The Sun.
London, England, 1860-07-24 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING, JULY 24, 1860.

pointed a commission to inquire into the present state of

those most important points to which I have referred. The

result of the commission is a report which is upon the table

of the house. The recommendations of the commissioners,

which have been confirmed after revision by a committee of
military officers, called the Defence Comeritece, amount to
a recommendation of a total outlay of £11,000,000, in which
is included £1,500,000 for armaments and floating defences.
I hold that it is absolutely necessary for the safety of the
country that these recommendations should substantially be
carried out. (Hear.) Now, there are two modes of doing this.
You may either vote annually such a portion of the annual
income as the country would like to spend on a matter of
this kind, and by so doing defer, perhaps for 18 or 20 years
the accomplishment of these defences ; or you may take
that course which it will be my duty to recommend, and en-
deavour to complete them at the earliest possible period—
(hear, hear)—without at the same time laying upon the
country for a considerable period of years a larger annual
burden than would be incurred if you prosecuted these
works more slowly. I mean yon may, by raising by termin-
able annuities to run for thirty years a sum that would be
sufficient in the course of three or four years to complete
these works—you may get immediately, or within a short
period, the security you require ; you will not lay upon the
country a much heavier burden than that which would be
incurred if you were to wait until the slow process of an-
nual votes brought these works to a conclusion. (Hear.)
My opinion is that if these works are necessary, and I think
common sense shows you they are necessary—(hear, hear)
—if they are necessary, they are necessary as soon as we
can get them. (Hear, hear.) They are necessary for time
present—(hear, hear)—and it would be folly to postpone for
eighteen or twenty years the completion of defences against
dangers which I hope may not arise, but dangers which we
may contemplate as possible, and. which, if possible, may be
possible in the course of a comparatively short space of
time. (Hear.) Now, that is a course which I know is to a
certain degree a departure from ordinary usage; it is con-
trary to principle to raise money by loans for the annual ex-
penditure of the country. To do so for the purpose of de-
fraying the ordinary expenses of the year would be as spend-
thrift a proceeding as for an individual to borrow money
every year to pay his household expenses. We know what
would be the fate of an individual, and the country which
did so would no doubt be brought into great embarrassment.
But, by recent legislation, Parliament has empowered and
encouraged individuals to raise money by loans, either from
the Exchequer-bill Commissioners or from private com-
panies, for the purpose of effecting permanent improvements
upon their landed property, and spreading the repayment
over a considerable period. Now, what is sound policy, re-
cognised by Parliament, in the case of individuals cannot be
unwise or inexpedient a 9 regards the greater and more im-
portant interests of the nation. By raising money by termin-
able annuities we could prevent that loan from becoming a
permanent addition to the debt of the country. I think
that ought to be avoided in all cases where it is possible, and
in the present case I am convinced it is possible. Now, as
to the necessity of these works, I think it is impossible for
any man to cast his eyes over Europe and to see what is
passing there without being convinced that the future is not
free from danger. It is difficult to say where the storm may
burst, but the horizon is charged with clouds which betoken
the possibility of a tempest. (Hear, hear.) The house, of
course, knows that in the main I am speaking of our imme-
diate neighbour across the Channel, and there is no use dis-
guising it. (Hear.) It is in no unfriendly spirit that I am
speaking. No one has any right to take offence at conside-
rations and reflections which are purely founded upon the
principle of self-defence. (Hear, hear.) We have, it is true,
recently concluded a commercial arrangement with France.
(A. laugh.) These are not matters to be treated with levity.
(Hear, hear.) These are not arrangements without great
value—(hoar, hear)—for it is well known from experience
that nations which have with each other great commercial
intercourse—nations between which great mutual interests
are involved in the maintenance of peace—are less likely to
fall out and become antagonists than nations between which
those ties are not cemented. (Hear, hear.) But at the same
time these things are not brought aFout at once. A great
nation which has not hitherto been much addicted to com-
merce, whose mind, whose feelings, and whose glories have
chiefly been in relation to warlike operations—such a na-
tion carnet be expected on a sudden to be entirely free from
its former habits, and at once to comprehend all the benefits
and advantages that would arise from peaceful and com-
mercial relations. I hope much f-om this treaty, but that
treaty alone would be a f •ail security to a great nation like
this, with extensive interests, with great wealth, and whose
shores are more open to attack than the land frontiers of
any country—(hear, hear)—because, whereas upon a land
frontier the points of attack can be pretty well guessed,
and can be guarded, a country whose frontiers are the
sea is open to attack at any point to which an enemy
able to command the sea may choose to direct his
opposing force. Therefore I say it would be folly to
rely upon the future effects of the commercial treaty
when we know that we have vulnerable points which re-
quire artificial defences,and that we have the means of pro •
valing those artificial defences. (Hear, hear.) 13 there
nothing in the state of Europe that leads us to think that
we might by the course of events be called upon to defend
