The Sun.
London, England, 1854-02-15 00:00:00

wCohluenhelhßar
in,diutcaepdpehiad wasniretos quiteendfor jthuestftiefideet; ihnethe alarms
had
been
'.warned by all the consuls in the south of the Russian
dominions and the north coast of Turkey that Russia was
arming both by sea and by land ; and he was warned that
Prince Menschikoff had actually threatened the Ministers
of the Porte that Russia would consider it an act of hos-
tility if the subject of any negotiations proposed to them
was repeated to the English or the French ambassadors at
Constantinople. This was at once suspicious, and it was
very natural that Colonel Rose, healing this, and that
Prince Menschikoff was, as it were, ashamed of his own
propositions, and wished to keep them secret—it was most
natural that he should ask for the fleet. But Colonel Rose
did not ask that the fleet should go to the Dardanelles ; he
merely requested that Admiral Dundas should advance to
Vourla, a fort open to every one, and where, he believed,
our°ilrlfleaet went every summer. Her Majesty's Government,
however, differing from Colonel Rose and also from the
Emperor of the French, commanded Admiral Dundas to
remain at Malta, and the consequence of that command he
(Lord Malmesbury) maintained still (and this book he
thought proved it) was, that Russia was confirmed in the
delusion under which she h‘boured—namely, that England
and France were not on the same line. The noble marquis
(Clanricarde) had read to their lordships the thanks which
the Prime Minister received on that occasion from Count
Nesselrode; and similar thanks were also given in the same
letter to his noble friend (the Earl of Clarendon) who was
looked upon as a novas honor, in whom Count Nesselrode
had great hopes for the future, and in whom he thought he
might put great confidence. Count Nesselrode not only
did that, but actually congratulated the Government on
the want of unity in the two allies. Nothing, he thought,
could confirm more than did all these transactions—espe-
cially this letter of Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow—
the justice of the reproaches he (Lord Malmesbury) had
directed to her Majesty's Government on a former occasion
on this point. Although, however, the consuls had de-
clared these military preparations were going on—although
Prince Menschikoff was convicted of attempting to conceal
from the English and French ambassadors the negotiations
he was commanded to open up at Constantinople—all this
did not open the eyes of the noble lord the Secretary for
Foreign Affairs. He (Lord Malmesbury) should have
thought that after the noble earl's (Clarendon's) experience
in Spain and in Ireland, the credulity inherent to the most
generous mind might at least have been shaken by what he
heard from the various sources open to him. Not at all.
Long after these events had taken place his noble friend,
on the 18th of April—a month after Colonel Rose had
been so alarmed, and two or three-months after the reports
of the consuls, said :
" I told Count Walewski that the same information had
been communicated to her Majesty's Government by Colonel
Rose, but I had reason to believe that the treaty in question
would be a written agreement with respect to the Holy Places,
and the mode of conducting divine worship and religious
ceremonies there by the Greek and Latin communities."

Well, if it was to be a written agreement with respect to
the Holy Places—a subject with respect to which his noble
friend (Lord Derby) and Lord John Russell had declared
the English Government had no interest —if it was
merely that, why should Prince Menschikoff attempt to
conceal his proposals to the Turkish Government ?
It would have been only fair to suppose that, had the
Holy Places alone been the subject of his mission, he
would have had no object in concealmeut, when it had
been declared that the English Government had no inte-
rest in the matter. (Hear, hear.) His noble friend the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs still, however, continued to
believe in the good faith of the Russian Government. He
(Lord Malmesbury) agreed that no policy could be so in-
jurious as a policy of suspicion, but however thii might
apply to the frequent expression of suspicions, it was a very
different thing from their being entertained in the mind of
a Minister Irons whom the utmost vigilance and watchful-
ness were to be expected, and he was surprised at the con-
tinuance of the noble earl's delusion until the film was
, actually torn by force from his eyes. He (Lord Malmesbury)
had said there had been a want of unity of action between
the two Governments of England and France almost from
the beginning. With respect to the calling up of the fleet
by the ambassadors, it was, 'of course, a matter of discus-
sion in the English Cabinet whether that authority should
rest with the Government at home or with the ambassa-
dor at Constantinople, and it was at last, and he thought
very properly, given to Lord Stratford. When, however,
had it been given ? It was given, according to this book,
on the 2d of June ; and at that moment it did not appear,
from these papers, that her Majesty's Government were
aware that the French ambassador had had authority to
call up the fleet of that country since the 22d of March.
