The Sun.
London, England, 1835-11-04 00:00:00

rently constituted from the first. Therefore many have
suggested, what is indeed the American plan, that the
elective franchise should be higher ; and consequently that
the second chamber should represent a class of indivi-
duals different from those who choose the first. Suppose,
then, that only persons of 5001. a year or upwards were to
elect atiistng the Peers—or there being no distinction in fa-
vour of Teas, t appose they were to choose among all
classes indiscriminately.--What would be the result? We
are by no means certain that a tidier chamber than the pre-
sent House of Lords would not be found but we are very
sure that it would be quite as hostile to liberal principles ;
indeed it would probably be more hostile—for the wealthier
classes would by no means return as many Liberal Peers
as now sit by right in the Upper House. The new and
elective House might be in some respects better : it would
be more diligent, and it would lend itself to fewer jobs—
because it would be accountable for its votes to a body of
constituents. But, as these constituents would assuredly
be very generally adverse to reform, we can have little
doubt how the decisions in general would turn. Then be
it borne in mind, that whatever extends the basis on which
the House rests, arms the Peers with new power, and
confirms their courage to resist the propositions of the
Commons and of the people ; so that even the present
House of Lords would be far more domineering when it
owed its existence to the voice of a large portion of its
countrymen than it now is, without any title but that of
inheritance or creation."
The Reviewer objects that if the people were to elect
the Peers of Parliament by the same qualification by which
they choose their own Representatives, the Upper House
would be a mere duplicate of the Lower. In what sense
does he use the word duplicate Q If by a duplicate he
means a body having the same interests, the same great
objects, the same general views and dispositions, as the
faithful trustees of the nation—if this be the meaning, the
duplicate is precisely what is wanted. The Edinburgh
Reviewer would surely not contend that the Upper House
should have interests and objects at varianc6 with the pub-
lic interests and objects ; or that its views and disposi-
tions should be opposed to those of the trusted friends of
the people. But if by a duplicate he means to say that
the House of Peers, -as elected by the people, would be
composed of the same classes as the majority of the
Commons, the answer is, that whatever peculiarity there
is' in the condition of a Peer, would belong to the Mem-
bers of the elected Upper House, as none but Peers would
be eligible to it.
The Reviewer will, we suppose, admit that the best
Peers would be elected by the people ; and if the effect of
excluding the less worthy from legislative authority would
be to make the Upper House a duplicate of the Lower, let
us be informed what there is of value in the present compo-
sition of the House of Lords, which keeps it from heirs- a
duplicate of the other House ? In familiar terms, if to take
the cream of the House would render it a duplicate to the
Commons—what is the worth of it when it is not moll a
duplicate ? Why, according to the Reviewer, the peculiar
virtue in it, when not a duplicate of the Commons, consists
in the preponderance of those prejudiced and factious
Members, whom the people would reject, as opposed to their
interests. From the idea of a House of Lords composed
of such men as Lord Durham, Lord Melbourne, Lord
Mulgrave, the Marquis of Westminster, Lord Lans-
downe, Lord Holland, and—we may surely add—Lord
Brougham, the Reviewer would shrink with horror as
a " duplicate" of the Commons ; but he is content with a
House in which such men are overwhelmed by the New-
castles, Winchilseas, Rodens, and the like, for to their pre-
dominance it is owing that the hereditary legislature, born of
the old corruption, is not "duplicate" of the Commons.
The Reviewer having in one sentence taken fright at the
notion of the election of the House of Peers by the people,
as such a constitution would render it " a mere duplicate"
of the other House, presently after takes flight also at his
own suggestion of an Upper House chosen by a wealthy
constituency, because, forsooth, instead of being a mere
duplicate," the Peers would, by such a constituency, be
armed with new power and more domineering than the pre-
sent House. And, undoubtedly, the effect of rendering the
House of Lords elective would be to raise it in authority,
and the more popular the basis of the electoral system, the
greater would be the increase of its power—the broader its
foundation in the public respect and confidence, but propor-
tionately great would be its responsibilities binding it to
public duty.
We agree that an electoral body of a high property
qualification, would give a bad Upper House ; but why
then propose an electoral body of a high property qualifica-
tion ? No reasonable being can desire to separate the inte-
rests of the Lords from the interests of the people, and the
only effect of making the Lords representative of large
bodies of the people would be to make them representative
of common instead of narrow interests. Those Peers would
be chosen whose opinions were generally thought accordant
with the popular interests.
