The Sun.
London, England, 1859-07-30 00:00:00

HYDE-PARK.

In reply to Mr. W. EWART,
Mr. FITZROY said that two years ago complaint4were
made against allowing cows to roam unrestrictedlyover the
park, and it was for the convenience of the public that rails
had been erected, which confined the cows within narrower
limits. If the public wished that they should be allowed to
roam at large he would make arrangements to meet the
public convenience.
LANDED ESTATES COURTS.

Mr. GRIFFITH Wished to ask the Chief Secretary for
Ireland whether a memorial had been received from Mr.
Wrenfordsley, solicitor of Dublin, applying for compensa-
tion, on the plea of having suggested that the handed
Estates Courts in Ireland should be made self-supporting ;
and whether it was the intention of the Irish Government
to recommend such claim to the Treasury for considera-
tion ? '

. VANCE considered the gentleman was entitled to
some compensation for the pains he had taken in bringing
forward his plan. He disapproved of the system of the rates
of poundage ; the effect of which was to keep large ()States
out of the court, and ho hoped a change would be made.
Mr. CARD WE LL said the court had been in existence too
short a time to admit of any return of the poundage. The
gentleman referred to had not made any application to him.
CHURCH' RATES ABOLITION BILL.
Mr. CROSS wished to know what were the intentions of
the Government with regard to the Church-rates Bill,which
stood amongst the orders for that evening. He trusted it
would not be brought on at two o'clock in the morning. , He
had given notice of certain amendments similar to those
approved of by the Government in 1856, and on which the
house had never pronounced an opinion. Unless when the
bill came on the Government were prepared to state their
THE DEFENCES OF THE
views with regard to them, he would oppose the further
progress of the bill that evening.
COUNTRY.
Mr. BENTINCK said the question of which he had given
notice involved considerations of such importance that he
should ask the indulgence of the house for a few moments in
prefacing it with some observations. He admitted it rested
solely on the ground of rumour. The noble lord might refuse
to answer a question founded on rumour, but the matter in-
volved so much, not merely the honour and dignity bbt the
very existence of this country, that he feltjustified in bringing
it forward, and pressing the Government for a clear and con-
clusive answer. He was sure hon. members would acquit
Min of any party motive, but he could not ignore the history
of the past. At the commencement of the Crimean war they
had a coalition Government, including the two noble lords
opposite and the present Chancellor of the Exchequer,
and characterised by the same composite character as the
present. That Government attempted to carry on the war
with a peace establishment. The result was the loss of a
large number of valuable lives, and a subsequent wasteful
expenditure of public money. Looking to the composition
of the present Government, it became the imperative duty
of the house to ascertain what cortduct they intended to
pursue with regard to the armaments, more especially the
naval armaments, of the country. Since he had given his
notice an announcement had been made which rendered it
still more important to have a clear and distinct answer. It
was announced that the Emperor of the French intended to
commence a system of disarmament, and the consequence
was at once a series of articles congratulating this country
on being able to cease its exertions. The fact that the
French Government was about to reduce its armaments
was no reason for any reduction in the armaments of this
country. (Hear, hear.) Whatever might be the reduction
of the Frenbh army, it was the duty of the Government to
'continue their exertions until the defences of the country,
both naval and military, were placed in a more efficient state
than they had • yet attained. (Hear, hear.) Suppose the
Emperor of the French should say to the Government " I
am about to reduce my army." (He would put a case to
show there was no parity between the armaments of the
two countries.) " I intend to reduce my forces ; I intend
to reduce my army by 100,000 men, and I call on you in
fairness to do the same." What would be the result ? The
Emperor would be left with 500,000 men, but this country
would be left with nothing. (Hear, hear.) So far for the
military force. The disparity in the positions of the two
countries with reference to their naval forces was still
stronger. There was no parity between the two countries
as to the amount of naval forces they required for their de-
fence. France had no demands on her for the defence of
distant and extensive colonies, any naval force she kept up
must be solely for the purpose of home defence, or in war
of foreign aggression. The position of this country obliged
her to furnish a large force for the colonies before she could
spare a ship for home defence. Again,• suppose a proposi-
tion was made for a naval disarmament and acceded to, and
each country paid off 20 line-of-battle ship s what would be
the result ? France could recruit thesemen again in 48
hours. (Hear.) It was merely placing more ships in ordinary
and landing the seamen until a telegraphic message called
them together again , but in this country, if a ship was paid
off, re-assembling the men was a question of months, and
almost of years. He trusted that nb proposition for a dis-
armament would be accepted, and that no reduction would
be made in the navy merely because of proposals to dis-
arm. There was no parity in the positions of the two coun-
tries ; in France, after paying off, the men were as available
as ever, but here it was otherwise, and if such a proposal
were accepted it would place this country at the mercy of
France or any other aggressor for many years to come. He
should like to know from the hon. member for Birmingham
what would become of the commerce of the country if she once
lost the supremacy of the seas? He would be glad to know how
our commerce was to be supported without a navy. It had
latelybeen suggested that Government should propose to the
Emperor of France to make a mutual disarmament; he
was informed the suggestion had already been acted on.
He believed his information was correct, but he left it to
the house to judge of the story. At the time of the fetes
of Cherbourg a very distinguished person, fully qualified
to do so, made a suggestion to the Emperor like that now
recommended to the Government. ' The answer of the Em-
peror was, that he considered he was the best judge of
whatu as required for the well-bein„,... and welfare of France ;
that, in his opinion, her welfare:thquircd that she should
have 50 of the best screw line-ofdiattle ships that could be
built. He referred to some ships then in the French ports,
and said that was Apt what he meant, but 50 of the most
modern and best constrpction. -Ire added that, if he might
offer a suggestion to tngland, he Nonldi af,i,y she onght to
have 100 line-of-battle ships of the best oeifpruction ; he
believed that would be the best chance of Maintaining a
long. and lasting peace between the two countriis. He
(Mr. Bentinck) gaw3 the statement as he heard it; he be-
lieved it to be true. He believed nothing Would be more
fatal to the interests of the country than to reduce the
naval defences. (Hear.) He had put his notice on the
paper in the hope that other hon. members would give
their views, and that they might have some clear and
dis-
tinct assurance that there was no intention to reduce the

naval armaments. He begged to ask the First Lord
the Treasury whether there was any intention on the part
of her Majesty's Governnient to redudo the naval arma-
ment of the country ? •
Mr. CONINGIIAM said' that one of the most effectual
modes of providing for the defence of the country wouldbe
to establish liberal constitutions in the 'northern states of
Italy. (A laugh.) . •
Mr. LINDSAY' would wish to put the question to the
noble lord in a different shape, ae he supposedlhis conaiet
would be guided by, what were the real intentions of France.
He considered there was a great deal of false •econonly in
allowing the defences of the country to fall al low as. they
had been. (Hear, hear.) The mere rumour of an invasion
produced such a difference in the iitchanges that the loss
to the country was far more t han was required to
keep the navy in an efficient state. (Hear, hear.)
It was reported that France intended to reduce her naval
armaments. As to her army it was different ; she might say
the arm"), was not to meet England, but Austria, Prussia,
and Russia • but as to the navy, that was to meet England
and if the Emperor was prepared to reduce his navy he
trusted the noble'lord would consider whether the present
expenditure could not be checked.. A bill introduced that
morning by the Secretary of the Admiralty would involve an
additional £600,000. If France made the first move he
trusted the noble lord would meet the proposal in the same
spirit in which it was made.
Lord LOVAINE reminded the' house that when ships
were paid off in this country the men were all dismissed,
there was no reserve of seamen; but in France the men were
merely IDlaced in barracks, and, if required, the ships could
be fitted out.and the men placed on board almost before the
troops which were to embark in them could be got together.
He trusted there would be no -reduetionin the naval force
until they had an absolute pledge from France, not only that
she would pay off her ships, • but also that she would not
build any more. That would be the only way to get security
against unpleasant results. (Hear, hear.)
Lord ASHLEY expi eased his cordial sympathy in the
views of the.hon. member for West, Norfolk. Unless the
navy was maintained in an efficient state, the country never
would be safe.. It was very well for the Emperor to talk of
reducing ; it meant nothing but putting a few ships in ordi-
nary, and placing their crews at the naval depots, where they
were available at a moment's notice. He had had tie honour

of serving in the Black Sea fleet; no vessels were ever better
manned ; but whore were the men now ? Some had entered
the American service, some were in Australift, others in
whalers. In consequence of the reduction at the end of the
war they were obliged to seek employment where they could,
and if: hey were now wanted to man the fleet, they could
not be got. It took a long time to make a sailor; mere
pluck and willingness were not enough. (Hear.) The navy
ought to be maintained at a sufficient force without regard
to that of any other State, and he trusted they would re-
ceive some satisfactory assurance from the Government on
the subject.
Mr. S. BOOTH considered that such discussions did not

at all tend to the credit of the house, or become the dignity
of the country. (Hear.) If the Government was fit to
conduct the business of the, country under present circum-
stances, this question of her defences ought to be left in
their hands. The constant repetition of these alarms in the
house only increased the agitation in the tountry.
Mr. HUTT wished to know whether the report of the

