The Sun.
London, England, 1860-05-02 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, WEDNESDAY EVENING, MAY 2, 1860.

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

HOUSE OF LORDS-(YESTERDAY.)
The LORD CHANCELLOR took his seat on Ike woolsack at
five o'clock.

other day in the other House of Parliament that 40,000
French seamen are regularly employed in the fishing trade
off the North American coast, near Newfoundlva], and that
the French Government, in order to encourage that trade,
pay a bounty amounting to more than the value of the fish
that is caught. That is a course perfectly consistent with
the principles laid down by Adam Smith in his admirable
work. Now, my lords, let me turn to the other side of the
account. Everything, as the French say, depends upon the
personnel—that is, on the manning; and I am disposed to
agree in that remark. What is the force that we require ?
—A Channel:fleet equal to that of France, with the means of
replacing it in case of disasters. We also require a Medi-
terranean fleet and a fleet of observation for the protection
of cur distant possessions. How ale your ships manned,
and what materials do you have for manning such a navy ?
And here, my lords, let me remind you that in the event of
reverses you are not in the same situation as France would
be in on the defeat of her fleet, independently of any land-
ing on your shores. If France were to obtain the mastery
of the Channel and to blockade your ports, what becomes
of the country ? what becomes of your revenue ? what be-
comes of your trade ? what becomes of your means of feed-
ing your people ? The whole island would be thrown into
a state of permanent confusion. These are grave considera-
tions which should convince you that you ought not to be
content with an equal force. Nothing short of what is ne-
cessary for your absolute security ought to satisfy you on a
subject of this kind, so vital to your interests, and even to
your existence. MyjoydliNtlkat.'iitianallv iffig-
ditrfletVtr—l *bin speak upon my own authority ; I will
quote to you testimony which cannot be controverted. What
was the language of Sir C. Wood, late First Lord of the
Admiralty, speaking on this matter in the other house not
long ago ? He says :
" I have no doubt that if time be allowed, in the course
of two years we should have not the slightest difficulty in
adding to our navy as many men as might be required, but
it is when the emergency arises that the difficulty is felt.
What we want is, not that that number of men should be
put on board at the end of two years, but in two months, or
in two weeks. Russia and France can do that."
(Hear, hear.) Here, my lords, is another authority, for
this is not 'a recent state of things ; but one that has con-
tinued for the last 10 or 15 years. Admiral Berkeley, lately
First Naval Lord of the Admiralty, says :—" We have a re-
serve force of 30 sail-of-the-line, ready for commissioning,
and fit to proceed to sea in a few days." That is cheering
—encouraging in the highest degree. But what does the
same gallant admiral add ? " But where are the men to man
them without having recourse to impressment?" Every
man throughout the country admits the impossibility of our
again having recourse to impressment. My lords, when it
was proposed to send an expedition to the coast of Syria, the
Mediterranean float was upon a peace establishment. And
not only so, but it was far shortof its complement of men in
consequence of sickness and other casualties. And it be-
came necessary therefore repeatedly to apply to this country
to send out an additional supply of seamen. Hear what the
gallant admiral to whom I have referred says on that sub-
ject :

