The Sun.
London, England, 1854-03-13 00:00:00

ASSIZE INTELLIGENCE.

MIDLAND CIRCIIIT.—NOTTINGHAM, March 10.
(Before Mr. Justice Coleridge.)
CHARGE OF MURDERING A WIFE.

Edward Theobald Stevenson, aged 26, a carpenter,
was indicted for the wilful murder of his wife, Sarah
Ann Stevenson, on the 27th of September.
Mr. Booth appeared for the prosecution, and Mr.
O'Brien defended the prisoner.
This case was of an extraordinary, though most dis-
gusting nature. It seemed that in September last the
deceased had a miscarriage, and after lingering in intense
agony for several days she died on the 27th, the direct
cause, according to the medical evidence, being inflam-
mation of the peritoneum. Before her death, and when
she believed herself to be in a dying state, she made a
declaration to her mother and two police officers to the
effect that her huiland had, on several occasions, em-
ployed an instrument for the purpose of procuring abor-
tion. The medical witnesses stated that such an em-
ployment of an instrument would produce the inflamma-
tion which had caused the death of the woman. It
might, however, they admitted, be caused simply by
cold.

Mr. O'Brien addressed the jury on behalf of the pri-
soner and his lordship summed up.

A verdict of acquittal was returned, and the prisoner
was ordered to be discharged, his lordship, however, re-
marking, that although the evidence as to the cause of
the woman's death was too doubtful to warrant the jury
in finding him guilty of the murder, still it could not be
doubted by any one who had heard the evidence that he
had behaved in the brntd and wicked manner described
in the statements of his unfortunate wife.

NORFOLK CIRCUIT.—BEDFORD, MARCH 11.
(Before the Lord Chief Baron.)
MURDER AT HEATIT,AND.REACII.

Abel Burrows, 37, a gardener, was indicted for the
murder of Charity Glenister, at Heath-and-Reach, near
Leighton Buzzard.
The prisoner lived in a cottage with his wife, neer
another cottage, in which his father resided with the de-
ceased, who was about 70 years of age. On the night
of the 24th Nov., the prisoner became very violent, and
went to his father's house very much excited, and using
strong language. The old woman, Charity Glenister,
went into the house of A.dains, a neighbour, as prisoner
had threatened her life. In the course of the night pri-
soner's father was heard to call out " Murder ;" and in
the morning, about 8 o'clock, prisoner went to Adams's
house, burst the door open, ran up the stairs, and
having caught hold of the poor old woman, struck her
on the head with a stone-breaking hammer and knocked
her down. He continued to strike her, although Adams
tried to prevent him. He expressed his joy at the event,
and said Charity and his own wife had sent his mother's
soul to hell, and would cause him to be hanged, as he
meant to murder both. He sang hymns and uttered
strange incoherent expressions until the policeman of
the village took him befure a magistrate. On being com-
mitted to Bedford gaol he was much excited and con-
tinued so for some weeks. Medical testim my was given
that prisoner had been ,a person of loose habits, and had
suffered from delirium tremens. Lately he had been
cautioned by a surgeon to leave off drink, or he would
lose his senses. It appeared that he had the stone-
hammer in his possession for some time, and threatened
the life of his father, and expressed his determination
to murder his own wife, but no person attempted to take
it from him. The poor old woman his victim had the
left side of her skull completely beaten in, and she died
that same morning.
The Chief B teen summed up strongly in favour of the
admission of the prisoner's plea of inseni t. •
The jury retired fer !ieme tines, aul on coming into
court returned a verdict of " Wilful murder."
The judge then passed sentence of death upon the pri-
-50462,, wbo ttil get betray the 'cut eraotioz o. concern,

A RUSSIAN MEMORANDUM.

The Journal (11 St. Petersbourg publishes, in a
supplement to its number of the 19th of February
(3d Much), a memorandum addressed by the Rus-
sian Government to its diplomatic agents abroad,
and communicated by each of them, in virtue of
instructions annexed to it, to the Government to
which ho is accredited. The importance of this
document induces us to giro it in extols°.

" MEMORANDUM.

" At the moment when, the Eastern question becomes more
complicated than ever by the entrance into the Black Sea of
the fleets of England and France, and by the rupture of our
diplomatic relation with both Governments, it is natural that
each of the principal parties interested in this affair should
seek to throw off its shoulders the burden of responsibility
attached to the possible consepances of the redoubtable
question. The conscience of the Cabinets becomes alarmed,
and starts back with reason at the idea of a general war in
which the prosinritie,s of a long peace would perish, and
which may expose to new dangers a society scarcely recovered
from the last revolutions. Many efforts have been male and
are still daily male to fix upon Russia the cause of the actual
crisis, and to throw upon her the reproach of the evils that
may result therefrom. A retrospective glance on the motives
and different phases of this crisis will show that if it has
assumed such alarming proportions the fault is net to be attri-
butbd to R'14319.

