The Sun.
London, England, 1821-05-21 00:00:00

who commanded the artillery ;, to Lieutenant Remon, of the
Engineers ; to Major Stannus, my Assistant Adjutant-Gene-
ral ; to Capt. Wilson, my Assistant Quarter-Master-General ;
to Lieutenant Wilkinson
•inji. Assistant Commissary-General,
who acted as my personal Staff; and to Lieutenant Marriott,
my personal Brigade-Major, whose numerous wounds however
put him HORS DE COMBAT at the first moment of the assault,
and now render him incapable of becoming the bearer of my
dispatches, but whom I most earnestly beg to recommend to
the notice of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as an
Officer of great merit, whose exceeding gallantry has on many
occasions brought him, to public notice.
I do myself the honour to forward a return of the killed and
wounded, and also a copy of my order issued on the occasion.
I have the honour to be, &c.

(SignJAIT L. STANHOPE, Lt.-Colonel.,
[The returns of-the killed and wounded we gave on Friday.]
Extract from a Dispatch from the Government of Bombay o
the Court of Directors •of the East India Company, _dated
Dn. 15, 180.
We have the honour of transmitting to your Honourable
Court, Copies of a Dispatch from the Political Agent at
Kiahma, confirming the intelligence we had previously re-
ceived of the.'failure of the expedition against the Arabs of
Alashkarah, in the Gulf of Persia.

Copy of a letter from Captain T. P. Thompson, of the 17th
Light Dragoons, to Francis Warden, Esq. Chief Secretary
to the Government of Bombay, dated Muscat, November
18, 1820.

SIR-I have to communicate the ill success of the attempt to
co-operate with his Highness the Imaum of Muscat, against the
Arabs Of the tribe of Beth Ben Ali, after appearances which
led to expect a different result.
In my last letter, I stated that the Messenger, sent Niith the
coinrnuracations directed by your letter of the Bth June, 1820,
had been cut to pieces, and that six companies of sepoys, with
eight pieces of artillery, had, in consequence, been conveyed to
uscat. '

The landing at Alashkarah, at this season of the year, as
described in the letter of Lieutenant Colinson, of the 29th of
September, already transmitted to Government, and confirmed
by other accounts, appeared to be really impracticable. In ad-
dition to this, it has been stated. by Lieutenant Collinson,
though not included in his letter above alluded to, that he saw
a force of five or six' hundred men collected behind the sand-
hills, from which it was apparent that the force of the enemy
would be nearly the same, whether it was encountered. at•
Alashkarah or at their residence in the interior. The landing
at Soor was secure, and the road to the principal residence of
the tribe lay through a line of country, in possession of the
Imaum, who had a town within three miles of the enem, to
which he had already been transmitting his preparations for an
attack. Under these circumstances, the chances appeared to
be more favourable for advancing against the hostile force from
Sour, backed by the power of the State of Muscat, than for
meeting the same force on the beach at Alashkarah, under the
disadvantages of a precarious disembarkation, without the con-
junction of the Imaum, and with exceedingly inferior results in
the event of success.
The detachment sailed from Muscat on the 22d of October,
and arrived at Soor on the 24th, where it was disembarked.
The Imaum's force had previously proceeded towards Soor by
land.
On the 25th of October information was received that the
Arabs had abandoned and set fire to Alashkarah, together with
14 of their boats, and had retired to their principal residence.
'The crews of the Imaum's vessels landed; and brought-off two
two boats and three guns, and destroyed such fortifications as
were left.

His Highness the Imaum, who had directed his force towards
Soor, for the purpose of marching against the principal resi-
dence of the tribe, in conjunction with the British detachment,
arrived there on the 26th, bringing with him one thousand
fighting men, besides men to draw the guns, 600 camels for the
use of the detachment, and 300 other cattle.
On the Ist of November the whole force marched from Soor,
carrying with it two six-pounders, two howitzers., and two iron
eighteen-pounders. The remaining two eighteen-pounders were,
left at Sour.

After considerable difficulties in transporting the guns, the
force entered the level province of Jahlaii on the sth of Nov.
On-the oth of November the whole force arrived at a town
belonging to his Highness, named Salad Beni Bon Hussan,
within three miles of Balad Beni Bon Ali; the residence of the
hostile tribe, without any loss, either by sickness or accident.
The evening before arriving at Beni Bon Hussan, a report
had been circulated that the enemy intended to attack the camp
in the night. On arriving at Beni Bon Hussan with the
Imaum, I directed the camp to be pitched in an entrenched po-
sition, consisting of a ditch flanked with towers, which inclu-
ded a space sufficient for a camp between it and the town, and
as the camp had begun to be pitched in the Oen plain before
our arrival, I caused it to be removed.

