The Sun.
London, England, 1849-01-24 00:00:00

SPIRIT of the PUBLIC JOURNALS
TlMES.—Though it is too probable that we have not
seen the end of the war in the Punjaub, yet this desirable
consummation cm hardly be so far distant as to render
premature any mention of the conditions of peace. We
need not ascend to any considerations more romantic
than those of our nearest interests, to prove thut a
thorough chastisement of the Seikhs must precede any
debate respecting the disposal of the Punjaub. Our In-
' dhin history must comprise no more ‘• retreats." Still,
as we have actually retired from the gates both of Can-
dahar e.nd Ave without leaving any unfavourable im-
pression of our power either in Affghanistan or Buruili,
it is clear that the Pvacution of a territory once occu-
pied is not essentially significant, even in Oriental eyes,
of imbecility or decline. We shall be perfectly justified,
therefore, in including the totul abandonment, of the
Punjaub amongst the alternatives which may shortly be
entertained by the Government of India. As regards,
indeed, the prime facie aspect of such a measure,
we have already shown that it would be nothing
more than was contemplated in the spirit and pro-
vided for by the letter of the treaties of Lahore. Our
occupation of the country was wholly provisional, and
although a certain period was fixed for its termination,
yet provision was also made for any such earlier dissolu-
tion of the connexion as might seem advisable. Such
considerations, however, are of course far from being
conclusive. The hostilities into which we have gra-
dually relapsed with the whole Seikh nation supply a
point from which we must now start afresh; and the
question is, what settlement of the Punjaub will be most
conducive to our credit and tranquillity, now that the
policy first devised for the selfsame ends has proved, as
we must needs acknowledge, unsuccessful and abortive.
It is true that what we could have done after the victory
of Sobraon we cannot now do with the same grace, or
the same safety, until after such another victory; but we
ihall at least have learnt by experience to eschew
any such middle course as our charity and our for-
bearance suggested before. The Punjaub must now
either be made wholly British, or be abandoned wholly
to its own anarchy and murders. We have been com-
pletely released from all consideration for the Seikhs
themselves; our sole object must now be the protection
of our north-western frontier, wherever fixed, with the
greatest possible permanency and at the least possible
cost. It is a condition of debate already granted, that
we have no desire or inclination, for aggrandisement's
sake, to add the Punjaub to our own possessions. An-
nexation is only recommended as the cheapest and most
effective fashion of control. Our inquiries, therefore,
must be directed to a comparison of the respective ad.
vantages, or, as we fear it should be phrased, the respec-
tive disadvantages of the two proposed schemes. For,
to say the truth, we are on the horns of a dilemma. If
we do not hold the country with the strong hand, as is
now recommended, we must hold the frontier as we held
it for the six years previous to the last Seikh war. Un-
less a second Runjeet could be discovered in Ghoeleb
Singh, who could rule the Seikh Sirders with a rod of
iron, and employ the fierce spirits of the soldiery in less
troublesome conquests, we should but witness a renewal
of scenes that are past. The question is, which of two
schemes would cost us least, and at the same time be
most conducive to the general interests of the empire.
Some of the leading arguments on either side we here
subjoin. If we annex the Punjaub to the dominions of
British India, we should substitute for the frontier of
the Sutlej either the Indus or the mountains beyond it.
We should probably prefer the Indus, and in this cave
we might doubtless make many friends among the Be-
ioochee and Affghau tribes by the restoration of the pro-
vinces on the right bank to those owners who were die
possessed by Runjeet. It was formerly considered an
advantageous circumstance that so warlike a nation as
that of the Seikhs should be interposed between our ter-
ritories and those highlands from which all con-
querors of India, except ourselves, have descended; but
after what we have now experienced, it may be thought
more judicious to preclude any possible union of the
Seikhs and Affghans by the subjugation of the former,
and to have only the latter in our front instead of the
two together. The Affghans have never, during our su-
premacy, shown any capability of uniting for purposes
of aggression, whereas the Seikhs have unmistakeably
done so. These are general considerations; next tollow
those of the cost and feasibility of the plan itself. The first
of these points we may dismiss, since, it the Punjaub in
Runjeet's days could maintain 100,000 fighting men,
and yield a surplus revenue, it could surely under our
hands support half as many (which would be all re-
quired) with a like result. But the practicability of so
thoroughly subjugating the Seikh spirit as to obviate
any recurrence of such events as we yesterday re-
corded, is another question, and one to which history
supplies no encouraging answer. The Seikhs were
thoroughly beaten in the field, and mercilessly
persecuted by die lieutenants of the Mogul empire;
I and yet they survived to turn upon the Mogul in his de-
cline. They wore thoroughly beaten in the field, and
apsarently almost exterminated by the swords of the
Ahdallee Affghans, and yet they survived to drive the
Ail-khans from the Punjaub, and occupy LTmritsir in
greater strength than ever. It is true that the spirit of
religious fanaticism, which supported them in these des-
perate contests, has become so far extinct that it is no v
confined to a few desperate bravos; but the spirit of na-
