The Sun.
London, England, 1807-01-03 00:00:00

y 1.0
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IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT

HOUSE OF PEERS.
I'RIDAY3 JAN.
_2.

-Lord BREApALBANE took the Oaths and. his Seat
as a British Peet.—His .Lordship was introduced be-
tvieen Earls Moira and Lauderdale.
The Controverted Ele6tion Bill went through the
Committee.

SAT URDA Y, JANUARY 3, 1807.

r interests, or to our Allies and the matters that more
particu ar y concerti there. There Might be much
'impropriety, as undoubtedly thereig-often much in-
, convenience, in bringing such part icelars prematurely
before the public. The information contained in the
Papers on your Lordships' table, although they do
not embrace the whole of what has passed; will, I
trust,, be sufficient and satisfaelory on every material
point. Without incurring the impropriety and in-
convenience to which I have already referred, more,
perhaps should not have been disclosed, even resped-
ing what relates to.this' Country only, and her parti-
culars. Many discussions may arise upon the Com-
parative value of this or that cession, and upon the
different light in which this or that particular obje&
may be viewed by the Contraaing Parties, which it
might be highly improper and unwise to lay open to,
the world by such publications. The publication of
such points, and of the manner in which they had
been discussed, were produaive, dining last war, of
many' inoonvenienci,?s, and threw no few difficulties
in the way of the last Negotiation, by committing
the opinions of the two Governments on the value
of particular cessions and equivalents, and prevent-
ing therm from arriving at the wished-for -arr.;inge-
merit, both with resped to this Country and her
Allies. No doubt, with regard to' the interests of
one's own Country, more discreti6n may be.used, or
more freedom indulged in, in disclosing discussions
of this nature. , The form of our Government, and
pradiCe of our Constitution, may require such coin-7
munications ; but this rule Nies not apply with re-
gard to our Allies. Your own opiuions and feelings,
you may take upon yourselves to -examine and dis-
cuss,- but how can you-.pretend to judge of the incon-
venience that :nay arise to your Allies, by venturing
to interpret their opinions, their prejudices, and their
feelings ) These observations I think proper to. pre-
mise, my Lords, to account for any omissions which
may be observed in the documents before you.; yet,
such as they -ate, I ara pretty confident they will af-
ford ample ground for the nature and extent of the Ad-
dress Which I shall have the honour of submitting to
your LordShips' approbation. Should, however, any
further explanations be deemed necessary, I will with
thentmOst readiness and alacrity-endeavour to supply
whatever may be required„ now, my Lords,
suffer me first to drawyoueattention to this Country,
'and to what more, immediately concerned our own
interests; for I have already hinted that the Nego-
tiation proceeded upon two principles ;—The one
hadin view the interests of this Country; the other
what referred to.our Allies and the Continent. In
the first place, it truly must be unnecessary to urge.
any argument. in proof of the right to pursue Peace,
if Peace be likely to be obtained on jast and adequate
conditions. In the present, unfortunate and cakuni-,
tous situation of Europe, great difficulties, it 'must be
owned; existed, unfawurabk.- -to the- attalinnettrof
. that end, .But Peaceshould be locked for in the spi-
rit of-Pe:ace; and if any chance offered of obtaining
it on just and adequate terms, no apology surely can
be necessary for making the attempt, especially when
all the circumstances of the War are dilly consider-
ed. But this second question, may b of difficult so-
lution. .It is not easy to say what may be. Considered
just and adequate conditions of Peace, under all the
circumstances of the, War. Besides, it should well
be considered, how long the Peace might continue, if
it happened to be concluded. Peace cannot be ob-
tained,but at the expence ,of great sacrifices ; and
how can you appreciate what you are'to acquire, but
by the degree :of, strength aid security you may ob- .
tain against the circumstances ander which the War
might .be renewed. Now, desirable as I allow it to
be to obtain Peace,- yet with' theexperieoce of the
last six years before us, it is not easy' to say, at pre-.
sent, how permanent a Peace might he, Vim more
could be,.frxpe(ted from -concluding it than what
seems to have resulted, from the Ti'eaties which we
have seen concluded. No doubt theassurance of a
Certain interval of tranquillity may
,he well worthy
very great sacrifices ; buLthat assurance is the thing
to be anxiously considered, together with all the pro-
bahilities,ofthe &ration of Peace. Were you in
possession of objeas of strength and safety, and of
security against the renewal of the, War, would you
sacrifice such objeds for-Such an assurance, of
the continuance of Peace fis Might •be derived
from the consideration of fOrmer Treaties? These
were the points that arrested the whole atten-
tion of Government—on them turned the fate of the
Negotiation; and from thel*ginnine to the end of
that great transadion, and during' the whole of its
progress; not a shadow 'of any difference in opinion,
and even the doubt and hesitation of a woment,ever
occurred among the Members His Majesty's Go-•
vernment. These views of the matter brought them
to look upon , the uti i'ossidetis, or state of
.aanal
possession, to be the natural basis of any Negotia-
tion. First, because a price should not be paid . for-
an uncertain Peace ; which, however, would be paid
for it, if we gave up objeas which to us were
strength and security—and, in the second plaCe, it
was to be considered that both Powers had made
great acquisitions—but these acquisitions -were diffe-
rent in their nature, when considered with respea
fo the. Power who possessed them. They could not
therefore be easily made equivalents. What to us,
might be extremely valuable as a naval amid cum-,
mercial Power, might be of little value - to France
ip.her present situation, and unless she should ac-
quire, whatitis so improbable, a naval superiority.
In the same manner the acquisition,s of France,. as a
Thrritorial Power; May 'be very valuable to her—
butmot sounder- other circumstances. Hence the
difficulty of ascertainit.g.- the value of equivalents;.
when regard is. paid to the 'different nature of the
power possessed by the two countries. What basis ,
could then be well adopted but that of actual- poi-
session—a basis not adopted from choice, but from
necessity, resulting from the present -situation of
France. Under all CreseditEculties, Which it' the
study of France to increase,, our great principle still 1
was, and always I hope, will continue to be, never ,

