The Sun.
London, England, 1849-03-28 00:00:00

THE RIVER PLATE.

SOITTLIAMPTON, MARCH 27.—8 y the arrival of the
Estafette, off Cowes, we are placed in possession of in-
telligence from Monte Video and the River Plato to the
16th of January, about twelve days later than has
hitherto been received, and which anticipates the ex-
pfeted mail via Falmouth.
Her Majesty's ship Kestrel was to sail on the 17th for
Rio Janeiro, with the mails for England.
The siege of Monte Video, which on the 16th of Fe-
bruary would complete its sixth year, still continued to
drag on its weary length; packet after packet was looked
for, but the expected succour did not make its appear-
ance. The length of time that the war has lasted has
reduced the inhabitants, with bat few exceptions, to ab-
solute beggary, and many families had been compelled to
leave for Buenos Ayres, notwithstanding former and
long kept resolutions not to return while it was in the
power of General Rosas. Tradesmen, labourers, and
small mechanics had proceeded in great numbers to seek
employment, driven away by the immensely high price
of articles of food.

Since the French followed the example of the English
in taking off the blockade, the business of the River
Plato has almost been entirely transferred to Buenos
Ayres. Vessels that discharged any of their cargoes at
Monte Video were not allowed entry at Buenos Ayres.
Business was in a deplorable state, and the revenue of
the Custom-house had fallen to so low an ebb that there
was some talk of the Government putting aside the claims
of the shareholders for a time to be enabled to prolong
the resistance to Oribe. There appeared to be no chanco
of the termination of the war.
Shortly after the arrival of English mails in Novem-
ber in the Kestrel, the French Admiral, Le Predour,
proceeded to Buenos Ayres in the Chinere steamer; the
object of his visit was not made public. It was, how-
ever, generally thought that he went to seek from Rosas
ample guarantees for French life and property in Monte
Video, in case the squadron should retire altogether
from the intervention.

Her Majesty's steamer Griffon was dispatched to
Rio Janiero immediately after the arrival of the Kestrel.
The Raleigh, 50, was to be towed up the river by the
steamer Harpy, to have her bottom cleaned.
Mr. Southern had not been received in his official
capacity by Rosas. The rejected Mr. Hood still re-
mained at Monte Video. The interdiction of Rosas,
preventing the communications with the shore of the
officers and crews of the English men-of•war, continued
in force, but was understood not to apply to the Alecto
on waiting on Mr. Southern, and was said to be evaded
in other mice.

The following was the distribution of the ships 'of
war on the South American station :—Tho Raleigh,
Tweed, Harpy, Renard, at Monte Video. The Alecto,
at Buenos Ayres. The Lizard en route to Rio Grande.
The Hydra, at Rio Grande. The Kestrel would take
the next mails to Rio. The Griffon was en route thither,
and the Spider expected with the outward mails.
French Squadron in the River Plate—Frigates, the
Constitution and Erigoue; corvette Trionaphante, barque
Astrolabe, four brigs of war, and the steamers Chit
Grondeur, and Freton. The Sardinian brig of war
Eridano. The Brazilian corvettes Don Francisco and
Bertioga, barque Berenice, and schooner Olinda. The
American corvette St. Louis sailed for Rio on the 16th
of January.
Exchange on London merchants' bills, 40d. to 40,id.
per current dollar. Navy bills were passed at 40d. On
Paris, the rates were sf. 30c. Navy bills on the French
Treasury, M. 60e.; on Rio Janeiro, par.
In freights no change.

