The Sun.
London, England, 1827-11-01 00:00:00

TURKEY.

(Fiorn the Oriental Spectator.) ,
SMYRNA, SEPT. 15.—The English opposition
papers declaim with much vehemence against the
treaty relative to the pacification of Greece. Some
of them attribute it to an immoderate desire of popu-

larity on the part of Mr. Canning; others, to secret
motives, which are anv thing rather than those
which are the basis of this important act; others, in

fine, to views of individual ambition on. the part of
the Contracting Powers; but all are agreed in repre-
senting the difficulties. of its execution as insur-
mountable, and in declaring that it appeals impos-
sible to them, that in case of refusal by the Porte,
England should decide upon thus throwing -herself
into a war, the consequences of which she cannot

foresee, solely for the interests of huinanity—interests
always vague and abstract—and under the futile
pretext of destroying piracy, which could be caused
to disappear whenever it was wished by other means
than that of proclaiming the unrestrained liberty of

pirates.
From the midst of a number of false and exagge
rated arguments which confuse and disfigure this
discussion, those of the Morning Post must be dis-
tinguished, as it treats the question with infinite force
and fairness. It divides it into two parts, that is to
say, the justice,and the right of intervention, and then
the possibility of its execution. It equally blames
the treaty in both respects, and concludes by say-
ing, that whatever may be the result, this act con-
tains in itself a principle which may be fatal to the
repose of nations.
Its arguments, it must be allowed, have an ap-
pearance of solidity which strikes at the first instant,
but we believe that it is possible, by throwing away
every species of exaggeration, by confining the ques-
tion to its real value, to regard it under relations
more exact, and more in accordance with the interest
of both the parties concerned in it.
What was the situation of things before the war ?
The Morea was divided into two Pachalicks, those
of Patras and Tripolizza ; but the administration was
in the hands of Primates or Bodjabachis, chosen from
the most considerable Greek families. The bachas
appeared to be there only for the maintenance of
order and harmony amongst the inhabitants of the
different provinces, which were always divided in in-
terests and ready to come to blows; and particularly
to make war on the inhabitants of the mountains,
who were always animated, not, as has been said,
with a spirit of patriotism, which inclined them to
combat unceasingly against the Turks, to contend
constantly for their rights and liberties, but solely
with a spirit of plunder, which had become for ages
their only trade, and against which the Governors
had unseesingly to defend the inhabitants of the
plains. Thus the Pacha made war and received the
taxes ; he in no case entered into the interior affairs,
which were entirely directed by the Greeks.
In the Islands the Government was similar, and
even more favourable Lo the Greek population,
because the Turkish Governor, having no necessity
to employ a military force, by reason of the tran-
quillity which prevailed, was only accompanied by a
few servants, and appeared solely intended to assert,
by his presence, the rights of the Porte. lii several
of those isles there was not even a representative of
the Turkish Government; the Primates governed
alone, and controulled and directed the administra-
tion both civil and military. The taxes were remitted
to Constantinople, through the Captain Pacha, upon
whom the inspection in chief of the sales devolved,
and who once a year made a circuit with his fleet, for
the purpose of satisfying himself that good order pre-
vailed, and to enforce the payment of arrears of taxes.
Such was the situation of the Greek Provinces
before the revolution of 1821. The Porte was
nominally their Sovereign, but in reality only exer-
cised a right of protecticu.
From that epoch, a bloody war has drawn be-
tween the two people a line of demarcation, which
it is not possible can ever more disappear. it is not
to be imagined that things can be established on
their former footing—that would be wishing to con-
tinue in existence, with all its force, a revolution,
which succeeds in demoralizing the Greeks, and
threatens to swallow them all up—which harasses and
disturbs the march of the European Governments,
and which wearies and compromises that of the Ot-
toman Empire. These are facts which must be ad-
mitted in all their strictness, in place of reasoning
upon abstraction and vain hypothesis; because the
knowledge of facts is the true knowledge for go-
verning men, and the only one which leads to the
rational application of principles.
It was then become necessary to put an end to
this war, and this is the object of the intervention.
The fury of parties was excited one against the
other, by assistance furnished to one of them, and
unremittingly renewed by the public opinion of
Europe, of which the power must also be taken into
consideration, because it was not wished at first to
instruct it, and to oppose to it the arms of reason
and of truth; this fury, which so many extraneous
causes had augmented, does not admit of the belief
that the struggle could have terminated promptly
and naturally, either by victory or treaty. It was
necessary to interpose, and assuredly it was better
that this should be done by Governments than by
individuals. For six years the latter had lavished all
their efforts, but the result had disappointed their
hopes. Such a complication required a powerful
arm to arrest its consequences, and the mediation
presented itself. What, at this moment, is asked of
the Porte ? That it should give itself up to the
evidence of facts--that it should acknowledge. the
necessities of the times by granting a restorative Go-
vernment to a country desolated by war and anarchy.

