The Sun.
London, England, 1848-01-04 00:00:00

•
••••

S U N 7 JANUARY 4, 1848.

THE NATIONAL DEFENCES.

The following is a copy of the letter addressed by
the Duke of Wellington to Sir John Burgoyne, an
analysis of which has already appeared in this
journal :

" Strathfieldgaye, 9th Jan., 1847.
TO MAJ.-GEN. SIR JOHN J. BURGOYNE,
K.C.8., &c., &c.
_ _

" My dear General,—

"Some days have elapsed, indeed a fortnight had,
since I received your note, with a copy of your ob-
,ervations on the possible results of a war with
France, under our present system of military pre-
paration.

" You are aware that I have for years been sensible
of the alteration produced in maritime warfare and
operations by the application of steam to the pro-
pelling of ships at sea.

" This discovery immediately exposed all parts of
the coasts of these islands, which a vessel could ap-
proach at all, to be approached, at all times of tide
and in all seasons, by vessels so propelled, from all
quarters. We are in fact assailable, and at least liable
to insult, and to have contributions levied upon us on
all parts of our coast ; that is, the coast of these, in-
cluding the Channel, islands, which to this time, from
the period of the Norman conquest, have never been
successfully invaded.

"I have in vain endeavoured to awaken the atten-
tion of different Administrations to this state of
things, as well known to our neighbours (rivals in
power, at least former adversaries and enemies) as it
is to ourselves.

"I hope that your paper may be attended with more
success than my representations hare been.
"I have above, in few words, represented our dan-
ger. We have no defence, or hope of defence, except-
ing in our fleet.
" We hear a great deal of the spirit of the people
of England, for which no man entertains higher re-
spect than I do. But unorganised, undisciplined,
without systematic subordination established and
well understood, this spidt, opposed to the fire of
musketry and cannon, and to sabres and bayonets of
disciplined troops, would only expose those animated
by such spirit to confusion and destruction. Let any
man only make the attempt to turn to some use this
spirit in a case of partial local disturbance ; the want
of previous systematic organization and subordination
will prevent him even from communicating with more
than his own menial servants and dependants, and
while mobs are in movement through the country the
most powerful will find that he can scarcely move
from his own door.

" It is perfectly true, that as we stand at present,
with our naval arsenals and dockyards not half garri-
soned, 5,000 men of all arms could not be put under
arms, if required, for any service whatever, without
leaving standing without relief all employed on any
duty, not excepting even the Guards over the palaces
and the person of the Sovereign.
. .

" I Calculate that a declaration of war should
probably find our home garrisons of the strength
as follows, particularly considering that one of the
most common accusations against this country is,
that the practice has been to commence reprisals at
sea, simultaneously with a declaration of war, the
order for the first of which must have been issued
before the last can have been published.
" We ought to be with garrisons as follows, at the
moment war is declared :

Channel Islands (besides the militia
•
of each well organized, trained, and
disciplined)
Plymouth lO,OOO
Milford haven 5,000
Cork
Portsmouth
Dover
Sheerness, Chatham, and the Thames 10,000
I suppose that one half of the whole regular
force of the country would be stationed in Ireland,
which half would give the garrison for Cork. The
remainder must be supplied from the half of the
whole force at home stationed in Great Britain.

" The whole force employed at home in Great
Britain and Ireland, would not afford a sufficient
number of men for the mere defence and occupa-
pation, on the breaking out of the war, of the works
constructed for the defence of the dockyards and
naval arsenals, without leaving a single man dis-
posable.
" The measure upon which I hare earnestly en-
treated different Administrations to decide, which is
constitutional, and has been invariably adopted in
time of peace for the last 80 years, is to raise, em
body, organize, and discipline the militia of the same
numbers for each of the three kingdoms united as
during the late war. This would give a mass of
organized force amounting to about 150,000 men,
which we might immediately set to work to discipline.
This alone would enable us to establish the strength
of our army. This, with an augmentation of the
force of the regular army, which would not cost
400,0001., would put the country on its legs in
respect to personal force, and I would engage for its
defence, old as I am.

