The Sun.
London, England, 1813-03-13 00:00:00

signs of the Ruler of France,,alltl upon principle ,e
which would' enable that power eventually_ to con-
.Vert that defensive system into •one of lle
otisive
warfare. They were also aware of the seutialehti
entertained, and even . the xvishes expressed-its;
Rus-sea; as to the best and most effeetteal
_ this military could adopt, of operatiPas in its fir-
half, winch was by a vigorous proseeation of
til.ities against the enemy in the. Peninsula.
complexion of-affairs upon the Continent was alsia-,
such as-'to set 'tit liberty the great disposable
force for active service, which ne.'-rthe com-
mand of an °nicer, who was one of those that
watched over the dawning glories of the Martinis
Wellington, he meant Lord Wi'diant Bentinek:
The state of the PeninsUla itself. too
,was diffe-
rent, and most l'avournble too, froni-what it %vas
nt. any preceding period. Its Military system was
ahioillotted by bins that was the great soul of all
Lis militltry operations, to a subordinate Admini-
stration ; and an interior system Of Government
was. established of a kind so aidienlotts, so. Judi
crows,' that could 'not decorously, in' that
House, express his contemptuous disgust of it.
The different armies of the enemy ‘vere placed in
situations so remote, so apart from effectual cum,
-mnnieation with each other; as to afford unprece-
dented facilities to the Allied Forces—that of the
South, under the orders of Sonic, was occupied at
-the time, in operatiima of 30 extensive, so peva- I
liar iv maitre, that the presence 6f that excellent 1
officer Sir Rowland Hill, with the comparatively'
small force under his,eonimand, was able to op-
pose a certain degree' of resistance to them,: and
he did not think it tot) preach to say, that, under
the then 'circumstances of. the French army, a
;force might have been brought forward, s(r as to
bold it at check at another important point. Mar-
shal Marniont's force, too, .was comparatively in-
significant at the time ; and between these two
General Officers there existed material differences.,
Upon the whole, the crisis was such! as that a
more favoiirable opportanity never occurred in
the world. And at such a crisis, the country and..
Emilie were geuerally united in sentiment, that the
most effectual exertion was to be Made.;. and that' •
was .the universal 'feeling of Spain herself:. He .
was.prepared ,to state to their Lordships„ and ire
meant to endeavour to shew, that at every point
in which the late eintyai.on in Spain had failed :
'it was solely from theinetlectual means afforded---
from the inadequate resources given to the 'lllns-.•
trious Officer who commanded, and so often led on
ihe allied troops-to victory and to glory. From
t hese cries es he 'wits disabletlfrom-folkiwing up Ilk
hitherto unparalleled successes-7--from advancing .
after the brilliant affair of Badajoz, to che attack
and destruction of the aecumulated and main re, „,
sources of the French at Seville, the very founda-
tions of their power 'which might have been
caimplished in the then very , favourable state of
things in the South of Spain.. The war might
then, were it not for inadequacy, of means, have
been carried into the North of Spain. He knew
that at the-moment a temporary movement,to-
wards the North of. Spain had become.necessary
with reference to the unproie.cteci state of the.for-
tresses:of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida ; though
hail there. been unadequate force to hold. tire•
French militaryin check in .the Noah at the time'
stich a sudden _movement of the main army to-
Wards.that quaiaer woald.ntit be necessity. . in-
deed the enemy's force in the North- *is such at
the tinted that', as it wasknown to the NtahleLordS
opposite, they were repulsed* by the Militia in
the Northern Provinces of Portugal—that niith
a small division of British troops Marmont might
be takeu ; and it was the peculiar disastrous for,.
