The Sun.
London, England, 1854-02-24 00:00:00

this swarm of miserable little covert antagonists
found in the weakness, or the perversity, or the
ignorance of the Go vernor-, reneral, Lord
Dalhousie, the willing agent for the grati-
fication of their spiteful malevolence. Lord
Dalhousie, we have seen, had courteously told Sir
Charles Napier, as early as the occadon of their
first interview at Simla; that " he would take
damned good care" that (he (Sir Charles) should
never encroach upon his power as Governor-Gene-
ral of Hindostan. A delicate intimation, whiCh lie
adopted every means to verify. In short—we ask
the reader's pardon, but the phrase is not our own,
it is that of:. the representative of her Britannic
Majesty Lord Dalhousie took such "damned
good care" to prevent the possibility of this dreaded
encroachment, that he insulted Sir Charles Napier
so very grossly, wantonly, and unjustifiably as to
necessitate the course pursued by that heroic
veteran, when he; tendered his resignation as_
Commander-in-Chief--of our armies in ilindostan.
How ? The tale of this great wrong is soon told.
A mutinous. pirit manifested itself in 1849 through-
out no less than thirty Sepoy battalions, battalions
which were either then marching towards,C or were
actually-in, the Punjaub. The Governor-General
(Lord Dalhousie) was at sea in quest of health—
leaving the Commander-in-Chief (Sir Charles
Napier) the highest in authority and in respor-i-
-bility in Hindostan. Now everybody at all ac-
quainted with the growth and character of our
power over our Indian possessions is familiar with
the fact, that the greatest of all evils to be dreaded to
that power is the spread of a feeling of insubordi-
nation. A mutinous spirit among our Sepoy
troops, wherever manifest, must, consequently, be
met with vigour and promptitude. It was so
manifested in 1849 in as many as thirty battalions.
The Governor-General was, as we have remarked,
away—he was actually at sea—and the Comman-
der-in-Chief was left alone, and was responsible,
consequently, by his position for the preservation
of the general tranquillity. Precisely at this criti-
cal juncture, a Government order (an order, by the
way, merely locally applicable) threatened to be
brought accidentally into operation—where ? Why,
at one of the very places where the mutiny had
come most plainly to light—namely, at Wuzzeera-
bad. It was an order peculiarly distasteful to the
Sepoys, inasmuch as it tended to the diminu-
tion of their allowances. What happens there-
upon ? Brigadier Hearsey, dreading lest the
operation of this inopportune order might
prove disastrous under the circumstances, by
fomenting the ill-will rife among the discontented
battalions, addresses an anxious communication to
his superior officer, Sir Walter Raleigh Gilbert,
telling him plainly of his fears as to the conse-
quences. Sir Walter Gilbert coincides with the
views of the matter taken by Brigadier Hearsey—
coinciding in those views, the former transmits the
letter to Colonel Grant, theAdjutant-General, and
the latter officer, agreeing with Sir Walter Gilbert
and Brigadier Hearsey, submits the whole question
of the difficulty to the judgment and decision of
Sir Charles Napier, as Commander-in-Chief. Re-
member that the peril of the time was one of great
magnitude ! Remember that the Governor-Gene-
ral was, at the period, far away on the Indian
Ocean ! Remember that the responsibility of the
crisis rested wholly and exclusively upon Sir
Charles Napier, in his capacity as Commander-
in-Chief ! Remember that the danger of allowing
the order to come into operation at that pre-
I cise moment was recognised and asserted by
three distinguished and experienced officers in
the Company's service—by Brigadier Hearsey, by
Sir Walter Gilbert, and by Colonel Grant, the
Adjutaut-General ! Remember, moreover {with
this posthumous- 'Censure from the hands of his
Grace, now at our elbow, as recently published by
order of the Directors], especially and peculiarly
remember, that Sir Charles Napier found at the
time the following remarkable passage among the
instructions of the Duke of Wellington :—" On a
station so distant, and of such magnitude and po-
litical importance, you must necessarily act in a
great measure from your own discretion." Sir
Charles Napier did act upon his discretion.
