The Sun.
London, England, 1810-02-15 00:00:00

THE INQM

~ . .
that, r4eal, :ree•precalli to recall the tiftlerg in
Council; ,without wattina for the conely;ion of a
. .
treaty.
I And you are authorised in the -circumstances
1 beteill descrled, to take such reciprocal engagement
ton his Adaiesty:s behalf. 'I arm &c.
1 4. (StllCti) GiGaGE CANNING.

DISPATCH from Mr. Secretary CANNING to the Hon.
DAVID EasKINE. dated l'ore)gn Otficc, M4' 22, 1800.

Sltt—Yaur dispatches; Nos. 19 and 20, of the
igth ,tnd 2oth nave been received Jrie! this
day, and lad.betbre the King.
I have lost no time_.,in receit ing his Majesty's
onnirnands to signify to you his Majesty's sentiments
on the manner in which you have executes the in-
str&tions oo:tveyed to you in riy dispatches by Mr.
Oakky.

It is nuich_to he regretted; that in the execution
of itistrbetions upon 'points of. so Much delicacy and
importance„ you Should have thought yourself au-
thorised to tteplrt 'so widely not only from their le6-
ter, but from their spith. ••
• With reilect twthe• instructions relating to the
CheS:ipeake, which form the suksject of my displteh
No. -I; I have to remark, first, the total omission
by you of *a preli.riinary the most -inaterial
portance. A *departure from the terms: .of
youf instructions in the manner of 'conducting the
Negociaticn and 3dly, the admison by you, and
so tar as apireats, without. rernOnstrante or observa-
tion, of r Note 'contain/ing expressions offensive to
his. Majesty's dignity,•tiutl as no Minister of his
Majesty oug!tt rd have submitted to receive, and to
transmit to lai, Government. . •

lst, It is distinctly stated by me, as the condition
of his r414.,517' do lodger insisting upon the re,
call of the Proclamation of July 1807, as a prelimi-
nary.to,the adjustment of the difference arising from
the affair of tl!e.- Chesapeake," "11)4 the ships of
ivar of France•Shalll, in point of fact, have been ex-
cluded from the ports of the. United .States, and
such shilis.of that description as were in those ports
_shall have been warned to,dePar,t." ', . .
Of this condition you appear to have taken no
notice whatever. The Non-Intercourse Bill • ope-
rated only-to the prospective exclusion ; but as to
the warning to be given to •any sllipS of war of
France. (if.any such there were) in, the liens of the
United State.,, it no • where 'appears 'that' even a
question was put by you on this subjeet, lunch less
that you received ally satisfadory assurance upon it.
2dly, But if. this preliminary condition had teen
fulfilled, y our in.trutlions proceeled to state, that
even then " it would still be 'necessAry that either
- the Proclamation should be withdrawn, or its. ope.:
ration formally declared to ,be at an end, though it
wevld he sufficient tivi such withdrawal or ckela-
-ration be recoid.2d in the same instrument,
or at the same time with the terms of repariaten."
' . So far incti,penablie condition having
been obtained by you, Mr. Smith, in the answer
-returned by .him to your note, stuLliously avoidi.apy
thing like a -recognition of the principle on which
. alone the demand of the formal. recall of the,Proc.a-
inatiOn was lo be waved ; neither is the Proclama-
tion itself withdrawn, nor its operation declared to
be zt enl. • . ••

' The.obvious consequence of this omission is, that
if the Non-Iliterconr.e Ad, whieji is •a•temporary
,Aa, to be- suffered, to expire, -the Prociama-
tion might. revive, and. the inequality bet Ween the
two.Belligererits he thereby restored.,
It was ohNiwisly your duty, before you commit-
ted his Majesty's name Ityia written offer of repa-
ration, to ascertain in what manner that offer would
be received, and answtifed ;"arid if you found that
the express condition either of the withdfawing the
Proclamation,' or declining its, operations to be at an.
end, would riot be.Oomplied with, to abstain from
,proceeziing one sio7le -srepin: the i.legocintion until
you had referred-home for further instruelions.,
-That part' of yotir instructions which oirected that
this arrangement, if not made the siihjeel of con-
sideration,
,should-.be stAtled .by the exchange of
-Mtniverial Notes, dated on the same thy,..and re 7..
eiprocaily delivered at thesame time, was expressly
intended to guard against the, vi:ssibiiity of your
cot-minting yourself by a writt:tu propor,al,-in the
uncertaitity 4, what Might be the natwe of ihe
answer to be retuned to it. • .