" The first reinforcement of the seamen, or rather persons
so called, did not arrive till the month of January (six
months after the warning was given !) and it amounted to
GOO men only. Thus we were left for a period of six months
expecting continually, with ships, the complements of
which were reduced below their peace establishments, to
come into collision with the French fleet, the ships com-
posing which were fully manned and no means spared to
render them in every respect efficient. Add to which it
since appears that the French were fully aware of our weak-
ness, and were only waiting for orders from their Govern-
ment to enable them to take advantage of it."
Such was the state of things at the period to which I have
alluded. It has existed, as your lordships will perceive, for
a very considerable length of time, and no adequate means
have been taken to remedy the evil. But, my lords, I can
bring the case down almost to the present day—to the time
when our fleet was sent to the Baltic to attack the fleet of
Russia. See what was the state of our navy at that time. Ad-
miral Berkeley wrote to the commander of that fleet in the
Baltic to this effect :—" Have any of your ships tried for
men in a Norwegian port ? It is said you might have any
number of good seamen from that country." We were so
reduced that when we sent out only one single fleet we were
so incapable of manning it that the commander of that
fleet, not having a sufficient number of English seamen, was
desired to search on the different coasts of the country in
the neighbourhood of which he lay to see if he could not
supply his deficiency by foreign seamen. Is it possible to
present a more unfavourable picture of the position in
which we stand Again, my lords, Admiral Berkeley, in
writing to that commander that he was about to send out
two vessels, the James Watt and the Prince Regent, states
that they would soon join him, but he afterwards adds that
"men are wanting, and it is impossible to say how long it
will be before they are completed." On the subject of the
navy he writes thus :
" Notwithstanding the number of landsmen entered, we
are come nearly to a dead standstill as to seamen, and after
the James Watt and Prince Regent reach you I do not know
when we shall be able to send you a further reinforcement
for want of men I Something must be done, and done
speedily, or there will be a break down in our present
ricketty system."
My lords, I have brought these observations down almost
to the present day, and I am afraid at this moment we are
not in a better state than that which is described by the
authorities to which I have referred. What, then, is to be
done ? There is one point arising out of the new system of
naval warfare to which I wish to call your attention. A
blow can be struck in a moment. It does not take time to
prepare it. In the course of the evidence given before the
commission to which I have referred it is stated—and many
naval men concur in the correctness of the opinion—that the
striking of the first blow in the event of a naval war will
be almost decisive of the result. My lords, it is our
duty not to deceive ourselves—it is our duty to take care
that the country is not deceived; it is our duty to meet the
difficulty in a manner corresponding with the emergency.
When, then, is to be done ? The Government appointed a
commission of inquiry as to what course should be adopted
for the manning of the navy. At the head of that commis-
sion was my noble and gallant friend who sits before me
(Earl of Hardwicke). No selection could have been more
proper, from the gallantry, naval skill, as well as from the
civil experience of the noble lord. That Commission met
in July, 1858, and made its report in the February follow-
ing—that is, about a year ago. What did they recom-
mend ? An addition of 4,000 sailors to the home reserve.
I believe I may state, although I shall be happy to be con-
tradicted on that point, that not one of these men has yet
been raised. I am glad to read the smile on the counte •
naneo of the noble duke (of Somerset), which leads me to
suppose he means to correct my statement to this extent,
that out of 4,000 perhaps 1,000 men may have been raised.
We shall, however, have a correct statement by-and-by
from that noble person. They further recommended 5,000
marines to be added to the present force,—l believe not a
single marine has yet been raised after the lapse of a year.
They also recommended 2,000 to be added to the coast-
guard. Now, my lords, I call your attention to this point,
for great confusion has been allowed to prevail upon the
subject of the coastguard. There are two descriptions of
force comprised under the designation of the coastguard.
There is a revenue coastguard, and a coastguard in 11 ships
scattered along our coast. Of the 11 ships I give the noble
duke joy. They never go to sea. The ships are occasion-
ally driven by steam from ono port to another, as conve-
nience may dictate, but there is no mode of effectually
training to seamenship the men who form that part of the
reserve. The other department is divided into two bodies
—the fleet-men, and the shore-men. It is most material
to attend to this distinction. The fleet-men amount to 3,200,
and they are most admirable seamen. You cannot find a
better portion of seamen in any quarter of the globe. But
there are 1,400 shore-men who are of no use whatever
to the navy, so that when you talk of an increase of 6,000
coastguardmen—for that is stated, I understand, as the
amount of this reserve—while that force embraces 3,200
admirable seamen the balance consists of these coastguard
volunteers whom I have before described. I have it on the
authority of many men connected with the service, and
Admiral Martin, in his pamphlet, states it in most distinct
terms, that the only real coastguard consists of 3,200 men.
Well, my lords, this is a lamentable catalogue. But let me
go on to the main point. The main point for your con-
sideration, and to which I am about to call your attention,
is the great naval reserve—the Royal Naval Volunteers.
It was stated by the commission that it was absolutely
necessary immediately to raise that body of men for the
purpose of supplying all the defects that might arise in our
navy, and for the purpose of being prepared to meet any
contingency, lam very anxious, my lords, being myself
a civilian, in calling your attention to this subject, to sup-
port myself by eminent authorities. The report says this :
"The force we require must be composed of trained sea-
men, and, as the necessity for such a reserve is urgent, it
must in the first instance be recruited from adults."
That is ti'e language of the commission. What is the