FATAL ACCIDENT AT 1.1119 NEW RAILWAY-BRIDGE,
BARNES.—A few days since a fearful accident that re-
sulted in the death of one, and very nearly six lives,
occurred at the works of the new iron girder-bridge,
now in course of erection across the River Thames, at
Barnes, and which is intended to continuo the loop line
from the Barnes station of the Richmond Railway to
Twickenham. Stretching across from shore to shore
are two stupendous wooden frames, across which a tra-
vellrr, or frame, is propelled on a railway, supporting a
crib or winch, to which is attached a massive block and
chain, for the purpose of raising large blocks of stone,
or heavy masses of iron, and placing them in the place
intended. On the afternoon in question six men where
at work at the winch, lowering the last of the iron
girders which had been taken out of the barge on to a
platform, a little below the top of the pier on which it
would finally rest. It weighed not quite seven tons, be-
ing only one-fourth of the entire ribs that are to be used,
and it had descended slowly and steadily to within three
inches of the platform, when two sharp cracks were
heard; the connecting rods were snapped like a piece of
thread, and the hugh bulk cf timber broke like a rotten
reed, hurling the massive winch, platform, and three of
its occupants, on to the platform below. Two men were
left on the frame, and the deceased jumped into the
river. The tido was then running down, and had been
doing so for more than an hour, but there was sixteen
feet of water, and though the deceased rose twice, he
sank, and was carried away before any aid could reach
him.
MARGATE, MARCH 27.—A great uantity of
wreck has been brought in to-day from thoq neighbour-
hood of the Long Sand, and a little cargo consisting of
boxes of candles, barrels of bread, peas, &e., with the
log book of a vclsel bound to Batavia, lost on Friday
night last. The log book being made up to Friday night
there can be no doubt the vessel was lost in the gale that
came on early on Saturday morning.
his Excellency Count de Revel, for a long time
resident Minister of Sardinia at the Court of St. James's,
has been compelled, on his return to Turin, atter his
recall, to enter the ranks of the Garde Mobile as a pri-
vate. Such is the account made of the energies of a
man who, for twenty years, has proved himself an an
able diplomatist. Such a fact speaks volumes for the
present unhappy state of ltaly.—Chronicle.
His Royal Highness Prince Albert, attended by
Colonel Bouverie, paid a private visit of inspection 3,e;
terday to the Asylum fur Idiots, Park-house, Highgate.
Baron Ward, an equerry of his Royal ilifzltheis
[1,,, Duke of Parma, arrived in town 3 esteiky evening,
the bearer of eilleiddispatchea, iu which the Luke abdi-
cates in favour of the Hereditary Prince of Parma, at
present residing in England.

THE WAR IN INDIA.

The last mail of the 3d has taken to you news of two
great events, the fall of Moultan, and the so-called vic-
tory over the Seikhs, near the Jhelum, at Mojnawalla,
or Chillianwellah, as it is variously termed by corres-
pondents. The first will have been received with that
unmixed satisfaction which it deserves to be, and with
more than ordinary congratulation, since the close of the
siege was, as far as we know at present, a bloodless one.
Moolraj having by unreserved capitulation, when two
breaches were practicable, and the troops were about to
storm, prevented the terrible loss, and, indeed, massacre
of his followers, which must have resulted in a place
whence there was no egress, and under the attack of
troops so excited and eager as ours. Since I last wrote
the operations of a regular siege were carried on in a
very admirable manner; batteries of heavy guns were
pushed up by sap to within 100 yards of the fort walls,
and the wall battered in breach in two places—one by
the Bengal and the other by the Bombay troops. The
counterscarp was blown in by a mine scientifically con-
structed, and the breach, in spite of the mud embank.
ment of the fort wall, which appeared for a time to defy
artillery, was rendered practicable by firing charged
shells into the earth, which acted as small mines and
exploded the earth, which balls could not eff.•ct. Doting
the 21st, without any cessation of fire from the guns and
mortars on our part, Moolraj made several overtures for
surrender, but some conditions being required by him
his overtures were not accepted; and the troops having
been told off into the trenches, of which he must have
been aware, during the night, and no alternative being
available, he surrendered at daybreak the shattered end
untenable citadel ho had so long and so gallantly main-
tained against us. Never, I believe, in India has there
been a more determined and reckless defence, and
scarcely has a siege been carried on against such an
adversary and so strong a fortification with less loss on
our part in the trenches, or in the operations for push-,
ing on the batteries. There were for :some time ugly
reports that our ammunition was failing, and that
operations would again be indefinitely delayed; but
these turn out to have been mere grumbling surmises,
for it would, by all accounts, have been difficult to exceed
the amount of fire night and day from guns and mortars
which has been hurled against the fort, and which has
left it utterly shattered and untenable.
