The Sun.
London, England, 1856-05-02 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, FRIDAY EVENING, MAY 2, 1856.

mischievous resolution that could be imagined, because it
would affirm the inexpediency of entertaining the question
-of the fall of Kars before discrissiug the articles of peace.
No ono ra ore lamented that calamity than he did ; but he
looked upon it merely as an incident of the war, and by
- no means fraught with those political consequences which
the hon. and learned gentleman so much dreaded. No
doubt sufficient means would be taken to disseminate the
news of its fall throughout Asia Minor, and Russian agents
would represent it as a great Russian triumph. But with
the news of its fall would go forth that of the desperate
assault and repulse of Mouravieff on the 29th of September,
and it would become known that it was famine alone, and
not the arms of the enemy, that induced it to surrender.
The same newsman who convoyed the intelligence of its
fall to the remotest parts, would spread far and wide the
immortal name of General Williams, and the knowledge
that he was an Englishman would go fat to maintain our
prestige throughout the whole of Asia Minor. He re-
gretted that the honourable and learned gentleman should
have spoken in so contemptuous a tone of the " doctor."
No one who had read the blue book could fail to ob-
serve that Dr. Sandwith had rentlere the most es-
sential service, and really he thought that after
the noble self-devotion shown by that gentleman in re-
lieving the suffering of the troops, the hon. and learned
gentleman would have been ashamed to have spoken so
slightingly of the "doctor." But the hon. and learned
gentleman bad poured the torrent of his indignation upon
Lord Stratford ; and, after continuing his attack as long es
he could with any decency, he turned his attention to Lord
Clarendon. Now what was the whole gravamen of the
case as against Lord Stratford de Redcliffe —that he did
not answer Gen. Williams's despatches. Nothing, he ad.
mitted, could excuse that, whether resulting from negli-
gence or any other cause ; but he put it to the house whe-
ther, when they looked to the important results which
would follow, it would justify the Government in recalling
the noble lord. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was a diplo-
matist a the most distinguished abilitie; ; he was em-
phatically the right man in the right place, and it was ac-
knowledged upon all heads that he possessed an authority
in Turkey which noother man could possess— an authority
little shirt of that of the Sultan, and it was absolutely
necessary for the interests of the State to maintain him
in that position. If he had been recalled it would
have been said directly that an entire change had taken
place in the views of the British Government, and the con-
sequence might have been disastrous. He admitted that
so far as the non-answering of General Williains's des-
patches was concerned, a cas 3 had been made against Lord
Stratford de Redcliffe ; but he utterly denied that it was
such a case as would wairaut her Majesty's Government,
under the circumstances, to recall the Ambassador. Tug
fall of Karp had no influence upen the result of the war.
This was proved by the protocols. No doubt every
achievement in war added to the power of those who ef-
fected it. But it was clear that Kars must be surrendered
on the restoration of peace • and the restoration of peace
hid really resulted from the taking of Sebastopol. The
French had not attached great importance to Kars, an I
sent not even a commissioner there. The discussion of
the question was justifiable, but it should not have been
made a means of displacing the Government. (A. laugh.)
There was no fairness in thus fastening on a particular
part of the conduct of the war. Lord Malmesbury had
shown that he had come to this opinion by withdrawing
his motion on the subject in another place. He (Mr. V.
Smith) knew that the people of England deeply lamented
the fall of Kars. (Loud cries of " Hear, hear.") He him-
self had had lamented it most intensely. But the people
of Elgland had also cause to rejoice at the fall of Sebas-
topol, and they could not be unge ateful for it ; and they
were unwilling t ) rake up bygones, and would recoil from
such motions as this, and were reluctant to encourage
party attacks. If in the management of delicate alliances
and amidst great difficulties, the Government had com-
mitted sonic slight error in referem.e to Kars, he appealed
to the gene osity of the people to be grateful for a war, on
the whole, well conducted, and a peace well concluded.
(Ministerial cheers.)
No member rose for some moments, and there were cries
of " divide, divide," when
Mr. VANSITTA ta rose, saying that he should not have
spoken, but that no other memberappeared dispos,d t ad-
dress 1,10 house. He i 133 e -veil that the defenders of the
Government, backed by what they fondly thought to be a
majority, had actually arrogated for their entire credit an
immunity from blame in the conduct of the war. Now,
to that view he could not assent ; and the contrary feeling
would dictate his vote. The Government were not justi-
fiable for perilling the Britislename by sending a " com-
missioner" to Kars, with the appearance, without the
reality, of power, and leaving him to inevitable defeat,
backed up neither by men, money, nor materials. It
would have been better to have left the Turkish Govern-
ment with the sole responsibility of the defence of Kars,
and not to have associated it with th e British name. Kars
might have fallen a month or two sooner; but though the
Russians might have gained the same success, England
would have escaped some disgrace. (Hear, hear.)
Captain L A FFAN desired, as a military man, to address
the house. He dwelt upon the importance of he siege of
Sebastopol. What could the Government have withdrawn
forces from the Crimea awl sent them to Kars, for an object
the French considered purely English—the defence of the
route to India ? It was impossible to send English troops
to Kars ; and all that could be done was to advise the
Turkish Government as to the use of the forces under their
control. The plan of Omer Pacha was utterly impractic-
able. The supposed force for the purpose existed in a
great degree only upon paper, and the rest was incougraous
and haler ogeneous. The two main charges against the con-
duct of the war as to Kara was the discouragement of this
expedition by Georgia, and the recommendation of the
route by Trebizond. But in both of these courses the
Government ha I shown their sense and judgment. Approv-
ing of the conduct of the Government iu a military point
of view, he thought them politically wrong in not having
sent money to General Williams; for with money at his
command that gallant officer would h eve saved Kars.
(Hear.) But he could not bring himself to believe that
any amount of •• foresight and energy" on the part of the
Government eowd have saved that fortress.
Col mel DUNNE did not think the hon. and gallant
member who had just spoken had been more successful in
his defence of the Government than hon. members who
had preceded him. (Hear.) The defenders of the Go-
vernment contended that Kars wee not a place of great
military importance ' • but in his (Colonel Dunne's) opinion
Kars was the lever by which a peace, neither acceptable
nor grateful to the country, had been brought about.
(Hear.) He believed that this country had suffered a great
diminution of glory by permitting that fortress to be taken.
(Rear.) With regard to the strategical operations, the Mi-
nister of War had said that the march by Trebizoud was
the proper method of proceeding ; but every military man
Lad expressed an opinion adverse to that view. (Hear.)
The road by Trebizund was not practicable for the passage
of cannon. It would take 30,000 men three or four months
to march to the scene of action by that route. (Hoar.)
No military man doubted that the proposition of Omer
Pacha ought to have been carried out. Thu march by Erze-
ruum was not practicable; that by Soukum Kelela was,
and the Government was greatly in fault for delaying pro-
ceeding by that route so long. (Hear.) Had the contingent
of General Vivian been sent to Balaklava, Omer Pacha
would have taken his troops to Asia Minor, and Kars
would have been saved. Nothing had prevented Omer
Pacha's advance by Kutais but the lateness of the season ;
and this delay was owing to the indecision, the want of
foresight, and the incapacity of those entrusted with the
arrangement of the operations. It was a most flimsy argu-
ment to say that the contingent was not sent to Balaklava,
because it was unfit. In his opinion, the guilt of the fall of
Kars rested on the War Dapartinent of this country. If
the War Department were tried by a jury of military men,
ho felt assured that its condemnation would be more sigual
than in the House of Commons, or in the country. He felt
no doubt as to the opinion of the nation being in accord-
ance with the resolution of his hon. and gallant friend the
member for Enniskillen. Without going into the earlier
portions of Lord Stratford's conduct, he must be permitted
to state his regret that the ambassador had not answered
General letters. (Hear, hear.) In extenu-
ation of the ambassador, however, it ought to be
rememb3re I that Gen. Williams was not placed under him,
but under Lord Raglan; that Gen. Williams occupied the
same position as did Col. Rose with GOD. Pelissier. But
the Government were responsible for the conduct of their
mbassaclor, and the War Department guilty of the fall of ,
Kars (Hear.) As yet he had heard no defence of the con-
'
duet of the Government. Ora the contrary every speech
uttered had confirmed him as to their guilt. (Hear.)
Mr. COWAN stated his intention to support the Go.
vernment.
Mr. LIDDELL said he had no hesitation in voting for
the amendment of the hon. member for Dorsetshire. With
regard to the resolution of the hon. anti learned member
for Enniskillen, he could have hoped to have seen it dif•
ferently worded, and less forcible in its meaning ; but while
he could not agree in all the censure which that resolution
cast upon the Government at home, yet if asked whether the
f all of Kars was or was not attributable to the want of fore-
sight anti energy, he must vote in the affirmative._

