Star.
London, England, 1808-02-29 00:00:00

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Majesty can dis-
1, both by the
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)le fortress to

Alexander Stratton,
Minister Plenipo-

10, 1807.

laid before the
appear to have re-
ubsidy, that sub-
wersations by M.

made to me
good deal of
ipposed lrackward-

enr:gy.

*Ns in *WIPE the aterdess which the King of Sweden is willing
to make.
There certainly is no ground for such an impotation. In the
instructions of your predecessor you will find that he was uni-
formly directed to state the importance which his Majesty attached
to the undertaking of offensive operations on the side of Pomers-
pia, and thathe was even authorized to give assurances of peen.
niary assistance from the moment the Swedish troops should have
passed their own frontier—but it was added, that before any thing
could be conclu,:dely arranged, it was necessary that his Swedish
Majesty should communicate generally to this Government his
plan of operations, and more particularly the amount of force
which it might be in his power to employ.
M. de Rehausen has urged the impossibility of stating in detail
' all the measures which it may be necessary to arrange with a view
to a future campaign. No such thing, however, was required.—
The information asked for was only what was necessary to enable
his Majesty to judge of the general expediency of the measures
proposed, with respect to which it is evident that no satisfactory
opinion could. he formed without a knowledge of the force destined
to execute them, and of the time when it would be ready to act.
Even further details; when they could be conveniently communi-
cated, his Majesty, considering how largely he is expected to con-
tribute his support, would have a right to expect ; and such corn-
mutication v:ould be obviously necessary to enable his Majesty
to direct any efforts, which on his side he might have an oppor-
tunity of making, to the advancement of the common objects of
the two powers.
In order to come to a right understanding upon this point, you
will, with as little delay as possible after the receipt of this dis-
patch, request an audience of Ms Swedish Majesty. You will state
the sincere pleasure with which his Majesty has seen the King of
Sweden's steady resistance to the common enemy. You will repeat
the opinion already expressed en the part of this Government, that
a diversion by a Swedish force on the side of Pomerania, would
be at the present moment of the utmost importance ; and with a
view to bringing the discussion to a point, you will request par-
ticular information on the three fallowing heads :
1. What is the amount of force which the King of Sweden could
employ, exclusive of the garrison of Stralsund? In addition to
which information, it is desirable to 1- ow where it is now stare
' dotted, and how soon it could be ready to act ?
2. Whether any, and what addition of British troops would be
required ?
3. What amount of subsidy the King of Sweden would demand
in proportion to the number of troops employed ?
Should the Swedish Government be willing to enter into this
discuss on, you will state upon the two first points, that it does
not appear tb his Majesty that any effectual operation could be un-
dertakeervithout a force amounting at the very least to twenty-
five thousand men.
From M. de kehaesen's statements to me, it appears that the
chief deficiency of the Swe:'.ish army is in cavalry. This is cer-
tainly the description of force which his Majesty could best spare
trom his own army. If a brigade of dragoons would enable his
Swedish Majesty to bring into the field, a force of the amount
above stated, you may state that this proportion of cavalry might
probably he furnished front hence.
With regard to the last rainy:ie. that of subsidy, you will state,
that his Majesty will be disposed to contribute to the support of the
proposed operation, by a subsidy regulated wording to the pro-
portion of that which was given to Austria in 1805 ; bur that this ,
proportion cannot be exceeded, except as to a sum usually fur-
nished as a " premiere mitt en c mpagne,' which, as soon as the meat- i
sures in contemplation shill he conclusively agreed upon, may be
advanced to the amount of two, or at most three months subsidy.
Having communicated these proposals to the King of Sweden,
you will request his Majesty to enter upon the hrunediate discus-
sion of them ; and to prevent the loss of tftwe, you will suggest
the expediency of sending to this country some confidential mili-
tary officer, fully instructed upon all the points above mentioned,
who might assist M. de Rehausen in giving the necessary explana-
tions, and ha bringing this business to a prompt termination.
I know it is unnecessary for me to recommend to you the ut-
most diligence in the execution of these instructions, and in ob-
taining and transmitting to me the most accurate information re-
specting the present state and disposition of the Swedish Govern-
ment, and the condition and numbers of its army.
HOWICK(Signed)
No. 24.—Extract of a dispatch from Lord Hutchinson, addressed
to Viscount Howick, rated Memel, March 9, 1807.—Received
April 18, by Mr: Secretary Canning.
