The Sun.
London, England, 1859-01-03 00:00:00

who were condemned to lie for months idle in the
home ports, because they could not get men enough
to venture out to sea and face an enemy. Admiral
Napier openly declared in Parliament that he
could not with so weakly manned a fleet have un-
dertaken any hostilities against Russia, and the
admiral had already, in the year 1850, warned the
Admiralty in a published letter, that in the event
of a Russian attack by sea the English fleet could
not, for want of men, make any effectual opposition,
and that England would inevitably fall a prize to
either a Russian or French invasion.

In former years recourse was had to pressing—
that is, the seamen were taken from the mercantile
shipping. It may fairly be a question whether
this would be in the first place sanctioned by Par-
liament, as it would give a death-blow to Eng-
land's trade and most important interests ; or
whether it would be practicable in the face of pub-
lic opinion. The Government itself does not
appear to consider pressing as an available mea-
sure. It would appear that recourse would be
had to pressing only in case of utmost need, from
the so-called Coastguard having been established
about four years back, which is modelled after
the Equipages de Ligne ; and it is thought that
pressing, that remnant of meditevar,roughness, may
be superseded by the formation of a fixed corps of
seamen. This institution is, however, too young to
afford already the desired results, and it will re-
quire several years before the Coastguard can fulfil
its object, considering the little attraction which
the naval service seems to possess for the English
sailor,

In France 'impressment has been abolished for
now 200 years, at which time in its stead the far-
seeing Minister of Louis XIV. established the
above-mentioned inscription maritime. This in-
scription combines all the seafaring population of
France like one family, who are put under the
guardianship of the State for their own and the
State necessities. The sea service requires a long
apprenticeship; and it is impossible to train a re-
cruit into a seaman in the time that will suffice to
make a soldier. With this experience the " in-
scription maritime" has been founded, the prin-
ciple of which is as follows :
Every man who is engagedin the service of ship-
ping or in fisheries, on the coast or at the mouths
of rivers which flow into the sea, and who is there-
fore acquainted with the sea, is entered on the
muster roll of the Marine—first provisionally, and
then definitively, when he has declared that he
will remain a seaman. The period of his liability
to service, and the power which the inscription
gives to the State over the seaman, extends from 18
to 50 years of age. In time of peace a seaman can
free himself from the inscription by declaring, one
year beforehand, that he intends to quit the sea
service or fishery. So long, however, as he con-
tinues on the list he must obey the call of the State.
All seamen who are not called upon to serve, can,
under fixed rules, freely dispose of themselves, but
must, wherever they may be, immediately obey any,
call for service in the fleet. The levies from the in-
scribed aremade in a regular manner, and in such
way that those seamen who have served the least on
board ship, and have not passed their 40th year, are
the first taken. The duration of their active service is
the same as that of the land service. Besides their
pay, of which they can during their service allot a
portion to their families, they have prize money for
any enemy's ships that they may capture. Their
pay cannot be confiscated, and in consideration of
their arduous services they receive, after a_certain
number of years, pensions and support from the
State. Moreover, they cannot be transferred to any
other than the naval service.

As it is not absolutely necessary to man a ship of
war solely with seamen, and it is sufficient under
all circumstances for the efficient service of the ship
that two-thirds of the complement should be sea-
men, it is, therefore, and in consideration of the re-
quirements of the mercantile marine, provided in
the inscription that only two-thirds should be held
ready.
The levies are calculated according to the actual
amount of the navy in commission. With the in-
crease of the French foreign trade, which at the
time of Napoleon's wars was reduced almost to no-
thing, the number of the inscribed has materially
increased, and especially in the last ten years. In
the year 1825 the list gave 94,611; in 1845, 125,272;
and 1855, 162,000 as liable to sea service, at the
same time that the peace establishment of the
French navy called for only 50,000 men. France is
therefore not only in a position to man her navy
fully with seamen, but also possesses, in the event
of a serious war, where the trade by sea would have
to be discontinued, a reserve of 42,000 men, as much
as in the time of Napoleon I. the whole inscription
maritime at the utmost produced.
However good this institution might appear to
be for manning the navy, it helped but little in the
earlier stages of its organisation; and as in respect
of its inferiority in ably manning the fleet other na-
tions, and especially England, surpassed it, France
was compelled to introduce here also some modifi-
cations. This consisted, as we have before shown,
in the establishment in the year 1822 of a military
marine force, the Equipages de Ligne. People
were at last convinced that it was not enough to
have ships and to fill them up with men, even if
these men came from the inscription and were sea-
men ; but that the •ship's complement, in order
to be worth anything, must be accustomed to the ,
life of a ship of war, and have confidence in them-
selves.

