The Sun.
London, England, 1860-02-27 00:00:00

the gallant officers and men under my orders.
The French Admiral hoisted his flag in an Eng-
lish gunboat ; English gunboats took the French
forces to the attack on the forts ; an English gun-
boat led the attack ; an English vessel received the
French wounded ; English gunboats led the way
up the Tien-tsin River, and were the first foreign
vessels ever off that city ; English gunboats
alone kept up the communication between the
city and the fleet outside ; and when troops were
likely to be required, English gunboats took on
board the whole of the French troops for convey-
ance up the river. I mention these facts,
not with any desire to exaggerate the services of
the British gunboats, in depreciation of the forces
under my gallant colleague, whose whole conduct
has been marked by frankness and sincerity since
the opening of the campaign, and from whom I have
invariably received the most cordial support, but to
defend the character of the squadron under my
orders. Our gunboats were much smaller than those
of the French, and consequently more available in
narrow waters. Had the case been reversed I should
have received the same support from Admiral
Rigault.
"9. I entirely differ in Lord Elgin's opinion,
that had we moved up the river immediately on our
arrival off the Peiho, without resistance, it would
have sufficed to bring the Imperial Government to
terms, and that any further measures of violence or
On would have been avoided. I have had
experience in Chinese warfare, and any
eworeoTas yiears,
one who has been long. in China will bear me out
in the assertion that nothing but the conclusive
evidence of irresistible force will ever fully satisfy
the Imperial Government. I consider therefore as
stated in my despatch reporting the operations at
the Peiho, that the Chinese having been allowed
time to fortify their position, and being confident
of their strength, the capture of the forts under
such circumstances would have a greater moral
effect on the Imperial Government then if we had
attacked them when less prepared. Subsequent
events fully bore out my opinion. It was ascer-
tained that guns from Tien-tsin, and even from
Pekin, had been conveyed to the forts at Taku, and
that all the available military force was also assem-
bled there. At one blow therefore the whole of
their guns were captured, and their army driven
like a scattered rabble into the surrounding coun-
try, to spread everywhere the reports of our invin-
cibility, and the destructive and terrific missiles we
made use of. To this brilliant and complete suc-
cess I attribute our total exemption from annoyance
while at Tien-tsin, and the conclusion of a treaty
within a month after, which may be said to open
the whole of China to the world, and which may
in a few years develope a field for commercial en-
terprise of which we have at present no conception.
" 10. On my arrived off the Rugged Islands I
only remained a sufficient time to send off despatches
to England, and hurried off to the gulf of Pecheli,
where I arrived on the 24th of April, and found that
Elgin had the same morning, before my arrival,
sent in his ultimatum to the Chinese Viceroy Tan,
who had arrived at Taku, though, as already re-
marked, his lordship had admitted that he had not
sufficient force to make any onward movement in
advance.'
LORD ELGIN'S DESPATCII OF THE 20TH OF APRIL.
"This letter commences with reporting the Ad-
miral's arrival in the Gulf of Pecheli, in the Cal-
cutta; but as the ship draws 25 feet water, she can-
not approach within five miles of the Peiho River ;
also the arrival of the Coromandel, towed by the
Sampson, which also cannot cross the bar. His lord-
ship likewise expresses doubts about the arrival of
the gunboats till the end of May; and remarks on
the inadequate nature of the force I had ordered to
the Peiho, and that it would not arrive till the ap-
proach of the season when the climate is most un-
favourable to the European constitution.
" 11. Lord Elgin should in candour have added,
these ships bring with them a body of 600 trained
seamen and marines, six large boats mounting guns,
and peculiarly adapted for river service, and a large
supply of provisions, stores, clothing, and money
for the squadron ; and that the Coromandel, besides
her armament of five guns, possesses in her roomy
decks a desirable shelter for troops, and draws only
8 feet of water. The five gunboats alluded to arrived
ready for service on the 9th and 10th of May, in
company with the Hesper, and, with the force al-
ready in hand, proved more than sufficient for the
service required.
" 12. So far from the climate being unfavourable
to Europeans, there was not one death from sick-
ness in the whole British force in the Peiho, from
the 20th of May to the 7th of July. Indeed, I may
say, that, notwithstanding the men were for the
first fortnight constantly in boats, there was hardly
a case of sickness, as reported in my despatches.
Lord Elgin is in error in stating that I promised a
large fleet, especially of gunboats, to be is the Gulf of
Pecheli at the end of March. I engaged that an
adequate force should be at Shanghai at the end of
March or as soon after as convenient. It is utterly
impossible to move a force of gunboats up a stormy
coast with the precision or a railway train; and,
though his lordship makes so light of the monsoon,
and suggest towing the gunboats up the coast by
paddle steamers, I can assure their lordships that,
while the Calcutta was making her voyage to the
north, the most powerful merchant steamer in China
of 400-horse power, was obliged to bear up within
40 miles of the Yang-tse-kiang, and run back to
Foochow, a distance of 200 miles, from stress of
weather. My arrangements for getting the gun-
boats up to the north were made with the view to
see them arrive in an efficient state, and rut torn to
pieces by being towed against a dead sea, an object
I fully. causing them to coast the
by
weather. The Fury, the
fastestahe, a
orders. did tow two
o steameraccomplished,ndanh ourn dine
. bady m
gun-
boats from Shanghai to the Gulf of Pecheli, but
there was no advantage gained, as the gunboats
which came up under sail made the passage in the
same time. Lord Elgin compares the powerfully-
built and full-rigged French gunboats, and the 80-
horse power gunboat Slangy, with our small ones of
60-horse power. I leave that for their Lordships'
decison.
Englishit. by
" Lord Elgin next states that the French admiral
arrived on the 25th of April with his whole fleet,
and that, at the moment of writing, the French flag
was represented by two gunboats within the bar of
the Peiho;
two despatch boats
aground" 13. I might smile at this statement, were it not
o n
theth theetop oi
on account of the motives which appear to dictate
it, and the impression it must have made on their
Lordships. The Nimrod and Cormorant grounded
in the previous night in trying to cross the bar in
company with the three French gunboats, as did
one of the latter (their Lordships must under-
stand that at low water the bar of the Peiho is
nearly dry, and it is only at particular times of
tide that even a ship's launch san cross). In two
hours after his lordship's despatch was sent away
both vessels had crossed the bar, and the Eng-
lish flag was represented by three English vessels,
including the Slaney, of superior force to the
French ; the English boats close to the batteries,
the French somewhat to the left. I cannot refrain
from drawing their lordship's particular attention
to the impression attempted to be made by this
complaint, in reality so groundless. The Cormo-
rant, Nimrod, and Surprise were specially selected
by me, as peculiarly qualified for service in the
north. They draw only a few inches more water
than the French gunboats; are more capable of re-
sisting bad weather than the smaller vessels; and
the Cormorant , the only one of the three I consi-
dered it necessary to take up to Tien-tsin, was more
manageable than the French gun-boats. As Lord
Elgin mentions that on the 25th April the whole
French fleet arrived, I add a list of the ships of the
two flags on the day in question :
English.
Calcutta, 84.
Pique, frigate.
Sampson, steam frigate.
Furious, ditto.
Nimrod, gun-vessel.
Cormorant, ditto.
Shirley, ditto.
Coromandel, ditt,).

