The Sun.
London, England, 1848-07-05 00:00:00

37, BEDFORD-SQUARE, LONDON.

Doctor of Medicine. Matriculated Member of the University of Edin-
burgh, Licentiate of Apothecaries' Hall, London, Honorary Member
of the London Hospital Medical Society, &c.
Marriage requires the fulfilment of several conditions, in order
that It may be really the cause of mutual happiness. Could the
veil, which covers the origin of domestic wretchedness, be raised,
and its true source is every instance disclosed, in how many could
it be traced to physical disqualifications and their attendant disap-
pointments. Excesses are always injurious ; the gift, which when
used in moderation is fraught with advantage, becomes, when
abused.the prolific source of mischief and of greater or less Injury
to the constitutional and vital powers. The particular excesses, on
the nature and consequence of which this Treatise professes to dilate,
are productive of greater severity of misery to the human frame,
han any other to which it is subieet.
This work contains an accurate and complete account of the
Anatomy and Physiology of the Reproductive Organs, and of
their relative conditions in health and disease. It deservedly
requires the closest attention and study, for what subject can
be of more importance than the preservation of the health
and of the physical capabilities of which every man should
be possessed. It unfortunately happens that the unhappy
victim of excessive indulgence and vicious habits, whether acquired
in early life or from the follies of advanced age, while suffering
from their invariable consequences, unwisely entertains a fear of ap-
plying to a qualified physician for relief. Shame and the dread so
frequently, but erroneously entertained that these complaints are
beyond the reach of art, alike restrict him and prevent his seeking
for assistance where alone it can be procured. In acting thus, he
forgets that accurate discrimination n ascertaining the causes of
disease, sympathy with the sufferer, and, above all, secrecy, inva-
riably characterise the intelligent and practical physician, and to the
medical man who can show by his possession of the requisite legal
qualifications that he is entitled to esteem and respect in his profes-
sional pursuits, the utmost confidence should be extended. Dr.
altatifrarty,teane fdorthhies
eL,et'MERT has obtained the highest medical honours, as his diplomas
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The petitioner, James Henry Hance, seeks protection
as a non-trader. It is objected that he ought to include
in the list of debts certain old debts as to which he was
discharged by this Court a few years ago, and that this
brings with it the necessity of calling himself a trader,
some of these debts having been contracted by him when
in trade, and then it is urged that being a trader,
owing 3001., he cannot petition under the new Act.
I will pass at once to the point which has been argued,
whether the debits of a former prison insolvency are to
be included. Does the party petitioning come before us
owing those debts within the meaning of this statute? I
have not before had the opportunity of dealing with this
question, and have never intimated an acquiescence in
the opinion which is commonly said to prevail. It is a
questiou which I ought to entertain with much caution,
because in deciding one way, I should, as I conceive,
contradict the principles on which the law of this
Court has hitherto stood, and stultify our own
practice, as it has prevailed for thirty years.
Some are satisfied with this truism, that the debts of
an insolvency are not absolutely extinguished but,
exist until paid, and declare, as a necessary consequence
that they are to be reckoned in the total whose amount
regulates the competency to petition. I must de-
cline so rapid a conclusion. Words are to be con-
strued with regard to the subject matter in which
they are employed. The subject-matter is this—a man
surrenders all his estate and effects present and future
for payment of his debts ; he desire& to have protection
against process for his debts, and the owners of the debts
are to share in the property which shall be obtained as the
result of his petition. It seems reasonable that in all
these propositions " debts" should mean the same thing.
The words of the Act are—" A person being a trader,
but owing debts under 3001. may petition. The peti-
tion shall have annexed to it a full and true schedule of
debts with names and dates of contracting the debts
severally, the nature of the debts, and the security."
Surely the debts which he owes for the purposes of this
Act are those in respect of which he seeks an advantage
to himself by the protection of his person on the one
hand, and in respect of which his creditors are to have the
benefit of his estate, on the other hand. By these tests let
the question be tried. The first test is easily disposed of.
The petitioner is no petitioner as to the debts of the past
insolvency. His protection as to them was pronounced
long ago: he cannot ask to alter the terms of it. The
latter test gives the one topic to be discussed. Is the
property that shall be obtained under a new insolvency
distributable only among the creditors, as to whom pro-
tection is sought, or also among creditors under prior
insolvencies, as to whom protection is not sought ?
The argument must be the same as if the party were
again petitioning under the Insolvent Act The cre-
ditor's right of suit under either scheme depends on the
position in which he and his debtor stood before this
new insolvency took place—that is to say, in the rela-
tion which was established between them for the time to
come, when the latter received the benefit of a discharge.
There is no provision in the new laws which professes
to alter their relative rights and liabilities. The defini-
tion of a petitioner—" trader owing debts under 3001."
—cannot be held to impart to the creditors of a former
insolvency new powers over property present or future ;
and the question of letting them into proof and dividend
is the same as if that definition had not been expressed.
