The Sun.
London, England, 1854-02-15 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, 'WEDNESDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 15, 1854.

satisfied, required its ministers at Paris and London to ob-
tain written explanations, to know if a system of recipro-
city and an armistice was to be established iu the Black
Sea, and if we were to remain neutral, which we certainly
were not. The British and French fleets were there for
the protection of the Turkish territory and flag, and to in-
sist that a weak power shonld not depend upon the will
a a pewerfnl nation. To have declared ourselves neutral
would have been to stultify ourselves, and to tie our hands
for the future, and injure the very cause we wished to sup-
port. But my noble friend seems to complain that Russia
was not allowed to transport her forces from one Russian
port to another. Why, if we had permitted that, we
should have had to remain passive spectators whilst large
forces were being conveyed from Russian ports to Erzeroum
and the most distant parts of the Black Sea, or to have
passively witneased.the spectacle of the Tnrkish fleet inter-
fering with such an expedition and insulting it. That, my
lords, would have been an anomaly ; but certainly Ido
not think it so great an anomaly as the occupation of the
Danubian principalities without a declaration of war, in
order to obtain a power which could not be rightfully
demanded or conceded without the sacrifice of the indepen-
dence of the Sultan. (Hear.) And although my noble
friend takes the part of the Emperor of Russia, and says he
has been very ill used, I think what has taken place cannot
be very new to the Emperor of Russia, for I will
which
occurred • lordships' attention to a case analogous to it, wla
occurred in the year 1850, and of which my noble friend
must be more cognizant than myself, for he was a member
s
of the Government at the time. In 1850 the Emperor of
Russia declared that he had constituted himself a pacifica-
tor between Austria and Prussia—that he was about to
propose certain terms of arrangement to Prussia, upon
which peace might be negotiated ; and when Prussia re-
jected the proposal, the Emperor of Russia declared that,
although it would give him much pain t° °PP°sect
to
his ally Prussia, yet, that if she persisted in _
her rejection
of the terms proposed, he (the Emperor) should consider it
a CaM3 belli; and further than that, he requested that the
British squadron should be sent to cruse in the Balticwith
the Russian fleet, in order to show thati
were ld be were
were determined that the dispute son settled, and
all further resistance put down. Therefore Ido not think
that the Emperor of Russia can complain o f this as a very
new proceeding. (Hear, hear) I must
apologise
to
your
lordships for taking up so much your time, but I wished
to notice the points to which my noble friend has adverted.
My noble friend has rather treated with levity, or at least
has viewed as insignificant, the attempts which we have
made to secure and cement the alliance between this coun-
try and France with Austria and Prussia ; but, my lords,
1 must say that even since the last occasion when I had
the honour of addressing you, we have had fresh reason to
be satisfied with the conduct of these two countries. My
noble friend the other night complained of the deference
which we have shown to them. [The Marquis of Clanri-
carde here made a remark which did not reach the gallery.]
my noble friend even complained of Vienna being selected
as the place for holding the conference, although it was the
mediation of the Austrian Government that had been asked
for by the Russian Government, and one of the proceedings
on which he based his objection was, because of the extra-
ordinary astuteness of the Russian minister at the Court of
Vienna. I can only say that I wish that the same astute-
ness, or, as I should rather say, wisdom, had been displayed
by the Russian Government itself ; for this minister ap-
proved of the Turkish modifications, and recommended his
Government to adopt them ,• and if his advice had been
followed I do not think that Russia would have stood in
the isolated and unenviable position which it now occupies.
But Austria and Prussia have come to three determina-
tions, which are recorded in separate acts—first, that the
war, prolonged to whatever extent it.may be, shall not be
suffered to alter the geographical limits previously settled
between the belligerent Powers ; next, they have recom-
mended the terms of an honourable peace, which they say
ought to be accepted by Russia ; and thirdly, they have
recorded their conviction that the minter propositions of
Russia are not such as to be worthy of being sent to Con-
stantinople. Therefore, through the joint action of Eng-
land and France, as well as Austria and Prussia, the means
of assenting to an honourable peace have been placed in
the hands of Russia. And, whilst I do not wish to pro-
nounce any unjust or harsh judgment, I must still say that
there can now be no doubt what will be the individual
opinion of mankind with respect to that Power which ap-
pears determined to plunge Europe into the incalculable
horrors of war, when, with honour to herself, she might
have averted it. (Cheers.) Certainly, Austria and Prussia,
as I took the opportunity of saying before, a few days ago,
have met the proposals of Russia in a manner becoming
the dignity of independent Powers. Whilst England and
France are preparing to go to war with Russia, and are
determined to do so if necessary, with Austria and Prussia
it rests to avert war, or, at least, to render it of short
duration. (Hear, hear.) And, undoubtedly, the interests
of these two Powers are in harmony with a noble and
generous course which will bring safety abroad as well
as at home, for they will have with them the universal
opinion of Germany ; and revolution, my lords, will not
rear its head, nor will England refuse its simpathy to
countries which are faithfully endeavouring to perform
their duties and obligations. (Loud cheers.) My lords,
the answer of Austria was that so long as Russia main-
tained a defensive attitude, so long Austria did not
feel it incumbent on her to act ; but now that Rus-
sia appears determined to go forth, and to push her
intentions beyond that which she had led Austria to ex-
pect, Austria would be governed by a sense of her own in-
terest and dignity, and she had sent a large portion of
troops to the frontier, first taking care to give satisfactory
assurances to Turkey with regard to the object of this
measure, and declaring that if armed intervention should
become necessary to maintain the strictly legal and terri-
torial status quo, she would not refuse to join in it. The
answer of Prussia was quite as dignified and decided • and
an account of this intention of Prussia being known, I be-
lieve Count Orloff did not extend his mission t., Berlin ;
and therefore I think that your lordships will be of opi-
nion that our endeavours to secure the alliance of Austria
and Prussia, and our deference to those powers, have not
proved in vain or been misplaced. I believe that the peo-
ple of this country, who, I must say in passing, have dis-
played the most admirable discretion during several months
of great excitement and continuous misrepresentation. have
not come to any decision on this subject, still less have
they passed a judgment upon the Government under im-
perfect inf,rmation. And I say I cannot help believing
that the people of this country, now that the flicts are
fully before them, and they are possessed of proper infor-
mation, will not regret to find all the labour which the
Government has spent in the cause of peace, but that, on
the contrary, they would even now, at the eleventh hour,
be desirous of preventing war, could it possibly be pre-
vented consistently with the honour and dignity of this
country. (Hear.) And if it should be our duty to inform
them that peace on those terms cannot be maintained, sure
I am they will come forward in a manner worthy of Eng-
lishmen, worthy of the cause described by my noble friend,
and worthy of the ally by whose side they will then for the
first time find themselves ranged; that they will stop
short at no sacrifice, at no effort to obtain such a peace as
was glanced at by my noble friend—such a peace as will
be consistent with the national honour, and will establish
those principles which we are determined at any risk to
maintain. (Cheers.) [The noble earl was occasionally only
imperfectly heard.]
The Earl of ELLESMERE wished to call their lord-
ships'
attention to a subject of considerable importance. It
appeared that, in consequence of the occurrences connected
with the return of the fleets to Constantinople, there
seemed to be an impression that a censure upon the admi-
rals was implied. This country was embarking in a wor-
thy cause—troops were being sent out which were never
sent in vain, more particularly when sent for the protection
of a weak State against the oppression of the strong, and
he trusted that they would not be despatched upon any
principle which would allow civil or diplomatic agents to
interfere with the professional judgment of their com-
manders. Such cases had been known in English history,
and the result had been disastrous. A gallant English
general who had died for his country had been thwarted in
his plans by such a system, and, their lordships knew that
if it were not practised upon the greater man who suc-
ceeded him, it was only because he never would submit to
it. He entirely concurred with his noble friend as to the
great ability of our ambassador at Constantinople, and he
thought it would he paying him a very bad compliment to
extend his control to naval or military operations. With
regard to the return of the fleets to Constantinople, it
seemed to be generally allowed that they could not have
remained at any plase more adapted for favouring the
views of Russia than Siuope, and it was advisable to pause
before taking any step which might en:ist in the service of
Russia the fogs, the lee shores, and the ens rents of the Black
Sea.

The Earl of MALMESBURY hoped that the noble lord
the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, would do him the justice
of admitting that neither during the last session of Parlia-
ment, nor at the commencement of the present, had he
pressed the Government, against their wishes, to lay any
papers before their lordships when they declared that to
do so would be to the prejudice of the public service.
He had already stated to their lordships the reasons
which led him to believe that her Majesty's Ministers had
not taken the course best adapted for preventing the evils
with which at present the country was threatened. He had
at the close of the last session pressed the noble lord, the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs to lay on their lordships'
table a paper which was not of the same nature as the
other papers, but which would have enabled him to give
the country some idea, some notion, of the animus
which guided the policy of her Majesty's Government
The noble lord thought proper to refuse to produce even
t,,hat_document which was an answer to the circular issued
uount Nesselrode ; and it, therefore, appeared as if
the noble earl had not answered that circular,' while the
French Government had done so. He (Lord 31alb
could not, on perusing mesurY)
the papers now before their lord-
ships' see any reason for refusing to roduce his reply to
tb. bes4e
t circular, that reply did the greatest credit to
the noble earl. Still l reason was there for not pro-
ducing the reply to the first circular, because much had
been said w,dch ought to have beenl answered before the
face of all Europe. There must, he was aware, be imper-
fection in the books as they were at present, because
events had taken place since heyzdere first printed and
laid upon the table; but a correspondence most intimately
ceunected with what followed Lehr rt.%
thee been pro-
duced at the same time. He referred
.aunt Leiningen to Constantinople, and he
pcieuelmlinsnsoidtontcohoanft-
veive thee such a mission could have taken
the Emperor of Russia would not have observed its
with jealousy, and have endeavoured to put himseleronrsea
par in that Court as regarded any claim, or pretended
claim, upon the Turkish Government. He also felt jun_
tified in saying, after a careful perusal of the papers which
had been laid upon the table, that the Russian Govern-
ment had been in the first place deceived as to the inten-
tion and feelings of her Majesty's Governnient ; and, in the
second place, that they had been confirmed in that opinion
by the evident and positive want of identity of action be
tweon England and France. This assertion with respect
to the. impression of the Russian Government as to the
feeling of the English Cabinet was confirmed by anextract
from a despatch of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe after Prince
Menschikoff made his first demand. Prince Menschikoff
was feeling his way, in order, if possible, to have the
co-operation of Lord Stratford ; and it appeared that
that noble lord himself thought the opinion of
Prince Menschikoff was not only that the British
Government would not oppose his demands, but that
they were actually inclined- to assist them. Now, when
confidence was reposed in any person, it was always the
result of some train of argument ou the part of those who
so reposed it. What, than, could have been the reasons
'which induced Prince Menschikoff not only to believe that
the) English Government would remain neutral in this
Twitter, but that they would positively assist the Emperor
ba his endeavours? What he had just read was the first
symptom in these books of the impression—the unneces-
'LlU and erroneous impression— which Russia bad that we
'should assist her. Still, there must have been some
language held elsewhere • there must have been some in-
ducement for the Russian Government to adopt these
opinions and to inoculate Prince Menschikoff with these
views. The next charge he had to make against the Go-
vernment wee with respect to the sending for the fleet.

