The Sun.
London, England, 1810-03-30 00:00:00

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es
tles cont shoull he vi Sited on thelteadt Irian- GOVer.hreent; ' that fife idea ;of our Lend pg bY An (*der for the Gens-d'Armes ana Guard Ara-,
-
. .
. _ -. ,nit ‘.V.l's planned, He reap It only troops... toseTrieste nevea ►einered Theis: cestleine ; tiasszak to- March thitheriminerliately, atlas, 'pct. it in a
~ . :: juS'ificatibn brit to
.prove- that Mi- ; platieri.,, Bute it was. ' roe vise, to ,us that. we : preperestaie of defence. ' Freest this it was most eb-
.: ,,,' in a; wing ireat ere aeitiated liy., motives i should' make an attempt in 'ltaly that weshould vjoo=sthiu Antwerp had no.ealseeiously 'been put in a
ka HT free. a just sense of public duty--such as, _ continue 'our 'operations in the Peoinsula; and , proper state of aiefetice, and thns a sort .r.f.-reiro-
le ~Huitf 3.1 y if he were not a party concerned, that we
"should . attempt, a d .io , the ' sp`edive acknowledgmen was inada that the plan,of
en te .ed ahsen to the approbation of the country-- North of Germany. \Vela regard. Loftonaly, the itt-1 The Expedition was softar Wise,' 'ft has been con,
sucheaseniahr well be -recOmmended to their suc- , tempt, as he had already stated, had been made, S terafed, 'that Ministers did foresee the ditfiettities of
eesors—e-ieti stieli as no Administration would blush and-in the Peninsula, we certainly lad. carried .'on i his E kpeditit;n",' roid yet aheys.'aSlopted it. -- Most
fo; ,::,,:. -;s..i;-. He woeld nor consider it as an in- : our operations' u ith undiminished. vieseur. The, re- ,Aindootnectly the nefioisteTS ;lid foresee ditricullies„hM
Su: :, : e.-,L;.o:!, but ;is part Of that systeM wh cli maiteng.paiut
.of operation was the North Ger- . theydid not -t.ppear to be such as tb-rprecluile aational
hae , esi pursued. i tire-upon( site present war, is many. Much had lieen "said upon 'the 'adisaittafeet • prospect of bl 3 c c (.'• ss . 'Gentlemen seemed, to think it,
The proses' eiion of which _we had a double interest; likely rot e derived
,iioM aii attack in that quartet was- nycessary, that 'be.far .anasapedition.sailed, Mi-
6ast to ereserva other nations from the doniination from the insurrections which oer ..presenc.e •would, would, -pistets slioiSid id"
oat
bave.an .abschate certainty.of
.01
•Franc,,;.---,o,,iseeontlly,, to preserve our own in- have encouraged ; but he would contend, and- haf.-I sncer,s , hot that they shonla have :raced:out to the
legrity.- l'o pro, e the great interest we had in the -always conteptled, that to. excite insurrections week Corneeindera every s'ep s‘hieli. they mere to take
~
lit - • i
• (.l c.;se neeute ne argument ; but he contended 'we ha..l not the weans of arroralieg eifeettail protee- Wiih Inalacioatical•pre;isiOn. •To this:. arvunint he
it was t-qually our duL' to do the former. Standing ii,ei afterwards, Vras an ad not a on.), of the greatest tilii.st ;.i,,,e a decided negative:* it w-aS absburd
au
s '
. ..
