The Sun.
London, England, 1866-12-11 00:00:00

of cavalry endeavoured to force a magistrate to
accompany him anddirect him in his operations. The
magistrate refused, and the officer declined to act.
The result was disastrous, and the question arose
whether the magistrate was justified in the course
he pursued, and the officer in that he had taken.
A judge pronounced a very distinct opinion on the
conduct of the magistrate. He held that it was not
the business of such a functionary to ride at the head
of a squadron of cavalry, and that he was justified
in declining to do so. He was not armed or trained
to the use of arms, or to the evolutions of cavalry,
and therefore he could not fairly be expected to
place himself in a post of danger for which his
training had not fitted him. But then arises the
question--How, in his absence, was the officer to
act? If a body of troops be called in for the pro-
tection of a town, and the town be plundered in the
presence of these troops, the officer in command
must suffer. Generally, in these cases, the magis-
trate gets out of the way, and leaves the com-
mander to act at his discretion. The unfortunate
man, ignorant of the law, knows that he works
with a halter round his neck, and, in proportion to
his ignorance, his fears are increased of acting con-
trary to the spirit of our statutes. The indecision
thus produced gives an impetus to the riots, and
leads eventually to disastrous consequences. A
shower of brickbats exasperates the soldiers, and
the impunity with which the missiles are hurled
_ _ _

emboldens the mob. The troops are eventually
driven to act in self-defence, and the bloodshed is in-
creased by the feelings of anger, excited by the an-
noyances to which they had been subjected. The
system at present in vogue is to throw all the diffi-
culties and responsibility on the officer in command.
It is necessary, therefore, to define more clearly
what his conduct should be in the face of rioters,
both in justice to himself and in justice to the lives
and property he is ordered to protect. The
mode of street fighting and the plan of direct-
ing the fire is clearly enough laid down.
But these are mere military details, which
cannot help the officer in arriving at his de-
cision when he is to act in earnest, or if the circum-
stances warrant him in acting at all. When two
mobs are opposed to each other, as was lately the
case in Belfast, the difficulties of the soldier are, if

possible, increased. The magistrate is pretty sure
to be a partisan, and the officer can scarcely act
without being denounced by some one, most pro-
bably by everybody. Thus in the case of the New
Orleans massacre, had the troops of the United
States been compelled to fight, it would have been
impossible for them to act without breaking the
law: On the one side they would have been opposed
to the civic authorities and the police; on the other,
to loyal citizens who assumed to be assembled in a
State Convention. Happily for the officers of the
United States army they are not trammelled by the
absurd regulations which bind the British army,
and are allowed greater licence, to take the steps
dictated by common sense to preserve the peace.
In England so great is the horror of military in-
terference that nothing but very distinct regula-
. _ _

tions, which an officer could show he had not in-
fringed, would avail to save him inthe to suppression
of ariot. But such regulations have now no existence,
and in justice to military men it is but fair that

they should be embodied without delay. We may
therefore congratulate the British army in the for-
mation of this Committee, and it is to be Loped that
they may be authorised to extend their inquiry to
the whole procedure of military law.—Anglo-
Amerian Times.

