The Sun.
London, England, 1832-09-12 00:00:00

LONDWS, WEDNESDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 12, 1832.

MARKET INTELLIGENCE.

LONDON MARKETS.
(From the London New Price Current of yesterday.)

SUGAR. —There was a steady and considerable demand
for Muscovades last week ; the purchases exceeded 3,500
hhd,. and trs. ; there was no alteration in prices. The
market has been dull all day ; the estimated purchases, in-
cluding the public sales, are 800 hhds. and trs. ; the lat
ter, 152 hhds. St. Lucia, and 118 hhd.. Barbadoes, went
off freely at market prices. There is no alteration in the
currency. The stock of West India Sugar is now 37,870
hhds. and trs., which is 15,366 less than last year. The
stock of Mauritius is 46,402 bags, being 630 more than
last year. The delivery of West India Sugar, 3,481
hhds. and trs., beit.g 630 more than last ye ir. The de-
livery of Mauritius 8,891 bags, being 2,362 less than th.
corresponding week of 1831. The Refined Market
wa-
very dull last week, and the prices lower; the reduction
on low and fine goods about 61. per cwt. This afternoon
there is no alteration in the market; it is still heavy.
EAST INDIA SVGA R.-Tbe sales of East India were
confined to small parcels ty private contract.
MAURITIUS SUGAR.-There were no purchases of Mau-
ritius Sugar last week worth reporting ; the inquiries
were considerable. This day's public sale 500 bags Mau
ritius fui exportation only sold Is. lower, 18s. a 21s.
FOREIGN SUGAR.-There have been no sales of Fo-
reign Sugar to report. Average price of sugar, 1/. 7s.
per cwt.
COFFEE.-We noticed a decline in the prices of British
Plantation Coffee on Tuesday last of la. to Is. 6d. ; the
Market has since rallied, and has fully recovered this de-
cline. Foreign and East India continue very dull ; good
Br..zil, 575. a 58s. ; Ceylon, 535. to 545. This day's
sale 1,963 bags Sumatra Coffee cold 50s. 6d. a 525., is. a
2s. lower, but the prices recovered considerably as the
.sale proceeded. By private contract there is little in-
quiry.

RUM, BRANDY, AND HOLLANDs.—There is rather
more demand for Rum, particularly for Leewards; very
few parcels of proofs now offer at Is. 7d. Brandy con-
tinues very firm, and the home consumption very exten-
sive. In Geneva there is a small advance, on account of
some export demand for the British North American Co-
lonies.

lIEMP, FLAX, AND TALLOW.-The Tallow Market
has been rather brisk, and extensive transactions are re-
ported. In Hemp or Flax there is little alteration. The
Market this afternoon is rather dull, on account of the
purchases reported at Petersburgh ; the price from 435. 6d.
a 445. is now 435. 6d. a 435. 3d.

°H.q.-Further purchases of Gallipoli Oil have been
made for export. Sperm Oil at public sale went off rather
higher than the previous week. Common Oils firm ; no
intelligence yet from the Straits. Seed 0;ls as last week,
though Linseed is full 2s. per qr. dearer than on Monday
last week.

TURPENTINE.—AIthough Turpentine is dearer at out-
ports it is steady here at uls. 0., which would be given
for any good parcels. Spirits are, however, dull.
TEA.-The Black Teas finished yesterday. To-day
the Twankays are selling at about the last sale's prices,
but heavily, and a good many have been refused. This
afternoon Twankays have sold at 2s. 11(1. a 2s. 74(1. ;
about 2,000 chests have been refused ; the prices are much
as at last sale. Congous finished yesterday. About
180,000 lbs. B ark Tea have been rejected this sale.
Souchongs sold at 2s. 71. a 4s. 4,1.
COTTON. —The demand for Cotton has been brisk and
the puchases extensive, particularly towards the close of
last week ; higher prices are more asked. The sales are-
-150 Bowed, mid. kid., good 6A-d. ; 160 Bengal, good
fair qd., Rood sd. ; 1,530 Surats, ord. 4-p., good fair
Sad ; 610 Madras, good fair 5d., good 54d. ; 60 Pernams,
good fair 94d:_

INnmo.:--Indigo remains without ;.Iteration as to price,
but last week th.,re was more inquiry for Oude and Ma-
dras, and about 200 chests of the former and 50 of the latter
zhola ‘1AL1T24,9 lb,
4,479 chests, and it is expected the quantity will be in-
creased to about 6,000 chests; the inspection commenced
on Tuesday last, and it is found that there is but a very
small proportion of fine qualities, the greater part being
such as sold at the last sale from 3s. 6d. to 4s. 31 per
lb., of which there is a greater proportion than usual of
specky and imperfect lots.
Assortment of 2,060 chests Company's Indigo, declared
for sale on the 2,1 of Oct., by the East India Company:-
45 chests ord. to good consuming qualities,
valued at last sale's prices
'704 „ good consuming to mid. shipp. do 3s. Gd. to 4s. Od.
1,075 „ mid. to good shipping ditto
196 „ good to tine ditto ditto
40 „ very tine shipping ditto ss. and upwards.
SPICES.—In spices there is little alteration ; the mar-
ket is dull. This day's sale 530 bags Pepper sold at for-
mer prices, 31d. to 3p.
COCOA.—This day's public sales, 1,227 bags Brazil
Cocoa, the general price for the good 245. a 245. 6d.
HOPS.—The picking has commenced, and will be ge-
neral next week ; they do not yield so much as was ex-
pected. The duty is now estimated at 140,000/. The
few new parcels which have appeared have been sold at
41. to 61.

