The Sun.
London, England, 1870-08-12 00:00:00

STRATEGY OF rut CAMPAIGN.

As yet everything points to the probability of a great
battle before Metz, and within a Very short time. The
Prussian advlces are so slight that we cannot penetrate
their plan of operations with any certainty. We are much
inclined to believe that they will endeavour to push for-
ward their left across the Moselle south of Metz, and,
holding the road to Verdun, endeavour to hem the French
in against the neutral territory, cutting them off
from Paris. Meantime, although the delay is allowing
the French the opportunity of concentrating forms to
oppose their advance, it must not be forgotten that the
Pru,ssians have even greater reserves, which they are now,
at all events to some extent, bringing up to the frontier.
We have reason to know that on Monday large bodies of
troops were -still pouring southwards through Coblenz
and Cologne. The delay cannot be supposed to
argue timidity or hesitation ; we must look for
its cause to one of two motives, or perhaps to both cora-
blued. These are the necessity for concentrating an over-
whelming force within striking distance of the French at
Metz, and the necessity for bringing great quantities of
supplies together for the support of such a force. The
Prussians have reason to know that they will be opposed
at Metz by at least 130,000 troops, and if MacMahon and
De Failly should join Bazaine, by fifty thousand more.
The last French despatch says that reinforcements are
being rapidly brought up by the Eastern Railway. The
Prussians must advance against such a force, holding as
it will a very strong tactical position, with at least 200,000
men. Those 200,000 men must be supplied in a
country which is by no means rich, and which the
French have also drained. The difficulty of forage
alone must be very great. The valley of the Saar
was burnt up by the scorching heat of the early summer,
and before the war broke out hay was bringing nearly
four times its usual price. Subsequent to this a French
army, of 250,000 had lived on the country. The
Prussians depended chiefly for forage in the war
of 1866 on the country in which they carried
on operations, bringing in their supplies by means
of country carts and waggons taken from the farmers.
The transport of forage from the interior of Germany
would be a work of immense difficulty, and the formation
of magazines of supplies would be essential to the Prus•
sians before they could venture to advance boldly. It
must be remembered that they were not quite ready for
war, and that although the French inactivity allowed
them to strike the first blow on the frontier, they cannot
have been ready to advance into the heart of France.—
Standard.

The junction of the Crown Prince with the two other
German armies is now an accomplished fact. Some have
fancied that he would effect the junction by way of Bitsch
—in other words, by painfully retracing his steps north-
westward from Woerth and Haguenau, and chosing perhaps
the most awkward of all the Vosges passes for his transit.
No doubt, the surrender of the garrison of Bitsch,
and also of that of Petite Pierre—a little fortress
which closed the pass between Bitsch and Phalsburg
—has made the Prussians free of the mountains to the
north of the great Strasburg road by Saverne. The road
from Haguenau across the Vosges westward to the plain
of Lorraine, passing by Petite Pierre to Saareunion and
Fenestrange, might more naturally be followed ; but there
is another route, which now lies open to the Crown
Prince that of Severne itself. We know,
now that MacMahon, after displaying a desperate
bravery at Worth, to be matched only by the
severity of his losses, retired southward upon Sa-
verne ; but that on Sunday evening he continued his
retreat westward towards Nancy, and the town was occu-
pied by the advanced guard of the Crown Prince. Now
Saverne) which is twenty miles west of Haguenau, is only
fifty miles east of Fenestrange, where the advanced
cavalry of Prince Frederick Charles was on Wednesday
night ; Marshal MacMahon, retiring on Nancy, must, in
the three days that bad passed since he quitted
Saverne, have got fairly into the neighbourhood of
Nancy, by Blamont and Luneville on the south, by
Dieuze and Maisel on the north ; and no French
troops kept the field to the east of Fenestrange and Sarre-
bourg. Thus we do not outrun the actual progress of
events, when we say, that the junction of the three great
German armies has already been practically effected. On
the crest of the Vosges, whether by the pass of Petit Pierre
or by the Strasbourg route from Saverne, the Crown
Prince is not more than a d'ay's march from the left flank
of his cousin's army on their western slope ; and since the
relative situations of the armies are subject to the
Changes which three days have made—for the German
centre had reached Fenestrange on Wednesday night,
while the Third Army had reached Saverne three days
earlier—it may well be imagined that by this time the
Crown Prince has brought into line on the west
of the mountains no inconsiderable portion of his
twice victorious troops. The junction of the two
armies may have contributed to cause the delay at
which we have all wondered ; but it will also assuredly
increase the magnitude and decisiveness of the conflict
for which we are now waiting. It remains to be seen
whether Bazaine, Canrobert, and MacMahon will really
make a stand on the Moselle against forces so over-
whelming, with troops discouraged and in part disor-
ganised. Prudence would strongly dictate further
retreat; but Paris clamours for a victory, and the Mar-
shals may be constrained to deliver battle against their
better judgment.—Telegraph.