The Sun.
London, England, 1870-11-09 00:00:00

SUN, LONDON, WE DNESDA , NOVEMBER 9, 1870.

THE WA go

THE SIEGE OF PARIS.
[BY BALLOON man.]
PARIS, November 3.

The fights at the village of Le Bourget on the 28th and
30th, were of considerable military and political import-
ance. When I last wrote our attention was absorbed by
the tumult at the Hotel de Ville, and the disaster at Le
Bourget was partly forgotten. It has now, however, re-
turned to our recollections. In truth, it was one of the
causes -which induced the Reds to imagine that
their hour was come, and that nothing more
than a shoW of vigour was needed to supplant the
moderate Republic and establish the socialist institution
in its place. Le Bourget was taken on the 28th. The
capture was of no great military moment—indeed,
General Trochu declared that he did not want the place,
for it was too exposed to further his plans. But the little
exploit was very neatly effected, and if of no strategical
value, it did a great deal in the way of moral elevation.
It was our first real success. The Germans were driven
out in good style, and the grerich immediately proceeded
to strengthen the , position. Then occurred some
lamentable bungling. The Germans were so annoyed by
the check that they forthwith prepared to retake the
place, useless though it was. The French knew very
well, indeed they could see, that these preparations were
being made. The Germans accumulated a force of be-
tween 10,000 and 15,000 men. The total strength of the
French occupying Le Bourget did not exceed 2,500,
composed of a few regulars, the two battalions of the
Mobiles, and some Freeshooters. From these premises
the inference was clear that the French commanders
ought to have sent up more men or abandoned the place.
They took neither course. The 2,5Q0 troops were left to
encounter the German host, and not only did they
stand their ground, but kept up a ' gallant
conflict for two hours. . The German superiority
of numbers was in some measure countealalancefl
by the.. strong position. which the wrench had. created.
Every inch of, ground was disputed, the Germans losing
very heavily--an incontestable fact which the heaps of
slain and wounded clearly proved. At last, however, the
end came. The German's pressed on with their customary
vigour, the odds were irresistible, and the retreat was
sounded. But it was found easier to sound a retreat than
to execute one. The Germans had almost surrounded the
village, and caught their adversaries, as it were, in a
trap. The retreat became very confused— something like
a rout, and it ended in the loss of a great many prisoners.
No wonder the Parisians should be angry at such a dis-
graceful affair. Had the troops retreated, the eclat of the first
success must have been preserved. Had they been properly
supported by fresh bodies, the Germans might have been
beaten a second time. To leave 2,500 men, after long ex-
posure to a drenching rain, to be butchered in this
style, is simply to encourage men to run away.
If the armistice question did most to bring
about the enzeute of the 31st, the Le Bourget
blunder had the next prominent share in producing
that result. The capitulation of Metz produced
comparatively little effect. That was the work of others;
this muddle was the Parisians' own.

Disaffection still prevails, and more trouble seems to be
brewing. The revolutionary.. leaders are not exactly dis-
comfited, though the fiasco of the 31st was a
severe blow. Flourens is dismissed from his military
command, and so are eight other heroes .of
similar, though lesser, effulgence. The National Guards
recently led by these men seem flow •to acknowledge no
sort of authority. They wander about in a semi-dis-
banded state, but preserving their arms. and evidently in
close league with each other. They form a mine
of revolution, which may at any time explode.
It is certain that the leaders are not idle. They hold
daily communication with each other, and may be ex-
expected not to allow a favourable opportunity to pass.
However,, the Government will now have no excuse if it
fail to-display the needful vigour.-' .
M. Jules Ferry has. written a Litter about his share in
the proceedings of the glorious 31st.: To him was chiefly
owing the triumph of the Government. , He arrived on
the spot, with a division of the National Guard, and
surrounded the building which was occupied by
the insurrectionists. M. Deleschuze came forward
to make terms, and- M. Ferry consented at his
request to permit those who Were in the Hotel dci'Ville to
come out on condition .that the Government should keep
Posses4on of the place. He waited for two hours for the
reply; which M.Delesehuze had promised to send him im-
mediately. At last, loging patience', ha went forward with
some troops, and turned out all the occupants of the
place. Having been the absolute master of
the Hotel de Ville for some hours, and, having, been only
animated by the desire of restraining the zeal' of the
National Guards around him, M. Ferry declares that he
cannot allow anyone to say that lie allowed the factious
persons in the Hotel to make terms with him. They
neither respected nor followed up the proposals made in
their name ; he spared the greater number, and that
was all. .