ay,
• •
,
high as we do among the ti4tions,of Europe, it was. cruelty, but of the most obviatis- impoliey. ' Theses that fie attempt should he wade titlle'ss With an ab- -
ineurnbetit upstri &island to assist weaker nations who contenaed that we .ought to have sent 'than ex-. snitite Certainty. of success, b'ecan'ae. in that .Case
against oppressien, not oily as far as we could do pedition to the North of Germatiy. rather th to. - 'no expedition could ever be undertaken nor did
,so consistently with our own interests; but as tar as . the Scheldt, .because the-sbipping and arsenals yve lie.. think :it was jteCk.-ssary Jo .point, out fyith
coltssour doing so was not absolutely inconsistent with our li3d a view to in the• Scheldt E4peclitioi'. g.tv e ; precision: tO Cornmanders the whole. detail Of
Own security. Throughout the war it had beti our ' our exertioes the appearance of eemanatieg trout Abe eperat ions they were to piarsue,..becaUse much
practice to avail' ourselves of ad spirit of ' a selfish- principle, (.arrie. si a ood -principle ton ' .mte:t alWaya depend Upon contingencies'.much
;resistance 41ahitested by other nations agaimSt the en-. far. collateral edv.intaiges in such a. case '.uight npon obeCevatioe -colleete.d 'upon the spot. lii his'
aeroacements of Fret-tee, and cenatstratly ttk_fiy 'to one be lei:Areal tel withoet either the -apPearance or .opieieneallahat etitild'be required of Miniiters was
,succoir of those who were assailea .by her:ambitions : the reality of fe sordid motive. . When
~a tern- - that. tlie'y . should .seleel al
..objea. Of sufficient
t was much to be lamented that the course of war e pinery interest of oars was put in competition Impoilalice .tO ,justify file nttenipc, and where
end
been such, that we ini.gtot short( have to-con-. : with • the . vital • itnerest..'ef an Atli, our• • tern- there waS a fair and ...rational 'prosped of -suc-
send single
,hande,,i, not oily aaaiiist the ambitious
:' porary ioterest ought-dertaSnly to gite Way ; but 'to cess ; illak they shauldconsmunicate that object to
Rut. 4. 'of France,
.but also ,against teoae 'sowers . put ..out:interests out cans olviewe woui4 be absurd in Ilie totniaaanders, and that they, furniifi them with
tla Whom 'our existeoee tad heen extended, who . the extreme,' Along period-had not elapsed sineo .. adetitialo means of carrying the plateinto execution,
We had- scot an army into the Northof Gertnany-- 2.linistei s.. dia not_ 'flaitik of takin:g Antwerp by A
:'.l)gvcl op his "side in cOnsenuence Of his successes, ,
While their nearts,were for us, might be compeded tat ,an army which. arrived just' in time to learn't he i,soo , rogialar
.sit' se'; they eXpeCted tia.taka 'it by surprise',
raise ther hands againse us. Wg ought -never to i of the fatal _battle Of2Acsterlitz.- . But he 'begged . and by; assault ;• brit Gentlemen hatfcensUred them
lime sights of the t•,,;tiey of making all -the' Powers !, Cientletneet to'compare the State of the Continent at , for
.uodertakingeit in opposition "tO the opinion- of
... el the Continent feelltheir interest sepatated frons : that time with What it was when we- undertook ' the Commander ire phief and Colonel Gordon and
those of France; and he . Uesired • that :the ;Ex-
_the. Expedition to the Scheldt., - There was at that. ah expression of the latter had been partici:Aar!),
Pedition to the. Scheldt Might be considered as time a Russian Artny advancing to the aSsistanee relied upon, viz. that• it was.- a- deiperatp enter.;
into to May. the foundation' of such a separae of the Allies ; there - was a body of 15,060 Men prise ; but that expteisiOn was -sused in a 'col-
tissue. . It did not originate in the .Austaian war, . ready. to co-operate with 45; ; Denmaelt was 'in a dequial Sense, and did not meat). that 'the enter-
her did the Expedition to the Scheldt originate with state of neutrality, the 'power of Prussia
.was unbroe pri'ae was so- difficalt, as to 'be devOid of • all.
the prekeot Gaivernment ;it had been'contemplaied ken ; she'prOP.9sld neutrality, and her tatritories 1)- -pc.... Great endeaOura liml been.: inade, so isi,;:i.z.
by sev.eral successive Adniimstrations, and neyer.. ; were, ', to a certain- extent, respeated. - Look at lite rage. the ()pillion. of General Brow nrigge and it wa
Was there so• urgent au. occasion for such 'tn. 4pe- state of ;the North of Germany When we were in- said tiaatelie tied not stated. his. ffilthorititsaa teat tie
ditiOn 'as at that period 'at which the lite-at-ma' vited . there last year. Russia the a6live .Ally of ob.sereed.that Gentlemen did uot -cal) 'for the antho-'
raelit was fitted out. He hoped Gent lethen opposite : Fraace, penmark hostile, and Alie power of Prtiasia rities -of those otficers„ whOac opinona Were hestile
'Would not tbinklie wished to recriminate any censure: completely
,broken. ' The situation of • the minor" to Ministera.
