The Sun.
London, England, 1835-12-30 00:00:00

may be traced to the resort to implied powers, and the use

of corporations clothed with privileges, the effect of which is
to advance the interests of the few at the expense of the
rnany. Vie have left but one class of these dangers exhibited in

the contest waged by the Bank of the United Siates affainst the
Government, for the last four rears. Happily, they have
been obviated for the present by the indignant resistance of
the people ; but we should recollect that the principle
whence they sprung is an ever active one which will not fail
to renew its efforts in the same tend in other farms, so long

as there is a hope of success, founded either on the inai;
tention of the people, or the treachery of their represent*•
fives, to the subtle progress of its influence. The bank is,
in fact, but one of the fruits of a system at, war with thci

genius of all our institutions—a system founded upon a po-
litical creed, the fundamental principle of which is a dis..

trust of the popular will as a safe regulator of political
power, and whose great ultimate object and inevitable re-
sult, should it prevail, is the consolidation of all power in
our system in one central Government. 'Lavish public dis-
bursements, and corporations wifu exclusive privileges,
would be its substitutes for the original, and, as yet, sound
checks and balances of the constitution—the means by
whose silent and secret operation a control would be exer-
cised by the few over the political conduct of the many, by
first acquiring that control over the labour and earnings of
the great body of the people. Wherever this spirit has
effected an'alliance with political power, tyranny and des....
potism have been the fruit. If it is ever used for the ends
of Government, it has to be incessantly watched, or it cor-
rupts the sources of the public virtue, and agates the
country with questions unfavourable to the harmonious and
steady pursuit of its true interests. _

We are now to see whether, in the present favourable
condition of the country, we cannot tal,-e an effectual stand

