The Sun.
London, England, 1861-04-18 00:00:00

LAW 11177 ELLI9ENCE.-April 17.

COURT OF PROBATE AND DIVORCE.
(Before Sir C. Cresswell.)
GRAY V. GRAY.

The petitioner in this case, Mary Louisa Gray,
prayed for a dissolution of her marriage with
Richard Thomas Clement Gray, on the ground of
adultery coupled with bigamy. The respondent did
not appear. • The cause was heard by his lordship
on the 17th of January last, and a decree nisi was
pronounced for the dissolution of the marriage
with costs. On the 20th of March the Queen's
Proctor, by direction of the Attorney-General, ap-
plied to the Court under the 23d and 24th Vic., cap.
144, for leave to intervene. Leave was granted, and
the Queen's Proctor thereupon filed a plea and
prayed that the petition might be dismissed, and
the petitioner or the respondent condemned in the
costs.

Dr. Wambey, on behalf of the petitioner, moved
fer leave to take the petition off the file.
The Attorney-General (with whom was Dr.
Phillimore, Q.C., and Dr. Spinks), said that this
being the first case which had been brought before
the Court under the new act, he thought it his duty
to attend to resist the petitioner's application. It
was difficult to express any decided opinion with
respect to a novel kind of practice like the pre-
sent ; but, looking to the analogous practice in the
Court of Chancery, in caselo where decrees nisi were
to be set aside, the application ought not to be enter-
tained. That technical question, however, was
very immaterial. The Que,,?.l.,'s Proctor having re-
ceived information, from whit he felt it to be his
duty to intervene after the cis cree nisi was pro-
nounced, obtained leave to do so. He then placed
the following pleas upon the files .of the Court :
" That the said petitioner has been :ae ting in collusion
with the respondent Richard Thomas ClelYient Gray, for
the purpose of obtaining a divorce contrary to the justice
of the case.
" That divers material facts respecting the conduct of
the said petitioner and the respondent have not been
brought before the Court.
" That at the time when the said petitioner prevoknited
her said petition for dissolution of her marriage, she was
and had been for some years previously habitually coul-
milting adultery with Thomas Kendall, an omnibus pro-
prietor.
" That from the autumn of the year 1850 down to the
middle of the year 1862 the said petitioner was in the con-
stant habit of meeting the said Thomas Kendall at the Red
Cow Tavern, Dalston, in the county of Middlesex, and of
there committing adultery with him.
" That from the time mentioned in the preceding Para-
graph to the month of December, 1856, the said petitioner
lived in divers places in the said neighbourhood, and was
there constantly visited by the said Thomas Kendall, and
had on divers such occasions committed adultery with the
said Thomas Kendall.
" That from December, 1856, to March, 1859, the said
petitioner lived and cohabited as his wife with the said
Thomas Kendall, at Radnor •terrace, King Henry's-walk,
Ball's-pond-road, in the county of Middlesex.
" That, from the month of March, 1859, to the present
' time the same petitioner haslivedaud cohabited as his wife
with the said Thomas Kendall, at a house situate at Tyssen-
terrace, Dalston-lane, Hackney, in the county of Middlesex."
It was, he submitted, important to the highest inte-
rests of justice that parties should not be permitted
after they had proceeded so far as to obtain a de-
cree nisi, to withdraw their case from the further
consideration of the Court, and to obliterate all trace
of it by removing the petition from the file. The
Court and the public had an interest in having the
suit finally determined. The Court having been
induced to pronounce an improper decree, it was
under an obligation to set it aside. It was impossible
that the object of the Legislature could be attained
if the moment the Attorney-General intervened for
the purpose of preventing the highest contempt of
Court being permitted—namely, the obtaining a
decree by an imposition on the Court, the petitioner
was allowed to defeat justice by withdrawing his
petition. This extraordinary application was made
solely in consequence of the intervention of the At-
torney-General. He hoped the Court would not
accede to it, but would hear the evidence by which
the Queen's Proctor proposed to prove his allega-
tions, and would then finally determine the case in
the ordinary course.
Dr. Wambey Contended that the only object
which the Queen's Proctor could have in interven-
ing would be fully attained if this application
were granted and the petition were withdrawn.
He was unable to understand how the public in-
terest could be effected, or how the public morality
could be in any way benefitted by an exposure of
all the facts tending to prove collusion' if collusion
existed. He could not conceive why the petitioner
should be debarred from withdrawing the petition.
The Judge-Ordinary—I am of opinion that I
ought not to grant this application. I think that
the interest of the public is concerned largely in
the matter, and that it is important, in the interest
of the public and in the interest of morality, if a
woman comes forward presenting shamelessly her
sham case—a case not founded on truth, but on
collusion with her husband—that her conduct should
be fully exposed, and thati the disgrace which be-
longs to such a transaction • should be thoroughly
understood. I think, moreover, that the Attorney-
General having directed the Queen's Proctor to in-
tervene under the authority of the statute, it is not
competent to the party, after that intervention, to
seek to defeat the object of the proceeding taken
under the authority of the Legislature for the
purpose of evading the consequences of her mis-
conduct by withdrawing the petition. I think,
further, that one consequence of this proceeding,
which the statute contemplated, could not be at-
tained if the petitioner were allowed to withdraw
her petition. It is in the breast of the Court, if it
should think that a case of fraud and collusion has
been established, to fix the costs upon the husband,
at all .events, if not upon the wife. That conse-
quence would be evaded if the party to a collusive
suit were to be allowed to withdraw the petition.
On all these grounds I shall hear the evidence
which the Attorney-General ptoposes to adduce,
and shall let the case proceed to its legitimate de-
termination in accordance with the directions of
the Legislature.
The Attorney-General asked his lordship to re-
serve the question of the costs of the present appli-
cation. . .

