The Sun.
London, England, 1857-07-03 00:00:00

THE INDIAN MUTINY.

An M.P. writes to a contemporary as follows :
"Much as we may deplore the bloodshed and
disorganisation resulting from the recent mutinies
in India, no partial observer of the progress of
native society can fail to rejoice that the moment
has arrived when the Government must yield to
the suggestion frequently offered, that it is expe-
dient greatly to reduce the native army, and sub-
stitute for the disbanded a smaller but mere reliable
European force. The diseases of society, like the
disorders incidental to the human frame, always
seem to require a crisis before the curative agencies
can be rendered efficacious. Heaven knows bow
long the gross imperfections of our own army
would have continued to flourish like evil weeds,
had not the Crimean war brought them them to a
culminating point and forced remedial measures
upon our attention. The Indian mutiny, though
• perhaps of less importance to the European eye
than a war with Russia, is, nevertheless, in its
way a very instructive catastrophe, and I venture
to call upon you,' as the great pioneer of all our
social reforms, to afford your powerful aid in con-
tributing to the only remedy for the evils which
affect us in India, and the only sure protection
against similar calamities for the future.
"Many of the most distinguished officers of the
Indian army have held high opinions of the bravery
and fidelity of the native troops. Malcolm, Adams,
Ochterlony, Nott, and others were loud in their
praise, because they had on several occasions dis-
played great daring, self-denial, and an ardent
attachment to the British Government. Granting
their merit, it must still be admitted that the per-
nicious consequences of their caprice and the
limited charac er of their utility more than counter-
balance their pretensions to be regarded as a force
worths of respect and retention. The Indian army
is at best, but a local police, possibly useful, under
European example, in protecting the frontier against
external foes (when we have not any to the North),
but anything but reliable as a protection against
internal discord, and quite effete as an auxiliary in
European wars. A-country like England, in form-
ing an army, should have in view its adaptation to
all our wants, foreign, domestic, and colonial. The
facilities of intercourse established all over the
world admit of the rapid removal of troops to any
point where their services may be required. Their
suitableness foe general employment should there-
fore be the first consideration in their formation.
This important paint has been overlooked in creat-
ing the India army, and we consequently experi-
enced the mortification of knowing during the late
war with Russia that we were paying upwards of
250,000 men whose services were not available in
the greatest struggle in which we were ever en-
gaged.
" This alone is an argument against the retention
of a disaffected force upon its present scale ; but
other suggest themselves, irrespective of the inap-
plicability of the army to general purposes and the
pervading mutinous spirit. The proximity of Eng-
land to our Indian Emgire, which admits of the
rapid despatch of reinforcements ; the establish-
ment of the railway system in India, which ena-
blss us to dispense with the Sepoys as treasure
escorts, provision and store convoys, &c. ; the in-
troduction of the electric telegraph and the extinc-
tion of all frontier foes with whom it were difficult
to fight an even battle, constitute irresistible ar-
guments in favour of early and extensive reduc-
tions. We may, perhaps, be exposed to the bare
chances of an irruption of Affghans or Nepaulese,
but, inasmuch as the Sepoys demonstrated in the
last war with the former and with the Sikhs, how
incapable they are of competing with hardy moun-
taineers or organised troops, our sole reliance must
be on the Europeans.
"From these general reasons against the con-
tinuance of the employment of the native troops
we may go to the causes immediately in hand—the
disposition to mutiny which the Sepoy has mani-
fested during the last 80 years, and especially at
the commencen-iat of any campaign. He has never
been at a loss for a pretext for disaffection. In
those moments he contrives to forget that he is a
" Nimul walla." The salt of the East India Com-
pany has then lost its savour. He either discovers
that he will lose his caste if he goes from the Indian
shores by sea, or he wants 'extra batta, or he needs
carriage, or be wishes to take his family with him,
each of these being so many grounds of extortion.
In peace time Lis discontent finds vent in his
affected attachment to his religion—sometimes
leather has bees his abhorrence, and now he has
found a mutinous ally in mutton fat. I say de-
liberately his affected attachment,' because the
instances are not rare in which the Sepoy has
readily adopted usages which are incompatible with
the strict injunctions of caste.
" These- may, in the minds of dispassionate men,
appear to be valid reasons why we should take ad-
vantage of the present crisis to work out an organic
change in the constitution of our Indian army, and
I conjure you not to relax in your efforts to
achieve so very important an object. In the
opinions here expressed I present the result of 20
year's experience of India and an intimate acquaint-
ance with the army of our Eastern territory.
They are probably opposed to those of the Ea-4
India Company's Government and the officers in
their employ, but they lose, I submit, little of their
cogency on that account. The constitution of the
Court of Directors disqualifies it from the candid
and impartial consideration of the subject at issue.
The intimate relations of the majority of that body
to the civil and military services, the vast patron-
age which the continuance of the present system
concentrated in their hands, and the dislike which
settled Governments entertain to great innovations
which involve trouble and ignore their claims to
pre-eminent wisdom, form strong grounds for their
resistance to the sweeping change which recent
circumstances so powerfully recommend.
"India, I repeat, has nothing to fear from
foreign invasion. The great bugbear Russia broke
down in her attempt in 1840, and her army was
destroyed before it reached Khiva by famine, cold,
and pestilence, and she has furnished us recently
with a far more memorable and decided proof cf
her inability to maintain armies at any distance
from her centres in the celebrated siege of Sebas-
topol. If Russia be unable to support an army in
her own territory, in one of the most formidable
strongholds in the world, what possibility is there
of her marching an army over deserts and imprac-
ticable roads, removed 'from her own territory and
supplies by vast distances, to encounter in the
Bolan or the Khaber Passes—places of great
natural strength—a British force in its own terri-
tory, amply supplied, with all the resources of
India at its back, and with railways concentrating
troops on all and every point necessary ?
" But, if invasion were ever possible, it can only
be met and resisted successfully by European
troops. If it were being attempted at this moment
we might find our native army flocking to the
standard of our foes, and deranging and disorga-
nising all the plans of our wisest and best generals.
India has only to dread the Sepoys whom we enlist
and pay—the population are quiet and peaceable
deprived of the arms of strength an-1 the nucleus
for organised and armed revolt which we create in
our 250,000 Sepoys. Less than 15,000 Europeans
in Bengal will have successfully pet down these
deeply organised mutinies, although with more
courage and determination on the part of the muti-
neers, and less energy and decision on ours, all
Bengal might now be in the hand of the native
army and the disaffected population. If such a
force should accomplish this in the face of such
difficulties, how comparatively easy will it be for us
to hold Bengal when none of these elements of
weakness and disaffection exist ? The remedy is
simple and should be promptly applied.
" 1. Disband every regiment of the Bengal army
that did not manifest in the late mutiny strong
feelings of loyalty.
(42. ' Cease recruiting in the remaining regiments
of the line.
" 3. Increase your Irregulars from the Ghoorkas,
Sikhs, and Belcoclies.

