The Sun.
London, England, 1859-10-25 00:00:00

AFFAIRS OF lUbCANY.

A letter, dated Florence, Oct. 19, says :
The long-expected answer of the French Emperor
to the deputations of the States of Central Italy
reached Florence in the night,between Monday and
Tuesday, but was not published yesterday, owing to
a certain strange tenderness which makes the Tuscan
Government hug the news they receive, be it good,
bad, or indifferent—as if it were precious essence,
likely to lose its virtue by evaporation. The sub-
stance of the Paris telegram, published at last in
this day's Monitore, was, however, known to all
men last evening. The answer of Napoleon-111.
is precisely what all sensible men expected ; it is a
mere repetition of the thousand and one speeches
of which the great Monarch bas delivered himself
on the same subject since the fatal peace-day of Vil-
lafranca. The Emperor professes, of course, the
greatest love for Italy, and zeal for the cause of its
independence. Ile has, however, his duties and ob-
ligations arising out of the terms of the Villafranca
treaty. In the meantime he will undertake to screen
the Central Italians from all foreign interference,

. -
and even from Neapolitan aggression
If anything could make a lover of the Italian
cause despair of the country, it is the breathless
state of anxiety and trepidation with which these
unmeaning responses of the Imperial oracle are
looked forward to for weeks and months before

they come, and minutely construed, sifted, and win
sowed, commented upon and strained in all possible
manner to build up a transient edifice of hope upon
their slender and slippery basis. The Italians, one
would say, have faith in all the world save only in
themselves. They fear everybody except them-
selves; yet they alone are masters of their own des-
tinies—they alone can make or mar their country.
I am sorry and ashamed to have to record that
not a few of my friends here pointed to some of the
Words of the French despatch with a sort of abject
exultation :—" Central Italy is safe even from Nea-
politan attack 9" Why, no man in his senses ever
dreamt that the King of Naples would be so mad as
to tread on the tees and corns of the French troops
of Gen. Goyon, or send his fleet across the lines of
the French cruisers crowding the Adriatic, to brine,
the Pope help, of which the King stands in the
greatest need for himself. No man ever doubted
that, if the Neapolitans ever crossed the Tronto,
or landed at Pesaro or Ancona, they would either
join the patriot forces at Rimini or would be
scared and scattered by the mere talisman of
Garibaldi's name. Save them from the King of
Naples! Why, the Italians might well go down on
their knees before King Bomba's son and heir ; they
might well beg, aid coax, and bribe hiin to assail
them by all means, and might decree a medal, worth
£lO,OOO, to the first Royal maccaroni eater who
would be so kind as to venture across the frontier;
for, assuredly, an encounter with an enemy
of that nature would bring the remedy to
all the internal and external evils of Central
Italy, and lead us to the only possible solution of
the general national question. What kills the
Italians, both those of Piedmont and Lombardy, and
those of the Duchies and the Legations, especially,
the volunteers enlisted in the national army, is in-
action. Peaceful organisation seems to be an
achievement beyond the faculties of those fidgetty
mercurial Italians. Under the pressure of the Lom-
bard war Garibaldi was able to improvise a band of
heroes in his huntsmen of the Alps, and Mezzacapo
gathered together a regular division, whiCh gave
proofs of discipline no ess than of valour. Peace
is now rapidly undoing the work of war. Not only
are the armaments of Northern and Central Italy
not progressing, but the symptoms of serious dis-
orders are everywhere apparent. I know that every
syllable I have just uttered is flatly contradicted by
nearly the whole of the Italian press, and nothing
is more distressing or alarming than the utter disre-
gard of truth by which the newsmongers here seem
bent upon deceiving themselves no less than the
world. It is enough to make a man rub his eyes,
and stare about him, and wonder whether he is
awake or dreaming, to notice the contradiction
between the statements of all, even official
newspapers, and the facts that fall under one's
immediate observation, and the news that circulates
through the medium of private conversation.
It is not true that Central Italy has at this pre-
sent moment more than 45,000 or 50,000 men under
arms. It is not quite a week ago since General
Mezzacapo assured me the Central Italian forces
only amounted to 25,000 men. It is not true that
the Modena, Reggio, Parma, &c., brigades are com-
plete, or near completion. The Brigata Parma
numbers, 112,00 men ; the one of Reggio hardly
exists, except on paper; the Hussars of Piacenza
have hardly 50 poor horses as yet. We have only
embryos, not only of the Central Italian, but even
of the new Sardinian or Lombard forces, with the
exception of the Modena Brigade (old Cacciatori
della Magra) of the Mezzacapo Division—the
Tuscan and other troops, which, under the same or
,different names, either existed before the war, or
were drawn up on the spur of the moment. Since
Villafranca Italy has talked an immense deal, and
spent even more, about her armament, but has done
next to nothing and, what is worse, is now suffer-
ing what has been previously done to go, to a great
extent, to rack and ruin.
The causes of this deplorable break-down are to
be sought less in the incapacity of the Italians for
self-organisation, thiin in the state of harassing un-
certainty in which they allow themselves to be kept
by the crooked policy of that very French Emperor
to whom they obstinately look up for their safety.
Their destinies are in their own hands, if they only
dare to do what everybody suggests in a whisper.
Look upon the annexation as a fait accompli.
Let Piedmont govern Central Italy. Let the
Romagnese trolps march away from Romagna, the
Modena brigade from Modena, every Italian s Mier
as far away as possible from home. Removed into
Piedmont, surrounded by the Savoy or Cuneo bri-
gades, incorporated in the Queen or Savona regi-
ments, Mezzacapo's fine looking soldiers would be
far from the temptations to mutiny, away from all
opportunity for desertion. Garrisoned by Piedmon-
trse soldiers, watched over by Sardinian gendarmes,
• such towns as Parma would not be for hours the
prey of a murderous mob. The Italians must be go-
verned that they may be armed; they must be armed
that they may b 3 free. No man, who was not a
madman, could fancy that a people ju,t issued from
the hands of Antonelli's priests, or the Duke of
Modena's sbirri, men till lately subjected to An-
viti's bastinado, should all at once and for ever ex-
hibit all the virtues of free men The Italians have
done much, too much, to win the respect and sym-
pathy of the world; more cannot be fairly expected
of them ; more can certainly not be obtained.
Were the present provisional state of the country
to last through the winter the work of disorganisa-
tion would be beyond the palliation of the most im-
pudently lying newspapers. It is necessary that
• there should a King aver Italy—the King of her
own choosing. Better for Italy to perish in her at-
tempt to assert her right against not only the King
of Naples and Austria, but even against France, if
need be, than to allow her pure and sacred causs to
be sullied by riots and tumults, to be in the end
the prey not only of France and Austria, but even
of the King of Naples, the banished Dukes, and
the priests.

