The Sun.
London, England, 1854-11-28 00:00:00

THE MILITIA.

The most perfect success attends the enrolment of the
Kerry Militia. Recruits are flocking in in large num-
bers, and those attested present an appearance worthy of
the old character of the corps. During the last week a
large number of volunteers have passed muster, and
from the spirit manifested by the people the Kerry Re-
giment will probably be one of the first in Ireland fit for
active service. The Tipperary Militia have been also
successful in procuring eligible recruits, a large batch of
volunteers having been attested in Clonmel on Saturday
last.
The Oxfordshire Militia is ordered to assemble at the
County-hall, in Oxford, on Wednesday, the 6th of De-
cember, when the regiment will be embodied for service.

EMBODIMENT 07 THE SHROPSHIRE MILITIA.—The
following official communication from the Home-office
was, on Saturday last, received by the Right Hon.
Viscount Hill, Lord-Lieutenant of Salop :
" Whitehall, Nor. 17, 1854.

"My Lord,—In the absence of Viscount Palmerston,
I have the honour to inform your lordship that a war-
rant will be forthwith laid before the Queen for her
Majesty's signature, to empower your lordship to draw
out and embody the Shropshire Regiment a Militia.—
I have the honour to be, ray lord, your lordship's obe-
dient servant,
H. WADDINGTON.

" The Viscount Hill."
It will be recollected that at the last training the corps
volunteered to put itself at the service of her Majesty in
the present emergency, so that there is no doubt that it
will be ready and willing to take any duty which may be
required. An important circular has just been issued from
the War•ofice to the colonels of militia regiments. It
says :—" The rapid augmentation of the regular army
being at this moment of urgent importance, it has become
necessary to call upon all embodied as well as disenabodied
militia regiments to give as many volunteers as possible to
the regiments of Guardsand line, and to the Royallittarinse,

THE LAST AUSTRIAN NOTE.

DEPATCH ADDRESSED TO COUNT
ESTERHAZY, AT BERLIN, DATED Nor. 9, 1854.
"The Cabinet of Berlin replied to our communication
of the 23d of last month by a despatch, communicated
to us by M. d'Arniin, of which a copy is subjoined. The
communication of the 23d expressed the sincere desire of
Austria to obtain for herself and the German confede-
rates guarantees which a union desired, in will as in
action,of Austria and Prussia, can alone assure to all
Germany. It is in that spirit that we have examined
with the most scrupulous attention the note of Baron de
Manteuffel.

" We are glad to see that the elements of accordance
and entente contained in the preceding declarations of
the Prussian Cabinet have a more clear and pronounced
form. Like ourselves, Prussia shows herself inclined to
oonfine to the past the divergencies of opinion which had
for too long a time compromised the value and effect of
the treaty of the 20th April, and to take resolutions
which aoteal circumstances may claim of it, in conse-
quence of its participation in the alliance (offensive and
defensive) of the 20th April.
"It is in consideration of that; disposition of Prussia
that we recommended in the instructions to Baron
Prekesch, and communicated in substance to the Ca-
binet of Berlin, to avoid as much as possible sterile dis-
cussions en the point of the obligations already con-
tracted in virtue of the treaty of the 20th April. But at
the same time we proposed, in three points, the project
of a federal decision, au it seemed to us, necessitated in
an urgent manner by the 'common interests of Germany
in the actual state of affairs. It is, therefore, with very
great satisfaction that we found,, in the propositions
made by the Cabinet of Berlin in reply to its above-cited
communications, that the three points in question are
reproduced in their essential dispositions.
" We are happy to see in this aceordance an assurance
of the direction towards the same end of the efforts by
which the two German Powers applythemeelves to obtain
the solution of the serious complications of the moment.
But the more value we attach to our accord with Prussia,
the more do we hope that the Prussian Cabinet will not
insist upon conditions and restrictions of pure form which
would very probably diminish the chance of the speedy
establishment of peace, and might even, in the course of
events, compromise the most important interests of
Austria and Germany.
" We have not the slightest desire to enter into dis-
cussions of pure form when the situation is so serious.
We therefore think it of very little consequence to ex-
amine whether it is better to select, for the dispositions
to be taken, the more simple form of a federal decision,
or that Austria and Prussia should first come to an agree-
ment (s'entendent d'abord) between themselves on the
dispositions to be taken, and then submit them to the
Diet ; although the adoption of this last form does not
appear necessary, since the treaty of April, in oonse-
quence of the accession of the Confederation, has taken
a greater extension, and has become, as regards its exe-
cution and a new eventual extension, the object of the
decisions which the Diet may take conformable to the
federal constitution.

