The Sun.
London, England, 1859-11-28 00:00:00

SPAIN AND MOROCCO.

A letter from Malaga, dated November 17, says:—
The young soldiers here at Malaga, the head-quar-
ters of the 3d corps of the expeditionary army,
commanded by General Ros do Olano, are begin-
ning to learn that, even when all seems ready for
war, many things still remain to be done; and cer-
tainly the Spanish Commander-in-Chief is right to
avoid precipitation: All the circumstances of the
conflict to which he is about to lead his army pre-
scribe prudence and deliberation. He has to com-
mand untried troops against an enemy whose qua-
lities are but imperfectly known, and whom it would
be rashness to despise. It is very long since Spanish
troops met a foreign foe. Even the civil war
against Don Carlos has become a matter of history,
so long past that probably very few of the soldiers
who shared in it now remain in the service. And

that contest, although bloody enough in many of
its episodes, was of a widely different character
from the one approaching. In an uncertain seam,
and on wild and comparatively unknown shores,
the Spaniards have to assail a foe who in numbers
will probably prove superior to them, and whose
courage and powers of defence and offence must not
be underrated. A Paris paper lately gave some
details concerning the Morocco army, according
to which a certain degree of organisation has
been introduced into it since the battle of Isly.
A portion of the Emperor's troops, if those accounts
be correct, aspire to the title of regulars; there are
battalions armed with the modern rifle, and we are

told even of artillery trained in the European sys-
tem. Doubtless such corps are looked upon with
admiration in their own land, but it may be doubted
whether they will prove the most formidable of
those brought against the Spaniards. A little
knowledge is often dangerous, and it is difficult to
believe in the efficiency of Arabs newly trained to
European drill and discipline. Their regular lines
would probably appear less imposing to young
European troops than would be the impetuous
swoops of those clouds of wild horsemen who
whirled and swept around the French squares in
the memorable retreat from Constantina. As re-
gards the fighting qualities of the North Africans
there can scarcely be a doubt. They may not be
military, but they are decidedly warlike. More-
over, we well know the desperate courage given
to them by fanaticism. Their priests, we learn,
have been preaching up a religious war, and ex-
horting them to do good battle against the infidel.
Although the war appears popular in Spain, and
O'Donnell's soldiers may go into it willingly and
with confidence of success, it is not to be supposed
that their martial ardour and desire for distinction
will be stronger stimulants than the blind enthu-
siasm of men who reckon on crowns of glory in a
paradise of houris as the sure recompense of death
in conflict with the unbeliever. In short, it would
be a dangerous error on the part of the Spanish
Generals to imagine that they have but to walk
over the course ; that the Moors will fly io terror
at the very first onset of their battalions. A
glance at the annals of the French armies in
Algeria must satisfy them—even allowing for
a little high colouring on the part of conquerors
who were their own historians—that they will
find stout opponents, and should render it
incumbent upon them to take every precaution
tending to insure the triumph on which they reckon.
The,Kabyle hordes that will be launched against
them are of the same breed and courage as the best
of those Turoos who, more than once in Lombardy,
bore down the stout resistance of the well-disci-
plined Austrians. And, besides the armed opposi-
tion to be expected, the Spaniards must encounter
and overcome the severe hardships and many ob-
stacles inseparable from a campaign in such a coun-
try. It is of the highest importance, in order that
they may do this without great suffering, that the
commissariat and means of transport should be well
prepared and highly efficient, and we are justified
in believing that the necessity of such preparation
is fully present to the mind of the Commander-in-
Chief and his Generals, and that to it is due the
delay in the commencement of operations. The
department of the artillery ought also to receive the
greatest attention, for it will probably be found the
most effective arm that can be employed against the
Moors. In the French army in Italy it was well
known that the Turcos, desperate with the bayonet
and intrepid in the exchange of rifle shots, were not
to be depended upon when opposed to the fire of
artillery. The Spaniards have long been accustomed
to speak highly of this branch of their service, which
will now have an opportunity of justifying its re-
putation.
With respect to the place and manner of com-
mencing the war, nothing is yet known, and you
must attach but slender value to any statements on
the subject you may have seen in the Spanish or
other papers. It is manifestly desirable that the
operations on land should begin as near as possible
to the place where the troops disembark, in order to
save them from toilsome marches over a rough
country. With only irregular forces to oppose
them, it ought not to be difficult to land at
any convenient spot, under cover of fire from from
the ships. My own impression is that all opera-
tions near the coast will be comparatively easy,
and that if, as it would be unhitr; to doubt, the
Spanish Generals prove capable and the Spanish
soldiers brave, success will attend their first opera-
tions. But if, carried away by early triumphs, they
attempt too much, and press on into the interior,
they will risk reverses, due, probably, as much to
natural impediments as to the perseverance and
daring of the enemy. Every league they march in-
land will increase their difficulties and dangers,
since they will be so much the further from their
supplies, and so much the more exposed to the
harassing warfare in which the Arabs excel. Their
convoys will be in greater danger, stronger escorts
will be required, the encumbrance of their sick will
be the more felt, while the sick themselves are likely
to be the more numerous by reason of fatigue, ch-
tnate, and exposure. The Spanish soldier is, per-
haps, unequalled by any other in his powers of en-
durance. He will march further and faster, on less