Star.
London, England, 1808-01-28 00:00:00

TENTH DAY.

Almon the wh,le of this day was. ncenpied in
reading 9ver Genet al Lurnley's evidence of yeiterday,
to which he wade Come immaterial additions and
exrlattatino3.
Atter a conftderable degree of difinfUln among
the Mentheis of the Court, an expleflion ufed by
Ntaj r G neral Gower, when he gave the orders to
dean)), the cavalry appointments, was ordeted to be
erafed from the proceedings.
Colonel Ll-yd, whoft. name was menti-ned by
General Lumley as c9-mmanding the cavalry, was
then called. His evidetice merely went to confirm
that part of General Lumley's refpaling the orders
to dellroy the higgage of the drapont, and (fated
the number of :ma and hot fes cmbatked at bknte
Video.

ELEVENTH DAY.

Brigadier General Sir SAMUEL AUCHMUTY Called in
and fworn.
He was then requefted to detail the operations ofl
the army from the moment he came tinder General
Whitelocke'a command, up to the evening of the 4th
of July.
" General Whitelocke landed at Monte Video an-
expeaedly on the night of the toth of May, and next
morning lie requefted that I would confult with
General Gower on all matters relative to the expe-
dition. Before 1 could communicate with General
Gower, he had already-an-timed the command of the
troops, and dried orders from that day until we wr:e
brigaded to go to the attack of Buenos Ayres. I had I
no command or interference with the troops at
head quarters except twice, when the men were un-1
der arms, and I was reqttelied to take the command
of the infantry. A few days after Genera White-
locke's arrival, I was tequelled by him to accompany
General Gower and examine all the (hips in the bar 1
hour, and to feleCt thole which appeared fit for the
navigation of the river. With thefe exceptions, to
the belt of my tecolleClion, I was not confulted on
any arrangements or equipments for taking the
field. In civil mattets, and arrangements relpeCling
the out polls of the army, 1 was at &ft frequently
confulted. I was privy to many converfations at
bead quarters., refpating the praClicability of carrying
on operations at that advanced feafon of the year, as
well as the molt advifable places for the army to
land—a landing abrive the town, it was evident,
would be attended with fewelt difficulties ; but it was
doubtful if the channel would permit us to approach.
The Milian' (batter Mallet General had been Oil.
patched previous to General Whitelocke's arrival,
with proper naval officers to examine the banks of
the river ; and on his return the Deputy (tarter
Mailer General was alto fent up, and I rinderlined
from his report it was nearly impratlicalde to land
above the town. I was alfo prefent at the examina-
tion of many perfuns who kne ry the county y below
the town.. From what I could collect, it was very
difficult, but not impraClicable, to 'pals the morals
between the landing and the heights at any feafon, and
the General allured me that he could without difii
culty throw a bridge over the Chuelln. From this I
concluded that he meant to land below the town,
but I was not privy to his final determination.—
When the troops under General Crawford arrived,
I intimated to the General that I conceived that a
mild but firm letter to the Governor of Buenos Ayres
might be attended with good conlequences, and I
offered to carry it myfelf. The General approved
of the idea, and requelled me to draw up one. He
afterwards Paid he approved of my letter, but thought
it advifable to delay any lummons until he appeared
(aefore the town. I was unacquainted with any fur
ther Ileps taken to induce the enemy by negociation,
to frurender the town. On the 17th of June I em
barked for Colonial, With the troops lately arrived
from the Cape. I was to take the command there
until the remainder of the unfits came up, but I had
no pa:ticstlar inlituflinns relpeeling that poll. I
having had a long pillage, General Gower arrived
there the fame, day, and when I waited on him the
next morning; the 25111 4 June, he was difmantling
the works, intending to evacuate the place. This was
effefted the next day, and the garrifon failed to join
the others. The Admiral came to an anchor that
afternoon off Enfenada Barragon. and orders were
the fame evening iffued for the light brigade and
mine to land next morning Many of the !hips with
my btigade on board had not yet joined, nor. was it
inalible to notify to them all the orders I had re. 1
ceived in time to 1 repare provifions. As the day
was rainy, they did not dilembark till the 28:11.- I
'llse troops landed with three days provilions ready II
dr elf.A. My brigade confined of the sth, 38th, and li
87th regiments, heing about 2000 men. The two II
latter, inured to the climate and the fervice, in bia,h ;)
order, and with every neceffsry equipment for the 1I
field, except that, equally with the telt of the army, !,
they landed without camp equipage or camp kettles. ;I
The sth regiment had jult arrived with General I
Crawlend its high order and equipment. A Itrong !I
brigade of artillery was to have been attached to me,,11
but it never joined. Immediately on landing, the .1
3nth and 87th were detached from me, and I was I ;
left with tne sth at the battery near the landing
place. Nn oppolition was made to the landing, nor
did I fee any of the enemy. Thenext morning, the
29th, I marched with the General and the mein
body of the army to the heights, about five miles off
through a flat country, and a great part of it under , I
water, places two and three feet deep, and interfeCled
with very deep fwamps. This march took us the ;
greaten, part of the day, and the troops were much ',
fatigued. I
The principal country houfe where we halted I
was not abandoned, but what information the Ge-
neral gained there Ido not know. A few of the
enemy's houfe reconnoitred us in this pofition : the
38th and 87th were left here, and again joined us.—
't'he line was ordered to march at nine o'clock on the
3oth, but as Reduainn was two long marches frnm
us, and the men had but one day's provifion in their
knapfacks, if any thing had remained after the feve-
rity of the march, frecoently up to their middles in
water—l obferved to the General that I was more
arprehenfive of want of provifions than of the ene-i
my ; and. afterwards, upon his exprefling fume dif-
appointment about the commiffariar, and remarking
that he found he mull be a Commiffary as well as a ,
General, I took the liberty of laying, that if a
General did not attend Isimfelf to the fiipply of
his troops, they would often want provifions. Pre.