An interposition for such a purpose is assuredly better
than many others which have taken place in our times;
but in reducing these concessions to their just
value, and especially laying aside irritated self-
love and insulted pride; which are always bad corm-
sellers, whether to individuals or to Kings, what is
the object of the interference? To consecrate de
jure what previously existed de facto. The su-
periority is confirmed to the Porte, and a tribute
will be paid to it, and the nomination of the chiefs
of the country will be sanctioned by it. If the
Divan balances against this the infinite difficulty
it finds in realizing the contributions entrusted to
its agents in. the Islands and the Mores—the almost
continual-war which it must necessarily carry on in
that country—if it calculates the Waste of treasure,
and the bloodshed necessary to maintain an autho
rity always precarious, and, at the best, useless—if
it compare, in a word, this position of violence
with that which it is proposed to establish—will it
not acknowledge the advantage of remaining master
of that country unburdened by tbe expences which
its
administration imposes, with receiving imposts
paid with exactness, and probably in greater amount,
instead of ruinous levies, of which but a small part
was realised ? And, if it rise to higher considera-
tiens—if it look to the (uture destinies of
Turkey, by reason of the new course which
it has just_ entered upon—will it not appre-
ciate the great value derived from the termination of
this war, when the result of the peace must be, to
deliver the empire from a state of disquiet and un-
certainty, the duration of which might compromise
its tranquillity, and to, take from the malcontents all
hopes and all pretexts for commdtion--Lto consoli-
date the new institutions—to permit, above all,
without hindrance, the formation of the 'law army,
and, lastly, to put to silence for ever, or at least for
a long time to come, the but thinly disguised ambi-
tious projects to which the Greek war must infallibly
have presented, sooner or later, an opportunity of
fulfilment? Assuredly such consequences are most
important to the Divan, and it ought well to esti-
mate all their weight. Peace produced in this way,
furnishes it all those guarantees which it could hope
to obtain in no other. The three Powers are bound
to maintain it ; and, once established by the conces-
sion of the Divan, they must defend it, not only
against the turbulence of Greece itself, which is a
less important matter, but also against every attack
that might be-more important. The truth must be
told. A positive refusal leads to a rupture, and a
rtifiture with the three first Powers of Europe
would be attended with fatal consequences to the
Porte. • The mediating Powers announce, that they
are determined to complete the work of pacification. If
they be compelled to establish the armistice by force,
the Porte then places itself in a state of hostility with
them, and their. pacific demeanour assumes another cha-
racter. The limitation of Greece,and the conservation
of the superiority of the Porte, will be largely consi-
dered, and it is impossible to say how far such con-
duct might lead. It has been remarked for many
years with what sagacity the Porte has succeeded in
all its negociations, in discerning its true interests
and preserving its -dignity. It is placed at this
moment in a predicament in which an imprudent de-
termination may compromise its future welfare, and
if it will reflect upon all the high questions which
it is called upon to resolve, without suffering self-
love and the recollections of the past to take a part
in its deliberations, there can be no doubt that it will
still justify this opinion of that ability which it has
justly acquired.
The Porte, if it yields to the counsels of its real
friends, will say to the mediatory powers, as Mr.
Canning said in- reference to the interposition of
France with Spain—l leave to you the burden of the
organization of Greece.
There is not in Europe any one Power, except-
ing England, which has not been compelled, during
this present age, to make concessions to necessity.
The States that have suffered the least are those
which have decided with most promptitude; and of
this England itself may be cited as an example, in its
treaty of 1813, with the United States. This is au
example which ought not to be disdained by the
Porte, and on which it ought well to meditate before
it come to any termination.

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