The Sun.
London, England, 1838-11-20 00:00:00

APPLICATION FOR A CRIMINAL INFORMATION AGAINST

FOUR MAGISTRATES

Mr. V. LEE applied for a rule to show cause why a cri-
minal information should not be filed against four Magis-
trates of the county of Berks. William King, the person
on whose behalf the application was made, occupied a cot-
tage immediately adjoining Bagley Wood, between Oxford
and Abingdon. The wood belonged to St. John's College,
but certain parties claimed the right of cutting wood. The
affidavits stated that he had been taken before four Ma-
gistrates, on a charge of maliciously cutting a white thorn
of the value of sixpence.
Mr. Justice LITTLEDALE said this was a serious charge,
and as a rule could only be obtained for next term, it had
better be moved for in the full Court.
Mr. LEE thought his Lordship would have no difficulty
in granting a rule if be heard the affidavits, which'• were
made by five or six different persons. No such case had
occurred since his Lordship had sat on the Bench.
Mr. Justice LITTTEDALE said this was a charge against
four Magistrates acting in their public character, and as
the last four days were appointed for motions in the
other Court, he did not like to interfere.
Mr. LEE said the party eras at present in custody.

Mr. Justice LITTLEDALE said that his granting a rule
for a criminal information would not get the parties out of
custody.
Mr. LEE was aware of that, but was of opinion that if
a rule should be granted there would be little difficulty
in procuring the discharge of the party.
Mr. Justice LITTLEDALE said it was too serious a case
to move before a single Judge, and the application must be
made to the other Court.

COMMON PLEAS.-(THIS DAY.)

BOUSEY V. STEWART.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL appeared to show cause
against a rule which had been obtained by Sergeant Wilde
for setting aside the verdict found for the defendant in this
case on the third, fourth,fifth, and seventh pleas, or for a new
trial. This was an action for trover to recover possession of 16
bales of silk, alleged to be the property of the plaintiff, but
which had been pledged with defendant
,by plaintiff's fac-
tors, Douglas, Anderson, and Co., on account of advances
made by him, the pleas in controversy claiming a lien on
the property in respect of such advances. It was not dis-
puted that the advances were made by the defendant on
the dock warrants of the property ; and the ground on
which Sergeant Wilde mainly relied was, that on the
15th of October, when an advance of 3,0001. was made,
and on the 22d October, when a further advance of 2,000/.
was made, the warrants were not uno flails, delivered to
defendant, but two days afterwards. He (the Attorney-
General), denied that this circumstance made any dif-
ference ; and he affirmed that there was a general argu-
ment between plaintiff and defendant, that warrants depo-
sited with defendant by Douglas, Anderson and Co. should
be charged with any subsequent advances. The defendant
founded the pleas which claimed a lien on the grounds in
question upon the second section of the fourth George IV.,
chap. 94, which was designed to remedy the grievance
arising from all pledges of goods by a factor being consi-
dered void, if disallowed by the factor's principal. That
section enacted that if any person allowed a party
to be considered as the real owner of property, so
far as to be empowered to make sales of it—those
who made blna fide advances on the deposit of the
goods by the factor with them, should be entitled to bold
the goods as securities for such advances. Now the de-
fendant's pleas not only alleged that Douglas and Co. were
at the time of the pledges in actual possession of the bales
referred to ; that they deposited the warrants with de-
fendant ; and that defendant advanced the money on the
faith of the warrants ; but that they had no notice that the
bales were not the real property of the factors. The only
issue which the plaintiff took was that the advances were not
made o❑ tha faith of the warrants.