The Sun.
London, England, 1861-03-20 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, WEDNESDAY EVENING, MARCH 20, 1861.

his son, reporting that the Russian agent had arrived in the
city of Cabal—that Dost Mahomed Khan had said he did
not wish to receive any foreign agent so long as he had a

hope of the sympathy of England, and that he would order
him to be sent away immediately. Sir A. Burnes felt it his
duty,un der the circumstances, to tender his advice to Dost
Mahomcd, which advice was that, inasmuch as that prince was
on terms of peace with Russia, he could not properly refuse
to see a representative of that power. That despatch was so
garbled as to make it bear a different sense altogether to that
which it really did. Then came a confidential despatch of Sir
A.Burnes, addressed to the Governor-General, in which he
proceeded to show the friendly character of Dest Mahomed
as regarded British interests, and the reasonableness of his
expectations. Slr Alexander then went on to relate the
particulars of the arrival at Cabul of the Russian ambas-
sador, of his desire to see the Ameer, the confidential con-

versation he had with him on the subject, the desire of
Dost Mahomed to refuse all intercourse with the agent

any power but that of England, aßd of his being dissuaded
from such a course by the advice of Sir Alexander. The
writer further stated that so anxious was Captain Vicovich
to obtain the friendship of the Ameer that he offered to pay
an annual sum of money if he could secure it ; and Sir A.
Burnes concluded his despatch by recommending to tho Bri-
tish Government the adoption of certain vigorous measures
to counteract Russian intrigue in India, and the exercise
of all their influence to secure an arrangement of the affairs
of the Shah of Persia. Now (observed Mr. Dunlop) who-

ever prepared those documents for presentation to Parha.

went must have been a man of genius. An ordinary person
would fancy it impossible to distort the meaning of this de-
spatch by the suptiression of passages. The meaning of it,
however,. was strangely falsified by garbled sentences taken
from it and strong together in apparently consecutive order.
lt mentioned All the startling facts regarding Capt. Vicovich,
his interview with Dost Mahomed, and the alluring offers
made to the latter. The document then went on with the
recommendation of Sir A. Burnes for the adoption of the

