The Sun.
London, England, 1836-01-20 00:00:00

FROM THE “ PORTFOLIO."

COPY OF A VERY SECRET DESPATCH FROM
COUNT POZZO DI BORGO.
Dated Paris, the 28th of November, 1828.
(Continued from The Sun of yesterday.)
This disposition is very naturally the consequence of that
species of European amalgam to which we have had to as-
sociate the special policy of the empire. The interest of
all the others is to retain us there, because they thus pos-
sess more chances of impeding our progress—ours should
tend to deliver us imperceptibly, by the force of events,
and without having the air, if possible, of being desirous to
escape from them.
The surest method of accomplishing this object—which
is essential to our present and future independence—is, to
evade, unaffectedly, the ill-timed negotiation which the
Courts of Europe would wish to bring about during the
winter, and to put ourselves in a state to enter upon the
ensuing campaign with preparatives and forces that shall
carry every thing before them.
This, I trust, is not above our means. The Emperor
has acquired the experience in the late campaign ; his
Majesty has seen and judged of the obstacles : he has be-
come acquainted with what the foresight of his subordi-
nates could not even guess. The generals, the heads of the
corps, the officers themselves, will not be surprised at the
manner in which the enemy resisted their valour. It will
be known beforehand what materiel is requisite for the pro-
posed operations, and it will be supplied in time. In short,
it will no longer be a trial, but a decisive combat, main-
tained with all the means which must render its issue
favourable to us.
The considerate cautiousness on our part, which has only
served to embolden the enemy, and to furnish the malevo-
lent sentiments of Austria particularly, and a great portion
of the English public, with an opportunity of blackening
with calumny acts of the most honourable generosity, must
entirely cease. We will allow the Christians to combat
their tyrants, and we will raise up against our enemy all the
tempests he invokes, as they become a part of our natural
defence, and a means of forcing him to submit to those con-
ditions which our honour and our safety require that we
should impose upon him.
Your Excellency knows, that from the first moment that
the question of war was debated, I took the liberty of submit-
ting to you the opinion of reducing the principal fortresses
which defend the entry to the interior provinces of the Otto-
man empire, and consequently the approaches to the ca-
pital. Some of these bulwarks are already in our hands ;
the ethers, particularly those which are on the Danube,
must be ours. When possessed of them, we shall not only
be free in all our other movements, but we shall have a
formidable frontier against the attacks of Austria. In
fact, she can only inflict a serious blow by entering the
principalities and threatening our communications. If
we once established ourselves on both banks of the
Danube, it would be Austria who would be deficient in
points d'appui, in case she descended into the plains,
whilst we, in our turn, should be enabled to threaten
the forces she might thus risk. These ideas are those
which I have recognized in the expose of the Russian
Cabinet—in which I have followed the project of carry-
ing on operations on the Danube, and at the same time of
sending forward a sufficient army, protected by Varna and
the fleet, and guaranteed by a corps of observation against
Choumla.
This plan, supported by all the means of commanding its
success, may, in two months time, lay the Ottoman Empire
bare, and place its fate (dependant on the will) in the hands
of the Emperor. It is then that the Cabinets of Europe
will redouble their efforts to force the Sultan ,to make
peace, because they will see that they can save him only
by a treaty. This unanimity can exist in this case only, for
in every other case, and if the question were that of hosti-
lities against Russia, it would be impossible that they should
agree among themselves. This situation would be the most
suitable one for the Emperor. With the power of doing
more, his Majesty would consent to demand less, and this
minimum would merely consist in the propositions contained
in the confidential exposé of your Excellency-. To attain
this superiority appears to me what ought to be the aim of
all our efforts. This superiority has now become a condi-
tion of our political existence, such as we must establish it
and maintain it in the eyes of the world and our own. Our
adversaries, and it must be owned that we have adversaries,
have conceived hopes to the contrary, their towards
us has overcome their accustomed dissimulation ; we have
nothing more to learn on that score. Nothing more re-
mains for us to do than to prove the reverse by facts, and
we are enabled to do so.
It would, in my opinion, be committing a very great
fault, were we inclined to weaken our strength on the real
theatre of war, in order to leave considerable forces on other
distant points, where we must merely be on observation.
Austria alone can attack us. Before she decides upon that,
we shall be warned of her intentions by her movements. If
they are directed against any part of our frontiers, remote
from - the Danube, they would soon cease, and would not,
like all eccentric diversions, produce great effect. If, on
the contrary, they are directed, as is most probable, in the
supposition advanced, so as to interrupt by its immediate
influence our operations against the Turks, we shall then
have it in our power to paralyse them, in proportion as we
shall have at our immediate command troops to oppose to
them. For it does not appear impossible so to dispose of
our armies. That they might at the same time be able to
feed the war against Turkey, and to keep the 'Court of
Vienna in (en imposer) respect, if it dared to compromise
itself so far as to force us to have it for our enemy.
These questions, Monsieur le Comte, belong to more
competent authorities than mine, and who have under their
eye both the ensemble and the details necessary to give re-
gularity to such essential and nice combinations. If I
make mention of them it is rather a wish that I express
than a settled opinion that I offer, in the hope that what-
ever shall be decided on relating to this important object,
will be conformable to the nature of the operations which we
have to undertake and to the objects which it imports us to
accomplish.
The foregoing considerations, and those still more lu-
minous and decisive enumerated in the confidential note of
your Excellency, which I have constantly taken as my
guide, appear to me to lead us naturally to the following
conclusions :-
1. That the results of the campaign just ended, is not
decisive enough to allow the Emperor to treat with a
probability of success, and even without prejudicing the
political object his Majesty has in view.
2. That a second campaign is indispensable, in order to
acquire the superiority requisite for the success of the ne-
gotiation.
3. That when this negotiation shall take place, we must
be in a state to dictate the conditions of it in a prompt and
rapid manner, in such a manner that the European powers
shall, if possible, learn the termination together with the
commencement.
4. That our friends and enemies will expect, as far as
regards them, to see us display great means at the com-

