The Sun.
London, England, 1822-04-22 00:00:00

PRICE SEVENPENCE.

income. The cliarge respecting the shawls was represented as
having a different meaning in each of three sets of counts—
the first representing it as imputing a felonious receipt of
stolen goods; the second describing it as conveying the impu-
tation of receiving goods obtained by false pretences ; and the
last merely setting out the words, without alleging any specific
meaning. The jury would decide whether either of the two
first of these inuendoes could be supported. His Learned
Friend certainly would be agreeably disappointed ; for he would
have another opportunity of addressing them on evidence
which would be adduced, and which would, he trusted, re-
duce the verdict to nominal damages. This was no case where
the defendants had pierced the shades of private life to drag an
individual into disgraceful notoriety ; but where they-had at-
tacked a person seeking the public attention, at a period when
the public mind had been greatly infuriated and agitated, and
when the plaintiff had personally. interfered in two inquests,
while holding"an office essential to the public peace. How far
his conduct on that occasion tended to sooth and tranquilize the
national mind—whether his whole conduct or that of 'the de-
fendants was best calculated to sustain the ;%lonarchy.and the
Constitution—was not now to be decided ; but it was material
to obseire,- that-in that season of excitement and heat, the de-
fendants thought it right to call the public attention to those
facts of which some evidence would be given to-day.
The LORD CHIEF JysTrcE.—What is the initure of the
evidence whiCh you propose to give, as it seems to me very pro-
bable that I shall entertain great doubts whether I ought to
receive it ?,

Mr.. Sergeant VAuGIIAN.—I submit that I have a right,
under the general issue, to give evidence of any facts, short of
a complete pstification, for the purpose of negativing the pre-
sumption of malice.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE.—What authority have you
that such evidence can be given ?
Mr. Sergeant VAUGHAN.--A case which your Lordship
remembers well—that of " The Earl of Leicester v. Walter."

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE.—That is a very different case
from the present ; there evidence of rumours was admitted, to
show that the plaintiff, having previously lost his character,
had sustained no injury ; but here you propose to give in evi-
dence, not rumours, but facts.
Mr: Sergeant VAUCHAN.—One of the charges here is, that
the plaintiff sold contraband goods. This I cannot prove, nor
am I at liberty to do so under the general issue. But sup-
posing I can show that he was charged with so doing ; that an
information was filed against him; and that he submitted a
memorial upon it, would not this be evidence to disprove the
malice imputed to the defendants ?
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE.—But no part of the present
action applies to this charge. I understood Mr. Scarlelt. to
proceed only on the charges relative to the purcljase of the
shawls and the perjury.
Mr. SCARLETT said that his Lordship had understood him
correctly. The reason why he had not proceeded on the impu-
tation respecting contraband goods was, that he thought it not
sufficiently specific to sustain an action ; otherwise he should
have laid it in due form, and have given that explanation which
Mr. Waithman had offered on former occasions, and was anxious
to render.