Commission on Dockyard Expenditure, appointed by the
late First Lord of the Admiralty, would be laid on the table
before the close of the session. He understood it had been
in the hands of the Admiralty for some time.
Lord PALMERSTON—Sir, my hon. and learned friend
the member for Cork will understand why I did not answer
his question at the moment. I saw there was another ques
tion on the paper to be put to me, and I thought it better to
wait as I could only speak once. My hon. and learned
friend asked me whetherthe Sovereign of the Roman States
has finally accepted or declined the position of President over
the Confederated States of Italy; and whether, in the event
of the Sovereign Pontiff accepting that office, it was intended
on the part of her Majesty's Government to adopt effectual
steps for establishing direct diplomatic relations with the
Court of Rome. As to the first question, I really am not
competent to give an answer, because as yet no confedera-
tion has been formed, and we are not in such a positionwith
the Pope as would induce him to give us an intimation as
to what his intentions may be. I would refer ntY hon. and

learned friend to the hon. and learned member for Dundalk,
who is much more likely to be in the confidence of his Holi-
ness. As to the second question, whether in the event of
the confederation we intended to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with the POpe as the head of it ; if sucn a confedera-
tion was established we would, no doubt, have diplomatic
relations with the diet which would represent it, as we have
diplomatic relations with the German Confederation. Our
representative is accredited to the diet quite independent of
any diplomatic relations we may have with the sovereigns
who constitute the confederation. It may be as well, per-
haps, that I should state what is the law with regard to
diplomatic relations with the Pope. It will be in the re-
collection of the house that some years ago an act was
passed enabling her Majesty to enter into diplomatic rela-
tions with the Pope. In the upper house a clause was in-
serted, preventing her Majesty_from receiving an eccle-
siastic as his representative; the Court of Rome chose to
consider this as a bar to the establishment of diplomatic
relations with the Court of Great Britain. The Govern-
ment of Prussia, which is a Protestant country ; and of
Russia, which is non-Catholic, decline to receive at their
courts any ecclesiastic as representative of the Pope. I do
not know the reason, whether it is the law or otherwise,
but still such is the practice on their part, and I confess I
do not understand why the Pope should make a distinction
between England on one hand, and Russia and Prussia on
the other, and should require us to repeal a law before he
would do for us what he does for them. It is true he does
not send representatives to Berlin or St. Petersburg ; yet
he receives their representatives at Rome. With regard
to the question of the hon member for West Norfolk, I
might`simply content myself with saying at once that the
answer to his question must depend on a, great variety of
circumstances, which in due time, and at the proper mo-
ment, it will be the duty of the overnment to take, into
deliberate consideration. (Hear.) The hon, gentleman
asked the First Lord of the Treasury whether there is any
intention on the part of her Majesty's Government to re-
duce the naval armament of the country. If I were to say
that we have no intention to depart from the estimates pre-
pared by our predecessors, and which we have adopted,
that would be a sufficient answer. As to one ground on
which the hon. gentleman has put his question—viz., in
consequence of information having been received that
the Emperor of the French intends to make a reduction
in his naval and military establishments, and his assump-
tion that this information may be met by a corresponding
change on our part, I might put it to the honourable
gentleman that although such information may afford him
and other honourable members a firm ground for putting
forward their opinion, it would be somewhat prema •
ture to expect the Government—(hear, hear)—to give any
information as to what course they may think it their, duty
to adopt in consequence of an event which has not yet hap-
pened, and of which information has only been received
that it is intended to take place. I have no hesitation in
concurring in the principle which I understand has; been
laid down, that it would be impossible for the Government
of this country to enter into any treaty with another coun-
try for the reduction of our naval and military establish-
ments in order to put our establishments upon a footing to
be determined by the arrangements which another country
might think fit to make. (Hear, hear.) If there were but
two powers in the world—if you had but England and
France—l should say that even then it would be an ar-
rangement we could not enter into, because the interests of
England and France, the position which they have to main-
tain, are so entirely different, that no arithmetical arrange-
ment could be entered into that one country should make a
reduction simply because the other did so. But the house
will remember that there are other parties to be considered
besides England and France. There are powers with whom
we have, and I hope shall continue to have, friendly rela-
tions, but with whom 'those relations might alter. Hence
our naval and military armaments must depend .not upon
any foreign power, but upon that which the responsible
Government of the day may from time to time consider to
be necessary for the safety of the country. Sir, I can say
no more than that. Of course, the duty of the overnment
is, while on the one hand it proposes to Parliament the es-
tablishments which it conscientiously believes to be neces-
sary for the public safety, on the other hand not to raise
false alarms or to burden the country to a greater extent
than necessary. With regard to the , question put by the
hon. gentleman, I am informed that the report to which he
alludes will be placed before Parliament in a few days.

CHURCH RATES.
Lord J. MANNERS said it was desirable to know what
was proposed. to be done by the Government on the subject
of church rates.
Sir C. LEWIS said that all which the Government could
do was to give precedence, so far as possible, to all mattters
which must be disposed ofhefore the end of the session.
At a later period,
Mr. BOL DERO asked whether, if the Church Rate Bill
were brought on at a late hour, the Home Secretary would
move the amendment which stood en the paper in his name.
The hon. member was proceeding to discuss that amend.
ment when he was called to order by the SPE4KER.
Mr. M. GIBSON said that he believed his right hon.
friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department
would move his amendment if an opportunity offered. He
concurred with the hon. gentleman in the inexpediency, as
a general rule, of bringing on important questions late at
night. (Hear.)
THE ROCKY MOUNTAINS.
Mr. CAIRD asked the Under-Secretary of State for the
Colonies whether any new instructions were sent to Captain
Palliser on receipt of his report of October 7, 1858, inregard
to his further explorations along the American boundary line
and in the Rocky Alountains ; and whether Captain Palli-
ser's journal had been received and would be printed. He
said that Captain Palliser had discovered a countrytowards
the range of those mountains which was most fertile, and
which promised to open up a most fertile track of land for
the purposes of this country. These explorations had not
been carried so far as they would have been, on account of
the want of funds. Now he trusted that no feelings of petty
economy would be allowed to stand in the way of further
explorations.
Mr. ELLICE said that no new discoveries had been
made by Captain Palliser, and:he hoped that no more money
would be wasted on this subject.
Mr. D. SEYMOUR quite differed from the right hon.
gentleman. He believed that Captain Palliser's discoveries
were fraught with interest of great value to the public. If
no new discovery had been made, certainly Captain. Palli-
ser had for the first time made that public which was before
generally unknown.. Within the last year Captain Palliser
had discovered four passes through the Rocky Mountains.
He hoped that the Government would turn their attention
to this subject.
Mr. BLACKBURN protested against the money of this
country being expended upon this subject.
Mr. C. FORTESC UE would not enter into all the
points which this question might give rise to. He,would
assure the house that the Government would not expend
the money of this country on places which were destitue of
colonists. (Hear.) The report to which the hon. gentle-
man referred was received in January last, and at that time
a small sum only was asked by Captain Palliser, and that
amount had been sent to him. In answer to the question
of the hon. member he could only state that everything re-
ceived from Captain Palliser had been published.
RIFLED GUNS'
Mr. MONSELL called the attention of the house to the
fact that a valuable invention in rifled guns had been made
by Mr. B. Briden, and that repeated trials of guns rifled
upon that plan had been made at Salisbury and els4where.
The groat advantage of the plan consisted in its making a
bore of only 1-16th of an inch 14 the interior of the gun,
whereby no injury was done to its strength. Ife wished
to know whether in the rifle guns which were being made
Mr. Briden's invention had been used.
Mr? S. ITERVERT said that many ingenious plans 'had
been submitted to the Government for rifling gum; and
amongst them was .that of Mr. Tiriden, Thisa plans were
now the subject of experiment and inquiry, and until these
experiments were concluded, there could of necessity be no
answer to his right hon. friend's question.
Mr. MILNES asked a question on the subject of judicial

::~; Lit:)

