The Sun.
London, England, 1866-02-26 00:00:00

THE SUE, LONDON, MONDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 26, 1866.

400.
THE PAPAL STATES.

THE SEPTEMBER CONVENTION

The following is the text of Cardinal Antonelli's
despatch to the Pontifical Nuncios abroad upon the
September Convention :
" Most Illustrious and Reverend Sir,—Your ex-
cellency is doubtless aware that the Convention
concluded on the 15th September of last year (1864)
between the French and Piedmontese Governments,
and of which no communication was made to the
Holy See until the afternoon of the 28th of the same
month, has already commenced to be put into exe-
cution by the gradual withdrawal of the French
troops to be completed within the course of next
year.
" The Government of the Holy See, as it was
foreign to the stipulations of that treaty, is in the
same position with respect to its fulfilment. The con-
sequences, however, which it may have, greatly in-
terest the Pontifical Government, and it is there-
fore necessary that they should be clearly stated in
order to rectify public opinion, which an unscru-
pulous press continually seeks to mislead on this
point, as well as to remove every responsibility from
the Holy See before the world.
" After expressing at the Congress of Paris in
1856 the desire to see the Pontifical States evacuated
by foreign troops, as soon as that could be done
without danger to the tranquillity of the country,
and the consolidation of the authority of the Holy
See,' M. Drouyn de Lhuys in a despatch addressed
on the 12th September, 1864, to the French Am-
bassador at Rome, expressed himself on the same
subject as follows We were resolved not to
abandon this post of honour until the object of the
occupation had been attained.' Now, even if the
idea of the realisation of such a condition entered
into the motives of the present recall of the French
army from the States of the Church, the Pontifical
Government is bound to declare, although it has not
been questioned on the subject, that such an idea is
a vain deception and a fallacious hope. To whom,
in fact, upon hearing of this recall at the pre-
sent juncture, would not the following questions
occur ? Does the situation in which the Sovereign
Pontiff is now left fulfil the object for which the
dominions of the Holy See were occupied by foreign
troops ? Was this the intention of the appeal made
by the Pope himself to the Catholic Powers, and to
which France, with filial affection, replied? Were
these the strong reasons for which France herself,
with the applause of the whole Catholic world,
which will retain towards her an imperishable gra-
titude, determined to respond to that appeal ? Who
would dare to place in the mouths of the valiant
soldiers recalled to their country such absurd words
as these We were at Rome in the name of
Catholicity upon the appeal of the Pope, who called
us to aid in recovering possession of his States. He
is now despoiled of the greatest and best part of his
provinces, and even for the little that remains to
him he is threatened with similar spoliation by an
inimicalpower surrounding him on all sides. There- '
fore the object of our occupation is attained I'

