The Sun.
London, England, 1857-01-30 00:00:00

'THE LOSS OF THE TYNE.

OFFICIAL INQUIRY.
SOUTH A MPTON, THURSDAY.
The Board of Trade inquiry into the circumstances
connected with the stranding of the R,yal Mail Co:n-
pany's steam ship Tyne, off St. Alban's Head, on the
morning of the 13th inst., was opened this morning at
11 o'clock at the Guildhall. The magii,Lra,Les on the

bench were—Capt. Br‘ton (chairman), Admiral Bowyer,
Messrs. J. R. Stebbieg, J. Lobb, J. Clark, and R.
Pierce. Captain Walker attended from the Board of
Trade, accompanied by Mr. O'Dowd. solicitor under the
Merchant Shipping Act, and Mr. W. H. Bucket], col-
lector of Customs at this port. Mr. Coxwell, solicitor of
Southampton, watched the proceedings on the part of
Captain Valler, the commander of the ship. There Teas
a large attendance of gentlemen interested in nautical
matters, among whom were Captain Vincent, superin-
tendent of the Royal Company at Southampton : Capt.
M‘Dougall, Admiralty superintendent at Southampton;
Captaies Burney, Haste, Strutt, Parker, Bevis, and
Weller ; George Mills, Esq., superintending engineer;
and several other officers in the company's service.
Mr. O'Dowd stated that he appeared there, in pur-
suance of instructions received from the Board of Trade.,
to inqnire into the circumstances which had led to the
loss of the Tyne, as-this was the first inquiry of this
nature that had been held at this port under the sanction
of a recent act of Parliament, he would call attention to
the statute under which the inquiry was held. It was
held under section 433 of the Merchant Shipping Act,
1854, which he read to the Court. That eection consti-
tuted the magistrates a court of inquiry, and it would
be their duty to send a report to the Board of Lade,
based upon the evidence, which would be taken, with
extracts from that evidence if they thought proper. The
Board of Trade considered that the aid of a nautical
assessor would be desirable and, as questions would
undoubtedly arise affecting the nautical skill of Captain
Valler, requiring the co-operation and advice of a
gentleman high in position, in the nautical pro-
fessiov, the senior member of the Marine Depart-
ment of the Board of Trade was present to assist them
in the inquiry. In fairness to Captain Valler he would
state that, although he was not there to make any charge
against that gentleman, yetnipratly he was undoubtedly
on his trial. He would state the circumstances very
briefly, as the captain was there to make his own state
ment ; but it would be an injustice to the highly respec-
table company by which he was engaged if he did not
at once state that they had manifested every anxiety to
keep the witnesses together, which was not always an
easy matter, and to assist the government in their en-
quiry. The Tyne was built at Newcastle in 1854, and
her registered tonnage was 1,788 4-10, giving including
the tonnage of the engine-room, a total capacity of about
2,100 tons. There were three sources of information open
to them—the officers in charge of the vessel, the log-
book, and the passengers. He should not trouble them
with any extensive body of evidence, a: that of the pas-
engers was out of the question, all of them being in bed
at the time of the disaster, and they could give no evi-
dence of its immediate antecedents. The logbook was
in court, and the officers, including Capt. Valler himself.
It was truethat the master was not adisinterested witness,
but from the communications hehad had with him, he was
satisfied that he would be a most trustworthy and honest
witness, although his own characterand position were at
stake. Capt. Valler, had under the old law, obtained a
certificate from the Trinity Board, and on the consolida-
tion of the maritime laws under the Merchant Shipping
Act, 1854, he obtained a certificate from the Board of
Trade. He was an accurate and skilful navigator, or he
would not have been in the service of the company for 15
or 16 years. The learned gentleman then narrated the
circumstances preceding the stranding of the ship, as
they are detailed is Capt. Yaller's evidence. It might
reasonably be asked how, in such weather, with a
tempestuous sea and a dark and hazy night., Captain
Vallee had not continued to take soundings in a po-
sition where the perils of the navigation were a
matter of notoriety 4 It appeared to bim that the
lead ought to have been repeatedly used after the Port-
land Lights had dipped. Tne depths varied from 32 to
as low as 4 and 6 fathoms of water; but Captain Valler
had not used the lead from the time of passing the Port-
land Lights till the ',teenier was stranded. It would be
for the magistrates to coueid, r whether the neglect had
contributed to the disaster. lf it could be proved that
it did not no one would rejoice wore than he should if
Captain Valler lest the court, without a stain upon his
professional character. On the contrary, no matter how
high and flattering his' testimelhials might be, they were
bound, in justice to the public, as they valued the safety
of life and property, not to be influenced in his favour by
those testimonials, but to snake such a report as justice
and the facts of the case would warrant.

