The Sun.
London, England, 1836-12-13 00:00:00

LAW INTELLIGENCE

COURT OF CHANCERY, DEC. 12.
BUTTIVANT V. TAYLOR.

In this case, which was not concluded yesterday when
OUT Reporter quitted the Court, the LORD CHANCELLOR
said there was no part of the practice of the Coart which
should be watched with more vigilance than that which allowed
a party to make half his case at first, and then, if that half
failed, to allow him to produce more, or ask for an inquiry
which he had not, in the first instance, thought necessary.
This case was, however, not an instance of that kind.
Wartneby was brought before the Court as a person claim-
ing a lien on the deeds. The bill which brought him into
Court prayed that the deeds might be delivered up, but it
also prayed an inquiry into the grounds of the alleged lien,
and into the amount of the debt. The Master of the Rolls
' had ordered the deeds to be delivered up, but excluded the
inquiry. No harm could, however, result from the inquiry,
while great injustice might be done if it was refused ; and
his Lordship thought, therefore, under all the circumstances
of the case, that Wartneby ought to have an opportunity
of proving his lien if he could on an inquiry before the Mas-
ter ; the deeds, in the mean time, to be delivered up and
deposited in the Master's office.
SPENCE V. HOGG.

In this case also, which was left unfinished yesterday, the
LORD CHANCELLOR dismissed the appeal with costs.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, DEC. 12.
WRIGHT V. WOOD.

This was an action brought
by the plaintiff to recover
compensation in damages for bodily injuries, alleged to have
been sustained by him through the negligence of certain
persons employed on the defendant's premises. Shortly
before nine o'clock on the evening of the 30th of March
last a quantity of beer had been brought to the cellars of
the defendant's house, the Anchor, situate in the parish of
St. Mary-at-Hill, Thames-street, and the drays or waggons
were near the house, and the draymen in the cellar, arrang-
ing the casks, when the plaintiff, who was an old man, in
attempting to walk by the house, was thrown down upon
the pavement and partially into the cellar, by ropes, as he
alleged, which were depending from the dray-carts into the
cellar, and by means of which the casks had previously been
lowered. The plaintiff was so severely injured by the fall,
especially about the hip, that he was confined to his bed for
three weeks. The negligence complained of consisted in
leaving the flap-doors of the cellar open, and in allowing
the ropes to remain in the position described after the casks
had been once deposited in the cellar.—The Jury found a
verdict for the plaintiff—Damages 1001.

EXCHEQUER COURT, DEC. 12.
HARRIS V. PERRIN.

This was an action against the defendant, as overseer of
the poor for the parish of Greenford. The declaratio❑
stated that the plaintiff was the occupier of a house and
premises in the parish, and liable to be assessed to the
rates for the relief of the poor ; that the antecedent occu-
pier of the house had been licensed to sell beer ; and that
plaintiff, wishing to have a license also, gave notice to the
defendant, in order to be assessed to the rate ; but that
defendant, through malice, omitted to rate her, whereby she
was prevented from having a license, or making application
for one.

Lord ABINGEIi summed up, and the Jury found for the
plaintiff, damages 201.

GREGORY V. GREGORY.

His Lordship said that in this case the only question
was whether he ought to direct in his, decree that James
Gregory and John Gregory, the trustees under the will of
of an individual, also of the name of Gregory, should be
charged with the sum of 7001. with interest, which it was
contended they ought to have received from James Gregory
the younger, their co-trustee, and whether he should direct
an inquiry as to which of these sums had been lost to the
estate by the wilful default of the parties who were the
executors under the will of James Gregory the elder. The
will gives an option to James Gregory the younger to purchase
an estate called The Chequers, otherwise Pilkington Farm,
which had been devised to the executors in trust to be sold
for the general purposes of the will. James Gregory availed
himself of this option, and conveyance was accordingly ex-
ecuted in 1808 of the lands in question, and on the bask of
this conveyance the executors signed a receipt for the pur-
chase-money. In point of fact, neither of the executors
received the money, but it remained unpaid by James Gre-
gory, -the younger, who became a bankrupt in 1816. It
was contended in this case that the parties were trustees,
and not executors, and that the rule of liability affecting
them stood on a different ground. In the case of execu-
tors, if they joined in the receipt of money which might
have been lawfully received by either of them, they are all
liable, seeing that their joint receipt might reasonably be
taken to amount to an admission of their having controul
over it, and where either of them had received, and there
occurred a loss to the estate, they must be all held to be
equally liable. But it was not worth while to canvass the
law on-this side minutely, as it did not apply to the present
case. Here the receipt purported that the money was
under the controul of both the executors. If one of them
only had received his money, his case would be different
from the other ; but here neither of them had received,
and therefore both were guilty of a. breach of duty, and
liable to make good the loss. He proposed, therFfore, to
add to his decree a direction to the Master to inquire whe-
ther these things were so, and, if the facts were as sup-
posed, then he would charge the parties with the 700/,
with interest at four per cent.

