The Sun.
London, England, 1842-06-24 00:00:00

JUNE 24, 1842.

was called on to give his opinion, and he (Mr. Bailie)
had reason to know he gave the best and soundest ad-
vice. He told the Governor-General that the course, he
was about to undertake was unjust and impolitic—un-
just in a political point of view, as regarded the deposal
of Dost Mahomed ; and impolitic in a military
point of view, as the country was so dis-
tant and so remote from all resources that
could be afforded ; he pointed out the possibility of
defeat and the impossibility of retreat—the character of
the frontier beyond the Sutledge, and the propriety of
making the Indus the boundary of the country. That
advice walgiven ayear before the marching of the army;
so that, as tar as the Commander-in-Chief was concerned,
he performed his duty to his country. But before un-
dertaking a great military. expedition, contrary to the
advice and opinion of the great military authorities of
.the country, it might have been deemed advisable to have
consulted some of the great military authorities of this
country—either the Commander-in-Chief of the army,
or the higher authority of the Duke of Wellington.
If mat had been adopted there was every reason to be-
lieve that it would be consonant in all respects with the
opinion delivered by the Commander-in- Chief of the
army in India. That the expedition to .Affghanistan was
a great military fault, and a 'great political mis-
take, no one, he thought, at the present moment
was prepared to deny. He believed that politicians
were now anxious to devise means, if anything could be
devised, by which our troops could be withdrawn without
exhibiting proofs of our want of power in India.
What were the reasons of the Governor-General,
in order to justify the invasion of Affghanistan ? They
were stated in the manifesto, dated October 1, 1838,
which was published in every newspaper throughout the
country; it was, therefore, familiar to all those Hon. Gen-
tlemen who had paid any attention to the subject. It was a
rather remarkable document, and a most important one.
The Governor-General in that manifesto stated, that from
information he had received from various officers in Aff-
ghanistan, the Beloochee Chiefs, from their unpopularity,
were unsuited to be useful allies to the British Government.
Such wore the opinions of the only English officers
who had visited Caubul previous to the march of the
army of this country,with the exception of those who were
with Capt. Burnes. He denied that Shah Soojah-00l-
Moolk was so popular a Monarch as had been represented.
They would be prepared to join with the Russians or
the Persians, or any force in Central Asia, directed
against the English. They could not be justified in
placing the British army in a position altogether inde-
fensible ; such as the occupation of a country by
our troops between 500 and 1,000 miles dis-
tant from the place of operation, which could
only be approached by the permission of a power-
ful and independent, people, and that through the most
dangerous passes only. Such a scheme was worthy of
a boy, but he did not hesitate to say that no military
man would ever venture to recommend such a step. In
making this motion be wished it to be distinctly under-
stood that it was not his object to make charges
against the late Governor-General of India or the
late President of the Board of Control ; they might be
able to justify by the_production of papers all their
proceedings in that country. ; but he complained that
sufficient information had not been laid before
the House to enable them to arrive at any,fair or just
conclusion. The Indian papers that had already been-laid'
on the table of ,the House were mostly garbled extracts of
letters, from which they would be quite unable to
arrive at any fair conclusion. He did not say that a
bulky volume had not been laid on the table of the House,
nor did he say that it contained no information.
He thought the House would admit this war
could only have been justified on the supposition
that it was impossible for the Governor-General
of India at that period to make any treaty
wiith the former chiefs of Affghanistan. Those were
the express grounds on which the Governor-General,
in the manifesto to which he (Mr. Baillie) had before
alluded, justified the war. Let tlfem see then whe-
ther such assumption could be borne out. In the autumn
of 1837 Sir Alexander Burnes arrived at Caubul,
where he was most hospitably treated by
the natives in the encampment. He found the
Chief not only well disposed to the English,
but so anxious to form a friendly alliance with
us that he at once pet off all the negotiations
he had previously made with the Court of Persia,
The Persian Ambassador had arrived at Candahar, on
his way to Caubul, with costly presents for the chief.
At the same time a Russian agent had arrived at Caubul,
but they refused to negotiate with him, whilst there was ,
a probability..of making an alliance with the English.
Now, it was necessary that the House should know what
were, in fact, the proposals which Dost Mahomed at
that time offered to the British Government. They found
those proposals laid down by Capt. Burnes in one of his
despatches to the Governor-General. (The Hon. Member
then read a dispatch of Captain Burnes to the Governor-
General, stating that Dost Mahomed had stated
that he was desirous of placing himself under the pro-
tection of the British Government, and did not wish the
restoration of Candahar, provided he received that pro-
tection.) What, he asked, was the protection of the
British Government against Persia, in the event of his
alliance with us calling down upon him the hostility of
that power ? And what was the answer of the
British Government to these proposals ? A positive and
direct refusal to afford any protection from Persia what-
ever, except that which the presence of Captain Burnes
might afford. Dost Mahomed did not under-
stand the meaning of this moral influence.
In • a few days after this refusal Captain Burnes
took his departure from Caubul, and upon his
arrival at Hyderabad, he wrote to the Governor-General
stating that the moral influence of British power and
the arguments derived from it had no weight at Caubul.