language of Admiral Berkeley on this subject?
"No person can consider the ease with which a powerful
squadron might bo manned and rendered available for hos-
tile purposes,—the great increase in the number and power
of their steamvessels, together with the menacing aspect at
times of our foreign relations,—without coming to the con-
clusion that the present state of our naval affairs demands
the most serious and prompt consideration of her Majesty's
rnoefi t
hparamount
dnee
lcaeys s t
oyr,
Government, and that
my
tisa
mind,matte
—adautnitescoefsseiotmy pwrhonicihise, to adopt such measures as shall, in
the event of a sudden outbreak of hostilities, place a reserve
force at the disposal of this department sufficient to man
effectually, and at a few days' notice, at least 12 or 14 sail
of the line."

Such, my lords, is the language embodied in the report of
the commissioners. This report was made in the month of
February last year. The subject was of an urgent nature,
one which demanded in dealing with it the most prompt
and incessant activity. What then has been done ? The
fact, I believe, is, my lords, that no attempt was made to
raise a single man until the Ist January last, in accordance
with recommendations of the commission. And what, let

me ask, is the number which is now stated by Lord C.
Paget to have been obtained 4or this most important reserve
of 30,000 which ought to have been immediately raised ?
Why, 800 men constitutes the whole of the force, whose
services have been secured in the space of three months;
so that at that rate it would take about 10 years to raise the
whole 30,000—(hear, hear)—and, in the meantime, one-
third of the number raised would, owing to sickness or
some other cause, be found to be missing. Under these
circumstances I think I may safely say that the Ad-
miralty have not succeeded in carrying out the scheme
which was recommended by the commission as one
which it was absolutely necessary to carry into effect
for the security of the country, and which is also viewed
in that light by every naval man who has directed
his attention to the subject. (blear.) The fact is, my lords,
the scheme is an absolute failure, and is so regarded, I be-
lieve, by the members of the naval profession almost without
exception. (Hear.) To what causes, then, let me ask, is
this failure to be attributed ? As to the circumstances to
which it is owing, there may be some doubt, although of
the fact itself there can be none entertained. There is, how-
ever, one circumstance which it appears to me may have in
some degree cenduced to this result. Sailors are, as a
general rule, very simple-minded men, and do not like enter-
ing into complicated terms of engagement. Now, I hold in
my hand the regulations by which the seamen who enrol
themselves in this service are asked to abide. They consist
of 159 clauses. (A. laugh.) Now,
,mylords, there is not en,
attorzieyiiiihe ITniFetntfiterdff-who could mike himself
master of these 159 clauses in one fortnight. (Hear, hear,
and a laugh.) How then can it be expected that a common
sailor who is, generally speaking, wonderfully jealous of the
Board of Admiralty by which he has been so often imposed
upon—(laughter)—will enter blindfolded into engagements,
the nature of which he cannot comprehend ? Why, my lords,
I, who was a member of the legal profession, and who for-
merly knew something of the practice of the courts, should
be obliged if, in the 'vigour of my life, I was reduced to such
a position as to render it necessary for me to join the naval
reserve, to call to my assistance, Mr. B. Kerr or Mr. Coul-
son, or some other eminent conveyancer, in order to make
myself acquainted with the various provisions of this ab-
surd document. (Renewed laughter.) In these regula-
tions there is to be found, in my opinion, one obvious cause
of the failure of the scheme to which I am referring. (Hear,
hear.) I am, in saying so, giving expression to the views of
many persons competent to form a judgment on the subject,
for I should be somewhat shy of committing myself to any
opinion of my own with regard to it. A sum of S 5 or £6 is
given to those seamen who enter the Naval Reserve, and
you suppose then that you have bought their services. You,
however, will not find men to join the force for that amount.
If the number of 30,000 sailors were, in accordance with
the report of the commission, raised, you would at the pre-
sent rate of payment expend on that body only £lBO,OOO a-
year, while the total amount of your Naval Estimates
reaches the sum of £12,000,000 sterling. (Hear, hear.)
But you ought to bear in mind that all your machinery is
of no use, and might as well be thrown to the bottom of the
