The Sun.
London, England, 1848-02-18 00:00:00

TOE SUN, LONDON, FRIDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 18, 1848.

TIIE POOR-LAWS.
Mr. ROBINSON presented a petition from Poole
complaining 'of the operation of the poor-laws, and
praying that the poor might be maintained by a na-
tional rate.

THE TEA DUTIES.
Mr. COWAN presented a petition from the Cham-
ber of Commerce of Edinburgh, praying for the
repeal of those duties.
CH URCII-RATES.
Captain PRCHELL presented a petition from
Brighton, praying that Dissenters might be exempted
from the payment of these rates.
LOCAL TAXATION (IRELAND).
Mr. P. SCROPE gave notice that he would, upon
an early day, move for leave to bring in a Bill to ex-
empt small tenements from local taxation.
ISLE OF MAN.

Dr. BOWRING moved for tabular returns,
showing the number of vessels, with the amount of
tonnage, that have entere 1 the ports of the Isle of
Man during the years ending the sth day of January,
1847 and 1848, distinguishing each port ; showing
the several quantities of goods allowed to be imported
into the Isle of Man under license, the quantities of
such and other goods subject to duty carried
into the island, with the rate of duty
charged thereon, and the several amounts re-
ceived, and amounts of revenue received during
the years ending the sth day of January 1846, 1847,
and 1848; also showing the several amounts of public
moneys in the late Clerk of the Rolls' hands in the Isle
of Man, on the 13th day of Mara, 1847, with the
names of each estate to which they belong, and
showing where the said moneys were deposited
on the said day ; if in any bank or bankers'
hands, in what manner the interest on the
said money was appropriated, and by what
authority : and the number and names of the several
high bailiffs, magistrates, judges, and members of the
House of Keys, who preside as judges in the civil or
ecclesiastical courts in the Isle of Alan, who are prac-

tising attorneys in the said island, and showing. the
names of the several courts where they preside as
judges, and the courts wherein they practise as ad-
vocates or attorneys.—Motion agreed to.
SHANNON NAVIGATION.

Dr. BOWRING also moved for copies of the evidence
taken before the Commissioners in November and
December, 1847, for inquiring into the;4conduct of
the Shannon Navigation Commissioners, with copy
of their report, and of any report of the audit board
thereon • and of the first report of the Commissioners
appointed to audit and report upon the accounts of the
Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland, with copy
of any report of the audit board thereon : also for re-
turns of the Shannon N avigation Commissioners, and
of the persons employed under them, with their sala-
ries and allowances : and of the Commissioners
of the Board of Works in Ireland, and of
the persons employed under them, with their
salaries and allowances: and, of the Commissioners
and others specially employed in arranging and
examining the accounts of the moneys advanced by
the Board of Works in Ireland, and expended under
the Acts 1 Vic., c. 21, 9 Vic., c. 1, and 9 and 10 Vic., c.
107, with their salaries and allowances, and incidental
expenses; also, the funds out of which the payments
have been made, and the authority for payment.
Motion agreed to.
THE SOLICITORS OF THE COURT OF

this been done before ? He must say that her Ma-
jesty's Government had not acted, in his opinion, so
fairly or frankly to the House as he thought they
ought to have done.—(Hear, hear.) There had
been an evident desire upon their part to
avoid any debate upon the subject.—(Bear, hear.)
Upon the very first night of the session the Right
Hon. Baronet the Chancellor of the Exchequer had
made a sort of a rush down to the House for the
purpose of appointing a Committee to sit upon the
question, instead of having a debate upon the:subject.
But still this Committee, though appointed, would not
touch the point which he now brought before the
House. lie felt it his duty, therefore, to bring for-
ward this subject with a view to its being properly
discussed and a deliberate opinion recorded upon it.
It was maintained by some Members of that
House that the Act of 1844 did not create
the difficulties that occurred last year. Well,
if that were so, what necessity was there for
relaxing its provisions in October ? Upon what
other ground could Government justify the policy
they then pursued than that the Act had produced the
mischief?—(Hear, hear.) But there could hardly
be a doubt that the Act brought into existence
the mercantile difficulties this country suffered
under last year, and he would venture to tell the
House that had the relaxation of its provisions been
delayed one week longer, the commerce of London
would have been stopped. The reduced state
of the Bank securities had given rise to the
utmost alarm, and those who had money in their
possession were exceedingly cautious to whom they
advanced it, if, indeed, they would lend or part with
it at all. But it was said this state of things was
not necessarily the consequence of the Act of 1844,
but arose out of the mismanagement of the Bank.
Now he thought he should be able to show that it
was no such thing, and that no skill or ability on the
part of the Bank directors could have averted the
crisis which happened last year. He would
give a simple relation of the events that oc-
curred in 1847. The Act gave rise to dis-
tinctpanics at two distinct periods of the year.
In the early part of the year the demands made upon
the Bank for the purposes of food gave rise to the
utmost alarm, and when the coffers of the Bank be-
came reduced to the lowest point tolerated
by the Act, a crisis arose that shook many
noble commercial houses in the country.—(Hear.)
It had been said that great mismanagement had taken
place on the part of the Bank of England ; he had
looked most carefully into the subject, and he
saw no reason for saying that there was any
mismanagement on the part of that establishment.
