The Sun.
London, England, 1853-02-25 00:00:00

LONDON, FRIDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 25, 1853.

FATAL ACCIDENT ON THE GREAT WESTERN

IMILWAY.

A terrible accident took place yesterday on the Great
Western Railway, by which one of the directors was
killed upon the spot, another sustained very serious in-
jury, and several first-class passengers were much hurt,
while others, including two directors, narrowly escaped
with their lives. The accident happened to the up ex-
press train leaving Bristol at 8.10 a.m., and due in Lon-
don at 11.30 a.m.
The train loft Bristol punctually, and kept correct
time up to its arrival at Ealing, about five miles west of
Paddington. It consisted of an engine and tender, a
luggage van, two second-class and three first-class car-
riages—the latter being in the rear. A travelling por-
ter invariably accompanies the express trains on the
Great Western Railway, occupying a small iron box on
one end of the tender, from which he commands a view
of the train, and, in case of necessity, can communicate
with the engine-driver without difficulty. The train
had just passed under the bridge a short distance on
the London side of the Ealing station, and was tra-
versing that portion of the line known as the Eal-
ing cutting, when the travelling porter observed that
the first of the three first-class carriages was off the
rails, and swaying to and fro in a very alarming
manner. He instantly got up and turned round to
the driver, who was in the act of looking round at the
moment, and who, observing that something was wrong,
shut off his steam and reversed the engine. At that in-
stant the coupling chains between the second and first
class carriages gave way, and the two first of the latter
ran up the embankment with fearful velocity. The first,
on reaching the top, a height of about 15 feet, toppled
over and fell backwards upon that which followed,
crushing three out of four ef „ifALcomp.artments,
forcing it back on the main line, where it fell over on-its
side. The third carriage did not leave the rails. The
driver brought up his train as quickly as possible, and
returned to the spot, where a fearful scene presented
itself. The first of the three first-class carriages was
turned completely over and lying upon its roof—the
several compartments being more or less crushed and the
passengers imprisoned within. The second carriage had
suffered most. In the centre compartment of this had
been seated four of the directors of the railway on their
way to the usual weekly board meeting. The names
of these four gentlemen were—Mr. Richard Potter,
of Gloucester ; Mr. Henry Simonds, of Reading ; Dr.
Richard Prichard Smith, of Reading • and Mr. James
Gibbs, of Clifton, near Bristol. The latter gentle-
man was killed on the spot. Dr. Prichard Smith,
who was seated by his side, sustained a dislocation
of the shoulder and had a rib fractured. Mr. Potter
and Mr Simonds, who were seated in the same com-
partment, and opposite Mr. Gibbs and Dr. Prichard
Smith, had a most miraculous escape and were not all
seriously hurt. There were several other officers of the
company and general passengers in this carriage, but
none of them sustained any severe injury. The passen-
gers in the third carriage escaped with nothing more
serious than the shock. The best aid that could b given
to the sufferers was afforded on the instant by the se-
cond-class passengers, none of whom had suffered the
smallest inconvenience. One of the guards hastened
back to the Ealing station, and the other, as soon as the
passengers who were not hurt could be transferred to
the second-class carriages, came on to London with the
train. Intelligence of the catastrophe was instantly
communicated to Mr. Saunders, the secretary, and Mr.
Gooch, the locomotive superintendent. The former,
without a moment's loss of time, summoned Mr.
Caesar Hawkins, Mr. Alfred Keyser, Teevan, and
Mr. Harper, medical gentlemen resident in the neigh-
bourhood, and dispatched them to Ealing to render
every assistance in their power. The latter soon
got together a party of men to clear away
the debris. On their arrival it was found necessary to
break up the two carriages most injured in order to ex-
tricate some of the passengers who were still completely
wedged in. One gentleman, Mr. Adam Duff, of Read-
ing, who was seated in the first carriage when it fell
over on to its roof, got his head fixed firmly into the
hole through which the lamp is ordinarily suspended,
and it was with the utmost difficulty he could be extri-
cated. Mr. Duff had some of his fingers broken, but
was not otherwise injured seriously. The body of Mr.
Gibbs was got out as soon as possible and conveyed to
the Ealing station. Among the other passengers in-
jured were Mr. Miller, of Warminster, whose forehead
was seamed with a terrible gash ; Mr. Ormerod, of
Brazenose College ; and Mr. Kelly, the company's sta-
tionmaster at/Birmingham.
Dr. Prichard Smith was brought on to London and
conveyed to the Prince of Wales Hotel, close to the
station, where his dislocated shoulder was reduced by
Mr. Csar Hawkins. He was stated last evening to be
going on favourably.
Mr. Miller was also stated to be doing well.
The accident is supposed to have originated in the
breaking of one of the "scroll-irons," or "spring
hangers," attached to the near leading wheel of the
front first-class carriage. The consequence of this
breakage would be to set the axlebox free, thereby giving
the wheela play which would necessarily in a very short
time throw it off the line. The ballast is torn up for
some 400 yards, indicating that the wheel or wheels had
been off the rails before the coupling chains broke.
There must, of course, always be a degree of uncertainty
as to the precise cause of any accident of this character.
But it is suggested that the extraordinary variations in
temperature may have led to the fracture described, no
imperfection being visible in the iron.
The accident, it is needless to say, occasioned a great
shock to the board of directors, who were expecting the
arrival of their colleagues when ,the news reached Lon-
don. The deceased gentleman has been a director for
many years, and was universally respected. He was
one of those members of the board who, at the recent

