The Sun.
London, England, 1842-01-24 00:00:00

FRANCE.
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.
SPEECH OF M. THIERS ON THE ADDRESS.
M. 'Tiers addressed the Chamber. He began by say-
ing that, as the Eastern Question had been argued so
fully, he would confine himself to general. remarks, and
would, above all, avoid recrimination and personal al-
lusions. He then said, I will commence by reminding
the Chamber that what I said on this subject has been
completely verified. I said that the Cabinet was about
to return to the European compact, under the induce-
ment of an act of slight importance, viz., the closing of
the straits. I said this on the 13th of April, and on the
4th of March the initials of the Government to the draft
of the Convention were affixed. I was perfectly correct,
therefore, both in the fact itself, and in the details. It has
been said; in the course of the present discussion, that the
solution which has been come to—a solution which some
think bad, others a little less bad, but which no-
body considers to be absolutely good—is due to the
friendly disposition of the German Powers. Whether
this assertion be strictly correct or not, I will assume
it to be so. I will allow that the German Powers
were desirous that France should again become a
party to the European compact, and I will crave permis-
sion to remark on the useful information which this fact
conveys. I will, gentlemen, on. this point, speak with
perfect candour, for it is my duty to be frank on so seri-
ous a subject ; it is not my intention to give offence to
any person, but it is necessary that the truth should be
told. There are three Powers always ready to unite,
I will not say against us, but against our influence.
A fourth Power is sometimes with us - and some-

times against us ; but, from the nature of its Govern-
ment, it ought to be with us more frequently than
against us. Amongst the Continental Powers is one,
Russia, with which we are at peace, but with which
all our friendly relations have ceased, either on
account of our. revolution of 1830, or on account of
Poland. Russia is opposed to our influence in Europe.
As to the. two German Powers, they have attempted
to seek for support from Russia against France ;
and here it is necessary that I should draw the line of
distinction between the people of those countries and
their Governments. The people of Germany have a
great deal of sympathy for our principles ; but if it be
true that our principles have made great progress in
Germany, the people also remember our invasions under
the Empire. They are, therefore, in some respects
kith us, and in others against us. As to the Govern-
ments of Germany there is not one which does not regard
us as an enemy who will soon become very formidable
to them. There are two motives for this—motives of
territory, and motives of principle. At the present
moment nearly all the Governments of Germany are,
from the partition of territory made by the treaties of
1815, necessarily against us, for they have, nearly all,
possessions beyond the Rhine, and they feel that, sooner or
later, France will endeavour to make of the Rhine her
frontier. France is in their eyes the type of revolution.
When France stirs, there is effervescence in Italy. Thus,
in the eyes of the German Governments, you represent
a formidable question of territory, and a still more for-
midable question of principles. All the great Powers
of the Continent are, therefore, against you, not because
there is any person on the Continent or elsewhere bold
enough to assume the initiative ; but there is always the
desire, when the opportunity presents itself of doing
so without great danger, to weaken and annul your in-
fluence, in order that other nations may reckon less upon
you. As to England, you have the chance of finding her
sometimes with you, and sometimes without you. She
assisted you in the Belgian question, and even in the
Spanish question, because the 'Whigs had contracted en-
gagements towards Spain. What the Continental Powers
have been aiming at was to detach England as rapidly
as possible from the cause of France. And do you
know what inspired the Continental Governments with
confidence on this point? I will tell you. On the
Belgian question, you began with grandeur, for it
must not be said that since 1830 nothing grand has
been done by France, although, when one speaks of one's
country, we must not use the word grandeur too com-•
placently.—(Disapprobation from the Left.) I repeat, that
we did a grand thing in Belgium. Europe, which could
not prevent it, retained it, however, in bitter remembrance,
and had at heart the taking its revenge, by seeking
the first opportunity to annul our influence in Eu-
rope. The good understanding between France and
England, in the affairs of the Peninsula, was an extra-
ordinary oecurrence,lwhich increased the unfriendly dis-
position of the other Cabinets of Europe, and at that
period the efforts of the German Cabinets were directed
to exciting suspicion and jealousy in the French Cabinet
of Lord Palmerston, who, it was said, was going too far
in Spain. Austria succeeded in separating England
against us. Then came the Eastern question. How has it
happened that on this question you have had every body
against you? Did you say that you were determined alone
to bring about the solution of it ? Did you say to Eu-
rope that it should obey your dictation ?—No. You said,
through your diplomatists, that to crush the Pacha of
Egypt, was to crush the only Turkish power existing in
anything like an organized state; that fresh disasters
would arise in the Archipelago, and that Egypt would
be given up, not to the Sultan, but to anarchy. This
was the language of all the diplomatic documents.