tionality has outlived the sectarianism in which it origi-
nated, and we need nothing, after the events of the last
six months, to prove that the martial character of the
Seikhs has in nowise degenerated. It; on the other
hand, after a plain example of our unshaken superiority,
we abandon the Punjaub to its fate, we limit our liabili-
ties to such a protection of our original frontier as we
have previously maintained. We exempt ourselves from
all participation in the internal troubles which may
follow. It will hardly be doubted by those con-
versant with Seikh character and history, that the
scenes of five years since would upon our departure be
enacted over again, even to the final consummation of
domestic anarchy by foreign invasion. But we have
already ascertained that we can defend our own frontier
against a stronger force than is likely, at least for some
years, to cross it, and unless there is a finality in one
case which is wanting in the other, we need surely not
take so much pains to go and fight on the Chenab for
fear of having to fight on the Sutlej. There is another
consideration too, and that of no slight moment. By
keeping within our own territories and managing the
Seikhs from without, we generally gained the alliance
of one party in that turbulent state, and were thus
enabled to counteract any unwelcome designs of the
other ; whereas, by intruding ourselves personally
into the country, with whatever good intent, we
have contrived to unite all parties against us to-
gether in a sentiment which, if less noble than
patriotism, is almost as efficacious. We fare, in fact,
very much like the civil power in an Irish riot,
against which both factions, however deadly may be their
reciprocal hostility, do not for a moment hesitate to com-
bine. Lastly, even supposing that our object should be'
wholly or in part realised by this measure of annexa-
tion, it will certainly be asked where such practice is to
end ? What are we to do if the anarchy of Lahore
should he reafter be transferred to Caubul ? Are we to
absorb Atighanistan ? or are we then to make of the
Indus what we might before have made of the Sutlej ?
No doubt the former river is, both naturally and histori-
cally, a boundary of India ; but, as regards the national
character of the states opposed to us, there is certainly
now more plausible reason for drawing the requisite
line at the Sutlej. When the Punjaub was a peaceful
province of the Mogul empire the Seikhs were not in
existence. Their singular origin and progress has in-
troduced quite a new element into the political question,
for, Ilindoos by race though they may mainly be, in
temper and bearing they more nearly resemble the
Affghans than the Rajpoots, and the martial tribes of
the north-west may now be said to commence with the
Sutlej. Such are some of the arguments which suggest
themselves for consideration upon this subject, and the
obvious trouble and hazard of the decision is part of the
price which must be paid for conquests.
lIEBALD.—Our readers will pardon us for again re-
curring to unhappy Ireland. It is with no pleasure, but
as a solemn duty only, we resume the subject. In this
respect we have no option. The imminency and urgency
of the topic—the hundreds of letters we daily receive
from Irish landlords still abiding in their unhappy
country—and from others who have fled to Devonshire,
to Bath, and to other cheap quarters of England, con-
strain us to speak out. These letters, ono and all, point
to the antagonistic articles of the Times, and the writers,
from the continued series of attacks in that paper, inter
that the fixed intention of the Whig Government is to
destroy, as far as in them lies, the present race of Irish
landlords. But in this our correspondents, we think,
go somewhat beyond the fact. The Whig-Radical
clique have, no doubt, no active sympathy with
—no compassion for the Irish landlords. But we do
,
not believe the Government, as a body, to be actuated
by the crude and cruel suggestions of the the
That journal is much more the intimate organ
ofT
Cobdens, Brights, Schwabes, &c., than it is the expo
nent of the Whig Cabinet opinions in referenceto Ire-
land. Our correspondents ought
ability, is
Irish Secretary, though a man of vigorousnoble
to remember that the
yet an Irish gentleman of considerable
an idiot as wit.
and is not, though no conjuror,
self
10Iande d property;
measures which,
lingly and knowingly to lend him
se
estate.
though they may serve hie
We, therefore, conceive thatroupsaermy;
of
sthe
r ui
apprehensionsn
groundless, and that they all
of our correspondents areof g
the action and power of the
exaggerate the extent of
It is true that there is often,
Times on public oP,,e";ii_
totally irrespective of the Times
oareditishearrlichre,,egveor9L, bad, or indifferent, cold or crude—
of public feeling in this country in
great ebb and fl
reference to Ireland.. When, for instance, our Irish in-
telligence, and to-day, contained. or eon-
telligence, as
tains the record of crimes of violence and arson, there is
a feeling of loathing in the public mind for 24 hours
approaching to dis;ust. But after an Englishman ex-
presses himself in terms of merited opprohium as to such
incendieries as attacked the Misses M.4lreag h, in the
county Down, he begins—after his feelings of detestation
have subsided—to think that the crimes of a class should
not blind him to the miseries of a whole nation—to the
virtues of the Ii jab generally—or prevent him from al—
preciating the many noble qualities, the many lofty
feelines, the mistily, kindly sentiments which distinguish
the mass of the natives of Ireland. The Times, and -he
parties of which it is the appropriate organ, would have
us believe that there is something in the character of the
Celtic race—(that's the word they use, as though the
best part of the French and Belgians, and a great part of