The Sun.
London, England, 1860-06-13 00:00:00

ME SUN, LONDON, WEDNESDAYffEVENING, JUNE 13, 1860.

under his direct. ion. These gunboats had been a shame and
disgrace to the o l '• They were told the contract was
that theyshould b
!milt of sound timber. But no examination
untl
them, and therefore he would say
em. The hon. and gallant member
of this matter had tak.`l3l place up to this time. There was now
anoctohinmmgifturteethseitrtiarl t)gouotntil
then:complained t ha'a after the Russian war, on the return
of the fleet to this country, the men were turned adrift, and
the Admiralty had! not, up to the present time, been able to
regenerate the navy. They were in want of petty officers,
and they could not gat them. There had been no economy
in the course purflued. He implored the hou.se to come to
some arrangement. If .the Admiral y was well conducted,
no examination into the conduct of the Board could injure
it ; while, on thi ) other hand, the inquiry would be a source
of great satisfaction to the country. They would know how
the fleet was nu maged. If the Board were guilty, of course
they would not submit to the appointment of a committee;
but he trusted .one would be ;granted, and that it would
make a searching inquiry.

Mr. WARRE said he had come to the conclusion after
much consideraVoy that it would not be advisable to press
this motionto a divition ; but if it were done, he should vote
against it. He believed the discussion of those questions
would be of considerable advantage to the public service,
and he did not think the suggestions of the right hon.baro-
net the member for Droitwich would bo thrown away. He
thought that if other powers in Europe made costly and
large experiments in their navies, it would be absolutely ne-
cessary for this country to move with them par i passu. At
the same time it was his wish that the day might be far dis-
tant when they would be called upon to use these destruc-
tive arms against each other.
Sir J. ELPHINSTONE thought the discussion that had
taken place would answer all the purposes intended by the
gallant admiral. At the same time he thought the Admi-
ralty acted more on political principles than with a view to
promo'e the success of the naval service. The Admi-
ralty had jurisdiction over the tidal waters, and that
function was not always discharged with a view to the
public good. As to the ship-building department, scientific
men were of opinion that recently the ships were not
built as formerly, with a due regard to stowage. If that
department -were thrown open to the public the country
would be better served. In steam machinery, also, the Ad-
miralty were not competent judges, and with respect to the
wood department, the board was highly culpable for not
having h sufficient quantity of seasoned timber always on
hand to meet any emergency. The surveying department
was most important, but conducted in a most imperfect
' manner by means of the most wretched, vessels. The trans-
ports were even more faulty. The comptroller of the navy
was the most important person in connexion with the Ad-
miralty, and yet he had no voice at the board. As to
whether a naval man or a civilian should be at the head of
the board was a matter of great difficultyjnasmuch as the
department was almost entirely of a political character.

Sir C. WOOD doubted whether a select committee of
that house would be fitted for making such an inquiry as
the one proposed. A commission would certainly be better
qualided for such a purpose, but he thought the board
itself should be loft to do so. With reference to what had
been said about the objectionable timber being used in the
construction of the gunboats, he could say that with one
exception the contractors stated that they had the seasoned
timber which was required for building them. It was
necessary that these boats should have been built within a
certain time, and that being so he should have ordered
them to be built of the best timber that could be procured.
Putting in defective bolts was clearly a fraud, and as such
a defect might have led to loss of life, it was a crime also.
(Hear.) He had before stated to the house that he had
consulted the naval officers of the board as to the building
of these boats. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, as the
boats were built under an order from the board, and that
could not have been given without the sanction of the board.
The right hon. gentleman then stated that sheds were
built for the purpose of placing the gunboats under cover,
as it was considered it was better to do so than to keep
them in the water. As to appointments, he had never
made an appointment or promotion in his life without the
full concurrence of the board, and he never appointed or
promoted any one who was not, in his opinion, well quali-
fied for the office. He believed that upon the whole, it was
for the benefit of the public service that the First Lord of
the Admiralty should be a civilian, as he was the better able
to hold the scales even between the naval lords. As to ship-
building, that subject was always brought under the consi-
deration of the board, as the building must be done by the
order of the board. He might also mention that of the five
junior lords four were naval. There were already four or
five committees or commissions sitting upon the naval ser,
vice, and, therefore, he did not see that any advantage
would arise from acceding to the present motion. As to giv-
ing the comptroller and the accountant-general seats at the
board, he could assure the house that if that were done, these
important officers would be quite unable to attend to their
respective duties at the dockyard. He had also a good deal
of experience of several boards, and he could safely affirm
that he did not know of any board in which business was
better performed than at the Board of Admiralty. (Hear.)
Lord LOVAINE was of opinion that some improvements
might be made in the constitution of the Board of Admiralty.
The changes that took place on changes of Administration
were not desirable, but he did not see how that could be
avoided. He hoped the Admiralty would not lose sight of
the necessity of making such improvements as might ap-
pear to be required.