sea, unless you have a number of seamen sufficient to man
your fleet. In framing these regulations, then, the Admi-
ralty acts, in my opinion, somewhat after the fashion of a
workman who, in making a clock, constructs the machinery
admirably, using the very best materials for the purpose,
but who, when he comes to make the mainspring, through
some false notion of economy, uses imperfect materials, and
renders the whole work, as a consequence, comparatively
valueless. (Hear, hoar.) I may, however, be asked what
course I should propose to be taken with the view of
remedying the existing state of things. My answer to such
a question as that is, " I have pointed out a great evil de-
manding immediate removal. It is not for me but for her
Majesty's Government to provide the remedy." I may, how-
ever, say that I had a letter sent to me by a gallant admiral—
A dmiral Bowles—suggesting a conscription of some sort with
the view of forming a maritime militia. I mention this fact
for the consideration of the Government. The conclusion
on the subject to which I have been addressing myself at
which I have arrived is, I may add, that in point of mate-
rial—that is to say, in ships—you are far below the require-
ments of the country, while so far as the manning of the
fleet is concerned you are in a situation the most deplorable.
(Hear.) Ido Rot mince the matter. Our position in this
respect ought to be known throughout the country. No man
ought to be ignorant of the real facts of the case. Ido not
seek to aseribe the existence of those shortcomings to which
I have alluded to inefficiency on the part of the Board of
Admiralty, though I cannot say that I look upon—that
Board as a well-constituted body. A civilian who
probably never know anything of naval affairs, who never,
perhaps, even owned a yacht—(a laugh)—is placed at its
head. (Hear.) There are also four naval lords, to each of
whom different departments of the service are intrusted,
the proper administration of the details of which is quite
sufficient to occupy the entire of his time, so that there is
an absence of that superintending control which is requisite
to direct the machinery. This leads to a state of things not
quite so bad, indeed, 'as that which prevailed in former
times, when a Dutch fleet sailed up the Medway and burned
our ships at Chatham, and when not a single Lord of the
Admiralty was at his post, the only one connected with it
who was to be found on' the occasion being the Secretary,
who ran to and fro shaking his hands, and sending his sil-
ver in one direction and his gold-bags in another, to place
them beyond the reach of spoliation in case of the landing
of the Dutch. (A laugh.) There has been, I admit, a change
in the conduct of affairs at the Admiralty since that period,
but not such a change as the requirements of the country
imperatively demand. (Hear, hear.) I ask your lordships if
I trespass upon your time in dealing with this important
subject to a greater extent than is convenient? (Cheers.) I
assure you the inconvenience is 10,000 times greater, in all
probability, to me in my own person than is that which you
may experience. (Hear.) I shall then, with your permission,
again briefly refer to the evidence of Admiral Berkeley, who
states that from the moment he went to the Board of Admi-
ralty he strenuously advocated the necessity of an available
reserve to a large extent. I may here, perhaps, remind the
house of that to which it is perhaps not requisite to allude—
that the construction of the Board of Admiralty is not only
such as I havo pointed out, but that its members do not con-
tinue to be the same for:more than a few years, inasmuch as,
owing, to the frequent changes of Government, one set Of
officials, as a matter of course, are obliged to give place to
another equally uninformed as to the details of the service
and equally inexperienced as their predecessors. (Hear,
hear.) Admiral Berkeley adds :

" The constant change of Boards—above all, the frequent
change of the individual at the head of the Board—renders
it almost a hopeless task; it requires perseverance in one
system in detail, as well as a whole. No scheme can pros-
per that is so constantly altered, and, above all, any schema
on the subject of manning the navy, as well as establishing
a reserve, must be steadily persevered in, and the one end
kept constantly in view."
These are the opinions of the gallant admiral to whom I
have referred. There is another opinion with which I will
take the liberty of troubling your lordships ; it is that of a
former friend of mine, a most gallant officer, of high charac-
ter, loved by all who knew him, and standing high in pub-
lic estimation. It is the opinion of Sir George Cockburn.
He says :

