The Sun.
London, England, 1809-10-11 00:00:00

" T must acknowledge that these reasons dla not appear to
me sutistactory to induce him to abandon so-important a po-
sition as that of Talaivera."--JAord Wkllington's Dispatch.

General Coesta did well to quit. Talavera'. His de-
struatou would have been the consequence of 'any
further delay. He did very •ill to leave two divisions
upon the Tagus, with 40 pieces of ordnance; he lost
them, and this post, which was the rear, was a post
of honour; .Gen. Wellesley ought to.havp occupied
it. It is an acknowledged fad in war, that a van-
guard or a rear-guard, according to the operations, is
the most important to defend. But General Welles-
ley had taken the head, and accordittg to the laudable
custimi of his nation, abandoned the post of danger
to the allies.-;---Itionitetir.

"The enemy, who was said to have a force of 30,000
pen, &c."—l.urd Wellington's Dispatch.

The English General, at the date of his letter, was,
not yet informed of the amount of the French,
force.. He speaks' only of the corps of the Dukes
of Dalmatia and Elchiugen, and appears nut -to
have known any thing of the existence of the corps
of the Dike of Treviso, which consisted of 25 bat-

talions of the best stoops in Europe, that had not
been in action since their arrival in Spain. If Lord
Wellesley often commits such Mutts as these, he
may one day pay dear for them.—Moniteur.

" Admitting that he left zo,ooo men in order to observe
Venegas, and that in the last battle tic had lost from to to
1'2,000 men, he would still have about 25,000 znet►.".—Lord
Wellington's Dispatch.
- - -

This is a singular calculation of Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley's with regard to the Ist and the 4th corps and
the reserve. The Ist corps consists of 36 battalions,
the 4th of 30, the reserve of 20 battalions, and the
cavalry of 40 squadrons. Sir Arthur was therefore
surrounded by 170 battalions, and from -80 to 90
squadrons, and he relied upon the conquest of Madrid
with 20)000 men. We do not speak of the Spaniards,
they may be reckoned for a great deal in order to
plunder isolated individuals, even to. defend them-
; selves behind a wall, but they must be counted for
hardly any thing in a pitched baffle, as the English
may have convinced themselves. Although Sir Ar-
thur Wellesley, in addition to his 20,000 men, had
the army of Lord Chatham, which is gone to be
swallowed up in bogs of the island of Walcheren,
his expedition would have turned out only to his
shame, contusion, and overthrow.
It the English wish to contend for Spain against
France, they must laud an army, if not equal to that
of France, at least two-thirds as strong, that is to say,
at the lowest calculation,. 150,000 men, for the
Spaniards Cannot be'reckoned at above one-third in
a pitched battle; and nothing can be more -advant-
i.ageous to France than the English involving them-
selves in a war. by land ; for, instead of conquering
(''England by sea, we shall vanquish it on the Conti-
nent. Such a contest describes in a wonderful man-
' ner the- men by whom the Cabinet of London is
directed. _

Theinistocles advised the Athenians to abandon
the citadels and to take re►uge on board their ships.
It were to be wished that the Cabinet may persist,
as they have commenced, in their project of desert-
ing their ships, and of thro themselves upon
the Continent. We may then torctei the humi►ia-
tiot of England and the tonclilsion of Peace betote
the exp►rat►on of one year.
Before tine year is elapsed, the English, whatever
efforts they may make, u• driven out of the Pe-
ninsula, and the Imperial Eagle will fly upon the
fortresses of Lisbon.--Moniteur. .

"I was of opinion that it wtis prudent to fall back to the
bridge of Arzobispo, and to take a definitive position on the
Tagus " - Lord wellington's Dispatch.
- -

We will. not continue these notes: it would be
insulting our -readers. This falsehood of Lord Wel-
lington's dispatch is self evident.
crobaiiii6o.Sir Arthur, without being acquaint-
ed with the •force of'the enemy who was opposed
to him, without being provided with what consitutes
an army advanced as far as Talavera. The idea of
entering Madrid turned his brain; he took the
French army for an army of sepoys. He arrived
at Talavera' with between 25 anii 26,000 men : he
was there joined by 30,000 Spaniards and with these
two armies united, he attempted to march against
Math id. The, Duke of Belluno manoeuvred properly
in ,order to draw him towards it ; he formed a
junction with the fourth corps and the reserve, and
the King at their head marched so meet the enemy.
The Duke Dalmatia, with forces which were yet more
considerable than those of the King, marched.against
his rear. Sir Arthur Wellesley could not disembarrass
himself otherwise than by separately betting the two
armies. The Ist and 4th corps furnished • him with
that opportunity, for, without waiting the arrival of
the three corps commanded by the Duke of Dalmatia,.
they 'attacked. The English fought well ; .victory at,
Talavvra was claimed by both sides. The loss of
the English was much more considerable than ours :
the French artillery was more numerous: It ap-
pears that by a series of faults the French could not
carry the left position, but that the English were
beaten every time that they attempted to advance
against the French. When the 70,000 who were
commanded, by tbe-Duke of Daltuntia were at Ma,
cencia, Sir Arthur Wellesley imagined that there
• were only 10,000 troops, and in consequence formed
the most ridiculous combinations. He discovered the
folly of his calculations, his extretneimprudence, and
was fortunate enough, by the protedion of the
Tagus, to escape into Portugal with his infantry.—
What would then have been the case, if, manceuvr-
ing according the principles of war, the French had
not given battle until all the army was assembled
Sir Arthdr says, that the want of the means of car--
riage prevented his tnarchina to Madrid. What would
have been the case it he had marched to Madrid, and
if tine Duke of Dalmatia had posted hitnself between
him and the Tagus ? , He and his army would have
been [parched, to France. He sacrificed brave troops
through presumption, and the ignorance of what a
General ought not to unacquainted with.
• This expedition a good .deal resembles that of.
.Gctieral Moore to the month of November last.=
Bpt 4weral Moore-was prudent he retreated More
.
speeclil and althougo his loss was enormous, half
of his army returned ao England, without their lug-
gage, Sm.' Like Genet.rl Moore, General Welies-
ley abandoned his hoipitals, and his artillery : he
arrived in Portugal with half his army. At this
moment he,has not under arms 18,,000 of the 40,000
.men who 'sailed from the ports of ..Englandilloni-
tett,.

The Munitgur of the 3titil contains another
article- on the niiiicar eve—as in *Spain. Atter