The Sun.
London, England, 1859-08-17 00:00:00

he first rose to power—has lcd a large army, and:
manceuvred that army on the plains of Solfermo,
will the skill of a consummate general ; and, as he
has a right to be proud of his success, so he de-
serves the credit of curbing the ostentatious expres-
sion of that pride. 'When he reminds his generals
of the disadvantages with which he had to contend
in the want of early training upon the field, he
obliquely compliments himself; but the inference is
so neatly concealed that it does not obtrude, and
arises only when the first impression-of the speech
is past. We must confess, however, that we can-
not see in the Emperor's inexperience of actual ser-
vice any grave disadvantage in leading an army.
History, if her teaching is worth anything, teaches'
that a civilian of intelligence and the requisite
-moral courage, after some study of strategy, is quite
as likely to make a good general as one who has
passed his life upon the manual and platoon—that
mere alphabet of the art of war, upon which the'
British officer generally spends his whole life.
Great commanders have in all time been persons
who were able to break away from the meshes of
professional pedantries and to invent for themselves
some new, art of strategy. It has always been by
a bold divergence from old rules that great vic-
tories have been won, and a man who has read, and
laboured, and meditated outside the professional'
circle is better educated for a general than a man,
who has to unswathe himself from the bands that
have sustained him during th 4 past portion of his
life, arid to accustom to independent exercise a
mind which has hitherto known no virtue but
obedience. We could wish that if the time of need
should ever come we may nave many men who
have educated themselves for command as well as
Louis Napoleon has.
But it is our ungracious duty, default of some
other monitor near and as free, to perform the part
tEo Chorusafmgepeow
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tede‘b. Drama, and to in form and
warn while
i the actors are playing out, their des-
times. It s our duty once again to remind the
each other with what purpose and for what advan-
beenyentnbNeve wo
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at which they were bought has been spilt. That
question
future generations. How will it be answered?
Has he indeed chosen to throw away the fair prize
of so much valour and skill, and is Italy, scarcely
yet able to feel her freedom, to be loaded with
heavier fetters? Are these 50,000 men "momen-
tanement" left in Lombardy intended to quicken
the good faith of Austria, whose dip'emacy is quick
to retrieve military reverses, but moves slothfully
to consummate disagreeable concessions ? Or is that
French army in Italy only to wait the command td
restore the sovereignty of the Grand Dukes in the
Duchies, and the tyranny of the Pope in the Legit-
tions ? There is a third and still more damnatory
suggestion as to the presence of the French force at
what is now no longer the seat of war. Those tat-
tered flags which told so suggestively the fate of
thousands of brave men who stood 'by them when
that iron storm was flying the marks of which they
bear, were greeted with loud plaudits as they came
in sight, because the French people still believe
that it was for the liberation of Italy those losses
were incurred. The medal which the Emperor
promises will be worn with pride, because Magenta
and Malegnano and Solferino are even now held to
be victories in the cause of Italian freedom. But
what a cloud would come over this scene, what a
taint of infamy would infect these victories, how
suddenly would a glorious war in a glorious cause
change into a piratical inroad for merely selfish
objects, if it should tarn out that the sole motive
and effect of all this has been nothing greater than
to carve out a little kingdom in Central Italy, and
to put Prince Jerome upon its throne!