The Sun.
London, England, 1854-02-01 00:00:00

, FEBRUARY 1, 1854.

[PRICE SD.

the wish and desire of the Emperor of Russia himself.
In either case it was in the interests of peace, and in
the interests of the Sultan, to allow further opportunity,
for the ascertainment of the real issue, and for the dis-
covery of some form of note distasteful to either party,
and sufficient to carry into effect the intentions of both.
Austria and Prussia entirely agreed with us as to Rus-
sia's occupation of the principalities; whicle'they consi-
dered not only unjust and dangerous as a precedent, but
as dangerous to themselves, and menacing to the peace
of Europe. They therefore asked, at this crisis, to en-
ter into the negotiation, and to assist in an attempt at
the settlement of these differences ; and they earnestly
deprecated .any declaration of war on the part of the
Sultan until all peaceful means of settling his differences
with Russia had been finally exhausted. And, whatever
the noble lord may think, I doubt not that your lord-
ships will own it was of great importance that the four
Powers should be thus united, that Austria and Prussia
should join with England and France in isolating Rus-
sia in her wrong, and in lttting Russia to understand'
that she would not be able to reckon on that support
from Austria which, for more than one reason, she
might have expected. (Hear, hear.) Her Majesty's
Government never doubted that the occupation of the
Principalities was a cases belli—(hear, hear)— but
the Government, recognising it as a cams belli, con-
sidered also the declaration with which A was accom-
panied, and, under the impression that that might be
sincere, did not advise or press the Sultan to treat •it
as such, and so end all chance of peace. Take tile
other case, that Russia was not sincere. A. declaration
' of war at that moment would have furnished the Em-
peror with just the very excuse he wanted. It would
have absolved him.-from his premise, and from the re-
_pOAltiiililit.Lor...SQUlPletwier hostilitiek and would,hate
„left him in .a position to say, " I ()coupled the Princi-
palities, but I declared it should only be for a short
time. I did not desire war. I was ready to accept
peace ; but my assurances have been disbelieved. War
has been declared upon me, and I now consider myself
bound in honour and dignity to accept the challenge."
(Hear' hear.) Ido not say that the argument would be
just ; but it would be as good an argument as many
others employed in the course of this affair. And your
lordships must be aware that at that moment Turkey
was wholly unprepared for resistance, her fortresses
ungarrisoned, and her army weak and undisciplined.
Were not these most cogent reasons on our part for not
recommending the Sultan to declare war ? By our not
doing so, he gained time—time for settling affairs peace-
ably, time for making preparations for war. And before
this opinion of her Majesty's Government could be con-
veyed to Constantinople, we found that her Majesty's
ambassador there—who, being on the spot, was a better
judge than ourselves of what was for the interest of the
Sultan—bad tendered the same advice, that the Sultan
had accepted and determined to act on it, and that, with
such a hope of a peaceable solution, it would have been
most unjustifiable in ns to urge the Sultan on to war. I
trust your lordships will consider these satisfactory rea-
sons why we did not then press on those more active
measures which my noble friend considers to have
been necessary ; and I assure him that our not
doing so was not from any abject indisposition to
war, such as he seems to attribute it to ; for I do
not think that any Government in this country
with a just and righteous cause, would be allowed to
want the support of the people of England in carrying it
out. And here, lam sure you will not think it out of
place if I declare my testimony to the straightforward,
friendly, and perfectly honourable policy of the French
Government on this question. The two Governments
have been in daily, I may almost say hourly, communi-
cation. They have formed, as it were, but one Cabinet ;
and I can assure my noble friend that there have never
been more differences between the two Governments than
are to be found in the same Cabinet—differences that
have only increased our respect for each other and ren•
dered the harmony more complete. And this union that
exists between the two Governments is not only con-
fined to the Eastern question, but extends to other mea-
sures, in which happily the policy of the two countries,
hitherto antagonistic, may be now seen to be harmo-
nious. This good, at least, then is secured, that two
great and hitherto rival countries have learnt to know
