The Sun.
London, England, 1859-07-06 00:00:00

THIRD READINGS.

The Gateshead Quay, Hampstead Junction Railway,
and Vale of Neath Railway Bills were read a third time
and passed.

COURT OF CHANCERY.
Lord LYNDHURST said he had given notice of his
'ntention to draw the attention of the house to the proceed-
ings of the Court of Chancery on Friday next, but as he
perceived a noble lord had had a motion on the paper for
that evening restiecting Italian affairs, he should postpone
proceeding with his subject until next week.
The LORD CHANCEHLOR said he hoped the noble
and learned lord would persevere in his intention, as no
person was so competent to deal with the question.
Lord LYNDHURST said he should most certainly do
so on Monday or Tuesday next.
PETITIONS.
Lord BROUGHAM presented a petition from Derby-
shire complaining of the exclusion of Dissenters from the
administration of trust funds of endowed grammar schools,
and also a petition against church-rates, and another against
the trade in opium.
THE ITALIAN QUESTION.
Lord STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE read the terms
of his motion with respect to Italian affairs, it was as fol-
lows :—" That an humble address be presented to her Ma-
jesty expressing the thanks of this house for her Majesty's
gracious communication of the deeply important correspon-
dence on the Ititlian affairs, presented recently to both
Houses of Parliament by her Majesty's command, and gra-
ciously acknowledges the unquestionable evidence that
correspondence affords of her Majesty's earnest
and important endeavours to avert the calamities
of war. That her Majesty may be assured of the
loyal confidence with which this house relies on her Ma-
jesty's determination to maintain neutrality, and that finally
it be represented to her Majesty that while every
suitable endeavour be made under her Majesty's authority
for the completion of our defences on sea and land—the
operations of the belligerent powers be carefully observed,
with a view in particular of such offers of mediation on
her Majesty's part as may lead to the conclusion
of peace on just and comprehensive grounds."
The noble earl said he thought it would be for the conve-
nience of all parties that the question should be brought
forward on Friday next.
The Earl of DERBY thought that day would suit the
convenience of all parties.

ATLANTIC TELEGRAPH BILL.
On the motion for reading this bill a third time a
lengthened conversation ensued, in which the Earl of
GRANVILLE, Lord STANLEY of ALDERLEY, and several
other noble ords took part, the till was eventually read a
third time and passed.
PETTY SESSIONAL DIVISIONS BILL.
This bill passed through committee.

OUR NAVAL DEFENCES.

Lord LYNDHURST, who had given notice of his inten-

tion to draw their lordships' attention to the military and
naval defences of the country, then rose and said—My
lords, it was suggested to me that, after the discussion which
took place the other night on the question of my noble and
learned friend, and especially after the statement of my
noble friend opposite and the speeches of my noble friends
the two noble earls on these benches, I should withdraw
the notice which I had laid on your lordships' table. At
first I was inclined to do so ; but the subject is one of such
great importance, that it ought to be repeatedly discussed, in
order to satisfy the people of this country of the necessity
of submitting to those charges and those expenses which
our present situation requires. I was the more disposed to
proceed with this question because there is a party in this
country of whom I wish to speak with the greatest respect,
a party likely very soon to increase in power and influence,
who are not disposed to believe that we ought to expend our
resources at present in any extension of our military and
naval power, and that, so far from doing so, we ought to
abstain from any extension of that power, because by doing
so we shall involve ourselves in hostilities. Now, my
lords, I beg leave, in the first place, to say that any obser-
vation which I shall make will be made, not with the view
of aggression, but of defence. (Hear, hear.) I shall say
nothing whatever in any party spirit, for party can have
nothing whatever to do with this question. (Cheers.) I
shall endeavour as simply as I can to point out these cir-
cumstances and those topics which I think are important
for the consideration of your lordships, leaving it to others
who are more acquainted with military and naval details
than I can pretend to be to fill up and supply the defects in
the statement which I shall make to your lordships. The
