The Sun.
London, England, 1870-09-01 00:00:00

OUR MILITARY ORGANISATION.

The Standard disputes Lord Elcho's broad conclusions
that " Mr. Cardweli's conduct of military affairs is in the
main sound and calculated to inspire army
reformers with confidence and hope." That
administration cannot be sound which produces
the fruits which Lord Elcho describes. According to
Lord Elcho's statement, the total regular army of Great
Britain, the army which is the last result of the combi-
nation of " diminished expenditure" with " increased
efficiency," the army which is to maintain the first line
of the home defence, to assert our national position
in the world, to enable us to discharge our treaty
obligations to Belgium, and to defend the colonies,
consists of 50,870 infantry, 10,654 cavalry soldiers, with
6,539 horses, and 180 guns. Our companies of infantry
have scarcely more than a third of their proper numbers.
Our batteries of artillery are at half their war strength.
Our cavalry is little more than half mounted. So much,
then, for "increased efficiency." Of the new reserves,
for which the War Minister has taken so much credit, it
is shown that only 2,000 men, that is those of the first class,
are available for the filling up of the cadres of our cavalry
and infantry regiments. The second class, consisting
of 19,000 men, are old pensioners, not liable to foreign
service, and who have no regular. place in the line of
the British army. 'ln addition to these we have some 20,000
militia, who have been enlisted on condition of being liable
to be, transferred to the regular army in case of emer-
gency. But these, as Lord Elcho observes, are
not trained soldiers. As to the extra 20,000 soldiers
which Mr. Cardwell was compelled to ask for, in view of
the present critical state of affairs on the Continent, the
very fact that they were so required proves, as Lord
Elcho justly contends, the utter unsoundness of the
system of reserve which had been introduced by Mr.
Cardwell, especially for occasions of emergency like the
present.

Speaking of the difficulty of officering the Militia,
the Daily News remarks that the promotion in this body
is very uncertain, and seems wholly to depend on
the caprice of Lords Lieutenant and colonels of
regiments. A subaltern who does not happen to
have influenee has small encouragement to !make himself
efficient, because, however hard he may have laboured to
render himself a useful officer, he is always exposed to the
risk of having somebody else promoted over his head, or
a new man brought into the regiment at once as his
superior. In a military force in which this can be, and
frequently is, done, we cannot be surprised that
any approach to zeal among the subalterns should be want-

ing, and that many who, under another system, would be
ready to join it, now keep themselves aloof. It is this
peculiarity which principally causes the disinclination
of Militia officers to avail themselves even of the
advantages they at present possess for learning
their duties. It has been suggested that a
number of non-commissioned officers of the Line
should be granted commissions in the Militia. The
adjutants of all the Militia Artillery, and certain of
the Militia Infantry, Regiments were non•commis-
sioned4 officers either in the Artillery or the Line.
On the limited scale on which it has been tried
the experiment has succeeded, and these officers
have all along proved the salt of the corps into which
they were introduced. There is every reason to antici-
pate that the plan, if extended, would be of great benefit
to the service.