The Sun.
London, England, 1859-10-19 00:00:00

tion of all the rights of the sovereign and the people. The

ehabitants had once again a proof .of how much avail for
heir own dignity were these petty political circumscription
Lnd these feeble dynasties, powerless against revolt; power-

less against the violent acts of the foreigner, and hostile by
their hopeless state to the future hopes of the nation. The
opinion of Europe is now enlightened respecting the motives
and the character of the political movement in Central
Italy. This movement explains itself by the most legiti-
mate of feelings, the national feeling, \vhich is also a prin-
ciple of order in the breast of society. Now, in this respect
hat was the situation of the reigning family at Parrha re-
latively to its subjects ? Since 1848 the dynasty had never

ceased making common causo with Austria, binding itself
to her with bonds of yet greater and greater strictness. By
the treaty of Feb. 4, 1818, the Duke had concluded a private

convention, which, in contempt of the general treaties, esta-
blished real relations of vassalage towards AUstria, handed
over to her on every occasion the territory of the State, and

waled. with her an offensive and defensive league of a per-

rnanent nature. By an article in that treaty the Duke of

Parma, moreover, eneaged to conclude with no other Power
any military convention whatever without the previous
consent of the Impeaial Government of Vienna.
Some have wished to establish a distinction as to what
regards the national question, between the policy of the
Government of Parma under the Dukes Charles IL and
Charles 111. and the policy of the Government of Parma
such as it was lately constituted. Such a distinction falls
before the evidence of facts.

When the Piedmontese Government, with a prudent fore-
sight fully justified by ulterior events, called the attention of
Europe to the condition of the Peninsula, and to the en-
croachments of Austria, it began by protesting against the
fortifications of Piacenza and the treaties of 1848 as act*
that evidently modified the condition of things such as Eu-
rope had wished to create it by the treaties of 1815. •

The government of the Duchess Regent had then an op-
portunity of disengaging its personal responsibility either
by public declarations or by communications to the Pied-
montese Government. It did not do so. Another and a still
more favourable opportnnity presented itself when, in. ViCV/
of the eventuality of a war, the question of the special
_ _

