The Sun.
London, England, 1860-07-06 00:00:00

THE REPEAL OF THE PAPER DUTY.

Mr. GLADSTONE laid on the table a petition, signed
by a large number of manufacturers in the north of Eng-
la.nd, representing property to the extent of £20,000,000,
dot; ouncing the conduct of the House of Lords in rejecting the
bill ,for the repeal of the duty on paper after its adoption
by the House of Commons, as a dangerous and unconsti-
tutioaal act, dangerous to the privileges of the
House of Commons, and tending to paralyse
commere, calculations in the mercantile world being
made on the faith of acts in the House of Commons relating
to taxation.. The right hon. gentleman also presented a
petition from
,the metropolis, signed by between 3,000 and
4,000 persons, of a similar character.

, .
Mr. E. JAI4.ES gave notice that at the end of the third
vesolution he would move " and that this house is deter-
mined to assert snc•h privileges."
BOMBALUDMENT OF NAPLES.

Colonel STUART' asked the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs whether her Majesty's Government have
taken, or are rrepared .to take, any steps in concert with
the French Government, tc. prevent the bombardment of
Naples by the King's troop{, in the event of General Gari-
baldi's suddenly occupying the t city as he did Palermo ?
Lord J. RUSSELL—In answer to the hon. and gallant
gentleman, I may say that, after tlte intelligence of the out-
rages which accompanied the bombardment of Palermo, the
question was taken into consideration what her Majesty's
Government could do in order to preye:it similar atrocities
taking place at Messina and Naples. Bat with respect to
the question put by the hon. and gallant m,'mber, there are
two considerations which must guide the Government on
the subject. The one is, that it would be a di:rect interfe
rence with the civil and internal discord of another coun-
try. (Hear, hear.) And even supposing that objextion, on
principle, to be got over, it would not only be difficult but
impossible to give such precise and definite orders to the
commanding officers of her Majesty's vessels of war Its to
enable them to distinguish between that which would be
the legitimate defence of the royal troops against the at-
tack of a mob or an insurrection and a wanton and atro-
cious destruction of the city and the lives of its inhabitants.
Such being the case, we refrained altogether from giving
any orders which would enable our naval commanders to
act by force either at Naples or Messina ; but we did make
strong remonstrances to the Government of the King of
Naples against any renewal at Messina or Naples of the
dreadful scenes which took place at Palermo. (Hear, hear.)
I am happy to say, however, that the accounts I have re-
ceived from her Majesty's Minister at Naples lead me to
think there is no prospect at present of such a bombardment
taking place. lie informs me that he does net think it at all
probable,and he hopes that no insurrection whatever will
occur at Naples. The hon. and gallant gentleman is aware
that great changes have taken place in the Government of
Naples—(laughter)—that the constitution of 1848 is pro.
ciainied, and an election is to take place for the representa-
tives of the assembly which will meet in September; and
the Neapolitans will thus be enabled to decide what shall
be their own future political conditijn. (Hear.) I may
mention that the rumours which have from time to time
been circulated respecting the conduct of her Majesty's
forces and Ministers abroad have often been very erroneous.
There was a report some time ago, the house will remember,
that the fort of Castellamare had been occupied by the Bri-
tlaiaalairal during the evacuation of Palermo by tho Nea-
politan
troops. That report gave great uneasiness in some
foreign quail
iBl and it was supposed that her Majesty's
forces were about to take possession of Sicily. There is not
theleast foundationatever for that report. (Hear.) There
was another reportwhich occasioned some inquiry in another
place, to the effect that herlaiesty's Minister at, Naples had
taken a part 1* advising that the two vessels which had been
captured by the Neapolitan
cruisers should be given up by
the Neapolitan Government, Now I have a despatch from
her Majesty's Minister at Naples, in he says he has
just heard of thereport, and tehzi hertherre is not the smallest
H
foundation for it, (Hear.)
says that he had no
right to take such a course, and that if h
tion of exercising such right. He also atidhsethhaadt tnhoeinNtena:
politan Government had spontaneously given upt those ves-
sels, and that they were at liberty to return to
MR. DUNCOMBE'S MOTION. el".
Lord FERMOY suggested to the hon. member for Fins.
bury (Mr. T. Duncornbe) not to press his motion, of which
.
he had given notice yesterday, as an amendment to the
rlsolutions of the noble lord (Lord Palmerston), but to sub-
mit the same as an amendment—a course which Would
have the approval of other hon. members like himself
(Lord Fermoy).
jto, T, puNcoMBE said that as he could not calm-
iate on the support a Liberia members, he would with-

