The Sun.
London, England, 1859-12-22 00:00:00

"VIII.

" But this is not all. Let us take the impossible supposi-
tion that the Church does not fear this damage, and that the
Pope does not retreat before this extremity ; let us suppose
that it is agreed to restore the Romagna to the Pontifical
Government,—how is it to be thrift ? Is it by the voice of
persuasion and by good counsel ? But those means have
been• exhausted. The Emperor of the French, who has con-
stantly'defended the rights of the Ibly See, has exercised
all his moral authority to calm the public mind in Central
Italy, and to reconcile the populations with their former
Governments. It has not succeeded, and its influence
failed before the impossible. There remains then; but one
means—force.

"It is force only which can restore the Romagna to the
condition imposed upon it by treaties and by history. Can
it be employed ? And if employed, who is to be charged
with executing it ? Is it France ? Is it Austria ?
" An armed intervention to subjugate the Italians would
be the most fatal step for the late Governments, especially
for the Pontifical Government. Restorations effected by
foreign arms have never been successful ; they have always
had to pay the penalty of their origin. Whqn a Govern-
ment is imposed upon a country by the stranger, it is
never accepted freely, and is nearly always violently over-
thrown.

"It is true that France reinstated Pius IX. at Rome.
It is already a misfortune for the Church that it was neces-
sary to have recourse to that extreme measure, and this is
evident from the necessity of prolonging the occupation by
our army. It must be added that Rome is in a situation
quite exceptional, which traces her destiny. She is
destined by her past greatness to the position she occupies
since the establishment of the Papacy. She cannot escape
from it ; her fate is settled (regle). It is the decree of civi-
lisation, of history, and of God himself. But is that
which is necessary for Rome also possible for the other
cities of the Roman States? We do not think so, for 'the
inconvenience of that intervention, already so considerable
as regards the metropolis of Catholicism, would be far more
serious 'if it became necessary to lay siege to every town of
the Legations. It would be the moral ruin of the authority
of the Sovereign Pontiff. Instead of reigning by acknow-
ledged right, and by the respect he inspires, he would have
to reign by force.

" Let us go still further, and ask who will be charged
With this restoration by force ? Would it be France?
Would it.be Austria ?

" France I But she cannot do it. A Catholic nation, she.
would never consent to strike so serious a blow at the moral
power of Catholicism. A liberal nation, the could not com-
pel a people to submit to a Government which their will
rejects.

"Catholics who sack such a triumph for the Church ap-
pear to us as dangerous for it as would be for the Monarchy
the Royalists who would dream of re-establishing the
ancient legitimacy by the aid of a new invasion.
"As regards compelling peoples, France is not used to
such work. When she meddled in their affairs it was to
enfranchise them, and not to oppress them. Under Louis
XVI. we went to the New World to help it to achieve its
nationality. Belgium and the Danubian Principalities are
indebted to us for their political existence. It is not the
Emperor who could prove unfaithful to these generous tra-
ditions.

" In Italy, more so than in any other country, France is
bound to uphold the principles of her liberal policy. Franco
.has carefully avoided encouraging and recognising the Go-
vernment de facto in Central Italy—she has exhausted her
diplomatic efforts to reconcile the Princes with the popula-
tions ; but she cannot forget that those Governments sprung
into life the day Austria retreated. They arose from a
legitimate reaction against foreign occupation, and from
it noble outburst of nationality towards France, which came
to save the independence of the Peninsula.

," What has, fallen at Bologna, as at Modona, at Parma,
and at Florence, is, then, not so much the authority of the
farmer Princes as the influence of Austria, uhder which the
Princes had unhappily effaced the national character of
their sovereignty.

'• It would certainly have been very desirable if what
has fallen from the reaction of the national sentiment so
long oppressed could be re-established under the guarantee
of reforms which had been promised. In giving her aid
thereto, France was acting up to her policy of moderation;
but in doing more, by turning now against the Italian
people those victorious bayonets which six months ago
protected it against Austria, she would bo acting contrary
to all her principles. No man of common sense would give
her such advice.

"IX.

