The Sun.
London, England, 1859-02-26 00:00:00

in course of building. These would have been launched at
different periods during the next few years, but we have
selected those which were the most forward, and therefore
could be orated upon most easily, and with the least ex-
pense, and pe
propose to launch four of them during the ensu-
ing year. In all, therefore, there will be launched during
the year six screw line-of-battle ships—viz., the Hood, 91
guns, and 600-horse power • the Revenge, 91, 800-horse
power • the Victoria, 121, 1,000-horse power; the Howe, '
121, 1,000-horse power; the Duncan, 101, 800-horse power;
and the Prince of Wales, 131, 800-horse power. It
will be seen that during the time that that right hon. gen-
tleman was at the Board of Admiralty considerable addi-
tions of smaller vessels were made, such as corvettes, sloops,
and, above all, gunboats. lam not sure whether the addi-
tion of gunboats had not commenced in the time of the
right lion. baronet the member for Carlisle ; but our present
gunboats were chiefly added by the right hon. baronet the
member for Halifax, and I do not think a more valuable ad-
dition has ever been made to the navy than those gunboats.
(Hear, hear.) They are extremely popular, and while I
have held office I have received applications for them from
the service in various parts of the world. But the additions
made by the right hon. baronet opposite (Sir C. Wood) had
reference to the emergency in which they were made. Those
additions were chiefly made in 1856 ; they had reference to
the war then going on with Russia; and the right hon.
gentleman very naturally added vessels of a class suited to
the emergency of the moment; but while a considerable
force of those gunboats and sloops was added to the navy,
the line-of-battle ships and frigates did not increase in the
ratio which the interests of the public service demanded.
(Hear, hear.) On the contrary, the result of the war was
actually to check the progress which ought to have been
made in augmenting the number of line-of-battle ships in
the navy. I hold in my hand a statement of the proposals
made by the surveyor of the navy for an increase of line-
of-battle-ships and frigates during the last ten years. I have
the programme submitted and the orders given thereon, but
those orders were not carried out. In the course of the last
ten years the orders for ships of the line amounted to 37, but
the number of ships of the line actually built during those
years was only 25, and therefore when I came into office I
found 12 line-of-battle ships less than we should have had if
the intentions of the Admiralty from year to year had been
carried out. (Hear.) In late years, I believe, the falling-off
originated in the requirements of the Russian war, which
to a certain extent had the effect of diverting labour from
the building of line-of-battle ships. With regard to frigates,
that is a strongercase. During the last 10 years proposals
were made for adding 37 frigates ; the actual number built
was only 23, so that there was a deficiency of 14 frigates in
that interval. All this has made a very material difference
in the positive and relative state of the navy. I attach no
blame to the late Admiralty for having built those smaller
vessels, but we must recollect that in contemplating the
future action of our navy we must have regard to the pos-
sibility of a naval war. (Hear, hear.) We cannot look for
a repetition of a war similar to that with Russia; we must,
I say, contemplate the possibility of a naval war ; and
should we ever find ourselves involved in a naval war it
will be absoluteiy essential to have line-of-battle ships and
frigates in such numbers as will enable us to conduct such
a war in a satisfactory manner. Very shortly after I came
into office we received at the Admiralty a paper called a
" submission," from Sir B. Walker, the Surveyor of tole
Navy, calling our attention in very strong terms to the un-
satisfactory state of her Majesty's naval force in respect to
line-of-battle ships. This submission" was laid before
the Admiralty, I think, in the latter part of March last.
Again, in May we received from Sir Baldwin Walker
another pressing "submission," calling our attention to the
deficiency of line-orebattle ships. In the course of the sum-
mer we thought it our duty to institute inquiries into the
state of the navy of France. We felt, as I shall soon show,
that the navy of England was not in a satisfactory condi-
tion ; but we thought it our duty to make inquiries in refe-
rence to the condition of the navy of France. In July we
again received a strong "submission" from Sir B. Walker,
urging on us the necessity of making vigorous efforts for
the safety of our own shores in the building of powerful
ships of the line. From that document I will read an ex-
tract. Sir B. Walker says :
" The information recently received from France having
fully confirmed the accounts previously obtained of the
state of the French navy, and shown the additions contem-
plated during the ensuing year, it is now beyond a question
that, although a few years ago we were far ahead of them
in respect of screw line-of-battle ships, they are now, for
the first time, equal to us, and unless some extraordinary
steps are at once taken to expedite the building of screw
ships of the line the French, at the close of next year,
will be actually superior to us as regards the most powerful
class of ships of war."