first circumstance that strikes me in considering this sub-
ject is the great difference between our present and former
position. (Hear, hear.) That is a distinction which ought
never to be lost sight of. We have hitherto felt the greatest
confidence in our situation and in our domestic safety. We
owe that confidence to our naval superiority—to the superior
number of our vessels and the skill and gallantry of our
seamen. We have been accustomed always to look to what
we call our wooden walls as our best defence, and experi-
ence justifies us in that opinion. We have sometimes, in-
deed, received checks and affronts. The Dutch at one time
sailed up the Thames, burnt our ships in the Medway and
in the river. At a much later period the combined ships
of France and Spain chased our fleets into the waters of
Plymouth under the height,i of Mount Edgecumbe. But
those clouds soon passed away: They were amply avenged,
and we shone out with more distinguished lustre than be-
fore. My lords, there was another source of our confidence
and safety, and not an immaterial one—namely, the diffi-
culty of transporting any body of troops from the opposite
coasts to our own shores. It was impossible to collect any
number of troops on an oppoite coast without being observed
by us, and without giving us notice and allowing us time to
prepare ourselves against them. Besides, an expedition of
that kind was necessarily liable to many casualties. Any
joint operation, therefore, from different points was impos-
sible, or nearly so. A few thousand troops might, perhaps,
occasionally be landed on our coasts, sufficient, indeed, to
give trouble, but not sufficient to excite any fear of danger.
The greatest force that ever was landed here was that of the
Prince of Orange, amounting, I think, to about 14,000 or
15,000 men. But that force was invited to this country by
some of the most eminent men in England. It was received
with enthusiasm by the people. It led to no catastrophe,
and James 11. retired, the victim of his own bigotry, folly,
and tyranny. But that expedition was nearly defeated by
an accident. It sailed down the Channel with a fair wind.
When it arrived opposite Torbay a dense fog arose. It
passed therefore the place where it was intended to disem •
bark. It was followed by the English fleet. It was there-
fore in the greatest peril; but on a sudden the fog dis-
persed. The wind veered round, drove the Dutch fleet into
Torbay, and checked the progress of the English fleet. The
English fleet shortly afterwards was dispersed in a storm.
I mention this to show the accidents to which, under our
old system, enterprises of this kind were subject. This was
our past situation—a situation of perfect security. What
is it now ? A great change has occurred. That change
arises from the application of steam power to commercial
navigation and to naval warfare. What do we know of the
effect of that power upon naval warfare ? We have had no
experience of it. No peraon can venture to predict what
will be its effect. I have consulted many officers, both of
the army and of the navy, upon the subject, and I have
never been able to persuade myself that any one one can
with any degree of confidence say what will be the result of
this great change. I have read in the admirable work of
Sir Howard Douglas that military officers in France be-
lieve that this change has a great effect upon our naval
power, and will reduce it to comparative unimportance.
There is one advantage which we hitherto have had in naval
combat over our adversaries under the old system—the
skill and experience of our seamen, and their knowledge of
everything connected with the management of a vessel.
(Hear.) Unfortunately, though we have not entirely lost
that advantage, it has greatly lessened under the now sys-
tero. There is a change in the armaments, in the materials,
in the construction, and in the form of war vessels. A great
facility of boarding arises out of the new system, and num-
bers, therefore, would have a great advantage. Above all,
the new system of manoeuvring which must follow this
new system is such that it is doubtful what would be
the issue of a naval contest. (Hear.) I have stated these
points for your consideration, because you will be satisfied
when you have considered them that we cannot, as hereto-
fore, rely with perfect confidence upon our naval defences.
(Hear, hear.) Still, however, and perhaps more so in con-
sequence of what I have stated, it becomes necessary that
we should carry our naval machinery and everything con-
nected with it to the highest point of efficiency, and that we
should refuse no sums necessary for that purpose. (Cheers.)
