The Sun.
London, England, 1860-06-22 00:00:00

THE SUN, LUNDON, FRIDAY EVENING,

" I adhere to the opinion that the interests of India re-
quire that there should be an army devoted to India. I am
confirmed in it by the experience which I have acquired,
after much intercourse with officers of her Majesty's regi •
ments of the Line in India, of the unwillingness which ap-
pears to prevail among them to look to India as the scene of
their profession for any considerable length of time: During
the excitement of active service this feeling was not so per .
ceptible; though even in 1858 the applications for leave to
return to England were numerous ; but since the cessation
of military operations it has become very strong, anti it is
not too much to say that it is a rare occurrence to meet with
an officer of the Line who looks forward contentedly to a
long stay in India. Ido not think that the unwillingness
will be removed by throwing open the door to their employ-
ment in every kind of Staff or irregular service. Maker;
every allowance for the events of the last three years, for
the disjointed and uncertain condition of service in India to
which those events have led, and for all the discomforts of
frequent and unseasonable movement of corps and indiffe-
rent accommodation, the feeling is, I fear, likely to prove a
listing one among those who are brought to India only ac-
cidentally. I believe that there are very few Englishmen
indeed who will readily make up their minds to devote
themselves to a career inthis country, unless they are trained
to look to it, and are bound to it from their youth."
I think it is impossible to overrate the value and importance
of an opinion of that kind coming from the Governor-Ge-
neral. I have in the course of the last two years made my-
self acquainted with many opinions which have been ex-
pressed uponimportant matters byLord Canning. Sometimes
it has been my fortune to differ from him, but far more fre-
quently I have agreed with him ; and whether I have agreed
or whether I have differed, I never saw an opinion of his
expressed upon any question of policy which did not bear
the marks of anxious and careful inquiry, and of the most
cautious examination and consideration. (Hear, hear.)
And recollect, when Lord Canning expresses this opinion
he is not so much a man telling you what he thinks
about the question as one who gives evidence as to a fact
which has come under his knowledge. From his position he
knows better than any other man can do what are the feel-
ings of those who are engaged in the Indian service. Ap-
plications for leave are made to him ; he knows who wishes
to stay, and who desires to go ; and when he speaks of a
prevalent distaste for Indian service as existing among men
who are not trained in early youth to Indian life he is only
bearing witness to a fact which is more or less familiar to
every one who is conversant with Indian society. (Hear.)
No doubt, the feeling of which he speaks has been aggra-
vated by the recent mutiny, and by the antipathy of races
to which I am afraid it has led, but it is a feeling which
existed in India years ago, and I have repeatedly heard
from able and experienced servants of the Government,
from men whose Indian career has been one unbroken suc-
cess, from men who, if any men have done so, have won the
prizes of Indian public life, that although they were satis-
fied with the fortunes they had made, although they did
not regret that their lives had been passed in India, yet
that if any opportunity of coming to England had offered
itself to them earlier in their career, they would undoubtedly
have thrown up the service and returned to this country.
Nor do I assert this only from my personal experience. Of
all the public men who have ever served in India there is
none who has left a more illustrious name than Lord
Metcalfe. He was a man who possessed all those qualities
which make success not a matter of speculation, but of cer-
tainty; yet what was the case with regard to Lord Met-
calfe ? We have it upon record that not long after he
entered the Indian service he became so wearied, and so
disgusted with the apparent hopelessness of his career, that
he wrote to his f iends imploring that he might be allowed
to sacrifice his prospects in India and return to England.
If a road had been opened to him, if it had been in
his power, without any material sacrifice, to come
home, he would have acted upon the feeling which
he then acknowledged, would have abandoned his prospects
in the Indian service, and India would have lost one of her
most illustrious administrators. (Hear.) Ido not say that
the life of public servants in India is one which men ulti-
mately regret. It is a career of great interest. It offers
noble opportunities, and men who go out determined not to
look back, and knowing that their lives must be passed in
India, become mentally as well as physically acclimatized
and make the most valuable public servants that we have.
But what I say is, that in the first instance there is a strugs
gle and a sacrifice, and that the prospect of banishment from
England for the greater part of his life is one which no -nan
willingly faces. It is a sacrifice generally made only when
men are driven by necessity. In the next place, if you do find
men who are willing so to serve, it is hardly possible they
should acquire the same training as they do now ; for in
order to gain a real knowledge of India I believe that it is
essential that men should go there at a thee of life when
their ideas are still unformed, when their habits are flexible,
and when they can adapt themselves to any situation. (Hear,
hear.) My right hen. friend asked why should not that be
the case with officers of line regiments—why should not they
go out early and determine to remain in India ? Because
they have no certain' y of being able to do so. Suppose there
is a war or a prospect of awar at home, and an officer is living
with his regiment in India, and has for years been studying
the languages of the country, intending to retire from the
service and devote himself to civil administration. His regi-
ment is recalled with a prospect of being engaged in hostili-
ties, and it is impossible for him with honour to leave it.