Colonel Rose, it appealed was quite justified in the alarms
which had induced him to send for the fleet; he had been
warned by all the consuls in the south of the Russian
dominions and the north coast of Turkey that Russia was
arming both by sea and by land ; and he was warned that
Prince Menschikoff had actually threatened the Ministers
of the Porte that Russia would consider it an act of hos-
tilitynegotiations proposed to them
was r
repeated
etahteedfmtboi
etchteoEfnavnKsh or the French ambassadors at
Constantinople. This was at once suspicious, and it was
very natural that Colonel Rose, hearing this, and that
Prince Menschikoff was, all it were, ashamed of his own
propositions, and wished to keep them secret—it was most
natural that he should ask for the fleet. But Colonel Rose
did not ask that the fleet should go to the Dardanelles ; he
merely requested that Admiral Dundas should advance to
a fort open to every one, and where, he believed,
our ufleet went every summer. Her Majesty's Government,
however, differing, from Colonel Rose and also from the
Emperor of the French, commanded Admiral Dundas to
remain at Malta, and the consequence of that command he
(Lord Malmesbury) maintained
still (and this book he
thought proved it) was, that Russia was confirmed in the
delusion under which she laboured—namely, that England
and France were not on the same line. The noble marquis
(Clanricarde) had read to their lordships the thanks which
the Prime Minister received on that occasion from Count
Nesselrode; and similar thanks were also given in the same
letter to his noble friend (the Earl of Clarendon) who was
looked upon as a novas homo,
in whom Count Nesselrode
had great hopes for the future, and in whom he thought he
might put great confidence. Count Nesselrode not only
did that, but actually congratulated the Government on
the want of unity in the two allies. Nothing, he thought,
could confirm more than did all these transactions—espe-
cially this letter of Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow—
the justice of the reproaches he (Lord Malmesbury) had
directed to her Majesty's Government on a former occasion
on this point. Although, however, the consuls had de-
clared these military preparations were going on—although
Prince Menschikoff was convicted of attempting to conceal
from the English and French ambassadors the negotiations
he was commanded to open up at Constantinople—all this
did not open the eyes of the noble lord the Secretary for
Foreign Affairs. He (Lord Malmesbury) should have
thought that after the noble earl's (Clarendon's) experience
in Spain and in Ireland, the credulity inherent to the most
generous mind might at least have been shaken by what he
heard from the various sources open to him. Not at all.
Long after these events had taken place his noble friend,
on the 18th of April—a month after Colonel Rose had
been so alarmed, and two or three months afterthe reports
of the consuls, said :

" I told Count Walewski that the same information had
been communicated to her Majesty's Government by Colonel
Dose, but I had reason to believe that the treaty in question
would be a written agreement with respect to the Holy Places,
and the mode of conducting divine worship and religious
ceremonies there by the Greek and Latin communities."
Well, if it was to be a written agreement with respect to
the Holy Places—a subject with respect to which his noble
friend (Lord Derby) and Lord John Russell had declared
the English Government had no interest —if it was
merely that, why should Prince Menschikoff attempt to
conceal his proposals to the Turkish Government ?
It would have been only fair to suppose that, had the
Holy Places alone been the subject of his mission, he
would have had no object in concealment, when it had
been declared that the English Government had no inte-
rest in the matter. (Hear, hear.) His noble friend the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs still, however, continued to
believe in the good faith of the Russian Government. He
(Lord Malmesbury) agreed that no policy could be so in-
jurious as a policy of suspicion, but however this might
apply to the frequent expression of suspicions, it was a very
different thing from their being entertained in the mind of
a Minister from whom the utmost. vigilance and watchful-
ness were to be expected, and he was surprised at the con-
tinuance of the noble earl's delusion until the film was
actually torn by force from his eyes. He (Lord Malmesbury)
had said there had been a want of unity of action between
the two Governments of England and France almost from
the beginning. With respect to the calling up of the fleet
by the ambassadors, it was, of course, a matter of discus-
sion in the English Cabinet whether that authority should
rest with the Government at home or with the ambassa-
dor at Constantinople, and it was at last, and he thought
very properly, given to Lord Stratford. When, however,
had it been given ? It was given, according to this book,
on the 2d of June ; and at that moment it did not appear,
from these papers, that her Majesty's Government were
aware that the French ambassador had had authority to
call up the fleet of that country since the 22d of March.
Now, that the French ambassador should have had that
power must have been as well known to the Russian am-
bassador at Constantinople, and to the Turkish Government
and everybody else concerned, as it was to himself ; and
this example of want of unity of action must have made
a strong impression upon the Russian Government, and
have contributed to encourage the delusions and ambitious
dreams of an obstinate man, who perhaps only wished for
some such excuse to continue in the course he had entered
upon. But there were other things which ought to
have made the noble earl suspicious of the real objects
of Russia, for Russian misrepresentations were not con-
fined to stating what was certainly not the fact with
respect to the mission of Prince Menschikoff, but there were
all sorts of misrepresentations made at different times with
respect to the ambassadors themselves. A most gross accu-
sation was made in the first volume of these papers against
Lord Stratford, who was charged by Count Nesselrode with
having been the primary cause of the rejection by Red-
schid Pacha of Prince Menschikoff's demands. Such a charge
was wholly unfounded, and Count Nesselrode, probably not
believing his informant, refused the only remedy he could
honourably have given—namely, an investigation into the
source of this gross and undeserved accusation against an
ambassador. That was not all. Strange misrepresentations
were made as to the conduct, words, and actions of Lord
Westmoreland at Vienna. All this ought to have convinced I
her Majesty's Government that the cause which required
such support could not have been a just one. Still, how-
over, they continued a course of negotiation ; and if he
(Lord Malmesbury) were an older diplomatist he should
say that that negotiation resulted in an accident in diplo-
macy which would never be forgotten. The Vienna Note
was composed by men of undoubted talent and experience,
and they, of course, as honourable men, wishing well to
Turkey, and wishing to defend it against the aggressions
and the unjust claims of Russia, framed such a note as
they believed would answer the purpose. That note was
forwarded to both parties, and. was at once accepted by
Russia, Count Nesselrode saying, very suspiciously, that
the Turkish Government ought to take it aux mains jointes.
Redschid Pasha, however, refused to adopt it, and sug-
gested modifications. When the noble earl (Clarendon) sent
the note to Lord Stratford, this was what he said about it—
" Her Majesty's Government have, in preference to all
other plans, adhered to this project of note as the means best
calculated to effect a speedy and satisfactory solution of the
differences. They consider that it fully guards the principle
for which throughout we have been contending, and that it
may, therefore, with perfect safety be signed by the Porte ;
and they further hope that your Excellency, before the re-
ceipt of this despatch, will have found no difficulty in pro-
curing the assent of the Turkish Government to a project
which the allies of the Sultan unanimously concur in recom-
mending for his adoption."
That was the opinion of her Majesty's Government, but
what was the view entertained by our ambassador? Lord
Stratford wrote—

" Though I scrupulously abstained from expressing any
private opinion on the merits of Count Buol's Note while it
was under consideratien at the Porte, I think it incumbent
on me to state frankly to your lordship that the decision of
the Council has in no degree surprised me. In making this
avowal I have exclusively in view those passages of the note
to which the Porte objects. It really appears to me, with all
deference to your lordship's superior judgment, that the first
two of the objectionable passages could hardly stand as they
are without exposing the Porte to inferences not borne out by
facts, and eventually to pretensions that it would be equally
inconvenient, if not dangerous, to admit or to resist."