(Hear, hear.) Again, he says
" This condition of things would not- have occurred if
the successive programmes of the last few years could have
been carried out, but the exigencies of the late war so inter-
fered with the building of ships that it was found utterly
impossible to do so."
I now wish to state to the house that last summer, when
my attention was drawn to this state of affairs, the effec-
tive line-of-battle ships in England were in number only
29. (Hear, hear.) With respect to block ships, of which
we have heard a great deal, and of which I scarcely knew
how to speak in the first instance on my coming into office,
I must say I have now no hesitation in stating that these
block ships are wholly useless. (" Hear, hear," and a
laugh.) They are good for nothing as sea-going men-of-
war ; they may be useful perhaps as floating batteries ; but
as men-of-war I say they are perfectly useless. Most of
them are rotten, and they are very nearly worn out. (Hear,
hear.) We must dismiss block ships then and sailing line-
of-battle ships from our consideration. The effective line-
of-battle ships in England, as I ha's e said, when I came to
the Admiralty were reduced to the low number of 29. The
house will permit me to state what the number of the navy
in England has been in former times. In the seven years'
war (1760) there were 113 ships of the line in commission,
with 86,626 seamen and marines ; in the American war
(1783) there were 126 ships of the line in commission, with
105,443 seamen and marines ; in the French revolutionary
war (1799) there were 120 ships of the line in commission,
with 120,409 seamen and marines ; in the war with France
(1809) there were 113 ships of the line in commission, with
144,387 seamen and marines ; and in the war with Russia
(1856), when we had no enemy on the sea—when
we fought no naval action, and when our ships of
war were engaged in the transport of troops, or
in attacking stone walls, there were 42 ship's in commission
(including block ships and sailing ships) with 67,791 sea-
men and marines. Those sailing ships and block ships
answered the purpose when there was no enemy on the
sea; but you cannot calculate on them in future; and, in
although the lowest number you had in the war with Ma-
sia was 42, your force is reduced to the lower number of 29.
That was in the summer of last year ; and four ships were
taking in their engines, which increased the number to 33.
Hear.) I shall not dwell longer on this matter. I admit
its difficulty, but it seems to me that the difficulty must be
grappled with. The efficiency of the public service re-
quires it. My belief is, without pledging myself to any de-
tails, that the sound principle is to follow the rule already,
adopted to a considerable extent in the army. Naval offi-
cers, like all other human beings, must yield to the force of
time ; and it is essential to the well -being of the navy that
we should have the services of active and vigorous offi-
cers, capable of performing their duties. The best system
of promotion is that which, while it induces aged officers
to retire, will secure the advancement of younger men
to posts which their physical strength and professional
attainments qualify them to fill. In answer to a question
put to me yesterday, I stated that I should avail myself of
this occasion to allude to a subject whisk has lately excited
very great interest—viz , the present position of the surgeons
of the Royal navy. (Hear, hear.) lam sorry to find that
my answer has been very much misunderstood. Iby no
means intended to imply that I had any doubt or hesitation
as to the course to be adopted. On the contrary, I then
meant, as I mean now, to express in distinct terms my
opinion that the present position of the surgeons in the navy
is not satisfactory. (Hear, hear.) But Igo still further. The
complaints we now hear from these officers are, no doubt,
much founded upon the late warrant issued in respect to the
army; but I think that even before the date of that warrant
the surgeons of the navy were not relatively placed on an
equality with their brethren of the army. Now, however,
they have an unanswerable claim to the consideration of
their country. Nothing in the military service could be
nobler or more gallant than the manner in which the medi-
cal officers of the navy have discharged their duties under
the most trying and painful circumstances, and they are,
therefore, entitled to more liberal treatment than they now
receive. Their claim is based upon two grouuds—first, it is
due to them as gentlemen that their position should be im-
proved, and secondly, public policy requires that the services
of this most useful branch of the profession should be more
highly appreciated and better requited, so that able and effi-
cient men may not be deterred from joining the navy. It is,
therefore, our intention in spirit and in substance to concede
to naval surgeons the advantages which they justly seek to
obtain. At the same time I will not and cannot now
commit myself to the exact mode in which that object
shall be carried out. The peculiarities of the naval service
may render it inconvenient to follow the precise rule
pursued in regard to the army ; but these and other points
of detail will be duly considered before our plan is finally
decided upon. The naval chaplains have preferred a very
similar claim, as have also the class of masters, and it is my
desire to take the whole of these questions into simultane-
ous consideration, carefully examining them in their rela-
tion to each other before arriving at any definite conclu-
sion on the subject. The next vote is that for transport,
on which there is a considerable reduction. It has fallen
from £410,500 last year to £200,000 for the present year.