.tune of the whole elunpaigti, that, from the same
eat e, inadequacy, of means,. the main force was
unavoidably employed la operations for. inferior,
°hit:as. • If there
.waS a stitheicat British forcelo.
have kept Mariimut in chediti as Sault .was kept-
'by General Hill in the sonth, that sudden move-
meat towards the north would be unaecessary,
and the main may hod been left free t,.) act against
the immense resources of the French in the south°,
which then might have been cut. off; and that was-
no vain, or fantastic opinion, but one of clear amid'
tlitiit praCticability. But from the s:tine.pardys-.
ing.cause, the inadequacy Of lila means, the illus..
trito3 Getteralwas incapacitated Iran rendering
so signal, 3O complete, and so essential -Wrvice
to
.his country, to. Spain-, and to Earope. These
were facts and considerations Which afforded' ant-
ple grnand for aft inquiry, and such he meant to
c;til seer. The..,same paralysing cause precluded
the advauce of a victorious army into the interior
of Spain.,Scarcely had' that great General en-:
tared upon that progress, than fie felt. himself
constrained, from the insufficiency of his means,-
. to ciniunence what was,,under these-circumstances,
a patient arid necessary retreat. He found him-,
self opposed by itiartnont in such a way-as to ren,
der that line of conduct necessary; and, at the same
times...through a similar line• of management,
which induced hiS'imMediitte sitwttion, ire abso-.
lately knew. nothing. of the arrival of the Sicilian
expedition, nor was it possible, in ,fair view of
the subject, that he could have had !, ; From the
combin WOOS of force against him, it Becamenot -
only a matter of ,prudence and wisdom on the part
of the ,of ahsolute neeessits,
to continence a regular. Series of defensive nribra-,
tious. Such was the state of things
.on' the lith,
Of ;filly, when the system of retreat adopted by
Lord Wellington was-prudently, wisely, and pro-
perly entered upon, bet. use the force opposed to
hint was,so greatly `superior to his owe. He was
satisfied that If that
,Noble,Lord (Wellington) had
received a reinforcement of J 5,000 men, he would
have adVanced, instead of being obliged to re-
,. treat. But as Lord Wellington was realiysituat-
, td, it was impossible :for .him to adVallCe. .He
had indeed, through an effort of 'his genius, taken
advantage of a favourable opportunity, ancl con-
,

SATU It DAY. \\IA H 13, 1813'.

• vetted tietreat into victory. But something more
dim a favimtable opportunity was necessary to
ti,le him to Change a.- retreat, into an advance ;
ie Girder to accomplish this, it was absolutelynee
cessary to Thane the'whole system of our depots.
and magaeines, whiclewere not under 'his ;mine-.
It was-not therefore. possible for
him to change the retreat iptci an advancer To
prove imw very inadequate the expedition from
Sicily had been to the object which Was intended.
by i:, it was only necessary tti obserVe, that after
the arrival of that. expedition,. Suellet had been
nbte to semi a reinforcement to the corps- of Jo-
seph, which rendered that corps efficient,- and by
mudding it to bane. On the ,flanks .of Lord Wel-
lington'saymy, issue deprived thanof the fruits of
the victory, of .Saltutienca. But 'l.'6rd ,Wellieter
.too had not Ate Meansof following up the ad-
vantage which• he obtained by the victory Of
Salanancr e- the very success on that occasion
,showed the inefficiency of his means. Some
persons had o!nected to Lord Wellington going
I to ikladrid. If he (Lord Wellesley) -was asked •
whether-he considered it a politic measure to have
made the British army,take possession of Madrid,'
although there-was no. certainty of their being
able to keep possession of it ? he would answer
the' be considered the policy of the Measure ques-
tioutuble: But in the case of the Commander of
the Heitish army in Portitgal, the taking possession
Madrid'wasa thattei of necessity ; for nothing
would have been mnre - detrimental to-
.his Lord-
ship than to have left•Mhdrid with 'a pOssibility of
it being taken possesSion of by theFeench.' An-
other necessary object of inquiry would be into the
meet Of the failure atßurgos. it'was an import
ant, Operation to take that place, it would certainly '
be proper to knowwity fee failed. In a letterwhich lie
himself had received trout his Noble Relation,- be
• Was informed that he had beette, from • accidental
circumstances, imapprised of the strength of that
furtress. Ile hod also heard from other persons
that Lord Wellington had declared, that although
he had succeeded-in taking Burgort, •be could not
have made'a• successful campaign without rein
liireements. Ihe object, it seemed, was to ac-
complish the t.!vecttation of the South of Spain ;
bat was it necessai, iii Ordcr
toevaCtelte the Whole of Spain, exce,,?t, a few fron-
tier fortresSes ? But to let the palter still go
further, what could have teen a more dreadful
les-
son to the people of Spain, than eo see theiteoun-•
.try deserted by Our army, while driving 'the
French before- them ; and they e ere scarcely de- •
livered from that hardship whenitheywere exposed
tnanother,, perhaps a wors'e;\ when titeyshw the
French, in their turn, driving liack the British -
twiny. The effect of such things 'must certaiuly
eeery had; lint-he hopedin God, that the bad
effects of such a lesson,- might be effaced by some
future-success. But why did Lord Wellington re-
,tiete---was it for the purpose of `completing the
etacaation of the South of Spain hy.the• Peeneb ?
