The Sun.
London, England, 1860-03-14 00:00:00

IRE SUN, LONDON, WEDNESDAY EVENINC I, MARCH. 14, 1860.

to the actual censure of one or the other government. My
observation related solely to what had fallen from the right
hon. gentleman the member for Bucks, whom I understood
to say that the conduct of her Majesty's Government lay
open to considerable animadversion. It never entered into
my mind to lay down the doctrine that Parliament was not
to discuss a matter of great European interest connected
with the foreign relations of this country, and the affairs of
Europe, unless that discussion had reference to a direct reso-
lution of censure. I certainly never laid down a doctrine
so inconsistent with the proper functions of Parliament. I
think that the course which her Majesty's Government have

pursued upon this matter is much more clear and consistent
than would appear from the observations of the hon. and
learned gentleman. When first this question of the cession
of Savoy and Nice to France was spoken of as a matter
still in doubt, my noble friend immediately instructed her
Majesty's ambassador at Paris to question the French mi-

- -
nister as to the fact, and to ascertain whether there was any
foundation in the statement. He did so, and was told by
Count Walewski that the notion had been abandoned.
(Hear, hear.) After that there were rumours, no doubt,
that the plan was still in contemplation, but it is well
known that it had been settled upon the peace of Zurich

that whenever the treaty should be signed, a congress
should be assembled for the purpose of taking cognisance
of the treaty of Zurich, and of taking into consideration
the settlement of the affairs of Italy. If that had been
done the natural course would have been to state at the
congress the opinions which England or any other power
might have entertained on any arrangement dependent
upon, subsequent to, or consequent upon, the arrange-
ments of Zurich and the settlement of the affairs of Eu-
rope. There would, therefore, have been no great use in
this country entering into an angry correspondence with
the French Government upon a contingent event which
would depend upon discussions in the congress, whenever
that congress might take place. The house is aware that
the treaty of Zurich was much delayed ; and as the con-
gress wasnot to meet till the treaty had been signed, it was
not until the end of last, or, I believe, the beginning of the
present year, that it became known that the congress had
come to nought. When we became aware that the congress
would not be assembled, my noble friend, as appears from
the papers which have been laid before parliament, did ex-
press a very strong opinion to the French Government with
regard to the contemplated cession of Savoy and Nice. I
did not quite understand which of the two opinions that
the honourable and learned gentleman has expressed be
entertains, because at one moment he seemed to censure
my noble friend for not having expressed the opinion of
England with sufficient firmness and strength, and at
another time he criticises my noble friend's despatch for
being too strong and energetic. The course which her Ma-
jesty's Government pursued was one that in my opinion
showed considerable discretion, and was the one that ought
to have been adopted. In the first place, as was stated by
my right hon. friend (Mr. Horsman), it was quite clear that
this was not an occasion upon which the issue of peace or
war would depend. Whatever opinion we might entertain
upon the cession of Savoy and Nice to France, no one can
maintain that that cession would involve so directly the in-
terests of this country that it would justify the Government
in going to war with France to prevent it. France would
not, so far as we were concerned, be more formidable because
she had Savoy and Nice than she would be without them,
and therefore our interference ought not to be viewed by
the French Government or the French nation as arising
from any jealousy of the power of France ; because so far
as England is concerned France would not be stronger with
the two provinces nor weaker without them. And there-
fore it was not from any apprehension that we originated
the negotiation; nor is the case one in which, should that
negotiation not succeed, this country would think it right
to take up arms to prevent the cession from being com-
pleted. (Hear.) That being agreed on all sides, I think
it is clear that the measures which have been suggested in
the course of this discussion would not have been expedient.
We are told, for instance, that we ought to have applied to
the great powers of Europe, and to have entered into an
alliance with Prussia, and Austria, and Russia, to prevent
the transaction from taking place. The way to prevent it
was to point out to the Government of France the objec-
tions that suggested themselves to our minds; for unless
we had been of opinion that it was a matter of sufficient
importance to justify the country in taking up arms, my
own opinion is to have endeavoured to array a hostile con-
federacy against France would have been an injudicious
method of endeavouring to accomplish our purpose.
(Hear.) It would have raised the national feel-
ings of the French nation; it would have stimulated the
sense of dignity of the French Government ; it would
have borne the appearance of compulsion when we were not
prepared to exercise compulsion ; and therefore it would be
calculated to prevent the accomplishment rather thanto for-
ward the attainment of our wishes. (Hear.) That which
it was expedient to, do, when it was evident that there
would not be an opportunity of bringing this matter under
the discussion of the assembled council of Europe, was to
state fairly and distinctly, as my noble friend did, to the
French Government, the objections which ho saw to the
project, and then to communicate those objections to the
other great Powers, in order that they, knowing what we
had done, might take a correspeading step on their part,
