The Sun.
London, England, 1854-06-20 00:00:00

employ in aid of German interests. Under these circum-
declaration made by Austria an
stances, it was not only natural. bdutpirnudsissipaeenhseaubllde
btahvaet the
declaration made by Austria and Prussia should have re-
nets of Berlin and Vienna informed
to German interests alone, antdh,etcheerneffeodreer,atthieenCtabbait-
terial and even t e poll-
was inconsistent with the ma ,
the continued military occupation of the Lower Danube
Dbanub.e
tt ihcea lmt,e interests
oppose o f
aGgetramt
ea
of
fy
t,
quo,_ though somewhat
bainudgaapwpheiaelhedmwuistthperoenvefidfaentacel too
ambiguouslyt he m .
reB"fereu3nce solely to German into-
eaillpurseiossnecito,
has
se
The
greatly obstructed the free-
dom of the Danube. That
Danube by i
rests on the Lower Danube.a The occupation of the Lower
the correct meaning to the declaration is
I have attributed
dom of comitmueroess a
h which states that a vast •
from the paragraph field is
evident
an industry in the East, and that it is
and tahlerenaav-
opened for Get
he outlet by the mouth of the Danube '
essential that the great
should not be obstructed. The object of the declaration is
announce that the contracting Powers would not consent
to
to
e.
toriad changes in any of the great States of Europe
which would injuriously affect German interests. That is
not an unnatural declaration to proceed from two great
German Powers to the minor Powers whom they invited to
cooperate with them for a common object. There is no•
thing in the document to alter the assurance which we have
received from Austria. After the philippic which my noble
friend has pronounced against the word " confidence," I am
almost afraid to venture on a declaration of my confidence
in Austria. But I think lam justified in saying that we
should look at Austria as an independent Power, carrying
out her own policy, having some internal dangers to appre-
hend and many German difficulties to contend with, and
that, under these circumstances, fall allowance is not
made for her difficult position. Bat, my lords, as the
alliance of Austria is of great importance to us, and as far
as the inland operations of the army of Austria are con-
cerned, I consider them to be essential to us, I think it may
not be out of place if I advert to some past proceedings,
and state to your lordships the facts upon which I found
ray confidence in the assurances which Austria has
made to us. Such a course will, I think, be more practi-
cal and more useful than that of following my noble and
learned friend in his history of Russian aggression, the
character of which I need not say is such as I must neces-
sarily condemn, but which, in my position, and speaking
under a greater degree of responsibility than my noble and
learned friend, I think it better that I should abstain from
commenting upon, and confine myself to matters which
may be more practically useful and more interesting to
your lordships. (Hear.) I will, therefore, proceed to state
what are the grounds upon which I feel confidence in the
assurance of Austria. My lords, about three months ago
I ventured to state in this house my belief that Austria
could not remain neutral in this great contest, and that for
the very reason stated by the noble and learned lord opposite,
namely, that her interests more than any other power were
concerned in the issue of the war, and that the menace that
was held out was greater against her than against any
other Power. Nay, I will now go further, and say,
that if the German Powers—Austria more especially—
had stood alone, they would have been compelled by every
consideration of policy and self-interest to protect Turkey
against the aggression of Russia. Because, if Russia
remained in possession of the principalities • and, in spite
of resistance on the part of Turkey, advanced to Constanti-
nople itself, if her fleet retained the entire command of the
Black Sea, and she closed the mouths of the Danube, the
commercial prosperity of Germany would be entirely de-
stroyed, and Austria would become, not the ally, but the
vassal of Russia. True it is that there are some German
Powers who still look with awe at the imaginary omnipo-
tence of Russia, and who seem to wish to derive a guarantee
from her for their future existence ; but Austrian has not,
shared in this ignominious feeling. Had_ sheem must .)asvoe, tleeean-
trality would not have been her line. MI t n
not I repeat, as an
compelled to take part with Russia, ,
Prussia too,
Prus •
inde-
pendent ally, but as a vassal But Austria, and
was made on them by Russia by
repelled the demand that
way of convention, and from that moment a separation
took place between Austria and Russia, which is a matter
of no small importance,
because it has always been a
sup-
posed that Russia, having claim on the gratitude of Aus-
_
taaa, would possess that influence over Austria which my
noble and learned friend described. But Austria did not
yield to any such influence. She had gone with us. She
had declared that she agreed with us, and she supported
our summons to Russia to evacuate the principalities.
