The Sun.
London, England, 1870-08-16 00:00:00

STRATEGY OF THE CAMPAIGN,

Speaking of the news of the fighting on the Moselle,
the Telegraph, without adopting either report, says the
French army seems to have narrowly escaped a vast
catastrophe. To be caught by a superior adversary, in
the act of retreating across a great river, is almost to
incur destruction; and only great good fortune, or the
advantage of a fortified position, can avert disaster. The
Emperor says that "half of his army had crossed,"
when the Prussians, with greatly superior forces, fell
upon the remainder. If the assailants were really re-
pulsed, the fact speaks volumes for the skill and energy
of Marshal Bazaine, charged with the task of drawing off
the army across the Moselle. And the Marshal's credit
is all the greater if the battle was fought, not under
the guns of Metz itself, but in the open field, about
eight miles east of the fortress. Pange is a village
of some importance—just midway between Herny—the
King of Prussia's headquarters—and Metz ; and an army
drawn up with its centre at the village would cover
at once the roads leading westward from Saarlouis,
from St. Avold, Sarreguemines, and Saverne, and
the railway from Strasburg. But the mention
of Pange does not bear out the Emperor's state-
ment that his army was interrupted in the operation
of crossing the Moselle in retreat ; for we can scarcely
conceive that one half of his troops would have been
kept in position at such a great distance behind
the part which had -passed the river. Such
a division of forces, in presence of a superior
enemy, would have been eminently dangerous; and,
on the slender information yet before us, we
are disposed to believe that Napoleon and William I.
really refer to distinct contests, in the contending tele-
grams which claim victory for either side. It is perfectly
imaginable that an important affair of rearguard may
have taken place at Pange, before the French army drew
off to cross the Moselle by the bridges of Metz ; that the
Prussians pushed the enemy before them to the verge of
the works of the fortress; and that another contest
was then waged, resulting in a check for the Prus-
sians, thrown back by hostile masses, supported by
powerful fortifications. Meanwhile we may frankly con-
fess that, whether one or two battles be indicated in the
vague telegrams received yesterday, the result of the
fighting was not in favour of the French. Even a victory
of the most decided character could have won for them at
the best only an unmolested retreat across the Moselle;
and since we are told that the Prussians are already at
Vigneulles, about 30 miles from Metz, in the direction. of
Chalons, it is perfectly clear that Marshal Bazaine
could not have effectually shaken off his pursuers.
The Standard does not accept the theory that two
battles have been fought. To our mind the battle described
by French and Prussians is one and the same. We read it
in this way. The French army under Bazaine, commenced
early on Sunday morning to cross the liver from Metz with
a view to retreating on the river Meuse. To cover the
retreat, which must of necessity be carried out by the
several corns in succession. the corps of Ladmixault anal

of .Vacaen, wno, It will be remembered, succeeded Mar-
shal Bazaine in command of the third corps on Bazaine's
appointment to the chief command of the left wing, were
left in front of Metz, and probably took up position on
the heights overlooking the Nied—at least so we
conjecture from the report of Prince Pless, the military
inspector of the Society for Aid to Sick and Wounded,
who says that the battle was fought in the direction of
Pange, a village nearly two miles south of the main road
from St. Avoid to Metz, and on the right or western bank
of the Nied. From this point there would be a safe re-
treat in case of defeat under the guns of the
fortress of Metz. These troops appear to have been
attacked by two Prussian corps, the Ist and 7th, before
they had quitted their position as a rear
guard ; but when the other half of the army,
whieh would be the Guard and Frossard's corps,
had already crossed the Moselle. The French claim
to have repulsed the Prussians with considerable
loss ; on the other hand the King of Prussia, though
in a very different tone to the joy expressed
at " Fritz's wonderful luck," claims a victory.
Both accounts may be reconciled by supposing that
the French repulsed the Prussians, but subsequently
retreated to the fortress, having performed their
duty as a rear guard effectually, and thus, on the prin-
ciple that those who hold the battle field are the con-
querors, allowed the Prussians to claim to have won the
action. A glance at a large scale map shows that a very strong
position might be held across the road from St. Avoid to
Metz, on the line of the Nied. Woods, which the French are
beginning to learn the value of for defensive purposes,
come down to the bank of the stream on the bank nearest
the Moselle ; while on the side by which the Prussians
must advance on open plain has to be crossed for several
hundred yards. Still nothing is heard of Marshal
MacMahon and his corps. Count Palikao does not ven-
ture in the Corps Legislatif to say where he is, and what
he is expected to do. An unofficial telegram states that
he was at Toul on Saturday afternoon, but if so he takes
good care to place a whole day's march between himself
and the Germans. This statement, if accepted, shews
that he is separated by a very long line, one
of forty or fifty miles, from Marshal Bazaine,
and we may look upon his junction with that
Commander as now hopeless. The German army is now
between him and the main body of that of France, and
the Prussian cavalry would not permit any transverse
movements even if he were able to execute them. None
but wholly speculative and conjectural accounts are given
of the strength or composition of the corps under
MacMahon, and a belief is spreading that in this, as in so
many other matters, the Government is mystifying the
country.—Daily News.