A summons was the same evening conveyed to the enemy
from his Highness, demanding the surrender of the persons
who had killed the Sheik of Rassal Hadd (the messenger men-
tioned in the former part of this letter), and of the fortifications
of the tribe, with their arms.

His Highness proposed that the summons should be sent in
the name of the Officer commanding the British troops ; but I
represented to him that it was desirable to avoid the appear-
ance of a double command, and that his Highness, as a Sove-
reign, must, of necessity, take the lead. At the same time 1
communicated the substance of some points which I was anxi-
ous to cause to be explained in the summons ; and he desired
me to give them in writing, and caused them to be inserted.
What I was thus anxious to insert was an explanation of the
motives which had induced the appearance of the British
troops, in conjunction with those of his Highness.' It briefly
stated, that the causes of the war, on the part of the Imaum,
were already known. That the causes of a war, on the part of
the British, were the piracies of the tribe by sea, their refusal
to answer whet remonstrated with, and their having killed the
messenger ; that the causes on the part of the two Powers were
distinct and separate ; but that, each having cause, their forces
were united.

The messenger returned on the same night, and brought for
answer, from the hostile Sheiks, that the first messenger had
been killed without any orders from themselves, and that they
were ready to give up the persons concerned: that they had no
desire to be at war with the British : that they were willing to
surrender their fortifications ; but that they could not surrender
their arms, because the Imaurn would, in that case, give them
up as prisoners to the British.
'Under these'circumstances, I felt considerable expectation
that the terms I had demanded would be finally complied with.
At the same time it appeared that the way to promote this
effect, would not be by exhibiting any thing like an anxiety to
come to terms. On his Highness' therefore, asking my opinion,
I told him that I thought it would be bcst to proceed, without
delay. before the place, with which he entirely coincided,
and• directions were issued for marching on the • following
morning.
In concurrence with the opinion of his Highness, I directed
that the heavy guns should be left in the entrenched camp,
which, for the present, was to be considered as the depot : that
such stores only should be taken forward as the officers at the
heads of departments should judge necessary for present use ;
that the tents should be left standing in the entrenched camp,
-with the exception of such as might,be desired by the Medical
Department, and of a laboratory_ tent for the artillery: and that
men should be warned to take with them the tools which they
used for cutting wood, in addition to such as might be furnished
by the departments for the purpose of sheltering themselves
from the sun. •

The Imaum's fbrces, and the people of Beni Bon Hussan,
were, of course, perfectly acquainted with the position of the
enemy's town. The representation given was that it was placed
with its back to a deep date grove, which lay between it and
Beth Bon Hussan : that, it was, consequently, necessary to go
round the toWn, in order to come at the assailable front, and
that this front was in a sand plain, and protected by one ormore
diches cut in the sand, to which the enemy was, said to be
making additions. _ _ _

On 'ihe evening of our arrival at Beni Bon Hussan, I
communicated to the officers all the information I had received
respecting the place; and I further stated to them, that it was
my wish not to seek any contest with the enemy till he had ar-
rived at our position round the town ; that the artillery appear-
ed to be the point in which our superiority was most decided;
and that our object should be to get it into its position with as
little contest as the enemy would permit.
The Imaum left a portion of his troops in his camp in the
plain on the outside of the entrenched position of the British.—
The four light guns were manned with all the Arabs who had
drawn the six, who also carried their arms. The Imaum's
force had accumulated on the road, and the number which
marched that morning has been stated by his Highness at
2,000. The number of sepoys amounted to three hundred and
twenty, exclusive of the old picquet of sixty men, which was
ordered to follow the stores for present use, and to bring up the
rear. The number of the enemy, from repeated and varied in-
quiries, amounted to nine hundred, and there were said to be
eight guns, of small calibre, in the place.
The artillery were directed to have their limbers completed
with ammunition ; and I made a point of ascertaining, by per-
sonal inquiry, that a proportion of case-shot for the howitzers,
and of spherical case, for the six-pounders, made part of the
stores conveyed from Soor, and were actually present in the
limbers. •

On leaving Beni Bon Hussan, the light company of the Ist
battalion of the 2d regiment was directed to take the lead in
extended order. In the event of meeting an enemy, it was di-
rected to retire as most convenient, and to form behind the line
in reserve. The new picquet of 60 men preceded the head of
the column by a short distance, and was, directed to support the

light company, if required. Two guns were at the head of the
column, after the.pcquet, and two followed.
Soon after leaving Balad Beni Bon Hussan, the Imaum in-
formed me that the report of the morning was, that the enemy
had resolved on attacking the force, by day if they could,
and if not by night. Information on this was communicate,d to
the detachinent. who appeared to consider the appearance of the
enemy outside his works as a most desirable mode of bringing
the question to a decision,

'Alter proceeding abont a mile and a half, the column cleared
the jungle, and entered on an open country : with a view to
strengthen the line," the picquet in advance was directed 'to fall
in upon the head of the column, and, act as a company under
the command of its officer.

