The Sun.
London, England, 1854-04-01 00:00:00

THE &UN, LON'DOLN, SATURDAY EVENING- APRIL 11' 1854.

sir, it might be that the Emperor of Russia from his ob-
servation of Turkey, had arrived at the opinion that the
fall of Turkey could not really be prevented, and that it
was advisable, in order to prevent war, that some arrange-
ment should be entered into with the great Dower of Eu-
rope. That may have been his intention. But I think the
natural impression was that which Sir Hamilton Seymour
evidently derived from the conversations which he held
with the Emperor of Russia—namely, that if the Emperor
of Russia appeared to be so convinced that the fall of
Turkey was at hand, he contemplated that the fall of
Turkey should take place. But be that as it may, whatever
was the real meaning of the Emperor of Russia in these
conversations, her Majesty's Government had hoped that
when England entirelyrefused to be a party to any such pro-
ject it would have been relinquished by Russia, and that she
would certainly calculate the consequences of having all
Europe opposed to her in case she should proceed to an armed
aggression. (Hear.) I will now again refer to the mission of
Prince Menschikoff. Prince Menschikoff ended with a de-
r mend for certain privileges and immunities for the Chris-
tians. The Turkish Minister, in alarm, had recourse to
the Ministers of the Four Powers at Constantinople, ask-
ing their advice and assistance. Lord Stratford was dis-
posed to agree with the Turkish Government, that these
demands were dangerous to the independence of Turkey.
But the four representatives came to the decision that it
was a question which so nearly touched the free action
and the dignity of the Porte that it was not proper for them
in their then situations to offer any advice or instruction.
When that decision was communicated to the minister of
the Sultan, he declared that the Porte had already come
to a decision, and that that decision was adverse to the
claims put forward by Prince Menschikoff. Prince Men-
schikoff having, as I said, pronounced threats of the cala-
mities that would follow the rejection of his terms—threats,
by the bye, totally inconsistent with the language that he
had before held to her Majesty's Ambassador—Prince
Menschikoff having pronounced these threats, proceeded
with great state and ceremony to leave Constantinople,
and returned to the Russian territory. Upon this intima-
tion, her Majesty's Government, thinking that the time
had arrived when there was "danger to the independence of
the Porte, directed that her Majesty's fleet, then at Malta,
should proceed to the neighbourhood of Constantinople,
and her Majesty's Ambassador was directed, if it should
be necessary, to bring the fleet up to Constantinople. Now,
sir, I think that step was an irrevocable proof of the desire
of her Majesty's Government-to support the independence
of the Sultan. (Cheers.) If terms had bean obtained
which were honourable to the Sultan—which would
have maintained the independence of his authority and
the integrity of his dominions—the fleet would pro-
bably have returned to Malta ' • but whilst de-
mands were insisted upon which could not be sub-
mitted to, while those demands were to be enforced by
arms, still more was it impossible for her Majesty and the
Emperor of France, in concert with whom her Majesty
aced, to withdraw their forces from the support of the
Sultan. (Cheers.) I lay the more stress upon this circum-
stance, because it was at the time a matter of inquiry in
this house. A fear was expressed—a fear in which I did
not participate—that a sudden invasion would take place,
directed immediately-against Constantinople. Bat this at
all events was clear, that the house approved of the de-
monstration which was then made, and approved of the
declaration which I made at that time—that it was a proof
that her Majesty was determined to support the Sultan
against unjust aggression. (Cheers.) Sir, when the intel-
ligence arrived at St. Petersburg that the last demands of
Prince Menschikoff had been refused, it was decided that
a message should be sent, conveying a letter of Count
Nesselrode's demanding in the most peremptory terms
that Prince Menschikoff's note should be signed within
eight days, and annonocing that, in default of such signa-
ture, the Principalities, part of the Sultan's territories,
would be occupied by Russian troops. It was quite im-
possible for the Sultan, with any regard to his honour, to
assent to such terms. The invasion by Russian troops im-
mediately took place. The question then arose, what was
the Sultan to do under these circumstances ? Lord Strat-
ford— as I have always said, the truest and best friend of
the Porte—(hear)—advised the Sultan not to exercise his
right of making it a cases belli, but recommended hirnto
renew negotiations, in she hope that honourable terms
might be obtained, and in the mean time to strengthen
those places by sea and land the defences of which during
peace had been greatly neglected as well as greatly dimi-
nished. That advice was taken by the Porte. It was in
conformity with the opinion of the four powers, of Eng-
