The Sun.
London, England, 1854-03-22 00:00:00

iN x MARCIt 22, 1854.

+lmitative and official statement 'of the price of the
Three per , Cent. Consols. Now I must observe that
Chancellor tee Chancellor, of the Exchequer had made upon the even-
i.`g in queStf6a. an amicable remark to his right honourable
cs'lleague the President of the Board of Trade. I recol-
lect that he oat the friend—the lidzss Achates, to use a
classical quotation—of the right hon. gentleman-=(a
laugh)—and he it was who obtained the information for
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He disappeared; he re-
appeared with a red book under his arm, and he
The CRA-NCELLOR, of the EXCHEQUER—" No-
thing of the sort." (A. laugh.)
Mr. DISRA.ELI -Well, whether I am right or wrong
in this conjectiire it has nothing tad° withthe priceof Con-
sole. rehi'. :f inn; the question, and here I have the
Ruth° 04,e retup of the price of Consols in Decem-
ber and at the beginning of unary, The right hon.
gentleman the Clitt;:si'ssor c the Exchequer, in answer to
my statement-that there had been a continuous fall in the
price of Cons,ols to the aroosaus of pa, cent., explained
that fall, as I lroNo b Stating at it was occasioned
by the pa stmt 4 the dividend—(cheers}—that, of ceists;.o.,
as there WO payment of 1 per cent. in ,Tan x, that
would explain the reason why the wine Ars tteuary was
I.t vs, cent. Jess than IA 4-)e,sereyr.' (Rear.) ow, what
wan to 7io in-Cgeto akcOtain whether my statement
was corrector not ? Why, I must obtain from the hlOest
authority the pribe of Consols in Decembg, os di,vz,xleud„,
and the pride of Consols in .-F21,-,rnstry.. Jyery gentler tau
will rt‘iT.,e, tlyav l'pliat WAS the poor vx'ay. (Efear.) Won,
I havegiit t at. t haVe gOt the price of upon the
unfortunate (fq on which, I Isetissak I assigned the seals.
I haVe got the prior of CsoissoSa, ess. dividend, on the 27th
of December, and the price of Consols on the Bth ot
February, the day on which the Chancelley f r tile, Ex-
chequer reduced the interest on the VaiftiMocl aiette.
It appears that the lark() of gonsols ex. tlividgnsl
on the 27th of December was 1014 and that the price
of Consols on the Bth of February, ex dividend, was 9)1,
so that the fall in the Three per Cent. Consols, from the
end of December to the day when the right hon. genti:.,man
announced the reduction of interest on the untamed debt, I
was not 1) per cont., and which fall the, right hon. gentle-
man explained by the payment csi the dividend, but was
really 1 per cent. (Chem.) But, besides the official re-
turns, I have a return here from a quarter not official, but
which in these days is as well-informed as any public office
in the kingdom, for it is the Times newspaper. (Laughter
and cheers from the Opposition.) Here I find in the Times
of the 27th of December 1852, in the city article, written
on Monday evening—", There was not much business in
the English funds to-day, and, although the market opened
with firmness, the closing prices show a decline. Consols
were first quoted at 101 es:dividend, and they left off at 1001
to 1.4' Tlfe4 011 January 3, 1853, I find :—" The English
funds roman without the slightest variation. Consols for
the opening were plot 4 1004 tog ex. div. throughout the
day-2T In fact, Consols had been sick throughout the
whole week—(a laugh)—and had been on a continuous de-
clines 911 OW MI of tlftiltielly the Times city article said :
„%. 7th opened this morning at the lower
prices of yesterday, and experienced a further decline of
an eighth," upon an announcement to which I am going to
preshutl. `i The first quotation of Consols for
money was 10Qk to g, and they closed at 100) to i." And
so they went on falling, until we hod them by the official
list upon the riti4 Vehruary, 1/53, as low as 99i, a fall of
li. Now, let the Wise recollect, because they will sym-
pathise with me, that this is the only opportunity that I
have had for regre than a fortnight to notice that extraordi-
nary statement of the Chanc.ellor of the Exchequer—which
the right hen. gentleman said was not a statement—
and to show that that fall in the priee of Console between
December awl February, and which I have proved was
caused by the imprudence of his conduct, was not really
occasioned by the payment of the dividend. The right hon.
gentleman in replying to me was happy and affluent in un-
necessary taunts, He said I had remarked that the funds
had fallen 1) per cent, after the Government of Lord Derby
resigned office, and he wondered my modesty did not in-
duce me to connect cause and effect, and to tell the house
that it was in consequence of the resignation of Lord
Derby's Government that the fall in the Consols had taken
place. Well, sir, I have some modesty, I hope. (Much
laughter.) I am not prepared to say that it wasabsolutely
in consequence of the retirement of Lord Derby's Govern-
ment that that fall of a.) per cent, took place. But this I
have no hesitation in saying—that if the country had been
the least aware of what the retirement of Lord Derby's
Government would lead to—(hear, hear)—if it had been
possible to conceive what has occurred during the last six
months—(cheers)—and the position in which we are now
placed—l have no doubt that a fall of 13 per cent. would
have been but a very moderate and modest estimate of
what the opinion of the public would have been ; and the
present state of the funds is, I think, rather germane to
that point. (Cheers from the Opposition.) But when the
Chancellor of the Exchequer turns round and uses un-
seemly and discourteous taunts—and not only uses un-
seemly and discourteous taunts—but, as I have shown,
makes statements which are quite unauthorised—when
he attempts to twist a reference to the price of flints
into a perversion for an unworthy object which served
his purpose that evening, I beg to ask whether the
state of the public funds was the only test that
as a prudent and cautious administrator of the
public funds he ought to have observed? (Cheers.) I say
that a more rash, a more improvident, and a more super-
ficial course was never taken ; and that it was not the con-
duct of a wise and prudent man not to condescend to
notice a fall of 1) per cent. in the interval before adver-
tising the reduction in the interest on Exchequer-bills.
(Cheers.) But were there no other symptoms that ought
to have made you pause, and which would thus have pre-
vented you from coming forward now and saying that you
are the victim of circumstances that could not be foreseen ?
