The Sun.
London, England, 1854-02-21 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 21, 1854.

(Hear, hear.) I say this aespatch proves violence and per-
fidy according to the views of the Government. I say, if I
it be a fact that the Government were aware of the inten-
tions of the Russian Government, of course their conduct
was not perfidious ; but I say, if the statements in this
famous despatch prove violence and perfidy, w' ly is it that
Lord Clarendon after all this—after Colonel Rose's decla-
rations had been confirmed by Lord Stratford—after the
occupation of the Principalities—after Count Nesselrode
had declared, in his vindication, that from the first the
English Government was cognisant of the policy of his
country and of the intentions of the Emperor—why is it,
after all that occurred, that Lord Clarendon says in his
circular, " He does justice to the moderation which has
heretofore distinguished the Emperor of Russia's policy,
and rests the hope of an amicable conclusion on the Em-
peror's repeated declaration to respect the integrity of the
Turkish empire?' (Hear, hear.) Mind, that is the cir-
cular of the Secretary of State after the Chancellor of
Russia has publicly declared that the English Government
were cognisant from the first of the intentions of the Rus-
sian Government. (Hear, hear.) I am obliged to curtail,
but if I did not refer to the passages, some one would
answer me, "It is all very well, but turn to page so and
so and you will find a complete answer." I must, there-
fore, repeat the case fairly and completely as the despatches
give it. (Aaar, hear.) But after all this Lord Clarendon
writes a despatch on the 4th of July, which, I am bound
to say, is a very sensible and spirited performance. (A
laugh.) Several pages are expended in proving that he
has been taken in. (Laughter.) I will not make any com-
ment upon it. I would have quoted some passages in his
favour, but the impatience of hon. gentlemen opposite will
not permit me—(laughter)—and I refer to them for his
vindication. (Hear, hear.) Allow me to remind you, sir,
that I have now gone over the negotiations from January
till the end of July. I have reviewed those negotiations
until we approach the Vienna note. There is only another
important despatch which I am bound to notice, for it
is of the utmost importance. It is a summary of the
seven months' negotiations. Lord Clarendon was appealed
to by Lord Stratford to take a more decided course, and
Lord Stratford said, " that in any case nothing can be
worse than a hesitating, uncalculating course." Lord
Stratford then tells the English minister "to look an evil
in the face, which, if evaded, will return ;" and what is
the language of Lord Clarendon in the last despatch which
I am going to read ? On the 28th of July he says—" No
doubt that France and England, if they set to work in ear-
nest, may certainly cripple Russia, but Turkey may be
wholly and irretrievably ruined, and peaceful negotiation
is the only course to pursue." If that were an argument
then, it is an argument now. If it were a good argument
during the whole course of these negotiations, it is now an
argument fatal to the policy of the Ministry who recom-
mend war. (Cheers.) If the inevitable consequence be the
irretrievable destruction of Turkey, why go to war at all?
(Hear, hear.) What, then, becomes of this war for the
integrity and indegendence of Turkey? (Hear, hear.)
Well, sir, Count Wllewski proposes that we then go to the
Dardanelles, but Lord Clarendon objects; he says it is a
hypothetical arrangement, and he reads to Count Walewski
his despatch to Lord Stratford, in which he states that
" in case of further aggression or undue delay on the part
of Russia, the Government will be pr pared, in conjunc-
tion with France, to take more active measures." While
he objects to hypothetical arrangements, ho advocates a
hypothetical policy, and retains the opinion, that if Eng-
lend and Franco cripple Russia, the destruction of Turkey
is irretrievable. (Hear.) I regret that the great apostle
oT peace who quoted to-night the instructions of the Secre-
tary of State to her Majesty's ambassador, to prove that
this country has no confidence in the resources or energy of
Turkey, omitted to quote that passage also. It would
heighten the colouring of his picture, strengthen his case,
and enforce his argument, if he could have shown, after
seven months of negotiation and official responsibility, that
Lord Clarendon, the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, writes his soleion opinion, that the active interfer-
ence of England and France must ensure the irretrievable
ruin of Turkey. Now, I shall proceed, if the house will per-
mit me, to draw what I consider the inevitable conclusion
from the despatch to which I have called the particular at-
tention of the house. (Hear.) Remember that it spreads
over a period of seven months—remember that it notices
every principal incident—that in January the Russian army
was ac on! ilulated upon the Turkish frontier - - remember that
the Cabinet of Russia is announcing to her Majesty's minister
at the Court of St. Petersburg that his court is about to
demand measures of compensation iu favour of the Greek
Church—remember that throughout this period we have
no formal and pacific demand on Russia to express expli-
citly what are her intentions—remember that throughout
this period of seven months minister after minister sent
fruitless warnings to the Secretary of State—they came
from St. Petersburg—they came from Constantinople—
they are disclaimed and rejected when they come from a
charge d'affaires, they are confirmed and authorised by an
ambassador—armies are assembling, vague demands are
made, haughty, ostentatious missions are sent ; the Prime
Minister of Turkey tells you that the independence of his
country is at stake, your diplomatic agents simultaneously
inform you that the balance of power is at issue ; and all
this time, in every form—in letters to Constantinople—in
despatches to St. Petersburg—in instructions to its own
ministers—in conversations with Baron Brunow and with
Count Walewski, there is no expression on the part of her
Majesty's Government, that there is no cause for alarm.
(Hear, hear.) If there be no cause for alarm, why have
you diplomatic agents—why should there be any ambas-
sadors—why should there be any despatches ? (Loud
cheers.) Why have you locked up in some secret cabinet
the despatch of the Emperor of Russia—why do you not
place it under your pillow and sleep in peace, though you
may be responsible for the safety of the world ; (Heir.)
Let us try to find out then the cause of this war. What I
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Government during these seven months, and during their
observance of this strange conduct ? (Hear.) Lord Cla-
rendon talks in one of his letters of an alternative, and I
shall offer an alternative also—either the Government was
influenced by a degree of confidence which assumed the
morbid character of credulity, or they were influenced by
connivance. (Cheers, and cries of " hear," from the
Opposition benches.) I mean a policy which calculated
that it was better that the dissolution, in their opinion—
in the opinion of the Secretary of State and of the Prime
Minister—should receive the compliments of the Emperor
of Russia—a policy that calculated- that it was better, on
the whole, that the inevitable dissolution of the Turk-
ish empire should take place by the indirect means of
foreign interference, under those peculiar circumstances,
than that England and France should go to war to
maintain what are called the integrity and indepen-
dence of the Porte. Now, sir, that is the alternative
which it is most important to decide. Was it cordiality
or was it connivance ? And. I beg the house to observe,
that on ascertaining that point depends our also ascertain-
ing what is the object of this war. I believe that the cause
of the war has been the conduct in these negotiations, dur-
ing these seven months, especially of her Majesty's Go-
vernment. If their conduct has been prompted by credu-
lity, they may carry on the war with success and spirit.
