The Sun.
London, England, 1857-07-28 00:00:00

nexation of Oude took place early in 1856. This is only
the middle of 1857. Is it true that there has been no
evidence of combination and conspiracy .in .India ? There
may have been evidence which the Government has not
understood. There may have been symbols which per-
plexed them. There may have been conduct, the
motives of which they could not penetrate. But that
.there is no evidence of combination for the last twelve
months,, especially in Bengal, seems to me a position
which cannot . for a moment be maintained.' (Hear,
hear.) The house has heard of- the circulation of myste-
rious cakes in India, or, if not, allow me to tell them what
has taken place and was taking place ire India nearly ft selve
months ago.. This took place. A messenger comes to
the headman of a village and brings him six pancakes—
chupatties, such as the natives make of wheaten flour, and
he says, "These six pancakes are, sent to you; you wit!
make six others and send them on to the next village.
The headman obeys, accepts thesis cakes, makes six others,
and sends them on to the headman of the meat village with
the same message. How did itbagin ? It is a mystery.
If we knew the village whence: the pancakes were first
circulated we might get very valuable information. Bob
in the course of four or five months the whole of Bengaland
the greater part of tl • contiguous country have been sub-
jested to this process of a man going from village to village,
from headman to headman, from police-station to police-
station, leaving six pancakes with ro other order than that
six other spaucekes sheuld be made and circulated. Sup-
peso the Emperor of Russia, whose territory in extent and
character has more resemblance to our Eastern possererions
than the territory of any other power—suppose the Emperor
of Russia were told, "Sire, there is a very remarkable
circumstance going on in 3 nur territory ; from village to
viii-ge men are passing who leave the tail of an ermine or
a pot of caviare, with a message for some one to perform
the same ceremony. Strange to say, this has been going
on in some 10,001) villages, and we cannot make head or
tail of it." I think the Emperor of 'Russia would say,
" I do not know whether you can make head or tail of it,
but I am quite sure there is something wrong and we wait
take some precautions, because, where the people are not
usually indiscreet and troublesome, they do not make a
secret communication unless it is opposed to the Govern-
meat. This is a secret communication, and therefore a
communication dangerous to the Government.... This
sending of cakes went on. Ido not say that the Govern-
ment could penetrate the secret; I do not find fault with
them because they did not find it out. .What I want to
show is—that there were outward and visible signs of con-
federacy. There was also an indication of conspiracy
among the military which must have been known
to the Indian Government. I allude to the cir-
cuenstsnces of the lotus flower. A man , came
with a lotus flower and gave it to the chief of *
regiment. It was circulated from hand to hand in the
regiment, and every man who took it looked alit and
passed it ou, saying nothing. Wo must understand that
every man who passed it on was acquainted with the plot.
When it came to the last soldier of the regiment be die'
appeared and took it to the next station. The process was
gone through in every regiment in Bengal. There was not
a regiment, not a station, not an escort to which the lotus
flower was not sent. All these things took place after the
annexation of Oude. (Hear.) An hon. gentleman reminds
me that last year the Bengal regiments refused their fur-
loughs. That was certainly a significant circumstance. I
ventured to say that I would show a state of society in
India which proved the existence of general discontent,
and, difficult as it might be to pro re conspiracy, that
would offer the house facts and circumstances sufficient to
convince them that those was conspiracy. I think I have
said enough to induce the house to pause before they form
too precipitate an opinion upon the causes of the disasters
in India. I think I have said enough to make the house at
least feel that it is not by saying that we have to deal
with a were military mutiny that we shall save India.
The truth is, as I have shown, that the people of India were
only waiting for an occasion and a pretext. That occasion
was furnished, and that pretext was soon devised. Turning
for a moment to the last Indian paper—that relating to
European troops—l find there an observation by Lord Caw
ning which I think worthy the attention of the house.
