The Sun.
London, England, 1856-03-14 00:00:00

THE SUNS LONDON, "FRIDAY EVENING, MARCH
_l4, 1856.

they could not have got six or eight sail of the line properly
manned, they might have got six or eight frigates, or if not,
six or eight sloops, which would have cost less money. But
in his fleet he believed there was uot a junior officer, a lieu-
tenant, or even a captain that had ever sailed in line before.
That, however, was not their fault. They had host no op-
portunity. It was no easy matter for ships to sail in line
within one or two cables length of each other. It was diffi-
cult in the day-time, and much more so at night. This
being the condition of the fleet under his command, he na-
turally hesitated in going into the Gulf of Finland so early
in the year, the entrance being at all times difficult from
the vast number of rocks and shoals which abounded,
and especially so at that early period of the year, when
the navigation was scarcely yet open. Upon this he re-
ceived a letter from the Admiralty, which he thought
rather sharp, but he had written a letter to them which, he
was afraid, was rather sharp too. Hear, and a laugh.)
The moment, however, that he discovered his error,
he acknowledged it. Nevertheless ho was afterwards ac-
cused of disobeying orders, and treating the board with
disrespect. He confessed that he had lopted a tone i n
that letter which was not altogether proper, but it was his
failing to go sometimes too fast and sometimes too slow.
(Cheers and laughter.) He ought to have stated that he
received a letter before he left Xioge Bay from the right
hon. baronet stating—
lam entirely satisfied with your proceedings. Neither
Lord Clardndon nor r anticipated your movement inside the
Belt, and believed that you would watch in the Cattegat the
entrance of the Sound and of the Belts' until you received
orders to enter the Baltic, Yon judged, however, wisely, and
the time which you have gained has been very precious, and
the pacsa;e of the Belt in fine caller and in safety has been
a most successful exploit. You will also have been enabled to
exercise your officers and men to gre.tt advantage, with the
certainty that the enemy is in front of you, blocked up in the
ice for some time to come, and that your reinforcements will
arrive, and that your discipline will be improved. When the
state of the ice permits,l conclude that yon will establish a
close blockade of the Gulf of Finland, dividing the enemy's
squadron at Crenstadt and at Sweaborg, and intercepting the
trade of Revel and Riga. I rely on your prudence in not
knockinyour head against stone walls prematurely, or with-
out the certainty of a great success, or the fair prospect of
attaining some most important object worthy of the risk and
of the loss, which when you attack fortresses with ships are
serious and inevitable.

Of cenrse ho naturally felt pleased at receiving this laucla
tory letter from the right hon. baronet. After ho had made
this mistake in writing to the Admiral as he bad done, he
received the following letter from the right hon. baronet,
which was especially satilfactory to him :
I have received your letter of tho 19th, off the entrance of
tho Gulf of Finland. I am glad that you decided not to pro-
ceed to Sweaborg.. The weather is still broken, the channel
is not clear of ice, and your force is not yet concentrated. A
safe anchorage within the Gulf of Finland would S4Olll to me
your greatest and most pressing necessity. I bad hoped
that Port Baltic might be available for this purpose ; but
if it be commanded from the shore, or if for any other reason
you reject it, still I trust that you will be enabled to esta-
blish and to hold a close blockade of the Gulf of Finland,
and to ,cut off the communication by sea between Sweabo'g
and Cronstadt. Your force, I hope and think, will be large
enough to render the escape of any Russian squadron from
the Batic iznpossitle, and to leave us quite at ease in En-
land, although we may have no large. reserve ready on our
own shores. It' will be b: ft, in the first instance, to feel
yrur way, and to make good your ho'd in the Gulf of Finland.
When I say this, I by no means contempl do an attack either
on this or that place (mentioning two pines). I have a great
.respect for stale walls, and have no fancy for runnicg even
screw line-of-battle ships againA them. Because the public
here may be impatient, you must not be rash ; becaur,e
they, at a distance from danger, aro foolhardy, you must
not risk the Ides of a fleet in an impossible enterprise.
I believe both to be all but impregnable from the sea,
Sweaborg more especially; and none bat a very large
army could o:-operate by land efficiently. If, then, you
have no means except naval at your command, you "must
pause long and consider well before you attempt say attack
on the R:issian squadrons in their strongholds, and I am
afraid they are much too cautious to come out and meet you
Had you been weaker, they mielt have done so ; now they
will wait and watch an opportunity, in the hope that you
wi 1 seriously cripple your Lot co by knocking your head against
their forts, when they cony take you. at -a serious disadvaa-
tige, and inflict a fatal blow. These considerations must not
he overlooked by you. I recall them to your mind, lest in
the eager desire to achieve a great exploit, arid to satisfy the
wild wishes of an impatient multitude at home, you should
yield to some rash impulse, aid fail in the discharge of one
of the noblest of duties, which is the moral courag , to do
what you know. to be right, at the risk of being accused of.
having done wrong. It is enough to present this view to
deliberate attention; you wia reflect on it, and I am certain
that your judgment will not err.
Thinking, then, that it was not right to go into the Gulf of
Finland at that early period of the year, he went into the
Harbour of Elfsnabea with the intention of looking to the
rigging of the shits, anti getting in water, but it came on to
blow, and bad nothing but a succession of gales for-several
days, so that he was detained for ton days when he expected
only to be detained for twr. Considering the shoals and
rocks about El fsnaben he was never more anxious in his life
than during this limo. Had it come on to blow hard, the
danger woal 1 . have been imminent ; but by the mercy of
Providenee all the ship. got. safely out of this'trap—.'or
such he might Call it. In this difficulty, which was in"
Creased by a thick fog, the greatest zeal and energy were
exhibited by officers and neon. There was no wavering, no
ivaat of decision on the part of the captains, and the rea-
diest obedience on the part of all the subordinate officers
end the seamen, and, as he, had said, every vessel was
broue,ht safely through. But he would leave hon, gentle-
men to suppose what a state of anxiety he was in until the
signal was made in the afternoon that all were in safety.
He felt he was fully justified in going into Elfsnaben, seeing
that there was nn roadstead off Sweaborg. He then wrote
to tko Admiralty sating that he intended to proceed to
the tipper part of the Gulf as soon as he could get together
a sufficient force, but how it was to be done with 20 sail,
some of which were not fit to go into action, he did not
know, bat all thet could be done with the means at his
dienoal, ,?e ti
plied,a Their lordships are saCsied that you will do all
that you can do. It is to be regretted that, by your latter
of the 23,-1 ult., you consider some of the ships under your
command are unfit to go into action, an I my lords cal,-
not but feel surprised that such. a statement on your
part should have been unaccompanied by • detailed- re-
ports of the condition of the vessels to which you allude."
de read this letter. because when his noble and learned
friend behind him (Mr. :NIL lins) made a ;notion on this sub-
ject the right hon. baronet read this letter and said he had
had no reply to it. He (Sir C. Napier) did reply to it.
The letter was to the effect; " that he alluded to the ships
which had lately come from England which bad not seen
a shot fired ; they were poorly manned, but the admiral;
had been indefatigable, and the c Vains had done their
best to put them into a state of discipline."' Why the
right hon. hart. made that statement unless to bring him
into had *dour he could not conceive. How could be be
astonished that the ships were not in proper order in two
tenths, when every experienced officer knew that it could
not be done in loss than 12 mouths, or even two years?
tie (Sir C. Napier) wrote alsci to his hon. and gallant friend
( admiral Berkeley) as follows. The hon. and gallant gentle-
man then read the letter, to the effect " that he had done
all in his rower to get the skips se my for battle, but that
it must not be supposed ships could be made perfect in a
day, whereas the Russian ships were in excellent order."
Re wrote another letter complaining that " the ships
were without subordinate officers, mates, masters as-
sistants, midshipmen, and cadets, and that there
were yoni g men who might have been sent out." He
mentioned this because there were so few o cers of those
ranks in the navy generally, and it would have been easy
to have picked up from the numerous steam-vessels in tile
mercantile marina young men for,thoie.ranks, on the under-
standing that they were not to stay in the service unless
they were found quite capable. But that was net clone,
and there were too few of those officers, without whom it
,vas no easy matter to carryon theduties of a 'ship. After
this ho returned to Hango Sound with fourteen sail of the
line, the Russians having eight or nine sail of the line at
flelsingfors. By the by, he must say it was most extra-
ordinary that though we had a minister at Copenhagen, a
uinister in Sweden, a minister at St; Petersburg, a minis-
sr at Hamburg, and consuls all over the Baltic when the
fleet sailed, it was not known whore the Russian fleet was,
and 11 gallant officer now no more was sent from England
to poke his way up to Revel, and a very extraordinary way
he did it in ; for he put his vessel's bows against the ice
and bored her through it, and one very break he pushed her
stem through it. That was that gallant officer Captain
Lyons (the son of Sir E. Lyons), who was now unfortu-
Innately no more. (Rear.) His (Sir C. Napier's) object in
going to Hango was to endeavour to coax the Russian fleet,
and, following the example of Nelson, he went in, hoping
that the Russians, seeing his fleet in one of their own bar-
brows, would have had the courage to come out. Bat they
did not, and rernained snug in their harbours. He then
went to Sweaborg to examine the Russian fleet there. There
he received a letter from "the right hien. baronet of the
most complimentary kind :
I am well pleased with all your operations, and the con-
centration of your force at the entrance of the Gulf of Fin-
land, in a safe harbour where yon can command fresh water,
appears to me a judicious operation.. I conclude that you
will leave a squadron before Helsingfors sufficiently strong to
prevent the escape of the Russian squadron within the har-
bour, and proceed with the rest of the combined fleet to the

