The Sun.
London, England, 1832-08-10 00:00:00

THE CHOLERA.

as
6}
2,SY

Due.

- ---
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BERLIN', ATJO. 3.
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, The cholera is making the most appalling ra-
vages in Glasgow. On Saturday and Sunday the new
cases atnounted to three hundred and eighteen, and the deaths
to one hundred and fusty-four. Among the victims were
several in the upper clas,•es of society. In Edinburgh the
disease continues moderate, and what is more astonishing
when its proximity to Glasgow is considered, in Paisley it
seems on the decline. In Greenock, too, we are happy to
say, the c.lses are less numerous than they were a short
time ago. In Gourock no cases are occurring— Greenock
Advertiser.

Templars eat their way to the bar, gormandi-
dizing spendthrifts eat themselves out of house and home,
and Aldermen and Common Councilmen eat themselves
into their graces,

COURT OF CIIANCERY-(YESTERDAY

THE SUN NEWSP.APER.

YOUNG v. THORNTON, and WINCHESTER e. YOUNG.
Sir E. SUDDEN, Mr. JEMMETT and Mr. BACON ap-
peared as Counsel for Mr. Young, the plaintiff in the ori-
ginal, and the defendant in the cross cause. Mr. PEP vs,
Mr. KINDERSLEV, and Mr. PALEY were Counsel on the
other side.
Mr. BACON opened the bill and pleadings of the origi-
nal cause. Mr. PALEY opened the answer to this cause,
and the pleadings of the cross bill.
Mr. JEMMETT opened the answer of his client to the
cross suit.
Sir E. SUDDEN, in rising to address the Court on be-
half of his client, stated, that the case came before hie
Lordship by an original bill and a cross suit. The Counsel
had agreed that both suits should come on together, there-
fore there would be no difficulty in opening the whole
case. The original bill prayed that the Court would decree
a dissolution of the partnership between the plaintiff and
Mr. Grant, order the newspaper stock, &c. to be sold, the ac-
counts to he taken, and declare the plaintiff's right of pre-
emption established. The prayerof the cross suit only differed
in this, that the declaration of the Court might be, that the
plaintiff had no right of pre-emption. The point of liw
that arose upon the question of pre-emption depended en-
tirely upon the provision of the partnership articles inde-
pendently of all conduct. The partnership articles recited
the partnership between the parties, and that the plaintiff
was to have one-fourth of The Sun newspaper for the sum
therein mentioned. The particulars have been frequently
before the public, and it would be unnecessary to be mi-
nute upon details in this part. The nominal value put
upon The Sun about the period at which the partner-
ship commenced was 15,0001. The clause in the ar-
ticles relating to the right of pre-emption was this :
" If any partner for the time being shall become bankrupt,
or take the benefit of any Insolvent Act, the other partner or
partners shall have the power of dissolving the partnership,
and the right of taking the share or shares of the said bankrupt
or insolvent partner at a valuation, made or to be made as herein
provided for, or, if necessary, to be made as shall be directed
upon reference."
The case then for the consideration of the Court had arisen
upon the bankruptcy of Mr. Grant, which gave to Mr.
Young the right of putting an end to the partnership, and
entitled Lim, as he conceived, to the right of pre-emption.
Certain witnesses had been examined in the cause, in order
to show what the proceedings had been since the bank-
ruptcy of Mr. Grant. Originally, the plaintiff's bill was
filed, praying that it might be declared he had not only a
right of pre-emption, but a right to purchase, in conse-
quence of certai❑ negotiations which had taken place. In
the first instance Mr. Young had proposed to give a cer-
tain sum of money for Mr. Grant's share in the paper, and
finally a❑ arrangement, as the plaintiff alleged, had been
made by the assignees to sell to the plaintiff. The plain-
tiff had gone into no evidence, but the defendants had ;
and it appeared by the testimony of Mr. Briggs himself,
the solicitor on the other side, that the agreement had been
closed with Mr. Young ; that a draft of it had been
sent to Mr. Young for his approval ; that it
bad been returned approved of; that it had been
engrossed on proper stamps, and that a subse-
quent meeting had actually been appointed for the parties
to complete the agreement at. On the other side it was
alleged that all this had proceeded upon the condition, that
if, between the period of Mr. Young making his offer and
the completion of the agreement, no one came forward
to offer more for Mr. Grant's shares, Mr. Young was to
have them at the sum stipulated for. Mr. Young having
attended the meeting alone at which he made his offer,
which according to his understanding was absolutely
agreed to, it was thought better to abandon that point
than to proceed to litigate it; consequently notice had been
given to the other side that it was not intended to be in-
sisted upon. The question then simply was upon Mr.
Young's right under the clause of pre-emption.
The LORD CHANCELLOR supposed, as the other side did
not seem to dissent from this statement, that he might
take that to be the naked question.
Sir E. SUDDEN believed he was accurate in saying that
that was the only and simple question. The offers which
Mr. Young had made had been all without prejudice to
his right of pre-emption. It was easy to be understood,
why the defendants insisted that the plaintiff was not en-
titled to his right of pre-emption. According to the terms
of the deed, nobody could sincerely (in the Learned Coun-
sel's opinion) doubt the plaintiff's right of pre-emption.
T....vidpd for hod occurred, namely, the bank-
ruptcy of Mr. Grant, which gave the right to she plaintiff
to call for the dissolution of the partnership, and to insist
on his right of pre-emption. The bill had been filed,
insisting on those two things, and the only inquiry was,
whether there was anything in the terms of the instru-
ment, to prevent the Court from granting the prayer of
the plaintiff's bill. Supposing there had been a commo❑
contract entered into between A and B, A having agreed
to sell to B, at a sum to be fixed upon by
arbitrators to be appointed, no doubt that would
have been an incomplete contract, and the Court would
not have decreed the execution of it; but even that
law was not without its limits, because if the valuation to
be taken was to be of something in the shape of an ad-
junct to the property sold, such as timber upon an estate
or fixtures in a house,—if it appeared to the Court that
execution was to be given to the principal subject of sale,
then it would not take the trouble of inquiring who
the arbitrators were to be, but, assuming jurisdiction in
the case, it would refer it to one of its own Masters
tTtttfoohhor:iiipinissbgudtait
iiniviakeaorprtsteour opntupoto,:eiatgnrahoappyttnpaah valuation on such adjunct. This was the
rule of the Court. The cases that had arisen would be
incompletef
y
y
te tri
,nbt hu butet
thepresent
o purchase
uieaartgeorhfeaces
nmes
was case. It
ntyot teaslthbtoeytf hpetorhoncipeet
question.
ulelsepyt
t otr bhtn
another,
partner,
agree-
ments which the Court would execute, and where it
was pointed out that the execution should take place
in a particular way. Supposing the accounts had been
directed by the partnership articles to have been taken by
arbitration, it was clear that a bill might have been filed
to have had the accounts taken by the Master, without re-
sorting to the arbitration clause at all. Then was it ne-
cessary to execute the trusts of the partnership deed ? It
was, and the Court would execute them—the Court would
dissolve the partnership for that defendant in the Court,
and nobody could dissolve it but the Court, where the
parties differed. This was one of those authorities of the
Court which no party could denude himself of the benefit
of. The Court had the power to dissolve the partnership,
and no partner could come and say it should not do it.
There could be no doubt that the Court would in this
instance dissolve the partnership, and direct the accounts
to be taken ; and any stipulatio❑ in the partnership deed
respecting the sale of the property would have to be attended
to in taking the accounts. Such stipulation would really only
have to be considered as an item in the winding-up of
the affairs, and of the taking the accounts, because the share
of the bankrupt in this newspaper would, undoubtedly,
have been sold somewhere or other, somehow or other,
in or out of the bankruptcy, either by force of the decree
of this Court, or by the order of the Commissioners.
The Loan CHANCELLOR said, he was sorry to inter-
rupt Sir Edward's argument, but, as lie was obliged to go
to attend a Commission in the House of Lords, the re
mainder of the case would have to stand adjourned til
to-morrow.

