The Sun.
London, England, 1859-07-06 00:00:00

effect upon the French coast ; whereas, if we had no reserve
and our fleet is destroyed in a contest with the French fleet,
we are entirely at the mercy of the enemy. We have seen
lately what France can effect. Suppose the English fleet
defeated and d . iven from the Channel, the events which
have pased almost under our eyes within the last few
weeks show the great pail to which we should be exposed
from the extraordinary facility with which a military force
to an immense amount might at once be landed on our
shores. But it is not sufficient for us to have a Channel
fleet capable of coping with the country directly opposite to
us. Our Channel fleet must certainly and necessarily be
of an amount sufficient to cope against any two Powers
which may be united against us. (Hear.) We know full
well that at this moment the Russians have seven or eight
line steamers, fitted for sea. If by any accident or by any
event, which might easily occur, we should be engaged in a
dispute with France and with Russia, we should be in a very ,
unfortunate situation if we had not a naval force sufficient
to combat both those Powers. (Hear, hear.) Our naval
power is essentially defensive. It is absolutely essential to
our security. The naval power of France is not defensive—
not necessarily so. It is aggressive, in its character. (Hear.)
Then, I say, with respect to the amount of the Channel fleet,
if we wish to be in a state of security, if we wish to main-
tain our great interests, if we wish to maintain our honour,
it is necessary that we should have a power measured by
that of any two possible adversaries. (Cheors.) It is not
very easy beforehand to say what that power should be, but
we must watch events and extend our naval power accord-
ing to the necessity of the case, and whatever necessity re-
quires, whatever the expense, we must submit to incur that
eipense. (Cheers.) The Channel fleet is only one part of
the force necessary. We must .have a fleet sufficient to
command tUe Mediterranean. If we have not a fleet suffi-
cient to command the Mediterranean, every one of our
strongholds will inevitably fall into the possession of France.
Not only would that be the case, but the desire and the
wish of the first Emperor to convert the Mediterranean into
a' French lake would be at once realised. (Hear, hear.)
Do your lordships suppose that that idea is aban-
doned ? Far from it. I recollect very well .that
when the present Emperor, of whom I wish to speak
in terms of respect, made his southern tour, and when
he, arrived at Bordeaux, declared that " The Empire is
peace,"—l recollect in that progress, when at Marseilles,
and about to proceed from Marseilles to Toulon in a fleet of
war ships, reference was made to this desire of Bonaparte.
Was it repudiated ? It was adopted by the present Em-
peror amid the enthusiastic cheers of the audience assembled
on that occasion. (Hear, rtear.) But, allow me to say, with
respect to a fleet necessary for commanding the Mediter-
ranean, if France has the command of the Mediterranean,
what is the inevitable consequence ? She will be able to
leave and return to the Mediterranean at her pleasure. She
will be able to take our Channel fleet in flank at any mo
ment. She will be able to unite her Mediterranean and
Channel fleets. She will be able to cross the ocean, and one
by one to take possession of our colonies, and she will be
able to sweep the ocean of our ships, and destroy our whole
property. (Hear, hear.) It is necessary, then, not only to
have such a Channel fleet as I have stated, but such a fleet
as will enable us completely to command the Mediterranean.
(Cheers.) Something further is still necessary. We must
have a fleet for the West India Islands. T admit not a
strong fleet, nor do I pretend to say where that fleet should
be stationed. I must leave that to military and naval per-
sons to determine. There is another point . with respect to
the Mediterranean. Unless we have the command of the
Mediterranean—if we are driven out of the Mediterranean,
what is our situation with respect to India? We cannot
communite with India, except round the Cape of Good
Hope, while France will be abre to communicate by a direct
and easy course by means of Egypt and the Red Sea.
What would be the result of that state of things I leave
your lordships to imagine. (Hear, hear.) I have thus
shortly directed attention to what I conceive to be necessary
in reference to a Channel fleet, a fleet in the Mediterranean,
and a force for the protection of our colonies. There are
one or two points more to which. I beg leave to refer. I
find by examining the report of the commissioners for man-
ning the navy they recommended a reserve of seamen.
That reserve, I consider, should be made immediltely with-
out the least possible delay. (Hear, hear.) It should be
so considerable and so well-trained as at any moment when
necessary to furnish able gunners to ships in commission.
