The Sun.
London, England, 1854-11-16 00:00:00

A JACK TAR'S LETTER.

If you want to hear the roar of cannon come to this
place, and you will have enough of it. We have had
eleven days, and it may be as many more before we get
possession of Sebastopol. We had the pleasure of throwing
some of Lancaster's shells at them the day after we arrived
on the station. The Arrow went in company with the
Sampson, and in sight of tho fleet, to try the effect of our
long range ; the enemy was not idle, for as we ran down
the coast we came all at once on a battery, and they sent
their shot and shell around us thick, and to menclthe matter
the engine would not work for some time, so there we
lay—a target for them—at length away we went and
" astonished the Browns." Two days after we paid
them another visit—my eye, what a dust there was in the
forts. Tho naval brigade on shore works well, and so do
the red-jackets. I wish I was with them. Our fleet en-
gaged the first day, and to tell you the truth they got
roughly usod but " novel say die wh:l© there's a shot in
the locker." Everybody is in good spirits, and expects to
beat the enemy.—P.S. No Sundays in this place—all
work on fighting. lam glad to say wo have none hurt
as yet—that is to say on board our craft.

" On we went—astonished, but unshaken in nerve—over
half a mile of rough ground, losing dozens of men and
horses at every stride, to attack horse artillery in our front
supported by three times our numbers of cavalry, heavy
batteries on the right and left flanks, backed by infantry,
riflemen, &c. We took the guns, cut up the gunners,
routed the cavalry, and amid a storm of shot found our-
selves very soon surrounded on all sides by the enemy,
through whom all that remained of us cut our way back to
our position: We went into action 140 strong. I num-
bered the reg:ment off 34, when we returned. The other
regiments suffered nearly as much."

The following extract of a letter of an officer on board
the Sanspareil, off Balaklava, Oct. 28, describes some
curious incidents in the late action. The words, how-
ever, attributed to Lord Cardigan, as directed to Captain
Nolan, doubtless originate in some misreport ; that
officer had seen too much gallant service for such a
reproach to! have been tinder any _circumstances ad-
dressed to him :

. . . . You will see that we have shifted round
to this little nook, and a busy place it is. There is a Rus-
sian force close to us. They day before yesterday they
attacked, and our light division of cavalry were severely
cut up. Lord Cardigan behaved nobly. We were all
roused up in the middle of the night by a little skirmish
—daylight this morning discovered 2G Cossacks lying on
the field. The Scots Greys charged three times through a
Cossack regiment the other day, and played the deuce with
them. The 93d Highlanders were charged by cavalry, and
received them in a manner which sent them to the right
about. They say it is one of the most brilliant things that
has bee* done this war. Capt. Nolan, of 15th Hassars,
was seen riding away from the Russians. Lord Cardigan
hailed him to stop, or ho would have him tried for cow-
ardice, but when his horse joined the cavalry, every one
was horrified to find he was shot through the heart. Is it
not most extraordinary? Except that his horse was run-
ning about wildly, one would have supposed he was alive.
Another odd thing happened to Maude, of R.H. Artillery.
A shell burst in the stomach of his horse, and sent him At
the air, yet, with the exception of a wound in the leg, he
is safe."

The following additional details respecting the francs-

tireure are given in a letter from a Zonave to hi:father.
They are published by the Journal de Maine-et-Loire :
" I am almost like a poacher ! I go out ever slay to
shoot Russians ! This is the way we do :—As early as two
o'clock in the morning, our toilette completed.—and that
of a Zouave is not long—wo leave, carrying with us
ammunition, and one 'or two biscuits. Arrived in the
entrenchments, we take sand bags, a spade, and a
pickaxe ; then, at a given signal, we leap from the
parapets with the rapidity of deer, and establish our
homes close to the forts. There we dig a hole, a sort of
warren to hide ourselves in. We place our bags to pro-
tect us, and our residence is then terminated. We remain
in these holes all the day, and it is not until night is rather
advanced that we are permitted to leave them ; this we
often do amidst a shower of grape-shot. You will ask me,
my dear father, what we do in the holes all day. Very
good work, I assure you. We fire almost as fast as we can
load, and every discharge demolishes a Russian artillery-
man. The other day two officers climbed up a large pole
on the summit of a tower, opposite my lodgings, and they
began to examine our works. With two shots I brought
thorn both down. Then a storm of balls, shells, and grape-
shot, was directed against us, but, happily, we were so
near the forts, that it passed over oar heads without touch-
ing any one of us."