neighbourhood of Cronstadt, which larn afraid you will find

unassailable. If the Russian fleet will not come out to meet
you, and if you find that you cannot reach them, after having
well reconnoitred the works and ascertained what it is pos-
sible and impossible to do, your return to the more open sea
below Helsingfors would appear to be a judicious measure,
every necessary precaution being taken to prevent the re-
union of [the Russian force now divided at Cronstadt and
Helsingfors. I am well aware of all the difficulties of your
position, and of the impossibility of triumphing over an
enemy who will not fight you on fair terms; but you
will discipline your fleet and make your officers and
men ready for any service. It is a disgrace to Russia
that she dare not show. a ship in her own waters, and that eh)
is driven to seek for safety under the shelter of her fortresses.
It would be madness to play her game, and to rush headlong
on her granite walls, risking our naval superiority, with all
the fatal consequences of defeat, in an unequal contest with
weed against stone, whiCh in the long run cannot suceeed. I
had reliance on your prudenee which was doubted. Your bril-
liant courage was proved long ago. You will now show to the
worl i that you possess a combination of those great virtues
,e',ieh are necessary to make a consummate Commander-in-
Chief.
tie went to examine Sweaber; and to see if it wan possible
to do anything, and he wrote to the First Lord of the Ad-
eliralty the f Mowing letter. The letter was to the follow-
iez effect : " That he had taken sounding's about Sweaborg,
led he would have undertaken to carry the ships up as far
AS a certain channel, but it was impossible to get them tin
to Sweaborg, for the passage was not wi ler than the length
of a ship and a yeetel was sunk across it, while the stneke
of the steamers alone without that of the guns Wee en Ili-
tient to defend the harbour; it was only by Means of a
large military force occupying the ielamis and' Reeding
shells into the fortress, that it was. assailable." Various
plans were sent to him by the Admiral ty—sonie of then
ridiculous enough—and OR the ISth' of July he wrote to
Sir James Graham the following letter, which lie wrote
to him personalty, as he did not wish it to go before the
Board of Admiralty. The letter was to the following ef-
fect, "that the only euc'eesful manner of attacking Aren-
berg that he could see, after grim:, consideration and can-
snltation.with Admiral Chad; who was well acquainted
with gunnery, was fitting out a great number of gun and
mortar boats, each carrying one grin with a long range, and
stationing them west of slweaborg ; then every shell wou'r
tell, that force being backed by the fleet to relieve the men
as they requited
.it. By this means Sweaborg snd Hel-
eingforis might have been laid in ashes. The sshipe
not have been destroyed ,for they could have moved az t of
the way. lie was at the siege of Martinique, and then
they could not take Fort Botirbon until 50 mortars wore
'used tat shell it, when it soon surrendered. ' He had sent
;Lome copiee.of all the Tisane propose:l, nail he thought if-
ithey were laid before artillery and engineer officers they
would agree that it was the only way to destroy the for
tress. It was too late in the e*aon for that to be done,.

but preparations ought to be made for the next year. lie -
was sure that thirteen such mortars would do it ; and,
although it would be at a great expense, yet if they wanted
the war to be carried on successfully, that ought not to be-
considered. Ho could excuse the Government and the Ad-
miralty in 1854 for not having gun-boats fitted out, for in
the sudden, transition from peace to war they could not be
aware that mortars would be wanted, and they probably
never read how Martinique was taken. The weather was .
now settled, and the ships were assembled in Faro Sound. -
The French fleet were there too, and a beautiful sight it was
to see 27 sail of the line in a Russian port, and pitiable to
think that they were all useless. He wrote to the right hon.
baronet his opinion in a letter dated after that of the 18th
July, which the Admiralty denied that they had received.
The letter wasto the following effect--"that hehad received
the Duke of Newcastle's despatches and his (Sir J. Gra-
ham's) instructions, and he believed that they could be car-
ried out. He had been told that there was to be a complete
blockade of the Gulf of Finland, and that was done ; he had
boon told to look to the Aland Islands, and send home the
soundings and Capt. Sullivan's report. There were three
courses which might be followed—firstly, to make the ser-
vice one of blockade, but that would not please the peo-
ple of England ; secondly, to go to Cronstadt and offer
battle to the Russian fleet, which they were not likely to
accept, unless you went into their harbours, where the
channels were so narrow that only one ship could go in at
a time; or the Aland Islands were to be attacked; but if
that was clone and there were no troops, the ships might
go in as near as they could and land all the marines,
French and English, and attack Bomarsund, for which
purpose 10,000 seamen might be pnt on shore and turned.
into soldiers. He could propose this to the French admi-
ral, and, if he did not assent, they could go up to Crou-
st eft. The French admiral had doubts about, the at-
tack on Bomarsund without troops, and that it would
be bettter to go to Croustadt. That being his view,
it was determined to go to Cronstadt." It was no
doing of his that 10,(00 meta were sent to attack
the Aland hies. All he wanted was 2,000 or 3,000 mou ;
but the GJvernment sent 10,000 French troops. The right
hon. baronet wrote to him in reply as follows :
If anything can b 3 done you will discover the best means of
doing it„but no rash experiments must be tried which do not
hell out a reasonable prospect of success. lam anxious to
hear your opinions aA. intentions when you have looked at
Swcaborg and entered the Gulf of Finland. lam afraid that
the Russians will not pluck up courage and come out to meet
you.

