The Sun.
London, England, 1870-09-01 00:00:00

THE CONDITION OF OUR FORCES.

We invited attention last week to the number of candi-
dates for commissions in the army, and the surprise of
the.public at the state of things revealed must, we should
think, have been considerable. But this is only one of
many facts all pointing in the same direc-
tion, and all, as it appears to us, but imper-
fectly comprehended. Let us take the case of
these expectant officers first ; it will be found to
mean a great deal more than is apparent on the surface.
We said that at the present moment 600 young gentlemen
had established their qualifications for the military profes-
sion to the satisfaction of official examiners ; but that tells
only half the tale. Let the reader reflect for a moment
on the conditions under which these candidates have
come forward. In the first place, they have been con-
tent to undergo a preliminary course of study and
submit their attainments to the test of actual examina-
tion. In the next place they are prepared to pay a con-
siderable_lsum—say £5OO each—for the privilege of
entering the Army as officers, and to provide
nearly half their future subsistence besides. Lastly.
thjy understand full well that many years of
their service must be passed in a country thousands of
miles from home, probably in utter inactivity, and
under the influence of one of the most oppressive and
enervating. climates in the world. These are the terms
offered to candidates for Commissions in the Army, and
yet, in spite of their hardness, the supply far exceeds the
demand. The truth is, so far from being in want of
officers, 'we have got more than we know what to do with,
and ths,t, in point of fact, is our case as regards soldiers
also. In all our successive panics we have contented
ourselves with raising additional forces under some
new title or other. In 1848 we increased the strength of
the line and the artillery ; in 1852 we called out the
Militia; in 1859 we enrolled our Volunteers. These
measures, following one upon the other, have actually
given us, as official returns shew, a force of 450,000
troops within the limits of the kingdom. Even according
to the scale of modern armaments these numbers must in
themselves be considered sufficient, and to add to them
once more would only increase a mass of material which
already appears too large for us to manage. It is said
that these men are without officers. True, but there are
the six hundred qualified candidates for officers' commis-
sions ; and is it not perfectly certain that with a little mo-
dification of terms these six hundred would quickly
become six thousand ? We cannot dispense with profes-
sional qualifications, but suppose we dispensed with pur-
chase, and offered homei service instead of service in
Bengal—does any man doubt that we might officer a
hundred regiments before the year is out ? It
is necessary, however, under the circumstances
of the time to take into considerntion two points of great
importance. Our 450,000 men may be roughly classified
as 110,000 regulars, 20,000 reserves, 150,000 militia and
yeomanry, and 170,000 volunteers. Now, of these the
regulars may be carried off on an emergency for foreign
service or garrisons, and this would leave us
with only 340,000 troops for the defence of the king-
dom. But, again, one-half of this force—that is to say,
the 170,000 Volunteers—are neither so organized nor so
disciplined, it is said, as to be available for the line of
battle. They might be of some use as light troops, but
nothing more. This deduction, therefore, would leave
us with our 150,000 Militia and Yeomanry for the
actual shock of battle, and can that force be deemed
sufficient ? We answer that if the 130,000 infantry
were as well organized, officered, and supported
as they might be, and if the 20,000 Yeomanry were
as serviceable as the Prussian IThlans2 the whole force
together might prove a very good match for any army that
could escape our fleet and effect a landing on our shores.
There is not the least necessity, however, for confining
ourselves to these numbers or proportions. If the Volun-
-teers are too numerous for light troops, and the militia
too few for the line of battle, nothing would be easier
than to make the Militia stronger. The fact is its present
strength is absurdly small compared with the number of
the population. In 1814 the population of Great
Britain was about 13,000,000, and the Militia,
regular and local, numbered 370,000. At the pre-
set time those figures may be about doubled for
the population and halved for the Militia ; so that if we
raised the Militia to 700,000, we should not be doing more
than our fathers did before us. But if our military ad-
ministrators cannot deal with our existing forces, what
would they do with twice the number ? The truth of the
whole matter is that we are in want, not of material, but
construction. It is of no use adding some new force tb
the forces we have already raised, and yet have never
been able to organise. Let us construct one Army effec-
tively before seeking materials for another. Let us bring
together the officers we have got and the men we have
got, support the whole by services complete in every re-
spect, and, then, if need be, call in additional levies.—
Times.

COMIC PAPERS.
(From Punch.)

THE THREADS OF DISCOURSE.—Lint.

PRE-OccurATloNs.---Minister Chevreau, in the French
Chamber the other day, said, in answer to M. Gambetta's
questions as to the state of things at the seat of war, that
Marshal Bazaine was too much occupied to be able to send
reports. Query, whether the occupation of Metz had not
more to do with the Marshal's silence, than the occupa-
tion of the Marshal ?