THIS DAY.

sapriScati
e:duent(.i,
Geaetcdt:mrioren,:it,z,viEpf
Ash: sttar
ioi 1
50y0.,, :
esvect.:i
i.oEnost
!Loyal
fdriresumingLkeo:t.osish,pontt:eeenig_irnrilyesterday,
onagulloycfga,ithisuorr).tlnntd ti
hhi
is:
distinguishing
Iconsequential
case,eabut mrshaeie tdenuo rtupainfp.ai
accounts,lr)i
dissolutioni
nnloeun enmugop,
uitttotirshsl
hn.teeceaeort
yttaeeluher, doecoatec):
sfioouetnt
utndrhgohal
concluded
Young's
inprp‘w:ao'
aglhsrT:siSntaelti partnership,
rent rereolfort'oElLseh-or.l e.ofiPhti
he no doubt the Court would decree that.
tion, whether it was to be considered as a reference to the
ar-
rangement agreed on to be adopted.
a common contract to sell an estate, to be valued by arbi-
trators, where there being only one thing to be done, the
agreement was incomplete, and the Court would not en-
force it. Here it was essential to the winding-up of
the partnership affairs, that the property should
be sold, the value ascertained, and the value
taken. Nobody could take the benefit of the part-
nership without submitting to the provisions 01 the
partnership deed, and in the present instance, the case had
arisen under the partnership deed, which gave Mr. Young
purchase of Mr. Grant's
allt..ehavingift declaration
ptlotaoinpatlishow that 'Mr.
tthheerefore, of several terms of
sthhaerretg.ht
rorfhispr,,e,-aesmoptitiviononien,
an entire contract to be executed, the execution of which
hrneeool ittnhhslivenuragiss 181 eidene t appearedj(ltrtliehstei right of p r e-e m p t i o n ,
the Court would not hesitate to decree. By the evi.
dnyeo:jurneegvidoenhtarcdte)e
ansexrtegarded authorities,
consequently
his favour. The Learned Counsel did not deem neces-
saryietregtsi,.aesn
to go through the cases, because they were well
it would rather be for him to
answer them than otherwise. This being so, so much
bakynnyo known to
jteooettitiilo:
ner Csto,:udret,b;e a ridin
offered,th the
of the cross-suit as prayed that no declaration might be
made in favour of Mr. Young, upon the clause of pre-
emption, would have to be dismissed, and the deer•e
would have to be (or a sale of the shares of Mr. Grant in

the usual and ordinary way, Mr. Young to have the op
portunity of purchasing them, the accounts to be taken,
the debts to be paid, and the surplus to be properly
applied.
Mr. JEMMETT considered the question to be reduced to
so very narrow a compass as to render it necessary for him
to make only a few observations. The only question
was whether or not, under this partnership deed, Mr. Young
was entitled to a right of pre-emption in rest ect of the shares
which bad belonged to Mr. Grant. To him it appeared,
the only way in which this question could be met by the other
side, would be by showing up!' the evidence that there
had been some waiver on the part of Mr. Young of the
right of pre-emption, or that the parties had so dealt with
the partnership deed, that it was impossible for Mr. Young
now to come into Court and ask his Lordship to act on the
pre-emption clause. It was only necessary to refer to a
few dates in order to ascertain that there had been no such
waiver on the part of Mr. Young. The partnership deed
was entered into on the 25th of June, 1828. At that
time Mr. Young WAS entitled to 8 shares out of the 32 in
The Sun, in consideration of services he had performed,
and which were to be performed, estimated at the value
of 1,9001. and a fraction, exclusive of the debts due by the
concern prior to that date. Mr. Young was likewise to
be continued the sole editor and manager of the paper ;
therefore it was clear there were no other accounts to be
taken than the accounts respecting the shares of Mr. Grant ;
Mr. Young being clearly entitled still to haw e the management
of the paper. In February, 1829, Mr. Grant went
abroad, and did ❑ot return till October, 1830. On the
4th of November in the same year, he was made a bank-
rupt.

