The Sun.
London, England, 1849-01-29 00:00:00

LAW INTELLIGENCE.
COURT OF CHANCERY, Jan. 27.
THE ROYAL ETCHINGS.
PRINCE ALREIsT V. STRANGE AND JUDGE.
The arguments in this important case were resumed
by Mr. Russell on the Lord Chancellor taking his seat.
Mr. Rolt. followed Mr. Russell in support of the
appeal of Mr. Strange from the order of Vice Chancellor
Knight Bruce, refusing to dissolve the injunction granted
against the appellant.
Mr. WARREN, who followed Mr. Rolt, for the appel-
lant Strange, said, that he would confine his arguments
to those points of law applicable to the case, which came
within the province of that part of the profession
its
prayer which he belonged. The statements in the bill and
prayer raised questions of great moment respecting the
jurisdiction of courts in respect to the property that a
man had in the labours of his own brain. A parade had
been made that Mr. Strange had submitted to that part
of the injunction restraining the exhibition of the etch-
ings; but the reason that he had so done It as, that such
restriction was, as far as he was concerned, non ad rein;
he had only had one of them in his possession, which he
returned, and as for the other 63 or 64 he had never
seen them. Then, with respect to the catalogue, the
Vice-Chancellor had gone a great way indeed in grant-
ing the present injunction without giving Mr. Strange
an opportunity of having his legal title investigated
by a court of common law; the more so as his
Honour in his judgment had not stated that it was
not a fit question for a court of law. The de-
cision of Lord Lyndhurst in the case of " Spottis-
wode v. Clarke and Phillips" had clearly defined what
ought to be the rule of this court in regard to cases of
this description. His Lordship there stated that where
the question depended upon a legal right the title must
be very clear indeed for the Court to interfere by in-
junction before sending the case to law, as great injustice
might be done to the defendant if it should afterwards
tura out that the plaintiff's view of the case was an
erroneous one. The same principle had also been laid
down by his Lordship in a later case of " Rigby v. the
Great Western Railway Company." There could be no
foundation for the interference of this court except on
the ground of property ; and yet the bill might be
searched through in vain for an allegation that his
Royal Highness Prince Albert claimed any property
in the catalogue, or even in the particular copies of
-the etchings described in such catalogue. In addi-
tion, there was no charge in the bill that the pro-
perty of the plaintiff in the etchings, even if he
had any, would be injured by the publication of the cata-
longe, or that the etchings themselves or the catalogue
were of any value. With respect to the charge of fraud,
the statements in the bill did not go to the extent of
saying that Mr. Strange had obtained his information
by any improper means, and it was therefore quite con-
sistent to infer that he had gained it bona fide, although
the source from which it came might be tainted. It was
• extremely painful to have to argue a case of this kind,
were the parties concerned were of such exalted station,
but it was his duty to submit to the Court all the points
of law bearing upon the subject. The whole proceed-
ings, most likely, were offensive to the royal personages
int r sted, and it :was much to be lamented that they
should be so annoyed; but the answer of Mr. Strange
contained a solemn disclaimer on his part of any in-
tention to cause such pain, and a d, claration that the
instant he discovered the exhibition would be dis-
tasteful to her Majesty and the Prince he determined
to abandon it. It might be asked, what, then,
could be the reason that Mr. Strange sought to
annul the injunction? The answer was, that he had a
character to maintain amongst the members of his own
trade in London and the public, and could not, therecore,
sit down quietly under the imputation that he had sur-
reptitisty obtained p ,sscssion of his information. In
the next place the allegat,ons in the bill were, that some
of the etchings in question had been done by her Ma-
jesty, which, be would submit, was no assertion of the
plaintiff's having any property in them; fur, by the sta..
' tute 3d and 4th Victoria, chap. 2, sec. 3, it was enacted
that the husband of her Majesty should not, jure rnariti,
gain any interest in property belonging to her Majesty,
but that the same should continue her own. And yet
the injunction covered the whole of the etchings men-
tioned in the catalogue, which was too extensive, as the
plaintiff ought too have have disciiminated which were
his own property. The real question, however, was, had
the plaintiff any property in the copies possessed by Judge,
, or in the catalogue? If he had, there was no such allega-
tion in the bill; nor was there aey statement that the cata-
logue itself was of any value, although at the bar it had
been urged that it might turn out to be extremely valu-
able if her Majesty thought fit to present it to any
charitable institution. Could the conclusion, therefore,
be drawn from the pleadings, that the legal title of the
plaintiff was so clear as to justify the Court in abstain-
ing from submitting it to the usual ordeal of a trial at
law? The case of appellant was, that no such clear
title could he inferred from the bill and affidavits.