" But, on the other hand, imperious considerations
prevent us from accepting, under any form whatsoever,
contractual engagements binding (obligatoires) in the
sense of the additional dispositions possessed by Prussia.
" According to the Prussian project, we ought to en-
gage ourselves by a formal convention to address, con-
jointly with the great contracting parties, a new invita-
tion to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to accept the bases
of peace, and it should only be the result of such a step
which should decide whether Germany should bind her-
self or not (iobligerait ou non) to defend our position in
the principalities, and whether site would leave us or not
full liberty of action towards Russia.

"Neither the condition upon which it is wished to
make depend (dont on veut faire dipendre) the promise
of a common defence, nor- the restrictions which there
may be an intention to put upon our eventual resolu
tions, appear to us sufficiently justified.
" Why should the assistance of the Confederation
only be assured in the case Russia should once again reject
the bases of peace I Supposing Russia accepts them,
but that the Western Powers refuse to enter into ne-
gotiations, and that the war continues, would it not
be still our task (taehe) to maintain ourselves in the
principalities ? And for what reason should we not,
in that case, count upon the assistance of Germany ?
"To make at once the concurrence of parties to the
alliance depend upon future events and the declaration of
Russia and the interpretation given to them by the
allies, would be to deprive beforehand the steps that
might be taken at St. Petersburg of a portion of their
weight. Opinion is already so much divided on the right
and obligations which result from the treaty of April,
that it is to be feared that Russia has it in her power to
create new controversies, with the assistance of vague
declarations, or of such susceptible of different inter-
pretations. We should therefore have just motives
in net formally engaging ourselves to take steps of this
description in common,, at least as long as all the Ger-
man governments do not make with us one powerful
body, capable of accepting all the ulterior consequences
of such steps.

"As the Prussian Cabinet justly observes, the con-
duct of Russia will doubtless exercise a very great in-
fluence on the measure in which we may claim the assis-
tance of our allies. Russia may adopt pacific resolu-
tions, and give guarantees against any attack on her
part ; she may thus take away (cloigner de nous) the
danger with which we are menaced by her present atti-
tude. But the will have the more motives for doing so,
the more intimate i■ the alliance of Germany. It is
precisely in this respect that it appears necessary to us
to extend the common assistance of Germany to our
Position in the principalities, without making it depend
upon the acceptance or refusal of the bases of peace by
Russia.

"Practically the want of these restrictions appears the
less to exist, as according to our propositions the Diet
will retain the right of pronouncing itself according to
circumstances upon the degree of danger that would
menace us, and upon the case in which military aid
should be given.

