The Sun.
London, England, 1859-02-05 00:00:00

m.

" We have demonstrated the policy of England with re-
respect to Italy—now what is the interest of Germany in
this question ? It is useless to speak of Austria, interested
in, maintaining a state of things favourable to her domina-
tion. There remains Germany, properly so called. Pope
Pius IX., addressing himself to the Emperor of Austria,
at the time he was maintaining against the Lombards and
Venetians a contest doubly painful to the patriotism of the
Italian Prince and the heart of the Pontiff; defined in these
terms the duties and the mission of Germany :—' We feel
confident that the German nation, so generously proud of
her own nationality, will not commit her honour in sangui-
nary attacks against the Italian nation, but that she will
rather believe she is interested in nobly acknowledging her
for a sister, both our daughters, both so dear to our hearts,
consenting to dwell each in its own natural territory, where
they will live an honourable life, blessed by the Lord.' Thus
spoke the great soul and elevated reason of Pius IX. The
spirit of concord which inspired this appeal elevated him to
a political view worthy of a statesman. The Emperor Na-
poleon 1., in one of those glances which he sometimes cast
upon the world from the top of his rock, had generalised
the same idea by applying it to all nations. One of my,
grandest ideas,' said he, ' was the agglomeration, the con-
centration of the same geographical nations which had
been divided and partitioned by revolution and politics.
Thus there are in Europe, though scattered, more than
30,000,000 French, 15,000,000 Spaniards, 15,000,000
Italians, 30,000,000 Germans. I wished to make of each
of these peoples one single body of a nation. It is with
such a cortege that it would have been grand to advance to
posterity and the benediction of ages. I felt myself worthy
of that glory.' What nation is interested more than,Ger-
many in the respect of nationalities ? It is justly jealous of
its own. Since 1815 it tends more and more to reconsti-
tute its unity, and we can see with what ardour it claims
the Duchies of Holstein-Schleswig from Denmark. Well,
German nationality bears in itself a cause of weakness, an
alteration of its right and its principle ; it is the element
which is foreign to it, which changes its nature by attach-
ing to the great Germanic body a shred of Italian nation-
ality. Thus the Marquis d'Azeglio, one of the most emi
nent statesmen in Piedmont, was justified when some time
since he expressed this reproach, 4Gtevaany is endeavour-
ing to obtain her independence and to constitute herself into
a nation, and at the sametime she is casting herself on Italy
to dispute with her the rights she demands for herself. In
that there would be an inconsistency against which the good
sense and patriotism of Germany would revolt.' In 1848 and
1849 public opinion was not mistaken on the other side of
the Rhine, and the immense majority of Germans formed
vows for the triumph of the Italian cause—only tile repub-
lican character of the revolution 0f.1848 justly alarmed the
Diet of Frankfort, and rendered the right side of that As-
sembly particularly circumspect in its sympathy for Italian
nationality. The Germanic Confederation believed that it
was menaced in its independence; in fine, some German
officers asserted that the line of the Mincio was in a strate-
gic point of view, necessary to Germany, and they had ac-
credited this opinion, that in any case Austria ought tokeep
as a necessary cover the country comprised between that-
river and the Adriatic. Prussia had accepted this point of
departure to propose. to the Diet a species of compromise,
which at least manifested its sympathy for the Italian cause
and at the same time its solicitudefor German interests. Ac-
cording to this plan, prepared by M. de Radowitz, Austria
was to keep the line of the Miner° as a strategic point, but
the country whichremained within the limits of the Austrian
empire was to form part of an Italian confederation. This
plan was rejected by the Diet, over which Vienna influence
prevailed. In Germany, as in Italy, as everywhere, the re-
volutionary spirit prevailed over the national movement
which had preceded,or followed the burst of 1848. The Diet
of Frankfort produced nothing. The Germanic Confedera-
tion Obtained none of the guarantees of unity and liberty of
action that it sought; placed under the influence of two
great Powers, it has, perhaps, no hope except in their neces-
sary rivalry. Both of these towers are condemned on their
side to that opposition which is the condition of their im-
portance. Prussia; which tends to become the head of the
Germanic body, has an immense interest in keeping Austria
in check. By becoming her ally she would make herself
the accomplice of her own humiliation, and she would thus
disown the work of the great Frederick.
" In a word, the Italian question, reduced to a national
interest, disengaged from the revolutionary element, limited
and tempered in its pretensions by the moral protectorate of
Europe, could have nothing menacing for Germany. Far
from it. Its solution, if it was possible, would be a new
force for German nationality, and a guarantee of security
and equilibrium for all the States that compose it. •
IV.

