The Sun.
London, England, 1854-05-29 00:00:00

THE PROP.UETIC PAMPHLET OF 1834

From the remarkable anonymous pamphlet, pub-
lished in 1834 by Ridgway of Piccadilly—a pam-
phlet to which we have already, in our leading
columns, made particular reference, as one contain-
ing arguments startling from their display of
prescience on thepart of the unknown pamphleteer
—we may make the following additional extracts,
as particularly entitled, at this moment, to the
popular consideration :
" Austria and Prussia cling to Russia because exposed
to dismemberment by every movement of France, be-
cause exposed to internal commotion every hour :
Russia is their refuge against both dangers, while she,
secure in her distance, her climate, and her poverty, pre-
pares a crisis in which the various states of Europe will
mutually exhaust and destroy each other. In the en-
deavour of both to swallow up the estates of Germany,
they are supported by Russia, they are opposed by
France ; hence a double source of dependence on her,
by the objects she can favour, by the hostile influence
she can counteract. What would Russia be to-day but
for the rivalry of England and France ? What would
she be without the war of liberalism and despotism ?
It is in these contests she has been aggrandised ; these
contests are necessary to her future agerandisement.
France is the object of attack. France must, therefore,
look on each accession to the strength of either of the
Allies—not as on a question of foreign or commercial
influence, but as ammunition introduced into a hostile
fort, as a reinforcement entering into an enemy's camp on
the eve of battle.
" In this state of real hostility, what must the conse•
quence be of the accession of all the resources of the
Turkish Empire to the Northern Alliance ? From
that hour Russia is invulnerable—a few thousand men

suffice to guard her southern and'eastern frontiers-L—
-her attention is all concentrated in the West. A very

few years will double and triple her revenue. The com-
merce of Europe will be in her hands—in her control
be placed all the materials at present used in the
arsenals of France. The influence and commerce of
France is immediately arrested in the sea hitherto her
own ; and at any hour Russia may transport her Cossacks
to the shores of Italy or of Spain to support the factions
and the principles which, even at present, cause her so
much inquietude. These circumstances will react
on Belgium, on Germany, on internal faction. The
very hour that Russia is entrenched at the Dar-
danelles these consequences will be evident. Then
will the time be at hand for carrying into execution
the plans so carefully matured in the three Cabinets,
and for extinguishing, by a thifd occupation, the spirit
that inspires such terrors to the Northern Courts.
" England, to-day the ally of France. will she be so
then Can she send fleets or armies to her support ?
Clearly impossible. Whatever may be her sympathy
England cannot again engage in a continental war—
and this struggle will be confined to the dry land.
"If such consequences flow from the occupation of
Turkey, is not that question one of existence for France?
Supposing it possible for these consequences to be de-
layed is it less so ? A nation's life does not run out
with the few sand glasses that mark the period of indi-
vidual existence. The life of a nation is its system ;
that life in France is already seriously compromised, and
a few steps further gained by Russia, its, fate becomes
inevitable.
" But reanimate the Ottoman Empire, the whole
future is instantaneously reversed. Russia will be ar-
rested where she is, and prevented from becoming
anything save that which she is--poor, exposed, and
vulnerable in her rear, if she foments or permits a
movement in Europe. While the Dardanelles are Turkish,
Russia can never dare to irritate the maritime powers ;
and the plan of the three Courts would never have been
dreamt of, save in the confidence of first possessing that
position. Even were a war necessary to reanimate
Turkey, France now chooses her time, instead of Rus-
sian choosing hers. She has the whole Ottoman empire,
with its immense power of resistance, to oppose her; she
avoids the armies of Germany, if they are hostile ; and
she calls in the maritime, and, still more important, the
moral force, of England. Success is certain, and the
means insignificant. She requires 500,000 men, besides
the National Guards, to be prepared against the contin-
gencies of European affairs.
" The fleet actually at sea, and the displacement of
20,000 men, would, in three months, solve the Turkish '
question entirely in her favour, carrying, as a conse-
quence, every European obstacle—giving the last blows
to the Carlists and revolutionists at home, and setting at
rest the irritations in the Peninsula and Belgium, ex-
cited by Russia and her compeers—to divert her atten-
tion from the field, where she has only to appear to be
victorious—and to comprehend, to appear.
" Not less imperative are the interests of England.
The Northern combination, political against France, is
commercial against England. This subject demands a
separate and more detailed exposition. Suffice it for the
PreSent to say, that the countries consuming to the valuei
of thirty millions of exports would be placed under the
immediate control of the Coalition, and, of cot
is rse, under
the regulations of the Russian tariff ; not.aswiboll.
but such as it would be when the mask y dr
op-
What would the effect on the
internal state of
England be if a considerable diminution of exportations
occurred 2 But it is only the direct effects of the tariffs
of the
Coalition that is to be apprehended. Would it
not command the tariffs of Northern and Southern
America ? Are the opening prospects of commerce, not
to speak of that actually existing in Turkey alone, of no
importance ? Is it nothing to see projects maturing her
direct communication with India through the Turkish
territory, while the Danube is rendered navigable, while
canals are about to connect that stream with the other
rivers of Austria and with those of Russia, Prussia,
and Bavaria, so as to establish a direct communication
between the manufacturing districts of German3T with the
marts of Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Arabia, and even
India itself ? Is it for England to allow freedom of
commerce to be extinguished in the only portion of
Europe where it exists ? Is it for England to allow an
empire, a principle of whose existence is freedom of com-
merce, to be swallowed up by the most restrictive power
on the face of the earth ? Is it for England to I.llow
the first commercial position in the world to be occupied‘
by such a power ? These motives would not have been
appreciated by Lord Chatham ; they did not then exist,
because the fiscality of Russia had not been deve-
loped, when he said with all the concentration of
deep conviction, With the man who cannot ap-
preciate! the interests of England in the preserva-
tion of the Ottoman Empire, I will not argue."
While the three Powers coalesce, first for the partition of
Turkey, that they may march, as the St. Petersburg
Gazette* has already ventured to threaten, 'by Constan-

* This memorable article in the St. Petersburg Gazette
was, on the reclamation of France and England, disa
vowed, but afterwards published in the Yassg Official Ga-
zette, and produced a strong sensation on the Russian
troop* then occupying rho provinces.