The Sun.
London, England, 1861-10-19 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, SATURDAY EVENING, OCTOBER 19, 'lB6l.

M. KOSSUTH ON THE STATE OF

CONTINENTAL All:411es.

The following letter from M. Kossuth, addressed
to Mr. M'Adam, of Glasgow, relative to the pre-
sent position of European politics, will be read
with great interest. It appears in the Glasgow
Herald, with a prefatory one by Mr. McAdam :
The anxious solicitude of Glasgow friends of the
patriot Kossuth has drawn from him (now on the
Continent) a deeply-interesting leter, dated the 7th
inst., such portions of which, bearing on the general
question of European freedom, we think it no breach
of confidence to publish, but au act only of simple
justice to our people, who so entirely sympathise
with him on his indignant retirement from the
base espionage to which he has been subjected by
a portion of our Government, for the advantage of
that Austria which has ever been our enemy when
it dared, and never has been our friend unless when
subsidised.

Kossuth may yet smile with contempt for such
as the renegade Roebuck—may even forgive the
unconstitutional interference of our Government in
his issue of notes for his native country (of which
he is legally, and in the hearts of its people still
its only legitimate Governor), and for the seizure
of arms stored at Galatz for the restoration of his
country's freedom ; but a reckoning will yet be
exacted for this, and for past espionage on him
and other patriot exiles, by our people,
who detest alike the police and Post-office
spy, and are disgusted with that bad part of the
German element—too prevalent in our councils-
-which thus disgraces our national hospitality.
Kossuth asks nothing from us now but the sym-
pathies of our people for his country, and that we
should not allow the British Government to coun-
tenance Austrian might against Hungarian right—
and even going the length of acting the spy and
the policeman, both at home and abroad, for Aus-
tria, to the prejudice of Hungary—a course not less
derogatory to the honour of Great Britain, than
contrary to the feelings of the British people. We
give that portion only of his letter which relates to
the Hungarian question, and make no comments ;
but we appeal to his friends now to ask for him, or
for his friend Garibaldi, again preparing to strike
for European freedom, when they think the right
hour has come.—l am, respectfully yours,

JOHN MADAM.
45, Hyde Park-street, Glasgow, Oct. 17, 1861.

EXTRACT OF M. KOSSUTH'S LETTER.
On the Hungarian Diet having been convoked,
and Italy having not yet been prepared for throw-
ing down the gauntlet to Austria on account of
Venice, it became all important to provide that
Francis Joseph should not be crowned King of Hun-
gary, because coronation would have implied a new
compact—a new transaction with that infamous
dynasty. I for one am opposed to the very idea of
any such transaction (be its terms what they may),
not from any revolutionary spirit. To me revolu-
tion is not a profession. I look upon it as a means
only justifiable as the last awful, but (because the
last) inevitable resource for preserving a people
from national death or from slavery, or as the
inevitable means for establishing a people's
national life and liberty. I am opposed to the
very idea of any transaction with the House of
Austria, because I know that faithless Austria would
never prove true to the compact—she never would
resign her absolutist Germanising and centralising
designs. Bent as she is on lowering Hungary to
the level of her patrimonial dominions, she would
act, as she had acted for more than 300 years. Hun-
gary, instead of peacefully developing the immense
resources of the country, and of the genius of its
people, and thus becoming an important element in i
the progress and the extension of civilisation, would
see herself doomed either to national death, or to
wasting her strength in ever anew recurring
struggles for the maintenance of her laws, her con-
stitution, her institutions, and her national exist-
ence. The House of Austria, restored by a transac-
tion with Hungary to life (which now is fast de-
parting from her), would continue to oppose the
logical consummation of Italian unity and indepen-
dence ; would embarrass her internal consolidation,
and endanger her very existence—she would make
a proper solution of the Eastern question impossible,
drive the south Sclavonic races into the arms of
Russia, defeat by her very existence, as a first-rate
Power, every endeavour towards the national unity
of Germany ; and thus, standing in the way of the
definitive settlement of each and of all those great
European questions which in the logical progress
of history imperiously claim their solution, Austria
would continue to form the great nuisance of Eu-
rope, rendering peace and settled tranquillity per-
fectly impossible in the European community ;
while the independence of Hungary, by removing
that great European nuisance, would for ever secure
as well as help to complete Italy—would reduce the
Eastern question to the proportion of a mere domes-
tic one, the ultimate issue of which would turn to
the profit of freedom, instead of turning to the pro-
fit of Russian Panslaveism, and would likewise
render the national unity of Germany possible by
removing the only obstacle—a powerful polyglot
ambitious Austria—which stands in its way. In
one word, the independence of Hungary would, by
itself, form the surest means for arriving at that
settled condition, and that lasting peace in Europe,
of which her secured national existence form an
indispensable desideratum.

