The Sun.
London, England, 1810-03-27 00:00:00

IUESDAY, MARCH 27, 1810.

it wit competent for him to 'deliver in at the table
the Paper complained of, which was the only course
he could pursue at present. , He might however do
so now, or to-morrow.

, -
Mr. LETHBRIDGE thanked the Speaker for his
- intimation,-.-and- wottld `l4 the " Papet to-mor,rov,
. and- bring the subjea' before the House on a future
day. - . .‘•
Lord Foutriciria-cculd not see the.propriety of
allowing the complaint-to stand over. -Was it right
.that the. Hon. BaronCt should remain subjeet to the
charge of having groisly insulted the House, .with-
,out. the opportunity of immediately vindicating him-
self ? ...Thellon. Gentlenian might make the trio- •
lion now, and he ought not to harbour. in his breast
- the grounds- of the motion. beyond 'the present mo-
ment. - When he had. roundly stated that the Hon.
Baronet had grossly insulted and violated _the privi-.
.leges.of the House, it was too much to expect that
be would- Set down, under such, ati imputation,
without desiring the HouSe to examine' the con-
plaint immediately. In the case of another,Mentr
her (Mr. Fuller), against'whom a charge of.a,simi-
lat.. -nature' had been made, the House proceeded
imniedlately to the consideration of the charge. If
such a complaint was suffered to pass a day without
investigation, it was contrary to all precedent..
1 General GASCOYNE- here-rose to order, and ob-
served, that it was usual to give notice of a motion
without "debating that notice;- therefore. the Hon.
Gentleman was perfe6tly, right in pursuing the
course he. had chosen.

The SPEAKER Interrupted the Hon. General, by
Stating, that in ordinary cases it was the praEtice to
give notice, but in matters affecting the privileges
of Parliament, the House had been in the habit of
consulting together. The Hon. Gentleman might,
proceed or not, as he judged most proper.
Lord FOLKSTONE maintained that he was Piir-
fealj, correct in what he had stated, and he con-
ceived the Hon. Gentleman would do well to pro-
ceed now.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER thought
the Hon. Gentleman ought to'be left to: judge for
himselt as to the precise time when he should
bring his motion forward. When- the Hon. Gen-
tleman had put the House in possession of his com-
plaint, then they would determine how to proceed.
The Hon. Gentleman might not be so prepared
')to mike his motion as if he had thought the Hon.
Baronet would have been in his place, yet at the
same time might be impressed with the strong
nkces,ityof calling the attention of the House to
the cause of complaint. The charge Wa's a grave
and'serious one, an it_ would mot
,be convenient to
discuss it now, when a debate was expected on an-
other s.ubjea. -*
11..C.,Wvt,ms could nor. agree with the Right
Hon. Gentleman, that it would be more desirable to
"interrupt ,the proceedings on the Inquiry in the
.middle,; which- must be
,the. case? unless, the Hon.
Gentleinan's motion was made before the Noble
'Lord brought forward his motion.
Mr. LETHBRIDGE intending to make a formal
complaint, would decline at present, and bring it
forward to-morrow.

PRICE XPEN~E HIFPENNS:

to the extent and nature of the evidence, first, with main. The CipiniOn of General -Hope, which was
respect to General Calvert's testimony, who stated, founded in assumptions; still was concurrent with
that-at the- end of March, the army which in the those of the other military_men: In all their opia
month of January returned from Spain was.etotfit niens the attack on Antwerp was censidered as the
for service; that some of the corps who weretlis, .1 primary' objea, -distina from the thedifated &cepa.;
charged from the hospitals were not fit for an aCdive Lion of
.Walcheren. The Noble Lord, having clan le -
campaign:- The House would "no doubt compare l suited five military men, finds the opinions of four-
this,statement with what they had heard during the decidedly 'adverse to his plan of carrying his object: by
last. Session es to the account of the British fore,. a coup-de-main, and the fifth not fairotiable.-..a
.and then -ask theenselves whether ,the impression Having examined the -military part of the evidence,.
which such statements were intended to produce, lee would now recur to the naval. On the 4th of
could convey to the country the real knowltdge of June,' Sir Hon*:Popham wasient:for to town, to
the:situation of the army; or whether they were; be consulted upon the subjea ; and after some. in.
not meant to delude the Hotise and the Country; terviews; Sn Home, on the tith of June, sentin
:Whether they did not induce a' belief that the army a memorandum -(referred to in his evidence) to. the
was completely ruined by the imprudence of Govern-.. -Noble Lord with his opinion, which' it,Would not bd
merit ?Of the 22 to 23,000 re-embarked from..Spai9 necessary to goehrOUgh in detail. He should con-
in
the month of January; Ministers could not in the tent himself with staring, that in that_ memorandum
rim th of March find I ,oniti fit for service, He Sir Home pressed two pointe for the.ettention and
should now pass over the subsequent examination of i coneideration of the Admiralty-00e orthem was,
the Commander in Chief, and advert to the letter tbe:neeessity that the troops embarked ahould he
of my Lord Castlereagh to the COMmander in Chief, sent'oilt in men of war,
.aed eohtransports, be:
which was. the first
.overt as of :Ministers, and cause "transports were clog to. the Expedition.
which skewed, at least, that they anted wisely ie Another point was the necessity of ttot delaying the
consulting Military men on the subje& of the Ex- sailing of the fleet ; because the season was then
pedition. • The Expedition was no new project,fasteadvancing in -Which* they would have a power-
could not be called a:precipitate measure, for it bad eiteeemy to contend with in the elements. He also _
long been under consideration ; the plan of it there,. ees'bed to press upon the eonsideretiOn of the
fore should at least have been well digested. lu Board; the propriety of having the 'Expedition reedy
asking for the opinions of these military r-nn,:theY for sailing by' the 26th'oe 27th of June, at the'lah;
did so'with eview tofetm their own decisions, only est.. He also reeommended that the number of
waiting for the favourable moment to carry the plan horses should be reduced. -Instead of attending to
into effea. What was the substance cf the Noble the suggestion of promptitude, .I.Vlittii.ters not olier_
Lord'scomriannication ? -Why he stated he had re- increased the number '
of hoeseS, but delayed the
ceiveti information which had led him to expe4 sailing until the, 28th of July. On' the t9th of
that he should not find any 'material resistance in June another ;riaval 'authority wa consulted, and
the proposed attack upon the Island of -Waleheren, that was Sir Richard Straohan, whp was placed in
This communication was made on the 29th May, the command of the newel part of the Expedition,
but it w-aa thought more advisable not merely to The observations of Lord Mulgraee to this Officer
depend upon.' the sole opinion of the Comman-, were, that the difficultiei 'attending the ulterior ob..
der in 'Chief, but to have the opinions, of finer jeas of the Expeditioh • would be great, but that
other Military Officers. Sir David"Pundas, how- the. Ships. must go above Antwerp. From the exa-
ever, states that if the enterprize was impossible mination of that gallant Officer it was clear, that
or' hazardous at the period when advice was asked, though Ministers had -fixed their eyes, -on this ob-
it would be still more -so at a future period. That I jet they.did-not think that the-ships could go up
the strength of the enemy, and the advantages the rive-. Sir Richard remarked to Lord Mulgraye,
which they might be naturally supposed to possess, that .1 -that could be thine was to take the Island of
should be well.weighed ; and he endeavoured to ins- Walcheren. The-gallent OffiCer thereby anticipat-
press on the mind of the Noble Lord, and proposed ed -wliat the House was in .posession of,--that the
two modes for-accomplishing the ebjea, if praaica- • produce of the ee-terprize was a iieavy expellee, and
ble. Sir David particularly advised, that, the corn- that -the ermaitc:ne had dohe nothing more than
parative strength of the enemy and tile local„situa- take the Island of •Walcheren,-and. afterwards eve-
tion of Antwerp should be` maturely considered. ,In cuate it. e Lord Millgrave's 'opinion • was, that it
his eVidence. he-had stated that Antwerp, from his would go on well. Sir- Straehan was ape
own personal knowledge; was tuffictenely_ fortified firehensive of the consequence In addition to
to undergo a regular siege. The Noble Lord should' these 'opinions, military' and
,naval, 11(Iutisters bad .
have well considered, before he risked tiro last army the: opinions of two naval 'Lords, then they form-
he possessed, the consequeneeS 'ot the attempt._ Sir ed a plan of •some sort or other ;* and here-his diffi-
David, ui his letter of the ed-of Jane, to. the Noble why •was' increased, for on lookittoVer the papers,
Lord, states, that "in whatever way. Antwerp is to !here were so many plane it was difficult to discover
be approached or taken, the service is one of very which 'plan was the best. • The Noble Lord had his
great risk, and irr which the safe return of the army ' plan, .which, in the outline, was ilffietilt in' follow—,
clinFjoyanu,,. LIR tic very 'precarious, two, ! ep- the Board of Admiralty had their plan, wheel was
position made, and the length of time consumed its different from the Noble Lord's. When the equip-
the operation, which enables the enemy to assemble merit and sailing came to be considered, the plan Of
in a short time in great, force from every part of the tai Noble Lord seemed the most wise, for Whateter
Netherlands and Holland, and even from Wespha7- became of the ships of the enemy, ours were not
pia by the course of the Rhine, as well as from the to be risked.—Then, as to plans, the Right Hon.
frontiers of France." Here then was suggested to Gentleman (Mr. Perceval) had his plan, and his ob-
. the Noble Lord the idea Which tie was booed to at- jest was not to send the Expedition •to that point
tend to, of what might be the 4iSposable force which -where success must attend its progress, but 'to that
the Ruler of France might asseMble tobear against poiitt, Where it could be conveyed- with the smallest
the British army, and the very great peril which quantity of dollars, totally forgetting that in an
might eventually attend the project. The next opi- equipment of this nature' bullion was as necessary
nion which the Noble Lord and his colleagues had as powder and
,shot. With respe& to the plan of
recourse to, was that of General Calvert, a person the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that he had yet
well selected by the Commander in Chief, and he to learn ;it might be 'pOssibie that though he had
seemed to possess what to -be sure the Ministers one in embryo, he did not, communicate it to his col-
scouted as unnecessary, but which all- rational men leagues. The Comthender in Chief of the naval
must consider as an indispensA)le preliminary, viz. part had a.plan too, but the Commander in Chief
a local knOwledge of the 3401 stare of Antwerp, of the land forces, it appeared, .had do plan at all.
the approaches to it, the meads of defence, 'The Noble Lord might think. it was difficult to find
atichttie knOWledge of the probability that the :ere -
.out hiS plan, but it was only to recur to what op-
my Must -.he appriied of the objects. of the pro- pe.ared to.be the original intention of Government.
posed enterprise.' The Noble Lord, however, con-. When the armament sailed, it was intended that the
ceived. he- had what he ealled data to go on, and left wing. of the army should take possession of
though he consulted military risen, yet he negletted Walcheren--sthat the main part, consisting of
the opinion of Gen. Calvert. Whet was that opi 22,000 men, ,should go to. Santeliet to accomplish
nion as disclosed by his evidence ?," That from the' what, was denomtuate .“ a second ulterior SIII)131.
circumgtapces. disclosed in the letter of, the Corn- taneous subsequent operation." The ground,of suc-
[Dander in Chief, the service, howevee urgent, was cess was, that the occupation-of Santvher was to be
one exposed to ,great risk."• What was the opi- accomplished in five days at, farthest: this was the
Ilion of Colonel Gordon on • the subject, a" that • opinion Of Sir Richard Strachan, should the weather
nistersshould take into their consideration as .their permit. Lord P. next proceeded to 'the consider-
primary view, the extent of our means and the ex- ation of the detail of the plan. On the 23d June,
tent of the enemy's.", As to the. information on Lord Castlereagh had a ~.communication with Lord
the latter point, there was none which could lead to chathanne. having, on the 21st, previously ob-
a probable guess even as to the extent of their force; tamed his Majesty's sanaion to proceed In the Ex-
but that from their protimity,. and the facility of pectgon.
.His zeal however outrun his Majesty's
approach, it Mustbe imagined that they would bring sanaiotii for the Commander in Chief in his estarni.
their whole force. One part of the defence of Mi- i nation stated,-that though the troops were ready for
nisters he Understood would be; that great part of the I embarkation on the 18th June, three days prior to
informatien on this head, bad been, received subse- having obtained the King's sanction, the Noble
quern to, the opinions which they had taken : that Lord represented that the great °hied' was to get
very circumstance furnished, strong ground of accu- possession
.of the arsenals and fleet of the enemy ;
sation, for he Must contend that they .should have j but itethe examination of the Commander in Chief,
been in° possession of information before,' they had his plan was stated to beto carry his objett bi a 'coup-
resolved to carry the project into effea. Colonel de-main, for that the resources furnished no means
Gordon pressed the necessity of having possession for protmaing,the War. The objet Were twofold,
of the; bank of the river: The sum total of this viz. the deattuaion of the enemy's arsenals', and the
Officer's opinion was, that the enterprise was` one of attack of Fluting, under certain contingencies,
very great. desperation and risk: The next opinion 1 combining with ethe latter• a powerful- diversion,
:was that of General
,Browitrigi, relatieg to the ppe- against the enemy. They entered upon the enter-
rations by lirtd,, and he concurred with all die pther prize, without considering, the great difficulties and
military,, officers as to the danger and impraaicabili- possibilityel failure, and recommended -its adOptiiin
ty The Noble Lora here commented upon
,the on no other expectation. of success then the hopeslhat
evidence of the General, whO declared that if the the• enemy vvoulds move, out of the' reach. of oar
destruttiou of the erletey s arsenals was the objets army.. What was the evidenceof Sir H. Popham as
that .
in view, could only be eff...Cted by seeding, up to the praaicability of success ? His opinion was,
the Scheldt ri'force of ten thousand troops, which ". that enless.-,one _bank of the Scheldt was in our
could riot be done unless We had the complete. na- .possession We could not pass up to Santvliet." All
illgation of the river. Notwithstandieg all these the Navalopinions were, that four days should be
' opinions, the Noble Lord recurred to. his own ex-7 -all Owed instead of three for accomplishing the. pase
travaeant and impraCticablo idea, as detailed in his* sage. Ministers had not chosen to consult Sir R.
• evidence, of carrying- the enteroise by a coupcli- Keaies upon the aubjed, although lie held a. 'high

