The Sun.
London, England, 1832-11-08 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS,

The embargo imposed on Dutch vessels, ht
the Order in Council published in an Extra
ordinary Gazette of last night, is a natural am
necessary consequence of the measures which on.
Government was bound to adopt in executiot
of the late convention. The stipulations of that
convention engaged England to undertake, in
conjunction with France, the blockade of thl
Dutch ports, provided his Dutch Majesty re-
fused to comply with the conditions of the treat
of November 15, 1831, by the surrender ot
Antwerp within a specified time. His Majesty
having refused compliance with that demand.
and having held out no hope that further consi-
deration would lead him to alter his mind, the
blockade must of course be enforced in the first
instance, and, if inefficient, must be followed 13‘
the advance of a French army against Antwerp
The very nature of a blockade infers the neces-
sity or the justification of an embargo. The
object of the former at present is to inter-
rupt the trade of Holland till Holland returns
to better counsels, and to make her feel that
the displeasure of the two most powerful nations
in Europe is not to be despised, even though it
May not lead to the immediate attack of her
ports, to the confiscation of her property, or to
the invasion of her territory. This can only be
done by prohibiting British vessels from clear-
ing out for the ports of Holland, and by pre-
venting Dutch vessels at present in the ports ol
Great Britain from returning to their own coun-
try. That would, indeed, be a most extraordi•
nary species of blockade, imagined by some
Tory blockheads, which would allow the com-
mercial and shipping intercourse between the
two hostile nations to remain as active and direct
as if no blockade had existed. From the me-
inent that the blockade was declared to the
Dutch Government, after its refusal to comply
with the convention of the 22d ult—from that
moment, we say, the British and Dutch Govern-
ments were in a state of hostility. It would there-
fore have been absurd to have permitted our ships
lo sail for the Dutch ports, either to be captured
by the enemy, or to contravene the policy of their
own country. It would have been equally ab
surd to have allowed such Dutch vessels as ma)
happen to be in British ports to return home.
when, according to the very conditions of
blockade, they must have been exposed to cap-
titre by our blockading squadron at the Yen
mouths of their own harbours. With regard to
the Dutch, the Older in Council for an em-
bargo is even a kind and benevolent arrange.
ment. Should the King of Holland surrender
Antwerp on the advance of a French army, et
before the French force reaches the Dutch lines
to commence hostilities, it is extremely probable
from the temper in which the naval expedi-
tion has been undertaken, that all Dutch naval
property in England will be restored. The em-
bargo will thus f.cilitate a restitution which ah
would desire. Had Dutch merchantmen been
allowed to sail from England and be captured
on their own coast, the captors would then
have claimed an interest in their prizes, which
would have been extremely embarrassing to
our Government, or costly to that of Holland.
The Dutch or English must have paid to the
blockading squadron the price of their captures.
By the embargo all this difficulty is prevented ;
and, as we have no desire to oppress Holland.
all the detained vessels will most likely be re-
stored as soon as the Dutch King is cured of
his temporary insanity. The French army will
certainly enter Belgium by the 15th inst. (ac-
cording to the terms of the convention), should
the presence of the blockading squadrons fail ot
producing the desired effect on the Court of the
Hague. Europe cannot, therefore, be kept much
longer in suspense about the result of a contest
which ought to have been settled a year ago.
That year has been one of considerable agitation
and alarm among all sensible and good men,
who see the only, or at least the fairest, chance
of consolidating free institutions, and of extend-
ing general liberty in the bosom of peace, and
in the absence oft hat military dictatorship which
successful warfare nearly always bequeaths to the
victor. But the interval has not been entirely lost
to humanity, though it has exposed Europe to
great dangers, and inflicted upon the Netherlands
great sacrifices.TheGovernments of the chief Pow-
ers oft he continent have learned to appreciate eacl4
other's interests and designs. They have beet,
enabled to see that war is a game in which each
may lose as well as win,—that it is not abso-
lutely necessary to consolidate freedom in France
or to protect despotic power in Russia ; and that
if propagandism should cease, and the ambition
of conquest could be restrained, the world might
endure in peace two sets of political opinions as
well as several systems of religious doctrine. 11
war, therefore, should now take place, or, in other
words, if the King of Holland should continue
to hold the gauntlet which he has so impru-
dently taken up, its circle will he extremely li-
mited. Holland, which pretends to fight for
her commerce, would not long continue a strug-
gle by which all commerce is destroyed, nor
would his Dutch Majesty, who retains Antwerp
to give him the chance of recovering Belgium,
desire to continue much longer that hostile oc-
cupation when, by the desertion of one portion
of his former allies, and by actual opposition ol
the other, he finds that object utterly placed be-
yond his grasp.—Times.
If the embargo on Dutch vessels, announced
by the Order in Council, be not one of those

fictions which, in the polite language of diplo-
macy, is called a demonstration, the tocsin of
war has been sounded by the " Pacificators of
Europe," and the conflict of arms follows the
confusion of the Protocols. The Ministerial

Papers that have repeatedly proclaimed, during
the last 18 months, the speedy settlement of the
Batavo•Belgic question by peaceable negotiation,
and that have as often ridiculed the notion of

the Protocol farce ending in a tragedy, now
labour to make the public believe that nothing
can be wier than entering into a war at the pre-
sent moment, because it is only to " preserve
the peace." A war to " prevent war" is a po-
litical novelty, of which the Statesman-like in-
tellect that has enriched the world with so great
a tliscovery, might well have been proud if the
original merit of the invention did not really
belong to that Irish pacificator who said that his
" only reason for breaking a man's head was to
prevent a breach of the peace." An Evening
Paper (the Courier) says, " Ministers have been
dragged on by events. NS' as it within the scope
of foresight, or within the calculation of probabi-
lities, that Holland would de& the power of

Great Britain—and of Great Britain united with

France ? Even now the fact, if fact it be, is

like some strange politicalsdream. But it seems
that Holland has thrown down the gage ; she
laughs at our menaces—despises our demonstra-
tions—rejects our endeavours to prevent the
necessity of waging war against an old Ally—
ai,d Holland must be made to learn that though