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4BER 30, 1854.

nia. Dissimulation may feign indifference, and make a
show of such slighting opinions which it dislikes ; yet,
when sad reality bears out the truth of disregarded anticipa-
tions, their very resting-place of proud indifference, and of

careless neglect. (Loud cheer;.) Under these circum-
stances, the Twenty-Fourth Anniversary of the Polish

Revolution of 1830 is not a more Polish domestic com-

memoration, intended to rouse the spirits of the living by
recollections of a :lorious past—it is a solemn warning of
self-preservation, addressed to the British State's wisdom ;
it is a quer.), by which the genius of the future i 3 about to
test the vitality of the British Empire. (Cheers.) Her co
the difference in the part we have to act. Poland makes
the query—England has to answer. England, gentlemen,
and not this assembly. The transactions of this evening
will not be wound up by words spoken within thise
nor by tho passing cheers some of them may have
met. This is no question which England might dis-
pose of by passing in silence over it. No answer
will be an answer likewise. And such will be
Englaull's future as England's answer will be. As
to ours dyes, representatives of other nationalities, we,
while waiting till the hour for our own battle strikes (and
while preparing for it, perhaps) we recline on our arms,
and watch, and witness, and warn. In keeping within the
limits of this sphere, I would address myself, first, to you
my brethren in misfortune, the Polish exiles, and then
to England, sir, if you give me leave. (Hear, hear.) To
you, dear brethren in exile, I have a word of thanks to
speak, and an assurance to give, and an advice to impart.
It is eighty-one years since Poland first has been quar-
tered by a nefarious act of combined royalty, which the
Swiss Tacitus, Johannes Miller, well characterised by
saying that " God permitted the act, to show forth the
morality of kings." (Cheers.) And it is twenty-four
years since down-trodden Poland made the greatest—not
the last—manifestation of her imperishable vitality, which
the cabinets of Europe were either too narrow-minded
to understand, or too corrupt to appreciate. Eighty-
one years of still unretributed crime, and twenty-four
years of misery in exile. It is a long time to suffer and
ylnv
patriotsoiott
uh dt
stoodei
ls
ep af i
unquenchablepru .
po l
beforea nAndd,
y o
Ga ul
werefhae
life-flame
sufferingi
hme • e
worldof pa along,antcdidlo
voiisunmngopst,
ids.
este
scaa rmtpi
"statue,"
streaming
,
ie dg
od
through its petrified limbs. You stood up a protest
of eternal right against the sway of impious might,
" Mono Tekel. upharsis," written in letters of burning
blood on the walls of overweening despotism. Time,
misery, and sorrow thinned the ranks of your scattered
Israel ; you have carried your dead to the grave, and those
who survived went on to suffer and to hope. Wherever
oppressed freedom reared a banner you rallied round—the
living statue changed to a fighting hero. Many of yours
fell, and when crime triumphed once more over virtue and
right you resumed the wandering exile's walking-stick,
and did not despair. Many amongst you who were young
when they last saw the sun rise over Poland's mountains
and plains have their hair whitened and their strength
broken with age—with anguish, and with misery; but
the patriotic heart kept the freshness of its youth. It is
young in love of Poland —young in aspirations for her free-
dom—young in hope, and youthfully fresh in determina-
tion to break Poland's chains. (Loud cheers.) What a
rich source of noble deeds patriotism must be that gave
you strength so much to suffer, and never to despair. You
have given a noble example to all of us your youn2;tr
brethren in the family of exiles. When the battle of
Canna was lost, and Hannibal was measuring by bushels
the rings of the felled Roman esquires, the senate of Rome
voted thanks to the Consul Torentino Varro for "not
having despaired of the commonwealth." Proscribed pa-
triots of Poland, I thank you, and history will thank you,
that you have not despaired of liberty. This is the thanks
I had to give. The time draws nigh when the oppressed
nations will call their oppressors to a last account, and the
millions of free men, in the fulness of their right and of
their self-conscious strength, pass judgment like arrogant
conquerors, privileged murderers, and perjured kings.
(Cheers.) In that sipreme trial the oppressed nations
will stand ono for all, and all for one. (Loud cheers.)
Faults, errors, and misfortunes of the past were not in
vain. It was a terrible ordeal school, but a school it was.
All of us have learnt something, and the best of what we
have learnt is, that the principle of national fraternity is
more than a philanthropic emotion—it it the only effective
guarantee of that freedom which we have to conquer, and
which we will conquer. Let England and America, proud
in their present security—let all those whom it concerns—
mind my warning, while it is yet time to mind it. Those
who will not have contributed to the triumph of freedom,

while they had the power to contribut3 to it, shalt have
forfeited their claim to a share in that mutual guarantee.

