The Sun.
London, England, 1859-08-20 00:00:00

THE FORTIFICATIONS OF ANTWERP.

BRUSSELS, AUG. 17.
The Chamber of Representatives was occupied
yesterday with the consideration of theprojet de loi
of the Government for the new fortifications at
Antwerp. The measure has acquired a great addi-
tional interest in consequence of the recent impor-
tant articles on the subject which have appeared in
several of the French journals, as well as in the
Independance Belge.
The discussion was opened by General Chazal, the
Minister of War, in a speech marked by much
eloquence, historical research, and sound reasoning.
The gallant general engaged the attention of the
Chamber for upwards of two hours, and at the con-
clusion of his address it adjourned until one o'clock
this day. The following is a brief sketch of his
address :
General Chazal commenced by observing that he
had heard a member of that Assembly some years
ago exclaim in accents of deep conviction that if he
were Minister of War he should not know repose
or tranquillity until the question of the national
defences had been fully considered and decided
upon. These words had made a deep impression
upon his mind, because they were, at the time they
were uttered, as they were at the present moment,
the expression of his own thoughts. Since that
period other members of the two parties in the
Chamber had demanded the solution of the ques-
tion. The Government had not, however, the
power to respond to those claims as soon as they
should have wished. The questions relating to the
national defences were, besides, the most difficult
and delicate of all those connected with military
arts ; and many countries long ago constituted, and
which were remarkable for their intelligence and
their initiation in all matters of improvement, had
been unable for many years to establish anything
like a system of complete defence. Everywhere the
question demanded long and serious consideration i
audit often required the experience of disastrous'wars
to establish a fixed idea on the subject. In France,
under Louis IV., a system of complete defence
was proposed by Vauban. The idea of that great
man was not at first comprehended. It required two
centuries and an invasion to effect the fortifications
of Paris. It was not, therefore, very surprising that
Belgium had not as yet a system of complete de-
fence. On being appointed Minister in 1847, his
first act was one connected with this important
question of national defences. He proposed the com-
mission that was then appointed, but whose labours
were interrupted by the events of 1848. In the face
even of those events he proposed to the King the
establishment of an entrenched camp at Antwerp,
and he confided the task of examining that project
to a special committee, which adopted the proposed
work as a provisional measure, recommending that
it should assume a permanent form when the cir-
cumstances of the country were more favourable to
the carrying out of such military operations. That
was the origin of the system of the proposed de-
fences of Antwerp. It was encountered with oppo-
nents everywhere, and many motives were ascribed
to the authors of it. An efficient system of national
defences rested in the first place upon the organisa-
tion of the physical strength of the nation ; in the
second place, upon a series of fortresses established
upon strategical pcints the most convenient for the
concentration of its strength and for maintaining
the great roads of communication. Every country
had a special system of defences suggested by its
peculiar topographical position, and its geographi-
cal conformation. Switzerland being a mountainous
country, could not defend itself in the same manner
as Belgium or Holland—flat countries which were
intersected with rivers and canals. The kingdom of
the Low Countries had a system of defences which
were near completion when the revolution of 1830
broke out. That system was principally directed
against France. They could not preserve it. In the
first place they could no longer c mint upon an allied
army of 60,000 men. In the second place, the neu-
trality which they had accepted prohibited them
from directing their defences only against a parti-
cular power. Since 1830 numerous roads running
from the extelior to the heart of the country, and
bridges over rivers, viewed as lines of defence, were
constructed ; but neither those roads nor those
bridges were of the slightest use as works of de-
fence unless they were commanded by fortresses.
Certain fortresses were subsequently built, with
breaches in them to allow locomotives pass through,
and arsenals with magaz'nes were constructed.
All such works had been interdicted under the
Government of the Low Countries. A new system
of defences was then recommended. The commis-
sion advised the adoption of a system by which the
defences of the country would be concentrated in
one stroll,. place. It was said that the concentra-
tion of the army in one strong position would be in
effect the abandonment to the enemy of the rest of
the country, and the reduction of the army to a
humiliating role. Ignorance or malevolence had
propagated that idea amongst the masses, which
were too easily deceived upon military questions.
