The Sun.
London, England, 1861-04-12 00:00:00

he had described, Surely they ought dot to incur that fur-
ther expenditure until they had had a thorough change in
• the system, and knew that they would get value for their
money. Even it were not desirable to have these vessels
built in private yards, their construction ought to be delayed
until some security was taken that they would be built at
a. low a price as it could be done elsewhere. (Hear, hear.)
If this country went on increasing its expenditure at the
present rate France must do the same, and there would
ne and to their rivalry in ruinous armaments. Let thr
house consider the foolish tariff which the States of North
America had lately passed, and which, although it would
injure its authors more than it injured us, would yet be a
blow to our own monufacturing interest. Let them consider,
also, the heavy load of taxation to which our people were
subjected, and remember that many operatives in the man-
ufacturing districts were already out of employment. He
had seen a telegraph from Manchester, dated Monday last,
which stated that great excitement prevailed among the
workpeople at Staleybridge and elsewhere, owing to a
threatened reduction of wages, and that disturbances of the
peace had taken place. Telegraphs such as that were as the
handwriting on the wall, from which it would be wise to
take warning. Ile called upon the house, then, to make
such substantial reductions in the public expenditure as
they could easily make without impairing the efficiency of
the service; and he felt confident that they would net
neglect the true interests of the people. (Hear, hear.) The
hon. gentleman concluded by moving his resolution.
Sir S. M. PETO, in seconding the motion, called atten-
tion to the circumstances connected with the building of the
iron war steamers Nemesis, Guadeloupe, Lizard and Harpy.
These vessels had been tried on distant service and in actual
warfare, and the reports of their commanders proved that
when struck with shot their plates were seldom penetra-
ted, and that even when so penetrated the damage done
admitted of easy repair. Having referred to the reports
of Captains Hall and Charlewood, the commanders of two
of the above-named ships, in support of his statement,
the hon. member observed that achango of ministry having
taken place in 1846, Sir Howard Douglas was requested by
the Government to make a report on the value and utility
of iron-built vessels. That distinguished officer gave an
opinion that they were utterly unfit for war purposes, and
that if pierced with shot, as they easily could be if struck
with a projectile fired with velocity, the aperture could not
be plugged from the inside. That report induced Sir R.
Peel to order that iron vessels should not be employed for
war purposes. He (Sir M. Peto) did not blame Sir R. Peel
for selecting Sir H. Douglas, nor did he blame Sir H. Doug-
las for giving that opinion, but he was induced to remark
that the opinion of any man, however talented he might be
supposed to be, who had been educated in a particular
school, was not likely to be characterised by those enlarged
views and practical knowledge which would make his opinion
valuable, It might have been supposed that the reports of
Captain Charlwood and other officers would have had weight
with the Admiralty, and that they would not have allowed
the opinion of one officer to outweigh the experience of
many. But the Admiralty wished to have the opinion of
Sir H. Douglas supported by experiment, and accordingly
in 1841 a small iron steamer of 200 tons, of inferior build,
was selested. That vessel was surveyed and was reported
to be in a very bad state, the iron plates of which she was
built not exceeding the thickness of a half-crown. Against
this vessel every species of gun was employed, andasraight
naturally be expected, she was blown to pieces. The House
of Commons was then told that the experiment proved that
it would be impossible to use iron ships with safety. In
1850 the Admiralty determined that not only vesselsof war
but also Post-office packets, must be built of wood, and it
was not until the Peninsular and Oriental, the Cunard, and
other great steamship companies warmly remonstrated, that
the Admiralty discovered how much their practice was at
variance with commercial practice, and then they relaxed
their rulein favour of Post-office packets, and subsequently
relaxed it also in respect of the navy. It was likely that
it would be said wooden ships would still be
needed. Possibly so, but the hon. member for Sunder-
land had shown that we had more wooden ships than all
the rest of the world besides. The only Power against
whom we were arming—judging from the debates in that
house and statements from the Treasury bench—was
France, who had ceased to build wooden ships. Why, then,
should we not stay our hands ? He might ask, of what use
would be wooden ships against the new class of projectiles
that were being adapted for warfare ? Sir H. Douglas him-
self gave an answer to that question in his account of the
last war, in which he stated that the Albion received se-
veral shells near the water-line, was once or twice on fire,
and it was necessary to tow her out of action. The Are-
thine was several times on fire. The Sanspareil suffered in
men and spars, as did also the London and the Queen. At
Sinope the whole Turkish squadron was burnt by shells
with time fuses. Sir H. Douglas also stated that an iron
vessel built with 5-Bth plates was perfectly shell proof.
