The Sun.
London, England, 1845-01-25 00:00:00

JAN 25 745.8
No. 16,363. LONDON, SATURDAY
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FRANCE.
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them at length : readersalready
may
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suete-
M. Thiers, after describing the bad policy of the
Minister, both as regards the right of search and the
treaty with Morocco, tells M. Guizot, the Minister of
peace, that he was on the brink of war for a miserable
settlement in the Pacific. It makes one shudder, he said,
to think on what a slender thread hung the peace of the
world ; if, instead of there being ut Otaheite three French
frigates to two English ones, the forces had been equal,
blood would perhaps have been shed in the Bay of Pa-
poiti, and in Europe ; the pacificators at any price would
have been unable to stop its torrents. The Ministry of
peace has brought France nearer to a war than any pre-
vious one.—(Oh.) Well, then, if no serious danger threat-
ened, what excuse have you for the sacrifices you have
made ? And fur •vhat has all this been done ? For a
miserable islet, at which we had only two fishing-vessels,
whilst other nations had hundreds. It has been said
that the possession of this island would be beneficial to
our trade with China ; but this is not the case, for no
vessels would take that route. It is a chimera to
which the best interests of the country have been
sacrificed. You have committed a fault against our
commerce, and also against our moral power. In this
opinion I have many parasites, but it is sought to take
them from me by insinuating that I am an enemy to our
maritime interests.—(Oh ! oh !) Such, however, is
not the case ; for my wish is, that France should have a
powerful navy—in a word, I am a friend to a real navy,
but I am a decided enemy to what I will call an illusory
navy.—(Noise.) I repeat that, in occupying the Mar-
quesas islands, you have committed a fault injurious to
our naval forces, and that will be a sufficient answer
to those who accuse me of not being favourable to
it. I believe that the country ought to have a real navy,
and I remember well a remark made by Admiral Lalande
with regard to the French fleet in the East, " I
had," he said, " some excellent vessels, capable of beating
anything they might meet, but I had others which had
just left port, and might have been taken in an hour."
The superiority of France should be in number. But,
it will be said, England has had as many as 100 ships-
of-the-line and 200 frigates, and France was never able
to have more than 60 of the former. That may be the
case ; but England has possessions to defend, which are
scattered over every sea, whilst France might concentrate
her forces, and enter into line with a superior num-
ber ; but, in order to do this, her ships must not be scat-
tered as far as Oceania, in consequence of the stupid
occupation of the Marquesas Islands. The millions de-
voted to that expedition should have been employed in
finishing the port of Algiers, and the magnificent har-
bour of Martinique. I shall now speak of the English
alliance ; my position with regard to that question is
very similar ; some wiih to make me pass for a par-
tisan of alliance with England an any price; whilst others,
and particularly the Hon. M. de Peyramont, pretends
that, in 1842, at least, I was a sort of enemy to it ; per-
mit me therefore, gentlemen, to offer a few explanations
on this point. The lion. M. de Tocqueville stated
yesterday, that although the English alliance might have
been desirable in 1830, it has since ceased to be so. At
that epoch an alliance with England must have been
generally approved of. But now, because in certain
given cases I appear disposed to withdraw myself from
England, I am accused of copying the policy of the
empire. No, gentlemen, I do not copy the empire ;
those who do so are the enemies of our good relations
with England. In my opinion, alliances are governed by
circumstances, and I also think that there is no alliance
that does not entail serious sacrifices. The history of
the past proves my assertion. France was once allied to
Germany, and she sacrificed her continental interests to
the necessities of the war which was then carried on
against England. Much at present is said of continental
alliances—you know my opinion on the subject. Per-
mit me to tell you that there is something chimerical
in alliances on the continent. Frankly, is there any one
possible for us at the present moment ? It is for this
reason that I am a partisan of peace—but not of peace at
any price. Time will undoubtedly change the con-
dition and the feeling of certain Powers ; but at present
there is not a single one of these alliances which is pos-
sible. The longer war shall be kept distant from us the
greater chance there is to find alliances on the conti-
nent of Europe. In all alliances some sacrifices must
be made. Thus, the first condition of an alliance
with Russia would be the sacrifice of our interests in
the East. An alliance with Austria would sanction for
ever tier rule over Italy ; and that with Prussia, the
most probable of all hereafter, would be to confine us
for ever in the limits fixed by the treaties of 1815. So
that it is my conviction that the solution of the great
European questions—that of the East, for instance, and
the interest of our revolution—requires an alliance
with England ; and I may add, that the analogy of
the two Governments will prevent England from again
forming a coalition against us, as she did forty years
back. The interest of our African possessions also re-
quires the English alliance ; for a war with England,
