The Sun.
London, England, 1861-02-07 00:00:00

THE NAVY ESTIMA. 2 ES.

It is to be hoped that any revision of our public
expenditure will include an efficient inquiry into
that department which is popularly supposed to have
a pretty intimate connection with the figures of the
Estimates and the burdens of the Budget. How is
the navy managed ? How is it that, with an outlay
of millions upon millions, we are so commonly
short of ships and so invariably short of seamen ?
How is it that no addition to the navy estimates
ever puts an end to our difficulties by securing us
what we want ? Is it not highly probable that
the "administration" by which all this business
is conducted must be badly organised ? Is it not
very likely that with a better organisation we
might obtain greater efficiency and yet save money
into the bargain ? By way of answering these
questions, we subjoin a plain description of the de-
partment in question, as recently given in a sketch
of " Admiralty Administration ; its Faults and
Defaults." After perusing this account the reader
will be in a position to form an opinion for himself
as to the efficacy of the machinery on which so much
depends.
Theoretically the Navy is governed by a Lord
High Admiral, but that office is now executed by
commission, and the Commissioners charged with
the duty constitute that " Board" with which the
public is familiar. The Board of Admiralty con•
sists of six Commissioners or Lords, and two Secre-
taries. Oneof the Secretaries is appointed perma-
nently, and occasionally one of the Junior Lords is
retained in office, notwithstanding a change of
Ministry ; but with these exceptions, the whole
Board " goes out," or " comes in," with every fresh
Administration.

The " First Lord," or political head of the Board,
has rarely any professional acquaintance with naval
matters, but is appointed with reference to his poli-
tical position only. The four Lords next in order
are naval officers, the first of them being known as
the " Senior Sea Lord ;" but the sixth, or junior on
the list, may be a civilian, like the first, though of
less political distinction. Supposing, then, that a
change of Ministry has taken place, the manage-
ment of the DIP imh Nary dovolreo on a sudapn upon
six gentlemen, of whom not more than four are
necessarily sailors, who may have little or no pre-
vious knowledge of each other's views, and who,
except that they belong to the same party, may
have no opinions in common.
Thus constituted, " the Admiralty" proceeds to
take cognizance of the affairs of its departmeflt,
according to a traditional "distribution of busi-
ness." This division of labour suddenly brings some
ten or a dozen different branches of naval adminis-
tration under the superintendence of each member
of the Board, but the arrangement is purely private
and discretional. The public has nothing to do
with it, nor Parliament either. It represents merely
an understanding of the members of the Board
among themselves, by virtue of which each becomes
accountable, in a private way, to the others collec-
tively, but undertakes no further responsibility.
No individual is responsible for this or that depart-
ment' either to Parliament or to the public, all
such responsibility being assumed by "the Board."
The Board, in fact, is presumed to do everything of
itself, like the contractors for a great public work.
There may be sublettings or delegations without
number, but into those matters nobody can enter.
Nobody can ask any particular officer how the
Navy comes to want precipitate " reconstruction,"
how it is that the fleet cannot be manned, or how it
is that we are in arrear of our neighbours in the
newest type of fighting ships. On all these points
the Board alone can be questioned, and the Board
alone can be put on its defence.
In one or two departments, however, usage has
introduced a certain modification of these arrange-
ments, and the details of business are practically
left to the management of permanent heads. But
with respect to other departments, there is no such
modification of the administrative theory, and the
matters thus expected happen to be of the most
critical importance. There is, it is true, a Surveyor
of the Navy, who might be considered responsible
for the material efficiency of the fleet, but the
proper business of this officer has of late years
been brought so completely within the direct con-
trol of the Board that his authority, and with it,
of course, his responsibility, has virtually disap-
peared. In two other departments of equal conse•
quence there is not even a pretence of definite or
particular supervision. The whole direction of the
" Works," which furnish so heavy an item to the
Estimates, and which comprehend the entire system
of basins, docks, and harbour accommodation, is
thrown, by the simple distribution of business,"
into the hands of the Junior Lord, who, being a
civilian and unacquainted with naval affairs, finds
Mime] fch arged, among an infinity of other functions,
with a duty which might well monopolize all the
energies of a professional superintendent. Similarly
the manning of the fleet is thrown upon the shoulders
of the Senior Sea Lord, who, while overwhelmed
with other business, has to provide for this matter
as he best can, having no recognised system to go
upon and no organisation of any kind to assist him
in the work.

