The Sun.
London, England, 1827-10-03 00:00:00

BUENOS

A SVECINCT EXTCVIIIION OF THE CONDUCT OF CITIZEN

-DON MANUEL JOSE GARCIA, AS MIND3TER DI.ENIPO-

TENTIARY OF THE REPUBLIC, FOR NEGOCIATING FEACE

litTlytEN IT AND 1112 MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF

'9IS.AZIL.

Extraordinary and difficult must be the situation
of a Plenipotentiary who finds himself obliged to
defend his official conduct in public, and to proclaim
in the streets the reasons which ought to be delibe--
rated upon only in the Cabinet. But such is the
situation in which lam at present placed. lam
bound to reason coolly in a moment of enthusiasm,
and I cannot in my defence avail myself of all the
resources which reason might offer me,, because, even
in this extreme case, I owe to my country a silence
uhich is necessary in several important points, I
however, willingly resign myself to this sacrifice, in
the full confidence that my countrymen will reeol-
lea the maxim of one of the most illustrious orators
of our Congress—" that to deliberate and resolve
in political affairs, it is necessary to have the heart
in the head."

Two charges are made against me : the first,
" the having acted contrary to the tenour of my in-
• structions ;" the second, " the having signed a con-
vention not only ignominious, but injurious to thy
essential rights of the nation." These are the two
points to which my defence shall he,directed.
It has been considered as indisputable that a
Minister Plenipotentiary cannot at any time or under
any circumstances depart from the text of his instruc-
tions, whatever be the evils which he may avoid, or
. the benefits he may hope to attain. It is added, that
such is conduct is unexampled in the history of
dipl,Jmacy. These propositions are taken fur granted
P.'s principles by my accusers, and form a dogma
with the multitude. The whole, however, is
founded in error. There are cases in which a nego-
tiator may ref►se that which his instructions have

directed him to concede ; in which he may grant
what he is imperatively oriltred to refuse ; and may
consent to modifications which he is not expressly
authorized to make. The cases are not new in
history. Among many -.vhich I might adduce, I shall
select two.

