The Sun.
London, England, 1857-01-30 00:00:00

THE LOBS OF THE TYNE.

OFFIC TA L INQUIRY.
SOUTHA .11 PTO N, THURSDAY.
The Board of Trade inquiry into the circumstances
connected with the stranding of the Royal Mail Com-
pany's steam ship Tyne, off St. Alban's Head, on the
I morning of the 13:1) inst., was opened this morning at
11 o'clock at the Guildhall. The magistrates on the
bench were—Capt. Breton (chairman)' Admiral Bowyer,
Messrs. J. R. Stebbing, J. Lobb, J. Clark, and R.
Pierce. Captain S alker attended from the Board of
Trade, accompanied by Mr. O'Dowd, solicitor under the
Merchant Shipping Act, and Mr. W. H. Buckell, col-
lector of Customs at this port. Mr. Coxwell, solicitor of
Southampton, matched the proceedings on the part of
Captain Valler, the commander of the ship. There was
a large attendance of gentlemen interested in nautical
matters, among whom were Captain Vincent, superin-
tendent of the Royal Company at Southampton : Capt.
M‘Dougall, Admiralty superintendent at Southampton;
Captains Barney, Haste, Strutt, Parker, Bevis, and
Weller ; George superintending engineer;
and several other officers in the company's service.
Mr. O'Dowd stated that he appeared there, in pur-
suance of instructions received from the Board of Trade,
to inqnire into the circumstances which had led to the
loss of the Tyne, as this was the first inquiry of this
nature that had been held at this port under the sanction

of a recent act of Parliament, he would call attention to
the statute under which the inquiry was held. It was