" Having filled the station of confidential or principal Sea
Lord of the Admiralty for more than 17 years, I feel that
my opinion regarding the constitution of the Board may
sooner or later be deemed worthy of consideration and at-
tention ; I therefore am induced to place in writing the de-
cisions to which my experience has brought me on this
point. I have, then, no hesitation in stating that I con-
sider the present establishment of that Board to be the most
unsatisfactory and least efficient for its purpose that could
have been devised."

He then recommends " that the Admiralty Board should be
abolished, and a totally new governing body established."
My lords, I have one more observation to make. I find
that at this moment, and with this state of things existing,
there is a party actively employed in the north of England
in liberalising and improving, according to their sense of
the term, the fiscal system of the country, with the de-
clared object—not unsupported, I am afraid, by pretty high
authority—of putting an end to all taxes on articles of con-
sumption, and placing the taxation almost entirely on rea-
lised property, and on realised property according to a gra-
duated scale. This is done with the avowed object of intro-
ducing here the social equality, or, according to the expres-
sion used by a high authority, that species of social equality
that exists in France, and which is cherished in that country,
regardless of civil liberty. (Cheers.) Another object they
have in view is to pull down the wealthier or aristocratic
classes, who, they say, are the favourites and patrons of the
army and navy, and to reduce those national establishments
to a lower status. So that, while the navy of France in-
creases from year to year, while its continuance in its pre-
sent strength is provided for till 1871, the navy of England
is to be reduced—and for what purpose and under what
pretext? In the expectation that the nation will continue to
possess the friendship of the Emperor of the French ; in
the expectation that, by the further exchange of cotton and
pottery for wine and silks, a warm friendship may be esta-
blished between this country and France. These are the
views entertained by a set of men who are aspiring to the
government of this country—(cheers)—and who, if they
could, would place themselves at the head of the whole
power of England. (Cheers.) They would reduce us to the
humiliation I have referred to, instead of maintaining our
establishments as they now exist, and holding high the
honour and reputation of the country. And under these
circumstances I see that a noble lord in the other house--
with an indefatigable spirit that dacs not find sufficient
employment in disentangling the complicated phrases of
M. Thouvenel and opposing the logic of his facts—as it
were in a spirit of mischief, and living only in troubled
waters, has at this time though it right to bring forward a
measure that opposes one class, of the community against
another. lie has done this at a time when, in the opinion
of all who have reflected on the circumstances, every class
ought to unite in support of the honour and independence
of the nation. (Loud cheers.) The noble and learned lord

