The Sun.
London, England, 1856-03-14 00:00:00

they could not have got six or eight sail of the line properly
manned, they might have got six or eight frigates, or if not,
six or eight sloops, which would have cost less money. But
in his fleet he believed there was not a junior officer, a lieu-
tenant, or even a captain that had ever sailed in line before.
That, however, was not their fault. They had hail no op-
portunity. It was no easy matter for shies to sail in line
within one or two cables length of each other. It was cliff-
cult in the daytime, and much more so at night, This
being the condition of the fleet under his command, he na-
turally hesitated in going into the Gulf of Finland so early
in the year, the entrance being at all times difficelt from
the vast number of rocks and shoals which abounded,
and especially so at that early period of tho year, when
the navigation was scarcely yet open. Upon this he re-
ceived a letter from the Admiralty, which he thought
rather sharp, but he bad written a letter to them which, be
was afraid, was rather sharp too. Hear, and a laugh.)
The moment,. however, that he discovered his error,
he acknowledged it. Nevertheless he 'was afterwards ac-
cused of disobeying orders, and treating the board with
disrespect. He confessed that ho had adopted a tone in
that letter which was not altogether proper, but it was his
failing to go sometimes too fast and sometimes too slow.
(Cheers and laughter.) He ought to have stated that ho
received a letter before he left Kioge Bay from the right
hon. baronet statiug—
lam entirely satisfied with your proceedings. Neither
Lord Clarendon nor I anticipated your movement inside the
Belt, and believed that you would watch in the Cattegat the
entrance of the Sound and of the Belts until you received
orders to enter the Baltic, You judged, however, wisely, and
the time which you have gained has been very precious, and
the passage of the Belt in fine vi caterer and in safety has been
a most successful exploit. You will also have been enabled to
exorcise your officers and men to great advantage, with the
certainty that tire enemy is in front of you, blocked up in the
ice for some time to come, and that your reinforcements will
arrive, and that your discipline will be improved. When the
state of the ice permits, I conclude that you will establish
close blockade of the Gulf of Finland, dividing the enemy's
squadron at Crenstadt and at Sweaborg, and intercepting the
trade of Revel and Riga. I rely on your prudence in not
knocking your head against stone walls prematurely, or with-
out the certainty of a great success, or the fair prospect of
attaining corns most important object worthy of the risk and
of the loss, which when you attack fortresses with ships are
serious and inevitable,
Of course he naturally felt pleased at receiving this lamb-
tory letter from the right lion. baronet. After he had made
this mistake in writing to the Admiral as he had done, ho
received the following letter from the right hon. baronet,
which was especially satisfactory to him :
I have received your letter of the 19th, off the entrance of
the Gulf of Finland. I am glad that you decided not to pro-
ceed to Sweaborg. The weather is still broken, the ehannel
is not clear of ice, and your force is not yet concentrated. A
safe anchorage within the Gulf of Finland would seem to me
yarnr greatest and most pressing necessity. I had hoped
that Port Baltic might be available for this purpose ; but
if it be commanded from the shore, er if for any other reaeoe
you reject it, still I trust that you will be enabled to este-
blish and to hold a dose, b`lockade of the Gulf of Finland,
and to cut off the comeennication by sea between Sweabo-g
and Cronstadt. Your force, I hope and think, will be large
enong,h to render the escape of any Russian squadron from
the Baltic impossil le, and to leave us quite at ease in Eng-
land, although we may have no large reserve ready oa our
own shores. It will be best, in the first instance. to feel
your way, and to make good your he'd in tire Gulf of Finland.
When I say this, I by no means contemplate au attack either
on this or that place (mentioning two pieces). I have a great
respect for stone walls, and have no fancy for rue/ling teen
screw line-of-battle chips against them. Because the public
here may be impatien', you most not- be rash ; because
they, at a distance from clanger, are foolhardy, you must
not risk the loss of a fleet ire an impossible euterprise.
I believe both to be all but impregnable from the sea,
Sweaborg more especially; and none but a very large
army could ee ...alienate by land efficiently. If, then, you
have no means except naval at your commauvi, you must
pause long and consider well before you attempt any attack
on the Russian squadrons in their strongholds, and I am
afraid they are much too cautious to come out. and meet yell.
Had yon been weaker, they might have dune so ; now they
will wait and watch an opportunity, in the hope that yea
wi 1 seriously cripple your fog C 2 by knocking your head against
their forts, when they may take you at a serious disadvan-
tege, and haillet a fatal blow. These coasideratioes must not
he overleeked by you. I recall thorn to your mind, lest in
the eager desire to achieve a great exploit, and to satisfy the
wild wishes of au impaticut multitude at home, you should
yield to some rash impulse, and fail in the discharge of one
of the noblest of duties, which is the moral conrag to do
what you. know to be right, at the risk of being accused of
having dens wrong. It is enough to present this view to
dAhera,te attention ; you wi'l reflect on it, and I am certain
that your judgment will not err.
Thinkiug, then, that it was not right to go into the Gulf of
Ululated at. that early'period of the year, he went into the
Harbour of Eifsnahen with the intention of looking to the
rigging of the ships, and getting in water, but it cause on to
blow, and had nothing but a succession of gales fur several
days, so that ho was detained for ten days when ho expected
only to be detained for two. Considering the shoals and
rocks ithont Elfsnaben he was never Mors anxious in his life
than during this time. Had it come on to blow hard, the
danger wonl ! hare been imminent ; but by the me-cy of
Providence all the ship+ got safely out, of this trap—;or
such ho might call it. In this difficulty, which was in-
creesed by a thick fog, the greatest seal and energy were
exhibited by officers and men. There was no wavering, no
want of decision on the pert of the captains, and the rea-
diest obedieace on the part of all the subordinate efficees
and the seamen, and, as he had said, every vessel was
brought safely through. But he would leave hon. gentle-
men to suppose what a state of anxiety he was in until the
signal was made in the afternoon that all were in safety.
He felt he was fully juetified in going into Elfsneben, seeing
that there was no roadstead off Sweaborg. He then wrote
to the Admiralty stating that he intended- to proceed to
the tipper part of the Gulf as soon as he ceuld get together
a eufficient force, but how it was to be done with 20 sail,
some of which were not fit to go into action, he did net
know, but all that could be done with the meens at his
disposal he would do. To this letter " My lords" re-
plied, " Their lordships are satistied that you will do all
that you can do. It is to be regretted that, by your letter
of the 23,1 silt., you consider some of the ships under your
command aro unfit to go into action, an my lords eau-
not but feel surprised that such a statement on your
part should have been nn:sccompanied by detailed re-
ports of the condition of the vessels to which you allude."
He read this letter, because wham his noble and learned
friend behind him (Mr. Malins) made a motion on this sub-
ject the right hon. baronet read this letter and said he had
had no reply to it. He (Sir C. Napier) did reply to it.
The letter was to the effect, " the.t,he alluded to the ships
which had lately come from England which had not seen
a shot fired ; they were poorly manned, but the, admirals
had been indefatigable, and the captains had done their
best to put them into a state of discipline." Why the
right hon. Bart. made that statement unless to bring him
into had *dour he could not conceive. How could he be
astonished that the ships were not in proper order its two
months, when every experienced officer know that it could
not be done in less than 12 months, or even two years?
He (Sir C. Napier) wrote also to his hon. and gallant friend
(Admiral Berkeley) as follows. The hon. and gallant gentle.
man then read the letter, to the effect "that be had doss
all io his power to get the ships ready for battle, but that
it must not be supposed ships could be made perfect in a
day, whereas the Russian ships were in excellent order."
Ho wrote another letter complaining that " the ships
were without subordinate officers, mates, masters as-
sistants, midshipmen, and cadets, and that there
were young men who might have been sent out." He
mentioned this because there were so few officers of those
ranks in the navy generally, and it would have been easy
to have picked up from the numerous steam-vessels in tee
mercantile marine young men for:thos; ranks, on the under-
standing that they were not to stay in the service sinless
they were found quite capable. But that was net clone,
and there were too few of those officers, without whom it
!vas no easy matter to carry on the duties of a ship. After
this ho returned to Hango Sound with fourteen sail of the
line, the Russians having eight or nine sail of the line at
Helsingfors. By the by, he must say it was moat extra-
ordinary that though wo had a minister at Copenhagen, a
minister in Sweden, a minister at St. Petersburg, p minis-
ter at Hamburg, and consuls all over the Baltic when the
fleet sailed, it was not known where the Russian fleet war,
and a gallant officer now no more was sent from England
to poke his way up to Revel, and a very extraordinary way
he did it in ; for he put his vessel's bows against the ice
and bored her through it, and one very break he pushed her
stern through it. That was that gallant officer Captain
Lyons (the son of Sir E. Lyons), who wag now unfortn-
tenately no more. (Hear.) His (Sir C. Napier's) object in
going to Hango was to endeavour to coax the Russian fleet,
and, following the example of Nelson, he went in, hoping
that the Russians, seeing his fleet in one of their own har-
bours, would have had the courage to come out. Bat they
did not, and remained snug in their harbours. He then
went to Sweaborg to examine the Russian fleet there. There
he received a letter from the right hen, baronet of the
roost complimentary kind :

