The Sun.
London, England, 1853-08-12 00:00:00

THE FRENCH NAVY

noise a naval force which may suffice as a well prepared
framework for future development, but which may be so
wisely limited as to arouse no anticipatory alarm in our
rivals, who are watching us."
M. C. Dupin's humane aspirations that the mis-
fortunes he predicts may not befall us, stand in
somewhat grotesque contrast to his earnest prayer
that France will prepare with energy to take ad-
vantage of them. If we cannot thank him for his
anxiety that we should escape intestine discord, at
least we may be grateful for his intimation as to its
possible consequences.
If some difference of opinion exists as to opera-
tions upon the coasts of England, the utmost
unnaimity prevails as to those that should he adopted
in other quarters.
The views of the Commission and of the witnesses
and precisely those of the Prince de Joinville's
pamphlet of 1844, but that production was con-
sidered by many persons in this country as the
foolish speculations of a headstrong youth, and a
few extracts from the reports are necessary to con-
vince these gentlemen, particularly those connected
with commerce, that the subject deserves some
little attention.
M. Collas, the secretary to the Commission, and
the ablest and most energetic of its members, re-
peatedly urges that the French force abroad should
be so constituted at all times that at the first out-
break of war " the enemy's commerce" may be de-
stroyed in all parts of the globe. At the first
sitting on the question of the composition of the
fleet, M. Collas observed, " We have a certain basis
for our calculations. The adversary is known.
There can be no question but of England." So
the " enemy's commerce" means that of England.
" He does not dispute," he says, " that in time of
war the frigates which shall have destroyed the enemy's
commerce and ravaged his possessions may in their-turn ,
be compromised ; but, at least, they will have fulfilled
their mission of devastation, and struck the enemy to
the heart."
M. Daru says, a " guerre de tirailleurs" should
be carried on against the English colonies and com-
merce.
Admiral Laine, a member of the Commission,
says,—
" The frigates we shall send to India maybe compro-
mised, but that is no reason for renouncing the idea of
harassing the enemy's commerce, and of supporting the
populations which may at a given moment revolt against
England."
Admiral Hernoux, also a member, observes—
" Frigates have but one duty to perform, that of cut-
ting up the enemy's commerce in every part of the globe,
especially in the Indian seas."
M. Normand, a witness, says—
"ln the Channel swift vessels are required, with a
screw and a light draught of water, able to enter and
run ashore in all the ports and creeks of the coast. They
should be real birds of prey, able to seize the enemy's
ships when it suited them, and able to escape when ne-
cessary to avoid them."
Admiral Dupetit Thouars, in his evidence, says—
" The best mode for France to make war upon England
is to destroy her commerce, which constitutes her
wealth. * * * ei,
Admiral de la Susse gives similar opinions in his
examination :
"We should attack commerce, pursue, and destroy
it in every sea. This must be the object of the divisions
of frigates despatched from the ports of the ocean."
M. C. Dupin obserues—
" The small value of the French possessions abroad
will be an advantage to France the day war is declared.
She can lose little, while England—vulnerable in every
part of the globe—would be obliged to disperse her
forces, which would be a cause of weakness."
The insignificance of the colonies and commer-
cial marine of France is frequently referred to in
similar terms. Her navigation au long cours is
decreasing, and she only possesses 72 ships of 400
tons and upwards. Her fisheries are maintained
solely by bounties, and in case of war all her sea-
men would be taken for the fleet, so that her foreign
commerce, already carried on principally under
foreign flags, would then be entirely in the hands
of neutrals. This subject has been also closely
considered by the Commission.
M. Fournier having expressed an opinion that
the changes in our navigation laws would involve
the reversal of the ancient practice under the law
of nations affecting neutrals, M. de Montebello
replies—
" When our commerce will be carried on under neu-
tral flags, when it will thus escape the blows of England,
while, on the other hand, ,English commerce will be ex-
posed to all our attackii`,,it is not to be supposed that
England will submit to such a position ; the day she re-
sists it, neutrals, as a necessary consequence, may be-
come our allies."