(Cheers.) If all the signs do not deceive uv, the men of
Poland may be the first called upon to baiter a breach.

Many will stand by you, and others will fight the common
battle elsewhere ; but though many they be, nearest is
nearest, and close by is best. It is not in vain that na-
ture, and nature's God, made Hungary a neighbour to
Poland, and Poland a neighbour to Hungary. Onr ene-
mies are the same, and our cause is identical. Tho much
I feel, the little I may know, and all I can, my heart, my
brain, my arm, shall be with Poland, Remember this.
Yet, though I may have learnt something, the pledge of
my own fraternal assistance is a small matter anyhow, and
even that little may be lost too soon. We are mortal men,
and I grow old, and am careworn. However, that is not
worth while speak,ing ef. I may bo nothing, but Hungary
is mach ; and it is the genius of Hungary which assures
you, through my lips, Hungary will stand by reviving
Poland. Remember my words. (Loud cheers.)
This is the assurance I had to give.
Last comes the advice.
The present complications of Europe—a necessary result
of the crimes and errors of the past--cannot be brought to
a definite end without Poland acting her part. Of two
things, one. Either an insufficient arrangement, leaving
the future unsettled, and the war sure to recur again, more
dangerous to some, more frightful to all who aro parties to
it ; or the war carried on to a definite issue. This is the
only alternative. In the first case, Poland may lose time,
but will not have lost her cause. It is others shall have to
meet the imprudence of such an irresolution. And none
more so than England, be sure of it ; England, the groat
nation which the Times estimates to be " tottering on the
climax of its greatness." If this war is not carried to a happy
definitive issue, the next time it recurs, I apprehend, it shall
be England's turn to present in her fate a second Poland in
history, may be even here at hand, who knows ? But cer-
tainly in and about America and in India England's proud
standing presents many a vulnerable point. So far there
is a difference between Russia and the British empire,
not to the advantage of the latter. England has many
a vulnerable point, Russia has but one —Poland Woe
to those who, though at war with Russia, still disregard
that fact. (Cheers.) In the second alternative' why it
is perfectly absurd to believe that matters can be carried
on without Poland. Those who mind this too late will be
brought to remember it with regret. Therefore, I say to
you, men of Poland, gird your loins, watch your opportu-
nity, slumber in your armour, but from this moment never
more sleep. Remember the French proverb, "Aide toi et
Dieu t'aidera" (Help thyself, and God will help thee).
(Lend cheers.) The moment is critical. It requires all '
the wisdom, all the discretion, and all the resolution of
every Polish patriot. I have heard some whispering about
tricks discussed in the dark recesses of secret diplomacy.
Oh ! the fatal word ! that workshop of conspiracy against
mankind, fraught with more and deadlier crimes than
ever were brought to light by tribunals and police-courts.
I warn the Polish nation to be on its guard. Cabinet
diplomacy may call on Poland out of dire necessity, but if
Poland, the nation, takes not in time a stand to reyindi-
cote her personality, and to reassert the position of an
equal, who as well has assistance to give as to receive, not
merely an object, but a party to the transactions, you may
once mere experience what you have already experienced
from the secret transactions of the Vienna Congress of