Therefore, I think that there was no reason to apprehend
that Austria would remain neutral in this contest. But I
know that it has been said that Austria has not moved
with that vigour and rapidity which was called for by our
intervention and by the possible necessity of the case.
But I would only call upon your lordships to place your-
selves in the position of Austria, and to remember that up
to the close of the year 1853 she did not believe in the'pos-
sibility of a war. She trusted to the assurances and to the
friendly feelings of Russia. She believed that her wishes
and her interests would not be disregarded by Russia, and
that the Emperor of Russia would not turn a deaf ear
to her entreaties. She did not think that the Emperor of
Russia would abandon his
conservative character, and be
himself the disturber of the peace of Europe. We must re-
member also the personal feelings which entered into these
considerations—that the Emperor of Austria had a strong
personal regard and respect for thejEmperor of Russia, and
that he had to weigh, with reference to the future, the
consequences to himself and his people between the con-
clusion of a treaty of alliance with Russia on the one hand,
and a treaty of alliance with the Western Powers on the
other. We should also bear in mind, that an alliance
with the Western Powers was, on the part of Austria,
nothing less than a complete revolution—a change of
policy so great as was not to be expected. But, as I said
before, Austria readily concurred in all the changes and
in all the onward movements which had been made, and
when the Emperor came to deal with the inadmissable
propositioni of Russia, and was not able to discover in
them any assurance that the object of the Emperor of
Russia was peace, he gave orders that an army of 30,000
men should be concentrated between Transylvania and the
borders of. Wallachia, and he formed a treaty with the
Porte that he should send troops into Servia if the Russians
entered into the principality. At that time, indeed, the
Emperor of Austria was disposed to act more vigorously ;
and he would have concluded a convention between the
Four Powers, but obstacles which were insurmountable
prevented him from doing so. He, however, did agree to
the protocol of the 9th of April, which embodied all the
terms that had been agreed upon by the other powers.
About the same time Austria and Prussia agreed to a
treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, which had re-
ference solely to German interests, affecting, therefore,
the other States of Germany, whose support and assistance
it was intended to invite. But there was an additional
article which accompanied that treaty, and which was of
a more extended view. By that additional article the two
Powers bound themselves to demand that no onward move-
ment should be made by Russia in sending forces into the
Turkish territory.
Lord LYNDHURST asked whether that additional
article had been laid before Parliament ?
The Earl of CLARENDON—I am not aware. I believe
it has not, and that the reason is that it was not commu-
nicated to the Conference. The treaty alone had been com-
municated to the several Governments, but it was not
thought right by Austria and Prussia that that which had
been withheld from the conference should be communicated
to the Governments. The reason the additional article was
withheld was that it had reference to matters beyond what
immediately concerned Germany, but at the same time a
copy of the additional article was communicated to her
Majesty's Government. This additional article of which I
speak gave a more extended view of the parties, and it pro-
vided that the two powers, Austria and Prussia, should
require Russia to suspend all warlike operations within the
Turkish territory ; that a definite answer should be de-
manded on these two points; and that if such an answer
was not returned as should give complete security and sa-
tisfaction to the two Powers, then Prussia pledged herself
that she would have her army in readiness to co-operate
with Austria, and, if the principalities were attacked, then
Austria and Prussia together were to take the offensive.