Some gentlemen might perhaps think that he (Sir C.
Napier) ought not to read thew because they were partly
pzivate.; but it should be recollea:ted that they were on the
public service ; and when he reas I the evidence of the right
hon. baronet before the Sebastopol committee, that he had
a right to turn offieers' private letters into public ones, he
(Sir C. Napier) die 'hot see whylie should not du the same.
(blear, hear.) His hon. and g. last friend opposite (Ad-
miral Berkeley) would, he hope :I, excuse hies if he read
some of his. (He teen read is letter of Admiral Y-mke-
ley, of 27th Jane, expreesizeg the satisfactiou of the
Admiralty with his conduct tine their reliance ou his judg- •
moot.) Now, ha of course felt kileasure at receiving these
communications front his euueric•rs, and if any one thought
he was wrong, they inuA rawest nor thithe considered that
he hail beseu sent adrift and disee!aced, anti he must be ex-
Cased in any &forte ho inarie to ;retrieve his character. Out
the 19th the fleet sailed for Cro a steel t, and arrived before it
on the 22d. Thu French adadiat and himself reeoeuortred
the ler tress. Now he had seen letrosie fortifications ; he hal
seen Tuition, Cadiz—he had not s set' Brest—but he had seen
Cherbourg ; but not one of the el was to be compared as
fortifications or w:th regard to te.rzeleth with Croustade. it
Was not merely a-fortress, for it those stone 4-deckeis wore
ie an open sea, and could be got. at, ho would not have hosi-
t .tell though ho had to try A:4 s against stone walls ; but
the danger was in going i 4 tit ue. The soundings in the
only channeLshowee the depthezu the passage to lie quarter
less three. How then could 1. ship drawing 27 feet of
water go through such a p issage where the depth of venter
was only gum ter less - throe ? Both ho and the French
admiral were of of inien that it was impossible, and he had
never changed his opinion. Jie wrote to that effect to the
Admiralty, and he also seut, a, plan, which he had formed,
for attacking the place, which. of course he c:.uld not die-
ceise. The Admiralty wrote. to him in reply. In that
letter they called "attentien to an able and well-executed
surveyof the approaches to.. Croustadt ; they expressed
conlideace in his judgment; Cher were aware that ho had
offered battle to the emeny, heat it would be of no avail to
attack au impregnable fortress.; that he Must bear in mind
that the great object was te render the Russian fleets
useless. The troops must • be removed without less
of time ; that the primary object was a close blockade of
the Gulf of Finland; and thsat having a sufficient force
to keen the enemy in check, he must bring up the troops
from Faro
~Suund wi bout 6.elay." Those were his in-
structioes ; and when he gate a to examine them he found
it iMpssible to execute them, lie was to take care
of Cronetadt, to watch Svet'es berg, and to go to Faro
and 'embark the tro.)ps. Mow was it possible to de it
all ? He did what he thong Let best; and instead of going
elsewhere he brought all the teemps to Ledsuud. He there
received the following letter from the right hon. baronet :
I am glad you have gone up to Croustadt, to see with your
own eyes what it may be peseible to do there. Whatever
man can do I ant certain will be• done by you; and, if you are
restrained by a sense of duty feern embarking in,any despe-
rate enterprise, on your return to Faro Soiled you shall ro-
e:eye In 1 inlay:flans from me respecting an attack upon tho
Aland Islands .
•It went on thus :

I had anticipated your return to the westward after an
oiler of battle, which I felt certain the enemy would d:cline ;
and it now remains for you to blot;kado the Gulf oC Finland, to
keep the fleets at Cronstadt and lielsingfore disunited, and to
await the arrival of the French tromps, When'yonancltao Frene
admiral and general must deliborate on the operations to be
.undertaken by the combined for.o;es. Bomarsund will clearly
bo within your 'reach. Sweabm..g., if it were possible, would
be a noble prize; but on no acuo ant be lecL into any despe-
rate attempt, and above all things avoid the least risk of the
Rassian fleet slipping out of the 'Gulf of Finland. when your
back is turned ; and be slow to laud your marines, without
whom your line of battle is disate.ed. • The Russians, thou;h
shy, are crafty ; and if they can. catch you at a disadvantage
they win Lu aoao open youo . With ou,utio troops and
-200 gun-boats you might still do something groat an:l deci
sive before the end of Sept.—l am, my dear Charles, yours
sincerely, Jo U. GRAHAM.
In another letter it was said " that the Admiralty had
w.t.thed all his proceedings with approval." He left Cron/
stadt on Aug. 3, and on the 6th arrived before 13omarsund.
He sent a squadron of 9 sail of the line to take cars of the
Russian (irate while he was at nonaar.un.l. When ko was
there he got the following letter from the sight hoe: ba-
ronet :

Admiralty, Aug. 1, 1854. [Recd. 6th.]
My dear Charles,--By your foresight and g,oci, arrange-
ments, the who7e of the French army will have joined you off
Bomarsund before the end of this week, and I hope that you
will send back the line-of-battle ships which carried them to
you as soon as possible. . lam aware that Bomarsund
presents difficulties, but I feel certain that you will overcome
them. The next move must be well considered, but the fall
of Bomarsund will be no bad begiuning.--I am yours very
truly, • J. G. GRAHAM.

The whole of the troops havingarrived at Ledsund, on their
way to Boum-send, there being a very intricate channel to
that place, he sent Admiral Chads to survey the ground
before Bemarsund. The French troops arrived on the 3uth
July, but the stores did not arrive till sth Aug. ; and he
would show that no time was lest, for on the 7th the troops
were transshipped, and came on to Bomarsand'; on the Bth
a landing was made simultaneously at tso places; on the
I)th the guns mere landed, and dragged by Sailors three
or four miles into the wintry ; batteries were established,
and on the 14th two towns on the island surrendered ;
and on the 16th the fortress of Batnarsund also surren-
dered. It was expected that it would have held out
for some time, but to their astonishment it surren-
dered at the time be had stated. It would have
been easy to have run the 'ships up to Bomarsun't be-
fore the troops arrived, but it would have been at a loss of
a great many moo, and perhaps of some of the ships. But
th French bad sent out au army, and if he had attempted
anything Wore they were ready, they would naturally
have been angry and disappointed. The French Admiral
thought that tomarsund ought,• not to be attacked before
the gone were placed in position. He had now brought the
history of the campaign down
.tothe taking of Bountreund.
Afterwards the Admiralty wrote to : him to the fol-
lowing effect:—" Your report of the combined military
and naval operations before Boiaarsund has afforded us the
utmost satisfaction, 'and we cordially approve of the admir-
ableaand judicious arrangements which you adopted." The
right hon, hart., wrote thus :

Portsmouth, Aug. 22,1854.

My dear Sir Charles,—l congratulate you sincerely on the
success of your operationsbcfore Bomarsund,anl I highly com-
mend your prudence and wisdom in effecting the capture of this
stronghold of the enemywithout the loss of a ship or mauylives.
You have judged well in every respect, both in detaining the
line-of-battle ships and steamers, and then in seeding them
home laden with prisoners.—l atu, yours ♦ery truly.
J. G. GRAHAM.
On the 25th of August the right hon. baronet wrote again
as follows :

Devonpore, Aug. 25, 1854.

My dear Sir Charles,—l am more than satisfied with your
proceedings. lam delighted with the prudence and sound
judgment which you haVe evinced. It would have been a.
miserable want of 'firmness had you yielded to clamour, and
risked your slips, and sacrificed many valuable lives, iu an at-
tempt to destroy, bi nay, 1 weans, works which were certain to
fall to an attack by laud. Your reasoning also, in favour of t
immediate and entire destructien of the forts at Bomaisuud, is
irresistible, and I hope you will take care that the destruction
is complete, and that not ono stone is left upon another. lam
well pleased also with the promptitude with which you have sent
back the line-of-battle ships and steamers. The work has been
well done, and I gladly give you the utmost credit for it. I
write in great haste, but that which presses is the order for
destroying Bomarsund. At greater leisure, and in a few
days, I will write to You on the subject of your ulterior ope-
rations; and of the preparations for an early retreat from the
Baltic before winter. am yours, very sincerely,
•
J. G. GRAHAM.