-
A pause of some moments ensued, di-11111g which no mem
ber 1.040 to address the house, and calls ware raised for a
division. At leagth,

Sir J. GRAHAM rose. He said —T know not whether
the hon. and learned member for Greenock (Mr. Dunlop) is
iu his place, but I can assure him and the house that it is
never toy practice, even were it in my power, to make a
speech for display; and it is only a sense of duty and the
feeling that I ought not to give a silent vote ou this im-
portant euesti, n which induces me to rise on the present oc-
casion. I shall take the hint which was offered by the hon.
an .l learned member for Greenock. and shall endeavour to
compress into the narrowest space the observations which it
will be my duty to submit to the house; and I am bound
to state that, like the hon. gentleman who has just sat
down, I have had some doubts with respect to the vote
which I ought to give upon this occasion ' • but, both iu
public and in private life, in a ease of doubt, I think
the rule a safe one to do as one would be done
by ; and having lately been a responsible servant of
the Crown during the conduct of the present war, I am
bound to remember the difficulties with which her Ma-
jesty's Government have had to contend. My own expe-
iience hiss taught me that it is a very difficult operation
to c<induot a great war, whether by sea or land, with
forces under commanders with a divided authority. Now,
what is the experience of the greatest commanders in this
respect ? I think it is an observation of the great Napo-
leon that even one bad general is better than two good
ones at the head of the same army. He makes also an-
other reflection—that an army composed of different na-
tions will to; be long before it commits great mistakes.
What, again, was the experience of the Duke of Welling-
ton in the Peninsular war? He felt the difficulty of a
divided command to so great an extent that almost iintne-
diately after his landing in the Peninsula he thought it
rnaoltisosiolo
nlyroefotuhisaitteartmoy, puhtoaktuntg7
as it were, both the first
head of the Portuguese
army en officer second only to himself, but he thought it
also indispensably necessary that he should be the gene-
and the second commands in it. At Talavera he did not
command, and at Salamanca he had only an imperfect
command, and felt deeply the inconvenience of a divided
authority. There is a remarkable letter of the Duke of
Wellington's written when Alexander, Emperor of Russia,
proposed to send a corps d'armeo to the Peniusula, to be
placed partially under the command of the Duke of Wel-
lington, which sets forth the opinion of that great man
upon the difficulties attendant upon a divided command.
In a despatch of the Duke of Wellington to Lord Bathurst
he says :

I.`l must not say bow much I am flattered by the dispo-
sition of the Emperor of Russia to place his troops under
my command. if the Emperor should carry this inten-
tion into execution, I beg leave to recommend not only
that the Emperor should place them under my command,
but that he should accept of my services (with the permis-
sion of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent) as a general
officer in his service of rank senior to the general officer
who should be sent in command of his Imperial Majesty's
troops, and that although the discipline and interior eco-
nomy of his Imperial 3lajesty's troops should be carried on
under the direction of the general officer who would come
to the Peninsula with them, all reports, &c., regarding
them and their operations should pass through my hands.
I mention this now, because, having for some years com-
manded an allied army composed of very discordant mate-
iials, and having bad the good fortune to preserve the

utmost harmony among them, I nm anxious that, iv Cri49
his Majesty the Emperor should b. 3 disposed to carry his
intention into execution, his views should m t be frustrated
by want of attention to the occurrence of one of those r,o•
cidents which experience has shown are too likely to occur
in the employment of allied troops in the same scene of
action."

