The Sun.
London, England, 1860-07-06 00:00:00

BOMBARDMENT OF NAPLES.

Colonel STUART asked the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs whether her Majesty's Government have
taken, or are prepared to take, any steps in concert with
the French Government, to prevent the bombardment of
Naples by the King's troops, in the event of General Gari-
baldi's saddenly occupying that city as he did Palermo ?
Lord J. RUSSELL—In answer to the hon. and gallant
gentleman, I may say that, after the intelligence of the out-
rages which accompanied the bombardment of Palermo, the
question was taken into consideration what her Majesty's
Government could do in order to prevent similar atrocities
taking place at Messina and Naples. But with respect to
the question put by the hon. and gallant member, there are
two considerations which must guide the Government on
the subject. The ono is, that it would bo a direct interfe •
rence with the civil and internal discord of another coun-
try. (Hear, hear.) And even supposing that objection, on
principle, to be got over, it would not only be difficult but
impossible to give such precise and definite orders to the
commanding officers of her Majesty's vessels of war as to
enable them to distinguish between that which would be
the legitimate defence of the royal troops against the at-
tack of a mob or an insurrection and a wanton and atro-
cious destruction of the city and the lives of its inhabitants.
Such being the case, we refrained altogether from giving
any orders which would enable our naval commanders to
act by force either at Naples or Messina ; but we did make
strong remonstrances to the Government of the King of
Naples against any renewal at Messina or Naples of the
dreadful scenes.which took place at Palermo. (Hear, hear.)
I am happy to say, however, that the accounts I have re-
ceived from her Majesty's Minister at Naples lead me to
think there is no prospect at present of such a bombardment
taking place. He informs me that he does net think it at all
probable, and he hopes that no insurrection whatever will
occur at Naples. The hon. and gpant gentleman is aware
that great changes have taken place in the Government of
Naples—(laughter)—that the constitution of 1848 is pro.
c'aimed, and an election is to take place for the representa-
tives of the assembly which will meet in September; and
the Neapolitans will thus be enabled to decide what shall
be their own future political condition. (Hear.) I may
mention that the rumours which have frcm time to time
sbeen circulated respecting the conduct of her Majesty's
forces and Ministers abroad have often been very erroneous.
There was a report some time ago, the house will remember,
that the fort of C4stellamare had been occupied by the Bri-
tish admiral during the evacuation of Palermo by the Nea-
Viten troops. That report gave great uneasiness in some
Zreigu quarters, and it was supposed that her Majesty's
„4, were about to take possession of Sicily. There is not
111 temt foundation whatever for that report. (Hear.) There
/t" an°l`ber reportwhich occasioned some inquiry in another
Places to the effect that her
Majesty's Minister at Naples had
taken aPart ia advising that the two vessels which had been
captured by the
the Neapslitan Goveruiraitan cruisers should be given up by
I have a despatch from
her Majesty's Minute, 8.-tenNta Now,l
in which he says he has
just heard of the report, and
Rdptehesfauirtthhere is not the smallest
foundation for it,
had,
that he had no
right to take such a comae, and that iffr adexidhe had no inten•
tion of exercising such right. lie also
those yes-
-4o
that the Nea-
politan Government had spontaneously given
sels, and that they were at liberty to return to uMR. DUNCOMBE'S MOTION. Genoa,
Lord FERMOY suggested to the hon. member for Fins
Lary' (Mr. T. Duncombe) not to press his motion, of which
he had
given notice yesterday, as an amendment to the
resolutions of the noble lord (Lord Palmerston), but to Bub
4
mit the same as an amendment—a course which wonl
have the approval of other hon. members like himself
(Lord Fermoy).
Mr, T. DUNCOMBF said that as he could not ealcu-
Sato otl ttts support of Liberal wenabers, be would with-

draw his amendment, much to the dissatisfattion of the

country at large.

