The Sun.
London, England, 1854-02-06 00:00:00

LONDON, MONDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 6, 18►4.

THE TURKISH BLUE-BOOKS.

No. 111.-THE VIENNA NOTE.
Our digest of the papers on this subject has
brought the reader to the Conference of Vienne
a species of diplomatic commission established at
that capital, in which the representatives of the
Four Great Powers endeavoured, in the, interests
of Europe, to devise .an acceptable adjustment of
the differences between Russia and the Porte, by
reconciling the demands of one party with the offers
of the other. The object, in diplomatic language,
was the manufacture of a certain "Note." Russia

had already waived her claim to a treaty—that is
to say, to a deed of reciprocal engagements between
the Czar and the Sultan—and had consented to re-
ceive an assurance proceeding from the Turkish
Government alone. This assurance, however, the
Porte had refused to give in the terms demanded by
Russia, though it had offered an equiyalent in
terms of its own. The object of the Conference,
therefore, was to frame such a document or
"Note," as the. Sultan might agree to give, and
the Czar be willing to accept.
We have already observed that it would exceed
the purpose of this exposition to enter minutely
into the turns or details of diplomatic negotiations,
nor shall we now trouble the public with the par-
ticular expressions, phrases, or conditions which
were debated at Vienna. It will be sufficient to
say that a note was produced which appeared ac-
ceptable to the representatives of the Four Powers,
and which was satisfactory to the Governments of
France and England. It has been before remarked
that projects of this description had been framed
and set • afloat by wholesale from the first mo-
ment of the rupture. There had been Austrian
Notes, French Notes, Turkish Notes, and
Notes of all kinds, purporting to meet the exi-
gencies of the crisis, but the particular project on
which-the -Conferrrice based its own suggestions
was of French extraction. Out of this was manil-
a Note which, as ultimately proceeding from the
diplomatists assembled at Vienna, was termed " the
Vienna Note," and this document, after general
opproval,
,was transmitted to St. Petersburg and
Constantinople for acceptance. To the gratification
of the public, the CZar returned an immediate ad-
hesiott to the proposal (Part 11., p. 43). All was
then considered at an end, when the Porte re-
opened the dispute by refusing the project, except
with modifications of its own. •
The first impression of all parties at this proceed-
ing was one -of astonishment, if not displeasure.
obody denied the abstract right of the Turks to
an opinion of their own, but, as their cause was in
European hands, and had been conducted with in-
contestable sincerity, it was not unreasonably-
thought that they might have acquiesced in a deci-
sion arrived at with so much trouble.. Especially
did this feeling prevail when the Turkish modifi-
cations became known, and appeared to involve no
substantial principle. Even Lord Stratford him-
self (p. 69) " repeatedly urged the danger of de-
clinina, or only accepting with amendments what
the four friendly powers so earnestly recom-
mended, and what the Cabinet of St. Petersburg
had accepted in its actual state ;" and reported to
Lord Clarendon that of the Divan's objections
" two only appeared to involve considerations of
any weight." Five days later, however, '(August
18), he writes, that Redschid Pasha had commu-
nicated the Turkish views to him in a formal me-:
morandum, and adds, " I confess that, in sub-
stance, it struck me as justifying more than I felt
myself at liberty to admit, or had even in some
respects anticipated—the course (viz. of refusal)
which his Government was prepared to adopt."
Still he " urged more the disappointment which
this refusal would occasion," and the " consequen-*
ces which were too likely to ensue" (page 72) ; but
after two days' interval we find him (August 20
acknowledging his conviction that the objectionable
passages of the Vienna Note could hardly stand as
they were, without exposing the Porte to infer-
ences not borne out by facts, and eventually
to pretensions that it would be equally in-
convenient, if not dangerous, to admit or
to resist," Lord Stratford, therefore, though
for some time doubtful, and kt first ad-
verse, ultimately came to coincide with the Porte
in its views of the proposition. A similar conclu-
sion was gradually forced upon the Western Pow-
ers, though in a different w 4.
At first the European Governments were natu-
rally somewhat annoyed to learn that the State
under their protection had protracted their embar-
rassments by a refusal of the terms expressly devised
by themselves for its security. They thought the
Turkish modifications unnecessary, and on this very
accountinjudicious : but, as they did not think them
objectionable, or in any sense opposed to their own
