The Sun.
London, England, 1861-02-06 00:00:00

politics with respect to the foreign relations of those coun-
tries. But it was quite clear that so far as France was
concerned that cordial and confidential understanding de-
pended upon two assumptions. It depended, first, upon
the assumption that France, profiting by experience, was
convinced that by the development of her internal resources
and by the multiplication of her highly gifted population
her power would be more securely increased than by any
forcible accession of territory; and, secondly, upon the
other assumption, that that noble weakness of the French
people, that " last infirmity of noble minds," the love of
glory, might be fairly satisfied by feeling that whenever
there was any international difficulty, their opinion would
be solicited, and would greatly and in the main be decisive.
More than this, sir, it was perfectly obvious to both French
and English statesmen, that even if these assumptions
were well founded, that alliance could not subsist wf,inont
the exercise on both sides of great forbearancCs sad Mee-
sionally the making of great sacrifices. For exastple, Eng-
land -.gas not a country that sought any 'lncrease of terri-
tory. During the revolutionary war she had obtained all
tb ose outworks which were neceesary for her maritime mad
colonial empire. France, on the contrary, had test a consi-
derable colonial empire, and was slowly constructing an-
other. France had also for a time, though but fora brief apace,
been in possession of great additions to her original territory,
and had lost by arms what by arms she had obtained. It
was clear, therefore, that there were occasions when in the
course of international embarrassments and difficulties that
might arise France would be called upon to sacrifice the
hope of any increase of territory. 'What was the sacrifice
that England would be called upon to make ? England
would be called upon to make the concession that she
would at least not promote a policy which rightly or
wrongly France believed to be adverse to her best interest.
The noble lord assumed the office of Secretary of State, as
I believe, an ardent supporter of a cordial understanding
with France. I understood the noble lord to state at the
time he acceded to office that he believed by so doing he
had prevented a war between England and France. Her
Majesty's late Government are still profoundlyunaware of
the circumstances to which he refers, and labour under the
impression that the relations between England and France
were cordial when they quitted office. But I mention
that to show the tone and temper with which the noble
lord entered on the duties of his position, Taking office,
however, as the warm supporter of this cordial and confi-
dential understanding with France, the noble lord—whose
sense of duty I do not question—immediately felt himself
called on to pursue on foreign affairs a policy exactly con-
trary to that which France was favouring, and one which,
rightly or wrongly, France believed to be hostile to her
best interests. 'What has been the result ? The noble
lord avowed himself an advocate of the unity of Italy.
France declared that she was entirely opposed to the unity
of Italy. The policy of France and the policy of the noble
lord were contrary and contradictory. The noble lord may,
perhaps, say that he preferred the policy which be pursued
—that he valued the unity of Italy more than his intimate
relations with the French Government. That is not the
question ; it is not my desire to enter into any argument
on that point. It was perfectly open to the noble lord to
follow the policy which he preferred. But has the noble lord
obtained the unity of Italy ? He may be in that situation
with the French Goverment that he is obliged to loir out
for new allies, by having forfeited—if he has forfeited—
that cordial understanding with them and that opportunity
of pursuing the same policy. Has the noble lord succeeded
in the policy which he prefezred ? Have his efforts ef-
fected the urity of Italy? We :hear—we know that a
powerful French army is stronglyintrenched in the centre
of Italy. We kraow that the contemplated capital of Italy
is not in possession of the Italians. In this age of jubilant
nationality Rome is still garrisoned by the Gauls. (Hear,
and laughter.) We know that Yenetia is bristling with
Austrian artillery andswarming with German and Sclavo-
nian legions. We know that even the King of the Two
Sicilies, deprived of his crown by universal end unanimous
suffrage, unfortunately followed by frequent insurrections,
and martial law—(hear, hear)—is even at this moment in
possession of the two prime strongholds of his kingdom.
We know that in the south of Italy they have combined the
horrors of revolution with the shade of conquest. These are
not the characteristics surely of the unity of Italy. But the
noble lord may say, perhaps, " All this is undeniably true,
the unity of Italy is not effected, but great results like these
are not accomplished with the rapidity you seem to expect ;
you must wait, we are only in the beginning of the opera-
tions ; much has been done, and the rest will be accom-
plished." The noble lord may say that the elections to the
Italian Parliament indicate a most hopeful temper on the
part of the people as to the means by which union may be
ultimately effected. I will not depreciate the possible advan-
tages which may accrue from these public elections. Unfor-
tunately history shows us that new political institutions
have very little power in times as critical as these. Old in-
stitutions that have existed for centuries, possessing an
authority which has been gradually conceded to them as
public necessity rendered it advisable—institutions which
have aggregated round them the power of prescription,
more important than armiesor police, may control and even
create events in an age of revolution : but we have, unfor-
tunately, no instance, as far as history can guide us, of new
political institutions exereich."