Added to this, he was convinced that the acts of the
Bank had not led to the monetary crisis that took
place last year. He believed that the inherent vice
was in the Act itself, and not in those entrusted with
carrying it out, and believing such to be the
case, he should move the suspension of that Act.
It was probably true that the issue of bank-notes
had not conformed itself to the fluctuation of the
bullion. The real effects of the operation of the bul-
lion upon the issue was in direct opposi-
tion to the theory of the Bill. The
Hon. Member for Portsmouth had himself admitted
that although there was a considerable reduction in
the amount of bullion in the coffers of the Bank,
still there was no corresponding diminution of the
issues of bank-notes.—(Hear, hear.) The rule was
that for every million of bullion decreased in the coffers
a corresponding restriction of one million in the cir-
culation should take place. Now the decrease in
the bullion at one period of last year was
about 9,000,000/. ; there ought therefore to
have been a corresponding reduction in the
circulation of 9,000,000/. What would have been
the effects of such a reduction in the circulation of
a country where it was assumed that 20,000,000/.
was a sufficient amount to meet all the
demands for the circulating medium of the country ?
The operation of the Act of 1844 prevented
the Bank of England during the late pressure
from issuing a single note to relieve the pressure
of the crisis, although at that time 8,000,0001. of
bullion was lying idle in the coffers of the Bank.—
(Cries of " Hear, hear.") It had been said that the
Bank of England had acted in error in reducing
their rate of discount to so low a sum as 21 per cent.
It might be that for the interests of the country they
had acted erroneously, but the directors were bound
to act in the best manner they could for the pro-
motion of the interests of their constituents.—(Hear,
hear.) The framers of the Act had no right to com-
plain of this conduct. When the Act passed there
were 16,000,000/. of bullion in the Bank of England,
and although they charged a low rate of discount,
still up to the middle of 1845, not only had no
diminution taken place in the quantity of bul-
lion, but it had actually risen to the sum of
16,600,000/.—(Hear, hear)—a larger amount
than the Bank had ever possessed during the
whole period of its history.—(Hear, hear.) At the
same time there was no doubt that the Bank of Eng-
land was in some measure responsible for the undue
expansion of commerce, which was consequent upon
the low rate of discount which they charged.—(Hear.)
The rate of 2i per cent. discount was, however,
confirmed when there was a sensible diminution in
the amount of bullion, caused, no doubt, by the failure
of one of the staple articles of food in this
country. The rate of discount then rose to three
and a half per cent. Again the bullion rose in
amount to the sum of 16,356,000/., and the discount
was again lowered to 3 per cent., which was conti-
nued from that period to the month of January, 1847.
On the 26th of December, 1846, there was more than
15,000,0001, of bullion in ;the Bank. But in January,
1847, the pressure upon the metallic resources of the
Bank began to be severely felt, for it fell from upwards
of 15,000,0001. in December to almost 14,000,000 L The
Bank was not wanting in taking precautionary mea-
sures, for in January, 1847, it raised the rate of interest
to 31 per cent. The next week the drain continued, and
the Bank once more raised the rate of interest to 4 per
cent., at which they kept it until the diminution of the
bullion to 9,867,0001. in September or October, when it
was raised to 5 per cent. He thought he had now shown
that there had been, at all events, no neglect, no absence
of watchfulness, upon the part of the Bank; that, with
the rise and fall of their bullion resources, they had
diminished or increased the rates of interest; and that,
in short, they had sedulously followed in the very foot-
steps of the Act, which, it could no longer be dis-
guised, was the real cause of what had occurred.—
(Cheers.) But it had been said that if the Act had failed
in securing the public against a great monetary derange•
ment, it had at all events been effective in one respect—
securing the convertibility of the paper circulation. Now
he (Mr. Herries) would say with great deference, that
the Act had done nothing whatever to secure the con•
vertibility of our paper circulation.—(Hear, hear.)
There was a great difference between saying that con-
vertibility was secure, and saying that the Act had
occasioned that security.—(Hear, hear.) The Act was
passed when there was 16,000,0001. of bullion in the
Bank—in its prpgress that bullion had declined to less
than 10,000,000/. Were they to laud this Act for its
having prevented a still further decrease?—(Hear, hear.)
