The Sun.
London, England, 1844-11-20 00:00:00

a verdict of Wilful Murder against John Young, and
he was forthwith committed to take his trial.—
Abridged from the _Essex Herald of this day.

LAW INTELLIGENCE.
COURT OF CHANCERY._Noc•. 19.
The LORD.CHANCJILLOR sat to-day, shortly after
ten o'clock.
THE ATTORNEY-OW.SIMA'. V. POTTHR:
The LORD-CIIANCHLLOR gave judgment in this
case, which came before his Lordship some time since
on exceptions. His Lordship allowed the exceptions.

EX-PARTS VAN SAXDAU.
His LORDSHIP said that, in the case of Mr. Van
Sandau, which was before him on Saturday, he had
stated, after mentioning the several precedents that
bad been referred to, that he would not take upon
himself to decide that the order which had been pro-
nounced was valid, bemuse the subject was under
further inquiry in a court of law. Ilis Lordship had
also stated that his decision was final. Now he ought
further to have stated that the judgment he was
gibing was upon an ordinary petition, and not a
special case for the decision of the Court of Review.
His Lordship believed that, by the 37th section of
the Bankrupt Act, no judgment of the Court
of Review could be questioned in the House
of Lords except upon a special case. It was true he
might have sent the matter to the Vice- Chancellor,
in order that he might direct a special case for the
opinion of the Court, but he did not think it neces-
sary. He had mentioned this case in consequence of
Some misrepresentations that had gone forth : he had
said nothing disrespectful to the Learned Judge ;
that was the last thing he would do, because he had
for him the most special regard.
?HZ DUPE OF LEEDS V. EARL AMHERST—THE PIC-
TURE OF THE GREAT DUKE OF SCHOMBERG.
Mr. BETHELL replied at some length today in this
case, the facts of which we have already given.
The LORD CHANCELLOR postponed his judgment.