statistics; but the `Home Secretary having already spoken
en this ,motion, no answer could be given., •
The motion that the house at its rising adjourn to Mon.
-day was then (lowed to.
THE NATIONAL DEFEN CES.
•
On the motion fo going into Committee of Supply, •
Mr. HORSIVIANT pursuant to notice, rose to propose' a
Motion as to the mode of providing for the expense of Com-
'pleting the cessaay works of
finational defence, pi-ejected
pr already in progress. If any apology were required for the
'otion he was about to submit, it would be found in the
preliminary diicussion which had already taken place in the
h4(Se that evening. The question of the national defenees
had only to be mentioned in that house to excite a feeling
of general interest, and he belieVed the feeling of that house
on the subject was a very inadequate representation of that
Which prevailed throughout the country. (Hear.) They
had just been called on by. Government to make a large in-
crease in the taxes of the Year, and that was grounded on.
the necessity of adding to our national defences., This year
our armaments would cost us £26,000,000, and in order to
meet that enormous outlay, we should have to submit to an
augmentation of the most odious, and exceptional of all our
' imposts. In a time of profound peace we were about to
dOuble the income tax nearly, and there was a general dis-
position to inquire whence the great exigency arose. It was '
obvious that those great estimates were the result of some
great necessity, and were the evidence either of some iina
glued or some concealed danger , How long, he asked, was'l
that state of things to continue, and what was the proba-
bility of these.estimates either being diminished or continu-
ing. permanent in their present enormous size ? There was a
point at which inquiry, on this subject became the duty of
Parliament, and when anything like reserve or concealment
on the part of the Government was fraughtwith danger
and involved a positive betrayal of the interests of thecoun-
try. (Hear, hear.) There was always a dispositidn on
the part of the House of Commons to act with fOrbearance
in reference to' 'all questions affecting international rela-
tions ; but there were occasions—and he believed this was
one—when it, behoved the house to , press the Government
of the day to speak out in plain and unmistakeable lan-
guage. All those armaments and 'that taxation originated
in one cause, namely, in an apprehension of some war or
some attack being directed against the country by France.
He need. have no hesitation. in saying it, for all Europe
knew and said it. It was an indisputable fact that our
Minister at War was adding greatly to our defences, and
that our Minister of Finance was doubling our income-tax,
and all from an uneasiness caused by the circumstance that
the armaments of our nearest and dearest, our much lauded
and much trusted ally, had increased and were increasing,
and, notwithstanding the intimation in the Jlioniteur of
yesterday, with no immediate prospect of diminution.
Ought we hot, he asked; to look our position boldly
and sensibly in' the face, and really ascertain either
the necessity or the folly of the alarm ? If that uneasiness,
which was costing us so much, was unfounded, we ought to
be instantlyrelieved from sacrifices we were nowcalled upon
to make ; but if there was anything like real danger in our
position not an hour should be lost in placing our security
beyond the possibility of question. It only remained for
the Government, like men, like Englishmen, like states-
men, to tell us so. Let them but say the word, that this
was an occasion for England to put forth some portion of
her latent strength, in order to overtake a march stolen
Upon her, and the spirit of the nation, which would be in-
stantly aroused, would do all the rest. (Hear, hear.) At
such a time the real indiscretion, folly, reproach, and guilt
Would be on the head of the Minister who, having bound-
less resources at his command, hesitated to employ them,
dissembling the danger until it was too late to avert it.
A rebuke had lately been administered from the Ministe-
rial'side of the house to the press of this country, because,
in expressing 'a feeling of misgiving occasioned by 'the
aspect of public affairs, it had used language alleged to be
offensive to our neighbours across the Channel. He was
one of those who, in common, he believed, with the great
majority of that house, had shared largely in the appre-
hensions which the public had lately expressed ; and he felt
I gratitude to the press for the warnings it had sent forth.
(Hear, hear.) It was his good fortune recently to listen to
the speech of a venerable peer whose courageous exposition,
of the national defences had created so much sensation, and
even with the fear of incurring rebuke, he could not refrain
from ta.king the most public opportunity of tendering- his
thanks. (Cries of " Order, order," interrupted the sen-
tence before its conclusion.) He had made no allusion
to the place where that speech was. delivered. He had
only referred to it as the Speech of a peer: He there-
fore submitted that he was in order, and he would take leave
to express his' admiration of the wisdom and patriotism
by which that address was characterised—(hear)—speak-
ing home, as it did, in much needful warning to the
'hearts, sympathies, and convictions of, he believed, the
great majority of his Countrymen from one end of the
kingdom to the other. (Cheers.) But what did those arti-
cles in the English press and speeches such as that really
imply ? Not fear of any enemy abroad but of our own in-
capacity at _ home. (Hear.) It was not fear of France, but,
_ _

correctly translate d;want of confidence in our own de.part
meats in England. It was not that we dreaded plans of
attack from abroad, but that we had an uneasy feeling as to
the want of plans at home. (Hear.) The recollections of
the Crimea had sunk deeply into the national mind. They
had never been obliterated, and knowing how powerful and
invincible we were as a nation we were struck with terror,
not of those by whom we might be invaded, but of those to
whom our defences might be committed. Again, if the lan-
guage of apparent hostility to France had caused so much
uneasiness, what was to be said of that language of compli-
ment and adulation of which this country had become some-
what ashamed ? There was no doubt the demeanour of some
of our public men towards the Emperor of the French
had lowered us abroad and sickened us at home, while
it had provoked many of those counter demonstrations of
opinion which would Mt have been so frequent or so marked
had the public not felt that the honour and character of the
nation had been complimented away. (Hear.) The Em-
peror of the French had been our friend and ally. He was
a man of sense, and a man of business ; and our Ministers

ought to have said to him, "We cannot, without explana-
tion, allow you under cover of the English alliance to make

such an'enormous increase of your armaments—it is under

the cover of our alliance that this increase has taken place ;
you have never ceased to make professions of peace and
friendship towards this country; but, for some time past,
We have found it difficult to reconcile those professions with
the enormous preparations you have'been making for war;

increased armaments ought to be resorted to only time of
danger ; the attitude you will shortly assume will be one of
menace, and in that case it is evident we shall soon cease to be
allies ; either you must give us the assurance that you will
desist from these menacing preparations or we shall be
under the alternative of girding up our loins and making
preparations for whatever may occur." (Hear, hear.) This
language would have been better and more appropriate than
the perpetual use of diplomatic compliments, which had not
raised us in the estimation of foreign countries, and which
was distasteful to our own people. (Hear.) The probability
was that two or three years ago the enormous preparations
which gave us now so much uneasiness—which financially
at least was so heavily felt—would have been departed from,
or at least we should have known what other alternative we

had to contemplate. (Hear, hear.) Our Ministers would only
have had to take the alternative that lay before us, and the

country would at once have been stimulated into activity
and liberality ; if it was felt that danger was reallyimminent
we should in a very short time have been placed in such a
state of security ac to render us impervious to fear, and to
cause the idea of invasion to be received only with a Smile.

(Hear.) Al; the eleventh hour, however, the necessity fpr in-
creasing our defence§ was proclaimed by the increased esti-
mates which the houSe had this year been askeil to vote.
But it was to be deplored that they were meeting that nece4-
sity with half measures, and he felt bound to say that, for
purposes of national defence, half measures 'were no imea-
sures at all—to be serviceable they must be cor4lete.
(Hear.) They were engaged on permanent works of na-
tional defence. These were vety costly, but the result was
veryunsatisfactory. Our arsenals were entirely undefended;
our shipping, in case of war, had no shelter for their pfotec-
tion or repair. The necessary works were planned, but the
money to complete them was got in driblets. It was distri-

buted over so rnany works, and spent through such a 'series
of years that in the meantime we were utterly defeneeless.
(Hear.) He had in his hand a few items taken from the
estimates for the year for these public works. The first
work he found was that of Devonport. The cost of these for-
tifications was estimated at £457,500; and the sum voted

this year waslB6,ooo. This was one of the most necessary
and urgent works that had been undertaken, but according
to the present rate of payment 'it would take four , years
to complete it. That was on the supposition thitt the
estimate was correct, for, as the house know, it frequently
happened that the expenditure was rather in excess of the
estimate. (Hear.) The next place was Dover. The esti-
mated cost of the fortifications hero waB£3ll,ooo. There

had been already voted £133,000, and • the vote this year
was £26,000. To complete these fortifications would take a
period of seven years. Alderney was next on the list. The
estimated cost was £200,000 ; last year £15,000 was voted,
leaving £185,000 still to be granted. To complete these
works would take no less than 12 years. (Hear.) Then
there was Pembroke, with the sea defences of Milford
Haven. The estimated sum for the works was £190,000.

There had been voted £25,000 this year ; £165,000 still re-
mained to be voted, and it would take six or seven years to
complete the works. Portsmouth works were estimated at
£300,000 ; this year £65,00) was voted, and it would take
31 years to finish the undertaking. The Hilsea Lines were
estimated at £135,000. A sum of £65,000 had been voted
this year, and 31 years would be required to complete the
works. The Southsea line was put down at £30,000 in a
supplementary estimate; £3,000 had been voted, and it
would take nine years to complete the works. The Stokes
Bay line was estimated in a supplementary estimate at
£20,000. They had voted £7,000, and it would take six
years more to finish the undertaking. But the most extra-
ordinary case was that of Portland. They all remembered
if
an enemy were to take possession of the of
wagth th importanceat w aof foPn oe r
ot
howland
.t hHis
Secretarystatement for it gthe finest harbours in the world, but that it was utterly de-
fenceless ; thatregarding d spokei git
island we should have great difficulty in dislodging him--
that the works required could be executed very eoonomi..
tally, but that when completed the defences would he so
strong as to make it impossible that Portland should ever
fall into the hands of an enemy. Now, everybody knew that
that was a very. fair statement, but what must be the feel-
ing of the Minister who made that statement when he re-
flected that, according to the rate of the vote taken this year
21 years would be required to complete the works at
Portland ? (Hear, hear.) He might rest his case on that
instance alone, for it was impossible that any Minister who
had made the house conscious of the importance of such a
work could contemplate with anything like equanimity the
idea that 21 years would be required to complete them—
(heaa)—but there were other cases—such as the defences of
commercial harbours—to which he would rejer the house.
Even with regard to Gibraltar and Malta a strong case
could be made out, for it would take four years to bring
the defences of the latter place to an end. (Hear.) There
were other works not in the estimates which the Govern-
ment must feel to be imperatively called for. He would
take the case of Woolwich as an example. The amount of
property in our arsenals there could not be less than
£10,000,000 to £15,000,000 ; and it was perfectly defence-
less, not a single shilling of public money ever having been
voted for fortifications at Woolwich. (Hear, hear,) He
assumed that the works to which he had referred were all
necessary, because,
with the exception of Woolwich, they
had all been approved by Parliament, and money had been
voted towards them.. Ile was far from saying
necessary that these works should be completed according
to the plans and estinta that it was
tt).S. liefbre the house. That was a
quesyll 4tat" Wonld come under the consideratin bf
Roya Oornmission to be nominated at the instance of his
hon. and gallant friend (Sir De L, Evans). In fact, the
appointment of that commission was necessary to carry
out the object of his own motion if the house should agree
to it. If that oommittLe were well selected, its report would
be most valuable, and ty money to carry out its recoin