ourselves against hostile attack ? We see i a France an army
of 600 and odd thousand men, of whom 400 and odd thou-
sand are actually under arms, and the remainder are merely
on furlough, and can be called into the ranks in a fortnight.
That army is greater than France requires for the purposes
of defence. (Hear, hear.) No nation in the world would
think, unprovoked, of attacking France. Nothing could
bo gains- I by it ; no one could expect to dismember France,
and no one would fare otherwise than ill who ventured upon
an unprovoked attack upon France; and therefore for the
defence of France we may pronounce that vast army un-
necessary. I do not mean to say that that army is raised
for the deliberate purpose of aggression. I I, ast it is not,
but the possession of power to agg,re 35 r ecittently gives the
desire to do so. Olean hear.) You cannot, you are not
entitled to rely upon the forbearance of a stronger neigh-
bour. You are Found to make your defensive mee^ R pro-
portionate to his mear R of aggression. (Hear, hear.) But
is it only on land that the in fangements of Franca are dis-
proportionate to her necessities for defence? We know that
the utmost exet.ions have been male, end 'll are making,
to create a navy—(heer, hear)—ve near equal to our own
—a navy which cannot be required for pupas- a of defence of
France, and which, therefere, we are justified in looking. upon
as a possible antagonist we may have to encounter—a navy
which would give to our neighbou's the means of trans-
porting within a few hours a le-ge and formidable number
of troops to our coast. (Hear, hear.) While, on the one
hand, the French navy has increased far beyond any
amount that it ha 3 reached since the end of the last war,
our navy has, on the other, from the charge that has taken
place from sailing, ships to socam, necess irly diminished
in numbers. (Hear, hear.) Wo had at one time, as I
have stated, 84 sag of the line, all ve -eels ; but
they have been necessarily greatly reduced. The right hon.
baronet opposite (Sir J. Pal ington), when he was at the
head of the Admiralty, did good service proceeding to
sabs'itute steam line-of-battle ships for sa°irg line-of-
battle ships. I trust we are going on in the same course,
and that in a short time eve shall establish our nae y on such
a footing of superiority to that of any n.',,hbor ig Power
as is absolutely necessav for our existence as a nation.
(Hear, hear.) I say, however, that in the present state of
things we have no tight to rely for or • security on the
mere forbearance of a rival Power. (lIee••, hear.) Our
interests are spread over the who's surfs ^3 of the globe.
Agents in every quarter are at all times liable, through an
excess of reel or a mistaken sense of duty, to le 1 the na-
tions they represent into clifficoy 'oe ; and no one cen in-
swer from 'day to day that something may not happen in
some part of the world that will lead to disagreeable com-
munications between different Poweia. (Hear, hear.)
With the utmost desire that these maters may be nicably
adjusted, yet, if one country is obviously greatly the strong-
est and another country greatly the weakest, it is very dif-
ficult for any arrangement to be m"de. (Hear, hear.) The
stronger Power naturally exacts conditions which the
weaker may not be disposed to grant, end though in the
case of an arbitrary monarchy and despotic Government
things might be easly arranged, yet where the Power con-
sists of a high-spirited and patriotic nation with r-e 3 insti-
tutions and with the popular feeling manifested on every
public event, you may be quite sure that the bulk of the
nation, who are not responsible for consequences, and who
do not know very often the difficulties and dangers that a
certain course might produce, would revolt against the con-
cessions made by the Government ; and if they were told
that those concessions were rendered nec ,ss y, by the ab-
sence of the means of defence, or by the neglect of former
Governments to provide for the security of the country,
they might be tempted to vent their indiaaation against
those in power, and lay the scAs c? fute -o disser -ions.
(Hear, hear.) Thus, for the sake of pear e, it is desirable
that we should not live upon forbearance, but that
we should be able fu'ly and effectually tcr defend ourselves.
(Hear, hear.) When that is the case no foreign country will,
without ample reason and provocation—which I trust we
never shall gave —disturb the state of pearefel relations that
may exist. (Hear, hear.) What are the dangers to which we
are exposed ? They are of two kinds —I speak now orly of
the United Kingdom, and say nothing of the colonies on
our various foreign possessions. The danger to which we
ahould be exposed would be that of invasion, for one or two,
Octi:ituay say three purposes—either with the hops of con-
lieibles ti which I think no country would imagine to be pes-
eta there iev h
e—(llLear)—or newt, to get possession cf the metropolis,
Y heavy
contributions, and by overbearing the
spirit and. hopes of the country dictate in the capital terms
of peace
that
vantageous would
be ignominious to the country and ad-
as I tbiuk mto
uc the eminvader. (Hear, hear.) The third, and
probable attempt, would be by a sud-
den attack—by wore
and
were too strong to take
laud, or by land if the sea de-
fencesarsenals, the cradles of °take
possession cf.— en our naval
our
anttt\ife, which is our national
strength, and by destroying
lay us open afterwards to otherermeeoat
souurresnaotf- alaggressionaggressforces,
o
which they might be enabled to carry
ryout. (Hear, hear.)
I dismiss from my mind the idea thatwould dream of conquering this country anyforeign
with t Power
viewe
permanent possession, as I do not believe it would
enter the
mind of any one. (Hear, hear.) No doubt London might
be open to invasion, but London is too vast a space to be sur-
rounded by fortifications. (Hear.) You cannot fortify ton_
don as you can Paris. London must be defended in the
field. (Hear, hear.) There are strong natural positions
between the coast and „London, which, skilfully taken ad-

