The Sun.
London, England, 1860-03-17 00:00:00

whom he had acted on the former Chinese mission in terms
of the greatest cordiality, should go to Paris and consult
with M. Thonvenel and Baron Gros on those points in re-
spect of which explanations were required. One of the
questions to be settled was whether Lord Elgin and Baron
Gros should have the supreme command of the naval and
military operations. That seemed to be a right principle,
but it must be observed that the naval and military com-
manders might find themselves in such a position as that it
would be impossible for them to stop with safety to the
troops and the ships. (Hear, hear.) These were points
which had not yet been settled. As regarded the necessity
for a display of military force, seeing that 400 or 500 men
had been killed and wounded by an ambuscade—(no, no)—
ho thought that the lives and property of Englishmen in
that country would not be safe if in some way or another
the Chinese were not required to make reparation for that
result. (Hear, hear.) Some persons said the passage up the
river was without notice to the Chinese, but Mr. Bruce
showed that that was not so, but that he had required to be
allowed to go up with the ships, and that he should be re •
ceived in an honourable manner. There was no positive re-
fusal, but the commissioner at Shanghai desired to send first
to Pekin, and the time he required for the Lurpose was un-
reasonably long. 'When Mr. Bruce had arrived at the Peiho
he found no Chinese authorities there, and the people were
acting without orders ; and, whether Mr. Bruce was acting
rightly or wrongly, he and Admiral Hope went up to the
mouth of the river without any notice that their passage
would be obstructed. That having happened, and a great
loss of life and property having occurred, there must be
some reparation. -(Hear, hear.) The demands made were ex-
ceedingly moderate. The treaty had been concluded, and
only required to be ratified. The Government also de-
manded that some apology should be made for the outrage
which had been committed. That being done, it was pro-
posed that the British Minister should go up to Pekin
and obtain the ratification of the treaty. With regard to
the whole matter no one could regret it more than him •
self. There was no question of boundary to be settled, or
other matters of that kind. All that they sought for was
trade with the Chinese ; and, in order that that might be
carried on, the Government required security for the lives
and property of their people. He would state that in late
, years trade had enormously increased at Shanghai and
at other places, and that a large number of persons were
engaged in it, and of course they were liable to disputes.
It was therefore desirable that our Minister should
have the privilege of resorting to the chief powers and
places in China, and not be confined to Canton and to
intercourse with the Governor there. He thought the
British Minister shouldlave the option of residing at Pekin
or anywhere else where interests of trade required it. It
might be that he should reside at Shanghai, and go occa-
sionally to Pekin; but better arrangements than the pre-
sent were eminently desirable. (Hear.) Lord Elgin would
soon return, and would then proceed on his mission. His
hon. and gallant friend seemed to think that no better choice
could have been made, and that no man was more anxious
to maintain peaceful relations with the Chinese. His lord •
ship had acquired an esteem for that people, and a strong
wish for their welfare; and he (Lord J. Russell) believed
that both he and Baron Gros were animated by the most
pacific sentiments, and that better could not have been done
than to send them out as plenipotentiaries. He believed he
had now troubled the house with all that was necessary to
be said on the subject.
Sir J. ELPHINSTONE regretted that, whilst sketching
out the proposed naval and military operations, the noble
lord had not also given them some comprehensive plan for
the settlement of our future relations with China. With
the permission of the house he (Sir J. Elphinstone) should
give a slight sketch of our policy and position in China
down to the present time. In 1832 the charter of the East
India Company came to an end, and there was consequently
a total change in our relations with the Chinese Govern-
ment. Instead of a monopoly opposed to a monopoly, car-
ried on by a disciplined body, acting up to all treaty stipu-
lations, the trade was thrown open to traders of any sort,
who, believing China to be an Eldorado, flocked to that
country from all parts. Our Government sent out a noble-
man to superintend that trade, but, instead of being accre-
dited as a plenipotentiary and supported by a sufficient force,
Lord Napier landed in the dead of the night, and was only
recognised by the chief of the police. He was conse-
quently subjected to serious insults, and the trade was
stopped. ' The results that followed led to the first Chinese
war, and then Sir H. Pottinger was sent out to settle
the question. He concluded the treaty with Nankin
after a series of hostilities which brought the Chinese
Government into great discredit with the people, and his
treaty was designated the seven years' settlement. Matters
dragged on under this treaty for years, during which British
subjects were persecuted with every indignity. The affair
of the Arrow was only the culminating' point of a serious
difficulty. He thought her Majesty's Government had been
right in that affair, and had lie been then in Parliament he
should have given them his support. (Hear, hear.) The
second Chinese war resulted in the mission of Lord Elgin,
into which he would not go further than to say that in his
judgment the whole operations were conducted not only
with singular ability by the gallant admiral and the pleni-
potentiary, but that everything that up to that time was
done was well done. (Hear, hear.) They had then the
treaty which was now before•them, which although a great
improvement on that of Sir H. Pottinger did not embrace a
sufficiently comprehensive view of Chinese policy. He
hoped that Lord Elgin might be able to effect his object
without the effusion of blood, and that his lordship would be
able to effect everything he had undertaken. But he en-
tirely differed from what the noble lord had shadowed forth
in his remarks, and he thought it would be a most fatal mis-
take if our troops advanced on Pekin. There was no doubt
but that the insult which had been passed upon us required
retribution, but he thought that, in the first instance, it
ought to be put to the Chinese to give an ample apology
and compensation for the lives and property that had been
destroyed. His plan would be to fall back on the city of
Nankin. That was the strategic point from which the em-
pire could be paralysed. The party that held that city had so
complete a control of the producing districts that it would be
perfectly impossible for the Emperor to collect his revenue
so long as that city was hold by a foreign Power. The empire
of China was intersected by two of the largest rivers in the
world—the Yang-tee-Kiang and the Hoanho—the first
rising in the mountains of Thibet, and the other more to
the north, and both falling into the sea. These two rivers
watered all the great producing districts of China, and any
force occupying Nankin not only commanded the Grand
Canal, but commanded also the mouths of the rivers.
Having reduced the Taku forts and the defences of the Pei.
ho, the army should fall back on Nankin, which should be