Let me now, my lords, call attention to what is the actual
state of our navy. I will begin by referring to last year. I
speak of the spring of last year, and of steamers, which are
the only vessels which it is material to consider. (Hear,
hear.) Last year we were in this position :—France ex-
ceeded us in line-of-battle ships in a small proportion, but
she exceeded us in an enormous proportion in steam fri-
gates. At present we surpass her in line-of-battle ships
considerably, but we are still greatly inferior in those im-
portant vessels, steam frigates. We shall, in the spring of
next year, surpass her still more in line-of-battle ships, but
we shall still be inferior to her in steam frigates. Thii is
a point for the consideration of your lordships, and for the
consideration of the country. (Hear, hear.) Give me
leave, ray lords, to mention one circumstance which I think
most material for our consideration when we are considering,
the subject of naval warfare. You will make a great mis-
take if you suppose for a moment that the relative power
depends entirely on the number or size or force of the ves-
sel. A more—l will not say a much more important, but
a very important power consists in trained crews of vessels.
(Hear.) The French for several years have had a system
of training of a most perfect kind—training in the conduct
of the vessel, and training not only in the conduct of the
vessel, but in gunnery. The moment a French ship is afloat
that moment they have trained men ready to go on board
the vessel. lam sorry to say, from all I hear and all 1 ob-
serve, we have not such a system as that to which I ave
referred—a system of the utmost importance, but which in
this country hitherto has been almost entirely neglected.
(Hear.) Now, with respect to force. What is required,
first, in the Channel ? We require not only a force for war-
fare equal to, France, but we require something more. We
require a powerful reserve. (Hear.) France requires no
reserve. The reason is this, and I beg your lordships to
mark it. If in a combat of the two fleets the English fleet
should be victorious, we have no power of landing with any

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effect upon the French coast ; whereas, if we had no reserve
I and our fleet is destroyed in a contest with the French fleet,
we are entirely at the mercy of the enemy. We have seen.
lately what France can effect. Suppose the English fleet
defeated and driven from the Channel, the events which
have passed almost under our eyes within the last few
weeks show the great peril to which we should be exposed
from the extraordinary facility with which a military force
to, an immense amount might at once be landed on our
shores. But it is not sufficient for us to have a Channel
fleet capable of coping with the country directly opposite to
us. Our Channel fleet must certainly and necessarily be
of an amount sufficient to cope against any two Powers
which may be united against us. (Hear.) We know full
well that at this moment the Russians have seven or eight
line steamers fitted for sea. If by any accident or by any
event, which might easily occur, we should be engaged in a
dispute with France and with Russia, we should be in a very
unfortunate situation if we had not a naval force sufficient
to combat both those Powers. (Hear, hear.) Our naval
power is essentially defensive. It is absolutely essential to
our security. The naval power of France is not defensive—
not necessarily so. It is aggressive in its character. (Hear.)
Then, I say, with respect to the amount of the Channel fleet,
if we wish to be in a state of security, if we wish to main-
tain our great interests, if we wish to maintain our honour,
it is necessary that we should have a power measured by
that of any two possible adversaries. (Cheors.) It is not
very easy beforehand to say what that power should be, but
we must watch events and extend our naval power accord-
ing to the necessity of the case, and whatever necessity re-
quires, whatever the expense, we must submit to incur that
expense. (Cheers.) The Channel fleet is only one part of
the force necessary. We must have a fleet sufficient to
command the Mediterranean. If NT have not a fleet suffi-
cient to command the Mediterranean, every one of our
strongholds will inevitably fall into the possession of France.
Not only would that be the case, but the desire and the
wish of the first Emperor to convert the Mediterranean into
a French lake would be at once realised. (Hear, hear.)
Do your lordships suppose that that idea is aban-
doned ? Far from it. I recollect very well that
when the present Emperor, of whom I wish to speak
in terms of respect, made his southern tour, and when
he, arrived at Bordeaux, declared that The Empire is
peace,"—l recollect in that progress, when at Marseilles,
and about to proceed from Marseilles to Toulon in a fleet of
war ships, reference was made to this desire of Bonaparte.