. .
These were the whole of the commendations he 'calved ;
but up to thiFi time every.act be performed was approved.
After that the French Admiral and General went to S wea-
borg, and gave it as their opinion that it could not be at-
tacked with success. General Jones, the Englielf)com-
maading officer of engineers, was of opinion that it could
be attacked by land with 5,0,0 troops. The French general
was of a different ,ophion. He commenced the embarka-
tion of the troops ; General Niel, the Fr uch engineer, was,
however, of opinion that ten sail of the line could knock
down Sweaborg. He (Sir C. Napier) might as well say
that he had received other letters of approbation which he
would not read.--[The hon. gentleman, however,i read
one Or txo, which was not of importance.] —But now
01100 the ilirficutty. When the right hon. baronet heard
that Vie F. &Ali Admiral had decided that Bei-mire:lnd was
to he destroyed, he wrote to him (Sir C. Napier) on the
29th of August as follows:
My dear Sir Charles,—The Emperor bas sent orders to Gen.
Baraguay d'ililliere. Wboa we know what arrangement is
to be made with moped to the French army we will concert
measures with France for the gradual withdrawal of the fleet
from the Baltic. You should begin by sending honie, with-
out much delay, the sailing three-deckers, the least weatherly
of the sailing linck)f-battle ships, and the slowest and worst of
the block ships. This will do for a beginning, and, by de-
grees, you must withdraw to the southward, leaving the
Gulf of Bothnia open, and watching only the Gulf of Finland
with a squadron of observation. Kiel, I conclude, will be
your first halting-fplace; but this is on the assumption that
the French army is withdrawn for winter quarters at home.
I am, (Sze., J. G. GRAFI ‘3l.
iAny parson reading that would have concluded that was an
'authority for sending home the bad sailing ships and the
.three-deckers. lie (Sir C. Napier) knew that it was right,
Tor August in the Baltic was not like Au -iiat in England.
-But when it was known in England that toe _French army
!woe coming home, meetings were held to Maine the Go-
tverriment because Cron,tadt was not taken, or Sweaborg,
or eeen Sebastopol. The right hon. baronet got alarmed,
and he turned shout to see who was to bear the blame,
and he thought he would place it on kiln (Sir C, Napier),

J

'

