The Sun.
London, England, 1854-12-13 00:00:00

THE ADDRESS.

At half-past four o'clock the mover and seconder of the
Address entered the house together, one attired in the
uniform of a lord-lieutenant, and the other that of a de-
puty-lieutenant. At this time the house was tolerably
full, but by no means so full as we have seen it on the
iirst night of many former sessions. All the Ministers
were in their seats, while the front Opposition bench. was
crowded with the leading members of the Opposition, in-
cluding Mr. Disraeli, Sir John Pakington, and Lord Stan-
ley.

The SPEAKIIa having read the Speech as it was delivered
from the Throne this aftern2on,
Mr. HENRY HERBERT rose to move the address,
which was an echo of the speech. Ho said—Sir, in rising
to move an humble Address be presented to her Majesty
in answer to her most gracious Speech, he could not ask
for that indulgence which was gen orally accorded to gen-
tlemen who addressed that hon. house for the first time ;
yet, he was sure no member ever stood in greater need of
that indulgence than himself. It was a source of the
greatest pleasure to hear that her Mjesty had concluded
a treaty with Austria, and also one with our transatlantic
brethren. There was a topic in her Illajesty'sSpeech—one
of the most solemn topics to every man, woman, and child,
he meant the war —at which he hoped they would permit
him to take a short glance. In making that retrospect he
thought the country had ample cause to congratulate itself
upon the victory, the splendid victory—(loud cheers)—
which had been achieved. He did not Underrate the losses
that had attended the splendid successes of her Majesty's
arms, and he trusted that the efforts that would be made
to alleviate the sufferers by those successes would prove
that those sacrifices had not been made in vain. (Cheers.)
The efforts made by the Turks at Oltenitza and Citate
had surprised every one, and proved that their courage
had not degenerated. Few could have expected
such splendid results with a foe so gigantic. The Russians
passed the Danube on the 27th of March. When they had ad-
vanced as far as Silistria, they met with a blow from the
Turks, commanded by the gallant Butler, they least ex-
pected. That campaign, already commenced by the cross-
ing of the Danube, ended by the Russians retreating
across the Pruth ; thus, without the loss of a single man,
the first object of the campaign was effected. He would now,
if permitted by the house, take a glance at the naval ope-
rations. There were some in this country who felt disap-
pointed that no great battles had been won—no glorious
results had been added to the naval glories of this
great country. On former occasions we had noble
foes to deal with, not those who skulked behind
stone walls and dared not show themselves. Persons were apt
to forget that long blockades had before led to the mast
brilliant results. Was it nothing for our sailors to have
done to have swept those seas which, until then, had been
called Russian lakes? (Cheers.) Was it nothing that our
flag should be as safe now as if we ware in a state of pro-
found peace ? Pleasure yachts could traverse the seas un-
armedjand unmolested by an enemy, and everywhere our
ships were on the alert. And hero he might take
the opportunity of congratulating our gallant seamen
upon the noble spirit they had displayed through-
out the whole of the existing struggle. The house was
aware that on the 3d of September the Allied Forces
left Varna, and within eleven days they were landed
in the Crimea. (Hear, hear.) That movement and
the instructions which he issued on the occasion, were
sufficient to satisfy the country that in Lord Raglan we
had a military commander as able as any who had, ever
borne arms in the service of England. (Hear, hear.) The
glorious battle of the Alma followed the landing, and then
subsequently came the Battle of Balaklava, which was
fought on a day that would ever be mournful to us as the day

on which our Cavalry was so terribly cut to pieces. (Hear.;
On the sth of November was fought the battle of Inker.
man, and on that day our troops well sustained the repo•
tation of that army which never knew when it was beaten,

(Cheers.) Since then we had been unable to carry on our
siege operations with the same vig9fir as before, and
though ho was ready to admit that we had underrated
the power and ability of the enemy, he did not think our
mistakes could be urged as a reason for not prosecuting the
war with increased vigour. (Cheers.) The country was
unanimous almost to a man in favour of its being carried
forward until some effective result had been obtained. As
an Irishman, it gave him great satisfaction to find that the
Minister did not hesitate to withdraw troops from the
Sister Kingdom to send against the enemy. There was a
time when the Minister would have feared to leave Ire-
land as it were without troops, but thank *God that day
was past, and now all classes of her Majesty's subjects in Ire-
land mere uniting to assist the Allies in carrying on the war.
On the whole then he thought we had good reason for con-
gratulation. Notwithstanding that our losses had been
great, our troops had obtained a position that was impreg-
nable, the flag of the enemy had been swept from off the
waters where it was wont to be seen, and without wishing
to shut his eyes to the power of Russia, he felt
that the time had' not yet come when we should give
way to a feeling of despondency. (Hear, hear.) Let the
house, then, be unanimous in voting the means necessary
for prosecuting the war with vigour and effect, and thus
show itself worthy of the country, who were anxious to i
see t terminated only on terms honourable alike to our-
selves and our allies. (Cheers.)
Mr. E. F. L. GOWER seconded the address. He said
he felt great difficulty in performing that task, because he
had not the ability to do justice to the one leading topic
of her Majesty's Speech. Every man must , lament
that he had lived to hear a speech from the Throne
which referred to no other subject than war ;
but at the same time it must be gratifying to all Englishmen
to find that the gallantry of our armies had been acknow-
ledged in suitable, nay, noble terms by her Majesty from
the throne. (Cheers.) The gallantry of our own armies
was only to be equalled by that of our own Allies, and
he hoped now that the two greatest nations of Europe had
united in the battle-field, that when peace should be re-
stored they would display a similar declaration to farther
the mutual interest of each other. (Hear.) Of course, his
seconding the Address indicated that• he had confidence in
her Majesty's Government, and he did so because they had
not only united all classes at home in support of the War,
but they had secured the feeling of all Europe in our
favour. (Hear, hear.) He would not attempt to criticise
our military or naval operations, but he agreed with the
mover of the Address, that though there might have been
mistakes committed, yet on the whole many vast and
permanent results had been obtained. (Hear, hear.)
We had shut up the Baltic for the year ; we had
done the same fer the Black Sea, while we had been
enabled to send out to the East an army of 50,000
men, and he put it to the house whether they would have
been credited had Ministers announced at the beginning of
the year that they meditated attempting those great
achievements ? (Hear, hear.) Well,lithen, he hoped the
house would be unanimous in supporting them during the
remainder of the struggle, and thus satisfy Europe, the
British Parliament, as well as the British people, were
resolved that the aggressive power of Russia should be
destroyed. (Cheers.)
Sir J. PAKINGTON—Mr. Speaker, if I am desirous
of availing myself of an early oppdrtunity of taking part
in the debate on the motion that has now been submitted
to the house, I do so because I' have a strong impression
that in the present state of public affairs, it is the duty of
men of all parties in this house frankly to state their sen-
timents, and not because I entertain the.smallest desire to
criticise, and especially in any hostile spirit, the speeches
which have been delivered by the hon. gentlemen opposite,
the mover and seconder of the address. On the contrary,
I readily recognise the fairness of the tone in which those
hon. gentlemen have spoken. I take na exception to the
spirit in which they have addressed the house, and I most
readily admit the ability with which they have done so.