land, of France, of Austria, and of Prussia. Fresh nego-
tion accordingly took place. The Sultan sent, by the ad-
vice of his Ministers, fresh terms of peace. These terms
arrived at a moment when a note had been agreed upon
representativesbytheerefore,the Sultan's
softas terms w
theo four powers
set aside,
and Vienna
and, therefore,
and the other proposal was sent forward. The Sultan
agreed to those terms, with some modifications. lam not
going to enter into verbal niceties as to the question of the
Vienna note. Bat what is perfectly plain—thatiany one
who reads it will, I think, admit at once—is, that the
Vienna note, as modified by the Porte, as altered in some
respects by the Porte, conveyed to the Emperor every se-
curity he could have wished as to the privileges and im-
munities of the Christian subjects of the Porte. The Sul-
tan said that he considered it due to his own honour to
maintain unimpaired and unviolated the privileges and
immunities of his Christian subjects. He was ready to
make this declaration in a note to the Minister of the
Emperor of Russia. Therefore the sole difference, and yet
a difference upon which all these subsequent demands of
Russia have been made—the difference was this, that, ac-
cording to the proposal of the Sultan, the Christian sub-
jects of the Porte would have enjoyed all their privileges
and immunities—they would have had them under the
sanction of solemn documents, confirmed by the Sultan,
as their Sovereign ; they would have had them under the
sanction of a declaration that it was due to his own honour
to preserve them ; they would have had them under the
sanction of an assurance given to all the great powers of
Europe—to all the five powers of Europe—to Russia also,
but to Russia no more than to any other power. (Hear,
hear.) The Russian proposal, on the contrary, was, not
for increasing the immunities and privileges of the Chris-
tian subjects of the Porte—whose privileges and immuni-
ties had not been diminished, but increased of late years
—but that all those privileges and immunities should be
confirmed by a special treaty with Russia, and thereby the
Russian Minister would have had the power, on every
question of spiritual, nay, on every question of civil privi-
lege, of interfering between the Sultan and 12,000,000 of
his subjects. (Hear.) Therefore the question was not, as
the Russian Government has repeatedly put it, a question of
a religious desire on the part of the Emperor to protect the
Christians of his own community in the Sultan's domi-
nions. (Hear, hear.) That was not the question. That
security was afforded—that security was amply afforded.
But the question was, whether the sovereignty of these
12,000,000 of people should be transferred from their own
sovereign, the Sultan, to a foreign sovereign who possessed
-an overwhelming force. (Hear, hear.) Sir, the position
which was taken by her Majesty's Government at that time
is stated so clearly in the circular of Lord Clarendon, dated
the 13th of June, that it is one of those few documents which
I shall take the liberty of reading to the house. My noble
friend says :—" The repeated assurances of the Russian
Government, given both to the Government of her Majesty
and to the Fionch Government, that Prince Menschikoff's
mission to Constantinople bad reference solely to the Holy
Places, had led her Mejesty's Government confidently to
hope that the satisfactory arrangement of that long-pend-
ing question would have removed all grounds of difference
between Russia and the Porte. But, under the plea of
confirming ancient treaties, further demands were put for-
ward by the Russian amhissador, involving a protectorate
of the Greek Church in Turkey, not only as regards the
spiritual, but also the civil rights and immunities
of its members. Every concession which could be made
was offered by the Turkish Government, who, throughout
these trying negotiations, displayed a most moderate and
conciliatory spirit; but it would have been impossible for
them to have complied with these last demands without
derogating from the sovereign rights of the Sultan, and
virtually surrendering the independence of the Ottoman
empire ; and her Majesty's Government have, therefore,
entirely approved the advice given by Lord Stratford de
Redcliflb to the Porte. In these views and opinions there
is a complete agreement between her Majesty's Government
and the French Government; and the English and French
fleets, which have been ordered to approach the Darda-
nelles, will act in concert under the orders of the respec-
tive ambassadors of the two countries. In taking this step
her Majesty's Government are actuated solely by the desire
to uphold the independence of the Turkish empire--an in-
dependence which the Great Powers are deeply interested
in upholdine, and which has been acknowledged by them
as necessary to the balance of power in Europe." (Cheers.)
Such, sir,
owvaesretmheeepteo.sitNioonwt,akwehneoupthbertohoeteEonfgvlisihenannad
French ,
modified in the manner I have stated, reached St. Peters-
bure, the Emperor, who had agreed to the original note,
nobi ilnon London,
altoenr.
