The Sun.
London, England, 1836-11-07 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1536.

CHANCES .Y COURT-3VEDriESDAY-

IN RE LUDLOW CHARITY.

SENDING THREATENING LETTERS TO THE 111AST4LZS (3:

THE COURT.
The LORD CHANCELLOR, on taking- his seat this morn-
ing, said, before the regular business of the Court 18 pro-
ceeded with, I wish to state an occurrence whitli tins taken
place in the office of one of the Maters, of which, after
above it) years' experience, I have seen no parallel. . Master
Brougham hes just put into my hands a letter which he
has received from a gentleman, whom the letter describes
as the barrister attending the Master upon the reference
under an order of the Court. I abstain at present from
stating the name, but I think it right to say that it is not
the name of any gentleman who I am in the habit of see-
ing in this Court. That letter states proceedings which
have taken place in the Master.' Office, and after com-
plaining of an opinion which the Master is sup-
posed to have formed—not stating any report to have
been made, but on the contrary stating that the case
is still pending before the Master—after using expres-
sions in that letter which no gentleman can permit to he
used towards himself, and proceeding in terms which I, not
intending at present to read the letter, shall abstain from
characterising, throws out insinuations certainly the most
calumnious, and concludes with a direct threat, the object
of which is in terms to induce the Master to alter the opinion
he is supposed to have formed, and to come to a conclusion fa-
vourable to the case advocated by the writer of that letter.
It is quite obvious what course the Master should have
pursued ; he ought undoubtedly, in my opinion, to have re-
ferred that letter at once to the Court. It appears, how-
ever, from other letters that have been sent to me, under
circumstances I shall presently state, the Master, under
the irritation of receiving such a letter, adopting a course
which I certainly cannot approve of, put this letter into
the hands of a friend, who, from his own high character
in the profession to which he belongs, would be quit! cer-
tain of not adopting any course inconsistent with the ho-
nour of the parties by whom he was consulted. That
friend doubted whether he could permit the case to
proceed, and he took the advice of another gentle•
man of the same profession, of very high rank and
station in the country, and they both agreed that it was
impossible the matter should proceed in that course, and
they both concurred in the opinion that the Master was
not at liberty to treat the matter as a personal quarrel, it
being an offence committed against him in the exercise of
his judicial functions, but that he was bound to refer the
whole case to me as the head of the Court, and ac-
cordingly I have been put in possession of this letter.
It is impossible for me not to disapprove of the course
the Master in the first instance adopted ; because
it is quite obvious if judicial officers are to take
up insults offered to them in the exercise of their
judicial functions as personal quarrels, that they not only
put themselves at the mercy of those who may wish to
attain their ends by any means in their power, but in the
exercise of their administration, there may exist and arise,
if such a course should become a practice, an influence
over the conduct of those who are exercising those judicial
functions, of a private or personal nature, which cannot but
interfere materially with the due administration of the law.
I entirely approve of the advice which the Master received
from his friends, to place the case before the Court ; and it
remains for me to consider what course I ought to adopt.
It is obvious, as I have said, that Masters and other officers
of the Court, are not to consider insults offered to them in
the exercise of their duty as the subject of personal quarrel,
but that it is the bounden duty of the Court to throw its
protection around its officers. The Court undoubtedly has
still power to do that, and it is a power which I shall feel it
my duty to exercise effectually. What I am now saying
is necessarily in the absence of the party Ithose name is
subscribed to that letter, nor have I any legal knowledge
the letter was written by him. A case of this sort has
never occurred within my knowledge. It has frequently
occurred that letters have been most improperly addressed
to Judges upon matters before them, sometimes from igno-
rance and sometimes from bad motives ; but I have never
before known them accompanied by insulting language and
absolute threats for the purpose of obtaining the ends of the
writer. In these cases a practice has been adopted by Judges
which I have frequently followed, of handing over the
letter to the opposite side ; and the parties who appeared
lsefore the Master in this matter are not to be deprived
of that benefit because the case has been aggravated by
the tone and manner in which the letter is written. I
propose, therefore, first, to direct as many copies
of this letter as there were parties attending be-
fore the Master, to be made and sent to them
in order that they may have an opportunity of considering
what course they should adopt. The course they may
think right to adopt may make it unnecessary to adopt any
other course ; I abstain from doing that which probably
ultimately I shall think it my duty to do, until I am in-
formed what course the parties litigant in the Master's
office think it right to adopt on behalf of their clients. I
shall direct (topics of the letters to be given to the soli-
citors, and postpone the further consideration of the sub-
ject to Saturday next.
This statement from his Lordship seemed to come like a
thunderclap upon the bar, each gentleman in Court look-
ing at the other, as if he was anxious to make the inquiry
who can the barrister be who had written a letter requiring
such strong animadversions from the Judge of the land.
The Court then proceeded with the appeal of Malcolm
v. 0 Callaghan.

house itself? He, (Sir F. Pollock) would contend that
udit:e thcse two hetuse.4 were en ettencetrtl tij,ether, ma-
naging their l'etnittanees in a particular way, whatever risk
there might he neeesktrilY b00t),t,..a to them, and could not
he cast,, upon the •Th 4 had ti 6 r4ilif. td td the
plAidttiTl di tO the putolic, " We have a particular mode of do-
ing business between ourselves, by which, the moment money
is paid to the one he puts it in his pocket and the other gets
credit for it, and whatever risk there is the public must bear."
The person who employs them has a right to say, " I have
given you money to remit, and you have no right to turn it
to your own account, any, more than if I had gh,on yutt
bar of silver," If th'e d6rendants had clone what the plain-
tin agent required of them, his rights would have been un
impaired by the insolvency of the East India House—they,
by remitting the money in a particular way, took all the
risk upon themselves, which was but fair, as they were the
best judges of how far their East India correspondents
could be trusted. The plaintiff was entitled to his remedy
either in equity or bankruptcy, in an action for money had
and received, which was one of the most equitable descrip-
tion. The case resolved itself into this simple question,
had the defendants done what they were told to do ?—or
had they not substituted an eqtivalent 9—and if so, were
they not to take the risk upon themselves, the East India
House having failed before the arrival of any advises of
the money having been sent out 9 Upon these grounds he
submitted that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict.
• The COURT having conferred together for some time,
Lord DENMAN observed that there was a case, " Buller
v. Harrison," in Cooper, very similar to it, and as the ques-
tion was one of immense importance to the commercial
world, the Court wished, before giving any opinion, to look
at it.

PRINCE V. SAMS.
Sir F, Pot,Loci( moved in this case for a rule to set aside
the verdict had for the defendant, on the ground of the ex-
clmion of some evidence which the plaintiff was entitled to
give. It was an action for an arrest without reasonable and
probable cause, the particulars of which have been recently
before the public. On the trial a witness named Patteson
was examined as to certain statements and admissions made
on a former trial by the plaintiff, the object of which was
to show that the plaintiff was a disparaged person, and also
that a certain debt between himself and Sams was really and
truly a debt. He (Sir F. Pollock) had proposed to exa-
mine the witness as to the whole of his evidence on that oc
casion, but his Learned Friend Sir William Follett had
objected to his doing so. Now he contended that when a
witness was called to give in evidence a particular declara-
tion of a party, the Counsel on the other side had a right
to the whole of what had taken place on that occasion, and
on these grounds he was entitled to a rule for a new trial.
COURT—You may take a rule.