The Sun.
London, England, 1861-09-03 00:00:00

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

Another most fatal railway accident has occurred
under peculiarly distressing circumstances. The
scene of the calamity was that portion of the Hamp-
stead Junction Railway which passes through the
Kentish-town fields close to the well-known water-
cress beds. It appears that the servants of the
North London Railway have formed themselves
into a society for the purpose of raising a fund for
the benefit of any of its members and their families
who may suffer from accidents occurring on the
railway. With a view to increase the fund it was
arranged that an excursion should be taken to Kew,
and yesterday was the day agreed upon for that
purpose. Accordingly, two excursion trains started
from Bow as early as 9 o'clock in the morning,
taking up excursionists at every station. Great
numbers, however, were unable to obtain places in
those trains ; but the company not wishing to throw
any obstacle in the way of the day's pleasure, espe-
cially considering its meritorious object, afforded
accommodation to all who were desirous of attend-
ing the festivity by the ordinary trains. Many
hundred persons were by these means traversing
the line during the day. On arriving at Kew the
people entered into all the enjoyments of a rural
revelling, the zest of their pleasures being height-
ened by the brilliancy of the day, and the deep con-
trast the scenes around them presented to their
everyday life in the metropolis. After several hours
bent in this joyous and innocent mode of recrea-

tion the hour approached for them to return to
town. The first train that left Kew was an excur-
sion train, and it arrived at Camden-town station
about a quarter past 7 o'clock without any impedi-
ment having been experienced. Soon after a second
train started on its return to town, consisting of 13
or 14 carriages, the first three being what are termed
" saloon carriages," and of considerable length.
Every carriage was crowded with excursionists,
and the speed at which it was going somewhat
exceeded the ordinary rate, but was not, as it
has been reported, so great as 60 miles an hour.
Nothing occurred to threaten danger until the train
reached the end of the embankment and the begin-
ning of the viaduct on which the railway is con-
stricted across the Kentish-town fields, when, just
as it approached the arch under which a road is
intended to pass from Hampstead-road to Kentish-
town, a train laden with ballast was being shunted
off the rails, but before it had entirely cleared the
rail the engine of the excursion train came into
collision with it, and in an instant the engine was
tumbled down the embankment, dragging after it
the three long saloon carriages and an ordinary
second-class carriage to a depth of upwards of 35
feet into the fields. The first carriage fell on its
side, the wheels towards the fields and the head close
to the wall-of the embankment, and was utterly
smashed. The next two carriages fell sideways on
to the first carriage, and the fourth carriage fell
on its side on the bank. The engine was separated
from the train, thrown a great distance into the
fields, and broken almost literally to pieces. The
scene that ensued was heartrending. The groans
and shrieks of the wounded and of the dying were
most appalling. But not an instant was lost in
rendering assistance to the sufferers, and the car-
riages being broken means were thus afforded to
rescue those who had been the least injured, and to
remove those whose injuries were such as scarcely
admitted of relief of any kind. The rumours as to
the number of the dead were, as in all occurrences of
this dreadful nature, conflicting. Sorae stated five,
and others seven, while there were persons who
alleged that no less than eleven bodies had been
removed from the wreck of the carriages. On
visiting the London University Hospital at half-
past ten o'clock we saw two women and one
man lying dead, and we, found that there were
upwards of twenty persons in the wards who
were more or less injured by the accident. The
consequences of this calamitous event, however,
were not confined to those passengers and excur-
sionists who were in the four carriages that were
precipitated down the bank ; many persons who
were in the other portion of the train were very
seriously injured, and a considerable time elapsed
before the railway was cleared. With regard to the
cause of this most fatal occurrence there can be no
difficulty whatever in arriving at it. The daily work
of carrying ballast is suffered to proceed on the rail
whether one train or 20 trains may be passing in a
given space of time. Persons living in the neigh-
bourhood and who witness the operations that are
going on often express their astonishment that acci-
dents do not happen ; but habit deadens the sense
of danger, and until some such awful calamity as
that we have now to report occurs the most ordi-
nary precaution which circumstances call for is
neglected. Had those who direct these matters re-
membered that when several excursion trains were
running on the line in excess of the usual number
of ordinary trains it was their bounden duty to take
care that the line was made clear of every moveable
impediment, no ballast truck would have been in
the way of the second excursion train, and no deaths
and sufferings from a most calamitous event would
now have to be recorded.

