The Sun.
London, England, 1853-11-12 00:00:00

THE OVERLAND :‘ lAr =L.

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We (Times) have received our accounts, dated
Bombay, the 14th October ; Calcutta, the 4th
October ; Burmah, the 19th September ; and
'Hong Kong, the 27th September. The following is
the letter of our Bombay correspondent
" BOMBAY, OCT. 14.
"Our troops in Burmah are in a state of siege,
and, with the single exception of Bassein, the
whole of our new provinces are in possession of the
enemy, for it has become absurd to call the fol-
lowers of Mea-Toon and Moung-Young by any
other name. The province of Bassein alone is in
peace and flourishing—the inhabitants have an
unbounded confidence in their Commissioner,
Captain Fytch, and he has taught the 'rebels that
it is dangerous to meddle with his districts.
The hostile Burmese have two principal chiefs :
the first is the famous Mea-Toon, who is said to be
in the immediate command of between 4,000 and
5,000 men ; the second, Moung Young-gye, or
Moung Roung-gee, is reported, by the Rangoon
Chronicle, to have 6,500 followers under him ; and
these two chiefs are said to be with these 11,000
followers within four days' march of Rangoon,
whilst toidefend that extensive position webave only.
800 fighting men available. The number of fol-
lowers the chiefs have actually with them is pro •
bably much exaggerated, but our position in the
country is unquestionably very critical, and it
would be impossible to exaggerate the misery to
which the inhabitants of Pegu have been reduced
mince they became British subjects, and thereby
entitled by the law of nations to British protection.
The blundering conduct of the Burmese business
has been a deep blot on Lord Dalhousie's otherwise
well-earned character for administrative ability. We
cannot afford to give up Pegu, for such a step would
be as fatal to our prestige in Asia as the first aban-
donment of her more distant provinces was to the
Roman Empire. The subversion of what is left of
the Burmese Empire certainly appears to be the
only course compatible with the protection of
British subjects in Pegu ; but it does not follow
that it is necessary to annex the whole country to
British India (the course advocated -by the Friend
of India.) It would be a much better plan- to
divide it between our allies, the Rajah of Muni-
pore and the King of Siam.
Mr. Thomason, Lieutenant. Governor of the
north-west provinces, died at Bareilly, on the
27th of September. He was appointed to the
Government of the Agra Presidency by Lord
Ellenborough, and the selection was the hap-
piest which Lord Ellenborough ever made, re-
markable as he was above all other Governors-
General for selecting the best men for every
vacancy, disregarding all rules of seniority
and precedent. Mr. Thomason did for the north-
west provinces almost as much as Peter the Great
did for Russia ; he made it to be known as " the
model Presidency." In the extension to the masses
of the benefit of vernacular education, in the es-
tablishment of engineering and other colleges for
affording a professional education to natives of the
middle and higher classes, in the acceleration of
mails and the construction of works of public utility,
on a scale commensurate to the wants of the coun-
try.

The assassination of Colonel Mackeson is supposed
on the spot to have been the result of some exten-
sively organised conspiracy rather than the spon-
taneous act of an individual fanatic, and a reward
of 5,000 rupees has been offered for the discovery
of any of the assassin accomplices. It has been
surmised that the deed was instigated by Dost Ma-
homed, but such an act would be quite opposed to
the character (a very high one for an Oriental)
that Dost Mahoraed has always borne.

The reports of an alliance between Russia and
Persia, and between Russia and Dost Mahomed,
which I mentioned in my last, have increased in
frequency and consistency, and as they have been
received through three different and independent
channels, namely,—by sea to Bombay, through the
Persian Gulf ; by way of Scinde, through the Bolau
Pass ; and by Peshawur, through the Khyber, they
have probably some foundation ; in fact, letters
have arrived from Persia by way of the Gulf,
stating that the King of Persia is about to proceed
from Teheran to the valley of Sultanieh, where a
large army is already assembled, which force is in-
tended to operate against the Turks.
" What makes this news. more significant is, that
there is in the treaty beween Russia and Persia, made
in the year 182 S, a special clause, which forbids the
Persian Government from assembling any force in the
valley of Sultanieh, without the permission of Russia
being first obtained. The reason of this is the proxi-
mity of the valley to the Russian frontier. It may
therefore be reasonably inferred that this assemblage of
Persian troops is with the full consent of Russia, which
no doubt expects to find Persia a valuable auxiliary in
the event of a war."
Both by the Bolam and Khyber passes reports
have been received of the conclusion of an alli-
ance between Dost Mahomed and Russia. The
Bost and his subjects are firmly persuaded " that
our occupation of Peshawur is with no other view