Monitan, then, has fallen. Now look back to the
events of the period that has intervened between the
murder of Agnew and Anderson, and judge whether
there has been that adequate prescience of the combina-
tions and difficulties awaiting us that ought to have
existed in political officers on the spot; and who, from
their own convictions, as well as the events occurring
before them daily, ought to have foreseen a second and
a most obstinate Seikh war, and strangled the revolt in
its cradle. Moultan was trifled with in the outset. I,
your correspondent, took the liberty to write to yea that
this was an organised revolt from the very first; that,
instead of having any notion of mai!. ning his Govern-
ment, Moolraj had made his preparations and sought
pretexts to quarrel, which would be afforded by officers
being sent down to relieve him. Why was not Moolraj
summoned to Lahore with all his troops? He would not
have come, and we should then have seen that there was
conspiracy on foot; and if there had been energy among
us, and the necessity would have called it forth, we
should not have thought of the hot weather, but we
should have done then in August or sooner—in June
—what we have had to do at the end of January, with
another hot season close at our heels. These triflings
with political events are most blameable, if not criminal
in our authorities. What was manifest to a❑ obscure
individual like myself must have been known to others
conversant with the Seikhs on the spot; if it was not,
with all meana and information to boot, they who neg-
lected them are sorely indeed to blame. Our officers are
no novices in Indian diplomacy, or in conception of the
probable course that native Powers will pursue when
intrigue is at work. Sir Frederick Currie knew in July
that this extensive Seikh conspiracy existes. Yet it was
not checked in the outset; he appeared to favour the idea
that it ought to be permitted to disclose itself fully, and
then be broken. Or, if ho did not do this, it is impos-
sible to account for the supineness which marked the
earlier proceedings, and the non-employment of adequate
forces to check a movement which, from week to week
and month to month, was only the more forcibly and
steadily developing itself. Call to mind the progress
how Moolraj strengthened himself, how Chuttur Singh
revolted—how the northern part of the Punjaub showed
disaffection—then Bhennoo and Tonk to the westward;
how Shere Singh threw off the mask at the most critical
period, and was allowed to move with but 5,000 men to
join his father and brothers; how the Peshawur force,
held together so long by Lawrence, could not resist the
contagion of disaffection, and rebelled too; and now be-
hold the fruit of all—that while we have won Moult=
after a six months' siege and investment, we have lost
Attock, as strong a place; and instead of only having a
small force under Chuttur Singh to deal with in the
north-west, we have at least 50,000 Seikhs and Affghans
and the league between them to be broken—to be broken,
Sir, at the expense of thousands of the lives of our own
troops, and at the expense of millions of treasure. Can
we afford either?

Why should this have been? Look you to the past,
and watch the progrees of neglect and shilly-shally.
