The Sun.
London, England, 1854-10-14 00:00:00

THE END OF TEE BALTIC CAMPAIGN

The campaign in the Baltic may now, wo presume, be
considered at an end, and some variety of opinion will pro-
bably be formed with respect tothe result of our operations
in those waters. The British squadron has undoubtedly
excluded the fleets of the Czar from the use of the sea,
and, if we observe the success with which the Russian
cruisers in the Pacific contrive to elude our frigates, and
the disturbance occasioned by their known presence in
those parts, we shall be better able to appreciate the value
of a blockade which has kept such troublesome visitors
from the highways of the ocean and the coasts
of our own islands. Every maritime outlet of the
Russian empire has been sealed up by our ships,
our flag has been carried up to the shores of the
enemy, and he has been insulted by open challenge and de-
fiance at the very mouths of his guns. One step further
has been taken. A specimen of the granite fortifications
on which his reliance is placed was actually assailel by
the allies, and in this trial of strength between the
resources of the belligerents the superiority was found
so wholly on our side that Bomarsund was taken
not only without loss, but, comparatively speaking,
without effort. Finally the entire fleet despatched on
this mission has been preserved from injury. Not-
withstanding the notorious difficulties of the navigation all
casualties have been escaped, nor is there so much as the
loss of a single cruiser to be set down to the adverse side
of the account. Looking broadly at the matter, and
speaking candidly, we think we might say thatsuch aresult
would, upon the whole, have been generally accepted six
months ago as a tolerably favourable conclusion. Of
course, there. were persons who thought that Cronstadt
ought to be taken and the Russian fleets brought to Spit-
head within five weeks or so, but the great body of Ene-

glishmen know and felt that, the first duty of our-Adruirias
was to maintain a thorough and effectual blockade, with-
out exposing their ships to unnecessary danger. Against
the fleet of the enemy our fleet would, of course, have
proceeded at once, and it will be remembered that the first
division of vessels despatched to the Baltic was so inferior
in number to the Russian squadron that nothing
could have been more defiant than the challenge thrown
out. But such fighting as this was not in the Czar's de-
signs. What he wished was to allure our ships into an
engagement with his shore fortifications, so that, after '
our walls of wood bad got the worse against his walls of
rock, his fleets might sail out of their skulking-places
and find easy work with our shattered and discomfited
squadrons. This was the risk to be escaped, and this risk
has indeed been escaped, while the fleets of the enemy
have been confined within their fortified harbours.
Nevertheless, we shall probably not be wrong in surmis-
ing that the preponderant feeling on this question will be
one of dissatisfaction, and this conclusion will find some
justification in argument. Such results as those described,
however desirable in themselves, aro certainly not cow-
' mensurato with the magnitude of the means employed. Of
such a fleet as we despatched to the Baltic more might natu-
rally be expected than that it should come safe home again.
A naval force so powerful, so well manned, and so admi-
rably appointed, never left the shores of this or any other
kingdom. Its equipment in regard to strength and re-
sources was perfect beyond example. Every ship was a
stupendous machine of offence, and engines of destruction
unheard of in past times were at the command of men and
officers inferior to none who ever sailed. Surely, some-
thing more than was at first designed might have been
achieved with such a squadron. It would be unfair to
shape our conclusions by any contrast with the operations
in the Crimea. Each campaign should be estimated by it-
self ; but, even thus, the reports from the Baltic leave
much to be desired. Undoubtedly it was wise to avoid
the trap which the Czar had laid for us in front of his bat-
teries ; but after the result or the Bomarsund experiment
it seems natural to inquire both why that experiment
could not have been tried earlier, and why so satisfactory
an issue was not more effectually followed up. The attack
upon the Aland Isles taught the fleet and the world that
granite ramparts were not impregnable to cannon shot,
nor did all the boasted resources at the command of the
besieged, such as red-hot balls, &c.. produce the destruc-
tion, or even the jeopardy of a single vessel of the attack-
ing force. It is true that a large body of land troops as-
sisted at the operations, but it is also true that this rein-
forcement proved to be quite unnecessary, and if among
the marines of the allied fleets there were 500 or 600 who
could use the Minio rifle with effect, the whclo affair
might have been accomplished at any moment by the un-
aided forces of the squadrons themselves. Although,
moreover, wo have bearded the enemy in his own strong-
holds, it is hardly to bo conceived but what our indisposi-
tion to close with his artillery must have given him in-
creased confidence in his own defences. The very demon-
strations, too, which wo made in the way of reconnoitring
and sounding may have had the effect of showing him his
weak points, and of enabling him to strengthen them
against future attack.
It cannot, however, be denied that these disappoint-
ments are in some measure traceable to errors of judgment
on the part of those who were charged with the equip-
ment of the fleet. The truth is that our attention had
never been Oirectecl to this species of warfare. The con-
tingencies which wo had in contemplation were those of an
ordinary war, with its regular sea-fights maintained by
great line-of-battle ships, no new elemeat except that of
steam power being taken into account. We made ready
to engage the Russian fleet yardarm to yardarm at any
odds, and we despatched our three-dockers accordingly.
But, when it came to practice, we found that no such trial
of this sort was to be anticipated, and that the Russian
squadrons had intrenched themselves, if the expression be
allowable, behind fortifications which could not be reached,
like those of the Alma, by an undaunted advance. Our
first-rates, especially those unprovided with screws, turned
out to be useless, and wo believe that not one of them up
to the present moment has fired a single allotted gun. On
the other hand, the vessels most particularly needed were
not forthcoming. We wanted a smaller species of craft,
offering little or no mark to the enemy's shot, but armed
with very heavy guns, and moveable at great speed with a
light draught of water. Such, in fact, are the gun-boats
recently launched, and if a good force of these, with some
powerful floating batteries, had been attached to the fleet, we
should have had a better title to look for substantial results.
Even then, however, it would always be necessary to keep a di-
vision ofliue-of-battle ships in reserve,otherwise theßussians
seeing only gun-boats before them, might take heart of
grace, sally out, surround some small craft with their
three-dockers, and repeat their performances at Sinope.
Putting recrimination aside, wo cannot do better, now
that the campaign is ended, than turn its lessons to good
account for advantage in the ensuing spring. By that
time the allies will probably have their Black Sea fleets
disengaged, so that large reinforcements might be
despatched to the Baltic. It does not seem, however, that
reinforcements of this kind are really called for. Our
squadrons, as already constituted, have proved quite
strong enough to scare the Russians from the seas, while
as to attacks upon shore fortifications it is clear that large
vessels, unless moved and handled like the Agamemnon,
cannot be brought into action. We have learnt that can-
non-shot can destroy granite walls, or at least such granite
walls as are built by Russian engineers, and the object is
to provide such a class of floating batteries as will carry
our guns up to their work. The exertions now made in
this direction offer a sure guarantee that the end will bo
soon secured, and a second campaign, undertaken Kith
better appreciation of our relative power, awl condnc 1
with more enterprise, will speedily produce, wo hav_oolsiot t 0
e:
at
doubt, results considerably more positive than those
present achieved.—Times.

