The Sun.
London, England, 1861-11-07 00:00:00

fthe view is very much obstructed, and on which the trains
often follow each other in rapid succession. It may be said,
truly, that the present lamentable accident did not occur
on the portion of line referred to, which *as unprotected by
telegraph, but on that portion (inside the tunnel) which
might have been considered the least liable to an accident
of this description, because the telegraph had been sup-
plied, and had been used for eight or nine years for its
protection; and further, that when the station-master
started the three trains from Brighton, whatever appre-
hension he might, or ought to have entertained in regard
to their safety between Brighton and the Clayton tunnel,
he would not, at all events, have had misgivings as to any
risk that they would encounter in the tunnel. When once
they passed the signalman at the south end of the tunnel,
they got under the protection of the telegraph, and any
danger incurred on the previous part of their journey ought
then to have been averted, if the telegraph was to be relied
upon. But the failure of the telegraph to preserve safety
on this occasion, was caused, as I have shown, by a mis-
take of the signalman at the north end, in wrongly re-
plying to a question from the south end of the tunnel,
which ought not to have been addressed to him so hur-
riedly ; and this happened whilst the two men were work-
ing the telegraph under a most unsatisfactory system. It
is just, as I have also pointed out, this want of a proper
system of working and using the telegraph, combined with
the employment of unreliable servants, or of servants with
too much of other work to attend to, that has in like
manner led to accidents in other cases—that has induced
mistakes on the part of the men which would not other-
wise have been made—that has afforded an excuse for not
employing it—and that has prejudiced railway managers
against it, in a way materially to hinder its adoption and
retard its progress; while the want of a really efficient code
of regulations, ready to be applied, and in which confidence
can be placed, has also partly contributed to the same re-
sult. I would, therefore, in describing the defect the system
under which this accident occurred, add something gene-
rally as to the system which ought to be adopted and the
experience of other cases. The greatest amount of security
is obtained on a double line of railway; in working a tunnel
or a section of railway by telegraph, when a separate tele-
graph needle is used for each line of rails, and when each
signalman (A) blocks over the needle of the signalman (B)
next to him, by means of a pin fitting into his instrument-
handle as soon as he (A) is informed that a train has passed
that signalman (B), and is travelling towards him, and when
be (A) keeps that needle (of B) blocked over until such train
has passed him. The telegraph-needle in this case acts
simply as a signal, by means of which A indicates " danger"
or " all right" to B, A blocking B's needle (which B can-
not alter) over, either to the "all right" or to the "danger"
side of the instrument, as may be necessary, and always
keeping it so blocked over, to indicate the actual condition
of the line. In the Clayton tunnel only one telegraph-needle
was employed, as I have stated, for two lines of rails, while
two trains might be passing through the tunnel, one on
each line, at the same time. This one needle could not, of
course, be blocked over to and kept at any particular indi-
cation, but was obliged to remain in a vertical or neutral
position, and the necessary signaLs were made with it when
a train passed into or out of the tunnel in either direction.
Under this arrangement, the signalman, being unable to
make a fixed indication, trusted to their memories during
the passage of the trains ; the signalman A being required
to remember that he had telegraphed " train in" to the
signalman B, and had not received " train out " from
signalman B during the time that tie one line was
occupied ; and being required, perhaps, to exchange signals
in the meantime with signalman B in regard to a train en-
tering, or passing out, upon the other line. This defect, in
the employment of one instead of two needles, rendered the
mistake made by Brown the more liable to occur. He
would not readily—he could hardly have fallen into it, if he
had previously pinned over his own and Killick's up-line
needle to " train-on-line" for the second train. He would
thus have had before his eyes a fixed indication to remind
him that the second train was in the tunnel. Killick could
not have moved that needle to address any question to him
upon it. If the question had been sent to him in any other
way,—say upon a third needle, he could hardly, with that
fixed indication before him, have made the mistake he did
in answering it ; and even if he kad made a mistake in his
reply upon the third needle, he would not even then have
compromised the safety of the trains, because his proper
needle would still have indicated " line blocked," and he
would not have taken that off, and turned it so " line clear,"
until the second train passed out, or, at least, he would have
had no excuse whatever for doing so. Having regard to
these considerations, it is quite clear that the main cause of
this accident has been, not the mistake of the signalman,
but the defects of the system under which he worked, which
rendered that mistake liable. Even this defective system
worked safely for eight or nine years, and under a good
system, such as I have described, properly carried out,
the chances of such an accident from any misunderstanding
between the signalmen would have been very remote in-
deed. In order that it may be properly carried out, how-
ever, a third needle should be supplied, in addition to the
two above mentioned, for the use of each signalman in
each direction. This needle being used for denoting the
description of train that is to be expected, for conveying
information in regard to any unusual circuthstauce, or for
any communication that the men may have to make to
one another, all excuse is taken away from them for
employing the train needles for other than the simple
signals "line blocked" or " line clear," which they ought
alone to convey. The men will talk to each other, or make
private signals to each other, on their train needles if they
are not provided with a recognised means of communication;
and they cannot do so without risk. It is better, if for this
reason only, to provide them with a separate single needle
instrument for the purpose ; and it is the more necessary to
do so when the tunnel or section of railway protected has,
perhaps, a junction at one end of it, and sidings at the
other end ; and when one signalman is dependent upon the
other for informing him of the siding into which a train is
to be turned when it arrives, or of the line on which it is
about to proceed. Of the different systems that have been
proposed and used from time to time, I may particularly
specify Tyer's patent, which is on use on the South-Eastern
Railway, as being one of the most perfect. The apparatus
for the use of the signalman comprises a telegraph needle
for each line of rails in each direction, and a bell and gong,
having different sounds, the one for the up and the other
for the down line of rails in each direction. The bell or
gong is used to draw attention to the approach or passage
of a train, and, by the number of beats employed, to describe
the train ; while the needles aro used solely to denote either
"line blocked" or "line clear;" and no signalman can alter
his own instrument, it being the duty of each signalman to
work the needles of the signalman on either side of him.
