The Sun.
London, England, 1857-12-05 00:00:00

IHE SUN, LONDON, SATURDAY EVENUN:G DECEMBER 52 lBx7.

Lela., and the relations between the Government and the
skink; for if that was done, in the first place you would
PeetPose every attempt at that usef legislation for
arhieh the country was now ripe, a , a', the same time,
in n,
quiry into the commercial cat set of the present
rills, which leas a worthy and a necessary subject of
~.'ll„eirY by a committee. (Hear.) That was the represen-
.l"mo he wished to make to his right hon. friend and
uhe house; and he hoped that he had not made it in any
other spirit than that of a desire that they should seize
the opportunity of converting a public difficulty and dis-
aster into aP üblic advantegeand a permanent settlement
of this
~ q uestion. (Hear.) Would it not be an immense
"'vantage to a government desirous of settling a great.
Plblie question to be able to take it, up at a moment
°inert the mind of the country was alive to its import;
u,n aee, and was ready to give' its assistance in the task .
" 48 it not often found to be a hopeless task by a public
14311 to stir up and animate the public mind on a quee-
n of which he knew the importance ? A.s an ins anee
1,141,1 an illustration of that tendency, let it lea remembered
to Inany gentlemen it was found possible a year ago
7lng together to listen to an Indian debate. (Hear.)
end„ now, because we were smarting from the eff...cts of
-cc°lnelereial crisis, should we postpone the et modera-
"l of a question connected with it until the public
kind had relapsed into apathy and lassitude' On the
itontrary, this was the time when we ought to deal with
that Part of the question which related to issue, and
Parliantenthad. given a defioite 'judgment with
regard to the laws of issue, then they woul I be in a
voction to deal with the laws of banking, for it was by
;°lziag up those two questions that you constituted a
the
difficulty in the way of finding ao entrance into
'he minds of men for that common sense principle ley
I/°,_hich they should be guided in dealing with a subject
'", this. they
If he
nd mae one observation more, he hoped
"hould not offendd any of those gentlemen from Scot-
]
BIL' Whom he saw around him. So far as regarded the
el3-velied question of a check to the circulation of
notes in Scotland and even in Ireland, be (
wMr.
‘-'ladetone) never expected to live to see the dav hen
rarliament would be in such a position as to have such
advantage in the dealing with that question as it now
of ,°lB,.eaied. He saw his right hon. friend the First Lord
''"a Admiralty looking at him, and he was confident
that his hon. friend agreed with him, whet it had oc-
curred
that two millions of gold had been sent to Soot.
land t
oftheir
enable the banks to meet their securities instead
giving gold for them out of their coffers. This
tight be very satisfactory to them, but he hopel that
e intellect of England was not so far in the background
as not to be able to understand at whose expense it was
do
(" Hear, hear," and sheers.) No doubt lit was a
"oheaP rap system of circulation for Scotland, as it was a
system of living for a private individual if he could
get his friends to pay his debts. (" Hear, hear,
413,1 laughter ) But he could net assume that in 1859
itt,. Public Mind would be in a f.avourabls condition for
the consideration of this ques.ren. We had coming
iontP us and in prospective a question of the moat gigar.
character, and one which was, owing to the unpre-
Psrednese of our minds with regard to it, perhaps the
al°Bt appalling which, as a public man, he could rea:in-
kn% It was a question of the manner in which we were
to deal with 200,000,000 of men of another race aed
religion—an ancient nation, which we seemed to think
we could treat as so many figures of wax, but a nation
whichhad got its own ha bits and manners, its own
h.2tory, its own civilisation, but with regard to
which we seemed to think that we had only to
walk into the country and leave it to the exhibition
Only of the properties and qualities of the Anglo-Saxon
tIS mettle all difficulties. (Hear, hear.) He thought that
eteo in 1859 we might not base settled that question.
(searll7„ , heat.) Great changes were to be looked for in
the emoagement of East Indian affair., and let us not be
I° sure that when we were in the midst of the conside-
ron of that gigantic queetion, it would be easy to turn
Plahlin mind to the question whether Scotch banks
flirei to support their circulation by means obtained from
Fore
(Hear, hear.) There cou'd net be much
thubt that Parliament was now competent to entertain
cc) question, but if it was referred to examination by a
linpisgion that it would only cause the letting slip a
h"° uvo opportunity for the consideration of, at 1-ast, one
it of the subject, and he was sure that by re'erring
*l7,° questions wan overburdened committee, the result
tVid be the postponement of the completion of the act
.1
e, '0 844 by legislation on the laws relating to is: us, and
an it
ha postponing, the perplexing, and the confusion ot
aluiry which was essential to he instituted into the
"Inmercial causes of the recent panic, and lie grieved to
y the present embarrassment. (Loud cheers )
I Mr. SPOONER said that he eeuld a*ure his right
cll. friend that if he was a member of the present
Icom-
mittee
he would not go into it with a view to propound
it own plans, but solely with a desire that the commit-
s '
se should first inquire into the causes of the present dia.
the
tress. agreed that if they west into an inquiry into
11,'"e Subject in the old way there would be no end of it.
tritlt reference to the existing state of things he would
mention that a witness, who was admitted by every one
ba of a high authority (lie meant Lord 0 verstone) was
07toined before the committee this year, and at the end
Ca° essay which hedelivered in answer to a question,the
oble lord stated, in reference to the act of 1844, " that
d' the strict and prompt adherence to the principles of
:o_4 act everything had p,issed off with regularity and
itevmonetary system was unshaken, the prosperity of .
`the wisdom
was undisputed, and such was the ccnfidence
wisdom of the act of 1844 that it-was daily gaining.
it-gth ; that if a practical illustration of the scundness of
IttPtineipleri and its beneficial results was wanted itwasonl
e y
of
teilssary to look around at the present state of the trade
again country, the prosperity of the revenue, the con.
.laden' of the people, the wEalth that pervaded every.
• t"' end having done so, the committee might be called
• k-,,4 '43r If they would interfere with the continuance
Bon.'" act which had produced such reults." He (Mr.
lold°+°") would reverse the question, and ask the noble
'whites° look now at the exactly contrary state of things
eatsted,and then to say whether Parliament ought
41)0• ,I.to be ready, net merely to interfere with, but to
had a° act which had proved to be a delusion, which
had 140 t carried out the expectations of its framers, and
den 11" received the confidence of the pubic. The
whaliiter had not yet passed, it bad hardly begun, and
throi:v°llld be done when numbers of persons were
heet,,-U°ut of employment I The Act of 1844 could
?tactic' on amended ; it was wrong; in principle and in
rev° and must be abolished. The Act of 1819 had
beet; ut,..•
en fully carried out, and it never could have
folio, Iv linever it was put in full operation it was
elistr'„";""arY to relax it on account of the commercial
th, 't Produced. Any prosperity which existed in
Put -o°lltltrY Would be hollow until the currency was
the
luProper footing. Look to the year 1825. In
State e 8 speech in February of that year, and in a
great-floot of the then Chancellor of the E-echequer,
and hoaat was made of the prosperity of the country,
the that ataternent was repeated in July at the time of
telel3r°rogation, arid the Chancellor of the Exchequer
1.0 Mr. Brougham, who hail given notice of a motion
been
~ dispensed through the portals of our ancient insti-
holucs to a just and generous people. In January, 1836,
I,,:ever, he cams down to the house and deplored the
6_ tolled state of every interest in the country, and was
able to account for it by the imprudence of some
:irtntry bankers. Panic had succeeded panic, but almost
.7413, one had been preceded by a declaration of great
!ild complete prosperity. The act of 1319 had never
been carried out ; and Mr. Horner, in 1310, warned
parliament that if they went on in the way iii which
they were proceeding, and as they afterwards did, they
never would be able to return to a sound Nt,:tO Cif cur.
retley in this country. In 1810-11 a resolution was
tend which had the support of the noble lord now at
e head of the Government, declaring that a one-p )und
tlau°t° and a shilling were for all legal purposes the earns
:° guinea, and that resolution was passed in opposition
II tnotion, the effect of which wasthat the depreciation
that to
bo marked and arrested, Mr. orner declaring
toaut if
it was not then arrested, it would be impossible
tindrerevt it What was done The national debt was
per
,r 400,000,0001., and there was a depreciation of 15
...e"t• The debt went on increa-ing to 800,000,000/ ,
I,l;4othe depreciation reached 30 per cent. Mr. Henry
qe,yrbt°n, who differed both from Mr. Horner and the
ibLerament, expressed a doebt whether it would bepos.
ttlt° to return to the national standard of value. The
neyreitucY had never been restored to that standerd, and
tte-r.would be restored to it. The attempts which had
ee„,,llll'4de to grant relief Lad only been suocessfutforthe
th4;"ft• They had eventually aggravated the evil, and
Ivo -ia'airs would go on until a panics would arise which
„4:1 d break p the whole social system. It was necee-
ea4 to reconei,ier the whole subject for the purpose of
sing the mischief caused by the not of 1819. The
is Y had never had a
practical cerrency redeemable
etird, and never would have one sufficient to carry on
20~uu0 enterprise of the country. Out of the
the ,0001 issued by the flank of England in notes, all
in on their face payable in gold, 14,500,000/. were
a"gr:0:111°,.11 lleteurities but still they were said to be payable
might 'be said that it would never be de.
:uttrreaelni.ir:aua, But that was the principle laid down.
It
t'Pon the very face of it, and a system of
right Which could not justly be maintained. The
that the gentleman (Hr. G:ailtene) as of opinion
rate
of act of 1844 had workeds well inw regulating the
t ailed
not be e'zchange'
but a discount tif 13 per cent. could
payment in 11 I t
go.L. practical point
° Inquire into how far the act 1841 hail assi,ted
c Wa.B
I:arrYing out the act of 1819. (Hear, hear.) What
5;5 cause of the present distract; It had been
" a
ce it aroma from over-igeme and over-trading seen,
1" rtain joint-stock banks had entered into
4el:,,hgernente of t
ee large a nature—and that the
confide of the pple had been thus shaken. No one
Zetild justify the conduct of some of these banks, but
qatern must be bad if a want of prudence in the
~,anageroont of a few such institutions could lead to a
Thre't °I confidence throughout the while commueity.
goidact of 1844 compelled the Bank of England to buy
„th.tWbether it was wanted or not, and to issue notes
spith4r they were wanted or not, The effect of that
eat had been to reduce the rate of interest to 2 per
c:11110s and consequently to force capital into all sorts
whie'ign investments and wild speculations, many of
rion turned out to be worthless, and the result was
thing but distress and misery. He believed all our
Present evils were attributable to the state of our mone-
app'ui" yr, and that great benefit would arise from the
of r„ ritrue4t of a committee to consider the best mode
n4d°ledYing those evils. With regard to the bill now
eorierll coneideration, he gave it his full and complete
den., tr,ene, and he believed that the Government had
diefioul"irc duty in
arisen.n endeavour
But heipo• to pwarnedut a stothpem that
to the
faced not done enough'
z
and that if they left matters
diffiu„T
ties to !low etood they would hereafter have still greater
suijPct
! encounter. They ought to look into the
'PPedily, without a desire to support any pre-
ILZd• ed notions or to pres forward any special theory.
aleocatd e;'en accused of bes
longing to that ecchool which
he hm an
Ever unlimited inconvertible currency. Now,
was f
" giu hisort to any such . He
our
t
a ve
limit, s
and would :ix that limitviews at the

