The Sun.
London, England, 1859-09-20 00:00:00

tion of our people from the hordes of Northern savages,
from whom we have already suffered, and from whose
threatened attacks many of our settlements down
the Sound are kept in 'continual alarm. San Juan is
just the place for a pest. The Indians must pass within
striking distance in coming to and returning from the
settlements.'
The following is Governor Douglas's message :
" Government House, Victoria, Aug. 3.
"To THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND ROUSH OF ASSEM-
BLY OF THE COLONY OF VANCOUVER'S ISLAND.
" Gentlemen,—l have to communicate for your informa-
tion the intelligence of the landing of a detachment of
United States' troops on the Island of San Juan, avowedly
(see encl3sures Nos. 1 and 2) for the purpose of forming a
military post, and of asserting the sovereignty of the United
States over that island.
" Having received' no information from any quarter that
the United States ever contemplated taking possession of
any part of the,disputed territory while the boundary line
remained unsettled, I am forced to believe that the late un-
warrantable and discourteous act, so contrary to the usages
of civilised nations, has originated in error, and been under-
taken without the authority of that Government.
" That impression is corroborated by a letter (a copy of
which is here enclosed) from the Hon. W. L. Marcy, Secre-
tary for the United States, dated Washington, July 12,
1855, to her Majesty's Minister at Washington, which con-
tains instructions from the President of the United States
to the Governor of Washington territory, and displays in
the clearest manner the conciliatory and moderate views
entertained by his Government on the subject of the dis-
puted territory.
"Though the right of Great Britain to all the islands
situated to the westward of Vancouver or Rosario Straits is
to our minds clearly established by the first article of the
treaty of 1846, and though those islands have, since the
foundation of this colony, been considered as a dependency
of Vancouver's. Island, it is well known to you, gentlemen,
that out of respect to the construction that has been put
upon that treaty by the Government of the United States,
we have abstained from exercising exclusive sovereignty
over them.
" Convinced that any assumption on either side of ex-
clusive right to the disputed territory, would simply be a
fuitless and mischievous waste of energy, neither detract-
ing from nor adding force to the claims of either nation,
wise and considerate policy enjoins upon us the part of leav-
ing so important a national question for settlement by the
proper authorities, and of avoiding complications fereign to
the views and wishes of, and probably embarrassing to both
Governments.
" Immediately on being informed of the landing of United
States' troops at San Juan, her Majesty's ship Tribune,
under the command of Captain Hornby, was despatched to
that. quarter, and soon after a detachment of Royal Engi-
neers, and Royal Marine Light Infantry, were ordered from
New Westminster, by her Majesty's ship Plumper, Captain
Richards, and those troops will be landed at San Juan to
protect the lives and property of British subjects.
" You will observe, gentleman, from enclosure No. 1,
that the captain in command of the United States' detach-
ment of troops, in a public notice, dated 27th July, assumes
the exercise of exclusive sovereign rights in the Island of
San Juan, while the President cf the United States alto-
gether disclaims such pretensions, and seeks at most to dis-
continue the joint right of sovereignty and domain in com-
mon with Great Britain. We may presume from that cir-
cumstance that the notice in question was framed in ignor-
ance of the intention of the United' States Government, ann
that the pretensions set forth will not be maintained.
" Entertaining such opinions, I have not failed to impress
on her Majesty's naval officers now stationed at San Juan
the desire of her Majesty's Government to avoid every course
which may unnecessarily involve the suspension of the ami-
cable relations subsisting between Great Britain and the
United States ; at the same time those officers have been in-
structed and are hereby prepared to assert the rights and
maintain the honour and dignity of our Sovereign and her
dominions. I have the honour to be, gentlemen, your most
obedient servant, "JAMES DOUGLAS."
In the report which Mr. Nugent, as United
States' Commissioner at Fraser River, made last
winter, he explains in a few words the nature of
the pending dispute as to the islands as follows :
"The treaty of June 15, 1846, stipulates as follows :
Article 1. From the point of the 49th parallel of north
latitude, where the boundary laid down in existing treaties
and conventions between Great Britain and the United
States terminates, the line of boundary between the terri-
tories of her Britannic Majesty and those of the United
States shall be continued westward along the 49th parallel
of north latitude to the middle of the channel which sepa-
rates the continent from Vancouver's Island, and thence
southerly through the middle of the *aid channel and of
Fuca Straits to the Pacific Ocean. Provided, however, that
the navigation of the said channel and straits south of the
49th parallel of north latitude remain free and open to both
parties.'