The item for the packet service differs little from the cor-
responding charge for the last year; and, in fact, it ought
not to be included in the navy estimates at all. It should
by rights be compromised among the votes fur the Post-
office department—(hear, hear) ;—and I only wonder that
the right hon. gentleman opposite did not get rid of it long
ago when he presided at the Admiralty. The general re-
sult of a comparison between the estimates for the present
and those for the next year is that, supposing we did not
take any extra money for shipbuilding, and did not add
3,000 men -to the navy, there would 'be a saving of more
than £138,000 in favour of the next year. Including the
expense for this 3,000 men, but deducting the charge for
extra shipbuilding, there would still remain a saving of
£23,897 upon the estimates for the next year. The real
addition to our naval expenditure on account of the pro-
posals we intend to make will amount to £1,009,604. With
the permission of the committee I shall now turn to the
increase of the navy which we recommend; and here I may
observe that throughout this statement I wish to deal with
the house with the most perfect candour. I must there-
fore say that this stun of 4009,604 which appears to be
the additional cost we are to incur for shipbuilding,
does not represent the whole augmentation of charge
which we contemplate. Besides that amount there are
postponed payments to the extent of £260,000. Of
that money £lOO,OOO will be. devoted to steam machinery,
which will not be paid for during 1859-60, but will be
brought into the accounts for the commencement of the
year following, being disbursed by instalments. There will
also be a payment of £160,000 due for the construction of
vessels by contract. Thus, the entire expense of the in-
crease we propose to make in the navy is not exhausted by
the sum of £1,009,604 which stands on the paper, but in
fact will amount—though it will not all be required for the
present financial year—to £1,269,604. The question then
arises—Why is that we want this addition to our navy ?
Are there sufficient reasons to justify us in asking Parlia-
ment to grant an increased expenditure for this purpose, in
round figures of nearly £1,300,000 My belief is that
neither in this house nor in the country will there be any
hesitation as to the propriety of this outlay. (Cheers.)
am sure it is my duty, as it is the soundest policy, to treat
the house with perfect frankness en these subjects. I did
so last year, and. I intend to do so now. I have previously
stated my conviction that the extent of our naval force is
known to foreign Powers. Foreign Governments are per-
fectly well aware of what goes on in this country. If there
is any concealrhent at all, it is concealment from the
people. (Hear.) It is right that the people should know
what is the real state of affairs, and why they are called on
to make these great efforts. I may state then, at once, that
we ask for this great addition to the cost of shipbuilding,
because . I am bound to say that when I succeeded to the
office I now hold I did not find the navy of this country in
a proper and adequate state for the defence of our coasts
and the prctectio4 of our commerce, (Hear; hear.) king

here in the most explicit terms to disclaim any intention to
cast censure upon any former Administrations. - If there
is anything which I am more anxious to avoid than another
it is any appearance of party spirit or party controversy.
