The Sun.
London, England, 1860-09-10 00:00:00

THE END OF BOURBONIC RULE IN

NAPLES.

The line of Bourbon, which for 120 years has
ruled—as Bourbons only rule—the kingdom of
Naples, has died at last of what Young aptly calls
" a slow sudden death." To say that the sword of
Damocles has been suspended over the head of this
Sicilian tyrant would be to do less than justice to
the precarious nature of his authority. The more
apt metaphor would be to compare the fate of Nea-
politan royalty with that of the unfortunate Eng-
lishmen who lost their lives in so tragical a manner
a few weeks ago upon the Col du Geant, stumbling
on, relying on the support that was no firmer than
their own footing, and sliding with gradually in-
creasing celerity to the edge of a precipice, over
which they were borne by a force which they nei-
ther created nor controlled. The moment the false
step was made destruction became inevitable; but
no one could tell how far they must descend on the
treacherous slope before they reached the point
where a slide was exchanged for a crushing per-
pendicular fall.
Never was a dynasty less entitled to the sym-
pathy of its contemporaries or the compassion of
posterity than that which has just so ignomi-
niously terminated its career. 1t is not merely
of the practice of systematic falsehood and
perjury that the dynasty of Naples is arraigned.
Great crimes of that nature have been committed
ere now, and palliated, if not expiated, by the
beneficial use made of a power preserved or attained
by such vile arts. The peace of the Roman empire,
the retorm of manners, and the glory of a bril-
liant literary epoch, incline mankind to view with
even too mush indulgence the cruelty and the
treachery by which Augustus triumphed over all
rivals, and placed himself at the head of the Re-
public. But in the case of the tyrants of Naples
their power has been as cruelly used as it was foully
gained. Their history shows a cowardice in adver-
sity and a cruelty and insolence in prosperity which
can only be accounted for by supposing in these
Kings a natural affinity for everything that is base
and degrading, a disinterested, or, if we may so ex-
press it, an unse,fivh pleasure in human suffering.
Many men have been found with consciences too
weak or with passions too strong to enable them to
resist the temptation of committing great crimes
when great advantages were to be secured by them.
The peculiar infamy of the Bourbons of Naples has
been that they persisted in torturing their victims
when torture could no longer serve the purpose of
example, and when it was as little needed to pre-
vent any further danger from the machinations of
men whom the famine, darkness, filth,and seclusion
of many i ears had incapacitated for the duties of
active life, and left no other wish than to find some
calm and peaceful retirement in which to wear out
the little life that the dungeons of their Sovereign
had left them. To the Royalty of Naples must
further be attributed the infamy, rare in modern
times, but occasionally to be met with in the his-
tory of Greece and of the Italian Republics, of say-
ing, with as much deliberation and sincerity as the
Fallen Angel himself, " Evil, be thou my good."
They made their people inexpressibly miserable,
not because they knew not how to do better, and
mistook their way in the attempt to make them
happy, but because the public misery was the end
and aim of their government. Their principle lite-
rally was, " the greatest misery of the greatest
number," and they applied it with the most un-
shrinking logic. "If our people," they argued,
become wealthy they will become turbulent,
therefore be it ours to keep them in perpetual
poverty. If they become enlightened they will
despise the rule of our priests and detest the go-
vernment of our police ; therefore let us by all
means keep them in as much ignorance as possible."
The end of Government was completely inverted,
and we doubt if Hobbes himself would have consi-
dered the compact by which he thought all man-
kind bound themselves to obey an arbitrary and
irresponsible power extended to such a domination
as this. It was enough to convert Filmer to the
doctrines of Bentham or Rousseau, and convince
Sancroft or Kerr of the justice of resistance to
Princes. _ _

Looked at from the side of its intense moral de-
pravity and iniquity, it is very wonderful that this
Government should have lasted so long,—that it
did not perish on the very day which brought to
Naples the news of the battle of Solferino. But,
when we consider the large naval and military
force of which this Government disposed, the sud-
denness of its fall is equally astonishing. The King
of Naples could not find money for the most neces-
sary public works ; he was too poor to continue the
disinterment of the buried treasures of Pompeii,
but for prisons in which to immure the bodies of his
subjects, for priests to darken and delude their
minds, and for soldiers to overawe and terrify those
for whom he could not find cells, fetters, and
gaolers,—in meeting expenses like these every King
of Naples has been punctual and even prodigal.
Yet the army has given the most signal instance of
defection which has occurred in history, It has
yielded to a force utterly unable to compete with
it, and melted away, apparently with no other wish
or ambition than to return to its native villages.
The habits of implicit obedience which the military
profession inculcates nave rendered it almost um-
formly the obsequious instrument of tyranny. But
what are we to think of a Government which even
the army which it pampered was ashamed of de-
fending, and which fell, not from the strength of
its assailants, but beeause nobody could be found
vise enough to draw a sword .in its behalf ? Yet
there were in this same Neapolitan army persons of
no very tender or refined conscience ; whose hands
were by no means slow to shed blood ; whose
3ympatbies were not strong iu favour of a
popular movement. There is a peculiar in-
famy in the murder of General Briganti. He was,
it seems, suspected of being a liberal—at least, this
was put forward as the pretext for his slaughter.
The troops he commanded, it appears, did not like
liberalism, And if so, there was before them an ex-
cellent opportunity of giving effect to this feeling,
Garibaldi was approaching, and with him they
might without more dishonour than that which
attaches to aisoldier who draws his sword in a bad
cause have settled the question of liberal or anti-
liberal politics. But this decision would have in-
volved exactly that element which a thoroughly
trained Neapolitan soldier is generally the most
anxious to eliminate—the element of risk. There
was a safer way of showing their dislike of a liberal
policy, and this was by murdering. their General..
To this there could be no possible 'objection. • - He
was one, and they were many. Pertinax himself
before the PrEetorian Guards was not more latterly
helpless, more entirely at the mercy of his. assail-
ants. There was, besides, another advantage. By