The Sun.
London, England, 1859-08-05 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, FEIDAY EVENING, AUGUST 5, 1859.

ANWELL COLLEGE SCHOOL, Middlesex.
L-1. Principal—The Rev. J. A. MERTON, D.D.

PURSUANT to a Decree of the High Court of
Chancery, made in a cause " Parsons against Peters,"
the Creditors of JOHN WESTON PETERS, late of Bridge-
house, South Petherton, in the county of Somerset, gentle-
man, who died in or about the month of July, 1859, are, by
their solicitors, on or before the 4th day ofNovember, 1859, to
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Monday, the 7th day of November, 1859, at One o'Clock in
the afternoon, at the said Chambers, is appointed for hearing
and adjudicating upon the claims.
Dated this 15th day of July, 1859.
CHAS. PUGH, Chief Clerk.
W. HARRIS, 5, Stone-buildings, Lincoln's-inn,
Agent for ROBERT LOWMAN of Crewkerne,
Somersetshire, Plaintiff's solicitor.

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THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN ITALY.

(From the Correspondent of the Times.)

Field-Marshal Count Schlick, once, on a visit to
England, having heard much in military circles of
the discipline of the Guards, proceeded to Hyde-
park to see them drilled. The men went through
their exercise admirably, and Count Schlick ex-
pressed in apprcpriate terms the pleasure he felt at
the precision of their movements. One thing, he
confessed, excited his wonder. There was but one
officer present, and the parade was directed by a
sergeant-major with a walking-stick. " How,"
said Could Schlick, " can an army produce Gene-
rals when the officers of a crack corps are absent
from drill, and the men are commanded by a man
with a walking-stick ? In Austria officers of every
grade go through the same fatigues as the men
they command. Whether in peace or in war, the
private and the subaltern, the captain and the
colonel, rise at the regulation hour and take part
in the duties of the day. They are initiated
from the first to the simplest forms of exercise
and the most complicated evolutions of masses."
The natural inference from remarks such as
these is, that Austria has excellent Generals as
well as first-rate subalterns in her armies. But
the campaign suddenly terminated by the peace
of Villafranca has practically demonstrated
that the Auste.aa armies had no leaders worthy the
name. Their vaunted experience has invariably
led _to defeat. ,To what cause can this result be
assigned ? The Austrian army hid the reputation
of being the best drilled and disciplined and the
most admirably organised army in the world: The
Staff was a specially instructed Staff, intimately
acquainted with all the duties of the field. Its
materiel was perfect. From the smallest cooking-
pot to the largest transport waggon everything
was in order. It could be ascertained with mathe-
matical precision where the regimental farrier
would stand in the lines of a camp, where the
smallest baggage-waggon would be placed. How
came it that an instrument so perfect worked so ill ?
Various causes combined to produce this result.
We have had complaints of favouritsm in the Eng-
lish army ; but in Austria the system is carried to
a point unknown in this country. The right man
is never in the right place.
There is a story current in Austrian circles not
complimentary to the noblesse of that country, but
which indicates a truth that no one will feel inclined
to disbelieve. An officer, discussing Count Cavour's
policy, and dilating for the benefit of his hearers
upon the horrors of the " Constitutionschwindel,"
exclaimed, "Let these principles but gain a little
more ground among us, and the heads of our
noblesse are not worth a day's purchase." " You
forget," cried a wag, " that the Austrian noblesse
have no beads." The joke is, unfortunately, true.
The Austrian noble is of a peculiar type. He is
bfba
anyr audgvto
Lichtenstein
hsseeteandnte itoroegi nieens,r;
alalmostegdaTi against
the
alwayste pta
hrameitfiJanissaries,
ass an,
oisfss
cos
halt dir7iieeea rsrx z
aceaanni rshdeetri.rit
gni
anse
still t
lheea
dP a
thelffy s S
armies
, e w a rozf ent
he rb
e gs
Austrian, a n Lch e n s tein
Emperors.s
The Austrian noble is a pleasant companion ; his
iisstoeoxcoefstseinvesu,
pheirsfiowiaela.ltnh
iagraeoacitu,
abinuttanheies
epdoulietaentieosns
with literature, science, or art, if it exists at all, is
of the slightest nature. His conversation is of balls
and parties, the Opera, or the last little social scan-
dal. Even after a battle he will talk more freely
of these things than of the tactics which directed
an action, or the faults which produced a defeat.
Like a party of Melton " swells " of the dandy
day who would meet at dinner, and would be
shocked were you to speak of the day's run, Aus-
trian nobles will spend the day after a battle in con-
versation upon solemn trifles. It is in favour of
this class of men that the higher ranks of the Aus-
trian military hierarchy are monopolized. The pay
of the service being altogether inadequate to secure
a decent livelihood for officers, none but wealthy
men have a chance of rising in it, and the posses-
sion of talent, versatility, or acquired advantages is
an exception. We need not, for this reason, won-
der at finding in the Austrian army numerous
Gyulais,exiatzmeps,lehsuotfwtehsehouldrather
be surprised that in
Lichst.enteins, and Zed-
w
an army so officered men of militacryhargleensiussholuiklde
Prince Eugene or the Archduke
ever be discoverable.
That Count Gyulai possspesrsocvdedallhtyheaprfiadeet aansd
yet
known to a few persons only.
in-
capacity of his class
,MfaogunendtahCimousenttf
engaged with an overwhelming f
Clam,O n thew mh oar np ionr gt
oonf tho
fe battlehi
s eo r opofar
The aide-
Gyulai, earnestly pressing far assistance.
force of the enemy.
He despatched an aide-de-camp with a note to Count
de-camp rode the 10 miles which separated him from
the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief in
little more than 20 minutes, and presented his letter
to Count Gyulai, who read it and put it into his
pocket. It was then respectfully suggested that
Count Clam would esteem it a particular favour if
some assurance could be given him at once that tip
assistance he so much needed would be speedily
forthcoming, as in that case he would be able
to infuse new vigour into his exhausted troops.
Count Gyulai's reply was characteristic—" I shall
proceed at once to dinner, and then give the neces-
sary orders ; and, by the way, you must be hungry
(addressing the aide-de-camp) ; you shall dine also."
Whereupon his Excellency sat down, and quietly
partook of his meal, leaving Count Clam to wait for
the reinforcements and the comforting assurance
he was so anxious to obtain. Well might Count
Clam exclaim on the evening after the battle, when
he received orders from Cuunt Gyulai to put his
corps in readiness for a renewal of the battle on the
morrow—" Tell his Excellency that I shall be too

