The Sun.
London, England, 1860-06-13 00:00:00

Till& SUN, - LONDON, WEDNESDAYXEVENING, JUNE 13, 1860.

under his direction. These gunboats had been a shame and
disgrace to the country. They were told the contract was
that theyshould be built of sound timber. But no examination
of this matter had taken place up to this time. There was now
a committee sitting on them, and therefore he would say
nothing further about them. The hon. and gallant member
then:complained thali after the Russian war, on the return
of the fleet to this country, the men were turned adrift, and
the Admiralty had not, up to the present time, been able to
regenerate the navy. They were in want of petty officers,
and they could not get them. There had been no economy
in the course pursued. He implored the house to come to
some arrangement. If the Admiralty was well conducted,
no examination into the conduct of the Board could injure
it ; while, on the other hand, the inquiry would be a source
of great satisfaction to the country. They would know how
the fleet was managed. If the Board were guilty, of course
they would not submit to the appointment of a committee ;
but he trusted one would be ;granted, and that it would
make a searching ixquiry.
Mr. WARRE said he had come to the conclusion after
much consideration that it would not be advisable to press
this motionto a division; but if it were done, he should vote
against it. He believed the discussion of those questions
would be of considerable advantage to the public service,
and he did not think the suggestions of the right hon.baro-
net the member for Droitwich would be thrown away. He
thought that if other powers in Europe made costly and
large experiments in their navies, it would be absolutely ne-
cessary for this country to move with them pa7i passu. At
the same time it was his wish that the day might be far dis-
tant when they would be called upon to use these destruc-
tive arms against each other.
Sir J. ELPHINSTONE thought the discussion that had
taken place would answer all the purposes intended by the
gallant admiral. At the same time he thought the Admi-
ralty acted more on political principles than with a view to
promote the success of the naval service. The Admi-
ralty had jurisdiction over the tidal waters, and that
function was not always discharged with a view to the
rublic good. As to the ship-building department, cientific
men were of opinion that recently the ships were not
built as formerly, with a due regard to stowage. If that
department were thrown open to the public the country
would be better served. In steam machinery, also, the Ad-
miralty were not competent judges, and with respect to the
wood department, the board was highly culpable for not
having a sufficient quantity of seasoned timber always on
hand to meet any emergency. The surveying department
was most important, but conducted in a most imperfect
manner by means of the most wretched vessels. The trans-
ports were even more faulty. The comptroller of the navy
was the most important person in connexion with the Ad-
miralty, and yet he had no voice at the board. As to
whether a naval man or a civilian should be at the head of
the board was a matter of great difficulty, inasmuch as the
department was almost entirely of a political character.

Sir C. WOOD doubted whether a select committee of
that house would be fitted for making such an inquiry as
the one proposed. A commission would certainly be better
qualified for such a purpose, but he thought the board
itself should be left to do so. With reference to what had
been said about the objectionable timber being used in the
construction of the gunboats, he could say that with one
exception the contractors stated that they had the seasoned
timber which was required for building them. It was
necessary that these boats should have been built within a
certain time, and that being so he should have ordered
them to be built of the best timber that could be procured.
Putting in defective bolts was clearly a fraud, and as such
a defect might have led to loss of life, it was a crime also.
(Hear.) He had before stated to the house that he had
consulted the naval officers of the board as to the building
of these boats. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, as the
boats were built under an order from the board, and that
could not have been given without the sanction of the board.
The right hon. gentleman then stated that sheds were
built for the purpose of placing the gunboats under cover,
as it was considered it was better to do so than to keep
them in the water. As to appointments, he had never
made an appointment or promotion in his life without the
full concurrence of the board, and he never appointed or
promoted any one who was not, in his opinion, well quali-
fied for the office. He believed that upon the whole, it was
for the benefit of the public service that the First Lord of
the Admiralty should be a civilian, as he was the better able
to hold the scales even between the naval lords. As to ship-
building, that subject was always brought under the consi-
deration of the board, as the building must be done by the
order of the board. Ho might also mention that of the five
junior lords four were naval. There were already four or
five committees or commissions sitting upon the naval ser-
vice, , and, therefore, he did not see that any advantage
would arise from acceding to the present motion. As to giv-
ing the comptroller and the accountant-general seats at the
board, he could assure the house that if that were done, these
important officers would be quite unable to attend to their
respective duties at the dockyard. He had also a good deal
of experience of several boards, and he could safely affirm
that he did not know of any board in which business was
better performed than at the Board of Admiralty. (Hear.)
Lord LOVAINE was of opinion that some improvements
might be made in the constitution of the Board of Admiralty.
