The Sun.
London, England, 1844-07-05 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, FRIDAY MORNING, JULY 5, 1844.

r attached, but if there were, they did nothing
to show clearly what the charge was. Now, apply
the doctrines of Lord Ellenborough to the present
case the indictment in the King v. Perry referred to
several transactions, but in this case it refers to a variety
of subjects. It is scarcely possible, I will venture to say,
for any individual to be able to meet such a charge as is
made in the present case. Certainty, in matters of a cri-
minal charge is one of the great principles of the law
that should be acted upon always, and never lost sight
of in a criminal charge. Such, then, my Lords, is the
fifth count. The sixth count charges the assembling of a
large number of persons, for the purpose of changing and
altering the Government of the realm as by law established.
The question is, were these meetings illegal ? they are
not charged ns being so. lite,lstiand 2d counts, which
charge the illegality of the meetings, were overruled by
the jury. Here was intimidation at a legal meeting
charged as a crime.
Lord BROUGHAM—The count says for an unlawful
and seditious purpose.
Sir THOMAS WILDE—The count ought to have stated
how it was unlawful. The count says, procuring divers
subjects of our Lady the Queen to meet and assemble
together in large numbers, for the unlawful and
seditious purpose of obtaining, by means of intimi-
dation to be thereby caused, alterations in the
Government, laws, and Constitution of the realm.
There is no charge that the-meetings were unlawful, or
that.they were called together for the purpose of intimi-
dation. In fact there is not a ,single circumstance that
gives to these meetings any illegality. If they had been
illegal what, I would ask, would be said to the Execu-
tive for allowing them to go on ? Look at Hunt's case,
he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment
for attending an illegal meeting. There is no
charge
,that the objects of the meeting were illegal.
It is stated that a meeting of a great number of persons
was caused, but nothing is asserted as to the conduct of
those who attended the meeting.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—There is no allegation in
this count that any meeting was held.
Sir T. WILDE —I thank your Lordship.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—The charge is a charge of
conspiracy to do certain acts.; there is no statement that
it was followed up. The question, therefore, is the
question of law, whether the conspiring of persons to do
the acts which are here stated is a. sufficient allegation—
conspiring to do that which on the face of the indict-
ment is stated to be illegal.
Sir T. WILDE—W bat I complain of is, not that the
indictment states it to be unlawful, but that it does not
show it to be unlawful • that it does not show that
which it ought to have shown, in order to enable you to
say that it charges a crime.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—As the object of the con-
spiracy the parties must be supposed to have met toge-
ther, and to have agreed to this.
Sir T. WILDE —Yes, so I understand it.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—The charge is that they
agreed to cause a meeting of a number of persons in
order by a demonstration of physical force to procure
changes and alterations in the Government, laws, and
Constitution of this realm as by law established. The
question is, whether, if parties conspire and unite toge-
ther for that purpose, such meeting is unlawful.
Sir T. WILD E—W h e t her the agreement is unlawful ?
The LORD CHANCELLOR—Yes.
Sir T. WILDE— Well, then, I say that the statement
that they meant to intimidate by causing a large meet-
ing is not a statement of an agreement which forms in
itself a crime.
Lord BROUGHAM—Conspiring together was once
stated to be assembling—to be assembling a portion of
the people of England together on Salisbury Plain, for
the purpose of intimidating the Government.
Sir T. WILDE—The question, my Lords, is, who is to
be intimidated ?
The LORD CHANCELLOR—When you are considering
this indictment you must suppose the parties to have
met together, and to have come to this agreement :

count stated no such thing. If half a dozen of those
gentlemen publish pamphlets at various times in order
that certain portions of the administration of the law
might be corrected, not doing this for any idle purpose
but to improve the tribunals of the country, could it be
said that they were bringing the tribunals of law into
disrepute ? Were those gentlemen guilty of conspiring
to bring the tribunals of the country into disrepute, be-
cause they sought to induce persons to withdraw from
those courts, and submit their disputes to other tribunals
to be constituted and contrived for that purpose ? I say
it is perfectly legal to do so, for there was nothing ille-
gal in the object or the means. Your Lordships have
passed many Acts to abolish or improve tribunals which
were in disrepute—that is, which did not answer the pur-
pose for which they were intended, or in the place of which
better may be substituted. - Suppose a person
should say it was not a wise or a prudent thing
to have recourse to the ecclesiasticul courts—
that it was costly, and would be followed by no good
effect, could it be said that he wanted to bring the tribu•
nals of the country into disrepute, so as to constitute an
offence punishable by law ? Here then was nothing ille-
gal in the object, nor in the means as far as could be
ascertained ; on the contrary, the object appeared to be
a good one. If it was intended that those other tribunals
should have something illegal in their character, that
would be illegal, and in the next count an attempt was
made to introduce an allegation for this purpose. The
allegation in the 9th count, that the defendants sought
to assume the prerogatives of the Crown in the establish-
ment of courts for the administration of the law in con-
tempt of the Queen's authority, is much too
general. There is no parallel fur it, except in the
case of the seven bishops. It is not stated
how this is to be done. Were they to have a great seal,
and set up some office for the purpose of creating courts,
or was it by Act of Parliament, or what other mode was
to be adopted? I cannot imagine how this usurpation
is to be carried into effect. This count is not more
sound than the last.
Lord BROUGHAM—I am not prepared to say if a person
set up a house as a court of law it would be illegal.
Sir T. WlLDE—There are, in this very city, coffee-
houses where persons are ready to decide causes, and
your Lordships frequently recommend resort to be had
to them. The next count is the tenth, to which I will
now call the attention of your Lordships. lam afraid
one of the Learned Counsel who will appear before
your Lordships will be under some apprehension
from the framing of this count, for he had in-
troduced a Bill to provide an appeal in criminal cases,
and the present case of the Queen v. O'Connell will not
diminish the necessity for such a Bill. The 10th
count charged the defendants with an attempt to
bring the tribunals of the country into disrepute.
Is it a crime to bring the tribunals of the law into dis-
repute without a cause? This is charged as having been
done unlawfully, but what is there in the body of the
charge to show that it is unlawful ? The mere intro-
duction of the words unlawfully and maliciously, does
not make that a crime which could not be so under other
circumstances. Now the law does not presume that the
tribunals of the law are so perfect that no man may not
have good grounds for bringing them innocently into dis-
repute. But what courts were to be brought into dis-
repute—there is no allegation stating what were
the courts—there is no overt act set out. Now,
suppose some listener at a door bad heard
these defendants say we will agree to bring the
tribunals of the law into disrepute, and had
heard nothing further, either as to the means by which,
or the objects for which, this was to be done, I submit
to your Lordship, that would not be sufficient to convict,
as it might-be with a perfectly legal object, and by per-
fectly legal means, that this was to be ; and, it Lord
Ellenborough's remark, that it was necessary that every
man accused of crime should know precisely that
of which he was accused, in order to be able
to defend himself, is to go for anything, then
this count fails. The eleventh count charged
" The said Daniel O'Connell, John O'Connell, Thomas
Steele, Thomas Matthew Bay, Charles Gavan Duffy,
Thomas Tierney, Peter James Tyrrell, John Gray, and
Richard Barrett unlawfully, maliciously, and seditiously
contriving, intending, and devising, by means of intimi%
dation and the demonstration of physical force, and by
causing and procuring large numbers of persons to meet
and assemble together in divers places and at divers
times within Ireland, and by means of sedi-
tious and inflammatory speeches and addresses to be
made and delivered to the said persons so to be assem-
bled as last aforesaid and also by means of the publishing
and causing and procuring to be published to and amongst
the subjects of her said Majesty divers unlawful mali-
cious and seditious writings and compositions, and fur-
ther contriving and intending by the several means
aforesaid to intimidate the Lords spiritual and tem-
poral and the Commons of the Parliament of the United
Kingdom of G rea t Britain and Ireland, and thereby to effect
and bring about changes in the laws and Constitution
of this realm as by law established heretofore, to wit, on
the thirteenth day of February, in the year of our Lord
one thousand eight hundred and forty-three, to wit, at
the parish of Saint Mark aforesaid, in the county of the
city of Dublin aforesaid, unlawfully, maliciously, and
seditiously did combine, conspire, confederate, and agree
with each other, and with other persons whose names
are to the jurors aforesaid unknown, to cause and
procure large numbers of persons to meet and as-
semble together in divers places, and at divers
times, within Ireland, and by means of unlawful,
seditious, and inflammatory speeches and addresses
to be made and delivered at the said several places,
on the said several times respectively ; and also by
means of the publishing and causing and procuring to be
published to and amongst the subjects of her said Ma-
jesty, divers unlawful, malicious, and seditious writings
and compositions, to intimidate the Lords, spiritual and
temporal, and the Commons of the Parliament of the
United Kingdom -of -Great Britain and Ireland, and
thereby to effect and bring about changes and alterations
in the laws and Constitution of this realm, as now by law
established, in contempt of our said Lady the Queen
and of the laws of this realm, to the evil example of all
others in the like case offending, and against the peace
of our said Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity."
New your Lordships will observe that in this count,
the charge is with attempting to intimidate
the Lords and Commons, for the purpose of
altering the law, without any mention being made
of her Majesty. I conclude that it is meant to be
charged that the Lorehrand Commons would be induced
to alter the law by intimidation. Now, I think your
Lordships will never admit that the House of Lords and
Commons could be intimidated to—
Lord CAMPBELL—There may be a conspiracy to do
that which may not be accomplished. There may be a
conspiracy to intimidate, but the Lords and Commons
may meet it with firmness and resist the attempt.
Lord BaouGuem—But if it were accomplished—

