The Sun.
London, England, 1860-07-02 00:00:00

DLINGER MENACING ITALI.

The intellirrence which reached us yesterday of
the violence offered to Baron Brenier, the French
Ambassador at Naples, by the Neapolitan mob,
is a matter of very grave concern to the friends of
Italy. There can .be no doubt as to the true origin
and intention of that assault. It is the act of laz-
zaroni, hired by the Sanfedist party in Naples, for
the express purpose of bringing about French inter-
vention in the affairs of Naples. That Louis Napo-
leon is anxious for a respectable excuse to interfere
we have but too good reason to know. French
statesmen have for some time been inclined to think
that the power of the Neapolitan mob is too danger-
ous to the party of order in Italy to render it safe to
abandon the Neapolitan Government to its fate.
Hitherto this predisposition for intervention on the
part of France has been kept in check by the atti-
tude of England and other causes. Will it be kept
in check any longer now? By the machinations of
the despotic party the life of a French Ambassador
has been endangered, and the excuse so given for
interference for which the Emperor has been on the
watch. Other influences, we fear, will co-operate.
We say it with deep regret, but we have good rea-
son to think that the telegram which attributed to
the Prince Regent of Prussia a very anti liberal
speech respecting the present state of Italy repre
cents correctly the general attitude of the Prussian
Government on that question. The influence exerted
by the Baden Conference over the affairs of Italy will
be anything but favourable. France will, we fear,
have learnt from it that no sympathy is felt by the
Executive power in Prussia for Italian unity and
independence, and will have been encouraged

thereby to assume once more the guidance of Italian
affairs with a view to French interests. That that
Conference is likely to check rather than stimulate
for the present any meddling with the German fron-
tier seems now genes ally admitted ; and if, there-
fore, the great Napoleonic policy of extending
French influence in Europe is to be pursued with
success, it must be pursued on the Italian side. We
have often pointed out the motives which will
sway France in .this direction. It is clear that a
united and powerful Italian kingdom on her
southern frontier, allied by constitutional sym-
pathies with the united and powerful British
kingdom on her north-west frontier, would tend
to diminish her present exceptional influence
in Europe. Besides, a powerful Italian king-
dom could not but divide with France the command
o! the Mediterranean, which could never then be-
come a French lake. In short, if the Napoleonic
foreign policy for France is still the main idea in
the Emperor's mind, a united Italy will present
formidable obstacles to its realisation. And a united

Italy is now 110 dream ; it is, if not prevented by
foreign intervention, all but a political certainty. The
highest authorities in Naples inform us that after
the first engagement in Calabria Garibaldi would
have a triumphant march to Naples, that the Go-
vernment is already crumbling away, and that no
power remains to offer the show of effective resist-
ance.. And the army of Lamoriciere would not, if
we may trust all we hear, long survive the army of
Naples. The spirit of the Roman people is roused
almost as effectuelly as the spirit of the Neapolitan
people, and when once Garibaldi reaches Naples it
will not be long before Rome is added to the area
of the reclaimed kingdom. Excepting Venetia,
Italy and Sicily may soon be free and combined
under oue crown. The enthusiasm for annexation ,
.to Piedmont is, we believe, as deep and universal
in Naples as it is in Sicily. A year ago no one
would.have thought of Italian unity as anything