The Sun.
London, England, 1854-09-19 00:00:00

LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 19, 1854.

THE W.R.

NAVAL AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.
The Algiers discharged powder and 'shell in Plymouth
Sound on Monday morning, and in the afternoon was towed
up liamoeze.; she was appointed to go into Keyhara Dock

this (Tuesday) afternoon.
The Rhadamanthus arrived yesterday at Sheerness from
Portsmouth. She was detained in the Downs on Saturday
for the purpose of supplying the Gladiator with 25 tons of
coals, the Gladiator having at the time only six tons on
board, being from the Baltic; she left the Downs on the
16th, at 8.30 p.m., for Portsmouth. On getting under
way she got in collision with a merchant bark, and some
slight damage was done to both ships.
The Salamander, paddle-wheel steam-sloop, Commander
Benjamin B. Priest, arrived at Woolwich yesterday, and,
after bringing up for a short time opposite the dockyard,
went down to the Royal Arsenal, where she is to take on
board a largo number of shot and shells, and proceed with
them to Malta and the Black Sea.

' Tho Tyne store-ship, Master-Commander Tucker, left
Deptford yesterday, towed by the Widgeon paddle-wheel
steam-vessel, on her way to the Island of Ascension and
Rio with stores.

The Janus paddle-wheel steam-vessel, shipped the gun-
metal screw propeller for the Algiers, 91, screw steam-ship,
yesterday, at Woolwich, and immediately after left for
Portsmouth and Devonport. Letters have been received
at Woolwich from the Britannia, 120, flagship of the Eng-
lish fleet, in which it is stated that Vice-Admiral Dundas,
Commander-in-Chief, had declared his determination to
have a dash at Sebastopol at the earliest possible moment,
and had no doubt of the success of the demonstration of
the English and French fleets against that fortress. The
troops and the crews of the ships of war and war steamers
can scarcely restrain their enthusiasm in consequence of
the prospect they have now before them of exhibiting their
capabilities against the Russians.

EXPEDITION TO THE CRIMEA.

(Prom the Times.)

It is impossible to know—it would be rash to antici-
fpate—the momentous events occurring in the East,
which may now from day to day be brought to our
knowledge by the first pulsations of the electric wires,
to be enlarged and confirmed ere long by records of good
or evil fortune that will take their place for ever in the
.annals of our time and the history of the world. If there
be any who have thought diplomatic negotiations too
:long and military preparations to slow, and have longed
Ito raise the evil spirits of war in swifter and more ter-
:rible action, such men may yet learn that, come when it
will, the dreadful reality comes soon enough. Never,
indeed, was a great expedition undertaken by the forces
of this country which appeared to' combine so many
oletnen s of success ; never did our troops go forth to
battle with a juster cause, a more powerful ally, a
mightier armament, or a more tangible point of attack.
Be the issue of this expedition what it may, it is an ex-
ploit worthy of the alliance of England with France,
.and its success will be a blow such as those Powers
could alone inflict on the Russian empire. That is the
feeling which pervades the army and the fleet, and
rouses the men to enthusiasm at the approach of toil and
danger. But to us, who watch in safety and at a distance
t the progress of these events, it must be permitted to
mingle with the exultation ef national pride and power
some thoughts of a more grave and anxious character.
These men who are just thrown upon the shores cf Crim
Tartary, to defend themselves behind hasty entrench-
ments against a powerful enemy, whom they must con-
; quer before they can hope to assail his stronghold with
I success, are allied in blood and affection to every house
. in England. The thought of some familiar friend will rise
in every heart as these words pass before the eyes of thou-
sands of our readers, and it would be unworthy of us not
to express the deep sympathy and ardent hope with
which the prayers of thousands are lifted up in England
for the lives, for the victory, for the safe return of those
who stand at this moment in the very front of war.
Within two days of the time last appointed for the
general movement of the forces they were all embarked,
and on the 4th the first division of the fleet, consisting
principally, if not entirely, of British troops, put to sea.
The French and Turkish divisions sailed on the follow,
ing day, and the whole of the fleet was to proceed along
the coast of
.Bulgaria to the north-east, until they
assembled at the Isle of Serpents, somewhat to the north
-of the Sulina mouth of the Danube. The distance from
this point to the shores of the Crimea is full 100 miles
• less than the distance from Varna to Sebastopol ; the
wind is more likely to be favourable, and the passage
from,shore to shore more easy. From the Isle of Ser-
pents we shall probably learn that the whole armament
has sailed due east for Kalamita Bay, and that on some
such point as we recently indicated at the mouth of the
Alma or the Katcha river the first descent has been
made.

