The Sun.
London, England, 1869-11-05 00:00:00

BORROWING:POWERS OF BUILDING

SOCIETIES.

On Thursday a case came before the; Lord Chancellor and
Lord Justice Giffard which called for the decision of a ques-
tion having a material bearing on the proceedings and inte,
rests of building societies. It took the form of an appeal or
demurrer from a decision of Vice-Chancellor Malins in the
suit of " Laing v. Reed," but the point actually raised
was whether a rule of the Northern Counties Per-
manent Building Society, of which the defendant was
a trustee, authorising: the borrowing of money to the
extent of two-thirds of the subscriptions for the purpose
of making advances to the members, was legal. The court
gave judgment to the effect that the borrowing of money for
the purpose of carrying on the legitimate objects of
a building society was by no means contrary to the
provisions of the Act under which such societies were
formed, especially where, as in this case, the sums so
raised were carefully kept within the amount secured
by the mortgages of the society. The borrowing of
money from persons other than the members in this case
was simply adopted as a mode of conducting business in
order to accommodate members desiring advances; and
judgment would therefore be given for the defendant.

THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE ORAILIVAY

COMPEXSA TIOE.

In the Court of Queen's Bench, on Thursday, Mr.
Vernon Harcourt, Q.C., moved for a rule in the case of

"Faire v. the London and North-Western Railway Com-
pany," to set aside the verdict of the jury on the ground
of excessive damages. In a recent railway collision the
plaintiff, a young clergyman, sustained severe injuries to
his spine, which, it appeared from the evidence,
would unfit him for the proper performance of
his duties during the remainder of his life-
time. The jury returned a verdict for £5,000 damages.
They took into account the changes likely to accrue by the
destruction of health and inconvenience likely to increase.
Mr, Harcourt contended that if this course were to become
a principle of law, railway companies would be unable to
meet the claims against them.
The Lord Chief Justice said the object of Mr. Harcourt,
as stated by him, was that there might be an
entire change of the whole course of proceedings as now
established by law, and some new principle of com-
pensation introduced. It was true that in some cases the
amount of damages might be productive of inconvenience,
but in most instances he was satisfied in trusting to the
common sense of juries, and, therefore, he saw no reason
for reconstructing an established law on the question. If
a company, railway, or otherwise, undertook to convey a
passenger, and that passenger sustained an injury, he was
entitled to bring an action for damages; and in con-
sidering the amount of compensation, the jury
were to look at two things : first, the amount of damage
sustained by the passenger being incapacitated from pur-
suing his usual avocation ; and, secondly, the injury
sustained to his health by reason of his physical capacity
being impaired. This involved a question not only as to
the amount of present income, but the probability of his
earning a larger income in the future. Mr. Harcourt com-
plained that the latter element had been imported into the
case. Now, it would not be right to grant a rule on
purely speculative views, but it would be monstrously
unsound if, where a man at a certain age had fair views of
increasing his income in the future, and had been pre-
cluded from so doing by the negligence of the railway
company, this should be excluded from the consideration
of the jury. He did not see, under the circumstances of
of this case, that the damages of £5,000 were excessive, and
the rule must be refused.