The Sun.
London, England, 1860-06-22 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, ITIDAY LIVENING, ITtYNE 22, IR6Ooi

la& to ease to exists' (Heart-hoar.) That is to say, we 1
are called upon to affirm that it is expedient that a certain
thing should be done, though many of us may believe that
great difficulty may bsCeiperienced in working out the ne-
cessary details. (Hear, hear.) Nur do I think the difficulty
which presents itself in dealing with the question in this
form is diminished by the suggestion which my right hon.
friend has thrown out, to the effect that we are not now
asked to consider the case of the native army, but only that
of the European force in India. If that were really so, and
that we were simply to decide upon what should be done
with a force of 20,000 or 30,000 Europeans, our views upon
the matter might indeed be materially altered. If we could
dissociate from the question at issue to-night that larger
question of what ought to be done with a native army. then
no doubt the interests involved would be less important,
and the point at issue drawn within much narrower limits.
I am, however, afraid that you cannot separate the case of
the local European from that of the native Indian army.
(Hear.) And for this reason, if you were to maintain in
India a powerful European force, consisting of 60,000 or
80,000 men, composed of the principal troops of the line,
and it together with and by the side of that army you were
to keep up at the same time a native army, which would be
necessarily less looked to, less thought of, and less trusted,
and which would be mostly employed, in all probability, on
services in connection with which opportunity would be
taken to economise European life—if, I repeat, two such
armies were to be maintained in a separate form, and with-
out any tie or bond between them, it is, I think, plain that
the officers of the native force would feel that their position
was one—l will not say of degradation, but at all events of
inferiority—that they would lose that self-respect and
esprit de corps which ought to belong to every army—
(hear, hear)—and that employment in the native force; in-
stead of being sought for by competent men in India
as heretofore, would form a refuge only for those who can
obtain no other employment. (Hear, hear.) I have heard
something of jealousy between the two branches of the
service; but which state of things, I should like to know, is
more likely to create and perpetuate an ill-feeling of that
nature than that in which the officers of the one army will
attempt to assert the superiority of their position over the
officers of the other, while the latter will feel that they are
placed in a position of undeserved but not the less real in
feriority. (Hear.) To take such a course, then, as to that
which I sin alluding, would, in my opinion, be to destroy
the efficiency of the native force. But the question may be
asked, tlo we require native troops, and can we trust them
after the experience of the last few years ? I answer that
question by another—how are those native troops to be
replaced ? (Hear.) You cannot hope, with any European
force which you can command, to rule over a million and
a half of square miles and 180,000,000 of inhabitants.
60,000 or 80,000 Europeans will never suffice to keep in
subjection so great an empire, and you cannot increase
your army beyond that limit, partly because of the com-
parative smallness of our military establishment, and partly
because of the waste of European life in India. It should
also be borne in mind that you require services to be per-
formed in India which European troops cannot render,
while I believe, in practice, no large force of Europeans has
taken the field in India without being accompanied by
native troops. Let me also remind the house that circum-
stances might arise which would render it a matter of con-
siderable difficulty to keep up the number of European
troops in India, even at the lowest limit upon which you
might deem it expedient to fix. There are many circum-
stances in this country the tendency of which is to make
recruiting difficult ; wages are rising, the position of the
labourer is improving, the capital of the country is rapidly
increasing ; but notwithstanding these facts, emigration
has not altogether ceased. If the contingency should arise
—which is painful even to contemplate, but still within the
range of possibility, because it is that against which the
existence of an army is intended to provide—if a war should
take place in which England should be compelled to take
part, I do not see by what means you could maintain an
European force of 70,000 or 80,000 men in India unless you
resorted to the expedient which unfortunately you had to
adopt in the Crimean war of enlisting foreign mercenaries.
(Hear, hear.) I hold, then, .that the maintenance of ar.
Indian army both for the present and for the future is in-
evitable—(hear, hear)—and holding that opinion, I am
glad to believe, as I do, that the dangers incident to its
existence are considerably exaggerated in popular belief.
You have in India every variety of race and opinion, and
between these various populations the old feuds and animo-
sities still continue. In 1857, when the mutiny first broke
out, the first thing done was to raise a new native army,
and that army marched on the enemy as it would have
done had it been a foreign enemy. You would have no
difficulty in obtaining the assistance of troops raised in any
part of India to put down such disturbance. The greatest
danger you had to encounter at the time the outbreak
occurred was that of giving the element of one single race
a vast preponderance in the native force. With the lesson
we than received, I repeat, the maintenance to a con-
siderable extent of a native force is under the circumstances
of India inevitable. If the maintenance of a native army
be inevitable, and if at the same time a native army cannot
be maintained entirely dissociated from the European force,
without the officers and men losing their esprit de corps and
self-respect, there must to some extent be a local European
force remaining in India. I don't like on questions of this
kind to appeal to authorities, however eminent, because
reasons of policy ought to stand or fall by the weight that
belongs to them. But I find that Sir John Malcolm, when
examined before this house in 1813, so exactly expressed
the opinion I have endeavoured to lay before you, that I
will quote one sentence from his evidence. He was asked—
" If the European regiments were to be reduced, and the
infantry of the Company's army to consist of natives alone,
what would be the effect ?" His answer was—" If such
a separation were to take place it would tend materially to
destroy the efficiency of the Company's army. . . . In the
sepoy sery cc the officers cannot be employed except in all
the lowest drudgery and fatigue of war. They will in con-
sequence sink in their reputation, and will become little
better than a country militia."
He-goes on to argue that an army, exclusively native, or-
ganised in the manner now proposed, would sink into a
position not superior to that of the armies of native princes.
(Hear, hear.) There is one consideration which you cannot
altogether overlook, although I am far from regarding it as
of paramount or primary importance. I mean the feelings
of those whom you aro about to transfer from one service
to another. I allude to that subject, because my right hon.
friend said that with very few exceptions the feeling of the
officers of the Indian army was favourable to amalgamation
—or at least that it is only the older officers that are against
amalgamation, the junior officers being in general in favour
of it. There must be much that is conjectural in an esti-
mate of the opinions of a large body of men with whom
we do not come into personal contact ; and when your
opinion is known a person in that position naturally shrinks
from expressing views which are known to be unwelcome
and which it is useless to discuss. That exists on one side
as well as the other. But, having communicated to a great
extent with the Indian army, and having a few years ago
resided in India, I must say I never heard the opinion that
any of the officers, except some very young officers of
the Indian army, were favourable to th 3 change. (Hear.)
I certainly have heard officers say that amalgamation
would take place sooner or later, and that military influence
prevailed at home which made it desirable that if the change
were to take place the sooner it did occur the better, so as
to relieve them from unsettlement hereafter. That is a
feeling which prevailed some time ago, and no doubt it is
rather increased than diminished by the long 'period of
suspense in which the Indi n army has been kept.. There is
another ground on which I believe that some officers of the
local force may be not unfavourable to amalgamation. No
one who has heard the expression of opinion among the
officers of that force can fail to be aware that one of their
strongest feelings a few years ago—l am not identifying
myself with that feeling as founded in justice, I speak
merely of its existence—one of their strongest feelings was
a belief that they have little chance of justice at home—that
interest, and influence, and favour have a great deal to do
with military administration here—(hear)—and that their
military service at a distance does not stand a fairchance; and
they argue in this way : If we remain as a local force we
have no chance whatever, but if we take our turn in service
with the European forces we shall be brought under the
notice of the authorities at home, and we shall have
some chance of recognition. I believe some of the officers
of the local force are in favour of the amalgamation
on that ground. But it is not for the sake of
the officers of the Indian army that I would main-
tain a local European force in India ; it is for
the sake of the public service in India. (Hear, hear) In
all the discussions on this question I have never heard afair
and satisfactory answer given to what is, in my mind, the
greatest objection to the measure of the Government, that
you will lose the most valuable assistance which the Go-
vernor-General now has in carrying on the local adminis-
tration of Indian affairs when you lose the service of some
thousands of officers trained exclusively to the Indian ser-
vice. (Hear, hear.) I don't know that it would be possible
to get any more important testimony than that of the Go-
vernor-Genei•al himself upon this subject, and here is what
he says
"No one would dream of attempting to administer the
.
affeirs of India through officers who were not attached
to the 9
,tory
eernment by some other tie than the receipt of In-
se7,;i'c'ae: int inasmuch as the efficiency of our military
ance to the peace(' branches of it which are of daily import-
mane and safety of the country, such as the
gent.nt of •
irregular regiments, or the conduct of the
in native States,d -military operations on the frontiers and
the officer give 4 t:PiTds mainlyupon the application which
with which he underitskearly training, upon the heartiness
es him duty, ing adherence to it, I 4,- and upon his persever-
jesty's army in, imipeoutlid grratly deplore seeing her Ma-
greater part, by men wit,, :r''•ore entirely, or even in the
at
theeiart liberty to cast themselves
loose from the country
ficant sacrifice of their interests!'leasure, and at an insigni-
ficant
sir, I den' t suppose that any man in this
better altogether
house will
argue the question on the ground thatit
to separate officers of the army from the civil administra-
tion of India. That may be very proper in a state of Euro-
pean civilisation, but it is certainly not a system that would
answer in India. (Hear, hear.) There are ma
India in which it would not be possible to adealanyisrerrts,of
affairs without the employment of military men for
that purpose. Let any man read the works of Sir 11. Ed_
warder on India, and he will have no doubt on this point.
Only think what is tie condition of lire in many of the wild
regions of India, and you will be able to judge how far it
would be possible in countries of that description to seps..
rote the power of administration from the power of the