Admiral SEYMOUR said in the navy a strong opinion
prevailed that there was a bias at the board whi,:h was in-
jurious to the public service. In France the various de-
partments formed a committee acting under the Minister of
Marine, who was solely responsible, and who, o3rld deviate
from the recommendations of the committee as lie thought
proper. He was of opinion that a civilian at the head of the
board was preferable, but he shoukibe guided in naval
matters by the opinions of the naval lords. He did not ap-
prove of the necessity of naval lords having seats in that
house, as the presence of the First Lord and the Secretary
of the board in Parliament was amply sufficient for every
purpose.

Admiral DUNCOMBE said ho was boundto say that no
one at the head of the Board of Admiralty could act with
greater impartiality than the noble duke now at its head.
He, however, thought that a naval man was best qualified
to preside as First Lord. He would not now press his mo •
tion further, and would withdraw it, with an intimation
that he would, in the next session of Parliament, bring the
constitution of the Board of Admiralty again before the
house.

sequence of events that have taken place since, and longer
and more careful consideration, that my colleagues and my-
self have arrived at the conclusion that it is not expedient
to continue that separate local force. I wish to state be-
fore I go further what the chain of circumstances and argu-
ments were by which we arrived at this conclusion—not
only tp relieve ourselves of the appearance of inconsistency,
but because the same arguments may weigh with others,
and tend to induce the same conclusions. When India
was governed by the Company this question was not
brought to my notice. The only military question con-
nected with India I had had to decide was the addition
of one regiment to the local force, which I aseented
to with the concurrence of Lord Hardinge ; and the
substitution of irregular for some regular cavalry. I
have been asked whether the disposal of the officers of the
native army will not be an insuperable obstacle to
the change. Ido not think it will be, by placing
their on an unattached list of officers for Staff appoint-
ments. Before this question of the amalgamation of the
Indian army could be brought to a decision the matter was
taken out of the hands of the Government. When last
Juno I was appointed to the office which I now have the
honour to hold I found that my noble friend who preceded
me had decided on maintaining a local army in India—
(hear)—to the extent of two-fifths of the maximum Euro-
pean force in that country, and I am not ashamed to con-
fess that I was extremely unwilling to disturb the decision
in, this respect at which my noble friend had arrived. I
well know the singlemindediless with which ho formed his
co :elusions on all subjects connected with India which
came under his notice, and that he had carefully considered
this particular question. I felt, therefore, the strongest
anxiety to carry his views in the matter into effect.
I may, however, remind the house that at that
time the mutiny of the European troops in India
had been only recently reported in this country,
and that its more grave features had not been
brought to our knowledge. It was under these circum-
stances that I made the announcement in August last to
which I have referred. I then, as appears from the papers
which have been laid before the house, submitted to a
member of the Council of India who came over to this
country charged with the views of Lord Canning on the
subject, and who certainly is one of the ablest advocates of
the maintenance of a local army, the determination at whiCh
my noble friend who preceded me in office had arrived on
the subject. I stated to Col. Durand that that determination
was to keep up the local army to the extent of two-fifths of
the maximum European force in India. Now, it is desira-
ble, as the house Will not fail to perceive, that the amount
of that local army should not be a varying, but a fixed
amount, because any variable force wou!cl be more easily
kept up by sending out the Queen's troops to India, ac-
