The Sun.
London, England, 1860-10-03 00:00:00

STATE OF NAPLES.

A letter from Naples, dated Sept. 25, says :
Garibaldi has been before Capua nearly a fortnight
—as long a time as it took him to accomplish his
triumphant promenade from Reggio to Naples. As
yet he has neither stormed the place; nor blockaded
nor thoroughly invested it, nor obtained any signal
advantage over its defenders. Cajazzo, an important
point on the hills on the right bank of the Volturno,
which had been taken and retaken by the Garibal-
, dians, not without serious loss, on the 19th, has been
since stormed by the Royal troops, who attacked it
with vastly superior forces (7,000 men against 800)
and, as' far as I can learn, it is still in the hands of
the Neapolitans. Garibaldi, has assembled all his
forces on the spot, and is Rreparing for a decisive
effort, He is, however, unable as yet to muster any
considerable array of siege or even field artillery,
All the pieces he has captured in war, or has found
in the Neapolitan storehouses, will be of but little
avail to him till he finds men and officers competent
to handle them. In his whole army I only hear of one
artillery officer, Col. Boldoni, a brave man, who is-
by common consent described as fully knowing his.
business.

The civil Government in Naples, like the military
operations at Capua, may be said to be " in a fix."
The Ministry have for several days tendered their
resignation, which was at last accepted. Garib2ldi
will not find honest men to tak6 their vacant offines
so long as all the measures adopted in the Cabinet
are thwarted by the dispositions of the Camarilla,
at the head of which is the Secretary-General, Doc-
tor-General Bertani. Nor is it easy for the Dictator
to appoint a Ministry under Bertani's presidency,
seeing that Bertani enjoys neither the confidence
of moderate patriots nor the goodwill of the coun-
try at large. On the other hand, Garibaldi is still
too true to the cause of King Victor Emmanuel to
give the management of public affairs into the hands
of the only men who would, perhaps, willingly join
Bertani—l mean Mazzini and his party,—even sup-
posing that these jealous democrats could be brought
to agree on any point of home or foreign policy.
Whatever may be his real intentions for the future,
Garibaldi must be aware that the country is not yet
ripe for Mazzinianism ; and the check he has met
with at Capua, and the rapid success of Cialdini and
Fanti in the Marches and Umbria, have somewhat
damped-the spirits of those sanguine partisans who
think all great political changes should be effected
by" God and the People," and that masses of volun-
teers are equal to all warlike achievements.
We have been for several days awaiting the arri-
val of the Marquis Giorgio Pallavicini Trivulzio,
who has been appointed by Garibaldi Pro-Dictator
of Naples. Pallavicini is one of the martyrs of
Spielberg ; for many years a Deputy, and now a
Senator, in the Sardinian Parliament. He is a man
whose heart was at all times sounder than his head,
an enthusiast whose. utopian views age has rather
exalted than sobered. He is sure to come hither
with upright and conciliatory intentions, but he is
the very contrary of the sort of man that is wanted
here; he will be kneaded aad moulded like a piece
of dough in the hands of Bertani.

However, a quelque chose malheur est bon ; and,
under all circumstances, I firmly believe it was pro-
vidential that Garibaldi should encounter at Capua
and Gaeta difficulties which he may be unable to
overcome single-handed. The King of Naples is
said to have still 40,000 men under his standard,
and it seems that he has now little to fear on the
score of their disaffection or insubordination. De-
fection and disorganisation, it would seem, have
done theii utmost, and the troops at Capua have
certainly shown both their ability and their
dogged determination to fight. Possibly the
valour and impetuosity of the Garibaldians
and the genius of their leader may make
up for inferiority of numbers and the lack of
warlike materiel and strong positions, and
eventually secure the victory on their side ; but
such a victory must be the result of strenuous
efforts, and it will take time. So long as the issue is
doubtful, the Mazzinian party must keep quiet, and
the madly projectedbconquest of Rome and Venice
by open war against France and Austria must be
indefinitely adjourned.
On the other hand, the success of the Piedmon-
tese under Cialdini and Fanti, in the Marches and
Umbria, has raised the spirits of the Piedmontese,
or National Constitutional party. By the latest news
the victorious Generals are at a few hours' distance
from the Neapolitan frontier, and the only question is
now whether they may be able and willing to cross
it. Should the Piedmontese, after occupying all the
Roman States as far asViterbo and Civita Casteilana,
appear before Capua and Gaeta, and by joining their
forces to those of Garibaldi put a speedy end to the
war, and should King Victor Emmanuel at the head
of 20,000 of his troops enter Naples, no doubt but
the Italian question, so far as Naples is concerned,
would be solved by the immediate annexation of
the whole South to the whole North of Italy. The
Mazzinian party would vanish into air, and Gari-
baldi would once more be won over to the King's
person, even if not reconciled with the King's Gc-
' vernment. In order to bring about these results,
however, it is necessary that the Sardinian Go-
vernment should, for the sake of order and peace,
be allowed to depart from the too strict rules of
diplomatic etiquette. Already Sardinia has, per-
haps, strained a point or two, when it ventured on
an attack upon Lamoriciere, but it was done with
the cordial applause of all Europe. An invasion of
the Neapolitan territory may be a more flagrant
violation of the old law of nations : but I feel con-
fident that the Neapolitan people have already
loudly pronounced in favour of annexation, and
that Sardinia is entitled to take what is already
her own by the unanimous will of the people, with-
out any further appeal to popular suffrage.
Nothing but annexation, and that without delay,
can, in my opinion, save these southern kingdoms
from civil war, and render any form of Govern-
ment at all possible.
Supposing the Sardinian Government have both
pluck and luck to accomplish all the task that is ob-
viously befite them, they will still have the ques.
tions of Rome and Venice to settle at no distant
period. Although there are not many thinking
Italians sharing Garibaldi's views as to the expe-
diency of an immediate attack upon France and
Austria in order to liberate all of Italy that remains
in the hands of foreign Powers, yet there is hardly
one who flatters himself that there can be real rest
and quiet in Italy so long as the French are in
Rome and the Austrians in Venice. That the
Italians, or even the Romans, should be made to
keep a Pope for the benefit of the Catholic nations
is something galling to the feelings even of the
most moderate patriot. It is not that every one is
so thoroughly convinced that United Italy can have
no other capital than the ancient seat of empire. It
is not that the presence of the Pope in Rome is an
intolerable sore to all Italian eyes. Although most
men in this country would feel unspeakable relief
' if they heard that Pius IX. had removed his See to
Jerusalem, to Avignon, or Tipperary, still it might
be possible to bow the Italian nation to the necessity
of allowing the Pope to reside at Rome, provided
it were merely in the capacity of a Bishop of Bishops,
or even with the mere nominal sovereignty of
Rome, securing, however, to the Eternal City all
the benefits of a liberal independent municipal
government, of which the Pope, and the Pope alone,
should have the presidency. But, in order that this
might come to pass, it would still be necessary that
the foreign garrison should depart from Rome, and
that the Pontiff should pass from French under
Italian protection. It would be necessary that

