The Sun.
London, England, 1860-06-19 00:00:00

DEFENCE OF LONDON.

Colonel Jebb, in a letter to a contemporary, says :
one can read the report which has just been
issued by the Commissioners on the defences of the
country without being impressed with a sense of
its vast importance, or without appreciating the
comprehensive and very practical manner in which
the subject of placing our naval ports in security
has been handled.
There must, however, exist, as is stated in your
impression of Friday last, a feeling of regret that
no definite plans for the defence of London appear
to have been specially considered.
It is admitted that " the main object of an enemy
invading this country would be to push for the
capital, in the hope that if he succeeded in obtaining
command of it, such a disaster would result in our
buying him off upon any terms he might think it
expedient to exact."
No less object than this would realise the dreams
of insatiate ambition, nor would any greater ob-
ject be likely to be attempted, for the permanent
subjugation of the country would hardly enter into
the calculations of any one acquainted with the
English character.
We may be caught unprepared, and we may be
beaten, and this we will rightly deserve for being
unprepared, but few think that we can be entirely
conquered.
No, if the British Lion is to be bearded in his
den, it would be to draw his teeth, to cripple his
power, and to humiliate him.
The capture of one of our naval ports would not
effect this object, or do much more than produce
permanent exasperation and temporary inconve-
nience.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that the com-
missioners are right in concluding that the blow
would be struck at the heart of the empire ; and,
however necessary it is to defend the extremities,
it is that most vital point that claims timely atten-
tion, for if the capital is secure, the prize which
might tempt an invasion would be out of reach.
Could it be clearly shown that within a reason-
able period measures might be adopted by which the
country would be placed in safety and freed from
the periodical panics and hot and cold fits to which
she has sbeen so long exposed, no sacrifice would be
deemed too high a rate of insurance to obtain so
desirable an object.
Lord Overstone, in his reply to the questions of
the Defence Commissioners, says :
" We may, however, be well assured that under the most
favourable suppositionlhe general confusion and ruin which
the presence of a hostile army must produce would be such
that it would be absolute madness on the part of the Go-
vernment and people of this country if they were to omit
any possible measures of precaution, or shrink from any
present sacrifice by which the occurrence of such a catas-
trophe may be rendered impossible."

The Commissioners have taken very good care
of our great naval establishments, and no doubt
the means of resisting a landing wherever it
might be attempted have been fully considered.
But assuming an enemy to have made good his
landing and to be pushing on for London, what is
to be done to insure his never reaching his desti-
nation ? This is a wide and most important, and
in some respects it may be a difficult question ; the
solution of it, however, should be vigorously at-
tempted without loss of time.
The following may be taken as a brief summary
of what we have to look to :
The first line of defence is the Channel; the
second, measures for opposing a landing; the
third, one or more general actions at a certain dis-
tance from London. Tho fourth and following
would be succfssive lines of defence in its more
immediate neighbourhood.
It was the opinion of the Duke of Wellington,
in speaking of invasion, that "there is no mode of
resistance, much less of protection, from this
danger, excepting by an army in the field capable
of meeting and contending with its formidable
enemy."
In this deliberate opinion of the highest autho-
rity to which we can appeal, fortifications, as such,
are left to fulfil the special and necessary objects
for which they may be constructed, as at Ports-
mouth, &c., and we are warned to trust the safety
of the country mainly to our army in the field.
It is on this point that I would, venture to claim
your permission to make a few observations.
If we may not expect to be at all times fully pre-
pared with a powerful army,—if our forces are
likely to be always made up of a moderate number
of regular troops, with a large proportion of militia
and gallant volunteers,—it is the more necessary to
take measures for giving them confidence and sup-
port, and for applying their services to the greatest
advantage, so as to insure their not only contend-
ing with a powerful enemy, Wherever they meet