The Sun.
London, England, 1827-12-14 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF TUB PUBLIC JOURNALS.

We are almost. sick of re-repeating the oft-re-
peated story, that we have no intelligence to offer
from Constantinople. Yet how, in truth, should
we do otherwise ? Would it be wiser or more in-
genuous to state the departure of the Ambassadors,
and to fix a date—say the 15th or the 20th—to
that act, decisive of war declared either by us or
against us ? But we do not know that they are
departed; and we do not place any confidence in
the assumed knowledge of others. The occurrence
is not improbable, but it is not certain. And then,
as to war by the Turks, what does it signify? We
are aware of the danger that may result from the
firing of the first gun : but then that danger, in the
present case, must be contingent and future ; the
real mischief can only arrive when the great Euro-
pean States begin to dispute with each other,—that
is, if they should so begin. Let the Turk arm ; let
him declare war : Qu'importe ? Can he march to
Moscow, at this or any season of the year, as Buo-
naparte did ? Can lie force his way to our East
India possessions ?—Can he bombard Paris ?
What, in truth, can he do ? It may be said,
lie will attack the Greeks with more fury. Then
we suppose he has been husbanding his efforts for
the last six years ! Has he ? Granted. But we
(the Allies) say, " You shall not attack the Greeks
;with more fury ; and if you will remain quiet the
Greeks shall not attack you." What reply can he
make to this ? Submission seems his best policy,
as well as his easiest course. In truth, when people
speak of wee with the Turks, they do not mean
that as a formidable or fearful thing, but their ima-
gination roams upon some future war springing out
of this. Turkish affair, in which, for the sake of plun-
der, or from the jealousy of each other's aggrandize-
ment, the Allies are to fall each upon his neighbour.
Such a result is by no means impossible; but the
only reason for thinking it not impossible, or
not improbable., is the experience of similar
alliances in the history of the world, rather than any
thing peculiar in this which the prophesiers of ill
can detect or point out. The attack of Lord Coche
rane upon Scio at this crisis is an unfortunate event;
but should the Turk at last consent to accept of the
general mediation, his Lordship, as well as General
Church and Colonel Fabvier, if not immediately
sent away, must be subjected, or will probably sub-
ject themselves, to the armistice. The dates which
we yesterday gave, of the last accounts from or re-
specting Constantinople, are perfectly correct. No-
thing is know:, here of any proceedings since the
night of the 11th. News of the lath is incessantly
expected : one of the Ambassadors had required,
and was to have a conference, which was to take
place on that day. Private letters from Vienna of
the let inst. have been received ; they give hopes
of the renewal of negociations. If this was true,
the Turk must, of course, have receded from his
previous propositions, and accepted a new basis of
treating; otherwise the Ambassadors would imme-
diately leave the Turkish capital. —Times.
In this time of uncertainty with respect to the
conduct of the Porte, it is natural that all manner
of speculations should be entertained with regard to
the consequences. There can be no question, we
should suppose (whatever may have been surmised
to the contrary), that Austria is deeply interested in
upholding Turkey; and we have no doubt, that if
the had possessed sufficient naval resources, they
would have been at the service of the Porte in re-
ducing the Greeks to subjection. Any acquisition
of territory which Austria might obtain from the
partition of Turkey would in the meantime be a
drain on her resources, rather than a source of in-
come; for what revenue could for years be ex-
pected from countries in so low a state of civiliza-
tion ? The Emperor Joseph obtained a considerable
revenue from the salt mines, in his share of Poland,
but he was obliged to expend large sums in
endeavours- to introduce something like in-
dustry and civilization into the country. The
provinces which Austria might gain from
Turkey, being low in respect of industry,
ends gseeunied by warlike tribes, would necessarily
entail a heavy expence on her for years,itithe erec-
tion of forts, and opening communications,&e. From
the acquisitions of Austria in Italy she draws a large
sevenue,and these acquisitions would be in imminent
dattser from Continental war ; on the .other hand,
her share of Turkey would only give her territory,
without revenue, in a quarter where she is already
weak, and where extension would make her still
weaker. Territory is only valuable as it is turned
to account by cultivation, and at present Austria
possesses abundance of fertile land, which is of little
account from the poverty of the people, and the in-
adequacy of their means for properly cultivating it.
Russia, however, is differently circumstanced.. To
her it would be of infinite consequence to obtain an
entrance into the Mediterranean. But even this ad-
vantage might be purchased at too high a price.
Constantinople lies at an immense distance from
her stores and magazines; and it would be necessary
for her to derive all the stores and provisions for
the army which might take and occupy Con-
stantinople from her own territories. When it is
considered that it would be madness to think of
attempting the conquest of Thrace with less than
a very large army, and that communications must
be kept open between that army and the old Rus-
sian territories, we cannot be far wrong in pronounc-
ing the enterprise to be greatly beyond the resources
of Russia alone. The Emperor Alexander embar-
rassed himself very much several years ago by movs
ing Torces and stores to the Turkish frontier; what,
then, would an invasion of Turkey be? The system
of Russia hitherto has been to occupy province after
province, treating the inhabitants of the now pro-
vinces with great mildness and liberality, so as to
gain their affections, and make them completely
:Russian. When a province has thus been made
completely Russian, she advances a step further.—
This is, indeed, the only system compatible with
her comparatively small revenue, and the inadespaey
of her means for aggressive warfare. Judging from +
the past, we should say that the intervening Princi-
palities would be more than she could manage to
occupy with safety for the present. The occupation
of the Principalities would bring her a stage nearer
to Constantinople, and thus enable her to seize the
nest favourable occasion for advancing on it. In the
meantime, while she will be strengthening herself in
her. snew territory, Turkey, by the separation of
Greece; would be more and more crippled; sad es it
would be for her interest to favour the Greeks, their
co-operation wouldbe of material benefit to her in a fu-
ture war. There is no doubt thatßussia would not think
of entering Turkey at present, in opposition to Eng-
land and France, to say nothing of Austria, the
power most deeply interested in keeping her out.—
But what if Turkey, listening only to a blind desire
of revenge, should persist in her impotent intentions
of hostility against the English, French, and Rus-
sians, and calling in fanaticism to her aid, should
commit such Outrages on the subjects of the three
States as would call for retaliation ? Could the
Allies, in case of such outrages resulting from the
carrying the Treaty into execution, content them-
selves with mezr! preventing the 'lurks from inter-
fering with the 4;eeks ?—and would they not be
bound in honour to chastise the Turks ? But the
only Power that possesses ,the means of chastising
the Turks is Russia • for it is elovious that neithemr
the French nor ourselves can disembark a Agee ade-
quate to the advance from the Mediterranean, on
Constantinople. We believe the Dardanelles are
now so strongly fortified that ships of war can no
longer pass them. Recourse, in that case, would be
bad to Russia by the other Allies, to advance at
the common expense. These are all loose conjec-
tures, but there is no harm at the present moment in
'miming the subject in all its bearings.—swor„ing
•-nronie/e.

