The Sun.
London, England, 1810-03-24 00:00:00

WASHINGTON, FEB. p

ARNIE!) CoNvoys.—"- Mr. Burwelli of a C6M-
mittee on the subjed, reported.a Bill, authorizing;
and requiring the PreSident to order the Na%y•of
the United States to convoy all ships loaded with
produce the growth of America, to any port whet-6
Orders and Decrees are not in force against,Ame-
rican Comtnerce';' that search is to be allowed for
enemy's property. and contraband goods, by na-
-riaial vessels ; but' the search by privateers and
letters of !barque to be resisted. They are also to
resist the capture of any vessel which has not ene-
my's property or
_contraband goods _on board.—
The Bill also permits merchantmen to arm on the,
same conditions, and 'to give bonds. Read twice;
and referred to aCommittee of, the whole."
• . `` MONDAY, FEB.- 12., "‘

'" Mr. Bur-well's Regolution for arming ruer7
chant vessels, was not taken. up this day, as:es-
peeled. It will probably. be ' dandled abort until
the Cabinet-can ascertain how it. is relished by the
people.
" Mr. Macon's Bill sleeps in the Senate."
THE STATE LEGISLATU The 'particular at=
tent ion of the Legislatr!re has, fora few days past,
been occupied by the discrission of theprinciples of
the Report on our. National Difficulties, submitted
to their.consideration on Thursday the.l.sth instant.
This subjeet was debated at considerable length,
and resumed on Friday, and finally dezided -at mid-
night, in favour of. the Resolutions:•hy the unex-
petted majority ,f one hundred and nine. W. 9
are precluded, for want of robm, from inserting the
yeas and nays on this highly interesting question;
but the decision evinces; very clearly, that. the argu-
ments of the Federal:sts, who p,urtrayedo the la.,
mentable pidure of our country's: danger in the
most vivid colours, had a powerful influence upon
the minds cif some of the Republicans. By uniting
with the Federalists, in order to avert, if it is.not _
yet too late, a-war with Great Britain, they deserve
not only -the thanks and uppbtuses of their COristi-
tuents, but the approbation of•the whole Nation.

" Yeas
" Nays

"- Majority

254
►4;
-1c9."

RESOLUTIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE OF MASSA--

CIiVSETTS.

" Whereas FRANCIS JAMES JACKSON, Minister
Plenipotentiary from the Court of Great ,Britain,
.having full powers to negociate and conclude a
treaty for the amicable adjustment of the controver-
sies unhappily.subsisting between the United States
and that . nation, after being duly accredited by the
Executive of the United States, has been suspended
from the exercise of his functions, for some eXpres•-
slant contained in his correspondence with the Go-
vernment of the United States, which are alleged. to
be derogatory to the honotir and veracity of the Ex-
-ecutive Government. And the Legishuures of some'
:of our sister States having declared their assent to
the construdion given to the said correspondence,
and their approbation -of the dismissal of the said
British •Mtnister.—And the Legislature of Massa
chusetts having, examined the said correspondence,
and being unable to discern in 'it any passage 'or
words,,which in their judgment can be fairly con-
strued to convey disrespectful and offensive imputa-
tion—And whereas the. doings of the said Legisla-
tures, combined with the Resolutions of Congress;
have a tendency. to widen the breach already'exist-
ing, and to remove still farther the prosped of ac-
commodation—And.w.hereas this Legislature, while
they are -always ready, at whatever hazard, to ern,
bark in a just and necessary war, and to support the
National Government with the whole force and le-
sources of the State, are nevertheless persuaded,
that no just cause exists for a rupture with Great
Britain, and that its effects, detrimental to both .na-
tions, would tend to the impoverishment of this
Commonwealth, to the destruction of its commerce,
and to the aggrandizement of a power, already for-
midable to the liberties of mankind—And whereas
we deem it a duty to use all means in our power to
allay the existing irritations, and prepare the way
for the restoration of a friendly intercourse between
two nations, whose interests are in many points es-
sentially united :--
" Therefore resolved, That the Legislature of Mas-
.sachusetts is affeded with sincere and profound re-
gret at the late unexpeded and sudden termination
of the Correspondence bet ween the American Se-
cretary of State and Francis James Jackson, his Bri-
tannic Majesty's Minister, for which they can per-
ceive no just 'or adequate cause.
" Resolved, That it is our anxious wish, that
some Means may be.devised, consistent with the ho-
nour, of the United States, to resume the negocia-
lions bet ween the two Countries, for obtaining repa-
ration of real injuries, and to establish peace and
amity, so essential to the. interests and happiness of
both, upon a permanent basis.
" Resolved, That ads of embargoes and non-in-
tercourse, and the whole system of commercial re-
straints adopted and contemplated by the late and
present Administration,.are impedimmtsto a restor-
ation of amicable relations with Great. Britain, and
have proved in the highest degree pernicious .to the
best interests of this country, and especially of this
commercial state. That all the predictions of their
opponents have been verified—Thit, by the oper-
ation of these ads; the public Treasury has been
drained, and brought to the verge of Bankruptcy—
That the commerce of the country has been palsied,
and, in a great measure, irrecoverably deStroyed—
That the whole of this impotent system has become
a subje& of derision with those, it was.intended to
coerce, and that its mischiefs have recoiled upon
our own country.. '