The changes that took place on changes of Administration
were not desirable, but he did not see how that could be
avoided. He hoped the Admiralty would not lose sight of
the necessity of making such improvements as might ap-
pear to be required. ._
Admiral SEYMOUR said in the navy a strong opinion
prevailed that there was a bias at the board wbiah was in-
jurious to the public service. In France the various de-
partments formed a committee acting under the Minister of
Marine, who was solely responsible, and who could deviate
from the recommendations of the committee as he thought
proper. He was of opinion that a civilian at the head of the
board was preferable, but he should be guided in naval
matters by the opinions of the naval lords. He did not ap-
prove of the necessity of naval lords having seats in that
house, as the presmace of the First Lord and the Secretary
of the board in Parliament was amply sufficient for every
purpose.

Admiral DUNCOMBE said he was bound to say that no
ono at the head of the Board of Admiralty could act with
greater impartiality than the noble duke now at its head.
He, however, thought that a naval man was best qualified
to preside as First Lord. He would not now press his mo •
tion further, and would withdraw it, with an intimation
that he would, in the next session of Parliament, bring the
constitution of the Board of Admiralty again Before the
house.

sequence of events that have taken.placeeeince, and longer
and more careful consideration, that my colleagues and my-
self have arrived at the conclusion that it is not expedient
to continue that separate local force. I wish to state be-
fore I go further what the chain acircumstances and argu-
ments were by which we arrived at this conclusion—not
only to relieve ourselves of the appearance of inconsistency;
but because the same arguments may weigh with others,
and tend to induce the same conclusions. When India
was governed by the Company this question was not
brought to my notice. The only military question con-
nected with India I had had to decide was the addition
of one regiment to the local force, which I assented
to with the concurrence of Lord Hardinge ; and the
substitution of irregular for some regular cavalry. I
have been asked whether the disposal of the officers of the
native army will not be an insuperable obstacle to
the change. Ido not think it will be, by placing
them on an unattached list of officers for S4taff appoint-
ments. Before this question of the amalgamation of the
Indian army could be brought to a decision the matter was
taken out of the hands of the Government. When last
June I was appointed to the office which I now have the
honour to hold I found that my noble friend who preceded
me had decided on maintaining a local army in India—
(hear)—to the extent of two-fifths of the maximum Euro-
pean force in that country, and I am not ashamed to con-
fess that I was extremely unwilling to distnrb the decision
in this respect at which my noble friend had arrived. I
well knew the singlemindedness with which he formed his
conclusions on all subjects connected with India which
came under his notice, and that he had carefully considered
this particular question. I felt, therefore, the strongest
anxiety to carry his views in the matter into effect.
I may, however, remind the house that at that
time the mutiny of the European troops in India
had been only recently reported in this country,
and that its more grave features had not been
brought to our knowledge. It was under these circum-
stances that I made the announcement in August last to
which I have referred. I then, as appears from the papers
which h6e been laid before the house, submitted to a
member of the Council of India who came over to this
country charged with the views of Lord Canning on the
subject, and who certainly is one of the ablest advocates of
the maintenance of a local army, the determination at which
my noble friend who preceded me in office had arrived on
the subject. I stated to Col. Durand that that determination
was to keep up the local army to the extent of two-fifths of
the maximum European force in India. Now, it is desira-
ble, as the house will not fail to perceive, that the amount
of that local army should not be a varying, but a fixed
amount, because any variable force would be more easily
kept up by sending out the Queen's troops to India, ac-
cording as their services might be required. I was, however,
in hopes—though my hopes were not perhaps quite so san-
guine on the point as those which others entertained—that
the European force in India might be diminished to an
extent which Ido not now deem expedient. I took the
maximum which General Hancock in his report suggested
should be 60,000, and I asked General Durand whether
24,000, the two-fifths of that number, would not be a suffi-
cient force to maintain. As will be seen by his letter, he
said that it must be a mistake to take that number as two-
fifths of all the force, the artillery being taken into account,
and concluded by observing that there was no alternative
between the adoption of Lord Canning's proposal, supported
in the main by the report of the committee, and a new act,
leaving it to the wisdom of Parliament, which would then
assume the responsibility to devise whatever it might deem
expedient. Now, Lord Canning's proposal was that there
should be an army of 80,000 Europeans, two-thirds of
which should constitute a local force. The military com-
mittee of the Council of India concurred substantially in
that view, fixing the total at 78,000 instead of 80,000, so
that I looked on Lord Canning's proposal :as being sup-
ported by the report of the military committee, and came to
) the conclusion that the local force, in accordance with the
opinions of its principal advocates, ought to amount to two-
thirds of whatever number of European troops we maintained
in India, whether that number were 40,000, the two-thirds
of 60,000, or 53,000 some odd hundreds, the two-thirds of
80,000. It was also contended that a small local force would
not occupy that equality of position as compared with troops
of the line, which everybody seemed to regard as indispensa-
ble. These views, I confess, took me somewhat by surprise,
and tended very much to shake my confidence in the pro-
priety of the determination which I had announced to the
house. While the question was pending a succession of let-
ters, extracts from which were laid on the table of the house,
arrived from India, pointing out how much more grave and
serious the conduct of the European troops who had muti-
nied was than had been supposed in the first instance. The
mutiny began to assume the appearance not of being the
work of young men who had just gone out to India, but
of an organised combination among their older comrades,
and this new aspect of affairs furnished ground for se •
rims consideration. In dealing with this subject, more-
over, the question of expense presented one of the greatest
difficulties. I myself was under the impression that the
additional expense of Queen's troops would be greater than
that of a local force. This, however, was a point with re-
spect to which it was not easy to procure any independent
expression of opinion, those who took opposite sides with
respect to it being disposed to regard each so entirely as
accurate their own facts and figures. I ultimately referred
to the Registrar-General under these circumstances, and
suggested that a civilian not likely tobe biassed by military
views should investigate the question. This report has
been laid upon the table, and the result is that
the additional expense of maintaining Queen's troops
) is found to be much less than the Indian authorities sup-
posed. In the course of the autumn we received accounts
of a number of men who took their discharge from the In-
dian army, and that in consequence that army was reduced
from being upwards of 24,000 to 12,000. The question, then,
which we then had to consider was not whether we should
maintain the Indian army such as it was, but whether we
should reform it, and raise a new army—not to the extent of
24,000 men, for that number would not be satisfactory to
the advocates of a local army—but to the extent of at least
40,000. Now, it seems to me that we may dismiss altogether
from our notice the proposal for maintaining a small local
army in India, which is a course which everybody who pays
regard to the efficiency of such a force seems to condemn.
