The Sun.
London, England, 1860-03-14 00:00:00

IRE SUN, LONDON, WEDNESDAY EVENING, MARCH 14, 1880.-

to the actual censure of one or the other government. My
observation related solely to what had fallen from the right
hon. gentleman the member for Bucks, whom I understood
to say that the conduct of her Majesty's Government lay
_ . .

open to considerable animadversion. It never entered into
my mind to lay down the doctrine that Parliament was not

;o discuss a matter of great European interest connected

with the foreign relations of this country, and the affairs of
Europe, unless that discussion had reference to a direct reso-
lution of censure. I certainly never laid down a doctrine
so inconsistent with the proper functions of Parliament. I

think that the course whichher Majesty's Government have

pursued upon this matter is much more clear and consistent
than would appear from the observations of the hon. and

[earned gentleman. When first this question of the cession

of Savoy and Nice to France was spoken of as a matter
still in doubt, my noble friend immediately instructed her
Majesty's ambassador at Paris to question the French mi-

nister as to the fact, and to ascertain whether there was any
foundation in the statement. He did so, and was told by

Count Walewski that the notion had been abandoned,

(Hear, hear.) After that there were rumours, no doubt,
that the plan was still in contemplation, but it is well
known that it had been settled upon the peace of Zurich
that whenever the treaty should be signed, a congress
should be assembled for the purpose of taking cognisance
of the treaty of Zurich, and of taking into consideration
the settlement of the affairs of Italy. If that had been