happy to take a musket in my hand, and fight with
the rest of the army, if it can be brought together,
but as for my corps, it is in no state to do anything
at present." What, one may ask, would have been
the condition of Count Clam's corps had Count Gy uali
condescended to forego his dinner P In 1848 Venice
was lost to Austria because the General in com-
mand loved his supper too much. In 1859 a pro-
vinceis lost for a dinner. Count Gyulai retired in
disgrace, but to wipe away the reproach that he was
a General of parade, and that he had never seen a
shot fired, he refused the Banship of Croatia, and
returned to his regiment willing to serve as Colonel,
since he could no longer be accepted as Commander-

in-Chief. How f✓w old soldiers would have had
the courage to do this ! At first his misfortune
hung heavily upon him, but it was remarked that
after the battle of Solferino his spirits revived. A
shrewd observer aid, after that battle, that it was
remarkable how much of the Gyulai incubus still
weighed upon tie Austrian army. The Count,
however, consoled hithself with the thought that
Hess had done no better.

The retrospect of Solferino must be very irritat-
ing to all who feel interest in the military fame of
Austria. It is needless to dwell on the well-known
fact that the Austrian army was forced into
action in positions most disadvantageous to them.
That fact has been explained and commented on.
It has been shown how difficult it was to defend a
series of heights like those of SOlferino, which,
lying at an angle oblique to the front of the attack-
ing force, were easily assailable on both flanks. But
other causes besides these combined to produce a
catastrophe. At Magenta the incapacity of the
Commander-in-Chief produced its natural conse-
quence—defeat. 'At Solferino, where there was no
Commander-in-Chief, and where each General did
pretty much what he pleased, too many of the
leaders proved themselves the worthy emulators of
Gyulai. It was peculiarly unfortunate that among
all the corps of the Austrian army that of Count
Clam should have been chosen to hold the position
in which most energy and decision were required.
Clam's corps had never recovered the shock it re-
ceived at Magenta. It supported but feebly the
efforts of the sth Corps. The weakness which it
evinced and the confusion into which it fell at the
most critical part of the day's operations proved
that Count Clam was not the right man in the
right place. A General, however brave he may be
in the field, cannot be said to possess the necessary
qualities of command unless he possesses, in addi-
tion, coolness, decision, and keen observation. A
General who does not know where his reserves are
placed incurs blame of no ordinary kind. Such,
unfortunately, was the case with Count Clam.
When his corps yielded and fell back the reserve
of six batteries (36 guns) might. if forth-
coming have retrieved the disaster. But when
that reserve was wanted it was not to be found
Precious time was lost in searching for it, and Sol-
ferino was already in the hands of the French,
when the digcovery was made that the reserve lay
at Volta, four or five miles from the spot where it
ought to have been. It was enough to raise a smile
on the countenence even of an Austrian to hear a
colonel say, at four o'clock in the afternoon, as he
rode over the hill of Madonna delle Piave, that he
was going for the artillery reserve of the First
Corps at Volta. _

