The Sun.
London, England, 1827-01-10 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF fhE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

3

We insert this day, a diplomatic document, whose of-
importance at the moment in which the Portuguese
',linister presented it to Mr. Canning was of the highest
order. The note in question is that which contained a
demand, on the part of Portugal, for military assistance
from Great Britai9, founded on the alleged occurrence of t
cersp3 fcederis, provided for by a succession of treaties. TLc
• course of argument observation pursued by the Mar-
:leis de Palmella, in this paper, appears to us to have con-
stituted the model after which the most useful parts of Mr.
Canning's speech for an address to his Majesty were
framed. We have, in the note, and afterwards in the
• speech, an enumeration of the treaties by which England
was;'`under certain contingencies, bound to give aid to
Portugal, followed up by a statement and application of
the facts which brought those several conventions into ac-
tivity. The chief interest of the subject is of course con-
, fined to the charges against the .Spanish Government ;
and to the enforcement of that reasoning, which told
with such striking power in Mr. Canning's speech—'
where the Right Hon. Gentleman explained the facility
with which the employment of Portuguese deserters in-
stead of -Spanish -troops, by Ferdinand, might serve
to defeat every treaty of alliance which could bind this
or any nation to the support and relief of a distressed
neighbour. It might result from the letter of those decla-
rations through which England disclaims all right of inter-
fering in the " internal" quarrel of other States, that the
Spanish Government, wishing to destroy that of Portugal,
however strongly the latter was guaranteed by the legiti-
mate principles of foreign alliance which the 'British Ca-
fillet has avowed, might find its means of accomplishing
the guilty object increased, in direct proportion to its own
trcachery, and to the conscientious integrity of Great Bri-
tain. "We cannot employ Spanish troops in this enter-
prise," whisper the members of the Camarilla to their
Master, " because that would bring the business too pal-
pably within, the casusftederis provided for by the treaties
between • the Portuguese and British Crowns ;" " but we
will cheat these islanders, byrecruiting among the Portu-
guese malcontents—bribing them to desert across the
frontier—and converting them into agents of Spanish mili-
tary policy, to the overthrow of their native Sovereign and
his kingdom; then, although paid with Spanish money,
equipped with arms and ammunition from oitr magazines,
regimented and disciplined by our officers, set in motion
for operations combined by our Captains-General,and mak-
ing war for Spain upon the neighbouring Government, after
all, they have but to call themselves Portuguese,fling up their
bonnets for a Prince of Straw, allege their loyalty to King
Miguel and their abhorrence of the ' revolutionary' regime
of Don Pedro, and behold the war comes out a clear and
orthodox civil war—which, if Spain only takes the trouble
to disavow, -England is prohibited by her own engage-
ments from ever interfering to settle." This is the spe-
cies of cleft stick which, by the simple superinducement
of perfidy upon injustice, the Spanish Court and its advi-
sers had prepared for the allied Cabinets of this country
and of Portugal. Had Great Britain been eager to lay hold
of pretexts for shuffling out of the spirit of a solemn treaty,
slie would still have exposed herself to the able reflection
of M. de Palmeila—that an unqualified adherence to the
letter of a promise to abstain from all contact with civil

dissensions,T might, "direct the enemies of Portugal in
the course which they have to follow ;" learning from it
that they might with impunity seduce soldiers to desert,
sow corruption amongst all the Portuguese army, embody
them in military corps, and commit upon the Portuguese
Government all kinds of hostilities—provided such hos-
tilities were (as they have been) disavowed—and Portu-
gal would be placed between an enemy who set up his own
treachery as a secure defence, and" an ally who was inter-
dicted from assisting her." We are not without daily
experience of the gravity with which this fraudulent sys-
tem was relied upon, and of the pertinacity with which it
is still resorted to for arguments, when it has ceased to
operate as a practical and substantial safeguard to
those who invented it. The Quotidienne, which is
the organ of the confederated Serviles on the south of the
Pyrenees, insists that there-are "no proofs" of the em-
ployment of - Portuguese bands by the Spanish COurt.
This is the whole secret of the. Apostolic policy, falsehood,
hypocrisy, and effrontery. We could wish to see the ser-
vile interest so f4r suppressed, that Ferdinand should he
compelled to recall and disgrace the Captains-General of
his western provinces, and that the Portuguese constitu-
tion should be formally recognised, because the conduct of
the frontier authorities was what constituted the act of ag-
gression, and because the refusal to recognise the Regent
stands foremost in the list of grievances which M. Palmella
enumerates in his note to Mr. Canning, as proofs of the
" animosity entertained by the Spanish Government
against that of Portugal ;" and, therefore, as principal
among the grounds of complaint which he calls upon
England to aid his Royal mistress in removing, if neees-
:ary, by force. It is right to add, that some positive dis-
grace, as well as change of destination, would, if visited
upon M. de Moustier, be in itself an act of wisdom, and
gratifying to those who have not ceased to believe in the
assurances of the French Government, or withdrawn their
confidence in its honour. If M. de Moustier has not yet
been punished, or kept at a distance, or rebuked,—if he
has, as report says, been caressed where he ought to have
been severely discountenanced,—what is this but arming
~vith fresh topics of incredulity and suspicion against the
Court of France, all men of all parties, who feel a satis-
faction in i proclaiming their distrust of the House of
Bourbon ?-7'imes.

