The Sun.
London, England, 1854-06-14 00:00:00

(Hear,) He knew that his hon. friend below him (Sir J.
Shelley) not long since got into sad disgrace for using the
word " sham." Awed by that example, ho (Lord D.
Stuart) would be more cautious—(laughter)—but he yet
would venture to say that he could not understand how
any Government, earnest in the cause of reform, could say
one word against the ballot. (Hear, hear.) Since the
motion was last discussed in the house he had taken the
opportunity of speaking to several Americans upon the
isubject, and amongst others, to the late American Minister
at this CoUrtea most distinguished and able man. (Hear.)
The replyeof. the American Minister to his inquiries was
this, that although there might be different grades of opi-
,Mionin, the United States on the subject of the ballot, yet
lye believed that if it were proposed to abolish it, every
eeettuericaa would refuse to be a party to such a measure.
.(Hear.) He thought as all former means of staying cor-
ruption and intimidation had failed, it was only just to
the country and to the house to give the ballot a trial. It
wait <endeavoured to set people against it by crying it down
as un-English. He would not pretend to say whether it
Was English or not, but he certainly thought the practice
was a moist " gentlemanly" one. (Hear, hear, and a
laugh.) Whenever any set of gentlemen were called upon
to vote they invariably used the ballot. (Hear, hear.)
Since last year a striking instance of this had occurred
the Christ .Church School election. There thecan in
dates were persons occupying the most dignified
posi-
tions—the one the chief magistrate of the city
oftlone
and the other a prince of royal blood
Of course not,
blood.
DL h
governors of the charity vote openly? O
the un-English, but nevertheless, al
practice of the ballot prevailed. ( e aE,tuniversal,
hear.) Ther
There
was a passage in the address of Lord John Russell to the
electors of the city of London which showed
ballot,wedtha anti hencetathe noble
lord still remained an opponent of the
the opposition of the Government was
the present occasion. The noble
hadlor to be looked for on
notsl givenbo openly.astedtha
that there
there was no vote which he
course that must be so while the "ballot was
howevernot thelaqwuitoef
the country.. He (Lord D. Stuart) was not
without a hope that the noble lord would yet have to give
a secret vote, for he trusted the day was not far distant
when the House of Commons would agree with him in
thinking that the ballot was the only way in which the
,„voice of the people
of this country could be fairly and
freely heard. (Cheers.)
Mr. WARNER (whose observations were almost totally
inaudible in she calls for a division) considered the ballot
•
p afforded the only means of putting an end to the wide-
Lread and disgthis country.racefal corruption whichprevailed amongst
e.electors of
Lord PA.LMERSTON.—Notwithstanding the impati-
ence of the house (a laugh), especially in reference to a
subject which has been so frequently discussed, I trust I
way be permitted-to state in a few words the grounds on
• which I intend to give my vote against the motion of my
boa; friend. lam not at all insensible to the advantage
which
w;esad accrue from an 7 system which would create
iiiiak
• ffacremady against intimidation and bribery, or
against the exercise of undue influence over the electors-
But, in the first place, my opinion is—and I must say,
that, it is an opinion not lightly formed, but of long stand-
, ing —that the ballot, which is proposed by my hon. friend
as a reinedyewould utterly fail in accomplishing that se-
.ecrecy upon which is founded all the results which he pro-
poses to effect. No man can persuade me in this country
that you can devise any means by which the people of this
country will keep to themselves the political opinions
which they profess—that men would not tell to their
frieode and. companions the political opinions by which
, the. are_ animated, the preference which they have for
partierdar candidates ; and that onthe day of election it
- would not be known as well with the ballot as with open
voting the way.in which the great majority of the electors
had given their -suffrages. (Hear, hear.) I say there is
m
no mechanical contrivance, no legislative enactment which
Parliament aan devise which would prevent the opinions
and, votes of, the great majority of electors from being
known under the ballot as under the present system
of, open voting. We have been told a great deal about
the example of other countries. Ask any citizen of
the United, States whether the ballot does produce
tlla _aesceticy which we are told is the essential
fnunelation of all security. It is perfectly well known
that it, accomplishes no such result—that the votes of men
at elections in .the United States are as well known, and
as ostentatiously avowed,- as in any part of the United
Iringdom—that men go to the poll with the ballot-ticket
in their hats, and with coloured papers indicating the par-
ticular candidate for whom they are going to vote. They
have the same blood in their veins which flows in ours.
They are too honest and too manly not to avow their opi-
nionsas(hear, shear)—and to support the candidate with
whom they have identified themselves. Away, then, with
the nceesense—eaway with the delusion which prevails in
the public mind, and which is utterly inconsistent with 41
known,faets and all previous inferences—(hear, hear)—for
the great bulk of theoelectors there would be no secrecy—.
they would scorn it. d (Hear, hear.) It would be repug-
tient to their personal feelings, and at variance with their
political predilections. With some, no doubt, it might be
secret-. The shopkeeper, the tenant,' or a few individuals
-who are under the apprehension that their vote would he
productive of Some injury to their own condition and for-
tune and hopes—these might take care in giving their
votes that. there Should be no knowledge of who the person
was to whom their vote was given. But what must be
the condition of that man during the interval between the
commencement of the canvass and the giving of the vote?
Would the ballot prevent hire from being solicited by the
person who has influence over him to extort from him a
promise to give his vote? (Hear, hear.) It does not follow
that because a vote is to be given by a twisted piece of
paper, put in a hole, that a man who thinks he can com-
4imand the vote will not use that screw which my hon.
end has dilated upon to obtain a promise from him.
Tlie promise may be given or withheld ; if it is given, and
a man votes according to his promise, of what use is the
ballot? If he gives a promise, and breaks it afterwards,
what then becomes of your argument as to the improve-
ment of the people? • (Hear, hear.) Yon are, in fact, de-
moralising the people, instead of raising them in the scale
of moral and civilised men. (Hear, hear.) If he refuses,
why should he refuse except be means to vote the other. way. No man will persuade me that the poison who has
power over an elector will not act towards him exactly as
he does at present, if the elector has given a vote against the
wishes of his controlling superior. The ballot in either
ease would be a perfect nullity for secrecy or for protection.
The first objection to the ballot is that it would not ac-
complish the purposes for which those who propose it put
it forward for the acceptance of Parliament. I object
to it because it would not succeed. In the next place,
• I object to it because it might succeed—(hear, hear)
and laughter.) The objection made to the Pretender was,
that he was not the son of James. 'And then, when the
friend to whom such an objection was made said, "How
can you bo so illiberal and unreasonable as to give currency
to such a report ?" the other replied, " I object because he
is the son of James." (Hear, hear.) Now I object to the
ballot if it were to succeed, because I think secrecy in a
matter such as that of voting for members of Parliament
evoilld be an entire change in the social habits of the people.