vantage of, might enable even a small force to repel a
larger force, and successielly drive back an invasion.
(Hear, hear.) And there is this to be said, that what-
ever amount of force an enemy might land on our shores,
so long as we retain our naval power, that force must ulti-
mately be lost, because its communications would be cut
off, its supplies rendered impossible, and, sooner or
later, it would be compelled to surrender. (Hear, hear.)
It might do great mischief ; it might cause extensive de-
struction of life and property, and entail great misery on
the country, but the ultimate success of such an operation
would not, I apprehend, enter the mind of any military
man or be regarded as one likely to be attended with per-
manent advantage to an enemy, except in so far as it might
inflict injury on this country. (Hear.) The operation
which I apprehend is most likely to be attempted is that of
landing a considerable force for the purpose of destroying
our dockyards. (Hear.) If your do ckyards are destroyed,
your navy is cut up by the roots. If any naval action were
to take place, your enemy, whatever the success of it might
be, would have his dockyards and arsenals to refit and re-
plenish and reconstruct his navy ; while, with your dock-
yards burned and your sores dispersed, you would have no
means of refitting your navy. (Hear.) If ever we lose the
command of the sea, what becomes of this country? (Hear,
hear.) Only let hon. gentlemen consider how dependent
we are for everything that constitutes national wealth—ay,
and a large portion of national food, on free communication
by sea. We import about 10,000,000 qrs. of corn annually,
besides enormous quantities of coffee, sugar, tea, and cot-
ton, whiCh is next to corn for the support of the people, by
enabling them to earn their food. (Hear.) Oar wealth
depends on the exportation of the products of our industry,
which we exchange for those things that are necessary for
our social position. Our exports amount to considerably
more than 100 millions in value annually. (Hear, hear.)
Picture to yourselves for a moment such places as Liver-
pobi, Bristol, London, and the Thames blockaded by a hos-
tile force. (Hear.) What would become of the industry
and wealth of the country in such a case ? The effect of
the landing of any number of troops upon our shores it is
impossible to contemplate without fear and alarm, nay,
without horror, and such a result is one which no gentle-
man ought to regard as possible. (Hear, hear.) Some
gentlemen think that we keep up excessive peace establish-
ments in regard to troops, but at least we ought to be pre-
pared to resist whatever force can be brought against us.
(Hear.) If London were in danger, what you would want
would be to fight a battle, or two battles, or three, if you
please—the first, I hope, would be sufficient—(hear)—with
the greatest amount of military force you could bring
against the force that attacked you. But your army being
limited, and your military means limited, and your dock-
yards being points that require defence, the way to get the
largest possible force to meet an enemy in the field is to
make arrangements for requirieg the least amount of mili-
tary force to defend your dockyards and arsenals. (Hear.)
It is obvious that if large forces are required to defend your
dockyards, you cannot concentrate for the defence of Lon-
don that amount of force which would be necessary to meet
an invading army. Therefore, it is demonstrable that forti-
fications for your dockyards—the effect of which will be to
equalise by artificial means, for purposes of resistance, the
smaller force within and the larger force without thesefor-
tifications—will be, in fact, means for the defence of Lon-
don, because they will set free a large amount of force for
the defence of the capital by operations in the field. (Hear.)
There are those who say why should you confine your de-
fences to such places as Portsmouth, Plymouth, Devonport,
Pembroke, and the like, and leave London undefended ?
Where are your fortifications for London? they say. My
answer to them is that bastiers and works are not a defence
for a great, vast city like London, surrounded as it is by
districts as large and as thickly populated as any of the
villages in the interior. Really the only defence for Lon-
don is au army in the field, and any means which enable
you to make that army as large as ycur military establish-
ments will allow are directly subservient to the defence of
the capital itself. (Hear.) Then we are told that we ought
not to confine our arrangements to our dockyards, and other
such points—that there are other points of great import-
ance—Liverpool, for instance, a port of great wealth and,
importance; Bristol, Newcastle, and other points. My
answer to thwee who make this objection is that we have
not neglected these outports, but that the defence of these
great e•,mmercial towns need not I,e of the same k ind and
character as those required for your dockyards. These
towns partake in a great degree of the nature of London.
They contain vast populations, for whose supply it would
bo difficult to provide if they were surrounded by walled
enclosures covering a vast space of ground, with sabre-hi
extending far beyond them ; and fortifications, unless they
stand on a spar) entirely free from housu, world be
of no use. To defend those towns, therefore, by
land against a force once lands I world be as difficult as to
pros :de a similar defence for London. These towns are not
likely to be attacked by an army lanaed for the purpose of
occapyir g them. What Government at all skilled in mili-
tary operations would thick of sending a large force to
attack Liverpool, even with the certainty of success? Liver
poel taken no doubt, would create a great deal of loss and
injury to the district which surrounds it, but Liverpool
taken would not have the same effect on the political exist-
ence of the country as Londen taken. (Hear, hear.) It is
