The Sun.
London, England, 1856-05-02 00:00:00

THE SUN. ON DON, FRIDAY EVENING, MAY 2, 1856.

the vanishing point of starvation, and yet that
aid was never sent. I find that when Omer Pasha
pressed the allied efierals and admirals to consent
to the adoption of his plan for the relief Kars,
and founded his arguments on a despatch of General Wil-
liams's, dated the 23d of June, showing the urgency and the
importance of sending aid to the Turkish force is Armenia,
the allied generals absolutely refused to give any opinion
upon the subject, on the ground that they had no informa-
tion from the ambassadors of their respective Governments
at Constantinople which could lead them to suppo,e that
the affairs of Asia were in a precarious position. That was
the species of concert which seemed ty prevail between our
agents in the East. Is it for the menl who have so signally
mismanaged our interests in that quarter to come forward
now and throw on Turkish mal-administration the blame
of any calamity that may have arisen ? I cannot but think
that her Majesty's Government strikingly failed in the duty
of providing early in the summer some plan for the em
ployment of the army of Omer Paella, whenever it might
be found that. that army could ho sent to Armenia. I
shall not, in an assembly of this character, and seeing as
I do before me many distinguished British officers, presume
to allude to strategical faults; but as a man of common
sense, I say, wby were you not provided with some kind
of strategy ? Your attention was repeatedly called to the
embarrassments which must necessarily arise under a cer-
tain state of circumstances in the direction of which events
were fast tending, and it was your bounden duty to have
provided some plan by which the anticipated evils might
have been met. (Hear.) But where was this organised
conception of yours ? I think it has been said by a mili-
tary authority of the greatest eminence that a good gene-
ral may be defeated, but cannot be sunarised. Such a say-
ing also is applicable to a. minister for war. lie ought to
think of a choice of plan's, and be ready to adopt one or
another when the monaunt for action arrives. Bat more

than that, it ie his duty to consult with his generals as

to the feasibility of tlie plan he proposes, and if if is
capable of altemtion—capable of modification, with re-
spect either to the time or to the circumstances, to come
to a decision in accordance with the necessity of the case.

But, above all, it was his duty to ba ready when the
emergency arose. (Hear, hear.) It was this want of
attention to preliminaries which led to the unparalleled
admixture of hurry and delay, energy and torpor, in
the month of July, which prepared the way for the
catastrophe which ultimately resulted. (Hear, hear.) Can
anybody doubt that had money been forthcoming when
required—had troops been supplied as they ought to have
been, the fate of Kars would have been wholly different?
I cannot but think that such would have been the. case.
(Hear, hear.) It was not until the month of July that
out of the cloud of the despatches there did at length
' emerge the awful form of our Mitester of War. Tho Greek
poet tells us that the advent of the Olympian Jove, in the
struggle before the beleaguered city, was productive of
order in the confusion ; but the advent of my Lord. Pan-
mure in the struggle seemed to render the confusion still
more perplexed and complicated. The only question being
how to stir for want of means, Lord Panmure writes ora-
cularly to General Vivian, and tells him to do—what? To
uphold the British reputation ! (Laughter.) But does he
provide the smallest aid? Certainly not. Does he even sug-
gest the means? No. (Hear.) If, in the month of July, all
these preparations were required to place Kars in a proper
position of defence, why was not the money forthcoming,
which would have been the hest countenance we could
have given to the prosecution of the war in Asia. If
you were so careful of the British flag, why permit it in
' the month of September to succumb to the Russiens
before Kars? Why, in the month of July, were you
provided with no moans to sustain it? The right
ho-
nourable gentleman deludes himself if be supposes that
the honour of the English flag was not concerned in the
surrender of Kars. By that time the eyes of England
nay, the eyes of Europe—were fixed with unalloyed ad-
miration upon the noble attitude of the bravo English sol-
dier, who, witu the assistance of three or four of his
countrymen, was upholding—embodying—the renown of
the whole nation. (Cheers.) Kars and General Williams
could not be divided in the mind of any one. Kars was
that Englishman, and that Englishman was Kars—(loud
cheers)—and to have evinced energy and foresight in pre-
paring for the defence of Kars would have been to have
closed the war with glory, not only to General Williams,
from whose renown nothing can detract, but to England.
(Renewed cheering.) " Organisation' " says Lord Pan-
mure—" organisation is as necessary to an army as sup-
ply." Can anything be more severely true? But, says
General Williams, "added to organisation supply is ab-
solutely necessary to the defence of Kars." What does
Lord Panmure say with respect to supply ? Contrast,
the account of the state of .the Russian array before Kars
with its defenders. Behold the soldiers in their com-
fortable tents, with decent fireplaces, and the officers' in
their huts, with glazed windows, and surrounded
by luxuries. Contrast the condition of those men,
whom we are accustomed to coloider as a sort
of semi-barbarians, with the miserable, ill-clad, famished
spectres, who for months withstood every effort
of the ens ny, and who were left to struggle and to starve
with all the wealth of England at their disposal, wealth ex-
pended so lavishly, too, elsewhere. (Hear.) And yet, fore-
knowing what must happen, the English Minister of War
could not devise a single measure of prevention until he
himself sees that it is too late. What is the popular argu-
ment which hon. gentlemen opposite now make use of to
shield the Government from the consequences of its inac-
tion? The war, they- say, is over. But if the war is over
its consequences remain. The Chancellor of the Exchequer
says, " We shall not tight the question again when we come
to discuss tho articles of peace." Bat will any one wh3
calls himself an Englishman tell ma that if a war should
break out again with Russia in defence of Turkey, and
that war should happen to have for its theatre the Asiatic
frontier, the surrenderofKars on this occasion will not have
the greatest moral effect in weakening British prestige.
Bat, sir, are we to bo told that because the offence is over
the offender is to be freed from his responsibility ? That is
not the line of argument adopted by the right hon. gentle-
man with respect to the Ottoman Porte. H. uw does it agree
with the demand on the part of the English Government for
the dismissal of Salim Pacha. His dismissal was dermtn,led,
and he was dismissed. Might not the Porte have said,
"Oh that's over ' • Kars is gone and the offence has passed."
(Cheers.) What was the offence of Salim Pacha? Why,
procrastination ; and if that is to be punished by less of
office, what, I should like to know, is the &miens infer-

