The Sun.
London, England, 1854-05-06 00:00:00

were actii Ig, under the instructions which had been sent
to them ; an 4it tie Russian vessels had not, acting on
a knowled I-) of those instructions, retreated into a Rus-

sary to make this statement, because the veracity of
what he stated the other evening had een called in
question, and he wished, in conclusion, to ask his noble
friend (Lord Clarendon) whether he had received any
further report upon this subject ?
The Earl of CL ARENDON—My lords, in respect to
the question with which my noble friend concluded his
speech, I have to say that the Government has had no
further reports with respect to this operation laid
before them. I have certainly listened, perhaps not
with surprise but with some regret, to the speech of
my noble friend who has just sat down, for though
at the termination of his speech he did make a charge
against the Government, the whole of his speech was
in fact a charge against the naval officers. (Hear,
hear.) I am sorry to find that my noble friend still
insists upon proving the veracity and correctness
of the Russian general—l suppose, founding himself
upon the veracity and correctness that have distin-
guished the Russian statements for the last six or seven
months—(hear, hear)—but I am happy to think that all
those persons with whom I have communicated since
this despatch was laid upon the table do not share the
opinions of the noble marquis, and do not think that the
peculiar duty with which these officers were charged
was performed hi that slack, and, I must say, that
cowardly manner, in which he charges them with having
acted. The duty which these officers were called upon
to perform was not to go and prevent any military ope-
rations, of which nothing was known, as the noble mar-
quis would have you to understand, They were simply
sent to make a reconnoissance. They were narrowly to
observe the Russian line of forts along the coast of
Georgia, Circassia, and Crimea, and the approaches by
sea and land. My lords, that was a very proper instruc-
tion to give, and a very proper precaution to take, before
war was declared ; but when the admirals were expect-
ing it to be declared, it would have been monstrously
improper if any act of hostility had been committed by
our fleets until war was declared. This report of the ope-
ration is datedthel6th of March, and it is founded upon
an instruction of Admiral Dundas, dated the Bth of
March, at which time he could have bad no news from
England later than the end of February. Knowing, as
they must have done, what were the state of the rela-
tions between this country and Russia, and ignorant,
as they must have been, of whether the differences
between Russia and the Porte were not at that
moment capable of being settled, it would have been
most unpardonable if the commanders of these vessels
had gone beyond their instructions. (Hear, hear.) My
noble friend cheers. What were these instructions ?
These instructions have been laid before Parliament be-
cause they were communicated to the Russian Govern-
ment, and they were that we intended to have complete
mastery of the Black Sea, and that if any Russian ships
of war were met cruising in that sea they were to be
required to return to the nearest Russian port. It was
under these instructions of December that Captain Jones
acted, and it appears that the Russian naval officers
were perfectly aware that he was acting under these in-
structions, because your lordships will observe that the
moment they saw the French and English vessels they
set off for port, and one of them, having in tow a trans-
port in which were troops, cut it adrift in order to get
out of the way of the vessels of war. My noble friend
(Lord Clanricarde) quotes the St. Petersburg Journal,
and says that 5,000 effective troops have been removed,
and he then tells us the great service that these 5,000
troops will perform when they are carried to Sebastopol,
and what 2,800 did in an island in the Mediterranean.
But the first proof he gives of the confidence he has in the
journal which he quotes, and upon which he asks your
lordships to reply—(no, no) —is to divide the number
mentioned by one-half. He says 5,000 first-rate troops
are brought away, and will do infinite mischief, and then
proposes that, to allow for exaggeration, we should take
the number at 2,500, and argues about the great mis-
chief which they can do. I should be disposed to dimi-
nish the number much more, because all that I see is a
mention of 300 men and 150 men. These are all the
troops which we hear of being brought away from these
fortresses. Then, with respect to the ships. It is true
they had each four 681 b. cannonades, one on each broad-
side forward, and one abaft. My noble friend says they
cleared for action. What does Captain Jones say ?