yions to our marching this day, a flock of Cheep had
been dircovered and brought into our camp ; but it
was fo late before it could be fecured, that though
the Gene, al delayed the march for the gturpofe, few
of the men had taken more than one day's confimp-
tion of meat, and many not fn much. They carried
it uncooked, and tome bircuit, not equal to a day's
comfumption, was iffued on the march. My brigade
came to their ground at Roderigo's Insole, a little
before fun let that day. I was fent between three and
four miles in advance with the Caralinteers of the
gib dragoons, difmeunted, the 45th, and part of the
95th regiment. We arrived upon our ground at defk.
The march this day and the next, was in general
i
upon riling ground with a fine turf, nterfeeed every
two or three miles with fwamps and creeks, fume of
all of them deep for the
themsvetroy dwiffiadeeratthtronipigafs;
h,
and we were never dry
during the march. Many horfemen made their ap-
pearance this day, and at night there was tome firing
at my picquets. The next day being the rlt of July,
my diva.' in was under arms at day break, waiting
for the rear. They arrived at eight o'clock, though
, they were to have joined we much former, and we
again marched. I had veiled the General to
let me in irch without waiting for them, as the
march was long, and I conceived that both divifions
would move with more facility, and come footer to
their ground at night when feparated. This the
General would not permit, observing. he willed the
troops to .march with regularity. The march this
and the preceding day,liad been much impeded by fr es
cprent halts, and we arrived at Itedualion by stalk!'
Molt of the troops had meat iffued to them in the
courfe of the evening. We law many of the enemy's
hutle in the courfe of the day ; but the few honks
we-paffed by, as well as the village of Redutlion,
were abandoned. Patties were ordered to Qllilmes
to bring t p provilions, far the communication with
the navy was now reltored, and butchers were fent
early in the morning to prep%re the meat for the
men. On returning from reconnoitring next evening,
being the ad, I waited on the General, and txpreffed
my hopes that he world ren the traops at kali that
day, as they were neatle exhaufled ; and the advan-
ced corps, from the numbers of it left at Reduetion,
appeared Hill more fatigued. The General replied,
that would depend upon a letter from General
Gower, and forth after I was ordered to beat to
arms, and leave the meat then ready to be cot in
pieces on the ground. I again noticed to the Cc
neral that the troops were without provifions. Hi•
reply was Don't you fee it is going ter rain ?"
As the troops did not march irrorfediately, I lira
hoped they could take fume of the meat from their
haverfacks, but they were prevented from removirg,
it by the General's orders. We were ordered to
march from our right by the great road leading to
the advanced corps, but immediately before we
moved, I was informed that the route was changed,
and we marched from r ur left about ten o'clock.—
['he fir It part of the march was good, but we after-
wards got into low frvampy t r and, very difficult
to pafs, arid the met had to wade a long way in the
water. Between two ma! three o'clock, iemediately
slier leaving the fwamp, the General fent for me to
the front, and trilled my opinion al-out preceeding?
He obferved, that his guide had dectived him ; that
the ford of the Chnello was Ilia-many miles eff—
that there was no chance of reaching it before dark
—that he had fecured cattle for the troops, and-
where he then was, theta was a firfficiency of fire-
wood to cook the meat.. Form this Ilatement, and
knowing that the troops were cr rnpletely &leaned,
I was decidedly of opinion that we fhould halt here
I mutt here obfei ye it was near three o'clock, and
the day doled at five. Plerity of meat, and half a I
day's bread was iffued to the troops. They were re-
titer difcnntented this evening, ant at my fuggenion
an ria',er was ilLed by the General, encouraging
them to do their duty cheerfully. In the evening'
we heard the firing of the advanced corps, and the
General appeared to me extremely uneafy at the
a:nation he was placed in. He afked me if I thought
General Gower was flrong enough to refill the
enemy ? I anfwered, that unlefs he advanced into
the town, I was perfuaded there could be no danger
whatever numbers might oppofe them. He ap
peered fatirfied with this remark, and faid he- had
In high an opinion of General Gower, he thought
he would not attempt the town without our coming
up. We marched again an hour before day light on
the morning of the 3.1. The country we pallid
through was low, and at times fwampy. A little
more lain would have rendered it impalfable, for it
had rained doting the nieho About noon we came
to a ford over the Clitiello, but did not pal, it. We
paffed the fecund we came to—the fold was not row,
but deep : in one place it Was near fiye feet. Not
long after, about two or three o'clock, we commu-
nicated with General Gower. My brigade was or-
dered to take up a polition with my right, join-
ing General Lttmley's left, and extending towards
the Recollettas. On approaching it I found Gene-
ral Lunacy's brigade had retired, and the enemy's
light troops had advanced to it. I formed my bri-
gade in the rear of the polition, and rccannoitred it,
and when the troops on my right were prepared to
regain their pofition, I advanced and occupied ir
Some of the enemy's fhot reached the line as we were
advancing. As loon as the brigade was formed it
was dark, and the rain fell itt torrents—the men
were fheltered in houfes, and received an allowance
of bifcuit, and flume liquor : there was much fi:ing
during the night at the outpofli,:v.hich I endeat oared
to prevera, as from the reports I had reafon to be-
lieve few or none of the enemy approached. I here
(peak of my own brigade.
Early the next morning I found the enemy had
got round my left flank, and were in confider able
numbers on my rear. I removed the left wing of the
38th, and the Rifle Corps, to the rear, and after tome
firing the enemy retired. It was now near to o'clock
eonrel a dragoon informed me the General was waiting
t
me at head quarters. On my arrival, the Gene
ral Informed the that the principal Officers of the
.army.liad been waiting for me about two hours. On
mvefttgatlon, it appeared that General Gower's
.aidoele canfp had been fent to me at day light, but
had been taken prifoner on the way. I found the
General and Field Officers in poffeflion of a plan of
attack, which was to be carried into execution at to
'o'clock. It was explained to me by Colonel Burke,
who had alfo the plan of the town before him. I
obbng4
fearvee were totally
dtotheGeneral that the Regiments of my
ignorant of the intended attack,