Mier some discussion between Mr. O'Dowd and Mr.
Coxwell, who appeared for Captain Valler,
Captain William Valler was sworn, and stated that be
was master of the Tyne, and bad a certificate of com-
petency under the Board of Trade. Had been engaged
in the navigation of vessels as master for 18 years, 15
of which were in the service of the Roy al Mail Com-
pany. Had been at sea 21 years in all. Substituted the
Trinity Board certificate for the one he obtained under
the Board of Trade. Had commanded the Tyne two
voyages to the Brazils and seven to the West Indies,.
On the last homeward voyage left Pernambuco on the
234 of December. Had 53 passengers and a small cargo.
All the passengers were bound for Southampton, and
were nearly all first class. The passenger trade is an
important part of the trade between the Brazils and
Southampton. They took out about 180 passengers on
the last voyage. They had very strong head winds
nearly the whole of the passage home. Nothing parti-
cular happened till the morning of the 12th. Saw Ushant
Light about 5 o'clock in the morning. (The logbook
was here asked for by Mr. O'Dowd, and handed in to
the Court) The handwriting in the logbook is the
chief-officer's. The logbook is made up every watch,
from the entries on the log-slate by the officers on
watch, and witness puts his signature when satisfied
of the correctness of the entries. Observed Ushant
Light above 15 minutes after five, bearing E. by
N. N. After seeing Usbant Light shaped the course
of the ship to N.E., and kept in that direction till 7
o'clock, and then altered to E. by N. N., which was
the direction for Portland. The weather became thick.
At 11 30 a.m. sounded, and on lifting up the lead found
they bad no bottom at 40 fathoms. At 4in the after-
noon sounded again, and found 46i fathoms, sand and
shells. At 6, found 41 fathoms, sand. At 8, 36 fathoms,
coarse ground. Was about 40 miles from Portland at
this time. Sighted the Portland Lights at 11 20 p.m.,
and 10 minutes afterwards altered the course of the ship
to eastward, to shape her course to the Needles. At
midnight stopped the engines and sounded, to ascertain
the distance from Portland Lights ; found 30 fathoms,
coarse ground. That he considered put him about 12
miles to the southward of Portland Race. The vessel
was then going slow, and had been from the afternoon
previous. By the log was going about 7 knots. The
wind was E.S.E. at this time. Saw the Portland Lights
again at 1 a.m. on the 13th, bearing N.N.E. E. At
1 40 the lights bore N., and at 2 18 saw the two lights
in one, bearing N.N.W. I W. At 225 the lights
dipped, bearing N.W. by N. N. The weather came
on very thick and hazy, but for which they would have
been able to see the lights longer. Had no lights at this
time by which to steer. Did not sound afterwards. He
did not consider this part of the Channel more perilous
than any other part. There was not much variation in
the depths of the Channel between Portland and the
Needles. Looking at the chart be found from 12 to 17
fathoms at the south of Bimmeridge Ledge. If there
were only 4 fathoms at any place it must be within a
cable's length—quite close to the Ledge. He blind one
part marked 6, and 17 close to it. Was on deck all
night. Did not leave five minutes together, just to go
down to the cabin to examine the charts. Was not in
the habit of communicating with the helmsman, but
through the officer on duty. The second-officer was on
duty that night. Depended upon the steering, making an
allowance for the inset, to keep the ship clear of every-
thing. By the inset he meant the effect of a wind and tide
upon the bow of the ship, which, as she was li ;ht and going
at half speed, was calculated to send the ship in. As it
proved, he did not make sufficient allowance for this. If
it had not been for the fog he should have kept the ship
more to the east. Was as familiar as any master could be
with that part of the channel. The vessel might have
struck even if he had made regular soundings from one
o'clock onwards, because they might have gone within a
mile of the ridge, and got the same depth of water-16
or 17 fathoms-3$ outside of St. Alban's Head, and in a
fair way for the Needles. If he had sounded and found 16
fathoms he should have considered himself in a safe posi-
tion. If he had sounded and found 9 fathoms, he should
net have considered it safe, and should have hauled out
to the southward. Should not have considered 12 fathoms
dangerous if he had.passed St. Alban's Head, which be
thought be had. The vessel had three compasses, which
be found to agree very well, and be threw no blame on
them. He attributed the disaster t&the combined causes
he had named, and the spring tide must have been run-
ning sto 6 miles an hour. Did not know this at the
time, and had no idea that they would run so strong.
About 20 minutes to 4 o'clock on the morning of the 13th,
after losing sight of the Portland Lights, and finding it
come on.very thick and hazy he went to the companionof
door, with the intention of going to the engineer he ir
watch to desire him to pump the boilers up,
twehn
edne dhteo
heardstop a
thet 4 o
officer'cl ock.
nII
we hadatnhthe ado in his hand
poHe e
rt , and supposed
from
at the
te
time it
companionn•a
deer s ad vessel
rt
crossing
them. abreast
of the enginerovh,atrhdeao.pffiocret.r„ oAf tshheedwhaitmchwaht
atthe
wastre
time calling out
matter, and he said therleiewdenruetbtrneasktearpsioienr.theßpeofrotrebothwe.
Witness immediately ca
ship's was stopped he felt her graze along the rocks,
and ie wqe a
next momentand sheinn
nwfdoars theyhsao tmdceaonutdli
could not
tbTuintu,or
vnfieenddhtienhi:
off, cleared away the boats. They
sheket nhe (gprltdn tpdhr
eenpaoasttercomen' engines
red to run an anchor out astern ; lowered
the three lifeboats, the mail boat, the cutter, and the
gig ; sent them outside the surf and anchored them.
There was a very heavy westerly swell when
the vessel struck, and the fog was sa thick that the land
coeusldeeneortly low
bemadewoeutetr. for
He frequentlyhaltanhourafetxerawmn
airded the
afterwards. It
w
compasses from the time they ceased taking soundings
Mr. O'Dowd—l am bound to ask the question-I\7;e
you sober on that night !
Captain Valler—l was perfectly sober. lam not in
the habit of getting drunk.
Mr. O'Dowd—l was bound to ask the question, and
was fully prepared for that answer.
Captain Walker said he thought there was no doubt of
the ship being well navigated till they reached the Port-
land Lights.

