The Sun.
London, England, 1842-11-05 00:00:00

VICE-CHANCELLORS' COURT, Nov. 4.

(Before the VICE-CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND.)
The Court was occupied this morning with unop,
posed petitions and short causes.

•
EX PARTE MARE V. THE MANCHESTER AND BIRMIIIG•

HAM RAILWAY COMPANY.

This was an application on behalf of the plaintiff
for an order respecting a sum of 450/., compensation
and interest, for the occupation of a piece of land, pur-
chased by the Company, for the purposes of the rail-
way. On behalf of the plaintiff it was contended that
the Company had entered into possession of the land
without the consent of the plaintiff. This possession
was taken in December, 1837 ; no purchase-money
was actually paid, nor did the Company remain, as
to that money, responsible to the owner. The money
was in a very unusual and extraordinary manner
handed over to the two solicitors of the Company,
and by those gentlemen lodged in a bank in their own
names. However good the responsibility might be,
it was the responsibility of the solicitors only, not of
the Company. The Company had been in possession
of the land ever since the above date, deriving a
benefit from it, and now would neither pay rent nor
interest. The Company relied on their own Act of
Parliament ; the purchase-money was paid in June,
1840, but the interest was still refused. The money
had been shifted from the Company to the solicitors,
and from the solicitors back to the Company, and had
at last been lodged in the Court of Exchequer. It
was paid into the Court in April, 1839.
Mr. BACON was heard on the part of the defendants.
His HoNoua said the case involved a vast number
of points, and he must read over the affidavits leisurely.
He should also like to have an affidavit as to the re-
ceipt of the letter of the 12th of April, 1838, by the
solicitors of the plaintiff. He should take time to give
his decision.
RANGER V. THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY.
On the application of the Counsel on both sides,
tha hearing of this case and cross case was deferred
till the 2d of January next.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, Nov. 4.
(Sitting in Banco.)
THE SOLAR LAMP—THE QUEEN V. DINNER.
In this case a scire facias had been issued to try the
validity of a patent which had been taken out by the
defendant for the invention of the solar lamp. The
case was tried before Mr. Justice Coleridge, and the
Jury found all the issues but one for the Crown, thus
finding that the patent was invalid.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL now applied for a rule
nisi to set aside the verdict, or for a new trial, on the
ground that the verdict was against the evidence.
The Learned Gentleman argued the question at great
length, contending that the defendant had made a great
improvement on the lamps previously in use ; that
his specification was correct, clear, and intelligible;
that it disclosed the whole secret of his invention, and
that, therefore, the finding of the Jury was against
evidence, and the patent actually a valid one in law.
The COURT took time to consider.
CANADIAN, THE DERBY, AND THE SUNDAY TIMES.
GREVILLE V. CHAPMAN.—LIBEL.
This was an action brought by the plaintiff, a
gentleman well known upon the turf, a member of
the Jockey Club, and the owner of the horse Cana-
dian, against the defendant, the proprietor of the
Sunday Times newspaper,. for the publication of a
libel, charging him with dishonourable conduct in
relation to the race for the Derby Stakes, at the last
Epsom races. The defendant had pleaded the general
issue, and had also placed on the record several pleas
of justification. The case had come on for trial be-
fore Lord Abinger at the last Surrey Assizes, and the
jury found a verdict for the plaintiff.
'the SOLICITOR-GENERAL now moved. on behalf of
defendant, for a rule to show cause why a nonsuit
should not be entered, or why a new trial should not
be granted, on the ground that the libel did not reflect
upon the character of the plaintiff at all, or if it did,
it reflected upon it only in relation to an illegal trans-
action, and one which could consequently not be
made the subject of an action. The alleged libel
had appeared in defendant's newspaper, and without
mentioning any names, it went on to charge a certain
person with dishonourable conduct in regard to the
Derby stakes at Epsom. The declaration had been
drawn up in a peculiar manner : it did not set out
I any inuendo, or state of what the plaintiff com-
plained as having been alleged against him. The
declaration, after stating that a race for the Derby
stakes had been run at Epsom on a certain day, on
which occasion a horse called Attila had come in
first,and a horse called Robert de Gorham second, went
on to state that a horse named Canadian had been entered
to run for the Derby, but had been withdrawn before
the race was run ; that the plaintiff had become the
purchaser of such horse after the horse had been en-
tered for the race, and before he had been withdrawn ;

