The Sun.
London, England, 1859-03-18 00:00:00

fectly dependent upon gold, because there was only
a limited amount of securities on paper, and that
limited amount was not one-third of the circulation
required. Well, in 1823 a relaxation took place, and
the Bank of England notes were declared a legal ten-
der at every place save at the Bank of England. In
1826, small notes were abolished in England, which
was a most fatal step, for the whole small circu-
lation was turned into gold, and in 1844 the
present Currency, Act was passed. The Currency
Act of 1844, which was applied to Scotland by
the Act of 1845, was to this effect :—lt declared
that the Bank of England was to be obliged to
receive all the gold that was brought to its door
from any part of the world ; and that for every
note issued above £14,000,000, they must have five
sovereigns in their coffers, which they were forced
to retain in the issue department. The intention of
the Act was to make the Bank of England the great
emporium of the gold throughout the world. It
fixed 31. 17s. 101 d. as the price of the ounce of
gold, at which it had to take all the gold which was
brought to it. At the same time the other banks in
the empire had a certain amount of notes given them
that they might issue without having sovereigns for
them. That was the immediate change made by the
Act of 1844, and you know what has been the state
of the country since that time. It has been this, that
the currency may be said to be almost entirely de-
pendent upon the retention of gold, because the
Bank of England is obliged by the Act to retain as
much gold in their coffers, and not to issue it to the
public, as they have notes out; and in general the
Bank of England has about two millions of notes out.
They must have seven or eight millions in their cof-
fers which they are not allowed to issue in whatever
extremity. The consequence of that is this, that the
Bank of England are under the necessity of con-
tracting their issue whenever the gold in their coffers
approaches even the low level of seven or eight mil-
lions. And why are they obliged to do that ? Be-
cause, whenever they find their gold going down,
they know they are coming to the limit—they know
there will be a great demand upon them by the
country banks, and if they go below eight millions
they are bankrupts, because they cannot go below
that. (Hear, hear.) In order, therefore, to prevent
that calamity, they are obliged to take measures of
precaution ; and hence they put on the screw the
moment they see the gold descending, and when
other banks see that, they put on the screw also from
the pressure of the same necessity. (A laugh.) I
will now run over the different crises, and show
you how it is that all the crises may be at once ex-
plained, and may be referred to the erroneous cur-
rency system which prevails. There was first of
all the crisis of 1818, which immediately followed
the resumption of cash payments by the Act of that
year, and I crave your attention to the immediate
effect which that had on the exports and imports of
the country. In 1818, before the Act passed, the
exports of the country were 45,000,0001., and the
imports 35,800,0001. In 1819, the year after the
bill passed, the exports were 34,252,0001., and the
imports 29,000,000/. ; so that both the exports and
imports fell off 10,000,0001. the moment the bill
passed. Now, what was the reason of that ? Mr.
Wallace, President of the Board of Trade, said in
the House of Commons (and these are his own
words), that " such was the state of the country,
that it bore all the symptoms of a dying nation."
(Hear, hear.) In 1823, as I have said, the Bank of
England notes were declared legal tenders, except
at the Bank of England itself, and that was an im-
mense relief. There was a great increase of the
paper issue, but soon after that there came a great
drain, in consequence of the South American specu-
lations. The South American mines were opened
at that time, and there was no end of speculation
then, in consequence of which there were 12 mil-
lions of sovereigns drawn out of England to carry
on these South American speculations. The result
of this drain was that the Bank of England were
almost obliged to applyto Government for a suspen-
sion of cash payments, when some clerk bethought
him that there was a box of old notes in the bank.
These notes, to the amount of two millions, were
issued, and saved the country from bankruptcy.