The active
readying for preparations,„,wl.i
are going on in !the, according to the latest accounts,
aDock.yard at Devonport, prove
that the Minist'xi---L
which is rather or. „'„,,.%.,1; possession of intelligence
0f th 4? Erebus borob,et aspect. The fitting-out
for the Mediterranean, showy extraordinary haste
t4a_t Government think

it not improbable that it may become necessary to
follow up the affair of Navarin by an attack on Con-
stantinople. The orders to get in readiness the
three line-of-battle ships—the Britannia, 69 Ocean,
and the Windsor Castle—affords a commentary on
the existing negotiations in the East of no very
pacific nature. Still we do not hold those proceed-
ings to be altogether conclusive of the question of
war ; as, before the final determination of the
Sultan and his Divan is known, our Government
may think it good policy to display an overwhelming
force in the Mediterranean, and thereby intimidate
the Power which, they have provoked. It would
have been better, however, if this policy'had been
acted upon sooner, or not at all. In our quarrel
with the Porte we are either in the right or in the
wrong. If we are in the wrong, we cannot too soon
acknowledge our error and make reparation. It is a
proof not of weakness, but of magnanimity, in
individuals or nations, to retract a mistake, and
offer redress to the injured party. But if we are
in the right—if we have taken up this question on
correct views and sound principles—if we have
only vindicated the laws of nations, and not been
misled by the spirit of Quixotic enterprise—we
should have struck, more effectually the blow that
we revelled at the power of Turkey. Instead of
having just sufficient vessels in the Mediterranean
to insure the victory of Navarin, we ouglil to have
had a reserve of vessels of war to sail immediately
after that event upon Constantinople, and terrify
the Sultan into peace. Whether Government, there-
fore, was in the right or wrong with regard to the
commencement of this quarrel, it has not acted ju-
diciously. On the one supposition, the blow ought not
to have been struck at all; on the other, it ought
to have been struck more effectually—whereby the
real condition of commercial interests would have
been better understood, the expenses of hostile pro-
ceedings curtailed, and a great deal of ruinous stock-
jobbing prevented.—Morning Herald.
It is said that many of the more religious of the
Jews are looking with peculiar earnestness towards
the present aspect of affairs both in Greece and
Turkey, in a persuasion that ;he time is not far dis-
tant, when those who have most scorned and perse-
cuted them will meet with retribution, and the
Jewish family be again gathered into one nation, in
which the ancient Theocratic Government will be
restored.—lbid.

