The Sun.
London, England, 1820-11-01 00:00:00

COURSE OF EXCHANGE, OCT... 31.

Amsterdam
Ditto, at Sight ... • 12 4
•
Rotterdam l2 8
Antwerp l2 g
Elamborgh ......
Alto.na . • B7 ~9 2i Us.
-
Paris, 43 Day's sight ... 25 80 0 Cs.
Ditto
Bourdeaux, ditto
Frank fort on the Main - ... 155 Ex. Money.
Madrid
Cadiz .. .... 36 Effectirs
!Whoa 36 Effective
Barcelona
ieville •
Gibraltar
LeghOrn 4('i_
Genoa 431---Venice, ital. Liv. 27 60
Nlalta 45 ----Naples . 381
Palermo
Lisbon . '
Oporto
Itio.laneiro
Dublin ' 6*. Cork ...... 61 per Cent.
. , BULLION. .
__

Portugal Gold, in Coin V.1.0 0 0 per Oz
Foreign Gold, in 111 rs 3 17 101
Sew 1)ont)14)oni
New Dollars 0 4 10/
Siiver in Burs, Standard 0 4 111

and Revolution.
I consider Reform to be a correction of abuses without de-
stroying the exising •Constitution. I consider Revolution to
be a correction of abuses, accompanied with the 'destruction
of the existing Constitution.
in tngland, in. 1688, the nation removed the existing
dynasty, and established a new uric. As the dynasty is con-
sidered as the must prominent part of the Constitution, this
change has been denomineted a Revolution. Perhaps, ac-
cording to my definition, ,it might more properly have been
called a Reform ; for the two other existing part's of the Con-
stitution, viz. the'llouse of Lords and the House of Com-
mons, were left unaltered.
lii 1789, that Government which had existed in France
during the reigns of Louis XIV. and Louis XV. was swept
away. A new , Constitution was established; and, when
Louis XVI. accepted royalty under this new Constitution, the
same dynasty, - but tinder a new title, seat placed on the
Throne. 1 consider this proceeding in 1789 to hare been,
in the fullest sense of.the word, a Re.volution.
In 1800, the Irish Government was abolished, and the
in
habitants of Ireland subjected to a new. 'Constitution. This
measure also I consider as a Revolution.
I have always dreaded Revolution. The crisis consequent
fin it, is sometimes beneficial ; I believe it will ultimately he
found to be so in France ; but the paroxysms which precede
the crisis, are terrifying. -As an Englishman I hare always
wished for Reform ; l•eCause I have always been of opinion,
that if Reforet did not take place, Revolution Would be a ne-
cessary consequence of the existing ..hoses.
I will state what 1 consider as the abuse which stands /hest
iii need of bang corrected. It is this -et hat individual Peers
'have, in many. places, usurped the nomination •of Members
e
f the
said individual
ttrliament i
trhfereuerCus\otil: those
❑smeh aad:g.oagrrirege gtutt:tatt ot
riginally 'ansnt granted
places;
n :httliladt(•)ii
•vidual Commoners have usurped the property in borenghs;
but
uis:o t
tnol
frequently
ii the i'tev powerand
lich t
if
) the
ae);
q
-hits thereby acquired Soon occasions him to be elevated.to the
Peerage. The mischief is -also greater where the usurpation
is by a Peer.; for aftter lie -hits acquired this -unconstitutional
power, he exercises functiens inconsistent with each other ;
in impeachment, for example, the Commons are the accu-
sets, and the l'eers the Judges; but if the Nlchiliers of the
House of Commons, who prefer the accusation; are nominated
.hy the Peers, and there ie. any .truth in • that maxim of the
common- law, Qui facit per (ilium,. fneit per se, those whO
are the Judges are at the same time the Accuser's.' Will af'Y
titan say that this ought to be ? By the principles of our Con-
stitution, the Contmons are to vote the taxes, and the Peers
have only a right to prevent the proposed tax from being iitt
posed, by refusing their consent. This regulation was haw-