tt influence the administrate", of
affairs must have who is a military officer than if he were
a mere civilian. My noble friend Lord Ellenborough felt
that so strongly that he at one time threw out a . uggestion
that all the civil servants should be required to ss through
the army, in order that they might have me military
training. Ido not go that length, but I assert what I be-
lieve no one conversant with Indian affairs r ill require me
to prove, that Indian administration, to be uccessfully car-
ried on, requires a large admixture of the military element.
(Hear.) Well, then, the question is, how will yeu get mili-
tary men to take part in that administration ? My right
hon. friend's theory—at least, it is thatwhich is usually put
forward —is that all you have get to do is to give induce-
ments and facilities for officers of the Line to leave their
regiments and enter into the civil administration, and you
will by that means obtain an ample supply. (Hear, hear.)
To that I have two answers. In the first place Ido not be-
lieve that you will get men, and in the second I do not be
lieve that if you do they will be men who have received so
useful and valuable a training as is now enjoyed by officers
in India. With regard to the first point, the difficulty of
obtaining men, probably tl.e house will permit me to read
another extract from Lord Canning's recently published
minute :

" I adhere to the opinion that the interests of India re- I
quire that there should be an army devoted to India. lam ,
confirmed in it by the experience which I have acquired,
after mach intercourse with officers of her Majesty's regi • '
ments of the Line in India, of the unwillingness which ap- '
pears to prevail among them to look to India as the scene of
their profession for any considerable length of time. During
the excitement of active service this feeling was not so per.
ceptible; though even in 1858 the applications for leave to
return to England were numerous ; but since the eessation
of military operations it has become very strong, ana it is
not too much to say that it is a rare occurrence to meet with
an officer of the Line who looks forward contentedly to a
long stay in India. Ido not think that the unwillingness
will be removed by throwing open the door to their employ
meat in every kind of Staff or irregular service. Makirs;
every allowance for the events of the last three years, for
the disjointed and uncertain condition of service in India to
which those events have led, and for all the discomforts of
frequent and unseasonable movement of corps and indiffe-
rent accommodation, the feeling is, I fear, likely to prove a
lasting one among those who are brought to India only ac-
cidentally. I believe that there are very few Englishmen
indeed who will readily make up their minds to devote
themselves to a career in this country, no' ess they are trained
to look to it, and are bound to it from their youth."
I think it is impossible to overrate the value rod importance
of an opinion of that kind coming from the Governor-Ge-
neral. I have in the course of the last two years made my-
self acquainted with many opinions which have been ex-
pressed uponiwportant matters byLord Canning. Sometimes
it has been my fortune to differ from him, but far more fre-
quently I have agreed with him; and whether I have agreed
or whether I have differed, I never saw an opinion of his
expressed upon any question of policy which did not bear
the marks of anxious and careful inquiry, end of the most
cautious examination and consideration. (Hear, hear.)
And recollect, when Lord Canning expresses this opinion
he is not so much a man telling you what he thinks
about the question as one who gives evidence as to a fact
which has come under his knowledge. From his position he
knows better than any other man can do what are the feel-
ings of those who are engaged in the Indian service. Ap-
plications for leave are made to him ; he knows who wishes
to stay, and who desires to go ; and when he speaks of a
prevalent distaste for Indian service as existing among men
who are not trained in early youth to Indian life he is only
bearing witness to a fact which is more or less familiar to
every one who is conversant with Indian society. (Hear.)
No doubt, the feeling of which he speaks has been aggra-
vated by the recent mutiny, and by the a-itipathy of races
to. which I am afraid it has led, but it is a feeling which
existed in India years ago, and I have repeatedly heard
from able and experienced servants of the Government,
from men whoa?. Indian career has been one unbroken suc-
cess, fr-om men who, if any men have done so, have won the
prizes of Indian public life, that although they were satis-
fied with the fortunes they had made, although they dtd
not regret that their lives had been passed in India, yet
that if any oppot .unity of coming to England had offered
itself to them earlier in their career, they would undoubtedly
have thrown up the set vice and returned to this country.
Nor do I assert this or ly from my personal experience. Of
all the public men who have ever served in India there is
none who has left a more illustrious name than Lord
Metcalfe. He was a men who possessed all those qualities
which make success not a matter of speculation, but of cer-
tainty; yet what was the case with regard to Lord Met-
calfe ? We have it upon record that not long after he
entered the Indian service he became so wearied, and so
disgusted with the appareirt hopelessness of his career, that
he wrote to his f lends imploring that he might be allowed
to sacrifice his prospects in India and return to England.
If a road had been opened to him, if it had been in
his power, without any material sacrifice, to come
home, he would have acted upon the feeling which
he then acknowledged, would have abandoned his prospects,
in the Indian service, and India would have lost one of her
most illustrious administrators. (Hear.) Ido not say that
the life of public servants in India is one which men ulti-
mately regret. It is a career of great interest. It offers
noble opportunities, and men who go out determined not to
look back, and knowing that their lives must be passed in
India, become mentally as well as physically acclimatized
and make the most valuable public servants that we have.
But what I say is, that in the first instance there is a strug-
gle and a sacrifice, and that the prospect of banishment from
England for the greater part of his life is one which no %ran
willingly faces. It is a sacrifice generally made only when
men aro driven by necessity. In the next place, if you do find
men who are willing so to serve, it is hardly possible they
should acquire the same training as they do now ; for in
order to gain a real knowledge of India I believe that it. is
essential that men should go there at a time of life when
their ideas aro still unformed, when their habits are flexible,
and when they can adapt themselves to any situation. (Hear,
hear.) My right hon. friend asked why should not that be
the case with officers of line regiments—why should not they
go out early and determine to remain in India ? Because
they have no certainty of being able to do so. Suppose there
is a war or a prospect of a war at home, and an officer is living
with his regiment in India, and has for years been studying
the languages of the country, intending to retire from the
service and devote himself to civil administration. His regi-
ment is recalled with a prospect of being engaged in hostili-
ties, and it is impossible for him with honour to leave it.
(Hear, hear.) He therefore quits the country, and takes his
part in the events which may be passing on this side of
the globe. lie thus loses the special aptitude for
Indian affairs which he had acquired, and a trained
administrator is lost to that country. You must not mea-
sure the amount of loss sustained merely by the number of
persons who are thus inevitably prevented from pursuing
an Indian career. You must bear in mind also the element
of uncertainty, the not knowing whether or not they will
be able to cohtinue in the Indian service, which will
more than anything else discourage men from entering
upon what is at first a very laborious and very irksome
task. Ido not like to read extracts, but only two days ago
I received a letter from a gentleman of considerable position
and very high attainments, who for a time held an official
situation in India, but who is wholly unconnected with
either the civil or military service of that country, and
whose opinion is therefore a perfectly unbiassed one. He
says :-
" I am convinced that no man, let him possess a c ncen-
tration of all talents, can or will fit himself for service in
India unless it is the business of his life." "At the end of
18 years' service in a tropical colony, with a thorough know-
ledge of the languages, I felt every day I had something to
learn. I learnt by every day's experience how I must liave
irritated my people by my iiporanco of their habits—an
ignorance excused only as being obviously ignorance,"
I think that it is impossible to overrate the importance of
this subject, because we have in India to deal with a people
whom we can hardly measure by any European standard
In Indian affairs we have repeatedly seen how great dis•
content and dissatisfaction has been created by ignorance,
as was the case with regard to the mutiny at Lahore. I will
not refer to the more signal illustration which the events of
the last two years have afforded, but this I will say, that
having heard, as we all have, innumerable speculations as
to the cause of the recent insurrection, I believe that al-
though undoubtedly there were deep-seeted causes also at
work, and although there were persons who for their own
objects excited the people, yet I am inclined to think that
the alarm excited by the greased cartridges was not affected,
but was a real alarm, caused by our ignorance of the preju-
dices entertained by our army upon that subject. Ido not
believe that any European going for the first time to India
and having to do with the natives, can avoid giving offence
and causing discontent, however anxious he may be to do
so. If hon gentlemen wish to see the subject discussed far
more fully and ably than I can deal with it, I can only re-
fer them to that admirable minute of Sir James Outram,
which they will find at page 110 of the blue-book, and with
every word of which I would express my concurrence. I
now come to that upon which my right hon. friend laid the
greatest stress. He argued as if there was a necessary con-
nection between the existence of a local European force and
the existence of discontent and want of discipline in that
army. We have had a great many assertions made upon
that point both in this house and out of it; but I have not
found any proef given of the truth of these assertions. True,
insubordination prevailed to a lamentable extent among the
local European troops of India last year. But what ought
to be shown, and what has not yet been shown, is that the
local character of that army had nothing to do with its in-
subordination. The incidents of their mutiny are fresh in
the recollection of every member in this house, and there-
fore I need only say that the event was altogether excep-
tional and casual. lam not here to defend these men. Their
claims were not reasonable and their conduct was unfortu-
nate. But I maintain that the circumstances which led to
that mutiny were such as can hardly recur. In the first
place, you had the older troops, as 1 believe, 'greatly demo-
ralised by two years of civil war. Then you had a number

of recruits raised in haste and sent out fiorn this country,
under the urgent necessity of the case, with the political
object of making as great a display of European force as
possible ; but in point of training and discipline they
were not in such a state as they might have been
if despatched under different circumstances. Then,
there were exaggerated expectations entertained, I am
told.

-, by many of these troops on the subject of prize
money. Those expectations were disappointed, and that die
appointment produced discontent. And although I am
most unwilling to say anything which may appear to throw
blame upon the local authorities, who itt a very dale/ate

