The Sun.
London, England, 1860-03-07 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, WEDNESDAY EVENING, MARCH 7, 1860.

Baron Ricasoli. If the French Government deems
it necessary to advance by arguments or considera-
tions which are especially applicable to Tuscany or
to the Romagna, I shall lose no time in transmitting
them honestly, at the same time inviting them to
give these arguments such a degree of publicity as
M. de Thouvenal may deem fitting.
" Yet I think it right to observe, that if the pro-
position relative to the Romagna be presented in
the form it assumes in the despatch of M. de Thou-
venal, we expose ourselves to seeing it rejected
almost unanimously by the Romagnoles. On his
part the Holy Father would probably give it a
still less favourable reception than if the absolute
separation of these provinces were in question.
" The idea of a Vicariat, implying that of a direct
interference of the Court of Rome in internal ad-
ministration, would encounter among the popula-
lations of these countries absolute resistance. It
would be impossible to make them accept it other-
wise than by force. Submitted to the test of po-
pular suffrage, that proposition would hardly meet
with any favour ; and on this point there can be no
sort of doubt. It is, moreover, evident that the
Holy Father would not accept this combination,
however inspired it might be by the desire of sav-
ing his rights, and of not lowering the high posi-
tion which he occupies in Italy. What has, in
point of fact, hitherto prevented his Holiness from
consenting, I do not say to measure calculated to
limit his sovereign authority, but even to reforms
which were suggested to him by all Europe, is the
fear of incurring the responsibility of acts which,
though in conformity with the principles in vigour
in the greater part of civilised countries, might lead
to certain results contrary to the precepts of reli-
gious morality, of which the Sovereign .Pon-
tiff justly considers himself the supreme
guardian. A very recent fact corroborates
this assertion. When France desired to put an
end to the occupation of Rome she requested the
Holy See to form a national army like the other
European Powers. The Roman Government re-
plied that the Holy Father could not admit of
recruiting, because it was repugnant to his
conscience to subject a great number of his sub-
jects to a-celibacy even temporary. The institution
of a Vicariat would not. prevail over these scruples.
The Holy Father, regarding himself as indirectly
responsible for the acts of its vicar, would certainly
not allow him the liberty of action necessary to
permit the proposed plan to have any useful result.
I am of opinion that France proposing to herself
to secure to the Holy Father certain advantages,
and to preserve his high political sovereignty, her
object would be attained with less difficulty if the
annexation were accomplished with the express re-
serve on the part of the King of Sardinia to nego-
tiate with the Holy See, and to obtain its assent to
the new state of things by means of certain obli
gations his Majesty would contract with it ; these
obligations to cousist in the acknowlegment of the
entire sovereignty of the Pope, and in an engage-
ment to co-operate even by force of arms in the
maintenance of his independence, and to contribute
to a certain extent towards the expenses of the
Court of Rame. According to these considerations,
which cannot escape M. Farini, it is possible
that, in order to obtain a more sincere manifes-
tation of the wishes of the population, the
Government of the Romagna will make no
express mention of the Vicarlat in the propositions
to be submitted to universal suffrage. If. however,
M. Thouvenel is of a contrary opinion, I think
that M. Farini would make no difficulty in pro-
posing the form in which the vote is to be given
in conformity with the despatch which M. Thou-
venel communicated to me. The proposition rela-
tive to Tuscany not giving rise to any misunder-
standing, I abstain from making any observation
on the form in which it is to be presented to the
popular vote. Whatever may be the reply re-
turned by the States of Central Italy, the King's
Government at once declares that it will accept it
unconditionally. If Tuscany declares for the pre-
servation of her autonomy by means of the forma
tion of a State distinct from Sardinia, not only will
it not oppose the realisation of this wish, but it
will frankly aid in overcoming the obstacles which
suoh a solution might encounter, and obviating the
inconvenience which may follow from it. It wil
act in like manner with respect to the Romagna
and to the Duchies of Parma and Modena. But if,
or. the contrary, these provinces again manifest in
a clear manner a wish to be united to Piedmont,
e cannot any longer oppose it. Indeed, did we
wish to do so, we could not. In the present state
of public opinion a Ministry who would refuse a
second demand for annexation, sanctirned by a
second popular vote on the part of Tuscany, not
only would no longer find support in Parliament,
but would soon be overthrown by a unanimous vote
of censure. In accepting beforehand the contin-
gency of annexation, the King's Government
takes upon itself an immense responsibility.