That was the question which we had to consider last June
or July, but such is not the case at the present moment.
Circumstances have altered within the 10 or 11 months, and
we aro not therefore open to the charge of inconsistency, if
we have now come to a different decision from that at which
we some time ago arrived. I have made this brief statement
in order that the house may see the reasons by which our
policy has been guided, and I shall now proceed to state
more fully the grounds on which our decision is based. In
doing so I think I may avail myself at the outset of an ad-
' mission which was made in the discussion on the motion of
my hon. and gallant friend behind me, to the effect that a
priori the argumentis now in favour of our having a Queen's
army in India. During the period of the existence of the
Company's Government there were many reasons which
might be advanced in support of the maintenance of a
Company's army. It was many, years ago contended that
it was necessary the army should belong to the governing
power of the country, although even then many high au-
thorities differed on the subject. Since, however, the
transfer of power from the Company to the Queen has taken
place, I think the force of argument lies entirely the other
way. Dismiss altogether, for the reasons I have stated, the
idea of a small local force, I would ask whether it is desir-
able to raise in the same country and from the same class
two bodies of men upon the 'same principles, but ruled by
different authorities and guided by different forms of mili-
tary discipline. That is the first question which I call upon
the advocates of the maintenance of a local army to answer
in the affirmative, and if they cannot do so upon any rea-
sonable grounds then I contend the a priori argument is
against the view which they take. If, then, they are not
able to substantiate their view in this respect, they must
either show that the local reasons are so strongly in favour
of a double army as to counterbalance the general disad -
vantagse connected with such a system, or that it is impos-
sible to put an end without some degree of injustice
to the existing army as it stands. Now, lam prepared to
admit that much ought to be conceded to the wishes not
to be lost sight of in dealink with this question. The
prop osal is that they should be united to and form part of
the Imperial army. I admit fully nothing can be prouder
than the recollections of the old Indian army of the three
provinces ; but we propose that they should form part of an
army on the standards of which are emblazoned many of the
battles from which they derive their own renown. Seringa-
patam and Delhi are not only on the standards of the Indian
army; but on many of the standards of the English army:
Arcot and Plessey would be associated with the Peninsula
and Waterloo. I admit that the older officers are all for

the maintenance of the Indian army, but the younger
officers are in favour of amalgamation. Among the papers
you will see statements to that effect. I would beg to call
attention to the letters on the subject of Lord Elphinstone
contained in these papers, because they contain the most
reasonable and well-considered views on the whole question,
without any prejudice of any kind. 'What does Lord
Elphinstone say ? I was constantly in communication with
him on this subject, and in a letter to me Lord Elphinstone
says:— _

" With regard to the local army, I think that people in
this country, with the exception of a few of the senior
officers, aro fast coming round to the view I have always
taken'of the subject. If the local army has no exclusive
privileges and advantageA, it must of necessity sink into a
secondary and inferior force. The conviction is now forcing
itself upon the more intelligent of the local officers. They
see that in amalgamation with the British army lies their
only chance of continuing upon a footing of equality, or,
perhaps, I should say, of maintaining the superior status
which they have hitherto enjoyed."

The same observations are made by a very able and wall
known Indian officer in this country. I asked him, "What
do the officers in the army think of amalgamation'?"
