The Sun.
London, England, 1859-01-31 00:00:00

VALE RAILWAY COMPANY.

In this case Mr. Phipson showed cause against a
rule for an injunction under the Railway and Canal
Traffic Act enjoining the defendants to afford to
the plaintiffs due and reasonable facilities for carry-
ing, forwarding, and delivering their coal traffic at
the junction, by making a proper side station there.
Mr. Bovill, Q.C., and Mr. Webby appeared in
support of the rule.
After the case had been heard for some time, at
the suggestion of the Chief Justice it was ordered
to be referred to some competent engineer to decide
what was requisite and what ought to be done to
accommodate the traffic, which in the article of
coals was said to be very great.—Referred accord-
ingly.
(Sittings at Nisi Pruis, at Guildhall, before Mr.
Justice Bylcs and a Common Jury.)
_ _ MAYHEW V. STONE AND ANOTHER.

Mr. D. Seymour was for the plaintiff ; Mr,
Atkinson for the defendants.

This was an action brought to recover damages
for an assault and malicious prosecution. The plain-
tiff was once a soldier, and afterwards a cab proprie-
tor at Hounslow. A Mr. Smith, who resided in
the neighbourhood, having missed a set of harness
and a pair of shears, a reward was offered for
the recovery of the property. It seems that
Stone and the other defendant, Harrison, who
is a fish hawker, recovered it, and on their
information the plaintiff was indicted on the
charge of having stolen it. Stone swore that the
plaintiff had sold him the shears, and Harrison
swore that the plaintiff had sold a portion of the
harness. The plaintiff was tried and acquitted, and
he now brought this action to recover damages for
the injuries which he had thus sustained. The cir-
cumstances of the case were very complicated, aid
the evidence extremely lengthy, but the main ques-
tion was, did or did not the plaintiff sell the stolen
property ? The defendants swore distinctly that he
did, the plaintiff swore as distinctly that he did not.
The learned Judge, in summing up, told the jury
that there was no evidence of assault, inasmuch as
the plaintiff had, on hearing of the charge, gone to
the police-office to give himself up. As to the count
for malicious prosecution he said there was plenty
of evidence to show that the defendant Stone was
much exasperated against the plaintiff. Stone had
sold his business as a cab proprietor to Mayhew,
and disputes had arisen between them which were
still unsettled, and Stone had, according to the case
of the plaintiff, threatened to get the other de-
fendant for a £5 note to swear against him and
have him transported. After the reward had been
offered Stone, with the assistance of Harrison aid
other persons, traced the harness, which seemed to
have gone to London, and then the two defendants
gave information against the plaintiff, on which
proceedings were taken.
The evidence given by the defendants' witnesses
was in direct opposition to that of the plaintiff in
almost all the important points in the case, and
having heard a very minute and lengthy summing
up from the learned judge,
The jury retired, and in about 20 minutes re-
turned with a verdict for the plaintiff—Damages
£125.

The announcement was received with loud cheers
from the bystanders. This was the last cause in the
list.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER.

Sittings in Banco, before the Lord Chief Baron,
Mr. Baron Martin, Mr. Baron Watson, and Mr.
Baron Channell.)
HARRISON V. PEARCE.

Mr. M. Chambers akPlied for leave in this case
to appeal from the decision of this Court, upon the
ground that the evidence of injury to the plaintiff's
trade as a printer and publisher, and the diminu-
tion in the circulation of his newspapers subsequent
to the date of the writ was not admissible, the ac-
tion having been brought the day after the publi-
cation of the advertisement alleged to be the libel.
The Court said that they had very carefully con-
sidered the question, with every inclination to re-
lieve the defendant if they could have done so, but
had found it utterly impossible consistently with
the law, and that as they all were very clear upon
the judgment pronounced no leave of appeal could
be given.—Leave to appeal refused.