The Sun.
London, England, 1859-07-11 00:00:00

THE ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY.

(From the Correspondent of the Times)
MONZAMBANO, ON THE MINCIO, JULY 3.
Austrian tactics are becoming again as enigmatic
as during the best times of General Gyulai. That
they would not defend the Mincio after the battle
of Solferino is not very astonishing, nor that they
retreated and took up a position between Peschiera
and "Verona, with the plateau of Rivoli to fall back
upoa and a double line of retreat either to the Tyrol
or else simply to the left bank of the Adige. But
that they should give us again this place, leave
Peschiera to itself, allow us to take Castelnuovo,—
the great centre of communication, wherethe roads
from Mantua, Verona, Peschiera, and the Tyrol
meet—and retire around Verona, leaving only a
small corps for the defence of the passage of the
Adige above Bussolengo, seems rather strange, and
we have nothing but conjectures to explain it.
Although this change implies for them only a
movement of a few miles to their left, it is as com-
plete as anything can be. It is leaving an offensive
position, and taking up a defensive one. If there is
not again a change in the command, this movement
is tantamount to acknowledging their inability to
keep the open field, and recogmsing the necessity
whichexists for them of retiring behind their forti-
fied lines, probably in order to await reinforcements
and to reorganise their army, which, after a series
of defeats and a long retreat, cannot be in the most
flourishing state. If one can trust the accounts of
the people in the villages en the Mincio, the morale
of the Austrian troops must have a good deal suffered
by the battle of the 24th ult. This is a natural reac-
tion from the exaggerated hopes entertained before
the battle. The expression used by the country
people, in describing the retreat is " Erana molto
avviliti." They crossed over, some on the very day
of, the battle, others the day after, and theyre-
mahted till Monday, the 27th ult. In a battle like
that of Solferino, where the Austrians were wise
enough to think of a retreat early in the day it was
possible to retire on most points in tolerable
order from the field of battle, and only on one side
—namely, in the plain between the hills of Cavriana
and the village of Guidizzolo—did it come to down-
right running, when some horse artillery was
brought up on the slopes of the hills. But the ef-
fide of such a defeat are almost always sure to
show themselves some time after, when the reac-
tion sets in after unwonted and unstteeessful exer-
tion.
Nothing is, therefore, more probable than that
the Austrians feel they need rest and fresh troops
before they can attempt another battle, and for
such a purpose the position taken up by them in
the camp before Verona and behind the line of the
Upper Adige is not without great advantages.
First, it removes them, at any rate, as far as it is
possible from the danger of an immediate battle,
and thus leaves them to wait for fresh reinforce-
ments and prepare for the offensive. Then their
position admits of advantageous tactical combina-
tions in case of an advance of the Allies either to-
wards Verona or towards the plateau of Rivoli.
Finally, should they be ready to take the offensive,
they have not less than three lines of operations to
choose from—from Verona in the plain, from that
place towards Peschiera, or from the Upper Adige
southward.
At any rate, there can be now no more move-
ments of retreat ; the Austrians must stand at bay,
unless they choose to abandon the quadrilatere,
which, of course, no one in his senses will sup-
pose.
The game is becoming even more interesting
than during the debut of the campaign. Then all
the world was in expectation of the first meeting
of the two great continental military Powers after
an armistice of 44 years, and of the premieres
armes of the Emperor Napoleon ; now it is the de-
cision of the campaign which may take place at any
moment.
If we look at the relative position of the two
parties, in spite of the constant defeats of the
Austrians, the chances are not so unequal as one
might suppose at the first moment. The failure of
the first part of the campaign, and the consequent
retreat on the Mincio, were attributed to the inca-
pacity of the commander ; they did not therefore
produce a sentiment of inferiority in the Austrian
army—above all, in its officers, who play there a
more important part than in any other army. One
Could see that from the confidence they had in the
success of their offensive movement in the Mincio
hills. At Solferino they could not complain that
they were taken at a disadvantage ; they were led
by their best Generals, were fighting under the eye
of their Emperor, had chosen their own position and
fortified it, they were more than equal to their ad-
versaries in numbers, and yet they were beaten in
these conditions. They must begin to feel that
they are no match for their adversaries in the open
field. This is certainly a disadvantage in an army,
but a similar one did not prevent the Turks from
holding Silistria with a handful of men against the
Russian army, or the Russians from defending Se-
bastopol for ten months after the battle of Inker-
mann.