[PRICE SIXPE E;

to treat in the supposition of net: inferiority iz
France. No Rich superiority on the part of the ,
Enemy can ever be allowed by us. We 'nest ever
negotiate on the supposition that the thanc,,,s
of war are equal—that Peace is equally desit--:
able for both—that equal and reciprocal advao..:
tages are to be stipulated. This was the lead.;
ing and steady principle in the view of the
late Negotiation. Never "did it lose sight for a
moment, from the opening to the concluding; ot the
independent existence of tlie'British-Enneire. The
next consideration now to be entered. upon IS our
condud reseeding our Allies and other Povverg. Af-
ter the total subjugation of Europe, and the despee
rate state of things that ensued, did we confine cur--
selves to our insular existence, and lOok with indif-
ference on the prostrate state of the Continent
No; on the contrary, we felt more anxiously eon,
cerned for the interests, and closer bound by every tie
to our Allies. Tice present Administration, on their
entering; inteotfice, 'found this Country bound try a
formal Treaty not to make Peace without their con-
sent and concurrence. Ilpeding that Treaty, I
will'not.with-hold my opinion, lest by with-hold-
ing it I should seem tO'doubf its propriety.. It -was
a Treaty which, I am ready tesay, was a fir Treaty
for the .Country to make 5 for the cause of Europe
she wished to make her cause;.' Even if it cost a
greater .sacrifice, .that sacrifice should not. be de-
clined for any.chanceof:accOmplishing the objeEt
our common interests ; though, the danger pressed
nearer on
we
on ifs; it was our duty toad
part had acted ; even had the Treaty been
Unfit and unwise, still-should-we have adhered to it,
.as it stood on the sacred-authority of His Ntajecty'a•-.
name, and the plighted sanctity of the public
Thus does our conclud •stand. not only clear with •re-
sped-to Russia, but Marked by every thing that
dicates scrupulous and disinterested attachment.----
But are we bound not to negoti,ite in a different
manner .under all 'possible circumstances?' Most eer.
taint', it is a maxim:established in 41 law, Mat
impossibilities no one can' be, bound ; and exfrenxm
cases could not be foreseen in the nature of our en.-
gagement ; neither are they to be apPrehended.
With reseed to other Allied Powers, we are dif-
ferently bound : .Swetten, for instance, and Por-
tugal. The other -Powers' are, Naples, and th-e'
Eledor 'of Hanover. With regard to Naples,
we are bound in nothing to his 'Neapolitan Maies-;
ty in reseed to his continental dominions. No
'doubt by the sacrifice of great Commercial and
finanCial ohjeEts, we could restore to him his Nea-
politan dominions, we should not perhaps hesitatti
about the sacrifice-; but -that' object is now imprae,
ticable. Then should • the -War be continued for
such an obje&, especially when ne.obligation e3Csta
to continue it for such a purpose I Very ditretent
IS "the case, and situation of Sicily. His Sicilian Ms.:
jesty, or rather we, ate in possession of it. It is de-
fended by a formidable, indeed, as i trust, invincible
army. -Surely we shall never use our power to for,
Ward our own interests, to deliver that Island into.