" It is far from our thoughts to wish to throw a doubt upon
the piciic seathneats of the powers who hwe just assumed an
attitude next to hostile against us Certainly they desired
peace, as we ourselves desired it. But prevention, distrust,
and an unjust appreciation of our political views with regard
to the Ottoman empire, which has been the principle of their
conduct since the beginning, could not but lead them naturally
to the very consequences they wished to avoid. Their position
and ours have been false ones since the beginning—
" 1. From the point of view from which they regarded the
question.
" 2. By the measures they adopted for its solution.
" A few words will sufile 3 to recal what was the first cause
of our difference with the Porte.

" For some time all the acts of the Turkish Government to-
wards us, as towards the Eastern Church in Turkey, bore
the evident stamp of hostility. It is known what sympathies
and spiritual relations an identity of worship and of race has
established from time immemorial between Russia and the
majority of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. It gives to
us in Turkey a moral influence which we do not wish to deny.
It is a fact which I did not create. It is the work of time
and place. Independently of treaties, it is the result of • the
force of circumstances. Hence the distrust it causes to the
Turkish Government. Hence its desire to weaken the Eastern
Church out of fear of the bonds that unite it to Russia; its
efforts to keep it in a state of inferiority opposite other Chris-
tian communities, and to favour at its expense the progress of
their propaganda. It wauld be too long to enumerate here, one
by one, all the proofs of this system, all the ooen or secret blows
which the Turkish Governmeathu aimed during the last years
at the worship we profess. Direst interference in its internal
affairs, and vi olati o e of its st states, under the pretext of reforms
to be accomplished in the clerical administration ; constant ir-
regularities in the election of the patriarchs; germs of discord
purposely sown in the spiritual relations between the Greek
and Slave races ; obstacles of every description thrown in the
way of the development of the Bulgarian and Bosnian
Churches, of the instruction of the native clergy, of the reli-
gions edireati in of the people; interdiction, for that purpose,
of the use of the national language in the performance of
worship ; prohibition or partial laceration of the holy books
, sent for by the Greco-Slave clergy to Russia for their use,
and which it cannot easily procure elsewhere ; prohibition to
build a stone church on the spot where a wooden one has
broken down ; in another case permission granted to the La-
tins to build a church where it is denied to the Greeks ; a
thousand facts, in a word, which, taken each individually,
have but a relative importance, bat which, taken in their
ewer-4W, demonstrate to us that for years it has been the
firm intention of the Turkish Government to contribute to
foster other faiths, to diminish with the power of ours the
number of those whom it regards as the adherents of Russia.
" We do not here speak of acts still more crying than this
mute persecution—of the massacres at Aleppo, of cruelties,
profanations, forced conversion to Islamism, in Albania, in
Bulgaria, in Herzegowina, in Montenegro. They are more
generally known.
" It is all these vexatious facts, the object of our constant
representations, which, crowned lately by the praju lice done
to the Greeks iu the affair of the Holy Places, and, finally, by
the public infraction of the firm in destined to re-establish
the balance between them and the L atin Church by proceed-
ings meet hurtful to the feelings of the Imperial Cabinet, and
of the Emperor in particular, modish I, it is known, the mis-
sion of Prince Mensettikoff to Constantinople.
" It will be we lerstee 1, then, that a pare and simple set-
tlement of the affair of the Holy Places, by means of a new
firman as pewerl ,se as the firs% could not sal ea to satisfy
our dxliplaitit;; that in futu-e we unit have a mire express
guarantee, to serve moreover as a reparation for the want of
personal consideration, of welch the Emperor had to com-
plain, on the part of the Sultan.
" It has b :ea pretended that, the arrangement terminated,
we have su heels and afterw ar is advanced the demand of
that g:II.C.VIt 30 as new preteasioa. The first notes pre-
seated by Prince WensehikoT establish bayou l a doubt that
from the outset of his mission the two demands were made
together and simultaneously.
" When time shall have removed the veil of suspicions and
preconceived ideas which tag often deuataralise the inten-
tions of Russia in all that concerns Turkey, it will be granted
that the text of that guarantee contained nothing unyual,
nothing alarming, for the safety of the Sultan. It was founded
upon treaties by which the Turkish Government already pro-
mised us to protect our religion and churches in its states.
An engagement to protect a religion and its churches, and a
reserved right to alter at will the privileges and immunities
which serve as a basis to its existence—are not those two
contradictory things? And of what practical value could be
an engage vent thus understood I In insisting upon the
maintenance of the privileges assured to tha Greek warship
by a secular possession (ah antig an), we do not demand any-
thing else than that which is implied by the treaty of Kai-
na.rdji itself, and by those confirming it, consequently no-
thing contrary to the independence of the Saltan if those
treaties were not considered contrary to it. The only new
advantages we demand for the Greeks are the more certain
possession of those they already possess; and for ourselves in
particular, no other rights than the One which has already
belonged to us of exercising our active solicitude in their fa-
vour. By admitting that the Greeks had already enjoyed,
an I would continue to enjoy, their religions privileges under
the egide of their Sovereign the Sultan, we sulleiently estab-
lished its character. Thera was n Wain so vary exorbitant
in all this. It was the only satisfaction which we demanded
in return for the little want of consideration shown to Ui.

