The Sun.
London, England, 1866-09-14 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE,,PDBLIO JOURNALS.

TIMES.—It is to be hoped that the military history
of our colony of New Zealand may be carefully
studied, and not soon forgotten. That settlement
has cost the British taxpayer many a million, but
the outlay will produce a substantial return if the
lessons of recent experience be honestly applied, not
only to the system of colonial defences, but to our
military system altogether. The reader will please
to remember that that native population of New
Zealand is, and has been for years, under 50,000.
It barely exceeded that number in 1858, and it has
been uninterruptedly on the decline. Of this popu-
lation 30,000 at the outside were males, and, if we
assume that one in three of these was able to bear
arms, we shall get a force of 10,000 men as the
aggregate fighting strength of all the savage tribes.
But of these tribes some are always friendly, others
neutral ; and it is believed that of late years, at
any rate, no rebel army in the field against us has
exceeded 2,000 combatants. On the side of the
Government was a population of Europeans, com-
prising in 1861 no fewer than 64,000 males, and
increasing rapidly. No further remark, we
think, should be needed to show that New
Zealand was perfectly able to defend itself,
and that the colonists were fully competent by
strength of numbers alone, apart from all other
resources, to deal with any insurrection or outbreak
of the native tribes. But there is a good deal more
to be added. These colonists could at any time have
availed themselves of native allies against Itative
enemies, and they were supported by a little squad-
ron of corvettes and gunboats on the coast, to say
nothing of Enfield rifles and Armstrong guns.
Nevertheless, things had got somehow into such a
groove that whenever the savages chose to take to
fighting, as they did about every two years, the
affair was actually regarded in the light of an Impe-
rial war, and Her Majesty's troops were despatched
from this country to the antipodes, at au enormous
cost, to conduct operations against a swarm of na-
tives in the bush. The proceedings, protracted for
tyear nr syrr, • • viv ottlaldt33, LULU
hen settled by a transaction called a treaty, came
under the description of "the war in New Zealand"
and generally added a million or two to the Esti-
mates before the account was cleared. The state-
ment will appear hardly credible, but it is neverthe-
less a fact that two years ago, when the relative
numbers of settlers and natives were such as we
have specified, a British army of 10,000 regular
troops—infantry, artillery, and engineers—was
maintained in the colony for the prosecution of "the
war," althaugh at that moment the colonial forces
actually in arms for the protection of the colony
were at least three times as numerous as the whole
body of natives in the field. The mischief, too, of
the system, was that, with all this prodigious waste
of power, we never did any good. No. New Zealand
war, even if reputed successful, ever left the natives
with a conviction that they had better not go to war
again. They rather enjoyed their campaign than
not, and only made overtures for peace when fight-
ing had become tedious, or the harvest demanded
their attention. Six months afterwards the news
came that " war" had broken out again, and that a
body of natives, perhaps 300 in number, had kept
the Queen's troops at bay for a month, and then
decamped without leaving wounded or prisoners
behind them. At last, however, and after humi-
liating experience, the secret of all this mischief
was discovered, or, it would be better to say,
recognized. What kept up the New Zealand war
was the army which we sent to New Zealand to put
it down. Our regular troops, regularly manoeuvred
under regular commanders according to the theories
of European campaigning, were not the troops for
this kind of service. Turned into Volunteers, and
relieved of stocks, pipeclay, knapsacks, drill, and
science, they would have disposed of the enemy
quickly enough, but their natural powers and
courage were utterly destroyed by the application of
professional tactics to rough bush-fighting. At
length the truth was seen. The war was handed
over to:colonial levies, with a few regulars, under a
really active commander, and in six months the de-
lusion was dispelled fur ever. Not only need we
never again send an army to New Zealand, but we
shall probably never again hear of a New Zealand
war. The lesson, however, thus taught us is of
wide and general application. The system which
disabled our army in New Zealand cannot well be
expected to improve it any Where else. There is no
reason, -of course, for jumping to the conclusion that
the discipline and tactics which so visibly sufficed for
New Zealand Volunteers would suffice under all
circumstances for the whole British Army ; but we
believe it is really true that our system of drill, while
it harasses the men and renders the service unpopu-
lar, is actually more damaging than advantageous
to the general efficiency of the troops. Au elaborate
and complicated system of parade movements, half of
which would be utterly useless in the work of a cam-
paign, worries the soldier, puzzles the officer, and
forms the staple of military instruction, to the ex-
clusion of far more important training. it would
surely be better to give the soldier more liberty,
and to cultivate his intelligence and enlarge his re-
sources while relieving him from the irksomeness
of purely mechanical exercise. When fine, brave,
and well-equipped troops are systematically put at
a disadvantage by half-armed savages, it is clear
there must be some impediment to success in the
system adopted and the tactics employed. In fact,
the colonial volunteers actually took the native re-
doubts, which our regular soldiers could not, or
rather did not, take. The soldiers could have done
the work fast enough in volunteer fashion, but found
it impracticable after the fashion prescribed to them.
It is evident, not only from this example; but from
the enlarged experience of European warfare, that a
soldier need not be such a machine as we make of
him, and that under a more intelligent system he
could not only be produced with far greater ease,
but be a far better specimen into the bargain. High
drill is by no means identical with perfect efficiency.
The knowledge of a few simple movements, com-
bined with expertness in the use of arms, and,
above all, with that muscular training which gives
the greatest amount of activity and endurance, would
forma very good qualification for a modern soldier.
We have seen in the last few months that troops
should be strong and hardy, able to march well and
march long, that they should be so clothed as to re-
tain the freest possible play of limb, and that they
should be armed with the most destructive weapon
known to science. We have seen that beyond this
very little proficiency is required, and that the rest
depends upon the perfection of subsidiarydep_art-
ments, and such general organisation as will place
troops in the field at the shortest possible notice, and
maintain them there in the greatest possible efficiency
by good food, good transport, good medical service,
good supports, and good reliefs. We should like to see
this lesson seriously applied. New Zealand wars are
past and gone; other colonial garrisons may be mea-
sured by the experience acquired in New Zealand,