Why, on the 7th of January a significant circumstance
took place. On that day, when the Consols were very
sick, this was the alleged cause—namely, the raising of
rate of discount by the Bank. The rate of discount had,
up to that moment, remained unaltered since the 22d of
April, 1852, but it was raised from 2 per cent. to 2) per
cent. on the 7th of January. (Hear, hear.) Well, was
not that a significant symptom? (Hear.) Was that a
sign to be disregarded? Was not that a circumstance to
be taken in connection with the price of public funds ?
(Hear.) But, is that all? The Bank of England raised
the rate of discount from 2 to 2) per cent. on the 7th of
January, while the Chancellor of the Exchequer was
making his great schemes for reducing the interest on the
unfunded debt. In the same month, on the 23d of Jan-
uary, what did the Directors of the Bank of England do?
They again met and again raised the rate of discount from
2) per cent. to 3 per cent. Twice in the month did these
gentlemen, meeting in the Bank parlour, raise the rate
of interest, which had remained nearly a year at a fixed
rate. Were these not symptoms to be taken into ac-
count? (Hear.) After a continual depreciation of the
price of the funds, and after a rise in the rate of discount
twice in one month, is the Chancellor of the Exche-
quer to turn round and treat it as a matter of im-
pertinence that I should allude to the fact that there were
symptoms in the state of the money market at that time,
which a wise man would not have disregarded. But is even
that all ? I will not touch upon the subject of the Exche-
quer balances, because I know that is a subject upon which
the right hon. gentleman, although a great master of self-
control, does not so much keep his tamper as a public man
ought to do. (Cheers and laughter.) But the premium
upon Exchequer-bills, which as a great supporter of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the hon. member for Lam-
beth (Mr. Williams) had stated was at 70s. in December,
had declined to 555. at the moment when the right hon.
gentleman was determining to reduce the interest on Ex-
chequer-bills. It does seem to me the strangest thing when
Exchequer-bills, from being at 70s. premium in December,
had fallen to 555. in February, that the Chancellor of the
Exchequer should say the best thing we can do is to re-
duce the interest upon Exchequer-bills; and it really re-
quires one to be initiated into the mysteries of that high
finance of which we hear so much before we can appreciate
its adroitness. (Laughter.) It is perfectly open to finan-
ciers of the school of the hon. member for Lambeth to say
that, because Exchequer-bills are at 70s. premium, you
must immediately reduce the interest, and, if possible,
cancel so dangerous an instrument ; but, as he has been, I
believe, told to-night, and ought to have been told lons.
ago, the interest of Exchequer-bills is no test or sign of the
real state of the interest which money command; and that
in moments of exigency, when money becomes precious
and the interest high, men seek an investment in Exche-
quer-bills because they are doubtful what the future
will turn out to be, and because they can command a
capital for what they are risking. I say, sir, without go-
ing into the question whether 70s. is too high a premium
for Exchequer-bills to range at or not, which may be
a matter of controversy, that a Chancellor of the Exche-
quer, who commences reducing the interest upon the un-
funded debt when there has been a reduction in the pre-
mium of fully 15s. during the preceding six weeks, may be
most able, and may ultimately prove most successful; but
he is, in my opinion, a very daring Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer. (Cheers from the Opposition.) The right hon.
gentleman was indignant the other night, after his financial
statement, because I made a passing observation that I
thought there were symptoms at the time he commenced
reducing the interest on the unfunded debt which would
have made a cautious man pause. I think I have shown
the House that there were such symptoms—(cheers)--and
I think I have shown it that the statement which I made
as to the fall of the Three per Cent. Consols was not that
ignorant and unauthorised statement which the Chancellor
of the Exchequer wished to impress upon the house that it
was, and which attempt his immediate supporters so enthu-
siastically but so rashly cheered. (Hear.) I think, if, as
I have shown, the rate of interest was twice raised in the
Bank Parlour in the same month, that that was rather
an important symptom, and one which ought not to have
been disregarded, and if the interest or the premium of
his own Exchequer-bills were rapidly falling, that that
was another symptom, and such a one as ought not to
have been overlooked. (Cheers.) But, after all, we
come to graver circumstances than these—circumstances
which would have caused a prudent man to hesitate in
embarking in that singular campaign in which the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer commenced his career as a Minister
of Finance, but which career is not yet terminated. What
made Consols fall? What made the premium onExchequer-
bills decline? What made the cautious but alarmed direc-
tors of the Bank meet twice in one month, after the rate
of interest had been fixed, and raise the rate of dis-
count ? that is the question. But what, sir, was the gravest
of all symptoms—the symptom which ought always to
occupy the attention of a Minister of Finance, the symp-
tom which should not be neglected by any individual who
lives in this country, having its cause at heart, and who is
interested in the industry of its people and in the mains
tenance of its grandeur? It was the state of the bullion in
the Bank. (Hear.) It was the alarming, the sudden, the
rapid deflux of the precious metals which produced all these
superficial symptoms, and which could not be neglected by
any one filling the high position of Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer, and acquainted with the real state of affairs as re-
garded the amount of bullion in the Bank. I am speaking
of this because it is a subject on which the Chancellor of
the Exchequer challenged my statement that there were
circumstances at the commencement of the year 1853
which should have made him pause inthe course which he
was taking of reducing the interest upon the unfunded.
debt. Here is a return by which it appears that on Decem-
ber the 3d, 1852, the bullion in the Bank amounted to
22,206,000/. Now, bear in mind those numbers while I
ask you what it was on the 4th of February, a few days
before the Minister of Finance made that startling adver-
tisement to the commercial and manufacturing world that
he was going to reduce the interest upon the unfunded
debt? The bullion in the Bank in December, 1832, as I
said before, was 22,206,0001., and on February the 4th,
1853, the bullion in the bank amounted to only 19,C00,000/.
