The Sun.
London, England, 1835-01-12 00:00:00

more widely as the growing settlement§ 6T thh country may
require.
'To a measure so important to the Government, and so just
to but' Constituents, who ask no exclusive privileges for them-
tir€ htit fo concede them to others, I ear-
nestly recommend the serioug atiefitieti Of.Pontfres§.
The importance of the Post Office Departttitiiit, Mid the
magnitude to which it has grown, both in its revenues and its
operations, seem to demand its re-organization by law. The
whole of its receipts and disbursements have hitherto been
left entirely to executive eCtitrOttl and individual discretion.
The principle is as sound in relation to this As to any other
department of the Government, that as little discretion should
be eonfided to the executive officer who controuls it as is com-
patible With its efficiency. It is, therefore, earnestly recom-
mended that it be organised with an auditor and treasurer of
its own, appointed by the President and Senate, who shall be
aii LI fit the Treasury. Department.
, .
Your attention is agaiii it:l/lent:fully invited to the defect
which exists in the judicial system of the Unheti states. No-
thing can be more desirable than the uniform operation of the
Federal Judiciary throughout the several States, all of which,
standing tin the same footing as members of the Union, have
equal rights to the advantage§ and benefits resulting from its
laws. This object is not attained by the judicial acts now in
force, because they leave one-fourth of the States without
Circuit Courts.
It is undoubtedly the duty of Congress to place all the States
on the same footing in this respect, either by the creation of
an additional number of associate Judges, or by an enlarge-
ment of the Circuits assigned to those already appointed, so as
to include the new States. Whatever may be the difficulty in
a proper organization of the judicial system so as to secure its
efficiency and uniformity in all parts of the Union, and at the
same time to avoid such an increase of Judges as would en-
dumber the supreme appellate tribunal, it should not be allowed
to weigh against the great Ifijustine which the present opera-
tion of the system produces.
I trust that I may be also pardoned for renewing the reran.
mendation I have so often submitted to your attention, in regard
to the mode of electing the President and Vice President of
the United States. All the reflection I have been able to be-
stow upon the subject increases my conviction that the best
interests of the country will be promoted by the adoption of
some plan which will secure in all contingencies that impor-
tant right of sovereignty to the direct control of the people.
Could this be attained, and the terms of those bfficers be

limited to a single period of either four or six years, I think
our liberties would possess an additional safeguard.
At your last Session I called the attention of Congress to
the destruction of the public building occupied by the Trea-
sury Department. As the public interest requires that another
building should be erected with as little delay as possible it is
hoped that the means will be seasonably provided, and that
they will be ample enough to authorise such an enlargement
and, improvement in the plan of the building as will more ef-
fectually accommodate the public officers, and secure the pub-
lic documents deposited in it from the casualties of fire.
I have not been able to satisfy myself that the Bill entitled

" An Act to improve the navigation of the Wabash river,"
which was sent to me at the close of your last Session, ought
to pass, and I have therefore withheld from it my approval, and
now return it to the Senate, the body in which it originated.
. . .

. ,
There can be no question connected with the administration
of public affairs more important or more difficult to be satisfac-
torily dealt with than-that which relates to therightful authority
and proper action of the Federal Governments upon the sub-
ject of internal improvements. To inherent embarrassments
have been added others resulting from the course of our legis-
lation concerning it.
I have heretofore communicated freely with Congress upon
this subject, and in adverting to it again I cannot refrain from
expressing my increased conviction of its extreme importance,
as well in regard to its bearing upon the maintenance of the
Constitution and the prudent management of the public reve-
nue, as on account of its disturbing effect upon the harmony of
the Union.

We are in no danger from violations of the Constitution by
which encrochments are made upon the rights of the citizen.
The sentence of condemnation long since pronounced_by the

American people upon acts of that character will, I 'doubt
not, continue to' prove as salutary in its effects as it is irrever-
sible in its nature. But against the dangers of unconstitu-
tional acts, which, instead of menacing the vengeance of offended
authority, proffer local advantages, and bring in their train
the patronage of the Government, we are, I fear, not safe.
To suppose that because our Government has been instituted
for the benefit of the people it must therefore have the power
to do whatever may seem to conduce to the public good is an
error into which even honest minds are too apt to fall. In
yielding themselves to this fallacy they overlook the great
considerations in which the Federal Constitution was founded.
They forget that in consequence of the conceded diversities in
the interest and condition of the different States, it was fore-
seen at the period of its adoption that although a particular
measure of the Government might be beneficial and proper in
one State it might be the reverse in another ; that it was for
this reason the States would not consent to make a grant to
the Federal Government of the general and usual powers of

