The Sun.
London, England, 1860-01-13 00:00:00

government and the happiness of the people. There is, in-
deed, no unwillingness at Rome to adopt improvement, and
much has been done, and is being done, to improve the
public adtnini•tration. But internal measures must pro-
ceed from the wisdom of the Holy Father, and not from the
dictation of foreign Powers; otherwise tho sovereignty of
the Pope would be compromised, and the dignity necessary
for every Governmant could not be maintained. There, is
another point, -still more essential in my opinion. It is this
—the Pope can renounce none of his temporal rights ' • they
are the inalienable inheritance of the Roman Catholic
Church, and in them every Roman Catholic in the.world
has a vested interest. Here, at least, is one point on which
the Holy Father might adopt the words of the pamphlet—
"On salt Lien quo Hen n'oblige un Pape a c,lder, et &est
des-antis force la plus redoubtable quo sa faiblesso est sun-
tAnt invincible, quarnd elle a pour elle l'egide du bon droit."
The Holy Father has indeed for protection the regis of
right. Relying on Divine PoWer, which has never forsaken
the See of. Peter, he can appeal fearlessly to Catholic Europe
against spoliation and injustice;. and he can appeal to Pro-
testant as well as to Catholic Princes and Governments, for
all are virtually interested in maintaining the sovereignty
of the Papacy, which is necessary for its independence, and
to all it is equallynecessary to repudiate doctrines and pro
posals subversive of the rights and Security of all Sovo
reigns and their dotniaions.—l- remain, air, your obedient
servant,
.GEon.or Bow BR,
Palace of the Order of Malta, Rome, Jan. 4.
.
NAPOLEON AND TIIE POPE.

