The Sun.
London, England, 1859-02-26 00:00:00

your hands at the conclusion of this statement—namely, to
the amount of men for which we intend to ask for the en-
suing year. Before I proceed to say anything with regard
to this vote I wish to refer to the report which has just
been placed in the hands of hon. members, ant which was
looked for with very great anxiety by the public. I allude
o the report of the commission moved for by the hon.
and gallant officer opposite on the manning of the navy.
As that report has only been in the hands of honourable
members two or three days, and I had not the advantage of
seeing it more than two or three days before it was com-
municated to the public, the committee, I think, will at
once see that it was impossible that her Majesty's Govern.
ment could have framed these estimates with any refer-
ence to the contents of that report. But I cannot omit
to say, and in so saying I think I am only giving ex-
pression to a very general opinion, that that commission
is entitled to public gratitude for the manner in which
it discharged its duties. (Cheers.) On consenting
to the motion for the appointment of that commis-
sion, I stated that I had one object especially in view, and
.
that was that some mode should be devised for establishing
a connection between the Royal navy and the mercantile
navy, in the event of arty emergency requiring that addi-
tional strength should be given to the Royal navy. (Cheers.)
I stated that so far as concerned the ordinary manning of
our fleet in time of peace I did not believe that the commis-
sion would be able to discover anything more effectual than
the plan recommended by the Manning Committee of
1852, and carried into full effect by my right hon. friend the
member for Carlisle, when he was First Lord of the Admi-
ralty—namely, the continuous service system. Tear, hear.)
I find in the report that the commission entirely confirm
the view which I then ventured to express. I think we may
rely with confidence on the ordinary manning of our fleet
upon that system, and I hope the house will enable the Go-
vernment to carry out that system still more efficiently. I
believe that there is no recommendation in the report of the
commission, from the beginning to the end of it,
.which is
not at least entitled to the prompt and serious consideration
of her Majesty's Government. I will at present express no
opinion upon the plan of a most important character which
the commission has devised for establishing a connection
between the Royal navy and the mercantile navy. The
vote for men that we are now going to propose is, I admit,
of a very unusual amount. I believe it is the largest vote
of men ever proposed is this house in a time of peace—
(hear, hear)—and I admit that we are bound to show rea-
sons for it. I trust that looking at the state of public affairs
and of the naval service, the committee will not hesitate to
confirm the opinion of her Majesty's Government, that we
should not have done our duty to the country if we had not
boldly asked Parliament to give us this vote. (Cheers.)
But I will speak without disguise on this subject. Appa-
rently, there is only a difference of 3,000 men in this vote,
but in reality the difference is much more. The demands
upon our naval service in distant parts of the world are not
now
so great as they were twelve months ago. Our naval
force in China is reduced by about one-half. (Hear.)
During the last twelve months several ships have returned,
and several ships are now returning from distant parts of
the world, and others have been recalled. Under these cir-
cumstances, the committee will admit that it is impossible
for me to state exactly the number of men which will thus
be placed at the disposal of the Government ; but I think I
may venture to say that, as compared with the votes of last
year, the real available increase must be taken rather at
7,000 than at 3,000 men. I find that at this time twelve-
month our force in the East Indies and in China consisted
of 68 ships, 767 guns, and 10,000 men. That force is now
reduced to 47 ships, 374 guns, and 4,875 men, being a re-
duction of more than 5,000 men. The committee will bear
in mind that this includes the marines attached to those
ships. On the East and West coasts of Africa, and at the
Cape of Good Hope we have 36 ships, about 200 guns, and
3,200 men, being about 200 men less than this time twelve-
month, and at present her Majesty's Government do not
intend to increase that force. I believe that the negotia-
tions now in progress betweem this country and the United
States will enable us at no very distant day to carry on the
suppression of the slave trade on much more easy terms and
more successfully than at present. I believe that the send-
ing out of steamships of smaller tonnage, or gunboats, will
materially enable us to do so. On the east coast of Ame-
rica we have 278 men more than last year. Our force in
the Pacific has been considerably increased, and now con-
sists of 12 ships, 281 guns, and 2,845 men, being 661 more
men than we had there a year ago. The main cause of
this increase was the disturbances occasioned by the dis -
covery of gold in the Fraser River. We received most
urgent requests from British Columbia to increase our
naval force there, but the ships that we sent out will be
shortly recalled. In the Mediterranean, also, our force
has been increased. It consists of 23 ships and 5,951
men, being 777 more men than there were last year.
