The Sun.
London, England, 1854-08-05 00:00:00

THE WAR IN ASIA.

The letters of our correspondents at Kars and on the
Circassian coast, which we published on Wednesday, as
well as those which appear in our impression of this
morning, are well worthy of attentive consideration. It
will have been seen that important results have already
followed the superiority established by the Allies in the
Black Sea, whilst far greater advantages may be expected
at no distant period. For five-and-twenty years the
Circassians, surrounded by the Russians both by sea and
land, had maintained a ceaseless struggle for indepen-
dence ; but, as soon as the Western Powers declared war
against the Czar, the minor forts on the coast were aban-
doned by the enemy, and there is every reason to hope
that Anapa and Sukum-Kaleh, which he still retains, will
ere long be captured by the allied armament which has
just sailed from Constantinople. Formerly, reinforce-
ments for the Imperial army in Georgia might be sent
across the Elaine from Sebastopol or Odessa ; but
now, not a single soldier or gun can reach the gar-
rison of Gumri, except by a tedious march of upwards
of a thousand miles from Moscow. Such being the
geographical conditions of the war in Asia, it is obvious
that the Russians are peculiarly vulnerable in that quar-
ter, and that there is the best possible opportunity of
wresting from them the conquests of the last fifty years.
The liberation of Georgia, and the permanent indepen-
dence of the Circassians Lesghis, would establish a firm
barrier against the enemy's encroachments on the East
of the Black Sea ; and there would thenceforth be no
danger of the gradual absorption of Persia into the
dominions of the Czar, whilst the fancied insecurity of
our own Indian empire would cease to haunt the imagi-
nation even of the most inveterate alarmists. What we
have already seen of the very limited resources which
Russia possesses for aggressive war in Asia, might, in-
deed, long since have taught us to dismiss from our
minds all apprehension of what her power could effect
when pushed further forward through fifteen degrees of
latitude ; and, as even the small force at her dispos4l. in
Georgia must have been hitherto maintained in great
part by sea-borne supplies, it will be exceedingly diffi-
cult to maintain its efficiency now that its maritime com-
munications with the rest of the empire are cut off.
Nevertheless, with.all these advantages, the result of
the Turkish operations against the enemy on the east of
the Euxine has, thus far, been almost uniformly dis-
couraging. It will be remembered that, on the 16th of
June, Prince Andronikoff defeated the Batoum army,
under Selim Pacha, at Urzughetti ; and a rumour has
since reached us—which is now, we regret to say, con-
firmed—that the Kare army, of which ZIA rif Pacha holds
the chief command, has been defeated by Prince Bebu-
toff, the Russian general at Gumri. It will have beeiii
seen that our correspondent at Kars, in his letter of the
9th ult., anticipated both the battle and its unfavour-
able result ; and enough is stated by him to account for
the fact that the Turks have failed where success might
have been thought most certain.
Since the disaster at Sinope, the Ottomans have en-
countered no obstruction in conveying troops and stores
to their Asiatic army. Both at Batoum and at Kars,
they have been for some time past superior in numbers
to the enemy, and they have received large accessions of
eager volunteers, while the Russians depend in great
part upon the compulsory service of native Georgians,
or of Poles, who are only kept to their colours by the
difficulty of desertion and by the terrible punishment
with which that offence is visited. But all this numeri-
cal and moral superiority is more than counterbalanced
by the incapacity of the Turkish generals. Indeed, all
the worst features of the old and worn-out systems of
the Ottomans may be found, in that quarter, in full force.
The Commander-in-Chief at Kars, Zarif Pacha, pos-
sesses no military skill—which; considering that he is
a civilian, is not, perhaps, surprising. His appointment
is, of course, due to the favour of some great man at
Constantinople. The Hungarian General Guyon, who,
under the name of Kourachid Pacha, holds a subordi-
nate command, is so thwarted by his superior, as well as
by his inferiors, that even his distinguished abilities are
of little avail. In a word, there is no doubt of the
bravery of the soldiers, but they want direction ; and
while the foreign officers in the camp are ill-sup-
ported by their incapable commander, there is too much
reason to fear that they are quarrelling among them-
selves. This state of things will serve to explain
the almost uninterrupted successes gained by the Rus-
sians in former wars ; and it is well for Turkey that
her European army is managed, in every respect, on a
totally different system. We cannot discover that the
Ottoman officers have, speaking generally, any idea of
war beyond hard fighting. Skilful combination they do
not seem to understand. On the Danube, the Porte
has fortunately entrusted its troops to the uncontrolled
discretion of a foreigner of high capacity, who possesses
the skill to turn to full account the valour of his sol-
diers ; but in Asia its armies are commanded either by
Turks without skill, or by foreigners without authority,
and the consequence has been that troops as brave as
those in Europe have been repeatedly worsted by in-
ferior numbers. We may learn, from our own history,
that the most courageous soldiers can effect little when
their superior officers arc chosen by corruption and
favouritism ; and we cannot, therefore, more effectually
serve the cause of Turkey than by using our influence
to procure the extirpation of abuses so fatal to the effi-
ciency of her armies. It is not in our power to spare
troops for all points where their presence might be use-
ful, but the example of English method and energy
ought to be found wherever the war extends.

