The Sun.
London, England, 1859-12-12 00:00:00

THIRD EDITION..

SUN OFFICE, sty o' Clock.

TATTERSALL' 8-(THIS EVENI.NG.)

Although the attendance rr:ecullation on the
Derby was at one time spirited, the ou',.siders engross-
in7 the greater degree of attention, 'Umpire im-
proved his last week's quotations, and at the odds quoted 8
to I—he was backed for £lOO, but that La-ice was afterwards
o3bred. The highest offer against Th( Jrmaaby was 11 to 1,
and at a point higher he would have lieen freely supported.
1,000 to SO was taken once abo at Buccaneer, while
Nutbourne was nominally at 13 to 1. 25 to 1
was taken freely about The Drone, notwithstanding
the suspicious inuendoes of Bar p; Lift, while Sir William
was backed to win £lO,OOO at IC,OO to 15. These were the
only notable movements of the Afternoon's transactions.
The disputed steeplechase a 4,, Croydon «3s to have been
decided to-day, but in the co arse of the afternoon the fol-
lowing notice was exhibited in the room :

" The hearing of the Cr.)ydon Steeplechase case is post-
poned until Monday, the 19th instant.
" By order of the Stewards.

" 12th of December, 7.859."
The cause of the posi,vonement is, we beliere, a domestic
affliction in Mr. ILzrison's family.

TILE DEILEY.
Sto 1 agi'c Umpire (taken and offered)
11 to 1 agst Thormanby (take 12 to 1)
12 to 1 a•g;st Mainstone
100 to 8 sigst Buccaneer (taken)
13 to 1 agst Nutbourno (taken)
2.5 to 1 agst High Treason (offered)
25 to 1 agst The Drone (taken freely)
33 to 1 agst Upperhand (taken)
50 t 1 agst Paleface (taken and offered)
50 to 1 agst Richmond (taken)
1:0 to 1 agst Rester (taken)
50 to 1 agst Cramond (taken)
2000 to 25 agst Blue Ruin (taken)
1000 to 15 agst Traducer taken)
1000 to 15 agst Sir "William (taken freely)
1000 to 15 agst Plumpudding.
1000 to 12 agst Oliver (taken)

THE LAND QUESTION IN O UDE.

