The Sun.
London, England, 1854-12-13 00:00:00

justified, or the people of this country satisfied, that the
future conduct of public affairs should rest in the hands of
the existing Administration.
Sir R. PEEL justified the policy pursued both before
hostilities commenced, and during the conduct of tie war,
and eulogised the chivalrous bearing of the officers, and the
indomitable courage of the men composing the British.
army. They had now cemented with their blood an alli-
ance with Franca. They had entered into a friendly treaty
with Austria, and, under these circumstances, he thought
it was highly indecorous and reprehensible that M. Kos-
suth and M. Victor Hugo should be permitted, on public
occasions, to attack their Allies. He appealed to the
noble lord th© Secretary of State for Foreign affairs, Whe-
ther it was not his bounden duty to interfere as soonas
possible?

Mr. S. HERBERT said—The charges, sir, wfiich have
been brought against the Government to-night are of so
serious a nature that I hope,the house will grant me their
attention while I endeavour to give an answer to tke state-
ments of the right hon. baronet (Sir J. Pakington) and give
that explanation which he states it is his right as a member
of Parliament to exact. I will do so by giving a plain his-
tory of the war in so far as it has come under the direction
of the Government. The 11011.38 of Commons will then con-
sider whether the conduct of the Government has entitled
them to ask for further power and further assistance to
carry on the war with vigour. The charges, sir, as I under-
stand them, which have been made are many in number.
The hon. baronet says the army was originally sent out by
the Government without any specific plan or intention—
that when at last they did decide on a plan, it was one not

justified by the forces at their command or the informa-
tion they had received of the power and strength of the
enemy they were about to attack. He further said that
the army was too small, that it was an ill•appointed army,
and this from want of due preparation by the Government
that sent it out—that the army was sent out too late, that
the reinforcements were not sufficient, and that by neglect
at home it was allowed to dwindle down till it became in-
significant. Now, I cannot do better than state, in a
few instances, what was the intention of the Govern-
ment when that army was sent into the field. I will
show what that force was, what was its state of dis-
cipline and its efficiency, and I will then show how
much truth there is in the allegation that; the army was
suffered to become weak for want of reinforcements.
'ln the month of April instructions were sent to Lord
Raglan as to the disposal of the force under his or-
ders—a force numerically much inferior to that now
under his command. The intention of the Allied Govern-
ments—for no step was taken by this Government with-
out consulting our Allies. (Hear, hear.) Their good faith
in council has been as signal as their gallantry in the field ;
and the house will understand that when I shall speak of
the Government, I mean not the English Government
alone, but tbe Allied Governments. At the time that
army was sent to occupy a portion of the Turkish territory,
we had a large fleet in the Black Sea, there was a power-
ful Russian army in the Principalities ; but few encoun-
ters had taken place between the Turkish and Russian
armies, and these most capable of forming an opinion had
but little confidence in the power of the Turkish army to
resist ; and it was feared that by a bold stroke on Con-
stantinople our fleet might be caught in the Black Sea,
with the Bosphorus in the hands of the Ensperor of Rus-
sia. I now speak of what was possible; it was also possi-
ble that if the Turks failed to make a resistance at Kala-
fat, the line'of the Balkan might be turned and an army
come down on Constantinople. English and French offi-
cers were sent to ascertain the best line of defence to save
that capital from a coup de main. Lord Raglan then
received instructions to take part of the army under his
command to Unkiar Skelessi, not only on account of the
salubrious character of the place, but because he was
then placed within reach of the Balkan, if that line
was menaced by the Russians, and also ready for an
attack on the Russian territory if that was determined
on. I mention this to show that the Government had
then three objects in view—first, to defend Constanti-
nople ; secondly, to defend the line of the Balkan ;
thirdly, to make attack on and carry the war into some
vital part of the Russian territory. The army was then
sent further—what had been foreseen took place—the
Russians crossed the Danube, and invested Silistria.
Omer Pacha considered that he could not save the town
unless the English and French made an advance, which
would frighten the Russians and compel them to raise the
siege. We all recollect the events of that siege ; we recol-
lect the gallantry of our countrymen in a miserable outpost
of that fortress ; but it was not their heroism, nor the
courage with which they inspired the Turkish troops, but
the fact that a French army was gathering at Shumla and
an English at Varna which convinced the Russian com-
manders that they could not retain their position. As to
Silistria, there may be question whether the importance
of relieving it was so great as to allow it to interpose be-
fore any other operation. No doubt time was lost by it,
but we gained material advantages by it ; we gained for a
Turkish army a great prestige ; we gained in the public
opinion of Europe the advantage of destroying the prestige
of the Russian arms in that campaign. It then remained
for the Government to consider what enterprise would
strike such a blow at the Russian power in the Black Sea
as to place her neighbour in comparative tranquillity for
the future. The siege of Silistria was raised on the 22d.
On the 29th instructions were sent to Lord Raglan to
spare no pains to ascertain the strength of Russia in
the Crimea, and how far an attack on it with the forces
at his disposal was likely to be successful. The officers
in command of the two armies were men of great
military experience ; the Government depended on them ;
one is now no more, but in his successor and the sur-
vivor we place unbounded confidence. The right
honourable baronet asks, did the Government give
any positive instructions after receiving information as
to the force in the Crimea ? If, sir, we had shown so

