The Sun.
London, England, 1846-11-09 00:00:00

WRIGHTSON V. MACAULAY.

The arguments on this appeal from th 3 judgment of
the Vice-Chanc;-11or Wigram, occupied the Court the
remainder of the day.

ROLLS' COURT, Nov. 7.
RAYNALL V. RAYNALL.

This was a case in which the plaintiffs, who were
legatees, sought to have the property of the testator
divided. It appeared there were no less than nineteen
legatees, some of whom were out of the country, and that
owing to the latter circumstance the rents arising out of
the property had been accumulating for a considerable
period.
The arguments turned chiefly on the terms of the will,
and were very lengthy.
Lord LANGDALE said that it was a very difficult mat-
ter to decide in the present case, because the intentions
of the testator were very ambiguously expressed. There
were parts of this will which were, even to all appear-
ance, not capable of being reduced to any consistent
meaning. A very ingenious question had been raised
respecting the executary devise, as well as on other
points ; but he had come to the conclusion, looking at
the circumstances, that the children of the testator had
become absolutely entitled to the estate in question.
He would therefore run the risk he must incur i❑ dis-
posing of the property in the absence of some of the
parties, and grant the decree, the costs to be paid out
of the funds.
The Court rose at three o'clock.

VICE-CHANCERY COURT, Nov. 7.
(Before the VICE-CHANCELLOR Of ENGLAND.)
His Honour the Vice-Chancellor of England heard
demurrers, re-hearings, and further directions to-day.

BINGHAM V. LEE.
In this case the COURT, at the conclusion of the argu
ments, ordered the demurrer to be allowed.
(Before Vice-Chancellor Sir J. WIGRAM.)

FRASER V. JONES.
The arguments in this part-heard cause were resumed
this morning.
His HONoun took time to consider his judgment.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, Nos. 7.
(Sittings in Banco.)

LYNDHUSS V. CRAFTS.-DISPOSING OF FURNITURE BY

BILLS OF SALE.

Mr. MONTAGUE CHAMBERS, Q.C., applied for a rule
to show cause why the verdict, found in this case for the
plaintiff, should not be set aside, and a new trial had.
The action was tried before Mr. Justice Coltman, at
Guildford, and came before the Court by an issue framed
under the " Interpleader Act." He grounded his appli-
cation on misdirection on the part of the Learned Judge
who tried the case, and because the verdict was against
the evidence adduced at the trial. The question at issue
was whether. on the 30th of May last, certain goods and
chattels at No. 20, Golden-terrace, Islington, belonged
to Henry Lyndhuss, or any or all of them? Lyndhuss,
it appeared, claimed the goods under a bill of sale, dated
the 6th of August, 1845, whilst the defendant claimed
them under another bill of sale, dated the 7th of
February, this year. It appeared from the plaintiff's case
that the goods were all( ged to have belonged to one
Sarah Benton, and be called an appraiser named Effers-
field, his own son, and another witness, whose evide,nce '
was immaterial, for the purpose of establishing his claim.
Efferslield to stifled that on or about 6th of August he was
emi loyed to place an execution on the goods of Mrs.
Benton, who then resided in Thomas place, Gravesend,
where the Furniture then was ; that a coinmunication
was made to. the plaintiff, who was a bill discounter, but
occasionally acting as an attorney, who came to the
house, and that in his presence some money passed be-
tween him and Mrs. Benton. The rent was paid, and
he consequer tly left the house; but he distinctly stated
that no bill of sale was executed in his presence. Then
the plaintiff 's son stated that he went to the house whilst
his father si 'as there; that he drew up a bill of sale, and
that he was 3 the attesting witness ; he also spoke to the
taking pm easion under the instrument. He added that
st shoat thn, s after this transaction his father went down

to Gravesend with two or three of his children, and re-
mained at the house two or three weeks, it being occu-
pied at the time by Mrs. Benton and ber son, when he
left a person, named Campbell, who was put in posses-
sion, and the goods were subs( quently removed to the
house in Golden-terrace, which was occupied by Mrs.
Benton and her son, and never by his father. The case
made out for the defendant was this :—He lived in
Gravesend, and on the 7th of February this year he
advanced 351. to liberate Mr. John Benton from prison,
where he was confined for debt, and as security he re-
ceived a bill of sale—or what was equivalent to a bill
of sale—namely, an agreement to make a bill of sale en
the goods, but containing words which mortgaged the
goods to him. The document stated that Mrs. Benton,
and her son, John Benton, agreed, within seven days of
its date, to make a bill of sale in the usual form, trans-
ferring the whole of the furniture of the house in
Thomas-place, Gravesend, to the defendant, and that
the instrument should be taken and considered as equi-
valent to a bill of sale. This was handed to him on the
7th of February, but, to his surprise, he found that
shortly after the furniture had been removed to the
house in Islington. He was unable to obtain access to
the house under this bill of sale, and he therefore brought
an action against Messrs. Benton, and obtained access
under an execution, when he levied a distraint upon the
furniture as the property of Mrs. Benton. It was on
this part of the case that he apprehended Mr. Justice
Coltman had misled the jury. Upon his taking posses-
siod the plaintiff set up his claim obtained under a bill
of sale of the month of August, 1845, and so the contest
arose. The Learned Judge, in:directin, the jury, said, "as
no possession was taken under the document, it was void
against the plaintiff if his was a bonci fide security." In
fact, he summed up as if it was a question of fraud on
the part of Crafts, whereas there was no imputation of
the kind. There was evidence which showed that the
plaintiff first said that he purchased the goods from the
son, and afterwards that he purchased them from the
mother, and that he had the bill of sale from Mrs.
Benton alone, which could not be valid, inasmuch as the
son was a joint owner cf them, which was shown by the
defendant's bill of sale, which was given in the name of
both. There was, however, a division to show the
goods belonging to the son and those belonging to the
mother. _

