The Sun.
London, England, 1853-06-04 00:00:00

and, by the concurrence of the directors, no time was lost
in sending that dispatch out. In another case, when the
electric telegraph was determined upon, all the ar-
rangements were made in less than one month after the
receipt of the dispatch of the Governor-General, recom-
mending that this step should be taken. With a mail to
India once a-fortnight, and with personal communications
such as I have described, there is not the least delay in
anything that requires speed. But one great defect has
been pointed out—namely, that, owing to a protracted and
expensive canvas, the best members of the Indian service
are not appointed directors of the East India Company. It
is said that it is a bad mode of remunerating, the services
of the board of directors that they should look only to the
distribution of patronage for their reward. Ido not think
that the imputations which have been made on this sub-
ject are fairly borne out. It has been said that the Indian
army and service do not receive a fair proportion of the
patronage. I think the directors have taken great pains
to preserve their patronage from improper accusations, but
I admit there exists a general opinion that it is undesir-
able that the remuneration of the board of directors
should consist in their patronage. I have now stated the
principal objections that have been made to the present
mode of conducting the Indian Government, and how far,
in my opinion, those complaints are justified. But I still
haVe to consider what it is desirable the government of
India should be for the future. The hon. member for
Manchester said the other day at a meeting at Bristol on
the subject of India that nothing could be satisfactory ex-
cept a single government by means of a Secretary of State.
That also is the view of the gentlemen who have associated
themselves together for the reform of the Indian government.
Now, we must consider what would be the effect of a change
of this description. The proprietors of India Stock and
the court of directors will remain a body until 1874, and
they will be entitled to receive their dividends secured
upon the territory of India, and to claim the whole value
of their stock at its present quotation. At the end of that
term they would claim to revive as a commercial body,
and to carry on their trade with the capital thus reim-
bursed. The Government, on the other hand, would as-
sume the charge and government of India, and the obliga-
tions, liabilities, and debts/of the East India Company, and
I am not sure whether my right hon. friend the Chancellor
of the Exchequer would be pleased to have that debt added
to his present obligations, because although it is true it is
secured on the Indian territory, yet it might be convenient
that that should be done for India which we have done for
some of our colonies, and that by giving the guarantee of
the Government a lower rate of interest should be charged
on the debt. But although in the present state of affairs
it might not be precisely just that such a guarantee could
be given, I am not so sure that we could thus answer the
claim of the present company. Still Ido not believe that
this is an insuperable objection, but it is one that requires
to be carefully considered. With regard to the nature of
the future government of India, we ought to look to the
evidence that has been given before us on this subject. The
question whether we ought to have a single or double
Government for India has been mooted before both the
committee of the House of Lords and the committee of the
House of Commons. There are three witnesses whose evi-
dence has been said to be more or less in favour of the
single Government. The evidence of the last witness ex-
amined upon this subject (Mr. Sullivan) is not yet in the
hands of members of this house; but I believe it will be
found to be not in favour of a single Government, because
Mr. Sullivan leaves two bodies— one for patronage and the
other for territory. However, as his evidence is not in
the hands of members, I will not enlarge upon it. The
most important evidence on this subject is that of noble
lord (the Earl of Ellenborongh), who has been himself
President of the Board of Control and Governor-General
of India, and I am bound to bear my testimony not only
to his great acquaintance with Indian affairs, but to the
singular ability with which he expresses his views on these
subjects. Ido not know that I shall be charged with
having said more than I am justified in saying if I add
that one need not be surprised to find the noble lord ap-
proaching the question of the Court of Directors with
some little bias. (Cheers and laughter.) The noble lord
recommends that the Government of India should be as
follows :—That there should be a council of 12, who should
be originally named in the act of Parliament ; that one-
sixth should go out every year, and that they should be
replaced by persons who have filled high situations in
India, and who should be nominatad on the recommenda-
tion of the Governor-General and of the Governors of the
Presidencies of India. The noble lord proposes that the
whole patronage should be vested in the council, and that
they should have a veto on the appointment of the Go-
vernor-General, but the noble earl did not propose to give
them the power of recal. (Laughter.) I remember ;the
time when the patronage of India was supposed to create
a power in the State of no inconsiderable amount, and a
body like that which the noble earl suggests, and who
would be practically irremoveable for six years, would
constitute an exceedingly independent and powerful body.
