The Sun.
London, England, 1849-02-02 00:00:00

ginning hostilities against Austria in Italy, and conjointly
with us to propose terms of mediation to the two powers.—
( Hear, hear.) The H ,n. Gentleman said, in another part of
his speech, that he doubted whether this country ought to
have acted with France—with the Governments which she
has had since the Revolution of February. Sir, I feel no
such doulsts.—(Cheers.) I feel convinced that our acting in
concert with France during the past year has been of great
benefit to the peace of Europe.—(Hear, hear.) I feel con-
vinced that if we had said at once, " However moderate
your propositions—however pacific the course that you pro-
pose to pursue, you have changed your monarchical Govern-
ment into a Republic, and therefore we will have nothing to
say to your proposals,"—in the first place, such an answer
would have excited a suspicion in France that, although we
did not profess it, we meant to interfere with respect to her
form of Government—(Hear) ;—and I believe, in the next
place, that being left to take her own line without concert and
without advice, she would have been driven by the violent
party in that country into hostilities by which the whole
peace of Europe would have been compromised.—(Hear.) I
therefore differ entirely from the Hon. Gentleman in think-
ing that we ought not to have had any concert with France
upon these matters. Whether France has been wise in
changing her form of Government to a Republic—whether
it is true, as the Hon. Gentleman says, that there are no
Republicans in France—that is a question upon which I do
not choose to enter—(Hear, hear)—it is a question for the
French people.—(Hear.) But what I know is, that although
at the commencement of that revolution there were terms
used in a circular of M. Lamartine's which certainly appeared
to menace the peace of Europe, and though there was, as I
thought, a great deal too much jargon about " na-
tionality," yet, with respect to M. Lamartine, with
respect to General Cavaignac, and with respect
to the present Government, I can say that we have
had to deal with persons directing the foreign affairs of
France since the revolution, who have listened fairly and
candidly to all the representations we had to make to
them, and who have fairly stated to us what they
believed to be the interest and the policy of
France ; and we have had no reason whatever to
complain, but, on the contrary, reason to rejoice that we
had to deal with men of high honour and of pacific
views.—(Cheers.) Rut I am not sure that I am at all con-
vincing the Hon. Gentleman when I say that our concert
with France has,tended to the preservation of the peace of
Europe, because, as far as I collect from the tenor of his
speech, his inclination seemed to be that our object ought to
notbe wlaert, andw,ar tht
eakt
et hi
tesfacuolut foundrhsee.—(Hear,
(H wenri,t
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what H
we said,onln
have gone on very well has been arrested by your mediation."
mediation has put a stopw ithtorespee
Why, what would have gone on ? The King of Denmark would
have resisted the power of the Germans ; the Germans would
have insisted that they had rights with respect to Schleswig,
which has been long a favourite opinion in Germany; and
France and Prussia would have taken their view of the matter.
Those views not being counteracted by any pacific media-
tion, war must have been the result; and the complaint
the Hon. Gentleman makes is, that we did interpose when
both the King of Denmark and the King of Prussia, and the
Central Power at Frankfort wished us to mediate, and that
we did not allow that war to get up, and to take its course
in Europe, as he showed very clearly it might otherwise
have done.—(Cheers.) Then there was another question,
naturally, so far as we are concerned, of more serious im-
port, because we have more actively interfered ; I moan with
regard to Naples and Sicily. It will be recollected by those
who heard the statements that were made last year, that
Lord Minto was requested by the King of Naples to pro-
pose to the Sicilians terms upon which they might consent
again to return to their allegiance; after a very consi-
derable time spent in conferences, Lord Minto, at the re-
quest of the King of Naples, went to Sicily and conveyed
those terms to the Sicilians. The terms were not ac-
cepted by them. Lord Minto was of opinion that they
might have been in prudence accepted by them; but the
ground upon which they declined to accept was one on
which it was not very easy to shake their determination.
