The Sun.
London, England, 1860-09-04 00:00:00

THE INVASION OF CALABRIA.

(From .the Special Correspondent of the
AU Times.)
REGGIO, G. 24.
Our position in Calabria may be said to be estab-
lished. The cannonading and musketry fire which
we watched with such interest during the day of the
21st are now fully explained. On both sides opera-
tions have been successful. Reggio is in our hands,
and the descent of Cosenz has been effected with
little loss. As usual in well-combined operations,
the one considerably facilitated the other. When
Garibaldi decided to march on Reggio he gave orders
to make a diversion towards the Faro, in order to at-
tract the steamers which had collected there at the
notice of his approach. The disembarkation toek
place under such favourable circumstances that it
was thought possible to tow off the Torino from the
bank where she had struck. While this operation
was going on (from 6 a.m. till about 11 a.m.) the
troops, who had been landed on one of the dry
fiumare in the vicinity of Melito, made themselves
as comfortable as they could on that arid and inhos-
pitable shore. They piled their arms, took off their
capotes and haversacks, and partly lay down to rest
after a sleepless night, while some went in search
of water, of which that part of Calabria is at this
season almost destitute. It was under these circum-
stances that the Neapolitan steamers arrived. Before
even their approach was perceived the Franklin,
which was the other steamer of the expedition, see-
ing her efforts fruitless, had taken her course for
Messina, and passed the Neapolitan steamers shortly
after entering the Straits. When, therefore, the
latter arrived, they found merely the stranded ship
and the encampment close by on the beach. They
opened fire on both, and created some excitement
among the troops peacefully reposing on shore. In
order not to expose them to a useless fire, the order
was given to move higher up into the mountains
which are close by, which was done. The two
steamers now concentrated their fire on the stranded
ship, and soon set her on fire. The troops were
concentrated again towards evening, and Garibaldi

passed the night at Melito.
Here, by one of those favourable accidents which
go by the name of " luck" in the operations of a
general, a detachment of those who first embarked
from the Faro came down in search of provisions
from San Lorenzo, and fell in with the troops
brought over by Garibaldi.
It was on this occasion that the first detailed news
could be collected as to their fate and wanderings.
The whole plan of their first descent had been ar-
ranged according to information given by a Cala-
brian gentleman, the Barone di Mussolino. He had
promised to get an officer of engineers and three
artillerymen into the fort of Alta Fiumara ; the
descent was to take place at the fiumara at the
foot of the fort. Three native guides were to be in
readiness to conduct the expedition by a circuitous
road on to the plateau where the Fort di Fiumara
lies. The fort is only guarded on that side by a high
wall, loopholed, but with no guns ; those who had
been introduced into the fort were to open one of the
postern gates, and then a rush was to be made to
seize the fort. For unforeseen contingencies ladders
were to be taken over to be used for scaling the
walls. The military part of the expedition was con-
fided to Major Missori; but, as Baron Mussolino
had planned the whole expedition, this engendered
a division in the command, to which probably the
failure of the attack on the fort is due.
The first contretemps which occurred was that,
instead of landing at the fiumara close to the fort,
they landed at the next, lower down. In the dark
night it was difficult to distinguish one from the
other, and to calculate the force of the current ; be-
sides this, there was probably a tendency in the Si-
cilian boatmen to make a mistake on the safe side ;
at any rate, the guides who were to have been there
could not be found. In order to look for them five
men were sent to the right and as many to the left.
Whether the Neapolitans had discovered a descent
had taken place, or whether they had posts outside
the fort on the slopes, certain it is that one of these
detachments sent out to look for the guides fell in
with a Neapolitan patrol, exchanged a few shots with
it, took two prisoners, but at the same time tho-
roughly alarmed the garrison of the fortress. Some
cannon-shot were fired, which we saw and heard at
the Faro, followed by a wild fire of musketry in
the dark. Major Missori was for waiting to see,
but a part of the men, rather shaken by the effects
of this alarm, followed a cry which was raised to
be off to the mountains, and scaled the heights im-
mediately behind them. The rest, seeing that it
was useless to wait any longer, went up the course
of the fiumara, and arrived after a fatiguing march
next day at the Cascina de Forestani, an isolated
farmhouse on one of the spurs of the Monte Alto,
between Santa Eufemia and San Stefano, where
they were joined by degrees by those who had gone
the other way, minus five, who were lost in the
dark, and fell into the hands of the Neapolitans.