The death of one who has filled a splendid and corn-
inanding station, is an event at all times full of mournful
instruction. The departure of ordinary men from this
scene of existence is an event only noticed or felt by their
immediate friends and acquaintances—it does not produce
any impression beyond the circle that bounded their do-
mestic connections; but when the possessors of earthly
glory and power go down to the grave, the blow which
has struck a single victim resounds through a whole nation.
The particular instance of mortality is felt over a vast
space; it rivets public attention, and touches, as it were,
the general heart of the community. So has the death of
the Heir Presumptive to the Throne of this Empire car-
ried a sensation into all ranks of people; and correspond-
ing with the earthly grandeur which he might have ex-
pected had he lived, is the melancholy impression which
the premature termination of his earthly hopes has excited.
Yet that event was for some time foreseen, and was not
one of those sudden fatalities by which a man passes f rom
the possession of health, and ambitious hopes; and riches
and grandeur, like the late EMperor Alexander, to the:
last home of mortality. Still the peculiar situation in
which the Duke of York stood—his position next the
Throne—his almost sovereign power in the superinten-
dence of the army—the place which he held in the affec-
tionate regards of his Royal Brother and King—the honest
intrepidity of his political sentiments, united to a temper
which, in the ordinary intercourse of life, was remarkably
courteous and gentle—all combined to make_ the British
public take a great interest in his fate, and to feel even his
long-expected death as a sudden calamity. Yet it does
'not speak well for the hearts of some, who set up to en-
lighten and improve the human mind,:that they should have
chosen the very moment when the pulse of life had ceased
to beat, and when his mourning relatives were preparing
to do the last sad offices to his remains—that, we,say, they
should have chosen that v
eri moment to rake up from
the records of political contention his real or imputed
errors, and dishonour the dead, and afflict the living, with-
out any apparent motive but tnat of the gratification of a
barren malignity. A man who would carry this spirit
into the " house of mourning, in private life, would be
regarded as equally devoid of feeling and decency. And
why should not Royalty, in such cases, at least, possess
the privilege which the meanest subject has in his domestic
affliction ?-11forning Herald.

Some of the French Papers will now have it that Al.
-neida (of the greatest importance in Portugal, it is added)
surrendered to the Royalists on the 20th December ; and
hat having made themselves masters of the above place,

isios of the principal cities of Upper
Beira ; viz. La-mega, Viseu, Guarda, and Coimbra. The
rapidity with which the French Papers, or rather their edi-
tors, travel in Portugal, is unexampled. We are, how-
ever, inclined to think, that the taking of Almeida, or
even a revolt there, now the great topic of exultation to
the Quotidienne and the French Apostolicals, is something
like the old story they told es, over and over again, of the
triumphant entry of the Marquis de Chaves into Oporto,
Coimbra, &c. Fortunately, we have, in London, direct
advices from Lisbon of the 28th, and from Oporto, by the
Providence, arrived at Liverpool, of the 22d of the same
month (December), and they do not allude to such an event,
or the danger of its happening. This, we should think, is
proof positive, that such a circumstance could not have
occurred at the date above alluded to, as Almeida is only
about fifty leagues from Lisbon, and a less distanee from
Oporto. General Pego has, for some time, been the Go-
vernor of Almeida, and he is perhaps the most experienced,
as well as the most staunch, officer in the-Portuguese ser-
vice, We alluded to him the other day, as having served
under Napoleon, and driven the Marquess de Chaves-bae.4
into Spain, when, in 1823, he undertook a crusade similar
to the present one, in the province of Tras-os-Montes. Al-
meida is garrisoned by a regiment of militia, and the opi-
nions of the men and officers must have, in a great mea-
sure, been influenced by those of their commander, conse-
quently little apprehension can be entertained of their
being contaminated with Miguelite principles. Besides,
it is well known, that on the 19th the Marquess de
Villa Flor was In the vicinity of Guarda, marching
from Alentejo with his victorious army, and Guarda
is only six leagues from Almeida. We have, there-
fore, every reason to conclude, that this newly in-
vented story will turn out like the old one of Oporto.
But even if the Royalists had entered Almeida on
the 20th, how does it follow that they took such rapid
possession of the other places above-named % If the Paris
Editors forget the season of the year, and the nature of
Portuguese roads, one. might expect them to bear in
mind the intervening diStances, were there no other dif-
ficulties. As we have all along stated, secret agents and
partizans of the Apostolicals have long been scat-
tered throughout the Portuguese provinces, and we are
ready to confess, that no political scheme was ever got
up in a more efficient .manner than the present one.
Wherever these emissaries can collect a party, they will
try to create a commotion, conformably to the instruc-
tions they have received, and on some isolated points
they may for a while succeed; but this could not be
the case at Almeida, for -the reasons above stated.
Almeida, the French tell us on this occasion; " is a
place of the. greatest importancein Portugal." If it was
in the situation it once stood, certainly it would be, if
Portugal wished to defend her frontiers against Spain;
but it must not be forgotten, that the works at Almeida
were blown up by accident, previous to its falling into
the hands of Massena, and have not been rebuilt.—Du-
mouriez says, " that Almeida (as. it formerly stood) may
waste a whole campaign; and when taken, will be of little
use, by reason of its distance from the centre of operations ;
meanwhile, the enemy may take post in the defiles and
gorges of Beira, entrench themselves in the fine camp of
Guarda, and ward oft' from Lisbon the blows of war,
against which, in fact, they ought principally to be directed.
1 even affirm, that were all the provinces to fall into the
hands of an invader, if Lisbon and Oporto he not reduced,
the aspect of the war would not be more changed, as far
as regards a negotiation for peace, than if nothing had
been done. lam therefore, confident that the surrender
of Almeida really retarded, instead of promoting, the pro-
gress of the ware," He then adds, " after taking Almeida,
an army advances into Beira, and there meets with the
Sierra d'Estrella, forming a tremendous barrier before the
capital." If then, the Royalists had taken Almeida, the
advantage would not be so great, if their object was to
push into the interior. It only contains about 1000 inha-
bitants, independent of the garrison.—Morninu Chronicle.

they were