(Hear, hear.) There is another point, my lords, to which
I beg leave also to refer. It relates to a matter of great
importance—the efficiency of our arsenals. It is of the ut-
most consequence that they should be as effective as possible,
and that the docks and slips should be of such dimensions as
to be adapted to the present size of our vessels. In that
respect they are, as yet, greatly defective. There ought to
be, also, such a system of machinery as to enable us, at a
moment's notice, and with the greatest rapidity, to fit out
armaments for our ships of war. (Hear.) These, my lords,
are the observations which I have to offer on this occasion
with regard to the naval part of the case. I trust that
what I have stated in that respect will meet with your
lordships' concurrence. (Cheers.) Of this I am persuaded,
that the more you examine the different parts of the sub-
ject and investigate the whole the more strongly will you
be impressed with the necessity of incurring whatever ex-
penditure may be requisite for *purpose of accomplishing
the objects to which I hhve called your attention. (Hear.)
But, my lords, that to which I have been alluding consti-
tutes only one portion of this important subject. Hitherto,
as I have already observed, you were, notwithstanding the
absence of your fleet, comparatively in a state of domestic
safety for the reasons which I mentioned. But what is your
position now ? In what state would you be if your Channel
fleet were dispersed or abient, or from any cause removed
for a short time from its proper station ? The noble lord
the leader of the other House of Parliament has told you
in very emphatic words that steam has converted the
Channel into a river, and thrown a bridge across it. These
are truly emphatic words, hilt they hardly exceed the
reality. They are scarcely exaggerated. Mark, my lords,
the state of things which has been more than once detailed.
We know from recent experience that the materials of war
may without exciting any observation be placed on board
ship on the opposite side of the Channel. We know that
in a few hours a large army may by means of the rail-
way, and without any notice whatsoever, be brought
down to the coast to different points of embarkation. The
facility of embarkation is quite extraordinary in conse-
quence of the new provisions made for that purpose by
France. We know that such a force as that to which I
refer may within a few hours—in the course of a single
night—be landed on any part of our shores. (Hear, hear.)
With so much certainty, indeed, can the movements of such
a body be regulated, that from different quarters its compo-
nent parts might arrive at the point of disembarkation
without any difference in point of time, (Hear.) That is
the state of things, my lords, with which we have to deal.
You will very naturally ask what probable force could be
brought together in the manner I have described. It is not
my province to give an opinion upon such a question.
Military and naval men are the proper persons to form a
judgment with respect to it. I may, however, be permitted
to state one or two circumstances which may serve to guide
you in arriving at a just conclusion on-the point. I ow
that in 1849, when France sent troops to Civita Vecchia,
one frigate carried a distance of 300 miles 2,000 soldiers
with all the munitions of war. lam further aware that a
much larger force than that can be embarked for a short
period of time on board a frigate, and a force still greater
on board a ship of the line. I know from information
which I have received, and the accuracy of which I do not
doubt, that the French are at the present moment building
steamers for the purpose of transporting troops, each of
which is being constructed to carry 2,500 men with all the
necessary stores. (Hear, hear.) This, therefore, is the
description of force which you must prepare yourselves to
meet. Ido not mean for a moment to say that there is no
risk in such an adventure as that against which 'I would
call upon you to be on your guard. No great military en-
terprise can ever be undertaken without ; some risk, but I
believe from all I have read and heard, and from all the
consideration which I have been able to give to the subject,
that the risk in the case to which I am adverting is
much less than it has been in many instances in
which the result has been attended with success.
(Hear, hear.) What then, my lords does it be-
come our duty to do ? What precautions does it behove
us to take ? What force ought we to maintain •in
order to be prepared for any emergency which may arise P
My answer is a force of regular troops—not yolunteers—not
undisciplined men, but, I repeat, a force 9f regular troops,
capable of opposing any military force which in'any proba-
bility can be 'landed on our shores. (Hear, hear.) It is
absolutely imperative upon us to maintain such a force.
It is a duty which we owe to ourselves. It is a duty which
we owe to the character of our country. (Cheers.) But,
my lords, independently of all this, we must provide for
our garrisons, and also for that which is of greater import -
ance still—our arsenals. (Hear, hear.) They are--I re-
gret to say it—at present in a very imperfect state of de-
fence. Much exertion, much expenditure, and much
engineering talent will be necessary for the purpose of plac:
ing them in such a position as to prevent their being
lseized
upon as the result of a sudden attack. If lam as
iwsetahheofuolrdcekewehip
up,ch themy saaufaewtyerofite, ethcoaut nom.
na ns u
ts a thatton
Yterd.ecmo.