If the account which has appeared in the German
Papers, of the questions addressed by the Allied
Ambassadors at Constantinople to the Turkish Go-
vernment, is at all to be depended on, it affords a
remarkable confirmation of .the opinions we have re-
peatedly expressed upon the.subject of the battle of
Navarin, and reduces to their just value the state-
ments of that transaction put forth by the three
Allied Governments in their respective official Jour-
nals. These questions were addressed to the Reis
Effendi by the three Ambassadors, three days after
they had each received a direct communication from
the Admiral of his own nation, but before the in-
telligence from Navarin had reached the Porte, and
were intended apparently to draw from it such ma-
nifestations of its temper and views as might serve
in some measure to guide the Ambassadors to the
course most proper for them to pursue, both with
reference to their own personal safety, and to the
advice which would be expected from them in so
critical an emergency by the Franks resident at
Constantinople. The answer treats this novel
and extraordinary diplomatic proceeding on the
part of the Ambassadors with suitable deri-
sion ; and so far from exhibiting Any acerbity,
and much less any ferocity of temper, it in-
dulges in a vein of humour which comports but
little with the ustkal gravity of the Turkish character.
It is evident, however, that the Ambassadors in
stating to the Reis Effendi, hypothetically and
with a view to experiment, the case which they
knew had really occurred, would feel no disposition
to add to it any circumstances of aggravation, or to
suppress any which they believed to be true, and
which were of a nature to justify or palliate the
destruction of the Turkish fleet. In this point of
view it is of importance to consider the language of
the Ambassadors, addressing themselves to the
Porte in the delicate circumstances in which the
battle of Navarin had placed them, and fully im-
bued with the official narratives of that transac-
tion, with which they had been supplied by the
•Allied-Admirals. Does the question of the Aulbas-.1
sadors, adapted by them to the circumstances as
they believed them really to have occurred, allude
in any way to the battle being brought on by the
aggression of the Turks ? Does it rest the merits
of the case in any manner or degree upon the ques-
tion as to who fired the first shot ? Does it speak
any language, or suggest any apologies, similar to
or reconcileable with the language and apologies
of Sir E. Codrington, as they appeared in the
London Gazette? It does nothing of the kind.,
It asks, " In what light the Porte would consider
hostile 'operations on the part of the three squa-
drons, if occasioned by Ibrphim Pacha persisting
to refuse compliance with the declared will of
the Allied Courts ?" This was in fact, and was
no doubt intended to be, an intimation of the
Porte of what had really occurred ; for al-
though it assumed the form of an hypothetical
question, and the Porte mistook, or affected to mis-
take its true import, so far as to receive it in that
light ; it is impossible for any man, knowing that
when it was put the Ambassadors were in posses-
sion of the intelligence from Navarin, to doubt that
their intention was to make an experiment upon the
temper of the Ottoman Couft, and by a slight inti-
mation to_ prepare it in some degree for that more
complete knowledge of the aggression which it must
'so speedily obtain. What then is the intimation ?
Is it that the Allied fleets fought only in self-de-
fence? Is it that the battle took place by ac-
cident ? No ! the merits or demerits of the
battle are referred by the Ambassadors to the
merits or demerits of the Treaty of Intervention,
or rather of dictation; and the intimation accord-
ingly is, that the Turkish fleet was destroyed be-
cause of the persevering disobedience of its Com-
mander to " the declared will of the Allied Courts."
That Admiral Codrington acted in what he con-
ceived to be the spirit of the Treaty we have no
doubt. That he had instructions which were not
quite congenial with the spirit of the Treaty we
strongly believe, That he read the Treaty when he
should have read only his instructions, or that in
construing the latter he referred too much and too
faithfully to the former, proves in reality nothing
more apiot him than that he is too honest a man
for the Administration under which it has been his
misfortune to serve. If the Jritish Ambassador• at
Constantinople had been influenced principally by
the letter of the Treaty, he would have left that ca-
pital before the battle of Navarin could have taken
place, and thus Admiral Codrington would have
escaped much of the obloquy which now Attaches to
him.—Mooning Post.

Thursday evening as a person, apparently
About 40 years of age, was coming to this city by the South-
ampton coach, just at the foot of Midford hill, where he
got off to walk, he complained of a pain in his side, and
about half way up the bill the coachman stopped to let him
resume his seat on the roof. The coach had proceeded but
a very shortdistance before be uttered a deep groan, dropped
his head, and died. He is supposed to be an o,;'erseer of
some parish, ashe had the charge of a pauper family on its
way to Bristol.-13nth Chronicle.

A 119;i'0 scene took place on Friday morning
in Church-street. It seems that one of the apprentices at
Messrs. PAT.:VIER. and ToyvNER'S foundry had over-slept
himself for several mornings, and the men, to cure him,
went to his lodgings about,eight o'clock, with flags flying,
&c. Having brought him forth, maugre all his efforts to
escape from their grasp, they hound him fast on a truck,
and then in triumph dragged him on his chariot down
Church-street, and back to the foundry by Trafalgar-street.
At the foundry gates he Was received by 'a promiscuous
mob of persons, who seemed much pleased with the sport,
although the poor apprentice appeared to have a sorry
time of it, and would no doubt rather have gone to bed
some night and for ever forgot to awake,
than go a second
__,B time through such purgatorial initiation,riOton
Paper,