The Sun.
London, England, 1827-11-14 00:00:00

and suffer-from the piracies committed by thos
who are driven to such _desperate courses by 'till
deiolating . character of • Turkish hostilities.—
Prudent people, who know that the consequent(
of..a battle between two parties of low Irish ir,
their .ueighbourhoodetill be' considerable injury
to their property, generally endeavour to compe
a peace with as little delay as possible. When
belligerents carry on war according to the practic(
of civilized nations, and neutrals do not. suffer
from their operations, such neutrals are withou
an colourable ground for interfering in all:
other manner than by an offer of mediation.—

But when belligerents can only make war in 4
way from which third parties must suffer/
the right of self-protection gives a right to inter
fere to put an end to the war as a nuisance
and the only question then is one as to the prii
Bence of exercising the right. Turkey has, wa
admit, ,been treated cavalierly, but this treatment
was absolutely nettssary. In this first, step, that
of the Treaty, Turkey was evidently considered
in the
.light of a Government, not entitled to th 4
treatment which one civilised State has a right
to expect from another. The Turks are viewed
as placed by their ignorance of the rules and
usages of civilization, in a, state of pu4
commence,pillage, and the Allies not by treating
with them on a footing. of .equality, but by pre-1
scribing a course for their adoption. They were
allowed no option; for they were told without
ceremony, if you do not arrange matters with the
Greeks, we will compel you. The Antbassai
dots of the Allies informed the Turkish Govern-4

latent, that instructions would be sent to the Ad.

mirals of France, Ruszda, and England, " in
the seas of the Levant, to prevent all collision

between the contending parties." I-laving as-,
sinned this language of superiority, and placed
themselves towards the Turks in the relation of
dictators, and not of adviSers, what has taken
place followed almost as a matter of course. The
Allies say we will P.bt allow you to fight any
lonfier ; the Turks refuse to yield obedience to
their dictation, and carry on the war in a more

savage manner than ever. Finding their pre-
scriptions disregarded, and promises made to
them violated, the Admirals were called upon to
act oni their instructions, by adopting the means.
Which were best calculated for preventing the
collision of the belligerents. They entered the'
port of Navarin in order of battle, not with a
hostile intent, but in the exercise of their
dictatorship, ,which required that the TurkiSh
fleet should be under their power. The ob-

jest entrusted to them was the compel-
ling the 'rinks to change their system ; and
of th courses open to them, the one which they
adqpted was the only one which could lead to
such a result. They could not keep. the sea ;
their permanent presence in NaVarin, even the
second course, could lead to no termination,
since the Porte persisted in not changing its
system,. and the object committed to them was
to compel a change of system.)
The Globe observes—" Their entrance certainly would
have needed no defence, if it had been to claim the ordi-
dary protection and aid which foreign ships lire entitled to
in a friendly port--but the fact of subsisting' friendly in-
tercourse and pending negotiations does not make the fact
of entering in order of battle, and for purposes of inti-
midation, the more justifiable ;—on the contrary, it ap-
pears to us to be the most difficult and unpleasant part of
the case.

" As both the Admirals concur in the opinion that
the first provocation was received from the Turks, and
after their entry into Nayarit), they also concur in their
account of the manner and intent of that entry.
" We stated yesterday that the Protocol of the Admi-
rals clearly showed the intention of their entry into Na-
varin to be this—to take up such a station as would put
the Turkish fleet in their power, and enable them to cap-
ture or destroy it, if Ibrahim Paella resisted some propo-
sitions which they intended to make to him."

We have 'already- obserVed, 'that the whole
proceedings must stand or'- fall with the Treaty.
If the Treaty was justifiable, then the inevitable
results of it were also justifiable. The Treaty
assumes the necessity of intimidation ; and
though the Turks are friends, yet we choose to
treat them as friends who require to be cud-
gelled into propriety of behaviour. There is, at
all events, consistency in the proceedings. Our
contemporary, after examining the reasons put
forth-by the English and French Commandei,s,
proceeds to observe—
"ls this the way of entering a friendly port, which en-
titles us to wonder that the ships which attempted it were
fired on ? If, we suppose for a moment that the same scene
was acted before and in the harbour of Portsmouth—
that the Admirals of the fleets of three foreign nations, who
Fad addressed demands to the Court of St. James's, held a
consultation at Spithead, and after having rejected the idea
of merely securing the inaction of our fleet as not effectual
enough, and having. decided that they would take up a•po-
eitiou in the harbour, in order to renew Prepositions to
oar Government,' and Made signals 'to prepare for action,
entered the port in line of battle, and anchored against our
own fleet, each ship having, as Adniirai Codrington ex-
presses it, ' their proper opponent'--ye suspect they would
be taught a lesson on the manner of entering a friendly
harbour, and receive a little more'decided provocation than
the allies received at Navarin. There does not seem to
us a shadow of doubt, that such a proceeding is an act
of hostility which a Government may tolerate, but which
officers left without orders from their Government are
bound to repel."
We have only to 'observe, that if the Turkish
Government was duly informed of the conse-
quences which follow a. refusal to obey the in-
junctions of the Allies, it was enabled to give
instructions to its officers, to guide them in an
exigency like the one in question. If these of-
ficers were left without orders from their Go-
vernment, ihai. was the fault of the Government,
which was Warned that instructions had been sent.
to the Admirals of the Allies to prevent colli-
siOit. It .was 'for the Turks to consider whether
they would regard the Menace, whether they
*Mild 'tonaider such an interference. ,as an act
Ofilestility, and whether they could not in.ho-
nour istne 'instiuctions to their officers to yield
obediepce to the Allies; but whatever may be;their
justification for reftieiUg to acknowledge the right
ofthe Allies to prescribe to theM,LaVing kept their
officers without • instructions, the responsibi-
lity of such a course must rest with'theirtielves.
If the Allies acted without justification in bind-
ing themselves as they did, of course the con-
duct of the officers remain's without justification ;
but, if the Treaty was justifiable, and the in-
structions were justifiable, the conduct of the
Admirals, as being a necessary result of such
Treaty and such instructions, was also justifiable.
International Law is, at best, a very odd sort
of lavc. Even in the case of 'civilized nations,
we all know what fine arguMents pro aid, con
have been raised to the right which vicinage
gives to interfere with the internal affairs of a
state when danger is anticiyated from them to a
neighbour. It is exceedingly difficult to lay
down a rule equally applicable in all cases. But,
in'.the case of a people like the Turks, who re-
gard.oeither your usages nor your laws, we must
be guided, in (Mr conduct, with regard to them,
by a consideration Of what, under all circum-
static", tipsy be the least objectionable Course.
We have a number of Allies, who re'qUiro dif-
ferent sorts of treatment from.us. have,
for instance, the' Sovereign''t theo.. Burmese,. the
Princes of A-fric.and.:4lBe:Grand Seignior, and
with thesehighiPptent,ite
we can. NO preCedeut just do the West
droivuttgal
J