cL

,
mendations would no doubt be most ungrudg,zu
,gly and un-
hesitatingly; provided: It would-riot do:for Governinent in
such a case to :ell the house that England .could nut 'afford
to spend whatever sum that•
commission might think ne-.
ce'tsaryfor thenational defences. The safety of England
was too PretiOne not to be insurt•cl. tit any price • • and the
'only-question was •h ow the money was to loe got,:. There
was no member of-that
house who Would:- not scout the
-idea of 'conSeriting to loan ler the 'purpose Of *the ordi-
nary expenditOre of`the country . but the question was
Whether this was' part of the- ordinary expenditure of the
Country. • :(Hear, 'near.) ' It' was expenditure which Was
taking place in anticipation of a possible war. It ass not
occasioned by a belief that any foreign Power at present en-
tertained or, he honed, would for a long time entertain, any
idea of invading England; but we' knew not h.oW suddenly
such-a war might arise, and if it brOke out and found us
unprepared and defenceless we should net be -sat& for a
single day. Hitherto the plan had been to spread this e'xpen-
diture over a series of years, but the general opinion :of the
house, and he believed also that rat' the Gevernment, now
was that it ought to be compressed,within a limited period.
If these works were to bo of eny use they ought to be com-
pleted at, once ; and if the expenditure intended to be that
of a series,ef yeers was compressed into two dr three, it be-
came an extraordinary expenditure, and muStbe-rnet by
extraordinary means. (Hear, hear.) You could not meet
it out 'of the ordinary income of the country. *(Hear, hear.)
You must therefore either complete these works by-means
of a loan or leave thenkunfinished. That was an alternative
which the house could not avoid. (Hear, hear;) Some gen-
tlemen thotight that his object in bringinglerward this mo-
tion was to obtain the establishment of a line 'of-forts along
the whole of our coasts, so as to prevent the pOssibility,of
landing being effected by an ihvadieg. army; Instead of this
hp went rather into the opposite extreme, and thought that
such an expenditure would-be perfebtly absurd, and indeed a
complete waste of money.. (Hear, hear.)' Our expenditure
Might to be limited to two objects We ought to provide
defences for our shipping and our arsenals Hii object was
merely that, as certain plans had been approVed by Govern-
ment, sanctioned by Parliament, and the Works already
commenced, we should obtain the motley required, and com-
plete at once operations which we-Lila otherwise .be spread
over a number of years. (Hear, hear.) It had also been
supposed that he wished to- borrow money to pay some part
of the eipense of -mir-Militark •and naval establishments.
Nothing could be more absurd.-- Theonly objection which
he had heard to the raising of this large sum of money, in
order that these works Might be completed within a oertain
time, was that if so great an-amount wai at once.placed at
the disposal of the Government there woulddie an enormous
quantity of jobbery and waete. His own :opinion was that
this was a very absurd Objection, and he-wastsure that he
might safely leave: it to be detilt With by his., right hon.
'friend the Secretary of State tbr War, whot;Wonld hardly
admit that, although his department could. control the ex-
penditure 'of £2,000,000 per- annum, it emild exercise no
efficient superintendence over that of £6,0015,000. It was
the more necessary that the -Money required fOr this expen-
diture should be raised as he proposed,- because for some
time, ,'at last,- the ordinary military and naval expenditure
of the country would absorb all that portion of the income
which could possibly be devotecito it; He was notable to
comprehend the logic of the statement made by the Chan-
cellor of the 'Exchequer the other. might, that it matters did
not get worse in the course of next year, they would pro-
bably get better. His belief was thatess.far as a diminu-
tion of expenditure went, they could not get better,, as long
as we acknowledged our obligation .to: keep
.the navy of
England up to an • adequate strength- The superiority of
our fleet—he would not say ourstipremacys at sea, as that
might be objected to. as implying rather .a bellicose spirit
—was as essential to our commerce as were the ships
which carried it. ( tlear, . hear.) He agreed with what
was said by an hon..member early thatervening, that the
Superiority of our navy was rendered, absolutely neces-
sary by the superiority of our colonial and commercial
interests. (Hear, hear_) , The superiority of our fleet at sea
had hitherto been the first necessity of. our empire.. It had
been considered the first law of our existence-as a. great Eu-
ropean Power. Other Towers had great military establish- -
meats. • The Channel was Our: natural dbfen.ce and if we
lost that, we should at once lose ourpositionin..iurope as a
first-rate Power. (Hear, hear.) From the time that Eng-
land first became . a great maritime Powee,,lier superiority at
sea was never lest until the close of theCeiznean. war. That
it should then have been lost was a great misfortune and a
great Mistake. - (Hear.) It was much to the honour of gen-
tlemen opposite that theyendeavoured-earid successfully en-
deavoured—to re-establish the navy of England in the posi-
tioniwhich it ought toihold ; and no: Government: 'would
deserve a moment's forbearance which did not . strain every
nerve to make it the most powerful navy in the world.
(Hear, hear.) During the discusSion upon the navy esti-
mates last year, he expressed an ppinion in which he was fol-
lowed by the gallant admiral the member for Southwark
that the navy of England ought tobe equal to thenavies of
France and Russia united. (Hear, hear:) To his great satis-
faction the noble lard at the head of the Governnient had the
other night endorsed that sentiment. It was an opinion which
was becoming very general in. that house; but, unfortunately,
the equality which. he desired was not very easily, obtained.
Russia had lately been building in the. United States large
ships of war, some of which were already completed. France
had got a-head of us, and was making every effortto preserve
-that start. While -we were only experimenting she had
already got iron-cased vessels, armed with rifled artillery—
(" Hear, hear," from Sir C. Napier)—and could at short
notice bring into the Channel a fleet more powerful than
ours, and could man it more easily with practised seamen.
It was admitted that if unfortunately a naval engagement
between the fleets of the two Powers should take place its re-
sult might be doubtful. If its results were in favourof France,
if she could blockade or destroy the remainder of the fleet,and
our defences Were incomplete, England would become part
of the main land' of the Continent, and France with the
command of the communications could transport a fleet
across the Channel as easily as she could send-it across the
line. Suppose such a thing occurred—and he was speaking
of what might happen-10- or 20 years hence, a short period in
the lives of such nations as England and France—we should
have to depend upon our land force: What was that ? Here,
again, everybody felt that we were the victims of half-
measures. Every one knew that if in any future war that
might occur a French general were to land in England, he
would bring with him every soldier for whom transport
could be found. It would be for invaders and invaded a life
and death struggle. That army would leave its own ports
an exultant and, by anticipation, a victorious army.. From
the moment it landed in England it would have to fight its
way with the desperation of a forlorn hope, and within two *
or three weeks of the landing of the first zouave either it
would be completely annihilated or London would be taken.
It would be less a war than a surprise, and its suddenness
would be one element in ,the. calculation of its success.
What force had we, what preparations had we to meet such
a danger as this ? We all knew that it was very inadequate.
We ought to have one of two.forces, either a standing army
equal to any which could be hroeght to invade us, or a large
auxiliary force of militia and volunteers. But could anybody
say that we had either, or. mere likely to have either ?
Lately.we had .had a movement - for. the. establishment of
rifle corps. They were set on foot by the late Government,
and finding them very popular the present Government was
obliged to take-theni up, but-still had extended to them but
a very chill support. (Hear.) So great; in fact, were the dif-
ficulties thrown in the way by routine and red-tape 'that it
seemed as though the Horse Guards and the War-offiCe would
preferto see the country conquered by the old methods rather
than saved by any perilous modern innovations. (Hear.) In
1803 we had 400,000 volunteers and militia under arms, and
even then we thanited our stars for- the Channel, which
was our best defence. (Hear, hear.) Napoleon, it was well
known, regretted to his .dying day that he had -not at-
tempted to invade England; for he. made but light of the
forces he would have to meet had, he once landed. In our
days we had no such volunteer force. . We might have rifle
corps, but it did-not appear as- though we had rifles to arm
them, for, he had heard lately that-a large contract entered
into with a Belgian house for rifles had been annulled on
aocOuneof someslight extra.•iron demanded by the contrac-
torS, so that we werealtogether left without the 'arms for
which a short-time ago there was:thought to be anrurgent
necessity. He hoped, however, to hear this report contra-
dieted, by the Secretary for War. But when, we saw how
inadequate were Our defences—whether (naval; -military, or
irregular—we could no longer wonder attitto
dis-
quietude whioh had sprung -up, 'net so much-from fear ofd
danger from abroad as from the state Of unreadiness an
non-preparation in-which we were at home. (Hear, heari2
feelingeof
.We ought not to lose one moment in putting England
anysUcha hostilestate a tutti- s.
(Hear.)
wouldiea ro blev entirely t rel y
everybodyou t o theope
n reachwastfhca
efr
distant ; but we ought to employ the interval m.
ocouunghttryaliNioatyos ,thoatbepoeuinro.fhetctitmt,esotaobtfee
ropefauc-tdee.ifnetnEocveaecrityniv;wtyuuhbi;lcichegvasenhryde
every private yard „
-workman and artificer ought to• be set to work, and at