little confidence in those selected for such responsible
posts of command, as to say to them, " Whatever be
the information you receive—attempt nothing till you
have told us, .evho are six weeks distant from you (for that
is the time it takes to receive an answer to a despatch),
what are the grounds of your opinion"--we should have
lest not weeks, but mouths tilt any expedition became im-
possible. These officers took every means of ascertaining
the Russian force in the Crimea, they then held a council
of war, and decided that the attack ought to be made.
They knew the forces at their command, they knew also
what force they might expect to meet with. aid Lord
Raglan knew better than any man what the military capa-
city of the English was. From that moment the allied
commanders applied every energy of their minds to make
preparations for that mighty arinWent which conveyed
their armies to the Crimea. Those who talk lightly of that
expedition seam to me to think that it is a very easy thing
to carry 50,000 men across the sea, and put them down on
a hostile shore, without boats to land them, or boats to
carry their heavy guns ; it is considered to be an easy ope-
ration, like landing them on a pier in time of peace. That
operation took immense time—it owes great credit to these
engaged in it; no expedition ever sailed' so complete in
every respect; and happily no expedition ever conveyed
so immense a force across any sea with so little loss
and with success so great. (Hear, hear.) But was this
army so insufficient for the purpose for which it was in-
tended ? Lord Raglan took with him to the Crimea
27,000 men, and our allies took a large force, not quite so
strong as ours, but which united to it gave a total of about
50,000 men. They soon after met the whole force then in
the Crimea, and met them entrenched in a position which
an advantageenemy equalheld taot that
ao fa doubling
position
ours at Inkerman, but held it with a
theirgave
them
nuemmbers. T
as strdlifferenas t result. But what else was there that
deelryayed the expedition ? Before it sailed from Varna a
fearful pestilence broke out amongst the men, which
thinned our ranks grievously. That was an- enemy more
depressing to the soldiers than any human one; but we
were not the only sufferers. Our Allies suffered still more
shtasateboeeunr
edxr eaacdt fluolslgy,
butfrom I
kits
now
so
;y ravages.that
far greater than from any other circumstance. Lord.
ur losse mfrotminadhi disease
Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud had to make every exer-
tion to arouse their troops from the depression consequent
on sickness, whilst they were preparing for the invasion of
the Crimea. But, sir, I do not think it is very clear that
if he had been enabled to land in the Crimea sooner we
should have gained very much as compared with the enemy.
The principal difficulty the Russians find in bringing up
their reinforcements arises from the difficulty of moving
over a soil that is broken up in bad weather; the longer
therefore the fine weather lasted, the longer would they be
enabled to receive reinforcements. But I must say that
there never was an army moved on land so rapidly and so
successfully as the corps of General Dannenberg. The
right hon. baronet says we underrated the power of the
enemy. Last session I made some observations on that
point. I warned the public that on account of the re ult
of the campaign on the Danube, in which no pitched battle
had been fought, they choose to assume that the power of
Russia was wavering, if not extinct, and would fall if
attacked with vigour. I pointed out that the Russian
soldier was a man of primitive nature, aid like all such
sincerely attached to his native country. (Hear, hear.)
The people of this country think that other nations who
do not possess institutions like their own are insensible
to patriotism and loge of country which they feel.
We have now received a lesson in this respect, and
those who have seen the defence of Sebastopol mast know
how the Russian will defend his country. And now, sir,
what is the truth of the statements—that the army sent
out was inferior in numbers and utterly without reinforce-
ments ? The army at first consisted of four divisions, the
let, 2d, 3d, and light divisions, amounting to 22,680. In
,June, before orders were given to make a descent on the
Crimea if circumstances were such as to justify it, a fifth
division was formed and placed under the lamented Sir G.
Cathcart. Now let us see what reinforcemOnts have been
sent. In June we sent 941 men, in July 4,588 men, and
in August, 2,032, and new we are told that from the mo-
ment the expedition was decided the Government should
have sent reinforcements—in September, 1,286 men ,• in
October, 2,855, and in November 7,037 were sent. (Hear )
There are further reinforcements, but these are sent in
consequence of late occurrences and Lord Raglan's de-
mands. This number may net please those who think
Englishr. battalions should be poured on the plain like
grater. But who are responsible for the fact, that Eng-
land, at the commencement of every war, is obliged to
lte
make a little war ? Since the peace the cry in every Parlia-
ment has been economy, and the result is our force is far
too small
get I
a ni intoas
m troubleueh t
oa nd
blame
as
sdifficulty.any one. I
have been Secretary (Rear.)
To speak
at War for many years, and
It has been d have
brought forward my peace estimates. the same
twhheetnru we
truth,
administration, however they
with all ministers. Every
fered on other points, agreed in the necessity of economy.
You ask us to make great efforts at the commencement of a
war, at once to create an army and to use it. When the
Militia Bill was brought forward it was stated that our
whole available force, after providing for the defence of
our colonies, did not exceed 10,00 j men. I have shown
what number of men were sent to Lord Raglan,
and what reinforcements are on their way. 1,700 men are
now waiting for embarkation ; and if I add to these the
regiments ordered fromthe different g
whole diterraneau, the that will shortly have passed under
Lord Raglan's command will to 54 736 men. I
has
believe the countryamount ,
not the smallest conception that
the force is so great. We have d state-
seen the stereotype
ment that Lord Raglan but
what does that mean 9 Ithas only 16,000 bayonetf;
actually present in the means the 16,000 effective men
duty, excluding all Pld, excluding all on detache 1
officers all artillery, commissionedcavalry, and non-commissioned
of Waterloo' the Duke of WYeird engineers. At the battle
bayonets. If we are to take Wellington had but 18,000 British
this mode
force will appear very small on of calculation our
country as to its amount. The re?tapher, and deceive the
with perfect truth and fairness that the. baronet has said
no reason to complain of the House of Co Government has
it. They have granted all our demands, Commons. I admit
now is, whether further power should b7d the
; question
who, according to the right lion, haropet Kaye to those
little wisdom in the use of the past. He 3k
ave shown so
duty of a member of Parliament to bo to le defined the
port to a war if it is a just war, and to give to
:o very 8".
the u
vernment conducting the war extraordinary ) o.
requisite, lots of men and money. But if lie thinks ;if
. Government will not use these resources With - the
Prudence