(Hear, hear.) He therefore quits the country, and takes his
part in the events which may be passing on this side of
the globe. He thus loses the special aptitude for
Indian affairs which he had acquired, and a trained
administrator is lost to that country. You must not mea-
sure the amount of loss sustained merely by the number of
persons who are thus inevitably prevented from pursuing
an Indian career. You must bear in mind also the element
of uncertainty, the not knowing whether or not they will
be able to continue in the Indian service, which will
more than any thing else discourage men from entering
upon what is at first a very laborious and very irksome
task. Ido not like to read extracts, Fut only two days ago
I received a letter from a gentleman of considerable position
and very high attainments, who for a time held an official
situation in India, but who is wholly unconnected with
either the civil or military service of that country, and
whose opinion is therefore a perfectly unbiassed one. He
says :
" I am convinced that no man, let him possess a c mem-
tration of all talents, can or will fit himself for service in
India unless it is the business of his life." "At the end of
18 years' service in a tropical colony, with a thorough know-
ledge of the languages, I felt every day I had something to
learn. I learnt by every day's experience how I must have
irritated my people by my ignorance of their habits—an
ignorance excused only as being obviously ignorance,"
I think that it is impossible to overrate the importance of
this subject, because we have in India to deal with a people
whom we can hardly measure by any European standard.
In Indian affairs we have repeatedly seen how great dis-
content and dissatisfaction has been created by ignorance,
as was the case with regard to the mutiny at Lahore. I will
not refer to the more signal illustration which the events of
the last two years have afforded, but this I will say, that
having heard, as we all have, innumerable speculations as
to the cause of the recent insurrection, I believe that al-
though undoubtedly there were deep-seeted causes also at
Work, and although there were persons who for their own
objects excited the people, yet I am inclined to think that
the alarm excited by the greased cartridges was not affected.
but was a real alarm, caused by our ignorance of the preju-
dices entertained by our army upon that subject. Ido not
believe that any European going for the first time to India
and having to do with the natives, can avoid giving offence
and causing discontent, however anxious he may be to do
so. If hon gentlemen wish to see the subject discussed far
more fully and ably than I can deal with it, I can only re-
fer them to that admirable minute of Sir James Outran,
which they will find at page 110 of the blue-book, and with
every word of which I would express my concurrence. T
now come to that upon which my right hon. friend laid the
greatest. stress. He argued as if there was a necessary con-
nection between the existence of a local European force and
the existence of discontent, and want of discipline in that
army. We have had a great many assertions made upon
that point both in this house and out of it; but I have not
found any proof given of the truth of these assertions. True,
insubordination prevailed to a lamentable extent among the
local European troops of India last year. But what ought
to be shown, and what has not yet been shown, is that the
local character of that army had nothing to do with its in-
subordination. The incidents of their mutiny are fresh in
the recollection of every member in this house, and there-
fore I need only say that the event was altogether excep-
tional and casual. lam not here to defend these men. Their
claims were not reasonable and their conduct was unfortu-
nate. But I maintain that the circumstances which led to
that mutiny were such as can hardly recur. In the first
place, you had the older troops, as I believe, greatly demo-
ralised by two years of civil war. Then you had a number
of recruits raised in haste and sent out ft om this country,
under the urgent necessity of the case, with the political
object of making as great a display of European force as
possible ; but in point of training and discipline they
were not in such a state as they might have been
if despatched under different circumstances. Then,
there were exaggerated expectations entertained, I am
told, by many of these troops on the subject of prize
money. Those expectations were disappointed, and that dis-
appointment produced discontent. And although I am
most unwilling to say anything which may appear to throw
blame upon the local authorities, who in a very delicate

matter undoubtedly acted to the best of their judgment, still
I have always thought that if some rather fuller and more
detailed explanation of the grounds on which the decision of
the Government was based bad been made known to the

men, and it had been proved to them that they were only
asked to do what they were previously bound to do, some-

thing at least might have been done—l do not know how
much—toward 3 allaying their discontent. All these consi-
derations form certainly not a justification, but a palliation
and explanation of the bad feeling which existed among the
local force. And what I wish to ask my right hon. friend
is this—Can you show, have you ever attempted to show
that, placed in the same circumstances, influenced by the
same opinions, and exposed to the same—l will not say real
but supposed—provocation (and even if it was ill-founded
the men felt it to be real to them)—troops of the line would
not have acted precisely as they did ? (Hear, hear.) Then, is
the accident of a single mutiny to condemn a service of 100
years ? You had a mutiny at the Nore;but did you on that
account condemn the whole constitution of your navy ?
