The Sun.
London, England, 1854-07-12 00:00:00

WAR-AND NO WAR.

It is not in our power to remove, at the present mo-
ment, the clouds and obscurity which appear to have
gathered more densely within t!•e last few days over the
diplomatic relations of Europe, and we leave it to more
speculative politicians than ourselves to foreshadow the
' results of the last appeal of Austria to the Court of St.
Petersburg, or of that irresolution in which Prussia
masks her trajitional faithlessness to the great interests
of Germany and of Europe. But, whatever may be the
, effects of this protracted contest as long as it is carried
on in the conventional language of Cabinets, it is clear
that we are arrived at a stage in these transactions in
which a single event is worth a file of protocols, and the
' best security of success is to do with all our might the
work we have undertaken. It is the part of those who
are engaged in the great duty of directing and of con-
ducting operations of war not only to watch for oppor-
tunities, but to make them—not only to steer along the
broad and obvious track, but to force a way where the
passage is narrow and the undertaking difficult.
All that is uncertain and precarious in our diplo-
matic relations would disappear, as if by enchant-
ment, with the first bold achievement of the campaign.
But it is high time that the plan of the campaign should
be pursued with energy, under the altered circum-
stances which have arisen since the raising of the siege
of Silistria and the retreat of the Russian army beyond
the Danube. We do not question the intentions of the
Government —we do not presume to censure the ex-
perienced officers who are responsible for the most effi-
cient use of the naval and military forces of the Allied
Powers ; but we cannot be insensible to the fact that a
more prolonged period of inaction would cover us with
ridicule, that halt the season during which military
operations are possible in the East is already past, arid
that the occurrence of one successful exploit, especially
in the Black Sea, would exert a powerful effect over the
political relations of Europe.
As it appears by the last accounts from the seat of
war that the Russians had already evacuated the right
bank of the Danube, and were retreating upon Moldavia,
the plan of operations which had been agreed upon for
the accomplishdient of this object is at an end.' Even
if the allied troops were to advance to the valley of the
Danube, they would not find an enemy, but, in fact,
with the exception of a brigade of British cavalry which
has been ordered to proceed to Silistria, the English
and French troops are at a considerable distance
from the scene of action, the former being en-
camped between Varna and Pravadi, and the
latter occupying Varna and Adrianople. As it is
not supposed that the allied army is intended to
mmwfipdpo
ererphaoafdeyeeersvrrnsiabeihsdeteni
ateeigfldwoni
tnressneboi
ttoesnyrh.
necessity,
teeAhthLts
hheswr
uaionetodtsfayrttuu:krrttdei
yahoaa
netwtonhytifferneDroytdww: Danube
tebaoh hhylt
taeßei
hoesxe,l
pacerbgpwaeo perv?retitt,
Wallachia.am mustursisi n
intgi
uod
sne taser
duflucodot
alnrh look
dnkfae
deor
rtrtmero thathloe4bhtesi
eeret
rd
means of accomplishing it. Whatever their decision
opinion on these subjects on imperfect information and
at a great distance, to give them credit for those qualities
of military judgment and enterprise for which they have
been selected to take these high commands. But it re-
quires no especial military skill or political sagacity to
discover that the worst course of all is to remain inactive.
It perplexes the Turks, whom we profess to aid, but
who have hitherto fought their own battles with no
better assistance than a few volunteer European officers
could afford. It discourages the army, among whom
every sort of stolid rumour finds easy belief in the gossip
*of a camp. And, lastly, it is the main cause of the he-
sitation which marks the conduct of those States which
are not our enemies, but not yet entirely dur allies. We
say nothing of the confidence it may give the enemy, and
the opportunity it undoubtedly affords him of improving
his defences and taking advantage of the chapter of acci-
dents. Some months unavoidably elapsed before the expe-
ditionary force could be ready to take the field at such a
distance from home, with its guns, its cavalry, its
stores, and beasts of burden ; and these difficulties have
been conquered with spirit and success. But from the
moment the army can be said to be ready to meet the
enemy not a day should be wasted in assuming such a
position as the altered state of circumstances permits and
requires. We do not ineai to imply that the task of
the British and French commanders is an easy one, or
that they will attain their object without great efforts.
It is precisely because they 'are engaged in a great and
difficult undertaking that they are invested with exten-
sive powers and surrounded by a large body of the
finest troops in Europe. But these splendid resources
are of no avail without the glance of military genius to
discover the weakest point of the enemy, and the untir-
ing energy of will to direct the entire strength of the
forces to that spot.

The armament which will sail within a few days from
the ports of the north of France to the Baltic' consist-
ing of a strong division of French infantry and artillery,
conveyed for the first time in history in British ships of
war, is doubtless intended fur immediate action on
some point of the Russian coast, for the men cannot re-
main long in the vessels which are to setae on this
occasion as transports. But we cannot foresee
that any operation in the Baltic, however sue_
cessful, is likely to produce results as decisive upon the
main causes of the present war as the efficient use of our
great naval and military forces in the Black Sea. Even
if St. Petersburg itself were taken or Cronstadt destroyed
the Government of Russia would retire, as it has done
before, into the impenetrable recesses .of the empire ;
but if Sebastopol falls the spell is broken by which Rus-
sia preponderates over Turkey and the Black Sea coasts.
We know not whether other military and naval enter-
prises may be undertaken with greater prospects of suc-
cess, but none certainly could produce so important and
so permanent an effect on the power of Russia in the
East. The longer the attack on Sebastopol is deferred
the more difficult it is likely to prove, for, threatened as
the place now is, every day is doubtless employed by
the Russian engineers to strengthen its defences by land
as well as by sea, and the retreat of the army from the
Danube may enable fresh reinforcements to be thrown
into the Crimea.. Yet, if this war is to be brought to a
successful and glorious termination, and if securities are
to be taken against the renewal of these attacks on the
Ottoman empire, the surrender of Sebastopol is the first
condition of peace, and, until an earnest and vigorous
attempt has been made against that fortress, the people
of England will not be satisfied that the war is carried
on with all the determination which such a contest de-
mands at our bands.—Tinics.