" The Minister above mentioned, with his well-
known penetration, could not but feel all the harsh-
ness of such a conclusion, and therefore, in his de-
spatch, endeavoured to justisfy his premises by va-
rious reflections, and to soften the crudeness of his
argument by showing the efforts made by the Pied-
montese Government for the security of the Holy
Father. It is necessary, therefore, for me to make
some observations on both points. The considera-
tions entered into in the Minister's despatch com-
mence by recording how, at the beginning of 1859,
the Holy Father himself proposed the evacuation of
his states by foreign troops ; and that in 1860 this
evacuation was fixed for the month of August, al-
though it could not subsequently be carried out,
not from any objection raised by his Holiness, but
from the occurrence of certain agitations. I certainly
need not dwell long upon these observations, since
theimmense disparity between present circumstances
and the state of things existing at that time is clearly
self-evident. In 1859 the Holy Father was not only
in full and secure possession of his states, his fron-
tiers surrounded on all sides by friendly powers ;
but had not then even a suspicion of the sacrilegious
attempts of which he subsequently became the in-
nocent victim. It might then have been justly con-
sidered that the object of the occupation of the
Pontifical States by foreign troops was attained.'
The Holy Father, on the other hand, was induced
to make the above-mentioned proposal not because
he attached no value to the presence of the French
troops in his states, or did not appreciate the impor-
tant services they had rendered him, and for which
he has professed and will ever entertain the greatest
gratitude, but solely from his desire to prevent the
evils which he apprehended from its being said in
high quarters that the ulterior stay of foreign troops
in the States of the Church might give rise to an
European war. In 1860, therefore, although already
despoiled of the Romagna, he still remained in
tranquil possession of the greater part of his states,
with an army sufficient to maintain order and guard
the frontier against irregular bands ; he had the
eastern and western frontiers not only secured from
enemies, but surrounded by friendly neighbours ;
besides which the revolutionary Parliament had not
expressed the sacrilegious wish to obtain, by one
means or another, the city of Rome as the capital
of the new kingdom, and consequently to annex the
whole Pontifical State. Can this now be said? The
testimony of facts absolves me from making a reply.
" The other consideration brought forward by
the above-mentioned Minister is that the occupation
of Rome produces two inconveniences, one of which
is that it constitutes a foreign intervention, the other
that it places on the same ground two distinct sove-
reignties. As to the first case, I pass over the fact
that the famous principle of non-intervention is not
recognised by natural law, which in many cases
enjoins an opposite course, nor by the positive law of
Europe; while France herself shows, at least by acts,
that intervention may take place when required by
any reason, or when it is believed to be required. I
will not dwell upon the solemn condemnation of
this principle by the Sovereign Pontiff, supreme
master of the principles of honesty and justice
among Catholics, who in the allocution delivered in
the consistory of Sept. 28, 1860, spoke in the fol-
lowing decisive terms :—' We cannot abstain from
deploring, among other evils, that fatal and perni-
cious principle styled non-intervention, which some
Governments, with the toleration of others, have
recently proclaimed, and even adopted in the case
of the unjust aggression of one Government upon
another, appearing to seek a pretext, contrary to
every human and divine law, for an almost certain
impunity and licence in attacking and violating the
rights of others, their property and dominions, as
we have seen has
happened in these troublous times.
And it is truly
Go-
vernment surprising that the Piedmontese Go-
alone should be permitted to violate with
impunity and disregard
see, with all Eurezt such a principle, when we
also for -witnesses, that it invades
with its hostile
gitimoant: the dominions of others,
driving out the le
princes.
the pernicious absurdity
an. Hence follows
tathe intervention of
others can only be admitted
foster rebellion.' I willnot, I when it will excite and
PAY dwell Upon these
and other similar considerations."
iarffirmci lonly that
whatever may be thought of this pin
purely political sense, it cannot certainly principle
applied
in in the present case relative to the States f
° the Holy
See. The very evident reason of this is derived both
from the interests at stake there and the persons who
would intervene. The political independence of the
Head of the Church, necessarily for the liberty of his
apostolic ministry, is a matter that does not only
appertain to Rome or its Sovereign, but intimately
concerns all the Catholic states, and oven the non-
Catholic states having Catholic subjects. This is,
therefore, in great part, a home question for all those
powers ; and so much the more so since it affects
the most delicate part of man—his conscience and
religious relations. Now, who shall describe as
foreign intervention the act of intervening in a
matter so closely connected even with the civil ordi-
nances of single states ? With respect, then, to
persons, it is beyond question that all Catholics are
sons of the common Father of the Faithful, and his
subjects in the spiritual order. How, then, can it
be said that the latter are foreign to the former, and
that one should be interdicted from going to the
assistance of the other, when threatened on all sides
and exposed to the danger of losing his indepen-

deuce ? With great reason, therefore, did the same
Minister, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, write, on Nov. 25,
1862, to the Marquis de Cadore, charg 'affaires,
of the Imperial Government in Londol, that ' al-
though, on one hand France inclined to the princi-
ple of non-intervention, she recognised, on the
other, that the question of the temporal power is
such as not to resemble any other, and that the rules
of that principle are not applicable to it ? And the
very words of the same plenipotentiary at the Con-
gress of Paris, in reference to the other object of
M. Drouyn de Lhuys, do not fail to record that one
of the titles held in the highest esteem by the Sove-
reign of France is that of the Eldest Son of the