views, they consented to recommend them to Rus-
sia. The Austrian Government (p. 85) "greatly
lamented the modifications which the Porte had
thought it right to introduce into the Vienna Note,
but strongly recommended their adoption." The
British Government (page 86) "earnestly hoped the
modifications proposed by the Porte might receive
the Czar's assent." The French Government (page
87) avowed its "dissatisfaction" and " disappoint-
ment" at the course of the Porte, but " hoped as
the modifications did not alter the sense of the
original Note, they would be admitted by the Em-
peror of Russia." The views of the English Min-
istry will be found elaborately developed in a de-
spatch from Lord Clarendon (p. 91), of September
10, in which, although the reasonableness of the
Turkish modifications, in themselves, is not im-
peached, it is argued that they do not afford any
such additional securities as to counterbalance risks
incurred by delay. Another impression too, then
becoming current, is thus delineated :
" In conclusion, I have to observe that these last con-
ditions were not made in the Note sent to Vienna (by
the Porte), and which, without them, the Porte was
prepared to sign as a find settlement of the question.
There is, consequently, some reason to apprehend that
they have since been brought forward, under the convic-
tion that they could not be complied with ; and should
this unfortunately be the case, it will verify the predic-
tion of your Excellency (Lord Stratford), made so long
ago as the 16th of July, that there would soon be more
to apprehend from the rashness than from the timidity
of the ,Turkish Ministers ; and it will confirm the
opinion lately cemmunicated to Her Majesty's Govern-
ment, and which they gather also from the tone of
your Excellency's despatches—namely, that the feel-
ing of the Turkish Government is a desire for war,
founded on the conviction that France and England
must still perforce side with Turkey, and that the war,
therefore, will be a successful one for the Sultan, and
obtain for him guarantees for the future which will ma-
terially strengthen his tottering power. England and
France will shrink from no obligation that their honour
and their duty clearly prescribe, let the sacrifice be what
it may, of fulfilling that obligation. . • But other
interests besides those of Turkey are committed to their
charge, and, before they expose these to"the dangers and
the injury that war would inevitably entail, they are
bound to take care that no effort for the preiervation of
peace has been omitted." (p. 95.)
Such were the general views of the British Go-
vernment, and the question was soon brought to
issue, for Russia, notwithstanding the recommen-
dation of the Four Powers, rejected the Note (p. 97)
with the Turkish modifications, and the dispute,
therefore, resumed its original aspect. But Russia
did something more than this ; she justified,
through a despatch of Count Nesselrode (pp. 99
—105), her own rejection ; and this justification
proved fatal to her cause. This document, which
we subjoin at length, made it clearly appear
that the apprehensions of the Porte were well
founded, and that the sense which the Turks had
detected in the Vienna Note as injurious to their
own independence was not only actually containedin
that Note, but had been relied upon by the-
peror of Russia in giving his adhesion to it. The
first to discern this fact was the British Minister.
On the 20th of September Lord Clarendon wrote
to Lord Westmoreland, " The reasons given by
Count Nesselrode in. his analysis of the Turkish
modifications induce her Majesty's Government
to think that the apprehensions entertained by
the Porte, so far from being groundless, are to
a great extent justified." He again continues,
on the day following :—" Count Colloredo said
that there would be" (in such case) "an end
to the
.Conference of Vienna. I answered that
that would be a matter of sincere regret to her
Majesty's Government, who 'had considered that
united opinion and action of the Four Powers
upon, not only the present, but future questions
between Russia and the Porte, would tend to
preserve peace and to uphold the Ottoman em-
pire, but that no advantage could be worth pur-
chasing by dishonesty, and her Majesty's Go-
vernment would consider it nothing short of
dishonesty to persuade the Turkish' Govern-
ment to sign the Note, now that they were
made aware that their interpretation of it was
not that of the Emperor of Russia" (p. 112). On
the 26th of September Lord Cowley writes from
Paris that lie had duly read a copy of the despatch
above quoted to the French Minister, and that
" M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, without hesitation,
that he subscribed entirely to your Lordship's rea-
soning." Again, therefore, were the British and
French Governments in complete accord upon the
Turkish question as thus constituted anew.
It cannot be denied that in this matter of the