,

• • .
sponstbility.
.The tad, Was, ti-;at notwithstanding
these palpable errors of Ministers, the country stilt
owed some of its glory to the gallant Cirlitklanchett,
61 the Raven, who gallantly 'forced his way idto the
passage, and although expGAed to the fire of the bat-
teries, or, in his own wOids,-" though the shells
caMeaboard.rue and the'rontid shot flew through me,
- yet I strceeded 'in- protetling our vessel's from the
enemy's fire.".- The sending of.thetse transports was
the most, frantic, inconsiderate, precipitate,
.and cul-
lable part of the conduct (31' Ministers. .The Noble
Lord obseived, .that (mina' accompanied Ministers
in their expedition to Santvliet, he should now go
into that part of it which appeared romance,
viz, the attack or siege of Antwerp a. sort of
Don Quixotte condu3, attacking windmills; and
here he must notice the alitaryprojed of Sir H.
11'ciplim for the.attack of Poi t .which he con-

sidered as practiCable in the event of the inhabitants
being friendly ; but then we must be satisfied that
'we could ensure that friendship,
,and also that the

Citadel would be udder the coniroul .of the inhabi-

tants. The next' past of the evidenee which be
sh,,nld examine, itvaS the vigorous attack of General:
S'onta6,-,, an Officer of abilities, who had been em-
ployed t oth On the British and on foreign service.
This officer, in eommon with General Don, con-
ceived that the terror, inspired by the appearance-of
the British fleet, would strike such alarm into the.
inhabitants of Antwerp that great hopes of success-
from that.circurnstani:e must be expected. Gene-.
ral Sontag stated. that, success was to_bel expected,
from " a vigorous attack union the enemy's weak'
points;`' that success was to be pbtained' by erect.'
Mg a battery of, twenty-f Our pieces of cannon, but'
on being asked this poser of a. question, where the
batteries should be erected, replied, " that he con.'
cei'ved the erer.tion of batteries to be a difficillt un-
dertaking." General Brownrigg entertained a san-
guine expectation of success from the attack on Ant-.
well). The General, was of opinion that fifteen
guns and fifteen bornbarding.artillery, would, well-
directed, to intimidate the inhabitants that they
v'ould speedili surrender. , The House, hovtrever,
would do well to look at the subsequent answer
of Gen. Broworigiz on the subject of bombardment.
Re, in answer to one or two questions, says, " My
opinion never w'as certain as that Antwerp, could
be tnl:cti by bombardment."' Lord Porchester next

•,utn.:.etot in the expedition. .It .was the opinion of
:hit intelligent Orticer, that if Bathz was defended,
the ene.tly would be enabled to increase in such
ntt:t.bers as to threaten us with dan4erous con,e
quenees that it was impossible. a.powerful-tlotilla
co., go en the Setif-Idt on account of the gun4orts.
fir the described the iffit.ol ties which the armament
must naturally .encounter horn. the .eircumstances
of being iknorant of he true.state of the enemy's
tt rc ...The.No))le.l,ord having commented. on this
dvidence, next averted to the intelligence given be-
fore (fie Sebrvt (one.-nittee by a person conversant
viit!r.the- navinionof the Scholdt, in whom two
i inistet.s placed great confidence. This i.erson; a
pit.., vatecl that th,.. passag,e to Bathz, might beef,
f.ctel in 48 hones, but that to effect it there should
.b,: a pilot in each sine of • battle ship and •in every
frigate. It zartie out in evidence that •there was only
,one oilotto the w hole fleet.. The same person al.f)
towed that it was. impossible to proceed to Bathz