without producing the loss of that country—far from it
—would considerably impede our intercourse with it.
From all this, I come to the conclusion that we ought
not to fling ourselves without conditions into the Eng-
lish alliance ; but that still it merits being maturely
and seriously meditated on and weighed. How then,
since I am in favour of this alliance, have I differed from
the present Cabinet ? In tho manner of conducting it—
which is a most grave and important consideration.
The situation has beceme singularly modified of late
years, and in the following manner:—When you find in
a country a party disposed to act efficiently with you,
as was the case with the Whig party, then you may
form an alliance with that country; but when in place
of the Whigs, a Tory party is found in England,
that is, a party holding itself on a certain reserve,
and not wishing to act freely with France, then I say
that you ought not to pledge yourself to that party, as
you are now doing. Such is my idea—to engage your-
self with those who consent to act freely with you,
and keep on the reserve with those who show a different
countenance towards you. But, in any case, do you sup
pose that an affair like the right of search can be a
means of alliance with England to act as you did in
1840 ? What did you find in 1840 ? I will suppose
that at that period I was alone, and I take on myself all
responsibility ; there was no ambassador in London, I
suppose ; and it is I alone who am the culprit.—
(Loud laughter on the Left.) Well, at that period
France was irritated against England, on account
of the treaty of the 15th of July, and it was to
it that concessions ought to have been made ; and
yet it is France that you cause to make the concession.
It is impossible to more completely mistake the state of
the patient and the nature of the malady. This treaty
on the right of search was then consented to, from
which you have been told that it was impossible to extri-
cate yourselves unless by a weakness or a folly. How
then was it got out of ? It has not been got out of at all.
The first year, they said to Lord Aberdeen, " Receive
at least our dispatches, that we may be able to say that
negotiations are commenced."—(A -laugh.) The second,
not knowing what they had next to do, they deter.
mined on naming a commission—that is, to prepare for
the question an indefinite adjournment.--(Marks of
denial.) And supposing that this affair had been decided
in the line of policy prescribed by the French Chambers,
would Chambers,
what would have been gained ? The
difficulty
have been transferred from the French Legislature to
the other side of the Channel, and all that would have
been dune was to excite the dreadful storms in the Eng-
lish Houses of Parliament.—(Marks of dissent ) And do
not think,gentlemen,thatit is a smallmatter to bequeath
such difficulties to an allied Government—it is to pre-
pare absolute impossibilities for one's self. If, after the
treaty of 1840, in place of conceding the treaty on
the right of search, you had given England to under-
stand that it was not an opportune moment to bring
forward that question—if, in place of crying up so
loudly the English alliance, you had cultivated it
discreetly and noiselessly, you would have effected in-
finitely more—you would have been able to make the
double influence of the two nations felt in Greece—
you could have stopped the effusion of Christian blood
at Constantinople—and have given the French residents
on the banks of La Plata an efficient protection. I de-
fine the present policy as at the same time feeble and vain.
That is, the former is proved by the fact that yon have
gone to the furthest ends of the world to seek for com-
pensations for your weaknesses, and this has in its
turn become the cause of fresh acts of weakness on
your part. It is vain, for when you wanted to establish
fresh and sincere relations with England, you flung the
right of seareh between the two countries—words in
place of things. But what do I say ? You hare given
us things—the Pritchard indemnity, the treaty of Mo-
rocco, and the commission on the right of search.—
(Great agitation, and the sitting was suspended for some
minutes.)
'The Minister of Foreign Affairs—The Hon. Deputy
who has just spoken has imputed to me an intention which
I had not previously felt, and which I do not entertain since
I have heard his remarks. He has supposed that I should
speak to him of 1840, and to the legacy which he then left
us. I regard the question of 1840 as one already judged
both in France and Europe. I maintain that the opinions
of all sensible men who observe the course of politics are
decided on that point. I do not require, either for my
cause or for myself, to speak now of the Cabinet of
the Ist of March, and of the state in which affairs were
left when it retired from power.—(Approbation.)
Neither shall I follow the Hen. Member through
all the questions on which he has entered, ques-
tions military, political, and historical, questions on all
our possible alliances, and on all the phases of the
policy of our country; I do not think it necessary so infi-
nitely to ex tend the field of a discussion such as that which
now engages our attention. I shall not therefore speak
but on subjects which are actually pending—(Approba-
tion.) Ileppily all these questions have been settled since
your session, and I can therefore,
last without fnrther
preamble, enter on en examination of affairs, all the de-
tails of which are fresh in your recollection. You will
remember how things stood at the close of 11;,st sesOon.
You left the Government in serious difficulties. When
things of paramount importance are on the mind, secon-

