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London, England, 1860-06-01 00:00:00

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CHINA.

THE REJECTION OF THE ULTIMATUM.
The following important correspondence was for-
warded to us for publication last night :
(Enclosure in No. 4.)

MR. BRUCE TO THE SENIOR SECRETARY OF STATE,

PAN G - WAN - CIIAN G.

Shanghai, March 8.

The undersigned, &e., has the honour to address
a communication to his Excellency Pang-Wan-
Chang, a Senior Secretary of State, and their Ex-
cellencies the Members of the Great Council of his
Majesty the Emperor of China.
The undersigned has the honour to state that, as
in duty bound,. he has laid before her Britannic
Majesty's Government a full narrative of all the
circumstances attending his journey to the mouth
of the Tien-tsin river last summer for the purpose
of exchanging the ratifications of the Treaty of
Tien-tsin, as required by the provisions of that
Treaty, on or before the 26th of June, 1859. Be •
sides the whole of his correspondence with the Im-
perial Commissioners and other officers of the Im-
perial Government, the undersigned has transmitted
to the Government of her Britannic 'Majesty a copy
of the Imperial Decree, dated the 9th of August,
and handed, by the Emperor's desire, to the United
States' Minister, Mr. Ward, on the eve of his de-
parture from Pekin.
The decree begins as follows :
" Last year the ships of the English sailed into the
port of Tien-tsin and opened a fire on our troops.
We accordingly instructed Sang•kolin-sin, Prince
of the Khorchin tribe, to adopt the most stringent
measures for the defence of Taku, and (the envoys
of) the different nations coming up to exchange
treaties on this occasion were told by Kweiliang
and Hwashana at Shanghai that Taku was thus
strictly guarded, and that they must go round by
the port of Peh-tang. The Englishman Bruce,
notwithstanding, when be came to Tien-tsin, in
the fifth moon, did not abide by his orignal under-
standing with Kweiliang and his colleague, but
actually forced his way into the port of Taku, de-
stroying our defensive apparatus."
The undersigned did not fail at once to npprise
the Government of her Britannic Majesty that the
Emperor had been singularly misled, Had it, in-
deed, been signified to him by the Commissioners
at Shanghai that his Majesty had decided on closing
to foreign Envoys the natural and most convenient
highway to his capital, such evidence of an un-
friendly disposition on the part of the Imperial
Government would certainly have been regarded
by the undersigned as fit matter of remonstrance
and negotiation.
No intimation of the kind, however, was con-
veyed to the undersigned in the letters of the Im-
perial Commissioners. The port of Peh-tang was
never named by them, nor did the undersigned
enter into any engagement with them other than
that contained in his letter of the 16th of May, in
which he acquainted his Excellency Kweiliang of
the nature and object of his mission, and of his in-
tention to proceed by ship to Tien-tsin, from which
city he requested his Excellency to give the ncces-
sari orders for his conveyance to Pekin.
He begs to enclose copy of this letter, as also
of that received from the Imperial Commissioner of
the 12th of June. These will prove that the under-
signed was allowed to quit Shanghai in total ignor-
ance of the Emperor's objection to his employment
of the usual river route.

