The Sun.
London, England, 1870-08-05 00:00:00

SAARBRUCK AFFAIR.

The Times finds that the engagement at Saarbruck is of
more importance than was at first estimated. Marshal
Lebceuf states that General Froissard's corps had not
taken possession of Saarbruck, because, as an open town,
it was of no strategic importance. But the passes of the
river, the suburb of St. Johann, the railway, and the rai.-
way station were much more to their purpose, and one won-
ders why the conquerors did not follow up their advantage,
especially if, as the Marshal states, the French batteries,
from their high position at Spicheren, had silenced those
of the enemy on the opposite hills. Saarbruck, or rather
St. Johann, was only of advantage to the Prussians as a
railway junction, and all we were anxious to ascertain
was whether the railway communication from Treves up
the valley of the Saar, by Saarburg, Merzig, and Saar-
lonia to Saarbruck, and again from Saarbruck to Neuen-
kirchen, and hence to the Rhine at Mannheim or Bingen,
was interrupted. If it were not, the strategic position of
the Prussians would have been by no means impaired;
but, if it were, the Prussian force at Saarlouis and Treves
would be cut ff from those in the Palatinate, and would
have no other retreat than either down the val-
ley of the Moselle. to Coblentz, or across the Eifel,
Mountains to Cologne. We are now assured that the
oJject of the French attack of last Tuesday was not
merely to occupy the left bank of the Saar, but also to
cut off the communication between Treves, or Saarbruck,
and Neuenkirchen, and, moreover, that this latter feat
was accomplished by a detachment of French Engineers.
The Prussians in their accounts only mention that the
btatiou and rolling-stock were somewhat damaged.
The state of affairs on the Saar seems, therefore, to be
as follows :—The French are in position on the plateau of
Spicheren and on ether heights south and west of Saar-
bruck ; the Prussians still hold the hills on the other side,
and between them lies the town, with its bridges, its
suburb, and railway statinn unoccupied, while at some
puha of the line the rails have been torn up, and other
damage, more or less reparable, has been done.
The Standard concludes that the Prussians were in over-
' whelming force. They struck at a weak point. They
were stubbornly resisted, but they carried the day. For
s time past all our intelligence pointed to the hurrying
up of French troops from Strasburg and Haguenan
t wards Bitsche, leaving the Palatinate frontier
c unparatively unguarded. This concentration of
troops in the direction of the valley of the Saar
was of course well known. The Prussians have taken
advantage of it, and have apparently crushed the French
troops guarding the exposed frontier with an overwhelming
force. Whether, indeed, as a diversion to assist a great
army of ittvasionwbich is being concentrated between Saar-
burg and Saarluis, or as a part of a general advance
a'ong the whole Prussian line, it is equally serious to the
French. This corps must be met and checked, and
f'r that purpose a very consideranle force must
bi detached from the main body of the French
army. We quite expect to hear of the battle
o Weissenburg being followed by another and still
b'oodicr engagement if the Prussians retain their footing
o French soil. For it is plain that no advance, either
into Prussian territory along the valley of the Saar or
t wards Kaisolautern, can take place with a large Prus-
&an force marching upon the flank of the invading army,
a•id occupying in its march the line of railway by which
Cie French would in great measure be fed. The Prus-
sians inn displaying the vigour of design and execution -
which distinguished their operations in the war of 1866,
aid the French army will have to fight quite as much for its
own soil as for that of its neighbour. Of the earlier events
of the war, the battle of Weissenburg is by far the more
serious. The capture of Saarluis by the French, of
which there was a rumour in Paris last night, would
more than restore the balance of victory to the French
a.any. But for the present the Prussians must be allowed
to have the advantage.

PRUSSIAN PLANS.

The Telegraph believes that the movement of the
Grown Prince proves that the German armies mean to
defend the Fatherland by a hostile and offensive move-
ment in the enemy's country. It would be but natural
tuat the onslaught of the Crown Prince should be sup,
ported by a simultaneous advance of Prince Frederick
Charles and of General Steinmetz. In this manner, if
the French turned to face the Crown Prince advancing
from Weissenburg, the two other Prussian armies would
at once press upon their flank, while, if they
turned to withstand the northern armies, the
Crown Prince would threaten them in an equally
dangerous manner. It might be expected, however, that
in such a case the Prussian head-quarters would leave
the Crown Prince to make the most fatal assault on the
enemy ; for not only is his force evidently prepared for
great deeds, but, if he could once pass the defiles of the
Vosges, the line of his march would enable him
to turn the Upper Moselle and the Upper Meuse,
and there would be no physical obstacle between
him and Paris. At the same time it is in the passes of
the Vosges that the difficulties of the Crown Prince
would lie. If, in that hilly and broken country, his leading
columns could be restrained and held back by a detach-
ment of the enemy, while his flank was threatened by
another force operating from the stronghold of
Strasburg as a base, the main bulk of the French
army could. be hurled, in superior numbers, on
Prince Frederick Charles and Steinmetz. Not that the
event would necessarily decide the campaign, or even a
single battle ; for the two Prussian northern armies muster
240,000 combatant. and the French, after leaving 50,000
men to check the Crown Prime in the Vosges, could
hardly attack with more than 270,000. When
such mighty legions were concerned, 30,000 men
alone could hardly decide the issue of a great
conflict ; and, if the French fought in such a
position, to insure success, their victory must be decisive.
The French army certainly possesses the advantage
known to military men as that of interior lines, which
consists in the fact, that, as their assailants are separated
by longer distances, the Prussians cannot act so rapidly
in unison, or move so quickly to give mutual support.
Bulb the advantage of interior lines has been much
mottified by the application of the telegraph to war.
Nor are the armies of the present day so liable to disaster
as were their predecessors when broken into separate
bodies. Each of the three Prussian armies would, fifty
or a hundred years ago, have been considered colossal ;
and, since each is individually perfect, it is tolerably in-
dependent, and is not force to trust for life to mutual
co-operation, as the detachments of Yorck or Blucher
were.