The Sun.
London, England, 1854-01-10 00:00:00

SUPPOSED PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

Speculations are made by all bands as to
what the plan of the spring campaign is to be.
Possibly a number of heads are similarly employed
in England at the present moment. The general
opinion appears to be that if the Turks are unas-
sisted by English and French troops, the Russians
will cross in force somewhere between Silistria and
RutSchuk, with an army of 100,000 men. This
they can easily do. They have now two corps
d'arinee (the 3d and 4th) in the Danubian pro-
vinces, and one (the sth) in Bessarabia. The lat-
ter roan be moved into the provinces, to keep up
the colAmunications, forward envoys, kc. ; to hold
thena, in short. The 3d and 4th corps will then
be available for the invasion of Bulgaria. Each
corps has a complete pontoon equipage, and could
easily, in a day or two at the furthest, cross with
the whole of the force, by establishing two, three,
or more bridges at once. Two corps of observa-
tion would be requisite to watch the garrisons of
Rutschuk and Silistria (of 15,000 each). The two
corps d'armee—making all allowance for sick men,
deserters, and for the regiments being under the
strength—may be taken at 50,000 strong each. Ac-
cording to the tables lately published in Colliurn's
Naval and Military Journal, their proper strength
is some 59,000 ; so that the allowance above named
appears ample. There would then be 70,000 men
in hand, able to march and give battle to the Turks
somewhere between their point of crossing and
Schumla.

Supposing this plan of operation to be adopted—
and it is likely enough that it may be so—what are
the Turks to do to resist it ?

Unfortunately for the defence of the line of the
Danube, that river from Widdin to Isatchka takes
a re-entering curve, which materially :weakens the
position ; for it is difficult to see how the troops
at Kalafat, Widdin, and on the lower Danube,
towards Isatchka, &c., are to be made available to
resist the invasion. This is why, if the Turks are
only to act on the defensive, the line of the Danube
should be abandoned Moreover, the position of
those troops will be one of the most critical na-
ture ; for they will have the whole of the Russian
invading army between them and Schumla, unless
that army is repulsed close to the Danube. If,
then, the Turks were to lose a general action
between Schumla and the river, there appears no
resource for them but to shut themselves in their
fortresses or entrenchments, and fight it out to the
last.

On the whole, this operation is one that must be
considered as the most fatal to the Turks that the
Russians could adopt. To prevent it, there ap-
pears to be but one method, viz., to cross the Da-
nube and fight the enemy, not on his own ground,
but on the ground he has lately stolen.
Then comes the question—Are the Turks in a
position, or rather will they be in a position in the
spring, to carry the war into Wallachia single-
handed, in the face of the three corps d'armee,
which, to a certainty, will be found there to meet
them—against, too, the infinite resources of Russia
at their back ? It is to be feared that they will
not. This is a question which England and France
ought to look to, and doubtless will look to ; for
upon its solution depends the necessity of sending
an Anglo-Gallic army of 50,000, or even 30,000
men, to make the chances a little more even, and
to prevent, perhaps, the Russians from making the
Balkans their boundary.
And, after all, what is this question of peace or
war ? It is simply—Can we manage to patch up a
peace now, that we may enjoy a further lease of its
blessings for three or four, or five or ten, years to
come, perhaps ? And if we can, it will only be to
find the unchangeable " serpent-boa" ready to
make a fresh attack upon the liberties of Europe.
It has been well asked, " When will such a favour-
able opportunity again occur for teaching Russia a
lesson which she has so long wanted, that the peace
of Europe is not to be disturbed, or solemn treaties
broken, at the mere will of a despot, with im-
punity ? When will England and France again so
thoroughly understand each other as at present ?
When will Austria be found neutral in such a
crisis ? And, lastly, when will Turkey be so well
prepared for war as she is at this present moment ?"
It is hard to know how this will read in England—
dreadfully bloodthirsty, perhaps ; but in Turkey
it appears sound, long-sighted policy.
Be it understood that it is by no means the