The Sun.
London, England, 1854-12-20 00:00:00

wanted—that the country is willing and ready to devote
its best energies to the successful prosecution of this mo-
mentous contest. (Hear.) If we wish for documentary
evidence upon the subject, we have only to look at the
statement made by the noble duke the Secretary of War
in another place. According to that statement, as soon
as it appeared evident that the siege of Sebastopol was
likely to be protracted, and that the undertaking was likely
to be one of greater hazard than had at first been sup-
posed—from that moment the number of our recruits bad
gone on increasing week by week until the last week,when
it had mere than doubled that of any preceding week since
the commencement of the war, and when we had enrolled
six or seven fold the number of men we had enrolled six or
seven weeks ago. (Cheers.) That is the evidence we have
with regard to the state of public feeling upon this sub-
ject. I say, that looking at these facts, you need not fear
but that you will be able, in the long run, to obtain in this
country ample supplies of men for your armies. The
noble lord spoke of the drain on the population of
28,000,000 to keep up an army of 200,000 men ! (Cheers.)
I believe there aro not at this moment in the United King-
dom less than 6,000,000 or 7,000,000 of male adults—that
is to say, of men above 21 years of age. But will it be said
that, large as that number is, you are withdrawing men
from other occupations in which they might be more ad-
vantageously employed? Well, I meet that argument by
a reference to a simple and notorious fact which the noble
lord=not accidentally, I think—overlooked. I meet it
by a reference to the reports of the emigration commission-
' ere. You tell me of German emigrants—well, I tell you of
English emigrants. (Hear.) It is argued that there are
many thousands of able-bodied persons passing through
this country every year whom it is desirable that we
should employ in prosecuting the war; but I say, on
the other hand, that this very year, and up to this
very time, you have had not thousands, but hun-
dreds of thousands of able-bodied Englishmen and Irish-
men emigrating from our shores. (Hear, hear.) I deny,
then, that we have any insufficiency of men, or that by
recruiting among our own labouring population
you would necessarily be diverting to military pursuits
men who would otherwise be more advantageously em-
ployed. But then it is said, that although we do net
want a sufficient number of men, it is impossible for us to
get our men ready in time. Now, upon that subject there
is, I think, a little discrepancy in the various statements
we have heard from the supporters of this measure. We
first heard from an hon. and gallant member opposite a
good deal about the time necessary to make a soldier. But
the right hon.-gentleman the Secretary at War set aside
that argument, and told us that it was an antiquated
superstition to suppose that one year or two years were
required to make a soldier. According to the right hon.
gentleman three or four months would be sufficient for
that purpose. We have here a high authority upon such
a point. Bat that authority does not stand alone. Two
years ago our militia were embodied, and before
they were embodied they were drilled for 28 days ; and at
the expiration of that period of drilling a military instruc-
tor, who went about to examine and report on the state of
the militia regiments, complimented them on being almost
equal in efficiency to troops of the line. Here we must no
doubt make some allowance for the language of compli-
ment, but still it could not have been so exaggerated that
those men must not be supposed to have acquired a con-
siderable amount of military discipline. But I am in-
formed, on good authority that if you bring your soldiers
from abroad you will not save as much time as you seem to
anticipate. I pass over that question of the enlistment of
intending emigrants passing through this country, because,
after all, the depth of winter is not the time at which
emigrants leave their homes. lam much mistaken if, at
this particular period, we have among us any very large
number of foreigners who propose to emigrate to some
more distant land. (Hear, hear.) I assume, then,
that you will have to send over to the Continent for the
foreigners whom you propose to employ in your Majesty's
service. You will have to recruit these men, you will have
to bring them here, and large bodies are not to be so
brought in a day, and even when all that shall have been
done, it is evident that the Government do not rely on
securing the service of trained soldiers, because they insist
on having a further period—a period unlimited in point of
time--during which they are to drill and train those men
in this country. (Rear. hear.) The question then arises
whethep 'the rawness of the English labourer, unfamilia-
risee4e4e has been with the use of arms, will be produc-
tive of more delay in preparing him for foreign service
than the delay which you must have to incur in the case
of a foreigner, who must be brought here from Germany,
and who, after having been brought here, must undergo
a certain amount of drilling and training. That brings me
to the next argument employed by the right hon. gentle-
man the Secretary at War, when he said that the question
was not so much as to the number of men whom you
could obtain, or the length cf time that would be required
for preparing them to take the field, as the amount of
hardihood which they might possess for enduring the la-
bours of a campaign. Now, I speak with diffidence on
military matters ; but it does not seem a very recondite
solution of the problem thus put before us, if your rules
for enlisting are such that you cannot take men beyond a
certain age—it does not seem a very recondite solution of
the problem that you should for the mo.nent relax these
rules. (Hear, hear.) Why should you not admit men
into your army of somewhat more advanced years? Why
should you not admit men who, I quite agree with the right
hon. gentleman the Secretary at War, will gain in point of
endurance more than they can lose in point of activity ?
