The Sun.
London, England, 1870-10-31 00:00:00

A GERMAN VIEW OF THE SURRENDER.

The Berlin correspondent of the Frankfort Gazette, who
has spent some time before Metz, says that Berlin has
found out that the seizure of Paris and the capitulation of
Metz take a long time. The German troops have become
impatient, because they took a superficial view of things,
and imagined when the Emperor was made prisoner
that the end of the war was at hand. This
extravagant idea has given place to the conviction that
the end of the war is far off. Bismarck may yet find out
that the possession of Metz and its environs may be most
inconvenient. Our soldiers of the army of investment do
not seem to fancy these new German brothers, and only
ask to be freed as soon as possible from all contact with
so hostile a population, and to return to the true
Germany.

Not the least interesting circumstance in the surrender
is the fact that the veteran General Changarnier is among
the captive officers. Carried towards Metz on an
irresistable and a thoroughly honourable afflatus of
patriotic enthusiasm, he reached the wreck of
the Second Empire only in time to be driven, high and
dry, on the same shoals; and perhaps his fate as the
victim of a man whom he detested, and the volunteer
of a system which he condemned, is the saddest
that strikes us in the present sudden down-
rush of careers and characters. But on a man
like Changarnier, hardened to the strokes' of
fate, and accustomed to more cruel destinies than
any his captors can by any possibility force upon him,

such a doom as mere captivity falls but lightly, The
utter prostration of his country must have been enough
to break the old man's heart, which the total overthro w
of the Empire might have almost gladdened. In any case,
there is the white-headed chief among the rest—a bright
exemplar, let us be certain, even to that last inter-
view in the Chateau of Frascati, of what a soldier
and a gentleman should be, under more trying circum-
stances than any that have fallen to the lot of French-
men for at least two generations. The figure named to-
day-173,000—may have called to the minds of observers
of events in the earlier campaign the question : With
how many men did the French enter on the War ! Let
us try backwards a little. We have been assured
sometimes that France was caught unprepared for the
struggle. We have been told that her cadres were not
full, that her corps were " not to the fore "—that, in a
, word, she was not ready for the great duel which she
} provoked. What is the fact ? Instead of having, as
she pretended when her disasters began, no more than
250,000 men were ready to do battle with Germany, she
must have had at least 400,000. The figures are
perfectly clear. The earlier battles of the campaign gave
10,000 prisoners and 15,000 hors de combat. Vionville and
Gravelotte were too obstinate to yield many prisoners ;
still 3,000 or 4,000 were taken, and at least 20,000 fell in
those two fearful days. The debris of MacMahon's and
De Failly's corps at Chalons—the last barely touched
by war must have amounted to at least 50,000
men. They were joined by reinforcements numbering
not fewer than 100,000 men. Of these about 125,000 were
taken prisoners at Sedan, or in the battles which preceded
that fearful day of humiliation; and the only regular
troops then left to France in face of the enemy
were Viuoy's ; which, by adopting Prussian tactis,
cleverly fought their way back from 1116zibres to
Paris—delivered out of the jaws of the lion. Throwing
out Vinoy's Corps, however, and reckoning in the troops
that got across the border to Belgium, we have 14,000
men who were killed or taken, besides those left to be
captured in Metz. If the Lorraine fortress has really
given in with 173,000, the grand total of losses to the
French in the three months' war, apart altogether
from any local and accidental losses, has been exactly,
337,000. We have only to add to this figure the num-
ber of regulars at this moment under Trochu at Paris,
or under Aurelles de Pala,dines, on the Loire—counting
the first; as regular troops, about 50,000, and the second
about 25,000 —to bring the total up to 410,000. A
reasonable althwance for the " thawing " of an army,
so to speak, under the hot influences of hostile presence—
and for the dispersion of the regular troops in Algiers,
or in cities like Marseilles, Lyons, and Bordeaux, which
wanted just about as much keeping down—would entitle
us to bring up to at least 500,000 the number of trained
soldiers with whom France • entered on the pre-
sent war. If she has been taken unprepared, it has been
simply because her peculiar scale and system of prepared-
ness fell below that of her stern a.ud cunning enemy. In war,
all is matter of comparison: the half-million of men whom
Germany now either feeds as prisoners of war, or con-
fronts as demoralised and incompetent railltaires,
had the force of thrice the number more, had they been
hurled straight at the enemy's positions, or lines of de-
fence, instead of lingering about the borders until they
had opened their lines to the irresistible wedges of the
German attack, so carefully, so promptly, so fatally
driven home.—Telegraph.
It appears that for some time before the surrender the
stock of bread and brandy had been consumed, the only
provisions left being horseflesh and wine. Scurvy—
from the want' of salt7-raged, and there was a
want of doctors and every requisite for the hospital.
The French state that in all the sorties they have in-
flicted a greater loss than they have suffered, but that in
tho last affair the men were so weak from want of food
that it was difficult to get them to advance. On seeing
matters had arrived at this stage Marshal. Bazaine
held a council of war. It was there debated whether a
desperate attempt should be made to break through the
enemy's lines. It was admitted that this could be done
with fair hopes of success, but with a certain loss of 25,000
men, who would have to be ahandoned to their fate where
they fell. It was, however, argued that if the army,
after marching several miles exposed for the greater
part of the time to the fire of the enemy's artillery, they
would be compelled to carry three successive lines of
entrenchments, and would be helpless even if they suc-
ceeded. They had plenty of artillery, but had eaten most
of the artillery and cavalry horses, so that on the infan-
try all the work would be cast. These latter had 130
rounds per rifle, but would reach the other side of the
enemy's line in a starving condition and literally without
a morsel of food, save perhaps horseflesh. In this state
it would be an easy matter for the Prussians to follow
them up with the three arms, and in the course of a few
hours kill or capture the whole of them. In fact, as we
have often asserted in the Diary of the War, Bazaine, if
he did cut his way through, could do nothing unless
his sortie were made at the same time as an attack
by a relieving army. In short, unless Prince Frederick
Charles were first crippled Bazaine could not, even if he
broke through the investing cordon, reach any spot
twenty miles beyond it. We fully believe that
if at the commencement of the siege, when his
artillery and cavalry were still horsed, and before
the Prussions had entrenched themselves, Bazaine
had thrown his whole army on one spot, making
use of his command of the bridge to deceive the enemy,
he would have got clear away. Instead of this he at
first remained quiescent, and when he did make sorties
he made them with detachments instead of masses. It
is possible that, relying on the arrival of MacMahon, he
thought he could not do better than merely detain 200,000
Prussians before the place, but as soon as MacMahon's
defeat was known to him he ought to have made a
supreme effort. When he began to consume his horses it
was of course too late to make any but partial sorties.
We are assured that it was simply starvation which caused
the capitulation, and that there was no political intrigue
whatever. It cannot be denied that Marshal Bazaine
has, by his prolonged resistance, rendered great
services to France, and has probably prevented
Paris from being entered the week after the capitulation
of Sedan. For upwards Ilef two months has the Marshal
kept some 200,000 Prussians before Metz, and if the
new armies of France should effect anything
they will owe their success to Bazaine, for
had he capitulated earlier the new armies would
have been strangled at the birth. The Prussians
have not been slow to profit by their victory. As soon as
the capitulation was certain, but before it had actually
taken place, the 2nd Corps was despatched to Paris.
What will be done with the rest of Prince Frederick
Charles's army ? We estimate the whole of it at 150,000
men. Of these some 10,000 men will be required to escort
the prisoners, and about the same number to garrison
Metz and maintain the communications. About 20,000
men have been sent to Paris. About 100,000 men will,
therefore, remain disposable. We imagine that a strong
force—say 50,000 men—will be dispatched to capture
Verdun, Mezieres, Thionville, Montmedy, &c., and to
contain General Bourbaki. The remainder will probably
advance towards the Loire, stretching out a hand on one
flank to Von der Tann, on the other to the army moving
on the Rhone.—Standard.