COUNTRY CORN MARKETS DURING THE WEEK,

Wheat.

Barley.

CANTERBURY, Sept. S.
Wheat, white has. to 6Ss. —s. to —s.

---- red 545. to 635. to —s.
Barley, Alalting —s. to —s. Grinding.. `21,3. to 325.
Oats `Os. to 225. —s. to —s.
Beans
—5. to 40s. Old----.. 365. to 38s.
Pease --.------- —s. to —5..... Grey —..... 335. to 375.

MANCHESTER, Sept. S.
Wheat, per 701 b. 9s. 9d. to 10s. 2d. Red Os. 61. to Os. Sd,
Barley, per 601 b 5 6 6 0 Oats 3 3 3 6
Beans, per Imperial quarter
Pease, White, per Imperial bushel 5 0 5 6
Malt, per 6 Imperial bushels 43 0 49 0
Flour, per Sack uf 2801 b

EXETER 51 A 11
Beef (score) Od. 9s. 6d.
Mutton (Ib.)—.-0 51 0 6
Veal and lamb-0 6 0 7
Pork 4 0 6
Geese (each) 0 5 6
Ducks ic0un1e\......4 0 5 0
Fowls N.«, 0 4 0

Wheat (bulhel) ...Se. Od. Bs. 6d.
Barley 4 6 4 9
Oats ...2 3 2 5
Beans 5 6 6 0
Butter (Ib.)---.....1 0 1 3
Eggs (12) .O 0 1 0
Potatoes (peck) ....0 6 0 7

RKETS.
)TE.—FRIDAY, Sept 7.
From 'Fo Average
2,148 Wheat, per barrel 20 stone 22 0 32 6 27 2
108 Bete _ 16 stone 11 9 12 6 12 3
16 stone 0 0 --
1,791 Oats 12 stone 8 9 ll 6 9 ('
10,119 Cwt. Flour 9 stonel 0 0 23 0 0
628 Oatmeal 8 stone) 9 0 14 0 10 0

IRISH MA
DUBLIN MARKET NO

Sold to ',takers only.
1
8,654 Cwt. Flour--
Average price of Wheat am
Receipts of Flour, 10,6051„, Firsts!/
Sales of Do. 10,119 —„..
Thirds
?RICE OF
I,id. I 1

Quartern Loaf.

I 17 0 I 23 0 I 19 'N
td Flour 48, 4d. per sack.
from 21s. Od. to 2.35. Od
ds, from 17s. 6d. to 20s. Od.
s,- from Cs. Od. to 128 Od.
BREA D.
Half

.
-- ______
Wheat, Barley. Oats. Flour, per cwt.
per barrel per barrel per barrel r----Ix-----t
20 stone. 16 stone. 14 stone. Ist. 2d.
--1-------
s. d. a s.d.l s.d. a s.d. s. d. as. d. s. 0. as. 0. s. d.a s. 0.
Cork ........... 21 0 '26 6112 6 146 80 96 17 0 19 6 6 0 17 0
Limerick 126 8 31 0112 0 13 4 12 0 13 6 16 0 19 0 0 0 15 0
Waterforo24 0 26 011 0 12 0 S 0 9017 0 18 010 0 15 0
Clonmel ...129 4 300 90 130 136 139 17 0 19 0 13 0 16 0
Carlow ........123 0 24 013 0 14 0 80 86°O 6 210 00 00
—2:---------==
Beef, Mutton, pork, 3oqe'ZL___.—_
per lb per lb. per cwt. Ist. 2d. 3d. 4th. sth.
-- —_ ---
'd. a d. d. a d. s. d. as. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d.
C0rk.,..,,,,.,, 4f 5 5 6 '29 0 32 0790750 68 0 62 0,54 0
Limerick— 3 43* 434 0 35 0178 074068062 0 56 0
Waterford 3 6 3 535 0 36 0'77 074070066 0 60 0
Clonmel 3 5 5 637 0 38 0174 0700—0 0 0
Carlow—.4 sjo 0 00 0050078068 0 58 0 0

• KILKENNY.—Butter 78s. to SOs. per cwt. ; Wheat 30s. to 3•-'`•
per barrel ; Flour 20s. to 345. per bag; Oats Bs. to 10s. per bar-
rel ; Barley 13s. to 15s. ; Beef 4d. to sd. per lb. ; Mutton 4(1.
to sd. ; Potatoes 2d. per stone; Coals Is. 2d, per cwt.; Bacon
Pigs 325. to 335. per cwt.

Did swallows fail to make their appearance
for a single summer, our houses and crops would be over-
tun with insects, and not merely annoyance, but famine
might ensue. Hence the impolicy, as well as cruelty, of
de,tro)ing mu'titudes of these harmless birds, either for
the table, or for improving:the practical skill of the sports-
man.

COMMITTEE ON THE BANK OF ENG
LAND CHARTER.

Evidence of JERE:MI—AIf HARMAN, Esq.

You were in thz Bank direction a great many years ?
I was ; I went info the Bank direction in the year 1791;
and I rAired from it in 1827.

Will you state the principles which guided the Bank in
their issues of paper, during the different periods of the
time you were in the B ink direction ?--The first principle
was attention to the security of the Bank itself, in which
we considered the safety of the public, of course, very
much involved ; to render as much service as we could to
the commercial community with propriety, always having
reference to the means which we possessed of fulfilling our
engagements.

What proportion of bullion did you conceive it requi-
site for the Bank to keep, as compared with their liabili-
ties, both in the issue of paper and their deposits?—lt was
impossihle for us always to judge in that respect ; from
various circumstances the quantity of bullion which we
possessed varied so very much, that I must honestly con•
fess that we never drew any line by which we should be
actuated in that respect.

