The Sun.
London, England, 1854-01-03 00:00:00

LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING, JANUARY 3, 1854.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

(From the Times.)

Whatever may be the result of the negotiations
which have been opened at Constantinople, they
serve to define with greater precision the nature of
the demands of Turkey, and the sanction given to
those demands by the Four Powers, although we
cannot anticipate that they will lead, at the pre-
sent time, to the restoration of a firm and lasting
peace. The conduct of the Turkish Government
on this occasion has been temperate and dignified.
The change which has taken place in the Ministry,
by the removal of the former Capudan Pasha and
the entrance of Halil Pasha into the Divan, is con-
sidered to be an additional guarantee of the pru-
dence and moderation of the Porte. AcCordingly,
the terms recommended by the Four Powers
appear to have been adopted without any essential
alteration ; and this circumstance is the more im-
portant from the - disposition already shown at
Vienna to evade the force of the engagement con-
tracted under the Protocol of the sth of December.
The forbearance and temper shown by the Ottoman
Government, after provocations of the most violent
and offensive kind, constitute an
.additional claim
to the support of Europe ; and the rejection "o,
Russia of overtures of peace offered to her in this
spirit, would complete the demonstration that :war
alone can set bounds to. so fierce and lawless an
aggression.

In the meantime, contrary to the expectation
generally formed both in this country and in France
when the disaster at Sinope became- known, it is
now ascertained that the combined fleets had not
entered the Black Sea on the 22d of December,
and, whatever the intentions of the British Am-
bassador and Admirals may have been, they were
not then carried into effect. A contemporary has
even published. a letter of somewhat doubtful au-
thenticity, purporting to be the answer given on
the 12th of December by the English and French
Ambassadors to the demand of the Porte for the
active support of the fleet. We are left in doubt
as to the genuineness of that document, which has
not yet been confirmed from other sources of in-
formation, and is not authenticated by Lord Strat-
ford's usual. style or signature ; but it was no secret
at Constantinople that great indignation as well as
regret had been felt by the Ambassadors and naval
authorities at the wilful disregard of their advice,
to which was mainly attributable the dreadful di-
saster at Sinope. The Capudan Pasha had sent to sea
the squadron of Turkish frigates with a perfect
knowledge that the Russian Admiral command-
ing at Sebastopol could at any time come
down upon them with an • overwhelming force.
Osman Pasha remained at Sinope, although he was
twice warned of the danger of his position by
Mustapha Pasha, who passed Sinope with three
ships of war both in going to and returning from
the coast of Circassia, and who got back in safety
to the Bosphorus, while Osman lay at Sinope to
be destroyed. At Sinope itself there appears to
have been only one small battery fit for service,
and that was ill provided with ammunition. The
squadron had been taken there in defiance of re-
peated remonstrances, and, however we may de-
plore the calamity which ensued, and admire the
desperate courage of the Turks in their defence, it
would be gross injustice to the officers commanding
the allied fleets if they were held responsible for
the consequence of an act which they tried in vain
to prevent. Should the hostilities, which now
seem inevitable, be prosecuted by the fleets, it will
soon be found indispensable to the success of our
operations to take into the hands of competent
European officers the sole conduct of the war, and
to obtain from the Turks the same sort of compli-
ance and discipline which we had so much diffi-
culty in exacting from the Portuguese and
Spaniards when we undertook to fight their battles
in the Peninsula. We shall otherwise be con-
demned to bear the burden of defeats we might
have prevented, and without this guarantee we
cannot even rely on the defence of the most im-
portant positions.
The strength of the combined English and French
fleets now in the Bosphorus amounts to 44 sail, in-
cluding line-of-battle ships, frigates, and steamers.
Of these the French and English have each three
three-deckers ; we have seven two-deckers (in-
cluding the Agamemnon) to five French two-
deckers, the French 90-gun screw-ship Napoleon
having, unfortunately, been sent back to Toulon
for repairs. Each flag has, or will soon have, 11
paddle-wheel steamers. The Sanspareil (English)
and the Charlemagne (French) two-deckers have
auxiliary steam power. In addition to this power-