He retired because he entertained deetbts of the
safety of the corps of Sie Rowland Hill. • The re-
treat of the army was attended with gloryto them-
selves and- to tacit leader, 'but with none to the
nation at large,whether it was taken.abStraetedly,
or as it related to the cause of. Spain and of
rope. From the conduct of the army on its re-
treat arose another argument on the:imperfection.
of the system adopted by his Majesty's iliinisters. •
No army could preserve-good discipline 'on a re
treat ;. but -then the question recurs again ,--why
was the army obliged to retreat ? :Whether
was-
it owing to a want of resources in the 'country, of
to the bad:testi of the administration of those re- .
sources That was a, subject which rleserved much
scrutiny. The effect of the last vampaign had not
been an approximation tie the object in view,7but
on the contrary, a removal front that object. The
object., the only honest object, stint the object which
he was persuaded uanit had in view, was ,•
the expulsion from Spain of the French troops, or
at least such a diminution of them .as .would be
adequate to an expulsion..: If the .campaign failed
from the want of sufticient,tneans,.such as failure
was not from necessity, but from the exercise
an unreasonable, degree of,discretion
,in the dis*-
tribution of those means. He Would wisleto tisk_
whether there were means, end to try the ues-
:lion on two points first, Twhe'ther there were ,
really means in the Ceuntry., Second, 'What the
means were, with proper regard to the pressure of •
the finances. He argued the %thole ulton • the,
one point, that the crisis demanded the greatest
possible effort. .One -Noble Lord had said, that a,
great flourish might have been made in tile last ,
campaign ; but that by doing so, the meanS.Of the'
country would have been so much exhausted; that
it. would not have been possihie toelo witch in the '
succeeding, season. but he would.state poSitively,
that any efforts which could have bee;-, made in
the last campaign, howilver `great and however •
straining :upon the resources- of the country;
Would; considering the crisis, haVe brought mat-
ters to an issue, and the efforts necessary in sue-
()ceding campaigns wonld halve hi eft c4;teparatkVely
small. Such an effortwouhl heve been ningnani"
Meth in justice, anti in resueet hair
duties ,
Russia and to Europe: -The Ai: title Margas then
went oe expatiating on the neeessitv :de-
manded the most strenuous efforts on -the part of
Government. Ile emceed into a' tletail Of tlu Mon-
ber of troops in the kingdom in the year 1612, and
contended from the state of the forces in the
tom, reinforeements might have been sent to-Lord
Wellington in such time, anti to havereached bon
before-the battle of Sulamance. Ile had said, That
1.5',000 mist, sent at a proper time, would. have
effected the object which was- rettoired. On com-
paring the 'number Sent by -eivernenent, be found
that they amounted
to about twenty thousand
men ; scarcely so many ) so: that Ministers; and he
119 t difrer so nitwit a=ir thesubjeet of the nuin-
hers as on the flute when they, should have been