draw his amendment, much to the dissatisfaction of the
country at large.

THE RESOLUTIONS.
Lord PALMERSTON then rose, amidst loud cheers, to

move the following resolutions :
"1. That the right of granting aids and pplies to the
Crcwn is in the Commons alone, as an essent'. 1 part of their
Constitution, and the limitation of all 8.1 h grants, as to
the matter, manner, measure, and time, i 4 nly in them."
" 2. That although the Lords have exercised the power
of rejecting bills of several descriptions relating to taxation,
by negativing the whole, yet the exercise of that power
by them has not been frequent, and is justly regarded by
this house with peculiar jealousy, as affecting the right of
the Commons to grant the supplies, and to provide the ways
and means for the service of the year.
"3. That to guard for the future against an undue
exercise of that power by the Lords, and to secure to the
Commons their rightful control over taxation and supply,
this house has in its own hands the power so to impose
and remit taxes, and to frame Bills of Supply, that
the right of the Commons as to the matter,
manner, measure, and time, may be maintained inviolate."
The noble lord said—Mr. Speaker, I rise upon an occasion
which undoubtedly will rank as the first in importance
among those which have taken place with regard to our par-
liamentary proceedings—(cheers)—because there can be
nothing, I think, of greater importance to the country than
questions which relate to the respective rights, privileges,
and practices of the two Houses of Parliament. (Hear.)
But, before I address myself to the subject, I wish to per-
form a duty—to call the attention of the house to that re-
port which has been presented to them by the committee
whom they appointed to investigate and examine the jour-
nals and the authorities of both houses bearing upon the
question, a document, I think, which contains a summary
of parliamentary practice that will prove a lasting source of
advantage to the house in regard to its proceedings ; and I
should fail to express what I am sure was the opinion of
that committee of which I have the honour to be a mem-
ber, if I did not state to the house how thankful they felt,
how indebted they were to the right hon. gentleman who
was chairman of the committee—(cheers)—and to the offi-
cers of this house who gave us their willing and assiduous
assistance in the performance of our labours. (Hem., hear.)
And I am satisfied that the house will respond to the com-
mittee by returning their sincere thanks and acknowledging
their obligations, both to the right hon. gentleman the
member for the University of Cambridge and to those offi-
cers of the house by whose assistance we were enabled to
proceed with our inquiry. (Hear.) Sir, the question at issue

