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THE TURKISH BLUE-BOOKS.

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No. IV.—ThE WAR.
The successive stages of the Eastern question
have now passed in review before the reader. We
have seen a contest between France and Russia
for the favours of Turkey transformed into a con-

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test between Turkey and Russia by the exorbitant
demands of the latter, and we have seen this dis-

pate adopted by Europe in the interest of the
Turks because the pretensions of Russia, if ad-
mitted, were serious enough to threaten the gene-
ral equilibrium and destroy the securities of public
law. The result of these events was a double con-
test, the two phases of which must be carefully dis-
tinguished for the correct appreciation of the
transactions ensuing. On one hand, Russia and
Turkey having each put their terms in the form of
an ultimatum, were brought face to face with no
further appeal but war ; on the other, Russia and
Europe were confronted, with every desire on the
part of Europe to close the dispute by pacific ad-
justment, but with a firm resolution to support
Turkey in her resistance to the Czar's demands.
This state of affairs produced, not unnaturally,
some confusion, for, while the protectors of Turkey
were exerting themselves in negotiation, Turkey
herself, under the provocations of hostile aggression
and the pressure of popular excitement, had aban-
doned the chances of diplomacy and declared for
war. Even this, however, was not permitted to
cut short the negotiations of the other parties, and,
as the Emperor of Russia (pp. 181-227) had an-
nounced his intention of making no counter-decla-
ration, and of confining himself to defensive mea-
sures, it was hoped that while an outlet was pro-
vided for the martial fanaticism of the Ottomans
the European Powers might still labour with a
good prospect in the work of peace.
These views received considerable support from
a certain important occurrence. Exactly at the
time that the Turkish Council pronounced itself
for war—that is to say, in the last week of Sep-
tember—the Emperor of Russia paid a visit to the
Emperor of Austria at Olmutz, and a species of
diplomatic congress was created by the occasion.
It was here announced, not only by Count Nessel-
rode, but by the Czar himself, at an interview with
Lord Westmoreland, that Russia desired to meet
" every legitimate wish" (p. 129) of the mediating
Powers, and a new project of Note, termed " the
Olmutz Note," originated in the confidence which
these declarations had called into being. The as-
surances, however, which were thus offered did
not appear to the British Government sufficiently
clear to neutralise the effect of the Nesselrode
despatch, in which the real views of Russia had
been so unluckily recorded, and the whole scheme
was soon deranged by the actual proclamation of
hostilities alluded to above. The course of these
proceedings, with the views of the several Govern-
ments thereon, will be found in pp. 128 140 of the
second part of the Blue-Books.
But, in the meantime, the Western Powers were
placed in a position involving greater obligations
than before. They were, in fact, so far committed
to a co-operation with the Turkish Government
that they could not desert this Government in any
measures, however precipitate, which were justified
by its real situation. They were of opinion that
the chances of negotiation were by no means at an
end ; that a Note comprising the modifications
suggested by the Porte might yet be so framed as
to receive the Czar's acquiescence, and that the
forbearance which had been practised at the first
invasion of the Principalities might still be conti-
nued with advantage. (See p. 136.) Nevertheless,
as the Porte thought otherwise, as the justice of its
requisitions was unimpeachable, and as it was im-
possible to deny the right of the Sultan to expel a
foreign invader from his own dependencies, the
French and English Governments agreed to adapt
their policy to the new situation of affairs, and to
concert measures for the more effectual protection
of the Porte by the allied fleet during the operations
which might ensue. The views Of the two Govern-
ments at this conjuncture will be found developed
in a despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys (p. 136) and
of Lord Clarendon (p. 140). Generally, too,
throughout the despatches the tone adopted toward
the Russian Government acquires from this time

