The Sun.
London, England, 1846-11-05 00:00:00

TEE SUN, LONDON, THURSDAY EVENING, IgOVEIVtisER 5, 1846.

of 401. It appeared that the testator in the cause, a
gentleman of the name of Webb, lived and cohabited
many years ago with the petitioner, and'had two natural
children by her. In 1802, in consideration of her agree-
ing to separate from him, the testator executed a deed,
by which he gave her an annuity of 40/. That deed
contained a proviso that in case the petitioner married
the annuity should be reduced to 20/. The petitioner
before the death of the testator married ; and the ques-
tion was, whether a gift restraining marriage was not
against the policy of the law, and therefore void ; and
whether such being the case, the petitioner was not en
titled to an annuity of 401. It appeared that the deed
executed by the testator was confirmed by his will, which
was made after the petitioner had married. The peti-
tioner, in ignorance of her rights, as it was said in her
behalf, had agreed to accept an annuity of 201,
but upon being advised that she was entitled
to an annuity of 40/., she took proceedings in the cause
which had been filed, to administer the testator's estate,
to obtain the annuity of 401. A refererce was made to
the Master upon the subject, who decided that the peti-
tioner was only entitled to an annuity of 201., and that
report, it was sought by the present petitioner, the
Master, should be order( d to review.
Mr. Bethel] arid a gentleman behind the bar appeared
for the petitioner ; Mr. Stuart represented the children ;
and ,Y 1 r. Montagu opposed the application.
The arguments not Laving concluded at half-past
three o'clock, at which hour the Court rose, the case was
ordered to be proceeded with to-morrow.
(Before Sir J. WIGRAM )
SAYERS V. LACON.

His HONOUR delivered judgment to-day in this cause,
which was part-heard. He said this was a case in which
the plaintiff sought to obtain costs which had arisen out
of proceedings he himself had instituted. The defendant
had purchased lands, the title to which was disputed by
the plaintiff, and to establish his position he brought the
case before the Court and the Master, by which proceed-
ings the costs had been incurred. He had carefully
studied the exceptions and the answer, and he consi-
dered that the plaintiff was entitled to all the costs in the
suit after the answer, and up to the hearing, as well as
the costs up to the abandoning of the suit. With respect
to the other they must depend upon the decision with
reference to the costs of the Master's office. He would,
therefore make a decree to this effect.

Mr. Justice Coleridge would look over his
notes of the trial, in order to see if there was
any ground for granting 'the application of the Learned
Counsel, and the Court would, therefore, defer its deci-
sion until this was done.

DAIL COURT.-(THIS DAY.)
(Sittings in Banco, before Mr. Justice PATTESON.)

LEMAGE V. OLDROYD.

Mr. THOMAS moved to set aside a nonsuit which had
occurred in a case tried before the Under-Sheriff for
the county of Middlesex. The Learned Counsel said
that the grounds on which he moved would at once
establish his claim to a rule. There were two causes on
the list in the Sheriff's Court, the same plaintiff against
different defendants. These causes stood second and
third. The actions were brought for money had and
received. In the case which preceded these causes, the
learned counsel engaged were not quite ready, and he
(Mr. Thomas) was asked to proceed with his cause. He
consented, on the understanding that all his witnesses
were in court, but on calling a most material witness to
prove the delivery of the money, he found that he was
absent, am' a nonsuit was at once entered. The other
cause was then called on, and the witness being present,
a verdict for the plaintiff was obtained upon his evidence.
It appeared from the affidavit made that the witness,
who was an attorney, had been requested to step into
his office close by, and fetch some papers, and while he
was gone the cause had come on. He had been sub-
pmaaed by both plaintiff and defendant, and a tender of

the costs of the day had been made to the other side, if
they would pet mit the cause to stand over for
a short time, but the opposing counsel had
no mercy. He believed that a motion was also going
to be made in the other case where they had obtained
verdict, as the other side were equally unprepared.
There w,:s every intuition of proceeding to trial on both
sides.