If they would give it such praise, they were bound to
show upon what grounds it was entitled to that praise.—
(Hear, hear.) But in what state was the Bank in
October last? Why did the Government send their
persuasive or recommendatory letter to the Bank if this
Act worked so well? Was there not a want of con-
fidence? Was there not a general want of credit? Was
there not an almost universal fear and distrust? and
where then was the security afforded by the Act, and
where was the use of securing money which could not
be used?—(Hear, hear.) He would contend that they
were much better off under the old system; and ho con-
tended, with great deference to the high authorities by
whom his opinion was opposed, that the country would
have been in a much better position if this Act had never
been passed.—(Hear, hear.) That was his strong, sin-
cere, and matured conviction, after the fullest and most
careful deliberation upon the, subject. He thought
it would not be altogether useless to endeavour to show
to the House what might have taken place under the old
system under similar circumstances. What would the
Bank have done under similar circumstances to those
which occurred between January and October, 1847, if
it had been unfettered by those new regulations and re-
strictions, and if it had been at liberty to make use of
all its resources for the purpose of discharging all its
liabilities ? It would have looked to the circumstances
which had occasioned the drain, to the possible pressure,
to the causes of the drain, and the probability or im-
probability of its duration ; it would have considered all
its resources, its gold, and notes—its reserve ; and it
would have, as on all former occasions, have done its
utmost to meet the exigency, and to have provided, not
only for its own internal interests, but for those of the
public, which, he felt bound to say, the Bank had never
neglected.—(Hear, hear.) Between January and April,
1847, the Bank would have carefully looked to
the state of the foreign exchanges, and if it
had it would have found them favourable—it would
have looked to the course of commerce, and would have
found that no great falling-off had taken place there ;
it would also have considered the failure of one of the
principal articles of food, and seen that great exer-
tions would be made for procuring provisions from
abroad—exertions that would require a considerable
drain of gold. But the Bank, if lett to itself, would not
have caused alarm by suddenly raising the rate of inte-
rest to a high figure—they would have felt perfect con-
fidence in their ,own resources—they would have felt
perfectly assured that there would be full convertibility,
and they would have altogether prevented the demand
which unfortunately arose for internal purposes.—( Hear,
hear.) He hoped the Government would not altogether
trust to the Committee which had been appointed. He
believed the danger still impended, and that the mone-
tary affairs of the country were on wrong principles, and
that there was no guarantee that what had happened
last year might not happen again in the present year, or
in the next.—(Hear.) The Government might, perhaps,
find it more convenient to wait until the Committee had
reported, however tedious that delay might be.—(Hear,
hear.) The Government might wish to avoid the
responsibility of any interference with the pre-
sent Currency Laws, and might wish to throw the
responsibility upon the Committee ; but immediate
legislation upon the subject was necessary. They
were, beyond all dispute, in a position of great dan-
ger—(Hear)—they had, he repeated, hanging over their
heads the possible recurrence of that catastrophe which
had occurred last year. It was the duty of the Govern-
meat and of that House to do all they could to remove

that incubus which still pressed upon the springs of in-
dustry, and which damaged public confidence and public
credit. It was their duty to at least endeavour to restore
a better order of things—a system of management under
which the commercial activity and enterprise of this
country might be once more cdvantageously exercised.
—(Hear.) It was not upon this country alone that this
pressure had fallen—it had fallen upon Scotland likewise,
in which country great depression existed owing to our
present monetary regulations. He asked them at pre-
sent, for the sake of the commerce of the country—for
the s dee of the industry of the country—for the sake of
the manufacturing districts, where the labouring classes
were now labouring under great distress—for the sake
of the moneyed interests themselves, not of those who
had accumulated large fortunes under the operation of
the present Act—(Heer, hear) but for the sake of
the general and industrious monetary interests—he
entreated the House to agree to the proposition he now
made to them, which would replace those interests ih the
state of comparative safety—he believed he might say
complete satety—which they enjoyed before the passing
of this Act. The measure he proposed was a purely reme-
dial one, and if Parliament in its wisdom should at any
future time determine to adopt a new system in place of
that which was at present existing, there was nothing
in his motion which could bind any one either to one
opinion or another. He hardly thought it right to tres-
pass further upon the patience of the House with regard
to this branch of the motion. He was aware he had
treated it very imperfectly, but it had been his wish to
confine himself throughout to simple argument. On the
first part of his motion, however, it might still be neces-
sary to offer a few observations. He was aware that to
this part of his motion it would be objected by many
that they were not satisfied with the conduct of her
Majesty's Government—that they did not wish to ex-
press any opinion as to the course which Government
took in October last; but that if they must do so,
they thought Government ought to have interfered
earlier, and that if they had done so much mis-
chief would have been prevented. Now, he was
undoubtedly of the opinion that if the Act of 1846 had
been set aside at an earlier period, it would have been
better for the country; but then he looked to the re-
sponsibility of her Majesty's Government—be was
willing to put himself in their position, and consider the
monstrous responsibility they incurred by their uncon-
stitutional act of suspending the Act, which was a step
to be taken only at the last extremity.—(Hear.) Then
some persons might object that there was a Committee
already sitting upon this subject, and that the House
ought to wait for their report. Now, if any Hon. Gen-
tleman thought the Committee which was now sitting
was likely to propose any measure that would relieve the
present distress—(Hear, hear, and a laugh)—of course
he Gould not expect his vote. Then it might also be
objected that there was no cause for apprehension, for
her Majesty's Government bad already, when the case
was urgent, taken a step to relieve commercial distress,
and that if the like circumstances were to occur, there
could be no doubt they would do so again. To this he
would answer, that it was not fair to throw the whole
responsibility upon Ministers, and that if Ministers
interfered at all, it would only be, as on the last occa-
sion, at the last extremity. Upon the whole, there-
fore, he submitted his motion with confidence to the
House.—(Cheers.)
Mr. HASTIE (Paisley) rose with no ordinary satis-
faction to second the motion, and he did so with this
strong conviction on his mind, that he bad never before
heard a more able, clear, and pratical explanation of the
question than that to which the House had just listened.
