The Sun.
London, England, 1856-07-15 00:00:00

minister of experience and hgh character could never have
introduced at a conference 'or the settlement of terms of
peace with Russia questions of this vast iinportance, with-
slutitavitig previously comnuhicateck litittrilais colleagues,
and felt the pllse of the •epresentktive' of the different
Courts. That was the conlusion which everybody must
have drawn from the protuols of the conferencei ; but a
short time afterwards paper were laid on our table which
completely exhibited the case of this conduct on the part
of thR French Minister. andthe means by which the atten-
. tion of the Congress was drected to these extraneous and
extraordinary subjects. It then appeared that on the 27th
March, ten days before theexpesition of Count Walewski,
the Plenipotentiaries of Sa•dinia placed in the hands of
Lord Clarendon a memorandum which, if it be anything,
is an act of impeachment e! Austria and Austrian rule in
Italy, which proposes secularisation, the Code Napoleon,
and other remedies, and wiich in spirit was the basis of
the observations that LotiClarendon made on the Bth of
April. Therefore it is quit► clear that there was an under-
standing-among the Pleniptentiaries in Paris that at their
meeting on the Bth of Apri all these extraneous questions,
including that of Italy, wire to be brought forward, that
the movement came from Piedmont, and that in the me-
morandum of the 27th of March may be found the mo-
tive spring of all that hai occurred. (Hear, hear.) Now,
to proceed a step further, what are the engagements, as
the noble lord the member for the city interprets them,
what are the representations which the latest inter-
pretation of the words ve might call them —of Lord
Clarendon ? Our Foreign Secretary agrees that the state
of Greece is " abnormal ;" he agrees that the condition of
the R )man States is also " abnormal ;" but, as regards
I_the Neapolitan Government,

" He is of opinion that h must doubtless be admitted in
principle that no Government has the right to interfere in the
internal affairs of other States, but he considers there aro
cases in which the exception to this rule becomes equally a
right and a duty. The N eapolitan Government seems to him
to have conferred this right and to have imposed this duty
upon Europe."

Now, I ask the house whether that is language that could
have been used, or ought to have been used, without hav-
ing some foregone conclusion as to the policy of which it
was to be the indication ? . Though I may not agree with
the noble lord the member fur the City that the language
of a protocol of this character-is an engagement which may
bind us with the formality of a treaty, still it is impossible
to read it without feeling that we have a right to expect
from the noble lord at the head of the Government, with-
out revealing the secrets of Cabinets or the mysteries of
States, some explanation of the declarations of t he Eng-
lish Plenipotentiary more satisfactory than those phrases
with which the noble lord has favoured as to-night, and to
which I confess I am at a loss to annex any other mean 11;
than that which I had the misfortune, years ago, to atl eel
to the statements hf the noble lord with respect to the affairs
of Italy. The noble lord has explained to the house what
is the nature of the exceptional character of the Neapolitan
Government, and why there should be a departure, in the
case of Naples, from that golden-ruleof non-interference to
which I trust the house will adhere, or which it will never
quit without the most urgent necessity. [" Hear, hoar,"
from Mr. Bowyer.] The noble lord said the position of
Naples was remarkable, because, if the Government were
to conduct itself so as to give rise to any revolutionary
eeeeeeeeeeio tee eyeeteere, th armed feswka of a grant
Powi r- Austria—were'ett hate", r ani y , n may depend
upon it," added the noble lord, " .a.usta is would occupy
Naples, thus producing a state of things that would not only
endanger the peace of Europe, but might bring about cala-
mities which it is difficult to measure or foresee." But when
the noble lord defends himself from the charge of doing no-
thing to mitigate the evils which, according to him, render
the state of Naples so exceptional, and which require our
interference, he intimates that, though England and France
may not succeed—have not succeeded—in obtaining that
mitigation of Neapolitan rule which he thinks so neces-
sary, yet some other influence, not less powerful, and
which will be received in a far more friendly spirit by the
Neapolitan Government, may be brought into requisition
with more success. The house 'clearly understood the
noble lord to mean the mediation of Austria. It was the
action of Austria upon Naples that, according to the noble
lord, was to induce the Neapolitan Government to cease
from its ill-doing and to adopt that remedial course which
seemed so expedient. But how extremely inconsistent is
it to hold Austria up to us as the Power which, by its
beneficent interference with Naples, is to put an end to
the iniquitous rule which you deplore, and at the same
time to say that, in the event of any revolutionary move-
ment in Naples, Austria will occupy the kingdom in order
to uphold the very misrule to mitigate which Austrian
mediation, according.to your own account, is now the only
