The Sun.
London, England, 1854-03-20 00:00:00

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[PRICE SD.

r his conduct were, the Emperor said very flattering to him. In dismissing me, his Imperial Majesty said, " Well, induce
4_
your Government to write again upon these subjects—to we"'
more fully, and to do so without hesitation ; I have confidence
in the English Government." "Ce u'est point un engage-
ment, une convention, que je leur demande ; c'est un libre
exchange d'idees, et au besoin une parole de gentleman ; entre
nous cela suffit." I might venture to suggest that some ex-
pressions might be used in the despatch to be addressed to
me, which might have the effect of putting an end to the fur-
ther consideration, or, at all events, discussion, of points
which it is highly desirable should not be regarded as offering
subject for debate. I may only add, apologetically, that I
may possibly have failed in reporting some parts of his Ma-
jesty's conversation, and that lam conscious of havinr, for-
gotten the precise terms employed by him with respect Co the
commercial policy to be observed at Constantinople when no
longer held by the Turks. The purport of the observation
was, that England and Russia had a common interest in pro-
viding for the readiest access to the Black Sea and the Medi-
terranean. A copy of your lordship's despatch was left in
the Emperor's hands.

SECRET MEMORIAL—IMPORTANT RUSSIAN
CABINET PAPER.
No. 7.

Sir G. IL SEYMOUR to the Earl of CLARRNDON.—(Received
March 19.)7,—(Seerot and Confidential.)

(Extract.) St. Petersburg, March 9, 1853.
When I waited upon Count Nessehale on the 7th instant
his excellency said that, in pursance of orders which he had
received from the Emperor he had to place in my hands a
very confidential memorandum, which his Imperial Majesty
had caused to be drawn up, and which was intended as an
answer to, or a comment upon, the communication which I
made to his Imperial Majesty on the 21st ult. I have the
honour of inclosing to your lordship a copy of what, ,under
the circumstances which have attended its drawing up and
delivery, cannot fail as being considered as one of the most
remarkable papers which have, been issued, I do not say from
the Russian " Chaucelloric," but from the Emperor's secret
Cabinet. Three points appear to me to be fully established by
the Imperial memorandum :-- the existence of some distinct
understanding between the two Imperial Courts upon the
subject of Turkey, and the engagement taken by the Empe-
ror Nicholas neither to possess nor to establish himself at Con-
stantinople, or to enter into arrangements respecting the
measures to be taken in the event of the fall of the Ottoman
Empire without previous concert with her Majesty's Govern-
ment. The wording of this engagement, coupled with the
conversation which I had the honour of holding with the Em-
peror, leaves upon my mind the impression that, whilst
willing to undertake not to make himself the permament
master of Constantinople, his Majesty is intentionally inex-
plicit as to its temporary occupation. Assuming, as a certain
and now acknowledged fact, the existence of anunderstanding
or compact between the two Emperors as to Turkish affairs,
it becomes of the deepest importance to know the extent of
the engagements entered into between them. As to the
manner in which it has been concluded, I conjecture that
little doubt is be entertained. Its basis was, no doubt, laid
at some of the meetings between the Sovereigns which took
place in the autumn ; and the scheme has probably been
worked out since under the management of Baron Meyendorff,
the Russian Envoy at the Austrian Court, who has been
passing the winter at St. Petersburg, and is still here.
(Translation.) Feb. 21, 1853.
The Emperor has, with the liveliest interest and real satis-
faction, made himself acquainted with the secret and confi-
dential despatch which Sir Hamilton Seymour communicated
to him. He duly appreciates the frankness which has dictated
it. He has found therein a fresh proof of the frindly senti-
ments which her Majesty the Queen entertains for him. In
conversing; familiarly with the British envoy on the causes
which, from one day to another, may bring on the fall of the
Ottoman empire, it had by no means entered into the Empe-
ror's thoughts to propose for this contingency a plan by which
Russia and England should dispose beforehand of the pro-
vinces ruled by the Sultan—a system altogether arranged ;
still less a formal agreement to be concluded between the two
Cabinets. It was purely and simply the Emperor's notion
that each party should confidentially state to the other, less
what it wishes than what it does not wish ; what would be
contrary to English interests, what would be contrary to Rus-
sian interests ; in order that, the case occurriug, they might
avoid acting in opposition to each other. There is in this
neither plans of partition, nor convention to be binding on
the other courts. It is merely an interchange of opinions,
and the Emperor sees no necessity of talking about it before
the time. It is precisely for that reason that he took especial
care not to make it the object of an official communication
from one Cabinet to another. By confining himself to speaking
of it himself, in the shape of familiar conversation, to the
Queen's representative, he selected the most friendly and con-
fidential form of opening himself with frankness to her Bri-
tannic Majesty, being desirous that the result, whatsoever it
might be, of these communications should remain, as it ought
to be, a secret betweeen the two sovereigns. Consequently, the
objections which Lord J. Russell raises to any concealment as re-
gards the other powers, in the event of a formal agreement being
entered into, of which there is at present no question, fall to the
ground, and consequently, also, the inconveniences disappear,
which he points out as calculated to contribute to hasten the oc-
currence of the veryevent which Russia aud England are desirous
of averting, if the existence of such an agreement should be-
come prematurely known to Europe and to the subjects of the
Sultan. As regards the object of this wholly confidential in-
terchange of opinions, the possible do'nfall of the Ottoman
Empire, doubtless that is but an uncertain and remote con-
tingency. Unquestionably thu period of it cannot be fixed,
and no real crisis has arisen to render the rcalisatiau of it im-
minent, But after all it may happen ; happen even unex-
pectedly. Without mentioning the ever-increasing causes of
dissolution which arc presented by the moral, financial, and
administrative condition of the Porte, it may proceed gradu.
ally from one, at least, of the two questions mentioned by the
English Ministry in itssecret despatch, In truth, it perceives
in those questions only mere disputes, which would not differ
in their bearing from difficulties which form the ordinary busi-
ness of diplomacy. But that kind of dispute may, neverthe-
less, bring on war, and with war the consequences which the
Emperor apprehends from it ; if, for instance, in the affair of
the holy places, the amour propre and the menaces of France,
continuing to press upon the Porte, should compel it to refuse
us all 'satisfaction, and if, on the other hand, the religious
sentiments of the orthodox Greeks, offended by the conces-
sions made to the lettins, should raise the immense majority
of his subjects against the Sultan. As regards the affair of
Montenegro, that', aceordirig to the late accounts, may happily
be looked upon as settled. But at the time that the Emperor
had his interview with Sir Hamilton Seymoutlit might be
apprehended that the question would take a most serious turn.
Neither ourselves nor Austria could haveallowed the protracted
devastation or forced submission of Montenegro, a country
which, up to the present time, has continued actually indepen-
dent of the Porte, a country over which our protection has been
extended former° than a century. The horrors which aro com-
mitted there, those which by Ottoman fanaticism, have a short
time since been extended over Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovino
gave the other Christian provinces of the Porte only too much
reason to anticipate that the same fate awaited them. They
were calculated to provoke the general rising of the Christians
who live under the sceptre of the Turkish empire and to
hasten its ruin. It is not then, by any means, an iale and
imaginary question, a contingency too remote, to which the
anxiety of the Emperor has called the attention of the Queen
his ally. In the face of the uncertainty and decay of the
existing state of things in Turkey the English Cabinet ex-
presses the desire that the greatest forbearance should be
shown towards the Porte. The Emperor is conscious of never
having acted otherwise. The English Cabinet itself admits it.
It addresses to the Emperor, with reference to the numerous
proofs of moderation which he has given up to the present
time, praises which his Majesty will not accept, because in
that he has only listened to his own overbearing conviction.
But, in order that the Emperor may continue to concur in
that system of forbearance, to abstain from any demonstra-
tions—from any peremptory language—it would be necessary
that this system should be equally observed by all the Powers
at once. France has adopted another. By menace she ob-
tained, in opposition to the letter of the treaties, the admis-
sion of a ship of the line into the Dardanelles. At the cannon's
mouth she twice presented her claims and her demands for
indemnity at Tripoli, and afterwards at Constantinople.
Again, in the contest respecting the Holy Places, by menace
she affected the abrogation of the firman and that of the
solemn promises which the Sultan had given the Emperor.
With regard to all those acts of violence England observed a
complete silence. She neither offered support to the Porte
nor addressed remonstrances to the French Government. The
consequence is very evident. The Porte necessarily concluded
from this that from France alone it has everything to hope, as
well as everything to fear, and that it can evade with impu-
nity the demands of Austria and of Russia. It is thus
that Austria and Russian, in order to obtain justice,
have seen themselves compelled in their turn, against
their will, to act by intimidation, since they have to do
with a Government which only yields to a peremptory atti-
tude ; and it is thus that by its own fault, or rather by that
of those who have weakened it in the first instance, the Porte
is -urged on in a course which enfeebles it still more. Let
England then employ herself in making it listen to reason.
Instead of uniting herself with France against the just de-
mands of Russia, let her avoid supporting, or even appearing
to support, the resistance of the Ottoman Government. Let
her be the first to invite the latter, as she herself considers it
essential, to treat its Christian subjects with more equity and
, _