~.,. ;
- - --k - --

and out came an order' for him to hold a council of war
with the French admiral and his own admirals, in order
to ascertain whether anything further could be done
against Sweabore. Well, the council of war met on.
board the Duke of Wellington, and it was unanimously
decided that at that season of the year, and with the
means at their disposal, nothing further could be done
against such a fortification as Swoaborg. Well, then,
the right hon. baronet felt his border blood begin to
boil. He forgot his " Dear Sir Charles," and turned'
that address into " Dear Admiral." He forgot having
called him (Sir C. Napier) a " consummate commander-
in-chief," and having expressed satisfaction with all
his arrangements. lie forgot that, only a few weeks before,
he had recommended caution with regard to attacking
stone walls, and had expressed the opinion that Sweaborg
could not be attacked with less than 200 gun-boats ,
and 50,000 men ; and now he wanted him (the admiral) to
attack it with Bor 10 sail of the line. Sir James also for-
got
that he had written, " I am commanded to acquaint
you that y.ourinstructions are not to control your discretion
as to any joint operation ; it is your duty net to undertake
any operation which your own judgment does not entirely
approve." Could the house believe, then, that the same
right hon. gentleman who had toll him that ha .was "on
no account to risk her Majesty's fleet," was serious now in
wanting him to attack Sweaborg with S or 10, ships of the
line? No, the right bon. gentleman was not serious; but
there was a commotion in the country, and the Government
looked about to see upon whom they could throw the
blame. It was a mere flash'in the pan, by which the right
hon. baronet tried to cover his own political cowardice.
(Hear, hear.) This life(Sir C. Napier) was able to prove.
On the sth of September the French Minister in London
applied to the Admiralty for steam-vessels to tow the
French ships with the troops lame. Notwithstanding that,
nod although the Government-hero must have known that
General Beragnay d'iiilliers had got orders to evacuate the
Maud Isles, they sent out an order to him (Sir C. Napier)
to call a council of war, and ask the French general, a
Marshal of France, to take General Jones's plan into con•
sideration. Now, what had General Jones done ?He had
gone with the French general of engineers to look at
Swoaborg, and had come to the opinion that by lending
5,000 men upon the Island of Bakholmen, which was
strongly fortilie and within pistol shot of Gustavevarn,
the strongeit of the forts, with three batteries upon it, not
knowing the number of troops in it, with a Russian three-
(locker lying iu the passage between them, almost touching
each shore, and with eight Russian sail of tho line lying in
the harbeur of Sweaborg, covering the whole of the island,
and manned, perhaps, by 0,000 or 7,00 e men, beside?, tl e
getrison—by landing in such a situation, the attack might
be made. Now be (Sir C. Napier) would put it to any
military or naval offieer, whether such a thing would be
safe? vie asset toil that. it would not bo sefe ; and that if
he and the French admire' and general had been foolish
enough to attempt such a thing, although the weather was
so bad that they positively could not have effected a land-
ing. With their guns and stores, not ono man would have
come off again free : eve: y Man jack of them would have
been made prisoner. (A. laugh.) Thet wes ns clear as pos-
sible to him : there could not be the slightest doubt, of it..
Well, the French general laughed at such a proposal, and
left the place ; so that he (Sir Charles) could not call the
council of war, because the French general and all his army
were gone. After that scheme was repudiate! crone an-
other order, in which he was referred to the opinions of
General Niel, the French general of engiecers, a very clever
man, who hid been opposed to the plan of landing 5,0U0
French troops, bet, after examining the place, was of opi-
nion that if eight or ten sail of the line were anchored
abreast of the battuties of aweahorg, which were stronger
than Gibraltar, and were said by officers who had seen
Sebastopol to be stronger also than the latter place, they
would be ahle to knock it down ; but., like a sensible meet,
General Niel added that he should think it a desperate at-
tempt, and that he did not consider it within his province
to recommend it. Why, that was condemnatory of the
whole project ; for Goneaal Niel spoke as areengineer, and
would no more undertake to tell a sailor where ho could
place his ships, than ho (Sir C. Napier) would undertake,
as a sailor, to tell a military engineer where to place his
batteries in besieging one of the strongest towns of Europe.
( [leer.) Well, the French admiral felt excessively
in lag-
nant at being de:rile:a isy the English First Lord of the
Admiralty to reconsider his opinion, or to consider the
opinion of Gen. •Trlde. The French admiral woull stay
no longer, but said, " I have given my opinion, and if I
were to go with yon DOW, and ycu undertook anything
there, I should be obliged to assist von, and if it failed
should be to blame for having been so weak as to join you
in it." So Admiral Parseval was naturally very much
irritated, although he (Sir Charles) tried to pacify him
as well as he could. The right hon. baronet at the
Admiralty, however, was still fall of fight, and wrote to
. say that " British steamers in fine weather, and in the
earlier part of September, might bo more gloriously em-
ployed then in towing home French troops. Now what
sort of tine weather was it the fleet were at that time en-
joying ? They were pitching at the bows in a gala of wind,
for five days together. It was impossible, then, to think of
landing troops at an anchorage which the ships could
hardly get into in the best weather. Sir James Graham
said at the same time—" We know nothing with certainty
respecting the return of the French fleet from the Baltic."
Now, that statement could not be correct—for the French
nelmiral received his orders on the 30th August to return
to Cherbourg, and showed him (Sir Charles) his orders on
the Ist Slptcraber, and also a letter, in which it was stated
:that the French charge d'Affaires in England had commu-
aeioated to the English Government the fact that the
French fleet was ordered home. The Government fie med
not to know that the French fleet was going to winter i
the B iltie. There was no end of the plans which they ap-
peared to think were flasible. One was, that he (air
Charles) should get two dredging machines to deepen the
passage at Sweaborg, by which 15,030 tons of rubbish
wore to be mixed in two days; and it was suggested that
he shinild take advantage of the smoke and fog to work
them unobserved by the enemy. Another plan sent out for
his consideration was to blast the ice in the winter when
the sea was froz in between the islands and the mainland,
to prevent the Ituesians from marching over. He was also
informed by the Admiralty that he could anchor all over
the Baltic in winter in any niece. which certainly did go
beyond After quoting some other letters of
Sir Jas. Graham's :bout the end of Septdnber, and showing
that they were contradicted by the orders he received from
the-Admiralty about sending home the sailiug ships, the
lion. 'and gallant gentleman gave an uccetints of his recon-
noitring Sweaburg in the Driver, piloted by Captain Sul-
livan, in conseqiumee of which he wrote to the right hon.
hart., a description of the formidable obstacles which would
have to be encountered if Sweabore, were attacked by the
fleet alone, and concluded by saying " Whether this.
attack would succeed or not, it is impossible to say ; but
we must calculate on ships being set on fire by red-hot shot
amid 'Jells, of which there would bo abundance ; and whe-
ther successful or not, it is evide ,t the ships would he in
Ito condition to beat the Russian fleet afterwards, and if
the 'attack were mado at this se Will of the year. when you
cannot depend upon the weather, Ido not know what
would be the result ;" he went on to say, " I beg you will
hot suppose Sweaborg cannot be attacked ; I think it can,
but it must be with caution and judgment." There were
thus two distinct opinions which he had, upon different oc-
casiens, given about an attack on Sweaborg. Ooe opinion
related to the supposition that the ships alone wero'to
attack; and in that case he pointed out the inadequacy of
the aneans, amid the dangers which would render almost
certain the loss of a large part of them. Another opinion,
nr plan of his, related to an attack 'with mortars and gun.
b rate, and with the whole of the fleet. It was on the 4th
October that the hoax arrived in England, the t tumour of
Sebastopol being taken ; upon which Sir James Graham
wrote to him, quoting his letter written after the last re-
canuaissance of Sweaborg, and interpreting it with the
ondea.vour to persuade him that he had committed himself
by that letter to the opinion that Sweaborg could be taken
with the means which he then had. But this was putting
a most impertinent construction upon his letter. He (Sir
Charles) had never said that the attack by the ships,
which ho bad described to the Admiralty, would succeed;
on the contrary, he had distinctly asserted that if he at-
tecked with the ships alone, he would lose a great number
of ships, and not be certain to succeed ; but what he had
said was, that if he attacked with the mortar-boats and
gun-boats which he had asked for, he was (pits certain
that Sweaborg would be laid in ruins. (Beer, hear.) He
could not really believe that at that time of the year, the
4th of October, the Board of Admiralty, consisting of a
civilian First Lord and five or six sailors, seriously intended
that the French fleet should return, and the English fleet
go- up without it into the Gulf of Finland et the begin-
ning of the winter season. Ho had no hesitation in
saying that if all those heavy three-deckers had gone
up. the Gulf of Finland at that date, to remain
for the purpose of undertaking any operations, there would
have been an end of them. After reeding some of the cor-
respoutlence which ensued upon his representing to Sir J.
Graham the uncertainty of the weather, and the advanced
season of the year, in reply to which the right laonngentle-
man argued that those objections were not insurmountable,
and having advised him to calculate the chances, and not
to lose an opportunity, ended by saying. " But the final
decision must rest entirely with yourself," the gallant ad-
miral said that if, during th‘ summer, such a goading letter
as that had been sent to him, instead of the cautious ones
he then received, he should not 'sieve hesitated for a single
moment to go into Sweaborg, lot the consequences be what-
ever they might, because no officer could endure to be writ-
ten to in such a style. But he was perfectly certain, in Oc-
tober, it was a piece of mere insanity ; he was convinced
that the Admiralty themselves could never have intended
it, and if they did, he would denounce them as totally unfit
to manage the British navy. But when the rumour cameo
that Sebastopol was taken, all England ran wild, and the
Admiralty shared in the excitement, and under its influ-
ence that letter was written, with a proposal which hie own
better judgment repudiated. But that the people in autho-
rity shuuld be capable of writing such a letter, whether to
destroy him, or out of their own folly, was disgraceful to
the public department over which they presided. (Llear.)l
He next read a letter from a gallant officer holding a coin-I
eland under him in the Baltic fleet, whose na ne ho did not
men den, agreeing iu the testimony that nothing co old -be
done at thee, season of the year, and that so far from then
thinking of an attack upon Swoaborg, he thought the fleet
was lying in a most dangerous position even where it was
at that time. Two or three letters of his own addressed
to the Lords of the Admiralty ire the month of April,
Sir Charles Napier then read, in.which he strove to
impress upon their lordships thterceighness and severity
of the Bettie winter, anti explained also that the plau
proposed by him (the admiral) in August was, firstly,
that Sweaborg should be well bombarded with mortars,
shells, and rockets by the gnu-beats, and that afterwards
the ships should go in and finish the work. On the 9th Oct
news cache to England which undeceived the Government
end the public use to the rumour of the capture of S3basto,
poi, and, without waiting for his reply to their orders, the
Admiraltyat once telegraphed that the ships were to go
borne; both French and English, and that they wore uo
longer to attempt to attack S wet-berg. Constant _gales of
wind prevailed at this time, the fleeelying at Nargen ; and
it was a pity the First Lord of the Admiralty was not oa
board then, that he might have picket out a favourable
day at that season for the fleet-crossing over to attack
Sweaborg. (A laugh.) But the right hon. gentleman was
as much of a gunner as he was a sailor, for he actually fan-
cied that, with long guns he could throw shot in the man-
ner of vertical firing, as from a mortar, that was with An
41evation of 45 degrees. Te be sure, be might have'learned
better than that if ho lied gone down to Portsmouth to see
the practice of the Excellent. The gallant admiral then
react a letter from' tbe Lords of the Admiralty, which he
received in October, before quitting the station, in which
they said, "My lords are fully satisfied with the reasons
you leave assigned for not undertaking to attack Sweaborg
after it became known to you that the ships under Admi-
ral Persoval had been withdrawn, and they might also
have keen satisfied with the decision adopted -by you ou
the joint report of the (aeons, had not your ewe letter of
'the sth September expressly informed their lordships that
You had formed a plan for an attack." Now that state-
ment Ira; not true. Ho never gave such an opinion. His
reason for not taking Sweaborg was that it was impossible.
In his letter of the ,9th Aug. he said he had sent them
;Gen. *Town's opinion, but he had nothing to do with it. As
he had said, it was perfectly impossible, and he might as
well, if Gen. Jones had sat down before Sebastopol, for in
etance, have told him they were all wrong, and that that was _

_

.

not the way to take Sebastopol, but that the only way to
take Sebastopol was to do so and so. He would now read nu
extract from a letter which be wrote in reply, in which he
said, "I beg to conclude this letter by most solemnly protest-
ing against the interpretation that theirlordshipe have put on
my letter." Their lordships replied to this in a most
jesuitical manner—he could not call it anything else—And
that reply anu•t have been written by the right hon. gen-
tleman himself, for no one else could have written it.
(Laughter.) "My lords have already declared themselves
satisfied with the reasons assigned by you for not attacking
Sweaborg." Here again they were assigning reasons that
he never gave. "But coteileringthe conflict of authority,
and the reports brought before thorn, their lordships can-
not look with satisfaction on the decision not to attack
Sweaborg." Now, how could they write him such a letter?
Why, in May he had not seen Sweaborg, and their lord-
ships had sent him plans of Sweaborg, and a Swedish en-
gineer also sent him plans, and on looking at them he
thought it impossible to take it. In his answer to that
conateunic stion he sail it was unfair for the Admiralty to
take the first part of his letter and issue the rest, and he
protested against it. Their lordships raised a► new question.
They said that in May ho sent them plans. This was.quito
true. His judgment was formed from the plans sent to him
from the Admiralty. But their lordships had forgotten Ad-
miral Chae's report, sent to Sir J. Graham on the 11th of
June, and hi, report on the 13th of July, after seeing S wee-
berg. Their lordships alluded also to a report he sent home
on the 24th July, and they referr©d so the Lancaster guns
not being sort.. He was aware that the Lancaster guns
could net be sent that year, and his observations regarding
them had reference to their being seat out the following
year. In reply he wrote as follows :

Kiel, Oct. 27.