Puce? (Hear, hear.) The Attorney-General turns to the
art'cles of peace triumphantly, and asks —What more
could we have done ? That there were faults no one can
doubt. One gentleman says, they rest with the ambassa-
dor; another, that Omer Pacha was to blame ; a third,
that it was the Ottoman Government; but if you ask me
to make a direct charge, all I can say is this :—Here are
the applications which General Williams made to you;
have you attended to them ? (Hear.) He is a man in whom
you place the utmost confidence, and who in circumstances
of great difficulty makes three requests. First, he asks
for money; secondly, for surgical aid ; and thirdly, to
increase and extend his personal authority. The money
you do not send ; even the surgical aid you do not send ;
and with respect to extending his personal authority, you,
through your ambassador, in effect decline to do it. Your
general cannot stir a stop because he does not receive the
information he is in want of ; when he asks for some ad-
ditional force, we are reminded that France might have
been an obstacle. Has any hon. gentleman on the part of
the Government shown that there was ever any consulta-
tion with the Preach Government as to what should be
done should such a contingency as the siege of Kars by the
Russians arise? No one has done so, and I think, there-
fore, that I am entitled to say such a contingency ou,ghtto
have been contemplaied and provided for, not that it
should be, as it was, left to the chapter of accidents.
When lam asked, what court the Government do ? I
say on the other hand, whA had the Government done? It
is no ans Ter to turn to the despatches. I grant that you
could not have written better ; but I cannot conceive any
case in which you could have acted worse. I confess I am
prepared to find a majority against me. Of course there
are many hon. gentlemen who honestly think there is no
case against the Government. Scme no doubt there are
influenced by a laudable attachment to ministers, others
who will be seduced by those seductive touches ofpatbetic
eloquence in which the Attorney-General reminds us that
the Government have concluded the war by an honourable
peace, although it may be a peace which I do not think has
been greeted with any great manifestation of popular en-
thusiasm. (Hear.) Some there may be who will vote for
the Government from their admiration of the noble lord
nt the head of the administration, in which admira-
tion lam free to say that I participate. But, upon the
whole Ido not think the majority will be great. If there
is one of her Majesty's Government who, when he goes
into the lobby, ventures to ask souse friend in a cautious
whisper, " Now, don't you think that this charge is unjust
and that the Government have . shawl' great energy and
foresight for the preservation and relief of Kars ?'' my be-
lief is that his friend will reply in an equally cautious
whisper, " If that be your idea of energy and f,rosight, I
trust, for Heaven's sake, that in future you will try to
direct it into some other channel." (Laughter.) lam not
altogether in the position in which I see some of my friends '
around me and many hon. gentlemen on the other side—
I am not tied by the ties of party, hut can afford fully,
freely, and fairly to do justice te the grdat qualities of the
noble viscount at the head of the Ministry, and also to
Lord Clarendon, who has evinced in his despatches the
deepest sympathy for General Williams. I grant that the
words of thane despatches must have been as gleams of
sunshine to the gallant soldier in his desolation and trial;
but if those letters come to cheer and encourage him, there
are others which tend to sadden and depress the gallant
defender of Kars, and which, like the gloomy apparitions
of the poet,