most vigorous memures against the intrigues of Russia,
but the nature of the se measures was altogether suppressed.
That despatch, so dis torted from its original meaning, led
to the most serious consequences, and mainly helped to
crush the fortunes of Dost Mahomed Khan. (Hear.) The
hon. gentleman at considerable length quoted from various
other despatches written.. by Sir A. Burnes and Sir W.
M'Naughten, for the purpose of showing that considerable
portions of them had been omitted, and that those that were
retained were of such a character as to give a wholly false
impression of the policy and the advice of Sir A. Burnes
with regard to Dost Mahomed, In fact, the chief object of
those who produced the papers appeared to have been the
striking out of every passage which could at all give a clue
to Sir Alexander's real opinions and conduct towards the
Ameers. That suppression was wilful, deliberate, and con-
tinuous. It was from the original despatches of Sir A.
Burnes that he totally disapproved of the course taken by
the Government towards Dost Mahomed ; and it was deeply
to be regretted that notwithstanding that opposition a sense
of duty, as a public servant, should have induced him to
obey the instructions of the Government. If he had not
gone to do so, his life would have been saved ; and it would
have been out of the power of the Government of the day
to load his memory with obloquy by garbling and falsifying
his despatches. And now what did he (Mr. Dunlop) ask?
He asked them to look at the evils which had been produced
by the suppression of the truth and the circulation of these
garbled documents. In the first place, look at what they
had done to Sir A. Burnes. He, at least, was a faithful
servant, and did his duty as our agent at Cabul. He was
one of the first victims. His body was hacked to pieces by
the Affghans, who looked upon him as the agent of theßritish
policy, and consequently their enemy ; and his reputation
which ought to have been defended and maintained, had
been hacked and mangled by the hands of those who ought
to have been its defenders more cruelly than his body by
the hands of the avowed enemy. He had been held up as
the instigator and adviser of that unjust war, attended by so
many calamities to this country, and all this was done for the
dastardly purpose of screening themselves from the just con•
sequences of the policy which they had pursued and he had
condemned. (Hear, hear.) Again, look at our conduct to
Dost Mahomed. We had driven him from the throne, we
set up an old pretender, we crushed his family ; and, not con-
tent with that, they had endeavoured to show in the des-
patches that he was faithless to us, and deserved all he got,
instead of having acted loyally throughout. How had he
acted towards us since ? Time came when he recovered his
throne, and our empire in India was tottering, and he, with-
out implicating himself by fighting, but merely assuming a
menacing attitude, might have created such an alarm on the
part of Sir John Lawrence as to have prevented the recap-
ture of Delhi, and if that city had not been taken in time we
should have had to reconquer the whole of India ; but Dost
Mahomed, whom we had used so ill, instead of seizing the
opportunity to revenge himself, showed a noble forbearance
—Mahomedan as he was—which was worthy the admiration
of a Christian people. It was universally thought that at
lE ast in the British Parliament papers were free from fraud ;
and accordingly, in a history of this very war, published in
Berlin, there was a chapter on " Sir Alexander Burnes the
author of the war uue ter
might be confidently relied on, because it was compiled from
British State papers. Well, but when a new edition cameout,
the author would have to unsay all he had said, and he must
confess that the State papers published by the English House
of Commons were just as useless as documents put forward
by the most perjured despot. We had thus discredited the
authority of our State papers throughout the world. Dis-
patches were daily produced in the house, but after what he
knew of the papers to which he had been calling the atten-
tion of the house, be really felt a doubt if any value ought to
be attached to any one of them. Further, he said the produc-
tion of such papers was an insult to the Sovereign. All these
papers were laid on the table "by her Majesty's command."
To alter then these papers, was like using the die of the Royal
Mint to stamp as genuine a false and spurious coin. Nay,
it was worse. Her Majesty intrusted her confidential servants
with the power of using her Royal name as a token of au-
thenticity and truth. Yet these confidential servants had
not shrunk from using it as the voucher and cover of a lie
Besides this, Ministers owed a responsibility t o Parliament.
The question in the case of the Affghan war was whether
Ministers were justified or not. And instead of laying on
the table documentsby which their conduct should have been
judged, they sought to escape censure by the production of
forgeries and fabrications. (Hear, hear.) These proceed -
ings had greatly tended to shake public confidence in the
honesty of the departments of Government, and to restore
that confidence it was necessary to have a committee to in-
quire into the whole circumstances. That investigation
was also due to the memory of Sir Alexander Burnes and
in justice to the character of Dost Mahomed. An inquiry
ought also to take place as to the way in which these papers
had been published—he did not say for the purpose of
punishment—that was out of the question after such a
lapse of time ; but if they shrunk from exposing the wrong
that was then practised they would in fact be inviting a
repetition. A more delicate question remained, to inquire
what security could be taken against the mutilation of these
papers. He would not suggest any plan, but he thought it
was a fair subject of inquiry. The hon. member concluded
by moving for the committee.
Sir 11. WILLOUGHBY seconded the motion.
After a pause,
Lord PALMERSTON said it was usual when a member
had to reply to a speech on a variety of topics to compli-
ment the previous speaker on the temper and moderation
with which he had stated his case. He was sorry he could
not pay that compliment to the hon. member for the speech
he had just made ; for he thought he would have displayed
more judgment, and not have recommended his motion less
to the attention of the house if he had abstained from that
violent vituperation, which he took leave to repudiate in
terms not less strong than those the hon. gentleman had used
—such words as falsehood and perjury—words which were
not commonly used by those who took part in the debates of
the house. It might have been thought that topics of foreign
policy belonging to the present time had sufficiently occu-
pied the attention of Parliament ; and a stranger casually
entering the house would hardly have expected to find them
engaged in discussing the operations in Affghanistan 20
years back. However, he did not dispute the perfect right
of the hon. member to bring this question before the house.
His speech divided itself into two parts—one as to the policy
of the Indian and British Government with regard to the
operations in Affghanistan and Central India ; the other
with regard to the personal character and regard for the
memory of Lieut. Sir A. Burnes. He would take up the
latter question, and he would say at once he did not admit
that the papers laid before Parliament in 1839 conveyed a
false impression, as the hon. gentleman asserted, with re-
gard to the manner Sir A. Burnes performed the duties ims
posed upon him in Affghanistan. The whole argument of
the hon. member went on the erroneous and totally false
assumption that Sir A. Burnes was to direct the Governor-
General, and that he and not the Governor-General was to
be the master of the policy of the Indian Government. He
said that Sir A. Burnes' opinion was that Dost Mahomed
was in favour of the British interest, that his fidelity might
be relied on, that there was no intention on his part to form
an alliance with Russia, and therefore the hon. gentleman
argued that the Governor-General was to blame, and that
the British Government was guilty of an atrocious crime in
not allowing themselves to be guided by Lieut. Sir A.
Burnes, whom they had sent on a special mission to Cabul,
but that they insisted on judging for themselves, as having
a larger range of facts within their knowledge. Why,
there was no doubt that Sir Alexander Burnes was a most
respectable man, of great energy and activity, but he fell
into a mistake which subordinate agents are very apt to
commit, that of identifying themselves with the govern-
ment to which they are sent, of being too easily misled,
of believing everything that was said to them, perhaps
in his case from the natural simplicity of his
character, but also perhaps from not having a large
range of facts which he might compare with what he heard.
From these causes he did believe implicitly in the friendship
of Dost Mellowed towards Great Britain, and recommended
that the demands which Dost Mahomed made on the Indian
government should be complied with. Now let the house
test the value of those opinions by what the hon. gentleman
stated. He said that when the Russian agent, Vicovich,
arrived at Cabul post Muhomed informed Sir Alex. Burnes
of the fact, and offered to send him back again. Sir Alex-
ander asked what M. Vicovich had come about, and the
Mast replied that ho knew nothing about it. Why, the
fact was that this Russian agent bad brought to Cabul an-

