The Sun.
London, England, 1856-04-30 00:00:00

THE FIREWORKS.

In answer to a question from Lord EiOTHAM,
The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said he
had no estimate for the expense of the fireworks. The
expense for the fireworks in London would not exceed
6,000/., and he did not think it worth an estimate. If,
however, the house wished it he weuld produce one.
SLEEPING STATUTES.

Mr. L. KING obtained leave to bring in a bill to re•
peal certain stontes which are sleeping and not in use.
DEPOPULATION OF IRISH RURAL
DISTRICTS.

Mr. IPMAHON called attention to the subject•mat-
ter of a petition from certain inhabitants of the parishes
of Killiegn,t and Ballynakill, in the county of Galway,
present :d last year, and moved for the appointment of
a select committee to investigate its allegations. He
stated the particulars of the ease, which related to the
" clearance" by an Irish landlord of the tenantry on an
estate which he had purcba-ed in the Encumbered
Estates Court. His object, he said, was to devise means
for restraining the depopulation of rural districts in Ire-
la-A, and he suggested some expedients by which this
abuse of a right might be checked.
The motion was seconded by Mr. BELLEW, who
strongly u? ged the impolicy, as well as cruelty, of
these wholesale clearances, and called upon the Go-
vernment, in the name of humanity, td grant this
inquiry.

Lord PALMERSTON admitted that the labouring
population of Ireland was not greater than its wants re-
quired, though it was injudiciously distributed ; but,
although there were many parts of the country in which
the accumulation of labour was greater than was eom•
patible with the interests of the tenantry themselves, he
thought those who exercised the right belonging to them
of clearing their estates did not act consistently with
the public interests. Considering, however, that the
house was is the middle of the discussion of an im-
portant question, he suggested that this subject should
be deferred to another opportunity, and he moved that
the house do pass to the orders of the day.
Mr. DISRAELI concurred in this course, and, after
some further discussion, this amendment was agreed to.
The \Vhicwood Forest Bill passed through committee.
The Bankers' Compositions Bib was read a third
time and passed. _

The motion that the house proceed to the orders of the
day was then agreed to. .
TFIE FALL OF KARS.—ADJOURNED DE3ATE.

The debate was resumed by
Mr. .1. G. PHILLIMORE, who regretted that the hon.
member for Enniskillen had not chosen a more fit opportu,
nity for the display of his abilities. The hon. and learned
gentleman ought to recollect that although it, was in allow-
able artifice for an advocate to hide all parts of the case that
made against him, such conduct was not dmissible in a
senator. The hon. and learned gentleman bid given a vote
on the subject of the Turkish loan which had more influ-
ence on the fate of Kars than any rhetorical display. It
mattered little that any hon. gentleman should make a pa-
triotic speech, but it mattered much that no vote should
be given in which _Russia could rejoice. The hon. and
learned gentleman had entered into considerable detail with
regard to the conduct of Lord Clarendon. He would not
follow him through all, but he would endeavour to show
that the charges against Lor.l Clarendon were founded on
enti,e misropresentation. The first topic insisted on by
the hon. and learned gentleman was that General Williams
was sent out without any ostensible character. He was
sent out with all the ostensible character the English Go-
vernment could give, and Lord Clarendon left no effort un-
exhausted to obtain from the Turkish Government the re-
cognition necessary to his efficiency ; if that had been ob-
tained the calamities might have been averted. The hon.
and learned gentleman said that as far as he understood
the quarrel between the ambassador and Col. Williams was
at an end in March, and that they then had come to an
un lerstanding. Even if such was the case, it would have
been mach to Lord Clarendon's credit that he had succeeded
iu reconciling two such important public servants. Lord
Clarendon saw that the quarrel existed, and did all in his
power to reconcile there ; but surely that could be no
charge against him. The hon. gentleman had complained
of the uk() administered to Lord Stratford. What did
the hon. gentleman mean ? Did he wish to have Lord
Stratford re •alle,l or not ? Lord Stratford's abilities were
great ; his knowledge of the people arid the language was
unrivalled ; he hold the thread of affairs in his hand, and
no NH/lister in his senses would have attempted to recall
him ; but it was their duty to show him that the Govern.
ment was dissatisfied with his apathy, and his hostility to
General Williams. Lord Clarendon did so. The hon. and
learned gentleman had referred to the question of the
troops ; surely no man would have undertaken the respon-
sipility of recalling a single soldier from Sebastopal to
send to Asia Minor ; no Minister would have imperilled
the main object of tha allies. The hon.and learned gentle-
man said Lord Clarendon sent three men and a doctor.

