The Sun.
London, England, 1870-07-22 00:00:00

FRANCE AND PRUSSIA.

Whatever may be the issue of Napoleon's threatening
demonstration, there can be no question that Bismarck
has the Emperor morally at a disadvantage. To the
rather peremptory demand that Prussia shall forbid Prince
Leopold to accept the Spanish crown, the answer is
dignified and just. Prussia has taken no part in the
nomination ; the Prince is not a member of the Royal
family ; by ties of blood he is much more closely con-
nected with France than with Prussia ; and if the
Spaniards want him for their king, Prussia, sees no reason
to interfere. Thus France is placed in an
awkward situation. If she declares war, the
patriotism of Germany will be rouse)/ to intensity at this
assault upon the national independence, and the people
will strengthen the hands of their King by every means in
their power. We know by experience the value of popu-
lar enthusiasm in supporting a great war. With France
the case will be very different. Apart from the French-
man's natural love of martial glory, Napoleon can count
upon no sentiment to inspire the heart of his people. It
will be evident, to all who reflect at all, that he under-
takes an aggressive campaign without sufficient cause ;
and of the two objects of the war, the rectification of the
Rhenish frontier and the settlement of the Spanish crown,
one will be regarded, by a large minority of his subjects,
as an unwarrantable seizure of foreign territory,
and the other as unwarrantable interference
with the concerns of a foreign kingdom. It
is by no means clear that the elevation
of a Prussian subject to the throne of Spain
would involve France in any danger, though it
would shake her prestige. But the loss of prestige is
surely no cause for war in these days of the world, and
those theories of international politics which allowed
powerful States in former times to settle the affairs of all
Europe are now pretty well out of fashion. The two
Powers will not only fight on unequal terms, but run
very unequal risks. If Prussia is defeated, she will not •
be seriously crippled; she will only fall for a time from
the first place in Continental politics to the second, and
her people will feel that they have failed with dignity,
and in an honest cause. The fate of Spain will give her
no uneasiness, for she cares very little about that
country, and is not likely to suffer, whatever King may
be chosen. To France, however, the consequences of
failure may be disastrous in the extreme. Three of four
plebiscita would not repair the mischief of such a defeat.
At one blow the influence would be destroyed for all the
rest of the present reign. She will never again dictate
even to a weak State like her neighbour beyond the
Pyrenees. She will have the mortification of confessing
to the world that she cannot support her own pretensions.
Republicanism will receive a tremendous impulse, and the
prospects of the dynasty will be dark indeed. All the
principal military enterprises of the third Napoleon have
been failures more or less complete, and another
would be more than the empire can safely bear.
The tenor of the dispatches indicate—or would
indicate if the news could all be trusted
—that Napoleon is trying to keep open a re-
treat from his dangerous position. Most of
the telegrams give only the rumours of Paris, and Paris
is the place of all the world where startling reports are
most readily made out of nothing. What messages have
passed between the Tuileries and Berlin we cannot yet
know, but it is always safe to assume that the war
rumours of the French journals are much exaggerated. It
is rather significant, however, that the latest intelligence
speaks almost entirely of the Emperor's efforts to induce
Spain, instead of Prussia, to reject the Hohenzollern
candidate. Spain is reminded of the services France has
rendered her in establishing the Provisional Government
and arresting Carlist invasions. She is entreated not to
insist upon the only candidate who is really distasteful to
France: She is threatened in ease she persists. If she
listens to these representations the danger disappears and
France retires from the field, not only without discredit,
but with increase of consequence. ' That she will abandon
the candidacy of Prince Leopold seems more probable to-
day than ever. If France and Prussia do battle for her
crown she is certain to be the victim, whoever is the
victor. While the war lasts she must be harried with
invasion ; when it is over, her king will be the puppet of
the conqueror. This is a heavy price to pay for a sovereign
who has no special personal recommendations, and is not
acceptable to all parties, perhaps not even to a majority,
in Spain itself.—New York Tribune.