At the beginning of this month a summons by the Austrian
Government, announcing that determination, was sent to
St. Petersburg. - In anticipation of the answer being unfa-
vourable, the Austrian Government, after communicating
with her Majesty's Government and with the Emperor of
the French, proposed a convention with the Porte by which
Austrian troops were to be permitted to enter the principa-
lities, in order to occupy them as long as was necessary.
Austria having stated to the English and French Govern.
ments that she was determined, however much her assist-
ance might be required, not to permit an Austrian soldier
to enter the Turkish territory without having previously
obtained the consent of the Sultan. At the same time Aus-
tria placed, at the Porte's disposal, any number of troops
that might be required for reducing the insurrection in
Montenegro. She also offered that her ships should co-
Operate with ours in order to suppress the Greek in-
surrection. And, my lords, my belief is that at the close
of this month, or at the beginning of the next, the Aus-
trian aimy, organised and fully equipped for active ser-
vice, will amount to 300,000 men. Now, my lords, under
these circumstances, I think we may feel some confidence
in the assurance of Austria, that her object and views are
the same as our own, and that in the prosecution of this
object we shall ,always find her. Nor can I believe that
after the knowledge which Austria has acquired of Russian
policy, and after the experience she has had of Russian
friendship—that after the vast expense she has incurred,
and the great risks to which she might be exposed—l say,
I cannot believe, as the noble and learned lord would seem
almost to infer, that she would be so wanting to her in-
terest and to her dignity as to conclude such a peace as
that to which the noble and learned lord has adverted—
(hear, hear)—which could be nothing but a short, hollow
truce—(hear, hear) —and to which England could not be a
party—(loud cheers)—a peace which could afford Austria
no guarantee for the future, but would leave her entirely
at the mercy of Russia, and leave Europe for ever after-
wards subject to the pernicious influence and oppressive
policy of that Power. (Hear.) My noble and learned
friend has asked what were the terms which would be pro-
posed for effecting a peace with Russia. My lords,- I can-
not possibly say, any more than my noble and learned
friend, upon what terms peace can be made. That must
depend upon the chances and the contingencies of war.
And indeed, my lords, if I did know upon what
terms we alone would be prepared to make peace—if I
was prepared to say that we would accept no other
terms than those which the noble and learned lord him-
self would accede to—l assure your lordships it would be
the most imprudent course I could possibly take. (Hear.)
But this we know, that the policy of Russia and the power
she has hitherto possessed of carrying it out, have been
and are dangerous to the peace and well-being of Europe,
and that both are adverse to the cause of progress and
of civilisation. And we also know that the object and
interest of Europa must be to curtail that power and to
check that policy. We know that the means of doing it
are now so great and effectual, and that the opportunity is
19 wonderfully favourable, that if we were now to neglect
it,
.we should in vain hope for its return. All Europe is
not to be disturbed, great interests are not to be injured,
L'a People are not to have fresh burdens imposed upon
abru, p great torn
and commercial relations are not to be
Europe are nasunder, and all the greatest Powers of
not
result. I thiukto be united in arms fur an insignificant
postpone the nyou must agree that repression will only
in—(The lastaawzr,oand that safety can alone be found
cheers that followed tfhe
the noble earl was lost amid the
The Earl of DERBY
rose
esfe of his speech.)
brie or two observation& The
er the purpose of making only
noble earl had entered into
tho question with his wonted vigour and e •
rspicuity but '
still ho thought that the terms of the
treaties which had
been signed and commented upon by his noble and learned
serious friend were of a character to cause most se •
apprehen-
sions
n with regard to the course which might be pursued by
two great Powers of Europe—Austria and Prussia. W ith-
out knowing what were the precise terms of the additional
article of the treaty between those two Powers, he could not
with any certainty as to the policy which had bee
speak
He thought the noble earl had been n
adopted by them.
in less
usual s attempt to explain the non-pro-
fortunate than
oftreaty. The nobli
portion the earl had
duction of that
of the treaty between Austria and
as if the terms
spoken
been similar to what had been assented to by
had
England and France. If that hap been the case, his noble
and learned friend would have had no cause to complain. put

_:~_ .