I think that you cannot debar them from those manifesta-
tions of their political predilections and antipathies which
are vital elements of the British constitution. I think to
compel mankind to hold within their own bosom all
political preferences and opinions would te a great national
calamity. I think, if you succeed in making the ballot
entirely secret, and that the result would be only known
by a tuajerity of votes on the poll, you would lose a great
element of political virtue. Now, sir, there is anotherob-
jection which I have to the ballot.' I think, if it succeeded
in accomplishing the purpose for which it was proposed,
the ballot would be a great evil as bearing on the political
organisation of this country. I think that upon principle -
as well as theory, that it is an error. The vote given at an
election is, I must contend, a trust exercised by the elector
for the benefit of the country at large: It is a trust not
only within the limited range to which the vote extends ;
hut, oven if that measure were carried, which I say is a mis-
nomer—if universal suffrage were carried—if everyman of a
certain age-were to vote, still I should say that it is a trust.
If every man, woman, and child had the right of voting,
still it would be a trust which otich individual would exer-
cise fdr the benefit of the nation at large. I hold that, ac-
cording to the spirit of the British constitution, everyman
who Possess political rights and performs a political duty
ought to exercise that right and perform that duty openly
in the face of of his fellow-men. (Hear, hear.) My hon.
friend quoted a passage from a work of a highly respectable
individual, Mr. Grote, to show that these objections were
founded upon a fallacy. With all due deference, I must
say that I never heard a passage containing more fallacies
than that which, my hon. friend has quoted. I think it is
a play upon words, and not an argument addressed to
the reason. I say it is a trust which every elector has
to perform when he votes for a representative to sit in
this house. And it appears to me to bo most essential
that every man who has a political function to discharge
and a political act to do, should discharge those func-
tiOns and perform that act subject to the responsibility
attaching to them, But lam told that there is no re-
sponsibility. Well, then, who is to judge? Are the
Tories to condemn the Whip, and the Whigs the Tories ?
I say there is a responsibility, and which every man of
sense understands--namely, to public opinion—to the good
°pinion of his , neighbours, and of those with whom he
commonly acts' whose opinions he values, and which ex-
ercises a great and governing influence on the mind of
every honest man, And I do not wish to deprive any
person of that rudder to keep him in the right course. If
secret voting could be so arranged that all the voters could
vote at elections without any man knowing how th
voted, I say then that you would lose an inestimable ad-
ey
vantage in keeping alive those feelings of political right
aand nd wrong which I think are so essential to the well-being
prosperity of the country. On what ground is all
thiseiegned ? -You sayevery man should be protected in.
the eaefaseetlas suffrage- g I say that if a man has a po-
right:that he uraghet.to make up his mind to suffer
any inconvenience thate
-might arise from its discharge. By
the same reasonin that you enable a voter to give his vote
in eacret, why shoguAledanot members of this house give their
votes in aeeret?
voting aniongia And so it in all countries wheresecret
eeectors is established. In France it
is so. And in mane electors"
where there is given to the
electors what is su
be the protection of secret
voting, the same secrecy ofitio.tuing is observed in the legis-
lative bodies themselves. settee requires it in the one
ease, it requires it also in the r.
.The members of this
house are interested equally i laical privileges, and
their functions have an esinganaeP:
wvinif ben the general
eat
efyos, should not
weal and interests of the country.
a member vote according to the b
" tious conviction, without fear of man
and
prel,
e ewrn eifl
elqtae outl lmo
cone.pien
well es the elector to lain-self,
.hou.se who'haNs.ea
given jest
jeeeste:smueehd
that mem;serof this
ambition, would not think it a great grievance e_
wkQ hia.s incurred the displeasure of h*
at the next election for the votes holies
(Hear.) As to the argument of
as the tradesman
customer or his landlorc
• injury resulting to the elector from acts of this sort, so far
as my knowledge goes I
ibelieve suchses aincwashetethotbreadgreemelyn
profess oAbe the victims of
exaggerated. I believe in many
ca
their votes that they are men
whose fortunes have been l a mac,ed before—(laughter)—..
and that they place upon their votes that which should
moreproperly be placed at the door of their own
fromnimprhuie-
donee. In general I think that what a man loses
opponents he gains from his friends, and that the accounts
are fairly balanced between both. Al
yet I think that, alas
I admit there
ey be cases in which abuses prevail,
taken in the aggregate, there is a great deal more clamour
made about them than there is real foundation for. Be'

voteM r
which. F 0 ShTeEgR felt a
vel
last
tbounda to
ea
ai repeat
session.
on t
All
legislation is occasion
against
in failure, and the house might epee
bribery, from 1831 down to the present(timn eo,nhai(tl resulted
in
bal-
lot In France, during the troubled of revolu-
tion, times the 1
good would be accomplished until they adoptedp the
htioorna,mt.he
reebaailnlooet
rteriiuomtphheiarntplryoprerseavioanilseda,gaainncal
tifhhroi
hon.rymaenmd-
itahheyill. would not hesitate to vote
Sir J. FITZGERALD had witnessed so many scenes of
elections,
of this
Ireland arising out of open voting that he
forintimidation the introduction at
oppression in
felt constrained
wereconst rained to support the motion. There the elec.
t
kidnapped, maltreated, and coerced by their
landlords to vote according to their wishes, and that fact
alone should be sufficient to induce scrupulous minds to
give the elector the protection of the ballot. Why, since
his election he had received letters from some of his Con-
stituents imploring him to intercede with their landlords
to prevent their being ejected, in consequence of their
having voted in his favour, while in many places in Ire-
land the landlords had had recourse to the aid of the mi-
litary to compel electors to vote against their will. Surely,
then, the best remedy for these abuses was the ballot,
which he hoped this session to see carried.
Mr. BRIGHT, in supporting the motion, said, that bri-
bery and intimidation, especially the latter, had greatly in-
creased of late, and that the difference between boroughs and
counties was, that in the former the electors had just in-
dependence enough to insist on selling their votes,
while in the latter they had not even that amount
of independence, and the landowners returned the mem-
bers. He declaimed vehemently against the Ministerial
opponents of the ballot, and cited the names of such mem-
bers of the Administration as were inclined to it as evi-
dence in its favour. He repudiated the leadership of
men who refused to the majority of that side of the house
the smallest concession, and he declared that those who
deemed this question of vital importance ought to apprise
Lord John Russell and Lord Aberdeen that they must
take up the ballot and carry it, or else understand that
they were not to rely on the support of the Liberal party.
Those who did not like this course were not doing their
duty to their constituents. After dilating upon the abso-
lute necessity of the ballot, and contending that legislation
would be ineffective to repress bribery or intimidation, he
expressed hie conviction that if the advocates of the ballot
resolved to have it, they could succeed by the means he
had pointed out.
Mr. WHITESIDE, in opposing the motion, said that
the ballot would lead to the destruction of constitutional
freedom. He urged that in Ireland, even if the ballot pro-
tected the voter against the landlords, it would not pro-
tect him against the priests. He considered that the con-
stituency of the country was already large, intelligent,
and upright enough to exercise the desirable influence.
Sir W. MOLES WORTH next rose to address the house,
and was received with loud cheers. The right. honourable
baronet said—My hon. friend the member for Manchester
has appealed to me in courteous terms, and I cannot refrain
from addressing the house on this subject. (Hear, hear.)
