The Sun.
London, England, 1859-10-10 00:00:00

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sI
efficientshoßld tahminekasiturjeuasst
in a military _ ..
about as valid a L. lis -Rugl. 1 Government to place
it would be for the , -r
.stminster-bridge to pre-
a London policeman on AN ,
-Kent by the Thames
vent thieves from crossing into _

unnel. matters do
nontem-
, t ht
that
as et baensyt informedindian
post on this Island
platea ; and even if it were, a
notß believeesides
nn c uT nr
sdijoani s
would not prevent ie. The Indians are far too well
versed in strategy to come to San Juan to be bagged.
The wise measure of the military post to catch In-
dians, reminds one of the old nursery advice for
catching birds by putting salt on their tails. The
reason given by one of the partisan papers was a
much better one, a more politic one, than the mili-
tary reason. It was that the General, taking it for
undisputed American
granted that the island was
territory, shifted one of his posts thereto as a mere
ordinary matter of professional duty.
Before people had got through discussing the
reason we find this " Indian-incursion-reason" aban-
doned, and another substituted by General Harney
himself, in an official letter addressed to the Gover-
nor of Vancouver's Island, dated at head-quarters,
in which he states :
" I placed a military command upon the island of
San Juan to protect the American citizens residing
on the island from the insults and indignities which
the British authorities of Vancouver's Island and
the establishment of the Hudson's Bay Company
have recently offered them by sending a British
ship of war from Vancouver's Island to convey the
chief factor of the Hudson's Bay Company to San
Juan for the purpose of seizing an American citizen
and forcibly transporting him to Vancouver's Island
to be tried by British laws."
The General adds, in a tone of virtuous indigna-
tion at this rude attempt of "the establishment of
the Hudson's Bay Company" to spirit away his
compatriot (a squatter, of course) :—" I have re-
ported this attempted outrage to my Government,
and they will doubtless seek the proper redress
from the British Government. In the meantime I
have the honour to inform your Excellency I shall
not permit a repetition of that insult, and I shall
retain a command on San Juan Island, to protect
its citizens in the name of the United States, until
I receive further orders from my Government."
As there is not one word of truth in this charge ;
as the acts attributed to " the British authorities,"
to "the establishment of the Hudson's Bay Com-
pany," to " the Chief Factor" thereof, are all false ;
as "a British ship of war" never went on any such
mission, or on any mission whatever, to the island ;
and as the " seizing of an American citizen" was
never contemplated, never thought of, and never
heard of, this second reason cannot be the true rea-
son for the military occupation.
I am not much versed in military matters, but it
strikes me that 400 soldiers, a colonel and aids, four
captains, three lieutenants, a battery of eight 32-
pounders, six howitzers, many tons of powder and
shot, and a body of free lances, are rather more
than ordinary strategists would consider necessary
for the purpose of preventing " a repetition of that
insult," even if we admit, for argument's sake, that
it had been intended to bring " an American citi-
zen" off the island.
We don't seize people to try them. Had the
authorities entertained an application on the pre-
mises, all they would do would be to allow a sum-
mons to issue. The whole story is a fabrication,
and the general should hasten to punish his infor-
mant, who has befooled him.
Having detailed so much of the proceedings of
our neighbours, I must now in a few words state
what has been done on our part.
The Governor's views were embodied in the mes-
sage which he addressed to the House of Assembly
and to the Legislative Council, of which I sent you
a copy with my last letter.
The House, in an address to the Governor, ear-
nestly calls upon him to impress upon the Home
Government the necessity of demanding the imme-
diate withdrawal of the American troops from the
island so dishonourably invaded ; of demanding
redress for the wanton and insulting conduct com-
plained of; and of strenuously and at all risks main •
taining her Majesty's right to the island in ques
tion and to the other islands in the archipelago.
The House has since entertained a project for rais-
ing a militia in the colony.
The view of the Legislative Council will be seen
from a copy of their answer to the Governor's mes-
sage, enclosed, and which I think it would be well
to publish for general information, but I dare not
trespass on your space so far as to embody it in my
letter, already too long.
The overt measures of thelocal Government have
been few and simple.
The Governor from the first took the view that
General Harney acted without instructions from
the Government at Washington.
The first natural impulse would be to repel force
by force. This course wculd involve great respon-
sibility and might lead to grave consequences,
without, perhaps, leading to a decision of the point
in dispute.
Although the Governor might have been justified
in coming to the conclusion that the amicable mu-
tual arrangement of nentrality had been broken on
the part of the United States by the hostile action
of one of their officers, yet he determined to main-
tain the arrangement of neutrality on the part of
his own Government in its integrity, and to take
no step which 'would " provoke a conflict" if it
could be avoided without dishonour.
This resolution was strengthened by the fact that
the force at his disposal was overwhelming. In
truth this circumstance of itself greatly increased
his reluctance to proceed to extremities.
His reasoning was to this effect :
The handful of United States' troops on San
Juan might indeed be sacrificed; but they must
act in conformity with commands, improper and
unjustifiable, no doubt, in every point of view, and
repugnant to the law of nations and of reason, but
the vengeance which would fall on them would not
fall on the parties really responsible, would not
affect the event, and would enhance the prospect
and the bitterness of a war if this alternative is
really sought by the United States, which, as I have
said, the governor doubted. And therefore a sense
of the responsibility which attaches to the autho-
rised movements of troops belonging to the fore-
most nations of the earth and the enormous inte-
rests at stake induced caution and control.
With a firm conviction of our right to the island,
the Governor felt, as most reasoning men would feel,
that no filibustering could weaken our claim to it if
it were ultimately decided to belong to us, while the
precipitate and inconsistent action of the United
States, or their General, in violation of their own
engagements, would rather weaken than strengthen
ther claim. And there could be no doubt that her
Majesty's Government would take prompt and
energetic measures to assert the just rights of the
nation in due time, or that the Government of the
United States would hasten to set itself right with
that of Great Britain.
These considerations and a desire to avoid com-
plications of the question at issue influenced the
Governor to a course of forbearance, which it is
probable may have really prevented a war between
the two countries.
He, therefore, contented himself with sending a
man-of-war to the island to watch proceedings and
to afford protection to British life and property.
Later, a detachment of troops was brought from
British Columbia, and added to the force already