There is not much in these papers ; but here is something
to which I ought to refer. In a despatch dated the 7tll of
February, 1857, the Governor-General takes, I think, 0
very rational view of his position and of the condition of the
Indian empire. He shows the dangers that may arise, but
he-remarks, " Peace has been restored in Europe it is trite,
and with its return the disquietude which even a distant
war had raised in the minds of the native population to
some parts of India hes passed away." (A. laugh.) There
is no doubt that the war between England and Russia coca'
sioned disquietude in India. It is the character of Eastern
nations, and especially of the Indian populations, many of,
which are extremely warlike, to sympathise withwar, an
the moment they hear that there is a great struggle iii
Europe, such as that which took place a considerable time
ago between England and France, or that which recently
occurred between England and Russia, we find that their,
minds are agitated. The mind of India was disquieted at
a time when there were causes of domestic disquietude
also occurring ; but no doubt the somewhat sudden termi.
nation of the war between England and Russia gave us *
good opportunity of protecting our empire in India. It i*
impossible to. believe that our Indian Government 'could
have been ignorant of the state of the Bengal army
(Hear, hear.) I cannot suppose that the strange eXprer
sioa which I have quoted from the minute of the late Ga.,
vernor-General could have been anything but a polities'
ruse, if I may use the expression, and if he avoided treat
ing in detail of a subject which he knew was pregnant with
so much danger perhaps he considered—as I believe it ts
the habit to consider in India —that, although the Bengi°,
army had been for years in a state of what may be Cello,
chronic insubordination, there -Was nothing in its-Bondi'
tint' tending to precipitate the -revolutionary movenaeot;
that have now occurred. But unquestionably it was tu"
duty of the Indian Government to have most solemnly 01;
pressed upon the Government at home that the time low
come when they ought most seriously toconsider 'the state,
of our India army and the means which should be adopted
iu the event of an outbreak, to defend and preserye colt
empire. Who can doubt- that such representations, won"
made to the Government at home? It 'is 'almost trifling
with the patience of assemblies like the two Honses o
Pariiwnent to be told ty Ministers when these grave event*
are occurring in India that they had been taken complete'',
by surprise, and that 21 hours befdre they had no idea of
their possible occurrence. (Hear.). I cannot but believe
that there are representations not only from Lord Ganningi
but from Lord Dalhousie—not only (roar poor Gene"'
Anson, to whose probable despatch or minute I have re-
ferred in my notice of motion, but from other persons t°
authority, that must have brought the state of India before
thieGovernment at home. We can understand that, hew*
aver cognizant either the Government in India or the Go-
vernment in England were of the dangers impendieg,iot'
death-struggle with the Russian empire, it was totally
possible to attempt to remove theta. It was one of 'the'"
conjunctures in which statesmen have' a right td sail!
" Great as the stake is, and bail as our chances are, st'a
for a long time we have lived upon chances in India'; an
in the midst of the efforts we are making in Europe "
cannot give our minds or devote one means to a denser s°
distant." But I cannot understand why our Minister*,
with the information which they must have at hand—be;
cause if they bad not that information they only 'pr°°,,
that there is no use for Ministers either 'in India or 11'
England--(hear, hear)—the moment the peace of P°l
was signed did not regard it as their first duty to give I'
their energies and thoughts and devote all their r_seurae°
to the settlement of India. (Hear, hear.) The first Pt:
Hoy should have been one of profound peace—a Pell°
suggested by the disquietude which prevailed, aecordiof
to Lord Canning himself, during the war between Eriglani
and Russia. What was the course pursued ? Was it fj,
a. sedative and tranquillizing nature? Did we calm the
population and at the seine time inquire into their griey;
sneers. and attempt to baffle their manoeuvres and, coal'',
racies? Why, the people of India, who for a long
,Seriiej
of years, as I have endeavoured to show to-night, and
think not unsuccessfully, had been preparing for an ()et•
break, found that as soon as a struggle in Europe
ceased, Asia was made the scene of war in more than on
quarter. (Hear, bear.) The most powerful class
'Mahoenedans—the Shiites—heard that you were going "tiv
make war upon an Oriental monarch and that monist.°
the head of their religion. There was nothing in that
telligence which tended to remove their disaffection, o°,
before they had recovered from it they found there v't,
war in China. The condition of India in 1856 has beke;
shown to you by Lord Canning, in what may ur
called a wail of lamentation over the state of 01
Indian emeire and the paucity of troops at his disposal.