1815, where the name of your nation has been made use of
to secure concessions, which were net of your concern, and
the concession once secured, Poland thrown overboard and
sacrificed to expediency. You may see the trick performed
once more. Nobody in the world has the right to dispose of
Poland's destinies but Poland alone. I call on the Polish
nation to take in time such a stand, that on the one hand
nobody shall dare to usurp her rights, and on the otherhand
nobody shall dare to ignore her. I would say to the Polish
nation, be prepared to receive assistance whenever it may
come, but beware how thou puttest tby trust in kings. They
cannot like Poland, because they do not like liberty.
(Cheers.) This is my advice. Now to England, sir, if the
assembly desires me to go on ; if not, I can stop here.
(Loud cries of "Go on.") First, and before all, I desire
to pay the modest tribute of my highest admiration to the
heroic army in the East, which, with so much glory, walks
the path of honour, of danger, and of death—(loud cheers)
—nothing daunted by .the reflection which could not have
escaped the mind of many of there, that the post of honour
to which they have been sent is certainly not the best
which might have been chosen to begin with a war against
Russia, and that a wiser po'icy, by not fettering those
auxiliary elements whom circumstances imperatively ad-
vised to resort to, might have spared much of their heroic
blood, all in promising richer results. Sir, I can tell some-
thing about what heroism is. The unnamed demigods of
Hungary who fought the gigantic struggle of 1849 may
well claim a place of immortal renown in the ranks of the
bravest of the brave. And I who have witnesed this, I
say history must go back for centuries to find out a battle
like that at Inkerman, where 14,000 men resist victo-
riousl the valorous attacks of 60,000 well-disciplined
troops,y and where almost every man who fought on your
side laid low one of the enemy. The battle of Alma, de-
fective as it was in disposition, and therefore barren in re-
sults, has been glorious in execution, and covered with
a lustre of immortality the renown of the British and
French soldiers but the battle of Inkerman, from
the first in rank to the last, was a prodigy of valour,
scarcely inferior to the miracle of Agincourt. (Cheers.)
The history of 1854, whatever bo its records about the
State wisdom of those who rule, will hand clown with im-
perishable renown to the admiration of posterity the im-
petuous military ardour of the French, and the stern, im-
movable courage of the Britons who fought in the Crimea.
However, they fight on a battle-field richer in glory than
in possible results, and richest in death. Ono more such
victory as that of Inkerman and the army is lost. It is a
sad consolation to know, that the tombs of those glorious
dead around Sebastopol can say, like those of Thermopylae,
" Wanderer, tell England thou hast seen us slain obedient
country's laws." The English public have been
ttooldouorf late, that there never was a position of mere press-
ing necessity, demanding so imperiously a mind that can
forestall instead of waiting on events, and can avert evils
which it may. be impossible to repair. (Applause.) That,
is perfectly just, though somewhat of an after-fact wis-
dom come out too late. But if it be just, then there is no
good service to England in lulling public opinion to sleep
by advising it to let bygones be bygones. A forestalling
mind must look to the past for instruction. And the great
lesson of accomplished faete is, that England's p?i
referlnoo tc, the present war, has been wrong is itsOr"'
7., in