Thus the point to be discussed resolves itself into a
question which has been constantly before us ever since
this Court was constituted, and which has received one
uniform decision. The former creditors have never
been inserted in a schedule, neither individually nor
in a mass. They have never received notice ; never
been admitted to oppose ; never allowed to receive a
dividend. So much has the contrary prevailed, that even
when such parties have obtained from the debtor fresh
securities they have been rejected, and told that their
claims belonged to a former and a different insolvency.
When the law (as was the case ten years ago) re-
quired the consent of a certain number of creditors
tor a man to petition a second time within five years,
the creditors of a former insolvency had no voice in the
questioe. If such creditors are to be admitted now then
in a prison case, their debts must be included
in the warrant of attorney, which will contradict the
90th section of the Act, which denies effect to all judg-
ment, except that which they have already got; in a
protection case they will share in taking a vested
interest in all future estates, which by enlarging,
contradicts the terms in which the former insolvency
placed them. Either result appears equally perverse.
If we were required thus to blend all the insolvencies of
a very insolvent life, it would be necessary to parti-
cularise all the debts of all in the last schedule. Each
creditor is entitled to know all his competitors. He
knows little by reading the provisional assignee's
name with a lumping security for claims that
have never been sifted. Moreover, the Act itself
requires " a full schedule, with names and
dates of contracting the debts severally, with securities."
If not particularised, how can they be challenged ?
Those whose practice I think to have been erroneous
never proposed that an assignee should prove for the
whole body; nor was it ever done. Each had to come
for himself. This appears in one case to have raised the
question whether any such old claim could be repelled
by the statute of limitations; and here it occurs to one
to say, that if to such a claim a man could desire
to plead that statute he would not be allowed
to do so; but the reason would be this, that a creditor
cannot be under a penalty for neglecting to sue when
the law has prohibited him from suing. The debtor,
in such a case, needs no such plea; he has a higher
ground of defence—whether six years or only three
have elapsed—he cannot be sued. The statute has
in terms disabled the creditors from all suit, " except
on the judgment entered up by order of this
court," and most especially disentitles him from
coming forward against the debtor in any new state of
insolvency. It is quite certain that none of those whom
we hear speak of as old creditors can compel a new in•
solvency. In order to do this a man must be a detaining
creditor, and the old one cannot become a detaining ,
creditor. The same thing prevents him from driving
the debtor to seek protection under the new laws; he has
it already against such parties. The debt, we know, is
not extinguished for all intents and purposes, but the
power of proceeding for the recovery of it is extinguished
excepting upon the judgment in the several ways pre-
scribed by the statute. Those peculiar methods of
seeking payment remain open to him; but the statute
limits the employments even of those to the t
case of the debtor coming into a solvent state.
Tho most important and definite feature which
marks the future relation between a discharged in-
solvent and his creditor; is that the special jurisdic-
tionfutohdhreges mfiuAiretsnetutt upon
there u
clause,c lgm e n
appear t
rht
aact
of
ech
sre e t
ddo
ttbohtr
eos e
therefore
shenTerodrhcfeei
'there
raeo
ebrt ability
cfei tanyanBol7lt otbfshueut pay."future
whatever
rsoe th
contrived by the statute for making after-acquired
property available, is not to be exercised, " if it shall
s
proceedings
enhedi e dBci n9O hs-
hsuaitteveexrcebpyt
disut
noeipctgoifteoani
tonvhnoetasuhrt
.0
of
irj
pt irsovoindebseehxaeelf
execution
fiaolnl
on the judgment., The next constrains him, when pos-
sessed of property not subject to execution, to transfer
so much as the Court shall direct " towards satisfaction of
The third compels those who hold money,
individuals,
B,,tjut. dc., bge
lmo
ne ng
n;
to him to deliver it for the " be-
nefit of the creditors entitled to claim under the
judgment." These are but different modes of satisfying
the judgment, all subject to the scrutiny of the Court
into the debtor's " ablility to pay:* These words have
always appeared to me of essential import in defining
the state of debtor and creditor after an insolvency.
But I do not perceive that these words have ever been
notified by those whose arguments and decisions are re-
ported for us. There is the leading case in matters
of bankruptcy, where the judge quotes at length every
clause in the Act which can be brought upon such a
question, excepting only these words which disclose and
illustrate the whole principle of the subject. Some of the
earlier Acts not only express this principle, but define
the meaning of it. By the 14th sec. of 53d Geo. lIL,
c. 102, " If the insolvent shall become able to pay
all or part of his debts, after a reasonable allowance for
the maintenance of him and his family, and payment of
his debts contracted since his discharge, the creditors
may apply for leave to proceed against bim, and in case
it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Court that he is
of ability to pay, it shall be lawful for the Court to re-
voke the discharge, or to permit execution to be takenout
on the judgment." The present Act exhibits the saw:,
contingency, "if it shall appear that ho is of ability to pay,"
the meaning of which, namely, ability after payment anew
debts, has been recognised by the Court ever since I be-
longed to it, now twenty-four years. We constantly
have inquiries into the truth of now debts, when al-
leged in resistance of a claim made to our discretion
upon fresh property. It is plain that if a man becomes
wealthy, not having new creditors, the old ones can
never deal with his substance by bringing on a process
of insolvency. They must resort to the special jurisdiction
of this Court under the insolvency to which they be-
long. Why, then, should the accident of his having a
new creditor who can arrest give them introduction to
that process? The new creditors may enforce payment
through that process. The old ones must follow the pro-
visions of the statute in their pursuit of the surplus. There
is indeed in the opposite doctrine this enormous absurdity:
if a man has new creditors, and just property enough
to pay them in full, the Court, while none of these ar-
rest, can by RO means whatever interfere with his pro-
perty iu favour of the old list, because the condition of
helping them is wanting—he is not more than solvent.