;' Show his eyes, and grieve his heart,
Come like shadows—so depart."
(Cheers.) Giving to the Government, however, all the
praise to which they can fairly lay claim, I ask the hon.
gentleman who can give a fearless opinion whether it is not
to such causes as want of energy and foresight on the part
of our Government that we are to ascribe the fall of Kars?
In almost every letter General Williams tell you of the
evils of procrastination—in almost every letter he tells you
you must not rely upon the resources of the Pelt° alone,
and yet to the last you procrastinate, to the last you con-
fine him to those resources—not One step do you take, not
ono remedy do you provide, not one stratagem do you con-
coct, until at length you are overwhelmed with the logical
consequences of your own improvidence and neglect, and
history, drawing her moral from the pages of this blue
book, will record with inflexible justice that the fall of
Kars in the two years' war was attributable, and attribu-
table alone, to the procrastination and neglect of the Bri-
tish Government. (Loud cheers.)
Mr. V. SMITH would not attempt to follow the hon.
baronet in those flights of fancy by which ho had adorned
the discussion ; bat he might lie permitted to thank him
for tho honourable contrast which his address presented
to the speech of the hon. and learned gentleman who made
the original motion. The hon. baronet complained of some-
thing like a want of courtesy by his noble friend at the
head of the Government on the occasion of the adjournment
of the debate last Tuesday. He assured the hon. baronet
no discourtesy whatever was intended, and least of all
would it become any member of the house to evince dis-
courtesy to him who was as much distinguished by his ur-
banity as his eloquence. (Hear.) But the hon. baronet would
recollect the circumstances of that evening, and the feeling
of listlessness and languor that existed. His noble friend
had alluded to the circumstance of the withdrawal of the
motion in the other house, and he (lir. V. Smith) must
say, considering that a great part of the discussion hied re-
solved itself into an attack upon Lord Clarendon and Lord
Panmure, it would have been more generous for them to
have pressed it in the House of Lords and abandoned it
in the House of Commons. It did appear to him that
there Was an obvious intention to evade the division.
They trusted for a time to the hope that the amendment
of which notice was ,given by his hon. friend the member
for Leominster would be debated, .but he having de-
.',nod to bring it forward they were in a dilemma,
irem, which they sought to escape by putting up an hon.
m 3
libel. to move a resolution with a view to evade the
shire had m
wha
d vi'ion, and accordingtlyhad been called the previous
the hon. member for Reset-
questlon, but which, if carried, would be the most idle sad

