The Sun.
London, England, 1856-05-02 00:00:00

mer of 1855. It is impossible to overlook the earnest de-
sire of the Turkish Government to send assistance to the
army -beleaguered at Kars, and more particul irly I must
advert to the recommendation and' conduct of Omer Pacha.
I think gentlemen who have read the minute of Omer
Pacha must be of opinion that his abilities in council
hardly fall short of his distinguished merits in the field.
Butt, sir, I have already stated that both the English and
French Governments, though they attached inenite im-
portance to the defence of Kars, as I think rightly, re-
garded that operation as altogether secondary to the capture
of Sebastopol. That was the primary object, and it would
have been folly and weakness to disregard the primary
object in the hope of promoting or even carrying a second.
Will the house bear in mind the precise time when
Omer Pacha made his recommendation ? It was after
the 18th of June—a day ever memorable in the annals
of this country, and not tarnished, as I contend,
by the adverse circumstances of the 18th of June,
1855. Still that day in that year is remarkable for the
failure of a great military effort on the part both of the
French and English armies, and it cannot be matter of
surprise that after such an event the generals and admirals
responsible for the safety of the united army should have
hesitated in weakening the forces immediately present at
that great military operation, the siege of Sebastopol. I
de not think it has been read, but it appears to me very
important that the letter of General Simpson with refer-
ence to the refusal of the wishes, stated to them by Omer
Pasha, to withdraw a portion of the forces then under their
combined command, should be brought to the recollection
of the house. This letter is dated the 16th July, about a
month after the assault on the Redan, and a considerable
time before'the brilliant success which carried the Kaiak-
hoff and ended in the taking of Sebastopol. I will not
trouble the house by reading the whole, but allow me to
read a portion of this letter:—
"At a conference which was assembled at the French
headquarters on Saturday the 14th, at the request of Omer
Pasha, and at which he, General Pelissier, General La Mar-
mora, Vice-Admiral Sir E. Lyons, Vice- dmiral Bruat, Rear-
Admiral Stewart, and myself were present, his Highness sot
.forth his reasons and views on the subject in question ; he
also produced a very large sheet of paper, whien contained,
as he affirmed, the instructions of his Government; but, on
being asked for a translation of which, he said that it would
take a fortnight to wake one. The arguments used by Omer
Pasha were those set forth in the correspondence, and failed
to produce any effect ou the minds of the other members of
the Conference, who all, without exception, entertain the
strongest objection to the withdrawal of any troops from the
Crimea at this moment."

We have, therefore, the united opinion of all the admirals
and all the generals that not only from Bal klava, but
from Kadikui, Kertch, and Eupatoria, under the circum-
stances a hich then existed, it was not expedient to with-
draw a singlemau. Omer Pasha, being dissatisfied with
the decision, went to Constantinople to obtain a reversal
of it, and General Simpson writes to Lord Stratford—
" I earnestly, therefore, beg your Excellency to use your
powerful influence with the Porte to cause our opinion to
prevail over that of his Highness; for great public interests
are at stake, and serious consequences might result from his
success."

