The Sun.
London, England, 1859-08-20 00:00:00

THE FORTIFICATIONS OF ANTWERP.

BRUSSELS, AUG. 17.
The Chamber of Representatives was occupied
yesterday with the consideration of the projet de 10l
of the Government for the new fortifications at
Antwerp. The measure has acquired a great addi-
tional interest in consequence of the recent impor-
tant articles on the subject which have appeared in
several of the French journals, as well as in the
Independence Beige.
The discussion was opened by General Chazal, the
Minister of War, in a speech marked by much
eloquence, historical research, and sound reasoning.
The gallant general engaged the attention of the
Chamber for upwards of two hours, and at the con-
clusion of his address it adjourned until one o'clock
this day. The following is a brief sketch of his
address :
General Ghazal commenced by observing that he
had heard a member of that Assembly some years
ago exclaim in accents of deep conviction that if he
were Minister of War he should not know repose
or tranquillity until the question of the national
defences had been fully considered and decided
upon. These words had made a deep impression
upon his mind, because they were, at the time they
were uttered, as they were at the present moment,
the expression of his own thoughts. Since that
period other members of the two parties in the
Chamber had demanded the solution of the ques-
tion. The Government had not, however, the
power to respond to those claims as soon as they
should have wished. The questions relating to the
national defences were, besides, the most difficult
and delicate of all those connected with military
arts • and many countries long ago constituted, and
which were remarkable for their intelligence and
their initiation in all matters of improvement, had
been unable for many years to establish anything
like a system of complete defence. Everywhere the
question demanded long and serious consideration
audit often required the experience of disastrous:wars
to establish a fixed idea on the subject. In France,
under Louis IV., a system of complete defence
was proposed by Vauban. The idea of that great
man was not at first comprehended. It required two
centuries and an invasion to effect the fortifications
of Paris. It was not, therefore, very surprising that
Belgium had not as yet a system of complete de-
fence. On being appointed Minister in 1847, his
first act was one connected with this important
question of national defences. He proposed the com-
mission that was then appointed, but whose labours
were interrupted by the events of 1848. In the face
even of those events he proposed to the King the
establishment of an entrenched camp at Antwerp,
and he confided the task of examining that project
to a special committee, which adopted the proposed
work as a provisional me
ermasureanent ,
form when the recommending that
it should assume a p cir-
cumstances of the country were more favourable to
the carrying out of such military operations. That
was the origin of the system of the proposed de-
fences of Antwerp. It was encountered with oppo-
nents everywhere, and many motives were ascribed
to the authors of it. An efficient system of national
defences rested in the first place upon the organisa-
tion of the physical strength of the nation ; in the
second place, upon a series of fortresses established
upon strategical points the most convenient for the
concentration of its strength and for maintaining
the great roads of communication. Every country
had a special system of defences suggested by its
peculiar topographical position, and it 3 geographi-
cal conformation. Switzerland being a mountainous
country, could not defend itself in the same manner
as Belgium or Holland—flat countries which were
intersected with rivers and canals. The kingdom of
the Low Countries had a system of defences which
were near completion when the revolution of 1830
broke out. That system was principally directed
against France. They could not preserve it. In the
first place they could no longer count upon an allied
army of 60,000 men. In the second place, the neu-
trality which they had accepted prohibited them
from directing their defences only against a parti-
cular power. Since 1830 numerous roads running
from the exterior to the heart of the country, and
bridges over rivers, viewed as lines of defence, were
constructed ; but neither those roads nor those
bridges were of the slightest use as works of de-
fence unless they were commanded by fortresses.
Certain fortresses were subsequently built, with
breaches in them to allow locomotives pass through,
and arsenals with magaines were constructed.
All such works had been interdicted under the
Government of the Low Countries. A new system
of defences was then recommended. The commis-
sion advised the adoption of a system by which the
defences of the country would be concentrated in
one strong place. It was said that the concentra-
tion of the army in one strong position would be in
effect the abandonment to the enemy of the rest of
the country, and the reduction of the army to a
humiliating role. Ignorance or malevolence had
propagated that idea amongst the masses, which
were too easily deceived upon military questions.
Far from finding a security in the dissemination of
the forces, he contended that they would only create
dangers. To guard all, in order to save all, was an
idea of another epoch. A particular place where
an army could complete itself, could organise itself,
could fortify itself, was much more useful to a
country than 20 places which the enemy could with
little difficulty take, but which it would be impos-
sible for him to make the central point of his move-
ments. It is thus that the most celebrated mili-
tary authorities had viewed this question—for
example, Frederick the Great and the Archduke
Charles. The Duke of Wellington professed the
same principles, and acted upon them in the war
in Portugal, when he created the celebrated camp
of Torres Vedras ; thanks to which he kept in check
the army of Massena, freed Portugal, and thus
merited the title of the greatest warrior of his day.