The fact that they are nndevided by the word of an Empe-
ror is a mournful fact. It is a lamentable circumstance,
but it is an incident to which generous minds may be
liable; and the very fact that they are undeceived may
Animate them to greater exertions, and to efforts which
will indicate their conduct to their country and to poste-
rity. (Cheers.) If this conduct of her Majesty's Govern-
'nent during these seven months has been influenced by
credulity, it is possible that you may have a war—a long
and a severe war -but it will be a war carried out for
treat objects. and may end in great public benefit. Russia,
by her perfidious conduct—if it have been perfidious—may
have postponed a struggle which, perhaps, was inevitable.
Russia may be forced at the end of this struggle to a posi-
tion which may secure the independence of Europe, the
safety of England, and the safety of civilisation. You may
have a war that may restore Bessarabia to the Porte—you
nay have a war that may convert the Crimea into an inde-
)(indent country, destined to flourish under the guarantee
)f the great powers—you may have a war that may make
the Danube a free river (cheers)—and you may have a war
which will make the Euxine a free sea ; but all this is de-
pendent upon the somewhat humiliating but pardonable
circumstance— the comparatively pardonable circumstance
—that her Majesty's Government has seen the consequence
of credulity. (Cheers.) But let us for a moment contem-
plate the results of the alternative. If it has been suggested
by connivance, you may have a war; but it will be a war
4uck as will be carried on by connivance—a tyrannous war
—a vacillating war—a war with no results, or rather with
the exact results which were intended. (Hear, hear.) It
is not a war which will place Russia where we think neces-
sary for the security of Europe and our country, bat it
is a war which will end with some transactions similar
to Prince Menschikoff's note, or to the arrangements of
the Vienna Conference. Now, these are two results-so
far opposed—so very different—one, I believe, is welcome
to the people of this country, the other is so entirely
satisfactory, that I think it does become—it is the
duty of this house, even if we " potter over blue-books"—
(a laugh), to try to ascertain the truth of these important
facts. Sir, I must—late as the hour is I cannot refrain
from trespassing a little while on the house—l must do
my duty to this subject. (" Oh, oh," from the Ministe-
rial, answered by vehement counter cheers from the Oppo-
sition side.) I am not responsible for this debate having
been brought forward. On the contrary, I have endea-
voured to throw no obstacle in the way of the Government
obtaining those votes which, whatever may be the opinion
of this house, it is 'my conviction it is our duty to grant.
But I feel it my duty to complete a fair view of this ques-
tion ; and I must remind the house that I, along with my
noble friend, are almost the only members who have risen
on this side of the house to speak on a subject that for
twelve months has engaged the interest and for half a
year has agitated the passions of this country. I cannot,
in spite of the groans of gentlemen on the backest of the
benches of the Treasury—(laughter and cheers)—l cannot
shrink from fulfilling a painful and a necessary duty. I
owe this, not so much to myself, but to those with whom
I have the honour and the happiness to act. (Cheers from
the Opposition.) I have taken for these seven months
important negotiations, ending with a despatch from a
Secretary of State, from which only one inference can be
drawn, namely, that under no circumstances ought we to
go to war for the integrity and independence of Turkey.
I have offered you the only alternative which can explain
the strange conduct of the Ministry. I have asked you to
decide whether it is credulity or whether it is connivance.
But, sir, there is a passage which I must now call the at-
tention of the noble lord to, because I think it demands
some explanation. You know last year we were not per-
mitted to touch upon this question. You know last year
sometimes a question was asked, and the Military, perhaps
not without reason, deprecated discussion. Therefore, I
think the noble lord is the last person who ought to com-
plain of being troubled with enquiries on this question.
He must feel that if in 1853 he told the House of Com-
mons that it was inconvenient to answer questions, in
1854 the creditor would have the right at least to ask
that the bargain should be satisfied. (Hear, hear.) It
is due to the country and the Government of which
the noble lord is a member that he should throw some
explanation over the circumstances to which I am going
to refer—(hear, hear),—which may assist us to a solu-
tion of this question, namely, whether the conduct of
the Government has been animated by credulity, or whe-
ther it has been suggested by connivance ? On the
21)th April, 1853, a noble lord who takes a great in foreign
affairs in another place addressed some questions to the
Secretary of State. The Marquis of Clanricarde adverted
—to the alarm recently excited by the announcement of
the special mission of Prince Menschikoff from St. Peters-
burg to Constantinople, and by the French Government
having considered this mission to be of such grave import-
ance as to induce them to send a portion of their fleet to
Salamis, circumstances which pointed to the great im-
portance of a union between England and France. This
was the most important inquiry that could then be made,
and second only to the interest of the debate which took
place at the end of the session, on the motion of Lord
Malmesbory. Lord Clarendon expressed a strong opinion-
with respect to the obligation to maintain the independence
and integrity of the Ottoman empire. He stated also, with
regard to the mission of Prince Menschikoff, that, the
Turkish Government having made to the French Govern.
meat certain concessions which appeared to be inconsistent
with concessions previously made to the Emperor of
Russia, the Emperor of Russia, knowing the great inter.

est felt by the Greek population in the holy shrines, de-
termined
upon sending Prince Menschikoff on a special
embassy; and that prince was ordered to arrange that mat-
ter of the holy shrines, and to place it on.a permanent and !
satisfactory footing. Now, at the time when Lord Claren-
don made that statement, he was fully aware, to put it
very briefly—first, that great military preparations were
being made by Russia, and secondly, that Prince Menschi-
koff had spoken of the question of the holy places as a
question which he did not understand ; and that, from
Colonel Rose's despatches, which he had received more than
a month, he was also aware that the real object of the
mission of Prince Menschikoff was the securing a treaty
with the Porte, which was inconsistent with the interests
of England and France, and with the independence of the
Porte itself. He was aware that Prince Menschikoff having
failed in his object, had left Constantinople. I ask
the house was Lord Clarendon justified in making
that statement to the House of Lords and to the Par-
liament of England, when he was in possession of that in-
formation? What is the condition of the forbearance of the
two Houses of Parliament towards Ministers? It is that
they should be at least met in a frank and candid spirit ;
that if the Minister rises and says it is inconvenient to the
public service that an inquiry should be answered, a patrio-
tic and proper feeling renders every member silent ; but
there is a clear understanding that no Minister should rise
in his place and mislead the Parliament of this country.