They said that in ancient times Sicily was a free country;
that in 1812 the constitution had been reformed, and under
the auspices of the British generally, and with every proof
of British sympathy, and that it was part of the
terms of the constitution then agreed upon, that the
Parliament was to decide with respect to the whole internal
administration, and with regard to the number of troops to
be kept up in Sicily; that no foreign troops of any kind,
being other than Sicilians, except those admitted by
treaty, should be allowed to come into Sicily. More-
over, there was an article in that constitution, that if the
King of Sicily should ever reside in Naples he should name
one of bis sons, or one of his family at all events, to
reign in Sicily. In 1816 the British Government had de-
clared, that though it gave no guarantee to the Si-
cilian constitution, it should take an interest in the wel-
fare of Sicily, and consider it injurious to the British
name if the welfare of Sicily should be less well provided
for in future than it had been. The Sicilians insisted that
that constitution should be in whole restored. When Lord
Mints) returned to Naples he found that the King
would not consent to such terms ; and there was an
end of that negotiation. It was undertaken by a British
Minister at the desire of the King of the Two Sicilies, as he
would be called in a formal diplomatic instrument; the two
parties could not agree, and that negotiation fell to the
ground. Whatever might be the case as to the justification
which the British Government might make for any further
interference, their decision was not to interpose any further
than to give any friendly advice to the Sicilians in cases in
which they might ask it.—(Hear, hear.) Accordingly, when
some time after an expedition was prepared at Naples for
the purpose of conquering Sicily, no obstacle was interposed
to the sailing of that expedition. It has been said that a
large British fleet was assembled at Naples for the purpose of
preventing that expedition from sailing; that is totally an
error, Sir W. Parker having taken the British fleet on ac-
count of other questions in respect of which he thought he
was entitled to ask reparation. But when that expedition,
reached Messina, there took place at the close of the
siege of Messina events which appeared so horrible and so
inhuman in the eyes of the French Admiral, that he de-
termined to interfere. I need not say now what those
circumstances were. There were atrocities, as I think
on both sides ; the destruction of houses, of villages, and of
unoffending peasants on the one side, the bombardment
against a town which had ceased to resist on the other. It
appeared to the French Admiral that it was impossible such
4 warfare could continue without an utter desolation of
Sicily, and such alienation from the Neapolitan Government
on the part of the Sicilians, that no final terms of agreement
could arise; he therefore determined to take upon him•
self to put a stop to the further progress of such a horrible
warfare. After he had so determined he communicated with
Sir W. Parker. Sir W. Parker had a most difficult duty to
perform, but taking all the circumstances into consideration,
our former friendly relations with the Sicilians, the accounts
he had received from the captain of one of her Majesty's
ships then at Messina, the atrocities he heard of, and that
the French Admiral was about to act, and it was important
at that juncture that the two nations should act in concert,
his determination was to give orders similar to those which
had been given to the French Admiral. I stated last session
that no orders had been given to stop the Neapolitan
expedition, but that the Government reserved to itself
to act in future as circumstances might dictate, and
that I had perfect confidence in the discretion and judgment
of Sir W. Parker. I remember the Right Hon. Gentle-
man, the Member for Stamford, expressing apparently,
though not in words, a concurrence with that sen-
titnent ; and I have the same opinion still.—(Hear, hear.)
He was not a man likely to be led away by passion ; he had
none of that revolutionary mania by which some persons
might be misled in those circumstances; he was anxious for
the honour of the British flag, and anxious for the cause of
humanity : and he took that proceeding upon his own respon-
sibility. The question, then, for the British Government was
whether they should entirely disavow Sir W. Parker, whether
they should tell him that he had done wrong to interpose, or
whether an armistice having been established, we should take
advantage of the circumstance to propose terms by which the
Neapolitan Government and the Sicilian people might again
be induced to agree, and this horrible warfare might
not be renewed. We took the latter part of the alternative.
—(Rear, hear.) We are responsible for that conduct. If
it was right to allow the war to recommence, to separate the
British fleet entirely from the course which was taken by
the French Admiral, and to disavow Sir W. Parker, we have
been wrong, and we have taken a course which deserves cen-
sure; but if, as I believe, it was the duty of the Govern-
ment, with respect to two countries in which they took a
great interest, with respect to the King of Naples, an ally
of this country, with respect to the Sicilian people, with
whom we had been long connected, to endeavour to frame
terms upon which both parties should agree, then, I say, we
are justified in the course that we have adopted.—(Hear.)