Now, that the French ambassador should have had that
power must have been as well known to the Russian am-
bassador at Constantinople, and to the Turkish Government
and everybody else concerned, as it was to himself ; and
this example of want of unity of action must have made
a strong impression upon the Russian Government, and
have contributed to encourage the delusions and ambitious
dreams of an obstinate man, who perhaps only wished for
some such excuse to continue in the course he had entered
upon. But there were other things which ought to
have made the noble earl suspicious of the real objects
of Russia, for Russian misrepresentations were not con-
fined to stating what was certainly not the fact with
respect to the mission of Prince Menschikoff, but there were
all sorts of misrepresentations made at different times with
respect to the ambassadors themselves. A most gross accu-
sation was made in the first volume of these papers against
Lord Stratford, who was charged by Count Nesselrode with
having been the primary cause of the rejection by Red-
schid Pacha of Prince Menschikofrs demands. Such a charge
was wholly unfounded, and Count Nesselrode, probably not
believing his informant, refused the only remedy he could
honourably have given—namely, an investigation into the
source of this gross and undeserved accusation against an
ambassador. That was not all. Strange misrepresentations
were made as to the conduct, words, and actions of Lord
Westmoreland at Vienna. All this ought to have convinced
her Majesty's Government that the cause which required
such support could not have been a just one. Still, how-
ever, they continued a course of negotiation ; and if he
(Lord Malmesbury) were an older diplomatist he should
say that that negotiation resulted in an accident in diplo-
macy which would never be forgotten. The Vienna Note
was composed by men of undoubted talent and experience,
and they, of course, as honourable men, wishing well to
Turkey, and wishing to defend it against the aggressions
and the unjust claims of Russia, framed such a note as
they believed would answer the purpose. That note was
forwarded to both parties, and was at once accepted by
Russia, Count Nesselrode saying, very suspiciously, that
the Turkish Government ought to take it aux mains yointes.
Redschid Pasha, however, refused to adopt it, and sug-
gested modifications. When the noble earl (Clarendon) sent
the note to Lord Stratford, this was what he said about it
" Her Majesty's Government have, in preference to all
other plans, adhered to this project of note as the means best
calculated to effect a speedy and satisfactory solution of the
differences. They consider that it fully guards the principle
for which throughout we have been contending, and that it
may, therefore, with perfect safety be signed by the Porte ;
and they further hope that your Excellency, before the 're-
ceipt of this despatch, will have found no difficulty in pro-
curing the assent of the Turkish Government to a project
which the allies of the Sultan unanimously concur in recom-
mending for his adoption."
That was the opinion of her Majesty's Government, but
what was the view entertained by our ambassador? Lord
Stratford wrote—

" Though I scrupulously abstained from expressing any
pKvate opinion on the merits of Count Buol's Note while it
was under consideratien at the Porte, I think it incumbent
on me to state frankly to your lordship that the decision of
the Council has in no degree surprised me. In making this
avowal I have exclusively in view those passages of the note
to which the Porte objects. It really appears to me,with all
deference to your lordship's superior judgment, that the first
two of the objectionable passages could hardly stand as they
are without exposing the Porte to inferences not borne out by
facts, and eventually to pretensions that it would be equally
inconvenient, if not dangerous, to admit or to resist."
