The Sun.
London, England, 1854-04-11 00:00:00

THE GERMAN POWERS.

It appears that although the Prussian Govern-
ment has striven to exclude from the military
convention just signed between Austria and Prus-
sia every stipulation which might bring it under
an engagement to appear in arms against Russia,
the convention contains provisions to which the
force of circumstances may very soon give the cha-
racter of obligations to fight against the common

enemy.
The Austrian Government announces in the
Oest Correspondenz that the Four Powers find it
necessary to declare that the state of war which
has arisen between two of them, France and Eng-
land, and Russia, has not changed the unalterable
agreement between those Powers, the object of
that agreement being the integral preservation of
the Turkish empire, the evacuation of its Danu-
bian provinces, and the amelioration of the Chris-
tian population.
The Russian party at the Court of Vienna are
extremely active in their efforts to prevent the
Austrian Government from taking part against
their patron. They contend that the part to be
taken by Austria ought to be an inactive one ; that
she ought to assume a position such as would make
her an impassable barrier between the Danube
and the Rhine, and a watchful observer of passing
events, so as to become the arbitrator of Europe
at the proper moment. They do not fail to raise
doubts as to the intentions of England. England,
they say, after having destroyed the navy of Rus-
sia, will not be long in finding a pretext to destroy
the navy of Austria. The war, according to them,
was got up, not by the aggressions of the Czar upon
Turkey, but by England, who hopes, by means of
this war, to ensure to herself the sovereignty of the
seas and the monopoly of the commerce of the world.
These are the ideas put forth at Vienna, andfostered
by the Russian party. According to accounts they
have made a deep impression on the Emperor of
Austria himself, and are repeated openly, not only
by him, but by the ministers and generals who are
his confidents. While the Austrian ministers and
the Sovereign himself entertain such views, it may
easily be conceived that, it would not be prudent to
place too much confidence in the assistance from
that quarter. The autograph letter from the Em-
peror Francis Joseph to the Emperor of the French
has never deluded the French Government. It was
all along felt to be evasive. It appears that the
preparations making by Austria are of the most
formidable description. All the different divisions
of the army have been successively reinforced. The
operation is still going on, and in a few months
Austria Swill be in possessions of an army which
will make her most formidable, and, as long as she
continues in her present vacillating policy, a cause
of serious uneasiness to the Western Posers.
A letter from Widdin after giving details of the
successful attack of the Turks upon the Russians
in their attempt to cross the Danube at Turtukai
says—" The Russians are plainly making a serious
attempt to cross the Danube. Now, what can
embolden them to take this dangerous step ? If
France and England are really and heartily aided
by the concurrence of Austria and the consent of
Prussia—i.e., if Europe is really arrayed against
the Czar, it would be madness and folly combined
for Caasar to go over the Rubicon, for then the die
is cast, for if Austria had sincerely joined the West-
ern Alliance, the Russian general would be com-
pelled to look about and see how he could run
away from Wallachia towards home, instead of
going over the Danube and getting further away
from home. The only possibility of safety for
him, in the midst of a hostile population in a
country not his own, with the enemy surrounding
him from Galatz to Kalafat, on the east, south,
and west, and the Austrian on the north, would
be to hasten for the narrow passage between Mol-
davia and Wallachia before this also be closed, and
the Russians effectually shut in on every side.
But granting the treachery of Austria, and sup-
posing a secret treaty to exist between her and.
Russia, and the thing is perfectly clear, this ex-
plains everything—e. g., Ist. We know then why
the Czar appears so blindly resolved for an impos-
sible war against all Europe ; 2ndly. We under-
stand why Austria has begun to vacillate, after
giving the English Ministers occasion to declare
her upon their side ; 3rdly. Now we comprehend
the otherwise unaccountable fact that Austria, in-
stead of entering Wallachia against the Russians,
or Bulgaria to assist the Turks, or Servia, where
the people, however falsely, are yet Said to be in a
'state of great excitement, or even instead of
remaining neutral at home, finds it necessary
to enter peaceful Bosnia—and for what reason ?
The whole thing cannot be explained without
supposing that Austria has a secret treaty
with Russia. Now I hazard nothing in saying
that in less than three months Austria will be
hand and glove with Russia. She will abandon
for the moment her Italian provinces to France
and Piedmont, and expect to recover them when
peace is made, or take an equivalent in the East.
And Bonaparte said, Europe cannot prevent Aus-
tria and Russia united from taking Constanti-
nople. It is my firm persuasion'that Europe is
about to witness the greatest diplomatic lie of our
century. Never trust Austria for one moment !"
A communication from Belgrade, dated March
29, says :—" The matter of Austria's treachery
grows more and more evident. Certainly if she
goes for Russia, a revolution breaks out in Hun-
gary. It is organised, and all ready. This is
sure."

The Cologne Gdzette says it is assured that
Hanover and Brunswick have declared themselves
in a sense favourable to Prussia in the view that
she takes of the Eastern question.
We find in a Berlin letter, written evidently
on information denied from an authentic source,
some details of the proceedings in the com-
mittee of the Second Chamber of Prussia on the
bill for a loan, which will be read with interest,
for they throw a certain amount of light on the
policy of the Prussian cabinet as regards the
Eastern question. One of the first points dis-
cussed by the committee was the reported pro-
position at the end of• February from the
cabinet of Austria to that of Prussia for the
signature of the latter to a new protocol of the
conference. M. de Manteuffel refused to lay this
proposition before the committee, but read the
copy of a despatch which he had sent to the
Prussian minister at Vienna containing his rea-
sons for refusing to sign it. These reasons were
that as regarded the principle upon which the
Four Powers had acted in the conference no new
protocol was necessary, and that if it was intended
to enter into a convention for the means of execu-
tion, Prussia could not be a party to it without
stipulating for reservations, as she was resolved
to maintain her liberty of action. It was announced
to the committee that the Austrian cabinet had
abandoned its first proposition, and now proposed
a new form of protocol. It is probably this letter
which, according to the last accounts from Berlin,
has been signed by the Prussian ambassador at
Vienna. Of the precise nature of this protocol
we know nothing officially at present, but the
letters from Berlin concur in stating that it has
for its object to continue the moral co-operation
of the Four Powers in favour of the rights of

