The Sun.
London, England, 1844-01-20 00:00:00

The reason is that Colonel Pottinger doubted the
possibility of effecting the crossing of the troops there.

-P. 87.

_ .
" I feel his Lordship must be fatigued with the perusal
of the bare-faced falsehoods, and unblulhing assertions
of firm and devoted frindship,' in which Noor Mahomt d

Khan persists, with a d.:gree of pertinacity such as is
quite wonderful."—P. 87.
" To all these observations the moonshecs replied at
great length, by pointing out the innumerable and con-
current proofs of his (Noor's) unfriendiiness and actual
_ _

treachery."—P. 88.
" On this subject (the strength of the subsidiary
force) I have bestowed a good deal of reflection since the
receipt of your letter o; the 29th ultimo, and I am of
opinion that we should demand from the Ameers of
Sinde, the cession of all the country, lying on the right
bank of the Indus, south of an imaginary line, to be
drawn due west from that river, at a point ten miles
(more or less) north of Tatta, until it meets the frontiers
of Beloochistan, at the base of the mountains. This would
give us a compact territory, the complete command of
the river,. and possession of the only sea port. At a very

rough estimate, I calculate that the cession I have in-
dicated, would yield at first, a revenue of from four to
five lacs of rupees, but it is one that would rapidly im-
prove under our rule, and, in a few years, I see no reason
to doubt that Tatta would spring into much of its former
opuleuce, and become a vast emporium of trade and
wealth." He then states the advantages of this plan to
the Government and to the country itself and proceeds
thus—" My plan therefore would be, to have a regiment
of Native Infantry and a company of Artillery at Kura-
dice, and all the rest of the troops at Tatta, where there
is an admirable site on the Muskalla hills (west of the
city) for a cantonment. I shall also propose that a
strong detachment of Bengal troops (equal perhaps to
the Kurachee one) should be kept at Sukkur on the
Indus, to which I suppose the Khyrpore Chiefs will
gladly give their assent. With these troops and British
agents residing at Hyderabad and Khyrpore, I look en
it that our perfect supremacy throughout Sinde, will be
as fully established as though we had entirely subjugated
it—a measure which, for the reasons recorded in some
of my former dispatches,.l could by no means recommend
to his Lordship."—P 89.
" I wrote them" (letters to the Governor-General)
" under the impression which I still entertain, that it
is the intention of the Govern w-General that the force
which I expect shortly, under the personal command of
the Commander-in-Chief, shall compet the Ameers into
acquiescence with whatever terms are to be prescribed to
them, and after that is done, the troops enumerated in
my first letter, above alluded to, will, I conceive, be
ample to uphold our supremacy under all possible con-
tingencies."—P. 90.
" And that I was astonished after these proofs of his
(Noor's) continued treachery and want of reliance in,
or friendship for me, he ventured to ask my advice or
opinion on any subject whatever."—P. 95.
In alluding to a letter from Noor, to one of his offi-
cers at Shikarpore, supposed to relate to secret corres-
pondence of a hostile kind, Colonel Pottinger says :
° I think it very possible, if not probable, that the ori-
ginal urecza to Mahon-led Shah of Persia, may be
amongst the expected letters, and at all events these will
doubtless be communications of a most secret nature
from the Candahar chiefs. I need not therefore point
out to you the great importance of getting hold of them."
—P. 96.
" On the 4th inst. I obtained positive information that
the surmise which I made in my letter of the 28th ult.
to Major-General Willshire and Lieut. Eastwick, of
Noor Mahomed Khan having secretly ordered no one to
serve us, was strictly correct."—P. 99.
Alluding to Noor having granted authority for the
hire of camels, &c., and then privately prohibiting it,
Colonel Pottinger says—" I considered this to be a case
of gross perfidy, such as was susceptible neither of expla-
nation nor palliation ;" and he sends to tell Noor so, and
to add, that "if the camels were not speedily forthcoming,
I should suggest to his Excellency Sir John Keane to
send a detachment and take possession of Kurachee."—
P. 99.
" I am sorry to report that the de'neanour of Meer
Shere Mahomed, of Meerpore, has been of late equally
insulting and unfriendly." He then states cases of wrong
done by Shure Mahomed and his officers, and says that
" there can be no doubt, however, that our credit and
character throughout Sinde will suffer by such indigni-
ties being winked at even for a time."—P. 101.
" My intelligence from Hyderabad, up to the 13th inst.,
leads me to believe that the Ameers there, excepting
Sobdar, are now really exerting themselves to obtain
carriage for the army, as the only means that offers of
getting rid of it. At the same time they are adopting
all sorts of precautions, which evince a total distrust of
our design, and have already assembled a considerable
body of their rabble of troops at the capital. They have
also written to all the chiefs, whether Beloochecs or not,
to be in readiness with their quotas, in case of neces-
sity."—P. 101.
Speaking of Noor's abject state of alarm, Colonel
Pottinger says—" But even when labouring under his
worst apprehensions, it will be observed that no such
idea has apparently ever crossed his mind, as that our
ultimate plan was to station even a company of Sepoys
in Sinde, and the moment that intention is announced,
I think it will be the signal for a cordial coalition to
oppose our arrangements. Although Sobdar has
stood neutral in all the angry negotiations, and
has announced his determination to do so ; that de-
claration has invariably been accompanied by the proviso
that he is not to be disturbed in his present possessions.
Neither he nor any other of the Ameers has expressed
a heartfelt sentiment that bespeaks his or their admis-
sion of the justice and necessity of the cause in which we
