The Sun.
London, England, 1861-06-08 00:00:00

which he thinks will follow from it. With regard to the
various applications which may be made of paper, and the
immense spread of knowledge which is to follow from the
repeal of this duty, these arguments may do very well for
Parliament, but I have not the least faith in them. I hope
my noble friend will not repeat the stale arguments about
cheap literature. These have been all answered. (Earl
Granville : Where ?) Why, in every house, in every con-
versation, in Parliament, and in every society where the
question has been argued. (Hear.) Look at the most im-
portant publishers—look at the authority of Mr. Bohn, who
has surely some knowledge of the subject. (Hear.) I know
one class to whom the relief would be considerable, and
that would be the class of propriet ;rs of penny newspapers.
They neay expect to buy the raw material cheaper, and they
certainly will not make the least reduction in the price to
their cougurners. Another point is that it would give re-
lief to the dealers in groceries and other goods which are
scrapped, or, as the noble lord in his peculiar phraseology
says, " wropped" up. (Laughter.) I belie% e that the
main argument in favour of taking off the paper duty con-
sists in an article which has been introduced for the first
time this year into the discussion, and which I
may call the great bandbox argument. (Laughter.) Next
to the proprietors of penny papers the makers of band-
boxes will derive the greatest benefit from the reduction,
but as to all other classes the advantages will be nearly nil.
(Hear.) I say nearly nil as compared with the reduction
of the income tax, or a proportionate reduction of the tea
and sugar duties. My noble friend surely will not deny
that a reduction of the tea and sugar duties would be a
greater and more general benefit to the working classes than
the remission of the paper duties. But this is a financial
question, upon which the House of Commons has a second
time expressed an opinion. I won't stop to examine what
may be the various motives which induced them to come to
the conclusion at which they have arrived. It will be suffi•
cient for me to say that that conclusion was not simply
guided by the merits of the tax itself, or the degree of relief
which it would give to the community. It was carried by
a majority somewhat large than the third reading of last
year—a majority of 15. But it is perfectly notorious that
that majority was obtained by the votes of a certain number
of gentlemen who were sincerely opposed to a reduction of
the paper duty, but who were still more opposed to running
the risk—not a great risk I think—(laughter)—of disturbing
the Government by compelling them to resign their offices
or to dissolve Parliament. lam not in the secrets of the
Government, but looking at the complacent manner in
which they took the check of the House of Lords last year,
I confess to a very strong opinion that her Majesty's Go-
vernment would have shown a placid and calm resignation.
And with regard to the dissolution of Parliament, I have
too high an opinion of the prudence, sagacity, and wisdom
of the noble viscount at the head of the Government to
think that he would appeal to the country on any such
question as to whether paper should be preferred to tea and
sugar. (Cheers.) But a majority of the House of Com-
mons decided in favour of the repeal of the paper duty ; and
I am perfectly ready to admit that upon a question of a re-
peal of duties, and the financial arrangements generally, it
does not seem expedient that your lordships, save in very
exceptional cases, should interfere with the discretion of
the House of Commons beyond,the extent to which the con
stitution gives you a right to. Suppose there is a surplus,
and the House of Commons, on a full consideration of all
the circumstances, have come to a decision that it is expe-
dient the paper duty should be repealed, I certainly should
not wish to take on myself the responsibility of advising
your lordships to set yourselves on such a point in opposi-
tion to the deliberate judgment of the House of Commons.
Last year the question was widely different. The question
then was whether upon the showing of the Chancellor of
the Exchequer that there would be no surplus in the follow-
ing year you would not give to the House of Commons a
further opportunity of considering the policy of sacrificing
this permanent source of taxation. But the question now
arises not so much with regard to the merits of the case as
with regard to the amount of interference which may be
justifiable or desirable en the part of your lordships' house.