(Applause.) Well, gentlemen, things went on, and
the Americans must have a crusade against the
notes too. In 1835 and 1836 they had an immense
number of banks, which had spread an amount of
prosperity throughout the Union, altogether un-
paralleled in the history of the world—greater even
than any progress made by Britain in the same
time. One-third of the whole number of notes
issued were represented in gold. But they must
needs make a crusade against the banks. It was not
a crusade for money, but a political measure. The
seaboard had become too strong for the small free-
holders in the back provinces, and the cry was, not
as in France, " Down with the aristocracy !" but it
was " Down with the banks !" Under the influence
of this pressure President Jackson and the Congress
passed a bill to this effect, that no payment of taxes
should be received except in gold ; and secondly,
that no payinent of the public landhold should be
received except in gold—in short, they were deter-
mined to revert to a metallic currency. What was
the effect of that upon America and upon England?
The effect upon America was that there was such
an overturning of everything that no less than
nine-tenths of the whole commercial wealth of the
country was destroyed ; and the imports into Ame-
rica from this country, which in 1836 had been 12
millions, sank down in 1837 to four millions. The
effect of this was an immense drain of gold from
En gland to Amenca to meet this crash—the amount
sent being about 9 or 10 millions. The consequence
of that in England was, that the gold in the Bank
of England was brought down in 1839 to 2,225,0001.
Now, what was the effect of that ? We were saved
from bankruptcy only by a loan of two millions
from the Bank of France. The consequence was a
long period of lassitude, and a great amount of suf-
fering, which continued for about four years—the
longest period of suffering that ever was expe-
rienced. Things, however, got better, and consider-
able relief was experienced by the railway ex pen •
i diture in 1845-6. In 1846 the free trade system n the
importing of grain was introduced ; and the great
object I have in view is to show you that that
change in our system in regard to grain must be
followed in regard to a change in our currency, if
we are to avoid the continual recurrence every one
or two years, of the disasters that occurred in 1848.
(Cheers.) In 1846 the Irish famine occurred. That
caused a great importation of grain, amounting to
10,000,000 quarters ; before that no more than
2,500,000 had ever been imported in any year. This
grain went far to abate the suffering, but it was al-
most all paid in gold and silver. It was stated in
the House of Commons that there were 33,000,000
stg. paid for foreign grain at that time. I will show
you what was the effect of that upon the country.
In 1847 the exports were 58,800,0001., and imports
90,921,0001; in 1848 the exports were 52,800,0001.,
and the imports 93,547,000/. ; in 1849, the exports
were 63,500.000, and the imports, 105,000,0001. Now,
attend to what is the effect of this great balance
of imports over exports ; that is the vital thing you
have to consider. Recollect, I am not complaining
of free trade. I take free trade as the settled, fixed
policy of the country. I argue upon it as such; and
what I say is this, that you must make your cur-
rency laws similar in a certain degree to your corn
laws or the country will be ruined. (Cheers.) In
1849 there was a balance of 40 millions of imports
over exports. The paupers of that year numbered
1,731,000, and the emigrants were 280,000. You
see how close, how immediate have been the bad
effects of this great drain of the precious metals. I
will now give you the counterpart of all this, which
is, if possible, still more illustrative of my argu-
ment. I need not tell you what was the effect of the
gold discoveries in 1852. I will merely mention
that, in consequence of these discoveries, the an-
nual produce of gold over the whole world, and for
the use of all its inhabitants, was increased from 8
or 9 millions to 36 millions. The gold came in in
such quantities that the paper was issued in similar
quantities, and that is the history of the prosperity
of these times. I will tell you what the state of the
currency was brought to by this great change. In
1846 the gold and silver in the country amounted
to 39 millions, in 1856 they amounted to 69 mil-
lions ; the total currency in metals and paper in
1846 was 79 millions, in 1856 it was 109 millions.
So you see there was an increase in the currency of
30 millions in consequence of the gold discoveries.
