The Sun.
London, England, 1866-08-24 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, FRIDAY EVENING, AUGUST 24, 1866.

half-year ought to have been more, and, that not
being the case, he believed the fares had been re-
duced below the proper standard. (Hear.) They
had reduced the fares to Booterstown 50 per cent.
since the line came into their hands ; to Blackrock
about 35 per cent., and to Monkstown about 25 per
cent. They had issued about 158 different kinds of
season tickets, and, owing to some unfair play, re-
quired modification and correction. They might
have to raise the fares a little to compensate them
to some extent for the great reductions they had
made in fares to some places.
The Hon. G. HANDCOCK, seconded the motion
for the adoption of the report, which, after some op-
position from Sir G. Preston, in respect of proposed
extension lines, and against raising money on prefer-
ence shares, was carried. The dividends on the 5 per
cent. and 6 per cent. preference stocks and shares
were declared, and at the rate of 4 per cent. per
annum on the ordinary stock for the past half-year)
payable on the 31st of October.

After some other formal business, the proceedings
;erminated with a vote of thanks to the chairman.

NEWQUAY AND CORNWALL JUNCTION.
The half-yearly meeting of this company was
held at St. Austell on Tuesday. The chairman,
Mr. W. L. Martin, announced that nearly a mile
and a half of permanent way had been laid, and
that negotiations were in progress for the purchase,
on satisfactory terms, of all the land required for
the construction of the railway.
The report was unanimously adopted.

; of it was in Bohemia—a part of it was in Italy, but
so small and so remote that it could not act as a
• reserve in time to support the larger portion in
Germany. Austria was, indeed, "in the camp of
Benedek," and she emerged from the wreck and
crash of Koniggratz only to find that the sceptre
of the German Caesars had been stricken from her
hand, and that, at home or abroad, she could find no
hope of regaining her Imperial glory. In Bohemia
and Moravia she had no troops, and no means of
resistance to an enemy could be found in a mere
peasantry of small cottiers and agricultural
labourers. Hungary made no response to the cry
of her King; there was no " insurrectio," no fervent
promise, " Moriamur pro rege nostro." The Sclaves
only saw in Austria's weakness Sclavonia's oppor-
tunity, and, of all the hosts furnished by forced
military service, not 150,000 men could be as-
sembled in the front of Vienna for Benedek to fall
back upon, or for the Archduke to march forward
to unite with the Army of the North till it was too
late, and the enemy had established themselves in
the Marchfeld, within sight of the capital. That was
of course no fair representation of the military
strength of Austria ; it only represented her want of
system and of preparation. Could the Prussians have
been delayed a few weeks longer Austria might have
put 500,000 men between them and the Danube,
with a reserve of 250,000 more, and further levies
could have been made to furnish her with a second
reserve of at least 250,000 men by the end of
August. But hypothetical warfare can never be suc-
cessful, and in seven weeks, just as Austria was con-
scious that she had been very late and very much
mistaken, the Prussians had gained their point, and
it will need more strength than she possesses and the
aid of alliances not now tangible to enable her in
some future campaign to reverse the degree of
July 3. Benedek has been censured for taking up
a position on the right, instead of the left bank of
the Elbe ; but, in fact, he could not help himself as
soon as he had failed to clime the passes at Nachod
and Trautenau, and had his left exposed by the de-
feat of Clam Gallas and the Saxons at Gitschin.
He could not possibly get over the Elbe in time to
get into position before an attack could have
been made on him, and he might have been
caught en flagrant delit in the act of cross-
ing the river. Besides, had he even suc-
ceeded in doing so he must have lost his rail-
way communications which ran on the right bank
of the river, and in that case his army would have
been left without supplies. He could not cover the
whole of the ground between Josephstadt and Ko-
niggratz, and he therefore selected the line of the
Bistriz, and concentrated his army on the latter
fortress as the least of the evils to which his failures
had conduced. It is said that as soon as the Prus-
sians had fairly entered Bohemia Baron Edelsheim
asked leave to take all the light cavalry and dash
into Lower Silesia, so as to cut off their communi-
cations, but Benedek would not give his consent,
and the Austrian horse had no part in the great
conflict except the ungrateful task of covering a re-

treat which it saved from becoming a rout.- The
result of the defeat of the Prussians would have
been by no means so decisive against them as was
that of the Austrians, unless the cavalry of the lat-
ter could have done more with their retreating
columns than the Prussians did at Koniggratz, and
that is not likely, for not only would the Prussian
horse behave with courage, but the formation of the
country and the Bistriz valley and river would have
offered great obstacles. Then, the Prussians had
great reserves ; they would not have fallen to pieces
in one battle, and the only grave consequences might
have been the increase of the discontent with the
war at Berlin and iu other places, which was trans-
ferred to Vienna, and the vigour imparted to Aus-
tria and her allies in- their campaign.
The more we know of the battle of Koniggratz,
the more extraordinary it appears to be in its ante-
cedents, its incidents, and its results. The van-
quished were beaten before they fought. The battle
lasted nearly nine hours, and was characterised by
a most liberal use of rifled artillery on both sides,
and of a novel and terrible weapon by one of the
combatants. Before the news of the day was well
considered by Europe, Austria, which had been con-
sidered one of the greatest military Powers in the
world, hastened to surrender her Venetian provinces
and to con fess that she was vanquished. If we take
(190,000 by 235,000 425,000, including the the number engaged in the battle on both sides at
re-
serves and regiments not in the fight, and the bag-
gage and rear guards, and accept the Prussian
statement of the losses as accurate, it would seem to
have been a protracted, but by no means a san-
guinary encounter. Prussians put the total loss at
50,000—viz., 40,000 Austrians and 10,000 Prus-
sians ; but in the former number is included a batch
of 18,000 prisoners, which ought to be deducted
from the number, so as to leave only the killed and
wounded. Then there are only 30,000 to be reckoned
as the actual loss, for the Prussians had some pri-
soners in the early part of the day. The whole loss
on the number engaged, therefore, was on the side
of the Prussians 1 in 23, and on the Austrians 1 in
9, in round numbers ; if we add the prisoners it be-
comes, however, nearly 1 in 5 of the Austrians.
Now, at the Alma we had more than 1 in 10 killed
or wounded on the number engaged in an action of
three hours' duration, and at Inkermann our loss
was 1 in 5, and far more if we take the number ac-
tually fighting. The only way of accounting for
such a small proportion, and, as I believe, the true
way, is that artillery was largely used for a long
time on both sides, and that rifled or long-range ar-
tillery is far less destructivethan the old smooth-bore
in many cases, and particularly against masses of
troops. It may he that our own Armstrong field
artillery is far superior to either the Prussian or the
Austrian rifled guns, and I think it is, but it is still
questionable if artillery can be brought near enough
whether rifled guns are as good as smooth-bore.
There can be no doubt concerning the very demoralis-
ing effect of fire on reserves and troops not engaged
who are reached by shot and shell ploughing through
them from guns so far distant that the smoke is
scarcely visible ; but at the same time it must be re-
membered that nothing is so feeble as an artillery
which, after a time, loses its terrors, and that nothing
so much emboldens troops as to perceive the enemycan-
not hurt them. And in the significant, but perfectly
reliable, statement which follows let our authori-

ties at home find something to think about. It is

The Austrians one and all declare that the

Prussian shells scarcely did any harm, because

gratz after the battle. A large party retreated to
Pardubitz along the right bank of the Elbe ; the
rest crossed by the bridges below the city, and re-
treated by Hohenmauth. Neither could have got
away had the Prussians possessed an overwhelming
cavalry or had the Austrians had none.