French.
N6m6sis, frigate.
Audacieuse, ditto.
Primauguet, steam sloop.
Phl6g6ton, ditto.
Fus6e, gunboat.
Dragonne, ditto.
Avalanche, ditto.

" On the 29th April, at Lord Elgin's earnest re-
quest, but against my own judgment, I despatched
the Sampson to Hongkong for two 40-horse power
gunboats, which, having but one engine, are not
desirable vessels to employ at a distance from a fac-
tory. Lord Elgin availed himself of the opportunity
to forward to England the two despatches now in
question. When these vessels arrived active opera-
tions were concluded, and, from their limited power,
proved far inferior in efficiency to the 60-horse
power gunboats.
" Lord Elgin next adds that he much fears that
it will be found, when the matter comes to be in-
quired into, that one of the reasons for the non-
appearance of gunboats when their presence would
be sl valuable is that many of them are unservice-
able from the way in which they were worked
in the Canton river in the discharge of duties which
might have been done by merchant steamers.
" 15. I should decline to take notice of this state-
ment were it not that I desire to give their lord-
ships the fullest explanation of my conduct. It has
excited the astonishment of every one competent to
offer an opinion on the subject that the gunboats,
after so long a voyage as from England, and con-
stant employment in the Canton river, should have
remained so long serviceable. Though many of the
boats have, as opportunities offered, been docked
and refitted, particularly those intended for service
in the north, I do not believe that at any one time
two gunboats out of the whole number were un-
equal to their work.
'of
chceu p
ac
toimo
nm, ua nn !lc aHt g k bo
ne tar
aennd
tChaen
coupto u
aft‘e'rloit's
stant conveyaxce of sick, stores, and provisions,
could only be carried on with safety and efficiency

