The Sun.
London, England, 1845-01-25 00:00:00

FRANCE.

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.—SITTING OF J.N. 21.
The 'ollowing are the speeches of M. Thiers and M.
Guizot on the Address. We have already given an out-
line of them, but some of our readers may wish to see
them at length :
M. Thiers, after describing the bad policy of the
Minister, both as regards the right of search and the
treaty with Morocco, tells M. Guizot, the Minister of
peace, that he was on aril brink of war for a. miserable
settlement in the Pacific. It makes one shudder, he said,
to think on what a slender thread hung the peace of the
world ; if, instead of there being at Otaheite three French
frigates to two English ones, the forces had been equal,
blood would perhaps have been shed in the Bay of Pa-
peiti, and in Europe ; the pacificatory at any price would
have been unable to stop its torrents. The Ministry of
peace has brought France nearer to a war than any pre-
vious one.—(Oh.) Well, then, if no serious danger threat-
ened, what excuse have you for the sacrifices you have
made ? And for what has all this been done ? For a
miserable islet, at which we had only two fishing-vessels,
whilst other nations had hundreds. It has been said
that the possession of this island would be beneficial to
our trade with China ; but this is not the case, for no
vessels would take that route. It is a chimera to
which the best interests of the country have been
sacrificed. You have committed a fault against our
commerce, and also against our moral power. In this
opinion I have many partisans, but it is sought to take
them from me by insinuating that I am an enemy to our
maritime interests.—(Oh ! oh !) Such, however, is
not the case ; for my wish is, that France should have a
powerful navy—in a word, I am a friend to a real navy,
but I am a decided enemy to what I will call an illusory
navy.—(Noise.) I repeat that, in occupying the Mar-
quesas Islands, you have committed a fault injurious to
our naval forces, and that will be a sufficient answer
to those who accuse me of not being favourable to
it. I believe that the country ought to have a real navy,
and I remember well a remark made by Admiral Lalande
with regard to the French fleet in the East, "I
had," he said, "some excellent vessels, capable of beating
anything they might meet, but I had others which had
just left port, and might have been taken in hn hour."
The superiority of France should be in number. But,
it will be said, England has had as many as 100 ships-
of-the-line and 200 frigates, and France was never able
to have more than 60 of the former. That may be the
case ; but England has possessions to defend, which are
scattered over every sea, whilst France might concentrate
her forces, and enter into line with a superior num-
ber ; but, in order to do this, her ships must not be scat-
tered as far as Oceania, in consequence of the stupid
occupation of the Marquesas Islands. The millions de-
voted to that expedition should have been employed in
finishing the port of Algiers, and the magnificent har-
bour of Martinique. I shall now speak of the English
alliance ; my position with regard to that question is
very similar ; some wish to make me pass for a par-
tisan of alliance with England an any price; whilst others,
and particularly the Hon. M. de Peyramont, pretends
that, in 1842, at least, I was a sort of enemy to it ; per-
mit me therefore, gentlemen, to offer a few explanations
on this point. The Hon. M. de Tocqueville stated
yesterday, that although the English alliance might have
been desirable in 1830, it has since ceased to be so. At
that epoch an alliance with England must have been
generally approved of. But now, because in certain
given cases I appear disposed to withdraw myself from
England, I am accused of copying the policy of the
empire. No, gentlemen, Ido not copy the empire ;
those who do so are the enemies of our good relations
with England. In my opinion, alliances are governed by
circumstances, and I also think that there is no alliance
that does not entail serious sacrifices. The history of
the past proves my assertion. France was once allied to
Germany, and she sacrificed her continental interests to
the necessities of the war which was then carried on
against England. Much at present is said of continental
alliances—you know my opinion on the subject. Per-
mit me to tell you that there is something chimerical
in alliances on the continent. Frankly, is there any one
possible for UR at the present moment ? It is for this
reason that I am a partisan of peace—but not of peace at
any price. Time will undoubtedly change the con-
dition and the feeling of certain Powers ; but at present
there is not a single one of these alliances which is pos-
sible. The longer war shall be kept distant from us the
greater chance there is to find alliances on the conti-
nent of Europe. In all alliances some sacrifices must
be made. Thus, the first condition of an alliance
with Russia would be the sacrifice of our interests in
the East. An alliance with Austria would sanction for