Whimsically enough, the Reviewer, who objects to
making the House of Peers representative, on the ground
that it would be thus reduced to a mere duplicate of the
Commons, places his special trust in public opinion as the
power that is to control the Lords, and compel them to ac-
quiesce in the measures of the Commons. Now, what is
an electoral system but the machinery for obtaining public
opinion ? But those who scout the notion of affecting the
Lords with the influeece of public opinion by a steady re-
sponsibility, %vitt yet place their first and last resource in
irregular tempests of public opinion, which are to sweep
away all opposition. They are, in fact, f.r submitting the
Lords to public opinion, with this condition only, that the
Lords must not feel its force till it amounts to a hurricane.
Mr. Grote observes, in a masterly tract on Parliamentary
Reform, to which we have often referred, "Is it not
strangely inconsistent to extol the opinion of the majority
when collected under every possible disadvantage and de-
fect, and to decry and ridicule it when transcribed in full,
when accurately computed, and demanded and delivered
with such a degree of solemnity as to ensure the most ma-
ture deliberation of which each individual is capable ?
Shall we hear it maintained that the desultory buz of pub-
lic opinion, the irregular show of hands, will be in favour of
truth and reason • and that when a day named, and the
solitary forewarned and considerate judgment of each indi-
vidual is computed at a poll, this decision will be reversed?"
Shall we also hear it maintained that the desultory buz
of public opinion should overrule the Peers of Parliament,
but that it would be mischievous to affect the same men
with more certain knowledge and the more steady operation
of public opinion by responsibility to large bodies of-the
people ? The sense of the public is ascertained with won-
drous distinctness by those who have an immediate interest
in learning it. Responsibility is a mighty conductor of
sound, and makes the most powerful ear-trumpet.
It is to be observed, that all the arguments against Re-
form of the Upper House come to this same conclusion,
that the Lords are to be subdued by public opinion : public
opinion is at last to make their body the mere duplicate of
the Commons, but would it not be more wise and just to
bring them into harmony with opinion by the Representa-
tive machinery, than to leave them to run a oourse of error
injurious to society, which is only to he checked and cor-
rected by some tempest of public indignation ?
In the work despotisms public opinion is not without its
restraining influence ; but in free, well-governed nations the
difference is, that it has legitimate channels for a steady and
unequivocal expression.
It is curious that the present question as to the House
of Peers is strictly analogous to the question disposed of as
to the late Tory Ministry. We were told that they suc-
cumbed to public opinion, and would not dare to attempt
any mischief ; but the question asked, and never answered,
was, what disposition or vocation they could have to any
good work ? The people say that it was not enough to
hold a mad Government in a straight waistcoat, but that
they had a right to the active services of willing hands.
So, in the Lords, we require a legislative assembly with
dispositions and motives to promote the interests of the
people, instead of a body with propensities to mischief,
which are only to be restrained in eases of extreme injury,
by proportionate explosions of public indignation.
The Edinburgh Reviewer admits the misconduct of the
Lords (though he vamps up a defence of them in several
culpable instances), and deplores their infatuation ; but
the remedies to which he looks, in preference to origanic
change, are, at first, the effect of a greater popular majo-
rity in the House of Commons ; and should that fail, his
last trust is in a Free Conference, in which the two Houses,
upon occasion of differences, would vote together.
As to the first expectation, we ask why the Reviewer
should object to the popular election of the Lords, on the
ground that it would make the Upper House a mere du-
plicate of the Lower, while his great hope is that a power-
ful majority in the Lower House will reduce the Upper
to submission ? In what respect then is a forced submis-
sion better than a concord, or the d..plicate abhorred by
the Reviewer ? Is there any kind of good in compelling
men to act against their will ?—ls it better to have a
House of Lords awed into acquiescence with the Com-
mons, than one agreeing with the Commons, because hav-
ing the same general views and responsibilities ? We ask
these questions, assuming for a moment that the Reviewer
has reason to suppose that the Lords would be overawed
by a large popular majority in the Commons : but, desir-
able as it is, for many reasons, that there should be such a
majority, it would but faintly and irregularly influence the
decisions of the factious and infuriated Lords.
As for the other resources of the Reviewer—the Free
Conference—it is the most 'preposterous crotchet that ever
was entertained by an intelligent man. As an expedient for
swamping the Commons, indeed, nothing more effectual
could be conceived. The present Tory majority in the
Peers, added to a majority in the Commons smaller than the
existing minority, would outnumber the Liberals in the two
Houies. And a Tory Ministry, by creating Peers, could
' always command the majority in a Free Conference. A
Liberal Ministry, it may be answered, could do the same

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