(Hear, hear.) lam told that we must accept the opinion of
the highest military authorities on this subject. Now, Ido
unreservedly accept that opinion as conclusive upon the fact
of the mutiny ; but what I do not see is the connexion be-
tween the local character of the force and the insubordina-
tion which has unhappily existed. I have endeavoured to
collect the reasons and arguments by which that view is

supported, and I find it stated by some very able advocates
of the proposed amalgamation, that men serving in the

local force become desperate because they have no oppor
tunity of returning to England. If that argument had
been used 70 years ago, in the days of Clive and Hastings,
it might have held good; but the pension list of the
Indian army sufficiently proves that the men who go out
to serve in the local European force do look forward for
their return, and actually do return to this country as much
as their brethren of the line. Another plea urged in favour
of the amalgamation is that if insubordination shows itself
in a portion of the troops of the line, it can bo stopped by
changing the quarters of the men, and thus preventing it
from spreading to the rest of the army. Now, I see no
reason why you should not take just the same precaution
in the case of a local force. This objection would be per-
fectly valid if it applied to alocal force raised for a territory
cf a very limited area. It would be perfectly sound, for
example, in Malta, the lonian Islands, or the West Indian
colonies. But, when we are considering the case of a local
force maintained in an empire the area of which is greater
than the whole of Europe, it is unreasonable and absurd to
say, " Oh I it is dangerous to have a local force, because,
if there be any inclination for mutiny or combination
among them, you have no means of separating the regi-
ments." (Hear.) But in his speech the other night the
right hon. gentleman said it was the opinion of military
men that a local force was apt to deteriorate, because it had
no opportunity of access to the highest military authorities.
Well, I want to know who the highest military authorities
are ; because I should say none is, or ought to be, higher
than the Commander-in-Chief in India. His power and
responsibility are generally equal to, and sometimes even
greater than those of your commander of the forces at home.
(Hear.) This objection, then, like the one I have previ-
ously noticed, merely takes the form of some general rea-
soning upon the subject, and it is applied to a case to which
it has no relation whatever. It is perfectly true that local
regiments raised for a small colony can never have an
opportunity of seeing service upon a large scale ; but it is
quite a different thing where your local force is intended
for a vast country like India, and is in magnitude quite an
army of itself. (Hear.) And with regard to disaffection,
I believe that so far from the fact of troops being localised
in India being an incentive to discontent among them, it
operates exactly the other way. I believe that nothing
tends so much to keep up a healthy English feeling or
a sentiment of patriotism among a body of men, whether
in the civil or tho military service, as the knowledge that
they are settled among a vast popr'ation wholly alien, and
in part, perhaps, hostile, but who always regard them in
the light of strangers, and in comparison with whom they
are themselves but a drop in the ocean. My right hon.
friend made very light of an argument which is often used,
viz , that if discontent should arise in the one army the pre-
sence of the other army would act as a check upon it. And
he made this remark—in which I entirely agree with him
—" God help us if our best resource or only chance for pre-
serving India is to be found in the employment of one Eng-
lish force against another I" Nobody, I should suppose,
contemplates the possibility of such an alternative ; yet it
has been argued that, if there be a danger of combination
or discontent among the troops quartered in India, the evil
would be less likely to spread over two separate forces dif-
ferently constituted and entertaining different ideas than
over one army homogeneously composed. That is all that
I have heard asserted on the subject, and as far as it goes
I believe it is a sound and fair argument. But, quoting dis-
tinguished authorities, the right hon. gentleman spoke of
the inefficiency as well as the bad discipline of the local
European force, and he used words to this effect, that it is
the commonly received opinion—l am glad my right hon.