mischievous resolution that could be imagined, because it
would affirm th , inexpediency of entertaining, the question
of the fall of Kars before discussing the articles of peace.
No one wore leniented that calamity than he did; but he
looked upon it merely as au incident, of the war, and by
no means fraught with those political consequences which
the hon. and learned gentleman so much dreaded. No
doubt sufficient means would be taken to disseminate the
news of its fall throughout Asia Minor, and Russian agents
would represent it as a great Russian triumph. But with
the news of its fill would go forth that of the desperate
assault and repulse of Mouravieff on the 9th of S sptember,
and it would become known that it was famine alone, and
not the arms of the enemy, that induced it to surrender.
The same newsman who conveyed the intelligence f its
fall to the remotest parts, would spread far and wide the
immortal name of General Williams, and the knowledge
that he was an Englishman would go fax to maintain our
prestige throughout the whole of Asia Minor. He re-
gretted that the honourable and learned gentleman should
have spoken in so contemptuous a tone of the " doctor."
No one who had read the blue book could fail to ob-
serve that Dr. Sandwith had rendered the moat es-
sential service, and really he thought that after
the noble self-devotion shown by that gentleman in re-
lieving the suffering of the troops, the hon. and learned
gentleman would have been ashamed to have spoken so
slightingly of the "doctor." But the hon. and learned
gentleman had poured the torrent of his indignation upon
Lord Stratford ; and, after continuing his attack as long P.B
he could with any decency, he turned his attention to Lord
Clarendon. Now what was the whole gravamen of the
case as against Lord Stratford de .Redclitle —that he did
not answer Gen. Williams's despatches. Nothing, he ad-
mitted, could excuse that, whether resulting from negli-
gence or any other cause ' • but he put it to the house whe-
ther, when they looked to the important results which
would follow, it worth' justify the Government iu recalling
the noble lord. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was a diplo-
matist of the most distinguished abilities ; he was em-
phatically the right man in the right place, and it was ac-
knowledged upon all hands that he p messed au authority
in Turkey which noother man could possess— an authority
little short of that of the Salter', and it was absolutely
necessary for the interests of the State to maintain him
in that position. If he had been recalled it would
have been said directly that an entire change had taken
place in the views of the British Government, and the con-
sequence might have been disastrous. He admitted that
so fa• as the non-answering of General Williams's dee-
p atches-was concerned, a case had been made ag-siust Lord
Stratford de Reecliffe ; bus he utterly denied that it was
such a case as would warrant her Majesty's Government,
under the circumstances, to recall the Ambassador. Tue
fall of Kars had no influence upen the result of the war.
This was proved by the protocols. No doubt every
achievement in war added to the power of those who ef-
fected it. But it was clear that Kars must, be aurrenlered
on the restoration of peace • and the restoration of peace
had really resulted from the taking of Sebastopol. The
French had not attached' great impedance to Kars, an I
sent not ellen a oonamissioner there. The- discussion of
the question was justifiable, but it should not have been
made a means of disp!acing the Government. (A. laugh.)
There was no fairness in thus fastening on a particular
part of the conduct of the wr.r. Lord Maltnesbury had
shown that ho had come to this opinion by withdrawing
his motion on the subject in another place. He (Hr. V.
Smith) knew that the people of England deeply lamented
the fall of Kars. (Lund cries of " Hear, hear.") He him-
self had had lamented it most intensely. Bat the people
of England had also cause to rejoice at the fall of Sebas-
topol, ant they could not be a eta for it ; and they
ware unwilling t rake up bygones, and would recoil hem
such motions as this, and wore reluctant to encourage
party attacks. If in the management of delicate alliances
and amidst great difficulties, the Government had com-
mitted some slight error in reference to Kars, he appealed
to the gene osity of the people to be grateful for a war, on
the wh de, well conducted, and a peace well concluded.
(Ministerial cheers.)
No member rose for.some moments, and there were cries
of " divide, divide," when
Mr. VANSITTART rose, saying that he should not have
spoken, but that no other memberappeared disposed t ad-
dress tee house. He . bse. ved that the defenders (..f the
Government, backed by what they fondly thought to be a
majority, had actually arrogated for their entire credit an
immunity from blame in the conduct of the war. Now,
to that view he could not assent ; and the contrary feeling
would dictate his vote. The Government were not justi-
fiable for perilling the British name by sending a " com-
missioner' to Kars, with the appearance, without the
reality, of power, and leaving him to inevitable defeat,
backed up neither by meo, money, nor materials. It
would have been better to have left the Turkish Govern-
ment with the sole responsibility of the defence of Kers,
and not to have associated it with the British name. Kars
might have fallen a mouth or two sooner ; but though the
Russians might have gained the same success, England
would have escaped seine disgrace. (Hear, hear.)
Captain LAFFAN desired, as a military man, to address
the house. He dwelt upon the importance of the siege of
Sebastopol. What could the Government have withdrawn
forces from the Crimea and sent them to Kars, for as object
the French considered purely English—the defence of the
route to India ? It was impossible to send English troops
to Kars; and all that could be done was to advise the
Turkish Government as to the use of the forces uuder their
control. The plan of Omer Pacha was utterly impractic-
able. The supposed force for the purpose existed in a
great degree only upon paper, and the rest was incongruous
and he erogeneous. The two main charges against the con-
duct of the war as to Kars was the discouragement of this
expedition by Georgia, and the recommendation of the
route by Trebizond. But in both of these courses the
Government ha 1 shown their sense and judgment. Approv-
ing of the conduct of the Government in a military point
of view, ho thought them politically wrong in not having
sent money to General Williams; for with money at his
command that gallant officer would have saved Kers.
(Hear.) But ha could not bring himself to believe that
any amount of " foresight and energy" on the part of the
G,v.rnment could have saved that fortress.
Colonel DITNNE did not think the hon. and gallant
member who h el just spoken had been more successful in
his defence of the Government than hon. members who
had preceded him. (Hear.) The defenders of the Go-
vernment'contended that Kars was not a place of great
military importance; but in his (Colonel Dunne's) opinion
Kars was the lever by which a peace, neither acceptable
nor grateful to the °country, had been brought about.
(Hoar.) He believed that this country had suffered a great
diminution of glory by permitting that fortress to bo taken.
(Hear.) With regard to the strategical operations, the Mi-
nister of War had said that the march by Trebizond was
the proper method of proceeding ; but every military man
bad expressed an opinion adverse to that view. (Hear.)
The road by Trebizond was not practicable for the passage
of cannon. It would take 30,000 men three or four months
to march to the scene of action by that route. (Hear.)
No military man doubted that the proposition of Omer
Pacha ought to have been carried out. The march by Erze-
n,um was not practicable; that by Soukup.' Kaleh was,
and the Government was greatly in fault for delaying pre-
deeding by that route so long. (Hear.) Had the contingent
of General 'Vivian been sent to Balaklava, Omer Pacha
would have taken his troops to Asia Minor, and Kars
would have been saved. Nothing had prevented Omer
Pecha's advance by Kutais but the lateness of the season
and this delay was owing to the indecision, the want of
foresight, and the incapacity of those entrusted with the
arrangement of the operations. It was a most flimsy argu-
ment to say that the contingent was not sent to Balaklava
because it was unfit. In his opinion, the guilt of the fall of
Kars rested on the War Department of this country. If
the War Department were tried by a jury of military men,
he felt assured that its condemnation would be more signal
than in the House of Commons, or in the country. He felt
no eloubt as to the opinion of the nation being in accord-
ance with the resolution of his hon. and gallant friend the
member for Enniskillen. Without going into the earlier
portions of Lord Stratford's conduct, he must be permitted
to state his regret that the ambassador had not answered
General Williams's letters. (Hear, hear.) In extenu-
ation of the ambassador, however, it ought to be
remember* I that Gen. Williams was not placed under him,
but under Lord Raglan; that Gen. Williams occupied the
same position as did Col. Rose with Gen. Pelissier. But
the Government were responsible for the conduct of their
ambassador, and the War Department guilty of the fall of
Kars (Hear.) As yet he had heard no defence of the con-
duct of the Government. Ou the contrary every speech
uttered had confirmed him as to their guilt. (Hear.)
Mr. COWAN stated his intention to support the Go.
vernment.

