Star.
London, England, 1808-04-19 00:00:00

No. I.

" Sift-I—Baron Stedingk remitted to me on the 9th
of January, an official note, of which I send you a
copy annexed, in answer to mine of the 16th of No-
vember. Its contents answer as little as the preceding
notification of this Ambassador, to what our august
Master expected (1) of the King of Sweden ; and his
Imperial Majesty, convince:l by this, that he has no-
thing. to hope from continuing further a correspon-
desce,which, ender such pressing circumstances, (2)
has already continued more than four. months, and
has_ produced no result ; has determined to deliver
the declaration which you will find annexed, in order
to satisfy himself definitively concerning the disposi-
tions of the Court of Stockholm. Though I shall
impart this declaration to Baron Stedingk here, yet
his Majesty commands you, Sir, to communicate it to
the
.Ministry of his Swedish Majesty. You will ob-
serve-to him, on this occasion, that it still depends
upon •the 'King to preserie good harmony between
the.two states (3). But that the most essential inte-
rest 4 of Russia do not permit his Imperial Majesty to
allow, in the present situation of affairs, of the least
doubt as to the dispositions of Sweden with respect to
Russia (4). I have the honour, &c. (Signed)
" COUNT NICOLAS DE ROMANZOFI.'-.
-" Ft. Petersburgh, Feb. 17,1 SOS.
" To M. d'Alopeus, at Stockholm." '

(1) As to what his Imperial Majesty asked ; Yes Le. the pa•
cification of the Baltic ; but as to what he extectel, perhaps, M
it he expected that Sweden would grant to him what he granied
even to France, the sacrifice of his interests and his independence.

t 2) The fear of the English must be verypee.uing. In spite of
an extraordinary delay of the English mails, the answer of England
anived at Stockholm on the 16th of March, a long time before 11
nuritiine expedition in the Gulf of Finland was physically possible.
The Cotiii of London acceded to the proposal, and consented not
to trouble the tranquillity of the Baltic, if Sweden were allowed
to remain at peace. Thus a peaceful and happy corner of the
world might be suffered to exist. But Russia will not have it so.
It remains to be seen whether the insidious invasion of Finland
will protect her shores from the English fleets.
(3) The Russian army was to enter into Finland before the de-
e :ration of war could be even delivered, and consequently before
the arrive.l of an answer ; yet they have the impudence to speak
ati:l of rood harmony. What was expected of the King was in
fact so illegal, so humiliating, that they who know-the character
of the King could not expect to obtain it voluntarily. They hive
boasted much of the Crown Prince of Denmark for having refneed
to treat with England subsequentlyto hostilities, and yet the same
thing is proposed to the Kirg. Contradictions, solecisms, and fats
sities are the or4incry attendints of injustice.
. . .

(4) There were then no doubts as to the dispositions of the Rai.
T very thing was on the r aces establishment in Finland till the sd
of February, when the King enquired of M. Alopeus what the
armaments of Russia on the frontiers imported ? and infornied
him, that he should, on his side, be obliged to put himself in a
state of defence.

No. 11.

Copy of a Note from the Ambassador of Sweden, Baron de Ste-
dingit, to the Minister Omit de Romanzuff, dated the 9th

(81st) January 1808.
4, The King having alreaty communicated to the
Court of St. Petersburgh, in answer to the Note of
the 22d September (Oct. 6), his opinion on the ac-
tual position of the North, and on the difficulty of
applying to it the engagements of 1780, his Majesty
had some hope of gaining the assent of his Imperial
Majesty to the evidence of these statenwnts. The
first glance upon the circumstances of the former and
present moment, appeared sufficient to shew their
immense disparity ; and the Cabinet of St. Peters-
burgh cannot, any more than others, hesitate to pro-
nounce on which side the preponderance was then,
and on which side it is now.

• Russia, the principal support of the Convention
of 1780, was the first to abolish it in 1801. If it
liras at her invitation that Sweden acceded to the new
system—under her auspices that she reconciled her-
self then with England ; she then contracted with
that power direct engagements, which, according to
the rules of public morality, she was obliged to ob-
serve, as long as the other Contracting Party did not
violate fils own.
“ The neutrality of 1780 being then once aban-
doned, the shutting up of the Baltic, founded in con-
cert, and the stipulated common armaments, appear
the less to concern Sweden, because since the epoch
of the last Convention, there has existed on this sub-
ject neither concert nor unity of principles even among
the Poweri whose shores lay along this sea. And
this shutting of the sea, which then meant properly
nothing but the defence of the Sound, is now become
undertakingn more vast and difficult to execute,
since the Engsh have found the passage of the Great
Belt practicable to ships of war, aVJ since the Danish
marine no longer exists.
" Generally speaking, a change of the principles
of neutrality, adopted in the last instant, would net
only be contrary to the subsisting engagements of the
King, guaranteed by Russia herself, but probably
no purpose, not causing a change of principles in
England during the war ; it would only tend to oc-
casion a rupture between the two states, useless to the
ally of Russia, hurtful perhaps to herself, and certainly
ruinous to Sweden.

" Bat with this attachment to his engagements,
the King is not insensible to the advantages of a pa-
cification in the I3altic. It is possible that England
Would consent td the neutrality of this sea, that she
would promise not to send thither ships of war, un•
less the mt•as+tres adopted aA:iiast the British:com-
merce oa alnat st all the coasts of the Baltic should
pet rouse her armaniel4s, or sinless new hostilities
should call her thither as an alailiary`" This is a
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