" Resolved;, That the temporary suspension of
these ads afforded demonstration of the means of
the United States to pursue .a highly lucrative corn-.
„pierce, even under existing embarrassments, and an
opportunity which was' gladly embraced by our mer-
cantile.citizens... That during this 'interval, all our
shipping was employed, and 'that. our navigation
experienced civility and protedion from the British
cruisers, whilst it has .been constantly annoyed by
the depredations of France and her all;es. " •

. .
" Resolved, That all tneagures calculated to pro-
duce unnecessary hostility witli Great, Biitain, ar all
times in-ipolitic and_Contrary to the true interests of
•

the nation; are at the present crisis peculiarly °l:for-
tunate, and ought to be discountena Iced by all con-
stitutianal means—That our countri is defenceless,
and our Treasury exhausted-That to' fortify the
one, and replenish the other, will require time,
economy, and the advantages Of renewed commerce
--;-That on the contrary, Great Britain is inaccessi-
hie; and invulnerable, except in. one of the provinces,
"ilie 'conquest. of which, if it could b effe6tcd, would
trove a curse, and a scourge to ourselves and our
posterity:
itisolved, That a -war with Great Britain would
inevitably lead to ari alliance with France, and thus
furnish to her ambltion the means and the pretexts
file organizing, within the United; States,, the mate-
rials and instruments 'for schemes of future domino:-
t ion. These materials unhappily abound in tne north-
ern frOntier, and in our newly-acquired territory in
the south. From suclLa contest, the United States,
if unsuccessful, would be compelled to retire with a
disgraceful surrender of.the objet-is of the-war ;or if
inccessful, by contributing to the downfal of Britain,
would be left alone to 'eneounter a power, Wlio;
unopposed by- the navy of •-his present enemy,
would call into requisition all the-resources and ener-
• gies-01 our solitary Republic,_ to defend, in doubtful
conflial, Our liberties upon our own shores. 7

THE INQUIRY.

EIGHTEENTH 'DAY

Lieutenant-:General BRpWURIGG was. called in, and
examined by the Committee,
Did the change, as described in the Meinoran-
dum;.nOwdelivered in, make any alteration in the
original intention, that-the right wing of. the army
should proceed,up the West Scheldt, with the least
pra&icable delay, to Santvliei i—None, in my Lord
ChathiatiPs=tonCepsion or rnide.

Suppcsing, theT armament destined to 'ad. against
Antwerp had sailed from. the Po wns successively in
divisions on the 28th, 29th, and 3041 of July, and
that they had arrived al Santvliet, 'allOwing tour
days: for their passage, on the ISt, ed, awl 3d- of
August, when do you consider the advance of the
army night have appeared oefore Antwerp', -find
when might the place have been -assa.lited, had 'a
recognizance of, the works. and :garrison, justified r
such species of attack think, if the armament
riestined to, act against Antwerp,had been.as,embled
at Santvliet by the 3d of August, which would have
been the "71:11' day-after the 'first 'division Sailed from
the.llowns, the whole. might have been .I)Jore,the
place 'by the Bth; I Mean by the whole, that the
heavy artillery also might have b:.en thefe.
,Exclusive -of the heaVy artillery, 'if the plaCe had-
been reported in.a state to admit. of the &defences
being stormed, when did you conceive that the arr..
mament might have been before the place, with
necessary means for sicirmilig,ihe place:?-1 t,hitu
that ii- place had .b,:•en reported assailable, an
s
e?ertion inigl,t have been made for tie troopi, to
have arrived by the 6th at night, and that ot course
t assanit wouldr have.bcen at,mmedi itely
When you state that the ;army might have been
before the place on the Bth, the, heavy artillery
for a bombardment, is it your opinion that the bunt-
bardment could have been cOnitnenced on the night
ot the .Bth %,--The. bombardment .might have con-
!mooed the moment the mortars could have been
placed in their beds.
- Have you'been yourself in the neighbourhood of
Antwerp, and when ?—I was at Antwerp 1794...•

