The Sun.
London, England, 1866-06-04 00:00:00

America and the Commercial Crisis.

It has been suggested that among the results of
the commercial crisis in this country will be a simi-
lar crisis in America. Such an idea, however, is
based on the erroneous assumption, that the course
of our trade in America is the same as in former
periods when the commercial interests of the two
countries were so intertwined that the least shock
to one was felt with extreme- sensitiveness in the
other. The experience acquired in the years 1825,
1837, 1847, and 1857, fails, therefore, to indicate
the commercial future of 1866. A small amount of
consideration will suffice to show how complete is
the contrast between the problem now presented
and that which was solved in former years.
Prior to the civil war, the chief basis of the com-
merce between the Northern and the Southern
States, as well as between Ann:Lica and England,
whs the cotton crop, of which the great central mart
was New Orleans. In 1860 the exports of that city,
being about two millions of hales, were equivalent
to those of all the other Southern cities put toge-
ther. From that centre were distributed through-
out the South-Western States all the goods which
a prosperous and rapidly-augmenting population
required from English and Northern manufacturers ;
and those goods were paid for in cotton. The com-
merce was, however, by no means simple and direct.
It passed through many hands, and was compli-
cated by intermediate operations before reaching
the last stage, at which Mississippi or Arkansas cot-
ton was exchanged for the products of Manchester

or Sheffield, of Boston or Lowell. The commodity
of the planter was generally sold by the city factor
in the South in order to repay advances made to
the grower before the crop was in the ground. These
dblavyrdiatv with
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lerrtaedhriwgtaobtained
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and merchants ; and City readers are familiar with
the names of the great houses known as " the three
W.'s," which were made conspicuous by the enor-
mous amounts of their commitments for American
acceptances in the panic of 1837. The supplies
furnished to the Southern States by English manu-
facturers were not, however, sent directly to the
consumers. The North had secured for itself almost
exclusively the monopoly of foreign commerce ; and
our own exports were shipped to New York, for
consignment to importers, who in turn sold to the
Southern merchants the goods sent into the interior
for distribution among consumers. But this trade
was also dependent upon cotton. The New York
buyer paid the Manchester seller with the proceeds
of remittances from the New Orleans dealer. The
New Orleans dealer was paid by the factor, who
got his money from bills diawn on the Liverpool
cotton merchant or London banker, discounted by
local banks, and remitted by them either directly or
via New York. These and similar operations were
in constant progress, not only between the two great
cities which we have taken as examples, but through-
out the whole seaboard of America, and every port
in Great Britain ; and the relations of the great
commercial houses were so intimate that the con-
necting chord vibrated at either end from the
slightest shock at the othero.olTw A heavy fall in
The whole fabric was
liable to topple over whenever any
dsuerriinogust,hienjpurrey.
in America. The
disasterpre precursor
of d
vtahaffaleetcntcceeedmonliftstehdmeitasyyins4ttebm ijiasi::eerpcotton.
have described, the certain
English houses
connected with Transatlantic business so that men
who look only to the history of former
aextensivee :ffuepn tt cy
on
panics, with-
eurs
n twith
fatal bankruptcy
with-
out further reflection, jump at once to the false con-
clusion, that the like results must now follow the
e
recent enormous decline in the value
oonf
AcointteoHnoaa,t
Liverpool. This decline is not over stated at £l6
a bale. With an estimated stock of a million bales
which
formernh ihc hand,
then d it
times amountss einvtounls
would
nine-tenths
toa have
fallenl fi , O O
of chiefly
ourfly supply. But
0,000--a loss that in
of the stock now in England only about two-fifths
are American ; so that the total is at once brought
down to £6,400,000, of which it is known that the
United States will lose only a portion, variously
estimated at from one-half to three-quarters—too
small an amount under any circumstances to pro-
duce serious effects, and the consequences of which,
in the altered state of frade, must be absolutely in-
significant.
The commerce of the United States, since the
close of the war has no resemblance, so far as this
country is concerned, to that which prevailed at the
antecedent period. When the sudden and vastly-
increased demand for our manufactures was shown
ent so safe and legi-
timate Trade, there were
nbyottwheanr
t
a business as a subject- of distrust. The
teitnugr nasl
aorfmti
shtes
0B oraerpdr
nosf
writer of the money articles in a prominent con-
temporary used all his efforts to depreciate Ameri-
can credit , • but, while commenting on the deficiency

of the United States exports, he omitted from his
calculations the most important of all the items—