The Sun.
London, England, 1835-12-10 00:00:00

CORN LAWS.

The noble author of the second address to the
Landowners of England exposes with great clearness
the injustice and impolicy of the Corn Laws, which
he proves by a reference to facts, to have eniirely
failed in securing the objects which the landlords who
framed them had in view—namely, the raising of-
prices, and the keeping up of rents as the consequence.
He also shows in a manner that even a country gen-
tleman may understand, the beneficial influence which
a low price of corn has upon the industry of the
country at large. But perhaps the part of the Noble
Lard's argument which will come most home to the
bosoms of the landowners, is that in which he points
out the advantage which they themselves would derive
from cheap bread. Self interest is a powerful and
pretty general motive of action, and to do the land-
lords justice, they have not been behind their neigh_.
bours in affording illustrations of its efficacy. Let us
see then how Lord FITZWILLIA-M appeals to the
selfish principle
" Your expenditure, as I have formerly taken the liberty of
suggesting to you, is more extensively and more distinctly re-
solvable into the wages of labour and the price of corn, than
the expenditure of any other section of the community. A
landed gentleman of any given income (be it 5,0001. or 20,000/.
per annum), devotes a much larger ploeortion of it to objects,
the cost of w hich is directly influenced 'by that of corn, than a
person of the same income in any other class of society. You
are probably aware of this ; but, if you have any doubt of it,
just turn your thoughts to your own habits, and compare them
with those of other and different classes. Consider the estab-
lishment of a country gentleman ; • you will find that bread,
meat, beer, the keep of horses, of dogs, the wages of labourers,
the purchase of timber, and other materials for building, and
improvements upon land, whether in contemplation of amuse-
ment or of profit, consume a comparatively large portion of his
resources, while a comparatively small one is devoted to the
purchase of articles less affected in their cost by the price of
corns such as foreign and expensive wines, splendid fur-
niture, rare and costly books, prints, statues, picture?.
Turn again, to the establishment of a gentleman of equal
fortune, but not derived from land, whose residence may be
either in the metropolis, or at a villa in its outskirts; you will
find something totally different, and the amount of the heads
of expenditure absolutely reversed. You will find compara-
tively few servants, few horses, few, perhaps no, labourers,
little or nothing of that sort of hospitality which prevails,
and must prevail, more or less, in every country establish-
ment. As expenders of income, therefore, the landed gen-
tlemen would be more benefited by a reduction in the price of
provisions, especially of grain, than the other classes of equal
fortune. You would thus receive compensation to a very con-
siderable extent for the diminution of income which it might
occasion. I have here been admitting that we should expe-
rience a diminution of income, and I believe that we should,
though, at the same time, it cannot be denied, that, even in
our character of receivers, we should derive some compensation
from circumstances to which I have previously alluded. If a
reduction in the price of flour leads to an increased consump-
tion of meat, an immediate compensation is made for the fall
in the value of corn by a rise in that of cattle; or by what is,
perhaps, quite ns advantageous, a readier sale for it. It may
not be a full compensation, but it will be a very considerable
one ; and, as far as it does go, it will be without drawback or
alloy. This, however, is not the only mode in which compen-
sation will be made to the lauded and to the agricultural inte-
rests for any fall in price which might be occasioned by adopt-
ing a freer system of commerce in foreign grain.
This is an argunzentuin ad crumenam, which we
think the landlords cannot—which we are sure they
ought not—to slight. Of the same kind—equally just
and equally well put—is the following argument on
the effect of a high price of corn on the poor's rates.
The landholders have always urged the burden of
the poor's rates on the land as a reason for enhancing
the price of corn. What says Lord FITZWILLIAM,
one of the greatest landholders in England, to this
doctrine ?

" The pressure of the poor's-rates varies directly with the
price of corn ; and if you examine the Parliamentary Re-
turns, you will find that a high price of corn is immediately
followed by an increase in these rates. The effect is not •
exactly contemporaneous—it is the swell which rather follows
than accompanies the storm. Now, if there be any reason
(and to a certain extent I admit that there is, though it is
much exaggerated) in the complaint of the landowner, that he
has been extravagantly and unjustly burdened by the poor's_
rate, it follows that, this point of view, the landowner is,
above all other men, interested in having corn at a low price.
I am perfectly well aware that some of our achocates put for-
ward the poor's-rate as one of the grounds for the Corn Laws.
These persons either have not considered the subject, cr they
are most inconsequential arguers. The poor's-rate has ope-
rated eery unequally upon parishes. We- find it 2s. in the
pound in one parish, and 10s. in another, or it may vary from
Is. 61 per acre in one parish, to 12s. in another. In the
first of these cases, the parish has, certainly, no right to com-
plain, or plead its burdens, and we may dismiss it at once
from our thoughts. In the second, no doubt, it is very heavily
burdened, and has ample ground for complaint. Let us in-
quire into its circumstances, and into the oil iets likely to be
produced upon it by any given variation in the price of corn.
Whorever a parish has been heavily burdened with poor's-
rates, it may be presumed that a considerable portion of the
rate has been applied to the relief of able-bodied men. Now
this must arise either from mismanagement, or from a surplus
and unetoployed population, or from a combination of these
two causes. The last, as a mixed case, may be passed over.
The first case, viz., the- mismanaged parish, has not, strictly
speaking, any right to plead its burdens, because no party has
a right to plead his own laches in an issue to be tried with a
third and unoffending, party ; but if we allow such Pirisliio go

