The Sun.
London, England, 1870-10-17 00:00:00

THE GERMAN PLAN OF ATTACK.

A somewhat extraordinary official declaration has been
published in the Staats-Auzciger at Berlin. The Prussian
public seems t) have grown impatie at the long inaction
of the Germans before Paris—the wives and children want
their husbands and fathers at home, and it has appeared
wise to declare publicly the reasons why the besieging
army is not getting on so fast as the Berliners think it
ought. This document is remarkable in several particu-
lars. It declares that the siege is a very difficult under-
taking indeed. It must occupy a considerable time. It
announces that the besiegers will not be satisfied with
merely sitting down before the place in order to starve it
into surrender. Both a siege and a bombardment will be
tried. The latter agency, however, will not be brong-h6
into play until the Germans have obtained possession of
some of the forts—which they confidently expect to do.
Then if the city does nor capitulate, the horrors• of a
bombardment will be inflicted.

The document commences by stating that peace in a
war with France can be obtained only at the capital. If
the French Ministry had possessed a good army the
capture of the city might have been a work of extreme
difficulty. One-half of the French troops has, however,
been annihilated and the other shut up. But the energetic
commander who has the control of the defence still
possesses such resources that the task is one of the most
difficult recorded in military history :—" Considered as
an object of attack, Paris can be scarcely regarded as a
fortress. It is rather a fortified battlefield, with forts
covering every point of access. Among- these forts some
are strong enough to rank as citadels of themselves, while
others, as for instance Mont Val6rien and St. Denis,
are well known to exceed the strength of many a fortress.
Behind the forts there is a continuous rampart nearly six
geographical miles in circumference. It would take no
less than twelve hours to visit the forts in succession, the
sphere of their efficiency actually extending over 18 hours.
Owing to the immense circle to be guarded the investment
of Paris cannot possibly be so close as was that of Stras-
burg. Another circumstance- which greatly interferes
with our cutting off allcommunication between Paris and
the rest of France is the hilly nature of the environs,
which, covered with gardens and villages and traversed by
roads and watercourses, renders the duty of the troops
surrounding the city extremely arduous. To bring up
more troops would complicate matters by having more
mouths to feed. Directly our generals recognised that,
cc% ing to the unavoidable incompleteness of the invest-
ment and the position of affairs in the interior, reduction
by mere enclosure would not lead to a piompt result,
preparations were begun to bombard and regularly be-
siege the place. Although in a city of 2,000,000
inhabitants the steady decrease of provisions and the
progressive disorganisation of society alone may be
regarded as guaranteeing ultimate surrender, still, as
the inclement season is drawing near, a partial bom-
bardment accompanied by an attack upon those of the
advanced forts whose possession may be indispensable in
certain contingencies will be an effective means to accele-
rate the catastrophe. But the preparations for bom-
bardment and a regular siege require an amount of time
and force which it is difficult for the unprofessional mind
to realise. It is true the conquest of Strasburg has
been achieved with so astonishing a rapidity that
the public, unacquainted with the technical ob-
stacles in the way, may be pardoned for mea-
suring Paris by the Strasburg standard. But there is
this wide difference between the two cases, that in Paris