but preparations ought to be made for She next year. He
was sure that thirteen such mortars would do it ; and,
although it would be at a great expense, yet if they wanted
the war to be carried on successfully, that ought not to be
considered. He could excuse the Go:arm-neat and the Ad-
miralty iu 1354 for not having gun-boats fitted out, for in
the sudden transition from peace to war they could not be
aware that mortars would be wanted, and they probably
never read how Martinique was taken. Tho weather was
nose settled, and the ships were assembler] in Faro Sound.
The French fleet were there too, and a beautiful sight it was
to see 27 sail of the line in a Russian port, and pitiable to
think that they were all useless. Ho wrote to the right hen,
baronet his opinion in a letter dated after that of the 18th
July, which the Admiralty denied that they had received.
Tho letter was to the followin: effect—" that he had received.
the Duke of Newcastle's despatches and his (Sir J. Gra-
ham's) instructions, and he believed that they could be car-
ried ant. He had been told that there was to be a complete
blockade of the Gulf of Finland, and that was done ; he had
been told to look to the Aland Islands, and send home the
soundings and Capt. Sullivan's report. There were three
courses which might bo followed—firstly, to make the ser-
vice one of blockade, but that would not please the peo-
ple of England; secondly, to go to Cronstadt and offer
battle to the liaissian fleet, which they were not likely to
accept, unless you went into their harbours, where the
channels were so narrow that only ono ship could go in at
a time; or the Aland Islands were to be attacked; but if
that was done and there were no troops, the ships might
go in as near as they could and land all the marines,
French and English, and attack Eornarsund, for which
purpose 10,000 seamen might be put on shore and turned
into soldiers. He could propose this to the French admi-
ral, and, if he did not assent, they could go up to Cron-
stadt. The French admiral had doubts about the at-
tack on Bomarsund without troops, and that it would
be bettter to go to Cronstadt. That being his view,
it was determined to go to Cronstadt." It was no
doing of his that 10,C00 men were sent to attack
the Aland Isles. All he wanted was 2,0i0 or 3,000 men ;-
bat the Glareernmeat sent 10,000 French troops. The right
hon. baronet wrote to him in reply as follows :
If anything can be done you will discover the best means of
doing it, but no rash experimentx must Be tried which do not
hold oat a reasonable prospect, of success. lam anxious to
hear your opinions ai.d intentions when you have looked at
Sweaborg and entered the Gulf of Finland. lam afraid that
the Russians will not pluck up courage and come out to meet
you.