The hon. and learned gentleman who last addressed the
house supposed that I had been converted by the speech of
my noble friend near me. I listened to that speech as in
duty bound, but though I always admire anything that
comes from my noble friend, I must say I do not think
his argument against the ballot was very convincing.
(Cheers and laughter.) In fact, it was nothing more than
the stock argument, which we have hoard over and over
again ad nauseam. (Hear.) Since the period when my
friend, Mr. Grote, made his celebrated motions in favour
of the ballot (one of which I had the honour of seconding
eighteen years ago), that question has been repeatedly and
ably discussed in this house, and I think I must have
heard every argument urged that can be urged either for
or against secret suffrage. The result has been to strengthen
my conviction that no measure ever can, or ever will be,
really effectual in checking either bribery or intimidation
which does not contain a provision that the votes of
electors shall be given in secret. (Hear, hear.) As I have
never heard any argument of any force in refutation of
the position that the ballot is the only legislative measure
which could put an end to intimidation, I will confine my
observations chiefly to thequestion of the efficacy of the bal-
lot in arresting the progress of bribery. (Hear.) This is
an important question at present, for every one admits that
bribery has prevailed of late to such an extent as to com-
promise the character of this house, and to cast some dis-
credit upon the representative institutions of this country.
(Hear). Both Houses of Parliament have, therefore, in
reply to the Speech from the Throne, declared that it is
necessary to take new and more effectual precautions
against corrupt practices at elections. (Hear, hear.) Now,
what ought those new and more effectual precautions to be?
Ought they to be analogous to the old ones, which,
after so many amendments have proved unsuccessful, or
ought they to be of a new and different description ? That
is the question at issue between the friends and the oppo-
nents of secret suffrage. My conviction that no measure
will ever prove effectual in checking bribery which does
not contain the ballot is founded upon an examination of
the reasons why the laws which have been passed against
bribery have failed. (Hear, hear.) That those laws have
failed both sides of this house admit, for both sides have
brought in a bill to amend those laws.. (Hear.) Why
have they failed ? I attribute their failure to the fact that
they are merely penal enactments, the object of which is
to deter persons from giving or accepting bribes through
fear of the punishment to be inflicted in the event of de-
tection and conviction. Now, it appears to me that a
penal enactment can only fail from two causes—either from
the inadequacy of the punishment threatened, or from the
difficulty of detecting and convicting the offender. (Hear.)
To which of these two causes is the failure of the laws
against bribery to be attributed ? Not, certainly, to the
inadequacy of the threatened punishments, for they are
severe, consisting of pecuniary penalties varying from eeot.
t01,000e., accompanied by disfranchisement or disqualifi-
cation. If the severity of these punishments were to be
increased, the public would probably consider them to be
excessive and out of proportion to the moral turpitude of
the offence; then judges and juries would become snore
unwilling to convict than they are at present, and the re-
sult woul,l be increased impunity. And, indeed, there is
reason to believe that the public consider that the punish-
ments at present attached to giving or taking bribes are
excessive, because, though hon. gentlemen are sometimes
unseated by committees of this house for bribery by their
agents, yet they are rarely convicted, and generally ac-
quitted, of any knowledge of the bribery, and I do not
remember any instance of an honourable member having
been convicted of bribery by a court of justice; yet I
think there can be no reasonable doubt that, after every
general election, there must he many hon. members in this
house who are morally guilty of bribery. (Hear, hear.)
I think the impunity which generally attends bribery
should be attributed to the difficulty of detecting the
offence and convicting the offender. That difficulty arises
from the peculiar nature of the offence of bribery, which
is very different from that of the great majority of offences.
Generally speaking, when an offence is committed, there
is some overt and patent act which manifestly inflicts sen-
sible wrong upon some person, as, for instance, when a
man is robbed or assaulted ' • then the injured person knows
that he is injured, feels that he is wronged, and is prompted
-by hie knowledge and feelings to seek out the offender and
to bring him to justice. Not so when the offence of bri-
bery is committed. In that offence there is no overt nor
patent act which manifestly inflicts sensible wrong upon any
person. For the offence of bribery consists simply in the
transfer of money or money's worth from the briber to the
bribed ; that act need only be known to the two persons
concerned in it, who are not injured by it, but who have
strong motives to conceal it, strong in proportion to the
punishment threatened for it, and If they keep their coun-
sel, the person injured by the bribery can never know that
he has been injured nor feel that he has been wronged.
(Hear, hear.) This essential difference between bribery
and the generality of offences was clearly pointed out by
my noble friend the Lord President when he introduced
his bill to amend the laws relating to bribery, treating,
and undue influence at elections. My noble friend justly
remarked that it was a very difficult task for the Legisla-
ture effectually to arrest the progress of bribery. I believe
that the Legislature will never accomplish that task by
means of penal enactments alone. For we cannot by such
enactments so alter the nature of the offence of bribery as
to render it less difficult of detection, and if we were to
endeavour to counterbalance the hope of impunity arising
from difficulty of detection by threats of the severest
punishment, our Draconic laws could not be enforced,
and our threats would prove vain. (Hear.) Therefore, if
we want to arrest the progress of bribery we must not rely
only upon penal enactments to deter men from committing
that offence, but must try to combine with such enact-
ments measures calculated to take away the motives to
commit bribery, by diminishing its efficacy, and by ren-
dering it less difficult of detection. I think the ballot is
a measure of this description. My position is, that it
would diminish the efficacy of bribery, and put an end to
every kind of positive bribery except that which is the
least effectual and the least difficult of detection. (Hear,
hear.) To sustain this position, I must observe that
positive bribery may bo divided into three kinds, accord-
ing to the period when the payment of the bribe is made.
The first kind is, when the bribe is paid before the elector
votes, on his promising to vote for the bribing candidate,
whom I call A. The second kind is, when the bribe is paid
after the elector has voted, and in consequence of his hav-
ing voted for candidate A. The third kind is, when the
bribe is paid after the return of candidate A, and in con-
sequence of his return. The first kind of bribery, namely,
when the payment of the bribe is contingent only on.the
promise of the corrupt elector, is rarely. and never wil-
lingly practised by skilful and experienced agents, even
with open voting ; for when the bribe has been paid before-
hand, the briber has little security that the bribed will fulfil
his dishonourable engagemente--(hear)—and not sell his
vote for a second bribe to the opposite party ; in fact, the
briber has no security except such as may arise from a
feeling of false honour on the part of the bribed, or fear of
being reproached for not keeping his promise. (Hear.) It
is evident that the strength of these feelings would be very
mach diminished, and in many cases entirely destroyed, by
secret suffrage. With the ballot corrupt electors would,
when they could, take bribes from both sides, and then
vote honestly according to their convictions. For corrupt
electors have frequently strong political opinioes, for which
they are willing to make considerable pecuniary sacrifices;
and it is a well-known fact that corrupt electors will often-
times vote for a'popular candidate for a leas bribe than for
an anti-popular one. (Hear.) I think, therefore, that with
secret voting the first kind of bribery, namely, paying be-
fore the vote is given, will be rarely if ever practised, and
When practised that the result will frequently be honest
voting. (Hear.) The second kind of bribery which I have
m
o ne at
et ei a fa act is
1 e ewi nhge na
ascertained t ipayment
a
oft
thet the
obor;irbnep its
electorc ti n
he e na
at
vof oted for the bribing candidate. This is the ordinary mode.