half-yearly meeting, went out by rotation, and were re-
elected. It is stated that he effected an insurance of his
life against railway accidents only a week or two ago.
When the carriage in which he was seated quitted the
line, his head appears to have been dashed against the
window-frame, probably while in the act of looking out,
or perhaps by the simple force of the shock. The temple
has been driven in, and the spinal cord is broken, so
that death must have been instantaneous. The right
arm is also fractured, but otherwise the body is not in-
jured. He has left a widow and family to deplore
his loss.
One of the most remarkable features of this accident
is that in the foremost of the three carriages, that which
mounted the embankment and then tumbled back upon
its own roof, there were 21 passengers, none of whom
were killed. Being crusbed down to the solid part of
the doors by the enormous superincumbent weight of
the wheels, iron work, and heavy framing, the escape of
so many human beings from instant death seems almost
miraculous. In this carriage were Lieut.-Col. Bell, of
the Royals and his lady, both of whom were jammed so
tightly amid the debris that they could move neither
hand nor foot, and it was with some difficulty that they
were extricated.
Mr. Wakley will at once proceed to hold an inquest on
the body of the deceased, and a searching investigation
will be made as to the cause of this melancholy accident.
The following official account of the circumstances has
been sent to us for publication :

IiIiPERIA PARLIAMKNT

HOUSE OF LORDS-(YESTERDAY.)