I have now, Sir, shown the house what was the opinion ex-
pressed by two of the greatest commanders of modern times
with regard to the difficulties of commanding combined
armies. It is true that in our history we have bright ex-
einples of achievements by combined armies. Reinilies and
Blenheim at once occur to our recollection, but still the diffi-
culties of a command over a corn bined army are great in the
extreme. I, sir, have had the advantage of being from
early youth a friend of the late Lord Raglan, and hay that
in valour, courtesy, srmness, and honour he was a bright,
example of an English general. (Hear.) He had, upon
the el oand to which I have referred, great difficulties to
contend against, but by his courtesy he won the esteem of
two Marshals of France—(hear)—in a combined operation.
His valour was proved when he led—a circumstance new
in our annale—leritish troops side by side with French to
the storming of a strong position, defended by brave sol-
diers, worthy of the adversaries against whom they had to
contend. (Hear.) He had, I say, great difficulties to con-
tend with, but thanks to his courtesy, the alliance roma tied
unbroken. Although his conduct during some part. of his
command has been made the subject of adverse comment,
I think that, taken all in all, we shall not for some time
look upon his like again. (Hear.) As regards General
Williams, who is more immediately connected with the
subject of this debate, he has displayed qualities of the
highest character, and has proved that for the future the
brightest hopes may be entertained of him. (Hear, hear.)
If Kars could have been saved by Gen. Williams I believe
it would not have fallen, but, while I say thus much, 1
must also bear my testimony to the manner in which Lord
Clarendon supported the authority of Geo. Williams. I
will state to the house a circumstance which has not yet
been mentioned, and which I think will show that the
merits of Gen. Williams, great as I believe them to be,
were not unobserved by thei Earl of Aberdeen. In the year
1843 it was the duty of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to
select an officer for the importsnt post of a commissioner to
arrange the frontier between Turkey and Persia, and Lori
Aberdeen, after full inquiry, appointed Gen. Williams to
that office—(hear, hear)—and I must say that the conduct
of that gallant officer o-i that occasion gave the greatest a s-
tisfaction to the Turkish and English Governments. When
it became necessary to appoint a commissioner to the Turk-
ish army in As-a Lord Aberdeen, remembering the serv,ces
of Gen. Williams, recommended Lord Clerenitt n to a, point
that gallant officer to the post, and Le d Clarendon, with
the concurrence of the Cabinet. made that aupointment
(dear.) It was not my intention to have rise ► so early
this evening, anti I deeply regret that I am obliged to speak
in the absence of an hon. gentleman, because I should have
liked him to hear the answer I am about to make to some of
his observations—l mean the hon. member for Aylesbury.
Now, sir, I must say that it is extremely easy to kick ad( ad
animei - (laughter) —and, as the hon. gentle ton has been
engaged, and I hope profitably engaged, in reseerc'e a con
nested with peop:e long since dead, I can quite imagine that
he would prefer kicking a defunct administration to coming
in collision with a Ministry in ease. (Hear.) I say, sir,
that the comments of the hon. gentleman on the Govern
went of Lord Aberdeen are most unjust. The hon. gentle
man says that the Administration of Lord Aberdeen en-
tirely overlooked the importance of the Asiatic frontier of
Turkey, and the danger to Turkey of the advances of Russi
iu that direction. Nov, sir, I will not trouble the house
with more extracts than I can help, but I must remind the
house that the despatches to which I shall refer were
written by the Duke of Newcastle as the organ of the
Government, and I think that the statement of the hon.
gentleman that the Government of Lord Aberdeen was
indifferent to the state of the Turkish army in Asia will
fall to the ground. I will not refute that position by many
extracts, but will confine myself to three. I would bee
the house to remember the dates. The Duke of Newcastle
lett the Administration with Lord Aberdeen towards the
end of January. In the preceding October Lord Claren-
don wrote to Lord Stratford de Ralcliffe—an fit is con-
sistent with my own knowledge that the despatch was
written in concert with the Duke of Newcastle—in the
following terms :
" Her Majesty's Government have a direct interest in the
effective state of this army (that is, the army of Kars and ou
the Asiatic frontier), as it is likely that military operations
upon a large scale will be carried on in Asia next year ; and
they must therefore again insist upon the necessary measures
being taken without delay."
On the part, therefore, of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet, I must
say that there was the earliest indicatiou of foresight with.
reference to the probable course of military events in the
early part of 1355. The date of the despatch is important,
—it is the 21st of Ocr,oner. It is immediately eonesquent
upon the hope entertained confidently by Lord Raglan anti
Mantle' Caurobert that the bombarduien: of Sebastopol,
which was to take place on the 17th of October, would b
successful, anti it clearly shows that the policy of Lord
Aberdeen's Government was that, if happily that bom-
bardment shouldi he successful, part of the allied forces
would be directed on Asia. Here is the matter most
dispute between the hon. gentleman and myself. Un-
doubtedly her Majesty's Government—l believe the pie -
sent as well as Lord Aberdeen's—did attach primate
importance to the Crimean operations, and regarded a-
secondary, although most important, the military move-
ments and events on the Asiatic frontier. The hon. gen-
tleinau takes an opposite view. He thinks, I believe, that
the operations in the Crimea were secondary to the move-
ments on the Asiatic side, and therein differs on a point of
strategy from the conclusions at which the Government ar-
rived after giving the matter their most careful considera-
tion, and consulting with those beat qualified to advise
them. But new I would ask attention, as a proof that the
Duke of Newcastle and Lord Aberdeen's Government never
departed from the view which they took with reference to
the importance of the Asiatic frontier to a despatch which,
I think, was partially read by the hon. and learned member
for Enniskillen. It is from Col. Mundy to Lord Wodehouse,
and is dated lith November :

" The Duke of Newcastle is of opinion that it will be found
almost an impossibility for the English and French forces to co-
operate with an army iu the state in which the Turkish army in
Asia is represented to be, unless a complete change of system
be effected. His grace further directs me more especially to re-
quest that your lordship *ill call Lord Clarendon's attention
to the statements of Cot. Williams with regard to the arrears
of pay duo to the Turkish soldiers, and the evil results arising
therefrom, not only causing distress and privAion in the army,
but encouraging desertion from its ranks ; the want of clothing
among the troops of all arms, and the absence of medicine for
the sick and want of properly qualified surgeons."