This reasoning is founded partly on the sound
logic of the situation, partly on the evidence which
history presents of the wicked incorrigible charac-
ter of the House of Austria.

But I have a stronger reason still for being ad-
verse to any imaginable transaction with the Haps-
burg-Lorraines. It is this, that even supposing
that that perjured family could by any possibility
change its character and become as honest as it is
perverse, and everything that is good, moral, just,
and liberal (a thing as impossible as the washing a
negro white), still Hungary never could become a
uumiLlLuLluuul
in the full accept-
ance of the word, under Austrian rule.

I must premise that Hungary never, never, never
will consent to be fused in the Austrian Empire;
she will never consent to abjure her claim to the
position of a nation ; and will never suicide herself
for the very questionable pl ensure of serving as an
element in the absurd experiment of creating a new
nation—the Austrian—which never yet had exist-
ence, nor ever shall. Some people at Vienna point
to the example of Scotland and of Ireland, but the
case is entirely different : Scotland gave kings to
England, and Ireland was conquered—neither is
the case with us. Besides, it should not be over-
looked that ours is a country larger than Great
Britain and Ireland together, or as Prussia, which
is numbered amongst the great Powers of Europe,
and we are a people of 15,000,000; consequently in
territorial and populationistical regard, as well as
from our geographical position,the natural resources
of our country, our history, and the maturity and
genius of our people, are in every way entitled to be
a nation.

Consequently, if Hungary were to remain under
Austrian rule, it could only be on the basis of per-
sonal union (as England and Hanover had been),
and as a distinct realm, having its own constitution
and Government, and not subject to the Austrian
Empire. Well, what would be the result ? I shall
answer the question by a simile.
Suppose the Queen of England were also Queen of
France, and as such would have an army of several
hundred thousand men, and a budget of a couple of
milliards, not subject to the control of the British
Parliament, would it be in the power of that Parlia-
ment to prevent the Queen, as Queen of France,
from pursuing a policy in her foreign relations on
the basis of interests and with objects for its aim
with which England had absolutely nothing to do.
Certainly it would be not in the power of the
British Parliament to preyent this. Well, suppose

in consequence of that situation and of such policy,
the Queen (as Queen of France) would cause her-
self to be embroiled in wars, and thus involved, she
would apply to the British Parliament to assist her
in defending herself, in what position would Eng-
land find herself ? She would have only this alter
native, either to assist her Queen in a war under-
taken on grounds foreign to England—may be
contrary to her interests—or else abandon her
sovereign, which could only be done by renouncing
allegiance and resorting to a revolution.
Now Hungary, submitting to the rule of the
House of Austria, would find herself exactly in the
same predicament. Suppose the Emperor of Austria
attacked on account of Venice by Italy. The Em-
peror, being also King of Hungary, would apply to
the Hungarian Diet to defend him 'against foreign
attack. Could Hungary practically refuse it ? Yes,
but only on the condition of renouncing her alle-
giance, and taking up arms against him, just as we
did in 1848.

Yes, but no nation on earth can at every moment
risk a revolution ; and without a revolution Hun-
gary could absolutely not escape the dire and shame-
ful necessity of being made a tool for the Emperor
of Austria oppressing any foreign nation which is
dear to our heart.

So much is, therefore, evident that Hungary
could never be truly constitutional—could never
pursue the course of an independent national policy
—when subject to the rule of a Sovereign who,
being likewise the ruler of a distinct empire, as
such would have both. interests distinct and con-
trary to ours, and the means of giving them effect
without the control of our Parliament.