.. ~.....
insecurity we ought to act as though the crisis were upon
extra hours. As long as We were' in our present state of
us. The volunteer corps ought to be encouraged, and if we
could not make rifles fast enough at home we ought to
renew our contracts with foreign houses, without troublng
ourselves whether they might demand 6d. extra per
rifle. The work of manufacturing, constructing, `recruit-
ing, and drilling, ought to be pushed on until Eng-
land was placed • in that state of security as never
again to be liable to one of those" humiliating, de-
grading, nay, even dangerous panics of invasion. Many
persons might think that all this was foolishness—(" hear,
hear, from Mr. Cobden)--but ridicule would not deter
him from expressing his opinion on this subject. It
was very much to be regretted that on a matter of such
deep interest, where the feelings and judgment of all men
ought to be considered, our highest military authorities, our
most experienced diplomatists, and our most venerable and
wisest statesmen could not use that liberty of speech which
was the birthright of us all, without being exposed to an
amount of ridicule and derision which was wholly unde-
served. (Hear, hear.) He had no fault to find with any
private rneinly:r responsible for his own opinions only ;,
taking this view of the question, the hon. member for Bir-
mingham, for instance, had a perfect right to express his
belief that there was no Zouave in the French army who
would not prefer a remission of the wine duties to the sack
of London ; but it was a very different thing when a Mi-
nister of the Crown rising after him expressed such a con-
currence in his views as to lead the hon:member tocongra-
tulate his friends on gaining over so distinguished a convert
to their views. The country, however, was not cons erted to
those views, and it would watch with great alarm the con-
version of the Government to them. (Hear, hear.) He and
others who thought with him had boen content to refrain
from any public statement of the reasons for their disquie-
tude—but when they were told on the highest ex thority
that the Ministers of the Crown were become members of
the Peace Society they felt bound to protest against the
progress of those viewsto state the reasons for their appre-
hensions, and to justify those reasons. He had never.uttered
h for
a word in disparagement of the Emperor of thheiFs
'Emperor
from that usually formed' in this country.
and he re-ez 3tablished
he had always formed a different estimate, of his rale aaraeter
found France in a state of anarchy, and he re-ix tablished
order. Before he appeared on the stige everybo _.
that France must go through a fierce yy
convul-
sion,belieTed
order. Before he appeared on
hthtehsetageriessiasnagtijainsardr
but he carried her through
and
grateful France re.
than anybody believed possible, nailer cost
She believed Id ra her bene-
warded him with the throne.
prosperity at homy t old military
thoughentire.l.vi; :iitt
given her peace afrontiers. Between hi:.n., and his people
factor, she chose himad for her sovereign, a, id he had
glory beyond her
crit (Iv
tirely shut out from foreign ,t sm, ti ns at leas
if not en accord, which
remove('
affairs of France we must have no con' :ern , it w: is our duty
there w
to watch her foreign policy,and
, if asYced why, viith his es-
timation of the character of the EmLieror, ILe he'd eyed in the
possibility of an invasion, .... lri
e was driven to a ssign as s
reason a fact which was notorionv to everybod'r. here and in
France. He believed in the possibility of a war w ith France
at some future time because he ~saw that the }lna peror him-
self believed in that possibility iirortithe preperE.ti ' L ins he had
mades; He believed-that if a war broke out an L attempted
-invasion of Faiglandwould be , one of the firm sty, is in that
war. As flick siw unmistakeable prOofs of pr mi ntion for
war, -tVery niitri who was- not,`wilfully`Vand inns see that
there were unmistakeable preparations for mal ch 3g that war,
if it took place, more formidable by invasion. l{ 3 knew it
might be said that it was an insult to the Emi ?eri ar to was:
pect such an intention, but he could only say ti 3at 1 to did n
insult any man by believing that possible -, silid h he had
himself openly, publicly, and ostentatiously tad, them he