clear, therefore, that the enemy who wanted to strike a blow
weed go at, once to the heart of the country. (Hear, hear.)
He world go to London, he IT ey'd net waste his time and
throw away his resources by an attack of that sort merely
on experiment. (11, r.) We have taken measures—my
right hon. ft:end the Sr et etre y for 'War is now pursuing
them—to protect not merely Liverpool and Bristol, but
several other commercial ports, from the only kind of attack
to which they were liable—the attack of smell aqua irons
for the purposes of mischief and lee yin's contributions,
without any large force being Fielded. That protect ion can
be given by batteries, either I ermanent or in the nature of
earthworks, for which means can be provided i r a different
manner from that to which we resort in this case. 'We have
therefore thought it right to follow the recommendations of
the Military Commissioners, and confine these defensive
works to the points which they have indicated. There are
many gentlemen who think that the sam estimated by these
commissioners is ex essive for the pr-To-e. (Hear.) We
can orly judge of these things by comparison, and if we find
that other countries have spent sums corresponding in
amount for similar purposes, wanting them perhaps not so
urgently as we do, it may be thought that the demand now
present-d is not out of proportion tr the object to be at-
tained. I have inquired what other countries have done
in this respect, and I w 11 give the house the result. In the
first place, howeser, I should say that that portion of the
estimate of the comn'eslonere which applies to what they
call armaments and floating defer ^es—viz., to gaps ar d
floating batteries —is an expenditure which we shirk
should properly come out of the arnuel expenditure.
In the course of the fore years it is to be expected that,
in the ordinary course of things, the ar; 'limy for th se
works will be completed, r ad it is not necessary to ;
elude those things in the sum which I propose to rai-4,
by terminable annuities. We are of opinion that,
instead of £11,000,000 odd, which make up ore t rtal
estimate of the commissieeers, £9,000,000 would be
sufficient for all the purposes which we contemplated in this
matter. It should be remenabeled that out of that there is
£1,850,000 taken fir the purchase of lend, p,,-t of which,
no doubt, will have to be cover, d by works, but a consider-
able portion of wlich world be ava"able for letting in a
manner to produce some sort of return ar -wally for the
re eney expended. That w redu' e the actual sum for
works to £7,150,000. But what has France done 'a regard
to theee things ?—Fre-,e wbieh is not so l"eely to be in-
vad, I, not rev' 117, so rounh Me-ace—a country whose
or'y acee,4ible frontier lies Letwc 'n Belgium on the one
hand, and Switzerland on the other—bee tuse an at ask
upon France by the Alps is now out of the question, and an
attack from Spain 0- -,,egh the P) .epees is equally relikely
In the year 1811 the French A ssembly voted £13,255,616
for works, of which the fortigea' 'ens of Pa- 's alone cost
£5,600,000, and the works, as I am reminded by the Secre-
tary for War, were not done by contract to be paid for in
the usual way, but the workmo-a employed were soldiers,
who only received their ordinary pay in that capacity.
Cherbourg has cost, from first to last, £8,032,000. France
now feels that the great improvement in cannon and the
greater range of missiles have rendered both Cherbourg and
Toulon less secure f-om attack from the sea than they were
before. Further works, therefore, at Cherbourg are going
on, whichlhave included in this £8,000,000, and at Toulon
other works are in progress Welly, ill cost £475,000. What
have the Netherlands done? At the end of the war it was
deemed right to improve and extend the works of those for-
tresses on the f (realer of the Netherlands, now forming part
of Belgium which were likely to be attacked by an enemy
coming f om the west. There was spent on those works
£6,409,000. There was no land f Ipurcha se, the works were
already existing, theyhad or ly to be improved and extended •
there was less to be done on the n, in fact, comparatively'
speaking, than we have to do in regard to the works row
proposed. How have the Germans thought in regard to
these matters? The fortresses of Coblentz, Ulm, and Rad-
stadt have c05t13,022,000; Posen, Konigsberg, and another
fortress have cost £2,829,000. The works at Alessandria
have cost nearly 7,000,000 francs. Russia, since 1813, has
spent £7,250,000 on her fortifications, of which £2,000,000
belong to Cronstadt. My hon. friend the member for South-
wark can tell us how effectual these fortifications were. (A
laugh.) Other naval officers, too, can tell us of what
value they were, for whereas we bombarded Sweaborg
and destroyed it, none of our officers, ge'lant r a they
were and strong as were their flee':, were able to get
near enough to Cronstadt to have a chance of attacking it
with any success. During the whole of the last winter the
most energetic means were taken still further to strengthen
those works. Two thousand carts were employed all the
winter in conveying across the ice immense masses of stone,
in square cases 24 feet square, to the extent of 14,000 cubic
fathoms, 16 tons to the fathom, so that when the thaw came
they might sink and render the barrier in front of Cron •
stadt still stronger and more effectual. 'When we see other
countries laying out these sums on their defences, it really
would be crimir al in the people of this country if they were
to neglect doing something of the same kind for the purpose
of defending those most important positions on our coast.
(Hear.) I have no doubt that when these works are com-
pleted, as I trust they will be in a comparatively short space
of time, they will place us in a position of comparative
safety. (Hear, hear.) The destinies of nations are in the
hands of a higher Power, but it is the duty of man to do
all that he reasonably can to deserve the support of that'

