The Sun.
London, England, 1859-04-28 00:00:00

THE FRENCH AND RUSSIAN
ALLIANCE

(From the Times.)

The event which we yesterday announced
perhaps, the most important that has been sub-
mitted to the present generation of Englishmen.
The two great aggressive Powers of the world
are united for common objects. Under the pressure
of no mutual danger, compelled by no visible
necessity, coerced by no antagonist, the Czar Alex-
ander and the Emperor Napoleon 111. have united
their fleets and their armies. This alliance is
marked by none of the causes which combine
honest men for protection, but it has all the pecu-
liarities which attach to an union by which strong
men confederate to plunder. The declaration of
this event is as startling by its suddenness as Ms
impressive by its importance. We were in the
midst of a somewhat unsuccessful attempt to
arrange a normal European difficulty. The public
opinion of Europe was pressing upon Austria to
adopt some moderation of tone and measures in
dealing with her Italian provinces. Sardinia,
young, impetuous, and illaidvised, was ready to
commit the error, so often committed and so often
repented, of calling in an ambitious ally to help her
in a quarrel with a disagreeable neighbour. France
was thought to be but too ready to obey the call
and to seize the opportunity. All Europe,
and Russia especially among the earliest
and the most active, was engaged in strenu-
ously urging France to restrain her vehe-
ment enthusiasm for Transalpine liberty, and to
relinquish her suspected desire for Transalpine pro-
vinces. Austria alone, urged perhaps by the pre-
sentiment which sometimes seems to take possession
of the doomed, saw no safety in concession, and no
hope of peace in diplomacy. She saw, or thought
she saw, that the only hope of escape was to despair
of safety, and she challenged the war which she
thought it impossible to avoid. The_ world cried
aloud against her—none so loud as England and
Prussia—except only France. Perhaps we were
right. Perhaps Austria was only improving, with
a short-sighted cunning, an apparent advantage.
Perhaps we were wrong, anti that Austria at the
moment knew what we now know. But, if this be
so, her strength was in publicity. If it be that she
had early intelligence of this alliance, she has
undergone the condemnation of Europe for the
sake of keeping an enemy's most precious secret.
This was the diplomatic masque which was in full
performance up to the early morning of yesterday.
By daylight of that morning all this acting pageant,
with its protests. and protocols, its proposals and
acceptances, its shadowy. Congress and mou,lded
and broken mediations, had faded away into past
history, and were as if they had never Taeen. The
scene in one moment changed, the puppets were
swept from the stage, and the two great despots
of the world stood united in grim strength,
masters of the scene, and sole objects of the
world's attention. The probability of this
alliance had occurred to many, but its realisation at
this special crisis was so sudden that the sense of
surprise was almost as great as the sense of danger.
However, this danger, great as it is, has come upon
us, and we must meet it with as much dignity and
examine it as calmly as we may.
We believe we may state from authority not
likely to
.prove incorrect that the provisions of the
Treaties just concluded between France and Russia
—for we understand there are two—are of this
import :—By the first Treaty Russia binds herself,
in the event of France being at war with Austria,
to assist France by the co-operation of her fleets in
the Baltic and the Mediterranean, and, moreover, to
place an army of observation of not less than 50,000
men on the Austrian frontier. This is the first
Treaty, and it is obviously directed immediately
against England. France can have nothing to
fear from the navy of Austria ; if she seeks to
strengthen herself at sea, it must be against
some first-class naval Power ; and what other is
there than England ? This Treaty is an agree-
ment between - France and Russia to unite the
fleets of the two empires, in order to keep the
navy of England in check, while one or both of
the contracting parties may be engaged in effecting
some object hostile to the interests or the security
of Great Britain. it is plain that the parties to
this compact do not count upon the neutrality of
England, and the existence of this precautionary
Treaty is in itself a proof that the enterprises
which are thus to be protected are such as it would
be impossible for England to allow to pass unchal-
lenged. The Russian Army of Observation is no
less significant than the unity of the Imperial
navies. This corps will, of course, be employed to
excite insurrection among the Hungarian and
Sclave subjects of Austria, and it requires no great
stretch of imagination to foresee how quickly the