of the Peers seems to have been made at a very
early period after Representatives of the Commons were beat
summoned to Parliament ; for in the first Parliament of Ed-
ward I. be enacted provisions to resteein this conduct in the
Peers. The expressions in the act are these; " Forasmuch
as Elections ought to be free, the King forbids, on pain of
severe forfeiture, that any great man or tither should, by
force of arms, or by menaces, or by any subtle contrivance,
disturb the freedom of Election."
The Commons of England now stand in need of this peo-
tection against the Peers, which was heretofore wanted by
our Kings. I know it will be said, that the Peer, who nomi-
nates Members of the House of Conn ions, and afterwards
sells their votes to the Minister, pays his proportion of those
taxes which are imposed. This may be true ; but the gain
of his immediate object induces him to forget the inure die-
taut evil.
I decline giving instances in the present reign, of the abu-
sive exercise of power thus:required; but I will name one in-
stance in the reign ot Gemge 11, , and it is so generally
known, that I am confident no man will dispute the correct-
ness of the anecdote. The post a Captain of the Band of
Pensiuuers was vacant ; the-King wished to give it to a gen-
tleman whom he desired to have about his person. The
Minister, Mr. Pelham, proposed to give it to atwitter gentle-
man; but after some struggle, the Minister yielded, and the
post was destined for the King's friend. At this moment,
before the place was actually given away, Lord Falmouth sig-
nified to the Minister, that he wished to have this employ-
ment. Mr. Pelham rewoustrated with 'hint that the place
was destined for a personal friend 'of the King ; the only
answer which Lord Falmbuth made, was ; " Sir, we are
nine." This was the-only answer which the Minister could
obtain bum him ; and because Lord Falmouth named nine
Members cif the House of Commons, the King and the
nister were both obliged to submit. Lord Falnioath 'cer-
tainly paid his share of the taxes, which these nine Members
assisted the Minister to impose. But this consideratieu was
out-weighed by the immediate object which he obtained.
The people of England have been gradually led to de-
mand a Reform in the House of Commons. I believe the
late Earl of Chatham was among the first who suggested thu
necessity. He saw that the number of Members nominated
by Proprietors and Patrons of Boroughs was so large, that.
the people were nut protected against immoderate taxation.
Towards the close of the American war, the people were
led to observe that they had been engaged in that war, isrot
subjected to heavy taxes, toe the purpose oeeefoecing a claim
of the House of Commons to tax their fellow. subjects in Ame-
rica. How far the House of Commons was entitled to thh
right, was at least doubtful ; ftir the usage had always been
for the Colonies to tax themselves in their own Pruvincial'
Assemblies ; and on questions of Constitutional Rights,
usage has always been appealed to. The people of England
found themselves disappointed in that hope which bad been
held out to them, that by procuring Revenue front America,
taxation on the inhabitants of Great Britain Would be
uished. They experienced the very reverse of this hope which
had been to held out to them. They found their own bur-_
thens immoderately increased, and if the contest Were pet-
severed in, they saw no bounds to taxes. While the Country
was in this situation, several eminent men pointed out •to the
people, that immoderate taxation was the consequence of the
existing state of the House of Commons ; that a Retordi
of
that douse was necessary ; that the people ought to be more
efficiently represereed in it.
The Duke of Richmond was among, those who- stood fore-
most in recommending a Rea.. in of Parliament. The remedy
which lie suggested, was Election by Universal Suffrage.
It I UM correct in what I bare stated respecting the trimmer
in which aggregate bodies of the Communalty acquired the
'right of sending Representatives to Parliament—the Duke
of Richmond's plan would not have been a Reform, but a
Revolution.
I will acknowledge' that I have always heard with regret,
the suggestion of this plan. It never could be a permanent
Constitution. It might, possibly be an intermediate state,
through which, atter touch suffering, we might ultimately pass
to a good Constitution.
I have said, that the nomination to-some seats in Parlia-
ment, has been usurped by Peers; I will explain what I- mean
by this assertion. In Burgage-tenement Boroughs, the right
of electing Representatives to Parliament has beet, granted to
every owner of a freehold interest, in a tenement within the,
Borough; and it has been decided, that the scite of an ancient
Burgage entitles the owner to a vote. A Peer purchases a
majority of the Burgages or ancient scites. The night before,
the election, he sends down his dependants. The Noble
Lord's steward then delivers. a Conveyance of a Burgage
to
each person; the next morning they are carried up to vote,
and as WWI as the return is shade, -the several Voters give
back their Conveyances to the steward, and they are heard
of no turn. '1 he Members thus returned, have nut been
elected by proprietors of a freehold in the.Burgages; for the
Conveyances transferred no interest to the several persons
to whom they were made. Suppose the Noble Lord had
made these Conveyances to prevent these Burgage-tene-
ments from tieing taken in execution by his creditors; will
any man say that these Conveyance's would. have been valid , •
against the creditors ? Lbelieve there is no doubt•as to the
answer which must he given. The Conveyances were .ficti-
tious and colourable; and as against the creditors they
were void; for they conveyed uu property. But can they be
void as against creditors, and valid as against the King ?
for the King has a right-to have two Members returned to
Parliament, elected by a majority of the owners of freehold
interests in the several Burgages within the Borough. • But
if the two members returned are not elected by owners of
freehold interests, they will sit in Parliament only by the no-
mination of the noble Peer himself.
I believe there are about sixty. Members of the House of
to
Commons, who thus sit in Parliament by the nomination of •
proprietors •of Burgage-tenement Boroughs. A more consi-
derable number sit there by the nomination of Patroas of
Boroughs. In these Boroughs the Right of Electiou is-vari-
ous. Sometimes in close Corporations; sometimes in Free-
men; sometimes in the payers of Scut and Lot ; sometimes in
Pot-boilers, with other various qualificatiohs. The I:atron's
merit with the • Nliffistet is, that he can supply him with. the
I nomination to these seats.
It will be asked, what mischief arises front all this ? The.
answer is:obvious.. .The Mielister having thus obtained a
cummand over a majority of the House of Commons, the
people are deprived of that- protection againstailimbeilerate
taxation, which the principles of our Constetutiou
hauPsrcur-
ed to them. Should it he asked, did the 11Onse of Cilannone
ever, in fact, protect the people against immoderate takerPf
answer, Yes. From the accession of the Tudors, te, the eßifuj
mencemeet ofthe great rebellion. in the reign of Charles -ft''.
the people were protected frtim immoderate taxation bv. then
House of.Conottons. Take, for example, the reign of 1.--teirSl-ae
VIII. in disposition the most tyrannical of ail our moaroctie.,
Thoug,halrey Tiehlestturevery other of his wishes, they would
nut
lifeisaengt people'sche toi . h money.ip ea fundsl-yai 161 daitd
they
rgcei
;et;l:teth
for, by Feoffinents
d
him ; and in this he told then, the truth ;
to-Cies, the profits which he
llom estates
held of ham its capitei, were,. withheld front him. It was
-not- until the 27th • yezis of his -reign, that he t,ould pre-
vail on them to, Lass the Statiite of Uses, by which the •
afrl'illti's,disigTel:liiceh had-s ti blievlcetiir.4tiorar ctui:arndY °yre'arlslimur'gvieisr; prevented ;
the House
Commons to pasl this statatr. I know it may be
that the nonse of Commons consented to let him confi-
scate the property •of the convents ; but that, property
wax not under their protection; They permitted Queru
Matry thh re-establish the Itornah -Catholic-religion; but when
she asked them to consent that the confiscated property of
ttie convents should be restored, they lefts's& it ; for that pru-
Peet), was then become the property et laymen, was un-
der their protection.
At the commencement Of the great rebellion in the time of
Charles I. pet hero there was hardly any nation in Europe iu
which taxes Were stroke moderate than iu Englaud, Ou clue.

