Star.
London, England, 1808-01-22 00:00:00

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whicie instead of being mstter of ccngratula-
. tion, was to him the subject of tile greatest possible
pain. la was easy to perceive that its great object
was to impress the public with the idea, that this was
not the time to make peace. It had been his constant
object, from the beginning of the contest, to bring
about this event, and he had no hesitation in now
giving it as his opinion, that negotiation had not
always failed because France was in the wrong, and
the Powers with which she negociated in the right.
—As to our relations with Vienna and Peters-
burgh, he would not speak of them till the pro-
mised Papers were upon the Table, but he conten-
ded, that if the principles of common sense were
applied to the present conjuncture, a more favourable
opportunity could not be hoped for, of negociating a
peace with France. He was far from wishing to
yield, as it was called, to France. But he wished
that Ministers should yield to the dictates of prudence;
and, above all, that they should yield their asperities,
and that, while they complain of the acrimonious
expressions of France against us, they should forbear
provoking them. Of the Orders in Council he should
only say, that they would be productive of much dis-
tress to a great body of the people. In consequence
of this distress, they must lay their account with
hearing complaints, and these complaints, instead of
being repressed, he was of opinion, ought to be en cou-
raged ; because, if they were stifled, they would vent
themselves, perhaps, in a way less constitutional than
by petition to the Legislature. These complaints
would he louder and more frequent if it was under-
stood that Ministers were resolved upon war. He ,
Was not sure that peace could be obtained, but at any
rate negociation ought to be tried. He wished rather
that the country should perish, than that it should
submit to ignominious terms ; but he deprecated all
attempts to shew our capacity to carry on endless
war. If we must die, said Mr. Whitbread, let us
die manfully and with glory ; but do not let us be told
that death is impossible. He concluded an able
speech, which our limits oblige us to curtail, by pres-
sing the state of Ireland on the attention of Ministers.
Mr. CANNING observed, that the line of argu-
ment pursued by the Gentlemen on the other side,
who resolved not to call for an immediate decision on
a question in which they said all mankind were ,
agreed, while they wanted time in order to marshal
arguments, to persuade the small portion of mankind
la that House, rendered it difficult and embarrassing
to animadvert upon their reasoning. In his view of
the measure, to which they seemed particularly to ob-
ject, there was no occasion to detain the House long
on the subject. Yet, as they had stated the course
which they meant to follow, it would be but fair to
point out the way in which their arguments were to
be met, and the outlines of the justification of his Ma-
jesty's Government. The Honourable Gentleman on •,
the other side started a whimsical reason for not enter- ,
ing upon the discussion to-night, namely, that no
previous communication of the speech had been made
to him ; but that, however, had not been the usual
custom of late years ; and it was rather extraordinary]
that he alone, of all those who had for some time held 1
the situation which he was now understood to fill,
should be unable in one day to make up his mind on
facts which were known to all the world. For his re- I
fusal to enter upon some other points his reasons were I
satisfactory, for, with respect to Russia and Austria,
promise was certainly made to lay some papers ,
the table. On this, however, the Right Honour- I
(e Gentleman seemed to comprehend the promise
. a larger sense than was warranted. It was not
meant to produce the whole of the corrrespondence
'pith respect to the Treaty of Tilsit. The Speech
ly promised the official Notes between the Govern.
silent and the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors,
relating to a certain point. The Right Hon. Gen-
tleman deferred his opinion on this till he had ascer-
tained from the Notes whether Russia was in a con-
.ion to mediate—but he hoped that in the mean
!me he could have no objection to concur so far with
address under this qualification, especially when
recollected that the payers re'ated, in a great mea-
sure to the settling a basis—a subject which occupied
•hree months in the late discussions at Paris. Whe-
er
Austria had assigned any reason for breaking off
connexion with this country, would appear from
papers—but at all events, the Right Honour-
le Gentleman could not surely refuse to concur
a war which was entered upon by an enemy who
ty have declined to assign any reasons for his conduct.