Vienna Note there has been a singular amount of
diplomatic blundering. Fountrained diplomatists
had drawn up a document to secure a certain object,
which object' • such d.ocument left substantially.
Unsecured, and,• what- is 'more, the oversight re-
mained undetected by 'their respective Govern-
ments, and even- unappreciated after its detection
by Turkey, until. Russia herself came forward with
a demonstration of the fact. It is evidently not
credible' that either the Vienna negotiators or
the Western " Cabinets should have assented to
the -Mote If they had believed it to contain
what it did contain, for such a course would
lia,Ve 'been a gratuitous sacrifice of the very prin-
ciples for which they were taking the trouble
to contend. If they had designed to let the Czar
have his way, they might have done so without
any conference at all, and their labour would have
been saved. Anhat can—be said is, that when
the mistake became really apparent they did their
best to remedy it ; and, as they were not in the
position of accepted arbitrators, whose award was
Wbe final, they were left with perfect liberty to
support the Turkish Government in a refusal which
had been thus unexpectedly justified. This course
the Governments of France and England promptly
adopted, and while still earnestly advocating a
pacific settlement, they resolutely backed the Porte
in its rejection of the Vienna Note. We subjoin
the despatch of the British Government in which
these views were justified.

But other scenes were now at hand. The efforts
of Europe had hitherto been successfully exerted in
preventing an actual outbreak of hostilities, and in
disguising with the semblance of peace what in
reality was little less than war. This position, how-
ever, could no longer be maintained. The ardour
provocations of
Russiaexc4ed aamnodngthteheatTtiuturkdse by
yf
the
eteir Government
pattook unavoidably of fanat4R2l4. nor_ can we be,
wr 6474 n `SitiviMirg tie s *or t oftwo
fa 1 nations' (hoes ever, cautiously promised) encou-
raged the Ottonian Cabinet in its preparations for
conflict.. The first development of these feelings
appears ou the 11th of September, when a tele-.
'graphic despatch arrived frOm Constantinople,.
announcing such a fernientation as to threaten,
not only the Christian pepulation of the capital,_
we
eertain incidents'
. himself.
In a
but even the throne of the Sulmtaany
be
excused uding
forto this
reverting point,t
affecting our own accuracy.' At the period referred'
to, vie informed the public of the events which had,
thus occurred, and we stated that the vessels which
on this occasion were detached from the combined
fleet had repaired to the Turkish capital, not in
pursuance of any ne 4, resolution or more warlike
policy on the part of the Western Powers, but
simply for the protection of lives and property at
the request of the Turkg themselves. Our asser-
I •
tions in this respect provoked the anger, not only
of the Protectionist prints, but of, journals with
feWer natural excuses ; and for weeks together it
was clainoronsly maintained that the movement of
the ships was directed against Russia solely; the
" coercion of the. Turks" being a calumnious inven.;
tion 'of our own. The reader may now see by the
actual deSpatches which statement was correct.

(Telegraphic.),

" The Ambassador of France at Constantinople to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
" Therapia, Sept. 11, 1853.
" The position of the Turkish Government becomes
worse and worse, and matters are arrived at such a state
as to cause serious apprehensions to be entertained of a
catastrophe, of which the inhabitants, Rayahs or Euro-
peans, would be the first victims, and which would even
threaten the Sultan's throne.
" Redschid Pasha and the Grand Vizier have imparted
those apprehensions to me. They have not concealed from
me, that the persons and the interests of my countrymen
would in that case be exposed to serious dangers, which
they were sensible they
.were incapable of preventing by
reason of the want of union in the Ministry and the threats
directed against, themselves.
" The same notice has been given to the Ambassador of
England, and, after having come to an understanding with
each other, we have decided upon summoning fromTesika,
each of us, two powerful steam-vessels, in order to reinforce
the ships at Constantinople, and that we may have at our
disposal sufficient resources for the protection of our coun-
trymen, and, g necessary, for affording support even to
the Sultan, in case the movement urged on by the war
party should go the length of menacing his authority.
(Signed) " DE LA COURT'

