The Sun.
London, England, 1854-06-20 00:00:00

103 - 105

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154 - 16,
9A -10
11 - 13
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23 - 23;,
99 -101
15 -20

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92 - 95
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MINES
•
1 all Aqua Fria
1 all Anglo Austrin. Gold
[Os. all Anglo Californian I
10 2 Australasian
20 6 Australian
1 all Australian Cordillera *
1 all Australian Freehold * 1
1 all Ave Maria — --
1 all Baden (Gd. Duchy of) a
50 all Blaeuarvon Ir. & Coal 8 10
1 all aritish Austrin. Gold ...
20 13.5 British Iron
35 24i Brazilianlmp.(issued
at .£5 pm 3* 4* 34
30 all Do. Cocaes & Cuiada 2 2*
20 15 Do. St. John Del Roy 30 —32 30& 1
1 * Carson's Creek .. I d
1 4 Clarendon Con. din
Co. of Jamaica .•• •••
40 all Cobra Copper 44 46
5 1 Colonial Gold ri
... 15 Copiapo - 12
St. all Copper Min. of Eng. 50 —6O
25 all Do. Pref. 74 p. cent. 2 4 P
5 all Epglish and Austrin.
Copper Smeltg.Co. 1 -- 21
20 all General
2 all Great Nugget Vein —
2 all Do.. Registered
3 all Great Polgooth
1 all Liberty
3 all Linares
1 all Loncl.&Californ.Gold
Quartz Crush. Co.
1 all Nfariquita
10 9 Ifexican&S.Americn 6l 6a pi 3
1 all New Granada
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and Smelting Co
1 all Nouveau Monde ... .
20 all Pontgibaud Silver
Lead Min, & Smelt 16*
-- 17
5 1 Port Philip 1 --
1 all Quartz Rock
50 all Rhymney Iron ...... 32 --
15 15 Do. New ............... 9* —'lo*
30 I.oi Santiago do Cuba ... 4* 5 41
' 1 all F 4
outh Australian ... I
10 7 Tin Croft ............... 2
28i all United Mexican ...••• -41 31
1 all Waller I
1 all West Granada ••• „•••,
1 all West Mariposa
1 12s. Worthing Mining of
Australia .......•••••• •••
1 all Yuba g
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JOINT-sTOCI, BANIEB.
40 all Australasia ...... ; ..... 81. 83 81
40 all British Colonial Bank
and Loan CompOY
50 all British N. American 65 6 x a
25 5 Chartd. Bank of Asia 1 id
20 2 Chrtd. Bak. of India,
Australia, & China ...d •
100 25 Colonial ................
100 20 Commercial of Lon a. ••• 33 2i
20 12 P•uglish Scottish and
Au5tra1ian........... 3* 3 d 8i 9
20 20 Loud. Chart. Bk. 01
Australia ............. 211 —21 a
50 20 London and. County.. ~. • 32
50 10 London Joint Stock.. ...
100 20 Loud. & Westminster ..„ 39
100 35 National Provincial
of England ...........
20 10 Do. New .............. . .
50 22}, National of Ireland..
20 all New South Wales....
25 all Oriental Bank of
C0rp0rati0n.......... 4TA 484 47f
25 5 1)0. New ............
100 25 Provincial of Ireland
10 all Do. New ...............
5 1 Royal Australn•Bk.
:gold Imp .. C 0.....—,
25 all ionth Australia ..... . 43 45 451 5
25 all Union of Australia.. 70 72 70. 11
... 2 Do. New ............... 7
50 10 Union of London... . . • ... 27 64

LONDON AND 60UTII-EASTERN R AILWA
turn for the week ending June 17, 1£
Corresponding week last year '

their establishments except Anat.a, on the- eastern of
the Black Sea. The chain of forts which they had for 50
years been constructing, in order to afford themselves op-
portunities to evade that telritory and to -give them free
intercourse with their possessions south of Circassia, they
have destroyed. Can it be supposed possible that, after
we have encouraged the Circassians and supplied them
with arms, it should be intended again to restore that ter-
ritory to Russia, to place her in the-situation which she
before occupied ? (Cheers.) How unjust would such con-
duct be towards the Circassians—how unjust to our alliesl
I say dint each a course of proceeding --never Can by:posSi-s
,bility_be adopted. Allow me now to refec to' the general
question. If you place. Russia in the same situation with
respect to territory as that in which she -stood before the
war, whatever may be the events of the war, I ask why,
notwithstanding everything that has now been done, may
she not hereafter take the first opportunity that she may
think will serve her purpose-what security have you that
all this matter will not be again re-opened? (Hear,hear.)