I have been repeatedly pressed by the Prussian Government,
with whom the Russians have also co-operated, to write to your
Lordship on the subject of a diversion to be made by the British
troops, whikh might occupy the French essentially, and force them
to withdraw apart of their troops from this quarter. Monsieur de
Zastrow made me yesterday a formal proposition.
Marshal Mortier now blockades Stralsund with about twenty
thousand men ; it is therefore proposed that the British and Swe-
dish troops should in coujenation force them to raise that block-
ade, and moving on the-left bank of the Oder, threaten the corn.
Imunicatioos in the rear of the French army. They might besiege
Stettin, which is a large place with a small garrison, and in a bad
state of defence ; were it taken, the communication with Berlin,
the Elbe, and the rest of Germany would be at once open.
11 If the French remain in Poland, a considerable force acting in
this manner on their rear would create the most serious embar-
rassments, and probably force them to evacuate Poland, or at least
oblige thent to detach such a number of troops as would soon leave
them inferior to the Allies.
Should even the French occ-a a the line of the Oder, this diver-
sion would be of the greatest “oportance, as the Russians would,
in that case, probably march with the greater part of their army
into Silesia.
This proposed operation would be'attended with little danger,
as the British army would always have a retreat upon Stralsund
open to them, and from thence to the Island of Rugen, from
whence they might be reimbarked. Stralaund., in summer, is, I
_.....
believe, a very strong place.
I have informed Monsieur de Zastrow t' a: I would undoubtedly
Make the proposition; that I was convinced the British Govern-
ma:lt meant to make a strong diversion in favour of the Allies,
as.d •vas empowered to give them the strongest assurances en that
subject ; but that I could not exactly pledge myself as to the quar-
ter in which it would be made. The one now proposed appeared ,
to use to be highly advantageous, and only attended with the or-
dinary risque% of war, as in every event the retreat of the troops i
employed in that service would not be an hazardous one.
YourLordshipwill probably rec rive a communication on this sub-
ject from Baron Jacobi: lord Douglas has also, I understand,
written to you on the subject from Petersburgh.
No. 25.—E:tract of a Dispatch from the Marquis of Douglas,
dated St. Petersbuigh, March 19, 1807, addressed to Vis-
count Howick.—Receivcdby Mr. Secretary Canning, April—
There is reason to suppose that it has been force-ably put to the
Emperor by some people here, little partial to England, that 1
Russia is abandoned by her friends ; that the whole contest is left
to her, and that even her intimate ally, Great Britain, neglects to
support her at a crisis when any reverse of fortune might endan- I
ger the empire itself.
It is the more painful to me that such insinuations should ap-
pear, for a moment, to be justified by fact, because I know how
little they are deserved, and how different they are from those feel-
ingis that both actuate the Government and the country at large- •
It is for his Majesty's •Aovernment to decide what are the ob-
jects of their present policy, and what are the means most likely
to secure these objects; but I should neglect my duty if I did not
observe, that should no effort be made this spring by the British
troops, it is more than probable that the above observations will
tccur in full vigour to his Imperial Majesty's mind; if so, I need
cot point out what will be the probable result. England, lam
aware, may secure herself; but I am convinced that his Majesty's
Government feels too much for the honour of,the country, and the
future happiness of Europe, to compromise for partial views a
) prospect of general and permanent welfare.
No. 'A.—Extract of aDispatch from the Marquis of Douglas, dated
St. Peter:burgh, March 22 (April 3), 1807, addressed to Vis-
count Howick.—Received by Mr. Secretary Canning, May I 3.
The activity of England I have frequently expatiated upon; but
I must not conceal-from your Lordship that this Court, alive to
the embarrassments that surround her, is determined, in spite of
1 every argument, to consider no act as directed towards their par-
ticular support,, that doe not, by occupying a part of the French
forces, relieve her from their concentrated attacks.
t No. 2".—Extriet of a Dispatch from the Marquis of Douglas,
dated St. Petershurgh, April 27, 1807 ; addressed to Viscount
Howick.—Recived by Mr. Secretary Canning, June I.
I am thoroughly convinced of the sincere and honourable Staten-
tions of the Emperor ; and yet, as it is Impossible that I should
\be deaf to the murmurs that surround me, to the expectations of i
thousands, to the intrigues of a few, all more or less begging to seek
the same object ; so I cannot,without some jealousy, look to the
I •
possible consequences. Should any diversion, however, take Rlace
on the part of Great Britain, or assisted by her troops, there is :.
great probability that in that case the Emperor, front a point of
honour, would consider himself bound to act with. all. possible