And I ask the noble lord, or any of his colleagues that may
follow me in this debate, did they, or did they not, think
I that Lord Clarendon was justified in the statement he
made on the 25th of April in the House of Lords—that
statement briefly that Prince Menschikofrs mission was to
arrange and dispose of the question of the holy places—
when he had information that Prince Menschikoff had ab-
solutely left Constantinople, and that his object was to
obtain a secret convention—secret as respects England and
Franco—and inconsistent with the independence of Tur-
key ? (Cheers.) But we have been told that we have
enough of information on this question. We must not
" potter over blue books." (A. laugh.) A year ago we
made inquiry of the Minister in his place in Parliament—
which of all places in the world should animate a man to a
noble fulfilment of his duty—and we are met by the usual
answer that the inquiry is inconvenient ; but information
is given, which information we did not find to be fraudu-
lent until we had the blue book to " potter over." (A
laugh.) I think that the Parliament of England have
been treated by a Secretary of State in a harder fashion
than they were treated by the Russian Minister. I will
give no opinion on the alternative; but what I want hon.
gentlemen to do is to apply this alternative to all these
documents—to apply this alternative to the representation
made by the Secretary of State when he was in possession
of Col. Rose's despatches; and I ask you whether that re-
presentation made by Lord Clarendon was influenced by
credulity or connivance ? That is a question which I think
should be asked. Well, sir, it is impossible for me not to
notice the Vienna note. That is the next phase of these
transactions. The noble lord has noticed it, and I shall
probably be able to treat it as briefly as any gentleman who
ever spoke on so difficult a subject. But the most remark
able thing is the language of the noble lord on this remark-
able document. Here are all the diplomatic wiseacres of
Europe—(a laugh)—assembled at Vienna in a conference ;
and they draw up a document which Turkey and Russia
both agree in ascribing the same meaning to —(hear)—and
which meaning is the one not intended • by any of the
ministers or diplomatists of Europe. That is the first re-
markeble circumstance. But the most curious thing is,
that the Vienna note, to men of common understanding,
in the exact spirit, and almost in the exact shape, if re-
jecte i by Prince Menschikoff, was at once to be considered
as a cants ULU. Is that a species of connivance or not?
Is it also a species of connivance when this note is first
sent to the Emperor of Russia and accepted by him, that
it is then hurried to Constantinople and offered to the
Sultan, with hardly a moment's time for consideration,
because time is precious, and providentially rejected by
him ? How does the noble lord treat• this? Upon the
hypothesis of connivance—but I express no opinion, I
speak only of facts—it is very easy to understand it. Hav-
ing intended from the first that there should be no real
struggle for the independence and integrity of Turkey—
having intended, from the first, that the ultimatum of
Prince Menschikoff should have been accepted, they would
have been very glad, by means of a Vienna note, to have
obtained their, purpose. But the other hypothesis—that
of credulity—is very difficult to apply to the case, because
I can hardly imagine that any man could be so credulous
as to suppose that Turkey having rejected the ultimatum
of Prince Menschikoff,'would have accepted the note of the
Vienna conference. But what was the language of the
noble lord with respect to this note? He said, " I do not
know whose note it is--it is none of our children. *(Ex-
pressicns of dissent from Lord J. Russell.) I understood
the noble lord to say that her Majesty's Government did,
not draw up the note, but he believed it came from Paris.
At all events, the language used by Ministers in another
place with reference to it was to the effect that the Govern.
ment were formally responsible for it, that it came from
Paris, that everybody touched it up a little, and that ulti-
mately this failure took place. At the end of the last
session, when the country began to be somewhat alarmed
respecting these transactions in the East, when the noble
lord the member for the city of London was pressed in this
house upon the subject, he answered, I admit, fairly and
frankly enough. But what was the reply to the question by
a minister much more peculiarly responsible, and more par-
ticularly qualified to give an answer to such a question ?
Lord Clarendon did not speak of this note at all in a de-
preciating tone or manner. On the contrary, he was most
sanguine, and in reply to the question of Lord Malmesbury,
he said that, in point of fact, the Vienna note had brought
the negotiations to the point of a satisfactory conclusion.
He said also that the note originated with the French Go-
vernment, that it was slightly modified by us, and it cos-
tained nothing derogatory to the independence or integrity
of the Porte, and could see, therefore, no difficulty to its
acceptance by the Porte The note, then, it appears, was
drawn up by one of the most able men in Europe,. the
French Secretary of State—it was sent to all the other
great Ministers of Europe; it came here, and had the ad-
vantage not only of the full consideration of the Cabinet,
but of a Cabinet of all the talents. (Laughter.) What is ,
to be thought, then, of the termination of the discrimina-
tion used in this case? This Vienna note was probably
one of the most important political documents ever drawn
up since the treaty of Vienna. You had the peace of
Europe depending upon the question—you had these great
statesmen concentrating their energies and intellect upon
the question—and they ultimately produce a note which
they themselves admit to be the greatest failure on record.
(Hear, hear.) But I look upon this matter in another
spirit. I give no decided opinion upon it, but IJcannot
believe that some of the ablest and most eminent men
in England, whom I now look upon, and those most
able and eminent men whom I might look upon in another
place, could have produced such a failure or such a docu-
ment. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) But if from the first
there was a foregone conclusion—l do not say in the whole
Cabinet, but in the majority of the Cabinet— for I think I
may be able to adduce evidence hereafter that upon many
points the Cabinet were not united—but if, I say, there
did exist a foregone conclusion in the minds of the Cabi-
net, or a majority of it, that the independence and inte-
grity of Turkey was a farce, and that by a conscientious
connivance the affair might be settled by means of this
note, then we can account for its production and its failure.
(Hear, hear.) I have examined the seven months of nego-
tiation which elapsed from January to July much more
briefly than I could have wished to have done, and now
let me ask the house to bear in mind the alternative
which I have suggested as a means of explaining the
cause and throwing some light on the object of the war.
After the failure of the Vienna note, up to the affair at
Sinope, there occurs a dreary interval. What was her
Majesty's Government doing in this important time? I
will not refer, as some one has done, to articles in a jour-
nal which Emperors read, and to which it is said Prime
Ministers contribute, as absolute evidence of the feelings of
the Government. I in no way impute its representations
to the Government, but certainly (luring that period there
never was so depreciating a tone taken with respect to
Turkey as in that interval which elapsed between the
failure of the Vienna, note-and the crossing of the Danube
by Omer Pacha. We were told that we might mediate
for Turkey, but we must not do more—that we might de a
little, but not too much—that Turkey was in fact "used
up "—(a laugh)—and that in fact the thing might be
settled in some way or other without England doing any-
thing like going to war. I do not say that that is evidence' •
but we have the evidence of one of the most distinguished
members of this house—of one who forms a part of her
Majesty's Government, and who is supposed to be pecu-
liarly in the confidence of the First Minister of the Crown.
The right hon. gentleman made one of those progresses
which public men make sometimes through the country.
