The Sun.
London, England, 1822-11-02 00:00:00

CAMPAIGNS IN THE CANADAS.

( Continued from Yesterday's SUN.)
After the operations on the Miami, the enemy abandoned
all intention of advancing against the Detroit frontier until they
could attain a naval superiority on Lake Erie. While General
Harrison, therefore, was augmenting his force, the American
arsenal at Presqu'isle was the scene of busy preparation for the
equipment of a fleet. The British held the command of the
waters of , Lake Erie, but our flotilla, like that on Ontario, was
manned entirely by Canadian sailors, and itrstate of equipment
altogether. was extremely' defective. The enemy early in the
siring laid down two heavy sloops of war at Presqu'isle. Their
views did not escape the British commander on the Detroit fron-
tier, and he formed the design of capturing Presqu'isle before the
new ships could be launched. But the attempt was utterly hn-
practicable without reinforcenrients, and these were long and
anxiously demanded in vain. When Sir James Yeo, arrived
with his seamen, Captain Barclay of the Royal Navy was de-
tached to assume the command on Lake Erie. A more able or
gallant officer could not have been selected ; but he was suffer-
ed to carry with him to Amhertsburgh, where he arrived in ,
June, no more than 25 of the seamen of the Ontario fleet. He
fully concurred with General Procter in the necessity' of an im-
mediate attack upon. Presqu'isle, and their endeavours were
united in soliciting the Conaruander-in-Chief to afford the means
of effectitig iittefore it should be too late; Their joint entrea-
ties were met only by promises which were never fulfilled. On
Captain BaKclay's arrival, a new vessel, to carry 18 guns, was, I
laid &own at Arnhertsliurgh, but there were neither men nor
suitable ordnance either for her or the rest of the fleet, and
though these wants were repeatedly stated, they were almost
entirely disregarded. So early as the 19th of June, after having
exposed the necessity of .destroying the enemy's arsenal, it is
said in a dispatch from General Procter ,to,the confidential -
Aide-de-Camp of Sir G. Prevost, I trust you will see the expe-
diency ofsendmg me the remainder of the 41st Reg,iment, I did
flatter myself that they were On their routq hither from your
letter to me; they should be sent here without delay, to in any
degree ensure the safety of this district—' I am very desirous of
having our new vessel on the water, where she will be much
safer ; every effort should be made to send seamen before the
vessels at Presqu'isle are ready. If reinforced I shall have
some confidence, but I know the cry has always been against
sending men here.' But this strong representation was re-
plied to only by empty promises of speedy succour, and though
the remainder of the 41st Regiment' could with the utmost ease
have been detdched from the army on the Niagara frontier after
their success on the 6th of June, with a reinforcement of sea-
men from Ontario (for the. short period their assistance would
have been required a'Presqu'isle,), not a man of either service
was sent at the time fez' the purpose. On the 4th of July it
was stated by General Proctor in a dispatch . to Sir George
Prevost, that if these reinforcements had been sent, it would
have been in his power, by the destruction of the enemy's ves-
sels at Presqu'isle, tb have placed the dock-yard and port of
Amherstburgh in a state of security which,. under existing cir-
cumstances, it cannot be said that they are m ; however, though
certainly more difficult to be effected, it may not be too late if,
agreeably to requisition,the remainder of the 41st Regiment be
immediately sent to .ong Point'. (on Lake Erie). It will
scarcely, be credited that, even after this, the Commander-in:
Chief should have suffered above five weeks to elapse before
he dispatched the small amount of regular troops that, at an
earlier period; would have sufficed to secure the half of the up-
per province from becoming a prey to the enemy ; although lie
fully acknowledgde his immediate ability to grant such a re-
inforcement by stating, in answer to the'deihand (on the 12th
of July) " the whole of the 41st Reginient will -be either with
you or on the way ere this reaches you." Such supplies of
men as were at length sent canie in detail and by small parties,
and were in consequence nearly useless.