Mr. Serjeant VAUGHAN then proceeded to argue the gene-
ral question. He referred to the case of Knobell v. Fuller, re-
ported in the appendix to Nlr. Sergeant Peake's Law Evidence,
p. 94, which was an action brought by a servant of the Duke
of Portland for a libel in the Morning Post charging him
with being concerned with another in procuring money from
the friends of persons convicted of capital offences, under pre-
tence of being able to obtain pardons through the influence of
his master. In that case, evidence short of a justification was
admitted by the Lord Chief«lustice Eyre in mitigation of da-
mages.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE again pointed out the distinc-
don between rumours and facts. He thought the rule was not
so laid down by any of the cases as to preclude the exercise of
his own judgment, which was decidedly against the reception
of the evidence proposed. Mr. Sergeant Vaughan must either
tender his evidence, and then argue the point on a bill of ex-
ceptions, or lie might decline opening it, and move for a new
trial.
The latter course appearing to be preferred, his Lordship
begged Mr. Sergeant Vaughan to state to him the substance of
the evidence in question, but to do so privately, that the state-
ment might not operate to the prejudice of the defendants. A
conversation in a tone inaudible in Court accordingly took place
between the Learned Sergeant and his Lordship.
The Lour) CHIEF JUSTICE then. invited Mr. Scarlett to
hear what Mr. Sergeant Vaughan had pioposed to offer.
Mr. SCARETT replied, that he had no desire to appear at all
on the occasion. His client had come prepared to explain every
action of his life which he thought might be brought into ques-
tion ; but he could not tell how to meet charges which were
altogether unfounded. In this last point of view only could he
feel anxious for the fate of his friend's proposal. This, however,
')i.e must say, that it would be a most bitter aggravation of the
mischiefs of a libel, if its author might plead the general issue,
and leave the plaintiff to suppose that: no evidence would be ad.
duced, and then might come into Court with a mass of testi-
mony affecting the &aracter of his victim, and say—” True,
I cannot justify the libel which I have published respecting
you ; but if 1 had written another libel, I could have proved
it." It was the common practice, if a party could not justify
all, to justify a part of the libel ; and thus, whenever lie had
fair gro!kid of mitigation, he might reduce the damages.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE—I own I have always thought
so, and I have never been satisfied with any of the cases cited.
Mr. Sergeant VAUGHAN and Mr. PULLER argued that the
plaintiff could not come unprepared, because he knew the cir-
cumstances to which the libel alluded—that the peculiar form
of a'libel, founded in truth, might preclude the fbrmal justifi-
cation of any part of it ; and that it was most important in in-
quiring into the design of the defendant, 'to ascertain whether
he had only mistaken real facts, or had invented an entire false-
, hood.

The LORD CHIEF JuSTICE, however, rejected the evidence,
leaving the Counsel for the defendants, if they should think fit,
to move for a new trial.

Mr. Sergeant VAUGIIA'N then. resumed his address to the
Jury. He proceeded to comment on the first four counts of the
declaration, and contended that on these the defendants were
entitled to a verdict, as the statement respecting .the shawls
could net fairly be construed to charge a felony. On the other
counts, he admitted that a verdict must pass for the plaintiff:
but the Jury, in estimating the damages, would consider that
the libel did not arise from personal malice, but from the warmth
of political zeal. They would remember that all intemperance
was injustice. The would observe that no special damage
to the plaintiff's trade, not even the loss of a customer, or of the
sale of a shawl, was alleged in the pleadings, or proved in evi-
dence. They would feel disposed, under these circumstances,
to deal leniently with the defendants, and would not lend them-
selves to resentments which no man was entitled to gratify,
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE, after directing the attention
of the Jury to the two specific charges relied on by the plaintiff,
observed, that it had been alleged that Mr. Waithman might
have sought redress by a criminal information, or an indictment,
rather than an action for damages. lie certainly might have
taken either of those courses; hut, had he done so, it would
have been said that he afforded no opportunity to the defend-
ants of proving the truth of their allegations, which he had
done by the course he had chosen. Had he preferred an in-
dictment, it was by no means necessary that he should himself
he examined as a witness on its trial. The defendants had not ac-
cepted the opportunity offered, of proving that their statements
were true, and therefore they must be regarded as false.
They had proposed to call evidence, indeed, as to alleged cir-
cumstances not specified in any plea; but this he had refused
to admit for this plain reason—that it is incumbent on every
man who comments on the character of another, to take care
that he states no more than lie can prove. His Lordship then
alluded to the first four counts of the declaration, and inti-
mated an opinion that the direct charge of felony specified
in them was not sustained, and directed the Jury, •if they
thought so, to find a verdict for the defendants upon them.
But the charge respecting the purchase of the shawls was,
as it stood by itself, a most grave one, deeply affecting
the character of the plaintiff as a tradesrnah and a man of
honesty. The other charge of perjury, though any one acquainted
with the proceedings must at once perceive that it was false—
for no oath ever was taken unless in case of an appeal, which
the libel said had not been made—would appear very serious to
persons unacquainted with the statute under which the tax was
collected. The question of damages was peculiarly for the con-
sideration of the jury. He would only make one observation,
which lie always offered when the nature of the injury might
excite strong emotion—that they should consider the case with
moderation and temper, anti suffer no party feeling or violent
passion to influence their decision.
The jury retired for nearly 50 minutes, and, on their return,
gave their verdict for the defendants on the first four counts,
and for the plaintiff on the residue—Damages 5001.