ALMA.-RUSSIAN CAVILS AT MARSHAL

ST. ARNAUD'S ItEPOBT.

The following carping attempt to invalidate the
statements of the late Marshal St. Arnaud respect-
ing the battle of Alma has been put forth in the
Journal de St. Petersbourg. Its special pleading
scarcely deserves notice. Two points, however,
may be touched upon. The humanity of the Allies
to the wounded Russians is not denied ; but
nevertheless an attempt is made to weaken belief
in it by a gross lie respecting the condition of those
who ware sent to Odessa by the English. The other
point is comical rather ; the Monitetcr Universel:is
taken to task for saying that one Russian general
was taken prisoner at Alma. The writer in the St.
Petersburg journal indignantly protests that only
two Russian generals were captured by the Allies.
(From, the Journal de St Petersbourg of Nov. 7.)

One of the greatest disadvantage for us, when the
misrepresentations of our opponents demand rectifica-
tion, is the unavoidable lateness of our answers. When
exact details of events, accomplished at such great dis-
tances reach us, public opinion, engrossed by more recent
pre-occupations, receives our retrospective explanations
with' only faint interest. Such will also probably be the
lot of those which we subjoin. For all this, we give
them, if only for the sake of truth, and in the interest of
history.
According to the report of Marshal St. Arnaud to his
sovereign, our forces at the Alma amounted to 40,000
bayonets, 6,000 cavalry, and 180 pieces of cannon. In
another report of the Marshal to the Minister of War
our cavalry was estimated at only 5,008 horses.
flaying pointed out this divergence of the two reports
emanating from one source, we are going to present at
the same time the numerical list of our soldiers en the
position of the Alma.

Men.
Infantry : 42i battalions, say about 30,000
Cavalry : 16 regular squadrons and 11
sotuias of Cossacks, say