(Hear, hear.) There had been in this short, but memorable
period, a deflux of the precious metals to an amount ex-
ceeding 3,000,0001. (Hear.) Sir, should not that have made
a Chancellor of the Exchequer hesitate before he introduced
a series of alterations which, commencing with the reduction
of the interest of the unfunded debt, was to terminate by
the reduction of the interest of the whole funded debt of
the country ? Having been taunted, and more than
taunted - (hear, hear)—with the observation I ventured to
snake at the time—that I thought the Chancellor of the
Exchequer should hesitate before he reduced the interest
upon the unfunded debt, I ask the House of Commons, I
ask hon. gentlemen sitting on both sides of the house
whether, after the statement I have now made, supported

las that statement is by authoritative documents, I was not
justified in the opinion I then expressed—whether, if they
blame me 64 all, it is net rather for not having expressed
myself in stronger langatag•e) and whether they think a
Minister of Finance ought to have chosen such a moment
to tamper with the interest of the unfunded debt of this
country? (Cheers from the Opposition benches.) A fall
in the stocks of 1i per cent. !—a diminution of the bullion
in the Bank to the amount of more than 3,000,000/. !—a
reduction in the premium of Exchequer-bills of 15s. !
and twice in the interval an increase to the amount of
discount in the Bank parlour ! What rhetoric, what
sophistry, can overcome facts like these? (Hear, hear.)
Sir, having alluded to the policy or the impolicy of the
course pursued by the right hon.
ssirentleman in reducing
the interest on the unfunded debt, 't adverted to the loss
which had been occasioned, by this most, imprudent and
most injudicious entesasrase. The right hon. gentleman
last year made a, great budget, and one of the items of that
budget was, ts'sie, amount he had saved by his operations in
the isesciss.atisses of the interest upon the unfunded debt. He
ssave us an estimate ot his savings.
The CHANCALLOR of the EXCHEUQER made an
observation Goss the table which was inaudible.
XI% AISRAW4I-1 don't much care about beir.g inter-
3i‘tSlo4e4s One gains breath and sometimes es;;lects
an unfortunate ones. thoughts. (Laughter.) The right hon. genl';'seman, thor gh
sometimes I think, he is unfortate financier,
accomplished orator, awls althoughis arn-ost
complain, I thin 4 AO might s I don't fora moment
par! his observations for his
l
reply.. ,-iT
-sQ4A'a hiearc) Well, 1 ram under the impression the
right Issas, gentieman told r.s he anticipated a saving by the
Wel„,,„elsi" of interest on linamded debt to the amount- of
ThoU""°.--"that is my me'asory of it. Bat, having a natural
curiosity in the mattsa and having the returns laid on the
table which I had myself myself movedfor, I said you will find the
anticipated D-
-36 ,„-s„.
is
~.ofit of 65,0001. will turn out an actual loss of
sea,.'''''' asaking a difference of 101,0001, on the general
ffscial statement of 1853. This led to immense contro-
versy. The right hon. gentleman said it was no such thing.
and finally took up my own returns, and, with an amenity
of manner which I am sure the house must have noticed,
laid them on the table, saying, " There are your own
figures, which prove that you really know nothing about it."
I naturally yielded to the Chancellor of the Exchequer
when he said I did not know my own figures. (Laughter.)
I am not going to weary the house with figures, as I dare
say I shall be able to make myself understood without them,
but if the house would be good enough to refer to one of
those numerous returns which we were obliged to trouble
the Government for—the return with reference to Exche-
quer-bills—they will see what is the gain and what the loss
by the operations regarding those bills. Of course thegain
will go under the head of reduction, and the loss under
that of increase ; there are only two items, making toge-
ther 82,000/. ; and on the side of reduction the numerous
items giving a gain. I asked the right hon. gentleman
to take his column of profits, and, looking at the date of
the first item, which I believe was the most important
item, more than 35,0001., it was found to be dated June
10, 1852, and was profit occasioned by the reduction in the
interest of Exchequer-bills, which I had the responsibility
of making, and consequently I took credit for it, and,
although the right hon. gentleman at first refused me the
credit, ho afterwards, in the course of the evening, said
he had no objection to my doing so. There are six other
items entered as profit, but which are really imaginary
estimates of the saving effected by the paying off of Exche-
quer-bills which were at the time cancelled, and not re-
issued until some months afterwards, during which in-
terval of course no interest was paid. (Hear.) This saving
of interest is taken credit for as profit ; but how were
these Exchequer-bills paid off? (Hear, hear.) They were
paid off out of the balances in the Exchequer, and the
balances in the Exchequer were obliged to be repaid by
deficiency bills, on which the right hon, gentleman paid
interest. He cannot take credit, therefore, for the saving
of interest on Exchequer-bills, unless he tells us what
interest he has paid on deficiency bills, and as it certainly
was not less than the interest on Exchequer-bills, I put
one against the other. (Hear, hear.) Therefore, leaving
out these items, and the item of 4000/. to which I have
already referred, instead of a gain of 65,0001. there is, in
fact, a loss of 36,0001. (Hear.) Ido not mean to say that
when we are doubling the incense-tax, though only for six
months, because at the end of six months it will probably
be something worse than that —(hear)--I don't mean to
say that these are very considerable items. But the House
of Commons is always of opinion that in matters of finance
it is just as well to be exact. (Hear.) No doubt, if you
have a minister of finance of very splendid ability, it may
be a matter of no consequence whatever whether you have
a balance in the Exchequer or not. (Hear, and a laugh.)
With his exuberant resources, he will always be able to
meet whatever emergency may arise—(laughter)—but if
his genius can find out no other resource than to double a
tax which is already felt to be most onerous, it is a gloomy '
and a grinding future for this country. (Hear.) But, sir,
I have been contradicted on another point. The right hon. ,
gentleman having contradicted upon the point, I am
obliged to trouble the house with an appeal to a book to
which I very seldom apply except in my own private
library. lam unwilling to weary the house with quota- J
tion ;it is the right hor„ gentleman, who, by that .lively 1
temperament of his,, which leads him so hastily to contras- 1.
diet his opponent, oven on a subject of no importance, now
forces me to refer to " Hansard.' The right hon. gentleman
says, that he made no estimate of gain upon Exchequer-
bills ' • he says that I was unauthorised to make a state-
ment to that effect, Rut in the corrected report of the
right hon. gentleman's speech, I find him saying that there
would he a saving in Exchequer-bills, owing to the dimi-
nution of interest, amounting to about 65,0001. (Hear.)