tion he refused, she entered a territory he had not yet ceded,
blockaded his ports, and drove out his troops from the citadel
of Antwerp; when, finally, on a recent occasion, England in
time of peace blockaded the Emus and seized Greek vessels
as a peenniaiy pledge for some insignificant pecuniary claims
—.all those measures, in a strict point of view, were cacaosbellti. The powers who did not take part in them, and dis-
approved of them, might have declared them such if they had
not preferred following a conciliating line of policy. They
did not do so then to avoid pitting Europe in a blaze. We
think that on this occasion it would have been desirable for
the peace of the world that England and France should have
shown the same discretion. It is true that, at the first mo-
ment, they did not positively declare our occupation a cases
belli. But they took good care to establish that the Porte
had and would have, whenever she chose, the right of regard-
ing it as such, and of acting accordingly. If this was not pro-
voking war by an immediate declaration, it was holding it in
suspense.

4 Although by the menacing position which they had taken
at the mouth of the Dardanelles the two maritime powers had
already constituted themselves judges and parties in the ques-
tion, and we consequently could not recognise them iu the
character of mediators, nevertheless we did not refuse to ex-
amine the propositions they made to us.
" This clearly proved that, in our idea, the occupation of
the principalities was less the object of ambitions covetous-
ness than a means to negotiate. It would be easy for us to
prove by convincing documents, that all the propositions
made to us were based upon the idea that some satisfaction
was due to us. The English Cabinet, in proposing to substi-
tute for the note rejected by the Ottoman Government a pro-
ject of convention (precisely the same form against which so
many objections had been main at Constantinople), meant
thereby to procure for us a more complete satisfaction. The
French Cabinet, on its part, by proposing to us the project
of a new note, presented it to us drawn up in a manner to
contain in substance all the essential guarantees demanded
by Prince Menschikoff, and to give us a title of intervention
if the disposition of the Divan should undergo a change. In
a word, it did not challenge either our right to express our
solicitude for our co-religionists in Turkey, nor that of exer-
cising it actively ; precisely what the Porte has since denied
us, and with it the Powers that had acknowledged it.
" From the pourparlers which took place, and especially
from the project presented by the Cabinet of the Tuileries,
resulted the Vienna note.

"The empressement with which we accepted it is known.
"We might have—it is a right which the Porta itself has
largely made use of—entered into a preliminary dispute on
the terms, and replied to that proposition by counter-propo-
sitions, if, as slander declared, we had sought a .pretext to
spin out negotiations, and indefinitely prolong the occupa-
tion of the Danubian provinces. We did no such thing,
however. The project of Vienna, as soon as it was received,
and though it was still liable, as was the case, to modifica-
tions at London and Paris, was accepted by us by telegraph.
Why ? If •we ifere not animated frankly by pacific inten-
tions, we wished to terminate the crisis as promptly as pos-
sible, withdraw a moment sooner our troops from the princi-
palities, take advantage of the season which still permitted
their retrograde march, and thus give to the two allied Cabi-
nets the means of withdrawing honourably from Besika Bay,
Which in the autumn would be untenlble. All this might
have been done; and for the second time the Powers had
the opportunity of cutting off all ulterior eomp:ications, pro-
vided the Porte coal,' m ►k3 up its min 1 as promptly as we
did to accept the compromise substituted for the project of
Prince Meuse hiko ff.

" What, then, was the duty of the Powers, if, as we doubt
not, like us, they wished to accelerate a solution ? To insist
a; Constantinople on a pure and simple adhesion ; not to allow
the Porte to make new delays and modifications to their note.
They were aware that we accepted it on that sole condition,
such a 3 it was.

" But by the very position they had taken at Besika, the
two maritime courts had weakened their means of action
upon the Porte. The Turks felt themselves supported and
masters of the situation. By inebriating them with the pres-
tige of their independence, they had taken Europe at its word,
and Europe in its tura had placed itself under the empire of
bellicose influences which disputed the ground at Constanti-
nople with the ideas of peace.
" The Porte objected to the terms of the note, and demanded
modifications, which the foreign representatives allowed
themselves to be persuaded to take ad referendum.

