The Sun.
London, England, 1827-11-15 00:00:00

argurnehts render the task of pulling them down,
one in which there is no difficulty to overcome,
and no credit to gain. We stated yesterday,
that the Turks had placed themselves in the po=
sition contemplated by the secret article of the
treaty of last July, in refusing all. negotiation
after being formally invited to joi❑ in it. That
secret article is as follows :

" If, within the said tenth of one month, the Porte do
not accept the armistice propoSed in the first article of the
public treaty, or if the Greeks refuse to execute it, the
High Contracting Powers shall declare to that one of the
two contending parties which shall wish to continue hos-
tilities, or both, if such become necessary, -that the said
High Contracting Powers intend to exert all the. means
which circumstances may sOggest to their prudence to ob.
taro the immediate effect of the armistice, the execution
of which they desire, by preventing, in as far as may be
in their power, all collision between the contending par-
ties ; and, in fact, imniediately after the aforesaid declara-
tion, the High Contracting Powers will, conjointly em-
ploy all their means in the accomplishment of the object
thereof, without, however, taking any part in the hostili-
ties between the two contending parties."
The, meaning of: this is obviously : Ist. That
if the Turks refuse to accept, or the Greeks to
execute the armistice when accepted, the Allies
will exert all the means which circumstances may
render advisable to enforce its execution. 2clly.
That if both parties reject the proffered media-
tion, still the Allies will use those means for the
same object, but without connecting themselveS
as friends or opponents with either of the belli-
gerents. In the first place, they will declare
their intentions to the party who may wish to
continue hoStilities, or to both parties, " of such
become necessary!' The obvious interpretation
of these words, " if such become necessary," is
that they will not make any declaration unless
they feel convinced of its necessity. The objec-
tion of our contemporaries, so far as it turns on
the want of a declaration, would, therefore, fall
to the ground, even had no declaration been
made. But who, without a positive assurance
to the contrary, can say, that the letter signed by
the three Admirals and sent, to Navarin two days
before the battle, and returned to them un-
opened, was not the very, declaration which
our contemporaries require, and which Ibrahim
would not peruse, in order that he might pretend
ignorance of its having been made ? We see,
therefore, that the secret article only says that
the Allies will issue a declaration " if such be-
come necessary," which must, of course, be left
to their discretion. We also see that it is more
than probable that such a declaration was issued;
but suppose due, it was not, it. must be recol-
lected that the public acts of the Allies. Were 'to
be regulated' solely by the articles of the public
treaty. Now, does that treaty hold' out to the
belligerents any expectation that such a declara-
tion should come forth before the measures
deemed necessary to restore peace in the Levant
should be adopted ? The first article is the only
one which contains any thing bearing upon the
question, and that is, " That there shall be made
at the same time e. on the offer of mediation) a
demand of an immediate armistice between them
(theTurksand G reeks), as a preliminary condition,
indispensable to the opening of any negociations."
So that here, in the only treaty of which Turkey.
or Europe have any right to demand fulfilment,
there is not a whisper of any declaration but that
implied in the offer of mediation. A declaration
was, however, made by the Ambassadors of the
Allieat in transmitting the copy of the treaty,
when it was distinctly announced that if no answer
were returned within a certain limited period, the
Allies would in consequence consider themselves
placed in the predicament contemplated by the
treaty ; that is, they would feel themselves call
ed on " to exert all the means which circurn:.
stances might suggest to their prudence to obtain
the immediate effect of the armistice," which had
been declared a necessary preliminary to negocia-
tion. No further declaration was necessary by
any rules of modern diplomacy or of justice. In
the case under discussion every delay had been
granted, every indulgence had been given, and
' the journals, which now accuse the gallant lea-
ders of the combined fleets of precipitancy, were
then as fbrward in charging them and the Am-
bassadors with dilatoriness. What was not said
of the sailing of the Egyptian fleet ? Was it
not argued that the difficulty of final arrangement
was mightily enhanced by that event, and that it
.ought not to have been permitted ? It was,
however, permitted, and why ? Because the
Ambassadors were honourably determined to
abide by the letter of their proposal, although
this junction of the Paella's forces together had
virtually absolved them from that obligation.
Not content with the refusal of the Porte to
treat, which left the Allies no option but the
employment of force, the English and French
Admirals, following up the plan of modera-
tion adopted by the .Ambassadors, determined
to do what in strictness was not only un-
called for, but might be deemed irregular.
They attempted, since the sovereign power
had refused to listen to any terms, to gain
the end of the intervention by an arrange-
ment with the subordinate officer. We 'used
the word convention.yesterday as the one which
seemed to us most applicable, not that we meant
that there had been a formal treaty entered into
by Admirals Codrington and De Rigny with
Ibrahim ; the • gallant Admirals had no such
powers.—That an, agreement was made, and that
Ibrahim did pledge himself to an armistice until
otherwise ordered by his Court, is matter of no-
toriety. What were the Allies to conclude-
-first, from the attempt of the Turkish fleet . to
escape ; and, secondly, from the ravages com-
mitted by Ibrahini on land, but that he had re-
ceived orders from the Divan not to observe the
armistice, or that he was determined not to ob-
serve it on his own responsibility ? And what
declaration was, in either case, required but that
which had long before been .formally sent to his
master ? It is, we believe, the first time that, on
such an occasion, a declaration was asked to be
made—not to the Government (that had been
made)—but to the commanders of a State
against which active measures had been re-
solved on. It is said that the armistice was li-
mited to the maritime forces, but where is there
a shadow of proof of any such liinitation ? To
assert that the object of the Allies was merely a
suspension of the maritime warfare between the
Turks and Greeks is to accuse them of the low-
est folly, as well as the basest mockery, in their
professions of kindness to the latter. The
Greeks needed no protection by sed. With all
, the hindrances and disasters which committees.
engineers, contractors, winds, waves, and fire
had combined to heap upon them, the fleets of
the Greeks rode triumphant in the Levant and
the Archipelago. The cumbrous and ill-managed
vessels of the Turks and of the Pacha were only
fitted to resist under the circumstances in which
they were placed on the
.20th.
.At sea, and in
• a stiff breeze, a tithe of the exertion, and a fourth
• of the force of the Allies, would have annihila-
ted them. Only their small craft could overtake
L. the Greek vessels, and those craft were neither
- manned, nor managed, nor fought with so
- much skill as their opponents. To say that an
r armistice at sea was all that the Admirils