The Sun.
London, England, 1832-09-10 00:00:00

By the EDITOR.
With several Papers on the Cholera, communicated by
the Government Board of Health, and various Surgeons
and Physicians—Reviews of Stevens on the Blood, and
Toil on the Ear—An Exposition of the new Duties of
Anatomists and Inspectors—A Lecture on the Nervous
System, delivered at the London University, by Mr.
Youatt—And a Case of Carcinoma of the Uterus success-
fully treated. Price Bd.

Edited by Mr. Wakley, and published by Ge L. Hutch•
Inson, at the Lancet-office, 210, Strand.

COMMITTEE ON THE BANK OF ENG.

LAND CHARTER.

Examination of JOHN EASTHOPE, Esq., a Member of the

House.

You are a stock-broker ?—I am.

Are you acquainted with the trade of banking ?--Ye.,
in some degree ; before I was a stock-broker I was engaged
Its a country banker for several years.

At wh it-place ?—At Tewkesbury, in Gloucestershire ;
at Eveshatn, in Worcestershire; and at Alcester, in War-
w•ickshire.

What is your opinion respecting the expediency of re-
newing the charter of the Bank of England with its pre-
sent exclusive privileges ?—My opinion i. decidedly against
the exclusive privileges of the Bank of England.
What is your reason for that opinion conceive that
they are injurious to the public interest, on principle as
well as in practice ; on principle, because I conceive that
the principle which would be safest to the public interest
:wonld comprise small profit•, but the system of tl,e Bank
is to make large profits; and in order to secure that, they
appear to me to have lost sight of the principles necessary
for the public safety. This is strongly illustrated in their
practices, particularly in 1825, and also, I believe, subse-
quently- Previous to the year 1825, the issues of the
Rink were very large, unnecessarily and injuriously so,
and then suddenly centracted in a way to be ruinously
destructive.

Then it is your opinion that the Bank has been more
guided with a view of securing large profits than with a
view of doing what would he best for the public interest ?
--I think that must be manifest from the circumstance of
the Bank being choked up with securities that cannot be
made available to them in case of necessity. Some of the
great evils that have happened have arisen from the Bank
being thus choked up with a species of security, which if
there was a necessity of availing itself of, it could not do,
end the attempt to do se is necessarily ruinous to indivi-
duals, and destructive of public interests.
In point of fact, have not the Bank realized large pro-
fits?—It is so understood, but every thing about the Bank
is so much involved in secrecy, and there is so much con-
cealment, that it is only now and then that we can have
a peep into any thing of that kind. I apprehend it is a
positive fact that they have realized large profits; we have
returns demonstrating that.
That is, in addition to the dividends, there have been
large bonuses ?—Yes.

What do you consider to have been the amount of the
increase of the issue of the Bank previous to 1625, and the
amount of contractions ?---The positive amount of the
increase in bank-notes perhaps was not very large ; but I
conceive there is a great delusion on that point, because
there was a very large drain upon the Bank for gold, and
that gold all went out of the Bank coffers, whilst there
was also, if not a very large one, yet there was an increase
of their notes. Now to have acted safely and fairly, there
ought to have been a large contraction when the Bank
was largely called upon for gold; if they had looked at
the thing in time to have prevented the evils that followed
in December, 1 conceive that there would have been a
large contraction of their notes as they issued the gold.
I believe there was a large diminution of gold, and not at
any t'rne any thing like a proper comparative contraction
of their notes.
That iP, you mean to say that after there was a decided
indication of a redundant currency by a demand for gold,
theh Bank continued to issue paper ?—lt is manifest that
PY did, because there was no contraction of the paper,
wbtilat there was an immense quantity of their paper taken
fo them, for which they paid gold, and yet the amount
their notes in circulation, by the returns delivered to
Parliament, was rather larger after than before the gold
went out.
At what time in 1825 was that P—l forget the exact
dates.
Did it not take place in 1824 ?—Yes, in 1821, and in
the
early part of 1825.
That is to say, there was a great tendency in the ex-
changes to fall, and there was a demand for gold ; and,
notwithstanding those two circumstances, the Bank in
la op
and the beginning of 1825 not only kept the circu-
ion up to its former amount, but actually increased it ?
My impression is, that there was, though not a very
large one, an actual increase, whilst I am under a con-
victi‘n that there ought to have been a decrease, if they
had dulY considered the effect likely to arise from the
amount of gold which they paid.
Then, on the whole, is it your opinion that the Bank,
by its conduct during the years 1824 and 1825 contri-
buted much to the distress at the latter end of 1825 and
the great commercial convulsion that took place at that
%hue ?—lt is my decided opinion, nor do I find any person,
unconnected with the Bank, that appears to have a doubt
about it.