concluded by putting the question of which he had given
notice, as to the state of the Naval Reserve, its present con-
dition, and probable future progress.
The Duke of SOMERSET—I am not sorry the noble
and learned lord has brought this important subject under
the notice of the house. Undoubtedly, the condition of the
navy is far more important to the country than the existence
of any Board of Admiralty or any Government ; but I must
say when I heard the speech of the noble and learned lord
he was about to come to the conclusion that I had unneces-
sarily reduced the Navy Estimates and cut down the expen-
diture, because in a great part of his speech he assumed that
the Admiralty had reduced our naval establishments, and
the number of our ships and men. I do net consider this in
any way a party question, and I may say, shortly, that the
desire of the present Board of Admiralty, as of others, is,
and has been, to maintain the navy in the most efficient
condition. (Hear.) On my accession to office in the present
Board of Admiralty I toek a survey of the state of the
dockyards ; • and I thought, looking at the programme of
work to be done left by the late Government, that the
money to be voted was not quite sufficient for the result to
be accomplished. I therefore added £lOO,OOO to the esti-
mate on account of ships to be built. I did so in an earnest
desire to complete within the year the programme laid
down by the late Board of Admiralty. And I can say that
during the last eight months more men have been employed
in our dockyards than at any previous Iteriod of the history.
of thneowntry7 --1-tlo-not-exerirdirtheihntr of the whole
great war, down to 1815 ; and I exclude the factories alto-
gether, which form another great division of our naval
establishments. I speak only of the shipbuilding depart-
ment ; and in that department I can show there has been
no relaxation. Undoubtedly, in the present year this exer-
tion has been somewhat diminished ; there was much incon-
venience in continuing to carry on work at that rate.
Therefore, as far as the works undertaken by the late Go-
vernment are concerned, they are still going on, but at the
same time I thought it convenient and advantageous that
these works should be differently arranged. We are now,
I may say, forward in ships of the line, and the noble lord
is right in saying that what we require, therefore, is to bring
on our small vessels. Not that I propose altogether to put
a stop to the operations on ships of the line, but it has been
agreed that they shall be left on the frames in such a way
that they may season and improve, at the same time that
they can be finished off rapidly if an emergency should
arise, and by this means all the energies of the dockyards
can be applied to the smaller vessels. The noble and learned
lord referred to the ships we have now afloat. I find that we
have built, and that there are afloat, 50 ships of the line.
Lord LYNDIIURST—Do you include block ships ?
The Duke of SOMERSET—I am not taking the block
ships into account.
Lord LYN DTI UR ST—Or sailing ships ?
The Duke of SOMERSET —I do not count them.

Lord LYNDHURST—Are those vessels all completed ?

The Duke of SOMERSET—They are all afloat. I do
not mean that they are all in the first class of steamvessels,
and nothing could be more unwise than to complete their
equipment, because the moment you put in the machinery
and set up the masts and rigging you stop the ventilation,
and the wear and tear begins from that moment, and the
expense mounts up at an enormous rate. We have conse-
quently, as I have said, .50 ships of the line afloat, 37
frigates, 17 corvettes, 88 sloops, many of which are very
powerful vessels, 26 smaller vessels, 24 gunvessels of a cer-
tain class, and between 150 and 160 gunboats. That is our
steam force at present afloat.
Lard LYNDHURST—Have you an account of the
French navy ?
The Duke of SOMERSET—I have an approximate me
count, but I will not vouch for the accuracy of the figures.
They have 33 ships of the line afloat, and they are building
six or eight—in all about 40 ; of frigates, they have 38 afloat
and 12 building, making 50 in all ; they surpass us in fri-
gates—(hoar, hear)—of corvettes, sloops, and all the other
classes of vessels they hays 103, which would not at all
equal the number of our smaller vessels. The noble and
learned lord referred to a former period, and to the evidence
of Admiral Berkeley as to our having 30 sail of the line for
the defence of the country. We have now 21 or 22 sail of
the line at sea more fully manned than at any previous
time, as we made an addition some months since to their
complement. (Hear, hear.) As regards either the force
afloat or the manning of the fleet, I therefore do not believe
that the objections can be sustained. Ido not think the
deficiency experienced during the Syrian war is likely to
occur again; and, with regard to the Russian war, it is
well known wo were called on suddenly to send fleets both
to the Baltic and the Black Sea, and that the Admiralty
had great difficulty in manning the fleet. But lam con-
vinced that, not merely as regards the vessels and machi-
nery, but the general arrangements for equipping and send-
ing vessels speedily to sea, at no time were the preparations
in so forward a state as at present. (Hear, hear.) I now
come to the subject of the highest importance—the men.
The noble lord says the ships are not half manned ; but it
so happens that it is just the contrary difficulty under which
we have laboured. On coming into office I found certain
estimates prepared and a £lO bounty in existence. I

adopted these, and before the end of August I found that
the number of men voted by Parliament was exceeded by
1,000. The news of the Chinese disaster arrived in Sept.,
and I did not think it was prudent under these circumstances
to put a stop to the enrolment of seamen ; the result is,
that for the last six months we have been 5,000 in excess of
the vote. This year we covered that large number by a
larger vote, but they wore still coming in so rapidly that
I was obliged to come to the determination only to take able
seamen, or ordinary seamen who had already served on
board the fleet and been drilled to the guns. Then I come to
the question of the reserve. I have taken in the estimates
some 10,000 or 11,000 more than last year—and, besides
covering the excess required for the navy, I have a body of
seamen in port ready to put on board ship as soon as they
arc commissioned. (Hear, hear.) With reference to the
Coastguard--
Lord LYNDHURST—Which Coastguard ?