Now, sir, I say this subject is not vast. It is not so im-
portant as the first sub which I treated of—whether it
was wise and prudent in the right honourable gentleman
to commence a great experiment upon the 'credit of the
country, under the circumstances in which he did so in the
year 1813. But, sir, though it is not so important, the
house will recollect that these are circumstances, that these
are statements, the accuracy of which has been challenged.
(Hear.) The house will recollect that the right hon. gen-
tleman has absolutely computed a saving, and intended
to put it down to his own credit, and that because I re- I
minded him that he was not entitled to it, he treated me 1
with scarcely Parliamentary courtesy. When, on the '
Wednesday following, ho came down, he said that there
had been some misapprehension, and with a courtesy which,
as one does not always experience it, one therefore prizes
the more, gave me this return, and said that he was sorry
to have been misunderstood. However, this statement
made it perfectly clear. It is a very significant statement,
the simplest in the world, the right lan. gentleman says.
It completely explains what the mysterious papers on the
table leave unintelligible. It settles the whole business.
Well, sir, it does havolve a most important matter. It is a
return of the Exchequer-bills paid off iu March and June
of the years 1853 and 1854. Now those of 1852 were paid
off in 1853 ; those of 1853 in 1854. Here is the principal
and interest of the Exchequer-bills of March and June,
1852, paid off in 1853, and for which lam responsible. It
is 17,742,0001. The interest paid upon them was 367,0001.
Then the bills fox March and June, 1853, paid off in 1854.
The interest on them was but 347,000/., and the right hon.
gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer says directly,
there is your answer; there is a saving of 20,0001. (Hear.)
He says, ' I don't go into return§ moved for by a political
opponent. I take a large and comprehensive view. (Laugh-
ter.) I will have the transactions of the whole year. The
Exchequer-bills in your year must be compared with
those of mine • the interest must be compared ; there is a
saving of 20,0001., and that is your answer." (Laughter.)
But now let us come to an analysis. There is not the
slightest doubt that the interest of Exchequer-bills, in the
one year, and in the other, was not the same. I call the
attention of the honourable member for Lambeth to this
subject. (Laughter.) I know that it is one that daily
and nightly engages his attention, and that no one enjoys
the details of an Exchequer-bill more than the honourable
member. Sir, it is perfectly true that there exists a dif-
ference ; that there was 20,0001 more interest paid in the
preceding year. Then, you will naturally say, what be-
comes of fallacious estimate attributed to the Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer ?—what becomes of the loss said to
be incurred ?.._I will explain. Look at the amount of the

Exchequer-bills. In 1852-53, Exchequer-bills, 17,700,000/.;
in 1853-54, Exchequer-bills, 1G,000,000/. (Hear.) It is very
true that you paid 20,0001. more interest on the 17,700,0001.
than on the 16,000,0001. ; but what interest were you pay-
ing all this time on the 1,700,0001. not accounted for in the
second year ? (Cheers.) How comes it that between the
two years there is a difference of 1,700,0001. in the amount?
(Hear.) I will tell you how it happens. Two-thirds of
that 1,700,0001. were paid off by money out of the consoli-
dated fund, which money was paid again by deficiency
bills. And then there was a payment by Exchequer bonds.
Do you think Exchequer-bonds do not pay interest?
There is a paper now on the table of the Lords, showing
the interest paid on Exchequer-bonds to be between
11,0001. and 12,0001. per annum. Deduct the interest on
Exchequer bonds, take into the calculation these deficiency
bills, and all together I should like to know whether the
Chancellor of the Exchequer would not get off very well
if the loss on his Exchequer-bills were as low as I have
placed it, were 36,0001. (Cheers.) When I called the at-
tention of the house to the state of the balances in the Ex-

he suspected all large and comprehensive measures. I
• have lived to see him in a Cabinet distinguished for. its
large and comprehensive measures. (Laughter.) How-
ever, the Chancellor of the Exchequer's was to be a large
measure, and was hailed with enthusiasm by the House of
Commons, with acclamation by the nation, as a measure
absolutely to reduce the national debt. hat' was to be
the ultimate consequence of the elaborate and ingenious
but somewhat unintelligible project that was preposed to
us on the 18th of April. The Chancellor of the Exchequer
had that confidence in his resources that he determined—
notwithstanding the effiux of bullion, notwithstanding the
fall in the prices of public securities, notwithstanding the
more than menace of a bad harvest—to embark in this
enormous, this portentous affair. Was there nothing else
to warn and guide the Chancellor of the Exchequer besides
the state of the exchanges—besides the countenances of the
Bank directors—besides the visages of the farmers of
England at that moment when he was going to embark in
an undertakingof such immensity and of such possible
danger. Wear, hear.) Why, I can fancy that the Chan-
cellor of t:iie Exchequer being extremely engaged, being
unrivalled for his devotion to affairs, being a public man
who does more than his duty to his country, who devoted
ly.eaself with an extreme ardour and unrivalled assiduity
to the labours of his office—l can fancy that the Chancellor
of the Exchequer at that time omitted to perform one of
his duties, and he may be pardoned. As a Minister of
the Crown, as a member of the Cabinet, it was his duty
to become acquainted with every despatch on foreign
affairs that arrives in this country. (Cheers.) Well,
sir, make every admission to the Chancellor of
the Exchequer— I treat him with a fairness
with which he has never treated me. (Hear.)
I have myself rather a weakness for foreign politics, I like
to read despatches, and when in office I often read des-
patches which did not concern my own department. But
I eau quite exonerate the Chancellor of the Exchequer from
the tedious and unprofitable task of pottering over those
blue books—(loud cheers)—which were placed on our table
at the commencement of the session by the gracious com-
mand of her Majesty, and which one of her Majesty's chief
Ministers treated immediately with what I in my inexpe-
rience thought was unparliamentary derision, but which I
now find was deserved mockery. (Prolonged cheers.) I
can easily conceive that the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
with great ideas, in a great position, full of youth and
genius, and energy, being determined to pay off the na-
tional debt —(a laugh)—was quite resolved not to waste his
anxious hours in reading those two volumes which have
recently been placed on our table in order to delude public
opinion. (Cheers,) I therefore make that liberal allow-
ance to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I say that the
Chancellor of the Exchequer was fully justified in not pot-
tering over those blue-books, but were there no other do-
cuments, the perusal of which would have been most salu-
tary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer which were received
at that time ? (Hear.) I want to know from any gentle-
men here, who 'think they have a chance of being Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer—(a laugh)—what would have been
their feelings, if they read a despatch from the ambassa-
dor of the Queen at St. Petersburg, marked " secret and
confidential," soliciting a partition of the Turkish Empire.
