The Sun.
London, England, 1844-02-03 00:00:00

THE STATE TRIALS.

SIXTEENTH DAY.
(B EXPRESS.)

(FROM OUR OWN REPORTERS.)
DUBLIN, THURSDAY, FEB. 1.
COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.
THE QUEEN V. DANIEL O'CONNELL AND OTHERS.
Mr. WHITESIAE, the counsel for the 'editor of the Nation,
commenced his address to the jury at a quarter past ten
o'clock, and said he wished that Mr. Duffy had selected from
among his brethren of the bar, and among whom there could
be found so many possessing superior talent, one more com-
tioneardeavosecdatebyhis cause ; his inferiority to others was
Pgereteantlty the disparity which existed between his
humble abilities and the arduous task which was committed to
him to discharge. Nevertheless, being assured of the con-
scientious feelings of the jury, being convinced of their intelli-
gence, and satisfied of their anxiety candidly to hear whatever
might be urged on the behalf of the accused, from whatever
quarter it might proceed, he had come to the resolution to un-
dertake the present duty. The crime alleged against the several
defendants was a crime of a peculiarly defined character.
If that peculiar crime, as it was explained.and described on the
face of the indictment, be not clearly and distinctly proved,
no matter what might be the other supposed offences of the
traversers—no matter what might be, even by possibility,
suggested that they might: be guilty of—they would be bound
to acquit them of the present indictment. To find men
guilty of one charge because it may be surmised that, by pos-
sibility, they may be accused or guilty of another, would be to
violate the law—to violate the justice of the case—from the
strict line of that duty they (the jury) were not to swerve.
He would say it with deference that they were not to re-
member any one word which was spoken or written by the
traversers, or by any one of them, which was not proved in
the indictment against them on the present occasion.
The crime of which the traversers was accused was
that of a conspiracy. In the proper acceptation of that word
there was nothing criminal in it—it simply meant having one
speech —that there was one prevailing idea, and that of com-
mon consent among men, for the accomplishment of a common
object—but a community of sentiment on political subjects
was not criminal. Associations existed in the present day,
literary, scientific, religious, and benevolent—the object of all
was to accomplish a given end, and for this they concen-
trate their opinions and strength, that they might bring
them to bear on a particular or a common object—and which
otherwise they never could accomplish. Governments, it
was well known, were always biassed against, and adverse to,
popular movements—they were always repugnant to change
—so that very great efforts—a great concentration of opinion
was necessary to obtain from them that which parties might
regard as beneficial. It was by such means that the wisest
reforms were effected, and the grandest trumphs in humanity
were accomplished, and the most righteous and wisest projects
had been achieved. In ordinary cases, where men are charged
with particular crimes, they ate to be proved guilty by what
they themselves had done ; and the evidence by which they
were to be convicted was to be strict and rigid, and the facts
prescribed were to be all prescribed by law. But, as was seen
in this crime of conspiracy, one man is affected not by what he
has done himself—not by what he has spoken himself—not by
what he has committed himself, but by what others may have
done or spoken—that is, some may suffer not the consequences
of their own acts or of their own speeches, but theymay suffer the
consequences of the conduct of others. That men should suffer
the consequences of their own conduct was natural and right,
because a man can control either his own language or his
own conduct; but it was difficult to understand why persons
should be held responsible for the acts of others over whose
movements they could have no control—whose tongues they
can neither silence nor check—over whose actions they have
neither authority nor power. If in ordinary cases that ob-
servation was founded in good sense, it was of more weight
when applied to the charge of political conspiracy. It was,
therefore, necessary for the jury to be on their guard; for
why should the incautious language, or the improper actions
of one man be visited on another, because that the other
man may happen to be an obnoxious individual ?
The traversers were accnsed of having conspired to excite
discontent and disaffection among her Majesty's subjects.
He should have occasion to comment on every part of the
indictment. The terms of that indictment were, " that the ac-
cused had devised to raise and create discontent and disaffec-
tion amongst the liege subjects of the Queen, to promote
feelings of towards her Majesty's subjects in England,
to excite disaffection in the army, and to cause large meet-
ings to be held for the unlawful purpose of obtaining, by
means of the intimidation to be thereby caused—by means of
the demonstration of great physical force at such assemblies, to
bring into hatred and disrepute the Courts of Law established
in Ireland, with the intent to induce her Majesty's subjects
to withdraw the adjudication of their differences with, and
claims upon, each other from the cognizance of the said
Courts of Law established. and to submit the same to the
judgment and determinion of other tribunals to be consti-
tuted and contrived for that purpose." Now, it was that
tingle crime of conspiracy teat the jury had to try—they
were to ascertain whether the accused were guilty of having
entered into a conspiracy to do the precise acts, the very speci-
fied things described and particularised in that most extraordi-
nary, unprecedented, and unheard-of indictment. The
Attorney-General, whom, he thought, had stated his case with
great moderation and temper, and, he would add, with firmness
and candour—the Attorney-General commenced his address,
as might have been expected, by a statement of the principles
and the authorities which he said were necessary to explain the
subject-matter of the accusation. As to general principles,
they afforded but little opportunity for dispute. It was the ap-
plication of those principles to the facts of the case on which
he should comment. As to the short definition of conspiracy
that had been given, no doubt could be entertained. Conspiracy