Such was Lord Stratford's opinion in contradistinction to
that of the Ministry, who had said it could be accepted
with perfect safety. Then the noble earl at the head of
the Foreign-office wrote :
"Her Majesty's Government aro far from denying that
these modifications are in themselves unobjeCtionable ; but
they do not consider them of that vital importance, nor that
they offer such additional security to Turkey, as to counter-
balance the risks to which the Ottoman empire is exposed
by farther postponing the settlement of this unfortunate
question."
So the noble earl stuck to his opinion, notwithstanding
the representations of Lord Stratford, and, of course, he
(Lord Malmesbury) concluded that the other diplomatists
who drew up the Note remained of the same opinion as
the noble earl. Who, however, turned out to be right ?
The question must have remained a matter of opinion to
this moment but from a starling despatch from Count Nes-
selrode himself, interpreting the original Note which his
Government had accepted, and refusing and scouting the
Turkish modifications. The Porte was, therefore, justified
in the eyes of his would-be friends for refusing to accede to
the Vienna Note. He (Lord Malmesbury) could imagine
the extraordinary confusion which would be caused in this
body of diplomasts at Vienna at learning that they had
composed a Note in direct contradiction to what they had
meant it to be. Then, as events went on, there was ano-
ther, and he thought very remakable proof of disunity of
action between the French and English Governments
—a disunity which was at once laid before the Rus-
sian Prime Minister, and was naturally remarked upon
by him—he referred to the order given with respect to the
objects of the fleets in being sent to the Black Sea. It ap-
peared that when the fleets were so sent it became the duty
of the ambassadors at Constantinople to acquaint Count
Nesselrode with the fact. The despatch which contained
this intimation was byldirection of the French Government
to be read to the Count by General Castelbajac, but the
substance only was to be repeated to him bySir G.Seymour.
Both Governments stated that the fleets were going into
the Black Sea to defend the territory. of Turkey, and at the
same time the English Government added that they would
do their utmost to prevent the Turkish fleet from making
any attack on the Russian fleet. That, however, was omit-
ted in the French despatch. Now, their lordships would
see at once the very great difference in the orders given,
and that difference had evidently made a deep impression
upon Count Nesselrode, who pointed it out to Sir G. Sey-
mour. Then, there was another discrepancy as to the ob-
jects of the fleets which he (Lord M.) was totally unable
to account for. In a communication to Baron Brunow, the
noble earl (Clarendon) said the fleets had made the move-
ment in question to avert the dangers which seemed to
threaten the lives and property of her Majesty's subjects.
Five days afterwards, Oct. 7, the noble earl had, however,
to write to our ambassador at Paris upon this subject, and
his words were these :
" It, therefore, appears advisable to her Majesty's Govern-
ment that general instructions should be given to the ambas-
sadors and admirals to employ the combined fleets in what-
ever manner, and at whatever place, they may think neces-
sary for defending the Turkish territory against direct ag-
gression. If the Russian fleet were to come out of Sebastopol
the fleets would, as a matter of course, pass through the Bos-
phorus,"

It was not, therefore, for the exclusive object of defending
her Majesty's subjects in the Black Sea, but positively (and
he was very glad to say so) to defend the Turks and to de-
fend their just claims. Why, then, in the name of all that
was straightforward—why not tell Baron Brunow that ?
He was the very man who ought to have been told ; his
mind ought to have been strongly impressed with the
fact that the fleets were to maintain the independence of
Turkey, the status quo, and the territorial arrangements
of Europe. Such an omission on the part of .the Govern-
ment only reacted upon themselves ; the Baron, of course,
transmitted to his Government that statement ; and it
tended further to deceive the Russian Government as to
the vigorous course which her Majesty's Ministers were at
last determined to follow. The same infirmity of purpose
and want of courage pervaded the whole of their policy
during these transactions. How did the noble earl treat
that event which must be regarded as one of the most
important in the whole series—the invasion of the princi-
palities ? With the same excessive politeness, the same
extreme tenderness, the same—he had not language to
express the manner in which the noble earl had treated the
question of the invasion of the principalities. What was