If, however, he has enough only to pay the
new ones half-a-crown in the pound, and one of
them shall arrest and petition, then, according to that
theory the old ones may rush in, and set the condition,
ability to pay, at defiance, actually resting their claim
on his inability to pay either one sot of creditors or the
other. Can any man study the insolvent Acts from that
of 1813 to the present day, and not discern the
policy of these laws ? It is that a man shall
be able to earn himself a livelihood, not ha-
rassed for his debts; that his struggle for subsistence
shall not be frustrated by the invasion of his means of
subsistence; that his past debts shall only bo a charge on
the contingency of a clear surplus estate. This policy is
set at nought if the old creditors can, by finding one
their own benofit. The farther removed willan shall
new man to arrest, procure a second insolvency for
be from a std ,e of muplais, the surer be the

scheme of oppression in the facility of finding the
instrument ot oppression. Such a state of things
is warranted by no words in any statute,
and is prohi-
bited by the whole tenor and principle of the laws which
this Court is required to administer. It remains that I
should notice the grounds on which a contrary opinion
seems to be founded. It is known that the scheduled
creditors of a discharged insolvent have been
permitted by
the Court of Bankruptcy to
prove under a subsequent fiat. I admit that
there is analogy. But if my observations
have been just; if the laws of this Court limit the
faculty of claiming payment to the predicament of a
clear surplus estate, this Court is to respect the law,
notwithstanding the practice of another Court of similar
character. But more is to be said—the admission of
such proofs in bankruptcy has been introduced on
the supposed authority of one single common law
decision—" Jellis v. Mountford," 4 Barn. and Ald. 256.
I dispute the application of that authority—the ques-
tion in that case was upon a prior bankruptcy,
not a subsequent one. One Routlidge had become bank-
rupt, that is, had committed an act of bankruptcy before
he passed through this Court ; and the question was,
whether, after he had gone through this Court, it was
too late to prove that bankruptcy; whether a creditor
named in the schedule was not barred from bringing
forward his debt as a foundation of the bankruptcy.
It was decided that he might petition on that debt.
In that instance there would of course be no diffi-
culty on the proof of debts •, for the bankruptcy
once established took all the funds by priority, and
creditors could not be deprived of their right
against the funds by the discharge of the debtor, under
au insolvency which was in law posterior to the bank-
ruptcy. This is the case which has been made the ex-
cuse for permitting proof of such a debt in a new bank-
ruptcy twenty years afterwards, for holding that a
creditor having received his share of assets under an in-
solvency, may at any distance of time share in
the new assets of a new insolvency. I hare ex-
plained my reasons for thinking that such position
violates the principles and enactments of the insolvent
law; but let us suppose those principles brought to the
notice of higher tribunals, which I am not aware that
they ever have been, would this case be allowed to sub•
vert them? I think not. In applying the decision of a
Court as a precedent, we must look to the case which
was before the Court; and not merely make a handle of
particular expressions, avoiding to notice the facts to
which they were applied. In thatcase there was a competi-
tion between a bankruptcy and an insolvency for the title
to a tailing man's estate, and the point was decided in
favour of the former. The result was that the proceedings
in this court, excepting only the award of personal
liberty, became void. As to debts and property, present
and future, our jurisdiction was utterly superseded. In
pronouncing the decision which was clearly right on
grounds of commercial policy, the Court expresses that
most unquestionable proposition, that the debt was not
extinguished ; and they sanction the use of it to a most
legitimate purpose, the purpose of enabling the
creditor to charge his debtor with an act of
bankruptcy, that shall over-reach the title under
the insolvency. The misapplication of this case as a
precedent consists in an extravagant value given to the
proposition that a scheduled debt is not extinguished to
all intents and purposes. It is not therefore alive and
available to all intents and purposes. It seems to me
that the case ceases to be a precedent, when you want
to use such a debt for a totally different purpose from
that for which it was permitted to be used there. Ob-
serve then, in that case, there was no succession of in-
solvencies or bankruptcies as in the question now before
us. There was no newly acquired property as there is
here. There was one state of insolvency, and
the contest was by which tribunal the affairs
should be administered in short, it was a
question of priority, of rather of the right to prove
priority, and the means of proving it. The Chief Jus- .
