The Sun.
London, England, 1870-10-29 00:00:00

IHE SUS, LONDON, SATUR

THE WAR.

THE CAPITULATION OF METZ.

The surrender of the great French fortress was appa-
rently unattended with any of those favourable conditions
which Bazaine strove to attain. It has been absolute,
like the capitulation of Sedan. It is now well ascertained
that for some time negotiations have passed between the
commander of the French armies, Prince Frederick
Charles, and King William. But the very fact that the
Marshal was so reduced as to be compelled to parley at all
shewed that the end of his resources was near, and so
encouraged the German leaders to refuse all terms in the
expectation of the complete triumph which has at length
rewarded them. Bazaine, too, made some overtures re-

spatting peace and the future Government of France,
but they have come to nothing. It was natural that the
commander of the only regular force remaining to his
nation should desire to exert some influence upon the
general conduct of the war, but it was not easy to suggest
a practicable scheme for giving that desire effect. The
administration of the country was in the hands of the
Republicans, they commanded all the national resources
save those of Metz, and it was not in the slightest degree
probable that anything Marshal Bazaine might resolve
would receive attention. There was nothing for it but to
consider the surrender as a strictly military event.
Starvation has done the work. The locking up of such
a large army within the range of the fortress made it im-
possible to take the place by siege; but the process of
starvation was all the more quickly accomplished. The
food in the fortress would have lasted the garrison of
16,000 or 20,000 men for a very long period. It has been
eaten up by the army and the garrison together in
about seventy days. How the number of un-
wounded prisoners reaches 150,000 is not clear.
The French army under Bazaine at Courcelles on the
14th, at Vionville on the 16th, and at Gravelotte on the
18th of August, was made up, as an official French
telegram informed us at the time, of the following
corps :-50,000 men of the Marshal's own corps, 30,000 of
General Ladmirault's corps, 25,000 of Frossard's corps,
and the Imperial Guard 25,000 strong—in all 130,000 men.
The garrison of Metz never exceeded 20,000 men, so
that altogether the forces in and around the fortress only
reached the figure of 150,000, before any losses had been
sustained through three great battles, the numerous
sorties, or by disease. These losses must have been tre-
mendous—indeed, nobody outside Metz would have sus-
pected that Bazaine had latterly more than fifty
thousand men under his orders, exclusive of the garrison.
The commander of the fortress, General Coffiniere, and
Marshal Bazaine were not agreed as to the mode of sur
render. On October 21st General Coffiniere informed the
Marshal that he could supply no more pro• isions, and
that his army must shift for themselves. Thereupon
Marshal Bazaine ordered his outposts to cease firing on
the German pickets, and tacitly allowed his men
to desert in groups of a dozen or two, which
were accepted by the German outposts as pri-
soners. Larger bodies were refused acceptance.
It was at first designed to make an irruption en masse on
Gravelotte, not with the hope of saving the army, but
simply to compel the Germans to take them prisoners, so
that the fortress might hold out longer with its compara-
tively small garrison. Marshal Bazaine, however,
persuaded Coffiniere that the necessary effusion
of blood would be too dear a price to pay
for a few weeks' prolongation of resistance. A mes-
senger was sent, on the 24th, to Prince Frederick
Charles, intimating the intention of the fortress to capitu-
late. This was the first proposition yet made which in-
cluded both the fortress and the outside army. On the
25th, General Changarnier, as plenipotentiary, spent
an hour with the Prince. He went away
from the interview much disturbed, and after-
wards, in excusing some forgetfulness of which notice
had been taken, said, "No wonder, the Prince was so
severe." By arrangement at this meeting, General
Stickles and Colonel von Herznurg, the Chief of the
Staff and Quartermaster-General of the Prince's army,
rode to Frescaty, a chateau three miles due south of Metz,
and just within the German lines. The two French com-
manders, together with Humbert, second in command in
the fortress, had been taken there by a Prussian post-
chaise. The meeting lasted from •six o'clock to seven
o'clock in the evening, and resulted in a but partial agree-
ment. At a further meeting, however, everything was
settled. 7he intention of the French to make a general
irruption was known to the Germans, who had collected
large forces at Gravelotte.

FRENCH PREPARATIONS IN THE
NORTH.

The special correspondent of the Telegraph, writing
from Amiens, Octobsr 26, says :—The general tone of
the news brought in from different points during the last
few days has greatly raised the already good spirits
of the troops gathered here ; and, unless some
unforseen blunder should be committed, we at
Amiens are in a position to hold our own, even
against a tolerably large force of the enemy. What
I like least in the preparations. for the defence is
tue giving of firearms to the working men who
are not soldiers—although, as is always the case in France,
a very great number of them have at one time or other
served in the ranks. That they have themselves asked for
these arms is true ; and that nine out of ten are able to
use them I have no doubt whatever. But, in a war like
the present, to arm men who don't wear uniform is like
playing a game of chance with immense odds against you.
These Frenchmen are so excitable, and reason so little
when they are excited, that it is a very great chance
whether artisans with muskets, and not under the imme-
diate control of officers, will not, should they be obliged
to retire, bring about street firing—which will, in th e
event of defeat, simply cause the utter ruin of this fine
town. I must say the whole population of the North are
now raised to such a pitch of fury against the enemy,
that I really believe they could go anywhere and
do anything. It is almost impossible to conceive the
change that has come over Amiens during the last three
weeks. Apart from the clergy, the citizens above sixty,
and the women, hardly a living soul more than sixteen
years of age is not armed in some way or other, either as
a Mobile, as a National Guard, or with a musket
on his own account. The town is full to overflowing
of Mobiles, who have lately learnt their drill
well, have been armed and equipped like regular troops,
and are full of quiet, confiding courage. Marchings out
and marchings in, drills, firing at marks, and going out
on reconnaissance, occupy the whole day. The shops
are driving a roaring trade in revolvers, Chassepots,
military caps, tunics, blankets, flannel shirts, and all
that a soldier requires for • a campaign. Many of the
Mobiles are young men, who have some means
of their own ; and the readiness with which these persons
not only incur privations themselves, but assist their
poorer comrades, is pleasant to see. And when I note the
wonderful improvement all these young troops have made
in:their drill during the last few weeks, I can readily be-
lieve the good that I bear of such as are defending
Paris. Nor are the National Guards behind the
Mobiles in zeal. Every man among them seems to be
anxious about one thing, and one thing only—namely,
that he may become an efficient soldier, and be able to do
his duty before the enemy. Some four or five times I
have seen the National Guard of Amiens turned out at a
moment's notice, and on each occasion the very small
number of absentees has greatly surprised me. To get
under arms late in the day, with a fierce wind blowing,
and a continual rain falling—to have to march out
some six or seven, , miles wet through and through,
and then to come home about midnight in the
same uncomfortable condition—is certainly not a com-
fortable proceeding, particularly when a cold, damp
autumn has fairly set in. Yet this is done day after day
by a very large body of men who are accustomed to every
comfort, and who, unlike the soldiers of the regular army,
have nothing to expect in the way of promotion or other
advantages.