The Sun.
London, England, 1854-03-03 00:00:00

"once to the army, which at present belongs to the wore-
taries of State, should for the future be vested in the Se-
cretary at War. 2. An alteration should be Ina de in the
form of the appointment of the Secretary at War :—I.
That he should in future be always a member of the
Cabinet. 11. That he should be the Minister by whom
the advice of the Cabinet, as to the amount
of the military establishments, should be laid
before the King. 111. That he should be the person to
consider and act on all points with the Commander-in
Chief on behalf of the Administration, and to be imme-
diately responsible to Parliament for all the measures of
Government with reference to the army. IV. That he
should assume all the merely formal duties relating to the
subject now performed by the Secretaries of State, such as
the preparing and countersigning of military commissions,
and the issuing of orders for the delivery of arms to the
troops. 3. The Secretary of State, to whom the civil
administration of our numerous colonies, with all their
complicated interests, is entrusted, cannot possibly give
the attention to the subject (amount and distribution of
the army) which it requires. 4. The Secretary at War,
by whom the army estimates are now moved in the House
of Commons, seems to us to be the person to whom the
important duty of watching over the whole military
administration of the country should be properly com-
mitted. 5. To give him (the Secretary at War)
a direct control over those large branches of busi-
s : relating to the military service of the country
hich are now managed by the Board of Ordnance
and by the commissariat department of the Treasury. 6.
With respect to the Ordnance, we think this might best
be accomplished by dividing the civil from the military
duties of that department. I. The latter (the military du-
ties) should be left, as at present, iu charge of the Master-
General, who should exercise the same authority be now
has in all matters of discipline, promotion, &c., subject to
the general orders of the Government, to be conveyed to
him, as we have already explained, by the Secretary at
War, instead of by the Secretary of State. 11. He should
also retain under his immediate orders the inspector-gene-
ral of fortifications, and be charged with the duty of su-
perintending the execution of all military works. 7. The
civil business, on the other hand, should be brought under
the more direct control of the Secretary at War, by making
the board officers, by whom it is more immediately con-
ducted, subordinate to him instead of the Master-General
and Board of Ordnance; so that their separate divisions of
the business would become branches of the War-office, and
the whole expenditure connected therewith would be pro-
vided for in the general army estimates." In support of
these recommendations, the hon. member read some ex-
tracts from the evidence of Earl Grey before the committee
of 1850, which, he observed, ought to carry conviction to
every mind. He had hoped that these changes would have
been made long ago, not forced upon us by an impending
war. This was not a state of things which ought to con-
tinue a day longer. The Government ought to take steps
for carrying out these recommendations without delay. A
fortnight ago he had asked if there was any such intention,
and being answered in the negative, he had no alterna-
tive but to bring on this motion. It might be said it was
ill-timed, but he contended that no further delay ought •
to be permitted. The hon. member concluded by moving
the resolution of which he had given notice.
Mr. A. PELLATT seconded the motion.

Mr. S. HERBERT said he certainly agreed much more
with some of the opinions which the hon. gentleman had
advanced in his speech than with the motion with which
he had concluded. He differed from some very material
portions of the report which he asked the house to adopt ;
and he (Mr. Herbert) concurred in many of his objections
to it. The house must first consider at what time and un-
der -what circumstances this report of 1837 had been made.
There had then been great impediments to the carrying on
of the public business, through differencies and controver-
sies which had arisen between different branches of the
war department. It was true that in 1812 there had been
very serious differences between the then Commander-in-
Chief, and the Secretary at War ; and at a later period,
shortly antecedent to the sitting of the committee, there
had been grave differences of opinion and very warm con-
troversy between them. There was great indisposition on
the part of the military authorities to adopt any changes or
improvements, or to listen to suggestions from the War.
office ; and Lord Howick, fearing that his plans would not
meet with the concurrence of the military authorities, felt
that some change was necessary in the organisation of the
departments, to enable him to carry out those plans which
he was rightly convinced were necessary to the
being of the army. On more occasions than one he had
had to speak in high terms of Lord Howick's efforts for
the improvement of the condition of the army ; but if
those controversies existed then, and rendered the appoint-
ment of a commission necessary, an entirely different state
of things now prevailed. In the first place, the energy of
Lord Howick succeeded, in spite of all difficulties and
opposition, in carrying his plans into effect. At present,
therefore, the ground of want of harmony between
the different officers no longer existed. In the last few
years very great changes had been originated in the War-
office, and ultimately they had been invariably successful.
During the administration of the present Lord Panmure
two of the greatest changes in the army were proposed by
him, and successfully carried out—the abolition of service
for life, and the substitution of a limited period of ten
years, and the introdnctionof examination for commissions
in the army. Those two were very vital changes. The
first altered the whole condition of service in the army-.
The military authorities thought service for life almost a
necessary condition for the efficiency of the army ; but, in
spite of that Mr. Fox Maule was successful in carrying oeft
the change. In point of fact, at the present day, tnere
was harmony between the military and civil authorities •
and the former entertained such enlightened and extended
views that the indisposition to introduce any change had
entirely disappeared. Therefore, on the ground of contro-
versy between the authorities, there no longer existed any
necessity for a change. (Hear.) But it was said the army
ought to have one head, as the navy had. But the navy
was not under one head, in the sense which the hon. gen-
' tleman proposed. In the nature of things, the navy must
be supplied with artillery and stores by another department.
All officers agreed that matters relating to artillery and
projectiles were more likely to be understood by those who
had devoted their lives to that scientific profession than by
the officers of the navy themselves ; and therefore the com-
mission of 1837 did not recommend that the supply of the
navy with ammunition and warlike stores should be taken
from the Ordnance. Neither with regard to the disposition
of the forces was the navy under one head. The First Lord
took the orders of the Secretary of State as to where the
forces should be employed. When he was Secretary to the
Admiralty, applications constantly came to them from the
Foreign-office ; and they used to think it most inconve-
nient, inasmuch as the political necessities of Ithe country
often diverted ships from places where, for the efficiency of
the service, the Admiralty wished to concentrate them. A.
few years ago, when the insurrection broke out in the
lonian Islands, the Secretary of State issued orders to the
First Lord of the Admiralty to send ships from other ports
of the Mediterranean to assist in putting down that dis-
turbance. More recently, under the authority of the Home
Secretary, ships were sent :to Ireland to supply the re-
Taired assistance there. Therefore it was not correct that