—(Hear, and cheers)—and telling us if, on reflection, we
did not agree with it, the, ingenious proposer was resolved
to hive his way, by one mode or another, and most cer-
tainly he would have recourse to force? I want to know
whether the right hon. gentleman read those despatches ?
(Hear.) Are we to believe that the right hon. gentleman
did not read those despatches, and so believe that he is
unworthy of the confidence of his Royal mistress ? Oh, no,
not that. The right hon. gentleman must have read those
despatches. The bullion in the Bank, even the state of
the Exchequer-bills, could hardly have prevented his de-
voting some moments of his anxious day to the perusal of
those startling missives. (Cheers.) To believe that the
right hon. gentleman was ignorant of those State papers,
is to believe that he is utterly unworthy of his posi-
tion. But to believe that having read them, with the
certainty that there had been an over-trading, with many
menaces of a bad harvest, with crimson war in the vista of
uncounted years before him, he should come down with a
proposal to deal with the funded and unfunded debt, is
the most marvellous conception that ever entered into the
head of man—(henr, hear, and loud cheers)—the most
marvellous conception that ever yet occurred to the ad-
venturous spirit of a young Minister of Finance. (Re-
newed cheers.) What I say, sir, is, the right honourable
gentleman owes a grievous responsibility to this house upon
this subject. We must have explanations en this subject.
It is not in the position it was last year. The right hon.
gentleman cannot come forward now with the reasons,
the excuses, of last year. He must come forward and tell
us why he denied the over-speculation which the directors
of the Bank had recognised. (Hear, hear.) He must
come forward and tell us why he neglected these menaces
of a bad harvest. He may come forward and.give his ver-
sion of these circumstances, but he cannot come forward
and tell us that the possible or even the probable contin-
gency of war was not an element which occurred to him.
(Cheers.) And I ask the House of Commons to decide
upon the character which he arrogates to himself—which
he will not allow me to make the subject of an idle com-
ment even in conversation and in committee. I will ask
the house and the country whether a Minister of Finance,
with such evidence of over-speculation in the country, as
the circumstances of January, to which I have referred,
prove with the evidence, as Minister of Finance, ho ought
to have possessed, as to the probable state of the harvest ;
and above all, in the possession of that dark secret, which
is now clear, and manifest, and open to us all (loud
cheers)—l say, was he justified in the course which he
took? Was he a prudent or provident man? (Hear.) I
want to know whether you think that a judicious, wise,
and prudent course for the right hon. gentleman to
take, with the knowledge which no one bat himself and his
colleagues could have possessed, which no critic in the House
of Commons could even have suspected. (Cheers.) I want
to know whether—in the possession of these facts—it is
your opinion that the right hon. gentleman ought to have
brought forward these vast schemes, which have involved
in their partial and mitigated failure great perplexity and
embarrassment, but which, as Lord Monteagle truly ob-
served in another place, were happily not successful—
(cheers),—schemes which, had they succeeded, might have
placed this country in a position which the imagination of
no man can picture, and might have involved responsibili-
ties and engagements which would have thrown us back 10
years at the least. (Hear, and cheers). That I say id a
consideration—that is a state of affairs—which the house
can now judge of with some advantage. (Hear.) Well, sir,
now, what was the scheme? I am not going to say a
single word on the great scheme of the right hon.
gentleman The great scheme of the right hon. gentle-
man has been touched on often, and I make only one re-
mark upon it, that I think if there had not been over-
speculation, if there had not been famine, if there had not
been war, the larger scheme of conversion of the right hon.
gentleman must have failed. (Hear, hear.) There was a
radical defect in it which secured its failure, which my
hon. friend the member for Suffolk has placed before the
house on this night and on previous occasions, and which
is not doubted by any person. (Hear, hear.) It must
have failed irrespective of all those circumstances which
would have made any common financial scheme fail. If
we had had influx of bullion—if we had had a most abun-
dant harvest—if we had had, instead of the war in which
we are now engaged, that perpetual peace which the mem-
bers for the West Riding and for Manchester prophesied
almost to the last, I say the great scheme of conversion
must have failed, because it was founded on fallacious cal-
culations. But there was a portion of that scheme of a
much more rigid, absolute, and commonplace character,
which did depend on circumstances which affect credit.
It was an engagement to pay off, speaking generally, a
portion of the public debt to the amount of ten millions.
That was an ,undertaking which depended upon the
weather, upon the harvest, upon the state of trade, upon
the state of the bullion, upon the temper of Emperors and
the resources of foreign nations. Nov, sir, what was the
engagement which the right hon. gentleman undertook
under these circumstances ? The right hon. gentleman
undertook, with perfect evidence before him that there
was every cause in the distance which most disturbs the
money market—he undertook to pay off at a hundred, ten
. . . .
....

millions of the national debt, having no resources what-
ever for that purpose. (Hear.) Perhaps I should say in
my view with no resources, because I think his attack on
the balances was not a legitimate course. (Cheers.) I want
to know how has that ended.? We have had au estimate to
night of the loss. The hon. and learned member for Suffolk
has told us the loss is 720,000/. It is, perhaps, impossible ac-
curately to tell what has been the loss on this forced at-
tempt to convert ten millions of South Sea Stock because
the transaction is not yet finished. There is a cer-
tain degree of interest saved, of which the right hon. gen-
tleman will no doubt inform us—there is the interest on
Exchequer-bills, which you have instead of fixed balances.