He said, "Every officer above' the rank of a major is
for the continuance of the local army; of those under
that rank nine-tenths are for amalgamation." It is
not unnatural that the older officers should be attached to
the glorious recollections of the service with which they
were connected ; and, on the other hand, it is also natural
that the younger and more active officers should be glad to
have the chance of service in connection with their brothers
in arms elsewhere than in India; and why shonld'we damp
that spirit from which the efficiency
of our ft4ure army in
India is to be derived ? Wel17 now I must perform what

certainly is the most painful part of my duty to-night,
which is to call the attention of the house to some of the
extracts of the letters on the table, which I must say
appear to me to furnish the strongest grounds for the
course we are about to take. It would be exceedingly
unbecoming in me, a civilian, to venture to give an
opinion on the efficiency, or discipline, or conduct of a
regimenb of soldiers; but those most competent to form
such opinions have given them. They have influenced us,
and I think they ought to influence this house. I shall
give no opinion of my own ; I shall simply read extracts
from the letters which are before you, containing the
views of persons well acquainted with the circumstances,
well acquainted with the facts, well able to form an
opinion,'and which will, I have no doubt, have great weight
with this house. Of the gallantry, bravery, and endurance
of the Indian army no one has ever expressed a doubt; but
there does seem to be, I confess, a most unanimous con-
current testimony of all officers of the Queen's troops that
the discipline of the Indian army is not what it ought to be.
To a considerable extent that has been admitted by their
own officers. I don't mean by discipline being well set up,
or smartness on parade ; but I mean what has been so well
expressed by Sir john Lawrence when he said :
"While I admit that the tone and interior economy of a
royal regiment may on the average be somewhat superior
to that of a local regiment."
1 (Opposition cries of " Hear, hear.") All I seek to establish
by that extract is that the interior economy of a royal
regiment is superior to that of a local regiment. (Hear,
hear.) It is admitted that the discipline of a Queen's regi-
ment remaining long in India deteriorates to a considerable
extent. What does that prove ? It proves that there is
some cause acting upon both local and English regiments to
deteriorate the discipline of an army remaining long in
India, and it is not difficult to assign a reason. I use the
word discipline as the shortest. I mean by it the interior
economy of a regiment and the relation subsisting between
its officer and men. I believe it has been generally observed
that a local colonial corps which cannot come under the
general supervision of higher military authorities is apt to
degenerate, more especially if they serve in a climate where
exertion and energy are not likely to carry them on for a
very long time, unless under the stimulus of war.
Officers, after 10 or 15 years in India, are not so active and
energetic as they might have been in a cool climate, or had
they been in India for a shorter period. That this is the
case we have the direct testimony of Lord Elphinstone
again. He speaks both of the system of native and Euro-
pean forcei. He says :
" The same system, resulting in the total want, of influence
over their men by the regimental officers, has led to both
mutinies. The organization of the late Bengal army was
as faulty as its discipline was lax."
There could not be a more impartial witness on this subject
than Lord Clyde. He served in India and all parts of the
world, and was a most competent authority on military
matters. What does Lord Clyde say ?
" It is clear from what we have now seen that it is abso-
lutely necessary not to trust to local corps, and that we can
alone put faith in a discipline which is constantly renovated
by reliefs from England, and the presence of officers with
their regiments who look to them as their homes."
Sir J. Outram says—
" So bad has been the system of promotion to commands,
and of selections for staff appointments in the local British
force, that the only wonder is that any discipline at all is
maintained."
In a letter to the Duke of Cambridge he says—
"As your Royal Highness knows, I have always been
strongly of opinion that it is impossible, as shown by prac-
tice and experience, to maintain discipline in a local corps,
such as we expect in her Majesty's regiments, but it did not
occur to me that the loyalty of the local corps might suffer!'
Sir IL Rose, not a martinet soldier, goes at great length
into the question. I will only read ono paragraph ; the
whole letter turns on the same point :
" Nobody has mixed more with Indian officers than I
have. I have never had a shadow of difference with them
because I was a Queen's officer and they were Company's
or Indian officers. I know the state of their feeling. They
admit to me that the disorganisation and undiscipline of the
Bengal army, and in a lessor degree of the Indian army in.
,general, were the causes of the mutiny. They admit espe-
cially, since the mutinous conduct of the European Indian
army in the discharge question, that amalgamation is neces-
sary for the better discipline of the Indian army."
Such is the opinion of these high authorities. lam quite
aware that there is much to palliate the conduct of the
younger soldiers. But it is not true that the mutiny arose
among the younger soldiers. We thought at first that this
had been so, but what says Lord Clyde upon the point ?
" I beg leave again to draw your Royal Highness's at-
tention to the fact of the passive participation of the non-
commissioned officers and so-called good men of the Bengal
Artillery in the evil intentions of the younger and bolder
men who were so near the commission of the worst crime.
liven in the old regiments the men have not confidence in
their officers. In my mind I must accuse the old soldiers
of the Bengal Artillery of having been the prime movers
and ringleaders in all this bad business."
