The Sun.
London, England, 1860-02-27 00:00:00

the gallant officers and men under my orders.
The French Admiral hoisted his flag n an Eng-
lish gunboat ; English gunboats took he French
forces to the attack on the forts ; an Erglish gun-
boat led the attack ; an English vessel iceived the
French wounded ; English gunboats hi the way
up the Tien-tsin River, and were the fist foreign
vessels ever off that city ; English gunboats
alone kept up the communication btween the
city and the fleet outside ; and when roops were
likely to be required, English gunborts took on
board the whole of the French troops ior convey-
ance up the river. I mention tlese facts,
not with any desire to exaggerate the cervices of
the British gunboats, in depreciation of the forces
under my gallant colleague, whose while conduct
has been marked by frankness and sincrity since
the opening of the campaign, and from wlom I have
invariably received the most cordial support, but to
defend the character of the squadron under my
orders. Our gunboats were much smallerthan those
of the French, and consequently more available in
narrow waters. Had the case been revered I should
have received the same support fron Admiral
Rigault.
"9. I entirely differ in Lord Elgir's opinion,
that had we moved up the river immediately on our
arrival off the Peiho, without resistance, it would
have sufficed to bring the Imperial Government to
terms, and that any further measures ofviolence or
coercion would have been avoided. l have had
two years' experience in Chinese warfare, and any
one who has been long in China will tear me out
in the assertion that nothing but the conclusive
evidence of irresistible force will ever filly satisfy
the Imperial Government. I considier therefore as
stated in my despatch reporting the oierations at
the Peiho, that the Chinese having bean allowed
time to fortify their position, and being confident
of their strength, the capture of the forts under
such circumstances would have a greater moral
effect on the Imperial Government then if we had
attacked them when less prepared. Subsequent
events fully bore out my oeimon. It was ascer-
tained that guns from Tien-tsin, and even from
Pekin, had been conveyed to the forts at Taku, and
that all the available military force was also assem-
bled there. At one blow therefore the whole of
their guns were captured, arid their army driven
like a scattered rabble into the surrounding coml•
try, to spread everywhere the reports of our invin-
cibility, and the destructive and terrific missiles we
made use of. To this brilliant and complete suc-
cess I attribute our total exemption from annoyance
while at Tien-tsin, and the conclusion of a treaty
within a month after, which may be said to open
the whole of China to the world, and which may
in a few years develope a field for commercial en-
terprise of which we have at present no conception.
" 10. On my arrived off the Rugged Islands I
only remained a sufficient time to send off despatches
to England, and hurried off to the Gulf of Pecheli,
where I arrived on the 24th of April, and found that
Elgin had the same morning, before my arrival,
i oeN etd dos h
makeai
pt Taku,hadan
y admitted'onward
n though,wa
sent in his ultimatum to the Chinese Viceroy, Tan,
oahvl
ereemhaadedny
tnr
ioent-
rtdh asault
who hadt
hfaiosrriej
n isa udaffivr
advance.