Put one against the other, and it is not at all impossible
the loss at this moment is 7,000& or 8,000/. Ido myself
believe that it cannot be much less than that. But I will
not dwell on the amount of loss. What I think is of great
consequence, of vital consequence, of pressing importance,
which cannot' be too much urged on the attention of the
house, because night after night it will recur, and, unless
you meet it boldly, depend upon it you will be landed in

chequer, I adverted to the two causes which I believed had financial disaster;iS the conseqUence of thus tampering with
brought a condition of affairs so dangerous to the the interest of the funded and unfunded debt in the state
country. One of those causes was the dealing with the of your balances in the Exchequer. Now, sir, I have ad-
interest of the unfunded debt by the Chancellor of the Ex. verted to the state of the balances as far as they seem
chequer ; the other was his dealing with the interest of the concerned, and therefore I need not touch upon them.
funded debt. Now, I wish for a moment very briefly to The right hon. gentleman delivered the other night some
touch on the second of these. I touch upon it because my extraordinary opinions. I entirely differ from the right
statement with regard to it has been controverted as to hon. gentleman. The member for Portsmouth has made a
fact, and utterly rejected as to opinion. (Hear.) We protest in favour of balances in the Exchequer to-night.
must recollect that there was a cause for all those menacing We have heard the opinion of a gentleman who was Gover-
circumstances which ought to have induced the chancellor nor of the Bank ; and I must say, in passing, I was quite
of the Exchequer not to have reduced the interest on the surprised that a gentleman like the member for Lambeth
unfunded debt. There was a cause, and it is not a secret. —(a laugh)—should get up in place, after the speech of the
At least it is not a secret. now. It is avowed. A year or member for Peterborough, and say he takes a Bank view of
a year and a half ago a man might have been supposed to the question. Theold-fashioned ideas of Bank views of ques-
have been professing some heterodox and unpopular opinion tions was very well 20 years ago, before the present charter,
if he had said that over-trading was this cause. But it is and at that distant date when the member for Lambeth cora-
perfectly admitted now—(hear, hear)—by every person who menced his financial studies, and formed his financial mind
has authority on such subjects. It has been admitted to- —(a laugh)—but I can tell him this :—All that the directors
night by a gentleman who was recently governor of the of thelßank of England want is, not to make a profit by a mi-
Bank of England, that there was extensive overtrading, nistry, but to have a Minister who will leave them alone.
that that caused an influx of bullion, and that that mate- That is all they require. Instead of taking a Bank view
rially affected the price of Consols and the premium on of questions, instead of viewing questions as tothe interest
Exchequer-bills. The Chancellor of the Exchequer did of the Bank, since the last charter, all the directors wish
not believe in that cause. (Hear.) Confident in the re- is, that they should have a Minister who would leave them
sources of the country and in the success of the commer- alone to carry on business according to those commercial
cial changes with which he is intimately connected, the principles which the late Sir Robert Peel says are the
right honourable gentleman defied, or disbelieved, in the only principles which ought to subsist between the Go-
overtrading which led to the disagreeable state of vernment and the Bank. (Cheers.) Well, I say, we have
circumstances that commenced the year 1853. (Hear, had protests by the hon. member for Portsmouth ;we have
hear.) Had anything happened besides the suspicion had indignant expressions of feeling from the member
or certainty of overtrading (hear, hear) to have made the for Peterborough on the subject of balances in the public
right hon. gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer treasury ; but I cannot conceive that it is necessary to
more prudent, when, at a later period, he commenced impress on any gentleman in this house, unless he be a
his greater speculation of dealing with the interest on the finance minister without balances—(a laugh)—then I know
funded debt ? (Hear, hear.) Overtrading, the effects of a man, as well as a fox, who has lost his tail has the pri-
over-speculation, of what may be called a surplus invest- vilege of the fable. (Loud laughter.) But I put it, the
ment, had made themselves unmistakeably felt at the course of a nation should be the same as that of an indi-
commencement of the year 1853. As the year advanced, vidual ; and I will ask any gentleman in this house, sup-
there was another circumstance which made men grave. pose he was about to embark in an expensive law suit,
We heard early in the spring that there was the prospect of would or woukl he not like to have a balance at his
a bad harvest, (Hear, hear.) Is there any gentleman who banker's? We are going to embark in a very expensive
did not hear that ? The seed time had been most unpro- struggle, and I want to know whether you think it for
pitious. The consequences were unusually fatal. In ad- our advantage or not to have a balance at our banker's?
dition to the over speculation that had already appeared, Sir, we have heard a great deal in speeches of late about
we pp principles of finance
had a prospect of a bad harvest. Is that a circumstance new, and philosophical, and enlightened rinci
that should make a man grave ? Is it apnihility which that, being engaged in war, we are to raise the whole of
should make a minister of finance provident; (Cheers) I the supplies for the year in the year ; and, sir, that is a
grant much to a distinguished tree trader. I have often very fine sentiment, and if war does not last more than
hoard the hon. member for Montrose express his anxiety six months, I dare say we shall be able to maintain it:,
to see the day when England would not grow a grain of truth. But, sir, lam not so clear, when we come to prac-
wheat. (Cheers and laughter.) 'But I think the Chancel- tico, that we shall find it more than a sentiment. (Hear,
for of tho Exchequer would hardly go so far as that. If, bear.) lam not, however, going to touch upon that ques-
therefore, he was told that there was a prospect of a bad tion. If the right honourable gentleman retains tho con-
harvest at that time, I should have thought the probabi- viction that with his own resources, and the resources
lity would have been that he would say, "As far as the of the country, such a result can be obtained, let it be
Exchequer-bills are concerned, lam infor it ,• but we know so. What I\r ant to impress upon the house and upon
the worst ;we have got a large balance in the Exchequer, the country is a much more serious affair. It may be a
which is a great blessing ; and we have got more than that very just—certainly, it is a very just—it is possible it may
—we have the means of raising the interest on Exchequer- be a practical thing, that you can raise in this country in
bills." (Cheers.) But the right hon. gentleman, having the year the supplies that are necessary to carry on the
before him over-speculation and possible famine in the war. Well, sir, it is a grand principle that this genera-
vista' boldly goes to work ,• and in the spring proposes a tion should bear the cost of its own achievements and not
great measure. (Hear.) I have been long enough in this burden posterity. All that I can understand. But what
house to hear of " large and comprehensive measures" is the state and the practice of our modern nuances uider
very often. (Laughter.) And I recollect the right hon. the management of the right hon. gentleman ? The right
gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty once saying that - hon. gentleman is not only going to carry on the war—is

Mom..
