The Sun.
London, England, 1860-11-29 00:00:00

IThe eyes of all Europe are turned at this
moment to the Court of Turin. It has the power
and it has the responsibility. Whatever Italy may
owe to this or that man, and to one man it owes
all that any one man could do, it has no choice
but to repose on the prudence and courage of
the Sovereign whcm it has accepted by universal
acclamation. It depends on the power and it
awaits the counsels of Victor Emmanuel, and it
accordingly devolves on that Prince to do all that
the situation requires. The least shortcoming would
be a misfortune to Italy and an eternal reproach
to the man who had undertaken the task. Ten
thousand churches would sing Ti Deztms over the
rash adventurer who had accepted the allegiance
of the Italian race, and lost the high prize, or
damaged it in the handling. Nor can there be
any doubt that this great affair does absolutely
rest with the King of Sardinia. had Southern
Italy simply surrendered to Garibaldi, or insisted
on independence, in that case it would have been
responsible for its own future disasters, which
would not have been inconsiderable. But it
gave
itself up to Victor Emmanuel, and Garibaldi him-
self, with every man of patriotism and sense about
him, knew that there was no other alternative. All
honour is due to the Dictator, who has been proof.
against allurements that would have dazz'ed and
upset a less noble nature or as
it
lessanstl7clyoulculdbge-
'sent ; but the deed is done, as
done, and Victor Eammnuel is now virtually King
of Italy. If the work be left incomplete, or if the
1 unfinished vase break in the annealing, it is now
his fault. If anarchy creeps in between one rule
and another it is his fault, If a state of things
should arise to suggest an ill comparison with the
old Bourbon rule, it is his fault. All hangs on Turin ;
and the larger or fairer or more famous cities of the
Peninsula must remember that if, for the present,
their own glory seems eclipsed, it is the condition
of that unity and independence they have sought,
and the common contribution of Italy to its new
lord.
Such were the considerations which pressed
heavily, but not more than the occasion demanded,
on Victor Emmanuel and his advisers when they,
found themselves in actual possession of the rwo
Sicilies. They had to deal with a mass of difficulties,
which we can but faintly imagine. In addition to
all the evils that had ever existed, and that consti-
tuted, in fact, the case for interference, there were
now two armies in the process of dissolution,
besides a civil service in almost the same case, and
a legion of candidates for everything which their
new masters had at their disposal. This we all
knew; it was to be anticipated ; and it has been
described by the pens of many able and impartial
spectators. lVhat it may take more mental effort
to apprehend is the position of Victor Emmanuel
with the gallant men who had crowned their noble
deeds by laying half Italy at his feet. It was im-
possible not to feel for them unbounded admiration
and gratitude. But it was Italy, not Garibaldi, that
was in question. In so great an affair the work-
man must yield to his work, and the donor sub-
mit to be measured by his gift. We believe there
is very little doubt that Garibaldi himself felt as a
hero would feel on the occasion, and could see the
crisis as Victor Emmanuel was compelled to see it.
But he had pledged himself deep in word and in.
affection to his lieutenants, who, as they will re-
ceive only a reflected share of glory, desired some-
thing substantial in the shape of power and patron-
age. No doubt they, too, had largely engaged
themselves, and done much which was not likely to
stand the scrutiny of more regular and experienced
rulers. So there is no doubt that when Garibaldi
met Victor Emmanuel he was made the mouthpiece
of a demand which would simply have added a year
of revolution to centuries of division, and plunged
Southern Italy into a night of anarchy, with but the
hope of a dawn. The proposition that Garibaldi was
to be Lieutenant-General of the Two Sicilies, with.
full powers, for a twelvemonth, simply meant that
Ciispi was to reign at Naples, Bertani at Palermo,
and Mazzini to make the best use of that year's law
at both places. It also meant the sanction and per-
manent recognition not only of the Army of Southern
Italy, and, in a general way, of its ranks and com-
missions, but of every separate appointment, what-
ever the object and under whatever circumstances
made. Such an arrangement would have been incom-
patible with safety, with regular government, with
the administration of the Piedmontese army. and
with the finances at the command of the new King
of Italy. We must distinguish between the men
who did the work and the men who stepped in when
the work was done, or who only appeared in the
front to co-operate with the regular Piedmontese
troops, if even then. For several weeks the Garibal-
diens very properly confined themselves to the defen-
sive, but that was the period of the largest and most
indiscriminate levies. The chief had no other
alternative but to accept the services of all who
offered ; it was impolitic, if not dangerous, to
refuse ; and in the crowd that did offer it was not
easy to sift the claims of men who demanded rank
in the service. It is now said that many of the
officers were such as could not bear rank in
any regular service, and that the attempt to put
them on a par with the officers who had fought
their way up to rank in the Crimea, at Magenta,
at Castelfidardo, and Ancona, would produce great
and just dissatisfaction. A considerable portion of
the army of South Italy was enlisted by Bertani
after Garibaldi had crossed the Straits and was on
his way to Naples. Of course, the Piedmontese
chiefs desire to recognise all these services for as
much as they have been worth ; but to have left
the matter entirely in Garibaldi's hands would
have been to leave it in the hands of his lieutenants
—the men who drew so largely on the authority
and resources which they supposed to be vested in
them, and who would probably consider their
honour pledged not to withdraw one tittle of what
they had once granted.
For some time it was generally believed in this
country, as elsewhere, that the point on which
Garibaldi had withdrawn to his Patmos was his
failure to obtain a general recognition of the acts
of his Dictatorship. It now appears that his friends
had engaged to make larger demands, which would
in effect have rendered the submission of the Two
Sicilies to Victor Emmanuel an idle form, meaning
nothing for the present, which in this case is every-
thing. They who prompted this demand either did
not want a real Italian unity or wished to substi-
tute some other form of unity for a kingdom, or
had some game of their own. It is essential
to a unity that every part should give as well
as take, should consent to merge its own import-
ance, and even what it may imagine to be its own
idea
of and at all events should give up all
of absolute self-government. How have we gone
to work ? We have grown from a Heptarchy into
one kingdom, from three kingdoms into one, and
have recently made another large Empire a depart-
ment of the State. At every stage we
badto
encounter difficulties which cannot be said to have_
has always been found on. the. side passed away ; but the true interest. fofat
thorough
lieutenants have been so lavish
I'l service nor the
amalgamation. Already it is. said.ethetahteiGraprrialainalises
that neither the army nor the civilfficient to redeem
revenues of Two Sicilies will. be
envfiint aitbyle.
of
money The s e
them,
men
a pap% and r thatt.a
h a
ve discontentdrawn.thoe
ni sanianei
single idea of !Italian.
and power, involved
_Tail
y. and every service, and
every individual, were
abnyd'the charm. But how
every class
ficoifs
nwaetalthand place, to
Ihe. question
not
to be sculdNadsaesnpolifyesleianbrneirdcahlSesdi
easily answered,
most certainly. is. . answered at all by
so prolific isl sech
realised
Naplesa unity,?
a'
nd Sicily in the hands of two sub-
dictators,bleuatviintg ready to promise everything, give every-
thing, and borrow everything, but 'wholly unable
to make either province larger or more populous or
richer than it is. The very opinion that a great
stride has been tak& and a new era entered upon
mast rest on a definite change, which can be no
other than the foundation of one Constitutional
Kingdom for all Italy.—. Times.