,
"After having demonstrated that England was morally
engaged and Germany politically interested in a national
solution of the question of Italy, we must examine how this
question should be characterised with respect to France.
"What doei Franco wish Does she wish, as under the

Republic and under the first Empire, to reconstitute Europe,
to impose herself on her, to change her frontier, to displace
the nationalities, to depose kings, to found dynasties ? or
rather does she desire simply to consolidate, to strengthen the
present order in Europe, by applying her power to resolve
the difficulties which may menace and endanger it ?
" We believe the question to be thus precisely laid down.
" The first Empire, as the Revolution, had a general ob-
ject in vie*, in presence of which the interests of nationa-
lity were merely secondary. Europe was leagued against
principles which had just triumphed in France, and Under
the influence of which an immense transformation was
about to be accomplished. We were condemned, for a long
time perhaps, to struggle alone against all, in a double in-
terest of territorial and political conservatism, and of moral
expansion for the benefit of other peoples. We had then to
create for ourselves everywhere—on the Rhine, the Scheldt,
the Pyrenees, the Alps-L-fortresses or advanced posts, in
order to support, acconlingto circumstances, our policy alter-
nately offensive or defensive. When the Emperor Napo-
leon I. caused himself to -be crowned King of Italy, and
proclaimed Protector of the German Confederation, he de-
sired rather to protect than aggrandise the French territory,
which was great enough in its natural limits not to go be-
yond 'them. He thus constituted the independence at the
same time as the influence of new France, and his victorious
eagles carried abroad with them, not servitude but civilisa-
tion.
" In what concerns Italy, particularly tho Emperor ex-
plained the motives of-his domination over that country in
one of the memorable conversations at St. Helena As
for the Italians,' he said, the agglomeration was already
far advanced. It was only to become old; and each day
ripened with them the unity of principle- and of legislation,
that of thought and feeling, that cement secure and infal-
lible of human agglomerations. The union- of Piedmont
with France, that of Parma, Tuscany, Rome, had been only
temporary in my thought,. Kid had no other object than to
watch, to guarantee, and to promote the national education
of the Italians. And let it,not be said that that generous
thought was in the conscience of the illustrious exile the
excuse for his lost domination. It was well and truly the
inspiration of his political genius, and what proves it is the
official answer which he made in 1808 to M. Melzi, who
headed the deputation charged with offering him the crown
of Italy.
" That reply is a ray of light in this historic question.
Here it is :—' I have always had the intention of creating
the Italian nationality free and independent. I accept the
crown ; I will guard it; but only for the time my interests
shall require it.
" The campaigns of the Revolution, the conquests of the
Empire, were then a violent means, an extreme resource of
struggle and of propagandism, but they were not a system.
Tho Emperor did net make Germany and Italy French but
only to prepare them some. day to be German and Italian.
Misfortunes surprised him before this object of European
equilibrium could be accomplished ; and what is most re-
markable is, that to drive him back from the other side of
the Rhine and the Alps it was found necessary to excite
against him the national sentiment which he understood,
and which entered into his vast plan as an element of gene-
ral pacification. It was by promising their independence
to Italy and Germany that the coalition was able to rally
them round its flag.
" The state of France with relation to Europe is at the
present day quite different. The French Revolution has
done its work as to institutions, laws, and manners, and its
influence is felt beyond our frontiers. The Empire, re-
established after more than 30 years' struggle, has gained
the alliance of some of the oldest monarchies, the friendship
of others, the esteem of all. There is consequently no
reason to fear that our generation shall see wars recom-