involved considerations of the utmost constitutional import-
anee. Our constitution consists of authorities separate from
and independent of each other, each possessing rights and
powers which it may exercise on its own authority. In the
early periods of our history it was not so. If we go back to
very remote periods we shall find that the Lords—that is to
say the barons—were powerful enough to overrule the
Crown ; and by their exertions, by their courage, by their
perseverance, and by their public spirit and their patriot-
ism, they obtained for us the great and fundamental charter
of our liberties. (Hear.) There came then a conflict, which
lasted for a great length of time, between the Crown and the
barons. The Crown, in the end, prevailed, and established
an arbitrary power, which ground down and controlled the
liberties of the nation, and which at last became an intoler-
able burden. The excessive use of an excessive power
created resistance. The nation rose against the power of
the Crown, and in resisting the arbitrary and excessive au-
thority of the Crown it not only overthrew the Crown, but
involved in its ruin the other estate of the kingdom. Well,
sir, the humour of the country did not long adapt itself to
that state of things. The power of the Crown was restored ;
and again restored to be again abused ; and again the abuse
of excessive authority produced its natural result. The
Crown was overthrown—that is to say that those who
exercised the power of the Crown were overthrown by
the very excess in the amount of their power, and the un-
checked and uncontrolled nature of that power. Then came
about that state of things under which this nation has ever
since happily lived and flourished—(cheers)—and under
which it has enjoyed a greater amount of civil, political.
social, and religious liberty than perhaps ever fell to the lot
of any nation of the world. (Cheers.) But how has that
result been accomplished ? Not by vesting in any one of
the three estates—the Crown, the Lords, and the Commons
—an exclusive or overruling power. It has been brought
about by maintaining for each its own separate and inde-
pendent authority, by those three :powers combining to-
gether to bear and forbear—to endeavour by harmonious
concert to avoid those conflicts and clashings which must
have arisen if independent authority had been exerted by
each and all ; and the result has been what we now so hap-
pily and fortunately see around us. I say that each retains
its power—that two possess the power of originating laws,
and that the third possesses the power in common with the
other of rejecting laws proposed for its acceptance. It is
generally supposed that the power of rejection by the crown
has ceased to exist, but that is a fUndamental error. That
power exists as before, but it is exercised in a different
manner. Instead of being exercised upon the measures
proposed for the Royal assent, it is exercised by anticipa-
tion in the debates and the discussions of the two houses of
Parliament. It is delegated to those who are the respon-
sible advisers of the Crown, and it is not possible that a
measure passed by the two houses of parliament should be
presented to the Crown and by the Crown should be re-
, jected and refused. And why ? Because it cannot be ima-
gined that a law should have received the consent of both
L houses of parliament, in which the responsible ministers of
1 the Crown are sitting, debating, and voting, unless those
who had advised the Crown had agreed to the measure,
and were prepared, therefore, to counsel the Crown
to assent to it. What would be the consequence
if any other course were pursued ? Why, if the mea-
sure were passed by the two houses of parliament,
against the will and opinions of the ministers of the
day, these ministers must naturally resign their offices, and
be replaced by those under whose advice Parliament had
acted. If that were not the case, I think the two houses
would very soon intimate to the Crown their opinion with
regard to those advisers which would not leave any choice
as to the hands in which the confidence of the Crown should
be placed. I say then, that each branch of the legislature
retains its power of rejection, but the Commons House of
Parliament have claimed from time immemorial particular
privileges with regard to particular bills. We have claimed,
and justly claimed, as stated in these resolutions, the exclu-
sive right of determining matters connected with the taxa-
tion of the people. We have claimed to ourselves the right
of originating such measures; we have denied to the Lords