Here is the history of the resurrection of England
in the Crimean war, and in the suppression of the
Indian war-30 millions of gold were added to the
currency bythe good providence of God, who opened
these huge banks of issue in California and Aus-
tralia. And what was the effect of that ? Why, it
was that prosperity again was spread over the land,
not by the wisdom of men, but by the blessing of
God. (Cheers.) That was the occasion of the
immense exports and imports of those years which
I have already read to you. It was that which en-
abled us at once to raise our taxation from 55 mil-
lions which it was before, to 75 millions, just in the
same proportion as the currency was increased,
and without the slightest oppression being felt
by the people. It was that which enabled us to
fit out an army which put a stop to Russian am-
bition on the shores of the Crimea. It was that
which enabled us to increase our Indian army from
29,000—that small driblet which it was in 1851—
to the magnificent army of 100,000 men, who now
assert the power of England on the shores of the
Ganges. (Loud cheers.) It was the good provi-
dence of God that gave us that strength because it
gave us the money, which all the foolishness of
men had not been able to take away. The very
effect, however, of this great prosperity that was
poured upon the country in consequence of the gold
discoveries, was to open up another and equally for-
midable source of evil ; and that is the cause that
produced the crisis of 1857. I will tell you what
that source of evil is. The effect of the present ,

currency laws making the currency of the country
entirely dependent upon the retention of gold, is
that the moment that the gold begins to leave the
country credit is shaken and everything comes
down. Now, on the other hand, when gold is plen-
tiful prosperity flows in, there is a great increase of
profit, a great rise of wages' and a great increase of
consumption—consumption by the working. classes
above all. And that was what took place in 1845
and 1846 during the railway mania, when the im-
portations increased to an enormous degree. I will
show you how true this is. In 1846 the imports
were 75,900,000/. ; the three following years they
were respectively 90, 93, and 105 millions. The
same effect took place to a still greater degree dur-
ing the four years of prosperity from 1852 to 1857,
when, as already stated, the balance of imports over
exports became so prodigious that it amounted to
55,406,0001. in 1854 ; to 47,972,2501. in 1855 ; to
56,764,0001. in 1856 ; and to the enormous sum of
65,000,0001. in 1857. Now, consider what is the
effect of a great excess of importations over expor-
tations. Why, the balance must be paid in gold
and silver ; and that is the fatal circumstance in
our present condition to which I wish to draw
your attention. Under the present law, two or
three years of prosperity are inevitably followed
by disaster, and the reason of that is that the
prosperity raises the wages of labour, increases
the consumption, and thereby increases the impor-
tations to an immense degree. During the last
three years the balance of importations, from 40 to
65 millions a year, had to be paid in cash. I do not
say that there is any loss in sending money out of
the country and getting in grain ; but what I com-
plain of is this, that you establish a system of cur-
rency which makes the credit of every bank, the
credit of every merchant, the wages of every
labourer, the profit of every shopkeeper in the
country dependent on the retention of gold by the
Bank of England—(hear, hear)—and at the same
time you establish a system which makes that re-
tention perfectly impossible. (Cheers.) I have
shown you what the balance is, and I will now tell
you how it happens that the balance in an old
country like this will always be against the rich.
The reason is this ; the rich country brings to the
market a far greater demand for consumption and
a far greater power to purchase than the poor
country. For example, we deal with Russia to an
immense extent. We import four or five millions
of quarters of grain from the south of Russia or
Poland. Our imports from Russia are eight mil-
lions ; our exports to Russia are 1,500,000. Why is
that ? Because Russia is a poor country, and is
not able to buy our manufactures, while England is
a rich country, and able to buy its grain to an in-
definite extent. Look at India. Colonel Sykes,
the late chairman of the East India Company, told
us latelyin the House of Commons, that last year
our exports to India were 12 millions, and our im-
ports from India were 23 millions, the 11 millions
of balance being paid in cash. Now what is the
reason that they will not take our produce, while
they take our gold to any extent ? The reason is
this :—ln India we have 181 millions of subjects,
and they have only 370,0001. paper currency among
them. The paper does not go beyond Bombay,
Calcutta, and other great towns ; the rest of the
population have no currency at all, except gold
and silver, and from the unsettled state of the
country, the tyranny to which they are subjected,
and to constant wars, the great wealth of the coun-
try is turned into gold and silver ornaments for
the persons of the people. There is the history of
the absorption of the precious metals in India, and
that shows you the great importance of attending
to the currency now that we have entered into a
closer connexion with that country. By uniting with.