We have received no new information concerning
the affair of the sth. The flank-attack on the right
of our army, whilst a sortie from the besieged took place
on our left wing, was a supreme effort to prevent by an
energetic diversion the speedy assault of the town. The
intrepid courage of our soldiers baffled that plan, which
was wanting neither in shill nor boldness. The success
of the plan might, in fact, have had for result to cut off
the communications between Balaklava and the besieg-
ing forces, and to take our troops between two fires.
The plan has failed. The Russians have retreated to-
wards the Chernaya, and the besieged have been forced
back within the walls of Sebastopol. Will this defeat
and the considerable losses, which it has caused to
the enemy, prevent them from undertaking a new
attack on the Allied troops ? We do not expect this.
It is probable that the Russian forces will return to the
charge, and again attempt the chance of a battle. The
hostile generals have not, in fact, any other means of
regarding, if not avoiding, the fall of Sebastopol. Since
th 4th, the breach has been large enough to admit the
assault to be given. A part of the town is in ashes ; the
forts are for the most part dismantled and reduced to
silence. Evidently, if the army of Prince Afenschikoff
leaves a single day's respite to the besiegers, if he does
not harass them by continual attacks, the assault will
take place, and the ardour and enthusiasm of our men
are such as to convince us that it will not bo long.
The tactics of the enemy must consequently consist of
turning us away from the siege, properly so called, by
every means in their power. This is what they
did on the sth, with a superiority of numbers calcu,
lated te inspire them with great hopes, and it is what
in all probability they will attempt again. But whq-
ever may be their efforts, we remain without disquiotude
as to the result. The Allied army occupies an impreg-
nable position. It is encamped on heights very differ-
ently fortified from those of the Alma, and the Russians
have not for the purpose of dislodging us these corps
of Zouaves, who care nothing for the asperities of moun-
tains or for impassable summits. The Russian sol-
diers, to whose courage we have never ceased to
pay homage, are marvellous troops by their resist-
ance and by the impassibility with which they know
how to die. But they have not the dash, the faria
of the French ; and in consequence, the Russian
generals have done everything in their power to en-
tice us down into the level country. Their cunning
has preyed fruitless before the intelligent tactics of
the chiefs of the Allied army, who contented them-
selves with a rigorous defence, whilst continuing on the
other side to bombard Sebastopol. It will continue to
fail as long as we shall not be masters of the town. It
is only on the day that we shall have obtained a new and
strong base of operations that our army, whose impatient
ardour is with difficulty restrained at present, will ac-
cept the battle wherever it may be offered, and will pur-
sue, if necessary, the remainder of Prince Menschikoff's
army. Meanwhile we are in a position as strong as it is
possible to desire, and we will not abandon it. It
has been announced that Prince Menschikoff was again
expecting numerous reinforcements. We believe that
he has now all that he could reckon on; and letters from
Odessa announce, in fact, that the convoys of troops
towards the Crimea have ceased for some days. The
Russian a-my is necessarily limited in the Crimea by the
resources in provisions and ammunition which it can
dispose of. 14 has not the sea by which to receive its
stores ; it must receive every thing, from the continent
by badly-kept roads, which will soon become absolutely
impracticable. The soil of the Crimea is chalky and
friable. The rains, which usually commence in Nov.,
soften it to such an extent as te destroy the communica-
tions. The roads become cut up and full of holes, and
the pools of water no longer allow of any transports.
The climate therefore menaces very seriously the army of
Prince Menschikoff, and if in a few days it does not ob-
tain a marked success, he will be obliged, under pain
of exposing to the most frightful privations his army of
100,000 men, to take refuge at Perekop to pass the winter
there iu the most complete inaction. Our army is in
far better condition. Close to the sea, it can incessantly
obtain everything that it wants. It has at its disposal
a powerful fleet, which is at the same time a military
auxiliary and a means of supplying stores. Without
doubt the Black Sea is renowned for its tempests and
inhospitable climate ; but there are no more storms and
contrary winds for steamers, and we have 200 of these
latter constantly plying from Balaklara to Constanti-
nople, and vice versa. On the other hand, there
have been already accumulated at Balaklava up-
wards of six weeks' provisions, and stores of every
kind, and every day there arrive there new con-
voys of men, arms, and provisions. If from these
oensiderations connected with the weather and cli-
mate, and from these details of supplies we pass to the
physical appreciation of the two armies, we find them
at least equal in strength. We see the Allies full of
enthusiasm and courage, still mere excited by the nu-
merous victories which they have already gained on
the Alma, over General Liprandi, and now over the

Grand Dukes Michael and Nicholas ; always ready for
the combat, prepared to resist every attempt at surprise,
and displaying in the face of danger that French
gaiety, which is one of the sources of strength of our
army, or Britannic impassibility, which makes our
allies a living wall of brass. Whatever may be the
means by which the courage of the Russians is fana-
tieised, it is impossible to make them believe that they
are victorious when they retreat in disorder ; and it
is impossible to conceal from them the disasters and
ruins of Sebastopol. And if that is the case, how
can it be admitted that the inevitable discouragement
which seizes on every army that has been three times

conquered should not creep into their ranks ? The ma-
terial situation, like the moral one, is therefore as good
as could be hoped for. Foolish are they who have ima-
gined that a town like Sebastopol could be takenin a day ;
that an army like that of Prince Menschikoff would sur-
render without striking a blow ; or that a power like
that of Russia would allow itself to be deprived, without

. -
combat, of its maritime bulwark in the Crimea! We
ougkt to have expected a desperate resistance, each as
we meet with. Why should we be astonished at it ?
But up to the present time we have constantly overcome
that resistance, and everything leads to the belief that
we shall overcome it to the end. In terminating, we
have to repeat—the day of the assault is near at hand,
and the assault, without any doubt, is the capitulation
of Sebastopol."

THE RUSSIAN DESPATCHES.

(Prom the Siecle.)