and make known their objections likewise to the French
Government. That was what we did, and it appears to me
that that was the course which it was best to adopt to ac-
complish our purpose without wounding the dignity or
France, and without placing the French Government in a
position in which they could not yield to any demand with-
out a sacrifice of dignity and honour. (Hear.) The hon.
and learned gentleman says that he does not yet know
what are my opinions upon this matter. My opinions agree
entirely with those of my noble friend, and I perfectly sub-
scibe to every word in those despatches which have been
laid upon the table, and of which, I think, almost every-
body, with the exception of the hon. and learned gentle-
man—has expressed his approbation. Indeed, I almost
think that the hon. gentleman himself, on a former occa-
sion, did justice to the spirit with which my noble friend-
has represented the opinions of her Majesty's Governmes
in this correspondence. (Hear, hear.) I think it would 14
a great mistake on the part of the French Government if
they were to persist in this plan. (Cheers.) When the pre--
sent Emperor of the French mounted the throne, or rather
when he first became the ruler of France, there were no
doubt excited in the minds of a great many of the Govern -
ments of Europe apprehensions founded upon an opinion
that he might adopt the policy of his uncle, which was a
policy that had involved the whole of Europe in the ca-
lamities of war. Well, the Emperor took an early occa-
sion to declare that the empire meant peace, and that
was a declaration that was received with the greatest pleasure
and satisfaction by the whole of Europe. It inspired a con-
fidence in his policy—in the future policy which it was sup-
posed to be his intention to :pursue. Ido not hold that
what took place last year was any departure from that policy.
(Hear, hear.) France undertook a noble enterprise—it
undertook the enterprise of freeing Italy from foreign domi-
nation, including, let it be remembered, French domina-
tion ; for part of the scheme was that when Italy should be
free, France, as well as Austria, should retire from any
future interference in her affairs. (Hear, hear.) It would
have been a most honourable and a most glorious result,
and it will still be—if the result should so turn out—if, after
having restored Italy to that freedom and independence of
which she had so long been deprived, France had been con-
tent with the glory of the achievement without mixing with
a generous enterprise any small and petty motive of self-
aggrandisement. (Cheers.) If reasons are assigned why
this cession is demanded, I cannot admit that there is any
force or strength in them. It is said, for instance, that if
Piedmont were a small power, she would continue
to be a harmless neighbour to France ; but that
if Piedmont were enlarged so as to comprise eight, ten, or
eleven millions of population, then she would become for-
midable as a neighbour, and that therefore an additional
security was required to the French frontier. Still I must
observe that when that language is held by a country con-
taining upwards of 30 millions—l believe 35 or 36 millions—
of people, the most warlike on the earth, full of resources and
compact of territory—when, I say, a country like that as-
serts that she is in danger from a neighbour with 10 or 12
million inhabitants, it is an argument that cannot for a
moment be seriously maintained. (Hear.) But then it is
said that France must have her natural boundary, and that
the population of Savoy speak the French language. Now;
in the first place, history tells us that natural boundaries
are no defence whatever. What instance is there on record
in which an army, sufficient in strength and determined to
invade a country, was over stopped either by rivers or by
mountains ? And, therefore, whether the Alps, or the
watershed of the Alps, are in the possession either of France
or Sardinia—France, being the strongest power of the two,
would be able whenever she pleased to enter Italy ; and if
Sardinia should ever be insane enough to fancy that she
could attack France, I think the French armies would be
able to give an account of the invaders as would not en-
iforl
re in.
the
T h econfederation
them to repeat the attempt. (Laughter.) But then
it is said that Sardinia might become a member of a confe-
deracy against France, and that she might afford a passage
tothelotroopsofo t h er countries.
muste 0 n Thesi
st
of answer
powers
o
t o
northt is is
pf
the Alps,
by
ps,and it is not likely that they would go into Italy
eprnuprpiroeseiso:pfcernoese sing the Alps when they might enter
Fan
way of her eastern frontier. (Hear, hear.) But
r t
(and I believed the intention of the
Emperor in enunciating that idea was perfectly • • it
is not conceivable that any confederae wotlde sibe nlfere.), d
eai rbs toldi
sa Englandhnedae,r
atnod
ni n
tEuropeh thei prtoirhnuo
ecpci oop sml d
for the purpose of invading Prance. 'Y(lrear hveearr lothmavee
os ao
si said
iotnhwao that there
Savoy,chhe r
would
oisu
ihnduot
btdehaonersegt
pre-
cedentproposed
s
upon which that precedent would be founded. If
to the question of natural boundaries, and lay downy thee
doctrine that the country which claims them is to be the
judge of what they are—(hear, hear)—it is easy to see that
Europe would find it very difficult to foretell where the danger
would begin, and where resistance upon a great scale would
not be required. (Hear.) If language is to be the measure
of self-aggrandisement it would be difficult to say that many
countries have a secure title to the possessions which they
now hold. These two principles, therefore—natural . boun-
daries and language—are principles which it would be
very dangerous to Europe to see established in practice,
however small the circumstance may be in regard to which
it is now sought to carry them into effect. (Hear, hear.)
There is one point, indeed, in respect to which the cession