Such was Lord Stratford's opinion an contradistinction to
that of tho Ministry, who had said it could be accepted
with perfect safety. Then the noble earl at the head of
the Foreign-office wrote :--

"Her Majesty's Government are :far from denying that
these modifications arc in themselvos unobjectionable ; but
they do not consider them of that vital importance, nor that
they offer such additional security to• Turkey, as to counter-
balance the risks to which the Ottoman empire is exposed
by further postponing the settlement of this unfortunate
question,"

So the noble earl stuck to his opinion, notwithstanding
the representations of Lord Stratford , and, of course, he
(Lord Malmesbury) concluded that tl se other diplomatists
who drew up the Note remained of the same opinion as
the noble earl. Who, however, tun sed out to be right ?
The question must have remained a. :matter of opinion to
this moment but from a starling despatch from Count Nes-
selrode himself, interpreting the °tip nal Note which his
Government had accepted, and refasi ng and scouting the
Turkish modifications. The Porte wars, therefore, justified
in the eyes of his would-be friends fo r refusing to accede to
the Vienna Note. He (Lord Malrnessbury) could imagine
the extraordinary confusion which w ould be caused in this
body of diplomasts at Vienna at 1 earning that they had
composed a Note in direct contradict ion to what they had
meant it to be. Then, as events vre:nt on, there was ano-
ther, and he thought very remakab le proof of disunity of
action between the French and English Governments
—a disunity which was at once la id before the Rus-
sian Prime Minister, and was main rally remarked upon
by him—he referred to the order evon with respect to the
objects of the fleets in being sent to. the Black Sea. It ap-
peared that when the fleets were so sent it became the duty
of the ambassadors at Constantin.nde to acquaint Count
Nesselrode with the fact. The de snatch which contained
this intimation was by direction of th e French Government
to be road to the Count by Genera Castelbajac, but the
substance only was to be repeated to. him bySirG.Seymour.
Both Governments stated that the. :fleets were going into
the Black Sea to defend the territc ,r 3• of Turkey, and at the
same time the English Governmen- t a.lded that they would
do their utmost to prevent the Tui •Itissh fleet from making
any attack on the Russian fleet. T ha t, however, was omit-
ted in the French despatch. Now. -their lordships would
see at once the very great different e in the orders given,
and that difference had evidently s na de a deep impression
upon Count Nesselrode, who point ed it out to Sir G. Sey-
mour. Then, there was another d iscrepancy as to the ob-
jects of the fleets which he (Lord! M.) as totally unable
to account for. In a communicatio a to Baron Brunow, the
noble earl (Clarendon) said the fleets ; had made the move-
ment in question to avert the da tigers which seemed to
threaten the lives and property of bier Majesty's subjects.
Five days afterwards, Oct. 7, the - noble earl had, however,
to write to our ambassador at Pars a mpon this subject, and
his words were these :
" It, therefore, appears advisable. to her Majesty's Govern-
ment that general instructions shoe dd be given to the ambas-
sadors and admirals to employ the combined fleets in what-
ever manner, and at whatever plact !, they may think neces-
sary for defending the Turkish te: rri tory against direct ag-
gression. If the Russian fleet were to come out of Sebastopol
the fleets would, as a matter of tour pass through the Bos-
phorus."
It was not, therefore, for the excl asi ve object of defending
her Majesty's subjects in the Blac' tS ea, but positively (and
he was very glad to say so) to del em I the Turks and to de-
fend their just claims. Why, the n, in the name of all that
was straightforward—why not t ell Baron Brunow that?
He was the very man who ought to have been told ; his
mind ought to have been stroi ly impressed with the
fact that the fleets were to mains ia in the independence of
Turkey, the status quo, and the t irritorial arrangements
of Europe. Such an omission on t ho part of the Govern-
ment only reacted upon themsely et
,• the Baron, of course,
tltransmitted to his Governmen t that statement • and it
tended further to deceive the I iu ssian Government as to
the vigorous course which her Mrsje sty's Ministers were at
last determined to follow. The sae se infirmity of purpose
and want of courage pervaded the 1 whole of their policy
luring these transactions. How • did the noble earl treat
that event which must be regarded as one of the most
important in the whole series—the invasion of the princi-
palities ? With the same excessive politeness, the same
extreme tenderness, the same--4 se had not language to
express the manner in which the not de earl had treated the
question of the invasion of the prig cipalities. What was

the language of the noble earl on the occasion? One might
have supposed that an English Minister would have mani-
fested his opinion of so gross a violation of treaties, of so
gross an outrage upon humanity—upon justice, in terms
of the most emphatic condemnation, however civilly and
courteously framed. But what said the noble earl in com-
municating to Sir G. Seymour the conversation he had
had with Baron Brunow on the 22nd of July ?

" I have communicated to Baron Brunow the substance of
my despatch of the 19th inst. to you, and informed him that
I had not alluded in it to the evacuation of the principalities
as a necessary and immediate consequence of an arrangement
of differences between Russia and the Porte, because I
thought it would be little less than an insult to the Russian
Government to suirpose, after the public assurances that bad
been given on the subject, that any portion of the Turkish
territory would be occupied by Russian forces for a day
longer than was necessary for their evacuation, when the
question at issue between the two Governments was amicably
settled."

Rosily, this language of the noble earl reminded him (Lord
Malmesbury) of a very timid master of the ceremonies in
a town near his residence, who, upon being requested one
night at the assembly to turn out a very ferocious-
looking personage who had entered the ball room with
his hat on, replied,—" Oh, have patience ; no doubt
he'll take his hat off by-and-by." (Much laughter from
the Opposition benches.) Neither was there mention of
the occupation of the principalities in the famous Vienna
Note, an omission of the most extraordinary description.
(Hear.) He trusted that none of their lordships would
suppose that he was blaming the Government for not
having taken hostile measures sooner ; it was not that he
complained of ; he did not compiain of the efforts they
had made to maintain peace—an object he valued as much
as any of their lordships ; what he conceived was, that
they had mistaken the best way of obtaining the Object.
They should have borne in mind that they had to deal
with a man of absolute power, a man of strong feelings, of
strong passions—a man who had an hereditary fixed idea
firmlyimpressed on his mind that it was decreed that
either he or his descendants should occupy Constantinople.
Having to deal with a man full of these feelings and this
prejudice, and of the most obstinately determined cha-
racter, the English Government should have seen, at the
outset, that he was only to be deterred from his purpose
by having it distinctly manifested to him, in the most
emphatic language and manner, that dangers greater than
any glory or advantage he could hope to gain from his ob-
ject would inevitably befall him as the result of attempting
it. Hear, hear.) They should have made him from the
very first distinctly understand that the existence of an
independent Sovereign at Constantinople was a political
necessity to England and to France, fully equal to that
which he might deem Russiain postession of Constantinople
to be, and that England and France were resolute, at all
cost, to -vindicate that necessity. (Hear.) It had been
lightly asserted, and by a man of eminent ability, too,
that it was matter of little consequence to whom Constan-
tinople belonged, and that there was no sort of political
objection to its being in the hands of Russia. Now, in his
(Lord M.almesbury's) conviction, not merely with reference
to our supremacy as a maritime Power, but with reference
even to our security as an empire, it would be as fatal
to us to have Constantinople in the hands of Russia as
it would be to have Ireland in the hands of an in-
dependent Sovereign. (Hear.) We knew that Russia
had, at this moment, 27 sail of the line in the
Baltic, and 15 sail of the line in the Black Sea. Without
spending one farthing more than at present on her navy,
Russia might have 37 sail of the line in the Black Sea, and
how, then, could the great force be kept from being avail-
able against us, if the Autocrat so desired ? Onoe in pos-
session of the Bosphorus, thus rendered impregnable, this
fleet so unassailable from without, might rush, at any
moment into the Mediterranean, and then in what posi-
tion would Malta or Corfu be, with such garrisons as we
had there now ! In what a position would English power
in the Mediterranean be, maintained by five or six sail of
the line we had kept up for some years past ! Nor would
the relative position of France, in such a contingency, be
better than that of England, for it was quite fallacious to
say that France had a less interest than we in the posses-
sion of Constantinople by the Russians. Their lordships
would at once perceive this when they reflected what
would be the position of France when she had 37 Russian
ships of the line within four or five days' sail of Toulon
and of her Algerine colonies. Unquestionably, then, it
was pre-eminently worth while for these two great nations
to apply their utmost efforts, how great soever the calami-
ties and the cost of war, to avert such a catastrophe as
the occupation of Constantinople by Russia. Had it been
timely declared to the Autocrat that England and France
were resolute to defend the independence of Turkey with
their last soldier and their last shilling, he would then have
comprehended the gravity of the undertaking he had
entered upon, when, without the least provocation, he
urged upon Turkey a series of demands which no inde-
pendent Sovereign could with dignity accept, and which
no independent nation should have heard of without utter
and open indignation. (Hear, hear.)
Lord GLENELG thought that no documents had ever
been produced by any government which on the whole were
more satisfactory than these. He look at them generally,
and spoke of their general effect. Government had a good
cause, and he thought it highly creditable to them that
negotiations having been carried on for so long a time, and
in so many quarters, that they should be able to produce
such documents. They deprecated war as the greatest
of evils, but they knew that there were evils to which
war itself was not to be compared. They condemned war,
but they thought war essential at the same time they
had endeavoured to avert war. And what was the main
objection? Why that they had delayed it too long.
There were men who treated the calamity of war with
comparative lightness. He could not blame Government
for having so long deferred war, from having tried every
expedient by which they could escape from war. That
was the position in which the Government was placed
towards the country at this period. The objections made
by the noble earl (Malmesbury) resolved themselves intotwo.
One was that the noble earl at the head of the Foreign-
office showed too much timidity, and the other was that he
had expressed himself in a despatch with too much tender-
noses. He would appeal to any assembly of gentlemen in
England, if they could find fault with any one for having
confidence in the assurances which were made by a man
remarkable for not deviating from his representations —by
a man who has been marked by wisdom and moderation,
and given too under circumstances which commanded the
belief not only of this Government, but of every Govern-
ment of Europe. He concurred most cordially in every
word that had been said by the noble earl (Clarendon),
and he considered the conduct of Lord Stratford de Red-
cliffe in this matter had placed him in a favourable light
among diplomatists. He considered that Government had
acted wisely in incurring delay rather than rush into the
calamities of war. Many statesmen had rushed into war
and gained great glory who would afterwards have given
worlds to have prevented it. What was it that made Sir
Robert Walpole so popular in succeeding generations ? It
was because he resisted war, and, though condemned by
the country at the time, posterity had since done him
ample justice. He thought the verdict of posterity would
be pronounced in favour of the course which the Govern-
ment had pursued ; and, if we were to have a war, he
hoped it would be carried on with vigour. (Hear.)