and T apprehended
litghteareiitionwte:lettlihinadatc:nfin,:itiwndglibidella,m,etil
communicate it ro them, and make the ‘.
atrangements for carrying it into et„
I alfo üblerved, having previeufly eonve44"
tome of the principal officers,
my opinion, an improper time to mrch eh;
fireets of a populous city, and I conceived v
nenetrate farther without fcrious l. ft, if ,Le
nwearsaidmefeenrrtei(dmteoddliaiy,
propolition
to
Gentili
uit
the room he':.; inevionfly cleared of All 1
cept the Get..;:als and en
Gower acquiefced in the propriety of 6LN
ferred till day light near m:rning. Anna—,
copying f. -r me the grneral order, f„, eilTet
hut General Gower nbfer we! there v. as an
in them, and he woilld fend me a cnned „. " "an hour. 1 received it in the (condi of the 62
I kit bead Travers with rbe l)eputy qt.t,tlee—'
General, who was to point out to me theLl!,
(he iiteets through which my columns treret"en
next mot using i but intelligence having been 4
that the cntrny were coming nut of the to-watt(
I repaired to my brigade, and fo in after tud,
to retire to the rear, in hope, nt eaticine, thee
to advance : we remained under arms the pi
part of the day, and when the brigade Leto
their ground, the Derry Q.!narter Mattercl
pointed out tu me the principal ,greet,, thrcto,
1 the columns we -e to perwrate.

