The Sun.
London, England, 1854-07-24 00:00:00

• THE MAIL STEAM-SHIP for AUSTRALIA,
August 4, 1854.—The magnificent screw steamship " CAL-
CUTTA," 1,800 tons, another of the fine fleet belonging to the Gene-
ral Screw Steam Shipping Company, will be despatched from South-
ampton with her Majesty's Mails for Adelaide, Port-Philip, and
Sydney, on the 4th August next. This flee vessel has maintained
her high reputation for rapid sailing and punctuality, and is a sister
ship to ti-,e " Argo," which has made the quickest v.,yage to and from
Australia up to this time. The Calcutta has been employed carrying
!he Mails to and from England and Calcutta, and from her superior
sailing and steaming qualities, it may be fairly assumed that she will
make the run in 60 days. Rates of Passage irons 30 to 100 guineas.
She will be followed, on the 4th of October, by the Cameos, of 2,500
tons. Full particulars as to Freight and Passage Money at the Com-
pany's Officei', 7 Cannon-street, City.

PATRON-H.H.R. PRINCE ALBERT.
RE-OPENING of the ROYAL POLYTECHNIC
INS! ITUTION

• UNDER ENTIRELY NEW MANAGEMENT.
In consequence of the numerous inquiries after Mons. DUBOSCQ'S
OPTICAL EXPO RIMENTS, %tr. PEPPER begs to announce that
the SPLENDID ILLUMINATED CASCADE, displaying a Variety of Colors,
'will be showti every Evening (except Saturday) at a quarter past
Nine. Lectures by J. H. PEPPER, Esq., on OPTICS, illustrated by
Mons. Duaoscq's apparatus; and by Dr. BACEIOFFENER On the
PLURALITY of WORLDS, illustrated by ASTRONOMICAL
DIAGRAMS.—DISSuLVING VIEWS of the SEAT of WAR in the
EALTIC and on the DANUBE ; and also a series after TURNER'S
Views on the RIVER LOIRE, in France. The PHOTOGRAPHIC
GALLERY for takine Portraits and teaching the art is open under
the direction of Mr. SCOTT.
A Band of Music, conducted by Mr. Warn).
Open daily from 11 till 5, and every evening , except Saturday,
from 7 till 10 o'clock.
Admission, Is. Stalls, 2s. Schools, and Children tinder Ten years
of age, Half-price.

.PROGRESS OF THE WAR.