And this is a point on which I find myself compelled to differ
in some degree from my noble friend—namely, as to the dis-
cretion that we should exercise on this occasion. As to the
right of the House of Lords to deal with questions of taxation
—and with regard to the privileges of the two houses gene-
rally, it is extremely desirable that no mistake should exist
as to their respective limits. IN hile there is a debateable
ground between the two houses there is certainly one point
on which there can be no discussion at all. As to the other
it must be settled as the question arises by the prudenceand
discretion of each individual house. (Hear, hear.) But
there is nothing more clearly laid down and recognised than
that to the House of Commons belongs the initiation of
every money bill. On the other hand, nothing is more in-
disputeble—and that is the vindication of your lordships'
conduct last year—than that the House of Lords have
the power of accepting or rejecting any money bill. The
debateable point is whether the House of Lords has the
power of altering a money bill submitted to them by the
House of Commons. What is the meaning of " having
power ?" The privileges of the two houses depend
on the mutual recognition of their respective powers,
and on the power of enforcing that recognition. The
House of Commons would not look at a money bill which
was introduced by the Lords, and their remedy is obvious—
to refuse to deal with it. The Lords reject a money bill
which they do not approve of, and the result is clearly the
same ; the bill falls to the ground and there is an end of it.
The House of Lords alter a money bill, and send it back to
the House of Commons. The House of Commons refuse to
entertain it. Let us see on what does their claim rest ?
It rests upon a resolution of 1671, entered into by the House
of Commons as to the privileges and rights of that house,
and incidentally as to the privileges and rights of the other
house. With regard to the privileges of the House of Com-
mons their resolution may be sufficient to bind them ; but
with regard to the privileges of the House of Lords, a simple
resolution of the House of Commons is, with all due respect
to that high authority, a piece of waste paper. The privi-
leges of your lordships' house cannot be restricted by a
resolution of the House of Commons. However prudence
may have induced your lordships to refrain from altering i
money bills you have never resigned the right of making I
amendment in those bills, though you have tempered the
exercise of that right by discretion, and by the knowledge
that if you do make amendments it is the same thing as
rejecting the bill. But every authority concurs in giving
this right of altering money bills to the House of Lords if
they think fit to exercise it. Mr. Hallam so lays it down;
Lord Macaulay so lays it down ; and in a work written by
my noble friend on the cross benches, I find the opinion of
Mr. Fox stated to this effect. Tt was a bill for regulating
cernmerco with America, and was introduced in 1787. The
bill was committed, and recommitted, with a variety of
amendments, and under the next administration further
altered by the House of Lords. "It was a money bill, but
lam of opinion," said Mr. Fox, " that the order of the
house respecting money bills should not be too strictly con-
strued. It would be absurd to send a loan bill to the House of
Lords for their concurrence and at the same time deny them
the right of deliberation." That is the opinion of Mr. Fox
upon the resolution of the Houseof Commons in 1671. The
privilege depends en the power of enforcing it. When you
amend a bill it falls to the ground. In former times—l do
not know whether the practice is still continued—it was
usual I believe to kice such a bill out of the house, or to
throw it under the table. It seems to me that such a form
was not a very dignified mode of proceeding, especially
when it was often followed by the introduction of a bill
with those very amendments which had been treated with
so much dignity. The House of Commons, if you choose to
act on your constitutional rights, may refuse to entertain
the bill, in which case it falls to the ground, or they may
introduce another bill or bills carrying out the same ob-
jects, and send them to the Lords in a form that they be-
lieved would be more acceptable to this house. This is the
limit of the rights and privileges of the two Houses of Par-
liament, and their rights can be enforeed in no other man-
ner than by the rejection of the measure, in the one form or
the other. In bills which are for the special purpose of
taxation, not bills in which money clauses may be intro-
duced incidentally, this is of the highest consequence, be-
cause wherever either house insists on the maintenance of
its privileges in that case, according to the circumstances of
the case, the matter will be judged of by the supreme judge
of all in this country. public opinion—(hear)—and that
house of the two which pushes its privileges to an unrea-
sonable extent and displays an unconciliatory spirit towards
the other will be the one whe_h, in the cause of a great na-
tional calamity—such as the shocking failure of the means
of carrying on the Government —will be visited by great
public indignation—(hear)—and that is the real control and
the real means by which the apparently conflicting privi-
f the two houses are prevented from bringing the
working of
the constitution to a dead lock. (Hear, hear.)