... ...,.
What... did those three men and the doctor do? Did they
not make an heroic resistance ? It was much to the credit
of Lord Clarendon that he should have chosen such a man
as General Williams. History showed how much a single
man had done : one man saved Syracuse—one man saved
Carthage. It was impossible to send numerical assistance,
so moral support was sent. The names of Lake and Tees-
dale would never be forgotten so long as nervic energy was
entitled to respect: The hon. and learned gentleman had
next referred to Lord Panmure ; the hon. and learned gen-
tleman had misquoted him and represented him to have
said that the cause was desperate. Lord Panrnure said
no such thing ' • on the 11th of July he wrote :—" More-
over, from all the information which has reached me, I
have every reason to believe the army of Batoum to be in
a deplorable state. I know the contingent to be scarcely
organised • of the Bulgarian troops you can have no know-
ledge, endl pieaume that Beatson's gorge" are as little re-
duced to control and discipline as your own troops. In
short. I am assured that it would be madness to attempt
to suceot- Brigadier Gen. Williams in this way." That
was very different from saying that General Williams's
situation was desperate. The noble lord the member for
Colchester (Lord J. Manners) blamed Lord Clarendon for
having encouraged General Williams to a desperate resist-
ance, but the hon. and learned member for Enniskillen
said, distinction to the Divan, and if Lord Panruure had
filled the office of Seraskier, and if Lord Clarendon had
held that department which is filled by the Turkish Secre-
tary for Foreign Affairs, the hon. and learned gentleman's
speech would have- been perfectly relevant to the question;
but it appears to me that for the most part it is wholly ir-
relevant as directed against her Majesty's Government.
The only way in which he was able to establish that the
Government is responsible for the proceedings at the siege
of Kars is by adverting the appointment of Gen. Williams
as British commissioner to the Turkish army. Now, sir,
much criticism was made by him upon the powers of Gon.
Williams; it was said they were indefinite —it was said
they were insufficient—it was said her Majesty's Govern
went did not obtain from the Gov es nment of the Porte
sufficient authority to enable him to carry his views into
effect. It may he said that the Government erred in at-
tempting to interfere in the affairs of the siege of Kars.
They undertook the task, however, because they believed
the great importance attached to that operation ; and in
order to do all that was in their power to assist the Turk-
ish Government in the defence of that fortress they de-
puted Gen. Williams to b he British commissioner. He
biwas a man about whose a ty, about, whose energy, about
whose military capacity there were not two opinions given
or existing in the house str amongst any body of English-
men who had either read this blue book or the various
publications in which his conduct had been illustrated. No
doubt can exist as to the assistance sent to him ' • it was no
blame at all to the Government of her Majesty that they
were unable to place him in the position which he ought
to have occupied, from the circumstance of their being
unable to arm him with autherity'which could only ema-
nate from the Porte. The French Government had the
same power of deputing a commissioner to accompany
General Williams, but they did not adopt that course.
They did not attach so much importance as the Go-
vernment of this country attached to the expedition
in Asia Minor ; they looped their desires and hopes to
the operations in the Crimea. Nothing then could be more
unjust, nothing could be less consistent with the troth
than to impute to the Government of this country any ne
glect, any oversight with regard to the operations in Asi•
Minor. All that can be justly attributed to them is, that
in attempting to do ell that was in their power by resorting
to the only means that it was possible for them to take
viz., appointing a commissioner to act in concert with the
i T arkioll authoxitieri in the fortress of Kara, they reudered