of Savoy to France would be attended with direct danger
to a country the independence and neutrality of which it s 1
the interests of Europe and of France herself to anaintait.-
__l
mean Switzerland. (Hear.) lam asked whet ter any' steps
have been taken to provide for the security of Swig' ,:erland
lin the event of that cession taking place. 'AVe, . have not
taken any such steps, and I will tell the house I v b ,y we have
not. If you begin talking about the medificat l'oll of a mea-
sure which you want to present in its entirety , youweaken
the ground upon which you stand. (Hear.) 3 A will be time
enough to talk of that when the cession has ' • become inevit-
able ; and therefore it would not have been p rudent to have

begun to talk to France about the condition on which the
cession of Savoy should take place, so long to s it was the in-
tention of the Government to try and prevea ,t the annexa-
tion from taking place at all. On what gra finds, then, I
may ask, can the Government aid the house, entertain the
opinion that the cession may not be effected? In the first
place, the Emperor has stated that Savoy sht till not be taken
by force of arms. In the next place, LT has. stated that it
shall not be taken without the consent of the sovereign and
the people; and lastly, that it shall mot be t 'eken. -without
consulting—and when you say without cons tilting, it fol.
lows that you mean without obtaining the a ass nt—of the
other Powers of Europe. If, then, these cc ou'litions here
laid down are abided by—if France abstains &coin force, ob-
tains the consent of the sovereign and the :pe ople, and the
assent of the other Powers—l say we are cam. eto a point at
which we are justified in hoping tkat reason, r eflection, and
a due regard to the interests and honour of Fa •anee may in-
duce the French Government to abandon t'ae project which
it has entertained. (Hear.) But we are 1 ;old that we have
laid down a doctrine with regard to Ti weeny which we
ought also to apply to the lonian Islands. The answer to
that is obvious. In the first place, we did not propose uni-
versal suffrage to the people of Tuscar Ly; but the great
difference between Tuscany and the loi aian Islands is one
that applies also to Savoy. In Tuscany r, as in Modena and
Parma, the sovereign had fled. He / lad done just what
James 11. did when he left this cm entry without a Go-
vernment; and a provisional government of their own
having been formed the people had, determined that they
would not have their runaway soy ereign bank again. We
are not the sovereigns but .the protectors of the lonian
Islands, at all events we have 'not yet run away from them,
and till that happens there is - no parallel between the cases.
(Hear.) The same may be sai Aof Savoy—the King of Sar-
dinia still reigns in Savoy, a' ad therefore I maintain that
the people of that country ire not in the position of the
Tuscans, to say of their own authority to whom they will
belong. (Hear, hear.) It.apr mars to me that we have upon
the whole pursued the tours e which wasbest adapted for the
purpoeo via had in view. 1 Ve inquired of the French Go-
vernment if they entertains 1 such an intention as had been
imputed to them, and they I mid they did not. We knowing
that in case the event ui Jon which the question hinged
taking place, we should ha- re an opportunity of moving the
question in congress waited till it should be assembled, and
when we found that it was not to meet we communicated to
the French Government t he strong objections we enter-
tained to the project. WI ten we had done so, without at-
tempting to array the other Powers of Europe in a hostile
confederacy against Franc a, we communicated our views to
those Powers, and as ti ie French Government has an-
nounced that it will cons' alt them, they will be obliged, in
answer, to state to Franc e the opinions which they hold.
In our opinion the question. is one of European interest and
I cannot imagine that the other Powers of Europe will not
take the same view of it that we have done—a view not
tinged with passion or jealousy, or one to which France can
justly take umbrage. Our objections are founded upon prin-
ciples of general European interests, in which I hold France
has as much concern as any of the rest. We have stated in
a calm and temperate manner the reasons which have in-
duced us to think that the proposed step would be unad-
visable, and I cannot divest myself of the impression that
the Government of France would gain more by preserving
the good opinion of this country, by retaining the confi-
dence of Europe, and by disarming the great Powers of all
feelings of jealousy and suspicion of warlike designs on the
part of France. To my mind they would gain far
more by that than by any advantage which they could de-
rive by the acquisition of some mountain tops and half a
million of new subjects. (Cheers.) With regard to the other
point adverted to, I cannot but congratulate the house and
country upon the prospect which seems to be held out—that
quiet determination on the part of Tuscany to unite herself
to Sardinia, and that there will be created in North and
Central Italy a state which by the freedom of her institu-
tions, and by the independence it will have acquired, will
hold out a fair prospect that Italy may for a third time place
herself in that eminence, as a portion of the civilised world,
which she occupied in the days of the Roman Emperors,
and afterwards in those periods when the revival of arts and
letters placed Italy, though not then a great military power
in a position of honotu• and glory that as long as history re-
mains will be looked back to with pride and admiration.
(Cheers.) I cannot but think that Italy, which has dis-
played such public spirit, and which has developed so much
talent and patriotism, is that Italy of which England may
be proud of having given her moral weight and influence to
in order to bring such a state of things about. (Cheers.) It
is moat important to contrast the judgment and the modera-
tion and temper, of those statesmen who during the last