But, although the noble lord's object is to get rid of the
double Government, yet he does not do so, because he
proposes to transfer to the Council the power of the direc-
tors, and to make them the advisers of the Board of Control
precisely as the Board of Directors now are. But the
noble lord goes further, and says that his object is to pro-
vide the President of the Board of Control with an able
body of advisers. The noble lord stated that he should.
not object to the continuance of the present Board of Di-
rectors if he were sure that it would be filled with men
like the late Mr. C. Grant, Mr. Elphinstone, and Sir
Richard Jenkins. If that were solely the object of the
noble lord, no doubt he would obtain good advisers from
Indian servants, but when he makes them responsible ad-
visers to the head of the Board of Control, this seems to
me to be a double Government under another name. The
noble earl says, when he wanted advice about Nagpoor, he.
went to Sir R. Jenkins, one of the directors, who had been
resident at Nagpoor, and that, fortified by his opinion, he
came to a conclusion without consulting the Board of
Directors. I should have thought it right, even if I had
consulted Sir R. Jenkins, to consult the directors also, and
I should not have thought myself justified in treating the
Court of Directors quite so cavalierly as the noble earl said
that he had done. The next gentleman examined, whose
opinion was said to be in favour of the single Government,
and who gave most valuable evidence, was Mr. Halliday,
secretary to the Government of India at Calcutta • but
when Mr. Halliday was examined on the English part' of
the question, he stated that he was not so well acquainted
with the Government of India that he could give his
opinion without some diffidence. Well, but what was
Mr. Halliday's opinion, which was said to be a decided
opinion in favour of a single Government ? He was favour-
able to the appointment of a body of twenty-four gentle-
men, elected as at present and as vacancies occurred, allow-
ing a portion to be nominated—say one-third or one-fourth,
as the case might be—by the directors theeiselves. This
body would form a council of India, and would discuss all
important matters connected with India with the President
of the Board of Control, that he might have the advantage
of hearing their discussions and weighing their arguments.
I believe that many matters are carried on in India under
the single responsibility either of the governors or the
judges, or those who manage the affairs of their districts
without consulting any person. But gentlemen who are
conversant with the deliberations of committees in the
House of Commons, and those who are acquainted with the
proceedings of Cabinet Councils, can imagine what would
be the result with 24 gentlemen thus elected. Even when
they agreed their numbers would be such as to throw an
impediment in the way of all business whatever. They
would be found to be as permanent and as independent a
body as the present Board of Directors. The President
would have the power of overruling their decisions, and the
result would be, that when they differed he would decide,
after hearing their arguments, just as if he had never heard
them. If it happened that they were overrulled once or
twice, I appeal to every person acquainted with what takes
place before committees, whether this mode of government
would be satisfactory. If the President of the Board of
Control were bound to attend their deliberations it would
be a practical hindrance, and would stop the progress of
business ; and if he were not he would decide without them.
But in any case to talk of this as a single government is an
abuse of words. And Mr. Halliday, when he was asked
whether he was favourable to a single government for India.