Earl GREY said the fault of the Government was in
having permitted themselves to be drawn into the original
quarrel between Turkey and Russia; and arguments were
not wanting to show that they ought to have pursued a
more pacific course. Because Russia had done wrong, it
did not follow that we should interfere on behalf of Tur-
key, as we had no treaty to entitle us to do so. But it was
said that our interference was required upon grounds of
national policy, because it was of European importance to
maintain the independence of Turkey. It was bitter
mockery to talk of the independence of the Ottoman em-
pire; and he called upon the Government to define what
they meant by it. Did they mean by it the authority of
the Sultan over his subjects. The character of the Turks
was that which it had always been. This was proved
by their harsh and cruel treatment of the Christian
population, in which it was hopeless to anticipate
any permanent improvement. This, he contended,
was the expectation entertained, as appeared from
their respective despatches, both by the Foreign
Secretary and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. He quoted
Mr. Layard to show that the Christians were treated with
extreme tyranny and a total want of faith. Such being
the character of Turkey, he asked whether the mainten-
ance of the Ottoman empire, which would perpetuate such
evils, could possibly be an object for which this country
ought to make any sacrifice whatever ? But it was said
that Turkey must be maintained as a security against the
aggressions of Russia. Now he was unable to concur in
the popular apprehensions of Russian aggression— first, be-
cause a nation of slaves could never become really formid-
able ; and next, because corruption and peculation were
destroying the efficiency of the public service of Russia.
He ridiculed the notion of a Russian invasion of India ;
and, adverting to the despatches, expressed an opinion
that peace would have been preserved if Turkey had been
allowed to accept the Russian ultimatum. He drew a pic-
ture of the evils to Turkey and her allies, resulting from
the adoption of the opposite course, and suggested the pos-
sibility of a Greek insurrection aided by Russia. Should
such an event occur—and it was far from improbable—
would the people of England and France consent to inter-
fere 612 behalf of the Mahometan, while Russia defended
the Christian population ? He thought not. The inevit-
able result of such a rising must be the destruction of the
Turkish empire ; and where then would be the utility of
our interference ? What should we have gained by it ?
Having dwelt upon the inexpediency of interfering with
the affairs of other countries, the noble earl concluding by
declaring that in his opinion the course which her Ma-
jesty's Government had entered upon was pregnant with
danger.
The D eke of ARGYLL rejoiced that the speech of the
noble earl had been 4, elivered, because, from the facts on
which he relied, it was possible to educe the strongest argu-
ments in. favour of the policy adopted by the Govern-
ment. The Government was not officially responsible
for the Turkish rejection of the Menschikoff ultimatum.
That was the act of Turkey alone ; but, at the same
time, Russia had no right to demand the Menschikoff
note, and therefore the question was whether the weaker
State should be sacrificed to the stronger. The object of
the Government was to maintain the status quo of Europe;
for, if Russia had succeeded in fixing new engagements
upon Turkey, she would not only have endangered the
existence of the Turkish empire, but would have inter-
rupted the progress of the Christian population. The real
issue before the house, however, was, whether peace would
have been better secured by what was called more ener-
getic action. Glancing at the circumstances, he argued
that the sa.fest measures had been taken to secure this ob-
ject, both diplomatically and with regard to the move-
ments of the fleet. It was perfectly true that there might be
some danger of a rising of the Christian population ; but
he reminclod the house that it was made the condition of
giving the Ottoman empire an European guarantee that
she should secure the privileges and immunities of its non-
Mussulmau subjects. Nothing had occurred to lead the
Government to regret the course they had pursued. In
conclusion., the noble duke vindicated the Earl of Aber-
deen from the attacks made upon him for his efforts to
maintain p 3aCe.
The Earl of DERBY—My lords, I thought after the
discussion that has taken place that there wasnothing of a
practical character to which I should have to draw your
attention, but I feel that the observations which fell from
the noble duke call for some reply from those who do not
altogether share in his views—very natural as they are—
of the po'li'cy and of the skill with which those diplomatic
relations h ave been conducted. (Hear.) I think it must
be gratifying to the noble earl, whose defence the noble
duke undertook at the close of his speech, and it must be
a somewhat agreeable surprise to that noble earl to hear
himself charged with not being sufficiently pacific.
(Laughter.) The noble earl was charged by a noble lord
on the lifers r bench with having indulged too much in the
spirit of Iva ,r, and with not being sufficiently pacific, and
I see the noble earlaccepts the compliment, and is somewhat
penitent tha t he has not done more to preserve the peace of
Europe. The noble earl might have done more, I admit,
than he has done to preserve the peace of Europe, but he
should have done it in a very different manner from that
which bac been adopted. (Hear, bear.) My noble friend

on the cross benches has made an eloquent statement, and
indulged in declamation on the horrors of war, which no
person is contesting, and he compared the noble earl and
her Majesty's Ministers to Walpole, without his little pec-
cadilloes—(laughter)—or his Parliamentary corruption,
from which they are all free. (Laughter.) My noble
friend, said the noble earl, was another Walpole—not the
warlike Minister which another noble lord considered him
to be, and which the noble earl seemed disposed to consider
himself to be—(laughter)—my noble friend said the noble
earl was another Walpole, but more successful and happy
in the issue; and then, said my noble friend on the cross
benches, if a different course had been pursued—if you
had prematurely gone to war, and used violent language
and taken violent measures, the country would have been
plunged into the horrors of war, from which the successful
diplomacy of the Government has preserved it. if they
have not preserved the country from the horrors of war,
where is the truth of the eulogium which the noble lord
has passed on the noble earl opposite ? (Hear, hear.) He
says—Were it not for the successful diplomacy of the noble
earl, we would have been plunged into war—where are we
now ? (" Hear, hear," from the Opposition benches.) Are
we plunged into war, or are we not ? (Hear, hear.) It is
very like war. (Laughter.) The noble lord the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs is too cautious in his language
in this respect to tell us whether we are at war or at peace
(Hear, hear.) He says it is a very natural question we ask,
and he informs us, most truly, that it is not very easy to
give a distinct answer to it. (Laughter.) He says, we
certainly are not at war—we certainly cannot be said to be
at peace, says my noble friend ; and he says also that, when
we consider the course of the negotiations, and what has
taken place in the Black Sea, and the passing of our fleet
there, we cannot be supposed to be a neutral power.
(Laughter.) I want to know what is the state of the
country, when we are neither at peace nor at war,
nor neutral. (Laughter.) My noble friend has given us
a new phrase in Parliamentary or diplomatic language; we
are not at war, nor at peace, and we are not neutral, but
we are drifting towards war. (Laughter.) We are drifting
to wards war, and drifting very fast towards war. (Hear,
hear.) When we are sending out the most powerful fleet
that England ever equipped to the Baltic—when we have
another fleet in the Black Sea—when a considerable de-
tachment of troops are to land some way or other in a
foreign country. I suppose not for pacific purposes, I
think the symptoms are very strong that we are drifting
somewhat rapidly towards war. (Hear, hear.) No infor-
mation havi•l; been given to us of the grounds on which
the noble earl—the warlike Minister of this country—
(laughter)—founds his hopes of maintaining peace, I must,
come to the conclusion that a fortunate result to the Wal-
polean policy has not been arrived at, and that they have
landed this country into a war. (Hear, hear.) The ques-
tion is not whether peace in the abstract is desirable, or
whether Government is to be charged for having used
every effort to maintain peace. As long as they endea-
voured with honour, and a due regard to the interests of
the country; to maintain peace, every man must commend
them for using every exertion for the preservation of peace;
but they must tell us whether the course they pursued was
likely to effect that object. On that subject I concur in
the opinion which was expressed in the month of July last
by one in whose praise the house has been unanimous —to
whose praise I can add nothing, except my cordial con-
currence in every word that has been said in laudation of
his discretion, firmness, and judgment, and whose opinion,
I suppose, will be received with respect by her Majesty's
Ministers (Hear.) I concur with Lord Stratford de Red.
cliffe in thinking that " our intense anxiety to maintain
peace, notwithstanding the progress of circumstances preju-
dicial to its contiivance, though derived from our best feel-
ings, may eventually go far towards frustrating the object,
without preventing the occurrence of a war." In the month
of July last, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe used this lan-
guage : "In no direction is the prospect a cheering one.
Negotiation, if not in despair, appears to beat fault ; and,
should a resort to force be unavoidable, the struggle must
necessarily be sharp and the issue uncertain. In any
case, nothing can be worse than a hesitating, uncalculated
course. It is, no doubt, a misfortune for Europe to be
dragged, when least expecting it, to the verge of an arena
from which it is difficult to recoil, and upon which it is
almost impossible to enter with any limitation of conse-
quences. But let it be remembered that an evil which is
postponed or evaded is liable to recur with more inconve-
nience and danger at no remote period, and that by ven-
turing at once to look it in the face, we afford ourselves
the best chance of viewing it in its true proportions, and
employing the most judicious means for its correction."
My noble friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
expressed great satisfaction that this subject should have
been brought on for discussion ; but at the same time he
regretted that my noble friend the noble marquis, who has
entered into a most able and eloquent analysis of those
papers should have felt it necessary at this moment to dis-
parage the conduct of her Majesty's Government. No doubt
it would be a very agreeable mode if the discussion of public
papers, involving two large volumes and the whole of the
conduct of the Government, were to take place, subject to
this provision, that no person who takes part in the dis-
cussion should say a word to disparage her Majesty's Go-
vernment ; but if the noble earl thinks that such a doctrine
should be held, I cannot join with him in the opinion that
he expressed, that it would be necessary to bring the sub-
ject before Parliament at all. The noble earl the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, in another part of his speech, says you
have an ex poet facto wisdom and judge of events after the
occurrence has taken place, but, he says, put yourselves in
the position we were in at the particular time, and then
say whether we were to blame or not. Now, my lords, I
will call the attention of the house to the intimation
which we received on the 25th of April last, at which
period the noble earl assured the house that there n3ver
was the slightest apprehension of any disturbance on
the side of Turkey, and that the peace of Europe was
subject to no risk in that quarter. On what did the
noble earl then found the assurance given to the house,
that there was no apprehension of a disturbance
of the peace of Europe on the side of Turkey ? The as-
surance was given by the Russian Government so re-
peatedly and constantly that it was impossible for him to
admit into his mind a moment's hesitation of their com-
plete veracity. But the question is not whether the Go-
vernment received those assurances from Russia, but whe-
ther reports of their various ministers coincided with those
pacific assurances and declarations. (Hear, hear.) I shall
bring very shortly under the notice of the house the in-
formation of which the Government was in possession on
the 20th April, when the noble earl assured us there was
no apprehension of any disturbance of the peace of Europe
on the aide of Turkey. (Hear, hear.) I will not go back
to an earlier period further than to say, that from the very
moment of the change of Administration, by which the
noble earl's colleagues took office—from that moment, and
I believe in one instance before that time, intimations
were given to the Government that, for the promotion of
its objects, military forces were preparing on the part of
Russia. (Hear, hear.) That information was given so
early as the 6th of January, and again on the 7th and Bth
of January. On the 6th of January, page 56, Sir George
Seymour says—" I believe that measures have been taken
by the Russian Government to ensure that the fifth corps
d'armee shall be placed in a state of actual service"—
The Earl of CLARENDON—That arrived here on the
19th.

