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London, England, 1859-04-28 00:00:00

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ambiguity about the 252 d section of If It S
stated that if any person wilfully falsified- any of
or documents with intent to defraud his creditors,
it was an offence under that act The question of
intent was therefore ono for a jury to decide. The
defendant in this case had made a false book, which -
he had delivered to his assigneeS to act upon, and
his subsequent substitution of a genuine book did
not-affect the original intention. The defendant
was therefore committed for trial, but he was
admitted to bail.
THE SPANISH CONSUL'S EXPLANATION IN VIN-
DICATION OF HIS CHARACTER.—Mr. Buchanan
attended before Mr. Alderman Phillips to make the
following application on behalf Don Juan Floran,
Marquis de Tabuerniga, the Consul-General for
Spain, in reference to some proceedings which took
place in this court a few weeks ago before Mr.
Alderman Rose.
Mr. Buchanan stated, that on the ith of the pre-
sent month a Spanish marquis, a nobleman of very
high standing in Spain, and occupying the respon •
Bible position of Consul-General in this country,
was brought to this court on a charge of immoral
conduct with a woman, which had most seriously
affected his character. On that occasion a gentle•
man of the name of Zulueta, hearing of the
marquis's unfortunate situation, sent his own
solicitor, a Mr. Freeman, to render him any
assistance he might require. Mr. Freeman
attended, but not having had any conversation
with the marquis he was not in a position to know
the real facts of the case, and although there
was a very long examination, the marquis was
unable to comprehend the effect of the evidence,
owing to his not sufficiently understanding the
English language. At the termination of the pro-
ceedings, he being at a loss to know how Mr.
Freeman's attendance affected him, very naturally
asked to be permitted to address the Court in his
own defence, which, as he had been defended in
due form, was, of course, very, properly- refused.
Mr. Ervinan pointed out the discrepancies in the
officer's evidence, and the fact was elicited that the
policeman had been a sergeant, and was-reduced_in
consequence of drunkenness. No doubt everything
that was done on his behalf was seen to; but the
marquis wanted no solicitor on that occasion, and
felt that justice had not been fairly administered in
refusing him a hearing in his own defence, and he
now sought to obtain a re-hearing of the case in
some way that would enable him to give his own
version of the case on oath. The case would have
assumed a very, different aspect if Mr. Freeman
had consulted with the marquis, or if the latter had
been allowed to conduct his own case ; but under
the circumstances he had not had a hearing within
the meaning of the law. It was quite true he was
found in company with the woman, and that the
policeman interfered, but not as he stated. The
simple fact was, that the officer interfered, and the
marquis, anticipating that he was about to charge
her with begging of, or robbing him, told him she
had not been guilty of either of those offences, upon
which he threatened to take the marquis into cus-
tody as well. That gentleman, however, handed
him his card, which had the effect of restraining
him from carrying out his threat. The marquis -
accompanied them to the station, and there gave
his promise to attend this court on the following
morning, and it was not until he was required to
enter into his recognisances to be of good conduct
that he understood what had been going on. In
consequence of that decision he had been super-
seded, and lost his £1,500 a year as consul-general,
but that was very immaterial to him compared to
the stain upon his character, which was dearer to
him than any pecuniary consideration. He came
over to this country, at the solicitation of his
Queen, whose esteem he obtained, by his devotion to
her cause while a member of the governing party
in that country during the most critical times.
and after being so honoured he felt he could not re-
turn to Spain without clearing his character of the
foul stain which the policeman's accusation had cast
upon it.
Alderman Phillips said he had allowed Mr.
Buchanan great indulgence in making this state-
ment, but he need not tell him, as a professional
man, that it was quite cut of his power to grant the
re-hearing. The marquis was represented here by
a legal gentleman sent by some friend, and he
thought nothing had been neglected that could
serve him under the circumstances. From what he
had read in the newspapers and heard since, the
magistrate on that occasion gave great attention to
the case, and acted only in accordance with his
duty and the evidence as it was placed before him.
It was, therefore, totally out of his power to assist
the marquis.
Mr. Buchanan asked if the worthy alderman
would allow him to renew the application before
Mr. Alderman Rose ?

