The Sun.
London, England, 1859-02-05 00:00:00

WRONG

THE SUN, LONDON, SATURDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 5, 1859.

"NAPOLEON M. AND ITALY."

The following is a full translation of the import-
ant pamphlet thus entitled, of which a portion
appeared in our edition of yesterday.
This pamphlet, probably put forth with a view
to conciliate the extreme Italian revolutionary
party, will probably excite much interest from the
belief that it was composed under the immediate
inspiration of the Emperor, and that much of it is
actually from his own band :
" I.

" With the earnest pre-occupations of the public mind

before us, every one will think with us that the question of
Italy is one of those which it is as impossible to lull as to
stifle. The most prudent way, then, is to study it, to mature
it, to calm it by means of an impartial and sympathetic ex-
amination, in place of irritating it by disdain, or keeping it
apart in obscurity by silence. This examination we have
just undertaken with the sincere desire of being useful to a
cause which comprises the greatest political and religious
interests of Europe. _

" Italy represents in history something greater still than
nationality ; she represents civilisation. It is on this privi-
leged soil that imperishable principles and the glorious
examples which have formed men and societies have taken
birth. Italy is more than a sister for other nations ; she is
a mother. Her genius, her power, her institutions, her
conquests, her masterpieces, and, later, her calamities, her
ruin, her troubles—in a word, all in ancient or in modern
times, her Consuls, her Tribunes, her historians, her Em-
perors, her martyrs, and her Popes, have contributed to
endow her with in some sort a generative character. In
policy, in war, in civil and penal legislation, in the arts,
in eloquence, in poetry, as in religion, she has been
the common country of all civilised States. It
may be said that her influence over the world has
never ceased. After having subjugated it, she enlight-
ened it. When her material dominion fell, her moral do-
mination commenced. Such is what history tells us. For
Europe to forget her would be ingratitude ; for Italy to for-
get it would be resignation. Can we ask that sacrifice of
those who have kept of their past grandeur but the pride of
having justified it, and the hope of one day recovering some
remnant of it ? And if we did ask it of Italy would she not
have a right to answer us with those words of Tacitus in
the Life of Agricola, ' We should have lost memory itself
with our voice if it was in our power to forget as well as to
be silent.'

cc 11.

" There are two elements quite distinct in the question of

Italy. The revolutionary element, "which corresponds to
subversive theories and violent passions, alike incompatible
with order in Europe, the laws of civilization, the religious
interest and political independence of the Papacy. The
national element, which has its origin in the history and
traditions of Italy, and which answers to all that is most
imperative and most legitimate in the aspirations of the
populations of the Peninsula, and in the very condition of
the duration and consolidation of Governments.

" Revolution would this day be but a powerless and de-
structive party in Italy. Isolated in Europe, whore the
spirit of order happily predominates everywhere. Isolated
even in Italy, where it would rouse against it conservative
and religious interests, it would find support nowhere. It
would be reduced to its own resources. Condemned by
opinion, vanquished by force, its attempt would be merely
an adventure ; it would retreat, it would succumb, it would
once more saturate with blood the soil of Italy, and would
only render the condition of that noble country still more
melancholy.

" The national element represents all that is most vital in
Italy. It answers to the common hopes of the population
and the Governments of the Peninsula ; far from menacing
thrones, it exalts them. It opens to the Papacy an impor-
tant and glorious part which seduced for a moment the
noble heart of Pius IX., and in 1847 it even combined is
ono common feeling of patriotism the King of Sardinia and
the King of Naples. Moreover, the national element finds
in Europe certain sympathies, for it attaches itself to the
principles of justice, which are henceforth the objects of the
policy of all the Governments. It finds in them the moral
support of the Anglo-French alliance formed between two
great States, precisely with the object of preventing Euro-
pean complications, of settling the differences between na-
tions, and of supporting 'everywhere the cause of the law of
nations and of civilisation.

