The Sun.
London, England, 1854-05-29 00:00:00

LITERATURE.

Memoirs and Correspondence of Maior-General
Sir William Nott, G.C.B. Edited by J. H.
Stocqueler. Two Vols. Hurst and Blackett.
These volumes have been edited by the author
of " The Life -of the Duke of Wellington," at the
request of the daughters of Sir William Nott, from
documents in their exclusive possession. Some
years after his death, there appeared in the Quar-
terly Review a notice of his career in Affghauistan,
in which a hope was expressed that the whole of his
letters would be given to the public. His daugh-
ters, although desirous of doing so, hesitated for
some time to publish what might censure or com-
promise any living characters. Feeling, however,
that a truthful record of the war in South Affghan-
istan was much needed, and knowing that in his
last illness the General had made a selection from
his correspondence with the intention of publishing
it, they determined to fulfil his intentions, leaving
the duty of selection in the hands of the editor,
and also the task of adding a memoir.
Ho asserts, that in the performance of
his difficult undertaking, it has been his
object "to discard every letter that might
unnecessarily give umbrage to deserving men."
The memoir is consequently written in a spirit of
impartiality and calmness that excludes all per-
sonal allusions or detractions. Commencing with
au account of his childhood, and the accidental cir-
cumstance that first turned his inclinations from
his agricultural pursuits, and prevented the futur
hero of Candahar from remaining an obscure farm. ,•
the narrative gives a complete though concise his-
tory of his military exploits, and the chief events
of his domestic life. It carries him through the
long years of neglect, and the subsequent distinc-
tions which he little valued, through the weary
time of inaction and the exciting period of
the command of Candahar and the conquest of
Ghuznee, to the conclusion of his eminent services
and the close of his mortal career. In 1844 he re-
turned to England, where every honour was paid
him, but his health was little suited for these fes-
tivities, having rapidly failed. On the Ist of Jan.,
1845, he died, and a public funeral was decreed.
It was decided. to erect a monument of him on the
spot where the closing days of his life were spent.
"In the exercise of all the duties of private life no
man was more exemplary than General Nutt. The
pure tenets of Christianity formed the basis of all his
actions, but his religion was always unobtrusive. His
charity was boundless. No better proof of it can be
given than his instructions to nis daughters to follow
his example in society, and pay the greatest attention
to those, if worthy, who were the most neglected by
others. Children loved him—the poor followed him
with their prayers. The rude Afighans, who abhorred
the Christian abstractedly, reverenced the just and
simple-minded soldier, who, at the head of ten thousand
men, held their provinces in subjection. He was a
just man in all his dealings, but lie ever tempered jus-
tice with mercy. He loved truth for its own sake, and
he held honour to be ' above life,'
' The noble mind's distinguishing perfection,
That aids and strengthens virtue where it meets her.'
"His occasionally strong and bitter denunciations of
the political and military authorities who misdirected
the affairs of the British in Affghanistan were not the
effusions of a warm and angry temper, but the over-
flowings of a heart which recoiled from the oppressions,
follies, and dangers which marked the whole course of
their policy, and the injustice to his own branch of the
service of which they were the frequent authors. In
long after-years the descendants of the General will
cherish his memory for his many noble public acts,
and his private worth, and in British military annals he
will live for ever as one of the best and finest specimens
ever produced of the Company's officers."