dary interests and embarrassments are forgotten. When,
therefore, at the close of the session, we found ourselves
thrown on these important affairs on our own responsibility,
every idea of persons instantly disappeared ; we no
longer thought but of the great interest involved, and
of the great duties imposed on us, and we endeavoured
to settle those questions according to those inte-
rests and those duties. Taken in thmselves, isolated
even from all foreign complication, they were diffi-
cult and serious. A first war with a neighbouring
State in Africa, the first steps of a new establishment
at four thousand leagues from the mother country, were
serious affairs. There was also to be taken into consi-
deration the connexion existing between Morocco and
the count-..y with which our relations were as impor-
tant as frequent. The whole of our foreign policy was
based on the questions which you had left pending. We
proposed to ourselves to settle these questions in main-
taining the right the interests, and the dignity of
France.—(Hear, hear.) I shall take up, one after the
other, the several questions under discussion—Morocco,
Otaheite, and the right of search ; and I shall examine
how we have resolved them, in paying att .ration to the
interests, rights, and dignity of each. In the Morocco
affair, our course of conduct was this—we declared pub-
licly what our intentions were. Much has been said of
communications made to the English Government; but
I can declare that I communicated nothing but what I
have already stated. That being done, we reserved to
ourselves the office of transacting our own affairs. We
willingly accepted the good offices of the agents of Eng-
land, but we did not ask for their interference. Great