the right of originating such measures, and we have denied
to them the right of altering or amending them ; and those
assertions of right we have the power to enforce, because
in every case bills so originating in the Lords, or so amended
in the Lords, must come back to this house, and this house
has then an opportunity either to confer with the Lords,
and endeavour to persuade them to give up their decision,
or to reject the bill. In either case, therefore, we have in
our own hands a clear, plain, straight, and direct method of
giving effect to the right which we claim, and which
naturally belongs to us. But in those memorable confer-
ences which took place between the two Houses of Parlia-
ment in 1671, it was admitted by the Attorney-General, on
behalf of the Commons—and for his conduct in those con-
ferences he was thanked by this h use, inasmuch as he had
satisfactorily maintained its rights and privileges—it was
admitted in those conferences on behalf of the Commons
that the Lords, although they could not originate, and
though they could not amend, had nevertheless the power
to reject money bills. (Loud Opposition cheers.) An ad-
mission which was no great concession, because, as I have
already stated, a bill rejected by the other house disappears;
it does not come back to this house, and therefore,
directly at least, and immediately, no action is possible
on the part of this house, in regard to such bill; and conse-
quently, in admitting, as the House of Commons did at that
time, and afterwards in 1678, that the Lords had the power
of rejecting "in the whole—that was the expression—the
house only admitted that which it would have been diffi-
cult to deny, and the denial of which, if made in a direct
and positive mariner, it would have been impossible to rut
in force. So matters stood at that time. Innumerable
cases have arisen in which bills connected with the imposi
tion of taxes on the people, having been amended by the
Lords and returned to us, have either been immediately re-
jected—even in some cases, as is recorded, with marks of
contumely, or conferences have taken place, by means of
which the Lords have departed from their decision ; or, in
cases in which the amendment of the Lords had been
merely verbal, or unimportant, or calculated to further the
intentions of this house, those amendments have been
ado d, dw,
ha ni
cdh awd oe pr
et ea
cd
ci no r
do thin egrl
y billspassent
buy pt
ht
eo
nit h. e
BHuctutsheosoef
cases relate to bills imposing taxes. The present case is of
a different nature. (Hear, hear.) It is the case of a bill
for repealing a tax, and, therefore, when you admit the right
of the Lords to reject bills—if that concession was not ac-
companied, as it was not, by any limitation as to the kind
of bills to which the admission applied--I say, that when
you concede to the Lerds the power of rejecting bills, you can
only, in point of argument, establish a distinction between
bills of a different kind ; but in fact, although we contend,
and justly contend, for a right, which is interwoven with
the constitutional history of this country—although we
contend for the right of originating grants of supply, or of
shaping them according to our belief of what is for the pub-
lie interest, yet, nevertheless, a bill so prepared, shaped, and
framed by us cannot pass into law without the assent of
the Lords ; and it is clear that an authority whose assent is
necessary to give a proposal the force of law must, by the
nature of things, be at liberty to dissent and refuse its
sanction—(opposition cheers)—and to take from the Lords
the power of dissenting from a bill to which
their assent is necessary, would require an Act of Parlia-
ment, to which they must be parties, or else it would be a
revolutionary subversion of the existing constitution of these
realms. (Cheers.) But I say that, if we look to that large
number of precedents in which the Lords have sent back
with amendments bills sent to them from this house, and
on which bills conferences took place in which alterations
were made, we shall find, as I have already said, that in
that long string of precedents here brought before us, al- i
though they almost entirely relate to bills imposing taxes
(and even in that precedent of 1671, in which conferences
took place by which that mutual right was conceded, that
conference having originated in the Lords trying to dimi-
nish a tax which was proposed to them), there did not arise
at
hceB ra
1.7
ods similarhavto
:r rutehatsewptiochcohnassernetcently oecurred, in which
Well, then, I say that this great
string of precedentsorfepealo t'
a
xi
s.