considerable severity, and the manifasto of the
Czar in defence of his proceedings (p. 228) had
little other effect than to confirm the suspicions
with which his policy was now regarded. (See pp.
238-240.)
The Turks lost no time in carrying their decision
into execution. On the 29th October Lord Claren-
don learnt from Berlin that the Turks had pos-
sessed themselves of an island in the Danube oppo-
site Widdin, and two days later a telegraphic des-
patch from Vienna announced the occupation of
Kalafat by the same detachment. Nevertheless,
though the contest between the Russia and Turkey
was thus hurried on to the issue of the sword, the
contest between Russia and Europe was still re-
stricted to the sphere of diplomatic negotiation ; and
Lord Stratford, at the instance of the British Go-
vernment, succeeded in obtaining from the Porte an
order for a short suspension of hostilities at the very
moment (Oct. 20) that the combined squadrons
were summoned to enter the Dardanelles. Un-
fortunately, this order was not delivered in time,
and Lord Stratford relates (p. 250) a piece of infor-
mation to the effect that, though the officer dis-
patched from Constantinople arrived at the Turkish
camp before the assault, the engagemant occurred
notwithstanding ; " the bearer himself taking part
in the attack." War, therefore, was actually com-
menced and battles were soon fought, of which the
reader will not require to be reminded. Lord
Stratford, with the sagacity so eminently charac-
teristic of his correspondence, had observed three
months before (Part 1., p. 370) that " the Turkish
forces would probably make a steadier resistance
thanthe defective state of their service might lead us
to expect ;" but the European public were certainly
not prepared for the successes which they obtained;
nor were those successes without considerable in-
fluence, in more than one respect, on the progress
of affairs. They disposed the Ottoman Government
and people to the prosecution of the war with the
hopes of more material advantages than had been
contemplated at first ; they rendered the acqui-
escence of Russia more improbable by wounding
the pride of the Czar, and they drew the Western
Powers into an attitude of more active participa-
tion. These points are treated at some length and
with great ability by Lord Stratford (p. 290) and
M. Drouyn de Lhuys (p. 306).
Still the work of negotiation was earnestly con-
tinued, and it was at this identical period that a
scheme was first mooted which has only just now
terminated in the perfect isolation of the Russian
Government by the concerted opposition of Europe.
It was suggested that the Four Powers, should by
their representatives, offer a " collective Note" to
the Porte, announcing their anxious desire to
mediate between the belligerents, assuring the
Ottoman Cabinet of the willingness of Russia to
treat, and inquiring the conditions on which it
would itself be prepared to do the same. To
this Note was annexed a " Protocol'—that is to
say, a species of declaration, recording not only
the object of the collective note, but the views
generally entertained by the Four Powers of the
pending contest and its consequences. In this
instrument it was formally stated as the
common opinion of the Plenipotentaries, that
" the existing war could not in any case lead
to modifications in the territorial boundaries of
the belligerent empires." Two points, there-
fore, of infinite importance were now secured.
The concerted action of Europe in the Eastern
question was definitely established, and it was an-
nounced as a conclusion of European policy that
the Russian Government could gain no territorial
acquisitions by the war. The history of this Note
and Protocol will be found in pp. 273-294.
Again, however, were the .transactions between
Russia and Europe complicated by the transactions
between Russia and Turkey, though on this occasion
by the proceedings, not of the latter Power, but the
former. On the 30th of November a division of
the Russian fleet surprised a Turkish squadron of
greatly inferior force in the Turkish harbour of
Sinope, and destroyed it with horrible carnage. As
this attack was considered entirely at variance with
the assurances given by Russia respecting her non-
offensive attitude, and as the barbarity of the pro-
ceeding was most outrageous, the British and
French Governments took immediate measures to
prevent the recurrence of any such catastrophes
by securing the command of the Black Sea. It was
not intended to commit any act of aggression upon
Russia, but the Turkish territory and flag were to
be effectually protected by the confinement of
Russian cruisers to their own harbours. Accord-
ingly the combined squadrons, which on the 25th
of October had entered the Dardanelles, and on the
7th of November had been summoned to anther in
the Bosphorus, proceeded on the sth of January
into the Black Sea. The general views entertained
by the British and French Governments in issuing
these instructions will be found explained in two
most important despatches, which we annex to
our remarks ; and an " explanation of the causes
which restrained the squadrons from . goipg
sooner" is offered by Lord Stratford in the
' subjoined passage of a despatch, dated December
17. "The causes in question, he writes, nay
be reduced to the following heads:—Want of linfor-
mation as to the movements of. the Russian fleet,
an unwillingness to incur any risk of collision, or
to narrow the claims of peace by premature provo-
cation of any kind, and an impression that we
should do best to wait for an invitation from the
Turkish Government. In aid of theseleading con-
siderations come the strong prevailing northerly
winds which retarded the squadrons in their passage
from Besika Bay, and the delays occasioned by the

departure of one French ambassador and the arri-
val of another."

