The Sun.
London, England, 1848-11-01 00:00:00

•
igffect n the...l4th - 413-ft • troops -carried the
Hummu Ghurree or out , g previously oc-
cupied a position close beside it. m this new post
`likely
the batteries were supposed
the fort and town without impediment, and everything
.now seemed drawing to an auspicious close. It wag
hoped that breaching might be begun alniost- at once,.
and, considering that we were within almost point blank
distance of the walls, it was supposed that in 30 or 40
hours at the outside the assault might be commenced—
when a sudden act of treachery on the part of our allies
blighted all our prospects, and eompelled us to raise the
siege and convert the besieging army into one ef obser-
vation. It has been repeatedly stated that here Singh,
a Seikh officer and nobleman, of distinction, was dia.,
patched early in May :by the, D'urbar, with a force of
3,000 men, with a view,* was-raid, of.keeping the Moat-
raj in check. We know little of:his:proceeriing until we .
End him in company with Colonel Cuortlandt and Lietzt.
Edwardes before Molinari.' • It: does not appar• that,
toil any active share in railiterv:operatioes, and his, fide--;
lity was said to be held mere f.han.quesripeat,le. Early
in July his father, Chuttur Singh, GoverLi,tr in zbe.kla-
zareh province at the othenextremity Of the-Puijilub,
headed an insurrection still in progress, and _aid to have
been prothoted with a view of taking advantage or the
absence of our troops from Lahore: About seven o'clock
on the morning ot the 14th intOrmation was brought 0,
Lieutenant Edvrardes that the Rejrl.l7:here Sin,rt had
' One over to the enemy, t-lkin!; with him above 5.000
Seikhs with 12 guns and 'howitzers, and 80 of the lighter
nieces called zumboorocks. • The movement appeared to
have taken both parties equally by surprise; latterly we .
had in some measure ceased to suspect; and so dubious
was the Dewan ot the trustworthiness of his new allies
hat he for a time.assigned them quarters btyond the „,ir` •
walls, but under the batteriei of :the. town. With _so.
formidable a defection from ,stir strength—so large .an
accession to that-off the enemy—it became at once-oh,
vious that it would be imprudent for the present to
continue the siege.. We had already seen with
what desperation. -our: opponents were determined
to resist uslaind with 5,00() added to their num-
bers—me clonging to :the old Seikh army, and who
knew thArnow they .fought with halters round their
neck and could not even lodk for quarter—it was vain
to proceed until -reinforcements arrived. General
Whishi_therefore, had his camp removed to a.safe dis-'*•/

tance from their _batteries, while the guns and all. the
working paities were called in, and our force was trans-1Q;;7)
torined into an army. of.obiervation occupying a forti-
fied camp.' Our rear was .annoyed but not much da.
(Raged by"the enemy. We had been bet a short time -,
in our new position when it became .evident that we:
hould find ourselves .much Momagreeably situated a
considerable way further from the town ; we accord-
-gn2ly once more decamped, and on the 17,11 took. up:a
post 18 miles from Moultan in the direction. of _Baha-
wulpore. Particniarsof.its save suent lame nut hitherto
reached us further than th-ii=tlat the material pre
pared for the siege, a large quantity of ammunition, and
a month's supply of biscuits, had fallen into the hands of
,he enemy. Animadversions on the arrangements of
General Whish are very severe ; wo are said to have
permitted the enemy to strengthen himself at every •
point most strongly and elaborately in the suburbs, and
then to have proceeded as if there were no obstruction
in our way. A considerable portion. of the troops which
went oVer with Shere Singh seem disposed to quit Moul-
tan with as little delay as possible.
The moment the tidings of this unfortunate affair
reached bead-quarters, preparations began to be made
to reinforce the besieging army. The Bombay Govern-
, tn,.nt was written to by express, and orders immediately
is iced far assembling, an army of 9,000 'men at Roree
u ider command of Brigadier Dundas, of her Majesty's
Kates. Of these, 2,000 are Europeans. It is not likely
they will be required to do more than perform the duties
of an army of reserve or observation—perhaps they
may afterwards be called on to occupy the city after the
siege is over should the Bengal troops be needed else-
where. They can hardly reach Moultan before Christ-
mas, and if the town is not ours early in November, it
will be strange indeed. At Ferozepore there are about
4,000, at Lahore about 8,000 men, and these will be rein-
forced immediately to 7.000 and 12,000 respectively.
The siege train from Sukkur is said to have been ordered
up; this, in addition to 34 pieces of beavy, and as nia7,.,
of light, ordnance, now in camp, will make the artiller
arm of the force very powerful indeed. A force of
10,000 men, of which details have not as yet been sup-
plied, is meanwhile being formed on the Lahore side
under the command of General Gilbert ; and this will,
without. loss of time, move on Moultan, so that the
army before the place will :shortly be as strong as that
which 'fought at Moodkce, or that with which in
April, 1842, GreuerakPollock forced his way to Carlini!.

The Delhi Gazette states, that the army to be formed at
Ferozepore will consist of five European regiments
(5,000), with 16 turps of Native Infantry—say 750 each
(12,000), and six regiments of cavalry (2,000), nine
troops of horse artillery, and hve field batteries (1,500)—
in all, above 29,000 teen.* Whether this includes the
force now at Ferozepore, or whether the whole is meant
for service, does not appear. It certainly is a strange
display of tactics to send 7,000 men to take a town
which, on the desertion of a detachment whose faithful-
ness from the first was doubtful, requires a reinforce-
ment of 25,000. Our latest news from Moultan is
brought by steamer and comes down to the 18th. This
is two days later than that received by the Delhi route,
the intercourse in this direction appearing for the pre-
eht to be interrupted. At present the accounts which
reach us from many quarters bear the impress of such
excessive exaggeration that we are compelled very care-
fully to sift them—omitting all that seem improbable or
transparently untrue. We think the correctness of the
greater part of what has been stated may be relied upon.
We must caution the European reader against believing
much more than has been set down. The statetaents of
the alarmists may prove correct—we have hitherto for
the most part found them to be the contrary, and at pre-
sent most assuredly we entirely disbelieve them.
Such are the bitter fruits of vacillation and hesitation;
while we were debating upon the size of the army to be
!ent and the most fitting time for sending them—calcu-
lating how much cost or inconvenience might be incurred,
or probable sickness occasioned by a march one month
compared with that by another we were tempting
traitors into the field and holding out a bribe for insur-
rection. A strong brigade half the size of our army of
observation under General Whish would, if dispatched
in May,.have settled the matter in a week's time. By
delay and vacillation, a chance explosion of anger aiM
haphazard attack, accompanied by murder, where the
deed was hardly ane when the actors were horror-struck
at their position, has waxed into a widely-ramified and
deep-rooted treason—fast rooted to the spot from whence
it sprung, and extending itself through every part of
the Seikh dominions. The slaughter that may nosz be
looked for as the denouement is tremendous. We hats to
contend with brave, highly disciplined, and perfectly
desperate men, fighting under the joint influence of
religious zeal and the knowledge that their lives are for-
' liked. We can under such circumstances neither expect
nor exhibit mercy—on both sides it must be war to the
knife—and after the victory, if ours, our artillery must
complete the carnage which otherwise would devolve on
the hands of the executioner.