The Sun.
London, England, 1807-01-06 00:00:00

~._..

to negotiate without Ru3sia ; and when
:• :) sent her Ministers to Paris, we negotiated

in form, but in sub.tance in concert.—
ignathre of D'Oubril's Treaty, Great Bri-
ni released from its engamements. But,
Twat), was disclaimed by Russia, the
ti were re; :aced .on their fermer foot-
Lord"Luuderdille had instructions to con-
Treaty in which the interests, of Rus-
gefitt not scrupulously attended. to. Did :the
feei dis Satisfied with the terms
by cite liritish Government ?. The terms
ii Ii possession ; that is, that. we
.co etery that we then held, except
equivalent to it. should be given to us in
e. This a -.ls a basis partichlarly, applicable to
itien of both Countries—France was power-
the Continent, Great Britain at sea. Neither
had the prospect of making any consider-
ahie impression on the other...lt was. a principle
of e.qunlity to hold Sicily for our Allies, to• maid-
tale good, faith with Naples, to
,recover Hanover,
which,as it was unjustly seized, itaxeuld have been
dishonourable to abandon ; to,smaintain the in-,
tegrity of Sweden and Portugal. These were general
propositions, from which we never materially re-'
ceded. ft must be recollected that the value of
concessions for Peace increased when that Peace
was likely to be precarious. There never was,
at any period of the Negotiation, the power of
Obtaining terms such as could. have been ac,
ceded to: Previous to Lord Yarluouth's arrival from
France, no particular terms had been specified ;-
thencame the proposition of the uti possidetis.—But
from this the French GOvernment immediately re-
ceded, both with relpeet to Sicily and to other ob-
jects. Nothing, however, was distinctly stated until
after the signature of:D'Oubril's Treaty. At that time
Lord Yarmouth stated, that Hanover, the Cape,
and remained pure and'untouched,---.-
Soon, however, this rejection. of the basis operated
with a vengeance. The French Negotiator declares
that his master will not surrender Pondicherry, Sn
rinam, Tobago, Goree, Berbiee? Essequibo, &C,—
Malta too was to be subject to the payment of cer-
tain pensions, &c. ; the British garrison to be limit-
ed in. force ; besides the tit nute of Malta would ,have
become quite insecure from the loss of Sicily, on
twhieli that Island depends for ita provisions. For
Hanover it was proposed by .the French to take the
principality of Hoya ; the Cape was to become a free
port, that is, Englandi was to pay the expenees of the
establishment, and other nations to derive the ad-
vantuges of it. Independensly therefore of the viola-
tion of faith, these were terms which Great, Britain
could not accept. She could not agree to abandon
Russia and Sicily. The equivalent for Sicily waito
be given to Sicily. ThesKing of Sicily was to have
been dethroned, and Great Britain to provide for
his subsistence. Could any man with a heart, and
with feelings truly English, say that these were terms
to w hich his Majesty's Ministers could have listened ?
On the 4th September, atter the information of the
non-ratification of the Russian Treaty had. reached
Pat-is, a great change took place, and they .were dis-
posed to go much further; they were willing togive up
Hanover wit houtdeduaion, Malta withouirestriaion,
theabsolute sovereignty of the cape to Britain, Pon-
dicherry, Cleandernagore,. Tobago, &c. . These were
better terms, but they were-far from the original
basis. Yet such as they were, they were to be
at th:.- price of abandoning lussia and. Sicily.
,Had they, however, been infinitely more advan-
tageous, at such a price they ought not-to have been
purchased : and at what time too were they offer-
ed ? not until the French Emperor had left Paris, to
take the command of his armies, then on their march
a.;ainst•Prussia. • His (Lord Howick's) opinion of
.the Russian connexion was, that if a
,hope remained
of retrieving the affairs of Europe, it rested on an
intimate understanding-between, Great
_Britain and
Itus4a. • By every tie both of good faith' and of in-
•terest, we were bound strictly to adhere to our en-
' ygemeets with that Power ; and with regard, to
Sicily; when it was recolle&ed how the King of Si-
cily had been brought into the present War, it must
be evident that we were bound to defend it for. him,
could obtain some fair equivalent. With
regard to Dalmatia, considering it even as a Russian
objea, hid Russia' no right to expe& any thing from
France at the conclusion of a Peace, in return for
her acknowledgment of the Imperial title ; for
her consent to the occupation. of Naplet and of
Holland ? • she had a.rigiit to demand the evacuation
of Dalmatia ; besides, Rtissia was in possession of
the strong fortress of Cattaro, ,on the, borders of
Dalmatia, from which Prance, with.all her-power,
could not dispel hcr. But Dalmatia was not alone
Russian ohje4—it was a British object.--Let the
situation of Dalmatia be considered—it was not.ht
'contaa with. France—it was, an •advanced position,•
which afibrded the French means of communivation
with the discontented bashaws of Turkey,. and sub-
sequently of attacking India. It also, by flanking
Hungry, becamedangerous to the German Powers.