That does nor point so directly to an intention of sending
further military assistance with a view to more active opera-
tions in the spring of 1855. I think Lord Aberdeen's Go-
vernment left office in the end of January, and there is a
despatch from Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Red-
o life, dated Jan. 11, which also is a despatch that I know
was written in immediate concert with the Duke of New-
castle. Lord Clarendon says :

" But this is all that has been done for the relief of the
army, notwithstanding the repeated and urgent remonstrances
of her Majesty's Government, which are of a date long ante-
rior to the departure of Gen. Williams from this country. The
Porte was well aware of the anxiety felt by her Majesty's Go-
vernment on this subject, and of the importance they attached
to the army at Kars being in a fit state to take the field next
spring."

Here is an indication of the policy of the Government and
the measures of precaution they thought it expedient to
take, officially communicated as early as January to Lord
Stratford de Rideliffe. (Rear.) Now, sir, I think I shall
rigUly divide the subjects of blame imputed to the Govern-
ment jute two—first, that there being reason not to be
altogether satisfied with the conduct of Lord Stratford de
Redeliffe, they failed to recall him ; and, secondly, that
Cley omitted to send aid to Kirs in the summer of 1853
ttlhhleeeapsieerconsecutively.ar apiisiseiaorn tome
I'l'
teh
et
hAheonlade house,
,tfii sgt‘,vtiowl with regard r°ertec. gt ni attack,to attentionantdh wcoi ttnho-
tdourcotoyo
GLoooredr
aSltrtah .afto
it
td
is
e impossiblee deff e. a
llt
oge agreethe
altogether
with v
itohdei
e-
iwn a therd s
tearlierh o
cud
o f stagelBosfl
o,a
these
dthpe rooocineetudienogose,mpeaorttoictuilBasrlsy,
ttohe-
tanhoe
egtilsetocott;dgtio:
of
tnhhsielovipe rut
ibitolhie:olsleeltrtveircseo.f authorityG e Gen.
whichW ill Williams—(cheers) Ina
ss
necessary( cheers)
to
—o
sustain him; and I think that there can be no doubt that
there was a misunderstanding between Gen. Williams and
Lord Stratford de Ratcliffe, which was not conducive to
aid
that muck, I think there are circumstances wuti,thuarveitTnt
to the past lite and conduct of Lord Sratford which would
have made it a fatal error on the part of her Majesty's Go-
vernment to all him from Constantinople. (Rear.) It is
said that he neglected to answer as many as 6L letters; but
it appears that on cue morning 17 despatches arrived to-
gether, t e luiring probably only one answer. I will not,
however, deal with the question iu that manner. I have
admitted that i think there were parte of the conduct
of Lord Stratford de Redeliffe fairly reprehensible ; but,
ou the other hand, I agiee with the honourable aud gal-
lant officer who spoke on the opposite side that there,
Wperhap, were defects in the original arrangement. Gen.
Williams was seat as miliiary commissioner, placed more
itn we dately under the orders and direction of Lord Rag-
lan, and not so immediately under the control of the
British ainbas.a tor. (Hear, hear.) Probably, too, his
powers and functions were nob strictly defined ; and
under these circumstances, although it is certainly to be
regretted, it was not very unnatural that in the first in-
stance, some misunderstanding should have Edison between
Lord Stratford and General Williams. But against that I
beg the house to set the services rendered by Lord Strat-
cpwtiayseu o
influence
less, Russianio
ogiaag, Russiaogoressst aggression
no
a capital Strat-
ford de Radcliffe to the country. Recollect how he stood
as a sentinel, almost alone, opposing a constant front to
theu r spirit
nu—dto
what
re
u
seduc-
tions havenot always been thrown away. Let me also re-
mind the house of the influence acquired by Lord Stratford
over the Turkish Government. Ho himself tells us of the
nthat
Russian quarter,
corruption which prevails iu every department of that Go-
vernment, and let us not forget how his honesty and wahggerreesh sido and
in-
tegritythe
currupjve influence of Russia in a capital where hit seduc-
tions havenot always been tiarovn away. Let me also re-
mind the house of the influence acquired by Lord Stratford
over the Turkish Government. He himself tells us of the
corruption which prevails iu every department of that Go-
Vernment, and let us not forget how his honesty and in-
tegrity have stood proof against the baneful influence, and
to what noble Purposes he has directed the influence
gained by honour and uprightness. The papers which have
just been presented to Parliament show how successfully
he has exerted himself in favour of the Christian subjects
of the Sultan. I attribute mainly to the influence of Lord
Stratford, constantly anti nobly exerted, that hatti-sheriff
which gives such important privileges to the Christian
population in Turkey. He assures us that no subject of
the Turk will be molested on account of his redgioue
opinions, or punished on account of the abandonment of
ally faith which he shalt renounce. That establishes religi-
ous liberty in Turkey ; and that hattiesheriff, so important,
is referred to by name in the treaty which has been laid on
our table; it is the condition on which Tut key is admitted
within the pale of civilised :elurope; it will give to the Eu-
ropean Powers, if it be not observed, either collectively
or individually, a right of remonstrance ; and I do not
think, all circumstances considered, a better or more sa-
lutary arrangement could have been made. More than
that I believe there was error in the conduct of Lord
Stratford do Radcliffe in the earlier part of the transac-
tions with General Williams, but will the house recollect
in justice to Lord Stratford, what were the efforts
he made after the commencement of 1855? I believe he
was earnest and unremitting in his exertions to obtain for
General Williams every possible assistance from the Divan.
Well, sir, under ail these circumstances, considering his
ability, the length of his services, his conduct, his cha-
racter, I am disposed to say that the Horatian maxim
with regard to poetry is equally applicable to political
services—