Government, but of such only as were specifically enumerated,
and the probable effects of which they could, as they thought,
safely anticipate; and they forget also the paramount obliga-
tion upon all to abide by the compact then so solemnly, and, as
it was hoped, so firmly, established.
In addition to the dangers to the Constitution springing
from the sources I have stated there has been one which was,
perhaps, greater than all. I allude to the materials which
this subject has afforded for sinister appeals to selfish feelings,
and the opinion heretofore so extensively entertained of its
adaptation to the purposes of his personal ambition. With
such stimulants it is not surprising that the acts and pretensions
of the Federal ,Government in this behalf should sometimes
have been carried to an alarming extent. The questions which
have arisen upon this subject have related-
-Ist. To the power of making internal improvements within the
limits of a State, with the right of territorial jurisdiction sufficient
at least for their preservation and use.
2d. To the right of appropriating money in aid of such wbrks
when carried on by a State or by a company in virtue of State au-
thority, surrendering the claim ofjurisdiction ; and
3d. To the propriety of appropriation for improvements of a
particular class, viz., for lighthouses, beacons, buoys, public piers,
and for the removal of sand bars, sawyers, and other temporary and
partial impediments in our navigable rivers and harbours.
The claims of power for the general Government upon each
of these points certainly present matter of the deepest interest.
The first is, however, of much the greatest importance, inas-
much as, in addition to the dangers of unequal and improvi-
dent expenditures of public moneys common to all, there is
superadded to that the conflicting jurisdictions of the respective
Governments. Federal jurisdiction, at least to the extent I
have stated, has been justly regarded by its advocates as neces-
sarily appurtenant to the power in question, if that exists by
the Constitution. That the most injurious conflicts would
unavoidably arise between the respective jurisdiction of the
State and Federal Governments in absence of a constitutional
provision marking out their respective boundaries cannot be
doubted. The local advantages to be obtained would induce
the States to overlook in the beginning the dangers and diffi-
culties to which they might ultimately be exposed. The
powers exercised by the Federal Government would soon be
regarded with jealousy by the State authorities; and, origi-
nating as they must from implication or assumption, it would be
impossible to affix the certain and safe limits. Opportunities
and temptations to the assumption of power incompatible with
State sovereignty would be increased, and those barriers which
resist the tendency of our system towards consolidation greatly
weakened. The officers and agents of the general Govern-
ment might not always have the discretion to abstain from in-
termeddling with State concerns ; and if they did, they would
not always escape the suspicion of having done so. Collisions
and consequent irritations would spring up, that harmony which
should ever exist between the general Government and each
Member of the Confederacy would be frequently interrupted,
a spirit of contention would be engendered, and the dangers
of division greatly multiplied.
Yet we all know that, notwithstanding these grave objec-

tions, this dangerous doctrine was at one—time apparently Pro-
ceeding to its final establishment with fearful rapidity. The
desire to embark the Federal Government in works of inter-
nal improvement prevailed in the highest degree during the
first Session of the first Congress that I had the honour. to
meet in my present situation. When the Bill authorising a
subscription on the part of the United States for stock in the
Maysville and Lexington Turnpike Companies, passed the
two Houses, there had been reported by the Committees of
Internal Improvement Bills, containing appropriations for
such objects, exclusive of those for the Cumberland-road,
and for harbours and lighthouses, to the amount of about one
hundred and six millions of dollars. In this amount was in-
cluded authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to sub-
scribe for the stock of different companies to a great extent,
and the residue was principally for the direct construction
of roads by this Government. In addition to these projects,
which had been presented to the two Houses, under the sanc-
tion and recommendation of their respective Committees on
Internal Improvements, there were then still pending before
the Committees, and in memorials to Congress presented but
not referred, different projects for works of a similar charac-
ter, the expense of which cannot be estimated with certainty,
but must have exceeded one hundred millions of dollars.
Regarding the Bill authorising a subscription to the stock
of the Maysville and Lexington Turnpike Company as the
entering wedge of a system which, however weak at first,
might soon become strong enough to rive the bands of the
Union asunder, and believing that if its passage was acquiesced
in by the Executive and the people, there would no longer be
any limitation upon the authority of the General Government in
respect to the appropriation of money for such objects, I deemed
it an imperative duty to withhold from it the Executive appro-
val. Although from the obviously local character of that
work, I might well have contented myself with a refusal to
approve the Bill upon that ground, yet, sensible of the vital
importance of the subject, and anxious that my views and opi-
nions in regard to the whole matter should be fully understood
by Congress and my constituents, I felt it my duty to go fur-
ther. I therefore embraced that early occasion to apprise
Congress that in my opinion the Constitution did not confer
upon it the power to authorise the construction of ordinary
roads and canals within the limits of a State, and to say re-
spectfully that no Bill admitting such a power could receive
my official sanction. I did so in the confident expectation
that the speedy settlement of the public mind upon the whole
subject would be greatly facilitated by the difference between
the two Houses and myself, and that the harmonious action of
the several departments of the Federal Government in regard
to it would be ultimately secured.
So far, at least, as it regards this branch of the subject, my
best hopes have been realized. Nearly four years have
elapsed, and several sessions of Congress have intervened,
and no attempt, within my recollection, has been made to in-
duce Congress to exercise this power. The applications for
the construction of roads and canals, which were formerly mul-
tiplied upon your files, are no longer presented; and we have
good reason to infer that the current of public sentiment has