The Sun.
London, England, 1856-07-25 00:00:00

THE CRIMEAN COMMISSION.

(From the Times of this day.)
We publish to-day the report of the Board of Inquiry
which sat at Chelsea Hospital. This extraordinary docu-
ment fully realises the worst anticipations of those who
saw in the whole proceeding merely a plan for screening
men whose conduct had been animadverted on by the
army, the public, and. finally, by Government Commis-
sioners despatched for the purpose to the seat of war. The
Chelsea generals acquit everybody, fully and unreservedly
—l-nay, they not only acquit, but applaud. There is no
half-work, no admission that the novelty of the situation
or the difficulties of the campaign may have induced in
some cases errors of judgment that ought to be excused.
Each of the implicated officers is declared perfectly blame-
less, the judgment of the Commissioners is reversed on
every point, and it is only grudgingly allowed that they
were not actuated by malici@us feelings. Now, if it were
likely that the nation would attach the least importance to
the verdict here given', it might be contested by argument,
-by the recital of facts which every one knows, and conclu-
sions from which fevr:would be likely to dissent. But the
matter is not worth reopening. The result of the inquiry.
is precisely what we anticipated and stated openly from
the first.

Consider the history of these events, extending over a
period of more than two years. England resolves on send-
ing an army to the East it has a force which, in propor-
tion to its numbers,. is by far the most expensive in Europe,
officered chiefly by men of means and family, and under
the exclusive control of a small professional clique. What
did the public—what did even Parliament know about
its organisation ? What interference was there in the
distribution, the patronage. the discipline, the equipment?
The Court and the authorities of the Horse Guards were
entrusted with the absolute management of every de-
tail. The nation bestowed entire confidence on them dur-
ing 40 years of peace. When war came, the question
was asked, "Is our army ready for it ?" " Yes," was
the unhesitating answer of the aristrocratic military clique.
The army was pronounced by Peninsular veterans to be
capable of any services that might be demanded of it, its
organisation was that by which it had won great victories
in a former war, it had during more than a generation
been governed by men who had received peerages, orders,
and pensions on the ground of their achievements, who
knew what actual war was ;—how, then, should it not be
able, as the phrase went, to "go anywhere and do any-
thing ?" Of the talk which we have heard since about
parsimony having destroyed its efficacy, about " the
system" containing the certain seeds of failure, there was
then not a word. Parliament was sitting, and sat till
long after the armies were on the Bosphormi and in Bul-
garia,—until the transports were actually assembling for
an invasion of the Crimea. Why, then, were these mili-
tary critics silent ? The conclusion is evident,—that the
authorities to whom the British nation had trustingly
committed the management of its army, both in principle
and detail, were ignorant of the exigencies of modern war-
fare—that a generation of officers had come into existence
who were unable to foresee the necessary result of their
own organisation, and knew not that the British army
must, from the first day of a campaign, move steadily and
swiftly to destruction.
The appointments to the chief commands were never
questioned, simply because the country knew nothing of
the subject. Who chose the generals, why they were
chosen, on what conditions they were appointed, and with
what instructions they were sent to their posts, we are
not likely to learn. Their names show how far they were
or were not connected with the ruling clique,—the men
who had created the very " system" which is now the
universal scapegoat. Lord Raglan, Lord Do Ros,
Lord Lucan, Lord Cardigan, Sir Richard Airey, Colonel
the Honourable Alexander Gordon were among
the chief persons to whom were committed the
destinies of England in a perilous enterprise. At least it
might be thought that these officers knew the British army
and each other. The want of a common understanding,
and of fellow feeling could hardly he predicated of men in
the same rank of life, brought up in the traditions of the
same military school, and the same belief in its perfection
and their own. At any rate, it might be thought they
would work together, help each other, forget when the
time came any private jealousies, any routine pedantry
about the separation of their " departments ;" further it
might be expected that the last defence that each would
make for any shortcomings would be one that necessarily
throws the blame on those with whom he served.
The hour of active service comes, and with it the cala-
mities of the British army. Now, were those calamities
real or fictitious? Did the men die from want of fresh
food, for want of proper tents, hutting, blankets, and cloth-
ing ? Were the horses starved with hunger and cold ? In
other words, were the facts dwelt upon in the communi-
cations of newspaper correspondents, in the thousands of
letters from officers and soldiers to their friends at home,
and after wards officially confirmed by the report of Sir
John M'Neil and Colonel Tulloch, true or fabulous? If
they were true—if men and horses perished miserably—if
the British army would have been ruined but for the reve-
lations of the press—if, as it is, the British name has
suffered much throughout the world, then there must bo
somebody to blame. These are the facts. Disasters took
place, for which the superior officers of the army must be
held responsiole. The Crimean Commissioners implicated
certain of those officers. The Chelsea Commissioners ac-
quit them fully and triumphantly. But the disasters re-
main unaccounted for. Did they produce themselves ?
Did the men die of mere perversity ? If not, then there
must be blame somewhere. The Chelsea Commissioners
prudently refrain from solving the question.
