The Sun.
London, England, 1854-12-13 00:00:00

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eginning it, he must havehad ample time forpreparation.
(Rear, hear.) And what was the force sent out to the
Crimea?-27,000 English troops. I believe the whole
combined force did not amount to more than 50,000 men.
I further believe, and the confirmation was forced upon
/131 e by subsequent facts, that the great force was sent oat
'without Government having any knowledgeof the namber
'of Russian forces in the Crimea, or of the strength of the
fortress intended to be attacked. (Hear, from the Opposi-
tic,n.) The great error that had paralysed all their efforts
Was that of underrating the difficulty of the objects to be
-aceomplished. lam confirmed in that view by the observa-
tions which fell from the Prime Minister at Aberdeen, who
affirmed that in six months they had sent out a finer army
'than any ever commanded by the Duke of Wellington, and
that they had commenced the expedition to Sebastopol in
such a manner as to insure its success. I traced in these words
of Lord Aberdeen that he was ignorant of the condition of the
Russian armies in the Crimea, and that he underrated the
strength of Sebastopol. It is perfectly clear to me that that
force was pushed on the shores of the Crimea in the idea
that they had nothing to do but to take Sebastopol. There
was not sufficient provisions for the troops—nor sufficient
foresight in providing reserves for the inevitable losses and
contingencies of war. These 27,000 men were pushed on to
the shore of the Crimea to take their chance, and they were
left to take Sebastopol, if they could. The great faultof the
Government was, as was obvious from the language of the
Prime Minister, that they overrated its strength. It was
perfect, said he, in all its appointments, but it was noto-
rious that the army was deficient in artillery, and almost
without cavalry. And with regard to the equipments of
War, ,tents, and other necessaries, they were almost for-
gotten, as was obvious from the description of their suffer-
ings the first days of their landing. They sent that army
to attack the Crimea without any reserves to support it,
and he called on the Government for an explanation of
that circumstance. (Hear, hear.) Were they justified in
sending out such an expedition without proper reserves to
support it? That was a point where, he thought, the
conduct of the Government was open to grave doubt—he
was afraid he should say, severe censure—and they had a
right to demand an explanation why it was sent without
reserves, and afterwards left there without reinforcements.
(Cheers.) He hoped her Majesty's Government would ex-
plain to the house why it was their army was left thus
exposed. (Hear, hear.) He (Sir J. Pakington) had not
certainly sufficient information on this subject which would
enable him to judge of all the facts of the case ; he spoke
only frOm these sources which were open to the public ;
but he believed their army had received nothing worthy
of the name of reinforcements from the time Lord Raglan,
landed, in the beginning of September, until the arrival of
the 46th Regiment in November, after the battle of Inker-
man had been fought. (Hear, hear.) He was open to
correction if he committed any error, but he believed
that was really the case. He was quite aware that shortly
after that battle, 3,000 men landed at Balaklava,
among whom was, .1,000 cavalry but that was all.
He made no complaint against the Government for not
sending a large force at first to the Crimea ; he was
quite aware that the difficulty of conveying them would
account for not forwarding a larger force than 27,000 men;
but the 3,000 men sent a few days after did no more, he
Was sorry to say, than to fill up the gaps caused by the
casualties at the battle of the Alma, and from the time

that army sat down before Sebasispol, and entrenched
itself from Balaklava to Inkerman, though decimated by
disease, and suffering from the effects of the climate, and
exposure to cold and fatigue, it was left there, with the ex-
ception of a few draughts sent out, without any reinforce-
ment:until the arrival of the 46th Regiment. (Cheers.)
*Under those circumstances, that gallant band of men
dwindled day by day, until they were attacked by an over-
whelming force on the sth of November. Let him ask
her Majesty's Government what was the actual available
force on that sth of November ? They landed, no doubt,
27,000; they got an addition of 3,000 in a few days after ;
but at Inkerman they had 20,000—had they 18,000 sta-
tioned from Balaklava to the heights of Sebastopol—had
they 15,000 effective soldiers? He (Sir J. Pakington) be-
lieved not e but this they knew, that the men who resisted
an overwhelming Russian force, according to the authority
of Lord Raglan himself, did not exceed 8,000 men.