When the Court of Austria—feigning to return
to the constitutional path—convoked the last (now
dissolved) Hungarian Diet, I had to consider what
course it was incumbent on me to take.
I came without any hesitation to the conclusion
that, as a faithful servant of my country, I must be
led by my nation, and not try to interfere with her
decision.

Accordingly, I determined to let the Diet take
the course it may think best to decide upon, even
though it may once more try a conciliation, which,
on the ground above stated, I decidedly disapprove.
But, while ready to submit to the will of the
nation, represented in Parliament, I considered that
—though (to my great regret) they might once
trying
twas not at all mwiotrhe
the
Mouse
itar—yg to come to terms
cer-
tain that success will crown their exuberant mode-
ration ; because on the one hand, I knew that the
faithless House of Austria neither was, nor ever
will be, sincere in her constitutional affections
towards Hungary. On the other hand, I was confi-
dent that the Hungarian Diet will not allow her-
self to be taken in by false pretences, and even the
most moderate amongst its members will firmly in-
sist on at least the full and entire restitution of the
historical rights and the constitution of the coun-
try, and not yield a hair's breadth to them. This
knowledge and that anticipation led me to think
that, leaving the Diet to follow its own course, it
was incumbent on me to continue to prepare for the
emergency of the Diet failing to arrive at an ami-
cable settlement, in order that in that case the na-
tion should not find herself without means and
chances to resist force by force.
I think, sir, I was doing the duty of a good citizen
and of an honest man, in not slackening, on account
of the convocation of the Diet, in my endeavours to
provide for the said emergency.

Here I may as well state the view by which I
always was, and shall continue to be, guided, while

lam an exile. It is this, that—
Should at any time my nation rise in arms
against her oppressor, of her own accord, and with-
out any regard to foreign aid or outward circum-
stances, I for one will in that case not weigh the
chances and prospects, nor will I lose time in pon-
dering whether or not it was wise to unfurl the
banner of national liberty, but alone, or with my
sons, or as many of my friends as would follow me,
I shall hasten to share in the dangers of my nation,
and shall throw myself, as the French say, " tete
faissee dans le melee"—come what may—vanquish
if we can—die if we must, for country and liberty.
But if, on the contrary, my nation should expect
me to give the signal, and to strike the first blow,
then on me would fall the responsibility of success,
as far as it is given to mortal man to be accountable
for it ; therefore, however weary I may feel of my
homeless life, I never shall allow myself to play
wantonly with the blood and with the confidence of
my nation, and shall only take upon myself the
initiative of the bloody arbitration of the sword in
case I can present my nation with such reasonable
chances of success that, so far as human prevision
can go, victory 4hould depend on the own determi-
nation of the nation herself.

This may be a course not sufficiently revolu-
tionary, but it is that of an honest, unambitious
heart. I was true to this course under most trying
temptations, and shall remain true to it in future
likewise—and though discretion forbids me to enter
on details, this much I feel at liberty to say, that it
is not only the honest sense of duty, but also a
cheering prospect of succoss, that confirms me in
my determination. _

Well, sir, I daresay the immense majority of my
nation is not less desirous than myself of seeing our
country freed from the House of Hapsburg-Lor-
raine; being not less convinced than I am, that
Hungary could never be free and happy under the
rule of that House.

This feeling of the nation was made manifest by
the public addresses with which the municipalities
of the country vied with each other, in honouring
my late lamented friend, Count Ladislaus Teleki,
on his involuntary return to his native land; and
still more, by the universal grief and profound con-
sternation into which the nation had been thrown
by his untimely, mysterious death.

Why was he thus honoured ? why did the nation
with such unmistakeable public marks of general
confidence assign to him the post of leadership? and
whence the deep sorrow, whence the nameless grief
at his death ? It is because the nation took him for,
In itality
was, the impersonation of these ten-
dencies, plans, and hopes with which my exile is
identified—because they knew that no man on earth
more than he had shared in, and was identified
with, my endeavours to free Hungary from the
Austrian yoke, and because they knew that his
true, chivalric, resolute, patriotic heart would never
for a moment swerve from the path which, during
the long years of his exile, he had pursued with so
much consistency, such patriotic self-abnegation,
such untiring zeal, and (as I trust a near future will
show) with such advantages to his country.
This reputation, so well deserved, had placed him
at once at the head of that large party of the Diet—
forming, to all appearances, a decided majority in
the House of Representatives—who did not think
it advisable to engage in any step that might throw
open the door to the danger of a possible transac-
tion with Austria.