" They were in great confusion, and, had it been our
intention to attack them, very assailable." I have not
the least doubt that the Sampson, which had on board
six heavy guns and 200 men, assisted by a French fri-
gate of about the same force, could with the utmost
facility have sunk all the ships ; but they abstained from
doing it, because they were obeying their instructions.
(Hear, hear.) And because those restrictions did not
permit them, nor was it likely they would permit them,
to commit acts of hostility against Russia before war was
declared. My noble friend would have had us, during
the last six weeks of the negotiation, without giving
notice to Russia of being at war with her, commit acts
of hostility against her. Now, my lords, I have not the
least doubt that Captain Jones and the gallant French
officer who was with him, and entirely approved of and
agreed with him in all he did, made great sacrifices of
their feelings. I believe they felt they were foregoing a
great advantage which they might easily have effected. I
have no doubt it would have been more agreeable to them
and perhaps to the public, who do not reason very closely
on such matters, to have sunk these ships. But, my lords,
such an advantage would have been gained at a cost which
I hope we shall never incur—at the cost ofdishonour— and
wouldhave given to the Emperor of Russia an advantage
which—whatever other advantage my noble friend may
attribute to him—l hope he will never enjoy, that of
having us clearly and distinctly in the wrong. My
noble friend seems to think I speak too lightly of these
vessels. I beg my noble friend and your lordships to
believe that I am not in the habit of making to this
house any statements for which I do not conceive that I
have sufficient authority. There were ono or two mat-
ters, not mentioned in Admiral Dundas's despatch, to
which I adverted in the few remarks that fell from me
the other evening, which were gathered from a private
letter from the admiral. I have obtained the permission
of my right hon. friend the head of the Admiralty (Sir
James Graham) to read a portion of that letter, in order
to justify what I then said. The letter states :—" He
(Captain Jones) was most opportunely on the Circassian
coast at the moment of the destruction of several forts of
the Russians. The Circassians had possession of the
coast, and were plundering the ruins of the fortresses—
a matter most important for us to know before war was
declared. Captain Brock and several officers landed,
and were cordially welcomed by the Circassians, who
told them that all the forts were destroyed, or were to
be so, except one." Your lordships will observe that
this was the first time that we had been in direct com-
munication with the Circassians—also a most important
point. " Captain Jones had a great deal to do with the
Russian transport, but I consider he acted strictly ac-
cording to the order we have received, ordering all ships
to return to the nearest port."
The Marquis of CLANRICARDE—What port?
Tile Earl of CLARENDON—Then, with respect to
the picked troops, on whose services my noble friend
seems to place so much reliance, in consequence of
what he gathers front that authentic source, the St.
Petersburg Journal, these people who are inured to
hardships, and whose services will therefore be so
valuable, Admiral Dundas says :—" I understand all
the soldiers on board the vessel belonged to different
regiments, which was observed by the numbers on their
caps. This corroborates a statement made by one of
the pilots, that the forts were manned by soldiers con-
demned to punishment. (Laughter.) There is now no
longer any communication by land from the north to
the south of Circassia, and supplies to Russian forts must
be got by sea, or where the inhabitants are friendly by
land. I apprehend the Russians would not have taken
this singular step if it had been pos,ible to retain pos-
session of the forts, which I find were of stone, erected
at great expense, and entirely supported by sea com-
munications. The six steamers were packets from
Odessa to Constantinople, and one of them was the
vessel Mr. Elcock the engineer was in." I think, then
that I was justified in stating that they were post-
office packets. (Hear, hear.) But my noble friend
seems to think that we have fulfilled no engagement we
held out to this country and to the Emperor of Russia,
when we said we intended to be masters of the
Black Sea, My lords, that engagement I consider to
have been most fully carried out. (Hear, hear.) It
may not have been so according to the view of my noble
friend, that the whole fleet ought to have been cruising in
the Black Sea during the whole of the winter ; but had
it done so, I am sure that he would have been the first
to have brought under your lordships notice—and very
properly so—the disabled state in which that fleet would
