The Sun.
London, England, 1861-08-10 00:00:00

GENERAL SCOTT AAD TRE STRATEGY

OF THE WAR.

(From the New York Times, 'fitly 26.)

On the Tuesday preceding the battle, General
Scott, at his own table, in presence of his aides and
a single guest, discussed the whole subject of this
war, in all its parts, and with the utmost clearness
and accuracy. He had a distinct and well-defined

.
opinion on every point connected with it ; and
stated what his plan would be for bringing it to a
close, if the management of it had been left in his
hands. The main object of the war, he said,
was to bring the people of the rebellious States to
feel the pressure of the government ; to compel
them to return to their obedience and loyalty. And
this must be done with the least possible expendi-
ture of life compatible with the attainment of
the object. No Christian nation can be justified, he
said, in waging war in such a way as shall destroy
501 lives, when the object of the war can be attained
at a cost of 500. Every man killed beyond the num-
ber absolutely required is murdered. Hence he
looked upon all shooting of pickets, all scouting
forays not required in order to advance the general
object of the war, all destruction of life on either
side which did not contribute to the general result,
as so many acts of unjustifiable homicide.
If the matter had been left to him, he said, he
would have commenced by a perfect blockade of
every Southern port on the Atlantic and the Gulf.
Then he would have collected a large force at the
capital for defensive purposes, and another large
one on the Mississippi for offensive operations.
The summer months, during which it is mad-
ness to take troops south to St. Louis, should have
been devoted to tactical instruction ; and with the
first frosts of autumn he would have taken a column
of 80,000 well-disciplined troops down the Missis-
sippi, and taken every important point on that river,
New Orleans included. It could have been done,
he said, with greater ease, with less loss of life, and
with far more important results than would attend
the marching of an army to Richmond. At eight
points the river would have been defended, and eight
battles would probably have been necessary; but in
every one of them success could have been made cer-
tain for us. The Mississippi and the Atlantic once
ours,the Southern States would have been compelled
by the natural and inevitable pressure of events to
seek, by a return to the Union, escape from the
ruin that would speedily overwhelm them out of it.
" This," said he, "was my plan. But lam only a
subordinate. It is my business to give advice when
it is asked, and to obey orders when they are given.
I shall do it. There are gentlemen in the Cabinet
who know much more about war than I do, and
who have far greater influence than I have in deter-
mining the plan of the campaign. There never
was a more just and upright man than the Presi-
dent ; never one who desired more sincerely to
promote the best interests of the country ; but
there are men among his advisers who consult
their own resentments far more than the dictates
of wisdom and experience, and these men will
probably decide the fate of the campaign. I shall
do, or attempt, whatever lam ordered to do. But
they must not hold me responsible. If I am ordered
to go to Richmond, I shall endeavour to do it. But
I know perfectly well that they have no concep-
tion of the difficulties we shall encounter. I know
the country—how admirably adapted it is to de-
fence, and how resolutely and obstinately it will
be defended. I would like nothing better than to
take Richmond. Now that it has been disgraced
by becoming the capital of the rebel confederacy,
I feel a resentment towards it, and should like
nothing better than to scatter its congress to the
winds. But I have lived long enough to know that
human resentment is a very bad foundation for a
public policy; and these gentlemen will live
long enough to learn it also. I shall do what
lam ordered. I shall fight when and where
lam commanded. But if lam compelled to fight
before I am ready, they shall not hold me respon-
sible. These gentlemen must take the responsi-
bility of their acts, as I am willing to take that of
mine. But they must not throw their responsi-
bility on my shoulders."
This is the substance, and very nearly the lan-
guage, of a portion of Gen. Scott's conversation on
the occasion referred to. It proves conclusively
that he was opposed to the advance on Richmond
by way of Manassas at that time, and also that the
administration was almost certain to overrule his
objections and command a battle.

Now, we have not the slightest wish to see
anything like a break-up of this administration.
Such an event, in the present condition of the
country, could only be fruitful in disaster. But
it is indispensably necessary for the President
to decide, peremptorily and finally, between General
Scott and those who would overrule him. The
great interest of the country now lies in its army.
Its military department is the dopartmt nt of over-
whelming interest and importance. Its finances
and its foreign relations are in good hands; and
there should not be a moment's hesitation in placing
at the head of the War Department some man of
larger views, of more Experience, and of more com-
manding personal reputation than the present in-
cumbent. And, above all, the country should know
at once whether it may still lean upon the great
military genius and experience of the lieutenant-
general of our armies, or whether we are to be
thrown back upon the new crop of generals and
statesmen who are striving to grasp the power that
rests in his hands.