twelve months have contributed so much to Italian renown,
with that less laudable spirit which prevailed in 1848—a
temper and moderation which may indeed give us the most
mums-lane hop°m of fvohu... I ~.11l only any with ragstra
to that Italian statesman whose name has been often men-
tioned in this debatte—Count Cavour—that though there
may be those whose views he has defeated and whose policy
he has thwarted, yet that the future will respect him as one
of the most distinguished patriots that ever adorned the
history of that country—a country which is under as great
obligations to him as any nation ever owed any one of its
members, and feeling this, and the success which has
attended his policy, he need not be disturbed by the criti-
cism which his public actions may in any country have oc-
casioned. (Cheers.)
Mr. DISRAELI observed—As some observations of mine
appears to have given rise to this debate, I wish to say a few
words before its close. It is gratifying to see that the noble
lord at the head of the Government has recalled that con-
stitutional dogma which he laid down in so general a man-
ner on a previous occasion, that in case the Opposition in
the House of Commons was not satisfied altogether with the
course of foreign affairs pursued by the Government it was
their duty to originate an immediate vote of censure. The
noble lord now says that I indulge in animadversions on
the conduct of the Ministry, and therefore I am bound to
make some such motion. But what I said was that their
conduct was involved in so much mystery that it required
explanation, and I particularly guarded myself against any
other object in it than a desire to obtain information upon
some particular points; and, indeed, it was quite clear
from the course of the discussion, and especially from what
fell from the Foreign Secretary, that it was a perfectly
rational desire on my part, and that it was the duty of the
Government to take measures to give the information which
was required by the house. Under that impression the
noble lord gave notice of a motion, that he would this even-
ing, on the presentation of papers, make a defence of the
conduit of the Government as to those points which ap-
peared to us to require explanation. The noble lord the First
Minister has spoken of some in this house who would make
the annexation of Nice and Savoy to France a cause of de-
claring war. The noble lord never heard from me any ex-
pression of that sort. The noble lord has spoken of some
who would make the annexation of those Sardinian pro-
vinces to France as good reasons why measures should be
taken by England to form a league among the great Powers
of Europe. Again, I say, he never heard an expression of
that kind from me. The noble lord will also admit that the
modest proposition of a pretest the other evening received
on my part no sanction. But as that subject has given rise
to so much misconception on the part of one hon. gentle-
man who took part in those discussions (the hon. gentle-
man the member for Birmingham), and who does not show
the same ability upon this as upon other topics, I might
inform the hon. gentleman who accuses the gentlemen
who sit on this side of the house of desiring to involve the
country in a war with France, because they recommend a
protest against annexation, that the very fact of having re-
course to a protest is prima facie evidence that the country
is not going to war, and that it is a diplomatic instrument as
formal as any treaty or convention—that it is not merely a
burst of rhetoric, but it is an instrument which expresses and
records the feelings of nations when they may not think it
advisable or prudent to have recourse to extreme measures;
and the present Government is not the Government, nor the
present Foreign Secretary the Minister, who should raise
anyolbjection to a course of that kind, or hold it up to the
notice of the house and the country as one of an irritating
and hostile character, for in the case of Cracow—a case
where very grave doubts were entertained, even by eminent
jurists, that there had been any violation of the Treaty of
Vienna—the English Government of that day did not go to
war, but protested, feeling that there had been a violation of
the Treaty of Vienna, and sent formal protests to the dif-
ferent courts. The Prime Minister of that day is the Foreign
Secretary who now sits opposite. (Hear, hear.) I now come
to the explanation of the Foreign Secretary. He presented
a paper to-day, after a formal notice that he would explain
the policy of the Government on the impending annexation
of Savoy and Nice, but he forgot to make any explanation
about that annexation. His whole speech was on the settle-
ment of Italy, and se far as the case which I was able to put
before the house at the end of a long debate the other night,
but which was placed before the house to-night with bril-
liant and logical precision by my hon. and learned friend
the member for Dublin University, he never afforded us any
information. He never denied that statement which I made,
though not with the confidence which I have now in its
accuracy, as to the repeated warnings with which the noble
lord was furnished as to the policy of the French Govern-
ment. The whole of his observations on this head were
most meagre and limited as regards annexation—the
noble lord made an unfortunate start from the begin-
ning. His first observation was made as if he would
startle this side of the house, but, in reality, it com-
pletely wrecked his own case, for he said that this affair
of the proposed, annexation of Savoy was known to the late
Government; that it was known to Lord Malmesbury ; and
he said that the records of the Foreign-office would not
show that Lord Malmesbury had received any satisfactory
reply. I might at another time attempt to prove that he had
a satisfactory reply ; but I take the noble lord's own show-
ing, and upon that it is plain that if his predecessor had not
received a satisfactory reply it was evidently the duty of the
noble lord to have pressed for one. (Hear.) I retaeraber

