The Sun.
London, England, 1859-10-06 00:00:00

Enclosure No. 6.—Memorandum.

Yesterday evening a Cantonese, Sen-seen-sang, who has
for several years been in the habit of lending money to ex-
pectant officials, whom he accompanied when appointed to
any post, called on me. He had just returned from Pekin,
via Shanghae, having left the former place on the 22d of
March. He informed me that at the time of his departure
from Pekin, the expected return of the British Ambassador
to Tien-tsin, and the possibility of his visiting the capital
were subjects freely canvassed in every quarter; that the
Emperor was known to be highly displeased with some of
the stipulations contained in' the Tien-tsin treaty ; that he
was entirely averse to the ambassador's taking up his quar-
ters in.the capital, and that he had resolved not to grant
him an audience on any pretext ; that military preparations
were going on at Pekin and Tien-tsin ; that the Russians
had offered the Emperor 10,000 muskets, but that his Ma-
jesty had declined to accept the present, fearing that the
muskets in question might be brought to the palace by an
equal number of Russians ; that the arrangement of all
matters connected with the reception of the British at Tien-
sin, and the preventing of any visit to Pekin, had been con-
fided to Sung-wang yay, a Ta-tsze-wang, son-in-law of
the last Emperor; that Sung-wang-yay was at Tien-tsin
with 50,000 troops, Manchoos and Mongols ; that the
batteries at Tien-tsin had been rebuilt, and the river
staked in such a way as to render it impossible
for foreign vessels to reach that city ; that 30,000
" so-lo" troops, men never called out except in cases of
the greatest emergency, were under orders to hold them-
selves in readiness to joing Sung-wang-yay if called for;
that Sung-wang-yay's orders were to receive the British at
Tien-tsin with all civility, but at all hazards to prevent any
nearer approach to Pekin ; that Sung-wang-yay was very
desirous of gaining military renown, and that the ambas-
sador would be unable to reach Pekin without having re-
course to arms ; that, according to the opinion of some, the
ambassador, accompanied by a few people, might possibly
reach Pekin without bloodshed, but that a fight would cer-
tainly ensue if more than 100 men were landed ; that the
country between Tien-tsin and Pekin being flat, and the
Chinese troops being so much more numerous than any
number of men the British could land, it was the general
belief that the British could be surrounded and cut to pieces
before the completion of one-half the journey.
Sen-seen-sang further informed me that a Russian am-
bassador had visited Pekin on the 2d March ; that the Rus-
sians in the capital, more than a hundred in number,
roamed about just as they pleased, much to the grief of the
Emperor and the anti-foreign party ; and that it was feared
the British, if they once effected an entrance, would take an
ell for every inch theßussians had arrogated to themselves
—that at Yung-chow large quantities of grain had been
bought up by the Russians. but that the Emperor having
become alarmed, had forbidden the traffic.
(Signed) ROBERT HART, Interpreter.
British Consulate, Canton, May 22, 1859.

No. 7.
MR. BRUCE TO THE EARL OF MALMESBURY.
(Received July 31.)

(E xtrac t . )

Victoria, Hong Kong, Juno 1, 1859.

I have the honour to inform your lordship that M. de
Bourboulon arrived at Hong Bong on the 26th ultimo, from
Macao, where he had been delayed by the non-arrival of
the corvette and small steamer destined to convey him to
Tien-tsin. Admiral Rigault had taken all the stoxes, &c.,
out of the corvette when at Turon, and she has not yet
completed her provisions, but I trust she will be ready to-
morrow, on which day I likewise proceed to Shanghae
direct. I have waited for M. de Bourboulon, as I thought
it advisable that every step we take in the Pekin
expedition should be taken by uc in concert ; and as I do
not wish to have any communication with the Imperial
commissioners, should they be still at Shanghae, until my
Freneh colleague arrives.

No. 8.
MR. BRUCE TO THE EARL OF MALMESEURY.

(Received August 11.)
Shanghae, June 14, 1859.

My Lord,—l took my departure from Hong Kong as soon
as the French corvette Duchayla was reported ready to pro-
ceed. Foreseeing that I should find on my arrival here
questions of considerable importance, which it would be de-
sirable to decide in concert with M. de Bourbolon, I did not
think it advisable to precede him, and thereby put myself in
the position either, of acting in his absence, or of giving as
a reason for delay that I was waiting- for him. I reached
Shanghae on the evening of June 6, and M. de Bourbolon
arrived on the following morning.
I found three letters from the Imperial commissioners,
proposing that, instead of proceeding to the north to effect
the exchange of the ratifications, I should remain here and
commence discussions on various details connected with
carrying the treaty into operation, alleging as their reason
for waiting at Shanghae that the Earl of Elgin, on proceq-
ing to the south, had left some of these details unfinished.
On reading, however, Lord Elgin's letter of March 3, 1859,
addressed to them on his leaving China, I saw that there
was nothing to justify their delay that they were informed
therein of my being the bearer of important documents to
be delivered at Pekin, and that they were warned that a
strict adherence to the treaty was the only method by which
peaceful relations could be preserved. One of the articles
prescribes the exchange of the ratifications at Pekin within
a year, and I know, from what passed last year. that it is
not, in the eyes of the Chinese, one of the least important
of its stipulations.

I am unable to state whether the commissioners were
acting under instructions from their go;ernment to use
every effort to prevent our proceeding to the north, or
whether they adopted this expedient for the purpose of being
out of the way when the visit to the capital, so unpala
table to the pride of the Chinese Government, is to take
place. But that their object was to gain time, the favourite
policy of this Government, in the hope that something,
they know not what, might turn up and relieve them from
this visit, I could have no doubt ; neither could I doubt,
independently of the precise nature of my instructions, that
anything which looked like hesitation pc irresolution on my
part, would encourage the Chinese in putting obstacles in
my way, and render the objects. of illy mission more difficult
to attain without a fresh appeal to forge.
I accordingly addressed to the Secrethry of State Kweili-
ang the enclosed note, declaring that my resolution to pro-
ceed was inflexible ; refusing to enter into any discussion of
details until after the exchange of ratifications ; declining
to grant them an interview at this place, and holding them
responsible for any consequences that might ensue from
the want of due preparation at Pekin for my reception.
M. de Bourboulon, who shares my opinion on the sub
ject, transmitted a note to the same effect.
I further sent a short note, pointing out that, by em-
ploying one of the steamers lying here, they might still, if
they liked, reach Tien-tsin in time.
In the meantime the squadron sailed to rendezvous at
some islands a short distance off the Polo, and Admiral
Hope left on the 11th, having agreed to inform the officers
in charge of the forts at Peiho that the Ministers of Eng-
land and France were coming, and to direct them, if they
had received no instructions on the subject, to communicate
the intelligence to Pekin, and to obtain a reply within a
fixed number of days. On the occasion of the Admiral's
departure I addressed•to him the letter (a copy of which is
herewith enclosed.)
At this time the reports that reached us were not encon-
raging, and I learned from the best authority that a high
Chinese official had declared that he would not go to the
north, as there would be trouble, and that we should be
obliged to give the Chinese government another lesson at
Tien•-tsin before the Emperor would be brought to reason
and before pacific counsels would obtain the ascendancy.
This tallied with other accounts, and with the fact that the
war party acquired so much influence at Pekin last winter, and
sent such extravagant instructions to the commissioners,
that Ho wrote back that if affairs were to be managed in that
spirit, the Emperor had better name his uncle and the other