The Sun.
London, England, 1822-10-31 00:00:00

CAMPAIGNS IN THE CANADAS.

( Continued from Yesterday's Sun.)
The naval operations of 1812 on the Canadian Lakes, though
few and uninteresting, 'were important in their influence upon
the events of the following year. When the war commenced,
the British possessed the superiority on both lakes, Ontario and.
Erie. On the former, the flotilla was composed of the Royal
George of 22 guns, and three smaller vessels, while the Ame-
ricans had only a brig of 16 guns : but our flotilla was unfor-
tunately manned only by Canadian, and the officers (who were
not of the royal navy) with their Commodore, Earle, were
notoriously incompetent. Earle, soon after the commence-
ment
of hostilities, stood over to Sackett's Harbour with his I
fleet to destroy the enemy's solitary brig ; there were then
no works at that place, but a few shot from two of the
brig's guns, planted without cover on a point of land. at the
mouth of the harbour, were sufficient to send the gallant
Commodore to his own haven of Kingston. The enemy were
soon aware of the importance of possessing an adequate
flotilla both on this lake and the others ; and, in, October,
Commodore Chauncey, of the American navy, arrived at Sac-
kett's, to equip a force of the desired superiority. Such was
his activity, that on the 6th of November ho appeared on the
lake with the brig and six fine schooners, mounting in all 48
guns, many of the heaviest metal, and manned by 500 of the
best seamen from the Atlantic ports. With this flotilla he chased
the Royal George into Kingston, cannonaded that port, and
swept the lake iu'triumph. Before the end of the autumn, a
new frigate, the Madison, to carry nearly thirty guns, was
launched at Sackett's Harbour ; while not the slightest exer-
tion was made at Kingston to increase the British force.
On Lake Erie, after the surrender of Hull, the enemy posses-
sed not a single vessel until they were permitted to board and
recapture their brig (which had been taken at Detroit,) as she
lay at anchor off Fort Erie. On this lake they also equipped
some small vessels before the close of the year ; and they com-
manded the waters of Lake Champlain with a flotilla, before
the British commander-in-chief had directed the construction of
a single gun-boat to oppose them.
In reviewing the campaign in the Canadas of 1812, the most
striking feature is the failure of the enemy in attempting the
subjugation of the British provinces. So extravagant were the
hopes of the American government regarding the issue of the
contest, that their secretary at war declared from his seat in
congress, that they could take the Canadas without soldiers ;
they had only to send officers into the provinces, and the people,
disaffected towards their own government, would rally round the
American standard.' Mr. Clay of Virginia added, that it was
absurd to suppose that the enterprize would fail of success ; he
was not for stopping at Quebec, or any where else ; he would
take the continent from the British; he never wished to see a
peace until this was dope.' Yet this Mr. Clay was afterwards
one of the American commissioners who signed the treaty of
Ghent !
The numerical force which the enemy collected in the course
of the summer was sufficient to give rise to lofty expectations.
On the different points of the frontier, Generals Hull, Van
Rensselaer and Dearborn had made their orders full Itl,ooo
men, of whom by far the greater portion were regular troops.
But their operations were feeble and disjointed ; and, if
ang general plan of action was ever prescribed to them, it was
neglected in execution. Hull advanced by orders from Wash-
ington before the American forces at other parts of the frontier
were prepared for operations.- Notwithstanding his proclama-
tion, the peaceable inhabitants of Canada soon discovered, in
the plunder and destruction of their property, that protection
and fraternity meant no more among the republicans of Ame..
rice, than the same terms had done 20 year before with other
liberator's and on another theatre. Hull certainly evinced great
incapacity after his passage of the Detroit, in not immediately
marching upon Amherstburgh with his whole force, for he
would, in all probability, have carried the place had he made
the attempt before Colonel Procter's arrival By lingering,
however, at Sandwich until that officer took the command, cut
off his communications, and closed the Indians on his rear, he
could not subsequently effect a retreat. Altogeter, from the im-
becile expedition of Hull, to the tardy advance and immediate
retreat of Dearborn, the conduct of this campaign displayed a
total absence of allmilitary skill, resolution and discipline in the
American forces. There exertions on the water were of another
character; they saw the full importance of- a command of the
great lakes, and availed themselves to the utmost of the supine-
ness of our commander.

