The Sun.
London, England, 1860-09-18 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 18, 1860.

COULD THE FREY OH SACK LONDON?

(From the New York Tribune.)

The report of-the British National Defence Com-
mission, which was recently published in London,
states that if the Emperor of the French were dis-
posed to send a hostile army to England, it would
be impossible for " all the available vessels of the
Royal Navy " to prevent it from landing at some
point of the 2,147 miles of coast line of England
and Wales, not to sneak of that of Ireland,. It
having been also conceded, at various times before
and since the publication of the famous De Join-
ville pamphlet; that a landing of 100,000 or more
Frenchmen could be effected in the British Islands,
under skilful management, the only important point
to be considered is, what power of resistance Great
Britain has at her command to mcet such an in-
vasion;

In compliance with an order of the House of
Commons, the strength of the British land forces
was reported in May last. It was as follows :
Total regimental establishments, 144,148; effective
of all ranks on the Ist of May, 133,952 ; embodied
militia, 19,333. When this statement was made
public, an almost universal cry from all parts of the
three kingdoms was raised, as to the manner in
which the 75,000,000 dols. appropriated for the army
estimates were spent, since an analysis of the
144,148 men, given as the available material of the
line, " revealed the startling fact that scarcely
30,000 infantry could be mustered for offensive or
defensive purposes, at a given place."
Mr. Sidney Herbert and his associates of the
Horse Guards immediately held a consultation, and
the London Times endeavoured to quiet the anxiety
of the people. It said—" We took occasion to ex-
amine the figures by which these allegations were
supported, and explained in some -detail the actual
position of affairs. It tried to " show that if by
the term 'troops' it was intended to describe only
infantry of the line, the state of the case had been
pretty accurately given, but that in reality the force
at home comprised strong divisions of other arms of
the service, so that its aggregate strength was by
no means so small as might have been expected."
The result of this nervousness on the part of the
public, and of the consultation at the Horse Guards,
was a completely new table of statistics, putting
down the military forces of Great Britain, at home,
at 323,259 ; or 179,111 men more than the statement
submitted two months previously. The first was
issued with the intention to show the numbar of
men that could, under favourable circumstances, and
on receiving reasonable notice, be made available
for immediate duty ; the last to supply the sum total
of every man and boy entered on the military pay
roll, and consequently receiving of the 75,000,000
dollars, besides including 227,179 volunterrs and
militia, of whom fully 200,000 have no existence
as soldiers. Then, there are 33,302 men ac-
counted for as belonging to " depots." Lest
we should be charged with prejudice in describing
what these " depots" are, we will cite the London
Imes as an authority :
" The troops in the depots really belong not to the
home, but to the foreign establishments. They are por-
tions of the battalions serving abroad, and there is nothing
strange in their being comparatively ineffective for duty
at home."

In short, they are merely an ineffective body,
composed of recruits not over three months in the
service, who are shipped off quarterly, or oftener,
when enlisted, to the regiments abroad, and old in-
Nalids who have been left at home as useless, "so
that, what with those who are exhausted and those
who are untaught, the corps itself is never in tke
condition of a regular battalion."
So much for the depots. Now as to the volun-
teers and militia. It is only necessary to repeat
that at least 200,000 exist at present, only on paper.
Mr. Maguire recently proved in Parliament that
nearly every regiment of militia had from 200 to
300 men more on the books of the Horse Guards
than could ever be got together on parade. Mr.
Sidney Herbert made a similar admission. On the
Irish militia regiments, whose members are com-
pelled, from hardship and poverty, to report them-
selves more punctually than their English neigh-
bours, many now estimated at 800—the Waterford,
for instance—have only 400. The estimate giving
the strength of militia and volunteers of England.
at 138,560 is probably as near the mark as it is pos-
sible for an impartial statistician to make it.
The force of the regular army at borne, according
to the recent report from the War Office, is 68,778.
The Household Cavalry (1,317), Royal Engineers
(2.089), the Army Hospital Corps of discarded in-
valids, the military train, and other partially una-
vailable troops, are here included. To avoid tres-
passing on disputed grounds, we will admit that
the entire 68,000 are available. This, supposing all
militia and volunteers embodied, and under arms,
would give a grand total of 206,560 men. We will
even add the Irish Police to the list, which will in-
crease it to about 237,000. 'the nominal strength
of the regular army and embodied militia, just now,
is given at 100,000 ; about 16,000 in excess of the
real figures ; but we will take it as it stands. Con-
ceding that 15,000 of the volunteers could be assem-
bled at a given point, within three days of, the
landing of the French, England would still have at
her disposal an army of 115,000. Of these, it must
be borne in mind that fully 25,000 are novices in
the use of arms. Now, all the navy yards, arsenals,
and Government strongholds, would require extra
garrisons, for there are never more than 8,000 ma-
rines ashore at the naval ports. Ireland, without
attaching any importance to the influence of the
" national petition" in creating a friendly disposition
to the soldiers of M'Mahon, will need an army. All
volunteers or militia would not suffice to keep or-
der in the Emerald Isle, with the prospect of a
fight in view. Her Majesty's authorities should at
least detail 10,000 regulars and 25,000 irregulars
for that country, besides the police. This would
make about 55,000 in all, and would leave only
80,000 soldiers in England and Wales, to guard
arsenals, armories, and navy yards. It is idle to
suppose that less than 20,000 serviceable troops
would be sufficient for this important duty, allow-
ing even the worn out or inexperienced men in the
_ .