_ .
without a change .of wind ; there were only
r Cella:la points tit .he wind in
"L high the ships could
sailtio, ant ii ,se were two points:bet ixt the West
ati‘i South; that unless Ntuisters coeld proviie relays
. -of witids at every, turnip(' and w iodise,-e' of the river,
it was impossible to reach the desired object. • With
respect te, the occupancy of 13athz, Sir John Hope
. had, declared, that it would hold, out several clays, if
. defended, In this opinion be was confirmed by
bed Resslyn, ; yet these necessary preliminary con-
, siderttions •were left out 01 the calculation of Mi-
nisters. The Calculations of the Noble Lott] and
General Browprigg. were founded on the probability
of landing on the 3d of August, when they conceiv-;
that a gool chance 'of success. The Nobl' Lord
then commented on thee‘idence as applicable to the
defence o• Bathe, and the f:stimoni"of Lord 'CaStle:-
reagh, who, could not, on being ouestioned4resume
to. judge the precise -day of the -occupation, nor to
calculate on the movements of the.eremy. " He
therefore Was justified in' contending that --the'Nuble•
Lord 'Stood coolertmei leyhis own testimony, for'
he had not' formed any caleillapon's as•to the proba-
ble hopes of the armament -picleeeding, nor had be
any pound on v hie!) to judge offthe pro'etbility of
the r safe retoni. It was,- preeliely the point on
wh.ch *Minist-rs ought to have Obtained' informa:
COD, because it was not only decisive of the fate'of
the army, but of tin- kiticoom. In •.stahl,clirrg the
evidence of another N:ble Lorii (Chatham), it
was desirable to listen with attention, for although
nothing to the shape o: opinion-could be gathered
from his test! liony, y 0 it Was-given in 'Such. S wan -
• ner as to convey a pointed sarcasm on his colleagire§-::
H well.knew that the business- was involved in•-a
bthi ninth. Lot.d'Porchester here contrasted the evi-
dence of ,Lord 'Chatham with the eYiclence of oilier
military characters, as to the praai ability of landing
'hree or four The Noble Lord attetebeing•
pressed hard,, at last ccinf'..-e:d, that„,pos.,,ibly it
yught be ette6,ted in that lute, -bit that, it was 'not'
• very. probable. Generals McLeod and Brownrigg
stated that the artillery and ho ;es were landed oe
the 4th Augest ,Laird, Chatham. stated they were
not landed on.the.6tb ; here was a" great variance iv
the testimony of titese ofticers havipg endeavoured
tq shew that the probabilities of suecess'.Nvere against
the enterprise, in conseehence•of th'iniscalculations
of IV..listers, wliO, reckoned upon the rapidity of
Movements, fbigetting-Tte. estiorate -thedangers trig
attending, the execution of their iti-c: =
gested.plaus. The. Noule Lord recerted.back to the
,„., ►,le•-.er the fallacy of
• their conduct in sending out so huge an armament
without any. settled:plan. It vas like, he observi:d,
the ArchiteCt; who built his Chamber 'floors with-
out considei mg the necessity .of constructing a 'stair-
case to ascend to them. There seemed to be but
one concurrent opinion among ail the Geiierals as to
the precise -tune
,at which Czdsand would be oc-
cupied, yet this prehminary measure was not con-
sidered until the •Expeclit.on had sailed. It 'was a
subject worthy oft consideration, Whether the de
fences of the tiyet were such as could. be surnount-
ed by our army. tiren-ral BrOw.nrigg lamented
greatly that the right wing of the army was not dis-
posed on the banl Of the river. If that wawa subject
of regret to Geo. Brownrigg, it must be a subject cf
• regret to Minis•ers and attached on them great re-

commented On the evidence of General M'Leod,
Sir W. Ersltihe, and General: Fyers, 'who, in con-
tra:Es-110e to the military opinion of- Lord Castle-
reagh, that it was pratlicable to carry the place by
a coup-de-r,ain, stand their reasons for not agriSeitig
with the Noble Lord, and the impossibility of so'
carrying it. The Noble Lord, however, bad talked
of the bombardment of the place, and recommended
that it should be battered in breach, yet so little had
he considered the subjed,.that he forgot there were.
no battering guns to etre& .hiS favourite objet, .the
coUp-de-ntain ; every thing- Was to be done by a
coup-de-main.. Su far from Ant-seri) being in -a
,statepl surprise, he • could 'prove by 11 French dos
cument, that every means were taken to put It in a'
state of complete deleoce three days prior to the ar-
rival 'the -expedition.! The .-condua of Lord,
Chatham was equally inconsistent and absurd., He
arrived at Baths without having-contemplated in
what manner to proceed. -No plan was formed for
the progress of the campaign until the council was
:summoned. It would be seen with whaisesiseet be
'treated the project of his colleagues, ,The expedi-
'non- was fitted out, relying-on the Noble Lord and
on the truth of the information heyeceived respects
ing the state of Antwerp; yet, cat being questioned,
the Noble Lord declared, that" he knew not:ring of
•thetrtith of the intelligence he had no ground
,for
'eithetsbelieving or disbelieving it, for he could not
know the 'state of-Antwerp." The- opinion of the
Commander-in-Chief on this subject was, " that the
possession- of Antwerp depended much on cOotin-
`genciess--that the works had -been- repaired, and
that it could not be taken' by a coup-de-main."
—The Noble Lord then made some observa-
tions on the testimony of Sir Joho Hope. The
,opinion of Lord Resslyn was, that had the Expedi-
tion reached Santvliet on the 3d or 4th, A.eitwerp
could not save been taken-. From the testimony of
Sir W. Erskine, who was at Antwerp in 1794, it
appeared the situation of Antwerp was such, that
the enemy could, within the space of one- week,
put it in a state to sustain a siege, and that the north
end of the town, against which he did not know
but our operations• were intended to be Principally
directed, could not be approached.. It had been said
ftliat AntWerp had no guns mounted for its defence.
Ide thider,tood in such townsit was not a customary
thing to keep the guns always mounted, and con-
stantly exposed -to the effects of the weather.; it
t:lierefiSre did. not follow that Antwerp, becausesit.
had 'no guns mounted, was in a defenceless state.
Wheri it :-yes; considered that at Antwerp 'a
great
-nsval 'arsenal had- _been
_established, which. was
growing one stif the most formidable in Europe,
it could • not • for a moment be supposed they
were without ordnance. The force toady to de-
fend it was more formidable than might be appre-
hensled. Buonaparte and. Sir Sideey Smith could
tell t hem-what might be expected from such a force.
Sir W. Erskine had tar- her stated, that neither Ant-
Werp, Lillo, nor Liefkenshoek could be taken by a
coup-de-main, as the arrival of a British armament
in the Scheldt must be known almost before they
had. fairly cast their anchors. The events which
shad occurred were not such as could not be for-
seen. Sir.,W. Erskine in a correspondence ,vieth
Sir Richard Strachan had partly anticipated what,
before the expedition sailed, would• take place, and
all liis predictions had been verified. Sn Eyre
Conte bad stated it to be ,his opinion') that success
was doubtful. The Marquis -of • Huntly thosignt it
impossible to take Ant wisp by a coul-sk,main ;.and
Geo. Calvert, -though tie mu not trunk it imrs,ssiee ,
considered the successful*complishinent of the , b-
ject Of the expedition as very impronahles Did the
Marquis of Huntly think when he. knew. that but
700 men could at once be disetisbalked at Cadsand
that success' was certain ? No, be rather apprettetid-
ed that once landed he shouk have much difficulty
'in "maintaining his position. They knew not where
they were going, and having no pilot able to conduct
them, they could- pet get up the _Wieling channel.
'General Brownrigg had given it as. los opinion
, that the means employed were adequate to the
obje& in view. He had stated that he }Amino roe-
' son to believe that Antwerp was defended, and the
French had found an army to defend it by acci-
dent. It appeared-that Antwerp was thus saved by
a fortuitous circumstauce. That an army of French
soldiers who were going somewhere or • other, hap- .
petting- to be in the neighbourhood of Antwerp
at the time the English Expedition reactied the
Scheldt, and understanding how things were going
on, thought it would be as well to enter Antwerp
and. see `,4 fair play." 'This circumstance, which
bad been described as fortuitous, was an accident
which, he-was sorry to say, bad often befallen the
enemy, but which had very -rarely happened to
us. It commonly occurred that a French army
happened to be where it was wanted, but lie could
remember very few instances of our sending One
where it could do any good. The information Mi-
nisters had of the enemy's force Was far from being
accurate. They had been infornied that there were
very,
,few troops at 'Antwerp, and that it would
take five or six days to assemble a considerable force
in that neighbourhood. In. June or duly they had ,
been informed 'by a confistenthl servant that the
force of the enemy in that quarter amounted to 26 or
23,009 men. 'From a-report however made to the '
Emperor of the French, dated. August Ist, the day
On which we entered Aoorrlpotlwhicb he here pro-
duced and read); giving an account of the appear-
an& of the English, and of the means resorted to to
repulse them, it appeared that such dispositions had
been previously-made by the enemy that a very consi-
derable force could easily be assembled in three days.
They plated their fiorce at stich a distance from Ant-
werp as not to leave Bolougne open to our attacks, yet
sufficiently near to defend Antwerp, when it was
known to what point our operation§ were intended
to be direeed,, and that arrangements accounted for
the arrival of a French army at the point of attack
just in time. Having now shewn that .the Ex-
-- pedition against Antwerp, according to, the theo-
ries of all those who were consulted by Minis
stets on,the subject, was morally, if not physically
impossible, he would proceed.to stew that-if those
theories were not precisely coffee, if it was not ori-
,
I ginally impossible for the enterprise against Ant-
i werp to succeed,: it was. made so by the arrangements
Of Ministers. , One division of the expeditien was
,• to be assembled atßathz, on the 31st of Julys He,
,wished to know what. General could take the force
Under his command there without disobeying or-
der's ? Was it Sir E. come ? Sir J. Hope ? ror the
Marquis of Huntly ? all of whom were employed

