade
—that they had no books open—and that they did
not issue notes. The Company having been so dis-
solved, he contended, that there was no authority
in any person or persons to constitute Uley Graham
a public officer. Now the defendants had had no op-
portunity of pleadinc, to that judgment. The Act of
Parliament precluded them from it, and the only
relief they could get was by application to this
Court. The only remedy a shareholder could have,
except through the interference of this Court, would
be to show that he had not been a shareholder for
three years before the debt became due. He sub-
mitted that Uley Graham could not be the public
officer of a dissolved Company; but even admitting he
were the public officer, then he contended that Graham
had no power to bind Mr. Bridger by a warrant of
this description. Mr. Bridger had not signed the
deed ; and he mentioned this, not for the purpose of
showing that he was no partner, but to show that
he had given no such authority as could au-
thorise Uley Graham to bind him by a warrant of
this description. The public officer had no au-
thority to give a warrant of this description ; and if
it were contended that Mr. Graham was a partner,
and therefore could bind Mr. Bridger as his partner,
then, he contended, that the partnership had been dis-
solved before the execution of the warrant ; and the-
case of Rathbone and Bick, in 6 Bingham, showed
that one partner could not bind another in this way,
under such circumstances. He also submitted, that
the warrant had not been executed by Graham in his
capacity of public officer, inasmuch as it did not dis-
tinctly state that he had signed it as the public officer
of the Company. The next objection was that he was
not authorised to sign, and in support of that objec-
tion he would refer the Court to the case of Cob-
bud and Childers. Tie next objection was that there
was no debt due, and surely it would
be hard upon the shareholders if they were to be pre-
chided from raising that question, by what they con-
tended was a collusive proceeding between a person
styling himself their public officer, and another person
claiming that a debt was due to them. His next ob-
jection was founded upon the provisions of the 18th
section of the Act of Parliament, according to which,
he contended, that parties obtaining judgment against
the public officer of a Banking Company, were
bound to proceed against the assets of the Company
before they proceeded against the assets of the indi-
vidual shareholders. He contended that the Legisla-
ture had, in making that provision, contemplated the
protection of persons holding shares in Banking Com-
panies. The next question he proposed to raise, he
considered was a most important one ; and he trusted
it would obtain their Lordships' serious consideration.
It appeared that a scire facias had originally been
issued against twelve individuals, Mr. Bridger not
being one of them ; and the point he wished to raise
was, whether it was competent to parties to issue scire
facias time after time, so that, if there were ten thou-
sand shareholders in a bank, it would be in the power
of any litigious person who had obtained a judgment
against the public officer, to sue out ten thousand
scire facias ? It never could have been the
intention of the Legislature that parties should
be vexed and harassed in such a manner.
He apprehended that a party was bound to select
that person or those persons whom he might think
sufficiently solvent to satisfy his demand, and that
having issued one scire facias, he was precluded from
issuing any more. This provision was a benefit con-
ferred by the Legislature on persons obtaining judg-
ments against Joint-stock Banking Companies, and no
person could take the benefit unless they complied
with the stipulations. They might, if they chose, in-
clude: all the shareholders in one scire facias, and then
declare against which of them they chose ; but having
issued one scire facias, it was not competent for them
to sue out another.