The first oc'Surred to Mutiny, Bishop of Ellie,
.who was sr.eat by Louis XI., King of France, to ne-
gotiate truce with Edward IV., King of England.
IVlletiny concluded the truce, but departed from two
:express articles of his instructions. Louis XI. being
highly displeased e-ith his conduct, put him on his
trial before the Parliament. Martiny defended him-
self by saying that what the King had verbally re-
vommended to him was to obtain peace with Eng-
land ; that without departing from the two points
specified in his instructions, it was impossible to ob-
tain it, and that he these rather to expose himself to
the disgrace of having his conduct reproached for
giving the King the time necessary to recover him-
self, than to lose without resource the object of his
mission. The Parliament acquitted Martiuy.
The second case is that of the Spanish Plenipo-
tentiary, Count de Aranda, who, finding that the
peace, which .was negociating in the year 1782, be-
tween Sp ;',n, France, and England, depended solely
upon •.e'le restoration of Gibraltar, which was made
sa 4:ose qua non by his Catholic Majesty, took upon
nimself to declare, in the name of his Sovereign,
that he renounced Gibraltar,
,and accepted in its
stead, the Floridas horn France, notwithstanding
that this was in contradiction to the most impera-
tiVe and absolute instructions. Count de Aranda
thus exposed himself to the disfavour of his Court ;
but by this transaction he merited to rank among the
men who have rendered themselves most illustrious
in the career of diplomacy. Other cases 'of the
• same kind may be seen, Wiquefort, book ii. sec. 5.
. Unquestionably such cases must be allowed to be
extraordinary. A Minister Plenipotentiary can
never so compromise himself without being tho-
roughly informed of the ideas of his Government—
of the state of its political system—of the positiun
and the interests of the country which he represents.
Farther, a Plenipotentiary cannot depart from the
letter of his instructions to agree to any thing which
.inay compromise the essential rights of the nation:
It is alone for the purpose of saving those rights
that he may depart from the letter of his instructions
—for in such case their letter must be held to be
contrary to their spirit, and to the essential object
of the negociation ; for it must here be recollected
that the first duty of a Government is to sacrifice
every thing to the national existence, and never to
sacrifice that existence to any thing, however grand,
• noble, or glorious it may appear to be.
Let us now apply this doctrine :
The essential object of the mission of the Plenipo-
tentiary to the Court of Brazil was peace, or the
immediate cessation of hostilities. The pen refuses
to sketch the picture of the Republic at that time.
It is sufficient to say, that it was such that the Go-
vernment believed it to be threatened with disso-
lution, if peace were not immediately made. I was
' sent to treat upon a basis which was rejected by
the Emperor 4,f Brazil; but it was necessary that
peace should be promptly negociated.
I shall not stop to detail the reasons which ren-
dered this proceeding urgent. They may be consi-
dered as included in the propositions confided to me
by the President of the Republic arid his Ministry,
at the time of my departure :—" Peace is the only
starting point on both sides. If the war continue,
anarchy is inevitable; if we cannot obtain peace, we
must resign ourselves to vassalage. Since the Re-
public has agreed that the Banda Oriental should he
separated, and form an independent state, the war
• has no longer any object.
I strongly felt the immense confidence which was
placed in me, by intrusting me with the negociation
of peace under such circumstances, and at the same
time could not conceal from myself the tremendous
darsgers in which the situation of men and things
placed me. Nevertheless, I yielded to my destiny,
and departed, full of the idea that peace would be
an essential benefit to the Republic for repairing its
losses, and for its existence.
On my arrival at the Court of Brazil, I found
that the difficulties which were previously of a most
serious nature had vastly increased. Three days
anterior to my arrival, the Emperor of Brazil had
solemnly declared before the assembled Chambers
his determination not to lay down his arms until the
Republic should recognise the province of Monte-
Video as an integral part of the empire. The pro-
babilities on which the Government supposed that
. he would treat upon the basis of the independence
of the Banda Oriental, had thus completely disap-
peared. Whatever might be the intentions of the
Emperor respecting the fate of that province, he
wished to be able to execute them of his own spon-
taneous will ; but to appear to be obliged to do this
by the Republic, was what he had resolved to resist
to the last extremity—a resolution in the support of
. which he had shown more obstinacy since the reverses
of his arms, the honour of which he wished to re-
cover at all hazards. To be listened to, then, it was
absolutely necessary to adopt another course. Nor
bad I the resource of temporizing, because of the
danger which delay presented in the situation of the
Republic, end because the Emperor, rushing with
Zeal into the war, would not suffer the recurrence of
uncertainties which might neutralize the mea-
sures he wished to carry into effect. In such a
state - of things, there remained nothing for the
negotiator to do but to take leave or to Ile-
' [sociate. If he did the first, the principal oh-
eeee of his mission was defeated, and he might
. elmnpromise the national existence. If lie did nego-
"Lts, it followed of course that he must depart from
the letter of his instructions, and put to hazard his
tranquillityd seed personal reputation. This consi-
_ er,tion was not to be disregarded when a grand
national interest was at state. The sole question to
be
considered PM, whether the conditions specified
b y the Governvnent in his instructions was of such a
nature, that being once altered, that great national
•. interest would also be compromised. Because, if
merely an inferior interest was qtuestions,eitWitsclear that such might be '
sacrificedin
o the securing
of the great object, the essential right of the cStrinateg,
which is its existence. The question then was re-

