The Sun.
London, England, 1856-08-19 00:00:00

LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING, AUGUST 19, 1856,

THE UNITED ►STATES AND TITE
CONGRESS OF PARIS.

Department of State, Washington,
July 28, 1856.
The Count de Sartiges, &c., &c., &c.
The undersigned, Secretary of State of the United
States, has laid before the President " The Declaration
e rncerning Maritime Law,"* adopted by the Plenipo-
tentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia,
Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, at Paris, on the 16th of
April, 1856, which the Count de Sartiges, Envoy Extra-
ordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of France, has
presented in behalf of the Emperor of the French to the
Government of the United States, for the purpose of ob-
taining its adhesion to the principles therein contained.
Nearly two years since the President submitted, not
only to the Powers represented in the late Congress at
Paris, but to all other maritime nations, the second and
third propositions contained in that " Declaration," and
asked their assent to them as permanent principles of
international law. The propositions thus submitted by
the President were—
"l. That free ships make free goods—that is to say,
that the effects or goods belonging to subjects or citizens
cf a Power or State at war are free from capture and
confiscation when found on board of neutral vessels, with
the exception of articles contraband of war ;
"2. That the property of neutrals on board an ene-
my's vessel is not subject to confiscation, unless the same
be contraband of war."
It will be perceived that these propositions are sub-
stantially the same as the second and third in the "De-
claration" of the Congress at Paris.
Four of the Governments with which negotia-
tions were opened on the subject by the United States
have signified their acceptance of the foregoing propo-
sitions. Others were inclined to defer acting on them
until the return of peace should furnish a more aus-
picious time for considering such international questions.
The proceeding of the Congress of the Plenipotentiaries
at Paris will, as a necessary consequence, defeat the
pending negotiations with the United States, if the two
following propositions contained in Protocol No. 24 are
acceded to : first, that the four principles shall be in
divisible ; and, second, that the Powers which have
signed or may accede to the " Declaration" shall not
enter into any arrangement in regard to the application
of the right of neutrals in time of war, which does not,
at the same time, rest on the four principles which are
the object of said "Declaration." As the indivisibility
of the four principles and the limitation upon the sove-
reign attribute of negotiating with other Powers are not
a part of the " Declaration," any nation is at liberty to
reject either or botb, and to act upon the " Declaration"
without restriction, acceding to it in whole or in part.
In deliberating on this important subject, it behoves all
Powers to consider, and, if they think proper, to act
upon this distinction. All the Powers which may ac-
cede to that " Declaration" and the subsequent restric-
tions contained in the 24th Protocol, will assume an ob-
ligation which takes from them the liberty of assenting
to the propositions submitted to them by the United
States, unless they at the same time surrender a prin-
ciple of maritime law which has never been contested--
the right to employ privateers during time of war.
The second and third principles set forth in the "De-
claration," being those submitted to other maritime
Powers for adoption, by this Government, it is most
anxious to see incorporated by general consent, into the
code of maritime law, and thus placed beyond future
controversy or question. Such a result, securing so
many advantages to the commerce of neutral nations,
might have been reasonably expected but for the pro-
ceedings of the Congress at Paris, which require them
to be purchased by a too costly sacrifice—the surrender
of a right which may well be considered as essential to
the freedom of the seas.
The fourth principle contained in the "Declaration,"
namely—" Blockades, in order to be binding, must be
effective ; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient
really to prevent access to the, coast of the enemy"—
can hardly be regarded as one falling within that class
with which it was the object of the Congress to inter-
fere ;, for this rule has not, for a long time, been regarded
as uncertain, or the can e of any " deplorable disputes."
If there have been any disputes in regard to blockades,
the uncertainty was about the facts, but not the law.
Those nations which have resorted to what ate appropri-
ately denominated " paper blockades," have rarely, if
ever, undertaken afterwards to justify their conduct
upon principle; but have generally admitted the illega-
lity of the practice, and indemnified the injured parties.
What is to be adjudged " a force sufficient really t pre-
vent access to a coast of the enemy" has often been a
severely-contested question ; and certainly the declara-
tion which merely reiterates a general undisputed maxim
of maritime law does nothing towards relieving the
subject of blockade from that embarrassment. What
force is requisite to constitute an effective blockade re-
mains as unsettled and as questionable as it was before
the Congress at Paris adopted the "Declaration."
In regard to the right to employ privateers, which is
declared to be abolished by the first principle put forth
in the " Declaration," there was, if possible, less uncer-
tainty. The right to resort to privateers is as clear as
the right to use public armed ships, and as incontestible
as any other right appertaining to belligerents. The
policy of that law has been occasionally questioned, not,
however, by the best authorities ; but the law itself has
been universally admitted, and most nations have not
hesitated to avail themselves of it ; it isas well sustained
by practice and public opinion as any other to be feuud
in the maritime code.