The main cause of this increase was that on acceding
to the office I now hold I found that our force in the
Mediterranean was much below the usual amount. There
were several sloops and other smaller vessels there,
but no frigates. The result is that on foreign stations we
have now 1,786 men more than we had this time twelve-
month. I will now advert to another heavy item in the
vote for this year—namely, the Channel squadron. Our
Channel squadron at present consists of seven ships, 498
guns, and 4,697 men. I include two ships—the Caesar and
the Diadem—which will be shortly recalled from Central
America, where they are doing temporary duty. The com-
mittee will remember that a year ago it was my duty to
state that we had no Channel squadron whatever; that we
had no naval defence of our own coast. I stated emphati-
cally that in my opinion we could not do without a Channel
squadron—(cheers)—and I promised that as soon as I had
the means at ray disposal I would provide a squadron for
the Channel. Before the close of the summer the Channel
squadron consisted of six line-of-battle ships and three
frigates, to which was shortly afterwards added another
powerful frigate. The line-of-battle ships are the Royal
Albert, Renown, Orion, Caesar , Victor Emmanuel, and
Brunswick. I have heard it said that this Channel squadron
is really too weak to be of any avail to the country. (An
hon. member, " Hear, hear.") My hon. friend's cheer
gives me to understand that he is of that opinion. (Hear.)
But I hope the committee will, at all events, admit that it
is a good commencement of the defence of our coast. (Hear,
hear.) My hon. friend will admit that five of these line-of
battle ships are of a most powerful class. Perhaps I cannot
say that the Brunswick is a very powerful ship. But as I
have stated, this squadron is at resent deprived of the
services of the Caesar and Diadem. They are now recalled,
and in the meantime I can state for the consolation of the
gallant admiral (Sir C. Napier) that very recently two
powerful line-of-battle ships, the St. Jean d'Acre and the
Algie2e, have been added to the home force. In a short
time it will be further augmented by two frigates. The
Channel squadron will therefore consist of eight powerful
the force in the Mediterranean, of four line-of-battle
ships and two frigates, the combined squadron in the
Channel will consist .of 12 line-of-battle ships, and
eight frigates, in all 20 ships of war. The gallant admiral
may say that this force is not sufficient, but it is a stronger
Channel squadron than we have maintained for many years,
and I earnestly hope it will be found sufficient ; but, if not,
I am confident the house will place at the disposal of her
Majesty's Government the means of making it so to any
extent required. (Hear, hear.) As to the number of men
the Government asks for, I am aware that, on one hand, we
may be charged with extravagance in requiring a greater
number than we have ever had in time of peace ; on the
other hand, we may be told the number is not large enough.
(Hear, hear, from Sir C. Napier.) The gallant admiral in-
timates that the number is not sufficient ; but it is an un-
usually large force. The estimate prepared for last year by
the right hon. baronet (Sir C. Wood) was 2,000 men more
than the highest estimate for 1867. The present Govern •
ment found:the ;estimate made for that number when it
came into office, and, after mature consideration, thought
the late Government had not asked for a greater force than
the public service required ; we adopted that estimate, and
it is now my duty to ask for such an addition to it as will
place at our disposal a force of 3,000 men. As to the man-
ner in which they will be employed, I have already stated
what are the demands of our foreign stations, what are our
intentions with regard to the Channel squadron, and what
number of men that squadron will probably require. In
dealing with figures of this kind it is very difficult to speak
with perfect accuracy. These numbers of men are fluctu-
ating from day to day, as one ship comes into port and an-
other leaves it ; but I think I can say that, after all the men
are allotted to the different ports and ships in different parts
of the world, we shall have a surplus force at home of about
3,000 men. (Hear, hear.) This brings me to a recom-
mendation I find in the very able report of the commission
appointed to inquire into the means of manning the navy.