Some gentlemen might perhaps think that ho (Sir C.
Napier) ought not to read these because they were partly
private ; but it /should be recollected that they were on the
public service ; and when he i tad the evidence of the right
hon. baronet before the Sebeetsopol committee, that he had
right to turn officers' private letters into public ones, ho
(Sir C. Napier) did not see why he should not do the same.
(Hear, hear.) His hon. and gallant friend opposite (_Ad-
miral Berkeley) would, he herlead, excuse hien if he read
setue of his. (lie then read a letter of Admiral Berke-
ley, o,27the Jane,' exproseing the satisfaction of the
Admiralty with his conduct a art their reliance on hie judg-
ment.) Now, he of course fete pleasure at ree& via; these
communications from his superiore, and if any one thought
he was wrong, they must remember that he considered that
he had been sent adrift and disgraced, and he must be ex-
eased in any eifertm he matte tees retrieve his character. On
the 19th the fleet sailed for Cie-dist/At, and arrived before it
on the 22d. The French eduii.:ral and himself reconnoitred
tat. fir; tress. Now he had seen. strong fortificetiene ; he hail
seen Toulon, Cadiz —he had no. seen Brest—but he had seen
Cherbourg ; but net one of them was to be compared as
fortifications or w:th regard tea strength with Crouetedt. it
was hot merely a lot tress, for if those stone 4-deckers were
in au open sea, and could be box, at, he would not have hesi•
b tel tueugh he haii to try alt it e against stone walls ; but
the danger seas in going iu tia,ae. The soundings iu the
only channel showed the deptie iu the passage to be quarter
less three. Herr -urea could a ship drawing 27 ieet of
water go through such a p ,ssage where the depth of water
was only Tier ter Its,s three ? Both he and the French
adeeiral were of of inien that t Was impossible, and he Led
never cheirged his opinion. ;Elie wrote to that effect to the
and he also sect ,e plan, which be had formed,
for atteeking the place, 'which of course ho c Add net ilia-
c,(m. The Admiralty wrote, to him in reply. In thet
letter they celled " attention te an able nut well-executed
survey of the approaches tc. Croustade; they expressed
coatirteece iu his judgment; they were aware that ha had
offered battle to the enemy, boat it.would b:, of no avail to
attack au impregnable fortress; that he must bear in mind
that the great object was to render the Russian fleets
useless. The troops, must be removed witeout less
of time ; that the primaiy ject was a close blockade of
the Gulf of Finland; and teset having a /sufficient force
to keen the enemy in check, be must bring up the troops
frees Fero Sound without ,rely." Thome were his in-
structions ; and when lie causes to examine them he found
it itep.ssible to execute the.r. lie was to take care
of Cronetadt, to watch Swett berg, and to go to Faro
anti embark the troops. H.%ew was it possible to do it
all ? Ha did what he thought best, and instead of going
elsewhere he brought all the teroope to Ledsund. Ho there
received the following letter Irom the right hon. baronet :
I am glad you have gone up to Cronstadt, to 500 with your
own eyes what it may be possible to do there. Whatever
man can do I am certain will be done by you; and, if you are
restrained by a sense of duty Lem embarking iu any despe-
rate enterprise, on your return. to Fare Sanaa you shall re-
seive furl isetiet..tious from me ;respecting an attack upon the
Alaad Islands.
It went on thus :

I had anticipated your retuxa to the westward after an
offer of battle, which I felt certain the enemy would decline ;
and it now remains for you to blockade the Gulf of Finland, to
keep the &len; at Cronstadtamt Helsingfors disunited, and to
await the arrival of the French ti•oeps, when you and tie French
admiral and general must deli oorate on the operations to be
undertaken by the combined farces. Bomarsuud will clearly
be within your reach. Sweabon, if it were possible, would
be a noble prize; but on no ac-count be led into any Oespe-
rate attempt, and above all things avoid the least risk of the
Russian fleet slipping out of the Gulf of Finland whoa your
back is turned ; and be slow to land your marines, without
whom your limo of battle is disabled. The Russians, thou4h
shy, are crafty ; and if they can catch you at a disadvantage
they will be down upon you. . With 50,000 troops and
200 gun-boats you might still do something great and deci-
sive before the cud of Sept.--T am, my dear Charles, yours
sincerely, J. G. GaAIIAM.
In another letter it was said " that the Admiralty had
waffshed all his proceedings with approval." He left Cron-
stadt on Aug. 3, and on the 6th arrived before Bonearsund.
Ho sent a squadron of 9 sail of the line to take care of the
Hessia❑ fleet while he was at lionianund. When he was
there he got the following letter from the eight hon. ba-
ronet :

Admiralty, Aug. 1, 1854. [Recd. 6th.]
My dear Charles,--By your foresight and g,od arrange-
ments, the whole of the French army will have joined you off
Bomarsund before the and of this week, and I hope that you
will send back the line-of-battle ships wuich carried them to
you as soon as possible. . . lam aware that Borearsumt
presents difficulties, but I feel certain that you will overcome
them. The next move must be well considered, but the fall
of Bomarsund will be no bad beginning.—I am yours very
truly, J. G. GRAHAM.
Tho whole of the troops havingarrived at Ledsued, on their
way to Boinarenncl, there being a very intricate channel to
that place, he sent Admiral Clads to survey the ground
before Bomarsund. The French troops arrived on the 3dth
July, but the stores did not arrive till sth Aug.;and lie
would show that no time was lost, for on the 7th Cho troops
were transshipped, and came on to Bomarsund ; on the Bth
a landing was made simultaneously at t..ro places; on the
10:1 the guns were lauded, and dragged by sailors three
or four miles into the country ; batteries Ireee established,
and on the 14th two towns on the island surrendered ;
and en the 16th the fortress of Bomarsund also serren-
dared. It was expected that it would have hell out
for some time, but to their astonishment it surren-
dered at the time he had stated. It would have
been easy to have run the chips up to Bomarsund be-
' fore the troops arrived, but it would have been at a loss of
a great many men, and perhaps of some of the ships. But
the French had sent out an army, and if be Lied attempted
anything before they were ready, they would naturally
have been imgry and disappointed. The French Admiral
thought that Annarsiund ought not to be attacked before
the guns were placed iu position. He had now brought the
history of the e.inipeign down to the taking of 13emarstind.
Afterwards the Admiralty wrote to him to the fol-
lowing effect :—" Your report of the combined military
and naval operations 'Befoul Bomarsund has afforded us the
utmost satisfaction, and we cordially approve of the admir-
able and judicious arrangements which you. adopted." The
right hon. bart. wrote thus :

Portsmouth, Aug. 22,18 M.
My dear Sir Charles,—l congratulate you sincerely on the
success of your operationsbefore Bornarsund,and I highly com-
mend your prudence and wisdom in effecting the capture of this
stronghold of the eneraywithout the loss of a ship or mAnylives.
You have judged well in every respect, both in detainiug the
line-of-battle ships aad steamers, mil then in sending them
home laden with prisoners.—I am, yours vary truly.
J. G. GRAHAM.

