The Sun.
London, England, 1861-02-06 00:00:00

. , -
THE
I .
SON, LONDON, WEDNESDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 6, 186:

—that he valued the unity of Italy more than his intimate
relations with the French Government. That is not the
question ; it is not my desire to enter into any argument
on that point. It was perfectly open to the noble lord to
follow the policy which he preferred. Bat hes the noble lord
obtained the unity of Italy ? He may be in that situation
with the French Goverment that he is obliged to look out
for new allies, by having forfeited—if he has forfeited—
that cordial understanding mith them and that opportunity
of pursuing the same policy. Has the noble lord succeeded
in the policy which he preferred ? Have his efforts ef-
fected the tr-ky of Italy ? We hear—we know that a
powerful French army is stronglyintrenclied in the centre
of Italy. We know that the contemplated capital of Italy
is not in possession of the Italians. In this age of jubilant
nationality Rome is still garrisoned by the Gauls. (Hear,
and laughter.) We know that "Venetia is bristling with
Austrian artillery andswarming with German end Sclavo-
nian legion's. We know that even the King of the Two
Sicilies, deprived of his crown by universal end unanimous
suffrage, unfortunately followed by frequent insurrections,
and martial law—(hear, hear)—is even at this moment in
possession of the two prime strongholds of his kingdom.
We know that in the south of Italy they have combined the
horrors of revolution with the shade of conquest. These are
not the characteristics surely of the unity of Italy. But the
noble lord may say, perhaps, " All this is undeniably true,
the unity of Italy is not effected,but great results like these
are not accomplished with the rapidity you seem to expect ;
you must wait, we are only in the beginning of the of. era-
tions ; much has been done, and the rest will be accom-
plished." The noble lord may say that the elections to tho
Italian Parliament indicate a most hopeful temper on the
part of the people as to the means by which union may be
ultimately effected. I will not depreciate the possible advan-
tages which may accrue from these public elections. Unfor-
tuaately history shows us that new political institutions
have very little power in times as critical as these. Old in-
stitutions that have existed for centuries, possessing an
authority which has been gradually conceded to them as
public necessity rendered it advisable—institutions which
have aggregated round them the power of prescription,
more important than armies or police, may control and even
create events in an age of revolution : but we have, unfor-
tunately, no instance, as far as history can guide us, of new
political institutions exercising this influence in an age and
in a country where revolution prevails. But Ido not want
to argue on these points. In order to obtain as accurate a
view of our situation as we can, after the bewildering com-
munications that have been made to 119, I am ready to offer
every concession, as far as argument goes, to the noble lord
and to her Majesty's Government. I will grant that the
union of Italy, if not already accomplished, may in time
be effected. But how is this result to be attained ? I
will admit that manipulating what is called the spirit of
the age, with all the adroitness of English diplomacy,
you may produce such a state of affairs that the
Emperor of the French, whatever his original or present
policy, may say--" On the whole this unity of Italy
seems to be a resulV.that is practicable, and I will consent
to it." But on what terms will the Emperor of the French,
or any one who represents French policy, consent to such a
result ? It will not be the moral influence of England that
under these circumstances will have accomplished the
unity of Italy—it will be the sword of France. (Hear.) It
is the will of France that can alone restore Rome to the
Italians; it is the sword of France—if any sword can do
it—that alone can free Venetia from Austrians. If the
unity of Italy is to be effected by such influences and by
such means, are we to suppose that a Sovereign who is
described as profound and crafty, and a people whom we
know to be ambitious and quick-witted, will be prepared
to make such an effort, and to endure such a sacrifice—such
a surpassing sacrifice and such an enormous effort, with-
out obtaining some result ? Why, sir, it would belie every
principle of human nature. We cannot impute it to that
Sovereign, and to such a people as the French, that they
would not after such exertions expect to obtain some great
political and public advantage. And it is obvious what
that result would be. Those who, under the circumstances
I have stated, will free the nation will make their terms,
and will be justified in making their terms. They will have
an alliance offensive and defensive with Italy, and the
Emperor of the French will then appear in the character
which he has himself shadowed out, for which he has
prepared the world, which the policy he has hitherto
pursued with regard to Italy has shown that he has
not too anxiously sought to fulfil, foreseeing its diffi-
culties as well as its glory. The Emperor of the French
will then come forward in that character, as the natural
head of the Latin race. He will find himself the eman-
cipator of Italy, at the head of a million of bayonets.
