The Sun.
London, England, 1828-09-25 00:00:00

LIFE ASStiIiANCE.

Lile Assurances are effected by the Company upon
moderate terms, while the Assured PARTICIPATE i❑
the PROFITS, which are to be declared at the expiration
of every successive period of Five Years.
A. HAMILTON, Secretary.

ambition.
makes to gain the object of his
this view, if the Emperor NICIIOEAST
be not prepared and iesolved'Woilfure , Varna,
•
c.
he should not have besieged griat+
error seems to have been in . the division and
subdivision of his'artny over an extent of ter-
ritory too great for their numerical force. At
the outset of the campaign we were told that up-
wards of three hundred thousand men were
upon the frontiers of Turkey, ready to pass
the Pruth, and, latterly, if the accounts may
be depended on, only 80,000 have passed
the Danube—a number barely sufficient to
blockade Shumla—certainly not strong enough
to invest it. The EMPEROR, or his Generals,
or perhaps both, were perplexed in adopting any
one determinate line of operations, but pushed
forward into the enemy's territory to try his pulse,
and then fashion the character of the. campaign
by the knowledge acquired. In doing this there
was Ho-great error, provided they were prepared
with sufficient means to meet any exigency that
might arise. That this was not the case we have
abundant proof 14 their delaying the attack of
Shumla, and being compelled to besiege Varna in
due fond. If their plan had originally been to
besiege and capture all the fortresses on the
Danube, and along their line" of invasion, they
should have provided the necessary number of.
troops, not only to besiege :the fortresses with
effect, - Ing to !overawe the surrounding
.country
in the vicinity of each, without which the siege
would be rendered abortive. Again, if the
Russians intended to make a dash by pushing on
J4ardless of the fOrtresseS, they should have
cjilected an army sufficiently strong for that pur-
pace, while a powerful' reserve was collected
to keep the fortresses nearest the line of ope-
rations in check, and secure the retreat of the
invading -form, should such be deemed neces-
sary. But in neither of these cases, judging
by what we have yet heard, have the Russians
been successful. Their operations seem to be
4 -
carried on, on a scale too enlarged for their im-
mediate resources—but the difficulties which
have hithertolleset their path, may be dissipated
by the timely arrival of 'reinforcements. That
their journey across the Balkan must be sus--
pended for this season, seems too probable, by
the progress they have hitherto made, and by the
nature of the country which they would have to
traverse, as well as by the unlooked-for resistance
which the Turks oppose to their progress. How-
ever, if the EMPEROR can take Shumla or Varna
this campaign, he will have achieved a triumph
greater than all his predecessors; and that he can do
it there is no question, provided he bring the requi,
site forces to bear. Varna and Shumla once in his
possession, we have no dOubt that he would
find the passage of the Balkan, even in winter,
not so inaccessible as travellers represent it.
The elements and the Turks might both ride
restive, but he would at least have the whip
hand of them by the possession of these for-
tresses, which form the coast and land key to
Adrianople-4f not to the capital itself.