means to which you can resort! Sir, I cannot have much
hope that the influence of Austria will be of the nature
which the noble lord supposes, if, as we are assured at the
same time by the noble lord, we have reason to anticipate
and fear Austrian invasion in order to support the mis-
government which Austrian mediation is to mitigate and
remove. But, air, in what way, viewing this question
Practically, are we to put an end to the occupation of
Italian states by foreign Powers? The noble lord who
began the debate confined the whole of his observations to
the Austrian occupation of part of the Roman states The
noble lord must have felt the extreme awkwardness of his
position, because when he assured the house of his confi•
deuce that, with the aid of our great ally, Austrian oceu•
pation might be terminated in the Roman states, he must
have remembered that another part of the same states was
occupied by the troops of that very august ally by whose
co-operation we were to put an end to the occupation of
the Legations by Austria. The noble lord touched very
lightly—or, rather, did not touch at all—upon the fact
that the capital of the Roman states is occupied by French
troops, though he must be aware that nothing can be more
irrational than to address violent representations to Aus-
tria in order to terminate the occupation of the Legations
by Austrian troops unless, at the same time, our ally is
prepared to take steps by which the occupation of the
Roman metropolis itself by French troops shall cease. I
know that this question has been settled by Count Cavour
in a very ingenious manner; ho insists upon it as a first
condition, that Austria should quit the Legations, and that
the French army should quit Rime, but should remain in
the Legations until everything is settled. Now, I ask what
is the use of doing what the noble lord has done to-night—
what is the use—to employhis own language—of "rousing
the passions" of Italy, unless we have a practical objectbe-
fore us, and unless the opinion of Parliament can support
the policy of the Minister ? (Hear, hear.) Never ie. this
house justified in entering into discassious upon external
policy unless wo are prepared to impugn the conduct pur-
sued by the Miuister as injurious to the country ; or un-
less we can, by the expression of our opinion, support the
Minister iu a policy which will be beneficial to the country
:and to Europe. So far as the theoretical part of the quee-
tion goes, so far as sympathy for Italy goes, 53 far as the
poetry of politics is concerned—there being but one feeling
in this house —I want to know, when we turn to the prac-
tical question, what the motion of the noble lord will do,
or a het 'anything we cs.n!say will do, to support the policy
of the Minister? Why, sir, what is the policy of the Mi-
nistry ? (Cheers.) It is the very point which throughout
this whole discussion has been mysteriously withheld from
us. (Hear, hear.) I don't expect the noble lord to tell us
the means by which the Cabinet is to fulfil his policy ;
but we ought to know from the noble lord what are his
general opinions on the subject of the occupation of Italy
by foreign troops, and whether he is prepared to take
steps to put au end to that occupation or not. (Hear.)
Now, sir, there are two modes in which wo can deal with
this question, and as they are both practical modes, I will,
with the permission of the house, and with as much brevity
as I can command, slightly advert to them. We can go to
war with Austri sae doutt ; we can send a fleet to the Bay
of Naples or to the Bay of Genoa; with the consent of our
great ally, we can send a French army to some part of Italy;
and we may embark in a great struggle, the object of which
will be entirely to change the phase of Italian life, to subvert
its Government, to emancipate—according to our views—its
people, and to effect a great revolution, which may, per-
haps, be accomplished after one of those long wars like the
Punic war, or the 30 years' war, or the French Revolution,
or after one of those struggles which al ways occur when such
immense consequences are aimed at and attained. On that
policy I will not presume to give an opinion, because I feel
that it is a subject which would require a discussion wor-
thy of its importance in this house before we embarked on
it. I will make only one remark with regard to it, and I
say, if that be the policy of the Government of this coun-
try, they are bound frankly to announce it. (Hear, hear.)
They are bound td submit such a policy to the considera-
tion of Parliament, and if sanctioned and ratified by Par-
liament, the people of this country will at least have the
satisfaction of knowing that they have not been drawn
into a great struggle without being aware of it, and their
minds will be prepared—as the minds of a nation ought to
be pi epered—for so great a struggle and so great a stake,
by those discussions in the house of their representatives
which will direct their attention to the great issue before
them. By this means they will be enabled to brace their
energies to the occasion, and they will have no grounds for
accusing the Queen's Ministers ortheir own representatives
of having embarked in a conflict of such difficulty-and du-
ration without fair advice and warning. I think all hon.