matter undoubtedly rioted to the hest of their judennent, atlil
I have always thought that if some rather fuller and more
detailed explanation of the grounds on which the decision of
the Government was based had been made known to the
men, and it had been.proved to them that the+ were only
asked to 'do what they were previously bound to do, some-
thing at least miglit have been done--I do not know how
much—towards allaying their discontent. All these consi-
derations form certainly not a justification, but a palliation
and explanation of the bad feeling which existed among the
local force. And what I wish to ask my right hon. friend
is this—Can you show, have you ever attempted to show
that, placed in the same circumstances, influenced by the
same opinions, and exposed to the same—l will not say real
but supposed—provocation (and even-if it was ill-founded
the men felt it to be real to them)—troops of the line would
not have acted precisely as they did ? (Hear, hear.) Then, is
the accident of a single mutiny to condemn a service of 100
years ? You had a mutiny at the Nore, but did you on that
laccount condemn the whole constitution of your navy ?
(Hear, hear.) lam told that we must accept the opinion of
the highest military authorities on this subject. Now, Ido
unreservedly accept that opinion as conclusive upon the fact
of the mutiny; but what I do not see is the connexion be-
tween the local character of the force and the insubordina-
tion which has unhappily existed. I have endeavoured to
collect the reasons and arguments by which that view is
supported, and I find it stated by some very able advocates
of the proposed amalgamation, Cut men serving in the
local force become desperate because they have no oppor-
tunity of returning to England. If that argument had
been used 70 years ago, in the days of Clive and Hastings,
it might have held good ; but the pension list of the
Indian army sufficiently proves that the mon who go out
to serve in the local European force do look forward for
their return, and actually do return to this country as much
as their brethren of the line. Another plea urged in favour
of the amalgamation is that if insubordination shows itself
in a portion of the troops of the line, it can be stopped by
changing the quarters of the men, and thus preventing it
from spreading to the rest of the army. Now, I see no
reason why you should not take just the same precaution
in the case of a 1°3.11 force. This objection would be per-
fectly valid if it applied to a local force raised for a texeitory
cf a very limited area. It would be perfectly sound, for
example, in Malta, the lonian Islands, or the West Indian
colonies. But, when we are considetiag the case of a local
force maintained in an empire the area of which is greater
than the whole of Europe, it is unreasonable and absurd to
say, "Oh ! it is d ingerous to have a local force, because,
if there be any inclination for mutiny or combination
among them, you have no means of separating the regi-
ments." (lleur.) But in his speech the other night the
right hon. gentleman said it was the opinion of military
men that a local force was apt to deteriorate, because it had
no opportunity of access to the highest military authorities.
Well, I want to know who the highest military authorities
are ; because I should say none is, or ought to be, higher
than the Commander-in-Chief in India. His power and
responsibility are generally equal to, and sometimes even
greater than those of your commander of the forces at home.
(Hear.) This objection, then, 1;ko the one I have pres 1-
ously noticed, merely takes the form of some general rea-
soning upon the subject, and it is applied to a case to which
it has no relation whatever. It is perfectly true that local
regiments raised for a small colony can never have an
opportunity of seeing service upon a large scale; but it is
quite a different thing where your local force is intended
for a vast country no India, and is in magnitude quite an
army of itself. (Hear.) And Cth regard to disaffection,
I believe that so far from the fact of troops being localised
in India being an incentive to discontent among them, it
operates exactly the other way. I believe that nothing
tends so much to keep up a healthy English feeling or
a sentiment of patriotism among a body of men, whether
in the civil or the rellisary service, as the knowledge that
they are settled among a vast population wholly alien, and
in part, perhaps, hostile, but who always regard them in
the light of strangers, and in comparison with whom they
are themselves but a drop in the ocean. My right hon.
friend made very light of an argument which is often used,
viz., that if discontent should arise in the one army the pre-
sence of the other army would act as a check upon it. And
he made this remark—in which I entirely agree with him
—" God help us if our best resource or only chance for pre-
serving India is to be found in the employment of one Eng-
lish force against another !" Nobody, I should suppose,
contemplates the possibility of such an alternative ; yet it
has been argued that, if there be a danger of combination
or discontent among the troops quartered in India, the evil
would be less likely to spread over two separate forces dif-
ferently constituted and entertaining different ideas than
over one army homogeneously composed. That is all that
I have heard asserted on the subject, and as far as it goes
I believe it is a sound and fair argument. But, quoting dis-
tinguished authorities, the right hon. gentleman spoke of
the inefficiency as well as the bad discipline of the local
, European force, and he used words to this effect, that it is
the commonly received opinion—l am glad my right hen.
friend did not endorse that opinion—that officers cannot
pass 10 or 15 years in India without losing something of
their energy. This is an ins :Mous subject; but if one is to
