The Sun.
London, England, 1854-06-14 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, WEDNESDAY EVENING, JUNE 14, 1854,

third mode of bribery, the payment is contingent on the I
return of candidate A. The payment is therefore uncertain
and depends upon an uncertain event, over which the indi-
vidual elector can have no control, except in the rare case
of his vote being the casting vote of the election. Conse-
quently, corrupt electors must prefer the first to the third
mode of bribery; and it is evident, likewise, that a much
smaller sum of money, to be expended in the payment of
votes as soon as they are given, would be far more effica-
cious in determining the votes of electors than the promise
of a much larger sum of money to be paid only in the un-
certain event of A being returned Therefore the third kind
of bribery would be much more expensive than the first,
could only be practised by larger capitalists, and, conse-
quently, by fewer persons. It is supposed, however, that
bribery of the third kind would be much practised in the
secret voting. Ido not believe that it would be. But if
it were, my position is that with secret voting it would be
much less efficacious and much less difficult of detection
than the ordinary mode of bribery with open voting ; and
therefore that the ballot, by putting an end to every other
kind of bribery, would do much towards arresting the pro-
gress of corruption. To prove this position I must institute
a comparison between the two kinds of bribery to which I
have just referred—viz., between the ordinary mode of
bribery with open voting, in which the bribe is paid to the
elector who has promised to vote for candidate A as soon
as he has fulfilled his promise, and the supposed mode of
bribery under the ballot, in which the bribe would only be
paid to the elector who had promised to vote for candidate
A when A was returned. In the ordinary mode of bribery
with open voting, the corrupt bargain is clear, simple, and
direct. " Vote for A," says the briber to the corrupt elec-
tor, " and you shall have a 51. note ; vote for B, and you
shan't have a farthing from us." But in the supposed
mode of bribery under the ballot, the corrupt bargain
would be —" If A be returned you shall have a 5/. note,
whether you vote for or against him; and if B be returned
you shan't have a farthing whichever way you may vote."
Therefore, with open voting, the temptation to the elector
to vote for A is the certainty of obtaining a 5/. note ;
with secret voting, the temptation to the elector to vote
for A would depend upon the elector's opinion of the
effect of his vote on the probability of A being returned.
If the elector thought that the return of A would depend
upon the elector's own individual vote, then the temptation
to vote for A would be nearly the same as with open voting,
anti equal to the certainty of receiving a Si. note. But if
the elector thought that the success or failure of A. was in-
dependent of the elector's own individual vote, then he
would have little or no motive to vote against his convic-
tions for A, because by the hypothesis in the elector's opi-
nion the return of candidate A, and consequently the pe-
cuniary result to the elector, would be the same whichever
way he voted. Now, as it rarely happens, even with open
voting, that en elector thinks that the result of a contest
will depend upon his casting vote, I think that with secret
suffrage an elector acting singly and, alone would be little
influenced in his vote by the promise of a bribe to be paid
in the uncertain event of the bribing candidate being re-
turned. It is said, however, that with secret suffrage cor-
rupt electors would not act singly and alone, but in combi-
nation, and that collective bribery would be substituted for
individual bribery. For instance, it is said that a body of
electors, sufficient in number to decide a contest, would
combine together to be bribed ; that a bargain would be
made with then.) to the effect that each of them should re-
ceive a certain bribe—say 51.—in the event of candidate A
being returned; that each of them would perceive that if
they acted together and voted together candidate A would
ba returned, and they would be paid. Thence it is inferred
that they would act together and vote together, and that
their temptation to do so would be nearly equal to the cer-
tainty of obtaining a 5/. note a piece, or nearly equal to
what it is in the ordinary mode of bribery with open vot-
e ing. I will, for the sake of argument, assume the vali,lity
of these positions ; but I maintain that such collective
bribery would be very liable to detection, and much less
less likely to escape detection than the ordinary mode of
individual bribery with open voting. For how is bribery
generally practised with open voting ? The briber says to
the elector, " Vote for A and you shall receive five pounds."
Then when the day of election comes, the corrupt elector
goes to the poll, votes for candidate A, receives a ticket,
takes it to a stranger in a dark room in an out of the way
' street, and receives a five-pound note; there the transac-
tion ends. It needs only be known to the three persons
concerned in it, namely, the briber, the bribed, and the
stranger ; and if they keep their own counsel detection is
almost impossible. But with collective bribery and se-
cret voting, the promise of the bribe must be made, not
to individual electors separately, for I have shown that
an elector acting singly and alone would be little in-
fluenced by the promise of a bribe to be pai I in the un-
certain event of a bribing candidate being returned, bat
the promise must be made to the body of electors who are
assumed to be leagued together for bribery and combined
action. Each of them would therefore be aware that
many electors besides himself were to be paid in the event
of candidate A being returned. Now, it is evident that to
procure any effect by this mode of collective bribery with. I
the ballot, the promise of a bribe must be made to a con-
siderable body of electors—considerable, I mean, in pro-
portion to the numbers of a constituency. For with the
ballot it would be no use to promise a dozen or so of elec-
tors that they should be paid in the event of condidate A
being returned. At present, with open voting, even in a
considerable constituency, an election may be gained in a
close contest by the judicious purchase of a small number
of votes. But with the ballot nothing of the kind could be
done. With the ballot the only effective bribery must be
wholesale and collective. A moment's reflection must con-
vince any hon. gentleman that if with the ballot he wish
effectually to bribe a constituency, he must promise to pay
in the event of his return as many electors as, in addition
to those upon whose unbought promises he could confi-
dently rely, would constitute a majority of his constitu-
ency. For instance, suppose the constituency to be bribed
contained a thousand electors—suppose an hon. gentleman
could confidently rely upon the unbought promises of 300
—thirty per cent. (a large proportion in a corrupt consti-
tuency with the ballot)—then to secure his return the hon.
gentleman would have to promise tu.pay in the event of
his return a body of at least 201. eleators; in the same