"England, in fact, cannot abandon Italy, for it is she,
her Government, her statesmen, her tribune, her journals,
that have constantly encouraged and supported her even
before 1848. We remember the change effected in the policy
of the last regime in consequence of the Spanish marriages.
The Government of King Louis Philippe had committed
the fault of sacrificing the Anglo-French Alliance to a
family interest. Its isolation in Europo was the consequence
of it, and as M. Thiers declared in a memorable debate, 'lt
was found at the instant even dependent on Austria, and
obliged to follow her inspirations in Italy and Switzerland.'
At that moment what did England? Sho took the part which
belonged to France; she took it oven in exaggerating it.

" Lord Minto fulfilled the mission with which he had
been charged by Lord Palmerston with an ardour which
went beyond the mark, by exciting impatience and illusion
when it was above all necessary to inspire moderation and
support firmness. The promise of that protectorate of the
Cabinet of London, conveyed to the Peninsula at the very
moment the Cabinet of the Tuileries seemed to abdicate
that which history and geography gave her, must neces-
sarily have overthrown our influence on the other side of
the Alps ; but it should also have maintained the national
impulsion which manifested itself after the accession of
Pius IX., and which was so soon imperilled by the revolu-
tionary spirit. Italy believed no longer in France, and it
was to England that she gave all her confidence.
" It must be admitted that that confidence was not de-
ceived. England, as a maritime Power, could not take part
in a continental struggle between Piedmont and Austria;
but when the revolution of the 24th Feb. caused to prevail
in France a policy which ought to be supposed favourable
to Italian independence. England did not hesitate to de-
clare herself against Austrian domination. The entire
policy of England on this point was summed up in a docu-
ment of high importance. On the 29th Oct., 1848, Lord
Palmerston addressed to Lord Ponsonby, Ambassador of
the Queen of Great Britain at Vienna, a despatch in which
ho declares that there was no chance that Austria could
keep, in a useful and permanent manner, Upper Italy, the
whole of whose inhabitants are profoundly imbued with an
invincible hatred to the Austrian army.' He adds, that
' it would certainly be more prudent on the part of the Aus-
trian Government, more useful to the real and proper force
of that empire, to free the population from its domination,
which they would ever consider as a yoke.'
" Lord Palmerston -thinks that that yoke cannot be
maintained but by a great display of force, at considerable
cost, and he foresees that foreign aid ought to be implored
and accorded. What would happen in such case ? Here
the Cabinet of London does not leave to the Cabinet of
Vienna any illusion as to the feeling of Europe and the
conduct of England. We quote the words of the despatch :
" Even though the war should become European by the
participation of other Powers who might find themselves
drawninto it, yet there is no reason to believe that the final
result would leave Austria in possession of any territory
beyond the Alps. But Austria must consider, moreover,
that however disposed the Powers her allies and friends
may be to succour her if she'was menaced in her own pro-
per and legitimate existence in Germany, there exists on
the subject of her pretensions to impose her yoke on the
Italians a feeling so universal of their injustice that this
feeling might well have for effect to leave her with very
little aid in case of a war such as that I have spoken of.'
"Is this clear ? Is it possible, we ask, to disinterest
more precisely England, and to isolate more completely
Austria, by raising between her and Europe the universal
sentiments of the injustice of her pretensions ?
" Lord Palmerston does not even admit that, in case of
war, Austria could count upon Germany. Is the Austrian
Government,' he says, quite certain that even the sym-
pathy of Germany would follow it in its efforts to impose
her yoke still more heavily on the Italian nation ?"