It is substantially the same recommendation as that of the
committee of naval officers that inquired into the same
subject in 1852. I will read the passage in the report of
the last commission referring to the advantage of having a
reserve of seamen at home :

" Another recommendation of the committee of 1352,
which has not hitherto been carried into effect, is the main-
taining an adequate reserve •f seamen in the home ports.
They observed that from the information and evidence that
had been laid before them ' during the progress of the in-
quiry, they had been led to the conclusion that • it was de-
sirable to keep a larger force at home than had been cus-
tomary of late years ;' and they recommended, ' that your
Majesty's navy should be maintained at such a numerical
force in commission as, independently of the Channel aqua •
dron, will admit of 10,000 seamen and boys (exclusive of
officers) being retained in England for the protection of the
ports and the coasts of the United Kingdom."
" The evidence before us shows that, when a ship of war
is commissioned, the moat costly part of her complement,
namely, the officers, and perhaps the greater part of her
crew, immediately become a charge upon the State, and
continue so for several weeks, and even months, during
which she is unable to put to sea for want of the smaller
portion of her crew ; while the whole expense of the ship
which she was intended to relieve is going on.
" We are, therefore, of opinion that a reserve of seamen
should always be maintained in the home ports, ready to
complete the crews of ships put in commission, for the re-
lief of foreign stations, and as the best and most prompt of
all reserves in the event of a sudden armament. The num-
ber to be thus retained in the home parts should bear a re-
lation to the number in commission; and, with our present
peace establishment, we think that it should not be less
than 4,000, besides those retained in the harbour guard
fillips. Such an arrangement also would afford a ready
means of giving a systematic training in gunnery to all the
men in your Majesty's naval service."
With this recommendation I most cordially concur ; and I
it, the Govoerrtn,i
beg to add that before the Manning Commission adopted
Government had might say in deference
to the report
without asking sense an the obvious but rather in deference to common
before Parliament
necessity of the case—not to come
with the estimates of this year
fo(urntaeanumber of men sufficient to establish
be no doubt. Bearingr,enhetT:e.)
asOf itsl tecessitytpere can
such a reserve.
rfieloyr t
coofnthe cofirm rtl.mtoon,
when the Ganges was
harbour 110
m
Diadem, commissioned in
I havep passage
here a statementav eread
thatle twillthe
thatcommissioned
statement it appears that
4ays beforeshe she remained in
Au completed her crew ;. the
135 days, and did not go to Sea tiililBs7, was detained
Renown, commissioned in November, 1857
1858 ; the
Ba7l,edwa!i detained
—us 121.
172 days for the same purpose, and thCn.
Marlboro
; some of themeware
—the
inb62 men
short of her complement—(hear, hear)
was delayed 129 days, and the Eury.t
ships manned within the last few years
delayed six months, all of them an average period of fourere
months, before they obtained their crews. Now, I ask the
house whether it thinks the ingenuity of any enemy could
devise anything more humiliating or more calculated to
impress foreign nations with a conviction of the decay of
the naval power of England than the fact that our ship„f
war remain in port four, five, and six months together, un_
able to obtain their complement of seamen ? (Hear, hear.) I
trust there will be but one feeling in the house as to the
necessity of putting an end to this humiliating state of
things. (Hear, hear.) We therefore ask for such a number
of men as will place a surplus force at our disposal sufficient
to maintain a reserve of seamen in our home ports, which
can, at the same time, be made useful in training sailors in
gunnery and the exercises so essential to the efficiency of the
service. (Hear, hear.) The expense of" this additional
force of 3,000 men is not so large in proportion as the num-
ber of men required. The estimate for the wages of seamen
for the current year is £2,487,062 ; this amount would have
been £44,400 more had it not been for the fact that our naval
force OW COASistti of a larger Atuubur of large chips NW a 1

smaller number of small ones, which • 'lninishes the average
expense per man and the number of officers employed.