Catholic Church,' and that far from feeling im-
peded by the principle of non-intervention from
obeying the appeal of the Holy See, that title car-
ried with it the duty of affording aid and support
to the Sovereign Pontiff. Hence it is easy to deduce
the origin of the intervention referred to. And, in
fact, it should be well understood that from the
reason above cited the Roman Pontiff cannot be
considered in the same relationship towards single
states as that of a simply political prince, nor can
his possessions be regarded in the same manner as
the dominions of any other power. Thus it is not
possible without a total confusion of ideas and a
most serious disorder in the sphere of action to apply
to the Pontiff and his temporal sovereignty the true
or false principles that may be established as a rule
of international conduct for lay States. The religi-
ous tie that connects the Sovereign Pontiff with every
place inhabited by Catholics and identifies his tem-
poral sovereignty with the independence necessary
for the fulfilment of his high ministry renders those
relations very numerous and various, and all that
relates to the conditions of his political existence
becomes a matter of common and peculiar interest
to each Power.

" The second alleged inconvenience of two sove-
reignties placed upon the same ground is also diffi-
cult to comprehend. If the French troops are at
Rome with the sole object of defending and uphold-
ing the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See, their
presence, so long as they confine themselves to that
object, would rather imply the removal of the idea
of two co-existing sovereignties. To protect the
sovereignty of a prince, in fact, is equivalent to pro-
tecting the independent exercise of a supreme
power, and to protect the independent exercise of a
supreme power excludes the presence of any other
distinct sovereignty. Hence, far from viewing the
nature of things as in opposition to the goodwill of
persons, it even seems that this goodwill finds in
the nature of things the rules for regulating their
conduct. By following this very clear and natural
rule the conflicts of jurisdiction, of which the des-
patch speaks, are rendered impossible unless by
these are to be understood certain small incompati-
bilities in practical application, unpleasant it is
true, but almost inevitable with foreign or mixed
garrisons, and which every experienced commander
can properly estimate and easily remove. Thus
disappears every intrinsic reason of antagonism be-
tween the duty which the minister justly assigns
to the generals of using the greatest vigilance for
the security of their army, and their duty as repre-
sentatives of the Pontifical authority, of zealously
maintaining in the acts of internal administration
the independence and dignity of the supreme
power. Among objects so distinct it cannot be
perceived how, through their intrinsic character,
they should clash with each other. Such objects, in
fact, are not only distinct, but are capable of being
reconciled with each other in a very high degree.
Nothing can be nearer to the wishes of the represen-
tatives of the Pontifical authority than the security
of the army whose duty it is to protect that autho-
rity. And nothing can be more agreeable to the
generals in command than to see jealously main-
tained in the interior administration of the country
the independence of the territorial Government,
which, with their army, they have the care of pro-
tecting. The nature of things cannot therefore be
called to account for any serious conflict of jurisdic-
tion, and eulogistic mention might here be made of
periods and persons equally free from any such con-
flicts. If sometimes from the motive mentioned
above remonstrances or complaints bare been made
it is very certain that the Imperial Government
would not reproach the Pontifical representatives
with being zealous in the discharge of their duty,
which is to maintain intact the independence of
their own Prince in the acts relative to his sovereign
authority.
" Finally, M. Drouyn de Lhuys enumerates
among the sources of inconvenience arising from the
occupation of Rome the difference between the po-
licy of the two Governments, neither following the
same inspirations nor the same principles. The Mi-
nister does not particularise, and I cannot, there-
fore, see in this vague generality what inspirations
are alluded to. Wishing, however, to remove any
misunderstanding on this head, I shall observe that
if allusion is made to merely governmental regula-
tions and their application, every country and every
State has its peculiar requirements relative to cus-
toms, habits, and circumstances, and of these the
local governing power must be the best judge. Nor
' can the diversity of suchrules of governmentamong
other nations afford ground for censure, since, from
the difference in the subject, prudence requires that
the action of the governing power should vary ac-
cordingly. Besides, when the appeal of the Sovereign
Pontiff was generously responded to, the nature of
the Pontifical Government was not unknown, and
M. Drouyn de Lhuys has himself recognised that if
it had its codes and its particular law, this arose
