The Sun.
London, England, 1857-11-14 00:00:00

CAPTURE OF DELHI

AND THE

RELIEF OF LUCKNOW.

By the arrival of the Bombay mail we have re-
ceived Bombay papers of the 17th of Oct. They
contain full details of the capture of Delhi and of
the relief of Lucknow. The letter of our Born.
bay correspondent has not yet reached us.
We take the following from the Bombay Gazette
of the 17th of Oct.:—
THE CAPTURE OF DELHI.

The following account of the last days of the
siege of Delhi and the assault of the plane will be
read with much interest ; it is written by an eye-
witness :

Your readers will have understood, from the
intelligence which has been from time to time pub-
lished, that from the period of the arrival of our
army before Delhi, in June last, up till very lately,
the position occupied by our troops has been in
effect a purely defensive one. It extended from
the picket at Metcalfe's house, close to the river on
the left, along the ridge facing the north side of
Delhi as far as the Sudzee Mundee suburb on
our right, where this ridge terminates—the dis-
tance from the city wall averaging from 1,200 to
1,500 yards.
We had from the first no choice as to the front
of attack, our position on the north side being
the only one that could secure our communica-
tions with the Punjaub, whence our supplies and
reinforcements were drawn.
Whether the city might or might not have
b.7en carried by a coup de main, as was con-
templated first iu June and afterwards in July,
it is needless now to inquire; but, judging from
the resistance we afterwards experienced in the
actual assault, when we had been greatly rein-
forced in men and guns, it appears to me fortu-
nate that the attempt was not made. The strength
of the place was never supposed to consist in the
strength of its actual defences, though these were
much undervalued ; but every city, even without
fortifications, is, from its very nature, strongly
defensible (unless it can be effectually surrounded
or bombarded), and within Delhi the enemy pos-
sessed a magazine containing upwards of 200 guns
and an almost inexhaustible supply of ammuni-
tion, while their numbers were certainly never
less than double those of the besiegers. Few
will doubt, then, that the General in command
xercised a sound discretion in refusing to allow
a handful of troops, unaided by siege guns, to
attack such a place, knowing, as be did, what
disastrous results must follow a failure.
By the beginning of this month, however, we
received the siege train from Ferozepore and
further reinforcements of European and native
troops from the Punjab, and, it being known
that there was no hope of any aid from down
country for a considerable time, it was resolved
that the siege should be at once commenced and
prosecuted with the utmost vigour.
Our available force amounted, in round nam
bets, to 6,500 Infantry, 1,000 Cavalry, and 600
Artillery, European and natives ; the regiments
in Camp being her Majesty's 9th Lancers, her
Majesty's 6th Dragoon Guards, Guide Cavalry,
Hodgson's Horse, and detachments of the Ist,
2i, and sth Punjaub Cavalry :
Her Majesty's Bth Foot (part of), 521 Foot,
60th Rifles (part of), 61st Foot, 75th Foot, Ist
and 2d Bengal Fusiliers, Sirmoor and Kumaon
Battalions (Ghoorkas), 4th Sikh Infantry, Guide
Infantry, Ist, 2d, and 4th Regiments Punjaub
Infantry :
Four troops of Horse Artillery (Tomb's, Tur-
ner's, Remington's, and Rennie's), two light field
batteries (Scott's and Bonchier's), and some com-
panies of Foot Artillery, attached to the siege
guns, which numbered about 40 heavy guns and
howitzers, 10 heavy and 12. light mortars.
The means of the Engineers were very re-
stricted, not in officers but in trained men, of
whom there were only about 120 regular Sappers.
Some companies of Muzbee Sikhs had, however,
been rapidly raised and partially trained ; and a
body of coolies had also been collected, who
worked remarkably well ; the park had been at
work for some time in collecting material,
and 10,000 fascines, 10,000 gabions, and
100,000 sandbags were ready for future
operations ; field magazines, scaling ladders, and
spare platforms had also been duly prepared, and
great credit is due to Lieut. Brownlow of the
Engineers in charge of the park, whose activity and
intelligence contributed not a little to the eventual
a ICCE lIN of our operation e.

" The north face being the side to be attacked,
it was resolved to hold the right in check as far
us possible, and to push the main attack on the
lift first, as the river would completely protect our
flank as we advanced ; second, as there was better

cover on that side ; third, as after the assault the
troops would not find themselves immediately in
narrow streets, but in comparatively opeu ground.
" The front to be attacked consisted of the
Mores, Cashmere, and Water bastions, with the
c:irtain walls connecting them. These bastions
had been greatly altered and improved by our own
wigineers many years ago, and presented regular
laces and flanks of masonry with properly cut
embrasures ; the height of the wall was 24 feet
above the ground level, of which, however, eight
feet was a mere parapet three feet thick, the
remainder being about four times that thickness
outside the wall was a very wide barn and then
a ditch 16 feet deep and 20 feet wide at the
bottom, escarp and counterscarp steep, and the
latter unrevetted, and the former revetted with
stone and eight feet in height. A good sloping
g aces covered the lower ten feet of the wall from
ad attempts of distant batteries.