icE 4D. sT.Amp,'

Piedmontese troops should be quartered in Castle
St. Angelo. The Pope of Rome is either no Sove-
reign, or he is an Italian Prince. If his Throne is
still to stand at all, it must rest exclusively on
Italian support.

Having settled the Roman _ question on there
terms, the Italian nation will next be storming at
the frontiers of the Po and Mincio to rescue Venetia
and South Tyrol from Austrian thraldom. By
alleging the necessity of arming and organizing-
' their newly annexed State of 22,000,000, the Sar-
dinian Government may be able to put off the
struggle for months, or perhaps years; but there is
no doubt that Italy will be very difficult to govern so
long as the Venetian question is left open, and that
the nation will be clamouring at the door of the 1
Government and Parliament till it compels them to
enter the field for Venice, even if it were against
the combined might of Austria and . Germany.
Those Roman and:Venetian questions, so long as
they are open, are the cheraux de bataille of the
Mazzinian party. A cry for distressed Venice or
for priest-ridden Rome finds an echo in every
Italian heart. The deliverance of those last
districts of Italian territory from foreign thral-
dom is a task which the Sardinian Government
cannot by any possibility shirk, but it can ask to be
allowed to accomplish it in its own good time and
by such means as it deems most expedient. It is, I
believe, of the greatest importance for the peace of
Europe that the Sardinian Government should be
borne out in the fulfilment of its mission by the sup-
port of all European Governments, and especially of
England and France. If Austria could be induced to
avoid a useless and a long and sanguinary struggle
by a friendly compromise leading to the cession of
Venetia. for a consideration, the revolutions of Italy
might be considered at an end. If Austria hold
what she considers her own to the last, and Prussia
and Germany back her pretensions,- a war between
Italy and Germany will become inevitable, and all
the States of Europe must needs be involved in the
quarrel. Italy has followed a course from which
she cannot now swerve, or in which she cannot stop
half way. By a succession of miraculous vicissitudes,
which her own valour and wisdom have known to
turn to her advantage, she has succeeded in winning
nine-tenths of her own territory. She must either
have the rest or lose all she .has won.
The tout ou riot theory, which was one of Maz-
zini's hobbies, has now become matter of universal
national faith. Every Italian feels that all Italy
must be free, and there is only disagreement as to
the means, and time, and opportunity for the ac-
complishment of the remaining part of the task.
Certainly, the Italians may aim too high ; they may
attempt impossible things, they may venture on
enterprises in which they may succumb ; they may
bring the Austrians and the French back into
their half emancipated country ; but the occupa-
tion of Italy, even by the combined forces of Aus
tria and France, of Germany and Russia, does not.
solve the Italian question ; it does not quell the
Italian spirit; it does not establish permanent
order in the country and secure the peace of Eu•
rope. Repressive means in every variety have
been, Heaven knows, employed in Italy since 1814.
We now see the results. The Italian nation is, it
may now be safely asserted, incompressible. More
may be obtained by doing the Italians justice, by
completing the work of their emancipation, by
doing for Rome and Venice what has been achieved
for Milan, Bologna, Florence, and Naples, than by
bringing all the hordes of Croatia to crush and tor-
ture those whom it has after so many centuries of
experiments been found impossible to subdue.