"The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.
" Foreign-office, Sept. 23, 1853.
" My Lord,—By a telegraphic despatch of the 11th
inst. from M. de la Cour to 4is Goyerpment, which has
been communicated to me by Count Walewski, Her Ma-
jesty's Government hvvo learnt the alarming stateof affairs
which then existed at Constantinople, and that upon the
representations of Redshid Pasha and the Grand Vizier to
your Excellency and M. de ID. Cour, you had each deter-
mined to send for two war steamers from Besika.
" The latest date of the despatches received from your
Excellency at this office is to the sth inst., and her Ma-
jesty's Government have, therefore, no information of the
events alluded to by M. de la 'Cour ; but assuming, of
course, that his report is correct, I have the satisfaction of
conveying to you the approval of her Majesty's Govern-
ment.

" Under ordinary circumstances, and as long as the Sui
tan does not declare war against Russia, nor demand the
presence of the British fleet, we must scrupulously observe
the treaty of 1811, :Inc your Excellency's original instruc-
tions on this matter remain therefore in full force. But
when it appears that the lives and properties of British
subjects are exposed to serious danger, and that the Turkish
Government declares itself unable to avert that danger, it
is clear that the treaty has no longer a binding force upon
us, and that urgent necessity supersedes its provisions.
" Your Excellency is therefore instructed to send for
the British fleet to Constantinople, and in conjunction with
the Admiral, to dispose of It in the manner you deem most
expedient for protecting British interests and the personal
safety of the Sultan ; and her Majesty's Government have
no doubt that tho Turkish Government will, without hesi-
tation, furnish the necessary firmans for that object.
" Similar instructions will be sent to M. de la Cour, and
I need hardly say how essential it is that your Excellency
should act in entire concert with your French colleague.
" I am, &c.,
.(Signed) " CLARENDON."
If any further exposition of this point is wanting,
it will be found at 'page'l2l, in a despatch from
Lord_ Stratford himself, dated. Sept. 15 ; in Lord
Clarendon 's acknoWledgmeut (page 123), and in
the same Minister's .communication to Baron Bra-
now, under date of Oct. 1 (page 126).
These transactions occurred between the 11th
and 15th of September, but before the end of the
month, affairs assumed a new aspect altogether.
OnCouncil u
opencil o f
war,
at the
leavingT u r
the Turks
solemnly pronounced6ththoef
t G
the Grandlrinftasdeclt to the discretion of the'
itself
Sultan. The Sultan adopted the decision, and on
the 4th October Lord Stratford forwarded the mani-
festo of the Ottoman Government to such effect.
(P. 158.) his document the Porte formally declaration the 2
de-
clared war against Russia, and hostilities were to be
commenced for the expulsion
of the Russians from
the Principalities if Prince Gortschakoff did not,
upon summons given, evacuate these provinces with-
in 15 days. This proceeding changed the whole posi-
tion of the protecting Powers. By the treaty of
1841 the Dardanelles were closed to foreign flags,
except on requisition of the Sultan in time of war,
and, as the Western Powers were actingin defence
of treaties, they could not so far belie their, own prin-
ciples as to set treaties at nought. (See the views
of France on this point, Part
p 229.) Although
therefore, the case really contemplated by the treaty
had been constituted by the Russian invasion of the
Principalities, the combined squadrons had hitherto
remained outside the Straits. But when war had
been openly declared the Straits were no longer
closed ; a formal requisition for the presence of the
fleets was made on the Bth Oct. (p,189), and on the
20th (p. 196)AdmiralDundas was required by Lord
Stratford to Concert measures with the Commander
of the French squadron, and to enter the Darda-
nelles.
The following is the Russian analysis of the three
modifications introduced by the Ottoman Porte into
the Vienna Note referred to above
(Translation.)

