The Sun.
London, England, 1861-06-27 00:00:00

" He was glad to say that Rochdale was the only'
town in England that in public meeting assembled,
had refused to establish a volunteer corps. He was
in France at the time. He believed from what he
there saw that the people of Rochdale were quite
right. He had been led to form this opinion from
what he personally knew of the feelings of France
towards England. He firmly believed when the
volunteer rage was going on in England, as now,
that the French nation never contemplated invad-
ing this country." We certainly share the pleasure
he expresses in the first sentence ; that " Roch-
dale was the only town "—for had other
towns followed the example, we have little
doubt that things would have been very different
from what they are, not only in England but on
the Continent. It may be that purposes of inva-
sion of England itself have not been many ; the
man at the helm in France well knew even in our
weakest condition that that would be but a desperate
throw of the dice. But can it be doubted that France
and her EMPEROR have both desired to outvie
England on the theatre of the world, and to exhibit
French policy as master of English policy. Does
any one believe that, had our navy not been what
it is,ltalian unity and liberties would not have been in
a very different positicn. Would Syria have been
occupied by a few trcops only, and those with-
drawn according to agreement ? Would the
Pacha of EGYPT have been left as independent as
he is ; and might not even the intrigue through
M, LESSEPS have been exchanged for relations
bordering ou a protectorate' If invasion of
England has been a wish and a pleasant dream,
rather than a deliberate project, and if the liber-
ties of Italy have almost become an unreversible
fact, we believe that the majority of Mr: COBDEN'S
4,000 auditors, would in their hearts, ascribe this
to our Volunteers and our Navy. We are confident
that GARIBALDI would heartily affirm this view of
the question, and so would all the great Statesmen
of Italy, And if Mr. COBDEN should reply what
is Italy to us, we should rejoin, put that question to
the meeting of last Wednesday.
On another main point or two, however, we
heartily agree with Mr. COBDEN. "If (he said)
he had seen that France was creating a navy
superior to ours, he should have been a traitor to
his QUEEN and country if he had not denounced it
with all his might. Before France should have a
navy equal to ours, without reasons for having such,
which she had not now, he would vote one hundred
tnillion sterling for the defence of our country."
Mr. COBDEN has said as much before and we
believe him, and this genuine English feeling it is
which keeps him right with his countrymen. We
also agree with him in another view, that we are
not in the position in which we ought to be for the
money we have spent. After a careful examination
not of the French estimates, but of the money
actually spent by them and by us on the navy, the
French naval expenditure for ten years up to 1858
—the year of the last audited expenditure—the
French had spent on their navy little more than
half what we have done! To this must be added—
" That while England had spent on her navy half
as much more as France, she at the same time had
an advantage over France of 20 per cent. Eng-
land could build her engines at 30 per cent.
less, while her coals and stores each cost her
20 per cent. less." The inference cannot be
evaded, that there has been the grossest misman-
agement. That we have paid scores of millions
and spent them uselessly ; that the income tax
collector has sponged us out of our earnings to
throw them all into the sea, This is mortifying
enough. The more so because we believe that
while the House of Commons is squabbling over
insignificant little leaks, the great leak is still
open. The Admiralty still remains unreformed—
an instrument for spending money rather than
for maintaining a fleet. If Mr. COBDEN will keep
his eye on this point he may make a most valu-
able use of his great talents.

A statement of considerable interest and of much
importance was made on Tuesday evening in the
House of Lords by the Noble Duke at the head
of the Board of Admiralty. It had especial refer-
ence to the position of the officers holding com-
missions in the Royal Navy of England. It was
a statement demonstrating quite clearly the fact
that, at any rate upon the active list of officers in
the Royal Navy, the national service is at this
moment, and has for a very long while been (for
war purposes at least) anything rather than over-
stocked. The retired list may for some reasons be
very disheartening to look upon—that is to look
from the point of view of a rigid economist. Not
thus, however, is it in any respect with regard to
the active list as aforesaid. The Duke of SOMERSET
spoke upon the subject we are here referring to
while moving at Tuesday's sitting in the Lords for
a copy of the " regulations under which masters
or mates of merchant vessels might be enrolled as
officers of the Royal Navy Reserve." Before at-
tempting to insist upon the advisability of this
course, his Grace endeavoured first of all to demon-
strate the urgent necessity of adopting some mea-
sure of the kind ; and secondly, explained to the
Upper House that other plans for mitigating the
evil recognised had been thought of, and even
tried, but had been also found upon trial of them
to be wholly inadequate for the emergency. The
statistics scattered through the remarks of the
Duke of SOMERSET on Tuesday may be here briefly
gathered together for the reader's consideration.
His Grace said that—while we have of Admirals
on the active and retired lists as many as 309 (they
having at the close of the war in 1816 numbered no
more than 236) while we have of Captains on
the active and retired lists as many absolutely
as —we
list—w e have, it is true, lieutenants on the
alone, amounting in the aggregate to
855. But—added his Grace immediately upon
mentioning the last specified total—" The whole
number of lieutenants that were unemployed was
150, and when they went through the list to see
how many of these 160 lieutenants were available
for the navy, there were not really
point of
above"—how
t,
many is it supposed?—why, actually not more
than 25 altogether ! Showing in
for war emergencies, a reserve of lieutenants upon
the active list that is literally no reserve at all.
Some persons, of course, had suggested that the
mates might be judiciously promoted. But—the
mates are very few altogether, they numbearbloeusst
than a hundred, their total is somewhere
eighty-six ! Then it was argued " EnterTha,,
moret,
cadets and you will get more officers." "
observed his Grace, " was very true, and for
the last three or four years they had entered
more. Instead of one hundred a year they had
entered two hundred, but it was to be observed
that entering a great number in one year was
unfavourable to the state of the navy. It would
be bad for the service, and bad for the officers
themselves. Bringing up a number of young
men of the same years' standing would diminish
their chance of promotion. That would, of itself,
be a great evil. Then it produced a large list
of officers who could not be employed in time of
peace, and the consequence was, that those officers
from want of employment became inefficient." All
these being good and valid reasons why the
entering of a larger number of middies into the list