THE TERRIBLE COLLISION ON TILE
LONDON AND BRIGHTON RAIL WAY.

BRIGHTON, MONDAY.

The adjourned inquest on the bodies of the 23

unfortunate passengers on the above railway, who
were killed by a collision in the Clayton tunnel on
Sunday, the 25th of August, was resumed this day
at the Town-hall, at 2 o'clock, before Mr. David
Black, Coroner,

Captain Tyler, the Government Inspector of
Railways, was again in attendance, as were Mr.
Slight, secretary ; Mr. Faithful], solicitor; and Mr.
Hawking, traffic manager to the London and

Brighton Railway. Captain J. C. Fitzraanrice,
auditor to the company, was also present. The legal
gentlemen who watched the case on behalf of the
friends of the deceased were again in attendance.
The first witness examined was—
Archibald Perry, inspector of permanent way of
the London and Brighton Company, who said,—l
have measured the distance from the south end of
the Clayton tunnel to where the engine lay. The
distance was 225 yards. You can see tha distance
signal 986 yards before reaching it from Brighton.
From the distance signal to the signalman's plat-
form is 300 yards, and to the mouth of the tunnel
305 yards. From the entrance of the tunnel to the
first sign of the collision is 220 yards. At this
point there are marks on the brickwork and dis-
placement of the ballast. From the south end of
the tunnel to the first shaft is 169 yards ; to the
second shaft, 368 yards. The entire length of the
tunnel is one mile 22 chains, of 22 yards to a chain.
The length of the tunnel in yards is one mile 484
yards. The distance of the north end of the tun-
nel to Hassock's-gate is 79 chains, one chain less
than a-mile. The distance from Brighton to the
entrance of Patcham tunnel is two miles 38 chains.
The length of Patcham tunnel is 22 chains. The
distance from the north end of Patcham tunnel to

the south end of Clayton tunnel is one mile 79
chains. It is seven miles from Brighton terminus
to Hassock's-gate. At the south end of Clayton
tunnel there is a gradient post, which states that
the gradient south of the tunnel is 1 in 264, the fall
being four miles and 50 chains. The same gradient
post describes the gradient north 1 in 264 north-
wards for three miles and five chains. Looking
south from the signalman's box at the south end of
the tunnel, the straight line is 871 yards; but 200
yards of slight curve intervene before the straight
line commences.
By Captain Tyler—lt is 220 yards from the
mouth of the tunnel to the mark left by the loco-
motive chimney on the top of the tunnel, where it
mounted the third-class carriage of the excursion
train. The collision may have been a few yards
south of that point.

By the Jury—l never heard of a driver running
past the distance signal at safety and being pulled
up by a signalman with a red flag.
The Coroner (to Mr. Faithfull)—Will you pro-
duce the guard's time-book now ?
Mr. Faithfull—Yes, sir.

Mr. G. Hawkins, traffic manager of the London
and Brighton Railway (after the usual caution
from the Coroner), was then sworn and examined.
He said,—l have been in the company's service 19
years. I have held my present office about 12 or
13 years. My general duties are to superintend and
supervise all the arrangements connected with the
traffic on the railway—porters, policemen, guards,
signalmen and stationmasters. The clerks in the
goods' department are also under my control. I
am responsible for the hours fixed for the starting
a the trains. The time-tables for the regular
trains are submitted to the directors; for the ex-
cursion and irregular trains I am solely responsible.
The times of the starting of the three trains had
been settled by me. The trains called excursion
trains, although running at lower fares, are really
regular trains, and run at stated hours. The
Brighton excursion train is one running every
week, and is therefore put in the time-table. (A
time-table was here put in by the witness.) A
train starts from Brighton on Sunday at 8 15,
calling at the Norwood junction. That is in the
time-table as a regular train. The Portsmouth
train runs only once a fortnight, and is therefore
classed among the special train service. It is not
mentioned in the time-table. A special paper is
circulated among the company's service every Sa-
turday morning relative to the special trains of the
week. (This paper was handed in.) The Ports-
mcuth train leaves Portsmouth at six a.m. on Sun-
day morning. This special paper is issued to
stationmasters, enginedrivers, signalmen, plate-
layers, and all others concerned. The Portsmouth
train has to make 16 stoppages before or including
its arrival at Brighton. It has to be shunted off
from the Portsmouth line to the Brighton departure
line. It has to make several "shunts," an opera
tion which cannot be well performed under 10 or 12
'Minutes. It arrived, I believe, at Brighton at 8.16,
and left Brighton at 8.28. That would be twelve
minutes, and would not be an unreasonable time.
I was not in Brighton when the accident happened.
The time of the three trains leaving was 8.5, 8.15,
and 8.30 a.m., one train, the first, being in the spe-
cial notice, and the other two in the general time-
table. It is one of the rules of the company that no
train shall be started (except at London.bridge) at
a less interval than five minutes from the despatch I