manner in a constituency 10,000 electors, the hon. mem-
ber would have to promise to pay, in the event of' his
return. a body of at least 2,000 electors. Now a promise
made to so many electors, and known by each of them to
be made to so many, could not be kept secret from the rest
of the bribable class of the constituency ; and then not
only those who had voted for A, but those who had voted
for his antagonist, would demand payment in the event of
A being returned. Then in what a horrible dilemma an
hon. member would be placed who had obtained his return
in this manner. (Hear, and laughter.) I ask any hon.
gentleman who is conversant with this subject—(hear)—to
put himself in the position of such an hon. member; to
fancy that he had secured his return by a promise to pay a
large body of electors; that, having fulfilled his promise,
he received applications for payment from a large number
of other electors. What would you do? What would you
say ? You could not refuse payment to any elector on the
ground that he had not voted for you, because with secret
suffrage you could not tell how he had voted. (Hear.) If
you were to refuse on the ground that he was not one of
the body of electors whom you had promised to pay in the
event of your being returned, he would probably tell you
that it was strange that you had not promised him ; that he
was as ready to be bribed as any one ' • that he had voted
' for you • and as you were returned, that he had, as good a
right to be paid as his neighbours. If you still persevered
in your refusal, you would make an enemy who knew your
secret, who had perhaps voted for you, who would be re-
venged upon you, and who would do his best to have you
detected and convicted. On the other hand, if you paid
him out of fear, you would have to pay every one of the
bribable class of electors in the constituency ; therefore,
in some constituencies, you would have to pay all who had
voted for you and all who had voted against yon—(bear)—
you would be ruined in consequence of the numbers whom
you would have to pay, and in proportion to the numbers
whom you did pay would be the chance of your detection.
Therefore in all cases the chance of detection would be
much greater than at present—in many cases it would
amount to a certainty. Then you would be convicted, se-
verely punished, disqualified from sitting in Parliament ;
your constituency ought to be disfranchised, a new and
pure one substituted, and its purity would be preserved by
the ballot. For one of the most beneficial consequences
which I should expect from the ballot would be the preser-
vation of the purity of constituencies that with open voting
are in perpetual danger of being corrupted. I firmly be-
lieve that if the ballot had formed part of the Reform Bill
—if it had then been adopted by Lord Grey's Government
—many constituencies which have since been a disgrace to
our representative system would have remained pure. For
I have shown that the ballot would have put an end to
every kind of bribery except wholesale and collective bri- ,
bery. Now, wholesale and collective bribery cannot be
introduced at once into a pure constituency. The adage,
"Memo repents fit turpis.simus" is as true of constituen-
cies as of individuals. The history of corrupt constituen-
cies shows that bribery has been gradually introduced into
them. I think such gradual introduction of bribery would
be impossible with secret suffrage. I will state my reasons
for this opinion. If the history of those constituencies
which have been corrupted since the passing of the Reform
Bill be examined, the origin of the corruption may be
traced either to a closely-contested election or to the bri-
bery of unsuccessful candidates. In the case of a closely-
contested election the contest was generally decided to-
wards the close of the poll by the votes of a few electors
who were bribed. In such a case parties were nearly equal
and animated by strong party feelings. When the day of
election came the race between candidate A and candidate
B was neck and neck—alternately the one, alternately the
other leading. Towards the end of the day nearly one-
half of the electors had voted from party feelings for
A, and the other half from similar feelings for B. The
constituency was nearly polled out, only a dozen or so
electors remained unpolled—a number sufficient, however,
to decide the election ; they were the scum of the consti-
tuency; open voting made them the arbiters of the con-
test, and empowered them to determine who should be the
representative of the constituency; they were indifferent
to the merits of A or B; they might, perhaps, have been
influenced by threats, but they were most easily acted
upon by hopes of immediate gain. In the excitement of
the contest such hopes were held out to them by some
friend, or agent, or partisan of A. A was returned, and
bribery was introduced into the constituency. Bribery
'once introduced, A's party could never be confident of see.
cess without bribing those whom they had briber! before,
and B's party could never hope to defeat A. ee'ethout also
having recourse to corruption. A corrupt struggle then
commenced ; each party strove to corrupt the electors of
the opposite party, and with each suexessive contest the
number of bribed electors increased. Both parties, being
equally guilty of corruption, ecneally abstained from at-
tempting to punish each other. -Sow it is evident that in
the first instance the motive 'which induced A's party to
bribe war, founded upon an exact knowledge of the state of
the poll, and that tb.e few votes of the unpolled electors
would decide the contest. With the ballot such knowledge
woul't not have been possessed, the motive to bribe would
not have existed, bribery would not then have been intro-
duced, and protected by the ballot the constituency might
have remained pure. With regard to the corruption of
'constituencies by the bribery of unsuccessful candidates.
In this manner many constieuenciee have been gradually
corrupted since the passiog of the Reform Bill. At first
these constituencies were very pure - they prided them-
selves upon returning their members free of expense. This
then one
conduct, however, was distasteful to some persons, we
had knowledge or experience of the profits of a cor",esrecei
otrhee money ur lie
than
election. They determined to get up a contese,
of their number —seenereely a low attorneee---vvent to Lon-
etep;erhsoenhwauilithtema
some richparvenu who aspired to the
principle,
ienn
etclubsiop
l e,tfi searchrlelqhfroe,
er
position of a I aeraber of parliament. This person—whom I
will call the bribing candidate—was informed that there
was an opening in such and such a borough for a candidate
of opposite opinions to the sitting member; he was invited
to hold teaose opinions and to stand, and he.evas told that
he might. be returned for a few hundreds: The invitation
was accepted; a contest ensued on the first •
opportunity;
during the contest large sums of money found their
ay from the pockets of the bribing candidate
leteeeth enysteriops channels into the pockets of
•°f• ' tee!) eelectors who elemanifested th some
.of . . . eir approba•
,nl3. political opinions. In the first emitest' he
was` defeated,
for the great majority of the oleo-
nf oat? eLeya,d° iodma

