The Sun.
London, England, 1859-03-31 00:00:00

JURIES IN CIVIL CASES BILL.

A debate and a decision of great public import-
ance occurred in the House of Lords on Tuesday
evening. A bill was before the house proposing
certain reforms in an institution no less sacred than
that of our time-honoured Trial by Jury. The
measure had been introduced by the Lord Chief
Justice himself; it received, notwithstanding its
innovating character, the support of Lord Cran-
worth and Lord Kingsdown, but it was opposed by
Lord Lyndhurst, the Lord Chancellor, and Lord
Wensleydale. This division of legal authority may
well induce the general reader to enter impartially
into the argument, and there is something, in truth,
to be said on both sides, although we believe the
conclusion of the house to have been undoubtedly
sound. There is unfortunately but too little occasion
for our stating the case as regards existing practice,
since the systeni under.which juries are summoned
and treated renders a vast number of persons only
too well acquainted with its oppressive operation.
The law requires from 12 men in every case unani-
mity of opinion, and, as this unanimity is obviously
not likely to be always forthcoming, it provides
also a certain species of compulsion for producing
the desired result. Until the 12 jurors can come
to an agreement without a dissenting voice they
are liable to be locked up and starved. It does not
seem to be quite clear that they can be carted by
the judge's order to the bounds of the shire and

,nere shot into a ditch. Lord Lyndhurst entered
nt• explanations calculated to dispel the impres-
sions to this effect, but at any rate a judge can very
severely punish a jury for not being of one mind,
and stands bound, indeed, to visit the unfortunate
men with serious disabilities during any protracted
deliberation. Now Lord Campbell's bill proposed
that in civil cases—for the innovation «as not as
yet extended to criminal trials—the unanimity
hitherto exacted from a jury might be dispensed
with, provided that a period of six hours had been
consumed in their deliberations, and that a majo-
rity could then be obtained of nine against three.
This, no doubt, touched a fundamental principle of
British institutions, as did also, and in scarcely a
less degree, the further proposal, that the jury,
during their detention, should be supplied with all
needful accommodation and refreshment. On these
propositions the debate proceeded.
The fatal objection to Lord Campbell's scheme
was, that he had not established the wrong he
was designing to remedy, whereas the remedy
went to subvert a principle of great antiquity and
the object of much popular veneration. It was not
quite' correct to say, as Lord Kingsdown said, that
the latter consideration furnished the main, if not the
sole, argument against the bill, for the balance of
reasoning was on the side of the Opposition as re-
garded even the intrinsic merits of the scheme ; but
tradition had its weight, no doubt, and in such a
case with some propriety. An existence of 500
years could not be pleaded on behalf of a proved
abuse, but it could certainly be advanced for the
protection of an unconvicted usage. For the aboli-
tion of so very venerable a system strong cause
ought to be shown, and the cause shown by Lord
Campbell had not strength sufficient for the pur-
pose. It required tobe shown that cases of disagree-
ment among jurors, of their discharge without ver-
dicts, and of the general miscarriage of justice in
consequence, were numerous, whereas Lord Lynd-
hurst produced evidence to the very contrary effect.
He affirmed, on good statistical authority, that 19
cases out of 20 were decided without the jury's
so much as leaving the box ; that in not more than
one case out of 000 were they dismissed for non-
agreement; and that the proportion of new trials
was even smaller still. To these statistics he
added the results of his own unrivalled experience,
reproduced by the aid of an astonishing memory,
and Lord Chelmsford gave testimony in the same
direction. Lord Campbell's case, therefore, was
not made out. Perhaps there was really some-
thing in the wrong and something in the remedy,
but the remedy seemed so perilous and the wrong
so inconsiderable that it would have been impru-
dent to venture on the application.
The matter was not quite so clear when the rea-
soning proceeded on more abstract grounds, though
even here, too, we think, the weight of argument
was, on the whole, against the bill. It is un-
doubtedly probable that the unanimity produced
by coercion and torture must often be, as Lord
ICingsdown defined it, a false unanimity. The very
terrorism employed _by the law shows that some-

thing beyond loiical Persuasion was reckoned upon
for creating an agreement, and it is obvious to re-
mark that the constitutional strength or obstinacy
of a single Juror may, under such•a system, enable
him to dictate terms to the other eleven. All this

is true, and we have no doubt the effects are occa-
sionally felt to the detriment of justice. But, as
Lord Lyndhurst inquired, how are we to escape
this by removing the obligation of unanimity from
twelve men to nine ? The likelihood of sincere
agreement is a little improved, certainly, but there
is still the chance of the perverse or the obstinate
juror domineering over his colleagues as before,
and, while this evil is not obviated, another at least
equally serious is introduced. Verdicts of Juries
under the new system would no longer carry with
them any uniform or decisive weight. At present a
verdict is a verdict, and it presumes that twelve men
have come to one opinion on a case, thus leaving
little room for any expression of discontent or mis-
trust. But suppose a losing suitor is publicly as-
sured that a certain portion of the Jury was in his
favour, will he then submit to sit down under his
loss, or will he not renew by any possible means the
litigation in which he finds he has some support ?
A divided verdict would only half settle a case,
and the "decision" of the law would be no deeison
at all.

Take, again, the respective operations of the old
and the new systems upon the actual proceedings
of a Jury. One plain confessed advantage of com-
pulsory unanimity is, that it enforces a discussion
and comparison of opinions. Everr juror must
be heard by his colleagues, for any one can stop
the whole machine, and it is therefore the common
interest of all to be attentive and considerate. But
allow that a majority may rule a minority, and all
these influences vanish.. Nine men seeing their way
to a common accord may treat the remaining three
with utter contempt, and set aside their arguments
without the least reference to their value ; whereas,
if the three could stop the verdict, they
could be
sure of commanding proper respect. So forcibly,
indeed was this consideration felt that Lord Camp-
bell found it necessary to take precautions on the
point, and it was to this end that his bill stipulated
for six hours' detention of the jury before a verdict
of the majority could be received. The idea of the
clause is, that the prospect of six hours' confinement
would operate proportionately just as the indefinite
prospect now dots, with effect sufficient for its
Purpose ; but this seems reckoning too fast. More-
over, it by no means follows that this period may
be devoted to honest discussion and comparison of
notes. As Lord Chelmsford remarked, all that a
majority
would have to do would be to " sit the
appointed time, and then pronounce their vote."
lirith such arguments as these before them their
lordships, we think, displayed a sound judgment
in rejecting the second reading of the bill ; but we
must add that it would be greatly for the public
advantage if one, at least, of Lord Campbell's
proposals were reserved for a better fate. The
Lord Chancellor himself expressed his desire " that
juries should deliberate in a proper manner, and
not be forced to give a verdict through weariness
of the flesh or exhaustion from thirst or hunger ;"
and we should much rejoice to see not only that
effect was given to so reasonable a recommendation,
but that the treatment of juries was improved in
other respects also. It can hardly be right, where
a title to compensation is recognised, that this com-
pensation should consist at most of a guinea, for
hours, or even days (as in the late Marchmont case),
of laborious and distressing attention. It cannot
be too anxiously remembered that the jury repre-
sents the very pivot of our judicial institutions, and
yet there is no functionary in the whole court so
ill-used as a. juror. This is the point at which
reform should be applied. Give juries a reasonable
recompense for their services and their loss of time,
abolish all the antiquated barbarism of bodily
coercion, treat them as they ought to be treated,
and it will not, we confidently predict, be found
necessary to innovate upon a system which is en-
shrined in the hearts of Englishmen as one of the,
most precious institutions.— Times.