The Sun.
London, England, 1859-10-19 00:00:00

aof all the rights of the sovereign and the people. The
iabitants had once again a proof of how much avail for

their own dignity were these petty political circumscriptions
and these feeble dynasties, powerless against revolt, power-
less against the violent acts of the foreigner, and hostile by
_ _ _

their hopeless state. to the future hopes of the nation. The
opinion of Europe is now enlightened respecting the motives
and the character of the political movement in Central

Italy. This movement explains itself by the most legiti-
mate of feelings, the national feeling, which is also a prin-
ciple of order in the-breast of society. Now, in this respect
w hat was the situation of the reigning family at Parma re-
latively to its subjects ? Since 1848 the dynasty had never

Ased making common cause with Austria, binding itself
,o her with bonds of yet greater and greater strictness. By
the treaty of Feb. 4, 1848, the Duke had concluded a private
convention, which, in contempt of the general treaties, esta-
blished real relations of vassalage towards Austria, handed
over to her on every occasion the territory of the State, and
formed with her an offensive and defensive league of a per-
manent nature. By an article in that treaty the Duke of
Parma, moreover, engagqil to conclude with no other Power

any military convention whatever without the previous
consent of the Impe.tial Government of Vienna.
Some have wished to establish a distinction as to what
regards the national question, between the policy of the
Government of Parma under the Dukes Charles 11. and
Charles 111. awl the policy of the Government of Parma
such as it was lately constituted. Such a distinction falls
before the evidence of facts.

When the Piedmontese Government, with a prudent fore-
sight fully justified by ulterior events, called the attention of
Europe to the condition of the Peninsula, and to the en-
croachments of Austria, it began by protesting against the

fortifications of Piacenza and the treaties of 1848 as acts
that evidently modified the condition of things such as Eu-
rope had wished to create it by the treaties of 1815.
The government of the Duchess Regent had then an op-
portunity of disengaging its personal responsibility either
by public declarations or by communications to the Piad-
montese Government. It did not do so. Another and a still

more favourable opportnnity presented itself when, in view
of the eventuality of a war, the question of the special
trcaties was brought forward categorically, and the neces-

sity of their abrogation admitted, it may bo said, by all the
Cabinets of the European powers, Austria excepted. We
can appreciate now the exceptional situation, yet one
free from danger, which the Government of the Duchess
might have made for it3elf at that period. No-
thing, however, took place to contradict its entiro acquies-

cence in that complete and necessary partnership in which

t found itself engaged with Austria. But that was not

enough. The Austrian Government was concentrating its
troops on the Piedmontese frontier with the aggressive ob-

ject that received its explanation by tin, subsequent sending
of the ultimatum. The Austrian troops were collected at
Piacenza; ithmense stores of war were brought there; the
invasion of Piedmont was preparel within the territory of
the duchy, and it was from thencethat a part of the imperial
troops set forth to invade the Sardinian states. The Go-
vernment of the Duchess took part in all this, without any
communication on its part, such as international duties
would otherwise seem to have required, and no explanation
of its intentions or cnuluct reached the Government of his
Majesty the King of Sardinia. It was only when the for-
tune of arms turned against Austria, and the protection of
the Austrian arms was about to fail her, that the Duchess
decided on proclaiming her neutrality.
The Piedmontese Cabiaet considered this offer to have
come very Ate, for it could not be admitted that a Govern-
ment should be allowed to declare itself and cause itself to
be respected as a neutral whenever fortune might declare
itself adverse to its ally, and it might think it expedient to
abandon that ally. A strange neutrality in fact ! For if
one relies upon preventive engagements that create rela-
tively to Austria duties of common action and defence,
evidently incompatible with the laws of neutrality, one
must then submit to the consequences of those engage-
ments in the same way that one has accepted their aclyan-
tages. If, on the contrary, it be argued that such was the
special situation into which the Government of Parma was
thrown by general stipulations concerning the fortress of
Piacenza, it is easy to reply by citing the terms of those
stipulations, which establish " that the fortress of Piacenza
offering a more especial interest for the defensive system of
Italy, his Imperial, Royal, and Apostolic Majesty will pre-
serve in that city the right of garrison, pure and simple, all
the regal and civic rights over that city being reserved for
the sovereign of Parma."
There is a difference, however, between this right of keep-
ing a garrison, pure and simple, and the creation of a vast
intrenched camp beyond the precincts of Piacenza, between
the purely defensive object of those stipulations and mili-
tary aggression prepared in tho territory of the duchy, and
affected by means of the Parmesan frontier. For the rest,