(Hear, hear.) A million of disciplined and even
distinguished soldiers will be at his command and
behest ; and then it will be in his po'wer—you having
forced him to a policy in Italy, which at first he was un•
willing to pursue—to make those greater changes and to
aim at those greater results which I will only intimate,
and will not attempt to describe. Ido not wish in any
way to offer these considerations to the house ; I am
merely trying to place the state of affairs in its real
light, after all the bewilderment which the public mind has
undergone from the speeches and from the despatches of
her Majesty's Ministers. Ido not want to underrate the
object which her Majesty's Ministers propose to themselves
in effecting the unity of Italy ; I am perfectly willing to
admit that if the unity of Italy be practicable it would add
greatly to the strength and splendour of Europe. But if a
British Minister did conceive such a re-arrangement of ter-
ritory to be of paramount importance, if he believed it to be
a policy of that sovereign character that the country to
achieve it ought to be prepared to make every sacrifice, why
thee. I think he ought to have attempted his object by other
means than those which are called moral influence. If we
had really interfered in Italy with a material agency, if we
had ourselves assisted the Italians in achieving their free-
dom, their independence, and their unity, we should then
have had claims oa their gratitude—(hear)—we should then
have been in a position to leek on them as our natural and
our grateful allies. But we have not taken' that course ;
we have had before us a large but misty object, never prac-
ticable ; we have expended at great force a puerile and de-
clamatory diplomacy, and we have given to it the vain,
the fruitless, and unsatisfactory title of " moral influence."
(Hear.) I am not counselling the house to go to war to free
Italy, nor have I ever counselled the house to such an ob-
ject. I think as a general rule we should leave countries
to make out their own freedom ; but, when the freedom of
a particular country is made the great political object on
which the rival claims and the rival systems of great em-
pires are concentrated, I say it is of importance the house
should understand that the country whose sword and will
frees the enslaved land is the country which, not only by
moral but material influence, obtains its future support, and
commands its future resources. That is the position in
which. it appears to me we are placed by the policy of her
Italyusresreo p;
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ibihoonai
artt
Majesty's Government. I shall wait with patience and
curiosity for the papers which they have promised on
tiswthihhiatteieesncistutaly:taresteiGocoofnolvloeefertutmhoeustpheeacyhoems wadheicihu
ththisehmouemse..;
when I recollect the despatches distributed throughout
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the house
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tryupy.
(Cheers.) I think it will be found to positionupy one of great
danger, and, perhaps, of great disappointment • but what-
ever it may' be,l think the case is one that demands the
gravest attention of Parliament. (Hear, hear.) By the
conduct of the Government we are placed in this dilemma

—and it is a very serious one—either we must be content to '
fall back on an arrangement similar in principle to the
Treaty of Zurich, that settlement against which, for the last
12 months, her Majesty's Government have been agitating
in every Court in Europe ; or we must be prepared to meet
that far more dangerous situation which is open to us when
Italy is united—united by the sword and will of France—
and has necessarily placed at the disposal of France all its
resources. (Hear.) As to the first case, I think it would
be disgraceful to this country, as represented by its Govern-
ment ; but the secend is much more dangerous—more dan-
gerous indeed, than one would at this moment attempt to
describe. (Hear, hear.) The settlement made by the pre-
liminaries of Villafranca was not one that would have
realised the youthful dream of the poetical statesman.
(Laughter.) That I admit ; but it secured many interests
which this country has always considered to be most im-
portant. No doubt, it substituted French for Austrian influ-
ence in Italy. Who denies that? That was a most natural
consequence of a war between France and Austria in which
France was signally victorious. We did not interfere in the
war; but the preliminaries of Villafranca secured a great
southern boundary t o Germany, and that I believe is an ob-
ject which no English statesman should despise. If it did
not secure, it did not destroy the independence of the Pope,
a consideration which the most eminent English statesmen
of all parties have always held to be important. (Hear, hear.)
It did not destroy the independence of Switzerland—Savoy
and Nice remained still an appanage of the King of Sardinia.
(Cheers.) There is a great responsibility on the Ministry,
who, by efforts, active efforts, influential efforts, I believe
none will deny, mainly defeated the accomplishment of that
settlement. (Hear, hear.) Now, we r-e in this position
—either we must fall back on a settlement similar to the
Treaty of Zurich, or we must encounter a sae of
affairs so dangerous that before its difficuries are solved
every throne in Europe may be shaken, and which ap-
pears to me to be inevitably and logically brought about
by the policy which her Majesty's Government have
steadfastly, but, as I think, most injudiciously pur-
sued. (Hear, hear.) And, Sir, how do we know that
it is in the power of the Englisa and French Governments,
if they come to an understanding, to fall back on an ar-
rangement similar to the Treaty of Zurich ? Great influ-
ences have been at work during the last year—influences
more powerful than French Emperors and British Minis-
ters. They had been slumbering in chaos ; but you called
.fort those anarchical elements, one of which alone may be
sufficient to produce a European war. What are these
questions which are now agitating Europe, and from the
agitation of which men shrank ? You have the rival claims
of priests and kings, you have the rights of races and the
boundaries of empires—questions, one of which alone
caused a war of 30 years. All these questions have now
been called forth while her Majesty's Government have
been pursuing the phantom of a United Italy. (Hear,
hear.) You have produced all those elements of anarchy,
and he is a bold man who would say that it is in the power
of Cabinets any longer to control them. (Hear.) This is
a grave position of affail-a, and one of which we have a right
to expect from her Majesty's Government some real expo-
sition. They have been treated by this house on the sub-
ject of their foreign policy with, I will say—speaking for
boll sides, and claiming no party merit—generosity. The
house has believed that the Government, ou their part,
have treated it with candour. I will not deny it ; but I say
that that candour has in its effects been most unfortunate,
because it has been of a most bewildering nature.
