The Sun.
London, England, 1827-11-14 00:00:00

THE TURKISH SQUADRON.

Ships of the Line 7
Frigates. 19 26
The difference, so far, therefore, as the above

species of force was concerned, is only six ships
in favour of the Turks. As for corvettes, it is

pretty well known that the broadside of a ship of
the line, or of a large frigate, will send a corvette

down at once. NOw, after looking at'this, what

would Howe, Duncan, Jervis, or Nelson, have

said to: the long rigmaroles which, on this occa-
sion, have appeared in some of the Ministerial
Papers ? Would they not have said that either
we.had declined in our naval skill, in comparison
with the Turks, or that the latter had made very

rapid strides in comparison with us.--Morning
Herald.

Sortie of our contemporaries seem to be
puzzling themselves very much with a very plain
question, namely, what.rightthe combined sgiia-

Irons had to enter Na—varin, and attack the

Turkish and Egyptian fleet ? The Times,
which. obeys •to the letter the advice of an old

philosopher—to live with its friends as if they
were one day to be its enemies—and which
never .defends a cause but in such a way as to
injure it—spends a great many worth to little
purpose, in attempting to show that the general
action was the result of accident. An Evening
contemporary, with more reason, observes, that the
advancing into the harbour of Nayarit], and
preparing to take up a position there, was really
and truly the commencement of the action. We
,agree with him, that virtually it was, and it was
just that the commencement of an action,

which was strictly retaliatory, should be on
the side of the party injured. It is quite true,
that had no gull, been fired by the Turks,
no gun would have been fired by the Eng-
lish ; but the latter would not the less have
taken possession of the fleet of the former—not

as prizes, but as a pledge for the observance of a
convention, regularly and voluntarily entered into
by Ibrahim and the allied forces. A very mis-
taken notion of that convention seems to be
entertained by our contemporaries. They
imagine that it covenanted for the inaction of the
ships of the Grand Seignior only. This was not
the case. The Treaty of the 6th of July is per-
fectly explicit, awl so were the representations of
the Ambassadors at Constantinople. The Allies
declared their intention to put an end to the war
between the two parties—the Turks and the
Greeks—by mediation, if both parties agreed to
accept of such means; but if either of the
belligerents refused, then upon the Allies
devolved the task of compelling the ar-
rangement,. which could not be otherwise
accomplished. The Ambassadors stated dis-
tinctly to the Porte that unless before a certain
day its agreement to the proposals of the
Allies were signified, it. would place itself in the
predicament contemplated by the Treaty—that
is, the Allies would proceed compulsorily to
settle the dispute of the Sultan with Greece.
From the poor Greeks the assignment of a day
was not required, for they put themselves and
their fortunes at once into the hands of their
generous and noble friends. The day appointed
for the answer of the Sultan passed, and what
was his reply ? That he would not negotiate at
all on the subject. The Allies had then one of
two things to do ; to allow the obstinacy of the
Turkish Government to overcome their declared
purpose, and to hold themselves up as a laugh-
ing-stock to the world, or to pursue; as they had
pledged themselves, the plan which they had at
first laid down. Now, we ask, did that plan in-
clude nothing else than a naval armistice, to be
kept most reluctantly and most unfaithfully by
the stronger party ? We allow that the inse-
curity of the Levant from the fleets of the con-
tending parties, was one of the reasons of the
Allies' interference, but it was not the only one.
Thegrandobjeetwasthe pacification of the East.
Why did Admiral Codrington declare to Ibrahim
that he would not allow him to sail for Hydra ?
Was it for any damage his vessels would do to
the island ? Was it not to prevent the slaughter
and rapine to be perpetrated by his troops ? Did
not the convention guarantee from attack the
Greeks in the environs of Navarin as completely
as the Greeks of Hydra ? Do our contempo-
raries understand that the Turks were free, under
its conditions, to murder and destroy as many
miserable Moreotes as they might see fit, pro-
vided they held sacred the persons and the pro-
perty of the Hydriotes ? Or that they might
indulge in any species and degree of atrocity to
which their cruelty inclined them, so long as
they did not turn the guns of their vessels upon
the town and fort which they themselves held?
Whether Navarin was to he considered as a
Turkish or Greek port seems a mighty silly
question. The rule of uti possidetis must
be observed in every preliminary Treaty. The
port was in the Turkish possession, and, there-
fore, for the purposes of treaty, Turkish ;
but this, does not affect the question of Ad-
miral Codrington's justification. Ibrahim had
broken the Armistice by his attacks' on the
and fended Greeks on shore. The destruc-
tion of his fleet, and of his army also, was' no
longer a question of right, but of expediency. If
the object -of the 'Allies could have been secured
by a threat, a threat only would have been used;
but
.the Turks despised threats as they had de-
spised conventions, and their chastisement was
thus no longer a matter olchoice. It is' evident
that the attack was anticipated .by Ibrahim. He
knew he had provoked it. His vessels were
drawn up in battle array, and his; Centre and his
flairkS were defended with' 'much skill:
not in the.'positiOn of a man who relies 'on ihe
faith of trees, but
ow who. 10.4 • broksillt?