Therecomm oisnson:,are point with regard to the mode in which the
to tack bills, to dealtii with this question, and with regard
interpretation of t2oeclirl wish to refer. According to the
privileges by the House of Com-
mons, that bill, if
it contained a money provision,
could not be amended
by the House of Lords, but
the whole measure must be swallowed or rejected alto-
gether ; and it is apparent that this would exclude the House
of Lords from the exereiszeufbttaheir legislative functions.
There never has been any
inadmissibility of
tacks—as to the introduction into to the
eey bill of subjects
wholly different from and uneonneacrat withathe main o-
you tomato
ject. But a more difficult question arises
deal with large financial schemes, whenrinseostitivihneneduced
but what has reference to finance, but ingsvethhieeghr isvfairnitorus pi e-
jects of finance are mixed up and put to
con-
sideration of Parliament. lam ready to admit to my the
ny noble
friend opposite that there are repeated precedents for the
introduction of whole financial schemes, for their being
sen
to the House of Lords and agreed to by this house. But,t
on the other band, there are repeated cases of financial
measures having been amended by the House of Lords and
accepted by the House of Commons. Suppose one bill sent
up last year for imposing a penny income tax and repealing
the paper duty; no one could complain of any excess of
authority on the part of the House of Commons, and like-
wise nobody could complain that the House of Lords had
not the opportunity and the power of exercising its judg-
ment by accepting the whole or rejecting the whole. If the
two points were fairly counterpoised, no one couldcom-
plain that this house had not an opportunity of dealing
with the subject • but the case is totally different when by
the action of the House of Commons you take away a
permanent tax and substitute for it a purely temporary
one. This point has been urged in the other house by a
right honourable baronet—a member of great weight and
experience in that house. It was laid down in the draft
report drawn up by a right honourable friend of mine
whom I highly esteem and regard (Mr. Walpole), but
:which report was not accepted by the committee. But
both of these right hon. gentlemen have come to an opinion
which I think is most fallacious in its origin and met
difaynogu allow a
erousinita conclusion. The argument is this—that
permanent taalarge portion of the revenue to be raised by
the consent of the i°l, which cannot be taken off without
you cannot House of Lords, and it is admitted that
weaken th take e
power i t
of off
without their consent, you
the, House of Commons. That
power it is
allowed
has
azdweakened, and it is argued
that it would be expedient
power at the expense of the good policy to recover that
permanent revenue of the
country. This is a gross fallacy
can really affect
feet fallacy to say that you In
argument' Ithteiscoanpterro-1
whieh the 1101120 of Commons has over thet finances of the
country, from whatever source derived
all very might have been
vcsll in early days, when there
whether the nee,eesio
es of Crown
was a question
Parliament should be called together to enable
require that
nable the Crown
to carry on the business of the country without the House
of Commons at all. Mut that a-prehension has long since
fallen to the {:round and
thediad ceases to have the slightest prac-
tical effect, What
power of the House of Commons,
and what is its control over the finances of the country?
The supplies for the army
are
vote ..and navy, the two great services
of the country,
year to year, and without the
sanction of Parliament to &l et) yaeel‘eation of the means for
the payments of the country those' se,
s
fall to the ground. That is the cage Zth-
. would at once
mrd to
army, the navy, the miscellaneous services, and e r the
g
which has to be provided for by annual estimates ; ''that is
to say, nearly the whole of the ways and means of the
country is entirely and absolutely in the hands of the House
of Commons. But, again, after the services of the year
have been passed and provided for, after the measures of
taxation have been decided upon, the House of Commons
possesses
•in absolute control, not only over the levying of
taxation, but over its application, because not one single
penny of the ways and paeans raised for the service of the