It was, he thought, very clear, that if this Act were per-
mitted to remain, whenever there was a short harvest,
or a foreign loan, or a disposition on the part of the
people generally to hoard money, there would be distress
in the country. No rise in the rate of interest would
prevent a drain of bullion, when that drain was caused
by the purchase of foreign corn or the other causes he
had mentioned. If the Act of 1844 were of that utility
which some parties would have them believe, there was
still no occasion for its remaining, because it had not
placed them in any better condition than they were in
before. In 1838 there was the sum of 10,000,000/. in
the Bank. The pressure was then not so great as in
1846, because there was no failure in the potato crop, nor
was the bad harvest which had occurred in England ge-
neral over the continent; bat if there had been only
10,000,000/. in the Bank in 1847, as there was in 1838,
he would ask what their position would have been in that
case? The banking department must have stopped pay-
ment, and he need hardly say that if one department of
the Bank stopped, whatever might have been the amount
of bullion in another department, it would have been
said at once by the general public that the Bank of
England had failed. He would further observe that pre-
vions to 1844 the Bank of England had never allowed
discounts below 4 per cent.; but on the passing of the
Bill they were told they would have nothing to do but
to attend to their business as bankers; and believing
that, and having a large stock of notes in hand, they
naturally turned them to the best account they could,
and thus reduced the rate of discount to 2f per cent.
The consequence was that bills for short time went to
the Bank, while bills for six, nine, and ten months were
eagerly sought after by the brokers and bankers, with
a view to discounts. This it was which had given such
a stimulus to credit as, in a great measure, to be the
cause of the undue speculation that succeeded. Such
was not the effect which any measure of this
House ousht to produce, and yet there could
be no doubt that the effect of the Bill of
1844 was, when money was plentiful, to render
it more abundant, and when it was scarce to add to the
scarcity ; so that in its twofold operation it was dan-
gerous to the country. It was an extraordinary fact,
which the House would do well to bear in mind, that a
rise of per cent. on the bills afloat, which were calcu-
lated at an average rate of 600,000,0001. a year, was a
charge of 20,000/, per month upon the commercial in-
terest. Now the interest upon these bills had occasion-
ally been raised as high as 3 or 4 per cent. ; so that the
loss must have been enormous. He thought the greatest
condemnation of the Bill was to be found in the speech
of the Right Hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer
during the former discussion, when he stated that, not-
withstanding the many suggestions he had received from
so many deputations which he then received, he and his
colleagues found that nothing would do but a suspension
of the Act, and that as soon as the Act was suspended it
had the magical effect of restoring confidence, and caus-
ing even more bullion to enter the Bank than was re-
moved out of it.—(Hear, hear.) lie cordially seconded
the motion.
The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said
the Right Hon. Gentleman had truly said, at the outset
of his remarks, that though he would make one speech
he would submit two motions. He thought no person
who read the resolutions submitted by the Right Hon.
Gentleman could entertain a doubt of that. The one
motion expressed approbation of the step which Go-
vernment had taken in October last; the other went to
pledge the House to an opinion that the Act of 1844
and 1845 ought to be permanently suspended. There
could be no doubt that he might be right as to the sus-
pension of the Act in October, and yet wrong as to the
propriety of suspending it now. On the other hand,
Gentlemen may be disposed to blame Government for
suspending in October, and yet be willing to suspend
now. The Right Hon. Gentleman said the Govern-
ment accorded a discussion on the last occasion. He
(the Chancellor of the Exchequer) did not know what
the Right Hon. Gentleman meant by that statement, for
he had certainly gone, he feared, at greater leneth than
was agreeable to the House, into the whole ques-
tion—the discussion lasted for three nights. Twenty-
two Hon. Gentlemen gave their opinions upon it, and
simply because no other persons appeared disposed to
offer their opinions the debate was closed.—(Cries of
e No, no, the debate was adjourned.") That was be-
cause nobody else seemed willing to address the House.
With regard to the resolution expressing approbation
of the conduct of Government, of course, he had nothing
to say. His own opinion was that he had done right,
and if the Honse chose now to express approbation, the
Government would receive it with satisfaction ; but as
he could not approve of the second part of the motion,
and thought it ill-timed, he had no objection if the Right
Hon. Gentleman would withdraw the second part, that
he should withdraw the first also—(Laughter)—and
then the whole motion would be as if it had not been.
The Right Hon. Gentleman proposed in his second
motion to suspend the Acts of 1844 and 1845—that is
to say, to suspend the laws by which the issues of
hank notes throughout the United Kingdom were now
regulated. Whether that suspension was to be per-
manent or temporary, the Right Honourable Gen-
tleman had left them in some little doubt. It did not
seem to him that the slightest case had been made out
for a temporary suspension of those laws. The Right
Honourable Gentleman stated, and very truly, that the
alarm which existed in October last was caused by the
low state of the reserve fund in the Bank. He concurred
w Right Honourable
originated not in the conduct of the Bank, or through
the operation of the Act of
that
tl
in that
the fellaa t
a frommn thethe
alarm which existed
1844, but in causes which
were altogether unconnected with them. He believed
Gentleman, a great
there could be little doubt that the alarm was caused by
the want of accommodation in the Bank, by which they
were usually enabled to discount commercial bills. In
the course of the autumn a number of bill-brokers
stopped or suspended payment, and the consequence
was a demand for accommodation from the Bank of
England to an extent that was quite
unexampled.
The discounts applied for at the Bank last year were
double the amount of what was asked in the Oc-
tober preceding.—(Hear, hear.) They discounted no
less than from 6,000,0001. to 7,000,000/. from the
increased demand for accommodation on the part of the
public. In so doing they reduced the amount of their
reserve to the point that was stated by the Right Hon.