(Hear, hear.) I confess also it is to me a source of the
greatest possible satisfaction in this motion that I find
myself unable to take any serious exception to the address
to her Majesty which has been moved by the hon. gentle.
man opposite, in answer to the gracious Speech which her
Majesty has this day delivered from the throne. Sir, in
contemplating the first paragraph of that speech and, of
the Address—namely, the paragraph in which her Majesty
has appealed to Parliament for support in the great war
in which she is now embarked—l do entertain a sanguine
hope that, among every party in this house, there will
prevail a degree. of candid unanimity which was never ex-
ceeded in any other popular assembly. (Hear, hear.) And,
Sir, I am sure I may say, in the name of the great Con-
servative party, both in this house and in the country,
that we do not yield to the gentlemen who have framed
that Address—that we do not yield to them nor to any
body of men in this house or in the country, in the firm
resolve to extend to her Majesty that suppo.rt.which. she.
desires. • (Loud cheers from the Opposition benches.)
Sir, the next portion of the speech appealsrn to this house
to sanction an augmentation of the ar • I feel my-
self equally unable to take the slightesty exception to
this demand on the part of her Majesty's Govern-
rfaetshi rear
believe the feeling esf those
raent. On the contrary, I
friends with whom I have the
in
of acting, is, not
to the 1, •
accedingt
he army, y,but
that we should now besitateeiinng
of the Government for increasing
feel disposed toe find fault with tolieppGoosviteiron; that we should
lan:. reel: st eh thet
step?"ar m
Govern-
ment for having so dtela4vdildloing
not soonetir
cheers.) The questiobnivronyeou,
now ?" but, "WhyeL esooner taken precautions to show that
Why have
aware"u o°f the magnitude of that struggle in which
you were now unhappily engaged ? I fear that the only
this country 13n
construction that can be put upon the policy which has
been adopted by her i
Majesty's Government, and upon the
course they have taken s, that until lately, until
within
the last month, when they have appeared to awaken as
from a dream—(laughter)—they have been entirely uncon-
„ions of the magnitude of the difficulties and of the perils
of the struggle with-Russia in which we are embarked. Sir,
that has been no fault on this side of the house. In the last
session of Parliament, whatever demands the Govern-
ment made were freely and liberally acceded te. The noble
lord opposite, I think, on more than one occasion, frankly
admitted the spirit in which the Government was rn, et, and
was th,er,fore not from any want of spirit on the part of
this house that the army was not earlier augmented ; but
I believe we shall trace:v. hat I must call the crippled state
of our military km amen ts .merely to the financial arrange-
ments of her Majesty's Government during last session ;
and to that attempt announced on the part of the Chan.

cellor of the Exchequer, to the principle of which we tak
no exception, but of the impossibility of which we warned
him, in so great a struggle, namely, to pay for the expensed
of the war entirely,from the revenue of the year. (Hear.,
I now approach two other passages of her Majesty's Speech
—namely, the paragraph which refers to the sondust of
the army, and the paragraph which refers to the conduct
of our noble allies the French. In approaching those
passages, I do so with a feeling, which f think every

inqn will entertain who touches upon them, of the diffi-
culty of expressing himself upon those subjects as he
would wish. No language can exceed the debt of grati-
tude which we owe to the British army in the Crimea-'--
(cheers)—and well does the language of her Majesty's
peech point to that debt when it says, ". The exertions
they have made, and the victories they have obtained, are
not exceeded in the brightest pages of our history, and
have tilled me with admiration and gratitude." Not only
is that language just—not only did not the page of history
record such gallantry, but we have not read even in fiction
—either in fable er in song—anything equal to the gal-
lantry of that army. (Cheers.) And while considering
the deeds of this gallant army, and of these among them
who suffered and who bled in those saeguinary struggles,
I hope it will net be considered inappropriate if I pay a
passing tribute to the memdly of one of those who had
fallen in those struggles, and whose loss that house had to
deplore—he alluded to the gallant Col. Blair. (Hear,
hear.) We valued, we esteemed him as a friend. No party
feeling should mix in such subjects. (Hear.) He was
esteemed by us all, and it was a matter of deep regret that
one so full of promise should have been so soon and so pre-
maturely cut off. (Hear, hear.) There was yet another
gallant officer whose name was familiar to that house, to
whom I cannot refrain from reference, and whom I do
hope we shall soon see amongst us in renewed health and
vigour. I allude to the hon. and gallant member for West-
minster. (Cheers.) No hon. member lam sure will feel
that I am drawing invidious distinctions when I am allud-
ing to a member of this house with whom we daily mix,
and I think the house will agree with me, that amongst
the noble deeds characterising the actions of our troops in

the Crimea, there had been nothing more heroic than the
manner in which that gallant officer had left his bed on tho
bloody day at Inkerman, to share in the dangers of the
fight—a gallantry which was only exceeded by the prudence
with which he refrained from resuming the command of
his division. (Cheers.) I hope the house will forgive me
for stepping aside to allude to these topics—(renewed
cheers)—but hope we shall soon see him amongst us.
(Cheers.) Honour to all—to those who have fallen, and
to those who have fought and bled. They have all suf-
fered for their country's honour, and deeply are we in-
debted to them for their conduct in the bead. And
while I allude in such terms to the gallant deeds of our
own army, I have no desire to disguise my feelings as to
how deeply we are also indebted to the heroism of our gal-
lant allies. the French army. (Cheers.) The hon. mover of
the address had already paid a just tribute to them—to their
noble emulation with our own army, and their unparalleled
gallantry, by which the French army had gained undying
laurels. (Loud cheers.) I cannot, also, while on this sub-
ject, avoid referring with praise to the noble spirit with
which General Canrobert rode side by side with our own
noble and gallant Commander-in-Chief, aiding him by his
counsel and advice on the day of Inkerman, and the readi-
ness and talent displayed by General Bosquet in coming
to his assistance. I hope these acknowle,igments and ob-
servations will be read by, and prove gratifying to, her
Majesty's allies, and I hope it will be known to our French
allies and to the gallant French army that the Parliament
of England recognise their services. (Cheers.) The next
paragraph in the Speech to :which I will allude, and. to
which I cannot refer with unqualified assent, is one of the
most important. I refer to the paragraph respecting the

treaty of alliance with Austria. We are at present igno-
rant of its terms; but it has been intimated that it will be
laid forthwith upon the table of the house. With the read-
ing of that treaty, with the state of affairs in the East, and.