clone the natural course would have been to state at the

congress the opinions which England or any other power
might have entertained on any arrangement dependent
upon, subsequent to, or consequent upon, the arrange-
ments of Zurich and the settlement of the affairs of Eu-
rope. There would, therefore, have been no great use in
this country entering into an angry Correspondence with
the French Government upon a contingent event which
would depend upon discussions in the congress, whenever
that congress might take place. The house is aware that
the treaty of Zurich was much delayed ; and as the con-
gress wasnot to meet till the treaty had been signed, it was
not until the end of last, or, I believe, the beginning of the
present year, that it became known that the congress had
come to nought. When we became aware that the congress
would not be assembled, my noble friend, as appears from
the papers which have been laid before parliament, did ex-
press a very strong opinion to the French Government with
regard to the contemplated cession of Savoy and Nice. I
did not quite understand which of the two opinions that
the honourable and learned gentleman has expressed he
entertains, because at one moment he seemed to censure
my noble friend for not having expressed the opinion of
England with sufficient firmness and strength, and at
another time he criticises my noble friend's despatch for
being too strong and energetic. The course which her Ma-
jesty's Government pursued was one that in my opinion
showed considerable discretion, and was the one that ought
to have been adopted. In the first place, as was stated by
my right hon. friend (Mr. Horsman), it was quite clear that
this was not an occasion upon which the issue of peace or
war would depend. Whatever opinion we might entertain
upon the cession of Savoy and Nice to France, no one can
maintain that that cession would involve so directly the in-
terests of this country that it would justify the Government
in going to war with France to prevent it. France would
not, so far as we were concerned, to more formidable because
she had Savoy and Nice than she would be without them,
and therefore our inierfennce ought not to be viewed by
the French Government or the French nation as arising
from any jealousy of the power of France ; because so far
as England is concerned France would not be stronger with
the two provinces nor weaker without them. And there-
fore it was not from any apprehension that we originated
the negotiation ; nor is the case one in which, should that
negotiation not succeed, this country would think it right
to take up arms to prevent the cession from being com-
pleted. (Hear.) That being agreed on all sides, I think
it is clear that the measures which have been suggested in
the course of this discussion would not have been expedient.
We are told, for instance, that we ought to have applied to
the great powers of Europe, and to have entered into an
alliance with Prussia, and Austria, and Russia, to prevent
the transaction from taking place. The way to prevent it
was to point out to the Government of France the objec-
tions that suggested themselves to our minds; for unless
we had been of opinion that it was a matter of sufficient
importance to justify the coin* in taking up arms, my
own opinion is to have endeavoured to array a hostile con-
federacy against France would have been an injudicious
method of endeavouring to accomplish our purpose.
(Hear.) It would have raised the national feel-
ings of the French nation ; it would have stimulated the
sense of dignity of the French Government ; it would
have borne the appearance of compulsion when we were not
prepared to exercise compulsion ; and therefore it would be
calculated to prevent the accomplishment rather than to for-
ward the attainment of our wishes. (Hear.) , That which
it was expedient to do, when it was evident that there
would not be an opportunity of bringing this matter under
the discussion of the assembled council of Europe, was to
state fairly and distinctly, as my noble friend did, to the
French Government, the objections which he saw to the
project, and then to communicate those objections to the
other great Powers, in order that they, knowing what we
had done, might take a corresponding step on their part,
and make known their objections likewise to the French
Government. That was what we did, and it appears to me
that that was the course which it was best to adopt to ac-
complish our purpose without wounding the dignity of
France, and without placing the French Government in a
position in which they could not yield to any demand with-
out a sacrifice of dignity and honour. (Hear.) The hon.
and learned gentleman says that he does not yet know
what are my opinions upon this matter. My opinions agree
entirely with those of any noble friend, and I perfectly sub-
scibe to every word in these despatches which have been
laid upon the table, and of which, I think, almost every-
body, with the exception of the hon. and learned gentle-
man—has expressed his approbation. Indeed, I almost
think that the hon. gentleman himself, on a former occa-