Teleki died on the eve of the crisis. His lamented
death will, I fear, ever remain shrouded in mystery,
and it would be useless now to speculate on what
would have occurred had the hand of death not de-
prived his fatherland of his services.
The Diet decided on not overpassing the limits of
what is called strict legality ! On this field it has
performed its duty nobly, manfully. It took its
stand on the law; to might it opposed right; to
arbitrariness it opposed legality ; but while bidding
silence to the indignation caused by present suffer-
ings, and to the ranklicg recollections of the expe•
rience of three centuries, with unexampled self-
abnegation, it presented the House of Austria with
a last chance of saving herself by rendering justice
to Hungary. The Diet was too sensible of its
patriotic duties to yield one hair's-breadth of the
historical rights, laws, and the constitution of the
country.

Whom God has doomed to perdition, in just re-
tribution of his crime, depriyee of the gift of corn-

mon sense. The Court of Vienna, as obstinate in
its folly, as criminal in its designs, instead of taking
hold of the hand of concilial,don, which, with an
over-loyal moderation was held out by the Diet of
Hungary, rejected it with insolent pride; and,
throwing off the mask of constitutional affectation,
first dissolved the Diet arbitrarily, and then pro-
ceeded on trampling, one by one, on the shattered
ruins of the time-honoured institutions ,of the
country.

With the arbitrary dissolution of the Diet, the
first act of the great historical drama, that of " a
Constitutional Opposition," was closed.
The second act is now going cn, that of " Pas-
sive Resistance."

But why " Passive ?" why not Active Resist-
ance ?" since never in the w)aolc history of nations
was there a case, when the taking up arms, and
the repelling force by force, could appear better
justified and more legitimate.
It is, sir, because the Hungarian nation is too
wise not to bide its time, and feels too sure of its
own resolution, to compromise success by improvi-
dent precipitation.
No man in his senses can doubt of the fact, that
the imperative logic of the Italian question infal-
libly points to the necessity of a war, in no distant
time, on the part of Italy against Austria. For
that emergency, I consider Italy and Hungary as
constituting the two wings of one and the same
army, which, if` combined in their operation, will
make Victory pretty well sure ; whereas, should
Hungary, yielding to legitimate impatience,
engage in the struggle single-handed and alone,
while Italy is not yet prepared to join in it, it
would be as much as giving the chance to the enemy
to beat.,us in detail. Therefore regard both to
the safety of our own country and to that of our
brethren, the Italians, advises Hungary to bide the
proper time for a final decision of the pending crisis.

Hence you see Hungary restricting herself to the
trialsome task of passive resistance.
You see her submitting to the sufferings of this
painful task, with that calm spirit of resigned self-
sacrifice which faith in the ultimate triumph of a
just cause can alone inspire, but also with that in-
domitable energy which has won for my country
the good opinion of the civilised world.
But passive resistance can neither last for ever

(it would be death by exinanition), nor is it an aim
in itself, it is only a means. What can be its aim
Of two things—one, either suffer and amidst suf-
ferings prepare, till a good opportunity offers itself
for taking up arms; or else suffer till Austria, ex-
hausted financially, and overpowered by increasing
difficulties, shall find herself compelled to yield and
grant what she has now refused.
There is no third alternative possible.

