The Sun.
London, England, 1846-06-16 00:00:00

THE UNITED STATES.

The military strength of the United States is usually
far overrated • we are blinded by her immense natural
resources, and do not consider that these resources, from
want of a sufficient population, are only to a small ex-
tent developed, and from the weakness of the Central
Government can be but imperfectly employed. We
rather estimate America by what she may possibly he
at some future distant period, than by what she actually
is at this moment. _ _

The most exaggerated ideas are entertained of her
naval power ; we fancy her a rival of the English.
The American navy in 1845 consisted of the follow-
ing vessels :—eleven ships of the line, viz., one of
120 guns, seven of 80, and three of 74 ; seventeen
frigates, mostly of 44 guns, with a total of 738
guns ; thirty-four smaller vessels, of 30 to 6 guns ; two
steam-boats of 500 horse-power, one of 220 horse-power,
and one of 120 horse-power, total 1,360 horse-power.
The American fleet in 1845 was manned with 6,100 sea-
men, of which only 960 were American born, the majority
of the remainder being English. In this statement are
comprised the unseaworthy vessels. The greatest force
the Americans could send to sea within one month being
five ships of the line and six first-class frigates. How-
ever, America has important sources for her navy in her
numerous merchant-ships and steamers, employing about
63,000 men, of which, however, above 40,000 are born
Englishmen. The English royal and merchant navy
employs 288,630 men. A great merchant navy can only
befof importance when backed by a strong war navy, in
which the seamen brought up in the former can be made
available.

The American army in 1844 consisted of 8,616 men;
this, in proportion to the total population, is but 1-22 of
the French army, and 1-26 of the Bavarian army. Al-
though the Americans have done much, by their military
school at Westpoint, to diffuse military science; and al-
though they have, even in time of peace, a dispropor-
tionately large number of officers, yet are these insuffi-
cient to give the necessary readiness toll skill to an
army suddenly and largely increased in time of war.
Of a sufficiency for the militia, rated at 1,750,000,
or 9.2 per cent. of the population of 1844, 18,980,000
inhabitants, or of any supply of available cavalry
or artillery far even the greatest necessity, no idea
can be entertained. Without these, in open ground,
like the whole coast land of the States is throughout,
Napoleon's guard itself could have done nothing, much
less a militia, with only a sprink!ing of military know-
ledge and forms. The preponderance of agricultural
population will, however, cause this militia to have a line
ph)bical appearance, containing many strong, robust
men, and also, what cannot be too highly prized, many
of them will be practised marksmen. Still, the more the
physical condition of the army is set forth, the more is
the total want of organic homogeneity felt, as also the
principal quality of a regular army—subordination.
This will also be increased by the unrestrained freedom
of the Americans in their civil life.

No illusions ought, however, to be allowed with regard
to the number of militia that can be brought together.
Male labour is there scarce. At harvest-time the militia
will disband itself, and for such periods the enemy will
reserve their chief attacks.

One of the greatest obstacles to a good and especially
long-enduring conduct of a war, is the want of a strong
central Government, whieh can dispose unrestrictedly
of the military resources of the confederation. The diffe-
rent states of the Union will feel the burden of the war
is very various proportions, especially the states on the
sea-board, as navigation and trade will be at a stand still.
Among these in particular, whither the war will be ac-
tractedby the thicker population, the number of large, rich
towns, and perhaps also by a commercial jealousy of its
flourishing manufactures. The sudden fall of all sorts of
paper in consequence of a war, as well as the change in the
value of the precious metals and all other articles, will cause
a change in the money-market and state of credit, that
would be felt throughout the Union, but most in New
England, as the seat of the greatest trading capitals.
The Western States, on the contrary, will only feel the
war in its effects of a stoppage of the sale of their pro-
duce, and increase in the price of manufactured goods.
The successes of the Americans in the war of inde-
pendence, as also in the war of 1812-15, have caused the
Americans greatly to overrate their own military
strength. They ascribe these successes to their strength,
while, in fact, they only resulted from a rare combination
of fortunate circumstances. In the war of independence
tho capitulation of Burgoyne at Saratoga was the
foundation of all subsequent successes, by giving occasien
to the alliance with France. The disparity in the talents
of the respective commanders, the French alliance, and
the then pending war, in which England was engaged
with France, Spain and Holland, were all causes of the
success of the American arms.
The war in 1815 showed repeatedly in the highest
degree the little dependence to be placed on the militia,
and proved that quadruple superiority cannot compen-
sate for radical deficiencies in a military power. How-
ever, they seldom speak in America of the numberless
defeats sustained by the Americans in their own states
and in Canada ; they only speak of Jackson's victory in
New Orleans. General Jackson would not, however,
have been so successful before New Orleans but for the
delay and errors of the English commanders.
The chief stratagetic idea of England in 1812 was
to attack the largest and most popular cities that could
contribute most to the war-taxes, and to waste the sur-
rounding inhabited country. As the prevailing winds
on the American coast are favourable to voyages from
north to south, and vice versa, these expeditions would
follow quick upon one another, before the Americans,
concentrated on one point, could be again dispersed.
These tactics will serve for another war, as troops
would be quickly transported from one part of the
coast to another with ease and speed, and on the other
side, the importance of the coast towns has enormously
increased since that period. New York in 1844 had
431,000, Philadelphia 310,000, Baltimore 161,000, and
Boston 118,000 inhabitants.
The United States have certainly a great number of
steam-ships, but compared to England but few large
sea-going steam-ships ; they aro also wanting in means
of armament and practised men for the marine and ar-
tillery service. Nor are those procurable endowed with
that obedience and endurance in danger peculiar to dis-
ciplined troops. The American river boats might cer-
tainly be fitted for sea by widening the keels, and other-
wise strengthening them, but their mode of construction,
and the weakness of their machines, would unfit them for
warlike purposes, or speed in a heavy sea.
In spite of their disproportionately small means of re-
sistance, the Americans, blinded by their cheaply gained
glory in the wars of 16 and 1812.15, persist in chal-
lenging the English bi:th eir chichanery and rhedomen-
twaadre,
which,of all kw hile it could
kinds. 're
latter are. slow to commerce a
result few real advantages,
would cause them the most sr3uft! s
injury. The Southern
States produce three-fourths of
million and a half of the English people
atirebwhich
employed.wia
ow, then, would all these people be supported when
How,
the supply of cotton fails ? What would become of the
great sums lent by the English to America ? How would
the East Indies stand, when a part of the force now main-
wiping order there was withdrawn to be employed
against the United States ? Would not Canada rise,
especially if Engiamnderriceafunr
asntdo
tandemreibtyheforrweehseadtowatn any
e
land, now so kept up by the present
fetters,
strong
rtl
oeo
rws
9
differential duty .
bring the greatest part of its
Could England
Egypt, she would doubtless
hold from India and
value lower rate act ea
Canadian
against America
areo
n, chained
are bays
thanoubtless
hold a firmer tone
than
nian
which although only
of
by masked conces-
sions if of iron. If even England
when the hands of thegiantcott
will this in the end
pre-
serving peace
.yet awhile,. still
all, come to war. The
avail nothing ; it will, in spite of
Ore on, nor' in
and diplomatic hoodwinkings, succeed in
real causes of quarrel do not lie in g
Texas, nor in blexico, nor in Canada, but in the ever