The Sun.
London, England, 1821-10-15 00:00:00

THE BRITISH NAVY.

[From The Times.]

The second part of M. DUPIN'S distinguished
work entitled " Voyages dans la Grande Bre-
tagne," is published in two quarto volumes. The
end of the whole work is so dignified and important,
its subject matter so valuable, and its execution
so powerful, that we should conceive ourselves
equally wanting to the cause of general know-
ledge, and to that of our own national politics,
if we failed to offer this public testimony of the
interest which we have felt in its perusal. The
immediate subject of discussion in this part of the
book, is the naval force of England ; for a
Frenchman, a delicate and trying theme. But
M. DUPIN is not an ordinary Frenchman. We do
not say that he has wholly shaken the peat-
listrities or prejudices 'of or t
j,iatiee' ors-641e or Ms 'reasonings, the accuracy of
his conclusions, and even the authenticity of a
few of his facts, have not been in a slight degree
affected by the emulous medium through which
he has examined this country. But such errors
are. specks upon the sun. M. DUPIN is deceived
but rarely, and others he never. seeks to de-
ceive. We have never read a book by any fo-
reigner, which bears the strong impress of such
indefatigable diligence, - of such clear intelli-
gence, of such temper, such candour, or such in-
tegrity, as this of M. DUPIN. The information
has been collected from the fountain-head. A
great proportion of it must have been 'official;
but the admirable mode in which it has been ar-

ranged, and the able disquisitions to which it
has been made subservient, betray small mark]
of English office. The subjects treated are of
great variety. They embrace the whole essence
of our naval system ; constitution and admi-
nistration in all their parts. The author begins
with a view of the operation of the royal and le-
gislative authority on the marine force of the
State, and follows out his inquiry through an im-
mense multitude of ramifications, until he finishes
with the breakwater at Plymouth. There is a
large portion of historical as well as scientific
investigation throughout this singular book, which•
in a passing sketch it would be impossible and
useless to advert to. We shall quote merely
two passages, both on points of which the inte-
rest can never wholly vanish from the national
mind of England. The first relates to the de-
sign of invasion by Buonaparte, and affords some
curious calculations of the capacity on one side
to execute, on the other to defeat, that gigantic
and memorable project. The second .passage
with which we shall present our readers de-
scribes-the fecpective charatteristies of the Bri-

fish and American navies, at the commencement
and during the course of the last maritime war s

the occurrences are detailed in the work of Mr.
JAMES,- on which M. DUPIN in general place;
implicit reliance. The former extract may as-
sist to fortify this nation against the possible re-
turn of ill-founded fancies unworthy of her in-
trinsic strength : the latter, to prevent the re-
currence of delusions opposite in their character,
and more replete with shame and with eventual
danger:—
At this epoch Great Britain had, besides the regular army,
600,000 Nlditia, infantry, and cavalry, in arms, all the seamen
of the merchant service enrolled for the gun boats, and the in-
habitants of the coasts embodied in corps, called sea-fencibles.
It remained to be seen whether this face was capable of with-
standing the shock of the Army of Boulogne, had that Army
crossed the Channel.

When the First Consul threatened England with an invasion
he did not appear inclined to attempt it with ships of the line :
he caused gun-boats to be built in all the ports and in all the
rivers on the Atlantic coast, and collected them to the number
of 1,300 in the port of Boulogne: Troops to the amount of
100,000 were to be embarked on beard of these gun-boats and
transports. In the case of a successful descent, immense re-
inforcements were to follow. They were to force a landing on
the opposite coast, and proceed direct to London, not, as was
supposed might be done in the time of Lloyd, by advancing
only two miles a day in consequence of the difficulties of the
ground and the embarrassment of baggage, but by forced
marches, carrying every position by the bayonet or field artil-
lery. After their landuig, nothing would in the first instance
have arrested the progress of the conquerors of Lodi, of Zurich,
of. Heliopolis, of Honenlinden, and of Marengo.
But was the • descent possible ? It was not possible to enter
Dover by force. That port is situated between two high moun-
tains, in a position in which its lofty batteries and works, safe
from any COUP DE MAIN, would 'easily destroy the most for.
midable fleet. There was besides on the heights of Dover an
entrenched.camp, occupied by a considerable force, which would
have defended the coast under the protection of the forts and
batteries.

On the other hand, how were 1,300 vessels to get out of Bou-
logne in one tide, and to stand over in any thing like order to
the English coast ? This could never be done under the tire of
the English squadron cruising in the Channel. •
gut that squadron might be driven off its station by a gale
of wind ; and before it could have time to return, the French
flotilla -might cross. Be it so. But let us see what would
follow. •

The English had lined their coast with strong batteries on
every point where a landing could be attempted. Strong towers
were built at short distances along the sliore, which was com-
pletely within the range of their guns; these martello towers
could not be taken by a coup de main. Brigades of light artil-
lery, corps of cavalry, flying camps of infantry, presented a
force moveable along the whole of the sea-coast by a road ex-
pressly made for that. purßose: The English had besides a
great number of gun. boats in all the ports opposite Boulogne.
All small craft, all pilot and fishing boats, &c., were prepared
for warfare, if necessary. They-were numbered, and classed in
divisions, with officers ready to direct, and troops to _man them.
The guns and ammunition were so disposed in the magazines
that these vessels could be armed in a moment. Finally, be-
sides the squadron stationed off Boulogne, there, was'a fleet of
observation in the Downs, another at Spithead, and a third at
the Nore. In a few minutes the telegraphic signals could com-
municate between all these* points and th Admiralty in
London.

Thus' ,whichever way the wind might blow, it, was probable
that the English would arrive at the point of descent, if not in
time to preept the larlding, ate east soon enough to burn our
flotilla. In thkt-ease cur army would have been left without a
retreat, without support; and without provisions.
That it would hays performed prodigies I am sensible. It
wouldnot have been less magnanimous than the army of the east,
after the naval battle of Aboukir. • But those opposed to it weze
not Tuiks and Arabs. It would have had to contend against a
pei-i'ple of prodigious obstinacy—against a million of men in
arms, animated by the enthusiasm-of patriotism, and incited by
the most implacable hatred of the French name.
I have impartially stated our means of attack, and the-Eng-
lish means of defence.

I am still of opinion that it was impossible to effect a descent
without the protection of a fleet equal to that which s e then
possessed, and'which was defeated in the battle of Trafalgar.—