on setwic--!s teliich-rendcred-it impraEticeble,ns-Were
Lord Rosslyn at* Geti. Grosvenor. Gen. Brownrigg
had stated, that when W.alcheren' was takeet 'the 2d
division of the armament it was intended should'pro-'
ceed to the accomplishment. of the ulterior objects of
the expedition. It however .appeared, that the ord..
nStrce; &c. was not sent ofl- from this country till
the". very day- on whith the' landing at Satitvliet:
was intended. A corps Of• Lord Huntl's divi-
sion; as soon as the investment .of Flushing was
complete, and the 'lsland of S. Beveland taken, was
to proceed .to Bathz, where a conjunct operation:
was to. be attempted, .with instructions how -to act
should theenemy proceed to Lillo ,or L;elkenshoek.
There appeared to be no particular hurty to get to
Antwerp.. A change in the plan had been madelin
consequence of the want of boats. Sir T. Hope's
corps had been- kept .two days in the boats,.apd or-
dered to taken position to observe Cohen and Bathz.
*Gen. Brewei igg
.remembered that Lord .Chatham
had resolved to keep the corps of .Lord.Rosslynas a
body of reserve. Sir Home Popham had ground,.
,ed his:hop:s of success on the embarkation of the
troops in ships.. of the. line, which mode of em-
harkation was ordered:to insure
,greater eltpedi-
tithe That mete expeditions mode of :embarking
troops was peculiarly applied to Flushing.: The
Admiralty would not sutler ships of the line. -to
enter -the narrow atid intricate passages of. the
Scheldt. They had given- orders tor collecting any
.ships but those of the line to convey the troops tsp
to Ant Nerp. The troops destined to act agoint
Wet-
cheretr were ernharked in h hips .of the line; but in
the ulterior operations of the armament that mode of
e.olbaekation was to be discontinued. from the diffi-
culties n tending the navigation Of the Scheldt. In
h letter from ,Sir. . Richard Strachan to the Score,.
hay
,of State, no mention• whatever had been made
of the ulterior objects of the Expedition.. .He had
merely said ". he • would lose no. time,!:' Tlie in,
structions of Sir .R.,StraChall to Captain Owen set
forth, that. there were tw9 services., to be accom-
plished—the first against Cadsandeahe. second to cut
off the communication with Boulogne. These per-
formed, Ire was to plat himself under the , cOmmaed
of Commodore Owen. • Could it possibly be thought
that any division of .the army would proceed to-Saet,.
vliet, when the instritaionsgiven.did not, in. the re-
motest •degree, .connienance'sueh, a procedure, as
all the officers, without e;(ception, were told either
to keep behind the rest, or to attempt one or two,
things,. and then wait for further orders.. Thus it
appealed that no one could proceed to Bantrliet,.
without disobeying orders. The ships of.the line
which had been used. for greater expedition to eM,
nark the.troops were not soused in; the Scheldt,.
though so meet) at that period depended upon.
expedition, while. the battering, train had not been
sent Steen the Downs, till.the period at .which it
ought to have arrived at SantVliet.. 'He ,would
say Dealing, farther on,•the plan pr policy, of..the
expedition. He would not even:matte comment,
bot leave the House to judge
..from all the 'eir,
cutest:glees, whether, or nut it way possible tor the
Expedition to. reach Antwerp,, whether or not with.
sucti instructi,insii Was possible to succeed, and whe,.
tiler or not the.prop.cl did not deseve to be cpnsi-.
dered as a wi;d romantic tistott. :He. woull no NV
proceed to rtheci.lidnct of, tlie.Expeclition..- He im-
puted the. blame to neither service; he telt as oared
that .each had deserved well of the country, and that
the failure e<s to be ascribed not to them, out tu.the.
circumstance 01 their valour hay:rig:been opposed to
-Lich wYrY I' urn aunrahie_Hith-rtohehad
taken but a..military view of the difficulties they had.
to encountyi from-the situation- of place, the forte
tuey had to encounter, tic. but iie had now' to
tice evils of a nitre formidable. nature; which
p,sed their exertions. They had to contend with
adverse elements; and still more wit It the 'horrors of
disease. It wag known that the climate was un-
healthy. • Lord Mulgrave well knew ire and he
.might have remembered that when he was there
his men were not only unhealthy, but that many
lost their liwes. yet this armament has been sent'
to a paitilential place at the Most pestilential season,
without one medical inan.i.being preViocsly don-
stilted, and. without any suitable provision beiiig
_made. If it were alleged that secresy, which
was considered necessary to the success of the enter-
prize, wouldliave-sidered by 'such a precautionary
step, why, he would ask, when the destination of
the army was notorious, did they not consult medi-
cal
men on the subjea, before they were told tliSit •
3900 men were sick, and in a :most dreadful sitd3.
tion, On the 31st August, Sir E. Cpote wrote home
i
on the sohjea, nclosing, a letter from. Dr. Webb;
st tting forth the deplorable state of the army, and'
pressinghiost urgently for immedipte assistance. He •
(Sir E. Coote) blamed navigation as tardy on an occa-
sion so important, and that the swiftest vessel sailed
too slow when relict wits necessary forthe sickening
soldiery. at the 2d Sept. the Noble Lord wrotretO•
Sir David Dundas, inclosing the note received from
Dr. Webb, yet through a something that did not
reach the War Office till December.- Subsequent
applieations were made, but it was not till disease
had made the most alarming progress in thinning our
tanks that any medical men were sent to investigate ,
the nature of that disease and that climate, which
ought to have been thoroughly known, and fully as-.•
'certained, before a man was sent from our own
shores. This policy was of a piece'with. that which ,
sent Lord Chatham, with an immense force, to a
place in ot.der to ascertain whether or not that
place :was assailable.; a mode of proceeding never
considered as convenient or eligible before. He
now came to the last but not the least import-
ant- charge, the retention of Walchoreh. He had
now to -ask what possible motive 114inisters could
have tor so doing. After what had been said'
by' Sir Eyre, Come and others on: the subj.-et •
of the distress of the troops; after they homer,. •
ous representations that had been made of"' their
wants, and of the afflicting hardships to which they
were exposed from the want of: clothing, of bag-
gage, and from being in hospitals %teaming roofs,,
exposed to the inclemency of- the season. This was
not all, their stock of Medicine had 'been 'so 19w,
that had it not been for the succour atibrded them
by a. smuggler, the army must actually have pd .
.rislied' for want of bark: The protratled delays
101103 occurred, he impt4ed, to that, Miserable
subordination which : had been, 'established, itar4.
which rendered a autyber of orders necessary from
one person in office to another, before any ef-
ficient measures could be taken to remedy the evil- .
deplored. Three or four orders were' thus' ren-

. . .
, •dered necessary 'to the attainment of one . objeb.
i The Medical Board, had it been whit a Medical
Board ought ttt be, instead of what it was, with such
a -system:could not htit be backward in;atTording the
assistance required. -The health of the army ought
not to have been entrusted tot such a Board as the
last, which itATA§ intended to abolish probably, evea
befetrethe sailing of the Expedition. What excuse .
'Cottld they make . fer.reposing-s'ich :a trust in such
persOnS ?.. None, but than private ' -discord had':
obliterated - from their bosoms 'all feeling for the '
public:interest. With what view could_ they have
kept our langnishing'soldierx in the unhealthy, filthy'
marshes of Walcheren for so long'a period? Were
they to be told that it was considered Rx be a good
military position, and as r..-tiCh ,worth retaining. Had
they not .been told by a high milttary otlictr that it
could not be kept without maintaining.a force of
22 or 23,000 men,,nor even with such a force _With;
• out - erecting .fortifi,:ations.. liatUthey not also been
told that ,there was no relying ,on naval assistance.
That during-three months in the y,..ar the shipping
would be under the necessity of going into Flushing:
thus affording the enemy an opportunity of -armo'
-tine us. Gen. Don had said, that at no time the- .
shipping could be sure of keeping their positions.--'7
Other testimonies to a similar etfeet could be ad•
duced. Now, putting feeling and :humanity out of
the:question, could it be policy to retain it under 8 (ICI'
circumstances !—CoUld we supply from otir.pontl.'.
Lition the annual . exhaustion by diwase3, Could
they think. of retaining. it with such enormous sa-.. ~
: cruces ? W.rethey not ,teld too by General pony.
•that the island was in a defence'ess state,, and that
he was apprehensive, if
_the enemy could break. .
their. line of stltt sifety:e, the hoSpital Must. be,..
' taken ? What, could Mike Ministers callous to their
retlealions ? WliaCcould induce thern 'to cortLr. our
brave army to remain there to perish ?.. Why, after
the representations
.on and before:. 2d September,
m
was the order forvs. cuat nig the islandt not given tilt •
.November f it was not becant-e Ministers were,;'
anxious for the 'retetnion of Walcitaren, but Ile-
cause they could think of little but the reten'
.tien, of, their own offices. The intelligence _front
,Wilcheren ought to have made a deep impressiod
..
,on.those who.serit:ant an expedition so fruhless, 0r..,
gather so fruitful of evils,, WhiCh the country, would f''
long have to deplore. But at, that 'period 11(lillir..
tern were too busy 'at
..home
,hoe :to thick of our pool ~
poldiers„ engaged- as ~they were ;in a' disgracg.d."
scramble for -.pla-Ls and for po.ver.—The 6017.:
..incinications. from. Austria prove] that nothing (4-:
theAtind had been -done .in eonsequence42l theit
wishei, When such an offer- was made. last ‘clir,
their 9,,iy reply was, ^ " where is "this Lland of Nitral-;
cheren r Austria could derive tno be.rieLt from the
retention of • Waicheren. - When it was kliow,n °‘
Buda that Lord,Chatharnhad retreoted, leaving a gar'
bison at Walcheren, theYexpressed'disappoiOtmert,
and declared they bard no hopes, of mfr. .doing i-11)'
gobd there, and only, wished 'some eruct to -I/.° ,
: . made in the North .of Germany. As early as rite •
6:b4 .of . Odober; Sir Eyre Coate • had -p reused 1?"
know • what were the intentiens.of Government re::
speaiOg• --Walcheren ; yet • nothm; docitiives w 3:
done ; onr remaining- tlLere could d., no good ; t-4-I.i
Ministers chose to nornoiate the . remains of 00c.,
'gardson to tile manes of Austrian greetnes.:. 00
own veterans had been thUS sent to sw.cour the Alas'
triad cause t 3 dayS-ufier peace had been coocluded•-;
When_ our brave, soldiers :were
.tiros wasted, it !Na„
not too much to ask if. the ,advantages gained WC'
equa to the saeritices 'fllAde ? That ' great cad'i
paigner" Gen ral Brownrigg . had said that some c',
the. troops Frapce had been called from the 43111.'0'
.01 the Danube by our disersion t bra; if a tew we'
actually so.;called off from our ally, was that cOokY,ll
for such an Expedition ? . The Expedition, he COL:..,
tended, Ita. d been begun in ignorance,. Oondyct`a
in impotence, and terminated in the loss ot111:1
finest army that, ever lett our shores, in nalinllie
disgrace,. arid almost in national despondency, -lie
:Noble Lord concluded moving the following rt,'
iwions, .whichi from his being much exhausted
king, by
4
speaking so g, Lord Temple read-to the goo-
~
. , 1.. That on the Agth. of July and followingdays an I Vier'', s,
tion of zg,ono soldiers, 37 ships of the line, three of 4-I,,g;',.esr
to frigates, :31 sloops, &c. &c. &c. sailed from our O' or.,
having for its rallied the capture of the enemy's ships P', a 1
Scheldt, 'the destruction of those building; the reductl'ldes,
the I,slatid of Walcheren, the capture 01 Antwerp, of
-truction.of its dricklards am! 'arsenals, and the mutat"
the Scheldt no lougernavigable, . • ~ ,
old
• 2., That Flushing. surrendered on'the tsth. of Augustieor
on the 29111, it was judged advisable to abandm the alt-
'obje4s of the Expedition. . too
13,:.:Tliit alter accomplishing. the destruction A; the ~,,,1
.and works of-• Flushing on the lath t)eecmber,' the l '
was ev4cuaredoa the 23d. . . . tit'.
4. That. Fl hat. this,ouse is of opinion that no blame is /1",
able either to the military or naval part of the arinatilell:t'n..it
e.„ Illation or about .tife !VII or September a tria.qii:ci
disorder made its.appearance in the army, and on the
Oct. the number 'of the sick amounted to t 0,9,^1. „,-,..
6. That it appears from the-reports of the I'lly'sic‘ i'llsiocl'
pointed. to investigate. the 'subject, that that disease. Pef coo-
t-ally-breaks Out in Walcheren with great violence, Dr," ,
,0 of
tinues to rage throughout the Autumn till the latter
rare;
; October,'That. recoveries from the eilects.ot it are ver.Y.,' in*
and that it is the cause of 'complaints which reiukr nit.'"
efficient tOr military purposes:
St f
7. That of. that army there died, On or 14
Seforc-the !".r,,,,51:
February ate, 6a ttficers -and.39ao men, excluSive of r,,,..
killed:in attion, and the number vf sick ,out the first of
b.rtiary, amounted to 267 officers, and t 1,996 then.
rft
o'd
8: That the Expedition was undertaken at zi pctio•
t soc•
under circumstances precluding every rational. hope ? o,sre
cess i.and that, the'adviiers of thiS illjacige. Ex p,..ditio.i..' 00
deeply t.ottponsible_ for the heavy calamities thus brood
'
the counny "

