The Sun.
London, England, 1866-10-19 00:00:00

The Real Causes of Prussian Success.

La France publishes extracts from letters communicate
to it;by one of its subscribers, "of German origin and re"
siding at Strasbourg," giving his impressions of a sib
weeks' visit to the theatre of the war in Germany.
merely desires to present a few observations suggested 1:1
his inspection of the ground, and particularly to mention
what he heard from the lips of those who took an active
part in the fighting as to the real causes of the astonishing
success of the Prussians. As to the famous breech-loading
needle-gun, he observes :—" It is undoubtedly an excellent
weapon, but in make and accuracy of aim leaves much to
be desired. I was talking one day to Prussian officers about
the effects of this weapon, and, like many others, I attri-
buted to it in great part the victories of their soldiers. I
soon perceived, however, that my expressions of admire'
tion produced an unpleasant effect on the nervous systoin
of the heroes of Sadowa. You greatly exaggerate,' said a
colonel of infantry, 'the part which the weapon of our in'
fantry played in this short campaign, and you attribute to
the instrument itself what it would be more just to attri-
bute to the instrumentalists. Now, allow me to explain to
you how it comes to pass that the Prussian army playa 60
agreeably on the little instrument which we call the needle
gun, and which, believe me, is far from being a perfect
portable firearm. Very many improvements, be persuaded'
will have to be made in this instrument, but no improvement
can be made in those who use it. You have no adequate
notion of the pains we have taken in our regiments to
teach our men to handle what Your soldiers in France e°ll
the six-foot clarionet. Shooting at targets, which until Val
recently your generals and your regimental officers regarde4
as a mere accessory and of little moment, has been for
many years in the Prussian army the object of continual
practice of the most serious study. In Prussia we have em'
ployed all means not only for carrying to perfection the
instruments, the engines of war, but to make the men eal3°-
ble of skilfully using what we put in their hands.' After
these preliminaries, my Prussian Colonel describes at length
and like a man well up in his subject; the modo by which
the Prussian soldiers were brought to be perfectly WO°
with their arms, and to obtain the best possible results
from it; the numerous exercises, graduated in an
gent manner, required from them ; the prizes awarded to
the best marksmen, and the care bestowed upon that'
Subsequently 1 happened to express great admiration 01
the organisation of the Prussian army and of the military
system of the country. You confound two things whiell
should always be distinguished,' observed a general ofdenit
who has gained great reputation in the corps commando,'
by Prince Frederick Charles; ' moreover, you do too much
honour to our famous system of reserve, or Landsvehr,
and you seem to me not to know that since 1863 Wa
have, in part, given up this old machinery ; or rather we
have greatly modified it, and have come near to Yeats
manner of acting. For a considerable time we had 1,1
Landwehr, because the Emperor Napoleon I. after ,
victories over us forced Russia to keep her regular ell
within 40,000 men. In order to provide for the defence
the country we were forced, in turn, to resort to the cir-
cuitous plan of a sort of. National Guard. Not being al°
to have an army like yours, we contrived that every in°
should be, if not a regular soldier, at least a defender of Lila
country. It was an excellent system against foreign inval
sion in a State well constituted and homogeneous, but n°
adapted for offensive warfare. The political personal,
who has just raised our country so high before attempting
the realisation of his great ideas, wished to free hill:1614(
from the purely defensive military system of the Landw",.f
and Landsturm, and to ester on that of a permanent regiv
tar army, fit for campaigning. After creating in 1863 al
army well instructed, and better disciplined than aNation°
Guard can ever bo, ho converted that National Guard, Or
Landwehr, into a powerful reserve, from which, when th%.!
war began, he draughted the most efficient part into t"'"
active army, leaving the rest to do duty as garrison iron&
We have had, then, immediately, and from the very rac).:
ment we opened the campaign, three distinct elements
troops for campaigning, troops of reserve to fill up vasell;
cies, and garrison troops to defend the country if the its'
first elements met with reverses. Our military orgeniss;
tion is quite different from the French system. believe
it to be equally good, and in many respects even super°.
to it'"