compare the services of the two armies respectively, I will
venture to say that those wire were lately known as Com-
pany's officers have had their full share of all the honour
acquired in Indian warfare, and that there has certainly
been no inferiority on their side. Look back only for 20
years, to the period of the greatest disaster that ever befell
our arms in India. Whose name is associated with that
event as the general then commanding our troops ? I am
not mentioning this as any reproach to Sir J. Elphinstone,
who was sent out late in life, and at a time when he himself
admitted that he was hardly fitted to undertake an active
command. That was the doing of the Government of the
day. But the fact remains that it was under the command
of a Royal officer that the disaster in Affghanistan occurred;
while it was under three Com, any's officers, Generals Nott,
Pollock, and Sale, that that disaster was retrieved. (Cheers.)
Again let me turn to the events of the last three years. I
should be sorry to appear to undervalue or disparage such
brilliant services as those which have 'seen rendered by Lord
Clyde, Sir W. Mansfield, and Sir Hugh Rose. It was lately
part of my duty to ask this house to recognise those ser-
vices, and I certainly never discharged any duty with greater
pleasure. But every man acquainted with England or India
mutt feel that the imminent peril was past, the neck of the
rebellion broken before those distinguished men reached the
scene of action. (Hear, hear.) And when Delhi fell, who
were the chief agents in producing that important result?
Why, those eminent Indian generals—Wilson, Nicholson,
and Neill, and that great Indian civilian, Sir J. Lawrence.
(Cheers.) And when I hear it said that officers after 10 or
15 years of Indian service lose a part of their energy, I ask
myself whether I am dreaming or under a delusion when I
suppose that Munro, Malcolm, Ochterlony, Henry Law-
rence, Outram, Herbert, Edwardes, and many others not
undistinguished in this house, were men who spent not 10
or 15 years, but the whole of their working life in active
employment in India. (Hear, hear.) Personal contrasts
are very disagreeable, but if we are to compare officers of
the two armies with each other, I must say I think an offi-
cer in the Indian service has opportunities for a manlier
training than can he had by an officer in the Queen's army.
Surely, a command on the Punjab frontier involves greater
responsibility and more active duties, and brings with it
greater knowledge of military life, than a command at Alder-
shott. And when we are speaking of service in India, what
can be more important than an acquaintance with the
country, its climate, its people, its roads, means of trans-
port, and commissariat? And at what a serious disadv in-
tage in these respects must an inexperienced Queen's officer
be placed on arriving in India ? Moreover, it should be re-
membered that we are now alway sure of obtaining the
best men in the Indian service to fill the highest commands;
whereas, under a single amalgamated army, a variety of
causes would deprive you of that advantage. -Upon the
question of the relative efficiency of the forces Sir Thomas
Franks was called before the commission to express his
opinion, and he said :

" I have served in the field with portions of the European
forces of the three presidencies, and nothing could surpass
their gallantry, efficiency, and intelligence."
•
(Hear, hear.) Sr W. Cotton said :
" I do not think it is possible to have better staff officers
than the Indian arlay had, nor that there should be a more
efficient force than the Indian artillery."
Sir James Outram may be said not to be an entirely im-
partial witness, but Jam sure he would not state as a matter
of fact that which he did not solemnly believe. (Hear,
hear.) Sir James Outram said :

" Men of the local force are better in health and physical
energy, man for man."

He adds, and there is some significance in what he says :
" If, as is alleged, the discipline of the local army is bad,
the fault of bad discipline is generally supposed to be with
the Commander-in-Chief, and of all the Commanders-in-
Chief who have served in India only one has been appointed
from the Leal service."
(Hear, hear.) And he adds :

" Contrast the performances of the Bengal Commissariat
during the niutini-s, when the empire was in a state of dis-
location, with those of the Royal Commis ariat in the
Crimea, under the eye of the British nation, and where a
land transport of seven miles only was required of the de-
partments. "
Lord Ellenborough, who has deeply studied war,
and is thoroughly acquainted with military questions,
stated explicitly that the company's officers have a more ex-
tensive knowledge comparatively with officers of the line :
" The Company's officers have acquired a much more
extensive knowledge; till this revolution they would pro-
bably have been, as soldiers, superior to the officers of tho
Queen's army. They had seen more, they had more en-
larged minds, because (hey had more to do,"

But upon this question I do not want merely to refer to the
evidence of all who are now living. My right hon. friend
in the course of his speech referred to the treatise of Sir J.
Malcolm, and I admit that a higher or better opinion than
' •

Sir J. Malcolm's it is impossible to cite. Ido not pretend
to know what opinion he expressed at other times, because

•
this is a question upon which men's views differ at different

periods of their lives; but he was questioned in 1813, be-
fore a committee of this house, and, after stating in very
high, but still general terms, his opinion of the character
of the local troops, a question was put which bears very
closely on the proposition now made by the Government.
He was asked,—
" Would it be advantageous to have, the regiments of
Europeans in India completed by Ulna up the casualties
with recruits, or to have them occasionally renewed by en-
tire regiments?"