tors were pure ; and being defeated, his corrupt practices,
though known, were not punished. Thus the seeds of cor-
ruption were sown in the pure constituency ; they ger-
minated repidly, and produced, fruit. Those who had once
tasted the fruit of corruption longed to taste it again ; they
communicated their longing to their neighbours. In a
second contest the number of electors willing to be bribed
increased, and the bribing candidate was defeated by a
smaller majority. So it went on • in each successive con-
test more electors were bribed, and the bribing candidate
was defeated by narrower and narrower majorities ; finally
he obtained a majority, or the opposite party commenced
bribing in self-defence; in either case the constituency be-
came thoroughly corrupt. It is evident that this process
of seduction and corruption could not have gone on with
secret suffrage; for I have shown that the ballot would
put an end to every kind of bribery except that on which
the payment of the bribe would be contingent on the suc-
cess of the bribing candidate, and consequently it would
put an end to all bribery by unsuccessful candidates. I
have shown that the ballot would put an end to every kind
of bribery except that in which the payment of the bribe
would be contingent upon the return of the bribing candi-
date; that such bribery, to be effective, must be wholesale
and collective ' • that wholesale and collective bribery would
be very liable to detection, and far less difficult of detection
than the ordinary mode of bribery with open voting.
Thence I infer that by the aid of the ballot the penal enact-
ments against bribery which, in consequence of the diffi-
culty of detecting bribery, have hitherto proved ineffica-
cious, would become effective in arresting the progress of
bribery—a progress which all friends of constitutional
liberty must deplore, as it casts discredit upon this house,
and saps the foun lations of our representative institutions.
As I have confined my observations chiefly to the question
of the efficacy of the ballot in arresting the progress of bri-
bery, I will only notice one objection to the ballot. It is
sometimes said that in secret electors would vote contrary
to their known opinions from corrupt motives, who would
be deterred from openly doing so by the public opinion
against bribery, and thus that the influence of public
opinion against bribery would be weakened. It would
be easy to show that there is no validity in this objec-
tion to the ballot. But, omitting other answers to it,
I will content myself with expressing a strong doubt
whether the public opinion that influences the actions
of the bribable class of electors is hostile to bribery,
or ever will be hostile to bribery, as long as intimida-
tion is practised by the upper class of electors. The
public opinion that determines the actions of particular
men is not the opinion of the whole community, nor of the
majority of the community, nor of the respectable, nor of
the intelligent portion of the community but of the cl'rss
or section to whom the men belong Now, the class to
whom the takers of money-bribes belong, especially in cor
rupt constituencies, do not look upon the taking of a bribe
as a blameable or discreditable act. If you converse on
this subject with an intelligent man of this class, he will
justify his co. duct by specious arguments difficult to refute.
He will cite the example of his betters—of his superiors in
station or in rank. He will say to you, " Why should I,
who am a poor roan, refuse to make a few pounds by my
vote, for the benefit of myself, my wife, and my children ?
In taking a bribe, is my conduct more corrupt than that
of the shopkeeper, who votes against his conscience to se-
cure the custom of his customers, or that of the tenant,
who sees in his vote the means of currying favour with his
landlord, and procuring an abatement of his rent? It is
true that I desire to be rewarded for my poLtical conduct ;
but so do many others, my superiors in station, wealth,
and education ; but so does the squire, who influences
half a dozen electors; so does the large landowner, whose
fifty pounders are counted by the score ; so does the mill-
owner, who can put the screw on a hundred ten pounders ;
so does the great territorial magnate, who intimidates a
whole county. If .I desire money in return for my vote,
they expect money's worth in return for their influence.
The squireen asks for his dependents potty places in the
Customs or Excise; the large landowner wants for his
younger sons a clerkship in the Treasury or an attache-
ship to an embassy; the rich millowner aspires to gain a
social position to be called Sir John This or Sir Thomas
That ; the groat territorial magnate desires a peerage, or a
step in the peerage—the lord-lieutenancy of his county, a
ribbon, or a garter ; and if the expectation of any of these