fi second string of Resolutions was here producech
in substance as follows

' - * • " ' •
J. That Sir E. Coote, being lelt'in Walcheren with 'oco
men, dirt represviit to his M..testy's M nisters that.the
could not be retaified without git immense sacrifice of bgs
• and treasinc. - • ,-" • r
_2: That on theie3d of September he stated titc
atil9ilgflie ()ups to- have nt;ide such an-alariningtry,—;','6
ir it S.) to ilicr:itsc tt r rho following '1
weeks our poN,e,si.;it of the Island Lvili! id be plecalion•
oul
• ' 3,, That • on. the ot-h of October, Sir E. Ccore star"a• be
possession of the I ;land to he pra..aii,us, a:ld dos.rca t()
ititbrmecl. of the ii.licutions of Goveram:nt.as to the'conduct thiey'llaellit in'contemplation tv pursue, wittt tcsP-
.to Its reteritton, zzo. •
4. That notwillts:ant(lng these and similar representaN bee,
his A•Lij..•;tv's Nl:nisterS`ll4s4leted till the 4th of 1\10",t"oill
to inter W-atelieren to be evacuated, and it was not 1` ,
.cr;:ctimed rt.!) the-z3tt'of December:
5.
.ThatsubNequeGtly to the.toth of September, 6933.10 t
wereei?):U iced for which by the time "
W:ig't,..;4,ll.ned; woe Augmented to i i tc,9.
„ atter tzwatiallialeil ~ of the ,reso obj-:tts 0-f
t arre
pedi!irin bad ccaszo to be consid:red as pr,eticable, our, ob.
was
.'kept his Miti,:st)'s :-,ll:Usters, without any , cit
jed'in view, in.' in the greatest- danger, apd r Y
posed for more .titaii time months to a disease whIC 1 aS". 0.•
as the,j ist, of August had assumed a must alarming all)
ance. Is 141 •
7. That the corAuel of his Majesty's Ministol.cal
ihe s,iverest .ce,Qtue of this ilouse,

