The Sun.
London, England, 1844-09-05 00:00:00

Lord COTTENHAM then proceeded to deliver his
judgment. He agreed with his Noble and Learned
Friend who preceded him, as to the difficulty in which
any Member of the House was placed who felt him-
self called on to come to a conclusion adverse
to the great majority of the judges, and the
effect of an opinion expressed by a great majority
of the judges ought, of course, to make an x, one
extremely cautious of coming to a conclusion con-
trary to what was expressed by their opinion, and it
ought to niake one watch everythsetempinod wnetaos supposed
ok,andto
weigh every conclusion which
to come to, in order that if a person came to an
opinion adverse to that of the majority; and he should
exercise all the powers with which he was invested if
he was to come to a different conclusion. He adopted
that course, he carefully attended to all that had
been urged at their Lordships' bar, and all
the reasons that had been urged by the
Lord Chief Justice in delivering the opinions
of the judges. He hesitated at every step of
the reasoning, as he followed him, and he still came
to the conclusion that the opinion expressed by the
majority was wrong, and the opinion expressed by the
minority was right. He apprehended it was his
bounden duty to state the reasons upon which he came
to that conclusion. They asked for the assistance of
the learned judges, in order to inform the House, to
assist them in coming to a right conclusion in matters
of law, and their opinions were entitled to great
weight, but they were not to bind the House, they
were merely to assist the House ; and no doubt when
a majority of them came to one conclusion, the great-
est caution and care should be taken at every reason-
ing upon which one felt bound to come to a different
opinion. On a question which lately carne before
their Lordship, there was a unanimous concurrence of
the judges, and two of their Lordships concurred in
their opinions, and two others dissented, so that the
decision come to was against the opinion of all the
judges. Upon one part of the case, to which his
Noble and Learned I riend had last adverted, namely,
the point of the challenge of the array, he would
merely advert to, for the purpose of guarding him-
self against the supposition of forming an opinion
adverse to the case of the plaintiffs in error. He
would only say that, if the judgment in that case was
right, it would establish this strange proposition, that
there was no remedy for an acknowledged wrong of
great magnitude. The only part of the case on which
he would address any observations to the House was,
as to the effect to be given to the opinion of the
learned judges, who thought that the first, second,
third, and seventh counts of the indictment were to be
rejected; the two last because they were hasten them-
selves, the others because the findings and the enter-
ing upon the findings were erroneous, and that a
judgment and sentence of the court, which was " for
his offences aforesaid" could not be impugned. A
court of law could not be affected by a consideration
of the nature of the counts which it was called on to
reject. The question they had to consider was, whe-
ther there was error in the record, and if they read
the record as any other document, and only gave
to the words found there the construction they
would receive if used in any other instrument,
could it be for a moment doubted that, on the intend-
ments stated in the indictments in the several counts,
the jury had found a verdict of guilty upon all, and
that the defendants, for the offences aforesaid, were
subject to punishment ? llad not the court below
passed sentence for the offences in the sixth and
seventh count, as well as for the offences charged in
the others ? It was so found in the record, and were
they to say that the court had not passed sentence
upon all the counts ? He considered that the only
answer given, namely, that the court only passed sen-
tence upon the good counts, was unsatisfactory.
They could not look to the record to ascertain cer-
tain proceedings not mentioned in it. Some of the
arguments that had been used, supposed the court
below to be right in all particulars. In his opinion the
reverse was the fact; there was manifest error
on the record, and it was not competent
for a court of error to inquire into the causes of that
error. Supposing there was a charge in a count of
a malignant libel, and that count was proved to be bad,
was it to be said that the party was to be punished
equally as if the count was good? Now, the judg-
ment of the House was to be governed by the cases
that had taken place; and with respect to them seve-
ral had been referred to. Two classes of cases had
been cited, the second of which -he considered only
to be applicable to the present case ; the first were
utterly inapplicable. The Noble and Learned Lord
then adverted to the cases of the " Queen v.
Rhodes" and the " Queen v. Ingram," for the pur-
pose of showing that the court in those cases
had arrested the judgment on the ground that, some
of the counts being proved to be bad, the court
could not apportion the punishment. " Young v. the
King" had been relied upon on the part of the Crown.
He had carefully examined that case, and he
did not consider that the decision pronounced
in it had any bearing whatever on the
present. It had been said, that in the " King v.