have been at the moment when it was most required for
effective service. I say that, to all intents and purposes,
we have carried out our declaration, and have remained
masters of the Black Sea. The great object which we
had was to enable the Turkish Government to convey
troops and stores to its Asiatiopossessions. Every time
the Turkish Government desired to do this, it has been
enabled by her Majesty's fleet to do so. Before these
instructions reached Constantinople, Lord Stratford had
informed us that the Turkish fleet was entirely locked up
in the Bosphorus, that it could not convey troops and
stores to the places where they were required, and that
without the aid of the allied fleets they must remain in
that helpless condition. My lords, troops and stores
have been conveyed to every portion of the Asiatic pos-
sessions of the Sultan ; and no ships have to our know-
ledge come out of Sebastopol. It is perfectly true these
—I may call them small vessels—these six packets did
come out from Sebastopol, and were employed in help-
ing to burn and destroy certain forts, and to bring away
certain men who, although they were so strong and so
fearless of the British officers as my noble friend stated,
were embarked at midnight. Anybody who knows the na-
ture of the Black Sea, who knows the situation of Sebasto-
pol, and the prodigous advantages which the Russians in
consequence enjoy, and who knows that the allied fleets
have to overlook and defend 900 miles of coast during a
winter of more than usual severity—a severity which, by
the last accounts, is by no means over, for one of the
severest days of the whole year was Good Friday last—
and who knows the difficulty of that service—l am sure
any naval man would be of opinion that it is impos-
sible to prevent a ship or two slipping out at some time
or other and slipping back again. (Hear, hear.) But to
say that that in any way nullifies our assurance, or that
we remain one bit the less masters of the Black Sea, or
capable of carrying out the intention we announced, is,
I say, a mere mockery of the house. Having said thus
much, I really must re-echo what fell from my noble and
gallant friend opposite (Lord Elardwicke). I must ex-
press a hope that, now we really are at war with Russia,
these criticisms in the spirit which I fear animates my
noble friend (Lord Clanricarde) may in future be avoided.
I do not complain of any attack upon the Government ;
I think that is all right ; but I am quite sure my noble
friends-does not know as I know the deep annoyance, or
rather I should say the mental anguish, that some of
these statements have caused to men as gallant and as
devoted to the service of their country as any whom
England ever knew. (Bear, hear.) Ido think that,
when we consider the peculiar nature of the service in
which these men are engaged, some latitude ought to be

left to men like Admiral Dundas and Sir Edmund Lyons;
and that, at all events, the country until it obtains accu-
rate information will trust in their zeal, and will prefer
a report made by Admiral Dundas to the leading article
of a Russian newspaper. (Hear, hear.)
The Marquis of CLANRICARDE said that he had
been totally misrepresented by the noble earl. He told
the noble earl that it was not of the officers, but it was
of the Government—it was of the vacillation, the bom-
bast, and the uncertain and wavering conduct of the
Government that he complained. He said that the Go-
vernment had no right to use the menace which they
had done to the Emperor of Russia, unless they were
prepared to give to the admirals and to the officers under
their command instructions to carry it out. They had
not given such instructions. In a former debate he
(Lord Clanricarde) had said what the noble earl had
said to-night, that you had no right to interfere with the
communications of Russia before declaring war. In
reply to him, the noble earl said :—" But my noble
friend seems to complain that Russia was not allowed
to transport her forces from one Russian port to another
in the Black Sea." The noble earl (Lord Clarendon)
complained that he should make any objection to such
a hindrance, so determined was he that. nothing of that
sort should be permitted lest we should see enacted be-
fore our eyes another affair of Sinope—an affair which
filled all men with indignation—which it was, perhaps,
well fcfr the Government happened while Parliament
was not sitting, and the popular feeling excited by
which had, he believed, caused the language of the
Government to be stronger than it would otherwise
have been—and to have remained passive spectators
of the transport of Russian troops to Trebizond or the
most distant ports of the Black Sea. Why, these were
the very things of which he (Lord Clanricarde) warned
them when they used their bombastic menace to the
Emperor of Russia. He did not complain of the officers.