occupied until the Emperor conceded our demands.
_lf you

went on to Pekin you must start in the middle of April,
and world arrive at the mouth of the Peiho, when, with
40,000 men, you would reduce the forts. By the time you
had done this August would have arrived; and it was the
univeroal opinion of every gentleman who knew anything
about China that the Emperor would retire into Mantchou-
ria, leaving your army in an immense city, and surrounded
by a vast and turbulent population. The September winds
swept over the steppe from the Amoor, and the thermome-
ter woad probably fall from 30 to 40 degrees below zero.
Sheepskin-clad Tartan; in myriads would harass the in-
vaders, thus placed 600 miles from their,base of operations.
Whence would they get their supplies. He would not im-
pose upon any officer the duty of placing the Queen's troops
in such a position. (Hear, hear.) They had heard of the
disaster of Cabul—let them not tempt the repetition of such
a terrible calamity. (Hear, hear.) There was no doubt but
that the army they were sending out would go through any
Asiatic army that could be collected ; but the difficulty
would be in getting the latter together to be slaughtered.
they must remember that the Chinese were the most subtle
people in the world, and that they would exhaust all pos-
sible means to prevent our getting to Pekin, and afterwards
tot harass us when our troops had taken possession of that
c iy. His policy, then, would be to take possession of
withNan-
kin a force of gun-boats, and to keep the rivers clear,
by ao doing the producing districts would be brought as
under our command, and the war to a speedy and satisfas •
tory conclusion. The Chinese rebellion was not a matter of
na,yineesdint ebtrhedgreeyAd.
malnenr
American
\hey
aee
nr re eo
ebfme lt
psh were
yne
era edmi net
of force
resistr‘c ahnogik-itang,
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t
public-house, and who was mad(oall‘a lulu:. r
Then,) of the Pea-
cock's Feather for his services. (.A
a movement took place which was a sort of semi-Christian in 1 849,
movement. There was also the movement of the triad socie-
ties,
the members of which became pirates. Our policy
throughout these events had been of a most vacillating
character, sometimes assisting the imperialists, and some-
times the rebels. In 1855 the rebels came down to Shanghai
and were supplied with ammunition by the mereantilecom-
tnunity. Three hundred blue jackets and marines defended
the European community, and Captain O'Callaghan, who
commanded them, had never been sufficiently rewarded. The
hon. member here read extracts from Lord Elgin's de-
spatches, descriptive of this state of affairs, and proceeded.
He knew that the rebels had never been able to create any
sort of Government themselves, so that our only chance of
maintaining any sort of regularity at all was to support the
Imperial Government as we found it. The noble lord at
the head of foreign aftltirs pointed out in his statement that
evening the eventuality, in case of other negotiations fail-
ing, that we must resort to some sort of indemnification from
the Chinese, but he (Sir J. Elphinstone) held that we could
not secure any indemnification unless we held the export
duties in our ONVI,I hands, and Lord Elgin took the same view
f the matter in a despatch to Lord Malmesbury in July 1858 ,
lie (Sir J. Elphinstone) thought it would be unwise to drive

