The Sun.
London, England, 1859-05-13 00:00:00

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Laharpe—the consequent disrupture of the com-
bined forces of the allies, through the mass of the
French army taking up a position between the
Austrians and the Sardinians—and the subsequent

humiliation of the Sardinians—brought the first
part of the campaign to an end, with the armistice
of Chevarco, concluded between the French and
Sardinians, upon special conditions highly.impor-
tant to the French in following tip -the campaign
against the Austrians. ',ln ctawsecnildpait of the
' campaign it was Napoleon' plan; to„driie the
Austrians out of Lombardy. and .across t
Adige, and to take up a defeifsiVP pbsitibhhp
on that river, which would luffciPd;,-7hini a
base for further operations against them,„at the
same time that it covered his conquests, in the
rear and his line of communication with France.
It was true that the Adige was a long way from
his base, and it was more than probable that if the
French should meet with reverses, the treaty of
Chevarco would be treated by the Court of Turin as
so much waste paper, and that the retreat of the
French would be anything but secure. The answer
to this, however, was that, however hostile in feel-
ing, Piedmont retained very little power of serious
annoyance. Her three great fortresses were in the
hands of the French, the others were dismantled, and
her levies disbanded. Her discontent nee& under
such circumstances, cause no more apprehension to
Napoleon than the rattle of a snake that has lost its
sting. Piedmont was under the heel of the con-
queror. Napoleon again by his deep strategy hood-
winked the Austrians by a rapid surprise in the
passage of the Po at Piacenza. Then followed in
rapid succession the defeat of the Austrians at Fom-
bio, in which town they had strongly fortified
themselves against the advance pf the French—the
surprise of the latter at Codagno, and death of
Laharpe, the French general—the flight of the Aus-
trians, under Beaulieu, towards Lodi—and the me-
morable battle of Lodi, terminating the second part
of the campaign. After this, between the 10th and.
the 22d of May was employed by Napoleon in or-
ganising Lombardy in the French interest, or, as he
facetiously termed it, liberating the enslaved sub-
jects of Austria. The manner in which (continued
the lecturer) the French of 1796 treated those
whose saviours they professed to be appears in
rather startling contrast with their professions,
and suggests rather an uncomfortable feeling
on behalf of those same enslaved subjects of
Austria in 1859. The third part of the campaign
consisted in the French advance to the Adige, and
the retreat of the Austrians into the Tyrol. The
lecturer further gave a rapid sketch of the subse-
quent movements of the belligerent forces down to
the surrender of Mantua in the early part of 1797,
which terminated the campaign of 1796.
The lecturer was loudly applauded at the close of
his interesting narrative, and the proceedings ter-
minated with a vote of thanks to him for the pains
he had taken in delineating many difficult and
intricate military tactics and evolutions, which
would be the means of giving a clear insight into
various movements at present being made by the
belligerent forces on the Continent. Indeed, on
the whole, the lecture was exceedingly interesting,
lucid, and instructive.

THE ORGANISATION OF THE INDIAN

ARMY.

