The Sun.
London, England, 1856-01-05 00:00:00

THE EXPECTED BALTIC CAMPAIGN.

La Nord discusses as follows the chances of the
expected Baltic campaign :
In the plans sketched by the English press, and
said to be those which the Allies have formed for the
ensuing year, the project of a landing in Finland oc-
cupies the foreground. To attack Russia simultaneously
in the north and the south, by land and sea, to place
her between two fires—this is indeed a gigantic plan,
but it appears to us, for that very reason, to be imprao-
ticable. Admitting that the Allies may be disposed to
renew by a war in the Baltic the enormous outlay and the
sacrifices entailed on them by their expedition to the
Black Sea, we may ask ourselves whether after they have
uselessly been scratching Russia's feet they will succeed
in overthrowing her by seizing her by the hair or bry
pinching her ear ? For it is to be observed that when
landing an army in Finland, or on any other point of
the Baltic coast, the Allies would find themselves con-
fronted by obstacles far greater than those of the Crimea
In that peninsula the campaign, interrupted by the
winter, could be resumed in the spring. In the Balti4 t,
where the navigation is only open for four or five month s
of the year, it must be otherwise. The Allies mns t
obtain a complete and decisive victory in a single rim •
mer ; they must smite Russia so terrible a blow as to
prevent her recovering herself during the winter. Now,
if the Allies, if England especially, have beea able to
make preparations for so great an enterprise, we must
suppose that the Russian Government has net re-
mained a passive spectator on her part. We confess
we do not believe in the destruction of Cronstadt, aid
the English believe in it just as little ourselves; buss
conceding, for the sake of argument of course, thuds
this eventuality is probable or possible ; admitting
even that the Allies may be able to make a demo's'.
stration against St. Petersburg—it will be seen that w e
are making very large concessions—do they imagii
that Russia would thereupon consider herself yam-
quished ? She would be stunned, we grant, but mot
overthrown, and one winter would serve to put her on
her legs again. And, even in this ease, can it be Tea-
sonably admitted that this blow can be dealt her in a
single campaign ? Why, the allied army would be ob-
liged to re-embark in the autumn, or else on the ap-
proach of winter it would resign miens velem to the
disagreeable alternative of seeing its retreat utterly cut
off, communication with the fleet, driven away by the
ice, destroyed—this too, in a country where they would
not leave a roof over its head, nor a sack of flour for its
sustenance; where the cold, far different from that of the
Crimea, sinks to 30 and 40 degrees of R6aumnr • where,
lastly, the Russian army which would then be in its
own element, might choose its own time to swoop upon
it when exhausted by the cold and hunger, oumpelling
it t yield or accept battle, the result of which could not
be doubtful.
Let this expedition be made to Finland or to the
Baltic provinces, or even to both points at 'once—a
thing less practicable than ever—still the conditions
under which it could be carried out would bo the
same. It is not upon hypotheses we ground our roa-
f'oning, but on the nature of these countries them-
selves—that is to say, on the winter, Russia's potent
auxiliary. As we see, the frosts of the north have
their own little special advantages. Then, again,
Russia possesses at this moment one army in Finland,
another in the Baltic provinces, a third in Poland, and
yet a fourth in St. Petersburg and its neighbourhood.
Surely these are obstacles not to be surmounted in a
hurry, nor can any one dream of doing so. In every
case it will not be English troops that can do it. It
will hence be on the shoulders of the French army that
Great Britain would once again lay all the burthen of
this fresh expedition. Now, we are of opinion that the
French Government, a better judge than England of
everything connected with military operations, would
look twice before it ventured on so difficult and formi-
dable an enterprise. It seems to us besides that the
French have been for two years doing England's work
for her, and paying dear enough for her alliance, not to
consider themselves now completely out of her debt. If
it is the task of these English to destroy Cronstedt—if
that is all they have to do—why have they not done it
this year, when they have been showing off before its
forts all the summer ? And if it is by the help of their
new gun-boats and floating batteries, which they talk so
much about, that they count on effecting their object
next year, we are afraid they will once more have to be
satisfied with feeding their imagination and shooting
awny their powder.

In the first place, Cronstadt is not Kinbourn ; again,
the success obtained by these floating batteries at the
bombardment of that petty fortress, where they were
employed for the first time, is not yet proved, for the
simple reason that Kinbourn, the construction and arma-
ment of which had undergone no change since the last
century, possessed none of those engines that may be
happily employed against these said batteries. There
was not even a single Paixhan guu in that fort. It is
different with Cronstadt, and formidable as this fortress
has always been, consisting notoriously of several forts,
it is more than probable that since those floating bat-
teries have been known at St. Petersburg they have
discovered the means of counter arming themselves
there.

The present war has proved that the arms of the engi-
neers and artillery are not so badly wielded in Russia,
and that under this head their inventive power.] are not
es poverty-stricken as previously supposed. The Bus-
elan., it is true, are not in the habit of trumpeting their
progress and discoveries. If others feel inclined to con-
sider this reserve of theirs as a proof of weakness, we,
for our parts, see in it a pledge of success, for which
both fact and prudence are the first conditions.
Thug, even when reasoning on the hypotheses most
favourable to the Allies, the possible chances of a fa-
vourable issue to an approaching campaign in the Bal-
tic—whether we consider it to he a gigantic enterprise
comprehending the invasion of Finland and the Baltic
provinces, or whether we reduce it to its simplest ex-
pression, that is to say, to the mere bombardment of
Cronstadt, it cannot by any possibility have for Russia
those consequences to which the English journals see
her already reduced.
We have not yet spoken, our readers perceive, of an
active co-operation on the part of Austria, for we do not
suppose they can seriously depend on such a thing either
at Paris or London. Besides, if Austria were really to
take the field against Russia, we are justified in believing,
from the private information we possess, that she would
encounter a more violent resistance than she expects—.
a resistance which on some future day might recoil on
Austria, and work more mischief than they seem to cal-
culate upon at Vienna.
The reflections just submitted to the reader are not
intended to prove that Russia ought not to make peace.
Quite the contrary. They are given merely by way of
answer to those threatening, and, as we think, unseason-
able clamours raised within the last few days by the
semi-official organs of the Vienna and London press.
The object is so transparent, under existing circumstances,
that of creating a sort of moral pressure, that no one will
allow himself to be taken in by it.
If it is passing strange to see the journals of England,
who in this war has only played a secondary part, hold-
ing forth every day to Russia, in a threatening tone,
the conditions of peace which they condescend to con-
sider acceptable, the Austrian journals, one would think,
assign with far less grace the same motives to their Go-
vernment, which has much less right than England has
to hide its own ambitious and selfish views under unjus-
tifiable and selfish pretensions. The question whether
Russia is or is not interested in concluding peace at this
present time is very debateable, and very differently
judged. We ought then to beware how we render the
solution of that question too difficult.