Shiced to the common and ordinary case in which
governments desist from their pretensiong in ex-
change, I do not say for saving their compromised
existence, but for enjoying the natural advantageS of
peace. Let us now exarriino this important ques-
tion, The Einperoi of Brazil is not willing to be
obliged to yield any one of the rights of sovereignty
which he pretends to have acquired, and justly to
possess, in consequence of the union, which he calls
spontaneous, of the inhabitants of Monte Video,
and of the sacrifices made in consequence thereof
by the Empire, to fulfil on its part the compact
entered into with the said inhabitants. The Go-
vernment of the Republic, denying the legitimacy
of this title, on account of the non-existence of the
alleged voluntary union, and resting its claiiteon the
right which its ancient possession, constantly sus-
tained by the blood and the fortune of the-citizens of
the Republic, not less by the free and spontaneous;
will, without any kind Of coercion real or apparent,
of the inhabitletS of the province, agreed to cede its,
fights, but on the condition that the said province
should be established into an independent State, se-
parate from Brazil and the Republic ; consequently
the province of Monte Video might cease to form
an integral part of the nation \tithed injury to, the
nation's essentialorightS ; or, what is the same
thitt► the Mpiibuc might renounce its right of so-
vereignty over the Banda Oriental without compro-
mising its existence by such renunciation.
It may, however, be said, that even though the
Republic might exist perfectly well without the
Oriental province, it would nevertheless have its
existence eminently threatened if that province
were occupied by a foreign power different
from its present inhabitants, and then the
condition specified in the instructions would have
reference to an essential right ; but such is
not the fact, nor did the Government of the Re-
public consider the subject in such a light. This is
demonstrable, because the Government had resolved
to make, not a partial renunciation, but a complete
and absolute cession of its sovereignty, without re-
serving to itself any eventual right—without impos-
ing any kind of condition on a new State, which
was to be erected in the Oriental province. That
State was to have of course full and absolute liberty
to enter into what stipulations it might think proper
with neighbouring States, or with any other, to
adopt the system of policy best suited to its inte-
rest; to avail itself without any obstacle of the ad-
vantages of its situation and territory ; and without
any obligation of paying any attention to the preju-
dices or disadvantages which might arise therefrom
to the prosperity or security of the Republic. The
Government, in thus ceding its rights, neither bad,
nor could have had, any other object in view than
that of extricating itself from the difficulty of a
ruinous war, by the honourable expedient of yielding
to is third party the sovereignty disputed by arms.
Secondly, because the Government was to make
this cession, notwithstanding it was fully aware
of the almost insuperable 'difficulties which op-
posed the formation of an independent State in the
Oriental Provinces, of the troubles which it would
produce, of the pretensions to which it would pro-
bably give birth in other provinces, and of the re-
sults which such a state of things might have for the
future. The reasons which the Government has
for taking this view of the subject are the same as
those which have been published to demonstrate the
impossibility and danger of governing the provinces
federally, besides other more powerful reasons,
which it is not here necessary to explain. It may
then he deduced, from the whole of what has been
said, that the renunciation of the rights of sove-
reignty of the Republic over the Banda Oriental,
even without the conditions specified in the text of
the instructions, would not compromise the essen-
tial rights of the nation, and that the Republic
might make this renunciation, always supposing that
by such a proceeding the national existence, which
at that time was compromised, might he saved.—
Having well weighed all these reasons, the Plenipo-
tentiary conceived that he was in a situation which
authorised him to negociate, modifying on his own
responsibility the only article of his instructions
which was directly opposed to the object of his mis-
sion ; and he resolved so to do, considering that he
might thus secure the Republic a benefit which was
urgently necessary, without the fear of compromis-
ing it by any obligation; and since, according to the
law of nations; obligation by treaties is the result
only of the act of ratification.
It now remains to be examined whether the pre-
liminary convention, which, in consequence of the
above resolution, was concluded by the Plenipoten-
tiary at the Court of Brazil, departed greatly from
his instructions ; whether positive advantages were
acquired by it, or whether it sacrificed essential
rights and wounded the national honour.
On carefully analyzing articles 1 and 2 of the
Convention, it appears in the first place, that though
by the tenour of the instructions given to the Pleni-
potentiary, the Republic was prepared to renounce
unconditionally all its rights to the province of
Monte Video, without any reserve, yet by the preli-
minary convention, it renounced " only condi-
tionaliy the rights which it might claim. This re-
nunciation or desistance made by the Republic of the
rights which it might lay claim to,.did not prejudice
those natural and political rights which the Oriental
province possesses and defends. The Emperor of
Brazil has essentially modified his pretensions, which
are these—the solemn recognition of his right of '1
possession of perfect sovereignty over the province
of Monte Video, a right which he holds to be ac-
quired by the spontaneous union of the inhabitants
of that country to the empire, and in virtue of which
the Republic cannot take part or interfere in its
affairs without committing a manifest aggression.
This right, of which the Emperor of Brazil supposes
himself in possession, is now connected with condi-
tions especially onerous to the empire,and favourable
to the natural and political rights of the inhabitants
of Monte Video, by giving to the Republic a new
right, founded on the right of its own preservation,
to interfere and set up claims respecting the mode
of existence of the Oriental province. If, con-
formably to the tenour of the instructions, the Banda
Oriental had been constituted a separate and inde-
pendent state, it might have stipulated its union
with the empire, under whatever conditions ap-
peared to it proper : or if the Emperor were to have
again military occupation of the province under cir-
cumstances similar to those which gave a fa-
vourable colour to the first occupation, the Re-
public would have no right to interfere, be-
cause, having renounced, unconditionally, all right,
the new sovereign state erected in the Banda
Oriental • might dispose of itself with the
same independence as the Republic was to
have disposed of it. By the preliminary convention,
the Republic does not obtain all that it proposed to
obtain on taking up arms ; but it does not lay them
down without securing to the province of Monte-
Video all the benefits possible for it to obtain ; and
if, in doing this, the Republic has even compromised
its existence, no one would deny that it had acted
honourably in its engagements, since it had arrived at
that boundary beyond which no Government can,
without temerity, pass. By article 3, the public
engages to withdraw its army from the Oriental pro-
vince, and reduce it to the peace establishment. The
judge who in to decide upon the peace establishment
is not the Emperor of Brazil, but the Government
of the Republic ; neither does the article prevent
arming in case of impending war with sone other
Power. It is a mere stipulation of form among na-
tions which has never been considered ignominious;
and whatever explanations might still have been
thought necessary, might easily have been intro-
duced into the definitive treaty. By article 4, the
Republic is obliged to maintain the island of Martin
Garcia in :tofu quo—that is, as it always has been,
destroying the temporary fortifications erected in
consequence of the war. This is precisely what the
Government would do in the case of peace, and to
engage to do it now is no way injurious. Stipula-
tions of this nature, and many much more serious,
are quite common in treaties and conventions, without
ever being. called dishonourable. By article 5, the
Republic is obliged to pay the . value of the prizes