I then explained to the Feld Officersthee9
their columns, and gave diretlions f•I th
properly placed in time the tsar
m „minus
defiled them to fearch for the tcol, the hid,
ntdered. By this time it was dark, and
d+wing the night, it v. a! repnrrtdtum,theot
had been made ti obtain the tool. without 6,
I obtained a few, however, from the houle<l
cupii!ti."

[Here the wand's bowed, ar.d he had kill
his narrative.]
Examined by the Junce Anwrirr.
Q. Slate to the Court w 1 .at infirrr,tintira,
ceivecl by Genera/ Whitelocke '.f the Otero,
and movements of the enemy, upon the Ce,t,
an ival at Monte Vide:‘, and previous to the
the attack of Buenos At res. A. In my c
cation., with the General, irome,satel; 4014
ival, I acquainted him that the inhabitants
inimical to us, I c, uld gain little inionnatiN•
Buenos Ayres, and that little was not lobed
on. That General Brit s.ord had better
informati n than it was in my rwer to obi*
fie had infOrmed me the number of reran
the enemy pori-eti-;:d were f:vr, and their Genet
nn means a man of abilities—that they !tads is
body of rr.en iu aim., and A veil' powesfultra
arti!lery. I nits unacquair t,sd with their incrii
or plans for the defence of the town, norml
quninted with any particular infornsationtliagn
afterwards obtained.

Q Having Rated, that upon the arrival piCa
rat ciawfurd, you prr p• fed to fend a mildbeti
fommons to :! e Governor ; have/rail"
copy of the letter you drew upon that occafil?
Nn. I d ef.i toyed it, but I dare fay the Genual'il
cretaty has got it.
CL 1) you know whether all the tinter aaJk
were brought au ay fr:,m Culonii, and if wit!
number was left ? A. I am totally anarquaiii
with what was done at Coloria, excepttharthei
nance was thrown into the river, and the
coated.

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O. Why was Colonia Foil clinfen as the
ren:ezvous, arid then abandoned ? A. I
know.

