The Sun.
London, England, 1822-01-23 00:00:00

ARCHES' COURT, MONDAY, JAN. 21.

PERRIN- V. PERRIN.
Dr. JENNER opened this cause, which was brought up by
etters of request from the Court of the Commissary for the
Bishop and Diocess of Winchester, for the parts of Surrey. ;
wherein it had been, originally instituted by Mr. W. Perrin
against. Mrs. Francis IPerrin, of Camberwell, Ins wife. The
letters of request were exhibited in the month of August, 1821.
He had now to pray the admission of the libel propounded ;
and after his Learned Friends should have stated their objec-
tions, he would endeavour to reply to them.
• Dr. LUSHINGiON, who appeared on behalf of Mrs. Perrin,
stated, that his objections to the admission of the libel would
confine themselves principally to the 4th article. The libel it-
self comprehended allegations which, supposing they should
be proved, would undoubtedly be sufficient to entitle the hus-
band to the remedy for which he prayed; but it did appear to
him that it comprehended also some facts and circumstances
that, according to any rules of proceeding ever observed in that
Court, were wholly inadmissible. The marriage took place on
the 7th af February, 1818 ; and the libel, after pleading this
fact, went on to state,. that on the 26th of February, 1820,
W. Perrin separated himself from hie wife ; having on that
day been informed, " and it then having first come to his
knowledge, that Mrs. Perrin had, previously to her marriage,
carried on an adulterous intercourse with a person mimed
Thomas Lee, with whom she had become acquainted, by
whom she had had a child, and from whom she had received an
allowance of 401. a year." The libel also charged, " that Mrs.
Perrin, previously also to the said marriage, had formed an adul-
terous intimacy with a person named Jobn Howell ; that on the
said day Mr. Perrin charged his wife with the facts in queStion,
and that she then admitted the same to be true." Now he
(the Learned Counsel) -objected to this article on several
grounds—namely, that these 'circumstances were all of them
stated to have occurred !at a period previbuS to that at which the
marriage was pleaded to have been celebrated ; that the yew
foundation of suits like the present, instituted in this Court,
was, in acts of adultery, pleaded to have taken place subse-
quently to the celebration of the marriage ; and in those no-
thing was pleaded saving relation to anterior acts. But he
did take it, that it was for the husband to make every proper
irquiry before he contracted. marriage, and the law presumed
always that he did so; but if he did not, he knew of no re-
medy that the law provided for his neglect. In point of law,
marriage was a complete waver of all acts of the nature
set forth, committed prior to its celebration ; and many reasons
existed why it should be so. It would be exceedingly incon-
venient for the wife, for instance, to defend herself from a
charge as to connexions that were long passed. And if she was
to be put on her defence under such circumstances, be would
be glad to know whether it would not likewise be competent to
her to inquire into the anterior conduct of her husband ? But
it was quite clear that misconduct, neither on the part of the
wife nor of the husband, previous to their union, could justify
the Court in making that the ground of a sentence of Separa-
tion as between the parties. He believed his Learned Friends
could not find one single precedent where that had been the
case. He had now stated the substance of his-objections; but
the Court would also see that the plea here was " that the
husband was informed." This, evidently, was no plea; but
doubtless his Learned Friends would ..say, they had introdUced
this article for the purpose only of 'Recounting for the separa-
tion which had taken place between the husband and wife.
But he denied this ; and it was important to observe that this
was not a suit in which the wife could counterplead the facts ;
and go, herself, into other events with regard to which the hus-
band might be put upon his defence. The fact of Mr. Perrin
being " informed," seemed to be introduced for the purpose of
prejudicing the mind of the Court, and of strengthening the
presumption that his wife had, as' pleaded, committed adultery
subsequently to their separation. The Learned Counsel fur-
ther denied, that by the law of the land, a husband had a right
to separate himself from his wife by reason of any misconduct
before marriage. He denied also that the husband could so se-
parate liiinaelt, except by a sentence of the Ecclesiastical Court.