than that of getting conveniently located, to seize
his kingdom on the first favourable opportunity."
Since our first visit to this capital we have " eaten
up" the Punjaub, and our frontier, our magazines,
and the bulk of our armies are now only a quarter of
the distance from Cabul that they were when Lord
Broughton first decided on the invasion of Affghan-
istan. Under such circumstances it is only natural
that an Oriental should conclude that the only
chance which Cabul has of independence is in a
close alliance with Russia. In forming such an al-
liance Russia may have other immediate objects
besides the annoyance it would cause to the Govern-
ment of British India. Some five or six mails ago
I forwarded an extract from the Benares Recorder,
in which the editor of that paper stated that he
had seen a copy of a letter from a Russian officer,
on the Caspian, stating that a force was being or-
ganised for the invasion of Khiva and Bokhara on
a grand scale, and reports have been lately received
from Cabul to the effect that a Russian force had
actually advanced into the heart of the Khan of
Khiva's country.
The following is from the Delhi Gazette :
" Letters from Cabul, received this morning, mention
a report that a Russian army having advanced within
ten marches of Oorgune, the commercial capital of
Khiva, the Khan of Khiva and the King of Bokhara had
taken the field with their respective forces, to resist the
enemy, and were at the date of our advices two marches
this side of Oorgunge. The avowed object of the Rus-
sians is said to be the conquest of the country. So that
the Khan of Khiva has reason to be alarmed, while the
King of Bokhara well knows that the Russians have an
old score to settle with him who has held so many
thousands of the Czar's subjects in bondage. It is thus
easy to understand why the Czar should have effected
the alleged alliance with Dost Mahomed, whose neu-
trality alone in such a quarrel would be worth securing
at almost any cost."

It will be remembered, that about two years ago
Dost Mahomed invaded and annexed the portion
of independent Tartary, round Balkh, lying on the
other side of the Hindoo Koosh, immediately north
of Cabul, and which was tributary to the Khan of
Bokhara, and that he has maintained his conquests,
though not without difficulty, ever since. He is,
therefore, in a position to assist very materially
any views which Russia may have on Bokhara.

The report that Russian emissaries had appeared
at Kohat, together with the assassination of Col.
Mackeson, and a false alarm of a combinad Aff-
ghan attack on Peshawur, and the forced march
of additional troops towards that part, had
occasioned a great deal of excitement on the
frontier, and not a little Russophobia. It is
stated that the presence of the Governor-General
on the frontier has become a State necessity, and
that he has consequently postponed his trip to
Burmah. The presence of Russian emissaries in
Affghanistan is nothing new, for it is well known
in India that a Russian officer of rank was living
disguised at Cabul throughout our campaign in
Affghanistan. No sensible person can consider a
Russian invasion of British India practicable until
either Persia or Independent Tartary have become
Russian provinces, and long before that can take
place it is holped that the construction of lines of
railway communication from all the presidencies to
the frontier, will enable us to concentrate our
military resources on the assailable points to an
extent which would crush at once any force that
an invader could drag through the difficult and
rocky deserts of Affghanistan and the Hindoo-
koosh, but the hostile incursions of the frontier
tribes already causes us great annoyance, and it is
considered that this annoyance would assume a
much more formidable shape if prompted by Rus-
sian money and directed by Russian officers.
It is certain that in the event of a war, Russia
would not neglect so facile a means of annoyance.
Yet the result of such interference might be con-
ducive to our prestige ; for if the Affghans could
once be persuaded to show in force on the plains
away from their hills, they would receive a lesson
that would last them for a dozen years at least.
The report that Pekin has fallen still prevails at
Shanghai, but it has not yet been confirmed. The
numbers of the Pekin Gazette last received, state
the rebels appeared at K.oe-fang, the capital of the
province of Honan, on the 19th of June, and that
between that date and the 31st of July, a good deal
of indecisive fighting had taken place along the
northern bank of the Yellow River ; this is, how-
ever, only the Imperialist version of affairs, for
general report, supposed to be authentic, puts
the rebels in possession of Keang-ping and other
towns, more. than 100 miles to the north of the
Yellow River, and very circumstantial reports are
current in Shanghai of the investment of Pekin by
the insurgent general, Taiping-vong ; on the other
hand it is reported that the Emperor has, as a last