The Sun.
London, England, 1842-10-11 00:00:00

been achieved by them. During the whole of last
winter, without money, and badly enough off for sup-
plies, he preserved the discipline and military feeling
of his army, and as spring advanced no one could
have been more active than he was in dispering the
enemy from every position which they had assumed."
We should not feel that we had done our duty
without expressing our cordial concurrence in
these sentiments. General Nott has not been
without his difficulties, and in no one instance
11 is he failed to meet them triumphantly. It
would be hard indeed if' the completeness of his
successes were to have the effect of diminishing
the public appreciation of them. He has never
found himself in imminent danger, it is true, but
how far is it owing to his own'decision and con-
duct that he has not been so? Enough, however,
of this subject, which is probably already under
the consideration of Government. Our corre-
spondents refer to another matter, which we con-
fess we cannot look upon without the greatest
apprehension. As if we had not enough upon
our hands, it seems that a quarrel is blowing
up between ourselves and the Sikhs—our old
allies, and in favour of whom (for the Sikh pos-
session of Peshawar was the real point in dis-
pute) we rejected the alliance of Dost Ma-
homed, and involved ourselves in the present
unhappy struggle. "It is said,"- we hear,
" that Sliere Singh
_has applied to Lord Ellen-
borough for aid against his Minister, Dhyan
Singh. This person's brother, Eblat Singh,
commands the Sikh army, which 'is in his inte-
rest, so that interference becomes more pro-
bable." If this be not truth it is marvellously
like it; it precisely tallies with the natural appre-
hensions which the history of the Sikh empire
thus far would suggest to any thinking mind.
Runjeet Singles greatness was based simply upon
his efficient and well-disciplined army—a power
which we gave him every assistance to perfect—
formed by European advice, and upon European
models. The machine so created was only kept
in order by the piercing and resolute mind of
him who had called it into being; and now, when
the reins of government have passed into less
capable hands, that the soldiery should feel their
power and proceed —or attempt—to cast off the
feeble successor of their old leader, or at least to
enforce the substantial dominion of a leader more
agreeable to their own wishes, and, perhaps,
much less inclined to British interests, is so
likely that very little evidence is necessary
to make us apprehend its truth. " I do not
say," says our correspondent, " that the Sikh
Government wishes for war (with England), but
the army does, and has done so for years: The
Sikh soldiery are a vain and insolent body, and,
as they are, desire nothing more than an oppor-
tunity of thrashing the Feringees, which, in
their hearts, they think they can do." This may
very Nve 1 1 be true, and if they choose to seek a
quarrel, they must take the consequences, which
probably will be little favourable to themselves.
If interference is in good truth forced upon us
by the insolence, rebellion, or treachery of the
army of our old ally—if we are unable to keep
our faith with his descendant without assisting
him against his refractory subjects—or, again, if
in this critical position of our affairs they for
whose sake we plunged into it break faith with
us, and leave us to weather the consequences of
their ruler's tanbition—let the interference be
what it ought to be, and what the formation of
the new army of reserve on the Indus, and the
movement of General England from Can-
dahar in the same direction. give every pro-
mise that it shall be—decisive and overpowering.
But it should be observed that, up to this time,
at far more trying moments than the present,
when a hostile movement in the Punjaub would
have had consequences on our empire which it is
difficult to calcultte, and which it is somewhat
alarming even to think of in retrospect, the Sikhs
remained firm and decided in our alliance. Nor,
though we have heard of many vague suspicions
and unauthoritative surmises, is there any pro-
ducible fact to stand against the hearty co-opera-
tion which General Pollock seem; hitherto to
have found in that very army whose disaffection
is now asserted. And though it may be true
that, according to time shifting character of
Asiatic politics, new feelings ni.ty have arisen,
fresh individuals have been cast up into the pos-
session of substantial power, yet still the preva-
lence of any deep hostility towards ourselves
must be allowed to be rendered prima fade very
improbable, by its non-appeamince lit that nut
very distant per;od of difficulty which was so
eminently calculated to call it out. We should
hear, then, with the utmost regret that these
indications had proved delusive,—that a
enemy had arisen where we most expected, and
bad most right to expect, a constant and active
gratitude, and that it was necessary, at the risk
of arousing a most formidable league against us,
and of losing no small character for constancy in
our friendships, to turn our arms upon a country
hitherto so steadily attached to'our interests. It
need hardly be said we should view with in-
finitely greater dissatisfaction an event so un-
likely that we will not venture to think it pos-
sible,—any attempt to compensate ourselves for
our failures in Aff,;hanistan by an unprovoked
attack on the tempting territories of the Pun-
jaub. If it were to appear that our Govern-
ment had taken advantage of any existing
distractions iu that country and of the pre-
sence of so large an English force upon its
frontier to intimidate its rulers into a sur-