THE PROPhETIC PAMPHLET OF 1834

From the remarkable anonymous pamphlet, pub-
lished in 1834 by Ridgway of Piccadilly—a pam-
phlet to which we have already, in our leading
columns, made particular reference, as one contain-
ing arguments startling from their display of
prescience on tie part of the unknown pamphleteer
—we may make the following additional extracts,
as particularly entitled, at this moment, to the
popular consideration
" Austria and Prussia cling to Russia because exposed
to dismemberment by every movement of France, be-
cause exposed to internal commotion every hour :
Russia is their refuge against both dangers, while she,
secure in her distance, her climate, and her poverty, pre-
pares a crisis in which the various states of Europe will
mutually exhaust and destroy each other. In the en-
deavour of both to swallow up the estates of Germany,
they are supported by Russia, they are opposed by
'France ; hence a double source of dependence on her,
by the objects she can favour, by the hostile influence
she can counteract. What would Russia be to-day but
for the rivalry of England and France ? What would
she be without the war of liberalism and despotism ?
It is in these contests she has been aggrandised ; these
contests are necessary to her future agarandisement.
France is the object of attack. France must, therefore,
look on each accession to the strength of either of the
Allies—not as on a question of foreign or commercial
influence, but as ammunition introduced into a hostile
fort, as a reinforcement entering into an enemy's camp on
the eve of battle.
" In this state of real hostility, what must the conse•
quence be of the accession of all the resources of the
Turkish Empire to the Northern Alliance ? From
that hour Russia is invulnerable—a few thousand men
suffice to guard her southern and eastern frontiers—
her attention is all concentrated in the West. A very
few years will double and triple her revenue. The com-
merce of Europe will be in her hands—in her control
will be placed all the materials at present used in the
arsenals of France. The influence and commerce of
France is immediately arrested in the sea hitherto her
own ; and at any hour Russia may transport her Cossacks
to the shores of Italy or of Spain to support the factions
and the principles which, even at present, cause her so
much inquietude. These circumstances will react
on Belgium, on Germany, on internal faction. The
very hour that Russia is entrenched at the Dar-
danelles these consequences will be evident. Then
will the time he at hand for carrying into execution
the plans so carefully matured in the three Cabinets,
and for extinguishing, by a third occupation, the spirit
that inspires such terrors to the Northern Courts.
" England, to-day the ally of France. will she be so
then ? Can she eend fleets or armies to her support
Clearly impossible. 'Whatever may be her sympathy
England cannot again engage in a continental war—
and this struggle will be confined to the dry land.
" It such consequences flow from the occupation of
Turkey, is not that question one of existence for France?
Supposing it possible for these consequences to be de-
layed is it less so ? A nation's life does not run out
with the few sand glasses that mark the period of indi-
vidual existence. The life of a nation is its system ;
that life in France is already seriously compromised, and
a few steps further gained by Russia, its'L fate becomes
inevitable.
" But reanimate the Ottoman Empire, the whole
future is instantaneously reversed. Russia will be ar-
rested where she is, and prevented from becoming
anything save that which she is—poor, exposed, and
vulnerable in her rear, if she foments or permits a
movement in Europe. While the Dardanelles are Turkish,
Russia can never dare to irritate the maritime powers ;
and the plan of the three Courts would never have been
dreamt of, save in the confidence of first possessing that
position. Even were a war necessary to reanimate
Turkey, France now chooses her time, instead of Rus-
sian choosing hers. She has the whole Ottoman empire,
with its immense power of resistance, to oppose her; she
avoids the armies of Germany, if they are hostile ; and
she calls in the maritime, and, still more important, the
moral force, of England. Success is certain, and the
means insignificant. She requires 500,000 men, besides
the National Guards, to be prepared against the contin-
gencies of European affairs.
" The fleet actually at sea, and the displacement of
20,000 mon, would, in three months, solve the Turkish
question entirely in her favour, carrying, as a conse-
quence, every European obstacle—giving the last blows
to the Carlists and revolutionists at home, and setting at
rest the irritations in the Peninsula and Belgium, ex-
cited by Russia and her compeers—to divert her atten-
tion from the field, where she has only to appear to be
victorious—and to comprehend, to appear.
" Not less imperative are the interests of England.
The Northern combination, political against France, is
commercial against England. This subject demands a
separate and more detailed exposition. S. uo to ffice it for the
present to say, that the countries theconsuming value
of thirty millions of exports would be
placed under the
immediate control of the Coalition, and, of course, under
the regulations of the Russian tariff; not as it is to-day,
but such as it would be when the mask
is wholly drop,
-
ped. What would the effect on the internal state of
England be if a considerable diminution of exportations
But it is only the direct effects of the tariffs
oocfctlrireed l
Coalition that is to be apprehended. Would it
not command the tariffs of Northern and Southern
America ? Are the opening prospects of commerce, not
to speak of that actually existing in Turkey alone, of no
importance ? Is it nothing to see projects maturing her
direct communication with India through the Turkish
territory, while the Danube is rendered navigable, while
canals are about to connect that stream with the other
rivers of Austria and with those of Russia, Prussia,
and Bavaria, so as to establish a direct communication
between the manufacturing districts of Germany with the
marts of Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Arabia, and' even
India itself ? Is it for England to allow freedom of
commerce to be extinguished in the only portion of
Europe where it exists ? Is it for England to allow an
empire, a principle of whose existence is freedom of com-
merce, to be swallowed up by the most restrictive power
on the face of the earth ? Is it for England to allow
the first commercial position in the world to be occupied
by such a power ? These motives would not have been
appreciated by Lord Chatham ; they did not then exist,
because the fiscality of Russia had not been deve-
loped, when he said with all the concentration of
deep conviction, With the man who cannot ap-
preciatel the interests of England in the preserva-
tion of the Ottoman Empire, I will not argue."
While the three Powers coalesce, first for the partition of
Turkey, that they may march, as the St. Petersburg
Gazette* hays already ventured to threaten, 'by Constan-

