The Sun.
London, England, 1859-02-16 00:00:00

War-office, and to Mr. Duncombe were privileged ;
but, whether that privilege has been abused is for
the jury. If it has been abused, the privilege is
gone ; but if the communications were made bona
fide, and in the discharge of duty merely, they are
privileged. The defendant was colonel of the regi-
ment, and Lord Combermere was his immediate
superior; and if there was any misconduct which
ought to be communicated to a superior officer,
he did no more than his duty in communicating
it. This will apply to both the papers of the
26th of May and the 24th of July. Mr. James
makes a distinction between these cases and that
of the slander uttered to Mr. Duncombe ; but

my direction to you is, that if, on that occa-
sion, Lord Wilton acted from a sense of duty merely,
he would be privileged in what he said. He had
heard from Gen. Peel that Mr. Duncombe wished
to see him, and he had heard that a question was
about to be put in the House of Commons on a
matter of interest ; and, if he went to Mr. Dun-
combe to communicate that which he believed to be
true, to enable Mr. Duncombe to do his duty as a
member of the House of Commons, my opinion is
that that is a privileged communication. But if he
abused that privilege, and from any motive other
than a sense of duty, or from what the law calls
" malice," made a charge, and said what could not
be justified in point of truth, and his object was to
prevent Mr. Duncombe from bringing those pro-
ceedings before the House of Commons, and so pre-
venting justice from being done, then the privilege
is gone. It lies on the party who would deprive
the other party of his privilege to show what the
law calls " malice." But by that term is meant, not
only spite, for any indirect motive, other than a
sense of duty, is what the law calls "malice." You
will say whether the defendant acted from a sense
of duty, and bonafide, or from a feeling of irritation,
and whether, acting at the suggestion of others, he
went beyond the law. His lordship proceeded :
Mr. James had stated several circumstances which
he considered had taken away the defendant's pri-
vilege; but, until the contrary was shown, it must
be presumed that a party had acted bona fide. His
lordship thought he might say that the defendant
(Lord Wilton) had always hitherto borne a good
character as an amiable nobleman, and he hoped
that, whatever might be the event of this trial, he
would continue to do so to the end of his life. But
the best of men sometimes erred, and the jury
might think that Lord Wilton had been actuated
for the time by motives which could not be justi-
fied, and had surrendered himself to those who had
a spite against Col. Dickson, though he himself
had none. Mr. James had relied on the constitu-
tion of the Regimental Board of June, 1857 ; but
it appeared that Lord Wilton had promised to ask
the Queen to knight Col. Dickson, and down to that
time there seemed to have been no change of feel-
ing. He (Lord Campbell) could not but lament the
constitution of that board, but thought that Lord
Wilton, acting as he did in the matter under the
advice of Colonel North, was not blameable for it.
If the plaintiff was to be affected by the decision it
was improper that he should be tried by three offi-
cers who.were immediately under him. Such was
the weakness of human nature, that those who sat
as judges should not have a shadow of interest in
the matter. His lordship instanced the case of a
clergyman about to be tried for any immorality
which might lead to his deprivation, and said that,
if the bishop happened to be the patron of the liv-
ing, the law would not allow that bishop to sit as
the judge. Whenever men might be swayed by
interested motives they ought to be kept out of the
way of temptation. However, his lordship thought
Lord Wilton was not to blame in that matter, for
at that time he looked on the plaintiff with regard
and esteem. His lordship then came to what was
done on the regimental board, and observed that
Lord Wilton was still less answerable for that.
Considering the questions referred to them the re-
port was very strange. But when the report was
made Lord Wilton did not seem to be inclined to
act upon it, and stopped till the month of March,
1858 ; and even then he did not seem inclined to
take any steps until he was urged to do it by, Capt.
Dixon, who was a bitter enemy of Col. Dickson.
Lord Wilton saw Lord Combermere in Jan., 1858,
but made no communication, intimating that this
report was to be laid before him, as a foundation
for the plaintiff's (Col. Dickson's) removal. On the
11th March the report was sent in to Lord Comber
mere, and by this time the rencontre with Captain
Dixon in the Haymarket had taken place, and Capt.
Poley was actively employed. Before the 26th
May, 1858 (the date of the first libel), it would ap-
pear that the debts of the regiment had been left
unpaid ; that the defendant (Lord Wilton) had
been sued for those debts, and believed that Col.
Dickson had instigated the Messrs. Sharpus to bring
that action. This might have irritated :Lord
Wilton. Then it appeared that the letter of the 26th
May was not written by Lord Wilton, but by Capt.