Every present advantage was to be sacrificed to the pros-
pect of the Commander-in-Chief in the field with 50,000
men in November. A force utterly inefficient was sent
Moultan; a force insufficient for the reduction of a
third-rate fortress was sent against one of the strongest
places in India, second perhaps only to Bhurtpore,
having a garrison of 10,000 to 15,000 capital troops,
artillery, ammunition, and stores of supplies. With
what hope of success? It cannot avail as excuse that
its strength was not known; it ought to have been known,
and Edwardes was on the spot to afford it. 10,000 men
—half from Bengal, half from Bombay—could have been
at Moultan in August, and those men would have done
what has been done now. The Seikhs would not have
fought under prestige of success, and Shere Singh, as he
is now, would never have been heard of. That period,
too, should have seen 5,000 British troops pushed into
the centre of the Punjaub, watching the lines of the
Chenaub and the Jhelum from their junction upwards,
with another force covering the passage of the Jhelum,
near Bhotas, and able to act efficiently in check of the
Hill tribes, or on the other side of the Jhelum if needs
be. These, with the usual garrison at Lahore, and the
troops in the Jullundur Dooab, would have checked open
disaffection I think, and if a conspiracy did exist, if it
was true, and it was true, that preparations in arms, am-
munition, and money, had long been made for this strug-
gle, our politicals must have been blind and deaf indeed
if they were not able eventually to discover all, and to
break up piecemeal, what now stands—and bravely
stands—the shock of one of the finest armies we have
ever brought together. It may be said that retrospec-
tion is now useless; we have only now to look what
there is in the face. But it is not useless, if it will teach
us for the future, and if the reckless indifference or
selfishness of those in authority can be exposed, as it is
most fitting they should be. What can your Govern-
ment, or your public, or your miltary authorities say of
these most. strange unaccountable proceedings? Unac-
countable, because with imminent prospect of a war,
forces, which Lord Hardinge had left complete for in-
stant movement, could not be sent on for want of car-
riage and equipment, and when the commissariat even
was so defective that stores of grain had not been thought
of and had to be provided at the eleventh hour, and at an
enormously enhanced outlay. What can you say to Shere
Singh net having been cut off from the north, and either
driven back on Moultan, or engaged and broken on his
way up the Chenaub? Is it not to this neglect that we
owe his now being is arms, with 50,000 men, instead of
5,000? Lord Gough is known to have disapproved of
General Whish's force being sent to Moultan—it was
not large enough; but why, as it was sent, was it not
supported from Bombay, as it could have been? It would
have been better to have recalled the force than to have
allowed it to proceed under conviction of its inefficiency;
and, that it was not aided instantly surely could not have
been, as many more than hint, to allow of its being
proved that it would not do.

I maintain that there has been serious and unexampled
indifference to the progress of events, and that there has
not been that comprehensive estimation of these difficul-
ties, nor the end to which they would lead, which was to
have been expected from the matured experience of our
political officers, and these causes combined have raised
up a strong argument, which it is difficult to meet, against
the retention of the Punjaub, even supposing it to be, as
it will be, eventually subdued. We are bound by an
article of the treaty, which must be familiar to you, to
preserve peace in the dominions of the Maharajah; and,
unhapily there was no clause inserted in the treaty that
provided against the possibility of treachery by the
Rhalsa army and the Sirdars. We have then, apparently,
to abide by our stipulation, whether the foe be the ordi-
nary small risings or rebellions which were contemplated
or whether the rebellion is, as the present, an unmistake-
able outbreak of the whole Seikh nation against us.
I cannot, however, imagine that the unprovoked hos-
tility of the Seikhs can be admitted as any set off against
our permanent occupation of the Punjaub; and our very
supineness may (though I doubt this) have been in reli-
ance on the good faith of the main body of the Khalsa
army, and of their operating with us in suppressing re-
volt of their companions in arms, though our supineness
in regard to active operations did, without a doubt,
operate to the effect of turning the Peshawur troops from
their duty. Yet it can hardly be an excuse to them for
having turned, when their conduct ought to have been as
far beyond suspicion as our own. We are accused of
having exposed them to, and perhaps by our supineness
led them into, temptation; but I cannot subscribe to the
argument which many Indian papers have taken up—
that the crime of their succumbing to temptation is at
our doors. Their course was clear and open. If the
Peshawur troops were not at first openly disaffected, they
were so mistrusted that they could not be led against
Chuttur Singh, and after a short struggle against re-
corded promises they threw off their mask openly and
fairly, and cast themselves with a full understanding of
the question and the fullest reliance on their own invin-
cibility, into a conflict for that national superiority which
had been for a time broken, but which they considered
not extinct. They have courted the trial, not we; and
the reeult has to be seen. I believe, as I trust, that it
will be eventual ruin and discomfiture to them, and the
present bloody war is, if anything can be, a lesson to us
not to trust men, with national feelings, with military
power and organization. The Mahrattes at Gwalior
were quiet for a long time, yet they met us Maharai pore,
and fought till they were destroyed. The Seikhs em-
ployed two years of peace in preparing privately for an•
other struggle, and till they are utterly extinct as a mili-
tary power we have no business to think ourselves secure.