which the leastowznoney
bribeeY, the most business-like and economical one, in
goes furthest, for money is only paid
(Hear.) The deft
nnitihat votes have been actually given.
when it is known
it must necessaril cease
'Yith open voting. The third and
which I would call attention is when
the payment of the brie iiitcentingent upon the return of
ghtebaendpirdaactteiSed w iitsh
secret
that this kind of
thhriehor3, bribingrni
well as with open
voting, but with this most imporetearne ifference, that with
oiron voting., in the event of the bribin erdidate being
returned, only those electors would be g who had ful-
whether
, but with
filled their promise of voting for candipLit
the ballot the electors would have to be °paid,
they had performed their promises or not. It would seem
en first thoughts that this kind of bribery would be
the most advantageous for a bribing candidate., for he
would only have to pay when the object of his wishes was
accomplished, and his return obtained. But with open
voting it is rarely, if ever, practised; and the reason is ob-
reflection. It holds out far less temptation to the
tor than the ordinary mode of bribery. For in
mode the corrupt elector is paid for having
the ordinary
A and as the payment is contingent
cvoior rll6;potn- elector
voted for candidate
en
of the elector; the perm
wins it. OD the other hand, ><a the
is certain if the elector
upo4 an act within the power

not to detainihn house any longer—l have stated the out-
lino of my objections to the ballot. My objections to the
ballet are these —that it would not prove effective to pro-
duce .ecrecy— that it would not protect the voter from the
,e9nsqllu,'neas of his political bias; and even if it did pro-
ace 2eCTeCY, I think that it would thereby inflict a great
injury ufton the British constitution. (Hear, hear.)
Sir J. WALMSLET regretted that the inatanoes of in-
' timidation'ilnoted by his hon. friend who made this mo-
tion had badno effect upon the noble lord. It might be very
well for the noble lord and those who were in an indepen-
dent position to contend in favour of open voting, but
that systeni had proved most oppressive to the or man.
It was universally felt that the ballot should accompany
an extension of the franchise, and that any extension of
th© franchise without the ballot would be mare mockery.
No reggo,:bill, therefore, wolli b 3 13tiafaTbry without

.a. :~ .

third mode of bribery, the payment is contingent on the
return of candidate A. The payment is therefore uncertain
and depends upon an uncertain event, over which the indi-
vidual elector can have no control, except in Lhe rare case
of his vote being the casting vote of the election. Conse-
quently, corrupt electors must prefer the first to the third
mode of bribery; and it is evident, likewise, that a much
smaller sum of money, to be expended in the payment of
votes as soon as they are given, would be far more effica-
cious in determining the votes of electors than the promise
of a mach larger sum of money to be paid only in the un-
certain event of A being returned. Therefore the third kind
of bribery would be much mere expensive than the first,
could only be practised by larger capitalists, and, conse-
quently, by fewer persons. It is supposed, however, that
bribery of the third kind would be much practised in the
secret voting. Ido not believe that it would be. But if
it were, my position is that with secret voting it would be
much less efficacious and much less difficult of detection
than the ordinary mode of bribery with open voting ; and
therefore that the ballot, by putting an end to every other
kind of bribery, would do much towards arresting the pro-
gress of corruption. To prove this position I must institute
a comparison between the two kinds of bribery to which I
have just referred—viz., between the ordinary mode of
bribery with open voting, in which the bribe is paid to the
elector who has promised to vote for candidate A as soon
as he has fulfilled his promise, and the supposed mode of
bribery under the ballot, in which the bribe would only be
paid to the elector who had promised to vote for candidate
A when A was returned. In the ordinary mode of bribery
dr
iirtehe
to. p e vet
ti
en gf ,0
forth hAo corruptsay B t
bbargains
and
ri toe ltehner csoirmr l)ee eal encd-
shan't have a farthing- from us." But in the supposed
mode of bribery under the ballot, the corrupt bargain
w he 'e
ti hd ebe
e"
you vI of t Abe
e for oreturned
against youbim
;s
if and have
ea
returned
unronteed,
you shan't have a farthing whichever way you may vote."
Therefore, with open voting, the temptation to the elector
to vote for A is the certainty of obtaining a 51. note ;
with secret voting, the temptation to the elector to vote
for A would depend upon the elector's opinion of the
effect of his vote on the probability of A being returned.
If the elector thought that the return of A would depend
upon the elector's own individual vote, then the temptation
to vote for A would be nearly the same as with open voting,
and equal to the certainty of receiving a 5/. note. Rut if
' the elector thought that the success or failure of A was in-
dependent of the elector's own individual vote. then he
would have little or no motive to vote against his convic-
tions for A, because by the hypothesis its the elector's opi-
nion the return of candidate A, and consequently the pe-
cuniary result to the elector, would be the same whichever
way he voted. Now, as it rarely happens, even with open
voting, that en elector thinks that the result of a contest
will depend upon his casting vote, I think that with secret
suffrage an elector acting singly and alone would be little
influenced in his vote by the promise of a bribe to be paid
in the uncertain event of the bribing candidate being re-
turned. It is said, however, that with secret suffrage cor-
rupt electors would not act singly and alone but in combi-
nation, and that collective bribery would be substituted for
individual bribery. For instance, it is said that a body of
electors, sufficient in number to decide a contest, would
combine together to be bribed ; that a bargaiu would be
made with theirs to the effect that each of them should re-
ceive a certain bribe—say 5/.—in the event of candidate A
being returned; that each of them would perceive that if
they acted together and voted together candidate A would
be returned, and they would be paid, Thence it is inferred
that they would act together and vote together, and that
their temptation to do so would be nearly equal to the cer-
tainty of obtaining a 51. note a piece, or nearly equal to
what it is in the ordinary mode of bribery with open vot-
ing. I will, for the sake of argument, assume the validity
of these positions ; but I maintain. that such collective
bribery would be very liable to detection, and much less
less likely to escape detection than the ordinary mode of
individual bribery with open voting. For how is bribery
generally practised with open voting ? The briber says to
the elector, " Vote for A and you shall receive five pounds."