From the earliest period, from the thee of Catherine down
to the present day. Turkey has been considered as the ulti-
mate prey of Russia; every war in which Turkey has been
engaged with Russia has ended in such a way that Russia
has advanced step by step towards the accomplishment of
;anti her purpose
been shown to us, we know that she considers Turkey as
a victim within her grasp, and that nothing will prevent
her from using every possible endeavour to seize the
spoil. But, my lords, let me ask you, if you were
to place Russia, whatever may be the events of war,
in the same situation as far as territory is concerned
that she occupied at its commencement, what will be
her actual position with respect to Turkey ? Ido not
wish upon a subject of this kind to rely on my own
authority, and I will, therefore, refer to an authority
which cannot be doubted, that of Count Nesselrode him-
self. Some time after the termination of the war which
was ended by that unfortunate treaty of Adrianople,
Count Nesselrode, by the direction of the Emperor of
Russia, wrote to the Grand Duke Constantine at Warsaw
to give an account of the result of that treaty, and of the
relative situation of Russia and TUrkey in consequence of
it, and I wish to refer to Count Nesselrode's language to
show in what position Turkey will stand in future if the
status quo ante bellum be adopted. He says, "we have
placed Turkey in such a situation that she must in future
be dependent upon our will, and do whatever we desire ;"
and he then goes into the question of the principalities.
"The pr;incipalities " he says, "are of no importance to us
to retain, -but will Only be a means of creating jealousies in
the other Powers. It would subject us to great expense
to maintain troops there; and we have given them up,
knowing, at the same time, that either in peace or in war
we shall dispose of them entirely at our discretion. We
have obtained," be says, "the key of the position, and the
Sultan must feet that if at any future period ne dares
again to brave us iahe result must be his entire and certain
ruin." This, then; is the position in which Turkey will
stand if Russia is to be allowed to retain the position she
held before the commeocement of the war. As I wish to
be perfectly accurate upon this subject, I will quote the
passage to which I hare referred. It is as follows :
"The Turkish monarekr is reduced to exist only under the
protection of Russia, and must comply in future with her
wishes. The possession of these principalities is of the less
importance to us, as, witho,ut maintaining troops there, which
would be attended with cons iderable expense, we shall dispose
of them at our pleasure, as well during peace as in time of
war. We shall hold the keys If a position from which it will
be easy to keep the Turkish a 'overnment in check, and the
Sultan will feel that.any attempt to brave us' again must end
in his certain ruin."

This would be the consequence of restoring Russia, what-
ever may be the events of the war, the position which
she occupied at the close of the treaty of Adrianople. But
I must further call your lordships' atten 'tion to what course
Russia is likely to pursue, to what policS she is likely to
adopt, in the event of her ending a favot !Table opportu-
nity, provided peaty is concluded upon t.11,95e conditions,
for the purpose of attaining that object whi...V.l she has long
essential
cherished, and which has been considered as
part of the policy of her empire, when she is lugan 0, condition
to pursue it without being embarrassed by Ear wean com-
binations against her. Here, again, Ido not a "i'3„h to act-
vance anything upon my own authority, and I wi..‘‘..`"°—as
your
I have done with respect to the other point—dire. 1-*
lordships' attention to the opinion of an unexceptic I.; able
witness on the subject—Prince Lieven. Prince Li e'en
was consulted previous to the commencement of the v"r,
that terminated by the treaty of Adrianople, as to wi
course should be pursued by the Emperor for the purpoh
of carrying into effect the designs he then contemplated,
and he expresses himself in these terms :
" We must be prudent, we must be cautious, we must con-
ceal our policy, we must be secret, we must collect double
Ili-mks, and when we have made our preparations without
tilotie, we must be prompt in action, and pour down upon
w
territories
of Turkey before any European force is able to
prevent us."
