The Sun.
London, England, 1854-02-07 00:00:00

T-BOOKS.

The successive stages of the Eastern question
have now passed in review before the reader. We
have seen a contest between France and Russia,
for the favours of Turkey transformed into a con-
test between Turkey and Russia by the exorbitant
demands of the latter, and we have seen this dis-
pute adopted by Europe in the interest of the
Turks because the pretensions of Russia, if ad-
mitted, were serious enough to threaten the gene-
ral equilibrium and destroy the securities of public
law. The result of these events was a double con-
test, the two phases of which must be carefully dis-
tinguished for the correct appreciation of the
transactions ensuing. On one hand, Russia and
Turkey having each put their terms in the form of
an ultimatum, were brought face to face with no
further appeal but war ; on the other, Russia and
Europe were confronted, with every desire on the
part of Europe to close the dispute by pacific ad-
justment, but with a firm resolution to support
Turkey in her resistance to the Czar's demands.
This state of affairs produced, not unnaturally,
some confusion, for, while the protectors of Turkey
were exerting themselves in negotiation, Turkey
herself, under the provocations of hostile aggression
and the pressure of popular excitement, had aban-
doned the chances of diplomacy and declared for
war. Even this, however, was not permitted to
cut short the negotiations of the other parties, and,
as the Emperor of Russia (pp. 181-227) had an-
nounced his intention of making no counter-decla-
ration, and of confining himself to defensive mea-
sures, it was hoped that while an outlet was pro-
vided for the martial fanaticism of the Ottomans
the European Powers might still labour with a
good prospect in the work of peace.
These views received considerable support from
a certain important occurrence. Exactly at the
time that the Turkish Council pronounced itself
for war—that is to say, in the last week of Sep-
tember—the Emperor of Russia paid a visit to the
Emperor of Austria at Olmutz, and a species of
diplomatic congress was created by the occasion.
It was here announced, not only by Count Nessel-
rode, but by the Czar himself, at an interview with
Lord Westmoreland, that Russia desired to meet
" every legitimate wish" (p. 129) of the mediating
Powers, and a new project of Note, termed " the
Olmutz Note," originated in the confidence which
these declarations had called into being. The as-
surances, however, which were thus offered did
not appear to the British Government sufficiently
clear to neutralise the effect of the Nesselrode
despatch, in which the real views of Russia had
been so unluckily recorded, and the whole scheme
was soon deranged by the actual proclamation of
hostilities alluded to above. The course of these
proceedings, with the views of the several Govern-
ments thereon, will be found in pp. 128 140 of the
second part of the Blue-Books.
But, in the meantime, the Western Powers were
placed in a position involving greater obligations
than before. They were, in fact, so far committed
to a co-operation with the Turkish Government
that they could not desert this Government in any
measures, however precipitate, which were justified
by its real situation. They were of opinion that
the chances of negotiation were by no means a an
end ; that a Note comprising the modifications
suggested by the Porte might yet be so framed as
to receive the Czar's acquiescence, and that the
forbearance which had been practised at the first
invasion of the Principalities might still be conti-
nued with advantage. (See p. 136.) Nevertheless,
as the Porte thought otherwise, as the justice of its
requisitions was unimpeachable, and as it was im-
possible to deny the right of the Sultan to expel a
foreign invader from his own dependencies, the
French and English Governments agreed to adapt
their policy to the new situation of afairs, and to
concert measures for the more effectual protection
of the Porte by the allied fleet during the operations
which might ensue. The views of the two Govern-
ments at this conjuncture will be found developed
in a despatch of M. Drouyn do Lhuys (p. 136) and
of Lord Clarendon (p. 140). Generally, too,
throughout the despatches the tone adopted toward
the Russian Government acquires from this time
considerable severity, and the manifasto of the
Czar in defence of his proceedings (p. 228) had
little other effect than to confirm the suspicions
with which his policy was now regarded. (See pp.
238-240.)