"Let us assemble a great force—so great, so enormous,
that it shall produce intimidation and alarm, and cause
a change in the Government and Constitution of the
country." They may have failed to accomplish tho
purpose ; but are parties, by meeting together and
agreeing to such a scheme guilty of an unlawful act
or not ?

Sir T. WILDE—Any epithets which may be intro-
duced, I apprehend, are not material. It is a meeting of
a large number of persons.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—YOU cannot say that epi-
thts are immaterial. " Seditious" is an epithet, and it
has a specific meaning.
Sir T. WILDE—But your Lordship used the words
" Freat " and " enormous," and I say that such epithets
will not be material. Now, I say, that this agreement,
this cospiracy, is not charged in terms sufficiently pre-
cise to constitute a legal offence. Of course, the indict-
ment is addressed, or purports to be addressed, to a sup-
posed agreement between the several plaintiffs in error.
The indictment supposeg an agreement to the effect set
forth. (Their Lordshipi here consulted together for
two or three minutes.) I say, my Lords, it must be
looked at with reference to the object here stated.
Lord CAMPBELL—What meaning is to be attached to
" physiCal force ?" When was it first inserted in an
indictment?

Sir T. WILDE—Let us first see, my Lord, what is
meant by " demonstration." I believe that word is at
least entitled to the merit of novelty. I have not been
able to find it used in any other legal form. Before,
however, I call your Lordship's attention to those
words, I wish to ask what is meant by "intimidation?"
Who is to be intimidated? how, by means of intimida-
tion, is the effect to be produced of procuring an altera-
_ _

,oia'of the law? It is not to " break the law;" it is not

to "set the law at dellance;" it is to procure
an alteration of the law. Does that mean by legal au-
thority or otherwise ? Is it a sufficient charge that by
a great number of persons meeting the Lords
and the Commons will be intimidated, and that they will
be induced, under the influence of that intimidation, to
consent to au alteration of the law contrary to their con-
victions, and as to what the interests of the country re-
quire ? Are these persons to be supposed to have
libelled your Lordships, as well as entered into conspi-
racy, by imagining that your Lordships would be in-
duced by intimidation to repeal an existing law? But it
is not said that your Lordships are to be intimidated, or
that the. House of Coriiinoni are to be intimidated.

Who, then, is to be intimidated? Are these persons a
set of maniacs who met for a purpose which
they could not possibly accomplish. It is not stated that
these persons intended to procure their object by operat-
ing upon her Majesty, or upon your Lordships, or upon
the House of Commons ; what is stated is an agreement
to call meetings of large numbers of persons, thereby
trying to intimidate, and by this intimidation,
so called, to procure an alteration of the law. I sub-
mit to your Lordships that it is absolutely necessary,
in order to mike this intelligible, that it should be
stated who it was upon whom the intimidation
was intended to operate. so as to procure, as
a consequence, an alteration of the law. Surely
it is not enough to leave this uncertain. And,
then, how is this intimidation to be produced by
the " demonstration of physical force.?" Is it meant
that physical force is to be used ? No ; it is simply
stated that by the meeting of a number of persons, some-
how or other, the alteration is to be procured. Is any
thing more meant,by a demonstration of physical force,
than the caning together of a number of men and
women ? Sure?), that is not such a demonstration of
physical force as can be supposed or intended to have the
effect of intimidation. I know of no authority for such
a position. In the case of Lord George Gordon, the in-
dictment was for high treason, for levying war ; and the
court laid it down, that the bringing of an immense mob
round the Houses of Parliament, and personally
Intimidating the Legislature, was not a con-
spiracy, but a levying of war against the King.
Lord George Gordon was tried for high treason, on the
ground of personally intimidating the Members of both
Houses of Parliament, surrounding the lobby, assaulting
Members, and pulling the Bishops out of their carriages.
That was an intimidation that could be understood. But
the intimidation here was confined to meetings in Ire-
land, at a time when the Legislature was not sitting—
when it was uncertain how many of the Members, or
which of them, would ever meet together again. Intimi-
dation is stated without saying who it is to operate
on ; I contend that such a charge is infinitely too gene-
ral and too ambiguous to be made the subject of a legal
charge. How is such a- charge to be met ! Was in-
timidation the necessary consequence of a large nnmber
of persons meeting together for a political purpose ?
Lord CAMPBELL—Might there not be an unlawful
agreement in the city of Dublin, to call meetings in Pa-
lace-yard, Westminster, for the purpose of overawing
the Legislature ?
Sir. T. WILDE—The count says meetings in Ire-
land only.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—YES ; meetings at places
" within Ireland."

Sir T.Wn.nssubmitted that the charge of intimidation
was too vague, general, and indefinite. The next count
varies from the sixth by adding to the general object of
procuring any alteration in the laws, the special means
of proceeding to procure a repeal of the Legislative
Union between Great Britain and Ireland.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—It is not the alteration of
the law that is the quebtion, it is the means by which
that alteration is to be effected—that is the whole
gist of the indictment. To entertain the legal question in
the indictment we must consider that such meetings have
been held.