Napoleon himself held the same opinion. His in-
structions to his generals charged with the defence
of inferior countries were all in the same spirit,
especially those he addressed to that gene-
ral who was charged with the protection of
Dalmatia, and which was threatened at the
time by the English fleet, as well as by the
Russians and the Turks. In the committee of the
defence of Lombardy Napolean said, " I wish that
the fortifications of Milan, of Turin, and of Tortone
should be at Alessandria." Referring to what
passed in Piedmont in 1848, Piedmont, instructed
by experience, created the fortified places of Ales-
sandria. In the last Ns ar that place, though not
completely finished, and though situated as it was
at the flank of the Austrian army, was able to stop
the invasion of Piedmont, and thus to afford time
for the arrival of the French army. It appeared to
him to be self-evident that an army, having its
basis of operations upon one great military position
whore all its resources could be concentrated, would
establish a much greater confidence in its own
strength and would acquire a mach stronger in-
fluence in its action than if it were scattered over 20
little places where it could not be certain of finding a
refuge, and where it would be exposed to be beaten
in detail, as had happened in the campaign of
Prussia. To be scattered over 20 points was to be
• weak in all—to be concentratedtpon one single one
was to be stroll°. everywhere. If the enemy, after
many combats, should persevere in continuing his
march towards this one stronghold he would require
at that place an army treble in number to that which
defended it ; consequently his preparations and his
muniments of war must be in proportion. Having
alluded to the check sustained by the Belgian army
in 1831, in consequence of neglecting that principle
of concentration, which resulted in an application to
France and England for assistance, General Chazal
then proceeded to argue in favour of Antwerp being
made the great point of military strength and of
defensive fortifications. If they viewed the question
in merely a political point of view, it would doubt-
leasbe much more importantto fortify and to defend
the capital than Antwerp. But, considering the
question in its military aspect, such a proceeding
would be impossible.
had play any of their great cities
M
the
a much more important part in the his-
tory country than Brussels, as for example,
Ghent,
Bruges,trand Antwerp. At all times Antwerp
had been
wishedenold of their provinces. When
the Spaniardsto secure their domination
over the Low Countries, it Antwerp they se-
lected as the centre of action. was
iooL
Later still, when the
Date Generanx wished to
defend themselves
against Spain, it was Antwerp they chose for the
concentration of their resistance. At the
commence-
ment of the present century Antwerp became the
situated near the centre, and.
chief ideal of the empire. When the capital of a
great country
when it was covered by a natural or artificial fron-
tier, the fortified frontier could serve
aSSIIITICy inc,
as a rallying
point to the arnly, and would enable it to
-
the offensive. The enemy could not advance fur-
ther without making, immense preparations
for a
great siege. if Paris had been fortified in 1814
Napoleon would have had some chance of success •
-b
11 d
ut the necessity of covering Paris compe e
constantly to retrace his steps to prevent the him
frac-
tions of the hostile armies from entering there.
o w, and
The same might be said of Vienna, M
Berlin • if they had been fortified the results might
have been' wholly different. After the campaign of
-Egypt B maparte was anxio is to push on further ;
but Syria was covered by a natural frontier, the
desert, and he could not proceed without taking the
place of St. Jean d'Acre. Well, notwithstanding
the valour of his victorious army and the talents of
his generals, he could not accomplish his original
objects. These were reasons in support ofthe
ciple that all capitals thus circumstanced should be
well fortified. When, on the contrary, the capital
was very near the frontiers—when it was not co-
vered by a natural or artificial f • rontier—when the
country was small, and was surrounded by • neigh-
bours much more powerful than 't lf se i—t was no

The proclamation which sweeps into eblivion a.
political offences has been received in France with
such joy and gratitude that the Emperor must
already congratulate himself upon his courageous
act. For the first time since he assumed the Im-
perial title the applause of his people is earnest,
heartfelt, and universal. The representatives of
every shade of opinion except only the organ of the
Ultramontane priests,
" Of whom to be dispraised is no small praise,"
vie with each other in frank and fervid acknow-
ledgments. When the unexpected proclamation
first burst upon the Parisian public there was a
moment of incredulity and a little season of sus-
picion. The news was too good to be true. It was
more than reasonable men had dared to pray for.
There must be some condition, some reservation,
some long list of exceptions, some hidden ambi-
guity which would annul the free action of those
wide-circling phrases of universal import. The
action of the officials has, however, put the best
gloss upon the terms of the Amnesty. The prisons
have been thrown open, the police have ceased to
watch over the suspects, friends are meeting and
embracing after long absence, lost relatives have
been found, and steamers are departing for Algeria
and Guiana to bring home the victims who are
now expiating the too great impetuosity of their
political convictions in distant exile. The memo-
rials of past civil discords are all thoroughly
sponged out. "It is with a throbbing heart," cries
the organ of one of the advanced sections of the
Liberal party, " that we think of the mothers of
the children whom this good news will transport
with joy. We are about again to see friends of
whom we have not for a moment ceased to preserve
a cordial and sympathising memory." By one sim-
ple courageous act the French Emperor has united
all France. He has given us a touch of his skill as a
pyrotechnist which no one of us had anticipated.