and, on a question put by the chairman of the committee,
said that ho aimed at improving the mode of transacting
business without introducing organic changes, which were
not desirable. Mr. Halliday Said—" The plain, straight-
forward course would be decidedly to have thei Govern-
ment and the Council nominated altogether by the Crown ;
but whenever I have spoken of that with well-informed
persons I have been informed, in a manner that I could not
possibly resist with my want of experience, that such a
measure was totally out of the question ; that it was quite
impossible ; and therefore, driven from that, I fall back
upon what appears to me to be the more practicable sug-
gestion, which I have made in the course of my evidence
to-day." The witness states distinctly what he thinks of
the proposal to establish a single government, and he says
he has been told by every well-informed person with whom
he has spoken on the subject, that such a measure is totally
out of the question. Surely after that he can hardly be
represented as a witness who advocates the establishment
of a single system of government. Now, these are wit-
nesses whose evidence is supposed to be in favour of a single
mode of government. I am aware that we have in this
house advocates of that form of government, and I have no
doubt we shall hear from the hon. member for Man-
chester and others able and powerful arguments in favour
of such a scheme, but certainly, they cannot claim in sup-
port of their views the evidence of those gentlemen to
whom I have just referred. (Hear.) But we have, on the
other hand, the very able evidence of a person well known
to this house, and well known to the world, as one of the
'ablest writers of the day on subjects connected with ques-
tions like the present—l mean Mr. J. Mill. No doubt
Mr. Mill is open to the objection of having a bias in favour
of the East India Company, in whose service he is. (Hear,
hear.) But, on the other hand, from his intimate ac-
quaintance with the mode of transacting business in con-
nexion with the affairs of India, which is greater, per-
haps, than that of any man in this house or the country,
his evidence is of great weight, and I will say from what I
know of him, and from the high character which he holds
iu the country, that I do not believe Mr. Mill is one who
would express an opinion which he does not honestly hold.
(Hear, hear.) I think, therefore, that the opinion—and it
is not an opinion that is not grounded in reason—which he
has given in his evidence, is entitled to no inconsiderable
Weight. (Hear, hear.) Though, therefore, the answers
are rather longer than I would wish to read, yet they are
so well put, and so much to the purpose, that I should be
sorry to diminish the effect of them by not giving his own
words. Let me, before quoting this evidence, observe that
it is obvious, if the Government is to be vested in a Secre-
tary of State, that that Secretary of State must be respon-
sible to Parliament, and to Parliament alone—that, in
short, it is to Parliament alone that the whole Government
of India must be responsible for the good administration
of the affairs of that country. On this subject Mr. Mill
says—" No one will deny that it is necessary that Parlia-
ment should be open to appeals on all subjects connected
with the government of any part of the British empire ;
but, so far as my experience goes, I should say that
the security for the good government of India derived
from discussions in Parliament is far short of that

derived from the habitual examination of all-Pal:Z.;
of any importance by persons especially devoted to
that object. I think that many bad and few good
consequences would result. The public opinion of one
country is scarcely any security for the good government
of another. The people of one country, whether re-
presented by the public authorities of this country
or by the nation itself, cannot have the same acquaintance
with the circumstances and interests of the other country
as they may have with their own. The great security for
the good government of any country is an enlightened

public opinion ; but an unenlightened-public opinion is no
security for good government. The people of England are
unacquainted, or very ill acquainted, with the people and
the circumstances of India, and feel so little interest in
them, that I apprehend the influence of public opinion in
this country on tho government of India is of very little
value, because there are very few cases in which public
opinion is called into exercise, and when it is So, it is
usually from impulses derived from the interests of Euro-
peans connected with India, rather than from the interests
of the people of India itself." Then with regard to the
effect of this kind of government generally, he says :
" There would be two great inconveniences. In ordinary
cases there would be apathy and indifference on the ii&t of


e for
Parliament and the public ; the Secretary d Stat
to es'"
India would be able to do exactly as he liked, an . „rot
any part of his duty if he were too indolent or to
Ilg_telfutt
ot
'„
to perform it ; but whenever it did happen that
was excited in Indian questions, they would bse.
questions ; and India would be made a subject
for
sion, of which the real object would be to (ffec.t_ai..i;
lye
in the administration of the Government of Engleant_riaot
objection, therefore, that Mr. Mill takes to the govied intro'
of a single Secretary of State is— first, that it wnm,c, lap;
duce party considerations into the administration of
and, secondly, that in the present state of
erirs hose
with regard to India, the experience of Is
lives have been devoted to Indian subjects isP;obet_teeressecre.'r
rity for good government then the House of (-) n?"', gear.)
serving, of course, to the House of Commons tn.a'',.eg.)
sary interference which it has upon all
Now, it is a remarkable circumstance in connection deciao4,
this question, that since the celebrated bill w!solf „toss
the fate of Mr. Pitt, party politics have via part!
into the consideration of Indian affairs. (lieri'avy
questions with reference to India are almost to
t or bere'
questionsetielerilio
known either in the other House of Parliamean,„ efisr
and I do not hesitate to say that it would be rn Inde the
minent danger to India if its affairs were againa±lDless
in
objects of party warfare. (Hear, hear.) I h
Parliament long enough to see that in colonisif97ool
questions have occurred in which the interests o._ hoe.