" When it is the question," says Admiral the
Prince de Joinville in his Essat sur la Marine
Francaise, to fit out the ships of a fleet, that is
only a matter of expense. Money, which a State
can always extract, achieves this point and fits out
the ships. But gold provides no sailors, no trained
ships' companies, no experienced officers ; and what
are ships without these living elements of a reliable
crew. To provide these, to educate and raise them
up, is the first care of a naval Power, and the
heaviest part of its task. For everything else there
is the means so long as there is the will." The
abandonment and neglect of this fundamental truth,
which Colbert had in view when he established the
inscription, had cost France dear in the wars of the
Revolution and Napoleon I. Then followed the re-
establishment of the Equipages de Ligne from the
inscribed and from volunteers; and through them
was created a regular stock for the several ships'
complements, since the strongest and most expe-
rienced seamen were sought out, and the greatest
attention paid to their training for man-of-war ser-
vice.

The corps of Equipages de Ligne is divided into
five divisions, one of each belongs to each of the
five French military ports—Brest, Toulon, L'Orient,
Cherbourg, and Rochefort. Each division consists
of permanent (provisional) depot and ships' boys
companies, each of which is 103: strong. The
strength of the whole corps was in the year 1845
36,000 men, but is now grown to 60,000. As a sub-
division of the _Equipages de Ligne is the corps of
Artillery of Marine, which is charged with the ser-
vice of the ports and arsenals, the manufacture of
the guns, and preparation of the ammunition. In
the year 1845 the Marine Artillery consisted of 30
companies of active service men, and six companies
of artificers, forming a total of 4,529 men, including
222 officers. But this corps also has been mate-
rially increased, and numbers now 6,000 men. The
seamen gunners, who amount to an effective force
of 3,500, are embodied with the five divisions of
Equipages de Ligne.
Independently of the preceding body, France has
also the Infiznterte de la Marine, or naval soldiers,
who are not, however, as in England, permanently
on board, but only on extraordinary occasions. The
Marine Infantry forms the garrisons of the war
ports and colonies, the administration of which be-
longs to the Department of Marine. Ther effective
strength reaches 20,000 men, and their organisation
is almost the same as that of the infantry of the
army. Besides these there is also a permanent
company at L'Orient, and a Gendarmerie Maritime
for the police of the ports-400 men—who are re-
cruited from trustworthy non-commissioned officers
of the marine troops, and consist of five ocmpanies.
Further, the convict guards-1,600 men—at the
three harbours of Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon,
where convicts are employed. Then five companies
of seamen artificers, for the preparation of ships'
rigging at the several war ports ; next the fire-
brigade men, also five companies strong. Finally,
there is also the corps of; Ingenieurs of the Imperial
navy, which supplies the designers of the fleet, 500
strong, and which is supplied from the Polytechnic
School.
Adding these several corps together, we have a
sum total of 92,000 available combatants with which
France can at any moment man her fleet, besides
the reserve which the Inscription Maritime holds
in readiness.
Taking into account the personnel of the English
navy, we will assume that the peace establishment
which England keeps up without difficulty, and
which would represent the Equipages de Ligne of
France, is the normal condition. This peace
establishment, from the budget of 1847, which is
the only one we can lay our hands upon, shows
that, exclusive of 12,000 marines (who can be added
or substracted on either side), the number was
34,000 sailors and boys, to which, adding the
Coastguard, who will in five years amount to 6,000
men, we find that under all circumstances the avail-
able force of the fleet amounted to 40,000 men.
Acid yet the seamen artificers, police of the ports,
&c., making about 10,000 men, and we have a
total of 50,000 men who can really be relied upon.
England, therefore, stands behind. France as
regards the personnel of her navy, as we have
shown by the comparison, and we shall not err
when we state that in this respect the comparison

between England and France stands as two to
three.