(Laughter.) The more the Government told us the less we
knew. What was one day explained to us as the policy of
her Majesty's Government, was followed the next day by an
exactly opposite one, and with contradictory speeches and
conflicting despatches. I am using ne exaggerated language
when I say that the public mind of this country is not
informed on the precise nature of our foreign relations.
(Hear.) I cannot find in the speech from the Throne any-
thing which gives us that information which I think we
have a right to expect. (Hear.) On the question of our
relations with France, it will be satisfactory to us to have
some announcement from the Government. Are we pursuing
with regard to Italy the same policy as is being adopted by
that Power ? And if we are not, what in the opinion of her
Majesty's Government must be the natural result ? Is
there rivalry with regard to Italy, or is there harmony?
These are questions to which the house has a right to invite
the attention of the Government. (Hear.) I think it is
idle to say that we ought to wait for the papers before we
do so. 'When we read those papers we shall be able to form
a judgment on the conduct in detail of Ministers with re •
gard to particular transactions ; but their policy has been
described by themselves, and it demeuds explanation. We
have the policy of the Government; we have despatches,
and we have Vattel the eminent jurist quoted by the noble
lord. (Laughter.) That quotation from Vattel is the basis
of the policy of the Government; and as it is only four
lines I shall read it to the house. In October the noble lord
informed us that— _ _ _

"That eminent jurist Vattel, when discussing the law-
fulness of the assistance given by the united provinces to
the Prince of Orange, when he invaded England and over-
turned the throne of James 11., says The authority of
the Prince of Orange had doubtless an influence on the de••
liberations of the States General; but it did not lead them
to the commission of an act of injustice, for when a people
for good reasons take up arms against an oppressor, it is but
an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the
defence of their liberties.' "
Now, Vattel was a Dutchman, which the noble lord is not
--(laughter)—and therefore ho had a right to quote Wil-
liam 111. Ido not depreciate Vattol's authority. I think
that on a diplomatic instrument, or a diplomatic procedure,
or on some question of the law of nations, he is a high autho-
rity and a correct and lucid writer ; but when it comes to a
question of the political conduct of men, I think that the
noble lord is as good an authority as Vattel, or better, -and
that there are men in this house who may use their judg-
ment, though they do not agree with Vattel. However, the
noble lord does not appear to be quite correct on this point.
This opinion of Vattel is followed immediately afterwards
by a qualifying statement, which I shall read to the house.
He says,—
" But we ought not to abuse this maxim, and make a
handle of it to authorise odious machinations against the
internal tranquillity of States: It is a violation of the law
of nations to invite those subjects to revolt who actually
pay obedience to their Sovereign, though they complain of
his Government."

(Hear.) Why, this is the conduct of Sardinia sketched by
one not at all influenced by the passions of the hour, as he
has long passed away from the earth. That is exactly what
has been done by the King of Sardinia. A great necessity
of State may, in the opinion of the King of Sardinia, and in
the opinion of the noble lord, justify the conduct he has
pursued—l will not enter into any arguments on that point
at this moment—but certainly it was a most unhappy quo-
tation from Vattel which the noble lord selected for his de-
spatch of Oct. 27. (Hear.) I have placed before the house,
without attempting to argue upon the propriety or impro-
priety of the conduct of the King of Sardinia, my views
upon this subject, and looking at all the questions in con-
troversy, I have endeavoured to bring those views to a
single object :—lf the unity of Italy is to be effected, it can
be effected only by a Power which occupies Italy in great
force, not by a Power which has no force there whatever.
That unity cannot be effected under such auspices without
results dangerous, in my opinion, to the pease of Europe.
(Hear.) That unity can only be effected in such circum-
stances by placing the Emperor of the French at the head
of at least a million of armed men, and making him master
of all the resources of Italy. (Hear.) I want to know
whether, with the probability of such a result as that, with
such dangers as these impending over Europe and more than
. Europe, inquiries and explanations have passed between
the Governments of England and France as to the inten-
tions and policy of the French Emperor. 1 want to know
whether the Government can inform the house what is the
exact state of affairs in that respect, what are the true re-
lations of France with Italy, and what are the prospects on
this all-important question which the Government can hold
out to the people of England. (Hear.)