proved to have been taken by acts of piracy.
This article is honourable to the Government,
and is consistent with the principles which it
has proclaimed respecting hostilities by privateers.
—The obligettien, Iniweveie Would amount to
almost nothing, because we have reasti to
believe that the crime of piracy is very rare among
our cruisers; and if any happen, it is but just that
the sureties which the Government requires from
the oWwets should be, answerable. Therefore, article
6 has for its object the adltidleation mid „rendering
more equitable the execution of the preceding article.
Article 7 requires no particular observation. Art.
8, without containing any thing offensive to the na-
tional dignity, presents very considerable advantages.
It guarantees the free navigation of the river, with-
out imposing on the Republic the expenses which
it would be necessary to enter into from the moment
of the conciusioii of petite for the obtaining of this
object, and which would be very burdensome during
the first years. In cases of war, especially in those
which would most probably occur during the first
fifteen years, the Republic would be able to elude
the effects of the most direct and vigorous hostility
which an enemy is capable of making. By Art. 9,
the blockade was to be raised in 24 hours after the
ratification, and hostilities arrainse the subjects of the
empire might be prosecuted' at sea for eighty days
more. The Republic was thus immediately relieved
from the most serious injury which the enemy could
inflict upon it, and yet it would not be obliged to
restore the prizes which, during so long a period,
might be taken. Art. 10 stipulates the term within
which the convention was to be ratified, and the
place of exchange,—both stipulations calculated to
enable the Republic to enjoy as speedily as possible
the effects of a peace supposed to be necessary.
It results from this analysis-Ist. That the preli-
minary convention contains no article by which the
essential rights of the nations are compromised. 2d.
That it presents important advantages. 3d. That
if the Republic does not obtain the whole object of
the war, as little does the empire preserve all the
rights which it claimed and exercised before the war.
Conventions and treaties far more onerous have been
concluded by nations most jealous of their glory,
when they have considered them calculated to pre-
vent danger to their national existence, to obtain
great benefits, or to gain a more advantageous posi-
tion. That a treaty is only advantageous or disad-
vantageous according to the circumstances under
which it is ratified, and the respective situations of
those who contract it, is a received doctrine among
all nations, and is supported by common sense. To
do the best that is possible, is essentially the duty
of every Minister, and he is responsible for what he
doe.. The preliminary convention has been par-
tially judged. All those points have been fastened
upon which were calculated to stir up national ani-
mosity, and every one censures the Minister for hav-
ing acceded to them ; but few have inquired what
were the circumstances under which that Minister
was sent to negociate, and this is precisely the point
which ought to be taken into consideration. I will
-put the case hypothetically. Suppose our disasters
to have been such that only one or two provinces of
the Republic could support the burden of the war;
that the other provinces could not or would not as-
sist them ; that from some powerful motive, whatever
it might be, instead of aiding they opposed them; if
the treasury and resources were entirely exhaust-
ed, credit utterly ruined, the national authori-
ties disobeyed, accused, and insulted, and the
army participating in these disorders, and wast-
ing itself even by its victories, without any
hope of improvement; if for these reasons
a peace or a truce were indispensably necessary to
save the country from the last degree of degradation ;
if in such an extremity a citizen sufficiently patriotic
to take upon himself the dangerous task of nego-
tiating a peace which could not be glorious, should
present the preliminary convention, would it be just
to reject it as inadmissible, disgraceful, anti subver-
sive of the essential interests of the nation ? Would
it be fair to criminate the negotiator, who, fully
understanding his country'S interests, should con-