" But as we stand now, and if it be true that the
exertions of the fleet are alone not sufficient to pro-
vide for our defence, we are not safe for a week after
the declaration of war.

" I am accustomed to the consideration of these
questions; and have examined and reconnoitred over
and over again, the whole coast from the North Fore-
land, by Dover, Folkstone, Beachy Head, Brighton,
Arundel, to Selsey Bill, near Portsmouth, and I say
that, excepting immediately under the fire of Dover
Castle, there is not a spot on the coast on which in-
fantry might not be thrown on shore, at any time of
tide, with any wind, and in any weather, and from
which such body of infantry, so thrown on shore,
would not find within the distance of five miles a road
into the interior of the country through the cliffs
practicable for the march of a body of troops.
" That in that space of coast (that is, between the
North Foreland and Selsey Bill) there are not less
than seven small harbours or mouths of rivers, each
without defence, of which an enemy, having landed
his infantry on the coast, might take possession, and
therein land his cavalry and artillery of all calibre,
and establish himself and his communication with
France.

" The nearest part of the coast to the metropolis is
undoubtedly the coast of Sussex, from the east and
west side of Beachy Head and to Selsey Bill. There
are not less than twelve roads leading from Brighton
upon London, and the French army must be much
altered indeed, since the time at which I was better
acquainted with it, if there are not now belonging to
its forty chefs ci itat Major-General capable of
sitting down and ordering the march to the coast of
40,000 men, their embarkation, with their horses and
artillery, at the several French ports on the coast ;
their disembarkation at named points on the English
coast, that of the artillery and cavalry in named
ports or mouths of rivers, and the assembly at named
points of the several columns; and the march of each
of these from stage to stage to London.
" Let any man examine our maps and road-books,
consider of the matter, and judge for himself.
" I know of no mode of resistance, much less of
protection from this danger, excepting by an army
in the field capable of meeting and contending with
its formidable enemy, aided by all the means of
fortification which experience in war and science can
suggest.
" I shall be deemed fool-hardy in engaging for the
defence of the empire with an army composed of such
a force of militia. I may be so. I confess it, I
should infinitely prefer, and should feel more con-
fidence in, an army of regular troops. But I know
that I shall not have these. I may have the others,
and if an addition is made to the existing regular
army allotted for home defence of a force which will
cost 400,0001. a year, there would be a sufficient dis-
ciplined force in the field to enable him who should
command to defend the country.
" This is my view of our danger and our resources.
I was aware that our magazines and arsenals were
very inadequately supplied with ordnance and car-
riages, arms, stores of all denominations, and ammu-
nition.
" The deficiency has 'been occasioned in part by
the sale of arms, and of various descriptions of ord-
nance stores, since the termination of the late war, in
order to diminish the demand of supply to carry on
the peace service of the ordnance, in part by the con-
flagration of the arsenal which occurred in the Tower
some years ago, and by the difficulty under which all
Governments in this country labour in prevailing
upon Parliament, in time of peace, to take into con-
sideration measures necessary for the safety of the
country in time of war.
" The state of the ordnance, arms, ammunition, &c.,
in magazines, is in part the question of expense, and
perhaps in some degree one of time.
" I would recommend to have an alphabetical list
of the stores examined by a committee, and made out
in form, as upon the enclosed half-sheet of paper, by
ascertaining what there was in 1804, and what there
is in store now, of each article, and the difference
between the two accounts.

[PRICE 3D.

"I have taken the year 1804 as the standard, as
that was the year in which the invasion was threat-
ened. It was previous to the employment of the
armies in the Peninsula or North America ; in short,
as nearly as possible similar to the political circum-
stances in which we stand at this moment, excepting
that we are now at peace with France—we were then
at war.
"A fourth column would be the estimate of the
expense of bringing the magazines to the state it)
which they were in 1804.
" With this information before him, the Master-
General could give the Government accurate informa-
tion of the wants of ordnance, arms, and ammuni-
tion, and stores in the magazines of the country.
" Yon will see from what I have written that I have
contemplated the danger to which you have referred.
I have done so for years. I have drawn to it the at-
tention of different Administrations at different times.