Lord J. RUSSELL—Though the right hon. gentleman
has a perfect right on this the firstnight of the session to ask
for an explanation of the views of the Government with re-
gard to its foreign policy, and to express his opinion on that
policy, yet he is not justified in complaining of want of in-
formation, when we have laid papers on the table of the
house which to-morrow morning would enable him to settle
all those doubts and obscurities of which he complains. The
right hon. gentleman, however, having stated his views of
the foreign policy of the Government, I have no objection to
state in general terms what is the course which we have pur-
sued, and the opinions we have expressed, with reference to
the Italian question. 'With regard to this mystery,of which it
is curious enough the right hon. gentleman should complain,
the policy of the Government was proclaimed about a year
and a half ago by my right hon. friend the Secretary fir the
Home Department at the Lord Mayor's feast, and every-
body knows that what is told to the Lord Mayor is prover-
bially told to the whole world. My right hon. friend on
that occasion said it was the policy of her Majesty's Go-
vernment not to attempt to impose any form of government
on Italy, but to allow the Italians to settle their internal
affairs in the way they thought best. (Hear, hear.) That
principle has been declared over and over again. It was
declared in her Majesty's speech at the end of last session.
It has been declared at the beginning of this session, and it
has pervaded all the despatches and documents that have
been laid on the table of the house. Now, I want to know
whether the right hon. gentleman considers that a right
principle or a wrong one—for the right hon. gentleman has
never given an opinion as to whether he thinks it right or
wrong that the people of Italy should be left to manage
their own internal affairs. (Hear, hear.) The right hon.
gentleman might have known that that was the principle
on whicb her Majesty's Government has all along acted,
and that the doubts and obscurities which he has conjured
up have no existence in fact. (Hear.) When, some years
ago, our views were in opposition, we declared ourselves in
favour of Italian freedom and independence, the right hon.
gentleman was always the leader of those who derided such
notions as visionary—(hear, hear)—who contended that the
best government for Italy was that of Austria, and who
were accustomed to sound the praises of the late King of
Naples and his system of Government. (Hear, hear.) Pre-
vious to the late war in Italy the Italians saw that they
had no hope of assistance from England, but looked to
France for aid in effecting their liberation. At that time
the Government of the day,:which wasithagof Lord Derby,
did not expect war, but as soon as they gained information
which led them to expect that war was impending, they

used their utmost efforts to prevent it. They were not suc-
cessful. I never blamed them for their want of success,
and I always regarded their conduct as prompted by the
best intentions and by a due regard to the policy which
this country ought to pursue. But their efforts were
not successful, and the war took place. Informa-
tion at length reached them that it was the intention of
the French Emperor to liberate Italy from the Alps
to the Adriatic, and that Savoy and Nice were to be trans-
ferred to France. Lord Cowley was instructed by Lord
Malmesbury to inquire of the French Government if that
intelligence was true, but he obtained no answer from the
French Government. Soon after the French army was,
inereased and entered Italy, and those events took place
which are familiar to the house. We were then told that
the French nation expected that Savoy and Nice should be
transferred to the French Government. After this came
the Treaty of Zurich. That treaty stipulated one thing,
wHe the French Emperor declared another thing, which,
Lough not totally inconsistent with the treaty, was prac-
tically adverse to it. The Treaty oZ Zurich said that the
Duchies of Tuscany and Modena should be restored to their
former rulers. The French Emperor said no troops.—Aus-
tiivn or French—should be allowed to effect that restora-
tion, and in consequence of that declaration the article in
the Treaty of Zurich was not fulfilled. Her Majesty's pre-
sent Government then declared, not that the unity of Italy
was their object—l shall show presently that from time to
time that was not our object, but that we only wished the
Italians to be free to choose their own rulers—that if the
Grand Duke of Tuscany or the Duke of Modena were re-
ceived with the consent of the people our Government
would see their restoration with pleasure, but that they
could not approve Sand would protest against any attempt
to impose on the Italians any government by force. (Hear.)
Was that principle right or wrong ? I ask the right hon.
gentleman again whether he approves or disapproves that
policy ? (Hear.) Does he maintain that it would be right
to force upon Italy a government not approved by the peo-
ple ? (Hear.) The right hon. gent!emr-r knows that Aus-
tria has declared that she will not go beyond her own fron-
tier to interfere in Italian affairs—that she will be satisfied
with the territories left to her by the Treaty of Zurich,
and that she was willing to be a party to the ancient prin-
ciple of non-intervention. This has been the policy which
her Majesty's Government has endeavoured to act upon;
and, so far as it has been in accordance with the policy of
the Government of France, it has been successful. (Hear,
hear.) But now as to the unity of Hely. We have de•
dared that we have no wish that the Grand Duke of
Tuscany and the Duke of Modena should not
return. I have stated with regard to Naples, both in this
House and in my communications with the Government of
the Emperor of the French, that in our opinion the happi-
ness of Italy would be better secured by there being two
kingdoms of Italy than one, and that if the King of Naples
would have granted aconatitution we should have been glad
to see two constitutional kingdoms in Italy. But still that
was a question for the Italians themselves. (Hear.) It was
for them to consider whether the Prince having hereditary
right on his side was a Prince in whom they could trust—
(hear, hear)—and they had the perfect right to regulate
their internal affairs in such a manner as to secure theirown
happiness. Was that a wrong principle ? We may have been
wrong in our opinion that it would be better there should
be two kingdoms in Italy, but we said that the Italians only
ought to be the judges on that point. Well, sir, other events
occurred, and the right hon. gentleman speaks of two des-
patches of mine. With regard to the first, it was published
without my knowledge. I saw it translated into the Cologne
Gazette. It was communicated by me to the Government of
Sardinia, and I do not know how it obtained that notoriety.