worthies is disappointed, marvellous is the change that
sometimes comes over Cis political convictions at the next
general election." (Cheers.) It is very diffieult to persuade
the bribable class of electors of the fallacy of these argu-
ments ; in their eyes, intimidation is a graver offence than
bribery ; for, say they, the magnitude of an offence is in
proportion to the evil that it does to society, and the pain
that it inflicts upon individuals. The evil to society from
an elector voting against his convictions is the same,
whether he does so for the sake of gaining a 5/. note or
from the fear of losing one—whether he is seduced by a
bribe or intimidated by a threat; but to the individual
elector the difference between seduction and intimidation
is very great—all the difference between pleasure and pain.
An elector seduced by a bribe feels that he is a free man, for
he does what he likes; an elector who is intimidated by a
threat feels he is a slave, for heacts under compulsion. There-
fore, I repeat, in the eyes of certain classes, intimidation is
a far graver offence than bribery. They ask, " Why should
one class bre permitteslto reap the mite of intimidation, and
another class be forbidden to enjoy the sweets of bribery ?
When you attempt to put a stop to the one, you ought
simultaneously to endeavour to put and end to the other."
For these reasons lam convinced that you can never pro-
duce a general feeling hostile to bribery until you have put
an end to intimidatiouby the upper class s. L will not tres-
pass on the house by attempsing to show that it would be
absurd and ridiculous to try to p'it down intimidation by
means of penal enactments. Yo cannot so define intimi-
dation as to constituteita punishable offence. Intimidation
li of the most potent kind may be conveyed by a nod, a wink,
a gesture, a seemingly casual expression of opinion, nay,
even by an invitation to a breakfast or 'a dinner. I have
heard of a numerous tenantry intimidated by an invitation
to a breakfast. The breakfast was on the polling-day.
Those who partook of it, as a matter of course, accompanied
their landlord to the poll, and what tenant dared to refuse
the invitation ? It is said that intimidation has decreased
of late years. I find, however, much difference of opinion
on this subiect, A:Me-opinion being held by the intimidating,
the opposite hje4hti intimidated elaseers. If you talk to one
of the intimidating daises, to a landlord onto a millowner,
he will tell you that he never intimidates his tenants, his
workmen, or his artisans, and that the ballot is not wanted.
But if you talk to one of the intimidated classes, you will
hear a different story. The shopkeeper, the tenant-farmer,
the workman, and the artisan will tell you, " We know too
well the opinions of our customers, of our landlords, of our
employers, to dare to vote against them, though they have
not positively threatened to punish us if we were to do so.
Yet we are afraid to vote according to our consciences, in
opposition to their wishes, without the protection of the
ballot." From these conflicting opinions I arrive at the
conclusion that the grosser and more outrageous forms of
intimidation have become less common, and in fact theyare
condemned by public opinion, but that the milder and more"
decent, and not less effective forms are practised to a great
extent ; and I doubt very much whether the real influence
of intimidation on the vote of electors has much dimi-
nished. It is notorious that if in an agricultural district
you know the opinions of the chief landowners if in ama
nufacturing district you know the opinions of the chief
millowners, you can tell very nearly what candidate ,gill
have the majority of votes in the district. I was much
struck at the last general election by an instance of thisde-
scription with regard to the county which I inhabit—l
mean East Cornwall. I was told just before the election
that the Free-trade candidate had a bad chance, that all the
farmers were Protectionists, and that my tenants would vote
against me to a man. I replied: that I had no doubt they
were Protectionists, but how did their landlords intend to
vote? and I asked the intentions of So-and-So, mentioning
half a dozen of the chief landed proprietors of the division.
I was told they were with us. Then said I, "Never mind
the opinions of the farmers; we shall have a large majo-
rity," and so we had. (Hear.) But what amused me most
was to find that my tenantry, with one or two exceptions,
plumped for the free trade candidate. (Hoar, and cheers.)
Now I did not use any intimidation. My tenants were only
aware of the fact, which every one knew, that I had always
been a most determined free trailer, and was a most zealous
supporter of the free trade candidate. The result of that
election showed that without the ballot the hon. gentle-