I cheerfully do justice to former Governments, and espe-
cially to that which immediately preceded us, to which in
regard to many points great credit is due ; and while they
left many things 'still to be done, it is but fair to say
that there were strong and obvious reasons connected
with the Russian war why certain reforms should not then
have been adopted. The right hon. member for Halifax
lately moved for a return showing the number of ships of
all descriptions which during the last few years have been
added to our navy. We propose in the ensuing year to con-
vert five more line-of-battle shins, and to finish six new
ones. The result will be that the Royal Navy will, in re-
spect of line-of-battle ships, be increased by 15. I now
come to the question of frigates, and I am sorry to say that,
in respect to that class of vessels, our position in compari-
son with the French navy, is still more unsatisfactory than
it is with regard to line-of-battle ships. In the course of
the autumn, I found that instead of being upon a par in
point of numbers, as was the case with regard to line-of-
' battle ships, we were in a positive numerical inferiority of
12 frigates. (Hear.) The English navy comprises 17
screw frigates and nine paddle frigates, two receiving their
engines and six building, making a total of 34. The French
navy reckons 15 screws, 19 paddle-wheels, three receiving
their engines, one converting, and eight building, making
an aggregate of 46. I cannot help here calling the atten-
tion of the committee to a comparison of the naval forces of
England and France at various periods in former years. In
1812 England hat 245 line-of-battle ships, while France
had 113. We had then 272 frigates and. France 72. In
1820 England possessed 146 line-of-battle ships and France
58. We had 164 frigates and France 39. In 1840 England
had 89 line-of-battle ships and France 44. We had 180 fri-
gates and France had 50. In 1850 England had 86 line-of-
battle ships and France 45. England had 104 frigates and
France 56. I have at the same time to state, for which the right
hon. gentleman opposite in some degree deserves the credit,
that among our frigates are some of the very finest ships of
that class that ever floated. Two very remarkable frigates,
the Mersey and the Orlando, have just been launched carry-
ing 50 and 40guns respectively. It is true that they are ex-
perimental ships, and that their value is not yet fully ascer•
tained, but I have every reason to believe that they will be
splendid men of war. Some of the French frigates, too, are
not so strong in respect of horse-power as ours are. When
we discovered our inferiority the Government felt, and, I
believe, the Committee will also feel, that we really had
no opinion but to endeavour, as soon as possible, to remove
that inferiority—(hear, hear)—and, therefore, the plan
. which the Government now asks you to enable them to
carry out is this. I may first observe that we have some
12 or 14 sailing 80-gun ships, which, as of that class, are,
I fear almost useless, but which I had hoped might be con-
verted into good frigates. lam sorry to say that they are
so old, averaging ipwards of 30 years, as not to be worth
the cost of conversion. Upon the other hand, we have
about 12 or 13 50-gun sailing frigates which are compara-
tively young, only averaging about eight or ten years of age,
and they will be converted and lengthened, and will be
most valuable vessels. Our proposal is, as to frigates, in-
stead of launching three, which is the usual number, each
year, to hurry on two which are building, and so launch
five this year. They will be the Galatea, of 26 guns and 800-
horse power ; the Ariadne, of 32 guns and 800-horse power ;
the Bacchante, of 50 guns and 600-horse power; the Nar-
cissus, of 50 guns and 400-horse power ; and the Immortalite,
of 50 guns and 600-horse power. In addition to these we
propose to convert four of the sailing frigates to which I
have adverted—the Phaeton, Severn, Sutlej, and the Phoebe
—to lengthen them amiiiiips, at the bows, and at the stern .
(Hear, and laughter.) I believe these ships will become
as efficient and as valuable as it is possible for converted
ships to be. I fear they will be very costly ships, but still
most valuable and effective, carrying the same armament
they now bear-50 guns. The cost will be for the labour of
conversion £42,000 for each ship, and the cost of engines of
500-horse power £30,000, so that each ship will cost about
£72,000. If, however, we were to construct new ships of
the same size they would cost at least each £40,000 more ;
and, moreover, these converted frigates can be added to our
navy in a much less time than it would take to build new
ones. We thus propose to add nine frigates in the course of
the year. I now have to beg the attention of the committee
to a portion of this subject which is the most difficult, but
upon which lam bound to be candid—l allude to the sub-
ject of iron; cased ships. In referring to the French navy I
made no mention of what they were going to do in respect
to those ships, but it appears that they have laid down at
Toulon two vessels upon that plan, which are far advanced
towards completion. They are to be about the size and ton-
nage of the vessel which they consider to be their finest
line-of-battle ship, the Napoleon, upon which I understand
they have been modelled. They are only to carry 30 guns,
but those guns are to be of the heaviest calibre, and the
vessels are to be coated with 41 inch plates of iron or steel,
it not being yet decided which metal shall be adopted. In
this state af things the Government felt it to be their duty
in the course of last summer to institute experiments as to
the power of certain metal sheathing to resist shot. The
committee will perceive that it would not be proper in me
to enter into detail at present upon that subject—(hear)—
and I can oily say that the experiments were most care-
fully made with all varieties of metal and in all ways. In
the course of the autumn, as every gentleman who reads the
newspapers must know, some wonderful inventions were
made in artillery, and it then appeared to me to be my duty
to ascertain how far the previous experiments would be
affected by the recent discoveries in artillery arms. The
house will not expect me to give in detail the result of these
experiments, but I am bound to say that it has convinced
the Admiralty that, whatever be the cost, we have no op-
tion in the discharge of our duty but to commence the con-
struction of these iron-cased ships. I shall not conceal
from the house that they will be the most costly ships ever
built for the British navy ; but still, assuming—that of
which I have no doubt—that our plans will receive the
sanction of Parliament, we have resolved that it is our duty
to lose no time in building at least two of these vessels.