(From the Timm.)
We are now approaching the sixth month of actual
hostilities, and as yet not a shot has been fired by the
land forces of England. The trocps despatched on the
"expedition to the East" took up positions successively
on the Dardanelles ; on the Bosphorus, and at Varna ;
but though the enemy lay within a few days' march,
they have never hitherto been brought face to face with
Russian soldiers. By our intelligence from the seat of
war, the public will have been circumstantially apprised
of the actual stations last occupied by the several divi-
sions of the British army, and will have learnt that the
advanced force is at or about Devno, and the remainder
encamped in different positions between that place and
Varna. For the information, however, of those readers
who possess no detailed maps of the locality, we may
state that the several points of the Devno, Aladyn, Ko-
juk, &c., are all so close to one another and to the coast
that the entire army may almost be considered at Varna
still, and it would certainly be far easier to re-embark it
at that port for transport to the Crimea than to conduct
it forward to the Danube. This, it must be confessed,
after all our exertions, performances, and anticipations,
is not a very satisfactory announcement, but the facts
admit of mach explanation, and the general result, if
short of our desires, is still by no means unfortunate.
If the war had been undertaken for the single purpose
of expelling Gortschakoff from the Principalities, the
plain course would have been to carry the allied forces
across the Danube with all the expedition attainable.
But such a movement, though calculated, perhaps, to
produce a brilliant campaign, would have done very
little for the true object of the war. The utmost success
of such an advance could only have accomplished a little
earlier and with somewhat more completeness what the
determined valour of the Turks has almost accomplished
as it is, while the flower of the British army would have
found itself in a desolate country, under a destructive
sun, and in face of an enemy which, however discom-
fited, was approaching its own resources exactly in pro-
portion as we were drawn away from ours. An immediate
advance into Wallachia, therefore, would, with refer-
ence to the broad policy of the war, have been a mistake.
This policy consists in striking at the very heart of Rus-
sian power in the East, and that heart is Sebastopol.
The forts and arsenals of Sebastopol constitute the
source, the secret, and the symbol of Russian en-
croachment upon Turkish rights. It is from this re-
doubtable stronghold that the Czar incessantly
threatens the Ottoman capital, commands the mouths
of the Danube, domineers over the Black Sea, and
spreads the terrors or attractions of his name over
the shores of Asia Minor. To destroy Sebastopol is no-
thing less than to demolish the entire fabric of Russian
ambition in those very regions where it is most danger-
ous to Europe. This feat, and this only, would have
really promoted the solid and durable objects of the war.
Then, why was such an achievement not immediately
undertaken, and why were the British troops not landed
at the Crimea, instead of being detained on the other
side of the Straits ? The reply is obvious. When the ex-
pedition first sailed the strength, or rather the weakness,
of Russia could not be accurately estimated. It was
not known but that she might cross both the Danube
and the Balkan, or even carry Constantinople by a coup
de main. Moreover, the first detachments of the allied
forces were comparatively weak, the state of affairs was
very imperfectly ascertained, and it would have been the
height of folly to expose our battalions to attack and dis-
aster without protection or support, If the British expe-
dition of 25,000 men had been, thrown on the Crimea—
that is to say, upon Rinusian territory—in March last, it
might at once have been assailed, by twice its numbers,
and possibly cut. to pieces. The first poSition: therefore,
was the isthmus of the Dardanelles, 'a position which
our command of the seas rendded impregnable, and
from which an army marching on Constantinople could
be taken in flank. From this point, as the truth began
to clear, and as it became evident that neither Constan-
tinople nor the Balkan was likely to be visited by Rus-
sian soldiers, we advanced successively to Scutari and to
Varna—the latter place being the most favourable point
of departure for Sebastopol.
But why, when at Varna, was not the army employed
either on one duty or the other--either carried on to the
Danube or across to the Crimea ? Why have we halted
between these two attractions, and so accomplished no-
thing at all ? The result, we suspect, though undoubt-
edly due in a great degree to the vacillation of Austria,
may also be traceable to the indecision naturally arising
from the vicissitudes and uncertainty of events. The
problem before the allied commanders was not simple,
It was true that the occupation of the Crimea was
the chief object, but it was not the sole one, and in-
finite mischief might have ensued if the absence of
all the allied forces had exposed Omer Pasha
to decisive defeat, and opened the road to Con-
stantinople. Admirably as the Turkish army has
behaved, it is still but a single army ; there are no
reserves in its rear, and it might at any time be
outnumbered, if reports are true, by a concentra-
tion of the Russian divisions. While the allied troops
were known to be interposed between the Danube and
Constantinople such an onslaught was highly improb-
able, and this species of moral support, while it deterred
the Russians from any sudden advance, encouraged the
Turks to redoubled exertions by the assurance of ulti-
mate safety. Until, therefore, this particular duty
could be assumed by some other Power, the allied com-
manders seem to have hesitated, and their hesitation has
been unfortunately prolonged by the Mays of that
Power whose action was expected.
Austria, by movements extremely easy to her
most effectually clear the line of the Danube,
disengage the forces of England and France for opera-
tions
against Sebastopol. This servicebigshueouss ttaandtsi
tde
of Prussia, and perhaps the menacing dispositions of the
e
Czar, have hitherto impeded her proceedings. That sh
might be exposed to attack in her Gallician provinces is,
:
Wally pledged to render ; but the c.
of course, unquestionable ; but, even if we admit that
the reports of the Russian forces on this frontier are
more faithful than they have been found in other cases,
it seems impossible to conceive that a Power which has
been unable to make head against a Turkish army,
with a division of the allies in its rear, should be com-
petent to override the forces of another empire owning
one of the finest armies in the world. To suppose
that Francis Joseph is afraid of what the Czar
can do against him is to suppose Austria more timorous
than the Porte, and to regard the road to Vienna as
more practicable for an invader than the road to Byzan-
tium. In the meantime, too, it should be remembered,
that by this overt accession of Austria to the cause of
the allies she is securing the tranquillity of her own
provinces, which discern in such a co-operation the best
pledge of future policy towards themselves,
We trust, therefore, that the renewed advance of the
Austrian army into the Principalities may enable the
allied forces to embark for the Crimea while the season
still permits the expedition ; but, even if the result
should be otherwise, our enemies will still have little
reason to congratulate themselves on the issue of the
campaign. Russia will nut have inflicted the smallest
blow upon the forces of France or England, nor will
any portion of our dominions have been exposed to the
calamities of war. The squadrons of the allies have
sealed up the ports of the Czar, while their own vessels
traverse every sea in safety. The presence of their
troops in Turkey has guaranteed the safety of the capi-
tal, and urged the Ottomans to efforts before thought
impossible. Aussie, on the other hand, has been foiled
before Silistria, has been worsted in repeated actions,
has lost the line of the Danube, and will hold only a
portion of the Principalities, if she holds them at all,
because it is not worth while to purchase her expulsion
from that desolate territory at the cost of operations far
better calculated to damage her power.

(Front the Morning Advertiser.)
If there by any public spirit, any real patriotism, any
true independence, in the House of Commons, we may
look for a display of these qualities this evening. Never
before was such an opportunity afforded for their exhi-
bition ; never perhaps—certainly not this session—will
there again. The house is to be asked to-night to accede
to a proposal on the part of Government for a sum of
3,000,0001. to carry on the war, over and above the
millions that have already been voted for the same pur-
pose ; and, what is more, which.haVe been spent. Under
ordinary circumstances, the amount asked for would
have been granted without a word. The millions already
voted were given with right good will, Even Mr. Hume
did not gruge the sum. He assented as freely and
cheerfully as any man in the house. But the case is very
different now. The house is asked to vote 3,000,000/.
to carry on the war, after the several millions already
voted have been expended, alth ,ugh we have had no
actual war at all. When the large sums which Mr.
Gladstone demanded, four or five months ago, were so
promptly and so generously voted by the house, its
consent was given with the full conviction, that before
1314nY weeks had elapsed, we should, botil