Sir THOMAS WILDE—Yes, my Lord. But what I
complain of is this, that the charge in the count is not
such a one as the defendants can answer. I complain
that it is not shown to whom the intimidation is to
apply. If it was stated that it was meant to apply to par-
ticular persons, it might be shown that the means taken
were not sufficient to make it so apply, but, as it stands,
it is impossible to say whether it is directed against
the .whole Irish people, the Legislature, or her Ma-
jesty. The seventh count is the same as the sixth.
The eighth count charges defendants with a conspiracy,
" To bring into hatred and disrepute the courts of law
established in Ireland for the administration of justice,
and to diminish the confidence of her Majesty's subjects
in Ireland in the administration of the law therein, with
the intent to induce her Majesty's subjects to withdraw
the adjudication of their differences with and claims upon
each other from the cognisance of the said courts by law
established, and to submit the same to the judg-
ment and determination of other tribunals, to
be constituted and contrived for that purpose."
Now, first of all, your Lordships have often been en-
gaged in framing Acts removing certain kinds of juris •
diction from one tribunal to another. It often happens
that merchants and traders present petitions to both
Houses of Parliament, praying for alterations in the ju-
risdiction by which their differences and disputes are
settled—the pending alterations in the laws of bank-
ruptcy are cases of that kind.
Lord CAMPBELL—This count charges an unlawful ob-
ject—the last one charged the use of unlawful means.'
Sir T. WILDE—Both counts proceed on the assump
tion of an illegal object, but the defect of the count is
not Rain forth how that object is to be carried out

Sir T. WILDE—I will suppose the alteration in the law
to have been effected. I will suppose that, at the time
of the Reform Bill, persons had been indicted for hold-
ing large meetings for the purpose of intimidating the
Lords and Commons.. Such an indictment could not be
sustained. Would their Lordships admit that such a
thing could happen as that, by intimidation, the Legisla-
ture could be induced to alter—and how could that
which they not accomplished, subject a party to an in-
dictinent for conspiracy, when, if they had accom-
plished it, they would have been subject to no such in-
dictment? An agreement to do that which it was impossi-
ble to accomplish was no crime. Would the law intend
to say that such. an effect could be produced, and if it could
not, how could the agreement to produce such an effect
constitute a crime ? To what intimidation does the in-
dictment refer ? It may refer to the intimidation to be
produced by setting before the Lords and Commons
the political ...consequences which must ensue
from a.. certain course of conduct. Now, was
it not lawful to lay before the Legislature.
the consequences of the doing, or failing to do, certain
acts. There was nothing degrading, as in the sense of
personal intimidation, in such conduct. Is it the intimi-
dation of the whole body, or only of individuals? If a
number of persons is ho had particular opinions agree to-
gether to endeavour to -induce the Legislature to alter
the law, is that neclsarily a crime? If an important
alteration in the law is required, in what situation are
the subjects of this country placed, if they are not to
express any opinion for the purpose of attracting the at-
tention of the Legislature to the subject?
Lord BROUGHAM—This is laid as by seditious speeches
and writings.

Ild be

Ind to know, if this is the

Sir E. WILDE-1 g'
charge, if those seditious speeches ought not to be set out,
that your Lordships might see if they were seditious or
not. If, a person makes seditious speeches he is
liable to be prosecuted for it, and an agreement to make
seditious speeches is not an offence. There is merely a
general allegation that intimidation was to he used.
Why, that is only what every great and powerful man is
in the habit of doing when he objects to an: act which
the Legislature is about to do. The allegation of inti-
midation as made in the indictment d.,es not constitute
an unlawful act.°
Lord CAMPBELL—Suppose it had been to corrupt the
Legislature. Although the law would not suppose that
possible, it would be an unlawful act.
Sir T. wmpz-I should say, ray Lords, that an

What tribunals were they from which confidence was to agreement to corrupt the Leeislature—the_ Lords and
be removed ? They might be of such a character that the Commons—would be treated asareidle crime.
your Lordships yourselves would be disposed to say, the Lord CAMPBELL—Suppose A, B, and C joined toge-
sooner they were put an end to the better. They might gether, having got 100,0001., to offer 1,0001. each to 100
be attended with delay, with expense, with many other Members of the House of Commons to vote in a certain
circumstances that might render them anything but a way, would not that be illegal ?
remedy. And here are no false representations alleged Lord BROUGHAM—It would require 1,000,0001., and
to be used with regard to them ; there is no statement that would not be enough.—(A laugh.)
how the defendants proceeded against these courts, Lord CAMPBELL—That I suppose is your price ?
whether by writing or by speech. Sir THOMAS WILDE—I doubt very much, my Lords+
Lord CeiumiELL—The count does not say all the whether that would be treated seriously as a crime.
courts of law. The case put to me does not appear to create the diffi-
Sir TnomAs Wienz—The count only says, the tri- culty lam presenting to 3 our Lordships' minds, be-
burials. Whether the defendants have proceeded by cause to corrupt the Legislature would be looked upon
writing, or by speeches, is not said. as impossible to be effected ; but to intimi-
The LORD CHANCELLOR—I see this indictment says, date it—that had often been done. Is not
" bringing the tribunals into contempt, and withdrawing the apprehension of consequences the motive constantly
from them the business that goes to them, and submit- of action in the Legislature ? Now, is the intimidation
ting the same to the judgment and determination of other here alluded to one of personal violence; the count war-
tribunals, to be contrived for that purpose." The indict- rants no such conclusion ; there is no appearance of the
ment does not say that these tribunals are not to be use of violence, nothing to warrant the supposition
" contrived" by the Legislature ! that personal violence was the species of inti-
Lord BROUGRAM said the charge was that of destroy- midation intended. how many persons, I will ask,
ing one kind of tribunals for the purpose of establishing have been intimidated by a threat of resignation.—
others, like destroying the Ecclesiastical Courts in order (Laughter.) Why, such a threat has produced greater
to establish Diocesan Courts. consequences than the millions or hundred thousands
Lord CAMPBELL said that the Commissioners ap- that have been talked of. - (Laughter.)
pointed to inquire into the operation of the Ecclesias- Lord BROUGHAM—Even when it was impossible.
tical Courts were in some danger under this indictment. Sir THOMAS WILDE—What, my Lords, was
Sir THOMAS WlLDE—Beyond all doubt, the Commis- the apprehension that produced Catholic calm-
sioners who made this report have committed an offence. cipation ? It was an operation in the under-
Whether it can be prosecuted or not, is another standing. The number of persons who meet is
question. important, as showing public opinion. - The crime in the
Lord BROUGUAM—It should have set forth—And to present case is striving to intimidate the Lords and
extend their jurisdiction: to. other tribunals than those Commons, 'and that is no crime. There is nothing
already established by laW, or to be established. shown except that it was intendecno operate upon the
Sir THOMAS WILDE—The next count had the effect understanding and the law. The law will not adopt
of doing-that. It charged them with "using and usurp- that as a crime which is calculated to alter the opinions
ing the prerogative of the Crown in the establishment of of the Houses of Lords and Commons.
courts for the administration of the law
_;" but the eighth
....Lord CAMPBELL—Do you maintain, Sir Thomas