I am, of course, for the first alternative, and shall
continue to act in that direction ; but the question
is, What will the nation do ? They may, to a great
extent, depend on the encouragement or discourage-
ment she may get from abroad.
If she see that Italy is successfully overcoming
the difficulties that are lying on her onward road ;
if she sees that Austria has no prospect of any aid
from any foreign Power, be sure of it Hungary will
indignantly reject the treacherous hand that Aus-
tria will not fail to hold out to her at the eleventh
hour. If, on the contrary, she should see that Italy
is retrograding instead of advancing; and if she sees
that Austria may hope to get assistance, for instance
from England, why in the long run she might de-
spair, and suicide herself by accepting a transaction
—a compromise.
Let every true friend of freedom in England and
Scotland assist me in averting this danger ; bear in
mind the decidedly hostile attitude of your pro-Aus-
trian Government towards Hungary, and the en-
couragement the Government received in its lament-
able course from the unaccountably passive indif-
ference of the British people until now; think of
the agitation Mr. Roebuck is engaged in, of the
shameful apostacy of Southampton, and of the
fuss made about it in the Austrian papers, as an in-
dication of an alliance between Britain and Austria
being in prospect.
Verily ! verily ! I say it is high time—nay, a
duty of national honour—for the British people to
speak out.
For the rest, I may as well remark that the course

Hungary is likely to decide upon will more parti-
cularly depend on Italy. I have no hesitation in
acknowledging that, for reasons I am not wanted to
enter upon now, we stand in need of Italy ; but, on
the other hand, I dare say the co-operation of Hun-
gary is equally necessary, nay indispensable to Italy.
The 15 millions of Hungary, not only taken away
from the forces of the enemy, but also added to the
forces of Italy, make a difference of 30 millions in
the chances of success, which is even morn than the
whole of Italy were she united—which she not yet
is. The leading statesmen of Italy ought well to
consider that it is not a matter of sympathy or of
fraternal benevolence, but one of vital national in-
terest, for the Italian nation not to risk to lose the
co-operation of Hungary. In my opinion, there is
scarcely any greater fault in politics than not to
- know to class the different exigencies of the situa-
tion according to their importance, and really I

think there is no success imaginable in any other
task incumbent on the Italian Government which
could be thought a compensation for the possible
loss of the co-operation of Hungary in the last in-
evitable struggle, on the result of which depends
not only that which is yet wanting to complete the
unity and independence of Italy, but also the safety
of all that has been already achieved. It is easy to
say, "Lot Hungary keep things in suspense—let
her wait until Italy can get rid of other matters she
has on hand." The fact is, that Hungary cannot
wait long. The crisis there is insupportable, and it
is not given to human povter to prolong a crisis in-
definitely, So or so, it must come to an end. Let
the leading statesmen of Italy take care that Hun-
gary should not find reason to lose her confidence in
the progress and vitality of the Italian cause. Let
them take care how they gave time to Austria to
paralyse Hungary, and by maiming, not her resolu-
tion, but her power of resistance, force her into some
artful net of compromise. The consequences would be
incalculable to the future of Italy. What would Ita-
lians say if the Hungarian nation were to shape her
course exclusively on the ground of isolated domes-
tic considerations, without any regard to the affairs
of Italy This, sir, is a grave consideration, and
the regards of high policy which Hungary is pay-
ing to the position of the Italian Peninsula ought
to be reciprocated by Italy. It should be borne in
mind that -if Italy allows herself to be absorbed by
' minor domestic matters, and pays no regard to the
critical position of Hungary, she risks to lose her
by too much delay; and, by losing her, will en-
danger the future of Italy herself. There may have
been logic in the plan to take Naples first, Rome
next, and Venice last. However, be the causes
what they may, the fact is that this plan has so far
proved a failure, that the Italian question, instead
of advancing, has retrograded, and that Italy this
day is weaker for a war against Austria than she
was six months, or even a year ago. Then, why
not reverse the plan ? One ought never to change
aim ; but one ought to conform one's means to cir-
cumstances. Consistency is one thing—rigid ad-
herence to one's means is another, There is, in my
opinion, no merit of consistency in risking to en-
danger the aim, by too rigidly adhering to an un-
availing plan. Therefore, I again ask, Why not
change the plan, and take Venice in hand ? To-
il the co-operation of Hungary is certain ; who
could tell what will be the case in six months

And if "Dam Roma deliberat &guilty??? peril"-
-if Hungary is lost in the meantime, will the
forces that may be drawn from Naples prove a
compensation for the loss of the co-operation of
Hungary ? Naples and Rome will not give Venice
to Italy if Hungary is lost ; but two simultaneous
battles gained on the Po and the Danube would
at once solve the question of Venice, and that of
Naples and Rome too. I §ay PA the Danube de-