man opposite (Mr. Kendall) would not have the slightest
chance of being returned again for East Cornwall, if he be
opposed. (Hear, and laughter) It appears to me that
there are only three conceivable modes of preventing inti-
midation. Take, for instance, the case of a customer and a
shopkeeper. To prevent a customer from intimidating a
shopkeeper you must either conceal from the shopkeeper
the opinions of his customer, or you must forbid the cus-
tomer from ceasing to deal with the shopkeeper in conse-
quence of his voting against the opinions of the customer;
or you must conceal from the customer the vote of the
shopkeeper. You cAnnot conceal from the shopkeeper the
opinions of Ms customer, unless you prohibit the customer
from ever expressing his opinions—an inconceivable prohi-
bition. Secondly, you could not prevent a customer from
ceasing to deal with a shopkeeper in consequence of hi s
voting against his customer's opinions, unless you were to
pass an enactment forbidding any customer from ever ceas-
ing to deal with any shopkeeper who had ever voted against
his easterner's opinions—an impossible enactment. There-
fore, there remains only the alternative of concealing from
the customer the vote of the shopkeeper, and that alterna-
tive is the ballot. Similar.y in the cases of a millowner
and his workmen, of a landlord and his tenant. If you
wish to prevent a landlord from intimidating his tenant,
you must either conceal from the tenant the opinions of
his landlord, which would be impossible, or you must pre-
vent a landlord from ejecting any tenant who had ever
voted against his landlord, in which case the tenant who
had voted against his landlord would have a perpetual
holding; or you must conceal the vote of the tenant from
the landlord by means of the ballot. Therefore, it appears
to me that any serious attempt to put down intimidation
by means of penal enactments would give birth to laws of
such intolerable vexation and severity, that all the intimi-
dating classes would cry aloud for the protection of the bal.
tot. But even if by means of penal enactments an end could
be put to intimidation by the upper classes, suchenactments
would not put down intimidation by the lower classes. To
protect the elector from the violence and the intimidation
of the mob you must conceal his vote from the mob.
It is said that there is one kind of intimidation which the
ballot could not put an end to ; that, for instance, a landlord
who suspected that with secret suffrage his tenants would
vote against his wishes would prevent them from going to
the poll ; that this kind of intimidation would be much
practised in Ireland, where, in consequence of the wide dif-
ference between parties, it is more easy to foresee how elec-
tors would vote than in this country ; that, for instance,
Protestant landlords would sometimes compel all their
Roman Catholic tenants to abstain from voting. Ido not
deny that acts of gross and outrageous intimidation of this
description might be practised under the ballot ; but, in
consequence of their very grossness, they would be rare.
They would only be
...e
practised by the most unscrupulous
intimidators ; and, as I have already observed, pulein.
nion condemns the grosser forms of intinijlee::on
likewise observe that a landlord who .
~,. should
would prevent his tenants from s" ....a *egret eoffreee
voting, compel them to ss- .erense vethild) WWI open
Now, it is a greater ee •eer• Ikg&ttllki their ooneeceneee.
pain to an elect- eill to the conttnunityi And a ireAtet
victims, te• ese to be compelled to dote Whist hi eon-
gethee ean to be compelled to abstain from voting alto-
+ Therefore, even if the ballot were not to pat 4. stop
as this kind of intimidation, it would fetbetittite a lesser
evil for a greater one, and that would be a gain to the
I community, Moreover, for a landlord to forbid hie tee
nantry to vote, would, as I have already Nei& lie Au net
of gross intimidation of so outrageous a character, that if
any act of intimidation could or ought to be punished, that
act could and ought. But I should doubt the eepetliency
of making it a punishable offence. I should leave it to be
put down by the force of public opinion, which, under the
ballot, would become very strong against acts of gross and
flagrant intimidation. For the ballot, by putting an end to
all the ordinary and mild modes of intimidation, would
much diminish the number of persons who could or would
intimidate. But only a few persons would possess the means
of intimidating and be unscrupulous enough to use slam
and only those few would approve of the employment' of
such means in the outrageous manner in question'-and the •'
conduct of those who did-employ ea Ch means weelrl
with the condemnation of all the rest of the community both
of the intimidated classes and of those who, in
conseq;a of the ballot, had ceased to belong to the intimilat'