clude a peace under such circumstances, risking only
his personal reputation, and in no way compromising
the Government ? But let it be further supposed
that during the absence of the Plenipotentiary, de-
cisive victories, powerful allies, and abundant re-
sources had been obtained; that the most cordial
union among the provinces of the Republic, the
most exalted enthusiasm in the inhabitants, and un-
limited confidence in the national authorities and the
chiefs of the army, should have entirely changed the
situation of the republic—in such a case, should the
preliminary convention be accepted ? Perhaps not.
The Government would see whether such a conven-
tion, which had been advantageous in the disas-
trous situation of the country, would be
disadvantageous in its bettered condition.—
It might be rejected, not as being odious, de-
grading, and destructive of the honour and exis-
tence of the nation, but as disadvantageous, consi-
dering the circumstances of the Republic.. The ci-
tizens, unmindful of their past misfortunes, and
thinking only of their present prosperity, might
censure the plenipotentiary, and be deaf to the argu-
ments in his defence ; but they would scarcely carry
their injustice so far as to impute to him the worst
of crimes.
The Plenipotentiary charged to negotiate the
peace with Brazil, under circumstances perhaps the
most critical that the Republic ever presented, con-
ceived that he could not satisfy the confidence re-
posed in him by the Government, nor fulfil the ex-
pectations of the country, if he did not hazard even
his personal reputation in negotiating the cessation
of hostilities, and signing a convention that might be
of the utmost importance to the welfare of the na-
tion, and which did not impose any obligation on
the Government till after its ratification. I repeat
once more that the Government was placed under
no engagement. A treaty of peace, a preliminary
convention, signed by Plenipotentiaries, does not
bind the respective Governments for whom it is ne-
gociated, until after it has been attentively examined
and formally ratified. The engagements entered
into by the negotiators are to be regarded as merely
conditional promises until after the act of ratification.
Besides, a preliminary convention, even, after being
solemnly ratified, is still a provisional treaty. Its
principal object is to obtain a cessation of hostilities,
and to fix bases for a definitive treaty. If this do
not take place, the convention or preliminary treaty
falls to the ground. Unhappily, with regard
to the present convention, the fundamental question
has not been examined, without the examination of
which it is impossible to judge properly of transac-
tions of this nature. There is only one case in which
the Republic ought to take no counsel but of its
courage, and in which no treaty or convention is
admissible ; and that is, when the essential rights of
the nation are attacked. As, for example; if a power-
ful neighbour should attempt to subdue and subju-
gate the Republic. With the exception of such
cases, it belongs to the discretion of Governments
to decide. They are bound to sacrifice every thing
to the existence of the nation. To preserve the
Republic, to avoid greater evils by knowing how to
make war and negociate in time, is the first duty of
those who govern. On their judgment depends the
yielding something opportunely for the re-establish-
ment of affairs, and for saving the Republic from
confusion and disorder, which even victories might
only serve to augment, and hold out to an artful
enemy greater probabilities of consummating the ruin
of the Republic, and profiting by its spoils.
Here might be added some important reflections
'on the true military- and political position ix which
the Oriental Province would be placed in the case
of the preliminary convention being adopted, and
on the manlier in which that convention was con-
cluded, even supposing that it has been properly
rejected; but, whatever advantage my cause might
derive from entering into the discussion, I prefer at
present to pay the tribute of a respectful silence to
the decision of the national authorities. The time
will come when impartial judges will be able, with
a complete knowledge of the case, to pronounce on
my conduct, and characterise it justly. Meanwhile
it suffices for me to have proved-1. That lam