Mr. Justice COLERIDGE—SureIy you might raise
that point upon the pleadings. You could plead that
one scire facias had already been issued, and on a
point of such importance the other side ought to
have the advantage of being able to take it to the
Court of Error.
Mr. TRESIGER apprehended that as the proceed-
ing was in this Court, it was this Court alone that
could grant them a remedy. He trusted the Court
would let in the defendant to answer a judgment
which had been obtained behind his back, and as he
alleged by fraud and collusion.
Lord DENMAN—We are of opinion that the scire
facias is void, as having been tested in vacation.
It, therefore, cannot be pleaded to. With regard to
the judgment, as it appears that at present Bridger
has nothing to do with the judgment, we do not see
how we can make the rule absolute on that point.
Mr. OGLE contended that as Bridger was a partner
in the Company, and as the judgment was against the
public officer of the Company, he (Bridger) had an
interest in the judgment, inasmuch as, if a valid one,
he would be bound by it, and cited several cases to
show that where parties had been indirectly interested
in judgments obtained on warrants of attorney, the
Court had permitted them to more to set aside the
judgments on the warrants of attorney.
Lord DENMAN said the Court had already decided
that the rule for setting aside the scire facias must be
made absolute. They were not asked to set aside the
warrant of attorney. With regard to the, motion to
set aside the judgment, the Court would take time to
consider whether it could proceed upon affidavits; tut
where a scire facias had been obtained, that set the
machinery of the Court in motion, seeing it was better
that points of this nature should be raised upon the
pleadings, as it was highly desirable that all the pro-
ceedings of the Courts of Justice should proceed in the
known channels.
Counsel for the plaintiff, the Solicitor-General, Mr.
Erle, and Mr. Butt ; for the defendant, Mr. Thesiger
and Mr. Ogle.

BAIL COURT, Nov. 24.

IN THE MATTER OF CAPTAIN ARCHIBALD DOUGLAS,

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL in this case moved for a
mandamus on the part of the prosecution, directed to
the Chief Justice of Madras, commanding him to hold
a Court for the purpose of examining witnesses, in
order that the case may be forwarded for trial. The
Learned Gentleman stated that his Learned Friend,
Mr. Chambers, had a similar application to make on
the part of the defendant, to which he was instructed
to consent. The application, on the part of the Crown,
was made without any affidavit. In this they followed
the precedent set in the case of the "King v. Ste-
phens and Agnew." In that case an affidavit was
prepared, but it was not found necessary to file it.
Mr. Justice WIGIITUAN—On the ground, I sup-
pose, that the matter contained in the information
shows the necessity of the order.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL—Yes,
information shows the necessity of;hemoyrdLero,rdand Tiltbaet
the subject matter of the prosecution occurred in the
presidency of Madras.
Mr. Justice WIGHTMAN—But the witnesses maybe
in London at the same time. It seems an unusual course
to grant such an application as you make without an
affidavit; but however, if such is the practice, you
may have your rule.
The ATTORNET-GENERAL--111 a case which oc-
curred in the Court of Exchequer Lord Abinger said
that an affidavit was not usual when the Attorney-
General stated that it was necessary to have witnesses
examined.—Application granted.

THE QUEEN V. THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY
COMPANY.

Mr. RICHARDS in this case applied to the Court, on
behalf of Lord Sidmouth and a person of the name of
Shackle, his tenant, for a mandamus commanding the
Great Western Railway Company to give direc-
tions to the Sheriff of Berkshire to summon
a Jury for the purpose of assessing the com-
pensation due to them for the damage done to
their property. The affidavits on which the appli-
cation was made stated that several acres of land
required by the Company for their works were ren-
dered almost useless, and that applications were made
to the Company to assess compensation, which were
not attended to.—Application granted.

IN THE MATTER OF THE STAFFORDSHIRE RIOTERS-

APPLICATION FOR A CERTIORARI.
Mr. PRICE applied in this case on behalf of several
prisoners now under sentence of transportation for de •
stroying by fire certain houses, for a certiorari to
remove the record into the Court of Queen's Bench.
The Learned Gentleman stated that the present
application arose out of the trials of certain rioters,
who had been tried and convicted before Lord Chief
Justice Tyndal at the late Special Commission. The
offence for which they were convicted was, that they
had destroyed, and pulled down, certain houses by
fire, and the objection which he took was that they
ought to be indicted for firing the houses. •Fire was
not an agent which would demolish or pull down
houses, and there was no remedy for these convicts, if
after returning from transportation they were taken
and tried for burning houses.
Mr. Justice Wioirrmax ;inquired whether the in-
dictment was bad on the face of it.