The LORD CHANCELLOR—Just mention again the date
of Mr. Grant's going abroad.
Mr. JEMMETT repeated it. Mr. Young hail solely con-
ducted the paper to the period at which Mr. Grant became
a bankrupt. Immediately upon Mr. Grant's be-
coming a bankrupt (in January, 1831), Mr. Young
offered to become the purchaser of his (Mr. Grant's)
shares, claiming his right of pre-emption under those
shares. In consequence of Mr. Young's offer, meetings of
the creditors were called ; the first took place on the 25th
of February, 1831, and another took place on the 17th of
March, in the saute year. At the latter meeting the offers
that had been made at the former meeting were withdrawn,
and an agreement was entered into between Mr. Young and
the assignees that Mr.Youngshould become the purchaser at
a given sum. This date was material, because on the
17th of March it would be found there was an end to
all competition, and that it was agreed Mr. Young was
to be the purchaser. Accordingly, through the agency of
the assignees, a deed of assignment of the property to Mr.
Young was prepared—it was engrossed, and an appoint-
ment was made for Mr. Young to meet the assignees on
the 19th of March, that the agreement might then be
privately executed.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—Mr. Pepys, as you are on
the other side, do you mean to rely on the waiver?
Mr. PEPYs-Yes, my Lord, it is part of our case.
Mr. JEMMETT had anticipated, from the terms of the
answer, and the manner in which the other side had taken
their evidence, that this point might be raised.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—I merely asked the question
that you might not be unnecessarily arguing the point, as
I thought that probably they did not mean to rely on that.
Mr. JEMMETT said that when Mr. Young went on the
15th of 'March to Mr. Thornton's counting-house—Mr.
Thornton being one of the assignees, and one who had
taken a very active part in the matter throughout,—Mr.
Thornton contended that the agreement was not a final
agreement—that it was a:conditional agreement depending
upon whether in the interim any better offer were made,
and that a better offer having been made, Mr. Young was
not entitled to the purchase. Mr. Young did not, so un'erstand the nature of the contract. The moment
the bankruptcy occurred Mr. Young made his offer, and he
conceived having agreed to the sum fixed upon by the as-
signees, that he was absolutely to become the purchaser,
and that the thing was to be comple,ed when he went on
19th to Mr. Thornton's counting-house. However, other
persons were there on that occasion. The shares were put up
again for sale, and Mr. Young said, rather than lose them
altogether, he would give the sum even then mentioned,
but that he made the offer in furtherance of his right of
pre-emption. The Court would see, by the evidence, that
Mr. Briggs, the solicitor ou the other side, expressly stated
that Mr. Young, on every occasion, had distinctly said he
made his offers in furtherance of his claim under the clause
of pre-emption.
Mr. PALEY observed, that the evidence was, that Mr.
Young had made his offer, protesting against the conduct
of the parties.
Mr. JE3II,LETT considered that that fully bore out
his statement. Mr. Young conceived there was some-
thing in the shape of a conspiracy going on against
him, by the putting up of the property for sale
at the nominal values, at which, from time to time,
it was put up. At the latter end of the meeting on the
19th, Mr. Young's solicitor entered the room, and ad-
vised his client not to take any part in what was going
on—that there was something unfair in the proceedings,
and that he ought to insist upon his right of pre-emption,
and there let the matter rest. Mr. Young agreed to this.
Heclaimed his right of pre-emption, and on the 26th March
filed his bill for the purpose of having that right established.
If, therefore, the Learned Gentlemen on the other side
me int to contend for any waiver, it was cleir that that
waiver could only be alleged to have taken place at the
meeting of the 15th, because at the meeting on the 17th
there was no competition. On the 17th the claim of
Mr. Young was recognized ;it was allowed he had his
right of pre-emption, and a certain sum was fixed at
which to sell his, the bankrupt's, shares. There would
be an absurdity in the argument to say that a
person was ousted of his right of preemption, when
at the very moment he was claiming that right,
and when in furtherance of that right he had made a
certain offer. Mr. Young never intended to waive his
right of pre-emption,and all that he ever did, in his opi-
nion, he did in furtherance of that claim. This original
bill, then, having been filed en the 26th of March, the
cross suit was filed in May in the same year, and the
plaintiffs in the cross suit moved in December for a re-
ceiver and manager, which motion was dismissed. On
the 6th of December Mr. Grant obtained his certificate,
and very shortly afterwards be started a paper in opposition
to The Sun called The True Sun. Supposing there was
no waiver whatever, the next question would be, whether
there was any thing in the deed of partnership with regard
to the other provisions contained therein, which could
operate so as to prevent the Court from establishing
the right of Fe-emption. By the deed there were
to be certain monthly and annual meetings, at which
the accounts were to be taken, and the value of the
paper rated. If the partners disagreed upon any part,
the matters in dispute were to be referred to some person
appointed by the Attorney and Solicitor-Generals. These
provisions, however, had never been acted upon, anal upon
the authority of " Jackson v. Sedgwick," Ist Swanston,
page 460, the Learned Counsel contended, that
as they had never been acted upon, the par:nership
deed was to be read as it contained no provisions at all.
i
That being so, and supposing the Court to be of opinion
usual
Mr. Young was entitled to his right of pre-emption under
the contract, then of course the declaration of the Court
have to be, to establish the right of pre-emption, to
way, refer the taking
Air.
of
Youngth
eaccstiiit:lnultds tobe theatlibertyMaster
nto purchase
upon paving the full value of
the property. It
levroe-u I dbe
should
b e t t better
so much opposition to this course of proceeding,
iwf't"he Learned Gentlemen Ge n the other side appeared only
for the creditors. No person could conceive how the
llinciple could b
s
for the creditors that this peculiar kind of property should
he sold out and out to an indifferent purchaser, just
as if it were the 'dock in trade in any common business.
T
manner, or that he bad not conducted it in a certain degree
very beneficially for the bankrupt partner and his creditors.
Therefore it would he absurd to contend that the whole
this
Paper in an exceedingly proper, and creditable
duhee t
e other h e r
ide did not say that Mr. Young had not con-
stock in trade should be put up and sold without reference
to Mr. Young, and probably to a person to be forced in
upon Mr. Young, with whom Sir. Young could not act
either in political opinions or otherwise. It seemed to the
Learned Counsel that if the creditors were to be asked hoar
this cause should be conducted,
usual manner, by having it sent into the Master's office to
ascertain the value, and that Mr. Young should be permittedto become the purchaser of Mr. Grant's shares, because it
Youngwas quite certain Mr. Young would be inclined to give
more for them than any other person could be found to
give, with whom it was not likely Mr. Young could act
amicably. Therefore, as far as the Learned Gentlemen
on the other aide appeared for the creditors, and not for
extraordinary
contendedtlem en o n
for,
0 r that
that
at it there

any person who desired to act hostilely to ML Young, it
appeared there could be no difficulty respecting the course
of proceeding to be adopted here. The value of the pro-
perty could not be deteriorated by the mode of proceed-
ing now proposed. The Master wonld take care to fix a
proper value upon it.

-The LORD .CHANCELLOR—What was the last moti
that was made in this case, because I remember the case
was before me in another shape?
Mr. KINDERSLEY—We made an application, my Lord,
for a receiver and manager some time ago.
Mr. JEMMETT said it was an application made on the
other side for a receiver and manager, and for an order to
discharge Mr. Young from the management of the papera

