The Sun.
London, England, 1860-04-25 00:00:00

ject of the difference caused by the constitutional
question of Hesse."
The motion was rejected by a large majority.
The resolution proposed by the committee on M.
Vincke's motion, implying confidence in the Govern-
ment, in its conduct in the question of Hesse, and
expressing the hope that it would continue firm in
adhering to it, was then put, and carried by 207
votes against 68.

A letter from Berlin, of the 22d inst., says :--
" The resolution of the committee on Vincke's
motion respecting Hesse has been adopted by 207
votes to 68. The interest taken in the debate was
very great. Long before the doors were opened
every approach was thronged by persons eager to
get in. Prince Frederick William was present both
days, and the gallery set apart for the diplomatic
corps was quite full ; the English Ambassador was
present. The result of the vote was received with
loud cheers. As the vote implied a vote of confi-
dence in the Government, the Ministers abstained
from voting."

IMPERIAL PAHL lAME N T.

•
HOUSE OF LORDS—(YEsTEnDay.)
GALASIIIELS AND PEEBLES RAILWAY DILL.

Oa the inotioh of the arl of EGLINTON this bill was
ordered to be re-comtritted.
LAW AND EQUITY BILL.

The LORD CIIANCELLOIt (who was indistinctly
heard), in moving the second reading of this bill, said that
we had arrived at a crisis in law reform, and the question
now was whether then) should be a further fusion of law
and equity. That subject had been committed t* the care-
ful attentionpf Parliament in the speech delivered from the
Throne at the commencement of the session, with a view to
enable the courts of common law finally to determine in a
stisfactory manner any case which might be duly brought
before them. There prevailed in this country what he be-
lieved was unknown in any other civilised State—a distinc-
tion between the law administered in one tribunal and the

law administered in another. That had arisen from what
he must call the narrow-minded and technical decisions of
of the common law judges in former times. Justice having
been denied to the subject in the courts of common law it
became necessary to apply to another tribunal. Another
tribunal was constituted, from which the most important
advantages were derived by the country ; he meant the
Court of Chancery. The great men who had presided in
that court had constructed a most beautiful system of juris.:
prudence, the admiration of the whole world. For many
genci ations a conflict went on between the courts on one side
of Westminster-hall and the courts on the other, and Lcrd
Mansfield made an attempt to bring about some reconcilia-
tion. But that jurist incurred great obloquy for his endea-
vours, because it had unhappily been the practice of the law
courts for centuries before to regard their respective rules
as absolute perfection.. He remembered, indeed, that when
he himself entered the profession the equitable doctrines of
Lord Mansfield were sneered at an tconfemneit. Thus things
continued until fortunately a commission was 4pointed
by her Majesty to consider what improvements could be
made in the courts of equity. The commission consisted
of ciainent men—viz., Sir J. Romilly, Lord Justice Tur-
ner, Sir W. P. Wood, Mr. Justice Crompton, Sir R.
Bethell, Sir J. Graham, Mr. Henley, Mr. J. Parker, and
Mr. W. M. James. Their recommendations, as far as the
courts of equity were concerned, had been almost entirely
carried into effect; but he was sorry to say that in the com-
mon law courts much yet remained to be done. The com-
mission took the most enlightened view of the subject and
offered most valuable suggestions. In the report which
they presented to her Majesty in 1852 they stated :
_ " The mischiefs which arise from the system of several
distinct courts proceeding on distinct and. in some cases,
antagonistic principles, are extensive and deep rooted.
These mischiefs, we believe, have arisen in part from the
different principles by which the different courts are go-
verned, and the different systems of law from which those
principles are derived, and in part from inherent defects in
the powers of the several courts-. . . It happens that, in
many cases, parties in the course of the same litigation are
driven backwards and forwards from courts of law to courts
of equity, and from courts of equity to courts of law. A
defendant in an action at law, who has a just ground of de-
fence, is often obliged to resort to equity to control the de-
cision of a court of law, or to restrain the plaintiff at law
from proceeding to obtain a judgment which cannot in
equity be permitted to be available. . . Again, courts of
law have no powers for the preservation of property pend-
ing litigation. A court of equity has such powers • and
parties suing in courts of law are thus frequently driven
into equity for the preservation of the property pending the
suit at law."