into court and plead its burden, is it not obvious that the rate
will vary directly with the price of flour ? It is perfectly well
known that the price of corn or flour is the basis upon which
the calculations for relief are made, and consequently a varia-
tion of ten, thirty, or fifty per cent. in the price of corn, will
occasion a corresponding variation in the amount of the rates.
This is remarkably exemplified by the vacillations in the pow's-
rate for Sussex in the years 1316, 17, 18, and 19. The mis-
managed parish, therefore, which is not over-peopled, has, as
far as the poor's-rate is concerned, an obvious interest, in
having corn cheap. The only remaining case is that of the
parish with en unemployed population. Let such parish he
entirely agricultural ; let its population be 1,000 ; let the
unemployed labourers amount to 30, or, at 5 to a family,
to a population of 150 ; let the allowance be 10s. a week
to each family, making an annual charge of 780/. Nf,W,
those persons who maintain that the poor's-rate in this ir.-
stance (and if it does not in this, it can in none) affords
an argument in favour of the Corn Laws, must advance one
of the two following hypotheses : They must either sup-
pose that the Corn Laws will raise the price of corn and
the rent of land, and thereby enable the landowner
to bear with greater facility this burden of 780 e per annum ;
or they must suppose that a rise in the price of corn will oc-
casion the eniploynn.nt of these thirty labourers. The ini-
quity of proceeding upon the former of these hypotheses is
too glaring to allow me to believe that there are many of us
who think it a sufficient reason for upholding the price of corn.
The latter, therefore, affords the only tenable argument ; and
I shall new proceed to examine how far it is reasonable to
hcpe that a demand for labour, so enlarged as to absorb the
superfluous supply, will ensue upon a rise in the price of corn.
If the parish consists of arable land, and is in cultivation, with
the rents paid up, reason Seems to point out that the occupiers
already manage it in a manner profitable both to themselves
and to the owners. It may consist of 4,000 acres, and the
population of 1,000 may lie thus distributed, viz., 100 young
farmers and non-agricultural inhabitants, 750 among employed
labourers, and the remaining 150 among unemployed labour-
ers. In this case, taking 5 persons to a family, the employ-
ment of the labourers will be at the rate of 1 to :26; acres,
a quantity of labour to which it is not probable that, in many
instances, any profitable addition can be made. In this case,
the regular payment of the rent (which is assumed as one of
the conditions) affords a presumption that the land is properly
cultivated, and therefore that there can be no increased de-
mand far labour. Let us, 'therefore, vary this condition, and
assume that the rent has not been paid, but that the tenants
are in arrear. The arrear of tenantry (I am speaking of a
number of tenants, not of an individual') evil only arise from
the circumstance toe rent and the value of the produce riot
bearing a due proportion to each other. Assuming the rent
to be any given sunn and to have been accurately calculated
at the peried of its-being fixed, the disturbance of the balance
roust have arisen either from the value or the quantity of the
produce liming fallen off. If the value of the produce has
fallen off, it is obvioui that a deficiency in the employment of
labourers cannot be inferred, and that the way to restore the
balance is te reduce the rent. If the queetity has fallen off,
. it may be inferred that the land is not equally well cultivated,
and that the non-employment of the labourers is the cause
thereof.
Let us now see what cen have been the inducement to a
farmer to diminish the labour he bestows upon the land, and,
consequently, the quantity of his produce. Necessity, it may
be said. It may be said that he diminishes the labour because-
lae alioril to pq
for it. But if his circumstances make
it. necessary that be F hould diminish his expenditure, why
should he diminish it in labour which is productive, rather than
in some other item which is not productive ? Among the non-
productive items are rent and taxes. Why, then, should be
not diminish either the rent or the taxes instead of the labour ?
The answer is that, in the one case, the Government, in the
other, the landlord, will not consent. We are thus brought
to the conclusion that, even in the case of the quantity of the
produce havieg fallen off, its diminution is to be traced to an
excess either of taxation or of rent. Assarah:g, then (though
I do not admit it), that taxation cannot be reduced, it is found
that the excess of rent obliges the tenant to economise by a
redo, thou of labour, and that tl:e redaction of labour leads to a
• dimieutien of produce.
• We are sorry we have not space for more extracts
from this admirable little pamphlet. We cannot tot.
strongly recommend. it to every one who swishes
thoroughly to understand the question of she orn
Laws, and at the same time to spare himself
trouble of much reading. To the landowner ancl the
farmer it is truly an invaluable manual.
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