classes, and who would, therefore, be loudest in the con-
demnation of the exercise of a power of which they had
been deprived. It appears to me, therefore, that the bal-
lot, by diminishing the number of persons who could
bribe or intimidate, would tend to create a strong public
opinion both against bribery and intimidation. For the
position of Hudibras, that men
" Compound for sins they aro inclined to
By damning those they have no mind to,"
is equally true of sins which men have no power to com-
mit. I have now stated my reasons for thinking that the
ballot will put an end to every kind of bribery except gross,
outrageous, and wholesale bribery, which might easily be
detected and punished ; and also that it would put an end
to every kind of intimidation except gross, outrageous, and
wholesale intimidation which public opinion would severely
condemn. I will refer briefly to one of the arguments of
my noble friend the Home Secretary. (Ironical cheers.)
He said the elective franchise is a trust (it is a very com-
mon objection to the ballot), that the elective franchise is
a trust confided to an elector for the public benefit—the
trust being to choose a representative. It is said that the
elector is responsible for the exercise of his tr -st, and
therefore that he ought to vote openly, in order that the
public may judge of and pronounce a judgment upon his
choice of a representative. Why so ? To affirm that an
elector ought to vote openly, in order that the public may
pronounce a judgment upon a choice of a representative
means, if it means anything, that the elector ought to be
influenced in his choice of a representative by the opinion
of the public. (Hear, hear, from the Opposition.) But
for what reason ought an elector to be so influenced? The
only reason that can be assigned must be that the public
aro better judges of who ought to be chosen than the elec-
tor is. But if the public are better judges of, they are
fftter to choose, a representative ; and if they are fit
to choose, they ought to choose, and therefore they ought
to have votes. (Loud cheers.) But who are the public
whom you consider fit to choose a representative ? The
whole community, or a portion of the community? If the
whole community are fit to choose a representative, then
they ought to have votes, and the suffrage should be uni-
versal, for to vote for a candidate is so simple an act that
there is no reason why it should be done by a delegate or
representative. If, on the other hand, you consider that
only a portion of the community are fit to choose a repre-
sentative, then you affirm that the other portion are unfit
to choose. It is evident that only those who are fit to
choose ought to have the franchise, and they ought to be
able to choose freely ; therefore they ought to be protected
in their choice of a representative from the influence of
those who are unfit to choose, and the only means by which
they can be so protected is the ballot. (Cheers.) There-
fore the arguments upon which the doctrin - of the respon-
sibility of the elector is based may lead to an extension of
the suffrage or to universal suffrage, but they are not in-
consistent with-secret suffrage; on the contrary, they show
the use of the ballot in protecting those who are unfit to
choose one. (Hear; hear, and cheers.) My noble friend
used another argument which I have often heard pro-
duced before, which I shall hardly trespass on your time by
noticing. (Ironical Opposition cheers.) He says, if the
elector has the ballot you ought to vote by ballot in this
house. 'cannot discover any analogy whatever between the
two cases. (Cheers.) An elector selects as his representa-
tive the man whom, on account of his political opinions,
he considers most fit to sit in this house. Therefore he
has a right to know whether by his votes his represen-
tative justifies that opinion, and if the representative
changes his opinions on any important question, it is his
duty to resign his seat. (Hear.) The elector has a right
to know whether his representative has fulfilled his pro-
mises, end whether he is acting on the principles on which
he was returned ; but the elector has promised nobody, it
being his duty to choose, without fear of punishment or
hope of reward, a representative of his opinions iu this
house. (Cheers.) The last argument of my noble friend to
which I shall refer is one which has been often used. The
ballot has often been denounced as a democratic measure.
Now the term " democracy " has two siguifications—one
good, and the other bad. In the good sense of the word
democracy simply means popular government ; and in
this sense of the word I admit that the ballot will be a
most democratic measure, for I believe that it would con-
duce more to good popular government than any other insti-
tutional change—then any reform bill that can be devised.
(Cheers.) On the other hand, democracy in its bad sense
means the government of an ignorant and violent mob.
But in this case I maintain that the ballot would be a most
anti-democratic measure because it would protect the
elector in the exercise of his franchise from every kind of
intimidation, and especially from the intimidation of the
ignorant and violent mob. (Cheers.) In fact, if the term
conservative be used as the opposite of democratic in its
bad sense, the ballot would be a most conservative mea-
sure, for it would enable an elector to preserve his prin-
ciples whilst giving his vote. (Hear, hear, and cheers.)
In conclusion, I must say that my firm conviction, founded
upon the fact that your penal enactments against bribery,
though repeatedly amended, have always failed, is that
youyo u may
np
ea
vt chand e r
arrest
mendth those
progress
corruption
to all
eternity,
t runt i
an
end to intimidation till you try the experiment of the bal-
lot; and if, contrary to my expectations and convictions,
that experiment should fail, you will not be worse
off than at present, but you would have the satisfaction of
;mowing that you had tone your best to cure great and
crying evils, which, be assured, cast deep discredit on this
house, and tend to sap the foundation of your representa-
tivesystem.anTd prolonged
herighthaopnpn
hon.
labasre.onet resumed his seat
amidst loud
Mr. I. BUTT condemned the ballot, as inadequate to
the repression of bribery or intimidation, as un-Bnglish,
and as deteriorating tothe national character.
Mr. P (JINN, amid continual interruption, took the con-
trary view from that of the last speaker, and declared that
the ballot must eventually be carried.
Mr. KENDALL, in answer to some remarks of Sir W.
Molesworth, instanced his own election success on Protec-
tionist principles, and in opposition to free-trade landlords,
as evidence of the uselessness of the ballot. _ _ _

