The Sun.
London, England, 1866-05-15 00:00:00

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is made must be noticed, but quotatiims must
be given of the exact language which is referred
to, and in reply frequently counter quotations
must be made from previous epistles. These
things make diplomatic papers. tedious, and
those who skim over them do not always mark
the precise features of the discussion. The cor-
respondence upon the Mexican question, between
Mr. Seward and M. D
the views rouyn de l'Huys, M. de
Montholon, Mr. Biael and r. Motley, is
impextremelyortant7nontw;o much min
the re-enun-
elation of of the United States Govern-
ment and those of France, as in the conclusions
swehwicahrdarten
arrived
Di.Aelnoattnt.holoT,P,enffirFsethdrueaspryat,clttho,fisilalrn.
el
ha bi
cohr ate
precededar, m
in uponf reference all
tothethe
F re
nccorrespondencehpnlipolicy
w
in Mexico and the views
doesptahtechUesnintefdi‘Sit.adtese
itlhieuryes-
on. The tone of the
is defensive rather tharnencenl
andhnotnter
emphatic. He desires to
establish that the French intervention was for
French interests only,
with the design of
interference with the institutions
of thweasMeehxnicsaenn
people. He avers that Maximilian
by the Mexican nation to be their ruler,and that
in order to obtain satisfaction for French'claims
,
t
was necessary to support him. -kr.
,iEWARDis 01 f
opinion that the Austrian was never fairly called
otoutththeatthritonweasbyimtpohesslkiblelexitcoanobtain people
a and points
n expression
of the natural will in the presence of the French
army, whichoverawed thefree expression of opinion.
The arguments, traced through the affirmations
and: counter reasonings of both parties, approach
finally the delicate point, how NAPOLEON can get
out of the scrape without seeming to compromise
French honour. The great point of anxiety with the
French Emperor has been to know whether the
United StateS would intervene upon the withdrawal
of the French troops, to drive MAXIMILIAN from
Mexico by force of arms. He desires a formal
guaranty that nothing of the kind will be attempted.
To this request Mr. SEWARD says that the United
States would not consent to make a treaty guaran-
teeing non- intervention, because that would authorise
an inference that they intended to act dishonestly in
. the affair. This idea is not sanctioned, but Mr.
SEWARD says—and this is the great point in the
despatch of February 9—that France need not for
a moment delay her promised withdrawal of mili-
tary forces from Mexico, and her putting the prin-
ciples of non-intervention into full and complete
practice in regard to Mexico, through any appre-
hension that the United States will prove unfaithful
to the principles and policy in that respect which
it has been the duty of the Secretary to maintain
throughout the entire correspondence. This is really
the important part of the despatch. It is a promise
that if the French withdraw from Mexico, the people
of that country will be left to settle the question
with MAXIMILIAN according to their own desires,
and-that no interference by the United States in any
fair expression of their sentiments, whether they elect
to retain the usurper or to expel him from the coun-
try, will take place. This is really all that France
could ask. The reply of M. DE L'Huvs, of the sth of
April, comes, therefore, " to Hecuba," avoiding, as
far as possible, those points in the argument which
may be considered as of no importance in view
of the final understanding. He finds in the lan-
guage of Mr. SEWARD a sufficient guaranty to
authorise the adoption of definite measures for
the withdrawal of the French troops ; and he an-
nounces that the first detachment will be withdrawn
in the ensuing month of November, the second in
May next, and the third in the ensuing November.
Upon this determination no reply has yet been
made by Mr. SEWARD further than to acknowledge
reception of the information. But we imagine that
it will be thought best to acquiesce in it, although
the delay is not pleasant to bear. It will be seven
months before the first detachment is withdrawn,
but if the troops then withdrawn should be one-
third of the whole,,the question will be practically
settled, so that MAXIMILIAN will have to write home
to have his castle prepared for his reception in 1867.
A most important kart of the correspondence is
'that which brings Austria upon the scene. Whe-
ther:the Convention which, it is said, pledges Aus-
tria to supply MAXIMILIAN with ten thousand sol-
diers, has been secretly made 'by an understanding
with NArouloN. or whether it. is an independent
proposition of FRAYCIS JosErii, the effect will be,
unless the movement is stopped, to render the French
withdrawal of no effect. It would be " change for
change, a black dog for a monkey," and subject
the Mexican people merely to a substitution of Aus-
trian for French tyrants. Against this project Mr.
MOTLEY is instructed to emphatically protest at
Vienna, and Austria is to be at once notified
that such "an intervention cannot be regarded
otherwise than as a matter of serious concern
by the United States," and that, if the intention
is carried out," the United States will feel themselves
at liberty to regard those hostilities as constituting
a state of war by Austria against the Republic of
Mexico, and in regard to such war waged at this
time, and under existing circumstances, the United
States could not engage, to remain as silent or
neutral spectators." This will be an intimation
to the House of Hapsburg by no means agree-
able, but which must have its effect. Austria
has probably as much to do in Germany as she
can attend to, and now that France, by the
mere pressure of remonstrance from the United
States, deems it advisable to withdraw from an
experiment which has cost dearly in lives and money,
it will scarcely be prudent for Austria to attempt to
involve herself in the expensive failure in which a
much stronger nation has been involved. The best
thing that FRANCIS JOSEPH can do is to sing-fondly
the gentle ballad, " Brother, come home."