The Sun.
London, England, 1826-08-01 00:00:00

SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE.

LLOYD'S.—(Tnte Day.)
DIAL, JULY 31.—Wind S.E.—Sailed about noon with the
rest of the outward-bound, the Britannia, Walkr, for Bombay ;
Sovereign, Adams, for Jamaica ; Jean Stewart, Witensie, far
4 Martha; and liyudnian Sergeant, for Dernerara-30tb,
4 p.m., an American ship, from' the River, is passing, report
to be the Mercury, fort, fOr Roston.
PORTSMOUTH, JUL
S.E.—Arrived his Majesty's
.hip Calliope, from a cruise; and Concord, Jacobs, frem Water-
JULY Wind E.—Arrived the Active,
Fame° m,
Banks, from London; sailed the
A Lord Melville packet for Buenos
yree.
The Spitabergem
from Greenland with 8 &amenl2,6 ) arrived at Terschilling, 25th July,
, seals.
The packet-ship Florida, from New York, is supposed to be
arrive
steamers, d off Liverpool
that ; vessel.
American built—being reported by
the as off Port

HAY AIARKETS—(Tms DAY.)
(At per Load of 86 Trusses.).
ST. JA MKS'S.
Lowland meadow ilay,f3 sto 4 5 C10ver...... ... . .£4 10 to 6 6
4 5 5 5 Oat Straw ............ 10 1 12
Upland I.)itto
Ryr-kr_u, Hay
... . t 5 5 5 Wheat Ditt ............ 112 IHI
New rdeadmv Hay .—. 4 0 5 0
I Ibleadow Hay 5s , *Clover Hay from ss, to (is. per load higher than
00 batur4lay ; prices of Straw stationary. Supply limited, and trade lA-
(her brisk.
.. .

SICTIIFIELD.
1)11
---iwhati hiloadow HaY.t3 oto 4 o Chile!' Hay generally /4 4to 6 14
~.17 bi
veins. Ray 4
-0 0 5 0 Dittoextraorrlitiarynneo 0 6 6
5 0 Oat Straw
16
1 I!
Supply short, trade dull, and pricy. a. on Saturday.

LAW INTELLIGENCE.

COURT OF CHANCERY.—(This DAY.)
WELLMAN V. BOWRING.

The LORD CHANCELLOR took his seat at half-past ten
o'clock, and proceeded to deliver himself of this case to