,His Majesty will not 1.11)1),:4se itthat Mr: Srnith's
intended answer can bairn -been comtnunir;ited to.
you previtiusly, and have obtained your approbation.
in the proposal for restoring the men taken from
on board the Chesapeake, it was not_intendell that
thecondition at his Nlajesty's right to reettiint;.em
in a' regular way from the Amlevican Government,
if either natural-born subjeas of his NLjemy, or,
de!,.ertt-rs fri.:ru his- Majesty's should have
beui omitted. I dwelt, however, t:,e leSs.on this
point,. as his Majesty's right, in this- respea,.is
founded on public Lmr, and does not regnire to,
be fortified by the recognition of any other Go-
vernment.

. - . . . ..
... • .
_.
MINUTES OF. EVIDENCE;
Talien befoie tlie Cotimittez• of the yvhole Hodie, appointed
totonsider of the Policy and Conduct of the Lite Explicit-
. lion to the Scheidt.

• •
FOURTH DAY, •
The R;ght Holt Sir I'OHN -it.NsTßlPiturfti the
chair_
.
Capt. Sir HOME POPHAM', "alkfeinber if the House
attending in his dace,
• . Examined by the Cernatiitee. -
When Were:you..first consulted with relative to
the objects of the tate Expedition to the Scheidt
I think I Was sent for on the 4th of 'June; in the
evening, to conie, to try.vn•as early as possible, and
to. wait on Lord' Mulgraye: •
' •you state what passed at ~that time ?---I
think, as nearly as. I can recollea, my Lord MIA,.
grave said there"was a large diSposable force; and
' that as the French had a very strong ,fleet in the
Scheldt, and, were still build.aec' more ships, it would
be.very desirable to make an cefort to destroy them,
and- he requested that I would turn my thoughts to
that subject, as -it would be -very desirable that I
should see Lord Chatham and rLo rd Castleereigh in
the course of a day or two, • •
In consequence of that couversition ltad you'any'
communication with Lord Chatham' and Lord Cas-
tlereagh 2—After :ti.at. convers:ition i cam (pitted
some arrang-ements to papee,:.auil I was -afterwards
,sent for to bring those tnernordnda ro . town, which
I did, and -delivered them to Lord INFAgnive ; the
day after my return into thetountry, I was: split tor
to wait upot! Lord Castlereagh, where .I Saw Lord
1 Chatham. '
•
Cm you state on what day it was you saw Lord
Chathatn and Lord Castlereagh,?—l think it was on
the t ith of June; I am gone certain it was on the
Sunday after the King's birth-day. •
_Will you state what passed at that interview re-
lative -to the Expedition ?--4 had an interview before
Lord Chatham came in, with Lord Castlereagh, on
the subjea of the expedition, and 'as. ntmly
can recolle&, Lord Castlereagh said there was a dis-
posable force of from thirty to thirty-five_ , thousand
men, and I think, but I am not certain. t hat he had
transports ready to embark abciut 10,000, whether
it.was.lo,ooo ton of transpor's; or transports for
40,000 men, I cannot say ; we had some-general
conversation on the subject of the expedition, and L
• pressed as much as I possibly could, the advanced
state of the season I also exixessed'an anxiety that
the nuinberofhorses should.be reduced to as low at
standard as possible, as They take up a great deal of
room; and I alse.submitted that as many, troops as
possible Might be embirked hi man of war,-to pre-
vent the, expeltioit being delayed by transports, as I
knew from excerience that tiansports were always
the, greatest clog to an expedition; some conversa- •
lion passed about differau landing places, and about
the march across the Island of South, St:vela:id. I
do not recoll-et every particular of the conversation,
but that was the general purport of it ; if. my me-
moilhas at nit failed me, I OA be exTentely glad
to be corrected by tile Noble Lord who is so near
me now_.in his
-With what view did you advert to the lateness ,of ,
the stand .at the beginning of June ?—Because it
was my opinion, and I think I stato.l.the same to
Lord Mulgrao, that the.expedltion ought to s:4l by
the 27th or the 28th of Julie, tor that was nearly.
about the full moon and the longest days, and tinit
we were liable, if we remained beyond that, time, to
have to encounter the greatest of all difficulties is
expeditions, the-elements. ,
State the substance of anyconVersation you had with
Lord Mulgrave, respeatipg the expedition ?--Wheti I
was sent for to,Lord Muigrave,.l believe Lord Castle-
reagh Was present ; and the subject upon which I %%.a
particulary examined, was that of.a landing place tn,
the neighbourhood of. Santvliet ;- and I was deshed.
by Lord Mulgrave to-draw tip a paper, .staring, as
nearly as I t ould, whereahout I suppost d a Irioding
might be effected in the neighbourhood;of Santvitet,
which I did, I. believe, ishire Lord Castlereagh was
in the rooni ; it s s signed by myself and bx Caps.
Plampin,.,who h-ad.hcco sent tar to town, as he w.s.
'acquainted whh the navigation of the gchelilt, and
had been consulted on that day, previous to my be-
ing sett{ for. I think Sir .Ricitard Straoh,ii, Sir
chard 'Bickerton, and Mr. Wellesley Pole were
~present. . , •

