Star.
London, England, 1808-04-26 00:00:00

everywhere made on the first rumour of the embargo,
to dispatch them, demonstrated* the President's dan-
gers to be imaginary—to have been assinned. Or if
great and real dangers, unknown to commercial men,
were impending, or sure to fall, how desirable was it,
to have it officially declared and published! This
would have produced a voluntary embargo, and pre-
vented every complaint. Besides, the dangers clearly
defined and understood, the public mind would not
have been disquieted with imaginary fears, the more
tormenting, because uncertain.
It is true that a considerable number of vessels were
collected in our ports, and many held in suspense ;
not, however, from any new dangers which appeared,
but from the mysterious conduct of our officers, after
the attack on the Chesapeake : and from the painful
apprehension that the course the President was pur-
suing would terminate in war. The National Intel&
gencer (usually considered as the Executive Newspa-
per) gave the alarm ; and it was echoed through the
United States. War—probable or inevitable war,
was the constant theme of the newspapers, and of the
conversations, as reported, of persons supposed to be
beet informed of executive designs. Yet amidst this
din of war, no adequate preparations were seen making
to meet it. The order to detach a hundred thousand
militia to fight the British navy (for there was no ap-
pearance of an enemy in any other shape) was so
completely absurd, as to excite with men of common
sense no other emotion than ridicule. Not the shadow
of a reason, that could operate on the mind of a man
of common understanding, can be offered in its justi-
fication. The refusal of the British officers to receive
the frigate Chesapeake as a prize, when tendered by
her commander, is a demonstration that the attack
upon her was exclusively for the purpose of taking
their deserters ; and not intended as the commence-
ment of a war between the two nations. The Presi-
dent knew that the British had no invading army to
land on our shores ; and the detached mihtia would
be useless, except against land forces. Why then was
this order for the militia given ? The nature of the
case, and the actual state of things, authorise the in-
ference, that its immediate, if not its only object, was
to increase the public alarm, to aggravate the public.l
resentment against Great Britain, to excite a wain
pulse ; and in the height of this artificial fever of the
public mind, which was to be made known in Great
Britain, to renew the demands on her Government ;
in the poor expectation of extorting, in that state of
things, concessions of points which she had always
considered as her rights, and which at all times, and
under all circumstances, she.had uniformly refused to
relinquish. The result of the subsequent negociation
at London has shewn how utterly unfounded was the
President's expectation, how perfectly useless all his
bluster of war. While no well informed man doubted

that the British Government would make suitable re•

partition for the attack on the Chesapeake • the Presi
dent himself, in his proclamation, had placed the affair
on that footing. A rupture between the two nations,
said he, " is equally opposed to the interests of both,
as it is to assurances of the most friendly dispositions
on the part of the British Government, in the midst of
which this outrage was committed. In this light the
subject cannot but present itself to that Government,
and strengthen the motives to an honourable repara-
tion for the wrong which has been done." And it is
now well known that suck reparation might have been
promptly obtained in London, had the President's in-
structions to Mr. Munroe been compatible with such
an adjustment. He was required not to negociate on
this single transient act (which when once adjusted was
for ever settled), but in connection with another claim
of long standing, and, to say the least, of double right ;
to wit, the exemption from impressment of British
seamen found on board American merchant vessels.
To remedy the evil arising from its exercise, by which
our own citizens were sometimes impressed, the atten-
tion of our Government, under every administration,
had been earnestly engaged ; but no practicable plan
has yet been contrived : while no man who regards
the truth, will question the disposition of the British
Government to adopt any arrangement that will secure
to Great Britain the service of her own subject:. And
now, when the unexampled situation of that country
(left alone to maintain the conflict with France and
her numetous dependent States—left alone to with-
stand the power which menaces the liberties of the
world) rendered the aid of all her subjects more than
ever needful ; there was no reasonable ground to ex-
pect that she would yield the right to take them when
found on board the merchant vessels of any nation.—
Thus to insist on her yielding this point, and insepa-
rably to connect it with the affair of the Chesapeake,
was tantamount to a determination not to negociate
'at all.

I write, Sir, with freedom, for the times are too
perilous to allow those who are placed in high and re-
sponsible situations, to be silent or reserved. The.
dace and safety of our country are suspended on a
thread. The course we have seen pursued leads on
to war—to a war with Great Britain—a war abso-
lucely without necessity—a war, which, whether dis-
astrous or successful, must bring misery and ruin to
the United States misery, by the destruction of our
navigation and commerce (perhaps also of our fair-
est sea post towns and cities), the loss of markets for
our produce, the want of foreign goods and manufac-
tures, and the other evils incident to a state of war ;
and ruin, by the loss of our liberty and independence.
For, if with the aid of our arms, Great Britain were
subdued—from that moment, though flattered per-
haps with the name of allies, we should become the
provinces of France. This is a result so obvious, that
I must crave your pardon for noticing it. Some ad-
vocates of executive measures admit it. They ac-
knowledge that the navy of Britain is our shield
against the overwhelming power of France. Why
then do they persist in a course of conduct tending to
a rupture with Great Britain ? Will it be believed,
diat it is principally; or solely, to procure inviolability
to the merchant fla of the United States ? In other
words, to protect al seamen, British subjects, as well
is our citizens, on board our merchant vessels ? It is
a fact, that this has made the greatest obstacle to an
amicable settlemerit with Great Britain. Yet, I red
peat it, it is perfectly well known, that the desires to
obtain 'only her own subjects ; and that American ci-
tizens, impressed by mistake, are delivered up on duly
authenticated proof. The evil we complain of arises
from the 'impossibility Of always distinguithing the
ptrsOns of two nations, ytho a few years since, were
Or people; who exhibit the same manners, speak the
same language, and piasess similar features. But
seeing that we seldom 'hear complaints in the great

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