The Turks lost no time in carrying their decision
into execution. On the 29th October Lord Claren-
don learnt from Berlin that the Turks had pos-
sessed themselves of an island in the Danube oppo-
site Widdin, and two days later a telegraphic des-
patch from Vienna announced the occupation of
Kalafat by the same detachment. Nevertheless,
though the contest between the Russia and Turkey
was thus hurried on to the issue of the sword, the
contest between Russia and Europe was still re-
stricted to the sphere of diplomatic negotiation; and
Lord Stratford, at the instance of the British Go-
vernment, succeeded in obtaining from the Porte an
order for a short suspension of hostilities at the very
moment (Oct. 20) that the combined squadrons
were summoned to enter the Dardanelles. Un-
fortunately, this order was not delivered in time,
and Lord Stratford relates (p. 250) a piece of infor-
mation to the effect that, though the officer dis-
patched from Constantinople arrived at the Turkish
camp before the assault, the engagemant occurred
notwithstanding ; " the bearer himself taking part
in the attack." War, therefore, was actually com-
menced and battles were soon fought, of which the
reader will not require to be reminded. Lord
Stratford, with the sagacity so eminently charac-
teristic of his correspondence, had observed three
months before (Part I.; p. 370) that " the Turkish
forces would probably make a steadier resistance
than the defective state of their service might lead us
to expect ;" but the European public were certainly
not prepared for the successes which they obtained;
nor were those successes without considerable in-
fluence, in more than one respect, on the progress
of affairs. They disposed the Ottoman Government
and people to the prosecution of the war with the
hopes of more material advantages than had been
contemplated at first ; they rendered the acqui-
escence of Russia more improbable by wounding
the pride of the Czar, and they drew the Western
Powers into an attitude of more active participa-
tion. These points are treated at some length and
with great ability by Lord Stratford (p. 200) and
M. Drouyn de Lhuys (p. 306).
Still the work of negotiation was earnestly con-
tinued, arch~ It vaswat thio,,,i4entical period that a
scheme was first Mooted which has only just now
terminated in the perfect isolation of the Russian
Government by the concerted opposition of Europe.
It was suggested that the Four Powers, should by
their representatives, offer a " collective Note" to
the Porte, announcing their anxious desire to
mediate between the belligerents, assuring the
Ottoman Cabinet of the willingness of Russia to
treat, and inquiring the conditions on which it
would itself be prepared to do the same. To
this Note was annexed a " Protocol"—that is to
say, a species of declaration, recording not only
the object of the collective note, but the views
generally entertained by the Four Powers of the
pending contest and its consequences. In this
instrument it was formally stated as the
common opinion of the Plenipotentaries, that
" the existing war could not in any case lead
to modifications in the territorial boundaries of
the belligerent empires." Two points, there-
fore, of infinite importance were now secured.
The concerted action of Europe in the Eastern
question was definitely established, and it was an-
nounced as a conclusion of European policy that
the Russian Government could gain no territorial
acquisitions by the war. The history of this Note
and Protocol will be found in pp. 273-294.
Again, however, were theltransactions between
Russia and Europe complicated by the transactions
between Russia and Turkey, though on this occasion
by the proceedings, not of the latter Power, but the
former. On the 30th of November a division of
the Russian fleet surprised a Turkish squadron of
greatly inferior force in the Turkish harbour of
Sinope, and destroyed it with horrible carnage. As
this attack was considered entirely at variance with
the assurances given by Russia respecting her non-
offensive attitude, and as the barbarity of the pro-
ceeding was most outrageous, the British and
French Governments took immediate measures to
prevent the recurrence of any such catastrophes
by securing the command of the Black Sea. It was
not intended to commit any act of aggression upon
Russia, but the Turkish territory and flag wore to
be effectually protected by the confinement of
Russian cruisers to their own harbours. Accord-
ingly the combined squadrons, which on the 25th
of October had entered the Dardanelles, and on the
7th of November had been summoned to anther in
the Bosphorus, proceeded on the sth of January
into the Black Sea. The general views entertained
by the British and French Governments in issuing
these instructions will be found explained in
two
lanation
most important despatc" he s, which we
of
the
going
which restrained the squadrons n causesx
our remarks ; and an exp from
subjoined passage of a
sooner" is offered by
deLsin
nembtheer
" he writes, " may
17. " The causes in question,
Stratforddatod p e
Russian fleet
mation as to the movements of t e
poradtch
risk of collision, or
an unwillingness to incur any
bo reduced to the following heads.h Want of infor-
ression that we
cation of any kind, and an imp
to narrow the claims of peace by premature provo-
Turkish Government. In aid of these leading con-
siderationsshould do best to wait for an invitation from the
come the strong prevailing northerly
winds which retarded the squadrons in their passage
from Besika Bay, and the delays occasioned by the