" There are two channels between the continent and Van-
couver s Island, both leading out into the Sti aits of Fuca—
the Strait of Rosario, a narrow channel nearest the main-
land, and the Canal de Haro, which, besides being the
beaten track, is much wider, has greater average depth of
water, and is nearer to Vancouver's Island. It is claimed
on the part of Great Britain that the Strait of Rosario, being
the channel nearest the mainland, is that contemplated by
the treaty ; but a very slight consideration of the circum-
stances under which the line was run, as well as of the
warding of the article above quoted, will show that this ,
position is wholly untenable. In the first place, the only
reason why the boundary line was caused to deflect from
the 49th parallel before it reached the Pacific Ocean was to
avoid the southern end of Vancouver's Island, on which
there was then a British settlement, The intendment of
the article was merely to save Great Britain the Island of
Vancouver, and consequently the nearest channel to Van-
couver was undoubtedly that through the middle of which
the treaty contemplated the line should run. Again, the
islands bordering on the continent belong to the continent,
unless otherwise stipulated ; but there is no stipulation ex-
cept as to Vancouver's Island, neither was there any reason
existing at that time why there should be, as none of the
islands in dispute were then occupied by subjects of Great
Britain."

TEE LATE SIR J. STEPHEN, S.C.B.

We announced yesterLy the death, on Wednes-
day last, at Coblentz, in his 71st year, of the Right
Hon. Sir James Stephen, K.C.8., Professor of
Modern History at the University of Cambridge,
and formerly Under-Seoretary of State for the
Colonies. The deceased was the son of Mr. James
Stephen, Master in Chancery (well known for his
writings and exertions between 1815 and 1830
on the subject of eolonial slavery), and was born
about the year 1790. "He was educated," says a
biographical sketch in the English
Cycloyedia, " at
Trinity-hall, Cambridge, where he graduated B.A.
in 1812. Having chosen the legal profession, he
was tailed to the bar at Lincoln's-inn. He had
hardly. begun practice as a Chancery barrister
when, in 1812 or 1813, he became connected offi-
cially with the public service as counsel of the Colo-
nial department. For 11 years he was at once
counsel for this department and a Chancery barris-
ter in extensive practice. He then retired from the
bar, and became at the same time both counsel to
the Colonial Department and counsel to the Board
of Trade. He held these offices jointly for 10
years ; after which; during the Whig Government
which succeeded the Reform Bill, he left the Board
of Trade and became Assistant Under-Secretary for
the Colonies. From the Assistant Under-Secre-
taryship he was subsequently promoted to the per-
manent Under-Secretaryship, spending 14 years in
the two offices together. He was thus connected
with the civil service 35 years in all, during the
whole of which time his relations were mainly with
the Colonial Department. His impressions of the
state of our Government offices, and of the Colo-
nial-office in particular, derived from this long
experience, were published, with other opinions
on the same subject, in a Blue-book in 1855,
when the question of the reorganization of the
civil service, by the adoption of the system of
appointments by competitive examination, instead
of by patronage, was first. agitated. The opinion
there expressed on the condition of the public ser-
vice, as regards the intellectual capacity and culture
of the majority of those comprising it, is by no means
favourable, but the writer speaks of splendid ex-
ceptions. Of these exceptions the writer himself
was certainly one. While in the Colonial-office he
was one of the ablest and most efficient public ser-
vants the State possessed, and his final retirement
from the Colonial Under-Secretaryship in 1847 was
a great loss to the department. He then received the
honour of knighthood. It was not only, however,
as a public official that he had up to that time dis-
tinguished himself. A man of general thought and
culture, he had all along employed his leisure in
studies ranging beyond the topics that interested
him as an official ; and he had latterly contributed
extensively to the Edinburgh Review on subjects re-
lating to the history of the Church and the develop-
ment of religious opinions. A collection of these
articles, already widely known and appreciated in
their scattered shape, was published in two volumes
in 1849 under the title of Essays in Ecclesiastical
Biography.' In the same year Sir J. Stephen was
appointed to succeed Wm. Smyth, M.A., as Regius
Professor of Modern History in the University of
Cambridge, which office he still holds. In 1851 he
published two volumes,' Lectures on the History of
France. this work is now in a third edition, and
there have been several editions of its predecessor.