While the extreme weakness of the British regular force on
the Detroit, after the expedition to the Miami, reduced General
Proctor to continue inactive, Mr. Dickson had succeeded in
bringing the nutnerous Indian body from the westward into'
the Michigan country, where full 3,000 warriors were now col-
lected in the British alliance ; a larg,er number of their nations
than had perfelps ever before assembled in arms for a com-
mon purpose. Had the Commander-in-Chief supplied a few
hundred regulars at this' epoch, the enemy must have been
annihilated, but the Indians would not act- without the sup-
port of the British, and, except their operations are directed
by a respectable force of white troops, every movement
must be governed by the caprice of the native warriors.—
The number of our allies which might have been made so for-
midable to the Americans, became, on the contrary, only em-
bairfisino• to ourselves. The difficulty of feeding them daily
increased. All 'the representations of General Procter could
obtain neither provisions nor money from below, and before
the end of July the warriors and their families were re-
duced almost to starvation. At length the impossibility of
provisioning them attained its height, and neither troops, nor
food, nor money being dispatched to his aid, 'General Proctor
was compelled, with such means as he possessed, to endea-
deavour to support his allies in the enemy's country. Ile
could not carry heavy. artillery with him, for the flotilla were
necessarily occupied in Watching Presqu'isle, though too weak
to attack it. He landed a second time near I ort Meigs,
which he blockaded, in hopes that Harrison, who, with the
body of his forces, was now absent from it, would attempt
its relief; but he was too wily to trust to the issue of a con-
flict with the Indians in the woods which surrounded that
fortress. A stratagem was then tried by the Indians to pro-
voke the garrison to a sortie, but the event of a former salip
was fresh in American recollection, and they were not to
be drawn from their defences. The Indians were now con-
iinced that nothing was ,to be done against the plhce ; they
found it hard,' in their own language, to fight against men
who lived like ground hogs,' or in other words were strongly
intrenched, and they ' immediately began to desert the British
commander. But he knew that it was hopeless to return to
the Detroit, and made one more effort to harrass the enemy by
embarking his little force and proceeding to Fort Sandusky
farther round the lake, and in the heart of their country..
Against this place an assault was attempted by the troops with
the utmost gallantry, but repulsed with loss, Ihr the Indians
fled at the moment when the columns moved towards the place.
No alternative now remained but a return to the Detroit, with
increased difficulties and diminished force; and the whole In-
dian body again concentrated in the Michigan territory.
The struggle which had 'hitherto been maintained on the
Detroit and Erie frontier with so much ability and courage un-
der every disadvantage and neglect from the Commander-.
in-Chief, was now approaching its crisis. General Procter
had scarcely arrived on the Detroit from the late operations,
before Captain Barclay was necessitated to retire into the
port of ilmherstburgh by the appearance on the lake of
the American fleet of far superior force to' that under his
orders, in the whole course of that vacillation and error which
unhappily distinguished the administration of Sir George Pre-
vost, his imbecility. of judgment and action was most flag-
rant and palpable in the circumstances which led to the de-
struction of our marine on Lake Erie. Captain Barclay stated
the wants of his squadron in men, stores' and guns with the same
truth and earnestness as General Proctor had repeatedly. ex-
pressed ; but the only reply of Sir George Prevost to his state-
ments was a cold and general promise, in a letter to General
Proctor, that some petty officers and seamen for Lake Erie
should be sent forward on the first opportunity,' and this first
opportunity, it seems, was neither sought nor found before the
month of September, when forty sailors only were supplied.—
The mode to be resorted to of procuring those stores and ord-
nance without which it was in vain to proceed against the enemy,
was curiously stated in the same letter—' The ordnance and
naval stores you require,' said Sir George, must be taken
from the enemy, whose resources must become yours ;" I am
much mistaken if you do not find Captain Barclay well dis-
posed to play that game.' It was assuredly, not from personal
experience that the Commander-in-Chief recommended this
manner for acquiring stores and artillery, ; for he brought no re-
sources from Sackett's Harbour ; on the 13th of July, the re-
quest for seamen was renewed—'Even 100 seamen,' says a dis-
patch from General Proctor to • Sir George Prevost of that
date, pushed on here immediately, would, in all probability,
secure the superiority on this lake'—` I am already weakened
on shore by my efforts to enable Captain Barclay to appear on
the lake ; if lie should not receive 100 seamen, I shall be under
the necessity of sending more soldiers on board the vessels.'
Yet no seamen came, and on the 18th of August, Gen. Proc-
ter announced to the Commander-in-Chief that the enemy had
appeared in superior force to Captain Barclay befor one sailor
had been supplied, notwithstanding every solicitation. Still
all hope was not past. The Detroit is launched,' says Gen.
Procter's dispatch of this date,.' and if I had seamen, a few
hours would place this district in security'—' I entreat your
Excellency to send me the means of continuing the con.
test.' Butt instead of replying to this application with an
immediate reinforcement of seamen, the Commander.in.Chicf