The Sun.
London, England, 1854-08-29 00:00:00

OUR COMMBRCE WITH RUSSIA.

The following extracts are taken from an inte-
resting paper in the Quarterly Journal of the Sta-
tistical Society :
The purposes of this paper is to afford materials for
answering the question----
What is likely to be the effect of the war we are now
engaged in upon our commerce with Russia ?
It will be observed, in the fret place, that we have
taken the initiative in the war! and that its immediate
operation, under the aspect suggested by this question,
is unusually simple in firm. It consists only in a
blockade of the. Russian ports, we having no access to
her land frontiers. And these ports all open upon
inland seas, egress from which must be extremely diffi-
cult in the face of a hostile fleet. In other words, we
have little more to consider than the effect of our own
acts upon our own share of the maritime commerce of
Russia.

Obviously, then, the first thing wanted is a clear ac-
count of the commerce of Russia in general ; then a si-
milar account of our share in it ; and, finally, whatever
authentic data may be available on which to estimate the
probable influence of the steps we have taken to put, a
stop to commercial intercourse between the two coun-
tries.

At the very outset of the inquiry, however, it becomes
apparent that the commerce of Russia, as well as the
country itself, and the peonle, are marked by features
broadly distinguishing each from any other we are ac-
quainted with. And, if not at first sight equally appa-
rent, it may be reasonably suspected that these peculia-
rities bays an important bearing upon the present sub-
ject. Hence it is necessary to a right understanding of
what we are about that they should first receive some
attention.

A great deal has been said of the enormous extent of
Russia ; but the extent of what now concerns us is not
greater than can easily be brought within manageable
limits. The area of Russia in Europe, according to M.
de Koeppen, may be taken, exclusive of Poland,
to be about 2,000,000 of English square miles. A large
space ; but not without parallel. The United States of
America, including their share of the Oregon territory,
as settled by the treaty. of 1846, is supposed, upon data
at least equally. sound, to contain 2,500,000 square
miles. And British North America, extending as it
does from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from the nor.
thern frontier of the United States to the Arctic Sea, is
about as large as the United States, or about one fourth
larger than Russia in Europe. Extent of territory is
but one of the elerhents of national power ; arid, unless
duly combined with the rest,.is apt to prove a source of
weakness rather than of strength.
The Russian census of 1838, increased in its results,
according to the same authority, by about 1 1-3 per
cent. per annum, gives us, for the population of this
area, in 1854, about 62,000,000 souls.

The comparative density of the population in the three
groups of provinces, showing us how the people with
whom we trade are located, may therefore he shortly
stated thus :—The population per square mile (English)
was in Finland, 17 ; in the Baltic provinces, exclusive
of Finland and Poland, 52 ; in Poland, 103 ; in the
Black Sea provinces, 26 ; in the central provinces, 80 ;
throughout Russia in Europe, 31.
These details then conduct us to the important con-
clusion that the people of Russia, as we have now to
deal with them, are grouped round two main centres,
one of wkich is Moscow and the other Warsaw. Put-
ting aside all reference to despotic political arrangements,
we thus discover the natural centres of production and
consumption ; and in the connection existing between
these localities, on the one hand, and the nature of the
commerce carried on by sea between Russia and the
rest of the world on the other, we may hope to find
sure indications of the probable operation of a maritime
war upon the Russian people in a mercantile point of

the three years 1841-2-3, was 2,840,000 owts. ; and from
other countries, in the same three years, 585,000 ewts.
I❑ 1851-2-3, from Russia, 2,266,000 mtg. ; and from
other countries, 1,182,000 cwts. So that, while the
Russian supply, in the ten years, fell off nearly 20 per
cent. the supply from other sources increased by more
than 100 per cent.
With respect to provisions, the supply from other
sources has doubled, while that from Russia has scarcely
increased.
On examining these results together it will be observed
that, as to five of the six articles (grain, hemp, flax,
tallow, and bristles), the supply from other sources ha,,
during the period in view, been increasing faster than
the supply from Russia, and, consequently, that there
has been a progressive diminution of the extent to
which we have been dependent upon that country for a
supply. It is also obvious that the increase, such as it
is, which has taken place in the imports of all these ar-
ticles from Russia (excepting tallow) has tended to make
the producers of that country somewhat dependent
upon the consumption of this country for a remunera-
tive demand.
Let us now consider how the present war is likely to
affect a foreign commerce such as that we have de-
scribed.
Putting aside the trifling amount of commerce carried
on through the ports of the White Sea and the Caspian,
we have seen that, speaking in round numbers, about
one-half in bulk of the exports of Russia pass through
her Baltic ports, and the other half through the ports
on the. Black Sea. In value, however, the amount or
the Baltic trade far exceeds all the rest.