It was not for him to tale upon himself (legally speaking) to
judge of the propriety of such separation. For all these reasons,
the Learned Counsel contended that the eircumstancei to which
he objected had been introduced into the plea without any legal
or equitable bearing on the case. The deed of separation bore
date on the 30th of March, 1820; and by that.deed, Mr. Per-
rin covenanted to make his wife a certain weekly allowance. In
cases like the present, deeds of separation might be introduced
for certain purposes; as, to shew the fact of separation ; but
they could not be exhibited as deeds in-any degree binding on
the parties. But why was not this deed itself produced I No
doubt, because if it were, it would be found that the preamble
ran in the usual way : " Whereas unhappy differences have
arisen between, &c. &c." taking no notice of the discoveries
said to have been made by tha husband, and alleged as the im-
mediate cause of such separation. He concluded that the Court
would direct that deed to be propounded, and order the libel to
be reformed, by striking out that part of the 4th article which
related to the information received by the husband on the 26th
Of February,lB2o.
Dr. Dopsoar, on the same side, confined his objection to the
4th article also.
Dr. JENNER, in reply, observed, that his Learned Friends
having bruited their observations to the 4th article only, had ad-
mitted .that no sort of imputation attached to Mr. Perrin, as to
any delay in the institution of this suit, after discovering his
wife's previous infidelity. In answer to what had been urged
against the 4th article, the Court would remark, that the facts in
question, as to Mrs. Penin's misconduct previously to the mar-
riage, were not pleaded substantively, hut merely for the pur-
pose of laying before the Court the grounds that led to the se-
paration of thehusband from his wife, followed up, as that had
been, by her own confession (whether that was true or not.'—
He apprehended that it was open to the husband to shew that
the separation in question arose out of particular circumstances,
which, though they might not go legally to establish, were suf-
ficient morally to justify. such a proceeding on his part. He
trusted that the libel would be admitted without alteratiOn.
Sir Joitax Nicitoz.i. said, the only question was, as to the
admissibility of the libel before the Court. The general sub-
stance of that libel was allowed to be properly pleaded, and to
contain such matter as,
,upon proof, must entitle the husband
to the relief for s+hichlie prayed. The confession by the wife,
as to the facts upon which the separation proceeded, was plead-
ed to have been made by the wife in the presence of her' mother
and several friends. Subsequently. to that separation, she was
alleged to have funned the criminal and adulterous intercourse
which was the foundation of the present suit. It was contend-
ed that the matter of the 4th article was not admissible ; that
ante-nuptial conduct could not be pleaded as a ground for sepa-
ration, in the case of a marriage contracted subsequently to
suchmisconduct ;- and this could, not be denied ; and the Conn-
id on the other side accordingly admitted that it could not be
.made the foundation of a suit like that which was here instituted
by the- husbands Then the article was laid in such• a way,
that the party himself did not seem to have relied upon this
p .it of ; for facts alleged only on' the information of the
husband, were.not that sort of proof which the Court could re-
ceive. But it was said, on his behalf, that this matter had
15een introduced into the plea for the purpose of accounting 'for
the fact of 'the parties having separated from each other. Now,
even in that point of view, be would not be et liberty to plead
it ; because if the wife had been guilty of 'these acts previous
to the marriage, the marriage itself would be a waver of all
sorts of complaints on the part of the husband on that account ;
neither would such previous misconduct be any justification of
a separation. The Counsel had rightly observed, that 'the
Court must guard itself from having its mind prejudiced by
any extraneous pleading of circumstances, that might have a
tendency prejudicial to the case of the wife. The learned Judge,
after observing Upon other parts of theylea, directed the fourth
article to be reformed, adding, that to obviateobjections, it had
better merely recite .the usual words of a deed of separation—
" that whereas unhappy differences had arisen between these'
Parties, on such a day they agreed to separate," arid so forth,
and to omit all mention of the misconduct stated to have taken
place before the marriage.
(Term commenced here this day,
and there were two admis-
sions of Prectori.)