The Sun.
London, England, 1859-07-21 00:00:00

that evidently was not expected. It was one thing
to march over the level plains of Lombardy,
crossing first this river and then that, and here and
there mounting a line of undulating downs ; but
the stone walls and moated works of the Venetian
strongholds were quite another thing. There the
Austrian was strongest, and the daring, dashing
valour that so distinguished the French troops
in the field was of less avail. There, too, it was
matter of pure fighting, and not of strategy, for the
foe was all in front. There could be no flank move-
ment but upon the side nearest the sea, and hence
the whole character of the war would have to be
changed; brilliant victories would no more have
kept up the public excitement in Paris and else-
where ; the telegrams would for many a long day
have resembled those we used to get from the
Crimea—mere chronicles of the opening of this or
that battery, the successful or unsuccessful sortie,
the throwing up of new earthworks, or the attack
upon certain rifle-pits. This would have looked
serious as a check, though is reality the beleagur-
ing forces might have been gaining ground. In
the meantime fever and the other ailments of camp
life would have been making almost as much havoc
as the sword, and thus the pick of the French
army might have melted away long before the
glories contemplated by the promoters of the war
had been achieved. The Emperor seems to have
felt that he had not room to fight as he desired.
He might assail the Austrian rear after an infinity
of lamentable damage to Venice, but he could
menace the enemy's right only by a movement
which could not have been successfully effected
without encroaching upon neutral territory—an
act which would have brought down the instant
action of all the military strength of Germany, and
involved a conflict on the Rhine as well as on the
Adige. This amongst other things determined
Napoleon not to proceed with the wv r, except under
the compulsion of circumstances, and he therefore
agreed to terms of peace.
It is open, however, to us to challenge the reasons
assigned as well as to doubt their cogency. The first
point mentioned is that political considerations were
added to those purely military. " I found myself,"
says the Emperor, " in the face of Europe in arms."
This must be held to be at least a very powerful
figure of speech. It is true that many doubted the
expediency of the war, and regretted to see it un-
dertaken, but there was not a single European State
in arms against France on that account, nor likely
to be. The Prussian army was indeed en route
for the Rhine, but in all probability would only
have done the duty of a corps of observation.
Supposing the original imperial purpose of loca-
lising the war had been attained, not another
Power in Europe would have attempted to engage
France in hostilities. But the Emperor says that
o :ly " a long and barren war was in prospect."
Long it might have been, but barren it could not
be called, had it but effected the splendid things
for which Italy had been taught to look. But then
the Emperor adds that, in spite of all this, he would
have persevered had the results expected borne any
true proportion to the enormous sacrifice which the
employment of the requisite means would have in-
volved. What these would have been in detail he
explains. He must first have " crushed the ob-
stacles opposed by neutral territories." That is, he
must have gone through a portion of the Tyrol in
order to operate against the Austrian right in
flank; and this would have been considered by the
Germanic Confederation as a casus Belli, which
would have necessitated a conflict on the Rhine.
Be'sides this, it would have been necessary to co-
operate with revolutionists, which an Emperor of
Napoleon's school may well be excused for dreading.
But for our part we do not see why, had the Vene-
tians revolted, the allied armies should not have
used their aid, as Garibaldi did that of the Lom-
bards. But beyond all this there was still the great
risk of failure, of the destruction of his army, and
the ruin of the military prestige of France. These,
as the Emperor truly says, constitute " a risk
which a Sovereign should only stake for the inde-
pendence of his country." The sum of all this
is, and there is no concealing it, that the obstacles
to the conquest of Venetia were such that Napoleon
saw no way of overcoming them except at a risk
that was inconsistent with the interests of his own
empire. We cannot blame him for refusing a
danger that he saw clearly before him, and felt
unequal to. But we cannot help regretting, in
common with the rest of Europe, that all this had
not been foreseen. It would have withheld the
Emperor from making large and unconditional
promises, which in the event are not to be fulfilled,
and it would have saved Italy from a bitter disap-
pointment. _ _

We confess to not being able to see where the
difficulty lay,unless in the insufficiency of the French
army. We cannot see why, with Peschiera invested
by the Allies, the Adriatic in the possession of the
French fleet, and the corps of Prince Napoleon to
operate on the Austrian left, the siege of Verona
should not have been attempted and the whole pro-
gramm of the war performed. It is clear, from
what we now know of the feelings of Prussia, that
there was no prospect of a declaration of war on
her part, unless the rights of the Confederation
were invaded; and, bearing this in mind, we cannot
see how the interests of France were more endan-
gered when the French were before Verona than
when they swept the Austrians before them from
the Ticino to the Mincio.