point I put down that force at at least ,
with many persons competent to form an
100,000
oon
regular
ngutlhaer
of the
b troops,odied and a nd
trainedw h whin I
militia, say regularwhile troopstdhaiinnwkelw. thereien include
il
lluistdhiheae:
itvhed(eHhmeee
Hear,
equal force of disembodied and tr d
hear.) Every observation,
my Tana to this
coun-
try. I have
on this(H ear,subjecth appliesearo
pae
the
case
erampled
may possibly be looked
ifnordmicaertethan
a themay be
latter.eve n erhaweplis the e pre cautions which
upon on the other side of puegh)._
as a "e
of the op.
from her in °lintlY
pressed nationalities--.(a la
melrerelnazeles-erearY(a ina
upon by a nation differingMoms,.n language,
of tell wh t
and in religion. cann
at all a misrepresentations
may be made. We must,cif reland events, my lords, provide
equally for the eafelLs the as_ or our own. In the
years 1804 and only periods, I believe,
in which we were threatened seriously with invasion'
by France, the force which we maintained was much
greater than
that which I have just mentioned. But
that was merely. a temporary force •while that which
I just indicated ,
necessary. to meet the
existing state of things ought, in
of the permanent force of the country.opinion, to form part.
If we wish to live
in security, to maintain our interests
abroad, to uphold the
honour of the nation, we must be willing to make every
exertion necessary :::for the li h accomp s ment of an ob-
ject something like that
which I have pointed out. (Hew.)
I have experienced, my lords,
something like a sentiment
of humiliation in '
going through these details. I recollect
the day when e
ad ed by very part of the opposite coast was block-
an English fleet.
of Camperdown and that of t Vincent, won by Sir J.
Jervis. Ido not forget the great. victorycenotf the
last of all, that triumphant fight et Trafalgar, which al-
most annihilated the navies of France and Spain. I con-
trast the position which we occupied at that period with
that which we now hold. I 'recollect the expulsion of the
French from Egypt ; the achievement of victory after Vic-
to in Spain ; the British army established in the South
of France, and then that great battle by which that war
was terminated. I cannot glance back over that Pries of

events without feeling some degree of humiliaiinn when. L
aue called upon to state in this house
,the measures which I
deem it to be necessary to take in order to piovide for the
safety of the country. But I may be asked; 4‘ Why dUyou
think such measures requisite ? are we not in alliance with
France ? Are we not On terns of friendship with Russia ?
What other Power can- molest -us?" To these questions,
my lords, my answer shall be a short and a simple one. I,
will not consent to live in dependence on the friendship or
the forbearance of any country. (Loud cheers.)7 I rely.
solely on my ewnvigour, my own exertion, and my own in-
telligence. (Cheers.) • Does any noble lord ,in this house
dissent from the principle which I have laid down? (A
pause.) I rejoice, my lords, to find that such is not the case..
But while this is a matter for congratulation, I regret to be -
obliged to say that we do not stand well upon the continent
of Europe. Ido not think late events have improved. our
position in that respect. But I go further, my lords,'
and express my belief, as the result of my. own
careful observations, that if any plausible ground
of difference should arise between this country and France,
and that differences should lead to hostilities, the declara-
tion of war with England on the part of the Government
of that country would be hailed with the utmost 'enthusiasm,
not only by the army of Francb, but by the great mass of
the French people. (Hear, hear.) If lem asked, " Will
you not rely upon the assurances, and the courtesy of the
Emperor Napoleon?" • I reply that I have a great respect
for that high person, and that I will not enter into any ex-
planation on this subject, but will leave every noble •lord to
draw his own conclusions, and to form his own opinions.
This, however, I will say, and I can say it without impro-
priety. If lam asked whether I cannot place reliance on
the Emperor Napoleon, I reply with confidence that I can-
not place reliance in him because ha is in a situation in
which he cannot place reliance on himself. (" Hear, hear,"
and a laugh.) He is in a situation in which he must be
governed by circumstances, and I will not consent that the
safety of this country should depend on such contingencies.
(Hear, hear.) My lords, self-reliance is the best road to
distinction in private life. It is equally essential to the
character and to the granduer of a nation. (Hear, hear.)