He complained that the Government had threatened to
do what they were not prepared to give their officers
permission to do. Sir James Graham said in a speech,
"Distinct orders have now been issued from the French
and English Governments that no Russian ship of war
shall be allowed to navigate the Black Sea, if the Eng-
lish and French force can prevent it." He (Lord Clan-
ricarde) said that that was not carried out. The noble
earl had read a private letter. He (Lord Clanricarde)
knew that it was known in the fleet that operations of
this kind were about to be commenced, or had been
commenced, on the eastern shore of the Black Sea when
the two ships were despatched, and Admiral Dundas
gave them the caution which had been referred to. Had
he not given that caution, the officers would have at-
tacked, and probably would have sunk or destroyed the
Russian vessels. This was a great military operation
which the Government had promised to prevent—a pro-
mise which they ought not to have made unless they in-
tended to fulfil it. Admiral Dundas could with ease
have prevented it, had he been allowed to do so. His
observations were not, however, directed against him,
but against the Government, nor were they founded
upon the St. Petersburg Journal, except so far as related
to the number of men. The complaint be had to make
against the Government was the same as he made when
they asked for half a year's double income tax to provide
the means for carrying on a war between England and
Russia—viz., that they were not prepared to look the
matter in the face when they ought to have done so.
The Earl of HARD WICKE rose to express his opinion
that his noble friend (the Marquis of Clanricarde) had
not said a word to detract from the character of the offi-
cers. He understood him to complain of the manner in
which certain statements made by the Government in
Parliament had been carried out. He quite agreed with
his noble friend opposite (the Earl of Clarendon) as to
the necessity of abstaining from premature criticisms
upon the character of the officers employed abroad, and
upon their operations. He would only say of Captain
Jones, that he knew him to be a tried officer who had
recently greatly distinguished himself in the affair of
Lagos, on the coast of Africa, and he believed that any-
thing that could be said of him must be in praise, not in
blame. He (Lord Hardwicke) complained of the same
thing of which his noble friend (Lord Clanricarde) and
the country complained from which the noble earl (Earl
of Clarendon) had drawn off the attention of the house
to statements in regard to the commanders in the Black
Sea. He would call the attention of the house to some
facts connected with the orders and instructions which
they believed were given to the commanders in reference
to the manner in which operations should be carried on
before the declaration of war. If there was one thing
more than another to which public attention was called,
it was the statement of the instructions which it was
supposed were given to Admiral Dundas, that every
Russian vessel seen out of port was to be required to re-
turn to Sebastopol, or some other port ; and it was gene-
rally understood in the country that if this requisition
were not complied with force would be used to compel
submission. The Emperor of Russia complained of this
as an injustice to himself—both to his people by a
manifesto, and to the English Govdrnment through
Baron Brunow. He complained that it was unjust to
him that they should prevent his troops from acting on
his own coasts, while they permitted the Turkish forces
to do so • and he put this forward in his manifesto as
one of the causes of war. How was it, then, if the Go-
vernment had so far offended the Emperor, and thought
it necessary to be so strong in their treatment of Russia,
that they had not the courage to carry it out (Hear.)
They had better have left alone a matter so irritating to
the Russian Emperor than, after making a threat, have
allowed a great military operation which relieved these
forts, otherwise untable, and indefensible, and conveyed
the troops to strengthen the forces of the Emperor of
Russ a elsewhere, to be carried on before the face of a
gallant officer like Captain Jones, who, if he had been
allowed, could have prevented it. They ought either to
have abstained from making such a threat, and to have
tended more to conciliation, or, having made the threat,
they ought to have carried it out in a vigorous, honest,
and statesmanlike manner.