sion, did justice to the spirit with which my noble friend
has represented the opinions of her Majesty's Governmen
in this correspondence. (Hear, hear.) I think it would be
a great mistake on the part of the French Government if
they were to persist in this plan. (Cheers.) When the pre-
sent Emperor of the French mounted the throne, or rather
when he first became the ruler of France, there were no
doubt excited in the minds of a great many of the Govern -
manta of Europe apprehensions founded upon an opinion
that he might adopt the policy of his uncle, which was a
policy that had involved the whole of Europe in the ca-
lamities of war. Well, the Emperor took an early occa-
sion to .declare that the empire meant peace, and that
was a declaration that was received with the greatest pleasure
and satisfaction by the whole of Europe. It inspired a con-
fidence in his policy—in the future policy which it was sup-
posed to be his intention to ;pursue. Ido not hold that
what took place last year was any departure from that policy.
(Hear, hear.) •France undertook a noble enterprise—it
undertook the enterprise of freeing Italy from foreign domi-
nation, including, let it be remembered, French domina-
tion; for part of the scheme was that when Italy should be
free, France, as well as Austria, should retire from any
future interference in her affairs. (Hear, hear.) It would
have been a most honourable and a most glorious result,
and it will still be—if the result should so turn out—if, after
having restored Italy to that freedom and independence of
which she had so long been deprived, France had been con-
tent with the glory of the achievement without mixing with
a generous enterprise any small and petty motive of self-
aggrandisement. (Cheers.) If reasons are assigned why
this cession is demanded, I cannot admit that there is any
force or strength in them. It is said, for instance, that if
Piedmont were a small power, she would, continue
to ,be a harmless neighbour to France ; but that
if Piedmont were enlarged so as to comprise eight, ten, or
eleven millions of population, then she would become for-
midable as a neighbour, and that therefore an additional
security was required to the French frontier. Still I must
observe that when that language is held by a country con-
taining upwards of 30 millions—l believe 35 or 36 millions—
of people, the most warlike on the earth, full of resources and
compact of territory—when, I say, a country like that as-
serts that she is in danger from a neighbour with 10 or 12
million inhabitants, it is an argument that cannot for a
moment be seriously maintained. (Hear.) But then it is
said that France must have her natural boundary, and that
the population of Savoy speak the French language. Now,
in the first place, history tells us that natural boundaries
are no defence whatever. What instance is there on record
in which an army, sufficient in strength and determined to
invade a country, was ever stopped either by rivers or by
mountains ? And, therefore, whether the Alps, or the
watershed of the Alps, are in the possession either of France
or Sardinia—France, being the strongest power of the two,
would be able whenever she pleased to enter Italy ; and if
Sardinia should ever be insane enough to fancy that she
could attack France, I think the French armies would be
able to give an account of the invaders as would not en-
courage them to repeat the attempt. (Laughter.) But then
it is said that Sardinia might become a member of a confe-
deracy against France, and that she might afford a passage
f the
to the troops of other countries. The answer to this is
plain. The confederation must consist of powers north of
the Alps, and it is not likely that they would go into Italy
or
purpose of crossing the Al when they might enter
F
if ranceby
way of her eastern frontier. (Hear, hear.) But
not the
conceivable empireis
: )teha ea
et
any(and I
confederacybelieved
wt
ohuel
d intentione ever
erb
e formed o f the
Emperor
m peror in enunciating that idea was perfectly sincere), it
isfor the purpose of invading France. (Hear, hear.) I have
said that there is no danger to England in the proposed
cession of Savoy, but there is danger to Europe in the pre-
cedent which would be established, and in the principles
upon which that precedent would Ifounded. If you come
to the question of natural boundaries, and lay down the
doctrine that the country which claims them is to be the
judge of what they are—(hear, hear)—it is easy to see that
Europe would find it very difficult to foretell where the danger
would begin, and where resistance triton a great scale would
not be required. (Hear.) If language is to be the measure
of self-aggrandisement it would be difficult to say that many
countries have a secure title to the possessions which they
now hold. These two principles, therefore—natural boun-
daries and language—are principles which it would be
very dangerous to Europe to see established in practice,
however small the circumstance may be in regard to which
it is now sought to carry them into effect. (Hear, hear.)
Moro its cue point, indeed, ix; respect to 1'4114 a° CCOPIOn

