The Sun.
London, England, 1854-01-30 00:00:00

THE QUEEN V. HENRY NELSON OVERTON.

The prisoner in this case was indicted before the
Recorder of London for embezzling certain moneys re-
ceived by him for his masters, Messrs. Winstead and
Co., from Messrs. Shoolbred and Co. It appeared
that the latter firm kept a book, in which all purchases
made by them were entered, and the person authorised
to receive the payment signed his name in one column.
At the trial the clerk proved that he had paid the
money to the person who had signed the book, and the
book was produced to show the identity of the prisoner,
and that it was he who had signed the book. The case
was argued last Saturday, and was remitted that it might
be amended, and the Recorder in the amended case now
stated that the signature was offered in evidence by the
prosecutor to prove the identity of the prisoner, and the
entry was adverted to by the prisoner's counsel, and was
not objected to by the counsel for the prosecution.
Counsel for the prisoner bad objected to the entry being
received in the evidence as it was a receipt, and did not
bear a stamp, but he had overruled the objection, and
had admitted the entry as evidence, in order to prove
the identity of the prisoner. The question now for the
consideration of the court was whether the entry had
been properly received as evidence or not.
Mr. Metcalfe, on behalf of the prisoner, contended
that the entry had been improperly admitted, and that
the conviction could not be sustained.
Mr. Parry supported the conviction.
The arguments having concluded,
The Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas de-
livered judgment. Ile said that in his opinion the con-
viction was wrong.
The question before the court de-
pended on the consideration of two points :—Firstly, if
the paper put in evidence was an instrument requiring
a stamp ; and, secondly, if it did, could it have been used
at the trial in the way it had been used, unstamped. He
thought it did require a stamp. Documents which re-
quired a stamp were defined as documents which were
an acknowledgment or receipt for the payment or dis-
charge of a sum of money, or which imported the same
thing. The case of "The Queen v. Hunter" showed
that a document which contained the signature of a
party, and which did not impart a receipt, might by
averment be made to signify a receipt, and this might
be brought within the revenue act. He considered he
was bound by the authority of that case, and that the
document required a stamp. If it required a stamp,
and was a competent proof of a direct issue between the
parties it could not be received in evidence without a stamp.
Inasmuch as it appeared that the whole entry was re-
ceived, and that it required a stamp, in his opinion the
conviction was wrong. Yet it was his opinion that the
instrument could have been used without a stamp to
establish the guilt of the party. The course which
should have been taken was to ask one witness if he
had paid the money to the man who had signed the
book, and then to have called another witness, and
asked him if the man who signed the book was the
prisoner from his knowledge of the handwriting. In that
case the signature would have been admissible—in the pre-
sent case it was not, and therefore the conviction could
not be sustained.

The other learned judges concurred.
The conviction was accordingly held to be bad.
THE QUEEN V. JOHN BURTON.

In this case the prisoner was indicted at the Middlesex
Sessions for stealing a quantity of pepper. It appeared
that he was observed coming out of one of the rooms in
the docks in which he had no business, and was stopped
by one of the officials, who said to him, " I think there
is something wrong about you." The prisoner replied,
" I hope you will not be hard on me," and then threw a
quantity of pepper out of his pockets. The witness for
the prosecution could not say that the pepper had been
stolen, for the quantity in the room was so large, but he
stated that the pepper thrown away by the prisoner was
like that in the room. It was contended on behalf of
the prisoner at the trial that the judge (Mr. Serjeant
Adams) was bound to direct an acquittal, on the ground
that the prosecutor could not swear that the article
which formed the subject matter had been stolen, but he
had left the case to the jury, who had convicted the
prisoner.
Mr. Ribton, on behalf of the prisoner, now submitted
that the learned judge was bound by the case of the
" Queen v. Dredge " to direct an acquittal.
The Lord Chief Justice—What is the case of the
" Queen v. Dredge," which was to have such a wonderful
effect on the learned serjeant ?
Mr. Ribton—lt is a case reported in "Cole's Criminal
Cases," in which Mr. Justice Erie decided that in a
charge of larceny, if the prosecutor could not swear to
the article, the prisoner must be acquitted. In that
case, a boy stole a doll and other toys from a toy-shop,
and hid them under his smock-frock, but he denied he
had done so ; and as the prosecutor could not swear to
the toys, the learned judge directed an acquittal.
Mr. Justice Maule—ln the one case the child is in a
toyshop, where he ought to be ; in the other, the man
is in a room, where he ought not to be ; in the one case
the prisoner asserted his rights as a British child—
(laughter)—to have the doll in his smock-frock. The
child stuck to the property ; the man threw it down ;
there is a wide difference in the cases, Mr. Ribton.
Mr. Ribton contended it was necessary to prove, in
the first instance, the corpus delicti, which had not been
done in this case.

Mr. Justice Maule—Suppose a man is seen going
into a cellar in the docks perfectly sober, and if it be
known that he has gone nowhere else, and has yet come
out drunk. would the corpus delicti be proved in that
case ? (Laughter.)
Mr Ribton submitted that the corpus delicti must be
proved conclusively ; but even the case put by his lord-
ship would not shut out the hypothesis, that the smell
of the wine made the man drunk. (Laughter.) The
Prosecutor being unable to swear to the article, the
judge was bound to direct an acquittal.
Mr. Justice Maule—ln one of4the circuitts a father
and his two sons were brought before me for stealing
shoes, the materials of which they were made and the
instruments for marking them from their employers.
The prisoners admitted the employment, and were in-
dicted for stealing 5001. of property for several years.
The prosecutor's stock being so large, they could not
swear to each article. You say I should have directed
an acquittal. Unluckily for the prisoners I did not
adopt that course—(laughter)—and they were all trans-
ported for long periods, which have not yet expired. If
you succeed in this case, I shall be happy to listen to
your application for a free pardon for those men.
Mr. Ribton--Probably at the time your lordship's at
tention was not called to the "Queen v. Dredge."
Mr. Justice Maule—No ; for the "Queen v. Dredge"
had not then, as it is called, "transpired." (Laughter.)
Mr. Ribton then proceeded to contend at some length
that the corpus delicti must be conclusively proved,
either by the loss of the article or by the party being
seen taking it. lie would however admit, though there
was some doubt in this point, that it might be proved
by a confession of guilt ; but he submitted there was
none in this case, for the phrase, "Do not be hard on

. -
me," was quite consistent with the statement made by
the prisoner afterwards, that the pepper had been given
to him by another man. In that case he was a receiver,
and not a thief. ,

The Lord Chief Justice—The case is perfectly clear—
the conviction must he affirmed. There is, as my
brother Mau!e has pointed out, a wide distiction between
this case and that of the "Queen v. Dredge," on which
the learned counsel relies.
Conviction affirtned.