The Sun.
London, England, 1870-09-22 00:00:00

A SPANISH VIEW OF THE CRISIS.

The Epsca, a Madrid journal of some influence has a
long article on the policy of Prussia towards France. The
interest of the grave . Franco-Prussian question it avers
centres less in the cities of Paris, Metz, or Strasburg, and
in the action of European and American diplomacy, than
in the attitude assumed by the German people who, in-
toxicated by victory threaten to exercise a disastrous
pressure on the King and Count Bismarck. After refer-
ing to the current rumours respecting the the terms
of peace to be exacted from France, the Epoca
continues : Prussia ought to understand that her rela-
tions with the other Powers are considerably
altered by the results of the present war. Formerly her
chief importance consisted of ,her alliances. Russia sup-
ported her to counteract the action of France in central
Europe, and of Austria in the East. England cajoled
her to progvide a basis of military and political combina-
tions between Russia and France. Austria contended
against her in German questions; but sought her friend-
ship in all struggles against the enemies of Germany. But
instead of 1: eing as formerly, the nation whose friendship
all the great powers cultivated in order to sustain the
equilibrium of Europe, Prussia, since the two short
campaigns in Bohemia and in France, has become
the nation against whose preponderance all are
aroused. The first, most necessary, and most immediate
result of a peace such as has been talked of in the tumult-
ous meetings of the German cities would be a close alliance
between Austria, vanquished at Sadowa, and France,
vanquished at Paris. The war would break out again in
another four years, and if victory has united the senti-
ments of Bavarians and Berlinese under the leadership of
Brandenberg, it is very possible than a change of fortune,
which is always fickle, and especially so in military suc-
cesses, will renew in defeat the hatreds, the rivalries,'
the municipal jealousies which, during so many centuries-
have impeded the unity of the German nation, and that,
if the idea of unity be too far advanced to be abandoned
it may be realised to the profit of Austria. Warnings
are beginning to be given from the direction of Russia,
which deserve the attentioi of the Prussian Government.
The lifoskiewskia Wizolenwskisays that the Government of
St. Petersburg has large armaments in preparation, and
the probability of a proximate Russo-German war is the
cause of the immediate formation of two entrenched
camps, one at Riga, and the other at Kowno. Even sup-
posing that nothing comes of these menaces we cannot
suppose that the Government of St. Petersburg would not
gladly see the diminution of the military power of a
united German Empire which would seem to annihilate
its importance in Europe, and threaten the creation of a
marine monopoly on the Baltic. If Prussia wishes to
secure the unity of Germany she must of necessity secure
a pernaaneht and powerful ally. This ally can be no
other than France. With Austria she can only treat
respecting German questions through the medium of vic-
tory. She cannot hope to obtain from Russia either syrn-
p4thy or support for her Baltic projects. England will
preserve her traditional alliance with Austria for Western
questions, and her friendship with France in the East: If
in thb present war Prussia shew,s herself magnanimous,

and is satisfied with the Empire of Germany and the
friendship of France, she will-attain the- complete• and.
definite result of an immense ascendancy. If she insisis
on carrying the west frontier of the Rhine to the Moselle
she may have made a glorious campaign, and a peace
that flatters, the pride 4 all her allies ; but other cam-
paigns will follow this one; and the pece will be no more
than a truce. • If the Pruisians hive had their revenge
of Jena, the French may end by having theirs of Waterloo
That may happen to Xing William and General Steinmetz
which happened to Napoleon 1., who was incontestably the
first captain of modern times, and who made victorious
entries into Vienna, Berlin, and Moscow, and -to whom
France owes-all the misfOrtnnes she has now encountered.
But the pretensions of France to extend her territory to
the western part of the Prussian provinces of the Rhine,
and the Palatinate have created an antagonism against
the French Empire in the German Confederation. That
the French people in their turn insist on such projects of
conquest, gives no excuse that a victory, owed in greal
part to a surprise, should tear from France without other
title than that of conquests provinces that were hers
before Prussian Kings reigned in Berlin. If the counsels
of prudence are followed the men who are the leaders of
the armies and the politics of Germany will not be misled
by the suggestions of- vanity, and the temptations
of ambition, but will understand that it is worth
more to King William to transmit the Imperial
Crown in security to his heir than to'place, perhaps tem-
porarily, a number of Governors in Alsace whose capital
he has not yet conquered, and in Lorraine, which no one
denies to be French. They will understand this enough
to resist the movement of public opinion on the other side
of the Rhine, which demands more than solid advantages,
and secure guarantees for the future, a peace which shall
be humiliating and disastrous for France as a satisfaction
to the popular sentiments of vain-glory and rancour.