friend did not endorse that opinion—that officers cannot
pass 10 or 15 years in India without losing something of
their energy. This is an invidious subject ; but if ono is to
compare the services of the two armies respectively, I will
venture to say that those whe were lately known as Com-
pany's officers have had their full share of all the honour
acquired in Indian warfare, and that there has certainly
been no inferiority on their side. Look back only for 20
years, to the period of the greatest disaster that ever befell
our arms in India, Whose name is associated with that
event as the general then commanding our troops ? I am
not mentioning this as any reproach to Sir J. Elphinstone,
who was sent out late in life, and at a time when he himself
admitted that he was hardly fitted to undertake an active
command. That was the doing of the Government of the
day. But the fact remains that it was under the command
of a Royal officer that the disaster in Affghanistan occurred;
while it was under three Company's officers, Generals Nett,
1 Pollock, and Sale, that that disaster was retrieved. (Cheers.)
Again let me turn to the events of the last three years. I
should be sorry to appear to undervalue or disparage such
brilliant services as those which have been rendered by Lord
Clyde, Sir W.Mansfield, and Sir Hugh Rose. It was lately
part of my duty to ask this house to recognise those ser-
vices, and I certainly never discharged any duty with greater
pleasure. But every man acquainted with England or India
must feel that the imminent peril was past, the neck of the
rebellion broken before those distinguished men reached the
scene of action. (Hear, hear.) And when Delhi fell, who
were the chief agents in producing that important result?
Why, those eminent Indian generals—Wilson, Nicholson,
and Neill, and that great Indian civilian, Sir J. Lawrence.
(Cheers.) And when I hear it said that officers after 10 or
15 years of Indian service lose a part of their energy, I ask
myself whether I am dreaming or under a delusion when I
suppose that Munro, Malcolm, Ochterlony, Henry Law-
rence, Outram, Herbert, Edwardes, and many others not
undistinguished in this house, were men who spent not 10
or 15 years, but the whole of their working life in active
employment in India. (Hear, hear.) Personal contrasts
are very disagreeable, but if we are to compare officers of
the two armies with each other, I must say I think an offi-
cer in the Indian service has opportunities for a manlier
training than can be had by an efficer in the Queen's army.
Surely, a command on the Punjab frontier involves greater
responsibility and more active duties, and brings with it
greater knowledge of military life, than a command at Alder-
shott. And when we are speaking of service in India, what
can be more important than an acquaintance with the
country, its climate, its people, its roads, means of trans-
port, and commissariat? And at what a serious disadvan-
tage in these respects must an inexperienced Queen's officer
be placed on arriving in India ? Moreover, it should be re-
membered that we aro now always sure of obtaining the
best men in the Indian service to fill the highest commands;
whereas, under a single amalgamated army, a variety of
causes would deprive you of that advantage. Upon the
question of the relative efficiency of the forces Sir Thomas
Franks was called before the commission to express his
opinion, and ho said :
" I have served in the field with portions of the European
forces of the three presidencies, and nothing could surpass
their gallantry, efficiency, and intelligence."
(Hear, hear.) Sr W. Cotton said :
" Ido not think it is possible to have better staff officers
than the Indian army had, nor that there should be a more
efficient foree than the Indian artillery."
Sir James Outram may be said not to be an entirely im-
partial witness, but lam sure he would not state as a matter
of fact that which ho did not solemnly believe. (Hear,
hear.) Sir James Outram said :
" Men of the local force are better in health and physical
energy, man for man."
He adds, and there is some significance in what he says :
" If, as is alleged, the discipline of the local army is bad,
the fault of bad discipline is generally supposed to be with
the Commander-in-Chief, and of all the Commanders-in-
Chief who have served in India only one has been appointed
from the fecal service."
(Hear, hear.) And he adds :
" Contrast the performances of the Bengal Commissariat
during the mutinies, when the empire was in a state of dis-
lccation, with those of the Royal Commis ariat in the
Crimea, under the eye of the British nation, and where a
land transport of seven miles only was required of the de-
partments."
Lord Ellenborough, who has deeply studied war,
and is thoroughly acquainted with military questions,
stated explicitly that the company's officers have a more ex-
tensiveo
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bably have been, as soldiers, superior to the officers of the
Queen's army. They had seen more, they had more en-
larged minds, because they had more to do:"
But upon this question I do not want merely to refer to the
evidence of all who are now living. My right hon. friend
in the course of his speech referred to the treatise of Sir J.
Malcolm, and I admit that a higher or better opinion than
Sir J. Maleohn's it is impossible to cite. Ido notpretend
to know what opinion he expressed at other times, because
this is a question itp.ai which men's views differ at different
periods of their lives ; but he was questioned in 1813, be-
fore a committee of this house, and, after stating in very
high, but still general terms, his opinion of the character
of the local troops, a question was put,which bears very
closely on the proposition now made by the Government.
