The Sun.
London, England, 1854-11-03 00:00:00

.RUSSIAN TRADE-RESTRICTIVE

NEUTRALITY.

We have devoted our roost careful attention to the
consideration of the question whether it is possible and
expedient to adopt further restrictive measures for the
purpose of checking the trade of Russia through the
neutral ports, and whether any effectual means can be
used to inflict additional pressure upon the commercial
resources of the Russian empire without causing still
greater injury to ourselves, and without surrendering
those broad principles of maritime policy which the
Allied Powers are pledged in this war to respect and to
maintain. We yield to none in our desire to apply with
the utmost rigour every right of war which is likely to
bring this contest to a termination by cutting off the
means employed by the enemy in carrying it on ; but it
must not be forgotten, in our eagerness to accomplish
this object, that we are at war with an empire the land
frontiers of which are more extensive than its coasts ;
that the right of neutrals to carry enemies' goods has
been conceded by the union of our policy with that of
France ; and that we ourselves have internal interests
of great importance engaged in this question.
It is desirable, in the first place, to establish as clearly
as we can the actual state of the case. The results of
the last eight or nine months cannot fairly be taken
as a definitive proof of the effects of our present system
for several reasons. The Russian trade is carried on by
a system of advances from this country, Holland, and
France. Upon the breaking out of the war large
quantities of produce already paid for were lying in the
northern ports, waiting for the opening of the navigation.
It was obviously expedient to afford time for bringing
this property away. Accordingly, the blockadewas de-
ferred, and in the White Sea this indulgence was carried
so far that, we understand, 700 ships brought away their
cargoes before the 10th of August. No such opportunity
will be given another year, and, if advances are made
during war, it will beat the peril of persons engaging in a
trade which may at any moment be wholly stopped
by blockade or by prohibition. Nevertheless, we have
reason to believe, from the best information we can col-
lect, that the decrease in the quantities of Russian pro-
produce imported into this country is far greater
than is commonly supposed, taking into the account
not only that which has been Leen brought from any
part of Russia, but also the imports from neu-
tral ports. This decrease in the three great articles
of hemp, flax, and tallow will be found to amount
to no less than 60 per cent., or, in other words, we
have imported in the first nine months of 1854 about two-
fifths of the quantities of these articles, being of Rus-
sian origin, which we imported in the same portion of
1853 ; and, what is still more satisfactory, the supply of
the same articles from other countries, not receiving
them from Russia, has increased in a very considerable
proportion. So that under the present system the ex-
port trade of Russia is certainly declining, and the trade
from other countries which are superseding Russian pro-
duce is augmenting.
There is no doubt that advantage was taken of the
delay in the blockade and of the indirect channels of
trade to import large quantities of Russian produce,
which were sold in this country at high prices, and are
held under the impression that a still further rise in
prices is to be anticipated, especially if the Government
could be induced to adopt more restrictive measures.
The consequence is that the stocks of Russian produce
have accumulated, and we believe that the quantity of
Russian tallow in London and of Russian flax at Dun-
dee is larger than at any former period, although prices
are kept up by the speculative holders of these commo-
dities. It is evident that, if the door by which these
supplies have been imported were now closed, it would
be of great advantage to a certain class of persons en-
gaged in this trade, but that advantage would be pur-
chased at the expense of the British community.
Great stress has been laid upon the rate of the ex-
changes, and the public were led to believe that, ow-
ing to the state of the trade, gold was flowing in large
quantities to St. Petersburg ; but, upon a closer exami-
nation of the facts, we find that this statement is the
reverse of the truth. The exchange between London
and St. Petersburg is at par when the rouble is worth
38d. When it rises to 39d. it is worth while to send
gold to Russia, but at the present time it is at 351, and
since the commencement of the war it has fluctuated
from 33i to 37—that being the highest point it has at-
tained. It is, however, extremely difficult to draw any in-
ference from the rate of the exchanges. No gold is
sent direct from this country to Russia ; it usually
passes through Hamburg or Antwerp ; but it is
impossible to discover whether these remittances
are on Russian account or not. Gold is perpetually
flowing through this country with great rapidity. Last
month about three millions of bullion were received and
exported ; for not only the Australian remittances but
the greater part of the Californian remittances to Europe
come is the first instance to this country. But the