He found himself in a city second only in importance to the
metropolis, and while there he found time to give his opi-
nions to au interesting assembly upon the state of foreign
affairs. How did the right hon. the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer then view the Turkish question ? The Chancellor
of the Exchequer, who will probably have to propose new
taxes in due time to carry on the war undertaken for the
integrity and independence of Turkey—the Chancellor of
the Exchequer said that the integrity and independence of
the Turkish empire was a very different thing from the in-
tegrity and independence of England or France, and they
must not in any way confound this sovereignty of Turkey
full of anomalies, full of misery, and full of perplexities,
with that of the two countries he had named. Now I want
to know what that means. If the independence and integ-
rity of Turkey are different from the independence and in-
tegrity of England and France, I would advise the house
—if that is the opinion of her Majesty's Ministers and of
the Finance Minister—to think twice before they eater
into this war. What is the case of Russia? Why, the
case of Russia is exactly that described by the right hon.
gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Russia says
to you, " We are prepared to respect the independence and
integrity of the Porte." You have, you tell us, the per-
sonal assurances of the Emperor to that effect. (A laugh.)
But, according to our opinion, the integrity and independ-
ence of Turkey are very different things from the integrity
and independence of England and France. Therefore, let
the Sultan be at Constantinople—let him still possess his
side of the Danube, but let us govern three-fourths of his
subjects. And why not ? It is, you know, a " sove-
reignty full of anomalies, full of misery, and full of
perplexity." Why, Count Nesselrode could not have
made a better plea—more fraudulent if you please. (A
laugh.) Then the right hon. gentleman the Chancellor of
the Exchequer made a speech at Manchester, at a time
when Parliament was not sitting, when every man was
anxious to receive some cue or some intimation of the
opinion of her Majesty's Government. (Hear.) Well, about
this time, the end of the autumn, it was thought that the
cause of Turkey was hopeless : for myself, however, I be-
lieved that there were one or two virtuous men who might
save this " beleaguered city." They were in the minority;
but it was understood that they had done their duty, that
their recommendations were right, and had been adopted
six months after the proper time. (A laugh) Certainly
nothing could be more gloomy than the state of Turkey at
the time when the Chancellor of the Exchequer was
stating the political views of the Cabinet at Man-
chester. What was it that oh mged the aspect and
fortunes of Turkey ? What was it that gave a new
impulse to the public mind ? It was not diplomacy,
not the Vienna note, not instructions to ambassadors, de-
preciating the energy of the land they effected to save—
not that accumulated mass of trifling, or worse than trifling
which we have upon our table— no, but the energy of the
Turks themselves, The valour and patriotic spirit of the
people whom the hon. member for the West Riding libels
and reviles—it was the energy, the patriotism, and the en-
thusiastic vigour of a " sovereignty full of anomalies, full
of misery, and full of perplexities," which Europe witnessed
an,i admired, and which among all classes in England met
with a ready and generous sympathy. The Danube was
crossed, the battle of Oltenitza was won ; Russia, which
had been accumulating her menacing forces, was put back
by the very men whom your very minister and ambassa-
dor had counselled for months to forfeit their independence
and to let their country fall to the ground. (Hear.) But
no sooner had the first flush of this good fortune passed
over, and a little re-action occurred in the public mind,
when, little accustomed to the unexpected incidents and
changes of the fortunes of war—no sooner had there been
a lull in the public mind, than the policy of credulity or of
connivance was at its dirty work again, and the Turks
were told that since they had shown themselves capable

of fighting successfully for their country, "Do not for
God's sake disturb the peace of Europe." Give over this
fighting. Respect the feelings of the Emperor of Russia.
We are going to send you some new propositions almost as
goad as the ultimatum of Prince M.enschikoff, and more
successful, we trust, than the Vienna note—(laughter)—
ant certainly there never was a more disgraceful fraud
either for diplomatists or for Ministers than when the
Sultan was repeatedly asking us to prove our sincerity by I
entering the Black Sea, which we as often declined to do.
It is as disgraceful for France as for England. Ono day
we are told the admiral quarreled with the ambassador;
another day the ambassador quarrelled with the admiral ;
then the two admirals disagreed, and then the two ambas-
salors ; at least we are told so if we " potter over blue-
books." (Laughter.) Bat my opinion is that all this time
there was a great diplomatic conspiracy going on. which
was to settle this affair in a manner which, if it had suc-
ceeded, would only, as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe tells us,
have postponed the evil day, and forced us to a solution
of this imperial difficulty under circumstances of much
difficulty under circumstances of much aggravated disad-
vantage. Well, as the battle of Oltenitza saved the Turks
once, the slaughter of Sinope operated again their favour.
Then we were obliged to enter the Black Sea ; but when
we entered the Black Sea what did we do ? Was that
a policy of credulity or a policy of connivance? When
I heard of the return of our squadron to Constantinople,
I could not help recalling the words of a great orator when
he was addressing an assembly not less illustrious than
this; when he said, "Oh ! Athenians, the men who ad-
minister your affairs are men who know not how to make
peace or how to make war." (Cheers.) Well now, sir,
having expressed my opinion that the cause of this war is
the conduct of the ministry, or at least of a powerful ma-
jority in the ministry, who influenced the negotiations for
the past seven months, I have a right to express my fear
that if it has been a policy of connivance which has only
been baffled by events, it will lead, after perhaps a disas-
trous war, to an ignominious peace. (Hear.) I come now
to the last point, to the preparations which the Govern-
ment have made for the future. Sir, the First Lord of the
Admiralty has given us a catalogue, though an imper-
fect one, of some of the advantages which we now enjoy—
though otherwise we should not have possessed them—to
meet the difficulties which we have to encounter. And
first of all I was glad to hear from the right hon. gentle-
man, that they have not done much in the interval ; they
have succeeded in cementing a good understanding and
alliance with France. The right hon. gentleman ought to
be a judge of the importance of such connexions. (Hear.)
About a year ago an alliance with France was not in such
favour on the Treasury benches. I remember it was im-
puted as a great fault to a noble friend of mine, who was
once Secretary of State, that he was too fond of an alliance
with France ; and when I remember the acrimony, the
vituperations, the ignorant impertinence with which
Lord Itialmeslaury was assailed the first moment of his
entering office, and contrast the feeling of public
opinion towards that nobleman at -this moment with
what it once was, as his colleague then, as his friend
still, I rejoice at what has occured. The pull° now
recognises that he was a man o: sagacity and a mini-
ster of unswerving firmness ; but this time last year the
French alliance, since happily cemented by her Ma-
jesty's Ministers, was not so much in vogue as at present.
Far be it from me to allude to past debates, nor should I
have done so had I not found that so discreet and expo
rienced a Minister as the leader of the house thought it
expedient that this year our debates should be again en-
livened by abusing another Emperor. Last year the Em-
peror of the French was a pirate ; this year the Emperor of
Russia is a butcher. (Laughter.) After the trial of Dr.
