The Sun.
London, England, 1870-08-01 00:00:00

THE SECRET TREATY.

IMPORTANT STATEMENT BY COUNT
BISMARCK.

A circular dispatch, relating to the famous projet de
traite between France and Prussia, has been addressed
by Count Bismarck to the North German diplo-
matic representatives at neutral courts. The
Chancellor commences by saying that this secret
• treaty document contained by no means the only
proposition of the kind made by France to Prussia.
Even before the Danish war " attempts addressed to me
"were made both by official and unofficial French agents to
effect an affiance between France and Prussia, with the
object of mutual aggrandisement." Count Bismarck
thinks that in offering such terms the French statesmen
could hardly have appreciated the national feeling
of Germany. Before his accession to the office
of Foreign Minister the designs of the French
Government on Belgium and the Rhine frontier had been
known to him. The behaviour of France at the
time of the German-Danish war betrayed the ten-
dencies of its policy. " The subsequent bad
feeling which France displayed towards us in
reference to the treaty of Gastein was attributable
to the apprehension lest a durable strengthening
of the Prusso-Austrian alliance should deprive the Paris
Cabinet of the fruits of this its attitude. France, before
1865, reckoned upon the outbreak of war between us and
Austria, and again willingly made approaches to us as soon
as our relations with Vienna began to be unfriendly.
Before the outbreak of the Austrian war pro-
posals were made to me, partly through 'relatives
of his Majesty, the Emperor of the French, and
partly by confidential agents, which each time had
for their objects smaller or larger transactions for the pur-
pose of effecting mutual aggrandisement. At one time the
negotiations were about Luxembourg, or about the fron-
tier of 1814, with Landau and Saarlouis ; at another about
lrrger objects, from which the French Swiss cantons and
the question where the linguistic boundaries of Piedmont
were to be drawn were not excluded." In May, 1866,
a proposition for a defensive and offensive alliance
Was put forth by France, of which Count Bismarck
quotes an extract. It provides that a Congress was to be
convened,. and if it failed, then France and Prussia would
make war on Austria. In case of hostilities peace was to
be made only on condition that Venetia were given to
Italy, and large portions of German territory to Prussia
(similar to what it actually obtained by the war of 1866,
and for France the territory between the Moselle and the
Rhine, exclusive of Coblentz and Mayence, comprehend-
ding half a million of Prussians, part of Bavaria,
omburg, &c. Count Bismark then goes on to say :
"In June, 1866, after we had rejected the above
schemes of affiance, notwithstanding several almost
threatening warnings to accept it, the French Government
began to calculate on the Austrians being victorious over
us, and upon our making a bid for French assistance,
after the eventuality of our defeat, to pave the way for
which diplomatically. French diplomacy was occupied to
the uttermost. That the Congress anticipated in the
foregoing draft of alliance, and again proposed
later, would have had the effect of causing our
three months' affiance with Italy to expire
wishout our having profited by it is well known to your
excellency, as is also the fact that France, in the further
agreements relative to Custoza, was busies in prejudicing
our situation, and, if possible, bringing about our defeat.
The patriotic affliction of the Minister Rouher furnishes
a comment upon the further course of events. Since that
time France has not ceased leading us into temptation
by offers at the cost of Germany and Belgium. I had
never any doubt as to the impossibility of acceding
to any such offers, but I considered it useful in
the interests of peace, to permit the French statesmen to
hold these illusions, peculiar to them, so long as it should
be possible so to do without giving a verbal assent to their
Propositions. I imagined that the annihilation of the
French hopes would endanger the preservation of peace,
the maintenance of which was in the interest both of Ger-
many and Europe. I was not of the opinion of those
Politicians who considered it unadvisable to shun by all the
means in one's power a war with France on the ground that
such a war was in any case unavoidable. No one can so
clearly foresee the designs of Divine Providence, and I
look upon even a victorious war as an evil in itself, which
the statesmanship of a country must strive to spare its
People. I could not in my calculations leave out the
Possibility that in the constitution and policy of France
changes might arise which would relieve the two great
neighbouring people from the necessity of war—a hope which '
Was favoured by each postponement of the rupture. For
these reasons I was silent about the propositions made,
and delayed the negotiations about them without ever on
my side giving a promise. After the negotiations with
his Majesty the King of the Netherlands fell, as is well
known, to the ground, extended proposals were again
addressed to me by France, including in their purport
Belgium and South Germany. At this conjunc-
ture comes the communication of the Benedetti
Manuscript. That the French ambassador, without the
assent of his Sovereign, and on his own responsibility,
drew up these propositions, handed them to me, and
negotiated them, modifying them in certain places as I
advised, is as unlikely as was the statement on another
occasion that the Emperor Napoleon had not agreed to the
demand for our surrendering Mayence, which was
officially made to me in August, 1866, by the
French ambassador under threat of war in case of our
refusal. The different phases of French bad feeling and
lust for war which we have gone through from 1866 to
1869 coincided with tolerable exactness with the wil-
lingness or unwillingness for negotiations which the
French agents believed they met with in me. In 1866,
at the time when the Belgian railway affair was being
Prepared, it was intimated to me by a high per-
sonage, who was not a stranger to the former
negotiations, that in case of a French occupation of Bel-
gium nous trouverions notre Belgique aillieurs.' Similarly
on other occasions I had been given to understand that in
a solution of the Eastern question France would seek its
share not in far-off places but close upon its boundaries.
am under the impression that it was only the
definitive conviction that no enlargement of the
frontiers was to be achieved with us that has led
the Emperor to the determination to strive to
obtain it against us. I have besides reason to believe that
had the publication in question not taken place so soon
ae► our and the French preparations for war were'com-
Plete, propositions would have been made to us by France
Jointly, and at the head of a million armed men, to carry
out against unarmed Europe the proposals formerly
Ina& to us, and either before or after the first

