The Sun.
London, England, 1848-11-16 00:00:00

CHAPTER XIL-TEMPORARY PROVISIONS.

Art. 112. The existing provisions of the codes, laws,
and regulations which aro not contrary to the present
Constitution remain in force until they shall have been
legally abrogated. _ _

Art. 113.-All the authorities constituted by the ex-
isting laws remain in exercise until the promulgation of
the organic laws which concern them.
Art. 114. The law of judicial organization will deter-
mine the special mode of nomination for the first com-
p :sition of the new tribunals.
Art. 115. After the vote of the Constitution, the Na-
tional Constituent Assembly shall proceed to draw up
the org4nic laws, the enumeration of which shall be di-
tt mined by a special law.
Art. -116. The first election of the President of the
Republic shall be proceeded with conformably to the
special law passed by.the National Assembly on Oct. 28,
1848.

LAW INTELLIGENCE.
ROLLS' COURT, Nov. 15.
WILSON V. EDEN.

This cause, for carrying into effect the trusts unper-
formed of the will of Mr. Peter Johnson, of York, with
seven codicils, proved in 1796, was again resumed, and
Mr. Malin), for the defendant, Sir William Eden, who
was in part heard yesterday, continued his address, and
was followed by Mr. Dumergue, after which Mr. Turner,
for the plaintiff, replied. The case depended mainly
upon the following proviso in the will of the testator :
" Provided always, that if it shall happen that my said
daughter shall have no issue male of her body living at
her death, or no such issue male as shall be entitled by
the true meaning of this my will to my real estates
hereby limited and settled as aforesaid, then, and in
either of these cases, I devise all my real estates (sub
ject respectively as aforesaid) to all the daughters, if
more than one, of the body of my said daughter wh
shall be living at her death, as tenants in common, and
their heirs respectively, with cross remainders amongst
them, in case of any one or more of them happening to
die under the age of twenty-one years and without
issue ; and if there be but one such daughter living at
her decease, and no issue of any other such daughter
then in being, then only to such surviving daughter and
her heirs."

Lord LANGDALE said it did not appear to him per-
fectly clear. He thought the sentence must be con-
sidered as ambiguous, and it seemed to him to be a
matter of necessity that the other parts of the will
should be looked to. He gave no opinion, excepting
that it was the case of an ambiguous will, and he
should send it to a court of common law for the opinion
of the judges.
After some remarks from the Counsel,
His LORDSHIP said that he should send the case for
the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench.
LEWIS V. BALDWIN.

This cause came on upon objection taken for want of
parties.
Mr. ROUPELL and Mr. GOLDSMID, for the defendants,
took the objection, which was opposed by Mr, TURNER
and Mr. ANDERSON for the plaintiff.
The suit related to the Midland Great Western Rail-
way Company in Ireland, the railway from Dublin to
Mullingar, and from Mullingar to Galway.
Lord LANGDALE Said the circumstances were such
that he eould not safely decide upon them until the
hearing of the cau. e.

VICE-CHANCELLOR'S COURT, Nov. 15.
(Before the VICE-CHANCELLOR of ENGLAND.)
EIMELL v. SIMPSON.
Rw
lill aitv,hetihsae
then
eagasneacyai
nlofatadnyst
Lni
na tomed theconsequencep Elizabethlaintiffo, Bolton,
fSelinaw hic hbym Maria her
rs.
Bolton's executors invested the sum of SC/. in the Three
per Cent. Consols. When the plaintiff attained her ma-
jority she applied to the executors for the legacy of 501.,
upon which she also claimed interest at 4 per cent., to
be computed from the end of six months from the de
cease of the testatrix, amounting in the whole to the
sum of 661. In answer to this application, it was stated
that the sum of stock paid in to answer the legacy, with
the interest upon it, only amounted to 561. 135., and this
sum the executors were ready to' pay to the plaintiff.
This offer was, however, refused, and the present suit
immediately instituted against the executors for the 661.
which the plaintiff had claimed.
Mr. Bethell and Mr. Rogers appeared for the plaintiff.
Mr. STUART and Mr. WALYORD appeared for the exe-
cutors, and contended that the executors being obliged
to invest the legacy on aceotint%oe-lheplaintiff4,mine-.
rity, it was precisely the same thing as if it had been
invested by the Accountant-General; expense had like-

wise been saved, which the payment in and out, under
the Legacy Act, would have occasioned. This had ac-
tuated the executors in doing as they had done, and tho
p!aintiff alone, out of many legatees, had complained.
Under these circumstances, the case was an exceuOingiy
hard one, and of vast importance to executors.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR said, that the executors might
have freed themselves entirely had they acted under tne
Legacy Act and paid the money into court; but not
having done so, he considered the plaintiff entitled to a
decree. The costs to be paid by the executor.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, Nov. 15.
(Sittings in Banco, before Lord Chief Justice DENMAN,
and Justices COLERIDGE, WIGHTMAN, and ERLE.)

REGINA V. THE HAMMERSMITH BRIDGE COMPANY.
In this case the Hammersmith Suspension-bridge
Company had been assessed to the poor-rate of the
parish of Hammersmith in the sum of 4751., in respect of
the net rateable value of a moiety of the bridge and ap-
purtenances, situated in that parish. The company ap
pe ded against the rate to the quarter-sessions of the
county of Middlesex, when the rate was amended by
atrikieg out the sum of 4751, and inserting in its place
the sum of 360/., subject to the opinion of this Court
upon a special case. The case stated, that under the
powers vested in them by two Acts of Parliament, the
company had constructed a suspension bridge from Ham-
mersmith, in the county of Middlesex, to Barnes, in the
county of Surrey, and had made a convenient road- from
the north-end of the bridge to Hammersmith, and also
a road from the south-end of the bridge to Barnes, and
another from the same end of the bridge to the road lead-
ing from London to Richmond. By the Act of Parliament
it was provided that one-half of the bridge should be con-
sidered as being in the parish of Hammersmith, and the
other half in the parish of Barnes. The company were
bound to keep the roads which they constructed in re-
pair, and were authorised to erect gates upon the roads,
at which they might take tolls for the roads alone, or
they might take the whole toll for the roads and bridge
in one sum. In fact, the toll had been taken in one sum
at a gate on the Hammersmith side of the bridge. The
case also stated, that of the roads made by the company,
there were 678 yards in the parish of Hammersmith, and
5,328 yards in the parish of Barnes; and that 720/. was
the net rateable value of the bridge and appurtenances,
based upon the amount actually received, after making
all lawful deductions and allowances, including the cost
of maintaining the roads. The sessions decided that the
net rateable value should be equally divided between
the two parishes; but if this Court should be of opinion
that it should be divided in proportion to the quantity of
land occupied by the bridge and roads in each parish,
the rate was to be reduced from 3601. to 1101.
Mr. PASHLEY and Mr. WILLES contended that the
decision of the quarter-sessions was right, in dividing the
net rateable value into equal moieties, and that, even if
the sessions were wrong, the net rateable value could not
be divided in proportion to the quantity of land occu-
pied by the bridge and roads in each parish. This
Court had never sanctioned the mileage principle of cal-
culation.

Mr. BODKIN (with whom was Mr. Prentice) contended
that the sessions were wrong, and that the mileage prin-
ciple of calculation ought to be adopted.
Lord DENIKAN said, the Court would consider their
decision.