The Sun.
London, England, 1845-06-27 00:00:00

was not a sufficient plea to state that the arrest
was committed in accordance with the privileges
of the House, and such was the effect of the judgment in
Stockdale v. Hansard. He confessed from all these conflict-
ing opinions he felt not only alarm but insufficient evidence.
If he took the case propounded by Mr. Justice Wightman he
could not consent that the warrant was to be piaed to pieces
so as to suit the lover of technicalities and special pleading.—
(Loud cheers.) If he adverted to the opinion he could not
agree that every cause on which the warrant was issued was to
be inserted in the instrument, and if he referred to Lord Den-
man's proposition that that House was not the place where its
privileges where to be decided, or as to their definition, from
that also he disagreed. All those opinions in-
clined him, nevertheless, to accede to the pro •
posal for an appeal to the court of error. He had
never been able to perceive that tl-ere was any ground
for saying that a fucther sacrifice, though in a trifling degree,
should be made of the privileges of the House. The question
which the House had in the first instance submitted to the
court of law, namely, that the act had been done in conformity
with their privileges, and in pursuance of the order of the
House, was a question that would bo submitted to the court of
error. It did not appear to him that the great and paramount
question had been submitted—whether the judges ought to
have been first told what were the privileges of the House, and
then to have examined them with the warrant that was issued,
bearing the name of the Speaker attached to the bottom. If the
judges should decide in their favour, or should point out in
what respect they considered the decision as to their privileges
in former times had been mistaken by the House, a light would
be afforded which would guide the House as regarded its future
course. He could not but think that that course must be
grounded in prudence ; if it were not so, he should not he
guided but by the judgment that was given, and by the
reasons which would be deduced. That the House had the
great and paramount power of asserting its own privileges, he
had the most intimate persuasion, but if it was meant to assert
those rights by their entire authority, they must not be daunted
by the public inconvenience that the subject would occasion.
The House had committed an error at the beginning of
the session by not assuming the exercise of those functions
—by refusing to act when called on, when it
had all the powers and privileges which would have
enabled it to have exercised its functions safely. The declara-
tion of the House that they were so determined, that they
held every power in the Constitution, whether the warrant
was submitted to the Executive for its delivery, or to the House
of Lords for concurrence, would before long have obliged the
Court of Queen's Bench to have complied with their fair and
just request ; but on making that demand on the first occasion,
it was not possible to deny that there would be great public
excitement and considerable agitation. For these reasons he
thought it would be better to have further time for consideration
before the House proceeded to assert its privileges in the ex-
treme manner suggested by the Hon. Member for Montrose ;
but when the time shall have arrived, when the court of error
shall have decided what the true position of the House is, with-
out having reference to the House of Lords, there will be abund-
ant material to act upon. A question had been raised that persons
might be so arrested, but it was a dangerous precedent, and he
trusted the House would be well advised before proceeding
to such an extreme measure. If the Sergeant-at-Arms, who
was an officer appointed by the Crown to do the
behests of the House of Commons, was not sufficient to per-
form their bidding, then the House must address the Crown,
for the purpose of obtaining any armed force to secure the
execution of their warrant ; and he thought it would be the
duty of the Crown thus to reinforce the Sergeant-at-Arms,
in order to secure the vindication of their authority. In the
case of Sir Francis Burdett, who had shut himself up in his
house, to resist the execution of the warrant issued against
him, the military did not hesitate to assist in carrying
the warrant into effect, and the judges, on delivering
their opinions on the subject, pointed out in a particular manner
that the soldiers had acted in the exercise of their duty. It
was a lamentable thing that the judges of the land should ques-
tion the authority of the House of Commons so as to oblige it to
have recourse to military force in the exercise of its constitu-
tional rights, and on them rested the responsibility of inter-
fering. For his part he was in favour of moderate force. The
House might be even called pusillanimous—it might be
said their privileges were being endangered, but peaceful means,
if possible, were best. But if it was necessary to resort to violent
measures, he for one was ready to take them, for ultimately
he would not consent to relinquish those privileges, without
which their existence was to be regarded rather as an injury
than as a good.—( Hear, and cheers. )
Mr. FITZROY KELLY begged to express his entire con-
currence with the Noble Lord who had just sat down, as to the
manner in which he proposed to assert the privileges of the
House. The privileges of the House ought to be respected,
and their warrants by a definite resolution should be made
part and parcel of the law. He conceived that a misapprehen-
sion existed as to the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench
that so many fierce and unjust attacks had been made upon it.
It was not his intention to offer any opposition to the motion of
his Hon. and Learned Friend the Solicitor-General, but he
considered it was his duty us state the grounds on which he
(Mr. Kelly) concurred, and also in favour of submitting the
question to trial in a court or error. He would beg leave to
say he felt inexpressible astonishment at what hail been stated
on a former occasion by the Hon. and Learned Member for the
city of Worcester. He had made a statement, which state-
ment was confirmed by the House, that he (Mr. Kelly) had
supported the view that no inquiry should take place beyond
the Court of Queen's Bench, and that if that Cou.t decided
adversely then that the House was at once bound to submit.
If that was the impression of the House he would beg leave to
say that it was not his impression; and he was quite uncon-
scious of uttering anything to warrant such a supposition.
He recollected the Right Honourable Gentleman at the head
of her Majesty's Government expressing an opinion in which
he was corroborated by the Hon. and Learned Member for
Worcester. to the effect that the inquiry in the Court of
Queen's Bench was, whether the warrant was a properly
drawn up and legal instrument, and not as to the privileges of
the House. Hew it could be conceived that the Court could
take any other course, appeared to him perfectly incompre-
hensible. He (Mr. Kelly) had maintained that view of the
question on a previous occasion, and in that view he was su
ported by the Hon. and Learned Member for Worcester. He
stated in the proposition, that in the action the real points at
issue were those of law ; that it was impossible to take any
other course than what had been taken, without a violation of
law ; and that to distinguish between that House and any other
individual in the realm, was an improper and illegal course.
His view then, as now, was, that there should be no difference
whether the plaintiff was an officer of the House of Lords, of
the House of Commons, or of the Crown, and any other in-
dividual in the State; that the Court of Queen's 'Bench was
bound to construe the law on the same principle to these
parties as to the humblost mechanic in the 'and. That was the
state of the law. He would now direct himself to the ques-
tion itself, having made this reference to what he had formerly
stated on the subject. The action in the present instance had
been brought against an officer of that House, and he was in-
struced to place a plea of justification on the record. He was
desirous of referring to the facts of the case, that the House
should understand the question, and be able to comprehend
the true effect of the judgment tl-e Court had given. Mr.
Howard alleged in his declaration that he had been assaulted
and imprisoned by Sir William Gossett, end the defendant,
in answer to the charge, put in certain resolutions of the
House and the Speaker's warrant. He justified the course he
had taken in virtue of the warrant. On such a plea, there-
fore, the defendant stood on the validity of the warrant. It
was a plea that left the question to be decided by the Court of
Queen's Bench, whether the warrant was a legal instrument in
point of form and substance, and accorded with the law of the
land. He would not at present enter into the legal:features
of the question, as the House was not the proper place for the
technical points of law to be discussed, but into a question
of far greater importance—namely, whether the House con-
sidered the tender of the warrant had been legal, and
also as to the course that should now be pursued. It was said
the warrant set forth no cause, and it was an important point as
to whether it ought to have had any attention paid to it.
Should it be decided that the warrant was a good one, should
the House maintain and enforce the validity of such a warrant,
then he was of opinion they might as well repeal the Habeas
Corpus Act, and withdraw the whole protection of the law from
her Majesty's subjects. It was, therefore, a question of the
gravest importance, but as he before stated he would not at
present enter into the technicalities and details of the law. He
had incurred the censure of his Hon. and Learned Friend op-
posite (Mr. Sergeant Wilde), and also of the Noble Lord the
Member for the City of London, because he (Mr. Kelly), as
represented by them, argued in a court of law against the privi-
leges of the House. This he did not admit. The privileges
of the House was not the question that was legally and consti-
tutionally involved in the discussion. If he erred in that
opinion, he erred along with several other Honourable
and Learned Members in that House—with the late
Attorncy-General ( Sir Frederick Pollock), and also
with the present Solicitor-General, who on a previous
occasion expressed the opinion that the inquiry into the va-
lidity of the warrant was not opposed to the privileges of the
House. He (Mr. Kelly) did not think that his giving his pro-
fessi,,nal services in the manner he had done, and on the view
of the question he had stated, could at all be supposed to inter-
fere with his giving a fair and independent opinion to the
House. There was another consideration, not personal, which
was worthy their attention. When an action was instituted
against their officer, he was supplied with ample funds from the
public; he had unlimited means at his disposal, and the Attor-
ney-General and Solicitor-General were instructed to conduct
his defence. This being done, was it seasonable, he would
ask, to take away from the constituency of that House
the assistance of any member of the bar that might be
of service to his cause—( Loud cries of " Hear, hear.") If
so, he would pray the House boldly and unhesitatingly
to come forward, and say by resolution what questions Honour-
able Members of the bar in that House should or should not be
allewed to appear in, and then he would determine what course
it would be necessary for him to take. It was said the Court
of Queen's Bench had attacked the privileges of the House.
This he altogether denied ; it was no question of privilege at
all. The only question was, whether the warrant was good.
It was, in answer to this, said that Mr. Howard being summoned
to appear before the House, and failing to do so, had been
guilty of contempt, and that a breach of privilege had been
committed, which led to the issuing of the warrant. What
the Court of Queen's Bench, on the other hand, held was,
that the defendant did not appear there as the officer of the
House of Commons, but merely as one of her Majesty's subjects
to try the validity of a warrant he had executed, and that the
privileges of the House formed no part of the case that had to
be considered.