The words of Prince Lieven are—

" Our policy must be to maintain a reserved and prudent
attitude until the momeut arrives for Russia to vindicate her
rights, and for the rapid action which she will bo obliged to
adopt. The war ought to take Europe by surprise. Our
movements must be prompt, so that the other Powers should
find it impossible to be prepared for the blow tuat we are
about to strike."

Now, give me leave to call your lordships' attention to
another document of no inconsiderable interest connected
with this subject, and contemporaneous with that to which
I have referred. The history I am about to relate is shortly
this—The Emperor of Russia was dissatisfied with the
conduct of the other Powers of Europe with respect to
the course they pursued at the time of the great Greek in-
surrection. He therefore drew off from the alliance, and
said—l will act for myself, I will be secret and reserved as
to the course I shall pursue, but, before I take any mea-
sures, let me be cautious as to my situation ; and he di-
rected Count Nesselrode to write to the different ambas-
sadors at the European Courts to inquire what course they
would be likely to take if he invaded the principalities,
what course they would take individually, and what pro-
bability there was of any concert between them. The
answers returned Are of thtl must Curious
doeer:pliea. `F2+.
most curious is that of Count Pozzo di Borgo, who- an-
swers every question step by step, beginning with respect
to this country. The question is—what will England do ?
The answer is, England has recovered from her financial
and commercial crisis, she is in a condition to do to war,
and probably will oppose you. She will, if she does cp-
pose you, do you considerable mischief, great injury, but
injury not altogether irreparable ; with respect to military
operations she can do nothing, she cannot oppose the march
of your armies. Then he refers to France, and after
throwing some abuse upon the then Minister of that coun-
try, he thus answers the question of whatshe is capable of
doing. France, as to marine operations, would be of no
importance, because everything that could be done by her
naval force would be prevented by England ; and, with
respect to her military power—l beg your lordships to mark
the opinion he has expressed upon this subject—her geo-
graphical position prevents her from exercising it against
us ; nowhere will a field of battle be found in France, and
it is well known what their armies will have to expect if
they come in contact with ourselves. My lords, we shall
see what will be the result of that meeting with respect to
which Pozzo di Borgo, who I believe was a Corsican, ex-
pressed so confident an opinion—(cheers, and a laugh) ;
and perhaps the Emperor may see that England and
France have now raised a barrier against his ambition
greater than be ever expected to meet. I have stated the
opinions of Count Pozzo di Borgo with respect to the po
tion of England and France, and his conclusion is, that
even if they were to unite they could not by possibility
prevent the accomplishment of the object of Russia,. I
will now state what were his feelings with respect to
Prince Metternich and his policy, who was at that time
extremely anxious to form an alliance of the Four Powers
against Russian ambition, but was not successful in accom-
plishing that object. Count Pozzo di Borgo, after pouring
forth a torrent of invective against that most enlightened
statesman, sums up the condition of Austria in a very few
words. To every country, he says, war is a calamity, but to
Austria it is certain ruin. The result of these considerations
was that the Emperor might prosecute his design without any
fear of impediments, for none of the other powers, either
collectively or separately, would bo able to oppose any
effectual resistance to it. Such is the policy, and at the
same time crafty perfidy of Russia, always intent upon in-
creasing her power, sometimes by silent means, by false-
hood and trickery—sometimes by open violence, as in the
case to which I have re' rred. But I have not yet alluded
to Prussia. (A. laugh.) The policy of Russia is permanent :
it never changes ; and so, to a certain extent, is the policy
of Prussia also. The coalition between Russia and Prussia
is not recent, it is of long standing, and has been main-
tained with great diplomatic skill, and a great counteract-
ing power is necessary to overcome that coalition.
ect to I will
read what Count Pozio di Borgo says with resp
Prussia :
" Prussia being lessjealous, and consequently more impar-
tial, has constantly shown by her opinions that she has a just
idea of the nature and importance of the affairs of the East,
and, if the Court of Vieille' had shared her views and her
good intentions, there can be no doubt that the plan of the
Imperial Cabinet would have been accomplished."