But, granting cogent reasons for stopping the war
what is to be said of the conditions on which it was
stopped ? What of the future of Italy, as contem-
plated by those conditions ? The Emperor says,
" The peace will be prolific of happy results." May
it prove so ; but what prospect is there of it ? " We
have vanquished an army," says Napoleon, " numer-
ous, brave, and well organised." True, up to, a
certain point, but no further. The Austrian army
can scarcely be said to be vanquished when the
French make peace in front of one of its citadels,
because to proceed farther would be to endanger the
interests of France. Thankful shall we be to find
that " every day will reveal additional cause for the
happiness of Italy, the influence of France, and the
tranquillity of Europe." But at present Italy is
exasperated from end to end, France herself is dis-
appointed,and the tranquillity of Europe by no means
assured. Complications of the gravest kind may
arise out of the impracticable conditions agreed upon.
This is deeply felt in this country, where the warmest
friends of the Emperor of the French have received
the tidin: s of this last act with acknowledged con-
sternation. What we all desire is, that both Em-
perors may have their eyes opened to see the
impossibility of carrying out the terms they have
proposed, and that, convinced of this, they will refer
the whole question to be decided in full by a Con-
gress of the five powers, and without any further
reference to the sword--in short, that those steps
will now be taken which should have been taken
by consent of all parties before the war began, and
which, in all probability, would have been taken if
England had not been saddled with a Government
incapable of wielding the necessary influence of this
country at the right moment.

(From the Morning Herald.)
The peace of Villafranca has produced more
apologies than any treaty that we can call to mind.
Henceforth it will be classed amongst the apologetic
in the list of conventions. First of all, the Emperor
Francis Joseph apologised for having accepted such
terms ; then the King of Sardinia apologised for
having given a reluctant assent to the treaty ; and
at length the Emperor Napoleon apologises for
having originated the proposal. Of all the apologies
it must be confessed that that of the young Emperor
of Austria is the most dignified. His army had
been compelled to retire before superior forces, and
an unwillingness on his part to terminate the con-
test would have excited general indignation. After
his defeat better terms were granted to him than he
might have expected before the war began ; so he
consented to sheathe the sword, and thus restored
tranquillity to Europe.
We value peace too highly to regret that the war
should under any circumstances have been brought
to a close. Fro-n the first we counselled modera-
tion, and declared that an appeal to arms was alto-
gether unnecessary. The manner in which this
treaty has been drawn up conveys the severest cen-
sure upon the folly that permitted a wanton sacrifice
of life and treasure. The independence of Italy was
not the object which Napoleon had in view. In his
Proclamation to the army of Italy, dated the 12th
inst., the Emperor Napoleon declared that "the
principal object of the war is attained; Italy will
for the first time become a nation." The fallacy of
this assertion has been fully demonstrated ; so the
Emperor takes up a fresh position, and in his ad-
dress to the great bodies of the state on Tuesday last
admits that he has left the work of emancipation
incomplete. The Emperor acknowledges the reluct-
ance he felt in retrenching from his programme
the territory from the Mincio to the Adriatic, and
to see vanish from honest hearts noble illusions and
their patriotic hopes. In order to serve the inde-
pendence of Italy I made war against the mind of
Europe, and as soon as the destinies of my country
might be endangered I concluded peace." Our no-
tions of freedom may be peculiar, but we certainly
do not perceive how the independence of Italy has
been in a single particular advanced, either by the
victories of the late campaign, or the treaty by
which it is followed. Sardinia has been called upon
to surrender some of her most precious rights ;
Austria has lost territory, but strengthened her
position ; and an attempt is made to confer upon
the Bishop of Rome increased temporal power.
Hence fresh elements of discord have been intro-
duced into the Italian question, and the condition
of the peninsula is worse than when the conflict
commenced. Already signs of discontent are appa-
rent, and it would be difficult to say how all this is
to end. Great expectations had been excited, and