The Sun.
London, England, 1836-04-08 00:00:00

being able to render it efficient for the purposes it was de-
sieue'd to accomplish. I entirely subscribe, therefore; to the
wisdom (with some modification in detail) of Mr. Lindsay's
second proposal, which he offers as an alternative, in the
event of his first suggestion of an armed interference' being
deemed inadmissable. He sas (p. 4) I would suggest the
withdrawal at once of all his Majesty's Commissioners, and
that a person of no pretensions should be sent out as agent
for the Customs, whose sole duties should consist in regis-
tering ships paper, and countersigning manifests. He adds,
that 'this mode of procedure will be highly embarrassing
to the Chinese authorities, who are most anx;‘----
__.,...s to see
some recognized chief' at Canton r--
..or the purpose, as they
term_ of Tana.',;,;;;; and controlling all eV:Air; Of the Eng-
-1 'll ;' and on' ths, Vtry firrt' difficulty or dispute
which occurta tiiiy will most anxiously inquire why no such
atithtrity exists. Our reply then is obvious--s' It is your
own fault ; for when we sent one to you; yod-treated him with
insult (1. c. rejected him); and it is incompatible with the
dignity of England that a representative (rather an officer)
of her Sovereign should be subjett to such indignity ; no
chief will, therefore; be sent, until you promise him proper
reception and treatment.
" Here we have, then, on the authority of Mr. Lindsay's
knowledge and experience of the Chinese character, a plan
easy and simple, perfectly peaceable as well as legitimate, if
not of obtaining all the objects we desire, at least all the ob-
jects which the Government of this country contemplated
when they appointed Lord Napier to reside in China as su-
perintendent. Here is, indeed, no appeal to the fears of the
Chinese ; but there is an appeal which, from all we know of
their character, we may expect will be equally effectual—an
appeal to their rational self-interest. You place them, by
a merely negative course of proceeding, in such a highly
embarrassing predicament (according to Mr. Lindsay), that
they must very shortly become most anxious to do that of
their own accord which it is not quite certain that all our
embargoes and blockades would extort from them. Is not
this case somewhat analogous to that of the countryman
and his cloak, in the fable, exposed to the alternate effects
of the sun and the wind, when the genial influence of the
former accomplished readily what_ all the powerful blasts of
the latter bad attempted in vain ?"
Sir George, however, is not, under all circumstances,
adverse to the nomination of an Ambassador by the
King's Government, to take up the lost thread of di-
plomacy, broken by the failures of Lords Macartney
and Amherst. The condition affixed to this proposal
is, that the Plenipotentiary shall be one peculiarly
qualified—and we think that a fair guess is afforded—
as the precise individual who would be sure to gain the
approval of the Hon. Baronet.
" I confess I think it possible that a third mission, if
sent to China, on a plan which this is not the place to
detail, might, in very skilful hands, steer clear of those dif-
ficulties which obstructed the former two in 'inane, and
rendered all negotiation impossible : and that our national
honour might be preserved at the same time that our na-
tional interests would be promoted ; but I am very far in-
deed from recommending that the experiment should be
tried. It would not only require a very skilful leader, but
it would be necessary that he should have the entire con-
fidence and co-operation, if called upon, of that British
commercial community at Canton for whose interests he
was to contend. Setting aside the risk of an ambassador
being named who possessed every good quality except that
peculiar one of fitness for his very peculiar office, what pos-
sible chance would he have of advancing peaceably in the
slow but sure steps of ordinary negotiation, while the ma-
jority of the British community at Canton, sympathizing, as
I believe they at present do, in the belligerent views of
Mr. Lindsay, would be impatient to cut at once with the
sword the Gordian knot of his diplomacy ?"
In the concluding passages of the pamphlet, writ-
ten with reference to one written by Mr. Matheson, of
which we shall have to speak on a future occasion, the
Hon. Baronet appears to labour under some confusion
of ideas. He admits that in the course of his cxpe-
.rience the " grievances" of England once brought the
servants of the East India Company to " 4 actual ex-
tremities" with the Chinese ; but that the extreme
point of those extremities went no further than
striking the British flag, which he states to have been
our " ultirna ratio"—for that nobody, not the highest
spirited individual of the British community then in
China or India, ever then contemplated a resort to
force in any case except that of " self-defence." Now,
we have certainly always understood that a case of un-
redressed grievance between nations is one which, on
the side of the injured party, justifies a resort to force,
and constitutes that very case of self-defence which is
thus alluded to, but, as it would seem, not clearly
comprehended by Sir George Staunton. Hissugges-
tion of the service of certain unoccupied islands near
the Chinese coast, as emporia for our trade with the
country, is just and reasonable, but has been often-
times anticipated:—
" Our grievances, as they have Leen termed, never
brought us to actual extremities with the Chinese but once
during my residence in that country. We then certainly
struck the British flag, which had been so long accustomed
to wave over our establishments, and contemplated the pos-
sible necessity of a final abandonment of our position on
the Chinese continent ; but this was our ultima ratio.
Not an individual, I believe, at that period—not the highest
spirited, or the most belligerent of the then British com-
munity, either in China or India, contemplated a resort to
force in any case, except that of self-defence. The means
were not wanting : the British chief and council in China
had at that time 20 well-armed ships, manned with about
3,000 men, under their uncontrolled command ; and they
would, no doubt, have found willing instruments to execute
their instructions, if they had conceived a demonstration,
as it has been called, expedient. It is impossible to say
what might have been the effect upon the Chinese of an
attempt at that period to intimidate them. It was a par-
ticularly favourable one, and one that in all probability will
never return ; for no other flag but our own then showed
itself, or could show itself, on the Chinese coast. Peace
had not yet been restored to Europe, and war had just
broken out between us and America. Schemes of inti-
midation were never adopted, nor even contemplated,
solely because they would have been wholly unjust and in-
defensible.