answer to an action the Court of Queen's Bench would say at
once that they were stopped.—(Hear.) He could not help
deprecating the shilly-shally course which was recommended.
If he selected a lay arbitrator, and he gave a judgment con-
trary to the law, his next course would be to apply to a court of
law, where he would be told that he ought to abide by the de-
cision of his own arbitrator. The report stated that if the
court of error confirmed the judgment of the Court of Queen's
Bench, it would be then for the House to determine what
course they would pursue with respect to their privileges.
They would only then do what they should have done in the
first instance, and would create a greater degree of prejudice
against them. The course recommended by the Hon. and
Learned Member for Bath was the only one which they ought
to adopt. It was true that they had made a mistake. The
Right Hon Baronet ought to have said, in the first instance,
that Mr. Howard has had his verdict, and let him have the
benefit of his 400/. That was the course the Han. and
Learned Member for Bath had advised, and it was the best
course; for if they had recourse to the means advised by the
Committee, they should have their privileges determined in a
less favourable way.
Lord MAHON said, that he regretted the cause that had
given rise to this matter. With respect to the writ of error, as
proposed by the Solicitor-General, he was of opinion that it
was a course which would be in no degree a violation of the pri•
vileges of the House. But he objected to it on the grounds of
expediency and prudence. From the gross and flagrant abuse
of those privileges in former years, unpopularity gathered
around them. Let them wait till some opportunity arose
in which the constitutional powers were evidently involved.
The course he would wish to press upon the consideration of
the Government was the one ho had suggested. And at the
same time, he would earnestly recommend to her Majesty's
Government to adopt a mild and considerate course. They
had already had before them the case of Stockdale and
Hansard, and he would entreat of the Government to bear
well in mind that case in coming to a decision upon this.
With those observations he would leave the case in the hands
of the House, trusting that the House would be guided in
its decisions by what he conceived was the right course they
ought to follow, and which course had been recommended by
several other Hon. Members.—( Hear. )
Mr. C. W. W. WYNN said he felt a good deal of difficulty
and diffidence in addressing the House on this question, but at
the same time he would be sorry to let the opportunity pass of
saying a few words on this subject, after what he had heard of the
situation in which the Committee had been placed in reference
to it. If he could agree with his Noble Friend who had just
sat down, that this was an isolated and solitary case, and one of
little or no importance, then he (Mr. Wynn) should concur
with him that there were strong grounds for adopting the
course he had suggested. But this case appeared to him (Mr.
Wynn) to strike at the root of all privilege—( Hear, hear)—
and the bulwark of the rules of the House, upon which the
House alone was competent to decide.—( Hear, hear.) He
would be sorry to detain the House by entering into the
details of this question, but without doing so, he
would say the case was one which afforded
strong grounds for the prompt interference of the
House. If the House adopted the course suggested, then
it should take into consideration the validity of the authority
of the Queen's Bench. Let him ask was there any analogy
between the authority of that Court and the House ?—( Hear,
hear.) He contended there was not—for he had read of in-
stances in which the doors of the House were locked in order
that the public should not know what the House was doing—
but the result was, the issue of the Speaker's warrant for the
presence of a witness in a case, without stating any explanation
for the summons. In fact there were many cases in which the
House pursued a like stringent course; but the occasion jus-
tified it, and he was one of those who supported the House on
one or two cf those occasions. The Court of Queen's Benoh
could not summons a witness without setting forth the case in
which he was summoned and all the ether particulars ; but that
was not necessary for this House to do, and therefore no analogy
could exist between them.--( Hear.) In the case of Lord
Coventry, in 1782, this question was also raised; but they had,
without any question as to its authority being put, issued the
Speaker's warrant for that Nobleman's presence, and he was
brought up. He thought they ought to be ready to main-
tain their privileges by their own means, for their functions
could not be carried on with advantage to the public or with
credit to themselves unless they did so.
Mr. J. S. WORTLEY (Bute) did not consider that this
was any question as to whether they should submit to have
their privileges decided by a court of law. .If he felt that that
were the issue he would have no hesitation in declaring that,
under no circumstances, and on no pretence, would he permit
the courts of law to consider, still less to decide, the privileges
of that House. But that was not the question which they had
to consider now. The question was, what course it was de•
sirable fur that House to pursue. He had no hesitation in
stating that it was absolutely necessary that they should have
the power of ordering persons into custody, and without
assigning any reason. He thought that it was absolutely ne-
cessary that they should assert their privileges to the utmost
extent of their power.
Lord J. RUSSELL did not feel that he could altogether
avoid the discussion of this question, after the statement that
had been made by his Hon. Friend the Member for the Uni-
versity of Oxford and the Noble Lord the Member for Hert-
ford. Had the only question discussed been that which had
been submitted by the Solicitor-General, he would have been
satisfied with the Hon. and Learned Gentleman's statement,
clear and able as it was, and would not have troubled the
House with any observations of his own. But his Noble
Friend had given to the House a statement of his opinion with
regard to the power and privileges of that House, which he
( Lord J. Russell) could not pass altogether unnoticed. The
Noble Lord had told them of the various instances in which the
power of that House had been abused, and his Hon. Friend
the Member for the University of Oxford advised them to
treat these matters as matters of law, and submit them in
future to the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench. Now,
that was totally inconsistent with the view which he (Lord J.
Russell) had taken of the privileges of that House.—( Hear. )
He considered that that House had a law and custom of Par-
liament which it was bound to adhere to and observe.
He should think that it was as preposterous for the Queen's
Bench to decide on the authority and powers of that House, as
fur that House to decide, by an arbitrary majority, that the
judges of that Court were wrong in their interpretation of a
question of common law. The privileges of Parliament were
as much part of the law of this country, as those which the
inferior courts were instituted to administer.--( Hear, hear. )
It had been said that they must act in accordance with the
law, but were they willing to set up their privileges, as Judge
Coleridge required, against the laws? His answer was, that
their privileges were as much law as the decisions of any
Court.--( Cheers.) What he therefore contended for
was, that it was just as consistent for them
to say to the Court of Queen's Bench that their
adjedications were will and caprice, as for that Court to say
that their decision was nothing but the IA ill and caprice of the
House of Commons. He could not but protest against any other
assumption than they were the: judges of their own privileges.
--(Loud cheers.) With respect to the question of precedent,
the Hon. Member far Montgomery ( Mr. Wynn), by far the most
able and competent authority in the House, had satisfactorily
settled that point. The use of the power was necessary for in-
quiries which could not be carried on without many witnesses,
arid, on their refusal, compelling them to attend. But it had
been said that the authority of the highest judges was against
them. He was free to admit that many of our ablest judges had
entertained narrow views upon the privileges of Parliament.
Lord Erskine, a man of transcendent legal powers, and of un-
rivalled eloquence, entertained on the subject of the functions
of Parliament totally inadequate views ; he had said that no
impeachment could be brought against a Member, except where
indictment would lie, whereas the very opposite was the estab-
lished law. Now, as in the cases of Lords Orford, Boling-
broke, and Somers, and Warren Hastings, where especially
in the last instance the most extensive privileges of Govern-
ment were involved, how could they argue the balance of
power, vested in Parliament, would endanger the liberty of
the subject ?—(Loud cheers.) The House, therefore, must
come to the conclusion that they had functions higher in their
nature than those which belonged to the Court of Queen's
Bench.—(Loud cries of Hear, hear.") It was a totally dif-
ferent question as to how the privilege should be exercised
in reference to the safety of the State.—( Hear, hear.) When
a judge had said that he had looked at a warrant of theirs as
technically as he would that of a justice of the peace, he had
totally mistaken the functions of Parliament.—( Loud cheers
from all p u.ts of the House.) A debate had lately taken place
or, the defences of the country, and the war establishment it
kept up. The first Minister of the Crown had then objected
to such discussions, considering their publicity unadvisable, if
not dangerous. Supposing, being of that opinion, the Minis.
ter should suspect that some officer intrusted with secret in-
formation, would confine it to a foreign warlike Power,
must the Speaker wait until he had sent for an
astute lawyer to see whether the warrant was in exact accord-
ance with all the technicalities of law, and search fot prece-
dents which the Court of Queen's Bench would be likely to
admit, with all their refinement of special pleading, before he
issued his warrant —( Hear, hear.) He contended it was for
the benefit of the country that that power was accorded, and
when he was told that it made the Hou e of Commons the su-
preme power, he replied, that with regard to the power to be
used, there must be some authority in which supreme juris-
diction was vested. In so:ne cases the Queen's Bench possess wi
that power, and in some the Court of Chancery; and the judges
of the Court of Queen's Bench could be removed by address from
Parliament. The right was invested for public safety. And
was there no check upon it? Undoubtedly there was ; and if
a tyranny were exercised, either for private individual interest
or for despotic power, why, the 'people themselves
would find the remedy and eject the tyranny from
its representatives.—(Loud cheers.) The Queen exercised
her power according to the constitution ; the Queen's Bench
exercised its power according to the constitution, and the House
of Parliament exercised its power according to the constitu-
tion also, with an ultimate appeal to the people of the country,
who, loving the constitution, would resist any attempt to in-
fringe it.—(Cheers.) The Hon. Member for Hertford (Lord
Mahon) had said that the power used in the last century by
universal consent would now be as universally condemned.
That proved his (Lord John Russell's) proposition—that an
appeal to the people would always prevent an infringement of
their liberties.—( Cheers. ) But if the Noble Lord (Mahon)
referred to the last century, he would carry him back to the
century before, where, in the Court of Queen's Bench, Judge
Jeffery had laid down the most preposterous injunctions.—
( Hear, hear.) Surely, then, if the House of Commons could
be accused of having once had a tendency, or even a
possibility to abuse, this objection was also attachable
to the Court of Queen's Bench, but no one would
say that any Member of the House of Commons was
disposed to push its privileges beyond their legitimate bounds,
and equally of the Queen's Bench no one would say that any
of its judges had a disposition to avail themselves of the odious
powers contended for by Judge Jeffery, or other of the justices,
before the revolution of 1688. But if technicalities were to
be required to be nicely observed in warrants, those powers
which Parliament exercised for the benefit of the country
would be seriously impaired.—( Loud cheers.) He had said
thus much upon the utility of the privilege generally, be-
cause the Honourable Member for Oxford (Sir R. Inglis)
had taken the opportunity of raising the question of the privi-
leges of the House. As to the broad question of the extension
and definition of those privileges it was easy to decide ; hut
as to the particular b Anch before the House, he felt much
more difficulty. Mr. Justice Wightman, in his decision, had
said that the warrant was not sufficient, because it said that
Thomas Burton Howard was to be token into custody, but had
neglected to state how he was then to be disposed of; in fact
the warrant was to be invalid, because it did not say that if the
officer found this Thomas Burton Howard crossing over from
Charing-cross he was to be kept there in the safe keeping of
the Sergeant-at-Arms, while all the conveyahces that were
passing might endanger their lives.—( Laughter and cheers. )
Oh, said Mr. Justice Coleridge, if that is all the difficulty, thl
objection is easily overcome ; theintention of the House on that
score is palpable, but inasmuch as the warrant did not state
the cause for which Howard was taken into custody it was insuffi-
cient. If the former opinion were thought narrow and trifling,
ow much more palpably erroneous was the latter for
its extensive and enlarged requirements. If the cause were
assigned, of course Mr. Justice Coleridge would assume the
right its sufficiency ; therefore if Matthw Prior was suspected
of being engaged in intrigues with foreign Powers, dangerous
to the country, and subversive of the dynasty as established
by the Constitution, and
awwarrant were to be issued for such
3aimr.aniusatllictehcoeselieTisdpiiociownosalreh:c: be put into the warrant and
thdecide whether it was
sufficient cause upon which to sumemotn° the man. Such a pro-
position that House could never assent to.—(Loud
wdikhereeegras )d
The Queen's Bench, by its limited arid narrOw—view°o
to their privileges, virtually claimed the keeping
science of that House.—(Cheers.) Lord Denman, whilecooliise-
senting from these opinions, still entertained
bad nedii almostit
equally objectionable...pp< Hear, bear.)

