The Sun.
London, England, 1870-11-05 00:00:00

THE EMPEROR'S MANIFESTO.

The Emperor Napoleon's pamphlet, entitled " The
Campaign of 1870: Causes which led to the Capitulation
of Sedan," has been already noticed, but it deserves a
little more attention. It is professedly by an officer of
the Staff, but no secret is made of the Emperor's partici-
pation in the work' The most remarkacile passage is one
at the commencement, in which the Emperor explains
his original plan of the campaign—the design he would
have carried out .if he had been able. This
scheme was known only to himself, Marshal Mac-
Mahon, Commander of the First Army Corps, and Marshal
Lebmuf, Major-General of the Army of the Rhino. Re
was to have crossed the Rhine into Baden, and at once
neutralise South Germany andsecure the alliances of Italy
and Austria by a striking success. The Emperor says
that he undertook this enterprise knowing that his army
was inferior to that of Prussia alone, but that he did not
know that that army was so ill found or its
administrators so resourceless. According to their project
100,000 men would have been marshalled at Metz, 100,000
at Strasbourg, and. 50,000 at the camp of Chalons. " The
concentration of the first two armies, one on the Sarre
and the other on the Rhine, did not reveal his projects ;
for the enemy was left in uncertainty as to
whether the attack would be made .against
the Rhenish provinces or upon the Duchy of
Baden. Ai soon as the' troops should have been
concentrated at the points indicated, it was the Emperor's
purpose to immediately unite the two armies of
Metz and Strasbourg.; and, at the head of 250,000 men,
to cross the Rhine at Maxau, leaving at his right the
fortress of Rastadt, and, at his left, that of Gammers,
heim. Reaching the other side of the Rhine,
ho would have forced the States of the South
to observe neutrality, and would then have hurried
on to encounter the Prussians. Whilst this
movement was in course of execution, the 50,000 men at
Chalons, under the command of Marshal Canrobert, were
to proceed to Metz, to protect the rear of the army and
guard the north-eastern frontier. At the same time our
fleet cruising in the Baltic would have held stationary, in
the north of Prussia, a part of the enemy's forces, obliged
to defend the coasts threatened with invasion." The only
chance of this plan succeeding was by rapidity of move-
, ment, and this condition was utterly wanting. Instead
of having the army corps organised locally, and each pos-
sessing in its own district all the material needful for
war, the French regiments were scattered all over France
and in Algeria, whilst the stores and accessories were in
different cities, in crowded magazines. The men who be-
longed to various regiments had to join their ranks
by a long and complicated route. Thus, for
example, the men who were at Strasbourg, and
whose regiments were actually stationed in Alsace,
instead of at once joining the ranks at Strasbourg, were
sent to their respective regimental depots, which might be
in the South of France, or even in Algiers, and were
thence obliged to return again to Strasbourg for incorpo-
ration. The powers of the commanders were insufficient
for prompt action. Almost everything required a Minis-
terial authorisation. Lastly, and most important of all,
the numbers of the force accumulated were far inferior to
those first estimated. The army of Metz—according
to this account, though the revelations of the
' late capitulation tell a different tale only
numbered 100,000 men, and that of Strasbourg
only 40,000 men. Nevertheless the Emperor did not
abandon the hope of carrying out the original plan ; but
Weissenburg and Woerth set all uncertainty at rest. The
French were then reduced to a defensive policy.
It was determined to concentrate the army upon Chalons,
where Bazaine's forces, joined to those of MacMahon,
must have opposed a stout resistance. The Emperor,
however, affirms that a letter from M. 011ivier pre-
vented the retreat from Lorraine by the assu- •
ranee that such
,a step would have the worst possible
effect upon the French people. (Poor M. 011ivier ! what
broad shoulders thine ought to he !) The French chiefs
then hoped to gain a victory over one of the three Ger-
man armies before the others could join it, but it was
found impossible to obtain 'information—such clouds of
cavalry hung all over the space in front of the advancing
hosts. The pamphlet confesses that the position of the
Germans could not be ascertained. At this juncture it
appears to have been apprehended that communication
with the rest of the army would be cut off, and it was
represented to the Emperor that his best course was to
retire. He did so', with the intention of reassuming the
functions of government. The state of Paris, however,
prevented the fulfilment of this design. The Ministry
had convoked the Chambers without any reference to the
Head of the State. By the convocation of the Chambers
the power of the Opposition became immensely
increased, and the Ministry seemed afraid to pronounce •
even the Emperor's name. He remained therefore at ,