v amount of debt owing by the Government to the Bank,
instead of having the securities locked up and paying
but a quantity of notes professing to be convertible into
gold, but which they were unable to pay. Hs would
leave the administration of the national paper in the
hands of the Bank, and would let them issue those
notes, instead of their own, on such terms as would be
fair and just for substituting that currency for their
own. By doing this, a double currency would be
formed. It might be objected that there would be a di'.
ference in the value of the two. But would it not be bet-
ter to allow parties to purchase the gold notes at a pre-
mium than to compel them to pay 13 per cent. I He con-
tende.l that such a plan would be more consonant with
the Lest interests of the country. By this means there
would be a reglar circulation of 20,000,000/ , and those
fluctuations whicn were so destructive to business would
ba av,.ided. Although he was prepared to sup.tort the
Bi 1 of Indemnity, there was one provision to which he
entertained an of jection, en I that eras the p >w,r given
to the Bank and the Government of breaking the law.
as was quite sure the country would not consent to
leave such a power in the hands of the Rink, and still
less to place such an unconstitutional power in the hands
of the Government. (Hear.)
Mr. GLYN said he did not understand the Chancellor
of the Exchequer to have proposed the insertion of any
clause conferring the power to which the hon. member had
just alluded, but that he had suggested it for the conside-
ration of the house.

Mr. SPOONER obsorved that it had been proposed by
the right hon. gentleman.
The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER remarked
that what he had said was that he would insert a clause in
the bill authorising tho Bank to exceed the legal limit for
twenty-eight days after the meeting of parliament after the
reces4.

Mr. GLYN—The hoc. member for Warwickshire ba
referred to the effect of the act of 1844 on the existing state
of things. In doing so the hon. gentleman was mixing up
two questions which were entirely distinct. He was mixing
up the question of capital with the question of currency.
This crisis which occurred in 1847 and that which now ex-
isted primarily arose from the same causes. In 1847, the
commercial crisis was brought about by the overtrading of
this country with India, and large speculations for the
promotion of the corn trade on the continent of Europe.
Thetis things, added to the internal pressure and panic,
were the primary causes of the crisis of 1847. The
causes which had produced the present crisis were iden-
tically the same, and had produced the same effects. The
country was now suffering paritly from the terrible over-
thow of its commercial relatips with the United States.
It was also affected by a new; feature which hitherto had
not been felt in its commercial relations —the total destruc-
tion of commercial houses connected with the North of
Europe. That trade had for a few years been carried on
very much like that of the United States —on an entire
system of credit. Another immediate cause of the crisis,
and a new one, was the extraordinary over-banking in
Scotland. (Hear, hear.) That, added to the over-banking
in some parts dEngland, be I caused the internal pres-
sure which had led to the disastrous effects under which
the commerce of the country was now suffering. But he
could not trace these effects up to the Act of 1814 in any
way consistent with justice. The provisions of the act may
be summed up under three heads—first, the separation
of the two departments, banking and issue—secondly,
the restriction of the amount of paper circulation upon
securities; and, thirdly, that which regulated the coun-
try banks. With regard to the first point it turned
out that the Bank directors themselves, some time before
the introduction of the bill of 1844, had instituted that
division as a departmental arrangement—a wholesome pro-
vision when kept in their own circle, but attended with
disastrous effects when made a necessary part of the act.
With regard to the restriction of the country bank circula-
tion, he did not think any difference of opinion existed.
The great difficulty of the question was in the limit of the
circulation to 14,000,000/. He did not think any indivi-
dual who had watched the operations of the crises of 1817
and that of 1857, could fail in arriving at this conviction,
that although the pressure was not caused by the act, yet
the limiting of the power of issue upon securities became in
itself the primary cause of the evil. It simply acted in this
way. The operation of the pressure reduced the reserves
at the Bank. The man who was ready to sacrifice anything
to meet his engagements, who was ready to pay even 20
per cent, for that purpose, was anxious to buy the currency
—would purchase it at any cost—aad that depressed the
reserve still further. (Hoar, hear.) He would venture to
assert that a person had no right to demand the purchase
of a portion of the currency to meet his engagements. That
loin; so, the issue of the Government letter became inevi-
teem both in 1847 and 1857. In the year 1847 especially
there was a moral courage in the issue of a letter which the
country oeght to appreciate and value; and nothing could
exceed the promptitude with which the present letter had
been issued, for it was issued without any pressure from
the commercial body on the Government. (Hear.) A. de-
putation was ready to start from Lives pool on the day the
letter was written, but they waited for a telegraphic mes-
sage to know whether they should come up or not, and
found their wishes had been anticipated by the noble lord
at the head of the Government. (Hear.) It was an inevi-
table consequence that whenever a pressure arose a letter
must be sent down to relieve the act of 1844. He believed
that no individual or Government would ever have the
hardihood to carry out the primary principle of that act.
If any Government did so they would be burled from
power, not by a vote of the house but by the physical force
of the coustry. (Hear.) The country would not allow its
commercial operations to be interfered with in any such
manner. Did any one suppose that the large machinery
connected with the mill power of the country and the
mining interests of the country would be content to go
a ithout their wages merely because a principle was to be
upheld? (Hear.) That being so, the question arose whether
the power which had been exercised should remain in the
bands of the government, without any positive knowledge
of the manner in which it might be exercised ? He thought
the proper Om for lodging such a power was in the hands
of a responsible body like the Bank directors, under suffi-
cient parliamentary control. Unless something of that
kind should be done, a pure metallic circulation must be
resorted to ; and he did not think the country was prepard
for such a proceeding. Mat tees could not be allowed to
remain in their present position much longer, for it was
constitutionally wrong to allow such a power to exist
without any certain rule for its proper exercise. (Hear,
hear.) He could not sit down without bearing his testi-
mony to the conduct of the Bank directors, which was
beyond all praise, and he must be permitted to say that
they had shown a degree of firmness, vigour, anl discre-
tion which entitled them to the warmest thanks of the
country. (Cheers.)
Mr. HENLEY agreed in the general opinion that the
government were entitled to a bill of indemnity. Bat if
they had acted otherwise, and had not been torn to pieces
by the people, they would have to defend themselves against
a bill of impeachment. (" Hear," and laughter.) There
would not only have been the risk, but the certainty of a
popular commotion. So far, therefore, as regarded the bill
of indemnity, he should give it a very cheerful support.
The next question was, why should there be a need of these
indemnities? (Hear, hear.) What was the state of the
law ? Twice within the last fifteen years a corporation,
possessed of an enormous capital, showing a rest of
3,000,0)01. or 4,000,0001. above their engagements, would
not have been able to pay anybody a shilling without an
indemnity. (Hear, hear.) In 1847 the directors stated
that the measure had been forced down their throats, and
that they could have done without it, but that was clearly
a matter of opinion. The hon. member for Kendal had
given credit to the government for their spontaneous
action in the matter, but ho had made one statement which
threw a shade of doubt upon their conduct, for it appeared
that a Liverpool deputation were only stopped from coming
up by the telegraphic announcement that something bad
happened. (A. laugh.) He differed entirely from his
honourable friend behind him. He was one of those
who wished to see the bank note convertible at overy
man's will who held it. (Hear, hear.) He could not
conceive that a monetary system could be safe without
that. Then the next question was what was being converti-
ble ? His notion of convertibility was that a men could go
to the counter when he pleased and be sure to have gold for
his note at the time. Then the next question came: how
far did the act of 1814 secure that ? The Chancellor of the
Exchequer sail that the distinguished individual who
brought that bill forward said ho had three objects. One
another to maintain convertibility,
was to prevent panics ;
and the third object was to prevent speculation by the
issue of paper. Now let them see how far these objects had
been attained. Sir R, Peel himself said it had failed in the
first object. It had failed to prevent panics. Well, failing
to pro ince panics—[A. MEMBER : "It has succeeded in
that "]-- (laughter) failing to prevent panics had it pro-
duced convertibility. What had the bank got to pay its
notes with ? Jo ordinary times it had twenty millions of
bank notee, fourteen millions of which were issued upon
' security, and the residue upon gold. It should be observed
that that gold was not in coin. Now if they had not bad a
letter to suspend the operations of the bank, if the bank
had been unable to pay its deposits over the counter, how
long would it have been before parties would have gone to
have their notes paid in gold ? They said people would not
be so foolish as to go, but why did they not go ? Because
confidence prevented their going. They must rely on that
confidence because all banking operations were founded on
it. Nobauker could keep every shilling that was confided
to him in his counter ready to be repaid ; but he must
trust to keeping a certain proportion of it. So it was in
what was called this mixed circulation. If they chose to
issue on security that was nothing but depending on the
confidence of the country. If it carried with it a limit
they laid the foundation of a want of confidence, and that
want of confidence, if they tried to maintain the lair would
necessarily prevent bank notes being paid in gold. A good
deal had been said on the subject of panics. Sir R. Peel
was reported to have said that provision could not be made
against panics. But he should like the Chancellor of the
Exchequer to state what ground there was for the difficulty
they were in now and that they were in in 1817, whether
in point of fact it was a real alarm, or whether it was
an idle panic ? The hon, member who moved the address
quoted an opinion of one of the directors, Mr. Hub-
bard, upon this subject, They had also in the blue-
book the opinion of the Governor of the Bank of Eng-
land. One of these gentlemen said the country
was grossly ignorant, and the other said they were not
well acquainted with the true principles of the act of 1844,
and they went on to explain that the panic arose from not
understanding what they called " the normal state of the
decrease or the reserve at a particular time." This decrease
in the reserve in 1847 took place in the month of October,
when there was a nice chance of building up a little his-
tory to show that the public were unreasonable, and it
figures.would perfectlyhamver.doHnuebbard said well,,
,T The
ef
chiefthey
difficultyh.ad kept clearih o e toe!
ber, 1817, was occasioned by the e •
public generally." Now that wasxacesstvl ignorance of the
(Laughter.) "Excessive ignorance clothe
i
with regard to the action of the Bank, jolly accusation.
anpdu io
especiallyenera
its
action periodically, and when the publication orefeitheenereeseerveet
of the Bank showed a declined state at the commencement
of October, the public mind was alarmed, and the alarm
became what was called a panic." Now, the difference be-
tween alarm and panic was when there was any reason for
alarm. This alarm, Mr. Hubbard said, caused people to
look up what money they bad got. .Mr. Hubbard did not
stop there ; but went into the region of prophecy. He said,
" I believe therefore that the experience of 1817, so far from
showing that the Bank Charter Act is untenable in terms of
difficulty, shows that it operated with perfect success—a
success teat will be greater under future trials by reason of
the Bank feeling more confidence in its own operations, but
what is more important still, the bankers and mercantile
community will know that they must exercise a little indie
vidual prudence, an I. nut consider the Bank of England a
dry-nurse in the hour of need." That evidence was given
it -July, 1857, and now let them see what Mr. Weguelin
said, because he went more into detail. This question
was put to him—" Suppose that in 1847, in the month
of October, the Banks accounts and the various domestic
causes regulating the supply of bullion had been as
correctly understood as they are in the summer of this yet r,,
do you think that the same panic would have accrued ? '
' And he said—and this was very curious—" The lowest
I
: amount of reserve in 1817, and consequently the highest