(Cheers,) The hon. gentleman who seconded the address
talked of the fearful odds to which the British army was
exposed • but why did they contend against this fearful -
odds ? (Cheers.) Let us thank God that it was not
utterly destroyed and annihilated ; and it was not teithe
credit of the British Government that only 8,003 men were
found to oppose such a force. (Cheers.) No doubt they
were justified in praising the unexampled bravery and
valour of their soldiers, and history hardly recorded so
fearful oils° glorious a struggles bat was it not little less
than miraculous that it terminated in such a result ; for it
was only by the mercy of God that such a band as that
were able to rsist the Russian force. (Great cheering.)
Why were there only 8,000 men present ? Their valour
unquestionably claimed the admiration and gratitude
of a 11; it was not beyond that even ordinarily displayed
by a British force ; it was not the mere courage of men
tghting against men, but the more enduring, calm, gallant,
intrepid courage, which enabled that band of heroes to
withstand, hour after hour, almost for an entire day,
under grievous privations and sufferings, the repeated and
overwhelming attacks of the enemy, and it was, in his
opinion; little less than miraculous, that they were now
able to congratulate themselves that victory was theirs,
instead of hsving to mourn the loss of their whole force.
(Load cheers from the Opposition.) That was a grave
matter for explanation, and they had a right to ask why
that fearful odds existed. (Cheers.) His own belief was,
that if her Majesty's Government had shown a-proper
foresight ; if, upon their undertaking the expedition to
the Crimea, they had sent proper reinforcements; if they
had had an army of reserve, or instantly supplied the
vacancies caused by battle or disease; if they had kept up
the British strength, even to the small number of 21,000
men, it • was, he repeated, his firm persuasion, that no
battle of Inkerman would have taken place. (Cheers from
the Opposition.) They all knew the trite phrase which
Used to be applied in the sister country towards this—and
We believe that England's weakness on that occasion was
Russia's opportunity, and that the Emperor seeing that,
'athered together his legions and sent them against a re-
eluced handful of men, who, brave as he knew they were,
thought he would succeed in overpowering them. (Cheers.)
Raving ' before that felt the effect of a British force at
Alma, he (Sir J. Pakington) was firmly persuaded he never
Would have risked the battle of Inkerman had the Go-
vernment et home displayed even common prudence.
(Cheers.) But was that all? What had been the suffer-
ings of their men ? (Cheers.) They had been on those
heights over Sebastopol under canvass tents, they were in
the worst weather that possibly could be conceived, ex-
posed to the rigours of a severe climate; and the effects of
that awful hurricane which was so fatal to our shipping,
totally unprotected. (Cheers.) And how was that, but
by the imprudence and want of foresight of her Majesty's
Government—(cheers)--and they had a right to ask them
for an explanation. That house found them liberally
with supplies, and in sending forth an army as brave and
gallant as ever faced an enemy, why did they allow them
to perish with cold and exhaustion on the heights of
Sebastopol? (Cheers.) Within the last two days he had
himself seen a private letter from a distinguished officer
of high rank in the Crimea; of course he was not at
liberty to mention his name, but he pledged himself that
he was an officer of high rank, and of unimpeachable cha-
racter fer veracity. The letter was written to a member
of his own family, and containeilthese remarkable words :
-" The spirit of the men is good, but their sufferings are
almost beyond endurance." (Cheers.) He (Sir J. Peking-
ton) could hardly with calmness advert to such a state of
things, for he could not see any possible excuse for such
neglect. (Hear.) Let them read the newspapers of the
day ; let them read Lord Raglan's despatche published
that morning, giving an account of the weather, and to
what a condition it reduced the ground on which the army
were encamped, and then let hon. members ask if these
brave men ought, at this season of the year, and in such a
climate, to have been exposed under canvass tents ?