He was asked,—
" Would it be advantageous to have tho regiments of
Europeans in India completed by filling up the casualties
with recruits, or to have them occasionally
r renewed by en-
tire regiments
That is practically the question ;am in issue—whether it is

better to keep an army permanently in India, recruiting it I
from England, or to renew it by sending out entire regi-
ments. Sir John Malcolm said :
" It would, no doubt, be mDst economical to have them
filled up with recruits, and the regiments would always
continue more efficient, as any new regiment coming entire
from England is unfit for service fir, I may say, a twelve •
month at least."' _ __ _ _ __ _ _

My right hon. friend quoted Lord Metcalfe, and I find in
Lord Metcalfe's volume of papers the following passage :
"The Indian army, although it be taken under the
Crown, must, nevertheless, continue in some respects a se-
parate body,—that is, it must be officered as at present by
officers brought up in its own bosom."
(Hear, hear.) He then proposes a system of exchange, so
that, if there is any meaning in words, it seems as if he were
contemplating a state of things in which the local army was
to remain distinct from that of the line. (Hear, hear.)
Again my right hon. friend cited the greatest name and
authority on military subjects in modern times—the Duke
of 'Wellington. I heard with interest, and I have since
read carefully the passage quoted. But what does the
Duke of Wellington say ? Ido not find in that passage a
single word about amalgamation (cheers), not a single
word about the disadvantage of "ea local army. 'What
the Duke of Wellington said was that the Company's
troops ought to be transferred to the Crown. (Hoar,
hear.) That is quite a different question, and I venture to
suggest that the motive may well be supposed to be
that, knowing there was a feeling among officers as to the
superiority of service directly under the Crown over service
under the Company, he thought the supposed inequality
between the two was the cause of jealousy which it was ex-
pedient to remove. (Hear, hear.) I have only one more
authority to quote. Let me remind the house that lam
not calling witnesses into court. I am only taking the
liberty to cross-examine witnesses whom my right hon.
friend has called. I have not looked through the writings
cf Lord Cornwallis. Ho may have entertained different
views at different times ; but, looking over Lord COl-1-
waPis's work, I alighted on this passage :
" several ob.:cetions have occureed to me on more mature
deliberation against declaring all the forces in this country
King's troops. If an act of Parliament could be obtained
permitting tile Company to beat up for recruits, and to keep
them under martial law until their embarkation, and if
some means could be adopted to establish equality of rank
between King's and Company's offie -,rs, I believe I should
be satisfied."
(Hear, hear.) 'What becomes of the authorities cited in
favour of the Government plan ? Lord Metcalfe favours a
local army ; the Duke of Wellington is only for a transfer
of the troops under the Crown ; and Lord Cornwallis would
be satisfied with the maintenance of a local force on certain
conditions which have long since been fulfilled. (Hear.)
The opinion of Lord Cornwallis alludes to one of the prin-
cipal grounds upon which the :asion is based—the alleged
existence of jealousy and rivalry between the two services.
Ido not care to deny that such jealousies have existed. No
doubt, beyond the limits of natural and healthy emulation,
jealousy has existed prejudicial to the interests of the pub •
lie service in India. But why has it existed ? Let us see
what complaints the local office' s have had, and up to what
time they have been excluded from an equality of rank
and honours. The first instance of a Royal commission being
granted to an Indian officer is in 1788. The rank of Lieu-
tenant-General was not granted until 1813. The order of the
Bath was nominally in 1815, but given for the first time in
1826. Brevets for service datefrom 1828. The rank of General
was first extended in 1837. Their rank as officers was not
recognized in Europe until 1855, end the first instance of a
Commander-in-Chief being appointed from the local forces
was in 1856—only four years age. (Hear, hear.) It is not
unnatural that, treated in such a way, they should have en-
tertained feelings of jealousy towards their more fortunate
comrades. We should entertain the same feelings under
the same circumstances. It is very easy to do away with
the feeling by doing away with the circumstances. By far
the greater part have been removed, and if any remain they
are insignificant. But when it is said that jealousy must
exist between two armies differently constituted in two
countries, I say that jealousy need not exist unless you put
one army in a condition of-greater advantage and favour
than the other. (Cheers.) In one respect there is a disad-
vantage in the continuance of a local force. I admit that
many soldiers who are invalided at an early age are only
invalided as far as India is concerned, and are still able to
do effective duty in a temperate climate. But, if that is ad-
mitted to be a disadvantage, it is one from which it is very
easy to escape, because there is no difficulty whatever, as far
as the men are concerned, in arranging a system of trans-
fer from one service to the other, by making the service in
one army count towards pension for service in the other.