However, the necessity for men does not alone
come before us. Experienced naval officers are also
required. There it must be allowed that France
has shown remarkable forethought in perfecting an
effective corps of naval officers, and in case of need,
in providing additions to it, and this has led to re-
gulations such as exist hitherto nowhere but in
Prussia. It is this, namely—that no French mer-
chant captain has permission to command a ship
until he shall have served two years on board a
ship of war, and shall have passed an examination
to show that he is enabled to undertake the duties
of an officer of the sea service. By these rules the
Government insures, in case of necessity, that some
thousand young and capable seamen shall be avail-
able from among whom to choose : and they are
not under the necessity of having recourse to un-
fit, invalid, and decrepid officers when On a sudden
any extraordinary number of ships are called into
service. As captains and officers of ships of war
men in full vigour are especially needful; old offi-
cers prove themselves no longer equal to the exer-
tions of the service.
At the same time this arrangement affords a re-
markable relief to the budget, and diminishes ma-
terially the extrordinary sacrifice of money to
which England is condemned by its regulations for
the support of the corps of naval officers. When
England, in time of peace, has not the half of her
ships in commission, she must keep up and pay, in
case a war should occur, the corps of officers for the
other half; because she wants the preparation for an
easy and sufficient reinforcement. It therefore
happens that we find in the English naval esti-
mates for the half-pay of naval officers an enormous
sum, which must fill with astonishment any one
not conversant with the fact. But still more, not
only all those who are liabl3 for active service at
sea, but all unfit officers, draw half-pay and ad-
vance quietly on. In the budget of 1847, which
we have here brought under consideration as a
peace budget, £726,000 are thrown away as half-pay
of officers, and besides £492,000 more for pensions.
—An aggregate amount which represents the fifth
part of the whole budget ; while in France the half-
pay is only 2,000,000 f. and the pensions 6,000,000 f.,
being the fourth part of the English sum, and the
14th part of the French marine budget. The bad
system by -which in England unfit half-pay officers
advance on in rank has this great disadvantage,
that they will not allow themselves to be com-
pletely pensioned off. The progress of the re-
mainder is consequently so retarded that in the
year 1847 there was no English Admiral under 70,
no Vice-Admiral under 65, and no Hear-Admiral
under 60 years of age. Officers of so great an age
are seldom at all fit for the field in the army, and
much less are they fit for naval war, the fatigues of
which are far greater. Young officers are a neces-
sity for the fleet, and admirals over 60 years of age
will scarcely ever make active or successful com-
manders.