* This memorable article hi the St. Petersburg Gazette
was, on the reclamation of France and England, disa-
vowed, but afterwards published in the Yassy Of Ga-
zette, and produced a strong sensation on the Russian
troops then occupying the provinces.

#C t 1 -if
.*!7* . ,;4 7i k
1....m....••••••■•..............0.
tinople to Paris,' they look with less co cse() .botti?4... vit
)t,
partition of the commercial prosperity of4re:at.,Bol44:::# -'jli?l,7
" On the occupation of the Dardanellk ,A4WAtrf2:-14' Xe4Sie_.l-;-•
the importance of our positions in the IlLevitnt ''7 sts'.,',l7
Os
were only valuable because the Turks held fhesc .strittry sei-sl4 Y
When Russia is there they are valueless, and 1 soot -:-.• -
be untenable ; although the expenses of harassing Ols- l'w-
servations may greatly increase our internal embarass-
ments. _ .
" But Russia here also has views distinct from her ..
allies. Our Indian possessions—shall we fight for them.
iii the Dnieper, as directing the whole Mussulman na-
tion ; or shall we fight for them on the Indus, at Bag-
dad, or in Persia single-handed, close to the insurrec-
tions she will raise in her rear, and when she is in pos-
session of Turkey ? In the Black Sea we have France •
to support us. Russia, by her principles, her interests,
and her designs must wage war to the knife with Eng-
land and France. Having possessed herself of Turkey,
she can choose her time ; her power being manifold,
augmented, and being rendered invulnerable, she unites
indissolubly to her Austria and Prussia—she dissolves
the union of England and France by the fact of its use-
lessness ; she attaches the interests and influence of each
in detail, without the possibility of the one giving sup-
port to the other. England and France, by attacking
her now, cast upon her the mass of Ottomans—provoke
to independence the whole of the unwilling subjects she
has acquired since 1779—neutralise her now subservient
allies. England obtains the co-operation of France,
which would be impossible on the Indus.
" France obtains the co-operation of England, which
she will not obtain on the Rhine. Russia's spirit of
conquest, which torments and menaces every corner in
Europe, will be extinguished—her banners arrested along
7,he 3,000 miles of their progressive movement, from the
Vistula and to the Arapes—her power lost in Europe—
her face for ever"turned from the east and south.
"We have more than once repeated that the allies
of Russia united to her in Western policy, united to her
in the abandonment of the Ottoman empire, are neces-
sarily detached from her by the division of England and
France to restore the Turkish empire. To develope this.
idea, which alone contains the solution of the whole-
question, we must examine the interests and motives
which, under different circumstances, may determine the
policy of Austria. Of Prussia we need not speak.
Removed from the scene of action, she is influenced by
many of the considerations which influence Austria ;
and besides, she has to reserve herself for interests of a
higher nature that claim her undivided attention, and' . -
which make even her military power too necessary, too ..,..
dear to the maintenance of the territorial integrity of a.
plain and intersected country to be expended on any
foreign quarrel whatever thatidoes not compromise and
increase that integrity.
" Austria, the old enemy of Turkey, has already been
enriched by recovered Hungary, Livonia—Austrian Croa-
tia wrested from that empire. A hundred years ago
she was inspired with the hopes of the possession of
European Turkey and Constantinople ; but another
enemy of Turkey has arisen, another competitor of Aus-
tria—Russia has succeeded to these expectations.
"It then became Austria's policy to unite with Tar-. I, ,
key to repress the Northern invader ; but the Bard
of the Polish partition reduced her to insignificance,
subserviency, and silence. Still, as the power of Russia
has increased, her indecision has diminished ; and during
the last war she was prepared to pour her armies into
Wallachia, and did not do so only because England was
engaged on the side of!Russia, Give Turkey support ;
she too will support her. Leave her to her Russian
enemy, and Austria will seek to profit by the catastrophe
she has not been able to prevent.
" But her interest in the Turkish question is a portion
of many cases. Her first object is that of self-preserva-
tion. The first shot fired on the Rhine or in the west
of Europe will be levelled against her existence. Her
government is under the control of a high aristocracy—
an aristocracy in the great Sclavonic and Hungarian
divisions of the empire, essentially feudal, without a
middle class between it and the serfs, whose position
is not far superior to those of Russia. But this system,
precarious as it is, has not the advantage of unifosmity.
The supremacy of the Government and of the local arise.
tocracies depends on employing the military means of
one province to enforce submission in another ; and is '
the precarous submission depenls not only- the unity
of the empire, but the existence of the aristocracy who
direct its policy. The preservation of peace is,-there-
fore, the first of Austrian interests, which she must
maintain by the sacrifice of all external interests, if ne-
cessary. But it her political state loudly deprecates
every external collision, her financial state not less im-
peratively demands repose. Her fiscal regulations can
suffer no violent disturbance, and the age and antece-
dents of Metternich and the Emperor render them
equally pacific.