the hands of the enemy: Others are the terms upori
which we stand, and we are bound to hold it at the
disposal of the King, and not tostratfic it to purchase
a Peace, or let it be disposed' of but by the full con.:
sent of its legitimate Sovereign. Now to Hanover
this was a nice and difficult point, and no misrepre---
sentation should be allowed- to go abroad • respedin,l,
it. Never was the issue of the Negotiation conned-,
ed with its fate. Never did any- interested feeling
arise reseeding it. But should it be alienated "fot
our sake ? What ! if we thought we owed such. a
.debt as that we acknowledged'to Russia,•to Sweden,
to Naples, hOw much Migher the debt we owe to onr
own Sovereign ? And surely we will avoid the dis-
grace of.such a sacrifice, which would contbund 'us
with those who made such -shatneful sacrifices to their
own fears•or their own interests. • Hanover was at-
tacked not as a Gertnan territory, not as conne6ted.
With the'Germanic Corps, but solely because Franca-
.was 'at war with- England ; and, while we were in.:
vulnerable here, the enemy was determined to wound
us through Hanover. But to adopt the saying anti
maxim of a •great Statesman, it seems to be that
under such circumstances Han Over should be as dear
to us as Hampshire ; and 'whenever it was attacked
for British interests, it should be defended by British
magnanimity. But the same feeling's reSpeding He-
nover-prevailed at Paris as here ; and from the tira
moment of the Negotiation it was resolved that it
should be restored to its laWful Sovereign. Indeed
it was needless to do otherwise ; *for titey well knew
that British honour would never haVe _consented to

_surrender it. Stich has been our condu&, my Lords,
with resped to the interests of our own country,
to those of our Allies—and now allow me a word
with regard to the leading principle in this great
transaction. And here let Me observe, that if it did
not end satisfaCtorily, or, at least, as I could have wish.
ed, yet we have the satisfaetian.to retie& that Vv4.
have aced steadily; inzonformity to the, policy we
had'adopted; we have' not separated our interests
from those of the Continent; and not only have we
adhered to the Treaties which bound us to other
Powers, but evinced a generosity beyond the spirit,
that diaated them. France, we know, cherished
but one principle; and uniformly aCted upon that
principle, Viz. to dismember us frQru our Allies. That
sire a6ted upon this prinOlple will plainlyapppar in
the Papers,•and that in every one of the four stages of
the Negotiation. All her offs rs were cc:inched in such
a form as, if accepted, • must separate us from, them';
and the terms might seem very 'fit to' be occepted. :-
but we refused them : What did France resOi t tit r
She applied to the Russian Minister; 'and by dint of
inducements or threats, prevailed upon trim to sepa.
rate Russia froth England, though hecould not sopa.,
rate Engli.r.d from Russia. During the suspense in
which the „Ratification of .the Russian Treaty way
expeCted; she would still mgotjate. with us;- but she'
is known tahave looked upon Russia breaking-4414
us as a &,Cisive victory ; :which, if any other proof
were
.wanting to couvince.us of the utility of such a