,
and had agreed to it even as altered with a view to
refusedmake
accede of
to
ot
thatmor
e clear tothe
tCe.a Notnet
modified
that which the
despatch, Russian
he
o v et
which
r nm e u
had d(sletchlaerre ea
edaptpobred
aconfidentiale
sopuigr hi
tt inn o twt
h oi
chave e bee ti
Russian c o n fi
Gd eonvteira,
nlment becausewere
ei t showedprepared the
to
agree to the Vienna note—it showed that, while they ac-
eceenpeteet
wl ehvi ec
lir ywwa
so radffioxfe
affixed
hat
to
i no ohtye ,a
utheythe dirtFo onr opt
oawffiexr
et
(i
ht
etahre)
—they did not affix to it the sense which the English Go-
vernment in particular had affixed to it--and therefore the
intention of the Russian Government clearly was, accord-
ing to their own explanation of their intentions, to accept
the terms according to one sense at Vienna—according to
one sense in London, in Petersburg, at Vienna, and at
si
wastt
to confidential,
be
e signed,
i
Constantinople.gnbe (ut
wt hay
Berlin—and afterwards to enforce them in another sense
(Hear,s
ihnotue hear.)
lrdp
i n agreeing to sign that mte, if such was their intention,
whom they were treating,
) And, therefore
they not only ought not to have made their explanation of
Why, sir, I say that,
note, knowing perfectly well
under whose sanction this note
a ci m
Itrhhe.
tatetaviten not told
hmteh themselves
propositionl powers
pvuteotstuhsignpato
upon it.
k( 1 In
knew,
war;
what
ehaart.
was the sense nixed to it by the four powers,
and especially by the English Government, and affixing
another sense to it themselves, which they meant to keep
secret, but no doubt to make use of against the Turkish
Government afterwards—(hear, hear)-_I cannot call that
proposition
th t
proposition anything less than what I describedit to be in
)has been attaclAd—a
fraudulent interpretation.
the speech to which so much blame
this interpetration was given in a note should
say
that
(Cheerers°.
Nesseliode. It is said to have been Itsigned by Count
nate in the Foreign-office at St. Peterrhen by a subordi-
Nesselrode has assumed its responeibiliis urgh, but Count
fied note having been thus rejected bRY;i Su', the the modi-
arose whether any further effort at negotiation e 'question
made. Even then the Sultan's Government were shfould be
being adverse to a settlement of the question, But far from
event occurred of the utmost importance. A step u an
,
taken by Turkey from which she thought she could no
longer refrain—l refer to the declaration of war by Tur-
ke
y. (Hear, hear.) Sir, it is always in the power of
tyrannical Governments to endeavour to impose upon
others unjust terms; but it is not in their power to pre-
vent that attempt exciting the indignation and provoking
the anger of the party against which the attempt is directed.
(Cheers.) Such was the effect of the attempt of Russia
against Turkey—such was the effect of the invasion of the
Principalities, containing four millions of the subjects of
the Sultan. The fanaticism, if you choose to call it so—
the enthusiasm, as the Turks would call it, of their nation
was roused ; they hastened to the standard of the Sultan,
and thousands of men appeared in arms on the banks ors
the Danube to resist the aggression. The Sultan had from
the first moment of the entry of the Russians into the
Principalities a just cause of war; encouraged and excited
by his subjects, he thought he could no longer—after this
first proposal of peace had been rejected, he thought he
could no longer refrain from a declaration of war. Well,
sir, it is hard for us to blame the conduct of the Sultan in
that respect. (Hear.) The wrong was with Russia ; the
wrong arose from the conduct of the Russian Govern.
ment. It might be imprudent in Turkey at any time
to resist that force of Russia; but, sir, it was an impra-
deuce which we must all honour—it was an imprudence
which arose from a just sense of independence, and resent-
ment of the wrong which had been done. Sir, when that
war was declared, of course the negotiations become more
and more difficult; still, terms of great moderAtioxt and

great fairness, which were recommended by the four re-
pre& intatives at Constantinople, were adopted by the Porte,
and transmitted to Vienna as the basis of negotiations.
Up( en considering these terms, the representatives of the
fov.r powers at Vienna, including the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Austria, were entirely agreed with respect to
their moderation, and they were forwarded to St. Peters-
burg, with a recommendation from the Austrian Govern-
moat, in the name of Austria, and in the name of the other
pow ere, her allies, requesting the assent of Russia to these
fair terms of peace. The first impression at St. Petersburg
was, that no answer should be given to this request. The
step actually taken was little short of that determination.