whatever. His lordship informed me then that he
reported it to the Earl of Clarendon.
" His lordship goes on to state, that on the 2d of
March he addressed me a letter, stating that it
would be advisable I should collect at Shanghai,
towards the end of March, or as soon after as might
be convenient, as a large a fleet, more especially of
gunboats drawing little water, as I could spare from
service elsewhere,' and that I had replied that my
attention had been for some time past directed to
that object ; that one gunboat and one gun-vessel
had already sailed for Shanghai ; that arrangements
were in progress for others to follow, and that it
was my intention to sail for Shanghai in the Cal-
cutta, should nothing prevent me, on the 16th of
March.
" 4. By reference to the disposition sheet of the
squadron, dated the 15th of March, their lordships
will at once perceive that at that date the following
vessels had sailed from Hongkong for Shanghai :
Higkfiyer, Slaney, Cormorant, Nimrod, and Sur-
prise ; that the Sampson, Coromandel, and Leven
were preparing to sail, and did sail a few days after;
and that the Opossum, Staunch, and Bustard were
to sail when the monsoon abated. These vessels I
ordered to be convoyed by the Hesper, steam store-
ship, that they might be supplied by her with the
necessary coals, to hasten their voyage. I left
orders with Commodore Stewart to despatch the
smaller gunboats on the 10th of April, that being,
as I considered, from experience, the earliest conve-
nient time at which they could proceed, to allow
them to reach Shanghai in an efficient state for ser-
vice, and I gave orders for two more gunboats to be
kept ready if sent for, as stated in the disposition
sheet. I should have left on the 18th of March in the
Calcutta, but I was detained till the 25th, on account
of a succession of heavy gales peculiar to the season.
I sailed on the 25th in tow of the Niger, but I
found the north-east monsoon still so strong that
on the third day I proceeded under sail. The French
Admiral left Hong Kong the day after I did.
" His lordship next stated, that ever since I
have arrived in China I have been in constant and
unreserved communication with Sir Michael Sey-
mour, and as he was perfectly aware both of the
tenour of my route to the Court of Pekin, of the
time fixed in it beyond which I had resolved not to
wait the arrival of plenipotentiaries from the Em-
peror of China at Shanghai, and of the importance
whifili I attached to our being able, in the event of
&Hare in the attempt to negotiate at that piaoo,
.to
appear off the mouth of the Peiho. His lordship
confesses that he addressed to me the letter of the
2d March more with a view to put matters in a pro-
per official shape than for any practical purposes.
" 5. Up to the date of the capture of Canton I
am quite willing to allow that Lord Elgin was in
constant and unreserved communication with me,
but this has not been the case subsequently. The
extent of my knowledge of his lordship's despatch
to the Court of Pekin is embodied in my letter to
you (No 68) of the 14th February, and to the mere
fact that his lordship had asked for plenipotentiaries
to meet him at Shanghai; but I must plead entire
ignorance of any date beyond which his lordship
had determined not to negotiate at Shanghai, or of
his lordship's intended ulterior proceedings, beyond
bringing pressure to bear on some point. near the
capital, the extent of which, as far as my know-
ledge went, was to blockade the mouth of the Peiho
and the mouth of the Grand Canal in the Yang-tse-
Kiang, as directed by her Majesty's Government.
" Lord Elgin proceeds to recapitulate the before-
mentioned reasons, and states that on the 3d of
April the Coromandel arrived at Shanghai, and
brought the very perplexing intelligence that not
only had Sir M. Seymour put off his own departure
from Hong Kong from the 16th to the 25th of
March, but that no preparations for the immediate
despatch of gunboats to the north seemed to be in
progress. This information his lordship gathered
from the verbal reports of the officers of the Coro-
mandel, for on neither point did his lordship hear
from Sir Michael Seymour. His lordship, under
these circumstances, determined to rally round him
all the force he could collect, and proceed without
delay to the mouth of the Peiho; that his lordship
therefore wrote certain letters to the senior officers
at Sh"anghai and Hongkong, and proceeded to the
north on the 10th of April, taking with him the
Slaney in tow of the Furious, and arrived in the
Gulf of Pecheli on the 14th. That having only the
Cormorant and Slaney, he had been precluded from
making any movement in advance; and that from
all he had observed and heard, his lordship was
confirmed in the opinion that if on our arrival we
had been in a position to move at once up the river
towards Tien-tsin, we should have been able to do
so without resistance, convinced the Chinese that
foreign ships of war can ascend the river, and have
placed our force between the capital and the junks
conveying supplies of grain, which would have suf-
ficed to bring the Imperial Government to terms;
and that any further measures of violence or coer-
cion would have been avoided. His lordship con-
cludes this do%pateh by stating that the chief credit
of tins ineasuie must have accrues to th., Britigh
navy.
" 6. On the 23d of March I despatched the Leven
and Coromandel to Amoy and Shanghai ; the for-
mer to remain at Amoy until relieved by the Elle,
to sail in a few days. As I was to sail two days
after the Coromandel, I did not write to Lord Elgin
by that opportunity, though I had written t' his
Excellency a private letter on the 15th; and to show
how little I anticipated any sudden removal from
Shanghai, from any information in my possession,
I quote the following extract from my letter to you,
No. 138, of the 25th of March I have the honour
to report that I intend to sail this day, in her Ma-
jesty's ship Calcutta, for the Rugged Islands, the
nearest convenient anchorage to Shanghai, with
which I shall keep up a communication by means of
the Coromandel steam tender.' On my arrival at
the Rugged Islands, on the 13th of April, I found
the Sampson and Coromandel waiting for me, with
the intelligence that LordElgin had, with the Pique,
Furious, Cormorant, and Slaney, proceeded to the
Gulf of Pecheli on the Bth and 10th of April. A.
letter from Lord Elgin announced the same in-
telligence; and that letter, of which a copy is en-
closed in my letter, No. 148, of the 13th of April,
contained
the first intimation I had received from
his lordship of his intention to proceed up the river
to the city of Tien-tsin. Having left Hong Kong
under the impression that on my arrival at Shanghai
any future naval operations would have been de-
cided on, after due consultation with the naval
commanders-in-chief, I must confess my extreme
surprise on learning that Lord Elgin had already
left for the Gulf of Pecheli; and I may add that my
feelings were fully shared in by Admiral Rigault.
Before leaving Hong Kong I had made every in-
quiry respecting the navigation of the Gulf of
Pecheli, and had come to the conclusion, which I
had hoped to have communicated to Lord Elgin, at
Shanghai, that the end of April would be suffi-
ciently early for her Majesty's ships to Resemble off
the Peiho, to carry on operations with effect; and
the
fact of the Calcutta having carried away her
mainyard in the still strong north-east wind, while
crossing the gulf on the 23d April, sufficiently
proves the correctness of my opinion. Even after
the 10th of May there were many days during
which it was quite impracticable for tho gunboats
to carry on active operations.
" 7. On referring to the Admiralty letter No. 151,
of the 20th April, 1857, it is distinctly stated that
the letter from the Foreign-office of the 17th April,
'that when negotiations become useless, it then
rests with the Admiral to determine where and
how the forces at his disposal shall be employed,'
and in the memorandum for Lord Panmure which
accompanies that letter this sole responsibility is
made more manifest. Had Lord Elgin waited my
arrival at Shanghai, I should have been able to
learn his Excellency's wishes, and to have made
the necessary arrangements for carrying out any
intended operations ; but no later than the 10th of
April his lordship, acting on the verbal reports of
the subordinate officers of my flag tender, and know-
ing I must be close at hand (I arrived thrce days after-
wards), proceeded with thesmall force then at Shang-
hai to the Gulf of Pecheli, and, having arrived there
on the 14th, finds, according to his lordship's own ad-
mission, that the force was inadequate for making
any movement in advance; so that the only object
attained was the placing me in a false position by
taking my ships under my orders, and giving to the
Chinese an undue knowledge of our approach.
" I most respectfully, and with all deference to
tspltiole. opinionewsesr,tupon
t
ipl ooatno'f thetemrthe , of Elgin,
arrived
lordship
beg to submit that
there was no urgent necessity for making the com-
municationhich
I had
potnerdsntianaritipessi
Shanghai,
theh:n muckothedr
that the delay of a few days
inennimeinaciiinggai, nmannst
also
s)
mn importantnetnntifootnphseer
las inn
it
meas
ptt
otellnitena
nsoetpgeninteinnwegeo
consequence.
lfhdi theav seasonhave
been
lordship
to stop the grain junks from entering the Peiho.
His lordship had it in his power to carry such ob-
ject into effect by application to the senior officer;
and I know that the senior French naval officer had
orders to carry his Minister's wishes in that re-
spect into effect should it be desirable. One gun-
boat inside the bar of the Peiho would have suf-
ficed. Had any casualty happened to the ships
which Lord Elgin took into the Gulf of Pecheli
(and one was very near occurring), or had the on-
ward movemei.t in advance,' which his lordship
seemed to contemplate without reference to me, on
whom the sole responsibility rested, been a failure,
it would have been the Admiral, and not Lord
Elgin, who would have been held answerable both
to their lordships and the country at large.
" 8. With regard to Lord Elgin's last observa-
tion, that the whole credit of the measure proposed
would have accrued to the British navy, I have
only to remark that the result of the operations
which did take place were highly creditable to