i tsta motion was dismissed. lithe Court wee, even to
I r 0 to declare Mr. Young to be entitled t, his right of
Plmption, that would just be tantamount to the Court's
hog appointed a receiver on the former Occasion.
la LORD CHANCELLOR—The motion was to displace
NYoung, and to appoint a receiver?
r. BACON—To appoint a Receiver and Manager.
;r. KINDIRSLEY—To appoint a Receiver and Manta-
god interim—until the hearing.
fr. JEMMETT would then submit that to decline to de-
' ee Mr. Young entitled to his right of pre-emption
Aid he to destroy the real value of the Paper. Mr.
1 ability to conduct the Paper had been acknowledged.
Thad been taken into partnership entirely in considera-
ti of such acknowledged ability; and by that ability he
}, carried on the Paper up to the present moment ; and
tae whole were now to be sold as a common stock in
tile, Mr. Young not being to have the ma-
°,ement of it or the right of pre-emption, it
/'a clear the paper would fall to the ground. This course
°proceeding never could be for the benefit of the credi- '
, its, who appeared to be acting adversely to Mr. Grant
f bnself. It did not appear that the creditors and Mr.
C'ent were going band in hand, because if Mr. Young
Rs not to have his right of pre-emption, or to continue
41-lave the management of the paper, the sale of Mr.
Cant's shares could produce but very little indet d.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—You see, Mr. Jemmett, on
tltir application for a receiver, and to displace Mr. Young,
Lad a perfect right, indeed it was my duty, to take into
a(count the common good for both parties, and the very
topic which you are now dealing with, namely, that it
Auld ruin the concern to take the course then proposed ;
let in the present case, I must leave the plaintiffs in that
`tit, Messrs. Winchester and Thornton, acting for the
eeditors, to judge for themselve The thing assumes a
afferent shape now, you are aware.
Mr. JEAIJIRTT was quite aware of that, but he was ar-
gling for Mr. Youn.4.
The LORD CHANCELLOR —Oh, certainly, in that way
of viewing it your argument is good.
Mr. JEMMETT said, that if it were not now to
Le carried into the Master's-oflice and disposed of
io the way proposed, and Mr. Young's share was
to be sold as well as Mr. Grant's, then a deep injury
Would be done to Mr. Young, who had embarked all his
property in this concern, and who had been carrying it on
•--carrying it on successfully, for many years. Surely
there could be no reason why, because Mr. Grant
became a bankrupt, that therefore Mr. Young was
to be ruined. There was a way of dealing with the
property without doing an injury to either party ; and
be contended, on behalf of Mr. Young, that Mr. Young,
having the right of pre-emption, his own share could not
he touched ; that Mr. Grant's shares only could be sold, and
that Mr. Young ought to have the option of purchasing
tich shares. It was clear,notwithstanding what might be said
on tile other side, that this course would be most benefi-
cial
to the creditors. It was true that Mr. Grant's share
in the property was greater than Mr Young's, but upon
Principle that made no difference; whether Mr Young had
more or less interest in the paper (in point of law) could
not operate either way ; and the Learned Counsel could
not conceive how any other course of proceeding could
be directed than that which he had before pointed at.
Mr. BACON followed on the same side. This case had
sow assumed so simple a form that he would not trouble his
Lordship at any great length. The question rested solely
l,ortlie consttuction of the partnership deed ; and if his
dship Was of opinion that the right claimed by Mr.
Youngthe was established by the deed, as he trusted it was,
ref n the prayer of his bill would of course be granted, He
_o
teurred his Lordship to the situation of these parties. Mra.
Y ng's services as Editor of the Paper were an import-
, r object to Mr. Grant ; and Mr. Young, on entering
into the contract, made it a specific obligation
that he should have the sole management of
that department of the paper. That principle ran
thruot!ghout the whole of the contract, and Mr Young
cwoaalssitda not by any ordinary occurrence be displaced. There
.nunther tiling in the deed which contemplated the
wile
polityof a change in some
part of the firm, and it
provided that whoever was substituted for either
partner, should still be subjected to the articles of the
same contract, All the articles were quite consistent.wi.th
the right of pre-emption, for the object was to bind the
parties. If there were any tl • g in the deed which
wouldi defeat or delay the creditorsnn of the bankrupt,
t lat would be an objection which it might be diffi-
cult to surmount, but he challenged the other side
to find in the deed any thing having such an effect
If the deed had been carried into full effect, no delay what-
-1 ~ ever would have accrued to the creditors of Mr. 'Grant ;
if they had joined in doing what Mr. Young proposed, no
delay whatever would have arisen. There were some pro-
visions in the deed which the Court could not take cogni-
zance of, because they had never been acted upon—he
alluded to the monthly account and the references, none of
which had been performed by either party. But it was
stipulated, that in case of one partner becoming a bank-
rupt, the continuing party should have the right of pre-
emption, anti the question was, whether this Court could
do what the parties had neglected to do for themselves. If
the clause for providing for accounts and references
had remained in full force, that question would
have been tried first, and the case would have
assumed a very different shape. But now that
point was thrown out of Court, and could not be
referred to. The Court was asked to declare the partner-
ship dissolved, and to declare that there was a right of
pre-emotion, as well as to order accounts to be taken of
the partnership, and he (Mr. Bacon) submitted that the
deed itself was sufficient to establish the claim made. If
it be contended on the other side that there was a waiver
of rights, an opportunity would occur to answer that; in
the mean time he submitted that it was answered by the
pleadings themselves. They admitted that the first offer
made by Mr. Young was without prejudice to his rights,
and that the whole of his dealings had been only incon-
clusive. If they were inconclusive, it had been on a saving
of his rights, anti if conclusive, they had no right to set up
their present defence, for throughout the whole of the
proceedings the right of pre-emption was admitted,
Mr. PALEY requested Mr. Bacon to point out that part
of the pleadings admitting the right of pre-emption.
Mr. BACON referred to Mr. Thornton's answer, and
said it was admitted that the first offer was made without
Prejudice, and there was no distinct denial of the right of
pre-emption. They might say that Mr. Young presented
himself at a sort of small auction, and there continued to
bid amongst other competitors; hut at that meeting no-
thing was done; and up to the last moment it was com-
petent to Mr. Young to declare himself off. It was com-
petent to him to waive that proceeding—but he did more,
he protested against it ; and when his legal adviser came
into the room, be said what he had done was wrong. At
first it was hut an offer to buy, subject to the right of pre-
emption, and upon the whole it was but a sort of negocia-
tti°°- That could not be called a waiver of rights under
toe deed. As to the situation of the parties, and what
had been done since the deed, its appeared that in Febru-
"Yl 1829 (the partnership having only began in June,
1828) Mr. Grant, the largest shareholder, withdrew
from this country, anti he was absent until October, 1830.
Luring the whole of that time Mr. Grant rendered no as-
*istance to the concern, and whatever prosperity accrued to
it was occasioned solely by the exertions and services of
'lr. Young, for Mr. Grant was absent, and it was not
Pretended that he lent the slightest assistance in money or
°therwise, and yet it prospered. The principle on which
the deed was founded was tried on that occasion, and
found to be a true one. It had been Mr Grant's belief
that MrYottng'a services would be beneficial to the concern,
and so they proved ; it was also Mr. Young's belief that
uY devoting his time and about 2,0001. to the concern, he
coI uld
make it a beneficial property. On the 9th of November
A_ r. Grant became a bankrupt, and in February following
Ay. Young claimed the right of pre-emption. Under these
circumstances he (Mr. Bacon) could not conceive on what
ground Mr. Young's claim could be met. The nature of
the property made it of no value, unless it was conducted
. ‘ on certain interests. The parties themselves had contrived
4 scheme to keep the management of the paper within cer-
tain limits. Would this Court say that Mr. Young was
to be deprived of all his rights under the deed, and that a
Purchaser should come in and conduct the concern upon
a new plan—that Mr. Young, who had acquired rights f which no power would deprive him, merely
because Mr. Grant hand become a bankrupt ? Mr.
I.°"ng had obtained a right of being editor of the paper,
and also of being the continuing partner. If the Court di-
rected the shares to be sold, it would sell more than the
common property of partners. Nobody would contend,
that Mr. Grant, who had 24 shares, had any right to
Mr. Young's shares, and to his rights tinder the deed. If
the paper be sold, it would be tatting it whol:y out of Mr.
l'oung's power—that which was property and wealth to
e'ito, would be wasted, and nobody could tell what would
be the value of his rights. Mr. Young would tie made
Poorer, and no man would be made the richer by it. Con-
!idering the nature of the property, the stipulations entered
1"0 by the parties (by which, he it observed, the assig-
;',e°4 were bound), he trusted hist Lordship would see that
'h!r• Young's claim was perfectly reasonable, and that
orel bill ought cos e granted. Ile desired neither to defeat
delay the ritors—he desired an account to be taken
I:ifar as could be taken, and that the property should be
1 ~- 4 Recording to the stipulations of the deed—sold so as
reserve to him his right of pre-emption. The property
o:taself 14 is exertions assumed a value which nobody but
could estimate. Quite enough appeared to make

out the claim of Mr. Young, anti there was nothing in it
inconsistent with justice or with the principles of the
bankrupt law.

