The Sun.
London, England, 1866-08-14 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

TlMES.—German wars have always had one great
and lamentable peculiarity. They outlive the object
for which they were begun, and conceive within
themselves other wars, taking continually a fresh
departure just when the old matter of dispute seems
to be settled or exhausted. The vast extent of the
country, its innumerable subdivisions, the strange
variety of races and tongues annexed to it, and its
geographical situation, bordering on all the principal
States of Europe, may in some degree account for
this strange and sinister destiny. So now, just as
it would seem that the fortune of arms had decided
and negotiation had ratified the decision of the
existing causes of dispute, Germany is menaced with
a new danger, and a fresh champion descends into
the arena, to demand concessions in the very moment
of victory, and to mortify the pride of a brave and
susceptible people just as the long sought for Unity
seems within her grasp. Whatever share the Em-
peror of the French may have had in promoting, or
in seeking to prevent, the war, no one can doubt
that its result has been unforeseen and is peculiarly
unwelcome and distasteful to him. He hoped to
play the easy and glorious part of mediator between
two great monarchies worn out with a long and
equal struggle, and he finds himself, instead of this,
confronted by a State flushed with conquest, and
issuing from the war far stronger than it entered
on it. The unfortunate result of a foreign policy
which looked for the aggrandisement of France
from the discords of her neighbours, and sought,
according to the maxims of M. Thiers, to make and
keep:them weak in order that she might be strong,
has been to erect on the frontiers of France two
great States on the east and south-east, each formed
out of the aggregation of smaller States, each
animated by a strong feeling of national unity, and
each animated with no very kindly feeling to a
powerful and encroaching neighbour. No one can
wonder that the Emperor Napoleon views this state
of things with much discontent, and seeks an escape
from a position which, though not really inimical to
his interests, is mortifying to his pride. No one,
then, has been surprised to learn that the Emperor
of the French, after the great events which have just
occurred in Germany, has called upon Prussia, just
as he called upon Italy, for a rectification of his
territorial frontiers to compensate France for the
suddenly increased power of her Eastern neighbour ;
and no one will be surprised to learn that the pro-
posal has been rejected, with the intimation that
Prussia cannot yield German territory to France. If
the Emperor Napoleon meant to provoke war, the
measure was well adapted for that purpose ; if he
meant to obtain his object by amicablo concession,
the opportunity was singularly ill-chosen. To ask
tribute from a conqueror flushed with a victory of
unexampled celerity and completeness would be
scarcely more presumptuous than to demand a cession
of territory. The public law of Europe has never
sanctioned the principle which the Emperor acted on
in the case of Nice and Savoy—that whenever any
neighbour of France gains an accession of power
France obtains a right to indemnification at the ex-
pense of the successful State. Such a doctrine tends
to make every change in the internal affairs of a
nation a pretext for further change, builds on do-
mestic revolutions claims almost sure to produce
foreign wars. The notion, so often proclaimed by M.
Thiers from the Tribune, and unfortunately adopted
by the Emperor, that the safety of France consists in
the weakness and disunion of her neighbours, instead
of in their reliance on her moderation and justice
and their conviction of her strength, is one which no
other nation on the Continent pretends to apply to
its own case, and which thinly veils the desire for
territorial extension under the pretence of an over-
anxious solicitude for a safety which is not really
menaced. If war is intended, never was a moment
worse chosen. The French nation is going through
the course we seem to have accomplished. It is
weaned from the aspirations of barren glory, and
seeks in the arts of peace that happiness which it has
not found on so many glorious fields of battle in
every quarter of the globe. It desires peace, mode-
rate liberty, and, above all things, sound finance
and equitable taxation, and peace would be endan-
gered for objects so paltry that they would be dearly
bought by the loss that the very apprehension of
war will create. As regards Prussia, a demand for
the frontiers of 1814 is both ungenerous and unwise.