Wo cannot have a double Government in the Punjaub.
and wo cannot again perpetuate the risk which attends,
the establishment of a national Seikh force, under what-
ever stringent treaty we may draw up, or however the
Seikhs, individually or nationally, may pledge themselves
to the performance of it. have no resource, to my
nerci ption, and I will tfua t., b`lt tc take the
Punjaub for good, and to make at least the Indus our
boundary; that even appears doubtful now, under the
macluot Qf the Affghpue wader D9St DlAll9l3lnled EVIICI

whether Peshawur have to b 3 conquered for the Maha-
rajah or for ourselves, we cannot deny that the necessity
exists that it should be recovered alike from the treach-
erous Seikh Sirdars who have given it away, or from the
Afghans who have as treacherously accepted it.
The same mail which took you tidings of the fall of
Jioultan will have taken news of the affair of Chillian-
wallah, which is claimed as a victory by us, on no other
ground that I can make out but that we choose to spend
gunpowder to proclaim one. Ido not know when we
have lost seven standards and four guns, and not held
the field of battle, that we have called the affair a vic-
tory. It is most strange to me that Lord Gough cannot,
or will not, profit by experience, that he cannot find out
what his enemy is doing, and that he persists in going
blindly at positions of which he knows no more but that
there are Seikh troops in them, and guns that may be taken.
It was thus at Moodkee and Ferozeshah, and the same
at I`daharajpore, where his Lordship has had the fortune,
evil or good, as you may please to call it, to command in
person. 4t Maharajpore he marched the troops into an
ambuscade, which he ought to have known of perfectly,
and which might have been entirely turned or taken in
the rear by a simple manceavre on ordinary information.
At Ferozeshah the destinies of India trembled in the
balance because of the same neglect of or contempt for
the enemy's dispositions; the troops were taken into
action hungry and after a heavy march, too late in the
day to win a battle properly, and were successful only
from their bulldog courage of holding through a weary
night what they won. One would think that experience,
if nothing else, would teach; but it is not so, apparently,
with the Commander. in. Chief, and again we sea our
brave fellows hurled against intrenchments covered with
jungle, and batteries which could only be seen by the
smoke of ti:e guns firing from them, in a chance-medley
manner, and with afternoon sufficient only for a temporary
success, at vast sacrifice of life, and no corresponding
benefit. The movement of the Commander-in Chief
was necessary, as his inactivity was doing mischief;
but, why not have ordinary caution? Why bring on a
general action, the enemy having chosen and fortified
their own position for five weeks previously, when un-
prepared for it? Would there have been any harm, after
having waited so long, in halting, at least for the after-
noon, at a distance sufficient to rest the troops, make a
reconnoissance, and attack with men who were fresh
and fit to fight men who had not moved out of their own
positions? It only surpasses this marvellous mode of
lighting that the Commander-in-Chief should have been
idle after the affair at Ramnuggur—should not have
followed Shere Singh up, the day after Thackwcll's affair
at Sadoolapoor, to the Jhelum, driven him across it, or
engaged him in the field, wherever he could have found
him. Are commanders of armies never to use the
principles of manceuvre, which we have been led to
believe are the basis of successful military operations?
Could not the Commander-in-Chief, with an army ac-
customed to manceavre in divisions, have pressed on
the front and flank of Shere Singh's force, followed him
from place to place, and forced him to fight without
intrenchments, and in the field ? I cannot believe that it
could have been otherwise had it been tried. Instead of
which, we know that Shore Singh purposely returns to a
snug place he had already determined on, after the ac-
tion of Sadoolapoor, and there, in a position strong
by ravines and by jungle, ho quietly pitches his
camp, undisturbed and unobserved, and throws up
intrenchments, which the Seikhs have a talent of
making as well as we can or perhaps better.