The Duke of NEWCASTLE—At any rate I rejoice
that this discussion has brought out two facts ; one that,
whatever may have been the speech of the noble marquis
(Clanricarde) as regards words, the meaning it seems
was not to imply any charge against the officers of her
Majesty's service. (Hear.) But I entirely deny the
statement of my noble and gallant friend opposite (Lord
Hardwicke). The speech of the noble marquis, at the
beginning, was a charge against the officers—(hear,
hear)—and it was only towards the close of his speech
that he made any observation which could at all be
considered to be a charge against her Majesty's Govern-
ment. However, we now know what he means; and as
emphatically as my noble friend just now denied the
justice of any imputations against the officers in her Ma-
jesty's service connected with these transactions, I ven-
ture to deny the assertion of my noble and gallant friend
opposite (Lord Hardwicke). What is it my noble and
gallant friend means What did the noble marquis
mean just now, when, pursuing a course of most extra-
ordinary irregularity, he not only got up to make a
second speech, but had reserved certain extracts to make
that speech after he had been replied to by my noble
friend behind me (Lord Clarendon). He produced cer-
tain extracts—garbled extracts—with a view to prove a
third charge which he made against her itajesty's Minis-
ters. Beginning by charging us with vacillation, and
next with bombast, and having stated these two charges
broadly in these words, he, by implication, made another,
and a much more disgraceful one—namely, one of false-
hood —[Lord Clanricarde : No, no] —of falsehood. The
noble marquis stated distinctly that the Government had
made representations to this house as to instructions to
Admiral Dundee, which instructions they had not given
--and that he could prove it, as he attempted by such
extracts as he read. My lords, I entirely deny that
charge. There has been no misstatement on the part of
the Government with regard to the instructions which
were issued to Admiral Pandas. My noble friend at the
head of the Foreign-office stated distinctly on more than
one occasion what these instructions were. I say that these
instructions were sent out, and these instructions have seen
literally acted upon. (Hear.) What these instructions
were my noble and gallant friend opposite (Lord Hard-
wicke) did not much, though he did a little, misrepre-
sent. They were these :—After the unfortunate affair at
Sinope—which, however deeply regretted by the Go-
vernment and the country, cannot be characterised
as reflecting either upon the Government or upon
the fleet in the manner represented by the noble mar-
quis—after the unfortunate affair at Sinope, it was the
determination of her Majesty's Government, although
not at that time feeling that we were arrived at a point
at which we ought to discard every hope of the mainte-
nance of peace, that nevertheless it was our duty to take
care, so far as human means could, that such an affair
should not again occur. What was the course adopted,
and what were the instructions sent? Instructions were
immediately sent to the admiral of the fleet, to protect
the Turkish territory and the Turkish flag • and in so
doing, and with the view of carrying out that object,
that if any of our vessels met in any part of the Black
Sea a Russian fleet, or Russian ships of war, they were
to desire them—in terms no doubt such as my noble and
gallant friend represents—to retreat into the nearest
Russian port, and, which my noble friend has omitted
to gate, they were, if they refused to comply, to compel
them by force to do so. These were the instructions
sent out by the Government. These were the instruc-
tions which we told the house had been sent out.
These were the instructions which were communi-
cated to the Russian Government, and which were known
by them, and which were proved to have been known
to them by the course which they took on that occa-
sion. (Hear, hear.) Is there any noble lord in this
house—is there any man in the country—surely not my
noble and gallant friend opposite—who would have
called on the Government to give secret instructions to
the fleet, before a declaration of war was made, to de-
stroy the Russian vessels ? I cannot believe for one
moment, whatever party feelings of hostility to the Go-
vernment may exist, that there is any noble lord who,
however he may wish to disgrace the Government,
would wish to disgrace the country by such a transac-
tion. (Cheers.) I say these were the instructions sent
out. They were the instructions which the noble mar-
quis himself, in a spirit of hostility to the Government,
on a former occasion condemned—not because they
were too weak, not because they did not meet the ob-
ligations cast upon us, but because, as he said, the
Russian Government had the greatest reason to com-
plain of our having taken such steps before a declara-
tion of war. It was nothing but the peculiar circum-
stances of the case —the necessity of defending the
Turkish territory and the Turkish flag—which could
have justified so strong a measure. But that measure,
strong as it was, was carried out in spirit and in letter.