amount of actual circulation corresponded exactly with
the period at which you might expect the lowest
amount of issue and the highest active citculation. Con-
sequently, if the public had been aware that it was nothing
more than a mere normal action of the reserve and
the active circulation, they would have concluded that
from that period the active circulation would begin to de
cline." He wont on to put in figures, and what were those
figures ? It seemed that at the commencement of October,
1847, the amount of reserved notes was 3.85!,0001., and on
the 231 of October it had sunk to 1,191,000/.. a diminution
of 63 per cent. Then Mr. Weobuelin contrasted that with
the period of .85G. In September, 1856, the amount was
6,218,0301., while on the 18th of October there had boon a
diminution of 3,700,0001., and therefore he wanted it to be
assumed that because in 1847 the reserve at the Bank had
only dropped 2,600,0001., and in 1855 had dropped
3,703,0001., the public were alarmed in 1817, and were
not at all alarmed in 1855. But it seemed very odd to him
(\lr. Henley) that a man should suppose it was the same
thing, with only 3,850,0001. to take 2,658,0001. away from
it, that it would be to take the same amount from a much
larg r paroel, because prudent people did not look at what
w a taken away—they looked at what was left. And,
therefore, so far from that statement of the two Bank
directors showing that what took place in 1817 was a
panic, they gave it resistible evidence, upon figures, to show
that reasoning men, who had their engagements to must,
had good ground for the alai m that they felt, and, there-
fore, that ground was cut from under the feet of those who
said that the provisions of the bill of 18;4 were always
good except in case of panics. He denied that in that case
it was panic; it was reasonable alarm. There was another
qrtesti m connected with the act of 1844 oa which ho knew
ho held an opinion which was not•shared by many, but he
was glad to find thatfopinion supported by no less an au-
thority than the late governor of the Bank. He hail never
been able to understand why, when the Bank of England
was issuing such aR amount of bank notes as it saw fit,
they were to pass a law to say to that corporation, you may
if you please, in addition to these notes that you have out,
issue 14 millions of notes more. He never could understand
the reason of that. .Ele believed the immediate effect was
to inflate the currenoy of the country, and that it indaced
to a certain degree excess of trading, and the governor of the
Bank of England expressed the same opinion, not in evi-
deuce, but in answer to a communication from the Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer. After stating certain advantages, he
said, "On the other hand, the act encourages the dangerous
theory that the Bank of Eoglatul mayin its bankingdepart-
ment act in all respects as a private bank in the arrange-
ments with its customers, and that the force of competi-
tion with large money lenders, and the produce of large
deposits, is apt to induce an unwarrantable inflation of
credit." That was a strong assertion to come from such
an authority. He would now inquire what was the ope-
ration of the law when it first passed. In 1848 the notes
issued were 19 millions, and the private securities were
5,500,0001. On the let of August, 1841, the notes issued
were 21 millions, and the private securities 6 millions.
That was the state of things antecedent to the bill of 1814.
The Bank of rate of discount had then for two years been
4 per cent., but Mr. Chapman said Messrs. Gurney were
charging only 21. 3s. 4d. in 1843, and 21. 2s. 6d. in 1814.
In 1845 the notes issued, instead of being 21,316,0001.,
were 28,250,0)0/. ; the bullion was 15,f;00,000/. instead of
16,000,000/., and the private securities instead of being
6,851,0a01., jumped up to 11,760,00)/ In 1846 things wore
about the same. The notes were 28.400,0001., but the pri-
vate securities had jumped up to 17,600,000/. That was
some little evidence of inflation of credithe thought. But
what was the discount? ila 1845 the Bank rate of dis-
count was 21. 13s. 4d., and Gurneys were charging 2/.
19e. 2d. These facts seemed to give some weight to the
opinion of Mr. Wegnelin, that this act had a tendency to
an unwarrantable inflation of credit. Now let them take
the other end of the stick. By the operation of this act
they had had to come twice to the house in ten years to
ask for an indemnity. The question was what they were
to do under these circumstances. No one had yet got up
in that house and said the operation of this bill ought to
be maintained in its entirety. (Hear.) The next point
was, was it safe or desirable to leave it in the discretion of
Government, or ought they to relax the law by repealing
it, or by some other mode. In speaking of the repeal of
the law he was only speaking of that part which related to
the issue of notes by the Bank of England. That which
related to the issue of notes by the country banks he
thought a sound provision. In July Mr. Weguolin said
in no case had the reserve gone below three millic.ns, and
there had been no anxiety in the pubic mind with regard
to the state of that reserve, but Mr. Chapman said the
state of the reserve ha I caused a very great anxiety, and
that in 1856 they were under great alarm, and that they
carried on their business only on an understanding that
they should be relieved by Government. What sort of a
state of things was that?
The CHA.NCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER—The
statement was contradicted.
Mr. HENLEY—The right hon. gentleman said it was
contradicted ; but where ? It was endeavoured no doubt to
be explained away. It was said that the promise was not
given by a member of the Government, ore member of Par-
liament, or a member of the Bank ; but Mr. Chapman said
they had it from an individual in such a position that he
believed it. With regard to the question where the dis- -
pausing power ought to be lodged, he (Mr. Henley) could
not see any quarter in which it could be placed with safety.
He believed there ought not to be a limit; and that had
been proved to demonstration by what ha I fallen from the
Chancellor of the Exchequer himself. (Cheers) The right
hon. gentleman had argued the question as if he was g )ins•
to be hanged unless ho could make out a strong case for
his indemnity. He said, "Don't think that the law has
been infringe I to the extent of 2,000,0901. or anything like
it," and then he went through a long list of figures to show
that the infraction really never amounted to more than
about 900,000/. Well, but would any one pretend to say
that the convertibility of the Bank note had been in any
way endangered by that excess of 900,0001.? He (Mr. Hen-
ley) agreed with the right hon. gentleman (Hr. Gladstone)
that to fix the limit at 16 or 17 millions would do no good
whatever; and that, while it would not lessen the mischief,
it might perhaps give a worse chance of meeting a crisis
when it occurred. The directors of the Bank had said
throughout that they should have acted in precisely the
same manner, and would have taken precisely the same
steps, if the act had nit been in existence. They would
have raised the rate of discountjust tho same ; and here he
(air. Henley) must confess that lie was not one of those
who believed they could keep the rate of discount at a uni-
form point. But if the conduct of the Bank would have
been the same, act or no act, why create all this alarm for
the sake of keeping up a limit ? It was like greasing a car
rizlge wheel ; if' they put the grease on before it got hot, it
never would get, hot ; but if it once bee ime heated no
amount of grease would save it from coming to ad:a 1
lock. As to leaving the dispensing power in the hands of
Government, he (Mr. Henley) was of the same opinion as
the member for Oxford and the member for Southampton.
When the point was raisedin the committee the member for
Oxford said, " If the Government was a weak one it would
yield, but if it was a strong one it would resist, and then it
would incur,a groat deal of unpopularity." By-t ho-bye,
did the hon. gentlemen opposite consider that Oath Govern-
ment was a weak one for having on this occasion yielded ?
However that might be, it was clear that if this power
was once conceded to Government, the whole matter would
be•virtually placed in their hands ; and now that a double-
precedent ha I been established, they might rest certain
saidthatthattorelaxtheactsimplyto they would never
tufy it, n
pressure. Mr.
ai h
Hubbard e
(Mr. Henley) believed that that was quite true. Mr. Hub-
bard further said that the effect of extending the provisions
of the act in times of difficulty would be to force the bank-
ing community into a complete dependency upon the Bank
have r
°actuallyetaken
P wasppe a rnote d a
los v ahy
as
oflacEsn4ol3fncao;urasnedpotshtaittoca
gascthatl heybencaotmu
rally asked what good it had done te
largely developed since the passing
oohffetmhoi:er
A very import-
ant
Carlisle, viz. :—" Are your primary
the solvencyof the
question was put in the committeceonbsyiatehreatmioenmsbewrhfeonr
paper is presented to you for discount,
parties
governor and deputy-governor
—the are
said, "These are not our primary considerationsy
and the state of your bspuollkioen
ourtnurkeessvean.?"
They
our only ones." Their principle was, rent, quocunque mode,
rent. Not so Messrs. Gurneys. The same question was
them, and they seemed not to be so slack-waisted ; for the
Old Lady of Threadneedle-street seemed to have latterly
got into some queer habits. ( Laughter.) The representative
0
of Messrs. Gurneys said, "There is a certain description
paper that we won't touch—we won't touch any
re-dis-
counted paper." Hon• gentlemen threw up their hands.
He andse.
He (Mr. Henley) did not say whether it was so or no
was not there to answer for the truth of the statements ho
quoted ; nor did he care whether they were true or false.
They only show what sort of paper was in the market—
whether Messrs. Gurneys dealt in it or not. . hey heard a
great deal now-a-days about "increased banking facilities"
"increased commercial facilities," and the like. H 3 did
not care what they called these things ; but it was obvious
that since the passing of the act there had been a
great development in the trading world of all kinds
of queer systems. (Hear, hear, hear.) Formerly,
when the Bank felt itself obliged to exercise its own
discretion there was not the sort of thing that now went
on. Twenty years ago he doubted whether the governor
and deputy-governor would have given an answer to the
effect that in carrying on their business they had no regard
to the character of the paper offered to them. (Hear.) For-
merly the Bank held a salutary check over speculative
transactions, and that had no doubt a good effect upon
trading morality ; but now there wore what they called
" slaugltor-houses ; " there were unlicensed pawnbrokers,
dealers in warrants, and buyers and sellers of cargoes "on
the run "—things which were never heard of a few years
ago, and by which small traders were completely
"chewed up." (Laughter and cheers.) Small traders died
away, and people shrugged their shoulders, and said, "Oh,
they cannot keep pace with the times." (Hear., And
yet, by means of this wonderful act of 1814, they had, for-
sooth, rreveuted an undue inflation of credit and specula-
ti in paper. (Cheers) Certainly, the act had restricted
the issue of one particular kind of paper, that called Bank
notes; but it had only encouraged the creation of other
kinds of paper which were ten thousand times more mis-
chievous. (Mar.) There was one other point on which
ho would make a remark—namely, the proposal of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer that the Scotch notes might
be paid in Bank of England notes. That proposition he
regarded as merely tending to aggravate a prejudicialstate
of things which now prevailed in England. By the act
they had given to a number of existing private bankers a
monopoly is the creation of notes, without their having a
single farthing to set against them that the legislature
knew of. At present these notes, amounting to 8,000,0001.,
formed, with the 20,000,000/. of Bank of England notes,
the currency of the country. Now, by the wonderful ma-
chinery of the act, the instant they came to have a pres-
sure upon gold, they had on the one hand the reserve of
notes lessening in exactly the same proportion as the bul-
, lion diminished, and on the otherhand, they had the coun-
try bankers compelled to run to the Bank of England for
notes amounting to at least 2,000,0001., to enable them to
meet the demands of their own customers. To make the

