The Sun.
London, England, 1854-08-24 00:00:00

POLICY OF SWEDEN.

According to letters-from Stockholm, the cap-
ture of Bomarsund is likely to remove all further
hesitation on the part of the Swedish Government,
who may now be expected to join the Western
Powers. It is believed that nothing but the fear
of an unsuccessful result in the present contest has
hitherto prevented that Cabinet from uniting with
the Allied Po ers in resisting the aggressions of
Russia. The Government possesses a reserve fund
of 4,003,000 dols. for extraordinary expenses,
which will prove exceedingly useful in case of war
being declared.
it will be seen from a telegraphic despatch in
another p!ace that immediately after the sur-
render of Bomarsund General Baraguay d'Hilliers
and Mr. Grey, Secretary of the English Legation,
started for Stockholm, it is supposed with a view
of inducing j
the Swedish Government to join the
Western Powers.

CONDUCT OF PRUSSIA.
Constant complaints are made says a Berlin
letter of the 21st August, that this Government
has been and still is undecided as to the policy
intended to be pursue' d in regard to the Oriental
question. This accusation is unfounded. The
Prussian Cabinet never professed to go further than
it has done. It clung to principles, and constantly
eschewed facts. It adhered to the letter of pro-
tocols and conventions, and repudiated all liabi-
lities arising from the spirit of these documents.
It professed to limit its co-operation with the West
to mediation for peace,
and studiously avoided giv-
ing its assent to any measures calculated to in-
volve it in a rupture with Russia, unless in such
extreme cases as the probable incorporation of the
principalities, or the impossible passage of the
Balkan.
Throughout the long and complicated negotia-
tions, the Berlin Cabinet has had but one object
in view, and that is to avoid collision with Rus-
sia. No secret has been made of this object, either
at • London, Paris, or Vienna. Count Groeben's
mission to England, and Chevalier Bunsen's with-
drawal, were based upon this principle ; so was the
mission of the Prince of Hohenzollern to France ;
whilst it was universally known at the time, and
proved subsequently, that the main purport of
Count Alvensleben being sent to Vienna, was
to pour oil upon and not to excite the troubled
waters. As a further proof of its intense and
paramount desire for peace, the Prussian Ca-
binet earnestly recommended the acceptance of
the Russian reply, as a fair and favourable vehicle
for negotiation, and showed no irritation when its
recommendation proved of no avail. In the same
spirit of conciliation and asserted impartiality, it

has now recommended the Western conditions to
the Emperor's acceptance, although, all " advan-
tageous and desirable" as they may be for Prussia
and. Germany, it considers them to be as much be-
yond as the Russian reply was below the require-
ments of the situation. Such at least is the asser-
tion of the official organ—an assertion singularly
illogical, but not inconsistent with the passive prin-
ciples upon which Prussia has constantly acted.
The Prussian Government, or, at all events, the
party which is said to influence the Government,
has not concealed its sympathies for Russia, or its
utter disinclination to give the slightest umbrage
to the Czar. It has never led the British or French
Governments to suppose that more could or would
be obtained than has been conceded. It has met
the active exertions of the two Western envoys
with the most baffling vis inertice. It has likewise
shown, up tothe very last moment, as will be proved
when its last note of the 12th sees the light, that it
only went hand in hand with Austria in so far as
their united efforts were directed to safeguard both
from war with their old Northern ally.