that the plaintiff was a member of the Jockey Club.
The declaration, after explaining the meaning of a per-
son betting 1,000 to: 1, or to 3, against a horse,
set out the libel which had appeared in defendant's
newspaper,r published on the Sunday after the races.
pie paragraph complained of was headed t‘ the Cana-
dian Affair." (The Learned Gentleman here read
the libel, which stated that the writer trusted
the recent doings at Epsom would operate
as a caution to to honest betters, since they found that
a man of high rank would bet thousands against a
horse, purchase him, and withdraw him just before
the race ; that Canadian had, on some previous occa-
sion, given Robert de Gorham a lumping weight and
beat him, but that, since then, Canadian had been
sold ; that a lame excuse was better than none,
for withdrawing a horse the day before a race ; and
the paragraph concluded with these questions, " Was
Canadian lame when he entered the van ? was he lame
when he came out of the van at Epsom." The Court
would perceive that no name was mentioned through-
out the libel. At the trial it was proved that Mr.
Greville had betted against the horse; that he had
afterward purchased the horse ; that the horse had
been sent in a van from Winchestor to Epsom, for
the purpose of running at the race ; that the horse
had fallen lame, and that he had been withdrawn, on
account of his lameness. Evidence had been given as
to the lameness of the horse. Now the libel imputed to
Mr. Greville that he acted dishonourably as regarded
the bets on the horse, not that he had acted dishon-
ourably in merely withdrawing him; there was no-
thing dishonourable in the mere act of withdrawing
the horse ; all that could possibly happen would be
that he would lose his chance of winning
the stakes. It was proved at the trial that he
had a right to withdraw his horse by the rules
of the Jockey Club ; and that if he had
betted against the horse and subsequently withdrew
him, he would, according to the rules of the Jockey
Club, be entitled to receive those bets. How, then,
could it be contended that the paragraph complained
of was a libel ? He had a full right not to run his
horse if he chose to withdraw him. But it had been
said that the withdrawing a horse under such circum-
stances was a dishonourable act, and on that point
he should presently contend that evidence had been
received by the Court which was not properly receiv-
able. Now he (the Solicitor-General) contended that
the action was untenable. The whole transaction was
an illegal one, and having embarked in an illegal tran-
saction, by betting at a horse-race, he had no right to
come to a court of justice to complain of any imputa-
tion cast upon him for his conduct in the course of
such illegal transaction. By the Act of IS Geo. 11.,
sec. 11, horse-racing itself was rendered legal, but
Acts 16 Car. 11., cap. 2 sec. 3., 9 Anne, cap. 14, sec. 5,
and 18 Geo. 11., cap. 34., sec. 8, all decided that bet-
ting was.illegal. In the case of Shillito and Beale, 7
Bingham, page 405, the Court had held that a horse-
race was legal, but that to bet on a horse-race was
illegal. In this case Mr. Greville betted large sums
against the horse ; the gist of the libel was, that it
imputed to Mr. Greville dishonourable conduct in
withdrawing his horse. Now, there wasnothing disho-
nourable in withdrawing the horse, and no action would
lie for any imputation on him in regard to his conduct,
in betting, inasmuch as that was an illegal transaction,
and it was the policy of the Court that all persons
engaged in illegal transactions should have no locus
standi in a Court of Justice, to complain of any mat-
ters relating to such illegal transactions.—(The
Learned Gentleman quoted several cases in support of
this position.) With regard to the admission of evi-
dence as to the withdrawal of a horse, being dis-
hourable, Lord John Fitzroy, one of the
witnesses after stating the rule of the Jockey
Club, had been asked by Mr. Thesiger for the
plaintiff, whether notwithstanding the rule, he should
not consider a person so withdrawing his horse as
having acted dishonourably. He (the Solicitor-Ge-
neral) for the defendant, had objected to the question,
but Lord Abinger decided that the question might be
put. He (the Solicitor-General) submitted that such
evidence ought not have been received. It was for a
Jury to form an opinion from the facts deposed to,
and witnesses ought only to depose to facts and not
to give opinions.
The COURT granted a rule to show cause on all the
points.—Application granted.

SOUTHET V. MARTELL.

This was an action brought by a medical practi-
tioner to recover the amount of his bill. The case
was tried before Mr. Justice Williams, at the last as-
sizes for Cambridge, of which University the defen-
dant is an under-graduate. At the trial it appeared
that the plaintiff was not a licentiate of the Apothe-
caries' Company. The plaintiff being a :member
of the Royal College of Surgeons, and the case
being a surgical one, it was contended on his part
that the action was maintainable. The bill was for
medicines furnished. The Jury found a verdict for

the plaintiff, damages 121.
Mr. ANDREWES now moved, on behalf of the de-
fendant, for a rule nisi for a nonsuit or a new trial,
on the ground of mis lirection on the part of the
Judge, who ought to have left it to the Jury to de-
cide whether it was a medical or a surgical case, in-
stead of telling them that it was a surgical case ; and
also on the ground that if it were a surgical case, the
plaintiff could only recover for work and labour done.
That was for his attendances, but he could not recover
for any medicines furnished, unless he were an apo-
thecary.