Whatever may be the merit intrinsically attach-
ing to Lord Canning's latest views of the land
question in Oude, they are certainly exposed to the
serious objection that they should either have been
adopted sooner or not adopted at all. The policy
may be wise, but it can hardly be opportune. Two
courses were open to us in dealing with the Talook-
dars and their tenures. We could either purchase
the allegiance of these martial chieftains by yielding
to their demands, or we could reduce them to order
and submission by the strong arm of authority.
Something was to be said for either course. By the
first method of proceeding we should escape an in-
convenient obligation and a costly campaign; by•the
second we should preserve unimpaired the privleges
of Government and the resources of the province.
Perhaps, in the long run, the former course promised
the most comprehensive advantages, but unfortu-
nately, it has only been selected after all the charges
of the latter have been gratuitously incurred. We
subdued the Talookdars first, and conciliated them
afterwards, so that we have surrendered at once the
fruits of our conquest and the indemnity for its cost.
The Talookdars, or great landholders of Oude,
occupied when we assumed the administration of
the kingdom a somewhat uncertain position.
During the chronic anarchy of the State they had
usurped many privileges and committed many
wrongs. They had encroached so unscrupulously
on the lands of the poor, that many village com-
munities had been dispossessed of their estates,
and the old distribution of the soil had been sub-
verted for the exclusive benefit of the powerful
lords. To such an extent had these proceedings
been carried, that the revenue fairly derivable from
the territory of the province had been in a great
degree lost, and accordingly one of our first acts had
been to appoint commissioners with the duty of in-
vestigating the land titles throughout the kingdom.
This measure, it was urged, earned us far more
unpopularity than the annexation itself, and ac-
cordingly, when the mutinies broke out, not even
the extraordinary abilities of Sir Henry Lawrence
could prevent the landholders of Oude from joining
eagerly in the rebellion. From that time, there-
fore, the game was in our own hands. The Talook-
dare had forfeited their titles by the act of revolt,
and it became competent to us either to insure
their loyalty by fresh grants and free concessions,
or to encounter them in the open field, and
appropriate to the uses of the State, by the new
right of conquest, the lands and property which
had long been alienated. We did neither of these
things, or rather we have done them both, without
advantage either one way or the other.
Lord Canning, as we observed at the time,
was justified in dclaring that policy of "con-
fiscation" which brought him into such disrepute
with Lord Derby's Government. There was a
good defence for the proceeding, and the principle
was intelligible. The Talookdars had in mauy
caeca no valid title to their estates, and they had
incurred, besides, the natural forfeits of rebels. •
The value of the land which by such forfeitures
would revert to the Crown was very considerable,
and the revenues of India, as everybody knew,
were sadly in need of augmentation. As a mere
question of administration, too, it might have
been argued that the Talookdai ea system was a
bad one, and that the good government of tke pro-
vince was concerned in its extinction. At any
rate, Lord Canning selected his course, and, as
that course confirmed the Talookdars in their hosti-
lity, the result was that we had to fight our way, inch
by inch, to the possession of Oude. In the end, after
a harassing and expensive campaign, Lord Clyde
was successful; every district of the province was
occupied or commanded by our victorious troops,
and the Talookdars lay absolutely at our mercy.
Then came the unexpected reversal of the policy
adopted. The Governor-General makes a triumphal
progress through the conquered territories, sum-
mons the humiliated Talookdars to attend his
Court at Lucknow, and surprises all India by there
freely giving them what, if it had been given be-
fore, would have relieved Lord Clyde and his bat-
talions of all the trouble of the war. No doubt, we
are thus insuring the loyalty of these chieftains and
probably the security of the province, but these
guarantees we could have obtained a few months
earlier at the same price, and with the saving of
the campaign into the bargain.
It is probable enough that Lord Canning's se-
cond thoughts may be best, and that, though our
Exchequer may be impoverished, our power may
be confirmed by this sudden enrichment of the
rebel Talookdars. Perhaps it is the true methed
of dealing with such cases, but, if so, it is cer-
tainly unfortunate that the fact was not recog-
nised in time to save us from the labours
and burdens of a difficult campaign. As it is
we seem to have won our rights only for the pure
pose of relinquishing them. The whole of Oude,
with its spacious and productive territories, is
placed by this last arrangement under that system
of tenure which effectually forbids any improve-
ment of revenue. There is not a doubt about the
expansiveness of its resources, but the increase
which will infallibly arise will not belong to the
Government. The settlement is to be perpetual.
A fixed rent is to be paid to Government, but after
that obligation is discharged the profits of the land,
however large, will fall to the Talookdars alone.
We cannot tax them or control them except
within very narrow limits. On their own estates
they will be feudal lords with heritable jurisdic-
tion,and it is but a barren sovereignty which will
an
pweerltla isne
satisfied fie
to the
with British
such Crown.
ttreatment,
t mOefn t, co
trust, do good suit and service in return, but we
had put ourselves to the charges of a different
policy, which, though costing more at the outset,
was calculated to produce more afterwards, and
this policy we have now forsaken for that which, if
we had adopted it earlier, might have been had,
with all its results, for nothing at all.
This is the weak point of the case as it now
stands. We may fairly hope that we have gained
a great.point in the permanent tranquillisation of a
province so turbulent as Oude, but we might have
gained that point a few months ago at a far cheaper
rate. We must now put up with a material loss
unqualified by any compensation. We have got
peace and security, it is true, but these advantages,
instead of being acquired, as they might have been,
in a bloodless manner by the bargain we have now
voluntarily made, were won at the sword's point
and by a heavy expenditure of life and treasure.
Our policy has an air of magnanimity beyond a
doubt, for we have accepted ithe3 obligations of
war and thrown away the prizes of conquest with
a lordly heedlessness and munificence, but whether
the Hindoos will give us full credit for such self-
sacrifice is another question. The war and the
surrender will, of course, produce their respec-
tive fruits. We have got our debt and we have
lost our revenue. We might have saved many
• a lac of rupees by promulgating some
time since so liberal a concordat with the Talook-
, dare as is now announced. We might have gained
many a lac year after year if we had kept the pro-
, duce of our conquest. We have foregone our rights
• for the sake of peace and quietness, and perhaps
r with good judgment, but there was certainly no
necessity to add to the purchase-money the cost of
t a previous war.—Times.

It is a curious circumstance connected with the
Court of Common Pleas, that amongst its judges there
have been three sudden deaths within five years. Mr.
Justice Talfourd, Lord Chief Justice Jervis, and the other
day, Mr. Justice Crowder.