The Sun.
London, England, 1866-02-26 00:00:00

dente ? With great reason, therefore, didxthoev. same2s,
Minister, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, write, on
1862, to the Marquis de Cadore, charg,! (l'affaires
of the Imperial Government
inclined to
theth princi-
ple al-
though, on one hand France
of non-intervention, she recognised, on the
other, that the question of the temporal power is
such as not to resemble any other, and that the rules
of that principle are not applicable to it ? And the
very words of the same plenipotentiary at the Con-
gress of Paris, in reference to the other object of
M. Drouyn de Lhuys, do not fail to record that one
of the titles held in the highest esteem by the Sove-
reign of France is that of ' the Eldest Son of the
Catholic Church,' and that far from feeling im-
peded by the principle of non-intervention from
obeying the appeal of the Holy See, that title car-
ried with it the duty of affording aid and support
to the Sovereign Pontiff. Hence it is easy to deduce
the origin of the intervention referred to. And, in
fact, it should be well understood that from the
reason above cited the Roman Pontiff cannot be
considered in the same relationship towards single
states as that of a simply political prince, nor can
his possessions be regarded in the same manner as
the dominions of any other power. Thus it is not
possible without a total confusion of ideas and a
most serious disorder in the sphere of action to apply
to the Pontiff and his temporal sovereignty the true
or false principles that may be established as a rule
of international conduct for lay States. The religi-
ous tie that connects the Sovereign Pontiff with every
place inhabited by Catholics and identifies his tem-
poral sovereignty with the independence necessary
for the fulfilment of his high ministry renders those
relations very numerous and various, and all that
relates to the conditions of his political existence
becomes a matter of common and peculiar interest
to each Power.
" The second alleged inconvenience of two sove-
reignties placed upon the same ground is also diffi-
cult to comprehend. If the French troops are at
Rome with the sole object of defending and uphold-
ing the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See, their
presence, !so long as they confine themselves to that
object, would rather imply the removal of the idea
of two co-existing sovereignties. To protect the
sovereignty of a prince, in fact, is equivalent to pro-
tecting the independent exercise of a supreme
power, and to protect the independent exercise of a
supreme power excludes the presence of any other
distinct sovereignty. Hence, far from viewing the
nature of things as in opposition to the goodwill of
persons, it even seems that this goodwill finds in
the nature of things the rules for regulating their
conduct. By following this very clear and natural
rule the conflicts of jurisdiction, of which the des-
patch speaks, are rendered impossible unless by
these are to be understood certain small incompati-
bilities in practical application, unpleasant it is
true, but almost inevitable with foreign or mixed
garrisons, and which every experienced commander
can properly estimate and easily remove. Thus
disappears every intrinsic reason of antagonism be-
tween the duty which the minister justly assigns
to the generals of using the greatest vigilance for
the security of their army, and their duty as repre-
sentatives of the Pontifical authority, of zealously
maintaining in the acts of internal administration
the independence and dignity of the supreme