it was a position mire formidable eveniu Peace than
in War ; and in every point of view it was import-
ant to Russia; it was important to England:: it was
important to Europe, that Dalmatia should not. re-
main in the possession of the French. Some might'
contend that the British Government ought not
to' have rejected the terms °tiered,: because it would
be difficult to procure better. To that he would an-
swer, that they -were rejected. because, it would. have
been dishonourable to have accepted them, :Insuf-
ficient as they were, they become more.se,.wheo it
was con:>idered 'that they were not offered until Bo-
naparte had left Paris ; and therefore that they, would .
not have produced the etrea, without which a Peace ~
on our part was scarcely dvsitable, of ditilising Peace
over Europe. • For lie would ask,.would our accept-
ranee of the offered terms have, stopped the opera-
. Cues of. the French armies ? Could any assurances
of Talleyrand's,:on that head, have been satisfaaory
The principal inducement held out to: M. D'Ou-.
bra to 'sign his precipitate Treaty, was, that the
changes in Germany ,might be prevented. But
bis'aignatore was scarcely dry, before the Rhenish.
-Confederacy took place. There were two results
to be expeCted from the War between France and
PaissitL Either that Prussia would be successful or
• that she would be unsuccessful, Had she been .suc-
cessful, what would have been said of alie,Adtaiiiii-
etiation who had concluded a Peace- on iesutlicient
temis, - and by that means. cramped the
.energies of
,t!, c. 'and that at a time when they Might other
wis3, have been exerted with • vigour and effect ?
if .niiaucceasful„, would our situation have tin Lne-

i

;~itr. t)

liorated Does any
.boly believe that, after the bat-
tle of Jena, Bonaparte would have been stopped by
the terms . of any Treaty recently concluded with
Great Britain r Ekperienee had shewn the contrary,
aad the transactions in which M. Sebastiani was en-
gaged, afforded sufficient proof 'of cases in which
Treaties were violated by the French. To add to the
'atrocities e
e of that man, be bad, -on his-mission to. Con
stantinople, passed through the country of the Hos-
. podars, by whom he had been treated with hospitality
and kindne3s.; and yet his first at on his arrival at
Constantinople was in dire& hostility to their lute-,
rests. -We-had a right, therefore, to conclude, that.
had the French concluded a Treaty with us, they.
-:would, in the present circumstances of the Conti-
nent, have described us in the detestible light of
• having been the original instigators of the• Cont-
inental War, and -of having deserted the Powers whom
we had excited to *ion. The present deplorable
situation of Prussia increasing the immense power of
France, placed the prosped of Peace-. at a greater
distance. Far would he be from encouraging any san -
guine ex pedations. What remainedwas ittthe hands of
Heaven: We had donewhatourhonourdemanded ofus.
Whether the chastisement of gurope was to continue;
orwhether t Ire instrument of vengeance was speedily to
be deprived of its power, he knew not; but this he
kne*,thatGreat Britain had negleded nothing which
it was her duty to perform—nor did he see reason for
despondence or dismay. He looked confidentially
through the medium of the honour, the courage, and
the resources of this Country, to the period when it
would be practicable to re-establish that balance of
power on which the tranquillity and happinesa of
Europe so materially depended. There were two
- points which he had omitted in his statement : the
one related to the extraordinary Note of the 4th of
SepteMbete as published its the French Papers, in-
.viting Lord- Lauderdale to a conference with M.