THE- SIEGE OF PARIS.

REPORTED STREET FIGHTINQ.

It was reported at German headquarters before Paris
that street fighting took place inside the capital on the
20th, and that the sortie of the next day was adopted to
occupy the minds of the Parisians. But we have heard
such stories before, and they have invariably proved un-
founded. The correspondent of the Cologne Gazette, how-
ever, gives some details respecting this affair. It will be
seen that the information does not come to much :—" This
information was spread by the troops which are under the
command of the Crown Prince of Saxony, and whose
outposts eagerly watch and reconnoitre the forts situated
close to the two revolutionary quarters of the town
par excellence, the suburbs of Belleville and La
Villette. They heard and saw the cannon fired from
these forts, but were unable to remark that this can-
nonade was directed against any spot along the whole of
our lines. At the same time, we are informed that on
the same day a demonstration had been made in Paris
against General Troche. The chiefs of the Red Repub-
licans had brought the accusation against him that the
measures that he was taking against the Prussians were
not sufficiently energetic, and they therefore called upon
him to venture a sortie en masse against the beleaguer-
ing army, who would in all probability be unabel
to withstand the enormous advance of 300,000
men. The general thereupon replied by an auto-
graph letter, the text of which unfortunately I have been
unable to obtain, but the contents were to the purport
that he could not venture, with the organisation and
armament of the troops he had at his disposal, to measure
strength with so well disciplined an army as the German
troops. This letter was received with strong marks of
disfavour and disapprobation. However, it appears that
General Trochu made up his mind at all risks to convince
his restless antagonists, who ardently desired a rencontre
with the enemy, of the wisdom of his policy. Thus may
be explained the sortie of the 21st October."