Lice says, "It may be important for creditors that a com-
mission should issue ; the assignee has a more exten-
sive power of recovering the assets." Mr. Justice
Bityly says, " We must recollect that the discharge has
no operation as against creditors not named in the
schedule, any of thesecreditors, therefore, might lawfully
sue out a commission, and then the same effect would
take place, and all the property of the insolvent would vest
in the assignees appointed under that commission. Now
to prevent this inconvenience, which would be still greater
than those suggested, it seems to me that the
creditors named in the schedule ought to have the
power of suing out a commission, for they cannot be
sure that the creditors not named may not after-
wards make their whole proceedings void. Besides,
their remedy under the bankrupt laws is much more
extensive than under the Insolvent Act; hero, the pay-
ment of money to the defendant was void under the
bankrupt laws, and the petitioning creditor, finding that
he cannot set it aside under the Insolvent Act, has
obtained a commission, and is seeking to distribute the
proceeds among all the creditors of the bankrupt." Is
the Learned Judge here talking with a view to future
trading and future acts of bankruptcy? Certainly not,
for against them the title :in this court is, safe.
He speaks on the subject before him, a commission that
may overreach the insolvency,
and, as he expresses it,
make the whole proceedings void. His point is, that the
creditors should not lose their option of the stronger
title. It has always been a blemish in the law that
t
creditors cannot more readily compel an insolvent
-to a bankruptcy, and I apprehend that the
Courts have been inclined to aid rather than im-
pede them in their resort to this process against
the trader's estate. It was not expedient that
his own act of petitioning this Court should
disable them from proceeding in bankruptcy or their
discovering that he had committed an act which would
over-reach the title of our assignee,
and place the funds
in the other court. " Jellis v. Mountford ' was decided
in favour of that principle in 1821 ; and by the Insol-
vent Act of 1824, creditors were relieved from all
difficulty on the subject, by a provision that the very act
of petitioning should itself be an act of bankruptcy.
When I framed the Act which was passed in 1826, I
found there was great injustice in this, for the assignee
of a man subject to the bankrupt laws could never know
whether his title was safe, as the:very faction which
it rested could any day be brought forward in
support of a commission to overthrow it. I
represented this to Lord Eldon, who was
sufficiently jealous on behalf of the bankruptcy ju-
risdiction, and on behalf of its presiding deity, the
Lord Chancellor. But his admirable sense of jus-
tice sanctioned the alteration which I revised, and
the result was that provision which now stands
the 39th clause of the present Act. It is a sta-
tute of limitations providing that the title in
this court shall not be avoided by a bankruptcy,
unless the bankruptcy be adjudicated before
the gezetted day of hearing, or within two calendar
months from the vesting order, and this limitation holds
good, however early may be the act of bankruptcy which
can be proved, and whether the debt for supporting the
fiat was duly scheduled or omitted. I feel assured that
neither Lord Eldon, in assenting to this enact-
ment, nor the judges of the King's Bench in
deciding " Jellis a. Mountford" had any notion of
dealing with a case such as is argued now—the
the debts of an old insolvency interfering with new as-
sets in a new insolvency. notwithstanding some re-
marks that are questionable, and others that are super-
fluous, I feel confident both that the decision was a
sound and wise ono, and that it is quite inappli-
cable to the case now before us. In showing that
upon its
I abut
e
this case is no precedent for the question before us, I
excuse myself from imitating the practice in bank-
s
aruapttwcyn,easwehaichupenprofesses to be
havef foundeddbedeen u
that
practice
will advert to them. In ex parte "Barrington," 2 Mont.
and Ayrton, 286, which was before the Commissioners ot
ou
the Great Seal in 1835, it was held that such a debt as
we speak of may support a fiat, and in ex-parte " Fen-
wick," 14 months afterwards, this was followed by the
Court of Review. In the former case the Court took
time to consider the judgment, so that one may expect
to find whatever strength of argument the subject ad- i
mits of. Lord Commissioner Shadwell begins with saying, '
" The question is, whether this fiat be good, the peti-
tioning creditor being inserted yin the schedule in the
Insolvent Debtors' Court. It is insisted that his name
and debt being therein, the debt is gone and destroyed
for all purposes." New, I must be excused for saying
that I (In not find any sushi monstrous proposition
put forward by counsel in that case or any other
that I have seen, and yet neatly the whole
of these judgments are employed in combat-
ting this imagined proposition. The Learned
Judge, who quotes at length many clauses of the sta-
tute, proceeds to repeat that " the Legislature has not,
in positive terms, declared the debt extinct for all pur-
poses. After quoting the 57th section, excepting only
the very important words, " if it shall appear that he is
of ability to pay," his Lordship observes—" This clause
clearly shows that the debts still exist in the contempla-
tion of the Legislature." There is then, this comment
on the 91st section: "It
appears to me that
this section applies only
to legal proceedings,
for though the word suit might apply to a suit in
equity, yet at law the proceeding is denominated a suit.