DEPARTURE OF MORE GUARDS FOR TEE EAST.—A,
au inspection yesterday afternoon of the Grein
th nadier a
on-
nd
Scots Fusilier Guards, at present stationed e L
don barracks, it was agreed upon by the military autho.
rities to send out to the seaiment,t of wanar d
150 from the Scuts
230 more men, viz.,
80 from the Grenadier reg
Fusilier Guards ; which body of men will leave England
on Monday or Tuesday next.
FLOATING BATTERIES.—Messrs. Green, of Blackwall,
Messrs. Wigram and Co., and Messrs. Smith, have each
received orders from the Govenment to build
,several
new war vessels of a peculiar construction.
The new
floating batteries are to be flat-bottomed and toe have
three keels. The vessels must he of sufficient tonnage
to carry a small description of fort constructed of iron
and wood. It is stated that three hundred and fifty tons
of iron will be used in the construction of each fort, and
that its iron walls will be everywhere nine inches in
thickness. The forts are to b
1 The destination o the new floating
o mountedbatterieswith
is cannon.
believed
NEW RAILWAY. —A memorial is in course of signature to be the Baltic.
"THOSEe AT SEA."—It is customary
by the inhabitants of Hanamersinith and its vicinity to LplEaTc'
roEnlesttPerßsOfmor
Em n belonging to 11.31. ships abroad
the directors of the Great Western Railway Company, for the officers
andt,e sent t oenglbannadrain emanfivrsats
nblaagils
urging them to form a branch continuation from Padding- to
ton station by Notting-vale and Shepherd's-bush to the sewed up and ,
Broadway, at Hammersmith, se as to afford access to With. ,pwachkiectil metare
Brazil packet, the
arrived in England
yesterday,li.._.By there was a letter bag from the officers of
the City by means of the tunsel line, known as " Mr,
Pearson's scheme." The cost of this continuation, it is Al S. Sharpshooter. The following address was beau-
stated, will not exceed 60,0001. Cluny printed in a German text hand on the bag, viz.—
THE PITMEN OF TUE COUNTY OF DURHAM.—A spirit " Letters from the officers of H.M.S. Sharpshooter.
of discontent at the amount of their present earnings is For England, home, and beauty." The latter sentence
again beginning to manifest itself amongst the pitmen in formed a wreath round an admirable drawing of the
this county. Sharpshooter. . . •