The Sun.
London, England, 1857-01-17 00:00:00

execution, it would be a vast improvement
he present system, and vould insure the wel-
and prosperity of the nztion.

1 'here is one point on wlich all writers on the
Cur rency Question fully ant completely concur,
viz. on the imperative necessity of decisive legis-
latic n. with reference to the Act cf 1844.
"11 - n •calor" himself unequivocally admits this.
Biel 'kB yj, in a recent letter to the Times—" In
tl se A pproaching session legislation must take place
%rug the Bank Charter Act. That measure must
be 1 enewed, or repealed, partially or entirely."
HEM ce his spasmodic efforts to bewilder the pub-
lic o nce more, and the recklessness of assertion by
wlai he deliberately states that which is clearly
arid palpably untrue, and which, moreover, has
bee a proved to be so by the concurrent
'test imony of unimpeachable witnessc 3, the
ma';, jority of whom were, like " Mercator "
hin iself, decided bullionis&. We do not wish to
imp ,ute wilful falsehood to Mercator. But there
is s , time-honoured adage that there are " none
so blind as those who will not see," and even high.
ided men have refused to be convinced of any-
thing opposed to a pet theory, even on grounds
thi ,t could leave no lingering doubt on the mind
of any disinterested and unprejudiced person.
W e cannot, however, permit the assertion to pass
vti.thout contradiction, that, within the 12 years
iviaich have elapsed since the passing of the Act,
tl] .ere has not been "any real disturbance of
pi iblic credit, or any apprehension respecting the
solidity of our monetary system !

Nov, what does Mercator say to the panic of
L 847, which led to the virtual suspension of the
in apolitic Act, under the Ministerial Letter of the
25th October, 1847 ? Was there, at that time,
"no real disturbance of public credit, nor any
apprehension respecting the solidity of our mone-

tall- system ?" Can he ignore the fearful state of
affairs that led to the stringent inquiries as to the
cause of the commercial distress, at that period? or
that the Lords' Committee reported that the then
" recent panic was materially aggravated by the
operation of the statute" of which he professes
himself the enthusiastic advocate ? Adding, This
effect may be traced directly to the Act of 1844,
in the legislative restriction imposed on the means of
accommodation, whilst a large amount of bullion
was held in the coffers of the Bank, and during a
time of favourable exchanges ; and it may be
traced to the same cause, indirectly, as a conse-
quence of great fluctuatiozs in the rate of discount
and of capital previously advanced at an unusually
low rate of interest !
The groat majority of witnesses, almost all,
with the exception of Mr. S. JONES LOYD, now
Lord OVERSTONE, agreed in " representing the
intensity of the pressure as more severe than the
distress of 1837 and 1839. MLny
even consi-
dered it to have been greater than that of what
had previously been, par excellence, the panic year
1825." Mr. SAMUEL GURNEY, one of the highest
authorities on such matters, thought that " the
catastrophes of last autumn (that of 1847) were

beyond all parallel in our monetary history."

The same gentleman, in accounting for the causes
of these disasters, said-4" Under the Currency
Act they (the Bank of Directors) found them-
selves not only under the necessity suddenly
of not only withdrawing the usual accommodation
by way of discount, but of calling in with
a severe and unrelenting hand the laws they had
made upon the security of bills, Exchequer Bills,
(N. The suddenness and severity of this change
was forced upon the Bank by the Currency Act !
Had it not been for that they would have spread
over months what they felt themselves compelled
to do in a few days, to the serious disarrangement

of the money market, and to much alarming

disaster I" And yet, during the whole period,
from the middle of April to the withdrawing the
restrictive clause in the Act of 1844, the foreign
exchanges were in favour of this country.

The celebrated Letter of the 25th October, 1847,
at once removed the difficulty. The fearful cause
of all the mischief having ceased the evil termi-
nated. Mr. GTTN, the eminent banker, declared
that " the letter of the Government stopped the
crisis, and abrogated the Act," while Mr. BROWNE
cousitlered it to have " virtually condemned and
annulled the Act of 1844 ;" and it was stated in
evidence " that the Bank would have had to
shut its doors in a week unless the law had been
violated." And yet Mercator now unblushingly
asserts that since the passing of the Act there hes
not been "any real disturbance of public credit
or any apprehension respecting the solidity of our
monetary system." What value can be attached
to the testimony of a volunteer witness capable of
such reckless statements ?

Mercator has again come forward with the
same flippancy of assertion, the same wholesale
disregard to well-known and recognised facts. In
his letter which appeared in the BuMonist organ,
he declares that we may confidently anticipate that
"the existing settlement of our monetary system
will be firmly maintained ;" that " the steady
force of sound principles, the clear deductions of
scientific reasoning, the emphatic verdict of expe-
rience, will not be hastily overruled." We hope
not, but in a very different sense from that of
Mercator. We have witnessed the fearful effects
of the fatal enactment. A committee of the
Lords, in one of the ablest reports ever issued to
either House, clearlyand unequivocally condemned
the principle, and pointed out its disastrous results.
Now that the time has arrived for modifying, or ra-
ther completely abrogating, the existing law, that
admirable document must receive the weight to
which it is so justly entitled. The Bank has not
faithfully performed the trust confided to its
charge. It must henceforward be placed in more
trustworthy and efficient hands, where the people
may be assured of disinterestedness, and respon-
sibility. At present the great object of the Bank
is to enhance the rate of discount. Their interests
are directly conflicting with those of the nation.
And yet we allow those subjected to such sinister
influences to control the national circulation at
their will
and pleasure—to create at one time a
feast, at another a famine—and that with-
out being accountable either to Parliament
or to the
People. The only tangible re-
medy is the establishment of a really National
Bank, the Directors whereof shall answer to Par-
liament for the manner in which they exercise
their powers. Mercator thinks that " weak or
dishonest Governments may yield to the pressure
to which they will of course be subjected, and
seek to obviate political difficulties, or to
promote their
own temporary popularity by a
fatal tampering with the solidity of the system."
This would, however, be practically impossible, or
at all events speedy and complete retribution
would at once follow any deviation from the cor-
rect course, The
" weak or dishonest Govern-
ment" would speedily be hurled from office; but,
unfortunately, there is no available mode of ob-
taining an alteration in the Bank Direction.
The voice of public opinion may be heard, but
nothing can be done. The nation is helpless. It
suffers deeply, but can only deplore the fatuity of
Legi s latur3, Which consigns it, bow ,1,1 hand and ;
foot, into the power of the muneyouraey, that has
rendered usury a thriving employment, while the
'legitimate trade and commerce of the country be-