It was setting aside all these proposals recommended by
the four powers, to propose other terms, those terms con-
taining in substance the Menechikoff note which the Porte
had originally rejected, and containing, besides, an article,
regarding refugees which had not hitherto been proposed. The Vienna Conference assembled, and they declared that
these terms were inadmissible. Still Count Buol, anxious
—and to his honour it should be said—anxious for the
preservation of the peace of Europe, suggested to Count
Orloff that other proposals might be made, that prelimi-
naries of peace might be transmitted to Vienna, might be
there considered, might be modified according to the views
of the four powers in conference with the Russian Mini-
ster, and. might be transmitted to Constantinople for the
assent of the Sultan. Well, this proposal was not assented
to, but preliminaries were sent—pretended preliminaries
of peace, preliminaries as inadmissible as the former,
although the article referring to the refugees was not
contained in them, and it was not insisted that the Turkish
plenipotentiary should go to St. Petersburg or to the Rus-
sian head quarters, but, in all other respects, terms which
could not have been assented to. Again the conference
rejected .these terms as inadmissible, and declared that
they could not transmit them to Constantinople. We
have, then, the agreement, not of England and France, but
of all the four great powers of Europe, that with respect
to this dispute between Russia and Turkey, Turkey has
proposed and is ready to assent to fair and moderate terms
of peace, and that the terms of peace proposed by Russia
are unjust, intemperate, and inadmissible. (Hear, hear.)
I think, sir, after this, considering how much connected
Austria and Prussia have been with Russia now for many
years, that the three northern powers were connected on
many occasions of European difficulty—I think that it will
not be denied that in this contest Turkey must have been
greatly in the right in order to have such an agreement of
the four powers. (Hear, hear.) The moderate proposals
of Turkey on the one side, and the inadmissible proposals
Russia on the other, seemed to preclude all hopes of an
amicable termination of these negotiations. The remain-
ing question was, therefore, whether or not we could any
longer maintain the position which we had maintained—a
position showing our interest in Turkey, and our sympathy
with her in her struggle, but at the same time taking no
active part in her support. Sir, it is obvious that, after the
court of Russia had rejected those terms, it must intend to
prosecute the war. The intelligence we have now received
put" that intention beyond doubt ; but there was moral evi-
dence of it without such intelligence. We therefore con-
sidered with the Government of France what step remained
for us to take. We came to the decision that we might
propose to Russia to evacuate the principalities within a
certain number of days, at the same time informing her that
her refusal to do so would be considered equivalent to a
declaration of war. That step we have taken ; but of course
no one would expect that the Emperor of Russia, having
refused reasonable terms, would yield to a summons so
peremptory. He has declined to give any answer to that
proposal, and it remained for her Majesty and the Emperor
of the French to consider of any other step, and what, re-
mained. They considered that no course but war did re-
main. (Hear, hear.) They considered that, having held
forth a promise of assistance to the Sultan, they were
bound to fulfil that implied promise of aid. They consi-
dered that the safety of Europe depended upon the main-
tenance of the equilibrium of which the integrity and in-
dependence of Turkey form a part. They considered that
it would be impossible to hope to maintain that integrity
and independence if Russia was allowed unchecked and
uninterrupted to impose her own terms upon Turkey. It
was therefore decided by her Majesty's Government at
once to address thlahouse—to advise Majesty to send down
a message to the Houses of Parliament, and at the same
to issue a declaration of war. That declaration of war has
been issued. We can none of us be insensible to the gravity
and importance of such a declaration—(hear, hear)—we
should all have been glad to avoided it—(hear, hear)—but
I hold that, consistently with our position, consistently
with our duties to Europe, consistently even with ithe
general interests of this country, we cannot permit the
aggrandisement of Russia to take any shape that her arms
might enable it to assume. Sir, there are, I imagine, but
few in this country who think that any other course was
open to us. There are, I know, some who think that this
country might remain altogether apart from the conflicts
of other European nations ' • that we might be indifferent ,
when the independence of a power is assailed, when a
country may be obliterated from the map of Europe, and
some power already great may obtain a fearful preponde-
rance over the others. These persons, indifferent to the
triumph at one time of democracy, at anotherof despotism,
and to the aggressions that are made in the name of one
or the other, think it right to say, like the philosophical
husbandman of Vigil,
Illum non populi fasces, non purpura regum
Flexit et insides agitans discordia fratres;
Ant conjurato descendens Dacus ab Istro:
Non res Romance, perituraque regna."
