The Sun.
London, England, 1859-07-07 00:00:00

THE BATTLE OF SOLFERINO.

(From the Times.)
The following letter is from the same correspon-
dent who has described the principal events of this
war :

POZZOLENGO, JUNE 26.
" I regret almost to have written to you yesterday
after the first impression of the battle ; it might give
a certain local colouring to one's narrative, but it
was at tke expense of accuracy. In a small engage-
ment, where you can yourself overlook every move-
ment and every phase of the fight, the noting down
one's first impressions is, no doubt, the best plan,
but in a great battle like that fought on St. John's
day you have to collect the details by degrees, and
it is only after the knowledge of all the details that
the battle assumes its proper shape in your mind,
and you are thus enabled to give a true picture of
it. It is almost presumptuous in such a case to give
an account at the first moment, for even the com-
mander-in-chief of an army would have some diffi-
culty in ascertaining the facts of the battle within
five hours after it occurred, and would be rather
embarrassed in giving an account of it. I find
that my first impression was right, and that no
battle was expected on our side. It was known that
the rear guard of the Austrian army, the Corps of
Benedek (the Bth), which hadfought at Malegnano,
and protected thence the retreat of the bulk of the
army, had repassed the Mincio on the 19th inst.
It had first received orders to stop at Castiglione,
and prepare to hold that place, but it had scarcely
begun to execute this order when a counter-order
arrived, which recalled the rear guard behind the
Mincio. In consequence of this it passed the Mincio
at Monzambano, leaving only a few outpostsbehind
it. Up to this time, then, the intention of the
Austrians was evidently to content themseives with
defending the Mincio line. From the 19th to the
22d a change came over the plans, which may be,
perhaps, explained by the circumstance that
Gyulai only took leave of the army on that day. He
did so in a very laconic order of the day, merely
saying that his Majesty the Emperor had called.
him elsewhere, and that he took leave in conse-
quence. In his stead General Schlick, originally an
officer of Hussars, who gained himself a name in
the war in Hungary in 1848-49, was named Ma-
jor-General of the Italian Army, of which the Em-
peror himself took the command. From all we can
make out there seems to have been too many plums
in the pudding, for there is a good deal of jealousy
among several of the Generals, who all think them-
selves entitled to the supreme command. For in-
stance, Gen. Benedek, who is considered—at any
rate, by his own corps—as the fittest to command,
is accused by Gyulai of having come too late for the
battle of Magenta on purpose, although it is more
probable that, being on the other side of the Po,
he had not sufficientlime to arrive.
" At any rate, it is to put an eird to all these jea-
jouses, which are greatly deplored by the army,
that the Emperor has taken the command in per-
son. This was on the 22d. On the 23d the army
received an order to be ready at seven a.m., and
the whole immense force, consisting of the Ist, 2d,
3d, sth, 7th, Bth, and 9th corps, passed the Mincio
on that day, and had taken up their respective po-
sitions before the evening closed in. This mass, to
which must be added 12 of the best cavalry regi-
ments, from whose activity on the plain of the
Campo di Medole a great deal was expected, cannot
have numbered less than 180,000 or 200,000 men.
Besides this a strong park of position guns was
also ordered over the river.
" On seeing such a mass cross a river in one day
and march up to positions some of which were 10 or
12 miles from the bank of it, one may well be asto-
nished at the activity displayed, and cannot but
conclude that the Austrian General did not know
to take advantage of it in the beginning of the war.
" And this large army came not to defend the
positions on the hills so much as to attack the
allied armies, and drive them out of Lombardy.
The confidence seemed to have been great, for the
march to Brescia and Milan had become table-talk
among the officers. The Emperor came up the same
evening, and early the next morning visited the
position of Solferino.
" This return of the Austrians had been so sud-
den that the news of it had not reached the allied
armies. For reasons which I cannot mention now,
the advance of these latter had been on purpose
slow, and they did not seek to penetrate too far, in
order not to have to hurry more than it suited their
plans. You must haveobserved this from the short
marches and long halts which were made since we
left Brescia. The allies contemplated no movement
on the day of the 24th. The only project for that
day was that the Piedmontese, whose line extended
from Desenzano on the Lake along the outer ridge
of hills down to Esenta, should send out two recon-
naissances, one in the direction of Peschiera, and
the other in that of Pozzolengo, on the road to the
bridge of Salionge, while the Ist French corps of
