The Sun.
London, England, 1854-09-13 00:00:00

RETURN OF SIR CHARLES NAPIER
FROM THE BALTIC.

It is reported, and seems to be believed, that Admiral
Sir Charles Napier may be shortly expected in this
country on his return from the Baltic. His arrival
would, of course, imply that operations in that quarter
are at end for the year, and that our fleet will soon find
its way to England for the winter. We must needs ex-
press an anxious hope that the rumour in question may
not bo true, for such a resolution on the part of our
authorities would, we think, be unnecessary, ill-timed,
and calculated both to damage the cause of the Allies

and serve that of the Russians.
The only reason which could compel the return of
the fleet from the waters which it now commands would
be the approach of the winter season. As the Baltic
ports at such times are sealed up by ice, and the blockade
of the Russian gulfs is effectually maintained by the
natural operation of the climate, it would be clearly
superfluous to add any artificial barriers to those already
provided, even if it were possible for a squadron to keep
the sea at such periods of the year. Exactly, in short,
as there was a time before which it was unnecessary
that the Baltic should be guarded by an allied squadron,
•

so there is a time beyond which it will be unnecessary
that this guard should be continued, but that time leas
certainly not yet arrived. The period at which, upon
an average, the closure of the Neva may be expected,
is, as we recently explained, two months distant, and,
even if preparations for the return of the fleet were
commenced somewhat earlier, it is clear that four or five
weeks must still remain available for active operations.
How, indeed, are we to reconcile the two facts that,
while in the Black Sea the work of the war is just com-
mencing, in the Baltic it should just be terminated ? If
enough remains of the autumn to permit the siege of
Sebastopol to be attempted, must not enough remain
to allow of some further enterprise in the north ?
We consider that this cessation of operations would
be ill-timed, because everything at present suggests a
contrary course. We have have just learnt our strength
and the enemy his weakness ; the Allies have been en-
couraged, and the Russians disheartened. After believ-
ing somewhat too implicitly in the imputed strength of
granite fortifications, we have just seen this persuasion
demolished by the test of experiment. The stone forts
on which Russia relies have been shown to be no match
for the floating batteries which represent the power of
England and France. If the Edinburgh at .500 yards in
seven broadsides can knock a breach in the towers of
Bomarsund, why should not Admiral Chads have an
opportunity of performing the same feat at Fort Alex-
-1 ander on the south side of the island of Cronstadt ? In
a contest which was a trial of strength between offensive
and defensive systems, that of the defence has proved
the weaker, and nothing, therefore, could seem more
impolitic than that the assailants should at this very con-
juncture relinquish the advantages obtained. The fall
of Bomarsund appeared to open to the allied squadrons
all the strongholds of the Russian gulfs, and it is clear
from the despatch of General Baraguay d'Hilliers that
the result wss actually regarded in this light. Where,
then, can be the wisdom of foregoing a superiority thus
established at the moment when it might be turned to
good account ? Surely, if it has been found that we can
destroy granite forts without risk of getting our ships
awkwardly crippled, we might as well pursue the advan-
tage as long as the season will permit.
What, too, we may ask, if operations are to be thus
prematurely closed, was the object of proceeding lately
with such urgency in the equipment and despatch of
gun-boats for special service in the Baltic waters? Every-
body observed that the chief risk encountered in the re-
' cent proceedings was that of grounding in the shallows,
1 while the chief advantage experienced by our forces was
in the superior range of our artillery. By a judicious
application of these lessons we have constructed vessels
with offensive powers of a most: ormidable character,
vessels drawing only very little water, and yet armed
with guns of enormous calibre and prodigious range.
One piece of ordnance capable of throwiinc,, a heavy shot
nearly four miles has already reached the fleet, and,
though this may seem of no great moment, it should be
remembered that a single 10-inch gun, well placed and
worked, had no inconsiderable share in the destruction
of Bomarsund. But there is time enough, we presume,
before the end of this month, to reinforce the fleet with
some of the gun-boat flotilla, and there would then still
remain another month available for putting their powers
in requisition. Why stop short at the fall of Bomarsund,
with such fair opportunities left for successful progress ?
We are now exactly at that conjuncture of affairs
when success would produce its greatest fruits, and when
anything like evidence of weakness would be attended
with peculiar disadvantage. Hitherto the war, though
certainly productive of humiliation to Russia, has not
been distinguished by any brilliant action on the part of
the Allies. We have driven the Czar to seek shelter be-
hind his fortifications, but we have not attacked him in
his position ; and, if our forces are too strong for him,
his defences have been too strong for us; The conse-
quence has been a temporising and uncertain policy in
quarters where a more decided success would probably
have brought about a cordial alliance, and these unde-
sirable results are only too likely to be confirmed by
proceedings which would appear to leave the field in
the possession of our enemies. We have learnt exactly
what to anticipate from the policy of the Russian
Government. If our fleet retires from the Baltic be-
fore the season is actually closed and while time and
opportunity still remain for action, the Russians
will instantly sally out into the seas thus conveni-
ently vacated, will reoccupy the Aland Isles, hoist
their flag on the ruins of Bomarsund, parade their vessels
along the coasts of Sweden and Denmark, and then issue
a swaggering manifesto to the world, setting forth the
ignominious retreat of allied the squadrons with nothing
accomplished, the triumphant resistance of the Imperial
forces against infinitely superior numbers, and the final
ascendancy of the Czar in the waters of the Baltic. This
will probably be the issue of the campaign, and, however
false such representations may be, appearances will not
be wanting to lend a plausibility to the story. A very
small thing makes a victory in the Invalide Busse.
We are quite aware that the first condition of opera-
tions in the Baltic was the preservation of the fleet from
such injury as would destroy its efficiency ; nor have we
been slow to inculcate on our countrymen the expediency
of acquiescing in the solid advantages of a blockade in-
stead of tempting fortune by speculative enterprises,
promising no commensurate returns. To these views
we steadily adhere ; but it is impossible to deny that
the capture of Bomarsund considerably enlarged the field
of judicious action. It was thought that guns could not
destroy granite, whereas it is now proved that granite
cannot resist guns. It has certainly not yet been ascer-
tained how far the wooden walls of our three-deckers
may be relied upon in a cannonade exposing them to
the full fire of land fortifications, nor is it necessary to
bring this
.question to any violent issue. Our artillery
is so superior to that of our enemies that we may carry
on our attacks without staking too much on the trial,
and, as long as these means of offence remain in our
power, it appears to us exceedingly impolitic to abandon
the field. That our fleets will have done good work by
blockading the Russian squadrons, paralysing Russian
trade, and bringing themselves safe home again, is cer-
tainly true, but this is all the more reason for depriving
the enemy of the smallest pretext for disparaging the
results of the campaign. Sweaborg or Cronstadt, and
not Spithead, should now be the destination of Sir
( Charles Napier.—Tinter.

