The Sun.
London, England, 1844-09-05 00:00:00

f counts. This eleventh count, in fact, describes a
' crime which could receive no aggravation whatever
I from the most complete finding of the other ten.
To even mention it would, of course, be fatal to
the whole of our Contemporary's argument, which
goes upon the hypothesis suggested, we regret to
say, by Mr. Baron Parke, that the several counts of
the indictment charge either separate offences, or at
least the partes integrantes of one offence, or more;
and by consequence, that the judgment pro-
nounced upon the convicted culprit must be
taken as compounded of modicums of pu-
nishment proportioned to the guilt imputed by
the counts severally. Now, with all respect for the
Morning Chronicle and Mr. Paron Parke, we contend
that this hypothesis is wholly untenable. The
counts of an indictment do not charge different
offences, or partes integrantes of one offence or more.
Each count is a substantive indictment per se, and
whatever their number, these counts all
charge but one and the same offence—
they charge that offence in different aspects,
and in varied terms, in order to meet all the possi-
ble chances of a trial. A different hypothesis leads
to the absurdity of supposing that when
a grand jury presents an indictment containing
several counts, twenty-three • gentlemen upon their
oaths falsely assert that several offences have
been committed, where, in fact, there has been but
one ; and it may be worthy of Baron Parke's con-
sideration to get out of this difficulty, and to reflect
whether the intervention of the grand jury does not
wholly destroy his fanciful analogy between civil
and criminal cases in this respect. But if the
counts of an indictment are, as the truth is,
but multiplied descriptions of one and the same
offence, it is obvious that the punishment due to the
offence is neither augmented nor diminished by the
number of these descriptions that may be found de-
fective or sufficient, accurate or inaccurate. It is
precisely the same thing whether a party be convicted
upon one sufficient and accurate description or upon
y
fift.

I AW INTELLIGENCE.
LOUSE OF LORDS, Sept. 4.
APPEALS.

After the decision of the case of " O'Connell v. tl:e
Queen (in et ror)" yesterday, Lord BROUGHAM proceedL d
L) give judgment in that of

BYRON V. COOPER,
in which the only question was, whether the rector of a
pathh in Lincolnshire was entitled to receive his tithe in
kind, or bound by the existence of an alleged modus.
The Court of Exchequer, from which the appeal was
brought, had decided against the modus. The House of
Lords now reversed the decree as to some of the lands
in question, reserving to the clergyman, if he thought
proper, the power of having an issue directed from the
court below, as to whether the remaining lands were
subject to the modus or not.

DRUMMOND V. MAUN.
The LORD CHANCELLOR moved that the judgment of
the court below should be affirmed with costs.

CREED V. CREED.
In this case a decree of Lord Chancellor Sugden had
been appealed against, the question being whether some
annuities charged upon real estate had or had not
priority over other legacies charged on the personal
estate. The Lord Chancellor had held that the an-
nuities were entitled to priority.
On the motion of Lord COTTENRAM the decree was
reversed.

TAYLOR V. CLEMSON.

This was a question as to a tenantcy of land under
the Manchester Railway Act.
Lord BROUGHAM, and Lord COTTENHAM were of
opinion that the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber
must be for the defendant in error with costs.

MURRAY V. MURRAY.

This was a question upon a private Act of Par.

The judgments of Lord BROUGHAM, Lord COTTEN-
IIAM, and Lord CAMPBELL were that the interlocutors
of the court below must be affirmed with costs.

STIRLING V. ]iii ART.

Lord BROUGHAM, Lord COTTENFIAM, and Lord CAMP
BELL gave judgment in this case, affirming the judgment
of the court below with costs.
KNIGHT V. BOUGHTON, BART.

This was a question upon the provisions of a will.
The Loan CHANCELLOR moved that the decree be
affirmed without costs.

Lords Brougham, Cottenham, and Campbell concurred.
STOCKTON AND DARLINGTON RAILWAY V. BARRATT.

The LORD CHANCELLOR delivered the judgment of
the court in this case, in which the question was, whether
the railway company could demand the higher or lesser
duty upon coals exported or shipped from Stockton-
upon-Tees. His Lordship moved that the judgment for
the defendant in error in the court below should be
affirmed with costs.