of the previous. That is in force at all the stations
except London-bridge. Rule 35 applies to trains
passing stations on the main line rather than to
trains starting from a terminus. The common prac-
tice is, that no trains should start within five
minutes, but there is no printed rule to that effect.
I never remember a time when that practice did not
prevail. I am still speaking of the stations and not
of London-bridge, where we start at intervals of
less than five minutes. There we have signals for a
long distance within view of each other, and we
sometimes start trains at intervals of three minutes.
If the trains are equal and engines equal I think
they may be started with perfect safety within five
minutes of each other between Brighton and Has-
sock's-gate. That is the shortest interval I should
recognise in starting from Brighton. The progress
of each train is made out by the station clerks at
various stations on the line, and sent to me. Those
stations arc Hayward's-heath, Three Bridges, Croy-
don station, Victoria station, and London-bridge sta-
tion, includinc, the time of starting from Brighton.
(Returns of Sunday, Aug. 18—the Sunday before
the accident—handed in, also guard's report from
Sunday, Aug. 18, to the Saturday following.)
I have not the returns of Sunday, the 25th
(the day of the accident). The whole ser-
vice of that day was completely disorganised, and
several trains did not run. I will produce them if
you wish, but we must have time to prepare them.
The guards make the entries of the time of leaving
the stations. I will have a return made out of two
or three of the Sundays on which the Portsmouth
excursion trains ran, with the time at which these
three trains started from Brighton, including the
Sunday of the accident, and including also the
time of arrival of the Portsmouth excursion train
at Brighton. I will also have a return prepared
of the actual time of starting every train going up
on the Brighton main line during each Sunday in
August. lam not aware as a matter of fact that
trains are started from Brighton at shorter inter-
vals than five minutes. No such circumstance has
ever come to my knowledge. The most frequent
cause of delay from any terminal station is the late
arrival of passengers. It is utterly impossible to
start a train at the precise time at which it is ad-
vertised. The doors of the station are kept open
until the exact hour. If a fly comes up when the
hand of the clock is on the hour it is admitted ; the
luggage has to be taken to the end of the platform.
The passengers won't be hurried, and they will
choose a carriage they like. There may be a large
family, and it is, in fact, impossible to start a train
at the precise minute advertised. The Portsmouth
excursion is advertised to start from Brighton at
8 5 a.m., but it does not take up passengers there.
If it kept correct time that would allow 8 minutes
for shunting. If the Portsmouth train arrived 20
minutes after time it would be sent off before the
Brighton excursion.
The Coroner—l have it in evidence that the
Portsmouth train arrived at 8 16, and left at 8 28.

Witness—ln that case it would be the duty of
the station-master at Brighton to start the
Brighton train first, because a considerable time
must be allowed for shunting the Portsmouth
train, and the interval would allow the Brighton
train to get well away. Express trains and excur-
sion trains can be got away nearer to their time
than ordinary trains, because people do not bring
luggage, and are more punctual in arriving. The
increase in passenger traffic on the line has been
very great. In 1848, the number of passengers
conveyed by the company was 2,485,000 ; in 1860,
it had increased to 9,545,000. That was exclusive
of the season-ticket-holders, who have increased in
a larger proportion. The number of trains, I
should say, has increased in a larger ratio than
the number of passengers. My object has always
been to keep the trains within a reasonable limit in

point of length, and I attribute our increase of pas-
sengers in a great measure to the increase of the
number of trains. A signalman who had two trains
passing him nine years ago, when Killick became
signalman, would have, I doubt not, four times as
many now. We have more relieving men than we
had then, but we have also more places to relieve.
When there is a large number of trains we get the
signalman's attention, which we cannot insure when
he has very little to do, The safest part of the line
is where it is most crowded. When trains follow
rapidly after each other,fif a signalman neglects his
duty we hear of it from the enginedrivers and
guards and travelling inspectors. 1f the trains, on
the other hand, have a long interval between them,
a man is far more likely to leave his post, or go to
sleep than if he has trains passing continually be-
fore him.