If the Emperors
" 1. In the Vienna draught it is said,
of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude
for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the
Orthodox Greek church in the Ottoman empire,' &c.
"Thispassage has been thus modified—' If the Emperors
of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude
for the religion and Orthodox Greek church.'
" The words, in the Ottoman empire,' as well as those,
the maintenance of the immunities and privileges,' have
been struck out in order to be transposed to a subsequent
passage, and applied to the Sultans alone. This omission
deprives the mutilated passage of all its meaning and sense.
For no one assuredly disputes the active solicitude of the
Sovereigns of Russia for the religion which they profess
themselves, and which is that of their subjects. What it
was designed to recognise is, that there has ever existed on
the part of Russia active solicitude for her co-religionists
in Turkey, as also for the maintenance of their religious
immunities, and that the Ottoman Government is disposed
to take account of that solicitude, and also to leave those
immunities untouched.
" The present expression is the more unacceptable, since,
by the terms which follow it, more than solicitude for the
Orthodox religion is attributed to the Sultans. It is af-
firmed that they have never ceased to watch over the main-
tenance of its immunities and privileges, and to confirm
them by solemn acts. However, it is precisely the reverse
of what is thus stated, which, having more than once oc-
curred in times past, and specifically in the affair of the
Holy Places, has compelled us to apply a remedy to it, by
demanding a more express guarantee for the future. If
we lend out selves to the admission that the Ottoman Go-
, vernmeut has never ceased to watch over the maintenance
of the privileges of the Greek church, what becomes of
the complaints which we'have brought forward against, it?
By doing so, we admit that we had no legitinkam grounds

of complaint : that Prince Menschikoff's mission was with-
out motive ; that, in a word, even the Note which it has
addressed to us was wholly superfluous.
"2. The suppressions and, additions of words intro-
duced into this passage with marked affectation are evidently
intended to invalidate' the treaty of Kainardji, while
having the appearance if confirming it.
"It was said in the Mote originally drawn up at Vienna,
that, 'faithful to the 1 e-tter and to the spirit of the Stipu-
lations of the treaties of' Kainardji and Adrianople relative
to the protection of the Christian religion, the Sultan con-
siders himself 'bound in. honour . • . . to preserve
from all prejudice . . . . the immunities and
privileges granted to th.e• Orthodox church. These terms,
which made the mainlesaance of the immunities to be
derived from the very :ipirit of the treaty—that is to say,
from the general principle laid down in the 7th article—
were' in conformity with the doctrine which we have
maintained and still maintain. For, according to
us, the promise to prostect a religion and its churches
implies, of necessity, the maintenance of the immu-
nities enjoyed by the ri 1. They are two inseparable
things. These terms, orillinally agreed upon at Vienna,
were subsequently first modified at Paris and at London ;
and if we did not objet i;o this at the time, as we should
have been entitled to do, it is not that we misunderstood
the purport of that alter cation. We clearly perceived the,
distinction made betwe(s z two points which, in our esti-
mation, are indissolubly connected with each other ; but
this distinction was, how -ever, marked with sufficient deli-
cacy to admit of our accey ?tang, from a spirit of conciliation,
and from a desire of spec .dily arriving at a definitive solu-
tion, the terms of the Note as they were presented
to us, which we thenceforth looked upon as unalterable.
These motives of defer euce no longer apply to the fresh
modifications of the same passage which has been made at
Constantinople. The lints of demarcation between the two
objects is there too plainl:r drawn to admit of our accept-
ing it without falsifying :11 that we have said and written.
The mention of the treaty. of Kainardji is superfluous, and
its confirmation without• object, from the time that its
general principle is no k Inger applied to the maintenance
of the religious immuniti( of,the religion. It is for tbis
object that the words th e letter end the spirit' have been
suppressed. The fact tha t the protection of the Christian
religion is exercised-' by t ,he Sublime Porte', is needlessly
insisted On, as if" we pre‘ended curselvost.n.exercise that-
mtelsttgliln the Sultan's florniniess ; and, as it is at the
same tune omitted ta-uoti.cie that,, according to the terms
of the treaty, the protecti on is a promise made and an en-
gagement undertaken by t. he Sultan, there is an appearance
of throwing a doubt open .the right which we possess of
watching over the strict fi ilfilment of that promise,
"3. The alteration p reposed in this passage of the
Austrian Note is altogeth n• inadmissible.
" The Ottoman Governm *int would merely engage to allow
the Orthodox chur..h to : share in the, advantages which it
might 'grant to other Cl' tristian communities, subjects of
the Porte. But if those col nmunities, whether Catholics or
ethers, were not compo ted of native R,ayalas, but of
foreign monks or laymen ( and such is the case with nearly
the whole of the conve ats, hospitals, seminaries, and
bishoprics of the Latin rite in Turkey). and if, let us say,
it should be the good pleasure of the Porte to grant to
those establishments fresh religibus advantages and privi-
leges, the Orthodox corm nullities, 'in their character of
Ottoman, subjects, would s tot, under the terms which it is
desired .to introduce into, this Note, have the right of
claiming the same favours, nor would Russia have the right
of interceding for them. •
" The malevolent iptenti On of the Ministers of the Porte
will become still more evid eat, if we cite an instance—a
pessible contingency. Lei; us suppose the very probable
case of the Latin Patriarch, of Jerusalem, recently extolled;
obtaining from.the Porte p renigativ.es net enjoyed by the
Greek Patriarch. Any cl: tim on the part of the latter
would be rejected, in con sideration Of his character of
subject of, the,Porte.
"Tile same objection would be made by the Ottoman
Ministry with reference to the Catholic establishments of
Palestine,, in case any fresh advantage or right not specified
in the last firmans should hereafter bo granted to them to
the prejudice of the native communities."