of Savoy to France would be attended with direct danger
to a country the independence and neutrality of which it is
the interests of Europe and of France herself to maintain—l

mean Switzerland.
,(Hear.) lam asked whether any steps
have been taken to provide for the security of Switzerland

in the event of that cession taking place. We have not
taken any such steps, and I will tell the house why wo have
not. If you begin talking about the modification of a mea-
sure which you want to present in its entirety, you weaken
the ground upon which you stand. (Hear.) It will bo time

enough to talk of that when the cession has become inevit-

able iand therefore it would not have been prudent to have

begun to talk to France about the condition on which the
cession of Savoy should take place, so long as it was the in-

;ention. of the Government to try and prevent the anneaa•

tion from taking place at all. On what grounds, then, I
may ask, can the Government aid the house entertain the
opinion that the cession may not be effected ? In the first
place, the Emperor has stated that Savoy shall not be taken
by force of arms. In the next place, he has stated that it
shall not be taken without the consent of the sovereign and

the people ; and lastly, that it shall not be taken withou
consulting—and when you say without consulting, it fol
lows that you mean without obtaining the assent—of the
other Powers of Europe. If, then, these conditions here
laid down are abided by—if France abstains from force, ob-
tains the consent of the sovereign and the people, and the
assent of the ether Powers—l say we aro come to a point at
which we are justified in hoping that reason, reflection, and
a due regard to the interests and honour of Franee may in-
duce the French Government.to abandon the project which
it has entertained. (Hear.) But we are told that we have
laid down a doctrine with regard to Tuscany which we
ought also to apply to the lonian Islands. Tho answer to
that is obvious. In the first place, we did not propose uni-
versal suffrage to the people of Tuscany; but the great
difference between Tuscany and the lonian Islands is one
that applies also to Savoy. In Tuscany, as in Modena and
Parma, the sovereign had fled. He had done just what
James 11. did when he left this country without a Go-
vernment ; and a provisional government of their own
having been formed the people had determined that they
would not have their runaway sovereign back again. We
are not the sovereigns but the protectors of the lonian
Islands, at all events we have not yet run away from them,
and till that happens there is no parallel between the cases.
(Hear.) The same may be said of Savoy—the King of Sar-
dinia still reigns in Savoy, and therefore I maintain that
the people of that country are not in the position of the
Tuscans, to say of their own authority to whom they will
belong. (Hear, hear.) It appears to me that we have upon
the whole pursued the course which wasbest adapted for the
purpose we had in view. We inquired of the French Go-
vernment it they oiltertalued 3Li 01 An intention ua Ima been
Imputed to them, and they said they did not. We knowing
that, in case the event upon which the question hinged
taking place, we should have an opportunity of moving the
question in congress waited till it should be assembled, and
when we found that it was not to meet we communicated to
the French Government the strong objections we enter-
tained to the project. When we had done so, without at-
tempting to array the other Powers of Europe in a hostile
confederacy against France, we communicated our views to
those Powers, and as the French Government has an-
nounced that it will consult them, they will be obliged, in
answer, to state to France the opinions which they hold.
In our opinion the question is one of European interest and
I cannot imagine that the other Powers of Europe will not
take the same view of it that we have done—a view not
tinged with passion or jealousy, or one to which France can
justly take umbrage. Our objections are founded upon prin-
ciples of general European interests, in which I hold France
has as much concern as any of the rest. We have stated in
a calm and temperate manner the reasons which have in-
duced us to think that the proposed step would be unad-
visable, and I cannot divest myself of the impression that
the Government of France would gain more by preserving
the good opinion of this country, by retaining the confi-
dence of Europe, and by disarming the great Powers of all
feelings of jealousy and suspicion of warlike designs on the
part of France. To my mind they would gain far
more by that than by any advantage which they could de •
rive by the acquisition of some mountain tops and half a
million of new subjects. (Cheers.) With regard to the other
point adverted to, I cannot but congratulate the house and
country upon the prospect which seems to he held out—that
quiet determination on the part of Tuscany to unite herself
to Sardinia, and that there will be created in North and
Central Italy a state which by the freedom of her institu-
tions, and by the independence it will have acquired, will
hold out a fair prospect that Italy may for a third time place
herself in that eminence, as a portion of the civilised world,
which she occupied in the days of the Roman Emperors,
and afterwards in those periods when the revival of arts and
letters placed Italy, though not then a great military power
in a position of honour and glory that as long as history re-
mains will be looked back to with pride and almiration.
(Cheers.) I cannot but think that Italy, which has dis-
played such public spirit, and which has developed so much
talent and patriotism, is that Italy of which England may
be proud of having given her moral weight and influence to
in order to bring such a state of things about. (Cheers.) It
is most important to contrast the judgment and the modera-
tion and temper, of those statesmen who during the last
twelve months have contributed so much to Italian renown,