The Austrians have now retired within their Se-
bastopol, and this not a Sebastopol fortified at the
last moment, but prepared ever since the Austrians
have acquired possession of Lombardy. It is not,
as the Crimean Sebastopol, separated by hundreds
of Miles of steppes from the resources of the empire,
but connected with the furthest extremities of it
by railways and excellent roads. These communi-
cations are so numerous, and their position so ex-
tended, that it will be almost impossible to invest
completely the latter and to cut off the former,
They have stored up for years all kinds of warlike
provisions in their stronghold between the Mincio
and the Adige, their Etat-Major and their Engi-
neers have made the ground the subject of a special
study, and must be aware of its strong as well as
of its weak points.
As for the Allies, the more they advance the
longer becomes their line of operations, and, conse-
quently, the greater the difficulty of bringing up war-
like supplies and reinforcements. They have no ar-
senal ready prepared for them, but must first form
it ; they find no magazines, but must create them ;
they have no hospitals, but must first establish them.
It is on account of this that such attention has been
paid to the railway which now, with only the inter-
ruption over Mount Cenis, connects France with the
Lake of Garda. All the bridges have been repaired,
and even the break which existed before between
San Martino and Magenta has been bridged over.
A considerable portion of this line of operations
must be protected against some possible move-
ment of the Austrians from the Tyrol. The Allies
are hampered in their operations by political consi-
derations, which prevent them from crossing the
boundaries of a territory forming part of the Ger-
manic Confederation. We are in the beginning of
July, consequently approaching the hottest season
of the year, so dangerous to the health of the soldier.
To all this must be added the strength of the
position itself—four fortresses, two of them first and
the two others second class fortresses, enclosing a
parallelogram far too large to be invested ; of the
two main lines of communication with the interior
of the empire, the one through the Tyrol protected
by a mountainous district of great strength, the
river line of the Adige, and the vicinity of Verona,
while the second and even more important one falls
to the rear of the strongest of the four fortresses,
and is therefore even more difficult to approach.
Here, then, are both sides of the question ; weigh
them, and you will see that the chances are toler-
ably balanced. The Austrians have all the advan-
tages of position, and very likely of numbers ; the
Allies, on the contrary, are unquestionably superior
in the direction and organization of their army, as
well as in the discipline of the soldier. If we ques-
tion history the answer will not be doubtful as to
which must in the end triumph, strength of position
or superiority of the soldier, provided that this
superiority is not temporarily acquired by favour-
able circumstances.
This is not the case in the Present instance. No
one who knew the armies of the belligerents, and
thought about them, would have any doubt of this
superiority, even before it was provedby results ; not
that you can .'tecognize any innate superiority of
the French and Piedmontese soldiers over the Aus-
trians. The races of which the Austrian army is
composed have as much sinew and bone, and have
shown more than once that they are not inferior in
spirit either, but the difference is that the armies of
France and Piedmont are national armies ; while
that of Austria is merely the result of an elaborate
military organization. The former are like solid
blocks cut out of the heart of the mountain ; the
latter like a concrete badly cemented. There
is one idea which animates the French and Sardi-
nian armies. They are fighting for their country.
They are proud of their name, and anxious to
follow in the wake of glorious traditions. What is
there to animate. the Austrian soldier ? Ask him
what .he is, and he will tell you Hungarian, Ita-
lian, Pole., Croat, or German, and will speak of the
Austrian as of some being entirely foreign to him;
he would think it an insult to be called by that
name. Go to see the prisoners, and you will see
each of the different nationalities trying to keep as
much as possible from the contact of the other, as
if it were, afraid of some sort of moral contagion.
It spec lks greatly for the talent of organization
of the Ai istrian Government to have been able to
cement a t all such elements and to form one mass
of thorn. It owes it to its officers, who certainly
are wond erfnl in their esprit de corps. An Austrian
officer, of whatever race he be, is above and before
cvdrythin g else. In an Austrian officer, the black
and ye,llo• sz sash seems a magic circle which effaces
all othe. r 4 distinction, and dries up all other feelings
except duty to the Emperor. No attachment of a
vassal to this t feudal chief has ever surpassed the de-