The failure of the enterprise, and the consequent
precipitous retreat, were not exactly calculated to
animate the spirits of this forlorn hope. All those
who were under the immediate command of Mus-
solino attributed the ill success to his bad disposi-
tions ; and most of the officers, who held a kind of
improvised council of war, were for giving the un-
divided command to Major Missori. But in order
not to cause a schism with the Calabrians, it was
at last arranged to continue as hitherto.
Although thus shut in among the wilds of Cala-
bria, with the road to the sea-shore cut off by the
Neapolitans, who immediately sent reinforcements
to the threatened point, the position was not des-
perate. All the villages in the neighbourhood vied
with each other in providing the little band with
everything which they required. The Neapolitans,
although so superior in numbers, seemed to have no
intention in the first days to molest them ; and
then there were the woods and mountains behind,
a tolerably safe line of retreat. After a few days
spent at the Cascina, there arose a general desire to
do something. In the direction of the Forte di
Fiumara there seemed little chance of success, for
it was known that the garrison had been reinforced,
and had taken possession of the plateau above it,
which commands the fort ; it was therefore agreed
to attempt something towards Bagnara, a little
town on the beach above Scylla. Being on the crest
of the high mountains, the descent was open in
every direction to a troop of lightly-accoutred men
without baggage. On the evening of the fourth
day the little band started, and marched all night.
The guide proved but indifferent, and the road was
missed repeatedly. Still, in the morning our volun-
teers were on the heights which overlook Bagnara,
and the fort with which this, like almost all places
on the sea-shore, is provided. A score of riflemen
were sent forward, who kept up skirmishing for
some time, but it required little time to see that a
band of 200 could do very little against several
battalions, who had a fort well provided with guns
as their point d'appui. It was work for Garibaldi,
but not for others. After some skirmishing there-
fore the 200 retired, and after another fatiguing
march fell back to the Cascina de Forestani.
It the :failure of the first attempt to take the
Forte di Fiumara rather disconcerted the small band
of volunteers, their landing, the preparations of
Garibaldi on all sides, and the reconnaissance to-
wards Bagnara seem to have had a similar effect on
the Neapolitans. They saw, as appears from their
telegrams sent to Naples, Garibaldian volunteers
isembarking everywhere—at Cann itello, to the left
Reggio, at Bianchi, Gerace Bovelina, on the east
coast, long before Garibaldi did land at Melito, and
yet when the landing did take place they were not
there to impede it.

Nevertheless,
.after the reconnaisanee towards
Bagnara, a moving column of 1,800 men, under
General Briganti, was organised at Bagnara, and
started in pursuit of Major Missori's men, and ac-
tually arrived at the Cascina de Forestani without
being perceived. Seeing that the force sent out
was so numerous, the order was given to retreat
into the woods which cover the crest of the moun-
tain. To protect this retreat, 45 of the Guides
remained in position at the Cascina. But although
so much ,Superior iii numbers, the Neapolitans did
not attack, but took up a position to observe.
When, therefore, sufficient time had been given to
the mass of the column to retire, the 45 Guides fol-
lowed without being molested by the Neapolitans.
Following always the very crest of the Aspro-
monte, the Volunteers had a hard march of 22

hours, exposed to the heat of the day and the chill
of night on those arid heights, until they arrived at
San Lorenzo, on the southern slopes of the Aspro--
rconte, above Melito. San Lorenzo is built on an.
isolated sugarloaf mountain, which rises above it s
neighbours. This was just a position of defence i a
case the Neapolitans ventured so far into the wilds
of Calabria. The little band was received there, as
everywhere else, with open arms, and it was deter-
mined to hold out there till another landing took
place, and thus circumstances were changed. In
order not to weigh too heavily on the small popu-
lation of 3,000, two detachments were sent out
foraging, and it was one of these which happened
to come to Melito just the day when Garibaldi
arrived there, on the 19th. A messenger was im-
mediately despatched to San Lorenzo to inform the
rest of the column of this unexpected delivery, and
to give the order for joining as scon as possible.
They set off with light hearts, but, in spite of their
eagerness, could not arrive in time, and joined
only at Reggio after the action had begun.
