The Sun.
London, England, 1870-08-31 00:00:00

THE BATTLES BEFORE METZ.

The official reports of the war are continued in the
Staatsanzerger of Berlin. The latest gives an account of

the great engagements around Metz :—" The combats of
the 14th, 16th, and 18th of August, are closely connected
with each other. After the defeat sustained by their
advanced guard at Saarbruck on the Gth, and in conse-
quence of the complete dissolution of their right wing
under Marshal MacMahon, the bulk of the hostile army
retreated on the line of the Moselle. The fortress of
Thionville and the very important position of Metz, with
its entrenched camp, gave extraordinary strength to this

,ne. A direct attack upon it would have been difficult.
The armies were, therefore, directed south of Metz
towards the Moselle, in order to pass the river above
the fortress and so attack the enemy. The movement of
great masses, which could only be carried on in a con-
siderable breadth of country, had to be secured by special
precautions. The Ist Army consequently undertook to
cover this march. As the enemy for a time seemed dis-
posed to await an attack on this side Metz. on the right
bank of the Moselle, in a strong position on the French
side, the nearest division of the 2d Army 'were so appro-
ximated to the Ist Army as to be able promptly to support
it. Meantime the other corps of the 2d Army had already
crossed the Moselle. The enemy consequently saw
himself forced, in order not to lose his communications
with Paris, to evacuate the right bank of the Moselle be-
fore Metz,as he could not venture to attempt an attack on our
movement. The advanced guard of the Ist Army, pushing
on towards him, promptly discovered this retreat, and in
the encounter of the 14th of August threw itself on the
French rear guard, forcing it forward on the marching
columns of their main army. The enemy was obliged to
move round some of his divisions to support it, while on
our side the entire Ist and 7th Corps and some
detachments of the nearest (9th) Army Corps of the
2nd Army joined in the engagement. The enemy was
forced back, and pursued till under shelter of the cannons
of the Metz forts on the right bank of the Moselle.
This combat had, moreover, this great advantage, that it
delayed the enemy's retreat. This, advantage it was
possible to piofit by. Two roads lead from Metz to
Verdun, the directiOn which the French army had to
take in case of a retreat upon Paris. These corps
of the 2nd Army which had already passed the
Moselle were immediately directed against the
southern road, the one most easily reached, in order
if possible to arrest the enemy's flank march on that
side. This important task was brilliantly accomplished
through a bloody and victorious battle. The sth division
(Stulpnagel) threw itself on the Frossard corps, which
covered the enemy's flank. The French army, with
almost all its corps, was gradually engaged, while on the
Prussian side the rest of the 3rd Army Corps, the 10th
Army Corps, a regiment of the 9th Corps, and a brigade
of the Bth took part. Prince Frederick Charles assumed
the command. The ground first won by us
in a twelve hours' struggle was victoriously
held, the south road from Metz to Verdun
was gained and retained, and the enemy's retreat on Paris
by this road cut off. The conduct of our troops was truly
heroic; our loss was very considerable, but that of the
enemy infinitely greater, as could be seen by examination
of the battle-field. Until the 19th it was impossible to bury
the French dead, and the great number of corpses of the
Imperial Guard evidenced the enormous losses of that
elite force. In the French official account the strength of
our troops is reckoned at double its actual numbers. The
Emperor's proclamation on leaving Metz, as also other
French official documents, leaves no doubt that the maih
army had the certainly quite natural intention of retreat-
ing to Verdun. The flank march by the north
road, or by making a wide detour further north, still
remained possible. Although such a retreat en-
tailed on the enemy great dangers, it appeared
possible that he would undertake it, as the only mode
of escape from a highly unfavourable position, since
otherwise the army was cut off from Paris and all its means
of assistanoe. On the Prussian side the 17th was turned to
account in bringing forward for a final struggle the neces.
sary corms part of whom were already over the Moselle,
while part had in the night thrown various bridges over
it above Metz. At the same time the enemy's movements
were carefully watched by the cavalry. His Majesty the
King remained on the spot until from the advanced hour of
the day no further movement of the enemy was to be ex-
pected. On the 18th it was possible that the decisive
combat might come off. In directing the troops it had
equally to be considered that the enemy might try to
escape by the north road, and that, perceiving the great
difficulty of this, he might prefer to accept battle imme-
diately before Metz, with his back turned towards
Germany. His position after the previous opera-
tions of the German armies left him no other choice.
On the morning the 18th the Ist Army, with the
7th Corps, was posted south of Gravelotte, the Bth Corps
and the Ist Cavalry Division being south of Rezonville
(the Ist Corps of the 3rd Cavalry Division remained on
the right bank of the Moselle. before Metz. This army
was first directed to cover, in the wood of Vaux and at
Gravelotte, the movement of the 2nd Army against any
sortie of the enemy from Metz. The 2nd Army advanced
in (.1 morning by echelons of the left wing towards
the north road, maintaining communication on the right
with the Ist Army. The 12th Corps took the direction by
Mars la Tour and Jarny, while the Guards Corps advanced