from its very nature. And that this is such as not
to have opposed, but always protected and propa-
gated true civilisation and real progress, is evidently
proved by history. On the other hand, its rules may
well be said to be not for the present day alone, but
for all time, and they are certainly not rejected by
truly Catholic consciences. If in alluding to the
fundamental principles of social order, these should
signify liberty of conscience, liberty of public wor-
ship, and the like, usually comprehended in what is
termed the new law, the Holy See has several times
expressed its reprobation of those principles in an
absolute sense, and as a rule of natural justice. If
among them there is any that might be tolerated,
such a course can only be adopted as a measure dic-
tated by local and personal necessities of govern-
ments which, in order to avoid greater evils, are
constrained to constitute their civil organisation and
legislation according to a system of ideas which, if
it may not correspond to the order of perfect social
harmony intended by God, is nevertheless the best
suited to the peculiar circumstances in which a
given people or nation may be placed. I cannot be-
lieve that the Minister intended to speak of such
principles in pointing out the divergence of views
between the two Governments, it being the duty of
every good Catholic to submit his own intellect in
those matters to the decision of him whom God him-
self has given to the nations as guide and master,
not only in all that appertains to faith, but also in
all that concerns morality and justice. I do not
dwell further upon such a point, since it should be
placed beyond controversy. And this will suffice
with respect to the considerations enumerated inthe
despatch in question. I now proceed to speak of
the efforts stated to have been taken to secure the
sovereignty of the Holy See, in view of the pro-
jected evacuation of the French troops.
" In order not to digress too much from the
principal point, I am here compelled to
omit many things. And in general I omit
all that refers in the despatch quoted to the
happy change in the disposition of the l'iedmontese
Government towards Rome,
me, and the adoption of a
policy towards the Holy See more
facts
tihnaatchcoarvdeanocce
with international duties..
=Ted Up to the most recent date furnish reliable data
to form a judgment upon this
this may be, it is certain that the Holy.
lyßsuete, e
will fivnedr
itself abandoned after having been reduced to an
almost total deficiency of inter/ aalmeans and exposed
to a continual menace of peril& from without which
renders the defence of the remaining territory very
difficult and uncertain. And with respect to the in-
terior it is observed by all that the present posses-
sions of the Holy See form a disproportionatewhole
without correspondence of parts. A great capital
like-Rome, deprived of its best and richest pro-
vinces, suggests the idea of a head withut a body,
or with a pigmy body, whoa e vital organsonly serve
for a very imperfect nourish ment and laboured re-

spiration. This fatal dismemberment cannot but
very greatly embarrass the regular action of the
Government,Since without taking into account other
inconveniences of no slight importance there are
two very serious ones of which special mention
must be made.
" In the first place, a most serious disorder is caused in
the public Treasury, since, besides the difficulties neces-
sarily arising from the diminution of the revenue, therm.°
the heavy expenses which the Pontifical Government has
to support for the maintenance of the whole employes, and
which were formerly borne by the whole Pontifical State.
Notwithstanding, also, the cessation of the revenues de-
rived from the usurped provinces, there remains at the
charge of the Holy See, not only the stipends of a not in-
considerable number of public servants who remained
faithful to the Pontifical Government in those provinces,
but also the whole public debt to the payment of which
all the States of the Holy See formerly contributed.
" It is true that St. Peter's pence and the Catholic loan
have hitherto been the means by which the Holy See has
been providentially enabled to meet its obligations ; but it
is also true that this means, besides not always correspond-
ing to the necessity, is precarious and uncertain, and can in
no way be considered normal. Further, loans cannot
always be obtained, and these in any case only render the
financial situation more serious on account of the interest
that must inevitably be paid.
" The other serious evil occasioned by tlieloss of the
invaded provinces is the great difficulty for the Pontifical
Government to obtain a proper garrison of native militia,
which cannot certainly be furnished by the small portion
of territory remaining to the Holy See. It might, it is true
repair this evil by the enlistment of foreign troops,
this being the right of every Government, and above
all of the Sovereign Pontiff, of whom all the nations are
children in Christ ; but, however clear this right may be,
the distress already pointed out, and the difficulties of
Pontifical finance, clearly define the limits of its possible
exercise.