It is perfectly obvious from his letter that, while Lord
Clyde did not attach much importance to the outbreak of
the recently-enlisted soldiers, the deepest possible impres-
sion was produced on his mind by the disaffection of the
veterans of the Bengal army. He thought, in fact, that
the state of that army, particularly in its older regiments,
was perfectly fatal to the maintenance of a local European
corps. A much more serious subject of reflection, however,
presents itself in connexion with what then took place—
viz., the power of. combination possessed by an army per-
manently located in India with a separate interest from the
rest of the Queen's troops. (Hear.) All history tells us of
the danger that may result from a large body of men with
arms in their hands having such a separate interest and a
remarkable power of combining together, for that the com-
bination which took place on the occasion to which I have
referred was extensive and perfect is abundantly clear. I do
not insist upon this with the view of dilating on the faults of
the men who took part in the movement, but I do wish
strongly to impress it upon the house as a warning for the
future. (Hear, hear.) And hero I will read only one para-
graph from Sir William Mansfield's letter :
" I have observed in some Parliamentary speeches which
arrived by the last mail a disposition to slur over and make
little of the misconduct in the local European army in this
country. I venture to impress on you the gravity and dan-
ger of the crisis which we have tided over, and that it was
impossible to exceed in completeness and wickedness the
combination whieh threatened us in May last. Such was the
feeling throughout the Bengal Artillerymen that, though
the old soldiers and non-commissioned ' officers were too
wary to commit themselves to overt crime, not one of them
in any part of the country came forward to warn their
officers of what was impending ; thoir combination and con-
spiracy in this respect being more thorough than that of the
Sepoys themselves in 1857."
That suggests matter for very serious consideration, and the
view which may be taken of it is expressed in a fartherex-
tract from Lord Clyde's letter, whisk says :
" Whatever may now be done, the recollection of this
strike or mutiny will never die out in the Indian local army.
It will very possibly affect her Majesty's army also in a
minor degree ; but in the former—the Indian local army
—it will live for ever, and be a precedent to which the
minds of the men will always revert when they are dissatis-
fied with their work or the regulations affecting them. I
am, therefore, irresistibly led to the conclusion that hence.
forth it will be dangerous to the Sate to maintain a local
army . . . I feel I should be wanting in my duty were
I to remain silent, now that the strongest conviction has
arisen in my mind that from henceforth we should have no
local Europeans whatever."
Now, be it remembered that Sir W. Mansfield was origin-
ally in favour of the maintenance of a local European army.
He had stated that opinion very decidedly, but the result of
what occurred on this unhappy oecasion entirely converted
him to the opposite view. I shall not fully discharge my
task if I do not advert to the main arguments of those who
advocate separate armies for India. The first argument,
which has been brought forward in two or three papers
which are before the house, refers to the dangers which
must ensue to India if there should be any withdrawal of
troops from India to England. I think that argument is
without foundation. It must be for the Central Govern-
ment to decide where the wauts of the empire are greatest,
and where the strength of the empire ought to be concen-
trated. During the Criinean war it might be necessary that
the forces of the country should be concentrated at home.
During the China war-they were properly diverted for the
defence of our Indian empire. If the Home Government
are not to be trusted with the decision and the discretion of
saying where the forces of the empire ought to be stationed,
they are not fit to hold the position of rulers. The danger
is said to be in withdrawing such a force as will endanger the
safety of India, and we are told that the safety of India was
endangered by the troops that were kept back in consequence
of the Crimean war. Now I have ascertained that the force
in India in 1857 was less than the force in 1854 by 1,500
men only. What is the proposal a That one-third of the
force should be Queen's troops, over whom the Government
have absolute power of withdrawal. Take the proportion of
60,000 and 20,000 which has been proposed. The Governs
meat at home have the power of withdrawing 20,000 men,
and we are told that a force of 1,600 will endanger the safety
of our Indian empire. The argument is perfectly absurd,
even if the Government are not to be trusted with the power
of looking to the safety of the empire. The next argument
is that the power of the Governor-General will be destroyed
by the removal of the local European army. lamat a loss
to see how this position is proved. It is said, with truth,
that it is impossible for the Governor-General to perform
those duties which would be far better discharged by the
Adjutant-General or the Quartermaster-General. The Go-
vernor-General ought to have, locally and temporarily, the
whole power that the Government at home possess. Tho
next argument is the great expense of the Queen's service,
I confess thitt on the ftrst considerat'on of the matter I
thought the expense of the Queen's troops much greater
than, upon investigation, it appears to be. Depend upon it,
also, the most efficient force will be the cheapest in the end,
and I do not think we ought to be deterred by the greater
expense of the plan proposed if on other accounts we think
it good. From the calculations made lam inclined to
think that if the whole of the existing local force were con-
verted into Queen's troops, the increased cast would be
about £114,000 a year. A saving ar otherwise of £20.),0(0
would, however, as I think, be no consideration in an, eats
penditure of £14,000,000, if it weighed with considerations
of safety or efficiency. I believe that the expenditure
may be 'very much rednced by depots, reliefs, and the
double staff; and I confess I think there is no proof that
the change proposed would entail an increased expense of 1'
£200,000. It is further objected that the whole expendi- 1
ture for India is thus thrown npon he authorities at home.