Mr. LIDDELL said he had no hesitation in voting for
the amendment of the hon. member for Dorsetshire. With
regard to tho resolution of the hoe. and learned member
' for Enniskillen, he could have hoped to have seen it dif-
ferently worded, and less forcible iu its meaning; but while
he could not agree in all the censure which that resolution
east upon the Government at home, yet if asked whether the
f ill of Kars was or was not attributable to the want of fore-
sight and energy, he must vote in the affiruaative.
A pause of some moments ensued, during which no mein
her rose to address the house, and calls were raised for a
division. At length,
Sir J. GRA.HA.3I rose. He said —T know not whether
the hon. and learned member for Greenock (Mr. Dunlop) is
iu his place, but. I can assure him and the house that it is
never my wactice, even were it in my power, to make a
speech for display; and it is only a sense of duty and the
feeling that I ought not to give a silent vote on ibis im-
portant question which induces me to rise on the present oc-
casion. I shall take the hint which was offered by the hon.
and learned member for Greenock, and shall endeavour to
compress into the narrowest space the observations which it
will be my duty to submit to the house; and I am bound
to state that, like the hon. gentleman who has just sat
down, I have had some doubts with respect to ,the vote
which I ought to give upon this occasion • but,-both in
public and in, private life, in a case of doubt, I think
the rule a safe one to do as ono would be done
by ; and having lately been a responsible servant of
the Crown during the conduct of the present war, I am
bound to remember the difficulties with which her Ma-
jesty's Government have had to contend. My own expe-
rience has taught me that it is a very difficult operation
to conduct a great war, whether by sea or land, with
forces under commanders with a divided authority. Now,
what is the experience of the greatest commanders in this
respect ? I think it is an observation of the great Napo-
leon that even one bad general is better than two good
ones at the head of the same army. He makes also an-
other reflection—that an army composed of different na-
tions will Lot bo long before it commits great mistakes.
What, again, was the experience of the Duke of Welling-
ton in the Peninsular war ? He felt the difficulty of a
divided command to so great an extent. that almost imme-
diately after his landing in the Peninsula he thought it
not only requisite to put at the head of the Portuguese
army en officer second only to himself, but he thougt it
also indispensably vecessary that he should be the gene-
ralissimo of that army, holding, as it were, both the first
and the second commands in it. At Talaveia he did not
command, and at Salamanca he had only an imperfect
command, and felt deeply the inconvenience of a divided
authority. There is a remarkable letter of the Duke f
Wellington's written when Alexander, Emperor of Russia,
proposed to send a corps d'aree to the Peni,,sula, to be
placed partially
under the command of the Duke of Wel-
lington, which sets forth the opinion of that great man
upon the difficulties attendant upon a divided command.
In a despatch of the Duke of Wellington to Lord Bathurst
he says :