India we have got 100 millions added to the na-
tional debt, and in addition to that we have got a
province to our empire, which will annually
absorb from 20 to 30 millions of our gold and silver.
Therefore, India must be a perpetual drain upon
our monetary sources, and what I want you to con-
sider is this—if our present currency laws continue
and we have a constant excess of imports over ex-
ports, occasioning an annual drain of from 40 to 50
or 60 millions, how is that state of things to be re-
conciled with the currency laws which say, the
moment the gold and silver go out of the country,
up go the discounts, and the merchants must pay
10 per cent. upon the money they get—and they
are very lucky if they can get it on these terms?
For 100 years before the passing of the Act of 1844,
there had been no change in the rate of discount.
It had always been 5 per cent. except a few months
in 1839, when it was 6 per cent. Since 1844 the rate
of interest has been changed 50 different times in
the Bank of England, and it has varied from 2
to 10 per cent. a year. This variation has been the
ruin of many commercial houses of the first credit
and respectability, and a most serious impediment
to all engaged in large undertakings. I remember
asking the head of a great mercantile firm who had
failed in 1857, to what he ascribed his failure, and
he replied to the rise in the discounts, which he
said made a difference of 40,0001. a year to him;
and in our country how many masters and mer-
chants are there to whom the rise in discount from
2 or 3 to 8 or 10 per cent. would make a difference
of 15,0001. or 20,000/. ! Under the system of Sir
Robert Peel in 1844, the Bank iof England must
raise their discount when the gold, goes down, be-
cause if they do not they will become bankrupt.
But in doing so, they only shift the burden off their
own shoulders, and place it on the shoulders of
trading and manufacturing men. (Loud applause.)
Now, here I will make one remark. We have been
told that all these evils are the resuit'of undue specu-
lation and the abuse of credit. But 1 go a step far-
ther, and ask what is the abuse of credit owing to?
Why, it is owing to this, that the banks are forced,
when gold is plentiful, to reduce discounts to a great
extent, and thus inflame speculation. When the Bank
of England lowers their discount the Scotch and
Irish banks do the same, and the country is thus
flooded with credit, and speculation is encouraged.
There was a banking establishment in this city, of
which much has been said. We have heard enough
from the London journals of the ignorance and reck-
lessness with which that bank was carried on. I know
nothing about the matter. lam neither a friend to
the Western Bank, nor an enemy; but I think that
they were most imprudent and reckless in their
conduct. But this I will say, that the recklessness
of the Western Bank, which created so much misery,
was a recklessness forced upon them by the mone-
tary laws of England. We never heard of such a
thing before the currency acts came into operation,
and I am happy to say, for the honour of Scotland,
that the bid Scotch laws have enabled them, not-
withstanding all that recklessness, to redeem their
honour, for they have paid their debts in full.
(Cheers.) There are many people who will tell you
that all the evils that I have described are owing
to the weight of the debt and the taxation. But
that it is not so I will prove to you. The country
never was so prosperous as it was from 1810 to
1815, and at that time we maintained 1,000,000
armed men, and raised by taxation 76 millions. You
remember the great prosperity from 1852 to 1856.
Well, the sums raised by taxation during these
years were from 72 to 76 millions annually. There-
fore, you see the evils I alluded to are not the re-
sult of debt and taxation, for when currency is suffi-
ciently plentiful, we can pay the debt and taxation
perfectly well. I wouldnot have dwelt so long upon
the distress which has occurred, if I did not think it
possible to find a remedy. I think it is perfectly
remediable, and though I will not venture to state
positively what that remedy ought to be, I think I
can suggest the principle upon which it ought to be
based. (Cheers.) Bythe present currencylaws specula-
tions are inflamed, and undertakings of the greatest
magnitude are set on foot as they were in 1846,1855,
and 1856, and just when they are approaching their
completion, and when the greatest possible advances
are required to carry them on, then is the time
that the imports exceed the exports, and the dis-
counts are raised. The way of remedying this is as
follows :—The principle of Sir Robert Peel is this,
the more gold in the country the more notes. Well,
what is the effect of that ? The country continues
in prosperity when currency is plentiful. But
speculation of the wildest kind is set on foot, wages
rise, profits are great for a time, consumption
rapidly increases, the imports come to exhibit a huge
excess over the exports, and the gold is withdrawn.