themselves a party to the responsibility involved in the
operations. But they were unable to send troops, and they
sent etther effi:dent assistance. General Williams, by being
.thus sent was placed in no anomalous position ; he was the
British Commissioner to the Turkish army. We sent also
a commissioner to act in concert with the French general
at, his head-quarters, and the French Government did the
same with regard to us. But tha circumstances of his po-
sition gave to Gen. Williams animportance which the other
commissioner did not possess. Ho was a Irian of extraor-
dinary energy and wonderful ability ; he found himself
obliged to act in concert with a Turkish general who was
deficient in energy and ability, and who wanted all the
most important qualities required for the command of a
heeieged fortress, (Rear.) It was owing to that circum-
stance that Gen. Williams's conduct has attracted so much
importance ; it was owing to that circumstance that ho
was compelled to assume the command of the fortress of
Kane and to form the army which defended it,. Now, the
hon.taird learned gentleman makes the charge
.as if the
'defence of Kars lead rested with an English army. Bilt7is
the c-overnmont at all responsible for• the army that did
defend it ? The hon. and learned gentleman would have
it guPposed that they are, but nothing can be more re-
trial from the truth. (Hear, he'r.) Now, I have stated
that from the beginning, the Government of her Ma-
jesty had attached great importances to the opera-
tion e in Asia Minor ; they had attached far more import-
anceto those operations than our allies, the Emperor of
the French or the King of Sardinia. We had Watched
from the-beginning the proceedings in Asia--Minor-;-but
we were not precluded from acting in cowed with, our
alliee, nor did we allow our attention to be much diverted
frOin the Crimea. (Hear.) . Now, oris it not true
that there- is. great justice in the view, which has been
taken by tha French Government, especially at the begin-
ningof the campaign, as to the great importance of the
Crireei, andlooking upon the Operations in Asia Minor as
l'only;ot secondary moment. And yet any -one who had
listened to the speech of the hon. and learnedgentleman
yesterday would have eupposed that Asia Minor was the
main theatre of the war. Now, is there the smallest
leerouhd, in o,mili.tary point-of view, forjustifyinethat
triettieofettreettnit u w*/afiiiid `*Nati e
the principles for conducting a war? Why, the greatest
masters of the military art have laid it down, and this
was singularly illustrated by the tactics of Napoleon in the
late war, that you should strike at the heart of your
enemy, and leave the extremities to take care of them-
selves. (Hear.) Well, now what was the heart; what
was the centre of the power of Russia in that region ? Can
anybody doubt that it was Sebastopol and not Kars? Can
anybody doubt that the French Government and the Eng-
lish Government were perfectly justified in making Sebas-
topol the main object of the campaign? (Hear.) Sir, I
cannot conceive that there can be any difference of opinion
upon a question, the answer to which is so manifest to all
persons who judge either by the reason of the thing or by
the authority of the opinions of great military judges. All
the military judges of the campaign agree that the main
object of it was to hold Sebastopol ; we had staked one re-
putation on the fall of that fortress when the negotiations
last year took place at the Congress of Vienna. What were
the feelings of the country and the house upon the sub-
ject? Were they not most urgent that no terms of peace
should be accepted, while Sebastopol remained untaken ?
Therefore it seems to me quite undeniable that the Govern.
ment would have failed in their first duty if they had with-
drawn troops from Sebastopol, sad so have weakened the
attack upon that place, in order to secure a purely
secondary object, the safety of the citadel of Kars- Upon
that policy her Majesty's Government, in concert with their
ally, the Emperor of the French, consistently acted. When
Sebastopol had been taken, a movement was at once made
in the direction of Kars, but unfortunately it was then too
late. I do not wish to go into the question of the compa-
rative advantage of the two roads by Erzeroutn and Ku-
tais, of which we heard so much last night. Unfortunately,
Omer Peale was not in time to relieve the place ; but the
great principle on which the campaign was conducted was
nevertheless unimpeachable. When the place was taken—
when Russia was in possession of Kars—it was, according
to the hen. and learned member, in possession of the key of
Constantinople; and (said the hon. member) it was a gross
dereliction of duty to give such an advantage to the enemy,
and lay open the road to the capital. But what are the
facts? If the road to Constantinople was open to him at
the end of November, what advantage did he make of it?
We see that after the taking of Kars he remained inactive,
and did not advance one inch ; in fact, of this great sue-
cess, not one atom of use was made by General Moeravieff,
an officer of whose talents not a doubt exists. But even
supposing that at the end of the winter another campaign
had been opened, to what use, could General Mouravieff
have then turned his possession of Kars? The communi-
cations with Kars are and were much easier to Turkey,
France, and England than they were to Russia. The
distance which Russia would have had to move her troops
to give the necessary strength to the garrison at Kara
would have been enormouti. The immense land transport
to which the Russian 'troops at Sebastopol had been ex-
po nd decimated their ranks, and if the most authentic
accounts which we have received can be credited made a
havoc compared to which the losses of the English and
French armies have been as nothing. If, instead of send-
ing to Sebastopol, Russia had had to send them to a
greater distance, in order to insure the success of Kars, it
is obvious that a most simple operation at the beginning
of the spring would alone have been necessary in
order to !deprive Russia of this great advantage, and to
drive her hack across the Caucasus. In whatever way,
therefore, you look at the subject—whether in relation to
its actual result or to its probable result—if the war had
continued to this spring, it mist appear that the capture of
Kars, in a strategetical point of view, was of no importance
—that it was a matter of secondary consequence when com-
pared with the attack upon Sebastopol, and that when that
fortress fell the allies would have had it in their power to
make themselves masters of the captured citadel. I am
therefore clear that, confining the matter within a military