But we, sir, who are following the maxim which, since the
time of William 111., has governed and actuated the coun-
cils of this country—we who have believed that we have a
part in the great question of the liberties and independence
of Europe—we who believe that preponderance cannot
safely be allowed to any °lie power—we who believe it is
our duty to throw our weight into the scale in these con-
fficts —we who have seen our country rise to power, rise to
reputation, rise, I may also say, in moral greatness, by the
assertion and maintenance of those doctrines—we who have
seen the country support burdens and incur sacrifices in the
maintenance of these maxims—maxims which I believe to
be connected not only with your honour and your dignity,
but with your very safety as a nation—we are not prepared
to abandon our position in Europe, and we ask you, by
agreeing to the address of to-night, to be firmly 'prepared
to maintain it. Sir, I may be asked two questions, sup-
posing that the house is prepared to assent to this address
—questions which I will not deny the privilege of any mem-
ber to ask—to which I should be glad if I could give full
and satisfactory answers, but to which I can only give
such answers as my duty will permit. I may be asked in
the first place, with what allies are we about to undertake
this contest? Now, sir, in the first place, we have, as I have
repeatedly assured the house, acted throughout these trans-
actions, we are acting in this last and final step, which ends
negotiation and begins war, in cordial concurrence with
France. I have not been able to lay upon the table any
formal agreement. We had proposed a formal agreement to
France ; in the then state of affairs, another form of agree-
ment was thought by the. French Government to be pre-
ferable—that was only a provisional agreement, and there-
fore I cannot lay anything in the shape of a convention
before the house ; but the two Governments are agreed
that their concurrence should be put in the shape of a con-
vention, and I hope before long to lay a formal instrument
of that nature upon the table. (Hear, hear.) But while I
say this with respect to a formal document, the house may
rest assured that with regard to the spirit of the agreement,
with regard to friendly intercourse, with regard to frank
communication, no two Governments were ever more allied
than the Governments of England and France are at this
moment. Then, sir, we have to consider the position of
those other two powers with whom we have agreed in the
negotiations —with whom we have agreed, not only in tke
protocols that have been signed, but so far that the Go-
vernments, both of Austria and Prussia, recommended to
the Emperor of Russia to accede to the terms that were
proposed, end to evacuate the principalities at our demand. I
But, sir, must say that I can add but little to the state-
ment I made on a former occasion—that while it is per-
fectly clear to us what the interests of these great German
powers demand, we have no document, no formal agree-
ment that we can lay before the house, or even an assurance
that these two powers will take part in the war against
Russia. At the same time, the communications made
by the Emperor of Austria and his Government have been
most frank and direct. They have expressed an entire
agreement with us as to the necessity of maintaining the
independence and integrity of Turkey ; but when we asked,
as I think we were bound to ask, some short time ago,
what, in case of a rupture, would be the conduct of Aus-
tria, the answer of Austria for the moment was of a satis-
factory nature. It reserved an application to the Govern-
ment of Prussia, and my belief is that if the Government
of Prussia had acceded to the views of Austria, I should
have been able now to make a most satisfactory communi-
cation to the house. It did not appear to the Prussian Go-
vernment that they could accede to our proposals, The
Prussian Government has stated to the world its views
upon this subject. I must say, those views at present
seem to me to be too narrow. (Hear, hear.) I had always
thought that Prussia was a European power—l had always
considered her as one of the principal powers of Europe ;
but in the document to which I refer, allusion is made
Ottly to Getman interests, and the duties of Prussia to-
wards Germany, and there is no allusion whatever to her
duties towards Europe. I trust, however, that a short
time may bring us communications of another kind. I
cannot but think that if Prussia means to maintain her
position in Europe, distinguished as she has been distin-
guished as she is, both in arts and in arms, she can hardly
allow that the disturbance of the balance of power of Eu-
rope, and the immense aggrandisement of Russia which
would ensue, can be matter of indifference to Germany,
still less to Europe. (Hear, hear.) But, sir, I state the
case ta_the house as it is—that negotiations are still going
on, and that even the passage of the Danube by the Rus-
sian troops has not brought from Austria an immediate
declaration that she will be in arms to oppose Russian
aggression. I have stated that I think she would have
been so prepared were it not for an apprehension that,
Prussia not concurring in her course, danger might sur-
round her if she proceeded to that tap ; but I repeat
again that which I have always thought with respect to
this subject—that it is impossible that this war should
prooeed, and that the great German powers should not feel
that it is their bounden duty—that it is their interest,
fully as much as it is the interest of England, to assert
their independence, and to check this nnjust and unprin-
cipled attempt. (Hear, hear.) Such, sir, is my belief—
such is my hope on this subject. The other question
which may be asked of us is with regard to what we ex-
pect as the object and termination of the war. (Hear.)
