The Sun.
London, England, 1836-12-17 00:00:00

THE FUNDS.-(TIIIS DAY.)

CITY, TIT' ELY E O'CLOCK.
Our arrivals this morning are the French and Ostend
Mails. No ship letters except from Berbice.
The Foreign Exchanges took an unfavourable turn yes-
terday, but their depression was rather • inconsiderable,
and not. calculated to cause any fear of a greater de-
cline. Money continues in detnand for commercial affairs.
Various reports have been spread for these few days past
respecting the conduct of • the Bank of England towards
the Northern and Central Joint-Stock Company, which
are entirely destitute of truth.
The Journal du Commerce of Antwerp of Thursday,
brings the Dutch prices from Amsterdam of the 13th Nov.,
21 per Cents., 53 5-16 ; Five per Cents., 100 ; Ardoin's
Spanish, 20i.
The Dutch papers do not contain any news. _

Consols, which dosed yesterday at BEi4 a for the Open-
ing, opened at 8811 i; Reduced 87i Exchequer Bills
12 14 ; India Bonds 8 10 ; Bank Stock 209 210 ; India
Stock shut. _

In the Foreign Market little doing ; Spanish Active
201 ; P4ssive 5 s ; Deferred 81 ; Portuguese 44 45 ;
Three per Cents. 28 29 ; Colombian 221 ; Mexican 221 ;
Dutch Two and a Half per Cents. 531 54.
It was generally expected among the holders of Portu-
guese Stocks that the dividend would have been advertised
this morning. This not being the case, Portuguese Stock
receded 1 per Cent. this morning, from 441 to 43k ; 3 per
Cents., 28.
In the other Foreign Stocks no alteration from our former
quotations.

lIALF-PAST ONE.

Extract of a letter, slated Madrid, Dec. 7 :—"Letters
from Jerez, of the 28th November, state that the Carlists
in their retreat had committed the greatest excesses. The
places through which they passed were completely sacked.
In Fillamartin they (lid not leave a rag. On the night of
the 28th, an aide-de-camp of Gomez and 50 men were
brought prisoners into Jerez. It was said that Mirasoi
would take the command of Alaix's division." _

Gongola may be quoted at 884 for the Account, with
little doing ; Reduced, 87i 4 ; Exchequer Bills, 12 15
prem.; India nends, 8 10 ; Rank Stock, 2091; India,
Stock shut.

In the Foreign Market scarce anything doing, except in
Portuguese Stock, in which a re-action has taken pkwe,
and they have improved, the Five per Cents. from 43/ to
44/ ; Three per Cents, from 28 to 281 i Colombian, 241 i
Mexican, 22 ; Dutch Two-and,a.Herf per Cents„ 041 i
Five per Cents., 1004.
The Share Market may be quotjd much the same cg,
Y`..-
--nsterclOy? except London and Birmingham, which has risen
• "'
to 73 prPni,

Consols for die 4ccounfl tigi, ?If/1W PVL 0 pR%

THE SPANISH CONTEST.

BY PELAGIUS.

LETTER I.

The contest in Spain has assumed a character of
importance which naturally attracts the attention of
the British public.
Presenting in its course anomalies which have per-
plexed those who arc not deeply conversant with the
nature of Spain, geographically considered, and of its
peculiar population, and involving in its results the
most important consequences to other countries, it
may be useful to present some observations on the
character of the people, the relative forces of the con-
tending parties,

Commencing with an apparently tiifling outbreak
in the norther❑ provinces, the insurrection, through
the bad management of the Queen's Government, and
the splendid military talents of the ferocious Zumala-
carregui, has daily gathered strength ; and a rebellion,
which those who did not understand the Spanish cha-
.racter imagined would be put down in six weeks, has
now raged above two years over some of the finest
provinces of the monarchy.
Among the causes which have contributed to this
melancholy result, we must number the double cha-
racter enacted by Don Carlos. To the general body of
the people he is the incarnation .of the spirit of fana-
ticism which has so strong a hold on the multitude—
while, by the people of the northern provinces, he is
adopted as the defender of their peculiar privileges .of
freedom ! •

