The Sun.
London, England, 1860-09-18 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 18, 1860.

COULD TILE ?REVUE SACK LONDON?

(From the Hew York Tribune.)

The report of the British National Defence Com-
mission, which was recently published in London,
states that if the Emperor of the French were dis-
posed to send a hostile army to England, it would
be impossible for " all the available vessels of the
Royal Navy" to prevent it from landing at some
point of the 2,147 miles of coast line of England
and Wales, not to speak of that of Ireland. It
having been also conceded, at various times before
and since the publication of the famous De Join-
ville pamphlet, that a landing of 100,000 or more
Frenchmen could be effected in the British Islands,
under skilful management, the only important point
to be considered is, what power of resistance Great
Britain has at her command to meet such an in •
vasion:

In compliance with an order of the House of
Commons, the strength of the British land forces
was reported in May last. It was as follows :
Total regimental establishments, 144,148 ; effective
of all ranks on the Ist of May, 133,952 ; embodied
militia, 19,333. When this statement was made
public, an almost universal cry from all parts of the
three kingdoms was raised, as to the manner in
which the 75,000,000 dols. appropriated for the army
estimates were spent, since an analysis of the
144,148 men, given as the available material of the
line, " revealed the startling fact that scarcely
30,000 infantry could be mustered for offensive or
defensive purposes, at a given place."
Mr. Sidney Herbert and his associates of the
Horse Guards immediately held a consultation, and
the London Times endeavoured to quiet the anxiety
of the people. It said—" We took occasion to ex-
amine the figures by which these allegations were
supported, and explained in some detail the actual
position of affairs." It tried to " show that if by
the term 'troops' it was intended to describe only
infantry of the line, the state of the case had been
pretty accurately given, but that in reality the force
at home comprised strong divisions of other arms of
the service, so that its aggregate strength was by
no means so small as might have been expected."
The result of this nervousness on the part of the
public, and of the consultation at the Horse Guards,
was a completely new table of statistics, putting
down the military forces of Great Britain, at home,
at 323,259 ; or 179,111 men more than the statement
submitted two months previously. The first was
issued with the intention to show the number of
men that could, under favourable circumstances, and
on receiving reasonable notice, be made available
for immediate duty ; the last to supply the sum total
of every man and boy entered on the military pay
roll, and consequently receiving of the 75,000,000
dollars, besides including 227,179 volunterrs and
militia, of whom fully 200,000 have no existence
as soldiers. Then, there are 33,302 men ac-
coanted for as belonging to " depots." Lest
we should be charged with prejudice in describing
what those " depots" are, we will cite the London
'I Imes as an authority :

" The troops in the depots really belong not to the
home, but to the foreign establishments. They are por•
tions cf the battal;ons serving abroad, and there is nothing
strange in their being comparatively ineffective for duty
at home."

In short, they are merely an ineffective body,
composed of recruits not over three months in the
service, who are shipped off quarterly, or oftener,
when enlisted, to the regiments abroad, and old in-
valids who have been left at home as useless, "so
that, what with those who are exhausted and those
who are untaught, the corps itself is never in the
condition of a regular battalion."
So much for the depots. Now as to the volun-
teers and militia. It is only necessary to repeat
that at least 200,000 exist at present, only on paper.
Mr. Maguire recently preyed in Parliament that
nearly every regiment of militia had from 200 to
300 men more on the books of the Horse Guards
than could ever be got together on parade. Mr.
Sidney Herbert made a similar admission. On the
Irish militia regiments, whose members are com-
pelled, from hardship and poverty, to report them-
selves more punctually than their English neigh-
bours, many now estimated at 800—the Waterford,
for instance—have only 400. The estimate giving
the strength of militia and volunteers of England
at 138,560 is probably as near the mark as it is pos-
sible for an impartial statistician to make it.
The force of the regular army at home, according
to the recent report from the War Office, is 68,778.
The Household Cavalry (1,317), Royal Engineers
(2.089), the Army Hospital Corps of discarded in-
valids, the military train, and other partially una-
vailable troops, are here included. To avoid tres-

passing on disPlited grounds, we ►ill admit that
the entire 68,000 are available. This, supposing all
militia and volunteers embodied, and under arms,
would giYe a grand total of 206,560 men. We will

even acid the Irish Police to the list, which will in-

crease it to about 237,000. The nominal strength
of the regular army and embodied militia, just now,
is given at 100,000; about 16,000 in excess of the

