The Sun.
London, England, 1860-08-20 00:00:00

GERMANY AND ITALY.

The following letter appears in a contempo-
rary :

Sir,—The violent anti-Gallicanism of a consider-
able section of English society and the English press
has had this bad effect in Germany—it has persuaded
the Germans that the Anglo-French alliance is so
completely broken that it cannot be re-
vived ; that England will now have to seek for
a military connection with Central Europe,
and that this connection must be paid for
by a change of the English policy in Italy. This
theory encourages the Germans to hope for the re-
establishment of Austrian supremacy in the Italian
peninsula. And most certainly if England and
France will quarrel, if they will separate more and
more from each other, if by the separation France
is thrown on Russia (now weak for external mili-
tary operations) for a connexion--for States can no
more live alone and in isolation than men—and if
England for the same reason is compelled to culti-
vate a German alliance, the danger and risk of
Italian independence are immeasurably augmented.
Look at what is occurring.
It is, no doubt, true that at Toplitz the Prince
Regent of Prussia did refuse to guarantee Venetia
to Austria. Such a formal guarantee would even
in a German sense have been a huge mistake. But
both the Prince Regent of Prussia and the Emperor
of Austria regard any attempt of Garibaldi on
Naples as a great danger to Venetia, and, through
Venetia, to Germany, and are preparing to resent
it accordingly; and in this view those Princes will
be supported by such public opinion as there is in
Germany, and by the false sentiment which is so
largely substituted for public opinion.
For example, it is some time since Herr Schleinitz
announced that the Court of Berlin was disposed to
give effective support to the King of Naples, if his
dynasty on the mainland were placed in jeopardy ;
and now Count Rechberg has, it is said, plainly
told the Piedmontese Government that a landing by
Garibaldi will be followed by an open intervention
in the kingdom of Naples, in defence of the royal
authority: This intervention will, I reiterate, be
applauded in Germany.
But Austrian intervention will lead to French
intervention, and a renewal of war in Italy between
those two great States. In that event the popular
feeling of Germany will be to afford Austria mili-
tary aid. A hundred considerations held Germany
back while the former struggle saturated the plains
of Lombardy with blood; among them I will
mention two. France and England were then on
better terms than they are now, and Venetia was
not attacked. But, amongst the Imperial reasons
given to the French people for the peace of Villa-
franca was even then the fact that Venetia could
not be attacked without rousing Germany. And
the subsequent facility with which Garibaldi has
driven the Neapolitan troops out of Sicily, the pro-
bability that the same success will attend any of
his operations on the mainland, his avowed policy
of annexing the whole of the Two Sicilies in Pied-
mont, and enabling Victor Emmanuel to become
King of united Italy, now convince the Ger-
mans that the Bourbon dynasty dethroned in
Naples, and both the Sicilies annexed to Pied-
mont, Venice and Venetia would next be quickly
assailed by Victor Emmanuel in due form of war.
Hence they approve of Austria regarding Naples
as an advanced defence of Venetia, of its treating
the acts of Garibaldi as those of the Court of Turin,
and of holding that Court responsible for the con-
sequences.
How, then, can the danger to Europe involved
in this situation of affairs be avoided. or averted ?
Not by the English Government simply offering
good advice to Victor Emmanuel and Count Cavour,
for their role is fixed and immutable. To them " re-
turning were as tedious as going o'er:" The inde-
pendence and freedom of Italy are inscribed on a
standard under which they must stand or fall. When
or wherever it is raised they have no alternative
but to follow it. Were they to shrink from sup-
porting the cause of Italian independence, how-
ever desperate, they would be disgraced before
Italy. It is useless at Turin to cry Peace, peace,
where there is no peace. Italy for the Italians
—ltaly for Piedmont, is their policy. And in that
policy they are pursued by a destiny sterner and
more inexorable than the Fate in the Greek tra-
gedy. When, for example, the Neapolitan Govern-
ment sent a mission to the Court of Turin to pro-
pose an alliance between the two States, what
reply was Count Cavour obliged to give it ?
Why, this, that either the alliance should be post-
poned until the Neapolitan Parliament had met and
pronounced an opinion on the existing state of
things—in other words, until the Neapolitans had
an opportunity of dethroning the Bourbons—or
