The Sun.
London, England, 1856-05-03 00:00:00

FRANCE.

Our letter from Paris, dated yesterday evening,
had not arrived when our afternoon edition went
to press.

AUSTRIA.

VIENNA, April 29.—The 15th Article of the
Treaty of Peace bas caused a terrible panic among
the holders of the shares of the Danubian Steam
Navigation Company. It is felt that the mo-
nopoly of the Danube by the Austrian Company
must soon be at an end, and consequently the
shares have fallen 30f1. (31.) within two or three
days.

TEE TREATY OF *PEACE.

(Prom the Press of this day.)

No sooner is the treaty of peace, with the ac-
companying papers, laid on the table of the Legis-
lature than a new, unexpected, and most calami-
tous difficulty presents itself. We have no desire
to magnify the gravity of this circumstance ; it is
of a nature to force itself on the notice of every
man in this country, and to excite the strongest
feelings of apprehension.
We do not propose here to discuss the terms
of the treaty. They are in general of a satis-
factory character. The two points of most im-
portance to the commercial interests of the
world—the neutralisation of the Black Sea,
and the freedom of the Danube—have been fairly
carried cut. Russia has been removed from all
control over the mouth of that great watercourse,
which will hereafter assume new importance for all
purposes of communication with the countries of
Central Europe. We could have wished that a
decision had been taken to unite the two Da-

nubian provinces, as by such union they might
have possessed considerable internal strength,
and have grown into a prosperous and indepen-
dent state. We have not much faith in the
sovereign superintendence of Turkey ; but we
may hope, as a commission will sit to regulate,
in conjunction with the Porte, the constitution
and government of these provinces, that their wel-
fare will be duly cared for, and that they may be
freed from the vexatious intrigues and interfer-
ence of their powerful neighbours. The matter
which strikes us as of paramount importance in no
way concerns them.

It is necessary, however, to dwell for a moment
on the Convention between Russia and Turkey
which regulates the amount of naval force they
shall respectively maintsin in the Black Sea.
Each power may keep afloat six armed steam-ves-
sels of eight hundred tons, and four of two hundred
tons. The force is small, and is professedly for
purposes of pplice, but no statement is made
whether these vessels are, under any circumstances,
to be available for the enforcement of blockade.
On this point explanation is required. If such em-
ployment of this force—notwithstanding the terms
of the Treaty, that the Black Sea is formally in-
terdicted to war navies—would be lawful, we shall
probably soon hear that Russia has announced a
blockade of the Circassian coast. For, incredible
as it may seem, we do not find that any kind of
provision has been made to prevent Russia from
immediately employing her whole military power
to achieve the conquest of the Caucasus.
'When the fifth point, empowering the Allies to
bring forward conditions not expressly stated, came
to be discussed, Lord Clarendon asked for explana-
tions respecting the Russian forts on the Circas-
sian coast which had been partially destroyed. His
lordship seems to have argued—for the protocol on
this matter is exceedingly brief—that to restore
these forts would be to violate the principle of the
neutralisation a the Black Sea. The Russian
Plenipotentiaries held, on the contrary, that
there was an intelligible and broad distinction
between purely military forts and military *aval
arsenals. The point at issue was adjourned,
and we do not notice that it was again
brought under discussion. Lord Clarendon most
likely gave way
on this point, as he appears
to have done on every matter of real import-
ance brought under discussion. No question
seems ever to have been asked as to the use Rus-
sia designed to make of these forts, though that was
one of the most important questions which could
have come before the Conference.

In discussing the Asiatic frontier of Russia, and
her relation with the countries east of the Black
Sea, all mention of the Caucasus seems to have been
scrupulously avoided. It is well known that the
independent existence of the warlike tribes of that
country has had a powerful effect in preventing
Russia from extending her Transcaucasian domin-
ions. Since the period when Peter the Great first
invaded the Caucasus, Russia has never aban-
doned the hope of completely subjugating that
country. Her policy has been constant, though
her action has been intermittent and far from
vigorous. From various reasons she has never
taught it worth her while to put forth her
whole strength for the attainment of her object,
and the armies she has employed, though suf-
ficient to keep the Caucasians in check, have
never been sufficiently strong to overrun and
occupy the country. Hence the Caucasus has
subsisted as a curb upon Russian power at the
very gates of Asia Minor, and prevented that ex-
tension of her influence through Central Asia
which would certainly and immediately take place
if the barrier were overcome.
As connected with the legitimate aims of the
war, and as contributing to the safety of the Asiatic
prov'neea of Turkey, it was an object of the
highest importance to make some provision for
the independence of the Caucasus. Some guaran-
tee of the kind was demanded, not only from con-
siderations of sound policy, but from motives of
humanity and good faith. During the War the
Caucasians have been, in face, our allies ; we have
recognised the value of their successes against
our eueray, and have APPlaucled their irefiJapible

