The Sun.
London, England, 1859-10-25 00:00:00

AFFAIRS OF lUbCAN.

A letter, dated Florence, Oct. 19, says :
The lows-expected answer of the French Emperor
to the deputations of the. States of Central Italy
Teached Florence in the night between Monday and
Tuesday, but was not published yesterday, owing to
a certain straeenderness which makes the Tuscan
Government hugg the news they receiv.e, be it good,
bad, or indifferent—as if it were precious essence,
likely to lose its virtue by evaporation. e stu.r
stance of the Paris telegram, published at las
this day's Monitore, was, however, known tonall
_.
men last evening. The answer of :Napoleon. . I
is precisely what all sensible men expected ;
eietelseas
mere repetition of the thousand arid. oneedsp
h.msnelf
of which the great Monarch has cleaver
on the same subject since the fatal peace-day of self
lafranca. The Emperor professes, of course, the.
greatest love for Italy, and zeal for the cause of its
independence. He has, however, his duties and ob-
ligations arising out of the terms of the Villafranca
treaty. In the meantime he will undertake to screen
the Central Italians from all foreign interference,
and even from Neapolitan aggression !
If anything could make a lover of the Italian
cause despair of the country, it is the breathless
state of anxiety and trepidation with which these
unmeaning responses of the Imperial oracle are
looked forward to for weeks and months before
they come, and minutely construed, sifted, and win-
nowed, commented upon and strained in all possible
manner to build up a transient edifice of hope upon
their slender and slippery basis. The Italians, one
would say, have faith in all the world save only in
themselves. They fear everybody except them-
selves ; yet they alone are masters of their own des-
tinies—they alone can make or mar their country.
I am sorry and ashamed to have to record that
not a few of my friends here pointed to some of the
words of the French despatch with a sort of abject
exultation :—" Central Italy is safe even from Nea-
politan attack ?" Why, no man in his senses ever
dreamt that the King of Naples would be so mad as
to tread on the toes and corns of the French troops
of Gen. Goyon, or send his fleet across the lines of
the French cruisers crowding the Adriatic, to bring
the Pope help, of which the King stands in the
greatest need for himself. No man ever doubted
that, if the Neapolitans ever crossed the Tronto,
or landed at Pesaro or Ancona, they would either
join the patriot forces at Rimini or would be
scared and scattered by the mere talisman of
Garibaldi's sname. Save them from the King of
Naples ! Why, the Italians might well go down on
their knees before King Bomba's son and heir ; they
might well beg, and coax, and bribe him to assail
them by all means, and might decree a medal, worth
£lO,OOO, to the first Royal maccaroni eater who
would be so kind as to venture across the frontier;
for, assuredly, au encounter with an enemy
of that nature would bring the remedy to
all the internal and external evils of Central
Italy, and lead us to the only possible solution of
the general national question. What kills the
Italians, both those of Piedmont and Lombardy, and
those of? the Duchies and the Legations, especially
the volunteers enlisted in the national army, is in-
action. Peaceful. organisation seems to be an
achievement beyond the faculties of those fidgetty
mercurial Italians. Under the pressure of the Lom-
bard war Garibaldi was able to improvise a band of
heroes in his huntsmen of the Alps, and Mezzacapo
gathered together a regular division, which gave
proofs of discipline no less than of valour. Peace
is now rapidly undoing the work of war. Not only
are the armaments of Northern and Central Italy
not progressing, but the symptoms of serious dis-
orders are everywhere apparent. I know that every
syllable I have just uttered is flatly contradicted by
nearly the whole of the Italian press. and nothing
is more distressing or alarming than the utter disre-
gard of truth by which the newsmongers here seem
bent upon deceiving themselves no less than the
world. It is enough to make a man rub his eyes,
and stare about him, and wonder whether he is
awake or dreaming, to notice the contradiction
between the statements of all, even official
newspapers, and the facts that fall under one's
immediate observation, and the news that circulates
through the medium of private conversation.
It is not true that Central Italy has at this pre-
sent moment more than 45,000 or 50,000 men under
arms. It is not quite a week ago since General
Mezzacapo assured me the Central Italian forces
only amounted to 25,000 men. It is not true that
the Modena, Reggio, Parma, Rec., brigades are com-
plete, nr near completion. The Brigata Parma
numbers, 112,00 men ; the one of Reggio hardly
exists, except on paper; the Hussars of Piacenza
have hardly 50 poor horses as yet. We have only
embryos, not only of the Central Italian, but even
of the new Sardinian or Lombard forces, with the
exception of the Modena Brigade (old Cacciatori
della Magra) of the Mezzacapo Division—the
Tuscan and other troops, which, under the same or
different names, either existed before the war, or