Then you had no fixed opinion as to what proportion,
upon the avenge, it was right to have of bullion to your
liabilities ?—During the greater part of the time in which
I was in the Bank, because I was in the Bank only two
years before the restriction, during the greater part of that
time it was quite impossible for the Bank at all times,
and indeed very rarely, to possess so much gold as they
would very gladly have possessed, from the constantly un-
favourable state of the exchanges, which I conceive it was
not always in our power to counteract. I was only two
years in the Bank before the restriction. At the time of
the restriction I was out, as the phrase is, by rotation,
and I did not come in again till after the restriction was
laid on. I do not of course say that with any view of
absolving myself from responsibility, but I mean merely to
state a fact.

During the time of the restriction, as you did not pay
in bullion, it was of little consequence, of course, what
amount of bullion you kept by you ?—We should have
very gladly kept up the proper proportion of bullion, but it
was utterly impossible to do it.

Do you consider that the Bank in its issues ought to
have any reference to the par of the exchanges ?—That is
a question which has been put to me repeatedly when I
have had the honour to attend becore committees, and I
hardly know how to answer it; that we always adverted
to it I must positively assert, but that we always acted
upon it I must confess that we did not, because I do not
think it was possible to do it, more especially under the
circumstances in which the Bank was placed during the
restriction.

Will you describe the measures which the Bank took
to prepare for the renewal of the payments in cash in
1819 ?—That involved a long period, and there were
many occurrences that interrupted any regular plan of
operations; but the measures were to obtain gold when-
ever we could do it. It was my opinion, and I shall have
no reserve whatever in giving my opinion, and taking the
responsibility or blame that may attach to me personally,
but it was my opinion that it was fruitless to attempt to
obtain and retain gold when the exchanges were against
the country.

You said there were many circumstances which inter-
fered with your intention of procuring gold ; will you
state what those circumstances were ?—I do not positively
mean that they interfered with our procuring gold, but
they interfered with that r( gular series of preparation
which it would have been our wish to make.
What were those circumstances ?—The chief circum-
stance was the fluctuation, and the calls upon us of various
kinds from the commercial part of the community, and
frequently from the Government itself.
Can you state the periods and the nature of those calls ?
—Having been out of the Bank so long, and_having no
quite willing and desirous to give any information in my

power.
In 1819, did the Bank consider itself sufficiently sup-
plied with bullion to resume cash payments ?—I should
think we were.
Did you take any measures to increase the supply of
bullion after 1819 ?—Not having the dates, I cannot an-
swer that question satisfactorily.
Did you take any measures in order to increase the cir-
culating medium in 1821 and 1822, for the purpose of
relieving the country from the low prices which then
existed ?—I must plead want of recollection of the parti-
cular periods.
About that time did you take any measures for the put.-
p,,se of increasing the circulation of the country ?—lf I
had known that these questions would have been put to
tne, I would have refreshed my memory by referring to
documents which are not in my possession ; but I can
only say that there was every disposition on the part of
the Bank Directors to meet the calls upon them which the
taking off of the restriction would make them liable to,—to
do every thing in their power which was necessary and
proper for the object.
Do you recollect any arrangement made by the Gover-
nor of the Bank, about the year 1822, that had for its
object the increasing the circulation of the country?--Yes.
Did that lead to an increased issue of Bank notes fol-
lowing that period ? --I think it did.
The circulation does in fact appear to have increased be-
tween the period of the beginning of 1832 and the begin-
ning of 1825, to the extent of about 4,000,000/. ?—I be-
lieve there was an increase of 4,000,000/. about that
period.
Do you recollect whether that 4,000,0001. was issued
upon advances to Government, or upon discounts to the
commercial world ?—I should think both.
By a paper before the Committee it appears that the
discounts at the Bank at the beginniog of 1822 were
3,100,000/., and at the beginning of 1825 they were
2,400,000/., therefore there was a diminution in the dis-
counts; does it not therefore follow, seeing there was an
increase of 4,000,0001. of Bank notes during that period,
that those notes must have been issued either upon ad-
vances to Government, or on mortgage, or other advances
to individuals, different from advances on discounts?—De-
cidedly; that follows as matter of course, because we
should not issue our notes but upon what we considered
solid security.
The amount of bullion, as appears from the paper be-
fore the Committee, held by the Bank in February, 1822,
for the average of the year up to that period, was
11,600,0001. ; and for the average of the year ending
February, 1825, 11,800,000/. ; so that there could only
have been 200,00 Q/. of notes issued on bullion deposited
at the B ink ?—ln the years 1824 and 1825, there was a
very considerable reduction of the amount of bullion, but
also a very considerable reduction of our floating Govern-
ment securities, to the amount, I should think, of four
millions and a half.
With respect to the issues prior to February, 1825,
does not it appear, according to the figures that have been
quoted, that those issues could not have been issues upon
bullion, but that they must have been either on Govern.
ment securities or advances on mortgages, or advances on
stock, or upon advances of a similar description ?—Yes.
Between February, 1825, and the end of November,
1825, a diminution of the circulation of the Bank appears
to have taken place to the extent of 3,500,000/. ; do you
recollect the circumstances which occasioned the Bank to
reduce its notes during that period ?—The fact was, that
about the month of April, 1825, we began to find a very
serious diminution of our bullion; the exchanges fell, and
although I do not mean to say that it was the leading mo-
tive which influenced the Directors, yet, at that period,
there was an excessive rage for speculation, and I, for one,
certainly did not think that that was a sort of spirit that
it was the duty of the Bank Directors to encourage ; that
may account in part, perhaps, for the amount having been
reduced.
Do you recollect to what extent the bullion of the B ink
was reduced between February, 1825, and the end of
November, 1825 ; was it to a very material degree?—
Very ; a great many millions. I should think in May or
April, 1825, we had about 10,000,0001. of bullion, and
by the month of November it was reduced to 1,300,000/.
Would not that reduction impose on the Bank the
absolute necessity of reducing its issues of notes, inde-
pendently of any consideration of speculation among the
public?—No doubt.
Do you recollect that that increased issue of Bank-notes
between 1822 and 1825 was accompanied with a con-
siderable advance of prices of property and commodities in
this country ?—Certainly.
1)o you think that that advance of prices was connected
with that issue of Bank-notes ?—No, I did not.
The price of Consols in February, 1822, being 74, and