I am bound to say, also, that we feel it to be no less our
duty to throw away no chance whatever in endeavouring
to -make these ships as effective and successful as pos-
sible. We 'have called upon the most competent parties
in differe;t parts of England connected with private
trade to gibe us their designs and counsel. We have like-
wise called upon our officials in the dockyards—upon our
able master shipwrights of whom, I am glad to says we
have a considerable number—to furnish us with designs.
The determination of the Admiralty is to leave nothing un-
done, to take every precaution that prudence and caution
can suggest, in order that the large sums which these ships
will cost shall not be thrown away We are equally re-
at, Lititte w Lune nuC .a moment 111 nrnlging
these ships into existence. They are the ships which ap-
peared in our estimates under the head of ships to be built
by contract. Wehave not room to build them in our dock-
yards. From the mode of construction which we propose
we have no hesitation in confiding their construction under
oursuperintendence, to those who will build them by con-
tract ; and by the close of the year upon which we are now
entering, I hope these two ships may also be added to the
strength of the British navy. (Hear.) Such are the pro-
posals to which we ask the consent of the house. If they
are sanctioned the result, as regards ships, will be this—in
the course of next year 15 line-of-battle ships, about half
our existing number of heavy frigates, and two iron-cased
ships, which will be as powerful as we can make them, will
be added to our navy. The general result will be an addi-
tion to the naval force of the country of 26 powerful men-
of-war. (Hear, hear.) Such is the use we propose to make
of the sums which we ask you. to vote. Lhave been per-
fectly open and candid with, the house. (Cheers.) I have
stated to them our necessity, and I have also explained how
we propose to meet it. If am asked why we propciose to do so
much, I answer it is not more than the case requires. If I
am asked why we do not propose to do more, I say these
proposals are the limit of our power—our dockyards could
not do more within the year. But I tell you frankly that
when these ships are completed—when we have added 15 to
our line-of-battle and nine to our heavy frigates, and when
we have built the two iron-cased ships to which I have re-
ferred—l, for one, shall not be content with the strength of
the British navy. (Hear.) At the end of next year, instead of
33 as now; we shall have 48 line of-battle ships. But there
are four more new ships on the stocks ; there are four more
line-of-battle ships which will bear conversion, and I hope
that in the ensuing financial year of 1860-1 Parliament will
consent to the completion of these eight vessels, thus raising
our force at the end of that year to 56 line-of-battle ships.
I trust also that Parliament will sanction a further addition
to our frigates,, so that ere long our supremacy may be
thoroughly re-established. (Hear.) I feel greatly indebted
to the house for the patience with which they have heard
my protracted, and, I am afraid, in some respects, dull
statement. (Cries of "No, no," and cheers.) r trust they
will consider that we have done no more than our duty in
making these proposals to them. We have made these pro-
posals from a conviction that it is our duty to invite the
House of Commons to aid us in our attempt to restore the
naval supremacy of England. (Hear, hear.) We are
bound to recollect the vital importance of this question.
We are bound to recollect that we have not only, like Rus-
sia, or France, or the other great continental Powers, to
provide for the protection of our own coasts and maint'ain
our position in Europe, but to protect an empire and a com-
merce that extend over the four quarters of the globe.
(Hear, hear.) Our naval force is of necessity divided, and
therefore it is essential for England not to allow her navy
to fall, as it has fallen, down to the lowest amount ever
known in our history—an amount not exceeding that of a
neighbouring Power without anything like, the same de-
mand upon its force. (Hear, hear.) It is our duty to take
care that our naval force is not only adequate to preserve
our position in Europe, but sufficient to answer the de-
mands made upon us in all parts of the world. (Hear,
hear.) Let me add, above all, that we make these pro-
posals in the interests of peace. (Hear, hear.) lam con-
' winced that with peace England must be powerful. The
best guarantee for peace is to show that we are prepared for
war, and I cannot, I think, conclude my speech in more
appropriate terms than those which I find in the ad-
vice of Sir Francis Bacon to Sir George Villiers :
" God is the God of Peace,—it is one of his attributes ;
therefore by Him alone we must pray and hope to continue
it ; there is the foundation. And the King must not
neglect the just ways for it. Justice is the best protector
of it at home, and providence for war is the best prevention
of it from abroad." (Cheers.)
