The Sun.
London, England, 1845-01-28 00:00:00

LAW INTELLIGENCE

COURT OF CHANCERY, Jax. 27.

DALTON V. HATTER.

The Court was engaged during the morning in hear-
ing this case, which came before it in the form of a
motion, upon a point of practice.

COURT OI QUEEN'S BENCH, Jan. 27.
(Sittings in Banco.)
THE BARON DE BODE V. THE QUEEN.
It will be recollected that in this long-protracted case
a verdict was given some time ago. There were three
issues, and the jury found for the suppliant on the first
issue, and for the Crown on the other two. Mr. Hill
then moved for and obtained a rule nisi, calling upon
the Attorney-General to show cause why judgment
should not be given for the suppliant, notwithstanding
that the jury found for the Crown on the other two
issues. The Solicitor-General also obtained a rule nisi,
calling upon the suppliant to show cause why judgment
should not be given for the Crown, notwithstanding
that the jury found for the suppliant on the first issue.
This being the state of the case,
The SOLICITOR. GENERAL now moved to make his
rule absolute.
Mr. Ilzu. said that the Solicitor-General had shown
no grounds to the Court for his rule when he moved for
it. He did not, therefore, know what objections he had
to contend against, and in such circumstances he thought
it hard to be called on to proceed till he had heard the
objections of the Solicitor-General to the rule which he
(Mr. Hill) had obtained.
Lord DENMAN said that the Court had no choice. The
Solicitor-General had obtained a rule, and it was the
usual course of proceeding to make that rule absolute,
unless cause against it were shown on the other side.
Mr. Iltu. complained of being called on to argue in
the dark and to start imaginary objections, which might
or might not be used on the other side, and then to
combat them. It had been said that a petition of right
would not lie in this case, but the Chancellor in giving
his judgment upon this case when the Attorney-General
opposed the motion for the petition, said it was due
ex debito justicise. Why did not the Crown
take this objection in 1839. It was mon-
strous on the part of the Crown to say
that a petition of right would not lie now, after the un-
happy suppliant had been put to all the expense of tra-
versing the inquisition. It bad been said that a petition
of right would not lie except for land ; but that objec-
tion had been disposed of ilt) long ago as the reign of
Henry VI. Would it be said that a petition of right
would not lie for unliquidated damages ? It was laid
down by the old law writers that a petition of right
would be given in all suits against the Crown. What
remedy was there for the Baron de Bode, if
it was not that of the petition of right ?
There was no right without a remedy. In the case of
Ashley and White, Lord Ilolt said it was monstrous to
say that there was a right, and that there was no remedy.
It was not alleged on the other side that there was any
other remedy, and he was entitled to assume that the
petition of right was the proper remedy till the contrary
was shown on the other side. The Learned Gentleman
cited authority to show that a petition of right would lie
against the Crown for work and labour done for the
Crown, for money lent or goods supplied to the King.
He apprehended then it could not be maintained that a
petition of right would not lie for unliquidated damages.
He would next ask, was there anything in this particu-
lar case to preclude the suppliant front his petition of
right. By the treaty of 1814, between France and Eng-
land, compensation was given in respect of property
belonging to British subk cts, which had been unduly
confiscated during the Revolution. It was found by the
jury that the Baron was a British subject, that his pro-
perty was confiscated, and that he made his
claim within the proper time. The French Government
had acted in the fairest and most honourable manner. It
did its duty—nay, more than its duty, for they offered a
million of money more than the Duke of Wellington, who,
on the part of the British Government, inspected the ac-
counts, thought they ought to receive. There was a
surplus remaining in the hands of the Treasury after
the other claimants had been satisfied, and he was
entitled to say that this surplus belonged to the
suppliant. But, if it were not his, it could not, at
all events, belong to the British Government :
they received it upon trust, and if he claimants were
all satisfied, the surplus clearly ought to be handed over
to the French Government. It was allowed that the
claim of the Baron de Bode was not satisfied, and that
there remained a surplus of the money given by the
French Government, lying in the British treasury. He
had, therefore, a right to say that this was money had
been received for the 11S3 of the Baron de Bode. The
Learned Gentleman went on to meet the objections that
might arise from the construction of the 59th of Geo.
111., and from the decision come to by the Commis-
sinners ; and, also, from the construction of the treaty
of 1814.
The cas was not finished NS hen the Court rose.

BAIL COUR7', Jan. 27.
(Sittings in Banco.)
BOOKER V. TIBBOCK.