(PRICE 7D.)

in February, 1825, being 94, do you think that the price
of Consols had advanced as connected with the issue o'
Bank-notes?—Not the least, in my humble opinion.
Between February, 1825, and November, 1E325, the
price of Consols fell down to 84; do you think that the
reduction of Bank-notes which has just been spoken of,
during that period, had any effect in reducing the price of
Consols ?—I must change all my notions before I can
answer in the affirmative.

Do you think that a diminution of the notes of the Bank
has a tendency to make money scarce in London ?—Yes,
I think it has.
Has it a tendency to raise the rate of discount in the
London market?—Certainly.

Has it a tendency to cause sales of stock and Exchequer-
bills ?—To a certain extent, if you suppose that it is a
violent operation ; that it is to a very great extent, not
gradual.

Do you remember the commercial situation of London
during that ye it do.
Was it one of considerable distress and difficulty, as well
,s of speculation ?—The latter end of the year, but not the
beginning of the year ; in the beginning of the year 1825,
on the contrary, every thing was in the most joyous state
possible.
Highly prosperous, do you think ?—We were told so,
from the highest authority.
But before the close of 1825, it appeared to be a period
of great commercial embarrassment and distress ?—Yes.
Do you remember at what period of 1825 this distress
began. to appear?—Late in the year.
Can you fix any particular date ?—I should say it came
on gradually, but this is a matter of recollection ; I should
think the distress came on gradually, from the month of
September very gradually ; it went on increasing from
that time to the end of the year, in December.
Did it go into 1826 ?—I think not.

It appears, by the papers before the Committee, that
the Bank sold Exchequer-bills, in the quarter ending
September, 1825, to the extent of nearly 1,000,0001. ;
was it about that time the difficulties took place in the
money-market ?—Yes, that is symptomatic a sale of
Exchequer-bills, on the part of the Bank, is -a
sign that
they thought some measure of that sort was desirable;

because the Bank have a twofold duty, and a very difficult
one it is,--they have to take care of their own pro-
prietors, and the public too.
Exchequer bills seem to have fallen in the months of
August and September, 1825, to a discount ; do you re-
collect that circumstance ?—The period I do not imme-
diately recollect without referring, but I should think it
was so.

Do you recollect whether any communication took place
between the Government and the Bank of England about
that period upon the subject of the low price of Exche-
quer-bills ?—I cannot call it to mind.

Do you recollect the circumstance of a delay taking
place in the usual period of advertising the quarterly re-
payment or exchange of the Exchequer-bills in September,
1825 ?—There was something of that sort.
Did you become acquainted with the cause of that
delay?7--I cannot say, but I think the cause was obvious.

Will you state what it was ?—lf I may be excused an-
swering that question, I would rather, as I wish to speak
with the utmost correctness.

Do you recollect whether it was by the suggestion of
the Bank of England that that postponement took place ?
—My recollection, I might almost say my conviction, is,
that it was not ; but there I am involved in the difficulty
which I anticipated, that I cannot answer with certainty.
Yo❑ are aware that when the Government advertises
Exchequer-bills to be paid off or exchanged, it gives an
option to the holder of that Exchequer bill, either to take
money or to take a new bill; are you of opinion that if
Exchequer bills should be at a discount during the period
when that exchange takes place, that that would occasion
a demand of money from the Government instead of new
Exchequer bills?—Yes.

,
recollect any particular sum.
Is it not more than 2,000,0001. ?—I should think more
than 2,000,0001., in general.
Would it be the interest of the holders of all those bills
to demand cash from the Government, if the Exchequer-
bills should be at a discount during such a period ?—Pal-
pably so.
Would the Government, then, feel perfectly secure in
issuing an advertisement, by which they bound themselves
to give money or to give new bills, at the option of the
holders, for several millions of Exchequer-bills, unless they
could provide against the Exchequer-bills falling to a dis-
count at such a period as that?—No, I should think it a
very imprudent me tsure, if they had not the ways and
means in their power.
Would not the Government apply to the Bank, under
such circumstances, to r- quest the Bank to secure that
Exchequer-bills should not fall to a discount, by the pur-
chase of Exchequer•bills in the market ?—Yes, and such
things have been.
Do you recollect whether such arrangement, originating
either with the Bank or with the Government, took place
about that period, prior to the close of the September quar-
ter of 1825 ?-1 do not recollect ; hut that there was inter
course between the Treasury and the Bank upon the subject
of Exchequer-bills subsequently to that period, is certain.
But you do not recollect any intercourse prior ?—No, I
do not. Ido not say it did not take place, but Ido not
recollect. _ _