LORD ELGIN'S DESPATCH OF THE 20TH OF APRIL.
" This letter commences with reporting the Ad-
miral's arrival in the Gulf of Pecheli, in the Cal-
cutta; but as the ship draws 25 feet water, she can-
not approach within five miles of the Peiho River ;
also the arrival of the Coromandel, towed by the
Sampson, which also cannot cross the bar. His lord-
ship likewise expresses doubts about the arrival of
the gunboats till the end of May; and remarks on
the inadequate nature of the force I had ordered to
the Peiho, and that it would not arrive till the ap-
proach of the season when the (Inmate is most un-
favourable to the European constitution.
" 11. Lord Elgin should in candour have added,
these ships bring with them a body of 600 trained
seamen and marines, six large boats mounting guns,
and peculiarly adapted for river service, and a large
sepply of provisions, stores, clothing, and money
for the squadron ; and that the Coromandel, besides
her armament of five guns, possesses in her roomy
decks a desirable shelter for troops, and draws only
8 feet of water. The five gunboats alluded to arrived
ready for service on the 9th and 10th of May, in
company with the Hesper, and, with the force al.
ready in hand, proved more than sufficient for the
service required.
" 12. So far from the climate being unfavourable
to Europeans, there was not one death from sick-
ness in the whole British force in the Peiho, from
the 20th of May to the 7th of July. Indeed, I may
say, that, notwithstanding the men were for the
first fortnight constantly in boats, there was hardly
a case of sickness, as reported in my despatches.
Lord Elgin is in error in stating that I promised a
large fleet, especially of gunboats, to be ii the Gulf of
Pecheli at the end of March. I engaged that an
adequate force should be at Shanghai at the end of
March or as soon after as convenient. It is utterly
imnossible to move a force of gunboats up a stormy
coast with tne prect3wil or a ialliraj aLia,
though his lordship makes so light of the monsoon,