I not only going to defray the expenses of the war with b taxes of the year—he is not only going to guard posterity
from the burelen, but he is absolutely at the same time pur-
suing a system that is defraying the burden that was left
to us by our predecessors. No course can be more oontraiy
to that which the right hon. gentleman says is his system
of finance—that which he lays down as a principle, that we
must not burden our posterity—than his scheme for making
sacrifices to defray the debts left by our predecessors. Sir,
no country can stand it. No country can pay off the na-
tional debt—no country, can attempt at the same time to
reduce old encumbrances and to bear the cost of a war
entirely from its own resources. (Hear, hear.) It is
very doubtful, as I think twenty-four men out of every
twenty-five in the house will admit, whetherin a continued
struggle we can raise the supplies in one year that are
necessary for the expenses of that year. That I say is
very doubtful. It is possible that from an excess of pa-
triotism, from an exorbitant amount of resources, you may
do so. I, however, do not believe it. But it certainly is
possible. No man, however, can maintain for a moment
that you can carry on a war and raise supplies for its ex-
pense at the same time that you are paying off ten millions
of debt. (Hear.) That is the position which the Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer has placed us in. The right hon.
gentleman is working two systems exactly contrary to each
other. He is coming forward animated by what is a sound
principle for this country—that we should, if we embark
in a war, not entail the cost of that war upon posterity.
But, while he is asking us to make these unheard-of sacri-
fices—while he is appealing to us to accomplish this unpre-
cedented act of patriotism, of virtue, of philanthropy—
he is absolutely calling upon us to diminish the debt which
our predecessors left us. Turn it and twist it as you like,
it is the most monstrous, the most impossible system of
finance that ever was carried on. It has been an immense
effort for Ministers to reduce the debt. Whenever there
has been a surplus, you have had a thousand applicants.
It has been the popular opinion that•you should diminish
taxation and not the debt. You have been obliged to pass
special laws to insure the reduction of the debt. You
have had special and stringent laws to effect that purpose.
But the Chancellor of the Exchequer comes forward and
says :—" I will combine with my new system of finance the
features of both systems. I'll absolutely not burden pos-
teritY, and I'll defray the charges which our predecessors
left us." Now, in what can this system end ? It will end
in one of the largest loans that a minister of finance ever
proposed in this house. (Hear, hear.) The right hon. gen-
tleman said the other day' that'll wanted him to propose a
You sh
" Divide.") I have little more to say.
hear the Chancellor of the Excheguer in
reply, and I dare say we shall hear him by and by. (Laugh-
ter.) We are asked here to increase the taxation of the
country to an enormous extent from particular circum-
stances, and the very form in which the gnesi ion is brought
before us must necessarily limit our consideration vay
much, and here is an hon. gentleman who cries " Divide."
I do not think it necessary for us to divide just yet. (Laugh-
ter.) My object was to call the attention of the house to
the state of the balances, and I say the question of the
balances must be met. It is in vain for the Chancellor of
the Exchequer to say that I proposed that he should raise
a loan. If the right hon. gentlemanihad raised a loan in
January, he could have raised it with greater advantage
than he is able to raise it now. If he attempts to raise it
now, he will raise it at a greater advantage than he can
expect to do in July. He may put the question off for six.
months more, and he will then raise it at a still greater ad-
vantage. It is evident that the right hon. gentleman has
been, in a time of peace and prosperity, or of fancied peace
and prosperity, tampering with the resources of the coun-
try; he must incur the cost of his conduct, and he must pub
himself in a sound position. You may rely upon it, that as
certainly as I am now speaking here, he will be forced to
raise a loan. There is no taxation—and he has tried it pretty
strongly—that can extricate him from the position in which
he has been placed. Well, it is a wise thing that a financier
should so manage when you are left with a balance of
9,000,000/., that he should at a moment of exigency be
forced to raise a loan ? I wish to impress upon the house
the very great importance of this point. (Hear.) There is
one point more, connected with the subject, upon which I
must touch. (Cries of adjourn.) If the house wishes to
adjourn, hon. members will be able to go to evening parties
or to bed ; but I think they had much better remain here.
(Laughter.) The right hon. gentleman said the other night
that Iheld him responsible for raising the rate of interest
which was occasioned by an acknowledged war and a bad
harvest. That I deny. I do not blame the right hon.
gentleman for raising the rate of Exchequer bills. That
was inevitable. But he ought to have foreseen the circum-
stances which prevented him from lowering the rate. The
right hon. gentleman urges one point which I feel to be a
great fallacy. That fallacy may be found in the Book of
Fallacies, by Bentham ; and as the members of the Govern-
ment are the disciples of Bentham and of Grote, they will
be able to correct me if I make a mistake. The right hon.
gentleman says that it is very possible that he has made a
very great error, but that he is not to be blamed for it ;
and he vindicated himself by accusing the person who
charges him with the error with expressing an erroneous
opinion. Bentham has noticed, in his Book of Fallacies,
that you, when charged with misconduct, exonerate your-
selves by imputing an erroneous opinion to your adversary.
The right honourale gentleman says, "It is all very well
you charging me with making a mistake, but in December
you yourself, occupying a responsible position, gave it as
your opinion that the rate of interest which was then
allowed, and which had not been raised at the Bank,
would, on the whole, be maintained." The right hon.
gentleman thinks that is his vindication. Now, consi-
dering that the right hon. gentleman is not a follower of
mine, I cannot see how any opinion of mine can be a vin-
dication of his conduct. (Laughter.) But a greater fallacy
than any fallacy mentioned by Bentham is the right hon.
gentleman's mistaking the whole difference between con-
duct and opinion. It is very true that in December I
gave it as my opinion that there were causes which had
occasioned, and which would, upon the whole, maintain
a low late of interest. Speaking generally on such
a subject, I cannot say that I see any great ground
for changing my opinion. That opinion, although
I am responsible for it in the house, and although
I did not give it after long thought, was not merely my
opinion, but the opinion of men who are second to none in
the country for experience in monetary affairs. But it
was an opinion, like that
sopinion which has been referred.
to in the course of the debate, which was expressed by the
right hon. gentleman in April last, to the clerk in Bir-
mingham, about low prices. The right hon. gentleman
then entertained the opinion that low prices had been
created and would remain. I am more charitable to the
right hon. gentleman than he is to me. I believe there is
some ground for saying that, generally spea.king, low prices
will be maintained. But whether the right hon. gentle-
man was right iu his view as to low prices, or lin my
view of a low rate of interest, these were two opinions—
they were mere opinions, right or wrong—they were
opinions, and a public man who has to give an opinion
every night for six months will perhaps often be in error.