might probably do. (Hear.) No man who had ever been
raised to a throne had taken more pains than the Emperor
of the French to advertise to the world what he believed to
be his future destiny and its fruits. The Emperor was a man
of thought before he was a man of action ; as they had been
told last night, he was an author before he became an Em -
perer ; and, after he had attained ripe age, after long study
and reflection, he gave to the world, in works of deep thought
and intense feeling, a programme of his opinions and his
policy. Whether dating from London, or from his prison
at Ham, or pleading for life before his peers in France, he
gave earnest of that which he had since proved himself
the world, as a man of strong purpose and inflexible
will. The dream of the exile, the prayer of the captive, the
address of the candidate for power, all betrayed one
recollection, and all pointed to one day of national
retribution. They all repeated that one word which,
he said, no Frenchman could utter without emotion ; and
since he became Emperor of France he had, almost con-
stantly, inspired his army with the belief that he and they
had one common commission unfulfilled, until by a last,
great, glorious enterprise they had effaced the stain of
Prance's deepest humiliation and her most dire despair. He
did not wish to say one word in disparagement of the illus-
trious ruler of the French nation, who could not be offended
at our accepting as true what he had himself avowed with
pride, It might be said that he (Mr. Horsman) was repeat-
ing an old story; but lie might remind hon. gentlemen that
the works to which he had referred had recently been re-
produced in prance, and had been revised and republished
under the authority of the Emperor himself. They were
extensively circulated and widely read in France, and what
was the effect they produced upon the French people ?
Why, they could only be regarded as a re-affirmation on the
part of the Emperor of the policy of the exile. They afforbled
ded
the key to what would otherwise be a mystery, and ena
people to interpret what would otherwise be unintelligible
—namely, that these vast preparations, the extension of the
navy, the fortification of the coast, the enlargement and in-
crease in the number of transports, and the conscription for
the marine, all indicated preparation for a gigantic enter-
prise to be undertaken some day or another against a gigan-
tic naval Power, and that Power need not be na med. The
.English were a practical and business- e peep Jeren when
they had these writings, which had been latery produced
and circulated, and when they saw the enormous military
and naval preparations which were made in France, it was
no wonder that they should ask., " A.re we in that state o
perfect security and defence in which we ought to be
even in times of peace ? " He repeated again that, in
making this statement, he did not say one word against
a ruler of whom he had never spoken disparagingly,
nor did he
my a word against that great and gallant
people • who all who knew them must admire ; but he
did say that they must look forward—as was quite
consistent with the most honourable policy—to some
future occasion when war might break out, and these
preparations were made in order that they might not a
second time be the vanquished party. He need scarcely
refer to what was, he believed, a notorious fact, with regard
to which her Majesty's Ministers were no doubt fully in-
formed that since the conclusion of the peace of Villairanca
so far from the activity apparent in the naval arsenals of
France having been at all relaxed, it had certainly, until
within the last 24 hours, been very much on the increase.
Yesterday the noble lord,l after making his statement with
reference to Italian affairs, drew the attest ntionn
of the house
to the announcement which had ju bee made in
ifoniteur. Now, no one would wish to diminish the im-
portance—whatever it might be—of that announcement, but
he might observe that if both England and France had had
war establishments, or if the British Government had been
making preparations in anticipation of an immediate pros-
pect of war, the announcement of a reduction of the mili-
tary force of France might have been very important to this
country. What he maintained, however, and what he had
endeavoured to enfore upon the house was, that the arma-
ments of France were as much above the requirements of a
peace establishment as those of England were below them—
(hear)—that we had reduced our establishments to a danger-
ous point ; and that, whatever might be done by foreign
Governments, there was a certain minimum of power below
which this country ought never to allow its defences to fall.
(Hear, hear.) In a time of profound peace, and in a spirit
of over-confidence in the continuance of that peace, this
country had, in his opinion, allowed her defences to all to
too low a point. They had fallen far below the require-
ments of a peace establishment, and when he looked back to
their condition when the mutiny broke out in India, he
must say it was fortunate that at that time:it never entered
into the mind of any enemy to take advantage of the
position of this country. For years past we had been pro-
ceeding with dangerous reductions, we had now fallen far
below the minimum point, and 11 he wished the house
to do was to raise our defences to that minimum point
below which, even in a (time of peace, they ought
never to be allowed to fall. He was aware tilt some hon.
Mends of his, whose opinions he valued very highly, would
think that these precautions and forebodings deserved very
little regard. No man could admire, and respect, and
honour more than he did the motives and principles of those
who were designated, invidiously in his opinion, to distin-
guish them from the rest of the house, as the " Peace
party;" but while, on the one hand, they honestly and
conscientiously followed their vocation, he must say, on the
other hand, that he believed if their views were carried be-
yond a certain practical point they were dangerous to the
country. His feeling was that the men who, by timely
warning and precaution, averted the horrors and calamities
of a warlike attack were the real friends of humanity and
of their species—(hear)—while the men who by blindness,
by over confidence. or by weakness, tempted and provoked
attack were, although unconsciously, the real enemies and
destroyers of their country. He believed that if the prin-
ciples of the party to which he was referring were carried
out to their full extent this country would be placed in such
a state of weakness that invasion would be rendered so
tempting as to be inevitable. He believed there was no
statesman, ne diplomatist, no military man in Europe—
there was not a soldier in France who did not feel that it
depended on England herself whether at some future—and
it was to be hoped, far distant day—all that accumulation
of the elements of destruction might not break upon her
head ; and woe to her if the storm found her unprepared ;
woe to the Ministers of England who might have invited
such a catastrophe! There was a certain little episode in
the late Italian war which we would do well to remember.
We were told that on the night before the battle of Sol-
ferino the Austrian generals had made all their dis-
positions, on the most approved military principles, for
surprising the allied army at the hour of nine in the morn-
ing ; but at six o'clock they were themselves surprised and
slaughtered by their enemies. It was to be hoped that
Austrian counsels would not prevail in our English
camp, and that the tocsin of Parliament would be
sounded before it was too late. He did not say that any
English Minister would for a moment be induced to neglect
what he deemed to be necessary for the safety of his coun-
try ; but he sincerely believed, with all respect, that the
present Government were not adequately alive to the mag-
nitude of the occasion. The heart of the country was sound
—its instincts true and unerring ; its feelings were too
strong to be trifled with on that subject , and for that mode
in which the Ministers discharged themselves of the grave
responsibility now resting upon them in connection with it,
they would be called to a strict account. (Cheers.) He had
spoken out freely on this great question, because it was one
on which no false delicacy should prevent them from im-
pressing upon the Government what it ought to know. As
far as it depended on the Secretary of State for War, no
doubt everything that eminent ability and great energy
could do would be achieved, but the labours and the good
will of one man were not enough to cope with the crisis.
Seeing, then, the great fact of our urgent want of prepara-
tion, neither on that nor on future occasions should he be
deterred from stating to the house what he had now felt it
his duty to state, although he had, perhaps, trenched on
ground which no other hon. gentleman had ever ventured
upon. (Cheers.) Thanking the house for the indulgence
it had extended to him, he had now to move—that the ex-
pense of completing the necessary works of national de-
fence, projected or already in progress, fhould be met by a
fund specially provided for that purpose, and independent
of the annual votes of Parliament.
The amendment having been seconded,
Mr. S. HERBERT said—Sir, I have listened incommon
with the rest of the house with great admiration to the
able and eloquent speech of my right hon. friend. If
I do not follow him through the whole of it—if I do
not venture upon the delicate ground on which he has
thought fit to trerd—it is because I do not wish to give any
encouragement to converting that which ought to be a de-
bate on the question of what should'be the system and the
basis of our peace defences into a discussion upon foreign po-
licy, in which we are to criticise the character, the motives,
the past life, and intentions of any great Sovereign in
Europe. (Cheers.) I maintain that in the preparation which
we have been making, if such a word can be used, or rather
in the defences which we are strengthening and confirming,
we are following the legitimate pacific policy which is the
true policy of a great commercial country like England.
(Renewed cheers.) We have no offensive designs—we can
have no offensive designs against any nation in the world.
Peace is our great security ; the great source of our pros-
perity and :our wealth—peace is best suited for the form
of Government under which we have the happiness to live.
(Cheers.) I say, then, that if I now discuss the question
of our defences it is not with the view of showing what
pow 3r we may be able to exercise against any one, but
merely what are the means which we are taking, which we
hope and which we ought to take for putting ourselves in
a state of security against any attack. I recollect the time
when the spirit prevailing in this country on these subjects
was very different from what it is now. The history of our
weakness in point of defence is curious to follow. After the
long war, when we, like the rest of Europe, were ex-
hausted by the enormous efforts we had made in that great
struggle, we believed, and Europe also believed, in a per-
petual reign of peace, never to be disturbed again by war.
Ding that time we lived upon our capital. We never
reproduced those means of defence which were essential to
seeP the country in proper security. Even when we
began to awake
to the danger of our situation, and to the
necessity of
snaking
some exertions to remove it, the coun-
tryhow,* exact go so willingly along with us, nor did this
from us any increased activity, but the con-
trary. I recollect when the discussion on our fortifications
first arose. I recollect the appointment of the first com-
mission to examine into the defences of our dockyards. I
recollect when my honourable friend the late Secretary to
the Admiralty and myself conjointly were objects of great
attack in this house
because
port a large easteaaiunlishment for the
we endeavoured to
create at Devon
construction and repair of our
com-
mittee of this house sitting upstairs condemned as extrava-
gant
gent the schemes we had then attempted to carry rava-
into ef-
fect. So far from beingatravagant, as it has turned out,
those schemes have siAleeen enlarged. They were larger
ften than anything before contemplated by any Govern-
meta, or ever carried into execution in any dockyary,
but
stil they were found to be insufficient, and have since been
greatly extended. I say this to show that in times when
pubic opinion was adverse, I, atileast, was not one of those
who retrained acquiescent in the then existing state of
thing:, (Hear, hear.) For a long period before that, whe-
ther yogi looked to the army or the navy, but more especi-
ally to the army, which has never been so popular with
this horse as the navy, there was nothing but apathy, ne-
glect, and, let me add, ignorance. We allowed our men to
perish, partly because we did not choose to be at the ex-
pe.ase of housing them as we ought to have done partly
because we did not believe, but rather scouted as the cry of
sanitarian quacks, the notion that men ought to have fresh
air to breath. (Hear, hear.) The other night a debate arose
on the subject of the appointment of a commission to inquire
into ti le state of our fortifications. I am very glad to find
that, l ooth as regards the necessity of more rapidly inireas•

ing our defences and of instituting a thorough investigation
by competent persons into the nature of those defences, be-
fore we embark in a great expenditure upon them, we have
the testimony, concurrent with my own, of the gallant offi-
cer the member for Westminster, and of my right hon.
friend the member for Stroud. I did not, coming in withithe
new Government to an office of immense detail, attempt at
once to pass :an opinion upon questions of this description ;
but as soon as my own mind was made up as to the neces-
sity of some immediate action in this respect, I made to
the Government the identical proposal which the hon.

and gallant member for Westminster has made, and in
spirit, though not as to the means of accomplishing
it, the same proposal as my right hon. friend has just
laid before us. (Hear, hear.) I am satisfied of this,
_ .