the Chinese to resistance and despair, which would only in-
crease the unpopularity of such a measure, and would create
sympathy with the rebels, by insisting upon the settlement
of pecuniary claims which, under no circumstance?
could be reasonably satisfied. That, he thought, settled
the question of indemnity.

Lord J. RUSSELL—The claim, then, was £1,200,000.
Sir J. ELPHINSTONE thought that 1,200,000 dollars
would be as difficult to obtain from the Chinese as
£1,200,000.

Lord J. RUSSELL—That was an indemnity for the mer-
chants and the Government under the treaty of Tien-tsin.
Sir J. ELPHINSTONE—Yes, but the noble lord asked
an indemnity for the great armaments we were now send-
ing out. But they had the Persian expedition to guide
them in their calculations as to the probable amowitt of the
cost of that expedition to China. The Persiait expedition

IRi;,, SUN, LO Dorf,

"".." '•
lasted only four or flee months, and the cost was £2,500,000,
which the people of E. ngland were called upon to pay. How
much of that amount was laid upon that willing horse, our
Indian empire, he co aid not say, but that amount was ex-
pended upon a small foils. going a distance of 3,500 miles.
Now the dis,tance from :Bombay to the mouth of the Peiho
was upwards of 6,000 miles, from- Calcutta 4,700 miles, and
from Madras 4„500 miles. The price of coal for the expe-
dition to the Perlbo would b e £3 per ton; the horses, artil-
lery, and attendanis upon an. army of 10,000 or 12,000 men
going such a distance must biz much larger than what was
required for the Persian expedition, and the basis of opera-
tions being India the army must carry the greater part of
its supplies with it. But, supposing the whole thing to be
done in a few weeks—though he did not expect it would
take less than 12 months—before the expedition could be
at an end, and supposing it would not be necessary to
leave any force in the country to make the provisions of
the treaty be carried out, in that case his belief was
that they would not get out of this Chinese war
at a less cost than £10,000,000. (Hear, hear.) And
yet they had a deficiency of £6,000,000, or £7,000,000,
or £8,000,000, of which no account was taken, but which
must eventually come out of their pockets. (Hear, hear.)
That was the reason why he had steadily opposed the mea-
sures taken by the present Government. (Hear, hear.) He
could not conceive what brought them into this Chinese
matter at all. (Hear, hear.) Sixteen years ago, when he
went backwards and forwards to China, the whole of the
French trade to that country was represented by one ship,
laden with claret, which took back toys and a little tea.
He believed that trade had a little increased now, but he
I was sorry to say, in a most unfavourable direction. Now,
the French ships were carrying coolies. That was a sys-
tem of slavery which had been growing up and would come
to a very' insupportable pitch, and would increase the dis-
' like of Europeans, and especially of the English, because
they could not draw a distinction between us and other na-
tions which had no great trade with China ; the odium
would all be laid upon the English, who were the only
Europeans known to the Chinese. That coolie question
must be dealt with, and other questions also which were
eating up the vitals of every Chinese treaty until we took
the matter up as we ought to do, and settled it, now that we
had an opportunity of placing our trade with China in a
position of security, such as became a great Christian na-
tion. (Hear, hear.)
Mr. BRIGHT said when the speech with which her Ma-
jesty opened the present session of Parliament first met his
eyes he was glad to observe the paragraph which referred
to these unhappy affairs in China, inasmuch as it indicated
a disposition on the part of the government to avoid re-
opening a war with China. The resolution moved by his
hon. friend near him (Sir De L. Evans) was in effect call-
ing upon the house to support the policy indicated in her
Majesty's speech, whick was such as he was sure every
member of that house would be willing to vote for, and
which the Government would be willing to accept. Ano-
ther object of that resolution was to enable the noble lord
the Foreign Secretary to make that statement which he