Mason," a misdemeanour was charged on two counts,
and therefore the judgment was sustained. Now that
was not the fact; and in the " King v. Fuller," it was
clearly laid down that judgment could not
be passed if there was any good count. From
all these authorities, it appeared that the rule
in criminal cases, on a motion in arrest of judgment
was, that the court having ascertained, before it pro-
nounced judgment, what counts were good and
what bad, awarded the punishment, as it thought
right, upon the offences contained in the good
counts. It appeared to him that a court of
error was in precisely the same predicament.
It had no more jurisdiction over the quantum of pu-
nishment, and no better means of referring one por-
tion of it to one count, or another to another, than a
civil court had with respect to damages in an action.
In both cases the judgment proceeded on an indict-
ment which was found to be defective, and having
come to one result upon the whole, which the su-
perior jurisdiction could not apportion, the same
necessity existed in the one case as in the
other, of holding the whole to be bad. It
had been urged that much inconvenience would arise
from adopting this rule. He felt satisfied that the
inconvenience which would arise from the opposite
course would be far greater, and would in many
cases be productive of great injustice. The only
inconvenience was, that the prosecutor would be com-
pelled to be careful as to the counts upon which he
rested his case ; whilst the rejection of
the rule would deprive the defendants of the benefit of
a writ of error. The rule contended for by the de-
fendants was founded on principle, and necessary for
the purposes of justice; and it was in perfect analogy
with the decisions in civil and criminal cases. The
opinion which he had then expressed he formed early
in the argument. He had carefully attended to all
that had been urged at the bar by the
majority of' the judges against it, and he
had not found any reason for altering his view.
Lord CAMPBELL then proceeded to read his judg-
ment. Ile said it was now his duty to state to their
Lordships the opinion which, after great considera-
tion, he had formed upon the questions of law raised
by this record, and to these, of course, he should strictly
confine himself. In the first place, he had no doubt
that there were various good counts in the indictment.
A conspiracy to effect an unlawful purpose, ur to
effect a lawful purpose by unlawful means, was, by
the common law of England, an indictable offence ;
and if several persons deliberately plotted michief to
an individual or to the State, they were liable to
punishment, although they might have done no act
in execution of their purpose. Where thy had
actually done what they intended to do, it
might be more proper to prosecute them for
illegal acts; but in point of law, they remained lisble
for the offence of entering into a conspiracy. The first
five counts in this indictment clearly charged the de-
fendants with having conspired together to effect un-
lawfurpurposes. The fifth count was strongly objected
to. Ile considered that any person who deliberately
attempte.l to promote feelings of and hosti-
lity between different classes of her Majesty's sub-
jects, to make the English hated by the Irish, or
the Irish by the English, was guilty of a most
culpable proceeding, and that, if several combined to
do so, they committed a misdemeanour, for which they
might be indicted and punished. He was likewise
clearly of opinion that the plea in abatement was bad
in form, if not in substance, for not averring that
there were not other witnesses duly sworn, on whose
evidence the indictment might have been supported,
and for not showing that the witnesses who were
examined could not, on account of their religious
profession, have been lawfully examined without being
sworn in. He thought the Court of Queen's
Bench was fully authorised to continue the trial in
the vacation, and that the order for that purpose,
though conditional, was quite sufficient. In his opi-
nion, the rule of the common law requiring the con-
tinuance of the order did not apply. The question
raised by the writ of error, coram nobis, was more
doubtful. The assignment of error in respect to the
witnesses not having been sworn in court, was free
from defects fatal to the plea in abatement. He
had no difficulty in over-ruling Mr. Steele's
point, that there was no statement written on
the indictment of the names of the witnesses sworn.
He was at first much struck with the objection to the
validity of the judgment by reason of the form of the
itr heetogenntisaalntehoueignhto which the defendant was required to
enter, and he was by no means free from doubt upon
he was not prepared to say that it
would be a sufficientt ground for reversal. It must be
taken to be part of s:snotfenweheicphrohneouhnacdebdeuepon
found
noutnhd
guilty, and it
couldc the
defendant for the offences
recog not be separated from
the finding. The
nisances imposed in this
case might lead to perpetual imprisonment.
Magna Charta provided that no fine should be im-
posed upon any party which it w•
as out of his power
to pay. The effect of the sent • sentence, this
case,
would be, that if the required rscognisances were not
found, the party would remain in prison for the rest

of his life. He felt still more difficulty when he
came to the next part of the case—probably the most
important part of it, as it was not merely a technical
question, but one which affected the administration of
justice—he meant the constitution of the jury by
whom the defendants were tried. The only question
here was, whether the challenge to the array was a
remedy which the law allowed. (The Noble
and Learned Lord here read that portion
of the plea of the defendants which applied
to this part of their case.) Now, he was
clearly of opinion that the defendants ought not to
have been tried by a jury constituted in the manner
described in the case of the plaintiffs in error. It
was there described not merely as a casual
omission of names., but the averment was that the
names had been fraudulently omitted. He conceived
that under such circumstances the panel ought to
have been quashed. No other remedy was suggested.
