The Sun.
London, England, 1822-12-23 00:00:00

CONGRESS 'OF VERONA.

MR. EDIT6R—The Congress of Verona has
now broken, up. Sovereigns and Prime Minis-
ters, and S,tatesmen..of every description had as-
sembled from various parts, of Europe ; they have
separated, and we ask what' was the object of
their meeting ? "Of what advantage are its deci-
sions likely to prove to the peace and welfare of
the world ? To give a satisfactory answer to
either of these questions, however natural and
simple they may be, is a matter of no trifling diffi-
culty. When we reflected upon the present poli-
tical state of Europe, and took into consideration
the avowed object of the Holy Alliance, we na-
turally supposed that the Congress met with no
other intention than that of enforcing the prin-
ciples of this singular and anomalous Associa-
tion. Formed for the avowed purpose of sup-
porting the ilea of Sovereigns to govern as they
may think fit, and to oppose all attempts the peo-
ple may make tO'better their condition, it seemed
probable that its leading Members assembled in
solemn Congress at Verona, would proclaim their
intention of arming themselves in the cause of
legitimate authority, and declare against both the
constitutional Spaniards and Portuguese, and
the not less reprehensible, llellinists. Con-
sistency, however, can scarcely be looked for in
the decisions and proceedings of an Association,
not only uncertain in its nature, but of which the
Members have political interests that are almost
in diametrical opposition. It is indeed true, that
it has been the avowed object of the late Con-
gresses and Treaties• to restore that equilibrium
of power which was formerly considered as the
only secure basis of permanent• peace, and for
the preservation of which torrents of blood have
been shed ; but experience proves, likewise,
that this system, however captivating in theory,
can scarcely ever be reduced to practice. The
plains of Europe may be deluged with human
gore, the bones of thousands of human beings
may bleach upon the ensanguined fields, still
some Monarch or another will exert a preponde-
rating influence over the rest of the Continent.—
No treaties can restrain the mad desires of am-
bition ; and it' seems that the example of the
past seldom proves of any use either to the pre-
sent or to future generations.
Such has been the secrecy of the deliberations
at Verona, that the final determinations of the
Congress are only matters of conjecture. The
threatning attitude assumed by France, and the
obvious policy of Russia, sanction, however, the
report that the former Power has permission to
attack the Spanish Constitutionalists, and the lat-
ter to assist the insurgent Greeks! This being the
case, it is allowable to consider the questions as
decided, and to argue upon the effect such a de-
cision may have upon the tranquillity of Europe.
That the feelings of the Cabinet of the Tuileries
are hostile to the proceedings of the Cortes of
Spain, is fully proved by the refuge afforded in
France to the disaffected, and still more by its
military preparations, and by the sentiments pub-
licly avowed in the Ministerial Journals of.
France. Connected with the Spanish Monarch
by the ties of blood, it is natural that the Bour-
bons of France should feel anxious to save their
kinsman from the dreadful fate of Louts XVI.
The Revolution of Spain has not, however, been
marked by all the unjustifiable outrages which
disgraced that of France ; nor have the Cortes
displayed the ferocious and sanguinary feelings
which precided over the proceedings of the Na-
tional Convention. They have only manifested
a firm determination to accomplish the arduous
task which they have undertaken, and all their
operations have been marked by no less cou-
rage than courtecy. They do not wish to inter-
fere with other Governments, they wish only
to new model their own. The Constitution they
. .
have framed may not be the very best ;- but will
foreign interference render it better ? If the
King be rgally well disposed, and is sincere in his
sanction or the changes that have taken place, he
has not the least cause for fear. Upon what plea
then will France now interfere with the govern-
ment of Spain ? What good excuse can she give
for an attack upon the Spanish Nation ? The
King, it is true, is kept under some restraint ;
but no personal violence has been offered to him,
and when we consider how many partizans the
ancient Government still possesses, can we blame
the Cortes for taking every possible precaution to
avoid the miseries of a civil war ?
Before a wise Government ventures to un-
sheathe the sword, it should undoubtedly weigh
well, first, the probable issue of the contest
abroad, and, secondly, what effect the measure
may. have at home. A want of unanimity in
a Nation has been generally considered as fa-
uourable to an invasion of its territory. Events
- that can scarcely be obliterated from the me-

