The Sun.
London, England, 1870-08-17 00:00:00

STRATEGY OF THE CAMPAIGN.

Whatever there might be obscure and contradictory in
,he Imperial and Royal despatches became clear when
read by the light of previous intelligence. The Germans,
we knew, had advanced t 3 the Moselle and the
Ateurthe, at Pont-d-Mousson and Frouard. They had
driven MacMahon from Nancy, and hunted him down
so eagerly that for some days every trace of
him was lost. Their cavalry, in the meanwhile, spread
far and wide throughout the country, threatening to cut
off all communication in the rear of Metz. At the
time the main Prussian army, with its headquarters at
Herny, pressed upon Metz on the east and
south, and sent its skirmishers to the very glacis
of that fortress. The day had come when Marshal
Bazaine must either fight before Metz or retire
from the place, or shut himself up in it only to leave
it as a prisoner; and, after a hesitation which robbed him
of his opportunity, he resolved upon a course which did
not allow him to avoid a battle, and which imperilled his
retreat. Upon the signal of retreat being given, a part
of his army was attacked by two Prussian Army Corps
at Pange, a village about half-way between Meta and
Herny, when the French were routed and driven back
into the town, leaving 4,000 of their dead and wounded
on the field. This was on last Sunday after-
noon, and on the following morning, upon the King of
Prussia pushing his reconnaissance to the outposts of the
fortress, he was allowed to advance unopposed—" a
proof," as the despatch argues, "of the discouragement
prevailing in the place." The French forces engaged on
this side did not, however, constitute the whole French army
at Metz. Half of this army, according to the Emperor's
version, had, in its retreat, already crossed the Moselle when
it was fallen upon by the Prussians, who were repulsed
with considerable loss. The Imperial telegram was very
vague both as to the place of this action and the troops
engaged in it ; still, as Pange lies five or six miles from
the Moselle, and the encounter described by the Emperor
must have been on the left bank, it is quite possible
that the fighting was going on simultaneously at
two different points, the Emperor not knowing
very well what was going on at Pange, and the King un-
aware of what occurred on the Moselle. That on this
latter spot the Prussians gave way, at least for a moment,
we have no rea son to doubt. The Emperor only speaks
of their repulse, not of their defeat. To judge of the im-
portance of this repulse we must consider the object the
contending parties had in view. Marshal Bazaine wished to
withdraw his army to Chalons ; the Prussian Generals
were bent on barring his path. The French divisions
seem, indeed, to have cut their way through their foes,
but their success could hardly be looked upon as com-
plete, unless they so thoroughly routed their enemies as to
insure themselves against future molestation. Instead
of this, there seems to be no doubt that the Prussians
immediately rallied, that they closed upon their
retreating foe, and that a running fight began, which went
on all Monday and part of Tuesday, and terminated
only at Verdun. The various corps, under the Crown
Prince were, as we know, in possession of different points
on the Paris and Strasburg Railway between Nancy
and Bar-le-Due. Thir übiquitous Uhlans had been for
Several days signalled at Toul, Vigneulles, and through-
out that woody region, and on Monday evening
they were at Commercy, that station on the Paris
and Strasburg line which is nearest to Verdun, and
communicates with it by a good road. There is no
railway between Metz and Verdun, and the French,
who, on their way to Chalons, made for that place,
were exposed to the flank attacks of the Prussian cavalry
all along the line of their march. We have the evidence
of the Sub-Prefect of Verdun and of Count Palikao that
the retreating army had to fight its way inch by inch. In
what condition it may have reached Verdun we are left to
imagine. The Prime Minister, indeed, asserted in the
Legislative Body that the pursuit had ceased, that the
various French corps were united, and that, after seve-
ral engagements, the Prussians had withdrawn from
Commercy. Under all circumstanees he could no
perhaps, hold different language. The terrible extent of
their losses will only too soon be revealed to the French
people.—Times.