The Judge-Ordinary—l am not in a condition to
deal with that question now. I have nothing before
me at present to affect the respondent.

DRUMMOND, COMMONLY CALLED VISCOUNTESS FORTH V.
DRUMMOND, COMMONLY CALLED VISCOUNT FORTH.
The Attorney-General, with whom was Dr.
Spinks, said he had an ex parte application to make
in another case of great importance, which was on
the paper for to-morrow. The petition was pre-
sented by. Harriett M. Drummond, commonly called
Viscountess Forth, against her husband, Viscount
Forth, for a dissolution of marriage, 'and the
Queen's Proctor had intervened in the suit. It was
deemed most essential that Lady Forth should he
present at the hearing, for the purpose of being
examined to prove the allegations of the Queen's
Proctor. A affidavit had been filed and made by
a clerk to the Queen's Proctor, who stated that
Lady Forth was now residing with her mother at
Hampstead ; that he attended at her residence on
the 15th and 16th inst. for the purpose of serving
her with a subpoena to attend at the hearing ; that
he had inquired for her, and had stated for what
purpose he wished to see her, but the persons in
the house denied that they had any knowledge
where she was to be found, and that he fully be-
lieved that she was endeavouring to evade the ser-
vice of the subpoena. The present application was
for an order that Lady Forth should attend at the
hearing for the purpose of being examined.
His lordship made the order.
PEARCE V. PEARCE AND FRENCH.
The husband in this case had obtained a decree
of dissolution on the ground of his wife's adul-
tery, and an application had been made by Dr.
Spinks on behalf of the petitioner for an order ra-
specting the property put into settlement at the time

of the marriage. The property was settled upon
the husband for life, then upon the wife for life, 111
the event of her surviving him, and then upon the
children of the marriage.
His Lordship said he had given a great deal of
consideration to the question of what order he ought
to make, and he had come to the conclusion that it
should be one to this effect :—That from and after
the death of the petitioner the property comprised
in the settlement should be applied by the trustees,
in the event of the respondent surviving the peti-
tioner, to the benefit of the children of the marriage
as if the respondent were then dead.