cording as their services might be required. I was, however,
in hopes--though my hopes were not perhaps quite so san-
guine on the point as those which others entertained—that
the European force in India might be diminished to an
extent which Ido not now deem expedient. I took the
maximum which General Hancock in his report suggested
should be 60,000, and I asked General Durand whether
24,000, the two-fifths of that number, would not he a suffi-
cient force to maintain. As will be seen by his letter, he
said that it must be a mistake to take that number as two-
fifths of all the force, the artillery being taken into account,
and concluded by observing that there was no alternative
between the adoption of Lord Canning's proposal, supported
in the main by the report of the conimittee, and a new act,
leaving it to the wisdom of Parliament, whioh would then
assume the responsibility to devise whatever it might deem
expedient. Now,- Lord Canning's proposal was that there
should be an army of 80,000 Europeans, two-thirds of
which should constitute a local force. The military com-
mittee of the Council of India concurred substantially in
that view, fixing the total at 78,000 instead of 80,000, so
that I looked on Lord Canning's proposal
.as being sup-
ported by the report of the military committee, and came to
the conclusion that the local force, in accordance with the
opinions of its principal advocates, ought to amount to two-
thirds of whatever number of European troops we maintained
in India, whether that number were 40,000, the two-thirds
of 60,000, or 53,000 some odd hundreds, the two-thirds of
80,000. It was also contended that a small local force would
not occupy that equality of position as compared with troops
of the line, which everybody seemed to regard as indispensa-
ble. These views, I confess, took me somewhat by surprise,
and tended very much to shake my confidence in the pro-
priety of the determination which I had announced to the
house. "While the question was pending a succession of let-
ters, extracts from which were laid on the table of the house,
arrived from India, poirlting out how much more grave and
serious the conduct of the European troops who had muti-
nied was than had been supposed in the first instance. The
mutiny began to assume the appearance not of being the
work of young men who had just gone out to India, but
of an organised combination among their older comrades,
and this new aspect of affairs furnished ground for se
rious consideration. In dealing with this subject, more-
over, the question of expense presented one of the greatest
difficulties. I myself was under the impression that the
additional expense of Queen's troops would be greater than
that of a local force. This, however, was a point with re-
spect to which it was not easy to procure any independent
expression of opinion, those who took opposite sides with
respect to it being disposed to regard each so entirely as
accurate their own facts and figures. I ultimately referred
to the Registrar-General under these circumstances, and
suggested that a civilian not likely tobe biassed by military
views should investigate the question. This report has
been laid upon the table, and the result is that
the additional expense of maintaining Queen's troops
is found to be much less than the Indian authorities sup-
posed. In the course of the autumn we reeeived'accounts
of a number of men who took their discharge from the In-
dian army, and that in consequence that army was reduced
from being upwards of 24,000 to 12,000. The question, then,
which we then had to consider was not whether we should
maintain the Indian army such as it was, but whether we
should reform it, and raise a new army—not to the extent of
24,000 men, for that number would not be satisfactory to
the advocates of a local army—but to the extent of at least
40,000. Now, it seems to me that we may dismiss altogether
from our notice the proposal for maintaining a small local
army in India, which is a course which everybody who pays
regard to the efficiency of such a force seems to condemn.
That was the question which we had to consider last June