swers to letfors which Dost Mahomed himself had written

long before to St. Petersburg. Dost Mahomed had applied
to Russia, to Persia, and he (Lord Palmerston) believed to
Bokhara, for assistance in the war which he was about to
make on Runjeet Singh, and yet this Ameer, whose word
was to be so implicitly taken, assured Sir A. Burnes that
he knew nothing about the object of the Russian agent's
visit. Thera was another instance of the simplicity of Sir
A. Burnes m entioned by the hon. gentleman. Dost Ma-
homed, as a proof of his confidence in Sir A. Burnes, showed
him a copy of the reply he was about to write to the letters
brought by M. Vicovich, and at the suggestion of Sir A.
Burnes he made some alteration, and this Sir Alexander

Burnes accepted as a proof of good faith. Why nothing
was more easy to conceive than this—the draft of the letter
shown to Sir Alexander Burnes was one thing, the letter

actually sent was one of a totally different character. As
to the alteration of the despatches, he would take first of all
those on which the hon. gentleman did not seem much dis-

posed to dwell—such as substituting Russia for the Em-
peror, and otherwise omitting words which tended to iden-
tify the Emperor himself as being engaged in personal
communication with Dost Mahomed. Why he contended
that was perfectly right, because if they wanted the Russian

Government to desist from and disavow their policy of

fomenting intrigues on our frontier, nothing could be so

foolish as to pin the Emperor personally to such policy,
to drive him into a corner, and force him, out d

mere pique, to pursue the policy on which he had entered.
lie did not apprehend any one would recommend such a line