"However, although Russia, by the manner in which
she refused to examine the propositions of peace made to
her, has put us in the impossibility of returning, in our
own interests, to the propositions she declined so cate-
gorically, it is nevertheless by no means in the intentions
of his Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph to exclude
all circumstances under which such a step might be
taken with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, in concert
with Prussia and the Germanic Confederation. The
exigencies of our position might ever oblige us to it. His
Majesty the Emperor hopes that the Russian Cabinet
will not misconstrue the motives which made him advise
the free acceptance, but without conditions, of the four
guarantees demanded. His Majesty accompanies with
his best wishes the confidential steps which the Court
of Berlin, as it results from Baron Manteuffel's despatch,
recently adopted, in this sense, with the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg. If these counsels are not attended with
success, au invitation, addressed iu the name of the
Confederation, to make Russia accept the bases of peace,
would certainly not be hors do propos. But as regards
Austria, she could not resolve to take a step of such a
nature except under certain reserves, as, under existing
circninstanees, euch a step would have a very grave cha-
racter. The eventualities which are necessaraily attached
to such a step, the situation created by the definitive
non-acceptance of the preliminaries of the peace, the case
is which the offensive would be inevitable, are so many
subjects but little suited to be brought before the Diet
without a preliminary confidential deliberation between
the Governments of the German States ; and the
Prussian Cabinet will agree, doubtless, that the ques•
tion of to decided an invitation addressed to the
Cabinet of St. Petersburg ought to be treated en
dchors of the resolutions which are to be shortly
before the Diet. We ought, therefore, to desire
that, in the federal resolutions which are to
bo adopted, neither the consequences of the possible ac-
ceptance of the preliminary bases nor of the refusal of
those bases should be the object of obligatory disposition..
We ought to desire that tho condition be not imposed
upon us of submitting our liberty of action, as regards
the eventual resolutions of the belligerent parties, to re-
strictions which limit it in a positive manner. Our duties
towards our own empire, our position in Europe, do not
allow us to say beforehand that if Russia declare herself
ready to negotiate on the basis of the four points, we
shall not have, whatever turn events might take, to de-
liberate on the ulterior decisions which would be made
to Russia. Guarantees generally recognised as such, a
real conclusion of peace, can alone satisfy our wants.
We cannot recognise the simple fact of an offer of peace
made by one party and rejected by another party as ex-
ercising an obligatory influence upon our resolutions,
whatsoever opinion we may entertain upon such a con-
juncture. If it were thus, there would be nothing changed
in the actual situation, unless that, whilst the belligerent
parties continue to act in full liberty according to the in-
terests and objects of war or of peace, we should be re-
duced to that forced neutrality which we have already
so often refused to accept for Austria.
"For all these motives it would be much more suitable
that the decision of the Diet should be restricted to the
three points which we have proposed. We give ourselves
up to the Imps that Prussia does not refuse to appreciate
our motives in an impartial and amicable spirit, and that
if she gives her assent thereto, she will be disposed to
render full justice to our desire of perfect entente, a
desire of which we bare given her a new proof by a
preliminary communication to the Cabinet of Berlin
of the instructions drawn up for Baron Prokesch. We
are now ready (a melee) to await the resolution, of
Prussia and of the Germanic Confederation. This is
why we give immediate communication of the above-
mentioned instructions, and of the present despatch, to
all the German Governments, and we shall sincerely re-
joices if we shall shortly be able to hail, as a glorious act
for all, an act which would deliver Austria and all Ger-
many from the anxieties which have hitherto weighed
upon them. We are persuaded that to attain it only a
little of that impulse is necessary which Prussia can give
by that great and legitimate influence which she exercises
among the German Confederates:; and finally, we express
once again the firm assurance that we shall find the
Prussian Cabinet disposed to give instructions to its re-
presentative at the Diet analogous to our own.
I, you will please to leave a copy of_this despatch with
Baron Manteuffel."

AUSTRIA AND THE WESTERN POWERS.