His Noble and Learned Friend on the Woolsack had
suggested no remedy. If the jury list was found to he
defective, the jury list of the former year
ought to have been brought into operation as though
no list had been formed for the current year. He
confessed that he should not have been inclined to ad-
vise their Lordships to reverse the judgment merely
upon this ground upon his own sole opinion, but since
writing his judgment he had listened to the argu-
ments of his Noble and Learned Friend the Chief
Justice of the Queen's Bench, and also those of Mr.
Justice Coltman. The jury were unanimous in the
opinion that the finding of the jurymen on the Ist,
2d, and 3d counts of the indictment were contrary
to law. His opinion was that the punishment must
be taken as having been awarded in respect of
the supposed offences charged in the bad counts.
According to the plain use of language and the com-
mon sense of mankind, the defendants were being
punished on charges which did not amount to crimes,
and for crimes of which they had not
i been con-
victed. With respect to the bad counts, t was said
that it was a rule of law if there were any good counts,
a bad count would not vitiate the judgment. It
would be strange if such were the universal rule.
Such might very well be the case where only one corpus
dilicti was charged in an indictment consisting
of more than one count in utile per inutile non
vitiatur ; but where the separate counts of an indict-
ment charged distinct offences, they must be consi,
dered as separate indictments, and, as had been shown
in the case of Feargus O'Connor, where the court
had arrested the judgment upon one count as
soon as it was discovered to be bad. They
were told that they were to presume that the
court below knew what counts were bad,
and what were good, and passed judgment upon those
counts only which were good. Such an opi-
nion would be contrary to the whole spirit of our law,
which supposed judges to be fallible, and provided a
machinery by bills of exceptions, writs of error, and
other expedients, for the correction of any errors into
which they might fall ; and it would be contrary to
fact, for all the judges in the Court of Queen's Bench
in Ireland had held the sixth and seventh counts to
be unexceptionable. He would suppose a case,
in which there were two counts, A and B,
A being a good count, and B a bad one, the court
below held B, which charged a grave offence, to be
good, and A, which charged a light offence, to be
bad, and passed sentence on the count B, would it
be held that a court of error, finding the count B to
be bad, would be bound to subject a man to that
severe punishment, because A, charging a lighter
offence, was good ? This doctrine was attempted to
be upheld on authority, and by the general
opinion of the profession. The dictum of
Lord Mansfield referred solely to motions in
arrest of judgment, and not to writs of error. It had
no application at all to the present case; and in the
cases of the " King and Mason," and the " King and
Young," the point had not been raised. The case in
" Russell and Bligh" amounted to nothing, as the
Court had no power to consider any thing but the
point reserved; and in the " King and Powell" it was
decided that misdemeanour and offence must be con-
sidered as a novum collectinum, and as both counts
were held good, there could be no doubt that the judg-
ment was correct. In indictments for perjury, if
one assignment were good, that would support
a verdict, because perjury was but one offence, and
one good assignment was sufficient to support it,
how many bad ones soever there might be in the
indictment. It was said that this indictment ought
to be supported on the ground of expediency. He
could not see what inconvenience could possibly
arise from taking A verdict upon such count, and
passing sentence only upon those counts which were
good. He understood thit Mr. Baron Rolfe had
passed sentence in an indictment for murder in which
one count was bad, but in such a case no practical
difficulty would arise, as where one felony was proved
it was sufficient to support a verdict of guilty, and
it could never be worth the while of a person con-
victed of felony on one good count to sue out a writ
of error. But in cases of misdemeanour it was very
different, for according to the present loose system of
drawing up indictments, a pleader having drawn one
good count, might go on drawing other counts,
each increasing in vagueness and ambiguity, until he
involved the party indicted in such perplexity, that
there would be the greatest difficulty in ascertaining
of what he was accused. There could be no difficulty
in taking a verdict of acquittal, or entering a nolli
prosequi on the counts that were bad, and passing
Judgment only on those that were good.