between Mars la Tour and VionviUe on Doncourt, and the
9th Corps crossed the highway to the west of Rezonvillk,
towards Caulre farm, north of St. Marcel. These three
corps composed the first line, and if the assigned
points were reached, the north main road was gained.
. Saxon and Prussian cavalry preceded the columns as
skirmishers. As soon as it was found that the
enemy did not contemplate a retreat, and could therefore
only remain before Metz, it was necessary to move these
three corps considerably to the right, and to bring up both
armies against the enemy. The 10th and 3rd Corps fol-
lowed in a second line, and then as the last reserve the
2nd Army Corps, which since 2 a.m.. had been march-
ing from Pont-a-Mousson towards Buxieres. About
10.30 it was evident that the enemy had
abandoned his retreat, and had taken up a position
on the last ridges before Metz. The 2nd Army was
thereupon ordered to carry out its sweep to the right, and,
keeping up communication with the first, to direct its
centre and left wing on Verneville and Amanvillers. The
general attack was not to begin tiil the movement was en-
tirely executed, and till the front of the strong position
could be simultaneously attacked on the right flank. The
9th Corps first threw itself on advanced detachments of the
enemy. Towards noon artillery fire from the neighbourhood
of Verneville announced that the corps at that spot was
engaged. The Ist army was consequently ordered to
occupy the attention of the enemy on the heights by
artillery fire from its front. About 12.45 they opened a
slow and well-directed cannonade upon the eminences
of the Point-du-Jour, to which the enemy replied from
numerous batteries. The thunder of the cannon was
drowned by the strange noise of the mitrailleuses.
" The position was an exceedingly strong one, and its
security was increased through fortifications, and by
ranges of rifle pits ; at certain points it had quite the
appearance of a fortress. The attack could not succeed
until our commanders had achieved the difficult task of so
directing their measures that the whole of the troops were
ready as well for the battle on the north as on the east, and
the latter attack could only commence when it was apparent
that the enemy had given up a retreat. It was not practi-
cable, moreover, to completely carry out the movement,
which was to envelop the enemy's right wing, and nothing
remained but to attack the front of this formidable
point. The struggle was long and difficult at
various points. On the left wing the Saxons fought,
and the Guards near St. Marie-aux-Chenes, afterwards
near the precipitous slopes of St. Privatla-Montag,ne, then
in that village, and in Roncourt. On the right, at St.
Ail, and beyond at Habonville, the wood of La Cusse
and Verneville, as far as the northerly road from Metz to
Verdun, the Guards and the 9th Army Corps sustained
the struggle, at Gravelotte and in the Vaux Wood up to
the Moselle the Bth and 7th Corps, and from the further
side of the river bank a brigade of the Ist Corps took part
in the fight, likewise some single Divisions of the 3rd
and 10th Corps, especially artillery. On the enemy's
side the whole'of the main French army was engaged,
even the troops originally destined for the Baltic
expedition, with the exception of MacMahon's Divisions
not stationed at Metz, and the larger part of Failly's corps.
The unsurpassable bravery of our troops succeeded at
the approach of dusk in storming the heights and driving
the enemy from his whole line, the 2nd Corps, which had
been marching since 2 a,m., taking a decisive part in this
on the right wing. The battle terminated about 8.30, when
it was quite dark. During the night the enemy drewback
into his intrenched camp at Metz. Numberless wounded
and stray detachments still wandered in the neighbour-
hood of the battle-field. His Majesty, who had directed
the battle ultimately from the hill of Gravelotte, made
Rezonville his head-quarters. The losses, as was ine-
vitable in such a combat, must be very considerable ; at
present they cannot be approximately stated, and just
as little can the number of prisoners and other trophies
be reckoned. As to the last, m 1 in reference to all en-
counters round Metz, a great body cannot be looked
for, as pursuit was not possible in the vicinity of
the fortress. The battle formed the conclusion of the
previous strategic movements round Metz, and the result
is that the hostile army is for the time cut off 'from all
communication with Paris. It is a subject of rejoicing
that on this eventful day the brotherhood its arms of
the Prussians, Saxon, and Hessian troops has boon sealed
in blood."