Wilde, that there is no good count in the indictment
Sir T. WILDE—I am prepared to maintain that, but I
don't think it necessary. The present case is of import-
ance far beyond the interest of the parties concerned.
It involves the whole criminal justice of the country,
and it will be for your Lordships to decide whether the
general charges made in the indictment are sufficient to
substantiate a criminal charge, and one for which parties
are liable to suffer imprisonment. Indictments of this
general nature in all times, and in cases, lead to
great evils, and bring the law into great disrepute.
If these parties have been guilty of the acts laid to their
charge there was a much better mode of indictment
then the present. The question has been repeatedly
put, whether there was a good count in the indictment,
and if it nas stated that there was, the judges generally
applied to the good count. In criminal cases the judge
always asked if there was any good count. The judg-
ment of the Court in a criminal case placed the judge
in the situation of a jury.
Lord BROUGHAM—With this difference, that the
judge knows which count is good and which is bad, and
the jury does not.
.Sir T. WILDE—I think your Lordship will find that
that does not operate as a distinction in this case. If all
judges are supposed to know at all times what judgment
they ought to give, writs of error are dead and useless
forms. The law, on the contrary, supposes the possi-
bility of error in judgment. The law gives an appeal
from one Court to another on that assumption.
Lord BROUGHAM—I remember taking this point in
the court of error before the judges, and Mr. Baron
Wood said, ." We contend in the court of error that the
judgment was given below upon the count, which is
gOod.
Sir T. WILDE—A judge cannot say, if the Court
below has given judgment upon two counts, that he in-
tended :o give it only upon one. There is no difficulty,
whatever in a Court having before it a defendant
for judgment.—(Their Lordships here consulted
fir about five minutes.) Why is it that, in civil
cases, the Court feels it necessary to arrest the
judgment altogether, where general damages arc found ?
The Court arrests judgment altogether, because it can-
not give judgment upon a bad count, having no legal
power to fix the proportion of damages. Care was taken
that the verdict for damages should be given on
counts which were unobjectionable. In a criminal
case there was no difficulty whatever. It is
perfectly competent to the Court to arrest judgment
upon the bad counts, and to pass sentence upon the good
ones. There is no reason which applies to civil cases
that does not also apply to criminal. In a criminal case
the Court is bound to give judgment upon
the good counts, and upon those counts alone. Judg-
ment is supposed to be compounded of the several offences
of which the party has been found guilty. There is
no ground, therefore, for the supposition, that in a crimi-
nal case the Court is authorised to give judgment upon
the whole record, good and bad, if there be a
good count ; and the mistake has arisen
simply from the judges saying in criminal
cases, when objections have been made that some
Counts were bad, " We will not arrest judgment"—that
is, there shall not be an absolute arrest of the judgment
upon the whole record. Nothing was ever heard of so
absurd, as that the judgment upon the entire record is
good,wben there are several bad Counts and one goodone.
It would be quite an anomaly if the Court could pro•
trounce a judgment which was in truth applicable only
to one count, as though it were applicable to the entire.
record.
Lord CAMPBELL—Suppose there were one count only
in the indictment, and that count charging a clearly
indictable offence, stated several things which would not
be indictable ; and there was a general verdict of guilty
upon the whole count. If judgment were given would
the whole count be vitiated ?
Sir T. WILDE (as we understood) intimated that he
thought it would.
Lord BROUGHAM—Was " The King v. Pellatt" a case
in error ?
Sir T. WILDE—Yes, my Lord. The Learned Counsel
then referred to the judgment of Lord Ellenboraugh, in
,support of his argument. If the Court gave judg-
ment on the whole of the counts might not intend-
inents .be made in the absence of evidence ? But
the record states that judgment is given on the
whole of the counts. What is the record ? A memo-
rial as to what the law is. If damages of 100/. were
given in a civil action on matters, some of which fur-
nished cause of action and some not, how would a court
of appeal deal with that judgment ? Refuse the whole
of it. What is the use of a writ of error ? Its object
is to see what the Court has done on the record. Who
could doubt that here a judgment has been pronounced,
and that the party is suffering an imprisonment upon that
judgment'? And should any legal legerdemain pretend
that this judgment had not been passed on certain parts
and part against a judgment on a civil
bad, the judgment would
of the record ? Surely it was sent up here as the record
action,
taiovne,riptyar.t
glnood n
an
be refused. A writ of error is given only on
the presumption that an error has been committed in the
Court below. Yet when the writ comes before this House
are your Lordships to be told that something has been
done different from what the record states? Would not
the effect of that be to leave all in a state of uncertainty.
Parties were put to an enormous expense in having their
decisions examined by this House ; and after
this, were they to presume that the Court
below has done just what is right ? What the Court
below has alone is not a matter of intendment,
it is inscribed in the record. The object of the
writ 'of error is to bring under review what the record
opinion that one years'
O'Connell is a
punishment that applies to the offences stated in these
idmecplrairseosn. m If
imprisonment
it i
acrd
dyo 2u,r oLoordfisnheipso' n
Mr.
counts, this House is then in the situation in which it
would stand with respect to a decision of the Court be-
low, in which a jury has given damages on several
counts, some good and some bad. Tnere are no means
of disentangling these counts, or of saying what portion
of the year's imprisonment, or what portion of the fine is
adjudged to any particular count ascompared with the rest;
and as you cannot apportion the punishment in one case
any more than you can apportion the damages in the
other, the judgment given on the whole of the rec3rd
cannot stand, if any portion of that record is bad. The
proper course is this, to send the record back, and
to correct it, according to the; facts, if any
mistake has occurred; but nobody ever heard of that
being done in a case of this description. UI am asked
for authorities for the reversal of a judgment on a
record partly good and partly bad, my answer is,
the universal practice and general principle of the law.
On every appeal the case is treated as if it was an
original hearing, and the judgment given in the Court
below is not considered of the slightest authority;
and here I refer your Lordships to the record
'tself. On that record sentence has been passed with
nect to the offences disclosed in it. These words

resp,
are not to be treated as idle words. It is a matter of
clear law, that the record must speak for itself, and if
judgment has been given upon it, it must be supposed
that it is upon the whole of it. What would
be the consequence of your acting otherwise ?
In future times in inspecting the record, what is to guide
those who seek instruction from it as to what your Lord-
ships' judgment has been, except what you chose to
enter. Whatever decision your Lordships come to, that
will be the guide. But let me ask how the defendant
have the record framed in such a way as to
stands ill point of plea here ? Is he not to
give him the means of pleading one way or the
other. is he to plead that he has been convicted, and
are the Court to conclude that he has been autrefois con-
vict? Surely in a case of such a complicated nature as
this, it is of importance that the record should speak for
itself. When there was a necessity to have the record pro-
perly framed, with a view to a
be an extremely
vicious practice to
it would
ce to say he
has never affirmed it, if it be the course of the courts
below, which I deny, tn enter jUd*Ment upon a bad
count of the indictment, because it would pass on
the good counts. There was no necessity for such a
course being pursued. Supposing that there were some
counts good and some bad. If the Crown was entitled
to judgment upon the good counts the defendants would
ba equally entitled to judgment on the bad counts.
There is no reason why judgment should extend beyond
the legal bounds to which it is applicable. Lord CAMPBELL—Allow me to ask you, supposing
oftle
tChoeurctouonf
tQs,uethene's7 thßench in
or
sake, was a bad count, bow do -ou suggest that it ought
stlhrelsaatyld, for argument's
thought that one