That is practically the question now in issue—whether it is

better to keep ken army permanently In india, reerulting ft
from England, or to "renew if by sending out entire regi-
ments. Sir John Malcolm said :--

"It would, no doubt, be most economical to have them
filled up with recruits, and the regiments would always
continue more efficient, as any new regiment coming entire
from England is unfit for service for, I may say, a twelve •
month at least."'

My right hon. friend quoted Lord Metcalfe, and I find in
Lord Metcalfe's volume of papers the following passage :
"The Indian army, although it be taken under the
Crown, must, nevertheless, continue in some respects a se-
parate body,—that is, it must be officered as at present by
officers brought up in its own bosom."

:Hear, hear.) He then proposes a s7stem of exchange, so
hat, if there is any meaning in words, it seems as if he were
contemplating a state of things in which the local army was
to remain distinct fr9m that of the line. (Hear, hear.)
Again my right hon. friend cited the greatest name and
authority on military subjects in modern times—the Duke
of Wellington. I heard with interest, and I have since
read carefully the passage quoted. But what does the
Duke of Wellington say ? Ido not find in that passage a
single word about amalgamation (cheers), not a single
word about the disadvantage of a local army. What
the Duke of Wellington said was that fhe Company's
troops ought to be transferred to the Crown. (Hear,
hear.) That is quite a different question, and I venture to
suggest that the motive may well be, supposed to be
that, knowing there was a feeling among officers as t.) the
superiority of service directly under the Crown over service
under the Company, he thought the supposed inequality
between the two was the cause of jealousy which it was ex-
pedient to remove. (Hear, hear.) I have only ono more
authority to quote. Let me remind the house that lam
not calling as itnesses into court. I am only taking the
liberty to cross-examine witnesses whom my right hon.
friend has called. I have not looked through the writings
cf Lord Cornwallis. He may have entertained different
views at different times,; but, looking over Lord Cera-
m allis's work, I alighted on this passage :
" Several obi actions have occurred to me on more mature
deliberation against declaring all the forces in this country
Kings troops. If an act of Parliament could be obtained
permitting the Company to beat up for recruits, and to keep
them under martial law until their embarkation, and if
some means cov".d be adopted to establish equality of rank
between King's and Company's offic zs, I believe I should
be satisfied."
(Hear, hear.) What becomes of the authorities cited in
favour of the Government plan ? Lord Metcalfe favours a
local army ; the Duke of Wellington is only for a transfer
of the troops under the Crown; and Lord Cornwallis would
be satisfied with the maintenance of a local force on certain
conditions which have long since been fulfilled. (Hear.)
The opinion of Lord Cornwallis alludes to one of the prin-
cipal grounds upon which the fusion is based—the alleged
existence of jealousy and rivalry between the two services.
Ido not care to deny that such jealousies have existed. No
doubt, beyond the limits of natursl and healthy emulation,
jealousy has &sled prejudicial to the interests of the pub •
lie service in India. But why has it existed ? Let us see
what complaints the local office' s have had, and nits. what
time they have been excluded from an equality of rank
and honours. The first instance of a Royal commission being
granted to an Indian officer is in 1788. The rank of Lieu-
tenant-General was not granted until 1813. The order of the
Bath was nominally in 1815, but given for the first time in
1826. Brevets for service datefrom 1828. The rank of General
was first extended in 1837. Their rank as officers was not
recognized in Europe until 1855, and the first instance of a
Commander-in-Chief being appointed from the local forces
was in 1856—only four years age. (Hear, hear.) It is not
unnatural that, treated in such a way, they should have en-
tertained feelings of jealousy towards their more fortunate
comrades. We should entertain the same feelings under
the same circumstances. It is very easy to do away with
the feeling by doing away with the circumstances. By far
the greater part have been removed, and if any remain they
are insignificant. But when it is said that jealousy must
exist between two armies differently constituted in two
countries, I say that jealousy need not exist unless you put
one army in a condition of greater advantage and favour
than the other. (Cheers.) In one respect there is a disad-
vantage in the continuance of a %eel force. I admit that
many soldiers who are invalided at an early age are only
invalided as far as India is concerned, and are still able to
do effective duty in a temperate climate. But, if that is ad-
mitted to be a disadvantage, it is one from which it is very
easy to escape, because there is no difficulty whatever, as far
as the men are concerned, in arranging a system of trans-
fer from one service to the other, by making the service in
one army count towards pension for service in the other.
It involves no other difficulty than the mere mechanical one
of balancing an account. (Cheers.) In the case of the
exchange of officers from one service to the other I am dis-
posed to agree with Lord Canning that the difficulties,
though grave, are not insuperable. But there is one other
consideration which I think the house ought not altogether
to overlook, and that is the effect of the change on the army
of the line. What do you propose to do? Why, virtually
to employ 25,000 or 30,000 troops in India more than have
hitherto been considered necessary. You will not be able
materially to reduce your colonial forces. You can reduce a
few at the Cape, because the number there is extravagantly
high. But with that exception you cannot reduce the co-
lonial forces. If, then, the colonial service cannot be re-
duced, and the Indian service is to be increased, every offi-
cer and soldier gets a longer period of service abroad, and a
proportionatelyshorter period of service at home. (Cheers )
For the men, perhaps, it will not make much difference ; but
for officers, consider how far you can afford to make the ser-
vice less attractive than now. You now require from them in-
tellectual qualities of a higher character than before, the pay
is low compared with other professions, and I apprehend that
this change will materially increase the difficulty—a diffi-
culty already great—of obtaining candidates for commis-
sions. It is now your object to induce, as far as you can,
men of social position and of independent fortune—who
have a stake in the country and are citizens as well as sol-
diers—to enter the army. That is a principle which may
be carried too far. I think it is carried too far if you sacri-
fice the intellectual qualifications of an officer to those ad-
vantages ; but, kept within reasonable bounds, no doubt
this is a sound policy, and it will be for the house to consi-
der how far this prospect of considerably' increasing the
period of foreign service will be likely to affect the entrance
of such men into the army. (Hear.) It may be said, per-
haps, that individual officers can find the means of evading
foreign service, because they can generally, at least in time
of peace, arrange an exchange out of a regiment which is
going abroad into one which is to remain at home. But,
even when such exchanges are possible, I do not believe
that is a system which the house will desire to encourage.
(Hear.) A good deal has been said as to the inconvenience
of locking up in India a considerable European force, by
making it a merely local force, when you may require it
nearer home. There is an Indiax as well as an English side
to that question, and it might be contended that, consider-
ing that India bears the expense of maintaining an army
for her protection, it is not reassnable that she should be ob-
liged to maintain as large an army in time of peace as in
time of war for thebenefit of the Home Government. (Hear.)
But I deny that in any strict sense of the word a European
local force is locked up in India. The Company's forces
have had before, and the local Indian troops may have again,
if required, to servo in time of war beyond the limits of India,
in Egypt, and in China. When any great emergency arises
there can be na doubt that they will and ought to be sent
out of India, provided that it be for the purposes of a war,
and not for ordinary garrison duties. What I contend for
is, not that a local force shall never, under any circum-
stances, cross the frontiers of India, for that has never been
the case; but that India shall be its home, and that it shall
not leave India except in the case of war. (Hear, hear.) If
its liability not to leave India except in the event of war
constitutes any objection to a local force, precisely the same
objection applies to the rule which regulates the service of
the Guards at home. Ido not think it worth while-to go
further into this question now. It is really a question
which it is hardly possible to argue fully within the ordi-
nary limits of a debate; but there is one aspect in which
the house ought to look at it, and that •is in its effect on the
power of the Governor-General. lam far from wishing
that, in regard to administrative matters, greater authority
should be given to the Governor-General than he now pos-
sesses. In some respects I think he, or rather his Staff at
Calcutta, have a larger administrative authority than is
desirable. I should be glad to see somewhat less centrali-
sation in the a !ministration of India, and somewhat more
local freedom given to the minor governors. (Hear, hear.)
But that feeling is quite consistent with the opinion I now
venture to maintain, that in all matters which are political
or military the power of the Governor-General ought in
India to be supreme. (Hear, hear.) Since the days of
Hastings, to whatever disadvantages the Indian Admini-
stration has been exposed, it has always been free from the
evil and danger of a divided authority. If that danger is
ever to arise, the division of power can only be between two
persons. The only person who could possibly be placed in
a position which would render him a rival to the Governor-
General would be the Commander-in-Chief. In the case
of a local army stationed in India every officer looks up to
the Governor- General as the head of the whole local service
and the representative of the Crown; but it is obvious that
the same feeling will not and cannot exist in an army of
the Line, which is serving only for a short time in the
country, and of which the immediate head is the Comman-
der-in-Chief on the spot, with a limited appeal to the Com-
mander-in-Chief at home. I believe—b‘ut Ido not want to
go into the subject now—that the effect of the change now
proposed will be greatly to increase the power of the Corn-
mender •in-Chief at the expense of the Governor-General.
(Hear, hear) I do not want to exaggerate the amount
of inconvenience, not to say danger, which will ensue;

