The Sun.
London, England, 1849-01-08 00:00:00

THE STATE OF INDIA.

CAMP, DECCAN, Nov. 25, 1848.—There was
nothing enacting in regard to news in India to induce
me to write to you by the last mail. Nothing had
been done at Moultan. The army to be assembled
was still in fragments here and there, none of them
progressing very rapidly to the scene of operation.
There seemed to be much vacillation in what v. as
being done, no connected movements being appa-
rently concerted. Troops were ordered here to day
and there to-morrow. Brigades were not formed,
nor did commissariat supplies appear to be ready
nor those equally imortant ones, materiel for siege or
field operations. General Whish, although Shere
Singh had left Moultan, was, or appeared to be,
in no condition or humour to renew the seige, nor
was there any probability or possibility of reinforce-
ment from Bombay or from Ferozepore. Shere Singh
was passing northwards to join his father, already suc-
cessful in the region he occupied beyond the Jelum,and
threatening the garrison of Attock, while he was
pursuing his intrigues with the garrison of Peshawur,
as yet steady under Major Lawrence. There was no
decisive move
,by any party, the most actively em-
ployed, perhaps, being Brigadier Wheeler, who, with
a small, but compact brigade, was busy reducing the
small forts of petty chiefs to the northward and on
the left bank of the Beas—a service in which he has
met with the success which his active character
deserves.
By the last news, however, the scene has changed,
and there is no longer inactivity on any side. Our
own procrastination, I surmise, more than any other
reason, has at last:caused the defection of the garrison
of Peshawur, which, on the 23d and 24th of October,
mutinied, and declared their intention of joining
Chuttur Singh or Shere Singh. Major Law-
rence's admirable management of this body for
the last four months has, therefore, proved abor-
tive. Seduced by the offers of Chuttur Singh, and
seeing in the advance unmolested of Shere Singh to
boin him hope of the national cause, the whole
roke, and Major Lawrence and his assistant,
Lieutenant Bowie, were obliged to fly. They have
taken refuge in Kohat, where Mrs. Lawrence and her
children had proceeded previously. It does not seem
certain whether the garrison of Attook had actually
joined the insurgent party • the report, as I write, is
that it had on the 28th. Nor is it surprising should
it have done so, with the temptation before it of the
successful enterprises of Chuttur Singh and Shere
Singh, and the likelihood of their junction in the
neighbourhood of Attock. Captain Abbott in the
Hazareh country, aided by the chiefs who had joined
him, still held his ground, nor had his forces, though
unable to cope with Chuttur Singh in the field, shown
any symptoms of wavering in attachment. The,
are to a man Mahometans, and, as Major Edwardes s
men still are, 'may be firm and faithful. If no other
result followed from this, their position and num-
bers would at least prevent Chuttur Singh getting
into the strong country ofithe Hazareh, while under
attack from our troops were assembled, these men
would be ready to operate upon their flank, and thus
materially assist our operations. There is still some
danger that they may abandon Captain Abbott and
remain neutral, if they do not join the insurgent
cause ; but I have hope from their first active move-
ment, that they may not be dismayed by the defection
at Peshawur, nor seduced by the offers which will,
doubtless, be made to them by Chuttur Singh and
Shere Singh. On our side, also, a column of Ghoolab
Singh's troops, under Colonel Steinbach, is in the
field, and will long ere this have joined the advanced
brigades under General Cureton, which had pushed
on towards the position of Shere Singh, and will
prevent, if possible, his junction with his father, and
the troops under Aotar Singh in Bunnoo, &c., also
in revolt.
I see by the papers that the news from the north-
west is considered unsatisfactory, on account of these
additional risings, and that we are not yet considered
strong enough to meet them. To a certain extent,
no doubt, it is most unsatisfactory that there should
be additional risings; (most unsatisfactory that there
should be a war at all ; but I cannot see what else
could be expected than what has happened after the
delay which has taken place in the assemblage and
marching of troops. Instead of putting down the
Moultan matter at once, at any risk of temporary in-
convenience to those engaged, our own brigades
were delayed, and an insufficient force sent at last,
Edwardes placed in a false position, and Shere Singh
allowed to remain, when he ought to have been sent
across the Sutlej, or to a point where he could
have been watched by the Bombay forces
at Sukkur. Chuttur Singh has been allowed
to gain head. No troops were pushed on
to occupy Attock or the central Doab, no activity
displayed commensurate with the importance of the
time; and the consequence is what we see, which
does not in the least surprise me, nor, I am confident,
will it surprise any man who considers that the
Seikhs as a body had evidently long prepared a strug-
gle for domination, and that it is the interest of all,
or appears so, to join in what may now be termed a
national movement against us, as they formerly made
against the Mahometans.
But withal it is not so very formidable as to cause
any serious apprehension. The estimate of the whole
rising may be thus taken for the north-west :
Chuttur Singh .. .. 8,000 good troops.
Shere Singh .. .. 5,000 good troops.
Peshawur men .. .. 6,000 good troops.
Aotar Singh .. 2,000 good troops.