And when the question is put to the Commission
whether or not the existing law of nations as re-
gards the right to seize an enemy's merchant ships
shall be maintained, it is at once carried in the
affirmative, M. Dufaure, the President, observing
that its maintenance is necessary—
" Because, if English merchant vessels were declared
safe from attacks, England, relieved from that which is
most vulnerable in her position—free from all anxiety
on the subject of the protection of her commerce—would
recover a freedom of action with respect to France that
would be highly prejudicial to us."
In the Mediterranean the greatest advantage is
attributed to the possession of Algiers as a means
of predominance, and of sweeping away our com-
merce in that sea, while the fact that the French
force will be close to its supplies of coal from the
mines in the south is strongly insisted on.
Admiral Baudin, in his evidence, says :
"The Mediterranean is the theatre on which great
interests will be at stake. The Eastern question is
always ready to divide the nations of Europe, and
France must always be in a condition, at least in the
Mediterranean, to earry troops with great rapidity to
the coasts of Spain, to the coast of Italy, to the Adri-
atic, or to the Levant, if her intersts should demand
it."
M. de Montebello, Minister of Marine under
Louis Philippe, observes in one of the proces ver-
baux :
" When the internal troubles of nations shall subside,
the Mediterranean will again become the theatre of
great events. A continental power of the first order,
and a naval power of the second rank, France might,
on certain points, oppose this double element of her
strength to England, which is only a naval power. We
should, therefore, apply ourselves to the development of
our steam fleet."
We recommend the preceding opinions to that
great commercial authority, Mr. Cobden, who has
told us that if we expect invasion, the fleet should
be immediately recalled from the Mediterranean.
Admiral Dupetit Thouars, who was a membeerarsof
It would be satisfactory to learn how we should de-
tothe Commission on Coast Defence of 1841
be of the same opinion, when after fend our colonies, and our merchant shipping—
therefirharlienpmg
eato_
Prince de Joinville's pamphlet, and how we should maintain our communications with
India, or obtain our supplies from the Black Sea,
sures of defence we had adopted, he observes .
" All invasions of England have been crowned with
which the cheapness of bread depends—if war
success ; she is not prepared for a territorialbreak out, and this advice were followed.
q
English are not animated by a warlike spirit war.;
The on
at this Our last uotation shall be from the evidence of
moment they have nothing organised ; and, if we have
Admiral de Vernina9, who was Minister of Marine
war, we have only one thing to do,—that would be to
land an army on their coasts." under the Republic in 1848 :
M. Charner, just appointed second in command I "Some distinguished statesmen, struck by the insig-
nificance of the colonies that remain to us, have re-
of the squadron of evolution at Cherbourg, and one
of the members of the commission observes—
garded our navy as being heneeforward for France an
affair of `luxe,' and of misplaced pride. But these
"Our position is singularly improved" (by the inven- have notreflected the revolution steam navi-
tion
tion of steam), " since an invasion of England on our gation must make, or rather they have not foreseen
part would be in a 'very different degree formidable to , .That revolution is immense ,throws abridge
anything • it
anything England could attempt against us."
across the waters, and unites together islands and
Of course, M. Charner refers to the enormous continents. On examining the extent of our mari-
army of France as compared with our military time frontier, which is double that of our land fron-
force and when we shall be insane enough to leave ' tier, it must be considered indispensable, however ex-
it in the power of France to obtain command of the pensive, to maintain a great naval establishment, and to
Channel, then that army may at any moment be carry it to the extent required for the security of our
brought against us, and we shall fare badly if we coasts.
are not prepared to defend ourselves on our own relation between the of sea and land
soil. ;
, that if there were no other reasons for the maintenance
arms
an
" The application of steam to navigation creates such
intimate
It is not, however, to be forgotten that since these
of a formidable navy than the facility, and the prompt-
and similar opinions were expressed, certain defen-
sive measures have been adopted, which, beyond tions in defensive, but especially in offensive
nwars,to rwee. tude it will henceforth provide for our military opera-
the mere additional force, have had the far more ;
important effect of proving that the people of Eng- commend them by discussion publictoocoasts
thepconflicts which,
cannot hesitate at once to prepare tlmo elniso,na
4,401
land, though deeply attached to peace, are fully re- " Steam brings back to the c
territory with an invasion,
solved to defend themselves; and probably M. for their own safety, sailing ships engaged in far from
Daru himself may now doubt whether the results the shore. It menacsesasevietry
is the least expected,—it re-
dangerou
he so complacently anticipated would be quite sowars of invasion, almost abandoned
easily accomplished. the more
stores, in short, the
M. C. Dupin's proposition looks rather to the
since the time of galleys.