Those provinces (the main seat of his power) have
enjoyed, for centuries, more freedom than the other
sections of the monarchy; and the result has been a
very dense and wealthy population, within the narrow
limits of a highly defensible district.
The amalgamation of the Basque provinces with the
rest of the empire has bitterly outraged the feelings of
the population, and the Government showed little tact
in decreeing it, without having first taken care to sta-
tion an overwhelming military force among them, since
it might be naturally expected that, however beneficial
to the kingdom at large the bringing all its parts under
one system of government might be, it would be
but ill received by the privileged class whom it placed
on a level with the rest of the community.
Astonishment has often been expressed that the
Queen's forces, far more numerous than those of her
adversary, have not succeeded in utterly crushing the
insurgents ; and those who advert only to the relative
proportion of combatants, still indulge in the mistaken
idea that a marked defeat of the main atmy of Carlos
would soon terminate the contest. I regret to add,
SUCH HOPE WILL PROVE UTTERLY ILLUSIVE !

Of the relative strength of the parties, we have no
trustworthy information, and but few data on which
to found a calculation. The most extravagant esti-
mates are put forth on each side.
Making use of the best information which we can
obtain, I would be disposed to offer a supposition that
Carlos has, acting in his name, about 25,000 men in
the Basque provinces (with a possible reserve of 10;000
or 15,000 more, not called out, or efficiently armed);
and an equal number in bands of from 9,000 to 100
men, scattered through every province of the Peninsula,
in varying degrees, Catalonia coming next in impor-
tance to the Andalusian corps under Gomez, &c., and
Gallicia being probably the most free from these locusts.
Of the latter 25,000 men, a full moiety are mere
banditti, mixed with armed rabble.
At first sight it should seem that 50,000 men in
arms, with the power of adding from 10,000 to 20,000
more to the number, when able to equip and support
them, ought not to present a very formidable resistance
to a Government boasting of a force of 200,000, with
a great number of militia.
When, however, we come to examine the subject
more in detail, our opinions become much modified.
Let us consider the composition, disposition, and
-maintenance of the Constitutional army :
First—as to its position—
The most necessary arm of a Spanish force, which
has to guard wide tracts of a thinly peopled country, is
CAVALRY. Now this is precisely the arm in which
the Government force is most (relatively) deficient—
the proportion not being above a moiety of that ob-
served in other European armies.
This deficiency is the inevitable consequence of the
poverty of the Spanish Exchequer, which forbids the
extension of the most expensive branch of the public
force.

In the next place, let us look to the efficiency and
discipline of the troops—,and here .we find yet more to
regret :
At the death of Ferdinand, the regular military force
was small, and, such as it was, was nearly destroyed
in the first year of the civil war, during which the ha-
voc by sickness, yet more than by the sword, was tre-
mendous.
It results, then, that the vast majority of the Con-
stitutional troops, are, in reality, little better than raw
recruits, ill paid, clothed, and fed. The sufferings of
the British Legion are a frightful commentary on the
consequences of a nearly bankrupt Exchequer.
Turn we to the disposition of this raw. army—The
position of Spain between two countries, often un-
friendly, has necessitated the construction of various
fortresses on the Spanish and Portuguese frontiers ;
and the formidable navy of England, frequently hostile,
in consequence of the Bourbon alliances of Spain and
France, has equally enforced the fortifying of the prin-
cipal sea-ports.
We have thus a great number of fortified towns, re-
quiring strong garrisons, during a civil war ; and pro-
bably above a moiety of the whole directive force of
the monarchy is thus withheld from service in the field
—where indeed it could hardly be supported by a poor
country—and the relative disproportion of the oppo-
sing parties greatly reduced.
The great trading cities also require strolls garrisons,
nor can the smaller forts be wholly neglected.
The Carlists, on the other hand, are not encumbered
by any points worth notice, which require fixed gar-
risons. In the Basque provinces, the country is ;one
mass of mountain, and the whole population its gar-
In the other districts, the marauding bands are
never stationary—finding quarters in the smaller towns
—and, if hard pressed, taking refuge in the mountains,
which intersect the country in every direction.
In my next letter I will proceed to notice otherpc-
culiarities which materially influence the contest.
(To BE CONTINUED.)

rison.