On the 12th of January intelligence of the in-
.ended expedition was communicated to the Russian
Government by our Minister at St. Petersburg,
who informed Count Nesselrode that " Her
Majesty's ships and those of the Emperor of the
French would enter the Black Sea, and would
require every Russian ship which they might meet
with to re-enter a Russian port."
On the very next day, however, as if to complete
the alternations of these transactions, a step which
had been almost decisive of war was counter-
balanced by another intended to be decisive of
peace. The " collective Note" and " Protocol"
above described as concerted by the European
representatives at Vienna had been anticipated
(pp. 339-368) by certain arrangements concerted,
in the same view, by the European representatives
at Constantinople. Without entering into the par-
ticulars of this diplomatic episode, we may briefly
state that the Constantinople project was finally
successful. " Our proposals," writes Lord Stratford
(p. 362), " are formally accepted under the Sultan's
sanction, and it now remains with the Four Powers
to obtain the assent of Russia, and to set on foot
the negotiation which they have expressed their
desire to obtain, and which, if the Court of St.
Petersburgh be sincere in his professions, ought to
terminate at an early period in peace. These pro-
posals, being transmitted to Vienna, were adopted
by the Conference there sitting, as agreeing with
their own, and were by them duly signed on the
13th of January, the day after Count Nesselrode
had been apprised of the entry of the fleets into
the Black Sea. Thus was the double contest
resolved at length into a single one, by the
identification of the demands of Turkey with
those of Europe. The Porte, as was announced
by Redschid Pasha to the four representa-
tives, "is prepared to conclude a peace in the
manner pointed out to it by its allies ; and, if
intelligence is received that the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg likewise accepts the bases, the Porte
will name and send a Plenipotentiary to a congress
to be held in a neutral city, which shall be spe-
cified by the Four Powers, and at which delegates
of the Four Powers shall assist, for the arrange-
ment of affairs with the Plenipotentiary of the
Court of Russia ; and thereupon, as is natural, a
temporary armistice for a fixed period will be con-
cluded." _ _

The four representatives at Vienna acceded, in
the names of Great Britain, France, Austria, and
Prussia, to the terms here mentioned, and this is
the stage at which the papers before us conclude.
Our intelligence of yesterday supplied the comple-
ment of the story. The conditions thus devised by
the representatives of Europe at Constantinople,
accepted by the Sublime Porte, endorsed by the
representatives of Europe at Vienna, and trans-
mitted to St. Petersburg with these recommenda-
tions, have been, rejected by the Czar. It is with
Europe, therefore, that the Czar is now at issue,
and of this contest we await the results.

The following are the despatches mentioned
above :

" No. 332.
" LORD COWLEY TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.
(Received Dec. 18.)
(Extract.)

" Paris, Dec. 16, 1853.
" Late yesterday afternoon M. Drouyn de Lhuys made
me acquainted with the outline of a proposition to be laid
before your lordship this morning by Count Walewski in
the name of the Imperial Government, which has for its
object to prevent the repetition of such sanguinary
scenes as that lately enacted at Sinope, and to make the
Russian Government understand that France and England
are determined to hold possession of the Black Sea as an
equivalent for the Russian occupation of the Danubian
Provinces. This afternoon his Excellency read to me the
despatch on this subject, addressed to Count Walewski
for communication to your lordship. Whatever her Ma-
jesty's Government may think of the proposition itself,
they will do justice to the clearness and precision with
which M. Di ouyn de Lhuys has placed it before them.
" Supposing, then, your lordship to be in possession of
this document, I abstain from offering any analysis of its
contents, and propose confining myself to a statement of
the arguments put forward by M. Drouyn de Lhuys in a
lengthened conversation in support of the plan of action
which he recommends.

"He first examined the abstract right of France and
England to interfere in the summary manner which he pro-
posed. He argued that, it being both their interest and
their duty to protect the Turkish territory from all aggres-
sive attacks on the part of Russia, motives of humanity
should impel them to prevent the repetition of such a car-
nage as must have accompanied the destruction of the
Turkish flotilla at Sinope. They had not, unfortunately,
the means (he observed) of enforcing a suspension of hos-
tilities either upon the Danube or in Asia Minor ; but they
could enforce it in the Black Sea, and the interests of
peace and humanity not only gave them the right, but en-
joined them so to do. If th two Governments had not
sent their fleets into the Black Sea at an earlier period, it
was because they confided iu the voluntary assurances of
Russia not to prosecute the war by offensive operations ;
and they were unwilling to meet so laudable a declaration
by any act of theirs which could imply distrust, or which
might give the Russian Government an excuse for taking I
a less conciliatory course. Now, however, that Russia had
thrown off the mask, he saw no certain means of controll-
ing her action in the Black Sea but by sweeping that sea
of the Russian flag.
" But there were other considerations of hardly less im-
portance, which M. Drouy-n de Lhnys said must be taken
into account in the consideration of his proposition. He
alluded to the material, moral, and commercial conse-
quences by which it must be followed, should the short-
sightedness of Russia give any permanence to its exe-
cution.
"1. As to the material effect which would be produced.
Besides the forced suspension of hostilities between Tur-
key and Russia within the limits of the Black Sea, the
latter would find it very difficult, if not impossible, to ad-
vance from the Principalities on Constantinople, unless
she had her sea communications with Odessa and Sebasto-
pol assured ; she would be equally unable to transport re-
inforcements, arms, ammunition, or provisions for the use
of the troops engaged on the Asiatic coast. On the other
hand, the various resources of water communication would
remain open to the Turks.
"2. As to the moral effect. At this moment the Rus-
sian flag of war was paramount in the Black Sea. In fact,
that sea was little better than a Russian lake. The races
which inhabited its shores believed, probably, that there
was no navy which could compete with that of Russia, or
dispute her maritime preponderance. They would now be
taught that there were other nations with superior naval
means at their disposal, ready to exert them for the pro-
tection of the oppressed. They would be encouraged to
rise against their hereditary enemies, and thus rendr the
position of the latter far more perilous,
"3. With respect to commercial effects. Vessels from
the combined fleets would visit every nook and corner of
the Black Sea, would sound its coasts and examine its
harbours and roadsteads. A more intimate knowledge
would thus be gained of the races which people its shores ;
of their wants, of their means, and of the productions of
the countries which they inhabit. Foundations might
thus be laid for commercial intercourse of great future
value.