The Earl of DERBY—On the 7th of January there
came an account of the amount of force that was pre-
paring to move, and again on the Bth of January, Sir
George Seymour writes that that was all that Count Nes-
selrode could tell him—of the extent of those armaments
Count Nesselrode was not prepared to speak with cer-
tainty—that orders were given to the sth corps to march,
and that directions were issued to the 4th corps to hold
itself in readiness, and his Excellency Count Nessel-
rode expressed his belief that affairs would be brought
to a satisfactory conclusion if efforts were used in Paris
and Constantinople to advance the rights which his Go-
vernment claimed, and to discountenance the pretensions
of the french Cabinet. (Hear, hear.) Again, on the 7th
of April, there was a similar note as to the preparations
made for war and the movement of troops, and though
Count Nesselrode did not then feel at liberty to give to Sir
George Seymour any assurance respecting the military
preparations, he did not hesitate to declare that the nego-
tiations at Constantinople would be brought speedily to a
happy conclusion. (Hear, hear.) You have from Sir
George Seymour accompanying that a declaration on his
part that the answer of Count Nesselrode on the subject
was evasive to the last degree—you had from Col. Rose,
and from your consuls in the neighbourhood, notifications
that the Russians were concentrating upon the frontier, or
were evidently to be moved upon the frontier, and ready
to cross the frontier at a moment's -notice. (Hear, hear.)
At pages 60 and 61 you will find one of those warnings.
A further intimation was given lby Sir George Seymour
to the effect that he had heard, from good authority, that
the head-quarters of the 4th corps had removed to a place
close to the boundaries. On receiving that statement the
Secretary of State waited for the receipt of further de-
spatches, before replying to the communication respecting
the removal of the 4th corps. It was hoped that the dis-
cretion of the Emperor would prevent him from taking so
warlike a step ; and it was said by Lord John Russell that
this hope appeared to be well founded. In answer to a
communication from St. Petersburg, to the effect that the
4th and sth corps were on the borders of the Turkish fron-
tier, and prepared to enter into the provinces at any mo-
ment, Lord John Russell said that this confirmed the hopes
he entertained that the Emperor of Russia would never
take so warlike a step—(hear, hear)—" that since the
question of the holy places had been noticed by the Rus-
sian Minister to the Earl of Malmesbury it had assumed a
new character ; that the acts of injustice towards the
Greek Church, which it had been desired to prevent, had
been perpetuated, and consequently that now the object
must be to find a remedy for these wrongs; that the suc-
cess of the French negotiations at, Constantinople was to
be ascribed solely to intrigue and violence—violence which
had been supposed to be the ultima ratio of kings, being,
it had been seen, the means which the present ruler of
France was in the habitof employing in the first instance."
And Sir Hamilton Seymour further stated that Count
Nesselrode said that " when his Majesty's resolution is
finally taken it will be made known to Baron Brunow, who
is desired to communicate with your lordship, and to ob-
lain the approbation of her Majesty's Government to the
steps about to be taken by the Emperor for securing his
acknowledged rights." What I wish to show is, that the
language of Russia was over and over again the same, and
it showed that it was determined to carry out the objects
it had in view, and the only difficulty which it saw in its
way was, as has already been stated, the union which it
hoped would not exist between the English and French
Governments, and the nature of its hostile intentions to-
wards Turkey—or, rather, its violent intentions—con-
stantly coupled with assurances of confidence in the inten-
tions of her Majesty's Government, and with repeated at-
tempts to sow dissensions between the English and French
Governments, as the union of the two Governments would,
it was felt, render success uncertain. The noble dukeoppo-
site had reminded the house that their lordships ought to
draw a distinction between the course of proceedings as
between England and France in the earlier period of
the transaction and the later times. I admit the propriety
of tho distinction drawn by the noble duke, as far as relate
to the time at which the question was confined merely to
that of the holy places ; because not only the present but
the preceding Government had declared their opinion that
so long as the question was confined to a dispute as to the
holy places, so long as there was no object requiring the
interference of England, so lone. her Majesty's Government
was determined to hold themselvesp aloof from the dispute
except so far as the dispute might in any way affect the
interests of this country. But then the question as-
sumed a very different aspect when the subject of the
dispute of the holy places was to be settled not by dip-
lomacy, but by the collection of troops upon the Turk-
ish frontier. And under these circumstances it was that
so early as the 28th of January M. Drouyn do Lhuys,
through the French ambassador, had called the attention
of the Government to the necessity of there being
a perfectly correct understanding of the respective
positions of the two Governments, the necessity of a
good understanding between England and France, and for
concerting measures, not for the purpose of settling the
question of the holyiplaces, but for the purpose of opposing
a successful remonstrance to that threatened measure of
war on the part of Russia, indicated by the constant col-
lection of troops near the Turkish frontier. And that I
am not misrepresenting the views which were taken of the
question at the time will be found from a declaration