and with the future prospects of the war, I hope that w*
shall soon be acquainted ; I hope that we shall soon have
an intimation from her Majesty's Government of what is
the real scope and object of that treaty. (Hear from the
Opposition.) With respect to the views and feelings of
Austria, and as to her conduct and intentions in concluding
the treaty, they had been watched by the country, in pro-
portion to their importance as bearing upon the present
contest, and an impression has prevailed that she was fol-
lowing out her own interests in exclusion to those of the
allies. The public were very little informed as to the con-
dition of affairs in the East, and as to the nature of the
treaty of Austria with the Porte; and an impression had
prevailed that Austrian 'intrigues had prevented Omer
Paella and his army from keeping in check the Russian
forces in Bessarabia, and thereby preventing the march
of those troops to swell the army of the Emperor of
Russia in the Crimea, and greatly augment the danger
surrounding our arms in that country. (Hear.) These are,
very important subjects. In the discussions on these sub-
jects last session, he spoke from memory, when the noble
lord the leader of the Opposition (Lord J. Russell) was ex-
tenuating the conduct of Government, he said that delay
which had taken place had secured the co-operation of the
German powers. But was that the case? What had been
their course of conduct from that time to the present mo-
ment ? The public had viewed with suspicion the conduct
of the Austrian Government--conduct which had been
marked with great ability as regarded the objects of that
power. The treaties now concluded by Austria with the
Porte and with this country and our French ally are mat-
ters of no little importance, and I hope the noble lord op-
posite (Lord J. Russell) will inform the house as soon as
he can upon these subjects. In the meantime I hope it
will be understood that the Address before the house will
be worded as not to pledge that house to all the provisions
of that treaty. (Hear.) Ido not know that there is any
other paragraph that requires special observation. Yes,
there is one—a somewhat mysterious paragraph, relating
to matter's to be proposed for the welfare and interest of
the country, which are .not specified. I hope that with
the experience the noble lord opposite had now had that a
reform bill will not form one of them. (Laughter and
ironical cheers on the Opposition benches.) The noble
lord, they could not forget, told them last year that it
would be a noble speetaele for a nation to let the world
see that it could at the same time reform its own institu-
tions and attack so great a power as Russia. (A. laugh.)
I hope his views on this subject are now permanently
changed, and, with the provisoes 1 have mentioned, I en-
tirely agree with the sentiments in the Address. It will not
do, with the duties which the war devolves on us, to take
unnecessary exceptions as to our domestic legislation. I
cannot find any severe fault with the language of Govern-
ment, and I have no intention to resift the language of
the Address. (Cheers.) I would gladly have limited my-
self to these remarks on this occasion. I feel strongly with
hon. gentlemen on the other side of the house, that this is
not the moment for a party struggle. It is most important
that we should show a united Parliament and a united na-
tion. (Cheers.) If we have differences amongst us, let it
be clearly understood that these differences refer only to
the best mode in which we can support our Sovereign in
this great struggle in which we are engaged. (Cheers.) But
on the other hand, I will not admit that it is consistent
with our duty as members of Parliament, on this side
of the house, to abandon our duty to the country. I think,
on the contrary, that when woo arts about to entrust to the
Government large powers and large resources, it becomes
our duty to state any grounds of complaint which may exist
as to the manner of conducting the war hitherto, and to
call for explanations upon points upon which the public)
wished for explanations. That is a duty which' will not con-
sent to abandon. There was a feeling in the public mind
that, whatever anxieties the Government could have to
bring the war to a successful issue, yet that they had not,
since it was declared, shown that wisdom, foresight, and
prudence in the measures they had taken, and which were
necessary most of all to conduce to that great end. (Op-
position cheers.). It was our duty last year severely to
criticise the conduct of the Government in the course of
the negotiations which were they sanded on. It was ad-
mitted that, when vigour and energy were most essential
their conduct was most passive. And now that we are in-
volved in an arduous war, and when it was the paramount
duty of the Government to show energy and decision in
their measures, and to temper them with the caution, pru-
dence, and foresight of statesmen, we will have, I fear, to
accuse them of rashness and incompetency. (Hear, hear,
from tife Opposition.) The public attention was so filled
with what was passing in the Crimea, that attention was
diverted from affairs in the Baltic Sea. But attention
would return to that subject, and when it fully considered
the magnitude of the naval armament sent to that sea— that
it was the finest fleet that ever swam upon the sea—and
when it was, as now, returning to England, without accom-
plishing any one act for which it was commissioned to leave
our shores, we have a right to complain. He heard ex-
pressions of dissent fro in hon. gentlemen opposite. (A laugh.)
Did they allude to Berearsund ? Ido not admit that that
formed any exception. Knowing the gallantry of our
sailors, I cannot compare that expedition to anything but
the well-known military expedition with which they were
all familiar in their early days :
" The King of France, with twenty-thousand men,
Marched up the hill, and then marched down again."
(Laughter.) This is a fair description of the Baltic expedi-
tion. Ido not allude to the Admiral of the Fleet. He
had no occasion upon which he could show his gallantry.
But after what passed at the celebrated dinner at the Re-
form Club, at the setting out of the expedition, no doubt
they would again meet to present their congratulations on
its return. I pass no censure on the gallant admirals, but
we have a right to know and to have from the Government
some explanation why so grand an armament had left our
shores with so little resulting from it. I believe the Go-
vernment adopted an unwise course in sending so large a
fleet to the Baltic. They knew that the Russian fleet was
not in the habit of fighting but at an advantage, and for
the purpose of a blockade the armament was altogether on
a scale of folly • aid recognising the gallantry of the fleet,
they had a right to complain of the comparative failure of
the expedition. (Hear, hear.) There was another subject
upon which the public mind had been much excited—l
mean the bombardment of Odessa. It was accompanied
by something like an apology from the admiral when at-
tacked, but after what had occurred since why was it left
untouched ? Had not subsequent events made it clear that
it was impolitic to refrain from attacking it ? Was it be-
cause it was a commercial town ? But when they found
that a large military force had been stationed there, and
its position between the principalities and the Crimea as a
great military situation, there is good ground for explana-
tion why it was not attacked. The Government had been
unwise and impolitic in leaving Russia free to throw her
forces from Odessa into the Crimea. (Hear.) I now come
to the policy of attacking Sebastopol. Ido not wish to
call for explanation of that policy ; but as the noble lord
at the head of the Government had only lately said that
his was a policy of peace, I do not know but that this
course has greatly protracted the war. This is not a .
time to enter upon it, but I reserve to the house and
myself to form an opinion upon a future occasion. Now
there was another view of that subject which they
were bound to take. If they attacked the Crimea,
they were not justified is doing it unless they did it
in a manner to secure success—(hear, hear)—but no
Government could have taken a weaker course. They were
bound not to attack a fortress with inadequate means, and
there is a strong public opinion that we should not be doing
our duty if we did not call for explanations on this sub-
ject. There were three questions upon which the public
desired information. The first was, Why was the expedi-
tion to Sebastopol undertaken without adequate means to
insure success? The second was, How was it that the
forces sent to the Crimea for that purpose had been so
little cared for, and so badly supported ? (Hear, hear.)
The third point upon which information was necessary
was this. If anything could have added to the difficulties •
of that undertaking, it was the unwise manner in which
the Government and the organs of the Government adver-
tised it, if I may so say. (Hear, hear.) They had put the
Emperor of Russia on his guard as to the attack
from a speech
that was
to he made. I hold in my hand an extract
delivered by the noble lord (Lord J. Russell) in July, and
taking it in connexion with the daily intimations of the
ufs9sri a
strengtheningw as
apprsea
fr organ of o fGovernment,expedition,
and thhee tEo
omkpme reoars oftir
measures
There was also a paragraph in apublie news'
paper of the very day the expedition was to sail from
Varna. When it was recollected that unmistakeable hints
were thrown out in July,
September,theandthata very late period expedition did
d notfor_
Rail till the beginning of

h eginning it, he must havehad ample time for preparation.
(Hear, hear.) And what was the force sent out to the
Crimea.?-27,000 English troops. I believe the whole
combined force did not amount to more than 50,000 men.