Lord DENMAN deferred the decision of the Court in
order that he might consult Mr. Justice Coltman.

PHILLIPS V. COLLINS.--LIABILITY OF PROVISIONAL
_____

COMMITTEEMEN. ----
Mr. Sergeant SHEA applied for a rule to show cause
why the verdict returned for the plaintiff in this case
should not be set aside and a new trial granted, on the
ground of misdirection, and on account of the verdict
being against the evidence adduced at the trial which
took place at the last sittings at Guildhall, before Mr.
Justice Wightman. The defendant was a member of
the provisional committee of a Geneva railway, and the
plaintiff is a cabinet-maker, and the action was brought
against Collins and a person named Greville, (who had
suffered judgment to go by default), for 160/. 10s. for
goods delivered on their credit, for the use of the pro-
visional committee of the railway. The only question
in the case was, whether Collins was liable ? The jury
considered that he was, but he (Mr. Sergeant Shea)
would remind the Court that the case was tried at a time
when, on account of t..e deeisions of the Court of
Exchequer, it was unhesitatingly considered that the
mere fact of being a member of a provisional committee
rendered a man liable for whatever expenses were in-
curred by the company with which he was so connected.
The case was tried upon this principle.
Mr. Justice WIGHTMAN differed with the Learned
Sergeant. The case was left perfectly free
to the consideration of the jury. He sub-
mitted the fi,llowir, questions to them :—Did
Mr. Collins hold himself out to the plaintiff and to the
world as one of the directors of the railway, or suffered
others to so hold him out, at the time the plaintiff sup
plied the goods ? Did the plaintiffs execute the order
on the credit of Collins and Greville being directors of
the company, and were the goods such as the company
required in its then state ? To all of these questions
the jury replied in the affirmative, and accordingly gave
a verdict for the plaintiff.
Mr. Sergeant SHEA said they did, forming their deci-
sion on the principle, that because the defendant was a
provisional committeeman, he was liable.
Mr. Justice WIGHTMAN repeated that he carefully left
the question to the jury. and held that if the defendant
suffered himself to be held out as one of the directors of
the company, and that if the goods were supplied on the
strength of the office he held then, that they ought to
find for the plaintiff.
Lord DENMAN-It will perhaps be assnmed now that
being a provisional committeeman is an exemption !
(ict. laugh.)
Mr. Sergeant SHE• said he did not contend that, but
he contended that the evidence was as slight as possible
to show that be was a provisional committeeman, much
less that he sanctioned or gave the orders, Two persons
named Gilbrante and Greville were the promoters
of the line, and various meetings were held at the
George and Vulture, Cornhill. There the busi-
ness of the company also, which was very trifling indeed,
was transacted, but afterwards it was deemed expedient
to take apartments at 73, Basinghall-street, and Gil-
brante ordered the furniture from the plaintiff.
Mr. Justice WIGHTMAN referred to his notes. From
them it appeared that Gilbrante stated, at the trial, that
he was to get directors, and that, if it was carried out,
he was to be assistant-secretary, at a salary of 31. 3s.
a week, and to have 300 shares in common with the
directors. He told Grcville that he wanted two more
directors, when he mentioned the names of some friends
who were members of the Reform Club, and promised to
get that number before the offices were opened. Ile
afterwards stated that he had got Collins to join the
company. Collins, it appeared, came to the office two or
three times, but his name was in the prospectus as a
director, and on going into the board-room on one occa-
sion he said " You are doing it up very nicely."
Mr. Sergeant SHEA said he called a number of wit-
nesses on behalf of the debt.