,
have been neglected for the party politics of tnAndial3
(Hear, hear.) I feel bound to say that the case the
in no respect similar to that of the colonies.
colonies belonging to this country there is a larteiples
of
of British subjects well acquainted with the Pr' sose,ve
representative government ; and even if the "'ors" re 0 P°
occur—if, which God forbid, those coloniesroeuati
separated from the mother country—thouoll I bese
why their connexion should not be for their inatur'is 011
—but even if a separation were to take place, there (fie3r'e
one of our colonies that could not govern itself too Pc,
hear.) But were a revolution of that kind t enal
in India, will any one say that consequences t n Theree
at which humamty would shudder ?1 (Hear, 103,1_ ihet!i
is, in truth, no similarity between the effects toe so
case and in the other, and therefore it is of ilnr"ssestu,
to allow party politics to interfere with the governveryfe"
that great dependency. (Hear, hear.) There are, isd I be;
gentlemen in this house who have been in India,
alilo%
have that even residence in one part of India is n t
sufficient to enable a person to form a comPe,ttre bPprd
1,
with regard to other parts of India. (Hear.)
so India
an hon. friend who sits behind me, and who 131,:araea
better than most men, state that what he llastlieve tmre
been learned chiefly at the India-house. r 0401.0
those who have been long connected with the iu.a of,.
have a better knowledge of Indian affairs than ioo
possess, And therefore I think there is some trua goveir/;
opinion of Mr. Mill, that it is a security for, ge°istotilOw
merit that all the details of the Indian allr°,",;rofsl; e
should be subjected to the careful revision anu,ces 011,1
amination of people who have devoted their elo°'io
study of Indian matters, and that they shoulao.r tirsete
over by those who have spent a portion of ledge of the
India, who, collectively, have a greater know'sve
subject, and whose opinion, therefore, should °‘,111:9
greatest weight. (Hear, hear.) Mr. Mill saYLtobOsf
all Indian proceedings are reviewed by two sePw: :
independent of one another is a much rote.
for good government than would exist underiis; o
tern by which those two bodies were merged less, is
The double revision by persons of a different pre tae
different position, and probably with different Peoluile
sions, tends greatly to promote a close and rigid witb:f
tion." Again,—" If you have a body unconnected
general government of the country, and containlic 097 i
persons who have made that department of loll) cestivf
the business of their lives, as is the case with tee,elibetii
Directors, there is much better discussion and cli;f10,1,
sifting of the matters committed to their charre, cro,,
such a bodT, in addition to the Minister of'tn't "of
than by having the Minister of the Crown wither:ooo
body, or the Minister of the Crown acting as 6'401'
the body." So far for the evidence upon this (111„", frOfi
which a distinct opinion is given that any cban'hasgebS
system like the present would necessarily be 3
the worse. I would now refer to the opinion e' 00%
lord who himself was a cabinet minister in this vael"'o
and subsequently Governor-General of India—I eir,evt
Hardinrre; and I must say al
no one is better able tzi°oo,f
opinion than Lord Harding°, who was a cabinet ,11,
at the time of the differences which led to the
1179,051,
Lord Ellenborough, and who, as Governor-00°f Oio
made well acq ssuainted with the administration e".,,
both in India and in this country, and who new
a position perfectly independent, and is able to esve4
unbiassed and impartial opinion. His opinion •ern
s think the system of double government is muchwlitliti
bringing the crown more prominently forward' lectelbr
the present plan is the best. For two members ct is
the Court of Proprietors, one director might be 1)1.:41,011;?