I am well pleased with all your operations, and the con-
centration of your force at the entrance of the Gulf of Fin-
land, in a safe harbour where you can command fresh water,
appears to me a judicious operation. I conclude that you
will leave a squadron before Helsingfors sufficiently strong to
prevent the escape of the Russian squadron within the har-
bour, and proceed with the rest of the combined fleet to the
neighbourhood of Cronstadt, which I am afraid you will find
unassailable. If the Russian fleet will not come out to meet
you, and if you find that you cannot reach them, after having
well reconnoitred the works and ascertained what it is pos-
sible and impossible to do, your return to the more open sea
below Helsingfors would appear to be a judicious measure,
every necessary precaution being taken to prevent the re-
union of Itho Russian force now divided at Cronstadt and
Helsingfors. lam well aware of all the difficulties of your
position, and of the impossibility of triumphing over au
enemy who will not fight you on fair terms; but you
will discipline your fleet and make your officers and
men ready for any service. It is a disgrace to Russia
that she dare not show a ship in her own waters, and that sh 3
is driven to seek for safety under the shelter of her fortresses.
It would be madness to play her game, and to rush headlong
on hor granite walls, risking our naval superiority, with all
the fatal consequences of defeat, in an unequal contest with
wood against stone, which in tho long run cannot succeed. I
had reliance on your prudence which was doubted. Your bril-
liant courage was proved long ago. You will now show to the
world that you possess a eonibination of those great virtues
which aro necessary to make a consummate Commander-in-
Osier.

On the 25th of August the right hon. baronet wrote again
as follows :

Devonport, Aug. 25, 1854.

,- - -
My dear Sir Charles,---I am more than satisfied with your
proceedings. lam delighted with the prudence and sound
judgment which you have evinced. It would have been a
miserable want of firmness had you yielded to clamour, and
risked your Clips, and sacrificed many valuable lives, in an at-
tempt to destroy, by naval means, works which were certain to
fall to an attack by land. Your reasoning also, in favour of tbe
immediate and entire destruction of the forts at Bomaisuncl, is
irresistible, and I hope you will take care that the destruction
is complete, and that not ono stone is left upon another. lam
well pleased also with the promptitude with which you have sent
back the line-of-battle ships and steamers. The work has been,
well done, and I gladly give you the utmost credit for it. I '
write in great haste, but that which presses is the order for
destroying Bomarsund. at greater leisure,, and in a few
days, I will write to you on the subject of your ulterior ope-
rations, and of the preparations for an early retreat from the
Baltic before winter. —I am yours, very sincerely,

J. G. GRAHAM.

Those were the whole of the commendations he iceeived ;
but op to this time every act ho performed was approved.
After that the French Admiral and General went to Swea-
borg, and gave it as their opinion that it could not be at-
tacked with success. General Jones, the English com-
manding officer of engineers, was of opinion that it could
be attacked by laud with 5,0v0 troops. The French general
was of a different opinion. lie commenced the embarka-
tion of tha troop ; General Niel, the French engineer, was,
however, of opinion that ten sail of the line could knock
down Sweaborg. lie (Sir C. Napier) might as well say
that he had received other letters of approbation which he
would not read.—[Thc hon. gentleman, however, read
one or two, which was not. of importance.] —But now
Caine the difficnity. When the right hon. baronet hoard
that the Reach Admiral had decided that Botnersond was
to he destroyed, ha wrote to him (Sir C. Napier) on the
29tb of August as follows :

fie went to examine Sweaberg and to rise if it was possible
to do anything, and he wrote to the First Lord of the Ad-
micalty the following letter. The letter was to the follow-
ing effect : " That he had taken sounding' abent Sweaborg,
awl he would have undertaken to carry the ships up as far
as a certain channel, but it was inspeesible to get them up
to Sweaborg, fer the passage wag not wider than the leng',l:l
of a ship and a vessel was sunk across it, while the smoke
of the steamers alone without that of the gnus was suffi-
cient to defend the harbour ; it was only by moans of a
large military force occupying the islands and seeding
shells into the fortress, that it was asseilable." Various
plans were sent to him by the Admiralty—some of them
ridiculous enough—and OR the 18th of July he wrote to
Sir Janees Graham the following latter, which he wrote
to him personally, as he did not wish it to go before the
Board of Admiralty. The later was to the fellowing ef-
fect, "that the only euclessful manner of attacking Swea-
borg that he could Mee, after great con,ifieration and con-
sultation with Admiral Chads, who was well acquainted
with gunnery, was fitting out a great numlesr of gun and
mortar boats, each carrying one gun with a long range, end
stationing theta west of -zveeaborg ; then every shell wou!,l
tell, that force being backed by the fleet to relieve the uioa
as they required it. By phis means Sweahorg and Ilel-
singfors might have been Lid in ashes. The ships could
not have been destro3ed,for they could have moved out of
the way. }ll was at the siege of Martinique, and then
they could not take Fort Bourbon until 5) mortars wore
used to shell it, when it soon surrendered. He had sent
tome copie, of all the plane propese 1, and he thought
they weir, laid before artillery and engineer officers they
Won Id agree that it was the only way to destroy the for I
tress. it was too late in the 'num for that to be done,

My. dear Sir Charlcs,—The Emperor has sent orders to Gen.
Baraguay When we know what arrangement is
to be made with respect to the French arny we will concert
measures with France for the gradual withdrawal of the lint
from the BAltic. You should begin by sencitng home, with-
out much delay, Use sailing three-deckers, the least weatherly
of the sailing line-of-battle ships, and the slowest and worst of
the block ships. This will do for a beginning, and, by de-
grees, you must withdraw to the southward, leaving the
Gulf of Bothnia open, and watching only the Gulf of Finland
with a squadron of obsr:rvation. Kiel, I conclude, will be
your first halting-place; but this is on the assumption that
the French army is with lrawn for winter quarters at home.
I am, &e., J. G. GRAIIIM.
Any psrso reading that would have concluded that was an
authority for zeialin3 home tha bad sailing ships and the
three-decker.. lie (Sir C. Napier) knew that it was right,
for Aoguet in the Baltic was not like Au-,itLizi, England.
But when it was known in England that too Emrich army
was coining horno, meetings were held to blatna the Go.
vernuicnt. be‘catTie Cron,tailt was tot taken, or Sweaburg,
or evz.n S!ba.s'ol•ol. The right hon. baronet got alarmed,
and he turned about to see who was to bear the blame,
and he thought I.'.e would place it on him (Sir 0, Napier),