VICE-CHANCELLOR'S COURT, Nov. 19.
(Before Sir J. K. Baucm.)
CUMING V. THROWER.
The question in this case was the liability of 'a
trustee to make good certain sums which had been
dissipated by an alleged abuse of trust on the part of
his co-trustee. His Honour had, on a recent occa-
sion, given his judgment on the main point,
declaring the estate of the trustee, Thrower,
liable for all the sums dissipated by the
co-trustee, Bland. But with respect to two sums of
6001. and 8001. respectively he had had some hesita-
tien as to the order to be made, and on these two
sums his decision had been reserved.
His HoNoua now said that the estate of Thrower
must be liable for the re-payment of these two sums
also in addition to the rest.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, Nov. 19.
(Sittings in Banco.)
HOWARD V. GOSSETT.
The SOLICITOR-GENERAL resumed his argument
in this part-heard case, and contended that, even if
the Court should be against him on the points which
he had submitted on Friday, still they must give
judgment in favour of the defendant, inasmuch as the
defendant was acting merely ministerially in acting
upon that warrant, which, at all events, was a suffi-
cient authority for him, and therefore that the action
could not lie. He, therefore, submitted that upon
this demurrer the Court must give judgment in
favour of the defendant.
Mr. KELLY then replied, and contended, on the
authority of the King v. Elgee, that this Court could
look to the wording of warrants issued by Courts
of co-ordinate jurisdiction, inasmuch as in that case it
bad decided that a warrant issued by the Court of
Bankruptcy, a superior court of record, like
the House of Commons, was bad. He also
quoted the case of Christie v. Unwin, in
which the validity of a warrant issued by the Lord
Chancellor had been questioned. He could not but
regret that during the course of the last century some
of the judges had laid down the law as if the Court
could not interfere even to grant a habeas corpus in
cases where persons had been committed by the
}louse of Commons, but those dicta of the judges were
contrary to the law, as it had been acted on both
before and since. In the case of Lord Shaftesbury, in
that of Hobhouse, in that of the Sheriffs of Middlesex,
this Court had granted a habeas corpus, and had
looked to the warrants of commitment, and because
they held those warrants to be legal, and for that
cause only, they remitted the parties to their original
custody. The law of the judges of the last century
was bad law, and all he asked the Court to do was to
do what had been done in all the cases to which he
had alluded—to look to the warrant, and see whether
or not it was a good warrant ; and he would dismiss
all these cases by saying that in every one of them
the warrant of commitment set forth the cause
of imprisonment, viz., contempt. He apprehended
that there was nothing in this warrant to show that
the party was to be taken to the bar of the House of
Commons. It was a mere simple mandate for taking
him into custody. The fact was the recital was so
uncertain that it was impossible for the Court to intro-
duce anything into the mandatory point.
Mr. Justice IVIGHTMAN alluded to the case of the
warrant for the arrest of Sir Francis Burdett, in
which the warrant not only stated that he was to be
taken to the Tower of London, but to be delivered to
the custody of the Lieutenant of the Tower.
Mr. KELLY agreed that in that case it was clearly
stated where the party was to be taken to, but in this
case there was nothing in the warrant to show either
why he was apprehended, or where he was to be
brought to. It might be to the bar of the House of
Commons, or before any one of the Committees. But
even if it were aided to the utmost possible extent by
the recital, it went no further than to say apprehend
the plaintiff and bring him to the bar of the House of
Commons, without stating for what. It was a mere
simple mandate of arrest without any cause assigned,
and was therefore illegal. He agreed with all
that had fallen from the judges in the case
of Burdett and Abbott, and Stockdale and Han-
sard, that this Court could not look into the cause of
imprisonment where it was for contempt, and if this
warrant had stated that the imprisonment was for
contempt, he should not have disputed its validity.
What was sought for under this warrant was not to
preserve to the House of Commons what it was ad-
mitted they possessed, the power of committing for a
breach of their privileges, but the power of making
that law which was not law, and to arrest under an
illegal warrant, a warrant which was contrary to
Magna Charta.
Mr. Justice COLERIDGE—Suppose the plea had
set forth the warrant was issued according to the
ancient usages of Parliament, should we not be bound
to consider it legal ?
Mr. KELLY apprehended not, unless the plea
set forth that the form had been used at the time of
Magna Charta. If it had not, it was contrary to
Magna Charta, and, therefore, unless legalised by Act
of Parliament, was void. Now, if the warrant were
insufficient in itself, he contended that the defendant
could not go to the averments of the plea to help it.
If a man resisted his arrest under a lawful
warrant, and killed the officer, he was guilty of
murder-4 the warrant were unlawful it would be
justifiable homicide. Now, suppose the plaintiff had
resisted, and killed the officer, could it be said to him,
" True, the warrant is bad upon the face of it,
but then there was behind it a resolution of the House
of Commons, of which you could know nothing, in-
asmuch as it was not set forth in the warrant ; and,
therefore, you must be hanged for murder." But,
even suppose reference could be made to the aver-
ments, he submitted that in these pleas there were no
averments which were sufficient to help the warrant.
All that was averred was, that the warrant was
issued by the proper officer of the House
to the proper officer for service, but it left
the question of the form of the warrant com-
pletely untouched. Now he apperehended that the
house of Commons possessed no peculiar privileges
of pleading ; they must plead like other people, and
tierefore they ought in express terms to have alleged
that, according to the usages of Parliament, it was
their privilege to arrest upon such a warrant, and even
that would have been insufficient unless it was
also alleged that such usage had existed at the
time of Magna Charta. But, supposing the
warrant might be aided by the averment,
and that the averments were sufficient, then
came the question, had the House of Commons the
right to arrest a person to compel him to give evi-
dence, or to arrest him upon a mere charge, without
having previously adjudged him guilty of contempt?
He apprehended that no such power existed. They
had power to summon a witness, and if he refused to
obey that summons, they could adjudge him guilty
of contempt for such refusal, and imprison him for
the contempt; and magistrates possessed the same
power; but there was no power to appre-
hend party for the purpose of bringing
h inn up in custody to compel him to give evi-
dence. No doubt all courts had the power of
issuing a subpoena to compel the attendance of a wit-
ness, and on his refusal to come to attach him for
contempt, and punish him for his refusal by im-
prisonment; but they had no more power by law to
apprehend persons and bring them up in custody as
witnesses than they had when they were brought into
Court to compel them to speak by the application of
the torture. If a witness were actually in Court and
refused to come forward, no doubt the Court had the
power of compelling him to come forward, but the
Court had no right to send for him into the next parish,
and arrest Mtn to compel him to give evidence, al-
though it might adjudge ih guilty of contempt, and
arrest and attach him focatlat contempt, but they
could not order him to he arrested and brought u
answer a charge ofp to
oTfhce
opinowirneorn contended
cont
for on the part of the nemoupst. e
power of at once arresting and imprisoning was
of
the Queen's subjects without any cause assigned atn
all—
a power which the Court would be slow in admitting.