the case put forward by his noble and learned friend was
this—that a document purporting to be the result of a con-
feren9e between Prussia and Austria had been submitted to
the Government, by which those Powers declared that what-
ever .might be the result of the war in other respects, the
whole object they had in view was that the integrity of
Turkey should be maintained, but that being done, so also
should the territory of Russia be maintained, thereby lead-
ing naturally to the inference that if the territory of Turkey
were to be secured, or rather if an engagement could be en-
tered into that the principalities should be evacuated, then
there would be an end to all the efforts on the part of Aus-
tria and Prussia. If after that England and France should
go further, and still continue the war, then Anstria and
' Prusia under the terms of that agreement, would have a
right to step in and say—" No ; we have said, whatever
may be the result, the territory of Turkey should be main-
;Pained inviolate ; it has been so maintained ; if you proceed
further, and make an infringement upon the Russian ter-
titory, that is more than you have a right to demand, and
we cannot go with you. Su far as the evacuation of the
principalities is concerned, you can reckon upon our al-
liance, but no further." The noble earl has passed lightly
over this which was the pinching part of the statement of
his noble and learned friend—the more pinching because
it threw a doubt up the intentions of Austria and Prussia.
Ry the terms of their treaty they would put a limit to
their obligations. If Russia evacuated the principalities,
they offered no security for the future independence and
integrity of Turkey. They give no material guarantee for
its security as an independent nation. But, according to
the interpretation put upon the agreement by his noble and
learned friend, and by any rational man, Austria and Prus-
sia might in such a case naturally stand aloof—and, still
more, they might take part with Russia against any of the
allied Powers, however opposed it might be to the peace
and tranquillity of Europe. Hie noble friend (the
Earl of Clarendon) insisted upon the sincerity of Aus-
tria. There was no question raised about the sincerity
of Austria—the only question was, what was the inten-
tion of Austria ? Austria, no doubt, was sincere in de-
claring the necessity of Russia evacuating the princi-
palities, and of her not attempting to pass the Balkan.
But the question was not as to the sincerity of
Austria. The question was, what was the real meaning of
Austria, and how far could England rely on, her co-ope-
ration in the event of the Emperor Nicholas so far coin-
' plying with the terms pressed upon him as to evacuate the
principalities, and then subsequently declaring that he
would retain all his existing possessions ? It had been very
satisfactory to him to hear the noble earl state again what
he had stated on a former occasion—that as we were now
embarked in this war, it was pleasing to know that we
were not embarked in it for any private object ; that there
had beeu forced upon us a great question, which had been
growing 'up for years - that the solution of that question,
having been so forced upon us, must be settled once and
for ever, finally, conclusively, and effectually. (Hoar, hear.)
He was rejoiced more than be could express on hearing
that declaration repeated by the noble earl, because mire
he was that the people of this country, greatly as they
might be indisposed to enter upon a war at all, much as
they might feel the pressure upou their interests, much as
ehey might recoil from all the dangers and all the horrors
that would be incurred, their disinclination would be infi-
nitely greater to arrive at the conclusion of a shameful and
a dishonourable peace—(cheers)-- and a dishonourable
peace he was confident they would declare that to be which
would not effectually check the growing ambition of Rus-
sia, and restrain her not merely within her existing limits,
but rescue from her those portions of her conquests which
rendered her so arrogant and overbearing, and take from
her those territories which should afford a material guaran-
tee against a renewal of those ambitious projects by which
. any further disturbance of the peace of Europe might be
effectually and permanently prevented. (Cheers.) But
this he would say, that the people of this country, having
expendeh very large sums of money, having made incredible
exertions, and being prepared to make still greater exertions
and meet all the inconveniences of a war, he was convinced
they would not he satisfied unless the Government resolved
that from henceforth there should be security takon for
the independence, not of Turkey alone, but of the neigh-
bouring States of Russia against Russian aggression. But
above all, as his noble and learned fried had said, one great
object with them ought to be—as well in point of honour
as of policy—not to desert that gallant people—(cheers)—
whose course we hap advised, and who had so valiantly
pursued that course—not to make our own terms, and then
finally leave them to the vengeance of Russia when she had
no other enemy to deal with. (Hear, hear.) Were we to
adopt such a course, we should be guilty of a base betray-
al of our duty. (Cheers.) For the future it was impos-
sible to permit that the Black Se should be a Russian lake
—(cheess)—or that the Danube should be a Russian ditch
choked with mud and filth. (Cheers.) We must have a
material guarantee for the peace of Europe, and te re-
joiced in the language which had been held by his noble
friend on the part of her Majesers Government. That
language would give perfect satisfaction, and he trusted
that the country would see it followed up by the whole of
her Majesty's Government, by acts as vigorous and deci-
sive as the language of the noble lord.