"To what:perils, therefore, would not a state be exposed
by what it expects from without when reduced to such dis-
tress at home, and so poor in the means of defence. The
Holy See finds itself almost enclosed in a circle of iron, and
barred so to speak from every part of the possessions usurped
by the very Government, which not only by fomenting and
sustaining rebellion, and by armed and violent invasion,
has reduced it to such a miserable condition, but has, be-
sides, declared by a solemn act before all the world its
wish to consummate its usurpation by possessing itself of
the holy place where the venerated successor of St. Peter
has sat and reigned for centuries. The sacrilegious wish is
not only not retracted by the convention above mentioned,
but even after its conclusion the representatives of that
Government have publicly declared, verbally and in writ-
ing, that the desire still exists and endures. Now, even ad-
mitting the hypothesis that, from some reason, no fresh
armed invasion takes place (which it would certainly be
impossible for us to resist), it is not credible that the wish
already mentioned, so strongly expreseed and so persis-
tently maintained, should remain inoperative. And indeed
if only the calumnious assertions insinuated by the Pied-
montese plenipotentiary in the Congress of Paris relative
to the administration of the Romagna were the germ of the
revolt which three yearsafterwards imposed itself upon the
majority of the good Catholics, it is certainly not unreason-
able to maintain that a wish discussed, emitted, and sanc-
tioned, with so much solemnity in a public Parliament, will
be a perpetual fomenter of revolution and a continual me-
nace against tho tranquillity of the country.
" Its supporters have already declared that they intend
to carry out their intention by moral means, and it is not
necessary to explain at length what such means may be
under the interpretation of that Government. Certainly by
such moral means must be understood those adopted on
another occasion to the prejudice of the Holy See by a per-
son from whom, having been invested by the Piedmontese
Government with a certain representative character, tho
Holy See should have expected anything but treason. As
means of this kind must be esteemed those put into opera-
tion by the Piedmontese Government in secretly promot-
ing and protecting the expedition directed against Sicily,
assuming before diplomacy to know nothing about it,
and even to wish to prevent it. Among the means of
this nature are to be enumerated those adopted by
General Fanti, when he allowed bands of revolutionists to
penetrate into Umbria and the Marches, whose object was
to attempt a rising in the towns into which they intro-
duced themselves, and when the same general afterwards
intimated to the Pontifical general that he should consider
himself at liberty to enter the States of the Church with
his army if the national demonstrations were repressed by
force. None can prevent the adoption of these and other
similar means by the Turin Government, which expressly
reserves to itself this right. It will not certainly cost it any
great effort to procure the entry at one point or another of
the frontier of scattered bands, arms, and money, while at
the same time protesting or making show of opposition.
Netiher can the Pontifical Gdmrnment establish a large
and efficient cordon along the frontier of the territory re-
maining to it, since, as above stated, it has but a very small
militia at its disposal. And even without that, will it be
very difficult for the emissaries of an unfriendly Govern-
ment to excite popular demonstrations in any particular
town subject to the Pontiff, either by intimidation, intrigue,
seduction, or gold ? How shall the Government of the
Holy See act in such a case ? Shall it allow them to pro-
ceed with impunity ? Moral force, it will be said, has pro-
nounced against the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See.
Shall it energetically repress them ? The pretext will then
be advanced that a Government which cannot subsist
otherwise than by the continual use of material force, is
irreconcilable with modern civilisation. The fable of the
wolf and the lamb is familiar enough, and may be instruc-
tive even in the present case.