Mr. PEPYS appeared as counsel for the defendants in
the first, and the plaintiffs in the cross cause, contending
that it would be a matter of course, upon the dissolution
of the partnership, to have the whole of the effects sold,
and divided between the parties according to their relative
proportions. It had, therefore, come quite by surprise
upon him that the Learned Gentlemen on the other side
had suggested at the bar that only that part of the
property which belonged to the bankrupt could
be sold. It had been settled in the case of Cook
and Collinridge, that by the law of partnership
the settlement must be by a sale and division of
the whole. In that case the parties were coachinakers,
and the Learned Counsel could see no difference on princi-
ple between that and the property of a newspaper. With-
out, therefore, his Learned Friend on the other side could
make out some particular provision in the partnership deed
to the contrary, he submitted that the decree of the Court
roust be for the sale of the whole effects of the partnership.
With respect to the right of pre-emption, Mr. Young had
only that right to the extent of being the highest bidder at
the sale, because, if he continued the business, he must
pay the full value of the property.
The Loan CHANCELLOR. observed, that whether Mr.
Young had the right of pre-emption or not, :if he were
the purchaser, he must pay the full value of the property.
Mr. ParYS—Thereexisted some difficulty as to the means
by which the value was to be ascertained. It was worth Mr.
Young's while to bid more than any other person for this
paper, because being in possession and management of it, he,
by paying a little more than others offered, would secur him-
self that possession which was, doubtless, advantageous to
him. The clause in which the right of pre-emption was
given, if there was any, provided no means of ascertaining
the value of the property, except by reference to the former
clause, and upon looking into that it would appear that all
was thrown into the general clause, the provisions of
which the Learned Counsel submitted to the Court could not
carry into effect. One part of the clause provided for a
reference of any disputes which took place ; that part the
Court would not carry into effect, for it would never en-
tertain a bill for the purpose of compelling a reference,
which was avowedly the purpose of this bill, as by a
reference, and that alone, could the value be ascertained.
That part was decided by Lord Eldon in the cases of
" Mills and Gray," and " Street and Rigby." There
was another objection, equally fatal. In " Wilson and
Greenwood," a case exactly similar to the present ; Lord
Eldon decided that no partner Lad any right with regard
to his own property to create any title in another to arise in
the event of bankruptcy. That clearly had been done in
the present case of Mr. Grant's, and the consequence would
be if the Court were to carry such a clause into effect, that
the bona fide creditors of Mr. Grant would be prevented
from having the full benefit of the bankruptcy. Such
provision the Learned Counsel submitted would be utterly
void as against a person becoming bankrupt.
The LORD CHANCELOR observed, that a lease might be
void upon the bankruptcy of a tenant.
Mr. Paris said that there the property was ac-
tually the property of the trader, which property
that trader, in the event of his becoming bankrupt, was
not at liberty to reserve a right in for the benefit of an-
other at the expense of his creditors. All these objections
the Learned Counsel submitted were conclusive against the
bill filed by Mr. Young, and if the Court should be of
opinion that Mr. Young was not entitled to have those
provisions carried into effect, the decree then must be for a
sale of all the partnership effects. Mr. Young here asked
for the specific performance of a totally new and indepen-
dent contract; he had abandoned the original contract by
his further offers ; but it was said he did that under pro-
test, and the evidence of Mr. Briggs had been referred to for
that purpose, which hesubmitted did not bear out that asser-
tion. According to that evidence the contract was originally
for 9,000/. Mr. Young, however, had waived that contract,
and, at a future bidding offered 10,0001. for the property.
The contract, therefore, which Mr. Young thought to
have specifically performed, was wholly inoperative, and it
was not in the power of Mr. Young to call upon the
Court specifically to perform it. It appeared to the
Learned Counsel that it was utterly impossible for the court
to say Mr. Young had the right of pre-emption under
the deed, and such being the case, the property of this
partnership, he submited, was to be dealt with in the or-
din try manner of disposing of partnership property,
namely, by selling the whole of it, and dividing the pro-
ceeds between the respective partners. No prejudice
would arise to any person by the adoption of such
a course. The Court, the Learned Counsel sub-
mitted, could not sell one part of the property,
and thereby compel the person purchasing it to become a
partner with Mr. Young. The only just proceeding in his
mind was, to adopt the ordinary course pursued in all
cases of partnerships, decreeing a sale, according to the
prayer of the cross bill of the whole of the partnership's
effects.

The Loan CHANCELLOR inquired whether the cre-
ditors bad no apprehension that the adoption of such
a course would drive Mr. Young from the concern, and
thereby deteriorate the value of the property.
Mr. PEPYS said, that he appeared for three-fourths of
the creditors, who, at a meeting, had determined upon
the propriety of the present course of proceeding.
Mr. PEPYS—It was clear from the fact of Mr. Young
now struggling against a public sale, and, of course, to
obtain the property at a cheaper rate for himself, that it
would be more beneficial to the creditors that that only
fair way of ascertaining the value of the property should
be adopted, and there was no reason why the right
of the creditors should not be thus protected. Mr.
Bacon had contended that the only joint
property which could be sold was, the
printing machines, the paper and the ink upon the
premises, but it was not in these things the value of a
newspaper consisted ; but even the good-will, as
it might be called, of the paper, in the character the
paper had, and in the profits those who had the
right of printing it derived frotn its sale. The
question now was, whether there was any thing
in the articles of partnership to take this out of the general
rule. He contended that there was not. The continoencies
contemplated by one of the stipulations bad not 'arisen
and could not arise. With respect to the other stint:. lation, for the appointment of arbitrators, it had
been decided, over and over again, that no such stipulation
could be set up in that Court, so that, in point of
fact, NI r. Young had no locus standi ; the only grounds
he had laid for his right of pre-emption having
been cut from under him. But, putting aside all
known law and all decided cases, he did not suppose his
Lordship would give a decision which would esta.
blish the principle that an individual could, in con-
templation of bankruptcy, make a stipulation which
could go to defeat the rights of his creditors. He did not
mean to say that fraud was at all contemplated ; far from
it ; but if his Lordship were now to make such a de-
cision, it would open the door to the grossest
frauds. Lord Eldon had given it as his opinion in the
case of Wilson and Greenwood, that such stipulations
would be contrary to the law of bankruptcy, and against
public policy.
The LORD CHANCELLOR-..Whit was the trade in that
instance ?