. „ . .
Can you state, tip,.substance of your, opinion witty '
respect to the practicaoifity of etleoling. a landtrig,
near Sautvliet beliel'e I had little hesitation iii
slating that a l
• .
andingrnigla theri-:; how- ,
tier, itTchat ) ,per oca copy of that paper wes to ha
produced to the Committee, ray exact opinion at that
•
time would be seen.
Was Ihe plart.of operations which was afterwards
acted upon So tar as. it was found practteableycolu-
miniicated to you, or were you coutitted.
o-e- final air:if:gen-rents r, certaltify w :13* acc,s•zar
to ill arrange-tientof the e•gperlition,
been exanien,...d t good. deal. by the Corn ilanuers iii
Chief of the nrcny and navy, With resp.:ei to nay
local knowledge of that country.
Have you any 'knoWledge pf thp.f;ituati.on
cireurnstat.eei of Antwerp and the of '
and the tief-tnee. or the Uppe..- St tc. ci ?—I
Aiti erp:, iil 179.1,:, I did nor take inucti.notie
the fortifwatioris, as the pritiCipA
had were'opbn the sea face; I understood tiwn tirat,
tIl works were very old, and that ttle ditd: s (irt-
in s6tile p but where I
With ret:peet to rthe- fort of I r...-
gret in one of the :mt-Ltuoiaii..i t., oat ,1 (aulti :i;); -
Lain ii&rinlttiou about that, watt 1 ne;ioVe
I at the same time obsc-reed, that i
the-11-,tbariterS;lin'l79B, were moving doix,l) to-
wards Liao, they did not e:.:yress, -aslundeestoocl,
all y doubt almut getting wissession of Lil:O.
I Did not' the p!..it liCanitity •of suee*ding in the
attempt upon Antwerp dePentr very materially
. Upon the being Mile to c, nvey the fleets sabc,ve the
torts of Lino and Lb titienilioeiok ?—ln a previous
answer I‘stated, 'that I Aas coribulfed Ripon lire prac-
ticability- of landing the alloy at Santviter; wirier is
fiveiniteSbAoW Liao.
-rte you well acquainted with ' the -Island of
Walchereir.pre.viOus to the sailing of the expediiiOn?
' As far as I could trust upon.. my memory from '1;2'94
On account of Mrs; BILLINGTON's indisposition, t. d' •
to the present lute, tuat I always stated in my
the,..firsf Vocal. Concert, intended for to-morrow
evening, is postponed to Friday in next week, as, Were you acquainted with the clime of Wal-
day.,papers;
announced by advertisement kisour first page this cheren and the'latluence of the climate upon the
Ana. i Wants; or upon troops that eatne.thrre

-1.. But I cannot fOrbear observing with reg.et, that
the bounty of his Majesty, in the intencle,d provi-
sion fur tire relations of the..rnpu killed on biard_of
the Chesapeake, is not only stated by yon -xttbout
a similar restriaica, but is brougin for‘t itt once
as a part of the reparation offeletfl avd
tbul c.,tive.rted by you from an aa of spuntatieous
'generosity, into one of positive obligvion. •
30,1 y, Ili addition to thesubstancs of. Mr.. Smith's
which I have alreddy 04:litiont;(1, it remains
:for mein notice th'e expressions so in 1 of diirespe4
.tOhis Wjssty with-whiCh that note
_And. I. auk to signify to,you cisple3sufe,,l,vbich
'his Majetyfeel4, that any Ministtr of ws.n.ijtsty
- should have shewn himself so far. insensibl; 01 NOLA
is due to the-dignity of his, Sovereign, as io have
c()::,,:ink.d to receive-and tranmnit to be laid belore
his .74,,j,5ty a note in which such expressiOns
wrre contained *. tam, &c.. •

GE(). CANNING.

'li:the following is the ofKutsive passage in Mr. Smith's
letter to which 'Mr. canning alludes :—" I have it in ex-
pre.ssi.charge trom the l',esident to state, that, while he for_.
bears to insist on a turtherpuniShment Of the MR:tiding Of.
fiver (Admiral Beateley), he is not the less sensible of the
justice and utility of such au example, nor the less persuad.
cd that it-would best comport 'with lat is due from his Bri-
tannic Majesty to his own honour, have. &c.
(signed)
." R. SMITH.".