render of their independence ;—if, without
invitation from their ally, without aggres-
sion from their assumed enemies, they allowed
themselves to be led by mere opportunity into
the wanton spoliation of an active and unsus-

pecting friend;—if the change of Governors and
of policy in India only amounted to this, that in-
stead of an unjust war with the Affghans, we
were to invo!ve ourselves in an unjust war with
the Sikhs and Affghans united—a war of which
the daring impolicy would quite equal its in-
justice—then, indeed, we should begin to remem-
ber that quos Deus volt perdere plus demmtat,
and to fear that our disaster at Caubul W4S only
the ominous beginning of those disasters with
which our unprincipled temerity was to over-
whelm us. But the character and professions,
both of Lord Ellenborough and of those to whom
he is responsible for the exercise of his authority,
forbid such a notion. We believe in his pacific
intentions—we believe in his pacific instructions,
and we cannot, and will not doubt that, ft every
reason combined—credit, safety, generosity—he
would shrink from so equivooal u step as a breach '
with the Sikhs, unless the preservation of tul
b jr.eigetliltsZiofairte.
honest peace became plainly impraiciltice
hands.We
ytreuts,titfhveTelalorneoutor
iolafvethaewictr;trwyari
we
shall
be
tNivoteahalivtetlehaaroitoielestsoonboefairo‘iiistlsiue
*ironi ni beim, just to
whose government of
far from wanting an_..ot,l.ireur.
li
HERA LD.—We are de
Lord Ellenborough
India we did anticipate much that would deve‘
lope the resources of that dependent empire and
improve the condition of its inhabitants, and that
would, through the augmentation of its exports,
and the happiness and prosperity of its millions,
re-act most beneficially on Great Britain I and
though we cannot withdraw a single expression
that appeared in Saturday's ilovaid relative to
that Noble Lord, we gladly yield a favourable
consideration to an the suggestions we halm re
ceived iii excuse or mitigation of his, Lordship's
conduct. There is not, we aNyetninded from a

quarter entitled to reipcnt and deference, any
evidence that Lord Eflenhorough ordered the
evacuation of Atfghanistan, of HQ Rnthoritative
a description as to justify 14 nse for a condem-
natory purpose. TnN c,lijection is more int.
posing in appeamnoe than in reality, Even
admittinfs that we are not entitled to use the
cotoint testimony of every Indian journal on
conveyed by Ow prods are the character and I'o-
this point—(what clithor teghM , than that
!allon of almost every European atatesmanthQV
ibunded ?)•—we have o ofidence from
iony
which to deduce the allootion. There have
been letters froml 3011alabad in London for

•
uPwaril4 i Ywo months, wherein the. arder
withdraw within the Indus is Staten of
as a fact notorious to the iirmy quartered
there; nay, more, therQ los been a letter from
General Pollock, shown In certain circles, for.
the %O l° of that period, wherein that Gallant
thileer states that he has received ()Mew il•om_

Sir Japer Nicholls, the CominainJer-in-Chief of
the Indian army, to ahanjon. his position, re-
trace his stev, od bring his forces within the
Indus l and m this same letter General Pollock
expressed his determination to assume the re-
sponsibility of disobeying the order he had re-
ceived until there was time to reconsider
In disclosing so much we abuse no confidence