It had been said by the learned judges, with the ex-
ception of Justice Patteson, on the good counts only,
and not on the three bad ones ; and yet; those counts
contained the most serious charges, including that of
creating discontent in the army. Now, could their
Lordships concur in the incredible fiction,
that the judges, having the general verdict,
so far neglected their duty as to overlook
those grave charges ? He would remind their
Lordships that they were not bound by the opi-
nion of the majority of the judges. The appeal was
not from the Irish to the English judges, but to that
Chamber, in the exercise of one of its most important
functions, which he hoped their Lordships would
long continue to exercise for the benefit of the coun-
try and the protection of its liberties.
The LORD CHANCELLOR then put the question thus
—ls it your Lordships' pleasure that the judgment
be reversed ?
Lords Denman, Cottenham, and Campbell said,
" Content."
Lord Brougham and two or three Tory Peers (lay
Lords) said "Not Content."
The LORD CHANCELLOR was about to put the ques-
tion again, in the usual form, previous to taking the
numbers or dividing, when—
Lord WHARNCLIFEE rose, but on the suggestion of
the Lord Chancellor, he sat down, put on his
hat, and addressed the House from his seat.
He said that he did not think it desirable that their
Lordships should divide, as there was a majority of the
law lords in the House in favour of the appeal. He
humbly recommended those of their Lordships who
were not law lords—and who, not having heard the
whole case, were not so well qualified to judge of the
question—to abstain from voting. It was far better
that the character of the House, as a court of appeal,
should be maintained, and that their decision should
be against the opinion of the majority of the judges—
even though in this case it should produce great
inconvenience—than that those Lords who had not
heard the case should, by their interference, reverse
the judgment of those members to whom the deci-
sion of such cases was usually committed by the prac-
tice of the House.
Lord BROUGHAM entirely concurred in the opinion
of the majority of the judges in Ireland and England.
But he also agreed with the Noble Lord who had just
spoken, that it was more advisable that those of their
Lordships who had not heard the case, should not
vote. He deeply lamented the division to which the
House would come ; but he would now only say, that
when he differed from the majority of the judges on
the question of Presbyterian Marriages in Ireland, he
did so upon the authority of Lord Stowell and other
eminent persons.
Lord CAMPBELL had voted with his Noble Friend
on the question of Presbyterian Marriages, and for the
same reason. He would now only say that the dis-
tinction between lay Lords and law Lords was not
known to the Constitution, but that it was the rule of
all courts of law that no judge should decide a case
which he had not heard.
The Duke of CLEVELAND was understood to say
that he had paid great attention to the case, and that
lie thought he had a right to vote upon it.
The Marquis of CLANRICARDE said that if any
other lay Peer voted, he would vote also, although
he thought it would be calamitous for the character
of the House, as a judicial body, if the established
rule in such cases were departed from.
After a few words from Lord VERULAM, the whole
( f the lay Peers withdrew.
The question was again put, and Lords Cottenham,
Denman, and Campbell having voted for the reversal
of the judgment, and Lord Brougham against it,
The LORD CHANCELLOR said—My Lords, THE
JUDGMENT IS REVERSED.
Their Lordships then proceeded to give judgment
in some appeal cases.

HER MAJESTY'S MARINE EXCURSION.—WINDSOR,
TUESDAY EVENING.—Ten of her Majesty's ponies and
six of his Royal Highness Prince Albert's saddle horses
left the Castle this morning, and were conveyed by the
Great Western Railway from Slough to Paddington, en
route to Woolwich, to be embarked on board one of the
Government steamers for Scotland. They are to reach
Blair Atholl by Monday next. The present arrange-
ments are, for the Queen and the Prince Consort to take
their departure from the Castle on Monday, proceeding.
from Windsor to the Farnborough station (where pre-
parations are now in progress for the accommo,lation of
her Mdjesty), and thence by a special train to the coast
of Hampshire, whence they will set sail in the Royal
Victoria and Albert yacht. The Court is not expected
to be absent from Windsor for mere than three weeks
or a month.

SPIRIT of the PUBLIC JOURNALS.

TROM THE DAILY PAPERS OF YESTERDAY.