Chalons. General Trochu was entrusted with the com-
mand of Paris. It was the Emperor's opinion, and also
MacMahon's, that the Chalons army should fall back and
fight under the walls of the capital, but the Ministry sent
the most urgent representations that an attempt should
be made to relieve the blockade of Metz. MacMahon
strongly urged the danger of making a flank march in face
of a more numerous enemy, and in accordance with
this resolution, retreated to Rheims. But a most pressing
injunction came at length, and the obedient soldier, much
against his will, moved forward. At this point the
Emperor gives some extraordinary accounts of the quality
of his army. Of MacMahon's First Corps he says that,
" principally composed of regiments from Africa, its
troops, after giving proofs of heroic bravery at Woerth,
were vividly impressed by the defeat, and by the tremen-
dous effects of the Prussian artillery, and came away from
the field of battle with dissatisfied and mutinous feeling."
" These were the oldest of our veterans. Covered
with the renown which rightfully belongs to the soldiers
of Africa, they had amply justified it. The spectacle of
their• discouragement, seen by the rest of the army, was
therefore doubly to be feared." Of the Fifth Corps, De
Failly's, it is said that, " Having lost without a fight a
portion of its equipments, and almost all its- baggage, it
had an appearance of indifference and of disorganization
of a nature to inspire the most lively anxiety " Douay's
Seventh Corps had been at Belfort, and never fought,
but " its solidity was not such as might have
been desired." With these men MacMahon moved for-
ward, but was delayed by the old difficulties of commis-
sariat. On the 27th the Marshal learned that the armies
of the Saxon and the Prussian Crown Princes had joined,
and he again desired to give up the enterprise as useless ;
but again came a formal order to continue the march, and
the Emperor was resolved not to oppose the decisions of
the Regency. The battles near and at Sedan followed.
The Emperor's account of these has already been
noticed.

The Emperor concludes :—" We should also have been
Letter prepared if the Chambers had not incessantly been
desirous of reducing the war budget, and had they not always
opposed any m ensure to increase the national forces. Fifteen
days before the declaration of war, the committee on
the Budget in the Corps Legislatif expressed an inten-
tion to suppress the imperial Guard, and to reduce the
effective strength of the army. To these principal causes
of our reverses we must add the lamentable habits intro-
duced into the army by the wars in Africa. Want of
discipline, want of cohesion, absence of order.

exaggeration of the weight carried by the v sol-
dier, and of the quantity of the baggage of the
officers—these are the abuses which have been intro-
duced into our armies. The French foot-soldier, for-
merly noted for the rapidity of his march, is become
heavier than the German infantryman. Carelessness of
bearing affects military spirit; our officers and soldiers
seem to be no longer proud to wear their uniforms; and
the medley of costumes painfully affects the eye. This
abandon in deportment is reflected in everything else. One

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comes across no rnoro that regularity, that love of duty, that
abnegation of self, which are the first qualities bol h

of those who command and those who obey. To sum up,
the army always reflects the state of society in which it"
has been farmed. So long as authority in France was

strong and re=pected, the constitution of the army pr

tinted I.einarkztble solidity; but when the exceaes of

Le Tribune and of tiro Press were permitted to eu,

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feeble authority, and to introduce everywhere a F•Piri„
of criticisn; and insubordination, the array felt the effects
of it."

