The Sun.
London, England, 1844-05-27 00:00:00

that the traversers should be in attendance in the morning
and the arguments proceeded with at once.
Mr. HATCHELL said they only looked for their strict rights.
The Court rose at a quarter to eight o'clock.
SATURDAY, MAY 25.
At the sitting of the Court this morning Mr. Whiteside
applied to have certain amendments made in the postea, by
inserting thereon that the jury had been allowed to separate
from day to day during the trial, and also by altering the
words so as to be strictly in accordance with the findings of
the jury upon the several issues sent before them.
Justice,CnnAivrox asked what was the object of the motion.
Mr. WiirrEsinE said the object was to have the fact set
forth according to the truth, and so as to have it put in a
train for argument before another tribunal.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL objected to the 'motion, and re-
fen ed to the assent of Mr. Moore, Queen's Counsel, Counsel
for the traversers, as to the separation of the jury, and also
to the circumstance that the matter had been fully argued
on the new trial motion, when the Court had unanimously
decided the point against them. With respect to the amend-
ment of the record by an alteration on the postea as to the
findings of the jury, he contended that the course followed
by the Crown was strictly in accordance with the practice in
all the cases.
- Mr. CLOSE followed on behalf of the traversers. He had
no objection to any form of expression on the record which
would set forth the facts according to the truth; but he did
not wish to have placed there words which would hereafter
preclude his clients from having the question argued on a
writ of error. With respect to the consent said to have been
given by Mr. Moore to the separation of the jury, he under-
stood it to have been given after the Court had made the
order on the subject.
Justice PERRIN said that the consent was either a compact
or a fraud, and, if the former, no advantage should be after-
wards taken of the circumstance. _

Mr. FITZGIBBON said, that if a compact had been entered
into they would not wish to violate it, and for this reason he
would send for Mr. Moore to ascertain the fact. _

Mr. MOORE, Queen's Counsel, having come- into Court,
said, in reply to Judge Perrin, that his recollection of the
circumstance was, that the consent was entered into yith
the approval of the Counsel for the other traversera ; but
certainly was not so made with the intention of leading the
Crown into error.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL was about to reply; but
The CHIEF JUSTICE said the motion could not be granted
by the Court, without violating the contract entered into be-
tween the parties. As to altering the postea as it then stood,
with respect to the finding of the jury, they would not assist
the party—first, because of the lateness of the application ;
and, secondly, because the traversers had used it on the mo-
tion fur a new trial.

Justice CRAMPTON, having read from the report of the trial
what had occurred as to the separation of the jury, expressed
his concurrence in the opinion of the Lord Chief Justice.
Justice PERRIN thought there was no error on the postea
as to the finding of the jury, and as to that part of the mo-
tion respecting the separation of the jury, he understood it
to be withdrawn, because it must have been made under a
wrong impression of how the matter stood.
Sir C. O'LOGHLEN said he was as Counsel on behalf of the
traversers to move in arrest of judgment, and, not anticipa-
ting that the motion for amending the posted could be con-
cluded at that hour (two o'clock), he was not at that moment
prepared to go on with his argument, but would respectfully
ask a postponement until Monday.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL objected to any further delay,
in a proceeding which had already occupied so much of the
public time.

The CHIEF JUSTICE asked—Would there be any objection
to furnish the Crown with the points intended to be re-
lied on ?

Sir C. O'LocumEN said the traversers did not intend to rely
on any matter already argued.
The CHIEF JUSTICE.—The Court would not permit them
to do so.

Sir C. O'Loommx.—The objections would arise in the shape
of a general demurrer fo the indictment.

The ArronxEy-GExEnAL protested against being con-
sidered a party to any further postponement in the argument
on an indictment found so far back as the month of Novem-
ber last. If the counsel for the trarersers did not go on till
Monday, it would be difficult for hi.i Learned Friend, the So-
licitor-General, in the hurry of sending for books of reference
to the library, to see the bearings of the authorities quoted
at the other side.
After a further discussion between counsel.