held under section 433 of the Merchant Shipping Act,
1854, which he read to the Court. That section consti-
tuted the magistrates a court of inquiry, and it would
be their duty to send a report to the Board of Trade,
based upon the evidence, which would be taken, with
extracts from that evidence if they thought proper. The
Board of Trade considered that the aid ct a nautical
assessor would be desirable • and, as questions would
undoubtedly arise affecting the nautical skill of Captain
Valler, requiring the co-operation and advice of a
gentleman high in position in the nautical pro-
fession, the senior member of the Marine Depart.
ment of the Board of Trade was present to assist them
in the inquiry. In fairness to Captain Valler he would
state that, although ho was not there to make any charge
against that gentleman, yeamorally he was undoubtedly
on his trial. Ho would state the circumstances very
briefly, as the captain was there to make his own state-
ment ; but it would be an injustice to the highly respec-
table company by which he was engaged if he did not
at once state that they had manifested every anxiety to
keep the witnesses together, which was not always an
easy matter, and to assist the government in their en-
quiry. The Tyno was built at Newcastle iu 1854, and
her registered tonnngo was 1,788 4-10, giving including
the tonnage of the engine-room, a total capacity of about
2,100 tons. There were three sourcesof information open
to them—the (facers in charge of the vessel, the log-
book, and the passengers. He should not trouble them
with any extensive body of evidence, as that of the pas•
engers was out of the question, all of them being in bed
at the time of the disaster, and they could give no evi-
dence of its immediae antecedents. The logbook was
in court, and the officers, including Capt. Valler himself.
It was truethat the master was not a disinterested witness,
but from the communications he had had with kim, ho was
satisfied that he would be a mos', trustworthy and honest
witness, although his own character and position were at
stake. C.ipt. Valler, had under the old law, obtained a
certificate from the Trinity Board, and on the consolida-
tion of the maritime laws under the Merchant Shipping
Act, 1854, he obtained a certificate from the Board of
Trade. He was an accurate and skilful navigator, or he
would not have been in the service of the company fur 15
or 16 years. The learned gentleman then narrated the
circumstances preceding the stranding of the ship, as
they are detailed la Capt. Valler's evidence. It might
reasonably be asked how, in such weather, with a
tempestuous sea and a dark and hazy night, Captain
Valler had not continued to take soundings in a po-
sition where the perils of the navigation were a
matter of notoriety ? It appeared to him that the
lea .l ought to have been repeatedly used after the Port-
land Lights had dipped. Toe depths varied from 32 to
as low as 4 and 6 fathoms of water; but Captain Valler
had not used the lead from the time of passing the Port-
land Lights till the steamer was stranded. It would be
for the Magistrates to consider whether the neglect had
contributed to the disaster. If it could be proved that
it did not no one would rej )ice more than he should if
Captain Valler lett the court without a stain upon his
professional character. On the contrary, no matter how
high and flattering his testimonials might be, they were
bound, in jestice to the public, as they valued the safety
of life and property, not to be influenced in his favour by
those testimonials, but to make such a report as justice
and the facts of the case would warrant.
Ater some discussion between Mr. O'Dowd and Mr.
Coxwell, who appeared for Captain Valler,
Captain William Valler was sworn, and stated that he
was master of the Tyne, and had a certificate of com-
petency under the Board of Trade. Had been engaged
in the navigation of vessels as master for 18 years, 15
of which were in the service of the Royal Mail Com-
patiy. Had been at sea 21 years in al'. Substituted the
Trinity Board vertificate for the one he obtained under
the Beard of Trade. Had comin4nded the Tyne two
voyages to the Brazils and seven to the West Indies.
On the last homeward voyage left Pernambuco on the
23d of December. Had 53 passengers and a small cargo.
All the passengers were bound for Southampton, and
were nearly all first class. The passenger trade is an
important part of the trade between the Brazils and
Southampton. They took out about 180 passengers on
the last voyage. They had very strong head winds
nearly the whole of the passage home. Notbiug parti-
cular happened till the morning of the 12th. Saw Ushant
Light about 5 o'clock in the morning. (The logbook
was here asked for by Mr. O'Dowd, and handed in to
the Court) The handwriting in the logbook is the
chief-officer's. The logbook is made up every watch,
from the entries on the log-slate by the officers on
watch, and witness puts his signature when satisfied
of the correctness of the entries. Observed Ushant
Light above 15 minutes after five, bearing E. by
N. N. After seeing Ushant Light Wiped the course
(if the ship to N.E., and kept in that direction till 7
o'clock, and then altered to E. by N. 4 N., which was
the direction for Portland. The weather b:-came thick.
At 11 30 a.m. sounded, and on lifting up the lead found
they had no bottom at 40 fathoms. At 4 in the after-
noon sounded again, and found 46i fathoms, sand and
shells. At G, found 41 fathoms, sand. At 8, 36 fathoms,
coarse around. Was about 40 miles from Portland at
this tinie. Sighted the Portland Lights at 11 20 p.m.,
and 10 minutes afterwards altered the course of the ship
to eastward, to shape her course to the Needles. At
midnight stopped the engines and sounded, to ascertain
the distance from Portland Lights ; found 30 fathoms,
coarse ground. That he considered put him about 12
miles to the southward of Portland Race. The vessel
was then going slow, and had been from the afternoon
previous. By the log was going about 7 knots. The
wind was E.S.E. at this time. Saw the Portland Lights
again at 1 a.m. on the 13th, bearing N.N.E. E. At
1 40 the lights bore N., and at 2 18 saw the two lights
in one, hearing N.N.W. W. At 2 25 the lights
dipped, bearing N.W. by N. N. The weather came
on very thick and hazy, but for which they would have
been able to see the lights longer. Had no lights at this
time by which to steer. Did not sound afterwards. He
did not consider this part of the Channel more perilous
than any other part. There was not much variation in
the depths of the Channel between Portland and the
Needles. Looking at the chart he found from 12 to 17
fathoms at the south of Kimmeridge Ledge. If there
were only 4 fathoms at any place it must be within a
cable's length—quite close to the Ledge. He found one
part marked 6, and 17 close to it. Was on deck all
night. Did not leave five minutes together, just to go
down to the cabin to examine the charts. Was not in
the habit of communicating with the helmsman, but
through the officer on duty. The second-officer was on
duty that night. Depended upon the steering, making an
allowance for the inset, to keep the ship clear of every-
thing. By the inset he meant the effect of a wind and tide
upon the bow of the ship, which, as she was light and going
at half speed, was calculated to send the ship in. As it
proved, be did not make sufficient allowance for this. If
it had not been for the fog he should have kept the ship
more to the east. Was as familiar as any master could be
with that part of the channel. The vessel might have
struck even if he had made regular soundings from one
o'clock onwards, because they might have gone within a
mile of the ridge, and got the same depth of water-16
or 17 fathoms—as outside of St. Alban's Head, at in a
fair way for the Needles. If he had sounded and found 16
fathoms he should have considered himself in a safe posi-
tion. If he had sounded and found 9 fathoms, he should
not have considered it safe, and should have hauled out
' to the southward. Should not have considered 12 fathoms
dangerous if he bad passed St. Alban's Head, which he
thought he had. The vessel had three compasses, which
he found to agree very well, and he threw no blame on
them. He attributed the disaster to the combined causes
he had named, and the spring tide must have been run-
ning 5 to 6 miles an hour. Did not know this at the
time, and had no idea that they would run so strong.
About 20 minutes to 4 o'clock on the morning of the 13th,
after losing sight of the Portland Lights, and finding it
come on very thick and hazy he went to the companion
door, with the intention of going to the engineer of the
watch to desire him to pump the boilers up, ashe
band
when to stop at 4 o'clock. He had the door in,h, b
when he heard the officer on watch call out, ar d.n11
a-
port," and supposed at the time it was a vessel crossing
them. He rushed from the companion door to abreast
of the engine room, the officer of the watch at the same
time calling out " hard-a-port." Asked him what was the
matter, and he said there were breakers
hon the port bow.
Witness immediately called out to stop er. Be ore the
ship's way was stopped he felt
_heetr_graze_aaleotngtherocks,
and the next moment she was h d and fast. Turned the
engines astern, and found they could not move her,
kept the engines
going for some time, but, finding
she did not come off, cleared away the boats. They
then prepared to run an anchor out astern ; lowered
the three lifeboats, the mail boat, the cutter, and the
gig ; sent them outside the surf and anchored them.
There was a very heavy westerly swell when
the vessel struck, and the fog was so thick that the land
could not be made out for half an hour afterwards. It
was nearly low water. He frequently examined the
• compasses from the time they ceased taking soundings.
Mr. O'Dowd—l am bound to ask the question—Were
you sober on that night !
Captain Valler—l was perfectly sober. I am not in
the habit of getting drunk.
Mr. O'Dowd—l was bound to ask the question, and
was fully prepared for that answer.
Captain Walker said he thought there was no doubt of
the ship being well navigated till they reached the Port-
land Lights.
By Captain Walker—lt was his practiea to compare
the compasses and correct them by observations two or
three times a-day. The bearings were always taken by
the standard compasses. Considered the variation in
the Channel to be 24 degrees, to which be added five or