This, however, was not all. General Zedwitz, with
six regiments of cavalry and six batteries of artil-
lery (about 15,000 men and 36 guns), unaccountably
remained at Goito, and paralyzed by his absence all
the efforts of the divisions forming the Austrian lett.
The Generals of the 3d, 9th, and 11th Corps were
waiting all day for Zedwitz. Inferior to the French
in artillery, they longed for the moment when the
heavy cavalry and artillery should appear and
restore the equilibrium of the battle. But they
waited in , vain. No cavalry, no artillery,
came on. Lichtenstein, too, with his 25,000 men,
where was he all this time ? Why had he not
come up ? While the battle raged many a glance
was turned towards the quarter whence he was ex-
pected, but he came not. Like Zedwitz, he never
moved. It is very small consolation to the Aus-
trians to know that Clam, Lichtenstein, and Zed-
witz shared the fate of Gyulai. Their removal
from the army could not repair the losses caused by
their incapacity or neglect.
The French said of the Austrian army, " The
cavalry is superb, the artillery is admirable, the in-
fantry are children." The children fought Solfe-
rino, and fought it alone, for the superb cavalry and
admirable artillery were not there. What a com-
ment,this on standing armies ! For years Austria
has sacrificed her treasure and lavished her atten-
tion on this cavalry and artillery. It was of little
moment whether the country were well or ill
governed. " It is true," an Austrian might have
said, " we have a bad Administration, hard taxation,
a hateful police ; but, on the other hand, we have
a splendid army, cavalry unsurpassed, and artillery
famous all the world over." The time comes when
this army, maintained at countless cost, is to prove
that it is worth the sacrifices made in its favour ;
anLbehold, when :t is 'ranted, the unrivalled ar-
tillery and cavalry are away, no one knows where !
Is this melancholy result only due to the fact that
commands have been intrusted to incompetent
hands, or is it possible that other faults are com-
mitted which cannot be excused ? One example
alone will prove that the experience of years has
not preserved the Austrians from gross military
errors. When the batteries of the 9th Corps opened
fire on the plain of Medole, they were so quickly
mauled by the superior number of the French
guns that it was found necessary to withdraw
them. In order to do this with effect Mensdorf's
cavalry was ordered out into the plain, and the
hostile fire was then divided, with so much sucesss
that the batteries were limbered up with smaller
loss than might have been expected. But military
men very properly inquire whether heavy Dragoons
were not organised for a different purpose than that
of drawing off an enemy's fire from artillery ? The
veriest tyro understands how troops may be
moved under cover of artillery, but what shall
we say of artillery moved out of fire under
cover of cavalry ? Had Count Mensdorf been
near the enemy, there would have been some
sense in ordering him out into the plain ; but
it was really too bad to send him into a plain
covered by hostile balls fired from a distance of
3,000 yards, and out of range of any guns such as
cavalry divisions generally take with them. One
can fancy the rage of the officer in command of the
battery that first accompanied Mensdorf when, in
five minutes after he entered the plain of Medole,
five of his guns were dismounted, at a distance
which rendered any attempt on his part to fire per- 1
fectly useless. A second battery took the place of
the first one. In less than a minute three of the
guns were dismounted.. The officer in command
asked permission to dash forward regardless of 'nil
odds, and fire a volley at close quarters. Count
Mensdorf refused, thinking, doubtless, that if three
guns could be dismounted in a minute at 3,000
yards, the remainder would be disposed of long
before they could have got into range. Finally, the
cavalry division retired without coming in contact
with the enemy. With regard to the purpose with
which its movement was undertaken, that cer-
tainly was effected. But this purpose was not
worth the cost. To save one set of batteries an-