on board the Pylades, but no troops have as yet
lauded.

Following up his policy of forbearance, avid to
evince his courtesy to the United Stater, as the
General was not at hand (having never come to the
island), and as the officer in command had no power
to treat, the Governor despatched Captain Prevost,
of hrr Majesty's ship Satellite, the British Commis-
sioner for settling this very boundary question, so
often spoken of, to confer with this coadjutor tilt
American Commissioner, at his camp in British
Columbia, and to secure his good offices with Gene-
ral Harney to induce him to desist from his course
while the question of sovereignty was still unde-
cided, and until the respective Governments could
be consulted.

Captain Prevost's mission was, however, unsuc-
cessful. The American commissioner would not
interfere with the military department. And all
that poor Captain Prevost " took by his motion"

was a good deal of misrepresentation, some abuse,
and more hostile criticism than so laudable a mis-
sion deserved from the American newspapers, which
it seems are kept as well informed in diplomatic as
they are in military matters in the present con-
juncture.
The propriety of Captain Prevost's mission has
been questioned.
I view it in this light. The island, with the rest
of the Archipelago, should have been considered as
under the guardianship and subject to the authority
of the two commissioners.
The disputed territory may be said to have been
put in trust in their hands pending the settlement of
the boundary. In their official position the com-
missioners were justified in protesting against any
action by either Government which would hamper
their deliberations or complicate the subject-matter
submitted to their adjudication. Therefore, as well
as for other reasons, I think it was quite justifiable
and proper to ask the American commissioner's in-
terference. The grounds of this refusal Ido not
pretend to question.
But having touched upon this part of the sub-
ject, I am compelled, reluctantly, to state that the
American commissioner has laid himself open to
severe animadversion for the part he has acted in
the matter of the military occupation.
He had been in communication with General
Harney just before the expedition set out. He ac-
companied it. He was present at the landing on
the island. He remained on the island on the occa-
sion from the 26th, when the troops arrived, till
the 2Sth of July, when he departed, but not before
the " Shubrick," which he had under his control,
had first gone in search of another steamer to help
her, which conveyed stores and military baggage
for the troops. The Commissioner may be said
to have assisted in the landing of the expedition,
yet it is boldly asserted that he knew nothing of
its object. If he didn't, ought not a sense of his
duty to have prompted him to inquire
This is not all. The following story is current:
—That he offered free passages to San Juan and
free gifts of land on the island, "and something
besides," to all American citizens who would come
and squat on lt. That he did this, representing
himself in his official character as commissioner,
which added weight to his offers.
Those are grave charges against a man in the
position of arbitrator for his country. Surely his
duty was that of a peacemaker, and not of an agi-
tator.