Sir C. O'LOGHLEN said the objections he intended to urge
were these—first, a technical one as to the caption of the in-
dictment; secondly, that the first five counts were bad for
duplicity; and, thirdly, that all the counts were too general
and vague. He would undertake to furnish the Crown in
the course of the evening with a list of the authorities in sup-
poi t of his views, reserving to himself the right of adding any
which, before Monday, he might become acquainted with.
But all he was then in possession of should be stated in the list.
This arrangement having been assented to, the Court
shortly afterwards adjourned. '

SPIRIT of the PUBLIC JOURNALS.

FROM THE MORNING PAPERS OF THIS DAY.
TIMES.—We long ago informed our readers of the proba-
bility that Judge Crampton and one of his brethren would
prove inclined to allow a new trial in the case of the Rev. Mr.
Tierney. Such turns out to be the case. The speech which
was the only evidence of conspiracy against that traverser,
" was one," said Judge Perrin, "no doubt of a highly repre-
hensible character; it was rash, and such as ought not to have
been expected from a gentleman of his profession and calling."
" It was," said Judge Crampton, " what he should say was a
seditious speech—it was of a very violent and inflammatory
nature, and proved that he was aware of the effects produced
by the monster meetings—effects likely to excite to hatred in
the great mass of the people against those whom he called
the Saxon race ;" but both agreed in considering the evi-
dence of conspiracy as insufficient. If a nolle prosequi were
entered as to him, Judge Crampton was prepared to
refuse the motion for a new trial ; but if that were not done,
he would, he said, at the risk of any public inconvenience, do
justice to the individual, and grant him a new trial, though
it should have the effect of awarding a new trial to all. The
only other exception to unanimity regarded a more impor-
tant culprit. Judge Perrin alone was prepared to grant a
new trial to the monster-agitator himself, Mr. O'Connell.
His grounds are not very satisfactory to the unprofessional eyes
of those who have a bias in favour of what are called
the merits of the case. Judge Perrin had no doubt
whatever of Mr. O'Connell's criminality. He had no doubt
that the verdict was right both in fact and law—in
the facts which it decided, and in the law upon
which it was based. So far all is natural and conceive-
able. We often have the most entire moral conviction of the
guilt of a prisoner, upon evidence which is yet insufficient to
support an adverse verdict. But Judge Perrin had farther
made up his mind that there was plenty of proof—plenty of
legitimate, admissible, conclusive proof—against the chief
conspirator. "He thought there was ample evidence, inde-
pendent of the objectionable parts, to warrant and sustain the
verdict." But then came the difficulty. Though there was
a sufficiency of good evidence laid before the jury, yet with
it there was some bad—some at least 'which, though good
for one purpose, was yet bad for another,, to which the jury
might have applied it, or might be thought to have been en-
couraged to apply it. And as the jury (though they
had plenty of good evidence before them) might, per-
haps, have based their verdict on this fraction of
bad, Judge Perrin was for giving Mr. O'Connell a fresh
start. And now, finally, what is the supposable pare-
logism—what is this illegitimate reasoning of which the mere
possibility is to be held sufficient to quash a confessedly
honest and right verdict? The judge apprehends that the
jury
smay have concluded that certain seditious speeches
were spoken by Mr. O'Connell, because they were reported
as his in his own papers the Nation and the Freeman, and
because in his presence and out of his presence they were re-
ferred to by counsel on both sides of the question as his, and
neither he nor anybody else dreamt upon the trial of
questioning either the fact that they were his or the evidence
of their being so. It is certainly, therefore, not inconceivable
that they may have drawn such a conclusion, unless they
were very specially indeed cautioned against it. Nor should
we presume to meddle with the legal conclusion which might
be authoritatively deduced from that possibility. Law we
know is law, and laymen must keep their fingers off' it if
they would not burn them. But, as friends of common sense,
we heartily rejoice that for once law and reason run together,
and that the Court does not insist upon our swallowing
Judge Perrin's most indigestible deduction. That a verdict
should be set aside because in the course of the trial certain
notorious facts not necessary for its support had been at-
tempted to be proved by evidence of the most conclusive