But I do not charge the right hon. gentleman with having
formed an erroneous opinion. What I say of the right
hon. gentleman is this—that his conduct has been inju-
dicious—that, having the best information at his command
—having before him all the circumstances which could
have influenced the opinion of a prudent man, and so in-
fluenced his conduct—l care not what opinion he formed.
—he went and conducted himself improvidently, and in a
manner detrimental to the public interests. (Hear, hear.)
Ido not care for his opinion. I have no doubt that many
of his opinions are worthy of attention, coming as they do
from a man of his abilities but, after all, opinion is
opinion, !and conduct is a fact, and his conduct is what I
blame, because it was conduct in defiance of experience,
and conduct, therefore, which ought not to be approved
of by the House of Commons. (Hear, hear.) Sir, I have
ventured to make these observations in vindication of the
statement which I previously offered to the house, and
which I challenge to be controverted. I know there is a
retort to which lam open. I have heard it already during
the session, and for aught I know, the right honourable
gentleman may jump up and use it again. He may, per-
haps, get up and say, " Well, if that is your opinion, why
do you not come forward boldly and propose a vote of
want of confidence in her Majesty's Ministers ?" (Cries of
" hear, hear.") " Hear, hear," from gentlemen whose
practice in cheering I well understand. I remember that
the noble lord opposite and others have called attention to
the retort that was made by the right hon. baronet the
member for Morpeth (Sir G. Grey) in answer to the re-
marks of my right hon. friend near me, the member for
Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington). I always listen to anything
which falls from the right hon. member for Morpeth with
attention, but I did not find that his retort contained that
profundity of thought or felicity of expression which jus-
tified the solemn tones of the noble lord, because I believe
the retort has already been made six times during the pre•
sent session, and probably not less than six hundred times
in this and other Parliaments. But, sir, there are good
reasons why we should offer criticism on the conduct of
the Ministry, or a branch of the Ministry, without being
answered as we were by the noble lord and the right hon.
baronet the Secretary for the Admiralty (Sir J. Graham),
and why we do not come forward to propose a vote of no
confidence. There is a good reason why we should not do
this. There is no necessity for proposing a vote of no con-
fidence in the present Administration. I think it is a use-
less ceremony. (Cheers and laughter.) It is quite unne-
cessary, in my mind, for me to waste the time of the house
of Commons—(hear, hear, and ironical cheers.) They cheer
who donot think I am wasting your time, and therefore I
treat with all the courteous indifference Parliament will
permit that derisive cheer. (Laughter.) lam now an-
swering the words of great men. Here i 3 the leader of the
house—here is the experienced Minister, to
the First Lord of the Admiralty—here are these valuable
and valiant allies who are at present unattached, but who
still have all the authority of ex-ministers,
who have re-
peatedly, frequently, and systematically, daring the pre-
sent
saying, seion,
If endeavoured
you e not to
eagreatee with
p all
our policy, and err -
debate and discussion
by
tieise our conduct, we call upon yon to propose a vote of
no confidence in us. (Hear.) r soy it is most preposterous,
most unconstitutional, and most inconsistent with the simul-
taneous declaration of the same Ministers, that it is of the
greatest importance with respect to foreign nations that at
the present moment there should be a general expression of
unanimity in Parliament. (11"1**) But Ido not put it on
that plea. I say it is tinneeessal7 for me to propose in this
house any vote of want of confidence in the present Go.
vernment, for this simple reason—that it is apparent, no•
torious, and proved to 11.11, that they have no confidence in
each other. sir, let us look
(Cheers and laughter.) Why,
to this vote—this vote, that is to be passed
for a moment, and only for a moment, to those transactions
which have led
so idly that a few hours' discussion makes some hon. gen-
tlemen tax to be converted into 10,000,000/-
ovt" divide," as if the people of England
wanted the in
tlereen call
per annum without a word being said on the sub-
le.eotetr.lint et us look a little at the conduct of our Ministers.
shall treat the subject, whatever answer I may receive,
with
fairness. I will not have recourse to any little test.
I will try them by a great test. I will try them not by
any of the petty points that are brought forward in party
struggles—l will try them upon subjects which interest
men in the streets—upon subjects which, as Dr. Johnson
said, any twelve men whom you could seize at Charing-
cross would take as tests. In deciding the question whe-
ther the present Government have confidence in them-
selves, I will take the greatest subject which we have at
the present moment—l will take the vast question of peace
or war. What confidence, what possible confidence, can
we have in this Cabinet, who have involved us in that ex-
traordinary position iu which the country now finds itself?
(Hear, hear.) Is there a man among them who can tell us
what we are going to war about ? Is there a man among
them who can tell us what is the object at this moment of
their councils ? I will not quote a single person except
themselves. Why, sir, there is the noble lord who is not here,
but who generally sits opposite to me—a Secretary of State
—he has declared his opinion upon this great subject of fo •
reign politics. lie told us at the end of the last session of
Parliament, in almost the only speech of ability and spirit
which we have heard upon the subject, that we were going
de i
to war, and what we were going to war for. He said, "We
are going to war because we believe thendepennee
and
integrity of Turkey are assailed, and because we
believe the interests of England to be involved in maintain-
ing the independence and integrity of Turkey. We look
upon the independence and integrity of Turkey," said the
noble lord "as facts, and our opinion is, that there is as
much vitality ens life in Turkey al in other countries, our