point of view, it is impossible for the hon. member to esta-
blish the hymn, tance of the loss of Kars. He may, how-
ever, say, " I admit that in a military point of view, that
event cannot be shown to be important; but, politically
speaking, the case is otherwise; Russia took Kars from the
Ottoman empire to give her an opportunity, when she came
to negotiate, of insisting upon terms which she could not
otherwise have asked." Setting aside the military, the
political aspect of the question is undoubtedly of great im-
portance, and I therefore wish to meet any arguments
which may be based upon it as distinctly as possible. Now,
the first plan for the pacification of Europe was discussed
and reduced into writing 'at Vienna in the beginning of
Nov. last, by the ambassadors of foreign governments and
the foreign minister of the Austrian Government. The
plan thus sketched out was transmitted to Paris for the ap-
probation of the French Emperor, whose concurrence it
received, and it was then transmitted to her Majesty's Go-
vernment for their consideration and approval. It under-
went certain alterations not very substantial, and that plan
so agreed upon by all parties may be seen in the protocols
now on the table of the house, where it appears in the shape
of preliminaries of peace. All these preliminaries were
originally sketched out before Kars had fallen ; certainly
long before the news of the capture of that fortress had been
received. The house is thus in possession of the plans of
pacification which were agreed to by the three governments
of Austria, France, and England—which were reduced into
writing, and rrc !ived a definitive le in before the capture of
Kars was thrown into the scele. I call upon hon. gentlemen
to compare these preliminaries with the treaty as it was
when it was signed by the plenipotentiaries nt Paris, and
es it is now on the table of the house. After they have
gone through the preliminaries, item by item, article by
article, I defy them to show that'the treaty fells short in
any respect of the preliminary articles ; on the contrary,
I believe it to be the fact that the treaty goes beyond the
preliminaries, and that will be found to contain more
conditions favourable to this country, and imposing upon
Russia restrictions favourable to the future safety of
Europe. If the result of such an examination should con-
vince this house, as I am satisfied it will, that the treaty,
instead of falling short, goes beyond the preliminaries,
and if it be ad initted to be the fact, which it cannot be
denied to be, that those preliminaries were conceived and
put into shape without any idea of the fall of Rare being
present to those who arranged their terms, I ask—l would
say any candid person, or any person putting himself into
a judicial frame of mind—but I ask any man who has any
idea of what reasoning is, if tho capture of Kars can be
said to have had any political effect? (Hear.) I will ask,
too, any gentleman to go through these protocols, which
arc upon the table, and state where they show so much
as a trace of any concessions having been wade by England
on account of tho disaster at Kars. I positively affirm
that uo such trace can be found, for, in truth, no such con-
cession was made. The doctrine which we laid down at
the very beginning that the integrity of the Turkish em-
pire must above all be asserted by us, was never lost
sight of, and it was felt that any bargaining about Kara
would not be consistent with our duty in this respect.
So far as the personal behaviour of the plenipotentiaries
was concerned, I have no doubt but that the frank and
straightforward manner which in the representative of
Russia gave up the point, and did not insist upon any ad-
vantage in respect of Kars, tended to the harmonious re-
sult of the entire negotiations. In fact, if honourable
members will refer to the treaty of peace, they will see
that nothing is said about equivalents ; it is not said, if
you restore such and such places we will restore
certain others. The article is simply as follows :--
" His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias engages to
restore to his Majesty the Sultan the town and citadel of
Kars, as well as the other parts of the Ottoman territory of
which the Russian troops are in possession." I think, there-
fore—unless what I have saii can receive some answer—
that the house will agree with me that whether we look to
the military or political importance of the capture of Kars,
the speech of the hon. and learned member (Mr. White-
side) is full of exaggerations. The noble lord the member
for Colchester (Lord J. Manners), not confining himself to
the question of the responsibility of the English Govern-
ment in consequence of the appointment of General Wil-
liams, said that we had prevented the Turkish Govern-
ment from taking such steps as it might have taken for the
relief of the
-place by our remissness in furnishing that Go-
vernment with supplies from the loan which was guranteed
by this Government and by France. As this is a matter
in which I have had some experience, perhaps the house
will bear with me for a few minutes while I state the ac-
tual facts of the case. The act, confirming the guarantees
of England, in addition to that of France, for the Turkish
loan, passed last session, having received the royal assent
on the 14th of August last. The management of the terms
of that loan was placed by the Government in the very
competent hands of Sir A. Spearman, who acted as com-
missioner for her Majesty's Government under the Turkish
ambassador, in whom the supreme arrangement of the
matter, of course, rested. The loan was contracted for on
the 20th of August. Of course, immediately after the
terms of the loan had been arranged, a necessary interval
had to be allowed before tho payment of the first icstal-
mont. The interval, however, was a short one, for on the
2fith of August 100,0001. sterling were delivered to the
War Department for shipment to Turkey. On the 31st of
0, &fug
ours,
tt
eamnbo
et
rh
thrlooeo,ootoob
e/r. , s ad oonf
100th oh
,10000 t
ela3clhh; awnedreilidteh-
livered over to the War Department.
arttmabelnet;sboTwhetsebaftacttbs,oreovhwicahs
appear in returns upon
no remissness on the part ofherM Majesty's
withGoveornomr
oewntn.
Sir, when the French Government
to make a joint guarantee on behalfoftheTurltish
Government, it was made an express stipulation on thepart
which was willingly illini( gilyacquiesced
in
nf tbhye
uEs:stpbearto rt'bs
omi ministry, slooneytr should not be
paid over at once
to the Turkish Government, but that in the first place a
security should be taken that it would be applied to the
purposes of the war, The loan wads guaranteed expressly that