"I must not say how much I am flattered by the dispo-
sition of the Emperor of Russia to place bis troops under
myccommand.lf the Emperor should carry this inten•
tioninto execution, I beg leaye to recommend not only
that the Emperor should place them under my command,
but that he should accept of my services (with the permis-
sion of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent) as a general
officer in his service of rank senior to the general officer
who should he sent in command of his Imperial Majesty's
troops, and that, although the discipline and interior eco-
nomy of his Imperial Majesty's troops should be carried on
under the direction of the general otUoar who would come
to the Peninsula with them, all reports, &c., regarding
them and their operations should pass through my hands.
I mention this now, because, having for some years com-
manded an allied army composed of very discordant mute-
;leis, and having had the good fortune to preserve the

utmost harmony among them, I am anxious that, in case
his Majesty the Emperor should be disposed to carry his
intention in t • execution, his views should not be frustrated
by want of attention to the occurrence of one of those ro-
cidents which experience has shown are too likely to occur
in the employment of allied troops in the seine scene of
action."
I have now, Sir, shown the house what was the opinion ex-
pressed by two of the greatest commanders of modern times
with regard to the difficulties of commanding combined
armies. It is title that in our history we have bright ex-
amples of achievements by combined armies. Pe-mollies and
Blenheim at once occur to our recollection, but still the diffi-
culties of a command over a combined army are great in the
extreme. I, sir, have had the advantage of being from
early youth a friend of the late Lord Raglan, and I say that
in valour, courtesy, firmness, and honour he was a bright
example of an English general. (Hear.) He had, upon
the ground to which I have referred, great difficulties to
contnd against, but by his courtesy he won the esteem of
two Marshals of France—(hear)—in a combined operation.
His valour was proved when he led—a circumstance new
in our annals—British troops side by side with French to
the storming of a strong position, defended by brave sol-
diers, worthy of the adversaries against whom they had to
contend. (Hear.) He had, I say, great difficulties to con-
' tend with, but thanks to his courtesy, the alliance roma' ned
unbroken. Although his conduct during some part of his
command has been made the subject of adverse copiment,
I think that, taken all in all, we shall not for some time
look upon his like again. (Hear.) As regards General
Williams, who is more immediately connected with the
subject of this debate, he has displayed qualities of the
highest character, and has proved that for the future the
brightest hopes may be entertained of him. (Hear, hear.)
If Kars could have been saved by Gen. Williams I believe
it would not have fallen, but, while I say thus much, I
must also bear my testimony to the manner in which Lord
Clarendon supported the authority of Gen. Williams. I
will state to the house a circumstance which has not yet
been mentioned, and which I think will show that the
merits of Gen. Williams, great as I believe ,them to be,
were not unobserved by the Earl of Aberdeen. IA the year
1843 it was the duty of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to
select an officer for the important post of a commissioner to
arrange the frontier between Turkey and Persia, and Lord
Aberdeen, after fell inquiry, appointed Gen. Williams to
that office—(hear, hear)—and I must say that the conduct
of that gallant officer on that occasion gave the greatest se-
tisfaction to the Turkish end English Governments. When
it became necessary to appoint a commissioner to the Turk-
ish army in Awe. Lord Aberdeen, remembering the s-srviees
of Gen. Williams, recommended Lord Clerend4n to a point
that gallant officer to the post, and L. d Clarendon, with
the concurrence of the Cabinet. maee that isopoietrnen t
(bear.) It was not my intention to have riser so early
this evening, and I deeply regret that I ern obliged to speak
in the absence of an hon. gentleman, because I ,hould have
liked him to hear the answer I am about to make to some of
his observations—l mean the hon. member for Aylesbury.
I Now, sir, I must say that it is extremely easy to kick adi ad
anim ii--(iaughter) —and, as the hon. gentle oven has been
engaged, and I hope profitably engaged, in researni. s eon-
neeted with peop:e long since dead, I can quite imagine that
he would prefer kicking a defunct administration to coming
in collision with a Ministry in ease. (Hear.) I say, sir,
that the comments of the hon. gentleman on the Govern-
ment of Lord Aberdeen are most unjust. The hon. gentle-
man says that the Administration of Lord Aberdeen en-
tirely overlooked the importance of the Asiatic frontier of
Turkey, and the danger to Turkey of the advances of Russia
in that direction. Now, sir, I will not trouble the house
with more extracts than I can help, but I must remind the
house that the despatches to which I shall refer were
written by the Duke of Newcastle as the organ of the
Government, and I think that the statement of the hon.
gentleman that the Government of Lord Aberdeen was
indifferent to the state of the Turkish army in Asia will
fall to the ground. I will not refute that position by many
extracts, but will confine myself to three. I would bee
the house to remember the dates. The Duke of Newcastle
lett the Admiuistration with Lord Aberdeen towards the
end of January. In the preceding October Lord Claren-
don wrote to Lord Stratford de Redclifre—au 1 it is con-
sistent with my own knowledge that the despatch was
written in concert with the Duke of Newcastle—in the
blowing terms : -
" Her Majesty's Government have a direct interest in the
effective state of this army (that is, the army of Kars and ou
the Asiatic froutier), as it is likely that military operations
upon a large scale will be carried on in Asia next year ; and
they must therefore again insist upon the necessary measures
being taken without delay."
On the part, therefore, of Lerd Aberdeen's Cabinet, I must
say that there was the earliest indication of foresight with
reference to the probable course of military events in the
trly part of 1855, The date of the despatch is important
—it is the 21st of October. It is immediately consequeut
upon the hope entertained confidently by Lord Raglan and
Alareh .1 Canrobert that the bombardment of Sebastopol,
which was to take place on the 17th of October, would bi
successful, and it clearly shows that the policy of Lord
Aberdeen's Government was that, if happily that bom-
bardment should be successful, part of the allied forces
would be directed on Asia. Here is the matter most in
dispute between the hon. gentleman and myself. Un-
doubtedly her Majesty's Government—l believe the pre-
sent as well as Lord Aberdeen's—did attach primary
importance to the Crimean operations, and regarded as
secondary, although most important, the military move-
ments and events on the Asiatic frontier. The hon. gen-
tleman takes an opposite view. He thinks, I believe, that
the operations in the Crimea were secondary to the move-
ments on the Asiatic side, and therein differs on a point of
strategy from the conclusions at which the Government ar-
rived after giving the matter their most careful considera-
tion, and consulting with those best qualified to advise
them. But new I would ask attention, as a proof that the
Duke of Newcastle and Lord Aberdeen's Government never
departed from the view which they took with reference to
the importance of the Asiatic frontier to a despatch which,
I think, was partially read by the hon. and learned member
for Enniskillen. It is from Cul. Mundy to Lord Wodehouse,
and is dated 6th November :