What will war be henceforward . 2 and
future than the present for effecting similar objects. He aek-s)
_
replies—
" We have now 55,000 seamen, robust and ready for
He says : "A struggle as muchsohroertteenreridhilne—da wurataiornnafs it wiill
service ; a yearly increase of two per cent. would, in be more bloody and in
ravage
p ay the principal
five years, give 60,000 efficient seamen, and, please God, and destruction, in which steam will
l•
in five years we may arrive at the complete development part.
of our materiel, which is acknowledged possible, and M. dethVe edrinsti
innaceti olnikebetl‘wieedne attackMli andtaigil adee does
fence,
which is necessary to suffice for these resoures in seamen. not see
" Many different systems have been suggested for for he says, subsequently to the above extracts :
enabling us from this time to struggle with the greatest It is designedly, and by a discretion all will under-
naval power—a power grown greater by our misfortunes, stand, that I have as yet only examined the utility of
and preponderating especially in proportion to the in- the marine under the head of defence. If France were
testine discords and revolutions which for 60 years have obliged.to take the offensive, she would find in the navy
weakened our country. England, in her turn, as little I propose (that proposed by the commission is far more
circumspect in 1850 as we were in
1788, and still more powerful) all the elements required for attack. It is
confident, flatters herself that no intestine cause of weak- only necessary to urge the formation of these elements."
M. de Verninac's further views •
ness can reach her. h I could share this in this discre-
" For the love of humanity II tion are again veiled under ast •
dof th
But am convince e asterisks • but we think
confidence, this security.
fear, will suffice to prove it. his evidence valuable as it shows the• • visions of
contrary, and few years, I
the naval forces of ambition and aggrandizement
is that equilibrium between was can alone ex-
Then it
sti
ll
France will be restored to us, plain the vast efforts France has made, and is ill
France and of her eternal
1 I give my country is to remain faithful making, for extending her naval power.
" The counsel
to t ' 4
he system of peace until then ; to orgamse without go be continued.)

PART IV.
•
THE COMPOSITION OF THE FLEET.
( Continued from The Sun of July 17.)
The commission, before it decided on the nature
and amount of the fleet France should build and
maintain, was obviously bound to consider the
course of action to be adopted in the event of war,
due regard being also had to the naval force of other
maritime powers. The deliberations on this sub-
ject, therefore, could not fail to give occasion to
frequent reference to England, and some account
of their tenor is desirable, not only because they
are in this respect highly interesting and instruc-
tive, but in order to show the objects which the
commission had in view in its recommendations re-
lative to the reconstruction of the fleet. The writ-
ten propositions of various members, the proees-
verbaux of the numerous discussions on these sub-
jects, and the evidence of the principal witnesses,
afford ample materials for the purpose.
The defence of the French coasts was naturally a
prominent consideration, and as M. Daru's elabo-
rate proposition, enters very much at large into this
question, and also expresses general opinions which
appear to be in accordance with those of the great
majority of his colleagues, we shall make no
apology for the length of our extracts from this in-
teresting paper.
M. Daru commences by comparing the invention
of the screw to that of the bayonet, which, he says,
" by placing two deadly weapons in one hand was
formerly a great cause of success to the people that
first adopted it," and he urges the necessity of im-
mediately securing to France this means of mari-
time superiority.
The vast steam-fleet (with piddle-theelS) so re-
cently constructed at an enormous; cost, he says;
" have been called frigates, corvettes, dr.c., for the
purpose of self-deception, and are, in truth only
transports."
The fleet, M. Daru thinks, should consist of two
classes ; the first, intended to fight, composed of
frigates and ships of the line ; the second, the ves-
sels intended to carry troops and watch the enemy.