I may say at this very moment, that if the Cabinet of
Vienna had shared " vthe lows and good intentions" of
Prussia some short time back, the object of Russia might
have been accomplished. Then, again, Count Nesselrode
expresses his opinion in these terms
Count Pozzo di Borgo transmits .to us the most positive
assurances, which leaves no doubt touching the favourable
dispositions on which Russia may reckon on the part of Prus-
Aia, whatever may be the ultimate course of events."
I have now stated the opinions which have been expressed
by Count Pozzo di Borgo and Count Nesselrode with regard
to the different powers of Europe, and as to what Russia had
to fear, either from their separate opposition or from their
general action, and I think that they afford us a satis-
factory lesson as to the caution we ought to exercise, and
as to the apprehensions we ought always to entertain of
the proceedings of the Court of Russia in endeavouring
to carry into effect its long cherished object of the !i,nnexaThe-
tion of the Turkish, empire to the empire of Russia.
same system has been constantly kept in view and con-
stantly acted upon : every pr
ecaution has
instances
taken for
the purpose of giving it effect in all the to which
I have referred, and in consequence of the prudent advice
and conduct of the Emperor he accomplished in a great
measure the object he had in view by the great advantages
he obtained on the termination of the last war by means of
the unfortunate treaty of Adrianople. Now, my lords,
there is another important point for our considerati
receive
on
We may say we are not to be sacrificed, we must
an effectual guarantee ; without such a guarantee we can-
not be safe, we cannot be certain that the integrity of Tur-
key will be held sacred ; but when that guarantee has been
obtained we need be under uo apprehensions of the conse-
quences. But I ask you, my lords, what that guarantee
is to be ? (Hear, hear.) We can have the guarantee: of
the Four Powers and that of Russia, but what will be the
consequences and the fleet of such a guarantee ? The
guarantee of the Four Powers, as long as they are united
and bold together, as long as no disputes take place be-
tween them upon other important' points, will be valid ;
but the moment this state of things comes to Ik. termina-
tion, the moment a quarrel takes pace between them with
regard to the other matters and other interests, this gua-
rantee will be perfectly useless. What assurance can you
have that a Power of this character will not infringe
any engagements, however positive into which she may
enter,? For my part, I look upon an engagement with
Russia on a subject of this kind as perfectly useless.
It would not be worth the paper on which it might be
written. (Cheers.)" Look at her whole couduct,
and then if any person can be credulous enough to trust in
any statement of Russia, or in any engagement into which
she may enter contrary to her own interests, all I can say
is, that I admire the extent of his faith. (Hear, and
.
laughter.) Let me recall, to your lordships' recollection
what took place at St. Petersburg with respect lies
ritla
Seymour, our intelligent, active, and able am
bass d
was sa
that Court. Sir H. Seymour heard that Russitps
were being c illected on the Turkish frontier
heis-
fied vyith his authority, and he mentioned the circumstance
tradieted the state-
to Count Nesselrode. The Count c,o,u
ment ; he said to Sir H. Seymour— Do not believe what
you bear; holier) only what you see—(a laugh)—all that

SI-'.4VEkt

r

• ...\
1 etale#E''r *
~zi
..e T....8*,.--''', ',l-Iz'
ei - rep we- 18 only a Clang eit? 15.- nce . Vcael
armies, which is usual at this seas'en ,' tir et& a'. ' • ;lll''
you you are mistaken." Sir H. se ,
too able a diplomatist to be thrown ' :le:. •-•• e ' ' - Alec.'
he wrote to the noble earl opposite ad le
Oee'act..- .r. e
..e-• , its.
declared the impossibility of reconciling a • e he.
.--ittirty_ .