if the Secretary at War were constituted into a Secretary
of State, he would be in the same position as the First Lord
of the Admiralty, who, in fact, took his orders from the
Secretaries of State. Then came the question—was it wise
that he should receive orders from the Secretary of State
It was proposed that an officer should be constituted who
should perform all the duties now performed by the Secre-
tary, at War, by the Master-General of the Ordnance (as
far as the civil duties of the ordnance went), by the trea-
sury, and by the commissariat ; and, in addition to this
vast consolidation of offices, that he should likewise per-
form the duties of two Secretaries of State for the Home
and Colonial Departments, and by his authority order and
be responsible for the distribution of all the forces of the
country. This would not increase promptitude, or make
the machine less cumbrous. How was the Secretary
at War to judge whether an additional force was
requisite in a certain district in England ? There might
be strikes in Lancashire, bread riots in Wales, or political
disturbances in Ireland ; but the Secretary at War could
only obtain information of these things from the Home
Secretary. For that reason he would not be responsiblee
He had no knowledge on the subject, and could only gain
it by going to the Home Secretary. The same with regard
to our colonial empire ; he could, in fact, be only a go-be-
tween. Tee Colonial Secretary knew what colony might
require the presence of troops; the Secretary at War could
not know it. In point of fact, therefore, it would be the
Home Secretary and the Colonial Secretary who would dic-
tate to the Commander-in-Chief, as now; but, in place of
doing it themselves, the orders must be filtered through
this new officer, who would be like a third wheel placed
between two cog-wheels that were moving each other with
accuracy. The result would be to create great difficulties
where now there was much simplicity, and a far more cir-
cuitous and cumbrous mode of arriving at the same end.
He did not pretend to say that the present system was a
perfect system. (Hear.) Theoretically, no doubt, there was
much fault to be found with it; practically, it worked Well.
But it was his conviction that by a well considered change
it might be made to work better. In support of his view he
would refer to the evidence of Lord Panmure before the
committee of 1850, as to the direction and distribution of
the forces. He was asked what member of the Government
he thought most competent to form an opinion with respect
to the wants of the public service, and if any one was more
so than the Home Secretary. He said certainly not—the
Home Secretary was the most capable, and he ought to be
the person who should advise with reference to all matters
connected with the preseryation of the peace, for he wag
constantly in communication with all parts of the country,
nor could any one be so immediately responsible in case of
civil war or disturbance. Whoever might be the party to
decide on what force was to be maintained in the country,
he of course must be guided by the advice of the Home
Secretary,
.as to what force should be maintained in the
home districts. If these duties were transferred to the
Secretary at War, he would have to go to the Home Sec-
retary for the information necessary to guide his judgment
andwould be a mere shifting of responsibility from one
it
Minister to another. Such was the opinion of Lord Pan-
mune The responsibility of the new Minister would sim-
ply amount to this, that he was told by the Home Secre-
tary that so many troops were required in the country.
After all he would be but a go-between between the Secre-
taries of State andthe Commander-in-Chief. His own views
were that they could not add very largely to the existing
consolidation in the Ordnance department. It had had
the duties of three or four departments cast upon it since
1815. He confessed that if he had the power, without re-
ference to any existing circumstances, or the difficulties in
which we were placed at this moment, when it was neces-
sary not to change our troops, but to use them, he should
say that there ought to be a clear distinction between
the Ordnance and the Commander-in-Chief. The Master-
General of the Ordnance was a far more important officer
than the Commander-in-Chief. It was true the latter
had the appointment of officers, their promotion and selec-
tion ; but that was almost a matter of course. He could
make no alteration in the army which involved ex-
pense without the consent of the Secretary at War. He
promoted whom he pleased to a vacancy; but that vacancy
could only be created by consent of the Secretary at War.
Similar duties were performed by the Master-General of
the Ordnance, but without the same check. The produc-
tion of arms, the construction and maintenance of fortifi-
tions, both came under the decision of the Master-General
of the Ordnance. These duties were very complicated in
their nature, and required the advice of men eminently
scientific. If batteries were erected in places where they
were useless, an unnecessary expense was incurred, and
men were kept there when they might be more usefully
employed in other parts. One error carried with it very
grave and serious consequences. He was therefore justified
in saying that, though not so
high in rank, the office of
Master-General was a more difficult and important one than
that of Commander-in-Chief So far as ho had seen of the
working of the War-office in connection with the Horse
Guards, he attributed very much of the financial economy
in the management of the army to this fact—that one oeli.
cer incurred the expense,
and. a different officer checked
it. (Hear, hear.) He believed that the reason why the
army had been administered so much more economically
tun the am wee, that there Whi an OZtralleous officer