THE SUN, LONDON, FRIDAY EVENING, MARCH_ l4, 1856.

and out came an order for him to hold a council of war
with the French admiral and his own admirals, in order
to ascertain whether anything further could be done
against Sweaborg. Well, the council of war 'net on
board the Duke of Wellington, and it was unanimously
decided that at that season cf the year, and with the
means at their disposal, nothing further could be done
against such a fortification as Sweaborg. Well, then,
the right hon. baronet felt his border blood begin to
boil. Ho forgot his " Dear Sir Charles," and turned
that address into " Dear Admiral." He forgot having
called him (Sir C. Napier) a consummate commander-
in-chief,", and having expressed satisfaction with all
his arrangements. He forgot that, only a few weeks before,
he had recommended caution with regard to attacking
stone walls, and had expressed the opinion that Sweaborg
could not be attacked with less than 200 gen-boate
and 50,000 men ; and now he wanted him (the wimiral) to
attack it with Bor 10 sail of the line. Sir James also for-
got that he had written, "I am commanded to acquaint
you that yourinstructionsare not to control your discretion
as to any joint operation ; it is your duty net to undertake
any operation which your own judgment does not entirely
approve." Could the house believe, than, that the same
right hon. gentleman who had told him that he was " on
no account to risk her Majesty's fleet," was serious now in
wanting him to attack Sweahorg with 8 or 10 ships of the
line? No, the right hon. gentleman was not serious;' but
there was a commotion in the country, and the Government
looked about to soe upon whom they could throw the
blame. It was a mere flash in the pan, by which the right
lion, baronet tried to cover his ownsolitical cowardice.
(Hear, hear.) This ho (Sir C. Napier) was able to prove.
On the sth of September the French Minister in London
applied to the Admiralty for steam-vessels to tow the
French ships with the troops home. Notwithstanding that,
and althongh the Government here must have known that
-General Beraguay d'Hilliers had got orders to evacuate the
Aland Isles, they sent out an order to him (Sir C. Napier)
to call a council of war' and ask the French general, a
marshal of France, to take General Jones's plan into con.
sideration. Now, what had General Jones done ?He had
gone with the French general of engineers to look nt
Sweaborg, and had come to the opinion that by landing
5,000 men upon the Island of Bakholmen, which was
strongly fortified, and within-pistol shot of Gustaysvarn,
the strongest of the forts, with three batteries upon it, not
knowing the number of troops in it, with a Russian three-
decker lying in the passage between them, almost touching
each shore, and with eight Russian sail of the lino lying in
the harbour of Sweaborg, covering the whole of the island,
and mance), perhaps, by 6,000 or 7,000 men, besirlee tin
garrison—by landing in such a situation, the attack might
be made. Now ho (Sir C. Napier) would put it to any
military or naval officer, whether such a thing would be
safe? els asserted that it would not be safe; and that if
he and the French admiral and general hat been foolish
enough to attempt such a thing, athough the weather was
so bad that they positively could not have effected a land-
ing with their guns and stores, not one roan would have
come off again free : every man jack of them would have
been made prisoner. (A. laugh.) That was as clear us pos-
sible to him : there could not be the slightest doubt of it.
Well, the French general laughed at such a proposal, and
left the place ; so that he (Sir Charles) could not call the
council of war, because the French general and all his army
were gone. After that scheme was repudiated came an-
other order, in which he was referred to the opinions of
General Niel, the French general of engineers, a very clever
man, who lied been opposed to the plan of landing 5,000
French troops, but, after examining. the place, was of *pi-
nion that if eight or ten sail of the lino were anchored
abreast of the bath-hies of Sweahorg, which were stronger
than Gibraltar, and wore said by officers who had seen
Sebaitopol to be stronger also then the latter place, they
would he able to knock it down ; but, like a sensible mac,
General Niel added that he should think it a desperate at-
' tempt, end that lie did not consider it within his province
to recommend it. Why, that was condemnatory of the
whole project; for General Niel spoke as an engineer, and
would no more undertake to tell a bailor where he could
place him ships, than he (Sir C. Napier) would undertake,
as a sailor, to tell a military engineer where to place his
batteries in besieging one of the strongest towns of Europe.
(Hear.) Well, the French admiral felt excessively indig-
nant at being desired by the English First Lord of the
Adirdr, lty to reconsider his opinion, or to consider the
opinion of Gen. Jones. The French admiral would 'stay
no longer, but said, " I have given my opinion, and if I
were to go with you now, and you undertook' anything
there, I should be obliged to assist yon. and if it failed I
should be to blame for having been so weak as to juin you
in it." So Admiral Pareovel was naturally very much
irritated, although he (Sir Charles) tried to pacify him
as well on; he co dd. , The right hon. baronet at the
Admiralty, however, was still full of fight, arid wrote to
say that "British steamers in fins weather, and in the
earlier part of September, might be more gloriously em•
ployed than in towing home French troops." Now what
sort of fine weather was it the fleet were at that time en-
joying ? They were pitching at the bows in a gale oi wind,
for five days together. It was impossible, then, to think of
landing troops at an anchorage which the ships creald
hardly get into in the best weather. Sir James Graham
said at ths same time—" We know nothing with certainty
respecting the return of the French fleet from the Baltic."
Now, that staternenecoald not bs correct—for tie French
admiral received his orders on the 30th August to return
to Cherbourg, and showed him (Sir Cbarl'es) his orders on
the Ist Sieternber, and also a letter, in Which it was stated
that the French charge d'atTaires in England had immix-
nicated to the English Government the fact that the
French fleet was ordered home. The GOvernment seemed
not to know that the French fleet was going to winter-in
the Baltic. There was no end of the plans which they ap-
peared to think were feasible. One was, that he (Sir
Charles) should get two dredging machines to deepen the
passage at Sweaborg, by which 15,000 tons of rubbish
wore to be raised in two days; and it was suggested that
ho should take advantage of the smoke and fog to work
them unobserved by the enemy. Another plan sent out for
his consideration was to blast the ice in the winter when
the sea was frozen between the islands and the mainland,
to prevent the Russians from marching over. He was also
informed by the Admiralty that ho could anchor all over
the Baltic in winter in any place, which certainly did go far
beyond his seamanship. After quoting some other letters of