NAVIES V. THOMAS.
In this case the only question was, whether the plaintif:
was entitled to claim a lien upon the estate of John Davies,
to the amount of 8951. I Is. 5d., which estate belonged ori-
ginally to James Davis, and was devised to Abraham Lloyd
in trust, to raise a certain amount due to David Davies, and
by the will the residue was devised to the testator's chil-
dren. Under this power the estate was bargained to be
sold by the trustees, and it was purchased by John Lloyd,
for the sum of 2,042/. In 1817, by a deed of release.
which recited the amount of debt and interest then due,
and the other material facts, the estate was advertised by
Abraham Lloyd, who was described as the surviving trustee
and devisee. In point of fact, the whole purchase-money
had never been paid, bnt only the amount of the debt due.
The remainder, being a sum of 8951., was secured by the
joint bond of John Lloyd and David Davies, and for this
amount, therefore, it was clear that there was lien upon the
estate. He delayed giving judgment in order that he might
examine the deed. Here there was an engagement to con-
vey the estate to certain uses stated, and no notice was taken
of the will. The decree must contain a declaration as
prayed by the plaintiff for the existence of the heir, and
this being the only point in dispute it was not necessary for
Lim to say another word on the subject.

111ABER V. HOBBS.

In this case he took time to consider his judgment, ar,
the question was one of great nicety, upon which the most
eminent authorities had given different opinions. The de-
fendant contended that the suit was defective for want
of parties, inasmuch as the assignees of Hobbs, who dead,
had an interest in the fund, which was the subject matter
of dispute, and were therefore entitled to be heard, had not
been made parties. In 1828 Mrs. Hobbs, then Miss
Brook, assigned over the estate in question to certain
trustees in trust for her sole and separate use and benefit,
and independent of any husband whom she might here-
after marry. In looking at that deed he was of opinion
that it contained no gift over, and it therefore followed
that it did not prevent Miss Brook, prior to her marriage,
from re-assigning the stock in question, nor after mar,
riage did it prevent her, jointly with her husband, fron,
making a similar assignment. He thought that the hus-
band could not set up his right, as husband, to the fund in
question, nor, consequently, could his asignees, so far a
the interest of the plaintiff was concerned. He was,
therefore, of opinion that, subject to the claims of prior
incumbrances, the plaintiff was entitled to the stock in

question, and his costs must be paid out of the fund, he
paying the costs of the prior incumbrances.

HUGHES V. GARNER.

The prayer of the bill in this case was that the defendant
might be restricted from setting up as a defence at law an
outstanding term, as a protection against an action of eject-
ment. The plaintiff claimed as eldest son and heir of
James Hughes, under a settlement made before his mar-
riage with Alice Griffin. The defendant had purchased
this estate by a subsequent conveyance, for a valuable con-
sideration. The rule in equity was that a person claiming
under a subsequent deed could not set up a prior outstand-
ing term, unless he was a purchaser for a valuable consi-
deration, and without notice. This must be made out by
the defendant. There must be a decree for the plaintiff;
but, under all the circumstances, without costs.
WEBB V. LU GAR.

This case was brought before the Court on admissions.
The only question was, whether the plaintiff was entitled
to the tithes of the defendant's farm.
His Lordship, after recapitulating the facts, which were
of no interest, dismissed the bill with costs.