" Instead of looking at this guarantee in its real light, its
be iriug and consequences were imeneasnrably exaggerated.
The arriarc p:311;13 of a political proctorate was gratuitously
discovered in it, which existed only in the imagiaation,
unless it WAS absolutely into al o I to give thet name to the
inflaence which we have always exercised in Turkey in fa-
vour of our co-religionists. Without taking into account
his anteeelents, the position of the Emperor, his duties to-
wards his people and his faith, the very exceptional nature of
a Aussulinin Government, which the laws aol customs of
Islamism male it difficult, if not impossible, for it to apply
rigorously the principles of public right between Christian
nations, the sovereignty of the Sultan has made an absolute
theory, inflexible, and ou this pure abstractioa a decisiou
has been given contrary to all engagements which the Sultan
might take towards a foreign government on the subject of
religion and churches. This was unlermining the foundations
of the treaty of Kainariji, which contains precisely such an
engagement. It WAS a desire to oblige us to tear, with our
own hauls, all our anterior transactions, forcibly to abandon
a whole order of things consecrated by the past and acquired
at the peace of Russian blood. We at once saw that, if it
came to au absolute determination to pat the question in
those terms, a pacific solution would, sooner or later, become
impossible.
"We do not fear to say it; if it had been wished at once
to cut short all serious complication, instead of listening to
unjust suspicions, instead of seeing iu the last note proposed
by Prince fef euschikoti- that which it did not contain, the men
in credit at Constantinople should have used their exertions
to mtk,) the Sultan accept it. The dispute would have been
settled, and Ear epe spared the ulterior consequences. Nay,
more; after all the exaggerate) rumours engendered by the
mission of our ambassador ; after all the concessions in form
and substance, which he hal already ra Lie, having first re-
duced his demands from a convention to a coned, and then
from a Belied twice modified to a simple note free from all bi-
laterel form ; it would have been easy to represent that note
as a result much below our first pretensions.
" But under the empire, if that ache .4t.f, that in his con-
duct towards Turkey Russia has uo ()bier aim than an in-
crease of i11q,1911C3 I.lld of material power, that all her thoughts
are directed towards the rain of that State, this form ala of
the immunities and privileges, the maintenance of which she
demanded for her warship, has been blown out beyond mea-
sure. It was nothing ta have obtained from us the reduction
of our demands to their mast simple expression. It was ne-
cessary that they should be cancellel altogether, and a strik-
ing the ek given to our political consideration. It was clear
that Russia could not submit to this, and the Imperial lega-
tion found it necessary to quit Constantinople.
"A series of measures now commenced, which have not
ceased to put in opposition our conciliatory dispositions with
the care of our dignity ; measures, which taken prematurely
necessitated others still more compromising, and which placed
us first opposite the Powers on a double incline, at the foot of
which a rencontre was finally to take peace.

" These modifications, which an attempt was made at first
to persuade us were insignificant, were so little so, that they
completely annihilated the whole compromise elaborated at
Vienna. They were inadmissible for us, as they deprived us
precisely of all that we were founded to believe the powers
had accorded to us, the right of expressing our solicitude for
our co-religionists in Turkey, and of exercising it actively.
We were obliged to reject them, and if frankness is a fault,
we were frank enough loyally to explain the motive of our
objections to the Austrian Government.

"This new complication, but which was only due, as has
just been seen, to the little inslstance which foreign diplomacy
at Constantinople had shown for the acceptance pare and
simple of the Note, aggravated the position which France and
England had made for themselves and for us by placing them-
selves in Besiks, Bay. Thanks to the new difficulties engen-
dered by the Turkish amendments, a precious time has been
lost between Constantinople and St. Petersburg, and the sea-
son hat arrived when the bay no leaser (Aural a safe an-
chorage. The fleets wanted a harbour. To seek one far away
from the Dardanelles, anl to leave us metatime all th ) winter
in the principalities was impossible for the courts. They could
not, on the other han i, without a new and mere serious com-
plaint than those which already existed against us, order their
fleets to enter the Dardanelles, which a declaration of war had
not yet thrown open to them. To escape this dilemma, and
make a brusque change of attitude, it was necessary to charge
us with some wrong. It was found in the observations with
which we accompanied the rejection of the amendments of
the Porte—observations which in form and substance never
had the factitious importance so carefully given to them.
For, as regards the substance, they contained nothing that
had not been already repeatedly developed in the documents
of our correspondence, or that could suddenly give a sudden
and expected light to the powers on our intentions. And,
as regards the form, they bear no official character, and were
not addressed directly to the two Cabinets.
" This, Austria, the only intermediator in the negotiations
of this affair, who had proposed the Vienna note to us, com-
municated the modifications made thereto by the Divan, re-
ceived iu exchange our acceptance of the note, our rejection
of the amendments, as also the examination we made of it,
and it is only indirectly in the way of informations and con-
fidential explanations that our ministers communicated it to
the other courts. A culpable abuse of 'coafidence, the source
of which is unknown to us, gave imm Kliately this examina-
tion to the daylight of a surreptitious public, dogged to opi-
nion, ignorant of antecedents, excited a new movement of
effervescence against us, and drove the Govbrnmeuts into a
more decided attitude. It was in vain that almost immali-
ately, at the interval at Olmutz, we offered t Austria, in the
most conciliatory spirit, the desired explanations on the points
of our examination which might a la rigueur admit soma am-
biguity. In vain also Austria, regarding them as satisfactory,
made them the basis of a pressing measure to induce England.
and France to ree.o.n.nend the Porte to accept the last ar-
rangement. The two powers refuse 1, declaring that the state
of things at Constantinople admitted of no chance of success
on that proposition.
" In fact, on the fear, more or less founded, that the reli-
gious and warlike fanaticism of the Miasselmea might cad au-
ger the life and property of English aul Freoch subjects, the
ambassadors of England and France had taken the resolution
to make a division of the two squadrons enter the Dardanelles.
This measure was contrary to the stipulations est tblishod by
the treaty of the 13th July, 1841. The declaration of war of
the Ottoman Government came almost immediately to legiti-
mise it, and bring the entire two fleets into the Sea of Mar-
more,.