Ititirgrigrarril`vi every ain-isilan virtue. 11NN-1;;O;11;;;
of regenerating Italy. It was the first inspiration of his ac-
cession; the ,i,-nrca'ffiess of Rome seemed to revive for a mo-
ment under the figure of this Pope. Turin, Naples, Venice,
Parma, and Milan thrilled with a new spirit at the signal
of nationality given by the bell of the dome of St. Peter's.
Unhappily, the revolution came on, which drew the popu-
lation along, caused princes to draw back, leaving him no
refuge but exile, and no safety but the sword of France.
" It is not the fault of Pius IX. if the temporal autho-
rity which he- desired -to reform was found again in his
hands such as he had received it from his predecessor.
Convinced of the necessity of that reform. he has had,
doubtless, the regret of having failed in it ; but he never
will have remorse before God for having attempted it. 7 his
day he bears with Christian resignation the weight of a
situation which he has vainly tried to better, and the abuses
of which his perfect goodness would have corrected if they
could be so. - -

" This situation places the Pope in presence of three real
difficulties, and ' which, we declare, expose seriously to
danger, according to us, the political power of the Papacy
—a power necessary for its independence, and the grandeur
of its religious mission.

" The -first of these difficulties is found in the adminis-
trative Government of the Roman States, which is but the
Catholic authority applied to the interests of a temporal
order. The laws of the Church are not proper for discus-
sion, and merit :-respect ; they must be considered as an
emanation of the Divine wisdom ; but civil society claims
its legislation as religious society exacts and preserves its
own. The Canon- Law, inflexible as dogma, immovable
amid the movement of ages, is essentially distinct from
legal law, variable as are the requirements and the interests
society.of lt could adapt itself to the early periods of
Christian civilisation when Charlemagne introduced in his
Capitularies the rules and precepts of theocracy ; but the
canon law cannot suffice for the protection and develop-
ment of modern society.
" There is, nevertheless, an essential point which must
never be lost sight of when the Pontifical-Government is in
question, namely,
,the necessity of respecting its twofold
character, and of reconciling the regime of the Church and
the regime of the Roman nation, which are exercised by the
same hand. They must be reconciled without being con-
founded. There is the problem—a difficult one, we admit,
but on the solution of which depends, perhaps, the salva-
tion of the temporal:power of-the-Papacy.
"In fact, real abuses, independent of men, inherent in
the nature of things, •spring from this confusion. These
abuses excite among, the Roman population a spirit which
would easily render them unjust and distrustful, and which
is only kept in check by the presence of our soldiers. 'We
become responsible for what we protect; and our very oc-
cupation; from the fact of being prolonged in such condi-
tions, would be worn out, and would endanger the name
and the influence of France.

" Thus, in a political point of view, the absolutely cleri-
cal character of the Government of the Roman States is a
centre-temps, an active cause of discontent, and consequently
an element Of weakness for the Pope himself, and a perma-
nent danger of revolution.
"The second difficulty for the Pope is that which result
from the national question. In this point of view his situa-
tion is not more defined nor less dangerous. The irritation
in the Roman States is still less owing to the absence of
legal guarantees and to the clerical administration, than to
the antagenisim necessarily established between the mission
of the Head of the Church and that of the Pope as an
Italian Prince. The cause of the Revolution of 1848 was,
above all, the explosion of the national idea. It is from the
Vatican that the encouragement as well as the obstacle to
the nationality of Italy had to come.
" The Pope supported, as Sovereign, the cause of inde-
pendence ; as Head of the Church, he disapproved the war,
and refused to break off with Austria. Placed between a
double duty, he was reduced to sacrifice the one to the other.
He necessarily sacrificed the political to the spiritual duty.
This is the condemnation, not of Pius IX., but of the sys-
tem; not of the Man, but of the situation, since the situa-
tion imposes on the man the terrible alternative of immo-
lating the Prince to the Pontiff, or the Pontiff to the Prince.
"Finally. A third difficulty, and this not the least seri-
ous, is created for the Pope by the absolute impossibility he
is of forming, in actual circumstances, an Italian army. All
the attempts made with this object have failed.
" Thus, in a word, in what concerns Rome there are
three considerable difficulties, which correspond to these
urgent necessities, viz.:—

r• 1. To reconcile the regime of the Church with a legal,
political, and regular regime in the Roman States.
"2. To . render the Pope independent of questions of
nationality, of war, of armaments, of internal and external
defence.