If' there is one Italian in all Italy who has full
faith in the possibility not only of preserving order,
but also of arming and organising the country, sup-
pbsing the present state of perplexity is to con-
tinue throughout the winter, let him say so; but if
there is, and there can by no possibility be one har-
bouring such a conviction, then let there be no re-
liance on false representations, which would lead us
to a treacherous security. No country was ever
saved by a lie. Such being, as I believe, the pre-
sent condition of Italy, what does the French Em-
peror say ? " He does not consider himself as suffi-
ciently free from the obligations of Villafranca to
advise aught else than a restoration, with large
securities of independence and freedom. He will
allow no intervention, not even a Neapolitan one.
His engagements have no other limits than those
of possibility. He recommends order as the main
substantial thing."
Now, what is the real mind of the Emperor ?
what are his promises and engagements ? He will
allow no intervention—that is to say, he will go to
war with Austria if she either attacks Central
Italy or renews her hostility against Piedmont;
but Austria is almost sure to be driven to some
such measure by despair ; and if Napoleon is a
friend to Italy, ought he not to wish above all
things that this country should be put in a position
to fight its own battles, that " every Italian should
be to-day a soldier that he may be to-morrow a free
citizen?"; And, if such be his wish, ought he
not to desire that Piedmont should, at least pro-
visionally, govern Italy, seeing that only in Pied-
mont are men able to understand what belongs
to military organisation ? He recommends order
as the main object, but can he earnestly reckon
upon the indefinite preservation of order, if every
town is to be perfectly in its own power, as Parma
was on the sth of October? Surely he must see
that " if Italy has done wonders, it is unfair to ex-
pect miracles of her." The immediate annexation
of these provinces to Piedmont, or at least their
administration by Sardinian civil and military offi-
cers, is the only hope of safety for this country, the
only hope fur the
preservation of European peace.
Are we told that such a measure would lead to a
fresh outbreak of hostilities with Austria ? But
surely Austria will
either obtain what she was pro-
mised at Villafranca or run the chances of a new
struggle; andif a new appeal is to be made to arms
can Italy be expected to be more ready for the field
at the entkof the winter, after
.onrdedrisloiradsebrser
atptuert
to the test of a variety of growing
1
Mezzacapo's division has been
l;
and the new brigadeo haye behayaed by desertion, v
ed like the Brigata