Moreover, this section speaks of " reply," which expres-
sion is inapplicable to a suit in equity. The judgment
then reverts to the main topic, saying, Even if this sec-
tion did apply to suits in equity, the language of the
whole Act proves that no intent to dis-
charge from a debt existed.' " Lord Com-
missioner Bosanquet speaks to the same effect
excepting that be does not declare proof in bankruptcy
to be a suit in equity. He inquires only whether the
debt was utterly dead and gone, saying, " The ques-
tion is whether the Act discharges the debt? Is the
discharge complete in all respects, or qualified? If the
Act intended to discharge from the debt, it is very
badly worded. If the Act intended completely
to discharge the debt, it would have been easy
to have done so, and there is nothing to enable a Court
to draw an inference the other way." The leading idea
that is thus laboured, is that the debt is not absolutely
extinct. No one ever thought or said that it was. The
idea is suggested only by those who combat it. The
most superficial notice of the statute shows that the
debt is not extinct. What then ? A debt may be ex-
tinct for one purpose, and not extinct for another.
The debt of one who has his debtor in execution is ex-
tinct for some purposes. He cannot sue him again, and
he cannot have execution against his property. Accord-
ingly he osnn4 institute a bankruptcy which is both a

suit and an execution. But his debt is not extinguished
to all purposes. If another man has instituted a bank-
ruptcy he may release the debtor and prove the debt
also; if the debtor die in custody, the right of execution
against land and goods is revived. Let us not then be
told that the debt, because not absolutely extinct, can
share in the scramble under successive insolvencies, and
that a court of law is not to consider in any case the
principle which should admit it or exclude it. Such in-
difference to principle does not characterise the decisi3n
on matters of bankruptcy. Observe the cases in which
the Courts have refusedito give effect to a second com-
mission, where the party is uncertificated in the first; or
to a third, where he has not paid 15s. in the second. In
those cases judges might have said, " A debt is a debt, a
trading is a trading, and an act of bankruptcy is an act
of bankruptcy; and we sitting in a court of law must
pronounce the commission to be valid." They have not
so reasoned; they have embraced views of public policy
and declared the nullity of assignments where there can
be nothing to assign—views sanctioned by a long series
of decisions of Lord Eldon, Lord Tenterden, and Sir
Nicolas Tindal, and which stand unimpeached, although
the words in which they have sometimes been expressed
were disapproved by a Lord Chancellor, as importing a
limit to his power. I allude to them only for vindicating
in the consideration of such questions a regard to
principles and policy. In the second case, ex-parte " Fen-
wick,' 2 Montague and,Ayrton, 681, I find one remark
not in the other case, namely, " This case is like a trust
deed of composition without a release." It seems to me
that there is the greatest dissimilarity. After such a
deed there are covenanted instalments, the full payment
of which is frustrated by the bankruptcy. Something,
therefore is to be claimed under the bankruptcy. No
such payment can be in progress after an insolvency ;
on the contrary, all is gone save a contingency, with
which bankruptcy is utterly inconsistent. While the
operation of a discharge by this Court thus prohibits
proof in bankruptcy, the statute of bankruptcy itself
seems to repudiate such a proof. By the 46th section
proof may be made by a creditor. Creditor means a
man armed with ordinary legal rights. Now, such
rights belong to the old creditor we speak of. By the
51st section, another sort of person may prove; one
who has given credit to the bankrupt for something
payable at a future time. No such credit exists in the
case we speak of ; for the indefinite delay of payment
is not credit, but the act of the law, and no future time is
ascertainable. By the 56th section another sort of per-
son may prove, one whose debt is payable on a contin-
gency; or, if hereafter such contingency shall happen,
then he may prove the debt. There is, indeed, a con-
tingency on which the claims we speak of may be
brought forward, but it is a contingency incapable of
valuation, and therefore incapable of proof—the contin-
gency of solvency and surplus. Moreover, it can never
arise, so long as a certificate is worth asking for. I can
imagine that one, who admits the strength of what has
been urged on the words and principle of insolvent-law,
get difficulty,
his certificate,
to
i at
r gw
ui
will
the old insolvency debts,
judgment ; therefore the
operating
hopa
uerb
rseaartpl perplexed r‘geptl
afet
debts,
aeh dtae wbfdami tenahtkmi
roaounnpgotseeming
shall
old debts must be proveable." I would answer by say-
ing, " We do not reason from certificate to proof, but
from proof to certificate." If I show that such a debt is
he
Act, and study the certificate clauses. The ex-
en
ffo
et
etto be porno vei pd, it ol
Looklow, s that
etyheer, c e rt
againi fic a t e
thou tn o
tent of the privilege gained to a man by
that instrument will appear by the provisions
made for his availing himself of it. By the 42d clause
of the last Bankrupt Act, " If he shall be arrested or
have any action brought against him for any debt, claim,
or demand hereby made proveable under the commis-
sion, he shall be discharged upon entering an appear-
ance, and may plead that the cause of action accrued
before, he became bankrupt." The discharged insolvent
is as a man who needs not a certificate to shield him
Aa ggit
ns
,t a r..