What took place on the occasion to which the noble
earl has just referred He regrets. no doubt, that we
have been prevented from obtaining a victory upon the
shores of Russia by destroying these forts. Now
the Russians had destroyed their own forts for us.
I don't express any opinion with regard to that. I
regret it as much as he does. But at any rate the
object was accemplished. The Turkish flag and the
Turkish territory were not in this instance endangered.
But the Russian ships, with guns on board seven of
them, vessels of war or not, were seen. The officers

sian port, officers, according to their instructions,
would unc cs ibtecll y have compelled them to do so.
(Cheers..) I c:to no t for one moment understand what is
the charge :ainst i;he Government, unless it be that in
some pa rtiou tar ma lner we ought to have instructed our
officers to do stroy any Russian ships which they found
afloat on On Black Sea which were' not of sufficient
strength neet us, before the declaration of war, which
entitles us n ow to take steps which our ships most un-
doubtedly Is ill take. (Cheers.)
The Ea rl of MAL IVlESEURY—Notwithstanding the

remarks o f the noble duke, we shall continue to Make
criticisms o n the conduct of the Government as long as
we choose 1 ,o make them, and whenever we choose to
make the n:t. (Hear, and a laugh.) The noble duke
seems to I. oe astonished at the remarks of the noble mar-

quis, and 9( 'ems to think that he had no right to make
the remarl ct : which .he has made. In the remarks of my

noble frie nid and tho noble marquis I can see no attack
upon any o Fficers in her Majesty's service. My noble
friend con ►p iained that Capt. Jones had too literally obeyed
his orders . Let me call your lordships' recollection to the
time whe a these orders were given, and to the circum-
stances w hi ch attended their publication. It is of some
consequei to a to remember the exact words used in the

English ii is tructions given to the English Admiral. The
word used i n those instructions is "required" when the
admiral m e Sts a Russian ship in the Black Sea, he is to
require su cl I ship to return to the nearest Russian port.
But what w as the word used in the French instructions?
The Freud i admiral was to "constrain" the ship to
return. (H ear, hear, and a laugh from the Duke of
Argyll.) T he noble duke seems to laugh at the distinc-
tion, and th inks it a distinction without a difference. He
rather astonishes me, because I know he is a great purist
in his lang wage. I contend that there is a great
difference b 3tween the meaning of the word " require"
and the ve, and " constrain " ; and, whatever the noble
duke may think of the matter, the admirals them-
selves thoul ;ht there was a material difference. (Hear,
hear.) An d the ambassadors thought there was a
material d ifference in the meaning of the words, and
that thi s lifference might lead to some confusion with
respect to their acting in the Black Sea. The noble
duke, as • a Cabinet Minister, must know that the ques-
tion was discussed as to which of the words was best to
be acted upon, and whether force was to be employed,
and to v ri hat extent. All this arose from what I believe
to have l i 3en a great error, a great mi,ta,ke ; and that
was the , hallenge which you so publicly gave to the
Russian Government, by going into Sebastopol and
threo.ten ig to do what you could not do. (Hear hear.)
