The Sun.
London, England, 1861-08-24 00:00:00

and the Second Brigade were crossing to the front
and right, the enemy opened his fire, beginning
with artillery and following it up with infantry.
The leading brigade (Burnside's) had to sustain the
shock for a short time without support, and did it
well. The battalion of regular infantry was sent
to sustain it, and shortly afterwards the other corps
of Porter's Brigade and a regiment detached from
Heintzelman's Division to the left, forced the
enemy back far enough to allow Sherman's and
Keye's Brigades, of Tyler's Division, to cross from
their position on the Warrenton road. These drove
the right of the enemy, understood to have been
commanded by Beauregard, from the front of the
field, and out of the detached woods, and down to
the road and across it up the slopes on the other.
side.

While this was going on, Heintzelman's Division
was moving down the field to the stream and up the
road beyond.
Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of
the road down which our troops had marched from
Sudley's Spring, is a hill with a farm-house on it.
Behini this hill the enemy had, early in the day,
some of his most annoying batteries planted. Across
the road from this hill was another hill, or rather
elevated ridge or table of land. The hottest part
of the contest was for the possession of the hill with
a house on it. The force engaged here was Heint-
zelman's Division, Wilcox's and Howard's Brigades
on the right, supported by part of Porter's Brigade
and the cavalry under Palmer, and Franklin's Bri-
gade of Heintzelman's Division, Sherman's Brigade
of Tyler's Division in the centre, and tip the road,
while Keyes's Brigade of Tyler's Division was on
the left, attacking the batteries near the stone
bridge. The Rhode Island battery, of Burnside's
Brigade, also participated in this attack by its fire
from the north of the turnpike. The enemy was
understood to have been commanded by J. E. John-
ston. _ _

Ricketts's battery, which did such effective service,
and played so brilliant a part in the contest, was,
together with Griffin's battery, on the side of the
hill, and became the object of the special attention
of the enemy, who succeeded—our officers mistak-
ing one of his regiments for one of our own, and
allowing it to approach without firing upon it—in
disabling the battery and then attempted to take it.
Three times was he repulsed by the different corps
in succession and driven back, and the guns taken
by hand, the horses being killed, and pulled away.
The third time it was supposed by us all that the
repulse was final, for he was driven entirely from
the hill, and so far beyond it as not to be in sight,
and all were certain the day was ours. He had
before this been driven nearly a mile and a half,
and was beyond the Warrenton road, which was
entirely in our possession from the stone bridge
westward, and our engineers were just completing
the removal of the abattis across the road, to allow
our reinforcements (Schenck's Brigade and Ayers's
battery) to join us. The enemy was evidently dis-
heartened and broken.
But we had been fighting from half-past 10 o'clock
in the morning, and it was after 3 o'clock in the
afternoon. The men had been up since 2 o'clock in
the morning, and had rsade what to those unused
to such things seemed a long march before coming
into action, though the longest distance gone over
was not more than 9,1 miles ; and though they had
three days' provisions served out to them the day
before, many no doubt slid not eat them or threw
them away on the march or during the battle, and
were therefore without food. They had done much
severe fighting. Some of the regiments which had
been driven from the hill in the first two attempts
of the enemy to keep possession of it had become
shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of
the ranks.

It was at this time that the enemy's reinforce-
ments came to his aid from the railroad train, un-
derstood to have just arrived from the valley with
the residue of Johnston's army. They threw them-
selves in the woods on our right, and towards the
rear of our right, and opened a fire of musketry
on our men, which caused them to break and re-
tire down the hill side. This soon degenerated into
disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every
effort was made to rally them, even beyond the
reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The batta-
lion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill
opposite to the one with the house on it, and there
maintained itself until our men could get down to
and across the Warrenton turnpike, on the way
back to the positio❑ we occupied in the morning.
The plain was covered with the retreating troops,
and they seemed to infect those with whom they
came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout,
and this soon degenerated still further into a panic.
Finding that this state of affairs was beyond the
efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully
during the long and hard day's work in gaining
almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing
remained on the field, but to recognise what we
could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders
to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to
form in line, and offer the appearance, at least, of
organisation. They returned by the fords to the
Warrenton-road, protected, by my order, by Col.
Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and
the different corps coming together in small par-
ties, many without officers, they became inter-
mingled, and all organisation was lost.
Orders had been sent to l‘liles's Division for a
brigade to move forward and protect this retreat,
and Colonel Blenker's Brigade was despatched for
this purpose, and was ordered to go as forward as
the point where the road to the right left the main
road.

By referring to the General Order, it will be seen
that, while the operations were to go on in front,
an attack was to be made at Blackburn's Ford by
the brigade (Richardson's) stationed there. A re-
ference to this report and to that of Major Hunt,
commanding the artillery, will show that this part
of the plan was well and effectively carried out. It
succeeded in deceiving the enemy for a consider-
able time, and in keeping in check a part of his
force. The fire of the artillery at this point is re-
presented as particularly destructive.
At the time of our retreat, seeing gnat activity
in this direction, much firing, and columns of dust,
I became anxious for this place, fearing if it were
turned or forced the whole stream of our retreating
mass would be captured or destroyed. After pro-
viding for the protection of the retreat by Porter's
and Blenker's Brigades, I repaired to Richardson's,
and found the whole force ordered to be stationed
for the holding of the road from Manassas by Black-
burn's Ford to Centreville, on the march. under the
orders of the division commanded, for Centreville.
I immediately halted it, and ordered it to take up
the best line of defence across the ridge that their
nosition admitted of, and subsequently, taking in
person the command of this part of the army, I
caused such a disposition of the forces, which had
been added to by the Ist and 2d New Jersey and
the De Kalb Regiments, ordered up from Runyon's
reserve before going forward, as would best serve
to check the enemy. The ridge being held in this
way, the retreating current passed slowly through
Centreville to the rear.
The enemy followed us from the ford as far as
Cob Run, and, owing to the road becoming blocked
up at the crossing, caused us much damage there,
for the artillery could not pass, and several pieces
and caissons had to be abandoned. In the panic
the horses hauling the caissons and ammunition
were cut from their places by persons to escape with,
and in this way much confusion was caused, the
panic aggravated, and the road encumbered. Not
only were pieces of artillery lost, but also many of
the ambulances carrying the wounded.
By sundown most of our men had gotten behind
Centreville-ridge, and it became a question whe-
ther we should or not endeavour to make a
stand there. The condition of cur artillery and
its ammunition, and the want of food for the
men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away
all that had been issued the day before, and the
utter disorganization and consequent demoraliza-
tion of the mass of the army, seemed to all who
were near enough to be consulted—division and bri-
gade commanders and staff—to admit of noalferna•
tive but to fall back ; the more so as the noition at
Blackburn's Ford was then in the posses:ion of the
enemy, and he was already turning our left. On
bendinot, the officers of the Staff to the different
Camps they found, as they reported to me, that our