come to transact. Never was a man more unfit to defend
a great capital. "Why do you not -act with energy
against the Ultras ?" said my friend. "I wish," replied •
Trochu, "to preserve my power by moral force." This
is all very well, but can • the commander of a,
besieged town be said to have preserVed his power
when he allows himself to be imprisoned by a mob for
six hours, and then does not venture to punish its
leaders? Professor Fustel de Coulanges has written
a reply to Professor Mommsen. He states the case
of France with respect to Alsace very clearly. " Let
Prussia double -the war-tax she imposes on France;
and give up this iniquitous scheme of annexation,"
ought to be the advice of every sincere friend of peace.
In any ease, if Alsace and Lorraine are turned with the'
German Rhine Provinces into a neutral State, I do hope
that we shall have the common sense not to guarantee
either its independence or its neutrality. If we do so,
within ten years we shall infallibly be dragged into a
Continental war. We have a whim about BelgiuM,- one
day it will prove a costly ono; we cannot, however, afford
to indulge in a new one.

The , German force at Versailles has been strengthened
by nine battalions of la,ndwehr. This assistance was
much needed. The German.lines. were, in many places'
too 'Voa,k. The new arrivals are excellent troops.

The rioters at the Hotel de Ville, Paris, took a good
deal of drink to keep up their courage. They made i
dreadful mess of the splendid apartments of the Hotel;
here upsetting the wine, there upsetting the ink, tearing
the rich stuffs of eurtains•and sofas and carpets; •• spitting
everywhere, breaking the backs of chairs, smashing the
mirrors, pocketing everything on the tables that could be
pocketed, and encumbering the velvet carpets with a
litter of cigar ' ends, mud, 'and an infinity of torn
paper.
A Paris correspondent writes :—I never shall see a
donkey without gratefully thinking of. a Prussian. If
anyone happens to fall out with his jackass, let me re-
commen4 him, instead of beating, it, to slay and oat itx
Donkey is, now. all
,the fashion. When one is asked to
an indupepent one is. told that there 'Will b 0
donkey. The flesh ,of this obstinate, but weak-minded',
.
civadruped is delicious—in colour like mutton, firm and
savoury. This siege will destroy many illusions, and
amongst them the prejudice which has prevented many
animals being used as. rood. I can most solemnly 'assert
that I,Jrver wish to taste a better dinner than a joint of
a donkey or a ragout of cat —expert° crede.

IHE CAPITULATION OF METE.

A GENERAL ON THE SURRENDER.