" This doubt is net expressed lightly, and the eminent
statesman accounts for it at once by a reason so politic, so
evident and just, that it may be considered as decisive. The
reason is, The principle of nationalities, now the rallying
cry of all Germany, would it not protest loudly against
Austria in such a struggle ?"
" The acts of England were in accordance with her
words. Her diplomacy so powerful had supported Italy in
her pretensions, as it had encouraged her in Irr impulse.
There was perhaps a moment of fortune for the Italian na-
tionality. It was that moment, too rapid, when the Pied-
montese, conquerors on the Adige, were masters of almost
the whole of Lombardy; when Austria, dismayed at the
general rising which forced her to fall back, disquieted at
her reverses, and not wishing to play to the end that terrible
game with the despair and heroism of a people, fearing on
one hand the revolution in Germany, offered the sacrifice of
the final act of the Congress of Vienna as the price of vic-
tory, and a concession to the re-establishment of peace.
Austria proposed the independence of Lombardy, and a le-
parate Govermoont for Venetia, on the sole condition of her
suzerainty. These .proposals were carried directly to Lon.
don—they were only known in France, It was theft be-
lieved in London that Italy might obtain batter terms, and
the English Cabinet did not use its great and legitimate
authority to prevent the refusal which was made to these
overtures at Milan. Tho discouragement of Austria did not
last long. In the month of May, 1848, she was disposed to
ocalatrhveeaiady exhausted in that unequal struggle,
treat on the bases just stated. At the end of Jul,' Md.
courage
ig
nn vaaelcro
oanifn where°Gllltpenplehvaracalrslt‘nreeenprliiaoensd inexhaustible.
yFraann
coeff.er,rohfe
mediation
thenco dviear
Government
=lomadene
nint
pwlhietceh England
lyunitedin-ams t
the
soajmoeinideanagsslanumdedanfdor Fthraeinrcest,
starting
g-
point of the new negotiations the bases which had been re-
jected at Milan, but Austria, victorious, declared peremp-
torily that she was no longer disposed to admit that which
she bad been reduced to propose. Nevertheless, it was
oddey knows what Tocqueville
decided that a congress should take place at Brussels,
andw EnglandhereFnee by m'assitroHbeenrryepErelsliens.tedEbvyeryMb.
happened—the Congress of Brussels was a mere plan—the

Anglo-French mediation could not succeed in constituting
itself—the voice of cannon was heard in place of that of
diplomacy. It was the cannon of Novara. Charles Albert,
impatient at the adjournments, irritated by the difficulties,
confident in his cause, had risked all in that glorious
temerity. Italy succumbed at least nobly, and the chival-
rous monarch, who had dreamed its emancipation, retired,
vanquished, and not humiliated, leaving his crown and his
cause to his son, who ascended the throne through this field
of battle, after having received 16 bullets in his coat. Since
that period Italian nationality has only lived in the patriot-
ism and policy of Piedmont, sustained by the moral sup-
port of the Anglo-French alliance. The flag of Novara
was hoisted in the Crimea, whore the Sardinian army had
their share in the contests, the trials, and the victories of
the French and English armies.- In fine, at the Congress
of Paris the plenipotentiaries of the King of Sardinia came
to take their scats besides those of the first Powers in
Europe, and to concur with them in the regulation of the
greatest interests in the world. This rank, which Sar-
dinia vanquished at Novara in 1849, was able to conquer
in 1856, in the • midst of the great Powers, she owes no
doubt to herself, but she owes it likewise to the moral

and direct support of the Anglo-French alliance ; she
owes it particularly—and nobody in the diplomatic re-
gions will deny this fact—to the persevering and marked
tendency of England to aggrandise and constitute
her importance. The English policy has consequently not
varied since 1847 with respect to Italy. It even anticipated
us; while the diplomacy of the King Louis Philippe sup-
ported the Austrian policy, the diplomacy of Queen Victoria
encouraged the Italian policy. The influence of England
did not cease to be felt for a single day during these 11 years
in the affairs of the Peninsula. It is to be fouhd in the first
burst of nationality which-hailed the accession of Pius IX.
as well as in the efforts of independence which at a later
period concentrated themselves under the'Sardinian flag.
Her hand is seen in the pretensions inspired by victory, as
well as in the negotiations which followed defeats. In fine,
when at the Congress at Paris Count Walowski thought it
his duty to call to the interior state of Italy the solicitude
and attention of the plenipotentiaries assembled to settle the
conditions of peace, Lord Clarendon, with that authority ac-
quired by his rank and his Jofty experience, energetically
supported the wishes expreeed by the Minister of the Em-
peror of the French. It is true that since that period the di-
rection of tho English policy has changed hands, but the
English feeling is not changed. England is a liberal nation,
and her great aristocracy has maintained itself through all
our social crises -and transformations only because it has
always marched at the head of civilisation and progress.
There is not a statesman—not a minister—not a parliament
in Great Britain which could support any other cause in
Italy than that of which the Queen's Government has been
for the last 11 years the firm support. This cause responds
to everything that England respects, to all that she has a
mission to propagate throughout the world. She cannot
make fault in it without belying her history and her nature.
In a word, the Italian question cannot but be one of national
interest for the Eiglish G-ovpmment as for the French. It is
an Italian question—it cannot be anything else. It could not
become French without ceasing to be European, but in re-
maining in its proper character it is certain to find in England
the sympathies of a liberal nation and of an enlightened Go-
vernment. As for England, she responds to true principles
to which she is bound by one of those alliances which have
their foundatian in the morals of a people, and their
sanction in its conscience.