Was it repudiated ? It was adopted by the present Em-
peror amid the enthusiastic cheers of the audience assembled
on that occasion. (Hear, hear.) But, allow me to say, with
respect to a fleet necessary for commanding the Mediter-
ranean, if France has the command of the Mediterranean,
what is the inevitable consequence ? She will be able to
leave and return to the Mediterranean at her pleasure. She
will be able to take our Channel fleet in flank at any mo -
ment. She will be able to unite her Mediterranean and
Channel fleets. She will be able to cross the ocean, and one
by one to take possession of our colonies, and she will be
able to sweep the ocean of our ships, and destroy our whole
property. (Hear, hear.) It is necessary, then, not only to
have such a Channel fleet as I have stated, but such a fleet
as will enable us completely to command the Mediterranean.
(Cheers.) Something further is still necessary. We must
have a fleet for the West India Islands. I admit not a
strong fleet, nor do I pretend to say where that fleet should
be stationed. I must leave that to military and naval per-
sons to determine. There is another point with respect to
the Mediterranean. Unless we have the command'of the
Mediterranean—if we are driven out of the Mediterranean,
what is our situation with respect to India? We cannot
eommunite with India, except round the Cape of Good
Hope, while France will be able to communicate by a direct
and easy course by means of Egypt and the Red Sea.
What would be the result of that state of things I leave
your lordships to imagine. (Hear, hear.) I have thus
shortly directed attention to what I conceive to be necessary
in reference to a Channel fleet, a fleet in the Mediterranean,
and a force for the protection of our colonies. There are
one or two points more to which I beg leave to refer. I
find by examining the report of the commissioners for man-
ning the navy they recommended a reserve of seamen.
That reserve, I consider, should be made immediately with-
out the least possible delay. (Hear, hear.) It should be
so considerable and so well-trained as at any moment when
necessary to furnish able gunners to ships in commission.
(Hear, hear.) There is another point, my lords, to which
I beg leave also to refer. It relates to a matter of great
importance—the efficiency of our arsenals. It is of the ut-
most consequence that they should be as effective as possible,
and that the docks and slips-should be of such dimensions as
to be adapted to the present size of our vessels. In that
respect they are, as yet, greatly defective. There ought to
be, also, such a system of machinery as to enable us, at a
moment's notice, and with the greatest, rapidity, to fit out
armaments for our ships of war. (Hear.) These, my lords,
are the observations which I have to offer on this occasion
with.regard to the naval part of the case. I trust that
what I have stated in that respect will meet with your
lordships' concurrence. (Cheers.) Of this I am persuaded,
that the more you examine the different parts of the sub-
ject and investigate the whole the more strongly will you
be impressed with the necessity of incurring whatever ex-
penditure may be requisite for the purpose of accomplishing
the objects to which I have called your attention. (Hear.)
But, my lords, that to which I have been alluding consti-
tutes only one portion of this important subject. Hitherto,
as I have already observed, you were, notwithstanding the
absence of your fleet, comparatively in a state of domestic
safety for the reasons which Imentioned. But what is your
position now ? In what state would you be if your Channel
fleet were dispersed or absent, or from any cause removed
for a short time from its proper station? The noble lord
the leader of the other House of Parliament has told you
in very emphatic words that steam has converted the
Channel into a river, and thrown a bridge across it. These
are truly emphatic words, but they hardly exceed the
reality. They are scarcely exaggerated. Mark, my lords,
the state of things which has been more than once detailed.
We know from recent experience that the materials of war
may without exciting any observation be placed on board
ship on the opposite side of the Channel. We know that
in a few hours a large army may by means of the rail-
way, and without any notice whatsoever, be brought
down to the coast to different points of embarkation. The
facility of embarkation is quite extraordinary in conse-
quence of the new provisions made for that purpose by
France. 'We know that such a force as that to which I
refer may within a few hours—in the course of a single
night—be landed on any part of our shores. (Hear, hear.)
