The Sun.
London, England, 1857-06-17 00:00:00

LONDON, WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 1867

It will be seen, by our naval intelligence, that
satiOe of the troops destined for China have al-
reedrsailed in two steam transports—the Mauri-
tiniiii(d,_Cleopatra. More are to follow in the
PiiiV6c;illollhrlotte (three-decker), and the Mel-
ville (twcA6cier). Both these ships are heavily
laden with provisions, military and naval stores,

and other necessaries for the army assembling at I
Hong Kong, preparatory to opening the campaign
against Canton and the Chinese generally. We
heartily wish them GOD speed. ! But as the ob-
ject is to concentrate a force sufficiently formidable
to go to work with effect, would it not be advisable
for the authorities at home to second their own inten-
tions and the efforts of those who have to sustain
the honour of their country by heroic daring, that
nothing possible should be left undone ? We
know that the brave men gathered together will
work with a will undeterred by difficulty, but
still trusting to the good faith and management of
those who direct their actions in so arduous a

campaign.
Now this war with China has assumed an im-
portance not only in England—in Europe—but
all over the broad extect of Asia, and will be
looked on with wondering, if not with doubt-
ful, eyes during its progress by those who
wish for our success or discomfiture. To
strike effectively we must strike rapidly and
boldly. There must be no hesitation on our part,
for doubt insures defeat ; while to conquer, as
conquer we must, we need nerve our courage to
the uttermost, and sternly go ahead. The Chi-
nese both fear and hate us. Let them not be
undeceived in their estimate of our strength, and
their fear will be turned into abject submissiveness.
We must conquer or die. There-is no alternative.
Promptitude in action will ensure success, and
make the war a short one. Why, then, if the
troops already at or near the scene of action are
waiting for reinforcements and munitions of war,
without the latter of which men are idly wasting
their health and time, why send these indispensable
requisites in heavy slow-sailing ships, such as the
Princess Charlotte and Melville—vessels, however
good, by their immense capacity for stowage, are
still deficient in the one thing needful—the
power of pushing on over calm seas or against
baffling winds ? Wo would respectfully suggest to
the Admiralty the propriety of sending a steamer
or two in company with these large sailing vessels,
so that their course should be clear and straight-
fir ward, irrespective of calms, foul winds, or other
casualties, to which all ships are liable. Some
short time since we sent out a few gun-boats under
charge of a large steamer. Why not send out some
more in company with those line-of-battle ships ?
They could be mutually beneficial. The large
ships could carry the armament of the gunboats.
They could even do more : they could carry a
thousand tons or more of coals stowed in sacks,
which would supply the steam-vessels during the
prevalence of calms or light winds, and thus the
voyage would be both pleasant and rapid. The
gunboats will always be useful in the East, and
the spare coals will be found very convenient and
useful for immediate operations. Every day the
freight of the squadron will be diminishing, so
that a very ample supply could be embarked,
aid thus save both time and expense, for
he truest economy is to be liberal and prompt in
matters of warlike necessity.
It is said the Chinese, taught by their experi-
ence of the late war, are preparing obstacles to
our approach in the Yellow Sea—fearful of an
invasion towards Pekin. This may or may not
be correct—but our true policy would be
to send a force sufficiently strong in that direc-
tion, and to paralyse the Cow t of Pekin
by the daring of our adventure. The gun-boats
3ould approach very near to the desired point,
tired the diversion—being promptly made would
4reatly accelerate the object of our negociation,
while it would teach the Chinese a most salutary
lesson not only for the present, but in all time to