ways knew that it was snbje& to agues in the •Au-
ta ~n : in 1794, I had an ague there
,myself in Au-.•
gnu(,‘ hut I do notfFeolleat that many of the inha-
bitants were,tben titillated with that ague, nor do I
think4-Ahough that, may easily be seen by matting
a tetetit of the regiments that were there in 1794,
that they were in any .degree.atilided-so much as the
reg rue,ts laSt year.
Any military. operations-upon the subje& of
tle 4xpfdition submitted to your consideration- by
Lord Castlereagh. or. Lord Chatham'?-.--I think, a
Iviemoir was given me to read by. Lord Chatham
upon t',e subject of passing to Antwerp by 'the
AaSt •F-clieldt, and Tole!) and Bergen op Zoom
By whom was that Memoir written ?—When• I
.receive) it ~from Lord Chatham, to read, it . xas
in his own house, and it was a 'confidential paper:
liitie4ndent of th;s . Memoir, which you have
tamed a confidential paper, were arty other opinions.
..of military men or others submitted to your consi-
deration, by
.Lord .Mulgrave, Lord Castlereagh, -or
Lord Chathani ?—1 do not recoiled any ethers. were. •
By the term !`.cunfidentially,"' do you mean to-
.
imply that. this Memoir was in the nature of secret
intelligence given by .some person, who might have
been employed to Collea thestate of the enemy's de-
fFnce„ or so forth, on, the other side of. thewater.;
or Wr4s the Memoir delivered in by a military person
or other in this country ?—The .Memoir was cer-
tainly by a person in this country; Lord Chatham
Kitt it into my hands to read ;I received it froM him.
m the most coefidential manner,' and therefore
thought .it my duty to state distivaly to the Corn-
'Mace my einba:assment in giving up the name
of the person who was confidentially put, in my'
possession.
Was the Memoir put into' your hands for the
purpose of your making any comment; or forming
any opin:on upon it? I rather' think that the Me,
xnoir was- put into 'My hand to. shew how far a
military opinion went with repel to the pt atticabi•
lity pf -going to Antwerp by the route of the Eastern
Scheldt., . .
Were you.yOurself employed in the expeditipn ?
I was. . • • • •

In; what capacity ?—I was Captain of the Ve-
'peraPle. ' . ,
Were you, in any other situation than Captain -of
a Fi:ieate.sltip in the fleet?-1 was going to state that
was employed upon detac!ied services by Sir 4i-
chard*St rilchan.: in the first 'instance,.l-carried the
first dtvision of the fleet into the-Rompoot,,add re-
turned and carried. the second division into the
,Rompoot, and' then Sir 'Richard Strachan dire6ted
me to land.:with Lord Chatham, and remain with
.him till he shpuld.give me further -orders.
You have stated, that it-was intended to land ihe
:army near Santvliet, will you state whether you re-
connoitred the lauding place in the neighbourhood
.of Santcliet believe I stated, that I was de-
.sired to .give my -opinion upon the practicability of
landing at. Saptvlier ; but I have -no hisitation in
. saying, -tfrit..as far as I was a judge,.l thought it an
. iexcelient plate.
. ,
W.as not the first objet. of
,entering the Scheldt
the occuOti-m of -Willeheren, and particularly •of
Flushing ?-1, rather think that it was always intend-
ed drat the first ohjed should be Cadpnd, to give
-us the cormnand Of the Wheeling Channel.
When you had the command of the Wheeling
• Channel, what was the next objet, according to the
plan submitted to you of the expedition ?-1-o. pass
_ the shipi and the that were not employed
-,in carrying troops for the irnmtdiate, objeet. of mak-
ing a -descent upon Waicheren into the Western
Scheldt by that channel; •As I trust drepaper that
I laid before the Adinv alty may be laid• be ore the
.—House, if I should-at-all vary in . the, opinicin. that
gave then, and
.what I-Statt:new,, I trust- it %ill be
ent.rtly attribUted to my not exaCtly recolleaing
the precise detail;' proposed for those arrange-
ments. ' - •
From the printed papers laid before diet-Rinse,. I
recollect that the first objet of the. expedition was
the occupation of Walcheren, and that I ,s;o6Q.men
Which the-ships al war carried rartieularlywere iii
• tended exclusively. for that destination;, did you un—
• derstand; at the time of the communication of the
plan to you, that the rcecupition of Walcheren vas
intended, a'nd by•such means as 'the 'paper laid: bes.
fore the douse -imports it -was ?—The first obje6t. of
permanent possession was certainly Walcherien ;
Catisstid:vtas never intended to be keptlonzer than
sufficient to dcstroy• the batteries, and to enable our
Ships to pass' through the; Wheeling Channel into
the Western Scheidt, at least so I understood it ;
and I believe it will be found in the paper I men-,.
tioned, that I ventured to submit thpt idea to.. G-
overnment.