not criminal for the act of having negociated. the
preliminary convention under a departure from the
letter of my instructions, for similar transactions
have obtained eulogy instead of vituperation.-
2. That the convention which I signed contains
nothing which compromises the essential rights of
the
The nepublie appeao bp* to he relieved from
the serious difficulties which vieighed upon it at the
time of my departure for the Court of Brazil and,
among the advantages begun to be enjoyed, the
most important doubtless is, the power of accurately
fathotiiitig the depth of the abyss on which it stood.
When that shall be correctly known by the people,
they will be in a condition rightly to judge which
deserves best their esteem or indulgence—the citi-
zen who, in such a crisis, sacrifices his reputation,
and perhaps his existence, to his country, or he who,
at all risks, would render his country only the in-
strument of his fame.
MANUEL JOSE GARCIA.
Buenos Apes, July 6.

cipal basis of order and happiness ; the ridiculous I
reports spread abroad that the garrison wish to esta-
blish the patrol system, already abolished, to burn
houses and convents, to proscribe and vex indivi-
duals; have no other. object than to spread trouble
and disorder, by indisposing the people towards the
troops. But fear northing; the origin of these
views is known; the perfidious hypocrites, depriv-
eel of all virtue, who inspire these alarms with guilty
dissimulation, are marked. Live in peace; you will
. rather be witnesses of their just punishment than of
the disunion of the troops and these honourable inha-
bitants. I cattanswer for the sentiments of this generous
garrison; its wishes aspire to defend the august person
aid sovereignty of our legitimate Monarch Ferdi-
nand VII. whom God preserve ; also to exact the
obedienee due to the laws teed authorities, and to
)reserve public order, with the mod.eration and dis-
tipline, which, above all things, foto( the chief fea-
tures in the character of these d,‘,...fenders of the
throne; such is their duty, and they. vrill, in con-
junction with me, and the other author:ties,
this day, there is not an event of the least .
the ends they have in view. You know Oa, to
attain
import-
-4p
andriroc
tsi a.
will
anof
onirtni
tdnhiuveei
Continue,
future
ree‘rveihf)
therefore,
r ecat
stilld strengthened e nyt
otltpart assespreserve
r fvutt,ti
loh ne,
"same spirit of union, and testify by your conduct
your fidelity to his Majesty. This your provisional
governor expects from the purity of your zeal.
(Signed) JOSEPH DE TORRES."
The rebel chiefs have announced to the inhabi-
tants of all the villages of the coast, that they are
masters of the district of Gerona ; and they are for-
bidden, wider pain of death, to furnish provisions to
the isles of Medas, fortified positions at the entrance
of the gulf of Rosen.
(rItiVATX CORILESPOISDENCE.)
FRANKFORT, SEPT. 25.—Letters from Berlin say,
that in case of war breaking out in the East, a body
of Prussian troops of observation will assemble near
the extreme frontier of the Grand Duchy of Posen,
and that it will be conVosed of the fifth corps,
where the divisions occupy i.!lat Duchy, and a part
,of Silesia, and of a division ef the third corps,
;which will march for that purpose ,from Frankfort
Iron the Oder. •