It has justly been observed that there is no'precise
parallel for an operation of this nature, since the landing
orSir Ralph Abercromby in Egypt, did not amount to
,of le-fourth of the size of this expedition. Indeed, some
of the greatest military writers have assumed that no
so ch expedition ever could take -place, because they
argued that an army of 60,000 or 80,000 men would be
required to attack one of the great military Powers on
his own territory with any chance of success, but that
t a transport the materiel for an army of that magnitude
acrost the sea was a task beyond the means of any State.
ro this observation others of a similar nature have been
a gilded. Thus, an army recently disembarked finds itself
i a the disadvantageous position of having an enemy in
' !rout in possession of all the strong points in the country,
and the sea in the rear. Such an army may be cut
off from its floating base of operations and supplies by
' bad weather on the coast, and it is deprived of the means
of retreat. To these general objections, however, there
is, in this instance, one valid objection. The Crimea is
so peculiarly situated as a peninsula, divided from the
main territorS, of Russia, by seas, lakes, and steppes,
'chat it is far more accessible to the allies by sea than
to the Russians by land, and that to concentrate their
strength in the interior of that remote portion of the
empire is more difficult than to concentrate our forces
upon the coast. Neither the nature of the country nor
the character of the people affords any of those re-
sources
which are commonly available everywhere for
the purposes of national defence ; indeed the remnant of
the indigenous population is Mussulman, and indiffer-
ently affected to the Russian rule. For these reasons,
the Crimea resembles a dependency rather than an in-
tegral portion of the Russian empire ; and if our forces
succeed in occupying hereafter the lines of Perecop,
which extend across the isthmus, the country may be
ehefended against all reinforcements. In 1736, when the
Russians first entered the Crimea under Munich, they
found these lines so strong that the historian of that
campaign declares that they would have been impreg-
nable if they had been defended by any but Tartar
troops.

Assuming that the larding of the expedition has been
effected, and that the Russians do not succeed in pre-
, venting the descent of the allied armies on their coast,
their generals will, in all probability, retire upon some
strong position in the interior, such as Batohi-Sarai
and Simpherophol, laying waste the country behind
them, and destroying the wells ; for, the first principle
they have to observe is to unite their forces, and to
fall back upon a point in which they can best resist
attack. The allied forces, on the other hand, would
,find great difficulty in laying siege to Sebastopol and
carrying the works of that great fortress, as long as
they are threatened in the rear by an army in the field.
This point may demand the exercise of great military
skill and judgment, for the main army of the Russians
will, of course, endeavour to draw the invading forces
away from Sebastopol, and it is highly to be desired that
the allied forces should be sufficiently numerous to con-
duct both operations at once. The superiority of the
Russians in number and weight of cavalry, and, perhaps,
in field guns, will, however, render the allied commanders
cautious as to undertaking any extensive field operations
in the interior till they have acquired some further
knowledge of the country and of their own resources in
it. For instance, one of the great difficulties in moving
large bodies of men is to provide sustenance for the
horses and other animals belonging to the army, and
this difficulty is greater in autumn than in the spring,
when there is provender upon the ground. The destruc-
tion of towns, villages, and crops by retreating armies is
an habitual artifice of Russian tactics, as General
Krusenstorn has of late very needlessly reminded the
world. But the Russian army is not operating in the
Crimea on a vast expanse of territory. The whole
country is but 120 miles long by 200 broad, and, if
laid waste by the Russians, they will suffer more for
want of supplies than the allied armies, which may be
victualled by sea. The operations to be carried on in
the interior are, therefore, in our opinion, the most ob-
scure and uncertain part of this expedition, for we do
not allow ourselves to doubt of the success of the landing,
and Sebastopol itself must eventually fall if it can be
permanently invested by sea and land, even if it should
not be taken by a coup de main. At the same time, it is
possible that the allied commanders may have resolved to
turn their whole force instantly upon Sebastopol itself, in
order to reduce it, if possible, before the end of.the season ;
and the language of the Moniteur itself is somewhat
favourable to this supposition when it hints that the
expedition, if not entirely successful this year, may be
withdrawn, to be renewed in the spring with greater
effect. We will admit, however, of no such doubts.
Humanly speaking,
rdo
not
alwayshas been donew
h to
esend
k
ill
and valour
orftu man, fortunes of
this expedition with effect—everything will be done
everythingfollow
Il ot s
to make it successful ;
and, although the variable and
uncertain f
of lira
they obey the overruling justice of
o Providence.

