The Sun.
London, England, 1845-11-26 00:00:00

CHINESE POLICY.

It is to be hoped that the importance of our relations
with the Chinese empire will not be estimated by the
amount of intelligence which generally reaches this
country by the overland mail. Little corrt ct and ex-
plicit information on this subject appears to find its way
to the Indian journals. A few hasty private letters,
communications dictated by the overflowing bile of some
officer living in a sort of exile at HongsKonss, and the
highly-coloured statements of merchants, whether pros-
perous or unprosperous, added to the meagre articles
of a half-starved press, constitute the sole basis on
which they erect their speculations. There is, conse-
quently, little reason to be surprised at the narrowness
of their views and the general indecision of their lan-
guage ; and still less cause have we to wonder at the
vague, shifting, contradictory notions of such of our
Contemporaries here at home as live in he Ipls sat depend-
ence on such guides, in all that relates to the po!icy of the
further east. To do the Indian press justice, however, we
must admit that it has recently put forward correctei
views, respecting China:and the Chinese, tiianits habitual
copyists in England, who, affecting to be for once inde-
pendent of their teachers, have fallen into the grossest
errors. When we argued some time back that it would
be impolitic to restore Chusan to the Chinese under pre-
sent circumstances, the fickle oracle of Printing House-
square, with tolerably well-feigned indignation, de-
nounced our suggestions as highly profligate. With a
sort of Malay CI ergy, which so frequently urges that
journal into the practice of running a-muck, it flung
itself into an offensive attitude, and prepared to make a
surrender of reason to its destructive propensities. But
happening to be more familiar with the facts of the case.
we were enabled, by a very few plain words, to still the
rage of one Contemporary, and may hereafter, perhaps,
enjoy the advantage—if advantage it be—of having
it as our coadjutor in this matter. We
repeat, therefore, that Chusan ought not to
be evacuated. Not because it would most likely, in that
case, fall into the hands of the French—though that, we
are prepared to maintain, ought to be an additional in-
ducement for as to do justice to ourselves—but because
the Mantchoo Government of China has not fulfilled its
engagements with us. The most factious and itrejudice6
journalist will probably admit that there are more ways
than one of breaking a treaty, and that the most cun-
ning and subtle infraction is as much a breach of com-
pact as a gross and clumsy inf.ingcment. This truth,
which, out of deference to common sense, must be recog-
nised, will supply us with sufficient reasons for insisting
on the retention of Chusan. We formerly rested our
arguments chiefly on what has taken plaCe at Canton
ever since the peace ; but facts are coming forward
singly, and invested with no pomp or ,appearance of in-
terest, which ought to be regarded as still more signi-
ficant and conclusive. In reality, the Chinese authorities
carry on the war against us still. They have only changed
the phenomena of hostilities, and for material imple-
ments substituted others, fashioned in ethical and poli-
tical forges, which they trust will prove far more effec-
tual. In plain English, the Mandarins at all the con-
sular ports, acting of course under instructions from
Pekin, are labouring to undermine the foundations of
our commerce, and, by instigating the multitude to put
in practice a perpetual system of annoyance and auda-
cious insolence, to drive us from those much coveted
markets in disgust or despair. They who understand
the civil polity of China will be able to perceive how
this may be done, though the Chinese people be gene-
rally well disposed towards us. Mobs under such a
despotism as that of the Mantchoos are swayed by two
impulses—the one natural, which they would obey if
they could; the other communicated to them by autho-
rity, which, as a rule, they must obey. When engaged
in persecuting an Englishman under the eye of the
Mandarins, they overact their part in order
to ward off from themselves the suspicion of
favouring the outside barbarians. It signifies little to
their victim, therefore, that in their hearts they are sorry
for what they do, and prefer their commercial visitors
from the sea to the ruthless tyrants from Mantchooria,
to whom their own want of courage has given an irre-
sistible ascendency over them. But, however this part
of the question may really stand, every communication
we receive from China may be said to lay before us fresh
proofs that the Tartar authorities are resolved to render
the treaty with Great Britain as nugatory as possible.
Our exclusion from the trade of the north-east coast be-
yond the thirty-second degree of latitude, may be matter
of regret, because it was in that part of the empire that
we might have found the best market for our woollens;
but the fault was our own, and arose out of that hasty
and pedantic diplomacy which has so frequently marred
our prospects in the east. The Chinese had a perfect
right to overreach us if they could. They were not
bound to consult our interest. All they had to do
was to watch over their own. Accordingly, nothing
can be further from our intention than to blame them for
what must be regarded as our own blunder. But that
system of petty vexations—that constant obstruction of
our trade—that fanatical and ferocious persecution
which has been unremittingly carried on against our
countrymen at Canton—and those clandestine hostilities
which have been incessantly pursued against natives of
all ranks who either favoured us while we were in force
in the country, or are suspected of having a leaning to-
wards us now—these things, taken collectively, consti-
tute a good ground for entering' into fresh negotiations
with the Government, and demanding other conditions,
which, from its character, it may be more likely to
fulfil. Meanwhile we may, without the least shadow of
injustice, retain possession of Chusan, where an im-
mense trade with the Chinese could be carried on with
little chance of unpleasant collisions between us
and them. As has been repeatedly shown in time of
war moreover—and wars will one day or another
unquestionably arise—the possession of this island
must prove of the highest importance, commanding as it
does the entrance to the Yang-tee-Kiang, which has
justly been denominated the great artery of the empire.
But it is as a means of preserving peace that we are
chiefly disposed to value it. Under present circamstances
the renewal of hostilities may, in our opinion, be con-
stantly looked for, considering the evil disposition of the
Mandarin=, and the kind services which the emissaries
of certain friendly Powers are so actively engaged in per-
forming for us in China. To prevent the evil conse-
quences of these and other causes of misunderstanding,
we have no representative at the Court of Pekin or on
the coast, for Sir John Davis is little better than a cypher. j
All his energies evaporate in squabbles with the British
merchants at Ho ng-Kong ; and if this were not the case
he is obviously quite incapable of coping with the subtle
diplomatists of China- A new mission to Pekin, there-
fore, might be very prudently undertaken just now, and
the ambassador who should conduct it would find suffi-
cient employment for his abilities, hoe ever keen
or brilliant they might be. He might remove
much misunderstanding, and postpone conside-
rably the period of inevitable collision between
the two countries. We say inevitable
because it would, in our our opinion, be wholly impossi-
ble to preserve fer aiiy greet h.ngth of time purely pa-
cific relations wi:h such a Government as that of China.
Despotisms are like childr« n, easily forgetting past (Hs-
i asters and chastisements, arid prone to provoke fresh
ones by acts of petulant caprice. In the actual posture
! of affairs, hoe eve r, an able English statesman at Pekin
might possibly check the tendency of the Mantchoo
Court to insolence and injustice, awl thus preserve it