Mr. BERKELEY made a few observations in reply, but
said that an answer from him was almost unnecessary, the
subject having become a Cabinet question.
Mr. MA.GUIRE, as a Roman Catholic, urged that the
ballot, by protecting the humble Irish voter, would pre-
vent the interference of the priests; by rendering their as-
sistance wank-big:oT. -
The house divided, after about five hours and a-half of
debate, and the numbers were—
For Mr. Berkeley's motion
Against it
ALijority against 37
IRISH CHURCH TEMPORA.LITIES.

Mr. Sergeant. SEIEE moved for leave to bring in a bill
to alter and amend Oa laws relating to the temporalities of
the Church in Ireland, and to increase the means of reli-
gious instruction and church accommodation for her Ma-
jesty's Irish subjects. He declared himself bound over in
recognisances nut to do anything det►imental to the Pro-
testant Church, and said that he cheerfully accepted that
restriction. He entered at excessive length into a discus-
sion of the question, his speech being interrupted by an
unsuccessful attempt at a count out. He proposed, by
various reductions of episcopal and other revenues, by
grouping benefices, and other economical arrangements.
to obtain an income with which he desired to improve the
condition of the Presbyterian and Roman Catholic clergy,
and he urged that he did not intend to injure the Estab-
lished Church, but to allay the differences and heart-
burnings which its existence in its present form occasioned.
Mr. P. URQUHART seconded the motion.
Mr. BROTHERTON moved the adjournment of the
debate.

