Star.
London, England, 1830-06-07 00:00:00

first paper in which the question cf the extent to be given to Greece
Gas been treated with any precision; it carried the Greek boundaries
as far as the mountains of Macedonia. Since that period the reso-
lution to blockade the coasts of Greece having been adopted by the
powers who signed the treaty of July 6th, it became necessary to de-
termine how far the blockade should extend, and it was ehen agreed
that it should be established from the gulf of Arta to that of Vole.
This is also the ,ffect of the communication which 3lr. Stratford
tanning made in the month of Dec. 1827, to the Reis Effendi,
who was desirous of knowing what was the extent of the country
to which the Powers proposed to apply the work of pacification.
A question of this nature interested the Greeks too nearly for them
not to exert themselves to attain such a settlement of it as should be
most advantageous for themselves • accordingly the assembly at
&gine, in the note which they addressed to the Admirals in Decem-
ber, 1827, took great pains to prove the necessity of extending the
limits to the rivers Hallyanon snd Veroussa. The Ambassadors,
on the contrary, were inclined to think, that in case the Porte should
adhere sincerely to the Treaty of the 6th of July, it might be ad-
visable to reduce Greece to the islands and the Morea, withlthe ad.
dition at most of Attica and Bootie.
The change of these plans was natural, for they were destitute of
basis or consistency, from a want of being supported by a cotnpe.
tent knowledge of the localities of the country ; and the conference
of London being every day more sensible of the necessity of some
fixed determination upon this important point, instructed the am-
bassadors accredited to the Sublime Porte to proceed to the Archi-
pelago, and there to collect on the very shores of Greece the informa-
tion necessary to elucidate this question, and hereafter .0 direct the
definitive judgment which the conference reserved to itself to form,
;n execution of the Treaty of the 6th of July. The instructions
addressed to this effect to the ambassadors, while they admitted that
other lines of demarcation might equally be submitted to their de-
liberation indicated four, of which the least extensive crossed the
isthmus Of Corinth, while the most comprehensive stretched from the
north of the gulf of Volo to the mouth of the Aspropotatnos.
This last line is that which has been preferred by the Ambassas
don, who have given to it, however, at the same time, a slight ex.
tension. They have adopted it in the whole of its eastern part ; but
instead of leaving it to follow the course of the Aspropotamoa, a
shallow river, each bank of which is inhabited by Greeks, they car.
vied it to the Gulf of Arta, which almost corresponds with the line
elready agreed upon by common consent by the three Powers, as the
limit of the maritime blockade.
This line of frontier which, taking its departure from the Gulf of
Volo, follows the summit of the range of Mount Othryx, as far as
the Pindus, from whence it descends to the Gulf of Arts, comprises
an extent of only fifty-five leagues.
It separates two portions of poopulation, of which the one has
already submitted to the Porte for the last four years while the
other has never ceased to be, and still continues, engaged in insur.
rt.etion ; and between which, moreover, the difficulty of communi-
cation has prevented the establishment of much intercourse. It is
intersected by eight principal defiles, but not one of the roads through
these defiles is passable for carriages.
It is natural that both these portions of people thus separated
should wish to find In this line of frontier the means of defence ;
but if the Turks have reason to apprehend invasions which the in-
clinations of a people who continue subject to them might possibly
encourage, the Greeks have even still more to fear. The nature of
the Turkish Government is well known: the supreme and central
power resident at Constantinople is, ii ordinary cases, • tolerably
honest and faithful observer of treaties in its general intercourse
with foreign states; but some of the military chiefs nevertheless
permit themselves to make incursions into the neighbouring territo-
ries on their own account, and at their own risk and peril.
If the frontiers of so powerful a state as Austria have often suf.
feted from irregularities of the kind, how much more reason is
there to fear it for a weak province, without any natural defence,
and but just withdrawn from under the dominion of the Sultan; for
a province too, from which Blussulmans will be banished, after
having been dispossessed of the property which they possessed in
it ? It may be added, that by a natural effect of the inclinations
and customs of the Albanians, the Porte will always have the power
without the necessity of regular armies, by the distribution of a
few millions of piastres, to let loose upon Greece this population
Always ready for war and plunder.
In this respect, therefore, both parties will find advantages almost
equally balanced in a mountainous frontier, partially opened only
by some defiles, easy to be defended, by means of small forts cost-
ing little to be built or maintained.

If the Turks on their side had not such advantageous positions u
those of Zeitoun, Coraco, and Macrinoros, which would fall to the
lot of the Greeks, they would find compensation for these advan-
tages on the west in the possession of the upper valley of the As-
propotamus ; while, in the eastern part of their territory, the vast
plains of Thessaly, which stretch from the very mouth of the de.
tiles, would present to the Greeks fields of battle in which their in.
fantry could not risk themselves against the numerous cavalry of
the Turks.