If Prussia were ever so anxious to meet the wishes
of France, such a concession is at this moment most
difficult. She owes her splendid success mainly to
the fact that she is not only the impersonation of
force, but the embodiment of a principle. That
principle is the unity of the German race under one
political organisation, the amalgamation of the small
States into which the Fatherland is parcelled out,
and the making all Germany one land and one peo-
ple. How can it be expected that a Minister de-
voted to this single idea can, at the very moment of
its accomplishment, in the face of all Germany and
all Europe, cede to a foreign Power a portion of
German territory ? Such an act would in itself half
und) all that has been done, and convince the Ger-
man nation that its destinies were in unworthy
hands. It is not impossible, indeed, that the pro-
posal of the Emperor of the French to appropriate
to himself a portion of German territory is so far
acceptable to a statesman of the fearless and aspir-
ing temper of Count Bismark that it strengthens his
position. Without the pale of the great State which
he is forming there are many States—Baden, Ba-
varia Wurtemburg—whose people, whatever may
be the sentiments of their rulers, would cordially
sympathise with Prussia if involved in a war not of
her own seeking for the sake of preserving the unity
and integrity of the German territory. Nay, we
doubt whether the eight million Germans comprised
in the heterogeneous Austrian Empire would not
find themselves drawn by an irresistible sympathy
to the side of their recent conquerors, and whether
it would be possible for the Emperor of Austria, if
he were so minded, to throw his power into the scale
of France. Such a war would be the best justifica-
tion for all that Prussia has done; it would enlist
on her side the wavering opinion of Europe, and
consolidate the work of this year into a solid and
durable fabric. France has nothing to fear from
any foreign enemy, and such a war would be re-
garded only as a pretext for aggression. Even
Russia, which looks with so much displeasure on the
aggrandizement of her hitherto humble and obse-
quious neighbour, would hardly draw the sword to
strengthen France at the expense of Germany, and
to irritate a powerful nation on her frontiers in or-
der to please an old adversary between whom and
her an united Germany is the best and surest bul-
wark. The Emperor of the French has for once
been baffled by events which no one foresaw. It is
the lot of man, from which even his sagacity is not
exempt. But he would turn a small check into a
great calamity if he sought to heal one evil by
another, and to plunge France into all the miseries
of war in order to convince the world that he had
not been mistaken. In politics as in business, it is
often a good thing to know when to make a loss,
and a check patiently encountered is often the parent
of a more favourable opportunity.
HERALD.—We are not yet certainly informed as
to the exact nature of the demand which the Em-
peror Napoleon is said to have addressed to the King
of Prussia. It is possible that, as yet, only a sug-
gestion has been made, which has not taken the shape
of a demand at all. In the very word " demand"
there is something threatening to the peace of
Europe. It might not be quite safe for France,
whose army is not yet provided with breech-loading
guns, to claim in categorical terms a cession of
territory, however small, from a Power which has so

recently vindicated its character for military prowess.
Such a requisition must be distinctly complied with,
or distinctly refused. The Prussians, in their

present triumphant humour, might think, and pro-
bably do think, such compliance a humiliation. A
refusal, on the other hand, would be a rebuff for
France which the Emperor of the French could
hardly choose but resent. It may seem a monstrous
thing that there should be a possibility of two great
nations going to war about an insignificant patch of
territory such as that of Saarlouis. But we know
that more trifling causes have led to wars as great
as that between France and Prussia would be at
this moment ; and when the pride of a nation is
roused, or its national honour seems at stake, a
question of a square mile may put armies in motion,
may lead to the overthrow of a dynasty, or the re-
modelling of a continent. If this claim to Saar-
louis—whether or not including two fortresses to be
demanded of Belgium, and the castle and territory
of Landau, in Rhenish Bavaria—is put forward
only as a suggestion on the part of the French Go-
vernment, it will be open to the Governments con-
cerned to take it into consideration, or reject it, as
they may think advisable. If they reject what has
not been asked, but only insinuated, they cannot,
we should imagine, give umbrage, or any fair ground
of quarrel, to Napoleon 111. If it is put forward as
a demand the case is altered. We put Belgium out
of the question. She is not strong enough to refuse
any demand made by France, but any compulsion
put upon her will become a matter of European im-
portance. France can need no guarantees in the
direction of Belgium, and can very well afford to
do without Phillippeville and Marienburg. As
Rhenish Bavaria is now completely under the heel
of Prussia, who has concluded an armistice with
Bavaria, but may press her advantage against that
State if it should prove contumacious, the question
of Landau lies in the same nutshell with that of
Saarlouis. We may feel pretty sure that if France
has formerly demanded the cession of one or both
of these towns it is because she feels sure that the
demand will be complied with without a murmur.
