The Sun.
London, England, 1870-08-10 00:00:00

retire to the shelter of tlleir fortresses. But days anct
weeks passed by, and the Emperer made no movement,
while the million soldiers of Germany are mobilised
and ready for battle. The Prussian generals might
well see cause—in the inactivity, the hesitation,
the evident weakness of the enemy,—to change suddenly
thelplan of campaign, so far as the centre and right were
concerned, and to 'launch the Crown Prince at once
against the French right • flank, incautiously ex-
posed by the' drawing-in of MacMahon upon
the centre for the Much meditated but lOng-delayed
attack. This theory would e,xplain at_ once the feebleness
with which the Prussians at first held Saarbruck ; the
energy with which; as their divisions successively arrived
from the north, they retook it on Saturday last ; the delay
of Steinmetz and Frederic Charles to form up the masses
of their troops, but lately put in march from the Rhine ;
and the delay of the Crown Prince himself in pushing the
great advantage he won at Woerth, until he should
learn that the main army—and perhaps also the Fourth
Army, destined to cross the Higher Rhine—were fully
ready to support his further advance into the French ter-
ritoity. The necegbity of repairing losses and replacing
ammunition must also count for something in retard-
ing operations; but this cause alone could not explain
the delay, at least on the part of the First and
Second Prussian Armies, only a very small portion of
which was engaged at Forbach and Spicheren the other
day. A day or two at the most, however, will suffice to
place the various German armies in a state of perfect effi-
ciency itr an offensive campaign—a chief difficulty being,
as we indicated yesterday, the supply of provisions
for operations in a country almost eaten out by
the Imperial troops. Each of the three armies num-
bers about 140,000 men ; and thus, even if we
leave out of account the South German levies, who
are gathering on the' Upper Rhine, the Emperor would
have to do with more than 400,000 already victorious
enemies, of whom 2430,000—under Prince Frederic
Charles and Von Steiumitz—act as one single body be-
tween the Vosges and the Moselle, while "Fritz," with
his one hundred and forty- thousand men, on the eastern
slope of the Vosges, is proof against any possible
attack that can be made by the French in
the present posture of their affairs. Even by the
Emperor's own account, he has not more than 230,000
men under his hand ; and these are, as was shown yes-
terday, scattered in three distinct bodies, over a line of
about a hundred miles in length, from the neighbourhood
of Metz, to Saverne, on the crest of the Vosges, twenty
miles north-west of Strasburg.—Daily Telegraph.
It is possible, though we confess it seems to us hardly
probable, that the Emptror may even now design to con-
centrate his whole army to defend the passages of the
Vosges. But he could scarcely expect to be in time. Can-
sobert's corps would exhaust the transporting power of
the railway for two days, and the troops from Metz
would have to make four marches in order to reach
Phalsburg. Before their four marcheeNould be com-
pleted MacMahonll'even if assisted by Canrobert, would
in all probability .be beaten back, and the Vosges
he crossed by the army of the Crown Prince. Yet, as a.
last desperate risk, the effort might be worth making.
Saverne closes this pass of the Vosges, and must be taken
before an advance on Nancy can be made by either the
railroad
,or the great Strasburg road. In rear of it a
strong position might be taken up. It is situated on the
Zorn, where it debouches into the plains of Alsace, and
above it rises a spur of the Vosges, covered with forest.
It ,was chosen by the Romans as a station for the
defence of the Vosges, and that argues that it is not
incapable of defence. Of its old defensive works only
some ruined wails and towers remain. But if Saverna
itself were taken, the railway to Nancy would easily be
made useless. Immediately after passing Saverne there
is a viaduct on six arches which carries the railway over
the road, canal, and river, and then, after several deep
cuttings, there is a tunnel nearly 500 yards long. The
main road is closed, when Sat'erne is passed, by the
fortress of Phalsburg, and although this may not be
strong enough to stand a long siege, having still only tine
work designed by Vauban, it would prove a for•
midable check to an advancing army. We know
how it opposed the Allies in 1814 and in 1815.
But in order that MacMalson or the Emperor should
hs-,e an opportunity of opposing the Crown Prince at
Saverne and Phalsburg the. Crown Prince must first
attack by that 'road ; and if" does not follow
that because MacMahon has takes that . route
the Crown Prince will do -lo as well. Hip first
despatches chew that he was under the. impres-
sion that the marshal had taken the road to Bitsche,
and he would naturally halt before pushing on against
that strong positibii, where the fort-crowned hill closes
the pass, till assured of assistance from the other armies.
He is long since aware that the army of Prince Frederie
Charles has occupied Saarguemines, and that the French
army has retreated along-the whole frontier. Helmet
know, what was doubtless the case on Monday, that there
are nS French forces to bar that passage to the Vosges,
and it is more than likely that he will disregard MacMahon
for the present, or at least leave a corps to oppose him,
and hasten to cross these difficult hills, and effect his junc-
tion with the other armies. If once the three Gesman
armies foin together, west of the Vosges, they will ad-
'ance in Such strength on Metz that the Emperor's forces
will be entirely outnumbered.. It is now impossible for
the Emperor to dispute these northern passes of the
Vosges ; and it seems, the refore, that a concentration for the
purpose olholding tipke mountains cannot be sure of suc-
cess. It would be no use to hold Phalsburg, and have the
position turned by Bitsche. Besides the risk of throwing
the whole Frbuch army towards the Vosges would be
enormous. It affords to Steinmetz and to Prince Charles
the opportunity of ascending the Moselle unchecked, and
placing themselves between the French army and Paris.
The more we think over the dispatch which states this to
be the plan the more we see that it is now too late for such
at attempt, and that the probabilities are much more in
favour of the Emperor's calling Canrobert to Metz, and
there endeavouring to make a stand against' the armies
which will advance upon him from the Saar.—Standard.