The news just received is sufficiently serious for us to
be allowed to say a few words on the subject. We
publish without hesitation the Russian despatches. It
is necessary that the public should know how the enemy
explains to his own advantage a war in which above all
other details the three following facts are brought out :
The battle of the Alma ; the progress of the siege from
the opening of the trenches on the 10th ult. to the open-
ing of the breach on the sth inst., the day on which an
assault was, according to the Russian despatch, unsuc-
cessfully attempted, which is not impossible after the re-
sults of the labours of the engineers and the artillery ;
and the advantage maintained by the Allies in all their
positions of attack and defence, from the 27th September
to the sth November, in spite of all the efforts made to
dislodge them and to free Sebastopol from the circle of
iron which bums it, and which will stifle it in a given
time. It cannot be denied that the Russians are brave
soldiers ; the prodigality with which their generals shed
the blood of the troops does not excite the slightest mur-
mur amongst them ; the soldier carries his obedience so
far as to believe himself a conqueror on the word of his
chief, when his defeat is evident to himself and to all
the world. There is in them the germ of great military
qualities, which the Muscovite Government uses and
abuses, as is the case with every despotic Government.
The Russian despatches have therefore for their primary
object to deceive the Russian people and the Russian army,
for wherever there exists a shadow of liberty, of examina-
tion, the artifice of them is soon brought to light. We
have no information to enable us to contradict the spik-
ing of 16 guns in one place and of 15 in the other, as
announced by the despatch of Prince Menschikoff. It
must not be forgotten that a sortie, even if the men
composing it get into one or two batteries, is not from
that circumstance crowned with success. This is so
true that Prince Menschikoff himself implicitly admits
in his despatch that the sortie was so quickly driven back
that our soldiers attempted to enter the town with their
assailants. As far as regards the attack on the Allied army
by that of the Grand Dukes, it has been remarked in the
Debats that it was skilfully combined, for, if it had been
successful, all our siege works would have been taken in
flank and overthrown, and the enemy would have reached
the basis of the English operations at Balaklava. To
form a plan is not, however, all that is necessary ; it must
be kept from the knowledge of the adversary until the
moment when it is too late for him to oppose it. Since
the 25th ult. the Allied generals clearly saw the baton.
tions of the Russians, and, disdaining all luresiireslohlveerde
to receive the battle, and not to go andseek France re-
.
is in this a proof of military skill
quired in order to be tranquillisehdh which
had come to theas
to the fate of au
army less numerous than that I,,ic
rison of 30,000 men.
relief of a place having itself g
Besides, the activity displayeda bar the three Allied Go
Besides,
verninents in sending reinforcements
that that position has been clear y 3''
uu sufficiently
te
nothing has
been neglected to, second the heroic efforts
of the soldiers of civilieation.

HOME Lrrs ix RUSSIA..-13f a Russian Noble.
Revised by the Editor of "Revelations of Siberia."
"This work, while purporting to furnish us with the
curious and extraordinary incidents in the career of &
Russian Government employe, gives also a very interest-
ing and graphic account of the manners and customs of
the IZnssian people. The most interesting and amusing
parts of the work will be found to be those interior scenes
in the houses of the wealthy and middle classes of Russia,
upon which we have but scanty information, although
they are some of the most striking and truthful indications
of the progress and civilisation of a country. As such,
we recommend thyna to the study of our readero,"—
Oisfacr.