Far from finding a security in the dissemination of
the forces, he contended that they would only create
dangers. To guard all, in order to save all, was an
idea of another epoch. A particular place where
an army could complete itself, could organise itself,
could fortify itself, was much more useful to a
country than 20 places which the enemy could with
little difficulty take, but which it would be impos-
sible for him to make the central point of his move-
ments. It is thus that the most celebrated mili-
tary authtliities had viewed this question—for
example, Freder'ck the Great and the Archduke
Charles. The Duke of Wellington professed the
same principles, and acted upon them in the war
in Portugal, when he created the celebrated camp
of Torres Vedras ; thanks to which he kept in check
the army of Massena, freed Portugal, and thus
merited the title of the greatest warrior of his day.
Napoleon himself held the same opinion. His in-
structions to his generals charged with the defence
of inferior countries were all in the same spirit,
especially those he addressed to that gene-
ral who was charged with the protection of
Dalmatia, and which was threatened at the
time by the English fleet, as well as by the
Russians and the Turks. In the committee of the
defence of Lombardy Napolean said, "I wish that
the fortifications of Milan, of Turin, and of Tortone
should be at Alessandria." Referring to what
passed in Piedmont in 1848, Piedmont, instructed
by experience, created the fortified places of Ales-
sandria. In the last war that place, though not
completely finished, and though situated as it was
at the flank of the Austrian army, was able to stop
the invasion of Piedmont, and thus to afford time
for the arrival of the French army. It appeared to
him to be self-evident that an army, having its
basis of operations upon one great military position
where all its resources could be concentrated, would
establish a much greater confidence in its own
strength and would acquire a much stronger in-
fluence in its action than if it were scattered over 20
little places where it could not be certain of finding a
refuge, and where it would be exposed to be beaten
in detail, as had happened in the campaign of
Prussia. To be scattered over 20 points was to be
weak in all—to be concentrated upon one single one
was to be strong everywhere. If the enemy, after
many combats, should persevere in continuing his
march towards this one stronghold he would require
at that place an army treble in number to that which
defended it ; consequently his preparations and his
muniments of war must be in proportion. Having
alluded to the check sustained by the Belgian army
in 1831, in consequence of neglecting that principle
of concentration, which resulted is an application to
France and England for assistance, General Chazal
then proceeded to argue in favour of Antwerp being
made the great point of military strength and of
ind merely
fortifications. If they viewed the question
_ereiy a political point of view, it would doubt-
less be much more important to fortify and to defend
the capital than Antwerp. But, considering the
question inmilitary aspect, such a proceeding
would be impossible. Many of their great cities
had played a itsu
more important part in the his-
tory of the country
Antwerp,
than Brussels, as for example,
Bruges,Ghent, an
. At all times Antwerp
had been the stronghold of provinces. When
the Spaniards wished to,secures their domination
over the Low Countries,
it Pvi.a
lected as the centre of action, LaterAn sdtill, twerpwhen the
the
y se-
defen
Riots Generaux wished to
themselvesagainstaainst Spain, it was Antwerp they
ehoeame thconcentration of their resistance. At the for the
of ea
Commence-
ment of the present century Antwerp
capital be
chief ideal of the empire. When the
situated near the
great country was centre, and
when it was covered by a natural or artificial fron-
tier, the fortified frontier could serve as a rallying,
point to the army, and would enable it to assume
the offensive. The enemy could not advance fur-
ther without making immense preparations for a
great siege. if Paris had been fortified in 1814
Napoleon would have had some chance of success;
but the necessity of covering Paris compelled him
constantly to retrace his steps to prevent the frac-
tions of the hostile armies from entering there.
The same might be said of Vienna, Moscow, and
Berlin ; if they had been fortified the results might
have been wholly different. After the campaign of
Egypt B )naparte was an xio is to push on further;
but Syria was covered by a natural frontier, the
desert, and he could not proceed without taking the
place of St. Jean d'Acre. Well, notwithstanding
the valour of his victorious army and the talents of
his generals, he could not accomplish his original
objects. These were reasons in support of the prin-
ciple that all capitals thus circumstanced should be
well fortified. When, on the contrary, the capital
was very near the frontiers—when it was not co-
vered by a natural or artificial frontier—when the
country was small, and was surrounded by neigh-
bours much more powerful than itself—it was no