patriotism and splendid exploits. We will venture
to say that no independent person in this country
who ever seriously directed his thoughts to this
subject imagined for a moment that a peace would
be made without some stipulation in favour of this
heroic people. During the war in Asia Minor the
Circasians materially impeded the operations of our
enemy, and kept a portion of their forces in check.
To abandon them to the mercy of Russia after hav-
ing experienced the value of their services would
be, not only to commit a great blunder, but to per-
petrate an act of unparalleled baseness. By their
heroic efforts they have hitherto been enabled to pre-
serve their independence against an immense supe-
riority of force ; but it is very doubtful whether
they will be enabled to do so longer if now left to
fight their battle single-handed. The circumstances
of their relation to their foe are entirely changed.
By the action of the war the military power
of Russia has been so concentrated as to al-
low of an overwhelming force being directed
against the Caucasus. The Georgian army on
one part, and the Crimean army on the other,
are conveniently disposed for acting against
the Caucasus with irresistible numbers. A por-
tion of the Russo-Caucasian army, under Gene-
ral Khruleff, is, it appears, ready for action on
the spot. Tho army of Mouravieff, strengthened
and inspirited by the spoil of Kars, will be at once
available for the new theatre of operations opened
to it ; while the immense force in the Crimea, re-'
leased from the duty of maintaining its ground
against the allies, will be able to send reinforce-
ments to the scene of action to any extent that
may be required. The organisation of the army
for the conquest of the Caucasus is rapidly pro-
ceeding—regiments are now on their march to the
spot, and already we are informed by accounts
from St. Petersburg that large supplies of all kinds
are being forwarded for the use of the Caucasian
army.

It will be impossible for the Caucasians to resist
the invasion with which they are threateLed. The
military power which opposed England, France,
and Turkey in arms, is now to be directed solely
against them. They perceive their danger. As
we write, an announcement appears that a deputa-
tion from Circassia had arrived on the 24th of
April at Constantinople to request the recogni-
tion and the guarantee of their country by the
Porte. What answer will be returned to them ?
This subject could not have been overlooked by
our Government ; but, on the other hand, is it
possible that it has deliberately come to a re-
solution to connive at the conquest of the
Caucasus ? if so—and it does not appear that
amid the multifarious topics discussed at the
Conference one thought was given to this point
—we shall have concluded a peace which is in
reality no peace, as hostilities will continue on the
very borders of the Black Sea, and Russia will
probably at last close the war by a conquest which
she has been attempting for more than a century
past, which will prodigiously increase her power
and fame in Asia, and far more than compensate
her for the defeats she has sustained at the hands
of the Allies.

We believe that the public willawait explanations
on this point with the greatest anxiety. A contin-
gency has arisen which they had not the slightest
reason to expect. While we remained in ignorance of
what was passing at the Conference, the Russian
Government seems to have been making active pre-
parations for this new war, and all the resources
which had been accumulated in case the con-
test with the allies should have been con-
tinued, are now to be employed for the com-
plete and final subjugation of the Caucasus.
This result is so unlooked for and astound-
ing, that we can yet scarcely believe it possible.
We are sure that if a resolution has been,
indeed, arrived at to leave the Caucasians to their
fate, the people of t his country will regard it as
a most afflicting and dishonourable termi-
nation of the War ; and that it will entirely
destroy the satisfaction with which they
would otherwise have welcomed the return of
Peace. The thought that the Treaty just con-
cluded will be signalised on the part of Russia by
an overwhelming invasion of the Caucasus, and
the extermination of its heroic people, will cast a
gloom over the mind of the country, and make the
day appointed for rejoicing,a day of profound re-
gret and humiliation.