But you would think it very imprudent for Govern-
ment, at a time when Exchequer-bills were at a discount,
to commit itself by such an advertisement as has been de-
scribed, without making an arrangement with the Bank,
which should secure that the Exchequer-bills should not
fall to a discount ?—I take it for granted, that if either
the Government or an individual have a call coming upon
them, it is their duty to provide means for discharging it.
At that period, you have stated that the Bank of Eng-
land was eff•cting a reduction of its issues of notes ; did
you think that a reduction was necessary to the safety of
the Bank ?—That again involves a very interesting ques-
tion ; I conceive that it is quite impossible to say what the
consequences of any measure may be beforehand, and th.
reduction of the blank notes during a time of panic might
' be of very serious consequence.
The question refers to the period prior to the panic
which took place early in December ?—The mode in which
we reduced our Bank notes was by the sale of Government
securities.
Thinking that step necessary for the safety of the Bank,
its bullion rapidly diminishing 2—Decidedly.
If the Government applied at that time to the Bank to
purchase Exchequer-bills by an increased issue of Bank
notes, did not the Government apply to the Bank to edop,
a measure inconsistent with its own security ?—lt cer-
tainly was not a very desirable measure.
In the answers you have just given, do you contemplate

that at that time there was a great pressure upon the
credit both of the Government and of the Bank ?—Yes.
So that if the Bank assisted to issue Bank notes by tilt
purchase of Exchequer-bills, in order to relieve the diffi-
culty of Government, that might endanger the security of
the Bank, and if it refused that measure, it might endan
ger the security of the Treasury 2—Yes,
Do you recollect the circumstances of the commercial
world during the months of October and November,
1825 7—Full well.
Was it a state of very great increasing difficulty and
embarrassment ?—Dreadful.
You were understood to say that the bullion of the
Bank was reduced by the end of November to 1,300,0001. ?
_—That is my recollection.
Was that prior to the breaking out of the panic ?—No,
the panic had begun then ; I will not charge my memory
whether it was by the end of November, or in the month
of December ; but I think it was in the latter end of No
vember.

Were the Bank placed in great danger in the month of
December, 1825, in consequence of that short supply of
bullion?—No question about it.
Did Exchequer-bills fall greatly in the month of De•
cember, 1825 ?—Yes, so much so, that if the Bank had
not lent its aid in a most uncommon manner, there would
have been a complete stagnation of every thing.
And a total destruction of the paper system of the coun-
try ?—I will not say that ; there would have been a com-
plete stagnation, in my opinion.
Will you describe the manner in which the Bank lent
its assistance at that time ?—We lent it by every possible
means, and in modes that we never had adopted before ;
we took in stock as security,—we purchased Exchequer-
bills, we made advances on Exchequer-bills,—we not only
discounted outright, but we made advances on deposit (it
bills of exchange to an immense amount ; in short, I y
every possible means consistent with the tatity of
.th,
Bank; and we were not upon some occ.anone over mee ;

id the Government recommend to the Rink an in-
creased issue of Bank notes at that period ?—Whether they
r commended it or not, may admit of a question, but that
they encouraged it, is most certain.
Did the Bank state to the Government the low amount
of its bullion at that time ?—The Minister knew every
thing; there was no concealment.
Did the Bank represent to the Minister that an increes•
ed issue of Bank notes at such a period as that might pro-
bably cause a stoppage of the Bank ?—lt %vim so obvious a
thing, as the Government had the whole detail before
them, that it was hardly necessary to point out to tl ens
what might be the consequence ; it was an effort to stop
the plague.

Do you remember whether his Majesty's Government
pointed out to the Bank any course for t',e B ink to adopt
in the event of the gold being exhausted ?—I do not exactly
unders,and the meaning of the question.
Did any communication take place between the Bank
and the Government respecting an order in council to re-
strain payment in'gold at that period ?—Yes, it was sug-
gested by the Bank.
What answer did his Majesty's Government give to that?
—They resisted it from first to last.
Did the Government suggest any other course, in re-
fusing the suggest:on of the Bank ?—No, they left the
Bank to act at its discretion, hoping that the panic would
subsi.t.e ; and it is to he observed, that though our treasure
was so much reduced, even much more reduced as we ap-
proached the crisis, we were a' that period receiving gold,
because we strained every nerve .to get gold from the con-
tinent. Bullion came in, and the Mint coined : tin y
worked double tides ; in short, they were at work night
and day : we were perpetually receiving gold from abroid
and coin from the Mint.

Was there a period in December, 1825, during which
the Balk contemplated the great probability of being en-
tirely exhausted of gold ?—At the latter end of 1825, de-
cidedly.
Do you recollect the lowest quantity of gold which the
Bank possessed during any period of December, 1825 ?
No, I do not remember immediately ; but it was miser-
ably low.
Was it under the 1,300,0001. you have mentioned ?
Unquestionably.
It was stated by the late Mr. Huskisson, to a Member
of the House of Commons, that he, as a Member of the
Administration at that time, suggested to the Bank, that
if their gold was exhausted, they should place a paper
against their doors, stating that they had not gold to pay
with, but might expect to have gold to recommence pay-
ment in a short period ; do you recollect such a sugges-
tion ?—There was such suggestion.
What would, in your opinion, have been the consequences
of that paper placed against the door of the Bank, without
preparation to support commercial and financial credit?--
I hardly know how to contemplate it.
The Bank of England issued It. notes at that period ;
was that done to protect its remaining treasure?--De-
cidedly, and it worked wonders ; and if was by great good
luck that we had the means of doing it, because one box,
containing a quantity of 11. notes, had been overlooked,
and they were forthcoming at the lucky moment.
Had there been no foresight in the preparation of those:
11. notes ?—None whatever, I solemnly declare.
Do you think that issuing of the 1/. notes did avert a
complete drain ?—As far as my judgment goet., it saved
the credit of the country.
The Committee have before them a table, which nay
given to the Committee of 1797, of the scale of cash and
bullion in the Bank prior to the Restriction Act, in which
table the amount of bullion, according to a scale number
of spare cash, is stated as 660 ; do your remember what
amount of bullion that represented I was a very
young director then ; and I confess honestly it was a hoeus
pocus which I did not thoroughly understand, though of
course I knew the actual amount at the time.

