The Sun.
London, England, 1854-05-03 00:00:00

THE BLACK SEA.

THE SKIRMISH WITH THE RUSSIA NS AT KUSTENDJE.
The following are some details respecting the ap-
parition of the Russian cavalry at Kustendje. The
steamers Sidon and Magellan were both anchored
in that port, and the captain of the latter with
some of his men set out on a shooting excursion.
Having arrived at a wood in the neighbourhood of
the town, the party encounted some troopers be-
longing
to a regiment of Russian cavalry in am-
bush at no great distance from the spot. The
French commander and his men opened instantly
a brisk fire, and having killed two of the Russians,
betook themselves in all haste to their boats, which
they' found unfortunately stranded. The Russians
came on in numbers, and would have necessarily
captured the whole French party, had it not been
that the affair was described by people on board the
Magellan, who, by means of a shell, launched at
all risks and all hazards, but with admirable pre-
cision, killed several of the Russian party with-
out inflicting the slightest injury on their own
friends. The confusion produced by so unexpected
a reception, enabled the captain and his men to right
their boat, embark, and regain their ship. The
first shell from the Magellan was followed up by
several shots from her long guns, which, it is un-
derstood, did good execution, and dispersed pele-
Tule the Muscovites.
MEDICAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE ENGLISH FLEET.
—A private letter from the Black Sea fleet dated
Kavarna, April 14, contains the following :
" Every preparation in the medical department
has been made for the eventualities of the war in
the Black Sea. All the medical officers, with few
exceptions, in this fleet are men of standing and
experience ; but few new entries. Extra supplies
of medicines and medical comforts have been oppor-
tunely sent out, including abundance of chloroform,
cotton wadding, &c. An hospital has been °eta,

Wished at Therapia, on the Bosphorus, in a large
kiosk or palace of the Sultan, pleasantly situate
near the beach, with extensive grounds attached to
it, the whole surrounded by a high wall. This
building, when full, will contain from 150 to 200
beds. Any great action taking place will be off or at
Sebastopol. The wounded of such an action would
be transferred in 30 or 35 hours to comfortable
beds and excellent accommodation on the Bos-
phorus. The fleet will have the benefit of this
hospital, extra of that fine establishment at Malta,
to which the wounded will be transferred from
Thcrapia—such of them as may require a change of
climate or rest on their way home, for those in-
valided and rendered unfit for further active service
in this fleet. Lord Carlisle, to our great pleasure,
has paid the admiral another short visit. He takes
immense interest in the war. He is off this evening
in the Fury, going to coal in the Bosphorus, and
will continue his way home."
Telegraphic accounts were received in Paris yes-
terday afternoon from Odessa, to the effect that the
English and French fleets had weighed anchor early
in the morning of the 26th April, and had taken
their departure, it was conjectured, for Sebastopol.

CONDUCT OF THE WAR BY THE ALLIED

TROOPS.

There are grand principles in the conduct of a
war (writes the correspondent of a contemporary),
upon which all the most eminent authorities have
hitherto been agreed. One of these principles is
never to act upon the defensive until the aggressive
has been tried and failed. In other words, to re-
serve the advantages of time, place, and instru-
ments of attack, rather than to offer them to the
enemy, and thus to maintain the moral influence
which an offensive campaign, conducted with
energy, exercises over the troops engaged in it,
which is of a precisely opposite character to that
experienced by the enemy, so that what is gained
by the one is so much directly subtracted from the
other. The same rules which have governed other
wars are surely in this case susceptible of application
more than usually rigid. The whole question to be
solved, then, is how the allied powers may most
speedily and satisfactorily terminate this war ; and it
is important to consider whether they can expect to
bringabout this result by concentrating their armies in
the immediate neighbourhood of Constantinople,
and constructing lines of defence at Gallipoli or
Bouzouk Tchekmedje, for to these objects opera-
tions seem at present to be directed. The forma-
tion of a permanent camp in--the vicinity of Con-
stantinople must have a most depressing effect upon
the inhabitants, who will be led to infer, from the
position of our army, that a moral conviction exists
in this country that sooner or later their capital is
to be invested by Russian troops, while the proxi-
mity of so large a garrison of Christian soldiers
must have a most paralysing effect upon the autho-
rity of the Turkish Government ; but, after all,
the consideration of most consequence to us is,
will our army there be in the best position to meet
the Muscovite hosts, flushed with victory, and
within sight of the long-coveted dome of St. Sophia?
So far as we, the ignorant public, can judge of the
use of the lines at Gallipoli, their principal object
seems to be to protect the embarkation of our
troops after they have been utterly routed, and
the Russians are in possession of Constantinople.
The fortification of such a port is doubtless an ope-
ration of the utmost importance, though it does
not seem the most brilliant opening of the cam-
paign. At the same time it is worthy of remark
that no analogy can be drawn between the lines at
Gallipoli and those of Torres Vedras, for as yet our
army has not suffered a Corunna. Instead of
forming a base of operations which presupposes de-
feats our hope of success seems to lie in the adop-
tion of a more vigorous and spirited policy, and we
may render substantial assistance to our allies by
the immediate conveyance of our troops to the seat
of war, or by the invasion of those southern pro-
vinces of the Russian Empire whose unprotected
coasts and disaffected populations invite such an en-
terprise. Of the importance of such a movement in
a strategetical point of view there cannot be much
doubt; but, if it is contemplated at all, delay will in-
conceivably enhance its difficulty. So long as the
centre of the Turkish line upon the Danube remains
unbroken, and the coast of the Dobrudscha is threat-
ened by our fleets, the position of the Russian army
in that peninsula must be eminently critical.
Whether it may be more expedient to support Omer
Pacha at Shumla than to attack the Russian army
of occupation, is a question for military authorities
to decide. In either case it is to be hoped that,
with our present naval resources, the idea hae never
been entertained of marching any portion of the
army across the Balkan, and that no more troops
are likely to follow that detachment which haa
already been ordered to Adrianople. That army
which has been sent out to defy the colossal power
of Russia are surely not to be employed any longer
in duties which ought to be undertaken by an army
of reserve. Landed either at Varna or at Odessa
they would be more useful than at Gallipoli
or Scutari, and it would be wiser to strike
a blow either in front or in flank than to
confine ourselves to preparations of defence or
retreat. A vast deal of energy and money has
been expended in vain if the end and object
contemplated by our expeditionary army was the
protection of Constantinople. By confining the
operations of our army to the south of the Balkan,
we shall dishearten the Turkish forces, who are
anxiously expecting their arrival, and encourage
their adversaries, who will assume fresh confidence
as they gain both time and men. The power of
the one for resistance will thus become diminished
in proportion as the resources of the other for
attack are increased ; the patience of our own.
troops will be worn out when they find that they
have to contend only with the hardships inciden-
tal to an ill-organised commissarist instead of the
enemy they long to meet. The disaffected popula-
tions of Russia will sink into apathy and despair
as the prospect of freedom becomes fartherremoved
than ever, and the means of attack which the in-
ternal weakness of Russia affords are neglected ;
the public at home will at last discover that the
object of the war for which they have been so
heavily taxed will never be gained, and the Em-
peror Nicholas will have reason to congratulate
himself not only on having succeeded in those
schemes of aggression which he at present enter-
tains, but on having destroyed the prestige which
attaches to the expeditionary army, and which is
now doubly enhanced by an alliance which should
prove irresistible.