• As the plan was communicated to you, you knew
that after Waleheten was occupied and Fltisbing was
reduced, the ulterior objeas of the expedition were
the:destruCtion of the 'French Fleet 'and the "Arse-
nals and Naval Works' at Antwerp ?-4 certainly
knew that the ulterior objet of the expedition4ere
the destruetion of the French fleet and the Naval
Ar's:etrals. at Antwerp. t'
you consider at the time that the plan: Was
thus C.ommunicated to you, that it would probably
be necessary, tor the accomplishment of those ulte.
rilr objects, to remove from Walcheren the farce
employed in the wank:Lion of Flushing, before these
ulterior.objetts could be accomplisheu ?—No, I did.
riot.

.
Then you consider the other -path of the force
not eMployed in Walcheren as sufficient to acCom.7
Plish those ulterior objals considered the re-
maiotog t. part of the force, so "far as I. was able to
itscige; sufficient to proceed to the execution of the
ulterior objeets, thptigh I always thLinght it poisi-
ble, -upon Flushirig being closely invested, lutt part
of the force originally" destined for that sert ice might
be spared to reinforce that part of the army which
was originallrintended -to proceed to 'the Ulterior
objeEts of the expedition.
Did you understandat the time this communica-
tion was made.to you that that part of the force now
intended to occupv Walcheren or invest Flushing,
was to proceed to the ulterior objeCfs of the expe-.
dition, before the surrender of the town of -Flush-
ing ?-1 so understood it.
At the time of th 6 cotnmunication of the plan to
you, was any distip&account given you of the state
of the fortifications, particularly of Lillo and. Leif-,
kenshoeik, and. the other fortifications that Must

.command, or a flea in different places the ..passage of
the .SCheldl, or, the stiit' of he defences of Ant-
werl)'.—l have in some .prcviOus answers regretted,
that Iconic! not obtAin i!,fotination with reiped
to Lill6, and I have ,anl all I know- with respect to
the fortifications of Ant wet-p.
How, 'without
.yout' bent able 'to obtain any
knowledge of the ;Cate of Itiilo, or Lief kenshotik,
and knowing nothing- of the state -of Antwerp, be-
yond what you kneW.of it in the year
,1794, are
yon able to come to a conclusion that it was sate to
advance the. remainder of the force, not in% esting
Flushing or gccupying W,Acheren, to proceed to the
.ulterior obje& of the nyedition, natnely;to
wroy the French fleet, and the liaval at sepal at Ant-
werp ?--Great pall of that is a' military question ; I
naturally concluded that. his Majesty's Minist&s
would have been in possession of any new-works
that had been, raised at Antwerp, and .if they had
decided before I was sent for, that they, were to-go
from Santvliet, then the fleet would hase.had no—
thing to do
.with Lillo till after the army was in pos-
session of that fortress.. •

Then ,your opinion of the propriety oftnaking
this attempt, with the part of the lace not engaged
in Walcheren, was
,founded on
.the copfi_dence.you
placed in the information obtained by his. Majesty's
Ministers )—I clo :not think I .have exaCtly_stated
that that was the only 'ground on which I did tin*
that -the. remaining part of. the force, for instance
20,000 men, might have proceeded.:..losvainly.did
bear that it was supposed that there were no regular
troops at that time in Antwerp, and Alia the ,LoW
Countries were never, so bare :of troop; 3 this was
the information I think I' received from th9se of his
Majesty's Ministers with whom I talked, and it was
on that- presumption.tthoUght it would 'be quite
safe for an army of 20,000 exclusive of the
aid Alley naturally 'would have derived `from the
fleet, to have proceeded towards Antwerp ; be-
cause they must have had intelligenCe time enough
_for them to have eff4.cted their retreat: to The fleet,
it any extraordinary number of troops had cone
down from the interior part of count*, OT was
On its march down; this is" merely matter of opi-
nion, which .I have stated to his,l\lo,-!siy" nisters,
and the several superior Officers, and wl.ic;i opinitth
was founded on the best judgment I posseised.•
Are there any other reasons' that-, induced you to
think .it WAS a proper measure ?—I trust that the
Committee will never check an anxiety in a Naval
Officer to_ &stray any part of the enerny's' fleet it
is ptaCtitable”tado so; I thought With that -force it
was possible to erfeCt that object.
Had. you any reason to believe that his Majesty's
Ministers had received any eicad or "accurate *tutor-
Mation of the state of the works of Antwerp that
time ?-4 really do ni,rt recollect that I had-any po-
,sitive,teason to know that they had ;.but the gene-
ral impression upon my mind, after talking- with
them; 'was that 'Antwerp-was in a' defenceless state,
and that there were very few troops in' the lots
countries., ••