,ipi.je
various quertees with Count Nesselrode's saurancite- - fie' 1- -
this the system, and are these the persons, on whose assn.
rances we are to depend ? (Cheers.) I remember hearing
an eloquent speech from a noble lord on the oross-benches
as to the-necessity of placing confidence in- a person with
whom we might be negotiating ; but the speech, ethmgle,
eloquent., was not convincing. As far as relates to the
transactions of private life, confidence may probably be
founded upon character ; but when great interests are do-
pending; —and when we employ agents to protect those
interests, give me leave to say that caution, jealousy,
and foresight are the qualities which should cha-
racterize our negotiations. (Cheers.) lam of the same
mind as Charles Fox was when he said he preferred the
old Parliamentary word "jealousy," to the modern one,
" confidence." (Cheers and laughter.) When the inte-
rest of millions are at stake—when the liberties of man-
kind are in issue—away with confidence. (Cheers.) Con-
fidence generally ends in credulity. (Loud cheers.) This
is true of statesman as of individuals. (Hear, hear.) My
lords, the history of Russia from the establishment of the
empire down to the present moment is a history of fraud?
duplicity, trickery, artifice, and violence. The present/
Emperor has proclaimed himself protector of the Greek
Church in Turkey, just as the Empress Catherine declared
herself protector of the Greek Church in Poland. By weans
of that protectorate she fomented dissensions and stirred
up political strife in the country. She then march,ed
into Poland under the pretence of allaying tumults, sink
stripped the kingdom of some of its fairest provinces. We
know the ultimate result • it is too familiar to require more
particular reference. Look at another instance of Russian
policy of more recent occurrence. Russia agreed to a
treaty with Turkey by which she recognised the indepen-
dence of the Crimea. Nevertheless, she stirred up insur-
rection in that country under the old pretence of protect-
ing one party against another, and when the opportunity
offered, she sent Suwaroff, one of her-most barbarowege-
nerals into the Crimea, who murdered the inhabitants and
despoiled them of their territory, while a line of Russian
ships invested the coast and cut off all communication witle
Constantinople. At the very moment when this was being
done Russia was not `only at peace with Turkey, but was
a, -
actually negotiating treat e of commerce with her.
(Lend cries of " kit ear.")- ee- Rl:Liaisn Government is
marked by all the chanscteristios of Asiatic barbarism. St.
Petersburg is merely
a
was going to Egypt second Tanner. When Napoleon
he took -possession of Malta and an-
nether small rock in the Mediterranean, which cans"
Pitt to say that there was nothing too vast for the aim of
his ambition. nothing too small for the grasp of his repa.
city. The remark is as applicable to Russia 29 it was to
Napoleon. Russia has doubled her European territories
within the last 50 years, and yet she is bent on possessing
herself of Shiva. The loss of two armies does not deter
her from prosecuting this purpose, although the place can-
not be of the elightest.value to her except as affording her
the means of annoying ne in respect to our Eastern pos-
sessions. In this way does Russia go on for ever, Take
the most recent instance. While -Nicholas was pretend-
ing to act the part of protector _of Turkey, and try-
ing to cajole the Sultan with 'professions .of. friend-
ship and esteem, he was at the Names time planning _
the partition of his-empire. (Hear, hear.) =This is the
Emperor with whom you ore now dealing, and on
whose statements and representations we are to rely I
(Cheers.) When Prince Mensciiikoff was despatched to
Constantinople Count Nesselrode assured eur Government
that his mission was connected wi.th nothing but the dis-
pute between the Greek and Latin churches; but after he
had been a short time in Turkey the prince opened nego-
tiations with the Turkish Government---which ho threat-
ened with vengeance if it should venture to oppose his
views—having for their object the placing of Nicholas in
a position in which he would share the government of the
country with the Sultan. Your lordships, too, may mole
.ect hearing at that time that Prince lienscleikoff had sent
a military officer to Athens. It has now tuee-ted out that
that statement was correct, and there is littie reason to
doubt that the Greek insurrection was the result of the
mission. These circumstances should pit us on our guard.