:he ii
If ti
If th,
itlArl

Q2_ Would not the polleflion of Colonia Inn .
a commanling influence on the left bank of titf
of gtest importance to any operations oft&
after the Innender of Buenos Ayres ? A.
was the only fortified putt on the left bra
river above Monte Vide r. and confeganall
always have been a place of importance.
Q._ Can you tell why the flrong brigaded
ler y promifed to be attached to your brigade,
joined you ? A. I know not the Generarstafoor
leaving it in the rear, but from the rapidity;
march, and the badnefs of the roads, it was
pollible it could join us.
O What artillery had you there ? A.llad
with my brigade.
Can you tell how it happened that tie
body of the army was in want of bread aad.
fo early as the z9th ? A. The dlfEcultyof .
fpirits acrofs the fwamp fulliciently accountr
I have already given in evidence that tbe..
marched on the zgth, with three dayspry
and I apprehend that molt of the bilcuit mat
been deltroyed, when the troops waded then
the zBth and 29th•
Q.... What became of the quantity of ,
landed at Enfenada for the ute of the army!
cann-t. tell.
. (,),._ Is the Court to underftand, that frat
to the evening of the ad there was no near
(inns from the Commilfariat ? A. What we,
Rednelion was from the country itfal bell
tatted from the Commitfariar..
Q._ Can you (late what qnamity was ifeell
the march from Enienzda to Redudlion? A.
Brigade received liquor either on the 29th et
hut at no other time.
0..... If there had been more mounted C
(Cour the coun!ty, would there not have beat
ample fupply of pt ovifions for the army? A.,
certainly, with the aflitlance of the nati9els
country, who alone could catch the cattle.
Q Was there any, and what nurntver d I
men accompanying the army for this pare
[bete were time Laffoemen, but I do 04
whether.they were attached to the main boll
the advance of the army.
Do you know of any orders givent°!
Q
cautions taken by General Wititelockeonn:
jt a ? A. An order was itfued on the 28th 011:
hi-bidet:l% the troops, on any account, tow!
vifions themfelves, without paying for thelnj:
rangeneents had been made with the Cursor
fupplying the troops in the field.
Q Would there have been any difficakli
• coring fuch a fupply• from the fleet as the
quired, by the fame means of contmunicatioP
1 obtained from point Zttilmes, while PA the
A. Pravifions might cert tins y have b!en •
I but not without difficulty, as they molt ha_i
. I brouLlit over a morals about two runes bro 7

vet'
,Tre
r (111

kw]
Q.

Leo innw, of your own knowledge, if my in tome meafure by the fituation of thefe !Inures ?
Yiere obtained hi this way A. I conclude A. Fuel could only-he procured at the farm honks,
pow, for parties were fen tto receive them. and the marches appeared to me to be regulated by
A verepo 'ou know what information General W. circumaances.
m" Redin9ion of the flrength of the enemy Q._Could we have procured thefe conveniences if
clean° ? A. Ido not kilo!. the army had marched in parallel columns ? A. I
the„_. yell Rate any more particulars upon the faw few or 11,•ufes on our lest Rank, being the
„f the con„eri,.inn previnua. to your march only line in which a parallel column could have
causing of the ad ? A. I recolleft no farther marched.
nor do I think any farther c mverfation • (4:Could we have arrived former, or marched with
of any confequence. lam certain the conver- g r eater rapidity, without dint-en ing the men, confi•
wed with the General's remark, "Don't you daring all the circumflances of the nature of the
g to rain !" This was about nine o'- ground, and Rate of the troops ? A. Ido not think
it they could have reached Reduetion fooner, without

Did yon know, before this lail converfation,
%octal Whitelocke had difpatched any letter
I Gower ? A. I did n"t. The Cow t will
Ace theta were two converfations.
r. What observations did General Whitelocke
you mentioned the exhauiled nate of
lake abet: '
tops, and that of the advance, from what you
rolat Reduaion ? A. Ido not recoiled any parti
ark be made.
- DoDo ynQo know whether General Whitelocke
Teceiyed the letter he ezpeded from General
Eier, when the drum was ordered to beat to arms,
'do cut, nor did he fay any thing on the fub.