TIMES.—Two speeches, delivered in the course
of the last few days, one by Mr. Disraeli, the other
by Lord John Manners, claim attention. Though
not delivered upon similar occasions, or to similar
auditories, they prove one point in common, showing,
as they do, the strong position which certain members
of the high Conservative, or rather, high Tory poli-
tics, who hale dared to let go the Premier's leading-
strings, occupy in public opinion. That these gentle-
men have not suffered by their independence is pretty
clear. And therefore it is pretty clear, so far as can
be judged from these two instances, that it is not
necessary for the character of a good Conservative
Member, that he should be a thick-and-thin sup-
porter of Sir Robert Peel. Mr. Disraeli goes through
the session at some length, and justifies every vote
that he gave in opposition to Ministers. " I had not
the moral courage, or the immoral audacity," he
says, " to say one thing to my constitutents at Shrews-
bury, and within twenty-flur hours after vote diame-
trically opposite in London." And after a moderate
explanation of his differences from Sir R. Peel, he con-
cludes, " I was his supporter when in adversity—in
prosperity I will not be his slave." The speech of
Lord John Manners was delivered at the meeting of
an operative reading association in Birmingham, at
which he was requested to officiate as Chairman. The
Noble Lord has made himself so known to the public
as a zealous patron of the poorer classes, and an advo-
cate for extending their time of relaxation and amuse-
ment, that his name appeared particularly adapted to
head such an association ; and, without any other
knowledge of him than what his Parliamentary and
literary character gave, he was invited to Birming-
ham. The subject of his speech is a useful one, and
suited to the occasion. He deprecates the existence
of " the class system which now prevails," and wishes
for a more " cordial amalgamation" of the different
ranks of society. Every one who attends to the
state of things now must agree with this view
more or less, and acknowledge a particular de-
ficiency in modern times on this head, compared with
a former age. A former age, whatever were its defi-
ciencies, possessed a point of advantage in its grada-
tion of ranks, and the acknowledged position of one
class below another in succession, all to a certain
degree standing in a subordinate relation to the class
above them. The descent was thus carried by con-
tinuous steps, and came by an easy line down to the
poorest class of all, who were thus made part of the
system, and the last chain of a series. The modern
system makes two classes of society, and two only—
rich and poor. The rich are all one class ; the poor
are as much below the lowest of the rich as they are
below the highest. It is not considered a matter of
degree and succession ; the poor, all clubbed together
as one mass, are considered the inferior, coarse, and
servile substratum of the community ; the rich rise
upon them, as an elegant building rises above the
sad, or the porcelain issues out of the clay. There
is an impassable line which separates the two.
Duke, Lord, and Squire, merchant and millowner,
differ in rank among themselves, but are all equally,
above the lowest class of all. And so far the posi-
tion of the latter is a servile one; for it is an ob-
servable point in the state of slavery that it makes
those in it equally below everybody else. Against
this "class system" Lord John Manners protests
warmly, and wants high and low to see much
more of one another than they do. We entirely
agree with him, and we respect the motive which
takes him to preside at the dinner of an association
of the humbler classes at Birmingham, to enter into
their plans, and encourage their schemes of harm-
less recreation and useful reading. We do not pro-
fess to be particularly warm admirers of me-
chanics' institutes and societies for turning the
poor into natural philosophers and metaphy-
sicians. The genius of, the few has been less elicited
by these institutions, perhapi, than the idleness •of
the many. And the pomp and parade of science,
without the reality, has thrown an absurd air over
such attempts. But the Association at Birmingham
has done itself the credit, instead of going to a Liberal
spouter of utilitarianism, and a march-of-mind Cock-
ney rhetorician, to aid their start, and make fools of
them and himself too,—has invited fur this purpose a
young nobleman of the highest character and prin-
ciples, both political and religious, and who has made
himself known for his strong opposition to the liberal-
ism of the day. Lord J. Manners has at the same
time shown, by his attendance and observations on
this occasion, that a politician of his school, so far
from being averse to reading and self-improvement
among the poorer classes, only wishes to base their
attempts upon sound principle, and to disconnect them
from that religious laxity and indifference which has
so often accompanied them.
GLOBE.--If we are later than some of our Con-
temporaries in noticing Mr. Ward's " Ideal of a
Christian Church," we derive this advantage from
delay—that three months having now elapsed
since its publication, we are entitled to express
surprise that an open plea far Popery, and protest
against the Reformation, by a clergyman of the Church
of England and resident fellow of Baliol College,
Oxford, has yet evoked no remonstrance from
the University, or censure from his. diocesan. Mr.
Ward's work is a long one ; but a very few passages,
or even sentences, are sufficient to enable our readers
to judge whether we have fairly described it as an
open plea for Popery, and protest against the Reforma-
tion. " Protestantism," says Mr. Ward, "is intellectu-
ally the subtlest and most extensively poisonous of
heresies, just as Lutheranism is morally." (p. 41.)