but the effect, both as regards the relations of the two,
the one with the other, and as regards the relations of
the Government with the native princes and subject popu-

lotion, will be most injurious. (Hear, hear.) I am not
going, at this time, into a consideration of the estimated cost
of the army. I agree most fully in the remarks made by the
gentleman to whom my right hon. friond committed the
charge of the inquiry into this subject, that materials are

wanting for anything like a minute or correct estimate of
the cost of the proposed change. The question to be con
sidered is, how far the invaliding of soldiers, with all the

expense it occasions, will be diminished by a system of more
frequent relief. I think that, of itself, not altogether free
from doubt. (llear, hear.) It is distinctly asserted, and
is, indeed, familiar to every one of us, that however men
may suffer in the course of years from the Indian climate,

`still by far the hargeit and mast formidable mortality is that
which-arises among newly-landed troops. (Hear, hear.) 1
find from one statement that eight regiments of the Line
los', 110 out of 1,000 men in the first year. And, of course,
the more frequent the reliefs, the more frequently you bring
young, raw, unseasoned soldiers into India, the greater will
be the mortality from those causes which affect men on their
first arrival. The house must not omit to observe, also,
that the liability to sickness which affects men who have
been long in the country is capable of diminution by pru-
dent sanitary measures, more especially when it is found
possible to quarter a large number of European troops in the
hills. On the other hand, however, the mortality which
falls upon young soldiers from their own imprudence, their
ignorance of the climate, their neglect of precautions, can-
not in a proportionate degree be diminished by artificial
means. Then you have further to consider, even assuming
that more frequent removals would diminish the mortality
of the troops, whether that would compensate for the
enormous cost of transport and the practical neutralization
of a considerable portion of the army by its being on the
passage backwards and forwards. I have touched but
lightly on these two last topics because I fear I must have
exhausted the patience of the house in endeavouring to
state, most imperfectly, the grounds on which I object
to the total substitution of the army of the Line
for a local force in India. In doing so, I can assure the
house I have discharged what is to me a distasteful duty.
I would always much rather on Indian questions support
the Government than oppose it. (Hear, hear.) I know in
this case I am acting against the opinions of many of those
whom I deeply respect; but I know the arguments I have
laid before you—and the weight of which I feel far more
strongly than I have been able to express—l know those
arguments do weigh heavily on the minds of those who, from
their experience and knowledge of' Indian matters, are most
competent to form a judgment on the question. (Hear.) I
wish only that the subject shall—as lam confident it will—
receive a fair, impartial, and deliberate consideration.
(Hear, hear.) lam well aware that from the position I have
occupied I have been too much mixed up in this question,
too long personally interested in it, to approach it at this
time with a completely unbiassed mind ; and, whatever de-
cision the house may come to, I for one will acquiesce in it,
knowing from experience that upon all questions of admini-
stration the collective judgment of this house is generally
wiser and sounder than that of any individual member.
(Cheers.)
General PEEL--Having been a member of the royal com-
mission alluded to by his noble friend, and differing from
tho decision to which his noble friend had arrived, he was
anxious to take the earliest opportunity of stating the
grounds upon which he had arrived at that totally different
conclusion. (Hear.) The question before the house, whe-
ther we should continue a local force in India, or, that the
European troops in that country should henceforth form
part of the Queen's general army, was far too important to
be made the subject of a party contest. Nor did he see that
there was the slightest disposition to make it so. But what
he meant was that they should not allow their judgment to
be swayed by any prejudices of officers of the Indian or the
regular army who might have interests of their own
which might be affected by the change. His noble friend
was very naturally in some degree biassed by the opinions
of those by whom he had been surrounded when at the
head of the India Board, and no doubt his (General Peel's)
opinions were as much biassed by his connexion with the
royal army. (Hear.) The arguments on each side were
so evenly balanced that it was imp ssible to expect una-
nimity, and ho would abstain therefore from quoting any
authority. ,It-was well known too that in the commission
to which allusien had been made there was a bare majority
' coming to a conclusion exactly opposite to that of the mi-
' nority, and in each case the reasons wero fully given in the
report. He had no hesitation in saying that he generally
agreed in the views of the majority, while his noble friend
as generally agreed in the views of the minority. The
' majority consisted of five eminent officers of the regular
army, while the minority consisted of the names of four as
' eminent officers of the Indian army. But he might call at-
tention to the fact that the officers composing the majority
had all served in India, and were as distinguished as those
who differed from them. He observed from the papers on
the table that the report of the commissioners had been re-
ferred to a naval and military committee at the India-
house, which was unanimous in condemning the decision
of the royal commission. In the midst of all this conflict of
opinion Lord Derby's Governsaent was called upon to form
a decision, and that decision was no doubt that there should
be a local army to consist of two-fifths of European troops.
He of course as a member of the Government had concurred
in that decision, but the mutiny which had broken out in
the Indian European army since was of itself sufficient to
justify a change of opinion. lie admitted that with regard
to the mutiny the Government was wrong at the commence •
ment, but it was impossible to get over the fact that a muti-
nous correspondence was carried on for some time between