of policy. What was the history of the whole transaction

Dost Mahomed and Runjeet Singh were enemies. Run.
jeet had got possession of Peshawur, and Dost Mahomed
wanted it back. Runjeet Singh was our friend; Dost
Mahomed they could not at any time rely on. He drew
a distinction between that time and this, because all these
disputes had passed away, and at the present moment the
Indian Government was on the best possible relations with
Dost Mohamed. But it was not so then. The Dost applied
for aid to Russia, to Persia—which was then an instrument
in the hands of Russia—and to Bokhara. At that time
Russia was actively engaged in hostile purposes towards our
Eastern power. She had entered into close communications
with Persia, urging her to take possession of Herat, which
in that case would have become a mere Russian outpost,
and she sent her agents, Vicovich and Sinionivieh, to in-
clude the Dost in the general alliance hostile to the British
power. All this was known—it did not depend upon Sir
A. Burnes; the facts were perfectly known to Lord Auck-
land and the British Government, and the course they were
to follow, therefore, did not depend on the opinion of Sir A.
Burnes as to the fidelity of Dost Mahomed, or his disposition
to be friendly with England. No doubt when Sir A. Burnes
arrived at Cabul it gave a turn to Dost Mahomed's calculations.
Before that time he was relying solely on Russian and Persian
support against Runjeet Singh; then he began to consider
whether he could not have the support of England, which
would answer his purpose better than the support of Russia,
and he induced Sir A. Burnes to recommend to the Indian
government that they should agree to his terms. But the
Indian government, who saw farther and looked deeper
into the facts than Sir A. Burnes, did not chose to throw
over an old and steady ally like Runjeet Singh for the
wavering and inconstant friendship of Dost Mahomed ; and
they refused that which was the condition of his alliance.
When that was communicated to Dost Mahomed he de-
clined the English alliance, and reverted to his original
policy of alliance with Russia and Persia. Sir Alexander
Burnes was obliged to quit Cabal, the policy of the Gover-
nor-General was adopted, and Doat Mahomed was treated
as an enemy because he allied himself to those who were at
that time the enemies of England and attacked a power
which was her ally. The whole argument, therefore,
rested on the assertion that the opinion of Sir Alexander
Burnes ought to have guided the government of India, and
that that government deserved all those epithets of vitu-
peration he had lavished on them out of his plentiful
vocabulary; because the policy which Sir Alexander Burnes
recommended was not that which the responsible govern-
ment adopted. The question, therefore, really was in what
degree was the Parliament misled, or the memory of Sir
Alexander Burnes injured, by the omission of parts of his
despatches which contained his personal opinions, which
arose from his over credulity, and which were at variance
with the opinions entertained by the Government. The
dispatches contained enough to show the policy on which
the Government acted ; and if the opinions of Sir Alex-
ander Burnes were omitted, it was to be remembered,
as an hon. friend of his once before remarked, that on
the other hand a very severe dispatch, written by Mr.
M'Naughten by the orders of Lord Auckland, cen-
suring the conduct and disavowing the policy of
Sir Alexander Burnes, was also omitted. When a
Government pursued a certain policy:they stated the par-
ticular reasons which induced them to follow it ; but they
did not enter fully into all the reasons why they did not fol-
low another course of action. In a despatch written by the
Governor-General of India he found fault with Sir A. Burnes
for having entered into an arrangement with the Queen of
Candahar, by which he committed the Indian Government
beyond what he had authority to do. The Governor-General
ss.l iss msont nail ol,^n /“., 4n mnirA n tmhlir dieavowal.
but that he must take an opportunity of showing that the
Indian Government were not prepared to make good the
engagements which Sir A. Burnes had said the Govern-
ment would enter into. So with regard to Runjeet Singh,
it had to be intimated to him that the policy of the Indian
Government was not that which Sir A. Burnes recom-
mended them to pursue. There was another despatch
omitted, in which Sir A. Burnes was taken to task for hav-
ing communicated while in Affghanistan to the Indian news-
papers information with which he was entrusted on account
of the Government. That was a reproof of which Sir A.
Burnes was well deserving. He did not mean to say that
these things wore serious cause of blame to Sir A. Burnes.
No doubt he acted according to the best intentions in what
he did, but he contended that the views of Sir A. Burnes
were short-sighted. He wished to show that on that
policy the Indian Government did not choose to act; and
that though Sir A. Burnes might entertain strong opinions,
