The Sun.
London, England, 1854-11-15 00:00:00

THE EFFORTS OF THE AUTOCRAT.

(From the Journal des Debuts.)
The despatch of General Caurobert proves that the
Russians are making the most desperate efforts to save
Sebastopol. The disposable reserves have at last arrived
from .the banks of the Danube, the Dniester, and the
Don, and with these troops the Czar sends two of his
sons to raise the courage of the garrison. The trenches
of the besiegers had advanced to within half musket shot
of the place ; the breaching-batteries were constructed
and armed ' • two of the principal batteries of the town
were already breached by the English and French
guns ; and it was announced that the assault could
be given on November 5. It was on that very day
that at the same time on two points of the line of
investment, the Russian army made with all its
forces a formidable attack, which might have been
attended with disastrous consequences, if it had not
been repulsed with the most valiant energy. The de-
spatch of General Canrobert, which could not at the first
moment enter into the details of the affair, allows us,
however, to form an idea of the battle in its ensemble,
and, above all, to appreciate its result. The plan of
attack of the Russians may be considered to be this.
In the affair of Oct. 25, at Balaklava, where General
Liprandi was beaten, notwithstanding the c ipture of
three redoubts, and in spite of the lasses undergone by
the English cavalry in a charge of too hazardous a cha-
racter, that general had perceived the impossibility
of forcing •on that point the redoubts and the line
of circumvallation of the Allies, the escarpment of
which was almost every where unapproachable.
The Russian generals, in attacking on November 5
with very superior forces the English army on its right,
close to the river Chernaya, seem to have been anxious to
force the line of siege, and to get between that line and
that of circumvallation, in order to fall on Balaklava.
If that manceuvre had succeeded, the Russian army would
have taken on the rear both the trenches and the posi-
tions on which the exterior redoubts of defence are
placed. At the same time that the English troops were
vigorously attacked by the Russian army of reinforce-
ment, the special garrison of Sebastopol executed agrand
sortie against the French trencheii. It is easy to per-
ceive all the cot ssquences that might have resulted from
so serious an attack, when made by very considerable
forces, and as ably combined as it appears to have been.
Fortunately the English army, although not very
numerous, supported on the right this formidable at-
tack with the impassable firmness which characterises it,
and the French troops had time to come and reinforce
their Allies, whilst the sortie of the garrison was vigor-
ously repulsed on the left by the French in their trenches.
The battle lasted all day, and was of a stubborn cha-
racter, says the despatch. It adds that the Russians
have lost from 8,000 to 10,000 men, comprising the
1,000 men of the garrison.- So large a loss can only be
explained by the extraordinary desperation of the enemy,
and by a resistance not less remarkable on the part of
the Allies. The Russian generals are in the habit of not
sparing_ their men and of sacrificing them by masses in
order to obtain the result which they aim at. It is not
astonishing that in order to gain these points they should
have had a vast number of men killed in their desperate
efforts. Our losses must also have been rather great.
In this double attack of the Russians against the line
of siege, they must have momentarily found them-
selves masters en some points of a part of the trenches
and of some batteries. Prince Menschikoff, in a des-
patch on this affair, states that the guns were spiked in
' an English battery and in a French one. His despatch
is terminated by a remarkable circumstance which Gen.
Catirobert does not mention. According to Prince
Menschikoff, the Allies, in pursuing the Russians, deli-
vered an assault which did not succeed. That result was
without doubt the consequence of the impetuosity of our
victorious troops who dashed at some point where the
breaches were not very practicable. But that very cir-
cumstance proves. in a most marked manner that the
Russian army was vigorously repulsed. The Alma, Ba-
laklava, and the battle of Nov. 5 demonstrate the incon-
testable superiority of the Allies over the Russian troops,
whom they have three times beaten although having the
advantage of number.

THE DESPATCHES FROM TIE CRIMEA

(From the Constitutionnel.)