Parma, several of whose volunteers lent a hand to
the murder of Anviti, and all of whom had to be
hastily removed from the town ere measuresitould
be taken for the restoration of the empire of the
law ?
Once more, let it be repeated, the condition of
Italy is painfully, supremelycritical. The Emperor
Napoleon, if he could be taken at his own word,
would seem to insult the Italians in their misery.
But all the past teaches us to interpret every word
uttered by the Emperor with a grain of salt, espe-
cially when by long preparation and deliberation
he gives his speech all the solemn obscurity of
a response of the Pythoness. What is the mean-
ing, for instance, of "his engagements having no
other limits than those of possibility ? " Which
engagements ? Those he has with Austria ? or those
which bind him to the Pope ? or the hopes he created
and fostered by his promises among the Italians ?
Supposing him perfectly disinterested,both for what
concerns him, his cousin, and France, is he willing
to go once more to war to screen the Central Ita-
lians from foreign intervention ? Is he ready to
recommence, under less 'favourable auspices, that
work which he left unachieved, the world has not
yet discovered for what earthly reason ? Is he in-
clined to allow the cause of Italian nationality to be
again debated, now that the Papacy has become in-
volved in it—now that the Romagnese revolution,
so long warded of, has broken forth ? Is he dis-
posed to undo his own work of 1849, and wage war
against the whole of his French priesthood, that
priesthood whose suffrage he bought by abject sub-
serviency to their worldly interest ? His position, if
he be fair and sincere, is difficult beyond all human
comprehension, and, great genius as he is thought
to be, he_ cannot have the power to see his way
clearly out of it. But, if he be something dif-
ferent—if, as the man who obtained the drown
of France by questionable means, his , only aim is
to extend the power of his empire over the Italian
peninsula by means equally questionable—how easy
are all the apparent mysteries, shifts, and con-
tradictions of his conduct at once expitaned ? He
had a footing in Rome ; he now wishes, like Charle-
magne, to have the Pope and the Popedom under his
entire and exclusive protectorate. He has driven
Austria from Tuscany, the Duchies, and the Lega-
tions ; it must go hard if he does not put himself in
her place. He recommends order to the Italians as
the unum necessarium. That was his watchword
to them from the beginning. He put them to an
ordeal from which their best friends could hardly
hope to bring them out unhurt. Order has been
maintained for above four months, in the most pro-
digious manner. There is now anew cry for " order,"
to last for five or six months more. But if the Ita-
lians could maintain order, if they could arm and
govern themselves, what need would they have of
his help, or what fear of either Austria or France
herself? Twelve millions of men, properly guided,
are, in a good cause, and in self-defence, a match
against all possible odds. The danger of the Ita-
lians is in their previous anarchy and demoralisa-
tion, in their long-engendered unfitness for self-
government. When the Emperor so eagerly recom-
mends " order," he resembles that doctor who
advised calmness to a feverish-patient ; and, after
all, what if the Italians were to find the further
maintenance of order an impossibility ? Would
Napoleon suffer them once more to fall under the
sway of Austria ? Would he allow all the work of
Magenta and Solferine to go for nothing ? Would
he stand by and see the Duchies and the Legations
again ruled over by crowned Austrian lieutenants,
and exposed to constant Austrian occupation ? Or
would he, the French Emperor, take upon himself
the task of the restoration of order ; would he him-
self accomplish in Italy the mission hitherto dis-
charged by Austria, step into Austria's old shoes,
and bring back into Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and
Bologna that admirable order which he re-esta-
bliahed at Rome in 1849 ?
P.S. As if to confirm the most melancholy fore-
bodings to which I have given utterance in the
above, I see now a private letter from Rimini, dated
the 17th, in which it is said that the Mezzacapo
division has been on the point of disbanding en
masse, and unanimously refused the new enlistment
which was proposed to the, soldiers for 18 months.
The motives of their discontent is the unsatisfactory
state of their dress, unfit as they think for a winter
campaign ; the harshness of some of their officers
—especially the Piedmontese ; and the habitual
silence and austerity of their General. There was
also a complaint that Major Pinelli, the War Mi-
nister, out of jealousy and against the
brothers Mezzacapo, ill-treated this division, show-
ing partiality to the troops under Rosselli and those
organised under his immediate inspection. The
orders for the release of those who refused any
longer to serve had been drawn up, but not deli-
vered, when happily the arrival of Garibaldi to
some extent pacified the malcontents. By his
rough but manly eloquence Garibaldi prevailed
upon most of the soldiers to abide under their stand-
ards. Nearly the whole division have consented to
enter into the new engagement for 18 months. The
troops at Cattolica have been under arms for the
last three days and nights, awaiting a combined
attack of the Papal troops and of the Neapolitans,
who, to the number of 20,000, were reported
to have either crossed the frontier by land or to
have landed at Ancona. Very active measures are
taken to guard against a sudden attack. Garibaldi
evidently succeeded in conjuring up the storm for
the present ; but those Romagnese troops will cer-
tainly do no good unless they are removed from
their country, and kept under very strict discipline.