In former instances of commercial difficulty and of
great fluctuations in prices and in the currency, are you of
opinion that the Bank contributed to produce those
effects?.--My belief is, that a system so regulated as that
of the Bank must necessarily be connected with evils of
that description.
Have you examined historically those instances of com-
mercial distress and fluctuations in the currency which
took place in the years 1782, 1793, 1797, 1800, ISI6,
and ISIS ?—I have examined them generally, so as to
have only a general impression; 1 have not examined
them with that minuteness that would warrant me at this
time in
giving any positive evidence arising upon that exa-
Mtnation.

Is it your general impression that the Bank in those in-
°trances conducted their affairs upon a wrong principle ?
That is my general impression.
Do you believe that the management of the Bank direc-
tors subsequently to 1825, has prevented a recurrence of
similar evils to those which occurred in December 1825?
J%ly belief is, that the fears of lePublie have materially
to the same extent,
°Perated to prevent those
Yet similar evils, and not thee careful
vils'l
conduct of the Bank.
is if not
We commonly understand what meant by a burnt child
dreading the fire; now I believe it has been in no slight
degree attributable to that kind of fear that we have not
tot into some of the evils in question. Ido not subscribe
to the opinion of its being sufficient for the Bank directors
to regulate their conduct by a regard to foreign exchanges
"lay ; my belief is that such is the last stage,
kt and n
atage, by which they ought to regulate their conduct the
t,h4t may be sufficient for their own security, but then if
t.iey leave the thing till it comes to that stage, I think it
very probably will occasion the ruin of an immense num-
ver of persons. I cannot help thinking that the
eßasn.k.
ought to regulate their system of management in a
byt
erable degree by the returns upon themselves, that on e
amount of their deposits. We have been led to un-
derstand that the deposits of the Bank of England were
very large and have been so for many years; I cannot
help thinking that ought to be viewed as evidence of a re-
dundant currency. If there were to be large speculations
founded upon a reduction of interest, and the consequences
which arise from a redundant currency, and people go into
speculations which lead to an export of gold, then the
Bank take the thing in hand, and begin to operate upon
the money-market, so as to prevent the export of gold ;
but then it follows that they ruin the speculators, as was
the case in 1825. I think that the Bank ought to take
the thing in the earliest stage; though it may secure them-
ties, to go and sell all they can of their available securi-
ties, and contract their curr,ney, to prevent the export of
gold, it solely is proper and fair that the public should re-
quire some security against an appearance of things which
ktturally induces people, without having the same means
ti knowledge as Bank directors, to go into those specula-
ons by which they become ruined.
What do you mean by regulating their issues by the
akiount of their deposits?—Supposing the Bank to have
',sued 20,000,000/. of notes, and 8,000,0001. of notes are
deposited with themselves, for all the purposes of liabili-
ties of the Bank it is 28,000,000/., and for all the pur-
,poses of circulation it is 28,000,0001., because the London
Bankers and others have a claim upon the Bank for
Ibooo,ooo/. ; when the Bank of England has 8,000,0001.
°f
notes brought back opon them as deposits, I think they
'tight to come to a determination that there is too much Nrrency; it they had done so, they would nut have lent
the London-bridge Company a million of money ; the
tit '1,111; lent the London-bridge Company a million of money
of the time when we understood they had many millions
deposits ; but Om) In it remerubtredi we are obliged to L'