" I have thought it my duty to caution M. Drouyn de
Lhuys against placing the occupation of the Danubian
Provinces by Russia, and the presence of the combined
fleets in the Black Sea, on the same footing of irregularity.
To do so would be to allow that the Euxine was a mare
elausum, and would be a dangerous admission to make.
True, our late treaties with the Porte effectually shut the
Black Sea to our ships of war in time of peace ; but the
exclusion was the effect and not the stipulation of a treaty;
and it behoved us, in any negotiation on this matter, to
keep this distinction in view.
" M. Drouyn do Lhnys agreed in this remark.
" It only remains for me to state that I have had an
opportunity of speaking to the Emperor on the subject of
this proposition, and that his Majesty partakes entirely
the sentiments of his Minister. He desired me to recom-
mend it in the strongest terms to the favourable conside-
ration of her Majesty's Government as a measure incum-
bent upon himself and them to take, avowing the disap-
pointment which he should feel if a difference of opinion
prevented its adoption."

" No. 333.

" M. DROUYN DE LEMYSTO COUNT WALEWSKI.-(COM-
NUNICIATED TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON BY COUNT
WALEWSKI, DEC. 17.)

(Translation.)
" Paris, Dec. 15, 1853.
" M. le Comte,—The despatch which I have had the
honour to write to you under No. 159 has made known to
you the first impression of the Emperor's Government in
regard to the destruction of the Ottoman flotilla in the
roads of Sinope, and I entertain no doubt that it was
fully shared in by her Britannic Majesty's Government. I
perceive by Lord Stratford's telegraphic despatch, which
you,
Lord Clarendon has had the goodness to communicate
that our representatives at Constantinople havein-
stantly understood the necessity for a demonstration o_ n the
part of our naval forces in the Black Sea, and I am pleased
to think that on the return of the ;team vessels sent
to reconnoitre at Bourgas, and at Sinope itself, they
will not have hesitated to send out of the Bosphorus the
greater portion of the two squadrons. The operation which
they proposed to support, and which is that of which Lord
Clarendon and myself had equally the idea, will be a first
indication of the inspection which it is become necessary
to enforce on a coast where we had not supposed that an
aggression could so quickly take place.
" In fact, our last information from St. Petersburgh still
represented Russia as disposed to treat,
and as determined
above all, to assume the offensive in no quarter. Tin 7
prenes
fidence explained why our fleets did not move. It a 8 con-
atzli
to us that the presence of our flag in the Waters of
protect that
tinople demonstrated our firm intention to
capital against a sudden danger, and we ect
were unwilling
that our premature appearance in quarters more in the
vicinity of the Russian territory should run the risk of
being taken for a provocation. The state of
war
rendered a collision possible by sea as well by la,ll da oi lbtl es
between,s
the belligerent parties, but we had be
in-
fer from the repeated declarations of been authorised to
serve would be imitated by he
misunder-
standing the real object of our Russia that our re-
r, and that, not
avoid, with the same care she would
demonstration,
collision, by as ourselves, the occasions of
abstaining from proceeding to aggressive
measures within the limits in which if we could. have sup-
posed her to be influenced by different intentions, our
action would have naturally taken effect concurrently with
her own.

" In a word, M. to Comte, we admitted, without, how-
ever, stating it, that the Sebastopol fleet should protect the
Asiatic coast of the Russian empire, keep the approach to
it clear, and provision the garrisons, and in none of those
circumstances would we have had to interfere with its
movements. To do so would have beer. to attack Russia ;
and we had passed the Dardanelles only to defend Turkey.
" The expedition directed against Sinope has conse-
quently surpassed our anticipations ; that fact modifies, in
the same degree, the attitude which we should have wished
to have been able to maintain until the end.
" Instead of availing herself of the sea, which we left
free to her, for the purpose of her own defence, Russia,
abusing as it were, her position, has availed herself of it in
order to attack our ally in his ports, and, not satisfied