But I must say there have been three objects which her
Majesty's Government have kept in view throughout these
negotiations. One was that Italy should be left free to settle
her own concerns. Whether she succeeded in obtaining
two constitutional monarchies, or became one united Italy
under one constitutional monarchy, we declared that it
would be satisfactory to us to obtain either of those results,
and that in our opinion in either case additional security
would be given to the other States of Europe. Another ob-
ject we had in view was that the peace of Villafranca, with
the conditions of which we had nothing to do, should be
maintained as a security for the peace of Europe. I am un-
able to express to this house the importance I attach to the
maintenance of the peace of Europe. (Cheers.) No one can
say how far a war once begun may extend, what changes of
Governments may not be produced, what alterations in the
position of various Powers may not be caused, and how
difficult it may not be for any country in Europe,
and particularly this country,- which we are bound to
cherish more than any other, to keep itself disengaged from
such a war. (Hear, hear.) Not only, therefore, from a
general hatred to war and unnecessary bloodshed, but for
reasons connected with the dreadful aspect of such a war,
we have been most anxious that the peace of Europe should
not be disturbed. In August, therefore, I wrote in strong
terms—some may think too strong, although I think what
I wrote was calculated to do good at the Sardinian Court—
recommending that, for the benefit of Italy herself, Sardinia
should not rush rashly and madly to war, thereby bringing
on herself great evil. It was in the interest of the Sar-
dinians, I urged, that the obligations of good faith bound
them to keep the treaty of peace that they had concluded so
lately—a treaty under which they bad given up Venetia
while they had obtained Lombardy. Every consideration
of regard to their own interest prevented them from leadir g
their newly-formed and not numerous legions against the
armies of Austria. I said her Majesty's Government
trusted that the King of Sardinia would not make war on
Naples; without the knowledge of the Sardinian Govern-
ment, but with the strong impulse of the people, an expe-
dition went out from Genoa to Sicily. Sicily was conquered.
The people declared in favour of Garibaldi. He had only,
some 1,800 men to lead against 20,000 or 25,000 soldiers of
the Neapolitan army; yet he marched from one success to
another. Garibaldi then landed in the kingdom of Naples.
He went to Naples in a railway carriage with ten or twelve
of his companions. He entered the town with those ten or
twelve companions, a'though there were 3,000 to 4,000
troops of the King of Naples in the city. He was welcomed
with general applause, and proclaimed himself Dictator.
Now, if I look at a statistical account of the kingdom of
Naples, I find that the king had 100,000 soldiers belonging
to the regular army, and a reserve of between 40,000 and
50,000 men • that he had two ships of 90 and 80 guns, and a
number of Other ships. Here was, then, a Sovereign who,
one might have thought, would have laughed to scorn the
attempt of a chief, who has been talked of in this house
with much undeserved contempt—(cheers)—who, with
nothing but his own valour and patriotism to council him,
went with 1,800 men to assail so strong a kingdom. It
might have been thought that it was madness to make such
an attempt—that the ships, frigates, and corvettes of the
King of Naples would enable him utterly to destroy such a
force. Yet we all know the result. Well, the inference to
which I came, and every man made himself, was that the
King of Naples was not very strong in the affections of his
subjects. (Cheers and laughter.) I ventured to suppose,
not that 100,000 men were not able to defeat 2,000, but that
they had no heart for the enterprise ; that the accounts of
my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and
others of the dungeons of the King of Naples, and the de-
scriptions given by our Consuls, were true ; and that the
tortures impeseci on them had disgusted the subjects of the
King of Naples, and had led them to welcome as a deliverer
any man who came to free them from that rule. (Cheers.)
I do not mean to defend the whole of the conduct of the
King of Sardinia, but it was a question for him and his
ministers to consider whet they should do. The right hon.
gentleman thinks little of thatipotentate. I will. however,
mention an opinion to which the right hon. gentleman may
attach more importance. In 1821 the position of affairs in
Italy afforded a great contrast to its present state. The So-
vereigns of Europe met at Verona. They laid down certain
principles, from which no nation was allowed to depart, that
Sovereigns might introduce improvements, and that if it
pleased them to improve their laws they were at liberty to
do so ; but that if it did not occur to any Sovereign that
arbitrary imprisonment, that caps of silence, and dungeons
where prisoners might be confined without trial for several
years, were objectionable, he need not introduce any im-
provement in those matters. It was, however, laid down
that any improvement introduced by the people was against
the divinity of Kings, and was not to be permitted. Lord
Castlereagh, on the part of England, did not think it
necessary to declare on this account an armed resist-
ance on the part of England. This country had carried
on a very long war, and the efforts she had made had been
very costly. We had retained at a great sacriace the an-
cient limits of Europe. The sovereigns who met on that oc-
casion were chiefly sovereigns in alliance with Great Bri-
tein. They were sovereigns with whom and for whom we
had encountered these perils and incurred these costs. But
while Lord Castlereagh did not advise his country to go to
war, he protested against the principle of this general super-
vision, and he said what, if the house will permit me, I am
about read. His words appear to me to be so sound that
it is worth the while of the house, although the extract is
not a short one, to attend to them :
" After baying removed the misconception to which the
passage cf the circular in question, if passed over in silence,
might give countenance, and having stated in general
terms, without, however, entering into the argument, the
dissent of his Majesty's Government from the general prin-
ciple upon which the circuler in question is founded, it
should be clearly understood that no Government can be
more prepared than the British Government is to uphold
the right of any State or States to interfere, where their
own immediate security or essential interests are seriously
endangered by the internal transactions of another State.