" On the evening of the 7th Sept., No. 1 ad-
vAnced battery, iu two portions, was. traced about
no yards from the Moree bastion, the right por-
tion for five 18-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer
was to silence the Moree and prevent its interfer-
ing with the attack oa the left. The left portion
fur four 24 pounders was intended to hold the
Cashmere bastion partially in check. The working
parties were very little disturbed during the
light ; the covering parties in front kept the mus-
ketry at a distance, and ex-est three well-aimed
showers of grape thrown from the Moree, which
knocked overcome workmen, we received no further
annoyance. By the moraing the two por-
tions of the battery were finished and
aimed, though not ready to fire until nearly
hilurise ; a trench was also made connect-
in ; the two portions and cxzending a little to the
right and left, so as to give communication with
a wide and deep ravine, which, extending very
buarly up to our left attack, formed a sort of first
parallel, and gave good cover to the guard of
Übe trenches, the doo!iev, ctn.!. Fur some time we
were well pounded from the Moree with round
Slot and grape ; but as our guns in the new bat-
tery got gradually into play the enemy's fire grew
less and less, and was at length completely ovet-
powered. This battery llecaine known as Brind's,
b.ii/ig worked by that officer with !great effect till
the end of the siege.

On the evenings of the Bth and 9th No. 2
Battery was traced and commenced. To cur sur-
prise we bad been allowed to seize this advanced
position at Ludlow Castle, within 600 yards of
tb 1 city, without even a fight for if, on the previ-
ous day. In fact, there is little doubt the enemy
still thought the attack was to be on the right,
where all the fighting had hitherto been, and
where all our old batteries were still located.
Ludlow Castle and the Koodsee Bagh were now

occupied by strong detachments, and formed our
chief supports to the left attack. During the 9th
a •iharp fire of musketry, shot, and shells were
opened on these positions by the enemy from the
jungle in front, and from Cashmere and Water
Bastions, and the Seliroghur, but no great damage
was done.

During the nights of the 9th and 10th No.
2 Battery was completed and partially armed, but

not yet unmasked. It was in two portions—one
immediately in front of Ludlow Castle, for
nine 24-pounders, to open a breach in the cur-
tain between the Cashmere and Water Bastions
immediately to the left of the former, and to
knock off the parapet to the right and left for
some distance, so as to give no cover to the mus-
ketry; the other portion, some 200 yards to th e right
consisting of 7 8-inch howitzers and two 18-pound-
ers, was to aid the first position, and work with
it for the same end. No. 3 Battery was also com-
menced on the left, and No. 4 Battery, for 10
heavy mortars, completed in the Koodsee Bagh,
but not yet unmasked. Major Tombs was in
charge of this battery ; the light mortars, under
Captain Blunt, were afterwards worked from the
rear of the Custom-house.
During the nights or the 10th and 11th No.
2 Battery was strengthened, armed, and unmasked,
and No. 3 Battery completed. This last was
made in the boldest manner within 180 yards of
the Water Bastion, behind a small ruined house
in the Custom-house compound, and under such afire
of musketry as few batteries have ever been ex-
posed to ; it was for six 18-pounders, which were
to open a second breach in the Water Bastion,
and was worked by Major Scott. The enemy also
went to work to-night and made an advanced
trench parallel to our left attack, and about 350
yards from it, from which at daybreak they opened
a very hot fire of musketry, which was main-
tained throughout the rest of the siege; they had
previously got some light guns and one heavy gun
out into the open on our right, which caused con-
siderable annoyance by their enfilade fire.
On the 11th our batteries opened fire, a salvo
from the nine 24-pounders opening the ball, and
showing by the way it brought down the wall in
huge fragments what effect it might be expected
to producelafter a few hours. The Cashmere
Bastion attempted to reply, but was quickly
silenced, and both portions of No. 2 went to work
in fine style, knocking the bastion and adjacent
curtains to pieces. Majors Campbell and Kaye,
Captains Johnson and Gray, had charge of No. 2.
No. 3, however, did not commence fire till the
following day, when the full power of our artillery
was shown, and a continuous roar of 50 guns and
mortars pouring shot and shell on the devoted city
warned the en emy that his and our time had at length
come. Night and day until the morning of the 14th
was this overwhelming fire continued. But the
enemy did not let us have it all our own way.
Though unable to work a gun from any of the
three bastions that were so fiercely assailed, they
yet stink to their guns in the open, which par-
tially enfiladed our position ; they got a gun to
bear from a hole broken open in the long curtain
wall ; they sent rockets from one of their martello
towers, and they maintained a perfect storm of
musketry from their advanced trench and from
the city walls.
Oa the night of the 13th the Engineers stole
down and examined the two brauchei near the
Cashmere and Water bastions, and both being
reported practicable, orders for the assault were
(nee issued, to take place at day-break the fol-
lowing morning.
The arrangemnts for the storming were as
follows :-
Ist Column—Brigadier-General Nicholson.
H.M. 75th Regiment, Ist Bengal Fusiliers,
and 2d Punjaub Infantry—To storm the breach
near the Cashmere bastion, and escalade_athe face
of the bastions.
Engineer Officers attached—Lieutenants Med-
ley, Lang, and Bingham.
21 Column—Brigadier Jones, C. B.
H.M.'s Bth Regiment, H.M.'s 61st Regiment,
and 4th Sikh Infantry—To storm the breach in
the Water bastion.
Engineer Officers attached—Lieuts. Greathed,
Hovenden, and Pemberton.
31 Column—Colonel Campbell.
H.M's 42d Regiment, 2d Fusiliers, and let
Punjaub Infantry—To assault by the Cashmere
gate, after it should be blown open.
Engineer Officers attached—Lieuts. Home,
Salkeld, and Tandy.
4tth Column—Major Reid.
Detachment of Europeon Regiments, Simmoor
Battalion, Guide Infantry, and Detachment of
Dograhs—To attack the suburb Kissengunj, and
enter the Lahore gate.
Engineer Officers attached—Lieuts. Maunsel
and Tennant.
sth Column—Brigadier Longfield.
H.M.'s 60th Rifles, Kumaon Battalion, and
4th Punjaub Infantry, the reserve.
Engineer Officers attached—Lietits. Ward and
Thackeray.
At 4 a.m. the different columns fell in and were
marched to their respective places, the heads of
Nos. 1,2, and 3 columns being kept concealed un-
til the moment for the actual assault should arrive.
The signal was to be the advance of the Rifles to
the front to cover the heads of the columns by skir-
m'shing.
Everything being ready, General Nicholson,
whose excellent arrangements elicited the admira-
tion of all, gave the signal, and the Rifles dashed
to the front with a cheer, extending along and
skirmishing the low jungle, which at this point ex-
tends to within 50 yards of the ditch. At the same

