The Sun.
London, England, 1860-03-17 00:00:00

fled at all. I think if Mr. Bruce had taken such a course
there would have been just reason for blaming him for not
having performed his duty. (Hear.) It might have been
said to him, " You were told to go up the Pei-ho in a ship
of war. You were told to go with the admiral with a suffi-
cient force. There was a sufficient force. Why did you
run away and set the honour of the country at nought ?
Why did you go away when, according to all previous ex-
perience, you had a sufficient force ?" But the right hon.
baronet says that on the morning of the day on which the
attack took place, at nine o'clock, Mr. Bruce received a let-
ter from the Chinese authorities inviting him to take an-
other course. The right hon. baronet read the letter very
glibly ; and if Mr. Bruce had received the letter as it is
in the blue book he would have read it very glibly too ;
but unfortunately the letter was in Chinese, and it took a
considerable time to translate it. lam afraid it was
not less than two hours before the letter could be
understood, and then he had to consult with M. Bour-
dillon, the French Minister. And rmme time was lost in
procuring a boat, nearly all the boats having been sent
below the bar, so that it was a long time before he could
reach M. Bourdillon. By that time the firing had begun,
and therefore it was too late to make any change in the
operations. But supposing that the letter had come to him
in time, would it have been wise to have gone round by the
land route ? We know what would have happened, because
the American Minister did go round that way and we know
that he was detained some time before he was allowed to
land, and then he was transported up the country in a
wooden box with two wheels with no light or air in it, and
at last, when he got to the last stage, he was obliged to get
out and walk because it was impossible for him to endure
the torture of riding in that box any longer. And when he
got to Pekin he was kept a close prisoner and was not al-
lowed even to visit the Russian Minister, and he was not
allowed to exchange the ratifications, but was sent back.
Now, would this country have been satisfied if they found
that their Minister had been sent to Pekin with a sufficient
force, and that by his instructions ho was not to submit, on
his passage to Pekin, to any ceremony that was in the least
degrading, " for remember," said Lord Malmesbury, "what
is done on your arrival in Pekin will be made a precedent
for all future occasions—remember the honour of the mis-
sion and the dignity of the country,"—l ask, would this
country have been satisfied if they had been told, that our
Minister had been detained some days before he was allowed
to land—that he was then put in a covered cart, and so
jolted that he was compelled to walk a considerable part of
the distance ? We know that in China there ere three
modes of honour, or of degradation, I may say. Those who
are treated with honour are carried in palanquinsand sedan
chairs ; those who are the next in rank are allowed to ride ;
and, if any, none but those who are of the lowest class are
put in these covered boxes. (Hear, hear.) I say, then,
that even if Mr. Bruce had received the letter in time, it
would not have been prudent to have acted upon it. Cer-
tainly, if I had been in his situation, nothing should have
induced me to consider that it would justify me in under-
going so much personal degradation and so much personal
inconvenience. (Laughter.) I think it very unfair for
Mr. Bruce to have cast upon him the censure to which
some are disposed to subject him. I accept the princi-
ple laid down by the right hon. baronet. I ask every
one to consider himself placed in the same position, and to
say what he would himself have done, as a roan of
honour, charged with a public responsibility? (Hear, hear.)
The conduct of the gallant admiral has been sufficiently
defended by those who are better able to judge of such
matters than I am myself, and I therefore pass that
by. Everybody, I think, will admit that there never was
a greater display of heroism, and that not by the admiral
only, but by every one that was concerned in these transac-
tions. (Loud cheers.) The circumstance that success did
not attend the efforts of our force detracts in no degree what-
ever from the bravery or the distinction of the services
which they rendered. (Hear, hear.) The right hon. gen-
tleman wants to know what is our policy with regard to
China. That is a question undoibtedly which he is en-
titled to ask, and I think my noble friend has sufficiently
explained what our policy is ; but when the right hon.
baronet asks what are our instructions with regard to the
operations that are to be performed, that is a question which
I must beg leave to decline answering, because the house
must see that to tell beforehand what are the instructions
which have been laid down in order to guide the proceedings
of our naval and military commanders, or our diplomatic
agents, under circumstances that may not arise, might
defeat the purpose fir which those instructions are given.
(Hear, hear.) Our policy is simple, and I think it is just
and correct. A treaty has been concluded with China, and
that treaty has been approved by the Emperor—because, in
the blue book you will see that he convoys to his negotia-
tors his entire approval of the treaty, and orders it to be
carried into effect. Well, we want the ratifications of that
treaty to be exchanged—we want that treaty to become a
formally acknowledged contract between the two nations.
(Hear, hear.) Some persons think that the treaty contains
some concessions that it was not—l will not say justifiable—
but, that it was not handsome in us to ask for. lam not of
that opinion. The chief variation between that treaty and
the treaty of Nankin is, in the first place, that we obtained
by it a right to have R rasidant at Pekin, and at all times to
have a direct communication with the central Government—
a right, the almost neccessary consequence of the want of
which has been to cause the differences and the unpleasant
events which have taken place between the two Governments.
(Hear.) We have hitherto only had communication with
the Viceroy at Canton—an official whose great duty was
to put us off with excuses, and sometimes not even to
send to Pekin the representations that were made—to keep,
in short, the "barbarians" off as far and as long as he
could, till the result has been that accumulation of com-
plaints and grievances which has led to such important
and such disagreeable consequences. (Hear, hear.) But
there is nothing in that concession which could be offensive
to the Chinese; because Russia has for some time had a
diplomatic agent residing at Pekin, and we therefore ask
nothing for ourselves that the Emperor has not already
conceded to Russia. We have as much commercial inter-
course with China as Russia has, and I should think more.
We have certainly more subjects resident in China; and
there are more occasions when it might be essential to our
interests that we should have the power of communicating
directly with the Government of Pekin. (Hear.) It may
be a matter of discretion whether we shall so far exercise
that right as to have always a permanent resident at Pekin.
There are many reasons why, during a portion of the year
at all events, it may not be right to place any one in the
position of having to live in that city; but the right of
going to Pekin whenever we please, and of communicating
directly with the central Government are really essential
if we want to have our subjects and their property secure
in their commercial relations with China. (Hear.) Then we
obtain a right to navigate the great river Yang-tze-kiang,
and some others that are named. At present, seeing that
the rebellion has depopulated the towns on the banks of
those rivers, that concession may not be of much moment.
It has been recommended that we should take Nankin. If
we did, I do not think that we should find good accommo-
_