I further believe, and the confirmation was forced upon
me by subsequent facts, that the great force was sent out
without Government having any knowledge of the number
of Russian forces in the Crimea, or of the strength of the
fortress intended to be attacked. (Hear, from the Opposi-
tion.) The great error that had paralysed all their efforts
was that of underrating the difficulty of the objects to be
accomplished. I am confirmed in that view by ihe observa-
tions which fell from the Prime Minister at Aberdeen, who
affirmed that in six months they had sent out a finer army
than any ever commanded by the Duke of Wellington, and
that they had commenced the expedition to Sebastopol in
such a manner asto insure its success. I traced in these words
of Lord Aberdeen that he was ignorant of the condition of the
Russian armies in the Crimea, and that he underrated the
strength of Sebastopol. It is perfectly clear to me that that
force was pushed on the shores of the Crimea in the idea
that they had nothing to do but to take Sebastopol. There
was not sufficieet provisions for the troops—nor sufficient
foresight in providing reserves for the inevitable losses and
contingencies of war. These 27,000 men were pushed on to
the shore of the Crimea to take their chance, and they were
left to take Sebastopol, if they could. Tho great faultof the
Government was, as was obvious from the language of the
Primo Minister, that they overrated its strength. It was
perfect, said he, in all its appointments, but it was noto-
rious that the army was deficient in artillery, and almost
without cavalry. And with regard to the equipments of
war, tents, and other necessaries, they were almost for-
gotten, as was obvious from the description of their suffer-
ings the first days of their landing. They sent that army
to attack the Crimea without any reserves to support it,
and he called on the Government for an explanation of
that circumstance. (Hear, hear.) Were they justified in
sending out such an expedition without proper reserves to
support it? That was a point where, he thought, the
conduct of the Government was open to grace doubt—he
was afraid he should' say, severe censure—and they had a
right to demand an explanation why it was sent ..without
reserves, and afterwards left there without reinforcements.
(Cheers.) Ho hoped her Majesty's Government would ex-
plain to the house why it was their army was left thus
exposed. (Hear, hear.) He (Sir J. Pakington) had not
certainly sufficient information on this subject which would
enable him to judge of all the facts of the case ; he spoke
only from these sources which were open to the public ;
but he believed their army had received nothing worthy
of the name of reinforcements from the time Lord Raglan
landed, in the beginning of September, until the arrival of
the 46th Regiment in November, after the battle of Joker-
man had been fought. (Hear, hear.) He was open to
correction if he committed any error, but he believed
that was really the case. He was quite aware that shortly
after that battle, 3,000 men landed at Balaklava,
among whom was) 1,000 cavalry— but that was all.
Be made no complaint againit the Government for not
sending a large force at first to the Crimea ; he was
quite aware that the difficulty of conveying them would
account for not forwarding a larger force than 27,030 men ;
but,the.3,ooo men sent a few days after did no more, he
was sorry to say, than to fill up the gaps caused by the
casualties at the battle of the Alma, and from the time
that army sat down before Sebastopol, and entrenched
itself from Balaklava to Inkerman, though decimated by
•disease, and suffering from the effects of the climate, and.
.exposure to cold and fatigue, it was left there, with the ex-
ception of a few draughts sent out, without any reinforce.
ment, until the arrival of the 46th Regiment. (Cheers.)
Under those circumstances,
_that _gallant band of men
dwindled day by day, until they were attacked by an over-
whelming force on the sth of November. Let him ask
her Majesty's Government what was the actual available
force on that sth of November? They landed, no doubt,
27,000; they got an addition of 3,000 in a few days after ;
but at Inkerman they had 20,000—had they 18,000 sta-
tioned from Balaklava to the heights of Sebastopol—had
they 15,000 effective soldiers? He (Sir J. Pakington) be-
lieved not; but this they knew, that the men who resisted
an overwhelming Russian force, according to the authority
of Lord Raglan himself, did not exceed 8,030 men.
(Cheers.) The hon. gentleman who seconded the address
talked of the fearful odds to which the British army was
exposed • but why did they contend againet this fearful
odds ? (Cheers.) Let us thank God that, it was not
utterly destroyed and annihilated ; and it was not to the
credit of the British Government that only 8,000 men were
found to oppose such a force. (Cheers.) No doubt they
were justified in praising the unexampled bravery and
valour of their soldiers, and history hardly recorded so
fearful or so glorious a struggle, bat was it not little less
than miraculous that it terminated in such a result ; for it
was only by the mercy of God that such a band as that
were able to resist the Russian force. (Great cheering.)
Why w ore there only 8,000 men present ? Their valour
unquesi ionably claimed the admiration and gratitude
of all ; it was not beyond that even ordinarily displayed
by a I tritish force ; it was not the mere courage of men
fighting against men, but the more enduring, calm, phalli,,
intrepid courage, which enabled that baud of heroes to
withstas ad, hour after hour, almost for an entire day,
-under gi devons privations and sufferings, the repeated and
overwhs filming attacks of the enemy, and it was, in his
opinion, little less than miraculous, that they were now
able to I songratulate themselves that victory was theirs,
instead of having to mourn the loss of their whole force.
(Load ;hears Hem the Opposition.) That was a grave
matter or explanation, and they had a right to ask why
that fee rful odds existed. (Cheers.) His own belief was,
that if her Majesty's Government had shown a proper
foyesigh t ; if, upon their undertaking the expedition to
the Cris nen, they had sent proper reinforcements • if they
had ha, I an army of reserve, or instantly supplied the
vacancif as caused by battle or disease ; if they had kept up
the Brii ;dale strength, even to the small number of 21,000
men, it was, he repeated, his firm persuasion, that no
battle o. I Inkerman would have taken place. (Cheers from
the Opp 'coition.) They all know the trite phrase which
used to be applied in the sister country towards this—and
we beli we that England's weakness on that occasion was
Russia 'a opportunity, and that the Emperor seeing that,
gather, ad together his legions and sent them against a re-
duced handful of men, who, brave as he knew they were,
thougi it be would succeed in overpowering them. (Cheers.)
Ravin g before that felt the effect of a British force at
Alma, he (Sir J. Pakington) was firmly persuaded he never
would have risked the battle of Inkerman had the Go-
vernm sat at home displayed even common prudence.
(Mee] s.) But was that all? What had been the suffer-
ings t f their men ? (Cheers.) They had been on those
height et over Sebastopol under canvass teats, they wore in
the w *rat weather that possibly could be conceived, ex-
posed to the rigours of a severe climate • and the offeete of
that : swful hurricane which was so fatal to our shipping,
total] y unprotected. (Cheers.) And how was that, but
by tb e imprudence and want of foresight of her Majesty's
Gove rnment:—(cheers)—and they had a right to ask them
for a m explauation. That house found them liberally
with supplies, and in sending forth an army as brave and
galls at as ever faced an enemy, why did they allow them
to p eris?.i with cold and exhaustion on the heights of
Seba sit,opol? (Cheers.) Within the last two days he had
bin:toe:if seen a private letter from a distinguished officer
of I sigh rank in the Crienea ; of _ course he was not at
liberty to mention his name, but he pledged himself that
he :was an officer of b.'gh rank, and of unimpeachable cha-
racteir for veracity. The letter was written to a member
of t.is own family, and containeilthese remarkable words :
•c`Thei spirit of the men is good, but their sufferings are
almost beyond endurance." (Cheers.) He (Sir J. Peking.
boss) could hardly with calmness advert to such a state of
thins, for he could not see any possible excuse for such
-neglect. (Hear.) Let them read the newspapers of the
day; let them read Lord Raglan's despatcha published
that morning, giving an account of the weather, and to
what a condition it reduced the ground on which the army
were encamped, and then let hon. members ask if these
Leave men ought, at this season of the year, and in such a
climate, to have been exposed under canvass tents ?