" Vermin übi plum intent in carmine, non ego panels
" Offender macuds, quas nut incuria fudit,
"Ant humane parum cavil nature."
This accusation, I grant., more particularly applies to
Lord Aberdeen's Goveinfuent, because the offence was
committed i❑ the beginning of the year 1855 or at the close
of the year 1854. But if it be au oror tint Lord Stratford
was not recalled, had I remained is member of the Admi-
nistration I should have partaken of the councils of my
lleagues, and I should have resisted to the ut►uost the
e 11 of Lord Stratford. I come now to the second point,
which is the omission of sondin; aid to Kati in the sum-

mer of 1855. It is i urpossible to overlook the earnest de-
sire of the Turkish Government to send assistance to the
army beleaguered at Kars, and more Particul irly I Must
advert to the recommendation and conduct of Orner Pacha.
I think gentlemen who have read the minute of Omer
Pacha must .be of opinion that his abilities in council
hardly fall short of his distinguished merits in the field.
But, sir, I have already stated that both the Eogli,l and
French Governments, though they attached infinite im-
portance to the defence of Kars, as I think rightly, re-
4arded that operation as altoget her secondary to the capture
if Sebastopol. That was the primary object, and it would
have been fully and weakness to disregard the primary
object in the hope of promoting or even carrying a second.
Will the house bear in mind the precise time when
Omer Pacha made his recommendation? It was after
the 18th of June—a day ever memorable in the annals
of this country, and not tarnished, as I contend,
by the adverse circumstances of the 18th of June,
1855. Still that day in that year is remarkable for the
failure of a great military effort on the part both of the
French and English armies, and it cannot be matter of
surprise that after such an event the generals and admirals
raspensible for the safety of the united army should have
hesitated in weakening the forces immediately present at
that great military operation, the siege of Sebastopol. I
to not think it has been read, but it appears tome very
important that the letter of General Simpson with refer-
ence to the refusal of the wishes, stated to them by Omer
Pasha, to withdraws, portion of the forces then under their
.:ourbined command, should be brought to the recollection
of the house. This letter is dated the 16th July, about a
month after the assault on the Redan, and a considerable
time before the brilliant success which carried the Malak-
hoff and ended in the taking of Sebastopol. I will not
trouble the house by reading the whole, but allow me to
read a portion of this letter:—
"At a epidemic° which was assembled at the French
headquarters on Saturday the 14th, .at the request of Omer
Pasha, and at which he, General Pelissier, General La Mar-
mora, Vice-Admiral Sir E. Lyons, Vice-Admiral Bruat, Rear-
Admiral Stewart, and myself were present, his Highness set
forth his reasons and views on the subject in question ; he
also produced a very large sheet of paper, whin contained,
is he affirmed, the instructions of his Government ; but, on
being asked for a translation of which, lie said that it would
take a fortnight to make one. The arguments used by Omer
Pasha were those set forth in the correspondence, and failed
to produce any effect on the minds of the other members of
the Conference, who all, without exception, entertain the
strongest objection to the withdrawal of any troops from the
Crimea at this moment."

We have, therefore, the united opinion of all the admirals
~nd all the generals that not only from Bal. klava, but
from Kadikol, Kortch, and Eupatoria, under the circum-
stances which then existed, it was not expedient to with-
draw a single man. *Omer Pasha, being dissatisfied with
the decision, went to Constantinople to obtain a reversal
of it, and General Simpson writes to Lord Stratford—
"l earnestly, therefore, beg your Excellency to use your
powerful influence with the Porte to cause our opinion to
prevail over that of his Highness; for great pnblie interests
ere at stake, and serious consequences might result from his
success."

iarely, sir, in the face of that appeal we may well under-
stand how very unwilling the Governments at Paris and
at London must have been to reverse a decision, taken on
the spot by the most competent authorities, by orders di-
rectly opposed to ,what on the spot was thought necessary,
tot only for the honour and success, but absolutely for the
safety, of the forces there employed. (cheers.) It must
lot be concealed from the h use, and it has not been con-
cealed, as I think rightly, by the-responsible Ministers of
the Crown, that there was a great indisposition on the part
of the French Government to favour any operations else-
where until success at Sebastopol had been obtained. It
may be a matter of question whether that disinclination
was nut carried to excess ; still, in operations of such deli-
cacy and difficulty, it will be a bold measure if the House
,f Commons, after such a result, pass condemnation on the
Government, upon the exercise of discretion in very nice,
trying, and difficult circumstances. (Cheers.) Again, let
us see what the great master of the art of war ir, our time,
r•he Duke of Wellington, says. Genezal Cooke held a coin-
nand at Cadiz; the Duke was commanding on the banks
,f the Douro, and in one of his instructions ho said, " It
inexpedientto give peremptory orders from a distance.
I would not do it. I would not gladly, if they were given
to me, submit to them." I do not stand hare to say that
iiistakes have not been committed. Ido not believe that
gentlemen on the Treasury bench, considering the large
extent covered by thesetransactions, will bo prepared to
.ay that no errors have been committed. It is iuipo eible
that in such immense transactions some oversights shoula
eot occur. I say frankly, I think there was too much of
telegraphic communications and telegraphic orders.
(Cheers.) I agree with the hon. and learned member for
7sNuiskillen in disapproving that particular telegraphic
lespatch, which gave peremptory orders to abandon
Kars' and Erzeroum and fall back upon Trebizond ; and
if recommendations were to be conveyed by telegraph at
dl I should not have recommended any other recommenia-
ion to Gen. Simpson than to reineinner Kars. That was
.ot the instruction, but, perhaps, the end would have been
:leach happier had it been so. Still, lam bound to say
!_hat, whatever those instructions may have been, it was-
eutta open to the Government to yield to the •strong re-
presentations made by the commanders of the allied forces,
sad not allow any detschuam.;,s to be sent. I cannot fail,
eoweveri to express my sympathy with Gen. Williams
and my admiration of his conduct. It is heartreuding to
~wed some of these despatches. (Hear.) He says that he
~hought his army was left doomed to destruction, that ho
was absolutely forgotten, that his position was isolated anti
neglected ; and yet, while he felt the neglect, his manly
end noble spirit, nothing daunted, persevered in spite of
every disappointment. Hope even was dead within him,
yet did not that spirit so entirely fail that he was unwill
ing to meet the enemy to whom he was opposed with
only three of his countrymen try his side, and lead
a Turkish army, under circumstances of unexampled
difficulty to almost unexampled victory. (dear, and
,Cheers.) Theie may be many things to regret in toe war
now happily closed, but do not let us under such cir-
tiumstanc Acaase to be proud of the noble conduct of a
handfill of 'our countrymen on two occasions of almost
equal danger and difficulty. I look in vain to the annals
of modern warfare for a parallel to the defence of Silis-
tria or Kars—both in the main (owing to the courage, the
skill, the constancy, and the example of British officers)
leading to that triumphant success which, when we come
to confer with him who was our enemy, anti is now, I
hope, our friend—long may he continue to be so—l mean
the -Russian—will tell us that the defence of Silistria
Lid Kars rendered the English name, with which
they were associated, illustrious and ever memorable
iu the recollection of his countrymen. (Cheers.) I said
it was heartrending to think what Gen. Williams must
have endured. Here is a trifling instance. It is said the
honour of the second class of the Bath is conferred upon
him. He receives it with a faint smile, his spirits are
sunk, and that noble heat is almost broken. (Outsets.) I
may be wrong in expressing my opinion, but I do not think,
as yet, the gratitude of this country to that distinguished.
man has been sufficiently marked. The second class of the
Bath is a proud distinction, but I cannot think his services
are rightly measured by that distinction. The thanks of
Parliament, considering the failure, cannot, according to
precedent, be given, but, if nay noble friend will advise her
:Majesty, the fountain of all grace and favour to the mili-
tary profession, to confer some solid mark, in which we
may partake, in reward of the services of Gen. Williams,
I do not believe there is a man in this house who will not
hail it with satisfaction. (Loud cheers.) Now, sir, I shall
be asked, am I then prepared to say that no errors were
committed ? I have already shown that some errors were
committed • it will now be my duty to point out others.
I have read a despatch of the Duke of Newcastle, in which
it is suggested that medical aid might be afforded to the
army at Kars and that pecuniary assistance might be given.
And this brings me to the question of pecuniary assistance.
And here I confess I think that some blame is due to the
Government. (Opposition cheers.) It will be, perhaps,
contended, that I and some of my colleagues in -Lord Aber-
deen's Government who left office were opposed to the
Turkish loan. Sir, this is not the occasion to argue that
question over again. But before I left Lord Aberdeen's
Government, and ever since, I have been opposed to the
system of loans. I remember that injunctiou, which is
valuable to nations as to individuals :
" Neither a lender nor a borrower be,
For loan oft loses both itself and friend."