As soon as Garibaldi saw that it was all over with
the Torino, lit was anxious not to lose time, and
set off on the 20th from Melito, following the road
on the seashore. Although little more than 20
miles, the first eight, to the Capo dell' Armi, the
ancient Leucopetra, are only a bridle path, often
rather difficult to pass, except in single files. But
more than this is the difficulty of finding water at
this season, when all the wells are nearly exhausted
and the fiumare are dry. This was a great draw-
back in a corps which eontained a considerable
number of Sicilians. Of all water-greedy animals
I ever saw the Sicilian Volunteer on march is the
most greedy. It is in vain you try to convince him
that the more he drinks the more he will want to
drink. He is more irrational in this respect than
any animal ; he cannot pass a well or fountain with-
out taking his share, and he has so little control over
himself that he gets completely demoralised if he
cannot indulge in this desire—an offshot of his
fancy. Garibaldi, on the contrary, has complete
control over himself, and allows no weakness in
others. He is without pity in this respect. He
thinks every one ought to be so absorbed with the
object in view as to forget all the little miseries of
life. A great friend of walking, and indefatigable,
his habit is to dismount, take his sword on his
shoulder, and stride along for hours without halting
once. In the march to Reggio it was, besides, im-
portant not to lose time, and to arrive before the
Neapolitans had time to strengthen the garrison of
Reggio. The result was that a number of the troops
remained behind, and were picked up by the column
under Major Missori, which, having descended from
San Lorenzo, followed the road in the wake of Gari-
baldi.
Having given a short rest to his troops some
miles from Reggio, the march was resumed the
next morning at daybreak. The story about the
people of Reggio having asked the commander of
the garrison, Colonel Du mez, to fight outside was
true, for, leaving a few hundred men in the fort,
he went out with the rest, and took up a
..position
at the jrumara which is crossed by a stone bridge
just outside of Reggio. Every fiurnara in these
regions is a natural position, not only in winter,
when it is often inaccessible, but even in sum-
mer, when there is no water, for the banks are
steep and always well wooded. But, in spite of
this, there seemed no intention on the part of the
Neapolitans to make a serious stand. Garibaldi
divided his force into three columns. The town of
Reggio, like all towns built on a narrow beach, is
long and of little breadth, although it encroaches
considerably on the hills around it, by which it is
commanded. The object, therefore, was to get pos-
session of the higher part of the town and of the
hills. The chief attack, under Garibaldi himself,
was, therefore made in that direction, while Bixio
operated against the centre, towards the bridge ;
and the column to the left advanced by the sea•
shore. Whether the Neapolitans were resolved
from the first not to fight very desperately, or
whether they were discouraged by some other cir-
cumstance, at any rate they gave way soon in the
centre and on their right. On the left alone they
attempted to make some resistance. Garibaldi,
1 with a few men, had taken possession of a cascina
opposite to their position until a sufficient rein-
forcement could be brought up to charge with the
bayonet. At the first etternpt the Neapolitans
gave way, and the column entered the town, chas-
ing before it the Neapolitans, who fled in all hurry
towards the opposite end of Reggio. In the mean-
time Bixio had likewise entered by the main street
to the Piazza of the Duomo, cutting off the retreat
of the Neapolitans who had been before him.
Arrived at the Piazza, the latter went off towards
the higher part of the town to the right, and when
debouching by a transverse street into the upper
street, which runs parallel to the main street, they
fell in with Garibaldi's column. The Volunteers
prepared to attack, but were prevented by Gari-
baldi, who thought they were coming over. The
Neapolitans, instead of coming over, took to
running, followed by ours, and were taken
prisoners in batches of 20 and 30, while the
rest dispersed and made their way towards San
Giovani. The town was thus clear in less than two
hours from the time the first fire began. The fort
alone remained. The losses had been trifling on
both sides. They would have been more serious,
and perhaps would have prevented success, had the
Neapolitan steamers, of which there were not less
than seven, done as they did at Palermo. But they
had evidently orders not to fire on the town. They
merely sent a few shot and shell towards the road
while the column was advancing, but ceased firing
as soon as the latter had entered the town. Besides
this their attention was soon called to another point.
Cosenz had got everything ready for a descent on
the coast of Cala,bria from the Faro Point at the
first notice of the attack on Reggio. Ninety boats
Ifull of men were waiting for this movement in the
lake, where they escaped the notice of the only
Neapolitan steamer which had remained towards
the entrance of the Straits, the others being en-
gaged at Reggio. As soon as the first cannon shots
were heard from Reggio 60 of the boats started, and
made a rush for the other side, when they were
quickly followed by the 30 others. Both the steamers
from Reggio and the one from above made a race
to overtake the boats, but all they could do was to
send shots on to the beach and shatter the empty
boats, while the troops they contained took a posi-
tion on the heights. Besides they had soon to think
of their own safety, for the Faro batteries began to
open. All the firing which we watched from Mes-
sina with such anxiety did no harm on our side,
and probably little on the other. Except a big
shell, believed to be a 13-inch, which burst above
one of the batteries without hitting any one, lite-
rally not a single Neapolitan shot ever reached the
Sicilian shore. Our artillerymen, of course, stoutly
maintain that their shot told more than once, that
they set on fire some bushes on the opposite shore,
and that they disabled one steamer at least. As a
truthful chronicler, I must say that they seem all
safe.