In the following despatch from the Earl of
Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour, the British Min-
ister examines the interpretation which Count
Nesselrode put upon the Vienna Note:—
" Foreign-office, September 30, 1853.
" Sir,—The despatch from Count Nesselrode to Baron
Meyendorf, communicated to me by Baron Brunow, an-
nouncing that the Turkish modifications of the Vienna
Note had been rejected by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg,
and the analysis of the grounds upon which that decision
was founded, would appear to preclude the hope of an
amicable arrangement between Russia and Turkey, and,
as their effects may consequently be disastrous to Europe,
they have received the serious attention of her Majesty's
Government ; and I shall now proceed to state the opinion
thatlhas been formed of them with reference to the in-
tentions of the Conference of Vienna in framing the Note,
to the motives of the Ottomon Government in proposing,
amendments, and to the repeated declarations of the Em-
peror that he desired no new right nor any extension of
influence in Turkey.

"In his despatch Count Nesselrode alludes to the terms
on which the Note had been accepted at St. Petersburg,
and the understanding that if any changes were introduced
at Constantinople the Russian Government would be at
liberty to withhold its assent.
" The Russian Government had, of course, a right to
make this condition, or to suggest amendments to the
Note. The Turkish. Government, possessing a similar
right, exercised it by proposing
.certain modifications. The
Conference had no power to impose the Note on either
party; its position was that of a mediator endeavouring to
do equal justice to both parties, and its intention was to
guard the honour and independence of the Sultan, and se-
cure to Russia what she was entitled to claim, but no more
—viz., the maintenance of existing treaties, and the status
quo in matters of religion. The Conference, therefore,
could not refuse to entertain the modifications of the Porte,
although regretting the loss of time which they occasioned.
They were not looked upon as altering the sense of the
Note, nor at variance with the intentions of the Con-
ference, and they were unanimously recommended to the
acceptance of the Russian Government, the Russian Mi-
nister at Vienna, it is understood, concurring in the re-
commendation.
•