An Hose. MEMBER.—Who held those opinions?
Mr. F. KELLY—Lord Denman and Mr. Justice Coleridge.
The Hon. and Learned Gentleman proceeded. He must
venture to observe that if this plea, instead of containing the
general language which it did contain, had contained what it
ought, and told the Court of Queen's Bench it is our privilege,
founded upon the law of England, which you are bound to obey,
and therefore we arrest the Queen's subjects, it would at least
have been clear, intelligible, and positive. But the plea con-
tained no such allegation. There was no question of privilege
involved in the plea. Hon. Members might say that these
arguments were of a technical and frivolous character, but he
begged of them to recollect that the technical rules of pleading
must be observed, and that the judges were bound upon oath
to interpret every plea that came before them by those very
rules. If the House meant to assert its privileges by arrest
upon a warrant of this kind, it ought to take care that the
privileges upon which the warrant was founded were properly
stated, and if they did so they might possibly find that the
Queen's Bench would give a different judgment. He knew not,
unless the Court of Queen's Bench was bound to hold that the
House might arrest any of the Queen's subjects, with or without
cause, how it could have done otherwise than it did, or how it
couid have put a different construction on the warrant. It had
been said that the Court of Queen's Bench had sat itself up in
a conflict with that House against its privileges, and that it had
been always ready to administer the law in a manner least fa-
...