THE WAR WITH AVA.
The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH said he was afraid he
would find it somewhat difficult to attract their lordships'
attention to a question of Indian policy and war, after they
had been occupied with matters connected with the do-
'mostic policy of this country. He must, however, endea-
vour shortly to explain the position in which the British
Government now stood with regard to the Court of Ava,
and before he put the first question of which he had given
notice—namely, whether her Majesty's Government had
any objection to lay before the house a letter from the
Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East
India Company to the Governor-General of India in Coun-
cil, dated in September, 1829, giving instructions as to the
line of operations in any future war with Ava, he thought
it right to state under what circumstances that dispatch
originated. At that time he was president of the Board
of Control, and various matters came before him connected
with the then recent war in Ave. He had occasion to be-
come acquainted with the great force employed, with the
great losses sustained, and with the enormous expense
incurred, which, according to the statement of the then
chairman of the Court of Directors, amounted, he be-
lieved, to something like 12,000,000/. All these matters
came before him, and he thought, considering that they
had obtained a very extended knowledge of the country,
of its resources, and of its geography, and that the
war had bee)/ one of so important a character that it was
extremely desirable, and indeed necessary, that he should
-place allthe-isierenation hir possesstxr befor&the late
of Wellington, who was then at the head of the Govern-
ment, and obtain that noble duke's authoritative instruc-
tions as to the line of operations which should be adopted
in the event of their being at any time forced to make war
upon Ava again. Accordingly he placed before the Duke
of Wellington all the information and papers bearing most
materially upon the subject. The noble duke considered
the matter, and was kind enough to communicate to him
(the Earl of Ellenborough) his opinion in detail, and that
opinion was conveyed to the Government of India in the
dispatch to which his question referred. He (the Earl of
Ellenborough) was not aware whether his noble friend 'I,
would consent to lay that dispatch before their lordships,
and therefore he would not further refer to it ; but this he
thought he was at liberty to say, that the course of opera-
tions
which had been lately adopted by the Government
of India was not the course described in the Duke of Wel-
lington's instructions. Another thing he thought he might
venture to assume, recollecting all that he had read of the
opinions of the late Duke of Wellington, and the many
conversations he had had with that noble duke, especially
in connexions with the war in China—namely, that it was
impossible the Duke of Wellington could have sanctioned
and approved of the course of operations which had been
adopted. He (the Earl of Ellenborough) said so on this
ground, that he thought it quite impossible that the Duke
of Wellington could have approved of a plan of operations
which involved the necessity of employing troops along the
internal waters of a great empire, at a considerable dis-
tance from their ships, without the assistance of animals,
and therefore without tho means of movement upon the
land. He held it to be impossible that the Duke of Wel-
lington could have approved of such a system of opera-
tions, because he knew that if the noble duke had done so,
he would have given an opinion directly inconsistent with
every opinion he had over heard from that noble duke.
Now, he would refer for an instant to the details they had
received the other day with regard to the operations for the
relief of Pegu, and it would at once be seen that those ope-
rations proved the impolicy of attempting to carry on a
war with troops destitute of animals, and, therefore, with-
out means of movement. A large number of troops, by the
orders of the general, were conveyed on board several steamers
to Pegu; and in the course of two or three days he collected
twenty-five carts. The general applied the animals at his
disposal to drawing these carts with six days' provisions,
and had then no animals whatever left to draw his guns.
The army proceeded, without guns, without animals, and
drove the enemy before them. In the course of three days
they marched twenty-four miles. The general had then done
the enemy little injury, for they constantly ran away and
avoided contact with his troops ; he had no means of fol-
lowing up the successes he had obtained, and the breaking
down of a cart laden with beef and biscuit crippled his re-
sources, and rendered it impossible for him to proceed.
Whatever might be the coolness under fire of that officer
—whatever might be the courage and discipline of his
troops, he (Lord Ellenborough) held it to be impossible,
with troops so ill-provided, to subdue an Empire ; and yet
that was apparently the object of the Government of
India. What had happened at Pegu might happen else-
where; but let their lordships consider with how much
greater loss, if the distance from our resources was greater
than on this occasion. He knew it would bo recollected
by their lordships that we at last succeeded in obtaining
success in China, and compelling the Emperor of China to
submit to the terms which we dictated to him, and that
wo effected that object by troops with very limited means
of carriage. No doubt we did, but observe the difference.
In the early stages of that war islands were taken, towns
were taken, armies were defeated with great loss, and the
enemy suffered greatly, but no impression whatever was
produced on the Government of China until the whole
character of the war was completely changed—until our
resources were concentrated on one point and brought
to bear on the mouth of the Great Canal, so as
to interrupt all the great commercial operations of the
empire. When that was done we undoubtedly suc-