No expenses, heweyer, can be incurred for India except by
the consent of the Secretary of State and the Council for
India, and that is as complete a check as can be devised
for the control of the expenditures The greater expense of

the Queen's troops must depend upon the superior health of
the local troops. But the returns do not bear out that con-
clusion. The health of civilians is said to deteriorate ac-
cording to length of residence in India. Mr. Martin, a me-
dical authority in the Indian service, says that length of re-
sidence in India, so far from conferring immunity from illness
leads to physical degradation. The general assumption is
that English regiments, on landing, have so much sickness
that they lose their men. This is not, however, borne out
by the facts. Mr. Hammish asserts that the most beneficial
results will follow from the practice of more frequent reliefs.
It is perfectly well known that men come home invalided
from India who are quite competent to serve in this climate.
Another observation I wish to make is one suggested by an
old Indian of great experience--that of late years there has
taken place a great change in the character of Indian offi-
cers. They are not so entirely devoted to India as their
scene of service as they formerly were, when they used to
go on leave only to the Cape of Good Hope and return to
India again ; a practice which led the officer to regard India
very much as his home. The more rapid and easy commu-
nication with England now enables officers to come home,
instead of going, as heretofore, only to the Cape; and this
circumstance has tended very much to diminish the differ-
ence between the officers of the local army and those of the
line. (Hear, hear.) The former are not so exclusively Indian
as they once were. But what are the services for which these
officers are required ? They are r rincipally on what is called
staff employment, and that in India has a very large signifi-
cance. It includes diplomatic service, employment as agents,
magistrates, and judges, service in the Commissariat and
Ordnance departments, in the pay-office and in public works,
and indeed in every conceivable mode of employment. So
far as the civil service is concerned, I think the supply
from the army is a very valuable one ; but the efficiency of
the army is impaired by the removal of officers from their
regiments. (Hear, hear.) The system is by universal ad-
mission the worst that could be adopted for the army. The
officers are taken from their regiments and employed in the
discharge of civil duties, perhaps for many years, and then
return to the command of their regiments when they have
ceased to have any practical knowledge of military matters.
(Hear.) (The right hon. gentleman read the opinion of Sir
P. Grant in corroboration of this view.) The arguments
against our expectations of getting a sufficient supply of
officers from the line are founded on a state of things in
which those officers have not been in a position to obtain
those appointments. It is only recently that Staff appoint-
ments have been thrown open to troops in the Queen's ser-
vice, and therefore it is not fair to argue that young men
will not in future be found to do that which hitherto they
have not had any opportunity of doing. Upon this point
Sir C. Trevelyan says :--
"But if, instead of this, an Indian career were opened to
line officers, and it were arranged that a certain period of
regimental service in India, with a certain proficiency in
military science and the native languages, would qualify for
transfer to the local Staff Corps, young men would crowd
into the line regiments serving in India in order to push
their fortunes in that country."

Other authorities have expressed similar opinions. What I
contemplate is a body of officers so raised, so trained, and so
employed by the Indian Government rising in the corps
by certain numbers who would be devoted to an Indian
career: That is the ultimate state of things which I hope
to arrive at, but which cannot be arrived at for some years,
as the existing Indian officers have a prior claim to service
on the staff. They are to a great extent at present em-
ployed, and it is only as vacancies occur that openings for
officers of the line will present themselves. This attempt
will afford ample time to ascertain whether or not the
officers of the line will furnish a sufficient number of can-
didates. If the supply from that source should not be
adequate, there will be ample time for us to take
other means for procuring the requisite supply
of officers. I blow that some fears have been
expressed lest we intended to break faith with
the Indian officers, but those fears are unfounded, as
such an idea has never been entertained. (Hear, hear.) It
would be most unjust, most ungenerous, and most unwise
to break faith with those officers. (Hear.) Take the case
of an European regiment in the,company's service. All the
existing officers of that regiment must have risen by regi-
mental seniority until they arrived at general seniority.
All the officers in that regiment will come in as Queen's offs.
cers, available fot general service. Every man in that re-
giment will have entered for 10 years, and at the end of
that time will be entered for general service. If the regi-
ment remains in India for 10 years, the probability is that
neither officers nor men will have any complaint to make
of Indian allowances. After that time the regiments will
be available for general service. With regard to these re-
giments we propose to try a system which is much advo-
cated by many gentlemen in this house will be successful
or not. We do not propose to introduce the purchase system
there. A man entering will rise by seniority to the rank:of
captain, and thence to the grades of major and lieutenant-
colonel, partly by selection and partly by seniority. I do
not myself entertain that antipathy to the purchase system
which is felt by some, but I will enter into the subject now.