" But if France cannot intervene, let her allow Austria to
have her way. This is what the partisans of foreign inter-
vention in Italy say. And should we have run the risk of a
great war, gained four victories, lost 50‘000 mon, spent 300
millions, and shaken Europe, that Austria might on the
morrow of peace resume in the Peninsula the domination
she exercised on the eve of her defeat ? Magenta and Sel-
ferino should be simply trophies of contemporaneous his-
tory P Shall our soldiers have shed their blood for vain
glory ? French heroism be sterile ? No Ino I French
policy does not harbour such inconsistencies and degrada-
tions.

"The domination of Austria in Italy is at an end. This
is the grand result of our campaign, consecrated by the
peace of Villafranca. For Austria to return to Florence, to
Farina, or to Bologna it would be necessary to admit that
it was she who vanquished us. Let us render justice to her
honesty and common sense. She does not pretend it, and
those who in France make the pretence for her fotget at
the same time what our principles impose upon us, and
what our honour prohibits us. Our principles bid us leave
Italy to herself, and respect the sovereignty we have re-
stored to her, on the condition that she will know how to
conciliate its rights with the equilibrium of Europe. Our
honour prohibits us from recognising the right of Austria
to armed intervention, which we do not admit for ourselves.
" France, then, cannot intervene for the re-establish-
ment of the temporal power of the Pope in the Romagna,
and she cannot allow Austria to have recourse to force to
compel the populations when she rejects its employment on
her own account.

"X.

"If neither France nor Austria intervene, whose arm
is it that will bring back the Romagna under the Papal
sway ? Would it be that of an Italian Power ? There is
but one Power to which such a task might appertain—
Naples. But is that possible ? The kingdom of the Two
Sicilios is labouring under a deep-set movement in the
public, mind, which does not allow its Government to at-
tempt a diversion on the Abruzzi. It has need of all its
forces to meet dangers at home, and by provoking a
struggle it would incur the risk of a revolution. It would
be the greatest act of imprudence it could commit to the
prejudice of order, and especially to the prejudice of the
Holy See. If all the elements of revolutionary combustion
in the Peninsula have hitherto been kept under, it must be
attributed to the passive attitude of the different factions,
the hostile contaet of which would produce the spark that
would set all Italy in a blaze. Opposed to the King of
Naples, the champion of absolutism, would stand the King
of Piedmont, the supporter of the liberty of the pecple.
Civil war would have to decide, and anarchy would fatally
be the last word of so disastrous an attempt. _ _ _

" The armed intervention of Naples would produce
nothing but disasters if it were possible. But it is not pos-
sible, for it would be a manifest violation of the neutrality
imposed upon all the Italian States. In fact, if the Neapo-
litan army entered the States of the Church, nothing could
prevent the Piedmontese army from occupying Parma and
Tuscany. Such disorder would not only be the overthrow
of all international rules ; it would be, moreover, a revolt
against the jurisdiction of Europe, whose duty it is, while
respecting the right of Sovereignties, to watch over the ge-
neral order which concerns the safety of its equilibrium.

"XI.
onlyonete is thatrventio of thenthat hocwanblee of Europe,regular,effi
cac‘ Thereious,a is
legitimate—itnd
united in a congress to decide all the questions that affect
the modifications of territory or the revision of treaties.
The competence ofan European congress is established
by the principles of international law. For the laws that
bind the people of different nothing, as well as for those
'which are obligatory on the citizens of the same State, it is
the twofold consecration of public interest, and general as-
sent that constitutes conventional right. Practice is in ac-
cordance with the theory, and we know from history that
States have been formed, aggrandised, modified, and trans-
formed in virtue of treaties.

" It was the treaties of 1815 that determined the politica'
existence of Italy and its territorial divisions.

"The cession of Lombardy to France, who again ceded it
to Sardinia, was a special act of the will of Austria, which
did not affect the organisation of the independent States of
Italy, as they were constituted at the Congress of Vienna.
To alter the frontiers of these States requires a reference to
the same jurisdiction that regulated them—that is to say,
to all the Powers who were parties to the treaties of 1815.
" This is what has been done by the reservation inserted
in the 19th Article of the Treaty of Zurich, the immediate
consequence of which is the appeal to an European Congress
that will meet on the sth of January. _ .

"The Congress of Paris has full power to alter what was
settled by the Congress of Vienna. Europe, combined at
Vienna in 1815, gave the Romagna to the Pope ; Europe,