In order to the settlement of this question, Fuad Pasha
proposed a further meeting, at which the Turkish system
of accounts was to be examined. This meeting did not
take place immediately, it was postponed from day to
day, and, in fact, did not take place until Nov. 24. That
was the very day on which the capitulation of Kars took
place. Hence the house will see that whatever delay may '
have taken place it was in no respect owing to any remiss-
ness on the part of the English or French Government, but
on the contrary, that they and their officers acted with the
greatest promptitude. Ultimately, a sum of half a million
was delivered to the Turkish Government on the let Dec.,
and on the 17th of that month an answer to the memorans
dum was received from the Turkish Government, containing
a general assent to its provisions. I think that the house
will see from this that it was the delay of the Turkish Go-
vernment, caused by its unwillingness to submit to a rea-
sonable and necessary precaution, and not to any remiss-
ness on our part, which led to the evil of which the noble
lord (Lord J. Manners) made complaint. I should state
that though the memorandum underwent some slightmodi-
fications, it remained unaltered in all material points, and,
so unaltered, was assented to by the Government of Turkey
—a fact which proves that there were not conditions in it
absolutely repugnant to that power. It ought also to be
stated by me that the Turkish Government obtained large
advances on the faith of this loan by bills drawn upon
Messrs. Rothschild. In this manner it obtained on the 21st
Sept. *23.000/., on the Ist October 200,0001., and on the
3rd of that month 100,0001. So that it was not so desti-
tute of moans as the noble 1 erd seemed to imagine. An-
other expedient for supplying the Turkish Government
e'itli funds was suggested by the bon. and learned mem-
ber for Enniskillen (Mr. Whiteside.) He said we might
have resorted to a subsidy of 100,0001., and that if the
Government had come down to this house and asked for
that sum there would have been no difficulty in obtaining
it, and that when obtained it would have enabled the
Turkish Government to relieve the garrison at Kars.
Now, I do not see the hon. and learned member in his
place, and I do not wish to be supposed to use laugnage
belied the back of the hon. and learned gentleman wlei eh
I would not use before his face. I cannot, however, re-
frein from notcing that throughout his speech the hon.
and learned member dealt mach in vituperative epithets,
especially condemieg very many actions of the Govern-
ment. and of poisons connected with it, as " contempt-
ible." I cannot, however, but think that if the bon. gen-
tleman had come down to this house last summer, and
asked for a subsidy of 100,0001. to be handed over to the
Turkish Government to assist it in the carrying on of the
war, no word could more aptly have been applied than
that very word—contemptible. The hon. member referred
to the example of subsidies in the late war. I do not wish
to go into the question of the policy of subsidies, at the
same time I cannot but feel that during the late war we
(lid offer a resistance to the power of Franco, and fence
ourselves round by menus of our lavish system of subsi-
dies. It was a system of defence which enabled us to bring
large armies into the field ; but we did not send them
100,0001., and I cannot but think that the hon. and
learned gentleman, however he may approve of that idea
now that he has the light of subsequent events to guide
him, would have been ono of the first to object to it had
the Government last session acted up to his present sugges-
tion. I will now say a few words on the amendment of the
hon member for Dorset (Mr. K. Seyiner) who spoke with
sound moderation and good sense from below the gangway.
He gives various reasons why he cannot support the
motion before the house, and offers an amendment which
looks very like moving the previous question. The effect of
his motion must at all events be to give the go by to the
main question, as the house is by the amendment called
upon to dec!ine giving any opinion at present on the me-
rits. Looking at the motion itself I think I can perceive
in it a strong family likeness to a motion made in another
place. The latter is certainly not identical in phraseology
to the motion before this house, bat it bears so close a re-
semblance as to indicate that thee person who prepared the
ore had before him at the time a copy of the other. Lord
Malmesbury gave notice for the .ed of Mny to move that
while the house (of Lords) feels it a duty to express admi-
ration at the gallantry of the Turkish army, and of the
self-relying courage of General Williams and the British
officers engaged in the defence of Kars, it feels it to be
equally a duty to affirm that the surrender of that fortress
was a disaster seriously affecting the security of Asiatic
Turkey and the negotiations for peace ; and further, that it
was in a great Degree to be attributed to a want of foresight
on the part of her Majesty's Government. There is, then.
the closest resemblance between the two motions, but I