A JUDGMENT ON BAZAINE.
The correspondent 'of the Manchester Guardian, :5,,1°,,
was shut up in the fortress of Metz throughout the 111,,v
ment, and who had, therefore, every means of Part:
gives the following remarkable judgment on Baz9l,ee
conduct:— After Sedan and the fall of the Empire, "3
i
news of which reached us on the 7th of September,
became evident to all that Marshal Bazaine refill
to act on the aggressive. He would 11°0
compromise himself in any way—to play a waiting 0111 be
was his policy. If a strong Republican party could 5
. formed, he could then sell his sword and his service
to them. If, as we all thought probable then, Pril°slli
would do anything to avoid the firebrand of a republic°
near her borders —borders which seem to enlarge day h 9
day ; if she. would the rather foster a regelicYme,-h
repeat the history of those Hundred Days wwcie
followed the parallel epoch in the great Napoleon'3'.a;
—then Bazaine's power would be at its culminating 13t
4
By this light alone can the military- inactivity of tc'd
army of the unseen Rhine, which sat dowh so long °ll.l,
sadly by the waters of the Moselle, be read. From t)5
cause alone did that cavalry, the pride of France;
do nothing but eat its own horses, and it is this °
which will be written between the lines of 13311it5r1,
the
history wherein are described for the first time
capitulation of 188,000 men, three marshals of France'
and half a hundred generals, with all their arres9A
baggage, without a battle ; the rendering up of a R 1144
%1
1
town against the will of its inhabitants and in sPite
their remonstrance ; the abandonment of a forl,
almost impregnable, which never fired a shot from its w...-i
and into which no shot ever fell ; and which sen,
away an army " vanquished by famine " with six dOs
full rations, and who, as I saw myself, handed out fr°'.,,
their .fourg,ons huge portions of bacon to the people ii':
they were led away yesterday morning into captivity.
~,,
is necessary to state this as a preliminary apoloP
for the brave men who are suffering to-daY, „Pr
the faults of others—faults in no way attaew'
themselves to the working portion of the aril°
but arising simply and solely from the self-I°°e'
self-esteem, and jealousy of- .their generals. At the
same time it is not fair to place all the blame on Marshal
Bazaine. Wishing himself to rule alone, he incurred the
distrust and dislike of his coadjutors, and an open rupture'
or even not seldom a fracas, in the Council of WO W
the lamentable spectacle 'presented to us and reported
ti!°,
once to the enemy. Bazaine was the inheritor of
feebleness of his predecessors ; that feeblene'ss was 11::i
personal strength ; and, supplanting them, he encourag t
rather than suppressed their discussions, using their 011
of unity as an excuse for inactivity, resting in . a detucr
ralising idleness from the Ist of September until ill°lB‘
ment was impossible. From the day of the disastri
and disgraceful battle of St. Privat (August 18) of wbicii4
sent you an accounc.we waited day after day till the 31;
of August without a single movement, and at eleliet
o'clock on that day began a tardy, lingering movenle°
from the camps to the front-of St. Julien for the attaelt°,°
St. Barbe, the enemy's position commanding the lost
valley of the Moselle. This movement, conducted in t,,„
mencing m-
open day, openly talked of for days before, and not cow
as a serious attack till 3 in the afternoon, was eircP
yet successful, and if carried on with vigour might hAI
broken that cordon which surrounded us, and have 11°
, only relieved Metz from the incubus of an overwheln3l9
and ever-eating force of useles defenders, but havernarer
to the relief of the other threatened or beleagueredtown° '
but it was not carried on with vigour. The Prussiall:,
taken, in spite of our warning, at a disadvantage, we'o
allowed time to bring up their reinforcements. Our facet
were split up into detached sections, and on-the Ist
September we were driven back to our old quartets'
losing, it is true, few men, but much hope and all flail ill,,
the capacity of our generals. Never since then has ther"
been made one serious effort to make a sortie, not ctle
single attempt to leave in Metz but a garrison sufficie°t
for its defence, and to give the officers that boon tbe',,
begged for—or grant men that prayer they prayed forte
the opportunity to do or die.
The Pall Mall Gazette condemns Bazaine unreservecllP
It says there is now no doubt that he had under his 01'3;
mand more men than was at first announced. He had at
least 160,000, whilst the Germans could not dispose e`‘
more than 240,000,- which were scattered over a ii,,„e
twenty-seven miles long, and broken in two '-','
a river. Bazaine might have broken 1311".
That political motives prevented him is car'
tatu. But what, remains inexplicable is the inaction
or at least the indecision, of Bazaine during the last dth/4
of August and the first days of September. On the 31"„
of August he attempts an attack towards the north
and continues it throughout the night and the followiq
morning ; yet three Prussians divisions are suftieien"
to drive him back under the guns of the forts.
The attempt must have been extremely feeble, consider
ing the enormous strength with which he might have mad;
it. A general who has sixteen divisions of splendid
infantry under him, to be repelled by three divisions of
the enemy ! It is too bad. Bazaine's previous militall
career was none of the brightest. His Mexican campaign
merely proved that he cared more for reward that'
for glory or the credit of his country. His nomination t°
the command-in-chief of the Army of the Rhine was all°
to accidental circumstances ; he got it, not because he w°B
the most eligible but the least ineligible of the
possible candidates ; and the deciding consider
tions were anything , but strictly military. Ile
will be immortalized' as the man who committed the
most disgraceful act in Ffench military history--who pre-
vented 160,000 Frenchmen from breaking through the
investing army of, under the circumstances, positively
inferior strength, and surrendered them as prisoners °,
war when there was nothing more to eat.