of his Majesty's Government reiceng billitarjaiversloii on
the coast of FranCe• has not produced a favourable effect on the
opinioo either of the Ministers or the public of this country.
No. 15;—Extract of a Dispatch from the Marquis of Douglas to
Viscount Howick, dated St. Petershargh, Jan. 26, 1807.
(Received )
Before I conclude, I must informs your I .ordship that Baron Bud-
berg complained of the situation In which Russia was now placed,
being left to combat alone against France, without either support
on one side or diversion on the other.
No. 16.—Extract of a Dispatch from the Marquis of Douglas
to Viscount Howick, dated St. Petersburgh, Feb. 4, 1807.
(Received --- )
During this interview Gen. Budberg seized every occasion of
complaining of the Russians being left without military assistance
on the part of Great Britain. An attack on any part of the coast
of France, or even the alarm of an attack promulgated with couff
dence, would tend to relieve Russia from the concentrated Forcer
of the French army. Was any measure of this kind to be adopted
I am persuaded I should no longer hear any arguments against the
ulterior guarantee; not that I omitted to remind the General
that after what had been done In Italy, and what was ready to bt
done at Constantinople, Great Britain could never be consideret
as a negative coadjutor, whether in reference to the commit'
cause, or in reference to her immediate friends and allies.
No. 17.—Extract of a dispatch from the Marquis of Douglas t.
Viscount Howick, dated St. Petersburgh, Feb. 8, 1807.
(Received --e- )
His Excellency said, that the Court of Petersburgh being now
abandoned to her own resources, was entitled to expect some el
forts which may divert the attention of the French Governmers
before they consent to enterlnto any engagement which is likel
to create future differences with that Power upon a subject nt
inunediately interesting to Russia.
No.lB.—Extract of a Dispatch from the Marquis of Dougl.
to Viscottut Howick, dated St. Petersburgh, Feb. 15, lao7.
(Received March 8.)
I cannot sufficiently express the extreme anxiety felt here, th
some expedition should be undertakes by Great Britain to dive
the general concentration of the French troops from the banks
the Vistula.
No. 19.—Extract of a Note from General Budberg to the Ma
quis of Douglas, dated Feb. 1, 1807. Transmitted by t
Marquis of Douglas, and received March 8.
'l'he Undersigned has already had occasion to observe to t
Ambassanor the Marquis of Douglas and Clydesdale, that part
and separ'Jte expeditions cannot influence the general operatio
in an impressive manner, and that a vague assurance, such as
" We shall soon see what England will do," cannot be sufficient
satisfactory iu circumstances so imminently critical as the preset
The Emperor is therefore desirous that the British Governmt
should make known to hint kith the greatest possible detail, t
plans which it may have in view, in order to effect a powerful
version upon one or any of the points of the coasts subject to t
enemy ; and that in general it should communicate to his Miaie
s teh views and projects, the execution of which it may judge cat
ble of contributing to the success of the common cause. His I
penal Majesty thinks himself the more justified in expressing t
wish, as at all times he has prescribed it as a duty to his Cain,
to communicate to that of his Majesty the King of Great Brice
every thing that might interest it upon this subject, and, as in pc
of fact, the British Government has been regularly informed of
the measures which, in the. course of events, have been adop
by Russia, and has been acquainted with the forces which
has employed on such points, %%here their presence has been ju
ed useful to the interests of the allied Courts.
No. 20.—Extract of a Dispatch from Viscount Howick to
Marquis of Douglas, dated Downing-street, Feb. 20, 1 Elq
With respect to military diversions, your Excellency mus
once have been prepared to state to the Russian Government
extreme difficulty of any maritime operations at the present
set The difficulty and danger indeed at all seasons of laodinl
a country :aches France, where the means exist of collecting
short time a much larger force than any that can be sent from
country, and from whence there can be no secure retreat, r
be sufficiently apparent. All that can at present be said then
on this bead is, that if a favourable opportunity should arise,
Majesty will be desirous of exerting his utmost efforts to dis
. Ithe enemy upon any point which may present an advantag