in a country where revolution prevails. But Ido not want
to argue ou these points. In order to obtain as accurate a
view of our situation as we can, after the bewildering com-
munications that have been made to us, I am ready to offer
every concession, as far as argument goes, to the noble lord
and to her Majesty's Government. I will grant that the
union of Italy, if not already accomplished, may in time
be effected. But how is this result to be attained ? I
will admit that manipulating what is called the spirit of
the age, with all the adroitness of English diplomacy,
you may preface such a state of affairs that the
Emperor of the French, whatever his original or present
policy, may say—" On the whole this unity of Italy
seems to be a result that is practicable, and I will consent
to it." Bat on what tams will the Emperor of the French,
or any one who represents French policy, consent to such a
result ? It will not be the moral influence of England that
under these circumstances will have accomplished the
unity of Italy—it will be the sword of France. (Hear.) It
is the will of France that can alone restore Rome to the
Italians; it is the sword of France—if any sword can do
it—that alone can free Venetia from Austrians. If the
unity of Italy is to be effected by such influences and by
such means, are we to suppose that a Sovereign who is
described as profound and crafty, and a people whom wo
know to be ambitious and quick-witted, will be prepared
to make such an effort, and to endure such a sacrifice—such
a surpassing sacrifice and such an enormous effort, with-
out obtaining some result ? Why, sir, it would belie every
principle of human nature. We cannot impute it to that
Sovereign, and to such a people as the French, that they
would not after such exertions expect to obtain some great
political and public advantage. And it is obvious what
that result would be. Those who, under the circumstances
I have stated, will free the nation will make their terms,
and will be justified in making their terms. They will have
an alliance offensive and defensive with Italy, and the
Emperor of the French will then appear in the character
which he has himself shadowed out, for which he has
prepared the world, which the policy he has hitherto
pursued with regard to Italy has shown that he has
not too anxiously sought to fulfil, foreseeing its diffi-
culties as well as its glory. The Emperor of the French
will then come forward in that character, as the natural
head of the Latin race. He will find himself the eman-
cipator of Italy, at the head of a million of bayonets.
(Hear, hear.) A million of disciplined and even
distinguished soldiers will be at his command and
behest ; and then it will be in his power—you having
forced him to a policy in Italy, which at first he was un•
willing to pursue—to make those greater changes and to
aim at those greater results which I will only intimate,
and will not attempt to describe. Ido not wish in any
way to offer these considerations to the house ; lam
merely trying to place the state of affairs in its real
light, after all the bewilderment which the public mind has
undergone from the speeches and from the despatches of
her Majesty's Ministers. Ido not want to underrate the
object which her Majesty's Ministers propose to themselves
in effecting the unity of Italy ; I am perfectly willing to
admit that if the unity of Italy be practicable it would add
greatly to the strength and splendour of Europe. But if a
British Minister did conceive such a re-arrangement of ter-
ritory to be of paramount importance, if he believed it to be
a policy of that sovereign character that the country to
achieve it ought t 3 be prepared to make every sacrifice, why
thee I think he ought to have attempted his object by other
means than those which are called moral influence. If we
had really interfered in Italy with a material agency, if wo
had ourselves assisted the Italians in achieving their free-
dom, their independence, and their unity, we should then
have had claims on their gratitude—(hear)—we should then
have been in a position to look on them as our natural and
our grateful allies. But we have not taken that course ;
we have had before us a large but misty object, never prac-
ticable ; we have expended at great force a puerile and de-
clamatory diplomacy, and we have given to it the vain,
the fruitless, and unsatisfactory title of " moral influence."
(Hear.) I am not counselling the house to go to war to free
Italy, nor have I ever counselled the house to such an ob-
ject. I think as a general rule we should leave countries
to make out their own freedom ; but, when the freedom of
a particular country is made the great political object on
which the rival claims and the rival systems of great em-
pires are concentrated, I say it is of importance the house
should understand that the country whose sword and will
frees the enslaved land is the country which, not only by
moral but material influence, obtains its future support, and
commands its future resources, That is the position in
which it appears to me we are placed by the policy of her
Majesty's Government. I shall wait with patience and
curiosity for the papers t
which they have promised on
Italy ; but when I recollect the speeches which the mem-
bers of her Majesty's Government have made in this house;
when I recollect the despatches distributed throughout
Europe on this question of Italian independence, and when
I see what the state of affairs is, I want explanation of our
present position. (Hear.) I want the house and the coun-
try to understand what is the real position that we occupy.
(Cheers.) I think it will be found to occupy one of great
danger, and, perhaps, of great disappointment ; but what-
ever it may be, I think the case is one that demands the
gravest attention of Parliament, (Hear, hear.) By the
conduct Of the Government we are placed in this dilemma