The Sun.
London, England, 1849-08-28 00:00:00

AFFAIRS of FRANCE and ROME.
REPORT OF THE FRENCH COUNCIL OF STATE
ON THE CONDUCT OF M. DE LESSEPS AT
ROME.
The Jioniteur publishes the following on the affair
of M. de Lesseps ;—" Art. 99 of the Constitution de-
clares The National Assembly and the President
of the Republic may in any case order an examination
into the acts of any functionary, except the President
of the Republic, by the Council of Stare, whose report
shall be published:" The following report, adopted
by the Council of State in its sittings of the 6th and
Bth of August, is published in execution of the -above
article :
"Monsieur le President,—ln execution of Art. 99 of
the Constitution, you have referred to the Council of
State the examination of the acts of M. de Lesseps
relative to the mission confided to him in Italy. [The
report here recapitulates the circumstances which
preceded the apponitment of M. de Lesseps, and then
says:]—The twofold object of the mission of M. de
Lesseps was—' First, to remove from the States of the
Church the anarchy which desolates them.' M. de
Lesseps, although charged' to enter into arrangements
with the men invested with power at this moment, must
ahstain from anything which would make them believe
that we consider them as a regular government, or lend
them a moral force of which they have hithet to been
destitute. He can only enter into partial engagements
with them.' In the second place, the mission tends to
prevent the re-establishment of a regular power et
Rome from being compromised in the future by a blind
reaction. In preventing the development of the inter-
vention exercised by other powers animated with less
moderate sentiments, a larger place must be preserved
for our especial and direct influence. On the other hand
must be avoided every word, every stipulation of a na-
ture to excite the susceptibilities of the Holy See and of
the conference at Gaeta, which are too much disposed to
believe that we are inclined to think too lightly of the Court
of Rome. To attain these results, it is prescribed to the
envoy to act in concert with MY!. d'Harcourt and de
Rayneval on every subject of any gravity, on every thing
which shall not require an absolutely immediate solu-
tion.' These instructions were formal. If they do not
enter into all the details of what M. de Lesseps might do,
they clearly point out what he was to avoid. To com-
plete them, the instructions addressed to our ministers
at Gaeta were forwarded to M. de Lesseps on the fol-
lowing day. He knew, besides, that the Government
was always resolved to have recourse to arms if the at-
tempts at arrangement should be without success. A
telegraphic dispatch, addressed on the 10th of May to
General Oudinot, was also communicated to M. ds Les-
seps. This dispatch terminated as follows:—' Endes-
your to enter Rome in accord with the inhabitants, or if
you are forced to attack let it be with the most positive
chances of success.' To endeavour to enter Rome with
the consent of the inhabitants, without recognising the
Roman authorities, without inspiring uneasiness in the
Court of Gaeta, and without bringing its rights in ques-
tion; to foresee the eventuality of an attack, and not to
compromise the chances, such was the object of the
mission of M. de Lesseps. No uncertainty can exist on
this head; the terms of the instructions are formal. The
discussion in the National Assembly of the 7th of May
had nothing to invalidate them. Besides, AL de Lesseps
could not in any case avail himself of this discussion
against the letter of his instructions, which is the sole
basis of the examination into his conduct. The instruc-
tions of an agent of the Government can never be
weakened, extended, or modified, by the aid of foreign
circumstances, or of external comments which are no
p-trt of them. All the rules of hierarchy and responsi-
bility would be confounded if this principle were not
rigorously followed, and the Council of State would fail
in its duty if it did not observe them with severity. How
has M. de Lesseps conformed to his instructions? This
is what the Council of State has sought to ascertain.
The first act of M. de Lesseps, on his arrival at Rome on
the 16th of May, was to pronounce in accord with Lien.
Oudinot the suspension of hostilities. He could net ne-
gotiate without giving a pledge of his pacific intentions.
Our army, however, was impatient to obtain reparation
for the surprise of the 30,h of April. The season of
fever was approaching and menaced our cantonments;
the Austrians were marching; the Neapolitan ;troops
had crossed the frontier, and a Spanish expedition was
announced. It was necessary, therefore, that the sus-
pension of hostilities should not extend beyond the
period necessary for the negotiation, and that it shotild
cease as soon as a pacific solution could no longer be
hoped for. It is not apparent that M. de Lesseps was
sufficiently penetrated with this necessity. In tact, on
the 19th of May, after a first attempt at arrangement,
followed by a refusal on the part of the Triumvirs, M.
