The Sun.
London, England, 1854-07-07 00:00:00

SWEABORG AND CRONSTADT.

Soma old strategists afford us certain views about the
operations of any land force in Finland which may now
be worthy of consideration. The Baltic is free for
navigation only during five months in the year, in the
months, namely, from May to September inclusive. The
two grand military ports, those of Sweaborg and Cron-
stadt, are, according to old notions, impregnable against
the attacks of a fleet. Although a military occupation
of the islands of Aland might greatly assist our opera-
tions now, yet during the seven months of ice Aland is
in fact united to the continent, and unless Finland were
thoroughly occupied with troops no effectual opposition
(say the old strategists) could be offered to the march of
Russian forces through Finland, and ov, r the ice to
Aland. In the absence then, of the allied fleets, which
could not remain in the north duriug the winter, the
Russians might regain Aland by a land force, and the
whole work of the Allies would have to be done over
again. So far runs the argument of the warriors of the
last generation. Grant all the positions, and the con-
clusion is undeniable. It will be noticed, however, that
the whole construction of the argument depends upon
the impregnability of Sweaborg and Cronstadt. Could
Sweaborg be taken and occupied, Aland—were it like-
wise occupied—would be in little danger of winter in-
vasion by the Russians, and the same is nearly true in
the event of the occupation of Cronstadt. If, then,
troops are being prepared for the occupation of Swea-
borg or Cronstadt, in the event of the reduction of these
forts by the fleets, or even for the purpose of ultimate
assistance in the inevitable capture of those places, the
old strategists would have to fall back upon the line of
defence occupied by their predecessors in the days of
Napoleon—namely, that success, although achieved, was
gained against all sound principles of warfare. All de-
pends, then, upon the impregnability of Sweaborg and
Cronstadt. Sir Charles Napier may possibly tell us
soon something about the latter fortress, we must ques-
tion history for facts respecting the former. And
history does not give us reason to despair.
In the year 1808 Sweaborg was in the hands of the
Swedes, and was considered impregnable, as some con-
sider it now. The garrison was composed of above 7,000
men, partly Swedes, partly Finns. In the beginning of
the month of March the Russians commenced he siege
of this place, with eleven battalions, four squadrons, and
four field batteries. The transport of the guns of the
besiegers was a matter of the greatest difficulty. The
heavy artillery had to be brought on sledges from Russia.
During the whole of the time that the siege was carried on,
the number of artillery never exceeded forty-six pieces of
cannon, of which sixteen were mortars. The Russians
kept the place in a constant state of alarm, by constant
attacks, during the whole of March and part of April,
and the morale of the officers and men, on the part of the
besiegers, began to deteriorate. At length, on the sth
of April, Count Cronstedt, the Swedish commander,
agreed to an armistice, and a convention was agreed
upon between him and De Suchtelen, the Russian chief
engineer, that the truce should be continued until the
3d of May, and that if by that time the fortress were not
effectually relieved by the arrival of at least five ships of
the line, it should be given up to the Russians. The
relief never arrived, and the Russian general took pos-
session of the place. At the time of its capture it con-
tained 58 pieces of brass ordnance, 1,975 iron guns,
9,535 cannon cartridges, 3,000 barrels of powder, 10,000
cartridges, 340 projectiles, nearly 9,000 stand of arms,
with other weapons, 2 frigates, 6 xebecs, a brig, 6 yachts
of war, 25 gun-boats, 51 otherr, called yawls, 51 barques,
sloops, &c., 19 transports, an immense depot of naval
stores, and considerable magazines. These details are
taken from an account of the siege lately translated by
General Monteith from the manuscript of a Russian
officer.

It may be assumed for certain that, although in the
forty-six years since Sweaborg was taken the fortifica-
tions have been greatly improved, the resources of be-
sieging armies have improved in the same ratio. Swea-
borg was then considered impregnable against an attack-
ing force, as it is now. It yielded, nevertheless, after
two months' siege, to a small army not remarkably well
provided with materiel. It was attacked on the land
side only, and had at the time a considerable naval force
in the harbour. The Russians who took it were scarcely
sufficient in number to occupy it and to superintend the
disbanding and sending away of the Swedish garrison.
Taking these facts into consideration, is it at all likely
that Sweaborg would be able to resist at the present time
the combined action of an efficient force by land, while
the most powerful navy in the world was thundering at
it from the sea. It is the opinion at St. Petersburg
that even Cronstadt is not impregnable against a sea
force alone, and this is felt still more strongly with re-
spect to Sweaborg. Assisted by a land force, the cap-
ture of Cronstadt or of Sweaborg by the fleets would be
certain. Aland being taken from the Russians, and
depots of troops established which could easily commu-
nicate with Sweaborg during the winter, a strong posi-
tion might be held in Finland until the time of com-
mencing naval operations again returned. This,
however, it is to be hoped, is the lowest point at which
success will stop. It is confidently anticipated by many
that the fleets alone arc sufficient to capture the for-
tresses, in which case the detachments of troops which
are being sent out will be needed only to occupy the
garrisons, and hold possession of the country. If Fin-
land is once wrested from the Russians, it should of
course never be returned to them, but should revert to
Sweden, its real proprietor. The Autocrat would thus
be taught that no length of possession sanctifies robbery.