OUR COTEMPORARIES---This Morning,

OUR 'ARMY IN 18745 AND IN 1870.
The Times draws a noteworthy contrast between the
strength of the English army in the present year and a
quarter of a century ago. Looking to home service
alone, we had in 1845, according to the Duke
of Wellington's reckoning, an available body of
perhaps 5,000 men. We have now at least 400000.
Of artillery, instead of 7,000, we have upwards of 50,000
at home arid abroad, the regular artillery alone
being nearly 30,000 strong. In short, if we take 90,000 as
the strength of the Regular Army at home, and then
add the numbers of the militia, volunteers, • and other
reserve foicce ,s we shall find that at the present'moment
we have within- these islands a larger military, force than
that with which Prussia., four years ago, entered the lists
against Austria, consolidated Germany, and raised herself
to that eminence which has provoked the present war. If
then all this prodigious increase .has,.atually been
achieved by our twenfy-five years' preparation, how
can we be said to be apreliarecf? We answer that
if we have got the men, 'and, indeed, the material of
war, we have got nothing else. Of that machinery
which makes an effective array out of a multitude- of
Men we have hardly a trace. Our militia is nearly
104;1,000 strong, not merely on paper, but on parade, Our
Volunteers, with the impulse which this new alarm will
give to the movement, may be reckoned at 200,000.
These 300,000 men are there and they are as good men as
the Prussians, who won the battles of Weissenburg and
Woerth. They have seen indeed, almost as
much service, for those Germans of the first
line were young conscripts enrolled since the
campaign of Sadowa. But the Germans had a com-
plete militaiy organisation, while we have none.
Our Militia is not half officered, and of its few officers
not half are trained. Our volunteer officers have no
knowledge but-What, in spite of difficulties, they have
contrived to pick up themselves. For neither force is
there anything like staff administration, commissariat, or
other supports. The result is, that on the first alarm we
perceive the deficiency,, and, instead •of relying on this
enormous mass of national strength, we hastily pour a
few thousand men had the Line.

THE ENGIickgMENT BEFOAV
The Daily Hews rewatis that a :glance at the Empe-
ror's telegram will'shew-that no pitched battle, no contest
for a- field or the honOura of ivais, momentwas for a in
E
question. According to the mperor's statement
atmy was retreating, • and the Prussians learning
the fact came lip "to administer a blow in its rear as
it left. On Sunday morning, his Majesty tells us, the
French army befoze Metz was withdrawing hi order to
place itself behind the :VI melte. The• operation, involving,
of course, much more than the mere march of the troops,
would occupy a considi3rable time ; and while it was
going on the French scouts announced that the Prussian
vanguard was in sight-. „It was the advanced guard of
the 7th and -Ist Army Corps. The Prussians,
according to the well known rule of war, attacked when
almost one-half of the French army had got across the
river. The Emperor says•they attacked in great force,
and that the fight lasted four hours, at the end of which
the Prussians were repulsed with considerab'e loss.
Inasmuch, however, as the French fought retreating,
and withdrew across the river, this information can
only signify that their rearguard did its duty in a
spirited and successful manner. The King describes the
engagement as a victorious battle before Metz, and from
Berlin we get the further explanation that it was fought
near Pange. There is a village of this name on the Nied,
between Are Laquenery and l elite, about eight miles to
the south-east of Metz. - The 'Prussian Army Corps, as
above mentioned, are cernmended, the Ist by Lieutenant-
aeneral von Manteuffel, =Attie-7th by Lieutenant-General
Von Zastrow, and have,-each a nominal strength of
25,000 infantry, 3,300 cavalky, 96 guns. It will be seen
that this was an engagement of only a portion of the right
wing of the German tinny; tnd is not in any sense that
great general action before Metz which was expected
last week. No strategic result was to be obtained, but
inerely as much harm as possible to be done to the re-
treating army.