Were.you of opinion that that part ofthe force
_Which was not required for the occupation of Wal-
cheren, or the attack upon Fllishino, might pass up
*to', Satitvlitg, having one bank of the Scheldt in our
posse-:sion ?--i kii-ow of noihing to prevent it.
You have stated that you' are not aware that
the alteration 'which - took place in the plan of
attack at Deal made any difference 'as to the
ultimate objects -of the Expedition ; did • that
chthige make any alteration in the pradicability of
obtaining the ultimate objeds of the expedition
is necessary for nie, in stating the groundS
Upon Which the alteration *as made, and.the'eX.
tent to which that alteration would'have gone uri.
,dei• ordinary circuthitances, to state that if there 'was
any difference in the pi-atiicability of the-ulterior
objects, that the difference did. tot anise from Op
. alteration-of the plan, but that it arose frOM
the .circumstances of the weather. The plan was
changed from a landing i.l Zoutland' Bay to a land-
ing -:bout Dumberg, by which 'means the whole of
thefleet would have been at anchor in the Stone
Deeps, and. would-have made 'an open sea tohae
gone. into, the..Scheldi after-the debarkation had taken.
place upon. Dinuherk;- but when- Dutnberg beach
. was examined; there was so' great' a surf that it
was- quite impoSSible to land a man there, and it
blew so extremely hard that there was great appre-
hension many- of thelransports might part their
cahles and get on Shore., and that 'in all
,probability
most-of the gun-boats would have foOndered at theif
anchors; that on that account it was proposed, as
originally mentioned as the alternative in the original
plait, incase such a circumstance of Wind and Wea-'
ther should arise, that the whole fleet should go
into the 'Rompoot, where a landing was efleded
without any diffictilty,
_And without 'the toss' of h.
'single man. ••' • • I

You have stated, that in .yoUr opinion the
. mate objects of the expedition might have been at-
tained by the proceeding of Such of. the 'troops 'ass_
were not employed in the investiture of -Flushing
up the -Scheldt to
.Slintvliet, from- whence they
might_have gone to Antwerp; and that. there were
Very troops ip Antwerp ; are you aware that
in. thlitias well .ai other parts of the French donii-
nions, theje is a very strong National Guard for tbe,
defence of the country am aware that there. is
a National Guard, but I did' not know.that it ikas
so strong in the Low Countries as it is in France ;
at the same time .1 never made any particular itt
quiriei about it; -and the opirtiOn which I gave
upon the .praElicability, as -far as it struck me, of
proceeding with so ,large a force, was merely the
opinion of a naval officer upon a military question;
and therefore if! that opinion was erroneous, it will
not, I hope be an impeachment of, any professional
opinion I may give.
Did you Conceive that that corps of troops could
have-advanced for the purpose of obtaining the ul-
timate objeEt of the expedition, without investing wr
disposing the forts or fortifications upon the Scheldt,
-betyVeon Santvliet and Antwerp ?—.l think it Might
only have been necessity for a midi corps to have
masked Lillo, if it should have been deemed inexpe-
dient to pass it.
AFi you conceive that a small corps, .out of the
original 'corps landed at- Santvliet, must have been
left to have masked Fort Lillo, do you conceive the -
.ultimate object of the expedition, namely, the
idestru6tion of the French 'fleet,- and of the baSin
and orsenali at Antwerp, could have been obtained

,N,Fithottkoiir,,troops tavitig.prvitiuslyobtahrd pos-
session of the tortikations at Antwerp ?"-..4 think. it
would iLive;treen -necessary for us to have obtained. _

•posse!ision of the fortifications at-Antwerp, unless it
should have appeared,' -when the. river was, opened,
_that it was. possible 'to haVe stormed the town on the
sea lace during the mght.
Does that opinion extend .toihe.occuation of the
Cit Adel, or only the works of the town ?—Were -it
possible to move a fleet two 'or three miles, :the
movement. of ..thf.4• fl?et might change any -Opinion
that could he previously given. If the fleet, was
.lying-at the lower part' of the town of Antwerp,- I
think it would' have been possible to have destroyed
;the fleet without possession of the c.itadel,•if we'vvere.
in possession of the river ; but if the fleet lay above
the Citadel, I. do not apprehend the fleet could have.
been destroyed. .without the.. Genera- commanding`
tile, troops conceiving that the force in Antwerp was;
so small as -to justify his masking it or passing it, and
- going round with_ his army to ere& batteries to des-
troi• that fleet. •

. ,
Do. you know whether, our expedition sailed' on
the. supposition that t he enemy's fleet could or could'
not runup above the town of Antwerp ?4,-L believe,
,when the expedition siiled, every body was aware
that, the fleet' might run up to Antwerp, and ;it is
.possible that many people might , be aware that it
could run higher up, but I do not believe that the
circumstance was much- agitated about its running
up above Antwerp'; it. will be -seen by the papers, =
as far as I know. myself I believe many, people
have thought that they might go above, Anfwerp;.
and if any body had.,askd me whether they could
go much above Ani rp,:.l should :have said-, be-
lieved not much,. but it is now found. that they can
run above it. • • . •

In point of • faa; did not the enemy's fleet runup
above Antwerp ?—Part of the fleet went: up above
A ntwerp.w Rile I was laying at talc?; I think five sail
of the line ; I could bring accurate information of
the number,. if required.