Gen., Bisson, whocommanded one of the divisions before
Metz, has written a full account of the events which pre
ceded the capitulation, to the Etoile Beige.. It is impera-
tive, ho says, that Europe Should know that the generals
in command of the divisions and the brigades of the army
of Metz were not consulted throughout. Every time that
the commandants of the corps d'qrinee were assembled it
was not to ask their advice, bat to inform them of
accomplished facts. The whole responsibility of
the errors cominitted mast rest with the
Commander in - Chief and ' the leading generals,
or, in other words, on Bazaine,' Claurobert, Lebceuf,
Ladnairault, Froissart, and Des,'aux, who replaced
Bourbaki. On the Bth of October, by orders. of the Com-
mander-in. Chief, the commandaats of the corps ifarmde
convoked the generals of division, and informed them that
only eight days' provisions were left, even on reducing the
rations one-third, and that the town of Metz had at the
outside only enough for ten days' more ; that it was neces-
sary to take some measures before the total extinction of
the provisions. So its not to • make any mistake, the
narrator confines: himself to the recital •of what
took place in his Own diviSion, •of which
Marshal Canrobert was • the chief. The Marshal,
after reading the letter of the Commander-in-Chief, with-
drew, and told his generals to confer tog ether: They had
never been consulted as to the in Utley o:oerat ions which
had produced this disastrous result. The generals of di-
vision in the sth corps agreed to-propose a capitulation On
these terms. The army. of Metz, having-no provisions;
was to withdraw td the South of France with flags, arms,
and baggage, undertaking not to serve against Prussia
during the rest of the campaign, the town of Metz being
meanwhile free to continue it; defence. If these 'con. li-
tions were not messaged, they were unanimous in favoar
of attempting to cut a passage through, arms in hand, The
five generalS•of the 6th Corps singned this resolution, and
forwarded it to General. Oanrobett. Tao 'next day CI
general who tel!s the story sent to Canrobert 'a propos 1
whicli he begged him to lay before Bazaine. Ho proposed
that an 'advance guard of foot chasseurs and eclaireurs
should be formed from all the corps d'armoo, amounting
to about 10,000 Men. If allowed to put himself at thiir
head he would undertake to open a passage' for. the army,
by seizing the woody lieights which line the left bank of
the Moselle nearly up ••
to Thionville, thus turning the,
enemy's batteries in that quarter. The. army might byl
passing below the wood, escape the artillery on the right
hank, and,- protected by the advatiee guard, would only
have • to' defend itself in the rear. . The Prussiaa
lines in the ' valley were weak, and 'might easily,
'be 'driven back, so that during the day tai
troops might gain Thionville, or at worst throw them-
selyes into Luxembourg. No notice was taken of this;
proposal by Bazaine. On the 11th the officers were told
that Boyer-had started for Versailles. On the 18th Can-
Tobert called General Bisson before him, and feigning
not to be aware what news Boyer had brought in the
night, lie questioned him closely a; to his opinion in case;
the enemy refused to accept honourable conditions. Generals
Bisson replied that the only course to be -taken was the
one he had proposed—that of trying t , gain Thionville byi
the woody heights. There the conversation ended,: but
the same day at two o'clock all the principal officers of
the army were summoned to hear the result of Gerieral
.Boyer's mission. ' -In- the assembly of the officers of the
61k Corps .Marehal Caiwobert was excessively embarrassed
in giving the details. ile.spoke for a long while without'saying anything of importance, his voice trembled, ant..
.after a great deal of circuploctition,, he ended . by
annOMicing that the 'Dings of Pienssia would nol
recognise the Government of National Defence
but that .he would treat willingly and advantageouslYi
to the Ifrencb army, with the Government of the
,Regency;
and therefore General Boyer was sent to the Empreee.
The marshal desired the generals tonssemble their officerA
and make themunderstand that the only means to extril
sate the army froth its painful position was to establish the
Government of the. Regency in France. The army would
in a few days time be: sent to. the south of France with
arms,. flags, and luggage, when the new Governmenti
would be proclaimed. The offleaea acceptedlhe proposal;
as the sole means of returning tuFrance with the honours
of war, but not one agreed to impose such a Government
on tha.cpuntry. The Caine day orders were giuen to beau
readiness to leave at the first sighal, and the PruSsiaii piano k
.nttack was given to all the staff so as to convince the
officers of the hopelessness. of resistance. A great deal of
this information was immediately discovered to be false
when the French army passed the Prussian lines. On
24th, at five,p.in., Marshal Canrobert again summoned
his generals, to announce the refusal of the Empress. The
only hoperemnaining was that General tihang,arnier had gone
to Prince Frederic Charles to propose to him to appeal to
the former deputies of the empire, who should choose t
Government which the army would make France accept.
As soon as the Marshal, finished. speaking General Biasoti
said that the mission was a feint, as the reunion of the old
Chamber was impossible. Fraace would not tolerate the
deputies anynorethan the Regency. The army; he added
felt itself trickeJ,
..since it uncierstood it was to enter
France witiiihe honours of war, but the generals in com-
, maid were too muoh coMpromised for that, and preferred td
surrender to the enemy so ai tp save their lives and fortuneS.
.Canrobert repelled this." accusation, but agreed that
Changarnier's errand was -hopeleSs. Two days later
he summoned them for the last time, and told them the
capitulation rendered them prisoners of war, for Prince
Frederick Charles would liear ,no conditions.. General.
Bisson entreated permission to appeal to the troops ands
muster ten thensand amen to march on Ars,'
...
the Prin:,e's headouartero,.. to seize • his cannon,
and teach , him the valui of . the army to which
he so contemptnOuSly refused the honours of war. The{
Marshal replied uah asi alert would be worse than useless.
Resistaneewas impeSsible, and there was no choice but, to
submit to the p-onclitions.aseepted• by the chiefs. A final
deceit was practised. , A confidential letter from Marshal
Canrobert to • the generals of division promised that the
eagles should be burnt before tile surrender,, whereas they
wale not burnt, but surrendered as trophies to the enemy.