" With regard, however, to the recall in question, it
will therefore happen that the Pontifical; State, in the
position to which it has been now reduced by Piedmontese
usurpations, will be subjected to continual annoyances
from the enemy which keeps it continually surrounded by
snares and perturbations; and the little army of the Holy
See will have no other task than that of vainly hurrying
here and there to repel bands of invaders, which will
speedily find a refuge in the territory of the enemy
until the moment arrives for a grand irruption by the
regular army, which, in the long run, will certainly find
some shameless pretext for repeating the iniquitous mas-
sacre already perpetrated at Castelfidardo. And oven if
generous and magnanimous France should afterwards de-
clare herself ready to take up arms in order to wrest from
Piedmont her prey, that would not prevent th© Pontiff, his
Government, and faithful subjects, from being subjected,
during the interval preceding such an expedition, to an in-
calculable amount of trouble and injury. Moreover, let us
even suppose that the hostile Government should have re-
nounced, for some reason, not only the use of force against
the Pontifical State, but also that of the various plans
adopted in order to cause revolts, should we be safe, even
then ? No ; certainly not ; because in almost' every pro-
vince subject to the usurpation of Piedmont there exists a
party, which, in these days, styles itself the Party of Ac-
tion, and which, professing views of the extremest revolu-
tionary character, is very serviceable to that strange class
of pseudo-Conservatives who likewise seek for revolution,
but on a moderate scale. These, owing to their violent
character and impatient aspirations, will certainly be un-
able to keep quiet, the more especially as the so-called na-
tional will, alluded to above, acts as a sharp spur to their
flanks, and as a strong blast to their inflamed cupidity.
Now, if this party can hardly, and only with great diffi-
culty, be kept down in states which dispose of colossal
powers, what will it be if once it bursts into the feeble
States of the Church ? It would, then, be a difficult
matter to prevent this party from raising serious tumults
in one place or another, wherever there is most chance of
success, and then the King of Piedmont will believe him-
self authorised to intervene, under the pretext of defend-
ing the Holy Father and restoring order and public tran-
quillity. Thus will he achieve his iniquitous purpose
Another pretext for probable intervention may be the fol-
lowing: - Bands of marauders—the actual consequence of
the reaction excited by the violent annexation of the neigh-
bouring kingdom of Naples—are continually molesting
the Pontifical frontiers. The repression of such bands has
already cost the Government of the Holy See sacrifices of
no light nature in any respect, and has given occasion for
frequent territorial violations on the part of the Piedmon-
tese troops—and that, notwithstanding the presence of the
French army and the disapprobation of its leaders. It is
evident how much such violations must necessarily increase,
both in frequency and extension, after the departure of the
French troops, particularly if special regard be had to the
scantiness of the Pontifical army—hardly sufficient for in-
ternal security—and these violations will give rise to many
conflicts and complaints, and we well know what solution,
in such a contest, would be brought about by a prodigi-
ously stronger power having to deal with a feeble antago-
nist.

" Lastly, let us suppose that the Government above-
mentioned should no longer make use of arms, rebellious
intrigues, or pretexts for intervention. Indeed, we think
it probable that, at least at first, it will try to make a dis-
play of moderation and to maintain the appearance of be-
ing a good neighbour. But what of that ? Those ac-
quainted with the plot have not hesitated to prescribe,
themselves, the tactics to be followed—and that even in
writing. What they say is :—lt is not we who should go to
Rome, but Rome which must come to us by doing away
with the Pontifical Government. Such an object must be
achieved, not by disturbing material tranquillity, but by
working with a view to cause the dismemberment of the
country by opposing obstacles to the regulation of the fin-
ances, the administration, and the exercise of justice, and
by enticing the soldiers to desertion by means of promises
and bribes. Sundry persons have already sold themselves
to this base trade, and receive monthly stipends from the
instigators and abettors of such sacrilegious stratagems.
Against such snares and perfidious machinations the Pon-
tifical Government has to struggle alone and almost un-
armed. It will do all in its power to defeat the iniquitous
plots levelled against it; but if success be wanting in so
difficult an undertaking, with whom will lie the fault ?
With the Pontifical Government, which was unable
to perform prodigies, or with those who, step by step, have
reduced it to such extremities ?