dent for the French granting an indemnity to Mr. Prit
chard. At the same time, however, that we agreed to
this indemnity, it was expressly stipulated that it was
not given on account of his expulsion, but merely in
consequence of the harsh treatment to which he had
been subjected. It would be weakness in them to deny
that they were glad that this indemnity had been the
means of removing the clouds which had hung over their
relations with England, but they should at the same
time have granted the indemnity had no political con-
siderations been connected with the affair. This, gen-
tlemen, is what I have t) say on the ensemble of the
question. At a future time I shall inter more into de-
tails. I will now say a word as to the conduct of the
English Government with regard to the affair of Mo-
rocco. It was made known to us how far its interests
might be involved in it; it strengthened its force on that
station, but at the same time kept it below our own, to
make it apparent that it only sought to protect the
legitimate interests of the country. This done, it entered
into our complaints, and both at Tangier and elsewhere
represented those complaints to be just, and our demands
moderate; it did more, it tendered to us its good offices.
In fine, the English Government accepted a situation
which was difficult and delicate for it—that of being
present and watching our success; and it had the good
feeling to wait to see what we considered it just and
proper to do. We well knew what were the feelings of
England on the subject, but she demanded nothing of us.
Do you imagine that, if affairs had been taken in another
spirit, they would have taken the turn they have done?
One word will serve to enlighten the Chamber on this
point. I will quote a few words from a letter from Lord
Aberdeen to the English Ambassador at Paris:—" My
conviction is," writes the British Minister on this occasion,
" that the sincere desire of the two Governments to culti-
vate the best and most cordial understanding renders it
almost impossible that incidents of this nature, if they
are viewed dispassionately, and treated in a spirit of
justice and moderation, can ever lead to anything but an
amicable and happy issue." This, gentlemen, is the
feeling which characterises both the incident itself.and
the reciprocal situation of the two Governments. In
order that such incident should not carry in its train
grave consequences, it was necessary that both Govern-
ments should act with a spirit of justice and moderation.
M. Billault here demanded permission to speak.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs—But there is some-
thing grander and more novel than this good intelli-
gence. France has often been at peace with England,
but behind their outward show of friendship there always
subsisted a jealous and hostile spirit of rivalry. The
prosperity, progress, and activity of one of the Govern-
ments were a source of annoyance to the other. But
this is no longer the case ; for both, acting in the plenti-
tude of their liberty, in place of being opposed as for-
merly, are able to aid each other. Such was the present
opinion of the two Governments. There are then, I say,
two Governments in Europe who consider it their duty to
act towards each other in a particular way, and act so;
they continually testify a mutual confidence in each
other's intentions and acts, and the care of their gravest
interests end neither in a rupture nor a coolness.—
(Hear, hear.) The result, then, of all that I have just
alluded to has been this—the King of the French went
to England.—(Murmurs on the Left.) This result is not
a conjectured one, but palpable and undoubted. It has
been said that we have hurried on matters to admit of
this visit. We precipitated nothing ; all were resolved
maturely and independently; and when nothing more ex-
isted to embarrass the two Governments the King went to
London. The propriety of this journey has certainly not
been contested by any person, and its political utility
cannot be impugned either. Although the personal inter-
course between Sovereigns is not at present so important
as at other periods and under other forms of government,
yet certainly they have a certain influence on the good
accord of States and on the easy arrangement of affairs.
You know the result of this visit, you have beheld the
manifestations of the sentiments of the Queen of Eng.
land, of her husband, of those of the whole country,
towards the King and dynasty of July, towards France
herself, towards our policy of peace and liberal conser-
vatism. Every one beheld this—Europe witnessed it—
and do you suppose that the spectacle is without fruit?
—that France was weakened or humiliated by these in-
cidents ? Ask where you please in Europe, and I will,
beforehand, agree to accept the answer.—(Loud approba-
tion.) But what Europe witnessed and comprehended,
France herself' also understood. I saw the King's re-
turn to France—l saw how he was everywhere welcomed
—I saw a just pride displayed at the consideration with
which he was greeted in England, and a just satisfaction
at the removal of all difficulties between the two States.
—(A. fresh burst of approbation.) I shall only
add one word more on the question which has been
alluded to so repeatedly in the course of our discussion
—I mean the right of search. Ido not wish to give my
words an extension beyond what facts will bear out. I
do not say that this question is already settled, for the
conviction of England was that it was the only means of
putting down the slave trade, and you all know with
what honourable perseverance that question was prose-
cuted in England. It was then necessary to prove to
England that other means might be devised to effect the
desired object. This was an immense step, and that
step had been made by the nomination of the mixed
commission. Believe me, this commission is not ap-
pointed to elude the question—the names of the persons
appointed to compose it—taken as they are from the
most considerable of the two countries—will be a proof
of the contrary. Gentlemen, such is the position of
affairs at present, and there is a vast distance from this
lofty region to mere party struggles. In which of the
two will the Chamber place itself ? Will it side with
mere party squabbles, or will it take into account great
public interests ? Such is the question which the dis-
cussion will resolve. I have placed it before you in all
its truth. The Chamber must decide.—(Loud appro-
bation.)