(Loud cheers.) I was opposed to the joint and several
liability for the Turkish loan. I objected to the mortgage
of Egypt. I retain that objection. I think that the sub-
ject of the loan may give rise to grave discussions between
France and England. (Hear.) But I never was opposed,
and I do not thinkthat any rational man would be opposed
to giving pecuniary assistance. (Cheers.) I differ from the
member for Aylesbury on some points, but I agree with
him in one poiat, and I do thick that a credit might have
been given to General Williams, either upon our Ambas-
sador at Coustautinoi:le or upon the Treasury in Englane
for a moderate :omouut, and that for a 8,4111 of 10,1,0J0/.
the army at Kars might have been supplied with all the
provisions-necessary. (Cheers.) I am also of opinion with
the lion and leaf ned gentleman (Mr. Whiteside) that if a
few hundred canary had been sent to Kars, they weuld,
as General Williams says in deacribing his brilliant vic-
tory, have enabled him to destroy the Russian army.
Again, I think tlint although General Williams had guns
in sufficient quanl.aty, yet that when he asked for afew
hundred artillerymen and cavalry they might have been
sent to him. I cannot but believe that in the early part
of the summer of 1855, without detaching any troops from
the Crimea, there m!,ght have been sent from Constanti-
nople to Erzeroum some assistance of this kind which
would have borne meet essential results. Here is another
point upon which I hiwe a strong opinion. I: it wore in-
exi,edient to weaken the force on the plateau in front of
Sebastopol, still there were no insuperable objections to
meeting the wishes of Omer Pasha and allowing him to
withdraw from that position the Turkish veterans he was
accustomed to comunaid, and supplying their place by the
Turkish Contingent. (Hear, hear.) It may be said that
the troops were not sufficiently disciplined, but the house
will pardon me if I again refer to the highest authority—
the Duke of Welling7t3n. He had experience in these
matters, Then in Portugal he had to use similar tr sops
constantly, when they were very imperfectly disciplined,
and he has put upon record in his own pithy manner a
dictum which the house w;11 allow me to read. It refers
to the effect of lone; training and discipline upon such
troops compared wii,h their being well paid, well fed, and
well cared for, and it shows that these attentions go far
in making troops efficient in the field. The Duke is writ-
ing of Spanish troops when under British officers. His
letter is dated :

" Lisaca, July 25, 1813.
,‘ The Spanish tY:oops do not want discipline, if by disci-
pline is meant instruction, so much as they do a system of
order, which can only be founded on regulaipay and food,•
and good care and clothing."
Now, the Turkish Contingent had these advantages for
some time, and my
own judgment would be that, at that
time, when the question of withdrawing the Turkish troops
from BalrklavE4 was mooted, their
place might have been
advantageously and sufficiently supplied by the Turkish
Contingent so officered. (Hear.) The Dukegoes on to say:—
" These BrL:,ish officers could not give them, and, notwith-
standing that the Portuguese are now the fighting cocks of
the army, I b, slieve we owe their merits more to the care we
have taken of their pockets and bellies than to the instruc-
tion we have ; iveu them."
Showing that, the opinion of the Duke of Wellington was
that instruct ion and long training with reference to the
efficiency of foreign armies are to a considerable exteiit
supplied by "British pay, feeding, and. care. The Turkish
Contingent laving had these advantages might, I think,
have been a ant up to Balsklava so as to have liberated the
troops of 0 mer Pasha. And, sir, there is no use in not
very frank, y stating my full opinion to the house, sine,:
they are so indulgent as to listen to me. (Hear.) I have
another ot tjectiou which is of a somewhat delicate charac-
ter. I an r bound to say that, with every desire to main-
tain the ..I!rench alliance in its full integrity and to run no
risk of a inisunder-itanding with that country, and feeling
bound to admit that the Emperor of that great nation hal
acted with constant fidelity—(cheers)—and with a degre,,
of good faith. and firmness that entitles him to the grati,

ude of this conntrY, Yet I cannot but think that too much.
wasp.onced, dto the prejudices which, I must say, were not
well founded on the part of our French allies. After Sebas•
topol had f dlen and after Kars had fallen there was the
Turkish Government displaying an earnest, natural, and
anxious desire to withdraw a portion of their army from
the Crimea, and to occupy Trebizond without delay after
the fall of Kars, in order to prevent the danger of the fur'
ther advance of the Russian army. As late as the 14th of
December, Lord Stratford writes to the Earl of Clarendon
to say :