already quoted of the noble lord the Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, to the effect that, at that time, the 2Ah of Jan.,
he saw cause for thinking that it was absolutely necessary
that the two great powers should understand each other,
and that he would take into his immediate consideration
the measures in consequence. (Hear. hear.) What, then,
becomes of the argument of the noble deice, that until
after the mission of Prince Menschikoff the English and
French Governments had acted separately and alone, and
that the question of the holy places only was in discussion,
when his colleague acquiesced in the view of M. Drouyu
de Lhuys of the 28th of January, that it was absolutely
necessary that England and France should act in accord-
ance with each other, not, undoubtedly, for promoting the
views of France with respect to the holy places, but for
the purpose of providing against a contingency which they
expected might arise from the course pursued by Russia ?
Now, I am told that there was no end of assurance from
Russia—such assurances, indeed, as it was impossible to
doubt—that there was but one object, and one alone,
which Russia had in view. Now Ido not wish to defend
the course taken by Russia. I cannot defend the course
of proceeding or conduct of that power; but this I must
say, that from the first to the last of Count Nesselrode's
despatches, it was distinctly stated that the question of
the holy places, in the view of Russia, always involved the
protectorate of the Greek subjects of the Porte. The two
points were never kept separate a single moment in the
view of Russia. The Emperor of Russia contended that
under the treaty of Kainardji, he was entitled to the pro-
tectorate over the Greek subjects of the Porte. It was
contended that it would not be a violation of the in-
dependence or integrity of the Ottoman empire that
such a protectorate should exist in the hands of Russia.
I do not mean to say that both these positions on
the part of Russia were not utterly untenable, and
if she obtained such a sight as she assumed they
would be fatal to the integrity and independence
of the Porte ; but, from first to last, that question
upon which we have finally come to issue—the protectorate
to be exercised by Russia—was never dissociated from the
question of the holy places. No man in his senses could
suppose that it was the mere possession of this key of a
grotto—(a laugh)—that was alone influencing the conduct
of Rnssia. The object of Russia was, that her protectorate
which she said, and falsely said. had been violated—should,
in point of fact, be exercised over the whole of the co-
religionist subjects of the Turkish empire. Russia asserted
over and over again that she had no desire to overthrow
the Turkish empire. Certaidy not, because nothing would
snit the purposes of Russia better than that Turkey should
remain as she now is —that she should not be divided into a
number of independent principalities which would exist
on the frontiers of Russia—that there should not be esta-
blished in its place a principal Byzantine empire—and that
the kingdom of Turkey should not be split up into a num-
ber of free republics. But so far as the control of Russia
was concerned, it was much better for her that she should
have the opportunity and plausible righ • of interfering with
her power over ten or eleven millions of the subjects of the
Sultan, and most of all that that right should appear to be
confined to her by new and extended constructions given
to the treaty of Kainardji. Upon that it was that Russia
founded her pretensions, and that she wished to enforce
them. Russia never concealed this, but at all times in-
variably claimed it in her demands with respect to the holy
places. It was not in connection with Prince Menschikoff's
mission that for the first time that claim was raised. You
had been told over and over again, before the 25th of April,
that the question of the holy places was a secondary object
only, and the information had reached the noble lord the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, before he made that
speech to which I have alluded. Before that speech of the
25th of April was made, you had information to this effect
from Colonel Rose and from Lord Stratford de Radcliffe.
Col. Rose distinctly told you that whatever Russia might
tell you, she was endeavouring secretly to negotiate a treaty
at Constantinople, which was to be kept secret from
the powers of England and France, and that she
was seeking to enter into an alliance offensive and
defensive with Turkey, and that, in return for the protec-
torate to be established in her favour, Russia was ready to
give a fleet and four hundred thousand men to Turkey
if she ever needed aid against any Western Power what-
ever. Now that intelligence had reached the noble lord
at a time when he assured us that he placed implicit re-
liance and confidence in the assurances and statements. of
Russia, and that upon the side of Turkey not the slightest
danger of a rupture was to be feared. (Hear, hear.)
Whatever might have been the assurance of Russia, she
would reconcile this assurance with the present state of
things by the declaration to which I have referred—that
she does not now desire the dismemberment of the Turkish
empire, that she founds her claim upon the treaty of Kai-
nardji, and contends that under that treaty she has the
right to the protectorate, and that all these questions are in-
cluded in the settlement of that regarding the holy places.
That is the argument of Russia. But whatever might have
been the assurance of Russia, you received the intelligence
on one and the same day of the disclaimer on the part of
Russia of any hostile attempts on the independence of
Turkey, and a notification from Colonel Rose of the conclu-
sion of the attempts to establish a secret treaty, to which
you were to be no party, and from which you were to be
sedulously excluded; and you received also at the same
time statements from two of your consuls of formidable
Russian forces being collected upon the frontiers of Turkey.
You received on one and the same day these three notices,
and you tell us on the 25th April that you have a perfect,
absolute, and unhesitating reliance in the friendly assur-
ances of Russia. I have, according to the wish of the noble
duke, thus placed her Majesty's Government in the position
in which they desired to be placed, not as we view events
now, but as the Government must have seen them on the
25th of April. Subsequent to that time Sir Hamilton
Seymour had a long discussion with Count Nesselrode,
though by no means a satisfactory one, on the subject of a
previous despatch of the noble earl the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs; in this communication Count Nes
selrode had said :—" That from the substance of his de-
mands his Imperial Majesty would not recede, and a
dreadful responsibility would be assumed by any Go-
vernment which, by counselling the rejection of the
demands, might bring about the downfall of
the Ottoman empire." This was subsequent to the mission
of Prince Menschikoff, and when seeking to establish
openly the protectorate over the Turkish empire which it
had been all along the object of Russia to obtain. Writing
to Sir Hamilton Seymour, on the 7th of June, the noble
earl states, " Your despatch of the 27th of May"—this is
the despatch which intimates the intention of the Emperor
not to recede from his demands—" has been the cause of
great surprise and regret toher Majesty's Government. It is
a source of deep regret to her Majesty's Government that
upon questions of such a nature any misunderstanding
should have arisen with the Government of his Imperial
Majesty. But my despatch of the 30th ultimo will have
placed you in possession of the views of her Majesty's Go•
vernment upon the subject, and further comments are
unlikely to lead to any useful result, while they might
produce feelings of irritation, which it is the anxious
desire of her Majesty's Government to avoid. On the 30th
of May, just previous to the occupation of the princi-
palities, Sir. G. H. Seymour, writing to Lord Clarendon,
said :—" At the close of our conversation Count Nesselrode
observed that it could not be denied that the state of affairs
was very alarming—that the position of the Emperor was
one from which it was impossible for his Majesty to recede
—and that he would not conceal from me that a continued
rejection of the terms offered to the Porte would be fol-
lowed by the issue of orders for the entrance of the Russian
armies into the Principalities. His Excellency was desirous
of remarking to me that war could hardly be undertaken
by the Sultan under more disadvantageous circumstances
than when it was brought about by a refusal of those condi-
tions the acceptance of which was so warmly desired by the
whole Greek population of Turkey, and which carried with
theta the sympathy of the co-religionists of that country."
That is a distinct statement, not only that the Emperor of
Russia will not recede, but that he will enforce his demands
by marching his troops into the Principalities. It is utterly
inconsistent with the friendly feeling professed by the Em-
peror of Russia. But when was the first notification made
which produced any effect on her Majesty's Government ?
What was the language in which you met that threat and an-
nouncement ? Remember it was not then a fait accompli.
It was announced that in the course of a certain time—six
Weeks—these instructions would be carried out ; that in the
event of the rejection by Turkey of the treaty which your
Minister, in concert with all his colleagues in Constan-
tinople, had declared to be degrading, derogatory, and fatal '
to the independence of Turkey— that in that case the troops
would march forward and occupy the principalities as ‘, a
material guarantee" for the fulfilment of those demands
against Turkey. Now, what is the language used by her
Majesty's Government in reply to this threat ? Is there no
remonstrance made ?—no attempt made to point out the
gross nature of these proceedings ?—no attempt to throw
upon the Emperor the responsibility, if such a step were
taken, of drawing the whole of Europe into a collision ?
or no attempt to tell him that, if he was the first to
draw the sword, he would be responsible for the fatal conse-
quences which might ensue ? Quite the reverse. The lan-
guage of the noble earl opposite was :—" The Emperor cannot
doubt the warm feelings of friendship towards himself enter-
tained by our gracious Sovereign, and his Imperial Majesty
must be also aware that it is alike the duty and the desire of
her Majesty's Government to maintain the most cordial rela-
tions with Russia, feeling how essential such relations are to
the peace of Europe, and viewing, as they do, with alarm and
abhorrence whatever may tend to the interruption of that
peace." Her Majesty's Government, I repeat, do not believe
that Europe can be in danger of the terrible calamity of war
from a qusstion such as that which is now pending at Con-
stantinople ; they do not believe that the door will be finally
closed against an arrangement which to them appears to be
still practicable ; and they venture, therefore, to hope that
the demands of Russia may be confined to the recapitulation
of existing treaties, and their due fulfilment, but without
seeking to extend that influence over the Greek subjects of
the Porte that Russia must always and necessarily exer-
cise." This my lords, so far as these papers are concerned, was
the sole remonstrance—the sole representation—made by a
British Minister against the flagitious occupation, in time of
peace, of the Wallachian and Moldavian principalities, with-
out a particle of excuse, except that of obtaining a material
guarantee for the fulfilment of conditions which Turkey had
announced she was prepared to resist, and should never be
able to concede—nay, more, which your Minister, acting
under your authority, had encouraged Turkey to resist and
to refuse, and had promised by material assistance to sustain
her in refusing. (Hear, hear.) That was the tone and that
the language by which you hoped to be able to act on Russia,
and to turn the Emperor from his purpose. (Hear, hear.)
My lords, the language of the Emperor had been consistent
throughout, and that which he asked had been put in a posi-
tion from which he could not recede. (Hear, hear.) In one
of Count Nesseh-odo's conversations with Sir Hamilton Sey-
mour, he stated that, " Warmly attached as he was to peace,
and anxious as he was, upon personal grounds, that peace
should be preserved, the condition which was now proposed,
that the Emperor should recede from the position which he
had taken, was a condition which it was impossible to enter-
tain, and to which he could not advise him to assent."
(Hear, hear.) No ; not after he had crossed the Truth—
(hear, hear)—not after he had advanced his troops—(hear, ,
hear)—not after he had committed himself to war—(hear,
hear)—hut if you had addressed him, not " with bated
breath," and iu the language of this despatch—not with
violent or threatening language, which I should be the Last to
advocate, but in firm, and temperate, and proper terms—if
you had pointed out to him that the course which he proposed
to take was one which it was impossible that England and
France, acting cordially together upon this question, could
ever view with indifference, and which they would feel it
their duiy to resist—if you had done this before he had com-
mitted himself to such a step as the occupation of the
principalities with his troops, I believe that such lan-
guage, firmly and temperately put, would have had the
effect of checking this unparalleled invasion of a neutral
country in violation of the law of nations. (Cheers.)
That would have been the language to have used to the Em-
peror of Russia at that time—appealing to his sense of justice,
appealing to his sense of right, yet not concealing from him
the fact that such au attempt as that which he had then in
contemplation would bring down upon him the united resist-
ance of this country and France. (Cheers.) I believe that if
that language had been used, the peace which you say yon
are so anxious to maintain would have been preserved. (Hear,
hear.) I believe that the Emperor would have abandoned his j
intention, and that a pacific solution of the difficulty would
have been secured, if he had not already gone so far that it
was in fact impossible for him to recede ; and if he had not,

on the other hand, believed, whether rightly or wrongly, that
you and France were not acting cordially together, and above
all, if had not entertained the opinion which he has here ex-
pressed, that England would never upon such a question be
drawn into a war. (Hear, hear.) My lords, I will not enter
into the argument brought forward by the noble earl who sits
on the cross benches (Earl Grey), that we ought to have in-
terfered at all. (Hear, hear.) It is possible that if the course
which the noble earl suggests had been pursued, peace might
have been preserved, but it would only have been for a time.
(Hear, hear.) By pursuing that course, we should have given
the assent of Europe to the monstrous interpretation which
Russia was prepared to put on her existing rights And we
should have given to that power such a hold on Turkey as
would have prevented our ever interfering hereafter effectually
in her defence, and would have led from the protectorate of
the Christian subjects of the Porte to the ultimate incorpora-
tion of the whole of Turkey into the Russian empire. (Hear,
hear.) I cannot look upon such a possible, or probable con-
tingency, with the same complacency, as the noble earl.
(Hear, hear.) 1 think it would be fraught with great danger,
that Russia should have such preponderating power, both in
the north and south of Europe, as to be absolute master of
its destinies. The noble duke who spoke last vindicated
the policy of the Government in separating from that of
France [The Duke of Argyll interposed an observation,
which was inaudible in the gallery.] Not entirely. Perhaps
the noble duke does not vindicate our expressions
of regret to the Emperor of Russia. (Hear, hear.)
—perhaps he does not vindicate our expressions of regret at
the hasty step which France had taken, at sending her fleet,
not into Turkish waters, but to occupy an advanced position,
n order that it might be ready to act, if the necessity for
action should arise. If you were not taking an altogether
different line from France, it was a most extraordinary pro-
ceeding that, while you were acting together—and while your
Foreign Secretary was giving out that there was a perfect un-
derstanding between you and France as to the course to be
pursued—his successor should have written a letter to the
Emperor of Russia, regretting and apologising for this move-
ment of the French fleet as a " hasty step." If I remember
rightly there is a despatch in which the noble lord, or his pre-
decessor,
announces to the Emperor of Russia that, in point of
fact, the only question which raised any embarrassment in
Europe was the position which France had taken, thus throw-
ing the whole blame of any possible occurrences, not on the
Emperor of Russia, but on the premature movement which
had been made by the Emperor of France. But the noble
duke, having vindicated the separation from the policy of
France on that occasion, and the adoption of a different line
of conduct proceeds still further to vindicate the Vienna
note. He tells you that that note is not open to the objec-
tions which had been made to it,—that it does not bear the
interpretation which Turkey and Russia put upon it—that he
stands by its whole phraseology, and was prepared to advise
its acceptance, but that Turkey declined to accept it, and we
backed up Turkey, and, in consequence of having backed up
Turkey, we were now opposed to Russia. (Hear.) Did ever
any human being hear such a reason as that assigned for a
great war ? The abandonment of a note to which you see no
objection—by every word of which you are prepared to stand
—the abandonment of that note to be the cause of a great
war—and the foundation on which you rest the whole of these
warlike preparations which the country is called upon to
make. (Cheers). I am not about to enter on a vindication
of the Vienna note. When these two volumes reached me,
I was so bewildered with notes and projects, and counter-
projects—(hear, hear)—with proposals by Austria, and
France, and England, and Turkey—with one set of diplo-
matists sitting at Vienna, and another set of diplomatists
sitting at Constantinople, the diplomatists at Vienna dis-
agreeing with the diplomatists at Constantinople—that
I gave up the attempt to wade through that labyrinth of notes
and projects, and counter-projects, proposals, and counter-
proposals ; but I thought I saw through the whole of this
legitimate cause of quarrel—the assertion by Russia of rights
which were inconsistent with the independence and integrity
of Turkey, and dangerous to the peace of Europe—put for-
ward, I must say, in a most violent and arbitrary manner.
(Hear, hear.) I thought I saw in the course pursued by Rus-
sia a necessity now, if at any time, for cordial co-operation
and active union among the other great Powers of Europe, to
prevent the dangerous consequence to which the course pur-
sued by Russia would be certain, if unchecked, to lead. (Hear,
hear.) Having said so much of the past, I cannot look with
the slightest hope to the realisation of the wishes of the noble
earl, that war may yet be averted. When negotiations are
closed—when military preparations have been commenced—
when diplomatic intercourse has been broken off—l am at a
loss to understand on what he founds the slightest hope that
there can be even a possibility of peace being still preserved.
(Hear, hear.) He is not going, I presume, at this moment,
after all that has taken place, to abandon the cause of Turkey,
and to advise her to submit to the conditions imposed on her
by Russia. (Hear.) What, then, does he expect ? That, in
the presence of these preparations, and of all these hostile
movements, the Emperor of Russia will suddenly recede, and
abandon the position he has taken ? Why, my lords, if that
should be the case, if the noble lord believes that, it would
be the strongest possible commendation of the policy pursued
throughout. (Hear, hear.) If you believe that the Emperor
of Russia, having taken up his position, will recede from it
through fear of the hostile preparations of this country and of
France, on what ground will you contend that if you had
taken at the outset a line as bold and decided as that which
you have taken now, you would not have saved the country
from all the anxiety of the last ten or eleven months, and
the imminent danger of war ? (Great cheering.) One word
more with respect to what the noble duke says as to
the protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte.
He says it would not have been for the welfare of Turkey if
the right of foreign countries to interfere to a certain extent
for that protection was not admitted. He seems to have for-
gotten that the Sultan has throughout expressed his readi-
ness to allow the utmost degree of liberty, and has even gone
so far as to confirm, by a firman, the rights and immunities
of all the Christian subjects of his empire. The noble duke
seems to think that we ought to insist on the protection of
those Christian subjects as a cuudition of our alliance. I will
not enter into that, but I say that such general protection as
would be exercised by the united European powers, granted
to them by Turkey as a condition of admitting her into their
alliance, is a widely different thing from the protectorate
which Russia, a single Power, and the most powerful neigh-
bour of Turkey, is now endeavouring to establish on the foun-
dation of ancient treaties. Ido not agree with the noble earl
(Earl Grey) that we could have avoided interfering at all,
And although I do not blame her Majesty's Government for
endeavouring to the last to maintain peace, I disapprove of
the course of policy which they have pursued as not being
the best adapted, in my judgment, to attain our common end.
The house is called upon to express an opinion upon past
transactions, and I cannot but say that I censure and disap-
prove of that course. But now I believe war to be inevitable,
and that everything depends upon the vigour and energy
with which the efforts of this country and of France, and I
hope of other European Powers also, may be directed to-
wards bringing about a satisfactory settlement of these com-
plicated and difficult matters. From this moment I discard
all past considerations, and if the Government are now in
earnest in embarking in this war—just and necessary as I
believe it to be—with a determination to carry it forward in
a manner worthy of the cause which they have in hand, of
the dignity of the country, and of the importance of the end
to be attained—l say if that is the case, it will be my anxious
and earnest desire—sacrificing all other considerations, and
waiving all other questions—to give them the best support in
my power.