and efficient instruments were not wanting to effect what
was wanted. Our land forces were commanded by an
illustrious general, and we can say that Algeria was
twice conquered by Marshal Bugeaud—onco in 1830,
and again from 1841 to 1844. All the means of success
were placed in the hands of the Marshal, and at the
same time we advised the Crown to give the command
of the fleet to the Prince de Joinville. This was as-
suming a grave responsibility, for it is always a grave
matter to intrust a command and the termination of a
political affair to a young Prince. It was greatly so at
that particular juncture, for there is not one of you but
is aware of the use—and allow me to say, of the abuse
—made of the Prince de Joinville's pamphlet on the
state of our navy. That publication was represented as
a mark of against the Cabinet. The noble Prince
had, in fact, been placed in a delicate situation, and we
considered it our duty to afford him the first opportunity
of proving his devotedness to the honour and dignity of
the country, and at the same time his full knowledge of
the policy which suited that country.—(Loud marks of
approbation.) The Prince de Joinville, in publishing
his note, had not intended anything else than to show
himself a good citizen and a sound seaman.
M. Dupin—Every one approved his conduct.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs—l think M. Dupin
cannot havo comprehended my words. When I said
that the Prulce intended nothing but to act like a good
citizen and a sound seaman, I evidently had the appear-
ance of speaking in terms of approbation ; but what I
meant was, that his note was misrepresented, and a sense
attributed to his words which they were not intended to
bear. That was what I intended to say, and the appro-
bation of M. Dupin is not, therefore, necessary. The
conduct of the Prince responded to the confidence of
the Government ; but every one must see that the re-
sponsibility was grave for us, and that there was some
merit in incurring it. This being done, our policy re-
specting Morocco clearly defined—all our measures
taken to carry on our affairs ourselves—the commanders
by sea and land placed in complete possession of all the
means which they required—we conceived that the war
ought to be carried on rapidly, and peace arrived at
promptly. It has been said that we did this on account
of Otaheite—the assertion is false. Were there not such
a place as England in the world—had her interests not
been in any way connected with those of Morocco—the
simple fact of Algeria being deeply concerned in the mat-
ter would have rendered it our duty to arrive promptly
at peace.—(Hear, hear.) I trust that M. Thiers, after
what I have just said, will not reproach us for having
paid undue attention to the legitimate interests of Eng-
land in this circumstance. I shall not at present enter
into the consideration of the clauses of the treaty; they
will be examined hereafter, when the paragraphs are
brought forward. I only wanted to give the Chamber a
general view of the manner in which the affair has been
conceived and conducted. I now come to Otaheite, and
oni that matter I have to say that there are several ques-
tions which the Hon. Deputy (M. Thiers), I will not say
confounded, but mingled up together. There is first the
occupation of the Marquesas ; I can say that this ques-
tion was discussed two years back at great length in
this Chamber, and yet M. Thiers preserved silence.
Why, if the taking possession of these islands appeared
to him then an enormous blunder, did he not demand
permission to speak, and declare it? I cannot but think
that his ideas have become considerably modified since
then, otherwise his silence would be inconceivable.—