Then when the day of election comes, the corrupt elector
goes to the poll, votes for candidate A, receives a ticket,
takes it to a stranger in a dark room in an out of the way
street, and receives a five-pound note; there the transac-
tion ends. It needs only be known to the three persons
concerned in it, namely, the briber, the bribed, and the
stranger; and if they keep their own counsel detection is
almost impossible. But with collective bribery and se-
cret voting, the promise of the bribe must be made, not
to individual electors separately, for I have shown that
an elector acting singly and alone would be little in-
fluenced by the promise of a bribe to be paid in the un-
certain event of a bribing candidate being returned, but
the promise must be made to the body of electors who are
assumed to be leagued together for bribery And combined
action. Each of them would therefore be aware that
many electors besides himself were to be paid in the event
of candidata A being returned. Now, it is evident that to
procure any effect by this mode of collective bribery with the ballot, the promise of a bribe must be made to a con-
siderable body of electors--considerable, I mean, in pro-
portion to the numbers of a constituency. For with the
ballot it would be no use to promise a dozen or so of elec-
tors that they should be paid id the event of condidate A
being returned. At present, with open voting, even in a
considerable constituency, an election may be gained in a
close contest by the judicious purchase of a small number
of votes. But with the ballot nothing of the kind could be
done. With the ballot the only effective bribery must be
wholesale and collective. A moment's reflection must con-
vince any hon. gentleman that if with the ballot he wish
effectually to bribe a constituency, he must promise to pay
in the event of his return as many electors as, in addition
to those upon whose unbought promises he could confi-
dently rely, would constitute a majority of his constitu-
ency. For instance, suppose the constituency to be bribed
contained a thousand electors—suppose an hon. gentleman
could confidently rely upon the unbought promises of 300
—thirty per cent. (a large proportion in a corrupt consti-
tuency with the ballot)—then to secure his return the hon.
gentleman would have to promise to pay in the event of
his return a body of at least 201 electors; in the same
manner, in a constituency 10,000 electors, the hon. mem-
ber would have to promise to pay, in the event of his
return, a holy of at least 2,030 electors. Now a promise
ma le to so many electors, and known by each of them to
be made to so many, could not be kept secret from the rest
of the bribable class of the constituency; and then not
only those who had voted for A, but those who had voted
for his antagonist, would demand payment in the event of
A. being returned. Then in what a horrible dilemma an
hon. member would be placed who had obtained his return
in this manner. (Hear, and laughter.) I ask any hon.
gentleman who is conversant with this subject —(hear)—to
put himself in the position of such au hou. member; to
fancy that he bad secured his return by a promise to pay a
large body of electors; that, having fulfilled his promise,
he received applications for p iytnent from a large number
of other electors. What would you do ? What would you
say? You could not refuse payment teeny elector on the
ground that be had not voted for you, because with secret
suffdege you could not tell how he had voted. (Hear.) If
you were to refuse on the ground that he was not one of
the body of electors whom you had promised to pay in the
event of your being returned, be would probably tell you
that it was strange that you had not promised him ; that he
was as ready to be bribed as any one • that he had voted
'
for you • and as you were returned,-th'at he had as good a
right to be paid as his neighbours. If you still persevered
in your refusal, you would make an enemy who knew your
secret, who had perhaps voted for you, who would be re-
venged upon you, and who would do his best to have you
detected and convicted On the other hand, if you paid
him out of fear, you would have to pay every one of the
bribable class of electors in the constituency; therefore,
in some constituencies, you would have to pay all who had
voted for you and all who had voted against you—(hear)—
you would be ruined in consequence of the numbers whom
you would have to pay, and in proportion to the numbers
whom you did pay would be the chance of your detection.
Therefore in all cases the chance of detection would be
much greater than at present—in many cases it would
amount to a certainty. Then you would be convicted, se-
verely punished, disqualified from sitting in Parliament ;
your constituency ought to be disfranchised, a new and
pure one substituted, and its purity would be preserved by
the ballot. For one of the most beneficial consequences
which I should expect from the ballot would be the preser-
vation of the purity of constituencies that with open voting
are in perpetual danger of being corrupted. I firmly be-
lieve that if the ballot had formed part of the Reform Bill
—if it had then been adopted by Lord Grey's Government
—many constituencies which have since been a disgrace to
our representative system would have remained pure. For
I have shown that the ballot would have put an end to
every kind of bribery except wholesale and collective bri-
bery. Now, wholesale and collective bribery cannot be
introduced at once into a pure constituency. The adage,
"Nemo repente fit turpissimus"- is as true of conetituen-
cies as of individuals. The history of corrupt constituen-
cies shows that bribery has been gradually introduced into
them. I think such gradual introduction of bribery would
be impossible with secret suffrage. I will my reasons
for this opinion. If the history of thosestate constituencies
which have been corrupted since the passing of the Reform
Bill be examined, the origin of the corruption may be
traced either to a closely-contested election or to the bri-
bery of unsuccessful candidates. In the case of a closely-
contested election the contest was generally decided to-
wards the close of the poll by the votes of a few electors
who were bribed. In such a case parties were nearly equal
and animated by strong party feelings. When the day of
election came the race between candidate A. and candidate
B- was neck and neck—alternately the one, alternately the
other leading. Towards the end of the lay nearly one-
half of the electors had voted from party feelings foe
A, and the other half from similar feelings for B. The
constituency was nearly polled out, only a dozen or so
electors remained unpolled—a number sufficient, however,
to decide the election ; they were the scum of the consti-
tuency; open voting made them the arbiters of the con-
test, and empowered them to determine who should be the
representative of the constituency; they were indifferent
to the merits of A or B; they might, perhaps, have been
influenced by threats, but they were most easily acted
upon by hopes of immediate gain. In the excitement of
the contest such hopes were held out to them by some
friend, or agent, or partisan of A. A was returned, and
bribery was introduced! into the constituency. Bribery
once introduced, A's party could never be confident of suc-
cess without brioing those whom they had bribed before,
and B's party could never hope to defeat A. without 'also
having recourse to corruption. A corrupt struggle then
commenced ; each party strove to corrupt the electors of
the opposite party, and with each successive contest the
number of bribed electors increased. Both parties, being
equally guilty of corruption, equally abstained from at-
tempting to punish each other. Now it is evident that in
the first instance the motive which induced A's party to
bribe was founded upon an exact knowledge of the state of
the poll, and that the few votes of the unpolled electors
would decide the contest. With the ballot such knowledge
would not have been possessed, the motive to bribe would
not have existed, bribery would not then have been intro-
duced, and protected by the ballot the constituency might
have remained pure. With regard to the corruption of
constituencies by the bribery of unsuccessful candidates.
In this manner many constituencies have been gradually
corrupted since the passing of the Reform Bill. At first
these constituencies were very pure ; they prided them-
selves upon returning their members free of expense. This
conduct, however, was distasteful to some persons, who
had knowledge or experience of the profits of a contested
election. They determined to get up a contest; then one
of their number—generally a low attorney—went to Lon-
don to search for a candidate; he haunted the purlieus of
the clubs till he found some person with more money than
principle, frequently some rich parvenu who aspired to the
position of a member of Parliament. This person—whom I
will call the bribing candidate—was informed that there
was an opening in such and such a borough for a candidate
of opposite opinions to the sitting member; he was invited
to hold those opinions and to stand, and he was told that
thhermoniggiiht be returned for a few hundreds. The invitation
was accepted; a contest ensued on the first opportunity;
during the contest large sums of money found their
"w.ay from the pockets of the bribing candidate,
was :" defeat
ulaterious channels, into the pockets of some
of the electors who had manifested their approba-
tion or hi,
political opinions. In the first contest he
defeated for the great majority of the elec.