Surely, sir, in the face of that appeal we may well under-
stand how very unwilling the Governments at Paris and
at London must have been to reverse a decision, taken on
the spot by the must competent authorities, by orders di
rectly opposed to what on the spot was thought necessary,
not only for the honour and success, but absolutely for the
safety, of the forces there employed. (Cheers.) It must
not be concealed from the h .use, and it has not been con-
cealed, as I think rightly, by the responsible Ministers of
the Crown, that there was a great inslisposition on the part
of the French Government to favour any operations else-
where until success at Sebastopol had been obtained. It
may be a matter of question whether that disinclination
was not carried to excess ; still, in operations of such deli-
cacy and difficulty, it will be a bold measure if the House
of Commons, after such a result, pass comlemnation on the
Government, upon the exercise of discretion in very nice,
trying, and difficult circumstances. (Cheers.) Again, let
us see what the great master of the art of war in our time,
the Duke of Wellington, says. General Cooke held a com-
mand at Cadiz; the Duke was commanding on the banks
of the Douro, and in one of his instructions he said, " It
is inexpedient to give peremptory orders from a distance.
I would not do it. I would not gladly, if they were given
to we, submit to them." Ido not stand here to say that
mistakes have not been committed. Ido not believe that
gentlemen on the Treasury bench, considering the large
extent covered by these transactions, will be prepared to
say that no errors have been committed. It is iuipo-sible
that in such immense transactions some oversights should
nut occur. I say frankly, I think there was too much of
telegraphic communications and telegraphic orders.
.(Cheers.) I agree with the hon. and learned member for
abiskillen in disapproving that particular telegraphic
despatch, which give peremptory orders to abandon
Kars and Erzerouin and fall back upon Trebizoud ; and
if recommendations were to be conveyed by telegraph at
all I should not have recommended any other recouneues-
don to Gen. Simpson than to remember Kars. Teat was
not the instruction, but, perhaps, the end would have been
much happier had it been so. Still, lam bound to say
that, whatever those instructions may have been, it was
quite open to the Government to yield to the strong re-
presentations made by the commanders of the allied forces,
and not allow any deeachmout,e to be sear, I cannot fail,
however, to express my sympathy with Gen. Williams
and my admiration of his conduct. it is heartrending to
reed some of these despatches. (Hear.) He says that he
thought his army was left doomed to destruction, that he
was absolutely forgotten, that his position was isolated and
neglected ; and yet, while he felt the neglect, his manly
and noble spirit, nothing daunted, persevered iu spite of
every disappointment. Hope even was dead within him,
yet did not that spirit so entirely fail that he was unwill
lug to meet the enemy to whom he was oppme l with
only three of his countrymen by his side, and lead
a Turkish army, under circumstances of unexampled
diffi, lily to almost unexampled victory. (Hear, and
Cheers.) There may be many things to regret in toe war
now happily close], but do not let us under such cir-
cumslivic ,s cease to be proud of the noble conduct of a
handful of our countrymen on two occasions of almost
equal danger and difficulty. I look in vain to the annals
of modern warfare for a parallel to the defence of Silis-
tria or Kara—both iu the wain (owing to the courage, the
skill, the constancy, and the example of British officers)
leading to that triumphant success which, when we eeme
to confer with him who was our enemy, and is now, I
hope, our friend—long may he continue to be so—l mean
the Russian—will tell us that the defence of Silistria
and Kars rendered the English name, with which
they were associated, illustrious and ever memorable
in the recollection of his countrymen. (Cheers.) I said
it was heartrending to think what Gen. Williams must
have endured. Here is a truing instance. It is said the
honour of the seeland class of the Bath is conferred upon
him. He receives it with a faint smile, his spirits are
sunk, and that noble hea tis almost broken. (Cheers.) I
may be wrong in expressing my opinion, but I do not think,
as yet, the gratitude of this country to that distinguished
man has.been sufficiently marked. The second class of the
Beth is a proud distinction, but I cannot think his services
are rightly measured by that distinction. The thanks of
Parliament, considering the failure, cannot, according to
precedent, be given, but if my noble friend will advise her
Majesty, the fountain of all grace and favour to the mili-
tary profession, to confer some solid mark, in which we
may partake, in reward of the services of Gen. Williams,
I do not believe there is a man in this house who will not
hail it with satisfaction. (Loud cheers.) Now, sir, I shall
be asked, am I then prepared to say that no errors were
committed? I have already shown that some errors were
committed ; it will now be my duty to point out others.
I have read a despatch of the Duke of Newcastle, in which
it is suggested that medical aid might be afforded to the
army at Kars and that pecuniary assistance might be given.
And this brines me to the question of pecuniary assistance,
And here I confess I think that some blame is due to the.
Government. (Opposition cheers.) It will be, perhaps,
contended, that I and some of my colleagues in Lord Aber-
deen's Government who left office were opposed to the
Turkish loan. Sir, this is not the occasion to argue that
question over again. But before I left Lord Aberdeen's
Government, and ever since, I have been opposed to the
system of loans. I remember that iniunctioe, which is
valuable to nations as to individuals :-
4, Neither a lender nor a borrower be,
For loan oft loses both itself and friend."