opening to assist the general operations of the war.
No. el.--Extract of a Dispatch from Viscount Howick to
Marquis of Douglas, dated Downing-street, March 7, II
I having nothing to add to my former Dispatches (to wh
Ise* leave to refer your Excellency) with respect to the renew
the Commertial Treaty, the proposalof Military diversions b
1111 country, and the suggestions of farther pecuniary assistance.
No. 22.—Extract of a Dispatch from Viscount Howick
Marquis of Douglas, dated Downing street, March 10,
Tile Messenger N'irk, with your Excellency's dispatches,
Fed on Sunday last, and I have it in command from the Ki
lose no time in expressing to your Excellency the lively sat
tion with which his Majesty has received the account of the
• tle of the Bth ult. Your FxceUency will take the earliest o
oinity of offering to the Emperor, the King's congratulatio
an event so glorious to the Russian arms, and so advantages
the cause in which the two Sovereigns arc engaged.
It is painful to me to pass from this to a less pleasing topic
) .1-.1 under the necessity of expressing to your Excellency ti
cteased disappointment and regret which his Majesty has e
e teed, in learning that so many unforeseen objections are still
against the renewal of the Commercial Treaty. The propos
tension of this Tret ty for two years, upon the conditions an
I to this proposal, is by no means satisfactory ; nor does then
to be any good reason for not coming to a definitive arrange
which his Majesty is seining to conclude without any alterat
the terms of the present treaty Had any new proposal been
on the part of his Majesty, there might have been some pr
for delay ; but in a case where the interests of the two cot
.ra so well understood, and in which experience has prey
advantage to both, of the treaty which is now about to
be. Majesty feels himself entitled, upon all the grounds of
interest and friendship, to renew his instances with his
Ally. for an immediate compliance with so equitable a pr
Though your Excellency will urge this in the strongest ten
will, however, consent to the offered extension for two y
being understood that the advantages at present enjoyed
British commerce are to suffer no diminution, rather than
the treaty to expire.
I cannot, however, dismiss this subject without some
upon the manner in which this concession, as it is termed;
pert of Russia, is made to depend upon an immediate as
of a powerful military diversion being made by this country
insinuation conveyed In this part of the Baron de Budbers
is so little justified by the former conduct of this Govei
that it cannot be passed over without notice. It is nece
state the obvious tendency of such language to produce
discontent, and to excite adverse pretensions, destructiv
troony and confidence which ought to prevail between
• t;overnments.
In renewing your representations, therefore, upon the
of a speedy conclusion of this Treaty, valfch your F.xcelle
remark is no less advantageous to Russia than to Enghold,
protest apinstany atteentSt to make use of it in this mann.
ss an induce seat or a threat, with respect to measures wi
it is wholly unconnected, and which must depend upon
rations of a totally different nature.
I I ave already explained to your Excellency the difficult
bwe hitherto ptetvented any attempt of military divers
more favourable season is now approaching—and you m
the Russian Minister, that this Government is sedulo
ployed in preparing the means of still more active cu
I hope soon to be able to communicate to your Ex7ett
thing more specific on this subject; but the Russian Go
niust be aw are bow much the force of which his Majest
ion for Continental operations Is necessarily limited, Ist
etatent of his naval exertions, and the necessary snpp
distant colonies—and how much the difficulty of =plot
sintageouslv is increased by the present situation of
Is
erns • :e his Majesty can neither look to the junc
army Wltil that of any ally, to any established magazine
it to advance, oor to the Possession of any considerable
same hi retreat.
SlS—Dispateh from Viscount Howick to Alexands
Esq. his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Miniso
tentiareot the Court of Sweden.
. Dated Downing-street, March 1
SlR—Your dispatches have been received and laid
iag.—Though the King of Sweden does not appear
'awed with yawthe question of an additional subsidy
jeet has been pressed upon me In repeated conversat
ktebausen.
from the communication which that Minister has
of the instructions he had received from his Court, a
SweineEetlatiic appears to be felt there at our supposed