mencement of the military operations, and that the impres-
sion caused by the events which will occur during the
second campaign, will have infinitely more influence upon
the idea which Europe will form of the forces of the empire,
and of the talent which directs them, than they had in the
former ; because the former was considered merely as a
trial, while the following one will be looked upon as the ne
plus ultra of our moral and material resources as applicable
to war, and that consequently it is in presence of all these
truths and obligations that we must begin it.
(To be continued.)

Fieschi, upon learning that his trial would com-
mence on the 30th instant, said to the huissier of the Court
of Peers who notified to him the act of accusation, " Ah I
diavolo ! you have seen your hair grow gray, but mine will
never grow gray." Pepin exclaimed, " What ! already ?
Are there no means of putting it off ?" " You will be the
sooner set at liberty," replied the huissier. Morey displays
his usual tranquillity, and Boireau is very cheerful.

A 'Wiltshire paper states it as a prevalent rumour,
that Paul Methuen, Esq., of Corsham House, Devizes, is
about to be raised to the Peerage.
TALLEYRAND AND THE WAGER OF OYSTERS.
—What schoolboy is there who would not claim the story
of Talleyrand's oyster breakfast ? This was the payment
of a wager which M. de Talleyrand had won of the Duke
de Laval. The oysters, according to the conditions agreed
upon, were to be furnished for 12 persons ; moreover, the
winner was to have the right of naming the 10 other
guests. Did M. de Talleyrand, in this case, act as
everybody else would have done—invite 10 of his friends ?
No such thing : this was very far indeed from his inten-
tion. He made very careful inquiries for 10 of the greatest
oyster-eaters in Paris. These he chose for his guests ; so
that the Duke de Laval had to pay for 500 dozen. One
of the actors in this breakfast, a very amiable man, fond of
good eating, and an excellent singer, was M. Cloisseau, for-
merly an attorney, who on this occasion was appointed
king of the feast. To the great satisfaction of the Am-
phictyon who did not pay, he swallowed, without the least
hesitation, his 54th dozen ; after which he stopped, alleging
as a pretence that he must partake of the other dainties of
the breakfast.—Life of Talleyrand.
NAPOLEON AND THE" MONITEUR."—During his
residence in St. Helena, Napoleon, on one occasion, spoke
a great deal of the Legion of Honour, of Goldsmith's
Collection, and of the Moniteur. Respecting the latter,
he said that it was certainly a very remarkable circumstance,
and one of which few besides himself could boast, that he
had made his way through the revolution at so early an
age, and with so much notoriety, without haying
,!o dread
the Moniteur. " There is not a sentence in it, said he,
" which I could wish to obliterate ; on the contrary, the
Moniteur will infallibly serve me as a justification,, when-
ever I may have occasion for it,"—Las Cases Meinozrs.
(Colburn's edition.)