The Sun.
London, England, 1870-09-16 00:00:00

hasten over a distance of five or six kilometres by a bad
road. General Wimpffen, on taking the chief command,
no doubt saw this, for he made the Ist corps resume its
position of the morning, and reinforced the left of this
corps with the Saurin brigade of the sth corps. A retro-
grade movement on Mezieres was difficult in broad day-
light. as the enemy, whose forces were continually increasing
occupied the ground between that place and Sedan.
General Wimpffen resolved to content himself with main-
taining his positions, and only fighting a defensive battle.
Up to this time the battle was not unfavourable to us.
Towards midday the commandant of the 7th Corps
became anxious about some of his troops who occupied
the wood of Garenne, and were exposed to a murderous
fire. General Wimpffen reinforced them by some regi-
ments from the sth and Ist, and some of the cavalry
reserve. The Prussian shells made terrible havoc in the
ranks of the latter. It was impossible to stand before the
rain of fire. Three batteries were opposed to the
enemy's artillery; these three batteries were dis-
organised in less than ten minutes, and withdrawn.
The cavalry were ordered tothe centre of the wood,and the
infantry could hardly maintain its position. Soon, even
General Douay was convinced that it was impossible to
hold it longer ; the whole Prussian artillery having con-
c( ntrated its fire on the plateau covered by the projectiles•
The General saw, too, that a retreat on the right to Illy
would be impossible in presence of the large force which
opposed him. The 12th corps, on the left wing,
maintained its position with success. General
Wimpffen, wishing to profit by the advantage
gained by the 12th corps, to relieve the right
by a vigorous offensive movement, and drive part of
the enemy's army to the Meuse, reinforced General
Le Brun by all ,that he could spare of the Ist and sth
corps. The commander-in-chief hoped besides to assist
this movement by cutting a passage in the direction of
Carignan and marching on Montm4dy. Towards half-
past three he sent to the Emperor, then at Sedan, a letter
in which he begged him to come and place himself in the
midst of his troops, who would be proud to receive him.
, The Emperor did not come, and General Wimpffen began
the offensive movement, the 12th corps, under General Le
Brun, attacking the enemy. Unfortunately the Ist and
7th corps, who remained on the plateau to form the rear
guard, being vigorously attacked and driven back by a supe-
rior force, instead of following up the offensive movement
of the 12th by passing between the entrenched camp and
wood of Garenne, drew nearer to Sedan, and ended by
pausing under the cannon of the citadel. Part even
entered the town, whose gates they left open. The Com-
mander-in-Chief, whose staff then headed the troops
which had not yet reached the place, flung himself upon
the route of the 12th corps scaling the heights by the road
of Givonne. This road was very difficult, progress being
impeded by parks, hedges, &c., and the column took a
road to the left, which led it to Belan: It was four o'clock.
Perhaps General Le Brun's movement, well seconded,
might have even yet succeeded, but at this
moment an officer sent by the Emperor, brought
to the Commander-in-Chief a letter, in which the
Sovereign informed him that he had hoisted the white
flag on the citadel of Sedan, and desired him to cease
firing, and to enter into negotiations with the enemy.
General Wimpffen positively refused this mission. The
Emperor renewed his requett. The General refused again,
and, instead of stopping his fire, he resolved on making a
last effort. He went into the town to summon all the
troops that were there. He hoped to bring them back to
the field to sustain General Le Brun, pass over to the
Prussian left wing, and open a passage to Montmedy.
Unhappily, the troops were exhausted by fatigue,
oppressed by dangers, worn out by three daye of march-
ing, fighting, and want of rations. Without considering
the risks they incurred by collecting in a town which it
was impossible to defend, and which the enemy com-
manded on all sides, the greater part of the men refused
to leave the walls. Scarcely 2,000 replied to the appeal
of the General and followed him. General Wimpffen put
himself at their head, chased the enemy from Belau, and
retook the village. Some Gerdes Mobiles and some brave
inhabitants of Sedan joined the volunteers. This was the
last act of the struggle. The General had not enough
men to attempt the only possible retreat. As he could
not reach the 12th corps towards six in the evening,
he decided on returning to Sedan. The town was encum-
bered with cases, horses, carriages, men, wounded
soldiers of all arms. Movement was scarcely possible. A
serious attack on the part of the Prussians, or a few
moments' bombardment, gild all would be lost. It was im-
possible to restore the morale of the troops, and what was
worse, the general had the painful conviction that there
were not sufficient provisions for more than one day, that
the men had no more rations, and could not get them.
The trains, at the first cannonade of the morning, had re-
treated to Mezieres. Things were in this state when the
Emperor wrote himself to General to General Wimpffen,
who had sent in his resignation, which he refused, and con-
jured him to keep the command. Fresh attempts were
made to induce the general to negotiate with M. Moltke
who was appointed by King William to discuss the capi-
tulation. It was easy for General Wimpffen to perceive
from the first words of the Major-General of the Prussian
Army that he knew perfectly well the fatal situation of
the French. In fact, Count de Moltke, while rendering
full, justice to the bravery of our troops, and while admit•
tine that the 70,000 men of our four corps had to dee;
with 250,000 adversaries, and that towards the close of

