The Sun.
London, England, 1849-03-15 00:00:00

INDIA.

There seems to be a prevalent opinion that our pre-
sent embarrassments in India are owing no less to the
extraordinary character of the enemy than the unusual
conduct of the war—that the courage and skill dis-
played by the Seikhs have never before been
shown in the East, and that the strength of
position and enormous force of artillery upon which
they rely aro incidents wholly unparalleled in the
annals of Indian campaigning. It is but common
justice to the conquerors of former days to state that
these conceptions are ensirely erroneous, and if the
reader can derive any encouragement from the fact
that we have often before been as sorely bested he will
be perfectly justified in taking such assurance. The
Seikhs, it, is true, have national peculiarities which
must always leave them troublesome antagonists, but as
far as bravery, obstinacy, and a sage choice of tactics
can make an enemy formidable, we have often encoun-
tered foes who would have given us just as terrible a
reception as we found at Chillianwallah if the same op-
portunities bad been left them. It may be relied upon that
one element only is necessary to place our armies in the
same relative position to those of the enemy which they
held forty years ago, and that element has just been
supplied.

To lend a lively illustration to these remarks, we will
refer to some dispatches of the early part of the century,
which carry as much matter of warning as of informa-
tion, and which, though written in days when the Pun-
jaub was an unknown land, contain instructions ;for
conducting an Indian campaign which might have saved
us all the calamities we aro now so bitterly lamenting.
The correspondents are the present Duke of Wellington
and Colonel Stevenson. The enemy was Scindiah, the
famous Mahratta chief, who, though his nation had just
experienced at Assaye and Laswarree defeats as
decisive as those at Aliwal and Sobraon, was never-
theless abroad with a force sufficient, like that
of Shere Singh, to call for all the vigilance and
activity which the English commander could exert.
We need not point out the lesson which might
have been recently learnt from the following advice:—
" There are three lines of operation to be adopted; to
attack the enemy, to stand his attack, or to
draw off towards me. I recommend that you should
adopt the first with caution, and only in case of necessity.
In respect to the second, it may possibly be worse than
the first. • * * In regard to the third, it might be
attended with risk and even loss." * * *

These are certainly no pleasant alternatives, •.and
a worse choice could hardly have been left us in
our camp at Heelah. But observe what comes next.
" Supposing that you determine to have a brush with
them, I recommend what follows to your con-
sideration. Do not attack their position, because
they always take up such as are confoundedly strong
and difficult of access ; for which the banks of the nu-
merous rivers and nullahs afford them every facility.
Do not remain in your own position, however strong it
may be, or however well you may have intrenched it,
but when you shall hear that they are on their march
to attack you, secure your baggage and move out of
your camp. You will find them in the common dis-
order of march; they will not have time to form, which,
being but half-disciplined troops, is necessary for them.
At all events, you will have the advantage of making
the attack on ground which they will not have chosen
for the battle; a part only of their troops will be en-
gaged, and it is possible that you will gain an easloose
rec-
tory. Indeed, according to this mode, you might_ choose
the field of battle yourself some day
meet them on that very ground. For my p.
ecion' the 23d
opinion that after the beating they received
to stand
of September (at Assaye), they are. likely" Country are rash-
ness personified, and I acknowledge on the 23d, even it'
see again such a loss as I sustained
Wellesley to Colonel
attended by such a gain."—(General
Stevenson, Oct. 12, seuolt-oopfearalltitohneseofprthue-
srpeeedily shown. The
dent conclusions,
Commanders, was
was evacuated at the first
capital city of Boor
two British Com
fortsaP of Asseerghur and Gawilghur
ma and 0031 e ) sagacious
wTahs
demonstration; the
—the keys of the Deccan—fell into our hands; the con-
afirnoemd at
ht
ea
dvaetrey
osmall
iovef
iviifcot,orayodofwAtthrginausmix
wwaeeskgs
costcl u s
correspondencehiuettin above quoted the formidable Mahratta
Chieftain
sued humbly for terms, and at length sub-
mitted to a treaty of peace, which through the remain-
ing twenty-four years of his life he never again seriously
disturbed.

If any person imagines that the enemy with whom we
had here to deal was in any respect inferior to the Seikhs
of the Punjaub, he may readily correct his opinions by
a reference to the most accessible histories of that period.
No people could fight better than the Mahrattas.
Though not natives of that northern climate which is
presumed by our correspondent " Civis" to have the ex-
clusive gift of conferring martial excellence, yet they
proved themselves as hardy, intrepid, and indefatigable
soldiers as we have ever found between the Sutlej and