Scotch notes likewise payahlein---Bank of England notes
would obviously increaso the evil. At the same time he
should be glad to see the circulation of the whole kingdom
put on the samo footing ; for at the present moment Soot-
land and Ireland stood on the footing of foreign states, so
far as their currency was concerned.
Lord J. RUSSELL--Whatever variety of opinions may

exist in this house upon this difficult question, I think all
will agree that the committee are very much indebted to
my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer for
the able manner in which be has laid before us the propo-
sitions of the Government. I am in the singular—l will
not say the unfortunate—position of being very wall satis-
fied with what has been done—tolerably satisfied with the
act of 1844, and entirely satisfied with the proposal of the
committee which is to follow after the present proposition.
I will say but one word with regard to the immediate
question before us, because I think that all sides of the
house are agreed that the measures takcn by her Majesty's
ministers was a right use of their discretion, and that it
contributed to save the commercial credit of this country.
(Hear.) Every party in this house will therefore admit
that an indemnity ought to be given to the Government
for the policy they have pursued, (Hear.) That question

i being disposed of, the further question naturally arises, if
the act of 1844 was rightly suspended in 1847, and if it
has been again rightly suspended in 1857, is it an act which
ought to be maintained ? Or, supposing that it is to be
maintained, will it not require some extensive alterations
• in its provisions ? Or, lastly, is it not necessary to give
some dispensing power either to the crown or to the Bank,
in order from time to time to suspend its operation? But
I think that, gentlemen, in discussing this question in this
house—still more in discussing it out of !doors—fall into
the error, against which they were warned by the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer and by Mr. Glyn, of confounding
the two questions of national currency and commercial
credit. (Hear.) I say that the act of 1811 was intended
to secure our national currency from depreciation and from
debasement. I believe that it has contributed to that
en I—indeed, that it has secured that end. (Hear.) But
commercial credit, which some of the more extravagant
supporters of the act of 1844 seem to think was to be saved
from all danger and all panic by that act--commercial
credit runs its own course ; and all that any act of
Parliament can do is to endeavour, as far as possible,
that the national currency may not be endangered by
it; that it may help from time to time—but that it
should net be swept away in the hurricanes that occa-
sionally desolate the fields of commerce. (Hear, hoar.) To
go back 'ots this clistincti, a —withregard tonational currency
I think that everyone that willconsider a momentwill be satis-
fied with the act of 1844 as a supplement to the act of
l),19. I remember perfectly well coming from the Low
Countries in 1815 with a number of 20-franc pieces; sad
for every one of these 20-franc pieces I got a one-pound
Bank of England note. The Bank of England note was
then worth Icifr. (Hear, hear.) But any one now would
get 25fr. or more, either in London or Paris, for that same
note. Well, then, there is an end of the depreciation ;
that depreciation had been cared by the act of 1819 and
the act of 1841. And I-do not think that in either of these
times of panic or commercial distress, either in 1847 or
1857, there has been the least doubt or question of the
convertibility of the bank-note. I believe that every
merchant and every individual iu the country felt satisfied
that his five-pound note would obtain its equivalent in
gold ; and therefore there has been no depreciation of the
currency; upon that question there has not been any fail-
ure. But when we came to that other question of coin-
naercial credit, I think that any one who looks at the his-
tory of the country only from the commencement of the
present century will see that there have been always these
changes— first, of rising and improving trade—next of
prosperity—next of inflation—and next of disasters and
distrust ; and, finally, the bubble burst, and we had to
begin again. (Hear, hear.) That was the case before the
act of 184 E was passed. (Hear.) I lament to have heard
from so high an authority as Mr. Glyn so much blame
thrown ou the act of 1814. Does he recollect what occurred
in 1825? (Hear, hear.) In 1825, if I remember right,
23 years before this act was passed, 700 priiate banks in
the c )untry broke; there was the greatest distress through-
out the country, the greatest distrust of country bank
paper, and a period of distress ensued. In 1447, again,
there were peculiar causes at work; there was a great de-
mand for corn, a very natural and necessary demand,
but which occasioned a great export of specie. Thera
wore other speculations which occasioned distrust, an-
other period of distress occurred. The same has occurred
in 1857 ; an I when the right hon. gentleman opposite reads
a number of passages from the evidence of merchants and
bank directors stating that trade is in a wholesome condi-
tion, it should be remembered that that only applies to the
time when the answers were given. Because every one,
whether engaged in trade or otherwise, must know that
there are changes—that there are revolutions, and very
often very sudden revolutions—which take place in com-
merce; that, owing to some particular cause—it may be a
very sudden cause—or owing to a great inflation of some
particular speculation, the country a'l at once finds itself
in a state of doubt and distrust with regard to even the
most healthy portions of trading operations. Now, let us
look what has been done with regard to the currency at
these separate periods ; because, while I would wish to
support the act 1844, I think that as it has been very much
over-blame:l on the other. I believe that it is an additional
security, that it is an improvement on our former laws ;
but I do not think, with regard to the action of trade upon
currency and currency upon trade, that the course of things
has v. ry much varied since the passing of that act. In
1825 we had the testimony of :Lord Ashburton in this
house. He stated that-the governor and deputy-governor
of the Bank, Mr. Huskiseon, and himself met to consider
what should be done. There was then a very small amount
of gold in the B ink—perhaps some hundred thousand so-
vereigns, I don't remember the amount- -and there was a
very great alarm. Whether there was a panic or not, and
whether alarm is a very just feeling, and panic a very un-
just one, I will not dispute—that seems rather a question
of philology than of finance. (Hear.) But there was very
groat alarm, and these very able men met to consider what
should be done. After some hours of consultation Lard