IVe have noticed the errors which the enemy committed •
thero remains the less grateful task of recounting those which
marred the efforts of our gallant and devoted army, and pre-
pared the way for subsequent reverses.
In the winter of 1011-12, the designs upon Canada were
openly avowed in the American Congress, yet, except the em-
bodying of a portion of the militia of the lower province, Sir G.
Prevost made not the slightest preparation for defence. Coteau-
du-lac and Isle-aux-noix are the keys of Lower Canada; the
former completely commands the navigation of the St. Law./
rence between the upper and lower provinces; and the latter
had been so decidedly regarded as the barrier of Lower Canada
from the Champlain frontier, that it excited the particular at-
tention of the French engineers in the last defence of their colo-
nies, and was afterwards fortified at considerable expence by
General Haldimand during the war of the American Revolu-
tion. Yet Coteau-du-lac, though Sir George had passed it in a
tour through the province, was entirely overlooked until 1813 ;
and Isle-aux-noix was left unoccupied for several months after
the war, for the Americans to seize upon, had they then pos-
sessed sufficient military skill to be aware of its value.
The first act of the Commander-in-Chief, on learning. the
American declaration of war, was an earnest of his future irre-
solution. He dispatched orders to the commanding officer at
fort St. Joseph's to remain upon the defensive; but Captain
Roberts knew that, if attacked, his post was untenable • he was
aware that the enemy at Michilimackinac must shortly be re-
inforced, and he boldly preferred to follow the directions of his
immediate Cominander, General Brock, to assault that place
if he found it advisable. The important result has already been
told. To Gen. Brock himself, Sir George Provost sent no in-
structions whatever for some weeks after he received intimation
of the war. Whether this neglect was intentional, to leave that
officer to his own responsibility, or was merely the natural effect
of the infirmity of purpose which the Commander-in-Chief after-
wards so repeatedly evinced, the consequences were equally mis-
chievous ; for General Brock had moved from York to Fort
George with the intention of attacking the American fort of
Niagara, then unprepared for defence' and was only restrained
from that measure by the perplexity of his situation in being left
without orders. Hill's invasion, however, put it beyond doubt
that he should do right in opposing him, and the capture of that
force preceded his receipt of the first dispatches from the Com-
mander-in-Chief. These dispatches, indeed, were of such a
nature that it was fortunate they arrived no sooner. They an-
nounted; as we have already stated, the conclusion of that im-
politic armistice between Sir George Provost and General Dear-
born at the moment which should have been devoted to active
exertion against the American posts on the frontier. By the
terms of this truce, General Hull was to determine, at his
option, whether or not the suspension of arms should be bind-
ing upon his division. If he had not already capitulated before
he could make his choice, what might not have been the fatal
consequences of permitting him to claim the benefit of the
armistice ? _ .

... .
No Sooner was the suspension of arms to which Sir George
had agreed at an end, than he issued positive orders along the
whole extent of frontier, that no offensive operations whatever
should be attempted against the different points of the enemy's
line. The short-sightedness of such a system of defence needs
perhaps little exposition, but a practical illustration of its
tendency was afforded before the close of the year in the unop-
posed devastation of great part of the Indian country by General
Harrison, while Colonel Procter was compelled by his orders
to refrain from advancing to the aid of our allies. This want
of co-operation had a most unfavourable effect upon the minds
of the Indians, and was an impolitic and unmanly desertion of
them.
But the most fatal and palpable error of the Commander-in-
Chief was his neglect to preserve that ascendancy on Lakes Erie
and Ontario which was actually 'enjoyed by the British at the
opening of the contest. The command of these lakes is so evi-
dently an object of primary consideration in the defence of the
Canadas, that it is perfectly inconceivable how any man in Sir
George Preirost's situation•could have been so infatuated as to
disregard the importance of maintaining his superiority. The
miserable incompetency of Earle and the other officers of the
provincial marine on Ontario was, notorious, and especially after
their scandalous repulse at Sackett's Harbour; yet, Sir George
neither removed Earle nor noticed his misconduct. A large
sloop of war arrived a Quebec from Halifax soon after the be-
ging of the war, and its Captain would have needed but a hint
of the Commander-in.Chietis wishes to lay up his ship, march to
Ontario with his crew, and supersede Earle and his feeble fol-
lowers ; but such a plan was beyond the capacity of Sir George;

and so little feeling had he of the paramount value of the com-
mand of the waters, that a mere common-place attempt to hire
sailors for the lakes at Quebec, at one half 'the wages which
merchants were giving at the same moment, was the only exer-
tion used to strengthen the flotilla! But, with Earle as a com-
mander, it mattered little whether sailors were procured or not.