Before I quit the subject of the men there is one other sub-
ject to which I wish to advert—l mean the practice adopted
by the late Board of Admiralty of sending out line-of-battle
ships as the flagships of the admirals on foreign stations.
(Hear, hear.) My opinion is that this practice leads to a
very unnecessary expense, and at the same time interferes
with the efficiency of our naval force. (Hear, hear.) The
flagships on our foreign stations, with the number of men
in each was till lately as follows :
Calcutta 720
Boscawen
Cumberland
Ganges
Indus 650

Total 3,390
I have received remonstrances on this point from more than
one of our admirals on foreign stations, and I am sure the
house will see the force of the objections taken by them.
The house is well aware that at one period last year there
was some probability of a difference between this country
and the United States, arising out of circumstances con-
nected with the suppression of the slave trade on the coast
of Cuba. At that time it was essential that our naval force
should be in a most efficient state. But just then I received
a letter from Sir Houston Stewart, stating that his flagship,
the Indus, was altogether unfit for active service. (Hear.)
This may be said of these flagships generally, and, in addition
to their being unfit for the kind of service in which they
ought naturally to be employed on foreign stations, they are
taking up a number of men who might be more usefully em-
ployed in other labours. (Hear, hear.) In my opinion, it is
better policy to let the admirals on foreign stations carry
their flags on screw steamships. This would cause a very con-
siderable saving in regard to men, while the screw steamers
would be really fit to render good service on the stations.
(Hear.) Acting on this belief, I have recalled flagships
from some stations and replacrd them with screw steamers,
while in other instances it has been found moreconvenient to
allow the ships to finish their time on the stations on which
they are placed. As a ride, in future the practice will be
to employ screw steamers on those stations as in every way
a more economical system. (Hear, hear.) The next vote
is that of the victualling of the navy, amounting to
£995,647. Last year it was £1,027,3.57—5h0wing this year
a saving, which is principally to be attributed to the reduc-
tion in the price of provisions. The next votes relate to the
Admiralty-office, the • Coastguard service, the scientific
branch, and her Majesty's establishments at home and
abroad, being numbered respectively 3,4, 5,6, and 7.
These all vary more or less from the rates of last year, some
being increased and some diminished but it is unnecessary
to enter into the details, though I shall be ready hereafter
to offer any explanation that may be required. Vote 8 re-
fers to wages of artificers, and I shall afterwards explain to
the house the large increase that has taken place in the
vote, believing that I shall best consult the convenience of
members by separating in this way the extra from what
may be called the ordmary portion of the expenditure under
this head. On the vote for the expense of wages in estab-
lishments abroad I shall'follow a similar course. Vote 10
is always a heavy item, relating to naval stores. Here,
again, I shall defer my explanation of the causes of the
great increase that is proposed, only observing for the pre-
sent that in ordinary circumstances the increase would have
been £95,448, in cons aquence of the necessity of adding to
the stores. Vote 11, for new works, is a heavy item, but
there is no material alteration from last year. Votes 12
and 13, for medicine and medical stores, and for miscella-
neous services, require no particular remark. Vote 14, re-
lating to half-pay, brings before me a subject on which I
wish to make a few remarks. The change in the vote itself
is very small, amounting to an increase of £12,361, but I
am desirous of stating the opinions which I entertain
with regard to the present state of the Navy List. (Hear,
hear.) I cannot help thinking that this is a very serious
question, affecting the welfare and efficiency of the navy.
Hon. members who have ever looked into the Navy List
must be aware that it is one of the most complicated and
unintelligible documents that any man could take into
his hand. (Hear, hear.) It is difficult, if not, indeed, im-
possible, for those who have not devoted their lives to the
study of the Navy and Retired List to understand the de-
tails with which it is encumbered. (Hear, hear.) And what
is the result of such an examination of it as can be given ?
Is the present state of our naval force with respect to offi-
cers as put down in that list in a condition of efficiency ?