As the Right Honourable Gentleman had deferred
decision on points where information was expected,
he deferred it c,n those where no information was
)mised and with respect to which judgment was im-
:diately called for. He could not conceive why he
ild not now make up his mind or. these latter topics.
to his motion for papers with regard to the Copen-
sen expedition, he could not be positively certain
it he might not move for papers that might possibly
granted. But he must state, however, that such
ipers as the Right Honourable Gentleman appeared
consider necessary, to remove what he seemed to
‘ink a stain upon the character of the country, could
be produced—(Hear, hear ! from the Opposition). i
said, that he saw no reason for withholding the
.iculars of the secret intelligence, and that he did
. know that exposing the thing must lead to. the
:posure of the person. But admitting the great re-
onsibility that attached to Ministers on that head,
.1- were resolved not to betray the confidence re- I
)sed in them. That was their determination—be- I
ides the allegation in the speech, their justification
rested upon -known facts. But if from their refusal
should, as had been stated, be held up to the exe-1
aims of all mankind, and exposed to disgrace
el ignominy, hard as that lot would be to those
io were as alive to a sense of shame as others, yet'
that they were resolved to submit, and that penalty
they would pay rather than betray the source of their
secret intelligence. If ever there was a period cf the
eorld when men might act on secret intelligence,
without l.ing com'.lled to betray the source of it,
is was the time—and even in cases where men might
Ave acted with the prospect of being able to produce
toculeents for their justification, subsequent events
might render it impossible to have recourse to this
means of defer ce. Was this a time to betray the
sources of secret intelligence, when the whole Conti-
nent was in the grasp of France, and when Bonaparte
ight drag from the very capital of any other power
ie persons en whom his suspicions might fan ?
Tem there no situations in which men might act with-
it the production of documents ? When it was known
at there was scarcely a Court on the Continent

where we had a Minister—when the power of France
extended as far as the map of Europe—was this the
state of things in which it would be prudent to cut of
the sources of secret intelligence ? Was this a time
when those persons who from zeal, fidelity, or worse
passions, might be induced to give us intelligence,
ought to be exposed ? Were they to be told that they
could give us information only once, and • that for
that they must pay with their lives ? This could not
be, and therefore we must act without communicating
our documents, or cease to act altogether.
But if there were any doubts as to the designs with
regard to Denmark, they ought to be removed by
what had happened with respect to Portugal. Thus
far he would tell the Gentleman on the other side,
that in July the same information had been received,
of the intentions of the enemy, as to both Powers.—
The Ministers had therefore two duties to perform,
and from the conduct that had been pursued with
respect to Portugal, a judgment might be formed,
'whether they were likely to proceed with any unne-
! cessary severity towards Denmark. An expedition
of the late Ministers to Lisbon had • failed (No, no!)
and therefore was not animadverted Upon. If he had
a failure to plead, perhaps the expedition of .the pre-
! sent Ministers might perhaps also have escaped obser- '
: vation. The Ministers had profited by 'the example
cf their predecessors, for there- were examples -to be
avoided, as well as examples to be followed. The
same policy had by their predecessors been adopted
as to Portugal, that they had pursued with respect to
Denmark ; but a failure in the former case, had pre.
, vented all question. But it was painful to follow this.
i course towards Portugal, although it rnightaperhaps,
with justice have been followed. But suppose an
alliance had been proposed to Denmark, and that
Power had been persuaded voluntarily to deliver up
its fleet the whole wouiJ then have been applauded.
Yow this was precisely what was done with respect to
Portugal. They had always given information of
; the demands of France, and requested toleration. We
might say, that if they complied in the least, it would
; be considered as an act of hostility, and resented
`as such. This might be just, but it would in this case
have been harsh and cruel. It did occur to Ministers
that is-was possible there might be treachery. in this ;
but they thought fit, upon the whole, best to run the
!hazard, and they had no reason to repent their confi-
dence. It would not have been politic to send an
expedition earlier to Portugal, unless they could have
done one of two things—either persuaded the Court to
abandon it, or find out some means for its defence.
It did not appear that any force that could have been
' spared by Great Britain could have defended it ; but
while Portugal herself saw any chance of a cotnpro-
i
• wise with France, and as long as a solemn as-
surance was given, that no demands of France
•, would induce the Government to injure , British
i subjects, or their property, it appeared proper to give
them every. indulgence that could be allowed.—
These engagements were coupled with assurances,
, that nothing would, in the mean time, induce that
IGovernment to admit a French garrison, . or to
I give up the fleet to Bonaparte. A secret Treaty to
i this effect was- onclud in October, every tittle of
which had been felfi on the part of the Portuguese
Government. .True it was that, on one occasion,
the Prince had departed from the terms of the Treaty
, so far as to detain a few persons, who had not availed
: theniselves of the permtssion to withdraw, induced to
lit by promises of torbe.trance on the part of France.