real figures ; but we will take it as it stands. Con-
ceding that 15,000 of the volunteers could be assem-
bled at a given point, within three days of the
landing of the French, England would still have at
her disposal an army of 115,000. Of these, it must
be borne in mind that fully 25,000 are novices in
the use of arms. Now, all the navy yards, arsenals,
and Government strongholds, would require extra,
garrisons, for there are never more than 8,000 ma-
rines ashore at the naval ports. Ireland, without
attaching any importance to the influence of the
"national petition" in creating a friendly disposition
to the soldiers of M‘Mahon will need an army. All
volunteers or militia would not suffice to keep or-
der in the Emerald Isle, with the prospect of a
fight in view. Her Majesty's authorities should at
least detail 10,000 regulars and 25,000 irregulars
for that country, besides the police. This would
make about 55,000 in all, and would leave only
80,000 soldiers in England and Wales, to guard
arsenals, armories, and navy yards. It is idle to
suppose that less than 20,000 serviceable troops
would be sufficient for this important duty, allow-
ing even the worn out or inexperienced men in the

de—pots to be able to hold their own. So Napoleon's
100,000 Frenchmen, Zouaves, &c., would be op-
posed by 60,000 red coats, of whom little more than
_ _

45,000 ;tout(' belong to the lire. The probable re-

salt of a reneounte—r between the two forces, thus

brought face to face, hardly admits of a doubt.
It will be objected that France could not equip
and despatch across the channel 100,000 men, with-

out its b'eing made known. It may be. But Eng-
land would not know where the blow would fall,
and would naturally tremble for the safety of her
possessions bordering the Mediterranean, and try
to reinforce her garrisons there lest the threatened
attack on London might be intended to cover ulte-
rior designs on Malta and Gibraltar. She would
send over to these places, in a few vessels of the
channel fleet, 20,000 or 30,000 soldiers, who would
not be "volunteers," thus throwing on the latter
the weight of resisting the enemy at home. Some
distinguished writers assert that even the sacking
of London would eventually be less injurious to
England, than her banishment from Malta and
Gibraltar.

But it will be argued that the mere announce-
ment of national danger would be sufficient to
arouse every Briton in the land, from the Cheviot
Hills to Cornwall, to hurl the intruders into the
sea. This is plausible. But experience teaches us
that no matter how intense the patriotism of the
masses may be, the fact that they, as a general
thing, have no arms, and do not know how to use
them if they had, renders their disposition in an
emergency of very little value. Cane-swords and
pitchforks may be weapons exceedingly dangerous
to human life in the Seven-dials or in the provinces,
but it is not reasonable to assume that they would be
irrepressible in repelling the Zouaves. It may also
be seriously doubted whether the middle classes who
almost exclusively represent the volunteer force,
would be so ready to answer muster with the French
on their native island, as they are when summoned
to receive the congratulations of her Majesty. At
all events, it is not more absurd to admit the pos-
sibility of the invading army numbering 150,000
than to suppose the volunteers can turn out 150,000;
since a cordial invitation from Buckingham Palace
cannot succeed in bringing, at the end of a twelve
months' recruiting, more than 18,000.
Some doubts having been expressed as to the
force actually reviewed at Hyde Park, we quote a
paragraph from the Manchester Guardian, of the,
second day's parade. The " private correspondent'
alluded to is Mr. Tom Taylor, an intimate and con-
fidential friend of Col. M'Murdo

" Our private correspondent, as our readers may
recollect, has stated the number at 18,300, on the
official authority of Col. M'Murdo, which is a little
lower than the amount given by Sir J. Burgoyne's
calculation. But the martial bearing of the Volun-
teers evidently struck Sir John more than the mere
number."
In estimating the force that could probably be
concentrated to oppose invaders,
w e have purposely
made the most liberal calculation in favour of Great
Britain. Our statement of the regular army admits
as efficient every man, sick and well, whose name
is on the military book,. The militia and volun-
teers hale been moldered as 116,000 strong, whiob.

those well-informed on the matter may deem exces-
sive. The acknowledged ability of French field
officers, the excellence of French military discipline,
the general superiority of French tactics; and, on
the other hand, the well-established stupidity of
many of the highest officers in the English army ;
the slovenly management of the regulars and volun-
teers (after five weeks' notice had been given one
regiment of militia actually mustered, in May last,
with 135 bare foot members); even the conceded
inferiority of the ensemble of a British to a French
fighting army—all the.se have not been considered,
although they are most important elements in a
discussion of the subject.
In view of these facts, it appears certain that if
Napoleon landed to morrow, at a judiciously-
selected port in England, with 150,000 or even
100,000 men, he could " sack London " and escape
the "annibilaCon" which a London journal recently
stated would be his inevitable fate, " if he put a
hostile foot on Saxon soil."