vourable to the liberties of the subject. He felt confident that
both charges were unfounded.—( Hear, hear.) The Queen's
Bench was ready to give effect to the privileges of that House,
and in the course of 200 years had consistently given effect to
these privilges, although commitments for contempt had been
brought before them in every possible form, on the authority
of that House--warrants so vague and defective that they would
not have stood for a moment in other cases; and yet, he re-
peated, in no one case during the last two centuries, had the
House or its officers been before the Court of Queen's Bench
upon cases of commitment in which the Queen's Bench had
discharged the party complaining, or done otherwise than give
effect to the warrants of that House.—( Hear, hear.)
The question was—whether the decision of the Court of
Queen's Bench should be submitted to a court of error ?
Whatever might be his own opinion, as one of the judges of
the Court of Queen's Bench had pronounced his opinion
favourable to these privileges—as many Hon, Friends of his

THE SUN, LONDON, FRIDAY EVENING, JUNE 27, 1845

required it should have what the Constitution gave
it, the uncontrolled right of immediately exercising its authority.
The Learned Gentleman oppo site said that the Crown could
not do this and could not do that. Why, the Crown could
issue no warrant lest it should come into collision with other
members of the State, and such collision would be revolution.
The Right Hon. Member for Oxford had said that the House
ought to prepare forms, but how could it adapt forms to all the
cases that might arise ?—( Hear, hear.) And whom would
they consult for drawing up those forms?—(Hear,
hear.) They would find in that very decision upon
the Speaker's warrant that Justice Wightman was
opposed to Justice Coleridge. Justice Williams thought the
warrant was good, when Chief Justice Denman pronounced
it to be bad—(A laugh)—and when Justices Wightman and
Coleridge agreed in thinking the warrant was bad, the Chief
Justice and Judge Williams pronounced it to be good. Let
them look to their condition. When ;would they awake ?
They had a general doctrine asserted, and had the extent of
their power under a warrant reviewed. What had they left?
No power but commitment; and how would they venture to
exercise it if this be law. They talked of waiting for an
emergency. —( Hear, hear.) They talked of waiting for
public opinion on the mattter ; but he would tell them
that it was the duty of the House to lead public opinion.
—( Cheers.) They had shown that they thought those privi-
leges unnecessary for the public safety. Nobody could main-
tain !authority who acted the weak part that the House had
acted. It was a difficult case, from which every Government
would wish to shrink• He would like to offer his powers to
give his most humble assistance in relieving the Govern-
ment. It was a contest which no one would like
to enter into. Were they to wait till they
brought the safety of the State into danger? The
House had sufficient legitimate power for the present purpose,
and for some reason they did not use it. The whole of this
arose from the discharge of those sheriffs who levied the money
knowing it to be an act inconsistent with the orders of the
House. They ought to have held them. They were brought
into this difficulty by their own conduct in not using their legi-
timate power. The House had really great reason to complain.
Nothing could be more distinctly stated by his Hon. and
Learned Friend, whose absence they all so much regretted, the
Attorney-General, and the Lord Chief Baron, followed by
several others, all distinctly assuring the House, that by ap-
pearing and pleading, the House in no way committed its pri-
vileges. His Hon. and Learned Friend who spoke last, never-
theless stated that the House did thereby commit its privi-
leges. They were told, first, that they were taking a step on
the most positive assurance that their privileges were
not involved, and, when they had taken it,
they were told that they had committed themselves,
that it had been said that when once they pleaded they had
submitted. Now, just let him suppose such a question as that
of a diverse or of a nullity of marriage having been pronounced
by an ecclesiastical court, would the judgment of that court be
deemed sufficient before the Court of Queen's Bench, accord-
ing to the present arguments of his Learned Friend opposite?
It certainly would not—(Hear, hear)—and yet, let him ask,
was the House prepared to follow up such a course ?—( Hear. )
Were the courts of law to be or not to be under the authority
of this House ?—( Hear.) If they were not, then he would
say it was the first time he ever heard it ; but if they were,
then he would call on the House to support its
authority.—( Cries of " Hear, hear.") He had
now before him an authority which he would read from, and
which he believed the House would bow to; it was one of a re-
sent date, and one which folly concurrrecl in his views. ( Here
the Hon. Member read the extract, and then proceeded to say
he conceived it fully corroborated his view of the constitutional
law on this question.) The case was now the same, the views
of the Right Hon. Gentleman were correct, only they had done
a little more wrong. But if they had done a little more wrong
they should not hesitate to remedy it. Were,they prepared to
magnify an evil which they had carried to a certain extent—
much beyond its due proportions, and if so how would they
proceed? A wise course should be adopted.. Would they refer
it to a court of error ? In such a court they could not possibly
gain any advantage, but must lose a great deal. Would they
again put it to the Court of Queen's Bencbs to which they had
stated they did mean to put it, or to the court of
error ? They made a mistake then--but they were
acting wrong by design now.—( Hear, hear.) The
judge presumed to decide whether the House had jurisdiction
in the matter or not. Would they make the matter worse by
putting the question again to them ? Was there any reason in
asking the judges a question which they ( the House of Corn-
minis) said they were not competent to answer ? Suppose they
affirmed the judgment. His Hon. Friend seemed to doubt
that they would do so. Then let them consider what was to
be done—do not let them act blindly. We should take no
step which they could not prosecute with :advantage to the
public. Suppose the judgment were affirmed. 'they would
recognise the authority of the judges by putting the question to
them. But if they did not refer it to the Queen's Bench,
would they go to the House of Lords, which history showed
had occasionally interfered to stop any excess of privilege
claimed by the House of Commons. In the case of :Skinner,
who brought an action against the East India Company for
1,000/., Sir John Holt, who was his counsel, was ordered to
attend, and he did not attend. The result was, that the House
of Lords set up an irresponsible jurisdiction over the subject.
The House of Commons interfered and prevented it. Was
that House to become subordinate to the House of Lords ?
(Hear, hear.) The House of Commo,:ss was open to control,
and might be dissolved and new Members elected by the people,
but the House of Lords was no new body, not bs-ought together by
any new diversity of opinion, but were hereditary, and exhibited,
session after sesaion, the same union of party and principle:.
The Hon. and Learned Gentleman opposite had said he did
not think the C:eirt of Queen's Bench would disehateee upon a
warrant of the House of Lords. Perhaps not at present's- hut
let the Court of Queen's Bench go on a little further, and they
would not stop at discharging upon warrants of the House of
Commons. When the two Houses of Parliament separated,
the two Houses retained certain functions; and, for instance
the House of Lords retained the judicial functions of Parliament.
I❑ theory the House of Commons was present in the House of
Lords during the exercise of its judicial functions, anti this
fact led him to the conclusion that it was an absurdity to
think of appealing to the Lords in this case. Well, then, sup-
pose in the court of error the judgment was reversed, what
would they gain by it ? Wily they would be establishing a
precedent of a most mischievous character. They would have
the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench reversed, and there
would stand 'von record the fact that they had consented to
enter a court of law to establish one of their privileges. But
the decision of the court of error might reverse the judgment
without declaring the Court of Queen's Bench to be in the
wrong. The court of error might say that the warrant was
good, though it had been a magistrate's warrant, and if the
judgment were reversed he could not help strongly surmising
that it would be upon that ground. Well, the judgment
might be reversed, but he was quite certain
it would not be done without some of the
judges of the court of error agreeing in the course of reasoning
adopted by some of the judges of the Court of Queen's Bench.
He would, however, venture to assert what he had often done
before, that if they went to the Exchequer Chamber they
would only come back with a regret that they had ever been
there. But they were about to adopt this course as a preli-
minary step to remedying a mischief they had already com-
mitted by legislation, and he would ask leave to say a word or
two upon what belonged to the question of legislation.
Suppose the House were not rescued, it would stand as a
judgment for the future guidance of the Court : but supposing
the judgment were reversed, the case would, no doubt, Ise
carried to the House of Lords, who had the power of deciding
the validity or equity of a decision of a court of error. Well.
the Lords might decide against them, and then, without
any futher appeal, where would their privilege be?—(hear,
hear.) What would be done then ? Would they pass a
declaratory Act of what their powers and privileges were ?
Well, but they had undefined powers. How then could they
explain them ?—( Hear, hear.) Well, it was evident they would
ultimately have to make some stand for their privileges, and
why could nut the stand be made now ? But a declaratory Act
would only weaken the privileges of Parliament, for at
present they rested upon prescription, and if they explained
them by statute a court of law would have power to
decide upon them, because it was the right of a
court of law to construe Acts of Parliament. He
warned them not to take any step founded on the prospect
of future legislation. He lamented the course which that
House was taking, for if they proceeded with it, that would be
the last Parliament which would occupy its proper station in
the country. He lamented that the Right Hon. Baronet had
taken the course which he had pursued ; but, above all, he la
mented that the name of Russell should be connected with it