Sacheverel, Sir Robert Walpole said that the Whigs had
had quite enough of roasting a parson. I should say that
her Majesty's Ministers hair had quite enough of roasting
an emperor, and I should not be surprised that, if the war
is shorter than some imagine, perhaps by this time next
year they may have succeeded in cementing a peace with
Russia. (Laughter.) What the character of the Emperor
of Russia may be then I cannot say, but I have no doubt
that the First Lord of the Admiralty will do justice to it.
(Laughter.) But we are told by the noble lord that we
have entered into a mutual alliance with France to prose-
cute this war. That is a most important declaration, and
11 I wish Ihe noble lord had favoured 3 with more details
upon the subject. The noble lord was somewhat vague
in his description, or rather his reference to the condi-
tions of this alliance. I think the country and the house
have a right to know what are these projected engage-
ments as to not disturbing the territorial arrangements of
Europe ; for that I infer was one of the conditions of this
projected alliance. I think if the noble lord awl his col-
leagues have entered into any engagement of that nature,
they have entered into one of the most unwise and most
unnecessary engagements possible. We have heard a great
deal—

Lori J. RUSSELL—I did not say that there was an en-
gagement, or anything like it.
Mr. DISRAELI—The noble lord's tone was somewhat
low anal diplomatic when he referred to the treaty. I am,
however, glad to find that he has not recommended that
arrangement. The hou., member for Surrey and others have
referred to the balance of power, and some gentlemen have
spoken of it with ridicule in a manner that I will not imi-
tate. But, sir, I never will confound the maintenance of
the balance of power with the maintenance of the present
territorial distribution of Europe. They have nothing to
do with each other ; and if we confound them, this country
will be involved in great danger and difficulty. We all
know— at least those who, like the noble lord, believe in
the absolute existence of a balance of power—we all, I
say, know what it is. It is at Madrid, it is at Belgium, on
the Adige, and at Constantinople ; but thou h this is true,
it is not true that the distribution of territory sanctioned
by the treaties of Vienna has anything to do with the ba-
lance of power. And we had a proof of that in 1848, when
the greatest changes in Italy were sanctioned by the most
illustrious statesmen, even by Prince Metternich, as not in
any way disturbing the balance of power. I impress this
on the house, because the _future of Italy mainly depends
on the appreciation of that truth. But we are told by the
noble lord that, in order to strengthen our position at this
moment, we have entered into an alliance with Turkey.
And I may be allowed to say that, admitting that alliance
with Turkey to be at this moment not only expodiont,but
necessary, my astonishment is that that treaty was not en-
tered into many months ago. It is a notorious fact that dur-
ing the last eight weeks there have been repeated attempts
to negotiate directly between Russia and Turkey. It is
known that In one instance the attempt was nearly success-
ful, and I should like to know what would have been the
position of the noble lord if he had had to come down to
Parliament to say that Russia and Turkey had succeeded in
settling this affair between themselves on terms fatal to the
independence of Turkey and injurious to the interests of
Europe, because her Majesty's Ministers had omitted at
the proper time to bind Turkey by a convention not to
compromise the interests of Europe by such a course ? I
should say they would have been in almost as compromis-
ing a position as they would have been had Turkey signed
the Vienna note ; and I believe that would have been a
position which for dismay, disgrace, and disaster was never
equalled by any statesmen. I am sorry that when the
noble lord gave us this information with respect to the
treaties with Turkey and France, he did not in any way
confirm the flattering statement of the First Lord of the
Admiralty with regard to the German powers. The First
Lord of the Admiralty, in his catalogue of the great
achievements of her Majesty's Ministers, and in his an-
nouncement of their successive labours for the welfare of
the country, told us to congratulate ourselves on having
drawn the German powers into union with England and
France. But I observed with deep regret—though I
believe the statement was perfectly justified - that the
noble lord distinctly seated that neither Austria nor
Prussia were bound in any way to interfere if war
continued. But, sir, I think it was the duty of her
Majesty's Ministers to demand from those Govern-
ments a distinct and categorical answer as to what they
intended to clo if war proceeds. I think, ton, that that is
a subject on which her Majesty's Ministers are bound to
give information to Parliament. On Friday night the noble
Lord said that I had made a most important observation
because I rose with the concurrence, indeed at the request
of the gentlemen on these benches, to state that we should
make no opplition to the vote of men which the noble lord
wished immediately to pass. The noble lord was pleased
to say that that was an important declaration. I confess
myself that I was rather surprised at the somewhat exag-
gerated view which he took of these simple words. For
whatever might be our opinion of the conduct of the Go-
vernment in the management of those transactions which
have led to this terrible conclusion, I cannot suppose that
on these benches there could be any difference of opinion
as to the duty which we have to fulfil, to support our sove-
reign and to maintain the honour of our country. I can
assure the noble lord that so long as the opposition benches
are filled by those who now occupy them, he will at least
encounter men who will not despair, under any circum-
stances, of the resources of their country. The noble
lord has: great historical information and great experience
of this house. I cannot but believe that the noble lord
must have drawn his opinion of those who sit opposite him
from his recollection of other and preceding oppositions.
(Cheers.) I do not know whether, on the part of the noble
lord, it was an effort of memory or of remorse. But this
I can say—for this I can answer on the part of myself and
my friends, that no future Wellesley on the banks of the
Danube will have to make a bitter record of the effects of
a British opposition that depreciated his efforts, that ridi-
culed his talents. (Cheers.) We shall remember what
we believe to be our duty to our country; and however
protracted may be the war, however unfortunate may be
your councils, at least we shall never despair of the republic.
(Cheers.)
Lord PALMERSTON then rose, and was greeted with
cheers from.. the ministerial side. The noble lord said—
Late as the hour to which this debate has been protracted,
I should feel that I was not discharging my duty which I
owe to this house and to the Crown if I were to permit the
debate to close without making some observations in reply
to, and in consequence of, the speech of the right hon.
gentleman. I am ready to admit that we are met here on
one of the most important and solemn occasions upon
which it can fall to the lot of Parliament to deliberate.
The country, by the admission of the responsible advisers
of the Crown, is, I am afraid I must say, upon the verge
of war. (Hear.) The house and the country have a right to
know what has been the conduct of Government, and what
has been the course which has led us to this position. We
have laid before Parliament the papers, which show what
the conduct of Government has been, and we have pro-
duced these papers for the express purpose that Parliament
might have the opportunity of considering and of reviewing
that conduct, and of expressingitsopinion thereon. (Hear.)