Baraguay d'Hilliers, which occupied the continua-
tion of the ridge from Esenta to Castiglione, was
likewise to send out two reconnaissances, one in the
direction of Madonna del Monte, on the road from
Castiglione to Pozzolengo, and the other on that
leading to Solferino.
" I was as you remember under the impression
that it was the meeting of these reconnaissances
which was the beginning of the battle. As far as
the Piedmontese are concerned this was correct, but
not quite so far as the French were concerned, for
before these reconnaissances started their line of
outposts was attacked in the plain from Medole to
San Cassiano. The plan of the enemy seems to have
been to refuse the right wing and strike a decisive
blow at their left, so as to endanger if not cut off our
line of retreat. Forthis purpose the Bth Corps, Bene-
dek's, which had come over the Mincio, was posted
on the heights about Pozzolengo, while the rest of
the army was massed from Solferino to Medole and
Cavrian to Ceresale. This movement to turn our
right flank was only possible so long as the heights
of Solferino were held ; for, these once lost, the
army, if it still maintained itself in the plain, was
in danger of being cut in two, and of losing one or
two of the Mincio passages.
" The Emperor, who, as you remember, arrived
about an hour after the first shot was fired, saw this
danger instantly, as well as the necessity of getting
possession of this key of the position. The great
point was to hold back the enemy's forces brought
against our right, and to push him back in the
plain until this could be effected. For this pur-
pose the Ist Corps received order to go on the roads
which skirt the hills looking down into the plain ;
the 2d Corp p
s took its lace at i right ; agai at its
right was placed the 4th Corpts s, and the thin rd was
kept back en potence on the extreme right, to serve
as a reserve to the fourth, if necessary, and to pre-
vent any flank movement of the enemy, and fall on
his flank should he attempt to make one. The in-
fantry of the Guard was placed as a reserve behind
the First and Second Divisions, while the whole
cavalry was kept ready to advance as soon as the
enemy was driven back towards the open Campo di
Medole. The obstinacy with which the Austrians
held the position of Solferino was only equalled by
the efforts
which they made to throw back our
right wing, and, if
possible to outflank it.
I gave you an idea of the position of Solferino.
I assure you it is one of those to which can be fully
applied the saying,
you like it.' t The more you look at it the less
impossible to imagine
stronger than this hill fort, anything
, with its lifgh precipitous
bastions and defiles of
road, flanked by smaller spurs
just of convenient height and distance for cannon.
The Austrians, who, of course knew every inch of
their favourite manoeuvring
--'lnd made the most
of these advantages. But it was above all the en-
trances to the village and the buildings
vil-
lage on which they had spent the in the
greatestvil-
care. As
the houses are built on the side of the steep hill,
they, as well as the gardens, stand, as
it were, on
high terraces, and their walls form a kind of
enceinte round the village. Every wall had been
loopholed, and behind it were one or two good
shots, firing constantly with rifles, which were sup-
plied to them by those posted behind. In Penetra-
ting into this village great losses were sustained.
The ground before it had been cleared, so as to coin-
pletely expose those who wanted to take the place by
storm. There being no ladders, and the gate-
way being too high to scale, the Ist Zouaves—
the same who distinguished themselves in the
battle of Malcgnano—made a human pyramid, those
below exposing themselves to the murderous fire
which was kept up against them in order to allow
their companions to mount and enter. But the most
terrific carnage was, as usual, round the churches—
one situate close underneath the high square tower,
the Spits d'ltalia,' of which I have so often spoken,
the other on one of the spurs the mountain throws
out towards the lake, and then the Spia d'ltal:a
itself. The square tower and the ruined wall which
surrounds it arc, as I told you, built on a high coni-
cal mountain, which throws out threa spurs, one
towards the plain, the second towards Castiglione,
and the third towards the lake. The first of these
is the least stee p and the broadest. On its summit
is a large church, with a curious cupola, and a large
yard before it, enclosed by high walls. One of the
roads goes down to the plain from this point
throilgh a tolerd.bly steep street, but once out of the
village the road. goes down in a gentle slope. This
road i s flanked on the left.by a high isolated plateau,
while on the: right it is commanded by the long
platea u-like spur which runs from the tower in the
direction oif Castiglione, and which forms a promi-
nent 1 'eature in the scenery, owing to a score or so
of hig, a --poplars planted in a row. The third spur,
lower i ti tan the two others, compensates this advan.