tors were pure ; and being defeated, his corrupt practices,
though known, were not punished. Thus the seeds of cor-
ruption were sown in the pure constituency ; they ger-
minated r .pidly, and produced fruit. Those who heti once
tasted the fruit of corruption longed to taste it again; they
communicated their longing to their neighbours. In a
second contest the number of electors willing to be bribed
increased, and the bribing candidate was defeated by a
smaller majority. So it went on • in each successive con-
test more electors were bribed, and the bribing candidate
was defeated by narrower and narrower majorities ; finally
he obtained a majority, or the opposite party commenced
bribing in self-defence; in either case the constituency be-
came thoroughly corrupt. It is evident that this process
of seduction and corruption could not have gone on with
secret suffrage ; for I have shown that the ballot would
put an end to every kind of bribery except that on which
the payment of the bribe would be contingent on the suc-
cess of the bribing candidate, and consequently it would
put an end to all bribery by unsuccessful candidates. I
have shown that the ballot would put an end to every kind
pf bribery except that in which the payment of the bribe
would be contingent upon the return of the bribing candi-
date; that such bribery, to be effective, must be wholesale
and collective ; that wholesale and collective bribery would
be very liable to detection, and far less difficult of detection
than the ordinary mode of bribery with open voting.
Thence I infer that by the aid of the ballot the penal enact-
ments against bribery which, in consequence of the diffi-
culty of detecting bribery, have hitherto proveclineffica-
thous, would become effective in arresting the progress of
bribery—a progress which all friends of constitutional
liberty must deplore, as it casts discredit upon this house,
anti saps the fours lations of our representative institutions.
As I have confined my observations chiefly to the question
othpaintiionnssefcrroemt elescotors would vote contrary
of the efficacy of the ballot in arresting the progress of bri-
bery, I will only notice one objection to the balot. It is
bcorrupty the
publicw h who
opinionw o ul d
against bribery, and thus that the influence of public
tsbo:tndhe:tilinke.:lldOs'fl'Vrilllim
openly
doing
opinion against bribery would be weakened. It would
be easy to show that there is no validity in this objec-
tion to the ballot. But, omitting other answers to it,
I will content myself with expressing a strong doubt
whether the public opinion that influences the actions
of the bribable class of electors is hostile to bribery,
' or ever will be hostile to bribery, as long as intimida-
tion is practised by the upper class of electors. The
public opinion that determines the actions of particular
men is not the opinion of the whole community, nor of the
majority of the community, nor of the respectable, nor of
the intelligent portion of the community but of the class
or section to whom the men belong Now, the class to
whom the takers of money-bribes belong, especially in cor
rupt constituencies do not look upon the taking of a bribe
as a blameable or discreditable act. If you converse on
this subject with an intelligent man of this class, he will
justify his co. duct by specious arguments difficult to refute.
.1-Iteai‘oviullocritien trhaleikexamiipelewoiflt betters—ofayhsistoyou,,,w
his superiors upei
shouldiors iu
colvwufnohrtteoeti:ataekflm a
oiielri
cgtuhpeo o man
r , refuse to make a few pounds by nay
benefituibou of myself, my wife, and my children ?
who
situry o
customers,
votesco conduct uct
againstor moreht ciaoctror uon
fspc corrupt thanconscience
et e thattnoa
uset
to,
shopkeeper,br
landlord,sho
vsees iannhdisvcitete
procuring
an
meansaba
toefmcounrrtyoifnghfiasvroeunrt
?withlthiiss
' true that I desire to be rewarded fur my pot tical conduct ;
but so do many others, my superiors in station, wealth,
and education ; but so does the squire, who influences
half a dozen electors; so does the large landowner, whose
fifty pounders are counted by the score • so does the mill
owner, who can put the screw on a hundred ten pounders ;
so does the great territorial magnate, who intimidates a
whole county, If I desire money in return for my vote,
they expect money's worth in return for their influence.
The squireen asks for his dependents petty places in the
Customs or Excise • the large landowner wants for his
younger sons a clerkship in the Treasury or an attache-
ship to an embassy; the rich millowner aspires to gain a
social position to be called Sir John This or Sir Thomas
That; the great territorial magnate desires a peerage, or a
step in the peerage—the lord-lieutenancy of his county, a
ribbon, or a garter ; anti if the expectation of any of these
worthies is disappointed, marvellous is the change that
sometimes comes over his political convictions at the next
general election." (Cheers.) It is very difficult to persuade
the bribable class of electors of the fallacy of these argu-
ments ; in their eyes, intimidation is a graver offence than
bribery ; for, say they, the magnitude of an offence is in
proportion to the evil that it does to society, and the pain
that it inflicts upon individuals. The evil to society from
an elector voting against his convictions is the same,
whether he does so for the sake of gaining a 51. note or
from the fear of losing one—whether he is seduced by a
bribe or intimidated by a threat; but to the individual
elector the difference between seduction and intimidation
is very great—all the difference between pleasure and pain.
An elector seduced by a bribe feels that he is a free man, for
he does what he likes; an elector who is intimidated by a
threat feels he is a slave, for he acts undercompulsion. There-
fore, I repeat, in the eyes of certain classes, intimidation is
a far graver offence than bribery. They ask, " Why should
one class be permitted,to reap the ruits of intimidation, and
another class be forbidden to enjoy the sweets of bribery ?
When you attempt to put a stop to the one, you ought
simultaneously to endeavour to put and end to the other."
For these reasons I am convinced that you can never pro-
duce a general feeling hostile to bribery until you have put
an end to intimidation by the upper class s. I will not tres-
pass on the house by attempting to show that it would be
absurd and ridiculous to try to pat down intimidation by
means of penal enactments. Yo cannot so define intimi-
dation as to constitute ita punishable offence. Intimidation
of the most potent kind may be conveyed by a nod, a wink,
a gesture, a seemingly casual expression of opinion, nay,
even by an invitation to a breakfast or a dinner. I have
heard of a numerous tenantry intimidated by an invitation
to a breakfast. The breakfast was on the ollinda.
Those who partook of it, as a matter of course, accompanied
their landlord to the poll, and what tenant dared to refuse
the invitation ? It is said that intimidation has decreased
of late years. I find, however, much difference of opinion
on this subject, one opinion being hell by the intimidating, the opposite by the intimidated classes. If you talk to one
of the intimidating classes, to a landlord or to a millowner,
he will tell you that ho never intimidates his tenants, his
workmen, or his artisans, and that the ballot is not wanted.
But if you talk to one of the intimidated classes, you will
hear a different story. The shopkeeper, the tenant-farmer,
the workman, and, the artisan will tell you, " We know too
well the opinions of our customers, of oar landlords, of our
employers, to dare to vote against them, though they have
not positively threatened to punish us if we were to do so.