On issuing from the jungle, the Imaum's fcirce appeared on
the left, and. the Imaum with a few horse was seen riding for-
ward to reconnoitre. The date-grove at the back of the town at
the same time began to be distinguished on the right.
His Highness soon afterwards returned, and said, that the
road lay ftirther to the left. I requested him to select a guide,
and he fixed upon the Sheik of Hiskem, who accordingly pro-
ceeded. - The guide soon afterwards began to turn considerably
to his left, or from the enemy, and was followed by the column.
On proceeding further, a small number of the enemy on
horseback became discernible in the direction of the town. The
front towards the plain also began to open : some of the enemy
on foot were afterwards observed on a ridge on the outside of
the town, formed (es is usual in this country) of earth, thrown
out of the date-groves to arrive at a better sod. The force con,.
tinned to move in its former direction.

Observing that the dateLgrove extended in the direction of
the camp at Beni Bon Hussen, and afforded facilities 'for an
advance upon that place, and also that. the old picquet of 60men
had not appeared, I felt apprehensive that in case of any event
this party would be found neither at one place nor at the other,
and therefore dispatched a written order to the Officer to remanv
in camp till further directions, and if met by the order to return.
As'l was dispatching this order, an Officer rode to me, and
said the enemy were numerous on the ridge. Conceiving this
might be connected- with the reported intention to attack, di-
rected-the column to halt and form line. The lithium also
.drew up his fore.; in good order on the left. But no, appear-
ance of the enemy's moving being observed, the column pro-
ceeded towards its original object.
A short time after -the column was in motion, some shots
from the light infantry announced a movement among the
enemy, and the light infantry were seen retiring as had been
directed. The enemy soon appeared in motion on the top of
the ridge, and from the, direction which he took, it was evident
that his design was to turn the right by moving on a point be,
gond it. • _

I immediately directed the troops to form columns of sections
to the right, and pass as quickly as possible behind the guns,
the head of the column inclining towards the former rear, so as
to make the new front parallel to the enemy's attack, form line,
charge bayonets, and advance. The lait movement was un-
happily not executed by the troops. Seeing them hesitate, as
no time was to be lost, I ordered them to fire; and the line
opened its fire upon the enemy. The Imaum with great promp-
titude moved his force to the right to close the interval, and a
part of his men moved along the rear of the Sepoys engaged,
and opened a fire of matchlocks upon such of the enemy as
were again attemliting to come round the right. The enemy at
the same moment detached a part of his force towards the left
of the Sepoys, where they were met and vigorously encountered
by the Imaum.
On seeing the direction of the enemy's attack, I immediately
rdde off to lead the right, which was the point attacked. The
enemy continuing to press forward, I was unable to leave the
extremity of the right, lest the sepoys should misconstrue my
departure, and
.give way ; I therefore continued upon that
point, encouraging the sepoys to keep up their fire.
On observing the enemy within twenty yards, I again made
an effort to induce the sepoys to use their bayonets; but without
success ; and while I was doing this, the whole of the sepoys
turned together, and threw themselves on the Imaum's troops,
who were behind.

As soon as the sepoys gave way, I rode round them to endea-
vour to make them turn, and in doing this, I found myself in
the middle of the•lmaum's matchlocks, who were still keeping
up their firs towards the right. Finding no effect produced
there, I rode to the place where the sepoys appeared to be the
thickest, and endeavoured to make them turn round, A few of
them turned and fired their muskets into the air over the heads
of those that followed, and immediately resumed their flight ; I
also addressed myself to such of the officers as I met with, and
to sonic of the Europeans of the artillery, but without effect.
On perceiving the'lmaum at a distance, I rode towards him,
and found he had just been wounded. He had endeavoured to
rescue a European who was cut down, and one of the enemy
fired at him so close that the powder entered the wound ; the
ball passed through his right wrist. •
After the sepoys had given way, I saw the Arabs advancing
upon the whole front against the lmaum's army, and I then
saw thy 'manes force turn round and give way.
On afterwards comparing observations with his Highness, he
said that the enemy who attacked the right, appeared to him
to consist of about 450, which agrees with what I observed, and
that the,party detached from these towards the left, consisted
of about 150.