by armed Government vessels, and the gunboats
offered the readiest and most economical means.
A roster of the whole number was therefore made,
giving to each her term of service, and also the
consequent rest to men and machinery. These boats,
in their passage up and down the river, always
stopped near the Furious for Lord Elgin's com-
mands, and his lordship had, in addition, a special
gunboat at his own disposal.
" His lordship next adds, that from what he
witnessed at the capture of Canton, and from what
he observed in his progress along the coast, the
means at the disposal of the British authorities in
these seas are ample for any objects which her
Majesty's Government may desire to accomplish in
China.

" 17. In this I quite agree with his lordship ; I
never doubted it.

" 18. On the vague and conjectural character of
the concluding paragraph of Lord Elgin's last
despatch, I do not consider it incumbent on me to
offer comment ; but as his lordship is pleased to
observe that, in order to attain the above objects,
and more especially to their attainment without
an unnecessary expenditure of blood and treasure,
it is indispensable that those who control the mate-
rial force of Great Britain in this quarter should
lend to those who direct its diplomacy a vigorous
and intelligent support, I have the honour to re-
port that it has been always my object to do so ;
and I beg to refer to the copy of his lordship's
despatch of the 6th of July, transmitted to you in
my letter, No. 229, of the 6th of July, in which
Lord Elgin acquaints me that it will not be neces-
sary to continue any longer at Tien-tsin ' the pres-
sure which has been applied by your Excellency
with so much effect, and at so small a cost of human
life and suffering.' I also transmit, for their lord-
ships' information, a copy of a despatch of the 21st
of May, written to me by Lord Elgin after the cap-
ture of the forts at the mouth of the Peiho.
" 19. I have endeavoured, as fully as possible, to
reply to the charges brought against me, and I am
now quite content to leave the whole case in their
lordships' hands. I was in entire ignorance of
Lord Elgin having written these despatches until
the arrival of the last mail. Why his lordship
should have proceeded from Shanghai to the Gulf
of Pecheli in the haste he did, three days before
my arrival, and without any consultation with me
as to the nature of the contemplated operations, and
whence the urgency for entering into negotiations
with the Chinese authorities at the Peiho without
any communication with those who were to be re-
sponsible in the event of negotiations failing, I have
never been able to understand, no subsequent cir-
cumstances having brought to light the grounds or
reasons for such precipitancy. Most fortunately for
the success which finally attended the great object
of Lord Elgin's presence in the vicinity of Pekin
the coercive measures that became inevitable, and
which the posture of affairs demanded, were delayed
until the 20th May, thus affording the time, and only
a sufficient time, for the imperial authorities to collect
their military strength and resources to a degree
that excited a confidence on their part so highly
favourable to the ultimate estimate of ourirresist-
ible power, when in a little more than three hours
their boasted defences were overthrown and ample
proof given of the inutility of further resistance.
The surest foundation was thus laid for the success-
ful fulfilment of Lord Elgin's mission to China, the
accomplishment of which has, through the skill and
perseverance of his lordship, been realized in the
highly advantageous treaty with China which is
now known in Europe.
" 20. I sincerely hope that the apprehensions felt
by Lord Elgin in April were diminished in June
and July, when affairs in the north were terminated.
" 21. Ever since Lord Elgin arrived in China I
have endeavoured to conduct myself towards his
lordship with the respect and deferencce due to her
Majesty's Plenipotentiary, and their Lordships may
rest assured that I shall continue the same course.
—I have, &c.,
" M. SEYMOUR, Rear-Admiral and
Commander-in-Chief.
" The Secretary of the Admiralty, London."

SPAIN AND MOROCCO.

(From the Correspondent of the Times.)