This sketch of our " Admiralty Administration "
is delineated without exaggeration or colouring
from the pages to which we have referred, and we
ask any man of business whether it could be ex-
pected that such machinery should produce good
work P There is no concentration either of autho-
rity or responsibility. The division of labour is so
contrived as to give everybody too much, and yet
to leave the most important objects without effec-
tive superintendence. There is an officer who
might be held accountable for the sufficiency and
efficiency of our ships of war, but the " Board"
has so effectually divested him of his
powers, that " if he were to witness the whole-
sale destruction of public property in the Dock-
yards he could take no step to arrest it,
except by a
' submission' to the Admi-
ralty." There is no officer who can be held
accountable for the supply of seamen, except in so
far as this charge is privately delegated to the
" Senior Sea Lord" by the internal arrangements
of the Board ; nor is there anybody charged with
the superintendence of Dockyard works, except in
so far a asm otnhge
aJuniorboat of
Lord
others,
o a
each
a te o accept
and
all this
o f
these points if any dissatisfaction is felt,—and it is
felt pretty frequently,—the responsibility devolves
upon the "Board" alone, which, besides possessing
the proverbial impregnability of all boards, is itself
in a state of almost perpetual transition. It we
should persuade ourselves at last that our lavish
and incomparably unproductive expenditure on
the Navy is all the fault of " the Admiralty,"
we are still nearly as far from .the end as ever,
for we shall be asked " which Admiralty "
we are proposing to censure ? Within the
last eight years there have been four com-
plete renewals of the Board, involving a succes-
sion of five First Lords and thirty-four subordi-

nate members. Take a period of 30 years, and it
is found that the total number of changes in the
officers who have managed the affairs of the Navy
amounts to 103. How can any responsibility be
fixed under such a system? How, without respon-
sibility, can efficiency be expected ?
It really a eems almost a wonder that things are
as well as they are, but unfortunately we only main-
tain the effic.iency of the Navy at au enormous
cost. If we had well-organised reserves of ships
and men, we might afford to dispense with some of
the force actually in commission; but as it is we
never seem to know, except by actual experiment,
how far our rescrurces really extend. To complete
the picture, it must be remarked that when the in-
competence of the proper officials to deal with such
a subject as the mavning of the fleet is confessed by
its reference to a " Commission," the Commission
is always strictly debarred from entering on the
only point which might lead to a solution of the
difficulty—the administrtition of the Admiralty
itself. Such, however, is the position in which we
now stand, and it cannot be considered a satisfac-
tory one. We must pay a certain price:, we suppose,
for Parliamentary government, but we do not think
the charge for that advantage should necessarily
include not only extravagant Estimates, but alto-
gether inadequate returns.—Tines.

COUNTRY MARKETS.

NEWARK-FEB. 6.

A fair attendance to-day, and the supply of wheat was
tolerable. Sales progressed steadily, and is per qr. more
money was realised. The barley trade assumed a healthier
aspect. Oats a free sale. Beans firm, at the late extreme
prices. Peas quiet.
White wheat, new, 608 to 74s Barley, grinding.. 31s to 35a
Red do. sos to 66s Oats, old, .. 33s to 36s
Old white 6os to 74s New do 25s to 30s
Red do.. 50s to 668 Beans.. 54s to 58a
Barley, malting.... 37s to 44s Beans. new 40s to 44s
Peas, ....40s to 50s.