" The Duke of Newcastle is of opinion that it will be found
almost an impossibility for the English and French forces to co-
operate with an army in the state in which the Turkish array in
Asia is represented to be, unless a complete change of system
be effected. His grace further directs me more especially to re-
quest that your lordship will call Lord Clarendon's attention
to the statements of Col. Williams with retard to the arrturg
of pay due to the Turkish soldiers, and the evil results arising
therefrom, not only causing distress .and privation iu the army,
but encouraging desertion from its ranks; the want of clothing
among the troops of all arms, and the absence of medicine for
the sick and want of properly qualified surgeons."

That does nor point so directly to an intention of sending
further military assistance with a view to more active opera-
tions in the spring of 1855. I think Lord Aberdeen's Go-
vernment left office in the end of January, and there is a
despatch from Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford da Red-
c.iffe, dated Jan. 11, which also is a despatch that I know
was written in immediate concert with the Duke of New-
castle. Lord Clarendon says :

" But this is all that has been done for the relief of the
army, not withstauding the repeated and urgent remonstrances
of her Majesty's Government, which are of a date long ante-
rior to the departure of Gen. Williams from this country. The
Porte was well aware of the anxiety felt by her Majesty's Go-
vernment on this subject, and of the importance they attached
to the army at Kars being in a fit state to take the field next
spring."

