The Sun.
London, England, 1836-11-18 00:00:00

LAW INTELLIGENCE

ROLL'S COURT.—Nov. 17.
WILLIAMS V. CALVERLEY.
In this case, which was not concluded yesterday when
we went to press, his Honour, after hearing Counsel, post-
poned the further hearing of the case until to-morrow
morning (this day).

VICE-CHANCELLOR'S COURT, Nov. 17.

THE MARQUIS OF BREADALBANE V. THE MARQUIS AND

MARCHIONESS OF CHANDOS.
The further bearing of this motion was resumed this

morning.
Mr. KNIGHT moved for an injunction on the part of the
Noble plaintiff to restrain the Marquis and Marchioness of
Chandos from availing themselves of a decree in their favour
pronounced by the Court of Session of Scotland in respect
to the claim of the Marchioness to a sum of 130,0001. out
of the estate of her father, the late Marquis of Breadal•
bane ; and further, to restrain the trustees of the will of
the late Marquis from paying the money, and Lord and
Lady Chandos from taking any proceedings in this
country or in Scotland against the trustees to enforce pay-
ment. By the law of Scotland a third part of the moveable or
personal estate of a deceased Scotchman, having chil-
dren, was divisible among them as their legitim, or bairns'
part, as it was sometimes called, and of which portion
their natural father could not disappoint them. Any of
the children might in the lifetime of their father contract
themselves out of their right to legitim, not indeed so as to
make the father a purchaser of their shares, but to increase
the shares of the other children who had not so contracted,
for the legitim or bairns' part remained undiminished to the
other. Another point in the law of Scotland necessary to
be brought to the recollection of the Court in this case was,
that the heir-at-law taking real estate was bound, in the
Scottish phrase, to collate, or, as it was expressed in the
English law, to bring into hotchpot, his real estate, if he
claimed any share of the legitim or portion natural. The
late Lord Breadalbane, although an English Peer, lived
and died a domiciled Scotchman. He left three children,
namely, the present Lord Breadalbane, Lady Mary Chan-
dos, and Lady Elizabeth Pringle. Supposing, therefore,
nothing had occurred to prevent the rule of Scotch law
from taking effect, one-third of the personal property would
have been divided among the three children. Lord Bread-
albane, however, must have collated his real estates, and as
these estates were large, the rule of law would have indirectly
operated a substantial exclusion of his Lordship for the
benefit of his two sisters. If; on the other hand, Lady.
Chandos and Lady Pringle had both contracted them-
selves out of their shares, Lord Breadalbane, being the only
child entitled, would take the whole legitim without the
necessity of collating. And this his Lordship now con-
tended, under the circumstances, was the true state of
things. Lord and Lady Chandos and Lady Elizabeth
Pringle was excluded by contract ; and that was no
doubt true. But they also contended that Lady Chandos
was not excluded, so that the question who was en-
titled to the legitim lay between Lord Breadalbane and
Lady Chandos. Shortly after the death of the late
Marquis of Breadalbane in 1834, Lord Chandos, who,
as an English nobleman, was not conversant with the
laws of Scotland, was informed of the rule of Scottish
law by Lord 13readalbane. In consequence a suit in
Scotland was instituted by the trustees of the late Lord
Breadalbane analogous to an English interpleader, in
which suit Lord and Lady Chandos intervened, and obtained
a decree establishing her title to letigim. That question
arose upon her Ladyship's marriage settlement, which was
made in 1819. By that instrument the late Lord Breadal-
bane gave his daughter a marriage portion of 20,0001. down,
and a reversionary 10,000/., payable on his death ; but no
words were inserted to exclude her from her right to legi-
tim. The question was, whether, without express words of
exclusion, where a father in his lifetime gave his daughter a
marriage portion, that did not amount to a virtual exclusion
of her light. The Court of Session decided thnt without a
clause of exclusion in the settlement, she was not excluded.
The case was afterwards brought before the House of
Lords, which affirmed the decision of the Courts of Scot -
land. After the decision of the Court of Session, Lord
Breadalbane for the first time consulted his English lawyer.
According to the habit of the profession, this gentleman,
hearing that the decision was at variance with the inten-
tions of the late Lord Breadalbane, inquired did nothing
precede the settlement ? Mr. Vizard looked, and a paper
was found containing the heads of the settlement agreed to
by Lord Lauderdale and Mr. Grenville to be made on the
marriage, which heads were expanded by the English soli-
citors, or Mr. Hodgson, the conveyancer, before whom they

were laid.
Mr. BURGE, on the part of the Marquis and Marchioness
of Chandos, opposed the motion. In the present case, as
stated, there was nothing but presumption and conjecture
of an intention on the part of Lady Chandos, at the period
of her marriage, to renounce her claim. There was no
evidence whatever of the existence of a contract on the sub-
ject such as the law required. The Learned Counsel then
detailed most minutely, and at very great length, all the
events, from the negotiation of the marriage down to the
present suit. Lord Lauderdale was an advocate at the
Scottish bar, and was perfectly familiar with the nature of
this right. If it were a mere matter of course to introduce
the renunciation oflegitim, how came it that Lord Lauder-
dale permitted the settlement to be made without the in-
sertion of the clause ? The Learned Counsel insisted on
the necessity of absolute contract.
His HONOUR, at a late hour, reserved his judgment, and
requested the books of style to be left with him.

COURT OF KING'S BENCH, _Nor. 17.
THE KING V. THE PROPRIETORS OF THE MANCAESTER

GUARDIAN.

Mr. CRESSWELL applied on behalf of Mr. Royds to
their Lordships for a rule to shew cause why a criminal
information should not be filed against the defendants, for
a libel published by them upon the character and conduct
of Mr. Royds. It would be in the recollection of Lord
Denman that two persons had been tried before him upon
the charge of having committed a highway robbery on the
person of a young gentleman named Royds, the son of the
gentleman now complaining of the libel. The two pri-
soners had been convicted and sentenced to death, but
the sentence had been changed to transportation. Some
persons had interested themselves in procuring a commu-
tation of the punishment, and among other grounds upon
which it was supposed the mercy of the Court ought
to be extended to the prisoners, was one founded upon
the alleged confession of some men who had been
tried and convicted at Shrewsbury upon a different
charge. It was said that the confession of these men
clearly exculpated the men who had been convicted be-
fore Lord Denman. As the Royal mercy was not at once
extended to these prisoners the defendants chose to attribute
the circumstance to the improper interference of Mr.
Royds, and on the 19th of October there appeared in their
paper an article reflecting upon his character and conduct
in a manner which, if true, would show him to be unworthy
of longer holding the commission of the peace. The
Learned Gentleman then referred to an article contained in
the Manchester Guardian, which accused Mr. Royds of
having improperly interposed between the men convicted of
the robbery and the mercy of the Crown. The paper attri-
buted to his influence the refusal of mercy to these pri-
soners, and said, " It is easy for a man introduced by an in-
fluential Member of Parliament to influence the mind of
Mr. Capper, and to persuade him that there was no ground
for the application for the Royal mercy ;" and it then went
on to attribute the opposition to party motives, which Mr.
Royds also denied.
Lord DulimaN—We think, Mr. Cresswell, that you
have made out a case of imputations being cast on Mr.
Royds sufficient to entitle you to a rule on his behalf ; but
without going with you in the latter part of your observa-
tions, for there may be many cases in which such discussions
would be both proper and necessary.
Mr. CRESWELL did not mean to deny that.—Rule granted.