It appears that an issue of gold was made by the Bank
between October, 1817, and April, 1819, to the amount
of nearly 7,000,0001 , the Bank Restriction Act then being
revived ; do you recollect the circumstances under which
that gold was issued ?—lt was issued by way of antici-
pating the measure, and in the hope that by gradually
getting out gold, we should lessen the effects of a sudden
arioti- .of Ueiiig melted 1-1 cannot recollect ; it was not is-
sued with the view of its being exported, but it was issued
with the hope of its getting into circulation gradually.
Do you think it was exported?—That must have de-
pended upon the state of the exchanges at that time.
The price of gold during that period having varied from
4/. Is. to 4/. 3s. an ounce, could ..ny of that gold enter
into circulation?—l am afraid not much. . .

Must not the consequence have been, that it was either
melted or exported ?—Yes ; but if it were melted and ex-
ported, I conceive it was not useless, because I take is for
granted that the balance against the country required re-
mittances, which the gold would supply.
During this period, the fact being that a demand ex-
isted for exportation, the balance being against this coun-
try, did this supply of gold from the Bank go to meet
such demand?—As far as it went, it must have produced
that effect.

As the price of gold at that period in the market was
from 4/. ls. to I/. 35., and as the Bank supplied gold at
Si. 17s. 10Id., did they not supply the market at a rate
under the market price?—At their own cost.
If the Bank h id refrained from issuing this gold at
this period, and had retained in its coffers the whole
7,000,0001., would not the case have been, that the price
of gold in the market would have advanced ?—No question
about it.
Might not gold have advanced from IL Is. to 4/. 3s.
(which is 31e to 6 per cent. above the Mint price, and
which
.o is a p
r 51.
Os. an anu
ounce,
nucpeo,n a a
n guinead o
to the
premiumt'
ona guinea) to
f
ss. or 10s. ?—lf there was a demand for gold for foreign
remittance, and gold could be obtained, it certainly would
come in aid of the demands against the country ; to what
amount or to what price the gold would have risen in the
market, what the difference would have been, it is impossi-
ble for me to say.
It might have been to ss. or 10s. premium upon the
guinea, or it might not ?—lt might have been to any given
amount.
Would not any estimate of the rate of depreciation of
our paper-money during this period have been a worthless
estimate, if it were founded upon the price of gold in the
market, and did not take into calculation the manner in
which the operation now referred to necessarily affected
the market price of gold ?—I hardly know how to answer
that question.
Du you think that if the prices of property and commo-
dities advanced in that period from 20 to 50 per cent., the
probability is that the price of gold would not have fol-
lower' in that degree if it had not been influenced by this
operation 2—That is rather too speculative a question fur
me to answer on the spur of the moment.
Do you concur in this—that the object was to get gold
into circulation, and that the eff ct was to depress the
market price of gold 3—lt is possible that I may err as to
the precise time; it seems palpable that by issuing gold at
Si. 178. lOid. when the price of gold was 4/. and up-
wards, it was not very likely to remain in circulation, and
therefore I am jealous whether I am answering as to the
proper period.
The Bank being then under no compu'sion by law to
pay in gold, gold being then rather an article of tnerchan-
dise than money, do you think that that operation was
calculated to affect the market price of bullion in a similar
manner to an operation which should throw upon the corn
market a large quantity of corn at 40s. a quarter ; that is,
would not the one operation tend to depress the bullion
market, in the same manner as the other would tend to
depress the market price of corn ?—To a certain extent;
if the calls for gold for export were limited, and the amount
issued were sufficient to meet them, it would have the
effect alluded to.
It would depend upon the demand ?--Decidedly.
It has been stated that the present system of the Bank
is to reduce its issues of notes whenever an unfavourable
exchange drains the Bank of its treasure ; do you think
that that was at all times during cash payments the manner
in which the Bank conducted its issues of notes—namely,
to reduce its issues at a period when its bullion was reduced
by a drain through an unfavourable exchange ?—I do not
think it always was ; but now I am speaking of what I
have been no party to.
The question refers to the period of cash payments be.
fore the Restriction Act, in periods when the Bank was
subject to payments is gold ?—I cannot possibly say what
the opinions or the acts of men were so long ago ; but my
honest opinion is, that it did nut always operate in that way.
Do you think it generally did, or that it generally did
not ?—I take for granted, that if the Directors of tl e Bank
saw that there was a strong run against the country with
respect to the exchanges, it would m ike them very c.artiotis ;
and that in all probability they would, as fa a: they ruuld
consistently with other duties, lessen the amount of their
paper circulation.
If the Directors of the Bank of England were men of

V )mmoa prudence and commercial experience, would it
net necessarily appear to them to be a proper course to
reduce their issues when ihrir tuition should be greatly
drained by an unfavourable exchange ?—Yes ; but then
comes another question, and that is, the risk that it may
occasion to the commercial world ; and the possibility
that, by omitting to take that measure, some fiVourahle
turn would take place, and render the convulsion that
might ensue from the measure itself unnecess iry.
You have spoken of the eXtremely gm ill quantity of gold
which existed in the Bank of England in 1825 ; coin you
state what was the comparative quantity of gold itia the
possession of the Bunk at the tine of the stoppa2e of the
Bank in 1797 ?—No ; it is on record, and there can be no
trfficulty in ascertaining it ; but I should think it was
somewhat about the same amount as in November ; it was
reduced very low, but not so low as it was in December,
1,925.