once being told, when we were seated on the benches oppo-
site, that we took with the responsibility of office the en-
gagements of our predecessors. If that principle be true in
our case, it is also just in that of the noble lord ; and the
very fact that the answer to Lord Malmesbury by the French
Government was net satisfactory should be the very reason
why the noble lord should prick up his ears and obtain
satisfactory information as to the annexation of Savoy.
However, there is no doubt from the evidence that the noble
lord was obliged to make some inquiries, and he received
that answer, as appears from the papers, at an early period
—in July—announcing that the Imperial Government had
given up all intention of that annexation. During the inter-
val between July and the despateh of January the noble
lord received frequent intimations from our own ambassa-

dor at Paris of the intention of the French Government to

revert to their original policy in contemplation of the events
in Italy. There is no doubt whatever now, that besides this
information from our own ambassador, from the first the
Swiss Government, deeply interested in this question (for
their existence as an independent and free people entirely
depended upon it), pressed in every way upon the repre-
sentatives of the Queen and the Government, directly and
indirectly, their great anxiety upon the subject. But what
is the defence of the noble lord ? He does not contradict one
of our facts, but rather confirms them. It was the most

singular defence ever offered by a minister, and especially
by one in the responsible position of the noble lord. His
defence is this—lt is very true those representations were
made to me, but I thought nothing of them—that they were
mere threats, and I treated them with indifference. But
have those threats turned out to be mere threats—on the
contrary, have they not turned out to be grave events which
have been accomplished ; and I believe, notwithstanding the
prospect the noble lord held out to us, they are on the eve of
completion. (Hear, hoar.) What are we to think, then,
of a Minister who treats those intimations as mere insincere
threats—turn out to be grave, well-considered, and mo-
mentous information on a subject of the highest policy. To
my mind it implies a want of perception. I say that from
July to the end of January, when that almost solitary de-
spatch was written—so far as a despatch expressing a policy
is concerned—the noble lord was completely or ought to
have been entirely aware that the policy of the French Go-
vernment was, that if Sardinia was to be aggrandised by
the annexation of the duchies and Tuscany, as a matter of
course France would demand annexation to herself of Savoy
and Nice. With that information before him, I say the
noble lord pursued a policy which favoured and assisted
the aggrandisement of Sardinia, and to that degree and in
that manner the noble lord was inevitably carrying out and
pursuing the policy of France in respect to the extension of
its present frontiers. This appears to me to be quite unac-
countable. At any rate it has not received any answer from
the noble lord, or from the first Minister. I also inquired why
the noble lord devised a policy for the settlement of Italy at
the commencement of the month of January, which was re-
corded in the four propositions—why, when those proposi-
tions were communicated to the great powers, the noble lord
did not communicate at the same time the cognisance which
he had of the inevitable policy of the French Government, if
the scheme expressed in the four proposals were successfully
realised in Italy. Upon that point we have had no answer.
The great powers appear to have been left, so far as England
is concerned, completely in the dark. Indeed, there is one de-
spatch which has not been mentioned in the discussions of to-
night, namely, the despatch of the 6th of February, from
Lord Bloomfield to the noble lord, in which he stated that
the Prussian Minister, in a state of some anxiety, inquired
from the noble lord (of coarse having received information
from the Swiss Minister) what her Majesty's Government
had heard respecting the annexation ; what it was their in-
tention to do ; and Lord Bloomfield said there were no in-
structions from the noble secretary except this, that the
English Government had received no official, no formal
communication upon the subject, and, in fact, that therefore
the better thing would be to leave the matter alone. Now we
know what the noble lord meant by saying that he had re-
ceived no official communication, because his communications
were in private letters—those letters respecting which I im-
pressed upon the house the ether night the importance of
expressing some opinion as to their production. Private let-
ters are perfectly legitimate so long as they are private, but
they will bring the utmost confusion into public affairs if
public functionaries are permitted to fall back from public
despatches upon private communications. I say, then, that
on the second point on which I wished for information—
namely, why the noble lord in communicating with our allies
on the subject of Italy did not frankly inform them of what
would be the probable consequences if this policy were suc-
cessful as regards the expansion of the frontiers of France—
we have no explanation from the noble lord. We
have an explanation, or dissertation, from the First
Minister on the settlement of Italy instead of upon the an-
nexation of Savoy. The noble viscount takes a totally dif-
ferent view of the whole affair from that taken by his col-
league :—The reason Is by we took the course we did was that
we expected everything would be settled in Congress, and
therefore, as a Congress was expected, and as annexation
would not take place until Congress met, we thought it un-
necessary to express our opinion to the French Government,
to communicate to our allies and other Powers of Europe,
or to take any steps regarding a policy which was, in the
opinion of the Government, at least a most pernicious and
perilous policy, and which might be averted or counter-
acted. Such is the statement of the First Minister.
Let us now see what there is of solidity in the clif-
f...clic° betwocn tlao two noblo lords, and what
excuse there is in that ♦iew of the case for this ap-
parently unparalleled neglect. I can treat it as negligence
by using the lightest phrase. If the statement of the noble
lord be correct, when did the difficulty arise which made the
French Government first recur to the original policy of an-
nexation, and when did the idea first became prevalent that
congress would not take place. There is no doubt that it
was towards the end of November, when the difficulties
connected with carrying into effect the treaty of Zurich be-
came generally felt amongst all practical statesmen, tha t
Count Walewski intimated to the English Government that
in consequence of those difficulties and the preliminaries of
Villafranca not being carried out, it would be necessary for
the French Government to re-consider their position, and if
the result of doing so should be that Sardinia would be
greatly aggrandised by the annexation of several Italian
provinces, France must look to the annexation of Savoy and
Nice as necessary towards the completion of her military
frontier. Ido not believe there is a sane man, or one
among all the statesmen who were cognisant of the real
state of affairs, who believed that the idea du congress be-
fore the end of December was not utterly impracticable.
What were the steps taken then ? The First Minister
dwells upon the congress as the cause which was to absolve
the Government from the consequences of their negligence.
We know by the records before us that at the end of De-
cember or early in January the greatest anxiety prevailed
in Europe upon the subject. The Swiss Government took
every passible step to bring their anxious views before our
Government, but I do not find that we took any steps in
consequence to re-assure Switzerland or to influence France,
or to lay before her those considerations of a high and pure
morality of which the First Minister had been so exuberant
to -night. (Cheers.) I want to knew whether the Queen's
Ambassador, or the Secretary of State, or any one
in authority or influence, was authorised to lay
before the Emperor those considerations militating
against his intended policy which the noble lord ex-
pressed to-night, and for which he received the ap-
probation of the house ? We have no evidence of it.
There is no evidence that a single thing was done during the
six weeks until Jan. 27th. Wo know now from private let-
ters that Count Walewski was frank and sincere in his ex-
planations of his policy to our Government, although the
noble Secretary treated it as mere rumour and idle menace.
The Swiss Government took every possible means, with the
great energy and perseverance characteristic of the race, to
bring the proposed fate of their country before the English
Government. We know well that apparently her Majesty's
Minister in Paris was not wanting, and that even when
Lord Cowley was absent our charge d'affaires wrote a de-
spatch—not a common despatch, but one which in 24 hours
ought to have been responded to in a manner that would
have influenced the opinion of the Court at which he was a
resident. But I see nothing until a few days before Parlia-
ment met, and then I find a despatch from Lord Cowley,
who, seeing the storm that was rising, and referring to what
he described as interpellatiens in both Houses of Parlia-
ment, and knowing that, although he had warned the Mi-
nister frequently, his warnings had been expressed in docu-
ments which it would not be parliamentary to refer to, abso-
lutely did that which, as far as my experience goes, is un-
known, and referred for his vindication in a public despatch
to his private letters. (Hear, hear) An ambassador must
be hard pressed indeed and a Minister must be in a peculiar
position to be driven to take such a step as this. A few
days before Parliament met we had this high-sounding de-
spatch, and we have had high-sounding despatches before.
We remember the Russian war and the circumstances which
led to that war. There was a great secret disclosed then
which might not, but for an accident, have been revealed
for 50 years—l allude to the communication which took
place between the late Emperor and Sir H. Seymour. What
happened then ? We then had the history of the last of
the De Medicis and the war of succession over again, and
that despatch, written with so much literary ability, did
not prevent the Russian war, and we ought to take warn-
ing by it—that a rhetorical despatch is not a spe-
cific against an impending war, if there are causes
which render that war imminent. So far as this discus-
sion is concerned, arising from the observations I made on
Friday night, I sum it up in this way, that with ample in-
formation as to the intentions of the French Government,
in case of the aggrandisement of Sardinia, to annex Savoy
to the French empire, the Queen's Government took no
step whatever to influence the French Government to adopt
a contrary policy to the one they had pursued, but they pur-
sued a policy in Italy which necessarily led to annexation.
Well then, sir, we have received no information upon the
second point as to whether, when the Government commu-
nicated formally their plan for the settlement of Italy, the
French Government did not simultaneously communicate
to them the fact that the adoption of that policy must
necessarily bring about the annexation of Savoy to France.
We have had no answer to that question to-night, though
we have had the reply of the two most eminent men in the
Ministry. Now, sir, what has been the conduct of France
upon this question ? Whenever we have made inquiry upon
the matter the noble lord the Foreign Secretary has told us
that these questions might kayo a Very pernicious effee

upon our relations with our near neighbour, and the noble
lord has denounced these inquiries as prejudicial to the
public interests, and that it would be more statesmanlike to
inquire into the subject in a more formal manner. (Hear,
hear.) If the noble lord had got up in his place and had
said that a discussion on this annexation could not take