:But even if Gen. BroWnrigg had Stated'
they , Might. have bestowed on the enterprize,iiihen Powers of the Continent was not More favourable the authorities'tipOn whiCh he founded his opinion",
he stated that such a one had nom always been disap- to our enterprize.. This was the State of ding's in Geotlernen would have ass
:for the
.aistlioritie; of
ProVea oft on that side of' the House. It was tar which we ,were invited to the North of Geritiany, those athorities, and -'so ori lift they it to. sotne
from him „0 to recriminate, as he thought the ahead Without friendship to receive, or neutrality to Pr, n'ect paint 00 which they could express their \valet of -bes
ztudable, and the policy wise., which dictated such Liss' If, hoWever, Sve bail sent an army thither, it lier.: Titey put hitn,in ind the,lndian proverb,
an effort. Ttie Noble Lord he had succeeded -in must have been under an eagagemeritithat it saeuld which says, that the asiorld 'stands. On-an elephants the
the • Office he had lately the honour to hot* reams- in the *inter,. for surely it would not be elephant stands on etortoia,e'but whaethe.tortoise
, .
hose ability and zeal could. not' be 'doubted by contended that any Minister would be justified in . ,t3lai- upon they do not'
.Istiow.,- .4, was said they
6,0 Y one, had, .on his leaving that House (itsi de- risking a British arrity there during.'Wliner, cOnsi- ought to have taken Lpril citai ham's o 'triton before
,
i,tate which, through some. circumstance, he be- dering the present situation of the ,continent.— the .Exrdition- was undertaken : they had Lord
.
:11eved, bait never been erode public), strong!y re- What Caett
,wovild•haye been the i:onsequence, if by ! Chatitarn's opiiiiee'i they had the strongest proof
ternmended such an E our appearance we had elicited the braves population .: of Ins seotimenta respealing the -EX.:a-edition by his
xpedition to the successors
,f 'hit Administration of watch. he formed- a:part. of the North to insurrection ? Why we nanst, hsve laoing so.cotintihnd. it.
,r 1,10 p„ !e Gelltien). .04 the
,f,l1-e- Nbble Lord,. in giving this advice, in leavioa
a. left Vae-i-s eaposed tOatill gre.at'cr.tytantry and cruel- other 'side 'of the, noose -tretltieh Ouded to; the
, .
Niis lepc),, .to his *successors, did wisely 's, he had ty. But thii .was not air; Prussia, humbled c)se ot two Fretich
.Ctilonela„, one of ;ybotn ie•.i.id to
1001 Ced al the growing naval force of the enemyeaad and broken as she is, has silli art artnty, cite,! with ' ;liis soldiers -" 411 ex. iz,ze,s. c;utti'n's." I'll,:
,otler said,
11t.tradocoosidereic of the mogt etfeetuel means of 'that .3i...by we must have.ccine ideont:ict.. .Would '
,*(‘ .1t11(r)is ?nes. eVarrs."
..tte lattYr lay hi; eapreasioe
checking it. 'That Noble Lord, from el
ears
it have beeri righ.t, would it have been politic, Atha - , aluswed liis-exeeeta:ion Of sileces-i by hiS williogness t.
which he had preaiously held as first Lord ()Idle der such circiani.staitces, •to Ove 'fbreed one se • , share the dang-er of „Ilia- atte:mpt. 40 anSwer to whip'
.-Aalmiralty-,: had had his attenton particularly callesd, ina) an active War with 'Prussia ? ,On ' the other had been said of theinteratticabiltr Of tak.N;;AnttVerp
'.19- the subject,: and therefere his authority was of hand, if was had not conae in cobalt svith PaoSsie ;. '• 'by surerize, the Mahle Lord -behied inin had hi-
great w. eigot upon this point, leath in that character if any thug like an understanding had'appeitred 'be- seaweed the ease
at
.Cepent,agen e .but this cane.
,dia
and in that of a genera! tate_iillill). But what vsaa twee(.( us, Would it not Irti.e furnished Bonnaparte not siu;t *Gehletnett„:.becuse,•foptpoi (1).4 had bet):
tile. State of Antwerp—l,vhat 'ails its irnpartanc at with a' pretext to wrest-from the Mon=dell .-Of that taken too much by:surpaze,. •• - Another curious mode
- the time the Noble Lord left 'that legacy, with its . Country the bauble of a Scttptre wh!ch he holda, to et adconining for the surrender ot Copenhagen was,
Liliporianee when this Expedition was undertaken ? ; Like away even the mockery of the Cr. *l.l which he , the the. indignation a iht. inriabitants against us
what had been the. increased means of the enemy •. still wears.? This Must •hare been th.:_i
_7:ionstoiltaeriCe
,was so. great, . that -they surreadered. This cer-
slPee that time?. ••Itny st be unnecessary to recall. of the Expediticiti to the North of Gerstrihy; and tins tandy waS he believed, the oddest effect that
,ato the attention of.the House the attention which . alone ought have
.nrade the British 'Government , ever • was 'prialesaed by indignation. 'He then •
any
$u the
had -paid to his Navy, aria toe boasts pause befare dal.. undertook such an Eatiedi, len:— s ‘stanced. the fell ot Brala„ Bergeti-op-Zoocn, apti
.;14v'llich he had held forth to Europeof his growing 'But besides 'this, what was the aanal st,te of the 'other places before 'Dtithourree, in the infancy of
al power-S-hoasts which, it was perfectly well
.• ansureation in the North ? A gallant, solclie-r, on- . the French Revolittion. ' Those though he thought.