Gentleman, and there arose an apprehension that the
Bank could afford that accommodation no longer, and
that was the cause of the panic. No doubt his opinion
was that this was originally owing to the low rate of
interest that had previously existed, and he was equally
clear that the real effect of his letter in October was to
place the Bank in the same position as if it had more
money in reserve. Parties were restored to the belief
that they could get accommodation with the Bauk if
they wanted it, which immediately allayed the panic,
the who!e amount subsequently taken out, as the Right.
Hon. Gentleman had stated, being under 400,000;.--
(Hear, hear.) What was the state with the Bank re-
serve et the present moment ? According to the state-
ment in the Gazette of last Friday, there were then of
notes and coin in the Bank a sum of 8,185,0001.; and he
had seen, just before lie came down to the House, the
return which the Bank had sent to the Treasury, and
which would appear in tomorrows ,Gazette, and he
found the state of the reserved fund to be, of notes and
coin, the sum of 9.686,000/.
Mr. PATTISON—And what is it now?
The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER be-
lieved it was increasing, but he thought it better to refer
to statements which were or would be accessible to all
the Members. There could not, therefore, now be the
slightest apprehension that the Bank was not in a posi-
tion to afford oasistance• Jle might also state that,

though slowly, the trade and commerce of the country
were now gradually reviving; and there was no likeli-
hood of any public demand which the reserve fund
would not he able to meet. If the Right Honourable
Gentleman's motion had been brought on in December
last, when notice of it was first given, and when Parlia-
ment was about to separate, perhaps there might have been
some plausibility for it, though even then he should have
opposed it. Not the slightest case had been made out for a
temporary suspension of the Act of 1844; for the dan-
ger, against which they were asked to provide, was one
of the most problematical kind. But the Right Hon.
Gentleman had intimated something more than a
temporary suspension of that Act; he proposed to sus-
pend it until Parliament should otherwise provide;
and therefore he might as well have asked the
House for a repeal of that measure.—("Hear, hear,")
from Mr. Herries.) Then he liked things to be called
by their right names—(Hear, hear)—and he thought it
would have been far better if the Right Hon. Gentleman
had directly proposed what he intended to effect under
the guise of a temporary suspension.—(Hear, hear.)
But he could not conceive anything that would so com-
pletely stultify the proceedings of that House as to en-
tertain this motion now, having before Christmas unani-
mously appointed a Committee to inquire into the whole
subject.—(Hear, hear.) That would be to judge first
and hear the case afterwards. The Honourable Gen-
tleman himself might be satisfied with a suspension
of the Act of 1844; but another Honourable Gentle-
man near him thought that, unless they altered the
Act of 1819, they would do no substantial good.
The Honourable Member for Birmingham thought that
the Act of 1844 was only a necessary consequence of
the Act of 1819; and many others were of the same
opinion. Then in that conflict of opinon, upon what
ground could the House proceed? Therefore the Com-
mittee had been appointed; gentlemen of various shades
of opinion were members of it, and he hoped,that
much valuable information would be obtained. Of
course the Right Hon. Gentleman must follow up his
motion by another to rescind that Committee, because
it would be perfectly idle for that Committee to continue
its labours throughout the session, if the House should
now, at once (whatever might be the result of those
labours), take upon itself to decide the whole matter.
On a former occasion the Right Hon. Gentleman had
thought it quite essential that they should know the
whole state of the Bank of England. Now, the Governor
and Deputy-Governor were to be examined before that
Commtttee, and he looked to their examination with
very great interest, as likely to afford the fullest in-
formation on that subject. It seemed to him, therefore,
a most premature proceeding—to use no stronger term
—to call upon the House to decide before it had re.
ceived the information stated to be so necessary.—
(Hear.) The Right Hon. Gentleman had said that
he was anxious to avoid a general discussion on the cur-
rency; and he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) quite
agreed in that wish; still, if they got into the merits of
the Act of 1844, he did not see how they were to avoid
the general discussion, and if they could not avoid
it, they were embarked on an ocean of which the shore
or any haven was very distant. They had now arrived
at a period of the session when the public business must
be proceeded with. To-morrow his Noble Friend would
I make his financial statement; the time would soon come
when the estimates must be voted, and he did not sup-
pose that the estimates of the present year would be
passed in so peaceable and quiet a way as they had been
in former years. Ho hoped, therefore, the House would
not encourage any lengthened debate on the subject; no
practical advantage could come of it, and he, at all events,
would not set the bad example of embarking‘ on that
endless sea of discussion. But there were one or two
points to which he wished to advert merely to prevent
misapprehension. The Right Hon. Gentleman had said
that the promoters of the Bill of 1844 had thrown blame
upon the Bank for reducing their discounts to 2f per
cent.; but he did not know who those promoters were.
He knew, on the other hand, that several opponents of
the Bill bad laid down the doctrine that the Bank of
England ought always to discount at one uniform rate.
—(Hear, hear.) And if, therefore, blame was to be
cast upon any one, he hoped the Right Hen. Gentleman
would place it on the right shoulders.—(Hear, hear.)
Again, the Right Hon. Gentleman had said that the Bill
entailed upon the banks the necessity in England, Scot-
land, and Ireland, of holding bullion to the amount of
about 3,000,0001.; but what was the fact? In England
it did not entail on the country bankers the necessity
of holding ono single sovereign, though it gave them an
issue of 8,000,0001. In Ireland also, it had not entailed
the necessity of holding one sovereign more than before,
and, in point of fact, last autumn, when it was said that
this measure was so mischievous in its effects—that au-
tumn, the experience of which was pointed to as fatal to
the measures of 1844 and 1845, the circula-
tion was 1,000,0001. below the authorised circulation.