There is a great simplicity in the struggle be-
tween the Russians and Allies. It is purely a ques-
tion of supply. Everything else appears to be
known, proved, indisputable, and capable of the
exactest appreciation. We may safely assume that
the Allies will hold their ground in the peninsula
they have occupied as long as they can muster even
one division of their armies ; that they will stand
any amount of charges as long as they can form a
line two deep ' • that they will turn out night and
day, and take their turns at the trenches, so long
as the blood flows in their veins ; that as long as
it will answer any purpose of offence or defence
they will continue to batter the walls and earth-
works before them ; and that whenever they have
a fair chance they.will rush to the assault of the
city. They surpass the enemy in courage, in stub-
bornness' and in skill, and are not inferior even in
hardihood ; otherwise they would not have
triumphed on every occasion, while acting on the
offensive or on the defensive. On the part of the
Russians it may equally be assumed that they will
attempt to waste and weary out the Allies by in-
cessant attacks, by sorties, by diversions, and by
surprises ; that they will not spare their men, and
As
veryto
un-
justth
that their men will do their duty quite as well as
Rquuesssti
iaonns
01 if aslk,
be
e
to the Allies to doubt their equality, for if
andusuallyill s
tr da
to
engey
it bwe feourl ed.
they have made mistakes, so also have the enemy,
and I we have occasionally lost more men than we
ought to have done, still we have uniformly been.
conquerors. When all these elements of the ques-
tion are thus known, and, so to speak, fixed quan-
ties in the calculation, there only remains one
element undetermined, and that is the numbers
of men and quantities of material we can seve-
rally bring t 3 the point of collision. That point
seems almost intended by nature for some such
mighty struggle. It is, towards the Mediterranean,
that is virtually to the whole world, the most
southern and most accessible point of the great
Russian empire. It is the salient angle of a whole
continent, occupied by serfs and nomadic tribes,
under an Asiatic despotism. But it is washed and
almost surrounded by a sea which belongs to the
great ocean that surrounds the whole world. From
the coast of Cape Cherson you may walk on to
Siberia ; once on the water before it, you may sail
to every shore, ocean, bay, or navigable stream.
The Russians are masters of the continent,--we of
the sea ; and the only question is, which can bring
up supplies to the battle-field the quickest—the
Russians with their continent, or we with the sea.
If anybody doubts this view of the question, or
thinks it inapplicable, he has only to consider the
successive news flashing across the continent almost
day after day. It is true we are only hearing, as
it were, the boom of the distant guns, and are still
left in suspense as to the real character and exact
results of the fearful conflicts of the sth, and again,
as it now appears, on the 11th. In both cases we
are told that the loss of the Russians was very great,
and that ours was only less ; while it is thought a
matter of congratulation that the Allies remained
masters of the field. We may suppose—and it is
neither an improbable nor an agreeable supposition
—that the loss of the two sids was in much the
same ratio as at the battle of the Alma—that
two to one in our favour. At this rate, in about a
week we should lose five thousand to ten thousand
of the enemy, and in two months' time should
achieve the destruction of 80,000 Russians, at the
cost of the whole Allied army. There is nothing at
all out of the way in this calculation, when it is con-
sidered that we have to throw into our losses the
constant drain by sickness. As a matter of fact
this is, and always has been, the Russian mode of
warfare. That Power, mancipiis locuples, egen
cris, always has been lavish of life, and ready to
pay two of its own for oue of the foe. The artil-
lerymen who turned their guns on the melee of
British and Russian cavalry on the 25th acted on
the customary calculation that a Russian dragoon
counted for nothing when there was an opportun-
ity of destroying :British one. Whenever, then,
the enemy can attack us with a reasonable hope of
losing only two to our one, we may depend upon it
that he will, and that the Emperor will hail it as
a victory over us. He will not grudge two Boro-
dines to destroy the two invading armies. When
such is the calculation evidently acted upon, and
the result answers to it, what is it but a question
of supply t All things considered, we really can-
not expect to continue always killing and wound-
ing two Russians to our one ; at least, we cannot
hope to do more than this ;we may do less. But,
at all events, if the contest goes on at its present
rate, our forces now in the Crimea will be destroyed
somewhere about New Year's-day, and we shall
have the doubtful satisfaction of knowing that the
Russians have lost twice as many, but are at last
" masters of the field."
This would be a very gloomy prospect, and we
should feel much as we did when we heard of the
rising at Cabal, but for the all-important circum-
stance mentioned above—viz., that if the Rus-
sians are masters of the continent, we are of the
sea. Iu fact, we are to all practical purposes
nearer the seat of war than the Russians, as
we can get up our supplies to it in less time
from any barracks in these islands than the
Russians can even from Odessa. From the southern
coast of France and from Algeria the distance is
much less still ; and, with the aid of the vast
steamers at our command, in spite of the bad
weather that may now be expected, we can get any
quantity of men and material up to the war faster
than the drain we have reckoned on. If we do
this, we entertain no doubt of the result, for the
enemy are in want not only of men—coming up
very slowly, and brought into action before they
have recovered from the fatigue of a rapid march
—but even of food, and still more of ammunition.
They must bring everything overland, and when
we find the seven miles from Balaklava to the bat-
teries no small part of our labour, we may be sure
the Russians find it no easy work to transport
heavy material for several hundred miles. The
" fruitless sea," as Homer calls it, is not so barren
as land, when it comes to supply war. We may do
just what we please ; we might put every regiment
in the service on the shores of the Crimea by the
16th of next month, and every needful supply.
Wo might arrange with France for any portion of
her large army, and land it on Cape Cherson by
Christmas at the latest. We may, if we please.
It is, then, our pleasure to do so, short of this,
whatever is necessary to supply the constant drain?
That is what we have to ask ourselves, and what
everybody is mentally asking of the War Minister.
Is he meeting this drain ? Is he keeping the British
army at the very low standard which from the first
was thought only just sufficient for this enterprise?
Reinforcements have probably arrived by this
time, and more are on their way. The Sinai brings
news of about 5,000 new French troops that would
doubtless be in time for the battle on the 11th. We
are now sending out, they say near 7,006, and are
assisting the French with steamers and provisions for
the conveyance of their troops. They are at work, it
is said, night and day in the Tower, sending out
clothing and other material. But the question to
be kept steadily in view is simply this,—Are we
sending out supplies adequate to the drain that we
know to be going on ? If we are, nobody need be
under any apprehension that the Allies will at
least stand their ground in the very excellent posi-
tion they now occupy. If we are not,—if we are
allowing them to be drained at the rate of about
a thousand a day by a succession of costly victories
then we are throwing away all the unparalleled
,
exertions of this year, and no small part of the na-
tional prestige, for no purpose that we can divine,
unless it be to save a little labour in letter-writing
and accounts or the balance in the Exchequer.—
Times.