Cheers.) Her Majesty's Government could not plead in
answer that they were taken by surprise—they could not
:allege that it was impossible for them to have foreseen
these things, for they might, and could, and ought to have
-foreseen them.. (Hear, hear.) The expedition did not
leave Varna till September, and he was very much inclined
to believe, looking at the whole history of that expedition,
and if he could dive into the secrets of the Government,
that it was originally intended to have taken Sebastopol
by a coup de main. Perhaps it was possible that they
conld have done so, but it was equally certain that they
/lad sm right in presuming that they could do so, and that
they were, therefore, bound to be prepared for either alter-
:native. (Hear, hear.) He maintained that her Majesty's
Government had no right or reason to expect the capture
of Sebastopol in such a manner. It was a great fortress,
well stored and garrisoned, and no man could doubt but
that the; Czar would strengthen this, his stronghold, and
be prepared to resist any attack. (Hear.) Was it likely
then, or possible, that such a place could be easily taken,
and. that when the expedition landed in the Crimea they
would succeed in taking Sebastopol by a coup de main.
They had no right to expect a speedy termination to
rthe contemplated attack, for they did notsend men enough
'to- do so ; it nay have been probable, but they had no right
to assume that such would be the case. They had an army
attacking a great fortress, but so weak in numbers that
they could not invest it ; on the contrary, they were
only able to occupy one side of it, leaving the enemy
:at liberty to come and go, and ;bring in supplies at the
'other just as? often and largely as they chose. What
right had they to suppose that it would yield without
struggle ? They may no doubt capture it, and he hoped in
Heaven they would; bat when they were placed in sach•
circumstances that they could not invest it, surely it was
certain that the struggle must be protracted, and if so, it
was equally certain that their soldiers would. be exposed to
the advent of winter in such a climate, anti to the dreeelful
sufferings they have since endured. They were now re-
educed, by cold and privation of every description, to an
extent which left them physically unable to peeform their
duties; officers were out on duty every two nights out of
three, and yet nothing was done t,. alleviate their condi-
tion. Her Majesty's Governmont may tell him that a
warm supply of clothing hasl unfortunately been lost in
the Prince—and that, of course, no blame could attach to
-them ; but they had a right to be informed why that sup-
ply was not sent out sooner, and why did it not reach the
Crimea until the month of November—until the cold be-
came so intense that the men suffered the most cruel pri-
vations. (Hear, hear.) When were the huts to be sent
stout and how long were the men to remain exposed under
'canvass tents? Why was it they were
going out in De-
cember? He had that morning met an officer of his ac-
quaintance,who was going out to superintend the erection
of those huts, and under these circumstances it was impos•
!Bible the men could be relieved from the canvas tentsuntil
the end of January. What would be the consequences
which, in the romntime, might ensue to the health of
these brave men? (Hear.) It is all very well to speak in
terms if praise in that house of their bravery, but it should
be remembered they were not giving them even the com-
mon care due to humanity. (Cheers.) Under all these cir-
cumstances he thought he was justified in saying that that
house would abandon its duty if it did not call on the
Government to explain why these things should have hap-
pened. They had a right to an explanation, not only in the
name of tbo people of this country, but in that of the
:army, to whose sufferipgs he adverted. If the Govern-
ment gave them a satisfactory explanation, if they would
show that hereafter they my not only rely on their good
intentions, which he (Sir J. Pakington) did not deny, but
on their prudence and foresight, they would have no cause
to fear from the Conservative party. (Hear.) They ware
riot the Whigs of 1790, nor the Coalitionists of 1853.
(Loud cheers from the Opposition.) They desired nothing
'but the honour of their Sovereign and the welfare of their
country. (Cheers.) Let her Majesty's Gererament ask
for supplies, and they shduld have them rith no niggard
hand ; let them ask Parliamentary support and they should
have it without meeting with any factious spirit. (Hear,
hear.) But if they made these concessions on the one hand,
they must exact conditions on the other, namely, that the
war should be conducted with a vigour, a wisdom, and
foresight beyond that which they had hitherto shown.
(Hear, hear.) They asked the government, therefore,
for these explanations; they were bound in duty to the
country to give them. Parliament would, no doubt, heat
those explanations ; it would ask how they intended to
shape their futurelcourse, and by the answer they gave it
would be seen whether the House of Commons would be

justified, or the people of this country satisfied, that the
future conduct of public affairs should rest in the hands of
the existing Administration.
Sir It. PEEL justiaed the policy pursued both before
hostilities commenced, and during the conduct of the war,
and eulogised the chivalrous bearing of the officers, and the
indomitable courage of the men composing the British
army. They had now cemented with their blood an alli-
ance with Franca. They had entered into a friendly treaty
with Austria, and, under these circumstances, he thought
it was highly indecorous and reprehensible that M. Kos-
sath and M. Victor Hugo should be permitted, on public
occasions, to attack their Allies. He appbaled to the
noble bird the Secretary of State for Foreign affairs, whe-1
tiler it was not his bounden duty to interfere as soon 'as
possible?
Mr. S. HERBERT said—The charges, sir, which have
been brought against the Government to-night are of so
serious.a nature that I hope the house will grant me their
attention while I endeavour to give an answer to the state-
ments of the right hon. baronet (Sir J. Pakington) and give
that explanation which he states it is his right as a member
of Parliament to exact. I will do so by giving a plain his-

tory of the war in so far as it has come under the direction
of the Government. The House of Commons will then con-
sider whether the conduct of the Government has entitled
them to ask for further power and further assistance to

carry on the war with rigour. The charges, sir, as I under-
stand them, which have been made are many in number.
The hon. baronet says the army was originally sent out by
the Government without any specific plan or intention—
that when at last they did decide on a plan, it was one not
justified by the forces at their command or the informa-
tion they had received of the power and strength of the
enemy they were about to attack. He further said that
the army was too small, that it was an ill-appointed army,
and this from want of due preparation by the Government
that sent it out—that the army was sent out too late, that
the reinforcements were not sufficient, and that by neglect
at home it was allowed to dwindle down till it became in-
significant., Now, I cannot do heeler than state, in a
few instances, what was the intention of the Govern-
meat when that army was sent into the field. 1 will
show what that force was, what was its state of dis-
cipline and its efficiency, and I will then show how
much truth there is iu the allegation that the army was
suffered to become weak for want of reinforcements.