The Coroner—lf it should appear that three
trains ran within six or seven minutes of each other,
under the existing arrangements would that be safe?
Witness—l think it ought not to be. It ought
not to be unsafe, bat it is imprudent. But I have
heard no evidence that the three trains ran within
an interval of six or seven minutes. The shortest
time mentioned was three within 10 minutes, which
gives an interval of five minutes between each train.
At 30 miles an hour they would be two miles and
a-half apart, and there would be no danger.
The Coroner—Then three trains might pass
through the tunnel within a space of 10 minutes
with safety.
Witness—Perfectly so.
The Coroner—Taking one day with another, and
under existing arrangements?
Witness—Yes, they might do so for ever. It
happens, no doubt, that one train leaving Brighton
and passing through Clayton tunnel might and
would gain on another.

A short adjournment here took place.
Mr. Hawkins then continued—l heard for the
first time at this inquiry that these signalmen have
24 hours' duty. I find that to get the whole of the
Sunday and Sunday night with their wives and
families they arrange with each other to work the
24 hours off at a stretch. Had I known it I should
not have sanctioned it, for I don't think a man ought
to work 24 hours at a stretch. A man may on such
duty read a book or newspaper. It is not work—it
is only duty that requires attention. On the busier
parts of the line a man has not time to read. The
signalmen are expected always to have their atten-
tion on the stretch to see a coming train, and because
I knew that it was not in human nature to keep the
attention directed always to one point where a train
was not expected I had the self-acting apparatus
fitted up to ring a bell when a train approached. I
never employ two signalmen at the busiest parts of
the line. If I did that I should get a divided re-
sponsibility, which lam always afraid of. I have
known but few accidents occur through the mis-
takes of signalmen. Where the signalman is also a
pointsman he sometimes makes a signal one way and
moves the points another. Accidents sometimes
arise from that source. A driver having seen a red
flag at the mouth of a tunnel ought not to have
backed his train without he had first sent his guard
back to see the obstruction, and without being told
by his guard to come back.
The Coroner—Was there any ground for Scott's
backing the train ? What could lead him to back
his train ?

Witness—There are many circumstances that
would make it excusable. He did not like to keep a
number of passengers within the tunnel. If he could
see that the line was perfectly clear the wisest
course would have been that stated by Jackson the
other day, to creep slowly on through the tunnel.
However, it would be against the rules, and there
might be reasons why one line only in the tunnel
should be worked. It was as much against the
rules to gn back, however, as it would have been to
go forward. It was the duty of the hinder guard
to run back directly the train stopped. He should
have gone back to the first fixed signal, to see it
put to danger. He ought then to have gone to the
driver and told him to back the train to the mouth
of the tunnel.

The Coroner now asked the professional men
whether they wished him to make an order for the
production of the docurnenti which were refused by
the solicitor to the company, or whether they would
be satisfied with the documents being placed in his
hands and those of the Jury, with liberty to examine
the witnesses upon any discrepancies. lle was
ready to make the order if they wished it ; but it
might cause some delay.
Mr. Read said he should be content if the Coroner
d the jury
discrepancies,
at the documents and ask
any questions
any
mightlook
occur to them if they ob-
served
Mr. Fryer said he differed from Mr. Read, and
a n t wouldhat
thought it desirable that the public and the jury
should have these reports.
The Coroner—What documents do you require ?
fryer—l wish to have the report of, the
journeymade by Scott, engine-driver of the
ir.BrightonFry excursion (the second train), and also his
daily return. Also the statement made by Boynett,
the guard, to Mr. Turner, the travelling inspector.
Also a statement made by Butcher, which was taken
down.

Some difficulty having arisen as to the custody
of these documents.

