The Sun.
London, England, 1854-11-28 00:00:00

DESPATCH ADDRESSED TO COUNT

ESTERHAZY, AT BERLIN, DATED Nov. 9, 1854.
"The Cabinet of Berlin replied to cur communication
of the 23d of last month by a despatch, communicated
to us by M. d'Arnim, of which a copy is subjoined. The
communication of the 23d expressed the sincere desire of
Austria t., obtain for herself and the German confede-
rates guarantees which a union desired, in will as in
action of Austria and Prussia, can alone assure to all
Germany. It is in that spirit that we have examined
with the most scrupulous attention the note of Baron de
Manteuflel.

" We are glad to see that the elements of accordance
and entente contained in the preceding declarations of
the Prussian Cabinet have a more clear and pronounced
form. Like ourselves, Prussia shows herself inclined to
confine to the past the divergencies of opinion which had
for too long a time compromised the value and effect of
the treaty of the 20th April, and. to take resolutions
which actual circumstances may claim of it, in conse-
quence of its participation in the alliance (offensive and
defensive) of the 20th April.
"It is in consideration of that disposition of Prussia
that we recommended in the instructions to Baron
Prekesch, and communicated in substance to the Ca-
binet of Berlin, to avoid as much as possible sterile dis-
cussions on the point of the obligations already con-
tracted in virtue of the treaty of the 20th April. But at
the same time we proposed, in three points, the project
of a federal decision, as it seemed to us, necessitated in
an urgent manner by the common interests a Germany
in the actual state of affairs. It is, therefore, with very
great satisfaction that we head, ii the prepositions
made Aiy.thscabinet of kg: te its above-cited
=eolumumeXMonot,'"nialt 'the three p in question are
reproduced in their essential dispositions.
" We are happy to see in this accordance an assurance
of the direction towards the same end of the efforts by
which the two German Powers apply themselves to obtain
the solution of the serious complications of the moment.
But the more value we attach to our accord with Prussia,
the more do we hope that the Prussian Cabinet will not
insist upon conditions and restrictions of pure form which
would very probably diminish the chance of the speedy
establishment of peace, and might even, in the course of
events, compromise the most important interests of
Austria and Germany.
" We have not the slightest desire to enter into dis-
cussions of pure form when the situation is so serious.
We therefore think it of very little consequence to ex-
amine whether it is better to select, for the dispositions
to be taken, the more simple form of a federal decision,
or that Austria and Prussia should first come to an agree-
ment (s'entendent d'abord) between themselves on the
dispositions to be taken, and then submit them to the
Diet ; although the adoption of this last form does not
appear necessary, since the treaty of April, in conse-
quence of the accession of the Confederation, has taken
a greater extension, and has become, as regards its exe-
cution and a new eventual extension, the object of the
decisions which the Diet may take conformable to the
federal constitution.

" But, on the other hand, imperious considerations
prevent us from accepting, under any form whatsoever,
contractual engagements binding (obligatoires) in the
sense of the additional dispositions possessed by Prussia.
" According to the Prussian project, we ought to en-
gage ourselves by a formal convention to address, con-
jointly with the great contracting parties, a new invita-
tion to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to accept the bases
of peace, and it should only be the result of such a step
which should decide whether G-ernsany should bind her-
self or not (s'obligerait ou non) to defend our position in
the principalities, and whether she would leave us or not
full liberty of action towards Russia.
"Neither the condition upon which it is wished to
make depend (dont on ?mut faire dependre) the promise
of a common defence, nor the restrictions which there
may be 'an intention to put upon our eventual resolu
tions, appear to us sufficiently justified.
" Why should the assistance of the Confederation
only be assured in the case Russia should once again reject
the bases of peace t Supposing Russia accepts them,
but that the Western Powers refuse to enter into ne-
gotiations, and that the war continues, would it not
be still our task (tacks) to maintain ourselves in the
principalities ? And for what reason should we not,
in that case, count upon the assistance of Germany ?
"To make at once the concurrence of parties to the
alliance depend upon future events and the declaration of
Russia and the interpretation given to them by the
allies, would be to deprive beforehand the steps that
might be taken at St. Petersburg of a portion of their
weight. Opinion is already so much divided on the right
and obligations which result front the treaty of April,
that it is to be feared that Russia has it in her power to
create new controversies, with the assistance of vague
declarations, or of such susceptible of different inter-
pretations. We should therefor' have -just motives
in net formally engaging ourselves to take steps of this
description in common, at least as long as all the Ger-
man governments do not make with us one powerful
body, capable of accepting all the ulterior consequences
of such steps.
"As the Prussian Cabinet justly observes, the con-
duct of Russia will doubtless exercise a very great in-
fluence on the measure in which we may claim the assis-
tance of our allies. Russia may adopt pacific resolu-
tions, and give guarantees against any attack on her
part; she may thus take away (aeigner de nous) the
danger with which we are menaced by her present atti-
tude. But she will have the more motives for doing so,
the more intimate is the alliance of Germany. It is
precisely in this respect that it appears necessary to us
to extend the common assistance of Germany to our
position in the principalities, without making it depend
upon the acceptance or refusal of the basis of peace by
Russia.