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PRICE 4D• STAMPED, SD.

of things the defendant in error contended that the
second shifting clause in the will of 1822 had taken
effect, inasmuch as by the death of the eldest son
of Nathaniel No. 2 without issue the defendant in
error, the second son, had succeeded as heir male of
the body of his father, within the meaning of the
language of the clause, to " the property settled on
the marriage of Nathaniel" No. 2; such property
being, as the defendant in error maintained, the
estates which passed by the will of 1797, and the
appointment of John of 1822 in 1810, made with a
view to, and as a settlement upon, the second
marriage of Nathaniel No. 2. The plaintiff in
error made three points- -first, that the properties
referred to in the second shifting clause as "set-
tled on the marriage of Nathaniel" were not the
estates comprised in the will of 1797 and dealt
with on the marriage in 1810, but were the Hick-
ling, Beeston, and Tunstal estates, dealt with
in the settlement made on the marriage of 1804,
and that, consequently, the contingency provided
for in the shifting clause of the second nephew suc-
ceeding in place of the first as " heir male of the
body" of his father had not happened, inasmuch as
the plaintiff in error had succeeded to these estates,
not as " heir of the body," but as devisee under the
will of his father ; secondly, that, even assuming
that the estates referred to in the shifting clause
were the estates devised by the will of 1797, still
the contingency provided against had not happened,
inasmuch as the plaintiff in error had not succeeded
to these estates as " heir male of the body" of his
father, Nathaniel No. 2, because, taking as first
tenant-in-tail after the determination of the
estate for life, according to the limitations of
the will. of 1797, he would take, not an estate
by inheritance, but an estate tail, as purchaser;
and, thirdly, that even if this should be held other-
wise, still the contingency provided for by the
will had not been fulfilled in regard to the estates
succeeded to, seeing that the estates settled (ac-
cording to the construction of the defendant in
error) on the marriage of 1810 comprised the whole
of the estates devised by the will of 1797, while the
plaintiff in error had succeeded only to a part of
those estates, another part having been conveyed to
Jonathan George, conformably to the will of 1822,
as the price of the Iridge estate. In this manner
the case came for the judgment of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas, the question being whether the defen-
dant in error had become entitled to the property
settled on the marriage of Nathaniel No. 2, in the
character of " heir male of his body." The Judge
of that Court gave judgment to this effect :—They
were of opinion that the properties referred to as
" settled on the marriage of Nathaniel" No. 2, were
the estates dealt with on the second marriage in
1810. It was plain that the estates devised by the
will of 1797 were those referred to. In no sense
of the word could it be said that any estates were
" settled" on the marriage of 1804. Was the clause
intended to refer to the estates devised by the will
of 1797 ? Strictly speaking, those estates were not
settled on the marriage of 1810 ; they passed to
Nathaniel No. 2, for life, and his sons after him in
tail by virtue of the will of 1797 and the appoint-
ment of 1810. Nevertheless, the Court was satisfied
that it was to these estates that the testator

intended to refer. As soon as that appointment
was made the practical effect was to pass these
estates to Nathaniel No. 2 for life and his sons in
tail male after him, in strict settlement; and the
testator might well refer to these estates as having
been " settled on the marriage." As the union of
the two estates, the contingency against which the
testator was seeking to provide, would equally have
arisen on a devise of the estate as on its descending
by inheritance, it was reasonable to suppose that
had the testator been dealing with an estate in fee,
which was not unlikely to be devised by will, he
would have guarded against the case of the estate
coming to the possessor of the Iridge estate by will
as well as against its coming to him by inheritance.
The term " heir male of the body" was applicable
to the estates devised by the will of 1797, and to
them alone. They therefore held with the plaintiff
(the defendant in error), that the shifting clause
was intended to apply to the union of the estates
devised by the will of 1797 with the Iridge estates
devised by the will of 1822. The plaintiff in error
then said that if the property " settled on the mar-
riage of Nathaniel" was to be hold to be the estates
devised by the will of 1797, the contingency guarded
against by the shifting clause had not arisen, inas-
much as the plaintiff in error had not come into
possession of the estates devised by the will of 1797,
but only a part of such estates, the Middlesex, Sur-
rey, and London property having been made over
to Jonathan George. Two satisfactory answers
might be given. In the first place such a construc-
tion would require a double contingency in order
to give effect to the shifting clause. In the next
place such a construction appeared to the Court to
be inconsistent with the scheme of the will. It ap-
peared to the Court that the reasonable construc-
tion to be put on the whole of the provisions of the
will taken together was that the shifting clause in
question was intended to take effect on the comple-
tion of the arrangement contemplated by the testa-
tor as to the transfer of the Surrey, Middlesex, and
London property, in the event of the rest of the
estates becoming united with the Iridge estate by
failure of the issue of the elder nephew then in
the possession of the former, and that consequently
the term " property settled on the marriage of
Nathaniel," although general and unqualified, must
be taken to mean that property short of that
portion of it which it was part of the scheme of the
will to have separated from it. The court, there-
fore, were of;opinion that the estates referred to in
the shifting clause were the estates which passed by
the will of 1797, and which came to the plaintiff in
error as part tenant in tail in remainder after the
determination of the prior estate of his elder brother;
that the character in which the plaintiff in error
actually took the estates was intended to be described
by the term " heir male of the body" of his father,
and that consequently the contingency provided for
by the shifting clause had happened. The Court,
therefore, gave judgment for the plaintiff (the de-
fendant in error).
Upon this judgment the present plaintiff brought
a writ of error to this Court. The case was argued
last Hilary Term, when the Court took time to con-
sider its judgment.
The Court was now of opinion that the decision
of the Court of Common Pleas was right, and that
that judgment should be affirmed. The reasons had
been so fully stated in that judgment that it became
unnecessary to restate them, as this Court consi-
dered that the construction put upon the shifting
clause by the Court of Common Pleas was the cor-
rect one. The judgment must, therefore, be affirmed.
Mr. Honeyman presumed it was unnecessary for
him to ask for costs.
Mr. Baron Martin affirmed with costs.