There is scarcely any rule of international law
which particular nations in their treaties have not occa-
sionally suspended or modified in regard to its applica-
tion to themselves. Two treaties only can be found
in which the contracting parties have agreed to abstain
from the employment of privateers in case of war be-
tween them. The first was a treaty between the King
of Sweden and the States-General of the United Pro-
vinces, in 1675. Shortly after it was concluded the
parties were involved in war, and the stipulation con-
cerning privateers was entirely disregarded by both.
The second was the treaty of 1755, between the
United States and the King of Prussia. When this
treaty was renewed in 1799, the clause stipulating not
to resort to privateering was omitted. For the last half
century there has been no arrangement, by treaty or
otherwise, to abolish the right, until the recent proceed-
ings of the Plenipotentiaries at Paris.
By taking the subject of privateering into considera-
tion that Congress has gone beyond its professed object,
which was, as it is declared, to remove the uncertainty
on points of maritime law, and thereby prevent " differ-
ences of opinion between neutrals and belligerents, and,
consequently, serious difficulties and even conflicts."
So far as the principle in regard to privateering is con-
cerned the proceedings of the Congress are in the nature
of an act of legislation, and seek to change a well-settled
principle of international law.
The interest of commerce is deeply concerned in the
establishment of the two principles which the United
States had submitted to all maritime Powers, and it is
much to be regretted that the Powers represented in the
Congress at Paris fully approving them should have
endangered their adoption by uniting them to another
inadmissible principle, and making the failure of all the
necessary consequence of the rejection of any one. To
three of the four principles contained in the "Declara-
tion" there would not probably be a serious objection

* [Translation.]
ANNEX TO PROTOCOL No. 23.—DECLARATION.
(Extract.)
That the Plenipotentiaries assembled in Congress at
Paris cannot better respond to the intentions by which
their Governments are animated than by seeking to intro-
duce into international relations fixed principles in this
respect.
The above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries being duly au-
thorised, resolved to concert among themselves cs to the
means of attaining this object; and having come to an
agreement have adopted the following solemn Declara-
tion :

1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished ;
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's
ception of contraband of war ; goods, with the ex.
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of
war, aro not liable to capture under enemy's flag;
4. Blockades, in order to be hinling, must be effective,
that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to
prevent access to the coast of the enemy.
[Translation.]
PROTOCOL NO. 24. SITTING OF PRIL 16, 1c56.
(Extract.)
On the proposition of Count Walewski, and recognising
that it is for the general interest to maintain the indivisi-
bility of the four principles in the Declaration signed Ws
day, the Plenipotentiaries agree that the Powers which
shall have required, or which shall have acceded to
it, cannot hereafter enter into any arrangement in regard
to the application of the iigiit of neutrals in time of war,
which does not at the same time rest on the four principles
which are the object of the said Declaration.
Upon an observation made by the Plenipotentiaries of
Russia, the Congress admits that as the present resolution
cannot have any retroactive effect, it cannot invalidate au-1
tececlea CQUlelltio/10.

from any quarter, but to the other a vigorous res.stance
must have been anticipated.
The policy of the law which alloys aresort to privateers
has been questioned for reasons vhich do not command
the assent of this Government. Without entering into
a full discussion on this point the undersigned will con-
front the ordinary and chief objection to that policy, by
an authority which will be retarded with profound
respect, particularly in France. In a commentary on
the French Ordonnance of 1631, Vali.n says :
"However lawful and time-honoured this mode of
warfare may be, it is, nevertheless, disapproved of by
some pretended philosophers. According to their no-
tions, such is not the way in which the State and the
Sovereign are to be served ; whilst the profits which in-
dividuals may derive from the pirsuit are illicit, or at
least disgraceful. But this is the language of bad citizens,
who, under the stately mask of a spurious wisdom, and
of a craftily sensitive conscience, seek to mislead the
judgment by a concealmeet of the secret motive which
gives birth to their indifference for the welfare and ad-
vantage of the State. Such are as worthy of blame, as
are those entitled to praise, wio generously expose
their property and their lives to the dangers of priva-
teering."