yet that he was not the, Governor-General. (Laughter.)
What was the object of laying papers before Parliament ?
It was to show the reasons why Government had followed
a particular course of policy, and it must be shown that the
Government acted on sufficient reasons, otherwise they
could not justify themselves. But the proceedings in
Affghanistan were discussed fully at the time, and he was
not aware that the result of those discussions was to throw
blame on the Government for the course then pursued.
(Hear, hear.) That course of policy was most important ;
it was no doubt followed by the disaster at Cabul, but that
was not in any degree the natural consequence of those
proceedings. There was a force at Cabul sufficient to hold
the ground. He did not wish to speak otherwise than well
of those who were gone, but that force was commanded by
a general who, from physical infirmity, was incompetent to
meet the demands necessary under very trying circum-
stances. But if the army had taken the Bala Hissar of
his opinion was that that disaster could never have
hCaabppaelned ; the town of Cabal would have afforded pro-
visions to last for the winter, and if any persons had had to
suffer it would have been the inhabitants of the town, and
not the British army in the Bala Hissar. Therefore it was
fair to say, post hoe ergo propter hoc, that because a disas-
ter in the retreat followed the occupation of Cabul, there-
fore it was the consequence of it ; if things had been better
ordered that disaster would not have taken place. But then
the question was whether the Government of India were
justified in proposing, and the home Government in
adopting the course that was taken. Russia was
snaking alarming strides at that time towards our Indian
frontier; Persia was at the command of Russia; Russian
officers directed the operations at the siege of Herat; Russia
was seeking to make Persia the instrument of her designs,
and a Russian lieutenant was despatched to win over, not
only Dost Mohamed, but Runjeet Singh. If that had suc-
ceeded it would be evident in what danger of disturbance
our Indian possessions would have been placed, especially
considering how different the position of India was then
compared to what it is at present. The decision of the Go-
vernment of India to resort to measures of force for the
purpose of thwarting that combination, was a course justi-
fied by the best regard for the interests of the cointry; and
if they had failed in doing so, despite the opinions of Lieut.
Burnes and other subaltern agents, they would have deserved
the epithets which the lion. and learned gentleman had that
evening so undeservedly levelled against them. The hon.
and learned gentleman, in the simplicityof his nature, seemed
to have taken for gospel everything an Afighan chief might
happen to say ; but the truth was, that there was a complete
labyrinth of intrigue which it required a good deal of saga-
city to unravel, and with which the Government had to deal.
At that time there were differences between the members of
Dost Maliomed's family and the sirdars of Candahar. If the
British Government could not rely on the steadiness of Dost
Mahomed, who, because he did not get all he wanted, threw
himself into the arms of Russia, it was their natural course
to adopt Shah Soojah, who had been on the throne, and
who had been expelled by one of those revolutions so com-
mon in eastern countries; the natural course was to endea-
vour to place him as the ruler of Cabal, ho being friendly
to English interests, rather than to have an enemy placed
there relying upon Russian and Persian assistance. There-
fore, there was nothing unnatural in the course the Indian
Government took to give effect to this policy. (Hear.)
Then he was at a loss to see what the particular committee
to which this question was to be referred was to have in
view. Was it proposed to refer to a committee in this year
18G1, to consider whether the Indian and British Govern-
ments were right in 1837-3 S in enter ing upon the opera-
tions conducted in Affghanistan ? (A cry of " No.") The
hon. gentleman said "no." Then that clearly was not the
intention. (Laughter.) Then he presumed the object
would be to see in what degree the passages loft out altered
thetendency policy which the Governments of India
and England
Would these passages, if put
o thenf
poi
sued.
in, have formed a condemnation of the policy pursued, as-
suming that the papers without them formed a justification?
passages they gave were the opinions
'orflfsir onlyA . additionalßarnes,
and
Go-
vernment bad made their decision. The question was
it was not upon them that the
whether the Governor-General and the British Govern-
ment had been justified in looking upon Dost Mahomed as
an enemy, and whether they had been well founded in the
opinion that Shah Soojah was a preferable ally ; and the
conduct of the Government of the day upon that question
was the only thing tbat could be iminirial rota. (Near.)
Mr, BRIGHT said he observed when the noble lord rote,