against placing the slightest reliance on any entitlements
into which Russia may enter. We must have gun,-antees
for the fulfilment of her undertakings. Ido not Ul Ca n per-
sonal guarantees—they aro worthless. Russia has coilled a
new phrase of which we may avail ourselves—" mr‘te‘rial
guarantees." (Cheers and laughter.) Russia must give us
what, she calls material guarantees ; and if we hold in pl .1(10)
i` or mortgage something valuable which she would not I'dt°
1/4, lose, we may hope to bind, her to her word ' • but as for
m' 'oral guarantees—as for a pledge of good faith and honorer
6 12ch things, coming from Russia, aro to my mind of no'
value— whatever. But then my noble-friend opposite may
. What course would you pursue ? What is your
say,— My reply is, that that would depend a good deal
on olitchye .
e 1
vents of the war. (Hear, hear.) This, however,
P
I eneesie, ~tingly declare, that in no event, except that of
extreme ne,
• -essay' ought we to make peace without pre-
viously d,„,'-x-oying the Russian fleet is the Black Sea, and.
I,,ying prosti .5 to the fortifications by which it is defended.
(Great cheeriees."-) If we leave Russia that fleet and those
defences, we I twve her in a position that she will be sure
to coerce Turk( ,1, because in that case Turkey must—to
use the words I have already quoted—be submissive to her
will. I know no, 41 what course Austria intends to pursue,
but I think I may venture to state that, in this matter, she
has far more at attests than either England or France.
Should Russia hold permanent possession of the Principe.
lities, the whole southern frontier, and, indeed, the inde.
pendence of Austria
would be threatened. If this mon-
strous—l know not wllust to call it—this leviathan Power,
which stretches forth itt' terms sn many thousand miles from
west to east, and presses ten the northern and eastern fron-
tiers of Austria, should els o succeed in establishing itself
on her southern frontier, .a.ustria must be crushed. (Hear.)
What course Russia will: take if she should succeed In
obtaining possession of the provinces of Turkey in Europe
it is not for me to predict. That she will not stand still—
that she will not remain eta tionary, is certain. She ktiows
—to use the emphatic langua, ee of the Emperor—that slue
Leaeasee, eeiesee eeese—rieee perr colosealenntirAr w;detswe_
and know that her vast armie nly await the signal for
pouring like a deluge over the ;_ states and kingdoms of the
world. My lords, I feel strong ly on this subject, and I
believe that if this barbarous n 'ktion—this enemy of all
progress except that which tends 1.`4) strengthen and conso-
lidate, its own power—which punish education as a crime
—should once succeed in establishing itself in the heart of
Europe, it would be the greatest calam i.ty that could befal
the human race. (Sustained cheering.)
The Earl of CLARENDON —Before rtii.4ying to the ob.
servations of my noble friend, I hope he ee ill permit me,
with all due deference, to remark upon there omewhat in's'
gular, and therefore inconvenient, course whiol't he hastaken
upon the present occasion. My noble friend . has made a
long, able, and most interesting speech—ehear, 1, tear)—with
the view of directing your lordshipse attention to a dome
went which is not before you, of which you can have no
cognisance, and which has not been cornmnnicatet 1 to the
Government, for this reason, namely, that Powers do not
make known to foreign Governments communications which
pass between them relative to their own affairs. Youe lord-
ships may or may not, as my noble friend supposes, . have
seen this document when it was published some mot iths
ago ; but I contend that you are not in a position to p ass
judgment on a paper, the contents of which, I believe, me, st
of you have heard to-night for the first time. If the s
proceeding should be drawn into a precedent for making, •
the communications between foreign Governments the sub.
ject of discussion in this house, I fear we should be exposed!
