The Sun.
London, England, 1870-07-30 00:00:00

THE RIVAL STATEMENTS.

Another point in the history of the projected treaty is
now, says the Times, confessed on both sides. Lord
Granville has informed the Lords that the Mar-
quis de Lavalette had called on him, under in-
structions from Paris, to acknowledge that the
draught at Berlin was in the handwriting of M.
Benedetti, but that it had been written by him
under the dictation of Count Bismarck. This con-
fession leads the Times to regret that the French
Government has refrained from communicating a verbatim
copy of its explanation of the Treaty, and it is even
doubtful from Lord Granville's statement whether
M. de Lavalette did, in fact, read the whole of the
despatch he had received. The substance of the
communication from the French Foreign Office consisted
of a counter-accusation against M. Bismarck as
the originator of the scheme for extinguishing
Belgium and despoiling the other intermediate
Powers between France and Prussia. M. de Lava-
lette was instructed formally to assure her Ma-
jezty's Government that in these proposals the initia-
tive was taken entirely by the Prussian Cabinet.
This general charge is supported by precise statements
that, in 1865 at Berlin, and in 1866 at Brunn, Count Bis-
marck told M. de Lefebvre de Behaine, then Charge
d'Affaires at Berlin, that Prussia would willingly recognise
the extension of the French borders by the absorption of
French-speaking neighbours. The effect of these statements
is weakened by the additional remark from the Due de
Gramont that if France coveted Belgium she could easily
have got it with the proferred assistance of Prussia.
The real point in dispute is whether Prussia ever offered
such assistance, and to argue that it must have been
offered because France could have easily taken Belgium
with it, but abstained, is a singular logical process'
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, shews
how the honour of France can be cleared, Count Bismark
charges that at a time of peace the French Ambassador
proposed to him to settle all possible differences between
them by absorbing Belgium, compelling a forced sale of
Luxemburg, and defying in arms every Power opposing
these violations of justice and of international obligation.
In support of his charge he produces a Draught Treaty,
embodying these proposals, in the handwriting of the
French Ambassador at Berlin. The Duc de
Gramont replies that all these things were
suggested by M. Bismarck, and specifies particular
occasions when they were made. In such a question
of honour why should not the French Minister of
Foreign Affairs produce the best evidence at his
command to refute his adversary ? He must possess
the contemporary despatches of M. Benedetti and
M. de Behaine, and he might lay these before the diplo-
matic body at Paris as Count Bismarck prodhced M. Bene-
detti's manuscript at Berlin. We know of no solid reason
that can be advanced against this suggestion. It affords the
simplest means of vindicating the sincerity of the French
Government, and the charge is sufficiently serious to
warrant its adoption were it a greater departure than it
would be from the uses of diplomage, and were it not in
this instance justified and sanctioned by the proceeding of
Count Bismark.

The Telegraph remarks that if the rival statements are
correct, Prussia and France have for the last few years
been playing the parts of Eve and the Serpent—with the
difference that the offer of the apple was rejected with a
determination not displayed by our first parent. Unluckily
on their own shewing, it is not yet possible to tell with
exact precision which of the two Powers played the part
of Satan, and which of Eve. " Since the ' patriotic
pang' of M. Rouher, France has never ceased
to lead us into temptation by propositions at
the expense of Germany and Belgium." These
propositions increased in liberality and in urgency after
the Luxemburg affair had been settled; and, to com-
plete the story, Count Bismarck has " some reason
to believe," that, but for the opportune disclosure of
these negotiations, France " would have proposed
to us, after the completion of her own and
of our preparations for war, to enforce Count
Benedetti'4 programme, at the head of the two
armies, against unarmed Europe ; that is to say, to con-
clude peace at the expense of Belgium." We are told, in
general terms, that these various proposals were made by
official and unofficial French agents ; and, in order to
appreciate the authority to be attached to them,
we should know, not only the names of the
negotiators and the dates of the negotiations, but the
circumstances under which they were initiated and broken
off. The Duke de Gramont's despatch to M. de la
Valette, retorting the charge against Count Bismarcks is
in this respect somewhat more satisfactory ; but still, in a
matter of such moment, it is obvious that everything must
be told, whether affecting persons, proposals, or circum-
stances.