gentlemen will agree that if that be the policy of the Minis-
. ry—that if they are prepared to go to war to emancipate
Italy from Austrian rule, they are at least bound frankly
to explain their policy, to appeal ,to Parliament, and to
take the verdict of the country upon itsexpediency. There
is another practical mode by which you mayproceed to at-
tain our °hied. I remember at the end of the session of
1818 it vas my fate, s t has bee a the fate of the noble lord
to-night, to bring before the consideration of Parliament
the question of interference in Italy. I have in my wind a
perfect recollection of the events which took place in 1847
and Vela, atiereathiongn tistrertoeite lora way not condescend
to profit by the experience of that adventure, I confess
myself that the consequences were so sad, and have been so
opposed in my opinion to the progress of Italy and to the
amelioration of the condition of Italian society, that I trem-
ble lest he should embark in a like enterprise again, and lest
welehould reap from that conduct the same bitter and de-
solating fie:tits. This leads me to thesecond practical means
by which you may attempt to emancipate, as it is termed,
Italy. You may have diplomatic communications—you
may have what you had in,lB47—first friendly advice, and
afterwards, what are called "admonitions" to the ruling
Powers ; and I have not the slightest doubt that without
declaring war and without the active co-operation of fleets
and armies, you may thus set a great portion of Italy in
flames, and may reap consequences which we may all have
deeply to deplore. (Hear) I will try for a moment to
trace what would be your diplomatic action under that
second system upon Naples. But before I do that, there
is one observation which I cannot help impressing on the
house. The state of Naples is declared by Lord Clarendon
to be so exceptional as even to justify the violation of the
golden rule of foreign policy, viz., non-intervention. Now,
it would be very desirable to have before us, en authority,
some description by tie Government of what the state of
Naples is. I will for the moment assume that all those
tales which haye reached us of ruthless aod savage im-
prisonment are perfectly authentic ; but if authentic, they
are in all probability in a great degree tho consequence of
the panic-stricken councils of a small sovereign surrounded
by jealousies and difficulties fomented often and encou-
raged by foreign Powers. I will admit all we hear to be
perfectly authentic—the ruthless imprisonments, and the
cruel and even sanguinary punishments. Well, but I re-
member a few years ago, when there were alleged against
Austria the same horrible stories of the imprisonment of
citizens --the flower of the worth of Italy—in distant fort-
resses. (Hear.) Who has not heard of the names of men
iu the highest walks of literature and science who have
been the inmates of Austrian dungeons? I don't know
what were the particular causes which induced those im-
prisonments. If I eater into that, I enter into the inter-
nal aelministration of the country, and the principle of
non-intervention in fcreign countries is much endangered;
but I want to know what there is in the state of Naples
more exceptional that there is in the case of Austria ; and
if the cruel imprisonment of citizens by as Sovereign is
considered, so exceptional a thing as to permit the violas
tion of the cardinal principle of our diplomacy, why do we
not violate it in the instance of Austria? (Hear, hear.)
Vs when we hear of •those dreadful banishments to
Siberia with which Inn. gentlemen are so familiar do we
not consider that an.exceptional case; and what other
difference is there between Naples, and Austria, and Rus-
sin than this—that Naples is a weak Power and the others

are very powerful ones? I would impress upon the
house, therefore, that it should be very cautious upon
this head. Now, let us see what will be the action of the
second practical course in the cape of Naples if we pursue
it. We determine not to go to open war to emancipate
Italy ; but still the condition of Naples is so intolerable
as to warrant interference though not in a military form.
Then, Sir, we have an admonition—England and France
publish an admonitory note to the King of Naples, and,
perhaps, au English fleet rides in the bay of Naples.
Every body knows what the consequence of that would be.
The instant that the discontented portion of the, popula-
tion of that kingdom find that Naples has lost the good
offices of the Western Powers, that process takes place
which the noble lord has referred to—bands of the Italian
population are reused. They will reason thus. They
know well, when their own Sovereign is lectured by Eng-
land and France and an English fleet is in the offing, that
if they rise, and rise successfully against their Sovereign, •
Austria dare not interfere. I deny the proposition of the
noble lord, that an insurrection in Naples is a necessary
prelude to an Austrian occupation. If England and
France arouse the passions of the Italian population by
proclamation and by lecturing the King of Naples, and if
an English fleet is in the bay, Austria will not occupy
Naples. The noble lord who introduced this question
seems to think that there is no contest going on in Italy
but between worn-out dynasties, and some intelligent and
well-educated persons of the superior classes, who desire
his great specific for all its evils—constitutional govern-
ment. I do not think that this is a true view of Italy.
(Hear, hear.) There is in Italy a power which we seldom
mention in this house, but without considering and under-
Can, i tg which we shall never rightly comprehend the posi-
tion of Itnly—l mean the secret societies. (Hear, hear.)