Poley, and adopted by, Lord Wilton, who thus
became answerable for it. Still, if it was•sineerely
adopted by, him, and if he was doing no more than
' his duty, he was protected. The language, how-
, ever, of the letter was peculiar. It had been said
that Lord Wilton was not the plaintiff's accuser;
but by that letter he made himself so in express
terms. It began thus :
" With reference to your Lordship's letter of the Ist inst.
I beg to inform your Lordship, for the information of the
Secretary of State for War, why I consider that Lieut.-
Colonel Dickson's conduct has rendered it imperative on
me, as Colonel commanding the regiment,' to suggest his
immediate removal from it.
He was the accuser, and he required Col. Dickson's
immediate removal from the regiment. He might
be a just accuser, but he was the accuser ; and the
jury would say whether the grounds which he set
down were the true grounds on which he proceeded.
His Lordship said he had felt astonished at hearing
the Attorney-General talking with levity of an
officer being dismissed from his regiment on the
ground of pecuniary fraud. If an officer of the
Queen's army was dismissed from his regiment for
misconduct, or required to resign to prevent his dis-
missal, he (Lord Campbell) took it that the officer
was for ever disgraced. Some of the charges con-
tained in the libel were of a grave nature, but there
were others which his Lordship was surprised to see
put in as ground for dismissal. The charge of em-
bezzling £2O 2s. 11d. of the Cremorne money was
certainly a serious charge ; but as to his not holding
mess meetings of accounts, that was well known to
Lord Wilton, and he took no steps in the matter.
Then, as to the charge of expending £250 in enter-
tainments, that excited his surprise still more, con-
sidering that Lord Wilton, was assisting at one of
those ceremonies (the presentation of new colours)
and had liberally contributed a sum which Colonel.
Dickson thought he ought to pay. He was rather
surprised to find that brought forward by defendant
as a charge upon which the plaintiff ought to be
dismissed. Another charge was that orders were
given by the plaintiff for goods, though, as to the
crockery and china, the defendant was fully aware
of that order, and was present when the specimens
were shown, and himself recommended one of
them. The Attorney-General was wrong in saying
that Lord Wilton was not a member of the mess ;
for, according to Colonel North's evidence, he was
entitled to take the chair. With regard to the
plates, it appeared in evidence that Lord Wilton
was aware of the order, he was present when it was
given, and it must be considered as his order.
There was also a charge about which little had
been said—that of insulting Captain Dixon, and
accusing him of improper malversation in his
accounts, and the charge about the plaintiff's
employing a spy in the regiment. The letter then
concluded thus :—" I feel that I should be failing in
my duty as colonel of the regiment, and as well
as for the credit of the corps, if I did not recommend
to your Lordship his immediate removal from the
service." His Lordship then referred to the
second libel, the letter of the 24th of July, 1858,
which charged the plaintiff with retaining the sum
of £25 given by Lord Wilton and Colonel North
to the sergeants' mess, and the conversation with
Mr. Duucombe in which the defendant charged
the plaintiff with having received and retained regi-
mental funds, and instigated Messrs. Sharpus and
Co. to sue the defendant. With respect to this
conversation, his Lordship said the law would
justify anything-which the defendant might bona
fide say to Mr. Duncombe as a member of the
House of Commons, for his information as such
member. He then proceeded to read over the ver-
sions which Mr. Duncombe and Lord Wilton gave
of what passed on that occasion, and observed that
he believed both parties spoke the truth according
to what they believed took place. If Lord Wilton
went to Mr. Duncombe and spoke the words bona
fide, and with the view to put him in possession of
the real facts of the case, he was protected, and en-
titled to the verdict on that count ; but, if his
object was to prejudice Mr. Duncombe against the
plaintiff, and he had the indirect purpose of pre-
venting him from putting his question in the
House of Commons, he was not protected, but
the jury ought to find a verdict for the plaintiff.
The same rule would apply to all the counts
in the declaration. His Lordship then expressed
his regret at the treatment which the plaintiff
had received at the hands of Lord Combermere;
for it was impossible not to see that in that stage of
the case justice was not well administered,because,
while Lord Combermere declared he could not un-
derstand the matter, he nevertheless pronounced
his judgment that Col. Dickson should be removed.
His lordship had no doubt that Lord Combermere
acted in the matter without in the remotest degree
believing that he was doing wrong. It was impossible
to look on Lord Combermere's glorious career with-
out admiration ; but at the same time we could not
shut our eyes to the fact that in no department of
the State should justice be so administered. His
lordship. (whose voice had by this time become
Almost inaudible) proceeded to observe on the