---- -
THE INVASION OF THE PAPAL

TERRITORI.ES.

The Sardinian Government, in a circular to its
representatives at foreign Courts, has explained at
great length its motives for the invasion of the
territories of the Church. The document is very
much what we might have expected to see, only
that it defends a step about which neither doubt,
nor ambiguity, nor dissimulation is possible, with
a little less candour and straightforwardness than
might have been desired from the character of the
Sovereign and the peculiarity of his position. The
step which Victor Emmanuel has taken requires
no long and laboured preamble for its defence. We
need not go back to the Peace of Villafranca, we
need not consider the case of the ?Emilia and of
Tuscany, we need not consider whether united
Italy will be a source of peace and quietness or of
war and disturbance to the rest of Europe. Tne
past we know, the future we cannot conjecture.
Neither seed we follow the Sardinian Manifesto
into its lamentations over the state of Venetia.
That question we shall also hear of again, sooner,
probably, than we wish. Nor need we dwell "on
•the almost providential" change which has taken
place in Central Italy. Providence, or almost
Providence, has handed over the kingdom of Naples
to Garibaldi, and Garibaldi has handed it over to
Victor Emmanuel. On that point also there is
little to be said.

Dismissing for the present these topics, the dis-
cussion of which takes up half the Sardinian Mani-
festo, we come at last to the real pinch of the case
—to the reasons which have induced the King
to enter the territory of a neighbour with an
armed force,
and to commence military operations
with great vigour and impetuosity. Sardinia has
a war to justify. Let us see how she sets about it.
The Government of Rome, she says, has obstinately
resisted the national movement of Italy. It has
long placed itself in open hostility to its people. It
has abused the spiritual power which it holds for
other and better purposes to the support of its tem-
poral government. By misrepresenting his cause
to Roman Catholic States, and by appeals to
fanaticism, the Pope has gathered men and money
from every corner of Europe, and formed an army,
strangers not only to Rome but to Italy. All that
pretects the Government of Rome wherever the
power of the French garrison does not extend is an
army of robbers or fanatics. These things provoke
the Indignation of the Italians who have already
achieved liberty and independence. They sympa-
thise with the people of Umbria and the Marches,
and eagerly desire to put an end to a state of things
so derlorable. The King of Sardinia entertains the
same sentiments, but hitherto he has not acted upon
them. Now, however, that Naples has fallen, that
the wish of Italy to assist the Pope and his subjects
can only be controlled by force—now that by re-
maining passive he would only place himself in direct
opposition to the nation—now that there is the most
imminent danger of an outbreak of violence, passion,
and anarchy, the King bas deemed it his duty to
Italy and to Europe to intervene. He called upon
the Pope to dismiss his foreign mercenaries, and
on his refusal, and on the request of the people of
Umbria and the Marches, he has ordered his troops
to enter the Roman territory, to re-establish order,
and give the people an opportunity of manifesting
their sentiments. The King disavows all intention
of interfering with the Pope's residence at Rome,
and reminds him that it was his voice which first
summoned the Italians to struggle for independence.
Now, we must admit that it is impossible to find
among the reasons given in this Manifesto any
statement which would in ordinary times, and under
tee under.stood conditions of international law,
justify the King in making war on the Pope. The
Pope has misgoverned his subjects—that is their
and his affair. He has collected mercenaries—that
is not in itself an offence to any foreign Power. He
has resisted all reforms—it is within the acknow-
ledged jurisdicton of a Sovereign Prince to do so.
His people are in insurrection—that is no justi-
fication for a foreign Prince to aid them. The jus-
tification of Victor Emmanuel must be sought in
some other code than the existing law of nations.
Why should not the matter be stated truly ?
Victor Emmanuel comes to conquer and annex
to his own dominions all those pm tions of the
Papal territory which he has not annexed
already, or which are not occupied by a French
garrison. He enters Umbria, as he annexed the
/Emilia, not in his capacity of King of Pied-
mont, but in his capacity of leader and director
of the Italian Revolution. The question is not
whether this particular war could be justified
standing alone, but whether the Italian Revolu-
tion, of which it is a necessary consequence, is justi-
fiable. It is quite clear that the power which Gari-