The secret sccieties do not care for constitutional govern-
ment. (Hear, hear.) They do not want existing society
ameliorated, they want it changed ; and the objects of that
change can neither be obtained nor secured by those en-
lightened institutions to which the noble lord refers. We
know something more of these societies than we
did. Since 1848 we have had means of obtaining a
knowledge of their numbers, organisation, principles,
and objects, and without some considerations of these
it would be absolutely impossible for us to form a
conception of what would be the consequence of our
interference in the affairs of Italy. It is useless to deny,
because it is impossible to conceal, that a great part of
Europe—the whole of Italy and France and a great part of
Germany, to say nothing of other countries—are covered
with a network of these secret societies, just as the super-
ficies of the earth is now being covered with railroads.
And what are their objects ? They do not attempt to con-
ceal them. They do not want constitutional government ;
they do not want ameliorated institutions ; they de not
want provincial councils nor the recording of votes—they
want to change the tenure of land, to drive out the present
owners of land, and to put an end to ecclesiastical esta-
blishments. Some of them may go further. Do you think
that, with their complete organisation, when Austria can-
not interfere to occupy the kingdom of Naples, when the
King is lectured on his throne by the Western Powers,
and when, as the noble lord says, the feelings of the people
are roused, these societies will be quiet? (Hear.) We
know what they did before. Their energy and their orga-
nisation carried everything before them. lam told that
a British Minister has boasted—and a very unwise boast
it sr., by holding out his hand be could raise a revo-
lution' in Italy to-morrow. I believe it is not impossible,
with the means at his disposal, that he aught. What
would happen ? Yon would have a republic formed on
extreme principles, and there may be many intelligent
and well-meaning persons—l do not say in this house—
who would say,-" And what then?' "Nothing can be
worse," they would say, " than the present state of Italy ;
let us try a Red Republic, or even a republic of is still
more fiery colour." But the question of Italian politics is
not of that simple character. Rome is not far distant
from Naples. The passage from Naples to the States of
the Church is not difficult. You may have triumvirs
again established in Rome ; the Pope may again be forced
to flee; and my hon. friend behind me (Ur. Spooner) may
say, " So much the better"—(laughter)—and not. cardi-
nal may be left,in Rome. What Will be the consequences

of thai.? 'The two great Catholic rowers of Europe
Prow°, whose Emperor boasts in these protocols of being

the eldest Eon of the church—that ally With whose bane- 1
ticent co-operation Italy is to be emancipated—and Aus-
tria will pour her legions over the whole Peninsula. You
will have to withdraw the British fleet ; your admonitions
will be thrown into the mud (as they deserve), and
your efforts to free Italy from the occupation of foreign
troops- will terminate by rendering the thraldom a thousand
times more severe, and by aggravating the miseries of the un-
fortunate people whose passions you have fired, and whose
feelings you have this night commenced to rouse. But
is that all the evil ? If the movement which commenced at
the conferences at Paris is to to be followed up ; if the proto-
cols are to be suceeded by speeches of the noble lord the
member fur London while Parliament is sitting, and by ad-
monition and written lectures by cur foreign Ministers and
by our representatives abroad during the autumn, in all pro-
bability you will again have Italy iu flames, and you will
again crash that progress which has been always going on in
time of.peace, and when we meet again we may find the posi-
tion of the Peninsula infinitely worse. But do not suppose
that that is the whole of the evil. What I have said I con-
sider—so far as the future can be certain—to be the certain
consequences of the policy which you are pursuing. What I
am now going to refer to are merely possible results, but
they are results of ...3 terrible a character that it is my duty
to refer to them, though I do so with reserve and some feel
ing of awe. The secret societies are not confined to Italy, as
I have ventured to remind the house. They are at this mo-
ment more numerous, more active, and in a higher state of
organisation in France than in any other State of Europe. If
Italy be in flames, if the Italian secret societies be successful,
do you think it will have no effect on the French societies ?