IThis infringement was immediately resented. During
this time a French force was advancing into Portugal,
'but without the knowledge of the Prince. By whom
the fact had been ccncealed from him, it vas unne-
cessary to mention ; but as soon as the Prince got
notice of it, he immediately returned to the Treaty,
and, with small exception, adhered to it strictly, of
which a proof appeared in the surrender of Madeira.
Perhaps it might be said, that the confidence reposed
in the Portuguese Government was almost ridiculous;
but in looking back at what happened, he saw no rea-
son to repent of any step which the British Govern-
ment had taken in the affair. But it was curious, that
those who assailed Ministers on the ground of violence
with regard to Denmark, should attack them on the
ground of delusion respecting. Portugal. But just
as it would have been, if the cases had been re-
versed, and if the delusion had taken place with
mud to Denmark, and the violence as to Portugal.
' Ministers acted better—they employed force where
there was enmity, and gave their confidence where
there was every reason to believe that all was truth
and fidelity. The situations of Portugal and Den-
mark were besides extremely different—it would have
taken six weeks at least to have brought an army
to Lisbon. But the French were ready to fall upon
Holstein, and the result would have been a compro-
mise to deliver up the Danish fleet to Bonaparte. It
was impossible to negociate without a force at hand,
to counteract the force of France. They were there-
fore under the necessity of committing whatwas called
an act of hostility, because it had been declared that
the first ship of war that appeared in the passage be-
tween Zealand and the main land, would be consi.
dered as such. But if they had been deterred by this,-
they would have been ridiculed for their ferbearance,
as ia the cafe of Portugal.
Bat this transaction was not wholly without pre-
ced:nt. -Among those who objected to it there were
s- -me who had a share in the taking of
_Mitleira,, kik
1801. That was as severely felt by Portugal at the
time, as the attack on Copenhagen was now felt lay
Denma:k. Yet it was justifiable, and appeared so tok
Portugal herself afterwards, though the necessity wd
by no means equal to that in the case of Copenhagen.
This, then, would be the course-which they Would
adopt in their justification, with a conviction that their
conduct was not only justifiable, but that they had
acted in the best manner for the service of the country.
—With regard to the mediation of Russia, he was
ready to enter upon that topic either now• or at a fn._
ture opportunity. Neither the temper, the power,
nor the means of Russia, were suited to such- 'a ram.
pose.. Ministers even thought that they had a just.
ground of hostility against her, but with a feeling
very different from what had been imputed -to them,
they resolved first to exhaust all methods of concilia-
tion with regard to powers which had -.to long made
common cause with this country. The Declaration
of Russia was as unexpected at Petersbiirgh as it was
in London. No angry discussion had taken place.
with the Court of Vienna, nay more, that power was
not even prepared to move, great as was the occasion
for it,. Strictly speakin there was no negociation
through the medium of Austria, nor a(ly distract offer

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The Right Honourable Secretary then proceeded to
state, that no remonstrances had been received from
Prussia. Every hostile appearance on her part was ex-
torted by France, -and so understood, and ho should
be sorry that any acrimonious expressions should be
used with respect to her. An insinuation had been
made in the Mani/ear, that Prussia must have given
the secret intelligence to ths country. In justice to
Prussia, he found himself called upon publicly to
declare, that this idea was wholly void of foundation.
In justice to the late Ministers, he stated that the ex-
pedition to the Dardanelles had been undertaken at
the request of Russia. As that had not succeeded,
the cause of war with the Porte had ceased. A ne-
gociation with the Porte was entered upon, and the
only difficulty was the admission of Russia into
the Treaty. In the middle of this the Russian
Minister left Constantinople, and then a treaty was
concluded by the Porte with France. As to Swe-
den, subsidiary negociatiOns were carrying on with
that Power, which would be laid before the House
when finished. With regard to America, as no right
had been claimed by Great Britain of searching
ships of war, satisfaction was offered for the affair
of the Chesapeake. But Ministers had kept that
affair distinct from other matters in dispute, while
the Americans endeavoured to blend theta.—He
at the same time acquitted of any serious blame,
the gallant Officer who had the command on the
American station, as his provocation was extreme.—
As to the policy of the orders in Council, all agreed
that there must be something of that sort, and the
difference was only as to the degree, Nvhich was a
question of inferior importance. It was proper to
dim other powers that Great Britain might be
formidable as Bonaparte in some instances, though he
admitted that our having a giant's strength was not
a reason why we should use at like a giant. It was
good policy also, to prove to Bonaparte, that the se-
paration from the Continent, which Le thought must
be annihilation to Great Britain, would only be the
source of more formidable efforts. This much he
considered himself called upon to state, even in the
present state of the discussion.