"They have been rejected, but the Russian Government
did not take its stand upon the condition on which the
Note had been accepted—viz., that of no change being
made; but has fully entered into the objections to which
it considered the modifications were liable, and which
showed that inferences were drawn from the Note, and
claims were to be established by means of it hereafter, al-
together inconsistent with the views and intentions of the
Four Powers.
" The frankness of this proceeding on the part of the Rus-
sian' Government, and the determination that its intentions
shook —not lie misapprehended, aret doubtless, very proper ;
but, on the other hand, her Majesty's Government feel
that, even while retaining their own original interpreta-
tion of the Note, it would now be highly dishonourable to,
press its acceptance on the Porte, when they have been
duly warned by the Power to whom the Note is to be ad-
dressed that another and a totally different meaning is
attached to it by that Power. And, even if this were not
dishonourable, it would be in the highest degree impolitic
for the reasons stated in Count Nesselrode's despatch with
reference to admitting of any amendments—viz., that the
Emperor would expose himself 'to renew political relations
with Turkey under unfavourable auspices, which deprive
them of all solidity for the future, and inevitably bring
about a fresh and more decided rupture.'
"Her Majesty's Government earnestly desire to see the
relations between Russia and the Porte re-established on a
friendly and permanent footing, and' they, consequently,
can be no party to an arrangement which the Cabinet of
St. Petersburg has shown would frustrate the object which
they have at heart.
" Count Nesselrode appears to think that the modifica-
tions are by no means insignificant; but he seems not to
be aware that this goes far to justify the Turkish Govern-
ment in proposing them ; and his Excellency altogether
fails to show by what right, or in reparation of what in-
jury, Russia claims admissions and concessions from the
Sultan, who is unwilling to make them, and whose inde-
pendence Russia, together with the other Powers of Eu-
rope, has determined to respect.
"With regard to the first objection in Count Nessel-
rode's Note, 1 have to obserie that the Conference at Vi-
enna, in adverting to the active solicitude at all times dis-
played by the Emperor of Russia for the maintenance of
the privileges and immunities of the Greco-Orthodox
church, simply intended to record the anxiety which every
Sovereign must feel for the welfare, in a foreign country,
of the religion hehimself professes ; but the Conference 137
no means intended to affirm that the immunities and pri-
vileges in question were solely due to the solicitude of the
Emperors of Russia, and the Porte is justified in asserting
that many of these privileges are of a date anterior to the
existence of diplomatic relations between the two coun-
tries.
" Count Nesselrode alludes to other grievances, but
specifies none except that regarding the Holy Places,
which has been satisfactorily settled ; nor have any other
grievances connected with religious matters at any time
been put forward by Russia, and it was not for the Con-
ferenpe to assume the existence of wrongs of which they
had no knowledge.
" But Count Nesselrode asks—where, then, was the ob-
ject of Prince Menschikoff's mission ?—and the answer to
that is the assurance repeatedly given, that it was to settle
the question of the Holy Places, and to obtain a guarantee
for its not being again disturbed. The question has been
settled to the satisfaction of all parties, and the Vienna
Note contains a guarantee against which Russia raises no
objection.
The modification proposed by the Porte with reference
to the treaty of Kainardji appeared to her Majesty's Govern-
Ment whollyuncalled for until they read the objection mille
to it by Count Nesselrode's Note. Her Majesty's Govern-
ment considered the stipulations of the treaty of Kain-
ardji, and the maintenance of religious privileges, had been
disconnected in the Note in a manner not to be mistaken, and
indeed this is admitted by Count Nesselrode, but the Russian
Government, while disclaiming all pretensions to exercise
a protectorate, yet affirms that all these religious privileges
and immunities are direct consequences of the treaty which
was, doubtless, a solemn engagement taken by Turkey
towards Russia ; and the fulfilment of that engagement,
but no more, it was the object of the Conference to secure.
By Count Nesselrode's interpretation of the Note, how-
ever, Russia would, under the 7th article of the treaty, be
entitled to superintend all these privileges and immunities,
which are of that peculiar character that she would be con-
stantly able, if so minded, to interfere between the Sultan
and his subjects; and thus the religious protectorate,
which is abjured, and the new rights and extended
influ-
ence, which are equally disclaimed, would be established.
ardji, by any subtlety of reasoning,
the 7th article of that treaty the Porte promises to protect be so constryued. By
en-
tertained It n
eis d superfluous et rhfie u
Conferenceou s to sa y
; thatno
rn ocasrthhe rintentioneat o was
K aei
nn
the Christian religion in all its churches throughout the
Ottoman dominions ; but, by the same'article, the Minis-
ters of Russia aro permitted to make representations in
favour of a new church and its ministers ; and this clause
would have been wholly unnecessary if Russian diplomacy
had also been allowed to make representations on every
matter connected with religion. If , the article bore the
sense that Count Nesselrode now seeks to attach to it,
it is reasonable to suppose that at the signing of the treaty
a stipulation so important as that of maintaining the pri.