in that House, for whose opinions he entertained the highest
respect, thought similarly—and as the House seemed to take so
warm an interest in the subject, he would not withold his
assent from considering the matter in a court of error.—
( Hear, hear. ) He trusted, and firmly believed that ample
justice would be done by that Court. But another course had
been suggested ay his Hon. and Learned Friend the Member
for Worcester, to which he could not assent. He meant an
appeal to force. Resorting to force, in at least doubtful cases
—defending the privileges of that House by a series of imprison-
ments—was a precedent which he would not consent to es-
tablish. He would not sanction the imprisonment of attorneys,
clerks, sheriffs, bailiffs, counsel, and judges, in vindicating
what was called the privileges of that House. It was too large
a field for present discussion to argue whether or not the House
possessed those privileges; but he would call the attention of
the House to what would be the natural course of such a line
of action. The House would first advise its officers not to
plead to the action. It depended upon itself whether or no it
would vindicate its privileges, and it had resolved not to plead.
Well then, he asked his Hon. and Learned Friend the Member
for Worcester to tell him what the consequence would
be ? There was the plaintiff, perhaps some unworthy and
reckless person, who broaght an action against the House, lay-
ing his damages at perhaps 100,0001., for some imprisonment
which he might or might not have deserved, and if the House
had pleaded to the action they would probably show he deserved
it. Well, he proceeded with the action. They committed
him. He brought another action. They committed his at-
torney, counsel, and judges, and stopped the whole administra-
tion of the law, but in the meantime the action proceeded, the
matter was brought to judgment, but he waited for the promo-
gation of the House until the House executed its judgment, and
then he went before a jury. Would they appeal to a jury
( Hear, hear.) No they would not condescend to do so, they
would not direct the Attorney-General to do so—the plaintiff
might state what he liked—he might make out a case of pre-
tended grievances —he might make himself out the most in-
jured person in the world, but no answer would be given.
He might be supposed as one oppressed by a tyrannical and
powerful body and obtained, perhaps, one-half of the amount of
damages he sought for, but took care not to issue an execution
until after the prorogation. He would ask his Hon. and
Learned Friend the Member for Worcester what was to prevent
the levying of the execution—( Hear, hear)—upon your goods
and land, Sir, (turning to the Speaker) or the property of
any other officer of the House? At the assembling
of Parliament they committed him. He went through the
same process again, and obtained damages. What could they
do? The truth was, when they resorted to force, their privi-
leges were useless, or worse than useless—mischievous, danger-
ous, unconstitutional ; but, above all, they never could be
maintained.—( Hear, hear.) 'They hail no weapon to fight
with—no shield to cover themselves, and were in truth as pow-
erless under such circumstances as the most helpless subject in
the realm. Therefore he prayed the House not to sanction
so dangerous a course. They might find precedent to justify
them, but if they valued the true interests, respect, admiration,
and regard of those who sent them there, they would not enter
into a contest in which they must be severely and discreditably
defeated. And why should they? Was there anything in the
present state of society to enforce such a line of proceeding ?
In their numerous committees did they find any difficulty in
procuring the attendance of witnesses, or compelling the
attendance of any man, though he might be in the most remote
part of the kingdom ? Well, but if they prosecuted and were
successful, would not the vanquished be considered as a martyr?
Take care that you are within the boundaries of the law—take
care that you are within the prerogative of the Sovereign—
take care that your record is within the privileges of the law:
But if they were disposed to accede to the advice of his Hon.
Friend opposite—if they were disposed to look at the position
of the parties or in which the defendants were placed, to look at
the powers with which they were invested—look at the posi-
tion in which the people was placed, and the power with
which they were invested; but they had a decision here against
them in the courts of law, and they were by this means bring-
ing the whole of their privileges into question, and they were
thus compromising the law of England by their negligence on a
great point. It was certainly desirable that this action
should be settled, and that the principle on which it was
based should be disposed of. In this case he would not say
that the privilege of the House hail been placed above the
law, but it was evident that the House had entered into a
contest with the law, and it was of the utmost importance that
this privilege should be placed, not only in accordance with
the law, but also in coincidence with the decisions of the
courts of justice, so that there should be no doubt for the future
of the extent of the obligation which the courts stood under to
recognise the privileges of the House.
Sir T. WILDE was not surprised at the determination
'which his Hon. and Learned Friend ( Mr. Fitzroy Kelly) had ex-
pressed, not to give his opinion on the main question before
the House, for he stood in that position, from his connexion
with the several parties in this case, which precluded him from
expressing an opinion in that House. The House was now
placed in a position the most remarkable, and for the first time
during that period its decisions were invalidated by the adjudi-
cation of a court of law, and that was set aside which had
hitherto always been considered the law of Parliament. It
was evident from the decisions of the Committee. that all their
considerations had a view to legislation, but while he felt bound
to treat their judgment with every respect, he must say at the
same time that legislation on this subject was impossible.
What was their legitimate power as a House of Commons?
The woid privilege seemed to some Honourable Mem-
bers to carry with it an associated meaning, as if it
were a mere something for the benefit of individual
Members. But it related to the power of the House alone.
That House was the corner-stone of the arch of the
Constitution. They were charged with the administration
of justice, let them then do justice to themselves. He much
regretted that the Right Hon. Gentleman (Sir R. H. Inglis)
had delivered an opinion that the power of this House
should be placed under the guardianship of a court
of law. He had on a former occasion quoted the opinion
of the assembled judges as far back as the time of Henry
the Sixths, when they were asked what was the extent of the
authority of flue House of Commons ? 1 hey replied, that
it was not their province to do so. The privileges of Par-
liament were known only to Parliament, and therefore they
declined to give an opinion on the subject. And from that
time to this, all the greatest lawyers of the country had held
the same opinion. In some cases, it waa true, that the
courts of law might allude to the privileges of Parliament,
but it could only be done so incidentally, and not directly.
What had happened in their own day? In the case of Burdett
v. Abbott, which, the House would remember, arose out of a
libel on the constitution of the Houses of Parliament; when
Parliament excited a not very favourable impression in the
public mind. Sir Francis Burdett, when committed, raised the
question in the House, aid it was decided, that by appearing to
plead it did not in any degree compromise the authority of the
House. The Attorney-General beguiled the House into
pleading, by stating the unanimous opinion of all the lawyers
in the House to be that when the Speaker appeared to plead, the
judges would not permit the case to go any further. —( Hear.)
That was the ground, and distinctly the ground, on which
the House was beguiled to plead. The case came on for trial,
and Jr.A Holroyd argued that the House of Commons did not
possess the power to commit for libel. The judges decided that
the House had the power, and that no court of law could
examine into the privileges of the House or its manner of
exercising them. Lord Ellenborough, however, in giving that
judgment, volunteered a strange dictium—" That there might
be a case where all law, and justice, and decency. might be set
at defiance, and when the courts of law might be
obliged to interfere." It was not easy to say
what the learned judge meant when he laid down that
extraordinary maxim of law. The Learned Lord bad ruled
that the House possessed the privilege, and that the Court:could
not inquire into the exercise of it. Why, then, should he put
the hypothetical and impossible case, that the House might
commit an act against law, and justice, and propriety ?—( Hear,
hear.) Most certainly, if a case had arisen which that Noble
and Learned Lord thought proper to consider as op-
posed to his notions of law, and jastiee, and propriety,
and he hail taken the course which was insinuated,
the House of Commons of that day would not have
hesitated a moment to commit the learned judge to New-
gate.—( Hear, hear.) The supposition was uncalled for, and
it was monstrous in itself.—( Cheers.) Where had the Con-
stitution placed the power of controlling the privileges of Par-
liament ?—in Parliament itself.—( Bear, hear. ) But it was
said that a power so extensive was liable to abuse ; but there
was that liability to abuse in all courts and bodies of "last
resort." The House of Lords might, upon the hearing of an
appeal, give away an estate from the rightful owner ; but then
there was this necessity in human affairs, that there must he
a place of final resort, and society must take the hazard of
whatever error might be committed by that last tribunal.
( Hear, hear.) What other body but Parliament, then, could
presume to take upon itself the power of controlling Parliament
—the discretion to control Parliament —in the definition
of parliamentary privileges, or in the mode of exercising them.
—( Hear, hear.) When the Court of Queen's Bench
decided against the attempt upon the privileges of the House,
Sir Francis Burdett brought a writ of error, but the House was
never informed of any proceedings consequent upon that writ.
Liberty, however, was taken, without the authority of the House,
to appear in the Exchequer Chamber, and afterwards, when
the appeal was carried further before the House of Lords.
But the House never gave any authority and no
communication was ever received by the House upon the
subject. That case of Burdett against Abbott was supposed to
establish the authority of the House.—( Hear, hear.) Next
came the case of Stockdale against Hansard, and then the
sheriffs were taken into custody for contempt. The Court of
Queen's Bench was applied to on behalf of the sheriffs, and
the Court decided that, as it was a question of contempt, the
judges had no power to interfere. However, on that
question Lord Denman threw out a dictum, which
would lay the foundation for their future judg-
ment, wherever the Court should think proper to inquire
into the right of the House to commit at all. Then came the
question as to the right of the House to publish documents.
One of the judges then raid that it might be advisable for
Members of the house of Commons to burn their printed do-
cuments as soon as they read them, for they contained libels,
and if read by other persons who found them in their libra-
ries, such Members might be subject to actions for publishing
libels.—( Hear, and a laugh.) All these dicta and in-
sinuations were entirely opposed to :Parliamentary law and
to the Constitution.—( Hear, hear.) In the present case
Howard avoided the summons of the House. The officers
were told at his residence that he was expected to return soon.
They waited until twelve o'clock, and as some objection was
made to their remaining longer, they went away. Well, in
that case the Queen's Bench took upon itself to decide what
length of time the officers of the House should be allowed to
occupy in the discharge of an important duty—in fact, to what
extent the House might go in the execution of its own war-
rants.—( Hear, hear. 1 The Right Hen. the Member for
Oxford said that if the privileges of Parliament were in any
imminent danger, the Habeas Corpus Act might be suspended.
but what was to he done before the Habeas Corpus Act could
be suspended? There must be three sealed bags handed over
to a secret tribunal, upon Is hose report Parliament would
proceed. Witnesses must be called, and examined in secret.
—( Hear, hear.) Witnesses mutt be compelled to attend,
And what would the Court of Queen's Bench do ?—( Hear,
hear.) Why, that Court had now decided that the House
had no right to send its officer for three hours to any man's
house. What power had the Court of Queen's Bench to know
that there was such a thing as attendance at the bar at
all ?—( Hear, hear.) What power had that Court to know
what were the motives or the objects of any proceeding in
that House?—( Hear, hear.) But to act consistently—and it
seemed that the Court was determined to be consistent—if
ever a question arose for the suspension of the Habeas
Corpus Act—if ever the State should be placed in immi-
nent danger, the Court of Queen's Bench would investigate
the privileges of the Commons, and inquire into its right to
send for witnesses at all.—( Hear, hear.) They were now
told that parliamentary privilege should be subject to revisal
by the most inferior tribunals. They were told that the
Court could determine how far the House of Commons might
go in compelling the attendance of witnesses. Now, no man
more respected the courts of law than he did—no man had a
greater esteem for Lord Denman's high qualities than he had,
and no man would more readily acquit that Learned Judge of
any intention to seek popularity by the mode in which he dis-
charged his judicial duties.—( Hear, hear.) For Mr. Justice
Coleridge also he had the greatest respect and friendship.
But with all respect to those Learned Judges he could not
admit that Parliamentary proceedings should be subject to re-
vision in the inferior courts. That was contrary to all that he
had ever read of Constitutional law. He thought that Parlia-
mentary privileges were exercised in cases of such importance
that they could not be questioned. The law of Parliament, as
for instance in the cases of impeachment, was altogether inde-
pendent of the parnmon Jaw, and when he looked to the power
of the House and the duties which it had to discharge, he
was convinced that , the interest of the State

