The Sun.
London, England, 1835-05-14 00:00:00

MIDDLESEX REFORM CLUB.

Last night the Committee of this Club met to make a final
arrangement of their proceedings previously to the general
meeting which takes place on Friday next. Mr. M'William,
Vice-President, in the Chair.
The SECRETARY had sent a number of circulars, &c. to va-
rious gentlemen to act as district secretaries to the club, and
read various communications which were of a very favourable
nature. A number of new Members were enrolled, and sub-
scriptions and donations received. He had also written to their
President ( Mr. Warburton) for the purpose of obtaining a
copy of Lord John Russell's Bill for the improvement of the
franchise, and relieving them from the obnoxious clauses of the
Reform Bill.
Mr. J. B. YATES considered the being rated was sufficient,
without being compelled to pay up the rates, to make a man
eligible to vote.
Mr. DE VEAR observed, the old scot and lot system was to
pay a certain portion of rates.
Mr. WEST had gone over the Bill with several other gen-
tlemen, and they had come to the conclusion that it would not
extend the franchise ; in the 16th clause, 15th page, 40th line,
the revising barrister has power to erase names of individuals
dead—how was he to know when a man was dead? They had
many instances of men representing absent electors. Another
clause he thought objectionable, was, that any person making
an objection to an elector, and not succeeding in erasing him
from the list, he (the objector) must pay all the expences.
Many other clauses were objected to, when a Committee of
five gentlemen were named to read over the Bill and report
upon it. Three gentlemen were named to form the Finance
Committee.

The private business having been gone through preparatory
to the public meeting, it was moved that the same be adver-
tised in the Morning Chronicle, Morning Advertiser, and
Sun newspapers.

THE COURT OF CHANCERY, AND

LADY lIEWLEY'S CHARITY.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SUN.

SIR,—It is understood that measures are in contemplation
for removing the evils arising to the suitors in Chancery and
the public from the perpetual changes in the Chancellorship
as a political office. Allow me to illustrate the hardships and
inconveniences arising from the existing system, and at the
same time to endeavour to elicit an opinion from any one qua-
lified to decide, as to the justice of my complaint, and the pro-
per means of redress, if there be any.
It is well known that a most important public question
has lately been frequently discussed in Chancery, in a cause of
the Attorney-General v. Shore, involving not only the inte-
rests of the present beneficiaries of the Charity of Lady Hew-
ley, (of whom I am one,) but the future objects of the Trust,
and the legal tenure of all the property held by a large class of
Dissenters, as well as the extent of toleration arising to them
from the Statute Law. The questions are new, and most
strictly and distinctively public ; a rule of law being to be laid
down, which will involve the rights of many hundred persons.
The case I allude to was heard, to a certain extent, on ap-
peal, by Lord Brougham, and two assistant Judges. His
Lordship's dismissal from office broke off the discussion in the
middle ; and the whole had therefore to commence de novo.
A scheme was, however, then suggested, (since revived and
acted upon,) for allowing his Lordship by consent, after quit-
ting the Bench, to give a decision ; the future Chancellor being
to adopt and pass it as a decree of the Court. This was ob-
jected to by the then Attorney-General, and very properly ; for
how were the parties before the Court—consisting of a public
officer (the Attorney-General) then, in fact, also virtually out
of office, and the defendants, who are only Trustees, to agree
with a Judge, himself out of office—to refer a cause, in which
third persons and the public were largely interested, to the
judgment of a man ceasing to hold any judicial or responsible
character ?

The whole discussion therefore recommenced, and two new
Judges were selected by Lord Lyndhurst as his assistants.
This hearing also broke off, being interrupted by circum-
stances. On a re-assembling of the parties for a third at-
tempt, Lord Lyndhurst's resignation was announced ; and now
the proceeding, so properly repudiated on the former occasion,
was effected ; the nominal Attorney-General and the Trustees
agreeing that the hearing should proceed ; and that Lord
Lyndhurst and the Judges should send in their unofficial deci-
Lion, to he adopted, by consent, as the decree in the cause.
Now, this strikes me, and many similarly circumstanced, as
a most singular and anomalous mode of remedying the vice
of the Court's constitution, bad as it may be, in thus exposing
its suitors to those delays and expenses. I wish, therefore, to
know how, legally and constitutionally, and on what public
principle an agreement can he entered into between a Judge
who has resigned, an Attorney-General in the same position,
and Trustees, acting for others (without the possibility of as-
certaining their wishes, independent of those of the many
who are indirectly concerned), that the rights of third parties
shall be virtually left to arbitration ; that they shall be de-
prived of the ordinary sanctions of the administration of justice;
and that an award made out of Court (not even in the face of
the public), by a private individual, shall go forth as a decree
of a Court, expelling perhaps individuals from their present
possession, or on the other hand excluding an equal number
of expectants, binding the administration of a public charity
for ever, and determining the legal status of a large body of
Dissenters ?

If this can be done, it strikes me, I must say, that a great
deal of expense might have been saved, and in fact might be
saved in all cases, by thus referring a cause to a competent
individual, and turning his decision into a decree. If it can-
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ter in dispute by agreement, I beg that any one skilled in such
matters will inform me how I am to proceed to prevent it, if

possible ; and whether any one can properly, in the discharge
of his official functions, give effect to such an arrangement in
a case of this sort, and thereby dispose of my interests extra-
judicially without my consent ? I am, &c. B. X.