protecting Power. (Hear, hear.) When these works are
finished, we may say— _

- -
- "Be gracious, Heaven,
Laborious nr,n has done his pqrt."

(Hear.) We shall have done everything that, humanly
speaking, lies in our power to protect ourselves from inva
sion. (Hear, hear.) If danger were to arise, I have no
doubt we should be able to muster in the field a force suffi-
cient to resist, and successfully resist, any invader who
might present himself upon our shores. We should show that
the British nation are, as they always have been, capable of
making any exertion that may be required of them. At the
beginning of the second act of the late war we had 470,000
volunteers. Now we have 130,000 ; but, if there were any
imminency of danger, there is no doubt that that number
would be manifold greater than it is at present. We should
show that we have—

"The unconquerable will,
The courage never to submit or yield,
And what is else not to be overcome."

But, with all that, I say that any Government who had this
report before it, who knew what the dangers and the neces-
sities are, who knew what are the means of remedying and
guarding against them, and yet should fail to call upon
this house to furnish it with the requisite resources for
providing those defences which are indispensable, would
be betraying its duty, would be guilty of a high crime and
misdemeanour, and would deserve—l say it not as a mere
metaphor, but in sober, solemn earnest—would deserve the
penalties of impeachment. (Cheers.) And I cannot believe
that any House of Commons to which this proposal is made
would do otherwise than respond to the feeling of the
country by adopting it. lam quite sure that any House of
Commons which should have that appeal made to it, and
should turn a deaf ear to it., would lose irretrievably and for
ever the confidence and good opinion of the nation. (Loud
cheers.) Sir, I now beg to submit the resolution with
which I shall conclude, viz. :

" That it is the opinion of this committee that towards
providing for the construction of works for the defence of
the Royal dockyards and arsenals, and of the ports of Dover
and Portland, and for the creation of a central arsenal, a
sum not exceeding £2,000,000 (which is the sum we pro-
pose to take for the present year) be charged on the Conso-
lidated Fund of the United Kingdom ; and that the Com-
missioners of her Majesty's Treasury be authorised and em-
powered to raise the said sum by annuities for a time not
excer ding 30 years, such annuities also to be charged upon
the Consolidated Fund."

Sir, the course we propose is this :—We do not ask the
house to vote at once the £9,000,000 which we think will
be requisite for the completion of these works. The works
will necessarily be spread over three or four years. We
think that £2,000,000 are as much as can advantageously
be spent between the present time and this time 12 months.
We therefore limit our present demand to that amount, re-
serving it to ourselves, if we should be in office, or to those
who may succeed us, to apply annually to Parliament for
such other portions of the £9,000,000 as may be found ne-
cessary to each successive year. There will be laid before
Parliament each year an account of the applicatien of the
money sovoted. I propose to bring in a bill which m ill be
an Appropriation Act for this purpose, by which the money
thus raised shall be paid into a separate account kept dis-
tinct from the ordinary revenue of the country, and which
shall be strictly applicable to these purposes and no other.
(Hear, hear.) An annual account shall be laid before Par-
liament for each instalment. Ido not now pretend to say
the exact amount of annual interest at which these
£9,000,000 of terminable annuities may beraised. That will
depend on the state and circumstances of the market. But it
happens that there are terminable annuities which were raised
for a period of 44 years in 1823, and which will therefore ex-
pire in 1867, involving an annual payment of £580,000. Well,
it is quite clear, whatever may be the rate of interest at
which these terminable annuities may be disposed of, that
the aggregate charge for the whole £9,000,000 will fall far
short of the £580,000 which will drop in 1867; so that the
only additional charge beyond that now incurred which
will arise from this measure will be limited to the interval
between the present flme aid the year 1867. In 1867 these
other terminable annuities will drop in, and from that
period to the end of the 30 years for which these new an-
nuities will run, only a portion of that £580,000 will remain
as a charge upon the public. I think that the course we
have proposed will, on the one hand, provide adequately for
the defence of these various important positions, and, on
the other, wi'l involve as small an arnmal charge on the
coun ,y as it is possible to impose. (Hear) The £2,000,000
which we ask at first will be applied more or less to all the
different places which are pointed out in the report of the
commissioners. It is obvious that that sum will not be
sufficient for undertaking all the works so recommended;
but as those works cannot all be undertaken at once, we
think the £2,000,000 will suffice for orr present purpose.
There mill be 'aid before Parliament a schedule to show in
what proportions the £2,000,000 will be divided among
these different places. Sir, I hope the committee, notwith-
standing the caveat of the hon. member for Birm'ngha-n,
will be disposed to agree to the resolution to-night. There
m ill be ample opportunity, on the resolution being reported,
and on leave being obtained to bring in the bill, for discuss-
ing the whole mat ter at length. The session is far ailvanced
and it ;. r -Lon: :al that Parlinntentai y authority should be
given to the proposal without any delay that can reasonably
be avoided. At the same time we have no wish to deprive
hon. members, or the house at large, of all those proper
oppos tunities for d;scussion which are naturally demanded
upon a measure the importance of which we are far from
seeking to underrate. (Loud cheers.) The noble lord
concluded by proN mg the resolution.
The ques ion having been put,
Mr. HUBBARD thought, if it were deemed desirable to