(From, the _Daily News.)
In a hush of deep suspense the whole country is now
listening for news from the Crimea. The nation sees
" in its mind's eye" nothing but the beach of Tarna or
Baljik denuded of sailing craft and steamers by the de-
parture of the expedition. It is gone : French troops
and English—horse, foot, and artillery—all but the
" heavy brigade," left behind till transports can be emp-
arkdeation all
emp-
tied and sent back for it—are ploughing the waters of
the Euxine. St, far we have reliable intelligence ; all
beyond is vague, unreliable, contradictory rumour.
"
" The fleet is to rendezvous at the Isle of Serpents"—
the English fleet was seen on the Bth steering to the
the
impossible." These scraps of news are listened to with
north"—"
coastsor t
h" 0 f
he preparationscrirn ea t
n render
e being i
an gdeb maindifference, for no one knows whence they come, or
difficult or
rather, every one knows they can come from no authen-
tic source. The fleet, with the gallant men it carries,
has disappeared for a time as entirely from our intellec-
tual vision as it has from the physical vision of those
who stood on the shore to watch its departure. An im-
penetrable mist—like that which hung over the termi-
nation of the visionary bridge of Mirza—veils it from
our sight. For the moment, the feelings with which
we think of it are akin, to those with which we dwell
upon some parted spirit whom death has ref t from our
cognizance. But there is nothing of fear or anxiety
mingling in the strained expectation with which the
national mind grapples itself to the Euxine fleets. There
is uncertainty as to its whereabouts—there is uncer-
tainty as to the exact nature of the task in which it is
engaged ; but no one for a moment doubts that when the
allied troops are let loose on the foe, the tricolor, the
crescent, and the imperial standard of England will be
borne onward triumphantly over every opposition. There
is a strange and terrible fascination in the hopeful,
absorbed state of the national mind, as it impatiently
waits for the next news from the East. So intense is the
expectation, that Fancy forgoes its usual privilege of
painting imaginary and shifting pictures of what is to
come.

With the national mind thus completely possessed by
one idea, no topic but the Sebastopol expedition has any
chance f more than a momentary and listless attention.
The marching and countermarching of Turks and Russians
in Asia, with reports of victories gained by the Caucasian
mountaineers, fall almost unheeded on the ear. Scarcely
a passing comment is conceded to the premature return
of the troops and fleets from the Baltic. The swaggering
of the trim and jaunty soldiers of Austria, as they march
through the gates of Bucharest, which Turkish hard
fighting has opened for them—looking as warlike as if
they had borne the burden aild beat of the day which the

Turks have endured—does not even excite the derisive
laugh which it would call forth at other times. All these
are felt to be subordinate, episodical incidents, while the
result of the Sebastopol expedition must of necessity
prove a turning point of the war. All the other opeh-
tions of the campaign of 1854 have been and must remain
resultiess—barren of fruits. The wretched treaty by
which the Austrian armies have been allowed to occupy
the Danubian Principalities, and protect the rear of
the retreating Russians, has prevented the Turks
from doing more than clearing their frontier of hos-
tile troops. The withdrawal of the allied forces
from the Baltic, just as the game of war appeared
to have begun to be played bi earnest at Bom.araued,
has given the Czar breathing time for another winter.
And the public, however reluctantly, appears disposed
to aequieiee in these disappointments. But the faiiure
of the Sebastopol expedition (we speak of a contingency
that is barely possible) would awaken a storm of public
indignation throughout France and England that would
compel the Governments, in sheer self-defence, to buckle
to the war with redoubled energy ; while the success of
that enterprise would tell upon the imaginations of the
people of Russia with a force that all the rain and fri-
volous lies of St. Petersburg Court journals could not
allay, and would leave the victorious Powers not a
shadow of an excuse for any longer temporising or
" waiting for the Austrians." Come what will of the
Sebastopol expedition, the after conduct of the war must
differ materially from that portion of it which belongs to
the past.
It is for the peoples of France and England to decide
whether the result of the war shall be honourable to
them or the reverse. The people of France have quite
as much power to influence the turn it is about to take
as the people of England. We have been neither tardy
nor cold in our appreciation of the decided policy which
the present ruler of France has pursued since the war
began. We have relied far more upon him than upon
our own Government fur its being carried on in a man-
ner worthy of the two great nations who are the princi-
pal parties to it. But, viewed as a test of his statesman-
ship, undoubtedly the most far-sighted and dexterous
features of his policy are the acuteness with which he has
discovered the wishes of the French people, and the
promptitude with which he placed himself at the head of
a national movement. Napoleon 111. has throughout
had a steady eye to the effect which the course pursued
by him in the Eastern imbroglio would have in consoli-
dating his own throne ; nor will men blame him for
this. He will study the leanings and desires of the
French people with the same observant and divining eye
in the future that ho bas in the past. And hence it comes
that the French people have it in their power materially
to influence the Imperial decisions. An intelligent and
high-spirited nation may, if it will, influence the policy
of its Government even without the apparatus of consti-
tutional institutions, though those institutions enable it
to do so at all times peaceably and safely. What the
French and English peoples are entitled to demand of
their respective Governments is, that the war, begun to
assert the integrity and independence of the Ottoman
empire, shall be so waged as to strengthen and confirm
the great principle of national integrityand independence,
not merely of dynastic permanence and power. Ever
since the ill-omened drawing clos'er of the bonds of amity
between the allied powers on the one hand and Austria on
the other, a thousand symptoms have shown that there
is danger of the people being juggled by the old and
effete, but wily diplomacy of Europe—of a war honestly,
undertaken for great national ends being made subser-
vient exclusively to the narrow and short-sighted inte-
rests of dynasties. If this fatal error is committed, the
war can only go on to ramify and extend itself in end-
less and aimless complications. In the present advanced
state of general information and of Europe, no peace or
settlement can be durable which is not honestly based
on the broad interests of the people.