As concerns the manning of the two navies, Eng-
land is, as is shown in our exposition, decidedly in
the background. The English press rightly re-
marks on this unfavourable comparison, and calls
the attention of the nation to the entire sufficiency
of the French system. Here, however, another and
a very important circumstance presents itself, which
we must enter upon. This is the relative strength
of a fleet as opposed to the positive (the number of
ships, guns, and men), and consists in professional
efficiency, in the superior spirit and intelligence of
the individual, in better discipline and subordina-
tion, in personal courage and endurance, and which
is of so much value, and conduces so much to the
result of a battle. These relative powers stand out
in importance beyond anything else in naval ac-
tions, where we in numberless instances have seen
small ships engage with advantage larger ones, and
in which, on account of their peculiar nature, the
physical strength of the individual has less scope
than on land.
Let us now consider professional capacity, in
which respect one is accustomed to look at the Eng-
lish seaman as the very type of a sailor, and this
idea is so generally prevalent that we ourselves in
Germany are accustomed to rank our seamen after
the English, although this is altogether erro-
neous. There are no better seamen than
the Germans, and this fact will be allowed by all
foreign nations. On the other side, on the contrary,
a poor opinion is formed of the French, and they are
considered bad sailors. None were more confident in
this respect than the English, who always looked
back upon the swept up crews of the French ships
during the Revolution and under Napoleon 1., until
the Eastern war opened their eyes on this point,
and they made the discovery that the French crews
of the present day are no more those of 1806; but
that, on the contrary, they do not in the least re-
spect come behind those of England. The Prince
de Joinville had also first recognised this great
want for a navy, and supplied it by keeping con-
stantly large squadrons of evolution, by which
officers as well as men were trained into practical
seamen. The English were at all times compelled, on
account of their extensive colonies, to keep up even
in time of peace large squadrons constantly on ser-
vice, the crews of which kept in constant practice,
afforded a warlike body of men on the breaking out
of a war. This made them necessarily overpoweringly
superior to those of other nations, and especially the
newly shipped complements of the French fleet.
Since 1840, however, this fault in the French
navy has been removed by keeping up permanent
squadrons of evolution, which, under the excellent
guidance of Admirals Lalande, Joinville, Ducas,
Hamelin, and Brust, have become the training
schools of the present highly distinguished force in
seamen, which since 1833 has laid the foundation
for much humility and many sorrows to the former
superiority of the proud English.
Those who had the opportunity of seeing the
united fleets of the Western Powers in the Black
Sea and in the Baltic, and of instituting a compari-
son, must have very soon come to the conclusion
that all which appertains to manceuvres, tactics,
and exercises, was far better, quicker, and more
exactly executed by the French than by the Eng-
lish, and that a large portion of the prestige which
the English navy possessed from centuries back had
then vanished.
Again, with respect to theoretical training and
schooled intelligence the French are far a-head of the
English. While the English set only in the fore-
ground practical education, and make so litte ac-
count of theoretic that many of the English officers
cannot calculate a right-angled triangle, the French
sea officer ordinarily-combines with practical know-
ledge also a scientific training in philosophical ac-
quirements. The English in the education of their
sea officers go upon the system that no person can
be taken on board ship too young. Consequently
the majority of the youths destined for the sea ser-
vice are placed on board in their 12th year in order
to learn their practical duty. Their theoretical
and higher education is then usually as good as
stopped, and there is henceforward imparted to
them, wherewith to pass their examination for
lieutenant, only common acquirements, which, me-
chanically learnt, are soon forgotten, and are not in
any case educating to the mind. There are, it is
true, many efficient officers in the English navy, and
it has raised up men who have distinguished them-
selves by high professional acquirements, as well
as by general intellectual culture. But these men
have not to thank the public management for the
pre-eminence of their acquirements or of their edu-
cation, but only their own efforts, or the chance of
a better instruction and education at home. Those
who follow the ordinary run of naval officers will
carry away but little knowledge of their profession
—nay, it may even happen that an officer may re-
main at that point of nautical education practically
and theoretically, that he may occupy the post of
a naval officer, and yet not be able to carry a ship
across the sea. This fault is only possible through
a very peculiar institution. From the earliest times
in the English navy a class of employes, the masters
or navigators, a position between officer and sub-
officer, who cannot advance further, whose duty,
however, it is to convey the ship across the sea, to
make the astronomical observations and reckonings
and especially to be on board ship—those who do
understand navigation, whether theoretically or
practically, or the latter only, however, will not
be inquired into. To men of their subordinate
position, who, even if he should know, cannot be
controlled by other officers, is a valuable
ship as well as the lives of hundreds intrusted.
For the first time, lately, do they appear to have
perceived in England that the naval officer cannot
well do without a theoretical training for his prac-
tical calling. A naval college, has therefore, been
lately established in which the naval cadets are
taught something more than formerly. Whether
this will answer, with the objections English sea-
men feel against theoretical knowledge, time will
show.

Against the French, on the contrary, one might
have more readily reproached that they
.were too
theoretical if their efforts in practical education did
not prove the contrary. In France those pupils
who are destined for naval officers receive in the
Ecoles Navales, and also on board ship, a thorough
education. They are not allowed to pass their
examination for officers if they have not attained a
certain standard of education, which answers to the
higher college class. Navigation is there considered
as the first line of study, and each officer must be
scientifically grounded in his nautical reckonings,
which is not always the case with the English.
Under the control of the first lieutenant and
of the captain, a lieutenant in French ships per-
forms the duty a the English master ; although
the French have also a corresponding appointment
(chef de timonerie), or head helmsman. He is,
however, only the asssistant of the officer on duty,