kind, but not applicable, in the eve of the law, to that exact
purpose, is a proposition which, if it were law, would inspire
some distaste for English jurisprudence. We are happy to be
relieved from the painful obligation of so considering it. On
the case of Mr. Tierney, then, the Court is equally divided.
On that of Mr. O'Connell they refuse a new trial, dissen-
tiente Perrin. On all the rest the Judges are unanimous.
The legal result is (as an equal division affirms what has
gone on before), that the traversers' motion is rejected
in toto. We hear, however, that by
.the time the Chief
Justice had finished delivering his opinion, a new motion in
arrest of judgment was announced; that this, however, is
likely to be speedily disposed of, and that judgment may be
expected in the course of the present week. We think all this
intrinsically probable. The experience of the past trial leads
us to suppose that they cannot possibly have much more
to say for themselves, but that, if they have anything what-
ever, they will most certainly say it. They had, indeed, the
grace to strike off from their late list of objections, or at least
to omit to argue some, of which Judge Crampton observes,
that " they were of such a nature as he had never heard of
before, and of which, for the credit of the Court and its
practitioners, he trusted he might never hear again."
But those which remained to be disposed of were not all
of a very creditable cast. Let us look at a few of the
answers given to them by the judge most friendly to
the traversers. In answer to the second objection,
what Judge Perrin "principally rested on was, that Mr.
Rigby was sworn (as juror) with the express assent and con-
sent, and in some degree at the united instance and desire, of the
counsel on both sides, and with a full knowledge of the facts."
In answer to the third, he observed, that when the extension
of the trial (now objected to) was formally applied for, " the
attention of the defendants' counsel was invited to it, and
they declined to argue the subject or object." In answer to the
fourth, "he rested upon the deliberate assent and continued
acquiescence of the traversers and their counsel throughout the
trial, and making no objection till after the verdict was
found." There cannot be much more to be said when ob-
jections are raised capable of being met by such answers as
these. It is like beginning to pay in sixpences. Desperate
as they may be, they must be near the end of their cash in
hand ; and we may fairly indulge some hope that rumour is
not far wrong, and that this wearisome affair will reach what
is at least something like a conclusion about Tuesday next.
CHRONICLE.—Most of the grounds upon which the ap-
plication was placed are of a nature which renders them
unfit for discussion in the columns of a newspaper. There is
amongst them, .however, one, the merits of which may, as
we think, be justly appreciated by any person of ordinary
capacity, and as that one formed the most prominent subject of
the judicial difference,and as it related to the case of the principal
defendant, and constituted the principal ground upon which
he relied for the success of his application, we shall take the
liberty of making a few observations upon the subject. In
the course of the trial, and for the purpose of proving that
Mr. O'Connell upon certain occasions attended certain meet-
ings, and gave utterance to certain opinions, copies were put
in of the Dublin Pilot and of the Freeman's Journal, contain-
ing what professed to be statements of the attendance of
Mr. O'Connell at these meetings, and reports of the speeches
which he was said to have there delivered. No other evi-
dence whatever was given, either of the speeches or attend-
ances, except the mere production of the newspapers them-
selves, and the question as to this point upon the motion was,
whether these newspapers had been properly received as
evidence of the truth of the statements therein contained,
of Mr. O'Connell's having attended the meetings, and given
utterance to the sentiments in question. If Mr. O'Connell
had been the sole defendant upon the trial, and was there
upon a direct and substantive charge of having spoken the
speeches and attended the meetings in the manner which the
newspapers professed to record, no person having the slightest
acquaintance with subjects of that nature could be so igno-
rant as to think that the charge could be proved by the
production of the papers; and no counsel in the empirewould
so affront the good sense of any judge as to tender such do-
cuments for such a purpose. It was, however, contended, in
the present case, " upon the other side," that as the papers
in question were published by Barrett and Gray, who were
themselves upon their trial for haying conspired with Ur.