place without serious injury to the public interests, and if
he had appealed to the patriotic forbearance of the Opposi-
tion, then, so far at least as I am concerned, not a word
from that time would have issued from my lips. (Hear,
hear.) But the noble lord laid the papers upon the table,
and he thereby solicited the opinion of the house. There
may be gentlemen in this house who consider the conduct
of the French Emperor as alarming to Europe, and that it
ought to be resisted by the Great Powers of Europe, but
those hon. gentlemen did not sit on that (the Opposition)
side of the house. Well, the noble lord has placed the
papers upon the table of the house, and I never know that
there was any other meaning in that other than that it
was intended to invite inquiry into the conduct of the Go-
vernment, but not necessarily to pass a censure upon the
Government. It seems now that the taste of the present
Government is always in the extreme, they desire our ap-
proval or our censure. (Hear.) But the House of Com-
mons have a duty to fulfil ; if upon reading the papers
placed before them they find them imperfect, obscure, or
involved in mystery, and if any part required explanation,
they were bound to take the usual parliamentary means of
making the inquiry sufficient—(hear, hear)—and I am not
aware that any other means have been taken up to this time
than those which the custom of Parliament allows in en-
deavouring to obtain more accurate information than yet
placed on the table of the house. (Hear.) Well, then, sir,
let us look at our relatiens with France, and see whether
there is any danger of those relations being prejudiced in
consequence of this apprehended annexation of Savoy and
Nice. I said the other night, and I repeat it to-night, that
so far from the conduct of the French Government to-
wards the English Government and the English nation
on this matter of annexation is concerned, it has been a
frank, candid, and a sincere policy—(hear, hear)—nothing
to complain of as regards the conduct of France ; and I
cannot see that there is any cause of quarrel with
France. (Hear, hear.) The French Government have
given timely and repeated notice of their Emperor's
policy, and they have told our Government that if Sar-
dinia were aggrandised, France must annex Savoy and
Nice. There was a notion prevalent after the treaty of Zurich
that that aggrandisement would not take place, and then
France said she would renounce her policy. Among the
latest documents we find that France expressed her inten•
tion, if the settlement of Italy as then contemplated should
take place in the spirit of that treaty, viz., that if the duchies
should be annexed, to renounce the policy to which she had
previously referred. I want to know then what cause of quar-
rel we have with France ? May all powers, I say, behave
towards us with the same frankness and candour. France
said distinctly that if Sardinia were aggrandised it would be
inevitable that she should not be restricted to her present
frontier ; and yet with that knowledge the Foreign Minister
of this country favoured the policy which he knew would
inevitably lead to that result. (Hear, hear.) It might be
better for England that Sardinia should be a more powerful
state, and that France should have her frontier extended,
but the Government could not now turn round and denounce
France for annexing the Sardinian provinces, when she had
month after month told them that their policy would inevit-
ably lead to this result if an addition of territory were made
to Sardinia. (Hear.) Therefore I say, sir, these are not dis-
cussions which will tend to irritate the French Emperor or
the French nation, but they will tend to injure somebody
else. (Hear.) I think we ought to remove this bugbear from
our minds. Do not let us be thwarted by the Goyernmentfrora
expressing our opinion on the subject, which is one of unpa-
ralleled importance to this country, and a discussion upon it
ought not to be stifled by the Government. (Hear.) The
noble lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has been brood-
ing over the affairs of Italy ever since his first visit to that
country, and he should, therefore, have matured his arrange-
ments with more facility. He might say that it is a very
serious thing that Savoy and Nice should belong to France;
but on the other hand we might add that we are in the hands
of eminent statesmen, who by their ceaseless labours, by their
happy vigilance, and by their blending of courage and dis-
cretion, have secured a free and independent Italy. But
no, said the noble lord, we have nothing to do with it. Then
was the noble lord justified in sending his proposals to
France and all the other great Powers, in the hope that he
could influence the conduct of those Governments ? (Hear,
hear.) I say, then, that it is not the English Government
that can complain of the want of candour of the French Go-
vernment, or of the policy which the Emperor has pursued.
But what is this policy ? The noble lord the Secretary for
Foreign Affairs is astonished that the House of Commons
should notice this point, and he says the questions are irri-
tating, and that repeated discussions are perilous to the
peace of Europe, and the noble lord did that which is cer-
tainly peculiar to him—he lost his temper, and he tells us
that these discussions are not to be tolerated—that the
House of Commons should not inquire into the policy which
has been so strongly described by the Government. There
is nothing in the records of England which could convey to
the country that something is pending—that there is some-
thing which is likely to endanger the peace of Europe—
than the description given by the Secretary of State as to
this intended policy of France. The noble lord's description
of it has been heard to-night from that celebrated despatch
which is fresh In everybody's mind, and the noble lord has
expressed the view of the Government upon the subject,
and the noble lord the First Minister has expressed himself
in language calculated to impress Parliament and the coun-
try that a crisis might be at hand. Is it to be expected,
then, that the House of Commons should be silent ? The
noble lord having denounco the policy of the Emperor
members would come down to the house and put questions
to him ; and I look forward to Friday with great alarm, in
consequence of the notices which will be placed on the
paper, to inquire whether affairs are less alarming. In
conclusion I think the policy of the Emperor of the French,
' in reference to the natural boundaries of empires requires
the constant attention of the country. I think it is a policy
' of very great danger, and if this principle of natural boun-
daries be countenanced there will be despair and distrust in
Europe, and if there should be sanguinary war—if empires
should be overthrown, and if dynasties should be subverted
her Majesty's Government, which had assisted that policy,
will be responsible to the country and to history.
Mr. KINGLAKE said he did not intend to trouble the
house but with a few observations. He agreed with the
right hon. gentleman in thinking that the tendency of this
discussion had been not to increase the venom which seemed
to be infused in former discussions upon the subject, but to
remove it. (Hear, hear.) Much of what had fallen from the
noble viscount was extremely gratifying. He understood
the noble viscount to say that he understood that when the
Emperor promised to consult the great Powers of Europe
it was made in its natural sense, and therefore they might
hope that the annexation of the provinces was an event
which would not take place without the assent of the
Powers which were interested in them. If that were the
case there was an end of all discussion on the subject.
What they had maintained was, that this annexation would
be extremely dangerous if made without the consent of the
great Powers. He could not help saying that the noble
lord at the head of the Government seemed inclined to put
a more favourable construction upon the conduct of the
Emperor of the French than upon that of members of that
house. The Government had taken upon themselves to
impute to members that they were in favour of a war po-
licy. For his part he indignantly repelled an accusation of
that kind. No man would feel more than he did the hor-
rors of war. (Hear, hear.) The noble viscount told them
the policy of the Emperor was the policy of peace, and then
he proceeded to say that the war which took place last year
was no exception to that policy of peace. Ho had waited
with great curiosity to know how the noble lord would jus-
tify that statement ; it was by asserting that the war which
did take place was a noble enterprise. He supposed the
meaning was that that aggression on the part of the Emperor
of the French was a lawful idea, and that therefore it de-
served the applause of England. He (Mr. Kinglake) did not
agree with that view. He thought that 'fever there was a war
which began in cold blood the war which was commenced last
year by the Emperor of the French deserved that descrip-
tion. The noble lord had treated this question as if we were
bound at the outset of any discussion with a foreign power
to make up our minds whether or no the discussion was to
end in war, a doctrine which he (Mr. Kinglake) contended
was contrary not only to diplomatic usage but also to the
general habits of mankind. Ho most emphatically pro-
tested against such a doctrine. To put thus the alternative
of war to a foreign country was offensive and inadmissible,
whereas if you did not mean it your negotiations were de-
prived of all power. He must say that although he ap-
proved of much of the language of the noble lord the Secre-
tary for Foreign Affairs, he could not but observe that when
he came to compare the published correspondence with
events he was struck with the want of reality in that cor-
respondence, as presented to the house. What he meant
was this, that the language used by our Secretary of State
had not produced its natural results. (Hear.) The noble
lord had, it was true, remonstrated in strong and vigorous
language, and front that it might have been hoped that
there would be concession to his demands, or else counter-
arguments, or at all events irritation. But in this corre-
spondence there was neither acquiescence, nor counter-ar-
gument, nor irritation. It was treated, in short, as null,
and did not seem to have been noticed by the French Go-
vernment. The only observation the French Government
seemed to have made was that there was a great deal of
force in the arguments, but he thought they might be an-
swered. Subsequently the Emperor addressed his Cham-
bers, and announced, without comment, his intention of an
vexation. Some explanation of this singular circumstance
was, however, given by the discussion of that evening, as ho
now understood from both noble lords that the result of the
transaction was that in July the Secretary for Foreign
Affairs strongly protested against the annexation of Savoy
and Nice, and was told that the project had been abandoned,
but that afterwards, when it became probable that Central
Italy would be annexed to Piedmont, it seemed to have been
fairly enough intimated to him that is that case the Emperor
would revert to the annexation idea. But then the noble
lord had said that as the accession of these provinces was
only a contingency, he thought it his duty to abstain from
making any protest. The result was completely to alter
our position with regard to France. The Emperor said he
had all along declared his intention, and that under thee,

