The Sun.
London, England, 1848-11-01 00:00:00

out effect—On-tirtnith the British troops carried the
Humrnund Ghurree or outwork, having previously oc..
' cupied a position close beside it. Front this nest' pest
the batteries were supposed likely to be able to fire into
the fort and town without impediment, and ever) thing
now seemed drawing to an auspicious close. IL was
hoped that breaching might be begun almost at once,
and, considering that we were within almost point blank
distance of the walls, it was supposed that in 30 or 40
hours at the outside the assault might be commenced—
when a sudden act of treachery on the part of our allies
blighted all our prospects, and compelled us to raise this siege and convert the besieging army into one of obser-
vation. It has been repeatedly stated that Shere Singh,
a Seikh officer and nobleman of distinction, was dis-
patched early in May by the Durbar, with a force of
3,000 men, with a view, it was said, of keeping the Monl-
raj in check. We know little of his proceeding until we
find him in company with Colonel Courtlandt and Lieut.
Edwardes before Moulton. It does not appear that he
took any active share in military operations, and his fide-
lity was said to be held more than questionable. Early
in July his father, Chuttur Singh, Governor in the Ha-
zareh province at the other extremity of the Punjaub,
headed an insurrection still in progress, and said to have
been promoted with a view of taking advantage of the
absence of our troops from Lahore. About seven o'clock
on the morning of the 14th information was brought to
Lieutenant Edwardes that the Raja Shtre Singh had
gone over to the enemy, taking with him above 5,000
Seikhs with 12 guns and howitzers, and 80 of the lighter
pieces called zumboorucks. The movement appeared to
have taken both parties equally by surprise; latterly we
had in some measure ceased to suspect; and so dubi-is
was the Dewan of the trustworthiness of his uew allies
that he for a time assigned them quarters beyond the
walls, but under the batteries of the town. With so
formidable a defection from our strength—so large an
accession to that of the enemy—it became at once ob-
vious that it would be imprudent for the present to
continue the siege. We had already seen with
what desperation our opponents were determined
to resist us; and with 5,000 added to their num-
bers—men belonging to the old Seikh army, and who
knew that now they fought with halters round their
neck and could not even look for quarter=it was vain
to proceed until reinforcements , arrived. General
Whish, therefore, had his camp removed to a safe dis-
tance from their batteries, while the guns and all the '''
working parties were called in,ratid our foree was trans-
formed into an army of observation occupying a forti-
fied camp. Our rear was annoyed but not much da-
maged by the enemy. We had been but a short-time
in our new position when it became evident that we
should find ourselves much more agreeably situated a
considerable way further from the town ; we accord-
ingly once more decamped, and on the 17th took up a
post 18 miles from Moultan in the direction of Baha-
wulpore. Particulars of its movement have not hitherto
reached us further than this—that the material pre-
pared for the siege, a large quantity of ammunition, and
a month's supply of biscuits, had fallen into the hands of
the enemy. Animadversions on the arrangements of
General Whish are very severe ; we are said to have
permitted the enemy to strengthen himself at every
point most strongly and elaborately in the suburbs, and
then to have proceeded as if there were no obstruction
in our way. A considerable portion of the troopszjaicb.
went over with Shere Singh seenidisposed to gait Mal-
tan with as little delay as possible.
The moment the tidings of this unfortunate affair
reached bead-quarters, preparations began to be made
to reinforce the besieging army. The Bombay Govern-
ment was written to by express, and orders immediately
issued far assembling an army of 9,000 men at Roree
under command of Brigadier Dundas, of her Majesty'.
Rifles. Of these, 2,000 are Europeans. It is not likely
they will be required to do more than perform' the duties
of an army of reserve or observation—perhaps they
may afterwards be called on to occupy the city after the
siege is over should the Bengal troops be needed else-
where. They can hardly reach Moultan before Christ-
mas, and if the town is not ours early in November, it
will be strange indeed. At Ferozepore there are about
4,000, at Lahore about 8,000 men, and these will be rein-

forced immediately to 7,000 and 12,000 respectively.
The siege train from Sakkur is said to have been order
up; this, in addition to 34 pieces of heavy, and as matir
of light, ordnance, now in camp, will make the artillery
arm of the force very powerful indeed. A force of
10,000 men, of which details have not as yet been sup-
plied, is meanwhile being formed on the Lahore side
under the command of General Gilbert ; and this will,
without loss of time, more on Moultan, so that the
1 army before the place will :shortly be as strong as that
1 which fought at Moodkee, or that with which in
April, 1842, General Pollock forced his way to Caubul.
The Delhi Gazette states, that the army to be formed at
Ferozepore will consist of five European regiments
(5,000), with 16 corps of Native Infantry—say 750 each
(12,000), and six regiments of cavalry (2,000), nine
troops of horse artillery, and five field batteries (1,500)—
in all, above 29,000 men.* Whether this includes the
force now at Ferozepore, or whether the whole is meant
for service, does not appear. It certainly is a strange
display of tactics to send 7,000 men to take a town
which, on the desertion of a detachment whose faithful-
ness from the first was doubtful, requires a reinforce-
' ment of 25,000. Our latest news from Moultan is
brought by steamer and comes down to the 18th. This
is two days later than that received by the Delhi route,
the intercourse in this direction appearing for the pre-
sent to be interrupted. At present the accounts which •
reach us from many quarters bear the impress of such
excessive exaggeration that we are compelled very csre-
fully to sift them—omitting all that seem improbal4* or
transparently untrue. We think the correctness of the
greater part of what has been stated may be relied upon.
We must caution the European reader against believing
much more than has been set down. The statements of
the alarmists may prove correct—we have hitherto for
the most part found them to be the contrary, and at pre-
sent most assuredly we entirely disbelieve them.
Such are the bitter fruits of vacillation and hesitations
while we were debating upon the size of the army to be
sent and the most fitting time for sending them—calcu-
lating how much cost or inconvenience might be incurred.
or probable sickness occasioned by a march one month
compared with that by another we were tempting
traitors into the field and holding out a bribe for insure
rection. A strong brigade half the size of our army of
observation under General Whish would, if dispatched
in May, have settled the matter in a week's time. By
delay and vacillation, a chance explosion of anger and
haphazard attack, accompanied by murder, where the
deed was hardly done when the actors were horror-struck
at their position, has waxed into a widely-ramified and
deep-rooted treason—fast rooted to the spot from whence
it sprung, and extending itself through every part of
the Seikh dominions. The slaughter that may now be
looked for as the denouement is tremendous. We have to
contend with brave, highly disciplined, and perfectly
desperate men, fighting under the joint influence of
religious seal and the knowledge that their lives are for-
feited. We can under such circumstances neither expect
nor exhibit mercy—on both sides it must be war to the
knife—and after the victory, if ours, our artillery must
complete the carnage which otherwise would devolve on
the hands of the executioner.