" France, by her principles, alone endangers Austria,
and the system of government on which Austria de-
pends. The interests of France, moreover, are opposed
to the consolidation of Austrian supremacy in Germany
and Italy. The power of - France, if she is powerful,
will deprive her of that supremacy, and expose it to an
attack in case of war. The principles of France, no less
hostile than her interests—no less dangerous than her
power—combine with both to render that supremacy
precarious, even under the most favourable despotism, of
the Government of France. But the Government of
France being popular, it is evident that neither the in-
terests nor the popular principles of the nation can in any
case be long excluded from action on her foreign policy.
A change of administration would follow, and bring
with it a violent reaction. Therefore, no compact, no
treaty, no alliance, no concession that is in the power of
France to make, can in any degree calm the alarms, or
soothe the hostility of Austria. But France at this
moment does exert an opposing influence in Germany ;
she noes hold Ancona. For three centuries the views of
Austria have been fixed on Italy. Her principal influence
in Europe depends on her possession of Lombardy, and
on her control over the remainder of the Peninsula.
Her Italian possessions furnish a large contingent to
her arms and a large portion of her revenue. Her
possessions on the Adriatic give an outlet to her
whole empire for its industry, and nourish that industry
by foreign produce. But they are so dependent on the
pressure of a strong body of Austrian troops, that Prince
Metternich has declared that the principle of interven-
tion is a vital question for Austria ; so that, while
French intervention puts these possessions in the greatest
hazard, the recognition by France and England of the
principle of non-intervention is fatal to her posses-
sions, if she is obliged to conform to it ; while its mere
proclamation multiplies her difficulties and her dangers.
" While France maintains so large a military force on
foot, Austria must maintain her actual establishment,
disproportioned to her means, beyond the resources of
her treasury. Yet no combination can diminish this
necessity ; because, were Franco even to reduce her
standing army, she could not dismiss her National Guard,
become now a portion of her institutions—a vital part of
those principles already in their moral character so dan-
gerous to Austria. These considerations may so deeply
affect the mind of Prince Metternich, that he may con-
sider all remoter interests or apprehensions of little im-
portance, when compared with the necessity of diminish.
ing the power of France, since he cannot expect to
modify her principles by anything short of a third occu-
pation.
" The means of doing so present themselves in per-
mitting Russia to occupy Constantinople. From Russia
she has no moral danger to apprehend ; on the contrary,
she has to look to her alliance and her predominance
for support at home. The territorial aggrandisement
and the increase of the political power of Russia would
strengthen the influence of Austria over Germany and
Italy, while Prince Metternioh may hope to counter-
bslance them by additions to the territory of Austria in
Roumelia—additions which may furnish uncontaminated
nurseries of soldiers to subdue revolutionary principles
in other provinces. There would certainly be no com-
parison between the accession of the strength of Russia
