Star.
London, England, 1808-12-15 00:00:00

•
fort St. Julien, how did you propene to get heavy
cannon From the ships. It had been settled
before I left England that I should have the use of
the heavy, cannon I vranted, from the ships of the
fleet,. and ammunition for 24-pounders, and mortars
' were sent from England in a store-ship, which joined
the fleet before we were in a situation to undertake any
siege. I conceived that when the enemy should have
_keen defeated; 'and I should be in possession of the
left Bank of the Tagus, and of the sea.coast as far as
the Rock of Lisbon, should be able to land the ar-
tillery I required. for the siege of St. Julien, if not of
•Cascaves, at some of the.bays between Cascayes and
,Cape itccka.
Q. Could you have made such landing from the
ships ?. A. I cannot be certain whether I could have
landed from the ships ; because this must have de-
pended on the state of the weather, which was very
precarious ; but I thought it very probable that the,
weather would have admitted of landing in one of
those bays, and it is now certain that it would, as the
horses of the 18th Dragoons were landed at Cascayes
Bay.
Q. How many days would it have required to have
taken both places ? i. A. I never made up my mind
on that subject,"anough some time must have been
necessary ; and Ido not believe that the arid would
have been suffici.,:ntly strong to byre underta both
sieges at the same time.
Q. Had not the French the power over the m
horses, &c. in the Royal Palace, and in Lisbon, sod 1
the neighbourhood ? and would not these have assist-'
id much in enabling them to go to Santern, or to
silky other place to which they might wish to retires?
A. They certainly had within their power a great
naniber of horses, mules, &c. which must have been
of great use to them in this or any other expedition
'of the kind. Their cavalry would have tended to
give greater celerity to their movements; and there
were boats in the Tagus in sufficient number to pea
the army to Cascayes at once.

'•ti

Q. After the battle of the 17th, were you not
nearer to Santern than Sir John Moore's carps lies
when at Mondego, and might you not have -anima
there before his corps ?—A. After the action ,of the
17tb;' I was nearer to Santern than Sir Johuigfoote's
corps was when at Mondego, and certainly *might
have arrived there . before Sir John Moore's corps
could arrive in a state of equipment. I conceived,
that there were two distinct lines of operation ingot.-
tugal, and two modes of supporting them,-one by,
Cascayes, dependant upon communications with the
coast Tor supplies of all kinds ; the other by Santern,
depending for supplies on thg costaiMnication with
Mondego.
[He proceeded to state the 31:peeler &drainages of
the latter, there being in that line places under the
controul of the Government of Portugal, whick
would have served as depots, and have kept up the
communication, whereas on the other,-the proper•
posts of communication, and also those places fit for
depots, either were not in the possession ,of the
.Go-
vernment, or had been burnt.]
" Therefore," continued Sir Arthur Welles*,
" I conceived, that, after the action of the 17th; it
was not expedient that I should change my plan. of
operations with a view to those reasons only ; and that,,
it would be best that-the corps should take their line'
to Santern, and should communicate with M "
Q. Do you not think that the victuallers whi .
victualled. Sir John Moore at Santern, could also
have victualled you ?—A. If I had been at Santern,
and.all previous arrangements had been made for the
'supply of the corps under my command at that place,
as detailed in my letters of the Bth, 'loth, and 12th
'August, to Sir H. Burrard, I conceive .the corps
might have been victualled.--In answer to a questio.
as to the propriety of allowing General Anstruther'
Finigade to land where it did land, 'Sir A. Welles-
ley said, " I was not informed of the arrival •of Ge.
iieral Anstruther's brigade till the night of the 18th
August. They were then off the Burliags to the
southward of Cascayes, and could not have. Land •
them nearer to Cascayes, than where they did land;
without sending them back to the North against the
wind, or altering my position again and falling back
on Cascayes after the action of the 17th August, to
facilitate the junction.
Q. Might not the rest of the force have landed at
Maceira, and formed a depot there ? A. I conceiv-
ed the formation of a depot of provisions and stores
on any part of the coast was very precarious, parti.
cularly so from the beginning of August to the end
.of Septerhber ; it might have been effected by a long
course of fair weather, but was a position not to be
calculated on.

Q. If artillery horses had been landed, might not
they have been given to the Commissariat ? A.
They might have been disposed of in this, or any
other manner; but they could have been of no use
ft: the Commissariat, as there were no carts with abo
Commissariat, or in the country, which could
been driven by horses.
Q. If artillery horses bad been landed, could not
artillery waggons have been landed with them and
made useful to the Commissariat ? A. I conceive
that there were not more artillery waggons with the
army than would be sufficient for carrying stores for
the artillery, but those artillery waggons might be
employed in carrying provisions where the Comman-
der in Chief should WO proper.
' Q. Was there no good ground at ordear Mafra or
'Lisbon, for cavalry to act on ?—A. In my opinion,
cavalry could be usecliwith advantage in nearly all
parts of Portugal ; not in large bodies any where, but
every where in small bodies ; and there was ground
between Mafra and Lisbon, on which cavalry could
act with,advantage. He did lit recollect to have
ever heard at what time the light dragoons marched.
Be imagined that they went in company with Sir J.
Moore's corps.
Sir H. BURRARD interrogated by Lord MOIRA.
Ist Question—Sir Hugh Dalrymple and Sir A.
Wellesley have both rated, that the French might
have passed the Tagus with their whole force, and
might have involved the British army in a long course
of doubtful operations, at the very.time the British
army might have acted with effect. Are you of the
same opinion ? A. I certainly am.
2d Question—Could not General Junot havetrans-
ported2 his forces across the Tagus immediately after
the 22d of August ? A. I think he.might.
10 Question—How is this conclusion to be resisted,
that General Isnot *Ought the conditions.of the Con.
!vention more advsnstageous to thy Frew& Worm,
thal4 An the muses which has bens