My dear Sir James,—So far back as Aug. 29, announced to
you the intention of ie French General to withdraw his troops.
I agreed with the French General and Admiral that Sweabo.g
could not be attacked at this season of the year, and I have
no hesitation in saying, had we moved the troops and ships
up to Miolo roads, and landed 5,0)0 men, we should not have
brought off one man, and how many ships we would have
lost I cannot say. After the capture and destruction of
Bemarsund till I loft Nargen, there h ,vo not been three days
fit for operations that required seven or eight, and then the
ships and transports must Laic lain amongst the rocks and
shoals of Miele Roads--a position that might have done for a
general, but certainly not for au admiral. Shoe ly after the
troops sailed, I communicated to you that the French ad:td-
ral bad received orders to go to Cherbourg, that they were
dated the 30th of August ; so that the decision was notlaken
'on the spot, as you suppose. Geueral Jones's report made no
change whatever in our opinions. You say the French gene—
rals partook of General Jones's opinions; then Way did he
I not carry them cut ? Surely, Sir James, you could not have
rea I them ; they are quite opposite. The French geu,rals
thought the fleet could knock down Sweabwg in two hours.
General Jones required acombined movJment, which would
require seven or eight days. The French general, in his letter
to use, says : —" Nous parosgeous l'opiuion do M. le General
Jones, Sweaborg peat etre att ique et pane par les flottes si
elles veulent faire contra cette forteresse nue attaqn. seriease."
He went on, alter some other observations, to say—

All summer, Sir James, you were cautioning me, and so
were the Government, not to risk my ships against stone
walls, for which yon had a great respect, and praising me for
the manner I had conducted the fleet ; now winter is come,
you are diss ithfied.at my not doing ; and as
the people arc not satisfied, the Government are preparing to
abandon me. because I will not follow the advice of a general,
contrary to that of my own admirals, and diametrically opl•o-
-site to the opinion of the French general of• engineers, and
attack a fortress at a season of the year when it is mere than
probable I should have lost half my fleet. I have gone into
this explanation :it great length ; it has given me much pain.
I mu conscious of having done my duty, and, if you are dis-
satisfied, you can bring 1113 to a court-martial, or remove me,
as I before =aliened to the Admiralty. lam very far front
well, an t I assure you this correspondence has not improved
my health, and I am suffering much from cold,
Well, they were mot satisfied after all that explanation ;
and after all the trouble he hart taken to show the position
• he was in, Sir James G:aham said— .

My dear Sir Charles,—You refer to my letters at the end
of Aug Ist, as contemplating then the early tcrtninaton of
active operations in the Baltic for this year. 1 was not pre-
pared, even at that time, for the immediate departure of the
French army after the capture of Bomarsuud ; and I point Al
oat to you Abe, Sweaborg, and Revel, as points which, with
nilitaty aid, were open to attack. Much less was I prepared
for the withdrawal of the Fre.ich squadron from the eons-
bi-ned-nartt operations-almost shaultancously, with the de-
parture of the army, as soon as Bomarsund bad been de-
strayed. These decisions were taken on the spot-- I believe,
with your consent, but without any reference to the English
Government.

They were no such thing as taken on the spot with his con-
sent. They were taken by the French Government and
communicated to our own Government. Sir James welt

on :
But in August we had not seen the report of General Jones
on Sweaborg, which you forwarded to us from Led-und on
the 29th of August, and which was in your hands before
either the French army or the French fleet had left the Aland
Islands. The report is entitled to respect. It made a great
impression here, and raised a strong presumption that with
the aid of the military force then present with the fleet, in
seven or eight das s the works at Swcaborg might be destroyed,
and that the month of September afforded ample time for tho
oppeation. On the sth of September you seat us the obser-
evations of General Baraguay &liners and of General Niel on
the report of General Jones. General Baraguay
says expressly, after having reconnoitred Sweaborg hims lf,
together with , 'eaeral Niel :--s‘, We partake of the opinion of
General Jones. Sweaborg may be attacked aid taken by the
fleets, if they think fit to make on that fortress a so/lions
attack." General Niel went further, and said that, without
any military co-operation, eight or ten sail of the lino could
lay the works in ruins in two hours, by a bombardment near
at hand, on tl o sea front, where the works are weakest;
and he intimated very distinctly an opinion that the attack
ought to be made.
Now he presumed Sir James Graham nuderstood Free .
aorieeei vie] Rees, ,R tssessiesses seses.stre st•s pis et pries id.si
les flottes, si sales vealent faire centre. cette,forterease one
attaque se.riease." The right hoe. gentleman translated
this tie moan that'an attack ought to be made. Sir James
went on to say :
Intho Leo of these reports, and within a week after re-
ceiving them, the iatellieenee that the French army and French
fleet had left you, without a, shot being fired, except at Bo-
marsund, was both a surprise and disappointment. Then
came your own second reconnaissance of Sweaborg, and a plan
of naval attack, which you considered practicable. We were
anxious, if the French and English forces could be united,
that it should have been tried even this year, before the im-
mense fleet which bad been assembled retreated from-the
; but our own sailing ships having gone to Kiel, and the
French squadron being omits way home, the opportunifry was
lost, and nothing now remains to be clone but gradually to
withdraw the line-of-battle ships, and to await the moment
when ice shall enclose the Russian fleet within the Gulf of Fin-
land for the winter.
Where were the -50,000 men and the 250 Swedish gun-
boats? Then the right hon. gentleman came back again to
." My dear A,,miral.".
I am very unwilling to be involved in a written controversy
with yen, but you have brought it on yourself, by your re-
port of the 25th of Sept.,- after your second reconnaissance of
Sweaborg. • That report appeared to me to be entirely at
variance with the opinions previously expressed by you, and
I certainly understood you then to say, that if you had mor-
tars, rocket:, and Lancaster guns, you con-i 'ered Sweaborg
assailable by sea. In May you declared it to be unassailable,
by sea and land, and the Admiralty did not send to you the
appliances which, in September, you de;lared to be wanting,
beeauSe they believed, fresh your account, they would be use-
less against a place which in the first instance you pronounced
to be impregnable. I could not bring myself to believe that
the want of Lancaster guns, or even of mortars, rendered a sea
attack, on your plats of the 21th of September, impossible, if
you had 25 sail of the line re-assembled before the place, with
all their moans of vertical fire. I am sincerely sorry to he u.
that yen are unwell. I hope that Kiel Harbour and milder
air will restore your health.
This was the answer :
I can assure you, Sir James, it is far from my wish to enter
into a controversy with you, but I will not admit that I have
brought it on myself ; there is not a word in either my pub-
lic or private-letters that justifies the construction that you.,
and the Admiralty have thought proper to pat upon them.
My letter in answer to their lordships' last despatch is plain
enough; but if their lordships think proper to deliberate on
one part ably letter,* and ignore another part, I can only
protest against it ; and I am quite prepared to defend my-
self against any unjust attacks that are made against me. I
have documents enough in my possession to justify my con-
&act, Enough has not been done to satisfy an impatient
public, as you called them—some one must be blamed, and I
am the chosen one ; but I will not allqw myself to be crushed
because I could not do impossibilities. All this stir has been
caused by the reports of two engineers (ono French and the
other English), diametrically opposed to each other ; in ad-
dition to which was the report of the capture of SeSastopol,
not yet taken, though the fleet there is assisted by an army
of 70,009 men, in a fine climate ; and I have been expected
to take places much stronger with a fleet alone ; and the same
people, who se often warned sue against unnecessarily risk-
ing my fleet, are now dissatisfied because I did not expose
their to certain destruction. I presume yore have seen Cap-
tain Sullivan by this time ; he is capable of _opening the
eyes of the Government, if they are not hermetically sealed.
I have gone through the world with honour and credit to my-
self, and just as I am about to leave it unworthy attempts
aro being made to ruin my reputation ; but they will fail, and
recoil on themselves.
A. full report of the state of Sweaborg was rnaitle by him to
the First Lord of the Admiralty, because he did not wish
it to get into the hands of the clerks; and the house would
be astonished to learn that that report :vas never laid before
the aeard of Admiralty, and the he rd knew nothing
about it. The Admiralty wrote to him amusing him of
falsity ; it would have been more honourable in them to
have written to hint and said they mistook his letter, and to
have madedsim an apology, and there would have been an
• end of this difference. Now he did not like to make use of
hard words, and this was not the time to accuse a person
of high treason, but it appeared to him that the then First
Lord of • the Admiralty Was never serious in the Russian-
war, because. ho .g him orders not to attack Sweaborg in
the summer time ;. and if he had written to him in the
summer the letters 'that he wrote to him in the winter he
should Most decidedly have attacked Sweaborg But the
moment winter came the right hon.baronet fo got all that
he had written to him in the summer, and tried to goat him
on to attack thwe fortifications, when he had told him that
if he did so the fleet w.euld probably have been lost. If the
Emperor of Russia had been First Lord of the Admiralty
ho would have given him just the same oriole that the
First Lord of the Admiralty did ; he would have forbade
him to attack the fortifications when it was just possinle
to succeed, and he would have ordered him to do it when
it was impossible. Well, they came away from Nargen and
went toKiel, and shortly afterwards tho whole fleet arrived
safe in England, after a most arduous campaign in a sea
that had never been navigated bysuchaflest before. When
they arrived in England he went, as in duty bound, to p•ay
his respects to the First Lord of 'the Admiralty, atilt he
must say that he was received ie a sneering way. They
knew how the right hon. baronet could sneer when he
chose. It was with the greatest difficulty that he (Sir 0.
Napier) kept his temper. Sir Jas. Graham sail to him.—
" You may tell me what you please, but I titan make no
reply." That was the language use 1 to him by the First
Lord of the Admiralty. When he got back to Portsmouth.
he received an order to haul, down his flag, and after that
interview he was not surprised at it. He did not expect
to be sent to the Baltic again, and he never would have
served again under the right 'eon. baronet after what had
taken place between them. He considered that no man's
houour was safe in the right hon. baronet's hands, and the
board wrote to bins a letter in which they said, "'though
their lordships have on some occasions not bail th.,t
sati-
faction in reading your repot ts as on others, they have
only to repeat that no censure has been passed on
your conduct with reference to the operations under your
orders, and their lordships have already expressed their
sense of your services in the manner customary with an
officer of your rank. Their lordships do not feel themselves
Called upon to enter a aecond thus into as disc', aion on