With ‘so much certainty, indeed, can the movements of such
a body be regulated, that from different quarters its compo-
nent parts might arrive at the point of disembarkation
without any difference in point of time. (Hear.) That is
the state of things, my lords, with which we have to deal.
You will very naturally ask what probable force could be
brought together in the manner I have described. It is not
my province to give an opinion upon such a question.
Military and naval men are the proper persons to form a
judgment with respect to it. I may, however, be permitted
to state one or two circumstances which may serve to guide
you in arriving at a just conclusion on the point. I know
that in 1849, when France sent troops to Civita Vecchia,
one frigate carried a distance of 300 miles 2,000 soldiers
with all the munitions of war. lam further aware that a
much larger force than that can be embarked for a short
period of time on board a frigate, and a force still greater
on board a ship of the line. I know from information
which I have received, and the accuracy of which I do not
doubt, that the French are at the present moment building
steamers for the purpose of transporting troops, each of
which is being constructed to carry 2,500 men with all the
necessary stores. (Hear, hear.) This, therefore, is the
description of force which you must prepare yourselves to
meet. Ido not mean for a moment to say that there is no
risk in such an adventure as that against which I would
call upon you to be on your guard. No great military en-
terprise can ever be undertaken without some risk, but I
beheve from all I have read and heard, and from all the
consideration which I have been able to give.to the subject,
that the risk in the case to which I am adverting is
much less than it has been in many instances in
which the result has been attended with success.
(Hear, hear.) What then, my lords, does it be-
come our duty to do ? What precautions does it behove
us to take ? What force ought we to maintain in
order to be prepared for any emergency which may arise ?
My answer is a force of regular troops—not volunteers—not
undisciplined men, but, I repeat, a force of regular troops,
capable of opposing any military force which in any proba-
bility can be landed on our shores. (Hear, hear.) It is
absolutely imperative upon us to maintain such a force.
It is a duty which we owe to ourselves. It is a duty which
we owe to the character of our country. (Cheers.) But,
my lords, independently of all this, we must provide for
our garrisons, and also for that which is of greater import.
ance still—our arsenals. (Hear, hear.) They are—l
-re-
gret to say it—at present in a very imperfect state of d e
fence. Much exertion, much expenditure, and much
engineering talent will be necessary for the purp bor of f plac-
ing them in such a position as to prevent their as em
gseizedthat
upon as the result of a sudden attack. If lam ask
is the force which the safety of the country dema
,we should keep up, my answer is, that after consultation
with many persons competent to form_ ;),n2,1,3. On the
point I put down that force at at se
t.niculut;tdmo regular
I have made
troops, and whin I say regular troop. I e the em-
lords which
and trained militi "
bodied and trained militia, while I think there should be
equal force of disembodied a. (Hear,
hear.) Every observation, my
the case of the
on this subject applies as well t9erlreland as to this coun-
try. (Hear, hear.) Perhaps th precautions which I have
more necessary in
of tillalCdh may
possibly be looked
upon on the othq.
side
lau annel as one of the op •
finordmiceartedthmaneythbee latter.eve n
pressed nationahtLe2
differing
g‘ii----aa a country trampled
upon by a nation
_from;
her customs, language,
and in w e cannot tell what misrepresentations
may be made. We must, at all events, my lords, provide
equally for the safety of Ireland as for
years 1804 and 1805, the only our own. In the
in which we were seriouslythreatenedperiods, _ I believe,
by France, the force which we
greater than that which I have maintained was much
just mentioned. But
that was merely a temporary•
force ; while that which
I have just indicated
a
existing state of things ought,s necessary to meet the
in my opinion, to form part
of
of the permanent force the
country. If we wish to live
in security, to maintain our interests '
abroad., to uphold the
honour of the nation, w
exertion we must be willing to make every
necessary for the accomplishment of an ob-
ject something like that which I have pointed out. (Herr.)
I
have experienced, my lords,something like a sentiment
of
humiliation in going through these details. I recollect
the day when'
every part of the opposite coast was block-
aded by an English fleet. (Hear.) I remember the victory
of Camperdown and that of St. Vincent, won by Sir J.