Now, sir, I have said that I can state no more than that
which I consider it my duty to state, and I consider that
I should be departing from that duty—grossly departing
from that duty—if lat all restricted the Government of
England from at any time assenting to terms of peace
which that Government thought honourable and just.
For my part, I should not, think any terms honourable
and just that did not provide for the security of the
Turkish empire ; but with regard to the manner in which
that security is to be provided, we all know what are the
chances and contingencies of war, we all know how quickly
the aspect of Europe may change from one month to an-
other, and I think it would not be right, it would be a
course not only wanting in prudence, but in justice to the
people of this country, if I were to specify the details of
any terms that were to be procured as the terms upon
which peace would be concluded. (Hear, and cheers.)
This house well knows that if terms were agreed to which
it should think insecure and dishonourable, this house has
it in its power to rebuke and censure the Ministers who
should make such peace. This power has been exercised
—whether wisely or not is not the question—but this
power has been exercised, and the Ministers who signed a
peace eensured by this house were driven 'from office for
agreeing to such terms of peace. I think the house may
be satisfied to leave the question in this position—that,
having taken up arms from necessity, for the sake of sup-
porting an ally, our first object must be resistance to the
aggressor and protection to the ally, and that we shall
continue in arms so long as that ally is threatened by his
formidable opponent. I know not, therefore, sir, that I
can add anything to the statement which I have made in
respect to the course which these negotiations have taken
with respect to the causes or the war and to its object.
That object is plain and simple. An ally, one of the powers
whose integrity and independence (are sanctioned by the
public law of Europe haahad his provinces assailed and
endangered, and itkroquizod to alga dishonourable terms

of peace as the price of the evacuation of these provinces.
He refuses to agree to these terms which he considers dis-
honourable ; we go to his support in resisting that aggres-
sion. We have already agreed to a convention with Tur-
key, a convention which, not being ratified, I am sorry
that I cannot lay before the house, but which provides that
Turkey shall not make peace without the concurrence and
consent of England and France. The convention does not
contain—l think it would have been very wrong if it had
contained—any stipulation with regard to the internal
Government of Turkey. (Loud cries of " Hear.") We
have proposed no such convention to the Porte. We
have proposed to her a convention in the nature of a mili-
tary convention, and which, when it is laid upon the
table of the house, I think will be sanctioned by the ap-
provl of the house as well as of the country. Well,
then, I leave the case as it at present stands in the hands
of this house, fully convinced that the great majority of
this house have at heart the honour and greatness of this
country; that they will all lament, as I do, that the ne-
cessity of war should be brought to us, but convinced
also that they will not be disposed to shrink from a con-
test which is honourable to us, and which I trust will
end in securing the independence of our ally. The noble
hard concluded, amid loud and continued cheering, by
moving the following draught of an address :
" Most Gracious Sovereign,—We, your Majesty's most
dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United.
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament as-
sembled, beg leave to return to your Majesty our humble
thanks for your Majesty's most gracious message, and
for the communication of the several papers whien
have been laid before us in obedience to your Ma-
jesty's command. We assure your Majesty of the just
sense we entertain of your Majesty's anxious and uniform
endeavours to preserve to your people the blessings of peace,
and of our perfect confidence in your Majesty's disposition
to terminate the calamities of war whenever that object
can be accomplished consistently with the honour
of your Majesty's Crown and the interests of your
people. That we have observed with deep concern that
your Majesty's endeavours have been frustrated by the spirit
of aggression displayed by the Emperor of Russia, in his
invasion and continued occupation of the provinces of Wal-
lachia and Moldavia—in the rejection of equitable terms of
peace, proposed under the sanction of the four principal
powers of Europe—and in the preparation of immense
forces to support his unjust pretensions. These preten-
sions appear to us, your faithful Commons, subversive of
the independence of the Turkish empire ; and we feel that
the trust reposed in us demands on our part a firm deter-
mination to co-operate with your Majesty in a vigorous
resistance to the projects of a Sovereign, whose further
aggrandisement would be dangerous to the independence
of Europe."