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Lord eivrtnaEAGn 'than "role,' He %7. as sure tingencies, and atated os strialy as a letsalcaae-ni-hUld it no`to:••isle (4 suppose (hilt :Lord chathalP h•aid -re- •hurnilitya that, they would declare • not only thas.
.. • •.
. ~. .
~ .
tb:lt the. HOtige. WOOl,l 0 ink ' it l
e,'
!nee al be to a lawyeas . And whot was.a; waitten tialoa',O ,cnived lite fullest ilSfotMatiOn on tneoubject—that rte . Government aad been justifible: to the step whieh
that he ahouhl be anxietls to aSail hinisellot "It' opinion in ansiver to welt. a
.case drib w,; weee it eo.ie; . svotild lost tlthes the .trodps. to embark Withoot o Ma-
_they..had taken, but that teey weie bound beea pas-
-earliest epp„rtenity to s„bran tm, hem et he groends obtained i Little ;yr. - te'hfhng.. Fither the oases- it heenaticalotemonstratien of successa-that he '-tljd not , remount, derynot to.iet slip an opportunity which
egn 'which he- hatacenceived that the measure under ; . moat :be ,stated only open
:tee oeist eidi.,:peeme,,, •
.tii„k the iotaestation of the enemy Was the pi ieciple .apeeeredOtoeatford an excelleet muck of ..annoying
~ discussion was justifiable and polirrr. ..,,He feltehowe'
ever, groliais, the answer to whicii•witeld'of cote se ex- ot't whieh he was boued. unwettriedly to soOt ?, The alie,etteare.
i He would not argue the question ors
that he roolal acao,nPlish this egliellQa•les' V '
etude hroPabiliiics and contiogeneies; or pit:l).4lns . ittatrectiona to which lie alluded Were wider the Sign }the narrow-grounds upon which it bad been argued
by the :cipposite side. of the House,. It had been
experiencing theft extramilinary indttleatMaitt He lilies and contingencies rntist be stated as certaintiea Manuol. - letter some lines they
.proceeded thus :-.-. • :
was persuaded, indeed,. that the House wool(' be theamswer to witich would probably be falsified
..by ' "sliot- sailerOas noillhog cao so siseedilyOnd effectu- . assented by them, that-the destructiou of the ships
aware,-froth the coosse pursued. by the•Noble•Lord , the practical reault. ;Its would now explain how -ally annoy the•eneiny Irian entehprio.e„against Roche-, •at Antwerp was the sole,obje6t of the Expedition.
that with every.enort on his part to avoid dilation, 1 these militery epinititta eame to be coiled for at- all: • forte onew in and :pleasure is, that yseu attack,. as. far 11Th4t was ;pot ;ate esasse It was eerteitily a principal
it would be impossible to- /so/uprise what he had . For. 'noised, he' shTstild h tv-e loeen well ConTem to as ig ohoatoable.'' for on the,phsetioithility it appeared. 1 feature of the
.k.N.pedition hut •it was c eineeted with
to 'say ints, - The sebieset. -take the. benefit .of the advice .of -the Officers U.y theepthect wis. leß to'd.-eide, " the enemy, by nie-k- ' other objeds.• -In proceeding, he would obserVes
a very narrow compats.
--the subjeft had been disengaged of seeeral
was ineurnbered with many ditlicoltiess A great : whom those opie'ions -wets, . -a:tot:need, -old-unite iss Si dcsOeht.ol..l; the Fteneh chase, mew Rochefort, thqt,
part of a was of a prolessionel nature, in the dis- throwing hpoo the!ii any respotisieletee Thecae:sea.- leer-der, it prectic.l.l):e,to'atteck the toree thereeand topics which had been 'urged in accusation of his
Government: on :former •occasione. The
:: • coision of whieh.hemust: enter with doubt and heSia .' howeves in the 'present inetanC.,.l‘ WiPi ctrl; ;• le had, to bur:rand de's-troy:lN:docks, arsenal, arid shilipinge • :majesty,
HOuse hadolot been teld 'by the Noble Lord that
.• : radon. Solicitous however, :to saveehe time of the •' for many weeks 'before • the Oetertiftnatioil ofelthe: After' the. •attii-ck et .•Iticheferte shone' circutuo.
the operationaoconld 'lltiVe• beer, •etimmenced strap
House as Motih as polsible, be should discharge the Ea eednien, 'ofstintled a vareety of naval and unlit say semees admit of: terther operatsoetO.you, must Coe-
• COciltlitlliiC,itionsioe!uci:date the.great dbjeetswhieli atilat, L'.Orient and Boerdeziux aa'a•our next: objects;.' ,
earliet period. -Theeeidenceeheentrovettibly proved
-'..' hi:lot:a impesed open him as•briefly as -.circumstances
would permit, and too-, that, puirpose would- trust Gove, einem-had in seeees On, thiS potty several of • antl;ottiosill and tileasUre is, that yoo related to One' that the utmost diligence add expedition -had been
used. He'• epprehended also tliat it had heen.dis7
:chiefly to the recolleEtion of theeHouse-witharespect • tale Choi-denten wlso liadbeee exontine.t as
.witnesses -or both of those places isainay appear advisebleO.' .
titaaly 'Alet-tented lay the evidence,. di-it. was
so the evidence that had' heeneheard at their Bar, _had :fallen into ato shade. 'lles, bad-declared; that , Thits -it seemed that this•ollier went without.a. dia.
'they had given their opinion, tis Upon a Nut-jet-1 dOe ;noel knowledge.of the,precisea object entrusted .to . tati VI her S'acia ice which' could be put int aconeietil ion
a. and quote those passoges, only which it- c{ r 1;
•:S din-
gall necessity to tee-older - with mineteusda , Ho, cidod •on by his Majesty'', Government. CertailAy- ' hint., brit With. a discFetion whit:lel-le was to. eiorciess s oeith the•.aieae...,
.ceutitlertaken. This Wil'S ilillloSt kn.-
.' felt :that he • should be: ("alit's' of itsgrateeedlioo the-el„ hent,4as•tlie -minds of his•Mejaasty's.Goistsefithent. •as eirontostaneto uttered. After Sir
*Jelin ,had gene esirtaiiheonsideratiOn. .He put it to indit iduela who
Noble L, id, it he :did nobt. e'epreaasehis tickled:it:lefts es had tbalottitakinite been, ..on.the great oojeet -which . to the foie ee Wiglit, he wrtate. the it:thee-jug:Ls ter.,
,:bad elestished dotihts With'reasee ato the L( ef
1 L
.
IllentS•for the•opeorturtity whicit, had bleu' olfeedtitl':. 1 lity .hod in vie-sae their eeanesinesa might have ai- : to. Mr. Pitt s-- - ~...
. . • . • ,:- the meaSor ' whether those doubts did net proceed
o•
-olx el dis I • '' • • -I, , b submittinge.Sumed theeeemblanceof -decieion- hut as' Certainly '` Having since my arrival: lieres. cnOversed •With .
catargina:a great- puede: as), y .:• , .
from bOe of t A,O.CatISCS •• eitner the opinion that we
. ,
. s. •
i.
.• `" tile 1-Tiase of 'Como-ions his view ,of thei importan: 'tlo•y had never arrived to ti• final-decisitio:unfiCtite. • :`,` ;ins flew 3•
and Vice-Ad:total .fonowles, _ _wenslrned- our. backs en the Pet iiisclj winch .we
slbjectsin. cpseatt,n. • liOweverthe peofessional parts 'mouth uf June. The' .-No ate Lord 'oast staved that
.',' . who botir•st:ein in be in- opinivii, ilfzitit ii. possi.,-., bound to defend"with air uticlivi'ded force, or
.. of the subject might seee Letter considered.: io :ma •he (laerd. CO had oOdersel-the'aroiy to•-neepai e ter .*:.` Vie) dretn the nature ofs the Davits-Tipp to It ell the'opiniOn,ati:ft, biiis4ed ,Eiys.elf--..hi.teisr, we turned
otheietribisnal there VMS tics .flam but (teat House'. 24.,tkatioo on • the- ..i•grl) •of .slune, . but . bad ties - ''' timi•e mlh-; deer -th.ar 15'.' dctain"ds eV 'n in. sikilt -df osir backs ,on the- North of Getni tOye where . oTo
in. le Inch 'heeive'",ld have beet} :enabled eao hilly -.. , k .his ;"
ti1....C1a .:-LijeAy's olmistire on toe suinact, uetil 's :Its, coast of Fratice) -tor lt :wee or ten- days, welts erniv -.Would heaa ba;ens ahled in it
• etilit;ae 'by the
to sett, the- natuie and. -the- objects of. the Expe-' the 21st : of that- nioLia... 'The fat •wass thin he'had,
.s.''-iseteseiag able:to g,-.1 illtatii•• :o-id, or.tiff't.i.le iSiSt , '
ditty, of a brave,populatiste i- Heseatt Jett it his
'litter. neder diacussione, .to se: erate ; those-obje,ott --laheit: tuts ' i‘laiesty.' pleasure on the bci hi t,tct on the. e"' te; :Aix, during which Sims au alarm wilt iTereesa . ditty, du
the. progress of the Chaamitter. to brim g
-I,l°`" the Masa'ef eithontay -attache:l to therre.and to 14th "-tit St e..w i-. res'eivites -Oda/ that point which 're-- ": litity.beeiVe In t Ole Rios ; titis ceOje • oe decl . these two ;poiets tooter .censideratiea, and to sheer
uri l* - .1 ' b ' ' '
na i tem to i tat teirmg upon o ..e...1 -
~ to:ional ascii . lated {Shute. landing at Stni vliets, which was left to.- .4 sita.ition•tr• it aTieTed tiappen, *.,, :. ,yme 9 '',hatatte d; slat Austria were Prinit,,alydireeed
. , . .
r.
, ,
• llight lust)), differ. There was anoth,a esipootaiste 'the consieeration of the Admiralty-. , The telestion a "-very clelicates etet enuaoy 1.., to.. .•):-.-:r tifili.cers :in
...'..oanOt he' t: Objeti, althongn hi sloing so lie incurred
tadvatitae .ittendants open thel.araity in ihatOisl, Ilse. 'had neierlieeh des hied Upen.by`o6verninemituntil,.
."' the expedient-, Seeo' isee., os eta:tads-it, be ale time respensibiiity. of deityleg „his wiaLes He lied-
ts4f -he h,-;1-tject had been-brought before ant:oiler tti- .1
toe whole was before them. on the 2i st Of Jot;es,.•at;' 'if first 111.,.•unlin.to,J, co,ll.te to b..: tiLi&i the :same satisnetl the Cumtnitteealso wih respect to the hi-
. ,ilnal, the -country 'would nes have gi, en er, oii ;to ' eashieto.periodebeAdmiralty had corm:. to .:I deCisioti, " ditlit4o:y ►
(; lie s`-ii;::, ss '4 i.eir 'ondestaking A:spend= anegeocy of the pecuniary means 1
is tr.. the,Lol.llltly In
le exettionaof a -.Jildg-- Advocate; directed as '.it
~' oil the exped:oricy of the landteg at Sauteliet. The
.'
.S'itire, as i •apprz•lienu.. oil the sOddelinessot les eX- . t
, tear aesp ct ;. and% however. he- ought be actfused of
_ .
ekertioas must have b•-an against his Meieity's co- -ground on • which 'he had •L. (') solienptis to obi if: " . eclat t:ar) that I photriti-b;
,gIV, if it is thOu'ght ':c.ccasion;ite; disclosures prejudiehO
.to: the •netionitl
‘rerninent. It was only to that priliiics. hostility e toe 01412riii of the CointneeTier in Chief wag, that . " propeSe. to' haee ',a dire,'heol., le.eas lam to. aet in credit aed piospenty, he trusted that 110. St,eb evil
. ..
Willett asw ihterVVOvelf 'it our Constitution that the there ' were two lilies of operation.betaVeen Ni,itiCh it ' " !hat czi;e."-t• ' ••• .