raise this money in the most economical warner, it was
certainly not desirable to raise it in theform of terminable
rannities. The holders of such annuities had been so often
robbed that nobody would lend money on such a security,
without r- quiring a large allowance for the risks to which
he would be exposed. A n allowance would be insisted upon
not only for the possible continuance of the present income-
tax, but also for the possible increase of that impost. They
would therefore be unable to borrow money upon these
securities v :thout sacrificing 5 or 10 per cent. on the total
sum they world re .eive. By adhering to terminable an-
nuiCres he did not think it would be exaggerating to say that
out of the whole £12.000,009 they would throw away
£1,000,000. Landlords who borrowed money to improve
their estates did not adopt the form of terminable annuities,
but that of loans repayable in a certain term of years, capital
and interest. ny shorld the roble lord not resort to the
more productive medium of Cor o's ? (Hear.) The noble
lord wished, by giving 30 yea s for the completion of the
repayment, t .) throw this exp.ndiLc:e on the prcient gene-
ration. That was 1-1 excellent plan ; but it implied that he
durst not trust the House of Commons to repay with pru-
dence what they could re-pay yea- by yc Ir. What were
they told by he Chance"or of the Exchequer in bringing
forward his budget ? We bad £2,000,110 of Long Annui-
ties falling il; but what were we c -lied upon to do now?
To borrow £2,000,000 more. Therefore, what was the vir-
tue of such a r'e? We eu 'd neve:repay or-' debts if we
were in a F 0: , 1,1 obliged to borrow rge*-1. The only
mode of repaying debts was by their repayment out of sur-
plus revenue, whieh we c :Arld oily obt r. by economy in
the management of oar exp-rditure. It came to this, if
the house doubted that its successors would have the good
sense and intelligence to repay the loan out of surplus re-
venue, let them accept the proposition of the noble lord;
but if they were of his op* 'on, that it was useless to fetter
themselves by engageme its of this I'-id, which they could
not force themselves to k ep, let them rot borrow the money
in a manner which world, upon the whole amor rt, add
many hundred thousand pounds to the cost of these works.
(Hee.%)
Mr. BRIGHT—I shall not go "-Ito the point to wblch the
hon. gentleman has referred, nor to that which is a thousand
times more in-Torte-It—the proposition of the noble lord ;
but I will undertake to say that, during the 17 years that I
have sat in this house, a que,,lion of this chp-aeter, of this

magnitude, and invols, ;ng the expenditure of such enormous

sums of money, b ^ s never before bceu brought forward with-
out notice, ?Id the house been asked t) adopt it the same
evening. The noble viscount speaks of £9,000,000 or
£12,000,000, but it is impossible for any one who has read
that report, and knows what we all do of public works, not
to come to the conclusion that in all probability there will
be an expenditure of double that ?mount. (Hea".) I be-
lieve that as sure as you commence, in stead of spending
£12,000,000, you will spend £21,000,000; andovithout refer-
ence to the principle of the matter at 811, I am not at all pre-
pared Co give my sanction to a resolution like that, which
has never been placed upon the table of the house, which we
heard for the first time from the lips of the noble lord at the
conclusion of his speech, and which involves the house end
the country in so enormous an expenditr-e. I wi'l not go
into the question as to whether or not it as necessary that
anything of this kind should be done. In the name of the
house I protest against its being entrapped, if I may use such
a team, or invited, or cajoled, into agreement to a resolution
of this kind without notice. I shall not even say what I
think of the tone and marner of the speech of the noble
lord. He will hear of them on another occasion, no doubt. 1
shall content myself with moving that you, Sir, report pro-
gress and ask leave to sit again ; and I beg to state that I
shall divide the house upon that question, that if there are
gentlemen in the house who will support me, and the reso-
lution is pressed to-night, the committee will have the
pleasure of dividing a good many times before it is agreed
to. (Hear, hear.)
Mr. S. HERBERT—I think it is but fair that the com-
mittee should be in possession of some of the details of the
plan as it is proposed to be carried into effect before they are
called upon to vote for the resolution which has been pro-
posed by the noble viscount. It is difficult, in discussing so
large a scheme, to make oneself intelligible to the house,
but I will endeavour to point out what aro the portions of
the scheme to which the Government attanhes the greatest
importance, and which they propose to take first, partly be.
cause of their importance, and partly because there is, for
obvious reasons, great facility in commencing them. I ob-
serve that many hon members have in their hands the re-
port upon which the recommendations of the Government
have been founded, and if they follow me I will explain as
shortly and as clearly as I can what are the works which
we propose to take first. The sum which the Government
ask to be voted this year, and to be raised by terminable
annuities, is in round numbers £2,000,000, but that is not
the whole sum which they intend to spend within the year
if the house should sanction the r proposal. There is upon
the estimates which have not yet been laid before Parlia-
ment, except a lump sum .for fortifications in the ordinary

