The Sun.
London, England, 1870-08-23 00:00:00

THE FIELD OF WOERTH.

Regiment succeeded regiment as wave follows upon
wave, and at length, after a last struggle round the now
roofless church, the village was taken, the key of the
positio u gained, and the battle of Woerth was lost and
won. After this further resistance was impossible ; the
battle degenerated into a running fight, and finally into
a complete and fearful rout. Men threw away
knapsacks and helmets, arms, and even clothing,
that might impede them in their flight, and rushed head-
long through the vineyards and corn-fields that lined the
road. Now and then the French attempted to rally,
and at Niederbronn they made a stand that, in pre-
vious accounts, has been dignified by the tame
of a battle ; but all was useless, the day was
hopelessly lost, and victor and vanquished passed in
rapid flight and pursuit along the main road from
Niederbronn through the mountains to the west. The
village of Freschweiler shews the most unmistakable
signs of the conflict. The roofs of the houses are knocked
to pieces, and, in some instances, the houses themselves
are battered to the ground. The church was set on fire
by the shells, and is now a complete gutted ruin. Of
several houses in its immediate vicinity nothing is left but
heaps of bricks and charred timbers. The walls, shutters,
and doors are full of bullets, and in many cases
there is scarcely a square foot on the surface of the
wall that does not bear the signs of shot or
shell. The road for miles along which the routed
enemy pursued their way bears terrible evidence of the
horrors of the flight. The broken trees and hedges, the
crops trodden down into the ground, shew how despe-
rate must have been the rush of panic-stricken men.
Broken gun-carriages and weapons overturned, hel-
mets, shakoes, and breastplates literally ground and
powdered into dust, point out the direction of the flight,
and the whole surface of the ground on both sides of the
road is covered with knapsacks, cartridge cases, cloth-
ing, and weapons of every sort and size. It must, in-
deed, have been at first an awful sight. The field has,
of course, bean long eleared of dead and wounded, and
when I passed carts wrre conveying away all that
was valuable in the way of arms and accoutrements,
while the mass of worthless remains had been gathered
in great heaps to be burned. The road for some distance
back is still encumbered with these woful relics of the
slain, but the scene of the battle has been completely
cleared, and nothing remains upon the field but the sad
silent monuments of the unknown dead.—Correspondent
of Daily Telegraph.

THE POSITION OF THE TWO ARMIES.
It seems impossible to doubt that there is a very large
force of first-rate troops—probably not to be estimated
under 130,000 or 140,000 at least, at Chalons, or
wherever that army may at this moment be. Add
Garde Mobile, taken for what they are worth, and
there is an army ready for the field, capable of
fighting on even terms at least 150,000 Germans.
Against this army what can the Crown Prince
bring, supposing that he advances alone, and that he
is not supported by either Steinmetz or Prince Federick
Charles? He fought at Woerth with the sth and 11th
Prussian Corps, the Ist and 2d Bavarian Corps, and the
Werder Corps of Wurtemburg and Baden troops—say in
all 175,000 troops, of whom only portions were under fire.
Set down the losses in the battle at 10,000, the
troops investing Strasburg at 20,000, and there
are 145,000 remaining to advance upon the Moselle.
But this advance must depend on the security of supplies.
These supplies must in large quantities be drawn by the
Weissenburg - Wendenheim - Saverne-Nancy Railroad,
which runs through ahostile country, and must be guarded.
Thote communications can scarcely be guarded by less than
10,000 troops, and if 135,000 men can be moved to the
Marne, it is as much as can be expected. Is there any reason
to suppose that this number can defeat the French army on
the Marne ? Man for man, in equal numbers, it may be
that the Prussians can do as much as the French, but the
way in which the French have fought leaves.no room for
doubt that they are not to be beaten by inferior numbers.
Unless, then, reinforcements from either Steinmetz or
Prince Frederick Charles reach the Crown Prince,
it is hardly to be supposed that he will attack the
force before him. It would not be in accordance with
his policy to fight unless reasonably sure of victory.
Moreover, we are not certain that none of Bazaine's corps
have escaped to join the army of MacMahon. Appear-
ances at present are against the supposition ; but it
would so evidently be against the French interests
to allow the real strength of the army of the Marne
to be known that reports go for little. It the
Marne
that
a portion of Bazaine's army had retreated long before
:ilunday, the 14th, and that the remainder has fought these
bloody battles to hold the armies of the King in position,
and hinder their detaching forces to join the Crown Prince.
We accept the possibility. There can be no doubt now
that whatever troops did remain at Metz, be they
the whole or Bazaine's original army or less, are
shut up within the circle of the entrenched forts.—
Ota ndard.

