The Sun.
London, England, 1853-01-29 00:00:00

THE WAR IN BURMAH.

(Front the Times.)
The intelligence which reached us yesterday by
a telegraphic dispatch from Trieste with reference
to the last incident of the Burmese war is of a dis-
tressing and unexpected charaAer. For, although
we have long since anticipated no good results from
the languid operations of General Godwin, it was
scarcely possible to conceive that an officer who
had neglected every opportunity of carrying on
the war from an excess of precaution should end
by placing his outposts at the mercy of the Bur-
mese army. In truth, the only business of the
campaign up to this time seems to have been
to take and lose and retake Pegu—a position,-
after all, in no way essential to the main object
of the war. On two former occasions we had
attacked this place, always with success, but we
found each time that the resistance of the enemy
became more formidable. Nevertheless, a feeble
detachment of only 440 men was left in the town,
though it was notoriously within reach of one of
the principal divisions of the Burmese army.
The consequence was that the enemy attacked the
place. The communications with Rangoon were
interrupted, a convoy of ammunition was taken
by the Burmese, and a first attempt to relieve
the garrison was repulsed with loss. Matters had
reached this point, when two columns of 2,400
men marched upon the Burmese army, defeated
it, and rescued the small garrison, to whose gal-
lantry, rather than to the prudence of the General,
we owe this successful termination of a very un-
pleasant and dangerous incident. When further
particulars reach us, we trust it may turn out that
this action has given a serious blow to the enemy
but if so, it will be the first that General Godwin
has attempted to strike, and he seems more en-
gaged in defending the ground he had occupied
than in dictating conditions to the Burmese
Government.

At any rate, it is impossible to acquit the officers
in command of this expedition of very inconsistent
conduct and inadequate measures. If it was worth
while to attack and capture Pegu at all, it is worth
while to hold it with a sufficient force. No value
can be attached to operations which merely end in
driving back the enemy, without any attempt to
disperse his armies or to destroy his resources,
leaving him to return upon his former positions, as
he has twice done at Pegu, when we were less pre-
pared to defend ourselves. But, in truth, the con-
tinued occupation of Peg-u and the adjacent terri-
tory can have no serious political effect on the Court
of Ava, while it diverts a considerable body of our
troops from the best strategical line of operations,
and harasses them with the accidents of a subsidiary
campaign. Meanwhile, Sir John Cheape and the
naval officers who are eager for the termination of
the war, which they would probably have accom-
plished, when the season permitted it, by a coup de
main, are still literally confined to the station at
Prome by their orders, and by the rapid fall which
has now taken place in the stream of the Irrawaddy;
indeed, at the date of the last intelligence, they
seemed more exposed to be attacked by the Bur-
mese than to attack the enemy in his intrench-
ments. These facts, which are not denied even by
those who are responsible for these proceedings, ap-
pear to us to constitute a case for grave military
inquiry ; and after the experience of the last few
months, it is impossible that the Government and
the public can rest satisfied with the mode in which
this important expedition has been conducted.
Among the divided authorities of the naval and mi-
litary service, and between the complicated action of
the Board of Control under different Ministers, the
Court of Directors, and the Governor-General of
India, it is not easy to point at once to the most
responsible and the most culpable person. But as
soon as Parliament meets we shall expect to find
these questions dealt with as becomes a subject so
nearly affecting the honour, the policy, and the in-
terests of the country.