The Earl of ABERDEEN.—My lords, I think, from the
character of some of the speeches we have heard to-night,
there can be but little doubt as to the degree of censure which
would have been cast upon her Majesty's Government, no
matter what might have been the course pursued by them.
(Hear.) If the negotiations which have been entered into
had been sooner brought to an abrupt close, war would have
been owing to our rashness, or our timidity, or our blunder-
ing conduct ; and, had they ended in peace, of course, in
bringing them to that issue we should have equally sacrificed
the honour and interests of this country. (Hear.) After all
the asperity, however, with which the noble marquis (of
Clanriearde) has described our conduct, followed up, as it has
been, by the noble earl (of Derby), I am a little surprised at
the nature of the motion which the noble marquis has thought
it proper to lay before the house. With such opinions, with
such convictions as the noble marquis entertained, I should
have thought it would have been nothing less than a censure
upon the conduct we have pursued. But what is the mo-
tion ? The noble marquis moves for a few additional papers,
without describing what they are, and without knowing what
it is he moves for—(laughter)--but desiring to have some
papers on the subject of the cessation of diplomatic relations
with Russia. Now, as these papers have been already laid
upon the table, the noble marquis has made a motion without
the slightest knowledge whether anything exists of the kind
for which he moves, and without knowing what information
he will receive. This, I think, is a very lame and impotent
conclusion to a speech which stigmatises every stage of the
conduct of her Majesty's Government throughout the whole
of these transactions. My lords, instead of this crude motion
now brought forward, the least I should have expected would
have been a direct vote of censure upon the conduct of the
Government. Indeed, a higher tone has Fes taken by those
who entertain similar opinions with the no marquis and
the noble earl who has just spoken, and *lave heard
loud threats of impeachment even against la .3r Majesty's
Government for the course they have pursued. Now, I
don't deny that in the course of these transactions I have
spent many anxious hours and many sleepless nights in con-
sequence of the difficulties with which we have been sur-
rounded, but I must say that the apprehension of impeach-
ment never entered into my thoughts. (Hear, and a laugh.)
What has had considerable effect upon the noble marquis, and
upon those who, like him, are prepared to pronounce sentence
upon her Majesty's Government, has been, as they allege, the
production of the papers now upon your lordships' table. To
my personal knowledge, however, many of those who are
most disposed on other occasions to censure her Majesty's
Government, have had the candour to admit that the produc-
tion of these papers has materially changed their views.
(Cheers.) I think, therefore, the noble marquis has done
wisely in modifying a vote of either impeachment or of cen-
sure into the motion with which he concluded. My lords, I
understand what is the spirit of the policy which is objected
to by the noble earl (of Derby), but I confess I do not exactly
know what is the precise step that ho would have recom-
mended her Majesty's Government to pursue. He has thought
proper to refer to declarations made by a noble friend of mine,
not now in the house, and others, who consider the continu-
ance of peace impossible. Now, I must again repeat that I
do not consider, and cannot consider, the preservation of
peace impossible so long as war is not declared and actually
existing, believing, as I do, that of the Powers concerned in
this dispute, even the Emperor of Russia himself, by his con-
duct for many years, has afforded a proof that he knows and
fully estimates what the serious consequences of war must be
to Europe in general, and believing, also, that his exertions in
former years in preserving peace make it not at all impossible
that he, on whom depends in a great measure the decision in
this case, may take such a view of the existing difficulty as
may possibly end in peace. It is a subject for great congra-
tulation that the other great Powers of Europe may be con-
sidered to') .ve acted in unison on this question. This is no
small adva stage, and whether the issue of the question be
peace or war, it is, I repeat, matter for congratulation that
the union of the great Powers should have been accom-
plished so far as it has been accomplished. I concur in
what has been said by my noble friend who has left
is
the
house (the Earl of Ellenborough), that the people
importance
country are not sufficiently impressed with the
and the magnitud., of the war in which they may
and this, I think, must bo apparent to your be engaged;
lordships. In
fact, we have been so long without having had any experience
of the horrors and the miseries of war, that it is but too com-
monly looked upon now as a species of pleasurable
excite-
ment; and I verily believe that if, by the blessing of God and
our endeavours, we still should be enabled to preserve peace,
l
a very great disappointment would ensue—(No, no)—in many
quarters. I don't say in this house or ,
who now among enlightened
men, but I do say, among
e in ass
thought-
lessly but very numerously,cl look forward with real feelings of
excitement to the event which we must still deplore. I agree
in thinking that the public feeling in this country
rous feeling—(hear)--and thoautg must ensue—inevitably ensue h the people generally do not
look to the consequences that
—if war should take place, yet still the feeling which exists i
to resist aggression and injustice s a natural and a generous