Our well-informed Paris correspondent, writing
on Wedneschey evening, says :—" The Emperor's
letter to the Pope has been most favourrbly re-
ceived by the public of Paris. I doubt whether
he ever did a more popular thing than to make it
public, together, with the Pope's grossly insulting
attack upon him." This is not by any means sur-
prising. If the pamphlet was welcomed simply
because it announced a liberal Italian policy sup.
posed to be favoured in high quarters, the Em-
peror's letter, reiterating in measured but de-
cisive language the same policy, would, of
course, be received with still greater enthusiasm.
This feeling is 'all the stronger from the State
of uncertainty in' which the ultimate fate of
the Romagna has been involved. It seemed
not improbable that a strong effort would
be made to reduce again the revolted subjects of
the Pope to the feeble and cruel rule from which
they had escaped. Such a result would, in fact,
have stultified the whole Italian campaign, as most
liberal and intelligent Frenchmen keenly felt.
They naturally therefore regarded the rumoured
Congress with suspicion, fearing that diplomatic
intrigue might, in part at least, destroy what
French valour had gained for the Italians. That
doubt is now finally dispelled. The Emperor has
at length decided that the Legations must retain
their newly-acquired freedom ; and he intimates
this decision to the Holy Father by recommending
him " to sacrifice the revolted provinces."
If the now celebrated letter, conveying this
pointed suggestion, is peculiarly welcome at Paris,
it will be still more cordially received in this
country. As a whole it is perhaps the best we have
ever received from the same Imperird pen. It takes
a liberal, statesmanlike, and we may add, tho-
roughly English view of the whole question. It
is the more interesting too as it shows the steps by
which the writer has arrived at his present more
enlarged and liberal Mime of Italian policy. He
has been strongly influenced by the "inexorable
logic of facts." We see no reason to doubt this
stateinext. It explains and interprets much that
has been ambiguous and vacillating in the Empe-
ror's conduct. When he entered Italy in the
spring, ho probably had no intention whatever
of coming into callision with the Pope. In the
nature of things, however, this was inevitable.
The temporal power of the Holy Father is so
dependent on the misery and degradation not
only of his own subjects, but of the whole
nation, that it is almost impossible to help or serve
the Italians in any way without injuring the Pope.
The Emperor of the French soon discovered this ;
and anxious to spare the Sovereign Pontiff as much
as possible, hastily concluded the peace of Villa-
franca. Here, however, the Emperor's perplexi-
ties, in his double character of friend of Italy and
" Eldest Son of the Church," really began. The
difficulties of the war were as nothing compared
with the difficulties created by the peace. To solve
them successfully was perhaps impossible. But to
attempt a primal solution in a serious spirit, and
arrival at a real, if only provisional settlement,
would be undeniable proof of statesmanship. The
Emperor of the French must certainly have the
credit of having done this, and all the more so as it
is peculiarly his own act. His Ministers were
almost unanimous in urging hint to adopt the old,
exploded, hopeless policy of dynastic interests. So
far from having any independent or original view
to offer, they simply repeated, in servile phrase, the
most vulgar traditions of despotic diplomacy. The
specific of hereditary claims established by foreign
arms had been tried over and over agatn, and
always failed. That would not do. Still the Em-
peror was not prepared to accept the antagonistic
principle of the national will—not in the States
of the Church, at all events. He had a scheme
etinreors'e'—which
oo
ff i
tnht
oe r ae lig
or
tei foo
or
sm —oo‘d‘
othreaadlnaiyinisgtorNa,
he believes would have induced the revolted pro-
vinces to return to their allegiance. " Unhappily,"
this plan was not adopted, and the Emperor found
himself ." helpless to arrest the establishment
of the new regime." What is to be done now ?
That.is the problem which the "Eldest Son of the
Church" has to solve. The Head of the Church
does not much help him towards its solution. He
prays for armed redress, piously urging the inter-
vention of French bayonets to destroy the newly-
established order and good government of the Ro-
magna, and re-impose the cruel yoke of Rome. The
"Eldest Son" sees clearly the mischief and folly of
granting the Holy Father's prayer. "If that sub-
mission were obtained by the aid of foreign troops,
it would necessitate another long-continued mili-
tary occupation of the Legations. Such an occu-
pation would awaken the hatreds and the animosi-
ties of a great portion of the Italian people, as well
as the jealousy of the great Powers; it would, in
fact, perpetuate a state of irritation, of uneasiness,
and of fear." This would obviously be no settle-
ment whatever. It would be the old story over
again—a permanent dagger on one side, a perma-
nent scaffold on the other. This " settlement" has
made Italy the thei tre of violence, revolution, and
blood—has been a source of perpetual distur:iance
to Europe for fifty years past. It cannot last for
ever. " What then is to be done ?" The Emperor,
after a serious examination of the difficulties and
dangers which beset 'the various solutions pre-
sented, replies, that "it is most in accordance with
the true interests of the Holy See to make a sacri-
fice of the revolted provinces."
This decision appears simple and easy enough to
us. But we must remember that a devoted Emperor
may find great difficulties in a course of action
which appears to us perfectly plain. The Emperor
knows that his decision is a "painful" one, and he
communicates it to the Holy Father with " sincere
regret." The fact is, it required some courage to
take this just and sensible view of the case, and the
Emperor has been a long time in making up his
mind. However arrived at, the policy now adopted
and announced in the letter to the Holy Father is
a liberal one, and as such will be heartily welcomed
here. The Emperor clearly recognises the right of
the people to enjoy self-government as superior to
the hereditary claims of the Church. He has all
possible respect and affection for the Holy Father,
but he has also some regard for the peace of Europe
and the welfare of Italy. He is a Catholic Emperor,
but in spite cf his devotion to the Holy See, he un-
dertook the Italian campaign, and feels that he is
in a manner responsible for its results. The best of
the results, in our view, is the decisive course which
the Emperor has at last adopted with regard to the
temporal power of the Pope. Alternately flattered
and menaced by the partisans of the Pope at home
and abroad, he has at length frankly sacrificed tho
arrogant pretensions of the Church to the in-
exorable logic of events—in other words, to the
claims of international justice. He has lost some-
thing, uo doubt—the support of the priests, the
sympathy of the Ultramontane press—perhaps, also,
the benediction of the Holy Father. But he has
gained something too—the lasting gratitude of the
Italian States, the sympathy and admiration not
only of his own subjects, but of every free people.
In throwing over the priests in favour of the people,
he has, indeed, simply abandoned what an ancient
Catholic calls a " principle of decay" for one of life
and progress.

We `hall not like this new policy of the Emperor
on the Italian question any the less because it hap-
pens to be our own—the policy which the English
Government, the English press, and the English
people, have universally adopted and firmly main-
tained. On the contrary, such an agreement on the
most momentous question of foreign policy must
tend to bring tho governments and people of the
two countries more closely together. If the alliance
has been weakened during the horrors of the war
and the perplexities of the peace, this proposed set-
tlement must help to strengthen it. Such a result
is to be hailed with the sincerest satisfaction. In-
dependent alliance with France—always our true
interest when it can b e attained by honourable
means—is now offered in connexion with the noble
artd liberal policy we have long advocated.—Daily
New.