Is it asked in what manner? By suspend-
ing the perilous order which must otherwise
have been brought into operation at a crisis
of a really extraordinary character. The Com-
mander-in-Chief, at the same time, forthwith,
namely, on the 20th of January, 1850, the date of
the order of suspension, forwarded a report of the
whole proceedings to the Supreme Government.
Thereupon, when the mutiny had been effectually
suppressed by this wise measure of precaution, Sir
Charles Napier was insultingly reprimanded by
Lord Dalhousie—the insult (mark this !) of the
reprimand being directed by him (p. 170)
against " a man of nearly twice his age, with
ten times his experience and service." It is
monstrous to assert, as was asserted by the
Governor-General, that the Commander-in-Chief
had, in the act alluded to, " cancelled a Govern-
ment regulation And introduced another." He
had done nothing of the sort—he had merely
suspended an order calculated to prove most dan-
gerous if permitted to come at that precise period
into operation—he had simply suspended that dan-
gerous order until such time as he could contrive
to communicate with the Supreme Government.
That it was calculated to be perilous, if not at
least delayed, was not only the opinion of Sir C.
Napier himself, but also, as before remarked, of
three distinguished officers in the service of the com-
pany—in the opinion (p. 66) of " the Brigadier com-
manding the station, of the General commanding the
province, and of the Adjutant-General of the Com-
pany's army." Let it be borne in mind, moreover,
that as recently as the 18th of that same month of
January, Lord Dalhousie had written these words
to the Commander-in-Chief (p. 185)—" Whenever
anything may occur which requires or would be
benefitad by the support of Government, that
support will beunreservedly given." Such a thing
did occur two days later, and that support was not
only unreservedly refused, but Sir Charles Napier
was even insultingly reprimanded. The Governor-
General forgot his, fine promise at Kotree, and
acted only in the 'spirit of his impertinent threat at
Simla—his courteous threat on the occasion of their
first interview, that he would. take " damned good
care" that his authority should not be encroached
upon by the new Commander-in-Chief. The
truth is, That Sir Charles Napier was repri-
manded, as he himself says (p. 174), " because
Lord Dalhousie was" personally jealous ! In-
tent to find fault, he petulantly, and with bad
faith, seized what he 'thought a good opportunity,
and made a mistake for his own character." Was
A
senotaofet
ro badrtoshf
the
tflfhtaBehi t faith
crisis
do ?
ef
aav
rs
January
hn
ae
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anghave
any
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x .exagge-
rated the
is simply preposterous, when we bear in mind
thatptininie dse(ep,.a had 1t67) before theorderof suspension, mu-
tiniesoccurred
ceirnabsaudc,ceasnsidonatatGßo:iwndul,
ghur. As to the Governor-General's paltry attempt
to depreciate Sir Charles Napier by representing his
gdhe ts fernod
ed dtaon
rgeepr e—l tt hh ee
jcoounrcinueyertoor Pofesslicaiwnduer
haas'sacollni
insinuation thus scornfully and triumphantly (p.
168) : " Peshawur was the real point of danger,
and his (Lord Dalhousie's) sneer, redolent of
ignorance and bad feeling, coming from a
man who had gone to sea at the moment of
greatest peril, should have been suppressed." If,
however, the Governor-General has failed to sup-
press his atrabilious sarcasm, the Commander-in-
Chief did not fail to suppress promptly and.effec-
tually that mutinous spirit which was known to
have infected thirty Sepoy battalions, and which,
if it had not thus been dissipated or crushed out,
must have threatened (p. 165) to involve an
army of 400,000 men in the most disastrous
insubordination. This was effected by three ener-
getic acts, indicative to the whole body of actual or
would-be mutineers of the determination of the
then supreme head of the Executive, the Comman-
der-in-Chief. Those three acts—the suspen-
sion of the order consolidating the Sepoys'
allowances—the disbandment of the 66th Regi-
ment for their attempt to'seize the fortress of Go-
vindghur—and the filling up of their vacant place
in the line by making the Nusseree Goorka batta-
lion the 66th or Goorka regiment. Happily Sir
Charles, was throughout impressed with the truth
that " mutinies are not to be bound with red
tape" (p. 153), that wholesome truth which he has
since in so many words thus axiomatically enun-
ciated. It is a melancholy ouramary of hopes