Jervis. Ido not forget the great victory of the Nile, nor,
last of all, that triumphant fight at Trafalgar, which al-
most annihilated the navies of France and Spain. I con-
tract the position which we occupied at that period with
that which we now hold. I recollect the expulsion of the
French from Egypt ; the achievement of victory after vie.
tory in Spain ,• the British army established in t he South
of France, and then that great battle by which that war
was terminated, I cannot glance back over that series of

events without feeling some degree of humiliation when I
am called upon to state in this house the measures which I
deem it to be necessary to take in order to provide for the
safety of the country. But I may be asked,. " Why do you
think such measures requisite ? are we not in alliance with
France ? Are we not on terms of friendship with Russia ?
What other Power can molest us ?" To these questions.
my lords, my answer shall be a short and a simple one. I
will not consent to live in dependence on the friendship or
the forbearance of any country. (Loud cheers.) I rely
solely on my ownvigour, lay own exertion, and my own in-
telligence. (Cheers.) Does any noble lord in this house
dissent from the principle which I have laid down? (A
pause.) I rejoice, my lords, to find that such is not the case.
But while this is a matter for congratulation, I regret to be
obliged to say that we do not stand well upon the continent
of Europe. Ido not think late events have improved our
position in that respect. But I go further, my lords,
and express my belief, as the result of my own
careful observations, that if any plausible ground
of difference should arise between this country and France,
and that differences should lead to hostilities, the declara-
tion of war with England on the part of the Government
of that country would be hailed with the utmost enthusiasm,
not only by the army of France, but by the great mass of
the French people. (Hear, hear.) If lam asked, " Will
you not rely upon the assurances, and the courtesy of the
Emperor Napoleon ?" I reply that I have a great respect
for that high person, and that I will not enter into any ex
planation on this subject, but will leave every noble lord to
draw his own conclusions, and to form his own opinions.
This, however, I will say, and I can say it without impro-
priety. If lam asked whether I cannot place reliance on
the Emperor Napoleon, I reply with confidence that I can-
not place reliance in him because he is in a situation in
which he cannot place reliance on himself. (" Hear, hear,"
and a laugh.) He is in a situation in which he must be
governed by circumstances, and I will not consent that the
safety of this country should depend on such contingencies.
(Hear, hear.) My lords, self-reliance is the best road to
distinction in private life. It is equally essential to the
character and to the granduer of a nation. (Hear, hear.)
It will be necessary for our defence, as I have already
stated, that we should have a military force sufficient to
cope with any Power or combinations of Powers that may
be brought against us. I know there will be great opposi,
tion to the expense. I feel and observe this. But look at
the opposite coast. An army of 600,000 men, admirably
disciplined, admirably organised, superior to any other force
of the same kind in Europe, lies within a few hours' sail of
our own shores. That army is composed of brave troops,
skilful, well -commanded, eager for conflict, enthusiastic,
fond of adventure, thirsting for glory, and, above all,
familiar with glory. That is the Power arrayed against
you. Ido not ask you to combat that Power aggressively-,
but only to put yourselves in a state of sufficient defence
to resist it. What have we seen within the last fe4'
weeks ? France, with a peace establishment, with no pre-
paration for war—(a laugh)--no desire for war, a
nation that could not reduce its establishment be-
cause it had never advanced it—(a laugh)—so the
Emperor told us, and I am bound to put faith in that state
ment—was vet able in the short period of five or six weeks
to transport an army of 170,000 men to the banks of the
Mincio, with 200 pieces of cannon and a siege train, gain-
ing two great battles in its progress, besides other lesser
fights, while she has a fleet of 50 war steamers in the Adri-
atic at this moment, with, I believe, an army of 40,000
men. (Hear, hear.) Cross the opposite coast, then, and
you find. the power of action, of motion, of hostility, of in-
jury. Are we to sit supine on our own shores, and not to
prepare the means necessary in case of war to resist that
power ? I do not wish to say that we should do this for any
aggressive purpose. What I insist upon is that we are
bound to make every effort necessary for our own shelter
and protection. (Hear, hear.) Beside this, the question
of expense and of money sinks into insignificance. (Hear,
hear.) It is the price we must pay for our insurance, and
it is but a moderate price for so important an insurance. I
know there are persons who will say, " let us run the risk."
