The Sun.
London, England, 1828-09-11 00:00:00

From the Journal du Commerce of Sept. 4. )
We published in our Journal of the 18th of
August, a few historical and military remarks, .
ntended to convey a correct idea of the position
e Russian army before Shumla, and the
actual state of the operations in the East. On
the same day we hazarded some doubts respect-
ing the success of the invading army. The
public had the pleasure to read in other journals
magnificent bulletins, in which the taking of
Shumla, and the great battle which preceded
it,
e'ercmost
intelligence stated,oiassi
our remarks have remained un
tilbree aentmi dacnoitnlhefierr.
mdesedt,aoils given in
and it is proved that the enterprise of the
Emperor consequently
tt
r aodf'i
ctthe da
Nicholas meets with obstacles suffi-
cient to render the issue doubtful, at least,
to delay the success to an indefinite period.
Since the arrival of the Russians before
Shumla, all their operations have been confined
to /nanceuvres. They are seen changing their
positions without hazarding an attack. The plan
of investment to which they coniine themselves
lsttiieb)r•otlaideir ritot
istria,
t they
h,shaeveytetshtil,alylk,:dniisnctiee)orrics-ieesetil)st.seiteiNnt\l'lolaliti.
of Rutschouck, by the
the orders of General Rudiger, has arrived at
mocecl'iltpeatn of l
forwardio otialsgraoitob and
urnaiafttshed ta
iiicleft,deunch-
der
Eski-Stamboul, upon the high road to Con-
stantinople. This is precisely what Kamenski
did in 1810, with this important difference, that
the investment which took place on the Ist of
July, had not in the present campaign been com-
pleted on the Ist of August.
Two indispensible conditions are attached to
the success of such an operation. The besieging
corps must be strong enough to maintain any
point upon the line of occupation. The besieged
must also be deprived of the means of sufficient
subsistence. Is the Russian army numerous
enough to maintain the line of blockade, which
from topographical circumstances cannot be less
than from fifteen to twenty leagues of circumfe-
rence ? The negative is not doubtful, if we take
into consideration that the sieges of Varna, Si-
Giurgewo, Rutschouck, the detachments
sent into Lower Wallachia, the guard of the
principalities, and the maintenance of com-
munications, must necessarily absorb half the
Imperial forces. o are not in the least
surprised that they expect important rein-
forcements before they strike any signal blows.
Eighty thousand men, it. is said, arc ready to
pass the Danube, but when will these troop be
found upon the theatre of operations ? The
Russians, it is generally known, march with ex-
treme slowness. They generally march about
eight leagues in two days, and rest the third.
A part of the Guards left Petersburgh at the
time the Emperor left it, and it has taken thrr,c,
months to arrive at the Danube. Upon the ge-
neral calculation, a month must yet elapse be-
fore reinforcements can arrive to enable the Rus-
sians to press the blockade of Shumla.
We are at a loss to know the exact state of
the place with regard to provisions. In this
respect the want of foresight on the part of the
Turks, is sometimes incredible ; as au instance
of which we may mention that, in 1810, their
army would have been forced to capitulate, if,
during the night which preceded the complete
formation of the blockade, they had not fortunately
received a convoy of two hundred camels.
That circumstance saved Shumla. If, as the
Russians say, Hussein Pacha has proposed
an armistice, we may conclude he is not pre-
pared to sustain a blockade, and that he is ae
anxious to gain time to obtain provisions, as
the Russians are to wait for reinforcements.
—The Grand Vizier shut tip in Shumla in
the year 1810, negocinted in die same way, and
broke off the treaty the moment after the ar-
rival of the great convoy we have just mentioned.
But admitting that the place is in want of prori-
sions, we must still bear in mind the intrepid
constancy and resignation with which the Turks
know how to endure want and privations of all
sorts. We find a memorable example of this
fortitude in the campaign of 1811, when the
Gratris, passing the p
aonndVizier,afte: havingube
resumed,he i offensive
againiveoix-
beaten back across the river, and enclosed by a
line of redoubts, by the able Kutusoff. De-
prived of communications by the right bank, the
Turkish army did not lay down their arms be-
fore they had eaten their horses—without bread,
nsilleoiairint
stahfoet
fe
or salt, and reduced, by famine and sickness,
from
One
n3eo,roe (1)110a
remarkable circumstance
n
Russian
bulletins is the seuldbi:iliagon.ootfhlea: corps destined to
invest Rutacheuck. This detachment must be
will
considerable, for the circumference of the place is
proceeded weaken-
ing the Delhi army, and another trait of resemblance
l
person
lfl
n of
efriencti
et
oxttelni esicvael.nripla'iigs
r having
established the blockade of Shumla, which he
confidedmeisk hv,iisthb2rost,l4eoro,
menlca-
against Rutschouck. Having arrived on the 9th
of July before the place, he ordered a general
assault for the 22d. Whilst the Russians scaled
the entrenchments, the Turks made a sortie, and
passing througli the fosses, fell unexpectedly upon
the rear of the assailants, of whom they made
a frightful massacre. This battle cost. the
i the
Russians 8,000 men hors de combat.
'W
.e„? Wllhilst
Russians be more fortunate this 3 •
bh
upon the right bank of the
Da
r co„
rpse the y
on themarc left
upon Rutschouk, another
a strong place forti-
bank surrounds Giurgevre,
fled by the Austrians. T
like Those tiro cities, placed
. la
in front of each other, yence and Cassel
-lend each other mutual
upon the Rhine, sup-
port. The
important
point for attack or defence
, the comm
is andf the river by gun-boats. The
ri of Nicopolis and other
possession places of the
Upper Danube iv e all the advantage in that,
to the urks.
respect
The Russian flotilla,
which can only come from the Lower Danube,
would be fired upon b •
) the guns of Silistria, if that
place be not compell d e to surrender immediately.
On the side 11 0 attic Wallachia and Servia,
the Russian army does not appear to make any
progress. During the preceding war, 40,000
Servians, commanded by the brave Czerni
Georges, operated in concert with them. At the
present day, Servia does not move an inch. They
have an interest in the war, arising out of privi-
leges secured by the Treaty. of' Akerman, the
non-execution of which occasioned one of the
principal complaints of the Emperor Nicholas.
It is probable that Prince had calculated upon
their concurrence, and that their inactivity has
deranged part of his plans. In conclusion, far
from having produced the fatal results which
many anticipated, it appears certain that the re-
forms operated by the Sultan, have, in reality,
increased the moral and physical strength of his
empire, and that his crown no longer depends on
the event of a single campaign. It is therefore
by no means impossible, that diplomacy may in-
terpose to prevent his -ruin.