The Sun.
London, England, 1859-06-03 00:00:00

would make Russia waver in her warlike prepara-. 1
tions. Russia is still but feebly armed. She has
been shaken to her very centre by the consequences
of the late war, and the Russians are not ea°er for
new experiences of such a nature. Morally and
physically Russia still sufftrs from the effects of
the last war. Russia is, moreover, engrossed with
internal reforms. The emancipation of the serfs is
a vital question, and a call to arms by a levy of
,new conscripts would create intense alarm among
the peasantry. The consequences might be terrible.
" Thus, with all possible hatred of Austria, with
every sympathy with Bonapartist views and plans,
men in Russia are by no means eager for war,
especially against Prussia and Germany, of whose
warlike deeds traditions are still extant among the
Russian people, which are in fact flattering to us.
"The St. Petersburg Cabinet is well aware of its
weak point. It has calculated the cost of war. Had
it not done so the Russian wolf would long since
have shown its teeth to Austria, for it is not every
day that such an opportunity offers itself. We
may consequently reckon that the more Russia feels
her impotency, the more violent will she be in her
threats and menaces. We must let her amuse her-
self in her own way, and not allow ourselves to be
alarmed even for one moment.
"To resume. A declaration of war by Germany
against France will assure to us more speedily the
support of England, and more assuredly still keep
Russia within bounds. If we falter, there will be
faltering on the Thames and on the Neva. If we
, delay for weeks and months, we cannot foresee what
fivents may not for a time impede the action of Eng-
land, and what obligations Russia may not enter
into, counting upon our disunion and inactivity.
But is it England and Russia alone which we are
to take into consideration ? Does not a more ter-
rible danger raise its threatening head ? Can we
doubt the existence of deep-laid plots to revolutionise
Europe ? Can we not already see the batteries that
are to fire the train in all the lands that surround
the German frontier ? Shall we wait till Posen and
Hungary are up in arms, for a cause as hopeless as
the former ones, but which will occupy a certain
portion of our troops ? Shall we wait till the Danish
water rat gnaws at Prussia, till the Montenegrin
jackalls snap at the heels of Austria ? And are not
the comrades of Fazy and Vogt, on the alert in
Switzerland? And even among ourselves do net
French pamphlets and French gold work their
way? _ _

1;'To ; let us be doing ! On to Paris ! Let us stamp
out there the flame that threatens to set Europe in
a blaze! And by one blow we shall put an end to
terror and disorder. The wide-spun plan, to sur-
round us with a chain of revolutionised populations,
rests upon an under valuation of German powerand
unity ; let us show that the calculation is wrong.
One single, well-aimed, powerful blow from the
sword of Germany, and all the small revolutionary
States will bend their heads, and a healthy air will
again blow over Europe.
" But, perhaps, our diplomacy has special reasons
that we should remain for a time passive spectators
of the struggle in Italy. Napoleon must reckon
upon this German hesitation ; for it is quite clear
that he delayed his departure to Italy until he felt
quite sure that for the moment he had not to fear
an attack from the Rhine. Had he not felt sure on
this point his departure from Paris could only be
regarded as a piece of folly or of fatalist belief in
his star, or France be supposed to be fully prepared
to meet a G9rman invasion, which we have good
reason to believe is not the case. We will not,
however, at present ask what respite is given to
him, on what date the Confederation will go to war.
We fear this delay bodes no good. We shall simply
point out the consequences of any further delay.
" We are now unanimous, and we trust to remain
so. But the longer we wait the greater the danger
for this unity. We are still young and inexperi-
enced in this sweet concord, while we are old and
experienced in disunion and discord. Our enemies
are well acquainted with all the sources of our dis-
union, and they will lose no pains to stir them up.
They will do their best in this respect.
" But let us turn to other considerations. The
first consequence of the war in Italy, if it continues
without Germany deciding it by marching on Paris,
is that France will call for more troops to cross the
Alps. France would then be still more deprived of
troops, and more open to attack. But this gain
will be fully counterbalanced by the result of in-
creased preparations in France and Russia, by the
explosion of revolutions which will have had time
to mature along the line of the Danube and our
Eastern frontier. And we must not forget that if
France draws fresh troops •to Italy, Austria will
also want them ; so many the less for our attacking
columns. The more bloody and obstinate the
struggle in Italy becomes, in a similar ratio these
results rise. In a war with France we should not
be so well off as we are at this present moment.
" But how, then, if, contrary, to expectation, the
Italian war should soon be decided, by two or three
great battles, want of money on either side, or by
unforeseen circumstances ? Suppose Napoleon
remains the victor—and he would be this if Austria
conceded to him the smallest strip of land; French
pride and revolutionary triumph would rise like a
swollen river, and war on the Rhine would soon
follow. Austria would then be hard pressed, and
would have to exert her remaining strength on the
Danube and eastwards. The supposition that she
would leave the palm of victory to her foe in-Italy,
unless reduced to a last extremity, which would
humiliate her morally more than materially, can
only be entertained by those who believe only in
Austria's weakness and perfidy. And, should they
have calculated rightly, truly they have drawn the
worst lot for Germany.
"If, on the other hand, the Austrians should be
victorious over their enemies in Italy, and drive
them from the valley of the Po across the Alps,
which is not impossible, what then ? Our peace-
mongers and vacillators imagine they will then
be spared the sacrifices and the cares of war,
as the defeat in Italy would imply the fall of
Napoleon. It might be possible that a rising,
would destroy the power of the vanquished
Napoleon •, but it is just as possible that
the French would not be ready for the work—let
us only glance at the last ten years ; and it is also
possible that their patriotic feelings and reason
might drown their hatred of the despot, and urge
them to redeem their losses in Italy on the banks
of the Rhine. In either case, let us;imagine how,
victorious, but by the hesitation of Germany much-
offended, Austria would act. Truly, however, the
die might be cast, Germany would not be bettered,
and Gotha plans would dry up as quickly as rain-
drops on the roof with the sun's rays upon them.
"If we wish to give Frenchmen a wholesome
warning—to bring into play their hatred of Napo-
leonic despotism, we must do it now ; we must at
once prepare for battle. There is no doubt of it,
their national pride will at first display itself in
cries of opposition, but that opposition will soon
fall to the ground before the mighty, unavoidable,
ever-nearer-approaching danger. We shall then
put to the test how much is true of those fables
told of the irresistible power of the anger of the
French people, before which the first coalition is
said to have retreated.
" What are we, then, waiting for ? We can
never stand better than we do now opposed to
France ! Every week's delay can only damage our
position, our views, our right to attack. Where-
fore, then, do ye wait ? Whether Napoleon is
victorious or falls.in the Italian war shall w 9 not
seize upon the finest opportunity, which will never
present itself again, to reconquer what France de-
spoiled Germany of in the most shameful manner ?
fro:Lett:er.uS take a free, great-hearted decision—we
should drive back every enemy front the German
Let us go joyously to battle, and the
victory will be ours ; and when peace is restored
we will settle our internal affairs, and Germany
will assume once more that position as a Power
which it once possessed, and which the future now
places within its grip;