Austria acknowledged that France was right in demand-
ing Egypt and Syria for the Pacha ; Prussia adhered to
the same view; Russia had not explained herself tho-
roughly, but she did not appear to offer any opposition
to the proposition. Do you know what I thought of
the subject? If only the Pacha had been concerned in
the question of Egypt, I should not have been inclined
to take it up so seriously as I did; but when I saw that,
as regarded the East, all the Powers were leaguing
against us, I said to myself that if France, even on a ques-
tion of influence, should refrain from showing that she was
disposed to enforce her influence, that influence would be
gravely compromised. Let my opponents say what they
will, here lies the whole question. If you do not show,
when an attempt is made to annul your influence, that
you are ready to incur every sacrifice to make it re-
spected, you are no longer France—you are no longer a
great nation. This was the question with me. I had a
profound conviction that if we did not show that we were
still la grande France our influence would be lost in
Europe, and I predicted that if one day or other, upon
one queston or another, we should not resolve to display
all our energy, the regime to which lam devoted would
have to bear the shame of having come into the world to
degrade the country.—(Approbation from the left.) Now
where could a case of war arise in Belgium ? The des-
tiny of that country is fixed by treaties. In Spain, ex-
citement as to that country is calmed down. The only
case for war was in the East, for there was the
question of territory, there was the question
of influence, and you ought not to have al-
lowed Europe to coalesce against you to settle
the question of territory, and annul your influence. Be
convinced then that, in abstaining from the course which
I declare to have been necessary, you have not removed
any danger, you have only rendered it morn formidable.
It has been said that the Cabinet of the Ist of March
was insulting, and that it gave provocation to the Powers.
On this point, however, I can appeal to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs himself. From the moment when I and
my colleagues came to a decision that it was necessary
to assume an attitude of energy, we used only pacific
and moderate language towards Europe. I never ut-
tered the word war on any occasion. But when the
Powers saw that without menace, without boastings,
we were preparing for war, and that we were re-
solved coute qui coute to fortify Paris ; when Lord
Granville was convinced rather from my silence
than from my words that our resolution was serious,
and that we would not retract it, the language
of England was changed, and the hereditary right
which had been refused to the Pacha of Egypt was con-
ceded to him. Ido not say this for the purpose of
showing that the Powers were afraid of France. Every
Power is respectable, and ought to be respected ; but
they saw that the peace of the world was seriously
menaced. There were, therefore, in the English Cabi-
net, two parties, that of Lord Wellington, which was for
pushing things to the utmost possible extremity, and
another which accused Lord Palmerston of imprudence
for being willing, for such an interest as that of the
East, to place the peace of the world in peril, and break
off the alliance with France. The latter party pre-
vailed on account of our demonstrations. Our arma-
ments were what induced the German Powers to aban-
don their first determination. It is true that to France
the Pacha owes the possession of Egypt, but it was to
France resolute, not to France timid, not saying, "We
will yield every thing rather than go to war." I am
convinced that if a few days more had been allowed
to pass by without acceding to an arrangement, the
Dacha would have obtained, if not brilliant conditions,
yet certainly better conditions than those which have
been granted to him. I was perfectly prepared to see the
Pacha defeated on the coast, but, although defeated on
the coast, be was not lost. He had still 70,000 men
between Aleppo and Damascus. His enemies had only
the coast, and it was not known what France would do.
It was not known whether the Pacha would dive way.
Bf. (Inizot came in, that the
He was still strong. It was not because. M. Guizot came
It was because the Ministry
into office that difficulties ceased. It was not because
ed upon energy to the end, and
not powerful and indepen-
dent If positiont Th eh Thiers esrot sf
March
thingsaerneth out
huatda resolved
changed.owl
va s
were and satdthat, with the Ministers of the 29th October consented to accept con •
p, he could never de-
fend which had been rejected by their predecessors.
M. Thiers here reviewed the present condition of the
with such a small
those who granted them. M.
if he should be attacked; conse-
quently, said M. Thiers,
illusory, all the conditions which bad
that if there have been any to kee, u
he could be re-
movedafernmd Yhimselfa sa
at teh we
successfully
Pbeaeenh ag
granted alit'l eiocdul ought
hes a bid
con-
cessions, they are due, such as they are, only to our
Thiers said, I repeat,
momentary display of force and energy. The empire
of
the East has come out of the hands of its protectors
"ppleasure
a sallowed
ur of
more sickly than it was. There is in the Turkish Em-
pire it gin a state of rand element of disorganisation. So long as
the Pacha existed power, the Sultan
could avail himself of it against the encroachments of
the Greek race. The moment will come when the
Christian race will rise, and they are only waiting for
the opportunity. At Constantinople there are neither
finances nor an army There is only a commencement
of civilisation, which has to struggle with all the routine
and ignorance of true Turks. We have had Turks visit-
ing France who have acquired our language, our cus-
toms, and our civilisation. These Turks are ridiculous
in the eyes of true Turks. What, then, are we to ex-
pect from them ? The Russians know that the question
of Constantinople is a terrible one for them. lam sure
that so long as the question of Poland shall not be defini-
tively settled, they will not go to Constantinople ; but
Russian diplomatists are resolved to expend their last
rouble, their last man, to prevent any Power from going to
Constantinople. In three days Russia can send an army
to the Crimea, and in 41113.0 days she can have an army
in Constantinople. Russia, then, 13 in the same position as
if she had every day an army at the gates of Constantinople.
Now, I ask you, it France had eonstantly an army ready
at the foot of the Alps, the English fleet before Alex-
andria, the Austrians an army 0014atantly ready upon the