The Sun.
London, England, 1859-01-03 00:00:00

THE_NAVI4S OF ENGLAND AND OF

FRANCE.

(From the Conversations _Lexicon, _Leipzig, 1858.)
(Continued: from The Sun of Dec. 30.)

In earlier times and in all lands _navies were
manned with soldiers. The sailors, properly so
called, who were on board acted. under the orders
of the seaman commander of the ship, and conveyed
the others over the seas. Each ship had, therefore,
two leaders—the military and the naval, of whom
it is true the latter was subordinate to the former,
but which latter alone directed the navigation of
the ship, the setting of the sails, &c., while the offi-
cers of the soldiers understood always but very
little, and in many cases nothing whatever of these
duties. This system, which must necessarily have
led to fatal differences, remained nevertheless in
force till reeent times. The English were the
first to abandon it. They perceived that unity of
command was of the first necessity on board
ship, and that this could only be attained by
giving to the military commander also the navi-
gation of the ship and the command of the seaman
portion of her crew. They, therefore, educated
their sailors as soldiers and artillerymen, and se-
lected the officers solely from the seamen. The
working of this wise regulation showed itself very
soon in the advantage which they derived from
the introduction of their new system in all battles
with their enemies. A small number of soldiers,
who were not seamen, were, it is true, later added
to the ships ; but these served mainly as supporters
of the officers against mutinies at any time on the
part of the seamen, who are never so much to be
relied upon as soldiers. With the service of the
guns, however, soldiers have either nothing to do,
or they are only made use of in a subordinate capa-
city. In war henceforth their main duty was to
cover or oppose boarding by their musketry- or to
effect landings. •
Other nations, however, adhered to the old
system. and the French, to their cost, the longest.
Until the year 1822 they had two bodies of troops on
board, the seamen and the artillerymen, entirely dis-
tinct and under separate command, of whom the one
were seamen and knew nothing ofgunnery,while the
others were gunners and knew nothing of seaman-
ship. Both corps had different institutions, and
were governed by a totally different spirit. Each
of them had its own discipline and its especial offi-
cers, each was jealous of its specialty and proud of
its privileges. In the abovenamed year it was at
last detefmined that a change in this respect must
be made if the navy was to fulfil its object ; that
only one description of force could exist on board
ship, and that only seafaring persons possess the
education, habits, and disposition to obey naval offi-
cers, and perform the requisite and complete service
of a ship. Such convictions give rise to the idea of
creating a corps of "Equipages de Ligne," which
were appointed to serve the guns as well as the sails,
and also to use small arms. We shall later return to
this arrangement, and only observe here that this
new system, which theoretically is ofuniversal adap-
tation, has in practice to struggle against difficulties.
After 11 years' trial it was needful to resort to ano-
ther change, which did not destroy the unity of the
" Equipages de Ligne," but still effected a subdivi-
sion in them, and this. was the seamen gunners,
whose special employmentwas the service of the guns.
The education of the seamen gunners is especially
calculated to enable them to act as captains of guns
on board ships, to superintend the service of the
fire-workers (sic) and sub-artillery officers, and to
form a corps from which in time of war to select so
important a personnel and distribute them over the
various ships of the fleet.
A similar arrangement existed long ago in Eng-
land, where a special training ship (the ship of the
line Excellent lying at Portsmouth) was established
for this object. The French formed a similar insti-
tution after the English model in the year 1837.
The best seamen of the navy were selected, and
trained for several years in the school ship of the
artillery. However, this establishment contained
one grand deficiency. As in France the conscrip-
tion obtained, the nation received no long service
from these persons, who after the expiration of
their period of service retired into private life and
were barely two years at sea after their education.
This defect, together with the remarkable extension
which the French navy received under Napoleon
111., led to a material improvement and extension
of the institution. The sailors who are taken for
this service must engage for a period of 10 years'
service in the navy, and the period of tuition on
board the several training ships precedes a theore-
tical course on shore and an examination, so that
the seamen gunners combine theory with practice.
These schools yield already annually 500 gunners ;
and the situations generally of captains of guns on
board ship are already filled with thoroughly
trained sea artillerymen. Simultaneously with this
important improvement in the personnel of the ar-
tillery, which not only equals but surpasses that of
, inasmuch as it unites theoretical know-