A like silence on the subject of the Imperial pro-
hibition was observed towards Admiral Hope, com-
mander-in-chief of her Majesty's naval forces in
these seas, when, in furtherance of the objects made
known to his Excellency Kweiliang in the letter
above cited, he appeared on the 17th of June at the
mouth of the river to announce the approach of the
undersigned and his colleague the Minister of
France. The Admiral was assured that the passage
had been closed by the so-called militia whom he
found in charge of the booms obstructing it, with-
out the orders of their Government, none of whose
officers, the militia repeatedly affirmed, were near
the spot; also that it was closed, not against
foreigners, but against a native enemy. These false
representations were supported by false appear-
ances ; the batteries of the forts were masked, no
banners were displayed, no soldier discovered him-
self. Still further to prevent verification of the
statements of the militia, no communication was
allowed with the shore. After promising to re-
move the obstacles at the river mouth, the militia
repudiated the promise. They conducted them-
selves with rudeness and violence to the officers who
were sent to speak with them, in one instance pro-
ceeding so far as to threaten the life of a gentleman
despatched with a message from the Admiral.
Such was the state of things when the under-
signed arrived outside the bar on the 20th of June.
Finding that the officials persisted in keeping aloof,
while the Militia continued to assert that the ob-
struction of the river way was their own unautho-
rised act, he called on the Admiral to take such
steps as would enable him to reach the capital by
the time appointed. This, after due notice given to
the Militia, and after receiving from them an assu-
rance on the previous evening that they should cer-
tainly have nothing further to communicate, the
Admiral was proceeding to effect, on June 25, the
eighth day from his arrival, when the forts, which
had been for these eight days to all appearances
deserted, suddenly opened tire upon his squadron.
Apparently to cover this treacherous conduct, the
officers in charge of the forts have imposed another
fiction on his Imperial 'Majesty, who has been led to
believe that the British squadron assumed the offen-
sive by bombarding the forts. This is utterly with-
out foundation ; no shot was fired until the bat-
teries had opened; the ships having no other ob-
ject in advancing but to remove the obstacles placed
across the river without authority.
The facts of the case are simply those stated by
undersigned ; and her Britannic Majesty's Go-
vernment, after mature deliberation, have decided
that whether the Emperor of China was cognisant
of this act of hostility, or whether it was directed
by his officers, it is an outrage for which the
Chinese Government must be held responsible. Her
Britannic Majesty's Government require, therefore,
an immediate and unconditional acceptance of the
following terms :
" 1. That an ample and satisfactory apology
be made for the act of the troops who fired
on the ships of her Britannic Majesty from the forts
of Taku in June last, and that all guns and mate-
rial, as well as the ships abandoned on that occa-
sion, be restored.
" 2. That the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-
tsin be exchanged without delay at Pekin ; that
when the Minister of her Britannic Majestic pro-
ceeds to Pekin for that purpose, he be permitted to
proceed up the river by Taku to the city Tien-tsin
in a British vessel ; and that provision be made by
the Chinese authorities for the conveyance of him-
self and of his suite with due honour from that city
to Pekin.

" 3. That full effect be given to the provisions of
the treaties, including a satisfactory arrangement
to be made for prompt payment of the indemnity
of 4,000,000 taels, as stipulated in the treaty, for
losses and military expenses entailed on the British
Government by the misconduct of the Canton
authorities."

The undersigned is further directed to state that,
in consequence of the attempt made to obstruct the
passage of the undersigned to Pekin, the under-
standing entered into between the Earl of Elgin
and the Imperial Commissioners in October, 1858,
with respect to the residence of the British Minis-
ter in China, is at an end, and that it rests hence-
forward exclusively with her Britannic Majesty,
in accordance with the terms of Article IL of the
Treaty of Tien-tsin, to decide whether or not she
shall instruct her Minister to take up his abode
permanently at Pekin.
The undersigned has further to observe that the
outrage at the Peiho has compelled her Majesty,
Government to increase her forces in China at a
considerable cost, and the contribution that may be
required from the Chinese Government towards dc-

fraying this expense will be greater or less, accord-
ing to the promptitude with which the demands
above made are satisfied in full by the Imperial
Government.

The undersigned has only to add that, unless he
receives within a period of 30 days from the date of
this communication, a reply conveying the unqua-
lified assent of his Majesty the Emperor of China
to these demands, the British naval and military
authorities will proceed to adopt such measures as
they may deem advisable, for the purpose of com-
pelling the Emperor of China to observe the en-
gagements contracted for him by his plenipoten-
tiaries at Tien•tsin, and approved by his Imperial
edict of July, 1858.
The undersigned, &c.
FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 5.
DECREE.
Translation.