By Captain Walker—lt was his practice to compare
the compasses and correct them by observations two or
three times a-day. 4*- The bearings were always taken by
the standard compasses. Considered the variation in
the Channel to be 24 degrees, to which he added five or

six degrees. klt was therefore .hocessaey, to allow an error
of 29 er'3o`degrees 41together. That applies to an easterly
course. Took a Lied of hand bearing, and could not
estimate correctly within a quarter of a point. From the
time of leaving Ushant till they sighted Portland took
soundings every two hours, and the engines were
" slowed" from 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The weather
was getting
,very thick and hazy, and he reduced to
h elf speed, in case of crossing any ship making down
Channel. Tiie f,g came over just as they lost sight of
the Portland Lights. When the lights were seen in
one he knew pretty well 11;8 position, and did not
think it necessary to take soundings, only he could not
estimate their distance exactly. Had made many voy-
ages in command of the Royal Mail Company's ships, and
was well acluainted with the Channel. It was high
water between Portland and St. Alban's between 10 and
11 o'clock. The steamer went ashore on the morning
of the 13th, about three days after the full moon. It
would therefore be low water about 6 o'clock. With the
two lights in one, and the distance estimated at 8 or 10
miles, he shaped the ship's course east, and continued
that course until the ship struck. Id estimating an
easterly course he would allow 30 degrees to the north.
In steering that course he estimated it would take the
ship five miles from St. Alban's Head. The distance
is
considerablyabut 5 tno
i lteBh
:nearer to S. Alban's.
fwe
eraoshmt
ewntahrtedh
ePo Portland ltt
111lightsaen dippeddE ti
lo Sant .tdh Alban's
übweahen;
ou. You think
they we
Capt. Walker—According to the Admiralty chart the
springtirde ratheresrun strongerabout
3 onk nots an hour.
r ?
Witness—Yes.
this occasion

By Capt. Walker—Did not think that if he bad
kept on sounding the ship would have been kept oat
of danger, as the ground was the same till within
about a mile from the shore. They might have hove
the lead in 17 fathoms, and in 10 minutes have been
in 14 fathoms. If he had kept in 14 fathoms the ship
would not have been in' danger, but he would not have
approached less. If the man had been kept constantly
in the chains during the two hours after sighting
Portland the soundings might have indicated the ap-
proach of danger, but he did not think they would have
,aved the ship, as the watertsboaled so suddenly. After
losing sight of the lights, and judging the vessels to be
in a oorrect position, he thought it useless to sound, and
steered by compasses only. He made allowance for the
ebb tide, and considered the variation a quarter of a
point. There would be a set of four or five miles' tide.
The vessel was going at seven miles.
Captain Walker—l wish to repeat my question. If
von had kept the lead constantly going from the time
the lights dipped would you not have had sufficient
warning that you were approaching the land—would it
not have indicated danger ?
Captain Valler—l think it would not, as there are 14
fathoms within a mile of land. I should not have con-
sidered 14 fathoms dangerous, but I might have hauled
out a little.

Captain Walker—Then, Captain Valley, I am to sup.
pose the heaving the lead is no guide for a ship going
down Channel ?

Captai❑ Valler—l do not think it of any use to heave
a hand-lead in the Channel in shaping a ship's course.
If you consider yourself in a dangerous position the lead
may be of use. I used the lead every two hours in cross.
ing from Ushant to Portland, in accordance with the
company's regulations.
Captain Walker—lf you considered it necessary to
ass the lead where the whole Channel was open to you,
did you not think it more necessary when you get into
the Channel!

