Star.
London, England, 1830-11-01 00:00:00

SIR HEW DALRYMPLE'S MEMOIR.

General Dalrymple was appointed to the command of Gibraltar in
1806. In the subsequent year the Preach troops entered Spain, and
early in 1808 Buonaparte developed his bold and atrocious views open
that unfortunate country. General Cavanos, the commander of the
Spanish troops in Andalusia, opened a contidendal communication
with Sir Hew Dalrymple, who soon after became the nucleus cf 'very
important negee 'stains, and who appears, as well from the disenet and
repeated testimony of the British Government as from the ample de-
tails given in the Ifcmoir, to have acted with much seal and kids-
ment in the vely delicate intercourse he managed with the leaders
of the patriotic eels' and in the often embarrassing circumstances
in whi-h he can placed by the proceedings of other British agents.
The perception which the eituation and facilides of General Dalrym-
ple enabled him to gain of the real character and views of the Spanish '
leaden seems to have inspired hint with some caudate and &strut
of them, whilst the people of England, intoxicated with joy at so
auspicious en event, saw in all of them only immaculate patriots, or
Parr wltawslisrt. This impression respecting the rulers of the issue-
rection,whielt:lt is but just to say later experience in a great measuts jos-
tilled. and the conviction that the British Miniany was deceived upon
this iinpor,lnt point, probably bad a material influence upon the mind
of Sir Her, when be assumed the command of the British many in
Portugal.
It is necessary to remind the reader, that the fill:Aster upon whom the
immediate direction of this great and difficult concern devolved, was the
, late Marquis of Lerdendeiry, then Lord Castlereagh. The wisdom and
I consistency of his Lordship's plans are not points to which Sir Hew's
Memoir is avowedly directed but the incidental evidence which it
affords of the Minister's vacillation and indecision, partly owing perhaps
to conflicting reports of the state of Spain, and of the views and wishes
of the insurgent leaders. tends to show the perplexity of all parties at
that period. British troops had been for a considerable time lingering
off the west of Spahr. cooped up in transports, but no effectual aid had
been rendered to the patriotic cause, except by the supply of' money,
which was greedily caught at by the juntas, whose incessant cry was
"Give, give !"
At length, in the summer of 1808, an expedition of 10,000 men was,
despatched to Portugal, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was to be
joined by the troops under General Spencer, then off Cadiz, and by ano-
ther force under Sir John Moore. This was notified to Sir Hew Dal-
rymple by Lord Castlereagh on the oth of July, 1803, at which period,
and for some weeks previous thereto, Sir Hew says, " the Ministers
were ill informed of the probable courier of events in Andalusia, and of
the character of the people and the authorities in that pare of Spain,"
having been the dupes of Don Tomas Mods and his confederates at Ca-
diz. On the 15th of July. however, Loyd Castlereagh acquainted Sir
Hew that" his Majesty, highly approving the zeal and judgment which
had marked the whole of his conduct under the late important events
which had taken place in Spain, had been graciously pleased to intrust'
to him, for the present, the chief command of his forces to be employed!'
in Portugal and Spain, with Sir Harry Buuard second in command et
so that, it would appear, the Ministers had determined to try a novel
experiment in the appointment of commanders, borrowed from thegame
of leap-frog, by which General Wellesley was to be superseded by Gen.
`Burrard, Gen. Bullard by Gen. Dalrymple, and Gen. Dalrymple by
some other officer !
Meanwhile, Sir Arthur Wellesley reached the Tagus, disembarked
his troops, and brought the French army of Portugal to action. The
battle of Rolieia was fought on the 17th of August, and gained, the
British having superior numbers ; but Sir Arthur, in his despatch,
says—re The enemy succeeded in effecting a retreat in good order, owing
principally to toy wart of cavalry." Lord Londonderry, in his " Nat.
noise," states, that the enemy retreated in excellent order, the attempts
made to harass proving unavailing.
It is here necessary to observe, that there was a Portuguese force,
under General Freire d'Andrada, of 7,000 infantry and 600 cavalry,
which was to have co-operated with the British army, and upon whose
co-opt ration the British Government and the British Generals of course
relied. This force consisted, according to Lord Londonderry, of raw
levies, wretchedly armed, and not likely to add much to the real
strength, whilst they would draw heavily on the supplies of the British."
Freire won quarrelled with Sir Arthur Wellesley, and withdrew from
co-operation with the British army, because Sir Arthur was unable or
unwilling to subsist his troops from the stores of the British army.
On the 20th, Sir Harry Burrard arrived in Maceira Roads; Sir A.
‘Velleteley went ininiztliately on board his vessel, laid before him a state-
nient of affairs, and submitted a plan of operations, which was imme-
diately to assume the offensive, by turning the enemy's posstion at Tor-
res Vedras. Sir H. Burrartl, considering the strength of the French
position. Cie absence of any co-opetating Portuguese force, the risk of
separation from supplies. by deserting the shipping, the want of cavalry,
already severely felt, and the execrable quality of the artillery horses,
determines', as he was oily in temporary command, that it would be
most prudent to wait for the arrit.ii of Sir John Moore's corps, which
had been recommended by Sir A. IVellesley to proceed to Santatem, in
order to con tine the movements of the enemy on that side—a plan which
Sir Harry had at Gnu resolved not to accede to, but afterwards sent
orders to Sir John to " act as be might think best for Sir Arthur's
aupport."
Next day, however, the French attacked the British army at Viuseira.
The battle had scarcely bet un, when Sir Harry Burrard 'nitric" on the
field ; but he declined to interfere with die execution of General Wel-
lesley's plant till the defeat of the enemy was clearly ascertained. "At
this critical jsinciure," says Lord Londonderry, " Sir A. Wellesley re-
presented, in strong terms, that this was the moment for edvanchig ;
but Sir Harry Bernard was not to be moved from his determination : be
had made up his mind already no to quit Vimeira till Sir John Moore
should arrive, and lie 34M nothing in the events of the day to cause a
change in his sentiments."
Nuw, it is to be considered, on behalf of Sir flurry Burned, that this
victory had cost the British it loss of nearly 1.000 mm,—that all the
objections already urged by Sir Harry against offensive measures were
rather strengthened than weakeeed,—that the despatch of Sir Arthur
Wellesley, reporting the result of this battle, states that the enemy was
"superior in cavalry and artillery," and, as it was afterwards remarked
by the Board el inquiry, Sir Arthur himself did not, on the 17th, when
the enemy had not halt' the cavalry as on the 21st, pursue successfully
en army more decidedly beaten.
Unfortunately le these who had to secure the fruits of this victory,
it was communicated to the liritish public in a manner calculated to
excite very sanguine expectations. Sir Arthur Wellesley's despatch