The Sun.
London, England, 1859-11-24 00:00:00

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.

Sir,—General Sir Wm. Napier has in several let-
ters lately published in the Times pointed out the
direction which the discipline and organisation of
rifle volunteer corps should take—namely, that of
teaching them to act in independent small bodies
as irregular troops, and he showed at the same
time that the project of making them in large
bodies with the view of. taking the place .af regu-
lars was only likely to lead to bad results. Now,
would propose that the system he advocated should
be extended to the formation of irregular cavalry
from our mounted gentry and farmers. I am aware
that there is nothing novel in the propoSal to form
cavalry volunteer corps, but I believe in almost all
instances the proposition has been to create a de-
scription of half irregular cavalry, half yeomanry,
that is, neither one thing nor the other, and which
Must entail the collecting together and drilling a
more or less large body of men, all or most of whom
having other pursUits renders it a difficult if not
impossible proposal to carry out. What I propose
woulil entail no collection or men in one place, and
little or no drilling.: All that is necessary is that
every man composing the corps should be able to
cross country, and hould, when debarred hunting
by the frost, take a little healthy exercise. -
There is nothing that an English army is so defi-
tient in
.as a body of thoroughly light irregular
cavalry—such, for instance, as the Cossacks, for em-
ployment in outpost duty, foraging, reconnoitring,
cutting off parties of the enemy, carrying despatches,
and, most important of all, hanging day and night
on the flanks and rear of an enemy and collecting
information. There is no country in the world in
Which a few intelligent irregular cavalry, perfeet
cross-country horsemen, could be of such service
as in England. In an open country undiscip-
lined irregular ' cavalry could always be driven off
by a few disciplined repulses. In a close country,
such as most parts of England, a regiment of foreign
cavalry, aye, and an English one too, would find a
ditch and rotten bank as great an obstacle as a
British square has been found before now. It would
be utterly useless to attempt to employ ordinary
cavalry; while to a party of English foxhunters
these hedges would afford a perfect screea from the
enemy's riflemen, till, seizing the opportunity when
they were extended skirmishing with our light in-
fantry or rifle volunteers, a small party, even 10 or
12 of them, suddenly dashing in would create great
confusion and havoc among any number of infantry
running in disorder to form rallying square. Once
they had made their dash, they should leave them
again, for massed they would form a good mark for
our riflemen to plump their shot among, which
would soon make them re-extend, but very warily,
to give the riders another chance.
An enemy's column advancing in England, and
finding bodies of rifle volunteers annoying it, would
naturally throw out a cloud of skirmishers, which,
considering their superiority in discipline and prac-
tice in skirmishing, and the proximity of a large
body of supports, would drive the volunteers offend
keep them at a respectful distance ; and though, of
course, the very fact of obliging him to throw out
his skirmishers would occasion delay and loss, it
would soon be overcome. If, however, each company
of volunteers had, say, 12 such irregular horsemen
attached to it, I really cannot conceive how a column
usual could
practice advance
eNtsv it ti trout i tulgi e
outgreatest
cavalry
Ta lcavalry
the skirmishers when threatened by
net Ise attempted by the enemy for the very simple
t
reason that on such ground their cavalry, could not
accompany their horses in the undertaking. And
skirmishing with the probability of having cavalry
dashing in upon you every minute would be a very
ticklish job.
I am aware that it can be urged against this that
a small party of horsemen would have no chance
against riflemen. This objection is more specious
than real. In the first place, the ground to be
covered under fire is very short, and it is not very
easy, under such circumstances—that of the mark
going at a hand gallop—to hit it, especially when,
from the distance changing every second, a different
sighting of ;the rifle is necessary. In the second
place, the shooting is not very steady when men
find themselves euery moment getting into more
dangerous proximity with horsemen, at whose
mercy, from their extended order, they know they
will be the next instant. The feeling of " Sauce
ei in tn
he coolest n
service
eh men,ow
aqnudi peat"N
every oViii lel
knows
rwy
hsetrioinagi.,
s weow—
ownielde tthheefiringis
horsemenin suchhav
ea case; and
their
thirdly, p
made
bear in mind, they have accomplished. their mis-
sion and make off as fast as theystr, leaving the
le.ensetnytialetya
willdisadvantageaftuoreetuhlein zflde,s
littotldeoeete-
duced.
I have thus briefly attempted to sketch the dash-
ing part of their career. There is another as bril-
liant, though steady service for them. What would
not a General give for a dozen or half-a-dozen such
orderlies—well mounted, intelligent men who could
carry messages which no common trooper could be
iutrusted with—who could, in fact, perform all the
duties of an aide-de-camp ? And how many regular
troopers would this not free to perform their proper
work? Our Generals never have a quarter the

number of orderlies a French General has attached
to his person, simply, I believe, becauso if they had