power. Among objects so distinct it cannot be
perceived how, through their intrinsic character,
they should clash with each other. Such objects, in
fact, are not only distinct, but are capable of being
reconciled with each other in a very high degree.
Nothing can be nearer to the wishes of the represen-
tatives of the Pontifical authority than the security
of the army whose duty it is to protect that autho-
rity. And nothing can be more agreeable to the
generals in command than to see jealously main-
tained in the interior administration of the country
the independence of the territorial Government,
which, with their army, they have the care of pro-
tecting. The nature of things cannot therefore be
called to account for any serious conflict of jurisdic-
tion, and eulogistic mention might here be made of
periods and persons equally free from any such con-
flicts. If sometimes from the motive mentioned
above remonstrances or complaints have been made
it is very certain that the Imperial Government
would not reproach the Pontifical representatives
with being zealous in the discharge of their duty,
which is to maintain intact the independence of
their own Prince in the acts relative to his sovereign
authority.
" Finally, M. Drouyn de Lhuys enumerates
among the sources of inconvenience arising from the
occupation of Rome the difference between the po-
licy of the two Governments, neither following the
same inspirations nor the same principles. The Mi-
nister does nut particularise, and I cannot, there-
fore, see in this vague generality what inspirations
are alluded to. Wishing, however, to remove any
misunderstanding on this head, I shall observe that
if allusion is made to merely governmental regula-
tions and their application, every country and every
State has its peculiar requirements relative to cus-
toms, habits, and circumstances, and of these the
local governing power must be the best judge. Nor
can the diversity of such rules of governmeutamong
other nations afford ground for censure, since, from
the difference in the subject, prudence requires that
the action of the governing power should vary ac-
cordingly. Besides, when the appeal of the Sovereign
Pontiff was generously responded to, the nature of
the Pontifical Government was not unknown, and
M. Drouyn de Lhuys has himself recognised that if
it had its codes and its particular law, this arose
from its very nature. And that this is such as not
to have opposed, but always protected and propa-
gated true civilisation and real progress, is evidently
proved by history. On the other hand, its rules may
well be said to be not for the present day alone, but
for all time, and they are certainly not rejected by
truly Catholic consciences. If in alluding to the
fundamental principles of social order, these should
signify liberty of conscience, liberty of public wor-
ship,
and the like, usually comprehended in what is
termed the new law, the Holy See has several times
expressed its reprobation of those principles in an
absolute sense, and as a rule of natural justice. If
among them there is any that might be tolerated,
such a course can only be adopted as a measure dic-
tated by local and personal necessities of govern-
ments which, in order to avoid greater evils, are
constrained to constitute their civil organisation and
legislation according to a system of ideas which, if
it may not correspond to the order of perfect social
harmony intended by God, is nevertheless the best
suited to the peculiar circumstances in which a
given people or nation may be placed. I cannot be-
lieve that the Minister intended to speak of such
principles in pointing out the divergence of views
between the two Governments, it being the duty of
every good Catholic to submit his own intellect in
those matters to the decision of him whom God him-
self has given to the nations as guide and master,
not only in all that appertains to faith, but also in
all that concerns morality and justice. I do not
dwell further upon such a point, since it should be
placed beyond controversy. And this will suffice
with respect to the considerations enumerated inthe
despatch in question. I now proceed to speak of
the efforts stated to have been taken to secure the
sovereignty of the Holy See, in view of the pro-
jected evacuation of the French troops.
"In order not to digress too much from the
principal point, I am here compelled to
omit many things. And in general I omit
all that refers in the despatch quoted to the
happy change in the disposition of the Piedmontese
Government towards Rome, and the adoption of a
policy towards the Holy See more in accordance
with international duties. The facts that have oc-
curred up to the most recent date furnish reliable data
to form a judgment upon this point. But, however
this may be, it is certain that the Holy See will find
itself abandoned after having been reduced to an
almost total deficiency of internal means and exposed
to a continual menace of
peril from' without which
renders the defence of the remaining territory very
tdei
rffii
ocru difficult
sn
od
bus
en:ye
erdt a
bi ny.
all And itthhe p rrespectcseatto t ein -
posses-
sions of the Holy See form a disproportionatewhole
without correspondence of parts. A great capital
like Rome, deprived of its best and richest pro-
vinces, suggests the idea of a head withut a body,
or with a pigmy body, whose vital organs only serve
for a very imperfect nourishment and laboured re-