Mr. Slight said he believed the whole of these
documents were in his custody.
Mr. Faithful] having repeated that he declined to
produce the documents,
The Coroner said,--I shall have to ask you to-
morrow, Mr. Slight, whether these documents are
in your possession, because I shall have to make an
order
Production.
Tyler—I consider the stationmaster at
3rh tn for
at.
wrongly if he started one train at
Bi
g yeuCapt.
their
ct
Te
ya
8.28 and another at 8-31. I think he was acting
not only against the rules of the company, but also
against his practice I think there was, in fact, an
interval of five minutes between the trains.
Capt. Tyler—The gaards and drivers all agree
with one another within a minute ?
Witness—l believe that the variance is not more

than that, according to their statement, but guards
and drivers always have a tendency to put the time
later rather than earlier—to take the minute rather
than give it. I believe it almost impossible for Mr.
Legg to have done what he did and started one
train three minutes after the other. I think the
interval must have been greater than the guards
and drivers put it at. We have never thought it
desirable that a book should be kept of the starting
of the trains at Brighton. Distance between trains
is a greater safeguard by far than time. I have
never yet been able to satisfy myself that the elec-
tric telegraph is a certain means of preventing acci-
dents. I find that the drivers come to have more
confidence in the working of the telegraph, which
they cannot see, than in the signals, which they
can see and ought to observe. The most perfect
electric telegraph is so liable to mistakes on the part
of those who work it that I am not satisfied of its
safety by itself. If I had been asked the day before
the occurrence I should have said that an accident
at the Clayton tunnel was impossible. It
would, perhaps, be better to have two needles
and two instruments for the up and down
line, but where you have two instruments in a box
a man would be more liable to make mistakes than
if he had only one. The operation is so simple that
it can hardly be said to tax the signalman's memory.
We use the telegraph in the tunnels in case of a
train coming to a standstill, and not because a tun-
nel is more dangerous. I think the tunnel is safer
than the rest of the line. I don't think you are so
likely to have a break down in a tunnel as on other
parts of the line. Obstructions, for example, are
frequently placed on other parts of the line, but the
tunnels are free from this source of danger.
Captain Tyler—Perhaps it would be as well not
to draw attention to it. (A laugh.)
By the Foreman—lt was the duty of the head
guard to prevent the engine-driver (Scott) from
backing his train (the second) to the mouth of the
tunnel, if it were possible. He might not be able
to prevent it, but if he did not do what he could to
prevent the driver backing to the mouth of the
tunnel he was decidedly wrong. He would be
acting against the rules in backing the train to the
mouth of the tunnel without orders from the guard.
I am entirely responsible for the adoptien of this
particular distance signal used at the Clayton tunnel.
It is an invention of Mr. Whitworth's, and puts the
signal on by the traia passing over it, leaving the
signalman to take it off.

-By Mr. Merry, a juryman—I think it probable
that if the distance signal had acted as it should
have done in the first instance, or failing, if the
signalman had put it on, the accident would not
have happened.

The witness was also examined by Mr. Stuckey,
Mr. Read, Mr. Pook, and Mr. Fryer, but his evi-
dence was in no respect shaken.
By Mr. Faithfull—This is the first accident in a
tunnel that has happened on the Brighton line. I
believe our system of signals is the best that can be
devised, but we are quite willing to consider any
improvements that could be made in it. We and
other railway companies used to close our doors five
minutes before the departure of the trains. The
outcry of the public was, however, so great that we
were obliged to abandon it, and if we were to re-
vert to that practice the daily papers would be full
of letters against it. (A laugh.) The increase in
the number of passengers on the line from 2,500,00 u
to 9,500,000, or thereabouts, is principally in our
suburban traffic. There has been no great increase
in our Brighton traffic proper for several years. The
number of trains on the main line running into
Brighton in August, 1852, was 16; the number in
the corresponding month of 1861 was 21 trains.
By Captain Tyler—l do not say that trains do
not gain on each other, but we have it in evidence
that they do net run faster than the rates mentioned
in the time-table. As a rule our Brighton trains
do not get into speed until they get into the Clay-
ton tunnel. lam still of opinion that a longer in-
terval elapsed between the departure of the second
and third trains than three or four minutes. The
witness explained, in correction of a former part of
his evidence, that the number of trains passing Kil-
lick's station would only be one-third greater than
it was four years ago.
The inquiry, after occupying eight hours, was
then again adjourned.