In Scotland the case was rather different; for there
the circulation was higher than the authorised
circulation by 470,0001. ; so that they were
bound to hold gold to the amount of about 500,0001.;
and taking all the three countries together, under
500,0001. in gold was all that the Act had required. The
Right Hon. Gentleman had also remarked upon a dis-
crepancy between his statement on a former occasion
and that of his Right Hon. Friend the Member for
Portsmouth (Mr. Baring), and had said that he (the
Chancellor of the Exchequer) had stated that there was
no great diminution of circulation, whereas his Right
Hon. Friend had stated that there was a great diminu-
tion. But the statement of his Right Hon. Friend ap-
plied to tho interval between August, 1846, and April,
1847; and his statement applied to the period between
August and October, 1847. It had been said that the
great distress last autumn was caused by the diminution
of the notes with the public, which, since the Act of
1644, was a much more correct expression than circula-
tion; and he had answered that that could nut be so,
because from August to October there had been no
great diminution. His Right lion. Friend, on the other
hand, had said that, according to the principle of the
Act of 1844, there ought to have been no considerable
diminution between August, 1846, and April, 1847; but
that there was that diminution. He merely alluded to
these points to prevent misapprehension; he did not wish
to set the bad example of entering upon a general dis-
cussion of the currency; he hoped the House would not
do so, and would not now prejudge a question which
was undergoing full investigation.

Aldt,rman. THOMPSON said that he would not en-
courage a general currency debate, but would confine
his observations to the question under consideration.
The Right Hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer had rested his opposition to the motion on three
grounds; first, that the present position of the Bank,
compared with its position in October last, was so much
improved, that no danger was now to be apprehended ;
the second was, that Parliament was sitting ; and the
third, that a ommittee had been appointed.—( Clear,
hear.) As to the first, he had the satistawion of agree-
ing with the statement of the Chancellor of the Exche-
quer as to the improved condition of the Bank ; but he
must remind the House what was the state of the Bank
this time last year.—(blear, hear.) In January, 1847,
the Bank had of bullion 15,000,0001.; and in the reserved
banking account 8,000,0001.; in April the bullion was
reduced to 5,000,0001., and the reserved account to
6,000,000/.—(llear, hear.) It might be said that the
price of corn influenced that diminution ; bat he would
ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he saw
perfect security in the present state of Italy and France,
and whether they might not be involved in such difficul-
ties as would produce again a great drain of bullion
(foHree!rn,ohtesaurc.h)
aTsticeopurheisebnet psaotseitiyioirieolifedthiunpgosnw.—as(,Htheearre.)-
As to Parliament sitting, he must beg them to remember
how the last House of Commons had treated the petition
of the merchants of London, pointing out the dangerous
position of affairs, and the remedy which seemed to them
applicable. Had they attended to it in the least ?
(Elese, hear.) And what security had they that the
present House of Commons would pay more attention to
their representations than the last ? As to the Com-
mittee, he would only say that that Committee met on
the 4th of February. This was the 17th, and they had
examined two witnesses.—(Hear, hear.) Considering,
then, what had been the suffering of the country, did
they think that the country would be satisfied to wait for
the report of that Committee as to the causes of the late
distress and the proper remedy for it ? He believed
that if the country entertained any such hope it would
only end in disappointment.—(Hear, hear.) Those who
witnessed the calamities of the past autumn must
know that it was utterly impossible for this country
to endure again such a financial pressure and its com-
mercial and manufacturing interest continue to exist.
His Right Hon. Friend the Member for Stamford had
stated that 180 houses had failed, with obligations
amounting to 30,000,000/. ; and he was sure that his
Right Hon. Friend did not overstate the case ; they
knew those who had fallen, but they did not know all
those who had been ruined by that pressure.—(Hear,
hear.) The trade between the continent of India and
this country was prostrate ; there was neither credit nor
capital to convey our manufactures in India ; seven or
eight millions of dishonoured bills returned to England ;
and without the intervention of the East India Company
the produce of the East Indies could not be sent here ;
but he placed full reliance upon that great Company.
The Right Hon. the Chancellor of the ~Exchequer had
said that there was no doubt a great deal of pressure
through the failure of bill-brokers ; but that was not all,
for ho ventured to say that there was no establish-
ment (he did not except even bankers of the highest
repute) whose credit did not suffer suspicion during
that pressure. It was impossible to negotiate bills to
any foreign country against shipments of goods ; for,
on the continent of Europe they believed that
all London was baukrupt.—.(Hear, hear.) What
was the state of Newcastle ? Why, but for the inter-
ference of Mr. Grote, the manager of the branch bank
there, the most disastrous consequences must have fol-
lowed, and Mr. Grote did himself immortal honour by
the course which he had pursued ; he (Alderman
Thompson) even doubted if the public peace could have
been maintained but for the timely assistance rendered
by that gentleman. The Same state of things existed
in the west of England. What was the cause of it all?