" I learn from M. de Tbouvenel tbae permission bas at
length arrived from Paris for Marshal Pol. • 0 assent to
theoleparture of the Egyptian infantry toria for
Trebizond. lam informed, however,. Turkish
commander had declared his determination bark the
troops without waiting for any farther comm tion."
This bears incidentally upon a part of the case of the o°.
vernment. They have been blamed for adhering to the
view taken by General Willie ' himself, and preferring
the auxiliary troops from Turk to the division of Omer
Pacba. The local knowled, he hon. member for
Aylesbury has male this peifec telligitile 'and he Ilse
Willis
shown thet in the early part of the summer the road from
Trebizoud to Maoism was more-direct in a military Point
of view, and more suitable except for artillery. But After
Sebastopol had fallen, the question was whether a portion
of the army ought not to evacuate the Crimea and go to
Trehizond. Hear what Sir W. Codrington, our COW..
mander-in-Chief, says with reference to this subject'
Writing on the 10th December, he says :
" I wrote to Marshal Pelissier in the general Wee
eee
your letter, expressing to him the great object it So°7
to be to get the Turkien troops to Trebizoud, and Lila";
if done at ell, it should be done at once, and offering In'
assistance, if I could, by communications with our Davi,'
farther this object. His answer was, that he could n___°:
consent to their leaving Eupatnria without the eXPre'"
sanction of the Emperor of the French." '
(Hear, hear.) That is to say, that the opinion formed by
the general commanding-iu-chief, backed by the wanes"
desire of the Turkish Government, was dependent on
the will of the Emperor at Paris, communicated by tele'
graph. This is delicstegrounds (cheers)—but I speak Wit be
every desire to show the utmost deference to theEnsperor 0
the French. Lord Stratford wrote to say - " The Turks are
. sadly mortified by the embargo which appeare to ha/
been laid on the Egyptian troops at Eupatoria." Thai
feeling of soreness and disappointment was both nature
and well-founded. (Cheers.) But I may be asked--
" Why, if you find these faults, do you not vote for °sole
motion of the hon. and learned member for Enniskillen' A
(Opposition cheers.) That is a fair question, and I ''
proceed to answer it. I will first take the amendment of
my bon. friend the member for Dorsetebire (Mr. K. S,eY',
mer). If the previous question hail been moved 01,:e."
early stage of the discussion, I do not know whether, vi"-
the view I take, I should not have voted for it. But sine.
the discussion has been opened, I cannot regard the
amendment of my bon. friend exactly- in the light of
motion for the previous question ; although it is a reseal'
able amendment, asking, not that no verdict shall be Pre.
nonneed, but that thre shall be delay in pronouncing :
verdict ; and he asks for delay upon the assumption tit
we are ignorant of the terms of peace, and that we ong
to be made acquainted with them, and to consider the
before we pronounce our verdict. With respect to teat
original motion, I cannot regard the question which Ii
raises as an abstract question ; even if I did so regard it, I
could not bring-myself—it may be from prejudice, it leeen
be from kindly feelings towards old friends—to sag. as t
abstract proposition, that I think Lord Clarendon deficient
in foresight or Lord Palmerston deficient in enerree
(Cheers.) But thie is not an abstract question ;it Tens.
Y.
regarded with reference both to circumstances and to tin',
Now, with regard to circumstances, there was great trl
tie,
and justice in the opinion pronounced by an it-0114%he
and intelligent spectator, General Mansfield, tbat„"ee
cause of the fall of Kars is quite obvious. He says Le
it was necessary, until Sebastopol had been taken, t° 'This
concentrating in front of Sebastopol every English, evee t
French, every Sardinian, every Turkish soldier, that
could be obtained; that the campaigns in. the Cerll.,
and on the Asiatic frontier, including Kars, must ue,iee
garded as a whole; that the centre and key of the enwere.
operation was Sebastopol, to which Kars, however iule t
tent, was but second-o-y ; and that the result was nott:d
all surprising we succeeded at the point where our n 0 its
energies are concentrated, and we failed at the esetron' g•ii
to which we could not direct any assi,tance. - G° that
-Mansfield adds that he had predicted the result; but' :4. to
the gallant feat of arms by which Kars was enableene
hold out prevented the advance of the Russian aroYi ne-et
yard further than Kars, and that if Sebostopol bar'-cle-
f:Olen we should, this spring, in consequence of the the
with
0,
fence of Kars, have opened the campaign in A.sis
brightest prospects. Then, in considering this. nr:leste
time is not to be disregarded. • I do not wish to autecerfers
the discussion upon the articles of peaee, but I eann°"aey,
get that peace is ratified, that it was proclaimed yesterhese
that we are cognisent of its terms. and, looking at t ob.
terms, I must say that, in my humble judgment, all fullyth?
jects, the principal objects of the war, have been
e
achieved, and that the peace is honourable to the eountr;
(Cheers.) Without wasting the time of the house by ern
teeing at any length into this subject, I must- give the The
a short summary of the terms we have obtained. g the
Principalities—the occupation of which by Russia we reep
pretext, the cause of the war—are rescued from the gbie;
of Russia. and to them is added the half of Beeearad to
the fort of Ismail, -long occupied by Russia, is restoret, ii
the Principalities ; the free navigation of the D3Snbo is
guaranteed by Europe ; the commerce of the Eullee is
opened to the world ; the Basilan fleet in the Erine„
annihilated, no military arsenals on the coast of the -7•30",,,,
iue, no military fortress on its Eastern shore Itietpe
to
been destroyed, are to be rebuilt, the standing
Sweden, Burnam:lnd and the Aland. Isles, is not again 7
be fortified ; the standing menace to Turkey, Sebastopol'
is in ruins; Kara is restored to the Turks without an
equivalent, progress of Russian aggrandisement is 91.
.
rested, the independence and integrity of Turkey 51."
sesured under the guarantee and panoply of EuroPe•
(Cheers.) These are the leading conditions of peace;
I have, without partiality, selpsured wherever I
thought censure was duo ; but I MK it, would be on'
generous to the Administration which has conducted the