the published documents permit us to appreciate at their
true value this pretended neutrality, since a letter of the-
26th of May last proves to us that the Minister of Parma
residing at Vienna regretted that he could not obtain the
succour of imperial troops, and complained of Austria's
limiting herself to assure him of her support after the vic-
tory which she confidently expected to obtain. This neu-
trality, however, which would have sufficed in so far as re-
gards the international relations with the Piedmontese Go-
vernment, and which constituted the last concession of the
Duchess Regent to the feelings of hersubjects, could it satisfy
the legitimate wishes and the supreme interests of the people ?
Were the inhabitants able to declare themselves neutral upon
hearing of the contest that decided the fate of the country at
large, whilst the French flag joined with the Italian flag was
being triumphantly borne across their territory, and the
Emperor Napoleon 111. was inviting the Italians all to be
soldiers that they might become the citizens of a great na-
tion ? Had they not clearly manifested their intentions by
sending:thousands of volunteers to the war of independence ?
The Government of the Duchess Regent, by proclaiming
under the pressure of events a neutrality it had not observed,
declared that this attitude had become necessary to it through
contrary duties which were equally sacred in its eyes. This
is precisely what the people of Parma cannot admit, and it
is perfectly justified in law when it demands Italian princes,
in whose eyes the interests of the foreigner are not so sacreg
as those of their own country. By its traditions, its natural
and constant tendencies, its weakness also, the reigning fa-
mily of Parma failed in its duties as a neutral sovereign
towards Piedmont, and in the duties of an Italian prince
to wards his subjects. The principle and character of our
political movement are sufficiently well known at the pre-
sent time to establish the fact, that any dynasty which has
shown itself hostile to the national emancipationhas estranged
from itself all hearts, and is a rotten tree in the Italian soil'
The Duchess, brought back to her States, would have to
rely on that national opinion, by which the family of her aost
is unanimously rejected. An irreparable and mutual distrust
would' ender any sel id and durable establishment quite impes-
sible. The Goveinment, hostile to Piedmont by its traditions,
fearing the national party on account of the sentiments of the
latter, would only seek more and more every day aid and
protection from that Austrian influence which doubtless WO
attempt from Venetia to recover its lost ground as much as it
can. The opinion of the country for its part, an (vial°
common to all classes and strengthened by the interests ,
all, will not renounce the idea of Italian unity, its hope Of
annexation to the kingdom of the house of Savoy. The
question of the•deposition of the Bourbons, and that of an-
nexation to Piedmont, are intimately blended in the minds
of the Parmesan people. The position which Austria main'
tains in Italy counsels them by the necessity of defence 0
concur in the creation of a strong Italian State, and Pre-
serve themselves by the introduction of the new right de-
rived from the national wish against all those rights of re-
versibility and military servitude established by treaties
whic if they were not abrogated, would lead us here-
after into as many and as dangeaous complications as thel
have done heretofore. This union, rendered necessary bl
the Italian idea, is required besides by all the moral end
material interests of the Parmesan provinces. Their in'
habitants know from long and hard experience the disad-
vantage of belonging to one of those petty political aggre-
gations powerless for good, and yet so fruitfil in evils and
dangers of every kind. That pei-iod of Italian civilisation.
which was accomplished by the rise and progress of muln-
eipal life, nes finished ages ago. Italian society is tics!„
modified by the effect of time, and seeks, too for late hereon,
to return into the way of those great national agglo-
merations by means of which other peoples have found
prosperity and happiness, and have been able to o ut-
strip us in civilisation and power. Experience has
proved that without those aggregrations there can
neither be those great institutions nor that large deve-
lopment of action, which constitute the very essence
of the modern life of nations. For. the Parmesan
Provinces the annexation is not only a satisfaction given to
the national feeling, it concerns and affects also in the
highest degree the material prosperity of the country. After,
the union of Lombardy with the Sardinian kingdom, the,
which was a political necessity becomes also an economics'
necessity. In 1848 the union with Piedmont was voted 11
37,250 :oters. The fortune of armies broke in pieces that
solemn compact, but misfortune sealed the concord of ideas
and sentiments. Eleven years later, the union with Pied-
mont submitted, to popular suffrage, was proclaimed hi
63,167 voters.
The vote of deposition, the vote of annexation, which are
mixed up togalier in the popular conception, cannot be
separated in the political realisation. Since the right of the
national will has been admitted in favour of Italy, hsw can
one of these votes be less legitimate than the other ? The
consent of the people cannot be asked solely for negative
resolutions, and the administration that is to secure the
tranquillity and prosperity of the country has special need
of this basis.
You will point out, sir, all that such a solution offers
in
tha way of guarantees for the future, both from the point ot,
views of Italy's military defence, and for the conditions 01
moral and material order in the Parmesan provinces.
It satisfies at the same time the sympathies and interests,
of the country; it pacifies men's minds by the realisation el
their unanimous wish, and achieves a great progress 0;
wards that work of national reconstruction which, aft°
having been initiated by the most generous and glorious ,
wars, is being followed up by the wisdom and energies
the people, and by the sympathies of liberal Europe.
Accept, sir, the assurance of my most distinguished con'
sideration. FARINI.

The Hon. P. Campbell Scarlett, C.B. (her .10'
jesty's Envoy in Tuscany), ancompanie'd by his family, b",
arrived at the Brunswick Hotel, Jermyr.-.3treet.