The Great Council writes a reply (to the Com-
missioner Ho, which he is) to transmit.
The Council received yesterday (or, a short time
since) a despatch froin the Commissioner, and with
it a communication he had forwarded from the
British Minister Bruce, the contents of which have
occasioned the Council the greatest astonishment.
He states (1), for instance, that Peh-tang was
never alluded to by the Imperial Commissioners
Kweiliang and his colleagues. It appears that last
year the , Imperial Commissioners, Kweiliang and
his colleagues, waited for the British Minister at
Shanghai for the express purpose of considering
with him in person all the conditions proper to an
exchange of treaties. On ascertaining that the
Minister Bruce had arrived at Wu-sung, they wrote
to him several times to engage him to meet them;
their object being, in fact, to acquaint him that
Taku was fortified (or that arrangements had been
made for keeping people out of Taku), and that he
must go by way of Peh-tang. He, however, repelled
them, refusing them an interview. The Imperial
Commissioners Kweiliang and his colleagues, more-
over, informed him that vessels of war must on no
ace punt (2) crossed the bar ; but the British Mini-
ster paid no attention to these words ; and when, on
arriving off the Tien-tsin coast (or, the port or ports
of Tien-tSin), Hang, Governor• General of Chih-li
despatched an officer with a communication to the
effect that he was to proceed by way of Peh-tang,
and sent him a present of provisions, he would re-
ceive nothing, but suddenly brought his vessels into
Taku, and (commenced) destroying the defensive
apparatus there placed. How can he allege that he
never received the slightest intimation that he was
to go by Peh-tang ? And, as he was coming to
exchange treaties, why did he bring with him ships
of war ? It was plainly his intent to pick a quarrel.
How, then, can he (when the blame is all his own)
charge China with shortcoming towards him.
The defences prepared at Taku are not either
(as he implies) prepared to keep out the British
(3). Suppose that some other nation's ships of
war were to go to the length of presenting them-
selves under British colours, could it be left to them
to commit any breach of propriety they pleased ?
Well, then, the defences of Taku cannot possibly
be removed, even when the treaty shall have been
exchanged.
(Then the demand for) indemnity under different
heads, and for the restitution of guns, arms, and
vessels, is yet more against decorum (4). The war
expenses of China have been enormous. The cost
of defending the coast from Kwang-tung and Fuh-
kien up to Tien-tsin, from first to last, has not been
short of several millions of money. Were she to
demand repayment of England, England would find
that her expenses do not amount to the half of those
of China.