occasion during that reign, an unusual number of ittbsidies
was dematukd in a message from the Crowe. The House was
startled at the novelty; hut a Member reconciled them to
the proposal by spewing them bow very small a sum he, who
was reputed a very rich man, should mooch. Ham den had
an estate of .20001. a year ; the shipy deded from
him was only twenty shillings: he resisted it; not on ac-
count of the amount, but on aceonet of the injustice of the
demand.
In the time of Charles 1. Members were sent to the House
of Commons 'from those Counties, Cities, and Boroughs,
whictesend them noie.. Chester and Durham, 1 believe, did
nut send Members tilt the reign of Charles 11. The altera-
time, however, as to the places which have a right to send
Members to Parliament, has been very little. But the Mi-
nister had tint then discovered the means of influencing Elec-
tines. I have attributed immoderate taxation to the manner
in which Members-are returned to the House of Commons.—
It is not the Members returucd who sire alone to he corrupt-
ed,. but every nem who contijhntes to the Election of the
Members is to be influenced; and the present system ren-
ders it necessary that the Crown should have great patron-
age. Men call for retrenchment in the expenditure ; but if
retrenchment were cat ried to a beneficial extent, the CRoW,
wvald Lv lift Under the pa?e,r of AN OLIGARCHY, the muse OP,
resessive of all Governments.
I have thus stated the mischief. What is the remedy? My
answer is, a House of Commons interested to lite p down
taxer. And to secure that the Howie of Commons shunld be
interested to keep down taxes, the Members should not only
be men of property themselves, but should he elected by met:
who have that degree of property which may make them soli-
citous to keep taxes modetate. Retrenchment must be pre-
ceded by Reform.
While al embers are returned to Parliament by those Cities
and Boroughs which now send them, is it practicable to se-
cure thest they shall be elected by men of property ? I think
-it is. For instance, in the Iturgage-tenement Boreughs' let
every Elector SWEA,R, not only that he is proprietor of the
-Burg,tge-tenetnent fur which he claims to vote, and has been
so fee a twelvemonth precrdiog /he election, but let him also
swear, that he has a landed estate of a moderate value, say
eal. a year, m that county in which the Borough is situate;
and if the Electors are found to he below a certain number,
suppose 100, let a concurrent right of voting be given to every
• Freeholder within the County, who is owner of 1001. a-year.
Apply the same remedy of a landed qualification to other
Cities and Boroughs, vat ying the circumstances according to
the different Rights of Electiou.
• I think it would he also advisable that the qualifications of
Electors for Counties should he raised flout 40 shillings to
• 201. a-year. This would preclude the necessity of Electors
• being carried to the Poll at the expence of the Candidates. 1
know that the remedy which 1 suggest, is the reverse of what
is recommended by the Advocates, for Universal Suffrage ; but
the mischief against which 1 wish to protect the people, is