fe slat
eo
shaacitli o
ben for debt
e nin scheduledn ine
rt hdi
es court.tai
ne
d
in prison for such debt, claim, or demand, where judg-
ment has been obtained before certificate, a judge shall
order him to be discharged." The debt of an old insol-
vency is no object of this privilege; the bankrupt was
safe against arrest and execution before the certificate
existed or the bankruptcy either. For all these reasons
I cannot help thinking that the Courts of Bankruptcy
have been wrong in admitting old insolvency creditors
to a dividend. The question has not arisen in a court of
law. It might arise, if the Court of Queen's Bench were
asked, on the ground of a certificate to prohibit this
Court from exercising its powers over a surplus estate
acquired by a party after his bankruptcy. The question
would be a new one in that court, so, perhaps, would
be the assertion of the obvious principles of the in-
solvent law made by Mr. Cooke in this argument,
principles which have long been familiar to my appre-
hension, and cherished for the sound justice in which
they are founded. My conjecture is that the Court of
Queen's Bench would recognise those principles, that
they would hold the old debt not proveable, and that the
contingent interest left to the creditor by the insolvency,
the right to ask the aid of this Court in the event of the
debtor owning some day a surplus estate, is an interest
not capable of proof, and that if ever such predicament
shall be attained, the peculiar powers which the law re-
served to this Court at the insolvency, will survive, not-
withstanding any number of bankruptcies and certifi-
cates that may have intervened. There is one other
point alluded to in the cassia—namely, that payment of a
scheduled debt may be sought in bankruptcy, because
this process is not by name prohibited. It appears to me
that all individual suit whatever is prohibited. Besides
the plain policy of the Act, and the defining of the debtor's
future liability, the words of the 91st section justly con-
strued are ample for the purpose. The words are—
" Any suit except upon the judgment." What is suit upon
the judgment? It is the execution or other process
which this Court may permit against a state of sol-
vency, and the petitions and applications made to this
Court for sanctioning such process. This is itself
a liberal use of the word suit, and the
one clearly-expressed exception takes away all
doubt from the extent of the thing spoken of, the suits
which are prohibited. All is prohibited, except upon
the judgment under the control of this Court. There is
high authority that favours us in claiming the most
liberal interpretation to the words of the 91st section,
which protect the discharged insolvent from the aggres-
sion of individual creditors. Lord Mansfield had held
that the statute of limitations did not prevent a creditor
from taking out a commission of bankruptcy, as it ex-
tended only to the remedies by action mentioned in the
stattite, not extinguishing the debt, nor taking away
other remedy—" Fowler v. Brown," 1 Cooke's B. 4. 13.
This was overruled by Lord Eldon. He gave a larger
and more liberal interpretation, saving, in his admirable
and most deliberate judgment, in ex parte "Dervdney,";ls
Yes. 471—" A commission of bankruptcy is nothing mote
than a substitution of the authorities of the Lord Chan-
cellor enabling him to work out the payment of those
creditors who could by legal action, or equitable suit,
have compelled payment; and the objection upon the
statute of limitation may be sustained." Now, when
we imaging in either statute what proceedings are ex-
cluded, the words of the Insolvent Act are far more
comprehensive than those of the Act called the statute
of limitations. Every limitation in the 21 Jac. 1., c. 16,
is applied in terms to some particular sorts of action, and
to those only ; there are no general words whatever, and
yet the principle of the Act has been ruled to extend to
proof in bankruptcy and to proceedings in equity, both
unmentioned in the Act. Much stronger are the grounds
for construing liberally restriction of suit in the Insol-
vent Act. There is the large general expression " any
suit," strengthened by one most pointed exception, the
expression which excludes the exceptions—that which
is excepted in the proceeding upon, and in aid of the
judgment, and the policy of the provision becomes still
clearer, when we see such proceeding limited to the ease
of ability to pay. The one case in equity, quoted at the
bar, is in the strongest confirmation of the principle by
which I abide. Those Courts maintain their right of
deciding with assets for the scheduled creditors of de-
ceased persons, who have at any time obtained the
benefit of an Insolvent Act, but those Courts aid them
only with that estate which shall survive the payment
of later creditors. This principle is derived from the
Insolvent Act; it is declared to be so, and cannot be
traced to any other source. In "Barton v. Tattersall," 1
Russ. and Mylne, 237, Sir John Leach decided, where a
party had in his lifetime gone through two insolvencies,
that the new debts which had never been in this Court,
must be paid first; that the debts of the second insol-
vency must be paid next, and those of the first insolvency
paid last, and why last? Because by the relation estab-
lished between debtor and creditor by that first in-
solvency, a relation so discernible in the policy of those
laws, they could only share in future property, when it
should present a surplus after satisfying new debts. I
think that lam supported by the words of toe written
law, by the worthiest portion of precedents, and by the
whole weight of principle in saying that the old credi-
tors cannot be admitted to share under a new insolvency
of their debtor at an after period of his life.