Count Ilenckel von Dannersmark, councillor to the
Prussian Legation at London, will return to his post.
He is said to be the bearer of despatches containing pro-
positions or communications from this Government to
Lord Clarendon.
It is rumoured that the Berlin police has succeeded in
discovering a breach of confidence on the part of an cm.
and M. de Norden•
ploy,' of the telegraphic-office, which has led to the ar-
rest of this person, and of another individual e
stock-broking speculations. ngagedin
of St. Stanislas,
I►l. de Pulk_amnser, chief president,
fly-eta, presidial councillor of the Grand Duchy of Posen,
the Live.
have received, the one the third cla,..s
and the other the second of St. Anne, fr,ra
rer of Russia.

MIXED MARRIAGES IN RIISSIA.—A. letter from Ber-
lin, the Constitutionnel, says " Among the mea-
sures destined to bring all nonconformists within the
pale of the Russo-Oriental Church may be mentioned a
recent ukase, in virtue of which any person, the issue of
a mixed marriage, is henceforth to be regarded as be-
longing to the Greek Church. The celebration of all
mixed marriages, in which one of the parties belongs to
the Greek Church, comes under the duties of the Rus-
sian clergy. All natural children, to whatever confes-
sion the mother may belong, as well as all foundlings,
must be inscribed in the communion of the Greek Church.
Every majorat in Poland, and in the provinces formerly
connected with that kingdom, cannot come into the
Possession of the lasvfnl heirs except they belong to the
Russo-Oriental Church. Of late years adhesion to that
church has been regarded as the sine qua non condition
of the creation of any majorat, and the Emperor only
made one exception to this fanatical rule in favour of
General Count Rudiger. At the time of the publication
of the ukase above alluded to, the general protested
against its consequences, and refused to see his children
members of the Greek Church. He at the same time
all his
offered to resign his majorat, and to
6:joy:,
offices. Thanks to this energetic rbesuotlbu
e has since con.
gained
his point for the moment ;. theu general
on front the Em.
sidered it prudent to obtain pernliiii
rem to sell hip estates