Mr. LAYARD might say most unfeignedly that no man
in that house had listened on morethan one occasion to the
noble lord the member for the city of London with more
pleasure, with more satisfaction, indeed, he might say, on
some occasions, with more enthusiasm, than he himself had
done; and if the noble lord would not think him presump-
tuous, he would say that on the three occasions upon which
the noble lord had addressed the house upon this most
momentous question they had heard speeches worthy of
the occasion, worthy of the noble lord's great reputation,
and worthy of a Minister who ought to have, at such a
moment, the affairs of this country under his direction.
(Hear.) He had listened t 3 the sentiments so nobly ex-
pressed upon all these occasions with a pleasure which
would be unmixed were there not other considera-
tions at the same time forced upon him. He (Mr.
Layard) was bound to inquire whether these sentiments
were the individual sentiments of the noble lord,
or whether they were the sentiments of the Ministry with
whom he was acting. He was bound to ask whether, at
this moment, in another place, the noble earl at the head
of the Government was not expressing sentiments, if not
diametrically opposed, at least very strangely at variance
with the sentiments which they had just heard in this
house. He was bound to ask whether the right hon.
gentlemen on the very .bench occupied by the noble lord
participated in that noble lord's sentiments. He regretted
to say there were good grounds for his asking that ques-
tion, and, "were there not, he should not have obtruded
himself on the attention of the house on the present occa-
sion. He felt the solemn responsibility under which he
spoke at the present moment, but, at the same time, he
had a duty to perform from which he could not flinch.
When a man was convinced that he had a right course to
pursue, and did not pursue it, then it almost invariably
happened that he found cause for regret. He made this
remark, because under similar circumstances to the pre-
sent he, last year, yielded to the advice of those in whom
he had great confidence, and at the request of the Govern-
ment refrained from pressing on the question relative to
Turkey and Russia. He, however, now solemnly believed
'that the discussion of the question at that time might have
evoked an expression of opinion in that house and the
country, which, perhaps, would have gone far to prevent
the unfortunate result to which the negotiations had now
led. (Hear.) At nearly the beginning of the session it
was his painful duty to review the conduct of the Mini-
sters in regard to the Eastern question. He disagreed to-
tally with their policy, and he felt also that that policy
was carried on in a way not worthy of the diplomatists
and statesmen of this country. At the conclusion of his
speech on that occasion, he stated that if the Government
would only adopt a policy which he (Mr. Layard) believed
to be equal to the occasion and worthy of the circum-
stances in which the country was placed, then he would
give the Government his most cordial though humble
support. Since that period, however, circumstances had
materially altered. Documents of an important na-
ture, which had thrown an entirely new light on
these transactions, had been published ; and ho, there-
fore, felt bound at the present moment to recur to
the subject. Upon the occasion to which he had
just alluded he was taunted with not bringing some
definite question before the house, and therefore he would
at once state what it was his intention 'to do. He would
be the last man, on such an occasion as the present, to pro-
pose any amendment or take any step which might in the
slightest degree impede the general expression of loyalty to
her Most Gracious Majesty, or have a tendency to show
that this country was not united as one man in supporting
the Crown in the struggle about to commence. (Hear.)
Bat if it should be the feeling of the house, after what b-e
should state to them, that the conduct of the Ministers
should form the subject of a Parliamentary inquiry or dis-
cussion, he, humble as he was, should not shrink from the
duty thus imposed on him, and he should bo ready to ask
the Ministers to fix an early day on which the matter
might be brought forward. (Hear.) The noble lord had
stated that the papers on the table had been so often dis-
cussed that it was scarcely of any use to recur to them.
It was very true that the papers first laid before Parlia-
ment had been discussed, but nothing had as yet been said
with respect to the most important papers subsequently
laid on the table of the house. He believed that those
documents would go far to prove the justice of the views
he should submit to the house when those papers should
come under discussion. In 1829 the noble earl, now at the
head of' the Government, was Minister for Foreign Affairs
in this country. At that period, as at the present moment,
Russia was engaged in a war with Turkey. The troops of
Russia succeeded in crossing the Balkan, and the Porte
was obliged to make a disastrous treaty with General
Diebitach. The noble earl at the head of the Government
claimed, within the last few days, the honour of framing
that treaty on which was mainly based the pretension
which Russia put forward for privileges and rights in re-
spect to the Greek population in Turkey. (Hear.) In
1842 the same noble earl was at the Foreign-office, and at
that time a most important revolution took place in Ser-
via, the governor of that country being expelled in con-
sequence of Russian intrigues. The Porte at that time
had the undoubted right to confirm the nomination
of the prince of that country, and to perform other
acts, but Russia upset that order of things. France
at that time was willing to go along with this coun-
try, but the noble earl now at the head of the Go-
vernment, approved the conduct of Russia, abetted.
