The Sun.
London, England, 1861-11-23 00:00:00

STITUEATS.

KING'S LYNN, FRIDAY EVENING.
Lord Stanley, M,P., met his constituents in this
borough his afternoon for the purpose of address•
ing them on the present state of public affairs.
The gathering took place in the Town-hall, and the
platform was occupied by the leading gentlemen in
the town of both political parties, while several of
the fairer members of their families were also pre-
sent. The Mayor (Mr. L. W. Jarvis) presided.
Lord STANLEY, who was received with cheers,
said,—Mr. Mayor and gentlemen, I thank you for
the heartiness of this reception, although it is no-
thing more than what I was prepared to expect
from many previous proofs of your kindness. It is
now nearly seven years since, standing before you
in this hall shortly after the commencement of the
Crimean war, I told you that it was my intention,
unless prevented by any unforeseen events, to take
an opportunity once in the course of each Parlia-
mentary session to give you an account of the course
of proceedings in Parliament, and to explain, or, if
circumstances should render it necessary, to justify
the part which I had personally taken. That pledge
I have regularly fulfilled up to the present time,
with the single exception of last year ; and I will
tell you frankly what was the reason of that omis-
sion. When I was here last summer the Reform
Bill was being talked to death in the House of Com-
mons, being defeated by debate evidently protracted
with that intention. Now, I did not altogether
approve that bill, and there are parts of it which I
could not have supported without modification, but
if I did not like the bill I liked quite as little the
manner in which it was opposed, although perhaps
circumstances rendered such a course inevitable.
The subject being one on which, if I had addressed
you at all, I must necessarily have spoken, I thought

it better to say nothing rather than to express
opinions which probably would have pleased no
party, and which—the fate of the measure being
then practically decided—could have answered no
useful public purpose. This was my reason, and I
hope you will think it a sufficient apology. Gen-
tlemen, it is no secret to any one that during the
last two or three years politicians and the public
have been much more occupied with the affairs of
foreign countries than with our own. For one speech
which we have lately heard on questions of domestic
policy we have heard half a dozen on the affairs of
other countries. This is not an ordinary state of
things, but the explanation of it is that no great
European disturbance can long continue which isnot
likely sooner or later to involve every other European
State ; and there never has been since the days of
the first French Empire a time of such universal
disquietude in Europe or when apprehensions of a ge-
neral disturbance were more alive than during the last
two or three years. There is hardly an important
State in Europe which has not been looking forward
either with hope or with fear to a future in some
way different from its present. The vast develop-
ment of the military and material pow er of France
—the rise of Spain from what seemed a condition
of hopeless decadence into a first-class Power—the
great measure of serf emancipation in Russia, in-
volving the fate of four or five times as many human
brings as are directly interested in that other ques-
tion of negro emancipation of which we hear so
much—the struggle for independence and self-go-
vernment in Hungary—the Italian revolution,
which, so far from being completed, seems to me to
be hardly begun—all these are events which if
they had occurred singly would singly and sepa-
rately have filled a large space in history, and which,
perbaps, lose something of their real importance in
our estimation because they do not occur imme-
diately before our eyes. Now, with some of these
events, England, as a nation, has no direct concern.
It does not concern us, and perhaps it does not
greatly effect mankind at large, if Spain retains,
instead of losing, her hold upon Cuba—if she ex-
tends her power over an adjoining isle, and if she
even regains some of her lost influence in her for-
mer colony of Mexico. We may be glad for the
sake of humanity if the great measure of serf eman-
cipation should succeed, but whether that measure
succeeds, or whether it fails, the one result—and
perhaps in the actual state of things the only re-
sult—which is certain, is that the social disorgani-
sation which must inevitably accompany so great
a revolution will for a considerable time to come
reduce the aggressive power of Russia almost to
nothing. In the quarrel between Austria and
her own subjects we are not called upon directly
to interfere, but, though our sympathies may be
very unequally divided as between the two par-
ties, still I think it is impossible for any one who
watches that question with interest, but at the
same time with impartiality, to feel an absolutely
unmixed sympathy with either party. On the
one hand there is no doubt that nothing could
have been more suicidal than the folly of the Aus-
trian authorities, and that nothing could be more
natural than the distrust which their past conduct
has inspired of their present professions. But, on
the other hand, we in this country have had some
experience of the constitutional arrangement which
the popular leaders in Hungary are now attempt-
ing, and which I understand to be a union under a
single crown, with two separate and mutually inde-
pendent legislative bodies. This experiment was
tried in Ireland under the constitution of 1782, and
it was made to work in a fashion for 19 or 20 years;
but if we are to speak the truth, I believe we must
say that it was only made to work because, although
in the old Irish Parliament the spirit of faction was
strong, the spirit of corruption was still stronger,
and all men who watched the working of that sys-
tem satisfied themselves that it could not perma-
nently endure, and after an experience of less than
20 years the legislative union of England and Ire-
land was accepted as a political necessity. Now, I
believe that the analogy will hold good in the case
of Hungary. No man can foretell the result of the
contest which is now pending, but to one of two re-
sults we may look forward as probable, either, as-
suming that the Hungarian leaders obtain for the
present that which they desire, the experiment of
legislative separation, and monarchical union will
fail, and some measure like the Union of England
and Ireland be adopted, or else there will be a total
separation from Austria, and a total and permanent
disruption of the Austrian empire. For my own
part, I must say—not at all admiring Austrian in-
stitutions or Government—that I should regret
such a disruption on general grounds. I should re-
gret it because I feel that whatever tends to break
up great empires into small and feeble States re-
moves one obstacle out of the way of any ruler who
at some future time may be disposed to play the
part of a conqueror ; and I am afraid that the ex-
perience we have had during the last few years
shows that the days of military aggression and
conquest are not so entirely gone by as it was the
fashion some time ago to suppose. It is not a
matter, however, in which we can in any way
interfere. It is impossible to deny that whatever
may be the misfortunes which befallhtahvee Austrian
a
Government, those misfortunes will
watchnd all
gthreaat twmaeaaasunrdeabrisoutgohwtaotnehb,yailttshoowugnhcownedumcaty,
with regret,:dca(lcamheietyrs.) whichßat
atit mthaisymbeominenntoimt
is in
power to avo
Italy that the chief interest of European politics
centres. When I last stood before you in this hall
the Italian war had very lately begun. I was then
bound to address you with that reserve which be-
longs to the position of a Minister of the Crown;
but, although bound to that reserve, I did not hesi-
tate to tell you plainly and frankly what I thought
of the justice of that war. It was then very gener-
ally considered in this country as a wanton disturb-
ance of European peace. Since that time opinion
has to some extent changed, and the contest is now
looked upon by many persons in the light of a war
of liberation. I confess that I am disposed to hold to
the earlier view. I have no great faith, as a general
rule, in the disinterested sympathy of despotic go-
vernments with the wrongs and oppressions of their
neighbours, and I have quite as little faith in that
freedom which is conferred as a gift by Emperors or
Kings. When first the Emperor of the French en-
tered Italy one might very reasonably doubt whether
he had any fixed or definite policy, tho
personal motives were sufficiently obvious. Tuo g
recall
the memory of his uncle's early campaigns, to re-
place the influence of Austria by
that of France, to alrhri