It is time we should know on what principles,
after all, this Burmese war is conducted. We are
told—though we can hardly comprehend the deli-
liberate concurrence of English statesmen or mili-
tary officers in such an opinion—that the intention
of the Indian Government has been to limit the
operations in Burmah to the occupation of a fringe
of territory on the coast, always to be attacked and
defended, without even the security to be derived
from a previous defeat of the enemy and a treaty
of peace. - It is said, we think very eironeousiy,
by members of the same Government which nego-
tiated the treaty of peace in 1825, that no treaties
are of any avail between ourselves and the Bur-
mese Court. Yet under that same treaty we con-
tinue to this day to hold undisputed possession of
the territory of Arracan, and for upwards of 25
years our commercial relations with the Burmese
coast were carried on with as much regularity as
can be expected in the dominions of a barbarous
Asiatic Power. There cannot be a reasonable
doubt that the Court of Ava is perfectly aware of
the nature of treaty engagements, and perfectly
able to enforce the fulfilment of them. Yet, by
some infatuation, which has yet to be explained,
we are told that no attempt is to be made on Ava,
where alone it seems probable that a decisive blow
may be struck, and our forces are scattered in the
attack and defence of paltry positions, which it is
useless to take and inconvenient to hold. These
operations forcibly remind us of the half measures
on tie coast of China which commenced our war
with that power, when it was supposed that the
occupation of Chusan would bring even the Celes-
tial Emperor to terms, until, after wasting time,
money, and troops, a vigorous attack was made at
the heart of the empire, and Sir Henry Pottinger
signed his treaty of peace under the walls of Nan-
kin. There is less excuse for General Godwin's
delay and failure in this instance, as he was at once
placed at the head of a force quite capable of car-
rying everything before it ; the rainy season proved
more favourable to the ascent of the river than any
other time of the year ; and it was demonstrated
by actual experiment on Prome, that nothing was
wanting to a brilliant and rapid victory but the
will to grasp it. Unhappily it was equally appa-
rent at a very early stage of these operations, and
even at the great distance from the scene of action
at which we write, that General Godwin took no
account whatever of the superior forces which a
powerful steam navy placed at
his command. He
chose to conduct the war precisely as if neither the
great
river of the Burmese empire nor the naval
and military resources of British India had under-
gone the slighest change in the last thirty years.
Accordingly, he found villages which he remem-
bered on the banks of the Irrawaddy now con-
verted into populous towns ; and he hung back
for months with as many needless delays as if
the British army had to cut its way through
the jungle. In reality, these pedantic pre-
cautions have led our troops into the only
dangers from which they had anything to fear, for
they have taught the enemy to view our boasted
power with contempt, and even to measure his own
strength against us, and they have exposed the
whole expedition to the prolonged action of an in-
salubrious climate. If the Burmese had really
been. the formidable warriors which General God-
win appears to suppose them to be,- they would ere
this have completed the parallel which his own
conduct suggests with that of General Elphinstone
at Cabul.
It is with great regret that we find ourselves
compelled to use this language in speaking of a
general in command of her Majesty's forces in the
field ; but if the opinion which General Godwin's
first operations were calculated to produce had
been acted upon with greater resolution, we should
now have to deplore a disgraceful periodof suspense,
interrupted at last by a disaster. No unforeseen
circumstance has occurred to disturb the plans of
the staff ; no resistance has anywhere manifested
itself which could prevent our troops from doing
whatever they pleased to attempt. The whole re-
sponsibility of the delay rests. with those
neglected to advance, when it was literally easier
to to advance than to remain stationary..
expla-
nations which have been transmitted to this coun-
tryse who__ lasia.veer
• on this point are wholly ni.isatisffateht
is due to the spirit and abliityo rior; caelsidenit-
interests of the
gaged, as well. as to. the politicals7es should be taken
which manifestly
tcooutieimtryli,ntahteat
aimsmtaetthe immediate
cen-
sure on men who are entrusted with; a power thy
throws a heavy responsibility and grievous ,
are afraid to use.

ROCKITEIS3I.—On Sunday night last an armed party
attacked the house of a widow named Power, at Cat-3-
town, in the parish of Aghaviller, and made severed
attempts, but without success, to force in the door und
windows, which fortunately were strongly barred and
secured ; they then . tried to break in through the roof
of part of the premises, which fell, carrying the loft with
it, to the ground. The rockites then departed, having
fired a shot. Providentially no one was hurt by the
fall of the roof and loft. We believe the attack resulted
from 59111 e agrarian dispute,--ZilkennyMocknitor.