I.town werenoe empty ones. It was this impor- iuthorised by his Sovereign, had eolleeted -a few V'saould be ascribed to the effed Of 'revolutionary prin-
ant consideration which led tee attention of Minis- followers—the Print:e'er Hesse, who had- beet) de_' 'ciples. was it necessary, then, to go back to that
ters' to-this object.; but there were other strong ins- prived of his dominions, was in arms ,vith a small 'of Prague, or to that of the generally accounted im-
-tiancements which led to the adoption of that pl3p. number-3nd the g-allant Doke of Brek had pregnable fortress'bf weiellitz in Silesia ? lino-
Ilorn'lt WaS' strongly recommended by a prine!ple of eco- , traver4ed with a . body of. troops, the whOle of the thee, „instance he might bring forwlrd Was Les
y, because, the success of the enterprize would North of Germany uninialested—it pioof, certatile, , ilia, . b.efore Whieh the great Conde failed; yet
fl
enabledGoaertimnet to hive dispensed with the of the diaposition of the vetaale-stant that d'spei-ion afterFarda, when the Duke of Orleans sat
ileets which it had been found necessary to maintain was quiescent. Thi was theextent of thetemptation : down . befbre 'it; it Was carried in a fortnight.
t Yarmouth amid the Downs. • Therefore, if the and the aleans, and this the extent of good. That a : Prom these .instancese, he 'only wished to infer,
Austrian War bad never broken out, the Expedition laudingthere would have detaehed'some 'troops f-rom that. what cos sonietimes .deemed impracticable
4gainst Antairer .wOula have been a wise meaahre, the Danube was very probable'. But you had to cotisi- • alight he 'accomplished. He did not mean to say
asleading to tie attainment of a great British ob- der. theexpence to yourselv.es,aua the sufferings you
~ they 'should place a• dependence on improbabilities,
Jed. It was upon these grounds that the- Eipetli, would bringe On the North. of Gerni:thy Austria but who in war -would never run a chance ? Who,
ti $.
was first resolved upon, and the preparations could not in justice call upon us to relieve her at the like the Austrian General at Ulm, would resign hope
oracle : then came the Austrian Ware then came expence of such sufferings. The part we did 1 .becanse. success was improbable, and calculating th
- -- -
6Pplications from Austria fur assistance—applif a- ; teke had this- great and important advantara-
ti°ns ' which were unnecessar lo:-.-

a

ralle 'y, „feause we -were
d upon by the, -most obvious policy, and the
3‘tongest self-interest, to give her every succour in
,(111.1' power. The question then naturally arose,
'czqv could we afford her the most effectual as-
listance ? There were but two modes of afl-ording
a!kcour to Aultr:a, the one was. by .dirtict co-oper.l-
- ; the otter was by making a diversion, fur the
Zpos.of drawing-off the attention of the enemy.Ualtit respect to direct co-operation, he should not
; ve thought it necessary to have argued upon the
~,`Enpracticability of it in the then situation of the
i;.'ohtinent, if he had not heard Gentlemen in that
it3'.lse talk of. he propriety of sending an expedition
t° the bottom of the Adriatic, to Trieste, in order
co-operate with the Austrians in that quarter;
idea sso ahsurd, so excessively absurd, that he
43 amazed when he head, it suggested. Did the.
tntlemen who proposed such au experiment think
or,the difficulties and dangers" of sending a fleet of
itC:v transports, crowded with troop s' uo su Ai a
Yage, throughthe Streights of Gibrapltan r, along
tl Airditerrailean, and through the, re
Ili ahno+t
Jriktiowo, Adriatic ? Such a noun a would never
ve-entered into the head of a Statesman; no man
, practical inforfnation would ever have thought of
vi"ding such an expedition, which might arrive
t. ree months after it sailed, and two months after
Atl:4 object for which it was"sent had ceased to exist.