Mr. KNOWLES moved for a rule to show cause why an
attachment issued against the plaintiff, and obtained by
his Learned Friend Mr. Cowling, on a former day, shGuld
not be set aside. The circumstances of the case might
be easily explained. The affidavit stated that an order
was made by the Court of Assizes, held at Liverpool,
with consent of all the parties interested on either side,
ruling that certain letters patent should be assigned to
the plaintiff, and that he should pay over to the defendant
the sum of 100/. as expenses. The time for paying such
sum was not imperative, and therefore he (Mr. Knowles)
contended that the assignment of the letters patent (the
first ground of the action) should have been made to the
plaintiff, ere the expenses of the case were paid to the
defendant. His friend Mr. Cowling did not once
attempt to say that this had been done, and had he
(Mr. Knowles) been allowed by the Court to file certain
affidavits in the case, he should have been able to prove
affirmatively that, which was almost negatively admitted
on the other side. He hoped, therefore, that on a mere
principle of equity the attachment should be set aside.
Mr. COWLING contended that nothing in the order
warranted the inference sought to be established, that
the act of assignment should precede the paying of the
expenses, and he trusted, therefore, that his Learned
Friend's application would be dismissed.
Mr. Justice WIOUTMAN said the attachment was not
returnable for a fortnight, and as the order seemed to
infer that the payment of the 100/. should be immediate,
the Court would merely suspend it for that time.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER, Jan. 27.
(Sittings in Banco.)
WADE V. SIMEON.
•
The application this case was reported in The Sun
of Saturday, and judgment was postponed until this
morning. On taking his seat on the bench
The LORD CHIEF BARON said—ln the case of Wade
against Simeon we have looked into the affidavits, and it
appears to us that there can be no doubt of the autho-
rity and jurisdiction of the Court extending to a case of
this nature. The case of Blight v. Brewer, 3d Dowling's
Reports, page 266, which was cited as an authority on
Saturday, was a case where there had been judgment
and execution; and the Court, therefore, had no occa-
sion to interfere in order to enforce the cognovit between
the parties. We think there can be no doubt that in
any stage of the proceedings, so long as there remains
any necessity for an appeal to the authority of the Court,
or any occasion to call for the exercise of its jurisdiction,
the Court has an undoubted right to interfere, and it is
its duty to interfere if it perceive that the process juris-
diction of the Court is about to be used for purposes
which are not consistent with justice. Here no judg-
ment has been signed, and it cannot be signed except
under the authority and sanction of the Court. The
question really is, therefore, whether this case is anala-
gous to instances where there has been a consent as to
an intervening step, or a verdict of the jury in invitum,
or whether it is to be treated like the case of an arbitra-
tion or a judgment and execution executed. It appears
to us that it is not like the case of an arbitration, because
there the question is, by consent, removed to
another forum ; and as soon as it has been
agreed that the cause shall be referred, it
immediately falls under all the rules and all the practice
in reference to awards, as to which tho Court will inter-
fere only in certain circumstances and under certain
limitations. Upon the first question, therefore, we are
clearly of opinion that the Court has jurisdiction—that
it has a duty to exercise with respect to the process to
be used in the ulterior stages of the cause. Upon the
merits of the case it is sufficient to say, we are of
opinion that there is a point which is fit to be submitted
to a jury. We think, therefore, that the rule ought to
be made absolute ; that the money should remain in
Court to abide the event ; that the plaintiff
should have judgment, if necessary, on the day
on a hich he would be entitled to sign judgment if this
application had not been made ; that the defendant
should pay the costs of the application, and continue to
pay the interest according to the agreement ; and that
the trial should proceed so as to put the plaintiff in the
same situation as he would have been in if this applica-
tion had not been made.
Mr. WATSON, as Counsel for the plaintiff, wished to
know if the Court would not provide for the case of either
of the parties dying before the trial of the action?
The LORD CHIEF BARON said, if either the plaintiff or
the defendant should die the action would proceed.—
Rule absolute.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, Jan. 17
(Sittings in Banco.)
DANIEL V. CAMPLIN.
. _

This was an appeal from Bristol against the decision
of the Revising Barrister, who had allowed the vote of
Mr. Camplin, an inhabitant of that city. The case was
part heard on Monday last.
Mr. Sergeant KISGLAKE having replied this morning
on behalf of the respondent,
The Lora) CHIEF JUSTICE said it appeared to him
that the decision of the Revising Barrister was right.
The objection taken to the vote of the claimant was that
in the lists made out by the overseer the nature of the
property, in respect of which the w
claim was made, as
improperly described. The words in the list were " Camp-
lin William, High-street, house and shop," and the objec-
tion was that the claim ought to have been for " a joint
occupation of house and shop." The objection was con
fined entirely to the list made out by the overseers. It
had been urged, that inasmuch as that Court had decided
that each successive set of premises must be mentioned
in the statement of qualification, it ought in this case to
have been stated whether the occupation was joint or
several. The ground, however, of the decision in ques-
tion was, that these successive occupations constituted,
in fact, the one subject matter of the claim ; whereas,
in the present case it was only to an incident attending
upon the claim that the objection applied. He thought,
therefore, that the claimant and the overseer had coin•
plied with the provisions of the Act in expressing the
qualification as they had done, and. that the name of
the claimant had been properly retained