dation for our troops and officers ; but the right of going
up the Yang-tze-kiang and the other rivers, and of trading
with the population on their banks, is one that may here-
after be of great importance to us in tie prosecution of our
commercial relations with China. (Hear, hear.) Then
there is a third eoncession, namely, that our subjects
should have the right to travel in the interior with pass-
ports. (Hear, hear.) That is a matter of great importance;
and the concession is one that would not be repugnant
to the feelings or habits of the Chinese. People are apt to
imagine that what took place at Canton is a sample of that
which would take place elsewhere, but that is a great mis-
take. The bad feeling excited against us at Canton was, I
believe, quite artificial ; for at Shanghai there is a large
European population, who live in perfect amity with the
natives. They visit and associate with each other, and our
residents go into the interior to a certain distance without
molestation, and on perfectly good terms with the inhabi-
tants. (Hear, bear.) Then our policy is to obtain the ra-
tification and the execution of the treaty of Tien-tsin. Our
policy is to obtain for our subjects in China freedom for
their persons and security for their commerce and their pro-
perty. (Hear.) Conquest does not enter into oar views, it
forms no portion of our policy to conquer any part of China
or to obtain possession of any part of it, except the island
of Bong Kong, which we already hold ; but we do think,
and I am persuaded tie country has the ulna opinion, thit
it would have been disgraceful to us, and that we could not
have expected to retain our position in the East, if,
after
the disaster on the Peiho, we had simply gone away and
taken no further notice of it. (Hear, hear.) It is said you
ace pressing too much on the Chinese by demanding an
apology. Well, sir, if we are to have any redress at all, I
think an apology is the very least demand which either a
nation or an individual can ask for an outrage such as that
committed on the Peiho river. (Hear, hear.) There is no
reason whatever for supposing that the Emperor of China
is at all disinclined to give that apology, for he character-
ised the outrage in question as an isolated fact arising from
the impetuosity of the British commander—that it was not
to interrupt in any degree the friendly intercourse between
the two nations, and moreover that there was now actually
open to British commerce one of the ports which by
the treaty was to be added. Therefore, sir, I say
there is no proof that the Emperor of China is in a
temper of mind to refuse an apology. (Cheers.) When
I am asked what is to be our policy in China
I answer that our policy is to require the fulfil-
ment of the treaty—a treaty of commercial intercourse with
China, but not to involve the two nations in war, if war
should not be necessary. We do not demand any additional
cession of territory. To those gentlemen who seem to un-
dervalue the importance of a commercial treaty with China,
I say carry back your recollection to the feeling which
existed in this country when the treaty of Nankin was con-
cluded by Sir H. Pottinger, and the enthusiastic applause
with which the announcement of that treaty was received.
Why, sir, the whole cotwtiy admitted that the treaty was of
the utmost advantage to the commerce of this country. The
greatest advantages were anticipated from the increased
commercial intercourse with China, and there can be no
doubt that by that treaty our commercial intereourse with
China was greatly increased. Nor did we unreasonably
anticipate the probability of events in believing that the
treaty of Tien tan, coupled with that of Nankin, if faith..
fully executed and carried out, would add vastly to the cora-

mercial intercourse, not only of England (for we seek no
exclueiye edTantagee), but of the other States of Europe and