If that were so, how great was the advantage of shell-
proof iron ships over wooden vessels, which were liable to
such accidents as those he had mentioned ! He wished to
refer to another point connected with the question. In
18.56 or 1857 France discontinued the building of
wooden ships, because in the action of Kinburn it was
found that shot and shell from the forts did not pene-
trate the sidee of the iron vessels. That fact was known to
our officers, and was communicated to the Admiralty; but,
although France immediately learned a lesson of wisdom, our
Admiralty was very slow to receive it, for since then we
have built and converted 70 ships, of 150,000 tons, mount-
ing 3,800 guns, with 33,000 horse-power. How could such
ships be sent to face the improved guns of the present day
with any chance of success ? He remembered that on a
previous evening, when the hon. member for Sunderland
made some observations on what France was doing, and
quoted a statement of the Minister of Marine, which state-
ment was received with doubts by some members,
and even by some sitting on the Treasury bench,
he (Sir M. Peto) had asked a personal friend, an engineer
of high standing, to visit all the ports of France, and to
report upon what was doing. He did so, and reported that
the Minister of Marine had rather overstated the amount
of work that was going on. At Toulon, Rochefort, and
other ports there was not the least sign of activity, the
only vessels preparing being the six which were ordered in
1858, and even they were not so far advanced as had been
stated, the Normandie not having a single plate upon her
sides. Now, what was the English Admiralty about ? It
had ordered the construction of three classes of iron ships.
First, two vessels were ordered by the right hon. baronet
the member for Droitwich, the Warrior and the Black
Prince. In the opinion of practical men these two vessels
ordered by the late Admiralty were the only iron ships
worthy of the name, or that would be of any real use to the
country. They were large vessels, carrying 36 guns, with
stowage for 1,2,p0 tons of fuel, and a speed of 14 knots per
hour. The second class of vessels were those ordered by the
present Admiralty, the Resistance and Defence. They wore
of 3,000 tons burden, and carried 16 guns ; but they were
slow, they were not expected to make more than 10 or 11
knots an hour. In the third class were two new vessels,
the Valiant and the Achilles; the weight of their hulls
was 4,000 tons, and the only space for the stowage of fuel,
or the carrying power, was the difference between the
nominal registered tonnage and the real weight of the hulls.
They would not steam more than eight or nine knots an
hour, or carry more than three days' fuel. (Hear.) Of these
six vessels two would carry 13 days' fuel, and two only
from three to five days' consumption. If our Admiralty
were bound to make an alteration in the plans of another it
ought to give some reason for that alteration ; and he could
not understand why the present Admiralty had departed
from the model laid down by the last. The speed of the'
French iron steamers was from 10 to 13 knots an hour.
Should not the English vessels be equal in speed and carry-
ing power to the ships it was believed theywere intended to
oppose? But there were many disadvantages in four of
the ships he had named, independently of their want of
stowage and rate of speed. What was required was, a dis-
.tinct class of vessels, acting together ; but, with only two
ships equal to the French vessels in point of speed, in the
event of an action, might not the f'ur be left behind alto-
gether and the two fastest ships find themselves opposed to
a much superior force ? But he wished to direct attention
to what might be done with their wooden vessels. The
French had not built a single ship wholly of iron. What
were called iron ships were only wooden frigates cased with
iron. (Lord C. Paget—One French frigate is built of iron.)
-If the Admiralty acceded to this motion he believed it
Would be possible to cut down the larger wooden ships then
in. course of construction into a smaller and useful class of
ve esels. The cost of the Government manufactory of
en, -Ones for steamships was put down in the estimates at
f. 300,000 a-year. The engines for iron steamers would cost
no noels than those for wooden vessels ; and, except actual
war, there was nothing in the ordinary wear and tear to
make core'inual repairs of iron hulls necessary. This made
a great differs ace in the cost of repairs of iron vessels com-
pared with those of wood. If an iron fleet were laid up
and the machines-)' of the ships kept in order by putting it
in motion once or tve:ce a month, that fleet would always
be ready for service without the extensive repairs
that were often unexpeel'edly found necessary in wooden
hlliK In building anti converting wooden ships
ti
eiaar,_ly £21,000,000 had boen expended in the last
g.'" Years. He thought he had made out a case worthy
of the attention
of the house ; tits difl:Tence of the cost of
maitth* •
eon. i—l4heg adwooden and iron fleet was worth considera-
Governraera dockyards
the policy of building: roll ships in the
to incur
tae
aspen ; if they were an experiment only,
in their ee• natruceeasetiouof the machinery and plaxit required
than an exper,roemt, was unwise ; and if they were more
recommend. There Wasit
no a step
no man of business would
from private builder stn..° udifticulty in obtaining iron hulls
meat the Government did
nxotettkprice. At the present mo-
ment what they cost. The
consideration of the sub Tact had
tiont forced on the English
Government by that of Sranc by the number of the
French iron vessels, but i 'heir efficiency, and he thought
efaiency alone was the tee tof value. (Hear.) The coun •
the late war
try was prepared to pay for efficiency. During
a sudden necessity was f 011) 7d for gunboats; the Admiralty
was obliged to have recourse to a foreign a Power to pur-
chase.) two gunboats, and th Ley were of iron. By their meark,
they war© enabled to burn ;the Russian itore at Kerteh.
Thofie gunboats were bong I Lt- from the Prussian Govern-
mere 4 so that in a difficui ty the English Admiralty was
driv ran to purchase vessels c ,f a rower 4
the Admire like prnliy ssilearneda, that
.
had scarcely any navy. B at 11—
any thing from this ? On a to contrary. The course which
of all cp. Troll
oug ,ht to be pursued was pl Lain. The buns