Concluding that Bazaine has been completely cut off
and invested in Metz, it remains to be seen with what
forces the Prussians will maintain the investment.
Theie are two things to be done either to
starve the French out, or to force on an imme-
diate capitulation. The first requires time ; the second
might involve the alternative of shedding much
more of that " noble blood" which the Kin and the
Berlin papers already so much deplore. But there is
another way. It does not require the whole of the First
and Second Armies to hold Bazaine in Metz ; and the
positions gained by the Prussian troops on the 16th and
18th instant will render more easy still the task of re-
straining the French within the works of their intrenched
camp. What is to hinder the King from detaching
the whole army of Steinmetz—or any other three corps—
to co-operate with the Crown Prince ? Already the
Prussian advanced guard is said to be closing in upon
Verdun, where there is no garrison, while the fortifica-
tions are but poorly armed, and little suited to stand
a siege. The two armies of Prince Frederick Charles
indiaGeneral Steinmetz number even now at
least 250,000 men against 100,000 French at the
utmost. If 60,000 or 80,000 men were detached from the

investing force, it would still be strong enough for all
it has to do at Metz ; and those troops, operating on the
right bank of the Marne, while the Gro*vn Prince acted
on the left—nearer to Paris—might speedily drive
the army of the Emperor off the roads to the
capital. But this, of course, is simple conjec-
ture. All that is clear is, that the Prussians have
made such formidable advances towards Paris, by the
heads of the rivers across which Blucher approached in
1814, that the Emperor Napoleon has not been able to
delay his entree en campagne. He has broken up the
camp, and taken an exended position along the line of the
Marne. We have no further details, but assuredly the
step seems to be most unwise. On the frontier the
evil consequences of attenuating the line were but too
cruelly felt. If the French second army—that of Chalons
—has taken a position along the Marne looking into the
Crown Prince's flank, it will be easy to dislodge it, and
perhaps to throw it off altogether from Paris, with the
superior forces of the Crtwn Prince, even unaided by any
troops advancing across the Meuse into the rear of the
Imperial army.—Telegraph.

We will not venture to estimate the force of the French
Army now falling back from Chalons, or what resour'es
it may find among the volunteers and National
Guards now mustering and drilling in Paris. The
French War Minister and the Commander -in - Chief
have strained every nerve to bring up all the detach-
ments which had been left in charge of public order
in the great centres of population, the Fourth
Battalions from the Depots, the Marines, Me
Gendarmes, the Custom-house- officers, the men of all
arms who were subject to military training and disci-
pline. It is a heterogeneous army, _and its nucleus, con-
sisting of the lately routed corps of MacMahon, De
Failly, and Canrobert, still, according to the evi-
dence of eye-witnesses, bears traced of the tremens
dons exertions which the battle and the retreat de-
manded of it. Still it would be rash to ex-
press any doubt of its efficiency, particularly under the
influence of the enthusiasm which will be sure to welcome
it on its approach to the endangered capital. The Chalons
Army was described as mustering 100,000 strong, and
about half that number will be added to it out of the
present Paris garrison. With such a force one more
battle before the gates of Paris may yet be risked. It may
save the honour of the capital, even though it may
achieve no more. But, after that, the defence of the detached
forts and of the National and Mobile Guard will, we
believe, be of little consequence. The Parisians would
doubtless fight very well if they were put to it, but
neither themselves nor their chiefs, nor their enemies,
will bring matters to such extremities.—Times.

We know very little indeed of the strength of the army
at Chalons. The corps of Canrobert and Douay, which
are always quoted as a reserve, appear never to have
aad any existence in that capacity. Regiments
which, according to the original constitution of
;he active army, promulgated five weeks Igo,
aught to belong to one or other of those two
3orps, turn up here and there in a battle, and
straightway the Prussians report that they have had
Danrobert's or Douay's corps against them ; but nobody
aver saw the corps. At present it would be premature to
3onjecture what force will meet the Crown Prince, as it
would certainly be to predict with what force he will
march upon Paris. All we know is that in the caniLti
itself no faith is placed in the power of MacAlahon ;o
itop the Crown Prince's army.—Daily News.