the court itself, taken from the Indian service' 1
been a member of the council, or who had gaUf tbir',l4
reputation for his service in India. I do n°,.upiecirit
would be advantageous to have the Court of ,011,431'
filled with men who had served in India ; there reerS
be in OA court such a fusion of European fee'letilci;l
talent, as well as Indian feelings and talent, as :'s;pic'ii
make it too Indian. A body of persons solely
ell e"
with Indian views would not administer the Cv,ectdfb
of India so well as the present Court 'of
oa
(Hear, hear.) I will quote another authority wies;y
subject, and that is the opinion of Mr. Mal'of a•
gentleman well acquainted with the feeling" crot
people of India, and he says " I think that a 4,0
such as the transfer of the whole of the. geTe "
CO')
of India from the Court of Directors to thea ac
would be much too violent and sudden, an
ry
W tend very much to embarrass so vast a ne'ottl'lo?
that of the Government of India ; and I think it 'it
more advisable to prepare for the change which rs.`4o,,
place by gradually remodellina. the Government. -`ll,OOO,
be possible to prepare for that great change by the toi
tion of a certain proportion of the directors, se oclift
public would have an opportunity of seeing interalar(ll.
how the newly-modelled machine worked. One-,,,f°1 b.fie
oven one-third of the directors, might be appoint
rect nomination from among those who have hat" to t
dian experience." I will only refer, in one worcifserli,
evidence of Sir C:Trevelyan, himself an old Indislo.. „
and well acquainted with the affairs of that coulllee"rir;
states that, in his opinion, an improved court ofu"
together with a board of control,lis the best forra °lot ./
-merit for India. I have now stated the evidence V' 1
been given on this subject. I must say I think i tbe'/
that one of the objections stated by Mr. Mill, vizl ;g
of information in this country on Indian subjec"o
that, with increased communication between th,is, tolio)
and India, may he expected to diminish from ap‘lt
Mr. Marshman expresses his surprise at the inter-dIV
the affairs of India have excited in this countrUt
yS
be allowed to express the hope that it is a snextlOP°oo
will excite a still larger share of the attention of
ede,ol,o
and of the country. If by the improvement and a 9 :tee"
of the natives of India we can establish a race st'he
of men such as Mr. Mill describes as affording " t
curity for good government, then a great Plyee'ciiell'
gained for the government of India. I think the„,""esieV
is passing over our heads, and in whichjthe core,
with India is increasing so rapidly from day eorefoel'
diffuse a knowledge of the affairs of India much "der "
rally among the members of this house, and rell coqoe
more and' more able to attend to the affairs of that ea
04
I find that notice has been given of a motion Viol the
friend of mine to-night, upon a subject in svllll,,e,;oo°tr,
intention to have made an amendment to the t'aeo 0
t of
part of the Government, viz., that the Preo ,et „Ole
Board of Control shall make an annual statet aOt
finances of India to the house—an exceedila,`Ms Ofjeo
13" .0
thing, and one in regard to which, I may say' d ( Aoe'
fault that the house has been kept uninforine t el
hear.) The question, then, for the Governnljaocia te
of
is, whether it shall continue the government °of
is—whether it shall assume the governmeu
itself—or whether it shall maintain the Prel-taia'efiPt,
government, but improve its constitution. tntioa a",
the defects that have been stated in the case everlse,
Court of Directors, it is impossible to leave ._'`d%the,rio
of India as it is. (Cheers.) I think, 011 ooe 0',,-00':e
that if I had been anxious to put myself thef;ll,§L'
most powerful that any minister could t
trolled possession, as Secretary of State for 11`0.-11111 os„,
patronage that might have accrued to the O.Ta Vole
certainly a prize the most tempting that eewi, for joe;
to any man. But we do not think it would 7i/esr, reps
vantage of India that that should be done. ;„` the f;1011..`
We think it far better and safer to maintnatiellog