Sir CHARLES WOOD did not intend, in any observe-
gone he,- was about to make, to offer any opposition to the
proposal of the right hon. gentleman. He felt that the
country ought to be always prepared for war, and he would
therefore vote with pleasure for the proposed increase in the
number of men in the navy. He wished to know how the
3,000 men who were to be the reserve were to be lodged.
He would suggest that they should be lodged in barracks.
Last year he proposed a vote of £25,000 to purchase land
for barracks in Keyham to lodge sailors ; but that item was
struck out by the house in its desire to carry out economy,
and he was glad to see that a sum of £25,000 was in the
estimates for a similar purpose, and it should have his sup-
port. He was most anxious that they should have an
effective reserve of men. He had last year obtained a vote
for 9,000 coastguard men as:a reserve; and he regretted that
that force was not now to be increased by at least 1,000
men. A naval coast volunteer corps would be a most valu-
able addition to the naval force of this country, and he was
glad to see that means were to be taken to enrol this body
of men in the service. He now came to the question of
the building of the navy, and he must say that he entirely
concurred in the proposal as it had been made to the house.
When he was at the Admiralty they employed all the ship-
wrights they could find; but it was not desirable to 'build
too many vessels, as they were invariably attacked with
dry rot in the-course of years. The right hon. gentleman
then referred to the number of small vessels built by the
late Government, observing that they were sufficient for
the purposes
.of the country. The late Government had,
however, built large vessels of war in the course of the
last five years. In 1853, they built 6 ; in 1854, 8 ; in
1856, 2 ; in 1857, 2 ; and in 1858, 8 ; so that with these
vessels and 200 gun-boats they had all that were necessary
for the present moment. It would no doubt be desirable
to build large vessels, but that would be a work of time. He
found that the extra pay for one year amounted to £17,000.
The late government proposed last year to add to the dock-

yard establishment 1,340 men, but the right hon. gentleman
refused to act upon that suggestion, and continued the sys-
tem of extra men. The right hon. gentleman had quoted
the report of the committee over which Lord Seymour had
ably presided. That committee was appointed to inquire
into the naval and military expenditure, and one of the
recommendations of that committee was as regarded extra
workmen. In that report it was stated that they ought to
increase the dockyard establishment as a matter of public
policy, and that the extra pay system ought not to be con-
tinued. He (Sir C. Wood) quoted from that report last
year; but the right hon. gentleman did not choose to adopt
his suggestions and that of the committee, and this year he
was pursuing the same course ; for, with the experience of
last year, he still refused to act on the recommendation of
that committee, and increase the establishment of the dock-
yards. The recommendation he alluded to was not only his
opinion, but was also that of high authorities, and he be-
lieved the system of extra pay to be not only unwise but
inexpedient. During the whole of last year, be it observed,
Government could not get shipwrights, but even the young
workmen left the dockyards and went to work in private
yards. By increasing the establishment they kept in their
own hands the power of increasing the amount of work
when it should be required. But if the men in time of peace
were put to task or job work, they would have no means,
in time of war, to make that increase which would be essen-
tially necessary. Now, look at the estimate of the right
hon. gentleman. Under the bead of pay to the dockyards
there appears the sum of £50,000 for extra work, which
showed the necessity for increasing the establishment of
the dockyards. When all had been done that was proposed
to be done by the right hon. baronet the navy would not
be made what it ought to be ; and he had stated, and
stated truly, that several ships were not in the state
they should be. As regarded block ships, they were
excellent ships to be used as floating batteries, at such ports
as Glasgow, Liverpool, and other important harbours, and
to be used for the training of men and boys, and the recep-
tion of coastguard volunteers ' • but they were not fit to be
used as sea-going ships, and should not be excluded from
the ships in this country. (Hear, hear.) One thing was
certain, that they must build large ships to compete with
the ships of other nations. He agreed that the Orlando and
the Mersey were both fine vessels, but they ought to have
many more that could compete with advantage with those
of other countries. They must, for several years to come,
increase building ships very considerably, and in eight or
ten years their navy would be in a proper condition. He
therefore objected to the way in which the right hon.
baronet intended to proceed. The same objections he had
urged would apply to the steam machinery, for, if it was
necessary to increase building, it was also necessary to in-
crease steam machinery. The only other matter he in-
tended to refer to was, the proposal to build two iron-cased
ships, and if other nations had used them with a probability
of success, this country ought not to be without them.