(Hear, hear.) But, however the Hon. Gentleman may
have thought on the matter, the Opposition spoke, the
Chamber heard them, and decided the question. The
other Chi mber also did so, and it was in conse-
quence of the vote of the two Chambers that the
expedition was proceeded with. The Hon. M.
Thiers has confounded dates and facts. The
Government never had an idea of possessing
itself of Otaheite, and putting France and England in
contact on that point. All it sought for was a desirable
port in those seas. The admiral sent on that expedition
had considered it his duty to assume the protectorate of
Otaheite, of which no mention had been made in his in-
structions. Two reasons determined us not to refuse
what the admiral had done, and the first reason was,
that the protectorate of the island of Otaheite was of
some importance to our establishment in the Marquesas,
and the other, that we did not wish to see the French
flag withdrawn immediately after its appearance.—
(Marks of adhesion) This provisional protectorate, a
protectorate not yet sanctioned by the Government, con-
tinued for fourteen months. It had, it is true, met with
difficulties and embarrassments ; but there had not been
anything like tumult or sedition ; everything went on
regularly and peaceably. When, on the contrary, Ad-
miral Dupetit Thonars thought it his duty to convert the
protectorate into a sovereignty, disturbances commenced.
Thus, during the fourteen months of the protectorate,
Mr. Pritchard, who was then at Otaheite, was unable to
excite any insurrection; it was after the assumption of the
sovereignty that he was able to do so. The Government,
therefore, were not so much to blame when, after having
accepted the protectorate, it refused the sovereignty ;
the former appeared to it necessary to protect the
interests of France, for which the latter was useless.
I now come to the last incident, that of Mr. Pritchard.
You will remember the strong sensation created in Eng-
land on the receipt of the news of his arrest ; this emo-
tion appeared to me to proceed from two causes—first,
the quality of agent of the English Government, with
which he was invested ; and, next, his religious charac-
ter. The conduct adopted by us in this matter was this
—we first sought to establish the truth of the facts of the
case ; to prove that Mr. Pritchard was not an official
agent, but a simple foreigner, living under the protection
of a law common to all. Had he been a consul, there
would have been certain forms to be observed with re-
gard to him, when desiring his expulsion ; but he was
not consul, and the truth of these facts we have been
able to prove to the English Government. As to his re-
ligious character, we have also established that be has
nothing to complain of at our hands ; we have proved
that the most perfect religious liberty prevailed in
Oceania. This was done, we remained quiet, in order to
allow the angry feelings which had been raised in Eng-
land to subside. When the proper moment arrived to
examine the affair to its foundation, what was the con-
duct of the Government ? We fully maintained the
right of the French authorities at Otaheite to expel any
foreigner who shall disturb public order. After having
supported this right, we maintained that our agents at
Otaheite had just reasons for using it ; and that they had
acted properly in so doing. After this, we made the ad-
mission that some of the conduct used towards Mr.
Pritchard was open to blame, and to be regretted, for it
could not be admitted that French agents should, in any
quarter of the globe, forget those maxims of equity and
consistency which were the rule of all regular Govern-
ments.—(Exclamations on the Left.) Our conviction
was, that in the arrest of Mr. Pritchard some of those
maxims had been departed from, and I will explain in
what those acts consisted. Without entering into any
irritating details, we considered that although there was
enough in the circumstances of the case to warrant the
authorities in taking every measure for their safety, yet
that it was unnecessary to keep Mr. Pritchard in soli-
tary confinement for eight days, and prevent his seeing
even his wife and children. We thought that it was
neither just nor proper to use more severity than was
really necessary. We considered that the step which
had been ordered by the admiral on his arrival at Ota-
heite six days after should have been done at the time,
viz., to compel Mr. Pritchard to leave the island. In
saying this I do not mean to shelter the Government be-
hind the Governor of Otaheite, for that would be neither
honourable nor just. They had no such intention. M.
de Bruat was one of its most intelligent and bravest
officers. He every day gave proofs of thrt. We have
admitted that there were certain points connected with
this affair for which it was honourable in us to express
our regret and our disapproval, and we, at the same time,
thought that there might exist reasons why a pecuniary
indemnity should be granted.—(alnrniurs on the Left.)
The Chamber sees that I do not avoid any point con-
nected with the question.—(Approbation.) Indepen-
dently of the rules of which I have spoken, there is a fact
of which I will remind the Chamber. Some years before
this affair two French Catholic missionaries had been ex-
pelled from Otaheite. Those missionaries bad gone to
that island under a Government which forbad any preach-
ing contrary to the established religion of the State.—
(Movement.) The will of Queen Pomare is the charter of
that country. The missionaries who went to preach at
Otaheite acted at variance wish that_ law, and it was in
virtue of it that they were expelled from the island.
Violence had, it is true, been used towards them,
but two years after Admiral pt4petit, Thouarsh4d de-
ritandsid and received an indemnity of 2,500 piastres for
the treatment they bad experienced. The admiral was
perfectly right in what he did, but it served as a prate.

