The Sun.
London, England, 1870-10-06 00:00:00

1. HE SUS, LONDON, TI.ULTRSP4-IY, OCTOBER , 18n.

tions which were freely indulged in by acute out-
siders. Hitherto no discord has appeared. When
the Germans first came np, some ominous signs did,
indeed, manifest themselves. The Reds seemed
a:ixious to conduct the defence of Paris on their own
peculiar principles. This danger, however, so far
from increasing, has diminished : the stern reality of
the German circumvention served to sink all minor
difficulties, and for the time at least the Government
of Defence meets no rival to its authority. The
•, rumours of street fighting are quite unfounded. The
city is much quieter now than at any previous time
during the last twenty years; and if its inhabitants
do not Make a very heroic defence, they have
at all events not commenced operations by
rebelling against their chiefs. Men of such diverse
opinions as TROCHIT, PICARD, GAMBETTA, and
ROCHEF-ORT can all fight the enemy in harmony, and
the battalions of Belleville and Lavillette find
more pressing occupation than carrying Socialism
into practice. It seems equally unquestionable
that the garrison is improving in effi-
ciency, as it must inevitably do, for the
drilling is constant, and the soldiers require no ex-
hortation to bring them to this irksome duty. Not
yet could these men hope
_.to fight the victors of
Sedan on even terms ; but the advantage of com-
batting behind strong works makes all the difference.
Of the number of the defenders portentous
accounts reach us. When the blockade commenced
it was known that General Tnocuu commanded above
300,000 troops, good, bad, and indifferent. This total
has risen in the balloon letters as rapidly as the bal-
loons themselves, and half a million, 600,000,
are now the usual quotations. It will
not, perhaps, be rash to conclude that
the original number has been materially aug-
mented. There are many more than 300,000 men in
Paris, and as the great bulk of the inhabitants can
have little occupation, they will naturally prefer en-
rolling themselves as , National Guards to idly
watching their felloW citizens fight in their
defence. Probably the number of defenders is limited
only by the supply of weapons.
With respect to the important question of food
less is known. It was to be expected that milk,
butter, fish, and similar articles of diet would fail
very soon after the blockade commenced, but such
deprivations are of little practical consequence. The
primary essentials of food are still plentiful, and the
only question is, how long will they last ? The
ordinary estimate, resting on calculations of some
authority, is that Paris is provisioned for two
months; and with this conjecture we must be
satisfied, for there exist no data upon which even
an approximate independent estimate may be
formed. The Government serves out the butcher's
meat in rations, and it has laid claim to all bread-
stuffs not requ;led for private use. But these
measures may indicate only that the authorities are
prudent. If they are determined to fight to the end, it
is obviously wise to practice economy from the
beginning. To eat np the provisions recklessly in
the early days of the siege could lead only to
premature starvation. It seems a safe conclusion
that the capture of the city by starvation will be a
tedious process. 'Yet it would be very rash to judge
of the final result of this remarkable encounter by
the evidence which yet lies before us. The experi-
ment is so novel that -it must be left to
work out its own solution. Considering the
vast resources known to be •at the command
of the besieged force it is clear that the resistance
ought not to be slight, and that it may prove most
desperate. The Germans themselves are evidently
of this opinion. They are establishing winter quar-
ters round the city, bringing upheavy trains, and in all •
respects acting so leisurely as to justify the inference
that they believe themselves sitting down to a lengthy
task. As to the ultimate success of the French,
whatever chance there may 'be of a favourable issue
depends upon the action of the provinces. The sec-
tion of the Government stationed at Tours is of
course alive to the necessity of . forming
an army to relieve. one or other of the
beleaguered towns. If a force could be raised
to relieve Metz, or even to defeat the German army
marching on Lyons, the position of the host round
Paris would in either case become untenable, for its
communications would be lost. But the prospects
of such an enterprise proving triumphant are at present
slight. Of armed men there are, indeed, abundance on
the line from Tours to Lyons. They are, however, so
ill-equipped, officered, and organised that it is more
than doubtful whether they could meet a German
army of half their numbers. It is equally dubious
whether their efficiency will sufficiently improve in
time to save Paris.

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

ciairse, Paris, Metz, Strasburg. Of these the
Germans have captured already • one, they
have long invested another, and they are
bJsieging the third. Sieges were more frequent in
the wars of ancient than of modern times, but
this war has been an affair of sieges. There is no
French force in the open field. The war is going
en, but it is a chronicle of investments, bombard-
ments, blockades, sorties, and, too often, capitula,
tions. Of the French army cif 350,000 men who started
gaily for Berlin all that are not killed, wounded, or
captured,. are shut up in one or other of the fortified
places which were believed to be the strength of
France. Out of the whole 119 fortresses, however, only
a•few have been brought into notice, but these few
lay directly in the route of the armies. Toul blocked
the way to Paris. Phalsburg occupied so peculiar a
position that its eastern gate is called the gate of Ger-
many, and its western the gate of France. Strasburg'
which has filled so prominent a place in the war
annals, implies by its name that it is the "fortress
on the highway." 'Though more than one of these
fortified places have been captured, they have
unquestionably greatly delayed the progress
of the enemy. Their military value must
therefore be acknowledged, but the terrible condi-

tion of the non-combatants and the injury done
to the beautiful works of art they contained, should
serve as a warning that civil and military purposes
should not be combined. Populous cities with
cathedrals, libraries, and thousands of peaceful resi-
dents, should not be turned into intrenohed camps.
If the fortifications of Metz and Strasburg are to be
demolished for reasons of state, at least the towns
will not in future risk the horrors of a siege, and
the lesson should not be lost.