The Sun.
London, England, 1861-01-23 00:00:00

...........
the city of Charleston. With great personal regard, I
remain, yours very respectfully,

JAMES BUCHANAN.
To lion. Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams, James
L. Orr.

"SECOND LETTER OF THE COMMISSIONERS TO THE
PRESIDENT.
" Washington, D. C., Jan. 1.
" Sir,—We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt
of ycur letter of the 30th of December, in reply to a note
addressed by us to you, on the 28th of the same month, as
Commissioners from South Carolina.l
" In reference to the declaration with which your reply
commences, that your position as President of the United
States was already defined in the Message to Congress of
the 3d inst. ;' that you possess ' no power to change the re-
lations heretofore existing between South Carolina and the
United States,' muth less to acknowledge the independence
of that State,' and that, consequently, you could meet us
only as private gentlemen of the highest character, with an
entire willingness to communicate to Conjress any propo-
sition we might have to make—we deem it only necessary
to say that the State of South Carolina, having, in the
exercise of the great right of self .government which under-
lies all our political organisations, declared herself SONO •
reign and independent, we, as her representatives, felt no
special solicitude as to the character in which you inight
recognise us. Satisfied that the State had simply exercised
her unquestionable right, we were prepared, in order to
reach substantial good, to waive the formal considerations
which your constitutional scruples might have prevented
you from extending. We come here therefore expecting to
be received as you did receive us, and perfectly content
with that entire willingness, of which you assured us, to
submit any proposition to Congress which we might have
to make upon the subject of the independence of the State.
The willingness was ample recognition of the condition of
public affairs which rendered our presence necessary. In
this position, however, it is our duty, both to the State
which we represent and to ourselves, to correct several im-
portant misconceptions of our letter, into which you have
fallen.
" You say 'lt was my earnest desire that such a dispo-
sition might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who
alone possesses the power to prevent the inauguration of a
civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of
the Federal force in the harbour of Charleston ; and I there-
fore deeply regret that in your opinion the events of the last
twenty-four hours render this impossible.' We expressed
no such opinion ; and the language which you quote of ours
is altered in its sense by the omission of a most important
part of the sentence. What we did say was, But the
events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assur-
ance impossible.' Place that assurance,' as contained in
our letter, in the sentence, and we are prepared to repeat it.
" Again, professing to quote our language, you say,—
' Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting
or asking for any explanation, and doubtless believing, as
you have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only
without, but against my orders,' &c. 'We expressed no such
opinion in reference to the belief of the people of South
Carolina. The language which you have quoted was applied
solely and entirely to our assurances obtained here, and
based, as you well know, upon your own declaration, a
declaration which at that time it was impossible for the
authorities.of South Carolina to have known. But, with-
out following this letter into all its details, we propose only
to meet the chief points of the argument.
" Some weeks ago the State of South Carolina declared
her intention, in the existing condition of public affairs, to
secede from the United States. She called a Conven-
tion of her people to put her declaration in force. The
Convention met and passed the Ordinance of Secession. All
this you anticipated, and your course of action was tho-
roughly considered in your annual Message. You declared
you had no right, and would not attempt to coerce a seced-
ing State ; but that you were bound by your constitutional
oath, and would defend the property of the United States
within the borders of South Carolina if an attempt was
made to take it by force. Seeing very early that this ques-
tion of property was a difficult and delicate one, ou mani-
fested a desire to settle it without a collision. You did not
reinforce the garrison in the harbour of Charleston. You
removed a distinguished and veteran officer from the com-
mand of Fort Moultrie because he attempted to increase his
supply of ammunition. You refused to send additional
troops to the same garrison when applied for by the officer
appointed to succeed him. You accepted the resignation
of the oldest and most eminent member of your Cabinet,
rather than allow the garrison to be strengthened. You
compelled an officer stationed at Fort Sumter to return im-
mediately to the arsenal 40 muskets which he had taken
to arm his men. You expressed, not to one, but to many
of the most distinguished of our public characters, whose
testimony will be placed upon the record whenever it is
necessary, your anxiety for a peaceful termination of this
controversy, and your willingness not to disturb the
military status of the forts, if commissioners should
be sent to the Government, whose communications
you promised to submit to Congress. You received
mad acted on assurances from the highest official autho-
rities of South Carolina that no attempt should be
made to disturb your possession of the forts and property of
the United States, if you would not disturb their existing
condition until the Commissioners had been sent and the
attempt to negotiate had failed. You took from the mem-
bers of the House of Representatives a written memorandum
that no such attempt should be made, ' provided that no
reinforcements should be sent into those forts, and their
'dative military statue shall remain as at present.' And
although you attach no force to the acceptance of such a
paper—although you considered it as nothing more in
effect than the promise of highly honourable gentlemen'—
as an obligation on one side, without corresponding obliga-
tion on the other—it must be remembered (if we were
rightly informed) that you were pledged, if you ever did
send reinforcements, to return it to those from whom you
had received it, before you eiecuted your i esolution. You
sent orders to your officers commanding them strictly to
follow a line of conduct in conformity with such an under-
standing. Besides all this, you had received formal and
official notice from the governor of South Carolina that we
had been appointed Commissioners, and were on our way to
Washington. You knew the implied condition under which
we cam C, our arriv»l wits notmea 10 you, and an hour
appointed for an interview. We arrived in Washington on
Wednesday, at 3 o'clock, and you appointed an interview
with Ili at 1 the next day. Early on that day (Thursday)