The Earl of ABERDEEN said—My noble friend has so
fully expressed the views and intentions of her Majesty's
Governmen that little remains for me to say. At the same
time I cannot help making a few observations on what
has fallen from my noble and learned friend opposite. I
think the speech of my noble and learned friend would
have been somewhat more appropriate and in place three
months ago than at the present moment. At that time
it might have been, perhaps, necessary to stimulate the in-
dignation and martial feelings of this country against a
Power with which we were not thed yet at war, but
having now engaged in war with Russia, I think it was
not requisite to indulge in that eloquent and protracted
phillipic which my noble and learned friend has de-
livered
in detailing the policy of the Russian Govern-
ment for many years past. My noble and learned
friend's fpeech reminded me of old times. I recollect,
25 years ago, having had the pleasure of making known
to him, then sitting on the woolsack, the French Ambas-
sador of the day, a man of lively imagination and much
wit, and the ambassador's observation to me afterwards
was :—" Chancellor, do you call him? Surely, he is a
colonel of Dragoons." (General laughter.) Now, it
seemed to me that my noble and learned friend's speech
to-night partook of the characteristic thus ascribedto him.
lam most happy to see that my noble and learned friend
retains all his vigour and martial energy—(laughter)--and
I only beg to observe that I think his speech would have
been more appropriate before we had entered into war than
after we were fully engaged in it, and when wo do not re-
quire those incentives to hostilities which otherwise might
have been needed. As this war at its commencement was
so strictly of a defensive character, I can fully understand
the cause of that apparent ambiguity in the expressions to
which my noble and learned friend has referred. Your I
lordships will recollect that, throughout, the object was to
resist the unjustifiable aggression of Russia against the
Turkish territory. Such was the declaration of her Ma-
jesty when publishing to the country the cause of war.
Her Majesty declared that the purpose of the war was to
protect an ally against an unjust aggression, and, through-
out, the integrity of the Turkish empire and the independ-
ence of the Sultan were the main objects—the objects put
forward, I say, exclusively, as the cause of war. There-
fore, it never occurred to provide against Turkish con-
quests on the Russian territory. Our object, and that of
Europe, in all these protocols and engagements was to
preserve entire the territory of Turkey and the independ-
i once of the Sultan. Consequently, in reciting these ob-
jects, there might be, no doubt, an ambiguity in confining
the objects of war to those points to which I have ad-
verted, and in not having in view the possibility of any en-
croachment on the Russian territory. But that does not
follow the least in the world from any engagement to which
we are parties. Austria is an independent Power, and
most happy have we been that Austria has engaged with
us so far as she has done; but if Austria refuses to go fur-
ther than those engagements, to whibh we all four have
been parties, what power have we to compel her to do so ?