OUTLAWRY.—The following persons were demanded
underGuilGuildhall,
httn,
outlawry
oLondon:—Frederick
dporno:cisFs
r e issuedder e
k against
William theta o into
v e
b ft
nd London
rol..
at the husting, held on the 3d of July, 1848, at the
lard, at the suit of Robert Merton; John Penlease, at the
suit of Thomas M'Gauran; John Busk, at the suit of
Abraham Joseph; Samuel Ellis Bristow, at the suit of
the Hon. Francis Henry William Needham; Joseph
Pike, at the suit of Sir Peter Laurie, Knt., and others;
John Ainslie, at the suit of George Webster; Henry
Patteson, at the suit of Thomas Flight; George Stanley,
at the suit of Anne Griffiths and another; Thomas
Henry Horsford Bingley, at the suit of Robert Gordon;
James Ball, at the suit of Kennett Kingsford, the elder,
and others.
TIIE NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY.--011 Saturday
the mail express and first-class trains on this line of
railway were accelerated, the distance betwen Rugby
and the other stations being performed in from thirty to
fifty minutes less time than formerly. An entire alter-
I ationalsotook placeare raisinginthetimseea-tab
fencibles on this
Government
coast. It is expected that this town will furnish about
300. They will be exercised, as formerly, ten days in
the course of the year, and be paid 2s. a day. Our
young fishermen eagerly enrol themselves, as, in the
event of a war, it would guarantee them against impress-
ment.—Brighton- Herald,

At the desire of several distinguished subscribers, La
Figlia, performed on the last extra night, was repeated
yesterday, with what success the large attendance will
prove. It will probably be the last performance of LaFiglia
for some time to come, for next Thursday will be de-
voted to La Sonnambula, and it is most likely that next
week the great vocalist will appear for the first time in
a favourite opera of Rossini, which has been on the
shelf for some years. Whatever Mdlle. Lind's success
in that opera, La Figlia, as the creation of her genius—
as an opera which draws its whole interest, musical as
well as vocal, from her embodiment—will always re-
main one of tho most curious and attractive manifesta-
tions of her genius and power. The Queen's box was
yesterday evening occupied by the Earl and Countess
of Rosebery, Lady Mary Primrose, and Colonel the
Hon. C. B. and the Hon. Mrs. Phipps. In her Majesty
Queen Adelaide's box were—the Marquis and Mar
chic:mess of Worcester, the Viscount Curzon, Lord G.
Paget, and Captain and Lady Rose Lovell. Amongst
the audience were—His Grace the Duke of Wellington,
the Prince Louis Napoleon, the Duchess of Leeds, and
Miss Lane Fox, the Duke and Duchess of Montrose,
the Duke and Duchess of Leinster and Lady Jane Fitz-
gerald, his Excellency the Russian Minister, Baron
Brunnow and Mdlle. Olga de Lechner, his Excellency
the Hanoverian Minister, his Excellency the Austrian
Ambassador, his Excellency the Sardinian Minister,
his Excellency the Swedish Minister and the Baroness
Rehausen, the Baron Nicolay, the Marchioness of Bread-
albane, the Marquis and Marchioness of Kildare, the
Marquis and Marquis of Sligo, and the Ladies Browne,
the Marquis or Clanricarde, the Marquis of
Granby, the Marchioness of Douro, the Marquis of
Donegal, the Marquis of Douro, the Earl of Fal-
mouth. the Earl and Countess of Jersey and Lady
Clementine Villiers, the Earl of Liverpool, the Earl and
Countess of Sefton, the Earl of Munster, the Earl of
Howth, the Earl of Lonsdale, Viscount Anson, Viscount
Cantilupe, the Viscountess Godolphin, Lord Polworth,
Lord William Lennox, Lord Adolphus Fitzclarence,
Lord and Lady Fitzroy Somerset and the Misses Somer-
set, Lord Ernest Bruce, Lord and Lady Charles Welles-
ley, Lord Gerald Fitzgerald, Lord Harry Vane, Lord
Elphinstone, Lord and Lady Brougham, Lord Sandys,
Lord Saltoun, Lady Colborne, Lady Bentinck, Lady
Thorold, Lord Otho Fitzgerld, Miss Burdett Coutts and
party, Lady Jervis, Sir J. Duckworth, M.P., General
the Honourable H. Cavendish, the Hon. C. Cavendish,
the Hon. Mr. Dundas, General Fox, Sir John Bailey,
Bart., and Lady Bailey, Sir Benjamin Hall, Bart., M.P.,
Sir G. Palmer, Bart., and Lady Palmer, Sir G. Carroll,
Bart., Lady and the Misses Carroll, General the Hon.
A. Upton, M. C. Koudriaffaky, Sir W. Beresford, Lady
Hall, Captain the Honourable James Macdonald, Lieu-
tenant-General Sir Alexander Woodford, Bart., Mr. and
Mrs. Atwood, Mr. and Mrs. Phillips, Mr. 0. Morgan,
M.P., Mr. H. Broadley, M.P., Mr. G. Cornwall, Cap-
tain Pelham, Mrs. Ascue, Mr. Hubert de Burgh, Mrs.
Howard, Mr. Towneley, Mr. Barry Baldwin, M.P., and
Miss Baldwin, Mr. C. W. Packs and Mrs. Paeke Read-
ing, &c.