were drawn up on the spur of the moment. Since
Villafranca Italy has talked an immense deal, and
spent even more, about her armament, but has done
uext to nothing and, what is worse, is now suffer-
ing what has Nen previously done to go, to a great
extent, to rack and ruin.
The causes of this deplorable break-down are to
be sought less in the incapacity of the Italians for
self-organisation, than in the state of harassing un-
certainty in which they allow themselves to be kept
by the crooked policy of that very French Emperor
to whom they obstinately look up for their safety.
Their destinies are in their own hands, if they only
dare to do what everybody suggests in a whisper.
Look upon the annexation as a fait accompli.
Let Piedmont govern Central Italy. Let the
Romagnese troops march away from Peomagna., the
Modena hr. gade from Modena, every Italian s ddier
as far away as possible from home. Removed into
Piedmont, surrounded by the Savoy or Cuneo
bri-
gades, incorporated in the Queen or Savona regi-
ments, Mezzacapo's fine looking soldiers would be
far from the temptations to mutiny, away from all
opportunity for desertion. Garrisoned by Piedmon-
tese soldiers, watched over by Sardinian gendarmes,
such towns as Parma would not be for hours the
prey of a murderous mob. The Italians must be go-
verned that they may he armed; they must be armed
that they may be free. No man, who was not a
madman, could fancy that a peoiele just issued from
the hands of Antonelli's priests, or the Duke of
Modena's sbirri, men till lately subjected to An-
viti's bastinado, should all at once and for ever ex-
hibit all the virtues of free men, The Italians have
done much, too much, to win the respect and sym-
pathy of the world ; more cannot be fairly expected
of them ; more can certainly not be obtained.
Were the present provisional state of the country
to last through the winter the work of disorganisa-
tion would be beyond the palliation of the most im-
pudently lying newspdpers. It is necessary that
there should be a King over Italy—the King of her
own choosing. Better for Italy to perish in her at-
tempt to assert her right against not only the King
of Naples and Austria, but even against France, if
need be, than to allow her pure and sacred cause to
be sullied by riots and tumults, to be in the end
the prey not only of France and Austria, but even
of the King of Naples, the banished Dukes, and
the priests.
If there is one Italian in all Italy who has full
faith in the possibility not only of preserving order,
belt also of arming and organising the country, sup-
posing the present state of perplexity is to con-
tinue throughout the winter, let him say so; but if
there is, and there can by no possibility be one har-
bouring such a conviction, then let there be no re-
liance on false representations, which would lead us
to a treacherous security. No country was ever
saved by a lie. Such being, as 1 believe, the pre:
sent condition of Italy, what does the French Em-
peror say ? ," lle does not consider himself as suffi-
ciently free from the obligations of Villafranca to
advise aught else than a restoration, with large
securities of independence and freedom. He will
allow no intervention, not even a Neapolitan one.
His engagements have no other limits than those
of possibility. lle recommends order as the main
substantial thing."
Now, what is the real mind of the Emperor ?
what arc his promises and engagements ? He will
allow no intervention—that is to say, he will go to
war with Austria if she- either attacks' Central
Italy or renews her hostility lityo
b age ainst Piedmont;
t
but Austria is almost sure drivenal to some
such measure by despair ; and if Napoleon
friend to Italy, ought he not to wish aebonoveisalal
things that this country should be put in a position
to fight its own battles, that e every Italian should
be to-day a soldier that he may be to-morrow a free
citizen?" And, if such be his wish, ought he
not to desire that Piedmont should, at least pro-
visionally, govern Italy, seeing that only in Pied-
mont are men able to, understand what belongs
to military organisation,
auisation . Ile recommends order
as the main object, but can he earnestly reckon
upon the indefinite preservation of order, if every
town is to be perfectly in its own power, as Parma
was on the sth of October? Suly he must see
that "if
has done wonders, it is unfair to ex-
pect miracle sof her." The immediate annexation
of these pro 7inees to Piedmont, or at least their
administratim: by Sardinian civil and military °fa.
for this country, the
eery, is the oi tiy hope of safety
only hope for the preservation of European peace.
Are we told fiat such a measure would lead to a
fresh outbreak of hostilities with Austria ? But
surely Austria trlll either obtain what site was pro-
mised at Villai.ranca or run the chances of a new
struggle; and..if a new appeal is to be made to arms
can Italy be e: spec ted to be more ready for the field
at the end of ',,he winter, after order has been put
to the test of a variety of growing disorders ; after
Mezzacapo's division has been halved by desertion,
and the new brigades have behaved like the Brigata

