The Sun.
London, England, 1861-05-13 00:00:00

these proceedings, and it is the general opinion at
the seat of war that General Pratt has acted with
great skill in accomplishing what he has done with
the force he has at his disposal, and the many ob-
jects which he had to accomplish in the way of
defence as well as offence with that force. In truth,
the only deduction which stern criticism is com-
pelled to make from his character for military
prudence is du© to his constitutional pluck, which
has sometimes led him to expose himself to a greater
extent than becomes a prudent general. In-
deed, in military command, prudence and
courage must always be in conflict. That man is the
best general wbo applies each in its proper place
and at its proper time, but I think Englishmen are
most disposed to pardon errors which proceed from
an overdose of bravery. There is a third element
which has had its influence on General Pratt—l
mean his fine, genial sympathies for the suffering
people around him. To protect them was, as he
(and I think very properly) regarded it, his chief
duty. I have already shown how small a force the
due performance of this duty left at his disposal for
distant operations. Now, no doubt, more force is
pouring in. He will have two additional regiments.
He will have a fine body of artillery, with the best
arms. He will have other means of successful attack,
and just as he is about to use them, in steps another
general to reap the harvest which Pratt has sown
and fostered almost to maturity. The Home Govern-
ment has employed one general to heap the loading
on the camel's back at great labour, and then sends
another to add the straw which is to break it. There
is nothing to justify General Pratt's recall. Since
the affairsof Mahoetahi and Kaihihi every mail has
carried home some account of successes, nearly all
accomplished before the reinforcements reached tho
seat of war. In what lies the secretwbf these suc-
cesses with a very moderate force ? It lies in this,
that General Pratt has had the benefit of eight or
ten months experience. He understands his enemy.
He knows the country in which ho is operating.
He has been accumulating new facts which before

baffled his experience, drawn from other countries

and other modes of warfare. Is it not, therefore,
no less injudicious than unjust to recall him just as
increased means have reach( d the Colony to
give effect to his well-earned experience ?
General Cameron begins with about three times
the force which General Pratt had at the date of
Mahoetahi. He has also the benefit of all the
collective experience gained under General Pratt,
which resides in the breasts of his officers. But
will he avail himself of that experience ? This is
doubtful. His own experience will, in all probabi-
lity be " bought and paid for." He goes out, lam
told, under the impression—or, at all events, loudly
expressing the hypothesis—that there has been too
much delay, He may, therefore, contemn the opi-
nion of his subordinate officers who are to some
extent connected with that delay. Hence he will
in all probability act upon his own views. At this
moment even a dangerous experiment may be suc-
cessful, simply because he has two regiments and
a large body of artillery more at his disposal than
General Pratt had; but I regard this possible suc-
cess as so very doubtful that I shall be very anxious
for the news of the next three months.

It will be observed that at the date of the last
telegram the Maories had hoisted a flag of truce.
It does not say whether this was hoisted from head-
quarters (Pukerangiora) or elsewhere. We are
ignorant of what may have resulted from this. It
is difficult to understand how the natives can ob-
tain ammunition, and by this time they must be
fully aware of the immense advantages which our
heavy guns, mortars, shells, and rockets give us.
It would not surprise me if this same flag should
prove the precursor of negotiations, but I have
also a strong
impression that the natives of New
Zealand generally will fight for the " tribal rights"
as long as they have an ounce of powier left.

MONDAY AFTERNOON.

P.S.--The mail from New Zealand has brought
some explanations as to the flag of truce. I have
before me a short letter from the seat of war. On
the 11th of March General Pratt received a
communication from Pukerangiora desiring a
short truce. This has been granted for 48 hours. It
is to open communications as to the terms of peace, at
least so it is believed. The General granted this
short truce, as it evidently leaves hint in no worse
position at the end of the 48 hours than ho was.
His arrangements for storming the pah were then
complete, or nearly so. His sap had advanced to
within 200 yards of the pah, and it is understood
that he has determined at the end of the time
granted to commence operations, The natives are
much discouraged by their successive disasters, and
it is believed that they now perceive that success is
impossible to them. There seems therefore to be a
reasonable probability that before Gen. Cameron
reaches the seat of war hostilities will be
at an end. A similar desire has been evinced by
the Waikatoes to see an end put to hostilities. '['hey
have made a proposal to Governor Browne to with-
draw the Waikatoes if it be agreed to leave the
question as it stood before hostilities commenced.
The Governor has declined to do this. The details
appear in the Argus summary of this day, to which
I refer you.

The Waikato chief William Thompson, a man of
influence and decision, had gone down to Taranaki
—no
th tin a
e
hostile
mood, but, it was thought, to
withdrawWaikatoes. If the temper of the
Waikatocs be decidedly in favour of a termination
of the war, Kingi alone cannot maintain it ; and it
is generally believed that his own people ars tired
of a contest which has only brought great disasters
upon them. There has never yet been so favourable
a prospect of peace.