The Sun.
London, England, 1854-09-30 00:00:00

TI

LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1854.

Another day has elapsed without bringing the
intelligence from the Crimea to which the public
has been looking forward with such intense
anxiety. IVe know that the Allied Forces had
landed safely, that all the munitions of war were
available for instant service, and that the troops
were actually marching against the enemy, and
that a serious collision was expected on the 20th.
It was also tolerably certain that a Russian corps
had taken up a position on the Alma river ; but
as they were less than half the number of the in-
vading army, consisting only of 25,000 men, and
as they expected to be reinforced by 15,000 ad-
ditional troops, it was scarcely probable that they
would hazard a decisive battle, or do more than
harass and impede the march of our forces until
the entrenchments on the heights above
Sebastopol were assailed, when the Fabian
policy would be no longer practicable.
The accounts from Vienna (which appeared in
our impression of yesterday) state that there had
been a contest on the 19th, in which the Russians
were driven back with much loss. This, as we
have stated, is not only possible, but even highly
probable. All such tidings, unless proceeding from
official sources, must, however, be received with
the greatest possible caution. We have had so
many examples of fraudulent intelligence, concocted
for the sole purpose of assisting the speculations of
interested parties, that it is impossible to yield
implicit credence, no matter how great the vraisem-
blance of any particular story. If such a contest
took place it could scarcely have been anything
more than a mere affair of outposts, between the
vanguard of the advancing army and a detachment
of the Russians. The troops, it appeared, were
not to commence their march on Sebastopol unti
the 19th, and it could scarcely be supposed that
nything very decisive would take place the same
day.

But it is not merely speculators who can furnish
fictitious accounts. The Russians have proved
themselves great adepts in concocting intelligence
to suit their own purposes. It has been stated
on high authority that tlllee sets of despatches
were prepared respecting every event. The first
for the OL 7roXXot, the ignorant Muscovite mass,
and for any strangers whom it was possible to
deceive ; the second for the Ministers and great
Officers of State ; and the third for the exclusive
perusal of the CZAR himself.

The first of these official documents was purely
imaginary. It was solely prepared for the
purpose of inducing the people to credit whatever
the AUTOCRAT wished them to believe. The
second was what the old story-tellers were accus-
tomed to denominate " founded on facts." There
were Some vestiges of truth, but with con-
siderable embellishments, some " grains of
wheat to a bushel or sack," or like FALSTAFF'S
6l bread bill" to his " sack account." The third,
however, was strictly accurate. The AUTOCRAT
" the truth, the whole truth, and no-
required
thing but the truth," and any tampering with
his credulity would subject the offenders to a coin-
pulsory trip to Siberia, or, no matter how high
his rank, to a very unpleasant application of the
knout. The duty then of Russian Commanders,
of all grades, is to practise the most unblushing
mendacity, to lie without shame or hesitation
whenever the interests of their master may require
them so to do. Truth in Russia is regarded as a
jewel of too great price to be bestowed on any of
less than Imperial rank.

In our impresssion of yesterday we gave in-
sertion to an account which appears to be a speci-
men of the first class of these despatches. It ras
to the following effect :

" VIENNA, SEPT. 29.
"A letter from Constantinople of the 19th announces
that a Russian courier had been captured, bearing
despatches, from which it appeared that 20,000 Russians
(2,000 ?) were prostrated by the cholera, and that the
whole force in the Crimea did not exceed 45,000 men."
Now, it may be asked, why should the authorities
in the Crimea desire to convey to the people what
could only be considered as very disastrous tidings,
calculated to dispirit rather than to encourage
hem. We do not believe that it was at all in-
tended for publication in Russia,
GQIICOctIt was solely
ikl with the object of deceiving the Allies