(Front the Daily News.)
And what of Austria ? There is something very signi-
ficant in the fact of General Coronini's promulgation at
Bucharest of the account of the battle of Inkermann,
which we re-publish today. In addition to this, we
hear in quarters into which the earliest information of
the wishes and designs of the Austrian Government are
known to penetrate, the affirmation confidently repeated
that—Austria is coming round to the Allies. Some
even go so far as to maintain that a treaty of alliance
between Austria and the Western Powers is arranged,
and ready for signature. Without reposing undue con-
fidence in the more definite of these statements, enough
has transpired to show that the almost superhuman
valour displayed by the French and English at the
battle of Inkermann ; the immense losses sustained by
the Russians on that occasion, and their subsequent
despondency and inactivity ; and, above all, the tho-
roughly roused spirit of France and England, and the
redoubled efforts that are being made to hurry forward
additional troops and military stores to the Crimea,
have made a deep impression on the Cabinet of Vienna.
We believe that Austria is now ready to draw closer the
ties that bind it to the Western Powers—that it is ready.
to forego all stipulations to be allowed to postpone its
final and formal breach with Russia to the spring. We
believe this, because we believe that the character of
the Austrian Government is unchanged and unchange-
able ; that it may be apostrophised now as in the days of
Shakspeare :
Thou ever strong upon the stronger side !
Thou--Fortune's ehanspioa—that doest never fight,
But when her humorous ladyship is by
To teach thee safety !

If Austria is indeed ready to conclude a treaty of
alliance with the Western Powers, it can only be because
Austria sees no other path of safety open to it. The
Western Powers may have its alliance upon their own
terms ; and it is a duty they owe the two great nations,
the assertion of whose rights and interests devolves
upon them, to take care that these terms are such as can
in no eventuality bring damage or dishonour upon them.
There need be no scruples about driving a hard bargain
with Austria on the score of delicacy. In its dealings
hitherto with France and England, Austria itself has
displayed neither delicacy nor common honesty. Its
conduct, with regard to the Principalities, has been
from first to last hostile to the interests of Turkey and
the Western Powers—particularly of England. On
the head of the Austrian Government rests in a
great measure the guilt of the bleed of so many
brave Englishmen shed before Sebastopol. Had
not Austrian intrigue, at Constantinople, and
Austrian chicanery and bullying at Bucharest,
paralysed the operations of Omer Pacha, many of the
Russian troops which fought at Balaklava. and Inker-
man could not have left the banks of the Danube and
the Pruth. Austria, while professing friendship to
France and England, has been manoeuvring to enable
Russia to detach troops from l3essarabie to combat the
French and English armies before Sebastopol. Austria
has been labouring assiduously to rob Turkey of the
Danubian Principalities by converting its temporary
military occupation of them into a permanent political
annexation of them to the Austrian dominions. The last
known insult offered by the Austrian Commander-in•
Chief to Omer Pacha was aimed also at England.
Austrian intrigue at Constantinople obtained from
a weak or treacherous Minister of the Porte, an
order to Omer Pacha to dismiss ore of his
bravest and most trusted officers—Massar Pacha.
That officer is an Englshn al—an Englishman who has
deserved well of his country by his gallant services in
the last Kaffir war, at the head of a troop raised at his
own expense. Sir Stephen Lakeman was selected by
the Austrians to be the man through whose side a
treacherous blow was aimed at his General, for no other
apparent reason than because lie was an Englishman.
At the time the order for his dismissal was obtained
from a weak or venal Minister at Constantinople, and
placed in the hands of Austrian diplomatists and gene-
rals to be transmitted to Omer Paella, there had been
no open breach between Sir Stephen Lakeman and
Count Corenini. The dispute about the reception of
Prince Ghika occurred subsequently to the clandestine
impetration of the order for Sir Stephen's dismissal.
Net a moment ought to be lost by Ministers, after
the meeting of Parliament, to explain the nature of
this extraordinary transaction, and the steps which
they have taken in consequence. They can at the
same time inform the Legislature—and through it the
country—what amount of truth there it in the assertions
of the Vienna journals, that up to this moment Mr.
Colquhoun, and his colleague at Jassy, have not re-
sumed the exercise of their consular functions in Wal-
lachia and Moldavia since the entry of the Austrian
troops, and what has been the cause of the delay,
Austria, it seems, is now eager to conclude an inti-
mate alliance with France and England ; but, before
Austria is admitted to the benefits of such an alliance,
France and England ought to insist upon its making
reparation for the injury it has done them. France and
England ought, moreover, to tie Austria down by dis-
tinct treaty stipulations to abstain from all attempts to
transfer the sovereignty of the Danubian Principalities
from the Porte to itself. Lastly, France and England
ought to give Austria clearly to understand that they
do not bind themselves to interfere in any case between
it and its subjects; that they do not intend to be made
the instruments for propping up its tottering dominion
over Hungarians and Italians.