During the whole summer and autumn, the enemy's activity in
building vessels at Sackett's was incessant, and equally well
known with the incanacity of the pet sonnel of our pmvincial
naty ; but still no eAiirt was made to keep pace with them. If
the crew of the Tartarus sloop of war had been sent to King-
ston, the enemy's flotilla must have been destroyed in embryo,
for Socket's' Harbour was yet unfortitied ; if ship carpenters,
of whom there W.ere abundance at Quebec, had been dispatched
to Kingston, we might have built at least as rapidly as the
enemy ; but neither of these things was done. In .July, 1812,
therefore, we had a ship and three brigs while the enemy had
but one vessel, and that of the latter description ; and in the
November ensuing they had a frigate and seven other sail of
two masted vessels, manned by 500 seamen, while our force re-
mained precisely as before, Our original superiority and the
opportunity of perfecting it were thus lost, and the enemy be-
came masters of the Lake. We shall have full cause to observe
the consequences in the events of the following year, and to
these we now proceed.
The preparations of the enemy for the campaign of i ill' 'Were
made with more limited hopes than they had indulged when,
but a few months before, the conquest of the Canadas was
considered as a matter of sure calculation. They did not,
however, relax in exertion, and reinforcements and abundant
supplies were expedied,hy their governMent during the winter ;
while great energy was exhibited in augmenting that naval
strength at Sackett's Harbour, where a second frigate and seve-
ral smaller vessels were in rapicprogress. On our part, after slum-
bering away the preceding summer and autumn without one
effort to increase our marine in amount of efficiency, Sir Geo.
Prevost suddenly awoke, in the depth of winter to a sense of
the condition to which is supineness had reduced the Bri-,
tish cause ; and the building of two frigates commenced with
convulsive activity. One of them (and only one) was laid down
in the secure dock-yard of Kingston,—the other was laid down
at York, an open place defended merely by two or three
small block-houses and unconnected batteries ! The enemy
as might have been foreseen, accepted the invitation which
was thus held out to them to destroy the ship on the stocks.—
soon as the season was sufficiently advanced for naval opera-
tions, Commodore Chauncey appeared on Lake - Ontario with
his frigate and nine other vessels, and embarking the Com-
mander-in-Chief, General Dearborn, with about 2,000 of the
land forces, sailed for York. near which the troops were landed..
on the 27th .of April. General Shea% occupied the capital
.of
Upper Canada, with 300 regulars and 350 militia and Indiana,
These troops, oiler maintaining an unequal contest witti deter:: ,
mined spirit for some hours, were finally compelled to retreat"'
towards Kingston. Before they fell back, however, they binn-
ed the new_ vessel on the stocks; but the town of York, a man,
Of-war-brig in the harbour, and a quantity of naval stores fell
into the hands of the enemy. General Sheaf& has been much
blamed, first, for the injudicious position of the troops, by
which the grenadier company of the. Bth Regiment, who be-
haved with great gallantry, were exposed to be cut to pieces
in a wood, and again for not returning to the attack,,after,
the explosion of a powder magazine had destroyed 250 of thc
enemy, and thrown them into confusion. But, whatever
were his faults, it is evident that the Commander-in-Chief
was the primary cause of the disaster, in alluring the enemy to
the enterprise by directing the construction of the frigate at a
spot where he had provided neither men nor tenable works for
its protection.
The enemy, after embarking the captured stores, sailed for
Niagara. Having there concentrated his whole force, to the
number of 6,000 infantry, 250 cavalry, and a numerous train of
artillery, Dearborn, in the morning of the 26th of May, tinder
cover of a heavy and destructive fire from his fleet, mode good
his landing on the Canadian shore below Fort George. Here
every gallant effort was ineffectually made to resist the over-
whelming numbers of the enemy ; and our troops were com-
pelled to .give way, after suffering. a heavy loss. Retiring up
the strait to collect the small garrisons of Fort Erie and other
posts, General Vincent, our commander on the Niagara, who
thus reinforced, mustered, after his loss, about 1,600 bayonets,
abandoned the whole of that line to the enemy, and 'gained -a
position at Burlington Bay, 50 miles from Fort George on the
lake shore towards York, before the enemy could succeed in an
attempt to intercept him.