Mr. KINDERSLY—That of a cotton-spinner.
The LORD CHANCELLOR—The creditors come into the
shares of the bankrupt, and take the disadvantages as well
as the advantages of his position?
Mr. KINDERSLY—Certainly.
The Loan CHANCELLOR—If in the articles of part-
nership it is agreed that certain things shall be
done in a certain event, it is part of the consideration of
the partnership, and Mr. Young might probably never
have entered into this partnership bail it not been for the
stipulation in question.
Mr. KINDERSLY said, that that could not be denied
as a general proposition, but he submitted that
noindividual contemplating bankruptcy could make
a stipulation to defeat his creditors. It was contended by
Mr. Bacon that Mr. Young was still entitled to his re-
sidence in the partnership house, to his eight guineas
per week as active manager, and to other advantages,
but it was clear to common sense that the whole of them
ceased on the dissolution of the partnership. The only
right Mr. Young could possibly possess ultra the partner-
ship, was that of pre-emption, and that, he had shown,
was both completely cut from under him by the law and
by his own acts.
Mr. PALEY said the case had been so fully argued, that
it would be necessary for him to trouble the Court wi▪
th
very few observations indeed. It was monstrous to sup-
pose that a bankrupt could by any stipulation with a part-
ner defeat the rights of his creditors. In the case of
Wilson and Greenwood, as it was not necessary for Lord
Eldon then to have decided the point, it was supposing
that he expressed himself so strongly as be had. As far
as his Lordship went he was in favour of the poi▪
nt
for which the assignees contended. The case of
a marriage settlement was so much in point here,
that he begged to call his Lordship's attention to it.
It had been clearly decided, that where a person, by his
marriagesettlenient, disposed of his property to another,
with a stipulation that on the bankruptcy of the donee, it
should go to another party, that stipulation should be good;
but precisely the reverse had been decided where the sti-
pulation was, that the property of a party should on his
own bankruptcy go to another. It was clear that no man
could stipulate that his property should, in the event of his

bankruptcy, pass into other hands than those of Lis assig-
nees. Supposing, however, that the point had not
been so decided, it was clear, that in this case,
the plaintiff had waived all right to the claim lie
had set up. First of all, he had set up a contract
by which the property was to be sold to him for 9,0001.
Surely that could not have been i❑ furtherance of his right
of pre-emption. Could it either have furthered his right
of pre-emption to go on bidding till the last bidding lie
himself made was about 12,000/. ? That was not the mode
in which a person would act who was anxious to sustain a
right inherent in him under the articles of partnership.
This act alone was a sufficient proof of a waiver of any
right of pre-emption, if ever the plaintiff had it. With
respect to selling such shares only as belonged to the bank-
rupt, the idea was absurd, if it could only be done
with injury to the remainder of the property. Under
all the circumstances he submitted that there ought, as
prayed by the cross bill, to be a sale, under the direction
of the master, of the whole of the partnership property;
and in the meantirue a receiver appointed.
Sir EDWARD SUGDEN-Ile admitted the right of the
opposite side to file a cross bill. The only question, now
in discussion, fur the rest, was as a matter of course in his
favour, was as to the right of pre-emption. His Hon.
Friends had rested their case in that respect upon four
grounds—first, that the Court could not sanction
the arbitration proposed; secondly, the Court could
not refer the case at all ; thirdly, that the Court
could not be called in to enforce this stipulation, because it
would be a fraud upon the creditors; and, fourthly, be-
cause Mr. Young had waived his right, if ever he had any.
The whole of these objections came to this—whether the
Court would, under the circumstances of the case, enforce
Mr. Young's claim or not. He had not for a moment
disputed, as no man who was acquained with the law of
the Court could dispute, the authority of the cases referred
to by the other side. But those cases applied to the ge-
neral principle, and he had argued his case as an
exception, and having drawn a clear distinction between
that exception and the general rule, his Learned Friends
had confined themselves entirely to the general rule, and
not touched upon the exception. It was clearly esta-
blished, that where the Court bad jurisdiction originally,
although the parties might have agreed to refer any parti-
cular point to arbitration, the Court nevertheless took the
whole of the matter under its jurisdiction, and, instead of
referring the point reserved for arbitration, as agreed upon
by the parties, referred it to the Master. Such points were
merely accidental incidents in a case, and could not bear
on the general jurisdiction of the Court. For instance, if
an agreement were made for the sale of an estate, with a
stipulation that the valuation of the timber should be by
arbitrators, yet the Court, having jurisdiction on the ori-
einal contract, would take the incidental point with respect
to the timber within its jurisdiction, and refer it to the
Master, although it might happen that the timber was five
times the value of the estate.

The LORD CHANCELLOR—We both recollect, that in
Cochrane's c ise the value of the timber was the point of
greater consequence.