It involves no other difficulty than the mere mechanical one
of balancing an account. (Cheers.) In the case of the
exchange of officers from one service to the other I am dis-
posed to agree with Lord Canning that the difficulties,
though grave, aro not insuperable. But there is one other
consideration which I think the house ought not altogether
to overlook, and that is the effect of the change on the army
of the line. What do you propose to do? Why, virtually
to employ 25,000 or 30,000 troops in India more than have
hitherto been considered necessary. You will not be able
materially to reduce your colonial forces. You can reduce a
few at the Cape, because the number there is extravagantly
high. But with that exception you cannot reduce the co-
lonial forces. If, then, the colonial service cannot be re-
duced, and the Indian service is to be increased, every offi-
cer and soldier gets a longer period of service abroad, and a
proportionately shorter period of service at home. (Cheers )
For the men, perhaps, it will not make much difference ; but
for officers, consider how far you can afford to make the ser-
vice less attractive than now. You now requirefrom them in-
tellectual qualities of a higher character than before, the pay
is low compared with other professions, and I apprehend that
this change will materially increase the difficulty—a diffi-
culty already great—of obtaining candidates for commis-
sions. It is now your object to induce, as far as you can,
men of social position and of independent fortune—who
have a stake in the country and are citizens as well as sol-
diers—to enter the army. That is a principle which may
be carried too far. I think it is carried too far if you sacri-
fice the intellectual qualifications of an officer to 'those ad-
vantages ; but, kept within reasonable bounds, no doubt
this is a sound policy, and it will be for the house to consi-
der how far this prospect of considerably increasing the
period of foreign service will be likely to affect the entrance
of such men into the army. (Hear.) It may be said, per-
haps, that individual officers can find the means of evading
foreign service, because they can generally, at least in time
of peace, arrange an exchange out of a regiment which is
going abroad into one which is to remain at home. But,
even when such exchanges are possible, I do not believe
that is a system which the house will desire to encourage.
(Hear.) A good deal has been said as to the inconvenience
of locking up in India a considerable European force, by
making it a merely local force, when you may require it
nearer home. There is an India: ias well as an English side
to that question, and it might be contended that, consider-
ing that India bears the expense of maintaining an army
for her protection, it is not reasonable that she should be ob-
liged to maintain as large an army in time of peace as in
time of warfor thebenefit of the Home Government. (Hear.)
But I deny that in .any strict sense of the word a European
local force is locked up in India. The Company's forces
have had before, and the local Indian troops may have again,
if required, to serve in time of war beyond the limits of India,
in Egypt, and in China. When any great emergency arises
there can be no doubt that they will and ought to be sent
out of India, provided that it be for the purposes of a war,
and not for ordinary garrison duties. 'What I contend for
is, not that a local force shall never, under any circum-
stances, cross the frontiers of India, for that has never been
the case ; but that India shall be its home, and that it shall
not leave India except in the case of war. (Hear, hear.) If
its liability not to leave India except in the event of war
constitutes any objection to a local force, precisely the same
objection applies to the rule which regulates the service of
the Guards at home. Ido not think it worth while to go
further into this question now. It is really a question
which it is hardly possible to argue fully within the ordi-
nary limits of a debate; but there is one aspect in which
the house ought to look at it, and that is in its effect on the
power of the Governor-General. lam far from wishing
that, in regard to administrative matters, greater authority
should be given to the Governor-General than he now pos-
sesses. In some respects I think he, or rather his Staff at
Calcutta, have a larger administrative authority than is
desirable. I should be glad to see somewhat less centrali-
sation in tho a _ministration of India, and somewhat more
local freedom given to the minor governoi-s. (Hear, hear.)
But that feeling is quite consistent with the opinion I now
venture to maintain, that in all matters which are politidal
or military the power of the Governor-General ought in
India to be supreme. (Hear, hear.) Since the days of
Hastings, to whatever disadvantages the Indian Admini-
stration has been exposed, it has always been free from the
evil and danger of a divided authority. If that danger is
ever to arise, the division of power can only be between two
persons. The only person who could possibly be placed in
a position which would_ render him a rival to the Governor-
General would be the Commander-in-Chief. In the case
of a local army stationed in India every officer looks up to
the Governor-General as the head of the whole local service
and the representative of the Crown ; but it is obvious that
the same feeling will not and cannot exist in an army of
the Line, which is serving only for a short time in the
country, and of which the immediate head is the Comman-
der-in-Chief on the spot, with a limited appeal to the Com-
mander-in-Chief at home. I believe—but Ido not want to
go into the subject now—that the effect of the change now
proposed will be greatly to increase the power of the Com-
mander •in-Chief at the expense of the Governor-General.