(Hear, hear.) My belief is— and I say it with a full sense
of the difficulties of the case, and without wishing to say
anything rash or imprudent—thatf the state of the Navy
List is not satisfactory. (Hear, hear.) It requires revi-
sion, and if that is carried out with a judicious hand it may
tend greatly to the efficiency of the service and the economy
of the public money. There are on the list about 3,700
officers, of whom 1,700 are on the reserved and retired list,
and the remainder on the active list. Out of the list of 100
admirals 39 are between the ages of 70 and 87, while of the
whole number, excluding the Board of Admiralty, only 14
are employed. (Hear, hear.) Out of 358 active captains
31 are above the age of 60, and while out of the whole
number only 90 are employed 180 of the remainder have
never served afloat in their present rank. (Hear, hear.)
Out of 507 active commanders 56 are above the age of 60,
and while out of the whole number only 179 are employed
290 have never served afloat in their present rank. (Hear,
hear.) Take next the lieutenants. Out of 1,061 active
lieutenants 120 are above the age of 60, and of the whole
number about 500 are employed in sea-going ships and 190
in the Coastguard and packet service. Of the remainder
a large proportion are either unwilling to serve without
some prospect of promotion or of increased half-pay in
consequence of such servitude when they become unfit.
(Hear, hear.) This is the state of the upper part of the
Navy List. It is overcrowded. These officers cannot get
employment, and, as we have seen, a large proportion of
them have never served afloat in their present rank.
Now, simultaneously with this state of things, it so
happens that in the lower ranks of the navy we
literally have no officers for the ships. (Hear,
hear.) At this moment the ships in commission
in the navy are nearly 400 short of their comple-
ment in regard to mates, midshipmen, and officers of that
class. There must be something wrong in a state of things
that overcrowds the upper list and leaves an insufficiency
of officers for the bottom. (Hear, hear.) Some reform is
wanted ; but what is to be done ? Promotion in the navy
is almost at a standstill. (Hear, hear.) Since I have had
the honour of holding my present office—now 12 months—
I have had only two vacancies for post-captains in the
navy. (Hear, hear.) By an order in council lam bound
to make one promotion for three vacancies ; and in this way
I hope to be able somewhat to reduce the overcrowded list;
but the system falls very hard on the officers tiatyaiso ragt
T..
scribed as stagnant (Hear, hear.) We have 11 reserved
lists of the higher order of o&cert, but except in the case of
one list, called the reserve flag list, every one of these is
completely choked, and we have no power of transferring
officers. I have stated to the house that during last sum-
mer
we thought it our duty to ascertain the state of the
French navy. We had heard much of the progress made
by France in increasing her naval armament during the last
few years. We took means of ascertaining what were the
facts, and we found that the line-of-battle ships of France
were exactly the same in number as our own—viz. 29. The
French had fewer three-deckers, first-rates than: we had,
but of our 29 ships there were 9 which were inferior to any
of the French ones. Therefore, we must make up our mind
to this, that in July last the screw line-of-battle ships of
France were 29, and those of England also 29 in number ;
but that in point of power and efficiency the line-of-battle
ships of England were, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, inferior to those of France. The 9 ships to which
I have referred are sailing 20-gun ships, which have been
converted into screw eighties, and consequently have not
room for their engines, and are generally inferior ships.
In a report, dated in December last, Sir Baldwin. Walker
says—

" With the exception of some of the more recently built
frigates there is scarcely a sailing ship which in its present
state is fit to go to sea, and most of them require such ex-
tensive repairs that it would not be desirable to incur the
expense of repairing them. As regards the screw vessels
all the 80-gun screw ships which from necessity were con-
verted have the same armament as they had as sailing ves-
sels, and are consequently so much pressed with their
weights, and cramped for stowage, as to render them bad
sea boats. .. . All these 80-gun screw ships ought not
therefore to be considered as forming part of the effective
screw force, but can only be regarded as vessels fit to re-
place the blockships for home service. The latter, from
their great age, are so defective that they will not be worth
repairing after their present commission. To show the
superiority of the French ships of the corresponding class,
80 guns, it may be stated that five were reduced from 100
and 10 from 90 gun ships, and are, therefore, not only more
powerful sailing ships but better enabled to stow their ma-
chinery, &c., than the English 80-gun screw ships."