and of Austria ; but Prince Metternich may be more
impressed with dangers of an internal than of an exter-
nal kind ; and he may suppose that Russia having anew
field opened to her ambition, her views will be directed
to the East, her energies and resources absorbed in the
pursuit, and all the dangers for Austria postponed to a
remote period—remote; and until the attainment of results
subject to many contingencies. That in the meantime
the animosity of Russia must be directed against France;
and Russia msst be riot only little inclined to quarrel
with Austria, but desirous to augment her strength, for
the furtherance of their common objects. Prince
Metternich will consider that Russia at Constantinople
would come into immediate contact with France ; that
the animosity which had animated for so ninny years both .
Governments, while the whole of Germany was inter-
posed between them, would necessarily be exasperated ;
so many interests, on which Russia can now exercise
a remote and uncertain influence, would thus be subject
to daily interference, control, and menace. Russian in-
fluence and commerce would become predominant in the
Mediterranean, in Egypt, in Greece, her navies threaten-
ing, and Ler Cossacks within reach of Italy, Spain, Corsi-
ca, and Algiers. Russia would moment, be
ttotrahNiNrae.yinl;e,
dsaatenatidbeaninui
csynehd:ne
readbbeerrendered
ra
cc
eku
necessary
er t:a
aac
rreym;
t 0
00 her
her,m ui si
irennss
yf
Austria orltaly.
cir-
cumstances, France would never venture to send tut
el od u lodf
o a large
for,c,eTiinietohoGsetirliiitiyaroi
to France occasioned for cen-
turies by their common view on Italy and Germany, and,
latterly, by the opposition of their political principles,
has rendered Austria necessarily dependent on the mari-
time superiority of England to protect herself in her
commercial and other interests exposed to the opera-
tions of the marine of France ; but the union of these
two powers renders their common principles more
dangerous, and takes from her all confidence,
al la p
gloas
ns.
bility of support in the maritime power
creation of the
d
against that of France. But in the E
naval power which Russia necessarily and immediately
from her ,
becomes possessed of, Austria finds relief
de-
pendence on England.
we r, at this moment,
"It is in Prince Metternich's
"a the ossession
to grant to, or withhold from,
enhuasi p
bas, therefore, imme-
on which these results hinge. H
co of great dan-
diately pressing upon bins the
ersonal hnviction onour ; and he
ger from principles he has in
p hands the destinies of
has the feeling of holding in his
sources of alarm on
one hand, and
These Europe.no -
con-
fidence on the other,t are,ni doubt, ably worked upon
c."l
by Russia ;and Met er 11
may think by one able stroke "-=
annihilate the European commerce
to bridle France, to
of England to dissolve a union evidently unchecked land-
,
' rcrti
will in a few years arbitrate supremely in every Euro-
pean interest, and so strengthen the northern combina-
tion as to render it capable of exterminating with the
sword the political institutions to which he is opposed,
and of restoring and effectually securing the supremacy
of the absolute principle by the destruction of the press.

SCOTCH AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS.—The Scotsman
says that a vote of 6,000/. is to be Proposed by acvern-
ment for the obtaining of a complete system of agricul-
tural statistics in Scotland, to be carried.,out through
the medium of the Highland Society,

7