de Lesseps and General Oudinot thought themselves
authorised to sign a declaration of rupture. M. de
Lesseps, instead of notifying it immediately, waited
three days, and then. on his own responsibility, added a
promise to notify the resumption of hostilities eight
days beforehand. He thus substituted an indefinite de-
lay to a fixed term, and opened to the temporisations of
the Romans a career they hastened to follow. It was
only ten days after, on the 29tb, that he lent himself to
a new ultimatum; he thus lost in useless measures a time
which was every day becoming more precious. In fine,
when on the 3lit May he signed the treaty, which will
be spoken of hereafter, he again consented to a last de-
lay of a fortnight after the non-ratification. Thus, in-
stead of urging forward the solution, he deferred it; in-
stead of hastening the moment when our army should
have freedom of action, he retarded it. He hoped to
come to an arrangement, promises were made him which
he believed, his confidence was excessive; there is no
circumstance to cause suspicion of his intentions; but
the event has proved that he neither formed a just opi-
nion of the state of affairs nor of the men with whom
he had to treat. It is to the character and the nature
of the negotiations themselves that the attention of the
C.,tmeil of State has been principally directed in its
examination. On his arrival at Rome, when M. de
Lesseps had fresh in his mind his instructions, the con-
ewsations which he had had in France with the Minis-
ters, and the impressions of the sitting of the National
Aisealbly of the 7th May, he showed himself, in form
at least, faithful to his instructions. He soon struck
against the shoals which he was ordered to avoid; the
more his mission was prolonged the more he appeared
to forget his instructions; once departed from the line
traced out for him, he every day removed himself more
and more from it. One deviation led to another; all his
pre occupations were ceotered in B, rne, and his thoughts
were never turned either to. the Government of which
he was the agent, or on Gaeta, the negotiations with
which he was to facilitate. We are authorised to con-
elude that it was not to bring back his instructions to
their original object that he successively modified his
conduct, and that it was at Rome its& that he was led
away by influences which he was not able to resist. The
examination of the Council of State proves that M. de
Lesseps acted against his instructions in their principal
points. 1. He did not confine himself to treat with the
Roman authorities as the de facto power, but he lent
himself to acts which gave them the moral force which
ha was ordered not to give them. 2. He put himself
in formal opposition to M. d'Harcourt and M. de Rayne-
val on the most fundamental questions, when his instruc-
tions ordered him to concert with them on every serious
point. In fine, he was only authorised to make partial ar-
rangements; the general and definitive solution of the af-
fairs of Rome was not placed in his hands; he had only
to concern himself with what related to the entry into
Rome, and the special conventions necessary to secure
that entry. He, however, took the whole question on him-
self, and in the arrangements, he made there is not one
which does not contain some stipulation foreign to the
defined object of his mission. In the first, he proposed
to maintain a Provisional Government, up to the
moment when the Roman people called on to make
known their wishes should declare themselves on the
form of government which was to rule them, and on the
guarantees to be made in favour of Catholicism and of
the Papacy.' In the second, he inserted a clause stating
that the Roman people have a light to declare them-
selves freely on the form of government. He added
that the Roman authorities will act according to their
legal attributions.' At a later period, he proposed to
the Triumvirs to declare that, 'The French Re-
public guaranteed the territory occupied by our
troops against any foreign invasion.' Some of these
stipuiatkons were in conformity to the idea of the French
G.,verrtment ; but oti,.ers were directly opposed to them,
sad none of them came into the terms of a partial ar-
rangement for they all implied a general solution. The
act by which M. de Lesseps has terminated his mission
is the most reprehensible of all. In form, it was con-
cluded in direct violation of his instructions, not only
without a previcius concert established with M.M. d'llar-
court and de R-synevat, but against their reiterated pro-
tests, against the express wish of General Oudinot, with
whom M. de Lesseps was bound to keep up intimate and
confidential relations. In matter this treaty, which
reproduces the principal provisions of all the projects,
and adds others, contains stipulations, the perusal of
which would almost suffice to set forth its gravity.
Art. 1 is thus worded:—' The support of France is
assured to the Roman States. They consider the
French army as a friendly army which comes to aid in
the defence of Their territory.' This article stipulates
in express terms a defensive alliance. It places the
forces of France at the disposal of the Romans.
This engagement was entered into at the time
when the troops of Austria, Spain, and Naples
were only at some marches distant. At t. 2. 'ln accord
with the Roman Government, and without in any way
mixing itself' up in the administration of the country,
the French army will take up exterior cantonments
+lilted both for toe defence of the country and for the
nealth of the troops; the communications are free. This
article oontains two distinct stipulations: 1, it recognises
theßoman Republic, although not named, in recognising
the
Government which represents it, and which stipu-
lates for it, and in maintaining to it the administration
tohfethFerc,onucrlicv This recognition was accorded when
in a
government at Paris and Gaeta had pro-
nounced itself, sense
directly contrary; it exposes
its policy to theof duplicity and treason. 2.
It prevents reproach
the French fromou"ltstiedring Rome, in reserving
to it cantonments on the
mission t, tided to obtain that outside
'I rstilhoecallodbjo'-eptenofwitthhe.
cut combat its gates to France.
The
entrance
into not
aware of that; the dispatch of May 10 c,jilaelds"Ps was
any doubt on the subject.
was for the Government, for the maintenance otFrtcorng I
is thienc,: iii Italy, for our military •honour after‘ the
eilair of April 30, a necessary condition, and which
our Envoy ould sot
give up in any case or on any
c
pre.exa A. 3, The French Republic guarantees
arainst all foreign Inv iston the territory occupied
b.), its troops.' This declaration is puerile or insulting
fur our army, in stipulating that France will not allow
herself to be expelled from the places which she occupies,
or it involves the question of peace or war. M. de Lesseps
could only give it this last signification, when he pro-
posed it for the first time in his let ter of May 24 to the
Triumvirs. Ile declared that he did not fear to compro-
mise his responsibility and future prospects.' Oa May
30 he used, in a letter to General Oudinot, a language
which shows that in his ideas war could issue from that