Sir .Jas. Graham's rbeut the end of September, and showing
that, they were contradicted by the orders he received from
the Admiralty about sending home the sailing ships, the
hon. and gallant gentleman gave an account of his recon-
noitring Sweshorg in the Driver, piloted by Captain Sul-
livan, in consequence of which he wrote to the right hon.
bart. a description of the formidable obstacles which would
have to be encountered if Sweaborg were attacked by the
fleet alone, and concluded by saying, ". Whether this
attack would succeed or not, it is impossible to say; but
we must calculate on ships being set on fire by red-hat shot
and shells, of which there would be abundance; and whe-
ther successful or not, it is evident the ships would he in
no condition to beat the Russian fleet afterwards, and if
the attack were made at this season of the year, when you
cannot depend upon the weather, Ido not know what
would be the result ;" he went on to say, " I beg you wilt
not suppose Sweaborg cannot be attacked ; I think it can,
but it must be with caution and judgment." There were
thus two distinct opinions which he had, upon different oc-
casions, gieen abort an attack on Sweaborg. One opinion
related to the supposition that the ships alone wore to
attack; and in that case he pointed out the inadequacy of
the means, arid the dangers which would render almost
certain the loss of a large part of them. Another opinion,
or plan of his, related to an attack with mortars and gun-
b rats, and with the whole of the fleet. It was on the 4th
October that the hoax arrived in England, the rumour of
Sebastopol being taken ; upon which Sir James Graham
wrote to him, quoting his letter written after the last re-
connaissance of Sweaborg, and interpreting it with the
endeavour to persuade him that he had committed himself
by that letter to the opinion that Sweaborg could be taken
with the means which he then had. But this was putting
a roost impertinent construction upon his letter, He (Sir
Charles) had never said that the attack by the ships,
which he had described to the Admiralty, would succeed ;
on the contrary, he had distinctly asserted that if he at-
tacked with the ships alone, he would lose a great number
of ships, and not be certain to succeed ; but what he had
said was, that if he attacked with the mortar-boats and
gun-boats which he had asked for, he was quite certain
that Swoaberg would be laid in ruins. (Hear, hear.) He
could not really believe that at that time of the year, the
4th of October, the Board of Admiralty, consisting of a
civilian First Lord and five or six sailors, seriously intended
that the French fleet should return, and the English fleet
go up without it into the Gulf of Finland at the begin-
ning of the winter season. Ho hart no hesitation in
saying that if all those heavy three-deckers had gone
up the Gulf of Finland at that date, to remain
for the purpose of undertaking any operations, there would
have been an end of them. After reading some of the cor-
respondence which ensued upon his representing to Sir J.
Graham the uncertainty of the weather, and the advanced
season of the year, iu reply to which the right hon. gentle:
man argued that those objections were not insurmountable,
and having advised him to calculate the chances, and not
to lose an opportunity, ended by -saying. " Bet the final
decision must rest entirely with yourself," the gallant ad-
miral said that if, during the summer, such a goading letter
as that had been sent to hhn, instead of the cautious ones
he then received, he should not have hesitated for a single
moment to go into Sweaborg, let the consequences be what•
ever they might, because no officer could etniure to be writ-
ten to in such a style. But he was perfectly certain, in Oc-
tober, it was a piece of mere ins inity ; he was convinced
that She Admiralty themselves could never have intended
it, and if they did, he would denounce them as totally unfit
to manage the British navy. But when the rumour came
that Sebastopol was taken, all England ran wild, and the
Admiralty shared in the excitement, and under its influ-
ence that letter was written, with a proposal which his own
better judgment repudiated. But that tho people in autho-
rity should be capable of writing such a letter, whether to
destroy him, or out of their own folly, was disgraceful to
the public department over which they presided. (Hear.)
He next read a letter from a gallant officer holding a corn-
nsand under him in the Baltie fleet, whose name he did not
mention, agreeing in the testimony that nothing could be
done at that season of the year, and that so far from then
thinking of an attack upon Sweaborg, he thought the fleet
was lying in a most dangerous position even where it was
at that time. Two, or three letters of his own addressed
to the Lords of the Admiralty in the month of April,
Sir Charles Napier then roads in which he strove to
impress upon their lordships the roughness and severity
of the Baltic winter, and explained also that the plan
proposed by him (the admiral) in August was, firstly,
that Sweaborg should be well bombarded with mortars,
shells, and rockets by the gun-boats, and that afterwards
the ships should go in anti finish the work. On the 9th Oct
news came to England which undeceived the Government
and the public as to the rumour of the capture of Sebesto-
pol, and, without waiting for his reply to their orders, the
Admiralty at once telegraphed that the ships wore to go
dome, both French rend English, and that they were no
longer to attempt to attack Sweaborg. Constant gales of
wind prevailed at this time, the fleet lying at Nargen ; and
it was a pity the First Lord of the Admiralty was not on
board then, that he might have picked out a favourable
day at that season for the fleet crossing over to attack
Sweaborg. (A laugh.) But the right hon. gentleman was
as much of a gunner as he was a sailor, for he actually fan-
cied that with long gnus he could throw shot in the wan-
ner of vertical firing, as from a mortar, that was with an
levetion of 95 degrees. To be sure, he might have learned
better than that if he had gone down to Portsmouth to see
the practice of the Excellent. The gallant admiral thou
read a letter from the Lords of the Admiralty, which he
received in October, before quitting the station, in which
they said, "My lords are fully satisfied with the reasons
'you have assigned for not undertaking to attack Sweaborg
after it became known to you that the ships under Admi-
ral Parseval had been withdrawn, anti tney might also
have been satisfied with the decision adopted by you on
the joint report of the officers, had not your own letter of
the sth S.mtember expressly informed their lordships that
you had formed a plan for an attack." Now that state-
ment wai not true. Ho never gave such an opinion. His
reason for not taking Sweaborg was that it was impossible.
In hhi letter of the 9th Aug. he said be had sent them
Gen. Jones's opinion, but he hail nothing to do with it. As
he had said, it was perfectly impossible, and he might Ad
well, if Gen. Jones had sat down before Sebastopol, for in
stance, bar, told him they were all wrong, aud that that was

