The Sun.
London, England, 1859-10-10 00:00:00

to with the American Government hi 1855.

In this state of affairs, without any notice whis-
pered, without any complaint preferred, and with-
out waiting for a settlement of the question of
sovereignty, the invasion is suddenly and secretly
made, accompanied by a band of armed " citizens"
of the neighbouring territory as volunteers, whom
the officer in charge of the military liberally invited
to help themselves to locations of land wherever
their choice might lead them, and to whom he pro-
mised protection in their squatter rights.
The officer in charge of the detachment of United
States troops loses no time in explaining his posi-
tion. On the date of the day of his landing he
issues a public notice, which in its arbitrariness
sounds like a parody of one of Napoleon the Great's
decrees when he was "annexing" his neighbour's
territories. This notice declares th© island to be
United States territory ; establishes a military post
thereon ; and kindly places the island under the
aegis of American laws exclusively. The conquest
would appear to be consummated to the satisfac-

tion of the parties engaged in it, by a sort
of proclamation, issued in the name of a person
brought with the expedition, styling himself a
" Resident Magistrate," appointing a couple of
" constables on and for the precinct of San Juan,
county of Whatcom and territory of Washington,
whom all persons are commanded in the name of
the United States to obey as such."
This sapient " magistrate" ignores the fact that
there are British subjects on the island, who will
naturally look to their own Government for pro-
tection to their lives and property, in preference to
" th• Magistrate of the precinct" or his two con-
stables. This gentleman would seem also to ignore
the fact that there is a vast amount of British pro-
perty on the island, although I'll be bound he did
not forget it. In fact, it was not long till he began
to talk of taxing it, and all along he had his eye on
it.

It needs no commentary of mine to show that all
these insolent proceedings are in violation of the
arrangement made with the United States Govern-
ment, that " no exclusive sovereign rights should
be exercised by either party ; and that neither
party should exclude the other by force until the
title is settled ;" and that they are equally in viola-
tion of ihe law of nations, and of the usages which
guide the conduct of civilised Governments towards
each other both in peace and in war.
I stated that on the part of any other country
such inconsistent proceedings as I haTe described
would be inscrutable.

On the part of America they are not inexplicable.
They are traceable to the national thirst for the
acquisition of territory, and to what a clever writer
in Blackwood the other clay described as " the
eagerness with which Americans will press forward
to seize even the most unpromising districts, espe-
cially when these aggressions tend to bring their
own Government into contact with the Crown of
Great Britain." When it is added that their public
men, military and civil, find their account both in
creating and in encouraging these cravings, Gen.
Harney's conduct is to my mind intelligible.
The press of Oregon and Washington has been
kept very well informed of all the proceedings in ad-
vance. It has been enlisted as an auxiliary of this
enterprise; and a very willing aid it has lent to it.
The assistance of the press was considered of such
importance that a newspaper, even in San Francisco,
was made acquainted with the intended expedition
in anticipation, so as to prepare public opinion—an
element very easily acted upon in such a case. The
press frankly declares the object of General Har-
ney's measures to be to keep the island, and all the
other islands in the Haro Archipelago. The reason
is given with equal candour by some of the papers
of the General's party, the Democrats. " The
island of San Juan is the key to the Gulf of Georgia.
We want it and were bound to have it." If these
candid publicists would add what they know and
believe, " and we can keep the Britishers out of
their gold country of British Columbia and annex
that and Vancouver's Island, whenever our Govern-
ment erects fortifications on San Juan, &c. We
shall have every British ship for Fraser River pass
under our batteries. We shall Filibuster a bit on
our neighbour's territories ; and our own navy now
fast increasing in our new dockyard in California,
will protect us ; and our good friends the Russians'
will assist us, and in 10 years we shall bring all the
British possessions west of the Rocky Mountains
under the dominion of the stars aid stripes," they
would then tell the whole truth, but they think it
premature to speak so plainly yet.
The press gives an unhesitating and unanimous
approval to all General Harney's proceedings. He
is just the man for the people, and the General for
the occasion. From what I have heard of him his
character may be given in ono word. He is reckless.

The only point on which the press and private
parties differ is as to whether this Geueral is acting
of his own volition or upon the orders of his Go-
vernment. It is idle to speculate upon this point.
I will, therefore, examine the avowed reasons for
his proceedings.

The first reason given was that a military post on
San Juan was required as a protection against
Indians. This was the ostensible reason given, anal

in a military point of view, I should think it just
about as valid a reason and as efficient a measure as

it would be for the English Government to place
a London policeman on Westminster-bridge to pre-
vent thieves from crossing into Kent by the Thames

unnel.

Besides, those best informed in Indian matters do
not believe that any Indian " incursion" is contem-
plates ; and even if it were, a post on this island
would not prevent ie. The Indians are far too well
versed in strategy to come to San Juan to be bagged.
The wise measure of the military post to catch In-
dians, reminds one of the old nursery advice for
catching birds by putting salt on their tails. The
reason given by one of the partisan papers was a
much better one, a more politic one, than the mili-
tary reason. It was that the General, taking it for
granted that the island was undisputed American
territory, shifted one of his posts thereto as a mere
ordinary matter of professional duty.
Before people had got through discussing the
reason we find this " Indian-incursion-reason" aban-
doned, and another substituted by General Harney
himself, in an official letter addressed to the Gover-
nor of Vancouver's Island, dated at head-quarters,
in which he states :

"I placed a military command upon the island of
San Juan to protect the American citizens residing
on the island from the insults and indignities which
the British authorities of Vancouver's Island and
the establishment of the Hudson's Bay Company
have recently offered them by sending a British
ship of war from Vancouver's Island to convey the
chief factor of the Hudson's Bay Company to San
Juan for the purpose of seizing an American citizen
and forcibly transporting him to Vancouver's Island
to be tried by British laws." _