Lord HENRY PETTY then rose, but from want
of room, we can only give a summary of the principal
points he touched upon—whatever merits as to stile,
the Speech ascribed to his Majesty might possess, it
wanted the more vulgar but more important merit of
a full statement of facts. It was a singular instance
to be in a state of war with a power against whom
there was no documents to prove a hostile act. The
only reason stated for refusing information was, those
who had communicated the intelligence would be
thereby injured. But all the mischief that could be
occasioned by this had been done already, for Mini-
sters had in a public declaration stated, that they had
intelligence as to the secret articles of the Treaty of
Tilsit. It was extraordinary in those who had, about
a year and a half ago, exposed the Ministers of diffe-
rent Courts to animadversion, by their communica-
tions, to be so scrupulous on this point. One might
!suppose that they had repented of their conduct then,
had it not been that, for the sake of rendering the
narrative more glowing, they had when there was no
call for it, stated facts in the declaration in answer to
Russia, respecting the conduct of the French to
Prussia, which they could have had only by secret
intelligence. With regard to the expedition to Lisbon
sent by the late Ministers, it iv'as•tarious enough to
hear it said, that it had failed, Merely, beeltasc its
object had been attained withdut the*Violence employed
against Denmark. If Lord StNincetit had proceedial
as they had done, where would now have been • their
golden dream as to the Brazils ? He wished for no
better parallel than the instructions which- had been .
given to Lord St. Vincent, compared with those. to
Lord Cathcart, and he wished the Right Honour.
able Secretary would' move for them. He con-
tended, that the principles of right and wrong were
to be considered in politics as well as in philosophy,
and on these they must reason generally till a par-
ticular case was made out. It became those, he
said, who checked petitions for Peace, to take
care that no opportunity of negotiation should be let
slip, merely on points of form. We ought to exa-
mine with jealousy into the subsidiary connection with
Sweden. He agreed in the propriety of keeping the
affair of the Chesapeake distinct from theother points,
and in the necessity of maintaining our essential rights,
but we ought to guard against unnecessary irritation,
and to beware of being led away by the name of vi-
gour, so as to inflict a severe blow on our own corn-
fierce. He concluded by expressing his regret, that
there should be so little in the speech respecting the
temporary policy as to Denmark, and nothing at all
as to the permanent policy respecting Ireland.
Mr. BATHURST and Mr. WINDIiAM op-
posed the Address.
The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER fol-
lowed Mr. Windham, and insisted that it was a suf-
ficient answer to the demand for documents and secret
communications, to tell that House that no man of ho-
nour would betray the source of the intelligence Mini-
sters had received. But, independent of this, hecontend-
ed that there were uponthe face of the measure suffi•
aient to justify it to every candid mind. He should rest
it on thistest—He calleil upon every Gentleman in that
House to put his hand to his breast and say, whether
he did not believe that Bonaparte's design was to direct,
the force of a maritime confederacy against this coun-'
try, and to make the naval force of Denmark more
immediately instrumental in effecting that great
object? The Right Honourable Gentleman had said,
that captured ships would rot—certainly they would
be rotten some time or other—but not in the ensuing
spring ; not at a period . when they might be em.
ployed in conveying French troops to • Ireland ; not
when they were to be employed in excluding us from
the Baltic, and furthering the designs of the enemy.
The Right Honourable Gentleman then briefly allu.
ded to the other topics, especially that relating to the
Order of Council, and said that he should, he trusted,

on a future occasion, when the papers were laid before
the House, be enabled to satisfy Gentlemen that in no
instance had his Majesty's present Government tem
indifferent to the interests of the empire.
Mr. SHERIDAN declared, he had never in his life
come down to the House withmore conviction, thatit
would be .unnecessary for him to take zny share in the
debate than on the present occasion, but he had altered
,his intention on account OThe maul= in which Minis-
tresistul chosen to defend; or rather refused to defend

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