(Front Mt Morning Post. )
The document signed, as we are informed by tele-
graph, on Sunday afternoon last, by Counts Armin and
Bu•l, was important, no doubt, as securing the adhesion
of Germany to the four bases as fit and proper starting
points in future negotiations for peace, without is any
way fixing them as limits, or forbidding the addition of
ether conditions. But, if we mistake not, in a very
short space •f time the telegraph will transmit to us news
of higher moment ; for we believe that, at the time at
which we write, or witl:in forty-eight hours of it, a step
will be taken by Austria which will have a most potent
influence on the fate of the war, by uniting in action her
flag with those of England and Fra,ece, and swelling the
alliance against Russia, by the accession of a Power who,
from her geographical position and military resources, is
in the highest degree dangerous to her ambitious
neighbour.

Till the deed is signed, till the fact is accomplished, we
cannot be perfectly sure. Austria, at the last moment,
may retreat. That is possible ; bit most improbable,
after the repeated and straightforward advances she has
made. The crisis, however, has arrived ; and, if the
Cabinet of Vienna were now to refuse to join us, none
could mistake its complicity with Russia, and the atti-
tude of the Cabinets of London and Pari■ towards
Austria would be immediately and totally changed. But
if faith caa be placed in professions, we may rely on it
that that is now being dens at Vienna which will give
us a new and welcome ally.
The intrigues of Russia in Germany have apparently
failed. It were needless now to enter into a history of
the long negotiations in which so much time has been
wasted ; but it is well to explain the last communications
of the German Courts, which have led to the agreement
•f the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna upon the manner
in which they shall present the four bases to the Ger-
manic Diet.

Without entering into the diffuse arguments of the
notes exchanged, we may state that Prussia wished to
present the four bases to the Diet, not as mere essential
starting points for the negotiation of peace, but as its
positive conditions and absolute limits. In this view of
the four bases Prussia received the support of the minor
States, headed by Bavaria. Austria, however, refused
to accede to their views, holding herself bound, by
the notes exchanged on the Sth of August with the
Western Powers, which plainly allowed such further
conditions as might seem fit to be demanded, in the
event of negotiation. for peace ; laying down the four
bases, not as limits, but purely and simply as essential
starting points. Matters were in this state, and argu-
mentative notes were being exchanged, when M. Von der
Pforteu, the Prime Minister of Bavaria, started for
Vienna, with a view of inducing that Court to adopt the
Prussian proposition with respect to the four bases. The
result of M. Von der Pfordten's mission, however, was,
that instead of persuading the Austrian Cabinet to join
kiln, he was persuaded to recognise the justice of their
views, and accordingly, immediately upon his return to
Munich, a personal comnausication was addressed from
that Court to the King of Prussia, announcing its com-
plete adhesion, and therefore that of other secondary
States, to the Austrian view. Prussia, thus placed in a
position of perfect isolation, has had to give way, and, as a
necessary consequence, Counts Bud and Argim have
signed the agreement, by which Austria and Prussia engage
to present the four bases to the Germanic Diet for its
acceptance without commentary or limitation. Austria,
therefore, instead of being bound down by Germany,
has her hands completely free, and may, with the West-
ern Powers, exact what further conditions of peace the
chances of war may hereafter place in their power to
demand, without owing any account of such demand to
Germany.
It is evident that, had not Bavaria and the States
which met at Bamberg obliged Prussia to give way,
Austria could not hare given way to them, if she had
any regard for her position as an European Power ; for,
whatever deference she may have owed to Germany, she
had higher duties and larger interests to consider,
in consequence of her pretension to the rank of a first-
rate European Power. On the other hand, it is mani-
fest that Prussia, which is a purely German Power,
could not suffer herself to be completely isolated by the
desertion of all Germany ; and thus Russia has been, as
yet, completely foiled in the diplomatic struggle. Ger-
many, and even Prussia, adopt the four bases without
limitation, and Austria is, we trust, about to throw her
weight into the scale of war on our side.
A very brief space will put an end to "ifs" and "be-
liefs," and will, we hope, enable us to announce the
most important event that has occurred since the de-
elaratian of war.