form of government, and to improve its cousti
a manner that while it will be rendered a igie sft
strument for the good administration of In dei f 101,0),
some respects it will render it more easy to bject cicofeelie
an extension of the information on the slid the of 4"
may render fitting— viz., the assumptions... 3 rovie'letb;
went of India in the name and under do is-- P 9
Crown. (Hear, hear.) What we propose tiourt ofof
the relations of the Board of Control and vies WO ti
tors as they stand—leaving the responsi„bgtioo
house and of the Minister who holds the Sio
now have the honour to do—to improve otrentip(lii;o
of the Court of Directors, limiting tlie,lrjonts'berg,l
imposing some check on the higher aPP3O niee'd
hear.) The Court of Directors consists oboe, aa
24 only sit, six of whom go out by reti,, 1u... o'v
they are subject to an annual election, they `electiveAli
elected for life.. We propose to reduce from Pew, life
o
hers to 12, and to add to them six
Crethe'll!eit°
have been Indian servants appointendambyeesCourt ..0
will make 18. It was suggested that th but it arleieo
should select one-fourth of thenumber ;nt p05,',.041!,0
us that they would be placed in a depend wesibo
those by whom they were appointed,
nathe reSP°l beeliCV
better that they should be nominated 0 _
.04,0 Poo
of the Crown, and named from person; or tbe IviAt°,4Y4
least 10 years in the service of the Crow
vroohl oot ,10_10
Company in India. (Hear, hear.) That uts de
objection that the best of the Indian soles tto take
hva love
obtain a seat in the Court of Directors• t-Lto taket 11140
beyond doubt that those most competeutreui than, *
the government of Ind.z.•,—coming hen,e.ttion of
_l,t ele
and able to take a part in the adrainisttaZug awseprovee,
W° shall the °gill.
—are deterred by the canvass from
Court of Directors, and we believewitboil.at jes,„,,bef
efficiency of the court by placing " of 111,111;:,r
&third 19-• 1)10 e- of
sity of going through a canvass, persons
tion. (Hear.) We propose that 3!_it to be ehgervalo
should vacate every second year, but to the it by tefet
able of being nominated again witu__„„rienae root ,90._
year. Great inconvenience is now rain tlie..efect
torvening year, and if they are fit should Tpror,',
there is no reason why that interval we do ile_titerAo/g
the e°ll' 111°'03°'
With regard to the elected nierneer:,
e, • 13°
make any change in the natnerenolt propel Tertie,ciei:l.
whom they are elected. We dholdevs et. L'e ini4ei"o
suggested by some, to add the
do se bY Pr 111'
osat`v t,
who, if they vote at all, can onlysuggested, al]
sooei
because in that case people
shall we add, as has also been.
e_
_re s:11A ,ers,
have served in India, because theyif wild
,intilepe!
as stated in Lord Campbell's b
the andF, of of in thin
throw the whole election intoe
~__t fair shar? do no t .400;
in
and should not, therefore, giv trutitiod.
er_L_ oleo _
India rinis y.
to other parties to which theyea
srubject thatt
(7_4l'torseropi,
from all I can gather upon
pc_._asing
fhturPertsi,vsporo
vantage could be derived fromn 10
the dee don ei„ that oharlgre
the persons entitled to vote in n
_iteratio thlg be
I propose, therefore, to make no wholet9,at
irj
We do not' contemplate to fl t
first Instance,
nt 3 0-;bo e,
at once. We propose in the
that the Prese 05
the expiration of the charter, ,
and op ilicha. of t.O
should select 15 of their num ,earsl.l?,rectors
select 3 persons who have ser, red J4rst cuo_.,eot. too,
will make the 18, who will be tn!,__'-'arre,ng r fl
o'
India Company under the ne be filledr 014utare
tho first 3 vacancies that, occur ww,un
nomination of the Crown until they.
awe del'i; ,•. •,c0;
minee members is completed. Tlaa,, fir
Aso
vacancies in the elected directors Nvi". uted trl,electe;vorit•
toga
and all future vacancies in the to keep uP e to biro j
be supplied by nomination, so as propos
000.t.ote
G nominated members. (Hear.) 6 years' 00°..,..e1ef,
director should servo for a period.eind thesebie of
the court, both of those electi
baeing eaps, lave
going out every seventh year, but
Inv be.
tion or re-nomination, as the ease
,„-

3