with that less laudable spirit which prevailed in 1848—a
temper and moderation which may indeed give us the most
sanguine hopes of the future. I will only say with regard
to that Italian statesman whose name has been often men-
tioned in this debate—Count Cavour—that though there
may be those whose views he has defeated and whose policy
he has thwarted, yet that the future will respect him as one
of the most distinguished patriots that ever adorned the
history of that country—a country which is under as great
obligations to him as any nation ever owed any one of its
members, and feeling this, and the success which has
attended his policy, he need not be disturbed by the criti-
cism which his public actions may in any country have oc-
casioned. (Cheers.)
Mr. DISRAELI observed—As some observations ofmine
appears to have given rise to this debate, I wish to say a few
words before its close. It is gratifying to see that the noble
lord at the head of the Government has recalled that con-
stitutional dogma which he laid down in so general a man-
ner on a previous occasion, that in case the Opposition in
the House of Commons was not satisfied altogether with the
course of foreign affairs pursued by the Government it was
their duty to originate an immediate vote of censure. The
noble lord now says that I indulge in animadversions on
the conduct of the Ministry, and therefore I am bound to
make some such motion. But what I said was that their
conduct was involved in so much mystery that it required
explanation, and I particularly guarded myself against any
other object in it than a desire to obtain information upon
some particular points ; and, indeed, it was quite clear
from the course of the discussion, and especially from what
fell from the Foreign Secretary, that it was a perfectly
rational desire on my part, and that it was the duty of the
Government to take measures to give the information which
was required by the house. Under that impression the
noble lord gave notice of a motion, that he would this even-
ing, on the presentation of papers, make a defence of the
conduct of the Government as to those points which ap-
peared OS us to require explanation. The noble lord the First
Minister has spoken of some in this house who would make
the annexation of Nice and Savoy to France a cause of de-
claring war. The noble lord never heard from me any ex-
pression of that sort. The noble lord has spoken of some
who would make the annexation of those Sardinian pro-
vinces to France as good reasons why measures should be
taken by England to form a league among the great Powers
of Europe. Again, I say, he never heard an expression of
that kind from me. The noble lord will also admit that the
modest proposition of a pretest the other evening received
on my part no sanction. But as that subject has given rise
to so much misconception on the part of one hon. gentle-
man who took part in those discussions (the hon. gentle-
man the member for Birmingham), and who does not show
the same ability upon this as upon other topics, I might
inform the hon. gentleman who accuses the gentlemen
who sit on this side of the house of desiring to involve the
country in a war with France, because they recommend a
protest against annexation, that the very fact of having re-
course to a protest is prima facie evidence that the country
is not going to war, and that it is a diplomatic instrument as
formal as any treaty or convention—that it is not merely a
burst of rhetoric, but it is an instrument which expresses and
records the feelings of nations when they may not think it
advisable or prudent to have recourse to extreme measures;
and the present Government is not the Government, nor the
present Foreign Secretary the Minister, who should raise
any objection to a course of that kind, or hold it up to the
notice of the house and the country as one of an irritating
and hostile character, for in the case of Cracow—a case
where very grave doubts were entertained, even by eminent
jurists, that there had been any violation of the Treaty of
Vienna—the English Government of that day did not go to
war, but protested, feeling that there had been a violation of
the Treaty of Vienna, and sent formal protests to the dif-
ferent courts. The Prime Minister of that day is the Foreign
Secretary who now sits opposite. (Hear, hear.) I now come
to the explanation of the Foreign Secretary. He presented
a paper to-day, after a formal notice that he would explain
the policy of the Government on the impending annexation
of Savoy and Nice, but he forgot to make any explanation
about that annexation. His whole speech was on the settle-
ment of Italy, and so far as the case which I was able to put
before the house at the end of a long debate the other night,
but which was placed before the house to-night with bril-
liant and logical precision by my hon. and learned friend
the member for Dublin University, he never afforded us any
information. He never denied that statement which I made,
though not with the confidence which I. have now in its
accitracy, as to the repeated warnings with which the noble
lord was furnished as to the policy of the French Govern-
ment. The whole of his observations on this head were
most meagre and limited as regards annexation—the
noble lord made an unfortunate start from the, begin-
ning. His first observation was made as if he would
startle this side of the house, but, in reality, it com-
pletely wrecked his own case, for he said that this affair
of the proposed annexation of Savoy was known to the lee
Government ; that it was known to Lord Malmesbury ; and
he said that the records of the Foreign-office would not
show that Lord Malmesbury had received any satisfactory
reply. I might at another time attempt to prove that he had
a satisfactory reply ; but I take the noble lord's own show-
ing, and upon that it is plain that if his predecessor had not
received a satisfactory reply it was evidently the duty of the
=big 1911 tfo 4RO PrvotiEl Or ow, (Hear.) I remember

