The Sun.
London, England, 1856-01-05 00:00:00

of the San Josef. in 1813, was appointed to Greenwich
Hospital in 1849. He entered the naval service in
July, 1807, as a first-class volunteer, on board the
Stork sloop, Captain George Le Guyt, stationed in
the Channel, where, until April, 1813, he continued
to serve, a great part of the time as midshipman, in
the Royal George, 100, flat, ship of Sir John Thomas
Duckworth, and San Josef, 110, Hibernia, 110, Ar-
mide, 38, and. Dublin, 74, all commanded by Captain
Richard Dalling Dunn. He then rejoined the San
Josef, as signal midshipman to Sir Richard King; and, li
on Nov. 5 following, had a leg shot off in a skirmish
with the fleet off Toulon. After a further attachment
to the Thisbe, 28, and Impregnable, 104 flag-ships in
the River Thames and at Plymouth of the Hon. Arthur
Kay Legge and Sir J. T. Duckworth, Mr. Cuppage was
awarded a commission, dated April 6, 1815. He subse-
quently joined, Aug. 18 following, the Roohfort, 74,
Captain Sir Arch. Collingwood Dickson, lying at Ports-
mouth ; served, from Oct. 3, in the same year, until
Nov. 21, 1820, on board the Magicienne, 36, Orlando,
36, and Minden, 74, flag-ships in the East Indies of Sir
Richard King; and was next appointed, Aug. 20,
1822, to the Arab, sloop, Captain William Holmes, off
the coast of Ireland ; July 1, 1823, to the Isis, 50,
hearing the flag in the West Indies of Sir Laurence
William Halsted ; Aug. 10, 1825, to the Warspite, 76,
Captain Sir James Brisbane, on the South American
station ; and Aug. 4, 1826, and Jan. 18, 1827, to
the Boadicea, 46, Captain William Fairbrother Car-
roll, and Java, 52, flag-ship of Rear-Admiral William
Hall Gage, both in the East Indies. Of the Java he
assumed command, as second captain, Dec. 24, 1527 ;
and, on the ultimate return of that ship to England,
was advanced to post rank July 22, 1830. He was not
afterwards afloat. Captain Cuppage obtained, April 4,
1816, a pension of 911. ss.
The late Captain Cuppage, from all we have heard,
will be painfully missed in the society in which he moved,
as his gentlemanly bearing and amiable manners en-
deared him to a large circle of friends and acquaintances.
By the demise of this gallant officer a valuable civil ser-
vice appointment falls to the gift of the First Lord of
the Admiralty, who, judging from the past, will doubt-
less select a deserving officer to fill up the vacancy. By
the Parliamentary return before us we find the appoint-
ment is worth about 4501. a year, with apartments, &c.,
but without the half-pay of the rank. Why, we know
not, as we perceive by Mr. Hume's return that the half-
pay is allowed to some ranks in the hospital.
Captain Cuppage's commissions bear date as follows :
Lieutenant, 1815 ; commander, 1827 ; captain, 1830.
WA have no doubt that Sir Charles Wood will be be-
sieged by applications, and we are equally sure that the
•
services rendered by officers during the present war will
not be permitted to interfere with the glories of our
veterans now, alas 1 dropping rapidly into the grave.