understand that since the commencement of business in this
house this evening, the motion in the other house has been
abandoned. However, it has been made the subject of de-
bate in this, having been opened by an hon. and learned
member in a speech of great elaboration, full of minute
details, and fortified by frequent reference t.) the corre-
spondence, and the house has been called upon to pronounce
a direct verdict on the hon. and learned member's motion.
Her Majesty's Government feel it to be their duty to meet
that motion with equal directness, they believe it is wholly
unsupported by the evidence which has been laid on the
table, they believe it to be wholly unsustained by the facts
of the case, and they are most desirous that the question
should be folly discussed and sifted. They do not shrink
from the closest scrutiny into their conduct, and they
court the decision of the house on the motion as originally
framed. 1 shill not, therefore, be able to support the mo-
. . .

Lion of the hon. member for Dorsetshire. I quite recog-
nise is conciliatory spirit, but, nevertheless, it is, after
a►l, merely a postponement of the question. The hon.
member says—" Let us first examine the treaty of peace
and the protocols, and then we can form a judgment on
the conduct of the Government." I say, ou the one
hand, that these papers can be soon examined, and that
there is nothing to prevent hon. members from at once
coming to a decision, nor any reason why the house should
he again called on to discuss this matter. The hon. and
learned member for Enniskillen has found ample evidence
for our condemnation ; I trust we shall get ample evidence
for our acquittal. I hope that the members of this house
will put themselves in a judicial frame of mind, such as
beseems the giving of a verdict, and if that should be the
case I feel confident that this motion will result in the
entire and complete acquittal of her Majesty's Govern-
ment. (Hear, hear.)
Sir J. PAKINGTON said he should not detain the
bons') by going at any length into the correspondence, or
the complicated questions which had boon raised. How-
ever, ho felt justified in saying that, notwithstanding the
speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the able and
powerful speech of his lion. and learned friend the member
for Enniskillen remained as yet wholly unanswered. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer was the first member of the
Cabinet who had risen to reply to his hon. and learned
friend ; and certainly, although he (Sir J. Pakington) had
had doubts as to the ground the Government would take

respecting the disasters of Kars, he never supposed that
any member of the Government would take up the extra-
ordinary ground that had been now taken. There was
one passage in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech
in which he cordially agreed, and that was the just and
well-merited tribute he had paid to the bravery of
General Williams. (Cheers.) Nor let it be confined to
that gallant officer, for every Englishman engaged in that
memorable s'.ege was entitled to the deepest gratitude
from his countrymen. (Loud cheers.) His honourable
and learned friend the member for Enniskillen had
alluded to the fact that the only contributions the British
Government had sent to the defence of Kars were four
Englishmen and a doctor. He (Sir J. Pakington) confessed
that he felt some regret at the terms which his hon. and
learned friend had used in that portion of his speech.
( Loud cries of hear.) When his hon. and learned friend
spoke of four Englishmen a right hon. friend behind him
said " five." His hon. and learned friend misunderstood
the remark, and added " General William's secretary wished h:3 to
bat the fifth individual to whose merits it w
bear testimony was the doctor, and he (Sir JaPakington)
was sure the house would feel with him that no slight por-
tion of any tribute to the defenders of Kars belonged toDr.
Sandwith. (Loud cries of hear.) He w_a_s als__o happy. to
add his tribute to the generous conduct of lien. Mouravieff,
in at once liberating Dr. Sandwith, in consequence of the
great care ho had taken of the _Russian prisoners when
within the fortress. (gear-) Every gentleman who like
him (Sir J. Pakington) had had the good fortune to make
the acquaintance of Dr. Sandwith must have been struck '
with the modesty and good feeling with which that gentle.
man always referred to the events of that miserable and
disastrous siege. (Hear.) He must now turn to those
portions of the right hon. gentleman's speech in which ho
did not concur. In his attempt to explain why no por-
tion of the Turkish loan had been paid until the mouth of
December the right hon. gentleman adverted to the fact
that the opposition had expressed strong disapprobation
to the loan ; but that was no reason why, having been
granted, it should not have been applied in the most
prompt and eilhieet manner. The judicious expenditure
of 50,000/. or 100,000/. might have enabled General Wil-
liams to save Kars. (Hear, hear.) The right honourable
gentleman had devote t a considerable portion of his speech
to proving that the capture of Kars had had no effect
upon the peace negotiations. He (Sir J. Pakington
would not allow himself to be prematurely drawn
into a discussion of thosa negotiations ; but this he
would say, that he believed it would be very difficult to
peisuade the house or the country that the capture of Kars
had not had an unfavourable effect on them. (Hear, hear.)
But that portion of the right lion. gentleman's speech
from which he wished to express the strongest dissent was
that in which he made the Government in no degree re-
sponsible either for the defence or fall of Kars. The right
hon, gentleman said, "No blame cau Attac4 to her Uojos.

