The Sun.
London, England, 1854-10-04 00:00:00

(From, the Journal des Debats.)

The capture of Sebastopol, with the fleet and all the war
materiel, which would be a result really prodigious by its
rapidity, is only thus far announced to us by private tele,
graph. We had hoped during all the day to hear the
thundering of cannon, announcing officially this great vic-
tory, but the cannon was silent. We must therefore wait
before accepting the news as officially certain. We take
pleasure in believing, however, that it is correct—calling
to mind that the first news of the disembarkation in the
Crimea was also given by the private telegraph. We will,
however, examine the probabilities of this great fact by
the discussion of dates and places. On the 20th of Sept.
the allied army met the Russian army, 50,000 strong, on
the banks of the Alma. The Russian forces were driven
back at the point of the bayonet, and vigorously pursued.
It appears that the enthusiasm and the ardour of the allied
troops gave them an irresistible impetuosity, which struck
the Russian soldiers with stupor, and broke down the
tenacity which has heretofore characterised them on the
field of battle. After this victory the combined army must
probably have found itself, on the 22d, before the forts which
protect the northern sk9rp of the roadstead, in face of the

elate tlie time Which the operations against these forts must
have taken, we must first of all dodnct at least four days be-
tween the date of the 22d and that of the 30th, for the
conveyance of the news by sea and by laud from Sebastopol
to Cronstadt, in Transylvania, or to Belgrade in Servia—
points at which the electric line commences, which line is
continued without interruption by Vienna to Paris. These
four days for the transmission of despatches being deducted,
we arrive at the conclusion that the surrender of Sebas-
topol took place on the 25th, and that the army, arrived
on the 22d, obtained this immense result in three days.
There is, however, something incomprehensible in that.
The forts which had to be taken, although much less
formidable on the land side than towards the sea, must
have been constructed with sufficient solidity to require a
siege, as Bomarsund did, which was also attacked on the
land side. At Bomarsund it was necessary to disembark
the siege artillery. Now, we do not think that our armies
of Sebastopol could in so short a time disembark their
heavy artillery—an operation which is always lung and
laborious. Even if they could at the beginning have
employed some heavy pieces, it appears perfectly extra-
ordinary that they had the time in three days to dig
the necessary intrenchmonts, to construct batteries, and
lastly to reduce the citadel on the north and the four great
forts which protect the northern shore of the roadstead.
Nevertheless, we desire to believe the reality of a fact which
is announced from so many different sources. We are
only now endeavouring to explain to ourselves tke un-
hoped-for promptitude of this magnificent result. In the
opinion, only one hypothesis can explain it ; that of a pro-
found discouragement having seized the Russian soldiers
after their defeat on the Alma and some reverse not less
sanguinary which they had to sustain on the Belbek, or in
some other position in the environs of Sebastopol. A very
remarkable circumstance mentioned in the despatches
gives some reason to believe in this demoralisation of the
Russian soldiers ; it is that they preferred to remain pri-
soners of war to accepting the free sortie offered them. We
can scarcely think that the Russian generals and officers
were stricken with the same panic and the same demorali-
sation; and we must therefore suppose that they were not
masters of their men. Perhaps it was the same as at Bo-
marsund, where a part of the garrison seems to have con-
sidered as a sort of deliverance the capitulation which
General Bodisco was constrained to sign without waiting
for an assault. Without the moral depression, and, per-
haps, without the discontent which, no doubt, troubled
the minds of the garrison of Sebastopol, not only would
tue Russian generals have prolonged the defence, but at
the moment at which they would have been forced to
yield, have burnt their fleet and their storehouses, their
arsenals, and even the town, as it is asserted they had
orders to do. Such are the appreciations which we have
thought right to make' of the despatches of the private
telegraph. We now wait with all Paris until the cannon
shall announce to us the confirmation of this great exploit,
the rapidity and the perfectly extraordinary circumstances
of which cannot fail to exercise an immense influence on
the future."