six degrees. [lt was therefore necessary to allow an error
of 29 or 30 degrees altogether. That applies to an easterly
course. Took a kind of hand bearing, and could not
estimate correctly within a quarter of a point. From the
time of leaving liehant till they sighted Portland took
soundings every two hours, and the engines were
"slowed" from 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The weather
was getting very thick and hazy, and he reduced to
half speed, in case of crossing any ship making down
Channel. The f,g came over just as they lest sight o
the Portland Lights. When the lights were seen in
one he knew pretty well his position, and did not
think it necessary to take soundings, only he could not
estimate their distance exactly. Had made many voy
ages in command of the Royal Mail Company's ships, and
was well acquainted with the Channel. It was high
water between Portland and St. Alban's between 10 and
11 o'clock. The steamer went ashore on the morning
of the 13th, about three days after the full moon. It
would therefore be low water about 6 o'clock. With the
two lights in one, and the distance estimated at 8 or 10
miles, he shaped the ship's course east, and continued
that course until the ship struck. In estimating an
easterly course he would allow 30 degrees to the north.
In steering that course he estimated it would take the
ship five miles from St. Alban's Head. The distance
from the Pentland to St. Alban's is about 15 miles.
When the lights dipped they were considerably to the
eastward of the Bill, and much nearer to St. Alban's.
Capt. Walker—According to the Admiralty chart the
spring tides run about 31 knots an hour. You think
they were rather stronger on this occasion ?
Witness—Yes.
By Capt. Walker—Did not think that if he had
kept on sounding the ship would have been kept out
of danger, as the ground was the same till within
about a mile from the shore. They might have hove
the lead in 17 fathoms, and in 10 minutes have been
in 14 fathoms. If he had kept in 14 fathoms the ship
would not have been in danger, but he would not have
approached less. If the man bad been kept constantly
in the chains during the two hours after sighting
Portland the soundings might have indicated the ap-
proach of danger, but he did not think they would have
saved the ship, as the water shoaled so suddenly. After
losing sight of the lights, and judging the vessels to be
in a correct position, be thought it useless to sound, and
steered by compasses only. He made allowance for the
ebb tide, and considered the variation a quarter of a
point. There would be a set of four or five miles' tide.
The vessel was going at seven miles.
Captain Walker—l wish to repeat my question. If
you had kept the lead constantly going from the time
the lights dipped would you not have had sufficient
arning that you were approaching the land—would it
not have indicated danger ?
Captain Valler—l think it would not, as there are 14
fathoms within a mile of land. I should not have con-
sidered 14 fathoms dangerous, but I might have hauled
out a little.

Captain Walker—Then, Captain Valley, I am to sup.
pone the heaving the lead is no guide for a ship going
down Channel ?

Captain Taller—l do not think it of any nse to heave
a hand•lead in the Channel in shaping a ship's course.
If you consider yourself in a dangerous position the lead
may be of use. I used the lead every two hours in cross-
ing from Ushant to Portland, in accordance with the
company's regulations.
Captain Walker—lf you considered it necessary to
Use the lead where the whole Channel was open to you,
did yon not think it more necessary when you got into
the Chan_iel ?