Referring to what you have stated, of the utility of 11.
notes in protecting the credit of the Government and the
Bank in December, 1825, do you think it Was a wise
measure to pass the small note Bill in the spring of 1826 ?
—I should be very el td to be excused eivinf, any opinion
upon that, for my opinion is very little worth having,
If it appeared to the Bank that their supply of bullion
was more than sufficient, what means might they adopt to
releve themselves front a part of it?—lt is very difficult,
but t.y calling in their notes anti iss.iing coin instead.
Is that the only mode in which they could do it ?—I
know no other.

Would not putting out notes by the purchase of x-
chequer-bilis have the sAme effect?—No, hecaUm the bul-
lion would otill remain in the Bank.

Would not that have the effect of turning the exchanges
in a gre-it measure against the country?—lt might, but I
think it would be rather a circuitous way of doing it.
In the month of December, 1825, the Bank made very
great advances to the public, and you are of opinion that by
those advances they saved the public credit of the country
and the private credit of the whule commercial community;
at that period you have stated that your balances of bul-
lion and coin were very low ; are you not generally of opi-
nion that in all cases of panic, though your coin may be
very low, it may he judicious in the Bank to advance
Bank notes, to prevent the increase and mischief of the
kind described ?—I have no dotibt of it.

If, for example, in the year 1825, instead of three or
four bankers, half a score had failed, by which the public
embarrassment, discredit, and distress would have been ex-
edingly increased, are you not of opinion that it might
not then have been in your poster to have alleviated the
mischief?-_I think we were within an ace of the whole
effort failing to save the credit of the country.
You think, therefore, that it is not on every possible
pension strictly true, as a General maxim, that it is wrong
in the Bank to advance Bank-notes even when the bullion
may be exceedingly low?—That has always been my opi-
nion ; but I know that it is one that has been extremely
criticised and objected to; but I am glad that I am out
of Om way of the exercise of so painful and anxious a
responsibility.

As every general rule has an exception, do you not think
that such an exception to the rule referred to existed in
the month of December, 1825?-1 am sure it did.
When the Bank increased its iasues in 1825, with a low
state of bullion, was not bullion at the same time coming
into this country ?---Yes, the tide turned in the latter end
of December, hut the brat gold that we got was consider-
ably above the 31int price that was owing to the efforts
we made over the whole Continent.

Was not that drain of gold, at that period, for the pur-
pose of supporting the credit of the banks in the country,
an:- not for the purpose of exportation?—Dccidedly, to
support the credit of the country; but as the exchanges,
till the latter end of Dee-tuber, continued in a depressed
state, we could not tell whether the attempt would he sue-
ccssful or not; not that the fall in the exchange was at
time fxri•ssive, and it would be more correct perhaps
to 8.1: that the state of commerce during the period was
fo.ch is to preclude the influx of gold; but the tide turned
and favoured our operations; moreover, when the alarm
subsided, the !!old which hid been sent into the country
won flowed back into the coffers of the Bank.

were aware, when you did increase your issues,
tl at the danger was not from the exportation of the bul-
lion, but from the call for that bullion for the support of
the banks in the country ?—Certainly.
Did you sell public securities, or did you issue notes, in
order to obtain this large supply of bullion in Novtmber
and December, 1825?—We sold public securities; we re-
•ovr4Ars.."..ra-sns • s the tubss.sseti.
panic varnished like a dream ?—Yes, whether that was
the cause or not, the fact is perfectly right; the 11. notes
were received with acclamation, almost.
Had you any doubt it was the cause ?—I have none upon
the face of the earth.
Would not, in your opinion, the proper conduct for the
Bank to pursue have been totally different between the
two cases, of a drain for the purpose of exportation, and
a drain for the purpose of supporting the country banks ?
—Yes; at the same time I must honestly confess that the
country was in such a state that it was a choice of evils ;
and it was very difficult to say which was the wise course
to steer.

Although in older times the Bank did not act upon an)
solemn resolution of looking to the state of exchanges,
still, did not that circumstance enter into their general
consideration of the motives by which they shou'd 1),
guided ?—No doubt.

Doe's it not stand upon record that, at the period of the
stu.pension in 1797, one of the representations made to Mr
Pitt at the time was the danger arising from the Austrian
loan ?—Yes.

Does not that point out that the Bank, although not tied
down by any positive resolution, did look at the state of
the (reign exchanges, in the general conduct of their
affairs ?—There is no doubt of it ; whether they were
always as much alive to it as some persons think they-
ought to have been, 1 am not prepared to say ; hut, on the
other hand, to say that they were unmindful of it is really
a libel upon them.
Was it not the fact, that in the year 1797, at the time
of the suspension of cash payments at the Bank, the foreign
exchanges were, and had been fur some time, in our fa-
vour ?—Yes, they were.
You stated that the foreign exchanges became in our
favour at the end of December, 1825: do you think that
that turn of exchanges, at that critical period, was occa-
sioned by the great and sudden fall of prices which accom-
panied the panic in London ?—•I have never considered it
in that point of view.