ceeded ; but had we the same means of success in the war
with Ava ? Was there any point on which it was possi-
ble we could concentrate our forces so as to produce the
same effect ? Or, even if we could do so, could we expect
to produce the same result when dealing with a barbarous
usurper, acting at the head of a barbarous people, as when
we were dealing with the hereditary Sovereign of a civil-
ised and wealthy people? One of the great difficulties of
a war like this was, that a barbarous people did not act on
the ordinary considerations which swayed the councils of
a civilised people. The former usually acted more from
passion than the latter. Undoubtedly, if we had been act-
ing on a totally different system from that which had been
followed during the present war—if we had been resting,
as we ought to have done, on our provinces in Arracan,—if
we had been keeping open our communication with our own
provinces, and had placed an army of 7,000 or 8,000 men
on the Irrawaddy, nearly at equal distances from Ava and
Rangoon, with perfect means of moving all our troops, so
as to be able to effect any purpose required from them in
the war ; no doubt, if we had done that, we should
have had a better chance of success than we could possi-
bly have in contending with the enemy under such diffi-
culties as we had been doing. But that was not the
course which had been adopted. (Hear.) Before he pro-
ceeded further, he begged to place before their lord-
ships, as far as he could, a statement of the present posi-
tion of the army in that part of India. He had taken pains
to ascertain the facts, and he believed that what he was
going to state was not far from the truth ; he calculated
that about the 4th of January General Godwin would have
arrived at Promo. , He would have there about 4,800 men
(of whom 200 would be cavalry), with 16 guns, of which he
believed not more than 10 were horsed and capable of being
moved. Ho could not find a trace of his having any ani-
malspurpose of moving provisions or am-
thsay
The men were dying
too, that out of the 4,800
mniue am-
munition.
neheea:tfie
fytHehrewf
regretted oerre thein
the hospital.
six, eight, and ten a day of cholera ; and no wonder. It
appeared that for a long time after they arrived they sub-
sisted entirely on salt provisions, and it was only when they
came to occupy the right bank of the river that they got
fresh meat supplied to them. On the left bank of the river
they were actually invested by the enemy. There was a
continued line of six miles of stockade, by which the ene-
my shut them in, with a jungle of two miles and a half be-
tween them and stockade. Behind that immense line
of stockade there were three other stockades, all to be
b
attacked by the troops before they
could meet the main of the enemy. If they deducted the 800 or 1,000
men in the hospital, and at least 500 more who must re,
main to protect the hospital and such stores as they had,
General Godwin would not be able to move out with more
than 3,500 men ; and he believed, that with the exception
of having animals to move his guns, he had no means what-
ever of moving his forces. In the event of these forces
succeeding and taking the stockades,—which, if the enemy
fought at all, must be a work attended with severe loss,—
how was it to be expected that forces so limited in amount,
and already so seriously affected by sickness, would be able
at last to march upon Ava, as was the dream of those who
looked at the subject from a distance ? In Arracan there
were 500 men employed in making a road to the top of the
pass-which leads from Arracan to the Irrawaddy. The
officer commanding these men reported that he could not
make the road in less than three months, that there was a
take,steep manoudnttkat ain
therewith awstaoecnkeat a.
stockade which
commissariat ictem was impossible to
officer
to provide supplies for his troops. The consequence was,
that that officer was actually raising supplies on his own
credit. Such was the state of the force employed to make
the road by which animals were to get to the valley of th©
Irrawaddy. That road was perfectly well known to
us. A regiment of Madras troops came back to
India by it. We were in possession of the most mi-
nute details respecting it ; and the fact was that there
was not the slightest difficulty in throwing troops over
and occupying that pass on the very first day of the
war ; but, now that we had allowed the pass to be so
strongly fortified, it would be a matter of great difficulty
to take it ; and, even if we were prepared to send out
animals to make the army moveable through that pass,
there were no troops to escort them. At Rangoon there
might be about 2,000 men, besides 1,100 to sweep the
country ; that was to say, there were less than 3,500 men
left below ; and, in consequence of the unfortunate mea-
sure of the occupation of Pegu, he did not think it pos-
sible, while that measure was adhered to, that one man
could be sent from the lower part of the river as a rein-
forcement. And this was the moment—when our army
was in this condition, before it had moved at all so as to
inflict serious loss on the enemy—this was the moment
which had been selected to declare the annexation of the
province of Pegu, which we did not occupy, and of inti-
mating our intention, if our proposals were not acceded
to, of moving upon Ava ! That was a very grandiloquent
pr oeolraclen a
sufficientt
i ; bu
unableunfortunately,us
to carrythereintoit execu-
tion. If General Godwin and the Government had
not exist
a f
confined their attention in the present eanmai„
to the possession of the province of Pegu, and had
attacked from the rear the Burmese who occupied the
pass at Arracan, so as to complete our communication
with our provinces on the Irrawaddy, he would not
say that in the following campaign it would not have
been a perfectly feasible measure, and that we could have
performed the operation of subjugating that power if it
were thought to be necessary. It was not for him (lord
Ellenborough), who knew the strength of the Indian army
and the resources of the country, to say that any measure