te•
What kind of weather was it on tlie 2d ? A.
Do'rbesight af the tit there was a few drape rain ;
he ad ou very cloudy, and it rubbed a little in the
item" sad again at two o'clock in the morning
(theca.
(Z. you (late the reafon for the change of
41, on the morning c f the 2d of July ? A. I en-
tired at the Q2arter Mailer General, and was told
K guide had promifed to lead the General a lh
rand better way to a ford rather above the Chicu

sw
Q, When the army haltel upon the zd, were you
rized of the operatiln in which the adv., ed
gips was to be engaged on that day ? A. I under.
loud it was intended that they fisculd ford the river

they could, either at the Chico pafs or above it.
Q From whom did you receive this information?
I cannot fay Folitively—it was generally under-

Q_Did you hear the Deputy Q.liatter Maffei-
',sacral inform G...neral Whitrlocke, At the time
rhea the queflion of halting was under conlidera.
ins, that he knew Major General.Gower confidered

ie older he had received as peremptory, and was
itermined to obey it ? A. Ido not knuw the order
tilieded to.
Q, Did you hear the Barter Mailer General, at
tie= referred to in the lad queltion, lay any thing
rfrrhat he knew of the intentions of Gen. Gower ?
ATo the bell of my recnlleelian, did nor.

(tlf an important fel vice hrd been to have hen
perfumed, was the fituation of the troops Inch ae to
under a halt unavoidable, when you gave your (Ti-
los that the halt on the zd was advifeable, Irons
thee:hafted lime rf the troops ? A. I have no
doubt, that the (pit it of the troops would have car-
tied them through much more fatigue, but, unlefs
for very cffntial pupae*, I do not think they could
hare marched much farther.

(Ong wu the caufe of the difiontents you for
meth allodeito ? A. It originated from their not
getting wood with the facility they expeCted, with
which to cool their victuals.

dilbeffing the men : they flight have come fooner
to their ground on each day's match, it the army had
not been fo frequently halted.
Q. Did I not repeatedly exprefs apprehenflone of
the Cain felling in, and evince great ar,ziety to gct
the men under cover, in the vicinity of the town ?
A. Grnetal Wltitelocke certainly did.
111 a Qrong with to cover the men had not urged
me to prefs forward, could not the Commirfaria
have fupplied the army frcm the refources of the
country ? A. There is no doubt that cattle might
have been had in abundance, with proper precau
lion.

Q.._ As form as we had taken Buenos Ayres, could
we hot immediately have reoccupied Colonia ? A.
Moll tertainly.
Q. Would it have been advifable to have left a
large body of men at Colonia while we attacked
Buenos Ayres ; and would it have been fide to have
lett a fmall detachment there ? A. Colotiia, from
its tituation and defences, did not require a large
body of men to be left there.
(I._ Were the 38th and 87th, which you have Ra-
ted to be inured to the climate and the farvice, in
better marching order than the 36 h and 38rh, corn•
poling part of the advanced corps! A. 'The brit two
regiments marched infinitely better than the sth
and the other part of my brigade ; and when I eta
ted that I thought the army could not h.rve reached
ReduCtion former, I think the 38th, 4orh, 87111, ant
95th, and 17th Dragoons could have marched tar
beyond it : 1 think the 38th and 87th could certainly
match better than the 36th and 88th.
If the 36th and 881 h were able to march on
the zd to take the Chucllo and take poll on the Mi •
ferari, might not the whole of your brigade have
marched as far from-ReduCtion, if the line of march
f the advanced cL•rps had been followed, and the
river palled at the fame ford ? A. fart of my brigade
might have marched much fat ther : the whole of it
could have marched as tar.
Qt2ettioned by Si. Jiro' MOORS.
By your evidence it appears that during the
whole march the troops a ere much exhaulted and
fatigued, by being hang under arms, frequent halts,
and want of regular Ares of provilions. Thus all
the confiquences of a forced aad rapid march feem
to have attended the army, a ithout gaining any more
than thirty miles in four days. In your opinion.
could any azrangetnewh have been made previous to
leaving Mon Video, fo as to have enabled the army
to have reached Red/tenon on the t a of July, being
in two days [turn its landing at Enfeeada ? A. I
have no doubt that arrangements might have been
made fa that the troops could have reached Reduc
lion ; hut I am very dlobtful if the cannon could
have been got through the twamp in time to have
been ready to move forward wi;h us on the 3o'h.
In that c rfe 'might not the river have been re
cl,nnoitred that day, fa as to have paired it on the 2d,
and advanced to the fuhurbs of Buenos Ayres A. If
the army had matched from Barragon on the 3oth,
it could not have reached ReduCtion till late in the
evening of the ;ft. Of c/ uric no arrangements
could have been made that evening to reconnoitre
the river. In explanation, I allude to the troops
alone getting forward co foon—the guns could not.
If the advanced corps had marched on the 29th,
they might have reached Reduttion time enough to
'reconnoitre the river on the t 11, in which cafe the
main blely might have been in readinefs to leave
Reduction on the ad, but not /oil the greatell part
of the artillery.
Were the difficulties and misfortunes of the ar-
my in Sood: America to be attributed to the na•
ture of the country and of the fervice, or to defec-
tive arrangements ? A. We certainly experienced
many difficulties from the nature of the ground, and
other localities. All of them might been lurmounted
however by arrangements. I have laid already the
troops themlilves were equal to any thing.