occupy the mind of the French people and to gratify
them with a spectacle in which they greatly delight
—that of their own nailitaryascendancy—were quite
sufficient reasons for the policy which he pursued.
Again, he has acquired the confidence of his army,
which never looks with perfect deference to a chief
who has not commanded in actual war ; and he has
exhibited the spectacle—which even to those who
are no great admirers of military glory in general
is somewhat remarkable—of a Commander-in-Chief
who at the age of 50 had never heard a shot fired
in earnest, taking the command of an army, and
winning two great and decisive victories against
distinguished and experienced generals. He has
humbled a second great European Power, Russia
being the first, and he has restored to France a
portion of the territory which, spared by the
arrangement of 1814, was taken away by the
defeat of Waterloo. These were considerable results,
and it is not difficult to see what the Emperor of
the French and what France regained in that Ita-
lian campaign ; but the position of Italy in conse-
quence of that war is Not altogether so clear. One
thing, however, is clear—she is placed in a position
in which she must necessarily show considerable
deference to the views and wishes of France, and
she is pledged to hostility against Austria, with
which country she cannot cope single-handed.
England, although she may lend her advice and her
moral influence, will not do more, and it is there-
fore on France that the Italian Government must
lean for support in pursuing any further plan which
they may have to carry out. On what terms that
support will be given, and whether it will be given,