The real difficulty does not occur in European regiments or
,in the amalgamation of forces. The difficulty arises from
the number of officers of the native army whose regiments
have been disbanded. There were 74 regiments of regular
native infantry in the Bengal army, but only 15 now re-
main. No one will propose to create anew the Bengal army
as it existed before the mutiny. These officers could not
claim it as a right that the Indian army should be main-
tained on its former footing and to its former extent in
order that their pay and privileges should be preserved
to them unchanged. Nor could they claim that a
European army should be formed with a view to their em-
ployment. The arrangement which we propose, as it
seems to me, violates no right to which they can lay
legitimate claim, and it is just the course proposed
by Sir Patrick Grant in reference to the Madras army,
when he suggested the reduction of 12 regiments.
There will be no difficulty in forming a staff corps and
officering the regular regiments from this corps. In some
districts a large number of officer's are employed, and if
some facility be offered to that end I believe it will lead to
the retirement of many, and that ultimately we are more.
likely to want officers than to have more than we need.
Then I have heard that a great many officers would be glad
to change their positions for a similar rank in the line.
Every officer of the Indian army will, if he chooses, have
the power of exchanging into the line, and will be eligible
for command in any part of the world. (Hear.) Thus the
general plan will be, that the European regiments will
form part of the Queen's army, the existing officers retain-
ing their positions, rising by seniority, as they do now;
that officers will be eligible for general service, rising by
seniority to the rank of captain, and afterwards by seleo-
tion to the rank of major and lieutenant- colonel ; that the
existing officers of the Indian army will be employed either
as they are now in the regular regiments, or in various
situations on the staff; and that ultimately vacancies in the
staff corps will be filled up by candidates selected from the
Queen's general army. (Hear, hear.) That is an outline
df the scheme for the regulation of the Indian army. But I
wish to.place before the house the alternative, which is a
matter for serious consideration. We are called on to main-
tain a local army of at least 40,000 men. The number of
local troops at this moment I will assume to be 15,000. The
question, therefore, is not one of maintaining an existing
establishment, but of raising 25,000 'nen in addition, and of
raising them in this country for service in India. Now,
how is that to be done ? Lord Canning's lost minute pro-
poses 24 additional regiments for Bengal alone. It is
admitted that new regiments cannot and ought not to
be formed in India. That experiment has been tried, and
failed. We must form, drill, and train in this country for
the•serviee of Bengal alone 24 European regiments. What
will the advocates of economy say to this? In the mean
time we are to,maintain the same number of Queen's troops
in India. And then, when these new and raw troops are
trained and drilled, I suppose the old and experienced soldiers
are to be disbanded. I ask the house seriously to consider
this question. If we adopt the views I have stated we
shall be put to the expense, trouble, and delay of raising
these men, and of training them in England for a certain
number of years, paying out of the Indian revenue for the
,double force of Queen's troops now forming part of the gar-
rison of India, and the force trained in this country which
is to form the future garrison. I do not think that anybody
will entertain each a project on the score either of economy
or efficient'. (Hear.) Hitherto I have said nothing as to
the authorities on one side or the other, but I must beg the
house not to be led away by the notion that this is a mere
question between Indian and English authorities. The
highest Indian authorities are extraordinarily divided on
the point. Lord Ellenborough, who has paid great atten-
tion to it, is strongly in favour of an Indian army. Lord
Elphinstone, who has had more experience in India than
almost anybody, who has been Governor of two Presiden-
cies, whose conduct throughout the whole of the Indian
mutiny has met with universal, approbation—(cheers)—and
who has shown himself most competent to deal with Indian
questions, is in favour ofihe amalgamation. Lord Canning
has sent home a strong minute against amalgamation. Sir
C. Trevelyan, who, with all his faults, knows a great deal
about India—(hear)—and has paid great attention to all
military questions there, expresses an equally strong opinion
the other way. nem are no two men who are better ac-
quainted with India than Sir G. Clark and Sir 3. Lawrence,
and they express directly opposite opinions. Sir Archdale
Wilson, the conqueror of Delhi, goes one way ; Sir 3.
Outram, the conqueror of Lucknow, goes the other way.
Sir Itt Vivian is strongly in favour of a local army ; Sir
Patrick Grant desires amalgamation. Going back to the
past, we find that Sir T. Munro was favourable to a local

army,while SirJ. Malcolm thought amalgamation desirable.
Islauntstuart Elphinstone was in favour of a local army;
Sir C. Metcalf thought there ought to be one army only.
I have quoted half a dozen authorities on each side who
most decidedly differed among one another; and the argu-
ments I have endeavoured to lay before the horse are not
overborne by the overpowering weight of Indian officers.