(Hear, hear) I do not want to exaggerate the amount
of inconvenience, not to say danger, which will ensue ;
but the effect, both as regards the relations of the two,
the the
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lation, will be most injurious. (Hear, hear.) I am not
going, at this time, into a consideration of the estimated cost
of the army. I agree most fully in the remarks made by the
gentleman to whom my right hon. friend committed the
charge of the inquiry into this subject, that materials are
wanting for anything like a minute or correct estimate of
the cost of the proposed change. The question to be con
sidered is, how far the invaliding of soldiers, with all the
expense it occasions, will be diminished by a system of more
frequent relief. I think that, of itself, not altogether free
from doubt. (Hear, hear.) It is distinctly asserted, and
is, indeed, familiar to every ono of us, that however men
may suffer in the course of years from the Indian climate,

possible to quarter a large number of European troops in the
hills. On the other hand, however, the mortality which

"Ills upon young soldiers from their own imprudence, their
ignorance of the climate, their neglect of precautions, can-
not in a proportionate degree be diminished by artificial
means. Then you have further to consider, even assuming
that more frequent removals would diminish the mortality
of the troops, whether that would compensate for the
enormous cost of transport and the practical neutralization
of a considerable portion of the army by its being on the

passage backwards and forwards. I have touched WI
lightly on these two last topics because I fear I must have
exhausted the patience of the house in endeavouring to
state, most imperfectly, the grounds on which I object
to the total substitution of the army of the Line
for a local force in India. In doing so, I can assure the
house I have discharged what is to me a distasteful duty.
I would always much rather on Indian questions support
the Government than oppose it. (Hear, hear.) I know in
this case I am acting against the opinions of many of those
whom I deeply respect; but I know the arguments I have
laid before you—and the weight of which I feel far more
strongly than I have been able to express—l know these
arguments do weigh heavily on the minds of those who, from
their experience and knowledge of Indian matters, are most
competent to form a judgment on the question. (Hear.) I
wish only that the subject shall—as lam confident it wal—
receive a fair, impartial, and deliberate consideration.
(Hear, hear.) lam well aware that from the position I have
occupied I have been too much mixed up in this question,
too long personally interested in it, to approach it at this
time with a completely unbiassed mind ; and, whatever de-
cision the house may come to, I for one will acquiesce in it,
knowing from experience that upon all questions of admini-
stration the collective judgment of this house is generally
wiser and sounder than that of any individual member.
Cheers.)

General PEEL—Havingbeen a member of the royal com
mission alluded to by his noble friend, and differing from
the decision to which his noble friend had arrived, he was
anxious to take the earliest opportunity of stating the
grounds upon which he had arrived at that totally different
conclusion. (Hear.) The question before the house, whe-
ther we should continue a local force in India, or that the
European troops in that country should henceforth form
part of the Queen's general army, was far too important to
be made the subject of a party contest. Nor did he see that
there was the slightest disposition to make it so. But what
he meant was that they should not allow their judgment to
be swayed by any prejudices of officers of the Indian or the
regular army who might have interests of their own
which might be affected by the change. His noble friend
was very naturally in some degree biassed by the opinions
of those by whom he had been surrounded when at the
head of. the India Board, and no doubt his (General Peel's)
opinions were as much biassed by his connexion with the
royal army. (Hear.) The arguments on each side were
so evenly balanced that it was impossible to expect una-
nimity, and he would abstain therefore from quoting any
authority. It was well known too that in the commission
to which allusion had been made there was a bare majority
coming to a conclusion exactly opposite to that of the mi-
nority, and in each case the reasons were folly given in the
report. He had no hesitation in sa)lng that he generally
agreed in the s iews of the majority, while his noble Mend
as generally agreed in the views of the minority. The
majority consisted of five eminent officers of the regular
army, while the minority consisted of the names of four as
eminent officers of the Indian army. Buthe might call at-
tention to the fact that the officers composing the majority
had all served in India, and were as distinguished as those
who differed from them. He observed from the papers on
the table that the report of the commissioners had been re-
ferred to a naval and military committee at the India-
house, which was unanimous in condemning the decision
of the royal commission. In the midst of all this conflict of
opinion Lord Derby's Government was called upon to form
a decision, and that decision was no doubt that there should
be a local army to consist of two-fifths of European troops.
He of course as a member of the Government had concurred
in that decision, but the mutiny which had broken out in
the Indian European army since was of itself sufficient to
justify a change of opinion. Ho admitted that with regard
to the mutiny the Government was wrong at the commence -
ment, but it was impossible to get over the fact that a muti-
nous correspondence was carried on for some time between
the different regiments, and not even up to the last moment
did the non-commissioned officers and old soldiers come
forward to give information. Either they knew of the
mutinous feeling of the men or they did not ; if they did,
and concealed it, they were as soldiers not worth their salt.