which was was ordered by the Government here was in-
capable of being executed there, but, with a yiew to suc-
cess, in all military operations, time, previous preparation,
and much -consideration were required, and no army what-
ever could effect great purposes in war which was not per-
fectly provided with the means of moving, and of these the
army to which ho was now referring had literally none.
(Hear, hear.) And here he begged to ask whether it was
advisable that we should annex the province of Pegu at
all ? If the annexation of Pegu were possible, -could we
stand there ? The fact was, there was no frontier, no range
of mountains, not the slightest line of demarkation. Even
if it were possible for us to obtain possession of the coun-
try by treaty with the King of Ava, could we look forward
being able to maintain it without further conflict ? Hb
believed it was impossible for us in that case to avoid
further conflict.
.And to what would that lead us?
To the occupation of the whole of the kingdom,
and thus place us upon the internal frontier of China,
as well as to a considerable extent upon that of tho King
of Siam. We had made, of late years, many annexa-
tions to the empire of India, but he had no hesitation in
saying that, while some of these had produced the greatest
possible advantage to us in a military point of view, they
had been of no material benefit to us in other respects, but

even the military advantages would be denied, as in the case
of Ave. In the case of the interior of India all the troops
at the various provinces could be easily available for the
protection of any one province that might require their ser-
vices, but from Ava it would be impossible to withdraw the
troops, which would be found necessary to keep possession
of it. Ave was out of India, and was altogether uncon-
nected with it. This was the first time the Government had
desired to extend the empire in that direction. We could not
occupy Ave without alarge military force, even if we confined
ourselves to the occupation of Pegu without a considerable
addition of force. Without this it would be impossible to
diminish the number of officers in the regular regiments by
appointing them, as we did now, to political and civil offices.
It would be necessary, therefore, to add several regiments
for the purpose of-procuring more officers. Already during
the present war no fewer than 22 officers had been taken
from their regiments, and placed in political situations. At
least four European and eight native regiments would be
absolutely necessary, even if we confined ourselves to the
occupation of Pegu.; but we must go further—we must
occupy the whole kingdom of Ava ; and, he had told their
lordships with what countries they would, in that case,
come into contact, and how great was the danger, that some
apparent or pretended necessity would be found of going
yet further. There was another consideration which their
lordships ought not to dismiss from their minds,—that was,
the manner in which they would carry on the Government
of Ave. In the case of the previous annexations which
had taken place in India they could bring from any part of
the country persons conversant with the habits and lan-
page of the people ; but the language of Ava was different
from any known in India, and how could they conduct the
Government of a conquered country with anything like
satisfaction to themselves, when they could not find a
single individual to assist them able to speak its language ?
(Hear, hear.) When he looked at the magnitude of the
operations in which we were now engaged, at the annexa-
tion of a province which we did not really occupy, at the
threat to occupy an empire and dethrone a Sovereign, if our
demands were not acceded to; when he looked at the expen-
diture which had been already incurred in the war—not less
at the present time, he apprehended, and from the com-
mencement of the war, than 130,0001. a month—remember-
ing the expense of the war in China, he might even say
150,0001. a month ; when he considered that we had
already detached from India 15 regiments, besides artillery
—that we occupied the whole steam force of India, besides
a portion of that belonging to her Majesty ; when he looked
forward to the prospect of more extended operations being
necessary to carry into effect the great object to which we
had now pledged our honour by that unfortunate procla-
mation ; when he remembered that the original causes or
pretexts that had been put forward in its justification were
two little injuries inflicted on British subjects, the details
of which were adopted, according to the statement of the
parties complaining, without any inquiry whatever by im-
partial persons—two little insults, as they were called, in-
flicted upon those persons, who went to the Governor of
Rangoon with a letter from the Governor-General of India,
—the first provoked by the recklessness with which they
acceded to the proposition to go two and a half miles in the
middle of the day to the Governor of Rangoon—a circum-
stance which would at all times be certain to call forth dis-
respect—and the second provoked and rendered necessary
by persisting in going to the Governor when ho had dis-
tinctly told them that he would not receive the mission at
all ; when he considered that the whole amount of the ori-
ginal damage was said to bo 900/. ; when he remem-
bered that we had Seized a ship of 900 tons burden,
which was surely equal in value to the amount of
the damage ; when he considered hew the presence of
five of our ships in their river might have been considered
by the Burmese as an injury and an insult, at least
equal to that which we said we received—when he remem-
bered all these things, he confessed it was most painful to
see the great and lamentable consequences which had arisen
from a cause so small. (Hear.) This was not the first oc-
casion on which differences had arisen with the Burmese
Government from supposed injuries to British subjects, and
supposed disrespect to the British flag; but on former occa-
sions the good sense of the Government had so acted as to
prevent the collision which had taken place in the present
instance. It was well known that on this occasion the King
of Ave did not desire war, and that he had made no prepa-
ration for it—that, whatever injury or insult had been in-
flicted on us, tho notion of acting hostilely towards us
never entered his head. When he remembered this—and
remembered also that on former occasions our disputes with
that Government had been settled in an amicable manner,
so as to avoid hostilities, ho confessed it was with deep re-
gret that he had seen on this occasion a course pursued so
entirely contrary. The Government, he was aware, were
not answerable for the proclamation to which he referred.
They must, and we all must, adhere to it and abide by its
consequences; but at least he desired, if possible, to hear
from the noble lord what were his views of our position
with regard to the Government of Ava, and in what man-
ner we could best extricate ourselves. (Hear.)
The Earl of ABERDEEN—My noble friend asks us
whether we have any objection to lay before the house a
letter from the secret committee of the Court of Directors

of the East India Company to the Governor-General of
India in Council, dated in September, 1820, giving instruo-
tions as to the line of operations in any future war with
Ave.. Now, although I believe it has scarcely over been
customary to produce any dispatch from the Secret Com-
mittee, I am not disposed to withhold the dispatch which
is now asked for ; for, although it may be a document pos-

