The Sun.
London, England, 1870-08-30 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, TUESDAY E VENING, AUGUST 30, 870.

to yield to the expression of public opinion. M. Thiers
has been universally congratulated upon the success he
has met with.

STRATEGY OF THE CAMPAIGN.

On Friday a piece of news was telegraphed which
caused great sensation among our contemporaries. It
came from Berlin, and was to this effect, that the King's
head-quarters had been moved to Bar-le-Duc, that corps
of the First and Second Armies remained facing Bazaine's
army, and that the remlinder of the German forces
"had resolutely entered upon their march to Paris."
Hitherto the movements of the German armies have been
kept secret during their execution. It was only when
the move had been completed, whin the blow had been
struck that we learned whither the troops had been
going. It seems strange that this system should be
re-
versed all at once ; that taciturn Moltke should, with-
out any visible occasion for it, all of a sudden proclaim
to the world that he is marching upon Paris, and
" resolutely " too. At the same time we hear that the
advanced troops of the Crown Prince are pushed nearer
and nearer to Paris, and that his cavalry spread more and
more towards the south. Even in Chateau Thierry,almost
half way between Chalons and Paris, the dreaded Utilans
are said to have been seen. Might there not be a special
reason, not quite evident at the first glance, why the an-
nouncement of the intention of the King of Prussia should be
made just now, and why, at the same time the German
cavalry should redouble their activity? Let us compare
dates. On the evening of Monday, the 22nd, Mac-
Mahon commenced his movements through Rheims
on the road to Rethel, and for more than fourteen
hours the columns passed continually through the town.
By the evening of Wednesday, if not before, the news
of this march might have reached the German head-
quarters. There could be but one meaning in it ; the in-
tention to set free Bazaine from the trap in which he is
shut up. The more MacMahon advanced in the
direction he had taken the more would he endanger
his communications with Paris and his line of retreat
the more would. he place himself between the
German army and the Belgian frontier. Let him once
get beyond the Meuse, which he is said to intend passing
at La Neuville, opposite Stenay, and his retreat may
easily be cut off. Now, what could more encourage
MacMahon to persist in his dangerous manoeuvre
than the news that, while he was hurrying to
the relief of Bazaine, the Germans had left only a compara-
tvely small portion of their forces before Metz, -and were
marching " resolutely " upon Paris with the great body of
their troops ? Thus on Wednesday night this same piece
of news is telegraphed from Pont-a-Monsson to Berlin,
from Berlin to London, from London to Paris
and Rheims, whence no doubt MacMahon has at once
been favoured with the information ; and while he marches
on towards Stenay, Longuyon, and Briey, the army
of the Crown Prince, leaving a corps or two in Cham-
pagne, where now nothing opposes them, would draw off
the rest towards St. Mihiel, pass the Meuse there, and try
to gain by Fresne a position threatening the communica-
tions of MacMahon's army with the Meuse, and yet within
supporting distance of the German troops before Metz.
If this were to succeed, and if MacMahon were to be
defeated under these circumstances, his army would haVe
either to pass into neutral territory or to surrender to the
Germans.—Pall Mall Gazette.

It seems positive from the news that MacMahon could
not have moved eastward up to Saturday night, or indeed,
up to Sunday, through Longuyon. Neither can he have
crossed the Meuse by Verdun ; for only on Friday, accord-
ing to French statements, confirmed by Count Palikao to
the Legislative Body, a large Prussian force made an
attack upon Verdun, and was repulsed with loss by
the National Guard. It seems as though MacMahon
up to Friday, or even up to Saturday, had not crossed
to the right bank of the Meuse. But has MacMahon
had time to cross the Meuse, if, indeed, that, as we
surmised, were his intention ? From Monday night to
Saturday five marches might have been made. Not
much over fifteen miles a day could be done without ex-
cessive exertion by the National Guard, of whorri we
must suppose some considerable portion of MacMahon's
force to be formed. The twenty mile marches
of the French army are very fatiguing over hilly country,
such as MacMahon would have traversed. From Rheims
to Stenay is some sixty miles by way of Vouziers, con-
siderably further by way of Rethel. We should have
thought Stenay might have been reached, and
the Meuse crossed by Friday last, if that were
MacMahon's object. Yet on Friday* the Prussian
Uhlans were destroying rails even west of Montmedy,
and there was an affair of francs-tireurs, or of light
cavalry, and that was all. That fighting was going on
yesterday at Stenay may mean that MacMahon was there,
but, if so, what keeps him there, when he left Rheims on
Monday ; and if MacMahon's corps is engaged, what
troops could he find to make any stand against him on
the Meuse, close to the Belgian frontier ? Can it be
that MacMahon too has tried to make a bold move,
and has been delayed by his Intendance till it is
too late ? But even now, if the fighting at Stenay
means that MacMahon has driven back any small
bodies of Prussians opposed to him there, and has
crossed the Meuse, he may possibly reach Metz in
time, provided the army of the Crown Prince was
committed so far into Champagne that it was on Sunday,
in pursuing MacMahon, only at Vouziers, and still on the
left bank of the Meuse. The next few hours will
probably bring information on this singularly
interesting point. We still adhere to our opinion, ex-
pressed more than once, that the bulk of Bazaine's army
is shut up in Metz, and that there can be no deliberate
intention either -on the part of MacMahon alone or of
MacMahon and Bazaine together, to fight a battle in the
neighbourhood of Stenay or Montmedy, in a position so
full of danger in case of a reverse.—Standard.

MacMahon is said to have guaranteed the extermina-
tion of the Prussian army. He appears to be under the
impression that the host which defeated Bazaine has
gone up on its way towards Paris, and left him and
Bazaine to deal with a corps just sufficient to invest
Metz. This, however, as there is abundant evidence
to show, is a mistake. All the Marshal's movements
have been anticipated. The Prussians have been
busy for days in the country north of the Metz-
Etain-Verdun road as far as the Belgian frontier. The
French journals report that they have been to Stenay,
Varennes, Montmedy. Further, a separate corps, that
under the Crown Prince of Saxony, is charged with the
especial duty of looking after the Marshal. Under these
circumstances, a surprise at Metz is out of the question ;
but if MacMahon persists in moving southwards from
Mezieres and Bazaine is reserving himself for an
attempt to escape, we must hear of it in a very
short time. But, just at this point, a tele-
gram informs us that the French Minister of the Interior
publishes "under reserve" the important announcement
that a corps of the Crown Prince's army has struck off in
a north-easterly direction from Chalons by Suippe ; and
also that the enemy has advanced towards Rethel and
Vouziers, coming by way of Monthois. This is pre-
cisely what has been predicted would happen if
MacMahon should be so ill-advised as to strike east-
ward. Should MacMahon descend upon Montmedy
he will find his course arrested by a Prus-
sian corps in his front, and while attempting to overcome
its resistance, he will be taken in flank and rear by an-
other corps working up by way of Vouziers, Rethel, and
Mezieres. The Marshal would then be placed in the
position in which Bazaine was ten days ago, with the
difference that lie would find no fortress like Metz to
shelter him, and if defeated, he would have to choose be-
tween capitulating to the enemy and giving up his arms
to the Belgians on the frontier.—Daily News,