Undoubtedly there were great improvements in the power
.f the ordnance used on board ships, and it was necessary
that they should keep up their improvements to meet and
compete with those which other nations had. It was not
his intention to offer any opposition, and he believed none
would be made to the vote which had been placed in the
chairman's hands ; but he had thought it necessary to
make the observations he had offered to the committee, re-
serving to himself the power of making such remarks as he
might deem to be necessary when other votes should be
proposed ; but he believed a permanent increase in the
workmen of the dockyards would be the best economy and
the true policy for this country to pursue.
Sir C. NAPIER said that during the time he had had
the honour of a seat in that house he had never heard the
navy estimates brought forward in so clear and distinct a
manner as had been done by the right honourable baronet
that night. He would not follow, the right hon. baronet
through his reasons for increasing the navy, but this he
would say that he had told them what was not usual. He
had told them how the money had been expended last year,
and how it would be expended during the present year.
This was certain, that they must build larger and longer
ships than they had built hitherto, and that would re-
quire that they should have larger and longer docks. As
to manning the navy, the report which had been made by
the commission was an excellent one, and if the Govern-
ment followed it up they would have the means of manning
the navy better than it had ever been manned before. He
had only one objection to it, that it did not go far enough,
and encourage petty officers and men to enter the service
by giving them better pay. The pay to petty officers
ought to be higher, and, by making it higher, they would
always be considered better officers, and the men would
be more ambitious of aspiring to be petty officers. He
had proposed that the pay of the petty officers should be
double that of the men, and that the men's pay should be
increased to what it was in the merchant service ; and he
trusted that, when the report was taken into considera
' -
tion that he would be able to induce the house to give
that increased pay. Since the year 1815, he would like to
know what the Admiralty had been doing. He must say
that he was very happy he had the honour of proposing
the appointment of the commission he had alluded to.
The next question was whether the vote of 3,000 men was
sufficient. It clearly was not sufficient to keep this country,
even with the men coming home from China, in safety.
The very smallest number of ships should be ten sail of the
line fully manned, and then if it was necessary to have 30
sail of the line on an emergency, there ought to be nine
ships with a small crew, which, in case of emergency,
could be easily increased. Those ships, together with the
Channel fleet, would be of essential service in case of
emergency. That house wanted to have an efficient navy.
They should have a navy equal to France and Russia, and
provided the country was satisfied the money was pro-
perly expended, that house would never refuse it. But
the money was not properly expended. And how could it
be otherwise with the constant changes in the Admiralty?
Every first lord chose his own admirals. Each of these had
his own views, and the result was that what was done by
one Admiralty was undone by another. There were always
some new ideas displacing the old ideas. This involved a
constant expenditure. He recommended experiments, prac-
tical experiments in gunnery, but notwithstanding all his
remonstrances they kept to the old system at Portsmouth.
If they had ten sail of the line in the Channel fleet, they
ought to have ten sail of the line in the first reserve, and
there ought to be a second reserve of the same number.
Without that he maintained the country was not in a safe
condition. Between Brest and Cherbourg, France had 20
sail of the line fully manned. By that he meant that the
ships were in the same condition as our first reserve. France
at that moment commanded the Channel. France com-
manded the Mediterranean. That was a position in which
that country ought not to be. France had a commercial
navy of 180 vessels and 170 steamvessels. She had an army
..z eoo,ooo --......, anti a powerful ua. j. aniintn7
be invaded by France at any time. Where was our force to
oppose to France ? Louis Napoleon could, if he chose, in-
vade this country. That was a position in which that coun-
try ought not to be in. (Hear, hear.) He did not wish to
give any alarm to France ; but he wished to alarm the gen-
tlemen of that house, and get rid of the rotten blockships
and of the rotten reserve ships. Was that a position that
this great country ought to be in ? Our present position was
an invitation to France. He did not gay that France had any
intention of coming to this country, but if she had she could
with her fleet, take the command of the chops of the Channel
and destroy our East India trade, and our Mediterranean
trade. If France declared war upon us, our first battle ought
to be fought at sea ; but where were our ships to fight it
upon any sudden emergency? What would be the conse-
quences if the French, with. the'command of the Channel,
landed an army on our shores ? Our little island ought to be
in a position to defy the world. But was she not, at that
moment, at the command of her more powerful neighbour ?
This country ought to be in a position to defy the whole
world. The First Lord of the Admiralty, when ho came
into office, found that France and England were equal in
their naval power. Then why did he not increase our
strength ?