or July, but such is not the case at the present moment.
Circumstances have altered within the 10 or 11 months, and
we are not therefore open to the charge of inconsistency, if
we have now come to a different decision from that at which
we some time ago arrived. I have made this brief statement
in order that the house may see the reasons by which our
policy has been guided, and I shall now proceed to state
more fully the grounds on which our decision is based. In
doing so I think I may avail myself at the outset of an ad-
mission which was made in the discussion on the motion of
my hon. and gallant friend behind me, to the effect that a
priori the argument is now in favour of our having a Queens
army in India. During the period of the existence of the
Company's Government there were many reasons which
might be advanced in support of the maintenance of a
Company's army. It was many years ago contended that
it was necessary the army should belong to the governing
power of, the country, although even then many high au-
thorities differed on the subject. Since, however, the
transfer of power from the Company to the Queen has taken
place, I think the force of argument lies entirely the other
way. Dismiss altogether, for the reasons I have stated, the
idea of a small local force, I would ask whether it is desir-
able to raise in the samweountry and from the same class
two bodies of men upon the same principles, but ruled by
different authorities and guided by different forms of mili-
tary discipline. That is the first question which I call upon
the advocates of the maintenance of a local army to answer
in the affirmative, and if they cannot do so upon any rea-
sonable grounds then I contend the a priori argument is
against.the view which they take. If, then, they are not
able to substantiate their view in this respect, they must
either show that the local reasons are so strongly in favour
of a double army as to counerbalance the general disad-
vantagse connected.with such a system, or that it is impos-
sible to put an end without some degree of injustice
to the existing army as it stands. Now, lam prepared to
admit that much ought to be conceded to the wishes not
to be lost sight of in ,dealing with this question. The
prop osal is that th y should be united to and form part of
the Imperial army. I admit fully nothing can be prouder
than the recollections of the old Indian army of the three
provinces ; but we propose that they should form part of an
army on the standards of which are emblazoned many of the
battles from which they derive their own renown. Seringa-
patam and Delhi ace not . nly on the standards of the Indian
army; but on many of the standards of the English army.
Arcot and Plassey would be associated with the Peninsula
and Waterloo. I admit that the older officers are all for
the maintenance of the Indian army, but th 3 younger
officers are in favour of amalgamation. Among the papers
you will see statements to that effect. I would beg to call
attention to the le.ters on the subject of Lord Elphinstone
contained in these papers, because they contain the most

. ,
reasonable and well-considered views on the Whole question,
without any prejudice of any kind. What does Lord
Elphinstone say ? I was constantly in communication with
him on this subject, and in a letter to me Lord Elphinstone
says:—

" With regard to the local army, I think, that people in
this country, with the ex eption of a few of the senior
officers, are fast coming round to the view I have always
taken of the subject. If the local army has no exclusive
privileges and advantages, it must of necessity sink into a
secondary and inferior force. The conviction is now forcing
itself upon the more intelligent of the local officers. They
see that in amalgamation with the British army lies their
only chance of continuing upon a footing of equality, or,
perhaps, I should say, of maintaining the superior status
which they have hitherto enjoyed."

The same cbservations are made by a very able and well
known Indian officer in this country. I asked him, "What
do the officers in the army think of amalgamation?"
He said, "Every officer above the rank of a major is
for the con inuance of the local army; of those under
that tank nine-tenths are for amalgamation." It is

not unnatural that the older officers should be attached to

the glorious recollections of the service with which they
were connected ; and, on the other hand, it is also natural
that.the younger and More active officers should be glad to
have the chance of Rilrvice in connection with their brothers
in arms elsewhere thanin India; and why should we damp
that spirit from which the efficiency of our future army in
India is to be derived ? Well; now I must perform whAt