You have stati:d that you did not kutoiv.whether
the fleet might noi•be carried above-the. -citadel of
Antwerp : do you. recoiled what is the depth of
the water marked upon that
.chartwith which the
Navy was furnished upon. the sailing of the ESpedi.o
tiop ?—I do not 'immediately= recoilect it, but I could
refer to it if it i 5 desired:-

Is it not marked immediately above the, Citadel
of Antwerp as twenty-six ,feet deeN—lt is very
possible it may. - _ _

. Is not the depth of the river marked upon•the
chart, the depth of the•river at low water ?..—The
depth of the river upon all. charts is marked at low
water, unless otherwise expreSsed.
• • DO you know how many•feet the•tide rises at Ant.
well) ?—I should suppose in ordinary .spring tides
18 feet,

[The Cliairman was dire&ed to report progress, and
ask leave to sit again.] •

FIFTH DAY, Fss. 9.

Major-General Brownrigg, in a letter to the Cotn-
mander in .Chief, did not,thint it would be advise.:
able to laud at Ostend and proceed by the Bruges Ca-
nal to Ghent and Antwerp, asohey might be inter-
capted on their return ; but he thought that by going
up the Scheldt with the capture oh Waicheten, the
object might be accomplished.

_ln Meinoranda (as they are called)
,by Major-
Genpral.Alexander Hope, the sane train nfreason-
it% is porsued—ad a priority. given to operations on
the eldt, t Scheldt, operations from the coast of Flan-
aers..' . . .. .

Captain Owen, of, the
_Clyde,. said, that he. had
received _ a second instruction ,from- Sir Richard
Strachan, intiowing, that the enemy might detach
his flotilla towardS.Cadsand, and therefore instruct,
ing him to use his.own discretion about landing, but
always keeping it in his recollection that it was of
the_greatest importance. to obtain possession of Cad,
sand. s Lord Huntley's- instructions , supposed_ that
Captain Owen had the means of landing 2000 Men
at one operation. HiS, provided boats could only
carry 61.5, but he foundmeansto.extendiho number
to 700. The transporthoats, if the weather had per-
initted.thern to act,would have doubled that nninber.-
When the moment of landing came, ,it blew too
hard for the transport boats to :ad. -It then be-
came a question with Lord Huntley whether, it
ought to be tried. Capt. Owen could only Lind 700.
at,a .time, and could not return fdr an hoyr or more.

On the mokning of the 31st July, a disposition was

made for running the transports with two regi-
_ipenti in shore, to facilitate the ..operation, but the
enemy 'were th4ti in considerable force, and it
was judged .better to wait for. Lord Gardner's
boats. Captain Owen. sent letter. to Lord _Gard-
_ ner, who, in return sent an extract of his instruc-
tions; by which it appeared, that .his-Lord.hip was
ordered to remain where:he ,was. On the 3d
of: August, Captain Owen took a 'position-uprin the
end of the Ellhogg, which divides the channeiS of
the Weelin and the.llderloo,_ which he cohsidered
good 'Position forasisting in the blockade of Flush-
ing, and held that statton ,during, the rest of the
siege. From the 7th he considered the. blockade
to have been complete. Troops might have 'been
landed, on the 30th of July, from men of war's
boats ; but to Lind 2000 men there must have been
a much greater tbrce of men of war. ;According to
report, the reinfOrc:ments drawn ,from 'Cadsand : to
Walcheren_ consisted of three regiments. Captain
Qwen was of opinion, that it would certainly have
been-desirable to chsarrn the.batteries at Cadsand; and
that if the island of Cadsand fiad been in..our pos-
se?sion, ici.vould have been possible for the trans-
ports to to have ,'-proceeded up the Scheldt without
molestation from the guns.ot Flushing. i-le doubted
whether thewhole number of troops that could have
been landed at Cadsand by his, boats-and Lord Gard-•;
ner's, would have exceeded 1000 men. There was
no appearance of. force at -Cadsandson the morning=
,of the 30th of July. He thought that the landing
would. have beer etleaed in that morning, had it
not been for the , violent state of the wind. Lord-
iluntley's instru -lions expressed an expectation that.
Captain. Owen would haile had the means of landing
2000 men. Captain Owen could not state. the rea-
son why the frigates and line -of battle'ships did not
'pass up the Scheldt, between-the 2cl and Bth of Au
gust. If a landing had been.attempti2d Cadsand;
ion the 30th of July, of 700 men, it might have
been made good between nine-and ten in the morn-