somewhat wide of the question which has occasioned this
research. There are, however, precedents that bear directly
on the point at issue, because between the year 1714 and the
present day there have been about 36 cases of bills for re-
pealing duties or imposts of some kind or other, which,
having been sent up to the Lords, have by them been re-
. _ _

jetted, or at least have not come down again to this house.
So far as these precedents go, it will be contended that they
_ _

are authorities upon which the House of Lords may think
itself justified in the proceeding which it has recentlycarried
into effect. But, nevertheless, if you look into those prece-
dents, you will find thet the bills which were so rejected by

them were those bills involving taxes of very small amount,
or taxes connected with questions of commercial protection,

or of policy of some other kind, so that in fact it may be

said that in those cases the rejection of the bills arose not

so pith from the determination of the Lords to continue an
impost on the country as an impost, but arose from their
differing in opinion with the Commons as to some question
of national policy, in regard to which those taxes or im-
posts were to continue or to be repealed. And this also
may be said in regard to the amount of those taxes that none
of them were at all to be compared in quantity or in amount
with the revenue which was involved in this bill for the re-
peal of the duties on paper. But then, admitting, as I think
we must do, that technically, in point of power, we have
never questioned the right of the Lords to reject bills, yet
the present case assumes somewhat of a different character,
because we have maintained in words, and we have main-
tained by actions, that it rests with this house to frame the
supplies of the year (cheers), to consider and determine with
regard to the aids and supplies of the year what taxes shall
be proposed, what taxes shall be remitted, what shall be the
proportionbetween imposition and remission, and what shall
be the nature of the arrangement ; and it is our privilege to
combine the whole into one scheme, and when that scheme is
so combined, it certainly is not consistent with the rights
and functions of this house that any material portion of the
scheme so framed should be rejected by the other house, so
as to alter and entirely vary the bearing of the whole finan-
cial arrangement. (Cheers.) Well then, the question is, was
that done by the House of Lords on the late occasion ? Why,
sir, one must admit that in principle it was done. (Cheers.)
It cannot be denied that the repeal of the paper duty did
form an important element in that plan of finance which
was sent up by this house to the Lords, and if everything
had remained as it was whenthat plan of finance was framed
the refusal of the Lords to pass that remission of duty, hav-
ing agreed to pass a bill adding to another duty, would have
deranged that combination of finance which, on a balance
of remission and imposition, had been thought by this house
to be good for the interest of the country, for the supplies of
the present year. (Cheers,) At the same time we have ad-
mitted that in those 36 cases of rejection to which I have
alluded an element ofpolicy was allowed to enter into the de-
cision of the house upon those cases. It is of course not easy
to affirm with certainty what were the grounds upon which
the House of Lords may have acted in any one of those
cases ; but looking at the manner in which, in those in-
stances, views of taxation waere combined with other kinds
of policy, it is fair to assume that in those cases the rejec-
tion of the bill did not arise from a refusal of the Lords
simply to relieve the people from a certain amount of bur-
then, but arose from the Lords believing that the arrange-
ments with which the repeal of that burthen was coupled
were not for the public advantage, and therefore they re-
jected the repeal because they thought the public interest
was not consulted by that with which it was connected.
Well, then, sir, I will put the case as impartially as I can,
in bringing my mind to the consideration of a question on
which I think party feeling should be cast aside, and in
which much higher and larger interests are concerned ; for
the course the house shall now take will be a precedent to
guide future Parliaments in time to come, and therefore one
ought to place oneself in the situation of an impartial spec-
tator, and state fairly and honestly that which may be said
on either side of the question. Now though I cannot allude
here to anything that may have passed in the debate in the
House of Lords—for it is not consistent with our orders to
do so—yet, looking broadly at the matter, I do not believe
that in ordinary circumstances, if this house had deter-
mined that a certain amount of taxation was fit to be re-
pealed, and had sent up a bill to the House of Lords for that
purpose, the House of Lords would have rejected such a bill.
I do not believe that if it had been shown that there was
any excess of taxation which pressed heavily upon certain
interests of the country, that that amount of revenue was
unnecessary, or that a better application of that taxation
might be made by transferring the burden to some other
interest that would bear it better—l do not believe, judging
from what has happened, we know, on some former occa-
sions, that the Lords would have taken the step which they
, have taken. Why we know what an immanse amount of
taxation has been repealed by the two houses of parliament
since the end of the war in 1815. Upon no one occasion
that I am aware of, in any of those instances, have the
Lords dissented from the decision of the Commons to relieve
the country from a burden which was thought to be unne-
cessary ; and therefore I cannot bring myself to believe that
the Lords intended, by the step which they took upon this oc-
casion to enter upon a course which if they did intend to enter
upon it, it would have become this house to resist by every
means which is constitutionally and legally in their power—