Mr. Justice PATTESON—Take a rule.
(Sittings at Nisi Prius.)
LAUDER V. JACKSON.

This was an action to recover the sum of 571. 183. for
goods supplied by the plaintiff to the defendant.
It appeared from the statement of counsel, and from
the evidence that the plaintiff is connected with a com-
pany entitled the Wenham Lake Ice Company, and the
action was brought for ice and refrigerators supplied to
him. The defendant had on being spoken to admitted
the justice of the plaintiff's claim, and had promised to
pay it in a short time. As he did not keep his pro-
mise the present action was brought. The defendant
had pleaded a special set off of 371. 145., stating that he
had given an order for 29 refrigerators to be supplied
within 24 hours, and that amount of loss had occurred

to him in consequence of their not having been supplied
within the time agreed upon.
Mr. Justice PAz-rEsoN then summed up, and the jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff tor 571 18s.

The jury, after consulting a short time, returned a
verdict for the plaintiff—Damages, 501.
(Sittings in Banco.)
KNIGHT V. BARBER.
In this case, which was tried at Liverpool, before Mr.
Justice Cresswell, the plaintiff sought to recover a sum
of money which he had lost iu consequence of the re-
fusal of the defendant to accept certain shares in the
Huddersfield, Halifax, and Bradford Railway, which he
had purchased for defendant, and which were subse-
quently sold, whereby the plaintiff was put to loss. The
result of the trial was, that the plaintiff was nonsuited
upon the ground that a certain document was put in on
the part of the plaintiff, purporting to be an agreement
between the parties. It appeared that the defendant had
given an order to the plaintiff to purchase fifty shares in
the above railway at 101. each. In the afternoon of the
same day defendant signed a memorandum to thateffect.
This written agreement was put in at the trial on the
part of the plaintiff, and when so put in the Learned
Judge who tried the case was of opinion that the docu-
ment should be treated as the contract between the par-
ties, and it was therefore necessary that it should he
stamped; no stamp being upon the; agreement, the plain-
tiff's case, consequently, failed.
Mr. BAINES now moved for a rule to show cause why
the verdict should not be set aside, and a new trial had
upon three grounds— first, that the contract did not re-
quire a stamp, inasmuch as it was au aercement fur the
sal of an article which he contended came under the
he ad of merchandise, which, with goods and wares, were
specially excepted from the operation of the Stamp Act;
secondly, that the document did, not reqtfre to be
stamped, because it was not the agreement between the
parties, the contract having been a parole contract, made
in the morning of the day upon which the document was
signed by d, f nd int in the evening ; thirdly, that the
document in question was not a c )ntract, but a mere
memorandum, and, as such, did not require to be stamped,
and that, therefore, the Learned Judge was wrong in
treating the case in the manner he had done.
The LORD CHIEF BARON considered that no rule
should be granted in this case. It was his opinion that
the written agreement formed the contract between the
parties, and whatever parole agreement might have been
made, still as soon as the terms were reduced to writing,
then the written agreement was to be considered as
binding, and not the parole, because if any difference
had arisen as to the performance of the contract, the
written contract would be that to which both parties
would appeal. The Learned Baron also stated that
it was his opinion that the document in question
should have been stamped, because it was impossible to
suppose that scrip could be considered as merchandise.
The sale of scrip was nothing more than an agreement
to part with such interest as the party might hold in it,
in consequence of some agreement made between himself
and some company or companies; it could not, there-
iare, be goods or merchandise, and not coming under
the exception contained in the Stamps Act, ought, there
fore, to have been stamped.
Mr. Baron PARKE was of the same opinion.
Rule refused.
COMMON

PLEAS.—(I' tIIS DAY.)
(Sittings in Banco.)
VAUGHAN V. HANCOCK.