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[PRICE SD.

destination of these sums escape sill power of
observation. The export of gold from Russia is pro-
hibited, but otherwise, at the present rate of exchange,
it would be more profitable to send gold from St. Peters.
burg to London than from London to St. Petersburg.
It is therefore incorrect to state that the measures
adopted since the commencement of the war have failed
to affect the trade of Russia, and have produced a rate
of exchange favourable to the enemy. But it is said we
might produce a far more decisive effect on the resources
of Russia by prohibiting the import of her produce into
this country altogether. That is a measure which would,
of course, be extremely onerous to the British consumer.
The flax-spinners of Scotland and the hemp-walks of our
maritime towns would be injured, while we should leave
the trade of Russia precisely what it now is with the
rest of the world. Prices would rise to the consumer
here, but they would remain unaltered to the grower
and importer elsewhere ; and the high prices of the
British market would draw to it the tallow and the flax
of neutral States which would supply their own con-
sumption by an importation of the Russian article,
superior in quality and lower in price. A ma-
ritime blockade is a barrier interposed, as far as it
extends, to stop the trade of the enemy with all
countries ; but a fiscal restriction of our own would in-
flict on ourselves the evils of scarcity, and leave to the
rest of the world the advantages of plenty.
_ _

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Moreover, a restriction of this nature would be wholly
inoperative against the semi-manufactured article, though
it might exclude the raw material of our own manufac-
tures. It would puzzle our consular agents to deter-
mine how much Russian tallow entered into a cask of
stearine from Belgium, or how many fibres of Russian
hemp could be detected in a halter from Holland. We
should have to import the cordage of our ships from
Hamburg or Amsterdam, or to procure the ships them-
selves ready rigged from Sweden or the United States.
The effects of the system of protection would be inverted
to our prejudice.
Nor can.we, on mature reflection, saticipste gulch.
advantage from—the scheme of blockading- nentrarperte'
contiguous to the Russian frontier. 'Such a measure
would be an act of war, for on no other ground could
neutrals be excluded by the blockade. But, even if the
whole coast of Prussia were closed, the same commo-
dities would find their way by railroads and canals to the
ports of Lubeck or Hamburg, Denmark, and Holland.
The only result would be increased cost of transport,
which would tend to augment the prices of these articles
all over the world, though that increase would not go
into the pocket of the Russian grower, but rather of the
neutral agent.
For the present, therefore, and speaking chiefly on
commercial grounds, our conclusion is that nothing can
be done to increase the restrictions imposed on the
trade of Russia, except by rendering the ,blockade,
especially in the Slack Sea, far more effective than it has
hitherto been. Any other of the steps suggested would,
in our opinion, be productive of mere temporary incon-
venience to Russia and of permanent detriment to our-
selves. It is, moreover, extremely doubtful whether
the French Government, which has hitherto shown an
extreme reluctance to apply rigorous restrictive mea-
sures to commerce, would be a party to any measures
which must impose severe sacrifices on the countries by
which they are enforced, as well as on those to which
they are applied. It does not follow, however, that we
regard thii state of things as permanent, or likely to
continue throughout the war. On the contrary, it arises
entirely from that neutral policy of the German States,
which has tended more than any other cause to produce
this contest; and, in spite of the efforts of the King of
Prussia to prolong his neutrality, and to serve the in-
terests of Russia, we trust that the time is not very dis-
tant when the Courts of Northern Germany will be led
by the force of events to hold a different conduct. From
the motpent that the European frontier of Russia can be
closed by land as well as by sea great progress will have
been made towards the termination of the war ; but if,
on the contrary, Prussia continues to use her neutrality
for the purpose of aiding Russia in carrying on this
struggle, it will become a question whether such a neu-
tral is not snore justly to be dealt with as an enemy.—
Times.