and appreciate each other, to detect the fallacy of con-
cluding themselves natural enemies, and to act heartily
together for a just and righteous cause, to which their
common sympathies attract them. There was another
point on which the noble lord dwelt on which I may
say a few words, reserving myself in all matters of
detail till the papers are before your lordships. As re-
gards the Vienna note, it should be stated that after
Prince Menschikoff left Constantinople, the Austrian
Government suggested such a note as, whilst not unac-
ceptable to Russia, should have regard to the indepen-
dence of Turkey. In the meanwhile the French Go•
vernment prepared a note on the same basis ; and they
submitted it to us. We did not think it a note likely to
be successful, but as the French Government had a ma-
nifest desire to sered it, by way of peace offering, both to
Petersburg and Vienna, we offered no opposition of
course, and it was duly forwarded. The Russian Go-
vernment, however, gave no answer to it, havingalready
accepted that of Austria. No answer being received at
Vienna this note was adopted, and was sent at the same
time to Petersburg and Constantinople. At Petersburg
it was said to be unsatisfactory, but the Emperor never-
theless professed himself ready to accept it, wit's no
alteration. Tire Porte objected to accepting it without
certain modifications. These inoilifications being core-a-
dored simply as means of rendering more clear the bona
II le intentions of both parties. were, on that ground,
adopted at the conference of Vienna ; but they were
rejected by Russia. We did not, of course, think that
the note originally exposed the Porte to the dangers
supposed, but the changes made were made on that sup-
position, and were merely such as more clearly defined
the first meaning and intention of the note. Great mis-
apprehension exists on this point as to the part taken
by the Four Powers. The Four Powers, be it re-
membered, had merely offered to mediate between the
two parties ; they were not arbitrating, and are not to
be considered as arbitrating. They were not there
to enforce the note, of which the first proof is, that,
as I have stated, they at once and unhesitatingly
adopted the modifications pronounced requisite by
the Porte, But her Majesty's Government did not
suppose the note to be of the dangerous character
supposed by the Porte, until Russia explained the
use it might be turned to ; then her Majesty's Govern-
ment said no more in behalf of it. The conference, after
having signed the protocol, determined to ask the Porte
on what terms he would be prepared to negotiate it, and
the Four Powers offered their bases for the consideration
of Russia. By the protocol they affirm that if Russia
does net accept them, she is the sole obstacle to peace,
and must be held responsible for war ; and that is the
present state of affairs as far as negotiations are con-
cerned. No answer has been received from St. Peters-
' burg • but I am inclined to agree that such fair and rea-
sonable propositions as those are not very likely to be
rejected. As regards the position of her Majesty's Go-
vernment, when, notwithstanding that negotiations were
going on, that horrible disaster at Sinope happened—
when, the Turkish fleet not having been employed- that
I know of in the way stated by my noble friend, but
simply lying peaceably in harbour—when this Turkish
fleet was destroyed in the barbarous manner it was—
(hear, hear)—in the harbour of Sinope, her Majesty's
Government with France determined at once to protect,
not only the Ottoman territory, but also the Ottoman
flag. They determined then to extend their protection,
and, as in honour bound, they sent notice of their inten-
tion to the Russian Admiral at Sebastopol and to the
Russian Government. .That is the present state of our
communications on this important subject, and, as I have
arid, I shall refrain now from entering into any details.
I have merely endeavoured to meet some of tire main
charges brought against the Government by the noble
lord, leaving it for the house, when your lordships have
the papers before you, to say whether the interests, the
honour, and the dignity of the country have not been
well cared for. We may even then possibly be charged
with having laboured to long, too far, and too hard in
the cause of peace, but such will not, I think, be the
opinion of the majority of the house. On the contrary,
I think that in the event of war we shall be able,with
all the greater force, to appeal to those pacific efforts,c
a
when, if we must, we call for the hearty, and energetic
assistance of the people of this country in aid of
ijust
and righteous cause. (Cheers.)