the different regiments, and not even up to the last moment
did the non-commissioned officers and old soldiers come
forward to give information. Either they knew of the
mutinous feeling of the men or they did not; if they did,
and concealed it, they were as soldiers net worth their salt.
(Hear, hear.) There were many other reasons besides the
mutiny justifying a change of opinion. He found that Lord
' Canning in one of his last despatches gave sufficient grounds
' to warrant any such change—for so far from the pro-
' posal of Lord Derby's government to have a local army
composed two-fifths of Europeans being approved by him,
he wrote home recommending in the strongest terms the
amalgamation of the two armies. Another fact of an im-
portant character was the number of men who accepted
their discharge whenever an opportunity occurred. Tho fact
that at the end of the eight years' service a number of men
belonging to the local army accepted their discharge at once
put an end to the efficiency of the local force. His noble
friend said that if a local force existed theyshould be allowed,
to exchange from one force to the other. They were he be-
lieved, able to do that now, and it was natural that after
several years' service in India a man should wish to come
home if his time were allowed to count on for pension. Ho
took it for granted that a plan had been determined upon
before his noble friend had determined, while Secretary of
State for India, in favour of a local force, but they had no
details before them as to how it could be carried out consis-
tently with justice to both ,officers and men. But supposing
such a plan devised, there were still other difficulties to be
overcome. Hitherto the European army in India had not
only provided the military service, but had supplied an effi-
cient staff of civil and political officers. No one would deny
that, whenever such duties were entrusted to military men,
whether of the one service or the other, they were always
efficiently performed, and though officers had been sometimes
accused of want of general business ability, political and
civil appointments had been filled by them as well or better
than by persons selected from any other class of the com-
munity. He agreed with Sir C. Trevelyan that if the two
armies were amalgamated there would be no want of candi-
dates for the service who would look forward to passing
their lives in India, and earning distinction in that
country, whereas if the Indian army was merely a local
one, thereeepuld be no doubt that appointments, instead of
being thrown open to all candidates, would be confined, as
heretofore, chiefly to the friends of the members of the In-
dian council, than which nothing dould be more prejuiicial
to the efficiency of the service. His noble friend had ob-
jected that, in the event of the amalgamation, officers ap-
pointed to political employment would be liable to be re-
moved when their regiments were ordered home, and the
service would suffer by continued change. But that would
not be the case; after two or three years of service, such
officers would be placed upon the staff list, and thus effici-
ency would be provided for, and an end put to that fatal
system of denu ling regiments of all their best officers and
leaving the regimental duties to men of less experience.
Another objection which had been made to the proposal for
a Royal army was this—it was said that a local armyalways
secured a certain and sufficient amount of permanent local
force to be maintained there, because it was not removable
at the caprice of the Government. Now, he did not attach
any importance to that. It could never be supposed that the
home Government would not feel the same interest in India
as it felt in any other part of the empire. India was repre-
sented in. the Cabinet. But it was a mistake to suppose that
the local force could not be now removed from India. The
opinion of the law officers of the Crown had been taken on
that subject, and there was not the least doubt that the
local force of India could be removed from that country.
It was folly, however, to suppose that any British Govern-
ment world ever endanger India by removing from it any
larger number of troops than the Governor-General sanc-
tioned. The greatest exertion was made in this country
to send troops to India in the hour of her need during the
mutiny, and some of our garrisons and colonies were placed
in jeopardy in order to do that. India must be prepared
to give as well as to receive assistance. Another ground
of objection was on the score of expense. It had been said,
and properly, that the amount of force in India must
always be regulated by the amount of the Indian revenue;
and it was the o inion of the minority of the Royal Com-
mission that the authority of the Secretary of State for
India, and of the Indian Government, would be interfered
with by having a Royal army. But recollect the amount of
force in India, whether local or European, must always de-
pend on the Governor-General, and on the Indian govern-
ment. The home government had not authority to send a
single regiment to India without its being applied for by the
Indian government. The right hon. baronet would admit
that there was not that difference between a local and a re-
gular force that (eight' to influence the decision of that
house. If the whole of the army in India were a regular
army he did not see why the allowances received by that
army should not be subject to revision, and made more in
accordance with the allowance to the troops in the colonies.
Of course those who remained there for life should receive
a higher rate of pay, but if the regiments were relieved
oftener he did not see why there should be that immense
diffet once between the pay of the regiments serving in India
and that of the regiments serving in the colonies that there
was now. But there was another objection which, although
it had not been brought forward so prominently, had, he
was afraid, affected the opinions of many more than any of
the objections he had hitherto stated, and that was the fear

entertained of the transfer nfpatronage from those who now
held it to the Commander-in-Chief, or to the Horse Guards.
He thought that was a bugbear. The original appoint-
ments would bo open to the whole world. The Commander-

in-Chief had expressed his willingness to give up all patron-
age as to original appointments, and the only thing left for
him would be the common regimental promotions, in which

