The Sun.
London, England, 1842-06-23 00:00:00

in a vain attempt to subdue a race of men no less
brave, no less fierce, no less fanatic, living at such
a-distance, as to render a war upon a large scale al-
most a fruitless undertaking. It was under these
circumstances that he asked for such information
as would enable them to decide whether the war was
originally undertaken upon fair and just grounds ;
whether the great military authorities in India
or England • were consulted upon the subject ;
and whether due weight was attached to the opinions of
the only men who could afford to give correct informa-
tion with regard to the country they were about to in-
vade, as well as to the sentiments, feelings, and
opinions of the country. The Commander-in-
Chief of the army in India was Sir Henry Fane,
who by his long and brilliant services in the Peninsula,
won the esteem and confidence of the Duke of Welling-
ton ; an officer, therefore, who was well qualified
to give the Governor-General the best advice upon
the subject.—(Hear, hear.) As a military man, he
was called on to give his opinion, and he (Mr. Bailie)
had reason to know he gave the best and soundest ad-
vice.
He told the Governor-General that the course he
was about to undertake was unjust and impolitic—un-
' just in a political point of view, as regarded the disposal
of Dost Mahomed ; and impolitic in a military
point of view, as the country was so dis-
tant and so remote from all resources that
could be afforded ; he pointed out the possibility of
defeat and the impossibility of retreat—the character of
the frontier beyond the sutledge, and the propriety of
making the Indus the boundary of the country. That
advice was given a year before the marching of the army
so that as far as the Commander-in-Chief was concerned,
he performed his duty to his country. But befora un-
dertaking a great military expedition, contrary to the
advice and opinion of the great military authorities of
the country, it might have been deemed advisable to have
consulted some of the great military authorities of this
country—either the Commander-in-Chief of the army,
• or the higher authority of the Duke of Wellington.
If triat had been adopted there was every reason to be-
lieve that it would be consonant in all. respects with the
opinion delivered by the Commander-in- Chief of the
army in India. That the expedition to Affghanistan was
a great military fault, and a great political mis-
take, no one, he thought, at the present moment
was prepared to deny. He believed that politicians
were now anxious to devise means if anything could be
devised by which our troops could be withdrawn without
exhibiting proofs of our want of power in India.
What were the reasons of the Governor-General

in order to justify the invasion of Affghanistan. They
were stated in the manifesto, dated October 1, 1838,
which was published in every newspaper throughout the
country; it was, therfore, familiar 4.r.a1l those Hon. Gen-
tlemen who had paid any attention to 'the subject. It was a
rather remarkable document, and a most important one.
The Governor-General in that manifesto. stated, that from

information he had received from various officers in Aff-
gbanistan, the Beloochee Chiefs, from their unpopularity,
were unsuited to be useful allies to the British Government.
Such were the the opinions of the only English officers
who had visited Caboul previous to the march of the
army of this country,with the exce tion of those who were
with Capt. Burnes. He denied that Shah Soojah-00l-
Moolk was so popular a Monarch as had been represented.
They would be prepared to join with the Russians or
the Persians, or any force in Central Asia, directed
against the English. They could not be justified in
placing the British army in a position altogether inde-
fensible ; such as the occupation of a country by
our troops between SCO and 1,000 miles dis-
tant from the place of operation, which could
only be approached by the permission of a power-
ful and independent people, and that through the most
dangerous passes only. Such a scheme was worthy of
a boy, but he did not hesitate to say that no military
man would ever venture to recommend such a step. In
making this motion he wished it to be distinctly under-
stood that it was not his object to make charges
against the late Goverbor• General of India or the
late President of the Board of Control, they might be
' able to justify by the production of papers all their
proceedings in that country ; but he complained that
sufficient information had not been laid before
the House, to enable them to arrive at any fair or just
conclusion. The Indian papers that had already been laid
on the table of the House,were mostly garbled extracts of
letters, from which they would be quite unable to
arrive at any fair conclusion. He did not say that a
bulky volume had not been laid on the table of the House,
nor did he say that it contained no information.
He thought the House would admit this war
could only have been justified on the supposition
that it was impossible for the Governor-General
of India at that period to make any treaty
wiith the former chiefs of Afghanistan. Those were
the express grounds on which the Governor• General,
in the manifesto to which he (Mr. Baillie) had before
alluded, justified the war. Let them see then whe-
ther such assumption could be borne out. In the autumn
of 1837 Sir Alexander Burnes arrived at Caubul,
where he was most hospitably treated by
the natives in the encampment. He found the
Chief not only well disposed to the English
but so anxious to form a friendly alliance with
us that he at once put off all the negotiations
ho had previously made with the Court of Persia,
The Persian Ambassador had arrived at Candahar, on
his way to liaubul, with costly presents for the chief.
At the same time a Russian agent had arrived at Caubul,
but they refused to negociate with him, whilst there was
a probability of making an alliance with the English.
Now, it was necessary that the House should know what
were, in fact, the proposals which Dost Mahomed at
that time offered to the British Government. They found
those proposals laid down by Cap. Burnes in one of his des-
patches to the Governor-General. The Hon. Member
then read a dispatch of Captain Burnes to the Governor-
General, stating that Dost Mahomed had stated
that he was desirous of placing himself under the pro-
tection of the British Government, and did not wish the
restoration of Candahar, provided he received that pro-
tection. What, he askad, was the protection of the
British Government against Persia, in the event of his
alliance with us calling down upon him the hostility of
that power ? And what was the answer of. the
British Government to these proposals ? A positive and
direct refusal to afford any protection from Persia what-
ever, except that which the promises of Captain Burnes
might afford. Dost Mahomed did not under-
stand the meaning of this moral influence.
In a few days after this refusal Captain Burnes
took his departure from Caubul, and upon his
arrival at Hyderabad, he wrote to the Governor-
General, stating that moral influence of British power and
the arguments derived from it had no weight at Cahill.
Now, in order to shew the House the good feeling and
the good spirit by which Dost Mahomed was actuated
at the commencement of the negotiations, he would read
t, the House an extract from one of Capt. Burnes'
expected dispatches were in the course of publicatibn.
The Hon. Member then read a letter of Dost Mahomed,
brought to him by the son of the Ameer, stating
that he wished to have nothing to do with any
other power but the British ; and that, if agree-
able to the Governor-General, he would turn
out the Russian agent into the road, or act
in any other way in which he was required. Sir A.
Burnes told the Ameer that he could not take upon him-
self to refuse an accredited agent, according to the usages
of civilised nations, but that he could make full disclo-
sures to the British Government of any designs
which might be opened to him.—(Hear, hear.)
He wonld ask the House if it was possible to show greater
good-will to the British Government ? Some doubts, it
appeared, had been expressed as to what were Captain
Burnes' opinions as to the policy of making war on Dost
Mahomed.ln order to make that point clear,he would quote
from a suppressed despatch of Capt. Burnes, addressed
to Sir Win. Macnaghten, dated Caubul, January 26,
1828.