The Sun.
London, England, 1861-12-27 00:00:00

THE DEFENCE OF ( ANADA.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—Perhaps you may permit me to intrude for
a few moments on your valuable space to point out
what appears to be the chief danger to which
Canada would b 0 exposed in the event of war un-
fortunately breaking out between the Federal
States and this country.
The defence of that province, as far as land forces
are concerned, may be divided into three parts :-
1. That of Lower Canada, or the left line of defence.
This is of great width, extending from the Richlieu
River to the Lake of thg Thousand Isles. The
greater portion of this line is covered by the broad
stream of the St. Lawrence, and Montreal lies in its
left centre. Against it the Americans can easily
mass large bodies, as it is reached by two railways
from their side—the Portland branch or terminus
of the Canadian Grand Trunk and the Ogdensburg
line. 2. The centre portion, or Niagara frontier,
between Lakes Ontario and Erie; This line of de-
fence is comparatively short, and therefore defen-
sible. 3. The right portion, or Detroit frontier,
between Lakes Erie and Huron, of much the same
character as the last. But these latter frontiers
belong to Upper Canada, and form its general line
of defence, and both are reached by railways from
the interior of the Federal States. During the last
American war it was against the Upper Province
that the efforts of the enemy were principally
directed, and there that the most severe and doubt-
ful engagements took place. The Grand Trunk
Railway of Canada traverses the whole rear of the
British line, from Lake Huron on the right to
Riviere de Loup, at the mouth of the St. Lawrence,
on the left, and affords a great facility for defensive
arrangements.

Viewing the progress of the war in a general
sense, it may be assumed, firstly, that during the
continuance of the severe cold, which must have
already set in, no great military operations can be
undertaken on either side. There may be a devas-
tating border warfare, but the movement in the field
of large masses of troops will be impossible. Secondly,
that the moment the spring becomes sufficiently
mild to permit the disembarcation of our land forces
at the railway terminus at the mouth of the St.
Lawrence and the introduction of our gunboats from
the sea into the lakes, all danger from a Federal in-
vasion is at an end. The period of peril to Canada
lies between these two.

This arises from rather a peculiar cause. The St.
Lawrence flows from the great lakes to the sea in a
north-easterly direction. The consequence of this is
that its mouth is so much further north than the

whole province of Canada that for fully five or six
weeks before the entrance to that river is accessible
to vessels military operations can, in ordinary sea-
sons, be undertaken along the Niagara and Detroit
frontiers. This is our danger, and it is a great and
pressing one. There is a period of considerably aver
a month when Upper Canada will be exposed alone
to the full force of an American invasion before our
reinforcements can reach it from the sea. Luckily
the Lower Canadian frontier, being further north, is
not so soon opened, and it is probable that no kreat
progress could be made there before the head of our
relieving column had reached Quebec. This is a very
fortunate circumstance, for a defeat on this point
would sever Upper from Lower Canada, and cut off
all our troops in the former province. Whereas any
disaster sustained on the Niagara or Detroit fron-
tier would only drive back the head of our column
on the supports ultimately coming up in its rear.
We may look upon the danger. therefore, as con-
fined for the present to Upper Canada. Now, in the
whole province of Canada we just now have only four
Line regiments and one colonial corps—five regular
battalions in all, with Artillery in proportion ; add
to this 4,000 or 5,000 efficient regular Militiamen,
and we have all that we can at once reckon upon.
It is very doubtful if any of the troops recently sent
out will be able to disembark in the St. Lawrence.
We shall certainly not be able to introduce more
than a couple of battalions in this way, or by mov-
ing them through New Brunswick over the snow.
This, then, with such assistance as can be obtained
from a numerous, hardy, and brave, but at present
wholly undisciplined local Militia, is all that the
British commander in Canada can look for
with which to meet the crisis in the first blush of
spring. By that time it is hoped that the efforts of
the officers sent out to organise the local militia will
have given them such a consistency that they may
be safely intrusted with the defence of towns, com-
munications, and frontier posts, so as to allow the
whole of our regulars and active militia to be
united on the point of danger in the field.
Should the Federals be determined to push the
war with vigour, and seriously to undertake the
invasion of the Upper Province, there is nothing to
prevent their throwing some 50,000 or 60,000 men,
such as they at present have in arms, across the
Niagara frontier in the early spring. Their railway
system gives them the means of concentrating such
a force in a comparatively short f_me from the in-
terior. Far inferior to our regular troops, they will
probably be on a par with our embodied militia,
and their overwhelming numbers may require no
ordinary military talent to withstand. We may
thus come to need the services of a commander of
strategical skill to organise the defence of an ex-
tended frontier with scanty means, of tactical ability
to handle to advantage a feeble force in the pre-
sence of superior numbers in the field, of cool judg-
ment to measure exactly the effort which can be ex-
pected from each of the variously organised corps
beneath his orders, of caution to save every drop of
his soldiers' blood until the decisive moment comes,
of firmness to pour it forth like water when the
crisis has arrived. Reinforcements we cannot now
introduce, but such a commander we owe to Canada.
As it seems to have been determined at head
quarters to send to that country, in the event of
the war going on, a superior officer to assume the
general command, it is to be hoped that his Royal
Highness in making this selection will allow no
considerations other than those of tried ability in
toe field to weigh with him. The names of some
officers have been mentioned in connection with this
appointment well known for their great talents
and high services at the Horse Guards; but this
is a moment when we cannot afford to give even to
an able man the opportunity of learning how to
become a great General. We require at once a
soldier equal to the situation, and that is one which
night come to strain, for a time, the defensive abi-
lities even of a Wellington, a Radetzky, or a Clyde.
One means which may much alleviate the pres-
sure along the Canadian frontier we hold within
our grasp. The concentration of a small army of
12,000 or 14,000 men at Halifax, perfectly equipped
at all points, with transprts equal to its immediate
embarkation, and a fleet completely blockading the
whole northern ports, would act as such a standing
menace to Boston, New York, and Baltimore as
would necessitate the concentration of a large Fe-
deral force at each of these points, and by so much
cripple their efforts against our Canadian posses-
sions. Of course, their whole troops detached
against the Confederate coast at Port Royal, Cape
Hatteras,
&c., would, if previously withdrawn, at
once fall into our hands.

But in the ultimate management of the contest
it must ever be remembered that the successful re-
sult of operations along the Canadian frontier de-
pends entirely upon the command of the lakes.
This it is the duty of the Admiralty earnestly to
look to. Of these, with our large fleet of heavily
armed gunboats—which can be introduced by the
St. Lawrence and Ottawa rivers and the Rideau
Canal into Ontario, and thence by the Welland
Canal into Erie—we ought, the moment the navi-
gation is open, to obtain at once the undisputed
mmand. Let our rulers lay to their hearts the
Duke of Wellington's words, written in November,
1814 :—" What is wanting in Canada is not a Ge-
neral, or general officers and troops, but a naval
superiority on the lakes ; till that superiority is
acquired it is impossible to maintain an army in
such a situation as to keep the enemy out of the
frontier, much less to make any conquest from
them." Without this, and it will have to be sought
for with diligence and held with energy, no mili-
tary combinations can avail.—l am, sir, your obe-
dient servant,
Dec. 23.

A BRITISH OFFICER.