"The latter," he says, "may besides do the work of
privateers ; they may burn unguarded places, seize mer-
chant vessels, land troops, effect surprises, skirmish like
the advanced guard of an army ; but, also, like an ad-
vanced guard, they can only be of service when supported
by a solid and substantial force.
When the naval organisation of France is consi-
dered, England, he says,—
"Is the whole question, and there is no other. We
must ask ourselves—lf we have war with England,
what shall we do ? Now, here is my answer. We
shall bave'a double duty to perform. First, to defend
our own coasts frOm all attacks and surprises. Secondly,
to place ourselves in readiness to strike the enemy to
the heart by effecting a descent on his coasts."
The opinions of the Commission on the Defence
of the French Coasts which sat in 1841 are thus
referred to by M. Darn, and are especially deserv-
ing of our attention :
The commission of 1841, after advising that the
naval ports, the places of commerce, the centres of
wealth, should be sufficiently fortified to secure them
from a coup de main, declares that the principal instru-
ment of coast defence is the steamboat ; that it should
at once fulfil the duty of action and observation ; that
thus swift vessels should unceasingly traverse the coasts,
correspond with the signal stations, warn them, or re-
ceive warning from them of what was going on at a dis-
tance. Moving with great swiftness, they will carry
intelligence, they will seek the forces prepared at the
nearest ports—at Dunkirk, at Havre, at Cherbourg, at
St. Malo, at Brest, at L'Orient, at St. Nazaire, &c.,
which would contain squadrons of reserve, acting sepa-
rately or united, and connected together by these swift
vessels, which, keeping close under the land, would find
refuge everywhere, especially under the fire and protec-
tion of a few batteries conveniently placed. Such is the
system of defence recommended by the commission as
most efficacious, because movable, and not fixed to one
spot. It is inexpensive, for merchant vessels may be
appropriated to this service if built on a model capable
of carrying a few guns, which might be easily effected by
means of a premium. It is efficacious, finally, because
it is supported by a real force, a force prepared for ag-
gression, which, menacing the enemy, inspiring him with
the perpetual fear of a diversion, will keep many vessels
in the waters of the Thames, or of the Irish Channel ;
an entire fleet will be thus paralysed, and will not ven-
ture to stir."
M. Daru says, that ten days after the order to
embark was telegraphed from Paris, the army sent
'to Rome in 'lB4B, was landed at Civita Vecchia
and took the field, with horses, field artillery, and
battering train, completely supplied also with stores
and ammunition, and with 20 days' provisions.
From these data M. Daru goes on t 9 calculate the
vessels required to land 30,000 men and 3,600
horses in Ireland or on the English coast, adding
:--
"If the east coast of England is to be threatened, the
principal part of this force should be concentrated at
Dunkirk : if the south coast or Ireland, at Cherbourg
and Brest." " Cherbourg," he says, " must of necessity
be the head-quarters of the steam-vessels intended to
act on the opposite shores of the Channel," and he en-
forces the dictum of Napoleon, " Cherbourg is an eye to
see the other side of the Straits, and an arm to strike."
M. Darn anticipates the obvious objection that
his force may be blockaded or intercepted by an
English squadron, and he disposes of it thus sum-
marily :
" It will be necessary to give battle, and to destroy it,
in order to effect a landing. There is no doubt on this
point. What forces shall we organise to effect this
object ?"
England will, he says, be weakened by the ne-
cessity of defending her numerous possessions and
interests in remote quarters, and he concludes that
a substantial force of 20 ships of the line and 10
frigates, all with screw popellers, of 25 frigates and
25 steam transports, with a certain number of
avisos and corvettes assembled at her northern
ports, will be sufficient.
The question of defence appears never to be
considered alone. M. de Montaignac, an officer
just returned from a tour of inspection in England,
expresses the general view of the subject when lie
says, in his examination,—
" I do not separate the question of defence from that
of attack. All organisation of materiel and personnel
useful for defence will be still more so for attack."
Opinions are sometimes expressed as to the in:-
sufficient defences of the French coasts ; but Ad
miral de la Susse says in his evidence :
" The commission will observe that I trouble myself
little about' the attacks England could direct against our
shores."