to be entered ?
Sir THOMAS a WILDE Th t he should go thereof with-
out_— bail.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—Can you give me any in-
stance of a record in a criminal case so framed ?
Sir T. WILDE—I am not aware of any such thing, but
it is easy to account for it, because there was no advan-
tage in requiring the record to be properly entered,
supposing the judgment to be,critered on a count which
is good. The opinion of the Court is taken on a motion
for arrest of judgment, and the Court say we give judg-
ment on the good count, and the record is scarcely made
up at all. What is the foundation of the difficulty
here ? Cannot a different judgment be given on
different counts, even on parts of a count and parts of a

plea, supposing the judgment to be dissimilar, in a ques- 1
tion of this description, where sentence. is passed, and
which still may or may not be supposed applicable to
each of the counts? That a judgment ever passed which
was applicable to all the counts upon which it was
entered, I very much doubt. But most extraordinary it
is that a
.prisoner is to suffer under sentence, which, as
appears in the record, is applicable to three or four
several offences, and that he was to be told when he ap-
pealed against that sentence, that a surmise would be
made that it was intended to be entere-aiift- that which it
was not. Suppose there be three counts in the indictment,
and that the Court of Queen's Bench holds the first to
be good and the others bad—that the Court of Ex-
chequer holds one to be good, which the Court of
Queen's Bench has pronounced bad, and that your Lord-
ships decide that that count is good which they both
pronounce to be bad, and that the other two are bad.
What is to be the intendment? It is perfectly impos-
sible that there should be any intendment at all. It
would be perfectly absurd that if a man was convizted on
eleven counts, and suffered sentence, and that a Court
of Error found possibly one of the counts to be good,
that he should suffer under the accumulated sentence of
the eleven counts, each containing different offences.
There is no foundation for it; and no authority can be
produced for it. Whenever a court of law has refused a
motion for arrest of judgment on bad counts, it assigned
for a reason that judgment was given on the good counts.
Lord CAMPBELL said, is there no case of au error after
judgment ?
Sir Tuomas WILDE—No, my Lord, we have sent to
the Crown-office, and we believe there is not one. What-
ever be the intendment it cannot be doubted that there
may be indictments for several distinct offences, that
some of them may not legally subject the party to pu-
nishment, and sentence be given on the whole.

left conspire tc, cheat A. B. out of the remaining horse. Now
here are three conspiracies between different persons at dif-
ferent times. Such would be found to be the conviction in
the present ca Eight persons would be found to have
convired to do certain acts. Some of those are found to have
conspired to do other acts, and there is a third conviction for
conspiring to do otb er acts, referring obviously to different
times, and with respe ct to some of the acts to different persons.
(The Hon. arid Lean ied Gentleman here read the finding of
the jury at length or the first and second counts.) Now, by
this finding there wiere eight persons convicted of one con-
spiracy, seven perm)l is convicted of another conspiracy, and
three persons cony icted of a third. Now, on the record, there
is one entire char ge. The first and second counts contain
one charge only, but the finding makes them guilty of dis-
tinct offences, son-, Ie distinct as to the persons, and all as to
their objects. The se offences may be more.or.less extensive;
they may be the w hole:, or a portion of the count, but upon
the finding the defer dant can only be guilty of one
offence. It Was not competent for the jury to find
and the Court to give judgment upon perfectly distinct and
independent offences, although those offences are part
of what is the entire charge, and although each of these
might have - been the subject of an indictment.
This finding, there. 'ore, cannot be a good one.
If there are three perfect ly distinct legal offences, they cannot
be convicted of one en tir e offence. The first objection in this
part of the case is, th: .upon those two counts, each being
entire, the jury did not convict the defendants of one entire
offence, but convicted th em of three distinct offences. On the
third count, your Lordshi us. will find that Daniel O'Connell, Mr.
Barrett, and Mr. Duffy, a r&' found guilty of the whole of the
third count, and that Mr. J-olin O'Connell, Mr. Steele, Mr.
Ray, and Dr. Gray, are not 1 ound guilty of the whole of it ;
they are not guilty of that:. part of it which charges them
with conspiracy to excite di affection in the army, and
the Reverend Thomas Ti' .;rticy was found guilty of that
part only which relates to tl ie exciting of disaffection in the
army. Here your Lordships will observe that Daniel O'Con-
nell, Mr. Barrett, and Mr. Duffy, are found guilty of the
whole matter of the count. They were charged with con-
spiring together with Mr. Jo' grr O'
Connell and the other de-
fendants to accomplish certain objects, and Mr. D. O'Connell,
Mr. Barrett, and Mr. Duffy, are ft nind guiltyof conspiring to do
thatof which Mr. J. O'Connell and the others who conspired
with him are not found guilty. It is impossible that Mr. D.
O'Connell, Mr. Barrett, and Mr.. Duffy could have conspired
with those other persons within t those other persons con-
spiring with them, for the natualo of a conspiracy is, that a
mutual agreement or contract lir:S been entered into to effect
the common object. The count c] targes eight persons with
conspiring together, and they fi.aid that the eight are guilty,
but that five of the eight were. not guilty of what three
others were convicted. If the aoq uittal of the five be right,
the conviction of the three mush, be wrong, and here the
same objection arises of finding t.vo offences, and I think
this finding is erroneous, and ougl it to be set aside.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—SUM )01;e a case of three persons
being indicted for conspiring to lo an act, of whom two are
found guilty and the third acq aitted—would not that be
good ?
Sir T. WILDS--I do not apprel end you can find that two
men conspired with a third; and find in the same record that
the third did not conspire with the n.
_ . _

At this period of the argument, the Lord Chancellor
and some of the Judges retired for the purpose of refresh-
ment. On their return