Ashburbon stated they were all agreed that, whatever
might be the cause, relaxation and the expansion of credit,
net farther restriction, was the remedy required. They
advised the governor of the Bulk to issue more paper. This
was on the Saturday or Sunday. On Monday morning the
Beek declared that they were ready to discount. Confi-
dence wee restored, an I, so far from the Bank being drained
of its last sovereign, its coffers were speedily replenished.
That happened before the act of 1844. In 1817, also, from
causes which I will not enumerate, there was a return of
difficulty and alarm. The case was represented to my right
hon. friend the pros nt First Lord of the Admiralty and
myself ; and several days we sat in anxi ins consultation
on the state of affairs, advising with Mr. Cotton, the
governor of the Bank, the directors, and other persons
very competent to enlighten us on what occurred from
day to clay ; and then, on our own responsibility—not at
the requtst of the Bank any more than now—not for the
purpose of s tying the national currency, which was not in
any danger, but for the sake of the commercial credit of
the nation—for the sake of many large firms which, though
perfectly solvent thernselve., were threatened by others-
-and for the great interests of the country, we resolved
to recommend the Bank to issue bank notes, if necessary,
beyond the limit imposed by law. I believe we were
justified in that course; and, if I remember rightly, Mr.
Herries, then a member of this house, moved a resolution
approving the conduct of the Government in that instance.
Well, in 1857 the state of things described to us by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer occurs. The Government
meets, and the First Lord of the Treasury and the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer issue a similar letter. I am sorry
to say the effect is nut so immediate as was that of our
letter in 1817. It may have been that the disease had
/plead its routs deeper; it may have been owing to some
other cause, existing, perhaps, in foreign countries; but,
a,cc.e. ling to the highest authority, we have not yet re-
cevered our former state of healthy tra'le and sound com-
mercial credit. As far, however, as it has gone that letter
has been effective ; it has saved many parties from ruin,
it has saved the general interests of the country from great
disaster. And, for my part, I hope, with my hon. friend
the member for Kendal, that we shall never see a Minister
of this country so infatuated in favour of an abstract prin-
ciple, sound enough in itself, as to refuse in these cases of
emergency to incur the responsibility of relaxing the Act
of 1814 and thereby preventing what may be a fearful
convulsion. (Hoar, hear.) But is it true that this Act,
having been t• vice suspended,
is altogether worthless, and
ought to be replaced by some other system ? I think that
nraetaidon oaflhacurrency as far as the national currency is concerned it is an Act
which does not require alteration. And with regard to
thathheaavred
a or
commercial crelit I venture to say that no one authority
all
times of commercial distress and ri panic— scheme which
shall preserve convertibility proposed
fi
tat
e schemedh
for
whhaitelh h
you ave
shall ever by
and yet be of sufficient force
to prevent the effects—the
mostnatural and inevitable
effects—be it of over speculation, of excessive trade, or of
the misfortune of the particular time. In order to show
that I do not wish to cast blame
upon those who, in some
instances at least, have been unfortunate in these
transactions. I cannot but call to mind a remark of
Mr. Tierney, who, in allusion to one of these periods of com-
mercial distress said, " You may talk of wild speculation and
rash trading, but the men accused of this rashness and wild
speculation would, if they had succeeded, have been enter-
prising British merchants." (Hear.) It is very often the case
that a have pushed their credit too far, that circumstances
have turned against them, that their failure loads to others,
and thus greet discredit is thrown upon the country, when
perhaps but a few—a very few, persons are to blame. But,
sir, if there are any persons to blamefor
giving too great
facilities to individual traders, whether connected with the
Bank of England, the Western Bank of Scotland, or any other
banking or commercial company, it seems to me that the
appointment of a committee is exactly the manner in which
the Government ought to deal with this case If such has
been the case it cannot but be useful to the country to learn
what errors have be n covnitted, and to obtain some warn-
ing not to repeat them in the future. My right hon. friend
the member for the University of Oxford protests against the
ec-sppointment of the committee to iuquire into banking and
issues, but ho says that he should quite approve the appoint-
ment of a c mmittee to inquire into the c ruses of the corn.
morel a distress. I, sir, am not very particular about the
title of this committee, or the exact form in which it is ap.
pointed. 1 am quite sure that if appointed as a committee to
inquire into banking it would inquire into all the causes of
commercial distress, and into the conduct of those who are
carrying on the trade of the country. I am eqcally sure that
if appointed to consider the causes of commercial distress is
would inquire into banking and the operation of the Act of
1544. It is impossible to bind down a committee not to con-
sitter these two subjects together, and, therefore, I think it is
quite right that it should be appointed in such terms as the
Ghaneellor of the Exchequer shall think fit. Well, then, sir,
with what view is the committee to be appointed 7 The right
hon. gentleman the member for Buckinghamshire asked a
question last night, which I think was quite right inspirit, bat
which he made rather more stringent than was necessary He
asked--'` Is the Act of 1844 to be maintained ? If it is to be
maintained why should you have the Act of Indemnity ? If it
is not to be maintained let the Act of Indemnity be passed,
and let the measures of her Majesty's Government be pro-
duced." Now, I understand—l do not know that I correAly
understand, the intentions ofthe Government, but, as far as I
understand them, it seems to me that they are prepared to
stand by the 2eneral principles of the Act of 1844 If they
were not prepared to stand by those general principles, if
they intended to throw the whole question of the currency
loose before the committee—if we were to have the plan of
the hon. number for North Warwickshire (Mr. Spooner)
which seems to me, if not so dangerous as I have apprehended
vet—l will not use an unusual phrase—more unreaoonable
that I bad expected—if we were to have our currency di-
vided into two parts, one of which is to rest on the security
of the Three per Cents., and the other upon gold, and if we
were to have other projects of that kind coming out of the
committee, then I should say that its appointment by the
Government would be a very unadvisable stop. But if we
are to have a committee, keeping in view the Act of 1844 and
seeing whether that act should be either amended or in any
way expanded, I think that is a very fair question to be laid
before a committee, and that it woul I be more prudent on
the part of the Government to say that whoa the evidence is
before us, and not till then, will they tell the house at what
conclusions they have arrived with regard to amendments its
harmony with the spirit ' of the act, but making its • •
provisions
still more effeetivo. Various ways are suggested in which
that act might be altered. There is one to which the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer alluded, and with regard to which I
with him, although do not quite agree
in what he says concerning it. Ho says that if you give to
the Government or to the Bank a discretionary power of re •
laxing this act from time to time, you will net make much
practical alter tion,
• but you will raise a constitutional ques-
tion' whether or not it is right to give sick a power by Act of
Parliament. Now, I beg pardon of my right hon. friend, but
I think you raise not only a great constitutional but a great
practical question besides : because, while I should be very
unwilling to give to Ministers this power ; of dispensing
with an Act of Parliament on constitutional grounds, I think
theatthere are moral reasons, and reasons of practical utility
which are still
more forcible against the adoption of such a
course. I feel convinced that if the Minister and the Bank, or
the Bank alone, had this power it would give great el-
couragement to wild and unsound speculation. (Hear,
hear.) Every ono would then say,
"We eau go to the
Gov lenient and tell them that they have got the power, and
that this is the v,ry case in which it was intended that they
should exercise it ;" whereas it is now a great inconvenience
and a great responsibility for a Minister to say, " I think
this Act is at present so obnoxious to the community that I

will undertake to suspend it awl will immediately call Par-
liament together to lay my conduct before it." I think that
that is a considerable check upon the conduct of the Minister,
and therefore upon those speculator] who would wish for the
frequent suspension of this Act. (Hear.) -Let us see what
has happened with regard to the Act. In 1844 it was
enacted ; in 1847 it was suspended for a time. That occurred
on'y three years after it was passed, and I think men might
then reasonably say that an Act which within three years was

found to be unavailing and had broken down ought not to re-
main upon the statute-book. But since 1847 we have for 10
years had a sound state of the currency—(hear, hear)—we
have had no corn laints of the working of the Act ; and it
may be five years, or it may be 20 before there is another
occurrence similar to that which we are now considering. I
would leave the future to the future. I would allow it to be
decided by experience wh ther or not another 10 years may
not elapse without the ad ption of such a course, and, if the
inconvenience is then no greater than has been sustain d in
1847 and 1857, I should think that there would be reason
not for repealing, but for maintaining the Act. (Freer, hear.)
For, considering that your primary object is to maintain a
currency convertible into gold, and that yoar next object is
as far as possible, without endangering that cur) ency, to give
help in times of commor.ial distress and disaster, I think
that an Act which performs those functions as they have been
performed by the Act of 1844 in 1847 and in the present
year, is one which deserves to be supported. My hon. friend
the rwmber for Kendal (Mr. Glyn) says that when distress
begins the sight of the Bank returns aggravates the alarm.
That may be so, but is that the working of the Act of 1844 ?
I remember before the passing of that Act asking a friend of
mine who was very well conversant with those subjects, the
Late Lord Sydenham, what ought to be done if we had a com-
mercial crisis and a state of discredit. He said, " Let the Bank
go on and p►y to its last guinea." But would not that be a
time of distrust and distress Suppose that you had the Act
of 1819 aloee, without that of 1844, and there came a time at
which the reserve of bullion in the Bank was reduced to
1,000,0001. —to 500,0001.—t0 100,0001.—would not that pro-
duce great alarm. Would there net be a people as anxious
to obtain gold as they now are to obtain bank notes? Would
there not be the same discredit and distrust as now exist ?
Therefore, as I believe, it is not the Act of 1844, it is the very
nature of a currency convertible into gold, operating with a
diminution of commercial credit and the spread of alarm,
which produces that state of things to which my hon. friend
referred. (Hear.) If that be ,o, let us see what is the actual
working of this Act. It is, I confess, not that which you
would expect upon the face of the measure. The Act says
that there are 14 millions an 1 a half which the Bank may
always issue, but that any notes issued beyond that amount
must be the representatives of gold and silver bullion in its
cellars. If that were literally carried into effect when the
Bank had 16 millions of balm it would issue 3J millions of
bank-notes ; when it had 7 millions it would issue 21 mil-
lions. But that is not the operation of the Act, because we

all know that there is no such demand for notes as to induce
the Bank to go beyond some 22,000,0001. or 23/100,000/ ,