There is another source of risk in tunnels traversed by a
double line of rails, which is not at present provided against
in practice. If a train breaks down, or runs off the line, or
causes an obstruction in any way, in a tunnel, to the second
line as well as to that on which it is travelling, then another
train coming up immediately afterwards is liable to come in
collision with such an obstruction. If the obstruction con-
sist of passenger carriages, and if an accident have oc-
curred previously to the first train, which has been the
means of placing those carriages and their passengers in
the way of the second train, the most serious consequences
may ensue. On the occasion of the present accident, the
first down train from London was due in the tunnel about
the time that the collision occurred. It was fortunately
late, and there was ample time for preventing it from
entering the tunnel, as it turned out; but the fatal results
of the accident would, in all probability, have been mate-
rially aggravated if this train had kept its proper time, Nar-
row escapes of this sort, in and out of tunnels, have not been
uncommon. On a crowded line of railway, when an accident
suddenly happens to a train travelling upon one line of rails,
by which the second line of rails is also obstructed, there is
risk, in a tunnel or out of a tunnel, of a train coming up
from the opposite direction before a guard or other person
can run forward to a sufficient distance to warn its engine-
driver, and this risk is much increased in a tunnel, in which
it is often impossible for a driver to see many yards before
him. There are several modes by which this risk might be
diminished or avoided. The most simple and the most effec-
tual means of avoiding it would be by allowing only one
engine or train to pass through a tunnel at a time in either
direction ; but this would occasion in many cases objection-
able delay to the traffic, and might increase the risk of acci-
dent in other ways by causing trains to be stopped short of
the tunnel. As has been suggested to me in connection
with this inquiry, byea sign-painter, who was formerly em-
ployed as a signalman in the Clayton Tunnel, a bell at each
end of the tunnel might be connected with a wire passing
through it, and this wire might be pulled by any passenger
or servant of the company if a train carne to a stand in the
tunnel, so as to ring the bells at either end, and warn the
the signalmen to stop all approaching trains. The only ob-
jection to this very simple plan is that the bells and wires
employed for this purpose, being only used in rare instances,
might be found to be out of order when they were wanted.
A better arrangement, as it appears to me, would be to place
the two train telegraph wires within reach along the side of
the tunnel, and to supply the moans of breaking the cir-
cuit at once upon any obstruction taking place. In ordi-
nary cases, the needles of the telegraph instruments
should show, as I have stated, "line blocked" or "line
clear," by the needles being blocked over to one or other of
these indications, according to the state of the line ; and
if the needles fell to the vertical position, and the instru-
ments would not work, it would at once become evident that
the circuit had been broken, and that an obstruction had
probably taken place. One or more fragile connexions in
the train-wires, easily fractured by a pull, would be alone
required to complete such an arrangement, and the advan-
tage of it would be that being part and parcel of the ma-
chinery in daily use, it would not be liable to get out of order,
and to be found useless when on some one occasion it was
urgently required. Of course, neither this nor any other
such method would be of any avail if one train broke down
subsequently to another entering the tunnel from the oppo-
site direction. The only possible mode of avoiding an acci-
dent of that description would be by restricting more than
one engine or train from being in the tunnel at one time.
Upon the whole, I conceive that for the safe working of any
double-line tunnel or section of railway, six telegraph-
needles are required for the use of each signalman if he
signals to other men on both sides of him, and three if he
signals with a colleague on one side only. Of these needles
one should be employed for each line of rails solely as a sig-
nal, and one, with .a telegraph bell attached, to describe a
trait; as it approaches, to ask leave for it to pass, to receive