The Sun.
London, England, 1836-11-12 00:00:00

non, his father. The object of the bill was to have it de-
clared that the compensation money awarded in respect of
the slaves belonged to the Vernons, and did not belong to
Punnett or Frazer and Co. The slaves were originally
found in the Island of Antigua, upon an estate called Ver-
nons. They were then removed to a plantation called Hawks-
bill, which belonged to a Mr. Casmajor, from whence they were
removed to Mustique, in St. Vincent, belonging to Mr.
Punnett, who mortgaged them to Frazer and Co. The
bill alleged that in August 1765, Mr. John Vernon, by will,
devised all his estates in Antigua, with the negroes, stock,
and crops, to his son, James Vernon, for life, under whom
the plaintiff claims. At the time when the testator made
his will, the plantation in the island of Antigua was leased
for a term of fourteen years to a Mr. Duncan Grant. To
that lease there was a schedule annexed, containing an ac-
count of the number of slaves on the property, and the im-
plements, &c., necessary for the cultivation of the estate,
which John Vernon devised to Casmajor. The bill also
alleged that previous to the execution of this lease, Mr.
Casmajor removed forty-nine of the slaves from the estate
of Vernons to Hawksbill, which subsequently came into the
possession of Messrs. Frazer and Co. Messrs. Frazer and
Co. had put in a general demurrer, for want of equity, and
also for want of parties, Punnett not being made a party
to the sale.

Mr. PEMBERTON and Mr. LEWIS appeared in support
of the demurrer, aid contended that there having been an
adverse title for forty years, that the slaves having been
found duly registered in the island of Antigua, that no
notice having been to Messrs. Frazer and Co. of their re-
moval, and no sufficient title being shown by the plaintiff
in the original transaction, the demurrer must be allowed.
Mr. KINDERSLEY appeared in support of the bill. The
plaintiff was tenant in tail in remainder, under a settle-
ment of real estate. The defendants had got possession of
that real estate, which, by the Act of the Legislature, had
been converted into personalty. The Learned Gentleman,
therefore, submitted that though they could not get back
the real estate in specie, it was inequitable that the defend-
ants should take money which had been awarded to his
client, which the defendants had got into their possession
wrongfully.
Mr. PEMBERTON having replied,
The MASTER OF THE ROLLS said he conceived the plain-
tiff hail not made out a sufficient title, and therefore the
demurrer must be allowed.

KING'S BENCH.-(THIS DAY.)

(Sittings in Banco.)

THE RING V. WILLIAM FRIPP, ESQ., MAYOR OF BRISTOL.

Sir FREDERICK PoLLocK appeared to show cause against
a rule obtained in this case by the Attorney-General cal-
ling upon the defendant to show cause why an information
in the nature of a quo warranto should not be exhibited
against him, to show by what authority he claims to be
Mayor and an Alderman of the city of Bristol, and of the
county of the same city. The grounds upon which the rule
had been obtained were, that the defendant was not en-
titled to be upon the burgess roll of the said borough, and
that he was not the occupier of any shop, warehouuse,
counting-house, or dwelling-house, and had not paid rates
within the meaning of the 9th section of the Act sth and
6th of his present Majesty's reign. On the occasion of the
revision of the burgess lists the name of the defendant was ob-
jected to, but after a full investigation the Revising Barrister
decided that his name should be retained upon the list.
His (Sir F. Pollock's) answer to the application was two-
fold—first, that the question of the right of the defendant to
have his name upon the Burgess list could not be raised by
the present motion ; and secondly, even if there was that
right, Mr. Fripp's name was properly on the list. He con-
tended that their Lordships could not be called upon to
sit as a Court of Appeal, from the decision of the Revising
Barristers ; and even if they were, they would find that the
decision come to in Mr. Fripp's case was correct. The
first point was, in his opinion, of infinitely mere importance
than the other, before it interfered with the decision which
a Court of competent jurisdiction, appointed by the law for
that purpose, had already pronounced. He would now call
the attention of the Court to the various clauses of the Act,
and they would at once perceive that if the name of a
party was admitted upon the Burgess roll, his right
was undoubted and indefeasible for one year. The
objection in the present case arose out of the 28th
section, which enacted " that no person shall be qualified
to be a Town Councillor or Alderman, who shall not be
entitled to be upon the burgess roll of such borough." After
reciting the provisions of some other clauses, the Learned
Counsel observed, that it was impossible to read any mo-
dern Act of Parliament without perceiving a certain laxity
of expression, arising perhaps from a horror of tautology,
and hence they found the words " entitled to," " quali-
fied," " having a right," and " being upon the burgess
roll," used in one clause or another, but all evidently with
the same meaning. His proposition, therefore, might be
summed up in these words—that the 9th section provided
who should be burgesses—the 15th provided for the making
out of the lists—the 18th appointed a Court to revise these
lists—and the 22d having dir Acted these revised lists
to be handed over to the town clerk, enacted that these
lists shall be the burgess-roll of that borough for that
year, and from none of these points could he be removed.
It was therefore, he must say, a quibble in his Learned
Friend to say—it is true you are in the burgess-roll, and
are entitled to vote, but you are not entitled to be upon
the burgess-roll. The Court could not carp at particular
phrases, or make such nice distinctions, inasmuch as the
Act of Parliament made no distinction between being on
the burgess-roll for one purpose and not for another. An
objection had been taken to the residence, and also to
the defendant's not being individually on the rate, lie
being one of the shareholders of the Bristol Fire Office,
in the name of which the rate was made ; but their Lord-
ships were aware that in all cases of joint occupancy, where
the value of the premises was sufficient to give a qualifica-
tion to each, the claim was perfectly valid. He would
conclude by observing, that a case of more importance with
regard to the peace of the Municipal Corporations, and the
time of that Court and the expense of litigation to the
parties, had not come under his observation for some time.
Sir WILLIAM FOLLETT and Mr. WIGIITMAN followed
on the same side.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL, in support of the rule, corn
tended that that Court had jurisdiction to revise the deci•
sions of the Revising Barristers, and cited several authori.
ties in support of that view of the case. There was a Bil
introduced into the House of Commons during the last
Session of Parliament—

Sir F. POLLOCK objected to that line of argument. His
Learned Friend had no right to allude to Bills which his
Majesty's Law Officers might hare thought proper to in-
troduce.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL contended that he had a per-
fect right to do so. He had never in the discharge of
his professional duties made any personal or party references,
but it was perfectly competent to him to refer to any Bill
quantum valeat.
Sir F. PotLocx—l must protest against it.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL—That is the second time my
Learned Friend has objected. The thing is matter of
history.
Lord DENMAN—What history do you find it in, Mr.
Attorney ?
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL--My Lord, I find it in Han-
sard's Parliamentary History.—(Much laughter.) The
Learned Counsel then proceeded at some length to contend
that the name of the defendant had been improperly placed
upon the list, inasmuch as his name was not found upon
the borough rate ; nor could it be said that his being a share-
holder in a Company which had an office in the borough
would establish an pccupency within the terms of the Act.
Mr. AUSTIN followed on the same side, and the Court
having conferred together,
Lord DENMAN said if the Learned Counsel who had
shown cause against the rule were right in saying that the
burgess list was binding, it was quite fit that the Court
should give a distinet opinion upon that subject ; but they
could not say that they were sufficiently satisfied to give
an opinion upon it. Still even if that were the case, much
remained behind, and the Court felt it necessary to take
time before giving its opinion.—Judgment deferred.