~:wr't.~vye.:.:e7s~3tr:~ ~~ ac:,R .~.- r.a ~

certainly is the most painful part of my duty to-night,
which is to call the attention of the house to some of the
extracts of the letters on the table, which I must say
appear to me to furnish the strongest grounds for the
course we are about to take. It would be exceedingly
unbecoming in me, a civilian, to venture to give an
opinion on the efficiency, or discipline, or conduct of a
reginieni; of soldiers; but those most competent to form
such oeinions have given them. They have influenced us,
and I think they ought to influence this house. I shall,
give no opinion of my own ; I shall simply read extracts
from the letters which are before you, containing the
views of persons well acquainted with the circumstances,
well acquainted with the facts, well able to form an
opinion, and which will, I have no doubt, have great weight
with this house. Of the gallantry, bravery, and endurance
of the Indian army no one has ever expressed a doubt ; but
there does seem to be, I confess, a most unanimous con-
current testimony of all officers of the Queen's troops that
the discipline of the Indian army is not what it ought to be.
To a considerable extent that has been admitted by their
own officers. I don't mean by discipline heing well set up,
or smartness on parade ; but I mean what has been so well
expressed by Sir John Lawrence when he said :
"While I admit that the tone and interior economy of a
royal regiment may on the average be somewhat superior
to that of a local regiment."
(Opposition cries of " Hear, hear.") All I seek to establish
by that extract is that the interior economy of a royal
regiment is superior to that of a bet.' regiment. (Hear,
hear.) It is admitted that the discipline of a Queen's regi-
ment remaining long in India deteriorates to a considerable
extent. What does that prove? It proves that there is
some cause acting upon both local and English regiments to
deteriorate the discipline of an army remaining long in
India, and it is not difficult to assign a reason. I use the
word discipline as the shortest. I mean by it the interior
economy of et regiment and the relation subsisting between
its officer and men. I believe it has been generally observed
that a local colonial corps which cannot come under the
general supervision of higher military authorities is apt to
degenerate, more especially if they serve in a climate where
exertion and energy are not likely to carry them on for a
very long time, unless under the stimulus of war.
Officers, after 10 or 1.5 years in India, are not so active and
energetic as they might have been in a cool climate, or had
they been in India for a shorter period. That this is the
case we have the direct testimony of :Lord Elphinstone
again. He speaks both of the system of native and Euro-
pean forces. He says :
" The same system, resulting in the total want of influence
over their men by the regimental officers, has led to both
mutinies. The organization of the late Bengal army was
as faulty as its discipline was lax."
There could not be a more impartial witness on this subject
than Lord Clyde. He served in India and all parts of the
world, and was a most competent authority on military
matters. What does Lord Clyde say ?
" It is clear from what we have now seen that it is abso-
lutely necessary not to trust to local corps, and that we can
alone put faith in a discipline which is constantly renovated
by reliefs from England, and the presence of officers with
their regiments who look to theta as their homes."
Sir J. Outram says—
" So bad has been the system of promotion to commands,
and of selections for staff appointments in the local British
force, that the only wonder is that any discipline at all is
maintained,"
In a letter to the Duke of Cambridge he says—
"As your Royal Highness knows, I have always been
strongly of opinion that it is impossible, as shown by prac-
tice and experience, to maintain discipline in a local corps,
such as we expect in her Majesty's regiments, but it did not
occur to me that the loyalty of the local corps might suffer."
Sir H. Rose, not a martinet soldier, goes at great length
into the question. I will only read one paragraph; the
whole letter turns on the same point :
" Nobody has mixed more with Indian officers than I
have. I have never had a shadow of difference with them
because I was a Queen's officer and they were Company's
or Indian officers. I know the state of their feeling. They
admit to me that the disorganisation and undiscipline of the
Bengal army, and in a lesser degree of the Indian army in
general, were the causes of the mutiny. They admit espe-
cially, since the mutinous conduct of the European Indian
army in the discharge question, that amalgamation is neces-
sary for the better discipline of the Indian army."
Such is the opinion of these high authorities. I em quite
aware that there is much to palliate the conduct of the
younger soldiers. But it is not true that the mutiny arose
among the younger soldiers. We thought at first that this
had been so, but what says Lord Clyde upon the point ?
" I beg leave again to draw your Royal Highness's at-
tention to the fact of the passive participation of the non-
commissioned officers and so-called good men of the Bengal
Artillery in the evil intentions of the younger and bolder
men who were so near the commission of th worst crime.
Even in the old regiments the men have not confidence in
their officers. In my mind I must accuse the old soldiers
of the Bengal Artillery of having been the prime movers
and ringleaders in all this bad business."
It is perfectly obvious from his letter that, while Lord
Clyde did not attach much importance to the outbreak of
the recently-enlisted soldiers, the deepest possible impres-
sion was produced on his mind by the disaffection of the
veterans of the Bengal army. He thought, in fact, that
the state of that army, particularly in its older regiments,
was perfectly fatal to the maintenance of a local European
corps. A much more serious subject of reflection, however,
presents itself in connexion with what then took place—
viz., the power of combination possessed by an army per-