ful fleet, there are in the Bosphorus at least seven
Turkish anti Egyptian line-of-battle ships, besides
frigates and steamers ; so that the combined force
:may be taken at about 60 sail. From the large
,amount of steam power, the weight of guns, the
'size of these ships in proportion to their rating,
!and the perfection to which naval gunnery has now
been carried both in the English and French navies,
this is, beyond doubt, the finest naval armament
lever sent to sea, though it might, if necessary, be
;powerfully augmented by the first-class steamships
and frigates which form Admiral Corry's squadron
now at Lisbon. Those vessels are, however, pro-
bably reserved as the nucleus of the North Sea
fleet in the spring. The best understanding pre-
vails between the English and French officers, and
the signal-books of the two squadrons have been
exchanged, with an arrangement that, in sailing
order, the French squadron will form the weather
and the English the port line.
Such is the state of the naval preparations of the
two Powers at the moment when the instructions
to enter the Black Sea, which were despatched at
latest on the 19th ult., arrive at Constantinople ;
and we entertain no doubt that these instructions
will be executed with the utmost alacrity and effi-
ciency that circumstances permit. But, whatever
may be the Policy of the Cabinets of London and
Paris, and the desire of the Ambassadors to give
effect to the orders they receive, it must rest with
the naval authorities to determine what measures
can be taken at this season with safety to the fleets
under their command. They have to encounter,
not the Russians only, but a climate of extreme
rigour in the worst season of the year—a sea dark-
ened by fogs, swept by sudden and violent storms,
and little known to our sailors—a coast notorious
in all ages as the noverca navium, the most inhos-
pitable of shores. It would evidently be the
height of folly and impolicy to expose the fleets
to great risk from weather, unless the Admirals
have a definite object and plan of operations in
view, which they conceive to be within their
The public in
Power • this country knows as yet
very little of the difficulties which it is their
duty to consider and to overcome. It is not
improbable that the northern shores and ports
of the Euxine are blocked up with ice. In severe
seasons the Gulf of Odessa, has been frozen over
for two months at a time, and the navigation
of that port is uninterrupted on an average
39 days in the year, especially in the month
of January. The north-west angle of the Black
Sea, between the mouths of the Dnieper and the
Dniester, is the coldest and most exposed part of it,
and Cherson, Nicolaieff, Odessa, and Oczakow are
probably unapproachable by water. Sebastopol is
scarcely more accessible to winter operations, and
the best naval authorities express doubts of the
possibility of maintaining any y close blockade of the
coast of the Crimea and Cherson at this time of
year. We state these facts, not from any doubt
or misgiving as to the service which the fleets are
ready to perform, but to guard against the danger
of underrating the natural obstacles they may have
to encounter. The climate of Russia is, by sea as
well as by land, one of the chief defences of that
empire during a considerable portion of the year,
and we cannot defeat the order of nature. Nay,
if anything could give the Russian navy a chance
of resisting the two greatest maritime Powers in
the world, it would be that they should have
wasted their forces in buffeting the winter and the
elements, while their real antagonist lies under
shelter of his forts, refitting his vessels for next
spring. The state of the weather at Constantinople
must decide the moment at which the fleets can
begin to act. The Black Sea has of late been so
tempestuous that we observe by the last accounts
a Russian cruiser has literally been driven into the
Bosphorus for shelter, and, until we learn that the
season has become somewhat more propitious to
maritime operations, we shall hesitate to believe
that they have actually begun.

DEATH OF SIR RICHARD JENKINS, G.C.B.—This
hon. knight commander of the Bath, and many years
one of the directors of the East India Company, died at
his residence, Blackheath Park, on Friday, in his 69th
year. Sir Richard, filled the office of chairman in 1839,
and received the order of the Bath for diplomatic ser-
vices in India, principally through the war of 1817-18.
FEMALE EMIGRATION FROM SHETLAND.—Funds have
been placed at the command of the Colonial Land and
Emigration Commissioners in this country, sufficient to
fit out and pay the whole expense of transport of 300
women from the Shetland Islands to Van Diemen's
Land, and the colonial Government offers additional
funds if more can be obtained.