TH OFFRANCE A STUMBLING
TONE TO THE EASTERN DESPOTS.

It appears, at first view, rather anomalous that the
earliest intimation or indications of what the Western
Powers really think or have made up their minds to do
in the Eastern question should all along have proceeded
from that ono of the two allies who seems the least
amenable to popular opinion. In England the adminis-
tration hold their places durante bent placito of the repre-
sentatives of the people, and are exposed to their inter-
rogations. In France the Emperor holds all but des-
potic power. Yet the pithy despatches of M. Drouyn
de l'Huys were published for the edification of our neigh-
bours on the other side of the Channel, long before our
ministers would speak out ; and now the Government
organs in the French press are beginning to speak
(covertly, it is true, but still quite intelligibly) of Austria
in the terms it deserves, while Englishmen have no
means afforded them of discovering whether or not their
ministers are still determined, on all occasions, to "wait
for the Austrians." A little reflection, however, suffices
to solve the seemingly puzzling problem. In France
public opinion is in reality as omnipotent as it is in
England ; although Frenchmen, tired of the aimless and
endless brawls of political F rondeurs, are contented a%
present to acquiesce in a form of government which
affords public opinion no legitimate recognised organ
of expression. The Emperor of the French has the good
sense to see this : he knows that his absolute power is
absolute only so long as it does not run directly counter
to popular sentiment and opinions ; he knows that
popular dislike of any course he may pursue, "having
no tongue to speak," will of necessity first vent itself in
action ; and he wisely seeks to prevent and
b to carry
the popular will with him as he pds, y volun-
tarily submitting to it early explanations. On the con-
trary, English Ministers, knowing that sooner or later
they must be brought to book, put off the evil day as
long as they can ; and Englishmen, satisfied that they
possess the means will com
slupellinmber g Mon in inisters
e• this pleasin to rendecon-
r a
account when they , n
sciousness of power, without exercising it. Thee cir-
cumstance, too, that Ministers can be peremptorily in-
terrogated only a certain season of the year—while Par-
liament is in session—renders it more difficult to extract
information from them at any other time. Of late there-
fore, the attention of the English. public has been more
frequently turned to Paris than to London, when on the
watch for intimations of what the Allied Powers really
think and inteni to do. This habit rests on the assump-
tion that the professions of entire unanimity made by
the two Governments are really sincere ; and this
assumption is at present tolerably well warranted.
English Ministers know that a
th
tieme, ca English peopale,
though they may be gulled forcannot perm-
be kept in the leading-strings of the Eastern
despot • the Emperor of the French knows that between
him and the old aristocracy of Europe then is a gulf
placed which he cannot pass over ; boi,h Governments,
French and English, are bound by the necessity of
their nature to thwart and oppose the living re-
presentatives of the Holy Alliance. Their coquet-
ting with Austria has, therefore, been as false and
insincere as the coquetting of that antiquated flirt with
them. The affectation of mutual confidence and sym-
pathy has been carried nearly to its utmost limits, and
the mask must soon be removed on both sides. Of this
impending necessity the Emperor of the French has na-
turally become sooner aware than havo the English M.
nistry. The English Government and nation,
of
,thougih
necessarily antagonistic to the vital principles
East-
European despotism have been so long established that
there aro no hopes of putting them down ; the absolute