the following effect :—This was an appeal brought by a
gentleman of the name of Bowring, the old gentleman
who, a few days ago, personally asked the Court for judg-
ment against a decree made by his Honour the Vice-
Chancellor, under the circumstances to be described. In
year 1764, persons of the names of Joseph Bryant and
,Elizabeth Wellman were each absolutely entitled to a dis-
tinct and separate copyhold estate. In contemplation oft'
marriage between them, they agreed -that the estates
should be united for their children, if they had any,
and, if none, that they should go in a certain
manner to their executors or administrators. The
bill stated that there was no appointment made by
the husband, who died first. It went on to state the de-
scent from him till it pointed out that the present defend-
ant, Joshua Bowring, was his heir-at-law. The wife took
after the husband's death, as his administratix ; and before
the died, in 1803, she made a surrender, and named her
brothers as the persons to be admitted, but who, in point
of fact, never were admitted to the estates. There was
All ectment brought, and upon that trial the heir-at-law
of the husband recovered the estates. He recovered on
the ground, that the estate, not having been possessed by
admittance, would descend to him. The question then arose,
whether he was to be considered in any other wav, than in
possession of the estate as a trustee under the effect of the
marriage settlement ? The bill was filed for the purpose
of having it declared, that under the circumstances of this
case, although there were no admittance upon the sur-
render, yet that the estate in equity would have to be
considered as bound by the marriage agreement ; and that
being supposed to be bound by the agreement, it was in-
sisted that the wife, being adtninistratrix, took the estate
Under the. uses declared: in the deed. in case there was no
'appointment, nor any child. Then another question arose,
namely, if she did so take it, what was the effect of
that, according ,to the custom of the manor, upon this'
agreement ? The heir at law contended, that according
to the custom of the manor, he was entitled, and in sup-
port of this he produced two customs. And the question
for the decision of the Court was, whether this was an
estate, under the effect of the marriage settlement, which
ought to go as the law had given it, by force of the eject-
ment that was tried; or whether, on the other hand,
though the heir at law had recovered, he was not bound
to make good the agreement that the parties had
made upon their marriage ? That depended upon this,
whether the custom of the manor (which the Court
thought nobody could doubt) authorised the husband
to convey to two persons, or to one person, describing that indi-
vidual as executor or administrator? And, secondly, if it did,
what was the nature of the interest, a person so described, took
under such a description, in copyhold estate? It was contended
on the part of the heir-at-law, that inch a limitation as might
be supposed would bar him, could not be made ; or if it
could, and he was to be considered as having recovered u a
trustee, that he was the next of kin himself. On the other band
it waft argued, that if the executor or administrator took, he took
for his own benefit. And thirdly, that if he took as
executor, what he did take would have to be considered
as personal estate of the testator. The Vice-Chancellor was of
opinion that Elisabeth Bryant, as ad.ministratrix of her husband,
was entitled to the absolute estate and interest in the copyhold
premises, according to the custom of the Manor, either bene-
ficially, or as trustee for the next of kin of Joseph Bryant ; there-
fore he declared her to he entitled to the equitable fee of the pre-
mien, called upon the heirs-at-law to surrender to her, and re-
ferretl it to the Muter, to inquire who were the heirs-at-law
(they not being all before the Court), in order to agitate
the question with them whether she took beneficially,
or as trustees for the next of kin of her husband.
Now the first question to be disposed of by his Lord-
ship was, whether this settlement, regard being had to its
ultimate 11111itiitiOn, was a settlement this Court would carry
into effect ? That is, whether the executor or administra-
tor could he said to he within the consideration of the
marriage settlement ; or whether he was to he looked upon as a
volunteer and stranger, when there were limitations to first and
second children, &c. ? His Lordship had struggled hard to de-
termine it by making a decree for the heir at law; but upon
Nihon consideration, he could give to the case, he was bound
to say, this was an equitable agreement, that the Court would order
to be carried into execution. Where there was an estate in a
gentleman, another in a lady, and when those two were about to
intermarry, he could not see why they should not agree that those
estates should be considered as personal estates ; and where they did
so, he could not look upon them as part of the settlement that was
voluntary, because either the husband, or the wife would be the
survivor, and as copyhold estate could at any time be converted
into personal estate, provided only a tenant was given to the lord
of the manor. M to the question, (the limitation being,
not to persons by name, but by office,) whether the wife, in
taking as administratrix took for her own benefit or not ; the
Court was of opinion that the meaning of the settlement was, that
the administrator or executor should take the copyhold estate,
converting it into perional estate, not as a voluntary provi-
sion, but as claiming an absolute and beneficial personal interest
in it. The duty of the Court therefore was, to declare, which it
did, that the decree made by his Honour the Vice Chancellor was
right.

By this decision the old gentleman, who has peen for a long
time an attendant in Court, and so anxious to get judgement, is
shut out.

COVENT-GARDEN THEATRE.

CONST V. HARRIS.
Ilia LORDS/M.-Gentlemen, I have seen the Masters in the
case of Const against Harris. We had it stated here yesterday,
and really I had myself so understood it, and I do now so understand
it, that where a receiver has been appointed by an interlocutory
order prior to a decree being pronounced, and afterwards a decree
is made, that that decree, carrying over generally most interlo-
cutory orders, carries over the order about the Receiver into the
office of the new Master. In the present case, as I understood
the matter from some part of the bar yesterday, and as I really
understood it myself, but I am now deceived in that respect,
I thought it carried it over to the new Master, under the decree,
exactly in the state in which it stood in the office of the Master,
who had had it immediately before that decree was made.
I thought I had a recollection, and I still think I have a recollec-
tion that, according to the old practice, though it did carry
over the accounts to the Master's Office, in order that they
might be carried over in the same state in which they were in
the former Master's Office, either that decree itself had
language, or,
which was the snore usual way, it was ac-
companied with, an order that the Muter should not
unsettle any thing that had been done in the former
Master's Office. It appears, that after the decree was
made in this case, as the Master has stated to me, both parties at-
tended him ; that he had himself decided all the disputed items,
and was ready to make his report, but that the division upon those
.
disputed items was not embodied in any report actually made
and signed. The decree occasioned the difficulty which caused
the appLeation to be m;
a !de to the see-Chancellor for an order
upon Master Cross, calling upon him to deliver over the pa-
pers in his office to another Master, and upon which he was
pleased to uy, he considered the practice so clear, that
Master Cross should deliver them over, that he should make no
order upon it. Now upon looking at the decree, it is a decree
made in a form, in which, as far as my poor recollection goes, I
never saw a decree before; it directs the matter to be re-
ferred to the Muter, and then that Mr. Robertson
Ilea And it was ordered that be
the tee:4,er should be contin •
should continue to act under the direction of the order made in
this cease on the Bth Dec., 1825." Now, from this, it seems to
have been understood at first, by both parties, as I confess it
Las been n by me, that the order of the Bth Dec., 1825, was an order
wnich I had referred it to Master Cross to take all thou ac,
counts, and the receiver to pass his accounts ; and that this decree
ordered the receiver to act under that order of the Bth of Detxm-
her. I should have supposed that this decree was not intended to
carry the accounts over to the new Master ; but upon stating to the
Vice Chancellor, the difficulty
clear that arose from the wording
of its he thought it
extremely, that he would not
add any exig so extrof that
---r-anatnrY words to it. The consequence
is, that I have found myself totally mistaken as to the prac-
tice upon the point. Al" W
a t r Do dswell assured me in the
co**, that if the papers art.
presence of Master Cross, to be dc.
livered over to him front Mr. Cross, and which 1 think cannot
be done without an order to- that effect ; because I think the
Master is entitled to have in his office some document,
authorising hint to part with the papers, though merely for
the sake of forra,—but, Master Cross
not having signed his re-
port, but only gone through the items in a loose way, Master
Dowdswell is of opinion that .h •
he interfere, and that
stated to me to be the practice in the
offices unless under

