The Sun.
London, England, 1870-11-07 00:00:00

A REVIEW OF BAZAINE'S CAMPAIGN.

An officer of high rank has furnished a general review
of the campaign, so far as Bazaine's army took part in it.
He maintains that the battle of the 14th, before the
blockade in Metz commenced, was a French victory, and
so was the fight on the 16th at Mars a la-Tour. The battle
of the 18th (Gravelotte) was, however, a defeat, caused
largely by a movement on the part of Canrobert, who
allowed too wide a gap to be left unfilled in one part of
the lino. By the battle of the 18th August the
investment of Metz was complete, and the town was cut
off from all communication with the outside. The
Marshal discouraged, in fact almost forbade, any attempt
to send messages. When he allowed the balloons to be
sent later, it was only on condition that they should con-
tain nothing but private news. A delay of some days was
necessary to restore order in the corps defeated on the
18th, but this was soon done, and everyone impatiently
awaited orders that never came. This delay was
the more to be regrettedi as the Prussians
lost no time, and erected batteries on all the surrounding
heights, no attempt being made to stop them. At last,
on the 26th, the impatient army set out on the march,
but no longer in the direction of Verdun. It recrossed
the bridges, and was massed on the narrow space near
Fort St. Julien, destroying the vineyards, &c., as it had
already done on the other side. It was said that the
object of this march was to procure from Thionville food
and munitions, which were lacking at Metz, but the state
of the munitions surrendered to the Prussians is the best
answer to this. Still the start was not made. The
rain fell, the march was declared impossible,
and the troops re entered their old quarters,
despite the reflections of those who observe that
the rain wets everybody alike but does not seem to hinder
the works of the Prussians. On the 31st of August the
army made another movement, at the moment when Mar-
shal MacMahon was fighting on the Meuse. Was
Bazaine informed of the efforts made to join him? This is
not known, but in any case it was then too late to endea-
vour to effect a junction, which would have been possible
some days earlier. From eight o'clock in the morning
the majority of the troops were massed in their several
positions. The Prussians were taken by surprise, and
made signal after signal to summon their reinforcements
to the point where they were threatened, and where their
inferiority was evident. But Marshal Bazaine possibly
did not care to make a serious attack since he remained
where he was until four o'clock. Then at last a violent
firing of artillery was commenced, which after about two
hours, ended in the retreat or destruction of the Prussian
batteries. Towards six o'clock General Changarnier, who
was watching the movements of the 3rd Corps as a simple
amateur, grew impatient of the prolonged inaction,
sounded the charge, and sent forward the Monteaudun.
division. The village of Nouilly was 'rapidly passed, and
Noisseville, defended by a formidable barricade, was rapidly
taken at the point of the bayonet, while other regiments
took possession of the village of Servigny. If this
attack had taken place earlier, if General Frossard had
been less prudent, and had seconded the manoeuvre by
turning the left of the Prussians, a disastrous defeat would
have been inflicted on the enemy. But it was late, the
men were wearied with long and useless waiting, and it
seemed simpler to rest satisfied with what had been done.
Marshal Bazaine went quietly back to St. Julien, leaving
his troops without direction, and scarcely a battalion to
guard the advanced posts. Twenty-four cannon having fallen
into our hands, an artillery officer having some gun car-
riages available proposed to remove them. We shall have
time to-morrow, was the answer. During the night,
however, we were attacked by superior forces,
and the advanced posts were lost. A fight
ensued, which ended by leaving both parties
much where they were. From that time down to
the end of the month the army was perfectly quiet.
About the 9th of September, when there was an exchange
of prisoners, we had the first news of the catastrophe of
Sedan. We had returned Prince Charles a thousand
prisoners, captured in the different fights, and he had not
been able to fulfil his part of the exchange all in one. Some
of the men he sent had been captured near Givone, and
their accounts seemed so extraordinary that we took
them for deserters. The optimism and self deception.
-were so strong that they were scarcely believed. Later
on fresh prisoners gave us details we were obliged to be-
lieve, and brought a copy of the Figaro of the
•6th, in which the sad news was told. The im-
pression made was most painful. A proclamation by
the Marshal, almost the only :communication he had
with the army and the town, told the population they
had nothing to fear as he had decided not to leave Metz to
prevent the enemy from interfering with them. As might
be thought, such intelligence created consternation in the
town, far from reassuring it. Why should he remain?
Would not a garrison to defend the ramparts be sufficient.
Was not the work of the army of France to fight, and not
'to wait till the exhaustion of provisions should surrender
`town and army alike to the mercy of the enemy. This is
what officers and soldiers, officials, and civilians repeated
'on every side. The Marshal remained immovable. To
leave became every day more difficult and more dangerous,
every day the enemy's blitteries grew more formidable, or
appeared to do so, for at Ladouchamp a much dreaded
battery turned out to be composed of barrels and pans
mounted on ploughshares"! There was in any case plenty
of artillery, and plenty of troops; but we • never knew
whether the corps of investment was in reality as for-

midable as it was represented to be. Many doubted it,
Always expecting an attack of this innumerable army,
and fearing that the forts and the town, notwithstanding
the deep fosses, and walls from eight to ten metres high,
should b'e carried by the enemy ; fearing, too, that our
camps should be taken off forcibly, the generals covered
their front with defensive works, which were
sometimes judicious, sometimes contemptible. It
mattered little after all whether these defensive works
were good or bad. It was clear to the dullest that the
enemy, without a park of artillery, could not dream of a
regular attack. A frustrated attack.would have been his
ruin, and he did not contemplate it.