gave fine house to understand a few nights ago be in-
tended to make upon these Chinese affairs. He (Mr.
Bright) confessed he was a good deal disappointed with
that statement. The noble lord told the house
scarcely anything, except that the amount of force being
sent to China was only one-half as much as was stated
by his hon. friend. It appeared to him that, on occa-
sions of that sort, when the country might be dragged
into a bloody and costly contest, it was the duty of the
Foreign Minister to be a little more explicit. (Hear, hear.)
They had the case of the Persian war before them, to which
the hon. baronet opposite had alluded, which cost this
country upwards of £2,000,000 of money, about which they
had heard nothing—when it began, or how it was carried on
—except that they had tc pay the enormous amount which
it cost the country. (Hear, hear.) They were now appa-
rently involved in another transaction of a similar character,
which he thought the most robust conscience in that house
would decline to accept as an honourable cause. (Hear,
hear.) Let them for a moment trace the progress of these
transactions. He would not go back to the original China
war, which was as bad a thing as could be, but only to the
war commenced by the indiscretion—to use no harsher
term—of the English Plenipotentiary, Sir J. Bowring.
That war was based upon a fraud, and that which the House
of Commons condemned as a positive lie. And though,
when there was a dissolution, a large majority was returned
to support the Minister then in office, no Minister ever
dared to reverse that decision, and he believed there scarcely
existed now a doubt throughout the country as to the folly
and guilt of that transaction. (Hear, hear.) Well, that
war came to an end, and a treaty was made under the
auspices of a noble lord now in the Cabinet. He thought
there was a grievous error in the formation of that treaty.
There seemed to be a constant wish to introduce something
into those treaties which should have the effect of special
aggravation to the Chinese, but which no man could ever
prove to be of the smallest use to the trade or the honour
of this country. For instance, one thing was insisted upon
which had never before been heard of in China—that
an English Minister should reside in Pekin. Now, it was
a question still open whether it was worth while keeping a
Minister at any court in the world--(a laugh)—aud whether
it would not be better to have all our ambassadors with-
drawn; and, when we had special questions to arrange with
foreign Courts, to send out special ambassadors for the pur-
pose. But however that may be, the question must be de-
cided by the European Powers. That man must have a
wonderful notion of English policy and English commerce
who thought that anything could be gained by sending
some veteran diplomatist to 'reside at Pekin, which was a
place where, of all others, he would probably be least com-
fortable, and certainly least wanted. (Hear, hear.) That
was a clause insisted on in the treaty with the especial ob-
ject of humiliating the Chinese and giving a proof of the
absolute supremacy and triumph which the arms of Eng-
land had obtained over the feeble Government of China.
Now they came from the question of the treaty to the ques-
tion of its ratification. FOr his own part he could never un-
derstand why a nobleman who had arranged this treaty
should not have stayed in China until the whole thing was
finished. There might, however, have been reasons for
Lord Elgin's return, and it might be that the Minister who
succeeded him had shown himself as competent as any other
man in the subordinate situations he had Tilled. On this
second case he (Mr. Bright) maintained we were just as
wrong as we were in the case at Canton under Sir J. Bow-
ring. All the arguments which the noble lord the Secretary
for Foreign Affairs used in 1857 would be valid against the
case he had in some sort apologised for to-night. The noble
lord s?oke of the treachery that had been exercised against
the forces of England, but they had it on the authority of
an English officer engaged in that sanguinary and unhappy
affair—a gentleman holding the rank of captain, and a near
relative of a dignitary of the Church—that there was no