SPIRIT OP THE PUBLIC JOURNALS,

TntEs.—lt is not very surprising to find that the
story of the Simla Court-Martial, though now
nearly forgotten in this country, is still the subject
of hot debate in India. There,' at any rate,
Sir William Mansfield is not without supporters,
and it is even said that some reaction in his favour
has occurred since the termination of the case. We
shall probably hear more of the matter before long,
and, indeed, the decision of the Home Government
on the quea ion, whatever it may be, will necessa-
rily reopen the controversy and revive the interest
of the public. We are bound, however, to say that,
so far as we can discover, nothing has appeared in
the shape either of argument or fact to affect the
conclusion which was formed by impartial judges
on the issue, of the trial. Captain Jervis, being
controller of Sir William Mansfield's household, was
charged by him with peculation and embezzlement.
Under this imputation be behaved with disobedience
and insubordination towards his military superior,
and in the end was brought to a Court-martial on
the double charge of breach of ho'nesty and bleach
of discipline. lie was acquitted on the first of
these indictments, but convicted on the second.
The Cotirt sentenced him, necessarily, according to
military law, to be dismissed the service ; hut at
the same time recommended him to mercy. This
recommendation, however, Sir William Mansfield,
who united the capacities of prosecutor and Com-
mander-in-Chief in his own person, refused to ac-
cept. He confirmed the septence instead of re-
mitting it, and thus virtually punished on his own
sole authority, in opposition to the advice of a
Court of Justice, an offender who had been pro-
voked to offence by his own proceedings. The
Court-martial, when it acquitted Captain Jervis of
the dishonesty imputed to him by Sir William,
evidently considered that the imputation furnished
some excuse for the professional misbehaviour of
Which he had really been guilty. Sir William
would not adopt this opinion, but acted as if his
original impressions in the case remaiced unaffected
by the finding of the court. These being the facts,
the opinion of the public in this country was soon
pronounced. It was felt that if a court of justice,
after weeks of patient inquiry, could be persuaded
of Captain Jervis's innocence on the criminal
charges, Sir William himself might have arrived at
that opinion personally by judicious management,
and so have averted a public scandal. It was also
felt that, under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, Sir William should undoubtedly have sup-
pressed his own private persuasions, whatever they
might be, in deference to the judgment of a com-
petent tribunal. He could, beyond doubt, confirm
or annul the sentence at his discretion, and he had
a right to that independent authority which his office
conferred upon him. But the rejection of the
Court's advice—a somewhat harsh and invidious
course in any case—was open to far graver miscon-
structionin the case before him. He was punishing
not only an offence committed against himself, but
an offence which would not have been committed
except for a mistake of his own ; and the proceed-
ing, therefore, was ill-judged and calculated to
bring obloquy upon himself and do harm to the
service. Both these results, in fact, have been ac-
tually experienced ; and yet Sir William's friends
are disposed to defend him, and assert that the
course which he adopted was more honourable than
that which he declined. We are assured by these
advocates that the idea of a young and defenceless
prisoner, overpowered by the influence and authority
of an irresistible accuser, is altogether mistaken.
They say that the aide-de-camp had many more
friends in Indian society than the commander-in •
chief, and that far greater influence was employed in
his behalf than was arrayed against him. They argue,
in fact, that the whole trial from beginning to end
proceeded under conditions favourable to the prisoner,
and that the final verdict, although it did not actually
go so far as an " honourable" acquittal, was re-
garded as against the evidence of those whose duty
it was to revise it. They say that the prisoner
took advantage of all kinds of expedients to ob-
scure the truth, and yet scarcely succeeded, and
they arrive by such reasoning at the natural con-
clusion that the Commander-in-Chief, being in-
vested with authority to correct erroneous verdicts,
was justified in doing so on this occasion, and ought,
in short, to be respected for so doing instead of de-
clining, for the sake of peace and quietness, such an
exercise of his lawful responsibility. We cannot see
that in all this there is one single point of tenable
ground. The decision of a Court is nothing if it is
not decisive. We cannot enter into any questions
about the narrowness of the majority by which an
acquittal was pronounced, or the true purport of
the evidence, or the influences under which the pro-
ceedings were conducted. For that matter, indeed,
the complaints are quite as loud on the other side,
and the printed reports of the trial contain enough
to convince us that if the Court allowed some
ambiguous declaration ou the part of the prisoner,
it listened to remarks quite as questionable on the
part of the prosecution. In such cases, the only
thing to be taken and considered is the net result.
The Court, after hearing all that could possibly be
said on either side, did acquit Captain Jervis, and
if it did not acquit him " honourably" inset terms,
.it did, at any rate, think him so far injured or
justified as to recommend him to mercy. That
simple fact is all that the public can consider, and
all that Sir William Mansfield ought to have con-
sidered. If, indeed, he had been personally un-
concerned in the case, it might, possibly enough,
have been wise in him to overrule a decision to
which he saw strong objections. As it was, such a
course was sure to assume so bad a complexion