treaties was brought forward categorically, and the neces-
sity of their abrogation admitted, it may be said, by all the
Cabinets of the European powers, Austria excepted. W°
can appreciate now the exceptional situation, yet one
free from danger, which the Government of the Duchess
might have made for itself at that period. Nes
thing, however, took place to contradict its entire acquies-
cence in that complete and necessary partnership 'in which
it found itself engaged with Austria. But that was not
enough. The Austrian Government was concentrating its
troops on the Piedmonteso frontier with the aggresSive ob-
ject that received its explanation by the subsequent sending
of the ultimatum. The Austrian troops .were collected at
Piacenza ; immense stores of war were brought there ; the
invasion of Piedmont was preparei within the territory of
the duchy, and it was from thence that a part of the imperial
troops set forth to invade the Sardinian states. The GO'
vernment of the Duchess took part in all this, without any
communication on its part, such as international duties
would otherwise seem to have required, and no explanation
of its intentions or cmduct reached the Government of his
Majesty the King of Sardinia. It was only when the for-
tune of arms turned against Austria, and the protection Of
the Austrian arms was about to fail her, that the Duchess
decided on proclaiming her neutrality.
The Piedmontese Cabiaet considered this offer to have
come very late, for it could not be admitted that a Govern-
ment should be allowed to declare itself and cause itself to
be respected as a neutral whenever fortune might declare
itself adverse to its ally, and it might think it expedient to
abandon that ally. A strange neutrality in fact I For if
one relies upon preventive engagements that create Clra'
Lively to Austria duties of common action and defence,
evidently incompatible with the laws of neutrality, one
must then submit to the consequences of those engage-
ments in the same way that one has accepted their advert"
taxes. If, on the contrary, it be argued that such was the
special situation into which the Government of Parma was
thrown by general stipulations concerning the fortress of
Piacenza, it is easy to reply by citing the terms of those
stipulations, which establish " that the fortress of PiacenSi,
offering a more especial interest for the defensive system 01
Italy, his Imperial, Royal, and Apostolic Majesty will pee
serve in that city the right of garrison, pure and simple, ill
the regal and civic rights over that city being reserved Of
the sovereign of Parma."
There is a difference, however, between this right of keep'
t
ins a garrison, pure and simple, and the creation of a vast
intrenched camp beyond the predhets of Piacenza, between
the purely defensive object of those stipulations and
tary aggression prepared in the territory of the duchy, or
effected by means of the Parmesan frontier. For the rest
the published documents permit us to appreciate at the'
true value this pretended neutrality, since a letter of the
26th of May last proves to us that the Minister of Pall3oe
residing at Vienna regretted that he could not obtain the
succour of imperial troops, and complained of Austria °
limiting herself to assure him of her support after the vie.
I tory which she confidently expected to obtain. This Ilea'
trality, however, which would have sufficed in so far as re'
garde the international relations with the Piedmontese 611/..
verninent, and which constituted the last concession of the
Duchess Regent to the feelings of her subjects, could it sati49
the legitimate wishes and the supreme interests of the pouPle
Were the inhabitants able to declare themselves neutral uPe'i
searing of the contest that decided the fat& of the country °
large, whilst the French flag joined with the Italian flag sche: -
being triumphantly borne across their territory, and ,
Emperor Napoleon 111. was inviting the Italians all to ov
soldiers that they might become the citizens of a great O.
tion Had they not clearly manifested their intentions 1/11,
sending Thousands of volunteers to the war of independence
The Government of the Duchess Regent, by proclaiodif
under the pressure of events a neutrality it had not observeu:
declared that this attitude had become necessary to it threig"
contrary duties which were equally sacred in its eyes. TN
is precisely what the people of Parma cannot admit, and
is perfectly justified in law when it demands Italian prilicele-f
in whose eyes the interests of the foreigner are not so sic
as those of their own country. By its traditions, its natl.'—
and constant tendencies, its weakness also, the reigning fa
e'
mily of Parma failed in its duties as a neutral sovereirs"
towards Piedmont, and in the duties of an Italian Prince
towards his subjects. The principle and character of 0""es
political movement are sufficiently well known at the Pre'
sent time to establish the fact, that any dynasty which hefige
shown it self hostile to the national emancipationhas estran°,i. o
from itself all hearts, and is a rotten tree in the Italian sel
The Duchess, brought back to her States, would have
rely on that national opinion, by which the family of her seto
is unanimously rejected. An irreparable and mutual diattl:
would ender any solid and durable establishment quite i 0113 e
sible. The Government, hostile to Piedmont by its traditiel'e,"
;
fearing the national party on account of the sentiments oft -a
latter, would only seek more and more every day aid anal
protection from that Austrian influence which doubtless Nv
attempt from Venetia to recover its lost ground as much eeie
can. The opinion of the country for its part, an opitll'e oe
common to all classes and strengthened by the interests of
all, will not renounce the.idea of Italian unity, its hope
he
annexation to the kingdom of the house of Savoy.
question of the deposition of the Bourbons, and that of sag
nexation to Piedmont, are intimately blended in the 1:1?illt
of the Parmesan people. The position which Austria mark
tains in Italy counsels them by the necessity of defence
concur in the creation of a strong Italian State, and yr:
serve themselves by the introduction of the new right cue,
rived from the national wish against all those rights a r.. 0
versibility and military servitude established by treaties
which, if they were not abrogated, would. lead us 10,1'4
after into as many and as dangeaous complications as tiL;),
have done heretofore. This union, rendered necessary a
the Italian idea, is required besides by all the moral e.ft.„
material interests of the Parmesan provinces. Their
habitants know from long and hard experience the dirt,
vantage of belonging to one of those petty political aggr-e
gations powerless for good, and yet so fruitful in evils an
dangers of every kind. That period of Italian eivilisatio,",
which was accomplished by the rise and progress of ratilltel
eipal life, was finished ages ago. Italian society is n°eif,
modified by the effect of time, and seeks, too for late her.
to return into the way of those great national agPtie
merations by means of which other peoples have fount,
prosperity and happiness, and have been able to cseite
strip us in civilisation and power. Experience uo
proved that without those aggregrations there c
neither be those great institutions nor thit large Or e
lopment of action, which constitute the very cseeellects
of the modern life of nations. For the Parlilee- to
provinces the annexation is not only a satisfaction give—tee
the national feeling, it concerns and affects also illfor
highest degree the material prosperity of the countryls-41tet
the union of Lombardy with the Sardinian kingdom/ %eel
which was a political necessity becomes also an econonll,,
necessity. In 1848 the union with Piedmont was veto:ll:tit
37,250 voters. The fortune of armies broke in piece° ;to
solemn compact, but misfortune sealed the concord of id a,
and sentiments. Eleven years later, the union with PI he
mont submitted, to popular suffrage, was proclaimed "
63,167 voters. sfe
The vote of deposition, the vote of annexation, which t
mixed up together in the popular conception, canin the
separated in the political realisation. Since the right ol
national will has been admitted in favour of Italy, hcc‘vfeee
one of these votes be less legitimate than the other?, the
consent of the people cannot be asked solely for tee
resolutions, and the administration that is to secure eel
tranquillity and prosperity of the country has special II
of this basis.
You will point out, sir, all that such a solution offer
of
the way of guarantees for the future, both from the of
views of Italy's military defence, and for the condition,
moral and material order in the Parmesan provinces. go
It satisfies at the same time the sympathies and iut!re
of
cf the country; it pacifies men's minds by the realisafteo
their unanimous wish, and achieves a great pros rcesoor
wards that work of national reconstruction whiebt of
having been initiated by the most generous and glerieto es Of
wars; is being followed up by the wisdom and energi
the people, and by the sympathies of liberal CO Europe. it•
Accept, sir, the assurance of my most distinguisnc
sideration. FARII4I'

The Hon. P. Campbell Searlett, C.B. (her Iroo
jesty's Envoy in Tuscany), accompanied by his faini!Y)
arrived at the Brunswick Hotel, Jermyr.•3treet.