..= '. „ . . '. •
would r,c;, te,
since-to e incunvenienc e witico had
Public - ' - like ti ' '.l. el
would trust on. occasions; te rest... . wes neceasary to determine. The one wa's the vete- . Mr. iht I, •in• answor ..-to thia.ce-ie, Th Stzlt.' ,'; *l. . aieted,liad lacti telt n former occasiens. He ac-
i '
.' Without imputing fo the Noble Lord • oppohte any ration- by toe Sehddt ; the othee• by cueseig tite jOilli,•tio'i 1/6 lllOli, btll frost, " .
aln e,. 1-;.-..T._:..1 ••Viett,,•trti teat he was •excesaively anxious to se
, is , -
Virit of which he (LOodo' Was disposedab coal a • Cotatinetit to AntWerp. 'He was le.vate . that Ail,: " tirertupon, by tee hatiga to signify to eeis ea..; ih,..- , tiety:,the House, and Eureee thzt his Majesty's Ge-
. ltain, he had 'aright to aSstitne :Mat the slob
of ttiettlties of •the knitter Were deemed very' serious , jsty's•pleeshre, 'e.g. yoo Or sueti either etficers Oil
.1
: verntnent had erticeaded on.ko nrrow view of -the
• .. -
accuser WA not So immerged in the charader 'of by the Adinitalty, bin be was also 'avyore 'that, the.
~,r.•-whokii the co:mitand may deVolves .dsee le chaa 1 subject ; but teat they,had gone to the. Beheld on
Judge in that Noble Lord, as to lead ' the, country difficulties 'of the lattetplan were deemed still more"; " fortuity to t)te I.:t onilLl kiien
.by his Atjesish In -. ! 'the principles.in, which the. Continent were . just as
t° dishellege that.-every -dispbsition eistet fasten , serius.bY the army alai the et mmtleder Iti Chief...—. sc -S:siiettoiisojedge ot tee paadicability,of the service, e lect' interested as Great Britain. With respect to
.11Pon • his Majestyo Government the -otrerices of He ti. dad written therefore his letter to the; Cenethan- • e. on .1:c sp,,r, accord,•.g as cootingent. eventS, and ties eessibility of sending so large a force te'one
'Avilich they "were eccused. It Zit also be, eatis- der ita ChOit, dated the aoili J este, 'to.- bring' the. '. ‘a.particelareireuitiances, may.; cosine ;, the Iting i)eeit, snd as large a one to the Peninsuia, it e
- laeory
.to the public to --It' 'Ow, that although some 'question teal) issue. 'ln his own- mind he Was eon- -as pidgCtle it hignly prejtattictal to tile good of his iSted ()lily ' iti The: imagination of 'those who enter
individeals had hitherto thought that .he Inquiry . vincadahat Vie ditficulties'in the one -c sse cook! 'be l " service to give ,articular orders, and directions With into thesenhicent discusaions in complete. t6noratwe
be be, betteie cosarteetedeie the ebEeoce -Of • surmounted, -anti tnat in the collar Cloy tech's. in ‘: sosregerd to 'possible - 'Cuilitiltlel l Cates'- that nueiv•
.-A- ----/ of the iii,‘li7ii ol.: the country. • There %sae another
erect that saareefy a e'entence had been re- suoeratee's but he wished for 'the opinion- of the .' ..'• atis!!." .
; • charge tigaii,s,-. f...ii nhije,tys Gies:et:ellen', et wile. h
lured inebeetiere, of the leefhirys of which tire puha , Cotinnktidersiii Chief 16" put that mato: ati reat;Lsa i
~ istaeli evhs'eae opinichn Of that sereat Minister upon nothin. loid beet!. ateit night- eearde naely, ti:e
' lie Were not in pos•sessien., Ftoin the commence- atilt :tildes- his Majeety's' Goveromeet 'Well ltirer .; Ofle•se senjecta. .It appeared therefore that the Gas inadequacy of tlie eyeee eaot outs Whatever ittignt
Gent of 'the investigation; net a sinale queatiorehad Must. cXISt WhiClie'Ver night"he the eourse out rued. '.%.c.1-littli-ii to which lie(Lerd-C::stlereagh). had had be the 'ctitfereuce o;' (,::::01--, on the policy of tile
be • •
'
, ~ .
-
• •
e'en stopped; and en -eery few questions-had-tny TheY ihad no Wild expeetatiens et certain seccess.-- -tfae hoecear to belong; wits not the first teoverneletit Expeditin, o on the eecearistenees rateedent on
tnaciassion token places He felt ennfident'therenpon'; 'They balanced the d,flicult its, aod wit heat being -• th it had sent Dire an expedition without ascettaining its tenures die competence et The ii-t. ny to ..'.:Morn
a confidetseo which he trusted world not' be -arils. blindly saoguirre as to 'the re'selt were desirous of • its obit..cit with 'matlierilatiCA prectsiOn:• The- only -great and impettatit aervices .0.•• IF kpileY',:ity admitted.
..
Plittd to any unbecotaingassomPlion, or waut of de- adopting- thiat plan eelech p•esente‘t. tloa !Oast ridteelo., talkie:A ctilcuonton teat cesed be made by staiestnen '-'l'he'Noble Lord dwelt at some ;eogth on (lie trei-
ference to the Huse, that the •que.i.vion was•brouglit AoailAt the sueposed °Wee:twit teat Govern 4... tat • 'ashe't, by b:ilabciog :the chalices ot out cess with ' the tote of the diversion •which -the EX-el-elitism etfordetl
.i,6, every piiitlt of it tO a fair isitle. Having 'stated . Were tinder hat Cell • fur Watery opinions iii •writig ': (lar;,4*,-,rs of tai!ure, a e.)lettlatian whieti Mem be: made .• to Austria, and , had contended • that i: cokii'd,not, and,
taus mileh, he would'say that he thought it rather •he entered his caveat. e•lleeappealed -'to au 1•1-•-• 'by't`i)e male:small., aid not bs militety intl.n 'alone. 'did not, ciette any such diversion. . tine teesi lei :Ably
Ito eitteaordindry practical isstie an which the:House nourabte Gentleman op posite,
.3.viiether sueii had - He ethic 116,4, to explain, why 'he 1.1,51 -nee ekactly ' the hued -of cr:atiqg a diversion had enTeeee %eta(
wore
to argue and-decide. Hu assured° the . be-- ft the plaaice of Giaterilitienr? lihd it been the ''Oeiteaoled in
the 01)1016:1S cf thoiebigh military, evia s largely jetty the VieWi.of "his Majesty's Go vele:went
ltioble Lord,- that whatever4taio of arOninent had eiree.tios diarieg the 'time that that Honottrable Gen, , thotitiOs whose opinions were on the. tehi6. ~ /and , -.whets - cotiaulting. the Expeditien. So much were
'been adepied by the opponents of -his Ma jesty'i. pre- aietiran held art Military Adrinniatration Of • die • fisors• 'Wit.h..reipect to•the Comm-andel' in Ctiief .in atheyhimpreesedith the nece ;shy of distracting the
sent Gover:iinnt-,-he should have be ea prepared to cOuntry ? • Whate:ver • iniolit have been the. nieriti I!'iiie- Expedition,' he :I..itnitted the Ins opinion was attention of. the enemy, that had the attack on Ant-
In •
eet them.• bet he did .think it. •A singular course, or demerits of that Honourable Gerelernan's..ahoh -'as •16 seed ' upon 'Oehertiment to pause a'ad werp been censidered impracticable, they should have
Ih,- , .
,r_latehe House shonld be 'required to decide upont it military tneSsnres,. he (Lord C.) •ktiew very. well, 'deliberate. upon it; but. he could rot edatit ..(and ohought it their duty to make a descent upon some
_attWhich .rrad not been carried into-operation!-- that to attack them would not be tojustity his own. son all' the conversations' with the Commander in.. Other part of the coast, even had euCh . a descent
u *Coilaier speculatively what might have been the He istotild not even ellude'to them invidiously, fOr •Cluet which he had held, dive,ted et ail respotist- --• been wholly unconnected with any _British object
.
even, if that: etah had been Carried into exaution ;to that would' be a bad return to the Hon. Geotletnan, ' bility), he had 'never understood i hat tie hal dis- wha:ever.....Let.theaituation of the Comintant, When
oman:ice sentene. notOrean eXpedition which had who, whatever difference di-opinion might exist bee finally protested -against the p, opo„ed. operations tire Expedition was only in contempiation, and when
bee ' .
.
. - '
4., a 'ln d, anal whieh had failed, bat on an expedi- iWeen them was h generous opposer..e,-Look to the as impracticable; and consequetely impolitic, hie, it sseted, she compared ; the oppos' side. of the
"art ‘vhich had nett urea tried. ' The. In ter- df National Glory amidst political. contest', and be did Would read a 'single . sentence of tee .short,l reticle :1-Ipose,took e-very.unfair view
:of !bite
epowr of this
the expeclitiott had.neveh been brought to a prac-. justice to the principies..ot his 'osantry, although the of :his ;Lordship, on the subject, •o-•:The: advaote hoottary, When they asserted:that a British army of
lira} last. If was a -spoculative question, whether gQ'ernment of his -country was -no longer •in his . through -tatiders would be attended with' great peat tht-teethuusand men were not likely, in the
21 AO .•Ll have tailed or lien. He said, in the in- hands. Without therefore meaning any attack on that • ditiicutry, 'and at • any
.: nee • the 'attack by ,he then aytte, of ,the
:Continent, -to create a favourale
"stlatio.of this qiiestioh he , i sated that credit Hob.. Gent. he would ask him; if he were 'called on •Scheidt wheld be pretereble.'' The:Co/Owe:Merin. divetsion. ,•, What was the state et the great conteste
l.t he giiren to him tor iris ,ve-te 'fi-otti the very ..
to justify -the expedition to the Dardatied 5, whether . totief would not have aesisted Government by point.- ee .i tie :Danube ? --About teur days before he bad
v.." nenceinent neter souehtto aili.le it: He .had. . lie could produce a %se itten military authority to that itig out the best means's)! attaining the objectead •taken his, Majesty's pleasure on the -subjet, infer
ett visit
,itato time Intio ty: With a iterate -and purpose. Could he produce the writieu authont., of fie considered the object to be wholly unattatnable. •• • matiene arrived .of the, beetle ot . Aspens.. What
e.!' reusaii conviction that
,the merits of the Expedia . tee Conunander in Chief that a navel 'equipment .He proceeded; " lii whoever way Antwerp is to, .Wea the force of thehooteediti on
?.- Titet of
` '"
Std on a roek which -could not tie shaken.— ssethodt any army'was the hest calculated to sectire 'be approached or Liken; -the. service will be one of Austria, by tier official :report that .eley which
11,
loe he stated the eiouirda oit Nc'hil:ll the qUeetion . the object in view Could he produse military OJ-- ~.great risk, as the,eoemywill soon be enabled toes,. premised so. much for Europe, wasls,ooo 'torn.--
