The Sun.
London, England, 1859-07-07 00:00:00

THE BATTLE OF SOLFE.RINO.

(From the Times.)
The following letter is from the same correspon-
dent who has described the principal events of this
war :

" POZZOLENGO, JUNE 26.
" I regret almost to have written to you yesterday
after the first impression of the battle ; it might give
a certain local colouring to one's narrative, but it
was at the expense of accuracy. In a small engage-
ment, where you can yourself overlook every move-
ment and. every phase of the fight, the noting down
one's first impressions is, no doubt, the best plan,
but in a great battle like that fought on St. John's
day you have to collect the details by degrees, and
it is only after the. knowledge of all the details that
the battle assumes its proper shape in your mind,
and you are thus enabled to give a true picture of
it. It is almost presumptuous in such a case to give
an account at the first moment, for even the com-
mander-in-chief of an army would have some diffi-
culty in ascertaining the facts of the battle within
five hours after it occurred, and would be rather
embarrassed in giving an account of it. I find
that my first impression was right, and that no
battle was expected on our side. It was known that
the rear guard of the Austrian army, the Corps of
Benedek (the Bth), which hadfought at Malegnano,
and protected thence the retreat of the bulk of the
army, had repassed the Mincio on the 19th inst.
It had first received orders to stop at Castiglione,
and prepare to hold that place, but it had scarcely
begun to execute this order when a counter-order
arrived, which recalled the rear guard behind the
Mincio. In consequence of this it passed the Mincio
at Monzambano, leaving only a few outpostsbehind
it. Up to this time, then, the intention of the
Austrians was evidently to content themselves with
defending the Mincio line. From the 19th to the
22d a change came over the plans, which may be,
7,liaßs, explained by the circumstdnce that
alai only took leave of the army on that day. He
did, so in a very laconic order of the day, merely
saying that his Majesty the Emperor had called
him elsewhere, and that he took leave in conse-
quence. In his stead General Schlick, originally an
officer of Hussars, who gained himself a name hi
the war in Hungary in 1848-49, was named Ma-
jor-General of the Italian Army, of which the Em-
peror himself took the command. From all we can
make out there seems to have been too many plums
in the pudding, for there is a good deal of jealousy
among several of the Generals, who all think them-
selves entitled to the supreme command. For in-
stance Gen. Benedek, who is considered—at any
rate, by his own corps--as the fittest to command,
is accused by Gyulai of having come too late for the
battle of Magenta on purpose, although it is more
probable that, being on the other side of the Po,
he had not sufficient time to arrive.
"At any rate, it is to put an end to all these jea-
jouses, which are greatly deplored by the army,
that the Emperor has taken the command in per-
son. This was on the 22d. On the 23d the army
received an order to be ready at seven a.m., and
the whole immense force, consisting of the Ist, 2d,
3d, sth, 7th, Bth, and 9th corps, passed the Mincio
on that day, and had taken up their respective po-
sitions before the evening closed in. This mass, to
which must be added 12 of the best cavalry regi-
ments, from whose activity on the plain of the
Campo di Medole a great deal was expected, cannot
have numbered less than 180,000 or 200,000 men.
Besides this a strong park of position guns was
also ordered over the river.
" On seeing such a mass cross a river in one day '
and march up to positions some of which were 10 or
12 miles from the bank of it, one may well be asto-
nished at the activity displayed, and cannot but
conclude that the Austrian General did not know
to take advantage of it in the beginning of the war.
" And this large army came not to defend the
positions on the hills so much as to attack the
allied armies, and drive them out of Lombardy.
The confidence seemed to have been great, for the
march to Brescia and Milan had become table-talk
among the officers. The Emperor came up the same
evening, and early the next morning visited the
position of Solferino.
" This return of the Austrians had been so mid-
den that the news of it had not reached the allied
armies. For reasons which I cannot mention now,
the advance of these latter had been on purpose
slow, and they did not seek to penetrate too far, in
order not to have to hurry more than it suited their
plans. You must have observed this from the short
marches and long halts which were made since we
left Brescia. The allies contemplated no movement
onthe day of the 24th. The only project for that
day was that the Piedmontese,whose line extended
from Desenzano on the Lake along the outer ridge
of hills down to Esenta, should sen out two recon-
naissances, one in the direction of Peschiera, and
the other in that of Pozzolengo, on the road to the
bridge of Salionge, while the Ist French corps of