The advantages presented by the boundary which extends from
the Gulf of Arta to that of Volo, would by no means be found in
the adoption of the plan which would enclose Greece within the li-
mits of the territory provisionally guaranteed by the protocol of the
16th Nov. By the adoption of so limited a frontier, nothing would
have been done for the safety of the Greeks, for the tranquillity of
the world, and for the security of maritime commerce. Thts is
easy of demonstration.
From the two castles which command the Gulf of Lepanto, and
which are separated by a narrow arm of the sea—from the two banks
of this narrow gulf, Greek and Turkish populations would con-
stantly be in sight of one another.
The Turks, masters of the best anchorages of most parts of the
gulf, with the advantage of the winds, which almost constantly blow
from the north to the south, would have the power of attempting, at
any moment, a descent upon the Mores.
The unwarlike population of that country would with difficulty
offir any resistance to the Turks, the Albanians, or even the Rom-
mel iota.

The continual dread of invasion would force the Greek Govern.
meet to keep on foot a permanent army, which would exhaust the
country, and would keep alive, together with military habits, those
barbarous customs, and that spirit of piracy, which has, in great
measure, rendered necessary the intervention of the Powers.
This same dread of invasion would disincline the population from
employing itself in the pursuits of agriculture and industry, by the
fruits of which they would feel that they were only acquiring the
means of exciting the cupidity of the Turks and Albanians. In.
stead of having secured peace to a laborious and peaceable people,
we should make of the Mores a scene of perpetual war, and a nur.
sery for pirates,
The tranquillity of the country situated to the north of the Gulf
of Lepanto would be scarcely better guaranted ; the inhabitants of
it have taken a very active part in the insurrection ; a great number
of them are employed among the Greek troops : others have
sought refuge in the islands. The restriction of Greece
to the territory of the Alorea would thus force a great number of
Roumeliots to abandon their properties. They are too far compro-
mised to hope for safety under the Turks, and the 180,000 Chris.
tuns who still occupy the territory which stretches from the Mons
to the gulfs of Arta and Volo sacrificed to 7,000 or 8,000 Turks
who alone survive the calamities of the war, would bear with im-
patience the yoke ion pa upon them, and would constantly renew
a struggle which wouM call afresh for the intervention of the powers,
by causing disorder and the effusion of human blood.
In speaking of this portion of territory, we naturally include in
it Eubcea ; that island nevertheless offers a remarkable exception.
It indeed rebelled in April, 1821, and was only subjugated in July,
1824; but the insurrection could not be kept up: the whole of the
island at present recognises the dominion of the Sultan ; and the
Turkish population, which is now in the other parts of Roumelia in
the proportion of one to ten, is still in Eublea as one to six. These
considerations are no doubt important ; but it will appear that they
ought to yield to others of a higher ceder.
Eulicea, which runs parallel to the Greek coast, flanks all its lines
of defence ; for this reason, therefore, the Turks were careful to
annex Eastern Greece to the Pachalik of Negropont. The commu-
nication is easy and constant between the two coasts of this strait.
Without Negropont Eastern Greece would see her navigation im.
peded, and the outlets for her productions closed; in fine, if the
island exhibits an external obee to the Porte, it must be be..
lieved that the seeds of discontent are yet alive, since it was at the
request of the Eubmans alone that Colonel Fabvieluanised, in
1825, the expedition which he directed against that island.
The question of the junction of the island of Candies to Greece is
one which might obviously give rise to greater doubt. On the one
hand, there is an unwillingness that the Turks should suffer so con.
siderable a loss; on the other, it is to be considered that from this
important and neighbouring point the Turks will continually
threaten the new state; that a large portion of the Greek popula-
tion of the island is in open insurrection; that the Turks, shut up
in their fortresses, no longer keep the field. The French Govern-
ment confines itself to pointing out this question, and submitting it
to the consideration of the conference.
These considerations are exclusively dictated by the spirit which
prompted the terms of the treaty of the 6th of July. The object
of them is to secure the pacification of Greece, and to put an end
tolbe bloody struggle which, while it abandons the Greek pro-
vinces and the islands of the Archipelago to all the disorders of
starchy, throws daily fresh impediments in the way of the coni-
Illette of European States, and even threatens the existence of the
tfteeenan Empire. There can be no question of needlessly enlarging
(frees at the expense of Turkey; all that is wanted is to find a
boundary which shall remove the points of contact between two
populations in such a state of agitation, which may give to both
ass y Moo of deism, and in short, may meet the necessity
so stiongly fek by of the maid, of establishing in Greece an order
of Op whisk it•R 000ry along with it the pledge and gumming
of its somblltp obi
It la 11. e with eke dime el wowing is kumeseeeles widek has
arisen is the Pakresativaa aurae Wen Odle dose POWS, km