WAKEFIELD ELECTION COMMISSION.

WAKEFIELD, OCT. 24

At the sitting of the Commission this morning,
Reuben Leighton, who was examined on Friday,
and who then swore that he had received nothing
for voting for Charlesworth, made his appearance
in the witness-box in order to correct his former
evidence. He said—l was bribed to vote for Charles-
worth by Mr. John Jubb with £2O in money and
the cancelling of an old promissory note of 123.
The reason why I did not tell the truth the other
day was because Mr. Jaibb told me that if I said no-
thing about the matter here the Commissioners
could make nothing of it. It is of my own free will
that I have come hereto-day. My conscience pricked
me for lying, and I have never been happy since.
Mrs. Leighton made a similar statement. Mr.
Jubb had persuaded them the other day to tell a
false story,- and had been to them that morning to
try and induce them to stick to it. They had to
live in the same village with Mr. Jubb, and were
afraid of him.

Mr. Sergeant Pigott—Speak the truth and shame
the devil, always, my good woman, without mind-
ing what people say to you. I am glad you have
both repented before it is too late, for the Commis-
sioners had already come to the conclusion that the
story you told the other day was a false one.
The cross swearing in this case occupied a consi-
derable time on Friday, and Mr. J. Jubb, who is a
town councillor and a poor-law guardian, swore
stoutly that he had never bribed nor offered a bribe
to Leighton, and that the debt of £25 the cancel-
ling of which was now shown to be part of the bribe,
was still valid.

Mr. T. Alder said, he canvassed for Mr. Charles-
worth at the last election but took no part in the
bribery. Was told by Mr. Goldthorpe that Michael
Cox had taken £25 to vote for Charlesworth, and
was asked to take care of him lest he should be car-
ried off by the other side. Had also heard that two
men named Halliday had received £240 between
them to vote for Leatham. Took some share in
the management of the " roughs". Somewhere
about 600 were engaged, 300 by night and 300 by
day, to watch the electors and prevent them being
carried off by the other side. Mr. Leatham's party
had many more "roughs" engaged—three to one,
perhaps—and it was necessary. to protect the Con-
servative voters; from their insults and violence.
The house of every Conservative voter in the town
was marked with.a cross in chalk, and men set to
watch, who went in and out. The watchers cost
between £9OO and £l,OOO, which he got from Mr.
Jose Fernandez. Had no idea who the " strangers"
were, and except the man to whom he had pointed
out Brear's Ipause, had never seen any in the town
during the election as far as he was aware. Mr.,
Fernandez Irld complained to him of the large ex-
pense of the non-electors, but had never said any-
thing,to him about the other expenses. Did not be-
lieve that :Z1,700 represented all the money spent
in bribery 'in Mr. CharleSworth's side, and thought
it very probable that the election cost him more
than £4,000. Should think the hotel bills would
be more than £l,OOO. It must have cost Mr.
Leatham much more—twice as much—for he was
an unpopular candidate with the electors, and
would hay e to buy his way among them more freely.
The expe'ases of the non-electors on the other side
must have been enormous, as there were large bands
of them patrolling the town before the election. On
the non iination day all the mill hands were set at
liberty to attend at the hustings and hold up their
hand.a for Mr. Leatham. There were between 400
and 600 mill girls at the hustings, and most proba-
bly the whole of them got their day's wages for it.
Had_ heard since the election that Mr. G. W. Harri-
son 'luta offered a sweep named Goldthorpe—in mis-
take for Joshua Dawson, another sweep—X2o to
vote for Leatham.

Colonel Cobbe, the chief constable of the West
Ridina,-, said that by the request of the magistrates
he tot )k charge of the town on the nominatim and
pollin g days. There was a general impression that
there would be a row, so that on the first day he
bring lit in 80, and on the second day 180 men.
The, !town was full of roughs patrolling the streets,
but ik stead of keeping
the peace the employment of
t