humanity. That will be the surest. means of relieving the
Emperor from the obligation of availing himself in Turkey of
those rights of traditional protection to which he never has
recourse but against his will, and of postponing indefinitely
the crisis which the Emperor and her Majesty the Queen are
equally anxious to avert. In short, the Emperor cannot but
congratulate himself at having given occasion for this in-
timate interchange of confidential communications between
her Majesty and himself. He has found therein valuable
assurances, of which he takes note with a lively satisfac-
tion. The two sovereigns have frankly explained to each
other what in the extreme ease of which they have
been treating their respective interests cannot endure. Eng-
land understands that Russia cannot suffer the establish-
ment at Constantinople of a Christian power sufficiently strong
to control and disquiet her. She declares that for herself she
renounces any intention or desire to possess Constantinople.
The Emperor equally disclaims auy wish or design of estab-
lishing himself there. England promises that she will enter
into , no arrangement for determining the measures to be
taken in the event of tin fall of the Turkish empire with-
out a previous understanding with the Emperor. The
Emperor, on his side, willingly contracts the same engage-
ment. As he is aware that in such a case he can equally
reckon upon Austria, who is bound by her promises to
concert with him, he regards with less apprehension the
catastrophe which he still desires to prevent and
avert as much as it shall depend on him to do so. No 1
less precious to him are the proofs of friendship and personal
confidence on the part of her Majesty the Qncen, which Sir
Hamilton Seymour has been directed on this occasion to im-
part to him. He sees in them the surest guarantee against
the contingency which his foresight had deemed it right to
p nt out to that of the English Government.

No. S.
SIR G. H. SEYMOUR TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.
(Received March 19.)
(Secret and confidential.)
St. Petersburg, March 9, 1853.
My Lord,—As it appears
very evident that the secret me-
morial which, by a despatch of this day, I have the honour
of bringing to your Lordship's knowledge, has been drawn up
under a complete misapprehension (real or assumed) of the
part taken by her Majesty's Government in the late Turkish
affairs, I have thought it my duty to address to Count Nessel-