(Hear, hear.) There were many other reasons besides the
mutiny justifying a change of opinion. He found that Lord
Canning in one of his last despatches gave Sufficient grounds
to warrant any such change—for so far from the pro-
posal of Lord Derby's government to have a local army
composed two-fifths of Europeans being approved by him,
he wrote home recommending in the strongest terms the
amalgamation of the two armies. Another fact of an im-
portant character was the number of men who accepted
their discharge whenever an opportunity occurred. The fact
that at the end of the eight years' see vice a number of men
belonging to the local army accepted their discharge at once
put an end to the efficiency of the local force. His noble
friend said that if a local force existed they should be allowed
to exchange from one force to the other. They were he be-
lieved, able to do that now, and it was natural that after
several years' service in India a man should wish to come
home if his time were allowed to count on for pension. He
took it for granted that a plan had been determined upon
before his noble friend had determined, while Secretary of
State for India, in favour of a local force, but they had no
details before them as to how it could be carried out consis-
tently with justice to both officers and men. But supposing
such a plan devised, there were still other difficulties to be
overcome. Hitherto the European army in India had not
only provided the military service, but had supplied an effi-
cient staff of civil and political officers. No one would deny
that, whenever such duties were entrusted to military men,
whethef of the one service or the other, they were always
efficiently performed, and though officers had been sometimes
accused of want of general business ability, political and
civil appointments had been filled by them as well or better
than by persons selected from any other class of the com-
munity. He agreed with Sir C. Trevelyan that if the two
armies were amalgamated there would be no want of candi-
dates for the service who would look forward to passing
their lives in India, and earning distinction in that
country, whereas if the Indian army was merely a local
one, there could be no doubt that appointments, instead of
being thrown open to all candidates, would be confined, as
heretofore, chiefly to the friends of the members of the In-
dian council, than which nothing could be more prejudicial
to the efficiency of the service. His noble friend had ob-
jected that, in the event of the amalgamation, officers ap-
pointed to political employment would be liable to be re-
moved when their regiments were ordered home, and the
service would suffer by continued change. But that would
not be the case; after two or three years of service, such
officers would be placed upon the staff list, and thus effici-
ency would be provided for, and an end put to that fatal
system of denuding regiments of all their best officers and
leaving the regimental duties to men of less experience.
Another objection which had been made to the proposal for
a Royal army was this—it was said that a local army always
secured a certain and sufficient amount of permanent local
force to be maintained there, because it was not removable
at the caprice of the Government. Now, he did not attach
any importance to that. It could never be supposed that the
home Government would not feel the same interest in India
as it felt in any other part of the empire. India was repre-
sented in the Cabinet. But it was a mistake to suppose that
the local force could not be now removed from India. The
opinion of the law officers of the Crown had been taken on
that subject, and there was not the least doubt that the
local force of India could be removed from that country.
It was folly, however, to suppose that any British Govern-
ment would ever endanger India by removing from it any
larger number of troops than the Governor-General sanc-
tioned. The greatest exertion was made in this country
to send troops to India in the hour of her need during the
mutiny, and some of our garrisons and colonies were placed
in jeopardy in order to do that. India must be prepared
to give as well as to receive assistance. Another ground
of objection was on the score of expense. It had been said,
and properly, that the amount of force in India must
always be regulated by the amount of the Indian revenue ;
and it was the o, inion of the minority of the Royal Com-
mission that the authority of the Secretary of State for
India, and of the Indian Government, would be interfered
with by haying a Royal army. But recollect the amount of
force in India, whether local or European, must always de-
pend on the Governor-General, and on the Indian govern-
ment. The home government had not authority to send a
single regiment to India without its being applied for by the
Indian government. The right hon. baronet would admit
that there was not that difference between a local and a re-
gular force that cught to influence the decision of that
house. If the whole of the army in India were a regular
army he did not see why the allowances received by that
army should not be subject to revision, and made more in
accordance with the allowance to the troops in the colonies.
Of course those who remained there for life should receive
a higher rate of pay, but if the regiments were relieved
oftener he did not see why there should be that immense
difference between the pay of the regiments servingin India
and that of the regiments serving in the colonies that there
was now. But there was another objection which, although
it had not been brought forward so prominently, had, he
was afraid, affected the opinions of many more than any of
the objections he had hitherto stated, and that was the fear
entertained of the transfer ofpatronage from those who now
held it to the Commander-in-Chief, or to the Horse Guards.
He thought that was a bugbear. The original appoint.
ments would be open to the whole world. The Commander-
in-Chief had expressed his willingness to give up all patron.•
age as to original appointments, and the only thing left for
him would be the commonregimental promotions, in which