Sir T. WILDE resumed his argument as follows—l
was stating to your Lordships that I was certain no au-
thority could be introduced for the extraordinary
proposition, that where judgment was entered
upon an indictment in which a writ of error
would issue, it was shown that some of the counts
were good and some of them were bad, the
judgments should be considered as entered upon the
good counts, and not upon the bad ones? Suppose your
Lordships should decide that the sentence passed
was applicable only to some of the counts, and
suppose Mr. O'Connell to be again indicted upon
the counts which were decided to be bad how
could he plead autrefois convict—a autrefois convict ?
On this point I will draw your Lordships' attention to
the case of the " King v. Wolf." In that case a jury had
been allowed to separate, in a case of misdemeanour.
In the morning the defendant's counsel had objected to a
continuance of the proceedings. Lord Tenterden, who
presided, said he would not stop the case, but that he
would take care to have the fact stated upon the record.
The defendants were convicted and sentenced to two
years' imprisonment, and a fine of 10,0001. A writ of
error was brought, and Sir Charles Wetherell appeared
to argue the case before your Lordships. The indict-
ment was produced, and on the postea it was entered that
the Court had been duly adjourned. Lord Eldon imme-
diately stopped the case, saying that he could look only
to the record—that Whether the jury separated or not,
was a qu:stion they could not enter into, as the record
stated that the Court was duly adjourned. The writ
was dismissed, and the parties suffered the imprisonment.
I mention this to show how implicitly your Lord-
ships hold to the record even when it may be
equivocal as to the purpose for which an entry wasmade.
Now, I ask, how would your Lordships deal with a plea
of autrefoia convict if put in by Mr. O'Connell, with
regard to one of these bad counts ? How would you deal
with such a plea if it were brought before you on writ of
error and the record showed a conviction on that count ?
Why, a counsel would be unworthy to stand before your
Lordships who should attempt to argue such a plea in
the face of such a record. Suppose an indictment for
perjury and assault—an indictment on two counts—sup-
pose the party convicted and again indicted for one o'
the offences. He would plead autrefois convict.
By and by the man produces the record of his conviction
of perjury and assault, he suffers the punishment—
will the liouse, in such a case, deal with it otherwise
than stated in the record ? The truth is, the record
must be dealt with as it was found. I cannot
produce it in order to show that in point of
fact • the Court pronounced a judgment of a
particular kind, because that was not admissible. If it
was found that the counts were good which we say are
had, the intendment will be the same. There is no case
in which an intendment is given, except upon the state •
ments of the record, and your Lordships cannot give
judgment in this case, except upon the statements in the
record. In the case of the King and Fuller, that was an in-
dictment charging the defendant with attempting to get
seamen from the service; there were several counts in that
indictment and several objections. There was an objec-
tion made to onecount in particular, and upon that a mo-
tion was made in arrest ofjudgment, but it did not succeed.
Now in the present case I submit that the several counts
I have adverted to are not good in point of law. Ido
tint mean to admit that the other counts are good, be-
cause I apprehend the objections I have urged to
the other counts will equally apply to them.
I have now addressed your Lordships as to
the effect of the general judgment upon the good and
the bad counts ; and I will now refer the House to some
authorities, to show that counts in indictments of such a
general nature have been continually held to be bad.
The Learned Gentlemen then referred to Hawkins's
Pleas of the Crown, Curwood's edition, and the
3d Institute, in order to show that general counts
in an indictment were held to be bad. In the
case of the " King v. Richardson," in Ist Moody
and Robinson, the parties were indicted for a conspiracy
against Sir Henry Parley. The case was tried in the
county of Somerset. The indictment charged that the
defendants did conspire, confederate, and agree
to cheat the said Henry Parley, and certain overt
acts were also stated. - The overt acts not being
proved, at the close of the case for the pro-
secution counsel for the defendant observed that the
count could not be sustained, inasmuch as the count was
too general, and stated no specific act by which the
Court could judge whether the conduct of the defendant
was unlawful or not. Lord Denman said, "My opinion
is that the indictment ie. bad in point of law. The alle-
gation is too :general, and it does not convey any
specific idea which the mind can lay hold of to judge
whether any unlawful act has been done or not."
My Lords, my great objection to this indictment is, that
it constantly, introduces terms such as those which the
Noble Lord here refers to as indefinite, and having no
legal and precise meaning. Reference was made in the
ease I have just cited to the case of the "King v. Gill," 2d,
Barnewall and Alderson, a case which is so often
referred to on account of its laxity, that
it is hardly to be considered an existing authority.
The Learned Counsel then referred to the case of " The
Queen v. Parker," tried in the Central Criminal Court. In
that case the object of the conspiracy, charged had been
accomplished. The indictment charged that the parties en-
tered into a conspiracy with each other and with other per-
sons, by divers means, to acquire and obtain goods from divers
liege subjects of her Majesty, and to cheat and defraud her
Majesty's subjects by false representations, and that the
defendants received the goods which had been obtained
by false pretences. The jury said that the parties
had, by means aforesaid, unlawfully gained possession of the
goods, and cheated and defrauded their owners. Now, in the
present case there is no mention of the persons to be in-
timidated; there is entire silence as to the means by which
certain ends, and those not ordinary ones, are to be accom-
plished, and the generality is infinitely greater here than in
any of the cases to which I have referred. In the " Ring
v. Cooper," 2d Strange, there is the case of a person in-
dicted for stirring up strifes, quarrels, and disturbances
against his Majesty's subjects. That was held to be a
bad indictment. The indictment in this case was for stirring
up Irish subjects against English subjects. In the "Queen
v. Rowell" a number of persons were indicted for conspir-
ing and agreeing with one another to do certain indecent acts
in a public place and in the presence of her Majesty's liege sub-
jects. Mr. Justice Patteson said "he could not admit an indict-
ment for treasonable, or for indecent or other bad practices
to be conveyed in such loose terms. From such words used
in common parlance the specific offence might be inferred,
but those loose words could not be admitted into a legal do-
cument." Mr. Justice Williams and the other Judges con-
curred with Mr. Justice Patteson, and their judgment Was
respited.
Lord BROUGHAM—What are the words of the indictment
—I mean what are the adjectives used to describe the in-
decency ?
Sir T. WILDE—My Lord, the words are very offensive. They
are " to do certain indecent, lewd, nasty, and unnatural acts."
But, notwithstanding all these words, the Court held that the
indictment was too loose, and could not be sustained. Such,
my Lords, is the general doctrine, and there are a great
many other cases similar to those which I have referred to;
but I will not now trouble your Lordships with them. I
stated to your Lordships that, in the case of the "King v.
Fuller," it was argued that the Court would give judgment
upon a good count, although the other counts were bad. In
the case of the " Queen v. Ingram," the Court held that thefine
could not be inflicted upon good counts, the others being too
general. That case is reported in Salty. I will now beg to
refer your Lordships to the case of "Grant v. Astell," Ist
Cooper, page 776, in which the decision was the same. The
position which I wish to present to your Lordships is that
the indictment consists of several counts which are bad by
means of their vagueness. Some of these counts do not con-
stitute any legal charge, nor any pretence for a legal charge.
Other counts are expressed in too general terms to constitute a
legal charge, and the judgment which was passed upon all these
counts cannot be sustained in point of law. The judgment
has been passed for a greater number of offences than were
charged in the indictment—a greater number of offences
than the defendants had pleaded guilty to. I must call your
Lordships' attention again to the first count. It first sets out
some overt acts, omitted in the next, although in respect to
general charges the first and second counts were the same.
Now, I must call your Lordships' attention to this first count.
The charge is that the defendants conspired and agreed with
each other and with divers other persons unknown to raise
and create discontent and dissatisfaction amongst her Ma-
jesty's liege subjects stir up hatred and con-
tempt of her Majesty's Government—to excite hatred
and jealousy in the minds of her Majesty's Irish
subjects towards their English fellow-subjeets, and to create
discontent in the army. I have now read to your Lordships
the first count which charges one conspiracy to do certain
acts, and to acomplish certain specific purposes. There is no
doubt, my Lords, that this count presents but one charge,
that is of a conspiracy to do certain acts. I am not here to
say to your Lordships that the defendants might not be found
guilty upon part of that count. Although it was bad in part, yet
it might be severed, and the verdict might be taken upon part.
The finding could only be on one conspiracy, and the judg-
ment of the Court could only be on one offence. The verdict of
guilty of conspiracy could only apply to one illegal agree-
ment or association. There are not several agreements
alleged, but only one; but the jury have found the defendants
guilty of three several conspiracies, though the indictment
presented a charge of only one. It would be found the same
as if it stood thus :—Eight persons conspired to cheat another
person A.B. of three horses, black, white, and grey. Eight
persons are supposed to conspire, they are proved to have
met in a room—that' they came to an agreement to cheat
A. B. out of his black horse; but a part of them declined
to become parties to cheat A. B. out of another horse. Two
persons out of the eight retire from the room, and those who
remain enter into an agreement to cheat A. B. out of another
horse. A portion of them again retire, and those who are

The LORD Cumienta.ou—ln a- conspiracy between A, B,
C, and other persons, if you find guilty of a conspiracy, it
is not necessary that C and B sl tould be joined in the con-
spiracy.
Sir T. WlLDE—Every indictn tent for a conspiracy must
be framed in one of two ways—either that persons unknown
had conspired with A and B, or. that A and B, and others
unknown, had conspired ; but you must always prove the
conspiracy as you charge it.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—IS it, necessary to prove a con-
spiracy against all the persons who are made parties to it ?
(At this period of the proceectii gs it was announced that
the Royal Commissioners were in waiting to give her Majesty's
assent to certain Bills.)
The LORD CHANCELLOR—We, will renew the argument
after the Commission is over.