Yet we arc afraid to vote according to our consciences, in
opposition to their wishes, without the protection of the
ballot." From these conflicting opinions I arrive at the
conclusion that the grosser and more outrageous forms of
intimidation have become less common, and in fact they are
condemned by public opinion, but thatthe milder and more
decent, and not less effective forms ,tre practised to a great
extent ; email I doubt very much whether the real influence
of intimidation on the vote of electors has much divai-
nished. It is notorious that if in an agriculturul district
you know the opinions of the chief landowners if in ama
nufacturing district you know, the opinions of the chief
millowners, you can tell very nearly what Candidate a ill
have the majority of votes in the district. I was much
struck at the last general election by an instance of this de-
scription with regard to the county which I inhabit—l
mean East Cornwall. I was told just before the election
that the Free-trade candidate had a bad chance, that all the
farmers were Protectionists, and that my tenants would vote
against me to a man. I replied that I ha i no doubt they
were Protectionists, but how did their landlords intend to
vote? and I asked the intentions of So-and-Su, mentioning
half a dozen of the chief landed proprietors of the division.
I was toad they were with us. Then said I, "Never mind
the opinions of the farmers; we shall have a large majo-
rity," and so we had. (Rear.) But what amused me most
was to find that my tenantry, with one or two exceptions,
plumped for the free trade candidate. (Hoar, and cheers.)
Now I did not use any intimidation. My tenants were only
aware of the fact, which every one knew, that I had always
been a most determined free trailer, and was a most zealous
supporter of the free trade candidate. The result of that
election showed that without the ballot the hon. gentle-
man opposite (Mr. Kendall) would not have the slightest
chance of being returned again fur East Cornwall, if he be
opposed. (Hear, and laughter) It appears to me that
there are only three conceivable modes of preventing inti-
midation. Take, for instance, the case of a customer and a
shopkeeper. To prevent a customer from intimidating a
shopkeeper you must either conceal from the shopkeeper
the opinions of his customer, or you must forbid the cus-
tomer from ceasing to deal with the shopkeeper in conse-
quence of his voting against the opinions of the customer;
or you must conceal from the customer the vote of the
shopkeeper. You cannot conceal from the shopkeeper the
opinions of his customer, unless you prohibit the customer
from ever expressing his opinions—an inconceivable prohi-
bition. Secondly, you could not prevent a customer from
ceasing to deal with a shopkeeper in consequence of his
voting against his customer's opinions, unless you were to
pass an enactment forbidding any customer from ever ceas-
ing
t o deal
opinions—anwithanyshopk eeper who had ever voted against
impossiblehi enactment. There-
customer's
There-
fore, re,
uttlreaslhtoeprnkaetepiveer, anti
ofcontcheaatlingfror
alterna-
tive is the ballot. Similary in the cases of a millowner
vote onlyof t
and his workmen, of a landlord and his tenant. If you
thef
c shteorme
eremains
the
wish to prevent a landlord from intimidating his tenant,
you must either conceal from the tenant the opinions of
his landlord, which would be impossible, or you must pre-
vent a landlord from ejecting any tenant who had ever
voted against his landlord, in which case the tenant who
had voted against his landlord would have a perpetual
holding; or you must conceal the vote of the tenant from
the landlord by means of the ballot. Therefore, it appears
to me that any serious attempt to put down intimidation
by means of penal enactments would give birth to laws of
such intolerable vexation and severity, that all the intimi-
dating classes would cry aloud for the protection of the bal-
lot. Bat even if by means of penal enactments an end could
be put to intimidation by the upper classes, such enactments
would not put down intimidation by the lower classes. To
protect the elector from the violence and the intimidationof the mob you must conceal his vote from the mob.
It is said that there is one kind of intimidation which the
ballot could not put an end to ; that, for instance, a landlord
who suspected that with secret suffrage his tenants would
vote against his wishes would prevent them from going to
the poll; that this kind of intimidation would be much
practised in Ireland, where, in consequence of the wide dif-
ference between parties, it is more easy to foresee how elec-
tors would vote than in this country; that, for instance,
Protestant landlords would sometimes compel all their
Roman Catholic tenants to abstain from voting. Ido not
deny that acts of gross anti outrageous intimidation of this
description might be practised under the ballot. ; but, in
consequence of their very grossness, they would be rare.
They would only be practised by the most unscrupulous
intimidators ; and, as I have already observed, public opi-
nion condemns the grosser forms of intimidation. 'I should
likewise observe that a landlord who with secret suffrage
would prevent his tenants from voting would, .with open
voting, compel them to vote against their convictions.
Now, it is a greater evil to the community, and is greater
pain to an elector, to be compelled to vote against his con-
victions, than to be compelled to abstain from voting alto-
to this kind of intimidation, it would substitute a lesser
gether. Therefore, even if the ballot were not to put a stop
evil for a greater one, and that would be a gain to the
community. Moreover, for a landlord to forbid his te-
nantry to vote, would, as I have already said, be an act
of gross intimidation of so outrageous a character, that if
any act of intimidation could or ought to be punished that
act could and ought. But I should doubt the expediency
of making it a punishable offence. I should leave it to be
put down by the force of public opinion, which, under the
ballot, would become very strong against acts of gross and
flagrant intimidation. For the ballot, by putting an end to
all the ordinary and mild modes of intimidation, would
much diminish the number of persons who could or would
intimidate. But only a few persons would possess the means
of intimidating and be unscrupulous itnough to use them—
and only those few would approve of the employment of
such means in the outrageous manner in question —and the
conduct of those who did employ such means would meet
with the condemnation of all the rest of the community, both
of the intimidated classes and of those who, in consequence
of the ballot, bad ceased to belong to the. yitimidating.

classes, and who would, therefore, be loudest in the con-
demnation of the exercise of a power of which they had
been deprived. It appears to me, therefore, that the bal-
lot by diminishing the number of persons who could
bribe or intimidate, would tend to create a strong public
opinion
both against bribery and intimidation. For the
position of Hudibras, that men
" Compound for sins they are inclined to
By damning those they have no mind to,"
is equally true of sins which men have no power to com-
mit. I have now stated my reasons for thinking that the
ballot will put an end to every kind of bribery except gross,
outrageous, and wholesale bribery, which might easily be
detected and punished ; and also that it would put an end
to every kind of intimidation except gross, outrageous, and
wholesale intimidation which public opinion would severely
condemn. I will refer briefly to one of the arguments of
my noble friend the Home Secretary. (Ironical cheers.)