Mr. CROWDER moved for a rule to set aside the non.
suit in this case and grant a new trial. It was tried at
last Bristol Assizes, before Mr. Justice Erle. The ac-
tion was brought to compel the fulfilment of an agree-
ment fur the purchase of a public-house. The defence
was that the agreement being a verbal one was void by
the statute of frauds. The Learned Counsel contended
at great length that the statute of frauds did not apply
in this case.
The COURT refused the rule.
LAMBERT ANDIANOTHER V. MILNE.--THE OXFORD, WIT-
NEY, CHELTENHAM, AND GLOUCESTER RAILWAY.

Mr. MARTIN, Q. 0., moved for a rule to show cause
why the verdict given in this case for the defendant
should not be set aside, and a verdict entered for the
plaintiff for 1,0391. 13s. 6d., or a new trial. The case
was tried at last Newcastle Assizes, and under the direc-
tion of the Learned Judge a verdict was entered for the
defendant. The plaintiffs were lithographers, at New-
castle, and the defendant was a provisional committee-
man of the Oxford, Witney, Cheltenham, and Gloucester
Railway, and the action was brought to recover an
account due, for preparing the plans, sections, &c., of the
company. A person of the name of Potter gave
the order, and the work was executed under the superin-
tendence of Mr. Nicholson, the engineer. Now it had
been proved on the trial that the defendant was a pro-
visional committee-man of the company from the be-
ginning, and that he had acted as such ; but it was de-
nied that he had been a party to giving the order in
questtiee. T
question, wasOrh e on Vie committee of management at
the imreal
point at issue was whether the
general provisional committee-men were liable for the
pecuniary engagements of the committee of manage-
ment. The Learned Gentleman concluded by giving a
number of cases in which it had been so ruled. At
present, with respect to some evidence, according to the
particular view of a judge, a verdict in any one of these
cases could be obtained for either plaintiff or defendant.
What Mr. Baron Rolfe ruled to be in favour of the de-
fendant, Mr. Justice Alderson and others had decided to
be for the plaintiff: Such was the state of conflict at
present —Rule granted.

PRICE V. BELCHER.--THE RETUrNING OFFICER OF

ABINGDON.

Mr. WHATELY, Q.C., moved for a rule to set aside the
verdict in this case for the defendant, and enter it for
the plaintiff for 40s. The action was tried at the last
assizs for the county of Berks, before Mr. Justice
!Wattle, and the verdict was given for the defendant, with
leave to move. The plaintiff was a Dissenting minister.
t'n defendant the returning officer of the borough of
Abingdon ; and the action was brought against the
latter for refu.ing the vote of the plaintiff, on the occa-
sion of an election in 1845, when Mr. Frederick Thesiger
was made Attorney-General, and also with denying a
scrutiny. It was proved on the trial that the plaintiff
had removed from Abingdon to Gravesend, and the vote
was alleged, in consequence, to be bad ; but, admitting
this to be so, he (Mr. Whateley) denied that the return-
ing officers had, under the Reform Act, the power at an
election to strike any name off the register, or refuse any
vote named in it.

The Lord CHIEF JUSTICE was of opinion that, though
the defendant might not have a right to vote, yet that
the name being on the register the returning officer
could not take the power in his hands he had done.—
Rule granted.
DARER v. BLARRITT.--STOCK EXCHANGE PROCEEDINGS.
Mr. W. HITEHURST, Q.C. moved for a rule to set aside
a verdict given for the' plaintiff in this case for
1,031/. Os. 5d., and for a new trial in an action tried
last sittings, alter term at the Guildhall, before Mr.
Justice Erle, and on they grounds of the improper recep-
tion of evidence ; and also that the verdict was against
evidence ; also he moved to show cause why
.the da-
mages should not be reduced to 9621. 10s. The action was
brought by Mr. Baker, i sharebroker, against Mr.
Blarkitt, a gentleman residing' at Gainsborongh, for the
purchase-money of 550 East India Railway Shares. The
price of each share was laid at 11. 155., with 2s. 6d. per
share . for brokerage and allowing the account to stand
over till the next settlement day
Gentleman went into
. 960/. 10i. was the nett
price of the shares. The Lear
a variety of details, to show that the defendant gave the
order through a person named Stark, who negotiated
with Baker, and that ho had expressed his willingness to
settle with Stark, who owed him a considerable balance,
but refused to recognise Baker • also to show that sere-
ral points of evidence against the defendant had been ad-
mitted by the Learned Judge,
which ought to have been
rejected. The defendant likewise denied that any such
company as the East India Railway Company was recog-
nised by the statutes relating to joint•stock companies.
The main point at issue was whether the company was
in legal existence before the Ist of November, 1844,
when the Joint Stock Companies' Act came into opera
tion, and in a position to issue shares, such as to admit
the fulfilment of any arrangement that might have been
come to in regard to purchasing fur the defendant. The
Learned Judge left this point to the jury, and they gave
a verdict in the affirmative; though he
(Mr. Whitehurst)
submitted that it was a legal point which ought to have
been decided by the judge.—Rule granted.
F.LDERTON v. EmiNGs—CHURCH OF ENGLAND LIFE AS -