The Earl of MALMESBURY said—The first para-
graph of the speech from the Throne, in reference to the
Eastern question, seemed to take away any hope that
might have remained of the settlement of that unfortu-
nate affair in a peaceful manner. There were in that
first paragraph several omissions which appeared to him
of an important character. In the first place, ho must
say that it appeared to him most remarkable that no
mention was made of two out of the three countries
which were in alliance with us in this most important
question, Austria or Prussia. Another omission was
that of the real purpose for which the people were to be
invited to support an increase of our armaments—the
maintenance, namely, of the independence of Turkey—
whereas the only object assigned in the speech was the
support of her Majesty's representative, and the more
effectually contributing to the restoration of peace. The
only explanation of this omission seemed to be that, in
point of fact, Ministers were not earnest in their support
of the independence and integrity of Turkey. Lord
Malmesbury then complained that the Government had
withheld from their lordships the means of forming an
opinion on their conduct, but had allowed one of the
most important documents in the negotiation to be pub-
lished in the Times, within a fortnight, he said, of the
time when Earl,Clarendon refused to produce the reply
of the Government to the second manifesto of Count
Nesselrode, on the ground that its production might
endanger the solution of the question. The paper
in question appeared at full length in the Times
newspaper, and was introduced by the language and
preamble which, by all who knew that newspaper, were
perfectly understood as indicating that it was a sort of
official announcement. The paper was stated to be a
correct version of tho noble earl's reply to Count Nessel-
rode's manifesto, an incorrect version having been given
in coma other journal. Now, he (the Earl of Malmes-

bury) said this was not respectful to Parliament ; it was
not respectful to Parliament ; it was not respectful to
the country ; and he would almost like to ask—he was ,
so much astonished that the noble lord refused to pro- ' ''
duce such a paper to that house—why it was, sent to the
Times? He would not have thought such a thing poi-
Bible ; but extraordinary rumours had lately been rife in
town that not long ago, when one of the principal
Ministers—if not the principal Minister 'in the Cabinet
—resigned his office, the first intimation her Majesty hs:d ... . -
of that resignation was throughtchoeTittnueseg firstnew leaspaprnert, .':-
and that some of the noble lord's colleagues
the circumstance from the Times newspaper, to which,,Of . .
course, it had been communicated by somcevery import- .
ant colleague of the noble viscount. Now, if this was
true—he (Lord Malmesbury) did not say that it was,--
if this system was acted upon,—if newspapers, or if a fa-
vourite newspaper, were to receive official communica-
tions of so important a nature that the Foreign Secretary •
declared 'it was dangerous to place them upon the table
of the house-4f newspapers were to receive docunients
of that kind before Parliament and instead of Parliament,
he could only say that they had four estateirin the realm,
and that of those four. estates the• Queen was not, the
I first and their lordships were 11.4 the second. He thought,
j however, that, in another point of view, her Majesty's
Government had erred in keeping the country and '
Par-
liament so long in ignorance of the negotiations. Re
could understand that, under some circumStances, it
might be very inconvenient to be constantly placine. pa-
pers of this kind before Parliament, but he believed that
I on this occasion, if the Government had been mere can-`T
did in their explanations, they would have elicited from .;
Parliament a- manifestation of that feeling which the '
country of its accord had since displayed. Such a dis-
play could but have assisted the Government ; it could
but have armed their hands, and prevented a misappre-
, hension, which he believed bad long existed in the mind
of the Emperor of Russia--namely,. that after fody
years' peace,. commerce, and prosperity, this country
had so much' degenerated that it had fallen into, a state'
of . indifference regarding its treaties with its allies,
its own:character and its own honour, and that:it
ready
. .
