The Sun.
London, England, 1827-02-03 00:00:00

TIIE KIN C.' V. LITTON.

. A rule to chew cause why a criminal information should not be
filed against the defendant, an attorney, for writing a letter to a
Mr. Vandygusen, who resides in Norfolk, challenging him to fight
a duel, having been obtained in the last term,
The COMIVOIK-SERGEANT appeared this day to oppose the rule,
on the grounds that the prosecutor had provoked the conduct of
the defendant.—Rule discharged on the defendant paying the
costa of the application.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.
ADAMSON V. JARVIS.

The plaintiff in this'action is an auctioneer, and was employed
by the defendant, who represented himself as possessed of a large
estate, to sell some property for him, which he alleged was his
Own. The plaintiff accordingly relying upon the defendant's
affirmation, which afterwards proved to be false, sold the pro-
perty, and, after deducting his own charges, raid the pro.
ceeds to the defendant. Shortly afterwards, however, the
true owner of the property raised an action against the
plaintiff, for the value of the property, in which he recovered
a verdict, and the plaintiff was in consequence obliged to pay him.
The plaintiff applied to the defendant to indemnify him, which he
refused to do, and the plaintiff was, therefore, under the necessity
of bringing the present action. It was tried before the Chief
Justice at the sittings after last Trinity Term, and a verdict found
for the plaintiff; but Mr. Serjeant Teddy, for the defendant,
moved for an arrest of judgment, on the ground that the defend-
ant did not know at the time he employed the plaintiff but the
property was his own, although it afterwards turned out that it
was not. The Learned Counsel also referred to several cases in
which agents were not to be indemnified by their employers under
such circumstances.
The CHIP. ' JUSTICE this day delivered the opinion of the
Court. He entered at considerable length upon the law regarding
principal and agent, and observed, that it would be extremely
unjust if agents were to suffer when they acted solely upon the in-
formation of their employers, in the event of that information
turning out to be unfounded. His Lordship could see no differ-
ence in so far as an agent was concerned, between a case where
this employer was affirming what lie knew at the time to be false,
and one in which he believed at the time that what he stated Was
true, though, should it be ascertained afterwards that it was false,
the employer, and not the agent, must suffer by it. With regard
to the cases referred to by the learned Sergeant, his Lordship
observed, that in all of them, the agent wr-; aware of the falsehood
of the employer's affirmation, and that they did not apply in this
case. His Lordship said, that the Court was unanimously of
opinion, that the rule for the arrest of judgment should be dis-
charged.--Rule discharged.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER.
LIABILITY OF SURETIES.
T 5 KING V. ATKINSON AND rAnicorsoN.
The only question in this ease was, whether the defendants,
who had become sureties in a bond for a debtor to the Crow m,
were liable to he now called on to pay the amount. The defend-
ants refused payment on the grounds, that although the bond had
been executed in It.oo, no previous proevednlo bud been takeu on

it, and that the principal in his lifetime, and his representatives after
his death, were possessed of property sufficient to satisfy the
debt to the Crown.

On the part of the Crown it was argued, that an extension of
time to a principal, allowed him through the inactivity of the cre-
ditor, did not release the surety from the liability of being called
on to pay the amount of the debt. The only ease in which exten-
sion of time could operate in favour of the surety, was where
it was given upon an express understanding between the cre-
ditor and principal, without the knowledge or consent of the
surety; and here it was not put upon the pleadings that any such
understanding had ever existed. If this were the ecknowledged
law between private individuals, how much more strongly ought
the doctrine to obtain where the Crown was the:creditor. It was
further urged against the plea of the defendants, that they merely
set forth that the property of the principal was sufficient to meet
the debt to the Crown, without alleging its sufficiency to satisfy
the costs to which the Crown would be entitled.

Mr. ALDERSON appeared in support of the plea put in by the
defendants. It was unnecessary, in his opinion to make distinct
mention of the costs in the plea, as the presumption must be,
that the principal having property to meet the demand, and the
debt being clearly due, it would be unnecessary to proceed
to law for the enforcement of it, and consequently no costs need
have been incurred. The Court wax bound to presume that the
principal would have instantly paid the amount. The Learned
Gentleman proceeded at great length to argue, that every person,
on becoming a surety, did so under an implied undertanding, that
the principal would, in the first instance, be resorted to by the cre-
ditor, and that there was an express provision in Magna Charta,
to the effect that the Crown would in no ease proceed against a
surety, whilst the principal had effects sufficient to satisfy its
claims.

Mr. Baron Hum.ocx thought this provision had reference only
to conditional creditors. His Lordship bad looked attentively
and anxiously into the authorities on this subject, without being
able to find a ease in which it was held, that the provision of
Magna Charta, cited by Mr. Alderson applied in the slightest
degree to sureties under a bond or recognizance.

Mr. ALDER SON confessed that he had been equally unsuccessful
in his search after a ease of that description.
Mr. Baron Humoca—Your success must depend on the exist-
ence of the case.

The plea was overruled, and consequently the liability of the
defendants was established,

CONSISTORY COURT.
THE OFFICE OF JUDGE V. COTTON.

This was a suit instituted by the lay impropriators of a parish
in Worcestershire, against Mr. Cotton, for erecting a monument
in the church-yard, without leave of the ordinary.
The case now came before the Court upon the admission of
articles, and it was objected that although it was allowable for the
Rector of a parish to institute such a suit, there was no precedent
of a lay impropriator commencing it.
The COURT was of opinion, that when grants of parishes
were made to lay impropriators, upon the extinction of
religious houses, all rights were conferred in as full a manner as
they had been held by the religious communities. A lay impro-
priator was bound to keep a church in repair, and subject in other
respects to the ecclesiastical authority of his Diocese, the Court
therefore, gave no weight to the objection, that the suit was not
promoted by a clergyman ; and having ordered the articles to be
reformed in some immaterial particulars, pronounced for the ad-
mission.