war to a conclusion, upon such a day as this, under divan..
stances such as I have feebly described, to declare that it
altogether unworthy of the confidence of the country an y
hes failed in foresight and energy. For these resioni '
shall neither vote for the amendment nor for the neoti°e
Mr. DISRAELI said—The right hen. gentleman the
member for Carlisle has this night tempered justice seitil.
mercy. (Laughter.) He has spoken against the ginlhee
ters, and he intends to vote for them. (Laughter.) The
right hon. gentleman seems to have put with considerable ,
force and Parliamentary experience the main points that
tall against the Ministers; but, remembering that the;
then
wire once his colt:segues and still his friends he says
h i will resist the irresistible inference that on this oeeelie°6
they are to blame. They are, in the opinion of the right
hen. gentleman, sinners to be condemned, but that, eees....
strectelly, conshlere I, they are innocent. (Laughter.) ".-
have just terminated a great war, and just concluded a;
important peace, and during that space of time an °ger:
has occurred which, in the view of many persons, has e-:
orcieed an influence on public affairs, and has been at
tended with circumstances which enlist the deepest °ni
pathy of the people of this country. There has been aX;tB;
.-,
valent belief that men distinguished by all those enalre-
and virtues which Englishmen are prone to admire ha"
been deserted by the Government ; and now, after a for.
bearance not more than due to the state of the counter and
,
to the embarrassing duties of the Administration—afterid
forbearance which reflects credit on this house, WO are to
.
because the attention of Parliament is called to the se elf•
cumstances, and because we presume in the House of CO!'
mons to discuss this question ofenational and universal Of
terest, which fir a long period has touched the hearts,. of
the whole country, that we are taking a part which Or.
tion only could have inspired, and the most sal
t.
fish and sor lid sentiments only could have prowl
~,,
d. (Hear, hear.) Before the main business of tu
night commenced an hon. member rises—a member for a
Scotch burgh, the member for Greenock, and he says that
this debate is only continued for the sake of a few speeches'
and that it is -entirely a factious movement. Is that the
;,,ide
this
country of the people of England ? Is there a man '` ci.- re
country who does not feel that the siege and fall of "a"
ought, and deserves to be, the subject of Parliamentary dig'
cession. (Cheers.) It is not only that one Scotch mew-
her
who presumes to give this opinion on the conduct of the
House of Commons. The house still echoes with the Pia°.
Live oration of the member for Ayr ; and what is the can°
why he addressed such language as he did to gentlemen °9
this (the Opposition) side of the house ? What is hes Vies"
ante ? His reason against the continuance of this debate le'
that he will thereby be prevented from introducing a hill'
And what is the history of that bill ? Some fortnight elfo
another golden opportunity was lost by that hon. and learned
gentleman. He came down to the house to expound his
legislative opinions, but unfortunately there was no house,
(Hear, and a laugh.) Really I do not think that there is an/
great grievance on the part of the hon. member. He has had
his chance, and a member having a bill to introduce and n°,
"
making a house is not a member who ought to complain e(
an adjournment of the debate. But there is a third reerebe.f
for Scotland, who represents the capital of that great cowl•
try, the successor, and, I believe, the successful rival, of one
of the greatest ornaments of British literature, and fornserlY
one of the gfeatest ornaments of this house—l mean the lion'
member for Edinbu gh. He declares all this discussion to
be vain and worthless, and says it is only an assault on the
Treasury bench. Does ho mean to say_ that the°
is in the city of Edinburgh, which, by some strati/1
anomaly, he represents—(a laugh) -such a total Want
of sympathy with all. that has happened at Kobe'
with those strange and romantic incidents which will he
remembered when the war is forgotten, and - when Oil
treaty of peace is a dusty document—does he mean to oaf
that there is in that city such an.extraordinary absence of
sympathy with the gallant Williams, and all those herds
achievements which form the subjeet of discussion this night i
(Hear, hear.) Does he represent faithfully the feelings of hie
constituents when he says that any discussion on this subject
is vain, futile, and selfish ? I have a higher opinion of the
educated, intelligent, and accomplished inhabitants of modern
Athens. (Hear, and laughter,) , I do not believe that the
hon. meelber on this point faithfully represents his constite•
ents, for I am sure the subject of our discussion must Wit°
among them the deepest interest. (Hear) But unfit-tie"
nately, it is not only of such small deer as these vituperetiT„
e
members of the sister kingdom (a laugh) that wo bave
_ee
complain to-night. ' A Cabinet Minister, whose speech, I ar.,
bound to say (as he spoke of contrast), was most favourewe
Cater!!
contrasted with the speech of another member of the
in this debate, because he did justice to the subject heleeeq•
us, and because he least admitted its importance, describe
this inotien as an attempt to upset the Ministry.'
should not have touched on that point. I think it beeene
the
the House of Commons to have some more clear idea of
it
has position of an Opposition in this country, and of the clutieosule.
has to fulfill, than appears to be prevalent among some °the
gentlemen, and even among right hon. gentlemen
"duty
Ministerial bench. I confess it appears to me that th
they
of an Opposition is to vindicate its principles,
when'theut
I Wilk I:
deem it necessary and convenient, and to assert them sel 0
the slightest reference to what may be the consequence ofea.
division. I think, in the second place, that it is the. Pee'r...
mount and peremptory duty of an Opposition to offer its
ticisms ou public affairs, when they th,iik that the conduct.e°2
the Ministry demands observation, without the slightest_ r
as
_
ferencc to the consequences of a division. If the duty of a
Opposition is only to be tested by the success which upsets
ositioA
Ministry, it is very easy to see that the sphere of opr

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