Now, in order to show the House the good feeling and
the good spirit by which Dost Mahomed was actuated
at the commencement of the negotiations, he would read
t ► the House an extract from ene of Capt. Burnes'
suppressed despatches now in the course of publication.
The Hon. Member then read a letter of Dost Mahomed,
brought to him by the son of the Ameer, stating
that he wished to have nothing to do with any
other power but the British ; and that, if agree-
able to the Governor-General, he would turn
out the Russian agent into the road, or act
in any other way in which he was required. Sir A.
Burnes told the Ameer that he could not take upon him-
self to refuse an accredited agent, according to the usages
of civilised nations, but that he could make full disclo-
sures to the British Government of any designs
which might be opened to him.—(Hear, hear.)
He would ask the House if it was possible to show greater
good-will to the British Government ? Some doubts, it
appeared, had been expressed as to what were Captain
Burnes' opinions as to the policy of making war on Dost
Mahomed.ln order to make that point clear,he would quote
from a suppressed despatch of Capt. Burnes, addressed
to Sir Wm. Macuaghten, dated Caubul, January 26,
1838. Captain Burnes therein stated, that since arriving
at Caubul he had seen an agent from Persia, who bad
come with most alluring promises, compelled to quit the
country, when he had reached as far as Candahar ; and
that the agent of Russia, who was also the bfarer of most
alluring promises, had met with no more civility. The
Ameer had declared that he always sought the alliance
of the British Government, and that he would never de-
sert it as long as there was a-chance of retaining it. He
begged to remind the House that the expedition to Aff-
ghanistan had not been undertaken till all the causes for
it had ceased. The siege of Herat had been raised; the
explanations which had been demanded of the Persian
Government had been given, and had been deemed by
the Noble Lord the Hon. Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs perfectly satisfactory. He believed they would
have heard little of the intrigues of the Russian agents
in Affghanistan if it had not been for the intrigues of the
English, agents in Circassia, with which the Noble Lord
had been mixed up—(Hear, from Lord Palmerston)
—at least such had been the opinion of the Russian Go-
vernment. They believed that the Noble Lord had been
endeavouring to find them employment in Circassia,
and therefore they were willing to give the Noble Lord
a little employment in Affghanistan.—(Hear, hear.)
A letter which Dost Mahomed had written to the
Governor-General of India after the departure
of Captain Burnes from Caubul, was important,
as showing the regret which the Dost felt
at not having formed a treaty with the Bri-
tish Government. The letter was dated on the
28th of April, 1838. Ile expressed his sorrow at the de-
parture of Captain Burnes, and his willingness to accede
to what was required of him with regard to the Sirdars of
Candahar ; and he further added, that it was well known
that in the time of Mr. Elp.hinstone, the Affghans and
the British had entered into a treaty, and that
the Affghans had refused to allow the Persians
and the French to pass through their territory to
the British territory, and that the Affghans were de-
sirous that the second article in the treaty
should be carried into effect. Now, from a
perusal of those papers, it was manifest that
the Governor-General of India, might at this jeriod
have made a satisfactory treaty with the former chiefs of
Affghanistan, which would altogether have superseded
the necessity of war, would have secured the alliance of the
native chiefs, would have given security to the northern
provinces, and, by giving them a nominal protection,would
have laid the foundations of a lasting friendship. This
was the course urged on him by Sir A. Burnes ; nay, it
was said that he had made a treaty on his own re-
sponsibility, which the Governor-General refused
to ratify. That he was induced to do so,
could only. be ascribed to the predominance
among his aavisers of that spirit of conquest and ag-
gression which had too often marked the course, and
influenced the conduct of onr Governors in India. All
that he asked was that inforination should be afforded
for the purpose of seeing whether the late Governor-
General of India had properly exercised the great
powers given to him with respect to the war in Affglia-
nistan. The House were to decide whether, taking all
the circumstances into consideration, the House of Corn-
more was to call for that information which would
enable it to come to a right conclusion. He regretted
that some Member of the Government had not brought
the subject forward. He should observe, however, that
he entertained no doubt whatever as to the course which
it was now the duty of the Government to pur-
sue. Whatever might have te.n the original =-
policy of the war, they were now placed in such
a position that they had no other course to take
but to endeavour, at whatever cost or sacrifice, to vindi-
cate the honour of the British name ; and he waa per-
suaded that was the opinion of every gentleman of that
House, who felt that it was for the interest of their
country to p -eserve our glorious empire in the East.
—(Hear, hear,) The Honourable Gentleman con-
cluded by moving for " Copies of the Correspondence
of Sir Alexander Burnes with the Governor-Ge-
neral of India during his mission to Caubul ; also copies
of the Correspondence of the Governor-General of India
with the President of the Board of Control, and e ith the
Secret Committee of' the East India Company, from the
Ist day of September, 1837. to the Ist day of October,
1839, relative to the expedition to AffglianisW,
gr. D'ISRA.ELI rose to second the mogen. He
thought the question was one of vast i-
-3Portance ;
and kit wised they would be Jude acquttiuted