army estimates, a sum of about £450,000, which is to be de-
voted to carrying on some of the very works which are in-
cluded in this general proposition. The commissioners, it
will be observed, give two distinct sets of estimates, one
for the completion of works now in progress, and the
other for the erection of works not yet begun.
If you add the £150,000 charged for works in
progress in the ordinary army estimates, you will
find that the sums proposed to be expended in the year will
amount to about £2,500,000. • I suppose there can be no
doubt about this, that of all the places to be defended,
Portsmouth is the most important. (Hear, hear.) There-
fore, we propose to deal almost entirely with the sea de-
fences at Portsmouth, and to commence the works covering
a great part of the land faces. Now, I have heard it said
that the defence of Portsmouth ought to be by a fleet.
(" Hear, hear," from Sir C. Napier,) The gallant officer has
said that, but I think I shall have him on my side if he re-
flects what is the main object of a fleet and what is the main
object of a dockyard. You want your fleet to be constantly
moving about, and if once you are induced to defend Ports-
mouth bya fleet at Spithead you have lost that fleet. (Hear.)
You are then endeavouring to do the work of permanent
fortifications with perishable materials such as ships. Those
ships are invaluable because they have the power of moving
to whatever point requires immediate defence, but if you
condemn them to be the fortifications by which your dock-
yard is to be defended you cannot move them. What is the
object of a dockyard except to make a fleet ? But if the ob-
ject of a fleet is to defend a dockyard, it would be cheaper
and better neither to have one nor the other. You must de-
fend that which makes the fleet by something other than
the fleet which is made by it. (Hear, hear.) You must be
able to send your fleet at a moment's notice to act hostilely
against the enemy; but in order to do that you must have
something left behind which shall not be moveable, which
shall be permanent, and be capable of defending these dock-
yards. I am going to say one thing upon this subject which
it is necessary I should say, because I anticipate the objec-
tions which shall be raised to-night. I know it has been
stated, and especially with regard to Portsmouth, that there
are in the evidence the opinions • of naval men pointing out
the weakness of its present defences and showing how it
might be attacked, and it has been asked how can the Go-
vernment take the responsibility of showing up the weak-
ness of these defences when information may by that means
be communicated to our enemies? Well, Sir, in a constitu-
tional Government we must risk a great deal. (Hear.) If
the House of Commors is to deal, as I hope it will deal, in
a generous and patriotic spirit with this question, you must
take it into your confidence. You cannot use reserve ; you
cannot say to this house, " We call upon you to spend large
sums, but we will not show any justification. You must
take it upon trust. We will not tell you how the money is
to be expended; it is a question of confidence in the discre-
tion of the Government." The House of Commons would
rightfully say, "Lay before us the materials upon which you
formed your judgment, in order to enable us to form one for
ourselves." In this country you must deal with Parliament
in that spirit at whatever risk, and it would be an immense
risk if you had a doubt about the success of the measure.
But I have no doubt as to the success of the measure. I do
not care about show :ng up the weak places if I know that
you will assist the Government to make them strong. That
is the proper way in which to meet this difficulty—a diffi-
culty upon which we have had to decide, but in regard to
which I believe that we have decided rightly, because I am
confident that the country will be disposed to forward the
efforts of the Government to put the dockyards in a state of
security. At Portsmouth we propose to proceed Best with
the sea defences and the landing places in the Isle of Wight,
which, after all, is the breakwater of Portsmouth harbour.
We propose to telte three out of the five defences at Spit-
head. I will not quote from the es idence, but hon. gentle-
men who have read the report must have seen that naval
men tell us that the anchorage of Spithead is not a safe one.
Steam has come in there again, and would enable a hostile
navy to make a rapid invasion upon that anchorage. Spit-
head is a harbour not only for ships of war, which can de-
fend themselves, but also for merchant vessels taking refuge
either from bad weather or from an enemy in the Channel.
We take these three works out of the five which have been
proposed, because about them no doubts have been ex-
pressed. As to the work upon the Spit, I believe that some
doubts have been entertained, It has been said that it
would be a buoy to lead ships in. For my own part, I do
not attach much importance to that objection. There are
buoys which are very unattractive to hostile ships. Vessels
do not like to coma near great tiers of gaps, and at night
there would no lights in these works. The marks by
which a hostile fleet could attack Portsmouth would be
the lights in Portsmouth and Gosport, and not any in the
towers upon those !shoals, which in themselves would not
be visible. We propose also to complete the works at
Gosport, which are now very much advanced, and to go
on with the defences to the westward, taking, not the
whole number of forts upon the plan, but five instead
of eight. We propose to finish other works at Ports-
mouth, and that will be all that will be done this year at
that place. The cost of the works at Portsmouth when com-
pleted will be £1,920,000, including the purchase of land.
[Sir J. Pakin.s,,ten —This year ?] No. for the completion
of the works. The sum to be spent this year will be
about £540,000. At Plymouth we propose to take the sea
defences, that is, the work behind the breakwater, and the
work upon Stand Point, and the three works to the north-
east, defending it from any force which might advance
from Torbay. A" the works when finished will cost
£1,200,000, of which we shall this year spend something
like £300,000. At Pembroke it is proposed simply to have
some works at the landing places in the neighbourhood,
and to erect a work on the north, which stand upon an
eminence and arrest the progress of an enemy who may
advance from that side. Those works when completed will
cost about £220,000, of which we propose to spend this year
about £130,000. I think no gentleman will deny that wkat-
ever is to be done for strengthening the Thames ought to be
done at once. We propose therefore to take £lBO,OOO, of
which we shall this year probably not be able to lay out
more than £lO,OOO or £50,000. The same applies to
Chatham and the Medway. At Dover it is proposed to
hasten the existing works, and the same course is to be
pursued at Portland. It has been proposed by the com-
missioners to make a large purchase of land at the latter
place, under the impression that, some time or other, there
will be a naval establishment there, The Government,
however, do not intend to carry that proposition
into effect, because it wou'd be impossible to defend from
bombardment from the seaward any works in the nateee
of an arsenal or a dockyard which might be erected at
Portland. We wish Portland to be made perfectly safe as
an anchorage, but we do not contemplate making a large
naval establishment there. Portland would be open to the
same objection as Sheerness, and would be constantly ex-
posed to be bombarded from the sea without any power of
resistance. The only other works which I have to men-
tion are those at Cork, where there is a magnificent har-
bour, and where we propose to erect works which n ill ulti-
mately cost £129,000, of which about £20,000 will be ex-
pend-1 in the pre lent yea-. We believe the works at
Cork will put that heti or- in a good state of defence. I
I tow not whether the committee now clearly understand
what are the works which the Government intend to
commence at once ; but I may say generally that they
are the sea defences everywhere, partially land de:erces
at Plymouth end Chatham, end nearly the
whole of the lend defences at Portsmouth. Those are the
works which will be commenced in the present year, and
which will ultimately, when completed, involve us in an ex-
penditure of nearly £5,000,000. The hon. member for Bir-
mingham says he 1, lows what public works are, and he will
be much surprised if we get out of these under £21,000,000,
instead of £12,000,000. The Government have excluded
from their proposals every thing which is perishable. It
would not be honest to saddle posterity, even in the limited
form of terminable annuities, with a charge for that which
perishes seem after it is created. Armaments are perishable.
Your cannon become useless and unserviceable after a few
years. Floating batteries, which are proposed as one means
of defence, and which are popular with many gentlemen,
would cost more than solid defences, because they are like
ships, which live only about 25 or 30 years. At the end of
that time, having cost an enormous amount for repairs in
the meanwhile, they would have to be rebuilt. There is a
further disadvantage connected with floating batteries. At
present weby
iknowrene
eliattrilnega,s
andto t wayheifit
of making
should
turthemturn
eut
thatinvul-
nerable
afloating battery was not invulnerable one unfortunate shot
might send the whole concern to the bottom—men, gals,
and all. The committee will see that there is an immense
risk attached to floating batteries, which does not apply to
solid defences. 11 the works we propose will be of a lasting
and permanent character. The estimates, moreover, have
been framed studiously and on purpose upon the largest pos-
sible scale. We have taken a very large sum for the pur-
chase of land, and I intend to introduce a bill which will give
us a power that, under the Defences Act, the Secretary of
State does not possess. It will enable us, where we went
land as a rayon around a work, not to purchase the fee-
simple, but to buy up the building rights, paying the diffe-
rence of value between agticultural and building land.
There will be considerable advantage in that provision. It
will prevent us from purchasing more land than is abso-
lutely necessary for our purpose, and as most of the places
where the contemplated works are to be erected are Parlia-
mentary boroughs, it is neither wise nor wholesome that
Government should become large landed proprietors within
them. (Hear.) Public opinion, moreover, is subject to sud-
den changes. We recollect the time when there were no
apprehensions of war, and when, in consequence of the eco-
nomical notions which prevailed, land of immense value to
the national defence was sold. The committee will under-
stand that it would be much Ices lucrative to sell a right of
building upon land than the land itself, and therefore we
shall not be exposed to one very obvious temptation. (Hear,
hear.) As I have said, the estimates are very large, because
our defences ought to be made as perfect as possible ; but
still the Government, as they were bound to do, have oxen
cised a discretion, especially on the land side, as to whether
or not, looking at the probabilities of attack, the whole of
the works recommended by the commissioners are abso-
lutely. necessary. The consequence has been that where
there has been a doubt between engineer officers as to whe-
ther additional works are wanted or not at any given place
we have decided in favour of the negative I,:ew. Hence I
have little doubt that the estimates we have framed will be
found more than sufficient to meet the expenses of the pro-
posed works, and at the conclusion of the business we may
discover that we have spent less money on the defences than