once being told, when we were seated on the benches oppo-
site, that we took with the responsibility of office tho en-
gagements of our predecessors. If that principle be true in

our case, it is also just in that of the noble lord ; and the
very fact that the answer to Lord Malmesbury by the French
Government was not satisfactory should be the very reason
why the noble lord should prick up his ears and obtain
satisfactory information as to the annexation of Savoy.
However, there is no doubt from the evidence that the noble

Lord was obliged to make some inquiries, and he received

that answer, as appears from the papers, at an early period
—in July—announcing that the Imperial Government had
given up all intention of that annexation. During the inter-
val between July and the despatch of January the noble
_ _ _

lord received frequent intimations from our own ambassa.

dor at Paris of the, intention of the French Government to

revert to their original policy in contemplation of the events
in Italy. There is no doubt whatever now, that besides this
information from our own ambassador, from the first the

Swiss Government, deeply interested in this question (for
their existence as an independent and free people entirely

depended upon it), pressed in every way upon the repre-
sentatives of the Queen and the Government, directly and
indirectly, their great anxiety upon the subject. But what

is the defence of the noble lord ? He does not contradict one
of our facts, but rather confirms them. It was the most

singular defence ever offered by a minister, and especially
by one in the responsible position of the noble lord. His
defence is this—lt is very true those representations were
made to me, but I thought nothing of them—that they were
mere threats, and I treated them with indifference. But
have those threats turned out to be mere threats—on the
contrary, have they not turned out to be grave events which
have been accomelished ; and I believe, notwithstanding the
prospect the noble lord held out to us, they are on the eve of
completion. (Hear, hear.) What are we to think, then,
of a Minister who treats those intimations as mere insincere
threats—turn out to be grave, well-considered, and mo-
mentous information on a subject of the highest policy. To
my mind it implies a want of perception. I say that from
July to the end of January, when that almost solitary de-
spatch was written—so far as a despatch expressing a policy
is concerned—the noble lord was completely or ought to
have been entirely aware that the policy of the French Go-
vernment was, that if Sardinia was to be aggrandised by
the annexation of the duchies and Tuscany, as a matter of
course France would demand annexation to herself of Savoy
and Nice. With that information before him, I say the
noble lord pursued a policy which favoured and assisted
the aggrandisement of Sardinia, and to that degree and in
that manner the noble lord was inevitably carrying out and
pursuing the policy of France in respect to the extension of
its present frontiers. This appears to me to be quite unac-
couliteele. -Jt any rate it has not received any answer from
the noble lord, or from the first minister. I alto inquired why
the noble lord devised a policy for the settlement of Italy at
the commencement of the month of January, which was re-
corded in the four propositions—why, when those proposi-
tions were communicated to the great powers, the noble lord
did not communicate at the same time the cognisance which
he had of the inevitable policy of the French Government, if
the scheme expressed in the four proposals were successfully
realised in Italy. Upon- that point we have had no answer.
The great rowers appear to have been left, so far as England
is concerned, completely in the dark. Indeed, there is one de-
spatch which has not been mentioned in the discussions of to-
night, namely, the despatch of the 6th of February, from
Lord Bloomfield to the noble lord, in which he stated that
the Prussian Minister, in a state of some anxiety, inquired
from the noble lord (of course having received information
from the Swiss Minister) what her Majesty's Government
had heard respecting the annexation ; what it was their in-
tention to do ; and Lord Bloomfield said there were no in-
structions from the noble secretary except this, that the
English Government had received no official, no formal
communication upon the subject, and, in fact, that therefore
the better thing would be to leave the matter alone. Now we
know what the noble lord meant by saying that he had re-
ceived no official communication, because his communications
were hi private letters—those letters respecting which I im-
pressed upon the house the ether night the importance of
expressing some opinion as to their production. Private let-
ters are perfectly legitimate so long as they are private, but
they will bring the utmost confusion into public affairs if
public functionaries are permitted to fall back from public
despatches upon private communications. I say, then, that
on the second point on which I wished for information—
namely, why the noble lord in communicating with our allies
on the subject of Italy did not frankly inform them of what
would be the probable consequences if this policy were suc-
cessful as regards the expansion of the frontiers of France—
we have no explanation from the noble lord. We
have an explanation, or dissertation, from the First
Minister on the settlement of Italy instead of upon the an-
nexation of Savoy. The noble viscount takes a totally dif-
ferent view of the whole affair from that taken by his col-
league :—The reason a by we took the course we did was that
we expected everything would be settled in Congress, and
therefore, as a Congress was expected, and as annexation
would not take place until Congress met, we thought it un-
necessary to express our opinion to the French Government,
to communicate to our allies and other Powers of Europe,