Tier confidence can only have arisen from the fact
of a distinct understanding to that effect between
the Prussian and French Governments before the
commencement of this war. If no such understand-

ing exists the demand for compensation is as rash
as it is unjustifiable. France is running the risk of
a collision with a Power which has already made
itself the terror of the Continent. Frenchmen tell
us that France, with her conscription, can only
raise an army of 600,000, out of a population of 37
millions, while Prussia has brought into the field
700,000 men, recruited from 18 millions. If the
area of Prussian conscription is to be doubled, what
may not France have to fear ? If the premises are
admitted, a far weightier conclusion may be deduced
from them. If a strong Germany is so great a dan-
ger to France it is absurd to allege that the acquisi-
tion of Saarlouis, or even of Landau, can provido
any.sort of safeguard against this terrible neighbour.
We are told that on Wednesday next, the 15th.
August, the Emperor's fete day, we shall be fully
enlightened as to the intentions of the Government
of France. In the meanwhile we need take little or
no account of the vague statements which have been
afloat during the last few days. The North Germali
Times is possibly justified in characterising as,
" absurd " the claim of France to " compensation
on account of the political changes in Germany
for, with Austria excluded, we believe that no pos-
sible German Power can be, in point of numbers, a
match for France. But the North German Times,
though reputed an official organ, may not this time
speak the sentiments of the King of Prussia. Dis-
posed to rest satisfied on the laurels which he has
reaped that potentate may not be indisposed to paY
a small price for that neutrality which was so
marked that it amounted almost to partisanship. W
cannot help thinking that if this " rectification"ol
frontier has been claimed it has been longpromisedt
and is an understood thing between France and
Prussia. The phrase which refers us to the frontiers
of 1814 is so vague that it has tended in an extra-
ordinary manner to disquiet the public mind. The
abortive congress of Chatillon-sur-Seine, which met
in February and March of that year. separated with-
out arriving at auy conclusion. Tne allies at this
time proposed that France should be restricted to
her limits before the Revolution. France, in fact,
held the frontier of the Rhine until the Treaty of
Paris in May of that year restricted her to the,
limits of 1792. After this she retained the frontier
fortresses which are now in question. After the
battle of Waterloo the allies made several large de-
mands on French territory, which were all passed
over with the exception of those fortified positions
which were ceded to the Low Countries and to,
Germany. Of the two places given to Prussia and
Bavaria one was fortified by Vauban in 1680, the
other in 1681. Landau, especially was conspicuous
in the wars of Louis XIV. It was taken by Tallard
in 1703, by Marlborough in 1704. Ceded again to
the French, it was taken by the Austrians in 1743.
It was besieged unsuccessfully by the German allies
in 1793, confirmed to France by the Treaty 0I
1814, and again taken from her in 1815. The
Government of the Second Empire has long desireo
to regain the possession of these fortresses, leSs on
account of their strategical importance, which after
all is insignificant, than because their loss is re-
garded as a sort of badge of the humiliation which
France suffered in 1815 at the hands of a European
coalition. The ambition to retrieve the consequences
of that great disaster is intelligible enough, and bY
no means discreditable to that Government. Wt.°
trust, however, that it will be advised to keep such
pretensions in abeyance, rather than press them a'
the risk of a general war in Europe.