circumstances the Government of England remained silent.
He (Mr. Kinglake) had promised that he should only make
a few comments on the observations, and ho had now only
to thank the house for their attention.
_ _

Mr. S. FITZGERALD had found the speech of the First
Minister more satisfactory than that of the Secretary of
State, because the former had given up the position that
discussions on this question might lead to serious conse-
quences, and that no one should commence them unless he
was prepared to bring forward a vote of censure. The noble

lord now admitted that:they 'might discuss this question
without any very dangerous consequences. He found, how-
ever that they could not have any discussion likely to in-
fluence the result, as that before the motion of the hon.
member for Bridgewater came on the annexation trans-

action would have been completed. The correspondence
which had been laid on the table seemed to place the noble
lord the member for London in a false position ; for whilst
nobody believed that the noble lord would wilfully mislead
the house, yet the manner in which private letters and pub-
lic correspondence were mixed up was such that it had been
impossible for the noble lord to answer the question put to
him at the commencement of the session by the right hon.
member for Buckinghamshire. The noble lord, then, re-
ferring to the commuuication of July, said that the annexa-

tion project had been given up; whilst the private letter
which had since transpired hinted strongly and frequently
at annexation. He (Mr. Fitzgerald) hoped that for the
future no private letters would be mixed up with official cor-
respondence. In other respects he thought that the Govern-
ment had by their conduct earned strong disapprobation.
First of all as to the position in which they had put us
with regard to France. France was so placed as to be al-
most in the right, and our Government in the wrong.
France had always said that in certain contingencies it
would be necessary for her to possess Savoy, and further
that we gave our implied consent to the annexation by
urging on the aggrandisement of Sardinia, which was the
contingency contemplated. The First Minister had that
night expressed a sanguine hope that the projected annexa-
tion would not be persisted in, but it must be observed that
from the commencement her Majesty's Government had
expressed an extraordinary facility of conviction. The F-
oreign Secretary was convinced that the great Powers would
be consulted, and the First Lord had made the same state-
ment, but since then they had found that the transaction
was only to be explained to them. Nobody now believe that
their consent was to be asked. So it was with other cases—
with the municipality and the Sardinian Parliament—all
allusion to which was left out in the despatch published 11
the Ilioniteur. The noble lord the member for London, in
his despatch to Lord Bloomfield, gave the latter little en-
couragement to obtain a remonstrance from the court of Ber-
lin, whilst to Sir J. Crampton or Lord A. Loftus there were
no letters at all. He (Mr. Fitzgerald) had only further to
express his hope that nobody would say thatthe expressions
which had been used that night were calculated to irritate
the French people, or to insult their Government. He could
only say that he had never used a term expressive of other
than respect, and as to the policy of the Government his
language had never been half so etrong as that of the noble
lord opposite. He did not think, therefore, that it lay in the
mouth of the noble lord to say that irritating language had
been used on that side of the house.
Mr. B. OSBORNE said that if the language used to-
night by the noble lord the First Minister was more satisfac-
tory to the hon. member for Horsham, the language of the
hon. member must also be considerably more satisfactory to
the noble lord. (Hear, hear.) But he (Mr. Osborne) could not
permit the hon. member to take advantage of so short a
memory and to make an apologetic speech. The. hon. mem-
ber was the man who, only a few nights ago, wanted no
figures of rhetoric ; he was for re-animating the Holy Alli-
ance. (No, no.) He had been that night thrown over and
discarded by his backers, but on a former night he had de-
nounced the Frenek Emperor by name. (Ns, no.) The
fact was that the Irish element was much too strong in the
ex-Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, but he had been
put aside by the right hon. gentleman of his party who had
spoken that evening, and now was overflowing with respect
for the Emperor of the French. He took the view in con-
tradistinction to that taken the other night by the hon.
member for Horsham. He regretted that the hon. gentle-
man had brought forward the subject in this manner. He
thought the Emperor of the French stood acquitted of any
deceit in these transactions. He thought no man could read
these despatches and have any right to accuse the Em-
peror of playing any deceit—(hear)—and if there had been
any deceit in these transactions, he thought our good friends
the Sardinians were to blame for it. lie thought that the
prjAciple of intervention, which he was sorry to see we were
r;nher rashly rushing into, was the cause of that little epi •
sode. But when they talked of disrespecting the treaty of
1815, he asked who had ever treated it with greater disre-
spect that the noble lord (Lord Palmerston)? The noble lord
committed the greatest outrage on that treaty, for he re-
joiced on every occasion that Lombardy was taken from
Austria. The right hon. gentleman the member for Bucks
mentioned the annexation of Cracow, but that was a great
mistake, for the annexation of Cracow took place so far
back as 1836.
Mr. DISRAELI—No ; in 1840.
Mr. OSBORNE—At all events a debate on it took place
in 1836. The annexation of Cracow was clearly a disruption
of the treaty of 1815. Every nation, for its own purposes,
had put its foot on this treaty of 1815. He did net think
this country had any right to interfere in the annexation ?f
Savoy. He believed the real thing was that they were afraid
of France going to the R hine. If they had ne confidence in
the Emperor why did they enter into such intimate alliances
with him ? (Hear, hear.) He believed the whole mistake
was this—we had a certain number of statesmen in this
country who have an ardent desire to raise up a great king-
dom in Central Italy. 11,3 (Mr. Osborne) had the greatest
admiration for the Italians, but he was not blind to the diffi-
culties of our statesmen interfering in the cause of the Ita-
lians. If the Italians could build up their own indepen-
dence well and good, but the more we interfered the greater
handle we were giving to the French Emperor for ag-
grandisement. He was surprised at noble lords and hon.
gentlemen believing in Emperors issuing proclamations on
going to war for an idea. To be sure language was of great
importance, especially when you were addressing soldiers.
He never supposed it could be for the interest of France,
which was not a constitutional country, to erect a consti.•
tutional kingdom at her own gate without some strategic
compensation. (Hear, hear.) But he should never suppose
that England was going to play her game by erecting a
kingdom in Central Italy. He could not help remarking
the change of opinion upon the opposite benches, and most
wisely too, because, from the language indulged in the other
night by hon. member for Horsham—
Mr. S. FITZGERALD—Repeat it. (A laugh.)
Mr. OSBORNE could repeat both the language and the
manner, too. No man in theithouse who heard that speech
but must know that it was the speech of a man who was
following the instructions of his party, and took it with all
his heart. He was glad the right hon. member for Bucks
had disowned the language of his under-secretary ; and he
hoped that in future discussions the same wise and states-
manlike spirit would be observed as that which characterised
the leader of the opposition on this occasion. (Hear.)
Lord J. RUSSELL—I have a few words to say at the
end of this debate. I cannot but remark that the hon. gen-
tleman the member for Horsham has made a statement this
evening very different to that he made the other night, be-
cause then I understood him to say there ought to be a
solemn protest addressed on the part of the powers of Eu-
rope, and that that protest should be collective.
Mr. FITZGERALD—I never said anything of the
kind.
Lord J. RUSSELL—I recollect the hon. gentleman
using the words, "A solemn protest on the part of Eng-
land."

