The Sun.
London, England, 1870-09-05 00:00:00

'THE SUN, LONDON, MONDAY SEPTEMBER 5, 187(k

THE EFFECTS OF MACMAHON'S DEFEAT. '
The effects of this victory over MacMahon can scarcely
be overrated. They are even More important than those
which resulted from the victories over Bazaine before
Metz. When Bazaine was driven into Metz, the corps of
Mac Manon, De Failly, and Douay were yet for the most
part able to concentrate at Chalons. The reserves added
to them, the marines destined for the Baltic, the old sol-
diers called up, and who helped to swell the corps of
Wimpffen and Vinoy, brought up the second army of
France to a more than respectable strength ; and
MacMahon stood in the way of an advance to Paris,
no trifling obstacle, but one which must be destroyed
before the advance could be effected. Now that
second army is defeated and thrown back into
the extreme north of the French Ardennes. The
strategy of MacMahon. boldly planned,, was feebly
executed, and the result has been a collapse that renders
his condition almost desperate. His plans were based
on false calculations. Every strategist knows that
marches are to be measured by time and not by distance,
and every element which tends to lengthen the
time occupied in moving • must be taken
into consideration by the commander. Mea-
sured by distance, the army a MacMahon,
with the start which it had gained, should have
passed the Meuse, and advanced well on its way.
to Metz before the Crown Prince of Prussia could
possibly have attacked his flank. Measured by time,
and considering only the ordinary obstacles to
the march, the same result would be reached.
But some unknown disturbing elements must have
entered in—either the demoralised condition of the troops
or the difficulty of supplies ; the calculation of time
became falsified, and the result was fatal. It is abso-
lutely impossible to suppose that when Mac-
Mahon undertook that remarkable counter-march,
he could for an instant have contemplated
the idea of fighting a general action against
superior forces close to neutral territory. Yet this has
been the result of his slow movements. Attacked at the
same time in front and in flank, he has been driven
back under the shelter of the fortress of Sedan. Not
such, a fortress, however, as Metz, nor even such a
place as Mezieres, upon which it will now probably be
extremely difficult for MacMahon to effect his retreat.
With the Prussian cavalry at work upon the railway, it
will be almost impossible for MacMahon to draw supplies
for his army by rail, whether he take up his position at
Sedan or effect his retreat as far as Mezieres. It will
not be difficult for the Prussians to close the roads
eastward and westward. We have heard it asserted that
the French troops in Mezieres, should they reach that
place, would be easily supplied through Belgium. We doubt
the fact. We doubt, in the first place, how far Prussia
would permit an organised system of supply for a great army
to be established from Belgium into France, and in the next
place, the Belgian army, which, as we know, is concen-
trated inside the frontier, close to the scene of action, will
require the resources of the immediate country, and the
lines of railway for its own use. Neither Mezieres nor
Sedan we expect is provisioned to support a large army
besides its garrison.—Standard.

THE STRATEGY OF MACMAHON AND

BAZAINE.

There can be no doubt that the advance of Mac Mahon,
which brought on these battles, had been concerted with
Bazaine, and that thelatter knew that the Germans would
be engaged with Mac Mahon while he was struggling
with Prince Frederick Charles. It may turn out that
MacMahon's delays, which have seemed so unaccount-
able, were planned to give Bazaine time to prepare
for a decisive effort. Letters from before Metz of the
24th ult. stated that the defenders were strengthening
the works of their entrenched camp on the west
side of the Moselle. The writer notes that the weather
had been cold and rainy for several days, causing much
sickness in the form of diarrhoea and dysentery among
the Prussian troops, who began to suffer from want of
shelter ; the day of action, however, found a sufficient
number of them equal to their task. It will be under-
stood that the French troops are not shut within the walls
of Metz as criminals are shut in a prison, although they
are hemmed in. To keep the French prom escaping, all
the roads from the fortress have been entrenched, and
camps have been formed about the place. It was, there-
fore, open to Marshal Bazaine to offer battle to Prince
Frederick Charles whenever he chose. On Friday last
he made an attempt to escape by the road to Courcelles,
probably chosen as that which would be guarded by
the least force. The Stuttgard Sanitary Committee,
who were visiting the works before Metz that
day, found on their arrival in the morning, the
Prussian outposts falling back before a sally in force.
But the Prussians had an entrenched position, which de-
fied the further advance of Bazaine's troops, who with-
drew early in the afternoon. The visitors heard later that
'the French had directed a more real attack up the river
to try to seize Pont-h-Moussan, and here also had been
repulsed. The prolonged attempt of Wednesday and
Thursday was, however, of a very different character
made after ample time for preparation, and with all the
forces at Marshal Bazaine's disposal. The French, it is
evident, fought like lions, to whom the cage had become
intolerable, and who were determined to break through or
perish in the attempt. Owing to the extraordinary cir-
cumstances of the struggle, which did not admit of an
interval during which the works of the investing force
might be strengthened against them, the French
maintained the struggle not only all day on Wednesday
but also through the night and again on Thursday. We
may easily imagine them again and again charging the
batteries and earthworks with a courage which failure
rather inflamed than extinguished. Prince Frederick
Charles pays a tribute to their great bravery, but sums up
the issue in one line—" The Marshal was victoriously
driven back at all points during the night." We may
be tolerably sure that the attempt will not be repeated
until it is believed that some great change at present un-
foreseen is made in the conditions of the contest. All
that men could do has been done by Bazaine's army in
these memorable days, and there is nothing left but to be
resigned to the result. Whether it be true or not that
epidemic sickness prevailed in Metz before the battle,
certainly the burial of five or ten thousand of the soldiers
who must have fallen in these battles will not increase the
salubrity of the Marshal's position. —Daily News.

