The Sun.
London, England, 1860-03-17 00:00:00

MARCH 17,

1860.

not. The reverse of the Peiho involved a degree of diffi-
culty which entitled the Government to the assistance of
hon. gentlemen on all sides of the house. After that
disaster it was right that the Government should see that
our power and prestige in the East were not diminished—
(Hear, hear.) He was not disposed, therefore, to find fault
with the Government for sending out an imposing force to
support their demand. He thought they had acted wisely
in doing so. (Hear.) The hon. gentleman the member for
Birmingham had alluded to a speech which he (Sir J. Pak-
ington) heard two years ago, but which the hon. gentleman
did not hear, from a cause which he was happy to see now
existed no longer. He agreed with the opinion which the
hon. gentleman the member for Rochdale had expressed to
the hon. gentleman the member for Birmingham in rela-
tion to that speech, which was the finest and most impres•
sive he ever listened to in that house. He only hoped the
right hon. gentleman had not forgotten the sentiments he
then expressed. (Hear, hear, and a laugh.) The noble lord
the member for the City of London also addressed the house
on that occasion. The noble lord was not then sitting side
by side with the noble viscount (Lord Palmerston) as he
was now. (Laughter.) They stood in entirely different
relations to each other. (A laugh.) The house had not
forgotten the emphasis in which the noble lord—in a spirit
of justice and wisdom in which he (Sir John Pakington)
heartily concurred at the time—bade the house " Be just
and fear not !" (Hear.) In the present state of our rela-
tions with China, he earnestly hoped that the noble lord
would act on that principle. (Hear, hear.) As to the
apology which was to be insisted on for the Peiho transac-
tion, he put it to the house, whether, taking the origin of
the transaction, and the whole conduct of Mr. Bruce into
consideration, we were really entitled to demand an apology.
(Hear, hear.) If the apology were refused what was to be
the alternative ? The right hon. baronet then quoted from
Lord Malmesbury's instructions to Mr. Bruce, to show
that those who said Lord Malmesbury's instructions justi-
fied Mr. Bruce in ordering the attack, were mistaken. On
the charge of diplomatic duplicity, he quoted passages from
the despatch of the Chinese Commissioners, and asked
what more the Government could want of diplomatists.
Their language was clear, fair, and bona fide, and he could not
see that Mr. Bruce had any reason to doubt their sincerity.
Immediately after he gave directions to Admiral Hope to
force the passage of the Pedro. If he determined to force his
way by that route, contrary to the determination of the Chi-
nese authorities, he thought he was not justified by the law
of nations. It seemed that Mr. Bruce was impressed with a
different idea of making a way to the capital from that which
appeared justified by his instructions. He rather thought
it was the intention of the Chinese to pay all honour to our
Minister, and it was unfortunate our Minister took a dif-
ferent view of the subject. It was unfortunate that our Mi-
nister ordered an attack. He thought the Chinese were
justified in fortifying their coast. They had indicated the
route our Minister was to take, and were we justified in de-
termining to take another route to the capital ? Well, then,
if the Chinese refused an apology, he thought it most un-
wise to make it a cause of war. At all events, he hoped that
no military operations would be ordered until the ambassa-
dors arrived on the spot. He took no exception to the mis-
sion of Lord Elgin; but was Mr. Bruce to continue in the
same diplomatic capacity ? He hoped he would receive
some explanation of the policy of the Government.
Mr. HOPE thought it was no excuse for ill-considered
operations that the admiral showed personal gallantry. He
thought Admiral Hope had refused to obey the instructions
he had received, and he would submit his conduct io the
judgment of professional men. However, although the opi-
nion of that house generally was in favour of Admiral Hope,
he would put it to every member whether ho was not mo-
rally responsible for this unseen disaster. He protested
against the waste of gallant lives in that attack. He ob-
jected to wars when success brought no honour, and defeat
brought both disaster and dishonour.
Mr. C. BRUCE read the British Minister's opinion of
the admiral. He was a hero of the old school, and if he
had under-rated his opponents, he should like to know
who had not. That river was the ordinary route to
the capital, and they had no reason to Suppose that any
such opposition would be offered. The French officers ac-
knowledged the gallantry of the admiral net in making the
attack—for attack he did not consider it—but in opening
the passage. He would take the liberty of referring to a sub-
ject which had already been referred to in that house. It
was stated that Mr. Bruce had received a message from the
Governor-General ; but the fact was that the booms were
blown up on the previous night, and Mr. Bruce went, in ac-
cordance with his instructions, in a boat for the purpose of
communicating with the official parties, and his boat was
then fired upon. A member of the embassy, too, who was in
the Magician, and anxious to communicate with the parties
inside the bar, made the attempt, but was unsuccessful, and
a most treacherous attack was made upon them. It was
easy for those to criticise who were not in the difficult posi-
tion in which Mr. Bruce was; but great injustice had cer-
tainly been done to that gentleman. (Hear, hear.) The
American Minister, however, and other official authorities
did him the justice that was due to him. (Hear, hear.) Mr.
Bruce's instructions were to go to Pekin, and there, and
not elsewhere, to have the treaty with which he was en-
trusted ratified, and it, was in his efforts to oarry not hie
