The Sun.
London, England, 1866-11-26 00:00:00

which a conscription and a reserve supply ? The
answer is happily in the affirmative, but the methoi
is different. And, first of all, let us see what it is
that is really required. How long does it take to
make a raw recruit into a soldier ? In our regiments
of Guards he takes his place in the ranks in
three months, and is relieved from extra drills in
six. But the Guards pique themselves on their
precision on parade, and the time required to
qualify a man for this hair-breadth accuracy in
step, time, and position, is six times as much 5.5 is
required to teach him all that be needs to know or
ever will practise on the field of battle. To march
to front, flank or rear—to wheel, to form fours, to
extend, and to close—are all the movements the
soldier has to perform; all besides is the work of
officers and sergeants. The value of veterans is in-
deed great, but it is of veterans in the field and not
in the barrack-yard. Their value consists not in
their fighting better, or standing steadier, for the
rawest levies will do as well in these respects, but ia
keeping their heads cool, looking to their officers,
and rallying after being broken ; and these quali-
ties will be learned as rapidly by the recruit as by
the three years' service man when both come into
the emergencies of actial service. And it is in evi-
dence by eminent artillery officers that even in their
more technical branch three months are sufficient t°
make a good gunner. Hence it follows that if we
have proper organisation to make recruits into sol-
diers, we need not fear but that in a month of warn-
ing we can make first-rate infantry, and in two
months more increase our artillery and cavalry to
any requisite extent. The comparatively longer
time required by the latter arm is, of course, a rea-
son for keeping them comparatively stronger in
peace, but it does not affect the question of thet
strength of the line. But what is organisation ?
is the having in readiness the system on which We
are to work, and the men who are to work it--a°',
those on whom they are to work. Our need,
t.°
then,,
is a system which shallgiveus officers and sergeants
qualified to train recruits when the recruits may '4
required. Such asystem can never be, without ow.:
mous expense, while purchase is maintained, an°,
promotion from the ranks denied. But it might
easily be if our regiments in time of peace were
looked upon as the schools in which are being edu-
cated the officers we should want in war. And
this might well be done. Nothing would be easietr
than to make the regimental commander so wor:'
his non-commissioned officers that they would be ,
to take command, and so work the best of his men
that they would be fit at a day's notice to wear the
sergeant's stripes. There would be no necessity for
creating new regiments requiring new field-officers
when the army had to be enlarged. The battalions
in peace need not exceed four companies' strength;
there are some eminent French authorities who think
that strength the best for a peace footing. When
placed on a war footing the number of companies
would be doubled, the lieutenants promoted to tDie
.
vacant captaincies, the sergeants promoted to the
new subalternships, the corporals to the sergeanteiest
and in three weeks the new recruits would be sergeants
roughly welded with the mass, and the regiment
ready for any service. The process is obviously
capable of indefinite expansion ; and to supply, clnri;
ing a long term of peace, the hope of promotL°f
which would be so attractive to a higher class °,
men to enter the ranks, it would only be necessary
to give them, besides an occasional commission%
recognized prospect of getting posts in the commis;
sariat, the arsenals, the military offices, or othe
suitable services. No doubt these ideas
are revo-
lutionary of established Horse Guards' prineiPie't
The question is, however, whether they are 0,
inevitable. The present system of relying upon bT-1
characters to keep up the army has confessedif
broken down. Characters are now too high for the
ranks, as the ranks are rated. Compulsion is 'ln;
possible. The public will not pay for an increasi
in our army what it would cost to bribe men of g
character to enter a degrading trade. What remain!
4
but that we try to remove the stain, to substitute
hope for reckless despair, and to provide the mean,
ly
by which, on emergencies, if emergencies arise, ,
may teach a whole population to stand in line
battle, knowing they are under officers who 3r*
competent for their work.