The Sun.
London, England, 1860-03-26 00:00:00

fire so arranged, so as to go off in about 10 minutes ; the other
beneath the remainin., part of the fortress, with a port-fire
calculated to burn until we ourselves were safe on board
the frigate.
After several days' anxious expectation of the arri-
val of reinforcements from the Junta, and severe
fighting, at least as far as the walls and enemy's
guns were concerned, for the fort could not return
a shot, the French, having established what they
considered a practicable breach, assaulted the fort ;
but when they had reached the summit of the
breach and thought that all was won, they met
with unexpected and insurmountable obstacles, and
their retreat was precipitate.
The citadel, however, from the want of rein-
forcements, which never arrived, was compelled to
surrender, and then, and not till then, did. the gal-
lant Cochrane evacuate the post, which be had
held when all deemed it impossible, his only regret
being that one of his charges missed fire, and that
the fort was only half blown up, thus leaving
enough standing for the French to place their flag-
staff. Verily people are never satisfied. Having
returned to England, he was appointed to command
the fire-ships in the Basque-roads, and in this
affair, like all 'others, he was most unfairly dealt
with by the Admiralty. Having been requested
by Lord Mulgrave to form a plan for destroying
the French fleet at Rochefort, he did so to the
satisfaction of the Board, and was requested to
take the command ; this he declined ; but upon
urgent entreaty reluctantly consented. When ar-
rived in the Basque-roads there was a bad feel-
ing against him, senior officers not liking a junior
to take a responsible command, forgetting that
they themselves had been unable to form any plan
which bad any prospect of success. The Ad-
miral, however, stood his friend as far as his
deference to the others would let him ; but, like
many other well organised schemes, to a great ex-
tent it failed from the want of unity in:the camp.
Lord Cochrane saw this, and he saw in the end
that without some decisive movement the French
fleet would escape, solely that he might gain no
credit for his undertaking. In this unpleasant
predicament he determined on a bold and clever
stroke to draw on an action. Although his fire-
ships had done no damage themselves, the f.ar
of them had effected almost as much as a collision
would have done. All the French ships were found
to be ashore in the morning, heeled over at low
water, an easy prey to the English fleet, yet no
effort was made for a considerable time to ap-
proach them. Lord Cochrane's impatience to go
to work can best be expressed by his signalt—
the Imperious© being nearest to the enemy, he could
of course see all.

At 7 a.m. we signalled again, "All the enemy's ships,
except two, are on shore ;" this signal, as well as the former
one, being merely acknowledged by the answering pennant ;
but to our surprise, no movement was visible in any part
of the fleet indicating an intention to take advantage of the
success gained.
Reflecting that, from the distance of the British force
from the stranded enemy's ship's—viz., from twelve to
fourteen miles, the commander-in chief could not clearly
be acquainted with their helpless condition, I directed the
signal to be run up, " The enemy's ships can be destroyed ;"
this also meeting with the same cool acknowledgment of
the answering pennant.
Not knowing what to make of such a reply, another sig-
nal was hoisted, " Half the fleet can destroy the enemy."
This signal was again acknowledged by the answering pen-
nant, the whole fleet still remaining motionless as before.
On this I made several telegraph signals, one of which was
probably regarded as impertinent, viz., " The frigates alone
can destroy the enemy," though it was true enough, their
ships aground being perfectly helpless. To my astonish-
ment the answering pennant was still the only reply vouch-
safed
Eight and nine o'clock passed without any indication of
movement on the part of the fleet, though the tide was now
fast rising, so that any ships sent to the attack of the
stranded vessels would have had the flood tide to go in and
the ebb to return, after having accomplished their destruc-
tion ; and it was evident that if not attacked, the same
flood-tide would enable the French ships aground to float
and escape, with which view some were heaving their guns
and stores overboard. On ascertaining this, I again sig-
nalled, " The enemy is preparing to heave off ;" and enter-
taining no doubt that the Commander-in-chief would not
permit such a catastrophe, the Imperieuse dropped her
anchor close to the Boyart Shoal, in readiness for any ser-
vicethat might be required.
At 11 a.m. the British fleet weighed, and stood towards.
Aix Roads. By this time the Ocean, three-decker, and
nearest ships aground were busily employed in heaving off,
with a view of making sail for the Charente I The advance
of our fleet had been too long delayed ; nevertheless, as the
bulk of the enemy's ships were still aground, good service
might have been rendered. To our amazement the British
fleet, after approaching within seven or eight miles of l the
grounded ships, again came to anchor' about three and a
half miles distant from Aix—that is, just out of range.'
There was no mistakingthe admiral's intention in again
bringing the fleet to an anchor. Notwithstanding that the
enemy had been four hours at our mercy, and to a conside-
rable extent was still so, it was now evident that no attack
was intended, and that every enemy's ship would be per-
mitted to float away unmolested and unassailed, I I frankly
admit that this was too much to be endured. The words
of Lord Mulgrave rang in my cars,Admiralty is bent
on destroying that fleet before it can go out to the West
Indies."
The surprise of the enemy at seeing the fleet anchor was
probably greater than my own. Before that, they had been
making great exertions to lighten and heave off, but no
sooner had the fleet brought up, than, seeing the possibility
of escape. they strained every nerve to hasten the operation.
In place ca the fleet, or even the frigates, a single bomb,
-syhioh, being, armed with a 13-inch mortar, could project
her shells to° a great distance, without being exposed to
aaoger
from shot was ordered in to shell the ships aground.
beZdeftaokul her commander, "what attack was going to
knew nothin enemy
by the fleet ?" he replied, that "he
bombard the geb.f.urther than that he was ordered to
no intention of 'Os ashore." Thi9was proof enough that
attacking with the fleet, or any part of it,
existed.

