The Sun.
London, England, 1836-02-20 00:00:00

most important consideration for England; but there were
many more of equal if not greater importance. Nothing could
interest the trade of Great Britain more than the possession
of the Dardanelles by Russia. The Turkey trade was of
great importance to England in point of value. It was also
a great and moreover an increasing trade. The trade to
Russia, on the contrary, at no time great or very valuable, was
daily decreasing in extent as well as importance. If any Hon.
Member doubted it he had only to look to the Russian tariff.
He would there find every commodity profitable to Great
Britain prohibited, and only those admitted which she required
as imitations or patterns in her own growing manufactures.—
( Hear.) Of all tariffs in existence the Russian tariff was the
most obnoxious to British trade. Turkey, on the contrary,
admitted all our manufactures without duty, or at most with a
nominal one. The subject was one worthy the attention of his
Right Hon. Friend the. President of the Board of Trade ; and
he trusted that a dile consideration of it would have the effect
of strengthening and drawing closer the alliance between
this country and Turkey, and of preventing a hostile nation
from deriving advantages from England at her own expense.
—( Hear, hear.) If Russia held the Dardanelles, England
would also lose the trade through Turkey to Persia ; and, as
Russia would then have the mastery of Persia, England would
also:lose another important branch of commerce—the trade
with the Persian Gulf. Indeed, he was informed that that
branch of our traffic was growing every day greater, and that
it employed hundreds in Devonshire in the manufacture of
coarse fabrics for that market, while large ships were being
built in the ports of that county for their transport to the Per-
sian Gulf. But what would be the effect of such a position on
the part of Russia upon ohr Indian possessions ? He (Lord
'D. Stuart) had heard with great satisfaction of the election of
the Noble Lord who lately ruled that extensive empire to the
representation of Glasgow ; he wished he was in the House
to bear testimony of the correctness of his views. The instant
Constantinople came into the possession of Russia the moral
effect of the circumstance would be such, that Persia, now
standing alone in opposition to it, sustained by England, would
become spiritless ' • all enterprise and energy would become ex-
tinct in her ; and not many years would elapse when that
country would sink into a Russian province as completely as
any one of those at present under the subjection of that
empire. Russia once in possession of Persia would be in
immediate contact with the British possessions in India,
and would have full opportunity of tampering with our
Indian population. Would it have no effect at Calcutta ?
It could not fail to be remarked by men of observation
that all the native Powers in Northern India who were dis-
'satisfied in any way at the results of British policy as affect-
ing their particular interests turned their eyes to
.Russia
as their only hope, as the only Power capable of interfering
with England, and as such it would ever form a rallying point
for the disaffected in that portion of our empire. Mithin the
last two years, the progress of Russian influence 'Viet part
of the globe had been rapidly increasing. It had been justly
said that our empire in India was one of opinion, one founded
on the conviction of British power and supremacy uncontroul.
able. But if Russia, with gigantic strides, and 4-grasping
arms, be suffered, unopposed, to manifest her posvakin Persia
for the destruction of this opinion, what would become of the
empire founded upon it ?—( Hear, hear.) It would escape
from our grasp, and melt away ere an efficient efforttcould be
made to retain it. Once permit Russia to attain a footing on
our frontiers, and an immense force must be sent out and
maintained there, to prevent her from passing it. Ten thou-
sand men must, at least, be sent out there for this purpose;
and what, he asked, would the expense be of shipping such
an armament to the East Indies ? Gentlemen, who are more
in the habit of making accurate calculations of this kind than
'he was, estimated the cost at 1001. per man landed on the
coast.--( Hear, hear.) Here was an outlay, in advance of
any subsequent operations, of a million of money.—( Hear,
hear.) When it was also considered that the cost of maintain,
ing soldiers in India was treble that of keeping up the
same force in Europe, and that the waste of life was enor-
mous—the prospect of maintaining an army of that extent
in the field there, would be enough to appal the most cou-
rageous Chancellor of the Exchequer.—( Hear, hear.) He
had not dwelt on the facilities for invading India which Rus-
sia would possess, from her occupation of Persia ; but those
ought not to be overlooked, in forming an estimate of the
dangers to which our empire would be exposed in, such a
juncture of affairs. The possession of Persia would give Russia
all the facilities which she desired, and remove, in fact, the
the only serious obstacle which had hitherto stood in her way.
Though Engliihmen might think that the privilege of passing
through Persia was a matter of trifling consequence it was not
not thought so lightly of at Petersburgh, where there existed
in the War Office special maps and plans laid down, having
reference to this darling object of Russian policy.--( He.)
There was not merely devised therein a plan of one road to
British India, but several. The knowledge of all these inten-
tions on the part of Russia could not but produce serious mo-
ral effects on the population of our empire ; that was much to
be deplored as very probable ground of future disquietude.
He would now come nearer home. He looked with anxiety
to the augmentation of the forces of Russia in the vicinity of
the Dardanelles, and to the expression of dissatisfaction which
she did not hesitate to manifest at the posture of affairs in the
Peninsula. He thought we might be prepared to witness
Russian interference in hal}, if any disturbance afforded the
slightest pretext. In the case of an excuse for a Continental
war, we migh t expect to see her occupyieg Gallicia, threatening
Austria, tal. ing Greece into her hands as a matter of course,
and appropriating all the resources of the European provinces
of Turkey on the score of protection. Austria could not
make the slightest demonstration without forfeiting pos-
session of all her territory on the east of the Adriatic.