Mr. Justice WIGHTMAN—You did ; but I thought
they strengthened the plaintiff 's case —Rule refused.
BILLS FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED.—WOOD V. MITTEN.
Mr. Sergeant SHEA also moved for a new trial in this
case, and for power to arrest judgment. The verdict
was found for the plaintiff. The action arose out of a
promissory note drawn by the defendant for 6001., en-
dorsed by him to a person named Clarkson to the
plaintiff. The quastion at issue was whether the
plaintiff knew that the bill had been fraudulently ob-
tained from the defendants. The defendant, who ;vas a
gay man of fortune, was defrauded of three bills in the
month of March, 1845, by a person named Barker ; two
of them came into the hands of a person named Hearn,
who brought actions against the defendant for their
amounts, but he bad been in each case defeated. lie
now produced the affidavit of a person named Rickard,
setting forth that with respect to this bill the plaintiff
was well aware that it had been fraudulently obtained,
he having been unable to do so at the trial. There could
be no doubt of the fact, as various proceedings had been
taken in the law courts and at Marlborough-street
Police-court, which were fully reported in the news-
papers. He moved for an arrest of judgment o:s the
strength of the statute of Anne, which rendered the note
not negotiable. The Court of Common Pleas had
granted a rule for a new trial in a similar case, and the
question was now before the Court of Exchequer on
demurrer.
The Court acceded to the motion for an arrest of
judgmt nt.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER, Nov. 7.
(Sittings in Banco.)
HOWDEN v. HOLMES.

Mr. Sergeant CHANNELL moved in ihis case for a rule
nisi and a new trial, on the ground (,f misdirection.
The trial took place at Maidstone, before Mr. Baron
Parke. The plaintiff who was employed as the Par-
liamentary agent of the Hull and Birmingham, and
Swansea Junction Railway, sought to recover the sum
of 25L from the defendant, as a member of the provi-
sional committee.
It appeared that in the latter part of the year 1845,
the managing committee called a special meeting at the
offices of the company, for the purpose of obtaining the
accounts of the different persons who had been em-
ployed in the service of the company, and also for the
purpose of devising some plan for the liquidation of
the outstanding claims. The result of the meeting was
that a resolution was agreed upon, to the effect that each
provisional committee man should subscribe the sum of
25/.. in order to raise a sufficient sum to clear off the
liabilities of the company. A letter enclosing a copy of
the resolution was forwarded to each member of the com-
mittee, including the defendant, who was then residing
at Hull. On the 25th of March following—the date of
the first application being the 14th of March—another
application was made by the secretary for the payment
of the sum in question. On the 29th of April the de-
fendant, together with other gentlemen, also members of
the committee, residing at Hull, signed a certain docu-
ment, in which they acknowledged the receipt of the
former applications, and requested that a general meet-
ing of the committee should be held in London, for the
purpose of considering the various claims made upon the
company, and to pay such as were proved to be valid
and proper. The Learned Baron who tried the cause
considered this document as containing a promise to pay
on the part of the defendant, and a verdict was accord-
ingly returned for the plaintiff.
Mr. Baron ALDERSON thought the defendant a very
honest man for sending the document referred to, and
thought that he should not be prevented from paying.
Rule refused.

WYLD v. HOPKINS.
This was an action in which the plaintiff Mr. Wyld,
of Charing-cross, sought to recover the sum of 761/. 55.,
for goods sold and work done on behalf of the Pets r -
borough and Nottingham Junction Railway, in which
the defendant was a member of the railway committee.
A verdict was given for the plaintiff for the amount
claimed.

Mr. WATsoN now moved for a rule to show cause why
a new trial should not be had, on the ground that the de-
fendant had never attended a meeting of the committee,
that lie had never been summoned to do so, and that he
took no part whatever in the management of the com-
pany's affairs, they being wholly conducted by a com-
mittee of management, of which the defendant was not a
member, and further, that the orders given to the plain-
tiff, Lind been given by the solicitor, who had the getting
up of the company.
The LORD CHIEF BARON seid, that in his opinion,
that this was one of the most naked cases, with reference
to the subject of provisional committeemen that had come
under his notice. The solitary fact shown in evidence
was that the name of the defendant appeared in the
printed prospectus of the company.—Rule granted.
IN THE CASE OF RANKS v. STILL.
The grounds of this case were similar to the case of
Banks v. Good, reported in The Sun of yesterday, and in
which a verdict was also returned for the defendant. On
the part of the plaintiff the Court refused an application
by Mr. Watson for a rule for a new trial.

HAYNES V. BUTTERWORTH.
This action, which was tried at Liverpool beforo Mr.

Justice Cresswell, was brought for the purpose of
recovering a sum of money atleged to be lost to the
plaintiff, in consequence of the defendant not accepting
fifty shares in the Grand Union Railway, according to
an alleged contract. The verdict was for the plaintiff.
Mr. BAINES now moved, by leave of the judge, fOr a
rule to show cause why a nonsuit should not be entered,
as it appeared that, among other evidence given at the
trial, it was proved that Haynes, the plaintiff, wai
in partnership with a person of the name of 'rudall,
and that, therefore, the action should have been brought
in their joint names ; also, that the shares which the
defendant contracted to purchase were the shares of a Mr.
Ainsworth ; those shares were not, however, sent to the
defendant, but to a person residing at Nottingham, and
other shares were handed over to the deft ndant ; and
further, that the agreement for the purchase of the
shares was not stamped.—Rule granted upon the whole
of the grounds.