I In a work of much repute, published in France almost
1 simultaneously with the proceedings of the Congress at
Paris, it is declared that—" The issuing of letters of
- marque, therefore, is a constantly customary belligerent
act. Privateers are bona fide waevessels, manned by
volunteers, to whom, by way of reward, the Sovereign
resigns such prizes as they naa.:ie, in the same manner es
he sometimes assigns to the land forces a portion of the
war contributions leviel on the conquered enemy."
(Pistoye et Duverdy, des Prises Maritimes.)
It is not denied thst annoyance to neutral commerce,
and even abuses, have occasionally resulted from the
practice of privateering ; such was the case formerly
more than in recent times ; but when it is a question of
changing a law, the incidental evils are to be considered
in connection with its benefits and advantages. If these
benefits and advantages (tan be obtained in any other
way, without injury to other rights, these occasional
abuses may then justify the change, however ancient or
firmly established may be the law.
The reasons which induced the Congress at Paris I.
declare privateering abolished are not stated, but they
are presumed to be only such as ara usually urged against
the exercise of that belligerent right.
The prevalence of Christianity and the prO;;;;Zif
civilisation have greatly mitigated the severity of the
ancient mode of prosecuting hostilities. War is now an
affair of governments. "It is the public authority which
makes and carries on war; individuals are not permitted
to take part in it, unless authorised to do so by their
government." It is a generally received rule of modern-
warfare, so far at least as operations upon land are con-
cerned, that the persons and effects of non-combatants
are to be respected. The wanton pillage or uncompen
sated appropriation of individual property by an army,
even in possession of an enemy's country, is against the
usage of modern times. Such a mode of proceeding at
this day would be condemned by the enlightened judg-
ment of the world, unless warranted by special circum-
stances. Every consideration which upholds this sen-
timent in regard to the conduct of a war on land favours
the applicatien of the same rule to the persons and pro-
perty of citizens of the belligerents found upon the
ocean.

It is fair to presume that the strong desire to ame-
liorate the severe usages of war by exempting private
property upon the ocean from hostile seizure, to the
extent it is usually exempted on land, was the chief in-
ducement which led to " the declaration" by the Con-
gress at Paris, that " privateering is, and reinaine,
abolished."

The undersigned is directed by the President to say
that to this principle of exempting private property upon
the ocean, as well as upon the land, applied without re-
striction, he yields a most ready and willing assent.
The undersigned cannot better express the President's
eves upon tha subject than by quoting the language of
his annual message to Congress, of Dec. 4, 1854:
"The proposition to enter into engagements to forego
a resort to privateers, in case this country should be
forced into a war with a great naval Power, is not en-
titled to more favourable consideration than would be a
proposition to agree not to accept the ser;ices of
volunteers for operations on land. When the honour
or rights of our country require it to assume a hostile
attitude it confidently relies upon the patriotism of its
citizens, nut ordinarily devoted to the military prof s
sion, to augment the army and navy, so as to make
them fully adequate to the emergency which calls them
into action. The proposal to surrender the right to em-
ploy privateers is professedly founded upon the prin
ciple that private property of unoffending non-comba-
tants, though enemies, should be exempt from the
ravages of war; but the proposed surrender goes but
little way in carrying out that principle, which equally
requires that such private property should not be seized
or molested by national ships of war. Should the lead-
ing Powers of Europe concur in proposing, as a rule of
international law, to exempt private property, upon the
ocean, from seizure by public armed cruisers as well as
by privateers, the United States will readily meet them
upon that broad ground."
The reasons in favour of the doctrine that private
property should be exempted from seizure in the opera-
tions of war are considered in this enlightened age so
controlling as to have secured its partial adoption by
all civilsed nations.; but it would be difficult to find any
substantial reasons for the distinction now recognised in
its application to such property on land, and not to that
which is found upon the ocean.
If it be the object of the declaration adopted at Paris
to abolish this distinction, and to give the same security
from the ravages of war to the property of bMigerent
subjects on the ocean as is now accorded to such pro-
perty upon the land, the Congress at Paris has fallen
short of the proposed result, by not placing individual
effects of belligerents beyond the reach of public armed
ships as well as privateers. If such property is to remain ex
po,ed to seizure, by ships belonging to the navy of the
adverse party, it is extremely difficult to perceive why it
should not, in like manner, be exposed to seizure by pri-
vateers, which are, in fact, but another branch of the
public force of the nation commissioning them.
If the principle of capturing private property on the
ocean and condemning it as prize of war be given up,
that property would, and of right ought to be, as secure
from molestation by public armed vessels as by priva-
teers ; but if that principle be adhered to it would be
worse tban useless to attempt to confine the exerciso of
the right of capture to any particular description of the
public force of the belligerents. There is no sound
principle by which such a distinction can be sustained ;
no capacity which could trace a definite line of separa-
tion proposed to be made, and no proper tribunal to
which a disputed question on that subject could be re-
ferred for adjustment. The pretence that the distinction
may be supported upon the ground that ships not be-
longing permanently to a regular navy are more likely to
disregard the rights of neutrals than those which do be-
long to such a navy is not well sustained by modern
experience. If it be urged that a participation in the
prizes is calculated to stimulate cupidity, that, as a pe-
culiar objection, is removed by the fact that the same
passion is addressed by the distribution of prize-money
among the officers and crews of ships of a regular navy.
Every nation which authorises privateers is as respon-
sible for their conduct as it is for that of its navy, and
will, as a matter of prudence, take proper precaution
and security against abuses.