"'4. ',ln addition to the 14,000 men now being
despatched, to India let your China force follow on
when they bave completed thbir work on China.
" 5.. Cease recruiting for the native army in the
three presidencies until it has fallen to such a nu-
merical strength as, including Irregulars, will not
exceed- SO, 000 men.
".6. 'Contemporaneously with this augment your
European force, until in the three Presidencies
they reach 80,000 men. This may be the work of
a few years, but shohld be the plan now initiated
and steadily pursued.

•' 7. Ymirentire force, European and native,
would thus be reduced from upwards of 300,000
men to 160.000 ; they would be maintained at re-
duced cost, they would be infinitely more efficient
and trustworthy than your present force, and on
re completion or part completion of your system
ro rallyip,ys you could detach from India to Eu-
. pe Cm the occasion of hostilities, a seasoned, prac-
tical, and off
men to be „:,r army
of from 30,000 to 40,000
, i;act of remi;y
inetei4taa by . recruits from this
.side,
for the Beene of activ'ail:l the case of the Crimea,
doubtful results. The' ruitli subh hazardous and
be nearly as available ruse
be force in India would
troops in this country ; yoncontinental warfare as
Nvi-:iilfl 1-,e enabled to
reduce your force and camps
and efficiency to "India and thiseete, and economy
country
would be
eecured."

THE ART TREASURES EXHIBITION.—The win-11,10ra
on Wednesday were—by season tickets, 1 on
payment, 2,094 ; total, 3,944, Of these 834 arrived by
rail Nay.