ing, 2400 men Might have been landed before font
o'clock. Captain Gwen -W,Tis of opini,.,n, that the
prerious‘calitare Flrishirig .13. as not m-cessary to
the intended attack upon Ant Aerp. The state, t,f
the Wind on the morning, of the 30th Was such
to enable the boats- of the men of war and the flat
boats to effeat a.landing;
13tig4tdier-Getteral Montressor stated, that Lord
Huntley's instreetions were communicated to him,
ty,,hiCh stated, -that the landing iw Cadsand Wo.s' in-
trusted to him, the- Brigadier-General, with 2000
Men,to he under bis command.. With respect ;qtr
the force of the enemy upon Cadsand, the NOophen
frigate telegraphed-2000 tried atlt wo o'clock oil the
•n4ernocir of the tst ; there 'Were 400 men seen
froni.n frigate on shore on the '3O! h. From the ap.,
(pearance of tile enemy's force, he ,did not think it
would nave been safe to have landed roe-force rr de.
tachtnents of from 6 to 700 'men.. He did not iris**
Moe the i aiding could. hive -been -effeetually-covered
by the ships of war; and there. was a want of guii,
boats. Lord "Huntley's 'division'.received Orders
the 3d of, August riot to make any-furtheratremdt
upon Cadsaird. He did not' think, if a iandii
of 0000 'men could have been effected" on' tad-
sand;:on the morning Of the of. -Lilly, that such
a corps could have maintained its position. againSt
the • enemy. Leta Huntley could have landed
ah-out 5000 men if necessary. Supposing 't hal bec9
•Poisible to hare landed 2000 men-on CadOnci
on tite day Of the 3ti, he did not think it Is',oUld have
1)*; pOlible to have landed so many- more men
to hare.ennbldd thos6 2080 to maintain their post-
tiOn, and in that case,,:fre• had iio doubt, th..t the;
.000. men musthave fallen. He did not think Cad-
satid,a necessary point to have taken, In-orcio- to
navigate the mouth' of the Scheldt. Be Co!ceived
'an 'attempt to land the tropp4 in detachments of 70CP
Men on the. morning Of-the 34/h would have beet'
111-ad Vised. Lord Huntley. expre,ised great ilisart-
p6intment at there ndt being boats to enable hira.,4o
/arid 2000 men-at one 'time, -as he- expected, ,anti
afterwards- fepeated his surpri.,e.
• 'Capt. Paisley; of the Royal- Engineers, CliiefEngi-
neer rn Lord Huntley 's division, \k ith re,peet to tue
praelicability,Or prudence of attacking-the hattedeff
at Cadsand on the 30th July, by finding deiachmetits
of riot mare thati'7oo Men at a time, stated th it the
batteries appeared to' him to havevery little strength
in themselves ; hut the propriety of at'acking therm
with 700 men, would depend entirely on thln
e,emY'.s
force, which he could not vouch tot; lie did not
know What force the eneiny.liad thete, the batteries
appeared to hirn to be open batteries. f-Ic did not kut.mv
the.reason 'vv,hy the debarkation did not Oke.pkok-e;
—On the morning of • the 31st, the soldiers were
ready to step into the:boats with two days' prow'
sions, cooked according to orders : he did not know
the reason why the orders were countdrmaoded,
,
It'appeaitd:to him there was no difficulty in land-
ing, :unless what might arise trOm the eneiny,having-
a greater force than we could oppOse to (tient in the-
tirSl instance ; of the enemy's force ho was not ..a
.11dge. 1500.1-nen "Were, he believed, telegraphed
to, be in Cadsand on the 30th, in the afternoon, and
some field-pitces on the 51st. •

Bow-,STREET.--Yesterday 'three well,known 011'
ra6ters, Hart, White, and Martin, were:charged by
Lack, one of the' patrole, with picking several gO-
- and attempting to pick others,
when.the company were corning out of Covens":
garden Theatre, on Monday n;g4xt. Lack st3tc4f
that, learning that a-. number of persons . had -been-
robbe4 as they were .coming out of Covent-garden
Theatre, for several bights 'past, he ci,sguised hira-
self aS a Coachman, and watchedthern, and saw' tt3olll
pick. several-. gentlemen's pockets,. and hand the
stolen property frotn one the anothex, to avoid 4Pe
property being. found upon them. He also saw
them attempt to. rob several. On searching *theal
several handkerchiefs were found upOn
There was also found upon them some foreign coin,;
two pocket-books, a curious tobacco stopper, 3°"
various other articles supposed to have been siOlen•
- The prisoners, were committed for further exball"
nation next Monday. '