At the end of his triumphs, his fetes, and his
blazing fireworks it was the business of an expert
Edile to manage some original device which
even after all the foregone splendours should sur-
prise while it delighted. He has succeeded so far
that all France is still astonished and still in admi-
ration. The last grand bouquet exploded, and fast
fell from it into each little circle of a thousand
families the most precious boon for which that family
could pray.
But the Amnesty comprehends not only men, but
those still more sensitive and liberty-loving crea-
' turea, the organs, or what once were the organs, of
public opinion. All warnings heretofore given to
newspapers in France or in the Colonies are to be
as if they had never been. Entire oblivion is to
extend to peccant newspapers as well as to com-
promised individuals. The jubilee passes over all
the political world and erases all bonds. How shall
we hope for the future ? May Frenchmen do with
impunity in time to come all for which they suf-
fered in time past ? We cannot hope that this
should be so ; for the liberty of those days was
licence, and approached very nearly to that " sacred
right of insurrection" which gave title to every
fanatic to shed blood in the streets. Is impunity
for the past deeds of the press entire freedom for the
future ? We cannot believe that this can be so.
Napoleon can scarcely so soon unlearn all the in-
stincts of an absolute ruler as to set the press free.
Yet it must come to this if, as cautious lookers-on
believe, it has entered into his mind to commence a
new era and to develope the energies of his king-
dom in a new direction. If he would emancipate
himself from the thraldom of his own priests, if he
designs to educate his people in sound political
knowledge, if he would draw forth all the commer-
cial and industrial power of his kingdom, if he in-
tends to break down the system of Protection and
to inaugurate an era of Free Trade, and if he sighs
for colonies and commerce as well as ships, he can
only do all this by means of a free press. The press
is the interpreter between the men of thought and
the men of labour. Great thoughts are born in hid-
den places, and come forth unshaped and often in-
comprehensible. They speak a language not under-
stood of the people. They require an interpreter
to go forth with them into the world, an interpreter
with strong lungs, great fluency of speech, and great
power of making abstruse matters plain,—an inter-
preter that can command attention and utilise that
attention when gained. Such an interpreter is the
Press. In physics and in morals, to cause the
application of a great invention destined to change
the nature of all human affairs, or to give practical
force to a newly found truth capable of preventing
great masses of human misery, the only agent is a
free Press. It must be free, or it will not be be-
lieved ; it must be unfettered, or it will not be
respected. But alone, and unshared by any com-
petitor, a free Press holds the prerogative, denied
to Kings and Emperors and Ministers of State, of
dispelling popular delusions, and of gradually but
surely disseminating truth. If Napoleon 111.
meditates a destruction of the present suicidal com-
mercial system in France he must set a free Press
to work, or ignorance will be too strong for him.
Let him remember how many thousands of columns
of this newspaper, closely filled with speeches and
essays, were required to convince, first, our people
that Corn Laws created scarcity of food, and,
secondly, our farmers that they might give up Pro-
tection and yet carry on their business with a
profit. Those speeches and those essays were read
and meditated over because the English nation had
confidence that they appeared in an arena where
there was a free stage and no favour for every
advocate for and against. When Cobden spoke a
thousand Cobdens next morning addressed a thou-
sand audiences ; when Newdegate or Ferran('
replied the speech was as faithfully multiplied.
Every man thus had the facts and arguments con-
stantly before him, and formed his own conviction
from abundant reading. As moderators in the great
controversy, we often pointed the moral, summed
up the arguments, or called attention to a fast ; but
it was the full, fair, fearless publicity, the unfettered
discussion of this question, which obtained the result
so simply referred to by Mr. Cobden on Thursday
night—" There is generally plenty to eat." There is
no other plan. If France is not to drop astern and
to be a mere population of very small cultivators,
taxed to the utmost to fatten a small class of ineffi-
cient manufacturers, a free Press must be allowed
to go forth and dispel the gross ignorance which
weighs over the land. If the Emperor's course is
really onward this must be one of his earlist steps.
But we must confess that we have no great de-
sire to see in action a French press such as existed
under the constitutional monarchy. No friend
either of France or of the press itself would wish
to
hsepeitehnach p. Paristpiersessosfwasio more N
l reinstated,.3 th.e position,
whichit held under Louis Philippe. In those days
than it is at this moment.Eeriea,llpv independentap
elNsa sthe
organ either of an individual who wished to make
his paper the ladder t? political power, or of a poli-
tical party,
the Tribun. It doingfor it what the party did for itself
iu praised ised and defended every act
ot:
the party
postponing the rty :n deeinetriciset thing
of i publicopposed
to
it,to
of
that of its own little circle. the
office of being trumpeter to some pressse i political iniucedna lkmantd:
most
n:
turer. Most of our ploylidteiesairlecototeriPe
an ableE
our statesmen ardent
glish
press in the same condition. Alany man is
uite intolerant of an honest exponent of public
q opinion where he is reflected without flattery and
criticised without hesitation. Alany a blockhead
points a witless sneer at an intelligence before
which his little dignity pales, and many a man
would have his own paper as Thiers and Carrel and