baldi has raised up and the army which General
Lamoriciere has formed cannot exist side by side—
one must destroy the other, and that it is the duty of
the man who has assumed the guidance of the revo-
lution to take into his hands the decision of this con-
flict, and, by bringing an overpo veering force to bear
upon it, to shorten its duration and diminish its
ferocity. It is too late to tell the man who already
holds by a purely revolutionary tenure all Italy, ex-
cept the States of the Church and Venetia, that he
must guide himself by prescription and interna-
tional law. The die has long been cast. The only
difference between the }Emilia and Umbria is, that
in the }Emilia the wishes of the people were kept
down by Austrians, while in Umbria they are kept
down by mercenaries. The conflict in Northern
Italy drew away the Austrians ; is not armed force
equally justifiable to drive away the mercenaries P
The Constitutionnel, in commenting upon the an-
nouncement in the Moniteur of the withdrawal of
the French- Ambassador from Turin, undertakes to
vindicate the conduct of the French Government
rather than to impeach that of Victor Emmanuel.
Certainly, never was so strong a step as the with-
drawal of an Ambassador accompanied with so
very faint a remonstrance. The Constitu-
tionnel praises the admirable consistency of
French policy, commencing, conveniently enough,
with the Peace of Villafranca, and ignoring
the Manifesto of Milan, the admirable consistency
of which with that peace, so far as Venetia is con-
cerned, it would be rather difficult to establish.
France has always been in favour of a Federal
Union, says the Constitutionnel, and cites in proof
of it the pamphlet " Napoleon 111. and Italy," the
Imperial authorship of which we suppose is no
longer denied. We cannot concede to France the
extraordinary consistency to which she lays claim.
She gave Lombardy to Piedmont, not as a confede-
rate, but as an integral part of the kingdom. This
was the first step towards federation. She left
Venetia to Austria, a German Power, which at once
rendered the presence of Venetia in a federation im-
possible. She did all she could to lower the position
of the Pope, the proposed head of the federation.
She allowed, when a word from her would have pro
vented it, Piedmont to unite Parma, Modena, Tus-
cany, and the We are told she disap-
proved it. France disapproved the conduct of
Austria, and she asserted her disapproval by the
sword. France disapproved the conduct of Pied-
mont ; a word would have done in the latter case
what a sanguinary campaign did in the former, but
that word was not spoken. Who but M. Grand-
guillot could call this a Federal policy, and cite a
pamphlet written before the war to show, as he says,
that the French programme was carried out to the
letter ? Now we are told that disapproval must
change into disavowal, because the temporal inde-
pendence of the Pope 13
.threatened by Sardinia.
Was not that temporal nictvendence threatened
when France,in a pamphlet avowed as the exposition
of her policy, threatened the Pope wit h the restriction
of his temporal power to the city of Rome ? Was
it not threatened by Sardinia when she united the
Romagna to herself? Is it not threatened by La-
moriciere, who exercises a power in the Roman
States over which the Pope can have no control ?
And is it not more grievously threatened by Gari•
baldi, who is about to fling on the Southern fron-
tier the forces which have already overthrown a
kingdom, and which burn with a peculiar ardour
to overturn a Papacy ? What does the attitude of
' France really amount to ? She wishes, if we are
to believe her sesm•offioial press, to maintain as

much as is left of the temporal power of the Pope,
and therefore withdraws her Minister from Turin
to mark her displeasure at the invasion of his ter-
ritory. But suppose Sardinia had yielded to her
advice, would the temporal independence of the
Pope have been secured, or would he not have been
kit to the tender mercies of the men who fight un-
der Garibaldi, flushed with the victory that united
Italy would be sure in the long run to obtain over
the forces of Lamoriciere ? We should be glad to
know by what arguments M. Grandguillot can
attack the invasion of the Roman States in 1860
which are not equally applicable to the invasion of
Lombardy by France in 1859. In both eves there
was misgovernment, in neither was there any direct
offence. Is not the withdrawal of the Ambassador
from Turin a censure of the victorious campaign in
the North of Italy pronounced by the Government
which planned and conducted it ; and is not the
declaration of the semi-official Constitutionnel that
there is a long way from a disavowal to a rupture,
and that the interests of France and Piedmont are
always the same, a censure of the withdrawal of
the Ambassador ?—Times.