Talleyrand; but which disgraceful Note never was
delivered to Lord Lauderdale ; for, bad it been
delivered to him, it :would most certainlf have
been -his • duty not to have remained a rsoment
longer in Paris. What could have been tie mo-
tive of this pnblication, he was at a loss;to guess.
It must-have originated in some error, of which
we were ignorant, for certainly nothing could
, have been more unjust than its applicator to
the Noble Lord. The other point related :o the
sudden change which the French Governmett had
asserted had taken place in the tone of ow Bri-
tish Councils, when Mr. Fox was no longer able to
attend them. They said, that the War Part: then
'prevailed. To this assertion-he could give the most._
complete denial. Whoever knew any thing of the
Noble Lord, his colleague in office (Lord Gre-
nville), must be well aware, to those uncommon ta-
lents fot business which he possessed, he enked a
firmess of mind which would not allow him to )e dic-
tated to by any -man. For himself, he had the sitistacs
tion of refieding,that from the commencemeet of the
Negotiation to the frzonclusion of it, his sentiments
were unaltered. It was true, that the last letter writ-
, ten by illr. Fox. was on the 26th of June, and that the
subsequent details were carried on by others ; but he
knew his sentiments for the remainder of the period
during which he was capable of expressing those sen-
' timents ; he knew that he always under Stood that
utipossidetis was the. basis offered by the French Go-
vernment.;_ and -he knew the indignation which he
felt at the cavils and equivocations on that subject,
On Sunday, the 7th of Septeinbere the Sunday pre-
ceding his death, when there appeared to be rather
a favourable turn in the Negotiation, anxious as that
great man was for the restoration of Peace, he
declared that there were three- objects, without
the acquisition of which Peace ought not to be con-
cluded : Ist, the maintenance of the honour of the
Country--the second was the preservation of our
connexion with Russia—and the third was the re- ,
establishment of the King of Sicily. It was on these
two last pOints that the Negotiation had been broken
'off; and he folemnly declared to the House, that
this rupture was in strut conformity to the • senti-
ments and recommendations of that, Illustrious
Statesman, who, in the most severe moments of his
illness, stated it to be the ardent wish of his mind
to accomplish, before his death two_ great works on
which he bad set his heart—the restoration of Peace,
and the Abolition of the Slave Trade, After a brief
recapitulation of the principal topics of his speech,
Lord Howick concluded by movieg an Address. si-
milar to that which was voted in the House of Lords
on Friday last. .
[Mr: MONTAGUE and Lord YARMOUTH rose to-
gether; but the sense of the House being strongly
in favour of the Noble Lord's prior title, .Mr. Mon-
tague give way.]
Lord I AR,IIUUTIT apologized for offering him-
self to the notice of the Manse so early in the De"-
bate. He trusted be *should' be acquitted of pre-
sumption, in claiming the priority of persons much
better able to direEt the tudetnent of the House,
by the candour„ of Gentlemen on every side, who
would be sensible of the propriety -of his ollering
an elucidetion of some circumstances respeding
the -Negotiation, and some' respeEting himself, in
this early stage of the debate. -It we.. es*ential
that he Should rescue hitnseil from some impute,
tions cast upon 'him, in another place, by a Noble
Lord high in auttiolity; to whom he could- not
regularly allude.
.He had seen the expressions he
.alluded to in as very respectable Newspaper early
on Saturday. , He could not doubt the authenticity
of the report, and.he wished to set himself right with
the House, and to set the House-right with respect .
to the question initbe points toe which he Meant par-
ticularly to advert; He thought, he could prove to the
Boise that the refiedions cakt.'upon hiM were un—
feundede He hoped it would not be taking up too
much of the timeof the House if he should, in his view
.of the surbjed under debate, gi-) back to the causes of
the present
,war. Considering- the aSsigned grounds
in the renewal of the War, he was'of opinion, that
at the beginning of this year there were strong rea- '
sons for entering into Negotiations for Peace. One
great causeof the war was the impessibility_of obtain-
tug .a sufficient guarantee for the security of-Malta.'
