The Sun.
London, England, 1810-11-17 00:00:00

1. A general and particular statement of each

army.
2. What number of men is necessary to complete•
eaf• army, accorithig to the plan proposed. , •
3. What qn unity of arms, ammunition, and
clothing is warned for each army.
4. What means have been taken to provide in
whole or in part, for the said wants.
5. What number of ships of war the nation pos-
sesses, specifying the state in which they are.
6. Whitt -Thimber of shins it will be necessary to
arm, mentioning their several classes.
7.. What naval stores are absolutely requisite at
present.
8. •What number of seamen is wanting to man'
out ships.
•,g, What numbers are necessary to keep up the,
,armed force.

The following is an extraet of a letter from a
Genera: Officer in the British service to his friend in
,London

" Cadecira, 36 miles from Lisbon, Q6l. z 6.
`,` ;All our opinions .respeaing the probable con-,
„sequences of the invasion of thii country have prov-
ed erroneous. With a very inferior army, at the
,beginning of the campaign, we kept close to Masse-
, na's array, which then consisted of 75,000111E11 ; end
e'when he commenced Avis operations, after the stir
--
sender of •Altrieida, we felt. back regulai.ly and slow-
:.ly, .never aoandoning him an inch of ground, until
-the 'near approach of so overwhelming a force obli-
ged us, as a measure a.t prudence. . At this time the
whole of out force did not exceed 25,•000 English,
arid the Portuguese ; abut we were 'daily- approaching
mar reinforcements, and concentrating the different
,corps of the army, which had !been necessarily se-
parated to, attend to other points which had • been
threatened.
the ietla September, we occupied a posi-
:tion where. we. [pieta have fought with advantage,
'end Lieutenant-General Hill and NI
Lelth would leave joined us the day after, with their'
corps, amounting to thirteen 'Briesieregiments, and
;as many Portuguese, elearly -twenty thou•and neat).
ery and two thousand cavalry. The enemy, how-
fver, appreciating the dangar of attacking us in such,
.a position, where, (torn the nature of the country,.
his lajge body of cavalry voold_ have been useless,.
auddenly crossed the river Mondego, for the purpose
Of marching upon Coimlke, and thereby- turning
bur position. Lord Wellington was immediately
aperiaed of this 'Movement, arid passing e • %lon-
dego on the 20th and 21st, cut in upon Massends
-route;,, and took up a co:en:and:Mg positicre on the
'height'S of Busaco, by which .he cut off their im-
mediate or dirtia rold to tl-te above;olentioned city;
which was twelve miles ie our year.
" .03 the 25: h the advanced picquets of my divi-e
"sion were warmly engaged the enemy, and
their columns approached our position iteevery di-
reetion.' The. eteli was employed in preparations
and ' combination', which convinced us of their in-
tention to attack oe the following morning ; and I
'had no doubt, born a variety of circumstances, that
the extended pobt I occupied in the position would
be else first and principal objeft of their attack. It
proved so. The whole of their artillery and several
heavy columns were brought to bear upon the pass
of St. Autoetio de Alcantare -tit day-break ; and
the attack was continued with great obstinacy on the
diffeeent points of the line occupied, by my division
until until twelve o'clock, when they desisted; after being
. driven back on every occasion in great confusion and
-welt greet loss. They were making their last effort,
whera-Gee-eral Hill and General Leith's corps arriv-
ed ; and a brigade of General Leith's division con-
tributee to put au end to the •basineseof the day.—
The Gazette will give you a detail Of the circume
-stances; Allah I 'was tooernuch "'engaged in to' de-
scribe with any accuracy. The enemy several
'times penetrated the line occupied by my division,
but -were al ways driven "back with the • ba) onet, and
-compelled to disperse and save themselves by a pre-
cipitate flight: The part of my division engaged,
-consisted only of three British and as many Portu-
guese regirrients, about 4000 ; and I may safely say,
that we placed as many of the'enemy hors-de com-
bat. The enemy allow that•they lost, in kilted and
wounded; orrthat ocea'sion, above eittool and in
-that case, we have certainly not taken more than
o'er share; for the whole of the real attack was
upon the position-of the 3d -diviiien, and -the de-
' monatrelons Upian the other points were merely
feints. It isidifficult to do .justice to the courage
'and gallentry of the regiments engaged ; every man
-fought a§il the safety and' lionourof his country had
*been exclnsilvely confided to his single arm. I shall
merely notice one aelion. The-line occupied by my
division was very extensive, above a mile and a half;
which enabled the enemy-to make distin4 and se-
-parate attacks on different points at the same time.
. Having repelled the principal attack, against which
-they brought'the whole of their artillery, I was 'gel-
loping to theother extremity, %%hick was at the'
same time closely engaged, when' I found a column
of the enemy had penetrated to the centre of my
line, and had actually established themselves on a
strong rocky point :which commanded every thing
,around. There was nothing- at hand
,but the light
infantry companies IA two regiments, which had
been dispersed and were retiring in' disorder. In
this extremely critical situation; with the assistance
of Major Smith, of the 45th, I rallied them with
softie. difficulty, and after•a few words, led them to
. a charge, from lehich I had but faint hopes of suc-
cess.' Major Smith fell, like a' tree hero, on the
summit elate rock, in the moment of vietory ; and
- we completely succeeded in dislodging thein ; and
- with theetssistanceiof a Portuguese regiment which
_arrived! at ;tile met:tent, we' dispersed them; • and
drove them across the ravine with great slaughter.
" We expevied that the enemy would have re-
hewed hiseettack on the following day ; but it ap-
peared that he had already got a surfeit. He de-
camped on the 28th, at night, and attempted to
reach CQl.7lbra by a cirCuitous route; but Lord
,aware of this movement, cut in by a
More direet eoad; and remitted it before him, which
we did earlyOn elle 30th f but it afforded no advan=
to genus position--we successively fell back to this
poSition, Where Massena may tight us whenever he
pleases.. We haveeretritrtted above 200 miles %t ith
toe greateet regulirity ahit good order; and the at-
.
- . .

/. s