1;v ith respect to the other plan which had been pro-
4ed, ;viz. that of lat.ding lit Italy, it had been
it to a" certain degree, and desisted, from whence
Has found that our effbris in that quarter could no
p°nger be attencLd with any advantage to our Allies,
C9nSeqtletoCe of the retreat of the Archduke John.
I:i,vltat-would have been the consequence if we
(1 attemp:ed the Tonstrol)s plan of sending a ,),ree e • to Triet ?
„WV, .w.twn we a:rived there wed ,
ha‘e 1..1:nd ;t p ,ssesciOnzot- -the French,
1:!lnout an. Austrian tri solitier 300 ruile;-ot us.
.
kuought it proper to xtctie, mjnStice to the riOs-

gc,_
that it combined the two objects whichta we
hid most io view to accomplish—it tended 'ef-
fectually , to assist our Allies, ..and. at the same
f' time to promote our own interest's. It bad been said,
upon a foimer occa4:on, he understood, that when
the Expedition sailed -from- the Scheldt, he had de-
clared.that he expetted co-operation from the people
of Flanders and of Holland. He begged to State
most distindly, that he had zuver used such an ex-
- prthision ; that he never et tent tined such an expecta-
tion ; nay, he could fairly s ~e, that that which most
recommended' this pl..n to his approbation was, that
the attempt was to be made at a part where there
was no probabilty of any such co-operation as had
been alluded to.—lf Gentlemen we,re required to by
their fingers upon that spot of subjugated Europe
which has suffered least from French domination,
they mast point out Antwerp. Before the Rem-
?tit ion, Antwerp was in a state of
tion ; her greatness had fled, her commerce was an-
nihilated, her once crowded streets, were covered
with grass. To this state she was reduced by a re- •
stritaion imposed, not by nature, but by tre Ity, and-I
from this she was relieved by her annexation to
Franc-4. From tlie population of Ant werp no co-
operation could be looked for, because they alone of
all the people of the Continent would suffer by being
in the situation its which they were before the Re-
olution. The only object ot the expedition was to
prosecu-e an open legitimate war. His-objet was to
take-Apt werp unprepare.l. That Antwerp w.,s not
in a proper state of preparation was molt unequivo•
cally proved by the -Moni?eur itself ie a ceriespon-,
denee bet weenthe Minister of War and I3uonaparte,
which was evidently publithed with a view to
make the people believe that Antwerp had not
been- neglected. The correspondence sct forth,
that °lir Expedition was originally intended tor
Spain, but that in consequence of the conclusion
ot the armistice between France and Au•Lia-
.deativation hal been changed. This was-fulic-.Fed I

- '
chances against him as if he were .engaged at chess,.
give up the, contest because the moves 'were against
him ? Such a person might I3e a good tactiCian,
but nothing more could be said in his praise.—
They all remembered a book :that came Out some
years ago in France on the subject of a carriage,
or something of the kind; 'in England, which
was to go a certain distance in a certain time.
;The author of the book undertook to prove; learn-
edly,. that the plan could not succeed was to
,represent the carriage-B, the horses-,-C, the dri •
ver—D„ the resistance of the air—E, the friction of
the earth—and -F, the impo§sibility of success.
There, said the author-•-•A, phis B, plus-C, plus D,
plus E, is equal to F; but nevertheless the plan
succeeded. He felt that he was labouring under
considerable difficulty ,in arguing this case before
Some of the Gentlemen of that House, because
by them Ministers. had not only been called upon•
to. defend themselves for failure, but to exculpate
themselves. for vi6tory, and to atone for triumphs
from these Gentlemen he certainly was not san-
gnine enough to look.-for a very favourable decisidn.
He trusted, hoWever, that the House would net make
Ministers resnonsiblefor misfortunes which theycould
not. prevent, aud 'Censure. them. because the weather
Was unfavourable. But there were many Gentle,
men, he observed,, who looked- at the Government
of this country in one point of view, and, atr Mona,.
parte', in another. He never heard the French
Ruler Cermared for want of skill, or for failure ; he
was not blamed for his attack upon Acre; nor was
lie censured .Wliert he placed himself last year. in
dud most p•ecarious situation in the Island .of
Bit those Gentlemen had another mode of deciding
upon the condutt of the British Goverinent.
With them success was the result of accident, but
failure was a proof of incapacity. What would have
been said, - had Ministers, instead' of defending
theirhaVingcaptured Waicheren, had to vindicate
their having sutfered the Isle of Wight to be taken;
rtha.cmravn-rii,t, as iilo
.might appear, a fair c011313R•