The force of the Seikhs is known, but nothing more.
There is no reconnoissance; a partial action ensues; of a
scrambling, unsatisfactory character; we have three corps
nearly cut to pieces; our men do prodiges of valour in
storming batteries, and after all we get only 12 guns,
and do not affect the Seikhs in any material degree be-
yond sending them a few miles further, where we are
unable to follow them without being largely reinforced.
Was there no way of turning the flank of this position
at Moong or Chillian ? No way north or south by which
the intrenchments could have been avoided ? Would a
few days' delay have signified, which could have been
occupied in manoeuvres ? Why not have tried to draw
the Seikhs out to ground more favourable to cavalry, in
which we are strong; or, if they would not move, to get
round to their flank or rear, which was not, so far as we
know even attempted? You will receive the dispatches
by the mail that takes this, and will form your own con-
clusions in regard to them. To my perception, these
wanton sacrifices of life, ...without object attained or at-
tainable, expose the Commander-in-Chief to the severest
animadversion. Nur can apology be found either for his
inactivity, on the one hand, after the affair at Ramnug-
gur, or fur the unarranged and inconclusive attack upon
the position of the Seikhs at Chillian.

The Commander-in-Chief has sent for reinforcements,
as he needs to du in presence of the force he has to com-
bat.
There is satisfaction in knowing that, Moultan
having fallen, the Bombay and Bengal columns or about
10,000 men, would march immediately up the Jetch
Dooad, upon Said Dadun Khan, and the Commander-in-
Chief's camp. General Wheeler's force had also been
sent for, and two corps from Ramnuggur, as well as a
European corps from Lahore. This ought to increase
the army by at least 15,000 men, when it would be in a
position to resume operations, which will most likely be
suspended for the present. The Seikhs were by the last
accounts at Russool, in sight of our own army. They
will, of course, intrench themselves again, and have
plenty of time to construct a bridge over the Jhelum, by
which they may retire. They are to be reinforced by
Chuttur Singh, with his regular troops and artillery,
and will, of course, be very strong. The fall of Moul-
tan may possibly have a dispiriting effect, inasmuch as
they will know that the trops and guns employed there
will come northwards immediately, but in no other re-
spect. Moultan has been of more importance to us than
to Shere Singh and Chuttur Singh.
Now we feel the folly of the previous delays. If
Moultan had fallen in September, or even two months
later, the force there could, or its proportion unemployed,
have been now, nay long before this, with the Com-
mander-in-Chiee. As it is, it cannot be with him till the
end of this month, when the hot weather is not far dis-
tant; it is a pity to lose the best season for operations,
which wo are likely to do, and everything but time is
redeemable. Lord Gough has yet to bent the Seikhs, to
cross the Jhelum, and to retake Attock—quite enough,
under the delay which must necessarily occur, to do be-
fore the end of March; and, as he said this campaign
would last two years, it seems really as if he was doing
his best to make his own predictions come true, for ho
will hardly do much more before the hot weather forces
him into quarters, if not back to Simlah; though I should
rejoice to see that his Lordship, from personal experience,
could find out, in case of a second Moultan matter any-
where, that the hot weather was of very little consequence
where real work had to be done.
