The Sun.
London, England, 1809-10-11 00:00:00

of former under-otteer3, abd former soldiers wTlo
had, obtained their discharges, and who had run to
arms on the first signal.
Lord Chatham, therefore, charged himself with
-a senseless operation, and those, therefore, woo pro-
jected it she wrd"themselves to be as ignorant of the
climate a's of the localities. Lord Chatham saved
the English army' by determining.to re-embark it
but every day that lie delays to execute this deter-
mination, heightens the tnisfortunes of his expedi-
tion, and if lie is culpable, it ii'not in having ordered
the- retreat, it is in having so long delayed.to-re-em-,
bark;, for during this delay, the English troops con-
tra6t fresh diseases and become infected with fresh
seeds of destru6tion.

Let it suffice to say, that the Emperor, when he
learned that an English army had been landed upon
that point, recommended -that it should not be at.:.
tacked, and•that we ,should leave the destruL-tion of
it to the diseases, which, in that dangerous climate;
must do the enemy more injury, than the-cannon,
without its costing any thing to France.
The EngliSh, in linding in Flanders, did, there-
fore, a thing contrary to all the ,rules of war :. Ist,
Because they took-for the theatre of their operations
a country so unwholesome, that they had to presume
that a month's stay in it would destroy their army ;
that the country is covered with strong places, such
as Flushing, Bergen-op-Zopm, Bathz, and Lillo;
and on the side of the island of Cadsand,.the new
ForfiNTapoleon, etc. &c.
2d. Because their principal obje& appeared to be
to capture- the squadron, they ought to have ima-
gined that the squadron depended upon, Antwerp,
and that Antwerp was iMpregnable, tor its cotntuu-
nications with France could not be cut. off,. except
by immense armies, against which the, whole popu-
lation of France would have time to match.
The result of all which is, that the English have
been for so many years shut out of the Continent,
that they are no longer acquainted with it. Every
thiitg has changed, except their hatred against
France. •

With regard to the Island of Walcheren, it is
said; that they Mean to keep it.' We should have
Only cause to applaud this resolution for 'many rea-
sons The English, although they had 20,000
men in the Island of Walcheren, could not prevent.
it from being attacked and re-taken ; 2d, 20,000
English, exposed to the influence of the climate,
would experience so much loss, that it would be ne-
cessary to be continually reinforcing them ; that, in
the course of the year, 80,000 men wonld as nqcqs-
satily become. -vlttuns to.the Climate, and it. would
cost them more to guard this marsh, than to pre-
serve the East Indies ; but it is probable that time,
would not be left for them to suffer such losses.-e--
The channel between the two Islands is so narrow,
hat bombs. can . reach from the one to the ot her
26 ships of the line and the flotilla, which we
have in the Scheldt, would soon make us masters of
that river. It would not be forgotten, that four years
ago, and with our flotilla .alone, we were masters of
all the coasts ; can it be doubted, that we should
be soon masters of a closed sea ? and can it, at the,
same time, be supposed that the English would at-
tempt to keep Flushing without being masters of the
Scheldt ? Besides, a flotilla is too eaog,erous d war
for them. Such 1;1 wrl7, is not earriethott..with boats
atone, it is VOXldlta4 kid) excellent .troops, that is
to say, with means eUich, do not allow the English
any advanTge over us.
We well knov.e.that men exist, who, although
completely jgnorant of the art of War, have,
.not-
witl.standirg, the. silly habit of taking andendea-
vouringrro give counsel to those who are masters in
it ; those people, yet more skilful than that public
speafier who introduced the subject of war before
Hannibal,, tell you, that the. Engligh, by preserving
the Wand of Walcheren, will wake it.a second Gi-
braltar,- or another Malta ; in fiee, a commanding
point, which will render them masters of Flanders,
of Holland, &o. -Poor madmen ! they cannot per-
ceive that if the English persist in keeping the Island
of Walcheren, that circumstance would be as advin-
iageous • for us as if they were embarrassed in the
heart of Spain.
In general, whenever an English army lands,on.
the Coetinent, every real Frenchman °opt to re-
joice. ' Such a contest is completely in our favour :
a nation of three millions of men cannot meet man
for man a nation of forty millions. A new army,
all the elements of which are in the navy, cannot
keep the field against the. veteran forces w hick have
conquered vuvo-thirds of Europe ; in tine, an army
which can only/arrive by sea, has neither artillery,
cavalry, nor equipages, at least it has a vety great in-
teriority in all these means, and Lord Chatham
really could not mount 'more than 2000 cavalry ;
well ! betbre 15 days were elapsed, the French el-
le6tive • cavalry, which were assembled on the banks
of the Scheldt, amounted to 4000 !

BRITISH OPERATIONS IN SPAIN.

Notes upon Lord Wellington's Dispatches, by the
Monitear:

- communicated with Sir Robert Wilson. and Cenefal
Cuesta upon the importance of occupy Mk Puerto de Banos,
and Puerto Perales." Lord Wellington's Letter of the litti of
August, in the Gazette.

We wish that Lord Wellington may 'command
the English armies. From the character of the man,
he will experience great catastrophes. It appears
that he has neither spies nor correct information a
thing astonishing ip a country in which England has
so many partisans.—/Iloniteiir.

" Because it was even of more importance to Its than to
the Spaniards, to open a communication by the way of Palen-
e.t.a."— Lord Wellington's Dispatch.

We are wiping to believe that these dispositions
were made, for we observe in one of his dispatches,
that he thought that he was opposed by only between
10,000 and i 2,000 French, and it was possible that
he might march -with 20,000 men against a corps
which, in his opinion, amounted only to between,
10,000 and 20,000 men. But he must have taken
another decision on his march ; he must have received.
information of this corps of 12,000 men really amount-
ing to 70,000. He had his retreat cut off, and -be
was very happy to make his escape by throwing
himself into impradicable- roads. General Welles
ley is inexcusable in not having knuwn• that the
corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia, of Elchingen,
and of Treviso, aft-jaunted together to 70,000 men,
and in having supposed that he was able to cover his
1t.4 wing against that formidable army by leavibg
two battalions at Puerto Banos. What an instance
of ignorance !—Vioniteuro • • '