The simple story of Sunday's battle seems to be, that
the French, clinging courageously to Metz to win time
for the retreat of MacMahon on the one hand, and the
arrival of reinforcements from Paris on the other,
began in earnest to draw off, on Sunday towards
the line of the Meuse and the Argonne Forest.
The Prussians endeavoured to overwhelm their
rearguard ; but, delivered from the enfeebling and
distracting presence of the Empreor, Marshal
Bazaine acted on energetic counsels, and did his very
utmost to make his retreat respected. The mere fact
that a total rout was not the result of this battle—fought
by 60,000 men, for four hours, against 70,000—seems
to have encouraged the Emperor, receiving reports at
a distance from the actual scene, to call it a vic-
tory; and a victory it was devoutly believed to be
in Paris on Monday. At the very utmost, it was
no more than a plucky and well-sustained affair of rear-
guard, in which the assailed party, having resolved to
retreat, resolved to retreat showing a firm countenance
and striking sturdy blows. Even from the King of
Prussia's own report, we are disposed to anticipate,
MOTO strongly even than yesterday, that the campaign
is about to enter on a new phaie. The French commanders
mist antedilv make an end of retreating. if thoin

would not give up the game altogether. The announce-
ment of the Count de Palikao that the Prussians, who
had advanced beyond Commercy—midway between Toul
and Bar-le-Duca—have been driven back, after three or
four engagements, indicates sufficiently that the Imperial
commanders mean to make astrong stand at the Meuse.—
Telegraph.

We have a despatch from the King of Prussia, dated
from Herny, at hall-past seven o'clock on Monday
evening, after he had returned from the battle-field,
which his telegram of the morning had announced
that he intended to visit. He writes that he
returned from the field of battle at Metz at three o'clock
on Monday. The advanced guard of the 7th Army Corps
had attacked the retreating enemy at about five o'clock
on Sunday evening. The French made a stand, and
were reinforced gradually by troops from the fortress.
The 13th division, and a part of the 14th, supported the
advanced guard, as also parts of the Ist Army Corps. A
very bloody fight ensued along the whole line, and the
French were thrown back at all points. The pursuit
was continued ups" to the glacis of the outworks. The
nearness of the fortress allowed the French, in many
instances, to secnre their wounded. After their wounded
had been secured the Prussian troops marched to their
old bivouacs at dawn. Such was the first despatch con-
veying any details of the action. It proves that the
French were retreating when the Prussian attack took
•, place ; and they retired under the guns of the fortress,
and that the Prussian attack was made by the whole of
one division of the 7th Corps and part of another, and
by portions of the Ist Corps, a force roughly to be
estimated at fifty thousand men. Another despatch
estimates the French losses at 4,000, and states that the
King made a reconnaissance in force on the following day,
Monday, and was close to the French outposts for several
hours, without'provoking any demonstration. This, which
the telegram describes as a proof that in the French
army strong discouragement prevails, is to us only a proof
that there is no French force left in Metz able to attack
the Prussian army. But, following this, comes a de-
spatch which has been accidentally delayed in transmission.
it is dated Monday, and gives further details of the action
from the Prussian side. It appears from this that about
four o'clock on Sunday afternoon the Prussian advanced
guard before Metz believed that they saw signs
of a retreat of the French corps which was still
encamping under the protection of the fortress.
Accordingly the brigade of General Goltz, one of
the two brigades of the 13th division (7th corps)
attacked the rear guard of this corps, which is
described as General Decaen's corps formerly
Marshal Bazaine's—and succeeded in engaging it in such
a severe encounter that the whole corps and some detach-
ments of General Frossard's corps were obliged to sup-
port it. General Glumer, commanding the 13th division,
then led his 2nd brigade to the front, and the divisions
of Generals Kamecke and Wrangel engaged in the
fight on the left wing, ultimately driving the
French back on all points behind their works.
Meanwhile the French corps of Ladmirault endea-
voured to turn the flank of Manteuffel's (the Ist)
Prussian corps, but was attacked by his reserves, who
stormed the positions held by the French, driving them
back into the fortress, and pushing on to Belle Croix,
a house on the road to St. Avoids, and to Borny, a
village three-quarters of a mile south of that road,
both of which are within range of the advanced forts.
So far, then, as this battle is concerned, it may
be summed up as an attack by the Prussians of two
corps on the French rear guard, reinforced later by more
than a whole corps ; and a retreat by the French, after
gaining time for the retirement of the remainder of
the army across the Moselle within the lines of their
fortress. Not only is there the Emperor's first
telegram, announcing that half the army had
crossed the Moselle before this attack was made,
but there is this significant addition to the Prussian
despatch—from the Prussian outposts—this is after the
King's reconnoissance on the day following the battle—
and from the most elevated spots around, nothing could
be seen of the enemy on the right bank of the Moselle;
but thick clouds of dust, which were visible on the oppo-
site bank of the river, lead to the conclusion that the bulk
of the army has withdrawn.—Standard.