The Sun.
London, England, 1859-01-27 00:00:00

FRANCE AND ITALY.

(Front the Daily News.)
While the steady stream of events seems to set
unmistakeably towards war, and the fickle eddies of
rumour fluctuate confusedly between war and peace,
it may be as well to consider some of the strategic
aspects of the possible struggle. Desirable as the
expulsion of the Austrians from Italy may be, it is
idle to disguise the difficulties which stand in the
way of such a consummation. The end to be at-
tained—the eviction of the Austrians from Lom-
bardy—must be accomplished, if at all, by force of
arms. The Austrian army in Northern Italy has
been raised to some 130,000 ' it is composed of sol-
diers in a state of admirable discipline, and is com-
manded by generals of great science and experi-
ence, aided by probably the best staff in Europe.
National enthusiasm is unquestionably a great ele-
ment of success ; but-it is not everything. It may
therefore be useful to state succinctly the position
occupied by the Austrian troops in Lombardy, and
to explain the strategetical problem which, in the
event of war, awaits solution.

According to some writers, the mere existence of
400,000 men on the muster-roll of the French army
implies war. But is this so ? Let us consider the mat-
ter. The Emperor cannot do with fewer than 130,000
in and around Paris ; he must maintain an army of
70,000 men in Algeria; he must retain a large force
near Lyons ; he must garrison sufficiently the great
fortresses which guard his eastern frontier ; he has
his Roman garrison; he must protect his dockyards;
and besides all this he must maintain his reserves.

If the Emperor is to continue that system of
government which now prevails in France, he can
hardly do so without an army of something like that
which he now possesses. Indeed, so far from the
mere existence of an army of 400,000 French sol-
diers necessarily leading to the anticipation of an
Italian war, it might almost be adduced as an argu-
ment to prove that Napoleon has no real intention
of embarking in any such hazardous undertaking.
But let us assume that he is prepared to cross the
Alps with 130,000 men, and that in the plains of
Turin he will be joined by 40,000 Sardinian troops.
The allied army will then amount to 170,000 men.
And the thing to be done is to drive the 130,000
Austrian troops to the east of Venice.

Now the Kustrian provinces in Lombardy are
protected by a triple line of defences, every one of
which is of the most formidable character. In the
first place there is the line of the Ticino, which ex-
tends from the Lago Maggiore to Pavia a strong
fortress. The distance occupied by this line is
about 45 English miles. To convey an army of
170,000 across such a river as the Ticino is by no
means an easy enterprise ; but to do so within a
space of 45 miles, and in the face of a large army,
commanded by able generals, requires more skill
than was displayed by any French officer before
Sebastopol. But even after the Ticino is passed,
the fortress of Milan, lying eastward within 20
miles of that river, must be captured. Such, then,
is the front line of defencer--a river difficult to cross,
flanked by a lake on the one side and a fortress on
the other, and supported in rear by another strong
fortress.
The second line of defence is that of the Mincio,
some ninety English miles east of the line of the
Ticino. This line extends from the Lago di Garda,
or rather from the strong fortress of Peschiera, for
twenty-eight miles southward across the plain of
Lombardy, past the impregnable fortress of Mantua,
to the Po. Even the great Napoleon could not
subdue Mantua, strong in its earthworks, stronger
still in its dams and dykes, strongest of all in the
mortal malaria of its marshes. Peschiera has recently
been raised to the utmost strength, and is amply
provisioned against reduction by blockade. Such is
the line of the Mincio.
A third line of defence is that of the river Adige,
which is defended by the great entrenched camp
of Verona. This camp has been constructed accord-
ing to the most scientific principles. It consists of
a series of round forts, so placed as to command
each other, but so numerous that the whole of them
can never be invested. The consequence is that
the Austrians, even if driven back upon Verona,
will not only have their retreat secured—for Verona
commands all the roads, north and east, to the
Danube and Vienna—but will be so placed as to
impossible it was to take Sebastopol so long as the
retreat across the harbour was secure, and the
Russians were able to fight behind entrenchments,
econmtrpenelehtmheentesn.
e m y Everyto fi fight
one themnow behind
knows theirho w
and to repair their losses. The same difficulties
will harass the allied army in Italy, with this
peculiarity, that there will be no means of cutting
off the Austrian retreat.
Such, then, are the three lines which must be
passed by an army advancing upon the Austrians
from Novara and the plains of Turin. The ground
which must be traversed is not unknown. Nay, it
is the very text-book from which every general of
these days has learnt the principles of war : it was
the military parade ground of Radetzky—the field
where, in peace, he constantly manoeuvred, and
where, in war he led his troops to victory. It was
here that General Hesitlearnt and practised, under
his great master, that science of strategy in which
he became so proficient that in 1849, being en-
trusted to draw up the plan of the short, final cam-
paign, he indicated Novara as the probable spot on
which the decisive battle would be fought. It is
easy for rhetoricians to talk of sweeping the Aus-
trian hordes out of Italy, but no strategist will say
that the passing three lines of defence such as have
been described is a simple matter. It will need con-
summate skill and devoted gallantry. Nor is lit
probable that an officer such as Niel, now at Turin,