is a secret which is locked in the breast of one man.
Personally, I sympathise with the feeling which is
undoubtedly that of the majority of the Italian
people—their desire for unity under a strong Go-
vernment; but, looking at it as a matter of reason
and not of mere feeling, I think it is impossible not
to see what grievous difficulties exist in the way of
that unity being accomplished. In the first place,
its completion necessarily involves a renewal of the
war with Austria. Without Venetia Italy is not
complete, and Austria will not cede the Venetian
territory, except by force. We may blame her for
that ; but, after all, we must remember that we
have no record in history of a nation having volunta-
rily ceded a large portion of its dominions upon no
other ground than because it was unpopular within.
those dominions. Austria will not cede Venetia, and
the party of war—the party who are at this moment
lending the King of Italy their influence and sup-
port—will give him, and very naturally so, no
rest till they obtain it. Therefore, there are the ele-
ments at hand of another European war. Then comes
the Roman question. Italy is not complete any more
without Rome than she is without Venetia ; and,
although it is possible that a change of opinion may
be taking place, yet, as far as we know, we have
reason to suppose that the majority at least of the
Italian clergy are favourable to the temporal
power of the Pope, and I need not tell you that
clerical influence in Italy is a very different thing
from what it is England. In North Italy those
provincial jealousies which have existed from
time immemorial between State and State and
town and town, although they may not have
wholly disappeared, have greatly softened down
but in Naples, although there may be very few
persons who regret their late rulers, and who wish
to have them restored, there is a party not without
numbers and influence who look with some regret
upon the loss of their local independence and self-
government, and upon what they consider as their
annexation to Sardinia. Then, again, war and re-
volution have disturbed Italian finance over the
greater part of Italy, and the taxes are at present
necessarily heavier at the present time than they
were under former rulers. No Italian statesman
fills the place which was occupied by Count Cavour
in the public estimation, and both the King and his
Ministers are well aware that that party which
most strenuously encourages him to prosecute the
war—l mean that party which formerly was under
the influence of Mazzini,—although they may have
for the present waived all republican ideas, and
may be perfectly sincere in the support which they
give, are not the safest and most natural allies of
his throne. Well, lastly, and this is the most im-
portant consideration of all, the policy of France
has for a long time been hostile to the formation of
a single Italian kingdom, which would create her a
new rival in Europe, and lessen that preponderat-
ing influence which she now exercises in Italian
affairs. No doubt the Emperor of the French is
not a man likely to be bound by the traditions of
the past if he thinks it is his policy to break
through those traditions, and no man is more com-
petent to strike out a line of his own ; but he has
thrown out hints which certainly seem to indicate
that the traditional policy of France is his also. He
has put forward a plan of federation which, under a
very specious and plausible name, really perpe-
tuates the division of Italy. He has refused to
withdraw his troops from Rome, although it is
quite certain that while they remain there the paci-
fication of the Neapolitan States can never be ac-
complished, and not improbably it is an idea which
might naturally have occurred to a mind less inge-
nious and astute than his that so long as Italy has
something which she wants to keep, and Austria
something which she wants to obtain, so long one
and the other of those contending Powers will be
more dependent upon his influence and more sub-
servient to his policy than they would be if their
quarrels were at en end, and if both parties were
confined within their respective boundaries. (Hoar.)
On the whole, therefore, so far from the Italian dif-
ficulty being settled, it seems to me that its solution
is hardly begun. Nothing is decided until the fates
of Rome and of Venetia are decided, and we seem to
be as far as ever from a decision as to one or the
other. It is not likely in the actual state of French
finance that the Emperor will be anxious to engage
in another war, and if he does not interfere in the
quarrel, and if Italy should single-handed attack
the Austrian power, I apprehend we could hardly
expect that such a contest would end favourably to
her. Now, I do not underrate the power of popular
enthusiasm and of national unity ; I do not say the
Italians may not triumph over all these difficulties.
What I say is that they are difficulties of the gravest
kind, and that we are, I think, in the habit of
greatly underrating them in this country. As to the
part of England in the matter, there is only one
thing to bear in mind. Undoubtedly a majority of
the English people are in favour of Italian union.
The exceptions are the Roman Catholics, who have
a very natural and intelligible feeling on behalf of
the temporal power of the Pope; some persona
think (and it is a supposition not devoid of plausi-
bility) that in the actual state of Neapolitan c:vili-
sation Naples is more likely to be a hindrance than
a help to Northern Italy in the course of political
progress, and there aro some persons who are hostile
to the Italian cause not so much from any settled
conviction on the subject as from morbid dislike to
popular movements. But the great majority of the
English people, so far as they take an interest in
the matter, are undoubtedly in favour of Italian
unity. The real doubt, the real question is, to what
extent we ought to engage or compromise our-
selves in the matter. We are not in this quarrel
in the same position as that which is occu-
pied by France. A nation which, from whatever
motive, has expended 50,000 soldiers and many
millions of treasure on behalf of another naturally
claims some right to decide what the results of the
victory shall be. So, again, a nation that is ready
to make war on behalf of another can express and
enforce its own views with a very considerable pro-
bability that those views will be attended to..ntßenudt
we have Not interposed by arms ;e do not
to interpose, and we are right. But, in that case,
advantages
otfh ai
nn twe
re-
ference and non-interference at the same time. We
do,we that oug ought to t
co a
n n bearo t
expecti n mind,
th ep perhaps t
of one who is prepared to take a principal part in
cannot at the same moment oamnedntthheooldomthmeasnecduinreg and easy
position of a neutral
the qunbdo,wthhaetreawnye
adviceltr are not
wshuirceh,
as in this quarrel.
case (Cheers.)
yFecannot
we offer will be taken, I think that some caution,
And
considerable degree of reserve and reticence,
some restraint from the expression of an opinion
l.
until that opinion is absolutely called for, is not
only for us the most dignified course, but it is also
the course which is most likely to secure attention
to the Time which we may express. (Hear.) There