Sir Robert Peel then says, diminish the notes in
order to bring back: the gold. The discounts
are raised to 10 per cent. or altogethet refused, and
general ruin ensues. How would a similar conduct
do in other similar cases ? Suppose the case of an
army when the supply of beef ceases. Sir Robert
Peel says, " if the beef is taken away take away the
bread also, and then they will be all right."
(Cheers and laughter.) But I say, if the beef is
taken away, issue more bread. (Cheers.) If the
gold is taken away Sir Robert Peel would take
away the notes also' and leave the country without
a penny to pay its debts. Now, my principle is
that, when the gold is taken away, issue more notes,
and then we will be able to get over the crisis.
(Loud applause.) Between the years 1810 and 1815
there was not a guinea sent into the country, never-
theless there was no monetary crisis at all. Why ?
Because there were plenty of notes issued. The
monetary crisis has only been a creation of modern
times, since 1819, when the system of paper
currency was established. A very curious fact is
that, in 1848, when there was a dreadful monetary
crisis, the stock held in the Bank of France, which
had formerly been 10 or 12 millions, suddenly fell
to 2,800,000/. What did the Bank do? They issued
18 millions sterling of notes, bearing a forced circu-
lation. They did not issue 750 millions, as they did of
assignats, but they issued a reasonable amount, which
never became excessive or was depreciated, and the
consequence was that credit was immediately re-
stored, and 120,000 men, who had been thrown out
of employment, were re-engaged, and before the end

of next year the gold and silver all came back,
and the Bank was able to resume cash payments.
(Cheers.) Now, the principle that I say should
be adopted is this :—ln the first place, I would in-
crease the sum that the Bank of England and the
other banks issue without having gold by 50 per
cent. In 1819 Sir Robert Peel thought that 14
millions issued without gold was a proper thing for
the country at that time. The country had then
19 millions of inhabitants; it has now 28 millions.
At that time the country had 40 millions of exports ;
it now has 120 millions. It had 45 millions imports
--it now has 185 millions. Considering the increase
in these things, it is only fair that the issue of notes
without gold should be increased to 21 millions ;
and as to other banks, they should be called on to
deposit securities with the Bank of England for
the amount of their issue. The notes would
thus, in the event of a crash, be perfectly secure.
(Loud applause.) In addition to that, there is
another thing which I think should be done in
order to prevent that terrible drain of gold which
is now of so frequent occurrence. Suppose we fix
15,000,0001. sterling as the amount of gold that
should be in the Bank of England to meet the pro-
bable wants of the country, I would have a regula-
tion by which, whenever the gold should get below
that amount, the inconvertible notes should be in-
creased by the amount of the deficit. Then, when
the gold comes back—which it certainly will do in
six months—these notes may be called in, and not
issued until required again. (Applause.) I leave
it to the bankers and other practical men to arrang,
as to how this should be carried out ' • but that is
the principle on which the Currency Laws ought
to be based. (Hear, hear.) There is only one other
subject on which I wish to say a few words—the
unhappy matter of strikes among working men. I
understand perfectly and appreciate strongly the
cause of these strikes.. I feel the evil of what the
men complain of, and I am not at all surprised that
they take this mode of remedying it. What I wish
to impress on you is, that of all mistakes:that ever
were committed by working men, the most fatal is
that of striking. (Applause.) I know perfectly
well that in many cases strikes are successful.
When the produce of labour is rising in the market
the working men are entitled to say that they ought
to sh are in the common benefit that is going on.