A report addressed to the Minister of War by General
Canrobert, announcing, under date of the 6th, that the
siege of Sebastopol was continuing regulariy, proves
how ill informed were the journals which, on the faith
of a despatch without date, believed that the assault
might be given on the 4th. This despatch was
sufficiently convicted of falsehood by the fact that
the- construction of the first breaching batteries were
only commenced on the 6th, and that the time neces-
sary for their complete termination was estimated at
ten days, It was absolutely impossible that in three
days the Allies could have constructed and armed all
their third lines of batteries, and made a sufficient breach
to permit the assault to be made. Was it, besides,
reasonable to suppose that Prince Menschikoff, after
having marched the greater part of his forces to the
valley of Chernaya, would leave them inactive ; would
thus have deprived Sebastopol of a portion of its defend.
ers, and have awaited the assault in the town, without
endeavouring to turn to account the position occupied
by General Liprandi on the right and the rear of the
Allied army ? Was it not evident that so long as be
might have a division to bring into a line, Prince Men-
eichikoff would multiply attacks in order to delay the
day on which the place could be reduced to its own
furces ? The possibility then of an assault being made
by the Allies was necessarily to he purchased at the
price of a battle. This battle took place on the stb,
and a summary- report of it has been addressed to
the Minister of War. To understand what took place
on the sth, we must call to mind the combats of the
25th and 26th ult. The table land of which Sebastopol
is the extreme point, and on which the Allies are en
camped, is bounded on the east by the valley of the
Chernaya, and on the south by a ravine which goes to
Ealaklava. At the point at which this ravine detaches
itself from the valley of the Chernaya, and at the ex-
tremity of two lines of heights which run parallel to it,
but are separated from it by a deep descent, were four
redoubts, two to the north and two to the south. It
was those redoubts which General Liprandi took on the
25th. The two redoubts to the north of the ravine, which
dominated the road from the sea to the Allied camp,
and the possession of which was important to the
security of the attack, were retaken by the English,
supported by the division of General Bosquet. To re-
capture the other two, it would have bean necessary to
descend the ravine which they command, and to
ascend a steep bill under a plunging fire of the enemy.
This would have,caused a useless sacrifice of many men.
In fact, the cceupation by the Allies of the two north-
ern redoubts completely paralysed the success obtained
by General Liprandi. This general, to attack the posi-
tion of the Allies, would have had to surmount the same
obstacles, and the same difficulties of ground, as those
which checked the Allies. The troops on both sides,
therefore, contented themselves with occupying the
heights, and with observing each other from both
sides of the ravine. It was evident that the one of
the two corps which should take the offensive and
descend into the ravine would exchange an assured
position for a perilous attack, and 'would expose
itself to enormous losses, if not to a check. The Allies,
therefore, had rio motive to abandon their inaction,
which was in no tvay injurious to the works of the siege;
every day passed without combat was so much advance
made towards the fall of Sebastopol. The interest of the
Russians was to attack, as that of the Allies was to wait.
The necessity of attempting to strike a great blow, to
save the place, appears then to have caused the Russians
to attack the formidable position occupied by the corps
of observation. Their principal effort was naturally
made against the English army, which they could at-
tack both at the top and bottom of its lines. What
took place on the sth was a renewal of the affair of the
26th ult. Whilst the corps of Liprandi attacked in
front the heights defended by the reserves of the Eng
lish, a sortie was directed from the place against the
English batteries; Prince Menschikoff and Gen. Liprandi
again endeavoured to give each other the hand across
Use enemy's lines. At the same time, to occupy the
French, and to prevent them from going to the relief of
the English army, another took place at the opposite
extremity of Sebastopol, in such a way as to menace our
most distant batteries, our communications with Cape
Chersonesus, and our depots of ammunition. These
three attacks, which rendered necessary a considerable
display of force, were made by the Russians with great
vigour, as is proved by the losses sustained by the allies ;
but it may be said that they formed the supreme effort
of the defence. The very obstinacy of the conflict
proves the decisive importance which Prince Menschi-
koff attached to the result of it. This result is quite in
faveur of the Allies. That, in the commencement of a
furious attack soldiers of Elite should have reached our
batteries, and have spiked some cannon, need occasion
no surprise. In the affair of the 25th, the English
hussars, at least 800 in number, passed right through
the Russian army, without any other result than a check
heroically sought for. It is not the less true that the
two sorties were driven back into Sebastopol, and the
corps of Liprandi was driven to the other side of the
ravine, which it had attempted to cross. The Russians
then found themselves on the 6th in the positions which
they occupied on the previous euening, after having ex-
hausted in a fruitless struggle their best soldiers, the
prestige of the presence of two Grand Dukes, and the
morale of their army.

THE REVENUES OF RUSSIA.

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A letter from St. Petersburg, in the Cologne
Gazette, says :
" The deficit in the State' revenues, and particularly
in the customs, since the commencement of the war, is
very considerable ; the Government, however, will not
allow a word to be published on the subject, nor of the
great efforts which the country is making for carrying
on the war. • Outwardly, the greatest satisfaction is
apparent ; but any one who can see behind the scenes is
forced to perceived that the truth is very different. When,
in circles, interested in the matter, it is related what
has been done for the families of the persons killed
in the war, in private it is remarked that all that would
nob have been necessary had Russia given up her plans
of conquest -and directed her attention to interior im-
provements. That was, in particular, said when it was
known that the Emperor had given 5,000 silver roubles
to the widow of Admiral Kornitoff, that her sons were
received into the corps of pages, and that a grand monu-
ment was to be erected to the deceased on a bastion to
which his name was to be given."
The Lloyd of Vienna of the 9th, says.:—" The
Russian Ambassador, Prince Gortschakoff, has had
an audience of the Archduke Albert. According
to present arrangements, Baron do Hess will leave
the capital in the middle of this month for his
head-quarters."