Turkey and the maintenance of the balance of
power .n Europe, without binding Austria and
Prussia to take part iu the hostilities of France

I

and England against Russia. Several of the mem,
bers of the committee having expressed themselves
as much dissatisfied with the language of the Pruirn
sian Cabinet in the despatch to the ambassador at
Vienna and said that they regarded the refusal to
sign the convention proposed by the other three
powers as indicative of a leaning to Russia, M. de
Manteuffel replied that in everything that had
been done by the Prussian Cabinet, there was proof
on the contrary that it disapproved of the conduct
of the Emperor of Russia, and far from encouraging
his pretensions was most anxious to convince him
that he had no reason to calculate on the support of
Prussia. What the Prussian Cabineedesired was to
reserve to itself full liberty of action, to maintain a.
policy of expectation and mediation, and not to bind
itself to either of the belligerent powers. If, he added,
the Western Powers or either of them should here,
after depart from the conduct which had been
hitherto observed by them, and which had met
with the approbation of Prussia, how could the
latter maintain her independence and impartiality,
if she became a party by convention to a policy of
action ? In support of this argument, M. Manteuf-
fel observed that in the possible, but certainly very
improbable, event of the Prussian provinces of the
Rhine being attacked by France, would it not then
be the duty of the Prussian Government to forget
the injustice and the aggressions of Russia on the
Eastern question ? The Prussian Cabinet had no
leaning to Russia, its sympathies were the other
way, as would also be its interests, so long as the
Western Powers should persevere in the prin-
ciples which in the conference of Vienna had the
full approbation of Prussia. The reservations of
which he spoke were, he declared, imposed by a.
right policy, and he had, besides, to remark to the
committee that 'up to the present time no power
has even asked for the active co-operation of Prussia.
This reasoning did not appear to convince the
majority of the Committee, but one of the mem-
bers, who is favourable to Russia, having expressed
an opinion that the Prussian Cabinet should de-
clare itself in favour of that power, M. de Man-
teuffel rejected the recommendation in terms of
such energy as to produce a strong effect in his
favour on the majority.
The speech of the Minister-President to the
Second Chamber, we learn from another source,
was nearly as follows :

"Gentlemen,—The Government of his Majesty has,
in consequence of the great political excitement in which
Europe is just now, and in consequence of the dangers
of war which threaten on various sides, approached this
House with the request to grant thorn a credit of which
they stood in need, to enable them, when occasion re-
'quires, to set the whole military power of the kingdom
in activity. When I brought forward this demand,
three weeks back, proof might possibly have been asked
for the existence of such dangers ; to-day, when every
newspaper brings evidence of the warlike commotion in
which the most powerful States of Europe are engaged,
no further proof is necessary, and the simple question
lies before you : will you, gentlemen, in the midst of '
these dangers, grant the Government the means of
meeting them with energy, or will you refuse them ?
You are competent to both decisions.
"To your committee I have given information as to
the progress of political events, and the attitude hitherto
observed by Prussia towards them, with all possible cir-
cumstantiality and candour. I did so with the full con-
viction that it might be done without injury to the
country, and because I would not withhold from you,
gentlemen, anything that might have an influence on 1"
your vote, and because it was a very welcome opportu-. f
nity for me to obviate erroneous representations and,
statements that were harassing the country, and place, ,
the policy of Prussia in the right light, as an independen
policy directed from the very commencement towards
peaceful settlement of the conflict.

- "I will not repeat what you have already before you, ,
printed in the report of the committee, but one fact I will
now add, which I could not communicate to the com• 1 •
miitee, because I did not know it myself—it is this, tha :
a fresh Protocol has been agreed to between the Repro- '
sentatives of the Four Powers in Vienna, one which at- ,
tests their community of action on the basis hitherto ob-
served, and that our Minister there received orders two
days back to sign the same.
"The Governmentdesires, from the very outset of this "r
important debate, to leave no doubt in what way it will
understand the meaning of your vote. The Government •
will look on a conditional or a deferred vote as a refusal
of the means required as important and necessary ; and
no less would the object of the vote demanded be defeated •
by conditions and assumptions, which would tie our
hands just at a moment when it is most essential that
we should keep them free. The Government cannot and
will not make a policy for the future, because it con-
siders such to be not to the advantage of the country.
"If you do not trust the Government that it
will
at the right time rightly employ the credit demanded ;
if you require undertakinga for the future ; if you
determine on having other guarantees than the past
and the present offer you—then, gentlemen, you have •
the right to answer ' s io' to the demand of the Govern- )•
ment. I need not tell you, however, what an influ-
ence 41
on the attitude of Prussia such a ' No' would
have in the present conjuncture of European events. If
it is otherwise with you, you will give us a hearty and
powerful 'Yes,' as a proof that, however opinions and
views may differ and diverge as to the questions of the
day, approaching danger always finds Prussia at
with herself." one

According to the Private (Lithograph) Corre- 2;
spondenee of Berlin, the real object of the mission
of the Duke George of Mecklenburg-Strelits to that
city was to prevent the conclusion of an alliance
between Austria and Prussia.

M.