Baraguay d'Hilliers, which occupied the continua-
tion of the ridge from Esenta to Castiglione, was
likewise to send out two reconnaissances, one in the
direction of Madonna del Monte, on the road from
Castiglione to Pozzolengo, and the other on' that
leading to Solferino.
" I was as you remember under the impression -
that it was the meeting of these reconnaissances
which was the beginning of the battle. As far as
the Piedmontese are concerned this was correct, but
not quite so far as the French were concerned, for
before these reconnaissances started their line of
outposts was attacked in the plain from Medole to
San Cassiano. The plan of the enemy seems to have
been to refuse the right wing and strike a decisive
blow at their left, so as to endanger if not cut off our
line of retreat. For this purpose the Bth Corps, Bene-
dek's, which had come over the Mincio, was posted
on the heights about Pozzolengo, while the rest of
the army was massed from Solferino to Medole and
Cavrian to Ceresale. This movement to turn our
right flank was only possible so long as the heights
of Solferino were held ; for, these once lost, the
army, if it still maintained itself in the plain, was
in danger of being cut in two, and of losing one or
two of Mincio passages.
" The Emperor, who, as you remember, arrived
about an hour after the first shot was fired, saw this
danger instantly, as well as the necessity of getting
possession of this key of the position. The great
point was to hold back the enemy's forces brought
against our right, and to push him back in the
plain until this could be effected. For this pur-
pose the Ist Corps received order to go onthe roads
which skirt the hills looking down into the plain •
the 2d Corps took its place at its right ; again at its
right was placed the 4th Corps, and the third was
kept back en potence on the extreme right, to serve
as a reserve to the fourth, if necessary, and to pre-
vent any flank movement of the enemy, and fall on
his flank should he attempt to make one. The in-
fantrk of the Guard was placed as a reserve behind
the First and Second Divisions, while the whole
cavalry was kept ready to advance as soon as the
enemy was driven back towards the open Campo di
Meddle. The obstinacy with which the Austrians
held the position of Solferino was only equalled by
the efforts which they made to throw back our
right wince and, if possible to outflank it.
gave Yon an idea of the position of Solferino.
I assure you it is one of those to which can be fully
applied the saying, The more you look at it the less
you like it, It is impossible to imagine anything
stronger than this bill fort with its high precipitous
bastions and defiles of road,
flanked by smaller spurs
just of convenient height and distance for cannon.
The Austrians, who, of course knew every inch of
their favourite manoeuvring
made the most
ground.
of these advantages. But it wasabove all the en-
trances to the village and the building, in the vil-
lage on which they had spent the greatest
.
atest care As
the houses are built on the side of the steep hill,
they, as well as the gardens, stand, as it
high terraces, and their walls form a kineci of
enceinte round the village. Every wall had been
loopholed, and behind it were one or two good
shots, firing constantly with rifles, which were
sup-
plied to them by those posted behinil. In penetra-
ting into this village great losses were sustained.
The ground before it had been cleared, so as to com-
pletely expose those who wanted to take the place by
storm. 'fhere being no ladders, and the gate-
way beintg too high to scale, the Ist Zouaves—
the same who distinguished themselves in the
battle of :?4alegnano—made a human pyramid, those
below ex3?osing themselves to the murderous fire
which w'as kept up against them in order to allow
their com panions to mount and enter. But te most
terrific ca alifiee was, as usual, round the chuhrches—
e
one situatclose underneath the high square tower,
the Spia d'ltalia,' of which I have so often spoken,
the other on one of the spurs the mountain throws
out towards the lake, and then the Spia d'ltal: a
itself. Thi square tower and the ruined wall which
surrounds it are, as I told you, built on a high coni-
cal moue lain, which throws out threa spurs, one
towards V. ie plain, the second towards Castiglione,
and the 11 iird towards the lake. The fisst, of these
is the leal t steep and the broadest. On its summit
is a largo church, with a curious cupola, and a large
yard befoi re it, enclosed by high walls. One of the
roads gos s down to the plain from this point
through a tolerably steep street, but once out of the
village the road goes down in a gentle slope. This
road irtai) Red on the left by a high isolated plateau,
while on ,t ,he right it is commanded by the long
plateau-lir Ise spur which runs from the tower in the
direction. of Castiglione, and which forms a promi-
nent feat are in the scenery, owing to a score or so
of high p oplars planted in a row. The third spur,
lower thr to the two others, compensatesthie advan-