Do you recollect the circumstance of cargoes of foreign
goods which hid been at that period recently imported,
being sent back to the ports they came from, in conse-
quence of the distress in London at that period ?—No, I
never beard of it ; there might he solitary cases of that
kind, but 1 should think to no great extent.
Would not the great additional pressure upon the money
market of London which the panic occasioned, have a ne-
cessary tendency to draw mon, y to London from commer-
cial towns abroad, in consequence of the low price of Bri-
tish and Foreign securities and commodities ?—I think it
would operate ; the merchants endeavour, by every possible
means, to draw their money, if they have it, from abroad ;
they would endeavour to pass their bills upon the ex
change, and that of itself would assist in correcting the
exchange.
Then, if that had not taken place, and had not cor-
rected the exchanges, but the exchanges had continne.!
unfavourable for one or two mi.ntlts longer, would the
Bank have been in a secure situation with 1,300,0001. of
bullion at the end of November, 1825 ?—No, certainly ;
if the exchanges had continued unfavourable, and we
could not have got bullion in, it does not require much
wisdom to see that we should have continued in a must
deplorable state.
Does it not follow from that, that the circumstance of
the panic did probably interfere to save the stoppage of the
Bank or of the Treasury ?—Amongst other efforts that the
Bank made, they encouraged the taking of paper from the
da.rent merchants, where they could do it with safety.
Did not they cause bills to be bought on the Exeb loge ?
—.Yes, that is what I mean.

If there had been another bank of issue besides the Bank
of England in 1825, do you think th it circumstance would
have been beneficial or otherwise to the support of com-
mercial credit ?—I am afraid it vcoull have bven a divided
interest, and that no good would have resulted from it ; in
Lontion, decidedly not.

Are you quite certain that you are correct when you
state that the exchange was not favourable to the country
before December ; does it not appear by the quotations
that they turned in our favour in October ?—I think not ;
it is always possible that there may be a quotation appa-
rently in favour of the country, when in tact it is not so;
you cahnot always rely upon the exchanges quoted for the
business done.

What was the date of the Bank determining to increase
i 's issues of notes, apparently in defiance of the ordinary
rnle, which govern its issues ?—lt was not till the latter end
of the y. ar 1825 ; I cannot charge my memory as to the
date; I sitoui.i ,hii,k that it was in November that we
began, but I speak doubtfully.
You have stated that the Bank, during the panic, end
sl.ortly after the panic, lent money upon Exchequer-hill,
u on funded property, and upon personal security; did
your answer Apply merely to applicants in London, or to

other parts of the country?—'to other parts of the noun-
try, through London holves.
Did the Bank lend 'money upon the deposit of goods tn.
ether with personal security to manufacturers in Scot-
?—Yes.

To any considerable amount ?-IVot to a very enormous
amount, but to a very coftsidcrilble amount ; we had de-
putations from E,lint.crgh, and we had a deputation from
Glasgow; the Lord Provost of each city came up, and
r:et-e with the Directors, urging assistance which they
'ould not obtain in their own country.
Then you had applications from the manufacturers of
Scotland for assistance, which assistance they could not
have obtained except through the meclitlm of the bank of
England ?--It was so reptesented to us, and I believe it
was the fact.

Had you appliv.:ations from other considerable outports
of England?—From several of the principal towns of
England, but most of the applications were though the
gentlemen in London.
Were those applimtioris for the aid of the manufactu•
rers and mertthants that resided in those outports?—They
wen"

Is it not in the nature of what is called a panic, or, iu
other words, a great distress for money, in London, or in
any other commercial places, to draw capital into it from
other parts of the world, without 'reference to the imme-
diate operations of the Rink ?--It is certainly obvious,
that individuals who must partake of the effect of that
Valk, will look about them, and endeavour to raise the
ways and means where they can ; to apply it to myself, if
I saw there was likely to be a very great scarcity of money,
and I had a large sum in Amsterdam or Pad-, if I could,
I should draw that home.

Does not that only induce the English merchant to
draw his money home, but does it not also induce the
foreign merchant to send his money into the place where
money is much wanted ?—That admits of a question
again, because if the panic is so serious and continues, it is
possible the foreign merchant might say, my money is
better where it is, than to send it there.

Does tot that transfer backwards and forwards of capital
and of money from one country to another, take place by
the merchants of the country, without the intermediate in-
terference of any alteration in the trade and merchandise
taking place?—Yes.
Tien it is not true to say that an adverse state of foreign
exchanges advances the price of merchandise, and that
merchandise goes out for the purpose of bringing in money,
but there is an intermediate traffic and dealinl in money
itself, and in capital, which circulates backwards and for-
wards from one place to another, without any immediate
necessary reference to any corresponding traffic in goods ?
—No doubt of it.

Is it not in the nature of a panic to lower prices, and
therefore to arm advantageous means of investment to
those who have cipital, snd is it not from that circum-
stance that there are advantageous means of investment
offered, that capital comes to that country where the panic
exists ?—lf the panic do's not extend to any very serious
state of things I should think that would be the
case; but wb.-n we are speaking of a panic, such as the
one alluded to, I think if a foreigner were to be aware of
the situation in which the country was klaced, and conse-
quently every individual in it, he would pause a little
before he sent his money here. .

If a person having money io the country saw that the
price of Conso!s fell greatly below the average price, would
be not think that an advantageous period of investment,
and be likely to send his capital to London for the purpose
of making an investment ?—No doubt, if his confidence
was still buoyant.
You s:ty, that in
.1825 there was a general spirit of spe-
culition, which the Batik of England was very unwilling
to encourage ?-I(es ; I know that was my feeling to a
very great extent, anti I have no reason to doubt that it
was the opinion of the majority of the Directors.
Do you attribute that spirit of speculation at all to over
issue of paper on the part of country bankers?—No, I do
not.

TO BE CONTINUED.

BANK OF ENGLAND.