(Cheers.) Her Majesty's Government could not plead in
answer that they were taken by surprise—they could not
allege that it was impossible for them to have foreseen
these thing's, for they might, and could, and ought to have
foreseen them. (Hear, hear.) The expedition did not
leave Varna till September, and he was very much inclined
to believe, looking at the whole history of that expedition,
and if he could dive into the secrets of the Government,
that it was originally intended to have taken Sebastripol
by a coup de main. Perhaps it was possible that they
could have done so, but it was equally certain that they
had n• right in presuming that they could do so, and that
they were, therefore, boundito be prepared for either alter-
native. (Hear, hear.) He maintained that her Majesty's
Government had no right or reason to expect the capture
of Sebastopol in such a manner. It was a great fortress,
well stored and garrisoned, and no man could doubt but
that the Czar would strengthen this, his stronghold, and
be prepared to resist any attack. (Hear.) Was it likely
then, or possible, that such a place could be easily taken,
and that when the expedition landed in the Crimea they
would succeed in taking Sebastopol by a coup de main.
They had no right to expect a speedy termination to
the contemplated attack, for they did notsend men enough
to do so ; it may have been probable, but they had no right
to assume that such would b'e the case. They had an army
attacking a great fortress, but so weak in numbers that
they could not invest it; on the contrary, 'they were
only able to • occupy one side of it, leaving the enemy
at liberty to come and •go, and .bring in supplies at the
ether, just as often and largely as they chose. What
right had they to suppose that it would yield without a
struggle ? They may no doubt capture it, and he hoped in
Heaven they would; bat when they were placed in such
circumstances that they could not invest it, surely it was
certain that the struggle must be protracted, and if so, it
was equally certain that their soldiers would be exposed to
the advent of winter in such a climate, and to the dreadful
sufferings they have since endured, They were now re-
duced, by cold- and privation of every description, to an
extent which left them physically unable to perform their
duties ;..officers-were out on duty every two nights out of
three, and yet nothing was done to alleviate their condi-
tion. If or Majesty's. Government may tell him that a
Warm supply pf clothing had unfortunately been lost, in
the Prince—and that, of course, no blame could attach to
them ; but they had a right to be informed why that sup-
, ply was not sent out sooner, and why did it not reach the
Crimea 'until the month of November—until the cold be-
came scrintenge that the men suffered the most cruel pri-
vations. (Hear, bear.) When were the huts to be sent
out I and how long were the men to remain exposed under
canvass tents! Why was it they were going out in De-
camber! He had that morning met an officer of his ac-
quaintance, who was going out to superintend the erection
of those huts, end under these circumstances it was impos.
Bible the men could be relieved from the canvas tents until
the end of January. What would be the consequences
which, in the meantime, might ensue to the health of
these brave men? (Hear.) It is all very well to speak in
terms of praise in that house of theirbraveryo but it should
be remembered they were not giving them even the com-
mon care due to humanity. (Cheers.) Under all these cir-
cumstances he thought he was justified in saying that that
house would abandon its duty if it did not call on the
Government to explain why these things should have hap-
pened. They had a right to an explanation, not only in the
name of the people of this country, but in that of the
army, to whose sufferings he adverted. If the Govern-
meat gave them a satisfactory explanation, if they would
show that hereafter they may not only rely on their good
intentions, which he (Sir. J. Pakington) did not deny, but
on their prudence and foresight, they would have no cause
to fear from the Conservative party. (Hear.) They were
not the -Whigs of 1790, nor the Coalitionists of 1853.
(Loud cheers from the Opposition.) They desired nothing
but the honour of their Sovereign and the welfare of their
country. (Cheers.) Let her Majesty's Government ask
for supplies, and they should have them with no niggard
hand ; let them ask Parliamentary support and they should
have it without meeting with any factions spirit. (Hear,
hear.) Bat if they made these concessions on the one an
they must exact conditions on the other, namely, thahtthde
War should be conducted with a vigour, a wisdom, and
. foresight beyond that which they had hitherto shown. therefore
(Hear, hear.) They asked the Government,
for these explan7-. 1; they were hound in duty to the
country to give these. Parliament Would, no doubt, hear
those explanations • it would ask how they intended to
shape their futurelcourse, and by the answer they gave it
would be seen whether the Souse of 'Commons b would