" Practically the want of these restrictions appears the
less to exist, as according to our propositions the Diet
will retain the right of pronouncing itself according to
circumstances upon the degree oedanger that would
menace us, and upon the case in which military aid
should be given.

" However, although Russia, by the manner in which
she refused to examine the propositions of peace made to
ou
r
own has put us in the impossibility of returning, in
own interests, to the propositions she declined so cate-
gorically, it is nevertheless by no means in the intentions
of his Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph to exclude
all circumstances under which such a step might be
taken with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, in concert
with Prussia and the Germanic Confederation. The
exigencies of our position might ever oblige us to it. His
Majesty the Emperor hopes that the Russian Cabinet
will not misconstrue the motives which made him advise
the free acceptance, but without conditions, of the four
guarantees demanded. His Majesty accompanies with
his best wishes the confidential steps whioh the Court
of Berlin, as it results from Baron Matiteuffel's despatch,
recently adopted, in this sense, with the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg. If these counsels are not attended with
success, an invitation, addressed in the name of the
Confederation, to make Russia accept the bases of peace,
would certainly not be kora de prolvs• But as regards
Austria, she could not resolve to take a step of such a
nature except under certain reserves, as, under existing
circumstances, such a step would have a very grave cha-
racter. The eventualities which are necessaraily attached
to such a step, the situation created by the definitive
non-acceptance of the preliminaries of the peace, the case
is which the offensive would be inevitable, are so many
subjects but little Suited to be brought before the Diet
without a preliminary confidential deliberation between
the Governments of the German States ; and the
Prussian Cabinet will agree, doubtless, that the ques-
tion of so decided an invitation addressed to the
Cabinet of St. Petersburg ought to be treated en
dchors of the resolutions which are to be shortly
before the Diet. We ought, therefore, to desire
that, in the federal resolutions which are to
be adopted, neither the eonsequences of the possible ac-
ceptance of the preliminary bases nor of the refusal of
those bases should be the objectef obligatory dispositions.
We ought to desire that the condition be not imposed
upon us of submitting our liberty of action, as regards
the eventual resolutions of the belligerent parties, to re-
strictions which limit it in a positive manner. Our duties
towards our own empire, our position in Europe, do not
allow us te say beforehand that if Russia declare herself
ready to negotiate on the basis of the four points, we
shall not have, whatever turn sweats might take, to de-
liberate on the ulterior decisions which would be made
to Russia. Guarantees generally recognised as such, a
real conclusion of peace, can alone satisfy our wants.
We cannot recognise the simple fact of an offer of peace
made by one party and rejected by another party as ex-
ercising an obligatory influence upon our resolutions,
whatsoever opinion we may entertain upon such a eon-
juncture. If it were thus, there would be nothing changed
in the actual situation, unless that, whilst the belligerent
parties continue to act in full liberty according to the in-
terests and objects of war or of peace, we should be re-
duced to that forced neutrality which we have already
so often refused to accept for Austria.
"For all these motives it would be much more suitable
that the decision of the Diet should be restricted to the
three points which we have proposed. We give ourselves
up to the hope that Prussia does not refuse to appreciate
our motives in an impartial and amicable spirit, and that
if she gives her assent thereto, she will be disposed to
render full justice to our desire of perfect entente, a
desire of which we have given her a new proof by a
preliminary communication to the Cabinet of Berlin
of the instructions drawn ,up for Baron Prokesch. We
are now ready (a in eine) to await the resolutions of
Prussia and of the Germanic Confederation. This is
why we give immediate communication of the above-
mentioned instructions, and of the present despatch, to
all the German Governments, and we shall sincerely re-
joice if we shall shortly be able to hail, as a glorious act
for all, au act which would deliver Austria and all Ger-
many from the anxieties which have hitherto weighed
upon them. We are persuaded that to attain it only a
little of that impulse is necessary which Prussia can give
by that great and legitimate influence which she exercises
among the German Confederates;; and finally, we express
once again the firm assurance that we shall find the
. Prussian Cabinet disposed to give instructions to its re-
'L presentative at the Diet analogous to our own., 'ee
you will please to leave a copy ofthis despatch whir
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