The Sun.
London, England, 1866-10-19 00:00:00

The Real Causes of Prussian Suece-s.

La France publishes extracts from letters communicataa
to it,,by one of its subscribers, "of German origin and re-
siding at Strasbourg," giving his impressions of a
weeks' visit to the theatre of the war in Germany. ll°
merely desires to present a few observations katggested by
his inspection of the ground, and particularly to mention
what he heard from the lips of those who took an active
part in the fighting as to the real causes of the astonishing
success of the Prussians. As to the famous breech-loading
needle-gun, he observes :—"lt is undoubtedly an excellent
weapon, but in make and accuracy of aim leaves much t°
be desired. I was talking one day to Prussian officers about.
the effects of this weapon, and, like many others, I OW;
buted to it in great part the victories of their soldiers.
soon perceived, however, that my expressions of admira-
tion produced an unpleasant effect on the nervous system
of the heroes of Sadowa. You greatly exaggerate,' said
colonel of infantry, the part which the weapon of our Or
fantry played in this short campaign, and you attribute t°
the instrument itself what it would be more just to attri-
bute to the instrumentalists. Now, allow me to explain t°
you how it comes to pass that the Prussian army plays f,
agreeably on the little instrument which we call the needle
gun, and which, believe me, is far from being a perfect
portable firearm. Very many improvements, be persuaded,
will have to be made in this instrument, but no improventent
can be made in those who use it. You have no adequate
notion of the pains we have taken in our regiments t(),
teach our men to handle what your soldiers in France call
the six-foot clarionet. Shooting at targets, which until VI,
recently your generals and your regimental officers regarded
as a mere accessory and of little moment, has been for
many years in the Prussian army the object of
continual
practice of the most serious study. In Prussia we have em-
ployed all means not only for carrying to perfection the
instruments, the engines of war, but to make the men capa-
ble of skilfully using what we put in their hands.' After
these preliminaries, my Prussian Colonel describes at lone'
and like a man well up in his subject the mode by Which
the Prussian soldiers were brought to be perfectly
familiar
with their arms, and to obtain the best possible resultts
from it; the numerous exercises, graduated in an intent-
gent manner, required from them ; the prizes awarded to
the best marksmen, and the care bestowed upon then];
Subsequently 1 happened to express great admiration et
the organisation of the Prussian army and of the military
system of the country. You confound two things which
should always be distinguished,' observed a general officerwho has gained groat reputation in the corps commanded
by Prince Frederick Charles; moreover, you do too in°
honour to our famous system of reserve, or Landwehr'
and you seem to me not to know that since 1863 0°
have, in part, given up this old machinery ; or rather ice
have greatly modified it, and have come near to your
manner of acting. For a considerable time we had
Laudwehr, because the Emperor Napoleon I. after 111"
victories over us forced Russia to keep her regular aril
within 40,000 men. In order to provide for the defence.°
the country we were forced, in turn, to resort to the cir-
cuitous plan of a sort of National Guard. Not being able
to have an army like yours, we contrived that every Oa°
should be, if not a regular soldier, at least a defender of the
country. It was an excellent system against foreign WI;
sion in a State well constituted and homogeneous, but n°
adapted for offensive warfare. The political personsg°
who has just raised our country so high before attemptll
the realisation of his great ideas, wished to free liiinse„:„
from the purely defensive military system of the Laudiv""
and Laudsturm, and to enter on i hat of a permanent regu-
lar army, fit for campaigning. After creating in 1863 al
army well instructed, and letter disciplined than aNatione
Guard can ever be, lie converted that National Guard, 0r
Landwehr, into a powerful reserve, from which, when 61°
war began, he draughted the most efficient part into tb°
active army, leaving the rest to do duty as garrison troops'
We have had, then, immediately, and from the very re°:
meut we opened the campaign, three distinct elements'
troops for campaigning, troops of reserve to fill up vneD'u;
cies, and garrison troops to defend the country if the tV(."
first elements met with reverses. Our military organi°3;
tion is quite different from the French system. I belleY;
it to be equally good, and in many respects even supoll°-
to it.' "