spiration. This fatal dismemberment cannot but
very greatly embarrass the regular action of the
Government;since without taking into account other
inconveniences of no slight importance there are
two very serious ones of which special mention
must be made.
" In the first place, a most serious disorder is caused in
the public Treasury, since, besides the difficulties neces-
sarily arising from the diminution of the revenue, there aro
the heavy expenses which the Pontifical Government has
to support for the maintenance of the whole employjs, and
which were formerly borne by the whole Pontifical State.
Notwithstanding, also, the cessation of the revenues de-
rived from the usurped provinces, there remains at the
charge of the Holy See, not only the stipends of a not in-
coasiderable number of public servants who remained
faithful to the Pontifical Government in those provinces,
but also the whole public debt to the payment of which
all the States of the Holy See formerly contributed.
" It is true that St. Peter's pence and the Catholic loan
have hitherto been the means by which the Holy See has
been providentially enabled to meet its obligations ; but it
is also true that this means, besides not always correspond-
ing to the necessity, is precarious and uncertain, and can in
no way be considered normal. Further, loans cannot
always bo obtained, and these in any case only render the
financial situation more serious on account of the interest
that must inevitably be paid.
" The other serious evil occasioned by the loss of the
invaded provinces is the great difficulty for the Pontifical
Government to obtain a proper garrison. of native militia,
which cannot certainly be furnished by the small portion
of territory remaining to the Holy See. It might, it is true
repair this evil by the enlistment of foreign troops,
this being the right of every Government, and above
all of the Sovereign Pontiff, of whom all the nations are
children in Christ ; but, however clear this right may be,
the distress already pointed out, and the difficulties of
Pontifical finance, clearly define the limits of its possible
exercise.
" To what:perils, therefore, would not a state be exposed
by what it expects from without when reduced to such dis-
tress at home, and so poor in the means of defence. The
Holy See finds itself almost enclosed in a circle of iron, and
barred so to speak from every part of the possessions usurped
by the very Government, which not only by fomenting and
sustaining rebellion, and by armed and violent invasion,
has reduced it to such a miserable condition, but has, be-
sides, declared by a solemn act before all the world its
wish to consummate its usurpation by possessing itself of
the holy place where the venerated successor of St. Peter
has sat and reigned for centuries. The sacrilegious wish is
not only not retracted by the convention above mentioned,
but even after its conclusion the representatives of that
Government have publicly declared, verbally and in writ-
ing, that the desire still exists and endures. Now, even ad-
mitting the hypothesis that, from some reason, no fresh
armed invasion takes place (which it would certainly be
impossible for us to resist), it is not credible that the wish
already mentioned, so strongly expreseed and so persis-
tently maintained, should remain inoperative. And indeed
if only the calumnious assertions insinuated by the Pied-
montese plenipotentiary in the Congress of Paris relative
to the administration of the Romagna were the germ of the
revolt which three years afterwards imposed itself upon the
majority of the good Catholics, it is certainly not unreason-
able to maintain that a wish discussed, emitted, and sanc-
tioned, with so much solemnity in a public Parliament, will
be a perpetual fomenter of revolution and a continual me-
nace against the tranquillity of the country.
" Its supporters have already declared that they intend
to carry out their intention by moral means, and it is not
necessary to explain at length what such means may be
under the interpretation of that Government. Certainly by
such moral means must be understood those adopted on
another occasion to the prejudice of the Holy See by a per-
son from whom, having been invested by the Piedmonteso
Government with a certain representative character, the
Holy See should have expected anything but treason. As
means of this kind must be esteemed those put into opera-
tion by the Piedmontese Government in secretly promot-
ing and protecting the expedition directed against Sicily,
assuming before diplomacy to know nothing about it,
and oven to wish to prevent it. Among the means of
this nature are to be enumerated those adopted by
General Fanti, when he allowed bands of revolutionists to
penetrate into Umbria and the Marches, whose object was
to attempt a rising in the towns into which they intro-
duced themselves, and when the same general afterwards
intimated to the Pontifical general that he should consider
himself at liberty to enter the States of the Church with
his army if the national demonstrations were repressed by
force. None can prevent the adoption of these and other
similar means by the Turin Government, which expressly
reserves to itself this right. It will not certainly cost it any
great effort to procure the entry at ono point or another of
the frontier of scattered bands, arms, and money, while at
the same time protesting or making show of opposition.
Netiher can the Pontifical Government establish a largo
and efficient cordon along the frontier of the territory re-
maining to it, since, as above stated, it has but a very small
militia at its disposal. And even without that, will it be
very difficult for the emissaries of an unfriendly Govern- I
ment to excite popular demonstrations in any particular
town subject to the Pontiff, either by intimidation, intrigue,
seduction, or gold ? How shall the Government of the

Holy See art in such a case ? Shall it allow them to pro-
ceed with impunity ? Moral force, it will be said, has pro-
nouncea against the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See.
Shall it energetically repress them ? The pretext will then
b 3 advanced that a Government which cannot subsist
otherwise than by the continual use of material force, is
irreconcilable with modern civilisation. The fable of the
wolf and the lamb is familiar enough, and may be instruc-
tive even in the present case.

