The Sun.
London, England, 1854-10-26 00:00:00

*combat" during the first day, and that Admiral
KORNILOFF was one of the slain. But there we
must stop ; and as to the other details, as well as
the " embellishments" respecting " the fire being
feeble on the land side," or " the fortifications
towards the sea having suffered very little,"
WO must totally disregard them, and patiently
await the time when authentic news can
be obtained from our own Generals, or rather
from the correspondents of the different journals,
who, notwithstanding the discouragement they
receive from the authorities, fearlessly and effi-
ciently discharge their onerous and important
duties. The withholding the last despatches of
Lord RAGLAN, which arrived on Sunday last at
the War-office, proves, beyond the possibility
of doubt, the manner in which the public would
be treated and the natural anxiety of the people
disregarded, if we were wholly dependent for in-
formation on the scraps doled forth from the
War-office--" the crumbs that might be suffered
to fall from the official table."

We may also the more freely believe the opening
of the fire on the 17th, inasmuch as we already
know that on the 13th everything was in readiness
on the English side, and that our Allies would
shortly be prepared to follow suit. On that day
"the Allies were within 700 metres of Sebasto-
pol," and " the English batteries were ready,
though still masked, as the French were not suf-
ficiently advanced." It was therefore generally
thought that the firing would commence on the 15th
inst., and we really cannot conceive any pretexts for
further procrastination- on the part of the com-
manders.

It is true that they have, by their dilatoriness,
allowed time for the arrival of the expected rein-
forcements ; and that, in consequence, another
formidable battle may have to be fought before
the capture of Sebastopol. But such a lesson has
already been taught to the Russians, as to the
steady determination and invincible bravery of
the Allied troops, that they will scarcely venture
to attack when all the advantages of position are
with the adversary, who so speedily and decidedly
routed them under sueh very different circum-
stances. Should they screw their courage to the
striking place, should they indeed venture on an
attack, we cannot, for a moment, doubt the re-
sult. We have implicit confidence in the Allied
Troops ; when they are allowed to meet the enemy,
there will be no shortcomings on their part ;
and we may safely rely on all that the
most unflinching valour can achieve. Any on-
slaught on them will only recoil on the heads of
those by whom it was attempted, and might lead
to very important results in our favour, so far as
the possession of the whole peninsula is con-
cerned.

We must, therefore, for the present, rest con-
tented with what we actually know. As the fire
has been opened under every possible advantage,
and when sufficient time had been allowed to
place everything en regle, we can join in the anti-
cipations of those who doubted not for a moment
that Sebastopol must fall ; and it is by no means
improbable that the tidings of its capture:are:even
at this moment speeding forward to appease the
anxieties and gladden the hearts of the peoples of
France and England.

As to the alleggd recapture of Eupatoria, it
is, if true (a matter that may be seriously ques-
tioned), a point of the most trivial consequence,
which can exercise no influence whatsoever on the
results of the campaign. We did not garrison it
with the view of defending it ; and, when by the
flank movement on Balaklava, we made that port
the pivot of our operations, Eupatoria became
worse than useless, an encumbrance rather than a
beneflh The only mistake was that we did not
Iciig since withdraw Captain BROCK and his
gallant followers ; and as they have got off with-
out loss of life, we should have nothing to regret
if the Russian statements were strictly accurate.

From the clear statement given by Dr. P,,_tr•.
there can remain no possible doubt respecting the
fate of a portion of the expedition under Sir JOHN
FRANKLIN. It is but too painfully certain that a
c )nsiderable number of men, about forty, of the
officers and crews of the Erebus and Terror, were
met by a party of Esquimaux sometime about the
spring of 1850, and that these unfortunate men
afterwards perished miserably from the combined
influences of cold and hunger. A horrible Bug•
gestion has been added, which we would fain hope
to be unfounded. We must recollect that none
of the Esquimaux with whom Dr. Min conversed,
and from whom he obtained his information, had
seen the " Kabloonans," or whites, nor had they
ever been at the spot where the bodies were found,
but had their information from those who had
been there, and who had seen the party when
travelling. We may easily imagine on what in-
sufficient data these ignorant men might arrive
at the conclusion that "our wretched countrymen
had been driven to the last resource—Cannibal-
ism—as a means of prolonging existence." We
know the tendency to exaggeration that exists in
all uneducated minds—how easily the slight-
est indications might be tortured into this
fearful opinion. It seems certain that many
of the bodies, those who first perished, were duly
buried by the survivors. It was not until their
strength had failed, when their own deaths were
impending, that the remains of their unfortunate
comrades were suffered to rest on the spots where
they had sunk under their protracted anguish.
Then comes the "mutilation." But might not
that have been inflicted by wild beasts, or more
savage beings of an unknown tribe ? The nature
of that mutilation should be strictly inquired into
from some of those who had seen the bodies, and
trustworthy information obtained. In like manner
too, as to " the contents of the kettles," by which
the accuracy of the awful surmise has bean
strengthened. Our lamented countrymen might
have had some food remaining which the Esqui-
maux discoverers could not recognise, and which
they might therefore erroneously suppose to be
the flesh of their fellow-men.

If it were for nothing else but to remove this
harrowing supposition, it would be essential to
send another party to follow out the clue thus
obtained. Nor would the task be so very diffi-
cult now that we know the exact spot on which
the researches should be instituted, and could

raco the footsteps of the unfortunate party up to

the very spot where the accident happened that
deprived them of their vessels. But there are
Additional and irresistible reasons for carrying out
this search. The gallant COLLINSON and his com-
panions must be succoured. We cannot again
afford to trifle with the Eves of those who freely
and willingly engaged in a task so arduous,
encountering such fearful dangers and certai 11
privations. No degree of re:l-tapirm, would save
the Admiralty from the universal reprobation and
umnitigated disgust which any degree of indiffe-
rence on such a subject would necessarily excite.
The intelligence
just obtained from these
gallant men strengthens the desire to send
them the assistance
that by this time may be
urgently required, although at the latest date to
which these accounts extend—the 27th August,
1852, twenty-six months
sincewell with the good ship and the
all was going
trusty crew. ;