It will be necessary for our defence, as I have already
stated, that we should have a military force sufficient to
cope with any Power or combinations of Powers that may
be brought against us. I know there will be great opposi-
lion to the expense. I feel and observe this. But look at
the opposite coast. An army of 600,000 men, admirably
disciplined, admirably organised, superior to any other force ,
of the same kind in Europe, lies within a few hours' sail of '
our own shores. That army is composed of brave troops,. •
skilful, well -commanded, eager for conflict, enthusiastic,
fond of adventure, thirsting for glory, and, above all, ,
familiar with glory. That is the Power arrayed against
you. Ido not ask you to combat that Power aggressively, .
but only to put yourselves in a state or sufficient defense
to resist it. What have we seen within the last few
weeks ? France, with a peace establishment, with no pre- •
paration for war—(a laugh)—no desire for , war, . a
uncedd to it— p
nation that could not reduce its establishment be-
cause
failtabniguh)t—basot
state-
ment—was caEmuspeeroirt
tohldadue,naeuvderl
aamdvbaon
yet able in the short period of five or six weeks
to transport an army of 170,000 men to the banks of the
Mincio, with 200 pieces of cannon and a siege train, gain-
ing two great battles in its progress, besides other lesser
fights, while she has a fleet of 50 war steamers in the Adri-
atic at this moment, with, I believe, an army of 40,000
men. (Hear, hear.) Cross the opposite coast, then, and
you find the power of action, of motion, of hostility, of in-
jury. Are we to sit supine on our own shores, and not to
Frepare the means necessary in case of war to resist that
power ? I do not wish to say that we should do this for any
aggressive purpose. What I insist upon is that we are •
bound to make every effort necessary for our own shelter
and protection. (Hear, hear.) Beside this, the questiOn
of expense and of money sinks into insignificance. (Hear,
hear.) It is the price we must pay for our insurance, and
it is but a moderate price for so important an insurance. I
know there are persons who will say, " let us run the risk."
Be it so. But, my lords, if the calamity should come, if
the conflagration should take place, what words can de-
scribe the extent of the calamity, or what imagination can
paint the overwhelming run that would fall upon us.
(Hear.) I shall be told, perhaps, that these are the timid
counsels of old age. My lords, for myself, I should run no •
risk. Personally, I have nothing to fear. But to point out
possible peril and how to guard effectively against it, that
is surely to be considered, not as timidity, but as the dic-
tates of wisdom and prudence. (Hear.) I have confined
myself to facts that cannot be disputed. I think I have
confined myself also to inferences- which no man can suc-
cessfully contravene. I hope what I have said has been in •
accordance with your feelings and opinions. (Hear.) I
shall terminate what I have to say in two emphatic words
—Vice Victis !—words of solemn and most significant im-
port. (Loud cheers.)
Lord STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE (to whom Earl
Granville, who rose with him, gave place) said he was not
entitled by any long standing in the house to interpose
between their lordships and the noble earl who had just
risen. Indeed, even without reference to that noble earl,
he had no claim, to address the house on a subject of this
kind. But he believed he should reflect the general feeling
of the house when he expressed his gratituds to the noble
and learned lord for calling attention to this most important
and ;solemn' subject, at so anxious a time as the present.
(Hear.) That speech afforded a strong proof of the feeling
prevailing throughout the country on this subject. Wlen
he remembered that though the supplies necessary to take
the precautions suggested could not originate in this house,
and yet that subject had first been brought under conside-
ration here—when he remembered that the noble lord did
not belong to the naval or military profession, but that his
honourable, his glorious career had been passed in totally
different pursuits—and when he saw him rise at a very ad-
vanced age and overcome the infirmities of that period of
life in order to perform a solemn duty towards the country,
he could not but feel all the importance of this subject, and
that it had not been brought under their attention without
adequate reason. (Hear.) In all countries possessing free
institution at all times there had been an unwillingness to
prepare for defence in anticipation of war. The feeling
brought out by these institutions was a very natural feel-
ing of self-confidence and of unwillingness to endure sacri-
fices before a strong conviction of danger had arisen. He
said, therefore, that it was with good reason that the noble
and learned lord had called attention to this subject. Itwas
well known that preparations had been made in this country,
and that we had assurances from both the late and the pre-
sent Government that the national defences would not be
neglected. He confessed that he had heard with satisfac-
tion some short time ago the just tribute paid to the late
First Lord** the Admiralty by the present Foreign Secre-
tary, for the successful exertions made by the right hon.
gentleman in his department. He quite agreed with his
noble and learned friend (Lord Lyndhurst) that it was not
a question of the degree of confidence put by this coun-
try in foreign Powers or in the Emperor Napoleon,
but that it was a shame and a humiliation that a great na-
tion like ours should exist for one hour under sufferance.