" You will observe, likewise, that I have consi-
dered of the measures of prospective security, and of
the mode and cost of the attainment.

" I have done more. I have looked at and consi-
dered these localities in great detail, and have made
up myr mind upon the details of their defence.
" These are questions to which my mind has not
been unaccustomed. I have considered and provided
for the defence, the successful defence, of the frontiers
of many countries.
" You are the confidential head of the principal
defensive part of the country. I will, if you and the
Master-General of the Ordnance choose, converse or
otherwise communicate confidently [confidentially
with you upon all the details of this subject; will
inform you of all that I know, have seen, and think
upon it, and what my notions are of the details of
the defensive system to be adopted and eventually
carried into execution.
" I quite concur in all your views of the danger of
our position, and of the magnitude of the stake at
issue. lam especially sensible of the certainty of
failure if we do not, at at an early moment, attend to
the measures necessary to be taken for our defence,
and of the disgrace, the indelible disgrace, of such
failure.

" Putting out of view all the other unfortunate
consequences, such as the loss of the political and
social position of this country among the nations of
Europe, of all its allies, in concert with and in aid of
whom it has in our own times contended successfully
in arms for its own lAnour and safety, and the inde-
pendence and freedom of the world.
" When did any man hear of allies of a country
unable to defend itself?

" Views of economy of some, and I admit that the
high views of national finance f others, induce them
to postpone those measures absolutely necessary
for mere defence and safety under existing circum-
stances, forgetting altogether the common practice of
successful armies, in modern times, imposing upon
the conquered enormous pecuniary contributions,
as well as other valuable and ornamental property.
" Look at the course pursued by France in Italy
and Russia ! at Vienna repeatedly, at Berlin, at Mos-
cow—the contributions levied, besides the subsistence,
maintenance, clothing, and equipment of the army
which made the conquest ! Look at the conduct of
the allied army which invaded France, and had pos-
session of Paris in 18151 Look at the account of the
pecuniary sacrifices made upon that occasion, under
their different heads of contributions, payments for
subsistence, and maintenance of the invading armies,
including clothing and other equipments, payments of
old repudiated state- debts, payments of debts due to
individuals in war in the different countries of
Europe, repayment for contributions levied, and
moveable and immoveable property sold in the course
of the revolutionary war.
" But such an account cannot be made out against
this country. No ! but I believe that the means of
some demands would not be wanting. Are there no
claims for a fleet at Toulon, in 1793 ? None for debts
left unpaid by British subjects in France, who escaped
from confinement under cover of the invasion, in
1814, by the allied armies ? Can any man pretend to
limit the amount of the demands on account of the
contributions de guerre
. _ .

" Then look at the conditions of the treaties of
Paris, 1814, 1815.
France having been in possession of nearly every
capital in Europe, and having levied contributions in
each, and having had in its possession or under its
influence the whole of Italy, Germany, and Poland,
is reduced to its territorial limits as they stood in
1792.

"Do we suppose that we should be allowed to keep
—could we advance a pretension to keep—more than
the islands composing the United Kingdom, ceding
disgracefully the Channel Islands, on which an in-
vader had never established himself since the period of
the Norman Conquest ?
" I am bordering upon seventy-seven years of age
passed in honour.
"I hope that the Almighty may protect me from
being the witness of the tragedy which I cannot per-
suade my contemporaries to take measures to avert.
" Believe me
" Ever yours sincerely,
" WELLINGTON."

THE NATIONAL DEFENCES.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE SUN.