" 3. To constitute a native army, and to substitute for
our occupation the protection of an efficacious and serious
Italian force.

" This is a threefold necessity, which, under pain of
certain and perhaps approaching disturbance, must be satis-
fied, in the interest of Italy, of religion, and of all the
Catholic States. (Triple exigence a laquelle, sous peine de
perturbation certaine et pent-etre ylrochaine, it import do
satisfaire dans l'interet de l'ltalie, de la religion, et de thus
les Etats Catholiques.)

" VII.
" Piedmont has grown greatly in importance and in glory.
She has won a place in the affairs of Europe, and a part in
the destinies of Italy. But, in order to establish her power,
as yet new, and to guarantee her security at home and
abroad, her Government is bound to give satisfaction to two
interests which are in a state of suffering—national interest
and religious interest.

"The Italian idea is, since 1847, the moving cause and
the necessary reason of all the acts of Piedmontese policy.
It is the passion of King Victor Emmanuel, as it is the flag
of the Cabinet presided over by Count Cavour. Now this
idea has produced all that in actual circumstances it was
enabled to produce with regard to military acts, prepara-
tion of armaments, systems of defence, and political mani-
festations against Austria; in this respect it could go no
further without encountering war.
" Nevertheless, Piedmont cannot remain without great
peril at the point at whichit is ; it cannot have taken vainly
the head of the Italian movement in order to draw back
afterwards. It is absolutely necessary that means should he
found of satisfying the hopes which it has excited under
pain of losing all influence in Italy, and of being outstripped
by the passions which its present popularity keeps in check.
"The interests of religion suffer in Piedmont, we have
said, like the national interests. It is then urgent, for
many reasons, that in a Catholic country should not be pro-
longed a dissension with the Church of Rome, which is an
encouragement to revolutionary passions, a cause of grief
and an embarrassment for the conscience, and a serious
danger for the' Government.
" The Piedmontese clergy have no hatred against repre-
sentative Governinent. In 1846 and 1847 they were nearly
all in the liberal movement directed by Count Balbo and
the Abbe Gioberti. Their attitude changed when the law
on civil marriage and that on ecclesiastical festivities pro-
duced a dissension with Rome. It is no part of our busi-
ness to discuss these laws; we merely observe that all the
enlightened Piedmontese deplore that state of things, and
earnestly desire to, see the end of them. We have too much
confidence in the high i,ntelligenee of the Prime Minister of
Sardinia not to be convinced that the obstacle to a recon-
ciliation so desirable would not be found in him. What
proves it is his declaration last session on the secularisation
of the property of the clergy, which he energetically re-
jected for profound political reasons, as he said.
" But we must not delude ourselves; that reconciliation
is not easy. There are engagements contracted, amour
propre excited, and an issue is difficult from this dilemma
when the debate is carried on only under the 'protection of
some great act which would be a pledge given to the na-
tional interest and a means of reconciliation with the in-
terests of religion.
" If, in place of that, the static quo be prolonged in Pied-
mont, it iq fated to end, as the political result in war, and
as the religious restatin schism.
" These are two great dangers, not only for Piedmont,
but for aIL Italy and for Europe, and to which political
wisdom counsels us not to shut our eyes.