In what military situation were you at the period
you were at Antwerp in ►794 ?—I was Deputy
Quarrel ;Master •General to tie British Arnty.
Froin yortr recolleatiOn of the ground, and par-
ticularly
of the suburbs of Antwerp, do you con-
ceive operations. could have beLn commenced against
the town without the necessity 'of •breaking ground
at a distance and proceeding by regular approaches ?
—There is a very considerable suburb on the road
leading to Breda, which is the side upon which We
'-slroultl.have approached Antwerp; Under cover• of
which 12M inclined to think that batteries for can-
non might have been estOlished within the distance -
of six hundred Yards, without regular approaches
being made for that purpese.' '
When you:state that the army might have been
before Antwerp with .the necessary means
:far its
'bombardment upon the, Bth, upon what scale of ord-
nance is your calculation founded ?=---The propor-
tion of mortars and guns would have depended upon
the judgment of the Officer commanding the Ar-
lillery and the commanding Engineer ; but I should
conceive, as far as my humble
,Judgment goes, that
about an equal proportion of tnortars anthguns, and
I should have imagined likewise hat about 30 pieces
of heavy ordnance would have been as many as our
Ineans would ha►e enabled us-to carry up in the time
meat toned.

What expeation of reducing the town of Ant-
werp by such an attack as you have now described
the British army would have had the means of
making, should you have entertained ?-,--I should
imagine that by a Vigorous bombardment and can-
nonade from the number of pikes of ordnaneeT
have mentioned, so populous,a' town ,s Antwerp
is, and. garrisoned. badly, asTbetieve it then was,
might have been speedily intimidated into a sur,
render.

Might not such an attack upon the town of Ant-
werp haVe been rnaterOly assisted by the use of the
rockets that attended the army ?—I had an •oppor:..
With), .of seeing those rockets 'used at - ;
-they certainly are very tremendous in their appear,
.ance, and alarm considerably-those against whom
they are direCted, and unquestionably would set fire
to any combustible substance-they met with.'
Supposing the town of Antwerp in the-possession
of the British army,. would it, in your judgment,
,have been practicable under the protection of the
houses: to have taken means for destroying the arse-
nals and the ships of war building on the slips at
Antwerp, notwithstanding any opposition that could
be, reasonably expected from the Citadel ?—We
could only have possessed ourselveS of a part of
Atityierp, that part which was under the imine-
diankinfluence of. the citadel, of course, we could
not hate possessed ; but I do conceive that under
cover of the buildings we :might have established
'guns that would have: borne upon the ships. on the
, stocks and the, arsenal, which in obability would
have succeeded in destroying the greatest part of.
thew ; when once a conflagration took place, it is
1,,,,t0.be presumed it woUld, have spread,

Supposing the communication between the toy,.
and arsenal'tb be•open, 'would it not have been prde-
ticable 2t night, 'without c:,-posing the troops- tai ctov
very-serious injury from he fire .of the Citadel, .to
have carried all description of mah"; ials tor se+ti
fire to theships, and-to haire applied them'etli -
ally for that purpose understand that the an,t:
nal is surrounded by a wal4; and theretbre I do corn,
ceive it.tVould. have been diffictilt: to have- deStnlyed
it by. those means ; I think the on ly .chatice. we had
of destroying it was howitz3l;s, shell, and rockets;
I doubt whether :lye should htiVe been able to have
approached itso:near as to have-done it by 'hand.
If.the wall to which you allude is a wall noterea-
ed for purposes of defence, but so prevent pillage.of
the materials in the ,irsenal, could there have 1-eer'
any- difficulty by, the tire" ot "artilltry in opening" t hat
wall so as to give to the troops .a free access to the ar-
senal ?-I\lo doubt
_artillery will destroy any. briel-.
Wall or moderately stone wall ; but I think the ob-
ea might have been effeeled without having reVoqrse
to those means:

After several questions respeeling the • state .of
Antwerp, the following Were put
Upon the whole, did you consider the foWn or
Antwerp as a respectable, fortification; (was a larg6,
populous city, with a rativart,and ditch, which had irr
in a military sense, fallen into neglect 1.—.-Certainly
in the state I saw intl,vip it could not lie called a
re4peatable fortification,' tar from it.