th6to wax no pal renege, as it Nriti d 1116r6 inettee of eourse.
As to the of oore to be selected, he took it for granted that
that would be left to the Governor-General, and he also took
it for granted that all appointments and commands in India
ought to be left to the Governor-General. The Governor-
General should at all events have a veto: and the patron-
age, position, and power of the Governor-General of India,
so far from being injuriously affected, would be higher if
this proposal were carried out. The only difference would
be this, that they would deprive the Commander-in-Chief
and the Indian Council of the power of making original ap •
pointments. We had raised 22 regiments of the line, two
regiments of cavalry, and we had also made a great addi-
tion to our artillery and engineers entirely to do service in
India, and depend upon it if the Indian Government did
not employ them we should have to add another million and
a half or two millions to our army estimates to maintain
them. If there was not a regular army in India these men
would be entirely displaced. And for what purpose? To
enable the Indian Government to raise new regiments, and
to proceed in that course which had proved so fatal. The
wisdom of disbanding old regiments fur'the purpose of rais-
ing new ones he could not see. He would undertake to sup-
ply India with every man that she required, and he would
maintain a much larger force in this country than was now
maintained without adding one shilling to the army esti-
mates. For these reasons, and trusting he had not said one
word that was offensive to the Indian officers, he trusted
that leave would be given to bring in this bill, and he
should give it his cordial support.
Col. SYKES said he would take a much more extended
view than that of class interests. The question was, would
this bill tend to the good government of India and the satis-
faction of the people. The great thing to argue was the ult -
mate results of the bill. Last year his right hon. friend ob-
tained leave to augment the troops from 20,000 to 30,000.
He had now altered his opinion of the local European force,
because they attempted to maintain their rights when the
Government of the East India Company terminated. The
hon. and gallant member recapitulated the facts connected
with the claim of the Indian troops to a bounty upon re-en-
listment, arguing that they were right as to the view they
took of their own case ; and of the 10,0_0 which came home
a great portion of them re-enlisted. There had been several
instances in which regiments had insisted upon and ob-
tained their rights, but that had not led to any want of con-
fidence in them in future times. The hon. and gallant
member read an extract from an address from Lord Clyde
to the Bombay army, complimenting them on their bravery
and discipline as shown in the face of the enemy and during
the recent mutiny in India. The hon. and gallant member
also read extracts from despatches from Sir H. Rose and
General Mansfield equally complimentary to the bravery
and discipline of the Bombay army. From all this he was
justified in saying that the grounds for the amalgam-
ion, as regarded the cause of the mutiny, had no founda-
tion in fact. His right hon. friend had quoted Malcolm and
Metcalfe in favour of this principle of amalgamation. But
when these celebrated men expressed themselves in favour
of amalgamation, the officers of the native troops had no
sank. But as these officers had obtained rank in 1855, the
reasons urged by Malcolm and Metcalfe for the amalgama-
tion were no longer in force. The hon. and gallant
member then referred to the patronage which this principle
of amalgamation would throw into the hands of the Go-
vernment, and said that, although that subject had been
pooh-poohed, yet it was a fact that, if the principle was
carried out, the Horse Guards would have to grant 4,980
new commissions, and this was no small amount of patron-
age. He would advise his right hon friend to withdraw
the bill.
Mr. PEACOCKE supported the bill, the principle of
which must be admitted to be based upon right grounds.
Sir DE L. EVANS said he desired to express a few words
on this subject; but he felt great embarrassment in at pre-
sent presenting himself to the house, when the bill before
it was not yet read even a first time, disinclined as he was
to take any course that could at all have a tcraenpy to nu-
bArrass the Government. Much lia.l L•et:u said about India,
but in his opinion they }•et Lacw very little of that great
nation. With regard to, the bill, he must say that it was, in
his opinion, a very bad and very ill-framed bill ; because in
it the frivernment proposed to preclude any further step to
be taken in reference to the arrangement. With respect to
the Royal Commission that sat last year on the subject, he
must say that it was not right to place the Commander-in-
. chief of the army as a member of that commission, stand-
ing as he did in a position in which he should not be ex-
posed to conceive a prejudice. Looking at the speech which
was delivered on the subject of the reorganisation of the
Indian army by the Secretary of State for India, the right
hon. gentleman in that speech, delivered on the 10th of
August last, expressed opinions on the question entirely at
variance with the opinions which he gave expression.to in
introducing the present bill. The hon. gentleman in that
speech, delivered on the 10th of August, said it was his in-
tention to recommend an augmentation to the extent of at
least 30,000 men to the local European force in India. The
right hon. gentleman spoke in high terms of that force on
that occasion, and said they had not, as imputed, mutinied;
but now the right hon. gentleman spoke of them as having
mutinied, and that it was desirable to do away with them,
as a local force, and to amalgamate them with her Ma-
jesty's forces of the line. It was his intention to move
for correspondence on the subject. He was rather sur-
prised at having heard the right hon. gentleman say that
the men of the local European force, when it was pro••
posed to them on their disbandonment to enter the Queen's
regiments of the line, were not entitled to bounty. Now
that was not fair towards the men, and particularly when
it was born in mind that when men volunteered from the
line into the local European force in India, it was a fixed
rule that they received a new bounty. Why, then, should
not the men of the local European force in India be en-
titled, on the same principle, to a similar advantage. It was
, now plain that the real originators of the so-called mutiny
sat on the Treasury benches. From the manner in which
the men were sent home it would appear that the authori-
ties at Caleuttahad some resentment against them. They
all remembered the state in which some of those poor fel-
lows were brought to Liverpool ; yet, unworthy of the ser-
vice as they were said to be, were immediately re-enlisted
in her Majesty's service. Could any step be more incon-
sistent or self-convicting. He was ready to admit the high
position of the officers upon whose opinion the Government
was proceeding, but he did not think that opinion was so
overwhelming. Sir Hugh Rose said that recent events had
convinced him that a local force in India was dangerous,
but the fact was that the career of those officers was a suffi-
cient explanation for what had occurred. It was most ex-
traordinary that officers should thus speak of men who had
distinguished themselves in every field, and who well main-
tained the honour of those who had fought in the great
battles of India since the days of Plassy. It would
almost seem from the reports that the local troops had
disgraced _themselves in every field. Why, who was it
who had been the saviour of the British empire in India ?
The noblest civilian in the service, Sir John Lawrence:
Sir Henry Lawrence, too, was called upon to perform the
most arduous and difficult service. But it was said,
forsooth, that the local troops were not sufficiently dis-
ciplined. However, the proof of the pudding was in the
eating of it, those officers' opinions could not be maintained,
and he thought they were by no means justified in the cen-
sure they had pronounced. He understood questions had
been put in the committee on the organisation of the Indian
army whether some officers had not been seleeted for high
commands in India who were physically incapable for the
service. Those questions were rejected and treated with
disdain by officers of high position on' the committee, but
there was no doubt that the Horse Guards had made such
appointments. One of them was reported to be wrong in
his upper storey, and another was both deaf and blind.
Such was the operation of that most exemplary of military
institutions, the Horse Guards, Of the last appointment
he spoke with the greatest reluctance, yet it was his duty
to say that an officer who had seen no service had been ap-
pointed by the ngble lord at the head of the Government to
the command of 320,000 men. IA spite of those assurances
that were made to them, they could scarcely believe that
Horse Guards appointments were made without perfect
regard for fairness and fitness. If the Horse Guards were
such a piece of perfection in military administration, hove
came it that committees of inquiry had been moved for,
both by the Horse Guards itself, and the War Department,
one of which was now sitting, to inquire into all kinds of

irregularities. It was unparliamentary to refer to the pro
ceedings of a commission which had not yet reported, but
the Governor-General had not hesitated to do so, and he
would take upon himself to say that the revelations which
had already taken place concerning it disclosed matters of
extreme importat ce.

The SPEAKER here interrnpted*the hon. and gallant
gentleman to remind him that it was a rule of the house
not to refer to the prcceedings of a. commission which had
not been reported.

Sir DE LACY EVANS said he only wished that other
hon. gentlemen, not Radical members like himself, would
adheto to the letter of the rule. However, as the house
would now be soon in possession of the report of the com-
mittee in question, he had every reason to believe that there
would be a fair opportunity for considering the matters he
referred to in the second reading of the bill. At present the
Government were aiming at acquiring the whole patronage
of the Indian native cadetships, and that was not a power
which ought to be entrusted to the Horse Guards. It was
generally thought, however, that some higher influence had
been used to make the Government go round from their
statements of last year, when they declared that a native
force of 30,000 men should be 'maintained in India to co-
operate with the European army. lie thought the state-
ments of the noble lord tb e member for Lynn were quite
conclusive against the hill, and he warned the house not to
consent to the dangerous extension of the patronage and
power of the Crown, which evidently constituted the chief
object of the bill. (Hear.)
Captain JERVIS said he was )nuch struck with the tone
of the speech of the hon. and learned gentleman who had just
spoken, and the purport of wlitch was that the bill was really
nothing but a job, its object being to extend the patronage
of the Crown. That was a question which he did not expect
to have been called upon to discuss. The question
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