Nevertheless, at that very period troops were sent to Persia
,
and to Chins, and the Madras army was told that it re°:
eearrisen Pegu. At the time when it was the policy of Bo*.
laud to soothe and tranquillise India, and to remedy the,
grievances occasioned by feeble government, our Ministers
ea the hardihood to raise the torch of war in every *dirse,S
tion throughout the East. (Hear.) lam told that only 5,uw,-)n
men went away, and 5,000 came or are coming back. "',,"
you think that the nations of India count your troops lIP°.;
their fingers? They know that your troops are goingiew°,,J;
—they hope you may have to send more; and, deckling
broadly upon these facts, they do not inquire how 113°,""t
are going or how many are coining back ; it is sufficient
them to know that you have war in Persia and in Chin
it
and that your European troops are gradually leaving tw",,
great peninsula, That being the 'state of the case, the OW
being ripe, the occasion being offered offered by the q°;
vernment of
sEngland—a pretext only was wanted, and
pretext was soon found. 'Tour cartridges greased in
manner to outrage their religious belief—men lost their
caste by serving the Power which they had so long ober'
I will not go into the question as to whether the cartridgvreo
complained of are the memo as have always been used, as
have been told is the case. I did not suppose that any onet,
will after this discussion suppose that because the car
ridges were believed to be or were pretended to be beliel„,
to be greased with pig's fat or cow's fat that that was tP,..
ca,u,e of this insurrection. (Hear.) I hope at least teai;
the rising generation in Parliamentary life, who are 0111
entering upon their career amid occurrences which wit
furnish ample materials for long discussions during I.o°?,'t
years iu this house—that they will not too hastily aeeerg
such superficial ideas. I can assure them that the rise Or.)
fall of empires are not affairs of greased cartridges." (Isleae
Such results are occasioned by adequate causes and bYO
accumulation of adequate causes. (Hear, hoar.)
~,,,
have now, Sir, endeavoured, imperfectly, as I am aviNe
to sketch the causes which I believe to have led
ve
the present condition of our Indian empire. Ib°
omitted many things, and many of importance, from sd
effort to avoid overloadi, g the subject with details, 0",
I know I have subjected myself thereby to many observ°o
lions in reply, which I might have avoided, had it not 1).0°0
for an anxious apprehension of trespassing. too long uroe
the attention of the house. But I hope at least I. bisect
conveyed to the house with clearness the general positielt
I wish to esteblish— (hear, hear)—by which Ido not send
t
fleetiug party triumph, but that after well tlivße
gaindeeply
caony considering and properly discussing this subject ia,
may arrive at some safe conclusion for our future turd
~
a„„, I will"now refer to the second branch of my 01W-so
ations, and I trust they will be much briefer than those 0,
which the house has already listened with so 'much Pseis
mice. Assuming, Sir, f r a moment that the general vie
ed
which I have attempted to convey to the house are for101:4
on justice, I have now to inquire what are the bece'llhe
menus which the Government ought to adopt to ineetoja
present emergeney. In a certain sense and to a Cer
be-
degree there can of course be no controvert' among osaseire
cause we are all agreed that in the present state of ao:or
the employment a force is the first and most necess;a
step. (Hear, hear.) But the degree of employment !toe
the manner of employment greatly depend on the vlvrely
which we take of the' cause of the emergency.. A 01°ffeet.
military mutiny may be met by a mere military 8, 00
But if, on the contrary, what we have to deal with 10,100,
insurrection favoured by the great mass of the populist
our measures must, as I think, be both in nature jO.
degree different from those of which we have had source
timation from Her Majesty's Government. Looking et
this as national revolt, I cannot artier) at a belief 4'a
the measures announced by the Government, Tieeea.)
military measures, a,re adequate to the occasion. ("iaece
I should doubt whether they were adequate for, I hes
military mutiny, but under no circumstances di, le% ie
lieve, as the Government appear to believe, thafetru'ea
a mere military mutiny, would I' presume to ate to*
strong opinion upon their conduct, If, when *