But if such a distinction were to be attempted it
would be very difficult, if not impracticable, to define
the particular class of the public maritime force which
should be regarded as privateers. " Deplorable dis-
putes," more in number and more difficult of adju,t
went, would arise from an attempt to discriminate be-
tween privateers and public armed ships
If such a discrimination were attempted, every na-
tion would have an undoubted right to declare what ves-
sels should constitute its navy, and what should be re-
quisite to give them the character of public armed ships
These are matters which could not be safely or pru-
dently left to the determination or supervision of any
foreign Power, yet the decision of such controversies
would naturally fall into the hands of predominant naval
PowerA, which would have the ability to enforce their
judgments. It cannot be off!insive to urge weaker
Powers to avoid, as far as possible, such an arbitrament,
and to maintain with firmness every existing barrier
against encroachments from such a quarter.

No nation which has a due sense of self respect will
allow any other, belligerent or neutral, to determine
the character of the force which it may deem proper to
use in prosecuting hostilities; nor will it act wisely if it
voluntarily surrenders the right to resort to any means,
sanctioned by international law, which, under any ci

cumstances, may be advantageously used for defence or

aggression.
The United States consider powerful navies and large
standing armies, as permanent establishments, to be de-
trimental to national prosperity and dangerous to civil
liberty. The expense of keeping them up is burdensome
to the people ; they are, in the opinion of this Govern-
ment, in some degree a menace to peace among nations.
A. large force ever ready to be devoted to the purposes
of war is a temptation to rush into it. The policy of
the United States has ever been, and never more than
now, adverse to such establishments ; and they can
never be brought to acquiesce in any change in interna-
tional law which may render it necessary for them to
maintain a powerful navy or large regular army in time
of peace. If forced to vindicate their rights by arms,
they are content, in the present aspect of international
relations, to rely in military operations on land, mainly
upon volunteer troops, and for the protection of their
commerce in no inconsiderable degree upon their mer-
cantile marine. If this country were deprived of these
resources it would be obliged to change its policy and
assume a military attitude before the world. In re-
sisting an attempt to change the existing maritime law
that may produce such a result, it looks beyond its own
interest, and embraces in its view the interest of all
such nations as are not likely to be dominant naval
Powers. Their situation in this respect is similar to
that of the United States, and to them the protection of
commerce and the maintenance of international relations
of peace appeal as strongly as to this country, to with•
stand the proposed change in the settled law of nations.
To such nations the surrender of the right to resort to
privateers would be attended with consequences most
adverse to their commercial prosperity without any
compensating advantages. Most certainly no better
reasons can be given for such a surrender than for fore-
going the right to receive the services of volunteers ;
and the proposition to abandon the former is entitled, i❑
the judgment of the President, to no more favour than
a similar proposition in relation to the latter. This opi-
nion of the importance of privateers to the community
of nations, excepting only those of great naval strength,
is not only vindicated by history, but sustained by high
authority. The following passage in the treatise on
maritime prizes, to which I have before referred, deserves
particular attention :
"Privateers are especially useful to those Powers
whose navy is inferior to that of their enemies. Bel-
ligerents, with powerful and extensive naval arma-
ments, may cruise upon the seas with their national
navies ;, but should those states, whose naval forces
are of less power and extent, be left to their own re-
sources, they could not hold out in a maritime war ;
whilst by the equipment of privateers they may suc-
ceed in inflicting upon the enemy an injury equivalent
to that which they themselves sustain. Hence Govern-
ments have frequently been known, by every possible
appliance, to favour privateering armament,. It has
even occurred that Sovereigns, not merely satisfied with
issuing letters of marque, have also taken, as it were,
an interest in the armament. Thus did Louis the Four-
teenth frequently lend out his ships, and sometimes re-
serve for himself a share in the prizes."
It certainly ought not to excite the least surprise, that
strong naval Powers should be willing to forego the
practice, comparatively useless to them, of employing
privateers upo❑ condition that weaker Powers agree to
part with their most effective means of defending their
maritime rights. It is, in the opinion of this Govern-
ment, to be seriously apprehended that if the use of pri-
vateers be abandoned the dominion over the seas will
be rendered to those Powers which adopt the policyand
have the means of keeping up large navies. The one
which has a decided naval superiority would be poten-
tially the mistress of the ocean, and by the abolition cf
privateering, that domination would be more fie•mly se•
cured. Such a Power engaged in a war with a nation
inferior in naval strength would have nothing to do for
the security and protection of its commerce but to look
after the ships of the regular navy of its enemy. These
might be held in check by one-half; or less, of its naval
force, and the other might sweep the commerce of its
enemy from the'ocean. Nor would the injurious effects
of a vast naval superiority to wearer States be much di-
minished, if that superiority was shared among three or
four great Powers. It is unquestionably the interest of
such weaker States to discountenance and resist a mea-
sure which fosters the growth of regular naval esta•
blishnients.