Lord Cornwallis was strongly in favour of one army, anti
-that in the time of the Company's rule. He could not carry
out his views, tho India Company being too strolg for him,
and the opinion of one of the most experienced'
statesman and soldiers. (Hear.) I was surprised the other
day to hear the Duke of WeHingl on quoted as an authority
for a native army, Now, in 1812 Lord Melville wrote to
the Dalce of Wellington, then in Spain, and asked his
opinion on this subject. I need not state labw great was his
experience of Indian matters, and how entirely he was i il
financed by the sole consideration of the good of his
country:

The Duke of Wellington wrote to Lord Melville, in answer,
to this effect :
" I will not miss this opportunity of stating to you my
opinion—first, that the European army in the East Indies
ought to be the King's; secondly, that the three armies (that
is, the armies of the three Presidencies) ought to continue
separate and distinct; thirdly, that the native army ought
to be the Company's, if the Company should continue to be
the Sovereign of the territory ; . • . fifthly, it is my
opinion that all authority, civil and military, must be vested
by the law in the Governor .in Council. The law must re-
cognise no other authority in the State. The Company may,
and ought to, instruct the Governor in Council—first, to
leave all matters of discipline solely and exclusively to the
Commander-in-Chief, and to interfere in them in no man-
ner, excepting when the safety of the State should require it;
secondly, that allrecommendations to military appointments,
such as the staff officers of the army to commissions, promo-
tions in the army of persons—civil or military—to fill the
departments of the army, and the inferior commands, should
be made by the Commander-in-Chief to the Governor in
Council. The Governor in Council should be obliged to
record his reasons for dissent. Thirdly, the recommenda-
tions to superior command, such as divisions of the army,
should be with the Commander-in-Chief when the holders
of these commands exercise no civil authority or, political
function ; and that, in the case of a nomination to a higher
command being vested exclusively in the Governor in
Council, without the recommendation of the Commander-
in-Chief, the Governor should be directed to consult with
the Commander• in-Chief in making the selection. It
would be very desirable to leave a latitude by law to the
Governor in Council to promote officers for meritorious ser-
vices,_ at the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief,
out of the usual regular routine, as well as to pass over off],
cers guilty of misconduct. This might be done by giving
the Governor in Council the power to promote such officers,
by brevet in the first instance, wheshould suttee d to the
first vacancies in the 'rank in which they should have been
promoted in the regiment to which they should belong."
I have read the whole of that opinion, :and it will be ob-
served that the three main conditions which, in the Duke
of Wellington's opinion, should be carried into effect are
that the European army should be the Queen's, that the
armies of the three Presidencies should be distinct, and,thut
the supreme authority of the Governor-General should be
recognised. I must deny that this is exclusively an Indian
question, and I maintain that both on Indian and on Im-
perial grounds the course to pursue is that upon which the
Government has resolved. It is quite true that the mutiny
of the Seyoys is over, and that tranquillity is restored ; but
I confess that there are still some grounds for solicitude.
The confidence which once prevailed is shaken, and, what
is still more alarming, I am afraid that there is considerable
estrangement between the races. Therefore it is essential,
in the first place, to put on a footing which cannot be
shaken our military superiority. The rebellion was put
down by the unparalleled bravery of our forces, and we
have vindicated and established our superiority ; but I.
hold that that must be maintained so potent and evident
that none shall question the efficiency of our arms. (Hear,
hear.) lam far from meaning that we should not endea-
vour to make use of conciliatory means. We are bound
to show the natives that we are their friends and benefac-•
tors, and that they would lose by a change. I believe that
such a course of proceeding is essential to the maintenance
of our power in India. lam anxious, however, not to
place everything upon mere force, or upon the authority of
the Government, but to depend likewise upon measures of
improvement and upon the influence of reason. Still to be
able to act in this way they must feel, and we must feel,
that we are not to be shaken in our military ascendancy.
' It must be felt that our rule is fixed, so that we may be
enabled to extend those blessings to India which I believe
it is our destiny to confer. This we should do, not only
for Indian, but also for Imperial reasons ; for the evil
which falls on India must be felt in this country. In the
last mutiny how much English blood was shed, and what a
great strain India became upon the resources of England
It is upon England in case of emergency that the pressure
must come; therefore, it is only fair, right, and just that
we should put our army in India in a state of the greatest
possible discipline and efficiency, and constitute it in such
a mariner as to enable it to be prepared, as far as human
foresight can do so, to prevent the possibility of the recur-
rence of such a calamity as we have lately experienced. I
hope the house will concur in the plan which is now pro-
posed by the Government, and I beg to move for leave to
bring in a bill to repeal so much of the Act of the 22d and
23d of Victoria, cap. 27, as enables the Secretary of State
for India to raise men for her Majesty's local European
forces in India.
Mr. H. SEYMOUR and Lord STANLEY simultaneously
rose to move the adjournment of the debate.
Sir C. WOOD suggested that he might be permitted to
introduce the bill to-night, and that the discussion might
be taken on the second reading.
After some conversation it was ultimately arranged that
the debate should be adjourned, and the debate was accord-
ingly adjourned to Thursday week.
PASSING TOLLS.
Mr. FENWICK obtained leave to bring in a bill to
abolish passing tolls.

BURIAL-GROUNDS ACT.
Mr. H. HERBERT obtained leave to bring in a bill to
amend the Burial-grounds (Ireland) Act, 1856.
The Councillors of Burghs and Burgesses (Scotland) Bill
was read a third time alid 'passed.
The house adjourned at 1 o'clock.