He was glad to hear now, from the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, because on a for.ner occasion he had ex-
pressed a different opinion, that he believed the panics of
1847 was not to be attributed either to the management
of the Bank of England or to the Bill of 1814. Then
to what was it attributable ? On the 23d of September
the Chancellor of the Exchequer assured a deputation
which waited upon him, that there were plenty of bank-
notes to be had, and that alI the difficulty arose from
speculation and miscalculation ; but he thought it might
now be fairly asked, whether he was not the miscalcu-
lator—(Hear, hear)—and whether, if he had been aware
of the mischief that was to take place before the 23d of
October, he would not sooner have written that letter to
the Bank, the necessity of which he fully admitted? Now
money was abundant ; it might be had on good security
upon easy terms ; and yet now there were two millions
less of Bank of England notes with the public than
there were on the 25th of October, when every one was
complaining of being ruined, on account of the difficulty
~.of getting bauk-notes. Between the 26th of September

and the 30th of October there was an increase of notes
to the emount of 2,754.0001, and of gold coin issued to
the public of 2,202,0001., making together 4,956,0001. ;
and yet money was not to be had under 17 or 18 psr
cent. It was that monstrous discount which brought
down so many houses. But this was not all ; for, es
the value of money increased, the price of produce
—(Hear, hear.) With regard to speculation in the
commercial world, if they looked to their imports, with
the exception of sugar, there was not a single article in
excess ; and what were the particular circumstances of
the eve ?—(Hear.) They had just made great altera-
tions in the duty—(Hear, hear)—and the Chancellor of
the Exchequer had said that the vastly increased impor-
tation and consumption would help to supply the defi-
ciency in the revenue. Was not there, then, great
inducement held out to merchants to import sugar
largely ? As to corn, at the beginning of the year the
Government were importing it themselves; and, in con-
sequence of the high price, questions were being asked
in that House whether the Government had considered
the expediency of paying a bounty on its importation?
Further, a day of humiliation was appointed on account
of the distress with which the country was afflicted; and
what was the consequence? All these things made thy
British merchants ransack the world for cord—([fear)
—and, instead of being abused as they had been, they
were entitled to the gratitude of the country.—(Hear,
hear.) The average price of wheat in London was in
May, 1547, 105 s. per quarter; and in August 51s. Such
changes baffled all calculation; but he contended that
no man ought to be called a speculator who imported
goods for the market, taking his chance of the prices—
that was legitimate enterprise, which British merchants
had always followed; but he was a speculator who
bought up articles of necessity rind general consump-
tion, and stored them for the purpose of keeping them
out of the market, diminishing the supply, and raising
the prices. The promoters of the Bill of 1844 had said
that if it did not prevent, it would mitigate panic. He
would take no blame to himself or. account of that Bill,
because he had opposed
,it from the first, and had ven
tured to offer his opinion that it would produce very
mischievous effects. They had been told that as the
bullion came in the Bank would issue notes, and as it
went out the Bank would contract its issue of notes; but
that had been found wholly impracticable. When the
foreign exchanges were favourable it was exceedingly
easy to manage the Bank of England, but, in his
opinion, when the exchanges were adverse, and discredit
prevailing, it was utterly impossible that the Act of 1844
could prove available for the purposes it was intended to
serve. We were told by the promoters of that Bill that
the way to prevent an inconvenient demand for bank-
notes was to raise the rate of interest ; but the fact way
that the higher the rate of interest the greater was the
demand for bank-notes, because the greeter the discredit
the more anxious were solvent commercial men to pro-
vide themselves with bank-notes to an extent exceeding
their actual wants. He had already alluded to the feel-
ing which existed abroad as to the state of English
credit, and as showing the opinion which prevailed in
the United States as to the commercial and financial
position of England, he would read an extract from the
New York Herald of the 10th of November. The
extract as read by the Hon. Geutleman, was to the
effect that the monetary crisis, and the frequent financial
changes which had taken place in England, had greatly
diminished her commercial influence, whilst the influence
of the United States had been proportionably augmented.
The writer went on to describe England's difficulties
from the large amount of her national debt, the state of
Ireland, and so forth, whilst he depicted the glowing
prosperity of the United States, and the rapid advance
it was making as a manufacturing country. As showing
the state of public credit during the crisis, the Hon.
Gentleman referred to the reduction which took place in
the price of Consols, and the large discount which had
to be submitted to to secure the sale of Exchequer-bills.
Was it not essential, he asked, that measures shculd be
adopted to prevent a recurrence of so disastrous a state
of matters ? The Chancellor of the Exchequer had
called upon those Gentlemen who disapproved of the Act
of 1844 to tell him what they actually wanted, and not to
attempt to do indirectly what they hesitated to do by
direct means. For himself, he did not say that he
wished to repeal the entire Bill. Ile was anxious, how-
ever, to see that part struck out which limited the issue
of the Banlc to the extent which it did, and also the
limitation placed upon the issues of notes upon the se-
curity. There never was a greater mistake than this
latter limitation.—(Hear, hear.) He was positive that
great advantage would have arisen had the Bank been
allowed to issue notes upon the security of silver to the
full value of that silver. He was anxious to maintain the
convertibility of the bank-note. lie was opposed to all
doctrines about a domestic currency. In his opinion a
domestic currency meant nothing more nor less than a
depreciated currency.—(Hear, hear.) Were such a
policy adopted, England would soon be in the position
of Russia, where there was a silver and a paper rouble.