But I mast confess I did not expect to hear from any mem-
ber of this house that which has just fallen from the right
hon. member who has just sat down—(hear)—because, I
think, that if I were to be of opinion that a Government,
in the direction of its public duty, in consideration of great
and important negotiations upon matters involving not
only the interests of this country, but the peace and wel-
fare of Europe, had been justly chargeable either with
credulity or connivance, I think that if I felt those were the
onlyalternatives upon which the housecould be called upon
to pronounce its judgment, I certainly think I should feel
there could be no other course open to me and to the house
than to withhold from them the confidence of Parliament.
Yet we are told that the Government in relation to which
this house has only the alternative of condemnation for
credulity or condemnation for connivance, is to receive the
confidence of Parliament by the supplies which may be ne- 1
cessary to carry on the war; and that the gentlemen who
sit opposite are ready to entrust to such a Government the I
fortune of the war. (Hear, hear.) Well, then, a Govern-
ment staiding in the position in which we stand has a
right to expect that its conduct wi.l be scrutinised to the
bottom. There are many charges that might be brought
against us. In the first place, we might be accused of hav-
ing rashly, imprudently, and without due regard to the
heavy responsibilities which weighed upon us, brought the
country to the condition of being obliged to draw the
sword and rush into war. That charge no one has made
against us. That charge would indeed have been a heavy
charge ; and, if proved against us, would have manifested
us as deserving of the severest condemnation of the country.
(Hear.) That charge, however, no man bas, as yet, in-
timated could be alleged against the conduct of the Go-
vernment. Well, another charge might be, that by delay,
by credulity, by absence of sufficient vigour at the proper
time, we had allowed matters to come to a pass at' which
they would never have arrived had we pursued a different

course. Now, I think that neither is this a charge which
can be rightly brought against the Government ; and, on
the contrary, I am ready to maintain that the model ation
and forbearance by which our conduct has been character-
ised are such as to enable us to stand well in the opinion of
the country. (Hear, hear.) If it is said that we have fore-
borne to the last moment, th .t we have exhausted every
means of negotiation, that we have clung to every hope of
terminating the disputes which threatened the peace of
Europe by amicable adjustment, that we have trusted
those who were not deserving of cur trust, that we have
believed assurances which events have shown were untrue,
that we have postponed to the last moment the deci-
sion which it may now appear we must come to,
these are not, in my opinion, charges against the Govern-
ment, but rather as a proof that we have done all in our
power, and up to the latest hour, to avoid war, will in-
duce the country to rally, as one man, round the Govern-
ment, seeing that war, if war comes, is a necessity which
could not be avoided; and to make every sacrifice which
the war, so forced upon us, despite our utmost endeavours
to avert it, must inevitably entail. (Hear, hear.) We
are accused of credulity ; I say, that the despatches in
these volumes justify us in having for a considerable
period reposed confidence in the assertions of the Russian
Government. (Hear, hear.) The right hon. gentleman
has accused my noble friend, the Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, of having misled Parliament, on the 25th of April,
by declaring, at that time, that the Russian Government
asked for nothing but the settlement of the question of the
holy places, whereas, says the right hon. gentleman, at
that very time Prince Menschikoff had left Constantinople,
and the English Government knew perfectly well that he
had been urging a certain treaty on the Porte. What are
the facts ? Prince Menschikoff did not leave Coast .nti-
nople till the 22d of May—(hear, hear)—and, as to the
latest declaration which, on the 25th of April, Lord Claren-
don had received from the Russian authorities, its date
was the 28th of March, on which day, in reply to a ques-
tion from Sir Hamilton Seymour, whether the settlement
of the question as to the holy places would arrange every-
thing between Russia and Turkey, Count Nesselrode with
his own lips assured him that it would—(hoar, hear)- - and
that nothing thereafter would remain to be settled between
the two Powers but some petty points connected with the
Chancery, wholly unimportant, and unconsequential.
(Hear, hear.) That statement was repeated on the 3:lth
of April, when Count Nesselrode declared most positively
to Mr. Hamilton Seymour that the arrangement which
was negotiating at Constantinople contained nothing
beyond that which had been already made known
to the British Minister at St. Petersburgh, and
by the Russian Minister at the Court of St.
James's to the English Government. (Hear, hear,
hear.) Sir, when such positive assertions as these are
made by the Government of a great country like Russia, I
say that the Government to which they are made is enti-
tled to place confidence in them. (Hear, hear.) It is said,
that we heard of military preparations on the part of Rus
sia, and we ought to have inferred from this that some
other demands were on foot. We were told by the Russian
Government itself that such preparations were making
but we were also told by the Russian Government that
their sole object was to counteract the menacing language
which had been used by France, awl that they bore solely
and entirely on the question of the Holy Places. (Hear.)
We were told also, it is quite true, that Russia required
some proof of confidence, as well as some reparation from
Turkey, for offences which sue had committed in connexion
with the changes that had. been made in the question of
the Holy Places, and that the security was to be in the
form of a treaty confirming the Sultan's firmans for the
settlement of that question. But we had never any in-
titnation that any such treaty was to apply tu other mat-
ters. (Hear, bear.) When, therefore, Count Nesselrode
assertel, at a later period, that our Government had known
from the outset what were the whole demands of Russia
upon Turkey, he asserted that—l am bound to say it--
which was utterly at variance with the fact. (Hear.) It
is painful to speak of a Government like Russia in terms of
censure or reprobation, but I am brand to say, on behalf
of the English Government, that the Russian Government,
by itself and its agents, has, throughout these transac-
Cone exhausted every modification of untruth, coi.ccal-
inent, and evasion, and ended with assertions of positive
falsehood. (Hear, hear.) I ask, however, has anything
been lost by the forbearance with which the Government
has conducted this question ? I say, that if in the last
summer a course had been taken by us which would
have brought matters then to the point at which
they now are—if we had found ourselves in June
or July last on the print of a rapture with
Russia—our position would not have been such as it is
now. It may be said, indeed, that the present result
would never have arisen—that Russia would have given
way, if we had shown greater vigour at first. (Hear.) That
is a plausible opinion, and one which is person may be jus-
tified in holding; but, after all, it is but an opinion, and,
had matters taken the course I have assumed, and turned
out wrong—had Russia, instead of submission, urged us on
then to the point at which we now stand—we should have
been justly chargeable with a grave political mistake.