Parma, several of whose volunteers lent a hand to
the murder of Anviti, and all of whom had to be
hastily removed from the town ere measures could
be taken for the restoration of the empire of the

law ?
Once more, let it be repeated, the condition of
Italy is painfully, supremely critical. The Emperor
Napoleon, if he could be taken at his own word,
would-L seem to insult the Italians in their misery.
But all the past teaches us to interpret every word
uttered by the Emperor with a grain of salt, espe-
cially when by long preparation and deliberation
he gives his speech all the solemn obscurity of
a response of the Pythoness. What is the.mean-
ing, for instance, of "his engagements havinghino
other limits than those of possibility ? " Which
engagements ? Those he has with Austria ? or those-
which bind him to the Pope ? or the hopes he created
and fostered by his promises among the Italians ?
Supposing him perfectly disinterested,bothforwhat
concerns him, Ins cousin, and France. is he willing
to go once more to war to screen the Central Ita-
lians from foreign intervention ? Is he ready to
fecomrnence, under less favourable auspices, that
work which he left unachieved, the world has not
yet discovered for what earthly reason ? Is he in-
clined to alidw the cause of Italian nationality to be
again debated, nlv7 that the Papacy has become in-
volved in it—now that the Romagnese revolutio.n,
so long warded of, broken forth ?Is he dis-
posed to undo his own wo;
against the whole of his Fri k of 1849, and wage war
priesthood whose suffrage he bow ea by abject sub.-
priestho?d, that
serviency to their worldly interest? His
he be fair and sincere, is difficult beyond all, human
position, if
comprehension, and, great genius as he is
to be, he cannot have the power to see his N-7(IY
J.iought
clearly out of it. But, if he be something dif-
ferent—if, as the man who obtained the Crown
of France by questionable means, his only aim is
to extend the power of his empire over the Italian
peninsula by means equally questionable—how easy
are all the apparent mysteries, shifts, and con-
tradictions of his conduct at once explained ? He
had a footing in Rome ; he now wishes, like Charle-
magne, to have the Pope and the Popedom under his
entire and exclusive protectorate. He has driven
Austria from Tuscany, the Duchies, and the Lega-
tions ; it must go hard if he does not put himself in
her place. He recommends order to the Italians as
the unum necessariwn. That was his watchword
to them from the beginning. He put them to an
ordeal from which their best friends could hardly
hope to bring them out unhurt. Order has been
maintained for above four months, in the most pro-
digious manner. There is now anew cry for' order,"
to last for five or six months more. But if the Ita-
lians could maintain order, if they could arm and
govern themselves, what need would they have of
his.help, or what fear of. either Austria. or France
herself? Twelve millions of men, properly guided,
are, in a good cause, and in self-defence, a match
against all possible odds. The danger of the Ita-
lians is in their previous anarchy and denioralisa-
tion, in their long engendered unfitness for self-
government. When the Emperor so eagerly recom-
mends " order," he resembles that doctor who
advised calmness to a feverish patient ; and, after
all, what if the Italians were to find the further
maintenance of order an impossibility ? Would
Napoleon suffer them once more to fall under the
sway of Austria ? Would he allow all the work of
Magenta and Solferino to go for nothing ? Would
he stand by and see the Duchies and the Legations
again ruled over by crowned Austrian lieutenants,
• and exposed to constant Austrian occupation ? Or
would he, the French Emperor, take upon himself
the task of the restoration of order ; would he him-
self accomplish in Italy the mission hitherto dis-
charged by Austria, step into Austria's old shoes,
and bring back into Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and
Bologna that admirable order which he re-esta-
bliahed at Rome in 1849 ?
P.S. As if to confirm the most melancholy fore-
bodings to which I have given utterance in the
above, I see now a private letterfrom Rimini, dated
the 17th, in which it is said that the Mezzacapo
division has been on the point of disbanding en
masse, and unanimously refused the new enlistment
which was proposed to the soldiers for 18 months.
The motives of their discontent is the unsatisfactory
state of their dress, unfit as they think for a whiter
campaign ; the harshness of some of their officers
—especially the Piedmontese ; and the habitual
silence and austerity of their General. There was
also a complaint that Major Pinelli, the War Mi-
nister, out of jealousy and ill-will against the
.brothersMezzacapo, ill-treated this division, show-
' ing partiality to the troops under Rosselli and those
organised under his immediate inspection. The
orders for the release of those who refused any
longer to serve had been drawn up, but not deli-
vered, when happily the arriy.al of Garibaldi to
some extent pacified the malcontents. By his
rough but manly eloquence Garibaldi prevailed
upon most of the soldiers to abide under their stand-
ards. Nearly the whole division have consented to
enterinto the new engagement for 18 months. The
troops at Cattolica have been under arms for the
last three days and nights, awaiting a combined
attack of the Papal troops and of the Neapolitans,
who, to the number of 20,000, were reported
to have either crossed the frontier by land or to
have landed at Ancona. Very active measures are
taken. to guard against a sudden attack. Garibaldi
evidently succeeded in conjuring up the storm for
the present ; but those Romagnese troops will cer-
tainly do no good unless they are removed from
their country, and kept under very strict discipline.