detpiOit:Ca AretriTifiVnTorgritalgird *-A
-
the respon.ibility of the Government ; and here he begged
to remind the house of the observation of the noble lord
the member for London at a former period, to the effect
that the Prime Minister was responsible for the despatched
issued by his Government. He must say that this de-
spatch was one which the Government ought to be ashamed
of. There were many of Lord Clarendon's despatches
which, he admitted, did him honour ; but this one was
neither -creditable to thh noble lord nor to the Government
—for the spirit in which it was written was craven and
unworthy. It assumed, and in fact invented, every ima-
ginable excuse for rejecting the only plan by which Kars
might have been relieved. It said—
The plan proposed by the Porte for the relief of the Turkish
army at Kars, as sketched out in yourExcallency's despatches
of the 30th June and let inst., has been attentively consi-
dered by her Majesty's Government, and I have to state to
your Excellency that it appears to be objectionable for the
followiug reasons : It would be in the greatest degree im-
prudent to throw on an unwholesome coast, without means
of land transport, without any certainty of provisions, with-
out an assumed communication with the rear, without an ac-
curate knowledge of the country to be traversed, or the
strength of the enemy to be encountered, and with the proba-
bility of a hostile population, 40,000 men, hurriedly collected
from various quarters, imperfectly disciplined, doubtfully
armed and equipped, and as yet tutorganised, and to expose
hem at once to all the hazards and difficulties of a campaign
against a Russian army.
Why the greater part of these dangers were mere assump-
tions—there was no proof whatever that they existed. The
Government assurded th It there was wanting the means of
transport—that there was no certainty of obtaining provi-
sions, and no communication in the rear, and that there
was no knowledge of the country. If there was one
thing more remarkable than another in these papers,
it was the amount of ignorance the Government die-
played of the nature of the country, and on that
wound only could their otstinacy in opposing every opi-
nion in the East. in reference to the Trebizond route, be
accounted for. His belief was, that the Government got
a map of the country, laid it out upon the Cabinet table,
and seeing that Tiflis, Erzerourn, and Trebizond formed a ,
triangle upon it, they concluded that, starting from Tre-
bizond, it was as easy to go one way as another. Let him
call attention to the next sentence of the despatch, for,
without exception, it was the most trifling and unworthy
he had ever read in a despatch penned by a British Mi-
nister upon any subject. It wa.a in these few words :
" They would fall ill between Redont-Kaleh and Kntais,
and be defeated between Kutais and Tiflis." Here was a
prophecy, not only as to when the Turks would fall
but as to where they would not be met, and have to do
battle with the enemy with a chance of victory, but be
defeated by them. What could be more calculated to
damp the courage of the Turks? Ho would now advert
to the answer of Lord Stratford, and that was one of the
severest and most condemnatory letters that any foreign
Minister had, he imagined, ever received from one of his
owu diplomatic agents. Lord Stratford, writing to Lord
Clarendon, said :