the action a fresh Prussian army of 80,000 men came into
line, declared that he must have guarantees, and exacted
the surrender of the French as prisoners of war. General
Wimpifen would not acceptjthese terms, and retired. He was
warned the next morning that the town would be bombarded
at nine o'clock, if by that time the convention was not

drawn up and signed. At dawn on the 2nd of September
the general summoned the commandants of the corps
d'armse and the generals of division. A council of war

was held. The resources of the place in provisions and
munitions of war were stated, and the council unanimously
declared it was impossible to do otherwise than treat with
the enemy. At nine o'clock the Commander-in-Chief

went to the head-quarters of Count Moltke and obtaine,

some mitigations of the conditions proposed by the
Prussian major-general. This convention, or rather

capitulation, is known.

En resume at the battle oJ

Sedan 65,000 to 70,000 exhausted French fought against
250,000 Prussians ; they lost 15,000 to 20,000 men hors de
combat ; and it is now certain that in the evening a fresh army

arrived on their lines of retreat, completely enclosing the
French troops, which were shut up in an undefensible

place, commanded on all sides by the formidable artillery

on the heights. It was with a broken hexrt that General
Wimpffen, who had arrived at the close of a former
failure to take the command, signed the fatal capitula-

tion. Will not France, the army, the companions in arms

of the brave and unfortunate general understand the dire

necessity of bis position ? Will they not know how dis-
tasteful to him was this act, which it was impossible to

avoid without causing the certain death of from 40,000 to
45,000 brave soldiers ? He hAstened himself to make
known to General de Moltke that he did not intend to

separate his own fate from those of his companions in
arms,"

THE INVESTMENT OF PARIS.

Regarding the investment of Paris a correspondent
writes :—From Sedan it is announced that the Intention
of the German commanders is to place the different corps
of the German armies all round Paris at ten leagues
distance from the town. The average diameter of Paris
is four leagues. By adding to this the twice ten leagues
left between Paris and the investing armies an average
'diameter of twenty-four leagues, and a circumference of
seventy-two leagues are obtained. Six corps d'arm4e
being placed on this circumference, occupying each an
average extent of two leagues, would be at a distance of
about ten leagues from each other. This would not prevent
good marching troops from being in constant communication
nor would it prevent, the light cavalry of each corps from
skirmishing every day through the half-distances of five
leagues. The six corps could cut off all communications
by the six principal railway lines, the Seine, the Oise, the
Marne, and the canals, so that no large transports of any
kind could arrive at Paris. According to what may now
be called the Moltke system, every sortie would be en-
countered by two corps, the one against which it is
directed, and the other nearest to this, either to the right
or the left. The German corps would exhaust the re-
sources of the circle between them and Paris, and draw
their provisions from the country outside their own line.
The large number of towns and villages surrounding Paris
would afford sufficient shelter for the besieging armies.—
Pall Mall Gazette.