" VIII.
" Can the status quo, so difficult to maintain at Rome and
Turin for the reasons we have just given, continue at Milan,
Naples, Florence, Parma, and Lucca ?
" At Milan the Emperor of Austria sent of the archdukes
him who had most sympathy for Italy. The good intentions
of the Archduke Maximilian are known. He used his power
with a moderation which we are happy to admit, but is the
domination of Austria in Italy the more solid therefor ?
The qualities of a prince—time itself—can do nothing. As
Lord Palmerston said, in 1849, in the despatch wo have
already qUoted—' There is no chance for Austria to keep
in a useful and permanent manner Upper Italy.' Thus on
that side, insurrection put down, often vanquished, but
never discouraged.
" At Naples the Government is isolated, not only in Eu-
ropo by her position with respect to France and England,
but also in Italy, by her rupture with the only state there
which is seriously organised. The King of Naples, also,
and ho more than any other, perhaps, weakened as he is
by this double isolation, has to deal with a national opinion
which exists in the south as in the north of the Peninsula.
Mention has recently been made of a document of great
interest, and which explains the resistance of the King of
Naples to the combined diplomatic action of the Anglo-
French alliance. By the 3d Article of the Convention of
the 29th of April, 1815, the two Governments of Austria
and the Two Sicilies engaged to conclude a treaty of alli-
ance, having for object 'to consolidate the state of peace
and tranquility, internal and external, of the Two Sicilies
and of Italy in general.' That treaty, concluded in the
month of July following, stipulates, in a secret article, 'that
his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies shall not admit
changes which cannot be rconciled either with monarchical

institutions or with the principles adopted by his Imperial
and Royal:Majesty for the internal government of his Italian
provinces. It is impossible to render more apparent the
hand of Austria. Evidently under such a stipulation it may
be said that it rules at Naples as at Milan. But will King
Ferdinand, who in 1847 freed himself from that domination,
always feel himself protected by it? Hit is permitted to be-
lieve that he feels the humiliation as well as the embarrass-
ment of it, and that he would be happy to lend a hand to
an organisation which, without prejudicing the prerogatives
of which he is so jealous, would.permit him to be an Italian
prince, and to win back the sympathies of the intelligent
men from whom he cannot remain divorced the whole of
his reign.
"At Florence the Grand Duke Leopold has seen eclipsed
the brilliant popularity which encircled him before 1848,
and the fruits of which he gathered in his spontaneous re-
storation to the throne. Between him and his people
stand the bayonets of Austria. Austrian domination presses
on Tuscany as on Naples. There is also a contract which
confirms, it. A treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive,
between the Emperor of Austria and the Grand Duke of
Tuscany delivers this part of Italy to the powerful hand
which reaches over her in the north, as in the centre and
the south. In order that this situation should cease, that
Florence should again become Italian, as-in the times of the
Medici, and that her Princes should recover their popula-
rity, a national Government and an Italian army are as
much needed in Tuscany. as in the Roman States.
"At Parma the Grand Duchess has resisted better than
elsewhere the influence of Austria, which she has not per-
mitted up to the present to have a garrison in her States.
It is a good example; and it is worthy of remark, that this
inspiration of patriotism should emanate from the heart of
a woman. But the Duchess of Parma, like all the Sove-
reigns of Central Italy, is bound by treaties and by policy ;
she belongs to Austria, and until Italy recover new life she
cannot withdraw herself from that yoke.
"As to the Duke of Modona, he is the admitted Lieu-
tenant of Austria ; he has the frankness of his situation.
1841_he did not hesitate to call upon the Austrians to
coin-at, not the revolution, which had not yet raised its
head, but the national movement of which Pius IX. was
the chief. I have behind the Po,' he wrote some time
previous, ' a reserve of 300,000 men.' The 24th of Decem-
ber, 1847, he signed a treaty of alliance with the Cabinet of
Vienna, and by the 11th article of that treaty ho granted
to the Emperor ' the right of marching the Imperial troops
on the territory of Modena, of garrisoning his forts with
them every time the interest of the common defence and
military precautions should require it. This alliance did
not hinder him from quitting Modena on the 21st of
March, 1848, after having instituted a regency, charged
with granting reforms which might be judged useful, and
giving to the Duchy a representative statute on the basis of
that of Piedmont. It is thus that at Modena, as in all the
States of Italy where it is established, Austrian domination
keeps up the revolutionary element, which can only be
dominated and annihilated by the national element.
"Such is the aetual state of the Peninsula; at Rome
antagonism between the Ecclesiastical Government and the
interests of civil society, isolation of the Sovereign in the
very midst of the respect which surrounds the Pontiff;
French occupation indefinite ; at Turin, excitement of the
national feeling that may lead to war. and rupture with
Rome that may end in schism ; at Milan, universal protest
on the part of nationality, beaten down but still living,
against the sovereignty of Austria ; at Naples, at Parma, at
Florence, at Modena—in every place where Austria governs
by her treaties, by her counsels, which are commands, and
by her garrisons ; revolt of the Italian feeling' capable of
degenerating into revolution ; in a word, an Italy where the
greatest recollections of history are effaced or blasted by the
greatest misfortunes, where the most essential interests of
society, religion, order, independence of people, authority
of princes, are endangered or lost, and where rise up as a
reproach, and as a permanent danger for Europe and its
civilisation, sufferings to which humanity and policy cannot
remain indifferent ;—such is the picture presented to our
view on the other side of the Alps. In producing it here in
its melancholy truth, we accuse no one ; we wish only that
opinion shall decide, with a complete knowledge of affairs,
not if such a situation is just, but if it is possible.
" IX.