THE RESOLUTIONS.
Lord PALMERSTON then rose, amidst loud cheers) to
move the following resolutions

" 1. That the right of granting aide and =- pplies to the
Crcwn is in the Commons alone, as an essent 1 part of their
Constitution, and the limitation of all sa h grants, as to
the matter, manner, measure, and time, ii • nly in them."
" 2. That although the Lords have exercised the power
of rejecting bills of several descriptions relating to taxation,
by negativing the whole, yet the exercise of that power
by them has not been frequent, and is justly regarded by
this house with peculiar jealousy, as affecting the right of
the Commons to grant the supplies, and to provide the ways
and means for the service of the year.
"3. That to guard for the future against an undue
exercise of that power by the Lords, and to secure to the
Commons their rightful control over taxation and supply,
this house has in its own hands the power so to impose
and remit taxes, and to frame Bills of Supply, that
the right of the Commons as to the matter,
manner, measure, and time, may be maintained inviolate."
The noble lord said—Mr. Speaker, I rise upon an occasion
which undoubtedly will rank as the first in importance
among those which have taken place with regard to our par-
liamentary proceedings—(cheers)—because there can be
nothing, I think, of greater importance to the country than
questions which relate to the respective rights, privileges,
and practices of the two Houses of Parliament. (Hear.)
But, before I address myself to the subject, I wish to per-
form a duty—to call the attention of the house to that re-
port which has been presented to them by the committee
whom they appointed to investigate and examine the jour-
nals and the authorities of both houses bearing upon the
question, a document, I think, which contains a summary
of parliamentary practice that will prove a lasting source of
advantage to the house in regard to its proceedings; and I
should fail to express what I am sure was the opinion of
that committee of which I have the honour to be a mem-
ber, if I did not state to the house how thankful they felt,
how indebted they were to the right hon. gentleman who
was chairman of the committee—(sheers)—and to the offi-
cers of this house who gave us their willing and assiduous
assistance in the performance of our labours. (Hear, hear.)
And I am satisfied that the house will respond to the com-
mittee by returning their sincere thanks and acknowledging
their obligations, both to the right hon. gentleman the
member for the University of Cambridge and to those offi-
cers of the house by whose assistance we were enabled to
proceed with our inquiry.- (Hear.) Sir, the question at issue
involved considerations of the utmost constitutional import-
ance. Our constitution consists of authorities separate from
and independent of each other, each possessing rights and
powers which it may exercise on its own authority. In the
early periods of our history it was not so. If we go back to
very remote periods we shall find that the Lords—that is to
say the barons—were powerful enough to overrule the
Crown ; and by their exertions, by their courage, by their
perseverance, and by their public spirit and their patriot-
ism, they obtained for us the great and fundamental charter
of our liberties. (Hear.) There came then a conflict, which
lasted for a great length of time, between the Crown and the
barons. The Crown, in the end, prevailed, and established
an arbitrary power, which ground down and controlled the
liberties of the nation,snd which at last became an intoler-
able burden. The excessive use of an excessive power
created resistance. The nation rose against the power of
the Crown, and in resisting the arbitrary and excessive au-
thority of the Crown it not only overthrew the Crown, but
involved in its ruin the other estate of the kingdom. Well,
sir, the humour of the country did not long adapt itself to
that state of things. The power of the Crown was restored ;
and again restored to be again abused; and again the abuse
of excessive authority produced its natural result. The
Crown was overthrown—that is to say that those who
exercised the power of the Crown were overthrown by
the very excess in the amount of their power, and the un-
checked and uncontrolled nature of that power. Then came
about that state of things under which this nation has ever
since happily lived and flourished—(cheers)—and under
which it has enjoyed a greater amount of cis il, political.
social, and religious liberty than perhaps ever fell to the lot
of any nation of the world. (Cheers.) But how has that
result been accomplisbed ? Not by vesting in any one of
the three estates—the Crown, the Lords, and the Commons
—an exclusive or overruling power. It has been brought
about by maintaining for each its own separate and inde-
pendent authority, by those three ;powers combining to-
gether to bear and forbear—to endeavour by harmonious
concert to avoid those conflicts and clashings which must
have arisen if independent authority had been exerted by
each and all ; and the result has been what we now so hap-
pily and fortunately see around us. I say that each retains
its power—that two possess the power of originating laws,
and that the third possesses the power in common with the
other of rejecting laws proposed for its acceptance. It is
generally supposed that the power of rejection by the crown
has ceased to exist, but that is a fundamental error. That
power exists as before, but it is exercised in a different
manner. Instead of being exercised upon the measures
proposed for the Royal assent, it is exercised by anticipa-
tion in the debates and the discussions of the two houses of
Parliament. It is delegated to those who are the respon-
sible advisers of the Crown, and it is not possible that a
measure passed by the two houses of parliament should be
presented to the Crown and by the Crown should be re-