ROYAL ITALIAN OPERA.
night bypec
th osAioaalddiemsiiereßo her M
Royale
alede3safjues,itqy T
u.
e,he
at
Paris.cast
Doniaetti's grand opera La Favorite was performed
hasMl asa,s been
greatly strengthened by the engagement of M.
t
His performance of the character of Alfonso XL im-
parted a perfection to the ensemble, the want of which
materially deteriorated the general effect of the former
representations. M. Massol is tall and dignified in per-
son, graceful in deportment, and his acting is marked
by great intelligence and true dramatic action. His
voice is a baritone of considerable extent, fluent in deli-
very, and just in intonation. The cavatina " Si, tutti i
cortigiani," was admirably rendered. The sentiment
was passionately delivered, and the vocalisation of the
best school. The applause was enthusiastic and unanimous.
The romance "A tanto amor " was charmingly inter-
preted, and convinced us that M. Massol may take a
foremost rank among the chief artistes of the lyric stage.
Madame Grisi was in admirable voice, and acted and
sang with great intensity, and Mario, though wanting
the necssary energy and dramatic power for the just de-
lineation of the great scene in the finale of the third act,
won unmixed admiration in the tenderer portions of the
opera. Nothing could exceed the beauty and pathos of
the lovely romance, " Angiol d'amore." The burst of
fearful despair at the close was quite perfect. The re-
demand was spontaneous. The exciting duet, "Vien
tutto obblio per te," was given with wonderful force by
Grisi and Mario, and achieved a similar honour. The
fine chorus of courtiers in the third act was encored.
The concerted pieces were superbly rendered,
and the closing scene, with its architectural excellence,
pictaresque miss en scene, and chorus of monks over
the corpse of Leonora, may be cited as one of the com-
pletest that has been witnessed on the stage of any
theatre. The house was full and fashionably attended.
The Queen and his Royal Highness Prince Albert,
accompanied by her Royal Highness the Duchess of
Kent, honoured the performance with their presence.
tier Majesty was attended by Viscountess Jocelyn and
the Earl of Listowel, and his Roy al Highness Prince
Albert by General Wemyss and Colonel Seymour, and
in attendance on her Royal Highness the Duchess of
Kent was the Lady Augusta Bruce. Their Royal
Highnesses the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge and
his Royal Highness Prince George were also pre-
sent, attended by the lion. Miss Mitford, Baron
Knesebeck, and Mr. Mildmay. Among the visitors
were his Excellency the French Minister, the
Duke and Duchess of Cleveland, the Duke and
Duchess of Beaufort, the Duchess Dowager of Bed-
ford and Lady Rachel Russell, the Marquis and Mar-
, ohioness of Ailesbury, the Earl of Cardigan, the
Earl of Bessborough, the Earl and Countess Bruce, the
Earl and Countess Granville, the Earl of Munster, the
Countess Dowager of Essex and Miss Johnson, the Earl
Cawdor, the Earl of Durham, the Earl and Countess of
Eglinton, the Earl of Pomfret, Viscount Templetown,
Viscount and Viscountess Canning, Viscount Exmouth,
Sir Charles and Lady Cecilia Des Vceux, Lady Char-
lotte Denison, Lady Caroline Maxie, Lady H. Baring,
Viscount Clifden, Lord and Lady Caringten, Lord A.
Harvey,,Lord Bateman, Viscount Mandeville, Lord Foley
and the Hon. Miss Foley, Lord Elphinstone, Lord Henry
Gordon Lennox, Lord and Lady Wodehouse, Lady
Joddrell, Lady Isabella Moore, Lady Lyndhurst and the
Hon. Miss Copley, Lady Macdonald, Lady Webster,
Lady Holland, Lady Morgan, Sir John and Lady Bur-
goyne and the Misses Burgoyne, Hon. George Mills,
Hon. A. Willoughby, Hon. Dudley Fortescue, Hon.
Mr. and Mrs. Upton, Hon. Spencer Cowper, Sir Ed-
ward Codrington and the Misses Codrington, Sir W. de
Bathe, Sir T. lore, Sir Henry Webb, Sir Jasper and
Lady Atkinson and the Misses Atkinson, Sir George
and Lady Amytage, Sir George and Lady Clerk, Sir
Henry Paulet, Admiral Tucker and the Misses Tucker,
Major-General Campbell, R.A., Colonel Freestun, Colo-
nel B. Knox, M.P., Colonel Blake, Colonel Wingfield,
Baron de Steinberg, Major Jones, Captain Cuddy, Cap-
tain Montressor, Captain do Bathe, Captain Dudley
Carleton, Captain Charles Seymour, Captain F. Cleve-
land, Major Gage, Captain Blake, Mr. Leslie, Mr.
Tunne, Mr. W. Rose, Mr. H. Greville, Mr. Spencer de
Horsey, Mr. W. and Miss de Horsey, Mr. H. Baring
M.P., Mr. Montague Gore, M.P., Mr. Divett, M.P., &c.