Au official statement in the Meniteurdeelared, long •
'after the commencement of the waf, that so long as
England retained Malta, Bonaparte would not relin-
quish the sovereignty of the Kingdoth of Italy. .111al-
..ta, however, was no;...the only cause of the War :
the desire to resist the aggrandizement of France
.was another cause: Russia, was as averse as we to
the oVerbeet big power and charaiaer Of France... But,
Russia was unwilling to engage ln the euterprize of
reducing France, tilr .Britain, which had little danger

to apprehend, individually, from the rekdt e the
contest, should be engaged, Front this principle
arose the Coalition, in which two Powers joined-=a
th,ird ought to have joined. That Coalition Was de-
feated by means of the policy Prussia had thought
props to pursue. In the Spring of 1806, the Con-
tinent at-lin-de(' a very gloomy prospect. Austria was
prostrate at the .feet of France ; Prussia, was bound
'to France in an alliance offensive and defensive.
There was nolonger any• hope of saving Europe b3t•
War. The only remaining chance of saving it was
by Peace. The existence of Austria could be pre-
served by Peace, aloes Peace alone could break the
union between Prussia and France, so detriMen,
tal to every hope of the deliveranee of the world as
,an union cemented by the transfer of a. part of his
Majesty's dominions. It was of littleinornent which
Power had Made the first overture. The first that
overcame the mad and fooliSt pride of robbing Na-
tions of ;Peace, rather than make an overture, was
entitled to the praise of both Nations, and of all man-
kind. The-great Statesman whose loss Europe had
to deplore. had.conduaed the earlier part of the
Negotiation.by the channel of a private correspond-
ence, the substance of Which was before the House.
'When he (Lord Yarmonth) was introduced into
the Negotiation, one great difficulty in the way of
Peace Was the connection with Russia. That, how-
ever, may be got :over on paper. But there was'
a difficulty with
.respect to Hanover, which was
much less capable of manageMent. It was known
that we would spurn any peace which would not: .be
coupled with the restitution of Hanover to our be=
loved:Sovereign. But at the same time Prussia had
been the unalterable Ally of France since the Revolu-
tion, and Hanover had been conveyed to Prussia, as
well in reward of that alliance as in consideration
of valuable cessions in exchange. 'Hence it .was ma-
terial that the intended cession should be made. mat-
ter of confidential verbal communication, till the
_Peace, for which it was to be ceded, should be as-
certained and agreed upon. The communication ,
was made confidentially, and treated of in letters
.from one friend to another. So he may speak of the
Ministers of foreign relations of this Country and of
France, though th countries were at war. Though
both parties, actuated by a desire for Peace, had cove-
,
panted for the cession of Hanover as one of the terms,
yet it was required on one side, and agreed to as reasob-
able on the other, that with a view not . to dissolve
the bonds which united France with Prussia, this
agreement should not be disclosed unless Peace
should have taken place. In the beginning of June
the proposal was sent by him to Mr. For. He de-
clined putting it on paper, in regard to the cenfi-
dential restriction imposed by the French Govern-1
tnent ; and it was not till the day of his departure
for France, with the answer of his Majesty's Go-
verninent, that be was induced,. on the'represen-
tenon of Mr. Fox, on the representation that we
were all mortal, and that in cases of such im-
portance, some fixed record, independent of hninan
casualties, should be preserved, 'that he was in-
duced, on the faith .of an assurance that the docu-
ment should notpasys the Cabinet, to commit the sub-
Stance of the proposal made to him to writing. He'
did not mean to decorate himself with plumes to
which he was not entitled. It may he true that
! one motive for chusing him to be the instru-
ment of, the Negotiation, was his having been
the bearer of the proposition from the French
Government ; but, if it •were inferred, as it had
gone abroad, that he had been chosen on that
°eround only,
.without any tegard to qnalification,
the inference was false. He regretted as .much
as any one that the choice of his Majesty's Go-
vernment had .not. fallen on some person cifgreater ability; but it was' at these= time material
to be known,',that any other person in such a capa-
city would nut .have been setfered. to remain twtdve
hours in Paris without producing his full powers.