Be it so. But, my lords, if the calamity should come, if
the conflagration should take place, what words can de-
scribe the extent of the calamity, or what imagination can
paint the overwhelming run that would fall upon us.
(Hear.) I shall be told, perhaps, that these are the timid
counsels of old age. My lords, for myself, I should run no
risk. Personally, I have nothing to fear. But to point out
possible peril and how to guard effectively against it, that
is surely to be considered, not as timidity, but as the dic-
tates of wisdom and prudence. (Hear.) I have confined
myself to facts that cannot be disputed. I think I have
confined myself also to inferences which no man can suc-
cessfully contravene. I hope what .I have said has been in
accordance with your feelings and opinions. (Hear.) I
shall terminate what I have to say in two emphatic word s
—Yee Victis !—words of solemn and most significant im-
port. (Loud cheers.)
Lord STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE (to whom Earl
Granville, who rose with him, gave place) said he was not
entitled by any long standing in the house to interpose
between their lordships and the noble earl who had just
risen. Indeed, even without reference to that noble earl,
he had nh claim to address the house on a subject of this
kind. But he believed he should reflect the general I celing
of the house when he expressed his gratituds to the noble
and learned lord for calling attention to this most important
and solemn subject, at so anxious a time as the present.
(Hear.) That speech afforded a strong proof of the feeling
prevailing throughout the country on this subject. When
he remembered that though the supplies necessary to take
the precautions suggested could not originate in this house,
and yet that subject had first been brought under conside-
ration here—when he remembered that the noble lord did
not belong to the naval or military profession, but that his
honourable, his glorious career had been passed in, totally
different pursuits—and when he saw him rise at a very ad-
vanced age and overcome the infirmities of that period of
life in order to perform a solemn duty towards the country,
1 he could not but fe 1 all the importance of this subject, and
that it had not been brought under their attention without
adequate reason. (Hear.) In all countries possessing free
institution at all times there had been an unwillingness to
prepare for deience in anticipation of war. The feeling
brought out by these institutions was a very natural feel-
ing of 'self-confidence and of unwillingness to endure sacri-
fices before a strong conviction of danger had arisen. He
said, therefore, that it was with good reason that the noble
and learned lord had called attention to this subject. It was
well known thatpreparations had been made in this country,
and that we had assurances from both the late and the pre-
sent Government that the national defences would not be
neglected. He confessed that he 'had beard with satisfac-
tion some short time ago the just tribute paid to the late
First Lord of the Admiralty by the present Foreigu Secre-
tary, for the successful exertions made by the right hon.
gentleman in his department. He quite agreed with his
noble and learned friend (Lord Lyndhurst) that it was not
a question of the degree of confidence put by this coun-
try in foreign Powers or in the Emperor Napoleon,
but that it was a shame and a humiliation that a great na-
tion like ours should exist for one hour under sufferance.