Relax your rules and the difficulty of which you now com-
plain will disappear. There is another statement of the
right honourable gentleman which I venture to dispute,
although I must dispute it with some distrust in my own
knowledge. He spoke of the landwehr system, with
which we are all acquainted ; and I understood him to
state, with sufficient distinctness, that the foreigners
whom the Government proposed to employ were men
who had gone t trough their term of service abroad, and
who were no longer liable to be called into the field
in their own country ; that was to say, you were to
select as recruits expressly on the ground of superior eligi-
bility the very men whom their own government reject—
not- absolutely, but as less fitted than younger men for
military serviee—(hear, hear)—not as unfit for service—l
do not wish to indulge in any exaggeration—but as being
past that age at which men are considered to make the
most efficient soldiers. (Hear.) The right hon. gentleman
spoke of the age of those men as being about 26 0r27 ; but
I can state on high authority—l may say on high diplo-
matic authority—that instead of 26 or 27, the average age
of those men is about 33 or 31 (hear, hear)—or very
nearly the age at which the English soldier retires from
active service. (Hear.) It has been carefully impressed
on us that this was merely a provisional measure, intended
to guard against a temporary emergency. But if you want
to meet such an emergency, I think you have resources at
home of which you have not yet availed yourself. Ido not
admire the system of subsidies. I can very well under-
stand that it would be very unpleasant—that it would be
injurious to our national honour to be taking into our pay
the troops of France ; but if this is really a question of
10,000 men for a few months, I ask what possible objection
can you have to call for that number of troops from the
French Government, which, by your own admission, will
be perfectly ready to grant them ? (Hear.) It may, per-
haps, be urged that the French Government is not able to
spare that number of men, or would refuse to send them ;
but the noble lord himself sail that the only difficulty
the Allies experienced was the difficulty of conveying men
out to the seat of war. If that is the case, however, I
would ask whether it would he loss difficult to send out
Germans than to send eut Frenchmen ? And I would
further ask her Majesty's Government why they have not
long since applied to that great ally who has, with so
much cordiality and sincerity, supported us throughout
the whole of those proceedings ? (Hear.) Why have they
not applied to him for temporary assistance in order to
meet a temporary emergency ? Why have they not
addressed to him a demand, which would have been
granted without the slightest injury to our national
honour, and which it would bo perfectly easy for them to
repay at some future time in one form or another? This
question has not been argued as a question of cheapness,
for no one asserts this the employment of foreign troops
would be more economical than the employment of our own
troops. I believe we are all prepared to admit that in a
great undertaking there would be no real economy iu em-
ploying second-rate materials. (Hear, hear.) After all,
the pay which you give to your own soldiers is hardly wore
than sufficient to supply them with the necessaries of life ;
and you could not offer a lower sum to foreigners, to whom
even that sum could afford no great in lucement to enter
your service, and whom it would he your interest
to place as much as possible on an equality with the
troops of this country. Nothing, therefore, can be gained
by this measure in the way of economy. Then comes the
question of the military capacity of the foreigners whom
you would enlist in the Queen's service. Upon that point
we are still at a loss to arrive at any very definite conclu-
sion, notwithstanding the admissions of the right hon.
gentleman the Secretary-at-War. Her Majesty's Minis-
ters were asked in another place where the new troops were
to come from, and to that question the only answer which
they gave was, that the Emperor of Russia would be very
much obliged to any one who would furnish him with that
information. But I confess that that statement appears
to me a very insufficient answer. Speaking from conjecture
I must say that I imagine you are prepared to treat, not
with individuals, but with some foreign government. In
considering that question it is impossible wholly tb lose
sight of the Polish question ; but that question is a very
grave one, and I perceive that no member of her Majesty's
Government has shown any inclination to introduce it into
this discussion. I believe that to expect that we could
afford any effectual aid to Poland by employing in our ser-
vice Poles who have for the last 20 years been exiles from
their native country, would be one of the wildest dreams
that ever entered into the head of man. If you wish
to restore the nationality of Poland, you must adopt a
policy of a character far more decisive—yon must adopt a
policy in which you cannot but expect the sympathy of the
most powerful of your present allies; and, above all, you
must adopt a policy from which there will be no receding.
I confess, therefore, that I shall be glad to find that that
question is not introduced into the present debate. Is it,
then, Swiss or Germans which you mean to employ? lam
given to understand that in Switzerland you will not at
present find any large supply of men prepared to enter your
service, for there is at present a considerable demand for
labourers in that country y; sand I believe besides, that the
Swiss Government has of late years passed a law, not pro-
hibiting altogether, bat in many ways restricting, the en-
listment of their people in foreign armies. With respect
to Germany, I must observe that I do not wish to outer
into a discussion of that most invidious topic—the military
character of the people of that country. But this I must
observe, that 40 years have elapsed since the Germans have
had any practical experience of war, and that the events
of the years 1813, 1814, 1815 can hardly afford a fair trial
of their military character. Throughout that period they
unquestionably displayed groat national enthusiasm in the
prosecution of the war which they waged against the Em-
peror Napoleon. But in that war they had to fight, for
the most part, against raw levies, and they possessed iu
general an immense superiority in numbers over the
enemy. And yet, notwithstanding these advantages, they
were not uniformly or oven generally successful ; and no-
thing can be more striking than the contrast afforded by
their chequered fortunes and the splendid career of the
Duke of Wellington throughout the same period at the
head of the English and Spanish army. All he contended
for was that they could not answer for the conduct in the
field of those ..leruatin troops (we understood). But the ques-
tion was, What would be the moral effect of this measure?
The noble lord at the beginning of the debate said, no doubt
it would be a lamentable thing if they depended wholly
on foreign mercenary troops; but, he added,
number asked for was so small that no injurious effects
could be produced. But then he (Lord Stanley)
asked, What effect would this measure have on the
public mind? Ho would consider what-would be said hore
if a similar step was taken by the enemy. H the EmperOr
in
of Itussia was at this moment advertising for soldierses.it He would
everyEuropeau market what would be the result
ma say that he
have every newspaper and-every public
driven to his last resource. (Hear.) man
tht he was
that the
was beaten, that his cause was unpopular, an
What heat hought
would be said, and not untruly, in the present case, wag,
that we were only able to bring into the field a !small army
f thdeoinggeneituss
toiliftytce
country was not for war, and we had no
means--orb—uetffitchiaetntasitnhecoanrcmluyctwaansd
bcuatpasbmlaelol