The Sun.
London, England, 1860-06-22 00:00:00

ought to cease to exist." (Hear, hear.) That is to say, we
are called upon to affirm that it is expedient that a certain
thing should be done, though many of us may believe that

great difficulty may be experienced in working out the ne-

cessary details. (Hear, hear.) Nor do I think the difficulty
which presents itself in dealing with the question in this

form is diminished by the suggestion which my right hon.

hiond has thrown out, to the effect that we are not now

asked to consider the case of the native army, but only that
of the European force in India. If that were really so, and
that we were simply to decide upon what should be done

with a force of 20,000 or 30,000 Europeans, our views upon
the matter might indeed be materially altered. If we could
dissociate from the question at issue to-night that larger
question of what ought to be done with a native army. then
no doubt the interests involved would be less important,

and the point at issue drawn within much narrower limits,
I am, however, afraid that you cannot separate the case ol
the local European from that of the native Indian army
(Hear.) And for this reason, if you were to maintain in
India 'a powerful European force, consisting of 60,000 or
80,000 men, composed of the principal troops of the line,
and if together with and by the side of that army you were
to keep up at the same time a native army, which would be
necessarily less looked to, less thought of, and less trusted,
and which would be mostly employed, in all probability, on
services in connection with which opportunity would be
taken to economise European life—if, I repeat, two such
armies were to be maintained in a separate form, and with-
out any tie or bond between them, it is, I think, plain that
the officers of the native force would feel that their position
was one—l will not say of degradation, but at all events of
inferiority—that they would lose that self-respect and
esprit de corps which ought to belong to every army—
(hear, hear)—and that employment in the native force, in-
stead of being sought- for by competent men in India
as heretofore, would form a refuge only for those who can
obtain no other employment. (Hear, hear.) I have heard
something of jealousy between the two branches of the
service; but which state of things, I should like to know, is
more likely to create and perpetuate an ill-feeling of that
nature than that in which the officers of the one army will
attempt to assert the superiority of their position over the
officers of the other, while the latter will feel that they are
placed in a position of undeserved but not the less real in
feriority. (Hear.) To take such a course, then, as to that
which I am alluding, would, in my opinion, be to destroy
the efficiency of the native force. But the question may be
asked, do we require native troops, and can we trust them
after the experience of the last few years? I answer that
question by another—how are those native troops to be
replaced ? (Hear.) You cannot hope, with any European
force which you can command, to rule over a million and
.a half of square miles and 150,000,000 of inhabitants.
60,000 or 80,000 Europeans will never suffice to keep in
subjection so great an empire, and you cannot increase
your army beyond that limit, partly because of the com-
parative smallness of our military establishment, and partly
because of the waste of European life in India. It should
else loe borne in mind that you require services to be per-
med in India which European troops cannot render,
'while I believe, in practice, no large force of Europeans has
laken the field in India without being accompanied by
native troops. Let me also remind the house that circum-
stances might arise which would render it a matter of con-
siderable difficulty to keep up the number of European
troops in India, even at the lowest limit upon which you
might deem it expedient to fix.• There are many circum-
stances in this country the tendency of which is to make
recruiting difficult ; wages are rising, the position of the
Labourer is improving, the capital of the country is rapidly
increasing; but notwithstanding these facts, emigration
has not altogether ceased. If the contingency should arise
. —which is painful even to contemplate, but still within the
r, *lgo of possibility, because it is that against which the
exi, itence of an army is intended to provide—if a war should
take place in which England should be compelled to take
part, I do not see by what means you could maintain an
Europe, an force of 70,000 or 80,000 men in India unless you
resorted to the expedient which unfortunately you had to
adopt in the Crimean war of enlisting foreign mercenaries.
(Hear, hear.) I hold, then, that the maintenance of an.
Indian army both for the present and for the future is in-
evitable—(hear, hear)—and holding that opinion, I am
glad to beliesee, as I do, that the dangers incident to its
existence are considerably exaggerated in popular belief.
You have in India every variety of race and opinion, and
between these various populations the old feuds and animo-
sities still continuo. In 1857, when the mutiny first broke
out, the first thing done was to raise a new native army,
and that army marched on the enemy as it would have
done had it been a foreign enemy. You would have no
difficulty in obtaining the assistance of troops raised in any
part of India to put down such disturbance. The greatest
danger you had to encounter at the time the outbreak
occurred was that of giving the element of one single race
a vast preponderance in the native force. With the lesson
we then received, I repeat" the maintenance to a con-
siderable extent of a native force is under the circumstances
of India inevitable. If the maintenance of a native army
be inevitable, and if at the same time a native army cannot
be maintained entirely dissociated from the European force,
without the officers and men losing their esprit dc corps and
self-respect, there must to some extent be a local European
force remaining in India. I don't like on questions of this '
kind to appeal to authorities, however eminent, because
reasons of policy ought to stand or fall by the weight that
belongs to them. But I find that Sir John Malcolm, when
examined before this house in 1813, so exactly expressed
the opinion I have endeavoured to lay before you, that I
will quote one sentence from his evidence. He was asked—
"If the European regiments were to be reduced, and the
infantry of the Company's army to consist of natives alone,
what would be the effect ?" His answer was—" If such
a separation were to take place it would tend materially to
destroy the efficiency of the Company's army. . . . In the
sepoy sery ce the officers cannot be employed except in all
the lowest drudgery and fatigue of war. They will in con-
sequence sink in their reputation, and will become little
better than a country militia."
He goes on to argue that an army, exclusively native, or-
ganised in the manner now proposed, would sink into a
position not superior to that of the armies of native princes.
(Hear, hear.) There is one consideration which you cannot
altogether overlook, although I am far from regarding it as
of paramount or primary importance. I mean the feelings
of those whom you are about to transfer from one service
to another. I allude to that subject, because my right hon.
friend said that with very few exceptions the feeling of the
officers of the Indian army was favourable to amalgamation
—or at least that it is only the older officers that are against
amalgamation, the junior officers being in general in favour
of it. There must be much that is conjectural in an esti-
mate of the opinions of a large body of men with whom
we do not come into personal contact ; and when your
opinion is known a person in that position naturally shrinks
from expressing views which a-e known to be unwelcome
and which it is useless to discuss. That exists on one side
as well as the other. But, having communicated to a great
extent with the Indian army, and having a few years ago
resided in India, I must say I never heard the opinion that
any of the officers, except some very young officers of
the Indian army, were favourable to the change. (Hear.)
I certainly have heard officers say that amalgamation
would take place sooner or later, and that military influence
prevailed at home which made it desirable that it the change
were to take place the sooner it did occur the better, so as
to relieve them from unsettlement hereafter. That is a
feeling which prevailed some time ago, and no doubt it is
rather increased than diminished by the long period of
suspense in which the Indi n army has been kept. There is
another ground on which I believe that some officers of the
local force may be not unfavourable to amalgamation. No
one who has heard the expression of opinion among the
officers of that force can fail to be aware that one of their
strongest feelings a few years ago—l am not identifying
myself with that feeling as founded in justice, I speak
merely of its existence—one of their strongest feelings was
a belief that they have little chance of justice at home—that
interest, and influence, and favour have a great deal to do
with military administration here—(hear)—and that their
military service at a distance does not stand a fair chance ; and
they argue in this way :—lf we remain as a local force we
have no chance whatever, but if we take our turn in service
with the European forces we shall be brought under the
notice of the. authorities at home, and we shall have
some chance of recognition. I believe some of the officers
of the local force are in favour of the amalgamation
on that ground. But it is not for the sake of
the officers of the Indian army that I would main-
tain a local European force in India; it is for
the sake of the public service in India. (Hear, hear) In
all the discussions on this question I have never heard afair
and satisfactory aniwer given to what is, in my mind, the
greatest objection to the measure of the Government, that
you will lose the most valuable assistance which the Go-
vernor •General now has in carrying on the local adminis-
tration of Indian affairs when you lose the service of seine
thousands of officers trained exclusively to the Indian ser-
vice. (Hear, hear.) I don't know that it would be possible
to get any more important testimony than that of the Go-
vernor-General himself upon this subject, and here is what