ever her rule over Italy ; and that with Prussia, the
most probable of all hereafter, would be to confine us
for ever in the limits fixed by the treaties of 1815. So
that it is my conviction that the solution of the great
European questions—that of the East, for instance, and
the interest of our revolution—requires an alliance
with England ; and I may add, that the analogy of
the two Governments will prevent England from again
forming a coalition against us, as she did forty years
back. The interest of our African possessions also re-
quires the English alliance ; for a war with England.
without producing the loss of that country—far from it
—would considerably impede our intercourse with it.
From all this, I come to the conclusion that we ought
not to fling ourselves without conditions into the Eng-
lish alliance ; but that still it merits being maturely
and seriously meditated on and weighed. How then,
since I am in favour of this alliance, have I differed from
the present Cabinet ? In the manner of conducting it—
which is a most grave and important consideration.
The situation has become singularly modified of late
years, and in the following manner:—When you find in
a country a party disposed to act efficiently with you,
as was the case with the Whig party, then you may
form an alliance with that country; but when in place
of the Whigs, a Tory party is found in England,
that is, a party holding itself on a certain reserve,
and not wishing to act freely with France, then I say
that you ought not to pledge yourself to that party, as
you are now doing. Such is my idea—to engage your-
self with those who consent to act freely with you,
and keep on the reserve with those who show a different
countenance towards you. But, in any case, do you sup
pose that an affair like the right of search can be a
means of alliance with England to act as you did in
1840 ? What did you find in 1840 ? I will suppose
that at that period I was alone, and I take on myself all
responsibility ; there was no ambassador in London, I
suppose , • and it is I alone who am the culprit.—
(Loud laughter on the Left.) Well, at that period
France was irritated against England, on account
of the treaty of the 15th of July, and it was to
it that concessions ought to have been made ; and
yet it is France that you cause to make the concession.
It is impossible to more completely mistake the state of
the patient and the nature of the malady. This treaty
on the right of search was then consented to, from
which you have been told that it was impossible to extri-
cate yourselves unless by a weakness or a folly. how
then was it got out of ? It has not been got out of at all.
The first year, they said to Lord Aberdeen, " Receive
at least our dispatches, that we may be able to say that
negotiations are commenced."—(A laugh.) The second,
not knowing what they had next to do, they deter-
mined on naming a commission—that is, to prepare for
the question an indefinit.. adjournment.—(Marks of
denial.) And supposing that this affair had been decided
in the line of policy prescribed by the French Chambers,
what would have been gained ? The difficulty would
have been transferred from the French Legislature to
the other side of the Channel, and all that would have
been done was to excite the dreadful storms in the Eng-
lish Houses of Parliament.—(Marks of dissent) And do
not think, gentlemen, that it is a small matter to bequeath
such difficulties to an allied Government—it is to pre-
pare absolute impossibilities for one's self. If, after the
treaty of 1840, in place of conceding the treaty on
the right of search, you had given England to under-
stand that it was not an opportune moment to bring
forward that question—if, in place of crying up so
loudly the English alliance, you had cultivated it
discreetly and noiselessly, you would have effected in-
finitely more—you would have been able to make the
double influence of the two nations felt in Greece—
you could have stopped the effusion of Christian blood
at Constantinople—and have given the French residents
en the banks of La Plata an efficient protection. I de-
fine the present policy as at the same time feeble and vain.
That is, the former is proved by the fact that you have
gone to the furthest ends of the world to seek for com-
pensations fur your weaknesses, and this has in its
turn become the cause of fresh acts of weakness on
your part. It is vain, for when you wanted to establish
fresh and sincere relations with England, you flung the
right of seareh between the two countries—words in
place of things. But what do I say ? You have given
us things—the Pritchard indemnity, the treaty of Mo-
rocco, and the commission on the right of search,—
(Great agitation, and the sitting was suspended for some
minutes.)
The Minister of Foreign Affairs—The Hon. Deputy
who has just spoken has imputed to me an intention which
I had not previously felt, and which I do not entertain since
I have heard his remarks. He has supposed that I should
speak to him of 1840, and to the legacy which he then left
us. I regard the question of 1840 as one already judged
both in France and Europe. I maintain that the opinions
of all sensible men who observe the course of politics are
decided on that point. Ido not require, either for my
cause or for myself, to speak now of the Cabinet of
the Ist of March, and of the state in which affairs were
left when it retired from power.—(Approbation.)
Neither shall I follow the Hen. Member through
all the questions on which he has entered, ques-
tions military, political, and historical, questions on all
our possible alliances, and on all the phases of the
policy of our country; I do not think it necessary so infi-
nitely to ex tend the field of a discussion such as that which
now engages our attention. I shall not therefore speak
but on subjects which are actually pending—(Approba-
tion.) Happily all these questions have been settled since
your last session, and I can therefore, without further
preamble, enter on an examination of affairs, all the de-
tails of which are fresh in your recollection. You will
remember how things stood at the close of last session.
You left the Government in serious difficulties. When
things of paramount importance are on the mind, secon-
dary interests and embarrassments are forgotten. When,
therefore, at the close of the session, we found ourselves
thrown on these important affairs on our own responsibility,
every idea of persons instantly disappeared ; we no
longer thought but of the great interest involved, and
of the great duties imposed on us, and we endeavoured
to settle those questions according to those inte-
rests and those duties. Taken in themselves, isolated
even from all foreign complication, they were diffi-
cult and serious. A first war with a neighbouring
State in Africa, the first steps of a new establishment
at four thousand leagues from the mother country, were
serious affairs. There was also to be taken into consi-
deration the connexion existing between Morocco and
the country with which our relations were as impor-
tant as frequent. The whole of our foreign policy was
based on the questions which you had left pending. We
proposed to ourselves to settle these questions in main-
taining the right , the interests, and the dignity of
France.—(Llear, hear.) I shall take up, one after the