SITTING OP JAN. 22,

The discussion on the Address was resumed to-day.
M. Bechard, in opposing the Address, said that he was
equally an enemy to the line of policy pursued by the
present Ministry and to that professed by the party of
M. Thiers, neither of which deserved the name of a na-
tional policy, as understood by the party of which he
was a member. The commercial interests of the coun-
try were, he considered, sacrificed to the English alliance.
M. Dupin, sen., in alluding to the questions of Morocco
and Otaheite,_ stated his opinion that on neither of those
points had the dignity of the country been properly pro-
tected. He condemned the Ministry for not obtaining
an indemnity from the Emperor of Morocco for the ex-
penses of the war, and accused them of sullying the
honour of France by the haste in which the
treaty had been ratified. The conduct of the
Government at Otaheite, he maintained, was also
dishonourable to France, as their flag should never
have been withdrawn. If the agents of the Govern-
ment had acted right in expelling Pritchard from
the island, what cause was there for blaming them, and
granting an indemnity? This could only have been
done by way of a peace-offering to England, and he
trusted the Chamber would never give its sanction.
With regard to the measure which the Government had
declared it had adopted of a mixed commission to seek
means to obviate the necessity for the right of search, he
thought the idea perfectly illusory. The measure of a
mixed commission had been designated by the Minister
as a grand pas ; in his (M. Dnpin's) opinion it was a
faux pas. He was an advocate of peace, but he would
not that everything should be conceded to one ally, and
refused to another. His motto was, each for himself,
and each at home. He preferred it to an alliance with
England, if it was to be paid for at the high price
placed on it.
After brief speeches from M. Iferbert and others, the
Chamber divided on the first and main paragraph, when
Ministers had a majority of 28.

IGE.—(YESTERDAY.)
Gibraltar..
Leghorn
Genoa
Milan ..... ......
Venice .......
Naples ............... 39i
Palermo, per oz llBl
Lisbon 53
Oporto.. . 53
Rio Janeiro ....... 24
Bahia ...... 24
Buenos Ayres
NewYork,22dyssight
Philadelphia
PRIM; Or BULLION, rimol.
Foreign bars...£3 17 9
Portuga' 'mold Coin 3 17 5
New 1100 l .00n5..... 0 0 0
New Dollars 0 4 9A
Silver i o Bars 0 4 1

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LORD RANBLAGII TO LORD ABERDEEN.
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N AN.i

Ft nd C m: t tu-
lagh).
OF SPAIN.

3,Bolton•row, March 15, 1844.
My Lord,—May liequest the favour of an interview at
your earliest convenience, being the bearer of a letter
from his Royal Highness the Infante Don Carlos, which
I am instructed to place in your Lordship's own hands,
and which is of the highest importance to the futon
tranquillity of Spain ?—I have the honour to be, m 7
Lord, your Lordship's most obedient servant,
RANELAGH.

In consequence of this note I had two interviews with
Lord Aberdeen, the result of which will be found in the
letters following :
LORD RANELAGH TO LORD ABERDEEN.

May 26, 1844.
My Lord,—On the 17th of March last J had the
honour of submitting to your Lordship, on the part of
Don Carlos, certain propositions with which I hut been
intrusted by that Prince.
Your Lordship admitted the importance of the ivo-
posals, and I had the satisfaction of being assured th.. 14
they should be referred to Madrid, whence an answer
might be expected in ten or twelve days. On the 17th
of April following I had received no communication from
your Lordship, and I again solicited an interview. .1
had the honour of attending your appointment accord,
ingly on the 19th, when you postponed your decision
until the arrival of a messenger from Madrid, expected
on the Wednesday or Thursday following.
On the Ist of May, being still without your Lord-
ship's commands, I informed you by my note of that
date that I was under engagements to leave London for
Bourges in too days, and begged a few minutes' inter-
view before starting.
To that note I received no reply.
On the evening of the 2d I called at the Foreign-office,
where I learned from your message that your Lordship
was engaged, but that you might possibly see me on
your return from the House of Lords. I replied that,
being myself engaged, I could not return on that possi-
bility ; and, having deferred my departure as long as
possible, I started the next evening (the 3d inst.) fur
Bourges, without any communication whatever from your
Lordship.
I have ventured to recal these circumstances. I now
take the liberty of asking you for a positive answer.
I have the honour, &c.

RANELAG H.