I am very sorry to have to give such universal
publicity to charges against a gentleman who in a
slight personal intercourse I found very civil and
agreeable ; but his conduct is very serious, as it
directly implicates his Government, and gives colour
to the suspicion that the United States desired to
break with England, to disregard the commission,
or annul it without notice, take possession of the
disputed territory ri et arias, and cut with the
sword the knot which the commissioner's diplo-
macy had failed to unravel.
The first catalogue of improprieties is incontro-
vertible. Ido not vouch for the enlisting of squat-
ters to occupy the disputed island and break the
neutrality. The whole matter requires explanation,
particularly if it be proposed to continue the pre-
sent Commissioner.
Matters stood thus when General Harney assigned
his second reason for his proceedings. As his charge
is demolished, and as we had no design upon any
" citizen" on or off the island, the Governor has
called upon the General to withdraw his troops—a
step which he has not yet taken, and which I do not
believe he will take until he has played out his game.
The colonists are unanimous in their condemna-
tion of the conduct of General Harney, which could
not fail to stir up feelings of animosity between
them and the resident Americans at a time when
the most friendly relations existed. The Americans
are in a large majority in Victoria. They all wish
success to the General's enterprise, for accession of
territory is dear to the American heart ; but most of
them think he was precipitate. In case of need
they would, however, sink all differences, and lend
all possible assistance to his designs on the disputed
territory. They held a few private meetings at
which they agreed upon such alineof action,should
an occasion for their services arise; and they bought
up all the odd parcels of lead in the town to serve for
bullets in case of need. Armed they always are,
wherever they go, at home and abroad ; but, on the
whole, there is nothing to complain of in their con-
duct. Americans visiting Victoria from Puget
Sound and San Juan blustered a good deal, and
hinted at the prospect of an attack on Vancouver's
Island, unless the Britishers should wear their
"faculties meekly ;" to all which, and to ki+dred
rhodomontade, no one paid much attention.
The British subjects, while willing and ready to
rise to a man to resist aggression, have the good
sense to commend the conduct of the Executive in
shaping a course which ought to prevent a collision
between the troops of the two nations. At the same
time there is a very general feeling of dissatisfaction
entertained against the Governor for not having
landed English troops on the island "to be equal
with the Americans." As a general principle this
sentiment has much force and reason. People can-
not well endure that the Americans should he
allowed to have it all their own way when they are
so clearly in the wrong.
Certainly, a contingency may arise in which the
presence of a British force on the island would be
very necessary. It was asserted lately that the
Americans intended to attempt to impose taxes
on the British property (which is the only pos-
session of value) on the island, and to extend their
revenue law to its commerce, which is confined to
the stock and provisions of the English owners in
possession. Any attempt to do either, or to sub-
ject British subjects to American laws, civil or
criminal, would, as a matter of course, be resister ;
ansl if any such attempt be made, those subjects
should have a national force at hand to appeal to
for protection; and the absence of such a force
might subject the English people on the island to
unjust exactions and to other inconveniences
However, a ship of war is always stationed at the
island, and there are other vessels of war at hand
which would suffice to meet either of the contin-
gencies above alluded to. Besides, there a-e
some soldiers quartered at Victoria and an addi-
tional number is coming down immediately from
Briti,h Columbia, which will make a force of about
160 men, besides officers, available at any moment,
in addition to the company of Royal Marine Light
Infantry, lately from the mainland, and besides
the men who could be spared from the ships of
war. In fine, we feel quite easy at Victoria, hap-
pen what may ; and, unless the American military
authorities bring it on wantonly, I do not think
any collision will take place.
From all I can learn, there is nothing to cemplain
of in the bearing or conduct of the American offic,rs
stationed on the island They are merely carrying
out the orders of their chief; and they are said to
have displayed considerable tact and ability,
blended with courtesy, in the performance of their
duties.
All eyes arc turned to the home Government, in
perfect confidence that its action will effectually and
for ever relieve the people of these colonies from
the irritating aggressions of an unscrupulous and
imperious neighbour, always ready and willing to
domineer over the weak and to succumb to the
strong. As our Government has the power, it
would be an insult to doubt that it has the will to
protect us in a just cause.
After wading through this tedious detail of in-
civility, insult, and aggression just practised upon
us, questions of serious import will naturally
gc,t thLlll,ilves to the mind of an English states-
man. For inAance—How is a recurrence of sue!;
Lug,:rous proceedings to be prevented ? Are we
have grent armaments, naval and military, sta..
tic:ad on the other side of the globe to keep our
neighb,urs in another hemisphere on their good
behilviour? Will the people of England submit io
taxed for the defence of such a distant appanage
And, are the colonies of British Columbia and Van-
couver's Island worth the cost ? In my humble
opinion these problems are susceptible of a favour-
able and easy solution.
As to the value of our colonies, I would mention,
hastily,
1. That our harbour of Esquimalt is considered
by our naval officers one of the best in the world—

