The Sun.
London, England, 1849-01-29 00:00:00

• Another point relied upon by-the other side was, that
privacy was one of the most valuable ingredients of right
annexed to property; but he would submit that it was
only an accidental adjunct to property, to which the
owner could not lay exclusive claim. The Learned
Counsel referred to the cases of " Martin v. Wright" (6
Sim.), "Giles v. Wilcox" (2 Atk.), and others, as
proving this proposition, and also that the bone fide
abridgement of the literary w ark of another person
could not be restrained by injunction. Ile now came to
'the effect likely to be produced by the publication of
the catalogue, and in no part of the pleadings was it
stated that it would prove injurious to the plaintiff.
Is must, therefore, be presumed that it was of an
entirely innocent character; and there was no reason
for the interposition of the Court on the score of viola-
tion done to private feelings. In point of fact the cata-
logue, on the contrary, was of a most eulogistic charac-
ter. The appellant hail proved that the catalogue was
the emanation of his own brain, and the Court could
only interfere with it on the assumption that the defen-
dant had no property in it, and that the plaintiff had.
Now, could such a state of things be presumed? As well
might it be said that a person, wbo happened to be in a
shop when another person was purchasing a variety of
articles of vertu, could be prevented from disclosing the
fact and nature of such purchase. " Chandler v. Thomp-
son" (3 Camb. 82). Taking it for granted that the pub-
lication of this catalogue would be a source of displeasure
to the plaintiff, that was not sufficient to give jurisdiction
to this Court to interfere by injunction, for his Lordship
did not sit as censor morum to punish parties for doing
tin injury to the feelings of others. If an injury were
so sustained that the law could take cognisance of,
the only remedy was in a court of common law.
" Gee v. Pritchard" (2 Swanston), and the case of
v. Seerward," in" Merivale's Reports," were tben
referred to and commented upon. If the Court did take
upon itself to interfere in a question of this s irt, it would
be called upon in every similar case brought before it
hereafter—and, without doubt, there would be many,
such if such a precedent were- once established—to in-
quire how far such a publication might be offensive to
the feelings of the plaintiff. This would be an entirely
new jurisdiction, and one very difficult to be carried into
operation. Lord Eldon had said that courts of law and
equity should be kept as distinct as possible, and yet this
would be an assumption of the functions belonging to
the courts of low, it there coul I be any remedy for such
a grievance. He would, however, deny that there was
any remedy by action for the mere deprivation of plea-
sure, and consequently none for the violation of a per-
son's feelings. " Aldridge'a case " (9 Coke, 55, A).
In looking at the judgment of the Vice Chancellor,
he could not help being struck by the confusion
therein of law and equity, and equity and ethics. It
appeared as if this Court would admit of the argument
ad vereeundiam, which seemed to him quite a novel pl, a.
Idconclueion, he trusted that the injunction would not
be.sustained, as it rested upon no legal base, but only
upon a matter of feeling and character. Ile was well
aw. Are of the onerous nature of his Lordship's public
duties, and hoped that he had not trespassed too much
upn his valuable time. These, however, were not
times to introduce any variation into the laws of this
country, and he felt assured that the illustrious person-
ages interested in this case would willingly bow to his
Lordship's decision if it should be opposed to their views,
which he confidently expected it would be.
The LORD CHANCELLOR here observed, that the per.
tioi of the injunction restraining the exhibition of the
impressions had been submitted to by the appellant, and
yet, he claimed the right of publishing the catalogue of
thoSe identical impressions. None of the arguments had
been addressed to this point, whether the Court, having
prevented the doing of a certain ac', would allow the
public announcement of the party's intention to do that
act. It appeared to him that the catalogue was prepa-
ratory to the exhibition, which had been restrained ;
and that it was connected with and ancillary to such ex-
hibition. The catalogue even stated that every pur-
chaser
of it would the presented with a foe simile of her
Majesty's autograph or of Prince Albert's, a
statements, with their
permission ; ought the Court to allow such
to be put before the public, which could not be carried
into effect, the more so as the appellant
that, he had no right to exhibit the articles named
in ie catalogue ? He made these observations as the
attention of the appellant's counsel did not seem to have
been directed to the point.
Mr. S. SHITu was the fourth counsel who was heard
for the appellant, and said that the cause now under
consideration seemed to have been anticipated by that
of " Miller v. Taylor" (4 Bur. 1,d056), which proved
that 'there could be no property in i
observations set forth in the catalogue had Shaeeofthe
appeared
in the newspapers of 1840, and yet the injunction
went; to the entire catalogue, which rendered it almost
impossible of being carried into effect. The injunction
proceeded upon the supposition of a breach of trust, and
yet the relations between the plaintiff and the person
injoitied, necessary to support such an order, had not been
made out. If there had been a breach of trust it had
been committed by a third party, and the appellant was
in no way connected with it. The injunction was also
bad, as being too extensive in covering all the imeres-
wpoi portion
itn
o
sions asf the etchings named in the catalogue' h
was admitted by the plaintiff himself that only a
of the etchings were his own property. It was his duty
t separate those which belonged to himself from those
white were tho property of her Majesty. Under these
circumstances the injunction ought to be dissolved.
The LORD CHANCELLOR, at the conclusion at the ap-
pellant's case, said, that he would proceed with the
motion on Monday.
The Solici sor-Greneral, Mr. Sere.ant Talfourd, and
Mr W". M. James, will then he heard for Prince Albert.

COURT OF COMM WV PLEAS, Jan. 27.
(Sittings in Banco.)
HOARE V. DIXON.
•

This case, in which a rule had been obtained to show
cause why further proceedings should not be stayed
until the payment of costs in a former action, came on
fot argument today.
The•Cnut JUSTICE said be had received a letter this
morning from the plaintiff (Miss Hoare) which he
bawled to his clerk, refusing himself to read it, and he
told Win that it related to a matter now pending in this
Court MeediDgly ialprOPer t 2 send td PrivAte,