The Sun.
London, England, 1860-07-30 00:00:00

from Sicily at pleasure. Its guns entirely com-
mand the straits. The men could land under the
protection of their fire, and there can be little doubt
what the next step of the young monarch
must be. Messina is the key of Naples,
as things now stand. Every effort has therefore
been made to put it in a state of defence. The
garrisons from the less important places in Sicily
have been brought together in it. Melazzo was
defended merely because it was practically one of
its outworks, and now it will be defended probably
as long as it can defy the means, the skill, and the
courage of the Garibaldians—or as long as the
soldiers will fight for the most worthless of causes;
because, the fall of Messina means the exit of the
Bourbons from the laud they have cursed so long.
To prevent the necessity of that step was the
object of the mission of the Marquis DE LA GRECA
to the Courts of London and Paris ; and the tele-
grams of to-day show with how little reason LA
GRECA complained in the letter which Lord JOHN
RUSSELL read to the House of Commons, of his Lord-
ship's having stated that the Marquis wished the two
Governments to employ force to prevent GARIBALDI
landing on the mainland. On the contrary, said
LA GRECA, I only wanted them to "put pressure"
on GARIBALDI. The pressure we now learn was
that which certainly would have effectually pre-
vented GARIBALDI from crossing the straits with
only his brave little Veloce for convoy. English
and French men-of-war were to cruise in the straits
and prevent a landing ! ! We feel a natural pride in
the immediate rejection of the proposal by Lord
JOHN RUSSELL ; although the Envoy could present
his master's abject supplications, backed by the
fact that the French Government were quite will-
ing to aid in saving a Bourbon. In fact, now it be-
comes evident that nothing French is wanted by
the Italian people, the next best thing in the eyes
of the French EMPERGR is to keep Italy dismem-
bered, and to prevent the Kingdom of Sardinia
from becoming a Kingdom of Italy. May the sword
of Italy and GARIBALDI frustrate his mean coun-
sels ! GARIBALDI has doubtless two other faults
in Imperial eyes; he is completely eclipsing, as a
General, all the performances of the Inaperator
from the Tuilleries of last year. As achievements
of military skill and courage, we have no doubt
that any English commanding officer would give at
once the preference to those of the popular Italian
General, and would prefer the fame of GARIBALDI
to that of LOUIS NAPOLEON. And perhaps the
still greater fault is, that he is a real, not a sham,
Liberator; that he enthusiastically longs for a
free and united Italy, and that he is on the road to
success. The man who halted at the Quadrilateral
did not intend this.

A contemporary, who speaks as if from special
information, and who is not prone to impose
canards on its readers, tells us that a
letter is in town which professes the
most earnest wish for alliance with England,
and for community of objects and measures in Syria
and Italy; that it gives also assurances of a frank
and explicit character relative to naval and mili•
tary strength; and is throughout inspired by the
idea of peace and the development of the commer-
cial resources of France. Assurances from such a
quarter are scarcely worth the paper they are
written on ; but in connection with Italy, we must
have the very reverse of sending frigates to prevent
GARIBALDI'S crossing to the mainland. Indeed,
if the EMPEROR ventured to give such an order,
we sincerely hope that English men-of-war would
be instructed so to place themselves that GARI-
BALDI'S transports could only be reached by firing
through them. As to " Partant pour la Syrie"
together, we must offer a few remarks soon on that
subject, with the light of recent information.

imeo Danaos et Bona ferentes. This time-worn
quotation will naturally occur to a good many
readers who ponder over the attractive synopsis of
a communication received from our Imperial ally,
which is given in this morning's impression of a
contemporary. The organ in which it appears is
usually the recipient of official intelligence, and
there is consequently little reason to doubt its
authenticity. We subjoin the paragraph alluded

.0 :

" Friendly words are always acceptable from a
neighbour, especially when it is in his power to
give proof of his intentions and complete our
satisfaction by deeds. If we are not misinformed,
a letter has jest been received in London which
cannot but ensure a hearty welcome from any
Englishman who may become aware of its contents.
An earnest desire for our alliance, coupled with
the practical request that we should work ont in
Italy and in Syria an united policy, are subjects
worthy of our willing attention ; especially when
in the East the firm maintenance of the Ottoman
Empire in its independence and integrity, and in
Italy the renunciation and hindrance of all 'and
any foreign intervention, are the lines of policy
suggested as both judicious and desirable.
" If we add to this, that we have reason to believe
that assurances relative to military and naval
strength, of a frank and explicit character, form a
portion of this document, it will be readily admitted
that we can hardly over-estimate its importance.
The thought which would appear to have guided
its author, and which we understand is repeatedly
expressed, is the maintenance of peace throughout
Europe, the development of the commercial re-
sources of France, and the cultivation of a good
understanding and common action between the two
great Western Powers."
Instead of anticipating a-hearty welcome for this
Imperial proposal, we apprehend that it will be
regarded with a very general feeling of doubt and
suspicion. An earnest desire, we are told, is ex-
pressed for our alliance, coupled with a practical
request for our co-operation in Italy and Syria.
Is the united policy to be the price of the alliance ?
Or will our august Ally be equally ready with his
friendship if we stand aloof from the practical exten-
sion of his " ideas." The conduct of the French Go
vernment with respect to Italian affairs has not been
altogether so free from suspicion of interested
motives, so unselfish in its benevolence, that Eng-
land should pledge herself to abide by its projects
and principles for the future. The "renunciation
and hindrance of all and any foreign intervention"
sounds grandiloquent enough. It may, however,
possibly turn out to mean integral dissensions
fostered between the different Italian States, an
appeal to universal suffrage, and the departure of
fresh bands of "independent " delegates to solicit
annexation to the French empire. Or it may signify
a check on the independent action of the English
Cabinet and the freely expressed opinion of the
English people. Are we fully prepared to
accept the responsibility of sharing the acts of
the Imperial Government, for we may be fully
assured we shall have half the credit of all doubt-
ful proceedings, though the glory, if there be any,
may remain to the promoters of pacific " ideas."
Let Savoy and Sebastopol prove warnings.
As'for the frank and explicit assurances about
naval and military affairs, there is really nothing
to be said. We do not suppose any amount of
Parisian eloquence will induce us to consider the
owner of Cherbourg and the ruler of an army
which retains the traditions of Waterloo, as a per-
fectly harmless and inoffensive individual. Let
him give us cause to trust that he will use his
strength wisely, not expect us to credit an asser-
Una of 'weakness.
We, too, are explicit on our side,

E S.