that it should be concluded immediately on the
Neapolitan Government dismissing all their foreign
troops, admitting into Naples and the fortresses on
the continent 24,000 Piedmontese troops, and send-
ing as many Neapolitan troops to Piedmont—in
other words, that Piedmont should at once be made
master of Naples. From the point of view of
Italian independence, the Court of Turin was per-
haps quite right in proposing this alternative.
But the fact that it did so, and was compelled by
its position and its duty to Italy to do so,
ought to convince England that it is not at Turin
the catastrophe of a new Italian war can be averted.
At the request of the English Cabinet, Victor
Emmanuel did lately address a letter of amicable
remonstrance to Garibaldi against landing in
Naples. Garibaldi replied in the terms which
Victor Emmanuel must have expected when he
complied with English wishes. Let us, then, have
done with remonstrances at Turin. No one
knows better than Lord John Russell that they are
utter waste of time.
Is our Government then to sit quietly by and see
war approaching as if it were an inevitable natural
calamity ? Certainly not. Nothing, Lord John
has assured Parliament, could be franker or more'
conciliatory than Louis Napoleon's desire and suc-
cessful efforts to come to an understanding with the
English Government on the Syrian question. Why
not ,try and extend this frankness and cordiality
to the Neapolitan question ? Naples is exactly
that part of Italy on the treatment of which, in
Ferdinand's lifetime, the two Cabinets did agree
and act concurrently and harmoniously. There
is not the smallest evidence of the Emperor seek-
ing to revive Muratist pretensions at Naples.
He has publicly declared himself anxious to
again act with England in the south of Italy,
and that, after the policy of the British Govern-
ment had been over and over again proclaimed . And
now the pretensions of Austria to intervene in the
affairs of Naples twaihst the people and in favour
of a King they hate, and the inclination of Prussia
to support Austria in those pretensions—involving
as they do all the risks of a general war—render
the agreement of the two Western Governments on
this question the readiest mode of preventing any
such conflagration.
If Austria does interfere it will be because the
two Governments cannot agree, and Austrian
interference will lead to French intervention.
What the world, out of Germany, wants, is
no interference at all. If Austria will precipi-
tate another R ar with Piedmont because of Naples,
Austria will become such a nuisance as the rest of
Europe ought to abate. But Austria won't interfere
if France and England inhibit interuention. Neither
Austria nor Germany has the smallest right to con-
demn the people of Naples to live perpetually
under a vile government, out of fright that, Naples
free, Venetia will next become free. And it is the
duty of England and France to separate the
cause of Neapolitan liberty from any depend-
ence on Venetian slavery. Before such an
agreement the Germans will think twice before
they promise any support to Austria. But the
danger is imminent, and time presses.
Frankfort, Aug. 10. A TRAVELLER.

SAVINGS BANKS.—At the close of the savings
banks financial year in November, 1858, the amount due to
depositors from all these banks in the United Kingdom
was £36,221,153. They had in the hands of the Commis-
sioners for the Reduction of the National Debt sums
amounting to £36,026,088. The difference, £195,065, had
not been invested in Government securities. In Great
Britain no trustee or manager is liable for any loss unless
it occurs by his own default; in Ireland he is liable, and
to the full extent, unless by a declaration filed with the
Commissioners he limits his liability to £lOO, a course ge-
nerally adopted. To the credit of four towns—Fareham,
Tunbridge, Carshalton, and Merthyr Tydvil—trustees and
managers there hava voluntarily made themselves liable to
a certain extent for any deficiency that may ever arise. The
managersi?(lanagers do
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returns from some English savings banks are curious. One
states that it is the duty of the actuary to handbut
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money to the treasurer every bank-day, and each of these
officers gives security, and the managers " see no need for
any further security ;" another, that theeafourtht,lkt.hat
that
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affords, manage any of the transactions of the hank,
witnesses of the proceedings ; a third, that " their signatures
are mere matter of form, and they never read oviveoruiNdvilbaet
they sign or ascertain if it be correct ;"
bank was established from a benevolent rn_otive, and, from
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