As to restoring ships and guns, the year before
last England destroyed the forts at Taku, and ob-
tained possession of a number of guns belonging to
China; ought she not, then, on her part to be con-
siderinc, how to make these good ? But, besides
this; half the British ships and guns (demanded)
were sunk in the sea ; they are not in the posses-
sion of China at all. The question may be dropped
therefore by both parties alike.
Then there is (the announcement that) the com-
promise by which, the treaties once exchanged (the
Minister), was to have resided somewhere else, is
at an end. The compromise by which once the
treaties were exchanged (the Minister) was either
to select some other place of residence, or to visit
(the capital) whenever there might be business of
importance to transact, was definitely settled by the
British Minister Elgin in negotiation with the
Imperial Commissioner Kweiliang and his col-
leagues. The revocation of this compromise now
(announced) is even more unreasonable (than all
the other propositions).
Last year when, after the Americans had ex-
changed their treaty, there was an alteration in the
rate of tonnage dues, and the ports of Tai-wan and
Chen-chow (Swatow) were opened to trade, the
British Minister earnestly prayed for a like
ar-
rangement (in his favour). The English had not
exchanged their treaty, but His Majesty the Em-
peror, liberal to foreign nations, and full of tender
consideration for the interests of commerce, gra-
ciously sanctioned an extension of the boon to the
English, for which they should be equally grate-
ful (5). But, if the compromise duly negotiated is
to be annulled, there will be no impropriety on the
part of China if she cancel the arrangement by
which she has conceded to the English (the same
advantage of) the improvements in tonnage dues
and trade that accruos to the Americans under
their treaty.
To come to the (British Minister's) request to be
treated with courtesy when ho comes north to ex-
change treaties. If he be sincere in his desire for
peace, let the Commissioner, when he shall have
thought over all the details of the treaty, those
which it will be proper to give effect to, and those
respecting which compromise (or arrangement) is
to be made, negotiate (with the British Minister),
and when both parties shall be perfectly agreed, if
he will come north without vessels of war, and with
a moderate retinue, and will wait at Peh-tang to
exchange the treaties, China will not take him to
task for what is gone by. He must be directed to
acquaint himself with the rules (observed or laid
down) at the exchange of the American treaties,
and the course to be pursued will be further discussed
with him (by the Commissioner). But if he be
resolved to bring up a number of vessels of war, and
if he persist in proceeding by way of Taku, this
will show that his true purpose is not the exchange
of treaties, and it must be left to the high officer in
charge of the coast (or port) defences to take such
steps as shall be thereby rendered necessary (lit.,
as shall accord with reason).
The despatch written on this occasion (by the
British Minister) is, in much of its language, too
insubordinate and extravagant (for the Council) to
discuss its propositions more than superficially
(lit., to go deep into argument). For the future he
must not be so wanting in decorum.

The above remarks will have to be communicated
by the Commissioner to the British Minister, whom
it will behove not to adhere obstinately to his own
opinion, as, so doing, he will give cause to much
trouble hereafter.
A necessary communication.

(From the Times.)

China has refused the British ultimatum with
directness and with an insolence such as a great
preparation and a consequent sense of security
alone could have prompted. The terms of the
ultimatum are confined to a confirmation of the
Treaty of 1858, an apology for the outrage at the
mouth of the Peiho, compensation for losses, resto-
ration of ships and material, a revisal of the clause
in the last Treaty on the visits of the British Mini-
ster to Pekin, and an indemnity for the expenses of
the present expedition, according to the obstinacy
of the Chinese resistance. It is evident from the
reply that the Chinese are infatuated with success,
and painful as it is to see them running headlong
to their doom, we cannot help feeling that this is
the long expected justification of ourselves and
others who on several occasions have maintained
against attacks the cause of her Majesty's servants
in these regions. The Chinese have recourse to
every trick of policy, every evasion of argument,
and every folly of invective which the traditions of
our very nurseries have ascribed to their race. In
the first place, and what alone would justify the
present expedition, they refuse to admit that our
remonstrances er ultimatum have been conveyed
to the Emperor, or to give any answer except as
from the Provincial Government, in accordance
with commands from the Great Gouncil. This is
equivalent to a refusal to negotiate in the only sense
of negotiation among civilized countries.—that
between one Sovereign and another. It is evident
that there never was an intention of confirming
the treaty, and that it has not yet been recognised
by the Emperor. The Chinese maintain that the
British and French Ministers were duly warned,
even at Shanghai, not to proceed to Taku, which
had been fortified, as they pretend they had in-
formed us, but to Pell-tang, or the false mouth of
the Peiho, which turns out to be, indeed, no mouth
at all. They still refuse to admit our ships of war
up the Peiho, on the ground that an Ambassador
can require no armament, and that any foe might
assume our flag. Against our expenses they plead
their own greater expenses. The ships and guns
cannot be restored, because they are at the bottom
of the sea, and we hal better let them remain there.
They propose to trtat, our Minister as they treated
the American ; and they criticise the tone of cur
ultimatum and correspondence as insubordinat,
extravagant, and indecorous. The Emperor's at
visers, or they who assume the name, could never
have any other purpose than to persist in the polio
of isolation, and leave foreigners no resource adains'
any amount of wrong. All the treaties hitherto A