To take the Baltic ports first. Of these we need only
mention S. Petersburg, Riga, Revel, Windau, and
Liebau. And the two first mentioned are so much more
important than the rest for our present purpose, they,
too, may be passed over. The share of the trade taken
by St. Petersburg and Riga may be safely inferred from
the following account of the entries of shipping in the
three last years for which the returns have just been pub-
lished

Tonnage of shipping entered at the ports of St. Peters-
bur.- and Riga
.in each Of the three, years 1847, 1348,
and 1849 :
St. Petersburg, 1817, 449,338 tons; 1848, 313,617
tons ; 1849. 323,252 tons.
Riga, 1847, 285,352 tons; 1848, 163,105 tons ; 1849
228,983 tons.
The tonnage entered at all the Russian ports on the
Baltic in 1847 was 808,026, and in 1848 was 645,836.
It appears, then, that in both years St. Petersburg had
more than half trade in point of bulk, and that Riga
had about two-thirds of what remained.
It will be here borne in mind that the chief localities
of Russian production are not,• as in most other countries,
upon or near. the coast where the produce is shipped.
The goods exported from St. Petersburg and Riga,
coming as they do chiefly from the central provinces be-
fore referred to, have to pass a long distance through the
interior, but a distaAoevhich, from the facility of land-
carrilge during the inter• months, may be almost as
easily travelled in one direction as in another. What,
then, is the average distance thus intervening between
the place of production -and the port of shipment ? I
conceive this may be estimated, in a manner sufficiently
accurate for the present purpose, by taking the distance
from about the. centre of these provinces to the ports
in question.
Examination of the map, and of the figures before
given, lead us to the City_ of Moscow itself as probably
the most common centre that could be chosen for such a
purpose. The distance from Mpscow to St. Petersburg,
in a straight line, is scarcely 400 miles. Practically, the
distance passed over between the two cities may be set
down at 480. The like distance between Moscow and
Riga appears to be about 630 miles ; but against the
distance of 150 miles further, by land, to Riga, is to be
set a saving of sea carriage of some 200 miles, in con-
sequence of Riga being so much nearer than St.
Petersburg to the entrance of the Baltic, which is to
be passed by nearly all vessels exporting the produce
of Russia. _ . .

So much for the export trade of the central districts
around Moscow. But there is, as we have seen, another
great centre of production around Warsaw. And this
is very differently situated. It will be observed that Po-
land and the neighbouring provinces of Vilna and Grodno
are separated from the Baltic coast only by a slip of
Prussian territory, some 70 or 80 miles wide. Upon the
seaboard of this territory, and upon a line the extremi-
ties of which are not more than 200 miles apart, are four
Prussian ports, Dantzic, Elbing, Konigsberg, and Me-
mel. A fine navigable river (the Vistula) and its tribu-
taries penetrate the entire kingdom of Poland, and even
float thitherward much of the produce of Russian Grodno
and Austrian Gallicia. - And though, during the last 30
years, the Russian Government has done all in its power
and not without considerable success, to draw the pro-
duce of this district northwards-, to ports within its own
territory (as Windan and Liebau), the natural course of
things is still so far maintained as to render these pro-
vinces of Russia mainly tributry, by their commerce, to
the ports of East Prussia.
It need scarcely be added that so long as Prussia re-
mains neutral, her ports will remain open, and the pas-
sage of Russian produce across her frontiers will be un-
obstructed. Hence it is to be expected that whatever
the Russians may wish to exchange for foreign goods,
and can afford to sell at a profit on the frontiers of Prus-
sia, they may continue to produce for exportation,
though every port they have on the Baltic be closely
blockaded.
Nor does it seem likely that the central provinces will,
in the event of a continuance of the war, find the Prus-
sian ports much less serviceable to them than they are
obviously fitted to be to Poland and the neighbouring
provinces in the west.
We have already set down the average distance of
these central provinces from St. Petersburg at 480 miles,
and from Rigi at 630 miles. On like data the distance
from Moscow. to Konigsberg cannot be estimated at
more than about 800 miles. And against the additional
land-carriage of 320 miles (as compared with St. Peters-
burg) there is a distance of some 500 miles saved by sea
--Konigsberg being at least so much nearer to the
Sound than St. Petersburg.
It will also be observed, on consulting a recent map of
these countries, that Cracow, at the southern extremity
of Poland, and Posen, but a short distance from the
western frontier of that country, are already within the
bulks of the continental railway system. Goods reach-
ing either of those cities from Russia are in immediate
communication• with Stettin, Hamburg, and all the
Dutch and Belgian ports ; and depots of foreign pro-
duce, for Med at either city, and destined for Russian
consumption, might be rapidly supplied by steam transit
from any of the ports of England, France, Belgium,
Holland, or Prusgia, and the goods easily placed en
route for Warsaw, St. Petersburg, or Moscow.
When the projected lines from Dantzic to Posen, and
from Posen direct to Cracow, shall be completed, the