M. D'Oubril was not „suffered to remain so long
without producing them ; and he believed it
,was
case unparalleled in history, that he.(L'ordYartuoutl)"
was not called, upon to produce his. , He, had hoped
that the private letter of Mr. Fox to Talleyrand, con-
veyed by him, contained some memorandum of the
substance of what he had communicated, and he
told Mr. Fox he did hope. so. He comninniCated to
Talleyrand the wishes of Government ; he made.
the demands he was instruaerto prefer in , a fair„
dire t, and manly manner, and not with any artifice
for the purpose of taking in. - He did state the basis
ofthe intended Neeotiation. to.. be, that of actual
possession; and no o%jeaion was made to that state-
ment, then, or at any other time---it being alwars
understood, that, though the uti possidetis was tile
basis, it was' subje& to exlilanation and variation,
according to mutual interest and convenience. , The
Negotiation might. have proceeded on thisunder-
standing, were it not for the ealousies conceived by
the political death of ,Mr, .which was under-
stood- to have taken place the I'7th of July. He
bad presented a Note to_assert, the basis of the uti
possidetis as soon as he had communicated his full
powers; and, in his second Note, that basis was
insisted - upon as much as it could be. But it was
not easy in private quarrels to make an individual
eat his wOrdS. It was much more difficult to bring
to that submission a man. who was at the head of
500,000 troops. Herice,the management • by which
to, avoid a retratlatien the word edopte was sub-
stituted for the word reconnoi4, in,the. acknowledg-
ment of the long-coutested basis. Little progress,
however, was made in. the Negotiation ; atci scarcely •
had an exchange of visits taken place when M. •
D'Oubril arrived at Paris. ill• Was of little moment
now to inquire, whether the Treaty signed by
D'Oubril was the aCt of his own impropriety—or ,
Whether the refusal to ratify, it arose merely , from:
a-change in the Russian Ministry, subsequent to his
Setting out: on his mission. He had given his Ma,
jesty's Ministers intimation by which they may have
anticipated the possibility of M. D'Oubril's con-
• clachne alseparafe Treaty,----and, in fa&, he did two
days after sign a Separate Treaty. There arose the
difficulty of his (Lord Yarmouth's) situation, and
on this point particularly he trusted to the candour
of the House for'a.patient hearing, though the state-
'tent was, he was aware, tedious.--On 89turday:*
morning, on getting up, he had read these words in 1'
a respeetable Newspaper, imputed, to somebody, he
could not say,--" The Noble Lord (Yarmouth) having-
instruaions not to produce his full lowers, with-
out a written acknowledgment of the desired basis, ,
'did think it proper to •prednce these: powers," It
was impossible he could have had such instruc- •
'lions.' It was a known thing, that no Paper

. •
,
ti `could paas.till 'the 'l4l powers had been exhibi ed.
He was instrueted to present a Paper, 'contain.ng,
the sentiments of his Majesty's Government, to the
French Minister. But the French- Minister refu
to receive it as a diplomatic commanication, with-
'out an exhibition of full -Powers. The French Mi-
nister desired him, in these circumstances, to go
• -home and 'copy the Note, and give it to-him as a.
Newspaper ; and then he would answer :it, under
an engagement not to make the contents public. If
his :Majesty's Ministers -were desirous to get a writ-
ten,ackno wledgment of the basis in question, there
should have been a letter 'on the subject to the French
Minister, which he would have been well contented
to have delivered as a post-boy, and which must
have called fOrth an answer. This answer he might
have had authority to open, and thus a written 'ae:-
knowledg-tnent of the basis might have been obtain;
ed, which would not have been denied except 4a
moment of anger. In the events that had occurred,
even the agreement to cede Hanover might. have
been deriied.—He expelled it would have been;
and it probably would, had it not been for the war
between France and Prussia. When he had
.receivdi,
ed the communicatiot: reffeEting on his disclosure btu
his full powers, he had sent a justification' on this
most material points, as between him and his Ma-
jesty's Ministers. He did not conceive that what
he wrote would come before the Public, or he would
have wrote a great deal more. He had no instruc»
tion to withhold his full powers, except on the
ground of Sicily; and he considered the consent of
his Majesty's Ministers, to negotiate for that island,
as an evasion of the claim to its absolute unqualified
cession, which he had been before instrualed to insist
upon as a necessary preliminary to the farther pro-
gress of the Negotiation.- The only, question be*
tween him and his Majesty's Ministers was, the
question of expediency ; and his answer to what
they urged against him on this point was, that he
could not possibly have advanced a step further its
the Negotiation without exhibiting his till powers.