Here is an indication of the policy of the Government _and
the measures of precaution they thought it expedient to
take, officially communicated as early as January to Lord
Stratford de Radcliffe. (Hear.) Now, sir, I think I shall
riglitly divide the subjects of blame imputed to the Govern-
meat into two—first, that there being reason not to be
altogether satisfied with the conduct of Lord Stratford de
Radcliffe, they failed to recall him ; and, secondly, thee
trey omitted to send aid to Kars in the summer of 185.5
These appear to me she leading topics of attack, and, with
the permission of the house, 1 will direct Mr attention to
then consecutively. And, first, with regard to the con-
duct of Lord Stra.‘ford de Radcliffe. I agree with the At-
torney-General that it is impossible altogether to vindicate
in the earlier stage of these proceedings, particularly to-
wards the end of 1851 and the comweucement oc 1653, the
neglect to answer the letters of Geu. Williams—(cheers)
and to give him the full authority which was necessary to
sustain him; and I think that there can bo no doubt that
there was a misunderstandiug between Gen. Williams and
Lord Stratford de Reicliffe, which was not conducive to
the gocd of the public servica. (Cheers.) But, having said
ver
that much, I think there are circumstances with reference
to the past life and conduct of Lord Sratford which would
have
uns meandte to it !
e a fatal error
iemrroirroomn
Constantinople.
ttionfohpeler.
(Majesty'saear.lGt
is
said that he neglected to -answer as many as 61 letters; but
it appears that on one morning 17 despatches arrived to-
gether, e luiring probably only one answer. I will not,
however, deal with the question in that manner. I have
admitted that 1 think there were parts of the conduct
of Lord Stratford tie Radcliffe fairly repreheushle ; but,
ou the other hand, I agree with the honourable and gal-
officer who spoke on the opposite side that there,
perhaps, were defects in the original arrangement. Gen.
Williams was sent as military cemmissioner, placed more
mune iiately under the orders and direction of Lord Rag-
lau, and not so immediately under the control of eh
British ambava for, (Hear, hear.) Probably, too, his
powers and functions were net strictly defined ; and
under these circumstances, although it is certainly to :10
regretted, it was not very unnatural that in the first in-
stance, some misunderstaudi rig should have Alison between
Lord Stratford and General Williams. But agaiuib that I
beg the house to set the services rendered by Lird Strat-
ford de Radcliffe to the couutry: Recollect how he stood
as a sentiuel, almost alone, opposing a constant front to
the spirit of Rusiiau aggression in that quarter, and to
what was no less deluge' ous than Russian aggression—the
corruptive influence of Russia iu a capital where her seduc-
tions
have not always been thrown away. Let me also re-
mind the house of the influence acquired by Lord Stratford,
over the Turkish Government. He himself tells us of the
corruption which prevails in every department of that q.-
Vernthent, and let us not forget how his honesty and in-
tegrity have stood proof against the baneful influence, and
to what noble purposes he has directed the ieflaence
gained by honour and uprightness. The papers which have
just been presented to Parliameut show how successfully
he has exerted himself in favour of the Christian subjects
of the Sultan. I attribute mainly to the influence of Lord
Stratford, constantly and nobly exerted, that hatti-sheriff
which gives such important privileges to the Christian
P-Pulation in Turkey. He assures us that no subject of
the Turk will be molested ou account of his reagious
opinions, or punished on account of the abancionment of
any faith which he shalt renounce. That estaulishes religi-
ous liberty in Turkey ; and that hattiesheriff, so important,
is referred to by name in the treaty which has been laid on
our table; it is the condition on which Turkey is admitted
within the pale of civilised Europe; it will give to the Eu-
ropean Powers, if it be not observed, either collectively
or individually, a right of remonstrance; and I do not
think, all circumstances considered, a better or more sa-
lutary arrangement could have been made. More than
that I believe there was error in the conduct of Lord
Stratford de Radcliffe in the earlier part of the transac- I
tions with General Williams, but will the house recollect
•
in justice to Lord Stratford, what were the e :for ts
he made after the commencement of 1855? I believe he
was earneA fur
General unremitting in his exertions to obtaie or
General Williams every possible assistance from the Divan.
Well, sir, under all these circumstances, considering his
ability, the length of his services, his conduct, his cha-
racter,. I am disposed to say that the Horatian
with regard to poetry is equally applicable to political
services—

" Verum übi plura intent in carmine, non ezo paucis
"Offender maculis, quas aut incuria fudit,
" Aut humane parum cavit nature."
This accusation, I grant, more particularly applies to
Lord Aberdeen's Government, because the offence was
committed in the beginning of the year 1855 or at the close
of the year 1851. But if it be an error that Lord Stratford
was not recalled, had I remained a member of the Admi-
nistration I should have partaken of the councils of my
o 'heaves, and I should have resisted to the utmost the
ez.dl of Lord Stratford. I come now to the second point, I
which is the omission of sending aid to Kara in the sum.