(Cheers.) Not only must such an existence inspire a sense
of shame which we ought indignantly to repel; but we
thereby deprived ourselves of the opportunity of performing
those duties which we owed to the world and to the Pro-
vidence which had placed us in a position of doing good
without limit. The noble and learned lord, he believed, had
indulged in no exaggeration in his representation of the
means of our neighbours. When we looked to those means,
and to the position which we occupied in relation to other
countries, there was much reason for anxiety, and still
greater anxiety must be occasioned by the changes which
had taken place in naval tactics. When he looked at the
growing demands upon our naval and military services for
the protection of our distant settlements, and at the extent
of our daily-increasingcommerce with all parts of the world
he saw an additional demand for augmented means of de-
fence, an additional danger proceeding from abroad, and
every reason for making those sacrifices which were neces-
sary in order to secure the safety of our shores and add to
our influence in negotiation with other States. He for one
put the question of invasion very much aside. Whatever
reason we might have to apprehend a hostile attack upon
our shores, he was still willing to believe that with a prudent
and at the same time firm policy on our part, and with some
feeling of regard for right on the part of others, we waren...at
likely to be exposed to that immediate danger. But there
were other considerations which made it an imperative duty
to lose no time in completing our defences, and placing our-
selves in that position of security which our honour and in-
terests both demanded. When he looked at the high pitch
of prosperity to which we had attained, at the united sen •
timent that existed to an almost unparalleled extent among
us, and at the fact that we possessed means of defence
nearly unlimited in amount,he found it impostible to enter-
tain any apprehension for the fate of England. Our danger
arose from too much self-confidence, from too great a re-
liance upon past successes, and from an unwillingness to
but
admit these changes which had actually taken place ,
was satisfied that if the warning were accepted—if
at
means we
looked the danger in the face,. and employed the
our disposal—so far from having any reason to dread a con-
flict the
with France or any other foreign Power, _ day on
which we should be called upon to defend our honour and
interests would prove the most glorious day that ever shone
upon the destinies of England. (Cheers.)
Earl GRANVILLE—I fully concur in the feeling of ad-
miration which has been expressed by the noble lord who
has just spoken with respect to the speech of the noble and
learned lord opposite. I fully admit that in this remarkable ' '
intellectual effort the noble and learned lord has put leis.-.
views clearly before your lordships, and that those views, so
lucidly stated, contain much of truth and much of patriot-
ism. At the same time I cannot refrain from asking my-
self whether any great practical good• is likely to result from
what has fallen from the noble and learned lord. (Hear,
hear.) I am not sure whether the object of his observations
is to stimulate the country or to stimulate the Government,
but I have no hesitation in • saying that,regards other
countries, as
countries, I cannot foresee any advantage in the course
which has been taken. (Hear, hear.) There is nothing which
gives such weight to this house as the debates which take
place in it upon all the important subjects relating to our
connexion with foreign States, but at the same time it can-
not be denied that upon each individual member rests a
grave responsibility in regard to what may escape his lips.
(Hear, hear.) During the first three months of the present
Parliamentary session I think we had only three debates
upon the delicate subject of our foreign relations. Those
debates were not devoid of spirit or of frankness, but they
were conducted with a prudence and discretion which were
not only highly approved by the public at large, but pro-
duced a good effect on the continent, and even in some
countries where our free institutions are little loved. (Hear,
hear.) Since the accession of the present Government
this house has sat only four nights, and during .three of
them sharp discussions have taken place upon some deli-
cate matters connected with our foreign relations. One
noble and gallant lord, whom I do not see in his place, spoke
d facility
on two consecutive nights with an eloquence and
in
one
and a precision which are certainly most remarkable
whose professional career has prevented him from acquiring
experience in Parliamentaay or any
other kind of public
speaking'; but at the same time I mast ssy that his attack
at
is present in
upon the head of a Government which
friendly alliance with us, and still
more the irritating re-
marks nation, were
which he made upon the whole
not well calculated to maintain peace between the two coon-
not
tries. (Hear, bear.) I am bound to state, however, that the
two noble earls whom I now see sitting together—l mean,
the late Prime Minister and the late Foreign Secretary--
having recently felt the responsibility involved in thJa
management of public affairs at a crisis like the presen4 t,
have abstained from observations of an imprudent and ix
jurious character. The noble earl who was at the herd Hof
the late Government has carefully abstained from takii
any part in the discussions to which I have referred, whi ile
the noble earl the late Secretary of State for Foreign A 5-
fairs has confined himself almost entirely to a very legil