The Sun.
London, England, 1870-08-23 00:00:00

WEAPONS OF THE TWO ARMIES.

Nothing is more natural than that reports precisely
contradictory of each other should reach us concerning
the efficiency of the weapons of the French and Prussian
armies. We printed lately a telegraphic dispatch
epitomising an article from the London Times, in
which it is argued that the French arm, the Chassepot,
on account of its fouling speedily, will prove far
less effective than the. needle-gun. On the same
page we printed extracts from the Parisian name-
sake of this journal, the Temps, setting forth
that the needle-gun must necessarily, from its
construction, foul sooner than the Chassepot, and that
consequently the French must possess in this respect an
immense advantage. The comparative merit of the
weapons will soon be, if it has not already been, put to
crucial test. In the meantime it is hardly necessary to
point out that in all human probability the Prussian
Government has made numerous secret, experiments
with the Chassepot, and that it is quite certain
the French authorities have done the same
thing by the needle-gun. Some years have elapsed since
both weapons were invented, and that the two armies
now facing each other would ultimately have to confront
them has been nearly as certain as that the sun shines.
It is absurd under such circumstances to suppose that the
qualities of either gun are to burst upon the leaders to
whom they are opposed in the nature of a surprise. The
finesse attributed to the Berlin Government as regards the
explosive bullets of the Baden troops should also be
taken with grains of allowance. As the story is related
by the Metz correspondent of the Siecle, Prussia contem-
plates in this matter an act of perfidy that would gain
her the reprobation of the whole civilised world. Baden,
we are told, refused to sign the agreement by which the
five Great European Powers bound themselves not to use
the explosive bullet. The theory of civilized war consists,
not in killing your enemy, but in putting him hors decombat.
Ordinary projectiles wound far oftener than they kill, so
that with them this end is attained. But with the ex-
plosive balls every man hit is killed. Now, Prussia and
France are debarred from using these terrible implements,
but Baden, who fights side by side with Prussia, can use
them at pleasure. It is threatened, in retaliation,
that France will use a similar projectile, the
exact nature of which has been kept a secret,
but which is said to be fearfully destructive. We
believe that neither side will use explosive bullets at all,
since, apart from any considerations of humanity, the
injuries inflicted by both would neutralise each other,
while a common odium would rest on both. The opinion
seems for the moment to be gaining ground that the
new weapons, instead of hastening, will have a tendency
to postpone decisive results. It is thought that,
inasmuch as the old theory of the writers on
war, imputing the advantage to the assailant, is rendered
obsolete by these weapons, which, it is claimed, rather
throw superiority on the side of the defence, a campaign
must consist of sieges and tactical combinations, rather
than of swift and conclusive engagements in the open
field. No such lightning movements as those of Napoleon
the Great, which, beginning at Jena and Auer-
stadt, October 14, 1806, placed him in Berlin
in less than a fortnight after, are now, it is
urged, to be looked for. Already reports reach us from
both sides that the Prussian troops are entrenching them-
selves, and fringing their elaborate system of fortresses
by earthworks such as were found so useful in our
late civil war. If it be true that the French field
artillery is as superior as by some it is supposed to
be, the wisdom of this becomes manifest. It
has been thought that the mitrailleuse, which
discharges perhaps forty bullets through as many tubes,
would really prove no more effective than an ordinary
cannon that should throw an equal number of missiles
through a single tube ' • and the allegation is doubtless true
that the experience of previous wars tends to lessen expec-
tion of great results from complicated forms of light artil-
lery. On the other hand the affair of Saarbruck,
if we can trust the French accounts, shews that the new
arm may prove of vital consequence at decisive moments
of the war. The unlooked-for hesitancy prior to a general
engagement may be owing to a variety of causes, and ap-
prehension of the unknown powers of the mitrailleuse may
possibly be among the number. —New York Times.