easy of access by night as well as by day, secure and
commodious, and so easily defended that a moderate
ontlay would make it secure against all the risks of
an attack. No vessel could get near its entrance if
resisted, while it is well suited for dockyards, and
commands the neighbouring coasts.
2. It is not only the best, but the only good har-
bour on the whole west and north-west coast of the
Pacific from Cape Horn northwards to Sitka, ex-
cept San Francisco.
3. If, by any fatality, we should part with it or
lose it, we should not, in case of a war, have a spot
in which to repair a single ship in the whole length
of the Pacific within the immense space I have just
mentioned. Its value to us is incalculable, and en-
hances a hundredfold the value and advantages of
the island of Vancouver, in which it.is, providen-
tially; placed.
4. Both Vancouver's Island and British Columbia
aro surrounded by numerous and good harbours.
Their coasts afford the best fisheries in the whole
Pacific in abundance and quality of fish. They
are close to the North Sea whaling-ground. And,
with the growth of Victoria, now rising into im-
portance without any forcing of patronage, but
from eligibility of situation and a free port, there
is no question but that this eligibility of situation
will attract the whalers to Esquimalt (the port of
Victoria), and that the whaling station will remove
from the Sandwich Islands as soon as a town shall
arise which will affbrd facilities for the refitting of
ships, the sales of cargo, and the operations of ex-
change. The position insures this result.
5. Both colonies have a healthy climate, abund-
ance of timber, for which Australia and the South
Coast of the Pacific afford good markets, and fer-
tile soil ; and British Columbia is one vast field of
minerals—gold, silver, iron, copper, lead, cinnabar,
and coal ; while in Vancouver's Island the coal
fields are said by competent judges to be more ex-
tensive than those of England. This island abounds
in minerals also. Gold exists in Victoria itself.
6. Then there is Queen Charlotte's Island, one of
our dependencies, lying close by, rich in gold, and
covered with timber.
7. Besides the vast resources of these colonies,
which afford profitable openings for the redundant
population of the mother country and investments
for its spare capital, their geographical position
tenders them of the highest political importance to
England. In fact, if sho either loses them or keeps
them and does not strengthen them, she will not
only lose her moral influence but she will be help-
less in this part of the world. With two such ag-
gressive despotisms on either side, America on the
south, and Russia on the north, she would be swept
out of the Pacific. To prevent the possibility of
such a catastrophe they must be made the strong-
hold of her naval supremacy in this ocean.
8. And, looking into the future, if the much-
talked of interoceanic railroad is ever completed,
it is not unreassnable to expect that much of the
commerce of Asia and Europe may pass through
these colonies should circumstances close the other
overland route through Egypt. This expectation
gains strength from the fact that a highway for
such a purpose would pass from ocean to ocean
through British territory.
Now, if you believe with me that these colonies
are worth the cost of protecting them, I trust you
will bear with me while I attempt to explain, in a
few lines, how I think they can be so strengthened
as to be invulnerable, without much expense.
Two things are wanted—first, is make Esquimalt
the station of our Pacific squadron ; and, secondly,
population from the mother country, and from the
other colonies that can spare emigrants.
Esquimalt is admirably adapted for the naval
station. It is as near to England for postal commit-
nication via Panama, as Valparaiso, the present
naval station, is. The freight of stores from
England would be very little more to this place
than it is to that. A great advantage gained by
the transfer would be that the money now spent on
and by the squadron among foreigners would be
disbursed among our own people. The expendi-
ture would give a great impulse to agriculture and
to trade, and to the settlement of the two colonies,
and would be an economical way of patronising
them and giving them a start by themother country.
The utility of the squadron in protecting our
commerce would be increased by the change of
station. Our greatest and more immediate interests
will soon be here, and not on the south coast.
But the effect of having this the head-quarters of
the squadron is what I wish to draw attention to
more particularly. The effect would be to keep our
neighbours within the bounds of their own terri-
tories, of which they have enough and to spare
without encroaching on us—to keep them on their
good behaviour, in short. This effect produced,
our prosperity is assured.
A few gunboats would be a most serviceable
addition to the force ; and I believe they could be
built on the spot with the timber of the island,
which is said to be well adapted for shipbuilding--
a n oak of the country.
This plan of shifting the station from foreign to
British territory would cost little additional ex-
pense. Except in the one item of freight on stores,
I don't see that it would cost any more, and its effect
for good would be incalculable.
No additional force, except a few gunboats, would
be required, nor would it be necessary to keep men-
of-war always lying here. They would cruise as
they do now; but the impression that some of them
might drop in any day would answer all the purpose
we want the station for.
The propriety, and now the necessity of the
change of location are so apparent that I believe our
naval officers all admit it. I know that some of
them do.
The next requisite to our protection is popula-
tion. This is more difficult to be obtained than the
other. Ships can be ordered to come, but men
must be coaxed to do so. There is every reason to
hope that with a radical reform in our land system
men would come. The present system is so devised
that it acts most admirably as a recruiting sergeant
for the United States, takes all the farmers away
from these colonies, and leaves the miner, in the
midst of a rich soil, to eat stale vegetables grown
800 miles off in California, or go without; to fester
of the scurvy, as many have done, because the land
is not yet for sale, because it is not surveyed, and
because, in short, it is tied up in red tape.
In Victoria, with a soil as rich as the richest in
England, such is the dearth of farming energy, by
reason of the villany of the land system, that all
our provisions come from California, Oregon, and
Washington; and very fine prices the lucky citi-
zens of these foreign countries do screw out of us.
.£l2 a ton for hay ! no, not hay either, but oat
straw.