They are of course always in a state of excitement and ready
to act upon every occasion. Parliament and the country
have confidence, and have justly confidence, in the character
of the great prince who now rules France. He is a man of
rare sagacity, he has been schooled in adversity, and he is a
man who is at this moment at the head of a numerous and
triumphant army devoted to him. You may therefore allow
Parliament to be prorogued with little fear as to the conse-
quences to France of the system in which you are now about
to engage in Italy. But we all remember another great prince
who sat upon the French throne, whose sagacity during his
reign was also proverbial, who was never mentioned in this
house but in terms of panegyric on both sides of the house,
who also had been schooled in adversity, and who was also
seconded by an army which he and his princes had
themselves formed, which was fresh and flushe I with
victory, and which was led by ,;neat generals devoted to him
and eager to prove their devotion by the assertion of his
rights and the maintenance of his throne. But that great
prince fell suddenly, and he fell solely and entirely by the
action of the secret societies. (Hear, hear.) That I apprehend
is a fact which no man acquainted with the events of 1848
will deny. No doubt that terrible catastrophe was assisted
by a great misfortune which then occurred to France. In
1847, when a member of the British Cabinet (whose career I
have commemorated in this house already) was sent to give
advice and counsel to the Italian princes, there happened to
be a season of unexampled want in Europe, and especially in
France. At no time within the following year were the
means of sustenance and of employing labour so deficient.
What is the condition of France at this moment ? A terrible
visitation has fallen upon that country. The charity of more
than one nation and the admirable measures adopted by the
ruler of France to mitigate the consequences of that visita-
tion may enable the next season to be passed without that
misery which fell upon the country in 1848. But the pros-
pect, in a material point of view, is very grave, and if you
commence another campaign of Liberalism—the expression of
sympathy without being prepared to support it by acts—a
policy convenient for a Minister or a public man who wishes
to make a political demonstration, or to au ambitious mon-
arch who wishes to increase his territories, but one which a
wise Parliament will hesitate to sanction with its ratification
—if you once embark in this scheme of raising the passions
of the Italian population, as the best means of atneliorating
their condition and mitigating the political evils of their
country ; and if the cousequ:nces of that policy should be
concurrent with a period of great agricultural distress in
France, it will require all the sagacity of the most sagacious
prince and all the resources of the army (however numerous
and however victorious) to guard against the danger ; and
fortunate will it be for France and for Europe if they escape the
most fatal results. I have touched upon these points be-
cause this is no holiday question. We are now in the very
lees of the session, and.this may probably be the last day on
which there will be assembled so largo a number of members as
were present when the noble lord (Lord J. Russell) addressed
the house. The noble lord has commenced a course which, if
not watched with vigilance and care, may involve the coun-
try in proceedings the consequences of which it is difficult
to foresee. I certainly find encouragement in the language
of the First Minister. Notwithstanding the proud protocol
of the Conferences of Paris ; notwithstanding this despatch
of the 27th of March fr M. Cavour, which must have been
delivered behind the s eves, and which in the papers appears
fin
as aspeeeh of Lord Cl rendon;.n,,twithstanding all the details

of the protocols', it appears to be the calm, the well-con•
sidered, and the solid determination of her Majesty's Minis-
ters to do nothing. (Hear, and a laugh.) I believe that the
noble lord, profiting by the past—(hear)---remembering his
experience of the years 1847 and 1848, has made up his mind
not again to be seduced into a position so difficult and so
dangerous as that which he then encountered. I will also
say that I have such confidence in the wisdom of the Em-
peror of the French that I feel persuaded that, as regards the
affairs of Italy, !leis of the same opinion and determination
as the noble lord the' First Ministhr. (A laugh.) I hope I
am not, wrong in this anticipation, but it cannot be unadvisa-
ble when such a subject as this is brought before .the house
to meet it fairly in discussion. Let us not as on loaner occa-
sions be met with t.t.o p.,01..--y yr poltles." (Hear.) I can feel
for the condition of Italy as keenly as any gentleman in this
house, whether he be a First Minister or an ex-First Minis-
ter. I hope and believe that the time will come when in
Italy there will be neither secret societies nor erowned
despots ; but these are questions for the closet, not for a
practical and popular assembly. We have to deal with the
facts before us, and if we raise up an agitation against Aus.