the news was received here of the movement of Major Ander-
son. That news was communicated to you immediately, and
you postponed our meeting until half-past 2 o'clock on
Friday, in order that you might consult your Cabinet. On
Friday we saw you, and we called upon you then to redeem
your pledge. You could not deny it. With the facts we
have stated, and in the face of the crowning and conclusive
fact that your Secretary for War had resigned his seat in
the Cabinet upon the publicly avowed ground tii.at the action
of Major Anderson had violated the pledged faith of the
Government, and that unless the pledge was instantly re-
deemed ho was dishonoured, denial was impossible.;
seek
did not deny it. You do not deny it now, but you seek to
escape from its obligation on the grounds, first, that we
terminated all negotiation by demanding, as a preliminary,
the withdrawal of the United States troops from the harbour
of Charleston ; and, second, that the authorities of South
Carolina, instead of asking explanation, and giving you the
opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other
property of the United States. We will examine both.
" In the first place we deny positively that we have ever
in any way made any such demand. Our letter is in your
possession ; it will stand by this on record ; in it we inform
you of the objects of cur mission. We say that it would
have been our duty to have assured you of our readiness to
commence negotiations, with the most earnest and anxious
desire to settle all questions ihetween us amicably and to our
mutual advantage, but that events had rendered that assu-
rance impossible. We stated the events, and we said that
until some satisfactory explanation of these events was
given us we could not proceed ; and then, having made
this request for explanation, we added and. in conclusion,
we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the
troops from the harbour of Charleston. Under present cir-
cumstances they are a standing menace, which renders ne-
gotiation impossible,' &c. ',Under present circumstances
What circumstances ? Why, clearly the occupation of Fort
Sumter and the dismantling of Fort Moultrie by Major
Anderson, in the face of your pledges, and without explana-
tion or practical disavowal. And there is nothing in the
letter which would or could have prevented you from de-
clining to withdraw the troops and offering the restoration
of the status to which you were pledged, if such has been
your desire. It would have been wiser and better, in our
opinion, to have withdrawn the troops, and this opinion we
urged upon you, but we demanded nothing but such an ex-
planation of the events of the last 24 hours as would restore
our confidence in the spirit with which the negotiations
should be conducted. In relation to this withdrawal of the
troops from the harbour, we are compelled, however, to
notice one passage of your letter. Referring to it, you say,
' This I cannot do. This I will not do. Such an idea was
never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No
allusion to it had ever been made in any communication
between myself and any human being.'
" In reply to this statement we are compelled to say that
your conversation with us left upon our minds the distinct
impression that you did seriously contemplate the with-
drawal of the troops from Charleston harbour. And in sup-
port of this impression we would add that we have the posi-
tive assurance of gentlemen of the highest possible public
reputation and the most unsullied integrity—men whose
name and fame, secured by long services and patriotic
achievements, place their testimony beyond cavil—that
such suggestions had been made to aild urged upon you by
them, and had formed the subject of more than one earnest
discussion with you. And it was this knoti ledge that in-
duced us to urge upon you a policy which had to recom-
mend it its own wisdom and the might of such authority.
As to the second point, that the authorities of South Caro-
lina, instead of asking explanations, and giving you the
opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other
property of the United States, we should observe—first, that
even if this were so it does not avail you for defence, for the
opportunity for decisime was afforded you before those facts
occutred. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday; the
news from Major Anderson reached here early on Thursday,
and was immediately communicated to you. All that day
men of the highest consideration—men who had striven
successfully to lift you to your great office, who had been
your tried and true friends through the troubles of your
Administration—sought you and entreated you to act—to
act at once. They told you that every hour complicated
your position. They only asked you to give the assurance
that if the facts were so—that if the commander had acted
without and against your orders, and in violation of your
pledges—that you would restore the status you had pledged
your honour to maintain. You refused to decide. Your
Secretary at 'War, your immediate and proper adviser in
this whole matter, waited anxiously for your de-
cision until he felt that delay was becoming dis-
honour. More than twelve hours passed, and two Cabinet
meetings had adjourned, before you knew what the autho-
rities of South Carolina had done, and your prompt decision
at any moment of that time would have avoided the subse-
quent complications. But, if you had known the acts of
the authorities of South Carolina, should that have pre-
vented your keeping your faith ? What was the condition
of things? For the last 60 days you have had in Charles-
ton harbour not force enough to hold the forts against an
equal enemy. Two of them were empty—one of those two
the most important in the harbour. It could have been
taken at any time. You ought to know better than any
man that it would have been taken but for the efforts of
those who put their trust in your honour. Believing that
they were threatened by Fort Sumter especially, the people
were with difficulty restrained from securing without blood
the possession of this important fortress. After many and
reiterated assurances given on your behalf, which we cannot
believe were unauthorised, they determined to forbear, and
in good faith sent on their Commissioners to negotiate with
you. They meant you no harm—wished you no ill. They
thought of you kindly, believed you true, and were willing,
as far as was consistent with duty, to spare you unneces-
sary and hostile collision. Scarcely had these Commis-
sioners left than Major Anderson waged war. No other
wards will describe his action. It was not a peaceful
change from one fort to another ; it was a hostile act in the
highest sense, and only justified in the presence of a supe-
rim- enemy, and in imminent peril. He abandoned his
position, spiked his guns, burned his
gun. carriageS, made
preparations for the destruction of his post, and withdrew
under cover of the night to a safer position. This was war.
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