" It may be seen, from what has preceded, that the pre-
mature appearance of the two fleets at the mouth of the Dar
danelles, first the determifiating cause of the final rejection of
our ultimatum by the Porte, and of our entrance into the
principalities, finished by-exercising a baneful. influence on
the issue of the negotiations relative to the Vienna note ; that
our examination of the changes which, deplorably, it had been
allowed to the Porte to make to that note, did not really in
itself offer suflleient new and serious motives to necessitate a
measure such as the entrance into the Dardanelles; that, on
the contrary, after our explanations at Oinratz, nothing would
have prevented the two Courts from no ticia-;, as Austria
eagerly demanded, a new attempt at Constantinople, and that
the veritable cause which induced them to make a sullen
hostile front towards us WAS the material impossibilky for
their fleets to winter in Besika Bay ; that, real or not,
the dangers which English and French subjects incurred from
Turkish fanaticism did not offer neither a sulleietit reason for
the entrance of the whole fleets at Constantinople; that
it was much rather the arrival of a portion only of those
Anglo-French naval forces which exalted that fanaticisim,
assured the triumph of the war party, and provoked the de-
claration of war—a declaration which, moreover, whatever
were the efforts, more or less energetic, of the ambassadors
to prevent it, had beeoun necessary to justify in strict right
the call and prolonged sojourn of the entire fleets in the Sea
of M trmora.
"Thus, in this chain of inflexible necessities, because the
fleets had been to Besika, it was necessary that they should
go to Constantinople ; because they had been to Constanti-
nople it was necessary to declare war to us. We shall shortly
see that the declaration of war led to other consequences,
and that the same fatality which pushed on the fleets to
the Bosphorus was to finish by pushing them into the
Black Sea. _

" War being declared—which the two powers should have
prevented at any price, if the accidental exactions of their
maritime position and the warlike fanaticism it excited could
have permitted them to do so—still they ought to have done
everything to prevent war actually commencing, and if it
did break out, at least help us in confining it within as narrow
limits as possible. It was the only means of breaking the
fall from the incline upon Which their new measure dragged
them, and to prevent them going further than they had
yet gone. We ourselves pointed it out to them. We
did so as soon as we 1 amt the declaration of war, before we
knew of their entrance into the Sea of Kamera. We had de-
clared spontaneously our intention to remain upon the defen-
sive as long as, we adde I—and account mast be taken of this
reserve—as long as our interests and our diguity permitted it
—as long as we should not be force 1 to oatstop. the circle
within which we wished to confine our action. The Emperor
then distinctly acid that he would not cross the line of the
Danube—that he would repel au attack without provoking it
- and that he should maintain that peAtion as long as he
should not be necessarily compelled to assame another. The
passage of the Danube by Omer Pacha, and even the defini-
tive entrance of Ihe whole of the fleets into the Sea of Mar-
more, had made to change in our pacific intentions. And that
they really were so, that we never seriously wished for war,
that we even refused to believe in it ti 1 the last Tenement —so
unlikely did it smear to us that the powers would allow the
Turks to wage it, so monstrous did it appear to us, out of all
proportion with its cause, contrary to all Ottoman and Euro-
pean interests—is evidently well attested by the facility with
which the Turks crossed the Danube, and invaded our terri-
tory in Asia. In despite of all the projects that have been
gratuitously attrilanted to us—notwithstanding all the reports
spread for more than a year, ever since Prince Monschikors
mission to Constantinople, of an immense concentration of
troops on our frontiers, of armaments, naval and military
preparations undertaken by us on the largest scale, to march
to the conquest of Constantinople—a was found that in Wal-
lachia we were only prepared for the defensive, and that in
Asia, at first, our troops were not even sufficient for that.
It is known that before the expedition of a body of 12,000 to
14,000 men along toe coast, a reinforcement which enabled us
to carry the victories of Atskhour, Akhaltsykh, and Basch-
gadyk-Lar, the Turks had time to carry the post of St. Ni-
cholas, (without even waiting for the term fixed for the com-
mencement of hostilties,) to cross our frontier, to ravage the
province of Armenia, and to threaten even the safety of Tiflis.
" These events, and the pretended triumphs of the Turks
on the Danube, so Ightly admitted, so inconsiderately exag-
gerated, led to two results ; one indirect, which we shall in-
dicate by and bye, the other more immediate. In allowing
hostilities to take finch a development by land and sea, prin-
cipally in our Asiatb possessions, we were forcibly torn from
a purely defensive s!stem which, under the preceding reserves,
we had voluntarily traced out for ourselves. Our national
honour, which the Freseuce of a double foreign squadron at
the mouth of the Be3phoru.s had already sufficiently placed at
stake, was becomin2 daily more jeop oNlised. Oar interests
were more directly effected. Because in Wallaehia, Turkish
territory, we had preposed to remain on the defensive at a
time when operatioaa on the Danube only were spoken of,
did it follow that abet on our own territory, on our coasts, we
470 re to al:ludo:1 patently the monopoly of agareseion to the