Having thus shown the opinion of the Surveyor of the Navy
that in July last out of 29 ships we had nire of a very in-
ferior quality, I will now turn to what our prospects were
with regard to the year 1859. We bad four ships receiving
engines, and during the year 1859 there were two new ships
to be launched and one to be converted, which would have
raised the number of our line-of-battle ships to 36. We
found that the progress of the French navy was not to beat
all in the same ratio. At the end of 1859, on the contrary,
the comparison would have stood—England, 36 line-of-
battle ships, with 3,400 guns, and 19,750-horse power, none
of these ships being the inferior ones to which I have re-
ferred ; France, 40 line-of-battle ships, with 3,706 guns and
27,510-horse power. I hope it will be clearly understood
that in making these statements I am not speaking in an
unfriendly spirit towards France. (Hear.) No man can
desire more than I do, for the sake of France, for the sake
of England, and for the sake of the world, that the friend-
ship and alliance between the two countries may long con-
tinue. (Hear.) Nor do I intend to blame France for the
efforts which she is making to increase her naval power.
(Hear, hear.) On the contrary, I respect the spirit with
which the French Goveanment have carried out these addi-
tions. But my argument is, that we are bound to do the
same thing ; that it is inconsistent with our naval power
and with our national safety and dignity that we should al-
low such a state of things to continue. (Hear.) When this
state of things was brought under my notice last, July,
when I fOund nominal equality but real inferiority with re-
spect to France, and learned that that inferiority would, as
time went on, be increased, I felt it my duty to lose no time
in bringing that state of things under the consideration of
my colleagues. I did so in the month of August last. At
that time Parliament was just about to be prorogued, and it
would, for obvious reasons, have been extremely unadvis-
able to come to the House of Commons with additienal esti-
mates for an increase of our force. The Government, how-
ever, felt that this was a state of things which we could not
allow to continue, and we therefore asked the Surveyor of
the Navy what arrangement could be made to enable us,
with the labour at our disposal, and without exceeding the
estimates to which we were pledged, to increase the num-
ber of our line-of-battle ships. The result of our delibera-
tions was, that we determined to withdraw from the ordi-
nary building and repair of ships a force sufficient to enable
us at once to commence the conversion of four powerful
three-deck line-of-battle ships, viz., the Neptune, the St.
George„ the Trafalgar, and the Queen, into vo-deck
screw ships, with 90 guns and 500-horse power each. That
was all we could then accomplish. Those orders were given
in the month of August last; during the course of the
winter these ships have been rapidly advancing to comple-
tion, and in the course of the spring they will be launched,
and added to the strength of the British navy. In addition
to these four ships we now propose to convert five others,
viz., the Lion (which was ordered to be converted by the
right honourable baronet opposite, Sir C. Wood, but with
which no progress has been made), the Nelson 'the Royal
William, the Waterloo, and the Rodney. The Nelson,
the Royal William, and the Waterloo, three deckers, will,
in the course of the ensuing year, be converted into ships of
90 guns, and the Rodney, at present a 90-gun ship, will be
e Rod converted into a screw line-of-battle ship of the same class.
I should have hesitated about the
expediency of converting
treated
ehdal
withn o t
gar
esistersuccess.sli p o f hlewirs,ilthneoLwonnideonnntiolately
beent so
the
new line-of-battle ships which we propose to add to the navy
during the ensuing year. Had no extraordinary exertions
end:lV:llg
been made only two ships would have been launched in the
power, Gentlemen
sG;etnhtelelll
course of the year 1859, viz., the Hood and the Revenge,
rozdd tahtethlteerevetungrne
138000 f
the navy Will gee that there are included
em, 10 ships as
hboorthseopf