though many persons doubt it, that in a country which
like England never, except after long effort and great
excitement, has had a large army, and which never will
have such an army except after long effort and great ex-
citement, you are bound to take care that every means by.
which the services of your force, small as it is, can be made
more efficacious, shall be immediately adopted. (Cheers.)
Your army, if small, ought to be the best equipped, best
armed, and best trained in the world—(renewed cheers)—
and no effort on the part of the authorities ought to be
omitted in order to produce that result. But among those
efforts it appears to me that, having great dockyards and
arsenals in which are concentrated property of immense
value, and, what is far more important, the means of sus-
taining and increasing your maritime strength, there ought
to be provided that apparatus for defence which mere flesh
and blood can not alone supply. It is cheaper to build for-
tifications than to depend on the maneuvering of an army
in the field. Any military officer will at once admit the
truth of this, costly as these works may appear to be; and
certainly my hon. friend has not exaggerated a bit in the
remarks he has made upon the estimates. He has said, indeed,
that we are now proceeding by voting mere " driblets." But
that is a comparative term. The " driblet," as he calls
it for the present year exceeds the sum of £lOO,OOO. But
what is the comparative cost of fortifications against that of
an army ? The mere pay of an army would amount to
L 757,000, or from that to £900,000 a-year. But £5,000,000
spent in fortifying our arsenals would, at 6 per cent., be only
a yearly cost of £300,000 ; and there is this also to be said of
an army, the men die, the powder and shells are blown
away, the rifles wear out ; everything has in it the element
of decay ; but if you have secured a well considered system
of defence by fortifications, that remains not only for you,
but for posterity. (Hear.) It must be remembered how
essential is the complete defence of our arsenals to the
existence of our navy ; in war, even a victorious fleet sus-
tains great damage, and requires costly repairs to put it in
an efficient state again ; the arsenals are the reproducing
establishments of our maritime power. Without going into
minute detail, I should like to tell the house what are the
amounts it has voted this year for fortifications. For Ports-
mouth, irrespective of the sums already voted, it is £405,000 ;
but that does not complete the defence of Portsmouth ;
nothing is proposed for fortifying Spithead. Again, for
Plymouth £335,000 have been voted, but that sum will
not put Plymouth into a complete state of defence.
I could go through the whole list of arsenals, Pembroke,
Sheerness, Chatham, Woolwich, they are all in the same
, state. I have always endeavoured to speak frankly to the
house on this subject; and in this spirit I must state that
Woolwich is totally undefended. (Hear, hear.) It is pro-
tected by the long reaches of the Thames ; still, it is a great
arsenal, and at present defenceless against attack. It has
been said that Woolwich is incapable of defence, and that
the true policy of England would be to break up the estab-
lishment, createothers elsewhere, and not risk so much ma-
terial in one arsenal. That is dquestion into which I cannot
enter to-night ; it ought to be thoroughly considered. I
have been asked whether the sums voted will be applied.
An hon. gentleman has remarked that we take the votes,
and sometimes do not spend the money. It is true that at
the end of the year, it appears by the accounts we have not
spent the money, and the sums have to be voted over again.
lam asked how this can happen ? There is a difficulty in
public works that does not exist in private undertakings,
such as railways. Their projectors work on, and if they are
delayed by any accident they make up the lost time after-
wards. To show what delays public works are liable to, I
may state I have recently heard that a strike is impending
among the men employed that may impede certain works in
the London district for some time. It is in consequence of
such unforeseen delays that it happens the money for public
works
has to be voted again. It was remarked the other
night that the commission to be appointed to inquire into the
state of the notional defences ought to have a wider field of
investigation. But I want an inquiry into specific objects,
I want advice on those specific objects; if you widen the
field of inquiry, and direct the commisoion to report on
military questions, as to where armies should be posted in
case of invasion, then you will want another class of men
to make the inquiry; you will increase the number of the
commission and delay the report. If I wanted to shelve a
question, a large commission of inquiry would be the best
instrument for the purpose. But I want to act imme-
diately, and therefore wish to get the men the best fitted
for the task, and confine them to one particular subject.
(Hear.) It is not that I have neglected the subject. My
predecessor appointed several officers of great eminence to
draw up a detailed report as to the steps necessary to make
available all our disposable force, and the best means of
rapidly increasing it, in case of a sudden outbreak of war.
(Hear, hear.) We have got that report, and we are at this
moment acting on it as rapidly as it is possible to do.
(Hear, hear.) We will go further than that. We wish to
see young !officers obtaining a knowledge of the military
features of the country, and surveys are being made with
the view to military purposes; it is not that we expect an
enemy actually to land, but we ought to take every precau-
tion in our power and every Government must wish to see
the army we do raise made effective by practical study of the
profegsion: It is the basis of a sound peace establishment
you want. Looking at the Army Estimates, at the enor-
mous sums voted, and at ithe small force maintained in
England, I think nothing can be more unsatisfactory than
that we should spend so much money and have so small an
army. (Hear, hear.) But what is our peculiar case ? We
have had to re-arm the whole force ; and we are
doing so at this moment at a great expense. I may allude
in passing to a rumour which has been mentioned, that in
consequence of a rise of sixpence in the cost of each musket,
asked by a foreign contractor, I have suspended the contract
for a supply. I not know in what the report could have
originated ; the only thing on which it can be founded hap-
pens to be a transaction of the exactly opposite kind. The
only case in which,l have meddled with a foreign contract is
by making an arrangement to obtain a superior kind of mus•
ket at a small additional expense—(hear)—and we shall ob-
tain a large supply of a better description. But to revert to
the subject of which I was speaking—the late Government
sent some very distinguished naval officers to inspect our for-
tresses in the Mediterranean. I think nothing can be worse
than to submit a subject to a commission and then shelve
the report. We are, therefore, acting on that report. It
states that though some of the works in the Mediterranean
have fallen into disrepair, yet no additional force is required
for them, nor any change in their armament; and I believe
that the notion of any attack on Malta or Gibraltar is quite
absurd. It would have been an easy thing, in the opinion of
many, to propose to increase the force of the army, by taking
a vote for, say 10,000 men; but that would have been an army
on paper. Ido not wish to deceive the country, First actu-
ally raise the 10,000 men, and then it will be time enough to
talk of increasing your regiments. I believe this country- will
never have a large army; but the army we have got we must
make as perfect as we can. Without a conscription, having
to trust wholly to voluntary enlistment, and obliged to com-
pete with the wages of labour, this country can never have
a large military force. We have now some battalions coming
home from India; if you create a force in the meantime,
when these Indian troops arrive you will haves larger army
than the country will like to pay for ; there will be an out-
cry for disbanding the additional battalions, and many
discontented and idle men will be thrown on the half-pay
list. I wish the Mouse of Commons would come to some
conclusion on these points, and not be so wild for an increase
of the army at one time and for its reduction at another.
We have got the whole of the ordnance to replace, and very
soon all our ships will be armed with a large proportion of
rifled cannon. This cannot be done without supplying a
new sort of ammunition. These are the things that make
our estimates so large while our army is so small. Improve-
ment and change are constantly at work, and I frankly say
that I do not see the slightest prospect of any very material
reduction in those portions of the army estimates which are
applied to the production and reproduction of warlike stores.
(Hear.) The right hon. gentleman has truly said, that
without the report of a commission we cannot proceed upon
any plan which may be proposed for our adoption. Unless
you can satisfy the public that you are working upon the
best plans, and that every care is taken to insure efficiency,
you will never get them to go willingly along with you.
Whether the work will be done by large votes, or by other
means, we must first of all know from a commission what
we ought to do, and then we must do it. (Hear.) Recol-
lect, however, that meanwhile we are not losing time. Not
one work is stopped, and every sixpence that has been voted
will be spent. I recently asked a very distinguished Engi-
neer officer if I gave him a ante blanche what could he do
more than he is doing. His reply was that the arrange-
ments necessary for getting large bodies of men together
would take time ; that the building season was nearly gone
by; and that, upon the whole, he did not think he could
proceed much faster in the present year. We shall take
the opinion of the contemplated commission as soon as pos-
sible, and I believe we shall gain time if the country is
satisfied, first, that the works are necessary ; secondly, that
our plans are approved by competent authorities; thirdly,
that is absolutely indispensable to vote money for their exe-
cution. (Hear, hear.) Here I must take exception to
some of the words which I find in the motion of my
right hon. friend. He says that " the expenses of com-
pleting the necessary works of national defence should
be met by a fund specially provided for that pur-
pose, and independent of the annual votes of Par-
liament." lam not sure that the course here recommended
is necessary to any well-considered plan for hastening our
works of national defence. Certain I am, at all events, that
if you expect Parliament to go warmly along with you in
your plans, you must net attempt to cheat it out of the
money requisite for the execution of your works. (Hear,
hear.) You must allow Parliament to exercise its judg-
ment upon each step as it is taken if you wish to obtain its
confidence and co-operation. (Hear.) One or two words
upon another point and I have done. The right hon. gen-
tleman has accused us of not giving due encouragement to
the volunteer movement because it is plebeian in character.
Now, I do not wish to cast any blame upon the late Go-
vernment, with whom the volunteer corps originated, but
I must say that as far as rifles are concerned we have given
much more encouragement to volunteers than our prede-
cessors. (Hear, hear.) I believe that at the present moment
there are forming several very efficient battalions of volun-
teers, and certainly, at all events, it never occurred to me
to look upon the movement as plebeian and to discourage it
upon that ground: On the contrary, as I stated upon a
former occasion, what I want to see is a military spirit per-
vading all classes of the community, but especially the in-
fluential and intelligent iniddle-class. I believe the volun-
teer corps will effect that object to a large extent, and
therefore I think they ought to be encouraged. (Hear,
hear.) Having thus stated unreservedly the opinion I
hold
upon, all the various points mentioned by my right
e into office I_
hon. friend, and endeavoured to satisfy the house that we
subject. I have been
house will probably be
are not altogethea idle, I shall only add that the moment I
be issued i
euernn turned yovadttuen
otino
it toev
ever
rhi since,veryans serious
i (t)hu
the
fife da
bede to hear
orp thattwo,
a ntdl
mission will •
men nominated on it willletlaPiratoptoseedgeenotil'el:
set to work as soon as possible
thereafter. Whenever the . Government are put in possession
its subject-matter, and ve
their most anxious attention to
frequently done, tile), will make instead
i the foundation
it, as is too
foundation of imme-
diate and energetic action. (cheers.)
Sir F. SMITH said that in reference to the question of
fortifications it must be remembered that therewere
several
different descriptions of fortifications. The first was coast
fortifications, and these, as applicable to England, were
not
required, and to create them would iv mow; _
thrown away,

