The Sun.
London, England, 1860-02-16 00:00:00

SOUTHAMPTON DOCKS.

The report of the directors shows a net revenue
for the six months ending Dec. 31 last, after pay-
ment of the interest on the debenture debt, the
dividends on the preference stocks, and all the
working expenses, repairs, &c., of £7,703, which
with the surplus over from the previous half-year
of £783, makes an available balance of £8,486.
From this the directors recommend a dividend for
the half-year of £2 per cent., being at the rate of
£4 per cent. per annum.

LAW INTELLIGENCE.—Feb.IIS.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.

(Sittings in Banco, after Term, before Lord Chief
Justice Cockburn, Mr. Justice Crompton, and
Mr. Justice Hill.)
BEACHEY T. BROWN.

This was an action for breach of promise of mar-
riage. The defendant pleaded that at the time of
making the promise the plaintiff was engaged to
marry some one else, and that if he had known that
fact he would not have entered into the engage-
ment. The plaintiff demurred to the plea, and the
demurrer now came on for argument.
Mr. Beresford Hope was heard in support of the
plea, and Mr. Jones for the demurrer.
The Lord Chief Justice said he was of opinion
that the judgment of the Court ought to be for the
plaintiff. If the old law still subsisted, and the
plaintiff could be sued in the ecclesiastical courts,
on the pre-contract, to compel her to perform it,
that would be a sufficient reason why she could not
be in a condition to require the defendant to marry
her or pay damages. But by the Act George IV.,
chap. 4, the pre-contract could not have any effect
on her marriage with the defendant, or offer any
obstacle or impediment to that marriage. That
ground failing, the plea did not disclose any other
reason why the defendant should not be asked to
fulfil his engagement or to pay damages for the con-
tract being broken. It was said that the contract
was überrimce fidei, and he entirely agreed in that.
But still there were a great many things which a
man might desire to have communicated to him,
and which, when communicated, might operate on
his mind to make him hesitate, if not to decide to
break his contract, and yet the non-disclosure of
those circumstances would not remove his liability
to an action. There were personal circumstances
or particular conditions of health and disposition
which a man might desire to be fully acquainted
with before entering into a contract to marry.
But if they were not communicated his ignorance
of them formed no ground why he should refuse
to perform his engagement when once he had en-
tered into it. Ordinarily it was right that such
facts or circumstances should be disclosed, but their
non-disclosure did not afford any answer to an
action of this kind. The only instance in which
ignorance of the party contracting would excuse
performance of the contract was the case where a
woman had been unchaste. Incontinence went to
the root of all the domestic happiness in contem-
plation when the contract was made, and was suffi-
cient to absolve from its performance. Nothing of
that kind was disclosed here. The plaintiff was
only said to have been under engagement to marry
another man. That afforded no impediment to her
marriage with the defendant. It cast no imputa-
tion on her virtue, and therefore did not come
within the principle upon which in practice the
misconduct of the woman was allowed to be an
answer. There was nothing disclosed in the plea
which barred the plaintiff from recovering damages.
Mr. Justice Crompton and Mr. Justice Hill
concurre d.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.
(Sittings at Nisi Prius, in London, after Term, be
fore Lord Chief Justice Erie and Special Juries.)

SOLLIEUX V. INNOCENT.

This was an action to recover 1758 15s. differ.
ences in the purchase of shares on the Stock-Ex-
change. The defendant pleaded 22 pleas, denying
his liability to the plaintiff, setting up that he
bought through a stockbroker, and by the rules of
the Stock-Exchange the principal was exonerated,
and that the contract was a wagering contract for
time bargains.
Mr. Lush, Q.C., and Mr. J. Brown appeared for
the plaintiff; Mr. Hawkins, Q.C., and Mr. Pearce
for the defendant.
It appeared that the plaintiff was a broker, and
a member of the Stock-Exchange, and on the 10th
of December, 1858, he sold to the defendant, through
a Mr. Mossop, a sharebroker, and not a member of
the Stock-Exchange, 100 Bahia Railway shares at
par, £3 per share, and on the 31st of the following
March £2,000 Turkish Six per Cent. Scrip, at
£79 10v. per cent., for the next settling day.
The defendant is a wholesale grocer in Bedford-
street, Strand.. At the next settling-day for
each of those shares and scrip the defendant di-
rected Mr. Mossop to carry on the differences,
and so, from settling.day to settling-day, the diffe-
rences were carried on in a falling market until the
28th of April, when Bahia shares had receded £1
per share, and Turkish Scrip had fallen to £47.
Mr. Mossop then determined to close the account,
and tho respective shares were then sold at these
prices, entailing a loss in differences of 7581 16s.
The money not being forthcoming, Mr. Mossop
could net meet the differences, and in consequence
the plaintiff became a defaulter, and a committee of
the Stock Exchange endeavoured to collect the
moneys due to him on behalf of his creditors, and
Mr. Leon on their behalf called on and saw the de-
fendant, who declined paying any one but Mr.
Mossop, and with Mr. Mossop he disputed the
amount due. In consequence the present action
was brought. The learned counsel for the plaintiff
said, by the general law, if a person made a contract
with an agent he might resort to the principal
when he discovered who that principal was, and
if the general law applied there could be no doubt
that the defendant was liable ; but the defendant
set up as a defence that he purchased through a
'broker, and that, by some custom of the Stock Ex-
change, this contract was taken out of the general
law, and the broker alone was liable. He also set
up that these were time bargains and wagering
contraas, which they were not, as the shares were
bought out and out, and only carried over. The
facts opened were then proved by calling the plain-
tiff; who stated that he sold the shares to Mossop
as agent for the defendant, for whom Mossop told
him he bought the shares. Mossop was not a mem-
ber of the Stock Exchange, When the account was
closed the differences duo amounted to the sum
stated, and payment could not be obtained from the
iefen dant.

The Chief Justice said he should hold that the
defendant, as principal, was liable, and give Mr.
iiaNl/4kins leave to move to set aside the yerdiot.
Verdict for the plaintiff for £l3,d ids.