not the way to take Sebastopol, but that the only way to
take Sebastopol was to do so and so. He would now read au
extract fro:n a letter which he wrote in reply, in which he
sail, "I beg, to cone; tide this letter by most aolein nly protest-
ing againat the interpretation that theirlordships have put on
my letter." Their lordships replied to this in a most
jesuitical manner—he could not call it anything else—and
that reply must have been written by the tight hon. gen-
tleman himself, for no one else could have written it.
(Laughter.) "My lords have already (Teetered themselves
satisfieel with the reasons assigned by you for not attacking
Sweaborg." Here again they were assiguieg reasons that
he never gave. " But considering the conflict of authority,
and the reports brought before them, their lordships can-
not look with satisfaction on the decision not to attack
Swsaborg." Now, how could they write him such a letter ?
Why, in May ho had not seen Sweaborg, and their lord-
ships had sent him plans of Sweaborg, and a Swedish en-
gineer also sent him plans, and on looking at them he
thought it impossible to take it. In hi j answer to that
comesunic Aion he said it was unfair for the Admiralty to
take the first part of his letter and issue the rest, and he
protested. against it. Their lordships raised a new question.
They said that in 3,Lay he sent them plans. This was quite
true. His judgment was formed from the plans sent to bins
from the Admiralty. But their lordships had forgotten Ad-
miral Chat's report, sent to Sir J. Graham on the 11th of
June, and bi, report on thelBth of July, after seeing Swea-
borg. Their lordships alluded also to a report he sent home
on the 24th July, and they referred to the Lancaster guns
not being sent. Ho was aware that the Lancaster gnus
could net be sent that year, and his observations regarding
there hagi reference to their being sent out thle following
year. In reply ho wrote as follows :

Kiel, Oct. 27.
My dear Sir James, —So far back as Aug. 29, I announced to
you the intention of the French General to withdraw his troops.
I agreed with the French General and Admiral that Sweabo,g
could not be attacked at this season of the year, an I I have
no hesitation in saying, had we move I the troops and ships
up to Miele Roads, and landed 5,000 men, we should nothave
brought off one man, and how many ships wo would have
lost I cannot say. After the capture and destruction of
Bemarsund till I left Nargen, there h .ve not been three days
fit for operations that required seven or eight, and then the
ships and transports must have lain amongst the rocks and
shoals of Miele Roads—a position that might have done for a
general, but certainly not for an admiral. Shor.ly after the
troops sailed, I communicated to you that the French ad ei-
ral had received orders to go to Cherbourg, that they were
dated the 30th of August; so that the decision was not taken
on the spot, as you suppose. General Jones's report made no
change whatever in our opinions. You say the French gene-
rals partook of General Jones's opinions ; then why did he
not carry them cut I Surely, Sir James, you could not have
rca I them ; they are quite opposite. The French generals
thought the fleet could knock down Sweaborg in two hours.
General Jones required a combined movement, which would
require seven or eight days. The French general, in his letter
to me, says :—" Noes partageons l'opinion de M. le General
Jones, Sweaborg pent etre attaque et pried par los flottes si
elles vaulent faire contre cetto forteresse une attaque serieuse."
He went en, after some other observations, to say—
All summer, Sir James, you were cautioning me, and so
were the Government, not to risk my ships against stone
wails, for which you had a great respect, and praising me for
the manner I had conducted the fleet ; now wiuter.is come,
you are dissatisfied air my net doing impossibilities ; and as
the people are not safTs3eil, the Government are preparine to
abandon me, because I will not follow the advice of a general,
oeutrary to that of my cram admirals, and diametrically oppo-
site ti the opinion of the French general of engineers, and
attack a fortress at a season of the year when it is mere than
probable
_I should
_have—lost—hal

this explanation at great length ; it has given me much pain.
I am conscious of having done my duty, and, if you aro dis-
satisfied, you can bring me to a court-martial, or remove ma,
as I before mentioned to the Admiralty. lam very far from
well, an! I assure you this correspondence bas not improved
my health, and I am suffering muck from cold.

Well, they were Rot satisfied after all that explanation ;
and after all the trouble ha had taken to show the position
he was in, Sir Jamas Graham said—

My dear Sir Charles,—You refer to my letters at the end
of Aug ist, as contemplating then the early tercnina.t;ou of
active operations in the Baltic for this year. 1 was not pre-
pared, even at that time, for the immediate departure of the
French army after the capture of Bomarsaud ; and I pointed
oat to you Abo, Sweaborg, and Revel, as points which, with
miiita y aid, were open to attack. Much less was I prepared
for the withdrawal of the Fre,ch squadron from the com-
bined naval operations almost simultaneously with the de-
parture of the army, as soon as Boinarsund had been de-
strzyed. These decisions were taken on the spot-- I believe,
with your consent, bet without any reference to the English
Government.

They were no such thing an taken an the spot with his con.
sent. They were taken by the Tench Government anti
communicated to our own Government. Sir James went

But is August we had not seen the report of General Jones
on Sweaborg, which you forwarded to us from Led-nnd on
the 29th of August, and which was in your hands before
either the French army or the French fleet had left the Aland
Islands. The report is entitled respect. It made a great
impression he-e, and raised a strong presumption that with
the aid of the military force then present, with the fleet, in
seven or eight da3 s the works at Sweaborg might be destroyed,
and that the month of September afforded ample time for tho
operation. On the sth of Septembar you sent us the obser-
vations of General Baragnay d'Hilliers and of General Niel on
the report of General Jones. general Baragnay d'Hilliers
says expressly, after having reconnoitred Sweaborg
together with general Niel :—" We partake of the opinion of
General Jones, Sweaborg msy be attacked arid taken by the
fleets, if they think fit to make ou that fortress a serious
attack." General went further, and said that, without
any military co-operation, eight or ten sail of the line could
lay the works in ruins in two hours, by a bombardment near
at hand, on tie sea front, where the works are weakest;
and ho intimated very distinctly an opinion that the attack
‘klught to be made.