and suggest towing the gunboats up the coast by
paddle steamers, I can assure their lordships that,
while the Calcutta was making her voyage to the
north, the most powerful merchant steamer in China
of 400-horse power, was obliged to bear up within
40 miles of the Yang-tse-kiang, and run back to
Foochow, a distance of 200 miles, from stress of
weather. My arrangements for getting the gun-
boats up to the north were made with the view to
see them arrive in an efficient state, and nDt torn to
pieces by being towed against a dead sea, an object
I fully accomplished, by causing them to coast the
shore, and anchor in bad weather. The Fury, the
fastest steamer under my orders. did tow two gun-
boats from Shanghai to the Gulf of Pecheli, but
there was no advantage gained, as the gunboats
which came up under sail made the passage in the
same time. Lord Elgin compares the powerfully-
built and full-rigged French gunboats, and the 80-
horse power gunboat Slaney, with our small ones of
60-horse power. I leave that for their Lordships'
decison.

" Lord Elgin next states that the French admiral
arrived on the 25th of April with his whole fleet,
and that, at the moment of writing, the French flag
was represented by two gunboats within the bar of
the Peiho; the English by two despatch boats
aground on the top of it.
" 13. I might smile at this statement, were it not
on account of the motives which appear to dictate
it, and the impression it must have made on their
Lordships. The Nimrod and Cormorant grounded
in the previous night in trying to cross the bar in
company with the three French gunboats, as did
one of the latter (their Lordships must under-
stand that at low water the bar of the Peiho is
nearly dry, and it is only at particular times of
tide that even a ship's launch can cross). In two
hours after his lordship's despatch was sent away
both vessels had crossed the bar, and the Eng-
lish flag was represented by three English vessels,
including the Blaney, of superior force to the
French ; the English boats close to the batteries,
the French somewhat to the left, I cannot refrain
from drawing their lordship's particular attention
to the impression attempted to be made by this
complaint, in reality so groundless. The Cormo-
rant, Nimrod, and Surprise were specially selected
by me, as peculiarly qualified for service in the
north. They draw only a few inches more water
than the French aunboats ; arc more capable of re-
sisting bad weather than the smaller vessels ; and
the Cormorant , the only one of the three I consi-
dered it necessary to take up to Tien-tsin, was more
manageable than the French gun•boats. As Lord
Elgin mentions that on the 25th April the whole
French fleet arrived, I add a list of the ships of the
two flags on the day in question:—

English.
Calcutta, 84.
Pique, frigate.
Sampson, steam frigate.
Furious, ditto.
Nimrod, gun-vessel.
Cormorant, ditto.
Slaney, ditto.

French.
Nemesis, frigate.
Aucheieuso, ditto.
Primauguet, steam sloop.
Phlezeton, ditto.
Fusel, gunboat.
Dragonne, ditto.
Avalmche, ditto.

Coroniindel, ditto.

" On the 29th April, at Lord Elgin's earnest re-
quest, but against my own judgraent, I despatched
the Sampson to Hongkong for tiro 40-horse power
gunboats, which, having but one engine, are not
desirable vessels to employ at a distance from a fac-
tory. Lord Elgin availed himself of the opportunity
to forward to England the two despatches now in
question. When these vessels arrived active opera-
tions were concluded, and, from their limited power,
proved far inferior in efficiency. to the 60-horse
power gunboats.
" Lord Elgin next adds that he much fears that
it will be found, when the matter comes to be in-
quired into, that one of the reasons for the non-
appearance of gunboats when thqr presence would
be so valuable is that many of them are unservice-
able from the way in which they were workod
in the Canton river in the discharge of duties which
migllt have been done by merchant steamers.
" 15. I should decline to take notice of this state-
ment were it not that I desire to give their lord-
ships the fullest explanation of toy conduct. It has
excited the astonishment of ever,- one competent to
offer an opinion on the subject that the gunboats,
after so long a voyage as from England, and con-
stant employment in the Canton river, should have
remained so long serviceable. Though many of the
boats have, as opportunities of Bred, been docked
and refitted, particularly those intended for service
in the north, I do not believe that at any one time
two gunboats out of the whole number were un-
equal to their work.

