The Sun.
London, England, 1844-10-26 00:00:00

SPIRIT of the PUBLIC JOURNALS.

FROM THE EVENING PAPERS OF YESTERDAY.
GLOBE.—Mr. O'Connell having given his sanc-
tion to the spinning for Irish account of a theory of
Government by a Federal Parliament, we may, no
doubt, look for a speedy completion of the w0rk......
Casting aside for the moment the particular ma-
chinery by which an Irishman and a repealer would
seek to relieve his country from her political
grievances, let us ask what, in few words, is the
object aimed at ? Is it not the making of some laws
concerning Ireland, or Irish affairs, which it is
found, or believed, that an Imperial Parliament can-
not or will not make—the doing of something in
the business of legislation which a Parliament com-
posed entirely of Irishmen it is hoped may do,
and which one composed of English, Irish, and
Scotchmen may not do ?—As we cannot conceive, in
any other form, an adequate motive for a reasonable
man seeking a repeal of the union, we will take the
affirmative for granted. The object, then is to legis-
late for the people of Ireland in particular, in some
way adverse to the interests, or opinions, or wishes of
the people of Great Britain,—or to do that by an
Irish Parliament which (whether just or unjust in
itself) would be done by a Parliament in which the
representatives of Great Britain had a voice. IVe
would not here be understood to offer any opinion
upon the measures which an Irish Parliament, look-
ing only to what it might hold to be the interests of the
Irish people, might think fit to adopt. It is sufficient for
our purpose that such measures, if of such a nature as
an Imperial Parliament would not have sanctioned, must
be considered as opposed to the views of the represen-
tatives of the people of Great Britain, and by conse-
quence to those of an assembly in which they should
form a decided majority. And indeed, if not, cui
bono ? What does Ireland gain by her native Par-
liament; or what does the empire gain by using three
Parliaments to do what might as well have been done
by one ? We are quite aware that the opposition of
the people of Great Britain to a measure desired by
the people of Ireland (always assuming the existence
of such a measure) may not be deemed in itself a just
reason why the measure should not be carried. But if,
while Great Britain and Ireland are united, such an
opposition is called into existence, and cannot be
evaded, it must be met; and if it cannot be over-
powered, it must be yielded to. That it does exist,
and has been exercised, are the only feasible grounds
we can conceive for the proposed change. In short,
we must deal with the principles of government as
we find them. With the fullest and fairest re-
presentation of every interest recognising a
common authority, we are driven to the
vote for a decision, and must always have
a discontented minority. This minority—the
weaker party—may endeavour to avoid the
conclusion it abhors by complicating the mode
by which it is to he arrived at ; and may even so far
succeed as to hide from itself the true result. So it
may he imagined that Ireland, by the expedient of
obtaining a special Parliament for the making of her
own laws, may have them made without, and even
in defiance of, the influence of the sister kingdom.
But this is only a variety of that species of sophistry
by which we are led to fancy that a thing is
changed in its nature by being removed one step
further from our apprehension. It is akin to
that Indian theory which supports the world on
an elephant, the elephant on a tortoise, and the
tortoise on something else which is not exactly de-
fined. With such a Parliament in Ireland as alone
would satisfy the cravings of the repeal party, a col-
lision between the two countries would be inevitable.
Let it be supposed that some such measure as we
have alluded to—marked by such an encroachment
upon British interests as should arouse the decided
opposition of the British people—were presented
for the royal assent. The Ministry of the
day would then, as now, it is presumed,
hold office by the confidence of the Imperial Par-
liament. The predominance of Great Britain over
Ireland in that assembly would be unaltered, and
would be heard in the advice of the Ministry to the
Sovereign. And how could it be otherwise ? Unless
we completely change the constitution of the Execu-
tive, the royal assent would still be given or withheld
under the influence of the responsible advisers of the
Crown. Assuming that it were withheld—and such
we may almost deem an inevitable consequence
of the supposed character of the measure, the
Irish Parliament would find itself opposed, nomi-
nally, to the Sovereign, but, in effect, to the
Executive and the Imperial Parliament. The
usual Parliamentary resource—a stoppage of the
supplies from Ireland—might follow. But what then ?
Uhe function of the Irish Legislature would be brought
to a standstill, and the supplies from Great Britain
remain unaffected. It would be idle to carry our spe-
culations further. The case we have put involves no
violent improbabilities; but, on the contrary, springs,
by the most direct inference, from the only grounds
upon which a repealer can be supposed to give to his
demand a reasonable aspect. If we refer to history, the
view we here take of the operation of the federal
principle is amply confirmed by experience. Of two
such States so united, the lesser has always been
compelled to submit to the greater, and has possessed
a Parliamentary constitution in theory and in name.
Even the history of the old Irish Parliament, defective
as it was in its constitution, is replete with evidence of
the utter uselessness of a local Parliament to that coun-
try, or any other similarly situated. Indeed, its defects
alone saved the empire from the risks which its exist-
ence in an efficient state must have constantly involved.
It was capable of being rendered subservient. Its
subservience, however, was costly to England—made
it wholly valueless to Ireland—and was never put to
so good a purpose as in aiding its final extinction. It
may serve to employ and amuse theorists, or to mis-
lead the masses who will reason upon the subject only
up to the limits marked for them, to raise a fal-
lacious distinction between the legislative functions of
the Sovereign and those of the Parliament; and
admitting division in the latter, appeal to the "gol-
den link" still furnished by the former for a saving
bond of union. But we need only to be reminded
of what is the actual position of the Sovereign in this
country, to perceive the weakness of such a link.
That reference to the " golden link"—(apparently a
favourite one with Mr. O'Connell)—has, indeed, a
fine loyal sound ; but it does not get rid of the diffi-
culty. It only shifts it one step further back. We
need scarcely repeat that the Sovereign is always
swayed by the predominating Parliamentary influence,
which has therefore, in effect, an absolute veto upon all
laws, whether made in Ireland or in England. We think
Mr. O'Connell touched the gist of the question of
Ireland's fair share of influence in the Legislature of
the empire (and of Ireland), when he objected to the
number of individuals she deputes to the Impe-
rial Parliament. Here, if at all, muQt Ireland be
strengthened. In obtaining a local Parliamen.t
she would either give up altogether, for a mere
name, the substantive power she ow
ha.so e
would find that, after all, the battle in ins -
cation of Irish rights must be fought, not in the
federal but in the Imperial Assembly ;
intentions
nd that the
extent 'to which she could effect the good
of the former would be exactly measured by the
actual weight of her influence in the latter. The real
complaint of Ireland, then, is, that the predominating
influence in the Legislature is adverse to the in-