~~

[PRICE SD.

tion, andinefficient, unsuccessful, and disastrous in details.
,Let us analyse the situation. `Your gigantic armada in the
Baltic is nearly without a laurel to rest its head upon. To
do something effective there, the co-operation of Sweden
was a matter of prima necessity. England did not get it,
because England's policy was wrong. I told England six
months ago that the co-operation of Sweden is to be got
only by calling Poland to arms. And that was the answer
which three months laier King Oscar gave to General Ba-
raguay d'Hilliers. Yon have taken Bornarsund; a Small
matter forsooth, yet when the time . comes that necessity
will force you to remember Poland, and shall have to thank
her far the advantage of getting Sweden ever to polar side.
Then Boinarsund would have proved an acceptable offer to
Sweden, but ymn•blew it up, as if afraid of your own vic-
tory ' • as if bent on the purpose not to have anything to
offer to Sweden. What a gigantic blunder. (Applause.)
England pretended to strike a blow at. the cominerCe of
Russia by blockading her coast, and England just succeified
in turning Russian commerce to Prussia. Englandqns
bent her mind on bringing Austria ever to herself; -she
has sacrificed to this ono aim everything : numerous Mil-
hens spent in vain ; the life blood of the flower of Erg-
laud spilt in. vain ; principles, political.. reputationl the
lilt ral character of the war, and the very issue of the war
—everything. .And- has your Government gained 'Aus-
tria? ( No, ne.) this it gained that Austria to whom
it has sacrificed everything—that. Austria of whom oven
the Times is bound at last to acknowledge that " you are
lightieg her battle, mere than your own ?" (No, no.)
What a proud sneering. there was in official quarters when
I months ago told the-good people of England that they
believe they pay-and bleed for freedom, when in reality
they are made to fight for Austria. Now it comes out at
last. Truth will come out, like murder will. Well, has
your Government gained Austria ? (No.) Go and read the
well-founded lamentations in the organs—even the Mini-
sterial organs of publicity—about the treacherous attitude
and the overbearing insolence of that Austria which your
Government persisted in courting with so much sub-
mission, and which in return facilitates the enterprises of
Russia, insults your allies, and counteracts your combina-
tions. (Cheers.) It is not only that you have not gained
over Austria, but you have the Turks arrested in the midst
of their victorious course ; and tie fruit of their heroic
struggle, poor Wallachia, played over into the treacherous
hands of despotic Austria. There is the Turkish army
paralysed on the one hand, and there is on the other hand
the Czar left free to threw overpovroringnumbers upon the
flank and the rear of your gallant ranks in the Crimea.
Thera you have the spirits of the Turkish army, high flow-
ing as they were by the victories at Silistria and Giurgevo,
now depressed ; there you have the spirits of the Russian
army, depressed as they were, now restored. And oh, I
Icould tellyou what it is to neglect the moment of spirited
excitement in a victorious army, and what it is to give
time to a demoralised enemy to resume its spirits and to
take breath. One such moment's neglect in a war, and it is
not battlea,lgentlemen, not battles, but empires, that may
be lost by it. And at last, alas Not least, there is Sebas-
topol. Every British heart has watched the great bloody
drama there with intense anxiety. I am not wanted to tell
you the tale of your heart. I am not wanted to describe how
your brave sons have found there an entrenched camp with
an army, instead of a fortress with a garrison, as your Go-
vernment appeared to have anticipated, how new armies
are pouring upon your shattered ranks, as your Government
does not appear to have anticipated, or else it would be
inore than an error to act as the Government did. All lam
wanted to do is to quote from public report these words:—
" The question is no longer whether we shall take Sebas-
topol or not. The siege of Sebastopol, though not raised,
may be regarded as at a stand-still. We are reduced to the
defensive." Such is the situation. " The leaves have
turned ; Russia is the besieger, you are the besieged."
And at what price has been this situation purchased ?
Gentlemen, on the sth of July, ten weeks before England
embarked on that expedition, ill-advised as well as ill-pre-
pared, I, in a speech, the contents of which would have
been well for Great Britain to mind, spoke these words at
Glasgow :—" Not one out of five of your brave sons will see
Albion again." Of course I used the number figuratively,
as indicative of a great loss. Now, it is a sad tale ; number
your dead, your wounded—and your disabled—more than
2,0,000 men out of 30,000 are already lost. My sad antici-
pations aro literally fulfilled ! And hero at home —why,
here the number of widows and orphans applying for sup-
port to patriotic charity amounts to 11,000. • Such is the
position, gentlemen. Now, with that position thus Dna-
! lyseil, I call on contemporary age, and on history, to say
whether I was exaggerating or too harsh in saying that
England's policy has been wrong, that it has been successful
nowhere, bat inefficient, unsuccessful, and disastrous every-
where. But you are told, for all consolation, that "no
human foresight could have fully anticipated the extraor-
dinary position which you find yourselves in." New, as to
this, I must say it is not true. Many a man must haveanti-
cipoecl that position. I, for one, have foretold it fact by
fact, and word by word. And certainly claim not the
slightest credit for perspicacity on that account. I wonder
how any thinking man could do otherwise than know all
this. Yet if such there wore, they could have used the
modest light of my poor oil lamp. It is time the people of
Groat Britain gave me tremendous cheers in return, and
went home to toil on, and then to sleep. It is as if I would
have been mendieating favours for myself, whereas it was
England's honour, dignity, interest, and SUCCESS that I held
up before their eyes. They went to toil and to sleep, and
the flower of your nation wont to die; and now, after my
disregarded words have proved true, some of them (the
Scottish liras) say—" The words lie spoke road like the
inspiration of a seer, or a picture drawn from history."
, Others, the Tines, say—" No human foresight could ha% e
anticipated the extraordinary position in which England
finds herself." Extraordinary ! Why, what is there ex-
traordinary in the inexorable logic of concatenation be-
tween cause and effect' Is it extraordinary that Sebes-