Supposing, the artny had continued in, health, do
you conceive that the disembarkation of the army
Might have been effeted on the loth of Atigust, near
Sanvhet, witliout prejudice to: its _safety from any
fotce.the enemy. might have brought against,it iii
the field do think, and
.inleeci I am surei: that
if the army had been in a state to have aete.l against
the enerny 'on the •511 i 'of August, it would have
beeniatided, and
.1-,shoUld not have bll..erLapp•tehetti•
sire That the softy of it would hive been •risked.
Are you of of,inioni or have you reason to know,
that-if the.arroy had then been' in a he'ali!.yrstate-, it
.would„have been.the &termination of the Chtnnian-
aer in Chief to 1:-.nd the array,; with a.view to open
the Scheldt by the redut'.tion of 1;,110 and Lletken-
ghoeik, if Sir: It'thard 'St fac. hati'had-reouired such an
ail from the.army haVe.:no-xloubt•but that such
an. attempt -would have been .made.
•With•what prospe:-t of success do you conceive
thal -such• an attempt might have been itlacie, upon
the 25.11, supposing, the army ..had been then in
completely et-iciive stater-mud in perteti health
eckoning confileritly, as't do, upri Oie-g(l,7llni:try
and spirit, of entefOxize :of :the navy avid amily,
entertain'a sangoirke that, we ttn..;l“ iitive'!ltc-
ceo:led.in taking Liel4tetishoeik.an,.l kobaal L 11cr,
which would have peened the SCheldi•tor the navi,
.and-might have led to iinpat tan: (7641Se(Iti.'inCer..
What was plat: °Onion'. pt to":•,avti,ig., as ttr.
thL, probal iloy. of iliesucce, ot ac-
corting to the d and the in-.
-T, (7, SilEii(.nt. ol'
the'obje!:ts of the ;:pp • •IC!Sl to tne to be.
from toe al.d..t:-,lll),:de-
pellded,tv on )•!- t' e ‘vithr, qi).`
have enabled i_l6 !to,":: StThe.io uy ;b, •1
lon • of. opildinn, .eti • io on( •
'llosse.,,sion,. and Nl:se h d
of
.theta•wouln. v.,!ty
.4tir
Bf,t Cl of success,
`,lo'whai
.doyou principally attribute 1,:!•
1,
P
Loped,failure ot iktitwerp
.sider .the untoitunate wh ch the'.
whOle armament to. base b. cn ,i.ls•ieinoed in .the•-:
Il:,Ornpot, NS fatal to t ulterior objects of
p: dttiota ; at d I roust • conclude, that it vk ould.thot
have been hadrecouhe to had theintri: tie cs of
Sihuigh been belote We
'for from the prevalence Of 'the' south-w:st
'after Out arrival off the c9,1t.0t. ZeAanct, it hi cause
',iinprA6ticable, to move the „transport s', tound 118'
northrWe4 s.:(l,z• of Walcheren, by which the origir
nal intention to carry .the foice destined io ocetit6--
-.e0.-ainst Antwerp up the- Schddt
• ~„
'so that an Operatinn which alight,: have. been
'formed in four or five days, from the. DoWns,
lengthened to ..thrpe .wieks.,. that time hat jay beet.n`
'occupied in pfissing_all the transports
tiontd,•AhrOugh . the Slough, .a distance of only` 1 •
n;iles;,,and I
.would.beg. leave. fUrther to.add, tb't•
it is gkehtly to be lamented that- the right. vvirog
the army, destined to,act a.gainst AotVsTeiß, .had W. 1-
been led at once from the Do . wns, into. the NYiel'o
Passage, when the.,possession of Cadsdnd,
lafb entry into the West Scheldt, would
been secured, thus leaving the let wing of al
army .allotted to reduce the 4stand of Wakberen to
itself.
t
i
Supposing the arthament had . been 'ass, aibl(l.`i
Santvliet in tiie beginning of the month of ti.u,g4sf
instead of at the close of that month, what pro-p°'t
are you now of opinion, would there then ft i% ,
isted of -ultimate suck es.i ?-1 think I nay:: ait-tOlf
FYI
'said, that if arma:nelit 41 arrived 'at S,uitt • •
ir
by the 3d of August, would have then a '
.prospect of success, in tuy opinion.
[l'u be cunlinued.l

BiR
Oni the 9th inst. at I)onegal.l-louse, the Nhuchiones' o
-
Donegal, ot a Son. • 1
- On the 16th inst. the Lady of Sir John Prhv,le, of .5 z!tc*.`
Scotland., ot a,.;on and
• On Titurschty, at 6161,111411, the Lady of the City 1201,';''
'brtncer, ot a Sun, futi r cto ' •