immoderate taxation.
The Members returned to the Freoth National Assembly
are elected by men, each of whom must have property to the
value of 18001. Sterling. I think this a good Right of Elec-
tion; for the Electors have an interest to elect those who
will keep taxes moderate. I know it may be said, that there
ace other articles which require to be defended as well as the
Subject's property; such as kis life and liberty. This is true;
but it is the property of the Subject which the Minister wants,
and it is, therefore, the property which we ought most solici-
tously to guard ; and let it be remembered, that the Repre-
seutative who has au interest to guard toy property, because
he is at the same time guarding his own will, fur the saute
reasoa, be interested to guard my life and liberty.
I have beard it. said, that Reform in the House of Commons
would prevent those men who have abilities, but are wit hunt
property, front being Members of that house, and that these I
met) are very useful. I act of different opinion. I think they
are rather mischievous than useful. I wish the House of Com-
futons not to continue to exercise that share in the Executive
Government which it has lately acquired. The Minister always
wishes the House of Commons to vote a previous approbation
of that measure which he is about to adopt. By this means,
he is protected from subsequent elimination. But the Nation
is deprived of one of the most important advantages which it
is entitled to expect from a House of Commons; viz. An As-
sembly watchful over the conduct of Ministers,and punishing
them for acts injurious to their Country.
I have given my opinion thus fully on the subject of Re-
forin ; because I am convinced, that either Reform or Revo-
lution NI UST SOON take place. I wish fur Reform, and depre-
cate Revolution.
I have thus ventured to give my opinion on the probability
that a Reform of the House of Commons will take place in
Great Britain. I have' expressed my wish that a Reform may
take place as being the only means by which Revolution may
be aroided. I have also expressed my opinion as to the man-
ner in which Reform may he effected. Must certainly more
regulations than those which I have suggested will be ne-

cryoary.
4embrrs of the House of Commons were first summoned
to Parliament to protect the King against his great Nobles ;
they are now wanted to protect the people against immode-
rate taxation. To induce them to afford this protection,
they must themselves be interested, and to secure that they
shall be interested, they must be elected by men who are
payers of the taxes. With this view, the right of electing
Pelembet s must be taken from many of the small towns and
transferred to the inhabitants of large towns.
Sonic men have thought that Triennial Parliaments might be
of great benefit, and this is the only Reform which the great
Wain Families seemed disputed to consent to. I cannot say
that I see any great advantage in the adoption of this mea-
sure. It wonld render the House of Commons less suited to
share in the exercise of the Executive Government. And this
is theonly benefit which I can see in it. I admit that this
would be a benefit; for while the House of Commons conti-
nue to possess that share in the Executive Government
which they have been allowed to usurp, they are disqualified to
watch over the conduct of the Executive Government, per-
haps the most useful ditty which they have to discharge.