mory prove, neverthgless, that this maxim,
ever plausible -it may appear in tbeOry, is not al-
ways found successful in the, practice. Every
one that has attentively studied the progress of the
French Revolution must know that it was the inva-
sion of France by the Allies in 17942 that consolidat-
ed the Revolutionary Government, and eventually
led the unfortunate LOUIS XVI. to the scaffold.
Nay, aroused by this attack of foreigners, the
whole population flew to arms, and, not content
with repelling the invaders, a spirit of military
enthusiasm was kindled, which threatened for a
while to bend the whole of Europe beneath the
yoke of France. During several years, Spain
had been the pliant tool of France, and both
her naval and her military resources were placed
at the disposal of BUONAPAILTE. His ambition
was not, however, satisfied. His armies invaded
Spain ; but Spain proved the grave of many of
his best troops, and this unjust aggressioti con-
tributed in no small degree to his final fall. The
loss which the French Armies sustained, and all
the countless miseries attendant upon a Guerilla
mode of warfare cannot be forgotten by the
soldiers, and should be recollected by the Go-
vernment. Those recollections must act upon
the mind of the French people, and the uncer-
tainty of final success must 'render such a war
still more unpopular. However degraded a na-
tion may appear, it must still possess some latent
and spark of virtue which awaits only a favour-
able instant to burst forth with surprizing vio-
lence. ;Spain appeared sunk low indeed in the
scale of European nations, when the dormant
energy and patriotism of its inhabitants were
aroused by the attempts of a foreign power to
subvert their national independence.

Though the partizans of the old regime may
be still numerous, they are almost as nothing
compared with the friends of the Constitution ;
and any attack on the part of France, now,
would not be considered as directed against the
latter party, but against the nation, and this con-
sideration would give it a national character
which must increase the difficulty of success on
the part. of the invaders. Spain, indeed, may be
considered as a country that can be more easily
defended than attacked : whence it is rational to
conclude that the war would be attended with
difficulties, and might possibly terminate in the
discomfiture and disgrace of the aggressors. In
the present state of popular feeling in France,
nothing could prove more injurious to the cause
of the Bourbons than an unsuccessful war. Hence
must they pause ere they determine to adopt so
important, or even dangerous, a measure. The
present French Ministry has proved singularly
fortunate. All its measures, in the late session,
were carried by triumphant majorities ; and most
of the late elections have terminated in favour of
the Royalists, to the exclusion of the Libe-
rals. Could such elections be considered as really
indicative of the national feeling, it might be con-
cluded that the cause of the Bourbons is daily
gaining ground. But if we bear in mind the
power of Ministerial influence, we are compelled to
admit that these event's are far from conclusive.
There is, and there must be, a large party in
France decidedly hostile to the Bourbons.—
They have for their enemies not only the rem-
nants of the Jacobin and of the Republican fac-
tions, but also another, and perhaps a more dan-
gerous party, the Buonapartists, who would wil-
lingly recover their influence and power by
placing the son of their late Emperor upon the
throne. This party is the most dangerous, not
only from its numbers, but from the possibility
of its being countenanced by the most' Machia-
velic Cabinet in Europe. To these parties must
be added one no less numerous, which com-
prises the friends of the present Constitution,
whom I consider as more attached to the Charter
than to the reigning Family. A war, by neces-
sitating the formation of armies, might prove ser-
viceable to the Buonapartists ; its disastroustermi-
nation might be favourable to the wishes OY the
Jacobins, whilst its successful termination would
probaby awaken the fears of the Constitutional-
ists. If the French army cheerfully consent to
restore to FERDINAND the absolute power he
once possessed, might it not be dreaded that the
Spanish forces would one day assist the Bourbons
to recover the authority which their ancestors
formerly enjoyed. This simple and natural re-
flection will no doubt be made, and will have no
inconsiderable weight with those persons who
may not feel disposed to believe that the mem-
bers of the present reigning family have the same
reverence for the Constitutional Charter. In
such a situation it is assuredly incumbent upon
the French Ministry to pause ere they adopt a
line of conduct pregnant with so much danger to
to the existing Government. The Throne of the
Bourbons is at best insecure ; let them beware
how they bring their fate to a crisis, by plunging
rashly into a war which must be necessarily un-
popular. Having already occupied too much
room in your valuable Paper, I will postpone to
a future day the remaining observations I have to
make upon the present state of political affairs.
Midhurst. A. P.