He implored the House to consider the course they were taking,
and he trusted that the Right Hon. Baronet would review the
whole matter, and not persevere in a course so detrimental to
the public, and so derogatory to the dignity and character of
Parliament.—(The Hun. and Learned Gentleman eat down
amidst loud cheers.)
Sir R. PEEL said that in the course of the Honourable and
Learned Gentleman's speech he had given the House a solemn
exhortation that they should not adopt any step of their own
inherent authority for the vindication of their own privileges,
unless they first carefully considered all the bearings of this
case. He ( Sir R. Peel) agreed with the Hon. and Learned
Gentleman, because he thought it of the utmost importance if
that House did take a step of its own authority, and to vindi-
cate its own privileges, that every other course should be taken
before they called on the House to vindicate its privileges by its
own authority. He looked to the constitution of
that Mouse, and he saw a popular assembly divided on
that question. Men of high authority were disposed
to support the authority of the courts of law, and he saw the
probability that a proposal to act upon their own authority
would be met with great opposition. He looked back to the
course which the House had actually pursued, and he saw the
Noble Lord who had been responsible for the conduct of
affairs prepared to vindicate the privileges of the house
in which lie ( Sir Robert Peel) assisted the Noble Lord.
He had seen the committal of the sheriffs, and had witnessed
the sympathy that was evinced upon their release, and all this
confirmed him in the conclusion that it was most important
that their resolution to support their own privileges
should be almost an unanimous one. He believed that there
was yet one other course which they might pursue, without
abandoning their privileges. It had been perfectly open to
them, within the last three weeks, to come to the resolution of