But, as they regard the assumption of such right as only
to be justified by the strongestnecessity—(hear, hear)—and
to be limited and regulated thereby, they cannot admit that
this right can receive a general and indiscriminate applica-
tion to all revolutionary movements, without reverence to
their immediate bearing upon some particular State or
States, or be made prospectively the basis of an alliance.
They regard its exercise as an exception to general pi in-
ciples, of the greatest value and importance, and as one
that only properly grows out of the circumstances of the
special case; but they, at the same time, consider that ex-
ceptions of this description never can, without the utmost
danger, be so far reduced to rule as to be incorporated into
the ordinary diplomacy of States, or into the institutes of
the law of nations."
Now, according to this opinion, in which I entirely concur,
the question forthe King of Sardinia and his Ministers was
whether the essential interests of Sardinia and of that part
of Italy over which he was then the ruler were so endan-
gered by what had taken place in Naples that he could not
remain a tranquil spectator of those events. What was
that situation ? Garibaldi, as I have said, had made himself
master of Naples and the greater part of the country. But
he had not been able—even if be had the talents for go-
vernment, which he does not appear to possess—to found a
solid Government in Naples. Everything was falling into
anarchy. What would have been the consequences of that
state of things ? Not that that anarchy would have con-
tinued, but that other Powers would then have said. We
are willing to allow Italy to arrange her own affairs, butisee
what a condition of anarchy exists in Naples? (Hear.)i A.
king unable to maintain his authority, a military chief mas-
ter of the State, everything in confusion. Now is the time,
certainly, for Europe to interfere to establish the Pope in his
dominions, to place Austrian garrisons in several of her pro-
vinces, and to show for ever that that dream of Italian in-
dependence has been a mere illusion which can never again
be revived." (Hear, hear.) Well, in that position I really
think the King of Sardinia could do no other than declare
himself at once to be so deeply interested in what had hap-
pened, as well for himself and his States as for Italy, whose
champion he avowed himself to be, that he would march
with an army into Naples and establish that unity of Italy

which hal long been the wish of so many of the people in
all parts of that country. But, Sir, this act of his did not
pass unnoticed. The right hon. gentleman says that on the
27th of October I wrote a despatch justifying that proceed-
ing. But that was not the first thing teat had taken place.
The Powers of Europe very frequently when it suits them
adopt that practice which the right lon. gentleman says
was so new in this instance—namely, although their affairs
are generally conducted with the utmost secrecy, they put
forth declarations of principles signed by their Minister
of Foreign Affairs, and which are intended to have
an influence on the events of Europe. In ffs case Russia
and Prussia had both thought it necessary to administer
lectures to the Xing of Sardinia—to point out to him that
he had departed from the law of nations, and that such an
outrage had never been known in the history of Europe.
Well, these preceedings were calculated to have a great
effect. The Emperor of the French at the same time had
withdrawn his Minister from Turin. Well, I certainly felt
myself, end I found that her Majesty's Government wore
also of opinion, that the King of Sardinia was defending
a just cause when he had so taken up arms; and it was im-
possible, I think, with any regard to the dignity of Eng-
land, that we should maintain entire silence white Russia,
Prussia, Austria, and France were doing all in their power,
as far as their morel influence would extend, to extinguish
the freedom and independence of the new Italian State.
(Hear, hear.) That, therefore, was my reason for not or'y
writing the despatch to our Minister at the Court of Turin,
but, as the Russ'en paper bed been published, for allowing
the despatch I had written t be published likewise. If the
light hon. gentleman says that the Italians owe us no gra-
titude, I bedeve "-e'r own feeling is very different. (Hear,
hear.) I believe their feeling is that the moral influence of
England in their favour, while they had the moral influence
of almost every other Power in Europe tv theist, was
of great weight and importance. (Hear, h 'tee.) Sir, I have
already said that we never nut roi yard the principle of the
unity of Italy; hut it tl• s oae consatutioeal
monarchy is the ;elm of government which the Italians
thirk best fitted to seer"; their indeperd, is e, we should be
the last persons to say we would tat 'ere to pi event them
from accomplishing theie wishes. (Hear, hear.) The right
hon. gentleman tells us we an now between two darters ;
those dangers are either that the Treaty of Zue:c'e should
be carried into effect, or that, on the other hand, the
sword of France will decide in favour of the unity
of Italy, and thereby great results will follow—
results so g:eat that he does not venture to specify
what they may be. But he is now talking, neNof the
actin." state of things, not of anything that is appa-
rent en the face of Europe, but he is borrowing from his
imagination schemes and designs which he thinks will be
carried into effect. New, I disagree with him on that sub-
ject. The danger against which we wish to provide is the
breaking out of war in Europe. We may suceed in this.