ht -
"I then on ally taken up. and acted upon by his ; Inuits with 'respect to the Expedhiutta to SOW h Ame- ..'seinble tr•-:11 eyery part of the Netherlands:, , and ..I.'he Austriansestimated the Freud.). at 100,000,
AI '
.
lesty's Government, he wished tO, discuss the , riea ?. These were lai,,:-. military;qorestiOns. He had- .
.'C•veti !tree Fratice." l'hia st,tement w:ts merely. an . -.What ntitnber did the Prertelt lose in the battle ?
tent whether, ttie nollialy spied which had never heard that-the• rime-G-1410min had oittaiiii•d •eX ~41irtatiou et. the eircurnsia:tces which itialctd the 'Little short of 50,000 men. At such a moutent,
b °. - ' -
.„een
, ;,..„ ...e, ~. .
e iven te • uovernment, and' wine!) WOre on the :the previons sanhtheii 0! tiny oiBil tilitti:ll7 11111tii:ily cointilitider ill 'Chief to -believe that. the erne:l;6,3e could we have-such a Mean and contenaptible fed..
!able of the House, ouelit to heve p-ssessecl such itd them. NusuCh &elements wese in.theOfficeeVer was attehdeci. with considerable risk.. Whether the ' ing towards oetsalvesets to tell iltit-ria that 40,000
4,,tl,'ltniity as to induce his Maje Sty Government to i which he- had..hasi thehhonout to
.piesSise, and he: _ peril existed •'or lint, belonged to another.p.irt Of British troopswere of so little. aorth that we would
'fl.ainiOn-the object- which they had in View. These believed that no suet) doeumste existeo.: It Was ' the
.inginnenth- The, Corninnickr .in Chief never keep them at hame, and leave her to decide the
Bpi, ion,,
.consisfed of five military oPitions from the not the system. on which the Government had: hi- proem:sited an opinion against - the operatioo Tex.: cone
singla ? Freneeh had draitted the Low
orse'Guards, and one naval:opinion, :when his ; therto been conducted, and therefore he ought not eel).* ' contingeot on the aitiount of torce with. 'Countries- eefere the tattle of Aspern.. On the
l'vinselltirry•nts with resd to those opinions had' been to be overwhelmed and borne down lycause .he-had - vOliell 'theSeeemy might be . pre:tared ,to reilit• .2-.1 of June,- a French . order was issued, that
recl'lired in toe Corn;:titio he had certainly declieed, : not adopted it. At the Saine time, lie Certainly With reSpect to . the ()pianos. ef. Colonel Gor- mite-trotins at Antwerp should ,r •a .to iho
g them,- not from any iodispositioh on hieort enteritined great deferefice tot the MilitarY:. ambits' , dOtt, he trusted, that in cent
upon it, •- he Danube. -After a pause in, the tate or- FI-ni:oe
airiY 10 meet, the queslion, but becluse he COnSider- r:tiel, the declarations of ' which were on; the tables ;-sliould not he considered as:depreciating the judg- ,of Mx- weeks or twa, months' (a -pause,
,dure•a.
" those se aiments not as matters of evidence, but of the House, and whert in • his Majesty's Govern- ' Men( of 'that' Officer,. for Wl3Olll 'he. entertainelet whiCh the opposite side •of the House . wozesd
.
fatherr d
olin ed on general reasoning; and here he meat he -,should have conceived hitnaelf guilty of ' a high respect. But when [lord
Gordon stata I haee Wished his- Majesty's Government to remain
)voUldcandi ilycoutess that had it not bsen far a par- a great derelidion of duty, had he not allowed hiaids 'ed hi his
.opinion the exreme Liiard and tisk -timid and inadive) the battle of Waaram was
Vein- •
.
. ,
{ocular ands
which he Should presently, re- self to. be influenced by' them. Engaged- ai.tit:.'. was, to which the Exeedititoi. would, bi-.: , auhject, • lie; fought. The -news of. that battle arrived only the •
Late, •
es_ it was proloa.ble,thOt.he..should,not have ' been in moving-away the-collateral points wnichobstritht- ; did so iii , the Coutemplation,, of ciatennstances i day-before the sailing the Expedition. Though
o
abled to lay on timetable of the House any written :.ed theo..-ceesslo the Main argotriennt, he wonld take ' whelly itiapplicahle. In the pasiage to which lie al-- l the.esewes enotigh of Britishinterests and collateral
• s
retillitary opinions on the sobjed. In faa lie could the opportsinity of. entering. an eeveat . against : Ludt d Colonel Gordon
_declared, that. he consideredi induternents still to make t the boon duty of
and*sil.°t adMit the.
,pritiCiple that under such cirentua. toe do-. ine that had been inculcated in' tins discus- eats attack by troops in launches as highly dangerous; 1 Gevernment to send. out the a, element, yet certaiii. •
!..tanOes it was obligatory on Government to produce ; pion. , He. denied that. it was the bounden duty of '' petit* eohld be mbre trite; it was even
_physically ~ ly the question- of diversion -had undergone some
- - - , - -. .
• -
Itary opinions in Wilting. In the course of his rni- i . 9overnmeni te abstain. from sending out an expe- impracileable.from the nature of the defences; but change. He had been called On -to prove that the,
liter' • -
Y° admmisiration. there had been many cases in dition, not only unless the object of: it were de- then such a mode of attack Was not Contemplated. -Britisti Expedition hachoccaoitened the returner L'n v.
vhi , •
th it would have been;utterlylineoleTble for him dared eao.ly practicable by military men, hut also Sit William Erskine, in hiS opinion, " did not esti- I regiments from • the Danube to .Antwerp--{ his ,°,,as
to i ~
I.ve dune. Boo; military men always made a 'dis- , unleSs the precise nature of the required opera- mate'
,tire risk of landing so highly as the subse- 1.
.not necessary. ' A force might have been retaieed at
theat- ,
ion oetween those military opinions which they tions could .he distinctly enticiptited, -and the -dea quent risk. General .. Elope stated,. that if the. l . Antwerp in consequence of
tire Expeniiion which
gave ill t r "
~ - '
...._, o wee
in riting,,andrthose in which they tails of. the resistance th•lt was to be expeCfed rill- expedition arrived earl in August, the troops I :would of
have quitted itS'at a time when the
leiluolged in conversation or discussion. This vessels, netelyeescerlained. ilad the • Hon. Gantleman might pace advanced: to Antwerp, and thence corn ; contest on the. Danube.-. was' not determined, and
;1(1)' stated in the evidence of Lord Chalhani. Lord
.apposite any titiouter knowledge of the state of the Meneed operai,ions. Snell was also- the opinion of i when the hi"rench did riot koow but that :he whole
Chatham said that his opinion had tiever!bee,n arsenal of Constantinople-when he sent his Expe- General Btoavtirieg, hnd that of COI. Gordon. • The 1 North of .Europestvotild rise against them. • t hes
• given formally in writing. 'Why ? Because hid IVIa7, Aitiop to the Dardanelles ? He had. not the least }louse would see thereforethat so far were, the elite I were asked why the EXpeditioh were not sent th!...
Jesty's •Goyerninent had had the advantage ot.obtainr; disposition to entreatthe forbearance of the.'oppo- Meros of theae opioioas fioat being adverse. to 'the 1• !her, lie woad anStVer thatit Was i Al' I
mpra., 'cab e,
..
in* }its • . .
* opinion in a better mode. It a ovetto- she side of the House, because their,practice when policy mad 'practiCabihty of the expedition, to
they It Would -.have -beew necessary to have creEed an
Mont wish 1
e; to pioted themselves by military in Governonent.was similar to that of his. His ne- gaffe it great counteoance. TWo of otiose Opinions ! army among the lull, that army would
()pink
ins against the responsibilitrof any measure stet understood. that it had been the .practice, at the supported that particular operation, a cttp-de-inciin, ; lio,.v.:ver require the-aid oldie British. 'By renialti.
%Yhieh ti
~!_(„ They wete about, to endortake, then assur- best times, to restrict Government to those military in which ' lit HoneuraOle Getlemen Opposite had : ine there in• winter .-the British 'll-rrty would have
.1 ,they would not. move a step, • without for- Operations 'pnly, the nature; of which was pre,. so' entrenched theteSelves; . brit -the Meaning of been coMpletely.committed, and by con:leg-away it
Thal., Written opinions ; but
.if withopt desiring to cisely known, and the
.result of which could oast which, iO tile I irger seises. in Whieh heailid,:ibt.o4l4l , W'6'.l)ll irive disgraced it
and wodld have injured,
,u,Y.:°'d responsibility they wished only to obtaintoili- . be distinctly foreseen. He would' 13).1 leave to if, ''lie Wotild'ekplAin tici..tre lie sat down. Govei
on ' tht,seswhom it was sent to assist., -Host,ever. cheap
1-ty tntormation, there was no‘mode less likely to read a short passage.. from the instrections given meot•,eaele, beend• they' °loam all the information on . the.opposite side of the House might hold the Ex-
detr.o .s 1 it than by wri ten opiniods, nor any 'mode by William, Earl of Chatham, to Sir J. Mordaunt, the the sulTiet WhiCh,.t 'could procure; and, noon a,' pedition, the Fr
Goverernent aid poi.`clo so, for
~.'",..resllkely to atford it than those c,nversations in Conimander of the Eapeon sent to. Rochefort, , Lriew of that . information, they were bound to they ordered the 'evacuation of the- four principal
""`"'"h m: itary men, divested of responsibility, -which Expedition failed. 'lle Pain iment.of that ! emus to a decision. rlf the. House would allow him forts in• the Prussian dotninions 'in order to avail
Vould .SC; .
..iltlic.• gtutindi on w ir:ch their oentiments day; instead of l'eptikii:iing Lord Chatham. for 0,6 to. explain - fully the 'grounds oil which ttiey had . themselves of:that force against is. But in tad th
were
-fish del. When a milieory case was put on complete failure of the Expedition, beser,Oed 4- .'. h=en Induced to ticlopt The trine
under considera. ', . tti 1d ' f- ' d diversion e
1 ency o the operation to -pro uce a
Paper • • . •, it ttll stripped of all .probabilities and .con• -plauseand adniiratiun oa Mtn for thri, effeit. Wei tion,- i
ste nais peroindad, with all due deference and i 1" was too obvious to require farther comment.
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