Captain Valler—l did not t hink it necessary. The
regulations of the company are on entering the Channel
to take soundings every two hours.
Uy Mr. Lobb—l am not aware that we are required
to sound more frequently when nearing land.
By Captain Walker—lf he had sounded and got 14
fathoms, he would have hauled her out to the southward.
He would have considered himself to the eastward of
St. Alban's.

By Captain Breton—ln 14 fathoms the ship might
have been saved.

Captain Walker—You must be aware, Capt. Faller,
that on getting into the Channel every precaution
ought to have been taken.

Captain Valler—l did take every precaution I
thought necessary.

Captain Walker—l have no doubt you did what you
thougnt right at the time.
Captain Taller said that such a circumstance as St,
Alban's Head not being seen at two cables' length would
not happen once in 20 years.
Captain Walker here read an extract from a book of
the company's regulations, requiring that on approaching
the land, or entering a port or roadstead, with or with-
out a pilot on board, two leads should be kept constantly
sounding.

Mr. di A. White, chief officer of the Tyne, was next
sworn, and stated that he had been 11 years and 4 months
in the compaoy's service. Had heard Capt. Valler's
examination and his description of the state of the wea-
ther, and there was nothing which he could add. He
came on deck the moment the ship struck.
Captain Walker—lt the lead bad been hove within
Portland, might the ship have been saved 'I
Witness.—l can't answer that.
Captain Walker—Are you incompetent, or do you
decline to answer ?
Witness-1 decline to answer.

Capt. Waiker—l presume, when you were appointed
chief officer, you were considered competent to take the
place of the master. Now, I ask, in your opinion,
whether, if the lead bad been constantly hove after pass-
ing Portland, the ship might have been saved I
Witness—lt is possible the lead would have kept her
out of danger. I think it might.
By Mr. Coxwell—l only declined to answer the ques-
tion at first, because I thought I was not compelled to
do so.
Mr. W. A. Wright, third officer, said had he been in
charge during the last quarter of an hour before the ship
struck, and the weather as thick as h then was, he should
have hove the lead, as an additional precaution. There
were several men on the look out ; one on each bow.
Land was not seen until five minutes before the ship
struck. The passengers were in no danger at any time
after she struck.

Job* O'Brien quartermaster, said it was very unusual
to use the lead after land had been made. In thick and
hazy weather it might be kept going, as a matter of
precaution.

Captain Vincent, R.N., Superintendent of Royal Mail
Steam Packet Company at Southampton, gave his opi-
nion that when Captain Valler found the weather come
on thick, he should have hauled his ship more off shore
to the southward, or have stopped and got a cast of the
lead. In clear weather, neither of these precautions
would have been necessary, as the land could be seen.
He considered the stranding of the Tyne to have arisen
from Captain Valler not making due allowance for the
strong ebb tide which was running from the time be
passed Portland till the ship got ashore. This and the
wind on her bow would send her six points to leeward,
more than half the speed she was going through the
water. There was want cf forethought on the part of
Captain Valler in not making sufficient allowance.
This closed the inquiry, but the result will not be
made known until it has been communicated to the
Board of Trade.

The Court admitted the previous high character of
Captain Valler.

RAILWAY INTELLIGENCE.

LONDON AND SOUTH-WESTERN.

Thb directors of this company have resolved to recom-
mend to the proprietors at the general meeting on the
12th of February next that the dividend for the half-
year erding the 31st of December, 1856, be at the rate
of 61. 10s. per cent, per annum on the capital of the
company, making, with the previous dividend, 6 per
cent. for the year.

RAILWAY AND OTHER BILLS IN PARLIA-

MENT.

Yesterday the Standing Orders of the Lords and Com-
mons were declared to have been complied with in the
following cases :—Leslie Railway ; the Cannoch Mineral
Railway ; London and South Western Railway (to
make derivations, and abandon parts of South Western,
Salisbury, and Yeovil and Salisbury Market Lines, and
in lieu, to construct new lines, and other purposes ; and
to authorise London and South Western and Great
Western to raise and app'y capital ; engineering estimate,
100,000/.) ; the Cork and Bandon Railway ; and the
Stockport, Disley, and Whaley-bridge Railway Exten-
sions. Also the Eastern Counties Railway Bill, for
making a line from Shenfield Station and Maldon to
London and Tilbury at Pitsea, and to River Crouch and
Chelmer Navigation, at a cost of 373,500/., according
to the estimate of Mr. Bruff, the engineer; the Dublin
and Wicklow Railway Extension ; the North Stafford-
shireand
Killarneyßailwa Railway (to vest iy, n
the
it several canals)
Telegrapheals;the cTraolmee.
pany, Glasgow City and Suburban Gas, and the• North
Level Drainage. The Dublin and Meath Bill is given
up.