was to purchase peace at any price. (Hear, hear.) •
By depiessiat,
the French alliance during his (Earl , ,
Valuiesbn,_
_rf§lYtenrire of office, they had led Russia' to, ' ~,-':..\....1' ' ~t''' ~,,
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gt—Tssion, in concert with France; he believed that peace
would never have been endangered. Almost during the
whole time for which his noble friend (Lord Derby)-held
the office of Prime Minister, the press which represented
or was supposed to represent the opinions, not only of
what he might call the legitimate Opposition—the Whig
Opposition—but also of a smaller section of politicians
who had since formed a coalition with the present Go-
vernment, unremittingly blamed the foreign policy of
his noble friend's Government with regard to the ap-
parent eagerness and anxiety which that Government
had shown to confirm an alliance, not with France only,
but with the new dynasty established by the French
people. He (Lord Malmesbury) was constantly taunted
with being ready to sacrifice the best interests of his
country for the sake of an alliance with the French
Government. The accident of his (Lord Malmes-
bury's) personal acquaintance with the Emperor of
France some years ago was sufficient ground for
framing against him an accusation that, having a per-
sonal predilection in favour of Louis Napoleon, he wished
to see him rather than any other man upon the throne
of France. He (Lord Malmesbury) felt little moved at
the time by those attacks, because he was certain that
no alliance could be of such vital consequence, not only
to this country itself, but to the general peace f Europe,
as an alliance with a powerful country like France—our
nearest neighbour, and with a man who, he had every
reason to believe, was determined to remain at peace
with all other nations, and to maintain the territorial
distribution of Europe as it was arranged by the treaties
of 1814. The policy of the late Government had been
fully vindicated since that time, for the very newspapers
which abused them for such policy had gone even to the
length of saying that no other alliance was of such im-
portance to England as that of France. But the lan-
guage of the press to which he alluded made a very
strong and lasting impression upon the Courts of Europe
with respect to our alliance with France. The eyes of
every Court of Europe were at that time intently fixed
upon the motions of the new-fledged Emperor and the
country which bad been the first to recognise him,
and what was their impression ? Judging from the
language of the mouthpiece—not the real but the
apparent mouthpiece of noble lords opposite—foreign
Courts naturally argued that if the then Govern-
-1 ment were not in office, a different line of policy would
be taken by the then Opposition, who might succeed
them. The Opposition did come into office very soon
afterwards, and was it possible to believe that the Em-
peror of Russia would not consider that the same
anxiety did not exist in the new Cabinet to form an
alliance, 'not only with France, but with the new
dynasty of France, which had existed on the part of the
preceding Government ? The eyes of Russia, as well as
of other Powers, were fixed upon the conduct of the
new Government, and what was the first thing that
happened ? Within a month after the new Government
accepted office two of its members addressed their con-
stituents, in two different boroughs of England, in a.
manner which, both in expression and in spirit, was
deeply offensive to the French people and to the French
Emperor. Those speeches were explained—how ex-
plained—he (Lord Malmesbury) did not know ; but he
was told by his noble friend last August that the Em-
peror of the French had sense and good feeling enough
to understand the motive of those speeches and not to,
be offended at them. He (Lord Malmesbury) perfectly
believed that, for the Emperor of the French had this
advantage over other Sovereigns—that through a life
of vicissitudes he had mixed with society of all gradets
and classes, that lie had lived a long time in this
country and knew it well, that he was acquainted with
its peculiarities—he (Lord Malmesbury) would not
say its eccentricities --and he perfectly understood that
the speeches of a Minister had various meanings accord-
ing- to the period at which they were uttered and tho
place in which they were spoken. These speeches were
therefore excused by the Emperor ; but it was certain,
and he (Lord Malmesbury) knew it to be a fact, that
the circumstance of such speeches having been uttered
so soon after the accession of a Ministry upon whom the
eyes of all European Governments were fixed, made a
strong impression upon those Governments that, im
their inmost minds, some, if not all, of her Majesty's
Ministers were averse, if not hostile, to an alliance with
the new dynasty of France ; and he believed that the
Emperor of Russia was deceived by these things. He
(Lord Malmesbury) agreed with the noble marquis in
thinking that more energy and vigour in time might
have saved us from the impending war. God forbid that
he, or any man on that (the Opposition) side of the
house, should not be ready to praise her Majesty's
Government for doing all in their power to avert a war.