THE MILITIA.
A -young man, about 27 years of age, descended
from a noble family, after six months' service in the
Inverness-shire Militia, has been made colonel of that
regiment ! He never smelt powder except in sport on
the hills, with pointers under his command. There is
nothing in his past history to show that he possesses
a martial spirit, thirsting for glory at the cannon's
mouth ; nor, so far as we are aware, has he ever given
evidence of any remarkable accomplishments, or any-
thing to make him conspicuous among the young no-
bility of Scotland. How, then, it may be asked, has
he been promoted over the heads of his brother officers
in the regiment I Sir A. P. Gordon Cumming is
major, and if a vacancy in the colonelcy occurred he
was the right man for the right place. He has had
13 years' service in the 71st Regiment of Foot and 4th
Dragoons as a recommendation. He was five years in
Canada at the time of the rebellion, and was officially re-
ported as an "efficient officer." Suppo&ng Major Cum-
ming to have been passed over there was next, Captain
James Duff, late of the 74th Regiment, with twelve
years' service in Canada, and who, besides this, saw a
very great deal of hard fighting among the Kafirs in
Southern Africa. No officer in a militia regiment could
have taken more trouble to put it in a proper state of dis-
cipline than Captain Duff has taken with the Ineerness-
shire Militia. Besides these two officers, whose services
gave them the first claim, there was the Hon. James
Grant, late of the 42d Regiment, who also should have
come in far promotion before a mere strippling with no
experience whatever of a military life, and, in other re-
spects, possessing no claim to promotion over the heads
of senior and experienced officers. How has this young
man been so greatly out of his turn ? lie has the good
fortune to he the son of a Highland laird, his father, is
Lerd Lieutenant of Inverness-shire, and has the power
to appoint a colonel to the regiment. Lord Panmuro,
as
Secretary at War, has nothing to do in the matter. All
he can do is to look on and frown. Lord Lovat reprss
Rents the Horse Guards in this district, in virtue of being
Lord-Lieutenant of Inverness-shire, an office to
which he, too, was appointed out of his turn. Lord
Glenelg, a Whig, should have obtained that office. He was
a man of ahifity, and rendered good service to the Mel-
bourne Administration. But Lord Lovat had interest in
high quarters, and the power with which he was invested
now appears in one of the most barefaced acts of injus
tie° towards deserving officers that could have occurred
in any regiment. He has not, honoured his son ;he has
dressed him in tawdry lace, which is a mockery to the
military profession— a kind of caricature, which only
raises deii,don instead of respect. Paternal love is com-
mendable, but folly cannot be respected, even among
British peers. The lad cannot, in the nature of things,
with six months' service at Fort George, be capable of
discharging, with anything like efficiency, the duties of
his new position, and his indulgent father has made hitn
the laughing-stock of a whole regiment. What can
Major Cumming, Captain Duff, or Captain Grant think
of their colonel ? What can the non-commissioned offi
core and privates think of him ? and what will the coun-
try think of a job of which any Highland laird might
he ashamed '1 We blush to record it. It is an insult on
the militia throughout the country, and we hope a me-
, mot ial will be presented to the Secretary of State, pray-
ing the Queen to vindicate the honour of the Militia by
cancelling the appointment.--Daily News.

SENTENCE OF DEATH UPON A NAVAL
OFFICER.

( From the Times of this day.)
A discussion of the events which have led to the
fall of Kars may seem like the consultation of
Moliere's doctors as to what ought to have been
done to save the dead man. The frontier fortress
of Turkish Asia has surrendered, and if the enemy
make no further progress it is owing more to the
nature of the country, the distance of the Russian
resources, and the bitter cold of those desolate
highlands, than to the presence of defenders.
Mouravieff may well declare that the Ottoman
opposed to him has ceased to exist. The troops
under Selim Pasha, despatched by the Porte to
the relief of the invested place, are safe in Erze-
roum only because the Soghanli range of hills is at
present almost impassable. Everywhere a spell
has seemed to bind the efforts of the Allies in the
Asiatic war. That grievous faults have been com-
mitted is now evident. It is easy to say what
might have been done to save Kars and the coun-
try it commands, and, though some may urge that
any observations made now are a criticism after
the event, yet we shall not hesitate to discuss the
subject, in the hope that by examining the causes
of former failure we may find the secret of future
success. The maxim that what cannot be reme-
died ought to be forgotten does not certainly apply
to the art of war. In no spirit of censoriousness,
then, we call attention to the fact that Omer Pasha
has fallen back on the coast, and now has his
head-quarters at Soukum Kaleh. Thus ends the
diversion which was to threaten the Russian pos-
sessions in Asia, and call Mouravieff from Kara to
defend Tiflis. It is iow some weeks since we ex-
primed an opinion that the valley of the Phasis and
the ridges of Armenia were too distant from each
other and too much disconnected as seats of war for
an advance into Imeritia with a moderate force to
affect the fate of Kars. That judgment has been
unfortunately verified. The small and ill-provided
army of Omer Pasha, after being two months on
the coast, could do little more than march to the
Ingour. The combat on the banks of that stream
was a brilliant affair, but the contest was already
decided ; a fortnight after the starving garrison of
Kars laid down its arms, and nothing remained for
the Turkish General but to provide for his own
safety. We know so little of the movements in
this region that it is difficult to form any judg-
ment of the causes which led immediately to his
retreat. It is probable, however, that the Russians
with a larger and better army, were defending po-
sitions between Khoni and Kutais. Omer Pasha
also knew that the fall of Kars had freed the army
of Mouravieff, and that, although the march of the
Russian General must be a work of great labour,
and perhaps impossible for his whole army, yet in
six weeks from General Williams' surrender a
Russian force might be in the country sufficient to
destroy his own, if he lingered so far in the inte-
rior. A successful assault and the capture of Ku-
tais would hardly improve his position, for the
place might be surrounded, no stock of provisions
could be laid in, the country was hostile, and in a
short time Kutais must have fallen like Kars. It
was therefore but common prudence to hasten back
to the coast, where a fortified position will protect
his army until the ensuing spring. It will then be
seen how far it is capable of further operations.
We now learn that the Porto is intent on de-
vising means to check any Russian advance. The
enemy's light troops may with returning spring
ravage the country up to the gates of Erzeroum.
Of course the trade, which, though not large ac-
cording to English notions, is yet of great impor-
tance to the East, is now at an end. Further con-
quest may be improbable, but yet the occupation of
two provinces gives a high position to the Czar.
Re is hardly likely to yield Kilia and Ismail without
a struggle, when he has the frontiers of Persia
and Turkey in his hands. It is said that 10,000
men will be detached from the army of Omer
Pasha and will concentrate at Trebizond. Other
troops will join them, and then it is promised that
something shall be done. Now, ono thing is per-
fectly clear—that we are just where we were a
year since, except that we have lost Kars. All the
obstacles to the last Asiatic campaign will exist
this year, the same difficulties must be overcome,
the same country and the same military plans must
be studied. It is therefore with a view to
practical results that the failure of last year may
be examined with advantage. The question was
fully debated in our Constantinople correspondence
on Thursday. It is plain that there was neglect
and error, but opinions differ as to who were the
most guilty. The chief responsibility at first sight
falls on the Turkish Government ; but who can
speak seriously of the Turkish Government on a
military question ? It is well known that for
nearly two years the allies have directed the Otto-
man armies as contingents to their own. They
brought Omar Pasha from the Danube to. the
Crimea ; they conveyed at a vast expense nearly
60,000 soldiers to Eupatoria ; they hurried the
commander to and fro between that place and K't-
miesh, as their own plans demanded. It was their
counsels which the Porte followed when it com-
manded Omer Pasha, in August, to advance for

