The Sun.
London, England, 1870-12-05 00:00:00

THE BATTLE AT A, MIENS.

The French papers of the North deny that the French
troops fled in complete disorder after their defeat at
Amiens. La Prance du Nord states that the army arrived
at Arras on Wednesday afternoon, and was received by
the inhabitants with open arms. Of the battalion of
Chasseurs present at the battle some companies have re-
turned to Boulogne. The reported loss of 600 or 800 turns
out to be a transposition of figures. Instead of one-fourth
being left, one-fourth were put hors de contkt. This is a
distinction with a difference. That a portion of the
troops should have been sent back to this place as their
depot, and that too in good order, is pretty clear proof that
there has been no general rout. A correspondent writes :
—"From Cambray we have news that when the French
troops quitted Amiens there were some disorders,
and ' the departure resembled a sauve-qui-peat.'
The National Guards discharged their muskets in the air,
broke them, and flung their ammunition in the river. In
the confusion several officers (of the army) were unable to
rejoin their troops, and were obliged to disguise them-
selves, and make their way through. the surrounding
villages. Perhaps the knowledge of these facts gave rise
to the Prussian telegram announcing the rout of the
Amiens army, but the fact that they took a leisurely
three days to get to Arras, and were unmolested, proves
the contrary."
The Courrier du Pas de Calais gives a very moderate
and apparently trustworthy narrative of this blow—so
destructive to the Northern army. It says that the
fighting was rather a series of isolated and numerous
engagements on an immense line of operations than
what is usually called a pitched battle. "In the plan
of the general-in-chief no general strategic manoeuvre
can be discerned, and it appears as if, however
gallantly he fought, he listened to the suggestions
of each brigade commander. This situation can
be explained, up to a certain point, by cir-
cumstances which the commanders of the Northern
Army were unable to control. This army, being in
course of formation, had neither regular cadres
nor confidence in itself. It was composed of provi-
sional divisions and a brigade created on the field
of battle. The generals did not know either their
troops or their officers, or the real resources at their
disposal ; the troops did not even know the names
of their chiefs. Under such conditions of inferi-
ority we had to confront a regular army, skilfully
directed, all the movements of which were calculated with
mathematical precision, and which has raised the
art of war to the highest scientific standard.
Moreover, we had too extended a line of Opera-
tions, either from the preceding engagements having
made it a matter of necessity, or from having been com-
pelled to adopt it by the movements of the enemy."
With respect to the behaviour of the troops this paper
observes :—" We must say generally that, if some Mobile
companies did not properly hold their ground, others,
which were better equipped, and perhaps better com-
manded, emulated the courage of the infantry of the Line,
which, although almost entirely composed of raw recruits,
behaved under fire like veterans. Among these, the first
mention is due to the sailors, who, as artillerymen and
musketeers, have rendered the greatest service and dis-
played heroic bravery. Unfortunately this body has
suffered considerable loss."