meant the accomplishing a legal object by illegal means,
er an illegal object by legal means. The first case
quoted (the King v. James) had not the least analogy to the
present accusation. It was an indictment against a bank-
rupt, charging him with conspiracy to conceal a part of his
personal estate, and that an illegal act bad been committed.
Lord Denman stated that that indictment ought to show that
an unlawful act had been done by unlawful means. Certain
it was that the indictment in the present instance did not so
demonstrate. In the second case adverted to, several per-
sons dined together; they pursued that common object with
industry and perseverance—( Laughter) they agreed to sup
together ; they confederately pursued that common object
also with perseverance and industry : they finally determined
to go to the play, and, having gone to the play, one of them
havingtra-par
ultra-Protestant
rattled t
it ; a third had a neck of a broken bottle, and he suffered his
u l
principlesi; togo so far that he threw it on
another having a whistle, whistled
the stage at the theatre. They were all tried for a conspiracy.
The grand jury ignored the bills. The Attorney-Gene-
ral, nothing daunted, referred the matter to a jury.
The formidable case of conspiracy was accordingly tried, and
no verdict was returned, except that acquitting Mr. Browilow.
The next ca ehe conceived to be more applicable. It was the
King v. Murphy, and it was stated—" If you believe the acts
done were done without a common design between the parties,
this charge of conspiracy cannot be supported. The common
design—that is to say, to do an illegal act specified—is the
root of the charge ; if Sou find that these two parsons pursued
by their acts the same object, often by the same means,
one performing one part of the act, and another performing
another part of the same act, so as to completed it, with a
view to accomplishing a certain object, you are at liberty
to draw the conclusion that the parties were engaged in
a conspiracy to effect that object." He had to observe that
the object to be gained was in the case just cited an
illegal object, because the persons agreed together to prevent
the collection of a certain rate, and to obstruct an indivi-
vidual in his duty—that is, the collection of the rate—and to
take from him the property he had seized. The object, he
repeated, was an illegal one, and it was declared per-
sonthatoanneother
at one moment having done part of the act, and
having contrived to complete the act, they (the jury) then were
at liberty to come to the conclusion as to conspiracy, and the
persons were accordingly found guilty. The next case quoted
by the Attorney- General was to be found in Knight, Carting.
ton, and Payne's Reports. The first count declared that an
unlawful and seditious opposition to her Majesty's Government
had been committed. The second count charged the parties
with having " induced a number of persons to assemble and
meet together, for the purpose of exciting terror and alarm in
the minds of her Majesty's subjects, and by means of such
terror and alarm to procure great changes to be made in
the Constitution of the realm as by law established, and to
annoy and alarm, disturb and prejudice, divers subjects of the
Queen, in the peaceable enjoyment of their property." In that
case certain policemen were asked whether, in point of fact,
anybody in the kingdom had complained to them of alarm being
inspired in their minds by the general character of the meetings.
In the course of evidence, a Mr. Roberts stated that several
persons complained that were alarmed at those meetings, and
requested him to send for military assistance. On that evi-
dence the parties were found guilty. Their Lordships would
please to observe that according to authority in that case,
it became competent to ask each policeman examined in
the present matter of conspiracy, not only whether anything
occurred which was calculated to excite alarm, but whether that
alarm had filled the minds of certain persons during the proceed-
ings which took place. The next case to which reference had
been made was one in which the accused (Stone) was charged
with conspiring against one Jackson, a person who died
from taking poison. Evidence was given to connect the
accused with another man of the same name residing in
France. Jackson had received a letter on the subject,
and Lord Kenyon at first conceived that the act of another
person could not be given in evidence against the prisoner.
Mr. Justice Buller was on the bench, and on the second day
Lord Kenyon said be was satisfied that the letter was admis-
sible. That letter was given in evidence, and the jury, im-
pressed with a sense of the danger of finding one man guilty
for the act of another, gave a verdict of acquittal. The next
case to which reference had been frequently made, was the
King v. Redhead, to be found in Howe's State 'I rials. In
that case the matters relied on in proof of the conspiracy, were
explained by proper averments. The Attorney-General had
relied on a certain passage to which he (Mr. Whiteside)
would take the liberty of directing attention. It was to this
effect :—" If the conduct of the defendant had been merely a
speculation of his own, it would be a different thing ; but when
it was set forth that there was a large assembly in the case,
it becomes necessary. to kno sr whether he did not address
them with a view to inflame their minds and their passions ;
if it could be proved that the act of combining, the results
which took place, and the providing of arms arose from a pure
motive, they might acquit. In the case in question, the pri-
soner was found guilty. Now he did not perceive the justice
of that distinction drawn by his Learned Friend, in reference to
that case—namely, that a great man might broach opinions
which a man in another position in life could not broach.
There was no law supporting such a distinction, and his
Learned Friend had not stated the true doctrine of the Consti-
tution. He would now direct the attention of the jury to
the language of an eminent jedge in a case recorded in the
32d vol. State Trials :—" It is not necessary," said Mr.
Justice Buller, "to elicit positive evidence from persons
who heard the conspirators consult; if you should find that a
certain plan was entered into, and you shall be satisfied from
what was done that there was a conspiracy to do certain illegal
acts, you may then draw the conclusion Of conspiracy." In that