instructions that the deplorable calamity occurred. He (Mr.
C. Bruce) however, did not think that the violation of the
treaty of Tien-tsin was of itself sufficient cause to commit
this country in a war with China; and here he must say
that even success to the British arms, in such a war, would
be a groat calamity to this country. (Hear, hear.) They
should not forget that China counted 300,000,000 inhabi-
tants, and that they would, if properly dealt with, become
large customers for the manufactures of this country. The
lion. member here quoted from a blue-book, narrating the
instructions given by the Earl of Derby when in office, and
by two other Governments, to Lord Elgin and Mr. Bruce,
and proceeded to argue that the latter gentleman had not
in any way departed from the letter of his instructions.
All the documents also went to prove that the whole of the
difficulties in the matter arose from there not having been
any direct way of communicating with the chief officers of
the empire. And here he might say that there were ample
proofs that the " people" of China themselves were not
averse to free and friendly intercourse with British subjects.
Even at the Peiho, they had come forward, and by "pre-
sents" manifested their friendly feelings. The hon. mem-
ber concluded by saying he felt strongly on this subject;
and by hoping the house would render that fair award of
justice to Mr. Bruce that was due to him.
Lord PALMERSTON—Sir, I entirely agree with one of
the expressions whichfell from the hon. baronet on the other
side of the house, that when you judge the conduct of a man
you ought to place yourself—or rather to imagine yourself
—in the situation in which he was when he performed the
act upon which you are passing judgment. (Cheers.) I
think that is the way in which the conduct of Mr. Bruce
ought to be considered. What were his instructions ? His
instructions were to exchange the ratifications of the treaty
of Tien-tsin. Ho was bid what those ratifications were,
and that, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, they
were to be exchanged at Pekin. He was ordered, there-
fore, to go to Pekin, and to go by the Peiho. He was
told that at the mouth of the Peiho he was to go up the
river in a ship-of-war as far as Tien-tsin, and that the ad-
miral was to accompany him with a sufficient force. What
was the meaning of " a sufficient force ?" The only inter-
pretation which anybody in Mr. Bruce's position could put
upon the term " sufficient force" was a force sufficient to
enable him from the mouth of the Peiho to go up the river
in a ship of war to Tien-tsin, and from thence to proceed to
Pekia to exchange the ratifications. But then it was said
that there was a qualifying clause in his instructions, viz.,
that he was to pursue that course unless any unforeseen
circumstances arose to induce hier to think any other
course advisable. Well, then, sir, I say that Mr. Bruce
was perfectly justified in thinking that no other cir-
cumstances had arisen to induce him to alter his course.
(Loud cheers.) The right hon. baronet had quoted a
letter from the Chinese Commissioners, in which it was ad-
mitted that they themselves proposed that our Minister
should proceed to the mouth of the Peiho for the purpose
of going thence up to Pekin to exchange the ratifications.
Well, their he comes to the reiho, and what does he find
there ? Does he find there an official communication say-
ing "the Government will not allow you to go up this way;
you must go up some other way; the passage here is ob-
jected to." Nothing of the kind; he finds, however, an
impediment. The hon. baronet has said that every nation
has a right to barricade itsrivers. But surely every nation
has not a right to barricade its rivers against its own friends,
if they wish to maintain peace, friendship, and commercial
relations with the nation so represented. Well, then came
the inquiry—What do these barricades mean P The people
say—" Itjs a simple arrangement of self-defence, established
by tho people of the district to protect them." Against
whom ? Against your English Minister F. No—against
pirates. Well, the British expedition were not pirates;
therefore there was no reason to suppose that the barricades
were placed there to intercept their progress. Was there
any Chinese officer present to say —" You cannot go up
this way : you must go up another way ?" Not a bit.
There was nothing but militiamen and peasantry ; at least
there was no other authorised obstacle. Well, then, under
these circumstances, it really appears to me that Mr. Bruce
and Admiral Hope were perfectly justified intaking steps to
remove obstacles which did not carry in themselves any
semblance whatever of official resistance against that which
they were authorised and entitled by the Chinese commis-
sioners to do. Well, did they begin the attack ? No ; in •
stead of their removing the barrier, it was the Chinese who
began the attack. Well, was the Path() the wrong way
The Pei-ho was admitted by the Chinese to be the way to
Pekin. In the treaty which they had completed with
Russia six weeks before this transaction there is literally
a stipulati,,n that the Russian Minister when he goes to
Pekin shall go by the Pei-ho. That is an admission by
the Chinesa Government that by the Pel-ho was the
proper way for an ambassador to go. Moreover, by owr
treaty of Nankin we are entitled to the privileges of
the most favoured nation, and therefore we were by treaty
entitled to go by the Pei-ho—by the passage that was shut
against our Minister. Therefore, I say, if any man will
place himself in tho situation of Mr, Bruce, knowing what
was the usual practice, and with the responsibility upon him
of exchanging the ratifications within the 41Mtecl time, I
really cannot imagine any men lilaced in the situation
shrinking from Olp c4Psiculty which he found in hie mule,
4p4 gOnrg away and leaving the treaty fbr any
chance that might happeg afcerward4 9i its ever being rati-