the defence of Kars. The allies, therefore, mus
consider the failure at Kars as their own, just as
much as they claim the victory at Sebastopol.
There were, indeed, great excuses for their gene-
rals. A twelvemonth since the war in the Crimea
was a contest of which many despaired. We were
in the midst of the calamities of the winter, and
tales of the hospitals and of the troop-ships were agi-
tating every heart. At that time the great fault was
committed. Eupatoria had been taken, and it was
thought necessary to retain it at any cost. The
Turks wore accordingly sent there. Gen. Williams
had gone to Asia to reorganise what had been once
an a,riny, and he anticipated important succours
and brilliant operations. It was popularly said
that no one would regret having attached himself
to the Asiatic army of 1855. So far as personal fame
is concerned, this prophesy has proved true ; but
far different were the hopes with which it was
uttered. The army of Anatolia was forgotten, both
by statesmen and the public, until Kars was in-
vested. Even then the news fell on unheeding ears.
We had just suffered the bloody repulse of the Re-
dan ; three months of sapping necessary to final
snccess had just begun. The greatness of the dan-
ger was unknown or disregarde, and, when it was
resolved to act, all action was vain. We are now
in a different position. True, the Russians have
gained a great advantage, one which it would be
folly to under-estimate. They hold a place forti-
fied by a British engineer on the newest principles
of science. By its capture their left flank rests on
a lofty mountain ridge 8,000 feet above the sea,
and where, even in spite of recent events, we may
say a winter campaign is impracticable. They can
traverse and waste before an approaching enemy
the whole neighbouring country. Their position
in this region is probably the strongest that they
hold at any spot likely to be the scene of war. On
tho other hand, we have no longer Sebastopol before
us. Troops amounting to a large army may be de-
tached from the vast assemblage now encamped in
the Crimea. Then, indeed, though with care and
forethought, the campaign may be attempted
in which Omer Pacha has failed. A force of
60,000 men, well supplied with transport, able,
from their own supplies, to traverse a devastated
country, and with commanders skilful enough to
ford defended rivers and break through fortified
chains of hills, may, after no very long campaign,
threaten Tiflis, and cause the Russian power in
Asia to fear utter destruction. It may, perhaps,
be difficult to carry on the war with effect at once
in the Crimea and Transcaucasia, but we have at
least this advantage—that we can choose our field,
and strike the blow where it will bo most keenly
felt. Of all things, however, an undecided course
is the most dangerous. Unless the allies are reso-
lute to send large and well-equipped armies to Asia
it is better that Omar Pasha should remain where
he is. If we have other work to do in 1856, let
Georgia wait till 1857. Let not the achievements
of the present year be marred towards its close by
another disaster like Kars, or another empty enter-
prise like the diversion in relief of it.