-onclude peace on the basis of the Benedetti
and at the expense, of Belgium. Concerning
of these proposals, I remark that the draft in
r, session is from beginning to end from the hand of
'Jount Benedetti, and written on the paper of the Impe-
!ial French Embassy, and that the ambassadors here,
Including the representatives of Austria, Great Britain,
Russia, Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Hesse, Italy,
Saxony, Turkey, and Wurtemburg, who have seen
the original, have recognised the handwriting. In Article
1, Count Benedetti at the very first reading withdrew the
closing passage, placing it in brackets after I had remarked
?hat it presupposed the interference of France in the
internal affairs of Germany, which I even in private
he could not allow. Of his own accord
'4;3 made an important marginal correction in
Article 2, in my presence. On the 24th instant
I informed Lord A. Loftus verbally of the existence
°f the document in question, and on his expressing doubts
invited him to a personal inspection of the same. On the
27th of this month he took note of it, and con vincedhisn-
self that it was in the handwriting of his former French
Le°lleague. If the Imperial Cabinet now repudiates at-
tempts for which it has sought since 1864, both by pro-
-41113es and threats, to obtain our co-operation, this is
easily to be explained in presence of the political situa-
taon.,,

M. BENEDETTI AND THE TREATY.
M. Benedetti has written a letter to the Duke de Gra,-
raont, in which he says that it was a matter of public
notoriety that both prior to and during the war of 1866
Count Bismarck offered to aid France in re-uniting Bel-
glum to France as a compewation for the Prussian aggran-
thaements. European diplomacy was not ignorant of this.
The Government of the Emperor instantly declined these
overtures and M. Drouyn de Lhuys would be able to
letxplanations which would clear up all doubt upon this
Po Since the conclusion of the treaty of Prague, and on
account of excitement aroused in France,. Count Bismarck
again displayed a desire to re-establish the balance of power
Which had been disturbed by the Prussian acquisitions, and
several combinations having reference to the integrity of
States bordering on France and Germany, were brought for-
Ward, and were the subjects of various communications,