Kluch may be done by negotiation, as well as by
arms, to advance the interest of the Porte in the.
countries between the Euxine and the Caspian. Russia
has spared no pains to bribe the Shah of Persia into pro-
moting his own ultimate destruction ; and he has been
offered a province as the reward of assisting in the ac-
complishment of plans which, if successful, must end by
placing all his dominions at the disposal of the Czar.
Although the commonest prudence ought to prevent
Persia from lending herself to the designs of the enemy,
we should feel much More confidence in the moral effect
of the defeat of the Russian army, and of the capture of
the frontier towns of Erivan, Guinri, and Akaltzick. In
particular, the appearance of an English force at the seat
of war in Asia could not fail to have great weight at the
Court of Persia, since the power of this country is already
known on the other side of the dominions of the Shah.
We may also hope, at no distant time, to gain the con-
fidence and co-operation of the Circassian tribes, The
Sultan's Government has wisely selected certain Cir-
cassians of high rank in its service, and sent them to
their countrymen to explain the objects of the war, and
to solicit their assistance. The mountaineers will, no

doubt, soon discover, that the friendly professions of the
Anglo-French are far more trustworthy than those of
Russia ; nor can they fail to be strongly impressed with
the power of nations whose threatened hostility com-
pelled the Czar, even before the outbreak of war, to
abandon nearly all his forts on the coast. The more
immediate object of the emissaries of the Porte is to in-
duce a Circassian force to assail the enemy's positions in
the rear, whilst the Ottoman armies at Batoum and
Kars advance against them in front ; and, should these
movements be well combined, the expulsion of the Rus-
sians from Georgia will be almost inevitable.

The prospects of the war on the south-east coast of
the Black Sea are, therefore, still encouraging ; and any
reverses which the Ottoman arms have sustained in that
quarter will, it may be hoped, be speedily counter.
balanced on the arrival of the Auglo-French auxiliaries.
But it is not so much to large bodies of troops as to
the skill and energy of individual officers that we
must look for satisfactory results of the campaign in
Asia. According to our correspondent, there are
already 60,000 regular troops at Kars—a number so
large as greatly to exceed the Russian force, and
to be totally unmanageable by its commander, Zarif
Pacha. Besides this army, irregular levies to almost
any amount might be obtained in the Turkish provinces.
The Porte has, therefore, an abundant supply of soldiers,
who are both brave and hardy, but it is greatly is want
of skilful European officers, armed with sufficient autho-
rity to enforce obedience. This deficiency it is the busi-
ness of the Allies to supply. Both England and France
abound in men excellently fitted for the task of convert-

ing the rude Turkish soldiers into disciplined and highly-
effective troops. The officers of our Indian army are
especially qualified for this undertaking, and many of
them have already offered their services to the Ottoman
Government. But the appointment of good officers will
not alone suffice. The Turks must be persuaded togive

them full powers, and not to neutralise their effortswby
placing over them an incapable commander ; and the
utmost influence of the Allies should be exerted at Con-

stantinople to secure this important point. On this
subject there is a conflict in Turkey between new and
old ideas. In Europe the former prevail, and we see
the result in the victories won by the Ottoman arms on
the Danube. The latter have hitherto predominated in
the Asiatic army, and the consequence is equally appa-
rent in disaster and defeat.—Morning Chronicle.