44 111.

" We have demonstrated the policy of England with re-
respect to Italy—now what is the interest of Germany in
this question ? It is useless to speak of Austria, interested
in maintaining a state of things favourable to her domina-
tion. There remains Germany, properly so called. Pope
Pius IX., addressing himself to the Emperor of Austria,
at the time he was maintaining against the Lombards and
Venetians a contest doubly painful to the patriotism of the
Italian Prince and the heart of the Pontiff, defined in these
terms the duties and the mission of Germany We feel
confident that the German nation, so generously proud of
her own nationality, will not commit her honour in sangui-
nary attacks againet the Italian nation, but that she will
rather believe she is interested in nobly acknowledging her
for a sister, both our daughters, both so dear to our hearts,
consenting to dwell each in its own natural territory, where
they will live an honourable life, blessed by the Lord. Thus
spoke the great soul and elevated reason of Pius IX. The
spirit of concord which inspired this appeal elevated him to
a political view worthy of a statesman. The Emperor Na-
poleon 1., in one of those glances which he sometimes cast
upon the world from the top of his rock, had generalised
the same idea by applying it to all nations. One of my
grandest ideas,' said he, was the agglomeration, the con-
centration of the same geographical nations which had
been divided and partitioned by revolution mid politics.
Thus there are in Europe, though scattered, more than
30,000,000 French, 15,000,000 Spaniards, 15,000,000
Italians, 30,000,000 Germans. • I wished to make of each
of these peoples one single body of a nation. It is with
such a cortege that it would have been grand to advance to
posterity and the benediction of ages. I felt myself worthy
of that glory. What nation is interested more than Ger-
many in the respect of nationalities ? It is justly jealous of
its own. Since 1815 it tends more and more to reconsti-
tute its unity, and we can see with what ardour it claims
the Duchies of Holstein-Schleswig from Denmark. Well,
German nationality bears in itself a cause of weakness, an
alteration of its right and its princitde ; it is the element
which is foreign to it, which changes its nature by attach-
ing to the great Germanic body a shred of Italian nation-
ality. Thus the Marquis d'Azeglio one of the most emi
nent statesmen in Piedmont, was justified when some time
since he expressed this reproach, Germany is endeavour-
ing to obtain her independence and to constitute herself into
a nation, and at the same time she is casting herself on Italy
to dispute with her the rights she demands for herself. In
that there would be an inconsistency against which the good
sense and patriotism of Germany would revolt.' In 1843 and
1849 public opinion was not mistaken on the other side of
the Rhine, and the immense majority of Germans formed
vows for the triumph of the Italian cause—only the repub-
lican character of the revolution of 1818 justly alarmed the
Diet of Frankfort, and rendered the right side of that As-
sembly particularly circumspect in its sympathy for Italian
nationality. The Germanic Confederation believed that it
was menaced in its independence ' • in fine, some German
officers asserted that the lino of the Mincio was in a strate-
gic point of view, necessary to Germany, and they had ac-
credited this opinion, that in any case Austria ought tokeep
as a necessary cover the country comprised between that
river and the Adriatic. Prussia had accepted this point of
departure to propose to the Diet a species of compromise,
which at least manifestedits sympathy for the Italian cause
and at the same time its solicitudefor German interests. Ac-
cording to this plan, prepared by M. de Radowitz, Austria
was tokeep the line of the Mincio as a strategic point, but
the country which remained within the limits of the Austrian
empire was to form part of an Italian confederation. This
plan was rejected by the Diet, over which Vienna influence
prevailed. In Germany, as in Italy, as everywhere, the re-
volutionary spirit prevailed over the national movement
which had preceded or followed the burst of 1848. The Diet
of Frankfort produced nothing. The Germanic Confedera-
tion cbtained none of the guarantees of unity and liberty of
action that it sought; placed under the influence of two
great Powers, it has, perhaps, no hope except in their neces-
sary rivalry. Both of these Powers are condemned on their
side to that opposition which is the condition of their im-
portance. Prussia, which tends to become the head of the
Germanic body, has an immense interest in keeping Austria
in check. By becoming her ally she would make herself
the accomplice of her own humiliation, and she would thus
disown the work of the great Frederick.
_