de-pots to be able to hold their own. So Napoleon's
100,000 Frenchmen, Zouaves, &c., would be op-
posed by 60,000 red coats, of whom little more than
45,000 would belong to the lire. The probable re-

suit of a reneounte-r between the two forces, thus

brought face to face, hardly admits of a doubt.
It will be objected that France could not equip
and despatch across the channel 100,000 men, with-
out its being made known. It may be. But Eng-
land would not know where the blow would fall,
and would naturally tremble for the safety of her
possessions bordering the Mediterranean, and try
to reinforce her garrisons there lest the threatened
attack on Londoi might be intended to cover ulte-
rior designs on Malta and Gibraltar. She would
send over to these places, in a few vessels of the
channel fleet, 20,000 or 30,000 soldiers, who would
not be " volunteers," thus throwing on the latter
the weight of resisting the enemy at home. Some
distinguished writers assert that even the sacking
of London would eventually be less injurious to
England, than her batishment from Malta and
Gibraltar.

But it will be argued that the mere announce-
ment of national danger would be sufficient to
arouse every Briton in the land, from the Cheviot
Hills to Cornwall, to hurl the intruders into the
sea. This is plausible. But experience teaches us
that no matter how intense the patriotism of the
masses may be, the fact that they, as a general
thing, have no arms, and do not know how to use
them if they had, renders their disposition in an
emergency of very little value. Cane-swords and
pitchforks may be weapons exceedingly dangerous
to human life in the Seven-dials or in the provinces,
but it is not reasonable to assume that they would be
irrepressible in repelling the Zouaves. It may also
be seriously doubted whether the middle classes who
almost exclusively represent the volunteer force,
would be so ready to answer muster with the French
on their native island, as they are when summoned
to receive the congratulations of her Majesty. At
all events, it is not more absurd to admit the pos-
sibility of the invading army numbering 150,000
than to suppose the volunteers can turn out 150,000;
since a cordial invitation from Buckingham Palace
cannot succeed in bringing, at the end of a twelve
months' recruiting, more than 18,000.
Some deubts having been expressed as to the
force actually reviewed at Hyde Park, we quote a
paragraph from the Manchester Guardian, of the,
second day's parade. The " private correspondent'
alluded to is Mr. Tom Taylor, an intimate and con-
fidential friend of Col. M'Murdo

" Our private correspondent, as our readers may
recollect, has stated the number at 18,300, on the
official authority of Col. M'Murdo, which is a little
lower than the amount given by Sir J. Burgoyne's
calculation. But the martial bearing of the Volun-
teers evidently struck Sir John more than the mere
number."
In estimating the force that could probably be
concentrated to oppose invaders, Nye have purposely
made the most liberal calculation in favour of Great
Britain. Our statement of the regular army admits
as efficient every man, sick and well, whose name
is on the military books. The militia and volun-
teers have been considered as 1151000 strong, 'which

those well-informed on the matter may deem exces-
sive. The acknowledged ability of French field
officers, the excellence of French military discipline,
the general superiority of French tactics; and, on
the other hand, the well-established stupidity of
many of the highest officers in the English army ;
the slovenly management of the regulars and volun-
teers (after five weeks' notice had been given one
regiment of militia actually mustered, in May last,
with 135 bare foot members); even the conceded
inferiority of the ensemble of a British to a French
fighting army---all these have not been considered,
although they are most important elements in a
discussion of the subject.
In view of these facts, it appears certain that if
Napoleon landed to morrow, at a judiciously-
selected port in England, with 150,000 or even
100,000 men, he could " sack London " and escape
the "annihilation" which a London journal recently
stated would be his inevitable fate, "if he put a
hostile foot on Saxon soil."

much as is left of the temporal power of the Pope,
and therefore withdraws her Minister from Turin
to mark her displeasure at the invasion of his ter-
ritory. But suppose Sardinia had yielded to her
advice, would the temporal independence of the
Pope have been secured, or would he not have been
12ft to the tender mercies of the men who fight un-
der Garibaldi, flushed with the victory that united
Italy would be sure in the long run to obtain over
the forces of Lamoriciere ? We should be glad to
know by what arguments M. Grandguillot can
attack the invasion of the Roman States in 1860
which are not equally applicable to the invasion of
Lombardy by France in 1859. In both cases there
was misgovernment, in neither was there any direct
offence. Is not the withdrawal of the Ambassador
from Turin a censure of the victorious campaign in
the North of Italy pronounced by the Government
which planned and conducted it ; and is not the
declaration of the semi-official Constitutionnel that
there is a long way from a disavowal to a rupture,
and that the interests of France and Piedmont are
always the same, a censure of the withdrawal of
the Ambassador ?—Times.