" On shuple presumptions modified by exaggerated reports
of the moment from the onset of the mission of Prince Men-
schikoff, without yet precisely knowin4 the nature of his de-
mands, Fr vice, seeing, as she said, in the attitude of Rassia,
whatever was the pretext, a serious attack against the inde-
pendence of the Ottoman empire, took the initiative. She
sent alone a squadron to the East, and only stopped at Sl-
lainis on account of the hesitation still shown by the English
Government.
" But on the first telegraphic announcement of the depar-
ture of our ambassador, without yet knowin; how we should
act, three or four weeks before we announce' it at Paris or
London ; and still, as an eve ita day
tlepati ling upon the un-
certain reply of the Divan, e'rance and England united made
a most serious naval demonstration. Tney seat their two
sin% kens to occupy the Bay of Besika, at the mouth of the
Da.rdaielles.

" At the time objections were male to the character of
comminatary pressure we attributed to this measure. It was
calm ivoured to represent an armed an:l combined price de
position of the two great maritime states of Europe in the
waters and ports of Terkel a 3 the inorensive anchorage of
vessels visiting friendly waters and poets open free to all
navies. Events have proved what that inoffensive anchorage
really in :ant.
" The fleets entered Besika at the moment that the Porto
still deliberated upon the last ultiinttu.n W 3 pat to it. It
was natural it should refuse compliance, seeing itself tins sup-
ported by the material force of E oglan.l and France. Oa the
one hand the appearance of the two spa Irons encouraged it
in its resistance to us; on the other hand, it ()Tended and
touched tenderly the dignity of the Imperial Government. Ef-
fecting the final rejection of the Mensehiko'S note, it came as
an ag4ravating cause to determine our entrance into the prin-
cipalities. Was this measure to be considered a case of war,
a flagrant violation of the equilibrium of Enrolee? We think
that a pre lent policy not io complicate matters should avoid
to pronoanee itself beforehand in so absolu:-3 a sense. Cross-
ing the Pattie with regret, wits inconsiderable forces, we
clearly denoted the character we wishel to give that purely
temporary occupation. We lea Ely disavow any idea of per-
m moat con E t est. It was not ain 3,1511T0 of war, not even of
a nature to imag shoat a e Misses, ao there were no Turkish
troops in the territory occupied. It was only a measure of
la:cc:silty, a means of ultwior negotiation, a pledge which
would allow us with honour to lend ourselves to some now en-
gage:neat. The moasaro might affect oar local conventions
with the Porte, but it did not att Lek any European treaties.
Numerous preceleats, moreover, autho:ised the distinction
between a simaie coercive Illea3'ire an 1 a veritable act of war.
It wilt be rem rnherel that, despite the expedition to tho
Mores, despite the battle of N avarino itself, Eallan I. an 1
France Inver cease]. to Sig that they ..very at petee with Tur-
key. We n 311101.31, srvely, far oehin l s tea acts in the way
of coercion in those we a leptel. Wan Fe 1.133,. in the time
of peace, forcibly seized Ancona—when, in concert with Eng -
W 'aeon tho Litn,3* or the Nethorlazis tr3,3sac •

THE SUN, LONDON, MONDAY EVENING, MARCH 13, 1854.

Turks—that we were to allow them to attack with impunity
our niaritinie postS, blockade our fortresses, and attempt td I
create a rising of the CatiCagtui against us ? Why did not
foreign diplomacy at Constantinople ptraient these attacks ?
Did they hope to see us beaten, or did they only; intend' to in-,
terfere—when we had ceased to be se ? Was it in the mule de
the independence of the Porte that a scruple was made to
limit the operations by sea ? But to-day they limit them ;
Wherefore, then, did they Wait until that which is deplored
was accomplished without before remedying; it? Under the
eyes of the ambassadors, under the flag of England tad of
France, convoys of arms and ammunition are publicly pre-
pared with a view to carry on the War on our territory. A
last convoy of this nature had reached its destination. We
were aware, with the same object in view, a considerable
Turkish squadron, convoying vessels of transport, was to
leave Constantinople ; that it had left the Bosphorus ; that
it had entered Sinopa—not to land reinforcements there, not
to station there, but to find a temporary shelter against foul
weather. It was there only awaiting the propitious moment
to proceed on its aggressive voyage. We made use of the
right of war by anticipating that aggression ; and to turn the
word against us, to qualify as aggression what was only a
legitimate act of defence, is not reconcileable with the notions
of strict equity.
" That if, moreover, it is objected that we were warned
beforehand, that England had announced to us her intention
of shielding against all attack the Ottoman ports and terri-
tory, we shall reply—That we never admitted that pretention
of limiting our rights of war without making war to us, and
that at London, as at St. Pet zsburg, by the Minister of Rus-
sia and the Imperial Cabinet its lf, those. rights have always
been reserved and maintained in their integrity.
" This is, however, what took place at Sinope, the forced
consequence of their anterior attitude, which has served as a
motive to the two powers to take another step in advance.
By entering the Black Sea, with the avowed intention of pro-
hibiting the free navigation to Russian vessels of war, they
have outstepped the limits of simple demonstrations; they
make a direct attack upon our belligerent rights ; they have
adopted a measure which, to speak plainly, is nothing less
than a declaration of war under the mask of protestations of
friendship, but which puts at stake again, more than ever,
the national dignity of Russia ; a measure which takes hence-
forth the direction of events out of the hands of the Govern-
ments themselves, and places it in the hands of their naval
commanders, making the peace of the world depend upon the
smallest fortuitous conflict.