must have been mere hypocrisies, and nothing short
of a visit to the Court of Pekin is likely to obtain
for us the simple rights of trading and sojourning,
conceded by all civilised States to one another.
The real question at issue appears to be whether
we shall continue our intercourse with China on our
terms or on hers. Our terms are those on which
we communicate with all the nations of the world
—simplicity, frankness, hospitality, high principle,
and equality, as between gentlemen. The Chinese,
on the contrary, insist on keeping up the illusion
of an unapproachable Sovereign, an irresponsible
Central Government, and the not less startling illu-
sion of an infinitely superior morality and sense of
decorum. So long as we permit this illusion, and
endure its natural consequences, we must be liable
to continual insult and degradation, to frequent in-
terruption of intercourse, to the cost and trouble of
reinstating ourselves, and the odium of waging war
with a people who know the proprieties neither of
peace nor of war, and over whom victory itself is a
scandal. This is best understood by the analogies
of private life. It may be necessary to have inter-
course with inferior people, but it is for us to choose
whether we will associate with them on:their terms
or our own. We may, if we please, condescend to
their insulated ideas, listen to their petty quarrels,
their invidious estimate of all classes above them,
their perpetual tole of depreciation, their im-
mensely exaggerated opinion of themselves, and the
substitution of one or two distorted ideas and in-
flated sentiments for the recognised maxims and
common sense of well-bred and well-educated
people. If we do this we inevitably sink to their
level, and wallow with them in the same Stygian
pool of malignity and folly. The only escape is
to dictate our own terms ; to maintain truth,
kindliness, and mutual respect; and to con-
sider ourselves, not as conspiring against
society for some paltry gain of our own,
but co-operating with it for our common good.
Some such account may be given of the terms
on which we may demand, and do demand, to com-
municate with China. The time has gone by when
she could impose her conditions ; they are con-
demned by the result ; we have tried them and
failed; we must now impose our conditions with
such gentle force as may be found necessary. All
policies are judged by the result—not our private
advantage, but the final development. The result
of our former weak and temporising policy in China
is that we are outcasts, and at war, at the very time
that our trade is greater than ever, and some hun-
dred thousand Chinese are settled in the British
dominions. The result on China herself is that
she is torn to pieces and her population decimated
by a wide-spread rebellion, and she is driven to
immense cost in the idle defence of her barbarous
system.

As it is only eight weeks since the receipt of the
answer to the British ultimatum it must be some
time before the arrival of any important intelli-
gence. It is very clear that whatever we hope to
gain we must gain by for alone, and that we
shall have to win every step by hard fighting. It
is too evident by some painful indications that the
Chinese have clever advisers, who know what they
are about to do long before the event, and whose
interest it is to keep us as far as possible from
Pekin, Other heads than Chinese have laid out
the fortifications, staked the approaches, and even
planted the guns. With this unseen aid the
Chinese surpass themselves in assumption and
defiance. The reply on which the British force
will have to act is not addressed di-
rectly to the British minister, but sent to the
Imperial Commissioner to be forwarded, a mode of
proceeding in the face of the Treaty. The Chinese
refuse altogether to ratify that Treaty at Pekin,
and refer us to Peh-tang. There is reason to be-
lieve that the reference to this place, on our visit
to Taku, was an afterthought simply to mislead
and baffle us ; and that, at the very time we were
told there was no one at Taku to hold communi-
cation with us, the provincial authorities were pre-
sent, directing the soldiers and preventing us from
being informed as to the real state of the case.
Can any one expect that such a people can be
brought to reason otherwise than by the strong
hand ? Having to deal with barbarians is, indeed,
a great responsibility, but we cannot escape it.
There we are with a mission to discharge, and we
must acquit ourselves as well as we can. At this
moment our course is plain. We have to enforce
a treaty, and it is for the interest of the whole
human race that we should do it quickly and
thoroughly.