EMIGRATION ntom LIVRIII'OOL.—The total number of
ships which have left Liverpool during the present month
for all foreign ports has been 43, of an aggregate ton-
nage of 41,474 tons, and having 10,326 persons on board.
Of these 9 were bound for Australia, with 3,230 pas-
sengers, besides others to St. John's, New Bruns-
wick, &c.

WHY SPARE ODESSA?

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.

Sir,—Net only is Odessa the greater feeder of Sebas-
topol and the depot whence the Crimea derives an im-
mense supply of provisions, ammunition, and men, but
it is, in fact and without exaggeration, one of the main-
spring of the Russian revenue, and, consequently, no
mean pillar of the enemy's power. The rival of St.
Petersburgh in wealth and importance, it is the empo-
rium where -the produce of nearly the half of Russia is
collected in order to be exported in exchange for the
sinews of war. Its various guilds number nearly 1,000
merchants, many of whom are Greeks, whose wealth has,
in the shape of loans and donations, contributed largely
to the resources of our foe. 'Why, then, spare Odessa ?
It is a courtesy of that superfine sort which the nation
can but ill afford ; while to our brave countrymen in
the Crimea it is an act of the most execrable inhu-
manity. For my part, Sir, I feel my blood rise
whenever I remember the foolery of that bombardment
of Odessa. 8,000,0001. or 10,000,0001. worth of Russian
" ways and means" lay at our mercy, and we contented
ourselves with pelting with red het shot the military
mud banks of the city, or with chipping bits of stone
from the fronts of its forts. John Bull must be sinking
into the dotage of old age, and certainly deserves to be
beaten, if he finds any gratification in such perform.
ances. 1 generosity so ungenerous to our brave de-
fenders merited no better result than the jubilant an-
nouncement of the Russian Government that the Allied
fleets had done their worst and retired in defeat snd dis-
tress. I am, Sir,

A TR.IIB BRITON.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.

Sir,— I am glad to perceive that the columns of your
journal have been thrown open to the question, "Why
spare Odessa?" and it is much to be desired that by
following it up the public may take the opportunity of
expressing what I believe to be their almost unanimous
opinion, in order that the Government may be awakened
from their merciful (so called) way of making war.
War is a dreadful scourge and an enormous evil ;
but, when it becomes the duty of a nation to take up
arms in the cause of right and of justice, that is the most
merciful proceeding which will render so immense an
evil of the least possible duration.
We are engaged in a momentous struggle with one of
the greatest Powers in the world—a struggle which it
will tax all our energies to bring to a satisfactory conclu-
sion and to humble a grasping and ambitious des-
pot. We must, therefore, take every opportunity of
injuring and crippling so powerful an antagonist ; and
the people of this country have no sympathy with such
a half-peace half-war policy as caused the town of
Odessa to be spared, and which has undoubtedly occa-
sioned the loss of many of our gallant countrymen and
allies, by that place being the rendetrous of the Ras-
sian legions, which have poured into the Crimea to
annihilate our army, and forming, as it does, the great
source whence the enemy is obtaining his supplies.
I hope, then, soon to hoar, with your advocacy, that
we shall make use of the power we possess, and that
at least a portion of the allied fleet, which can be easily
augmented, will proceed either " to capture," or " burn
and destroy," not only Odessa, but also every place be-
longing to the enemy it is possible to approach.—•l am,
sir, your most obedient servant,
Nov. 27. AN ENGLISIIMA.N.

REVOLVERS IN THE CAVALRY.