" As regards the real motive of such a resolution, it is self-
evident, and the two maritime powers have not dissimilated it.
It will be found in the position they created for themselves by
sending their naval forces to Constantinople from the moment
when, instead of employing them in keeping the war within
certain limits, the presence of the combined fleets, by arous-
ing the fanaticism of the Porte, only served to neutralise the
action of the two Cabinets. To assist as passive spectators
at the destruction of the Turkish navy, almost under their
eyes, placed them in a false position, but which, as nothing
had been done to prevent the cause, ought not to have re-
mained entirely beyond their provisions, whatever may be
said to the contrary. And, as at Basika, the necessity of get-
ting out of a dilemma, at any price, urged them to the violent
act of crossing the first strait of Constantinople, that of
escaping again from an attitude not less irksome obliged them
to cross the second strait.

" So truo is it that the progressive march of the measuns
they had taken must necessarily lead them to aggravate their
bearing, and that the first link of this chain of acts dangerous
for the peace of the world was the moment when their fleets
left Malta and Toulon.

" On the ground of negotiations, same consequences from
the starting point, same progression of overtures, always less
satisfactory for us, at least less favourable for peace. The
factitious and imaginary bearing which an incurable distrust
has given to the engagement which we demanded of the Porte
has caused the successive failure of every attempt at concilia-
tion which we proposed or accepted; first in the form then in
the substance.