The correspondent of the Pall Mall Gazette gives An
unfavourable account of food prospects in Paris. "We
are sadly pinched for meat, and have only beef An'
mutton for twenty days." •

When Schelstadt surrendered, the soldiers and the pleb
plundered the shops and stores, and set the place on fire'
The commandant, Count von Reinach, was the first to
leave the town under the escort of the Prussian officers
who had come to complete the document relative t°
the surrender. At Count von Reinach's request three
Prussian battalions were sent into the place to take pos•
session of the powder magazines even before the dock•
ments in question could be ratified.

The bread committee of Brussels, having learned that
Metz was about to capitulate, sent on Wednesday, the
26th ult., a train of provisions to that place under the
charge of M. Astruc. The provisions consisted of 40°
kilos. of sugar, 200 kilos. of coffee, 2,500 kilos. of salt,
kilos. of dried peas and beans, 2,000 kilos. of salt meat
and fat, 5,000 kilos. of flour, and 10,000 kilos. of potatoes'
Further supplies are being forwarded.

Herr Wachenhusen of the Cologne Gazette, comments oil
the splendidly martial appearence of the French Imperial
Guard. " The demeanour of the men was stern and quiet;
grief, sorrow, and the most deadly hatred against us, the
victorious Prussians, were plainly depicted upon the
countenances of nearly all the officers and non-cony
missioned officers, and even most of the troops. Numerous
painful scenes took place ; many of the French soldiers
burst into tears when they took leave of their officers, aoci,
I saw many a tear course down the bronzed and furrovio
cheek of many an officer."

[AnvEansEmENT.l7-Holloway's Ointment and Pills.;
Sore Throat.—There is in our variable clime no complain"
more common than this, few more annoying or more
troublesome to cure when neglected. The moment there
is any hoarseness or dry cough the part affected, ate;
fomentation with salt water, should be briskly rubbed
with a piece of new flannel for opening the pores fc'
absorbing ; the Ointment to be instantly applied. Repen
the process twice a day. The most obstinate sore throat
or cough will disappear before this treatment. It would
always be as well, while treating the disease externally
with the Ointment, to take a course of the Pills, whin
would gi ye tone to the system, and expedite and conflrni
the cure.