matters which have already been the subject orcantreieiiy
between you and them, and still less to enter into a discus-
nion on documents which have not been laid before them:"
He lied written for acourt-mattial, and they said they de-
clined a?controverny. They had heard of the praise—thee
lavish praiso—which they had bestowed upon him. "But
from the moment you left Wingo Sound, which you did
without orders"—after themselves saying that ho was right
in so doiue•—after his conduct in that respet had been ap-
prove! by the First LOrd of the Admiralty and the Secre-
tary of State—they went on to say that he had not treated
the board with respect. He did not deny it. They had ac-
euied him of cowardice almost, and he considered it was
perfectly impossible' that any man could have restrained
himself and not have written as severely to them as it was
possible to do. He did not complain of their not again
giving him the command of the Baltic fleet ' • the Queen
had a right to cheese whom she thought fit to command
her fleets ; but he complained of the unworthy manner in
which they Lad behaved to him, trying to throw the whole
of the blame upon him. He had now done with 1874, and
he would come to what took place in 1855. Tho house
was aware that he recommended a large fleet of mortar
and gun-boats to be sent to the Baltic when the fleet was
fitted out again. Heedid not blame them for not sending,
them in 1854, but after the intimation received from him •
of the mode to be pursued to take Cronstadt and Swea-
borg, it was the greatest neglect—it was worse than ne-
glect, for the Government to send to the Baltic, in 1855,
only sixteen gnu-boats and sixteen mortar-vessels. There
was no excuse whatever for want of time, because a
pewter vessel was built and ready the other day in three
weeks from the time she was laid down. • What instruc-
tions were given to the commander of the fleet he did not
know, but it was Very evident that no instructions could
have been given him to go. to Sweaborg and attack
it with the whole of the force. because part of the gun-,
boats went up to Cronstadt, where they remained a consi-
derable time to examine Croustadt, and see what could be
done with it. They must have known perfectly well that
Cronstadt could hot bo attacked by the force they had
sent, but he thought Sweaborg might. In 1854 the fleet
was sent out without gun-boats and mortars, and in 1855
the gun-boats and mortars were sent out, and the fleet was
sent aw,ty. Now, he did not blame Admiral Dundee in
the least. He was • erfectl e aware that wit bent a large
fleet of gun-boats and mortars it was ie pee ible to attack
Sweaborg with success. Had the whole of the fleet, and
the gun-hosts and mortar-boats, been assembled before
Sweabor,e and not a single vessel been sent to Cronstadt,
lie thought the admiral would have been perfectly justifies
in expecting to destroy Sweaborg , but it appeared that
te,r a bombardment of 33 hours the whole of the mortars
werte split, not owing to the badness of the mortars, but
because they were tired so fast. The admiral had but few
mortars, and he was desirous of tryiug the experiment as
long as he could. He thought Admiral D Irides would
have beeh wrong, seeieg that his mortars we -e split, to
have taken the fleet in. He thought, after the example of
1854, Government ought to have Rent into the Ba!tio as