" With regard, however, to the recall in question, it
will therefore happen that the Pontifical; State, in the
position to which it has been now reduced by Piedmontese
usurpations, will be subjected to continual annoyances
from the enemy which keeps it continually surrounded by
snares and perturbations; and the little army of the Holy
See will have no other task than that of vainly hurrying
here and there to repel bands of invaders, which will
speedily find a refuge in the territory of the enemy
until the moment arrives for a grand irruption by the
regular army, which, in the long run, will certainly find
some shameless pretext for repeating the iniquitous mas-
sacre already perpetrated at Castelfidardo. And even if
generous and magnanimous France should afterwards de-
clare herself ready to take up arms in order to wrest from
Piedmont her prey, that would not prevent the Pontiff, his
Government, and faithful subjects, from being subjected,
during tho interval preceding such an expedition, to an in-
calculable amount of trouble and injury. Moreover, let us
even suppose that the hostile Government should have re-
nounced, for some reason, not only the use of force against
the Pontifical State, but also that of the various plans
adopted in order to cause revolts, should we be safe, even
then ? No ; certainly not ; because in almost every pro-
vince subject to the usurpation of Piedmont there exists a
party, which, in these days, styles itself the Party of Ac-
tion, and which, professing views of the extremest revolu-

tionary character, is very serviceable to that strange class
of pseudo-Conservatives who likewise seek for revolution,
but on a moderato scale. Those, owing to their violent
character and impatient aspirations, will certainly bo un-
able to keep quiet, the more especially as the so-called na-
tional will, alluded to above, acts as a sharp spur to their
flanks, and as a strong blast to their inflamed cupidity.
Now, if this party can hardly, and only with great diffi-
culty, be kept down in states which dispose of colossal
powers, what will it be if once it bursts into the feeble

States of the Church ? It would, then, be a difficult
matter to prevent this party from raising serious tumults

in one place or another, wherever there is most chance of

success, and then the King of Piedmont will believe him-
self authorised to intervene, under the pretext of defend-
ing the Holy Father and restoring order and public tran-
quillity. Thus will he achieve his iniquitous purpose
Another pretext for probable intervention may be the fol-
lowing:- Bands of marauders—the actual consequence of
the reaction excited by the violent annexation of the neigh-
bouring kingdom of Naples—are continually molesting
the Pontifical frontiers. The repression of such bands has
already cost the Government of the Holy See sacrifices of
no light nature in any respect, and has given occasion for
frequent territorial violations on the part of the Piedmon-
tese troops—and that, notwithstanding the presence of the
French army and the disapprobation of its leaders. It is
evident how much such violations must necessarily increase,
both in frequency and extension, after the departure of the

French troops, particularly if special regard be had to tho
scantiness of the Pontifical army—hardly sufficient for in-

ternal security—and these violations will give rise to many
conflicts and complaints, and we well know what solution,
in such a contest, would be brought about by a prodigi-
ously stronger power having to deal with a feeble antago-
nist.

" Lastly, let us suppose that the Government above-
mentioned should no longer make use of arms, rebellious
intrigues, or pretexts for intervention. Indeed, we think
it probable that, at least at first, it will try to make a dis-

play of moderation and to maintain the appearance of be-
ing a good neighbour. But what of that ? Those ac-

quainted with the plot have not hesitated to prescribe,
themselves, the tactics to be followed—and that oven in

writing. What they say is :—lt is not wo who should go to

Rome, but Rome which must come to us by doing away
. .

with the Pontifical Government. Such an object must be

achievcd, not by disturbing material tranquillity, but by

working with a view to cause the dismemberment of the

country by opposing obstacles to the regulation of the fin-

ances, the administration, and the exercise of justice, and
by enticing the soldiers to desertion by. means of promises

and bribes. Sundry persons have already sold themselves
to this base trade, and receive monthly stipends from the
instigators and abettors of such sacrilegious stratagems.

Against such snares and perfidious machinations the Pon-
tifical Government has to struggle alone and almost un-

armed. It will do all in its power to defeat the iniquitous
plots levelled against it; but if success bo wanting in so
difficult an undertaking, with whom will lie the fault?
With the Pontifical Government, which was unable
to perform prodigies, or with those who, step by step, have
reduced it to such extremities ?
"We very well understand the arts which will be used
to cast upon tho Pontifical Government itself the imputa-