The Hon. Gentleman seems to say that there is no negotia-
tion, so well is he informed upon all these subjects on
which he proposes to address the Crown ; that it is a
negotiation confined to England and France. Now, he is
entirely mistaken in that. There have been terms stated
by the Sicilians, and an answer received from Naples
with respect to them, stating some of those terms as
reasonable in themselves, and such as the King would be
ready to consent to, and objecting to others, and leaving the
matter as one to be treated in further negotiation. The fur-
ther negotiation still continues. If it should end in our es-
tablishing permanent peace there, I think we shall have per-
formed a duty both to the Sovereign of Naples and the people
of Sicily, and shall have rendered a
_service likewise to the
cause of peace in Europe.—(Hear, hear.) If we are unable
to procure such a result, due notice will be given when the
armistice is to cease, and that war may begin again. But my
belief is that, after what has taken place, even if that war
were to be renewed, it would not be renewed in the same
spirit in which it was begun.—( Hear, hear.) My opinion
is that there would be, in the first place, such terms offered
by the King of Naples and such orders given, that it is pro-
bable that that war would not be conducted in so destructive,
so savage, and so desolating a manner. But with regard
to all these matters, although we do not ask for congra-
tulation or for approbation, yet I must say that I am
glad to find that during a year of great peril to the peace
of Europe, the services of England have been of use to stay
the ravages of war and to mitigate hostilities.—(Hear.)
I believe that, standing secure ourselves, having no such con-
vulsions as other nations have been exposed to, I believe it
was befitting this country, when she was asked, and in other
cases, to offer her good offices for the purpose of removing
quarrels, of which very often the ground is not very consi-
derable, but to which if once left to the arbitrament of war
may tend to as long and as bloody contests as if the grounds
of difference had been wider and more serious.—(Cheers.)
With respect to the next question to which the Hon. Gentle-
man referred, namely, the expense of our military establish-
ments, I think he seemed naturally enough to be hardly
better informed on it than he is as to the state of our foreign
affairs. He seemed to suppose that we had yielded to repre-
sentations which had appeared in a public letter addressed
to the Financial Association of Liverpool by the Hen. Mem-
ber for the West Riding. Now, Sir, my opinion is entirely
contrary to that. I think whatever reductions or augmenta-
tions you might make to take, the year 1835, or any other
fixed gear for some time past, and to say you will square your
estimates and fix your establishments according to the ex-
penditure of that year, would be, with great deference to the
Hon. Gentleman, an extremely irrational course for any Go-
vernment to pursue. In the first place, it is obvious that your
requirements might be very different. In the next place, any
one who will look at the finance accounts, or the votes of the
year, will see that there have been some 4,000,000/. or 5,000,000/.
added to our expenditure on grounds which have nothing to
do with any increase to our armaments. Therefore if you take
off 10,000,0001., instead of having the same establishments
you had in 1835, You would have smaller establishments
than in that year. Then, if you take 1835 as the standard,
you must be sure that the establishments were then fixed
exactly according to the exigencies of the country. I de-
cline altogether to adopt that principle. It is assumed by
the Hon. Member for the West Riding. In the next place,
our position, and what we have to furnish, is very much
altered and increased since 1835. In one colony we have
acquired since 1835, there were 1,800 of the infantry of the
line. So that if you were to take your rule from 1835 you
would have certain garrisons diminished below that year in
order to supply others which had since been acquired. Per-
sons engaged in manufactures, commerce, or farming never
would adopt such a principle. Suppose a man should say,
" I find that while my expenditure in factories is 30,000/. a
year now, I never paid more in 1835 than 20,000/. ;" yet
lie might find that he had two or three new factories
since that time ; or that he had conducted the
Imium of Ow or three AdclitimAl Arm 19 what