Bossing some historical interest, I think it is one of little

practical utility. That dispatch was written 25 years ago,

on a supposed event which might take place, viz., the ;el

newal of a war with Ava. Now, your lordships will see
that in this lapse of time many events may have hap-

paned to render completely inappropriate any line of
conduct prescribed in a dispatch of so old a date—
(hear, hear)—and therefore, although, as I have said, it
may be matter which may interest your lordships to pos-
sess the opinions of the illustrious man referred to by my
noble friend, expressed as they are in the language of my
noble friend who has just spoken, I still must consider it
a matter of mere historical curiosity, and not one of prac-
tical utility. I have therefore no objection to produce
the dispatch. My noble friend has also asked whether
her Majesty's Government are prepared to lay before
the house any papers explanatory of the present objects of
the war with Ava, and of the measures whereby it is pro-
posed to attain such objects. These papers her Majesty's
Government are prepared to lay before the house, and
from them I believe my noble friend will obtain all the in-
formation he requires. I believe that the papers now upon
the table bring down the operations to the end of March ;
and those which are about to be produced will include the
latest papers which refer to the annexation of the province
of Pegu, and the proclamation to which my noble friend has
referred. My noble friend has another motion upon the
paper to which he has not adverted—viz., to move for an
account of the expense already incurred in the war with
Ava, and an estimate of the probable expense to be incurred
in the current year. That of course, will be complied with,
so far as it is in the power of the Government to do so.
My noble friend has entered into a very full and minute
criticism of the objects of the war, and the detailed con-
duct of the operations which have taken place. Your lord-
ships are aware that her Majesty's present Government
are strangers to the whole of the policy and execution
of that war up to the present time. Her Majesty's late
Government, I apprehend, gave their general appro-
bation to that policy, and to the conduct of the war.
I am not disposed to dissent from that policy, or
to withhold the approbation which the late Government
expressed. My noble friend has animadverted upon the
annexation of the province of Pegu. My lords, I have
great reliance upon the discretion, judgment, and expe-
rience of my noble friend the present Governor-General of
India, and I believe that he would not have adopted a
step of that description without very mature consideration
and a perfect conviction that he was acting in accordance
with his duty. That annexation, like many other of our
proceedings in India, has been reluctantly adopted. Ever
since I had a seat in this house I remember that every
Governor-General who has left this country has gone out
with professions of a most pacific policy, and a desire to
abstain from anything like war or aggrandisment of terri-
tory ; yet I believe that there has not been a single Gover-
nor-General who has not found himself engaged more or
less in war. (Hear, hear.) In the present instance I have
no doubt that my noble friend has been led by the neces-
sities of the case to extend the sphere of his warlike opera-
tions, for, as your lordships know very well, an enterprise,
whatever may be its primary objects and intentions, ne-
cessarily undergoes great changes and modifications in the
course of its progress. My noble friend, opposite has also
referred to the various military operations of General
Godwin, and to the different movements of his army. I
am unable to form a judgment of the propriety, wisdom,
or military skill displayed by the officers and men en-
gaged in the war. I make no such pretensions. I
know perfectly well the ability and power of military
' criticism possessed by noble friend opposite, and very
likely there may be some reason for the criticism
in which he has indulged. Upon that I confess I
have no opinion, but I believe that the Governor-General
• is fully as well able to form a just opinion of those proceed-
ings as my noble friend opposite, and, therefore, having
b complete reliance upon his judgment and knowledge, I do
not feel, inclined to come to any different opinion from
- that which he expressed. As I said before her Majesty's

present Government do not feel called upon to engage
in any manner in discussing the propriety of the mea-
sures which have taken place. In general terms, I ac-
quiesce in the opinion which has been expressed by the
late Government upon the subject, and in the eulogies
which were passed by them upon the Governor-General.
(Cheers.)
The Earl of DERBY said his noble friend near him, and.

the noble earl opposite, had both reminded him that her
24atjetity's present Government were not resposible for the
course of policy which had been pursued with reference to