':he fortifications of arsenals, and these
were
en
required
ewder.ine
this country to a limited extent, and he
hoped the commission would only recommend so much of
this kind of fortification as 'was absolutely required. The
third class of fortifications was those in the interior of a

country. He believed such fortifications were not wanted
in England, though in saying this he was opposing the opi-
nion of the late Duke of Wellin,o-ton, who thought that
works should tie erected at Reigate, at Croydon, at
Brighton, and the most vulnerable parts of the coast. If
these works were erected we should have to man them,

and therefore he was anxious that the fortifications of our

dockyards should be limited. He believed that gigantic for-
tifications were projected for Devonport. He hoped that
the Government would weigh the matter well before they
incurred such an expense. The projected works at De-
vonport would require a garrison of 40,000 men, and where
were they to be found ? We had at the utmost on paper
110,000 men of all descriptions of troops. If 40,000 men
were required for Devonport, 30,000 would be wanted for
Portsmouth, which would make 70,000 for these two ar-
senals alone, while Portland and Plymouth and others
would also require considerable garrisons. The right hon.
gentleman had ti ilked of our not having a large army, and
we certainly had not. We were going to defend our com-
mercial harbours, but he hoped that would be undertaken
by persons on the spot, as we had not troops for the pur-
pose. Whatever the Government determined to do after
they received the report of the commission he hoped they
would do rapidly. As to the mode of defence into which
the commission was 1 o inquire, was it to be maritime or
military, or a combination of both ? He did not think
slightly of volunteers, for he believed that, well-trained and
armed, they would be a most efficient force in aid of mili-
tia and troops of the line. He, as an old soldier, would re-
commend the Government to trust to the navy, and not to
allow that force to be reduced to too low a scale. We
could not depend on a rapid manning of the navy in case
of emergency, and the men ought not to be hastily dis-

charged. -
Sir C. NAPIER said with reference to the defence of our
arsenals, Portsmouth: could only be taken by " coup-de-
main," and by a fleet running into the harbour, which was
too shallow for large ships, and the entrance to which
might easily be blocked up by two or three sunken vessels.
As to fortifications at the Isle of Wight or in the vicinity
of the Needles, they would be of no use. Fortifying Gos-
port was also of no use, as it would only prevent its being
taken by surprise. During the last war, when we had all
Europe, and America too, against us, who defended the
country? When the great Napoleon threatened us with
insesion, we trusted to the navy ; and in the narrow seas,
although it was a difficult service, hardly a ship was lost
that was employed in the blockade. We had got into the
state in which we were because we had not adopted steam in
our navy as soon as we ought. In 1848, when he com-
manded the Channel squadron, the first line-of-battle ship
—the Blenheim—was fitted with a screw, and though she
was a very inferior ship, on the first day she joined she went
to windward of the whole fleet. This success was reported

to the Admiralty, who did not go on adopting steam power.
Three other ships, which were afterwards fitted with
screws, were found to answer as well as the Blenheim.
Why did the Admiralty not go on further with that kind of
ship ? After the expedition to the Baltic in 1854, the
French had only one screw ship of the line, but now they
had got 33. But it was not ships alone that were neces-
sary—men were required, and it was a great error, after
the Russian war, to pay off so many men, who got dis-
gusted with the service, and we had been now for two
years trying to get some of them back and could not. The
French had an excellent plan of getting their fleets ready
for sea. When they talked of reduction they took a few guns
out of the ships and sent the seamen into barracks, and
when they wanted to call them out they were at hand, men
and officers, all told off for their stations, and in forty-eight
hours they were on board the ships just as they were
before they were paid off. The honourable and gallant
gentleman here referred to some statement of Sir Charles
Wood when First Lord of the Admiralty as to the manning
of the French fleet, and said that Admiral La Susse
had stated that the French had a reserve of 50,000
sailors and could make up the number to 90,000.
What was our present state ? We were told that
we had 26 sail of the line, full-manned and fit for service.
But that was not the case. We had 14 sail of the line in
admirable order and manned, but no more. We had only
seven sail of the line in the Channel fleet, and since it had
been created it had not been a month at sea. That was not
the way to train officers and men for service. The officers
and men were not to blame, but the Admiralty was for al-
lowing the ships to remain so long in harbour where, though
a good deal might be learnt, yet no proper and thorough
knowledge of their duties could be learnt by the men and
officers. In the war just ended the French fleet had had
good practice in carrying troops to and fro. Our fleet had
no practice because we could not man our ships. Now was
it not a disgrace to our country, a disgrace to every govern-
ment and every Admiralty board, that here in 1859, after a
peace of so many years the British fleet could not be manned
even by the offer of a bounty ? As Mr. Tierney once said,
" Give me a full exchequer and a well-manned fleet and I
will defy the world." If we had that there would be no no
cessity for spending enormous sums upon the fortifications
which could not be completed for so many years. It was
not likely that an enemy would choose to land exactly where
our fortifications were built. Were we going to fortify Tor-
bay, and the whole of our southern coast ? The truth was
that if France once obtained the superiority at sea, this
country would net be worth six months' purchase. If we
had not the Channel for a ditch between us and France,
should we be satisfied with an army of 600,000 men opposite
us whilst we had only 110,000 men for the defence of Eng-
land? France had proved in this late war that she could
transport her army by water as well as by land, conveying
half her troops from Marseilles to Genoa, a distance of 150
miles. It was true there was then no enemy at sea to op-
pose her on the way, but if once she got command of the
Channel she could do the same again. He therefore hoped
we should go on building ships in every dockyard, and not
be induced to desist by any professions of a reduction of the
French forces until we saw that France really had disarmed
a large party of her army and of her fleet, and that she was
paying off and unrigging her ships, and after that was done
we might feel safer, and might ourselves do the same.
Mr. COBDEN, who was loudly called for, said he could
not pretend to throw any light on the technical questions at
issue. But he observed that this matter had now arrived
at a stage where the old appliances and remedies were of no
use. We had voted this year 261 millions sterling for our
defences, of which 121 were for our navy. Together we
had voted for our defences twice as much this year as was
voted in the year when he first catered that house, and
three times as much this year for our navy alone as was
voted in 1835, when Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wel-
lington were at the head of affairs. And now his right hon.
friend (Mr. Horsman) came forward and said that we had
not yet a minimum of an establishment, and that we must
set every public and private dockyard at work to increase
it. It was quite evident, therefore, that we could not, by
voting any amount of money and going on in the same
course, bring ourselves into a satisfactory position. He
(Mr. Cobden) would therefore suggest whether there might
not be another view of the question—whether gentlemen in
a state of panic and alarm might not have exaggerated the
case, and fallen into some hallucinations about the danger
impending over us—whether they had not altogether mis-
taken the evil with which they had to deal ? Now, he had
been for some time past out of the reach of blue books, but
two days ago he stumbled by accident on a document ori-
ginally prepared for the information of our Government,
which gave a description of the comparative force of the
English and French navies. He confessed that he had
read that paper at first with some incredulity ; and if he
had not within his own recollection an incident which oc-
curred seven years ago, he would not now venture to quote
the statistics of that document, after what he had heard
said of the awful preparations which had been made in
France. The incident he alluded to was this. Seven
years ago, in 1852, when the panic of a French invasion
raged as much as it did now, if not more, he laid a wager
with a general officer, who had ever since been paying ten
guineas a year to the Manchester Infirmary as a penalty for
his rash adherence to. an association which he (Mr. Cobden)
had ventured to call in question upon this subject. To decide
that controversy, he (Mr. Cobden) applied to the French go
vernment for information, and got a statement of the naval
budget of France for that year, which he placed in the hands
of several gentlemen having the control of influential organs
of public opinion, and one of those gentlemen, who was now
sitting in the House of Commons, and who was the pro-
prietor of a great journal in the North of England, made
use of that information honestly to stem the torrent of alarm
and apprehension which then prevailed. He remembered
also that his hon. friend the member for Dumfries wrote to
the French Minister of Marine, M. Ducos, whose reply was,
" In answer to your newspapers accusing us of menacing
naval preparations, I will state that I have not added a
boat to our marine, or a gun to the armament of our ships."
Remembering these incidents, he would venture to quote
the document which he had mentioned, in reply to his right
hon. frier d below him who now spoke of the French as hav-
ing made " gigantic preparations for the invasion of a coun-
try which was a great naval power." Now what did this
document show ? The only salutary treatment for such a
fever as now affected many persons in and out of that house
was a cool investigation of the facts of the case. He had had
an opportunity of reading over this statement with the aid
of a few friends who were well acquainted with nautical
matters. He found that in this report, published by our
own Government, having been drawn up confidentially for
their information by a commitUe appointed for the purpose,
there was a comparison of the French and English navies,
showing what they were in 1852, when this awful panic
prevailed before, and what they were in 1858. Now, if the
house would be a little calm, he (Mr. Cobden) would state
the results of that comparison. It was admitted that the
French had a show of superiority in steam frigates, whilst
we had a considerable superiority in screw line-of-battle
ships. (No, no.) In line-of-battle ships, built and build-
ing, as against the French, built and building, we had a
superiority—he believed we had ten line-of -battle ships more
than the French, without including the blockships, which,
he was told, were serviceable. In the number of frigates, the
French navy was somewhat superior to the English, but
there was the rest of our navy, not to beleft out of the com-
parison, consisting of the corvettes and sloops, and all those
vessels which, according to the opinion of the wisest
persons upon naval affairs he had been able to consult
were the most effective of all. The Americans were build-
,
ing nothing but corvettes, and they said those were the
most serviceable vessels in case of war. Now, in 1852,
England had 176 war steamers, and in 1853 she lied 461
war steamers. This was an increase of 28S in that period.
The French in 1852 had 122 war steamers, and in 18.8 they
possessed 264 war steamers, showing an increase of but 142
against our increase of 288. Our increase had therefore been
just double the increase of the French in the number of
steamers. In 1852, moreover, the English navy had 299
sailing vessels, and in 18.58 we had 296 sailing vessels, show-
ing a diminution of three. The French in 1852 had 253; sailing
vessels, but in 1858 they hal only 144, showing a diminution
of 114 in the number of French sailing ships, whilst our
number had diminished by only three. The reason of this
was that the vast increase spoken of in the number of the
French screw steamers had arisen from the conversion of
their sailing vessels into steamers. We had been going
through the same process with our sailing vessels, but at
the same time we had been building other sailing vessels,
wiljlstve 144 covertea more sailing vessels into steamers