other set was sacrificed, and, in addition, a vast
number of men and not less than 500 horses. It
was here that the superiority of the rifled cannon
over ordinary artillery was finally and decisively
.proved. The horizontal fire on tho plains of Medole
dismounted guns more than 3,000 yards off. At
Solferino the practice was by no means so success-
ful, and the French, firing from heights against
heights, did not aim well. The rifled guns may be
said, however, to have rendered invaluable service.
If a military man were to be asked what groundhe
would choose in Italy for the evolution& of cavalry
he would at once pitch upon the plain of Medole as
combining all the advantages that could be desired.
The Austrians had the best opportunity of using
that plain. Their cavalry was not forthcoming in
sufficient numbers to neutralise the effects of the
enemy's artillery ; but even had they been in force
on that plain it is doubtful whether they would
have done much, unless they had been fortunate
enough to turn the French right.
It is not alone the rifled cannon that has changed
the conditions upon which modern armies must now
fight—the use of rifled arms of every description must
alter the:pld system of manoeuvring in the field.
Austria,,with its fondness for old established rules,
had not realised this is as the French have done. An
Austrian soldier retiring from the field at Solferino
remarked that the French fired much quicker than
their opponents. Numbers of them, he said, fire
from the hip without taking aim. This is true.
The French, instead of a simple line of skirmishers
in advance of their columns, had a double line, the
rearmost of which fired over those in advance of
them. Thus it was that the ground in rear of the
Austrian front was alive with projectiles, which,
although propelled without aim, did not fail to
annoy severely the regimental reserves. It It as
this system of firing at high elevation which ren-
dered the Rocca-hill at Cavriana untenable by the
Emperor of Maria and his staff long before the
French were in close proximity to the spot. It was
this system of firing which made the Austrian sol-
diers remark that they preferred fighting in the
foremost rank to standing in regimental reserve.
Other curious facts may be mentioned as illus-
trating the condition of the Austrian army. It has
been said, and is quite true, that there are no
field hospitals in the Austrian army. This is
part of a system upon ;which much may be
said on one side or the other. The Austrians
never carry tents in Italy. They say that
field hospitals fox the sick and tents for the healthy
are not required, because Italy is so thickly studded
with villages that shelter can always be obtained
for the troops, and the system of transport is so
perfect that the sick can always be carried to hos-

pitals in large towns. Unfortunately, the hospitals
of large cities like Verona and Mantua, though vast
and airy, are not capable of containing one-quarter
of the sufferers in such an engagement as Solferino;
and after every ward in Verona had been filled it
was found necessary to send off the majority of the
wounded to Vicenza, Venice, and Innsbruck. How
many men perished of exposure to heat and fatigue
consequent upon travelling under suffering it is
almost impossible to say, but this and the absence of
a sufficient number of medical men caused the loss of
many soldiers whose state was not such as to render
it. impossible to cure them. Again, the perfection
of the Austrian transport is not an unmixed benefit.
It encumbers the roads and prevents rapid motion.
This was seriously felt at Solferino, where the
transport trains impeded the movements of the
columns. The small-arm ammunition also, being in
carts, was so not easily supplied to the men in battle
as it ought to have been. It may give some insight
into the condition of a country through which an
Austrian army of 150,000 men moves to say that
were the whole of it marching upon one road the
head of the column would be 120 miles from the
rearmost file. It is calculated that, independently
of the cavalry and artillery, the transport train of
the Austrian army in Italy employed 100,000
horses.