Ido riot c omplain of the slackness of our officers. It was
perhaps i mpossible for them to act in stormy weather in
a sea : o d angerous. You own yourselves that what you
threat, me d to do could not be done. Surely, then, you
had in acl i better have refrained from saying anything on
the sul rje ct. You had better have made a valid declara-
tion of w ar, or waited to have observed the Russian fleet
with a 3ic inch vigilance as the season and circumstances
allowe 3, and without writing the presumptuous cartel
that y, in gent to Sebastopol. (Hear.) You might surely
have d one that. But it was placing this country, and the
officer: ; who serve it, in a humiliating condition, to make
such a ()oast at Sebastopol, and then put them into a
false p a iition, of the captain, who, with his hands tied,
saw a g reat military operation with which he could not
interfe.-, s. (Hear, hear.) We do not say a word against
the a.di n irals or captains ; we say the mistake was made
by th e overnment, and that they have made many others
on th is 1 atal question; and it was to that point that the
noble in arquis and my noble friend directed their obser-
vatioi is. ( Hear, hear.)
The I hike of ARGYLL—I do not deny that there may
be a d lift erence between the two words to which the no-
ble ea rl has referred, and that there may be a certain
force in the French word which is not implied in the Eng-
lish w .or d; but I can assure him that the intimation given
at St. Petersburg, and understood by the admirals, was
that, if they met Russian men-of-war in the Black Sea,
they were to be " required" to return to the nearest Rus-
sian I 3cl rt (hear)—but I am perfectly sure that the noble
marq ills did not intend to make any attack on the officers
but t h At he intended to make a party attack on the Go-
vern' ent and nothing else. But what we say is this—
not t it these observations are intended in the first place
to at' to ck the officers, but that, the position of the Go-
vern, Da int being unassailable, they do attack the offi-
cers. In the case which has been referred to, I think
the ,ffi cers put a fair construction on the instructions
of t 1 me Government, and carried them out. All the
obsei orations which have fallen from the noble lord,
ultin ia.tely recoil upon the officers, because the question
entir el.y turns upon the interpretation put upon the in-
struc ti ons by the officers. I conceive that the intima-
tion Ir. iven to the Emperor of Russia has been entirely.
carritc I out. When directions were given that no ope-
ratio,ni i would be allowed in the Black Sea, no doubt
the z.ention was that Russian troops should be pre-
vent ed I from going to Sebastopol, and other places to
atta' . Turkey. I have no doubt that if Captain Jones
had of iserved vessels coming out of Sebastopol he would
have' a ;topped them. But he did not see them until they
were .near another port. Since the instructions have
been is ;sued, the Russian fleet has never shown its nose
out of Sebastopol, and no great operations have taken
plaue. (Cheers.) Does the noble earl suppose that if
it h ad. not been for these instructions the Russian fleet
won sld not have been out in the Black Sea, and ~ery
like ay at Varna ? But nothing of the kind has 1 eeu
don R. The noble marquis talks of the bombast of the
Gen rernment ; and on a former night he said the Govern-
men it had been playing at the game of " brag." I agree
wit a him in condemning the game of " brag' by whom-
soever it is played. But there is a game of " brag"
which has been played, of which he seems to have a full
kno wiedge, and that is Russian " brag," and if it is to
find an echo in party spirit in your lordships' house, it
is difficult to say where it will end. (Cheers.)
TAXES ON LAW PROCEEDINGS
Lord BROUGHAM said as the discussion which had
been. going on seemed at last to have come to an end—
(laug hter)—he would take the opportunity of postponing
until a future day his motion, which stood for Monday,
relative to taxes on law proceedings.
Their lordships then adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—(YESTERDAY.)
The SPEAKER took the chair at 4 o'clock.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.
The following bills were read a third time and passed :
Neno Valley Drainage and Navigation ; Newcastle-upon-
Tyne Docks ; Perth and Dunkeld Railway; Whitehaven,
Cleator, and Egremont Railway.
The following bills were ordered to be considered :
Hertford and Welwyn Junction Railway; North London
Railway.
NEW WRITS.
On the motion of Mr. HA.YTER, a new writ was
ordered for Devonport in the room of Mr. Tufnell, who
has accepted the office of steward of her Majesty's manor
of Nc,rthstead.
A new writ was also ordered for Hastings in the room of
Mr. Risco, who has accepted the office of steward of the
Chiltern Hundreds.