exportable produce of Poland and Gallicia must tend to
seek a railway route to Dantzic or Hamburg, or even to
Ostend ; a tendency operating directly in proportion to
the value and the portability of the produce. But
whether this tendency of the German railway system to
draw westward the trade now. by the imperial system of
Russia, drawn northward to Riga or St. Petersburg, or
southwards to Odessa, will be permitted to operate with
any degree of freedom, must depend much upon the
duration and the issue of the present system. That
while hostilities continue, and the Prussian frontier re-
mains passable, the more free and natural course of
trade will be admitted by the Czar for his own sake,
though to the detriment of the imperial system is obvi-
ous ; a benefit to the cause he fights against, which may,
for the present, reconcile us to the equivocal-attitude of
one of the four powers.
So long, then, as Prussia remains neutral, the eastern
half of that country, as it obviously possesses the coast
line naturally appendant to the kingdom of Poland, and
to the Russian provinces immediately adjoining that
kingdom on the east, may be expected to afford a pas-
sage for the trade of these provinces, with all the ease
and all the willingness with which mercantile men, who
have long seen trade diverted from its natural channel
through their own hands, see it come back in conse-
quence of the temporary weakness of the disturber.
From the ports of the Black Sea the only regular sup-
plies we receive are of corn and seeds, with a small
quantity of wool and tallow, and a few articles of no im-
portance.
Corn, wool, and tallow, then, are the only articles
with regard to which an entire stoppage of our trade
with the Russian ports of the Black Sea would affect
this country. And how insignificant such a stoppage
would be to us may be inferred from comparison of the
quantity of each of these three articles imported thence
in the two years 1849 and 1850, with the quantity of
each imported into this country from all parts of the
world in the same year. •
Assuming the trade, on an average of years, to be
fairly represented, the corn would form only about 6
per cent., the wool about 3 per cent., and the tallow
from 1 to 7 per cent. of all we have been accustomed to
iin port.
But, reverting to what has been said of the facilities
for interior carriage in Russia, and of the great distances
over which nearly all the exportable produce of the coun-
try must be carried before it reaches the place of ship-
ment, we may safely infer that the greater part of the
produce now shipped in the Black Sea would, were that
outlet closed to it for more than one i,ea.sou, find its way
to the shores of the Baltic. It is also to be borne in
mind that the Russian export -Rade of the Black Sea
is chiefly concentrated at Odessa ; that port is supplied
from the country west of the. Dnieper, and drained by
that liver and the Bug and the Dniester ; and that this,
the most fruitful part of the Russian dominions on the
Black Sea, is at once most open to the menus of transport
to the Baltic already in use for Gallicia and Poland, and
is also the territory obviously most likely to be occupied
by the allies of Turkey in the event of a protracted con-
test, and an advance by the allies upon the most recently
acc;iiired and most southern dominions of Russia.
This conclusion may be stated in a few words. It is
that, while Prussia remains neutral, the efforts we make
to put a stop to commercial intercourse between Russia
and the rest of the world will result in little more than
in transferring to Prussian ports the greater part of the
trade hitherto carried on through the ports of Russia.
The people of Russia would suffer from such a transfer
mainly in the annoyance and loss always incident to an
obstruction or disturbance of the ordinary channels of
traffic—the nobles or landowners in a lower price ob-
tained for their exportable produce, and a higher price
paid for imported comforts and luxuries—and the
government in a partial loss of the revenue derived
from trade, and such a restoration of the main commerce
of the country to its natural outlets as cannot but post-
pone, if it do not ultimately prevent, the realisation of
the despotic scheme which makes St. Petersburg, in
spite of nature, the capital city and chief port of the
empire.
The sufferings of the
people will, at worst, he tempo-
rary ; for, could the transfer continue but a few years,
it would confer all the countervailing benefits of a more
natural state
while the damage done to the
of thinols •
artinoiAl Bygitom of the Government would be art4i.:
. ,