The Sun.
London, England, 1854-09-30 00:00:00

and inducing their Generals to suppose that at
Sebastopol they would have to encounter an enemy
far more formidable than the Russians. They
know the stuff better of which French and English
are composed to suppose that they could be deterred
from advancing by exaggerated accounts of the
strength and efficiency of the adversary. If bully-
ing or boasting could be of any service, they would
willingly resort to it ; but accounts of their strength
and efficiency would only stimulate the ardour of
the Western warriors, and render them even
more impatient for the fray. They strive
to make it be believed that they are
weakened by disease, and incapable of offer:-
ing an obstinate resistance. If the cholera
were so fatal at Sebastopol as to cut of 20,000 (!)
or even 2,000 of the Russian troops (as suggested
at Vienna), the leaders of the invading army, who
are known to look to the lives of their men with
much greater anxiety than Russian commanders,
might possibly feel disposed to protract their ope-
rations, more particularly if they supposed that
they had only to encounter 45,000 men, separated
and divided into different parts. If it only caused
the delay of a single day the advantage would be
cheaply purchased by the concoction of spurious
despatches, and the sacrifice of an unfortunate
courier. " Sacrifice," perhaps, is not the word.
His capture as a prisoner of war would probably
place him in a much better position
than he could hope to be while a miser-
able serf, dreading the Russian stick, and
subjected to every whim of his demi-barbarian
commanders. We believe, then, that the inten-
tion of the parties who framed this despatch was
that it should fall into the hands of the Allies,
and that the capture of the courier was delibe-
rately planned by the Russians, with the view of
retarding the march on Sebastopol. This will, we
think, prove to be the history of this one of the
latest wiles of our cunning adversaries.

It is easy to ridicule prophets, and to fling at
somewhat hopeful speculators the proverb of
counting our chickens before they are hatched ;
yet the next few moves must always be in the
minds of all earnest men. The press ought not
to allow the public to be without a course to take
in each probable event. Germanism and Rus-
sianism know full well what course they will
take, if the French and English people will let
them ; it behoves, therefore, those who watch for
peoples and not for Courts, to utter the popular
reasonings loudly enough to unite and embolden
the latter, and to keep our Cabinets in mind of
the power which can one day reckon with them.
All our managers of the War are friends of the
dynasties, all Englishmen and Frenchmen are
friends of the nationalities ; it is of the last
importance then that the supporters in heart of
HAPSBURGS, HOHENZOLLERNS, and even Ro-
MANOFFS, should nct catch the friends of the
enslaved nations napping. Just ,now, however,
and at last, we have taken a bold step, and the
inquiry what we mean to do, if it be successful,
is eminently pertinent.
Suppose, then, we accomplish our present ob-
ject fully—suppose Sebastopol taken—suppose,
too, if any one likes, the Circassian forts all de-
molished, Odessa in our hands, Ismail captured
and garrisoned by OMER PACHA, and the mouths
of the Danube quite free--rather too good a con-
clusion, no doubt, to the dawdling commence-
ments in the spring—the question is, What
then ? Will Russia vigorously prolong the war ?
We sincerely wish she may. In that case even
our Cabinet must go right. The Black Sea,
swept clean of Russian ships of war, if the cowards
who fired away at Sinope, but now skulk at
Sebastopol deserve that name, would need but a
small fleet of observation. Transports with a
moderate convoy would finish the work on the south
coast of Russia and in Asia next spring, or it may
even be accomplished before this winter sets in.
The whole nearly of the combined fleet, with suit-
able gun-boats prepared in the winter, would be
ready, on the breaking up of the ice, to blow every
Russian fortress which protects St. Petersburg to
atoms in a short time. As Fox and HENDERSON'S
men proposed over their wine, their masters would
contract with the Government, having such means
at their disposal, to take Sweaborg, Cronstadt,
and anything else they pleased, for so many thou-
sands or millions. We only hope the CZAR will
" ride the high horse" and compel our leaders to
give him a fall he will never get over, or the CZARS
after him for generations to come.
But suppose, on the other hand, his brothers
in crime, and one of them brother by affinity too,
persuade him in dignified diplomatic lies to cant
about peace—persuade him to do the humane,
with their own humane selves as the unselfish
mediators—shall he or they be listened to ? Shall
his amour propre, as the phrase went, be again
consulted ? Shall the great liar and deceiver's
self-complacent professions be entertained, just to
while away the sessions of the British Parliament ?
Shall negotiations which " cannot be yet made
public" be the stock answer for every interroga-
tor ? To all these questions the public must be
prepared with an emphatic NO—Russia must not
be admitted to treat, except as a beaten power.
She must surrender everything military on the
Black Sea for ever, seeing she has no real right to
be there, and knows not how to use military
power. The whole course of the Danube must be
free, and her armies must be forbidden to approach
the Pruth. Next, all her modern thefts must be
surrendered, not only south of the Caucasus, but
in Finland and Poland too. Very big talking
this, some may say, and descant on the folly of
making demands which will never be conceded.
Very likely they would not ; but we maintain
that we should gain immensely by the refusal.
It would be cheapest for us to finish up our Black
Sea work in the Baltic, and to put England and
France at rest for a century to come, on the score
of naval danger from the barbarians of the Krem-
lin. To the above righteous demands must be
added many others of course ; the Protectorate,
the Treaties, the intermeddling with the Princi-
palities, and the like, would go of themselves with
the pride and power of the foe ; but the indem-
nification of Turkey, France, and England ought
to be insisted on as a sine qua non. Russia made
Austria indemnify her for enslaving Hungary ;
Austria compelled Piedmont to pay her the ex-
penses of re-enslaving Lombardy. Let the ball
go round. Let Russia now pay the cost of being
prevented from enslaving any more of Europe.
It is the cheapest way of keeping her from trying
it on again. Let her raise a loan for once to pay
the costs of a war of independence. Paying the
interest of it will be the cleverest way of reducing
her army ; it will do as much for the peace of
Europe, to lighten her purse as to occupy her
territories. The worthy Jews of Frankfort and
our Exchange would not be very hard upon her.
They would think a loan, which bound her over
to keep the peace, quite as safe as a loan to aid
her and Austria in crushing Hungary and Lom-
bardy. Moreover, it is but fair to us that we
should be reimbursed for all the taxes, continued,
as well as imposed, to repress her fraud and
violence.

We lay it down as an axiom, that the Russian
business must not be done by halves. If we suc-
ceed at Sebastopol, her whole marine frontier can
snen be rendered powerless for offence. It ought
to be so. Fortifications at St. Petersburg are of
no
Ilse, except as a base for operations against the
Scandinavian Powers. Two great conquerors left
the city of the Czars untouched; no third con I
queror can do it with safety to Europe. Let it be
a, five months' northern port, if thr Czar-ships
like ; but let it not be a military fastness
ou the borders of barbarism, from which liberty
despot. Let the Czars
and civilisation shall be ever in jeopardy from the
proper place, and
live there and mind their iiltl will
never need to be burned again.
karemepeadtshlalese.ofivalowsiclofuwl
is
their
business,i if they w own
But will this, after all, enfeeble Russia ? Can she
not nurse her armies in her interior, and pour
them forth through Poland upon Europe ?
Spending her naval funds upon Ler army, can she