(Hear.) There were a great many reasons why forbear-
ance was desirable. It was of the utmost importance, in a
matter affecting the great interests of Europe, that, though
England and France have been from the outset acting to-
gether, heartily, entirely, and cordially, they should en-
deavorir to obtain also the concurrence of Austria and
Prussia. (Hear, hear.) We know that these two countries
have interests in this matter far more direct than those of
England and France. To Prussia and Austria it is a mat-
ter of vital existence, because, if Russia were either to ap-
propriate any large portion of Turkish territory, or even
to reduce Turkey to the condition of a Sato merely de-
pendent upon Russia, it is manifest—no man can doubt it
who casts a glance at the map of lenrope and looks
at the geographical position of those two Powers with
regard to Russia and Turkey—that such an immense ap-
propriation of geographical power on the part of Russia
must be fatal to the independent action of Austria and
Prussia. (Hear, hear.) Well, it was of great importance
to get these two powers with us as far as it wes possible to
obtain their counsel and advice ; but neither of them could
be expected to risk lightly a rupture with their great and
powerful neighbour. The reasons which might load Prus-
sia not to wish to risk such a rupture—the reasons, I
would rather say, why those who wished well to Prussia
—her well-meaning allies—would not have wished to press
her forward singly, are obvious to any man who looks at
the map of Enron?. Austria, we know, was under great
obligations to Russia. It was natural that she should be
unwillinglo break with Russia as long as it was possible
that matters could be arranged by any amicable adjust-
ment; and if Austria, seeing that England and France
were hurrying matters on, and precipitating a war when
she (Austria) thought that by more forbearance, by her
influence at St. Petersburg, and by diplomacy, negotia-
tions might have been carried on and war avoided, Eng-
land and France, under these circumstances, would not
have been entitled to expect her active co-operation in
the war. (Hear, hear.) It was therefore of great im-
portance to avail ourselves as much as we could of that
influence which Austria possessed, or imagined she pos-
sessed, at the Court of St. Petersburg, and to convince
Austria that we consulted her position as well as our own,
and that we were willing to give every possible oppor-
tunity for an amicable settlement of the difference. if by
any means it could be effected. (Hear.) I believe I am
not overstating the facts when I say that the conduct of
England and of France in this respect has been fully ap-
preciated by Austria and Prussia, and that whereas, if
war had been entered into and carried on in the
course of last summer, we might have had no reason
and right to expect their co-operation—l cannot per-
suade myself but .that, if matters go on to the
point I fear they are likely to go to—the conduct of
Austria and Prussia will be different now to what it would
have been under those different circumstances. (Hear,
hear.) Well, then, I say that the conduct of her Majes-
ty's Government is not blameable either upon the ground
of precipitation or upon the ground of too much forbear.
ance. The house, I think, will agree that the great ob-
ject of preserving peace was one which justified every
possible degree of forbearance short of the sacrifice of those
interests which it was our duty to maintain. But it may
be said, "Is the object, then, for which you are making
the country now to go to war—is the object one of suffi-
cient magnitude to justify the efforts which you require
the country to make ?" I might answer that question by
saying that the opinion of the Government that the object
is worthy of those efforts, is an opinion sharedtby France,
by Austria, and by Prussia—that all these powers have
recognised, in the most solemn and dis.inct manner, that
the independence and integrity of the Tn.kish Empire is
an essential condition for the continuance of the peace of
Europe, that it is an essential element in the balance of
power, and that it would he a calamity to Europe if any
attempt were made to destroy that integrity and inde-
pendence. Why, even Russia, while she is pursuing a
course which is acknowledged by all the Powers except
herself to be fatal to that independence, and that integrity
—even Russia does not venture to deny the principle that
the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire is
an essential element in the condition and welfare of
Europe. Why, Sir, it is manifest that if Russia were
to appropriate to herself those territories, which now
lie under the sway of the Sultan, she would become
a power too vast and too gigantic for the safety of
the other states of Europe. (Hear, hear.) If she were to
bestride the continent from north to south possessing large
naval power both in the Baltic and in the Mediterranean,
enveloping the whole of Germany, commanding regions full
of every natural resource, and a population of enormous
extent, she would become dangerous to the liberties of
Europe, and her power would be fatal to the independence
of other States. (Cheers.) I say, therefore, it is the duty
of the other countries of Europe to prevent such an enor-
mous aggrandisement as that which would result from such
a change of possession. I shall be told, very likely, " Yes,
but Russia don't want any accession of territory ; she don't
pretend or profess to take permanent possession of any ter-
ritory that belongs to the Sultan • she merely holds these
principalities as a maternal pledge for concessions which
she requires to be made—concessions which she says are
essential to her dignity and honour." What the Turkish
Minister replies to that is a true statement of the danger.
He says that it would be better that Turkey should have
a limb cut off than that poison should be slowly but surely
infused into her whole body corporate, which would surely
soon destroy her energies and lay her prostrate at the foot
of her powerful neighbour. (Hear hear.) That which
Russia dem •nded was nothing less than the sovereignty
over 12,000,000 of Turkish subjects, because the power
which was to protect them in all the affairs of life, both
religious and civil, would have been the power to which
those 12,000,000 persons would have looked, audithe Sultan
would have been no longer anything but the nominal ruler
of those subjects. (Hear, hear.) I say, therefore, that that
concession was one which the Sovereign of Turkey wasjus-
tified in refusing, and which every other power—which
England, France, Austria, and Prussia—united to declare
could not be granted without an abandonment of the inde-
pendent sovereignty of the Sultan. (Hear.) Well, I say,
t then, that the object for which we are contending is one
which a due regard for the interests of this country, and
a due regard to the welfare of Europe and • to the
peace of the world, justifies us in contending for. (Cheers.)
We are told, however, that, setting aside the abstract
I principle of preserving the balance of power—which some
' gentlemen profess to treat with great contempt as a matter
wholly undeserving the care and attention of statesmen—
we are told that, setting that aside, there is something in
; the condition of the Turkish empire which makes it utterly
I unworthy of our support, and that, because it is not in such
an advanced state of civilisation as this country, it ought
therefore, to be conquered by Russia, and blotted out as an
' independent nation from the face of Europe. I was asked
by the hon. member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden)
I whether I still maintained the assertion I made last session
that there was hardly any country which bad, in the same
period of time, made such material progress in its internal
arrangements as Turkey has done. Sir, I abide by that
assertion. (Cheers.) I am satisfied that an'y man who looks
into the condition of Turkey now, and compares it with 1
' what it was at the time referred to, will admit the truth
and justice of my assertion. It is quite true that Turkey
now is far behind England and France, but we are not on
this account to forget how much further advanced it is
now than it was in the time of Sultan Mahmoud. Any
man who knows anything of Turkey will know that in re-
spect to internal navigation, in respect'to her army, her
navy, and justice or political administration, great and im-
mense progress has been made since that period. But .

Turkey, forsooth, is not worth defeldirtg, and does not
desire to be defended, because the Christian subjects of
the Sultan are not in ail respects placid upon a footing of
equality with the Mri ',tamer:re. I ielieve that, legally
speaking, the great distinction now latween the two races
is, that the Christians pay the kharaj and are exempt from
conscription. There is also an iequality as to their
evidence in civil cases; but, I belies, in respect to crimi ►
-
nal cases they are now placed uporan equality with the
Mussulmans. But, sir, if the fact if any race in a coun-
try being upon a fo..ting of civil andpolitical inequality is
any justification for considering thaicountry as undeserv-
ing of independent political existene, what would have
been said by th hon. member for be West Riling, if he
had lived not very long ago, when there prevailed that
penal code in Ireland, which placer our Catholic fellow-
subjects on a much worse footing tlan that on which the
Christian subjects of the Porte now stand. (Hear, hear.)
