The Sun.
London, England, 1860-08-21 00:00:00

street by street, and house by house, they never would I
have consented to leave Woolwich in such a defenceless
condition. He thought that the defence of Woolwich would
materially affect the fortune of that battle which it was
expected would be fought ix advance of London. The
general who commanded the troops would consider that,
under all the circumstances, it was not on the whole a
favourable occasion to attack the enemy, and his proposition
might be to retire, if he could retire, to a better position, but
he would be left to retire on a very much worse position.
Woolwich being undefended, no position could possibly bo
more than 15 miles round London. The attempt of the
enemy would not be on London, but on Woolwich, because
Woolwich being destroyed, those arms would be struck out
of our hands with which we might have had the power of
defending London. Woolwich was essential for the defence
of London. We might regret that it was where it was, but
since it was there we ought to make all the
.advan-
tage of it we could, and it was absolutely neces-
sary that it should be placed within an entrenched
camp, so that those defending London might derive the
advantage of the materiels of war only to be found at
Woolwich. Some people said that it was impossible to for-
tiff London, but they forgot that in point of fact a great
city \vas a great fortress in itself, and that, if defended by
barricades, with bold men behind them, with plenty of arms,
ammunition, and guns, no prudent general would be very
willing to attack them. He would know that if he entered
with troops those barricaded streets he would run the
greatest risk of being defeated : but if he hesitated before a
city, what would be his hesitation if, on his right hand at a
distance of six or seven mike, there was a great entrenched
camp protecting a great arsenal—a sort of Sebastopol, com-
municating by covered railways, on both banks of the
Thames, with the city to be defended, open in all directions
to the country, so as to be capable of receiving all the rein-
forceraents that could be sent ; if we were in possession of
Woolwich, so fortified, the defence of London would be so
easy that no enemy would attempt to interfere with it. Wool-
wich should be made the citadel of London. As he said be-
fore, he might regret its situation, but still it was our duty
to make it the citadel of London, instead of throwing into
the hands of an enemy the immense material of war which
it contained. There was the very important statement of
Lord Overstone in the report of the commission, which
showed by no means too strongly the dangers which would
result from the occupation of London by an enemy. He
entirely agreed with all his lordship there stated on the sub-
ject. Lord Overstone was desired to give his opinion on the
supposition that private property was to be respected. What
would have been his opinion on the rational supposition that
private property would not be respected ? Depend upon it
if London should ever be in the possession of an enemy the
sack of London would stand in history by the side of the
sack of Rome by the Constable of Bourbon, and would
equal it in all its horrors and atrocities. It was to pre-
vent these that he ventured to suggest to the Government
that they should take the means which were in their hands
for the purpose of rendering the fortifications of London
secure, and of rendering it impossible for an enemy to
effect their purpose. If we were to fall, in the event of an
invasion, let us at least fall with arms in our hands and
with honour; and, at least, let the people of London. do as
much as the people of Palermo in resisting regular troops.
One word as to the number of the regular army. There
could be no doubt that this country derived enormous ad-
vantage from what was called our volunteer movement.
He trusted it would prosper and succeed, and that we
should not only have a greater number of men, but that
they would increase in skill. It was impossible to speak
too highly of the movement, or of the persons who carried
it forward—(cheers)—or of its immense importance to this
country. (Hear, hear.) It was by far the greatest, by far
the most valuable event which he could recollect since the
battle of Waterloo. It really did give strength and consi-
deration to this country; but it was contrary to reason to
expect that these men, brave as they were, and skilled as
they would be, could act in an open plain as regular troops
against a well disciplined army. They would act admirably
from hedges and in woods ; and as light troops in defence of
houses and villages, they would be of immense importance
to a general ; but, after all, it must be on a regular army, on
' the number of that army and its strength, that ultimately
the fate of this country would depend in the event of that
terrible misfortune occurring—the misfortune of invasion.
He could not, therefore, but express his deep regret that
our regular army was not much larger. If we would act
on the principle of concentrating our forces for a great blow
—if we would not act on the old system of endeavouring to
defend everything, which must; prove utterly futile ; if we
would use against the third Napoleon the principles we
might learn from the writings of the first Napoleon, there
would be no cause for fear, if we only put in the hands of an
able general an adequate force. We had not that force ; but if
we were to reduce unnecessary expenditure, the Govern-
ment might have sufficient means to secure the safety of the
country. For more than security he did not ask. No man
in the world had less idea than himself of placing a military
force in the hands of the Government for offensive operations.
He desired nothing but entire security for the country
against invasion. He said so, not only desiring to avoid the
dreadful horrors of invasion, including the destruction of
credit and the ruin of trade, but because he was quite sure
that if an enemy's army were three weeks in this country it
would be in vain for us, no matter how the retirement of
that army might be effected or obtained—it would be ire.
possible for us practically to re 'establish the constitution
under which we lived. He felt perfectly satisfied that the
whole people, indignant with the Government, and indig-
nant at the form of government, to which they would at-
tribute their misfortunes, would insist upon vast alterations
whether in a revolutionary sense or in a republican sense,
or (which was equally probable) in the direction of the
Crown, and giving greater authority to the Executive, he
would not say; but in whatever direction they went, those
alterations would be equally fatal to civil liberty and destruc-
tive of the free institutions which had made us what we
were. (Cheers.)
Earl DE GREY and RIPON said there were one or two
points of the noble earl's speech upon which he felt it his
duty to make a few observations. The chief point was the
omission of Woolwich from the scheme of fortifications
which the Government had presented to the house on the
recommendation of the commissioners. It should be borne
in mind that the recommendations of the commissioners,
which were confined to the erection of a fort on Shooter's •
hill, were far from fulfilling the large and extensive scheme
for the defence of London which the noble earl sketched
out. The commissioners simply proposed that there should
be a redoubt, which, although giving some shelter, would
be far indeed from affording a complete defence of that ar-
senal, which lay in a most exposed position, commanded on
every side, and a complete defence of which would require
very different measures. The Government had the autho-
rity of Sir J. Burgoyne and Sir H. Douglas for the course
they had taken in not at present adopting the recommenda-
tion of the commissioners in regard to the erection of that
particular fortress. They were of opinion that it would
not afford so great a defence of Woolwich as would justify
the necessary expenditure it would require, and that if it
stood alone it would be of comparatively little value in de-
fending the city of London. Sir John Burgoyne had ex-
pressed a very decided opinion that for the defence of Lon-
don we must look to operations at a distance, and to opera-
tions in the field, which must take place long before the
enemy could approach the neighbourhood of London. The
scheme of the noble earl was one of the greatest magnitude,
involving very large expenditure, and unquestionably of the
greatest difficulty—defending this vast city street by
street, and house by house. He (Earl de Grey and Ripon)
would misrepresent the views of the Government if he were
not to say that this subject was one which had occupied,
and must continue to occupy their most serious attention,
but it was not included within the scope of the present bill,
which did not deal with fortifications for the defence of
London. For that defence we must look, in the first instance,
to our naval resources, which constituted our first line of
defence; next, to our army and volunteers; and then to
hose subsequent operations which would be resorted to, be