.
he says :
" No one would dream of attempting to administer the
civil affairs of India through officers who were not attached
to the Government hysomeother ti than the receipt of In-
dian salaries. And inasmuch 'as thee'fficiency of our military
service, in those branches of it which are of daily import-
ance to the peace and safety of the .country, such as the
management of irregular regiments, or the conduct of the
half-political, half-military operations on the frontiers and
in native Eitgawetes; depends mainly upon the application which
officer
the
with which he to his early training, upon the heartiness
undertakes his duty, and upon his persever-
ing adherence to it,lshould grratly deplore seeing her Ma-
je, n India ty's army
who are
entirely, or even in the
greater part, by men
are at liberty to cast themselves
loose from the country at
ficant sacrifice of their interests their. and at an insigni-
Now, sir,, don't suppose that *any man in this house will-
argue the question on the ground that it isbetter altogether
fyropror 0
pt the i
ncivil t
aa ,tlenotifnEi sitt
rr a.--
to separate officers of the
of India. That may be vyer tiou
r.an civilisation, but it is certainly not a system that would
1)-'
(Hear, hear.) There system
eadroany pants of
answer in India.
India in which it would not be possible 'lister civil
affairs without the employment of inilitami
that purpose. Let any man read tie Works orfYsicnum for
11,
trardes on India, and he will have no doubt on this point.
Ea'
Only think what is the condition of life in many of the wild
regions of India, and you will be able to judge how far it
would be ro,itac in countries of that description to sepa-
rate the power of administration from the power of the