TETUAN, FEE. 12.
•
Now that fighting is for the time suspended, that
no Moorish camp is in sight, or restless enemy
harassing the outposts and provoking repulse, the
great question of interest here is, and for some days
has been, that of peace or war. Is the campaign at
an end or not ? Will Tetuan prove the limit of
advance, or Tangier be shortly assailed? The
majority of opinions, the unanimity of wishes,
were for the first alternative ; but it is only since
yesterday that scarcely any one doubts of its reali-
sation. For, yesterday forenoon, four tall and
dignified Moors, well afflict', well mounted, and
with an escort, reached O'Donnell's headquarters,
whither they had been forwarded by General Prim,
who commands the corps in advance, and were
ushered into the tent of the Commander-in-Chief.
The details of what passed beneath the shade of
that sacred canvas are of course enviroßed with the
customary mystery, but the substance has oozed
out and is understood to be to the following effect :
—The chief of the four envoys was the Kaid of
Tangier, and he came from Muley Abbas. Recent
events, he said, had convinced the Prince that Allah
was not on the side of the Moors, and that therefore
they could not conquer. He sent, therefore, to know
what the Christians wanted. To this O'Donnell
replied that he came to Africa to make war, and
not to make peace, and that he had not authority
to conclude the latter, nor could he say what terms
his Government might think fit to demand, but he
would send immediately to. the Queen of Spain,
and would be prepared with a reply on Thursday
next. To this end General Uztariz, of the General's
staff; left yesterday afternoon, on board the Volcano
man-otwar steamer, for Alicant, whence he will
hasten to Madrid and return hither by Thursday, on
which day the Moorish deputies will revisit the camp
to receive a reply. It is said to be probable that
Muley Abbas himself will come to the camp, as he
has expressed a wish to make the acquaintance of
the Spanish Commander-in-Chief. The Moors say
they had been deceived as to Spanish power and
resources, which they had believed to be much less
than they have lately been shown to be, and they
recognise their inability to continue the struggle.
The Spaniards who, with an obstinate prejudice that
troubles itself little about proofs, see the agency
of the British Consul-General everywhere and in
everything, of course believe that it is he who has
misrepresented them to the Moors, forgetting the
fact that their long endurance of repeated insults
to and aggressions upon their African possessions
fully accounts for the low estimate formed of their
force and energy.

The question now is what terms will Spain de-
mand, and will they be such as the Moorish Em-
peror can and ought to accept ? The point on
which a difficulty is most likely to arise is that
of the indemnity which will be claimed from
the Moors for the expenses of the war. There are
no means of knowing what those expenses have
been ; probably General O'Donnell himself does not
exactly know them. I hear them, however, roughly
estimated at five millions sterling, and although
the sum is large considering the numbers of troops
employed and the proximity of the scene of war to
the Spanish ports, yet, from what I have seen of the
lavish manner in which everything has been done,
of the haste, waste, improvidence, and, there can be
no doubt, exorbitant charges and extensive pecula-
tion that have attended the supplying of this army,
it would not surprise me to learn .that even a
greater amount had been paid by, or was due from,
the Spanish exchequer. In asserting that there have
been mismanagement, mal-administration, and mal-
practices, I may very possibly meet with contra-
diction from some of the Madrid papers, which
will admit nothing short of perfection in every-
thing relating to the army of Africa and to all
connected with it, and whose exaggerated and
fulsome laudation of their army, their generals,
their Government, their countrymen, and them-
selves, as well as their calumnies and unfounded
statements respecting England, can hut injure
their cause and excite the laughter of im-
partial observers. But from persons on the spot,
although as Spaniards they may not ehoose loudly
to proclaim their concurrence with what I state, no
contradiction is to be anticipated. This army has
been well supplied, but this has been done at an ex-
orbitant cost. The expedition was undertaken, as
you know, on a sudden, and with scarcely any pre-
vious preparation. The consequence was the long
delay within the lines of Ceuta, where cholera and
profitless csmbsts cost so many lives. That the de-
lay and loss might not be greater it was necessary
to lavish money and to cast economical considera-
tions to the winds. Things were done, said an
acute Spanish officer to me the other day, a la
Inglela—that is to say, regardless of expense.
A most defective Administration aggravated
the evil. This was to be expected at the
commencement of a war begun in haste by a
nation unaccustomed for nearly half a century to
other than civil contests. A large demand for
sprcdy supplies naturally entailed high prices and
heavy charges. Rations and forage of the best
quality had besought in foreign countries because
there was no time to prepare them at home.
Beef
biscuit, and compressed hay have Come in large quans
titles frornsEngland,—some compensation for the
injury whiQl), the Gibraltar merchants assert to have
been done to the trade of that place by the present
war. A large number of steamers, foreign as well as
Spanish, were taken up, generally at prices ex-
tremely remunerative to the owners Nothing Was