Finally, as to the condition of the Austrian
soldier going into battle. There. is no doubt that
an ill-fed army does not fight so well as one
which freely partakes of food. Now, the Aus-
trian army is an ill-fed army. The rations of a
soldier in Italy consisted of lb. of beef and a pro-
portional quantity of bread. Neither wine, nor
spirits, Ivor coffee are part of the bill of fare. If
the Austrian soldier wants more than his ration he
buys it. This is a fruitful source of disorder. On
a m-..i.rch the soldier falls out of his rank to buy
cheese or bacon. He must run to resume his place,
and he eats in the ranks. He is obliged so to
satisfy his appetite and quench his thirst because
the regulation is that he shall cook but once a-day.
In time of peace the meal is cooked and served at a
regular hour. In time of war, on a march, the cook-
ing takes place in the evening, after the bivouac is
prepared. The meal having been eaten, the soldier
lies down, and is not entitled to another for 24
.hours. The result of this et Solferino has already
been mentioned. The soldiers ate their dinner on
the evening of the 23d, and were not entitled to
another until the evening of the 24th. In the
meanwhile a battle was to be fought on an empty
stomach. Much was said of the hardships endured
by English soldiers in the Crimea because their
coffee was not roasted and ground for them. The
Austrian army get no coffee at all, and receive no ra-
tioas of spirits or wine. " It is shameful," said Count
Rechberg (a civilian) at Verona, " that the Com-
missariat should not feed the army better." " The
Commissariat is not to blame," was the reply ;
"it is the system. For 40 years and more
the Austrian army has been so fed, and
it is only now you discover that the ration is insuf-
ficient." The result of this discourse was that ad-
ditional rations were served out to the troops, which
is very like beginning to train a horse after he has
lost a race.

This generosity as to rations -was only visible,
however, after the signature of the armistice of
Villafranca, for previous to the suspension of arms
there was every reason to fear that the supply of
food to the army would be diminished rather than
increased. It is a remarkable example, indeed, of
the improvidence of the Austrians that their sup-
plies were failing at the very moment when provi-
sions were becoming most necessary. Their impro-
vidence had been equally great in another direction.
In their anxiety to strengthen Pavia and Piacenza,
they took a vast number of guns out of Verona
to arm the walls of those cities. When they
retired those guns were blown up, or sunk in
canals and rivers. Verona remained imperfectly
armed ; but, as it was not anticipated that
the war would be so unsuccessful as to make a
siege of Verona imminent, this unreadiness was not
a subject of much anxiety. For the same reason li
the victualling department of the fortresses had
been neglected. The disaster of Solferino brought
these omissions into serious notice. To defend
Verona without guns or provisions was impossible.
Those who have attentively read the history of the
siege of Sebastopol know that the Russians con-
stantly 'renewed the ordnance of their works from
the inexhaustible supplies of their arsenal. At
Verona, on the 25th June, 150 guns were still
wanting to complete the defences, and as for re-
serves in the arsenal, there were none. Again, with
respect to food, if the French had commenced the
siege at once it was a certainty that the supply then
at hand would not last six weeks. It is not extra-
ordinary, under these circumstances, that the Em-
perorFrancisJoseph should have desired an armistice.
It has been said that the first overtures for a sus-
pension of arms came from Louis Napoleon, but
this is a mistake. The Emperor of Austria asked
for and obtained the armistice, which was for him
an absolute necessity. Why the armistice was
granted by France is not so well known. The
armistice caused no surprise in the Austrian army,
except in so far as its duration is concerned. The
signature of the peace did create surprise and in-
dignation, but it may be assumed with certainty
that Francis Joseph would not have accepted it had
he not felt that it was the best thing he could hope
for under the circumstances. The reasons which
swayed his decision were partly military, but
mainly political, and these last it is not the purpose
of the present statement to touch upon.