The two together have given the author a high and
peculiar place in our graver contemporary litera-
ture. Among other slighter things which Sir James
has published are one or two lectures delivered to
popular institutions. One of Sir James's sons, who
has followed the legal profession, is likewise known
by various writings. His brother Sir G. Stephen, is
also known as the author of Adventures of a Gen-
tleman in Search of a Horse,' Adventures of an At-
torney." The Juryman's Guide,' The Clerk,' and
'The Governess,' in C. Knight'S series of Guides to
Trade ;' of a novel entitled, "rhe Jesuit at Cam-
bridge,' and of a pamphlet on The Niger Trade and
the American Blockade,' as connected with the slave
trade, a subject in which he has always taken much
interest."

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Colonel Simmons, Royal Engineers, in a letter
to a contemporary, says :
The subject of efficiently manning the navy is of
such great importance that you may, perhaps, think
the following observations and suggestions worthy
of consideration and insertion in your journal.
I was much struck the other day in reading the
able and interesting account of the Great Eastern
steamship, given to the public through your columns,
by the statement that the proportion of her crew was
as follows :-180 connected with the engine depart-
ment, 180 officers and crew, or what may be called
the nautical department, and 145 for the hotel de-
partment. The question naturally suggested itself,
if the Great Eastern requires only 180 in her nau-
tical department, why should any ship in her Ma-
jesty's service require more, except to supply casu-
alties, which may naturally be expected to be
greater ?
The crews of ships of war may be classed under
three heads, assuming every ship to be fitted with
steam power,—engine, nautical, and gunnery de-
partments.
The engine department is easily and fully sup-
plied from the civil and military dockyards and the
numerous manufacturing establishments of the
country, and can be supplied in greater abundance
by England than any other European country.
The nautical department is made up of officers
and seamen. Of the former there is no lack of
supply, whereas the latter, from the roving nature
of their occupation, and from the magnitude of the
demand, for which the supply is scarcely adequate,
are difficult to procure in large numbers in a, com-
mercial country like England, and constitute the
real 'source of embarrassment in maintaining an
efficient navy. Moreover, the peculiar duties of
their occupation in general as seamen in the mer-
chant service do not make them acquainted with
the service of guns, nor fit them for all the duties
of men of war's men. Therefore there is a constant
difficulty in procuring any very large force of such
men on a sudden emergency who can be regarded
as fit to sustain the honour of the British flag before
an enemy.
For this reason it would appear advisable to limit
the number of seamen on board ships of war to those
actually required to navigate them, and to extend
the corps of Marines, drilling and instructing the
whole force as Artillery, and abandoning the ar-
rangement by which they are now constituted as
light infantry.
The organisation of the entire corps of Marines as
Artillery would not preclude their being drilled as
infantry, and being made capable of acting effectu-.
ally as such on shore, for which purpose small arms
might be kept on board ship for their use, but the
result of increasing the Marine force would be that
wherever a fleet was present a larger force of well
disciplined troops would be available for disembar-
kation, to act as naval brigades on land, and for such
an expedition as that which will now probably be
undertaken in China.
Suppose this arrangement were carried out in a
line•ol-battle ship, which at present has a crew say
of 1,000 men, composed of 100 in the engine de-
partment, 150 Marines, and about 750 seamen.
The crew, according to this suggestion, would con-
sist of 100 in the engine department, and say 700
Marine Artillery with 200 seamen.
The Marines could do all the pulling and hauling
work on deck, assisting the seamen, who would
suffice to do all the work aloft, and the seamen
might be drilled to assist at the guns.
The demand for seamen would thus be materially
reduced, and it would probably be found that the
number required at any time could be always ob-
tained without difficulty, and whenever levied they
would be found to know all that was required of
them to make their ships effective as men of war.
Their place would be supplied by a body of men not
near so costly in their nature as able seamen, and
who, from gunnery being their special duty, would
naturally constitute a far more efficient body of
gunners-than seamen hastily got together and im-
perfectly trained to the use of guns. In fact, it is
well known that the best gunners on board ships of
war at the present day belong to the Marines, as
also do the best men in the use of small arms.