" The unfavourable judgment passed by her Majesty's Go-
vernment on the plans which have been lately under discus.
sign with a view to the relief of the Sultan's army at Kars,
has naturally increased the Porte's embarrassment. It was
my duty to make it known to the Turkish Ministers, not
only as au opinion, but, with respect to General Vivian's
Contingent, as a veto. A most serious dilemma is the imme-
diate result. Her Majesty's Government not only withhold
the Contingent, but express a decided preference for the al-
ternative of sending reinforcements to Erzeroum by the way
of Trebizond. This opinion is not adopted by the Porte, or,
indeed, by any official or personal authority here, The
Seraskier, Omer Pacha, General Guyon, our own officers, as
far as I have means of knowing, agree with the Porto and the
French Embassy in preferring a diversion on the side of Re-
dout-Kaleh, as offering better chances of success ; supposing,
of course, that the necessary means of transport supply and
other indispensable wants can be sufficiently provided.
France is at the same time decidedly adverse to any diminu-
tion of force in the Crimea ; and Omer Pacha, ready to place
himself at the head of an Asiatic expedition, requires for that
purpose part of the troops now there."
And then, in very despair, he added—" Such being the
present state of the case, I am precluded Cora contributing
to the Porte's extrication from its difficulties otherwise
than by countenancing some now location of the Contin-
gent, which, without exposing the corps to a premature
trial, might enable a force of the same amount to be de-
taehed for service elsewhere." And the despatch ended
with the words—" Meanwhile the advices from Kars are
not encouraging ; ant time of precious value is unavoid-
ably wasted in doubt and uncertainty." Well, he (Sir J.
Pakington) relied upon these two letters, and, in his opi-
nion, they distinctly proved that it was the Government
who were responsible for the fall of Kars. (Hear.) It
was true that they afterwards changed their minds and
agreed that a diversion should be attempted in Georgia ;
but that was two months after they had rejected this or-
ganised plan of the Porte—approved of by the Sultan and
his minister, and by the French and English ambassadors,
and by all the military authorities; and only whoa it was
too late ha 1 they given their sanction to Omer Pache
making a diversion in Georgia. (Hear.) Now let him ask
them was it possible for the right hon. gentleman the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer, in the face of those letters, to con-
tend that the Government were in no degree responsible
for the defence of Kars, and that they were not to be
blamed for its ultimate surrender. There wee ono other
point to which he wished to allude, viz., the language of
Lord Panmure in speakiegof this plan as a wild, undigest-
ed, and mad scheme. Lord Panmure said in his despatch
that, he had too much confidence in General Vivian's pro-
fessional ability to feel any anxiety that he could under-
take any expedition so wild, undigested, and mad. (Hear.)
And was the house aware that at that very time General
Vivian hail written a despatch, which was being forwarded
home by Lord Stretford, in which he said :—" I do not
entertain a doubt of the advantages of the proposed (that
was the diversion by Georgia) measure if it could be judi-
ciously arranged." The right hon. gentleman had said he
would not go into the comparative advantages of the two
roads. When the question of saving or losing Kars
turned upon that apparently very trifling question. He
(Sir J. Pakington) had been surprised to hear on the pre•
vious evening from the Attorney-General that General Vi-
vian approved of the proposal for attempting the relief of
Kars by the Trebizond route, and snore so at hearing the
Lord-Advocate state that the Trehizond roads were per-
fectly good for artillery, as every military man know. Ho
(Sir J. Pakington) must say a more audacious assertion
he had never heard hazarded in Parliement, and when it
was uttered he felt disposed to think that his legal friends
would say almost anything. What the right bon. and
learned gentleman's peculiar means of information as to
the Trebizond roads were he could not say, but he pre-
-1
sum
whollyFu a
sari, eGd e
nbeer a w
Williamsu c allow tghhat t toile
bTeurkkish okeadutuhpoor;tiaess
somed
Pashaa udteheoli,Litteyd;
that it would take
t aline cti btohteh
rteha adts Gtheenleeralwearned
unfit for artillery, .714
three or four months before it was possible to take an army
to make the house to the relief of Kars by that route. The right hon. gentle.
man had tried believe that Gen. Wil-
liams was in favour of trying to relieve Liars by way of
Trebizond ; lenteso far from that being so, he expressed a
hope that the allies would send an expedition to Georgia
to operate upon the rear of Mouravieff, and create is diver-
sion, otherwise nothing could saveKars. How, in the face
of such language, was it possible to contend that General
Williams was in favour of the Trebizond route, he (Sir J.
Pakington) could not understand. Again, writing inoc-
tobereWilliamsen.said—" Under these' circumstances,
I address thee° few lines to your lordship, with a hope that
such representations may be instantly made to General
Omer to act with vigour and decision against Georgia;
otherwise in spite of our brilliant victory, we must ulti-
mately fall into the enemy's hands." Here, again, it is
clear that in the opinion of Gen. Williams relief could
come to Kars only by the plan proposed by the Turkish
Government, which the noble lord (Clarendon) had re.
jested. He (Sir J. Pakington) had been induced to make
these remarks by the speech of the right hon. gentleman,
and he hoped he had shown the house that the Govern-
ment was not justified in assuming that they weie not re-
sponsible for the events which led to the capitulation of
Kars. (Hoar.) He, on the contrary, maintained that
they had made themselves responsible by the letter he had
quoted, and that upon thorn mainly rested the blame for
the loss of Kars. (Hear,)
Mr. LAYARD claimed the indulgence of the house for
a few moments, and assured them that ho would not detain
them longer than was necessary, for ho thought it was. too
much the habit of that house to speudjutdoogumleuncthuptionanetiline
words and little in acts. He hoped, however, to be able
very shortly to place the facts before them in such a posi-
tion as would aid them in forming a
question at issue. Hitherto he thought the subject
had not been clearly placed before the house. They had
had a resolution
vigorous
speech
proposedeh fr
om
and le reed member
opposite. The Government had been. strongly attackal in
atlined
isieuepr rted by a most able
and by other speeches delivered from the opposite side
of the house, while, on the other hand, the speeches from
the Treasury bench, be must say, had been somewhat
weak, and had almost tended to convert him to an oppos
site opinion from thet. they were intended to advocate.
(Hear.) It was unfortunate that the Government had en-
ti listed their case to a lawyer who had not got up his brief.
(" Hear," and a laugh.) 1\ etheut presuming too much, be
thought he could have made a better defence for the Goe
verneuent himself. He would, however, endeavour to take
away sehletiliDZ froal the fitreug elohleut of the debate, and