The General adds, in a tone of virtuous indigna-
tion at this rude attempt of " the establishment of
the Hudson's Bay Company" to spirit away his
compatriot (a squatter, of course) :—" I have re-
ported this attempted outrage to my Government,
and they will doubtless seek the proper redress
from tEe British Government. In the meantime I
have the honour to inform your Excellency I shall
not permit a repetition of that insult, and I shall
retain a command on San Juan Island, to protect
its citizens in the name of the United States, until
I receive further orders from my Government."
As there is not one word of truth in this charge ;
as the acts attributed to " the British authorities,"
to " the establishment of the Hudson's Bay Com-
pany," to " the Chief Factor" thereof, are all false ;
as " a British ship of war" never went on any such
mission, or on any mission whatever, to the island ;
and as the " seizing of an American citizen" was
never contemplated, never thought of, and never
heard of, this second reason cannot be the true rea-
son for the military occupation.
I am not much versed in military matters, but it
strikes me that 400 soldiers, a colonel and aids, four
captains, three lieutenants, a battery of eight 32-
pounders, six howitzers, many tons of powder and
shot, and a body of free lances, are rather more
than ordinary strategists would consider necessary
for the purpose of preventing " a repetition of that
insult," even if we admit, for argument's sake, that
it had been intended to bring " an American citi-
zen" off the island.
We don't seize people to try them. Had the
authorities entertained an application on the pre-
mises, all they would do would be to allow a sum-
mons to issue. The whole story is a fabrication,
and the general should hasten to punish his infor-
mant, who has befooled him.
Having detailed so much of the proceedings of
our neighbours, I must now in a few words state
what has been done on our part.
The Governor's views were embodied in the mes-
sage which he addressed to the House of Assembly
and to the Legislative Council, of which I sent you
a copy with my last letter.
The House, in an address to the Governor, ear-
nestly calls upon him to impress upon the Home
Government the necessity of demanding the imme-
diate withdrawal of the American troops from the
island so dishonourably invaded ; of demanding
redress for the wanton and insulting conduct com-
plained of ; and of strenuously and at all risks main-
taining her Majesty's right to the island in ques-
_ . .

tion and to the other islands in the archipelago.
The House has since entertained a project for rais-
ing a militia in the colony.
The view of the Legislative Council will be seen
from a copy of their answer to the Governor's mes-
sage, enclosed, and which I think it would be well
to publish for general information, but I dare not
trespass on your space so far as to embody it in my
letter, already too long.
The overt measures of the local Government have
been few and simple.

The Governor from the first took the view that
General Harney acted without instructions from
the Government at Washington.
The first natural impulse would be to repel force
by force. This course would involve great respon-
sibility and might lead to grave consequences,
without, perhaps, leading to a decision of the point
in dispute.
Although the Governor might have been justified
in coming to the conclusion that the amicable mu-
tual arrangement of nentrality had been broken on
the part of the United States by the hostile action
of one of their officers, yet ho determined to main-
tain the arrangement of neutrality on the part of
his own Government in its integrity, and to take
no step which would " provoke a conflict" if it
could be avoided without dishonour.
This resolution was strengthened by the fact that
the force at his disposal was overwhelming. In
truth this circumstance of itself greatly increased
his reluctance to proceed to extremities.
His reasoning was to this effect :

The handful of United States' troops on San
Juan might indeed be sacrificed; but they must
act in conformity with commands, improper and
unjustifiable, no doubt, in every point of view, and
repugnant to the law of nations and of reason, but
the vengeance which would fall on them would not
fall on the parties really responsible, would not
affect the event, and would enhance the prospect
and the bitterness of a war if this alternative is
really sought by the United States, which, as I have
said, the governor doubted. And therefore a sense
of the responsibility which attaches to the autho-
tised movements of troops belonging to the fore-
most nations of the earth and the enormous inte-
rests at stake induced caution and control.

With a firm conviction of our right to the island,
the Governor felt, as most reasoning men would feel,
that no filibustering could weaken our claim to it if
it were ultimately decided to belong to us, while the
precipitate and inconsistent action of the United
States, or their General, in violation of their own
engagements, would rather weaken than strengthen
ther claim. And there could be no doubt that her
Majesty's Government would take prompt and
energetic measures to assert the just rights if the
nation in due time, or that the Government of the
United States would hasten to set itself right with
that •f Great Britain. _

These considerations and a desire to avoid com-
plications of the question at issue influenced the
Governor to a course of forbearance, which it is
probable may have really prevented a war between
the two countries.

He, therefore, contented himself with sending a
man-of-war to the island to watch proceedings and
to afford protection to British life and property.
Later, a detachment of troops was brought from
British Columbia, and added to the force already
on board the Pylades, but no troops have as yet
landed.

Following up his policy of forbearance, and to
evince his courtesy to the United States, as the
General was not at hand (having never come to the
island), and as the officer in command had no power
to treat, the Governor despatched Captain Prevost,
of her Majesty's ship Satellite, the British Commis-
sioner for settling this very boundary question, so
often spoken of, to confer with this coadjutor the
American Commissioner, at his camp in British
Columbia, and to secure his good offices with Gene-
ral Harney to induce him to desist from his course
while the question of sovereignty was still unde-
cided, and until the respective Governments could
be consulted.

Captain Prevost's mission was, however, unsuc-
cessful. The American commissioner would not
interfere with the military department. And all
that poor Captain Prevost "took by his motion"