, .
and we know also that it is quite impossible for them to go on
issuing notes with safety to the extent of 7,000,0001., when
there is only that amount of bullion in reserve. Immediately
that tlio reserve of bank-notes is reduced to 1,000,0001., or
1,500,0001., still more when it is reduced to less, then comes
that desire to obtain notes which the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer has described. Every one sees that the reserve of
notes will soon be Exhausted and makes a rush to obtain
what proportion he wants, and thus the Bank becomes en-
dangered long before the notes represautin; 7.009,0001. of
gold are really issued. The Act of 1844, therefore, is more
restrictive than appears on the faoe of it. It hardly allows

the issue of 14i millions and the whole stock of bullion to
be represented ; there must bo a reserve of notes in order that
the Bank may be at all secure. The question may fairly be
discussed, whether any change should be mail in that re-

spect. Idoubt the utility of change ; but of this I am
quite sure; that if it should appear to a select committee that
a change might safely and beneficially be made it ought to be
made by Act of Parliament, and not by giving auy discretion
either to the Minister of the day or to the Bank of England.
(Hear, hear.) It should be plainly laid down in your Act
what further relaxation might be slowed. (Mar, hear,
hear.) I believe myself that the Act of 1841 has tended
to secure the currency and has not tended to aggravate
commercial distress. (Hear, hear, hear.) We have heard
with coins apprehension the views entertained by the
right hon. gentleman the member for Oxfordshire. Ho com-
plains that the Act of 1844 has encourae•ed the great evil of
over speculation, and has led to the circulation of a great deal
of worthless commercial paper in the country. (A laugh.)
That is a somewhat inconsistent complaint, and the right hon.
gentleman proposes accordingly a somewhat inconsistent re-
medy, because he says there should be no limit to tho issue
of paper by the Bank. (Hear, hear) Ho complains of the
limit ; but I wish to kn ow from him and from tho other
gentlemen who denounce the Act of 1844 what is tho real
extent of their demands. Are they satisfied or are they not
with the Act of 1819 ? Are they satisfied or are they not that
notes should always be conwr ible into gold ! Aro they
satisfied with the standard of the currency as lei 1 down in
ancient times, and as affirmed soon after the Revolution, and
again by Lord Althorp when he was Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer (Hear.) When thdy complain of the spec•al pro-
visions of the Act of 1844 do they not, in fact, mean a great
deal more ? Do they not really mean that there shall b% an
issue which shall not be founded upon bullion, but which
shall be so extensive, so expansive that it must necessarily
become greatly depreciated in value, requiring for the safety
of its credit the application of a Bank Restriction Act.
(Hear, hear.) If that be their intenti let them plaiuly
declare it. Do not let them complain of the special [revi-
sions of the Act of 1844, but lot them tell us whether they
mean to maintain the currency in its integrity. We shall
then know how to meet such a proposition. Such views aro
not openly avowed in this house, but they have been avowed
in some recent meetings; and in ono meeting especially
which took place in Glasgow, it was stated without disg,uiso
that your paper currency should be commensurate with the
demands of trade. (A laugh.) Is it intended, I ask, that
there should be any base for this currency, or is it mere
worthless paper, producing periodical convulsions worse than
any we have heretofore witnessed ? (Hear.) In defending the
Act of 1844, in admitting that there may be s me alteration
in its principles, but maintaining that there ought to be no re
in its provisions, I think I am in fact standing upon the Act of
1819 and the laws which regulate our currency. I believe that
th >se evils from which 'we have lately suffered, from which
we are still suffering, aro incickital to a very great and ex-
tended commerce. We all kndlirthat the laws passed of late
y ars, beginning in 1842 and ending with the repeal of the
Navigation Act in 1848, have tended greatly to increase the
trade of the country ; and we know also that while inereas ng
legitimate trade, while making many men wealthy and giving
general prosperity to the country; they have produced at the
same time the concomitant evils of unsound speculation, cash
adventures ,by men without capital, and bubble companies
eager to share i i the riches of the world. We are a great
commercial. country, prosperous beyond any that over existed
on t'e face Of the globe. But we must not expect too much.
We mu't occasimally be visited by misfortune. I believe,
however, that the general principles upon which we are acting
aro mound ones. I believe that the Government have on this
occasion pursued a course which will entitle them to the
gratitude of the country. I see nothing to be altered in our
general laws, and I hope that this house, at all events, will not
tamper with the great principles of a sound currency.
(Cheers.) •
Mr. DISRAELI—I trust that in discussing this question
we shall abstain from that vague declamation which has occa-
sionally been indulged in upon both sides of the house, and
among others by the noble lord who has just spoken, though
I admit that many of his observations, like much that falls-
from his lips, were worthy of. our most serious attoation.
What are we asked to do to-night ? It is no ordinary demand
that is made upon the House of Commons, We are asked to
consent to a Bill of Indemnity for an infraction of the law,
authorised by;the Government in consequence of the commer-
cial distress and distrust that have prevailed, and that unfor-
tunately still prevail. We have heard a great deal of com-
mittees upon commercial distress being advisable. Permit
me, though very briefly, to lay before you some suggestions
as to what may be the causes of the present commercial dis-
tress and distrust. The distress is general. It is not confined
to this country, where it is extensive. All know that it pre-
vails in the United States. It is • not peculiar to the United
States, as some gentlemen who have have addressed you
would seem to infer. It is European. It prevails in Ger-
many, in Aue.ria, in Denmark, in Sweden, and what is occur-
ring in Hamburg at this moment must be fresh in the recol-
lection and the fears of many members of this house.
Again, it is to be recollected that the commercial trans-
actions of Europe are carried on by au amount of
capital that is not to be counted by millions, but by hundreds
of millions. It is, therofore, a very great error—and hero I
entirely agree with the noble lord the member for the city—
to suppose that the management of a limited portion of the
currency of England could have occasioned this immense dis.
aster and these wide consequences, which really have origi-
nated, not from the mismanagement of the currency of this
country, but from the mismanagement of the capital of Eu-
rope. (Hear.) Now, there is one important point which we
must bear in mind in considering the Act of 1844. That Act
is an Act to'regulate the currency of this country. The pur-
port of it is in my mind irreproachable. Its object is one
er
easy
aer en
dnt dks the bo
which every man ought to wish to secure, and the means by
il
which that object is sought to bo obt tined are in many re-
spects worthy of public admiration. But is it or is it not the
fact that this Act, which really is intended only to regulate
the currency of this country, to establish and maintain the
convertibility of the notes of the Lank of England, has never-
theless the effect—as I believe, the unintended effect—of
greatly aggravator; commercial distr, ss and distrust when
they are occasioned by the misapplication and mismanage-
ment, not of the currency of England, but of the capital of
Europe ? (Hear, hear.) Now, I apprehend that that poi..t
has never been met throughout all these observations, which
I have listened to,.and I apprehend that it is a position which
can be established. I say it can be shown that it is in conse-
quence of the machinery of the Act of 1841, though intended
merely as a currency Act, and to h ,ve a limited application
to objects, no doubt, of paramount importance, that the
managers of the currency of this country h,.ve been forced to
treat in an identical manner and by the same means two cir-
cumstances totally opposite in their character, and both exgr-
cising a most powerful and injurious influence on the commerce
and capital of this country—that is, a foreign drain and a
domestic drain. I say that the Act of 1844, from the man-
ner in which it is framed, forces those who regulate the cur-
rency of this country to apply to a domestic drain exactly the
same treatment which is applied to a foreign drain ; while, if
there is anything which can be established by argument andan
abpeptre7alatteodfainctasnit
exactly
atehtalyt tchoenttrwnorysenitsaonfnecirr,cuamndstabnoceosnsehoonulnd-
tered by means exactly opposite. If that point be esta-
blished, and if that be the sound position, then surety we
accused
fairlysed byc otreidneorblae qluoredstioonf
wofisthinagt ktoindtamwpitehrouwtitbhetinhge
standard of value, to inundate the country with paper money,
or of desiring to recur to obselete modes of practice, and to
what took place in this country, with respect to the circula-
tion, when, in fact, the same circumstances did not exist,
and when there were not the same means of regulating tho
curt ency. The noble lord has made a very great appeal to-
night to the disastrous year of 1825, when he informed us
that 700 banks were broken in tho same morning, I believe.
(A laugh.) The noble lord was not then the Primo Minister
of this country, and though no man is letter acquain'ed with
its history than the noble lord, yet I think, that on this occa-
sion he has trusted too carelessly to his memory ; for at that
disastrous period, not 700 country banks, but 73 banks alto-
gether, in London and in the country, broke, and by no
means were the majority of these banks of issue. Therefore I
do not think that that illustrative warning bears very much
on the question we ought to consider this evening. (A laugh.)
But this year of 1825—this phantom of ancient distress con-
stantly raised in our debates—has really very little to do
with the modern principles of banking, and the means by
which the currency of this country is now carried on. It is
abusebtontwe
nituhnet Breaninkonidniroerettnoin•st ofin that day for what
1825 it was quite
impossible for the directors of the Bank of England to
themselves of those resources which yon now are always
ready to remind them are at their disposal to guard their
raising the rate of discounts. In 1825 you
by raising
laws to prevail, and it was impossible for
aav;Pathl:cel have a higher rate of discount than 5 per cent.
Therefore the year 1825 refers to circumstances which no