Mr. FITZGERALD—Hear, hear.
Lord J. RUSSELL—I could not help expressing then, as
protest
yopinionngi that hi
wouldnatt
into
if
effect
ffh e
oe
be pt
veryeww h e
what
stot
they
difficultE
proposed,
for p e
them were
ntlooetmxtpoarkienes
insist
nsstootiwl solemn I Inn
and very difficult for the Emperor to yield to a protest that
would look very much like a threat. (Hear, hear.) That
was the view he took then • but he has now changed his
tone. It seems to me the right hon. gentleman the member
for Bucks has transformed this question very much. I never
heard that her Majesty's Government had brought any
charge against the Government of the Emperor of the French
of deceiving us. A statement appears in Lord Cowley's de-
spatches, in which he said he had often heard Count Walew-
!id express an opinion, that if this plan—which he thought
impossible—could ever succeed, in that case Savoy would
be annexed. Lord Cowley goes on to say—" I never said
such a proposal would be approved by her Majesty's Go-
vernment." There is certainly no charge in Lord Cow-
ley's despatches of deeeit on the part of the French Go-
vernment. On the contrary Lcrl Cowley did receive com-
munications from Count Walewaki, but he did not think it
prudent to write despatches about them. We might have
written despatches week after week, and I might have been
saying to the French Government that if the annexation
were proposed we would object to it, and the French Govern-
ment might have gone on replying that if a certain event
happened he would require Savoy. Ido not think if we had
done so it would have made any difference at all, because the
question was a practical one, and our opinions were known.
If the congress had met it would have been discussed, or
would have been soon afterwards. The hon. member for
Horsham says, we ought to have sent copies of the despatches
to Berlin,Vienna, and St. Petersburg. Well, that is the very
course I have taken. (Hear, hear.) If the hon. gentleman
had waited till to-morrow, ho would find I have done what he
says I ought to have done; but he is too quick at censur-
ing, and blames me for not doing the thing that I have
done. But what have I not thought proper to do is, to ask
those powers to conform their language to ours, and to
enter into anything like an alliance or combination which
might seem hostile is the Emperor. With regard to the
French despatch, I certainly cannot inform him what it
contains. It has arrived to-day, but it has not yet been
put into my hands, and I cannot say what form it may take.
But there is another thing which the right hon. gentleman
the member for Bucks goes upon, and is always repeating,
although he carefully veils his meaning. 'He says that this
proposed annexation of Savoy is brought on because we will
persist on the policy of making a great kingdom in Central
Italy, and annexing Tuscany to Sardinia. I endeavoured to
explain to the right lion. gentleman that we endeavoured to
prevent force being used, and. that there is but ono prac-
tical way by which, if successful, we might prevent annex-
tion altogether, and that was by saying to the Emperor of
the French that he made very unreasonable objections.
When you oppose the use of force in Central Italy, let
your troops withdraw, and let the Austrians enter, and they
will be able to restore the Grand Dukes and the Romagnas
to the Pope, and then there would be no question of an-
nexation. That is the real meaning of the right hon. gen-
tleman's proposition, though he does not avow it as his
opinion. We have preferred to let the Italians take their
own course as to annexing themselves to Sardinia. They
have done so ; and they have chosen to annex themselves
to Sardinia.

PETERBOROUGH ELECTION.
Mr. GEORGE, chairman of the Peterborough Eloction
Committee, declared Mr. G. H. Whalley to be duly elected
for that city.