The Duke of SOMERSET—Not the Naval Coast Volun-
teers, but the Coastguard. Of these there are, first of all, )
3,183 who serve on shore, and the officers attached to this
force are 259. The crews of the district ships number 2,594;
and, in addition, there are the crews of the coasting cruisers,
consisting of 827 men. Not including the civilians, to
whom the noble and learned lord has also referred, there are
thus of Coastguardmen ready to be put on board ship 6,862
men. The noble lord seems to attach little importance to
the Coastguard ships, but he forgets that attached to these
vessels there are 14 gunboats, which are constantly exer-
cised round the coast. The crews for the most part are men
who have served in the fleet, and are a most efficient and
excellent body. More than 900 of them are petty officers,
which showed the class of men who entered the force. It is
said that the numbers of the force ought to be raised con-
siderably, but to do that at once would be very injudicious.
At present it is a great attraction to seamen—men who
have served their 10 years aro very glad to get into it—and
if we were all at once to fill up its ranks with any other
body of men we should be discouraging those men whojoin
the navy, looking forward at the end of their term to get ,
into the Coastguard. (Hear, hear.) The noble and learned
lord did not speak as if he had a very high opinion of the
Naval Coast Volunteers ; but the general tone of the re-
ports which I have received from the various districts is
that they are a highly useful body, good at their guns, apt
at their drill, and likely to be very valuable additions to
the crew of any ships into which they may be draughted.
(Hear, hear.) There are 7,000 of them ; they are in-
tended for the defence of the coast, and for that purpose
I believe them to be most eflicient. (Hear, hear.) It is
urged that we ought to increase the number to 10,000, but
in looking at this question you must consider the position of
the mercantile marine as well as the Royal Navy. From
the returns which I have called for from the various ports
in the kingdom, I learn that wages in the mercantile marine
were never higher than now—" Seamen scarce, wages
high," is the general tone of these returns, and the pros-
perity of the mercantile service cannot fail to create some
kind cf competition, and to interfere to some extent with
an increase of this force. The noble and learned lord
laughed at the regulations which we have drawn up for the
Royal Naval Reserve, saying it was impossible that any
seaman could ever read them through, but he does not re-
member that a great many of those regulations are intended
for the shipping-masters and the officers who enrol the
men. I believe all the regulations which seamen are re-
quired to know can be printed on a single sheet. (Hear,
hear.) All we want in regard to this force is a little time.
We did not begin to pay the men until April, and we all
know that seamen are not very likely to come forward.until
the pay begins. We have only been a month in operation,
and I believe the men are entering very fairly ; somewhere
about 1,000 have joined, and they are all of them fine men,
excellent sailors. In raising this force the Board of Admi-
ralty was unanimous in thinking it desirable that we should
only admit at first what are called "able seamen," faa
not go for ordinary men ; because we wanted to get a ouss
of men who would all of them be useful as the ttcle4s of a
ship's company, and to keep out that class who would join
only for the sake of the money, and when the emergency
arose would not be forthcoming. (Hear, hear.) A letter
has been forwarded to me, written by the seamen of
Hartlepool to the seamen of Aberdeen, which shows very
satisfactorily what is the feeling of the men on the subject.
The seamen of Aberdeen, it apnenra, did not like the
scheme, thinking there we,s some trap in it, and they wrote
to the seamen of gavtlepool to ask their advice. The reply
was :—" Upwards of 100 men have joined the force here,
all like it, and the general opinion is that before long ail
the eligible men in Hartlepool will be included in it."
The scheme is popular with the men of Hartlepool,
and they have every confidence in the Government not

_ .
sending them on a foreign station—any man who is
afraid of being called in a time of emergency is not fit to be
a reserve man. (Hear, hear.) That is their feelinz—and