The Sun.
London, England, 1854-05-03 00:00:00

CONDUCT OF THE WAR BY THE ALLIED
TROOPS.

There are grand. principles in the conduct of a
war (writes the correspondent of a contemporary),
upon which all the most eminent authorities have
hitherto been agreed. One of these principles is
never to act upon the defensive until the aggressive
has been tried and failed. In other words, to re-
serve the advantages of time, place, and instru-
ments of attack, rather than to offer them to the
enemy, and thus to maintain the moral influence
which an offensive campaign, conducted with
energy, exercises over the troops engaged in it,
which is of a precisely opposite character to that
experienced by the enemy, so that what is gained
by the one is so much directly subtracted from the
other. The same rules which have governed other
wars are surely in this case susceptible of application
more than usually rigid. The whole question to be
solved, then, is how the allied powers may most
speedily and satisfactorily terminate this war ; and it
is important to consider whether they can expect to
brin gab o Ili this result by concentrating their armies in
the immediate neighbourhood of Constantinople,
and constructing lines of defence at Gallipoli or
Bouzouk Tehekmedje, for to these objects opera-
tions seem at present to be directed. The forma-
tion of a permanent camp in the vicinity of Con-
stantinople must have a most depressing effect upon
the inhabitants, who will be led to infer, from the
position of our army, that a moral conviction exists
in this country that sooner or later their capital is
to be invested by Russian troops, while the proxi-
mity of so large a garrison of Christian soldiers
must have a most paralysing effect upon the autho-
rity of the Turkish Government ; but, after all,
the consideration of most consequence to us is,
will our army there be in the best position to meet
the Muscovite hosts, flushed with victory, and
within sight of the long-coveted dome of St. Sophia?
So far as we, the ignorant public, can judge of the
use of the lines at Gallipoli, their principal object
seems to be to protect the embarkation of our
troops after they have been utterly routed, and
the Russians are in possession of Constantinople.
The fortification of such a port is doubtless an ope-
ration of the utmost importance, though it does
not seem the most brilliant opening of the cam-
paign. At the same time it is worthy of remark
that no analogy can be drawn between the lines at
Gallipoli and those of Torres Vedras, for as yet our
army has not suffered a Corunna. Instead of
forming a base of operations which presupposes de-
feat; our hope of success seems to lie in the adop-
tion of a more vigorous and spirited policy, and we
may render substantial assistance to our allies by
the immediate conveyance of our troops to the seat
of war, or by the invasion of those southern pro-
vinces of the Russian Empire whose unprotected
coasts and disaffected populations invite such an en-
ter prise . Of the importance of such a movement in
a strategetical point of view there cannot be much
doubt; but, if it is contemplated at all, delay will in.-
conceivably enhance its difficulty. So long as the
centre of the Turkish line upon the Danube remains
unbroken, and the coast of the Dobrudscha is threat-
ened by our fleets, the position of the Russian army
in that peninsula must be eminently critical.
I Whether it may be more expedient to support Omer
Pacha at Shumla than to attack the Russian army
of occupation, is a question for military, authorities
to decide. In either case it is to be hoped that,
with our present naval resources, the idea has never
been entertained of marching any portion of the
army across the Balkan, and that no more troops
are likely to follow that detachment which has
already been ordered to Adrianople. That army
which has been sent out to defy the colossal power
of Russia are surely not to be employed any longer
in duties •which ought to be undertaken by an army
of reserve. Landed either at Varna or at Odessa
they would be more useful than at Gallipoli
or Scutari, and it would be wiser to strike
L a blow either in front or in flank than to
confine ourselves to preparations of defence or
retreat. A vast deal of energy and money has
been expended in vain if the end and object
contemplated by our expeditionary army was the
protection of Constantinople. By confining the
operations of our army to the south of the Balkan,
we shall dishearten the Turkish forces, who are
anxiously expecting their arrival, and encourage
their adversaries, who will assume fresh confidence
as they gain both time and men. The power of
the one for resistance will thus become diminished
in proportion as the resources of the other for
attack are increased ; the patience of our own
troops will be worn out when they find that they
have to contend only with the hardships inciden-
. tal to an ill-organised commissarist instead of the
enemy they long to meet. The disaffected popula-
tions of Russia will sink into apathy and despair'
as the prospect of freedom becomes fartherremoved.
than ever, and the means of attack which the in-
ternal weakness of Russia affords are neglected ;
the public at home will at last discover that the
object of the war for which they have been se*
heavily taxed will never be gained, and the Em-
peror Nicholas will have reason to congratulate
himself not only on having succeeded in those
schemes of aggression which he at present enter-
tains, but on having destroyed the prestige which-
attaches to the expeditionary army, and which is
now doubly enhanced. by an alliance which should.
prove irresistible.