topol is found to be an intrenched camp with a numerous
army in it ? Is it extraordinary that the Czar is pouring
whole fresh armies to its defence ? The Czar has been left
perfectly free, and with ample time afforded to do it ; nay,
in fact, he has been invited to it by the Turco-Austrian
treaty, negotiated under England's auspices. (Hear.)
The extraordinary in the matter is not that he has sent
reinforcements to Sebastopol, but that he has not sent
double the number, and a month earlier. I take this to
be so extraordinary that I find only two explanations to
account for it. The first is, that to begin a war against
!lassie with a landing expedition in the Crimea is an idea
so supremely absurd that the Czar, giving more credit for
perspicacity to his enemies than they deserved, did not be-
lieve it until you actually'landed. off Eupatoria. (A. laugh.)
SeLondly, and chiefly, you are indebted to Poland for not
having to meet 100,000 Russians more at Sebastopol. If
Blighted did disregard the fact that Poland is the vulne-
rable part of Russia, the Czar was prudent enough to
mind it. In the Crimea proud England and France at-
tack him • he is content with opposing 100,000 men to
them. On the Danube the flower of the Turkish army,
elated by victory, defies and menaces him ; he is content
to oppose them with 80,000 men. But to Poland, where
there is not one man in arms, but where the unquenchable
fire of a heroic nation's hatred is smouldering, he sent
an army of 300,000 man, to be prepared for emergencies.
(Cheers.) Some may tell you that this is due chiefly
to a precaution against Austria. (Hear.) But it is
clear to demonstration that the Czar feels perfectly easy
about the submissive obedience of his pro-consal in
Vienna—(a laugh)—or else he certainly would not have
left the very existence of his 80,000 men on the other
side of ;the Pruth at the mercy of his good friend the
Hapsburg. Yes, it is the name of Poland you have to
thank for the fact that your whole army in the Crimea, all
heroes as they are, have not yet fallen victims to over-
powering numbers. But the situation is sad enough such
as it is. To be sure there may have been some strategical
and tactical mistakes in the operations themselves such as
they are. Sir, I have not the pretension to say that my
past career could impart authority to any remarks about
military matters. I have not been brought up a soldier,
neither can I claim the honour of having had to act the
part of a soldier in our glorious war. My duties were high
and great, but somewhat of a different nature. They were
just what the duties of your Government are now, only
that mine were a great deal more difficult. We had to
fight two great powers alone ; you are three great powers
united to fight only one of them. And I had no ready
army, no rich treasury, no abundantly stored arsenals, and
no free communication with all the world. (Hear, hear.)
I had to create everything with nothing, out of nothing—
money and armies, and arms, and all military implements
—secluded as we were from all the world, and in the in-
terior with the deluded third part of our population armed
with the firebrand and with murder, in a condition worse
than the Vendee ever was in France, or Ireland some-
times to you. These were my duties ! and, besides, my
duty has been to designate the objects of military opera-
tions, and to direct the war in general, just as the duties
of your Government are. Yet, as soldier I was not at
that time, I could not draw the plan for a battle, or
direct it myself. But the fact is, had I been able to
add the skill of a soldier to my patriotic devotion, no
treasoa would have crept into our ranks, and Hun-
gary were now free—not all the Czars of the world
could have defeated us. (Loud cheers.) And who can tell
-whether I may not yet be called upon to tervemy country?
Therefore, I thought the time of my exile may be best
employed in preparing for possible emergencies, by
learning what, unfortunately, I have not known before.
And modest as bo my humble abilities, I certainly dare
say, if assiduous application and discretion, guided by ex-
perience, may master the mysteries of an art, I am a sol-
dier new, and feel competent to judge of military matters.
(Hear, hear.) With this consciousness, I say there have
certainly been some very serious mistakes connected with
the operations in the Crimea. I consider it an unaccount-
able mistake to have engaged in the siege of Sebastopol,
without taking previously hold of the strait of Perekop in
the north, and taking command by sea of the bay of Kertch
in the east, so as to prevent, or at least retard, the reini
forcemeats which it was easy to foresee that Russia would
send. And that neglect once committed, I certainlyt%anns•
not understand the logic of shifting the basis of operations
down to the southernmost corner of the
hence supp es
leaving the whole of the land free to draw- peninsula, tips
to Sebastopol, and leaving the Russieansrinmoetarbluytelneativrienlgy
at liberty to send reinforcements to th Cti
to them, besides, the very road
rperfectly open and unim-
peded, even to enter Sebastopol in smalljust as they please, without havingais called a moveable
t
t
to fight for it. My
opinion is, that, yours being h
basis (the fleet), you could choose that povinotwa,ltlhaelobnugathoef
coast which was the best to rest upon.
yonr Allied squadron is actually, not south a Sebastopol,
at Balaklava, but north of Sebastopol, off th.weeKlittsech?a r\y
ivvehr.
Why not remain there with the army Ilk
not draw up yor lines,Tealeaning on the Belbeck river,
tection against cavalry? There,
affording more
with a well-providedPrreedoubt at the point where the
only road from
the interior splits in two towards Se-
bastopol and Balaklava, you, by your position al-
ready, had restricted the communications of Sebas-
topol to that narrow ()save x whore it is now your bad
fortune to bo pent up. You would have cut off all
their supplies from ilia interior, and no reinforcements
could have entered Sebastopol without having first to fight
separately an open field battle, wherein, certainly, the
Russians are no match for your heroes there. Instead of
that, your army has been established so as to leave Sebas-
topol perfectly free to communicate with the whole em-
pire of Russia. This is a strategical error, in my humble
opinion, not even justified by tactical considerations.
By besieging the north instead of the south of Sebastopol,
yon would have encountered more of permanent fortifica-
tions, which is no difficulty for engineers, but would have
encountoredless of an entrenched camp with a less numerous
garrison which makes your real difficulty; and, at last,
qv) the north-fide liatifiegiQn4 Wan, 794 would at 0199