The Sun.
London, England, 1819-06-28 00:00:00

this, la.wever, weal(' be fire itr,,na just. To a eeriaiti eel tilt —...
to that extent in which it is enjoyed at this day, the right of
representation is incalculably valuable; it isthesafeguard of a
nation's liberties; an effectual end never-failing check on the
proceedings and designs of Parliament; and a fixed counter-
poise to 'Teal power. ,Beyond this it is in theory hazardous
and delusive—in practieeVas far as our little axperience guides
'us, subversive of that order and justice on which alone free-
dom can ever be grafted it) security. It most not be forgot
ten that the present election laws owe their establishment to
the former dangerous and mischievous extent of the eight of
voting. In very early times it was discovered that the quail-
!
ficatione of electors must he revised and fixed anew, so as to
decrease their numbers, or that every election would render
the country a scene of alarming tumult, which Would endan-
ger the purity of the House by the return of spurious Mem-
bers. There is no reason to suppose that at the present day,
when the populatian is so much more nuMerous, and party
agitations more siolent, that greater tranquillity and decency
would he preserved. Judging, too, by the usual proceedings
where the right of voting now exists, there can be little hope
that venality and corruption would diminish as the elective
privileges extended. If it is otherwise, we must suppose that
the present body of electors in Great Britain are men of less
integrity and independence 1 ban those who would be added
to their number by the extension of the franchise. It there-
fore appeals, that as the right of voting is within the reach of
all iedividuele who by their rank or property can he person-
ally interested in the affairs of the nation, and as there are
already great numbers possessed of that privilege, who only
use it for the purpose of pecuniary gain, its extension
would but increase that corruption which the reformers pro-
ttte to redress. This observation does not, however, apply
to large and popidous towns, like Birmingham and Manches-
ter, which Are unrepresented in Parliament. If a proposal
for granting the elective franchise to such as these could be
brought separately cad unconnected before Parliament, it
would probably he met with unenitmtue assent. It is acci_
dent alone that has left these without the civil rights to
which their wealth and censerpte.nce steam justly to entitle.
them : and attinengleit world be difficult to point out any
actual benefit which they would derive from time acquisition
of them, the change would harmonize with the established
system. These, however, are isolated exceptions to the ge
neral denial of a necessity for re form. It is the independ
ence and not the number of electors whirl) will secure the
' integrity of a House of Representatives. Many will he in-
duced to vote from motives of local interest ; some will al-
ways support a certain family ; others a particular party ; a
few will be directed by pure disinterested patriotism ; but a
great proportion will always yield to bribes of one kind or
another. The latter class will increase in a double ratio to
all others as electors become more numerous ; for the cor-
ruption so muds complained of rests not with the Constitu-
tion, nor with the House of Commons, nor with any of its
individual Members. It originates in the imperfection of
human nature ; and the morals of the whole nation must be
improved before it can he destroyed. It has been said that
where time morality of nature is insufficient to prevent crime,
human laws should be brought to its assistance: but in the
present case both are united. If The venality which is said
to- imfect the system existed only in the House, the election
laws would be strong enough to guard the people against its
effects. But where electors and candidates of all degrees and
opinions join in the practice of corruption, the'laws have
&me their utmost. If any ask why they are not enf:ireed,
they must answer the question themselves. The offence is
too general for punishment, and womild only.be increased by
an augmentation of voters. No plan of Parliamentary Re-
form has been directed against this evil ; and the Reformers
have therefore passed by a view of the question which might
hate helped them on their way among moderate and well-
disposed neutrals. If the present Electors of Great Britain,
consistine of the most respectable among the middle classes,
and the least dependent among the poor, are to be swayed
by bribes, or influenced by motives of personal interest, boa/
would it he if the Elective Franchise were enjoyed by the
incalculable numbers who, ignorant alike of their own and
of their country's political concerns, have no views
beyond the desire of providing for themselves and their fa-
milies. May it not be presumed, that they would be at the
devotion of whoever would bribe them highest; or, that hay-
log no just notions of men and things, they might be made
the effective instruments and promoters of faction. 'May not
any effect he expected, sooner than that, with the unbiassed
voice of reason and truth, they should bestow their suffrages
on such as might he safely trusted with the diversified inte-
rests of a great nation ?

" The influence, which the nobility bas gradually acquired
during the last century, in the House of Commons, though
contrary to the letter of our constitution, will probably be
found, when its consequences become more palpaple, to he a
correction of an evil formerly much dreaded though little
understood. It will finally confirm the stability of the Go-
vernment, and may be considered as an improvement which
has insensibly grown out of an experience of its necessity.
While this power was in its infancy, an able and ingenious
writer of the last century, commenting on the distant, but
anticipated determination of our present form of Govern-
ment, into either an absolute Monarchy or a Republic, ob-
serves, that in tine latter case, if the House of Commons, after
uniting in itself all the capacities of the State, should, as it
probably would, declare itself perpetual, we should suffer all
the tyranny of one factions, subdivided into many. The dan-
ger thus dreaded from the tendency of the present Govern-
ment to a Democracy, is effectually averted, by the commix-
ture of the Nubility with the Commons; while, from the state
of parties in Parliament, divided into opposite and conflicting.
interests, the prerogative of the Crown is neither augmented
nor infringed ; the medium of communication between King
and People is strengthened, and their respective interests
drawn more closely together. But, notwithstanding the be-
nefit immediately derived from this union of bodies in the
state, great stress has been laid by reformers, on an oriel
made to prove at the bar of the House, that eighty-four indi-
viduils could procure a majority in the Commons. They
might have said, that three hundred and twenty Commoner*
conk' do the same thing. And what is the inference to he
drawn from either fact; simply, that while Parliament is
composed of a certain number of members, there must ne-
cessarily be a majority constituted by some power or other.
Bot as that power is continually changing; as the same Lords.
who procure the return of four members to one Parliament,
may not be able to influence the election of two the
those Peers cannot be said, as some hare assert
ed, to engross the whole Legislative Power. The sane
observations would 'apply to a certain naniber of Coun
ties and Towns, as, were they to combine against the
rest, they might for one Parliament, and no more, oppress
them without restraint, But a general election is a tribunal