The Sun.
London, England, 1831-01-04 00:00:00

get apart for these purposes would he more judiciously ap-
plied and economically expended under the direction of
the State legislatures, in vselsiclu every part of each State is
immediately represented, cannot, I 'think, be doubted. In
the new States particularly, where a comparatively small
population is scattered ctier an extensive surface, and the
representation in Congress consequently very limited, it i•
natural to expect that the appireialions made by the
Federal Government would be more likely to be expeided
in the vicinity of those members through whose imme-
diate aF,,ensey they were obtained, On if the funds were
placed under the controul of the legislature, in which every
county of the State flees its own representative. This sues:-
position duel not necessarily impugd the motives of such
coneusestional representatives, nor is it su intended. We
are all sensible of the bias tr. tiehieli the strongest minds
and purest hearts art, :fader such circumstances, liable.
In respect to th last objection, its probab'e effect upon the
dignity ,and independence of the State governments, it
appears to me only necessary to state the case as it is, and
AR it would be if the measure proposed were adopted, to
show that the operation is most likely to be the very re-
verse of that which the objection supposes.
In the one case, the State Would receive its quota of the
national revenue or domestic use upon n fixed principle.
as a matter .of right, and from a fund to the creation of
whiais it had itself contributed its fair proportion. Surely
there could be nothing derogatory in that. As matters
now stand; the States themselves, in their sohereign cha-
racter, are not unfrequently petitioners at the bar of the
Federal Legislature for such allowances out of the national
Treasury as it may tt mport with their pleasure or sense of
duty to bestona 'upon them. It cannot require argument
to prove which of the two couttes is most compatible with
the efficiency or respectability of the State Governments.
But all these are matters for discussion and dispassionate
considerations. That the d. sired adjustment would be at-
tent:lea with difficulty, affords ne rer_snn why it should not
be attempted. The effenti.ve Operation of such motives
would have prevented the adoption of the Constitution un-
der which We have so long lived, and under the benign in-
ffeente of which our beloved country has to signally pros-
pered. The framers of that sacred instrument had greater
difficulties so overcome, and they did overcome them. The
patriotism of the petple, directed by a deep conviction of
the importance of the union, produced mutual concession
and reciprocal forbearance. Strict right was merged in a
spirit of compromise, and the result has consecrated their
disinterested devotion .o the general weal. Unless the
American people have degenerated, the same result can be
again effected, whenever experience points out the neces,
sitar of a resort to the same means to uphold the fabric
Which their fathers have mated. It is beyond the power
of man to make a nyatem of Government like ours, or any
other. erernate with precise equality upon States situ 'hl
like those which compose this confederacy; nor is inequa-
lity always injustice. Every State cannot expect to shape
the measures of the General Government to suit its own
particular interests. The causes which prevent it are
seated in the nature of things, and cannot be entirely
counteracted by human means. Mutual forbearance,
therefore, becomes a duty obligatory upon all, and we
may, I ens confident, count on a cheerful compli :nee
with this high injunction on the part of our con-
stituents. It is not to be supposed that they will
object to make such comparatively inconsiderable sa-
crifices for the preservation of rights and privileges which
ether less favoured portions of the world have in vain
waded through seas of Hood to acquire.
Our course it a safe one if it be but faithfully adhered
to. Acsptiescence in the constitutionally expressed will of
She majority, and the exercise of that will in a spirit of
moderation, justice, and brotherly kindness, will constitute
a cement which would for ever preserve our Union. Those
who cherish and inculcate sentiments like these, render a
most essential service to their country, whilst those who
seek to weaken their influence, are, however conscientious
and praiseworthy their intentions, in effect its worst
enemies.

If the intelligence and influence of the country, instead
of labouring to foment sectional prejudices, to he made
subservient to party warfare, were in good faith applied
to the eradication of causes of local discontent, by the
improvement of our institutions, and by facilitating their
adaptation to the condition of the times, this task would
prove one of less difficulty. May we not hope that the
obvious interests of our common country, and the dieL
tates of an enlightened patriotism, will, in the end, lead
the public mind in that direction?
After all, the nature of the subject does not admit of a
plan wholly free from objection. That which has for
some time been in operation is, perhaps, the worst that
could exist, and very advance that can be made in its
improvement is a matter eminently worthy of your most
deliberate attention.