Lora DENMAN—PIease to hand up the bill of
particulars.
Mr. Andrewes handed up the bill.
Lord DENMAN—SureIy these articles, such as in-
jections and lotions, which I find in this bill, are ex-
ternal applications, and such as a surgeon has a right
to furnish, and for which ke may recover.
Mr. Justice Wilmms—The evidence as to the case
being a surgical case was that of a medical man named
Green, who said "I know plaintiff, he practices here as a
surgeon. I have read the bill of particulars; the charges
are reasonable ; they are such as would be furnished in a
surgical case. I consider venereal cases to be sur-
gical cases ; they are always considered as surgical
cases by the profession. I consider this to have been
a surgical case." That was the evidence given as to
the case being a surgical case.
The COURT refused the rule.
STEERS V. REED.—CRIM. CON.

This was an action brought by the plaintiff to re-
cover damages from the defendant for criminal
conversation with the plaintiff's wife. The case was
tried before Mr. Justice Cresswell at the last Summer
Assizes, and the Jury found for the plaintiff with 1001.
damages.
Mr. COCKBURN applied to the Court for a rule nisi for
a new trial, on the ground of the improperadmission of
evidence by the Learned Judge. It was proved at the
trial simply that some person other than her husband had
on the occasion laid in the action, slept with the
plaintiff's wife ; but there was no evidence to prove
that the defendant was that person ; but in order to
show that the defendant was that person, evidence
was tendered to show that at a period sub-
sequent to the bringing the action, criminal
intercourse had taken place between defendant
and plaintiff's wife. That evidence was objected to
and Mr. Justice Cresswell had expressed some doubt
as to its admissibility. Ultimately, however, it had
been admitted ; but even that evidence did not quite
amount to a proof of criminal intercourse. There
was no other proof of the identity of the defendant
but that evidence. Under these circumstances he
moved for a rule for a new trial.
Lord DENMAN asked if there was any evidence to
go to the Jury without that.
Mr. COCKBURN—I do not mean to contend, my
Lord, that there was no evidence to go to the Jury
without that.
Lord DENMAN—If there had been no evidence to
go to the Jury without that, then, perhaps, it ought
not to have been admitted ; but clearly if there was
other evidence, then that evidence might be admitted
with other evidence to go to the Jury. Under the
circumstances the evidence was rightly admitted.
Application refused.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, Nov. 4.
TIBBS V. BARON.
This was an action for work and labour done, the
plaintiff claiming of the defendant the sum of 150/.,
being for ten months' service, at. 101 per month ; but
the general sum of ten pounds, or one month's salary,
being only set out in the declaration as the damages
claimed. The case was tried in London, at the sit-
tings after last term, and the Jury found for
m the
plaintiff; 1501.; but he could not enter up judgent
for a greater sum than was laid in the declaration,
without a special rule of Court.
Mr. Sergeant TALFOURD now applied for a rule to
amend the declaration, so as to give the plaintiff the
benefit of his verdict, which the Court at once granted.

BAIL COURT, Nov. 4.
BULL V. PARKER.
Mr. BTUs applied to the Court for an extension of
time to move in this case ; the motion was for a new
trial, and was to be Lade this morning, but the brief
in the case, and some others, were stolen, with his
outside coat, from his house that morning, and he
would not be prepared to move before Monday.
Mr. Justice PATTISON—You may be din u ged
under the circumstances.—(Laughter.)

QUO WARRANTO.—THE QUEEN V. „Talus.
Mr. BUTT applied to the Court on behalf of several
of the Magistrates of the county of Glamorgan for a
quo warranto against Evan Jones, Portreeve of the
borough of Neath, for assuming to give a license for
an inn and ale-house, called the Cross Keys, to a per-
son called David Thomas. The borough being too
small to be included in the provisions of the Munici-
pal Act, was governed by a Portreeve and Alderman,
and burgesses. Thomas applied seven or eight years
ago for a license to the Magistrates of the county,which they refused, and a similar application, which
was made to them on the 2d of September, was
also refused, on the g round that the house
not wanted, and was not of such a
descrip-
tion as to cal on them to grant A
ose-asßeens e,

The next day they went to Evans, the Portreeve, and
to Williams, the Alderman, who were working men,
and obtained the license from them. They did not
state that the Cross Keys was part of the borough, but
only that it was within the parish of Neath.
Mr. Justice PATTESON—it would appear that the
license is altogether void, for they acted as Magistrates
of the county.
Mr. BUTT—They assumed that the Cross Keys
was within their jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice PATTESON—I think the proper course
to take would be to apply for a criminal application,
properly so called, but you may take .a rule in the first
instance.