But the great error they commit is this, that they
think, by the same means, they can prevent their
wages falling in periods of adversity, and all the
great strikes which have produced such devasta -
tion in society have arisen from this cause. When
the price of produce falls, as it has done now, the
master is of necessity obliged to lower wages; if he
did not do that, he would become bankrupt in the
space of three or four months. Nevertheless, the
master will retain his workmen as long as he can,
because he loses so much by their going away. He
will never stand out against a strike in the face of
a falling market unless he is compelled to do so. If
you strike when, he could not pay you the wages
you demand but at a loss, you strike not in your in-
terest but in his. He is too happy to be rid of you
in such circumstances. Nevertheless, he will not
hold out unless forced to do so. It is the same evil
to a master if his workmen go away as it is to a
general if his army be disbanded. New hands
are never half so good as old ones. (Cheers.) The
old hands therefore will depend upon it that if the
master reduces their payment he does it from actual
necessity ; and the reason of that is that the changes
of the currency produce a fatal change in the price
of his goods. Now, only consider what is the effect
of these great strikes on the interests of the work-
ing classes. Why, the colliers' strike of 1842, in this
county alone, did not cost less than £500,000. The
strike of 1857, which was the consequence of the
monetary crisis of the year before, cost, in the
counties of Lanark, Ayr, and Stirling, no less than
£700,000, all of which fell on the working classes.
In these strikes you combine to do a thing which
is impossible, and in the attempt to do which you
are yourselves subjected to the severest priva-
tions. Therefore, what I recommend is, not
to combine against your master, who is the
victim merely of the currency laws, but
to combine against the laws which create these
great changes in the currency—(applause)—and
you will carry with you the whole of society.
There is no man of any sense in the country who
won't join with you in the effort to make such a
change in the currency laws as will prevent these
fatal changes in prices, and with them wages and
profits. (Hear, hear.) I will conclude by making
one observation, and it is this, I will give you an
idea of the enormous extent of the loss inflicted on
the country by these monetary crises to which I
have alluded. There have been four great mone-
tary crises in our own recollections—those of 1825,
1838, 1847, and 1857. Not one of these crises ha s
occurred without causing a loss of no less than
100 millions on the country—the last much more ;
the bankruptcies in 1857 alone were 45,000,0001.
The monetary crises which have occurred since the
passing of the bill of 1819 have inflicted upon the
community a loss of not less than 500 millions
sterling. To do away with the probability of such
loss occurring again is an object worth striving
for. (Applause.) The present system is that
holders of money issue money to all persons en-
gaged in speculations, however absurd, and, when
the money comes to be paid, up goes the discount.
There is ruin spread over the country to an extent
which would be inconceivable to those who have
not witnessed it. Sir Archibald concluded his
lecture by remarking that if he had made some
effect on the many intelligent persons before him,
and through them on the country, and that thus a
change of the laws which produced so much disaster
might be effected, his lecture of that evening---the
epitome of the labours of a whole life—would not
have been given in vain. (Great cheering.)
On the motion of Mr. MITCHELL, Chairman of
the Trades' Council; a vote of thanks was passed to
Sir Archibald Alison for his able lecture ; and the
usual compliment was paid to the Chairman.

(From the Glasgow Daily Herald.)
Sir Archibald Alison has delivered his views at great
length on the Currency and kindred questions, which latter,
in his opinion, are more numerous and more momentous
than the generality of mankind have imagined. The address
of the honourable and distinguished Baronet will be read
with interest by all classes, especially by the working, for
whose especial benefit it bears to have been given. Whe-
ther his conclusions will meet with an equal degree of con-
currence from the intelligent classes of his countrymen, is
a very different question. Ho says :—" It is a question on
which depends the liberty, independence, and existence of
the British Empire. I tell you, and I stake my credit on
it, that if the present system of the currency laws continues,
no amount of wisdom in your statesmen, no amount of
valour in your soldiers, can prevent us from rapidly
declining below our neighbours. I say that the liberty,
independence, and the very. existence of Great Britain,
depend upon a right adjustment of the currency laws."