that Power in all its acts, and made the most extraordi-
nary statement, to which he had alluded on a former occa-
sion, that Russia had a right to put her own construction
on her own treaties,—an assertion which would justify
fully and completely every step taken by Russia in the
present war. (Hear, hear.) In 1844, when the noble earl
was again at the Foreign-office, it was not surprising that
the Emperor of Russia should have visited this country,
and taken the opportunity of proposing to the Government
of this country a scheme which was part of the hereditary
policy of Russia. (Hear, hear.) The visit of the Empe-
ror of Russia ended in a certain agreement between him
and her Majesty's Government, which agreement had now
been laid on the table of the house. It was not now the
time to discuss that agreement, but it contained some
monstrous propositions, involving all the principles now
contended for by the Emperor of Russia ; for it was stated
that the policy of Russia and England would be to main-
tain the existence of Turkey as long as possible; but in
case it should be foreseen that the fall of Turkey must
come to pass, then that the two countries should enter into
a previous concert relating to a new order of things. He
did not know whether that memorandum was accepted as
a true statement in this country ; but it so happened that
near.the beginning of last year a change took place in the
Government of this country, and the noble earl (Aberdeen)
found himself at the head of the Administration. The
moment the Emperor received intelligence of this change
of Government he renewed those proposals which he had
opened in a former visited to this country. (Hear, hear.)
He (Mr. Layard) intreated the attention of the house to
very important documents laid on the table, because he
wished to show the extraordinary divergence of opinion
then and now existing between different members-of the
Government. The first proposal was made on the 11th of
January, 1853. The Emperor of Russia congratulated Sir
H. Seymour on the return to office of a nobleman for whom
he felt a great regard, and had had an intimate acquaint-
ance with for 40 years, and almost in the very next
breath was mentioned the plan for the partition of
Turkey. (Hear, hear.) It was not explained very dis-
i tinctly on that occasion, but it was a few days after
brought to Sir H. Seymour's notice in plain and
positive terms. Sir H. Seymour in communicating
this extraordinary proposition to the Government,
pointed out very ably the dilemma in which the Go-
vernment would be plaCed if they received the proposition
or took no notice of it. In the one case, he observed, they
would be called on to take part in the proceeding, and in
the other they would have it imputed to them that they
had tacitly sanctioned the- policy of the Russian Emperor.
That deipatch was received in England on the 6th of Feb.
last rear, and on the 9th of Feb., three days after, the date
was important, the noble lord who had just spoken return-
ed an answer, which, though perhaps not equal to what
might have been expected, was quite sufficient to make the
Emperor of Russia believe that the English Government
could not entertain his proposal. Consequently, in the
next despatch from St. Petersburg, it was stated that the
Emperor was very sorry to see that the English Government
would not listen to his proposal, but shortly afterwards Sir
H. Seymour had a most important and interesting inter-
view with the Emperor. On that occasion the Emperor
explained his views very fully on the subject, and made an
offer in order to induce the English Government to join in
his nefarious project, Sir H. Seymour lost no time in send-
ing to England an account of this interview, but, though a
former despatch had been answered within three days, no
answer was returned to this despatch for 19 days, nor was
it submitted to the Cabinet until the 13th March 1853, be-
ing 7 days after its receipt, But what did the noble earl,
now Secretary for Foreign Affairs, say in answer to that
despatch ? Instead of rejecting the proposal, as the noble
lord his predecessor had done, the noble earl began his de-
spatch by stating—
" I need not assure you that the opinions of his Imperial
Majesty have received from her Majesty's Government the
anxious and deliberate consideration that their importance de-
mands ; and although her Majesty's Government feel compel-
led to adhere to the principles and the policy laid down in Lord
J. Russell's despatch of the 9th Feb., yet they gladly comply
with the Emperor's wish that the subject should be further
and frankly discussed,"
When the Emperor received this intimation, he expressed
real and sincere satisfaction—and no wonder. (Hear.) The
result was, that that memorandum to which he (Mr. Lay-
ard) had referred, and which he conceived did contain da-
InniDg Aditii46ollol WAR presented, (ioar,) He had heard