In England we would have one bank-note payable in a
fixed amount of gold, and another note payable in
nothing at all. He would allow the Bank of England to
issue notes to the full value of silver, because silver was
the standard in Europe. When the exchanges were un-
favourable silver left the country, and when silver was
exhausted, gold followed, and, according to this view,
silver might be regarded as being available to the pay-
ment of gold. With regard to the country banks, he did
not think that all the threatenings of the Chancellor of
the Exchequer would prevent the evasion of the Act
which restricted the use of silver, should a deficiency in
the ordinary currency require it. He would not tres-
pass longer upon the attention of the house, but would
implore Hon. Members to adopt the motion of his Right
lion. Friend, and not allow the character and credit of
the commercial and manufacturing interests of the
country to be sullied—interests which be had ~.I,s'ays
looked upon as essential to the prosperity and stability
of the country. —(lfear, hear.)
Mr. W. BROWN, who was very indistinctly heard,
having adverted to the causes of the late commercial diffi-
culties, observed that the Bill of 1844 was a dead letter
until the panic came, and then, so far from doing what
its promoters had promised—prevent fluctuation of
prices and secure confidence—it had aggravated the
evil. There had been greater oscillation in the price of
money under this Bill during the late cries than in any
former period of financial difficulty during the last '25
years. In 1825 the rate of discount was--the lowest
31, the highest 41 ; and in 1832 the lowest was 2, the
highest 4 ; in 1837 the lowest was 3,1-, the highest !A ;
in 1839 the lowest was 3i-, the highest 61, being a diffe-
rence of 21 ; and in 1847 the lowest rate was 2, and
the highest nominally was 61 ; but with commission it
was in fact from 15 to 20 per cont„ and even at that rate
in numerous instances solvent houses could not obtain
advances. The Bill had also occasioned hoarding. In
Liverpool alone he believed he could show that a
million and a half had been hoarded to meet con-
tingencies, and to enable merchants to meet their
engagements, and to take up such bills as might come
back dishonoured, especially such as might be in the
hands of the Bank of England when the protesting of
any bill was attended with some discredit upon the houses
whose names it bore. He was an advocate for freedom
in banking, perfect security being taken for converti-
bility. The question was not now, however, whether
they were to maintain or abolish the monopoly of the
Banlc of England; but he contended that they should
make it efficient for the public good. So far its the Act
of 1844 carried out the principle of convertibility em-
bodied in the Act of 1819, and required payments to
be made in metallic currency, based on a fixed price for
gold, he concurred in it. lie was aware that many
argued that as the national debt was contracted in a
paper currency it was unjust to require its repayment
in gold; but when the contracts for the loans were
entered into it was stipulated by Act of Parliament that
six months after the restoration of peace payments in
specie should be resumed; and had it been supposed
that payment would be made in a depreciated currency,
Government would never have obtained the loans on
the terms they did—perhaps not at all—and lied that
been the case this country would now probably
be a French colony. Ile saw no great sidvan
tape that could result from a mixed standard of silver
and gold. Silver would always buy gold, and gold was
much the more easy and portable medium for commer-
cial transactions than silver. He thought there was
extreme danger in allowing the growing commerce of
this country to rust on an issue of 14,000,0001. based on
securities. Ile believed the Bank of England had done
what it could to preserve the public credit, and while it
was necessary that a discretionary power should rest
somewhere, he did not think it could be in better hands
than that of the Bank. To show with what attention
the Bank of England was regarded, he cited the case of
a merchant in America, who, on being remonstrated
with for overtrading by his English correspondents, said
that he was governed in all his operations by the con-
duct of the Bank of England. Now, if the Bank was
thus regarded in foreign parts, it was most necessary
that the Government of this country should have the
power of putting it on the most stable foundation. But
he knew how uninteresting the subject was to the House
generally, and he would only further express his regret
that he could not go with the Right lion. Baronet in
his measure. It would be desirable, he thought, not to
amend, but at once to repeal it.—(llear, hear.)
Mr. HUDSON regretted that this subject had not
been brought forward at an earlier period. Nothing
was more calculated to disappoint the country than the
course pursued by the Government in referring this
important question to a Committee. They had been
asked if they were prepared to repeal the bill of 1819.
That, however, was not the question at issue. They
were told by another speaker that railways caused the
distressed state of things. But the fact was, that the
railway calls in January, 1848, were larger than in
January, 1847, and yet money was now only at 3 per
cent. If railways, then, had anything to do with it,
why was not money as much in demand now as it was
last year ?—(Hear, hear.) They were told they were
consuming the capital of the country; but if they
looked at the coffers of the Bank of England now, they
found them full even to repletion. The truths was, the
importation of corn was entirely the cause of the crisis.
—Meal., hear.) That importation had now ceased,
and, therefore, our stock of money remained undrained.
No doubt the country had been in a desperate state
last October. In Newcastle, for example, if some-
thing had not been done to prop up the local banks,
it would have been necessary to introduce mili-
tary into the town. What they had principally to com-
plain of was, that solvency at that time was not pro-
tected. If the reason of their not affording such pres
tereion was the operation of this Act, then, said,hei
What
repeal it.—(Cheers.) Who defended the Bill ? w
commercial man in that Ilouse would get up and argue
in its favour ? Common consent condemned it. No
member of the Government said that it was necessary.
—([lear, hear.) He hoped when the Government next
wanted money, the Bank would only let have
them so
much as they could afford in justice to other customers.
It was notorious that the Bank let the Chancellor of the
Exchequer sweep away in one day a great part of their
reserve, which obliged them to limit the amount of their
discounts afterwards. This was a very blameable mea-
sure. But he thought this was about the only act of the