longer prevail in our laws and manners, and I protest against
the quotation of the year 1825 for the future in any currency
debate. (Hear.) Now, let us refer to the point before us.
We are in a state of great commercial distress and distrust.
I entirely agree with the noble lord on this point, that to
suppose that the great commercial distress which now pre-
vails could have been occasioned by the mismanagement of
the currency of this or any other country is like supposing
, •
that a greatnobleman coull be ruined by the mismanagement
of his pocket money. (Hear, hear.) The fact is, we are mis-
taking and have for a long time too easily mistaken, in all
these discussions capital for currency. But though the com-
mercial distress and distrust are entirely occasioned by the
management and application in this country, in America,
and in the European nations, of the great mass of floatingcapital which prevails, still, at the sam3 time, we cannot con-
ceal from ourselves that we have a law in this country intended
only to act on oar currency, and which, so far as the principle
it asserts is concerned, I hope the vast majority of this house
willmaintain, but which, whenever commercial distress an I
distrust occur, is found entirely u-iendurable, oppressive, and
ha ,racticable, and on every occasion of emergency we aro
obliged to suspend it. (Hear.) The noble lord who has just
addresse 1 the house, and who has addressed it with peculiar
authority on this subject, since he was the vel, first Minister
who recommended the violation of the statute, has referred to
the two occasions in a brief space of time when this Act was
suspended ; but, if he would refresh his recollection from the
evidence taken before the committee of last year, to which
c ,nstant reference has been made during this debate, he will
find that practically, or virtually at least, the suspension of
this Act is not to be confined to those ts o instances, memo-
rable as they are ; because in the autumn of 1853 there was a
a very great pressure, and the precious metals were leaving
this country —one of the causes, by-the-bye, of our present
embarrassment, and consequent on the expenditure for he
Russian war. The pressure on the money-market was ex-
treme ; the rate of discount was raised—and wisely raised—
by the directors of the Bank of England, and by the prudent
and courageous manner in which in that instance, as subse-
quently, they managed their affairs, the danger for the
moment was averted. But we have the evidence of Mr.
Chapman, and that is no inconsiderable testimony, as all
acquainted with the subject will admit. Well, he by whom
the force of a money pressure is al ways felt, who represents
the greatest discount house in Lombard-street, says that
had it not been for some private information which reached

him to the effect that in case of extreme pressure
there would be an inference on the part of the Go-
vernment he should at that moment have given up the
idea of struggling any further, and it was only on that tacit
understanding that he went on with his business. (Hear,
hear.) Remember who gave that evidence. He is the very
individual whose representations, if I am rightly informed, iu
1857 as well as in 1847, induced the Minister of this county
to recommend the suspension of this Act. (Hear, hear.)
The question naturally arises what is the effect of allowing the
currency of this country to be regulated by an A.,t which we
are in a continual stat ) of being prepared to' suspend ? So
entirely do I admire the object of that Act, so anxious am I
myself to hope that a largo majority of this House is pre-
pared to uphold the practicable and virtual convertibi:ity of
the note, that I should be most anxious to interpret the ma-
chinery of the Act in a manner the most favourable to its
co,,tinuance, and to the non-necessity of alteration. I would
pass over one crisis, in which its provisions had been sus-
pended, with what I should consider a wise indulgence, but
it becomes the committee deeply to consider whether it will
sanction a chronic state of suspension—whether we arc to
have an Act of such a character as always either to be sus-
pended, or to be in that state in which those who are acting
unsler it knew that when an emergency arises it will not be
put in practice. Is tint wise ? (Hear.) " But," says the
noble lord, "on the whole that is the course I recom r.end."
The noble lord loves a precedent. He sets a precedent in
this instance himself, and I can easily understand the
tender :egret with which the nob'e lord would, at the
same time, witness that we had turned from that
precedented, and as it were passed some censure, mild,
I am sure, on the sagacity of his conduct in
1817. But the noble lord says that this Act is a consider.
able cheek on what he calls over-speculation and an inflated
currency, which in times of prosperity abound. I am sorry
to hear from the noble lord that our periods of prosperity
aro always necessarily to be accompanied by such distress,
but when the noble lord so fairly tells us what are the con-
sequences of increased circulation—when ho tells es tha%.
unless we have these consider tble checks, the currency will
be greatly increased—there will be no thee': on the issues of

the Bank—a crisis will ariie, the circulation will be inflated,
and there will, in fact, be no standard of value, I may he
permitted to say to the noble lord with all respect, that
though these were opinions once held by persons of consider.
able reputation, and for aught I know m ty bo still adhered
to by persons of considerable repute, yet they are con-
clusions the authenticity of which is entirely impugned by
authorities of a more novel nature than perhaps the noble
lord may t-,e aware of, and of no less high a character than
any to which the noble lord could appeal. Many high
authorities have held that the depreciation of a bank-note
convertible at par is a simple impossibility, and they have
also held that it is quite out of the power of any bank to
issue beyond the requirements of the country, and what
is still more important, is that it is not in the power
of any one to prove that any i sue at any tiose has ever
affected the price of articles. Nay, mOro, we have con-
clusive evidence in our possession that the reverse is the
fact. Now really, Sir, under these circumstances I must
protest against the n•,ble lord so freely, and in that style of
declamation w:iich he can command even upon a curren y.
question, lending his authority to a principle which I believe
to be quite fallacious, and to conclusions whi h I believe to
be untenable, and to cict tits which I think he will find him-
self totally unable to substantiate. But, says the noblelord,
" this Act is a check upon the over-speculation of the day,
and although there may be sortie objection to the mode in
which that check is exercised, still the benefit which results
from it is indubitable." But when the noble lord talks of
this Act operating as a beneficial check, while the Govern- •
ment may interfere with the period of is bells carried out,
let me asz the house to consider one point which I think has
not been fairly taken into considerat on daring the course of
this debate. If the house be prepared to sanction and coun-
tenance this dispensing power so be exerted at the arbitrary
will of the Minister of the day, how don it propose to recog-
nise the difference of position between those firms who fall
victims before the dispensing power is exercised ? Are those '
who hold on a favoured 24 hours struck upon the clock of
the Royal Exchange of London to dominate over those with
whom they ought to be fellow-victims? (Hear, hear.) Let
me remind the house that when we discuss this question and
perhaps discuss it too easily as regards those whohave
it might perhaps be as well to go a little into detail, for
it is onl, through detail that the house can realise some
idea of the consequences of this fear and distrust in London
and the other great marts of commercial enterprise. Now,
sir, here is a document with which I have been
furnished, and I will ans-ver for its being correct and accu-
rate, although I cannot answer for its being complete, be-
cause there are names of many victims with rega d to whom
the amounts for whi h they have fallen h ,ve nut yet been
ascertained ; but here is a docement of desolation in my
hand, the contents of which I thick will surprise even those
gentlemen connected with the commerce and monetary
tran actions of the country who have addressed us to-night.
It is a return of the number of firms which have fallen be-
tween the 7th of September and the 12th of N ,v. mber,
a period of little more than two months, and among those
firms there are some of no inconsiderable import oleo, and
some which ranked, as far its capital c in be a test of position,
in the highest class in mercantile repu' e. In that brief period
I find that no 1- ss than 85 firms fell which represented a
capi al of 42,000,000/. sterling, and, with the exception of
firms representing 8,000,000 of money, those mercantile esta-
blislim nts fell before the letter of November, some of them a
few days, even holm, before that letter. (Hear, hear.) Now
if.we are to leave the I tw in this st tte, I really thaik that it
becomes us calmly, but earnestly and seriously, to consider
whatis the operation of the policy, what the state of the ad-
ministration in-this country which thus conducts and controls
its commerce. it have heard statesmen to-night, and among
them the noble lord the member for London, who do not shrink
from the responsibility of exercising this dispensing power. I
must eay that the right hon. gentleman. the .Chancellor of the
Exchequer, showed moromod sty, and display d his reluctance
to exercise such a responsibility, by intimating the possibility
.upon his ~art of making some suggestion which would avoid
a re ponsibility so terrible. A man must have great confi-
dence in himself, in his position, and in his character who,
under err urnstances such as I have described, when 85 firms
.representing a capital of 40,000,0011., had fallen within so
short a period, would, as a Minister of the Crown, have no
re uczance in deciding when to interfere. (Hear, hear.) I
am deeply conscious that every English statesman is sin-
cerely anxious to do his duty to his country, and I can readily
'Conceive the terrible anxiety with which a Minister under
such circumstanc s might consult some eminent capitalist,
perhaps one of his principal supporters, and ono whose mer-
cantile knowledge and intelligence had been of groat assist-
ance, I won't say is preparing a budget, but iu famishing
details for the assistance of a Minister in framing his financial
scheme. I am not making any personal allusion, but I am
only supposing the general position in which a Minister may
be placed. Well, then, suppose the Minister to consult such
an individual. It may be of the utmost importance to a man
engaged in commercial pursuits
,that the suspending power
should be delayed for 24 hours, or precipitated by that
period, in order to destroy a rival or to save himself. The con-
sequences of such a course I need not dwell upon. I know that
such a case may no:, happen, but would it be wise in us to
sanction a law which might, under any circumstances, lead to
. consequences of such a character ? I am sure that the House
will r fleet deeply upon the difficulty which now surrounds
us, that they will recollect the contents of the startling
document to which I have alluded, and that they will feel
that it is no child's play to bear responsibility oa such a sub-
ject—a subject which I say is the last with regard to which
the responsibility of a Minister of the Crown ought to be
exercised, It is a responsibility almost beyond the endur-
ance of any individual, and one which is totally alien to the
character of the constitution of this country. (Hear, hear.)
You have thought a dispensing power with regard to civil
and political rights unbearable, and you have changed a dy-
nasty rather than submit to it, and are you prepared now to
extend to a Minister such a power with regard to a subject
which in this country touches you. perhaps, more nearly than
either civil or political rights? Where commercial and mono-
tary.interests aro concerned, aro you prepared to submit
quietly to a dispensing power, exercised arbitrarily at the
discretion of the Minister, the exorcise of which even when
most virtuously employed may be unjust in its application
and ruinous in its results (Cheers.) I think, therefore, that
it is most desirable that we should take some course to prevent
a repetition of the transactions of 1847 and 1857. I think
the time has arrived in which we ought to exert ourselves to
solve a difficulty which may be great, but ono which we ought
not to evade but which we ought to endeavour to surmount,
and I regret that I Pee no disposition on the part of Govern-
ment to undertake the task. That such appears the case I re-
gret the more because I think that all that has been said upon
the subject during the present session might have tended to
prove to her Majesty's Ministers there woe no desire in any
quarter to throw any obstacle in the way of the full excercise
of their discretion, but that, on the contrary, there was every
wish to assist them to a solution of the difficulty which would
redound to their honour, We are to-night asked to agree to a
Bill of Indemnity ; now, I said yesterday, perhaps rather
inadvertently, that my consent to that bill would depend upon upon
the line taken by the Government with respect vspect toact
Bill itself. I forgot that the bill was not a of Indemnity f or
Ministers alone, but also an indemnity for the Bank directors.
Now, I don't think that any one can impugn the conduct of
the Bank directors. There is no evidence before us that the
Bank directors required this interference; and in 1847, not
only did they not only solicit the Government for a suspen-
sion of the act, on the contrary, they did not avail them-
selves of i s suspension, but disapproved the course which
had been adopted, and maintained the convertibility of the
note I have reason to believe that in the present instance the j
directors of the Bank have acted in the same lataguanimous
spirit ; and if, at the suggestion of. the Government, they
have consented to take an illegal step, I think, whatever may
be our differences of opinion on the general subject, it would
be cowardly and vindictive to throw any obstacle in the way
of their indemnity. So far, therefore, as the Bill of Indemnity
is asked, I am prepared to accede to the request of the Go-
vernment, but further than that I cannot afford my consent.
I think the Government have taken an erroneous step, not-
withstand ng the high authority just expressed in their
favour by the noble lord in recommending that the house
should again appoint the committee to consider this question.
I must repeat my belief that there is no subject which
can solicit the attention and consideration of public men on