to the inconvenience of arriving at decisions upon incon-
sistent and erroneous data, and expose ourselves to remon-
strances from foreign Governments on account of the con-
clusions at which we may arrive. The document to which
my noble friend has referred contains merely a recapitula-
tion of transactions in which the font powers—England,
France, Austria, and Prussia—were concerned, and it
states, as my noble friend observed, that the four powers
were unanimously agreed upon the maintenance of the
integrity of Turkey and the independence of the' Sultan as
essential to the equilibrium' of Europe. This document
was transmitted by Austria and Prussia to the members
of the Germanic Confederation, who had felt aggrieved at
having been excluded from the negotiations relative to these
transactions, which materially concerned the interests of
Europe. This was a matter with which her Majesty's
Government had nothing to do, and no doubt the Cabinets
of Berlin and Vienna had sufficient reasons for not de-
viating on this occasion from the mode of proceeding
usually observed in similar cases. These Powers, fore-
seeing that the aggressive policy of Russia might Tea•
der war inevitable, concluded with each other an offen-
sive and defensive treaty, and then arose the necessity
of communicating it, not only for the purpose of seciiring
the union of Germany against a common enemy, and a corae
mon danger, but also for securing the support of the large
armed force which the Confederation was always willing to
employ in aid of German interests. Under these circum•
stances, it was not only natural but indispensable that the
declaration made by Austria and Prussia should have re•
ference to German interests alone, and, therefore, the Cale.
nets.of Berlin and Vienna informed the Confederation that
the continued military occupation of the Lower Danube
was inconsistent with the material, and even with the poll.*
tical interests of Germany,
them to oppose a state of things which must pro lto
and appealed with confidence to
them.. The allusion to the status quo, though somewhat
rusts on the Lower Danube. The occupation of the Lower
ambiguously expressed, has reference solely. to German inte-
res
Danube by Russia had already greatly obstructed the free-
dom of commerce and the navigation of the Danube. That
I have attributed the cerrect meaning to the declaration is
evident from the paragraph which states that a vast field is
opened for Gorman industry in the East, and that it is
essential that the great outlet by the mouth of the Danube
should not bo obstructed. The object of the declaration is
to announce that the contracting Powers would not consent
to territorial changes in any of the great States of Europe
which would injuriously affect German interests, That is
not an unnatural declaration to proceed from two great
German Powers to the minor Powers whom they invited to
co-operate with them for a common object. Theft is no-
thing in the, document to alter the assurance which we have
received from Austria. After the philippic which any noble
aoinisat the word 'ion' coofeimfidvencocen,anare
friendalm ost hasafraid pronouncedt
oveauagainst the wor 'c6lsfidenoe,"l
almost afraid to ventur eg
in Austria. But I think lam justified in sa -•
should look at Austria as independent Power,
ying •
carrying
out her own poli having some internal dangers W appre-
hend and many German tend with, and
difficulties to coo ' • net
that, under these circumstances,fall ' that we
allowance is itihe
made for. her difficult position. 130. u'L 'lrdsiidasas ft I
alliance of Austria is of great importance . "VisS see apn-
ea the inland operations of the army "in
some past ptoceedines,
not be out of place if I Overt to
corned, I consider them to be essential us, I think it mi y
and state to your lordships which Austria h:11
my confidence in the the facts upon which I foiled.
of following my nobes and
cal and more useful than that
f R ' • th
made to us. Such 3 course
_swill', I think, bo more practi•
learned friend
1 eed of
Say 13 such as). Must DeCl33.
character of which
which,
in my positien, and speakiug
in bins history o ussian aegression, a
sarily
ter degree of respe 1
1 sibilitty than my noble and
under a grea 0 •
but ,
at should abstain from
learned frienc ,
and confine myself to matter-s which
commentiug upon,
ctically useful and more interesting to
cond. emiu'e thtnk it better that
ra
may be more p
(Heiar.) 1 will, therefore, proceed to state
are the grown s upon which I feel confidence in the
whatof Austria.My lords, about three months ago
assurance
your lordships.
state in this house my belief that Austria
I ventured to
could not remain neutral in this great contest, and that for
the very reason stated by the noble and learned lord opposite,
name y, that .her inter sts more than any other power were
concerned in the issue of the war, and that the menace that
was held out was greater against her than against any
other. Power. Nay, I will now go further, and says
that if the German Powers—Austria more especially--
bad stood alone, they would have been compelled by ever/
consideration of policy lend self-interest to protect Turkey
against the aggression of Russia. Because, if Russia
remained in possession of the principnlities ; and, in spite
of resistance on the part of Turkey, advanced to Constanti-
nople itself, if her fleet retained the entire command of the
Rini; seas and she closed the mouths of the Danube, the