THE PRUSSIAN GUARDS AT GRAVELOTTE.
The following letter was written from the battle field of
Gravelotte by a young officer of the Queen Augusta
Regiment of Guards to his father :—At half-past five
on the morning of the 18th we broke up our bivouac
near Sisemont, and marched as far as Mars-la-Tour.
Here the whole of the infantry of the Guard Corps
collected itself in close " rendezvous." The generals
rode from troop to troop, the chaplains exhorted the
men, and loud cheers for the King resounded from all
sides. After a short pause, the intelligence arrived that
the enemy was retreating, and would not accept battle.
The sun had already risen when the command was given
to march on. We passed through La Tour, over the
battle-field of last Tuesday, crossed a brook, and prepared
ourselves for action--the Ist and 3d battalions, and then
the 2nd. Then we advanced, passing through St. Marcel to
the right by Ferme Caubrd, as far as Verneville, and took
up our position on the left of the Bois de la Cusse. For
several hours we witnessed desperate fighting, and some
shells fell amongst us, but without inflicting any injury.
It was nearly 3 p.m. when we sent the Ist battalion to St.
Ail to cover our artillery. At 4 p.m. the 2nd and 3rd
battalions received orders to advance. We went to the
left, passing St. Ail on the north, were joined by our Ist
battalion, and without delay marched to the attack on the
heights to the south of St. Privat la Montagne. This
village is situated on an eminence, and the ground slopes
towards St. Ail ; two deep valleys led to the summit
of the heights which we had to take. St.
Privat itself is a strongly built village, with gardens
surrounded by stone walls. It was strongly garrisoned
by infantry, and further and higher by artillery ; the
position was what theory calls normal for the full effect
of fire on the part of the defenders ; with its trenches
the village was, in fact, a fortress. The colonel, Count
Waldersee, now once more re-formed his regiment, the
Ist battalion, in columns of a company, to the right ; the
3rd battalion, in columns of a company, to the left; the
2nd followed, but soon advanced into the first line. The
advance commenced with incredible steadiness. The bul-
lets rained upon us, but made no impression on our brave
men. Incessantly we pressed forwards, leaving roads of
dead and wounded behind us. Waldersee rode with the
utmost coolness in the midst of the advancing Grenadiers.
For 1,000 paces we advanced under an increasing fire from
the enemy, when the colonel ordered me to direct the
12 companies to a general attack on the highest hill. My
big bay charger, which soon received two grazing shots,
flew over the dead and wounded, and in the next moment
sundry companies, with drums beating and loud cheers,
charged the hill. The enemy did not wait for the last at-
tack, but withdrew. Arriving• breathless at the summit
our battalions threw themselves down, and fired on the
partly retreating and partly remaining enemy. The noise
of the small arm fire reached a deafening pitch. As the
enemy still retreated, Waldersee sent Von Stolzenberg and
myself back for some cavalry—not finding any far or
near I returned. Von Stolzenberg received a wound
in the leg, but succeeded in reaching Buditzky.
v,hom he stated our want of cavalry. In
tL ateantinie the enemy had rallied and kept