I do not believe the House of Lords intended to take the
first step towards partnership with this house in arranging
the budget of the year, the measure, the manner, and time
of the grants, the aids and supplies, which it belongs wholly
and exclusively to this house to tender. If any of us be-
lieved that such was their intention, and that it is only the
first step to another course— (hear, hear, from below the
gangway)—why then, I say it would become us to resolve
in our minds to take those measures which we have in our
power, and to meet that intention, to defeat and to frus-
trate it. But I say that until we have some more decided
proof that such intentions are entertained, I should abjure
this house—(cheers from the Opposition)—to content itself
with that record or declaration which is contained in the
resolutions I have the honour to lay on the table, and not,
without being driven into it as a necessity, to enter into a
formal conflict with that house. (Cheers from the Opposi-
tion.) Well, but had the Lords no encouragement from this
house to take that stop ? (Cheers from the Opposition.)
That bill passed on the second reading by a majority, I
think, of 53. It was brought into this house under cir-
cumstances which are entirely altered—notoriously and
publicly know.' to be altered—at the time when that rejec-
tion took place : but when this bill was proposed for the se-
cond reading, although opposed by many, it was neverthe-
less carried by a majority of 53. Well, sir, if on the third
reading it had gone into the Lords with an equal majority
or a large majority, I would net myself believe that the
Lords would have done otherwise than pass it. But they
saw—and these things, although they may not be known
officially, yet are matters of public notoriety, and the re
cords of our proceedings are laid cn their table—they
saw that during the interval between our second and third
reading, the opinion of this house appeared to have under-
gone a considerable alteration—(cheers from the Opposition)
—that the majority of 53 was reduced to nine. (Cheers
and laughter from the Opposition.) Were not the Lords
entitled to think that the opinion of this house was not 50
strong as it had been? and so far as they were guided by
public opini,,n, they might legitimately infer that which
the hon. Secretary to the Treasury has confirmed by an
estimate which he has laid on the table—(hear, hear, from
the Opposition)—that events which it was hoped would
not occur when the original arrangements were proposed,
and which we bad a right to expect might not take place,
had taken place, and would take place. And might they
not think that it would be wise to give this house at least
time for reconsideration, with a view to see whether that
amount of revenue, which was justly thought to be unne-
cessary at the time when the arrangements were made,
might not, by altered circumstances, the change of which
was beyond our control, become a source of income which it
would be desirable to keep for the year—(cheers)l—rather
than to make up for it by transferring to other interests
and other sources of industry that burthen which had been
borne by the industry and interest of paper ? Well, stating,
I think impartially—(cheers)—the case on both sides, while
on the one hand I think this house would have a right to
resent and to resist any at.empt on the part of the Lords to
enter into partnership with us, with a view of guiding and
determining the financial arrangements for the year—
while I think they would be stepping out of their pro-
vince, and departing from that line of constitutional right
which the history of the country has assigned them, yet
on the other hand, if it can be believed (and I am led my-
self to think so), that they were actuated on this occasion
not by any such intention, but by. motives of policy de-
pending on the circumstances of the moment, then I say
I think it would not be wise of this house to enter into
a conflict, upon a ground which might not really exist,
but to satisfy themselves with a declaration of what is
their own constitutional power and privilege, reserving to
themselves the exercise of that puwer which they have, by
their own means, if the occasion should arise, if that opinion
which I have expressed should not be confirmed, and if
the deliberate course should be pursued of changing the
whole system of constitutional proceedings with regard to
taxation, we will determine that if that should arise we
would use those means which I am convinced are in
existence, and which are sufficient to prevent any such in-
roads on the constitutional privilege of this house. Many
may think the last resolution too vague—(a laugh)—that it
does not point out the method by which we might enforce
our privileges (or our constitutional rights I will say, and I
will not say our privileges, for that i 3 a narrow expression),
if they have-been invaded. There are many ways, which
any man who knows the proceedings and powers of this
house will at once have present to his mind, and in which,
on such an occasion arising, we shall be able, first by per-
suasion, first by argument, and ultimately to the exercise of
our own authority, to prevent such an encroachment on
the constitutional functions of this house. And if such a
course, such a mad course, were to be attempted as that, it
is not by a violent resolution laid on the table of this house
it is not by a scolding match with the Lords—(laughter)
—it is not by impotent words laid on the table and voted
by this house that our constitutional rights would have to
be vindicated ; it would bo by action which we should not
be slow to discover the mode of taking. I have not that
opinion of the power of this house, and of public opinion,
which would back it in such a case, to believe that we
should be reduced to the condition in which the Commons
of 1671 represented themselves to be when they said that
their right to grant aids to.the Crown was " the only poor
thing which they had" for the acceptance of the sovereign.
The House of cQUIVIIQIIS is now in a very different