was originally contemplated. (Hear, hear.) Let me say a few
words upon a question which has been very much discussed
—the defence of London. How is that defence to be ac-

complisJled ? A writer of great ability, in a popular
periodical, has proposed to defend London by six forts
placed apart at distances of something like seven or ten
miles. What military commander, bent upon entering Lon-
don, would stop because he knows he has got two small
forts, one on either side of him, each five miles off (Hear,
bear.) Such a defence would not, I imagine, shake his reso-
lution to make a raid upon London. But it is proposed that
the forts in question should be built for fabulously small
sums. The land, for example, is to be got for £2OO an acre.
I know something about the purchase of land in the imme-

diate suburbs of London, and I say you would be more

likely to pay V,OOO an acre. (Hear, hear.) Moreover, the

very places you would select for your forts are just the sites
which, from their height and picturesque character, are the
best suited for villas and expensive gardens, and which con-
sequently bring the highest price. The zone around Lon-
don is far more valuable than that around any other town
in the world. Each fort would require to be surrounded by
a clear space ; in fact, you would have to make a kind of
desert round London, and the land would have to be pur-
chased at a cost so enormous as to render the completion of
the scheme impossible. Talk of locking up men. That is
the objection taken to the plans of the commissioners. I
am not certain whether it is a sound one. The plans have
been modified, and a much less force of men will be re-
quired than that contemplated by the commissioners. We
have to consider the relative expense of men and works.
When works are cheaper let us take works; when men are
cheaper let us take men. It so happens we are strongest
in raw levies. Raw levies cannot be mancouvred in the
field, but they may make a brilliant and successful defence
behind works. The most untutored nations in the world—
the Turks for instance—fight stoutly behind works, but
they will not stand in the field for one moment. So your
irregulars and raw levies should be used to defend your
arsenals and dockyards. Napoleon said it is dangerous
to trust to earthworks which are to be got up on a sudden,
unless there is a strong force behind them It has been
stated that Sebastopol is an instance of a successful defence
made by earthworks hastily erected. But those earthworks
were not erected on a sudden. We were never able to
force the sea defences, regular fortifications, Iwbich were
eminently successful, and we gave the enemy three weeks
or a month to make their land defences. That is a pecu-
liarity in the case, and I believe that if Sebastopol hadbeen
defended by permanent works on the south side, to which
we went because there were strong fortifications on the
north, it never would have been attacked at all. (Hear.)
Napoleon observed that a provincial militia was a force to
defend strong places. Keep your good troops in the field,
he said, and place your militia in works where they are as
good as the best soldiers in the world. That is my belief,
and for the very reasons why it is cheaper, better, and more
secure to defend your dockyards by permanent works, I
think it world be impolitic to adopt the same course in the
case of London. (Hear, hear.) lam sure the more
the House reflects on the proposals of the Government
and examines the plans of the Commissioners, the
more it will be satisfied that we have taken a wise
and politic course. (Hear, hoar.) It was an argument
prominently put forward in Mr. Pitt's time, though I do
not expect to hear it repeated now, that you cannot trust
the Crown with the possession of places so strong, because
they might be used as positions of aggression against the
people. Ido not tbie it that any man in his senses would
think of teeing suchan argument in the present day. It had,
however, a great effect formerly, and Mr. Pitt's plan to
fortify Portsmouth and other places was defeated. It has
been since said that this was a fortunate circumstance, be-
cause otherwise a considerable expense would have been in-
cutred and we should have had to make other works over
again. That however is not so, for Mr. Pitt's plans showed
great foresight and judgment, and a great many of them
are being executed at present. Though you are now com-
pelled to extend your fortifications farther, owing to the
longer range of g uns, and to defend yourselves by detached
forts, instead of coitinuous lines, yet it is always an advan-
tage when you have detached forts to have an inner line to
fall back upon. It is highly important that those places
where the means of your power are produced should have
every appliance which skill and art could produce to make
them secure. I cannot sit down without expressing my ear-
nest hope that the committee will consider this question to
be, as it really is, a national question. (Cheers.) Last year,
when my predecessor moved the army estimates, I was
struck by an observation of his to the effect that the house
should makeup its mind what to do with those fortifications
and not go on peddling with small sums year by year ; but
that if the fortifications were necessary they ought to be
completed at once, and if not they ought to be abandoned.
(Hear.) The right hon. and gallant gentleman repeated the
observation on another occasion. I had already made a pro-
posal to Government on the subject; but I thought it ne-
cessary to be strengthened by the report of men eminent in
science, and I believe that thereby we have found the means
of making an enormous improvement in the the security of
this country. (Hear, hear.) I have laboured at the matter
with great anxiety, and I confess I should despair of this
country if I thought the people would hesitate to make the
sacrifice we ask. Of course, a large expense is to be in-
curred, and to be defrayed not in the cheapest way—by
means of terminable securities. It is said that the money
may be had more cheaply and easily by means .of Consols,
No doubt ; but is it not important to show that we are no t
imposing a burden on posterity and making no effort our-
selves, and that this is an exceptional and extraordinary
proceeding ?'This country, looking at these questions with
an anxious mind, is determined that the kingdom shall be
pot in such a state of security, that nothing less but enor-
mous preparation, attended necessarily with due notice,
should be able to produce a force that con Id make an im-
pression of a permanent nature upon it. (Hear, hear.) If
these works are put into a thorough state of defence you
may rest on your pillow in the confidence that Portsmouth
or Plymouth, if attacked, will be able to defend itself, and
you may then concentrate all your energies upon the de-
fence of London, if you think it likely to be attacked.
(Hear.) Portsmouth, Portsdown, Dover, and Chatham are
the great outworks of London, and you are not neglecting
London or the navy when you are doing these things. lam
sure that the Government have no wish to force this pro-
position in a hurry through the house, and if gentlemen
wish for time to consider it w not be denied them. I
hope they will give the subject the most earnest attention,
confident that they w not be deserted by the generosity
and patriotism of the people of this country. (Hear, hear.)
General PEEL said that, so far as human foresight and
human means could provide for the safety of the country,
the Government of the day should be responsible for the
sufficiency of the national defences, and no punishment
could be too great for that Ministry who, by neglecting the
construction of needful works, allowed such a misfortune to
occur as that of the metropolis falling into the hands of an
enemy. (Hear, hear.) He thought that this house and the
country had a right in return for the large sums of money
voted to expect that the nation should be placed in a state of
defence and made secure against the danger of any attack.
The country would be willing to see any money voted to
secure that object, and in throwing the responsibility on
the Government he could not, for one, refuse to grant them
the means to provide for the protection of the country.
(Hear, hear.) He did not think it wise for individual
members of Parliament to take upon themselves, how-
ever competent to form an opinion, to criticise these
plans, or to quote military authorities who diet the same
thing. Let the house remember that those persons were
not responsible, and that the plans under consideration were
proposed by men responsible for the advice they gave
(Hear, hear.) It was this responsibility that he wished to
insist upon, not only for the plans themselves, but for the
construction of the works to be carried out. The fault of
the military administration of this country had been that
when a great error was committed it was not possible to
place one's hand on the responsible person. Now, he hoped,
with respect to these large works, for which the house wa s
called upon to vote so great an expenditure, that, at all
events, there would be some person responsible to the house
for seeing that this large sum was spent to the best advan-
tage. (Hear.) He observed from a paper placed in the
hands of members that day that the Defence Committee
expressed themselves entirely in favour of the views of the
Royal Commission ; but they said further that, either with
or without fortifications, there must be a great addition to
the regular army. (Hear.) The total of her Majesty's
forces, including 15,000 of the local European forces in
India, was 245,000 men. If, then, the largest number of
troops which it was reckoned could be required in India
were maintained there—namely, 80,000—the average num-
ber required in the colonies and our military stations abroad
being 40,000, that would leave a body of 125,000 regular
troops in this country. To these must be added 17,000
pensioners who were available for garrison duty, as wellas
that portion of the army of India who must always be in
depot here. This would leave us 150,000 regular troops,
and, after making all deductions, we should be able at short
notice to bring into the field 80,000 regular troops, including
the finest artillery in the world, and, he believed, the finest.
cavalry. (Hear.) This was exclusive of the militia, and
of the magnificent auxiliary army which had been recently
created, and which on an emergency might be increased to
hundreds of thousands. If all these resources were properly
organised, there would be no reason for the least alarm.
But the safety of the country depended materially on the
organisation of our army of reserve, and he cor fessed that
he was not satisfied that the proposed plan for re organis-
ing the militia would render them as efficient as they ought
to be. No doubt, they would be made as efficient as it was
possible for any men to be who had received on 28 days' drill,
but in his opinion an army of reserve ought to consist en-
tirely of regularly drilled soldiers. Depend upon it, if their
services were required, there would be no time for prepara-
tion. There would not be six months' notice of any war.
It would be a word end a blew, or very probably the blow
would fall without the word ; and under those circumstances
ho was afraid that the training of the militia would be found
insufficient. This, however, was a subject en which he
should have future opportunities of speaking. He would
only now say that those who sat on the benches around him
saw no reason for postponing this vote, and thought the
committee might very well come to an immediate decision.
(Cheers.)
Mr. OSBORNE—The very able and concise statement of
the noble lord opens such new, and, to my mind, such
alarming considerations, that it is impossible to suppose,
after
that speech, we can have the same friendly relations with