Mr. Ward is speaking of the English Reformation,
when he expresses, in page 44, " the deep and burning
hatred with which some members of the Church (in-
cluding myself) regard that miserable event." And
in a note in the same page, determined that there shall
be no mistake about his feelings, he adds, "I cannot
the English Reformation
it, I know of no single
to agree
the
foreign
with
r e
g those n
so who
far prefer
from
movement in the Church, except Arianism, in the
fourth century, so destitute of all claims on our
sympathy and regard." Mr. Ward charges against
the Reformation that it has violated two great prin-
ciples—the sacredness of hereditary religion, and the
supremacy of the moral conscience. A clergyman
of the Church of England, holding such opinions
as we have already quoted, is a funny champion
supremacy
of the moral conscience."
is phrase we do not profess
to The
of‘‘
nt'understandehaeninsgu p;
rioetifnmat may be a misprint for " supre-
macy of the Roman pontiff;" for Mr. Ward tells us,
in page 480, that he takes the oath of supremacy,
"non-natural " way he sub-
spiritual authority to the Pope,''
in a " non-natural
he understood as denying
s"en"'s. he h wlno utlhde naturally rea
scribes the eleventh article, which enunciates justifi-
cation by faith only; for Mr. Ward thinks
this " a most atrocious and immoral senti-
ment," and stigmatises it as invented by Luther
for his heresy: The Romish Church, as it is,
comes nearest to, if it is not itself, Mr. Ward's
" Ideal." " For my own part, I think it would not
be right to conceal—indeed, I am anxious openly to
express my most firm and undoubted conviction, that
were we, as a Church, to pursue such a line of conduct
as has been sketched in this work, in proportion as we
did so, we should be taught from above to discern and
appreciate the plain marks of Divine wisdom and autho-
rity in the Roman Church, to repent in sorrow and
bitterness of heart, our great sin in deserting his com-
munion, and to sue humbly at his feet for pardon and
restoration. . . . In these two necessary and
fundamental duties of a Church (moral and religious
discipline and orthodox faith), never in any period
has the Roman Catholic Church shone with brighter
lustre than since the Reformation." (P. 472.) There
can be no mistake about the sentiments of the author
of the above passages, and no chance of his being
_ _

unjustly judged by them. Mr. Ward does not con-
sider that he subscribes the twenty-second article of
the Church, on Purgatory, in " a non-natural sense,"
but looks upon the common understanding of that
article as "non-natural." He thinks that the twenty-

second article "cannot, without distortion, be ap-
plied to abstract Roman doctrine at all ;" and
that so to apply it is to force the natural mean-
ing of the article as much as he himself forces the
eleventh article, in order to sign it. (P. 480.) This
is Mr. \Vard's view of the present state of the
Church. "In a word, lam perfectly convinced that
no one clergyman of our Church would be able to
subscribe all such formularies of our Church in a

natural and straightforward sense; and I attribute
this fact to the utter want of fixed religious principles
displayed by the leading Reformers." (P. 481). And
Mr. Ward is a clergymen of a Church based on Arti-
cles, some of which he avows that he subscribes in " a

ttihoen
tneaftour Ina
al
tsieonns, e,"
for awn having
which he
fe
ei
lt
ss
,d e ep distinctiveand burning
hatred," which he calls " a miserable event," and to
whose promoters he ascribes " utter want of fixed
religious principles." Where is the Bishop of Oxford?
Mr. Ward is also a resident Fellow of a College in
a University which makes the Articles of the Church
of England the test of membership, and will not part
with that test, to allow avowed Roman Catholics and
Protestant Dissenters to share in its advantages.
Where are the orthodox zealots who raised the in-
sulting clamour against Mr. Everett's degree—where
Hampden, that they have been silent
the lusty champion of purity of doctrine who hounded
on Dr. Pusev, and Ain Ne xman, and Mr. Sewell, to
prosecute Dr.
all this while on the subject of Mr. Ward's extraor-
dinary production ? Do they who strained at Dr.
Hampden's gnat, bolt Mr. Ward's camel ?
STANDARD.—The Morning Chronicle will not
await, or permit us to await silently, the decision
of the House of Lords upon the writ of error
in Mr. O'Connell's case. Our Contemporary
has, this day, a long article upon the subject,
in which, however, it does not make the
slightest allusion to what we said yesterday of the
complete finding upon the unobjectionable eleventh
count, which count, fully found and free from all
exception, comprises the whole offence, with all
its attributes, as variously laid in the other ten