MEXICAN PAPERS.
VERA CRUZ, JULY 29.—1 t is important for 5."
to know that Ferdinand VII. has named his brother
Fr&ncisco de Paula, the son of Godoy (late Prince
of Peace), King of Mexico. In consequence Of
this, he sent Count Ofalia to the Courts of Paris and
London, to communicate this resolution, informing
them that the new Monarch would proceed thither,
supported by an army to open the ports to him; and
pave the way to the throne. General Morales, who
was on the " Costa firma," has been sent to recruit
troops in the Canaries for this expedition, and, with
theparic midieo naety
other
the
14ehi
Cabinetsch
ofe
disposal SEopufar no
Ferdinand,i
have
aC v Clergy geye
shipsh
Isf
informed
ir.ne
lae freeely
notes;pe
n
mqi
pi i po prtead:,
:edit)
odpeverypreparation
rati
oContinentn sa r eofimiacaakdo
lienifgi
no for ttuohsa, tatsphstietsrtpotstele
of the election of this new Monarch by diplomatic
i
new Baratarian Majesty at the rlavannah, a place so
inde-
pendence and liberty of which place was frustrated
by the Negretes in 1825, wherfit would have. cost
Mexico only an attempt.
Thus the Baptist Arenas appeared only as the
forerunner of the appearance of the Sovereign Paula,
and although his decapitation was fortunately anti-
cipated, it is no temerity to presume that be has
disseminated through this vast territory some
apostles, who, if they commit no actual damage and
havoc, may at least prove' troublesome. For my
part, I repeat with the Roman orator.—Pereant
amid, duns una irrinuci intercidant—(Perish our
friends, provided our foes fall at the same time);
for thus amongst the good, bad men would fall like-
wise, whom it would otherwise be difficult to dis-
Cover. The United States decreed, during the last
war, that every individual of that nation, old citizens
excepted, should remove 100 leagues into the inte-
rior, under pain of expulsion and sequestration.—
Why do we not adopt the same course with the
Goths, that are suffered to remain from motives of
pity ? This is a bad sort of American pity. , Were
I a Deputy, I should propose it.
JULY 27.—Letters from Tehueacan mention that
at half past one in the morning of the 12th ult., a
terrible shock of an earthquake was felt at that
place, the vibrations of which were appallingly vio-
lent. Nature seemed to have lost the harmony of
its elements, and the globe appeared to be on the
point of destruction. The rumbling of the noise was
truly terrific, and the shocks dreadful. Happy are
the people who are not exposed to such convulsions
of nature !
This trepidation has caused a variety of dangers.
The walls of many private houses tumbled down, as
well as those of the parish church and of the convent
Del Carmen. The sacristy of the hospital of San
Juan de Dios was rent, as well as the middle aisle of
the small Church of Calvary, situate in the vicinity.
The coach-house of a private dwelling was also
levelled, but did little damage.
OAJACA, JULY 13.—At 33 minutes after one
o'clock this morning, we were visited with a slight
earthquake, which, however, occasioned no damage;
and at half-past 11 at noon, it was repeated, but
proved harmless.
VERA CRUZ, JULY 26.—Within this few days
past, the only topic of conversation has been the
presence of the Spanish squadron, under the com-
mand of Laborde, who arrived on the 16th before
this port, when a hermaphrodite brig, belonging to
that squadron, entered the bay under a flag of truce.
What ! two frigates of the largest class, and a brig,
coming for the exchange of prisoners ! We know
and curse you already, a thousand and thbusand times,
ye imbecile instruments of the infernal Ferdinand ;
we not only penetrate your execrable designs, but
also fully anticipate the mischief you are capable of
committing. No, fellow-citizens,
it is impossible
that the arrival of these vessels upon our coast has
originated in the false and ridiculous pretence of
fetching the worthy vassals of his Catholic Majesty;
their views are far different, and if their wretched
impotency were not notorious, I would swear that
they have uo other object in view than the vile at-
tempt of capturing our beautiful corvette the
Tepayec, who thinks herself in safety, on account of
her having come under the flag of the United States
of North America. This, I consider, would be no
impediment to their despoiling us of a vessel that
will prove a source of terror to the dancing-masters
whom we see in Spanish naval uniforms ; they
would afterwards give satisfaction to our northern
brethren for the insult, by supplications that can
only proceed from degraded Spain, resting their de-
fence on the notoriety of this vessel having been
built for our service by officers of our navy, Sze.,
whilst in the interim we should be deprived of her,
until they pay to the United States treble her value,
after a year or two the squabble between the Court
of Washington and Madrid would last.
I conclude, by taking leave of Ferdinand and his
satellites, and pray the Supreme ArchiteCt of
Nature to curse them for a thousand generations—
that Heaven may oppress them—and that the in-
fernal furies may afflict them per scrcula sreculerum !
Amen, Amen. F. P. TAMARIZ.

THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT OF THE FREE
AND SOVEREIGN STATE OF VERA CRUZ.

By the copies which I have the honour to enclose
to you, you will perceive that existing circumstances
require now my presence at Vera Cruz, since some
of the enemy's ships have arrived in sight of that
port, which call my attention to the coast. lam
far from believing them capable of disturbing the
inhabitants of the frontiers ; but, should they have
the audacity to do se, I shall have the pleasure of
convincing them that the Mexicans, after knowing
how to obtain the independence and liberty of their
country, will know how to preserve and defend it,
and to bury their enemies en the very line at which
they may dare to invade the territory of freedom.
Please to submit this to the. Hon. Congress, that
it may issue peremptory orders for putting the Na-