The Sun.
London, England, 1856-05-03 00:00:00

FRANCE.

Our letter from Paris, dated yesterday evening,
had not arrived when our afternoon edition went
to press.

AUSTRIA.

VIENNA, April 29.—The 15th Article of the
Treaty of Peace has caused a terrible panic among
the holders of the shares of the Danubian Steam
Navigation Company. It is felt that the mo-
nopoly of the Danube by the Austrian Company
must soon be at an end, and consequently the
shares have fallen 301 (3/.) within two or three
days.

TBE TREATY OF PEACE.

( Prom the Press of this day.)

- -
No sooner is the treaty of peace, with the ac•
companying papers, laid on the table of the Legis•
lature than a new, unexpected, and most calami.
L. 4

to magnify the gravity of this circumstance ; it is
of a nature to force itself on the notice of every
mau in this country, and to excite the strongest
feelings of apprehension.
We do not propose here to discuss the terms
of the treaty. They are in general of a satis-
factory character. The two points of most im-
portance to the commercial interests of the
world—the neutralisation of the Black Sea,
and the freedom of the Danube—have been fairly
carried out. Russia has been removed from all
control over the mouth of that great watercourse,
which will hereafter assume new importance for all
purposes of communication with the countries of
Central Europe. We could have wished that a
decision had been taken to unite the two Da-
nubian provinces, as by such union they might
have possessed considerable internal strength,
And have grown into a prosperous and indepen-
tient state. We have not much faith in the
sovereign superintendence of Turkey; but we
may hope, as a commission will sit to regulate,
in conjunction with the Porte, the constitution
and government of these provinces, that their wel-
fare will be duly cared for, and that they may be
freed from the vexatious intrigues and interfer-
ence of their powerful neighbours. The matter
which strikes us as of paramount importance in no
way concerns them.

It is necessary, however, to dwell for a moment
on the Convention between Russia and Turkey
which regulates the amount of naval force they
shall respectively maintain in the Black Sea.
Each power may keep afloat six armed steam-ves-
sels of eight hundred tons, and four of two hundred
tons. The force is small, and is professedly for
purposes of police, but no statement is made
whether these vessels are, under any circumstances,
to be available for the enforcement of blockade.
On this point explanation is required. If such em-
ployment of this force—notwithstanding the terms
of the Treaty, that the Black Sea is formally in-
terdicted to war navies—would be lawful, we shall
probably soon hear that Russia has announced a
blockade of the Circassian coast. For, incredible
as it may seem, we do nut find that any kind of
provision has been made to prevent Russia from
immediately employing her whole military power
to achieve the conquest of the Caucasus.
When the fifth point, empowering the Allies to
bring forward conditions not expressly stated, came
to be discussed, Lord Clarendon asked for explana-
tions respecting the Russian forts on the Circas-
sian coast which had been partially destroyed. His
lordship seems to have argued—for the protocol on
this matter is exceedingly brief—that to restore
these forts would be to violate the principle of the
neutralisation cf the Black Sea. The Russian
Plenipotentiaries held, on the contrary, that
there was an intelligible and broad distinction
between purely military forts and military "Laval
arsenals. The point at issue was adjourned,
and we do not notice that it was again
brought under discussion. Lord Clarendon most
likely gave way on this point, as he appears
to have done on every matter of real import-
ance brought under discussion. No question
seems ever to have been asked as to the use Rus-
sia designed to make of these forts, though that was
one of the most important questions which could
have come before the Conference.
In discussing the Asiatic frontier of Russia, and
her relwion with the countries east of the Black
Sea, all mention of the Caucasus seems to have been
scrupulously avoided. It is well known that the
independent existence of the warlike tribes of that
country has had a powerful effect in preventing
Russia from extending her Transcaucasian domin-
ions. Since the period when Peter the Great first
invaded the Caucasus, Russia has never aban-
doned the hope of completely subjugating that
country. Her policy has been constant, though
her action has been intermittent and far from
vigorous. From various reasons she has never
thought it worth her while to put forth her
whole strength for the attainment of her object,
and the armies she has employed, though suf-
ficient to keep the Caucasians in check, have
never been sufficiently strong to overrun and
occupy the country. Hence the Caucasus has
subsisted as a curb upon Russian power at the
very gates of Asia Minor, and prevented that ex-
tension of her influence through Central Asia
which would certainly and immediately take place
if the barrier were overcome.
As connected with the legitimate aims of the
war, and as contributing to the safety of the Asiatic
provinces of Turkey, it was an object of the
highest importance to make some provision for
the independence of the Caucasus. Some guaran-
tee of the kind was demanded, not only from con-
siderations of sound policy, but from motives of
humanity and good faith. During the War the
Caucasians have been, in fact, our allies ; we have
recognised the value of their successes against
our enaOWY litwo applauded tlaei;; 4111441 e
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