While this intermezzo of the bold move of Cosenz
was going on at the Faro, Garibaldi, having driven
the Neapolitans out of the town, took measures to
blockade the fort of Reggio. All these shore forts
have their real line of defence towards the sea,
while comparatively little attention is paid to the
land side. Thus, with the fort of Reggio, three sides
of it are closely surrounded by houses, and only
that looking to the sea is free, while the heights
above look completely into it. All the issues having
been occupied, as well as some of the houses, one of
those desultory firings began which rarely lead to
anything except a number of wounded on both
sides. Among those who suffered on this occasion
was Bixio, the Commander of the Brigade, who
was grazed by a ball on the left forearm. The fort
answered with grape and ronndshot until about 11
a.m. The column under Missori arrived, and went
up to the heights. Being mostly composed of good
rifle shots, the Neapolitans soon left their guns on
the platform and retired into the casemates. The
Commander himself was mortally wounded by a
bullet in the breast, and soon after the white flag
ap eared on the fort of Reggio.
i
he terms made were those which were given at
M azzo—the garrison to evacuate with arms and
ba -et tga
g leaving behind all the materiel of the fort.
Tl*se conditions might seem too favourable, but it
mist be recollected that time is a great agent in

Garibaldi's combinations, and a thousand stand of
arms, or a thousand prisoners, mere or less, cannot
come into comparison with it.
As it was the spoil was notbad,—eight field pieces,
with horses, and all; six 32-pounders; 18 position-
guns, from 18 to 24-pounders ; two Paixhan's 10-
inch guns ; 500 stand of arms, a quantity of coal,
ammunition, and provisions, besides a number of

horses and mules.
For us the position and the guns of Reggio are
of the greatest advantage, for they insulate Messina
more than ever, and must give us the ultimate com-
mand of both sides of the Straits ; for the Neapoli-
tans the heaviest loss is the coal for their steamers,
of which the depot was at Reggio, and the naval
station itself. All the provisions, both for the fleet
and for Messina, in troubled times came from Reggio.
It was as it were the wrist of the hand with which
they held Sicily, and which is now cut off.
The reception all over Calabria, but, above all,
in Reggio, surpasses in warmth and cordiality by
far that which we received in Sicily. There was a
good deal of noise and cry over the way, but, with
the exception of Palermo, there was little intimate
intercourse with the natives of the land. It be may
a general shyness of strangers, or an aversion to the
military, but it is a fact. Here it is entirely dif-
ferent. It is only a few days ago our troops came
here, and they are received like friends in the
families, while over the way, in' many towns, the
officers were sent off to mess in order not to have
them in the family. This warmth produces consi-
derable impression on the volunteer who has come

to fight for an idea.
From the 21st to the 23d there were few incidents
of any consequence, either on this or on the Sicilian
side.
About four o'clock in the afternoon of the 22d the
town of Messina was alarmed by a succession of
cannon shots from the fort into the town, preceded
by a brisk fire of musketry towards the outposts of
Terranova. The troops ran to arms, the population,
men and women, made their way hastily towards
the upper part of the town, the National Guard
spread about in driblets in all directions. The im-
pression was that the Commander of the fort had
made up his mind to restore the Neapolitan losses
on the Calabrese side by bombarding the town.
Generals Turr and Medici were soon at the out-
posts; a parlementaire was sent across, and the
Commander of the fort, General Gorgola, came in
person to make excuse. He said that he could not
keep his men in order, a thing which admits of no
doubt ; for while the conference between him and
our generals took place in the middle of the Piana
of Terranova a hail of bullets was fired by the Nea-
politans on the members of the conference. The
whole thing had originated in one of those skir-
mishes of outposts which, in spite of injunctions
and. orders, had continued for the last week or so,
and, not producing any result by musketry, the
Neapolitan artillerymen took part on their own ac-
count, and began throwing shot and grape into the
Strada d'Austria, and into the houses looking to-
wards the esplanade of the fort. However, it seems
that the Commander of the fort got the better of
his troops, for the firing was discontinued.