He said the elective franchise is a trust (it is a very com-
mon objection to the ballot), that the elective franchise is
a trust confided to an elector for the public benefit—the
trust being to choose a representative. It is said that the
elector is responsible for the exercise of his tr -st, and
therefore that he ought to vote openly, in order that the
public may judge of and pronounce a judgment upon his
choice of a representative. Why so ? To affirm that an
elector ought to vote openly, iu order that the public) may
pronounce a judgment upon a choice of a representative
means, if it means anything, that the elector ought to be
influenced in his choice of a representative by the opinion
of the public. (Hear, hear, from the Opposition.) But
for what reason ought an elector to be so influenced? The
only reason that can be assigned must be that the public
are better judges of who ought to be chosen than the elec-
tor is. But if the public are better judges of, they are
fftter to choose, a representative ; and if they are fit
to choose, they ought to choose, and therefore they ought
to have votes. (Loud cheers.) But who are the public
whom you consider fit to choose a representative ? The
whole community, or a portion of the COM munity ? If the
whole community are fit to choose a representative, then
they ought to have votes, and the suffrage should be uni-
versal, for to vote for a candidate is so simple an act that
there is no reason why it should be done by a delegate or
representative. If, on the other hand, you consider that
only a portion of the community are fit to choose a repre-
sentative, then you affirm that the other portion are unfit
to choose. It is evident that only those who are tit to
choose ought to have the franchise, and they ought to be
able to choose freely ; therefore they ought to be protected
in their choice of a representative from the influence of
those who are unfit to choose, and the only means by which
they can be so protected is the ballot. (Cheers.) There-
fore the arguments upon which the doctrin- of the respon-
sibility of the elector is based may lead to an extension of
the suffrage or to universal suffrage, but they are not in-
consistent with secret suffrage; ou the contrary, they show
the use of the ballot in protecting those wh3 are unfit to
choose one. (Hear, hear, and cheers.) My noble friend
used another argument which I have often heard pro-
duced before, which I shall hardly trespass on your time by
noticing. (Ironical Opposition cheers.) He says, if the
elector has the ballot you ought to vote by ballot in this
house. Icaunot discover'any analogy whatever between the
two cases. (Cheers.) An elector selects as hisrepresenta-
tive the man whom, on account of his political opinions,
he considers most fit to sit in this house. Therefore he
has a right to know whether by his votes his represen-
tative justifies that opinion, and if the representative
changes his opinions on any important question, it is his
duty to resign his seat. (Hear.) The elector has a right
to know whether his representative has fulfilled his pro-
mises. rod.whether he is acting on the principles on which
he was returned ; but the elector has promised nobody, it
being his duty to choose, without fear of punishment or
hope of reward, a reprosentittive of his opinions in this
house. (Cheers.) The last argument of my noble friend to
which I shall refer is one which has been often used. The
ballot has often been denounced as a democratic measure.
Now the term." democracy" has two significations—one
good, and the other bad. In the good sense of the word
democracy simply means popular government; and in
this sense of the word I admit that the ballot will be a
most democratic measure, for I believe that it would con-
duce more to good popular government than any other insti-
tutional change—then any reform bill that can be devised.
(Cheers) On the other hand, democracy in its bad sense
means the government of an ignorant and violent mob.
But in this case I maintain that the ballot would be a meat
anti-democratic measure because it would protect the
elector in the exercise of his franchise from ever; kind of
intimidation, and especially from the intimidation of the
ignorant and violent mob. (Cheers.) In fact, if the term
conservative be used as the opposite of democratic in its
bad sense, the ballot would be a most conservative mea-
sure, for it would enable an elector to preserve his prin-
ciples whilst giving his vote. (Hear, hear, and cheers.)
In conclusion, I must say that my firm conviction, founded
upon the fact that your penal enactments against bribery,
though repeatedly amended, have always failed, is that you
you
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end to intimidation till you try the experiment of the bal-
lot; and if, contrary to my expectations and convictions,
that experiment should fail, you will not be worse
off than at present, but you would have the satisfaction of
knowing that you had done your best to cure great and
crying evils, which, be assured, cast deep discredit on this
honse, and tend to sap the foundation of your representa-
tive system. The right hon. baronet resumed his seat
amidst loud and prolonged applause.
Mr. I. BUTT condemned the ballot, as inadequate to
the repression of bribery or intimidation, as un-English,
and as deteriorating to the national character.
Mr. PHINN, amid continual interruption, took the con-
trary view from that of the last speaker, and declared that
the ballot must eventually be carried.
slr. KENDALL, in answer to some remarks of Sir W.
Molesworth, instanced his own election success on Protec-
tionist principles, and in opposition to free-trade landlords,
as evidence of the uselessness of the ballot.
Mr. BERKELEY made a few observations in reply, but
said that an answer from him was almost unnecessary, the
subject having become a Cabinet question.
Mr. .M.A.GUIRE, as a Roman Catholic, urged that the
ballot, by protecting the humble Irish voter, would pre-
vent the interference of the priests, by rendering their as-
sistance unnecessary.
The house divided, after about five hours and a-half of
debate, and the numbers were—
For Mr. Berkeley's motion
Againit it
194
Mijimity against 37
IRISH CHURCH 'TEMPORALITIES.
Mr. Sergeant, SHEE moved for leave to bring in a bill
to alter and amend the laws relating to the temporalities of
the Church is Ireland, and to increase the weans of reli-
gious instruction and church accommodation fur her Ma-
jesty's Irish subjects. He declared himself bound over in
recoguisances not to do anything detrimental to the Pro-
testant Church, and said that he cheerfully accepted that
restriction. He entered at excessive length into a discus-
sloe of the question, his speech being interrupted by an
unsuccessful attempt at a count out. He proposed, by
various reductions of episcopal and other revennes, by
grouping benefices, and other economical arrangements.
to obtain an income with which be desired to improve the
condition of the Presbyterian and Ronan Catholic clergy,
and he urged that he did not intend to injure the Estab-
lished Church, but to allay the differences and heart-
burnings which its existence in its present form occasioned.
Mr. P. UR.QUHART seconded the motion.
Mr. BROTHERION moved the adjournment of the
debate.
Mr. NAPIER begged that before the debate was re-
sunstd members would read the answer made by the Arch-
deacon of Meath to all Sergeant She's statements. He
considered the proposition unconstitutional, and contrary
to the oath taken by the learned sergeant.
the
Sir
debate he should meet the proposal with a decided
negative.
Mr. NEVirDEGATE charged Sergeant Shee with tak-
ing a course incompatible with the oath he had taken.
The late hour alone prevented a complete answer to his
speech.
Mr. J. FITZGERALD protested against Mr. Newde-
gate's interpretation of the Roman Catholic oath, and also
charged the " whips" with having tried to empty the
house.
Mr. LUCAS said that his complaint was, that Sergeant
Shee's proposal did not deal in a sufficiently sweeping
manner with the Irish Church, which had been endured
too long. He refused to accept the interpretation of the
Roman Catholic oath.
Sergeant SHEE denied that the book to which Mr.
Napier had referred contradicted his statements. He warmly protested against being charged with perjury, and
requested Mr. Napier to be civil.
Mr. WHITESIDE begged to say that when the learned
sergeant brought forward a motion he must expect to hear
it criticised, and argument met by argument. (Hear.)
With regard to the book which had been referred to by
his right hon. friend being a refutation of what had fallen
from the learned sergeant, he could only say that no man
who had written a book was willing to allow that the facts
contained in it had been refuted.
The debate was adjourned to Monday next.
On the motion of Mr. BROTHERTON, the house then ad.
journed at 25 minutes past 12 o'clock.