There has been some not ill-timed alarms in Calcutta
in relation to the Nepaulese. The Raja, the Minister,
and many Sirdars of note set out with 10,000 men to
hunt in the Z9rai, the belt of forest which lies between
us and Nepaul. So monstrous a hunting party, under
the present circumstances, and as the Nepaulese have
ever been held to be sympathizers with the Seikhs, led
many to suppose that the right flank of Bengal was to
be assailed, and forthwith a reckoning up of troops
began. It seemed we had about 20,000 in position, of
whom half might bo available. A wing of ono of her
Majesty's regiments which had been ordered down from
Divapore, and was at Calcutta, was sent back by steam
post haste, and a large steamer dispatched to Madras for
a wing of the 25th Foot, which was at its destination in
a few days. By the time it reached its destination, how-
ever, it was known in Calcutta that the hunting party
bad been obliged to return, having caught nothing but
many bad fevers in the pestilential jungles or covers they
they had attempted to draw. Alarm, therefore, has sub-
sided, and it is probable his Majesty of Nepaul may get
a broad hint that another time when he goes his plea-
sure in the woods to take, he had better choose a more
auspicious time and a less questionable garb. It appears
to have been a wondrous relief to the Bengalese that
this cloud has broken up, and that the sun once more
shines out from Nepaul.
Can it be true that the Board of Control and the Court
are now seeking to evade, or are resolutely bent on de-
nying the guarantee to Indian railways? Can it be that
this war has again dried up all their sympathies with
the improvement of the country, or that they can shut
their eyes or ears to the wondrous advantages which, in
case of war, railways would confer on the country, even
supposing them to give no other advantage ? If Lord
W. Bentinck, in establishing steam-vessels on the river,
could say that ho made one regiment of infantry equal
in value to three, in what proportion would the army not
be increased in power and weight did we possess rail-
ways through the length and breadth of the land; with
what facility could Madras troops now lying idle be run
up to Calcutta by our noble coast and Indian navy
steamers, and how easily could the Bengal or Madras
troops be pushed on to the north-west, and not only
men, but stores and ammunition, guns and waggons,
which have now to crawl along at the rate of 10 or 12
miles a day! Alas, Sir, this indifference to the founda-
tions of real healthy enterprise and improvement causes
our Government—said to be a well-intentioned one—to
make a melancholy exhibition before the advancement of
all other Christian and civilized Governments; and again,
before the stern aspect of war, we have to see all our best
intentions of improvement during peace affrighted and
demolished. No railways for India this year, nor haply
next, nor again after that. Hope deferred maketh the
heart sick. We are, Sir, very sick; sick of delays, eva-
sions, and shilly-shallyinge, which, could they be aban-
doned, would give place, we arc convinced, to hearty
exertions in this great cause of national splendour and
benefit. Can nothing be done? Cannot you assist us?
Is our cotton and our produce, as well in the Deccan as
elsewhere, to continue to bo unprofitable, solely because
there is no market? Aro we to see in a plenteous season
like the present the grain of whole districts a drug in the
market, unsaleable and unprofitable, because it cannot
reach the coast, whence there are a thousand outlets for
it ? Is it enough for this Government that it crawls on
in the old fashion of 50 years, ay, 100 years ago ? Are
not its obligations to the peope it governs yet under-
stood better than they were ? If they bo not, it is alike
useless that the press and the public urge, as both do,
and have done, this great question ; and yet I should
hardly say this. I do hope the efforts of neither aro
useless, and that eventually this most sluggish Govern-
ment will be driven, since it cannot bo led, into bond fide
acts, not mere discussions and intentions. If Cuba, as
we hear, can have its railways, and find them answer, is
it not a reproach to us, that the Governor-General cf
India, when he travels post, has to do so for the most
part in a truck which carries his palanquin, drawn by
bullocks, or on men's shoulders, and that important dis-
patches as well as the public letters crawl at the rate of
four or five miles an hour through the length and
breadth of the land ? I put all considerations of im-
provement of trade, increased value of produce, &c., out
of the question. That a British Government of so im-
portant a country, with all its vast interests flagging for
want of this one most healthy stimulus, should—after
taking the matt r up, p,s,ing into preliminary ar-
rangements, and holding out mere hope of ultimate
fulfilment of all, or most—now deliberately abauelon
all, is a spectacle of humiliation which not even mili-
tary defeat, should that ma) could equal,—Tines
Currioromigit,