Now he presumed Sir James Graham understood French
General Niel said, " Sweaborg pent-etre attaque et prig par,
lee flottes, si elles veulent faire coutre cette forteresse une
attaque serialise." The right hon. gentleman translated
this to mean that an attack onghtto he made. Sir James
went on to say :
In the face of these reports, and within a week after re-
ceiving them, the intelligence that the French ermyaud French
fleet had left you, without a shot being fired, except at Bo-
marsund, was both a surprise and disappointment. Then
came your own second reconnaissance of Sweaborg, and a plan
of naval attack, which you considered practicable. We were
anxious, if the French and English forces could be united,
that it should have been tried even this year, before the im-
mense fleet which had been assembled retreated from the Bal-
tic ; but our own sailing ships having gone to Kiel, and the
French squadron being on its way home, the opportunity was
lost, and nothing now remains to be done but gradually to
withdraw the line-of-battle ships, and to await the moment
whenico shall enclose the Russian fleet within the Gulf of Fin-
land for the winter.
Where were the 50,000 men and the 250 Swedish gun-
boats ? Then the right hon. gentleman came back again to
" My dear Admiral."
I am very unwilling to be involved in a written controversy
with you, but you have brought it on yourself, by your re,
port of the 25th of Sept., after your second reconnaissanc3 of
Sweaborg. That report appeared to me to be entirely at
variance with the opirions previously expressed by you, and
I certainly understood you then to say, that if yon had mor-
tars, rockets, and Lancaster guns, you consi lered Sweaborg
assailable by sea. In May you declared it to be unassailable,
by sea and land, and the Admiralty did not send to you the
appliances which, in September, yofi declared to be wanting,
because they believed, from your account, they would be nse.
less against a place which in the first instance you pronounced
to be impregnable. I could not bring myself to believe that
the want of Lancaster gnus, or even of mortars, rendered a sea
attack, on your plan of the 25th of September, impossible, if
you had 25 sail of the line re-assembled before the place, with
all their means of vertical fire. I am sincerely sorry to hear
that you are unwell. 1 hope that -Kiel Harbour and milder
air will restore your health.
This was the answer :
I can assure you, Sir James, it is far from my wish to enter
into a controversy with you, but I will not admit that I have
brought it on myself; there is not a word in either my pub.
lie or private letters that justifies the construction that you
and the Admiralty have thought proper to put upon them.
My letter in answer to their lordships' last despatch is plain
enough ; ebut if their lordships think proper to deliberate on
ono past of my letter, and ignore another part, I can only
protest against it • and I am quite' prepared to defend my-
self against any unjust attacks that are made against ma. I
have documents enough in my possession to justify my con.
duct. Enough has not been done to satisfy an impatieut
public, as you called them—some one must be blamed, and I
am the chosen ono ; but I will not allow myself to be crushed
because I could not do impossibilities. All this stir has been
caused by the reports of two engineers (one French and the
other English), diametrically opposed to each other ; in ad.
dition to which was the report of the capture of Setastopol,
not yet taken, though the fleet there is assisted by an army
of 70,000 men, in a fine climate ; and I have been expected
to take places much stronger with a fleet alone; and the same
people, who so often warned me against unnecessarily risk-
ing my fleet, are now dissatisfied because I did not expose
them to certain destruction. I presume you have seen Cap-
tain Sullivan by this time ; he is capable of opening the
eyes of the Government, if they are not hermetically scaled,
I have gone through the world with honour and credit to my-
self; and just as I am about to leave it unworthy attempts
are being made to ruin my reputation ; but they will fail, and
recoil ou themselves.

A. full report of the state of Sweehorg was made by him to
the First Lord of the .dmiralty, because he did not wish
it to get into the hands of the clerks ; and the hones would
be astonished to learn that that report was never laid before
the Beard of Admiralty, and the board knew nothing
about. it. The Admiralty wrote to him accusing him of
falsity ; it would have been more honourable in them to
have written to him and said they mistook his letter, and to
have made him an apolOgy, and there would have been an
end of this difference. Now he did netlike to make use of
hard words, and this was not the time to accuse a person
of high treason, but it appeared to him that the then First
Lord of the Admiralty was never serious in the Russian-.
war, because he gave him orders not to attack Sweaborg in
the summer time ; and if he had written to him inthe
summer the letters that he wrote .to him in the winter he
should most decidedly hare attacked Sweaborg. But the
moment winter came the right hon. baronet forgot all that
he had written to him in the summer, and tried to goa i him
on to attack those fortifications, when he had told him that
if he did so the fleet would probably have been lost. If the
Emperor of Russia had been First Lord of the Admiralty
he would have given him just the same orders that the
First Lord of the Admiralty did ; he would have forbade
him to attack the fortifications when it was just possible
to succeed, and he would have ordered him to do it when
it was impossible. Well, they came away from Nargen and
went toKiel, and shortly afterwards the whole fleet arrived
safe in England, after a most arduous campaign in a sea
that had never been navieetted bymuchafleet before. When
they arrived in England he wont, as in duty bound, to pay
his respects to the First Lord of the Admiralty, and he
must say that he was received iu a sneering way. They
knew how the right hon. baronet could sneer when he
chose. It was with the greatest difficulty that ho (Sir C.
Napier) kept hie temper. Sir Jas. Graham said to hilt
" You may tell me what you please, but I shall make no
reply." That was tho language used to him by the First
Lord of the Admiralty. When he got back to Portsmouth
he received an order to haul down his flag, and after that

interview he was not surprised at it. IHs did nut expect
to be sant to the B.►]tic again, and he never would have
served again under the right :ion. baronet after what had
taken place between them. Fie considered that nn man's
honour was safe in the right hon. baronet's li,nds, and the
board wrote to him a letter in which they said, " Though
their lordships have on some occasions not had that satiß-
faction in reading your reports as on others, they have
only to repeat that no censure has been passed on
your conduct with reference to the operations under your
orslers, and their lordships have already exp, eased their
sense of your services iu the manner customary with an
officer of your rank. Their lordships do not feel themselves
called upon to enter a second time into a diamaion on