In the month of April instructions were sent to Lord
Raglan as to the disposal of the force under his or-
ders—a force numerically much inferior to that now
under his command. The intention of the Allied Govern-
ments—for no step was taken by this Government with-
out consulting our Allies. (Hear, hear.) Their good faith
in council has been as signal as their gallantry in the field;
and the house will understaud that when I shall speak of
the Government, I mean not the English Government
alone, but the Allied Governments. At the time that
army was sent to occupy a portion of the Turkish territory,
we had a large fleet in the Black Sea, there was a power-
ful Russian army in the Principalities ; but few encoun-
ters had taken place between the Turkish and Russian
armies, and those most capable of forming an opinion had
but little confidence iu. the power of the Turkish army to
resist ; and it was feared that by a bold stroke on Con-
stantinopleour fleet might be caught in the Black Sea,
with the Bosphorus in the hands of the Emperor of Rus-
sia. I now speak of what was possible; it was also possi-
ble that if the Turks failed to make a resistance at Kale
fat, the line of the Balkan might be turned and an army
come down on Constantinople. English and French offi-
cers were sent to ascertain the best lino of defence to save
that capital from a coup de main. Lord Raglan then
received instructions to take part of the army under his
command to Unkiar Skelessi, not only on account ef the
salubrious character of the place, but because he was •
then placed within reach of the Balkan, if that line
was menaced by the Russians, and also ready for an
attack on the Russian territory if that was determined
on. I mention this to show that the Government had I
then three objects in view—first, to defend Constanti-
nople ; secondly, to defend the line of the Balkan ;
thirdly, to make attack on and carry the war into some
vital part of the Russian territory. The army was then
sent further--S-what had been foreseen took place—the
Russians crossed the Danube, and invested Silistria.
Omer Pacha considered that he could not save the town
unless the English and French made an advance, which
would frighten the Russians and compel them to laic() the
siege. We all recollect the events of that siege ; we recol-
lect the gallantry of our countrymen in a miserable outpost
of that fortress ; but it was not their heroism, nor the
courage with which they inspired the Turkish troops, but
the fact that a French army was gathering at Shumla and
an English at Varna which convinced the Russian com-
manders that they could not retain their position. As to
Silistria, there may be question whether the importance
of relieving it was so great as to allow it to interpose be-
fore any other operation. No doubt time was lost by it,
but we gained material advantages by it ; we gained for a
Turkish army a great prestige ; we gained in the public
opinion of Europe the advantage of destroying the prestige
of the Russian arms in that campaign, It then remained
'or the Government to consider what enterprise would
strike such a blow at the Russian power in the Black Sea
as to place her neighbour in oemparativo tranquillity for
the future. The siege of Silistria was raised on the 22d.
On the 29th instructions were sent to Lord Raglan to
spare no pains to ascertain the strength of Russia in
the Crimea, and how far an attack oft it with the forces
at his disposal was .likely to be successful. The officer:,
in command of the two armies were men of great
military experience ; the Governmenfdepended on them ;
one is now ne more, but in his successor and the sur-
vivor we place unbounded confidence, The right
honourable baronet asks, did the Government give
any positive instructions after receiving information as
to the force in the Crimea? If, sir, we had shown so
little confidence • in those selected for such responsible
posts of command, as to say to them, " Whatever be
the information you receive—attempt nothing till you
have told us, who are six weeks distant from yea (for that
is the time it takes to receive an answer to a despatch),
what aro the grounds of your opinion"--- we should have
lest not weeks, but months till any expedition became im-
possible. These einem took eVery means of ascertaining
the Russian force in the Crimea, they then held a council
of war, and decided that the attack ought to be made.
They kneel' the forces at their command, they knew also
what force they might expect to meet with. mad Lord
Raglan knew bettor than any man what the military capa-
city of the English was. Irom that moment the allied
commanders applied every energy of their minds to make
preparations for that mighty armament which conveyed
their armies to the Crimea. Those who talk lightly of that
expedition seam to me to think that it is a very easy thing
to carry 50,000 men across the sea, and put them +own on
a hostile shore, without boats to land them, of boats to
carry their heavy guns ; it is considered to be an easy ope-
ration, like landing them on a pier In time of peace. That
operation took immense time—it owes great credit to those
engaged in it; no expedition ever sailed so complete in
every respect; and happily no expedition ever cohveyed
so immense a force across any sea with so little loss
and with success so great. (Hear, hear.) But was this
army so insufficient for the purpose for which it was in-
tended ? Lord Raglan took with bins to the Crimea
27,000 men, and our allies took a large force, not smile so
strong as ours, but which united to it gave 's, total of about
50,000 men. They soon after met the whole force then in
the Crimea, and met them entrenched in a position which
gave them an advantage equal to that of doubling
their numbers. The enemy held at Alma a position
as strong as burs at Inkerman, but held it with a
very different. result. But what else was there that
delayed the expedition ? Before it sailed from Valeta a
fearful
thinned
opestilenceur
ranks
gbrri
eo
vk
oe u
siy out amongst
.That
atsh
se
enemy
ne ,m
y Which
more
depressing to the soldiers than any huinan one; but we
were not the only sufferers. Oar Allies suffered still more
dreadfully from its ravages. I am unable to state our
exact loss, but I Jenow that our loss from disease has been
far greater than from any other circumstance. Lord
Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud had to make every exer-
tion to arouse their troops from the depression consequent I
on sickness, whilst they were preparing for the inveseieh of
the Crimea. But, sir, I do not think it is very clear that
if he had been enabled to land in the Crimea sooner we
should have gained very much as compared with the enemy,
The principal difficulty the Russians find in bringing
,up
their reinforcements arises from the difficulty of neeviee,
over a soil tkat is broken up in bad weather; the longer
therefore the fine weather lastedpthe longer Would they be
enabled to receive reinforcements. But I mot 13s.'y ths'e
there-never was an army moved on hand so rapidl- and so
successfully as the corps of General Deeeheenberg. The
right hon. baronet says we underraittA the power of the
enemy. Last session I made wome observations on that
point. I warned the public that on account Of the reAllt
of the campaign on the Danube, in which no pitched battle
had been fought, they chooses to assume that the power of
Russia was wavering, If sot extinct, and. would fall if
attacked with vigour. I pointed out that the Reagan
soldier was a :;,an of primitive nature, and like all such
sincerely attached to his native country, Wear, hear.)
The people of this country think that, other nations who
do not posses., institutions like their own are insensible
to patriotism and love of Country which they feel.
We hates. now received a lesson in this respect, and
those -who have seen the defence of Sebastopol mast know
how the Russian will defend his country. And new, sir,
what is the truth of the statements—that the army sent
out was inferior in numbers and utterly without reinforce-
ments ? The army at first consisted of four divisions] the
let, 2d, 3d, and light divisions, amounting to 22,680. In
June, before orders were given to make a descent on the
Crimea if circumstances were such as to justify it, a fifth
division was formed and placed under the lamented Sir G.
Cathcart. Now let us see what reinforcements have been
sent. In June we sent 941 men, in July 4,588 men, and.
in August, 2,032, and now we are told that from the mo-
ment the expedition was decided the Government should
have sent reinforcements—in September, 1,286 men, in
October, 2,855, and in November 7,037 were sent. (Hear.)
There are further reinforcements, but these are sent in
consequence of late occurrences and Lord Raglan's de-
mands. This number may not please those who think
English battalions should be pourryhede
cry
yn
intheeveprlyaipnarlliikae,
water. But who are responsible for twhearf,acits,
commencement
the poefaceevet
nomye and the result is outelorce is far
has
nthb littleeee
been
eaer
went
small when we get into trouble and difficulty, (re
lma na kd
e,
ear.)