iwhick there exists even such a owning() of- knowledge and
information as upon the principles on which the currency of
this country should be established, and on which it has of
late years been carried on, and that any attempt to postpone
the solution of the grave difficulties which surround' t by
farther inquiry will lead to great public inconvenience, pos-
sibly to great public disaster. I think we Ought to show no
hesitation in meeting those difficulties that we ought to give
our best consideration not only to the passing, but the ihitne-
diate passing of some measure which will prevent the future
necessity 'of appealing to this house for bills of indemnity to'
her Majesty's Ministers for such acts as that in respect of
which thOy now deem it necessary to ask us to support them.
I h iveendeavoured to call the attention of the house to what
I thi,k the vital point in this bill which requ,reS our con-
sideration. lam for supporting the spirit of the bill as far
as it maintains the convertibility of the notes which the
Bank issues. I would do that completely, sincerely, and in
no spirit Of equivocation, but believing as I do that the law
by its enactments forcing the Bank to treat a foreign
and a doniestic drain by the same means, not only occasions
but as ;ravates distress and distrust among the commercial
classes of this country, I think wa ought to meet that difficulty
by re me :IYi ng the law in that respect. Let the house realise to it-
sel f onegreat differenc 3 between a domestic and a foreign drain.
With a foreign drain we have learnt by experience efficiently '
to cope. We have never had a greater strain on our resources
in that respect than we have had of late years, 'but by that
powerful arm which the usury laws now place on the Bank of
England we have been enabled to cope with that efficiently;
and I therefore think there is no man in this country who
has now ahy fear of ultimately disastrous consequences of a ,
foreign drain. A foreign drain is a very unimpassioned, cal-
culating transaction. It is founded on a knowledge of our
resources, and upon the necessities of those wlio in foreign
countries require our aid, and, however inexorable the de-
mand, it is one which is acted on almost In an instant by the
results of reason and calculation. But the moment you come
to a domestic drain you have to encounter elements of a very
different character. The moral quality, as well as the mate-
rial ele nent, enters into the calculation of the domestic drain.
The passions of fear and hope govern mankind ; the mart and
the ex3hange are not free from the influence of those pas-
sions, and when you have circumstances in which a whole
nation is panic Struck you cannot hope by the aid of economic
science successfully to encounter them. It is therefore the
duty of Parliament to remedy the deficiencies of the law in
that respect. But I cannot believe we have any 'chance of-
obtaining that remedy if we c nisent to the course suggested
by her Majesty's Ministers. In 1840 the whole question of a -
bank of issue was gone into by a committee which, whether
we look to the reputation of the members who formed it, or,
the high character of the witnesses called before it, produced
a volume inferior in interest to none in this house. In 1847,
after the panic, you had a committee to inquire into the
same subject and into the influence of this very Act of 1844.
At the beginning of last year a third committee was appoint-
ed, and its transactions are before you. What more can you

want ? An the more distinguished writers of the day on pub.
lie and political economy have favoured the country with
their speculations on this subject. There is no new writer
before us, and I think therefore the time has came when wo
ought to settle this question. What is the use of a govern-
ment if it cannot settle this question? (A laugh) What is the
use of a House of Commons if it cannot animate and - inspire
a governments? (Laughter, and an ironical cheer.) There are
some men who think that members of Parliament arc -only
made to form Parliamentary committees ; but it is only a
preparatory, though a very useful, training to accumulate in-
telligence in that way, to sift evidence and draw conclusions.
There is something higher and more necessary ; that is, to re-
commend a policy ; and I think the time has come when wo
ought to recommend a policy. (Cheers.) Now, the right hon.
gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer has no wish that
there should be any great de ay iu passing this Bill of Indem-
nity. I wish to meet him in that respect frankly and in the
most friendly spirit ; but I hope the right hon. gentleman
• will not really and practically hold if we give him this bill of
Indemnity that Parliament was only called together for th it
object. The right hen. gentleman has a motion on the paper for
a committee, If he would only settle the night on whichto tako
that motion for a committee I would move to that motion an
amendment the purport of which would be, Without, of
course, pledging myself at this moment to its exact phraseoe
logy, to express the opinion of the house that it is expedient
to legislate on the subject, and not to refer it to a select com:
mittee. If the right hon. gentleman will say this clay week
for his committee, I will assist him to the best of my power
in carryinghis bill; and on this day week, if he will move the
committee, I will endeavour in a manner befitting the im-
portance of the subject to ask the house to consider whether,
under all the circumstances of the ease, it is expedient that
this question should be referred to a select committee, and
whether it is not wiser to proceed at once to legislate on the
subject. (Hoar, hear.)
The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER could not but
acknowledge the fairness with which the right hon. gentle.
man had treated the subject, and the disposition he had
shown to facilitate the business before the house. Endoubt-
edly, the passing of the Indemnity Bill was the mein °Weet
for which Parliament had been assembled at this time, and
formed tho principal business which the Government wished
to forward. If the house consented to allow the bill to be
introduced that evening, he would propose the second read-
ing for Monday, and would bring forward hi, motion for a
committee ou Friday. Ho hoped that arrangement would
suit the convenience of the house. (Hear, hear) Per-
haps he would be permitted to refer for a moment to a
question of fact which had been adverted to by the right lion.
gentleman the member for Oxfordshire, and also by the right
hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli). He alluded to the
statement made before the committee of last session by Mr.
Chapman, the managing member of the house of Overend
and Gurney. At the present moment lie had not the report
of the committee before him, and therefore he quoted from
memory; but his recollection of the evidence given by Mr.
Chapman was, that on some oceasi in he had received as as-
surance from a gentleman on whom he placed reliance that
in the event of their house discounting to a large amount
they might rely on the suppo tof the Government. A ques- •
tura was put as to the authority on which that statement was
made, and he did not assert that lie had received any direct
communication from the Government. It was possible that
his (the Chancellor of the Exchequer's) recollection might
not be very precise as to the words used ; but, be that as it
might, he thought it right to stat,l that no such communica-
ti u). as Mr. Chapman mentioned was ever wade by the present
Government either to the house of Overend and Gurney or to
any other similar discounting-house whatever. (Hear.) Ho
wished to assure the house in the broadeSt terms that could.
be used that the statement of Mr. Chapman, and the
impression of the person to whom lie referred, had no autho-
rity from the Government, and must have originated in an
entire misapprehension. (Hear, hear )
Mr. CARDWELL said tho arrangement proposed by tho
Chancellor of the Exchequer led to the inference that
the discussion of the great question before them would be
t deen rather on the motion for a coearnittee than on the bill
whieli was about to be introduced. He acquiesced in the
wisdom of that arrang,ment and would reserve any observa-
tions he bad to make till Friday next.

The resolution was then agreed. The house resumed ; leave
was given to bring In the bill, and it was brought in accord-
ingly by the Chancellor of ►ho Exchequer, read a first time,
and ordered to be road a second time on Monday.
ACCIDENTS ON RAILWAYS.

On tho motion of Mr. BENTINCK, a committee was wood to
to inquire into the macs of accidents on railways, awl into
the possibility of removing auy such causes by further leg's-
latio a.