fore it was possible for the enemy to force their way to Lon-
don. The noble earl had alluded to the smallness of the force
at home, which we would be enabled to bring into the field.
He entirely agreed with the noble lord that we must look very
much to our regular troops in such a time of danger as was
contemplated. But our means of defence had been greatly
improved by the creation of that noble volunteer army
which Vad sprung up in the country, through the devotion
of the people, within the last few months. (Hear, hear.)
This fact would be of great importance in maintaining
peace, by the manifestation which it gave of the determina-
tion of the people of this country, He also believed that in
the hour of peril these volunteers would be of the greatest
possible service in defending fortresses and operating on the
flanks of the enemy; and some battalions, no doubt, might
take part in the operations of the field. It was a question for
the consideration of Parliament whether they would
increase the public burdens by a much larger regular
army. The force in the country at the present moment
was much larger than it had been at almost any previous
period of our history of late years. It had undergone no
diminution during the last few months, but stood now at a
higher point than in the spring of 1859. Whether that

force was sufficient or not to meet the emergency contem.

plated by the noble earl, in the judgment of the Govern

ment it was sufficient to fulfil the exigencies of the mo

nient. This bill would enable the Government to utilise

the force which it possessed. Ihe object of these measures

was purely defensive; they were aimed against no country;
they had reference to no Government ; but were founded

simply on the great changes that had taken place lately in

all directions in the aspect of affairs in Europe. They
threatened no nation ; and they were not to be regarded

as warlike measures, but as measures best adapted to secure
the preservation of the peace of Europe. (Hear.)

The
.Earl of ELLENBOROUGH said that when he
suggested the importance of making Woolwich impregnable,
he had clone it on very high authority, that of Napoleon I,
—not of course with reference to Woolwich, but to Naples.
He recommended the Government to read those letters in
which Napoleon gave advice to his brother Joseph as to
the defence of Naples ; and that was the manner in which

he advised the Government to defend London.
The bill was then read a second time.
CUSTOMS (No. 2) BILL.
This bill was read a second time.
- STAMP DUTIES (No. 2) BILL.
This bill was read a second time.
The following bills were read a third time and passed
attreshrent Houses and Wine Licenses (Ireland) pit;