" In a word, the Italian question, reduced to a national
interest, disengaged from the revolutionary element, limited
and tempered in its pretensions by the moral protectorate of
Europe, could have nothing menacing for Germany. Far
from it. Its solution, if it was possible, would be a now
force for German nationality, and a guarantee of security
and' equilibrium for all the States that compose it.
IV.
"After having demonstrated that England was morally
engaged and Germany politically interested in a national
solution of the question of Italy., we must examine how this
question should be characterised with respect to France.
"What does France wish ? Does she wish, as under the
Republic and under the first Empire, to reconstitute Europe,
to impose herself on her, to change her frontier, to displace
the nationalities, to depose kings, to found dynasties ? or
rather does she desire simply to consolidate, to strengthen the
present order in Europe, by applying her power to resolve
the difficulties which may menace and endanger it ?
" We believe the question to be thus precisely laid down.
" The first Empire, as the Revolution, had a general ob-
ject in view, in presence of which the interests of nationa-
lity were merely secondary. Europe was leagued against
principles which had just triumphed in France, and under
the influence of which an immense transformation was
about to be accomplished. We were condemned, for a long
time perhaps, to struggle alone against all, in a double in-
terest of territorial and political conservatism, and of moral
expansion for the benefit of other peoples. We had then to
create for ourselves everywhere—on the Rhine, the Scheldt,
the Pyrenees, the Alps—fortresses or advanced posts, in
order to support, according to circumstances, our policy alter-
nately offensive or defensive. When the Emperor Napo-
leon I. caused hjmself to be crowned King of Italy, and
proclaimed Protector of the German Confederation, be de-
sired rather to protect than aggrandise the French territory,
which was great enough in its natural limits not to go be-
yond them. He thus constituted the independence at the
same time as the influence of new France, and his victorious
eagles carried abroad with them, not servitude but civilisa-
tion.

" In what concerns Italy particularly the Emperor ex-
plained the motives of his domination over that country in-
one of the memorable conversations at St. Helena As
for the Italians,' he said, ' the agglomeration was already
far advanced. It was only to become old, and each day
ripened with them the unity of principle and of legislation,
that of thought and feeling, that cement secure and infal-
lible of human agglomerations. The union of Piedmont
with France, that of Parma, Tuscany, Rome, had been only
temporary in my thought, and had no other object than to
watch, to guarantee, and to promote the national education
of the Italians.' And let it not be said that that generous
thought was in the conscience of the illustrious exile the
excuse for his lost domination. It was well and truly the
inspiration of his political genius, and what proves it is the
official answer which he made in 1508 to M. Melzi, who
headed the deputation charged with offering him the crown