(Cheers.) Not only must such an existence inspire a sense
of shame which we ought indignantly to repel; but we
thereby deprived ourselves of the opportunity of performing
those duties which we owed to the world and to the Pro-
vidence which had placed us in a position of doing good
without limit. The noble and learned lord, he believed, had
indulged in no exaggeration in his representation of the
means of our neighbours. When we looked to those means,
and to the position which we occupied in relation to other
countries, there was much reason for anxiety, and still
greater anxiety must be occasioned by the changes which
had taken place in naval tactics. When he looked at the
growing demands upon our naval and military services for
the protection of our distant settlements, and at the extent
of our daily-increasingcommerce with all parts of the world
he saw an additional demand for augmented means of de-
fence, an additional danger proceeding from abroad, and
every reason for making those sacrifices which were neces-
sary in order to secure the safety of our shores and add to
our influence in negotiation with other States. He for one
put the question of invasion very much aside. Whatever
reason we might have to apprehend a hostile attack upon
our shores, he was still willing to believe that with a prudent
and at the same time firm policy on our part, and with some
feeling of regard for right on the part of others, we werenot
likely to be exposed to that immediate danger. But there
were other considerations which made it an imperative duty
to lose no time in completing our defences, and placing our-
selves in that position of security which our honour and nt-
terests both demanded. When he looked at the high piten
of prosperity to which we had attained, at the united sen-
timent that existed to an almost unparalleled extent among
us, and at the fact that we possessed means of defence
. o
nearly unlimited in amount, he found it enter-
tainimpostibleutrodanger
from any apprehension for the fate of England
arose too much self-confidence, from too great a
re-
liance upon past successes, and from an unwillingnesst
heat
admit those changes which had actually taken p aee. , u
was satisfied that if the warning were accepted—if we
loourokdeidspthosaie d—ansgoefrarinfrtohme face, and employed the means
having
any reason to dread a con-
flict with France or any other foreign Power, the day on
which we should be called upon to defend our honour and
interests would prove the most glorious day that ever shone
upon the destinies of England. (Cheers.)
Earl GRANVILLE—I fully concur in the feeling of ad-
miration which has been expressed by the noble lord who
has just spoken with respect to the speech of the noble and
learned lord opposite. I fully admit that in this remarkable
intellectual effort the noble and learned lord has put his
views clearly before your lordships, and that those views, le
lucidly stated, contain much of truth and much of patriot-
ism. At the same time I cannot refrain from asking my-
selfwh eaar.wt )hhlae tshafmean
or anyne t
sgi eat practical good is likely to result from
h
frme
wthheethnoerbltehane
object
jeler
ofi
ehdsloordbs.erv(aHtieoanrs,
is to stimulate the country or to stimulate the Government,
but I have no hesitation in saying that, as regards other
countries, I cannot foresee any advantage in the course
which has been taken. (Hear, hear.) There is nothing which
gives such weight to this house as the debates which take
Place in it upon all the important subjects relating to oar
connexion with foreign States, but at the same time it can-
not be denied that upon each individual member rests a
grave responsibility in regard to what may escape his lips.
(Hear, hear.) During the first three months of the present
Parliamentary session I think we had only three debates
upon the delicate subject of our foreign relations. Those
debates were not devoid of spirit or of frankness, but they
were conducted with a prudence and discretion which were
not only highly approved by the public at large, but pro-
duced a good effect on the continent, and even in some
countries where our free institutions are little loved. (Heart'
hear.) Since the accession of the present Gove en
three of
this house has sat only four nights, and duringsome
them sharp discussions have taken place i?
spoke One
deli-
cate matters connected with our foreign
nce and facility
on two consecutive nights with an eloquence noble and gallant lord, whom Ido not see
most
threernikaind oef in one remarkable
prevented him from acquiring
whose professional career laaso relations.o
h place,iosl
and a precision which are certainly
experience in Parliamentaay or public
rn hi h • ment
w is resent
speaking ; but at the same time I must sty that his attack
upon the head of a Gove
' friendly alliance with us, and still more theat irriptating re-
in
' marks which he made upon the whole French nation, were
not well calculittea to maintain peace between. tho two man-
' tries. (Hear, hear.) lam bound to state, however, that the
two noble earls whom I now see sitting top,;eth er—l mean
the lam Prime Minister and the late Foreign ;Secretary—
having recently felt the responsibility illy& ,red in the
management of public affairs at a crisis like I he present,
have abstained from observations of an imprucl mot and in-
jurious character. The noble earl who was at • the head of
the late Government has carefully abstained. i rom taking
any part in the discussions to which I have •referred, white
the noble earl the late Secretary of State f or 'Foreign Af-
fairs has, confined himself almost entirely.. to a, very lc giti"