WAKEFIELD ELECTION COMMISSION.

WAKEFIELD, OCT. 24.

At the sitting of the Commission this morning,
Reuben Leighton, who was examined on Friday,
and who then swore that he had received nothing
for voting for Charlesworth, made his appearance
in the -witness-box in order to correct his former
evidence. lle said—l was bribed to vote for Charles-
worth by Mr. John Jubb with £2O in money and
the cancelling of an old promissory note of £25.
The reason why I did not tell the truth the other
day was because Mr. Jabb told me that if I said no-
thing about the matter here the Commissioners
could make nothing of it. It is of my own free will
that I have come here to-day. My conscience pricked
me for lying, and I have never been happy since.
Mrs. Leighton made a similar statement. Mr.
Tubb had persuaded them the other day to tell a
false story, and had beau to them that morning to
try and induce them to stick to it. They had to
live in the same village with Mr. Jubb, and were
afraid of him. _ _

Mr. Sergeant Pigott—Speak the truth and shame
the devil, always, my good woman, without mind-
ing what people say to you. I am glad you have
both repented before it is too late, for the Commis-
sioners had already come to the conclusion that the
story you told the other day was a false one.
The cross swearing in this case occupied a consi-
derable time on Friday, and Mr. J. Jubb, who is a
town councillor and a poor-law guardian, swore
stoutly that ho had never bribed nor offered a bribe
to Leighton, and that the debt of £25 the cancel-
ling of which was now shown to be part of the bribe,
was still valid.

Mr. T. Alder said, he canvassed for Mr. Charles-
worth at the last election but took no part in the
bribery. Was told by Mr. Goldthorpe that Michael
Cox had taken £25 to vote for Charlesworth, and
was asked to take care of him lest he should be car-
ried off by the other side. Had also heard that two
men named Halliday had received £240 between
them to vote for Lcatham. Took some share in
the management of the "Troughs". Somewhere
about 600 were engaged, 300 by night and 300 by
day, to watch the electors and prevent them being
carried off by the other side. Mr. Leatham's party
had many more "roughs" engaged—three to one,
perhaps—and it was necessary to protect the Con-
servative voters, from their insults and violence.
The house of every Conservative voter in the town
was marked with a cross in chalk, and men set t•
watch, who went in and out. The watchers cost
between £9OO and £l,OOO, which he got from Mr.
Jose Fernandez. Had no idea who the " strangers"
were, and except the man to whom he had pointed
out Brear's house, had never seen any in the town
during the election as far as he was aware. Mr.
Fernandez had complained to him of the large ex-
pense cf the non-electors, but had never said any-
thing to him about the other expenses. Did not be-
lieve that £1,700 represented all the money spent
in bribery on Mr. Charlesworth's side, and thought
it very probable that the election cost him more
than £4,000. should think the hotel bills would
be more than £l,OOO. It must have cost Mr.
Leatham much more—twice as much—for he was
an unpopular candidate with the electors, and
would have to buy his way among them more freely.
The expenses of the non-electors on the other side
must have been enormous, as there were large bands
of them patrollin,, the town before the election. On
the nomination day all the mill hands were set at
liberty to attend at the hustings and hold up their
hands for Mr. Leatham. There were between 400
and 500 mill girls at the hustings, and most proba-
bly the whole of them got their day's wages for it.
Had heard since the election that Mr. G. W. Harri-
son had offered a sweep named Goldthorpe—in mis-
take for Joshua Dawson, another sweep-1;20 to
vote for Leatham.
Colonel Cobbe, the chief constable of the West
Riding, said that by the request of the magistrates
he took charge of the town on the nomination and
polling days. There was a general impression that
there would be a row, so that on the first day he
brought in 80, and on the second
.day 180 men.
The town was full ofjoughspattrholeh eningptilowymsterneettost.,
but instead of keeping the peace