Alderman Phillips said he could make no arrange-
ment for Mr. Alderman Rose. As far as he was
concerned, he could do nothing in the matter.
Mr. Buchanan then thanked the alderman for
his courtesy in hearing him so patiently, and with-
drew with his client, the marquis.

MARYLEBONE.—ROBBERY.—A man who
gave his name Thomas Jones was placed at the
bar, charged with the following robbery :
It appeared that on the previous afternoon, be-
tween two and three o'clock, the footman of Mrs.
Ly all, Cambridge-terrace, Regent's-park,was coming
down stairs with a tray in his had, when he saw
the prisoner making his egress by the front door.
He ran after him, and on overtaking him found in
his possession a soup ladle, a fish slice, and a gravy
spoon, which articles had been stolen from the
pantry. The articles were produced and identified.
Police-sergeant 33 S applied for a remand, as he
thought it likely that the prisoner would be shown
to have been implicated in robberies of a like
nature.
Remanded for a week.
FRAUD.—William Brown Hayes was charged
with having by false and fraudulent representations
obtained money upon two occasions from General
Brook, 18, Gloster-place, Park-square.
The prisoner, who pleaded guilty, was committed
to hard labour in the House of Correction for three
months.

LA MBETH.—CIIARGE OF INDECENT ASSAULT.
—The Rev. Nicholas Bessot, a short stout person,
50 years of age, who was said to be a Belgian.
Catholic clergyman, was placed at the bar before
Mr. Elliott on a charge of indecently assaulting
William Harris, a butcher-boy, in the St. George's-
circus, on the evening before.
Mr. Solomon appeared for the accused.
Police-constable James Lake, 153 M, deposed
that, on the evening before, while on duty in the
St. George's-circus, a little boy came to him and
asked him to take charge of the prisoner, who
stood near to him, for committing an indecent
assault on him. The boy said that while standing
in a crowd of persons who were assembled in the
Crown public-house, for the purpose of hearing the
address of Sir Charles Napier, one of the candi-
dates for the borough of Southwark, the prisoner
assaulted him.

The witness here repeated the statement of the
boy to him respecting the acts of the prisoner,
which could leave no doubt whatevell of his dis-
graceful intentions, and said that on the lad's re-
presentations he took him into custody.
Mr. Elliott—Did the prisoner say anything to
the charge ?
Witness—He denied it, your worship, and said
he had not touched the boy.
Mr. Elliott—Ls the boy who made the charge in
attendance ? _

Witness—He is not, your worship, though he
was told to be here at ten o'clock. _

Mr. Solomon.—My client is a French clergyman,
and he most solemnly assures me that there
thetreells me
is not
a word of truth in the accusation. H
that, on returning to his residence, 39, St. George's-
road, he had to encounter a large
Crown public-
assemblage of
persons collected in front of the u
house, to hear an electioneering speech from Sir
of having touched the
impossible to get
wsome one, but he had
Charles Napier, and
e no more than any one
throughnetthe
ewithout
slightest touching
recollectionei,airt4
lad who gave him
in
nomplamant h
proper to attend, I hope your worship w dismiss
—1 think it but right that the case
else, and. as the c as not
w thought
the case.
properly investigated, particularly as the
prisoner has been in custody before on a similar
charge.
Mr. Solomon.—l am aware that he has, Par
shouldl‘'fr. Elliott.be
worship, for I attended for him; and my impression
then was that the charge was perfectly unfounded,
and he was at once discharged. The charge now I
understand to be also unfounded,
Mr. Elliott.—Let the prisoner be detained for
the present, and let the lad be sent for.
At a late hour in the evening the prisoner was
again placed at the bar, when the father of the
complainant, Wm. Harris, who resides at No. 24},
Tennison-street, York-road, Lambeth, was put into
the witness box, and said his son had gone to the
west end of the town at an early hour in the
morning to look for a situation, and he did not
kno•cf when he would return.

Mr. Elliott.—He has given the prisoner into
custody on a serious charge, and signed the charge
sheet, and he must therefore attend.
The Father.—l would much rather he did not
have to attend.
Mr. Elliott.—Yes, but he must; and I shall hold
the prisoner to bail to give your son an opportunity
of attending. into
his prisoner was liberated on his entering
his personal recognizance of £4O t• attend at a
future examination.