If we are fortunate enough to succeed, we shall be most
happy. We may fail; and then I only hope we may be
treated by the right hen. gentleman with the same candour
with which we treat id him end his colleagues when they
failed in maintaining the peace of Europe in 1859. But
now, as to those two alternative cemingencies of which he
speaks, one is, that a confederation should be formed )fa
Italy; that the King of the Two Sicilies should be restored,
that the Pope should get back ell his dominions except, I
believe, Romagna; end that an Austrian Archduke should
reign in Tuscany. Well, if there be any truth in what we
hear, this would be very inconsistent with Italian feeling.
It is not likely that this could be done except by force of
arms, and against doing it by force of arms the Emperor of
the French, as well as ourselves, is most deeply pledged.
He has renewed that pledge no longer ago than yesterday.
(Hear.) He has said, what is perfectly true, that acting on
the principle of non-intervention may not exactly give rise
to, but may allow of excesses which those who confine
themselves to looking on may deeply deplore; but that,
notwithstanding these excesses, notwithstanding the re-
sponsibility which may be thrown on other Powers, he
means to keep steadfast to that policy. Well, then, on this
high point Great Bi itain is entirely agreed with the Emperor
of the French. The right hon. gentleman questions us as
to our policy. I will say at once, in one word, that we
are not now divided upon any great question, such as the
war of 1793, or the -war of 1804. On a main principle
of policy, then, we are entirely agreed with the Empe-
ror of the French. We are at the same time in close
alliance and intimacy with the ether great Powers of
Europe, end if there is any other quest'on on which it
shoula appear to us that France was in the wrong, or was
acting in that spirit of encroachment which has some-
times actuated a great military nation, then weshould form
an alliance with them to combat her designs. And so I
believe that the second alternative which the right hon.
gentleman has mentioned is not likely to come to pass. The
Emperor of the French has declaeed his strong disapprove'
of any attempt on the part of Sardinia to break the treaty
of Zurich and attack Venetia. I believe the French people
will entirely support him in that declaration. I believe he
has no intention of marching an army into Italy with the
view of aiding the Italians in that attempt. But, if a war
were made, it is impossible to say at this moment what
pert France might take as new events arose. But let me
state, in regard to this same question, that while I wrote
that despatch of the 31st of August which the right hon.
gentleman saw in the Cologne Gazette, I wrote about the
same time a despatch to our )Minister at Vienna to say that
we should entirely disapprove an attack by Sardinia on the
Austrians in Venetia. We should entirely disapprove any
aid given by France to such an attack; we should take
care to have our opinion known at Turin and at Paris ; we
trusted our influence would have its due effect, combined
with other considerations which must be in the minds of
the sovereigns of those countries; but, mind this, we can
go no further; it is not our intention to take part in such
a war if it should arise; we confine ourselves to what we
have stated. (Hear, hear.) Now, sir, the right hon. gen-
tleman has asked me what are our relations with France.
Sir, I agree with my hon. friend who seconded the Address
with so much good sense and so much practical sagacity.
(Hear.) The hon: gentleman said that the Commercial
Treaty would have this effect—that it would make an
alliance not only between the Governments of France and
England, but Letween the people of France and England.
(Hear, hear.) I believe that will be the case, and I render
due homage to an hon. friend not now in the house,—l
mean Mr. Cobden—(hear, hear)—who has devoted so niueh
labour and,' I am sorry to say, so much of his valuable
health, in order to complete that work, and to unite
these two nations in commercial relations which may
tend to future peace and future alliance, and which
I trust may be an enduring memorial to future genera-
tions. (Hear, hear.) Such, then, are our general rela-
tions with France., But I stated in this house we did not
mean to keep apart from other Powers and that declara-
tion, I remember well, was received with great favour on
the other side. (Hear.) We have acted on that declara-
tion. We have always communicated confidentially with
Austria, Prussia, and Russia with regard to :any affairs of
Europe that arose. We have communicated our opinions
to them ; they have communicated theirs to us. On some
questions we were in entire accordance ; on others we had
various opinions. But there is nothing in our relations with
any of these Powers that should make any of them enter-
tain any feeling of restraint, far less of hostility, to this
country. (Hear.) Sir, I can only end this part of the
subject by saying that my hope and my belief is that, not-
withstanding the dangers that menace us—and affairs wore
a far more dark aspect some time ago—notwithstanding
these dangers, the peace of Europe may at this time be pre-
served. (Hear.) It will be for Austria to settle her affairs
with Hungary, as it is for other Powers to settle their own
internal affairs; it will be for Prussia and for Russia to
settle the difficult internal questions which are now occupy-
ing their attention, but I do trust that none of the dangers
which menace us may lead to actual conflict in arms.
