The Sun.
London, England, 1859-05-27 00:00:00

E.I. Co's bls. House bls.
.. 23}

Calcutta, Co.'s rupee
Bombay ditto ......
•• • •
Madras ditto ........
's Bills drawn, from the 11th to
East India Cow
PanYthe 25th May.

Bengal £634 19 11
Madrlg
Porn bay

£32,4 19 11

-
Foreign Glll in Ears (StandarcP) per oz. £3 17 9
Mexiran DoThirg • „ 0 0 0
Silvn in 133r5 (Standard)

NAVAL APPOINTMENTS.

Thefollowirg appointinonts svera madelhis afternoon At

the Ad m fral h'

Lieutenants—Thomas A. Swinburue, John G. Boileau,
Wm. T. W. Humbly, and Robert J. Stotherd, to the Edg.T
Alfred Luekraft,-Edward F. Holm.e, W. N. Cornewall, a ld
W. J. Walker, to the Aboukir. •
Mates—F. Stirling, to the Aboukir; H. C. Onslow, 'o
the Brisk ; F. S. Vandermulen, to the T.,dgar ; and A. S'•
MontaguQ, to the Cadmus.
Midshipman—F. A. Sergeant, to the es
Brisk.-
Surgeons.—Thomas Somerville, to the Edgar; ,TAT)
Davidson, to the Aboukir ; John T. Gabriel (additional, to
the Edgar; William Evans (additional), to the Russell..
Assistant-Styrrons—Joseph Halpin (acting),
Edgar; ; Jtnnet Martin, to the Aboukir; John Cruicksha-k
(acting), to ditto. • - • to- the Firobror i.
.2Laster's Ar...;ietant--W. H. Buckdale, .. . •
Naval Cadets--H. W. Wodelloube, to the :RUyal Albel .. ;
G. Parnell,to the Agamemnon , -to t)1?
: .....

THE MANNING OF THE BOY AL
NAVY,

The following letters have been addressed to the
editor of the Ernes :

Sir,—ln my last letter I dwelt on various
grievances, real and imaginary, which are alleged
to exist in the Royal Navy, and which are assigned,
as the reasons why seamen evince so much disin-
clination to enter the Queen's service. I repeat
that the habits and training of merchant seamen
give me but slender hopes that we shall ever obtain
a considerable supply of good men from the mer-
chant service ; we must, therefore, have recourse
to other measures, and that without delay, for
efficiently manning our navy.
First, we must maintain something like a stand-
ing force ; it will not do to have 50,000 seamen
in one year, and only 30,000 or 40,000 in the next.
These sudden reductions are attended with great
injury and injustice to seamen. For the increase
of the standing naval force all the witnesses agree
in recommending a large addition to the number
of boys. The " boy" system may be expensive,
but it is what we must come to; I say, therefore,
let us go largely into it at once; and make our
own seamen as expeditiously as possible. If we
can ward off a naval war for three years, we shall
be able to meet an ordinary emergency ; if for five
years, we may, by persevering energetically with
the training of boys, and ,-with the aid of the
Coast Volunteers and increase of Marines, make
a good stand against even the combined fleets
of France and Russia, increased as those fleets
probably will be in the interval. -Excellent as
I think Admiral Milne's evidence is, there is
one important point, and only one, on which my
experience compels me to differ from him. I am
decidedly of opinion that sailors are not so indis-
pensable as they were ; still I say, let us have them
if we can procure them ; I would give them a pre-
ference, but, failing to procure them, let us take the
best substitute, which is a Royal Marine. He is
sufficient gunner for most purposes, he is an ex-
perienced small-arm man, and when he embarks he
is already trained to discipline. These are three
advantages which we cannot secure in a newly-
raised man. Moreover, in case of a reduction of the
fleet we can employ him on shore, instead of send-
ing him adrift as we do our seamen. Let us, there-
fore, speedily increase our Marines by a large
figure, for three or five years, to add to the fleet
when required, until the " boy" system begins to
develope itself ; then let us stop recruiting, grant
voluntary discharges, and thus reduce the Marines
to the number which we may require to maintain
permanently. Admiral Milne shows clearly that,
although we have a large number of registered mer-
chant seamen, we never have more than one-third
of them at home. A sudden war would have the
effect of keeping a great portion of the two-thirds
out of the country, as owners would naturally send
instructions to their captain's to take short freights
in the colonies, but nothing for Europe; in short,
to do anything rather than expose themselves to the
risks of capture by entering the Channel.
There is a suggestion put forth in Mr. Lindsay's
otherwise sensible paper, and which is supported by
the authority of Lord Clarence Pit,Tet's recommenda-
tion, which in my opinion is full of danger. They
both assert that the Queen's service has not kept
pace in improvement with the mercantile marine,
and that it has fallen far short of the astonishing
progress made in various branches of manufacturing
industry. And what do they suggest to remedy
this supineness on the part of our naval authorities ?
Simply that we should introduce on board ship
mechanical contrivances for working guns, hoisting
sails, &c. The object of these improvements is
stated to be that we may economize labour ; the
object of economizing labour is, of course, to enable
us to work a ship with a smaller crew. In order
that we may follow these improvements to their
consequences, let us suppose an action between a
British and an enemy's ship, equal in every respect
as to size, armament, and calibre of guns. Under
ordinary circumstances the English ship will un-
questionably be manned at least one-seventh in
number under a French ship; take the proportions
at 300 for the crew of the English ship and 350 for
the crew of the French ship ; but, owing to the
adoption of Mr. Lindsay's scientific and mechanical
improvements, we may perhaps be able to reduce
the English crew from 300 to 250. The inevitable
consequence in an action would be that the French-
man, taking advantage of the comparative weak-
ness of your crew, would make a dash, and carry
you by boarding. But Lord Clarence Paget and
Mr. Lindsay may say that they do not mean that
the crews should be reduced. Then, what becomes
of their boasted economy of labour ? lam not
aware whether these gentlemen have ever been
under fire ; it not, let me advise them to take a hint
from one who has ; let them avoid these mechanical
appliances, they will be terribly in the way, and
will cramp a space not too large at present ; inde-
pendently of this inconvenience, I can assure them
that cogwheels, bars, and pinches in an action will
make most ugly splinters. If economy of labour is
ever to lead to the reduction of the crews of ships,
it will be by the introduction of Armstrong's gun,
which may be worked by one-third of the number
required to work the present heavier guns. But,
after all, can we adopt this mercantile view in the
manning of ships of war ? And can we safely
overlook the proper relative strength of our crews
as compared with those of our adversaries ? These
are questions which must be answered without
reference to the adoption of mechanical contri-
vances and economy of labour on board our ships
of war.