have embarked ; and it is to me obvious that their sole
object is to save themselves by doing as little as possible
to further our views. Nor do I believe that any one of
them, or the whole collectively, would willingly give
10,000 rupees at this instant, to see the Goveraor-
General's measures perfected to the fullest extent of his
Lordship's desires."—P. 101.
" Even had I authority to offer them our guarantee of
their territories individually, without paying one farthing
for it, but stipulating that we were at our own expense
to keep a force in this province, I think they would re-
ject our proposal ; and, therefore, to expect that they
will, without coercion, consent to make the smallest pecu-
niary sacrifice, or to agree to our having a single regi-
ment in their country, seems to me to be hopeless. They
have acted all along, and are now doing so, as though we
had put their friendship and forbearance to the last test, by
requiring.a passage for our troops through their country ;
and their recent anxiety to get me to fix the sum they are
to pay the Shah, does not, I am satisfied, spring from
the serve they entertain of our friendly interposition.
but from a dread that his Majesty will, before he ad-
rances from Shikarpore, compel them too terms less rea-
sonable than we should prescribe. I am quite convinced
that were they sure the King would quit Scinde without
enforcing any demand, they would run all future risks,
rather than come down with one rupee, and that it is the
present pressure alone which weighs with them."—
P. 102.
In speaking. of the Ameers (including Sobdar), ad-
mitting the subsidiary force, as paying part of the ex-
pense, he says—" But I think my late dispatch will have
demonstrated to his Lordship that that is not the case,
and that if we ask for anything beyond what we have
done already, we must lay our aeceunts to have to exact
it. In saying this, I by no means intend it to be understood
that I believe the Ameers are inclined togo to war with us.
On the contrary, my belief is, that they are well aware of
our power and perseverance, and it is the dread of both
that has made them succumb even to the degree they
have done ; but we should make no demand of them,
especially at this period, that we are not resolved to en-
force ; and my former letter, particularly that of the
26th ultimo, to the Bombay Government, will have ex-
plained that I always have considered the force now
here, under Lieutenant-General Sir John Keane, to be
available for the settlement of Sinde."
He then states that the proposed subsidiary force alone
could not do that duty, &c.—P. 102.
" I am still more decidedly of opinion that the disclo-
sure of the Governor-General's plan regarding Sinde will
be highly ill-advised and premature, fur of course the news
will be forthwith conveyed to Hyderabad ; and if it does
not cause the Ameers themselves to break with us at once,
it will at least enable them to make preparations for the
best resistance in their power."—P. 103. •
" . . . He (Shere Mahes:ned) had already committed
direct acts of hostility and insult towards the British Go-
vernment."—P. 104.
" Since this letter was written, I had a further commu-
nication with Sir John Kean; and in consideration of
the dacide.lly hostile disposition of the Ameers," &c., he
advises the dispatch of troops from Bombay to Kurachee.
He then proceeds thus—" I have no doubt the Ameers
will consider these arrangements tantamount to a decla -
ration of war on our part ; but they have, I conceive, left
me no alternative."-I'. 104.
" It is my present intention to await the receipt of fur-
ther instructions from the Governor-General of India,
and should they not reach me becore I am required to
act, to do so on the principle laid down in my dispatch
of the 2:3d ultimo, with the view, under all circumstances,
of establishing our supremacy in Sinde. The Ameers
will have the option of avoiding war by acceding to our
demands; and if they refuse, I conceive we must settle
this province to our entire satisfaction, before we can
move into Attlianistan." He then further proposes that
the Company's rupees should be mites " a legal tender
throughout Sinde, and likewise that the Ameers shall
provide and make over to us 5,000 camels," &c. —P. 105.
" So far as it is possible to form an opinion on the in-
formation I now possess, my idea is, that we must settle
Sinde to our entire satisfaction, even should the Ameers
force us to subjugate it, before we look beyond it."—
P. 115.
" My dispatches, &c., subsequent to the 23d of No-
vember, will have shown the Governor-General that the
Ameers of Hyderabad are already resolved on not al-
lowing us to keep a force on any terms in this province,
and Ihave not the smallest doubt but the reserve force
will be opposed in its debarkation at Kurachee, even
should the news from Herat not cause the Ameers to
break with us before it arrives."—P. 115.
" Certain as I am of this resolution, I shall adhere to
my opinion (in which the Commander-in- Chief con-
curs), that it is my wisest course to refrain from making
any disclosure of his Lordship's instructions now before
me, in the hope that previous to this force advancing to
Hyderabad, I may receive others suited to present cir-
cumstances, which appears to me to dictate the neces-
sity of carrying our objects here at all ventures."—
Pp. 115, 116.
" You will tell the Ameers that Sinde forms a natural
and integral portion of Hindostan, that the supremacy of
that empire has devolved on us, and that we cannot, and
will not, allow any other Power to intermeddle ; that
it thence follows, that they have now no option left to
them of binding their interests irrevocably with ours,
and, that if they neglect the opportunity, they may
deeply repent it, when it is too late."—Pp. 119, 120.
" Their jealous and suspicious feelings will probably
induce their Highnesses to ask, supposing they agree to
our present terms, what security they have for our not
going further hereafter. The reply to this query, or
anything of the same tenor, is so obvious, that I need