Sir EDWARD SUGDEN...-Certainly, but where the Court
has jurisdiction in the original contract, it will exercise
jurisdiction throughout, and not refer any point to arbitra-
tion, althought it may be so stipulated by the contracting
parties. What he then said was, that this case fell within
the exception he began by laying down, and it ought to
be referred to the Master to ascertain the value of the pro-
perty. It was clear that the partnership must be dis-
solved—that the accounts must be settled—that the
property must be sold if there were debts to pay,
to pay those debts,—and that, if there was a
property to divide, it must be divided ; and it was not to be
contended that the Court, having general jurisdiction, could
not exercise jurisdiction throughout. Again, to illustrate
the case by the sale of an estate—suppose that it was
agreed to sell an estate for 15,0001., but that the value of
the timber should be settled by arbitrators named by both
parties, although it might be known beforehand that the
timber was worth 30,000/. the Court would take upon itself
to enforce the whole contract, and would refer it to the
Master to ascertain the value of the timber; and that
was all that was prayed in the present instance. All
that Mr. Young wanted was that his right of pre-emption
should be carried into execution by the Court. The
stipulation in this instance would afford particular
facility for carrying the contract into execution, for here it
was not stipulated that two private arbitrators should be
appointed, who, in spite of all the rules of law, would each be
influenced in the favour of the party appointing him,
but two high public officers, who were to name
an umpire as utterly unknown to the parties themselves
as would he the Master in Chancery to whom by rotation
this action was to be referred. So that in point of fact it
was not a transfer of the arbitration from private ar-
bitrators to a public officer, but from an umpire
nominated by a public officer to a public office.
Nothing whatever had been said in answer to his view of
the case, so that he was almost at a loss to know what
point of his Learned Friend's argument he should take up.
With respect to the opinion expressed by Lord Eldon in the
case of Wilson and Greenwood, which had been referred to,
notwithstanding the vague and uncertain doubt there ex-
pressed, it bad always been understood in the profession,
that a trader might make an engagement which
would be more beneficial to himself than to his
creditors. The only way in which he could
not do so was, that he could not assume
to himself a benefit out of property in his
own hands, exclusive of his creditors, upon his
bankruptcy occurring. But one thing he would particu-
larly urge upon the Court, that there were ten thousand
stipulations in these articles of partnership in favour of Mr.
Grant's estate, and his assignees had claimed the benefit
of the whole of them. It was impossible for them
to find fault with this stipulation, which they
fancied told against them, unless they were prepared
to give up the whole of the stipulations which were in their
favour. He did not mean to say (far from it) when he
spoke of other stipulations being in favour of the assignees,
that this also was not one in their favour ; for in ninety.
nine cases out of a hundred it would be their interest
to compel an existing solvent partner to take the property
at a valuation, because, after the bankruptcy of one, there
might be many persons unwilling to risk entering upon
such an undertaking. Were it to be sold entire, a pur-
chaser might fancy, (and would of course offer less than the
value of the property on that account) that it had been greatly
injured by the bankruptcy of one of the partners, and that
all things relating to it were in confusion. But now there
being a solvent partner actually carrying the concern on,
it would be valued as being full of vigour and vitality.
But independently of that, he maintained that the assig-
nees could not claim the benefits they might derive under
the articles of partnership, without also taking what they
might consider its evils. They must take the benefit and the
i turthen of the contract together, just in the same way as
the bankrupt would have been obliged to do. With what face
could they come into a court of justice and say, that only so
much of the contract was binding as was in their
favour ? A great deal bad been said about the form
of the record, he supposed to throw a colour upon
the case; it ought not to bear farther than on
account of any real connection it had with it. It was
imagined on that account that Mr. Young's object was to
get this property into his own hands for less than its
value ; but every thing in the cause very clearly and
distinctly proves that he had no such unfair inten-
tion, What be has wanted all along has been to
buy the property at a fair valuation, and such is the prayer
of his present petition. He never had any object in
view than to give the full value of the property; that being
solvent he was actually desirous of not being involved in the
ruin of his partner, who had became insolvent. He
meant to cast no imputations upon Mr. Grant, but a com-
mission having issued against that gentleman, certain con-
sequences bad followed, and he must abide by those conse-
quences. It was known some unpleasant discussions bad
arisen elsewhere out of these unpleasant transactions, hut
this Court had never mixed itself up in them, and he
was sorry that they had been alluded to. But as
regarded the form of the record, he was about
to say, that nothing could be more proper than that
in which it now stood. It was said that Mr. Young ori-
ginally insisted, although he now set up a right of pre-
emption, upon a sale to him under contract of the property
for 9,0001. It was true, that Mr. Young was willing if an
agreement could be come to for a sale of the property, to
purchase it ; hut if there could be no such agreement, then
he insisted upon his right of pre-emption. The question
then was, whether he had not at first reason to
suppose in the existence of such an agreement ?
It appeared by the evidence of Mr. Briggs that an agree-
ment was drawn up by him (the solicitor to the assignees);
that it was forwarded to the solicitor of Mr. Young for his
approbation ; that it received his approbation ; that it was
returned to the solicitor for the assignees, who caused
it to be engrossed, and it only waited for execution. Mr.
Young knowing this had a right to stand upon that
contract, and only did not persevere in doing
so, because he found that he himself was the only
witness to the fact, and heard that some parole condi-
tion not upon the face of the agreement would be set up
against him, and lie therefore, by the advice of Counsel,
struck out that part of his prayer, and confined himself
to the right of pre-emption. That that was the proper
course to take was now proved by the evidence of Mr. Briggs
himself, who, admitting the existence of the contract,
said that there was a private condition or understanding
that it should not be binding if there were a better offer
before the 19th, supposing such to have been the

tsrtm of the cont;aet, It would still have been in Mr.
Young's favour, for no better °fie/ was made before the 19th,
it not being till the 19'h itself that the bidding in question
took place, when undoubtedly Mr. Young, irritated by the
fear of losing his property, and by competition, did bid
up. Mr. Young was willing to agree upon a purchase if be
could, or to act upon his right of pre-emption ; but whatever
he did, the other side were dissatisfied with. There
was no pleasing them. When he attempted to buy, it
was all wrong ; and now that he rested upon his
right of pre-emption, they turned round upon him
and said, " Yes, it is very well of you to claim
a right of pre-emption, but it is all a fraud on your
part, you ought to have concluded your contract." It
was for the court now to decide whether, since the
parties could not agree upon a sale to Mr. Young,
to refer the settlement of the price to the Master.
As to the point about Mr. Young having ;waived
his right, it was too absurd to detain him
for a moment. In such a case as this it would be the
grossest injustice to say that all the shares in the paper
must be sold because one of the partners had become
bankrupt. In the case of " Cook and Collinridge," which
had been referred to, there was nothing to sell except the
debts and the carriages, with the contracts attached to
them.

The LORD CHANCELLOR—Was there no good-will ?
Sir E. SUGDEN—Whatever good-will there might be,
belonged to the premises, and was sold with them. There
would be clearly no good-will in the paper conveyed
by the sale of the premises. Whatever good-will
might once have belonged to the bankrupt he had taken
away with him, for he had got up an opposition paper on
the other side of the street, to which he bad given the
oddest title in the world, creating in fact another Sun.
The LORD CHANCELLOR,.--I did not know there were
two suns before.

Sir E. SUODEN-Nor were there. " The Sun" still
shone in all its splendour; but Mr. Grant having called his
" The True Sun" he supposed that the other
Sun must now he called the false Sun; or perhaps Mr.
Grant would wish to have it considered a moon, though
how that could be be (Sir E. Sugden) could not well ima-
gine, inasmuch as it received no light from its opposite
neighbour that it could reflect. Perhaps then Mr. G.'s object
was to eclipse The Sun, and certainly it could nut be de-
nied that he bad to a certain extent injured it and depreci-
ated its value, without, however, much benefiting himself.
This was the first time he had beard it argued, that
because one shareholder in a newspaper became insolvent,
that, therefore, the property of the rest must be sold. It was
well known that the shares in the Times and the Courier,
and some other papers which yielded enormous incomes,
were in the hands of persons totally unconnected
with trade, and were made the subject of mortgage,
sale, &c., as if they were fixed property. The
stock of a shop, whether mops and brooms, or
coaches and carriages, must be sold altogether, but
each share of a newspaper was distinct property, and
admitted of a separate sale. He (Sir E. Sugden)
did not dispute the general propositions which his
Learned Friends on the other side laid down, but they re-
fused to grapple with the particular circumstances of this
case. In this case the Court must understand that the
parties did not hold undivided shares. He (Sir Edward
Sugden) knew that nearly all the newspapers, and he
had had something to do with most of them, were
divided into a certain number of shares. In this
instance the number was 32, and it was agreed
that one partner held from No. 1 to No. 24 inclusive,
and the other from No. 25 to No. 32 inclusive. Those
shares were just as much distinct subjects of property as it
was possible for any two things to be that were carried
openly to market. Whatever the holder of the 21 shares
cho,e to do with them, he could do just the same as the
holders of shares in a joint stock company. In cases of joint
stock company, where no charter existed, and one member
should happen to become a bankrupt, the Court might
just as well order the whole company to be sold, as that it
should order Mr. Young's eight shares to be sold, because
Mr. Grant, who held the other twenty-four shares, was a
bankrupt. He (Sir E. Sugden) did not ask for the sale of
Mr. Grant's shares. If Mr. Grant's creditors could pay
the whole of the debts without selling them, he cared
nothing whether they were sold or not. There was a
dissolution of the partneship as regarded the articles,
but the interest still remained, and therefore if they wished
to wind up the concern, they must sell those shares.—
They did not submit, as they ought to have done, by
their hill, to pay the plaintiff what was due, but they
wished only to pay him rateably with the oti ‘r sed.itors.
The Court, however, he was sure, would see that it had no
power to sell the shares of Mr. Young, the solvent
partner. The case would be the sante if there were a
hundred partners; supposing there were one hundred who
each had a share, the person would be laughed out of
Court who, on the bankruptcy of one, would get up
and say that the shares of the other ninety-nine should be
sold. As in life assurances, where one partner was a
bankrupt, it might with equal propriety be said, that the
whole concern should be sold. The purchaser of the other
shares must come in subject to the contract. It was impossible
for his Lordship to make the order sought for on the other
side, without saying that all voluntary associations should
be sold if one member happened to become a bankrupt.
The Equitable Assurance Company was a voluntary asso-
ciation, the members of which were mutual assurers, and
if he (Sir E. Sugden) were in trade, and a bankrupt to-
morrow, why on that account should the whole concern
be sold ? He put those propositions, to show how utterly
absurd the argument was. _
_ _ _