(Hear.) For. although some are sanguine enough to be-
I Bove there might be a great war in Europe, in which we
could not take part, yet I have the melancholy conviction
that although war might be begun without us—although
we might declare we had no concern in it—yet, in the
course of that war events might take place which wouldlso
seriously menace the independence of nations in which we
take the deepest interest that we should hardly be able to
be free from its complications and dangers. (Hear.) For
this reason, therefore, I pray most earnestly that peace
may be preserved ; and, whatever the right hon. gentleman
may think of the inutility or utility of my exertions, I can
only say, such as they are, they shall be devoted to that
purpose—that almost sacred purpose in my eyes. (Hear,
hear.) Sir, I will now say a few words as to the amend-
ment. With regard to the question of reform, I will state
at once that I think it is perfectly clear no measure could
have been brought forward with a chance of its being car-
ried, except a measure of a very trifling character ; and I
believe, for my own part, that it is better for the Govern-
ment to leave that question entirely untouched than to
bring forward a measure which would create great disap-
pointment among its supporters, many taunts on the part
of its opponents, and which, whether carried or not, would
occupy a great deal of valuable time without any valuable
result. There is another consideration, which is, that on
this question of reform I have always had considerable
dread of what persons might be induced to do by way of
compromise, We had franchises by the Reform Act which
are secured to us so long as that Reform Act is not touched ;
but if, by way of getting certain provisions, you give up
certain other previsions, your loss is certain, while it is not
so certain you would gain anything equivalent to it on the
other side. Therefore, sir, I come to the opinion—we have
had eight years now to arrive at that judgment—that in
order to carry a Reform Bill that shall be actually of use
to the country, and I should call no Reform Bill of use that
did not admit great numbers of the working classes—
(hear)—in order to carry such a Reform Bill there must be
a great and favourable breeze of public opinion that will
enable us to carry it in this house, and with a swelling tide
over the bar of the House of Lords. (Hear.) Now I come
to consider what has been the state of opinion during the
last year. The right hon. gentleman has said truly that a
great part of the opposition against the bill we brought
forward came from gentlemen who sat on this side of the
house, and who represented great bodies of constituents.
There was one hon. gentleman, a friend of mine, the Chair-
man of Ways and Means, who, addressing his constituents
at Salford, said he was in favour of a£s franchise. I
thought if I produced a £6 franchise there was one gentleman
in the House of Commons who would not think I had gone
too far ; but my hon. friend made a speech entirely against
it. Then there was the hon. gentleman the member for
Edinburgh—he made a speech almost against the extension
of the franchise. There was clearly an indisposition of
members of the House of Commons on this subject. If these
speeches had been made in 1831 by members representing
great bodies of constituents, there would have been what
the Americans call " indignation meetings" among their
constituents, protesting that they had been misrepresented.
But not a bit of it ; the country was quite dead on the sub-
ject. (A laugh.) My hon. friend the member for Edinburgh
had to undergo some severe schooling from his constituents,
but scarcely anything was said about the Reform Bill, their
attention being almost entirely confined to the Annuity Tax
Repeal Bill. (A laugh.) Well, then, I say if such is the
state of public opinion—if the Governments of Lord Aber-
deen, Lord Derby, and my noble friend, have brought for-
ward different plans of reform, and they have failed, from
the general dislike that seems to affect them, I must come
to the conclusion that for the present time, and I speak only
for the present time—there is no such disposition in favour
of the further amendment of the representatidn as ought to
induce the Government, I might say to justify Government
in proposing a measure for the reform of the representation.
(Hear, hear.) However, the country has the matter in its
own hands. It is not too late for indignation meetings.
(A laugh.) If nothing will satisfy the country but a reform
bill which, to use the language of the hon. gentleman, shall
satisfy the just expectations of the people demanding it, they
have only to insist that the hon. gentleman who moved
these dol 'l(7
amendment shall take the place of my noble friend, ataifc,ic.,_
no doubt, will carry the Reform Bill to their
the sa
state of
tion. (A laugb.) That would show completely
the case; and till that is done I shall believe Cher
people.
right, and justly judge the dispositionmo/
motions
e in the
(Hear, hear.) Well, Sir, with regard
I may be allowed to say one word. With respect to
Re-
form Bills I have had enoughtol began with a
induce me not
of
to be very eager in introducinghe
819, lam sorry to say 41
them
motion on this subject in ml.
tion in this house with
years ago. I had as
regard to the corruption emanation
Grampound. Everybody agreed
the case was proved. It
suffrager o s
"What,"toiveth.ottwo me m-
was said,
hers to Leeds, with a £lO
of giving the representation to a new place 1"
glad to find that opinion became more,
" only think_
Well, sir, was