But the American general was not satisfied with the advantage
which he had gained, and he accordingly, on the lstJune, sent
forward from Fort George a force of 3,500, cavalry and infantry,
and 9 pieces of artilery, to force from their position or capture
Gen. Vincent's division. On the morning oftliesth June, the
enemy arrived within seven miles of the position at Burling-
ton, and in the course of the day, Lieut.-Colonel.Harvey, De-
puty Adjutant-General, having reconnoitred their camp, made
the daring proposal to General Vincent of attempting to sur-
prize it during the same night. The attempt was desperate,
but the occasion demanded no other. The night proved ex-
cessively dark and propitious 'for the surprise, and Colonel
Harvey, who himself led the troops, judiciously considered that
the smallest numbers which, could effect the object of throwing
the enemy into confusion, would be best able to co-operate.
The division had been under arms all day in expectation of
the enemies attack, and just before midnight, as if to change
their position only, the halves of two British regiments, mus-•
tering exactly 704, marched out of camp. At 'two o'clock, irf
the stillness of the night, this little band fearlessly rushed with
fixed bayonets into the American camp of just five times their
number. The surprize was complete ; a part only of the ene-
my had time to fire one destructive volley before they tied ,in
every direction, leaving Generals Windier and Chandler, their
two senior officers, and a hundred prisoners, in the hands of the
assailants. with four field-pieces. The British troops then re-
tired just before day-break to their own position, carrying with
them the prisoners and two of the guns of which the horses had
been secured. The object of the enterprise was most fully ef.
fected, for, with the day, the Americans only returned to their
camp to destroy stores, provisions, &c. and then their wholeforce made a precipitate retreat of eleven miles, until General
I..iewis joined them with a considerable reinforcement.
(To be continued.)

CANALS IN.ENGLAND AND I' RANGE.--The num-
ber of navigable canals in the United Kingdom is 103, of
which 97 are formed in England alone, not including those of
which the length does not exceed five miles ; five in Scotland;
and one only in Ireland. The total extent of these canals is
26821 miles ; i. c. 2471 miles of English canals, 1491 miles in
Scotland, and 693 miles in the Dublin and Shannon canal.
The sum expended in these constructions is' estimated at
more than 30,000,0001. sterling ; and, in some cases, the
original share's have risen, in a few years, to fifteen, and even
twenty times their original value. In the lines of these canals,
48 subterraneous passages occur, the entire length of which is
not accurately known ; but 40 of them, whose lengths are stat-
ed,-give a total developement of 57,051 yards, or more than 32
miles. It is deserving of remark, that of the total length of the
English canals, more than fourteen hundred miles communicate
with the grand navigable line between London and Liverpool,
the length of this alone being 264 miles ; and it is connected
in its course with forty-five others, of which •the united extent
equals 1,150 miles. Such is the present state of the English
navigable canals ' • not a yard of which existed before the
year 1755. Till that time, the idea of canals was ridicul-
ed as superfluous and absurd, in a country like England
enjoying, as it was said, favourable lines of coast, and
provided with numerous navigable rivers. It is well- known
that the Duke of Bridgwater by opposing himself to
the prevailing opinions and prejudices of the country, first
demonstrated the practicability and importance of 'such
works; and, to effect his purpose, on coming of age, he limited
himself to a personal expenditure of four hundred pounds per
annum, applying the remainder of his revenue to the
construction of the first Canal, bearing his name, and which
forms an imperishable monument of his genius and pa-
triotism. This work, completed in 1759, proved the prac-
ticability and advantage of the system, and laid the forinda-
don of all that has since been effected in it, so highly to
the interest, the convenience, and the reputation of the
country. Of navigable canals in France, the number is
very inconsiderable, there being only six of the first order,
and. about 20 of inferior dimensions. These six are the
canal of Briare, completed in 1642; that of Ltinguedoc, in
1680 ; that of Orleans, 1692 ' • that of Lorgn, finished, in 1723 ;
the Canal du Centre, in 1791 ; and that of St. Quentin, in
1810: the total length of which amounts only to 591,000
metres, or 378 English miles. The secondary canals have a'
total length of 250 miles, making thus together only 028 miles
of navigable canals, in a territory containing 26,700 square
French leagues ; being quadruple the surface of England, and
with a population nearly three tunes as great.