vindicating their privileges upon their own authority. They
had held the doctrine that they should defend the Sergeant-
at-Arms, because they wished the Court of Queen's
Bench to be made acquainted with the fact of the
privileges of that House having been violated. He
was surprised that the Hon. and Learned Gentleman should
have been one who voted for the adjournment of that debate
until a day after the day upon which the Sergeant-at-Arms
would be called upon to pay the amount of the verdict against
him. Was it not then competent to the House to have stated
that to dispute their authority was a breach of their privileges?
Was it not then competent to have passed a vote refusing to
pay damages? Whereas, as he ( Sir R. Peel) had warned them,
if they adjourned, the jury would have time to find a verdict,
and the House be obliged to pay. If, however, they had, as
he advised, without delay, passed the resolution, it would have
been conveyed to the judges, and they would have known that
the bare entertaining the question, much more the reception
of the verdict, would make them guilty of a breach of privi-
lege.—( Hear, hear.) But what had been the result ? The
House refused to accept his warning. Among those who re-
sisted it was his Hon. and Learned Friend opposite ( Sir T.
Wilde). The jury returned their verdict, it was received, and
the money had since been paid. Let them not, however, for
that act commit their officer for breach of privilege. Let them
be consistent, and commit the Treasury, who had paid the
damages.—(Laughter.) That would be far more just than to
visit with punishment their subordinate instrument ; or to
push the question to its legitimate extent, would the Learned
Gentleman opposite advise the committal of the judges
who infringed the privileges of Parliament ? The
Honourable Member had referred to the resolutions of 1837,
moved by the Attorney-General of the day, Lord Campbell,
than whom a more determined supporter of their privileges
could not be found, and the Noble Lord (J. Russell) had ex-
pressed opinions in which he heartily concurred. Influenced
by the same mo'ives, he could never advise the House to enter
upon a course of such a decided nature as recommended by
many, until he saw unanimity, or, at least, a vast majority in
the House seconding the step. It had been said that that
House ought to influence public opinion, but if a powerful
minority opposing backed the feeling but too palpable
in the country, the experiment would be most dangerous. It
would not do, by a majority of eight or ten, for the Govern-
ment to undertake the summary vindication of the privileges of
Parliament, and the House and country together must unani-
mously come to a determination cordially to support the course.
There must be no levees attending sheriffs, no sympathy with
the infringers of their privileges—there must be a feeling, both
in and out of the House, in favour of the rights
of the COMMAS of gDgland,—(Hear, hear.) It had

been recommended that the judgment of the Court of Queen's
Bench should be left unquestioned, but the reason assigned for
that course was the very strongest argument not to leave it in
that unsatisfactory state. The Learned Member ( Sir T.
Wilde) said that Mr. Justice Wighiman had delivered one
opinion which Judge Coleridge had destroyed, and that Lord
Denman had, in his time, destroyed that of Judge Coleridge.
Could a more powerful reason be given for appealing to a final
tribunal, or for anticipating the reversal of such conflicting
opinions ? And, surely, by asking if the Court below were right
in entertaining the question of validity, if the warrant was no re-
cognition of the judge's authority, where was the greater con-
cession in putting the question than in allowing the discussion
of their plea? He agreed with the Noble Lord the Member
for London, as well as with the concurrent sentiments of the
Learned Member (Sir T. Wilde), who had last addressed the
House, that as to upholding and vindicating their privileges,
it was essential to the proper administration of Parliament.
He would contend that the House of Commons, even without
a warrant, was competent to arrest any individual and brirg
him before the bar of the Honse. He thought it was a power
necessarily inherent in them, and to question that power was to
doubt the privileges, without which their power of rendering
service to their country would be altogether destroyed. The
judges on all former occasions had distinctly declared that this
power existed. The judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench
was very different from the opinions of judges expressed years
ago. His Hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge had said
that no court of law for the last 150 years had questioned the
right of the Howe of Commons to commit for contempt. He
( Sir R. Peel) was not sufficiently satisfied with that conces-
sion. It did not extend far enough. He thought to limit the
right of the House to commit only for contempt was not
sufficient. He contended that the House had potter to commit in
all cases and under every possible circumstance. It had been
said that if the House of Commons had this universal power to
commit it would destroy dagna Chaste, and would be con-
trary to the law of the land. That declaration, however, had
been set aside by judicial authorities. In the case of the " King
v. Paley," the judges had laid down doctrines which were per-
fectly consistent with the opinions he had expressed. He was
not endeavouring to set the authority of the House against the
jurisdiction of the Queen's Bench, but only to question their
authority as regarded their interference with the warrants
issued by the House. In the case to which he had alluded
Justice Gould had said, if the commitment had been made by
any inferior court it would be competent for the Court of
Queen's Bench to set it aside, but as the commitment had been
issued by the Commons, which was not amenable to any law,
it could not be interfered with. Was there ever a more ex-
press declaration that the House of Commons was above the
law? Justice Powell bad said that no man ought to
be taken into custody but by the law of the land.
But lex terrce was not confined to the common law, but, in
effect, did not include the lex ParliAnzenta. The House of
Commons have committed parties not under the common but
by Parliamentary law, and the application to the Court was
dismissed, on the ground that it was not compe tent for it to in-
terfere in matters over which they had no jurisdiction. He
would now refer to the opinion of a more eminent judge than he
had yet quoted. He alluded to the late eminent Lord Tenter-
den, who was one of the most learned judges that ever presided
in the Court of Queen's Bench. In the case of " Burdett v.
Abbott," which went by writ of error from that Court to the
House of Lords, Lord Tenterden ruled that it was competent
to this House to commit for breach of their privileges. It
would appear, at first sight, that Lord Tenderden meant to
apply the power of Parliament to convict only so far as its
privileges were concerned. There were many cases in which
that Court had refused to interfere with the commitments pro-
moted by the House. In the case of the " King v.
Patie" it had been distinctly laid down that
the Court of Westminster Hall could not judge
of the legality of the decisions of the House of Commons in
cases of committals for contempt. Lord Tenterden had fur-
ther distinctly laid down this broad principle, that the courts of
law could not judge of the privileges of the Parliament, and
also that they could not discharge from contempt a person
committed by that tribunal. Mr. Justice Blackstone had
stated that the little forms of execution or precision in the
mode of execution was required in carrying out the intentions
of the House of Commons. It was the duty of all parties to
attend to the instructions of the House without any such pro-
visions to which he had referred. Looking at the
decision of the courts, it was clear, both according
to the law and reason of things, that the privileges of the House
should be maintained. Then privileges were not given them
that they should possess any particular advantages to them-
selves, but rather to protect the public interests. The step
proposed to be taken by his Hon. and Learned Friend ( Sir F.
Thessiger) he thought was the best course to adopt at present.
They then could take the case into a court of error,
and by that means acquire the opinion of the
highest judicial authority.--(Loud cheers.) Should
that he opposed to them, they could then give their best con-
sideration as to the steps most prudent to be taken. In the
present stage, however, he woulld advise nothing further than
an appeal from the Court of Queen's Bench to a court of error.
Speaking of the judgment of Mr. Justice Wightman, he did
not mean that it should be tried on any technical grounds,
but that the whole scope and reasons of the judg-
ment should be tested fairly before the highest
tribunal. To leave the question without notice, as ad-
vised by an Hon. Member in the course of the debate, would
be a dangerous policy, to which he could not assent. He relied,
on the grounds he had stated, that the judgment should command
the revision of the highest legal authorities in the realm—
( Hear, hear)—so as to satisfy the House and the public that
nothing had been left undone, but that every course
had been tried before considering any ulterior mea-
sure.—( Hear, hear. 1 He would not at present anticipate
the course he would advise the House to pursue, in case the
decision of the judges was confirmed. He considered he was
not making concession in doing so.—( Cheers. ) With
respect to what had already been done in this case, he did not see
that the present Parliament was more faulty than its predecessors.
In the case of " Burdett v. Abbott" the House had advised to
plead. In 1837, in another case which [then transpired, the
House consented also to plead. That was in a previous Parlia-
ment to the present, and he believed the then Attorney-General
tendered that advice to the House. The same occurred in
1840, in the ease of " Howard v. Gossett," that one result of
which now occupied the House. Lord Campbell, then Mr.
Campbell, advised the House to plead in 1840, and on him
the responsibility of the present proceedings rested. The course
then advised he ( Sir R. Peel) had doubts of, and he still thought
the course taken had not been a correct one. With
regard to the proceedings of the House, no
man felt more strongly than he did that they were
in agreement with the law and the constitution of the
country ; but, at the same time, he must say the instru-
ments by which those privileges were attempted to be enforced
were very defective.—( Cheers. ) If they once began to commit
parties they must make up their minds to have an' abundant
supply. Under all the circumstances his feelings were, that
there was no other way to vindicate the House, and command
the support and respect of the country, but by the
line of proceeding he had recommended.—( Hear, hear.)
Their powers were very weak. There was nothing to prevent
actions being proceeded with during the recess, their power in
that case was most limited and impracticable. They committed
the sheriffs, but they did not prevent the payment of
the damages.—( Cries of " Hear, hear.") So it
would probably be again. If they committed more officers others
would be found ready to levy the datnages, and unless the pub-
lic mind be convinced that there was no alterna-
tive, but, as a last resource, they had asserted
their privilege by imprisonment, there would be no use
in their doing so. The House had no resource but imprison-
ment. They had no power of fining, and they had only im-
prisoned subordinates. It was impossible to deny that
public sympathy was in favour of these men—
( Hear, hear)—and it would be so again under similar
circumstances. It was better, he thought, to adopt even this
last resource than to relinquish its privileges ; but he ad-
vised them to defer doing so until they had ex-
hausted every other remedy. With all due respect
to the Court of Queen's Bench, he must say that he thought
their decision was inconsistent with reason, as it had been in-
consistent with the previous decisions of the same
court on former occasions. He repeated he was
prepared to exhaust any other measure to which
they could resort, without any compromise of the authority
or dignity of the House, before he appealed to those last and
extreme measures which might be necessary for the vindication
of their privileges, bat a necessity which might be averted by
giving time for the further consideration of this important
question.—( Cheers. )
The House then divided, when there appeared—