Counsel were then ordered to -withdraw, and the Royal
Assent was gives by Commission to certain Bills, for which
see our Parliamentary report. After the Commission the
argument was resumed.
Sir THOMAS WILDE then resumed—Your Lordship was
asking me a question respecting! the acquittal of one defen-
dant, when three were charged ,)13 an indictment for conspi-
racy. 1 know of no case in w taf•ch a record properly en-
tered and properly prepared a.lows incongruity on the
face of it. In this case, instead of finding that
Daniel O'Connell, Barrett, and Puffy conspired with each
other, and witk certain persons: unknown, to do certain
acts, the jury find that they are grLifty of the premises charged.
On the first and second counts they find them guilty of con-
spiracy with each other to do certain acts which form a part
of the premises set out in those 'c ounts. In an indictment
against those persons for conspiracy with each other to do
certain things, if the guilt of one of the three is not esta-
blished, the proper mode of entering the finding is, that as to
No. 3, not guilty, as to Nos. 1 and 2; guilty of conspiracy
with each other, to do so and so. _

Lord CAmpnELL—l....that an essential part of the agree
anent?

Sir T.MLDE—The essential part is, that it is an agreement
with several to do certain acts which constitute a conspi-
racy. The indictment here charges a conspiracy not only
with the eight defendants who were living at the.time of the
trial, but with a ninth who was not living.
The LORD CHANDELLon--Three persons are indicted for
conspiracy, and two have been found guilty of the premises,
whilst the other is not guilty. Will not that do?
Sir T. WILDE—No, my Lord. I must pray your Lordship
not to use the word premises, without stating its meaning.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—I made use of the word premises,
because it is in this very count.
Sir T. WILDE—And I use it for the same reason. But
then, when your Lordship uses this an as objection, I ask
what is meant by premises? The word " premises," I ap-
prehend, means that they are guilty of having entered
into the conspiracy charged in the count. If it does
not mean that, who can tell what it does mean ?
If the . word "premises" be a legal word, there must be a
certain meaning attached to it. Suppose they were to be in-
dicted again, what would be their plea?
The LORD CHANCELLOR—I think it is precisely the same
question.
Sir T. WlLDE—Surely it would be a different offence?
The LORD CHANCELLOR—Not at all. Suppose the parties
are charged with conspiring with A, B, and C, to do certain
acts, and the jury were to find that they had conspired with
A only, would not that be sufficient ?
Sir T. WILE.—Yes, my Lord. But your Lordship omits
the most material part of the question : that B and C have
been acquitted, and the conspiracy with them is denied.
Upon this occasion a conspiracy is charged against eight;
three are found guilty of the premises. If it was com-
petent to . find them guilty of conspiracy with the other
five, why was not the verdict consistent ? For which
charge_ had they received judgment ? 'This applied, to
a certain extent, through all the subsequent counts.
He conceived, therefore, that the record was defective in
what it had not found, and inasmuch as it had not found an
acquittal;;" for instance, the whole were found guilty on the
premises when the jury had negatived the possibility of
that guilt by the acquittal of certain persons with
whom they intended to conspire, and on which
intention a portion of the charge was founded.
There is a verdict of not guilty in favour of the defendants,
which ought to have been followed up by judgment. A ver-
dict was of no avail which was not followed up by judgment.,
and he was not aware of any case where judgment was not
pronounced in which a verdict of acquittal was found. The
defendants were acquitted on tke count charging them with
attending an unlawful. assembly, and upon this acquittal the
judgment of the Court was not pronounced.
Lord CAMPBELL—Is, that an error of which you can avail
yourself 2 You can only avail yourself of that by which you
are damnified.
Sir THOMAS Mu:we—Those for whom I appear, and the
other defendants, may be damnified in this respect, that a
verdict of not guilty could not be pleaded to another indictment.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—We can repair that defect here.
. Sir T. WILDS—I am not aware that in a criminal case,
where the Court below does not pronounce judgment, your
Lordships have ever added it.
The LORD CHAN CELLOR-I am informed that the Court of
Queen's Bench has done so in a case called " The Exeter
case," and upon the distinct ground of its being discretionary.
Sir THOMAS WlLDE—There are many things which the
Court of' Queen's-Bench would do which this House, sitting
as a Court of Error, would not do. I consider that the verdict
is good for nothing till it is sanctioned by judgment being
pronounced. I have now stated the most hnportant points
which I intended to address to your Lordships, but there are
some others of a technical nature, upon which Mr. Peacock
will address you. My Learned Friends will address your Lord-
ships upon some of those points which I have abstained from
urging at greater length in consequence of the shortness of
time. They will address you on the challenging of the jury
and the constitution G.f the jury-list.
Lord BROUGHAM—YeII do not mean to give up the point
with regard to the swearing of the witnesses.
Sir T. WILDE—The -Very reverse, my Lord. But my
Learned Friends and myself have agreed that there are sepa •
rate points upon which each should address your Lordships ;
and I was afraid that if I should address myself to those
points, that I would occupy too much time, and would pre-
vent others from being heard. I now conclude what 1 had
to say in the outset.
The Learned Gentleman concluded his argument at five
minutes to five o'clock, and the further hearing of the case
was adjourned till tomorrow at ten o'clock.

LAW INTELLIGENCE.
COURT OF. QUEEN'S BENCH, Juty 3.
At Guildhall, before Lord DENMAN and a Special Jury.)
LAKE V. TIIE DUKE OF ARGYLL.

This was an action brought to recover a sum of money for
printing the biliq reports,. &c., of the British American
Association. The atimrs of this Association have been fre-
quently before the pubic. The work in question was ad-
mitted to have been done, and the prices were adniitted to be
reasonable ; but it was con.tended for the defence, that there
was no evidence to fix the Duke with liabilities
Lord DENMAN, in summing up, said the Duke's merely be-
coming president would not make him liable for the debts of
the Association. The Duke could only become liable by his
own conduct, and by doing that Which induced persons to
give credit on his account.
The jury, after retiring to consult, and remaining absent
for about an hour, returned with a verdict for the plaintiff.—
Damages, 1451.
Mr. Platt, Mr. Swann, and another Learned Counsel were
for the plaintiff; and Mr. Martin and Mr. James were for the
defendant.

JULY 4.
(Sittings at Guildhall before Mr. Justice WIGIITMAN and a
Special Jury.)

BODMER V. BUTTERWORTH.

This was an action to try the right to a patent for certain
drawing frames, rollers, &c., used in the cotton and woollen
trade. There was not the slightest interest in the case.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER, July 3.
(Sittings at Nisi Prius before the
Special Jury.) LORD CHIEF BARON and a
REDMAN V. WILSON.