If the currency laws be so far wrong, and fraught
" with the very existence of Great Britain," it is high time
that our statesmen bestirred themselves to save us from
such fell results. Unhappily for the country, our wisest
statesmen, without respect to their political tenets other-
wise, with our political economists of highest repute, do not
see the ills apprehended by Sir A. Alison. That may be their
fault. They may change their views when the flood of light
shed forth in our City Hall on Tuesday night descends on them
like "a golden shower." In the meantime, however, they
are diametrically:opposed to the views propounded by Sir
Archibald Alison.
For our humble selves, we speak with all deference, and
the most unfeigned respect for Sir Archibald Alison, when
we declare, unhesitatingly, that we cannot subscribe to his
views on the Currency. In an address so lengthened, ne-
cessarily embracing so many and important topics, it is im-
possible for us at present to do more than touch upon a few
of the more salient propositions. Sir Archibald commenced
by informing his auditory—by whom be was deservedly
most cordially received—that our population, our shipping,
our imports and exports, or trade generally, had enormously
increased from 1818 up to 1858, a period of 40 years. This
is self-evident. Corresponding with this increase, we are
told, and we were startled by the assertion, that our navy
had alarmingly decreased. It appears that in 1812 (when
were in the thick of the great European war), we. had "245
ships of the line in commission, and 272 frigates, and
altogether 1,000 vessels bearing the Royal flag." 'Then.
comes the climax,—" At the end of this year, 1859, Eng-
land will have 36 ships of the line and 40 frigates, and
France 40 ships of the line. Now,
.gentlemen, here is
a picture 1" It is. Further, the picture is heightened
by the reminiscence that during the American
Revolutionary War we had 126 ships of the line
in commission ; prior to that, in 1760, nearly a cen-
tury since, we had 113 ships of the line in commis-
sion. We have therefore declined in naval power. Now, without instituting any comparison between our navy
'and
that of France, we ask, with all deference, where is the use
of raking up such naval statistics ,• still more, where is the
end of lending them such a peculiar application ?;,; What-
ever the number of our ships of the line, frigateaor cor-
vettes, in commission, or ready for being put into
'commis-
sion, at the present moment, it is notorious that our naval
power, whether in the time of Rodney, Nelson, or at the
opening of the last Russian war, could not for a moment
compare with that which is now, or shortly will be, avail-
able. Why, our gunboats could destroy the most powerful
fleet that Britain ever fitted out ere the application of steam
power. We do not look to the navy list as affording any.
real indication of our naval might. Still, it ought to pass
for something, looking to the statistics which Sir Archibald
has adduced, for prior and more palmy periods. Well, it
gives a number of vessels, of all descriptions, but entitled
to bear the pennant, of nearly nine hundred, including
about 161 gunboats. A very large portion a these are,
of course, in the non-effective schedule. We admit our
navy is not what it should be, but we trust will soon be ; still
we have not so declined since 1766. Then, our army stands
very deficient at present, according to Sir Archibald, as com-
pared with what' its fbree was when we were at war with
France, and finally fought the battle of Waterloo. We win
not enter on that question, beyond saying that our army,
deficient as it may be, has lost none of its former well-won
renown, either on the plains of the Crimea or in the wide
expanse of Central India.
Our pauperism, our emigration, our criminal statistics,
are also all unsatisfactory, or not keeping pace with our
progress otherwise as a powerful nation, "There is," as
Sir Archibald Alison says, using the words of another also
rather distinguished literary authority, " something rotten
in the state of Denmark;" and he adds, on his own autho-
rity, cg I am now to tell you what I conceive to be the cause of all this, and I will conclude by telling you the remedy.
The cause of all this I conceive to be the erroneous state of
the currency. When I say that such vast results are to be
ascribed to the state of the currency, I am aware that I am
making a stsong statement, for I am thus giving an ex
planation of facts that are almost inexplicable." alt is in