Austria is acting now both with a view to consult her own
interests and the general interests of Europe. Austria is
now listening to the advice of that veteran and able states-
man—(hear, hear)—whom my noble and learned friend eu-
logised, and' have no doubt will be guided by him, and bya
due regard to her own interests and the great interests of
Europe. Therefore I attach no weight to the apparent am-
biguity to which my noble and learned friend referred. As
to the conditions with which we should be satisfied, on the
conclusion of war, and the objects which we should have in
view, it would bo both premature and unwise to pretend
now to decide. My noble and learned friend, to be sure, has
given the Emperor of Russia due notice that he had better
lose no time iu fortifying Sebastopol, for my noble and
learned friend has already announced his desire to lay his
hand on that stronghold, and I dare say his Majesty the
Emperor will follow my noble and learned friend's advice.
(Laughter.) Butthe conditions for the termination of hos-
tilities are, I say, those wnich can only be described by the
expression—" a just and honourable peace." Now that must
depend in a great measure on the progress of the war. If it
should happen that you find the Russians at Constantinople
it is perfectly clear that the conditions of peace may be very
different from what they might be if the allies find them-
selves at St. Petersburg. Therefore, the whole course of
negotiations must be based on the progress of events. All I
can say is, that at all times I shall advocate an honourable
peace, though bent on obtairing, the great objects we have
in view—the security, integrity, and independence of the
Porte, and, as far as reasonable, what is called the security
of Europe which, however, I cannot say I feel to be very
much in danger by the chance of Russian aggression. For
let me remind mynoble and learned friend that when that
disastrous treaty of Adrianople to which he refers, was con-
cluded, at a time when the Russian troops were within 50
miles of Constantiimple—a treaty, I admit, to be most
onerous and disasterous—still no acquisition of Turkish
territory was made by Russia. (Intimations of dissent.)
Two or three small ports in Asia were taken possession of
by Russia (hear, hear), but not an inch of territory in
Europe ; and the principalities were evacuated. [An ex-
clamation of "the Danube ."] The Danube?—No doubt,
I have already expressed my. opinion in this house with
regard to the treaty of Adrianople ; and no one has ever
descritted the disastrous and onerous nature of its condi-
tions more ttrongly than myself. (Hear, hear.) But I
say, considering, the position at that time of the Russian
army, which was almost at the gates of Constantinople,
that treaty did not show any great desire of territorial ag-
grandisement. And what htppened since that treaty was
made, 25 years ago ? Sinee that moment hfis Russia ac-
quired a single inch of Turkish territory ? Has Russia
any hostility to the with Turkey at all ? Nona in the
world. The only interference that Russia has had with
Turkey has been to save the existence of a Turkish
empire by sending a Russian army to Constanti-
nople to protect it against Egyptian invasion. That
is all that has happened since the treaty of Adrianople.
There has been no war, there has been no aggressian,
but only a single service, rendered to Turkey by Rus-
sia. I think that if we can secure tranquility
for 25 years to come we shall not do amiss ; and that
ought !to be the object wo should have in view. I quite
agree with those who, notwithstanding they may have
been led away by the excitement of the moment at the
commencement of hostilities, still think that we ought
never to close our to the voice of peace ; and I, for one,
so long, or as soon as ever I see the prospect of a just
and honourable peace in view, shall most certainly endea-
vour to attain it. Now, this may not suit the spirits
of those who are more bent upon hostile measures ; but
it must not be taken as implying that I am in-
different to the conduct of the war. On the contrary, I
venture to say, that those who most desire peace may bo
most prepared to carry on war with tho utmost vigour and
determination—not to wreak vengeance on an enemy for
whom personally we can feel no hatred but to obtain with
more certainty and security such a peace as we ought to
desire. That is the reason and that is the motive which
will induce me to carry on the war with the utmost possible
vigour—(hear, hear)—and I do trust that in carrying on
war, animated by these feelings, which ought to inspire all
Christian nations, we may look for the attainment of the
great object, peace, in a shorter time than many noble
lords think probable. (Hear, hear.)
Lord BEAUMONT contended that the apparent mean-
ing of the documents was, that the view of the Four Powers
. were the same, and that this country was evidently bound,
under the circumstances, to respect simply and purely th©

•_

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