The enemy, as far as I observed, advanced only with the
sword till the sepoys gave way. But as soon 'as that happened,
his matchlocks were brought forward with -very fatal effect.
The pursuit was continued in the, direction of the camp of
Beni Ben Hussan inclining a little to the right or towards the
hills. Finding all efforts unavailing, on approaching the camp,
I made the Arabs who were outside throw themselves into the
intrenched camp, and called for the picquets. On finding them,
I directed_the officer of the pic,-piet_and an officer of artillery,
who had neither of them been in the action, to make prepara-
tions for defence, while I took out the picquet to the front. I
particularly recommended this duty to the latter officer, by say-
ing to him, " You are of the artillery ;" I at the same time di-
rected Mr. Sub-Assistant Surgeon-Fallon,- of the Honourable
Company's eruizer Prince of Wales, to take, the best means for
securing the sick.
On proceeding with sixty men of the picquet, I found myself
on the flank of the pursuit. As soon as the enemy observed us,
he advanced threatening with the sword, which was the first op-
portunity given for distinguishing him, and the piquet opened
its fire. The enemy then ceased to advance on the front of the
picquet, and began moving rapidly round the two flanks, with a
view to cut it off from the town, which made it necessary to re-
tire. The Jemadar of the picquet, Jemadar Rutten Sing, of
the Ist battalion 2d regiment, displayed great courage, and
would willingly have led the party into the middle of the
enemy. It is to be regretted that he had not an earlier oppor-
tunity for exertion.
On returning with the picquet to the camp,l found that Mr.
Sub-Assistant Surgeon Fallon had removed the sick and fol-
lowers into a fortified house, distributed ammunition and arms,
posted his people at their stations, and made the best prepara-
tions for defence. His Highness, the Imatun, was of opinion
that the -town might be maintained till reinforcements could
arrive, as the inhabitants had long been at war with the Beni
Bon Ali without being overpowered. In this opinion I was
anxious to support him. The Sepoys were distributed at the
towers,_ and the troops of his Highness kept in readiness to de-
fend the intrenchment; and I was exceedingly anxious to get the
remaining guns into some serviceable position,
.but was unable
to find either of the Officers formerly mentioned, or any of the
persons belonging to the artillery. The enemy' advanced upon'
the front during the night, and was received by a heavy fire from
the Sepoys, and by the Imaum's troops behind the intrench-
meats. Daringl this period, Mr. Sub-Assistant Surgeon Fallon
was exceedingly active in keeping. the Sepoys to their posts,
and supplying them with ammunition. In the morning it was
discovered that the two other Officers, instead of obeying the
directions,given them, had gone off on the preceding evening to
Spor, carrying with them every person belonging to the artil-
lery department.
Soon after daylight the Sepoys of the towers reported that the
people of the town had evacuated it during the night, and I
found it impossible to keep them -longer at teir posts. It was
also represented that the Imaum's followers were retiring. On
inquiring of his Highness, he appeared unwilling to admit it ;
but while 1 was with him a communication was brought from
a body of his followers to say they were retiring to their homes.
He replied calmly, "-tell them that those who will leave me,
must leave me ; ' but soon afterwards he communicated to
me that it would be impracticable for him _to maintain
himself in the town. His followers were diminishing, and
the town appeared to be almost totally deserted. The
Sheik of the town, with a few attendants, continued to stay
with the Imaum, and to ask his orders. The departure of
the officers with the artillerymen appeared to have removed
the last hope of holding out any prospect of assistance from the
detachment, either in maintaining the place or continuing ope-
rations against the enemy:
On the Iniaum's repeating his opinion that he could not main-
tain himself in the place, I asked him what he intended to do ;
he replied, "ifit is the will of God, we shall die." I told him
we must do that *hen there was nothing else left. He answered,
that he would do any thing which I should point out. I told
him we must destroy what could not be removed, and retreat.
I asked him what he could remove. He said he could remove
the sick, and give a camel for each of the Sepoys ; he after-
wards added that he could find camels for some musquet am-
munition.

As soon as the Imaum came to a decision, he appeared to be
anxious to put it into execution, and I felt apprehensive that if
it was delayed, he would be left without a guard. He desired
me to destroy the remaining guns and the powder. 'While he
gave directions to his people, an artilleryman, wounded in three
places, who had conic in during the night, fortunately • found
some spikes ; and Dr. Fallon, with the assistance of some pio-
neers, emptied the powder barrels into a well. The carriages
would.have been cut in pieces, but the departure of the artil-