of Italy. -
" That reply is a ray of light in this historic question.
Here it is :--` I have always had the intention of creating
the Italian. nationality free and independent. I accept the
crown ; I Will gtorci Ai but only for the time my interests
shall require it..
The campaigns of the Revolution, the conquestg Of the
Efflpire, Wert thileitt int4iis, t3tt atreme resource of
struggle and of propagandism, but they were 1101 4 Statein:
The BittPtior did not znake Germany and Italy French but
only to prepare them sahib day to lie German and Italian.
Misfortunes surprised Win befoie this objeet of European
tOttld be Meditiplisheti whet is most re-
i iarktble i 9, Mat to dive filet bddlt fittiti the other side of
the Rhine and the Alps it was found necessary to excite
against him the national sentiment which he understood,
and which entered into his test plan es an element of gene-
ral pacification. It was by promising their independence
to Italy and Germany that the coalition was able to rally
them round its flag.
" The state of- France with relation to Europe is at the
dresent day quite different. The French Revolution has
one its work as to institutions, laws, and manners, and its
influence is felt beyond our frontiers. The Empire, re-
established after more than 30 years' struggle, has gained
the alliance of some of the oldest monarchies, the friendship
of others, the esteem of- all. There is consequently no
row), to fear that our generatioh shall see ware mom-

menced such as those which have cost so much blood, and
gave so much glory to our fathers.
" If France, who wishes peace, was forced to make war,
Europe would no doubt be moved by it, but it ought not to
be disquieted at it. It is not her independence which is in
question. War, which fortunately is not probable, would
have no other object the day when it should become neces-
sary than to prevent revolutions by means of the legitimate
satisfaction given to the requirements of populations, and
the protection and guarantee of the recognised principles,
and of the authentic rights of their nationality.
" The Emperor Napoleon I. thought himself obliged to
conquer nationalities in order to free them. If ever his
successor had to defend them it would be to free them with-
out conquering them. Thus we might repeat to Italy what
M. Thiers said on the 29th January, 1848, from the tribune,
and with as much reason as justice—' When, 50 years ago,
we wished to possess Italy, it was a wrong, but an excus-
able wrong, because to possess it was to save it, and the vast
empire which stretched from Rome to Hamburg was but
the great reprisal for the celebrated Convention of Pilnitz.
Those times are past. Italy must know that France wishes
her to be independent, free, and happy.'
V.

" There are in France and in Europe men of good faith,

who ask themselves if there is really an Italian question. It
is true that this question has not been created in these recent
times either by civil war or by foreign war. Must we con-
clude that it does not exist ? Such is not our opinion. The
Italian question is created by the disquietude which it
causes to Europe, by the uneasiness it keeps up, and by the
false situation in which all the Governments of the-Penin-
sula are more or less engaged under the influence of causes
at once common and various.
"VI.

" At Rome the Pope is under the respectful and devoted
guardianship of the arms of France. That military occupa-
tion is at once an abnormal and a necessary fact. If it ceased
to-day we should see Austria or the Revolution take our
place to-morrow. The noble qualities and generous inten-
tions of Pius IX. seemed to reserve for him an exceptional
part in the history of the Papacy. Italian patriotism is in
him combined with every Christian virtue. He was worthy
of regenerating_ltAy: It, was the first inspiration of his ac-
cession; the greatness of Rome seemed to revive for a mo-
ment under the figure of this Pope. Turin, Naples, Venice,
Parma, and Milan thrilled with a new spirit at the signal
of nationality given by the bell of the dome of St. Peter's.
Unhappily, the revolution came on, which drew the popu-
lationr
e
t
dheoafun4Convincedu bdgltwhiche
ibsis
s i,nalong,suchoe:
h exile,
he
sit
regrethtehe,causedhea enaud
desired
hlp nar
foiodnft copre
necessityesi
safetyrcu e tesfooi
havingovf
Ibdre
reform
t failedath.
was.
atvti
hft bf
re
rat
oichsc
nffi
nwkeoo
u4l
i;ed;dan:s
bov iihfit:mage France.
again
ea himesc
unhs
se no
autho-
rityvahoedri
never
will have remorse before God for having attempted it. 7 his
day he bears with Christian resignation the weight of a
situation which he has vainly tried to better, and the abuses
of which his perfect goodness would have corrected if they
could be so. •