SURANCE .
Mr. Sergeant BYLES movedCOMPANY for a rule to show cause
why the verdict given in this case for the plaintiff, for
dtl
he, Oer
cOvno
verdict
dnsi
etho,
t ouarrl drwe
snhtyoe t b
da
übeye
wean
ttvreeiranelidrseloi ntdmetl the first
nyfioor
ts;t b
also,
losguorn:tnbfte
because
t hos
eer
the verdict was against evidence.
This action was brought by Mr. Elerton, a solicitor,
against the " Church of England Life and Loan As-
surance, Trust, and Annuity Company." It was for
breach of Contract, in discharging the plaintiff from
being the solicitor of the Company, he having been, it
was alleged, appointed permanent solicitor, at Ma
a-year. He received a verdict on the first count for
8001.; on the second, 2001. The defence set up was
neglect of duty, as solicitor of the Company. The
Learned Gentleman went at length into the particulars
to show that the removal was Justifiable, and that the
granted.
fairlyplain dtiflemhaanl_dreceived all the remuneration he could

BRODERATSNVIC. GIROISPERP.—THE—RIVITLEHGEISSOFDTIIAEYROYAL
PALACE AT WINDSOR.
This was a summons under the Small Debts Act to
enforce the payment of 101. Bs., debt and costs, for which
a judgment has been obtained in the Court of Exchequer.
The plaintiff is a grocer at Windsor, and the defendant
is one of the grooms of her Majesty's stables at Windsor.
Mr. Maynard appeared as counsel on behalf of the
defendant, at the instance of her Majesty's Master of the
Horse.
The defendant did not attend, and Mr. Billing, the
plaintiff's attorney, applied fora warrant of commitment
for contempt of Court.
Mr. MAYNARD, at considerable length, argued that
the defendant was a privileged person, and protected,
his
of the Act. The
privilege was a sufficient
x
from arrest, and therefore the Learned Commissioner
had no power under the Small Debts Act to compel his
attendance,
that
temeaning
a variety of cases to show
that caursnifee the
d c
had been arrested he would have
eLe
do withineuafnen rsd i
Counsel
lant quotedh
been discharged out of custody on the plea of privilege.
Mr. BILLING, in reply, contended that the Act gave
power to compel the defendant to appear, or take the
consequences for contempt, against which he was not
privileged.
The Learned COMMISSIONER said that it was a point
of importance, sand he would speak to his brother Com-
missioner. On his return, he said that he was strongly
of opinion that no sufficient excuse had been
offered by the assertion of privilege. As so
high an officer as the Master of
the Horse
had thought it proper to send counsel down to argue the
case, and had no doubt taken the opinion of the At-
torney or Solici *tor-General on the subject, it became his
duty strongly to express his opinion that he had not only
the power, but it was his duty to compel the attendance
of the defendant. Ile would adjourn the case till this
day week.

SHERIFFS' COURT.-(THIS DAY.)
Although this was the first sitting of the Court in the
pres.ent term, no causes were set down for trial ; the
first four days being allowed to plead, and in default the
cases are set down for inquiry in this court.