jected and refused. And why? Because it cannot be ima-
gined that a law should have received the consent of both
houses of parliament, in which the responsible ministers of
the Crown aro sitting, debating, and voting, unless those
who had advised the Crown had agreed to the measure,
and were prepared, therefore, to counsel the Crown
to assent to it. What would be the consequence
if any other course were pursued? Why, if the mea-
sure were passed by the two houses of parliament,
against the will and opinions of the ministers of the
day, these ministers must naturally resign their offices, and
be replaced by those under whose advice Parliament had
acted. If that were not the case, I think the two houses
would very soon intimate to the Crown their opinion with
regard to those advisers which would not leave any choice
as to the hands in which the confidence of the Crown should
be placed. I say then, that each branch of the legislature
retains its power of rejection, but the Commons House of
Parliament have claimed from time immemorial particular
privileges with regard to particular bills. We have claimed,
and justly claimed, as stated in these resolutions, the exclu-
sive right of determining matters connected with the taxa-
tion of the people. We have claimed to ourselves the righ*
of originating such measures; we have denied to the Lords
the right of originating such measures, and we have denied
to them the right of altering or amending them ; and those
assertions of right we have the power to enforce, because
in every case bills so originating in the Lords, or so amended
in the Lords, must come back to this house, and this house
has then an opportunity either to confer with the Lords,
and endeavour to persuade them to give up their decision,
or to reject the bill. In either case, therefore, wo have in
our own hands a clear, plain, straight, and direct method of
giving effect to the right which we claim, and which
naturally belongs to us. But in those memorable confer-
ences which took place between the two Houses of Parlia-
ment in 1671, it was admitted by the Attorney-General, on
behalf of the Commons—and for his conduct in those con-
ferences he was thanked by this h use, inasmuch as he had
satisfactorily maintained its rights and privileges—it was
admitted in those conferences on behalf of the Commons
that the Lords, although they could not originate, and
though they could not amend, had nevertheless the power
to reject money bills. (Loud Opposition cheers.) An ad-
mission which was no great concession, because, as I have
already stated, a bill rejected by the other house disappears;
it dues not come back to this house, and therefore,
directly at least, and immediately, no action is possible
on the part of this house, in regard to such bill; and conse-
quently, in admitting, as the House of Commons did at that
time, and afterwards in 1678, that the Lords had the power
of rejecting "in the whole"—that was the expression—the
house only admitted that which it would have been diffi-
cult to deny, and the denial of which, if made in a direct
and positive manner, it would have been impossible to put
in force. So matters stood at that time. Innumerable
cases have arisen in which bills connected with the imposi
tion of taxes on the people, having been amended by the
Lords and returned to us, have either been immediately re-
jected—even
in some cases, as is recorded, with marks of
contumely, or conferences have taken place, by means of
which the Lords have departed from their decision ; or, in
cases in which the amendment of the Lords had been
merely verbal, or unimportant, or calculated to further the
intentions of this house, those amendments have been
adopted, and adopted in other bills sent up to the House of
Lords, which were accordingly passed by them. But those
cases relate to bills imposing taxes. The present case is of
a different nature. (Hear, hear.) It is the case of a bill
for repealing a tax, and, therefore, when you admit the right
of the Lords to reject bills—if that concession was not ac- '
companied, as it was not, by any limitation as to the kind
of bills to which the admission applied—l say, that when
you concede to the Lords the power of rejecting bills, you can
only, in point of argunient, establish a distinction between
bills of a different kind ; but in fact, although we contend,
and justly contend, for a right which is interwoven with
the constitutional history of this country—although wo
contend for the right of originating grants of supply, or of
shaping them according to our belief of what is for the pub-
lic interest, yet, nevertheless, a bill so prepared, shaped, and
framed by us cannot pass into law without the assent of
the Lords; and it is clear that an authority whose assent is
necessary to give a proposal the force of law must, by the
nature of things, be at liberty to dissent and refuse its
sanction—(opposition cheers)—and to take from the Lords
the power of dissenting from a bill to which
their assent is necessary, would require an Act of Parlia-
ment, to which they must be parties, or else it would be a
revolutionary subversion of the existing constitution of these
realms. (Cheers.) But I say that, if we look to that large
number of precedents in which the Lords have sent back
with amendments bills sent to them from this house, and
on which bills conferences took place in which alterations
were made, we shall find, as I have already said, that in
that long string of precedents here brought before us, al-
though they almost entirely relate to bills imposing taxes
(and even in that precedent of 1671, in which conferences
took place by which that mutual right was conceded, that
conference
similar
having originated in the Lords trying to dimi-
nish a tax which was proposed to them), there did not arise
zh ca
011
miler to that which has recently occurred, in which
w. e Lords have refused to consent to the repeal of a tax.
then, I say that this great string of precedents is ,