The Sun.
London, England, 1869-11-18 00:00:00

THE FINANCES OF INDIA.

(From the Time 3)

"A Frontier Officer" addresses us this morning
on a question of considerable importance, as affect-
ing not only the general policy, but the financial
prosperity of the Indian Government. The
" Frontier" referred to is the North-Western
Frontier, or, more exactly speaking, the Northern
Frontier of the Punjab. Our correspondent him-
self gives an accurate description of the country,
but as no ordinary maps would show the places
specified, and as the point involved is not
material to the argument, we may leave the geo-
graphy of the case out of the question. It will
be sufficient to say that in the region beyond
the northern border of the Punjab there dwells
a population with which our authorities on the
spot are very frequently brought into collision.
So far it is the old story. Barbarian hill tribes,
inhabiting almost inaccessible fastnesses, descend
periodically upon the lands of their civilised neigh-
bours for purposes of rapine or vengeance. It
is equally imprudent to submit to these raids and
troublesome to punish them. An expedition, how-
ever justified by provocation, may end in one of
those frontier wars which are uniformly costly and
not uniformly glorious, while anything like patient
or timorous submission to affront might be danger-
ous to our rule. Now, under such circumstances,
exceed'ngly inconvenient, but practically inevitable,
what is to be done? What is the best course to be
pursued? 1* appears from our correspondent's
letter that upon this point the highest and most re-
sponsible authorities are at variance. The Govern-
ment of the Punjab, including for the most part
the officers actually engaged on frontier service,
hold to one " policy ;" the Supreme Government of
India holds to another. Our correspondent ima-
gines that the latter policy is based to a consider-
able extent on public opinion in England, and he
accordingly appeals to us to know what we really
think upon a question which he and his colleagues
on duty take seriously to heart.
It seems to us that " Frontier Officer" has
somewhat mistaken the position of the questLu in
making this appeal. If the difference existing were
a difference of principle, we could reply to his in-
quiries; but, as far as we can judge, it is only a
difference of detail concerning the character to
be given to those military operations which
all parties concur in thinking necessary. Let us
first set our correspondent's mind at rest by saying
that we do not believe these quarrelsare kindled by
the misbehaviour of British officers in charge of the
frontier. From the very nature of the country and
its people such offences must needs come, nor is it
probable that any methods could be devised for in-
spiring these fierce and lawless highlanders with
sentiments of peace. They will make incursions
into our territory, unless they are deterred by fear
ors possibly, quieted with bribes, and as the latter
alternative is not entertained there is only the former
now before us. [low are the tribes of the mountain
to be taught to keep their hands off our subjects
and our property ? Hitherto, we should observe,
the policy pursued has been one which both sides
now concur in discarding. When the provocation
offered became undeniable the authorities reluc-
tantly put the forces of Government iu motion. A
considerable body of troops, amounting some-
times to a small army, was hastily collected, and
at a large expense marched across the border to
do much or little, as the case might be. But,
besides the cost of the affair, there was another
and even more serious objection to such a system.
Although the garrisons of the Punjab are fully
30,000 strong, they are not so organised or quar-
tered as to be able to furnish a movable column of
5,000 men at a short notice. Such a force is only
to be assembled on the occurrence of emergency by
efforts and requisitions which throw the whole pro-
vince into agitation, and agitation in India is a very
undesirable state of public opinion. The Government
is supposed to be in alarm, not to say jeopardy;
the unquiet spirit of the population catches at the
chance of intrigue and disturbance, and more harm
is done by the commotion than any results of the
proceedings can be expected to compensate. That
system of operations therefore stands condemned,
but at this point the divergence of views begins.
Our correspondent, and, as we may assume, the
Punjab officers generally, would maintain the
old policy, while removing its disadvantages.
They argue that the policy failed, not because it
was wrong in itself, but because no provision was
made for carrying it judiciously into execution.
Why should a call for 5,000 troops in such a
province as the Punjab throw the whole country
into disorder ? Would there bo any difficulty
in so organising the military establishments of
the province that a contingent of this strength,
fully equipped for the field, could be furnished
without either delay or disturbance ? In that case,
what course could be simpler or more probably effec-
tual than to march such a force into the offending
country, administer the due measure of retribution,
and then withdraw it ? That is the policy finding
favour in the Punjab. The policy of the Supreme
Government consists in rejecting the system of
" expeditions" altogether, and providing for the
maintenance of order in the hostile districts by a
small permanent garrison. Instead of marching
au army into the wilds of the Black Mountain and
then marching it back again, Lord Mayowould place
a thousand men in cantonments on the spot, there
to remain as long as may be desirable. As to the
relative costs of the two plans, our correspondent
says that an effective raid under his system might
be accomplished for £lOO,OOO, whereas the garrison
would cost £30,000 a year. But for how many
years is it supposed the cantonment must be main-
tained ?

If the question here put to us had been whether
for the sake of peace and quietness all offences
should be left unpunished or the British name be
vindicated by fitting retaliation, there would be no
difficulty about the reply ; but that does not seem
to be the question at all. The Supreme Govern-
ment and the Punjab Government are at one upon
the necessity of giving the offenders a lesson ; they
differ only about the best methods of proceeding.
It appears to us, therefore, that all the arguments
drawn from the presumed unpopularity of border
wars and the generally pacific disposition of English-
men may be dismissed as irrelevant. We certainly
wish to see the Indian Exchequer protected against
the demands of a war, and we have learnt by
experience to look upon frontier " expeditions"
with very little favour. But in this case both
parties concur in recognising the necessity of
military operations, and the only question before
us is a professional question, concerning the par-
ticular tactics to be preferred or rejected. That
is surely a matter rather for the military autho-
rities of India than for the people of England to
decide. We should like to see peace kept on the
lluzaruh frontier by the cheapest and most effectual
policy discoverable, but when Indian officers differ
on this subject it is difficult for others to arbi-
trate. Our correspondent contrasts the rival plans
in forcible language. Conceive, says he, " 1,200
trained troops on one side of a mountain, perma-
nently located to protect a paltry little valley
(whose utmost revenue is £5OO a year) from 3,000
half-naked matchlock-men on the other side—
the borderibeing the crest of the mountain, 9,500
feet high, the sides clothed with huge forests, and
the villages on each side far down the slopes.
• • . Far better to take 5,000 men over
the mountain and have it out than thus perma-
nently waste our strength and prestige." Perhaps
that view may be right, but it is obviously possible
that 1,000 men on the spot may be worth more
than 5,000 out of sight, and, at any rate, the em-
ployment of a permanent garrison iusteal of a
column can baldly represent a pusillanimous
or inacti‘e policy.