The Sun.
London, England, 1854-07-03 00:00:00

THE AUSTRIAN OCCUPATION.

-
And so we are to have another "occupation." In
answer to questions from Lord Dudley Stuart and Sir
Henrysta
tNeVdi
thatllougah
cboynovne
nTt
ihounrisda
iady
bneiegnh
concludedt, Lo
betweenßus-
sell
Austria and the Porte, to which France and England
were no parties, for the occupation of the Danubian
Principalities by Austrian troops, on the departure,
whether voluntarily or by force, of the Russians.
Every one is amazed by this announcement ; what to
make of it nobody knows. One thing only is quite clear,
and universally understood, namely; that Austria has quite
as much of the monomania of occupying as Russia.
That has been manifest from the first. Ever since the
commencement of the quarrel the Emperor Francis Joseph
has had but one wish, but one prayer. "Do let me
occupy," has been his continual cry. Now it was Mon-
tenegro ; then it was Albania, or Bosnia, or Servia ;
and never has some kind of reason or excuse been absent.
And here, at last, when there remains no longer the
shadow of a pretext for going to fatten on any of these
poor people, Austrian must fain take possession of the
Principalities. The Turks have fought for them, have
spent blood and treasure to recover them, have done deeds
of unexampled valuur, and have fairly beaten the Rus-
sians. But the Turks are not to enjoy the fruits of vic-
tory. They are not to pursue the Russians, or to feed
on Wallachian rations. It would be too outrageous to
have them gall the kibe of the retreating Russians. It
would be too dangerous to give the opportunity
to England and France. So the Austrians kindly offer
to " occupy." The Times told us the other day that the
Austrian army in Gallicia and the Bukowina is so strai-
tened for provision that it cannot keep within its terri-
tory or find provision there. Well, then, we suppose
that it must " occupy" in order to live. We can add
that in Gallicia the peasantry are now dying by hun-
dreds of ittarvation. And just as Wallachia and Moldavia
were congratulating themselves on getting rid of the
hungry Russian, and on havine. A friendlier visit from
their liberators, the French and the English, who would
at least pay for what they might- consume, to they are
informed that such cannot be the case. They have fed
the Russian, and now they must feed the hungrier Aus-
trian. Why ? They may well ask, why ? If English,
French, and Turkish armies advanced to the Pruth, as
they ought, what need of any occupation of the Princi-
palities ? Is it feared that they will be too liberal, that
Prince Ghika or Prince Stirbey would he too indepen-
dent ? _ _

Really this ambition to prey upon one's neighbours,
yet not to fight for them, of which Austria offers such
notable example, is too bad. The Austrian army might
have long since put an end to Russian aggression. It
might have advanced and fought; and had it done so, no
one would have objected to its occupying the camp and
cities that the Russians had vacated. But to run no
risk, to go to none of the expense and sacrifice of Eng-
land and France, and yet to bag the game, is most un-
fair, as well as most preposterous.
We write on the presumption that this new occupa-
tion will be solely in the interest of Austria, and that it
cannot be for the interest of any other power, except
indeed Russia herself. In this we shall be very glad to
find ourselves mistaken. The alleged motives or rea-
sons are as yet a mystery, no doubt, but the effect aimed
at we cannot help suspecting. At the moment when the
allied armies should have been advancing, Austria moves
to intercept them. According to Austrian notions, the
retreat of the Russians behind the Pruth terminates the
war, and, the war
y for pursuing
need
gedeltirng closer toe England,
France,
the enemy ? The allies were welcome to take the
vanguard, as long as
there was risk but as soon as
risk is at an end, Austria steps in to cover Russia, and
,
intervene between her and her victorious foes. It is said
that Austria occupies the Principalities in order that the
French and English may attack Sebastopol. But if
they desired to attack Sebastopol, why
did they not
land at once in the Crimea instead of loitering at Galli-
poli, and at Scutari ? They certainly were not prevented
from striking this decisive blow by their haste to reach
Silistria, where they will probably not arrive in time to
do n
army th e land
can fide.
b e for Bythe
see the rear guard of the retreating Russian army. It
is notorious thnt Sebastopol was, up to the time when
the movement on Varna took place, open to a coup de
main
united
disembarked, preparations will probably be made for
the
fourth time, e , however,
timeeba r
k thatedthe
andun
their reception in the Crimea, and we shall be told that
nothing more can be done this year.
However, Austria prevents in any case an occupation
by the allies, and this was motive enough for the step
she has taken. There has been no greater fear at
Vienna, all along, than that the Western armies, and
the world of ideas which are supposed to accompany
them, if carried bodily into the Principalities, would do
there what the British troops are suspected of having
done in Spain, inoculate the country with the poison of
liberalism. One hundred thousand Anglo-French in the
Principalities has been a vision scaring the wits of
Viennese statesmen. The plague might spread over the
Austrian dominions, and certainly Hungary would be-
come intolerable. What if such a force, really desirous
of humbling the power of Russia, were to penetrate into
the Polish provinces, which are far more easily reached
from the Danube and the Pruth than is generally
imagined? Why, if they were to approach Gal-
licia and the Polish provinces, there would be an
end of the present 'state of things in the East-
ern part of Europe ! Such we believe to be the
fears of Austria, and they help to explain her tortuous
policy ; but to what extent the allies have admitted
weight to the one, or extended toleration to the other,
is the riddle waiting explanation.
Lord John Russell says that England and France are
no parties to the convention, but it is hardly conceiv-
able that it should have been entered into without their
permission. Turkey bad placed herself in their hands,
and this position was incompatible with any separate
or independent arrangement of which the effect might
be to transfer the arbitrament of peace to another
power, which had borne no part of the burdens of
war. The terms of the convention, that Austria
was to drive out the Russians in case they refused to
retire, would imply that it rested on a basis of service
to the allies, and of hostility to Russia, which there is
no proof as yet that Austria has had any active intention
of rendering. If the condition has not been fulfilled,
will the convention be permitted to operate ? Is not
Austria, even at this eleventh hour, in a position to turn
against us, and are we to strengthen her hands for that
purpose, and embarrass our own future movements in
the east, by consenting to give effect to a treaty which
only makes her more powerful in an interest opposed to
our own ?
Already the inconveniences of an " alliance" so extra-
ordinary and incomprehensible as this between Austria
and the Western Powers are becoming apparent. But
for the position of Austria we should hardly have had
the vehement advice which has lately been addressed
to us, to_eoncentrate our forces and direct them against
Sebastopol, since there is nothing to be gained by
invading the southern provinces of Russia. It would
be excellent advice, no doubt, if the allies could at
onco have moved their armies, if the siege artillery and
preparations could have been extended instanter, and
thrown upon the Crimea in a week. But we well know
what time such movements take, even to venture upon,
far less to execute. We also know how impossible is
anything like secrecy in the present age. Indeed, whe-
ther secrecy were observed or not, the Russians must
know that if we avoid to pass the Danube, we can have
' no other aim or design than to take Sebastopol. But