should be exceedingly sorry that so influen-
tial a journalist should be deceived, and, therefore,
unintentionally deceive his numerous readers, by
the letter from Southampton, on the "National
Defences," dated December 29 last.
True it is we have ships and stores in abundance, but
we cannot get crews to man them ; for we have no re-
served force of seamen at command, no maritime militia
like the French, registered 101,306 sea-faring men,
bound to serve if called, no permanent force of 8,000
skilled gunners and sailors, as at Toulon and in the
Channel. Give us time, truly ! why the first notice
we shall have of war will be the hostile invasion and
destruction of some of our arsenals, or the burning of
our merchant ships in the Thames or the Mersey.
When, in 1844, the British Consul was imprisoned
and then turned out of Otaheite, our channel fleet
consisted of ONE line-of-battle ship, and it took months
to obtain such volunteers as might partly man two or
three extra men-of-war ; and had the twenty-four
line-of- battle ships then at Cherbourg and Brest, been
towed out by the great steamers long-trained to the
duty, with the 20,000 or 30,000 soldiers always in
garrison in and near those ports, not to speak of Paris
and its garrison of 60,000, with a railway to the coast
—had they struck a sudden blow, such as Admiral
Lalande had proposed in 1840, we had neither navy,
nor army, nor militia, nor fortresses, to defend us.
We are somewhat better prepared now, but not
much.
Who doubts the courage of our population ; but
what could they do without training, discipline, or ,
knowledge of gunnery ? Would the sheriffs of_ coun-
ties and posse conzitatus have protected England, each
man being armed with the only weapons he knows
how to use effectively, his working tools?
The truest friends to peace are they who would
prevent careless security from giving the opportunity
of a sudden blow to those who hate us—who tell us
in their speeches and writings that they must and will
revenge our many victories and their own humiliation. i
When the French steamer of war, a few years
back, fired a salute at Sheerness, and found then no
batteries there to return the salute, no ships of war
but those lying dismantled in the Medway, what
could have prevented the destruction of millions of
property and thousands of lives in the river Thames?
If the public will not vote supplies to the Govern-
ment for defence, and for the proper organisation of
our means and power, we cannot be in a state of pre-
paration or safety, and shall be massacred and plun-
dered Alen we least expect. As for trusting to
impressment in future, it is unjust, unpopular, uncer-
tain, and at the best only provides crews undisciplined
and quite ignorant of cannon.

Your well-wisher,
M.
Kendal, Jan. 1, 1848.

FRENCH PLAYS.—The tragedy of Antigone, which
is to be one of the grand coups of Mr. Mitchell's season,
and in which M. Bocage will make his second appear-
ance, is now in a forward state of preparation. A full
rehearsal took place on Saturday, at which the whole of
Mendelssohn's music was performed, and we understand
that the tragedy will be positively produced upon Wed-
nesday. In the version played some years ago at
G
Covent-garden, the music of the great erman com-
poser was only partially given ; in the forthcoming
performance, however, every care will be taken to
ensure the due interpretation of the whole of it.
.The
orchestra will include many of the first instrumentalist,
•f the day.
HER MAJESTY BITTEN BY A DOG.—It will be re-
collected that, not long since, a splendid dog of the
Mount St. Bernard breed was presented by the Queen to
the Zoological Society in the Regent's Park. This
animal, which was a present to her Majesty from the
King of the French, is of so ferocious a disposition, that
it has not been deemed safe tosuffer it to be once un-
chained since its arrival. It is not generally known
that, just previous to its being sent away from Windsor,
the Queen, while stroking the dog at the private kennel,
was bitten in the right arm by the animal, inflicting a
wound which caused the blood to flow. Tbis unfortu-
nate occurrence caused considerable alarm at the time
for fear of the consequences, and the dog was com-
manded to be sent away, but not to be destroyed.

, 1
71*AnAt
,-,,' I fil •', 119
cl
' 141,11 ~ .), ..p,,
,5,,,i,,it. •,, , i, .... -
_„. • . ....,,t • , . 511? 4st C gilr,4
•.:,,N. ,'• Ar, `..,'---,,,% ir-
-14,,,\,,,,,,,
je. _ 70..., i 7, 4
_,
.., .T
r,td it:,,,V.' ,441, 44i , ...t-
.„.1-• 42 • 40. .. ,
- , :4: ‘c-------,,, 'l ;-,,,,-/:,740,.. 4; ~,r, ...., Th. -,, ~ .i.:.,,,,,,..., N.,
a 4 ...:., , ,e%.4 'l/4'''...--.- 'v.. . • „.... '.. ''''' ."4g, '''.''' 4. " '4111:11„.4 , n4..,....{.., -.44, -, , •
r 14 4, .00. rr,,,y,„-..r,,Z