" We very well understand the arts which will be used
to mat upon the Pontifical Government itself the imputa-

tion of the consequences, even more terrible than some
imagine,which may arise from so violent a state of things.
It will be said that the Holy Father ought to condescend
to friendly compromises with the so-called Italian Govern-
ment. But what other compromise is possible with one
who intends to despoil us than that of yielding up to him
our all ? And tho vanity of such a hope was fully proved
by a very recent occurrence, upon which many were eager
to base an imaginary future. The Holy Father, by an act
of generosity truly worthy of the character of the Pontiff,
sought to bring about some purely religious act of accord
in order to relieve the burdened Catholic Church. The
success which attended the Pontifical invitation is well
known ; every way to a reasonable arrangement was found
to be closed. Nor is this to be wondered at considering
the counsels prevalent with the Government ; for is it to
be expected that those who, in Turin, had revolution for
a guide, will, in Florence, lower their banner ? It is of
especial importance to the revolutionary party to destroy
the social life of Catholicism, nor will they rest until they
witness the overthrow of that temporal dominion which
forms a bulwark and barrier against revolution. Another
artifice will be used towards the Holy See in order to throw
upon the latter the blame of all that may occur and has
already commenced to be foreshadowed in the public
press. One measure after another of reform will succes-
sively be demanded on behalf of the inhabitants of the
now microscopically small territory remaining to the
Holy See, and by this means the temporal authority
of the Supremo Pontiff will be reduced to a mere
name, and Rome will become, if not the seat, at least
the property of the Piedmontese Government. And be-
cause the Pontiff will have to firmly reject such propo-
sitions of reform—especially considering the object to-
wards which they tend—cries will be raised of obstinacy
and shortsightedness, and such refusals will be said to
have produced any misfortunes that may ensue. These
arts are not new, and have already been used with some
success on former occasions. They promise a favourable
result in one of two ways. Either the Supreme Pontiff, it
is argued, will yield to the pressure brought to bear in the
matter, and will then lose the rest of his states, if not osten-
sibly, at least in reality ; or else he will resist, and thereby
afford a pretext for despoiling him by another way, namely,
by simply casting upon him the responsibility of all sub-
sequent events.

" This exposition of the dangers and intrigues by which
the Holy Father is surrounded, without any available means
of defence, cannot but place Europe and the world in a
position to -estimate the real state of things, and to do
justice to the Holy See by acknowledging it to be exempt
from responsibility in all future events whatsoever. The
present moment is a very critical one with regard to the
security and independence of the Holy See—even more so
than in 1848. At that time the sovereignty of the Supreme
Pontiff was attacked by a faction not numerous in It alp,
and discountenanced by every leading Government, and
the results of that aggression are known. Now, however,
there aro persons even among the ruling powers who unite
with the agitating factions, and strive by every means to
achieve the same end. Can it be supposed that these
machinations will not succeed, or that the Pontiff is now
possessed of more valid means of opposing them than before?
"From the above remarks your excellency will easily be
enabled to perceive, in a more definite manner, the nature
and serious extent of the perils to which the Holy Father
will be exposed after the departure of the French troops
from Rome. I have made this exposition somewhat ex-
tended, in order that it may serve your excellency for
guidance in any conversations which you may hold relative
to the manner in which the departure of the French troops
will affect the Holy See, and in order that your excellency
may not be led to believe that the Holy Father himself is
deceived with regard to the real intentions of his enemies,
" The Sovereign Pontiff will meet the dangers which
threaten him with that tranquillity arising from the con-
sciousness of not having provoked them ; but if, despite
every possible effort on his part, he is not successful in
obviating the deplorable consequences which may ensue,
it is perfectly clear that he is the last person in the world
to whom blame can attach.