I will not annoy you with a description of the
present system. I entered fully into the subject
15 months ago, and suggested a remedy. That
remedy was to lower the price. It is too late to
apply- that remedy now. The patient is too far
gone. The only thing which can now save British
Columbia is a system of free grants, or at the price
of survey, 6d. an acre; but say ls., which is double
the cost of survey, conditional upon occupation and
g"adual improvements, tillage, &c., to all British
übjects. There are thousands of men in Canada

ready to start for this country when they can get
land ; there are supposed to be 10,000 persons in
California who left different parts of the world for
these colonies, but who remained in California

()ming to the bad reports. A new country which
does not offer the inducement of cheap land with-

holds the chief attraction.
In Vancouver's Island the cvil already done can
be remedied to some extent by reducing the price
in ordinary cases, and in exceptional cases by free
!'ants prudently- given.

All the arrangements of the land department
:,}could be left entirely to the local Government. All
the Imperial Government should trouble itself
about is to put the mutter in such a state that it
emild sad• to all app'icants for land, or for informa-
-1 ion respecting land, " Go out; you will find plenty
of good land ready for you clu Ip,—only you must
work it, not speculate with it. Your farm must be
a bona.fide,homestead."

FRIDAY, AUGUST 27.
On the 22d news of peace between France and
Austria reached this place faom California.
This has raised the spirits of the colonists to a
high pitch, because it gives them assurance that the