The commissioners laid down principles which he wished to
see adopted. They said, "It is obviously most desirable that
in every case the court which has the cognisance of the
matter in dispute should be able to give complete relief."
Having then discussed the various remedies which had been
suggested they continued :

"We have arrived at the conclusion that without abo-
lishing the distinction between law and equity, or blend-
ing the courts into one court of universal jurisdiction,
a practical and effectual remedy for many of the evils
in question may be found in such a transfer, or blend-
ing of jurisdiction, coupled with such other practical
amendments as will render each court competent to admi-
nister complete justice in the cases which fall under it
cognisance. We think that the jurisdiction now exercised
by the courts of equity may be conferred upon courts of
law, and that the jurisdiction now exercised by cum is of
law may be conferred upon courts of equity to such an ex-
tent as to render both courts competent to administer en-
tire justice without the parties in the one court being ob••
liged to resort to the aid of the other."
There tho ground was laid down on which this bill was
founded—one cause and one court. It was not proposed
that a suit should be brought in the Court of Queen's
Bench against a trustee for breach of trust, or that an ac-
tion for assault and battery should be brought in the Court
of Chancery ; but that legal rights should be enforced in
the courts of common law, and, if equitable questions aro e
incidentally, that those courts, should have rower to dis-
pose of them without entailing on the parties the necessity
of going to another tribunal, employing another set of
counsel, and thus incurring infinite delay and expense.
His learned friend,. Sir It. Bethell, who was not only a
great advocate, but a profound jurist, in an address which
he delivered at the'inauguration of the Juridicial Society in
1855, said :
" For above a century this country •has exhibited the
anomalous spectacle of distinct tribunals acting upon anta-
gonistic principles and dispensing different qualities of jus-
tice. It is the rule and duty of the one set of courts fre-
quently to refuse to recognise the real right of ownership,
to ignore defences and claims founded on the best esta •
blished rules of justice : and the prevention of gross injury
committed in the name of law is wade to depend upon the
other court being quick enough to overtake and arrest the
first in its career of acknowledged injustice, and prevent it
from deliberately committing wrong."
The commissioners who were appointed to inquire into the
common law procedure had reported on the same subject
and the country was deeply indebted to than for their la-
bours. Whatever might be thought of their suggestions re-
specting the equitable jurisdiction, their recommendations
for amending the pleading and process of the common law
courts would be generally admitted to have been most valu-
able. During the first nine months after the Procedure
Bill of 1852 came into operation, the rules granted by those
courts were reduced from 38,009 to 3,081, although a greater
number of actions were brought and depending. The Com-
mon Law Commissioners were Chief Justice Jervis, Chief
Justice Cockburn, Mr. Justice Willes, and Baron Brad-
well. In their second report, in 1852, the commissioners
stated :

" We think we shall not outstep the limits of our com-
mission by so far expressing our opinion, upon what is com-
monly called the fusion of law and equity, as-te say that,
whether or not it may be thought conducive to despatch of
business and satisfaction in the administration of justice to
do away altogether with the present division of labour be
tween the courts of law and equity, so far as that division
arises out of the diversity of the subject-matters over which
either class of courts exercises an exclusive and complete
jurisdiction, it appears to us that the courts of common law,
to be able satisfactorily to administer justice, ought to pos-
sess, in all matters within their jurisdiction, the power to
give all the redress necessary to protect and vindicate com-
mon law rights and to prevent wrongs, whether existing or
likely to happen unless prevented."
They then went on to recommend specific improvements, on
which the present bill was partly founded. On the recom-
mendation of the commissioners jurisdiction was given to
the courts of common law in all cases where there was an
equitable defence ; but the courts of equity held that suitors
were not bound by the judgment where there was power
to set up an equitable defence; so that, if judgment were
given against them, they might go into a court of equity,
file a bill, and have the whole case tried over again. Sir
IL Cairns, a great ornament of the profession, had brought
in a bill which did give to the courts of equity the powers
that were required to do full justice to suitors who came
before them, whereas formerly it was necessary, when a
legal question arose, to go into a common law court, having
an issue directed to try the point. Sir H. Cairns's Act
enabled the court of equity to decide legal questions arising
in an equitable suit ; but he was sorry to say that the equity
judges were very reluctant to avail themselves of the power,
and it was often necessary in an equitable suit to resort to
an action in the common law courts to enforce a legal right,
and to incur great additional expense by employing two dis-
tinct sets of counsel. In their third report the Common
Law Commissioners, Cockburn, Martin, Willes, Bramwell,
and Walton, pointing out the evils and remedies, said :
"It is our intention and wish that the result of what is
proposed should be engrafted upon and become part of the
common law, and that the distinction between common law
and Chancery law should be so far abolished. -If, in addi-
tion to this, the Court of Chancery is prohibited from inter-
fering in cases where common law rights are thus rendered
capable of complete vindication in the courts of common
law, and in which, therefore, its interference will have be-
come useless, the greater part, if not the whole, of the field
of conflict will be done away with by confining the operation
of the courts respectively to subject•matters peculiar to
each. Thoroughly to effect this it is necessary to confer
upon common law courts power to give, in respect of rights
there recognised, all the protection and redress which at
present can be obtained in any jurisdiction, and it is upon
this principle that we have acted in our suggestions. If they
be carried into effect there will no longer be the spectacle of
jurisdictions imperfect in themselves and clashing with one
another, but each court will be armed in itself with exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the subject-matter within its cogni-
sance, and with full power to give all the protection and
redress which the law at present affords by means of a lu-
rality of suits. The conflict of jurisdiction will be done
away with, because the occasion for it will no longer exist.
We have only to add that we have given ow best Attentio;