flames would rise, and how far they would spread.
We cannot tell the character nor measure the scope
of the secret understanding which has prompted
this offensive alliance. Perhaps the o-reat design
may rest upon the Rhine on the one side, and may
comprehend the Principalities, or even lean upon
the Bosphorus on the other. It is hard to believe
that so small a matter as an Italian war could haye
rendered necessary such gigantic precautions
against the navy of England, or such menacing
demonstrations against the eastern provinces of
Austria. It may have been foreseen that the in-
tentionsof the two allied despots must provoke the
resistance of all Germany, and render necessary the
blockade of the ports upon the Baltic ; and it may
have been considered that, however peaceable may
be the intentions of England, the contemplated im-
pediments upon her Baltic commerce might render
her absolute neutrality scarcely possible. The se-
cond Treaty seems to have been suggested by POMP
knowledge or suspicion of the intended action of
Austria, for it provides that, in case Austria
should invade Sardinia, Russia shall declare war
against her within fifteen days of her violation of
the Piedmontese soil. No union can be closer than
that which these Treaties create. In the event of
Austria invading Sardinia the two fleets will sail
,together in the Baltic and in the Mediterranean,
and the army of observation will occupy Hungary.
These preparations being made and all things
being ready it was not to be expected that Austria
would be allowed to retire from the position in
which her precipitate summons to Piedmont hau_
placed her. Nor, on the other hand, would Ser-
dinia herself be permitted to abdicate her danger-
ous and unprofitable position as the advanced
guard of the French army and the first victim of
the newly developed enterprise. Recent circum-
stances would appear to argue that Austria was not
thoroughly well-informed of the alliance about to
be cemented, or that she had not learnt the extent
or stringency of its provisions. She seems t.) have
started like one who has trodden upon a coiled
serpent as she put forth her first step towards
Piedmont and found these Treaties in her path.
She at once yielded to the ultimate proposal of
England, andagreedto delay her declaration of war
upon the conditions suggested by Lord Malmes-
bury. But it was too late. The aggressive Powers
saw their advantage, and, whatever veil of decent
hesitation may be thrown over the proceeding,
the Powers who havebeen tempted to declare them-
selves will . unquestionably persevere. Austria
feels she must fight, and she has shown no slack-
ness in accepting the necessity. Punctual to the
hour she had named, her colurnms were in motion,
and on Tuesday night 120,000 men cßossed the
Ticino. The French, too, arc advancing, both by
way of Genoa and of Mount Cenis ; and Sardinia,
we fear, has already begun to feel some of the
slights which a small State always suffers from a
great ally. It is said that the language of the
French at Turin is already changed in tone, and
that the protectors are not choice in their terms of
scorn for the means of defence possessed by the pro-
tected. Perhaps Count Cavour may now recollect
what happened in Lombardy in 1796, and how the
fathers of the present Frenchmen treated the people
they then professed to liberate. The forced con-
tributions from Milan and from Modena, the con-
fiscations at Venice, the storm and sack of Pavia,
the shooting of the magistrates of the great cities
in cold blood, and the slaughter of the peasantry by
.of the masterpieces
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fusion. This, however, is scarcely to be hoped for.
Austria is marching as it to an assured victory, and
Sardinia is not yet quite disabused of the hope of
obtaining the jackal's share of the expected prey.
These are strange prospects suddenly revealed,
and they offer us no very promising future. Still,
we adhere to what we have already said,—that so
long as the war is confined to Italy, or to the inva-
sion or preservation of the Italian territories, we
need take no active part in it. If, however, the
tide of aggression should roll nearer home, if France
and Russia should attack Austria in Germany,—
Russia seeking, perchance, her indemnity in the
East of Europe,—or if Prussia should be laid wiser
a contribution of territory, then, indeed, the ditign
of these Treaties of offence would become no lass
than a partition of Europe, and the first principle
of self-preservation would compel us to considper
whether we can better defend ourselves on
Continent of Europe or at our own hoti2_enst g and
These
nd
These are serious topics ; but, although in -F;
we are all unanimous in desiring to
keepclear, if
we
possible, of these continental complications,
are also profoundly convinced
that the existence of
a great German
essential to our own safety.
Power