On the 15th day of July, 1858, her Majesty was
pleased to nominate a commission to inquire into
organisation of the Indian army, and the report of
the Commission, dated the ith of March, yesterday
appeared in the formidable shape of a large blue
book, of some 260 :pages of print, large and small.
The report itself, however, occupies but 15 pages,
and the following is its substance :—As regards the
first point of the inquiry—" the terms on which the
army of the East India Company is to be transferred
to the Crown"—it is stated that no change can be
made which would in any way disturb the system
of promotion by seniority as affecting officers now
in the service, but that the Act 21 and 22 Vict., c.
106, gives the Queen full power to frame new regu-
lations for future officers. The second question—the
permanent force necessary to be maintained in India
after the restoration of tranquillity—hardly appears
to admit a definite reply in a numerical form. The
Commissioners think that the amount of the Euro-
pean force ought to be about 80,000, of which
50,000 men would be required for Bengal, 15,000
for Madras, and 15,000 for Bombay. As regards
the ratio of European to the native force, they
believe that the latter should not, at present, bear
a greater proportion to the European, in cavalry
and infantry, than two to one for Bengal, and three
to one for the other two presidencies. The evidence
before the:Commissioners is unanimous to the effect
that the artillery should be mainly an European
force, and they themselves concur in this opinion.
In the military police corps formed, or in course of
formation, throughout India the Commissioners see
" the elements of future danger," and they recom-
mend that no stricter military training be given to
them than may be absolutely necessary.
How far the European portion of the army should
be composed of troops of the line, taking India
as part of the tour of service, and how far of
troops raised for service in India exclusively, is a
question about which authorities differ ; the
opinion both of the Commissioners and the wit-
nesses being equally divided. The opinions of the
majority and minority of the Commission on the
subject are given at length. Should it be ulti-
mately decided, " contrary to the strong and
sincere conviction of the majority. of the Commis-
sioners, that, with a view of leaving undisturbed
present vested interests, a local European force
is to be maintained for service in India," it
is recommended that the amount of such force
should be limited to that now authorised by
Parliament to be raised and maintained out of
the revenue of India. It is considered most
necessary, in fine, to retain a proportion of line
regiments in India, exeinpli gratia. To diminish
the relative ratio of line to local corps would, it is
opined by the majority, be a fatal error. These
views of the majority have the support of Lord
Elphinstone, Sir G. Clerk, Sir C. Trevelyan, Sir A.
Wilson, Sir E. Lugard, Major-General Pratt, Sir
W. and Sir S. Cotton, Sir A. Tulloch, and others.
The minority takes a very different view of the
question, being in favour of a powerful local Indian
army, European and native, as essential to the
British rule in India. They regard the anomaly
of a dual army under one Sovereign as necessarily
incidental to the very anomalous connexion of
England with her Indian empire, and they con-
sider that recent events have proved the benefit of
having distinct armies for the three presidencies.
The views of the minority have the support of
Viscount Canning, the Earl of Ellenborough, the
Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Madras, Sir
J. Lawrence, and the Punjaub Commissioners, and
other eminent and able men.

Supposing the European force in India to be
partly of the line and partly local, it is suggested
that the tour of service in
The
n en sf t
Ga bol
ni sail
um eo np te oi
sf
deemed worthy of consideration. The Commis-
sioners think that an amalgamation of the local
forces with the line regiments, although difficult,
might be an advantageous
pdrorstejeutara:
be effected aitangenaent, if it could
mentally is considereu
Any admixture
twuritehonfuEt
( 5 tlia
n'ilt i a existingt
i v eb f o
ffie e ,re fa rights.gc-
and discipline of both ; butimitelsathtoongbetf-tiliit t le!
admixture by brigade would be most advantageous.
The local force of Europeans might (it is suggested)
be
kept up partly by volunteers from line regi•
ments returning to England, and by recruiting in
England as for line regiments. The Commissioners
object to the levy of any colonial regiments com-
posed of men of colour, either for temporary or
permanent service. The native cavalry force should
be irregular, and to each cavalry regiment would
be attached one commandant, one adjutant, and
one European officer per squadron, with a surgeon.
The regular cavalry of Bombay and Madras, for the
present, to remain intact. The native infantry
would be mainly regular, and the regular should
decidedly preponderate over the irregular. Cadets
ought, it is said, to be drilled and thoroughly
instructed in their military duties in England
before proceeding to India.
The Commissioners, having disposed of the ques-
tions specially referred for their inquiry, beg to
submit the following recommendations on certain
important points, which in the course of examina-
tion of evidence have come under their notice:—
1. That the native army should be composed of different
mnaimtsi(onotsitiiyestharnodugchasetaecsh, arendg,imason.
atgeneral rule, mixed pro-
2. That all men of the regular native army in her Ma_
jesty's Eastern possessions should be enlisted for general
service.
possible be
3. That a modification should be made in the unifurni of
nativetchouentr
y ,and troops, m
aki n g
it more suitable t assimilating it more to the dress of the
4. That Europeans should, as far as po
in the scientific branches of the service, bute:tibiae tenctosyeodf
pioneers be formed, for the purpose of relieving the Euro-
pean sappers from those duties whioh entail exposure to the
climate.
5. That the articles of war which
ern
be revised, and that the power of Commanding
naotffiivee armyersbe
increased.
6. That the promotion of native co mni,sioned :in3 not-