The Sun.
London, England, 1860-09-27 00:00:00

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and, having made his survey, he determined to send
a considerable force to Caserta and its neighbour-
hood, which should be able not only to keep its
own against any attempt which the Neapolitans
might make, but which should be likewise capable
,of taking the offensive against the river line. Gene-

ral Turr was named commander of the whole force.

As for any evil intentions on the part of the
Neapolitan. army, it became soon apparent that
they entertained none. All their measures, after the
arrival of our advanced guard at Santa Maria, were
evidently calculated for defence rather than attack.
Not content with destroying the bridges and taking
off the ferry boats, they began to construct batteries
on all points where there seemed a likelihood of a
passage. All along the opposite bank of the river
strong posts of infantry, artillery, and cavalry were
placed, and only small advanced posts sent out of
Capua to observe our movements. At the same
time the troops which were quartered in the villages
behind and about Capua were drawn closer, so as

to be available for defence.
This disposition to keep strictly on the defensive
was proved the next morning, the 14th, when two
reconnaissances were sent out from Santa Maria—the
one to the left, consisting of two companies of rifle-
men, on the high road to Capua, and the other, con-
sisting of the Hungarian Legion, to the right, on
the road to San Angelo, which leads- to the Scafo di
Formicola, a bridge of boats destroyed by the Nea-
politans. As the two bodies advanced the Neapoli-
tan outposts fell back, keeping up skirmishing, but
retreating into the fortress of Capua. The two de-
tachments following till close to the end of an olive
wood which borders the Campo—a kind of glacis in
front of Capua. Arrived there, the guns of the for-
tress opened out. The object of the reconnaissance
being obtained, the troops received orders to fall
back, which they did without losing a single man.
During the next few days all remained quiet,
except a little harmless skirmishing in front of San
Lencio, which lies on the road from Caserta to
Cajazzo. In the meantime more and more troops
were sent to Caserta and its neighbourhood, and
Gen. Turr determined to make an attempt to throw
some troops across the river.
The 'Volturno is one of the most capriciously
winding rivers in Italy, so that its line from the sea
up to the foot of the heights of Cajazzo, which is
scarcely more than 20 miles by the road, is pro-
longed, through the windings, to almost double
that distance ; its banks are for the most part low,
and of about equal height on both sides. As its
width varies from 50 to 100 yards, there would be
no great difficulty in constructing a bridge and
forcing the passage on that long line.
But there were several reasons against such an
attempt. First, such a crossing is an awkward
operation in the best case, and much more so with
an army which is weak in the technical part of the
art of warfare. Thus our strength lies in the moun-
tains, and by making a movement higher up it was
possible to cross the river without finding resist-
ance, and thus get past the mountains on the left
dank of the enemy, to organize the popular move-
ment in those parts, and unite with the National
Guards of the province of Molise, which had al-
ready declared for us. With this view Major Gudafi
was sent with 300 men along the road from Caserta
to Campo Basso with an order to cross the Calore,
a branch of the Volturno at Amovosi, and throw
himself into the mountains above Cajazzo. This
took place on the 17th. He sent back the next
morning a report stating that Cajazzo was
occupied by 2,200 Neapolitans. On this it
was determined to send a battalion of riflemen,
about 300 men strong, under the command
of Major Catabene, in the same direction. The two
were to attack Cajazzo the next day, while a great
demonstration all along the line was to attract the
forces of the enemy in another direction, and pre-
vent him from sending reinforcements towards
Cajazzo.
A look at the map will show you that a net-
work of roads leads from Caserta, Santa Maria, and
Aversa towards the river, thus affording the facility
of making demonstrations on several points. There
is, first of all, to the right the road from Caserta
1 towards Cajazzo. It leads along the defile formed
by the mountains of Caserta and the isolated group
of St. Angelo, till within a couple of miles from the
point where the passage is, or rather was, across the
river. The next is that running from Santa Maria in
a due northerly direction to St. Angelo, and to the
passage calledScapo di Formicola. This road is sepa-
rated by the ridge of St. Angelo from the first-
named road, but, arrived at the bank of the river, it
turns to the right and skirts the foot of the ridge
of St. Angelo, and unites with it close to the point
where the first comes out of the defile. The third, to
the left, is the main road from Santa Maria to
Capua, running in a north-westerly direction, and
forming an angle of 25 degrees with that of St.
Angelo ; almost parallel to it runs the railway
line from Santa Maria to Capua. Then comes
the main road from Aversa to Capua, which, leav-
ing Santa Maria to the right, passes Carditello and
the Royal hunting-house close by, unites at La
Foresta with the road running from the sea shore,
and then proceeds along the river to Capua. The
three last named roads—namely, that from Santa
Maria to Capua, the railway line, and the road from
Averse, enter Capua at the same point—that is,
close to the river in the western angle. The town
itself is built entirely on the left bank of the river,
and is protected by regularly fortified bastions,
while it is skirted behind by the river.
In order to make a diversion and thus facilitate
the taking of Cajazzo, the real object of operations
the demonstration was to be made from all these
roads. The Brigade Saulis, with two guns, was to
advance on the extreme right on the road from Ca-
serta, and engage the enemy's attention towards
the passage of Cajtzzo and a ford which lies be-
tween this and the passage of Formicola. The Bri-
gade Eber, starti*lg from Santa Maria, was to de-
monstrate against this latter, to effect a junction
with the Brigade Saulis to the right, and at the
Capuasame toinm
thee
high in h
r oad
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Santa demonstrationNiaria
to againstcap Capua.
a.
Colonel Rustow, with six battalions and two guns,
was to advance towards Capua and occupy the
enemy, while on the road from Aversa to Capua
Colonel Spangaro was to go with two battalions to
La Foresta and operate in that direction. The order
for all was not to compromise their men, but do
just sufficient to force the enemy to concentrate his
forces on the different threatened points. All were
to be ready at 6 a.m. in the morning of St. Gennaro.
As every column acted independently and had its
own scope you must not expect a picture of an en-
semble of operations, but only screps of incidents as
they occurred on the different points. To begin by
the right, the Brigade Saulis advanced towards the
passage of Cajazzo. When it debouched from the
defile it found that the enemy held with two com-
panies a farmhouse situated just opposite to the
ford, while on the other side of the river two guns
were placed to oppose the passage. There is a row
of poplars and underwood which runs along the
river just on that point. These were occupied by a
battalion of riflemen. Higher up were two other
guns and a battalion of riflemen to defend the spot
against an attack on the left flank, while behind
and further down the river considerable masses of
troops were concentrated. Gen. Turr commanded
in person on this side. Placing the two guns he
had with him in an advantageous position close to
the entrance of the defile, a battalion of Saulis'
Brigade was sent forward in skirmishing line,
while another attacked at the point of the bayonet
the companies placed in the farmhouse. These
latter did not wait, but made off as fast as possible
along the river's bank. Having no means of pass-
ing, they had to run back along the river into Ca-
pua. The house was then occupied, and the skir-
Inisbers here pushed forward close to the river's
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exhausted, and had,
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ultimately, to return as best they could, on which
occasion a number were dispersed and lost.
While this was going on Garibaldi, who had just