It is very possible that one better calculated to effect the
objects in view miry yet be devised. If so, it is to be
hoped that those who disapprove of the past, and dissent
from what is proposed for the future,jwill feel it their duty
to direct their attention to it, as they must be sensible that,
unless some fixed rule for the action of the Federal Go-
vernment in this respect is established, the course now
attempted to be arrested will be again resorted to. Any
mode which is calculated to give the greatest degree of
effect and harmony to our legislation upon the subject—
which shall best serve to keep the movements of the Fe-
deral Government within the sphere intended by those who
modelled, and those who adopted it,—which shall lead to
the extinguishment of the national debt in the shortest
period, and impose the lightest burdens upon our consti-
tuents, shall receive from me a cordial and firm support.
Among the objects of great national concern, I cannot
omit to press attain upon your attention that part of the
Constitution which regulates the election of President and
Vice-President. The necessity for its amendment is made
so clear to my mind, by the observation of its evils, and
by the many able discussions which they have elicited on
the floor of Congress and elsewhere, that I should be want-
ing to my duty were I to withhold another expression of
my deep solicitude upon the subject. Our system fortu-
nately contemplates a recurrence to the first principles;
differing in this respect, from all that have preceded it,
and securing it, I trust, equally against the decay arid the
commotions which have marked the progress of other
Governments. Our fellow-citizens, too, who in propor-
tion to their love of liberty keep a steady eye upon the
means of sustaining it, do not require to be reminded of
the duty they owe to themselves to remedy all essential
defects in so vital a part of their system. While they are
sensible that every evil attendant upon its operation is not
necessarily indicative of a bad organization, but may pro-
ceed from temporary causes, yet the habitual presence, or
even a single instance of evils which can be clearly traced
to an organic defect, will not, I trust, be overlooked
through a too scrupulous veneration for the work of their
ancestors. The constitution was an experiment com-
mitted to the virtue and intelligence of the great mass of
our countrymen, in whose ranks the framers of it them-
selves were to perform the part of patriotic observation and
scrutiny ; and if they have passed from the stage of ex-
istence with an increased confidence in its general adapta-
tion to our condition, we should learn from authority so
high the duty of fortifying the points in it which time
proves to be exposed, rather than be deterred from ap-
proaching them by the suggestions of fear or the dictates
of misplaced reverence.
A provision which does not secure to the people a direct
choice of their Chief Magistrate, but his a tendency to
defeat their will, presented to my mind such an inconsis-
tency with the general spirit of our institutions, that I
was induced to suggest for your consideration the sub-
stitute which appeared to me at the same time the most
likely to correct the evil and to meet the views of our
constituents. The most mature reflection since has
added strength to the belief that the best interests of
our country require the speedy adoption of some plan
calculated to effect this end. A contingency which some-
times places it in the power of a single Member of the House
of Representatives to decide an election of so high and
solemn a character, is unjust to the people, and becomes,
when it occurs, a source of embarrassment to the indi-
viduals thus brought into power, and a cause of distrust
of the representative body. Liable as the confederacy is,
from its great extent, to parties founded upon sectional
interests, and to a corresponding multiplication of candi-
dates for the Presidency, the tendency of the constitu-
tional reference to the House of Representatives is, to de-
volve the eltsction upon that body in almost every instance,
and, whatever choice may then be made among the can•
didates thus presented to them, to swell the influence of
particular interests to a degree inconsistent with the gene-
ral good. The consequences of this feature of the Con-
stitution appear far more threatening to the peace and in-
tegrity of the Union than any which I can conceive as
likely to result from the simple legislative action of the
Federal Government.

It was a leading object with the framers of the Consti-
tution to keep as separate as possible the action of the
legislative and executive branches of the Government. To
secure this object nothing is more essential than to pre-
serve the former from the temptations of private interest,
and therefore so to direct the patronage of the latter as
not to permit such temptations to be offered. Experience
abundantly demonstrates that every precaution in this re-
spect is a valuable safeguard of liberty, and one which my
reflections upon the tendencies of our system incline me to
think should be made still stronger. It was for this reason,
that in connexion with an amendment of the Constitution,
removing all intermediate agency in the choice of the
President, I recommended some restrictions upon the