I fancy that in those days, whent,his country produced
many men eminent in all matters ofliterature and science,
they would have been very much suprised if they had been
told that they were a set of barbariane, and deserved to
be conquered by France in order tht the Catholics should
be put upon the same footing asthe Protestants in this
count. (Cheers.) Well, I say hen, that the condition
of the Christians is no reason whtever why, upon great
political grounds, this country and France—ay, and Aus-
tria and Prussia too—should not ombine to maintain the
Turkish empire in its present geogaphical position. I be-
lieve that the internal progress much has commenced in.
Turkey will be continued, and thatho Christian and Mus-
sultnan subjects will be placed a the same footing of
equality. I can assure the houo that it has been the
anxious object of the Governmen to bring about that re-
sult, and not only of the present, but also of former Ad-
ministrations. In the year 1816 when I had the honour
of being Secretary for Foreign' Afairs, immediately upon
assuming the seals of office I sat for Lord Stratford de
Radcliffe, who was then in Englnd, and urged him to re-
turn to Constantinople, assuring bin that there was no
one in whose ability, sagacity, aid knowledge of Turkish
affairs tho Government could taco greater confidence.
Lord Stratford replied that he \valid go upon one condi-
tion,—which.was, that he shout be allowed to exert all
the influence which his positiot as British ambassador
would give him to induce the sltan to proceed with in-
ternal reform, and to place his ciristian and Mussnlman
subjects upon an equal footing. We are now told by some
that our interference in the internal affairs of Turkey is
similar to that of the Russian Givernineut as explained in
the Menschikoff Note; but the treat difference is, that we
interfered only by advice, which he Sultan was at liberty to
refuse or accept, as he thought ft. We demanded no pro-
tectorate over his subjects; we oily counselled him to im-
prove the civil and political coalition of a portion of his
subjects, that they might be bond by closer ties to his
Government, and so become nore useful citizens. Our
interference was very different prom that of Russia, who
demanded a protectorate over sine 12,000,000 of the sub-
jects of the Sultan—so that if ore of them felt himself ag-
grieved he was to repair to St Petersburgh and trust to
the protection of the Emperor of Russia rather than to
the justice of the Sultan. (Thar, hear.) The object we
have at he'irt is one of great importance, and one deserving
that the efforts of the country should be made to attain it.
What, let us consider fur a moment, is the nature of the
adversary we shall have to cope with ? Th,re are two
things equally dangerous in matters of this kind. The one
is to overrate our adversary ; the other is to undervalue
him. To overrate an enemy is dangerous, but I must say
that I think that there never has been a great State whose
power for externalaggression has been more overrated than
Russia. (Hear.) We have seen that Russia is powerful
for defence, and have inferred that she is therefore
powerful for aggression, but the very circumstances
which render her powerful within render her weak with-
out. (Hear) The vast distances which invading armies
Intuit traverse, and the dangers of the march, all operate
against an attacking army; but the same causes operate to
prevent Russia being herself powerful in attack. There
is also a vast difference between an army on paper and the
actual number of men in the field of battle. An army
would be much reduced in one of these long marches from
its original strength. The accounts of the Russian troops
in the principalities estimated them at a very large amount,
but it seems that the 'Russians never had any very con-
siderable force there, and that is proved by the fact that in
all the encounters which have taken place they have had
the worst ; and the endeavour to force the passage of the
Danube never has succeeded. We have seen, on tha other
hand, that the Turks have shown is vitality which they
were not believed to possess, and what the Russians call
their fanaticism we ehoubl call a public spirit of patriot-
ism which leads them to defend their Sovereign and their
country. (Hear.) As an instance of this spirit, I may men-
tion that in one district, where the contingent required for
the army was 1,000 men, on the day of muster 4,000 men
appeared, and the 3,000 who were disappointed said that
if the Government would accept their services they would
ask for nothing in return but rations and arms, and they
would supply themselves with clothes. The Turkish forces
may be deficient in officers, but is evident that Omnar Pasha
has conducted the campaign in a manner which evinces
great military talent. (Hear.) My opinion is that any
one great Power like England or France, possessing
such naval and military resources, could, if it took up
the cause of Turkey, bring the quarrel to a success-
ful issue ; but when those two countries combined take
np the cause, I- maintain that the chance of the
Emperor of Russia is entirely desperate. (Hear, hear.)
We are entitled to expect that, if the war should continue,
Austria and Prussia will not remain passive spectators.
They will feel it due to themselves to take some part in the
contest, for, if they do not, Austria must have indeed for-
gotten all her established policy, and must be ignorant of
all her own interests ; and the same is the case with Prus-
sia,. I therefore say that, with England and France acting
as supporters of Turkey, with the opinion of the whole of
Europe opposed to the Emperor of Russia, who will have
not a single ally to support him in his career of injustice,
I have no doubt as to what may be the result. (Rear.) It
is a noble sight to see England and France, two countries
which have long been in rivalry with each other, united in
a course of action—(cheers)—bound be. a reciprocal engage-
ment to seek no territorial advantage to themselves, but
standing forth in the defence, not of their own interest and
welfare alone, but in behalf of the interests of Europe. It
is a worthy sight to see those fleets and armies which have
hitherto met in downy contest ranged side by side in per-
fect amity, not armed for the purpose of conquest, but
armed in a noble and generous cause to defend right against
might. (Hear, hear.) lam willing to lay the case of the
Government before the country and before Parliament,
convinced that the peer .le of this country will be satisfied
that we have not recklessly and without cause involved
' them in a war of which Ido not wish to underrate the con
sequences, but which I think will be a very different war
from all others in which this country has ever been involved.
I feel no hesitation in applying to the country for assistance
to enable us to carry on with vigour the contest in which
we may be engaged ; aryl I say that if it be the opinion of
the people of this country or of Parliament that we have
shown weakness and credulity or the infamy of connivance,
let them take the conduct of the war from the hands of a
Government incompetent to carry it on, and place it in the
hands of those in whose ability, judgment, and sagacity
they can place greater reliance. (Cheer,.)
Col. SIBTHORP declared that he had no confidence in
the Government, and placed no reliance on France or Aus-
tria. He hoped this country would not be humbugged,
but would rely on its own resources ; and he, as an humble
individual, holding the position of colonel in the militia,
would be ready to give the Executive all the assistance in
his power in prosecuting the war. (Hear, and laughter.)
The house then resolved into Committee of Supply.
On the motion of Mr.WILSON, 16,024,100/. wee voted
to defray the charge for outstanding Exchequer-bills.