The Sun.
London, England, 1861-02-16 00:00:00

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LAW INTELLIGENCE--(This Day.)

COURT CHANCERY.
(Ee,fore the Lord Chancellor and Lord Justico Turner.)
APPEAL-'MOTION FOR JUDGMENT-RE WARWICK AND

WORCESTER RAILWAY COMPANY EX PARTE SARRURY.

This is an apteal from a decision of Vice-Chancellor Sir
Richard T. Kindersley, retaining Mr. Sarbury's name as
a shareholder on the list of contributories in the winding-
up of this company.
The Lord Chancellor said,—ln this case I am of opinion
that the judgment of the court, according to the opinion
that I have formed, must be in favour of the appellants.
The question is, whether on the 25th of May, 1858, he was
then liable for any part of the shares that he was then
called upon to pay. I cannot doubt that he was not liable,
for he was discharged of all liability to pay any of these
debts, and of all claim against him as a contributor. It
appears to roe that by the order of instalments of the Court
in June, 1854, he was, discharged of all liability for these
debts. There is no imputation that it was not legal; if it
was, we must assume they were given up bona fide.
Lord Justice Turner, after delivering his opinion at some
length. came to the same conclusion.
Lord Justice Knight Bruce, in absence, expressed his
entire concurrence in writing.

The Lord Chancellor discharged the order of the Vice-
Chancellor without costs, and removed the appellant's name
from the list of contributors in the winding up of this com-
pany.

APPEAL-LEES V. MASSEY.
At the conclusion of the arguments of counsel in this
case, the Lord Chancellor reserved judgment.

DIVORCE COURT.
Before Sir C. Cresswell, Mr. Justice Willes, and Baron
Channell.)

BEVAN, FALSELY CALLED M‘MAHON, V. 301s1AHON.—

EXTRAORDINARY CASE.

This was a suit instituted by the petitioner, who described
herself as Margaret Lee Bevan, for the purpose of setting
aside a marriage solemnized between her and the defen-
dant, on the ground that the license for the said
marriage had been obtained by fraudulent represen-
tation, and [was, consequently, null and void. The
petitioner was the daughter of a singer who had been
in extensive practice in the neighbourhood of Liverpool,
and the defendant was an omnibus conductor, whose con-
veyance the petitioner was in the habit of using, in conse-
quence of which an intimacy sprung up between them.
According to the statement of the petitioner, under the
influence of some delusion or mental infirmity, she was
induced to consent to a clandestine marriage with the de-
fendant, on the condition that he was not to claim her as
his wife for two years. The marriage took place in a parish
some miles distant from where she resided, and, in order
to ensure secrecy, it was agreed that she should be
described as Margaret Bevan, the name Lee being
omitted, and that he should misdescribe his calling
and their respective places of abode. This constituted the
ground of the petition. It appeared also that the marriage
had not been consummated, and that no intercourse subse-
quent to the performance of the ceremony had taken place
between the parties. These facts were deposed to at the
hearing of the case some weeks back, but a legal doubt sugp-
gested itself to the learned Judge Ordinary, as to whether
the statute under which the petitioner sought relief ex-
tended to her case. He observed that a marriage under such
circumstances, if performed by banns, would be illegal, but
there was no precedent to show that a marriage solemnised
by license would be also invalid. He considered the question
so novel and important, that as the defendant did not appear
it should be argued by counsel on the other side, and stated
that he would desire the Queen's proctor to instruct counsel
for that purpose.

Dr. Phillimore, Q,C., appeared this morning on the part
of the Attorney-General to argue in support of the validity
of the marriage. The learned counsel contended that,
according to ecclesiastical law, statute law, and common
law, the canon which related to marriage had reference
to marriages where one or both of the parties were minors,
and had no application whatever to marriages solemnised
between adults. The Act of 1753 was passed in order to
prevent the practice of marriages being solemnised in
prisons, or places that were not used for public worship,
without a special license. Prevision was made by the act
for the punishment, even to the extent of transportation,
in cases where the marriage was procured by fraudulent
representation ; but this also was limited to the case of
minors, and the act did not even vitiate the marriage under
such circumstances.

Sir C. Cresswell—lt goes even further, for it states that
such marriages are lawful.

Dr. Phillimore then proceeded to argue the question at
length, and with great learning and ability citing a num-
ber of precedents in support of his position.
-The case was proceeding when we went to press, and is
likely to last the whole day.

POLICE IN7ELLIGENCE—(This Day).