In discussing the effect of the proposed treasure—
the abolition of privateering—a reference to the existing
condition of nations is almost unavoidable. An instance
will at once present itself in regard to tRO nations where
the commerce of each is about equal, and about equally
wide-spread over the world. As commercial Powers
there is great disparity between them. The regular
navy of one vastly exceeds that of the other. In case of
war between them, only an inconsiderable part of the
navy of the one would be required to prevent that of the
other from being used for defence or aggression, while
the remainder would be devoted to the unembarrassed
employment of destroying the commerce of the weaker
in naval strength. The fatal consequences of this great
inequality of naval force between two such belligerents
would be in part remedied by the use of privateers ; in
that case, while either might assail the commerce of the
other in every sea, they would be obliged to distribute
and employ their respective navies in the work of pro-
tection. This statement only illustrates what would be
the case, with some modification, in every war where
there may be considerable disparity in the naval strength
of the belligerents.
History throws much light upon this question.
France, at an early period, was without a navy, and in
her wars with Great Britain and Spain, but then naval
Powers, she resorted with signal goad effect to priva-
teering, not enly for protection, but successful aggrer-
sion. She obtained many Privateers from Holland, and

by this force gained decided advantages on the ocean
over her enemy. Whilst in that condition France could
hardly have been expected to originate or concur in a
proposition to abolish privateering. The condition of
many of the smaller States of the world is now, in
relation to naval Towers, not mach unlike that of
France in the middle of the sixteenth century. At a
later period, during the reign of Louis the Fourteenth,
several expeditions were fitted out by him, composed
wholly of privateers, which were most effectively
employed in prosecuting hostilities with naval Powers.
Those who may have at any time a control on the
ocean will be strongly tempted to regul►te its use in a
manner to subserve their own interests and ambitious
projects. The ocean is the common property of all na-
tions, and instead of yielding to a measure which will be
likely to secure to a few—possibly to one—an ascend.
ancy over it, each should pertinaciously retain all the
means it possesses to defend the common heritage. A
predominant Power upon the ocean is more menacing to
the well-being of others than such a Power on land, and
all are alike interested in resisting a measure calculated

to facilitate the permanent establishment of such domi-
nation, whether to be wielded by one Power or shared
among a few others.

The injuries likely to result from surrendering the
dominion of the seas to one or a few nations which have
powerful navies, arise mainly from the practice of sub-
jecting private property on the ocean to seizure by belli-
gerents. Justice and humanity demand that this prac-
tice should be abandoned, and that the rule in relation
to such property on land should be extended to it when
found upon the high seas. .

The President, therefore, proposes to add to the first
proposition in the " Deelaration " of the Congress at
Paris tho following words :--" And that the private
property of the subjects or citizens of a belligerent on
the high seas shall be exempted from seizure by public
armed vessels of the other belligerent, except it be con-
traband." Thus amended, the Government of the United
States will adopt it, together with the other three prin-
ciples contained in that "Declaration."

I am directed to communicate the approval of the
President to the second, third, and fourth propositions,
independently of the first, should the amendment be un-
acceptable. The amendment it; commended by so many
powerful considerations, and the principle which calls
for it has so long had the emphatic sanction of all enlight-
ened nations in military operations on land, that the
President is reluctant to believe it will meet with any
serious opposition. Without the proposed nmodificatio❑
of the first principle he cannot convince himself that it
would be wise or safe to change the existing law in re-
gard to the right of privateeriug.
If the amendment should not be adopted it will be
proper for the United States to have some understand•
ing in regard to the treatment of their privateer; when
they shall have occasion Ito visit the ports of those
Powers which are or may become parties to the Decla-
ration of the Congress of Paris. The United States will,
upon the ground of right and comity, claim for them the