" This situation places the Pope in presence of three real
difficulties, and which, we declare, expose seriously to
danger, according to us, the political power bf the Papacy
—a power necessary for its independence, and the grandeur
of its religious mission.
" The first of these difficulties is found in the adminis-
trative Government of the Roman States, which is but the
Catholic authority applied to the interests of a temporal
order. The laws of the Church are not proper for discus-
sion, and merit respect; they must be considered as an
emanation of the Divine wisdom ; but civil society claims
its legislation as religious society exacts and preserves its
own. The Canon Law, inflexible as dogma, immovable
amid the movement of ages, is essentially distinct from
legal law, variable as are the requirements and the interests
of society. It could adapt itself to the early periods of
Christian civilisation when Charlemagne introduced in his
Capitularies the rules and precepts of theocracy ; but tlu3
canon law cannot suffice for the protection and develop-
ment of modern society.
" There is, nevertheless, an essential point which must
never be lost sight of when the Pontifical Government is in
question, namely, the necessity of respecting its twofold
character, and of reconciling the regime of the Church and
the regime of the Roman nation, which are exercised by the
same hand. They must be reconciled without being con-
founded. There is the problem—a difficult one, we admit,
but on the solution of which depends, perhaps, the salva-
tion of the temporal power of the Papacy.
" In fact, real abuses, independent of men, inherent in
the nature of things, spring from this confusion. These
abuses excite among the Roman population a spirit which
would easily render them unjust and distrustful, and which
is only kept in check by the presence of our soldiers. We
become responsible for what we protect ; and our very oc-
cupation, from the fact of being prolonged in such condi-
tions, would be worn out, and would endanger the name
and the influence of France.
" Thus, in a political point of view, the absolutely cleri-
cal character of the Government of the Roman States is a
contre-iemps an active cause of discontent, and consequently
an element of weakness for the Pope himself, and a perma-
nent danger of revolution.
"The second difficulty for the Pope is tkat which result
from the national question. In this point of view his situa-
tion is not more defined nor less dangerous. The irritation
in the Roman States is still less owing, to the absence of
legal guarantees and to the clerical administration, than to
the antagenisim necessarily established between the mission
of the Head of the Church and that of the Pope as an
Italian Prince. The cause of the Revolution of 1848 was,
above all, the explosion of the national idea. It is from the
Vatican that the encouragement as well as the obstacle to
the nationality of Italy had to come.
" The Pope supported, as Sovereign, the cause of inde-
pendence; as Head of the Church, ho disapproved the war,
and refused to break off with Austria. I'laced between a
double duty, he was reduced to sacrifice the ono to the other.
He necessarily sacrificed the political to the spiritual duty.
This is the condemnation, not of Pius IX., but of the sys-
tem ; not of the man, but of the situation, since the situa-
tion imposes on the man the terrible alternative of immo-
lating the Prince to the Pontiff, or the Pontiff to the Prince.
"Finally. A third difficulty, and this not, the least seri-
ous, is created for the Pope by the absolute impossibility he
is of forming, in actual circumstances, an Italian army. All
the attempts made with this object have failed.
" Thus, in a word, in what concerns Rome there are
three considerable difficulties, which correspond to these
urgent necessities, viz. :
" 1. To reconcile the regime of the Church with a legal,
political, and regular regime in the Roman States.
"2. To render the Pope independent of questions of
nationality, of war, of armaments, of internal and external
defence.
" 3. To constitute a native army, and to substitute for
our occupation the pridection of an efficacious and serious
Italian force.
" This is a threefold necessity, which, under pain of
certain and perhaps approaching disturbance, must be satis-
fied, in the interest of Italy, of religion, and of all the
Catholic States. (Triple exigence a laquelle, sous peine de
perturbation certain° et pent-etre prochaine2 ii import do
satisfaire dans r inter& de l'ltalie, de la religion, et de tons
les Etats Catholiques.)