against monopoly, and practically prove, in respect to the
currency as well as other important interests, that 'there is
no necessity for so extensive a resort to it as that which has
been heretofore practised. The experience of another year
has confirmed the utter fallacy of the idea that the Bank
of the United States was necessary as a fiscal agent of the
Government. Without its aid, as such, indeed in despite
of all the embarrassment it was in its power to create, the
revenue has been paid with punctuality by our citizens ; the
business of exchange, both foreign and domestic, has been
conducted with convenience ; and the circulating medium
has been greatly improved. By the use of the State
Banks, which do not derive their charters from the General
Government, and are not controlled by its authority, it is
ascertained that the moneys of the United States can be
collected and disbursed without loss or inconvenience, and
that all the wants of the community, in relation to exchange
and currency, are supplied as well as they have ever been
before. If, under circnmstances the most unfavourable to
the steadiness of the money market, it has been found that
the considerations on which the Bank of the United States
rested its claims to the public favour were imaginary and
groundless, it cannot be doubted that the experience of the
future will be more decisive against them.
It has been seen that without the agency of a great
moneyed monopoly, the revenue can be collected and
conveniently and safely applied to all the purposes of the
public expenditure. It is also ascertained that instead of
being necessarily made to promote the evils of an un-
checked paper system, the management of the revenue can
be made auxiliary to the reform which the Legislatures of
several of the States have already commenced with regard
to the suppression of small bills, and which has only to
be fostered by proper regulations on the part of Con-
, gress, to secure a practical return, to the ' extent required
for the security of the currency to the constitutional me-
dium. .Severed from the Government as political engines,
and not susceptible of dangerous extension and combina-
tion, the State banks will not be tempted, nor will they
1- have the power which we have seen exercised, to diver:t
the public funds from the legitimate purposes of' Govern-
meat. The collection and custody of the .revenue 30eing,
, on the contrary, a source of credit to them, will increase the
security which. the States provide for a faithful execution
of their trusts, by multiplying the scrutinier, to which
their operations and accounts will be sulai'ected. Thus
disposed, as well from interest as the. obligations _of
their charters, it cannot be doubteil that such con-
ditions as Congress may see fit Cte adopt respecting
the deposits in these institutiean, with a view to
the gradual disuse of the small, bills, will be cheerfully
complied with ; and that we share. soon gain, in the place of the
Bank of the United States, :1 practical reform in the whole
paper system of the country. If, by this policy, we can ul-
timately witness the suppression of- all bank bills below
twenty dollars, it is apparent that gold and silver will take
their place, and become the principal circulating medium in
the common business of the farmers and mechanics of the
country. The attainment of such a result will form an era
in the history of the country which will be dwelt upon with
delight by every true friend of its liberty and independ:eoto. -
It will lighten the great tax which our paper- sYs`..ent has
so long collected from the earnings of labou-. and do
more to revive and perpetuate those habits of e.conomy and
simplicity which are so congenial to the cha',.acter of Re-
publicans, than all the legislation which h'as yet been at-
tempted.
To this subject I feel that I cannot feet; earnestly invite
the especial attention of Congress, wiAh out. the exercise of
whose authority, the opportunity to, 'accomplish so much
public good must pass unimproved., Deeply impressed with
its vital importance, the Executive has taken all the steps
within his constitutional porsers to guard the public re-
venue, and defeat the expectation which the Bank of the
United States indulged, of renewing and perpetuating its
monopoly, on the ground of its necessity as a fiscal agent,
and as affording a sounder currency than could be (~b-tamed
tamed without such an institution. In the performanem of
this duty much responsibility was incurred which would
have been gladly avoided, if the stake which the public '
had in question could have been otherwise preserved.
Although clothed with the legal authority, and supported
by precedent, I was aware that there was, in the act of the
removal of the deposites, a liability to excite that sensitive=
ness to Executive ,;,ower which it. is the characteristic and
the duty of frv,:men to indulge : but I relied on this feel-
in, also di'.-ected by patriotism and intelligence to vindi-
cate the conduct which, in the end, would appear to have
been called for by the best interests of my country.. The
apprehensions natural to this feeling, that there may have
been a desire, through the instrumentality of thet measure,
to extend the Executive influence, or that it may have been -
prompted by motives not sufficiently free from ambition,
were not overlooked. Under the operation of our institu-
tions, the public servant who is called on to take a step of
high responsibility, should feel in the freedom which gives
rise to such apprehensions, his highest security. When
}unfounded, the attention which they. arouse, and the dis-
cussions they excite, deprive these who indulge them of the
power to do harm : when just, they but hasten the certainty
with which the great body of our citizens never fail to
repel an attempt to procure their sanction to any exer-
cise of power inconsistent with the jealous maintenance
of their tights. Under such convictions, and entertaining
no doubt that my constitutional obligations demanded
the steps which were - taken in reference to .the re-
moval of' the deposites, it was impossible for me to be de-
terred from the path of duty, by a fear that my motives
could be misjudged, or that political prejudices could de-
feat the just consideration of the merits of my conduct.
The result has shown how safe is this reliance upon the pa-
triotic temper and enlightened discernment of the people.
That measure has now been before them, and has stood the
test of all the severe analysis which its general importance,
the interests it affected, and the apprehension it excited,
were calculated to produce ; and it now remains for Con-
gress to consider what legislation leas become necessary in
consequence.
I need only add, to what I have on former occasions said
on this subject generally, that in the regulations which
Congress may prescribe respecting the custody of the public
monies, it is desirable that as little discretion as may be
deemed consistent with their safe keeping should be givers
to the executive agents. No one can be more deeply im-
pressed than 1 am with the soundness of the doctrine which
restrains and limits, by specific provisions, executive dis-
cretion as far as it can be done consistently with the pre-
servation of its constitutional character. in respect to
the control over the public money, this doctrine is pecu-
liarly applicable, and is in harmony with the great prin-
ciple which I felt I was sustaining in the controversy
with the Bank of the United States ; which has resulted
in severing, to some extent, a dangerous connection be-
tween a monied and political .power. The duty of the
Legislature to define, by clear and positive enactment,
the nature and extent of the action which it belongs to
the Executive to superintend, springs out of a policy
analogous to that which enjoins upon all the branches of
the Federal Government, an abstinence from the exercise
of powers not clearly granted. In such a Government.
possessing only limited and specific powers, the spirit of i.is
general administrationr cannot be wise or just, &' en it op-
poses the reference of all doubtful points to tlrj great source
of authority, the States and the people ; "nose number and
diversified relations, securing them s-Bainst the influences
and excitements which may 41L-10`)... their agents, make them
the safest depository of peeve.e, In its application to the
Executive, with referenee ...o the Legislative branch of the
Government, tlt sate,e rule of' action should make the
President e;eer mrsious to avoid' the exercise of any dis-
cretio,,,,a.,:y authority which can be regulated by Congress.
rr •
n e biases which may operate upon him will not be so likely
to extend to the Representatives of the people in that body.
In my former Messages to Congress, I have repeatedly
urged the propriety of lessening the discretionary authority
lodged in the various departments, but it has produced no
effect, as yet, except the discontinuance of extra allowances
in the Army and Navyt and the substitution of fixed salaries
in the latter. It is believed that the same principles could
be advantageously applied in all cases, and would promote
the efficiency and economy of the public service, at th*