" At the Congress of Paris France and England perfectly
agreed that it was advisable to make Naples and Vienna
harken to good advice. That desire, which found nothing
but sympathy in the assembly of the Plenipotentiaries, be-
came the paint de depart of a negotiation which required, as
the first condition of success, the co-operation of Austria.
Rome was first taken into consideration. The Cabinet of
Vienna and that of the Tuileries mutually explained their
views on this grave subject, and both endeavoured to come
to an understanding to propose to the Pope a plan of reforms
the urgency and necessity of which were contested by no
one.

"The Emperor's Government wished clearly to define its
principles in this plan, which may be thus intimated :
" Secularisation of the administrative power by the for-
mation of a Council of Stab, consisting of laymen, charged
to examine and discuss the laws; •
" Representation of all the iterests of the country in a
Consultum elected directly by the provincial councils, or at
least selected by the Pope from a list of candidates pre-
sented by those councils and called upon to deliberate on all
the laws, and to vote the Budget ;
"An efficacious control over local expenses by provincial
councils, receiving their mission from the municipal coun-
cils, which themselves are nominated by electors, conform-
ably to the edict of the 24th of November, 1850 ;
Judicial reform, by the promulgation of a code of laws
on the plan of the Code Napoleon,' or the ' Code Lom-
bardo-Venetian,' or that of Naples ;
" A regular levying of taxes, according to the system
adopted in France •
" Finally, reconciliation of all classes awl all opinions by
the enlightened and paternal exercise of clemency towards
all those willing to make respectful submission to the Sove-
reign Pontiff.

Such were the bases of the project sent from Paris to
Vienna in the month of June, 1857. The Austrian Gover-
nment made immense modifications, and submitted, in return,
a counter-project where all guarantees of control proposed
by France had nearly disappeared.
Under the circumstances, France thought, with reason,
that it was better not to do anything than to join Austria in
blowing soap bubbles and deceiving the expectations of the
populations by sham reforms, when what they essentially
required were serious improvements.

By refusing her co-Operation to serious reforms, after
having frankly admitted their principle, .we admit that
Austria obeyed a political sentiment, which we cannot
blame, but cannot acknowledge. Not being able to make
reforms in her Italian provinces, she cannot allow thein to
be made in other parts of Italy. She fully understood this
in 1815, when she forbade the .King of Naples by the
secret article of the treaty already quoted to introduce
reforms which could not be reconciled with the principles
she had adopted in the internal
.arrangement of her
Italian provinces. M. de Metternich, with that keen glance
which was peculiar to him, thus laid down the principle of
the situation which has since arisen and which henceforth
can deceive no one:

"To ask Austria to exercise a milder .and more liberal
rule in Lombardy would be simply to ask her to commit
suicidt. It is evident she cannot maintain her rule in
Upper Italy, except by the strong hand ; every atom of
liberty conceded by her to that conquered country would be
made use of as a 'weapon towards enfranchisement. But
this is not all, and this was well understood by M. de Met-
ternich in 1815. Place the Roman States, Naples and
Tuscany, under a better system of government, and the
first effect of this change would necessarily be to create a
bond between those States and Lombardy the pressure of
which would immediately be felt by Austria.
" Thus Austria would not be menaced only by the re-
forms she might introduce into her own provinces, but also
by those introduced into these independent States.
" She is condemned to oppose a firm resistance to every
innovation ; immobility is the absolute condition of her
power. It is, therefore, impossible to obtain her co-opera-
tion, and without that nothing can be. done at Rome, at
Naples, in the Duchies, wherever her power is feared and
her impulsions obeyed. We must therefore come to the
sad conclusion that the wishes of the Congress of Paris for
the improvement of the government of the Peninsula are
sterile, and that the negotiations in which France took the
initiative consequent upon the Congress are powerless. At
least, these negotiations without a result will testify to the
sincere desire which animated the Emperor's Government
to remedy a state of things prejudicial to the quiet of
Europe and to tho interests of civilisation.
"X
"Between the impossibility of a reform and the immi-
nent dangers of a status quo what does there remain for
Italy ? How will she get out of the dilemma ? _
"Will it be by the desperate resource of a revolution?
This means would not only be dangerous—it would be of
no avail. Let us demonstrate it once for all.
"Enthusiastic revolutionists of every country have'
common passions and illusions. Infatuated with their ideas,
strangers to realities, they naturally substitute their fan-
tastic ideas for moro appreciable certainties. Thus, for
instance, they have long fancied, and still fancy, that there
is nothing so casyas to arouse Italy and drive the Austrians
beyond the Alps. This betrays more ignorance than pre-
sumption. The slightest knowledge of strategical positions
would convince any man. We maintain, without fear of
denial by any competent authority, that if all Italy were to
rise from the Gulf of Taranto to the Alps the Austrian
army might certainly suffer partial losses, but, in the long
run, would be always able again to make herself 'mistress
of the Italian peninsula.
'" In fact, revolutions produce enthusiasts, but seldom
practised warriors, or a solid military organisation, or that
immense materiel requisite to struggle with a great Power
like Austria. Italy alone could not defend her indepen-
dence, unless capable of bringing 200,000 disciplined men
into the field, of which 20,000 should be cavalry, 500 field
pieces, and 200 siege guns, which implies at least 50,000
draught horses. This simple statement shows that it
,would require at least 10 years of a strong and energetic
Government to produce such a military power.
" It must also be admitted that nature has done much
to protect Austrian domination in Italy, and what nature
has done has been strengthened and increased by the hand
of man. Upper Italy is a large plain, bordered on the
north by the Alps, on the south by the Appenines, on the
east and west by the sea. That plain is traversed by large
and deep rivers, as the Ticino, the Po, the Adda, the
Mincio, the Adige, the Brenta, the Piave, the Liirenza, the
Tagliamento. All these rivers offer admirable lines of
defence to Austria, who has covered the chief passages by
forts which art has rendered almost impregnable.
"Let us even suppose that by most extraordinary cir-
cumstances an Italian army should have arrived triumph-
antly as far as the Adige, and that the insurrection should
have spread through the flat country. Let us even suppose—
what is scarcely probable—that fortresses like Pavia, Pla-
centia, Ferrara, Brescia, Bresera, Pizzighitone, Peschiora,
Mantua, Milan, Laveno, la Rocca d'Anzo, Feve,
Venice, Osopo, Palma Nuova, should have fallen into the
hands of the victor. Well 1 the game would not be up
Alps
Austria; for, if Italy is her battle-field, Tyrol and the
of Carinthia aro real fortresses, of which 'Verona, with its
immense fortifications, is a retrenched camp, and an outpost
capable of holding 50,000 men.
" Well I Let us suppose Austria driven back to the Alps ;
she may allow the whole Italian
army to enjoy its momen-
tary triumph. With her lines of railway which run from
Verona to Trieste, and from Vienna to Innspruck, she can
forward fresh armies,
Alps, and by the new routes she has traced
out which lead to the
either by Bassano, or Vicenza,
or Verona, or Lake Idra, or Lake Iseo, or the Lake of Como,
she can fall suddenly upon the flanks and rear of the enemy,
cut off all his communications, and throw him back in the
twinkling of an eye beyond the Po, repeating the victorious
manoeuvre of Marshal Radetzki in 1848.
" From these facts a military man will at once admit that

XIII.
" French policy has traditions which it never can aban-
don, because they respond to the permanency of its influ-
ence. One of those traditions is, that the Alps, which are
for her a bulwark, shall not become an armed fortress
against her power. Our former Kings understood this, as
ir was afterwards understood by the Republic and the first
Empire. In that national idea Henry IV. only antici-
pated Napoleon I. That great King, who was as practical
as he was chivalrous, knew that between France and
Austria Italy ought to extend freely and belong only to
herself."