To speak the truth, I am as much to blame as telly one.— I
have been Secretary at Wart fort :,sane years, and have
brought forward my peace es inett. es. It has been the same
with all ministers. E T
'ver Ads" nistration, however th 'f eet
fared on other points, agreed in the necessity of beehomy,
You ask us to make great 'efforts at the eehimencenient Of
war, at once to create, an army and to use it: Whoa the
Militia! Bill was 'wrought forward it was stated that otle•
whole availal.;lo forte, after pr &sidle% foe the defence of
our eoloseies, did not exceed 10,009 ern. I have shown
what number of Meta were sent to Lord Raglan,
and what reinformatuts are on their way. 1,700 men are
how waiting for embarkation ; and if I add to thet the
regimente ordered from the different garritehe In the Mee
diterranean, the whole that will Phertt, hate posed tinde
Lord Raglan's commandwill amount to 54,78 thous
I
believe the country has etthe II At B.iteePtlen that
the force is so great. We have Math% stereotyped state-
ment that Lord Raglan has seen
bayonets; but
what does that mean It only 16,000
actually present i the means the 16,000 effective men
le es field, deteebed
duty, excluding all excluding all on ,
commissioned I gtealltiallOtiat
officers, all artillery, cavalry,an, LIOR
of Waterloo the Duke of W and engineers. At the battle
ellington h d b
bayonets. If we are to take thin
a ut 18,000 British
a m
force will appear very small on ode of calculation out
country as to its amount. The rightrer, and &delve the
with perfect truth and fairness that ton, baronet has said
he no reason to complain of the House of Government has
it. They have granted all our demands,ommons. I admit
now is, whether further power shoultiband the question
who, according to the right hon. baronet,e given to those
little wisdom in the use of the past. Hohashave shown so
duty of a member f Parliament to be to iv defined the
port to a war if it is a just war, and to g :very sup-
give o the Go-
vernment conducting the war extraordinary power
requisite, lots of men and money. But if he thin ; if
the
Government will not use these resources with prude
nee

I and foresight, I think i its the Arity of a member of Par-
liament not to entrtlit them with such powers, but to give
them to ether men—(hear, hear)—who will conduct the
war in a way to satisfy the country. The right hon.
baronet, in the course of his criticism, has stated that the
army was insufficient to undertake any campaign in fhe
Crimea, and that we lied neglected to sendfirein-
forcetnents. He states that *hob. the troops landed
in the Crimea they tended without their tents, and stated
we sent them out, withoat tents. Every regiment took its
tents from England with them. Lord Raglan lauded them
without their tects, and they bivouacked for several days
without them: . They landed on the IGth September. The
• first night was wet ; and I believe that a great deal of sick-
ness arose. Our troops were on the left, the French OR
the right, and they thus adVanced without their Write.
The Sanish army, Wellington's, never had any tenth.
Lord Raglan is blamed for landing the troops without their
tents—how justly I will now ask you to decide. A power-
ful army was known to be in the Crimea, and it was pro-
bable that he would have to encounter them immediately
after his landing. If he had brought the tents he would
have left several battalions behind them that occupied the
room that would have been taken up by the tents. If he
hat,l brought the tents and left the men, what would you
have said to him if for want of done few ltattalions the
affair at the Alma, instead of a glorious victory, had been
an undecided struggle ? What would you have said then
to Lord Raglan? (Cheers.) Why, you would have said,
" Why did you fill your ships with ambulances and tents
when you had got men, and such men, lying idle at Varna?
You were entering upon an expedition in which you knew
the first blow would be everything, and ybu should have
gone in light order, you should have sacrificed everything
else in order to take men ; strong battalions should have
been your only consideration," (Hoar, hear.) The right
hon. gentleman seems to think nothing of the expedition
to Bornarsund ; he says it was merely a blockade. Let
him recollect, however, that that expedition was directed
against islauds that were almost inaccessible—(hear,
hear)--iii which foundations were laid and fortresses
marked out for the pnrpo e of establishing another
Cr onstadt or Heleingfors. (Hear, hear, hear.) Now
that the place has been taken, the right-. hon.
baronet thinks nothing of the brave soldiers and
sailors having risked their lives to capture it. He thinks
nothing of such small things. The Emperor of the French
differs from him; he gave a marshal's baton to General
d'Hillions. To come back, however, to the case of the
Alma the right hon. baronet says the tents were not pro-
duced. I hope the explanation which I have given—it is
an explanation which must be obvious to every who—is
satisfactory to the house. (Cheers.) I do not imagine
that one iota of blame attaches to Lord Raglan on account
of that proceeding. (Loud cheers.) I believe that. he did
what every matt in his situation ought to do. Ho judged
of the circumstances as they then stood. He did not pre-
tend to prophesy success at the Alma; ha adopted every
means of insuring it. It is very easy to say now, " Your
success is certain; you might have left men behind, and I
brought the tents." I must here diverge for a moment to
meet a charge which the right hon. baronet has not made,
but which has certainly been made elsewhere. On that
subject I shall make a very frank statement to the house.
I have no wish to deceive them in any ono respect ; nor
will I defend what I think is indefensible, or condescend
for ono moment to conceal what I think, with respect to
details which have, in my opinion, been unsatisfactory.
(Cheers.) Now, I recollect that last session we ha l a good
deal of discussion here as to the merits of the coinnaisee-
nat. The commissariat ran the gauntlet of popular cri-
ticism. I believe the opinions which were then formal
with regard to that department .were exaggerated opi-
nions, and not founded in fact; but I am not prepared to
say that at the end of along peace the commissariat or any
other department of the army was in as perfect a state as
experience and practice would make it. (Hear, hear.) I
have no doubt, therefore, that up to a certain point there
was ground for criticism on the part of those who were
determined to find fault. But, sir, the commissariat has
outlived criticism, and I believe it is now universally ad-
mitted that there never was an army better fed than
that of Lord Raglan's. (Hear, hear.) Their rations
have been increased ; the rations of meat are 50 per cent.
larger than those of any previous expedition. (Hear.)
When fears were entertained that the health of the men
would suffer for want of vegetables, supplies of vegetables
were immediately obtained from rieste and Smyrna for
their use ; and when the Government wore informed that
these were to be sold I wrote to Lord Raglan that I thought
that whatever was necessary to snake the soldier efficient
in the peculiar position in which he was placed, in cone°.
guenme of the nature of the service, ought toj be provided
at the expense of the public. (Cheers.) Sir, it has been
asserted that there has been groat mismanagement with
respect to the medical department of the army during this
campaign. Now, lam very anxious that the house should
know the exact truth with regard to this matter, because
I think nothing can be so detrimeptal to the public service
as for the public to imagine that our brave soldiers expe-
rience heartless and contumelious neglect at the very MO-
meat when they have just earned for themselves a right to
the utmost care and solicitude. Let me first state what
was tho amount of the staff which was sent out. There
had not left the shores of England for a very long period '
an army so large, or, I believe, so well appointed ; cer-
tainly none had ell it under circumstances so important,
or to conduct operations so hazardous as those which were
entrusted to the army of Lord Raglans When that
army was first organised the Government took the opinion
of a gentleman on a matter of detail. It was but a
matter of detail, and I refer to it only to show the
care and attention with which these things were attended
to. Mr. Guthrie, a surgeon of great eminence and talent,
and of high character, told us there was am error in the
organisation of the medical department. He said —" You
hare but three surgeons to a regiment, though you have a
large staff. The regimental surgeon leas the strongest in-
terest in bringing men into a state of health as rapidly as
possible ; .the staff surgeon has no interest in clearing the
hospital; his interest is only to cure particular persons.