"VII.
" Piedmont has grown greatly in importance and in glory.
She has won a place in the affairs of li'airepe, and a part in
the destinies of Italy. But, in order to establish her power,
as yet new, and to guarantee her security at home and
abroad, her Government is bound to give satisfaction- to two
interests which are in a state of suffering—national interest
and religious interest.
"The Italian idea is, since 1847, the moving cause and
the necessary reason of all the acts of Piedmontese policy.
It is the passion of King Victor Emmanuel, as it is the flag
of the Cabinet presided over by Count Cavour. Now this
idea has produced all that in actual circumstances it was
enabled to produce with regard to military acts, prepara-
tion of armaments, systems of defence, and political mani-
festations against Austria; in this respect it could go no
further without encounterinc, war.
" Nevertheless, Piedmont cannot remain without great
peril at the point at which it is ; it cannot have taken vainly
the head of the Italian movement in order to draw back
afterwards. It is absolutely necessary that means should've
found of satisfying the hopes which it has excited under
pain of losing all influence in Italy, and of being outstripped
by the passions which its present pepultuity keeps in check.
"The interests of religion suffer in Piedmont, we have
said, like the national interests. It is then urgent, for
many reasons, that in a Catholic country should not be pro-
longed a dissension with the Church of Rome, which is an
encouragement to revolutionary passions, a cause of grief
and an embarrassment for the conscience, and a serious
danger for the Government.
" The Piedmontese clergy have no hatred against repre-
sentative Government. In 1846 and 1847 they were nearly
all in the liberal movement directed by Count Balbo and
the Abbe- Gioberti. Their attitude changed when the law
on civil marriage and that on ecclesiastical festivities pro-
duced a dissension with Rome. It is no part of our busi-
ness to discuss these laws; we merely obserye that all the
enlightened Piedmontese deplore that state of things, and
earnestly desire to see the end of them. We have too much
confidence in the high intelligence of the Prime Minister of
Sardinia not to be convinced that the obstacle to a recon-
ciliation so desirable would not be found in him. What
proves it is his declaration last session on the secularisation
of the property of the clergy, which he energetically re-
jected for profound political reasons, as he said.
" But we must not delude ourselves ; that reconciliation
is not easy. There are engagements contracted, amour
propro excited, and an issue is difficult from this dilemma
when the debate is carried on only under the protection of
some great act which would be a pledge given to the na-
tional interest and a means of reconciliation with the in-
terests of religion.
" If, in place of that, the state quo be prolonged in Pied:
moat, it is fated to end, as the political result in war, and
as the religious result in schism.
" These are two great dangers, not only for Piednrnt;
but for all Italy and for Europe, and to which po
lit
wisdom counsels us not to shut our eyes. ical
" VIII.
" Can the status quo, so difficult to maintain t e
at Milan
_and
Turin for the reasons we have just giv, conu
Naples, Florence, Parma, and Lucca ?
" At Milan the Emperor of Austria senht
eofgteheedarinctehndtuikeness
him who had most sympathy for Italy. T _ _
of the Archduke Maximilian are known. He used his power
with a moderation which we are happy to admit, but is the
domination of Austria in Italy the more solid therefor ?
The qualities of a prince--time itself—can do nothing. As
Lord Palmerston saidin
or Austria to kee
already quoted—' There islnBo49,
eheinnw the
f despatch we have
tinha a i
side, usefuliantieudrrpeereitnieannepilut
put down,
llepftepenr
.ehed, Thusop
but
n
never diseoliraged.
" At Naples the Government is isolated, not only in Eu-
rope by her position with respect to Franco and England,
but also in Italy, by her rupture with the only state there
which is seriously organised. The King of Naples, also,
and he more than any other, perhaps, weakened as he is
by this double isolation, has to deal with a national opinion
which exists in the south as in the north of the Peninsula.
Mention has recently been made of a document of great
interest, and which explains the resistance of the King of
Naples to the' combined diplomatic action of the Anglo-
French alliance. By the 3d Article of the Convention of
the 29th of April, 1815, the two Governments of Austria
and the Two Sicilies engaged to conclude a treaty of alli-
ance, having for object 'to consolidate the state of peace
and tranquility, internal and external, of the Two Sicilies
and of Italy in general.' That treaty, concluded in the
month of July following, stipulates, in a secret article, 'that
his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies shall not admit
changes which cannot be rconciled either with monarchical