trian rule without a distinct conception of the objects at

which we aim and the line of conduct which we intend to
pursue, we shall be arresting the progress of Italy and
aggravating every misfortune which has been brought
wider our notice. (Hear, her.r.) It is impossible to
conceal the fact that the great power of Italy is Aus-
tria. Both the noble lords have admitted that, unless we
are prepared to enter into an internecine struggle with Aus-
tria, our object ought to be to render the Austrian rule as
mild and beneficent as we can. At 'least we ought not to
encourage those who are prepared to conspire against that
rule, but who 're prepared to do nothing else. I was in
Italy long before the affairs of 1848. The Government of
Austria was not that Italian Government which poets would
imuine in their dreams. It was not! alsystem of Govern-
ment under which Petrai chs were crowned with laurels in the
capitol, but it was distinguished from the other Governmeats
of Italy by an immense expenditure of Imperial—*-not Italian
—treasure upon great public works, by the light taxation of
the people, and by the progressive material improvement of
the country. That was something. It was good to have a
country with roads unrivalled, with means of communication
yearly increasing. Thatis not, it is true, the only object of
life, but I need not impress upon hon. gentlemen that mate-
rial comfort is a basis upon which you may, and in time pro-
bably will, establish civil and political rights ; that the richer
a people become the more anxious they are to guard that
wealth ; and that, whatever we may say of the Austrian rule,
it was, so far as Lombardy was concerned, a rule under which
at least the material character of the country was greatly im-
proved. I have not been in Lombard since that unfortunate
year, 1848, but I have heard that the picture of society is
now tf a very different character. I hear that in consequence
of the affairs of 1848 taxes have greatly increased, the public
works have been arrested in their progress, and that the ma-
terial development of the country has much diminished;
therefore by the course we took in 1818 we have not improved
the condition of Lombardy. That leads me to my last point,
our position with regard to Sardinia. (Hear.) The noble
lord the member for London (Lord J. Russell) laid it down as
a principle that, although there may be in the treaty with
Sardinia no f rmal stipulation that wa will support that
coultry against other Powers, yet, after its allegiance to the
great alliance and all that has occurred since, we are bound
in honour to give it that support if it should be attar ked.
The noble lord the tfirst Minister (Lord Palmerston) seemed
not to question that position, but rather urged upon the at-
tention of the house that there was no fear that Sardinia woild

attack Austria. Now, I think it undesirable that a man of I
the great character and influence of the noble lord the mem-
ber for the city of London should in this house volunteer en-
gagements to other countries which the litera scripta of the
treaty does not authorise ; but I certainly agree with the noble
lord that any attackupon Sardinia by any Power in consequence
of the internal policy which she pursues would constitute one
of those grave conjunctures which would demand the most
serious consideration of the British Government, and could
certainly not be encountered by a despatch or an admoni-
tion. Let me, however, remind the noble lord, who .ays
that there is no danger of Sardinia attacking Austria, of what
occurred in 1848. It was Sardinia that attacked Austria. It
was when Austria was supposed to be in distress and in de-
spair, even while negotiations of a not unfriendly character
were going on between the two Courts, that the King of Sar-
dinia made, as it were, a nocturnal attack upon his Austrian
neighbour, and commenced the war which ended in his signal
discomfiture. I hope that the present King will profit by
that experience, and will feel confident that if he, within his
own dominions, pursues the policy which he believes to be
for the advantage of the great body of his people he will re-
tain the respect of Europe, and will be safe from any unjust
attack. I should deeply lament that any occupation of Sar-
dinia by Austria should take place, That would indeed be a
conjuncture which would require the deep consideration of
this house. To judge from the past, I cannot bring myself to
believe that any danger of that kind exists ; I cannot but be-
lieve that the King of Sardinia is safe so long as he remains
within the limits of his own dominions, and pursues that
policy in the management of his kingdom which he has a right
to follow. If anything can give to him power to develope his
whole political:system it is the maintenance of peace in Italy.
I am persuaded that, if the policy recommended by the noble
lard the member for London is followed, you will have the
position of Sardinia endangered—not by Austria, but by the
revolutionary element, exercising its sympathetic influence
upon the secret societies of Piedmont; and that throne will
fall, not by the hand of Austria, not by the interference of
foreign occupation, but by the efforts of men and bodies of
mega, who have in view far other objects than the constitu-
tional improvements which wisely engage the attention of
the King of Sardinia, and the subversive career of which will
be accelerated by the motion wade by the noble lord to-night.
the noble lord the First Minister tells us that he cannot con-
sent to the production of the papers now asked for. I
can hardly suppose that the noble lord the member
for London expected them to be granted - but he has
had an opportunity of placing before the hmase and the
country the policy which he advocates. I entirely dissent
from the views of that noble lord. (Hear, hear.) I say, if
you will interfere with Italy, you must interfere with fleets
and armies, and be prepard to meet the consequences.
(Hear, hear.) If you interfere in Italy, you must make up
your minds for a war of prolonged duration a war that
will tax your resources to the uttermost, and which, once it
is commenced, you must continue until yod have fully accom-
plished the objects for which you embarked in it, and have
in fact reconstituted the map of Europe. (Hear, hear.) That
is the only mode in which you can interfere in Italy. If you
are not prepared to do that, for the sake of the Italians, for
the sake even of liberty and civilisation, you will avoid
stirring up the passions of the population of that peninsula.
(" Hear," and a faint laugh.) I am confident this view is
right, although you may smile at the association of the words
" liberty and civilisation" with Austrian rule. (Hear, hear.)
