The Sun.
London, England, 1860-07-13 00:00:00

ment which we in the case of Savoy and Nice
thought better than war.
But this course must not be pursued too long.
It may be punishment severe enough for a first of-
fence, but not for an attempt at a second. LOUIS
NAPOLEON ought to know that, come what will, we
sh

all allow neither him nor Austria, nor Russia if
she could, "tor even the kingdom we are married to
in the north of Germany, to interfere with Italy.
We shall not further the annexation of Sicily, of

Naples, and of Rome itself to Sardinia, though we
desire a united Italy ; but neither will we allow
others to hinder it. Nothing would be more

popular in England at this moment, nothing

we are sure more popular with our fleet
in the Mediterranean, from the Admiral in com-

mand down to the cabin boys, than to place that
fleet at the service of GARIBALDI. We refrain

from doing it; we expect LOUIS NAPOLEON to do

the same. We are told that there is no reason to

;pink he has put " pressure on the Court of Turin

in reference to Italian matters." We do not believe
a word of it. If he swore to it we would not be-
lieve him. He has broken his word and perjured

himself openly more than once ; he is not so foolish
as to expect us to believe him. We look only to
facts which take place where he has re-
presentatives ; and the conduct of FRANCIS 11.,
and of the King of SARDINIA, too, all of

it looks to us as if the arch-intriguer

were doing his best to keep Italy disunited,

" Confederation" is Ms watchword. A confedera.

tion of French satraps. " Union," the watchword
of Italian patriots—a union strong enough to enable
Italians to maintain their natural independence
and constitutional freedom against all corners. We
cannot, of course, prevent his advising, but we
can prevent his advising with the understanding
that he will back his advice, if accepted, by force

of arms.
Lord JoHN RUSSELL does not think that the an-
nexation of the north and south of Italy will create
a very firm state. He says s—" It may be that the
people of Sicily will declare for annexation ; it
may be—l think it is the case—that an attempt to
annex Sicily and then to annex Naples, and I sup-
pose the Roman States, would not be likely to end
in the consolidation of a firm state. For my own
part, I doubt very much whether the people
of the north of Italy, under the same sceptre
as the people of Southern Italy, could form
a firm and united Government. Those

are my doubts, those are my opinions."
We have no right to object, he observes correctly
enough, if the King of NAPLES, and his continental
subjects and the Islanders can come to terms, "If
the King of NAPLES is able, by the concessions he
has made, to conciliate his Neapolitan subjects, and
induce them to live under him, with free institu-
tions, her Majesty's Government cannot find
anything to deplore in that result. If the
people of Sicily can obtain the constitution of
1812, and are satisfied with that constitution,
it is not for us to find fault with their
decision. Certainly not, since the Sicilian Consti-
tution of 1812 was almost our own work, and the
Neapolitan one of 1848 the one which has so long
been illegally in abeyance. On the principle of
nen-intervention his lordship uses language clear
enough on the right of the case. " But, on the
other han.s3, we will never lose sight of that principle
which we have dechuva,tehich we think is a
sacred principle, to which, indeed, there are some,
but very rare, exceptions,—that with regard to the
internal Government of a country, the people
of that country are themselves the best judges,
and that foreigners ought not to interfere by
force to coerce and overwhelm that decision.
His Lordship even illustrates and argues the ques-
tion in language well worth quoting, if only for its
last sentence. "It is not only a nice matter of the
most extreme difficulty for foreigners to say, Such
a man is worthy of your confidence—such a person
may be safely followed—such a chief is a good
political guide—such another will give you a con-
stitution under which you may live happily.' It is
impossible for a foreigner to advise in such cases. It
is for the people of Sicily—it is for the people of Na-
ples—and I must add also,whoever may be offended by
the expression, it is for the people of the Roman State(
also, to say for themselves what is the form of
government under which they choose to live. In
our foreign policy we may have, from day to day,
matters to treat in which our relations with other
Powers may induce us to recommend a particular
measure at one time, or a certain form at another ;
but I can assure this house—and it is the only one
and the last word I have to say—that with regard
to the people of Italy we have no other
policy than to leave them to decide for them-
selves on their own fate, and that if their
decision should be such as to lead to the happiness
and independence of that country for the future, I
feel confident that we shall not only rejoice at it—
for we who value liberty confine its power within
no narrow bounds—but that we shall hail it in the
conviction that—for the maintenance of the balance
of power in Europe—that term often abused, but
which has a clear and significant meaning—there
can be no greater security than the independence of
Italy." All that seems 'needed is, an intimation
' that England while she has a ship or a soldier to
spare will never again permit h violation of Lord
JOHN'S " sacred principle."

The Secretary of State for War, last night, ac-
cording to promise, brought forward the supple-
mentary estimates, as they may be termed, for this
new war of ours against the Chinese. They were
already known to amount—these additional esti-
mates—to the sum total of £3,800,000. Already,
as we know, the amount of £400,000 was charge-
able upon the present year for the liquidation of
the expenses incurred upon this war, agreeably to the
rose coloured calculations, advanced under that head
at the early part of the present session by the right
hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But now, a
few months later, we have another estimate of the
probable liabilities devolving upon us from this
warlike expedition not to the tune of another
£400,000, but, as before intimated, of a grand total
of £3,800,000. It should be explained, however, at
°nee that this formidable sum is laid before
the House of Commons as the amount that
will be required for the future expense of the
Chinese war minus the comparatively trifling sum
of £443,000 for arrears yet unliquidated ! The
present estimate, observed the Secretary for War,
yesterday in Committee of Supply—the present
estimate, applicable to the war in which we are
now unhappily engaged, is less than £3,800,000 by
£443,000, or, to be precise, £443,896 when
applied to past transactions ! But—the House
of Commons in Committee, while prepared
reluctantly to accede to the proposal
for passing a vote of credit for that Camel, in the
shape of £3,3s6,lo4—evidenced a resolute determi-
nation to strain to the last at the Gnat in the shape
of the small additional sum of £443,896 for old
liabilities yet unliquidated. The " lump-sum," as
Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT expressively though rather
inelegantly terms it, is looked upon by many upon
both sides of the house as decidedly unpleasant to
think
of even, after that first coukur de rose
total, talked of so very complacently and confi-
dently as au-suf6.cient at the beginning of the