The Loan ComicELLoa—That would not be a trading
in which you could have been a bankrupt.
Sir E. SUGDEN was not putting the case merely as one
of bankruptcy, but as the result, and the necessary result,
of a dissolution of partnership. Taking it, therefore, that
the principle was not different, his Lordship would have no
difficulty on that part of the case, but would at once say that
he had no jurisdiction whatever over Mr. Young's shares.
Those shares were liable to a share of the debts due by the
concern, and Mr. Young submitted to pay whatever sums
were due on his own account. The Learned Counsel sub-
mitted that there must be a dissolution of partnership, and
that accounts of the concern must be ordered. Then there
remained but two points—first, as to the right of pre-emp•
tion, and if the Court should be against him on that
point, then whether there was a power to sell
the whole property, which he submitted was
a point of no difficulty whatever.
The LORD CHANCELLOR stated that with respect to the
waiver, he was in favour of Mr. Young ; but he had con-
siderable doubts as to the right of pre-emption. He
merely threw this out at present, and also that he had a
strong opinion in favour of Mr. Young respecting the sale
of the whole property. He threw this out in case there
should, in the interval between now and the rising of the
Court, be any tendency towards an accommodation be-
tween the parties.
Sir E. Suc DEN was afraid there was not the slightest
hope of accommodation.
Mr. PALEY was of opinion that there was some hope of it.
Sir E. SUGDEN was exceedingly happy to hear his
Learned Friend say so. On the part of Mr. Young, he
might siy that all that was wished, was what was
fair and right between the parties. As the Court
had decided there was no waiver, and that it had not the
power to sell Mu. Young's eight shares, the only question
was as to the right of pre-emption.
The LORD CHANCELLOR observed that his opinion was
strongly against the power to sell the whole property. On
that he had little or no doubt. With regard to the waiver,
he was in favour of the plaintiff, Mr. Young. But as to
the right of pre-eruption he entertained considerable doubts.

HALF-PAY OFFICERS AND PENSIONERS.
--By a Bill introduced in the present Session, all officers
and pensioners are entitled to receive their pensions by a
remittance bill, such bill not to be liable to stamp duty.--
Dublin, Paper.
It is whispered in the circles of the Court that
the tour now performing by the Princess VICTORIA is the
first of a series which her Royal Highness will make of
her own countr). It is added that, as the heiress pre-
sutoptive has ri'mv arrived at an age for observation, she
will also visit the continent, according to an arrangement
proposed by the Royal Family some months ago.
The watermen complain that, though the pre-
sent is the finest summer that has been known for many
years, it is the dullest which for as many years has been
known on the river.

A. severe depression has been produced in
American Bank Stock, by thereto of the President to the
bid for the renewal of the charter. The price in New
York, was, previously, 117 dollars each share, and it fell
10 per centum. The exchange on England has
also been somewhat effected by it, and fell from 110
to 1071. The shares, which were quoted here yes-
terday at 26/. fis. each, are to day marked 241. 10s., but
it does
not appear that much business has been done. One
motive of General JACKSON for the step he has taken, is
well known to be that of securing his re-election to the
Presidency; but we find among intelligent Americans a
stronger disposition in favour of the policy of the measure
than we should have anticipated. The sudden contrac-
tion of the paper circulation, which the Bank must now
have recourse to, will be attended, it is feared, with serious
consequences to the commercial interest of the United
States.— Times.

The Day and Night City Police Bill, it is
understood, has fallen to the ground.

SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE-(THIS DAY.)

FROM LLOYD'S.

DEAL, AUGUST 9.—Wind E.N.E.--Arrived from the
river and sailed, the Ocean Queen, Jameson, for Mauritius.
PORTSMOUTH, AUGUST 9. —Wind S.s.—Arrived from
London, the Roxburgh Castle, Dumy, and James Psttison.
Bolton, for Bengal, the latter vessel lost a jibboom, and
bowsprit sprung. Off port—Albero, Cozen, for New Or-
leans ; Ville de Rouen, for Porto Rico.

FALMOUTH, AUG UST S.—Wind S. S. E. light. —Arrived
the Venus, Simon, fi orn Pernambuco ; John Buschiran,
Hindmarsh, from Pugwash. Off port—Ganges, Leach,
from Georgetown ; Old Maid, Carn, from Bay Chaleur ;
Branches, Atkinson, from Quebec, with loss of bowsprit,
and foremast sprung.
PLYMOUTH, Auc LIST 9.—Wind S.S.W.—Arrived the
Amelia, Duis, from Prince Edwards Island.
DARTMOUTH, AUGUST S.—Arrived off port—the De-
merara packet, Cook, for Jamaica.
COWES, AUGUST 9.—Arrived the Powhattan, Le Bre-
ton, from Virginia.
PORTLAND, AUGUST B.—Arrived off Cronberg, the
Tikiob, from St. Croix ; Samuel Robertson, Greswold,
from New York.

STA NDGATE CREEK, AUG UST 9.—Arrived the Tally
Ho, Mitchell, from Constantinople ; Union, Mould, from
Trieste; Juanita, Fans, from Salon.

SCILLY, Auc. B.—Arrived off port, the Paix Boase,
from Rio Janeiro; Isabella, Meyer, from New York; and
Scandinavia, Born, from Trapani.
BRISTOL, Auc. 9.—Arrived the Speculator, Cother,
from Demerara; and Eliza Fox, from Lisbon.
MILFORD, Auc. S.—Arrived the Ann, Bevans, from
Odessa; Mary, Roberts, of 13eauniaris, with loss of fore-
mast, &c.