We are told that we can expect nothing from Austria. Let
me impress on the house this point—that Austrian statesmen
are mon of the very highest enlightenment. Among these
are the present Prime Minister of Austria and the Minister of
that country at the Court of Rome. Prince Metternich is a
statesman distinguished above all others for his freedom from
prejudice and passion, and a man who has an interest in
self-government ; he must feel that, if Italy were tranquil
and undisturbed, Austria, being a powerful nation, could
afford to be clement, to trust, and confide. It is the King
of Naples—the little Sovereigns, teased with constant con-
spiracies, who, rather from a feeling of panic than any
natural cruelty or arbitrary disposition, are driven to those
excesses which we all equally deplore and desire to see ter.
minated. No man can wish to fill dungeons with his own
subjects. I remember perfectly well that when Lord Minto
went to Italy in 1817, and at the request of several of the
northern Courts tendered his advice on the part of the Bri-
tish Government, the same King of Naples, who is now de-
picted to us as quite a Caligula, was so anxious to establish
some form of constitutional government in his dominions that
he applied to our Government for their good offices towards
that end; and Lord Minto, at the King's express desire, re-
paired to Naples, and for a considerable period I believe en-
tertained most sanguine expectations of success. It was the
sudden outbreak of the French revolution which put a stop
to the arrangements then in progress in Naples. (Hear,
hear.) For these reasons, although there can be no division
tonight on this question, I hope the house will refuse to
sanction the course recommended by the noble lord—l hope
it will arrive at this conclusion :—if we agree to interfere in
Italy, let it be a real interference ; or, on the other hand, if
we are not prepared to act, if we are not prepared to give
effect to our policy by force, then the best thing fq,r us will be
to remain silent ; not to rouse the pagions of the population ;
not to upset thrones—a policy which can only end in aggra-
vating the thraldom of Italy, and may lead to consequences
still more fraught with disaster to Europe. (Cheers.)
Mr. BOWYER had been told by persons on whom he
could rely, that the evacuation of the Roman States by
foreign troops would very soon take place, and he trusted
that no more attacks would then be heard upon the Roman
Government. Nothing would tend more to prevent foreign
armies from leaving the Roman States than speeches such as
that which had been delivered by the noble lord the member
for the city of London, who was anxious to introduce into
Italy notions which were inapplicable to the condition of that
country. He concurred with what had been said by the
right ben. member for Buckinghamshire, that it was impos-
sible to carry into effect the views of the noble lord without
sending out a force sufficient to revolutionise Italy ; and be-
lieved that if the noble lord occupied the same position as
the noble lord at the head of the Government, he would take
a different view of the subject. Count Cavour had placed be-
fore the conference a monstrous document, recommending a
most ridiculous plan for the government of the Roman States;
and had said, that unless certain things were done, there
would be danger of revolution in Italy. Now, the danger
arose, in a great measure, from the violence of the press,
which made attacks of the most ferocious character against
constituted authorities and the Church, and from the viola-
tion of laws of property. It was gratifying to find both the
leader of the House and the leader of the Opposition taking
a reasonable view of the matter. He should be glad to see a
constitutional Government established ; but such speeches as
that of the noble lord tho member for the city of London
were not calculated to promote the progress of civilisation
He trusted things would be allowed' to take their natural
course, and that the Roman States would be left to manage
their own affairs without any foreign interference. (Hear )
Mr. M. MILNES said the noble lord at the head it the
Government bad given no right to the right hon gentle an
opposite to assume that he had come, to the same conclu on
as himself on this important question. He said (Mr. Mill es)
did not say that the Austrian Government was at presentlac-
tuated by any desire of aggression, but her previous condiact
rendered it necessary to watch her conduct most carefully ;
for under preteuce of assisting the Sovereigns of the States
applying to her, she might eventually occupy the whol : of
Italy. (Hear.) He believed. the Sardinian Government to
be at present in no peril, but no one could tell what its peal-
tion would be if it had not .the good will and good wishee.of
this country. Sardinia would be looked upon with an evil
eye by the Absolutist Governments ef the Continent, nd
I
therefore it was the duty of this country .to throw over r-
dinia the shield of its protection. He did4not think the ques-
tion of the independence 0, Italy iaas at all mixed up with
the question of religion. 'lf that independence were esta-
blished there would be no'`
.ff.;:7 of secret societies, or of any
other danger which some eople apprehended to society.
The Sovereigns of Italy nearly all acted under foreign rustica-
tion, and that he believed was the principal cause of the pre-
sent state of Italy. The Emperor Napoleon I. had always
said that one of the greatest. objects of our policy was the in-
dependence ofAtaly. That declaration would certainly not be
forgotten by the present ruler of France, and ought always to
be remembered by us.