some special authority so to do ; inasmuch as the signing
of that report would carry the testimonials of Muter
Dowdswell, and not of Muter Cross, though the former Muter
could know nothing of the items. Therefore, without some
special directions, Master Dowdswell cannot intefere, unless he
goes over again the whole of what has been done. As this is the
practice, I am very glad to have been informed of it, because some
order must be made to prevent the suitor from having to
go through all the proceedings upon taking accounts in
the Master's office, under an interlocutory order ; and
then through the same proceedings again under a decree.—
The question therefore here is, whether some order should not be
made in this cast, calling on Master Cross to conclude his report
according to the interpretation to be put upon this decree,
and then with respect to the l next account, that
Master Dowdswell should proceed with it ? I think there
will be no injustice in that, and I shall tell you to-mor-
row what order I shall make. But its a terrible thing for:a suitor
to have it said, that after a Muter has settled all disputed items, both
parties having attended him, that the whole should be gone through
again by another Muter. It is absolutely necessary that some-
thing should be done to prevent that dreadful oppression.

VICE CHANCELLOR'S COURT.—(Tits DAY.)
MORISZT V. WHIT!.
This was a petition praying to be allowed to take a sum of
money out of the Court, which had been lodged therein theyearl774.
A bill had been filed in that year to foreclose a mortgage, when
the money was paid into Court ; shortly after the mortgagee went
to sea, and was not since heard of ; administration of his effects was
granted to his next of kin in the Prerogative Court, on a presump-
tion of his death after an absence of 31 years ; the kin at law of
the mortgagor sold the mortgaged premises, and the purchasers
had no objection that the prayer of the petition should be granted
—be hoped, under those circumstances, his Honour would allOw
the representation of the mortgagee to take the money out of
Court.

The VICE-CHANCILLOR.--As the representatives of the rnort-
gager have no objection, I don't see why the application should
not be granted.

INSOLVENT DEBTORS' COURT.—.(Tats DAT.)
CONTEMPT 07 COURT.
Mr. HTATH chewed cause against a rule nisi obtained upon
the affidavit of an Insolvent named George Gee, for the purpose
of rescinding an order made in August last, that the insolvent
should pay 101. a year out of his salary as Excise officer. The
Learned Counsel said that though the affidavit of the insolvent was
correct in some parts yet it could not be supported in others, as he
had affidavits made on the other side contradicting some material
statement in Gee's affidavit. The facts were, that the insolvent
was discharged in August last by this Court, and ordered to pay,
ten pounds a year in liquidation of hie debts, out of his salary of
one hundred and ten pounds, which he received as excise officer ;
but when called upon by the assignee for a dividend, he set the
order at defiance, and refused to pay it. The insolvent had sworn
that he had a wife and seven children, who depended entirely on
him for their subsistence ; but he (Mr. Heath) would produce
three affidavits, stating, that three of the children were in re-
spectable employments, whereby they supported themselves. He
would mention another circumstance which could not operate in
favour of the insolvent ; since his discharge he had paid an old
debt by the way of a preference, which- he had no right to do.
If he was honestly disposed, he would have complied with the
order of the Court, and with the conditions upon which he had
obtained his liberty. Under these circumstances, he hoped the
Court would discharge the rule.
Mr. Coox replied at considerable length.
The Cuter Commemorate said, that it was of the utmost im-
portance that insolvents should know, that when they received
their discharge from this Court, they were bound to comply with
the conditions attending it, or satisfy the Court of their inability
to do so. No reasonable cause had been shown in thin instance,
why the order should be suspended ; therefore the rule must be
discharged. The assignee in this ease had acted in a laudable
manner. If all assignees were so strict in the discharge of their
duty, the orders of this Court would not be trifled with, as they
generally are, and creditors would benefit considerably thereby.