that from his countenance and from his language he seemed

to be suffering somewhat from the passion of anger.
Lord PALMERSTON—Not much. (Laughter.)
Mr. BRIGHT—The noble lord said not much. He ad-
mitted that in the course of his speech the noble lord calmed
down; but he was so far led from what he (Mr. Bright)
thought was a fair course, as to charge the hon. and learned
gentleman with making a violent and vituperative speech,

and he spoke of that vocabulary which he appeared to be
master of. Now he (Mr. Bright) undertook to say he was
only speaking the opinion of every gentleman in the house
who heard the speech with which the question was intro-
duced, when ho said that rarely was delivered there on any

subject a speech more strictly logical, more judicially calm,
or more admirable than the one they had heard that night

from the hon. and learned member for Greenock. But the

tact was, the noble lord felt himself hit. (Hear, hear.) The

noble lord was on his trial in this case, and it was on that ac-
count that he (Mr. Bright) expected that at the conclusion of
the debate the noble lord would not feel himself at liberty to

object to the appointment of this committee. After a few sen.

tences the noble lord touched on the case of Sir A. Burnes,
and he made a very violent denial of the:misrepresentations
which were charged against the Government of that day in
the case of that gentleman. But he went on to say, after all,
these things were of no importance—as to what was in or
what was left out was of no importance—but he would like
to ask the noble lord, then, what was the object of that
minute, ingenious, and he would say unmatched, care which

he had taken in mutilating the despatches of a gentleman
whose opinion was of no importance, and whose despatches
would not make the slightest difference in the opinion of
any person concerned ? (Hear, hear.) And the noble lord,
too, had stooped to conduct which, if he (Mr. Bright)
were not in that house, he would describe in words which if
be used there possibly might transgress the rules usually
observed in the discussions of that ass3mbly. But the noble
lord had stooped so low, as throughout the whole of his
speech to heap insult on the memory of a man who died in
the execution of what he believed to be his public duty—a