or to take any steps regarding a policy which was, in the
opinion of the Government, at least a most pernicious and
perilous policy, and which might be averted or counter-
acted. Such is the statement of the First Minister.
Let us now see what there is of solidity in the dif-
ference between the two noble . lords, and what
excuse there is in that view of the case for this ap-
parently unparalleled neglect. I can treat it as negligence
by using the lightest phrase. If the statement of the noble
lord be correct, when did the difficulty arise which made the
French Government first recur to the original policy of an-
nexation, and when did the idea first become prevalent that
congress would not take place. There is no doubt that it
was towards the end of November, when the difficulties
connected with carrying into effect the treaty of Zurich be-
came generally felt amongst all practical statesmen, that.
Count Walewski intimated to the English Government that
in consequence of those difficulties and the preliminaries of
Villafranca not being carried out, it would be necessary for
the French Government to re-consider their position, and if
the result of doing so should be that Sardinia would be
greatly aggrandised by the annexation of several Italian
provinces, France must look to the annexation of Savoy and
Nice as necessary towards the completion of her military
frontier. Ido not believe there is a sane man, or one
among all the statesmen who were cognisant of the real
state of affairs, who believed that the idea of a congress be-
fore the end of December was not utterly impracticable.
What were the stops taken then ? The First Minister
dwells upon the congress as the cause which was to absolve
the Government from the consequences of their negligence.
We know by the records before us that at the end of De-
cember or early in January the greatest anxiety prevailed
in Europe upon the subject. The Swiss Government took
every possible step to bring their anxious views before our
Government, but I do not find that ,we took any steps in
consequence to re-assure Switzerland or to influence France,
or to lay before her those considerations of a high and pure
morality of which the First Minister had been so exuberant
to-night. (Cheers.) I want to knew whether the Queen's
Ambassador, or the Secretary of State, or any one
in authority or influence, was authorised to lay
before the Emperor those considerations militating
against his intended policy which the noble lord ex-
pressed to-night, and for which he received the ap-
probation of the house ? We have no evidence of it.
There is no evidence that a single thing was done daring the
six weeks until Jan. 27th. We know now from private let-
ters that Count Walewski was frank and sincere in his ex-
planations of his policy to our Government, although the
noble Secretary treated it as mere rumour and idle menace.
The Swiss Government took every possible means, with the
great energy and perseverance characteristic of the race, to
bring the proposed fate of their country before the English
Government. We know well that apparently her Majesty's
Minister in Paris was not wanting, and that even when
Lord Cowley was absent our charge d'affaires wrote a de-
spatch—not a common despatch, but one which in 24 hours
ought to have been responded to in a manner that would
have influenced the opinion of the Court at which he was a
resident. But I see nothing until a few days before Parlia-
ment met, and then I find a despatch from Lord Cowley,
who, seeing the storm that was rising, and referring to what
he described as interpellations in both Houses of Parlia-
ment, and knowing that, although he had warned the Mi-
nister frequently, his warnings had been expressed in docu-
ments which it would not be parliamentary to refer to, abso-
lutely did that which, as far as my experience goes, is un
known, and referred for his vindication in a public despatch
to his private letters. (Hear, hear) An ambassador must
be hard pressed indeed and a Minister must be in a peculiar
position to be driven to take such a step as this. A few
days before Parliament met we had this high-sounding de-
spatch, and we have had high-sounding despatches before.
We remember the Russian war and the circumstances which
led to that war. There was a great secret disclosed then
which might not, but for an accident, have been revealed
for 50 years—l allude to the communication which took
place between the late Emperor and Sir H. Seymour. What
happened then ? We then had the history of the last of
the De Medicis and the war of succession over again, and
that despatch, written with so much literary ability,
totake did
not prevent the Russian war, and we ought
warn-
ing by it—that a rhetorical despatch is not a spe-
cific against an impending war, if there are causes
which render that war imminent. So far as this discus-
sion is concerned, arising from tho observations I made on
Friday night, I sum it up in this way, that with ample in-
formation as to the intentions of the French
Government,
in case of the aggrandisement of Sardinia, to annex Savoy
to the French empire, the Queen's Government took no
ste whatever to influence the French Government to adopt
a co. ntrary policy to the one they had pursued, but they pur-
sued a policy in Italy which' necessarily led to annexation.
Well then, sir, we have received no information upon the
second point as to whether, when the Government commu-
nicated formally their plan for the settlement of Italy, the
French Government did not simultaneously communicate
to them the fact that the adoption of that policy must
necessarily bring about the annexation of Savoy to France.
We have had no answer to that question to-night, though
we have had the reply of the two most eminent men in the
I%linistry. Now, sir, what has been the conduct of France
upon this question ? Whenever we have made inquiry upon
the matter the noble lord the Foreign Secretary has told us
that thews quedi9Ao Mjght have 4 Very per icioue effect