Captain Valler—l did not think it necessary. The
regulations of the company are on entering the benne!
to take soundings every two hours.
Py Mr. Lobb—l am not aware that we are required
to sound more frequently when nearing land.
By Captain Walker—lf he had sounded and got 14
fathoms, he would have hauled her out to thesouthward.
He would have considered himself to the eastward of
St. Athan's.

By Captain Breton—ln 14 fathoms the ship might
have been saved.

Captain Viralker--You must be aware, Capt. ti alley,
that on getting into the Channel every precaution
ought t) have been taken.

Captain Valler—l did take every precaution I
thought necessary.
Captain Walker—l have no doubt you did what you
thougnt right at the time.
Captain Valler said that such a circumstance as St.
Alban's Head not being seen at two cables' length would
not happen once in 20 years.
Captain Walker here read an extract from a book of
the company's regulations, requiring that on approaching
the land, or entering a port or roadstead, with or with-
out a pilot on board, two leads should be kept constantly
sounding.
Mr. C. A. White, chief officer of the Tyne, was next
sworn, and stated that he had been 11 years and 4 months
in the company's service. Had heard Capt. Valler's
examination and his description of the state of the wea-
ther, and there was nothing which he could add. He
came on deck the moment the ship struck.
Captain Walker—lf the lead had been hove within
Portland, might the ship have been saved ?

Witness.—l can't answer that.
Captain Walker—Are you incompetent, or do you
decline to answer !
Witness-1 decline to answer.
Capt. Walker—l presume, when you were appointed
chief officer, you were considered competent to take the
place of the master. Now, I ask, in your opinion,
whether, if the lead had been constantly hove after pass-
ing Portland, the ship might have been saved!
WitLe3s—lt is possible the lead would have kept her
out of danger. I think it might.
By Mr. Coxwell—l only declined to answer the ques.
tion at first, because I thought I wa3 not compelled to
do so.

Mr. W. A. Wright, third officer, said had he been in
charge during the last quarter of an hour before the ship
struck, and the weather as thick as it then was, he should
have hove the lead, as an additional precaution. There
were several men on the look out ; one on each bow.
Land was not seen until five minutes before the ship
struck. The passengers were in no danger at any time
after she struck.

JoLa O'Brien, quartermaster, said it was very unusual
to use the lead after land had been made. In thick and
hazy weather it might be kept going, as a matter of

precaution..

Captain Vincent, R.N., Superintendent of Royal Mail
Steam Packet Company at Southampton, gave his opi-
nion that when Captain Valler found the weather come
on thick, he should have hauled his ship more off shore
to the southward, or have stopped and got a cast of the
lead. In clear weather, neither of these precautions
would have been necessary, as the land could be seen.
He c-,nsidered the stranding of the Tyne to have arisen
from Captain Valler not making due allowance for the
strong ebb tide which was running from the time he
passed Portland till the ship got ashore. This and the
wind on her bow would send her six points to leeward,
more than half the speed she was going through the
water. There was want of forethought on the part of
Captain Valler in not making sufficient allowance.
This closed the inquiry, but the result will not be
made known until it has been communicated to the
Board of Trade.

The Court admitted the previous high character of
Captain Valler.

RAILWAY INTELLIGENCE.

LONDON AND SOUTH-WESTERN.

The directors of this company have resolved to recom-
mend to the proprietors at the general meeting on the
12th of February next that the dividend for the hall-
year ending the 31st of December, 1856, be at the rate
of 61. 10s. per cent, per annum on the capital of the
company, making, with the previous dividend, 6 per
cent. for the year.

RAILWAY AND OTHER BILLS IN PARMA-

MENT.

Yesterday the Standing Orders of the Lords and Com-
mons were declared to have been complied with in the
following cases :—Leslie Railway ; the Cannooh Mineral
Railway ; London and South Western Railway (to
make derivations, and abandon parts of South Western,
Salisbury, and Yeovil and Salisbury Market Lines, and
in lieu, to construct new lines, and other purposes ; and
to authorise London and South Western and Great
Western to raise slid apply capital ; engineesing estimate,
100,000/.) ; the Cork and Bandon Railway ; and the
Stockport, Disley, and Whaley-bridge Railway Exten-
sions. Also the Eastern Counties Railway Bill, for
making a line from Shenfield Station and Maldon t•
London and Tilbury at Pitsea, and to River Crouch and
Chelmer Navigation, at a cost of 373,5001., according
to the estimate of Mr. Bruff, the engineer ; the Dublin
and Wicklow Railway Extension ; the North Stafford-
shire Railway (to
City
iatvyi
lewas
atnydi :28tiuht
besuerEvbeal renaclt
Electric
Ta,
1)
and;g
rt
athhpe
the
TNCr a loorr
ae•at
h.
panancly,lEGilaarnegoewy,
Level Drainage. The Dublin and Meath Bill is given
up.