treachery whatever, and what was more, that if the Chinese
had intended to be treacherous, not one single vessel or one
person on board could have survived. (Hear, hear.) The
fact was it was not worth our while, as sensible men in-
volved in the discredit of these transactions, to try to cover
up these things by charges of treachery against the Chinese.
The real charge was one of utter folly and imbecility on
the part of our own Minister, and, notwithstanding all
that might be said of the valour of our admiral, of great
indiscretion on his part. (Hear, hear.) He held that pru-
dence and valour were twins, and together they did great
things, but separate they ended in disasters like this—(hear)
—and he had no patience in hearing hon. members con-
stantly praising the valour of commanders of vessels on oc
easions of this nature. There could be no doubt that the
number sacrificed were sacrificed to the bad arrangements
of the admiral and the folly of our Minister; and that was
not his opinion alone, but the opinion of those who had sur-
vived, and he felt sure of 99 out of every 100 of reflecting
men in England who had read through carefully the narra-
tive of these miserable transactions. (Hear, hear.) Up to
this point, however, no ens could blame the present Go-
vernment, because the noble lord had only taken office a few
weeks when this business occurred at the river Peiho. But
he thought the noble lord and his colleagues did not show
that judgment which might have been expected of than
when they heard the narrative of these transactions. It ap-
peared to him that no man living could read the despatches
and the narratives—whether they came from Chinese papers,
correspondents of London newspapers in China, Indian
papers, or from private sources—without coming to the con-
clusion that Mr. Bruce had been guilty of great want of
judgment, and that the consequence was a most disastrous
failure. But what ought to be done with a man who showed
a lack of judgment and failed disastrously ? He did not
Pretend to say but that many of those present might fail in
judgment in many affairs of their lives; but when a Mini-
ster, placed in a responsible position 15,000 miles away from
home, committed an error so grievous as this, and brought
about a state of things so alarming to all the people of this
country, the first thing the Government should do should
be not to continue a man guilty of this great failure in an
office of responsibility, but to supply his place by some man
ggh
mustc theo could I
necessarily
agency b e
oaf b s
a be
erd m
in whom they could hope to find sounder judgment and
n more discretion exhibited. (Hear, hear.) In his opinion,
goo had madetiationwi a
failurethpeop
people
through
inaisstea negotiation
h
inhis first and only transaction with them, and whose
mindrtoh ui:
greatly irritated by the failure
that had attended his efforts. It would be • impossible to
pick out a single man so entirely unfitted to have the con •
duct of these future negotiations or complications, what-
ever they might be, as Mr. Bruce, who since these transac-
tions had been continued as our Minister in China. If hon.
gentlemen would only read Mr. Bruce's despatches, they
would see at once that he was never fit fur his office, for he
proceeded to commence his negotiations under feelings of
most unfair suspicion and distiust. (Hear, hear.) Almost
every expression made use of by Mr. Bruce was one which
showed how ;ouch he was disposed to offend rather than to
conciliate those with whom he was about to negotiate. If
Mr. Bruce was not fit then, could he be fit now ? If this
man was so groat that the Prime Minister over 300,000,000
of people was not a sufficient great man for him to meet
with, and if the Government were determined to entrust
him with the future negotiations, he (Mr. Bright) should
not have the smallest expectation that any successful result
would be come to, and he should think that the estimate
made by the hon. member for Portsmouth wou
But the
short of the bill we should have to pay. (float%ld )
fall very
noble lord the Foreign secretary, doing tardily what we
ought to have done months age, was proposing to tend Lord
Elgin out again with the hope of terminating this unhappy

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