one. But, my lords, it is not for us to encourage that; on the
contrary, it is the duty of the Government to resist these
feelings, very natural and very generous though they may be,
and to direct them into the course of prudence and of policy.
(Hear.) In adopting this course I know very well I must sub-
mit to the epithets which have been bestowed upon my exer-
tions to maintain peace—such as cowardice, vacillation, and
treachery. All this I must submit to, but, at the same time,
it seems to me that her Majesty's Government have shown
more moral courage in resisting strong popular impressions,
because we thought them irrational and carried to a mischie-
vous extent, than in yielding to those common-places which I
am ashamed to hear applied by the noble earl. It is very well
to say that war should not be entered into for its own sake.
Everybody, even the greatest conquerors that ever have af:
flicted mankind, have always professed to love peace and only
to make war to arrive at peace. This is language which is
used upon ail occasions ; but when war ensues we must look
to that language which is really opposed to war, rather than
to the mere declamation of persons who profess not to go to
war for its own sake. When I say that the popular feeling to
which I have alluded is irrational and carried to a greater.
extent than is wise and prudent, I must also include a cer-
tain number of persons in this country who are really bent
upon war, who think and who maintain, and who have at
meetings declared, that war is to regenerate Europe, and that
that is the mode by which Europe is to be regenerated. To be
sure, such declarations are usually coupled with an allusion
to the guillotine, and 1 don't know what part that has to
play in the regeneration of Euro e otherwise than by bring-
ing about additional misery, desolation, and ruin beyond that
which ordinary warfare wonld necessary entail. But, my
lords, the real question is, practically, what the noble earl
would wish us to have done. He speaks, and he has repeatedly
spoken before, of what the noble marquis also calls our infir-
mity of purpose and our lack of vigour. If we had been more
vigorous and less infirm of purpose, says the noble marquis,
we might have brought matters to another issue; and the
noble earl brings the same accusation. I wish just to show
your lordships that the step taken by the Emperor of Russia
—the only step, the only act with which he could deal—was
the invasion of the principalities. Now, what would the noble
earl have had us to do in that matter ? He would have had
us threaten the Emperor with results the only practical mean-
ing of which was war. Now, I will put it to the house whe-
ther, if we had held such language and taken this course,
under the circumstances in which the occupation of the prin-
cipalities took place, we could have hoped for the sanction of
Parliament or of the country? (Hear, hear.) For, what
were the facts ? The Emperor had invaded the principalities,
and occupied the principalities, he said, as a material guaran-
tee for the claims he had made on Turkey. He announced
that the occupation was but temporary, that he did not de-
clare war, and that he did not intend to make it war. Tur-
key, at the same time, determined not to make it a case of
war, and abstained, therefore, from declaring war, being, in
truth, utterly unprepared to make war. Underthese cir-
cumstances, if we had made such an appeal to the Emperor
of Russia as would have produced war, I ask whether we
should not have found in noble lords opposite the most inex-
haustible fund of censure and attack which it is possible to
conceive ? (Hear, hear.) Whether we had found it or not,
I tun quite sure we should have deserved it. If you look
early into the negotiations, you will see what Lord Strat-
ford thought of this very point of the invasion of the
principalities. In describing the interview which ho had
had with the Sultan, he relates that the due position which
it was conceived the Porte should maintain was that
of moral resistance. It is all very easy after one course has
been taken, the event of which is known, to point to some
other course which, in the opinion of the suggester, might
have been taken. I can only say that, looking over the whole
transaction as it has taken place from the outset since nego-
tiations began, I cannot charge myself with any reason to
lament any step that we have taken in the whole course of
the transaction. (Hear, hear.) The noble earl is of opinion
that I have been more of a war Minister than I intended. In
saying this he has put forth more truth than he, perhaps,
contemplated ; for I can assure him, in good truth, that if I
have any misgiVing at all as to our course, it is certainly not
that we have been too precipitate. (Hear, hear.) But we
have done the best we could to preserve peace, in our earnest
desire to accomplish that object. I believe the course we
have pursued has been that which was perfectly justifiable,
and I will say further that, on full consideration, I should
feel disposed to repeat it were the occasion to recur. (Hear,
hear.) lam totally of a different opinion from those who sty
that the exertions to preserve peace have been continued too
long. I think that every additional day that peace has been
maintained has been an advantage, and I do not in the least
regret the time which has been spent in following out these
endeavours to effect peace. (Hear, hear.) The noble earl
has also found fault with us for not having at an earlier period
established an entire concert with France in the conduct of
these transactions. My noble friend behind me has shown
that so far as the Holy Places question was concerned, we
could not act with France, not only because we were in a dif-
ferent position on the whole subject, so far as English in-
terests were concerned, but also, in truth, because we
thought that Russia had some ground of complaint on that
subject, and it was, therefore impossible for us, at that time
and on that subject, to establish a concert with France ; but
so anxious were we that nothing should prevent us from act-
ing in strict concert with France, that noble lords will have
seen that, when Lord Stratford left England, in the instruc-
tions which he carried with him, drawn up by my noble friend
behind me, my noble friend instructed him, as he passed
through Paris on his way to Constantinople, to inform the
French Minister for Foreign Affairs that the English Govern-
ment had great satisfaction in believing that the interests of
France and England in the East were identical, and that
nothing need prevent their cordial co-operation in main-
taining the integrity and independence of the Turkish
empire. (Hear.) These instructions were written before
Lord Stratford left England, and yet the noble earl has the
courage to find fault with us for not having sufficiently early
cultivated concert with France. (Heat.) Now, let me say,
there is in the whole of this transaction, let it end how it
may, nothing which gives me greater satisfaction than this
very concert which the noble e trl finds fault with us for not
having, as he says, entered early into - (hear, hear) I say
further, from the outset, when Lord Stratford took those in.
structions to Paris, up to this hour, we have maintained the
most entire and cordial concert with France - (hear, hear)
and we have had every reason to be satisfied to the utmost
with the perfect loyalty, honour, good faith, and cordiality
with which we have been met by France. (Cheers.) Let
this negotiation end as it may, it will always, I say, be a
source of the utmost satisfaction to us that we have esta-
blished that concert and that mutual kindness and goodwill
between the two Governments. (Cheers.) That concert, and
that mutual kindness and goodwill will, I trust, continue, and
no endeavours shall be wanting on our part to preserve, and,
if possible, to strengthen, these frank and friendly feelings.
(Cheers.) The great object for which we first entered upon
these negotiations was the pro ection of the Turkish empire
against the aggressions of Russia an object which we have
deemed of an importance paramount to any other considera-
tions connected with the question. Ido not look without
apprehension to the consequences of a war, let it end how it
may ; for there is so strong a feeling of disaffection in the
Turkish dominions, and the condition of the Government is
such, that even a successful war wouldbe attended with great
danger to the future condition of that empire. Therefore it
is—wishing to preserve the existence of that empire as a Eu-
ropean necessity —that I am doubly anxious to preserve it, if
possible, from the continuance of war. The noble earl has
made merry with the answer given by my noble friend near
me to a question which he said was of very deep importance,
whether we are at peace or war. The noble earl said that,
being neither at peace nor war, and not being neutral, he
did not very well know in what position we are. At all
events, let that position be what it may, it is very far from
being unprecedented. We have been in it before, and very
likely we may be in it often again. Look at what happened
in the year 1827. Our ambassador was then withdrawn from
Constantinople; we blockaded the Turkish ports; we had
our Sinope too. (Hear, hear.) We destroyed the Turkish
fleet in harbour, with an immense loss of life, and we
were not at war. Not at all. There was no war, and things
continued for a year and a half in that state. We were not
at war, although there had been demonstrations such as have
not yet taken place between this country and the Russian
empire ; for as yet we have not struck a blow or fired a shot at
the Russian forces, and therefore we cannot be said to be so
much in a state of war with Russia as we were at the time to
which I allude with Turkey, with which we professed to be
at peace. Therefore, difficult as it may be to describe our
position, at least the noble earl will see that it is not unpre-
cedented. There are other instances of a similar kind. We
subsequently joined with the French; the French army be-
sieged Antwerp ; we blockaded it ourselves, but we were
not at war with Holland. Neuertheless, these demonstrations
took place, which, I say, were much more energetic than any-
thing that has yet taken place between us and the Russians.
I could very much desire that we had seen the worst of this
state of things, be it war, or be it peace—(hear, hear)—but,
although I have ventured to say I did not thimk war inevi-
table, I never said I expected that war would not take place.
I not only hope, but most ardently pray, that war may not
take place; but all I have said is, that it was not inevitable.
I cannot abandon this hope slender as it is—even now.
What I may hope, or expect, or think, is not a matter of
very deep importance, but what is of importance is this that
her Majesty's Government are making every possible prepa-
ration for war, as if it were inevitable.. (Hear, and cheers.)
That is all the country candesire, they may leave me
and athers to indulge, our hopes and our prayers as we think
proper ; but every o:fort will.be made, and is making at this
moment, to carry (tar ,If.l.war there must be—in such a
manner as becomesst e character, and aignity, and power of this country. (Cheers.) My lords, at this hour of the night
I will not fatigue you by saying more, but I am so far glad
th .t this motion has been brought forward, because Ido
think that, ie addition to the papers laid upon the table, the
clear justification of my noble friend, who has had the prin-
cipal management of these transactions, must have been such
as to satisfy your lordships that no prudence, or foresight, or
skill has been wanting in the management of these most
difficult aid complicated negotiations, and I have not the
least hesitation in appealing not only to this house, but to the
country, not merely far an acquittal of her Majesty's Govern-
ment, but I will almost venture to trust that we may have
their approbation. (Cheers.)
After a few words in explanation from the Duke of Any.
The Earl of ALBEMARLE said they had had seven hours
and a half's discussion upon one of the most unprofitable
questions that had ever come before them. They had been
debating on the past conduct of the Government, but they
had not beard what was to be .heir future policy. For his
own part, he should give his support to that future policy,
Awzohret.htehrs,
provided that it was suitable to the honour and dignity of the
country. (Hear, hear.) What he now wished to know was
whether we were going to war upon the status quo,
or as
inR guy
ya
fhuatduitowerramandgeomallenttreatthiees
Emurderenwae
asntedptahp:r,
common property of mankind, were to be kept closed at the
bidding of a despot ? (Hear, hear.)
nature The Marquis of CLANRICARDE made
tu
a fewu be
saeln•Vdaticoonns.
nhoetmspoveceidfyfoinrg. thein reply. The noble earl at the head of the Government had
wipaotpfhetrahhaimtwihnfoifaro necessity which he
what would there
Why, if he had been
tentsi o foundpossession
have been for his making the motion at all I What he asked
for was, that he and the country should be put in possession
of such papers and such information as would enable him to
tstaantdeffienetwiittehouiredphrarddityo
Turks lwhys:t
and sin them aekx a ci n
gt
apositionn we
toe
follow that ho was bound at the same time to move a vote of
censure upon the Government. At all events, the motion he
had made, whatever was its fate, would have this effect, it
support
in a
Government
ern theremenwtatshbruout
would satisfy the world that there was but one determination
in
up h
oert
throughout
this
iosfmito,maenndtotuhsatstwruasggre
in which we were about to embark—(hear, hear)—at the same
rap
onu t. e
offo
fen
eat
w Russiab cooluduf
as rhosnwvt
eoi
etdohnehpearavoie•dl yui
epneaedr
tifobntl
yhtehs
time he could not help repeating his conviction, that if we had
n
aele
precludedngdotniaf tt
himanEs af
rs uPocan th"
taking any daring steps against Turkey. The experience of
the last 23 years should have satisfied the Government of the
upon nature of the designs which Russia had ever and still enter-
tained Turkey, while the same experience, if it had
been well looked into, would have taught them that Russia
had
never ventured to make a single step to advance her ag-
gressive views so long as she felt that the Western Powers
wore opposed to her. No doubt the end of the contest would
h o the withdrawal of the impudent demands made by Russia;
but if England and France had evinced a decided opposition
to them in the first instance, much of the anxiety which we
had recently felt in the affair would have been spared us.
(Hear, hear.) And even now, there was an uncertainty as
to whether the allied powers meditated meeting Russia With