large a force as they possibly could; they ought not to
have thought of the expense. It was necessary to do it in
order to put an end to the war. lie believed tbliFif -the
same exertion had been made in 1855 that wed now being
made for 1856 the war would bavi been finished in 18:i5
With honour anti glory to this country. 'No .tenht, swee-
torg would have been destroyed. Ai to Croristadt he had
no hope of the kind. Ho thought the-house would see that
the Admiralty hail treated him in the most scandalous
manner; they had put into his mouth words that he never
used, which was riot werttey of a men iii the- position ist
the ight hon. baronet. He•hoped that some notice would
by taken of this in order. to prevent this kind of 'conduct
again. He must say he was never more surprised than
to Se 9 Admiral Berkeley's name Or such a document. He
!Sir Charles Napier) could not see any reason why the
Government should hesitate to give him the committee for
which he asked. Two geneial offibers had complained of
the report of a commission which had impunged their cirri-
rast!r, and a new commission had been appointed to exa-
mine into the whole case in order to see whether these pl-
iant officers Were right or wrong. He (the gallant admit al)
considered ho had an equal right to an inquiry. If he had
been guilty of misconduct let him be punished ; bat low,
could it be ascortaine4 whether he had been in fault unless.
committee was appomted to investigate the conduct of
the fleet in 1851 and 1g,55? He had now told his tale, and
• he put his case into the hands of the Government and of
the house, trusting that they would act towards him with
justice and fairness. Thanting the house for the attention
with which they had heard him, he would conclude with the
motion fur a committee, of which he had given notice.
After a short pause,
Admiral WALCOTT said he never could see , a brother
officer adrift without throwing him out a tow rope. (Laugh-
-1 ter and cheers.) He did not see any one disposed to second
the motion, and he would therefore do so himself. (Hear.)
At the same time, he thought that whatever disappoint.
inent or personal reproach might lie at the door either of
The gallant admiral or the right hon. gentleman the mem-
ber for Carlisle, they had themselves justly incurred it.
Before a fleet was despatched to the Baltic both the right
hon. gentleman and the gallant admiral Ought to have
considered the course which it was right and proper
to pursue. The /difficulties of navigation. in the Bal-
tic, the prevalence of shoal water, the intricacies of the'
:entrance to the harbours, and the strength of the fortifies-
, tions, must have been known, or at all events ought to.
have been known, to them both; and both had therefore
been.to blame, the right hon. gentleman for .not baying
provided adequate means of attacking the Russian forts,
and the gallant admiral for not having seen that the means:
supplied to him were sufficient. • (Rear, hear.) .11e con-
sidered, too, that they were also to blame, the one
for his speech 'at the Reform Club, and the other for
his celebrated signal for having led the country'
to expect successes which it was not probable would be obe
taincd. With respect to the question which had arisen on
the subject of mortar boats, he did not think that suffi-
cient use had been made of the experience of the last war.
tee (Admiral Walcott) happened to have served in the
Baltic during the years 1808 9 ; and he thought that the
experience of that period Might have suggested the sort of
force that would be necessary for services such as the fleet
could he required to perform. Ho remembered three eases
in particular. The first was one in which the boats of the
dzeieruplion attacked t: e sea batteries at Hango Head, and
lestroeed them. In the second the boats of the squadron, '
under the command of a most sagacious and, intrepid offi-
cer, Sir Byam Martin, to the number r f 17, manned with,
2,70 men, attacked a flotilla of 12 gun-boats and a large
armed ship, with a convoy of 12 ships, laden with provi-
sions and ammunition, all of which, with the' exception of,
one gun-boat, were captured or destroyed. The third-was
similar exploit performed by an officer named Forest,
whet brought out three gun-boats of the enemy. Those
:gases showed clearly what might have been done had there
leen a naval force adapted to the difficulties of the case.
(Hear.) If the object of sending our ships into the Baltic'
was merely to blockade those of the Russian Government,
no success could have been more complete than that which
had attended the g• !Lilt ad Hirai. He hail before now pro-
testiel against charging the'enemy's fleet with fear, because
it had not some out and fought with our own. To have
done so would have been a great error; because, the ene-
my's fleet being composed of sailing vessels, to have given
hettle to our screw line-of-battle-ships would have been in
truth a most senseless act. The courage which our foes had
shown at Sebastopol had redounded greatly to their honour,
and it ought to secure theta from all attacks upou their •
lall3ntry. He thought it was the duty of a Government
to select officers upon whom they could rely. not only for
their valour, but for their wisdom and disci-el ion ; but hay-
ing done so, it was no less their bounden duty to repose in
them the fullest confidence. There was much sagacity in
the maxim of that greatest of all modern authorities, the
first Napoleon-5" Let the men of the sword be made to -
del:rand as little as possible upon the men of the pen."
About 10J years ago a very admirable farce was recited by
our gallant and witty allies. In it an English courier was
represented, very protuberant before and also at the stern.
(Laughter.) The commanding officer seeing him, said,
What hare you got there before you " Your orders,
sir " " That is all right," continued the officer, " but
what have got behind ?" "Your counter-orders " ' " The
devil !" exclaithed the officer,'" then it's all up." (Laughter
and cheers.) So long as orders and counter-orders weee
given disasters must ensue. (Hear.) With respect to
secret orders, on which some obset vations hail been made,
he was not among those-who denied that it was right to

give such orders.; but he thought that if secret order; were,
read agsinst an officer ho ought to be at liberty also to read,
them in his own defence. lie thought the gallant member
had done quite right in bring:ng this subject before the
house ; for he would not give that (said Admiral Walcott,
snapping his finger...) for an officer who did not value his
honour more than his life, and the verdicts of his country
even more. (Hear.) The country no doubt desired greater
success than had been gained in the Baltic, but still be
thought that when a dispassionate view was taken of the
services of the navy during the last two campaigns it would
be allowed that they had been most meritorious. Those
services in the Black Sea had been most creditable consider-
ivg means the fleet had had at its disposal. The pro.
ceediegs, too, at Kertch, in the Sea of Aeoff, and at Kin-
burn—the manner iu which nearly 100,000 troops had been
transported by a fleet which covered nearly 16 miles of sea
without the loss of a ship or a man—the behaviour of the
fleet in the attack on the sea batteries of Sebastopol, and the
uanner in which the histuric Agamemnon went into action,
were worthy of the best period in the history of the British.

navy. (Cheers.) If the investigations of the proposed
eimmittue should remove any misconception which the
public might entertain, or oven, if having shown the con-
dition of the service to be faulty, it should lead to its im-
provement, he for one should rejoice that this discussion,
unsatisfactory as he thought it was, had taken place.
Sir C. WOOD said the hon. and gallant member who had
made this motion did not seem to anticipate that he (Sir
C. Wood) should take upon himself the task of replying to
his speech. Nor would he do so, but he must say that the
g ..11ant officer had rend extracts from despatches not laid
before Parliament, and from private letters, and he had
stated the confidential opinion of foreignofficers and officers
in her Majesty's service in a manner and to an extent which
lie (the right hon. baronet}, after a quarter of a century's
experience, had never seen done before. (Cheers.) Last
session when a similar course, though to a very limited ex-
tent, was taken by the hon. and learned member for Wal-
lingford (Mr. Dlalius), be (Sir C. Wood) stated his opinions
in similar terms, and the house then seemed very much to
concur with him. (Cheers.) The hon. and learned gentle-
man withdrew his motion, and it was much to be regretted
that the gallant admiral should now have taken a step
which he could not but regard as one very prejudicial to the
public service. (Hrar.) He would not fellow the gallant
gentleman into a single point which he ha raised upon the
correspondence be hal so read, for, so far as it would be
necessary to do so, his right hon. friend beside him (Admi-
ral Berkeley) and his right hon. friend the member for
4 iarlisle(SirJ. Graham), ►r ho were cognisant of all th facts,
would no doubt do so ; but he should be sorry if they
seould think it incumbent upon them, in defending their
own character-, o follow the gallant.aduairal in a course so
xtremely tnisenievous on all accounts. It. wasaindispen-
sable, not only that secret' orders should he given to com-
manding officers, but that perfectly eonfidential relatis us
should exist between them and the First,Lord of the Admi-
ralty. Even in Lis (Sir C. Wood's) short experience he had
experienced the greatest possible assistance from receiving
such confidential communications ; and the admirals had
been good enough to say that they had also found great
advantage in the private litters he bad addressed to them.
But it wiee obvious that if it might be brought forward in
the manner the gallant.titliniral had done, there would, be
an end to confidential correspondence, and he ventured to_
say that in that case the .public service could not he ad-
vantageously tarried on. (Hear.) With respect to tie gal-
lant admiral's motion, it was not enough that an hon.
member should ask for a committee; but some public
ground roust bo shown why one should be appointed. He
would appeal to any lion. gentleman in that, house whether
the gallant admiral who bad made the motion, or rho gal-
lant admiral who had seconded it, had given the slightest