Why, then, perpetuate a system which was per-
haps necessary, when every ship was dependent
only on sails, and which, in addition to the embar-
rassment it causes, deteriorates the value of the
ship as a battery or machine for war ?
When the crews of the splendid merchant ships
which traverse the ocean with their valuable car-
goes in all directions are seen to suffice for their
safe navigation, it cannot be necessary that ships of
war should be manned, as they now often are, with
four or five, and sometimes even ten times as many
sailors. The smartness of the ships in shortening
sail and in other nautical manoeuvres may, per-
haps, suffer—although this even may be questioned
—but it cannot be doubted that their batteries,
which are of more consequence, would be improved,
and much of the difficulty now experienced in man-
ning the navy would be got rid of by increasing
the corps of Marines by some 20,000 or more men,
making them all Artillery, and diminishing pro
tanto the force of seamen.
As improvements in artillery are introduced, such
as the Armstrong gun, this organisation of ships'
crews will become absolutely essential ; in the
meantime to man a line-of-battle ship, or even a
ship of war of each class on this principle, would be
a costless experiment (a few such ships' crews would
be very serviceable in China) which would afford a
satisfactory answer to all questions that may arise
out of this suggesti3n, which, as I have never seen
it advocated, I hope may find a place in your
columns, which will at any rate subject it to abun-
dant discussion and a thorough sifting of its merits
and demerits.

The following letters have appeared in reply to
the above :
Sir,—When a man of Colonel Simmonds' weight
recommends the expulsion of the seaman from the
British navy and the substitution of the marine, it
surely becomes some naval officer to expose the
error of imagining that the great naval problem
can be so resolved. I shall regret much if no bettee
answer than mine be produce ; failing such, how-
twer, the instinct of right being strong within me,
I hope to be able to dispel, at least partially, any
reader's belief in the practicability of Colonel Sim-
monds' scheme for manning the navy, as published
in your impression of the 16th inst.
A grave proposal certainly, and if adopted a very I '
dangerous one, I think, for the future weal of Eng-
land, " to equip the fleet with Marine Artillery-
men, and let there remain on board but a small
contingent of seamen." Colonel Simmonds states
that ho has never seen his suggestion as yet advo-
cated, but I recollect within the last few months
reading like suggestions in two separate letters
signed, if I remember aright, by " A Marine Officer"
and " A Marine Artillery Officer."
Our ships, according to these ideas, are to relapse
voluntarily into mere batteries of soldiers. The
sea-bred, sea-clad animal, England's own particular
child, is to be dispensed with, and, consequently,
the nation providing most soldiers, and able to build
most ships, must reign over that element which we
have hitherto fancied our insular position and mari-
time qualities give us some right to assert supre-
macy upon. Pleasing information, forsooth, for
certain huge military States.
Is this an argument—that, because the nautical
proportion of the Great Eastern's whole comple-
ment, when steaming peacefully from her Thames
moorings to Portland harbour, consisted only of
one-third, therefore the proportion of seamen on
board line•of-battle ships should be reduced to one-
fifth (?), for Col. Simmonds proposes that among
the 1,000 men of a liner there shall be but 200
officers and seamen.
The question is simply this an Artillery-
man fight a ship at sea, and be as handy for various
naval exploits as a sailor ?
With certain conviction I answer " No."
Admitting for the moment, for the sake of ar-
gument (for, holding a contrary opinion, I main-
tain the masts and sails of a ship continue as an
indispensable secondary power to ships of war)
that men-of-war no longer require spars, that they
should be mere hulks—mere floating batteries—
still I say they would be better manned by sailor-
bred men than by soldier-bred men, The man with
the loose easy dress, the supple active form, and
the hardy unshod foot would be fitter for sea
fighting and general sea work than would be he
whose very essence must continue to be a belted
uniform, an upright firm figure, and a pair of thick
boots. Where both are Englishmen, it can, of
course, be no question of pluck, but simply of
adaptation. The naked foot I consider a great
point ; it gives a sort of cling to the deck when
working a gun, and a power of balance under all
circumstances. Colonel Simmonds would, perhaps,
propose that the marine artilleryman should throw
off his boots ; but then, I say, he is disabled as a
soldier, and half turned into a sailor. Without
this naked claw and loose rig, who are to be the
boarders, swarming through the chains and over
the netting into an enemy's ship ? Who are to
give the marines a lift over, first their muskets
and then themselves ? Who are to man the boats