" 16. The communication between Canton,
after its occupation, and Hongkong, and the con-
stant conveyamee of sick, stores, and provisions,
could only be carried on with safety and efacism7

THE SUN, LONDON, MONDAY EVENIIIO, FEBRUARY 27, 1860.

by armed Government vessels, and the gunboats
offered the readiest and most economical means.
A roster of the whole number was therefore made,
giving to each her term -of service, and also the
consequent rest to men and machinery. These boats,
in their passage up and down the river, always
stopped near the Furious for Lord Elgin's com-
mands, and his lordship had, in addition, a uptcial
gunboat at his own disposal.
" His lordship next adds, that from what he
witnessed at the capture of Canton, and from what
he observed in his progress along the coast, the
means at the disposal of the British authorities in
these sews are ample for any objects which her
Majesty's Government may desire to accomplish in
China,

" 17. In this I quite agree with his lordship ; I
never doubted it.

"18. On the vague and conjectural character of
the concluding paragraph of Lord Elgin's last
despatch, I do not consider it incumbent on me to
offer comment ; but as his lordship is pleased to
observe that, in order to attain the above objects,
and more especially to their attainment without
an unnecessary expenditure of blood and treasure,
it is indispensable that those who control the mate-
rial force of Great Britain in this quarter should
lend to those who direct its diplomacy a vigorous
and intelligent support, I have the honour to re-
port that it has been always my object to do so ;
and I beg to refer to the copy of his lordship's
despatch of the 6th of July, transmitted to you in
my letter, No. 229, of the 6th of July, in which
Lord Elgin acquaints me that it will not be neces-
sary to continue any longer at Tien-tsin the pres-
sure which has been applied by your Excellency
with so much effect, and at so small a cost of human
life and suffering.' I also transmit, for their lord-
ships' information, a copy of a despatch of the 21st
of May, written to me by Lord Elgin after the cap-
ture of the forts at the mouth of the Peiho.

" 19. I have endeavoured, as fully as possible, to
reply to the charges brought against me, and I am
now quite content to leave the whole case in their
lordships' hands. I was in entire ignorance of
Lord Elgin having written these despatches until
the arrival of the last mail. Why his lordship
should have proceeded from Shanghai .to the Gulf
of Pecheli in the haste he did, three days before
my arrival, and without any consultation with me
as to tho unturo of thc c.untemplated operations, and
whence the urgency for entering into negotiations
with the Chinese authorities at the Peiho without
any communication with those who were to be re-
sponsible in the event of negotiations failing, I have
never been able to understand, no subsequent cir-
cumstances having brought to light the grounds or
reasons for such precipitancy. Most fortunately for
the sueces3 which finally attended the great object
of Lord Elgin's presence in the vicinity of Pekin
the coercive measures that became inevitable, and
which the posture of affairs demanded, were delayed
until the 20th May, thus affording the time, and only
a sufficient time, for the imperial authorities to collect
their military strength and resources to a degree
that excited a confidence on their part so highly
favourable to the ultimate estimate of our irresist-
ible power, when in a little more than three hours
their boasted defences were overthrown and ample
proof given of the inutility of further resistance.
The surest foundation was thus laid for the success-
ful fulfilment of Lord Elgin's mission to China, the
accomplishment of which has, through the skill and
perseverance of his lordship, been realized in the
highly advantageous treaty with China which is
now known in Europe.
" 20. I sincerely hope that the apprehensions felt
by Lord Elgin in April were diminished in June
and July, when affairs in the north were terminated.
" 21. Ever since Lord Elgin arrived in China I
have endeavoured to conduct myself towards his
lordship with the respect and deferencce due to her
Majesty's Plenipotentiary, and their Lordships may
rest assured that I shall continue the same course.
—I have, Sze.,
" M. SEYMOUR, Rear-Admiral and
Commander-in-Chief.
" The Secretary of the Admiralty, London."