manently located in India with a separate interest from the
rest of the Queen's troops. (Hear.) All history tells us of
the danger that may result from a large body of men with
arms in their hands having such a separate interest and a
remarkable power of combining together, for that the com-
bination which took place on the occasion to which I have
teferrod wag extensive and perfect is abundantly clear. I do
not insist upon this with the view cf dilating on the faults of
the men who took part in the movement, but I do wish
strongly to impress it upon the house as a warning for the
future. (Hear, hear.) And here I will read only ono para-
graph from Sir William Mansfield's letter :
" I have observed in some Parliamentary speeches which
arrived by the last mail a dispositien to slur over and make
little of the misconduct in the local European army in this
country. I venture to impress on you the gravity and dan-
ger of the crisis which we have tided over, and that it was
impossible to exceed in completeness and wickedness the
combination which threatened us in May last. Such was the
feeling throughout the Bengal Artillerymen that, though
the old soldiers and non-commissioned officers were too
wary to commit themselves to overt crime, not one of them
in any part of the country came forward to warn their
officers of what was impending ; their combination and con-
spiracy in this respect being more thorough than that of the
Sepoys themselves in 1857."
That suggests matter for very serious consideration, and the
view which may be taken of it is expressed in a farther ex-
tract from Lord Clyde's letter, whish says :
Whatever may now be done, the recollection of this
strike or mutiny will never die out in the Indian local army.
It will very possibly affect her Majesty's army also in a
minor degree ; but in the former—the Indian local army
—it will live for ever, and be a precedent to which the
minds of the men will always revert when they are dissatis-
fied with their work or the regulations affecting them. I
am, therefore, irresistibly led to the conclusion that hence.
forth it will be dangerous to the S ate to maintain a local
army . . . I feel I should ee, wanting in my duty were
I to remain silent, now that the strongest conviction has
arisen in my mind that from henceforth we should have no
local Europeans whatever."
Now, be it remembered that Sir W. Mansfield was origin.
ally in favour of the maintenance of a local European army.
He had stated that epini m. very decidedly, but the result of
what occurred on this unhappy occasion entirely converted
him to the opposite view. I shall not fully discharge my
task if I do not advert to the main arguments of those who
advocate separate armies for India. The first argument,
which has been brought forward in two or three papers
which are before the house, refers to the dangers which
must ensue to India if there should be any withdrawal of
troops from India to England. I think that argument is
without foundation. It must be for the Central Govern-
ment to decide where the wants of the empire are greatest,
and where the strength of the empire ought to be concen-
trated. During the Crimean war it might be necessary that
the forces of the country should be concentrated at home.
During the China war they were properly diverted for the
defence of our Indian empire. If the Home Government
are not to be trusted with the decision and the discretion of
saying where the forces of the empire ought to be stationed,
they are not fit to hold the position of rulers. The danger
is said to be in withdrawing such a force as will endanger the
safety of India, and we are told that the safety of India was
endangered by the troops that were kept back in consequence
of the Crimean war. Now I have ascertained that the force
in India in 18.57 was less than the force in 1854 by 1,500
men only. What is the proposal ? That one-third of the
force should be Queen's troops, over whom the Government
have absolute power of withdrawal. Take the proportion of
60,000 and 23,000 which has been proposed. The Govern-
ment at home have the power of withdrawing 20,000 men,
and we are told that a force of 1,600 will endanger the safety
of our Indian empire. The argument is perfectly absurd,
even if the Government are not to be trusted with the power
of looking to the safety of the empire. The next argument
is that the power of the Governor-General will be destroyed
by the removal of the local European army. lamat a loss
to see how this position is proved. It is said, with truth,
that it is impossible for the Governor-General to perform
those duties which would be far better discharged by the
Adjutant-General or the Quartermaster-General. The Go-
vernor. General ought to have, locally and temporarily, the
whole power that the Government at home possess. The
next argument is the great expense of the Queen's service.
I confess that on the first considerat on of the matter I
thought the expense of the Queen's troops much greater
than, upon investigation, it appears to be. Depend upon it,
also, the most efficient force will be the cheapest in the end,
and I do not think we ought to be deterred by the greater
expenee of the plan proposed if on other accounts we think
it good. From the calculations made lam inclined to
think that if the whole of the existing local force were con-
verted into Queen's troops, the increased cost would be
about £114,000 a year. A saving or otherwise of £2O ',OOO
would, however, as I think, be no consideration in an ex-
penditure of £14,000,000, if it weighed with considerations
ef safety or efficiency. I believe that the expenditure
may be very much reduced by depots, reliefs, and the
double staff, and I confess I think there is no proof that
the change proposed would entail an increased expense, of
£200,000. It is further objected that the whole expendi-
tare for India is thus thrown upon the authoriti-s at home.
No expenses, however, can be incurred for India except by
the consent of the Secretary of State and the Ceuncil for
India, and that is as complete a cheek rtg can leg cieyi4e4
for the control of the ekvendittere. 'fh,e greater Oxransie of