The Sun.
London, England, 1848-02-14 00:00:00

THE NATIONAL DEFENCES.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SUN.
SIR,—As steam has now deprived England of its
former insular security, it becomes necessary to con-
sider how far, as a semi-continental state, her means
of defence will bear a comparison with those of neigh-
bouring nations. This comparison, when made, is
certainly more striking than satisfactory, for while
France has an army 350,000 strong, and a national
guard numbering nearly a million, Prussia a standing
army of about 300,000 men, with every male inha-
bitant trained to arms, and Austria a regular army of
about 400,000, the force at present in all England
does not exceed 10,000 men, of whom scarcely more
than one-half would be immediately available to meet
an enemy at any given point. Almost any one of the
smaller Germ an duchies could therefore show a more re-
spectable defensive force than England. The passage of
the Channel by means of steam-boats can scarcely in
the present day be considered so difficult as was the pas-
sage of the Rhine, and of many other rivers which were
crossed by the French army in the face of an enemy,
during the last war, without that means of convey-
ance. The Prussian Government might at any
moment of danger remove the bridges of boats which
cross the Rhine, but the steam-vessels which will at
some future day bridge the;English Channel, may lie
safely in French harbours until they are required.
The passage of the Channel may, therefore, by the
aid of such means, be considered easier than that of
the Rhine, and England consequently more open than
Prussia to invasion by France. If such is the case,
the means of defence prepared by each country are
ludicrously at variance, and the writer believes that
the adoption of the Prussian system of general mili-
tary training would be popular, and as useful to the
people of England, both physically and morally, as it
has been to those of Prussia, while it would at the
same time render us almost invincible as a nation, and
that by strictly constitutional means.
Were not the subject one requiring serious conside-
ration, it would be somewhat amusing to observe the
number of untenable arguments which- have been
lately brought forward by the advocates of :" national
defencelessness."
Mr. Cobden, for instance, reposes his confidence on
the pacific disposition of the French people, though
the whole history of Europe! for seviral centuries
past, more than sufficiently proves an extremely op-
posite tendency on their part.
His next reliance is on the omnipotence of free trade
as an angel of peace, though no nation of Europe has
hitherto reciprocated our advances in that direction,
and the principle is therefore inoperative, and though
Christianity itself has for above eighteen centuries
failed_ to bring peace among men.
Some persons believe that the wealth of England
will protect her under all circumstances, whereas her
wealth is really the lore, and unless it be judiciously
employed in creating defences while there is yet time,
has no defensive property in itself. Others trust to
the 'moral and political influence which this
country possesses in Europe, without sufficiently
considering that as soon as war is declared
those influences cease, and that nations are not chival-
rous enough to rush to the defence of other nations,
more particularly of such as ought to be quite capable
of defending themselves. Some persons profess to
believe that there are no points along our coast at
which an enemy could effect a landing, though all
who choose to make inquiries on this subject] will
find that every county abounds in such places.
England his herself landed troops at the Texel, and
in Egypt, in the face of an enemy's force, without
any difficulty, and with small loss.
Many trust entirely to our navy for defence as in
days of yore, without considering the change which
steam has effected, in respect to the efficiency of our
" wooden walls," and, as though a squadron possessed
the marvellous gift of übiquity. Even in former
times our navy fell far short of this gift, for the
French force under La Hoche, was, before landing
in Ireland, buffetted about for three weeks, without
being seen by either of two fleets, which we had on
the look out for it. _ _ .

It also remains to be proved whether, considering
the great improvements effected in the French navy
of late years, ours may prove as superior in power as
formerly, and it would be the extreme of rashness to
expose the safety of a great empire to the chance, or
accident, of our fleet' meeting that of the enemy,
even supposing the result of the encounter to be less
uncertain than such matters ever must be.
With such persoris- as`-biliove that an undisciplined
body of men could resist the progress of a regular
French army on land, it would only be a waste of
words to argue this question.
By- consulting Alison's History of Europe, they
will find that during the whole course of the last war,
thereiwas no instance, unless in the Tyrol, and partially
in Spain, of the French arms being effectually resisted
by any such levy en masse. There are probably in
London about 300,000 men capable of bearing arms,
yet it may with entire respect to them be stated, that
unless previously disciplined, any general would
prefer 20,000 regular troops to that whole number,
for either offensive or defensive warfare.