This was an action to recover the sum of 2,500/. on a policy
of insurance effected with the Indemnity Assurance Company
on the barque Lord Wellington.
Mr. Jervts, ,and with him Mr. Iloggins, was Counsel for
the plaintiff. Mr. Erle, Mr. Tomlinson, and Mr. Forsythe,
appeared forthe defendant, who represented the above Com-
pany.
Mr. Redman, the plaintiff in this case, is a shipbroker, car-
rying on business in Lime-street. 'The vessel which is the
subject matter of the present inquiry belonged to this gen-
tletnan, by whom she was extensively repaired during the
years 1838, 1839, and 1840. In 1841 he intended her to go
in ballast to Sierra Leone for a cargo of teak. That she
might be in a fit condition to perform this voyage, he
caused her to be entirely overhauled by the Messrs.,
Green, Wigram, .and Green, shipwrights, whilst she was
lying in the West India Export Dock. Here she received 50
feet of new rough-tree timbers, 10 or 15 feet of new gunwale,
and a new raft-port. She was fitted with two new mizen-
channels, had a beam clamped, her rough-tree timbers were
examined, 9 broken ones being replaced, herchain bolts were
found to be good, and her shears fair. These repairs were chiefly
made on the larboard side ahead. Persons who had bad the care
of making them confirmed the above particulars, and said
that the caulking she underwent Would have infallibly dis-
'covered a bad plank.- These being completed, and the vessel
deemed seaworthy, she was insured for 2,5001. on the 6th of

July, 1841. Being afterwards chartered by Messrs. Laurie
and Hamilton, she sailed on the 15th of that month. During
her voyage she met with a great deal of foul weather. She
came to an anchor at the Nore, and there experienced a
heavy gale, in which she parted a cable and rode heavily.
The weather continued much the same all the way to the
Downs. Here it increased, and down the Channel she had
more or less of it. On the 21st of August she came off the
Cape de Verde. Here she was once or twice on her beam-
ends, and made a little water. On her first arrival at the
coast. of Africa the wind blew off the shore, but it after-
wards changed to S.W., and she was obliged to go under 11
heavy p.'ess of sail to keep off the lee-shore. This could not
fail to have the effect of straining her considerably. She
arrived at Sierra. Leone on the 2d of September, discharged
her ballast there, and then proceeded up to Tasso Island
Here she arrived on the 12th, and began to load the timber
At the end of the month, however, a severe illness, natural to
the climate, attacked the whole crew, arising from the damp-
ness of the timber, which is bent in the water, and floated by
cork-wood. it is customary at this place to load vessels by
means of a class of natives known by the general name of
Kroomen, as Europeans are sure to sink under the unhealthi-
ness of the country. At the time of this visitation 300 loads
had been put in, 500 being the complement. The Dittos
lasted 50 days, bat the vessel was fully loaded by the 7th Of
November. She was then brought down with her cargo to
Freetown. On the 9th she was exposed to a tremendous tor-
nado. Shortly after this date she underwent a survey by
three persons from various vessels then at the port. Before
this she had drifted two miles, having two anchors out, and
was then brought back to Forra Bay. The result of the sur-
vey was, that she was found to make a little water, and the
pumps being worked, very little was brought up. A second
examination, by three other persons, was afterwards insti-
tuted. On this occasion a part of the cargo was removed,
and she was found to leak much less in consequence, the
quantity being only three feet and a half in twenty-foul'
hours. Her knee-beams were.found strained. In this con'
dition it was very difficult to replace the grew, or keep the
Kroomen at work, and though the aid of the magistrates wee
procured, it was ultimately abandoned, as being impossible.
When it was then perceived that there was no convenient
place for laying a vessel tip, it was agreed to sell her. TO
was effected by her captain, Mr. Walker, who obtained 230/•
for her, under the direction and advice of the surveyors. IS°
blame rested upon him.
Mr. ERLE, for the defendant, contended, from the evidence
as it then stood, that no substantial injury to the vessel had
arisen from bad weather. On the other hand, he could show,
and to a certain extent he was borne out by the plaintiff, that
the injury was occasioned by the teak having been put in
improperly. The long leverage of some of these heavy beams
would throw the sternpost away from the ship's side. This
was where the leak occurred, the workmen could not stop it,
not having power to bring the separated parts together. The
vessel bad borne the best name in the Sierra Leone trade,
during former voyages ; and the damage, he could show, most
certainly arose from the cause be had already assigned. le
addition to this, he had very good grounds for cotnplainingi
in the name of the insurers, of a want of überrima fides, or
good faith. He was aware that such a charge was only to
be urged with the greatest caution, but he had not done
unadvisedly.

The jury gave a verdict for plaintiff, with damages 2,7061•
The inquiry lasted till half-past five o'clock.
JULY 4.
(Sittings at Guildhall, before the LORD CHIEF BARON and A

Special Jury.)
REDMAN V. HAY.
The hearing of this case, which occupied the Court a grel6
part of yesterday, was resumed this morning. It was an Ile'
tion to recover on a policy of insurance effected with the In'
demnity Assurance Company on the freight of the barque
Lord Wellington. There was no point of interest in the feel
of the case, the whole question turning on the terms and
conditions of the policy, and as to whether or not they I,Bd
_,
been complied with in the navigation of the ship. OP
some discussion between the Chief Baron and Counsel (Mr'
Martin and Mr. Tomlinson) as to the form of the verdict'
the jury were directed to find 'for the plaintiff, with dr, ,
mages, 1,5221.

ALEXANDER V. PRATT.
This cause was similar to the last, being an action brougboit
by the plaintiff to recover a sum of 3,0001. on a policy
assurance, granted by the General Maritime Assurance COn
pany, on the barque Cecilia, 325 tons admeasurement.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, July 4.
(Sittings at Guildhall, before Mr. Justice CRESSWELL and $

Special Jury.)
NICKELS V. HASLAM.
This was an action to try the validity of a patent of cots°
machinery, invented to facilitate the carding of cotton. The
whole matter, as far as it had proceeded, was of the nios
dry and technical character, possessing not the slightest
terest to the general reader.

COURT OF BANKRUPTCY, July 4.
(Before Mr. Commissioner FANE.)
• IN RE GRANT.
Win. Grant, boot and shoe merchant, Swaffham, appeared
to pass his final examination.
The amount of the bankrupt's liabilities was originalli
421. 2s. 6d., for which Messrs. Thomas and Co., of frida*
street, put in an execution ; and the losses attending the sale
_7
the bankrupt's stock by auction, with the attendant expeßar'
amounted to upwards of 140/.
The bankrupt was unopposed, and passed his examinatO
IN RE WHITE.
The bankrupt, Jonathan Williams White, holds a situatitl
in the Court of Chancery, as clerk ofaccounts, with a salsa
of 4001. per annum, which, however, in consequence of
duty, averaged during the last three years and a quarter 5,"
The amount of his liabilities were 6921., and he offered ,
lay aside 1001. per annum to meet his creditors.
A few of. those attended, and said that they would with
draw their opposition if the bankrupt advanced his Ow
to 1501.—He was finally put back to amend his schedule.

CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT.
OLD ,COURT.

(Before the RECORDER.)
Sharrington Bach was charged with uttering a forged b
of exchange, knowing at the time that it was forged. A
The case has recently been before the public, when it If"'
investigated at the police-office. 'og
The case was not sustained, the principal witness hall
failed to satisfy the jury that the name to the bill was
forgery. The prisoner was accordingly discharged.
This was the last case, and the Court adjourned to the •Oh
of August.