Fel, the motion
Against _ 48

Majori;;; for the motion
The remaining orders m
the day were then disposed of, and
the House adjourned at Two o•e:,?ek•

PARLIAMEN TAR Y VISIONS.

(From the Votes and Proceedings of the House of ContM9)2B.)
THURSDAY, JUNE 26.
PRINTED PAPERS.

Second Report of Committee further considered: Motion made,
and Question proposed, " That a Writ of Error be brought upon the
Judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, pronounced in the case of
Howard v. Gossett" :—Amendment proposed, to leave out from the
word " That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words
" it is inexpedient to entrust the maintenance of the Privilege of this
House to any other authority than that of this House itself," instead
thereof:—Question put, " That the words proposed to be left out
stand part of the Question." The House divided :

MAJORITY-AYES, 78.
Acland, Sir T. Eseott, Biekham Masterman, John
!Ciderley, C. B. Farnham, E. B. MiMalay, H. St. John
Astell, William Faller, A. E. Mitchell, T. A.
Millie, 11. J. Gardner,J. 1). Newry, Viscount
Baring, E. T. Gladstone, Captain Packe, C. W.
Baring, W. B. Gordon, Captain Palmer, George
Barnard, E. G. Gon!burn, 11. Palinerston, Viscount
Barneby, John Graham, Sir J. Patten, J. W.
Bernal, Ralph Grey, Sir George Peel, Sir R.
Bodkin, W. H. Hamilton, W. J. Pringle, Alexander
Brownrigg, J. S. Henley, J. W. Rashle gh, W.
Bruce, Lord E. Herbert, Sidney Rice, E. It.
....

Banbury, Thomas !lope, Charles
Cleric, Sir G. Hope, G. NV.

Rusiell, Lord 3.
Smith, 'F. B. C.

,'live, Viscount Howard, C. W. Somerset, Lord Q.
Connolly, Colonel Ingestre, Viscount Spooner, Richard
Curteis, 11. B. Inglis, Sir 14 11. Thesiger, Sir F.
Darner, Colonel James, Sir W. C. Trench, Sir F. W.
Darby, George Jermyn, Earl Vernon, G. H.
Dickinson, F. H. Kelly, Fitzroy Walsh, Sir J. B.
Douglas, Sir 11. Lawson, Andrew Wortley, James S.
Douglas, Sir C. Lamy, Anthony Wortley, John S.
buncombe, A. Liddell, H. T. 'Wrightson, W. R.
Dundas, David Lincoln, Earl Wynn, C. W. W.
East, James B. Lygon, General TELLERS.
Egerton, W. T. Mackinnon, W. J. Cardwell, Edward
Ellice, Rt. Hon. E. Mahon, Viscount Baring, Henry

MINORITY—NOES, 46.
Acton, Colonel Gibson, T. M. PI uniridge, Capt lin
_Adam, William Granger, T. C. Ita wd on, Colonel
Archbold, Robert Grogan, Edward Roebuck, J. As
Baine, Walter Heathcoat, John Stansfield, W. It. C.
Bowes, John Hill, Lord M. Strutt, Edward
Broadwood, 11. Mangles, R. D. Trelawny, J. S.
Brotherton, Joseph Marjoribanks, S. Villiers, Charles
Browne, W. Marshall, William Wakley, Thomas
Burrell, Sir C. Marsland, Henry Warburton, H.
liusfeild, William Milnes, R. M. Wawn, J. T.
Clements, Viscount Morris, David Wilde, Sir T.
Colebrooke, Sir T. Murphy, F. S. Williams, T. P.
Craig, W.G. Murray, AlexanCer
Dennistoun, John Neeld, Joseph;
Duncan, George O'Brien, A. S.
Easthope, Sir J. Ogle, S. C.
Forman, T. S. rattison, James

TELLERS.
Home, Joseph
Tanered, H. W.

THE NELSON LETTERS.—The third' volume of
" The Dispatches and Letters " of the heroic Nelson, edited
by Sir Harris Nicolas, far exceeds its predecessors in the in-
teresting nature of its contents. There is a passage in the life
of this great man which has hitherto been regarded as extremely
injurious to his reputation. We allude to the execution of
Caraccioli. The present volume of this national work brings
before the reader unquestionable evidence that in this un-
happy affair the character of Nelson is free from reproach. A
vast mass of invaluable correspondence and other important
documents, illustrative of all his proceedings on the coast of
Sicily, .creates the conviction that no blame can attach to the
British Admiral, and such materials enable the editor to vindi-
cate the character of his hero from the aspersions which igno-
rance and prejudice have cast upon it. As the period passed
over in this volume includes the Battle of the Nile, the capitu-
lation of the Castles of Elovo and Nuovo, and the expulsion of
the French from the dominions of the King of the two Sicilies,
with an account of all the rewards and dignities Nelson re.
.leived from his own and other Governments, some idea may
be formed of its historical value and interest,
The Right Rev. Dr. Walsh had an interview with Lord
Stanley yesterday, at the Colonial-office.