The formal declarations contained in the despatch
of M. Thouvenel to Baron de Talleyrand render,
it is aware, the dangers much more serious which it
may produce. If it do not recede before them, it is
because it is convinced that by rejecting the de-
mand of Tuscany, not only the Cabinet, but King
Victor Emmanuel himself, would lose all influence
and all mo-al authority in Italy, and would proba-
bly be reduced to the alternative of governing by
force. Rather than hazard in such a manner the
great work of regeneration, for which France has
made so many generous sacrifices, the honour, and
even the interest, well understood of our country,
urge the King and his Government to expose them-
selves to the most perilous chances. I venture to
flatter myself that M. Thouvenal will appreciate
the motives which engage us to follow the line of
conduct I have traced out, and, even should he con-
tinue to believe that we are taking a wrong course,
that he will kindly do justice to the sentiments
which prevent us from conforming entirely to the
councils which come from a Government for which
we are accustomed to have as much sympathy as
deference. After having explained with entire
frankness the intentions of the King's Govern-
ment, I think it my duty, before I conclude
this despatch, to add some reflections on the
proposal to restore to Tuscany her autonomy,
to which the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Emperor
Thouvenel
to attach a great import-
ance. M. de l'houvenel fears that a too great
extension of Sardinia would render the task of
the King's Government more difficult, and ex-
pose it to be led away by the extreme parties who
would no longer find a sufficient counterpoise in
monarchical traditions and in the Conservative in-
stincts of the old provinces of Piedmont. I confess
that I cannot participate in these fears. If the an-
nexation of Central Italy takes place, Tuscany very
probably will form the province which will
strengthen the Conservative and Liberal element
the most. The constitution of property, the morals
of the inhabitants, and their distinguished tradi-
tions concur in giving in that country a marked
superiority to the national opinions of the moderate
party. The events of 1848, and still more those
which have occurred within the last year, prove
that the great majority of the Tuscans knew how
to unite warm patriotism with a sentiment of well-
declared order ; and, consequently, if they are
united to us they will strengthen our constitutional
edifice in place of weakening it. Would the an-
nexation of Tuscany have a greater inconvenience,
and would it present more danger with respect to
our foreign policy ? I would not dare to contest It
if we had only to choose between annexation or the
restoration of the dynasty of Lorraine. If this
solution were realised Austria would certainly
accept it without difficulty, and it would imme-
diately receive the sanction of Europe. But a
Prince, freely elected, will meet the same opposi-
tion at Vienna, and will excite more objections at
St. Petersburg and at Berlin than King Victor
Emmanuel himself annexing Tuscany to his do-
minions. If, therefore, a Prince were imposed on
the Tuscans against their will, great interior diffi-
culties would be created at home without any com-
pensation as regards foreign policy. In my opinion,
therefore, the re-establishment of an autonomy in
Tuscany presents no advantage, but it may produce
serious complications and great inconvenience. A
throne surrounded with liberal institutions, which
would have neither the principle of legitimacy nor
that of a popular voice to support it, would be
without roots and without aid. The ultra-Conser-
vative party, and that fraction of the clerical party
which confound the interests of religion with
those of divine right would oppose it to the death.
The same may be said of the national party, which
certainly will not abandon the idea of annexa-
tion. Who would defend it ? The partisans of
municipal ideas. But those are few in number,
and they are diminishing daily, for ideas follow
each other everywhere, and particularly in Italy,
in a contrary current to municipal interests.
Without friends, and in presence of determined
adversaries, the new Sovereign, however great
his personal merit, would be shortly reduced to
absolute impotency. It may be objected, perhaps,
as I have already observed, that Tuscany possesses
Conservative elements. I will reply to that
objection that the Tuscans are moderate without
being apathetic or indifferent, and that the parties
there, although not extreme, profess Levertheless
decided opinions. Now a Government which finds
itself in contradiction with the principles of all
parties would be certain of meeting an opposition,
if not violent, at least very determined. But the
internal opposition would not be the greatest dan-
ger which would menace the Government of Flo-
rence. Its feebleness would infallibly attract to
Tuscany the ardent spirits, the violent men of all
other parties in Italy. This country would shortly
become a revoluttonary focals, dangerous even for
neighbouring countries. Thanks to these foreign
elements, legal opposition would be transformed
into violent and subversive opposition, and would , !