it would have been a question in that case with the
French` Government, whether it should sacrifice the
chance of Peace with England, and with that change
the King's' German dominions, to the preservation
of its alliance with Prussia ?or whether-it would en-
counter a Prussian War for the chance-of a Nego-
tiation with England. In order to create an atux-
nativein this case, lie thought it necessary to give
a real existence to the Negotiation by the exhibitiors
of his fiall powers. If he. had not- taken this resolu-
tion, he should have been under the necessity -of
getting into a post-chaise, and proceeding, not to
.Bbulogne, for he was 'not an accredited Negotiator,
hut to some other part from whence hiS Majesty's
.Ministers might have had news of him, 'and of the
issue of the Negotiation- with which he was intrust--
ed, in a fortnight after the close of the proceeding",
He wished he had had provisional instruttioas how
he . should ad in the event of the conclusion, of
separate treaty by D'Oubril. Then he would hey,
been

- in utrutnque paratus.

But it was not till the fact of the signature. of •t he
separate Treaty was known to all the COUVLS of
-rope that instru&ions were sent to him hOw to re-
gulate his .conduct upon that event. Shortly after
Lord Lauderdale was joined with him in the ma-
nagement of the Negotiation. He had too long• an
acquaintance with that Noble Lord, too high a valno
upon that acquaintance, too high a sense of his talents
and his character, to feel hurt Upon that appointment.
He owned he was hurt at the condu6t of hisAlajesty4
Ministers in the matter ; but he had too high a re-
spe6,l for the Noble Lord to allow :bitn to, see that
he fat himself from that time to be a mere dead,
letter ; but be dreaded, that if he should withdraw
front the Negotiation new difficulties ;and fresh-cold-
ness, and want of confidence should•arise. No one
could doubt that the opportunity was favourable ter
the conclusion of a more glorious Peace than hadat
any other time been Offered to, this country. We
had broken, off in the consideration:of Dalmatia and
Sicily. Our engagesnents with the Emperor of Rus-
sia were the grontid of this tenacity, .and our en-
gagements'with the King of Naples, and the intrin-
sic value of the Island ()f Sicily itself. It 'was trot
very easy to justify.the breaking offa Negotia tion.so
essential to the repose of two great nations, without
the proof of having made every reasonable attempt
to bring it to a favourable issue. What we thought
due to-the honour of Russia certainly could not wear
an unfavourable appearance when: proposed by- us;
but we should be informed whether Russia. herself
'set au equal value upon what we insisted upon,. from
a sense of her regarding it with equal estimation.
When 'the Kingof Naples entered into the war, with
View to the common interests of nations, he x-t,as-
nattrally defended, by dgreat part of the disposeahit
force of this empire, at a vast cxpence. He wished
Ave could be told that we were at war .because the,
Emperor of Russia- disapproved of the terms offered
for hint Self or for the King of Naples. What would.
'the coUntry think when we were told that more gto-
riot-14 Wins than had ever before ix!en, offered :had-
been rejeaed at a time when we had failed in •every
ContidentaLattempt, merely on the ground'of this
one iMpedintent ? We might say to itussi3, in also
the fa& of her alliance. with us- was clears and her
assent difficult,
Yhus much to mitigate thy'plaee,
%Vhich, if thou. urgest in strid4usticep
Must avail.
Brit was it to be supposed that the King of Napleo
would not have been extremely happy to exchange
Sicily, from which he might easily- be expelled by
France at a favourable opportunity, for some posses--
sion which the maritime superiority of Britain would
always be sufficient to preserve to birn, or some ono
which, by its own terrestrial power,would be sufficient
to maintain itself) Dalmatia and Albania had been of-
fered to the King of Naples, and it was not clear)
if the attempt had been made, but the Balearic Isl*
might have been annexed to these ; Dalmatia woul t
have,excited more jealousy if giVen to Russia,' tha I
if given to -Austria -.or Naples. If it was clear tact
the war was continued because justice would not
done to our Allies, there would be no doubt as to;
the resolotion the House ()Light to come to ; 113,
`more ought.thero to be it the- war-Were-- coutikviecl
on account or India.' BLit if it was honinue.i c,il 010'
former ground,. the identity of the sentitnents,
the reciprocity of the obligations of our allies,
to be established. He • had , risen..nierely to re;
his own condu.at the very extracrdinary.
lion of a public man charge'd wills violating, 'lr-
struLlions which he bad never received.