Mr. WHITESIDE said this was a subject of deep in-
terest, and the speech of the noble lord the member for Lon-
don upon it was logical and clear; but if his object were to
draw some definite statement of policy from the noble lord
at the bead of the Government he certainly had not suc-
ceeded, for no one who had heard that noble lord could have
understood what his argument or what his policy was. The
noble lord had displayed the faculty of talking for a consider.
able time peacefully, and saying'nothing. The noble lord had
declared no policy. Lord Clarendon's proposition was to
deal with a hard hand with Popery, and to secularise the Pa-
pacy, which meant the overthrow of the Government of the
Church.. And had the noble lord the member for Tiverton
endorsed that policy ? What did the paper which was
signed by the plenipotentiaries at Paris say ? Why, that the
armed occupation of Rome was to cease when the authority
ofo
st
theo
nPionpg it t a t consolidated.G
Pope
w
Greek rcalends Why, that was, in reality,
,
and that was the ppargu-
ment of the noble lord the member for London, and it had
so
not in any way been met. When did the noble, lord (the
member for Tiverton) say that armed intervention was to
cease ? He had said nothing about it. It hud been said that
within the last fortnight Lord Normanby, the ambassador in
Italy, had advocated the armed intervention of Austria and
France, so that
we had one ambassador in Italy holding one
argument, and another ambassador in France holding another.
The noble lord the member for London was justified in asking;
the noble, lord at the head of the Government what he in-
tended to do. That noble lord would have said, if he in-
tended to follow up words by actions, that if Naples dicienot
behave itself we would blow it to pieces. Instead of that the
noble lord had said nothing, a course which he (Mr. White.-
,
side) could not but characterise as childish. Was it the rule
of the noble lord's policy to have barren protocols and nothing
_else ? He believed that-the protocol on Italy would lead to
war, and the permanent occupation by armed troops of Italy.
There seemed to be something like a sarcasm in the observa-
tions of the noble lord the member for London, when he re-
ferred to the Pope. He said that if the troops were with-
drawn from Rome the Pope would settle with his people.
suppose the people settled him. (Laughter.) Wero the
troops withdrawn he apprehended that the cardinals would
as speedily quit the place as they did before, and Rome would
be deprived of some of its most respectable inhabitants.
(Laughter. Ho (Mr. Whiteside) believed that the course of
the Government here would exasperate the people of Italy
into revolution, and when in revolution the Government
would leave them to their fate.
Mr. J. G. PHILLIMORE said of all governments the go-'
vernment of priests was the worst, and the government of the
pope was the most mischievous in the world. The appear.
ance of an English fleet in the Bay of Ittraples would bring
the King of Naples to his senses in a day. The policy of
Austria had always been to keep her subjects in sensual
enjoyments, in order to keep the people from that freedom
to which they were entitled. He was astounded to find
that the right honourable gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli)
should defend the policy. of-Austria and a Metternich. The
policy of Metternich was that of despotism and nothing else.
As to the Emperor of the French defending the Papacy, he
(Mr. Phillimore) believed that much as France had submitted
to, there was one thing that she would never tolerate, and
that was that her present ruler should shed the blood of
France in putting down the liberties of Italy.
Sir J. WALSH said the French had created a word which
ought to be introduced into our language. It was specialte.
The moaning of the word was an aptness for certain things.
Now, he thought if there was one thing which the noble lord
the member for London was deficient of specialto in, it was
diplomacy. Now, however, the noble lord seemed again in-
clined to try his hand at it, and to come forth again in an old
character. The noble lord seemed to think that we ought to
interfere in the Papal Statt s As the withdrawal of the troops
would immediately produce revolution, he (Sir J. Walsh)
would be glad tnknow if the noble lord expected that the
Emperor Napoleon would allow himself to be made a tool of
by this country in a course of policy entirely antagonistic to
all his principles. He (Sir J. Walsh) could not look upon the
political parties in Italy as being so innocuous as some gentle-
men imagined. Why, some of them advocated the policy of
the stiletto, and many of the politicians of Itily were simply
Red Republicans, which was another name for the old Jaco.
binism. Could proper safety be placed in such hands ?
He believed not ; for there was a revolutionary element
:a existence in Italy, which, if not narrowly witched, would
defeat the objects of the best friends of Italy. He thought
that the noble lord at the heal of the Government had
been wise in speaking a good deal and saying nothing,
and ho supposed the noble lord the member ter Loudon had
now nothing to do but to withdraw his motion, which he