In despair, lest the ships aground should fs9efifect
their escape, at one p.in
Im-
perieuse to be hove atrip, and ordered theanchor of d
we
driited
ste the
stern
fore-
mostm- towards the enemy. I - say " drifted," for I did not
venture to make sail, lest the movement might be seen from
the flapship, and a signal of recall should defeat my purpose
of making an attack with the Imperieuse ; the object of this
being to compel the Commander-in-chief to send vessels to
cur assistance, in which case I knew captains would dt once
attack the ships which had not been allowed to heave off
and eacae.
Had this means not been resorted to, not a single enemy's
ship would have been destroyed, for all could have hove off
almost without damage, and that, to all appearance with-
out the slightest attempt' at molestation On the part of the
British fleet. It was better to risk the frigate, or even my
commission, than to suffer such a disgraceful termination
to the expectations of the Admiralty, after having driven
ashore the enemy's fleet ; and therefore we drifted by the
wind and tide slowly past the fortifications on Isle d'Aix,
about which the Commander-in-chief had expressed so
many fears in his letter to the Board ;:but though they fired
at us with every gun that could be brought to bear, the
distance was too great to inflict damage.
Proceeding thus till 1.30 p.m., and then suddenly making
sail after the nearest of the enemy's vessels escaping, at
1.40 p.m.,khe signal was run up to the peak of the Im-
perieuse I' Enemy superior to chasing ship, but inferior to
the fled." No attention being paid to this signal, at 1.45
p.m. I again signalled, "In want of assistance," which was
true enough, being in a single frigate, close to several
enemy's ships of the line.
As this signal, according to the code then in use, was
coupled with the oxe signifying " In distress," the signal
officer on board the flag-ship thus interpreted it to the brief
m-
mander-in-chief; a circumstance which will require
explanation.
In order to divert our attention from the vessels we were
pursuing these having thrown their guns overboard, the
Calcutta, which was still aground, broadside on, begrn fir-
ing at us. Before proceeding further, it became, therefore,
necessary to attack her, and at 1.50 we shortened sail, and
returned the fire. At 2 the Imperieuse came to anchor in
five fathoms; and veering to half a cable, kept fast the
spring, firing upon the Calcutta with our broadside, and at
the same time upon the Aquilon and Ville de Varsovie
with our forecastle and bow guns, both these ships being
aground, stern on, in an opposite direction.
This proceeding—though there could be no doubt of our
being "In want of assistance," seeing that our single fri-
gate, unaided, was engaging three line-of-battle ships—did
not look much like being " In distress," as the signal officer
of the Caledonia had interpreted the signal ; the nature of
which could not, however, have deceived the commander-
in-chief, who must have witnessed the circumstance under
which the signal had been-made by the Imperieuse.
After engaging. the Calcutta for some time, and simul-
taneously firing auto the sterns of the two grounded line-
of-battle ships, we had at length the satisfaction of observing
several ships sent to our assistance—viz., Emerald, Uni-
corn, Indefatigable, Valiant, Revenge, Pallas, and Aigle.
On seeing this, the captain and crew of the Calcutta aban-
doned their veasel, of which the boats of the Imperieuse
took possession before the vessels sent to our "assistance"
came down.
A considerable portion of the French fleet was thus
destroyed, which, but for the determined conduct
of Lord Cochrane, would have all escaped. Is it to
be *wondered at, that after such want of energy on
the part of a commander, Lord Cochrane should
protest in the House of Commons when it was
proposed to give a vote of thanks to Lord Gambier
—who thereupon demanded a court martial—the
account of which is given at full length; but upon
which it is unnecessary to make any comments.
Public opinion was pretty freely expressed on that
'subject at the time ; and by that all-powerful organ
the saddle was put upon the right horse.
We cannot quit this interesting subject without
expressing our satisfaction that Lord Cochrane has
t hroughout, while vindicating his own conduct and
expressing his keen sense of the neglect and in-
justice he has experienced, always maintained
with his pen the same straightforward course
which did so much honour to his sword; and that
however much he may stigmatise the conduct of
an opponent. he never fails to do him justice.
We look forward with pleasure to the next
volume.

Evenings with Grandpapa ; or, the Admiral on
Shore. Naval stories for children, from the
Fireside Stories 9f the late Vice-Admiral Sir
Jahleel Brenton, Bart., K.C.B. By his daughter
Harriet M. Carey, authoress Harp of
France," " Matilda of Normandy," &e. Dean
and Son, Ludgate-hill.
These stories are admirably adapted for intelli-
gent juvenile readers who have a liking for naval
subjects. They are simply but clearly and forcibly
told, and the whole of them are perfectly true,
having been told to the authoress in her childhood
by her father, the late Sir Jahleel Brenton, a dis-
tinguished admiral, who received his title for high
professional services. The little stories are pro-
fusely and ably illustrated.