In England we especially love peace, domestic
comfort, and the pursuit of wealth, whereas
in France the idols of a large proportion
of the people are war, glory, and conquest, and this
innate difference of disposition is nut sufficiently con-
sidered by our countrymen, who argue from their own
feelings against the probability of a war. With every
respect for the French people as the bravest, most
polished nation of the Continent, it is impossible to
conceal from ourselves that their tastes and feelings
incline to war, and, above all, to a war with Eng-
land. All our compatriots who have resided much
among them admit this fact, and however much we
may deplore the feeling, it is imperatively necessary
that we should be prepared against its consequences.
Some of the German journals have lately expressed
an opinion, which may at least be considered impar-
tial, that the next European war will, in all probabi-
lity, arise from the defenceless state of England en-
couraging our neighbours to snatch at a temporary
advantage, and I believe that the possession of
London for even a month would give more general
joy in France than the conquest of half
the Continent. The one would be a new
pleasure, the other a mere repetition of an old
one. Once possessed of London, I would respect-
fully request Mr. Cobden, as an economist, to con-
sider whether a smaller ransom than a hundred
millions, and the cession of our East Indian posses-
sions would suffice to purchase our deliverance. Mr.
C. Speaks of our exciting jealousy in France by any
preparation, and should our armaments ever be raised
to as high a level as hers, there might then exist
some reasonable grounds for such a feeling, brat in
our present state of defencelessness, as compared with
every other country of Europe, we are certainly
entitled to a monopoly of the feeling of jealousy, and
Mr. Cobden should be an enemy to all monopolies.
It is from a sincere and anxious desire for the preser-
♦ation of peace, and as being the most likely means for
the prevention of war, that the writer hopes to see
the defences of the country, both naval and military, as
well as that of the militia force, placed at once upon such
a footing as shall at least discourage, if not prevent,
aggression. The French budget for the present year
certainly shows a slight reduction in both the mili-
tary and naval estimates, but it must not be for-
gotten that the Chamber of Deputies passed three
years ago an extraordinary and special vote, equal to
3,700,000/. sterling, for the purpose of build-
ing ninety-three new war-steamers, a con3iderable
number of which are now in progress.
England has generally been overtaken by war in an
unprepared state, and has suffered reverses in conse-
quence. An opinion is now, however, prevalent, that
within a few days after the next declaration of hos-
tilities, she may have to encounter a French army on
her own soil ; the necessity for preparation is there-
fore much more imminent than in former days. The
English Government is not ♦ery likely either to
provoke or declare war, but it cannot prevent that of
France from doing :so, and it is generally admitted
that even within the last eight years the two countries
have been three times on the verge of hostilities.
Should the Prince de Joinyille happen to possess
any influonce with his brother the future Regent, it
is highly probable that such an event cannot be long
retarded.

Sir William Molesworth and Mr. Cobden have
declared their disbelief of any hostile feeling towards
this country on the part of France ; but if neither
Admiral Lalandes' letter addressed to the Minister
of France, proposing to destroy the English fleet, and
afterwards embark troops at Toulon for the invasion
of England, nor th► Prince de Joinville's pamphlet
pointing out haw by means of a fleet of steam
frigates a blow might be " struck at the heart
of England" if neither the revealment of Admiral
Bowles in regard to the contemplated destruc-
tion of Portsmouth, nor the plan laid before
Louis, Philippe by his generals for the capture of
London, can satisfy their minds on this point, it seems
doubtful whether any evidence shortiof the appear-
ance of a French army at Charing Cross, could do so.
It could scarcely be inferred from all these threaten-
ing; that England has for above thirty years acted in
the niest friendly spirit towards France, that the
Duke of Wellington advocated her interests in lthe
Congress of European states, and the English, Go-
vernment long supported the policy of the pires'ent
French dynasty in Belgium, in Spain, and elsewhere,
generally to its own disadvantage ; while a hundred
thousand of our countrymen evince their regard for
the French by constantly residing among them.
In conclusion, it may be stated that though the
English people care little who may sit on the thrones
of Spain, Portugal, or Naples, and would not tolerate
a war having any such unnational objects in view, yet the
defence of their own soil is a vital, and a sacred cause
for which their energies and their means may always
be relied on by any Government.

I am, -Sir, your most obedient servant,
Feb. 12th, 1848. E. C.