F.ance herself was not free from the threats of the
Autocrat. In such a position of affairs we should not lose a
day in increasing our naval force in the Mediterranean, not
by five or ten ships merely, but by the maintenance of a
large and effective fleet. _lndependent of the loss of national
respectability by the absence of a competent naval force, our
revenue was seriously diminishing from the want of efficient
protection. It was presumed that Russia had no design on the
Dardanelles ; but what proof had we of that ? On the con-
trary, we might observe an accumulation of her naval forces at
Sebastopol, which rendered her proceedings with regard to
them highly suspicious. She had already quite sufficient there
to accomplish the possession. Fifteen line-of-battle ships and
fifteen frigates, which, with the winds that prevailed in the
Black Sea nine months out of the year, could be brought to
bear in three days on the castles of the Dardanelles.—( Hear,
hear.) The forces at Constantinople would not be likely to
offer any resistance. The Turks were in the habit of seeing
ships of war constantly passing the Dardanelles—that is,
Turkish ships of war, not British.—( Hear, hear.) And they
might pass through unnoticed in the night, and take, possession
of the castles before any effective efforts could be made to save
them. Neither were there any forces at the Dardanelles ca-
pable of making resistance to a strong maritime attack, though
the castles had been lately improved by the kindness of Rus-
sia, who had lately landed engineers there for the purpose.
Russia once in possession, could not be dislodged without a
general war.—( Hear, hear.) Was any one desirous of be-
holding that ? It could not be maintained without a large
army. Did any one wish to incur the expense of raising it?
If they did, how were we to obtain the necessary funds ?
3,000 or 4,000 men at Malta would be altogether incom-
petent to effect anything useful ; 20,000, at least, would be
wanted there. Before ships could be got ready to convey
these troops thither, time would inevitably be lost ; or, if
they proceeded by land, before they could cress the Con-
tinent, Russia would have an immense assemblage of troops
prepared to resist our tardy demonstrations. She had already
a considerable force concentrated on the shores of the Black
Sea. Besides those now at Sebastopol there was a large
quantity of shipping constantly in readiness and available at
the port of Odessa; along the line of the Danube 200 sail
were to be found at all times, and, in short, before England or
France could bring a single squadron into action on the shores
of the Dardanelles, Russia could have 200,000 men encamped
there to defend them. —(Hear, hear.) It should not be for-
gotten, also, that Russia was the highly professing ally and
protector of the Sultan from the ambition of
,Mehemet AR,
who, though not perhaps going to invade him again on the
same line of attack, would probably soon give occasion for the
renewed interference of the disinterested protector by ad-
vancing on some new line of invasion. Russia, so prettily
characterised by some statesmen as a stranger to aggrdhdise-
meat, love of conquest, unjustifiable encroachments, or quarrels
amongst neighbouring nations, would speedily claim to inter-
fere to restore peace, and settle all disputes in its own
amicable way, terminating
,so happily for the consolidation
of Russian power and influence. However, he now
passed to another subject—the Prussian Commercial League
—which was well worthy of a separate and serious con-
sideration, and which he hoped it would receive in that
House, threatening, as it did, to overthrow our Continental
commercial intercourse and prosperity, and force us into the
adoption or recognition of contraband arrangements. Why
were we so anxious to put down the exclusive system of Na-
poleon if another might now be tolerated, based on similar
views? It was said, in consolation, that the smuggler would
lessen the evil; but he (Lord D. Stuart) maintained that he
could not render it innocuous. If a nation must pay 25 per
cent. (for instance) to the smuggler, it diminished the profits
of its trade by so much. Though the manufacturer might
obtain greater profits, it might yet be worse for the labourer,
for that system was not the best for a nation which gave the
greatest profits to an employer, but that which occasioned the
greatest employment, and enabled the manufacturer to give
the greatest wages. But to return to the Prussian league.
It was plain that it had been got up at the instigation of
Russia, and tended still more plainly than ever to show that
Prussia was merely her creature, to be sacrificed like Saxony
and Denmark, to the convenience of her European policy.
How was this to be accomplished? Russia knew that the
Prussian league must destroy the independence of the sepa-
rate States of Germany. The power of imposing taxes was
the best characteristic of the independence of any State.
With it independence is gone. How were the States of Ger.
many to be reconciled to that? They gained no financial
advantages in return for this concession. There was nothing
to compensate them, but the idea of raising Germany to the
rank of a great nation, by the formation of a grand Confedera-
tion of all the States, and thereby insuring to all greater im-
portance than ever in the scale of European policy. Russia was
well aware that in the progress of this confederacy all the rest
of Germany would become jealous of the preponderating influ.
once of Prussia, and would eventually look to Russia as a me-
diator, a deliverer, and a head. Another- and a favourite pro-
ject of Russia—one that more than any other involved and
sought support in national feeling—was that of uniting all the
great Sclavonic nations in a single empire, with the Autocrat
for its head. Such had ever been the grasping and swelling
ambition of that aspiring nation. ,It was Muscovy—it is the
Russias—and it aims to be Sclavonia.—( Hear.) It was worthy
of notice how sedulously the power of the Greek Priesthood
was everywhere maintained over the people by the policy
of the Russian Court, and its influence propitiated in
every corner of the empire by showering favours, presents,
honours, and privileges on their order. A constant inter-