It was not for endeavouring to avert a war that he
blamed them, but for not having taken the best means
to avert a war—(hear, hear)—for exhibiting vacillation,
for not having taken the ball at a bound, for not having
seized the proper moment when they might have given
Russia to understand that France and England were
determined to resist the aggression. The noble earl
then passed a warm eulogiam on the patriotic spirit
which Turkey had exhibited, and concluded by depre-
cating the introduction of any of the measures of reform
which were suggested in the Royal speech.
Lord GREY reserved his opinion upon the Eastern
question until the papers were before the House, but in
the meantime, he thought the course pursued by her
Majesty's Government stood greatly in need of explana-
tion and vindication. (Hear, hear.) So far as he was
yet acquainted with the facts, he confessed that, in the
first place, he was not satisfied that they ought to have
interfered at all in this matter. (Hear, hear.) He con-
curred in opinion with the noble Secretary for Foreign
Affairs that, the flames of an European war once lighted,
no man could tell how far the conflagration might ex-
tend, or foresee the depth of human misery which might
be occasioned. He argued that, even if the war were
ever so short, it would be attended with infinite
injury to the interests and welfare of mankind. All
those measures of improvement which in this country
and in others had made such wonderful progress within
the last 40 years, if not absolutely arrested, would at
least be materially retarded when men's energies and
thoughts were occupied in devising their mutual de-
struction, when the country would be called upon to
make the greatest sacrifices, and when misery would be
carried into many families by the loss of their friends
and relatives. These considerations struck him with
horror and apprehension ; and, knowing the character
of
tionthteheTurkh
fairest
isregion Government,of knowing
the e a
rearth
tohad whatbeen a cod n
reducedi-
by four centuries of Turkish rule, knowing, too, that
to this day the Christian subjects of the Porte were
labouring under an oppression as severe as that to
which the negro population in our own colonies were
subjected before slavery was abolished (for he believed
that even to this hour the evidence of a Christian was
not received against a Mahomedan in a Turkish court of
justice, whatever might have been the wrongs that he,
or his family, had endured); and remembering what the
calamities of war were, it would take much to convince
him that this country had any interest in supporting
Turkey against what he admitted to be the entirely un-
justifiable demands of Russia, which could for one mo-
ment be set against its immeasurably superior interest
in the maintenance of European peace. If, however, we
were to go to war, he urged that young and intelligent
officers should be appointed to the principal commands,
and justified his recommendation by the examples of al-
most all the great names in our military annals. Colonel
Eyre, who had distinguished himself in the Kafir war,
had been promoted, and be hoped that precedent would
be followed until both the army and navy were efficiently
officered. lie thought the question of reform by no
means pressed for immediate solution, and hoped that it
would not be allowed to interfere with whatever might
be necessary for the vigorous prosecution of the war.
The Earl of DERBY, after briefly alluding to the
" most awful crisis" in which we were now placed, ad-
verted to some of the minor topics in the Queen's Speech,
expressing his opinion of the difficulty of dealing benefi-
cially with the law cf settlement, declaring his strong
doubts of the advantages anticipate I from the measures
proposed for the Universities, and remarking on the omis-
sion of all mention of the great subject of general education,
the negotiation still pending with the United States, and
the conclusion of the treaty by which the River Plate had
been opened to the commerce of the world. He then en.-
tered into a criticism of the long negotiation with Russia.
I confess, he said, I could have wished that the language
of the Speech had been more distinct and clear on this
point. lam left, as the noble marquis who alluded to the
question, has observed, to conjecture whether we are at
this moment at peace or at war. If I were to presume
that we were actually at war, not only would it be imme-
diately repudiated by the noble earl at the howl of her
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