Do not, therefore, make any additions to the staff, but give
a fourth surgeon to every regiment, and you will find the
service more efficient." On the other hand, Dr. Andrew
Smith, the head of the medical department) differied from
Sir. Guthrie on that point. lie said —" If you give only
four surgeons to even) regiment, the regiments which suffer
most will not have enough, and must depend, upon the
staff." I consulted Lord Raglan as to which of these two
suggestionshe preferred. He said—" I think 51r, Guthrie',
right, and I prefer to have a fourth regimental surgeon."
Now, what course did the Government adopt under these
circumstances I One great authority was for a small stall
and a regimental establishment; the other was for '
large staff and a small regimental establishment. We said
to the one-- " Take a large regimental establishment ;" we
said to the other—" Take a large staff." Again, Dr. An-
drew Smith, who devoted himself to his duties day anti
night, assembled at his own hoese a large number of medi-
cal men, who were engaged in the itruty dttritig the las,
war. These gentlharerl dre* sip a feport of what would
be the pro,pet ainetint of stores for the use of the army ;
they recalled their recollections of the Peninsula ; they
calculated. everything at so much per head, and
made a plan of so much medicitits) aiid so much
of everything. (Hear,* heait) All argument founded on
what was done in t I Peninsula is not necessarily a sound
arguneeht amconnt of the improvements which have been
made in the interval, and I refer to these things to show
that it was our object to make the preperations fer the army
as full and efficient as poesihie... HOW many medical met'
were appointed tes th 6 army? Thli 'Amber of staff medics,:
officers in turkey *as 2W; the nanib6r Of regimental
ofileees 192, the nuMbei pf Oidnaneh medical officers 14,
making total 4./361 The staff of medical officers will
ultimately, When all have joined, be 495. Upwards of 100
hates been added singe the battle of Alma, when the num-
ber was 275. I find from the Moniteur de l' Armee that
the number of medical officers for the frendli army was
270, that being the number for the whole of the army sent
to -Turkey and landing on the shores of the Crimea. If
we had Chosen to limit the medical staff to the number en-
gaged in the Peninsula, *éshould hate fixed it at one to
ever 145 men;lwhereae the number was, in fact, one to
In Mt tctohWl
eli.etchmt anen oEi
ftn. gtlhilesvhecrarhremaa,tyi
et.sot
every 7f Menu This was the largest medical staff ever sent
We had
rfa
irdeotmt he
otep,hgbery.ema:e:
idsiitec
had medical
Iffid ee puol
meatytt3.sall
experience in wan If meta tt4;.it to raete civilians to a.tteno
' upon tOeastki,, tl3e ititkiiofill be that they will attend to them
till tut; >! fettte as that of 'cholera arises, and then having a
llate tniniber of patiemts *Wining theit services they will
tell you horreetlY that they bail tio longer attend to a regi
men,t. ,We had the greatest difficulty in getting surgeons,
and had to look for them in emigrant ships and merchant
vessels. We have taken civilians without number; given
them temporary rank in the , armq We Have not, done
more, because they do het *ieh to remain permanently,
their only ohje4 Weihg to Obtain practice and experience.
I think yost will do me the justice to admit that so far at
least es numbest are 61101.11nd, tbh Government is not
fairly chargeable With haviitg acted in a niggardly spirit.
Dr. Andrew Sinith was indefatigable in his endeavours to
supply the men with every possible comfort and oven lux-
ury which it was possible for them to have in hospitals. I
have here a list of the blankets, bedding, and sheets. There
were 19,000 cotton sheets, and everything was on that
scale. Ido not know that it is worth While to trouble the
house by reading its but I wish td impress upon the house
and the right hon. barb, opposite (Sir J. Pakington), if he
is open to conviction, that it has not been from heartless
indifference to their safferirigs that the troops have been
exposed to privations. (Hear, hear.) NV, the statement
to which I alluded was that awe the baffle of the Alma
a great deal of unnecessary Suffering was inflicted upon the
troops in consequence of a bad arrangement of the medical
stall. I will refer as little as I can to documentary evi-
dence; but I think I could ptit, the question to the house
in a manner which would Convince them that there has
been great misapprehension and great exaggeration of the
evils which have existed and which during war must
exist. It was stated that the wounded of the British
army lay on the field of Alma for two or three
tdhseyisr wothtdths
board ship ifsnumbers ac were not safe. 1
eylivenderrees6ehr.ughthtadtowtniletyo twheersehippus
put on
believe that a groat deal of this statement arose from
ignorance of what had happened In places beyond
the obserseation of these who made the allegations. The
Freaeit army, composed of feWer men than our own, lay
next the sea; their wounded, who *ere fewer in number
than Out Own, Ntiere eariiod inimediately to the ships. Out
troop§ *eta folk er five miles, I believe, from the sea. A
ftgld hospital was established for them in some buildings
which were found near the spot. All those of the worindeo
into t
whose
~
al i
cases
thosepermittedr hd themees tes d be
riot
d removed
p
treated bit Deb fldlti, food being conveyed to them, their
o o
Wounds dtessed, and as much Coveting being put over them
°evremdi permit were
were
as
et
m removed
couldjbe obtained: I need not sad that all the appliances
Whibh rhiild a tibtain6d dn, the field of battle were not
flefildient for the conifort or the Wounded men, but this is
one of the stern necessities of war. (Hear.) I have seen
evidence which satisfies me that not it single man was al-
lowed to leave the hospital to be put on board-ship with-
out his hdrte
been ettetided to or his wounds Ores-
!tea. It is quite trite that the number of men placed on
board the Kaiegatoo was beyond that which she could pro-
ia
perly be allowed to carry. The statement, however, that
M 00, PeEsOni Were put od board that vessel Was an exag-
gefittiori tot
the number did not at any time exceed seven hundred,
o extent ot snore than One-half. I believe
and those whom the Kangaroo could not properly take
were put on board another vussel. It has beet,
stated that litindtedi iii Men died on board of cholera.
I bel'ie've the number of those who died on board the
itangaroo was under 40, and I venture to assert that the
proportion of deaths to cases of sickness was far greater
during the last summer in many of the London hospitals.
ni admit that the number on board was great, but it could
not he avoided'without leaving the men on the field. Lord
a
Eaglan was obliged to remain two or three days on the
theyspot would be he was aware that if he left his wounded
be massacred by the Cossacks, ant when the
men were serit on board ship of course their sufferings
were great. It had been said that their wounds were not
dressed during the whole time that they were on board.
On that, point
I am informed by surgeons who have been
redressingsuch
wounds for three
surgeon would think of
the wounds being covered with
accustomed to the dressing of gun-shot wounds, that no
or four days, and that,
at length this subject,
on I)
- them. Oil*, I have dilated rather
lint, there ould be great eare ate first not to disturb