(tWu the fummrns to attend head quarters, on
therolningcf the 4th, the fits iolimatiun you had
of dauphin of attack ? A. The &It intimation I had
oftheplan ofattack was after I arrived at Lead
corters,in confequence of the fummons.
OCan you tell what meafures were taken, be-
im the arrival of the main body before Buenos
,Ayres, and the clofe of the 4th, to enfure the fuccefs
cif the attack, by bringing up artillery, or any other
lams? A. I have given in evidence every thing
Itnow on the fubjedt.
QWould not the FrEilion of the Recollettas have
leaned the left flank of your brigade and'the opera.
timid the army, and made any opening between the
any and the army ? A. I do not know what a .
it urnald have had, to have detached a farce to oc
espy the Recollettas ; certainly a communication
could not have been kept open with the fleet, unlef.
tic line made a movement more to the left.

Q, Would nit the m of the Itecollettas,
Wit been advifable, have prlduced the advantages
pointed at by the fait qucilion ? A. It would, it it
lad been fupported.
(t.. Was the Ration where the Commander in
Diet was to be feund during the attack of the sth,
stifled to the Generals and other officers of the
troy? A. It was not notified to me.

1 Q.... Were the posts, if *retreat hecAme neceff.try,
&wind in oreers, or otherwife, to the General.' and
other officers of the army ? A. They were not no-
tified to me.

Ulm you any other information to give to the i I
Court, on the fubje4l of the charee agaioti General
Whitefrac, down to the 4rh of July ? A. I cannot
to to mind any other information.
(.I.liellionii by General Wu rr LicKf.
QDid yon not give to General Moire:lock:, ilium
hr arrival at Monte Video, copies of the letters you
lad wrilen to the Secretary of State, giving an ac-
cent of the country, and the force neteffary to con-
gnu. and keep it ? A. I did.
(OWere your opinions altered by any infrequent
Rents, and what were they ? A. My opinions re.
Mined unaltered.
Q.Was not every arrangement completed on
Oaring that General Crawford was in the River, in
order that no time Hy uld be 1011, as Coon as he join.
&& ;and were not hones and Flores embarked as far
alit was pre4lie tide ? A. Preparations were made,
Ind Wier and ti .res were embarked. I have already
'ied to the Court how far I was coniulted on there
ktNernenits.
, w long was Brigadier General Crawford
°chimed in the River by contrary windft, before he
united at Monte Video ? A. He had heard of Ad•
tn..iral Murray being in the River on the 3oth of
M&Y: he came to anch•rr at Monte Video on the
of June,
il_Corifidering the diragreeable marches acrnfs
the i"nlinr did the convenience of fuel appear to
11)11 to be neceffary ? A. For cooking, abhlutely
uteliarY ; for drying e men, moft defirable.
, Were any other places found except the farm
pontes where Inch conveniences were afforded ; and,
11" e trot the marches and places of halting regulated