duty which was pressed upon him by the mad and obstinate
policy of the noble lord, and while his blood cried to heaven
against that policy the noble lord in that house, during
three-quarters of an hour, had scarcely ceased to heap in-
sult on the memory of that man. The noble lord said
throughout that Sir A. Burnes was a man of the greatest
possible simplicity of character. He (Mr. Bright) could
not, however complimentary he might be disposed to be,
retort that on the noble lord. (A laugh.) He said that Sir
A. Burnes, an eminent political agent, whom he spoke of in
that contemptuous manner, when at the court of Dost Ma-
homed, was so bewildered by the treachery of that Asiatic
ruler, that he took everything for truth which he heard,
and that in point of fact he was utterly unfit for the position
he held at Cabul, and yet Sir A. Burnes remained there,
and for two years after those despatches were written, and
until that perilous hour when not himself only but the
whole army of the subjects of the Queen fell victims to the
policy of the noble lord. He would tell the noble lord what
the proposed committee was not to do, because every mem-
ber of the house who heard the speech of the hon. and
learned member for Greenock and who listened to the noble
lord, must have seen that from the first the noble lord
avoided the whole question. (Hear, hear.) He endeavoured
to lead the house to believe that the hon: and learned gen-
tleman was going into some antiquated researches about
the policy of the English and the Indian government 20
years ago, and that it was proposed to have a committee to
dig up all the questions about the designs of Russia at that
time. His honourable and learned friend had no such in-
tention, and no man was more ccgnisant of the fact
than the noble lord, who had endeavoured ingeniously to give
a contrary impression to the house. It was not the policy of
the war, nor was it as to'whether Sir A. Burnes or Lord
Auckland was the Governor-General. They knew that Lord
Auckland was Governor-General and thathe, like Governor-
Generals, being hundreds and sometimes thousands of miles
from where events were transpiring, had to rely on the in-
formation he received from the political agent on the spot.
It was clearly, therefore, of some importance to know what
Sir A. Burnes said and wrote. It was not intended to in-
quire into the policy of Russia at that time, nor into the
policy which sacrificed 20,000 human lives of the subjects
Of the Queen of England ; nor was it intended to inquire how
far the loss of more than fifteen millions sterling had affected
for all future time the finances and circumstances of the
Government of India. Those were crimes—the whole of
that policy was a crime—of a nature that never could be
answered for, and the perpetrators of which no committee
of that house could adequately punish. He was sure that
his hon. and learned friend had not the slightest idea of
going back 20 years to bring even the noble lord or anybody
else to the bar of public opinion on that account. But it
was worth while to inquire whether the Governmentof that
time was worthy of the confidence that was placed in it,
whether members of the Government of that day were mem-
bers of the Government of the present day. It was worth
while knowing whether there was a man in a high position
in India or in England who had so low a sense of honour
and of right that he could offer to that house mutilated,
false, and forged opinions of a public servant who had lost his
life in the public service. Conceive any man at this .....i.nt
engaged, it might bo in the most perilous service, who might
to-morrow or the next day, or next year, have to lay down
his bones in that distant land—conceive the position of such
a man, being liable to have his letters mutilated and altered
so as to destroy his meaning, and then, when they were
altered, being presented to that house. The noble lord knew
as well as the hon. and learned member for Greenock knew,
that there had been garbling mutilation, practically and
essentially, falsehood and forgery, in those despatches that
were laid before the house. The original despatches had
probably been given after 20 years, because it was supposed
that after such a lapse of time nobody would take the
trouble to go into the circumstances. The hon. member for
Sheffield reminded him that the genuine despatches were
given by the noble lord the member for King's Lynn (Lord
Stanley), when he was in office. He tendered the noble
lord his thanks for the course he then took. He was quite
sure that the noble lord would be the last man to be mixed
up with a transaction of this kind—(hear)—except with a
view to giving the public full information with regard to it.
The object of the committee was to find out who did this
false thing—who supplied the information, knowingly false
and knowingly forged. If they added to or took from any-
thing in a note or a coin, that was forgery, and that was
precisely what somebody had done with regard to these
dispatches. That was an odious offence committed against
that house and against truth, and they wanted to know who
did it. The noble lord said that the alterations were trifling,
and that the opinion of Sir A. Burnes was not worth much.
If that were so would the noble lord tell them who did it.
Lord Broughton, in his evidence before the Indian salaries
committee, took the entire responsibility of the Affghan war
on himself. The noble lord at the head of the Government
was then at the India Board, and so was the noble lord the
member for the City of London. But the noble lord at the
head of the Government was also Foreign Secretary. He
(Mr. Bright) did not suppose he would be wrong in saying
that the question lay between the noble lord and Lord
Broughton. It was not done by a subordinate who
could not be found out. His honourable and learned
friend said that marvellous care had been used—
so much so that it must have been done by a man of genius.
(Laughter.) There were men of genius in very objection-
able walks of life. (Laughter.) They knew that the noble
lord was a man of genius, or he would not have been on
that (the Treasury) bench for the last 50 years. (Laughter.)
They knew also that Lord Broughton was a man of very
varied accomplishments. He (Mr. Bright) would like the
noble lord to tell them who did it. Was it his right-hand
or Lord Broughton's right-hand man, or some clever secre •
tary in the India Office who did the work ? He wanted to
know, because he wished to drag the criminal before the
public. They wanted to vindicate the character and honour
of Parliament in a matter involving the loss of £20,000,000
of money and 20,000 men, and he did not believe that the
house would ever consent to sit down quietly without
making any inquiry into the matter.
Mr. DISRAELI—After all which has occurred on this
subject I hardly like to be silent. The noble lord the First
Minister has talked of the lapse of 20 years which have
elapsed since this question was discussed. I can remember
20 years ago, when nearly in the very place now occupied by
the hon. member for Greenock I supported a motion of my
noble friend near me to call the attention of the house to this
subject. Twenty years upon my head has done that for me
which I suppose it has done for all of us, it has saddened
our life and softened our spirits, therefore it may be sup-
posed that in asking the house to consider this question I,
at least, bring to the subject no prejudice, but am prepared
to consider the motion before us with the advantage that
may result from some previous acquaintance with the
subject and some subsequent pondering on its nature.
In discussing the Affghanistan war I cannot for a moment
admit that we are to take refuge in any myste-
rious entity called the Indian Government. The persons
responsible for that war were the English Ministers
at the time, and he would be unworthy of being a
Minister, and almost unworthy of being a member of this
house, who under any eircumstances, or after the lapse of
any time, would shrink from such responsibility; there-
fore any remarks I make upon the matter affect the English
Government, and that Government alone. The name of a
gentleman of high character has necessarily been brought
into discussion in respect to this question ; and here let me
say that I had no personal acquaintance with Sir A. Burnes,
and can only form my opinion upon that public servant, as
we must form opinions upon others, by the public docu-
ments of their public life. I here I found great energy, great
devotion, great research, and a character admirably adapted
to the circumstances in which he was called upon to act. I
cannot, therefore, agree with the noble lord in his observa-
tions upon Sir A. Burnes. On the contrary I admire his
career and lament his loss. This question has been before
Parliament on previous occasions, and every one is almost
acquainted with its details. What, then, is the motion of
the hon. gentleman—a supporter of her Majesty's Govern •
meat ? It is not merely a vote of censure, it is not merely
a vote of want of confidence, but it is both united ; it is
absolutely asking the house to declare that the Ministers
are not only unworthy of confidence, but that They. have
perpetrated conduct with impunity, year .7; 4;a3 whichDu out
to be held up to public rept:ohatian, ' It beeop.jes,
then, the
duty of this ljoßrici ct deal with the •
question calmly, and
not to be eutrapped. _lnto a resolution which they may after-
Wards 'regre i. 'There were two points to be considered ;
first, as to the policy of the Affghan war, and, secondly, as