On the evening of the 21st the Ist Brigade of
Medici received orders to embark on board the
Queen of England and the Washington, both of
which were in the harbour of Messina. The captain
of the Queen of England, although she has not yet
changed her flag, consented to take the troops across;
but when he had his steam up he went out and
steamed up to the Faro. Message after message
was sent, but without effect, and as the morning
dawned the expedition was given up. In the mean-
time the other troops had been embarked on board
the Washington, where they remained all next day
and night, in the hope that the captain of the Queen
of England could be induced to keep his promise.
On the 22d, in the morning, there was a great
cannonade at the Faro. It was the Borbone,
a large Neapolitan screw frigate, which passed.
She hoisted the French flag, and under its pro•
tection came close to the batteries, when she
opened with a broadside, which killed two
men and wounded five, not in the batteries but in
the village of Faro. Previous to firing she hauled
down the French and hoisted the Neapolitan flag.
The batteries, although thrown off their guard,
answered, but could make only little impression, as
the Borbone steamed down with the full force of
her machinery and of the current.
The next day she came up again, killing one man
and wounding three, but without passing the
Straits, she returned to cruise below Reggio.
The artillerymen at the Faro, indignant at the
trick which had been played on them the day be-
fore, decided to take good care not to be taken in
again. And in fact, when, the next day, a Nea-
politan brigantine passed laden with forage and
hoisting the French flag, she was fired into ; and
when she did not stop some gunboats were sent
towards her which sunk her ; it was only when the
gunboats approached that she had hauled down the
French colours and hoisted the Neapolitan.
With all this it was a bad precedent to suppose
every French ship to be a Neapolitan in disguise,
and the consequences have already become appa-
rent, for to-day one of the French aviso boats, which
passed near the Faro, was shot at 17 times. For-
tunately the practice was bad, and no harm was
done. But, in spite of this, the French Consulate
made a protest, and sent immediately a strong re-
port to Naples. The Descartes steam frigate got
up her steam and went out of the harbour towards
the Faro point, where she went to anchor. Not
even time was left to have a report from the Faro
and to make the necessary excuses. As you re-
member, the two ships which were captured by
the Neapolitans, and taken to Gaeta, employed the
stratagem of hailing our ships in French, and be-
guiling them thus to betray the real scope of the
expedition, and since that time several similar feints
were employed. It is, therefore, the Neapolitans
who are more in fault than ours, but, at any rate, it
is an aw kward occurrence, which, if there is a will,
may serve to bring about disagreeable complications.
VILLA SAN GIOVANNI, AUG. 25.
Events are passing so rapidly that there is
scarcely time to record them even in their general
features. The whole Calabrese side of the Straits
is ours. As I mentioned before, the whole line of
defence on the coast is directed more against the sea
than against the land. From Scylla to Reggio there
is a succession of little forts, mounting from 15 to
20 guns on an average, and with the exception of
that of the Punta di Pezzo, which is on the beach,
situated on the first heights above the sea. The
road, the only line for military operations, runs
along the seashore, where likewise most of the
towns and villages are constructed. Above all this
line rises a succession of hills up to the backbone of
the Apennines, which runs nearly parallel with the
Straits. From this description you can see that as
soon as a force has one point on the coast it can take
this whole line of defence in the rear. The land side
of the forts is but indifferently strengthened, and the
forts themselves are looked into from the upper line
of hills. To oppose, therefore, a resistance to an ene •
my it is necessary to do so from the heights ; and
even this has the inconvenience that unless the most
lofty heights are taken up, the position can still be
turned. For the Neapolitans such tactics were
doubly difficult, for the heightsare the most favour-
able ground for us, where they cannot compete
with us ; but, besides, there seemed to be, likewise,
little intention on the part of either Neapolitan
troops or officers to make a very desperate resistance.
They had chosen Monteleone as their real line of
defence, and had, besides the garrisons along the
line, two flying columns, each of from 1,800 to
2,000, under Generals Melendez and Briganti, the
former more properly for the defence of the coast
from Baguara upwards, and the latter for the
Straits. After the taking of Reggio this latter force
had taken up a position above the fort of the Punta
di Pezzo, on the plain which intervenes between the
road and the heights. If the Neapolitan General
had wished to be taken, he could not have chosen a
more appropriate position, for by turning the heights
of San Giovanni he could not only be attacked and
destroyed by the riflemen from above, but risked
likewise having his retreat cut off. The position
was so much the more critical as the men landed with
Colrenz had already taken possession of the heights.
Paribaldi moved out with whatever was moveable
from Reggio, taking with the main force the hill
line above San Giovanni. San Giovanni, Azziarello,