(Loud cheers.) I was opposed to the joint and several
liability for the Turkish loan. I objected to the mortgage
of Egypt. I retain that objection. I think that the sub-
ject of the loan may give rise to grave discussions between
France and England. (Hear.) But I never was opposed,
and I do not thinkthat any rational man would be opposed
to giving pecuniary assistance. (Cileurs.) I differ irem the
member for Aylesbury on some points, but I agree with
him in ono point, and I do thick that a credit might have
been given to General Williams, either upon our Ambas-
sador at Constantinople or upon the Treasury in England
for a moderate amount, and that for a sum of 10a,0J0/.
the army at Kars might have been supplied with all the
provisions necessary. (Cheers.) lam also of opinion with
the hon and learned gentleman (Mr. Whiteside) that if a
few hundred cavalry ha been sent to Kars, they would,
as General Williams says in describing his brilliant vie•
tory, hava enabled him to destroy the Russian army.
Again, I think that although General Williams had guns
in sufficient quantity, yet that when he asked for a few
hunched artillerymen and cavalry they might have been
sent to him. I cannot but believe that in the early part
of the summer of 1855, without detaching any troops from
the Crimea, there might have been sent from Coustanti-
nnple to Erzerourn sense assistance of this kiad which
would have borne most essential results. Here is another
point upon which I have a strong opinion. Ii It were iti-
exuedient to weaken the force on the plateau in front of
Sebastopol, still there were no insuperable objections to
meeting the wishes of Omer Pasha and allowing him to
withdraw from that po itiou the Turkish ♦eterans he was
accustomed to command, and supplying their place by the
Turkish Contingent. (Hear, hear.) It may be said that
the troops were not sufficiently disciplined, but the house
will pardon me if I again refer to the highest authority—
the Duke of Wellingtm. He had experience in these
matters, Then in Portugal he had to use similar tr mps
constantly, when they were very imperfectly disciplined,
and he has put upon record in his own pithy manner a
dictum which the house w'll allow me to read. It refers
to the effect of long training and discipliuo upon such
troops compared with their being well paid, well fed, and
well cared for, and it shows that these attentions go far
in making troops efficient in the field. The Duke is writ-
ing of Spanish troops when under British officers. His
letter is dated :

" Lisaca, July 25 1813.
a The Spanish troops do not want discipline, if 2by disci-
pline is meant instruetion, so much as they do a system of
order, which can only be founded on regular , pay and food
and good care and clothing."
Now, the Turkish Contingent had these advantages for
some time, and My own judgment would be that, at that
time, when the question of withdrawing the Turkish troops
from Balaklava was mooted, their place might have been
advantageously and sufficiently supplied by the Turkish
Contingent so officered. (Hear.) The Dukegoes on to say:—
" These British officers could not giVe them, and, notwith-
standing that the Portuguese are now the fighting cocks of
the army, I believe we owe their merits more to the care we
have taken of their pockets and bellies than to the instruc-
tion we have given them."
Showing that the opinion of the Duke of Wellington was
that instruction and long training with reference to the
efficiency of foreign armies are to a considerable ezLeiit
supplied by British pay, feeding, and care. The Turkish
Contingent having had these advantages might, I think,
have been sent up to Balaklava so as to have liberated the
troops of Omer Pasha. And, sir, there is no use in not
very frankly stating my full opinion to the house, since
they are so indulgent as to listen to me. (Hear.) I have
another objection which is of a somewhat delicate charac-
ter. lam hound to say that, with every desire to main-
tain
the French alliance in its full integrity and to run no
risk of a misunderAtanding with that country, and feeling
bound to admit thdt the Emperor of that great nation hay
acted with constant fidelity—(cheers)--and with a degre,
of good faith and firmness that entitles him to the grad..