The pamphlet then, dwelling upon the plan of
Henry IV., which was to give Lombardy to the
Duke of Savoy, Sicily to thenkenetians, and Naples
to the Pope, says :
" Thus, the same ideas are maintained throughout the
space of time when they respond to permanent interests and
to a policy as national as it is European.
" XIV.
"Has the time arrived for forming an Italian Confedera-
tion ? The most delicate point is Rome."

[The position of the other States of Italy is then
entered into, and an Italian Confederation declared
to be the best possible solution.]
"But," continues the pamphlet, "there exists an obstacle
beyond Italian and beyond European interests. It is Aus-
tria's position in Lombardy. Opposition is the basis of
Austrian policy ; as Austria opposes reforms so will she op-
pose everything else."

" XV.

" What is to be done. Are we to bow to the veto of
Vienna ? Are we to discard it ? Are we to appeal to
force or to public opinion to overcome this resistance, and
effect a solution desired by the general interest ?
" This is the last question we have to resolve.

"
"The treaties which bind Governments are the interna-
tional laws of peoples, and would be only invariable if the
world was immoveable. If the treaties which are to protect
the security of Europe place it in danger, it is because they
no longer answer to the necessities or to the wants which
dictated them. Political prudence counsels to substitute
something else for them. A Power which would entrench
itself behind treaties in order to resist modifications de-
manded by general feeling would have, no doubt, for her an
acquired right, but she would have against her moral right
and universal conscience. If, then, it be demonstrated that
the situation of the Italian States is not only a cause of
suffering for the country, but even a cause of uneasiness,
and perhaps of revolution iu Europe, the letter of treaties
would be invoked in vain—it could not hold against the
necessity of politics and the interest of European order.
What, therefore, is to be done ? To appeal to force ? May
Providence keep such an extremity from us ! We must ap-
peal to public opinion. When the true situation of Italy
shall be known throughout Europe, and that everybody
shall be convinced that there is in the midst of the most
enlightened States on the globe, on that land from which
civilisation sprung, a focus of disturbance, disorder, and
profound perturbation, which might so readily become a
focus of hght and of noble activity, then public opinion
may judge, and perhaps impose itself as the pacific justice
of right. We have composed this work in order that public
opinion may have the means of pronouncing its judgment.
We have no hostility to Austria. The question of Italy is
the only difficulty which can exist between her and France.
"We respect its situation in Germany, which has nothing
to fear from us on the Rhine. The solution of the Italian
question would have for result to efface between France
and AuStria all subject of dissension. These two Powers
can approach each other by many common interests, and
the union of all the great Governments of Europe is not too
nmch to prevent future complications. It is in order to
combine their views and efforts in a general interest, that
we would remove all present difficulties, and resolve one of
the most urgent and most considerable questions of the
moment.

"To govern is to foresee. The best manner of securing
peace is to outstrip complications capable of producing war.
There are dangers in Italy—we indicate them ; on this side
there are guarantees to give to fundamental interests—we
demand thm. There are causes which cannot succumb in
the world; this is of the number, because it is neither
selfish nor exclusive. It is the cause of the nationality of
a living people, of the equilibrium of Europe, and per-
haps of the independence of the Papacy, which France has
always defended. God would doubtless reserve a noble
portion of human glory to those who would support this
struggle. Glory does not tempt us ; we have had enough
of it in the history of the past as in contemporaneous
events, to have no need of it. We therefore ardently desire
that diplomacy should do on the eve of a struggle what it
should do on the morrow of a victory. Let Europe ener-
getically unite for this cause of justice and of peace I It
ought to be with us, because we shall be always with her
to defend her honour, her equilibrium, and her security !"