The Daily News, referring to the dispatches read by
Earl Granville, says the question who first mooted an
iniquitous scheme, is remote from the real issue. Both
parties discussed it, and provisionally entertained it ; and
the inquiry as to who broke silence as to ideas which were
simultaneously in the mind of both, may be interesting
historically, but , is of no political import. The
one point of interest to us is the fact that the representa-
tives of two great military nations were discussing the
removal of their neighbours' landmarks, and a league of
spoliation offensive and defensive. We are told.
by French diplomatists and by the Official Jour-
nal of the Empire, that the thing never as-
sumed a serious shape. The statement is superfluous.
But the fact which is admitted on both sides is of the very
gravest character. When Ministers of State and Ambas-
sadors can approach each other with suggestions, and
sound each other as to projects such as are admitted to
have been in debate, when they can play and toy with
schemes of spoliation, when they can imagine the conquest
of an independent and neutral State, and set down in
writing the conditions under which it might be possible,
they have gone great lengths. Too often the gap between
the thought and the deed needs only one thing to fill it
up, and that is favouring opportunity. The pro-
jected Treaty, and the further disclosures which
are hinted at from Berlin, seem to justify
nearly equal suspicion of both the parties. If
we think more seriously of the designs imputed
to France than of those which are charged upon Prussia,
it is rather on the ground of differences in geographical
situation and national temperant than from more directly
moral and political considerations.

ENGLAND AND THE WAR.
The Standard sums up its remarks on the latest dis-
closures about the Secret Treaty with the recommenda-
tion that the question be no longer discussed in Parlia-
ment. It will lead only to members taking sides with
one party or the other. Both have been the authors of
great European wars, waged for no other purpose, so far
as Englishmen can judge, than the gratification of their
own interested views. Both, on the other
hand, have professed their friendliest feelings
towards us—France, ever since the establishment of the
Empire ; Prussia, since she inflicted upon us the shame
of tearing in pieces our guarantee of the integrity of the
Danish kingdom. We do not intend to take sides. We
desire to maintain a strict and a real neutrality, and it
would therefore be as well unfair and impolitic to enter in
Parliament upon a discussion of the merits of the strug-
gle. There is but one ground upon which we could be
called upon to abandon our neutrality, and that
would be a violation of the neutrality of Belgium.
Upon that point we have received assurances in which we
may very safely trust. Both Powers promise to protect
that neutrality both have the strongest reasons for re-
specting it. Under these circumstances, whilst it is our
duty to put our army and navy upon such a footing as
will enable us to intervene, if intervene we must, with
effect, it is our duty and our interest to maintain the pre-
sent absolute neutrality the Government skews itself die.
posed to maintain.

THE FIRST BATTLE.
The Times sums up that the question of an early engage-
ment ?depends upon the Prussians, who may either
confront the Emperor on the Saar or fall back
before him to the Rhine. Were they to resolve
upon the latter course, the French might either follow
their retreating enemy by Kaiserlautern to Mannheim,
whence lies their way to Frankfort, or cross the river at
Strasburg, or at some point above or below it, into
Baden, beyond which the territories of Wurtemhurg
and Bavaria would lie before them. An advance of
the French across the Rhine would, in all probability,
defer a general action. The position of the bel-
ligerents would be altered, if not reversed. Unless the
Prussians in their retreat abandoned or blew up their
frontier fortresses, Saarlouis and Landau, the French
would have to mask them, and they would also have to
protect their rear from the garrison of Rastadt, which they
would have on their right if they crossed the Rhine
at Mannheim, or anywhere below Lauterbourg, or which
would lie in their path if they came up
from Strasburg. With Rastadt and a large
German force on their right, and Mayence and
another large German force on their left the
French might find an advance upon Frankfort somewhat
perilous ; and were, indeed, such their plan of campaign,
the alleged policy. of the Prussians to allow their enemy
to cross the Rhine before giving him battle would seem
perfectly intelligible.

THE EMPEROR'S PROCLAMATION.
The Telegraph avers that the vanities of France are
liberally fed in every sentence and phrase of this truly
Napoleonic manifesto. His Majesty does not hesitate to
predict the issue of the combat. He owns to his troops,
indeed, that they are going to meet " one of the best
armies in Europe ;" bt he recalls the fact, that
" others quite as worthy's have been unable to resist the
valour ofFreneamen, and he says that "it will be the
same again at the present time." The Emperor does not
seek to conceal that the strggle may prove desperate; nay,
he distinctly anticipates that it will be "long and severe;"
but he adds that " nothing is too difficult for the
soldiers of Africa, the Crimea, China, Italy, and Mexico."
The Emperor had to address his soldier. in warlike lan-
guage ; and, everything considered, these phrases which
must otherwise sound too boastful to English
ears, are what a ruler in his peculiar position
was constrained to use. But there is apparent
between the lines of the Imperial manifesto a sense of un-
measured peril—a shadow of inscrutable gloom—which is
shewn more by the manner than by the matter of the
brief address. Whoever else laughs at the German nation
the Emperor does not.