The fact is that the whole inquiry was a farce,—
a scandalous one indeed, and likely to have serious conse-
quences-hereafter, but, as far as regarded Lord Lucan and
Cardigan, Sir R. Airey and Col. Gordon, a mere mockery.
No one ever heard of au analogous proceeding in civil
practice. Here were sufferings " horrible and heartrend-
ing," which could not be denied. Government had sent
Commissioners to inquire into them. The Commissioners
made their report, which might be considered to represent
the verdict of a Grand Jury or of a Coroner's Inquest.
The implicated officers were in the position of men charged
with an offence, and Government was bound either to pro-
secute or to declare that there was no reason for prosecut-
ing. Instead of this a Board is appointed, before which
the officers are allowed "to make a statement." That is,
the defendant is to be tried without any evidence for the
prosecution being brought forward. In the case of Sir R.
Airey, Col. Gordon, and Mr. Filder, Colonel Tulloch was
not even present to watch the case on behalf of Sir J.
M'Neil and himself, who were virtually put on their trial.
Every one knew what must be the result. The court
scarcely concealed its partiality. The implicated officers
and their friends were allowed to use a tone and manner
towards Col. Tulloch which would have called down the
severest reprobation of aiy judge in a court of common
law. Every witness knew that if he served those whom
the military authorities were determined to uphold he
might expect no small reward ; on the other hand, that it
would be a black day for him if he proved unfaithful to
the common cause. Even a man who has served his course
try and gained its esteem felt it not inconsistent with his
dignity to come forward and in a pompous harangue be-
spatter with ridiculous praise the authors of a miserable
calamity. Now we have the result. After two mon,ths
the report appears. The Board is satisfied that Lot d
Lucan " exercised every exertion to meet the peculiar
difficulties which he had to contend with, and
that he is therefore not chargeable with neglect in the
performance of the important duties attached to his com-
mand." Lord Cardigan is similarly acquitted. Sir R.
Airey, and, as the greater includes the less, Colonel Gor-
don also, are fully exonerated. Although the latter has
told us that he fully agreed with the statements in this
journal about the mismanagement that prevailed, the
Board acquits the department in spite of itself. If warm
clothing was not issued, Sir R. Airey and his subordinate
are blameless, because the " responsibility of that officer
must be understood to be limited to the duty of making
requisitions for certain stores, and not to their safe cus-
tody, stowage, or even issue." If rugs were not issued,
though in store, it was because they were useless for the
keeping out of wet and cold, though it does not appear
why rugs of this quality should be found in the stores of
the richest army in the world. If the greatcoats were not
issued, it was because they were too small for the men who
wore under-clothing ; if the shoes were not issued, it was
because they were totally unfit for the purposes of a cam-
paign. If there were no tents, yet Sir R. Airey had, two
months after landing in the Crimea, written home a re-
quisition for them. Tho paillasses were not issued, be-
cause there was no hay or straw to stuff them with. With
regard to huts, "the Quartermaster-General's Department
completely fulfilled its duty by ordering huts at an early
period from Constantinople—namely, Bth November,
1854 ;" that is, sending down to some overworked com-
missaries directions to procure wood, nails, hinges, tools,
and carpenters, in quantities that the Mediterranean
would not have supplied in less than three or four months.
It is of no use to go on. One phrase is continually re-
peated—" the responsibility of the Quartermaster-Gene-
ral's Department was confined to making a requisition"
for such and such a thing. The upshot is, that the
department is " completely relieved " from all blame.
Such is the result of the Chelsea Commission.
The shameful history of these transactions is fitly
concluded by a document which pronounces that each offi-
cer is justified in confining himself to the most bare per-
formance of his ordinary duties. How far the duty of
originating measures rests on the Commander-in-Chief
must be decided by coianion sense. The general idea of
such a person is as riding the whirlwind and directing the
storm ; we must confess, however, that we see no traces of
such en activity in the British Crimean army. It is sin-
gular enough that in the whole of these investigations the
name of Lord Raglan hardly once appears. The heads of
departments are "making requisitions" on each other, the
Generale are quarrelling, while cold and starvation are
doing their work on the unhappy army, and we now have
it, ou the authority of a Board of Generals, that these
officers are completely exonerated. They will receive the
congratulations of their own set, they will keep their rank,
and orders, and pay, and whatever else they may value.
On the esteem or confidence of the public we know they
set little store, and it is fortunate for them, for they will
never receive it. The conclusions to which men of under-
standing have come are not to be altered by the partisan
verdict of such a tribunal as sat at Chelsea. The lesson
remains. We see what notion officers of the dominant
school take of their awn duties, and what confidence may
be placed on their predictions before war and their subse-
quent judgment on its events. If the Chelseainquiry
convinces the nation that there is no hope of improvement
but in thorough reform, it will not have been held in vain.

THI3 CONVIOT WILLIAM Dowx.—The prisoner has ex.
pressed a desire to see the Rev. W. DT. Punshon, Wes•
leyan minister, of Leeds. In compliance with this
wish, the rev. gentleman proceeded to York yesterday,
and—in company with a minister of that city, who has
visited the prisoner every week since he was placed
in York Castle—spent an hour with him.—LcedB
Mercury.