The Sun.
London, England, 1854-08-03 00:00:00

offer to construct new vessels of that description,.
but with sending him out on a long, and, as it
happens, a-not unsuccessful endeavour to buy up
two old gun-boats, such as the Nix and the Sala-
plan der.

However-10,000 French soldiers have actually
been sent out very recently to co-operate with the
Allied Fleets in the Baltic, or rather in the Gulf
of Finland, fleets carrying 44 pennons altogether
—namely, fourteen French and thirty English !
And with the remembrance of this tardy trans-
mission of troops to aid by land the maritime de-
signs of .INAPIER and PARSEVAL DESCHENES—
comes the rumour to-day, by way of Stockholm
and Lubeck, to the effect that Bomarsund had,
on the 29th ultimo, been captured, after
a severe bombardment. Whether this ru-
mour be true or not, it is unquestionable that
the allied fleets can, whenever they feel so dis-
posed, take possession of the Aland Islands—
about the seizure of which, by the way, there has
been latterly a great deal too much fuss—seeing
that no great positive result of any kind whatever
would be attained by having these same Aland
Islands in our possession. However, we will sup-
pose them to be already captured—as we main-
tain they may be, readily enough, with a compa-
ratively insignificant portion of the vast naval
force under the British and French Commanders-
in-Chief. Well—in that case, some three or four
hundred out of the 10,000 French soldiers now
on their way up the Baltic, would be sufficient
for all purposes to remain behind them in garrison,
leaving the rest available for after and more im-
portant operations. Foremost among those ope-
rations must inevitably be the destruction of the
batteries of Sweaborg, and the advantage conse-
quent upon such a victory, the capture of Hel-
singfors. With the ca-operation of 9,000 or 10,000
French soldiers we believe that the sailors of the
allied fleets would find this feat of arms not
altogether impracticable. Assailed in the rear
by the land forces, and in front by the enormous
allied maritime armament there collected together
for that purpose—attacked thus by sea and land

simultaneously—Sweaborg would inevitably fall,
and with Sweaborg, of course Helsingfurs. As
among the happy results of which achievement
there would devolve upon Admiral CHARLES

1 NAPIER and PARSEVAL DESCHENES the capacity
(hitherto denied to them by the mere circum-
stance of their having yet to capture the fortifica-
tions of Sweaborg and the city of Helsingfors),
the important, and indeed inestimable capacity of
proceeding further up the Gulf•of Finland with
undivided attention, with undisturbed energy,
and with the whole of their force united—to the
attack upon Cronstadt [also", as in the previous
instance by sea and land simultaneously], and
the consequent attack upon the Russian capital
itself, upon the commercial wealth and poli-
tical might of St. Petersburg. Having van-
guished Sweaborg and taken Helsingfors, the
allied fleets might then [what they could
not do otherwise] take on with them up the Gulf
of Finland the powerful squadron hitherto detained
there for a long while under the command of
Admiral CORRY—and thus, as we have said, be
enabled to proceed with their whole force united
to the objects of all this vas:: maritime, and re-
cent!y also this important military, array—the
successive attacks upon Cronstadt and St. Peters-
burg.

Moreover, it should be remembered at last that
the time for diplomatic shiliy-shallaying has gone by
entirely. The allied Governments should, there-
fore, accompany, or, at the latest, promptly follow
up their seizure of the Alani Islands, and .the
double onslaught upon Sweaborg and Helsingfors,
by the transmission of a final appeal to Stockholm
and Copenhagen. So that we might learn before
proceeding further whether Sweden and Denmark
must be considered with us, or against us. There
should not be allowed any room for further uncer-
tainty in that matter. If with the fall of Swea-
ecrto
borg and the capture 9r Hetlyi"....ppOs
itussian: ArrOCßAT—trren they should be regarded
as foes, and treated accordingly. But under no
circumstances ought we, without putting an
end first to all doubt whatever upon this
head, to proceed with our fleets from the
destruction of Sweaborg and the capture of lid-
singfors, to the final and decisive attack (with our
whole force) upon Cronstadt, and through Cron-
stadt upon St. Petersburg.
Proceedings such as those we have here
sketched out would bring the war to an end by
enabling the allies to extort from the Emperor of
RUSSTA a peace, to them, in all essential respects
satisfactory. Better acts of vigour like these—
than diplomatic hair-splittings diwn to the end of
the chapter with the emissaries and representatives
of the Austrian and Prussian Governments.
Better than that continual talk about ingenious
manoeuvres along the Danube or in the Dobrudscho.
—better than these constant• rumours about
the likelihood of our transmitting assistance to
the Circassians—better than this perpetual babble
about the vague chance, the mere possibility, of
some ultimate descent being made by the Allies
upon the Crimea, with a view to the seizure of
Sebastopol, aud, we may presume, the subsequent
dismantling of its fortifications.