The Sun.
London, England, 1854-02-24 00:00:00

FUTURE WARLIKE OPERATIONS.

(Front the Times.)
The Government have wisely abstained from giving,
and the public from requiring, any information as to the
future movements and intended operations in which the
forces now departing from our shores may ere long be
engaged. It is obvious that, whatever the plans for these
active operations may be, it is the duty of those in au-
thority and the interest of the nation to keep them secret
until the moment of execution. We possess therefore no
,information on this subject which may not be common
to all who have examined the topography of the theatre
of war; and, if we did possess any information of a more
positive character, we should think it our duty to publish
it with great reserve. But the fact that a British army
of upwards of 25,000 men will shortly be on its way to
the East, and that it will be accompanied by a French
army of still greater magnitude, opens to our considera-
tion the positions in which they may be placed, and the
circumstances in which they may be engaged ; and to a
certain extent a knowledge of the country and the posi-
tion of the enemy Will indicate the measures likely to be
taken in the first instance. Marshal Marmont has dis-
cussed in his travels with great military judgment the
nature of the operations best calculated for the attack
and the defence of the Turkish empire, by or against the
Russians. He is of opinion that, if the Russians had
already by any means possessed themselves of the Darda-
nelles, the most intimate alliance and energetic efforts of
England, France, and Austria would be unable to force
them to retire from that position. But, supposing the
allied forces to be the first occupiers of the most essen-
tial positions in the Turkish territory, the advantage
would be on their side. With a view to the defence of
Constantinople, and the ultimate defeat and destruction
of a Russian army which should have crossed the
Danube and attempted to turn or force the Balkan, Ad-
rianople becomes unquestionably the grand centre of
operations at the commencement of a campaign, and
one of the measures recommended by the Marshal.to
cover Constantinople and to support the more advanced
divisions of the Turkish army, is the formation of an ex-
tensive camp at Adrianople, which might easily be for-
tified by intrenchments. The construction of 18 or 20
towers in the style of the works round Linz, would pro-
bably render such a position impregnable. Supposing,
for the present, that Adrianople is to be regarded as the
centre of preliminary operations, if we place that posi-
tion at the summit of an equilateral triangle, the other
two angles of the figure will fall at Rodosto on the Sea
of Marmora, and at Enos, near the mouth of the Ma-
i itza. The base of the figure thus described will cut off
the peninsula of the Thracian Chersofteses----that
strip of lend which lies between the Gulf of Saros
and the Hellespont, and commands on its eastern
coast the entrance of the Dardanelles. There
is no reason to believe that General Baraguay
d' Hilliers has selected Rodosto on the sea of Marinora
as the landing place of the French forces, from which
they may either be directed towards the capital, or by
the onward line march to Adrianople. Our own forces
will, it is understood, rendezvous at Malta, though we
question whether the first division will be delayed until
the second he ready to join it there, and the greater pro-
bability is that the troops now on their way will proceed
with very little interruption to the Turkish territory.
With a view, therefore, to future operations in Thrace
or Roumelia, such a corps would probably land either at
Enos, for the purpose of advancing along the valley of
the Maritza (the ancient Hebrus), or they would com-
mence by the occupation, by about 10,000 men, of the
strong position on the tableland called Mapta, above the
Castles of Europe, in the Dardanelles. That position is
the key of the Hellespont, and it is impregnable when
held by a power in command of the sea, which washes it
on either side. From the configuration of the peninsula
it could easily be protecte l by lines of no great extent,
and requiring hereafter but a small force to defend them.
Should the army advance by the Maritza, Deinotika
would become an important point south of Adrianople.
Marshal Marmont observes, in his criticism on this sub-
ject :

"If a French and English fleet were to pass the Straits
of the Dardanelles, and arrive at Constantinople ; and if
at the same time a corps of 50,000 men of the alliance,
Austrian or French, were to take up the position of Adria-
nople, and establish the intronched camp of which I have
spoken, then the Russians would have immense difficulties
to overcome in dislodging their enemies. From that mo-
ment their fleet must return to the port of Sebastopol, not
again to quit it; and if they moved an army towards the
Balkan, it would be exposed to great danger from the
operations of an Austrian force debouching either from
Transylvania and entering Bessarabia, or from Hungary,
and marching into Servia to take in reverse the army of
Bulgaria."

These remarks, written several years ago, describe
with curious accuracy the present state of affairs, espe-
cially since Austria has declared to France and England
her intention to take active measures to prevent the
advance of Russia, and to obtain the evacuation of the
Principalities.

This reasoning, however, is founded chiefly on the con-
tingencies of defensive war, and we apprehend that, as
far as the defence of the Turkish empire from aggression
is concerned, that object is attained from the moment
England and France send their fleets and armies to in-
sure it. No one can imagine that it is in the power of
Russia to invade Turkey with success, and to force the
double line of the Danube and the Balkan so as to me-
nace Constantinople, when covered by at least 60,000
of the best troops in Europe ; but the campaign, when
it opens, can hardly be merely defensive, for the Allied
Powers have distinctly in view two objects to
compel th e Russians
carry on
to
the w
evacuateara
tgain
the Principalities R
ussia
in
; and,
other
parts
secondly, t
of her dominions with such energy as to compel
her to sue for peace on our own terms.
The grand defect of the Russian position in Wal-
lachia is, that their whole line of operations is parallel
to the line of the Turkish fortresses, and is consequently
liable to be cut off at its base opposite Silistria or else-
where, while its front is attacking Kalafat or Widdin.
Bat the danger of this position is enormously increased
by the fact that the Austrian forces now being assembled
in Transylvania are also parallel to the whole Russian
line to the north, and may by a short advance intersect
it in Moldavia. Nor is this all. The great advantage
of the English and French armies occupying positions
on or near the coast, and assisted by the large amount
of steam-ships and steam-transports placed at their dis-
posal, is, that a complete corps d'armee may be thrown
with very little difficulty or delay on any part of the
enemy's coast or line of operations. Thus, it is open to
the officers commanding these combined operations to
operate on the rear or left flank of the Russian army on
any point of the coast of Bessarabia, from Odessa, Aker-
mann, the mouths of the Danube, or as far south ati
Varna. In this manner the Russian forces would be
literally surrounded and cut off from supplies on which
their existence in such countries depends. The further
they had advanced the worse their position would be-
come, and they ought to be reduced even to lay down
their arms.

Russia, as an aggressive Power, is, after all, weak.
Her armies dwindle away beyond her own frontiers, and
she has never since 1814 brought a really great force
into the field at any considerable distance from her base
of operations. Her real power is in the defence of her
territories, and there, within the recesses of her steppes
and her forests, the heart of the empire is unassailable.
But when the Emperor Nicholas imprudently boasted the
other day, in his answer to France. that his troops
would behave as they had done in 1812, he strangely
mistook the difference of his position. In 1812 England
was the ally of Russia, Turkey had concluded peace,
the Black Sea was closed, and the coasts of the
empire were secure. The Emperor Nicholas has now
both elements against him, and he begins war
by the attempt to keep possession of the Prin.
cipalities, in which his army is already outflanked, and
be has not a fortified place to cover a single regiment.
While he is carrying
on war on the Danube his own
ports and arsenals, Sebastopol, Odessa, Rherson, 1/aff
and Nicolaiew are more or less threatened. we havehere said nothing of his dangers in Asia ;
but, when the
season is more advanced, our attention will be directed
to the Baltic, where the immediate vicinity of the capital
and the vital interests of the empire lie with-h of
a powerful and euterprislog assailant. TOA9