" Nevertheless, as has been seen, up to the Vienna note,
inclusively, the essential substance of the guarantees de-
manded by Prince Menschikoff were not yet absolutely dis-
puted us. It was admitted that the Emperor had a right to
some satisfaction. It was allowed that he had the right to
express the sympathies which identity of faith inspired him
with for all the Christians of the Eastern confession. It was
thought simple that the Porte should, by a solemn act of de-
ference, render homage to those sympathies and take them
into consideration. The Vienna note always implied a direct
step by the Sultan towards the Emperor, by the sending of
an Ottoman ambassador, charged to remit the firma recently
granted to the Patriarch of Constantinople, in confirm 'thin of
the immunities and privileges of the Greek Church. Other
dispositions date from the refusal of the Porte to accept the
proposed note, or rather from the embarrassing • position
which forced the two Governments to leave the Besika station
for the shelter of the Dardanelles. They manifested them-
selves by the rejection of the last acco nraelatiou which we
offered them at Olinutz. They then went so far as to deny
the existence of the grievances of which we had to complain
on the part of the Ottoman Government since the origin of
the quarrel, and to contest our eight to dem ted. reparation.
The war has exploded. The first operations of the Turks on
the Danube, their sadden-invasion in Asia, transformed into
brhlliant victories, have produced illusions. Opinion is much
excited. lusteel of trying to cam it, it is regretable to have
to sty that everything has been done, or allowed to be d•me,
to excite it still m era against us ; and the Government the
most susceptible, perhaps, in matters of national dignity, the
most prompt to resent the abuses of the foreign press in the
countries where it escapes the control of the authorities, has
allowed the French press, of which it is the absolu e master,
to publish all the false reports, all the insults, all the exag-
gerations against Russia. As public opinion warmed, its
exactions grew in proportion; and, under their pressure, any
satisfaction whatever is now refused to us ; the rights of sur-
veillance, which we possess for the efficacious protection of our
co-religionists in Turkey are entirely denied to us. Russia is
sent, so to say, to the bar of a European tribunal, and she is
no longer called upon to cede half her demands, but all of them.
The Sultan has been consulted beforehand upon the conditions
that will suit him, and Russia is requeste 1 to ratify what has
been convened without her, conditions admitted in the ex-
clusive point of view of the Sultan. Tiiat is to say, that now
they turn against us the position which the Vienna note
made for the Porte, with this essential difference, however,
that the Porte was at liberty to raise objections, to propose
alterations, whilst it appears we are not allowed to deviate
from the bases put to us. M ireover, and putting aside the
very nature of the arrangement, un ter what circumstances is
it offered to us ? The overtures coincide within a few days
with the entrance of the English and French fleets into the
Black Sea, and with the notifications which are almost equi-
valent to a declaration of war. Of the four powers before
which Russia is called to come and negotiate a peace with the
Porte, two have already voluntarily renounced the part of
impartial arbitrators, by outstepping the line of a strict neu-
trality, by constituting themselves armed auxiliaries of one
of the adverse parties. Is not this placing Russia between
war and humiliation; and could the hope be entertained
that she would give in to menaces ? The position in which
she is placed may have been imposed upon weak states, who
then have not sabinitted until they had exit:meted all their
means of resistance. But when peace is sincerely and se-
riously desired, we doubt whether it should be offere 1 on
such terms to a great country justly jealous of its political
consideration, and which has already shown that it will not
spare any sacrifice when it is necessary to maintain it.
" If now, in presence of this policy of intimidation, of
these measures more and more grave, we oonsider, in briefly
resuming them, all the acts of Russia, We shall see that in
spite of the offences for which reparation has not yet been
given to her, her conduct has only been a succession of sacri-
fices, proving her sincere desire to spare Europe a general
conflagration, and at least to render strictly local the war to
which she has been forcibly driven (la guerre a la7uelle 071
l'a poussee forcentent). And first of all, let us pass under
silence the three concessions both on the merits, and in
form, which reduced her first demands set forth in the
Menschikolf note. The refusal of this ultimatum, accom-
panied by a menacing demonstration, having placed
our honour at stake, we were obliged to have recourse
to the employment of a measure of constraint. But
this measure, taken with regret, and from which we
to ek care to remove in advance any hostile character and
intentions, WAS almost immediately pat forward by us as a
reason for the resumption of negotiations. We hue I
our ultimatum to accept the note of Vienna ; we accepted it
by telegraph before knowing the precise text of it. This text
was melifled at Paris and London. Nevertheless we made
no objection, because we ware anxious to put an end to the
crisis which kept the world in suspense. But the Western
Powers unfortunately permitted the Porte to make other and
graver mediae diens, which entirely changed the character of
the arrangement which. WAS proposed to us. We were obliged
to pronounce against them, and we frankly stated why.
Verbal difficulties arose. Tau. were net insarmeunttble, since
Austria and Prussia, satisfied with the solution of them which
We offered, strongly recommended the two courts to employ
these now facilities for the resumption of negotiations. A.
precipitate measure had already broken the thread of conci-
liatory expleaetians. And sullenly, without any new com-
plaints that could ba urge I against us, an abrupt change took
place in the attitude of the two Powers ; the whole of the two
fleets were summoned Constantinople ; the Porte made a
declaration of war, and hostilities were commenced. Obliged
to continue the war, in spite of our wishes, we endeavoured
to restrict it to the left bank of the Danube, and we recom-
mended to the Powers the importance of seeing that the thea-
tre of it should not be unnecessarily extended. The small
number of our troops scarcely sufficed for the defensive, prov-
ing clearly the inanity of the schemes of aggrandisement as-
cribed to us. No attention was paid to our remonstrances.
The war was allowed to spread into Asia. Illusions were
indulged in as to its chances of success; and our enemies
were encouraged and excited. And it was not until after •
having been attacked at sea, on our coasts, on our terri-
tory, that we were at last obliged to strike an energetic
blow. Victory on land and sea having established the supe-
riority of our arms, afforded an opportunity for taking
advantage of our successes t e represent to us that we should
be more disposed to enter irate an honour _able arraulemont,
and for persuading the Turks to consent to it. This oppor-
tunity was neglected; those successes became new grievances
against us, and the event of Sinop) served as a pretext for a
violent resolution, which, leading to the suspension of diplo-
matic relations, rendered more than ever uncertain the chances
of the in iintenence of peace. However, even at the last
moment, the m aintenanee of these relations would still have
been possible, so much did we desire to carry the spirit of
conciliation to the eel, if, whilst protecting the territory and
the fia; of our adversaries against aeainst any attack, the two Powers
had left to that measure however contrary it was to our rights
as belligerents, the colour of a naval armistice, based on a
certain reciprocity. Bat from the moment they pretended,
whilst permitting. the Turks to send supplies to their ports, to
prevent us from mediae supplies to ours, and to maintain to
our enemies the free navigation of the Black Sea, whilst it
was rendered embarrassing for the Russian navy, the two
powers openly established their active participation in the
hostile operations of the Porte, and reserving the usage of our
rights according to subsequent eventualities, it only remained
to us to suspend diplomatic relations which tho two powers
still endeavoured to envelop in amihel protestations, but
which had henceforth become for us without frankness and
without dignity. Such are the facts in their development.
They prove that the question has arrived at its present pro-
portions, because tho Powers undertook from the commence-
ment, on account of the ambitious views which we are 17p-
posed to entertain, to combat a• hantom which did not exist;
because the first stop which was taken in a system of intimi-
dation and distrust progressively lei to others which have
rendered an honourable retreat more and more difficult for all
parties. If sudden conflicts, which may arise at any moment
from such a complicated state of things as the present, should
cause war to break out between us and the Western Powers,
and with that war all the misfortunes which will flow from it
on the whole world, Europe is able to judge who, even at the
moment at which we speak, has already taken the initiative
of it."

WAIL IN THE EAST.--The specie chests for the Com-
missariat stations, and those for the payment of troops
upon the field of battle, have been ordered by the Ord-
nance from Messrs. Hobbs, Ashley, and Fortescue, who
are proceeding rapidly towards their completion. These
chests are of iron, doubled cased, and are fitted with
the famed Americin locks. The same firm has just
finighed a large number of iron door+ and safes fur the
new Government Mint at Sydney, where their patei►t
locks will be likewise applied as a protection against
robbry.