" With this declaration, I bog to confirm to your excel-
lency the sentiments of my most distinguished esteem,
" Cardinal G. ANTONELLI.

" Rome, Nov. 18, 1865.
" P.S.—The telegraph has just brought me the text of
the speech by which the King of Piedmont yesterday inau-
gurated the new Parliament at Florence, and the speech
itself is more than sufficient to enable one to perceive the
real intentions of that Government."

mills are put into operation. Twelve months ago Reese
River ores that did not yield $BO to the ton could not be
worked at a profit, but now ores that promise $5O per
ton are sent to the mill for reduction, while the ore that is
estimated to be below this return is carefully stored for
future working, when labor transit and :machinery shall
be cheaper. It is supposed that at the present time not
more than two-thirds of the silver is extracted by the
process in general use, and so well is this now understood
that several cargoes of the richest ores have been sent to
San Francisco, and have there been shipped foi reduction
to Swansea, South Wales.

It is stated that most of the ores worked at the celebrated
silver mines of Freiberg, in Saxony, usually considered
the richest in Europe, are inferior to the Nevada ores that
are stored as unfit for milling. Much of the ore mined is
of surprising richness, specimen tons assaying in some
cases $3,000 to $5,000, but the average of the richest and
best paying mines of Washoe does not exceed $65 per ton,
and those of Reese River about $l5O per ton. At these
returns very satisfactory results are obtained.
Perhaps a few figures, which will show the result of the
workings of a few mines, may be of interest. In the year
1864 the " Gould and Curry" reduced 65,000 tons, which
Yielded $4,898,000 ; the " Orphir " 1,800 tons, which
yielded $1,012,365; the " Empire " 25,000 tons, and
$1,043,720, the average yield per ton was $65 ; the average
cost of working these Washoe mines was about $2O per
ton. The average cost of working the following mines,
which are in the eastern part of the State, was from $4O to
$BO per ton; the " Little California," in the eight months
ending July, 1865, crushed 693 tons, worth $159,630, or an
average of $230 per ton; in 1864 the ." Oregon " crushed
1,500 tons at an average of $2OO per ton; the " Midas
averaged $230 per ton ; the "Custom Mill" $l7l per ton;;
the " Plato " in 1864 paid dividends each:month of $1,335 ;
"The Bowers," which is only 12 feet long, was rented at
$144,000 for the year, and the tenant found it profitable;
the "Gould and Curry," which might during the past few
years have been bought for $lO,OOO, divided in 1864 among
its stockholders $1,080,000; the "Yellow Jacket" paid in
dividends in 1864 $1,440,000 ; the "Savage " paid in divi-
dends in 1864 $720,000; the "Empire Mill" during the
year built a mill and works at a cost of $300,000, and paid
in dividends over $1,043,720. It would be easy to quote
a multitude of other instances to show the enormous
wealth of this region, but perhaps a few general statistics
may be more to the point. In the year 1864 the whole of
the capital employed in the Reese River district returned
on an average 30 per cent., this being the first year in
which that district had been worked ; and as much of the
labour was preparatory, this, as an average return, must
be regarded as satisfactory. Nevada for 1864 shows that
the Washoe District, with a population of 20,000, produced
$24,000,000 of silver, or an average of $lOO or £2O per
month for every man, woman, and child in the district.
No mining district in the world will compare with this.
In 1864 the product of each stamp per day in Washoe
was nearly $45 ; in " Reese River " above $lOO ; while
the remunerative mines of California realised $l2 to $l5
per stamp, and Colorado $8 per stamp.—Anylo-Anterkan
Times.