I fear I must trouble you with one more letter.—
I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

BLUE JACKET.
United Service Club, May, 1859.

Sir,—ln common with your correspondent "Blue
Jacket," I have been surprised that more notice has
not been taken by the public generally of the re-
port made by the commission on manning the navy.
It is gratifying to notice that the changes advo-
cated in this report are gradually being carried out
by the Admiralty. One of the grievances com-
plained of by seamen has already been removed by
increasing the rations of salt meat and bread.
Having had a good opportunity of ascertaining
the feelings of a body of merchant seamen who had
been for a few years in the navy, I know that the
insufficiency of the daily ration, especially in cold
weather, was the chief ground of complaint. Many
inexpensive modifications of the scale of victualling
might easily be made, so as to vary the daily food,
and render it more nutritious and palatable.
The unpopularity of the navy among merchant
seamen has been greatly exaggerated ; whatever
disinclination to entering the service may formerly
have existed ampng these men, it is rapidly on the
decline. The meal thoroughbred seaman speedily
becomes accustomed to the life on board a ship of
war. He finds himself equal to the man-of-war's life
in his duties aloft, and he can easily master the gun
drill ; nor does he require much longer time or
greater labour to learn the musket exercise.
By a little judicious encouragement the guns'
crews soon strive to surpass each other, while the
exercises aloft excite eager emulation between mast
and mast when the ship is alone, and between ship
and ship when in company with other vessels.
Although the thoroughbred seaman is soon recon-
ciled to the pecnlarities of a man-of-war, there is a
nondescript amphibious species of being who takes
longer to educate, and it is men of this class who
must necessarily form the majority of our nnw
levies.

These men are at first perfectly helplesss ; they
cannot wash their clothes, far less repair or make
them ; the daily manipulation of their hammocks,
the most comfortable of single beds, is to them a
mystery; aloft, they are only in the way, and below
they are liable to be chaffed and quizzed by the
more experienced hands.
These are the men who in time become useful
fellows, but who at the outset of their naval career
require the considerate treatment and patient
teaching pointed out by the judicious Admiralty
circular recently issued.
No captain, however well Eccondcd by his senior
executive officer, can do much for these men in-
dividually ; the leading men on the lower deck, the
petty officers and seamen brought up in the service,
must take this raw material in hand and mould it
into shipshape fashion.
Now, this important duty falls chiefly upon the
master-at-arms and his subordinates. The comfort
of the ship depends'far more upon them than upon
the superior officers. Frequently has the improve-
ment of this department been .urged upon the
Board of Admiralty ; for on its efficiency the
happiness and discipline of the men on the lower
deck mainly depend ; yet I must reluctantly state
a fact, but too well known to every naval officer,
thatbe Properly
most important department has never
shir i_l7.2rganised. Its numbers in the larger
find a man capable and it is a. rare occurrence to
performing the difficult and
delicate duties of ° of
at-arms, or even those of
his assistant—the master-at-arms,
Your eorrespondenmEta,s, corporal.l
Jacket"—whose real
name would, if I keunot'
to the suggestions he makes—
has
great weight
alludedl., to the
want of an uniform system of discipline.
It seems from the tenor of his letter that it is
rather a system of routine to which his
remarks
are directed, for the system of discipline is in great
measure rendered uniform by the system of mi •
nor
punishments established a few years since.
These punishments are rather on the side of
leniency, for the few turbulent and refractory
characters to be found in every ship would never
'Le coerced by them alone ; yet they are, on the
whole, sulEcielitts uphold the discipline (if adminis-

tered with discrimination), provided they were
accompanied by greater facilities for the discharge
of worthless and incorrigible characters. Nothing
tends so much to create discomfort on the lower
deck among the quiet and well disposed men as the
presence of such characters. A man on whom
punishment has no effect is rarely a good seaman ;
he should therefore, no matter on what station, be
at once discharged from the service.
It cannot be too often explained to the public
that there is no difficulty in manning the navy in
ordinary times. But if we suddenly require for the
nautical labour market 10,000 seamen, it is pal-
pably evident that time will be required to procure
them. Jack's pockets are rarely so full that he
can stand idle until some political complication, or
one of John Bull's periodical alarms, obliges the
navy to bid for the merchant seaman's services.
Nor can it be too frequently repeated, that to the
well-disposed seaman who know his work the navy
is far from being an unpopular service.—l am, Sir,
your obedient servant,
ANOTHER BLUE JACKET.