moment the heads of No. 1 and 2 columns emerged
from the Kodsee Bagh, and advanced steadily to-
wards the breach. Our batteries had maintained a
tremendous fire up to the moment of the advance
of the troops, mad not a gun could the enemy
bring to bear on the storming columns ; but no
sooner did these emerge into the open than a
perfect hailstorm of bullets met them from the
front and both flanks, and officers and men fell
fast on the crest of the glacis. For 10 minutes ii
was impossible to get the ladders down into the
ditch to ascend the scarp, but the determination of
the British soldier carried all before it, and Pandy
declined to meet the charge of the British bayonet.
With a shout and a rush the breaches were both
won, and the enemy fled in confusion.
Meanwhile the explosion party advanced in front
of the column straight upon the Cashmere gate.
This little band of heroes (for they were no less)
had to advance in broad daylight to the gate-
way in the very teeth of a hot fire of musketry
from above, and through the gateway and on both
flanks the powder bags were coolly laid and ad-
justed ; but Lieutenant Salkeld was by this time
hors de combat, with two bullets in him. Sergeant
Carmichael then attempted to fire the train, but
was shot dead. Sergeant Burgess then tried and
succeeded, but paid for the daring act with his life.
Sergeant Smith, thinking that Burgess tco had
failed, ran forward, but seeing the train alight had
just time to throw himself into the ditch and eacape
the effects of the explosion. With, a loud crash the
gate was blown in, and through it the 31 column
rushed to the assault, and entered the town just as
the other columns had won the breaches. General
Wilson has since bestowed the Victoria Cross on
Lieutenants Home awl Salkeld, on Sergeant Smith,
and on a brave man of H. M.'s 521, who stood by
Lieutenant Salkeld to the last, and bound up his
wounds.

General Nicholson then formed the troops in the
main-guard inside, and with his column proceeded
to clear the ramparts as far as the Mores bastion.
It was in advancing beyond this, towards the La-
hore gate, that he met the wound which his since
caused his lamented deatb, a death which it is not
too much to say has dimmed the lustre of even th's
victory, as it has deprived the country of one of the
ablest men and the most gallant soldiers that Eng
tan 1 anywhere numbers among her rankl.
The 4th column, I regret to say, failed, but as it
was too far for me to know anything of its real pro-
gress, I prefer leaving its story to be told by an-
other, instead of sending you a vague and imperfect
account. Ha 1 this column succeeded, its posses-
sion
of the Lahore gate would have saved us much
subsequent trouble.

I regret that my account must stop here, as,
being wounded myself at this stage of the proceed-
ings, I was unable to witness the subsequent cap-
ture of the mnazine, the Burn Bastion, the Palac..,
and finally of the whole city. Some one else will,
doubtless, conclude my story i, i a more worthy
manner than 1 have told it.

On the day of the assault, we had 61 oeffiers and
1,178 killed and wounded, being nearly one-third
of the whole number engaged. The Ist Fusiliers