" If the British community should be once more com-
pelled, as they were in 1814, to retire from Canton, and
should their negotiator not be solicited by the Chinese
authorities to return and resume his functions (as I was at
that period, as noticed by Mr. Matheson, p. 44), they will
in that case, no doubt, be driven to the necessity of taking
another position. If . Singapore be deemed to be too
distant for a suitable- commercial entrepot, there is an in-
finite number of intermediate islands, possessing every faci-
lity and convenience, both for navigation and commerce,
which might be taken possession of, not only without a con-
test, but without the violation of any right in practical exer-
cise -, and I agree with Mr. Matheson in the justice of the
remark he quotes (p. 69), that the Chinese would not
hesitate to trade with foreigners there, if they could be
assured of receiving protection ;' and that such an inter-
mediate station might, under such circumstances, become
one of the most flourishing places in the East.' "—Times.

It is the common complaint of that harsh class of
political philosophers who object to a legal provision
for the poor in England, that the cases are very rare in
which pauperism maw not be traced to indolence or
improvidence. Without stopping to argue the ques-
tion whether even these -faults should be left to the
severe punishment of utter destitution, we wish to point
out that, with respect to the proposed provision for the
poor of Ireland, this objection will not apply. It is
true that among the Irish poor both indolence and
improvidence prevail ; but these vices, (under the
present circumstances of the labouring population)
are rather the consequences than the causes of pau-
perism. There really is no resource for the people
when their numbers exceed what is necessary for the
imperfect cultivation of the soil. Excluding the
North of Ireland, and the vicinity of the metropolis,
it may be said that there are no manufactures,
and where the resident gentry are so few there is
little chance of employment as domestic servants.
The thousand varieties of ways by which, in a rich
and active country like England, the industrious and
enterprising may earn something, even when their
ordinary occupation fails, have no existence in the
greater part of Leinster, Munster, and Connaught.
They must work upon the land, or be in idle-
ness and destitution, and we have already seen that
according to the English scale, three fifths of the Irish
agricultural labourers are redundant. Under the
wretched circumstances of privation to which this ab-
sence of employment, in proportion to the number to
be employed, necessarily leads, the economists would
argue that population must decrease ; but, like most of
the theories of these ingenious gentlemen, experience
teaches exactly the reverse. Adam Smith, a wise and
moderate man compared with many of his successors
and some of his commentators, tells us with great com-
placency, that " where the lowest class is not only
overstocked with its own workmen, but with the over-
flowings of all other classes, the competition for em-
ployment would be so great as to reduce the wages of
labour to the most miserable and scanty subsistence of
the labourer. Many would not be able to find em-
ployment even upon these hard terms, but would either