Sir J. PAKINGTON—I am not indebted to the hon.
and gallant admiral for information on this subject. In
August last I took measures to increase our naval strength.
Sir C. NAPIER said the First Lord of the Admiralty
was especially responsible for the protection of the country,
and hoped he would adopt necessary measures for that pur-
pose. The late First Lord of the Admiralty (Sir C. Wood)
paid off seven sail of the line. This made his successor's
duties more difficult, as it was not very easy to re-establish
that force and re-man our fleet. He (Sir C. Napier) trusted
that we should never find a man in that high office who
would dismiss our men and weaken our naval establish-
ments. (Hear, hear.)
Sir J. ELPHINSTONE congratulated Sir J, Pakington
on the clear and business-like statement which he had made.
He (Sir J. Elphinstone) had served on a commission whose
object was to place the navy of England on a proper footing.
That commission had made a report, the suggestions of
which, if adopted by Parliament, would materially benefit
the British seaman. If the Government would give prac-
tical effect to the report of that commission, they would
elevate the character of the British seaman and confer great
advantage on the country at large. As a naval officer, he
thought the British seaman ought to be recompensed for
his services. This would be an inducement to others to
enter into the service of the country. (Hear, hear.) The
ships ought to be so constructed as that the men should
have sufficient accommodation, and that the ship's
company should be - kept, as far as possible, in good
health. With respect to small vessels he could not concur
with the right honourable baronet. The small vessels
sent out to the tropical climates were deficient in accom-
modation for the men ; there was not a comfortable deck
for the men ; the main hatch was bad, and in the hold it
was almost impossible to squeeze the men into it. Our docks
were also inadequate for the accommodation of her Ma-
jesty's navy. With Cherbourg staring us in the face, we
ought to have a basin capable of accommodating 25 or 30
sail of the line, with the means of fitting out and repairing
our vessels. Would any merchant fit up a ship in the
stream ? It would be a waste of power. Then why should
the Government do so ? (Hear.) The ships should be so
fitted up in the docks that they could sail out like a flock of
ducks. (Laughter.)
Mr. S. HERBERT observed that if the hon. baronet had
been in Parliament somewhat longer he would have ob-
served that the temper of the house was subject to fluctua-
tions on this subject. He (Mr. S. Herbert) had been
Secretary to the Admiralty for four or five years, and he
always found it difficult to obtain votes for purposes of the
kind now under consideration. Complaints were now made
as to the inefficiency of the navy at the time he held office;
but it should be recollected that at that time our naval
architecture was in its infancy. Every vessel then built was
an experiment, and some of them were condemned shortly
after their. construction. Although criticisms had been
made on them by the gallant admiral (Sir C. Napier), yet
the Simoom, Birkenhead, Vulcan, "Mlegara, and another
built under the directions of that Board of Admiralty were
highly spoken of by the late Board of Admiralty for the
service they performed in transporting troops, &c., to the
Crimea. With respect to what had been said
as to the rela-
tive merits of iron and wooden ships and wooden ships
cased with iron, experience, he thought, had proved that
there was, after all, no very material difference. As to
the votes asked for by the right hon. baronet that night, all
he could say was that he believed there would be no difficulty
raised on the part of any hon. member to the granting of these
votes ; and with respect to that required for an addition to
the number of men, he was convinced that if even a larger
number was asked for, it would be readily agreed to by the
house and the country. (Hear.) One word as to the fleet it
was proposed to maintain in China. He was one of those who
differed from the majority of Parliament in opinion as to
the policy of the Chinese war. Since then there had been
great rejoicings over its termination, and for his own part
he had been disposed to concur in the general feeling on the
subject. But now he should begin to doubt the value of the
peace and the treaty if we were required to support an
armament of 47 vessels and 4,700 men in these distant
waters. (Hear, hear.) He hoped, however, that in the
course of time these large forces would cease to be required,
and that we should be able to bring them home, and to con-
centrate them where, if danger was to be apprehended at
all, they ought to be. (Hear, hear.)
Mr. WHITBREAD said he had always been of opinion
that we should have a comparative strength of our navy
with that of foreign nations. That had been given to them,
and the result was that it had been now stated on the autho-
rity of the First Lord of the Admiralty that for some months
it had been in the power of the French Government to place
in the Channel a fleet equal to ours. That was the most
alarming statement he had ever heard on such authority.
The right hom gentleman said he had heard it several times