20,000
These have from 60 to 70 field-guns in good order,
and the Pesbawur troops are known to be in a very
efficient state of equipment and discipline, superior,
perhaps, to the rest. I have seen no estimate of the
troops in the Bunnoo district which have revolted,
but it is understood that they are at least 3,000 to
4,000 strong, and may possibly unite with the main
body or bodies. It is evident that it is the purpose of
the leaders to unite, and there is nothing to prevent a
junction at least of the Peshawur force and Chuttur
Singh, or of 14,000 to 15,000 men, or if joined by
Shere Singh, of 20,000. To meet this, the cavalry
and infantry brigades, under General ureton, have
been pushed on, and, as he was not far from Shere
Singh in the last week of October, and had called
up Eckford's brigade, which was on the Ravee,
it seems likely he might be able to attack Shere
Singh, and prevent his :junction with Chuttur Singh.
It does, however, seem unpardonable that a strong
brigade of 3,000 to 5,000 men was not pushed on to
occupy some point on the Alum, or at least to prevent,
if possible, the junction of Shere Singh with his
father. This, es I have observed, may be effected, but
it is by no means certain, and if the enemy's divisions
join, we shall not have force enough in the field to
cope with them for a month or six weeks to come.
General Cureton's force, if joined by Eckford's bri-
gade, which had been left at the Ravee, near the
bridge of boats, must be far superior to Shere Singh's
in number.. It eme.i.ts of the cavalry division, her
Majesty's 3dland 14th Dragoons,sth and Bth Cavalry,
12th Irregular Horse, three troops of Horse Ar-
tillery, Godby's brigade, 500 cavalry, and 2 000 in-
fantry, in all some 7,000 men. Eckford's brigade, which
had been called up, consists of the 31st and 56th Native
Infantry, two companies of artillery, and one light
field battery, in all some 2,000 more ; making a total
of 9,000 men at least, by whom a very good account
ought to be given of Shere Singh, if he can be inter-
cepted, or he wait an attack. Colonel Steinbach's
force, whatever it may be, is not included, but it is
understood to be stanch. Independent of the forego-
ing, brigades have been ordered on from Koondah-
ghat, Gunde-sing-wells, and Ferozepore. An ar-
rangement is being made at Lahore which, by
concentrating the troops, would allow of three regi-
ments more moving if required. The rest of the troops
required for the grand army will, on hearing of the
defection of the Peshawur garrison, be pushed on
at double speed, and as the Bombay force is already
well on its way, we shall soon see at least 30,000
men in the Punjaub, with a large proportion of ar-
tillery, more than sufficient, one would think, for
entire Conquest. I see, therefore, no cause whatever
for any anxiety or apprehension, dilatory as have
been the PrePexations, and vacillating the conduct in
regard to the movements of brigades. This will be
no time for further hesitation, and as the Commander-
in-Chief arrived at Perozepore on the sth, his pre-
sence may serve to accelerate matters to the general
assembly of the army, if that, indeed, be practicable
Or desirable in the present scarcity of grain and
forage in the north-west, and peculiarly upon the
Sutlej and near Ferozepore. There will be much na-
tural anxiety as to the result of Cureton's advance move-
ment. His force in cavalry and horse artillery is a
superb one, and as he has enough of infantry and field
artillery, too, ought not to hesitate, nor will he, to
attack whoever and whatever may be in his reach. It
is certain that the delay which has occurred has de-
veloped the whole of the Seikh strength in the north
and west of the Punjaub; and so far it may have
been of value. It is better to have open enemies than
treacherous friends, and as we should Inevitably have
to go through the same course of events as the pre-
sent at a future time if the Seikh army remained in
its integrity, so, perhaps, as things have been allowed,
whether by design, or through neglect, to come to
the present pass, it is the beat policy to allow all to
assemble, all to rise that can rise, and by a decisive
blow to break at once and for ever the power which,
even in its relics, is as formidable as we see it now.
It is" very evident, whatever may be the fate of the
Punjaub, t.. h a_we can no longer trust any part of the
Seikh army, and that it will form a subject for serious
consideration in the new settlement which is made, if
the Punjaub be not absorbed, how it can be replaced.
I have never written otherwise than in condemnation
of the subsidiary force system, yet in this case it
would almost appear the only resource. The country
must have an army, the frontier must be guarded,
and, unless we take the whole for good, we must, as
at Gwalior, remodel the army on our own plan, or, as
most likely will be the case, entertain new men. It
is, however, premature to speculate, as nlllO3