Mr. NAPIER begged that before the debate was re-
sumed members would read the answer made by the Arch-
deacon of Meath to all Sergeant Shee's statements. He
considered the proposition unconstitutional, and contrary
to the oath taken by the learned sergeant.
Sir J. YOUNG announced that ou the resumption of
the debate he should meet the proposal with a decided
negative.

NEWDEGATE charged Sergeant Shee with tak-
ing a course incompatible with the oath he had taken.
The late hour alone prevented a complete answer to his
speech.

Mr. J. FITZGERALD protested against Mr. Newde-
gate's interpretation of the Ronian Catholic oath, and also
charged the " whips" with having tried to empty the
house.

Mr. LUCAS said that his complaint was, that Sergeant
Shee's proposal did not deal in a sufficiently sweeping
manner with the Irish Church, which had been endured
too long. He refused to accept the interpretation of the
Roman Catholic oath.

Sergeant SURE denied that the book to which Mr.
Napier had referred contradicted his statements. He
warmly protested against being charged with perjury, and
requested Mr. Napier to be civil.
Mr. WHITESIDE begged to say that when the learned
sergeant brought forward a motion he must expect to hear
it criticised, and argument met by argument. (Heir.)
With regard to the book which hail been referred to by
his right hon. friend being a refutation of what had fallen
from the learned sergeant. he could only say that no man
who had written a book was willing to allow that the facts
contained in it had been refuted.

The debate was adjourned to Monday next.
On the motion of Mr, BROTHEBTON, the house then ad-
journed at 25 minutes past 12 o'clock.

SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE.

NOTICES.
RUSSIAN FLEET IN THE EASTERN SEAS.
(Extract of a letter dated Calcutta, April 28, 1854.)
"We beg to bring to the notice of the committee for
managing the affairs of Lloyd's, the unprotected state of
the eastern trade, The British vessels of war in these seas
aro few, and of small size. By tht last steamer from.
Singapore we leave intelligence of a Russian squadron of
considerable force being in the neighbourhood of that port,
awaiting, it is supposed, intelligence from Europe of a de-
claration of war,

"JAMES COWELL and CO.,
" Agents for Lloyd's, and the Liverpool
" Captain G. A. Hal Association of UnderwritArs.
sted, R.N. Secretary Lloyd's."

---
LIVERPOOL, June 13.—The schooner Albion, hence to
Banff, in beating out yesterday through Channel, missed
stays in a squall, and ran upon Great Burbo. She came
off on the flood, and shortly after sank in the fair way.—
The Wildfire, from Quebec, at this port, passed large quail*
ties of ioe from the 16th to the 23d ult.
STORNOWAY. June 7.—The Swallow, from Shields, for
Cape Breton, is at anchor in the Sound of the Island of
Taransay (west coast of Harris), having sprung a leak in
the Atlantic, on the 234 of May. bq wilt kW tg •
dergo repairs,
- - •

•
--..)bIARTY, June 10.—The William and Jane, of this
port, went ashore about a mile beyond the North Suton,
on the Bth of June, but was waisted off on the flood, with-
out damage.
CARTHAGENA, June 4.—The Nairns, of Shields, has put
back to this port, with considerable damage, having been
hi contact with a foreign barque (name on. quarter-deck
" Venus"), on the Ist of June, iktotril bearing S.W. by
S., distant 25 rnilen,
TIIRSQUELLINQ, June 6.—The Fortuna, from Hartlepool
for Oberndorf, i 4 139 W PA shore here; crew saved. The
cargo (coals) will be lost
PiMmtai
..5147 2.—The,Helvellyn, sailed hence for Lon-
don on the 26tie Of April; has put back on the 28th, leaky.
ADELAIDR, March 10.—The schooner Thistle, at anchor
on the night of the 26th of February, was caught by a
heavy squall, capsized, and went down in thfee fathoms of
water ; crew and passengers supposed to be save,
, from Havre
PARIS, June 12.—The Canteleu (lighter )d
to Rouen, with sugar, cotton. and citrons, struck upon a
stake at the Grand Quai at Havre, and sprung a leak ; she
discharged cargo, part of which was much damaged, and
has been laid on the Gridiron to repair.
Nxw Mzy 3L--T te Thomas Wright, from Ma-
tanzas for London, with sugar, sprung a leak when four
' days out, ii;ntl„ in making f,or Savannah, struck on a glom'
libeut 12 milep,offOsiairtw Georg,in.. on tilt! 25t1 f
Iptving it4ont,- teo,t WILI•tr- h.. 401,1, i
nlQ,lnetl; the ship anal 9ige were expected to become a
total wreck. '
Aeggt 54.qhip Z•Teleue,
.from Ptlelbourne ;-Mt%rch 15,
•