ledge with practice, the improvement of the mate.
vial is also taken in hand. The most careful atten-
tion is paid to the construction of the guns as well
as to the fitting out of the ship. No branch of mi-
litary knowledge has experienced such changes in
the last 50 years as ships' guns. The discovery of
shell guns by Gen. Paixham has doubled and
tripled the size of the hitherto required calibre,
and, while in the earlier armaments the 32 poundsr
was the largest calibre in use, now it has fallen to
the smallest.
This change in the armament took place almo-t
at the same time in all the larger navies. With
slight modifications we can generally take the
armaments of similar classes of ships to be also simi-
lar. The Americans alone are an exception, for
they have quite recently, under the name of fri-
gates, built ships whose size is larger than that of
120-gun ships. The Niagara, which is appointed
for the laying of the transatlantic cable, is a frigate
of this description. She has, notwithstanding her
size, an armament of only 12 guns,. the calibre of
which, however, surpasses anything hitherto seen,
since they send balls of 2361 b. Whether this novelty
is practical the future must teach. England and
France have not been found to follow the example.
A comparison between the armaments of a French
and of an English ship of the line will show the
reader that the two:navies are in this respect nearly
on a similar footing.
English—Ship of the line Queen, of 116 guns
(nominal). Lower battery--10 shell gnus, No. 2, of 8
in., answeringthe French calibre of 22 centimetres;
IS 32-pounders, No. 1, answering 'the French 30-
pounder No. 1. Middle battery-4 B.inch shell
guns ; 24 32-pounders, No. 2. Upper deck-28
32-pounders, No. 3. Quarter-deck and forecastle—
Each 1 8-inch shell gun, No. 1 (95 cwt.), 24 32-
pounders, No. 3. Aggregate weight of a broad-
side-58 solid and hollow shot, together a mass of
iron of 2,1601 b.

French.—Ship of the line Ville de Paris of 120
guns (nominal). Lower battery-4 50 pounder
guns, 22 30-pounder guns, No. 1 ; 6 shell guns of
30 centimetres, No. 1. Middle battery-28 36-
pounders, No. 2 ; 4 shell guns of 30 centimetres.
Upper deck-30 30-pounders, No. 3 ; 4 shell guns
of 20 centimetres. Quarter-deck and forecastle-
-10 shell guns of 22 centimetres, No. 2. Aggregate
weight of broadside, 2,1201 b.
Consequently we find between these two ships of
similar class a difference of only 401 b. in the weight
of iron thrown by their armaments from one broad-
side, and it is true the difference is to the disad-
vantage of the French, but such as can have, how-
ever, no influence whatever ; and a similar result
is also shown in contrasting the armaments of heavy
frigates on each side.
While we believe we have said, as regards the
material, all that was necessary to enable the un-
professional reader to come to a correct judgment
as to the strength of the English and French navies
there remains now to compare and dismiss the
second main point of what constitutes the strength
of a navy—the personnel.
Looking hero again at the numerical amount of
the required complements, we find that England
requires for the complete manning of her entire
seaworthy ships 150,000 men, and France 130,000.
In England, which has her shipping to thank for
all her power, her riches, her existence, one half of
her population is familiar with a sea life, and is
even brought up to the sea. Her extensive ship-
ping is the nursery of a million of more or less
trained seamen, who are available on board ship.
The seafaring population of France consists, at the
utmost, of 300,000, for here the influence of the
sea extends scarcely one mile inland, and nine-
teen twentieths of the nation have no idea of a
ship. The navy has, it is true, become latterly po-
pular in the country, but only as one portion of the
general fighting power. In her specialty the navy
is strange to the greater number of Frenchmen.
Apparently, therefore, the advantage as regards the
question of manning the fleet leans to the side of
England; but this is only apparent, and in reality
the reverse is the case.

This state of things is founded on the differing in-
stitutions of the two countries. Two systems pre-
vail in England—recruiting and pressing ; while
in France an " inscription maritime," or general ob-
ligation to serve on the part of all seafaring per-
sons, is the rule, the same as with the land forces.
Enlistment, it is true, does in England in peace
time prove sufficiait, but in war time not so by any
means; and not long back the Eastern war demon-
strated fully the inufficiency of such system. Not-
withstanding the high bounty-, prize money, secured
pensions, and other advantages, which were held
out in England for seamen, in order to induce them
to enter the navy, it is a well-known fact that,
with some few exceptions, the ships of the Baltic
and Black Sea squadrons had scarcely a fifth of
their proper number of seamen, that many