and foresight, I think it is the duty of a member of Par-
liament not to entrust them with such powers, but to give
them to other men—(hear, hear)—who will conduct the
war in a way to satisfy the country. The right hon.
baronet, in the course of his criticism, has stated that the
army was insufficient to undertake any campaign in the
Crimea, and that we ' had neglected to send rein-
forcements. He states that when the troops landed
in the Crimea they landed without their tents, and stated
we sent them out without tents. Every regiment took its
tents from England with them. Lord Raglan landed them
without their torts, and they bivouacked for several days
without them. They landed on the 16th September. .The
first night was wet ; and I believe that a great deal of sick-
ness arose. Oar troops were on the left, the French on
the right, and they thus advanced without their tents.
The Spanish army, Wellington's, never had any tents.
Lord Raglan is blamed for landing the troops without their
tents—how justly I will now ask you to decide. A power-
ful army was known to be in the Crimea, and it was pro-
bable that he would have to encounter them immediately
after his landing. If he had brought the tents he would
have left several battalions behind them that occupied the
room that would have been taken up by the tents. If he
had brought the tents and left the men, what would you
have said to him if for want of these few battalions the
affair at the Alma, instead of a glorious victory, had been
an undecided struggle ? What would you have said then
to Lord Raglan? (Cheers.) Why, you would have said,
" Why did.you fill your ships with ambulances and tents
when you had got men, and such men, lying idle at Varna?
You were entering upon an expedition in which you knew
the first blow would be everything, and you should have
gone in light order, you'should have sacrificed everything
else in order to take men ; strong battalions should have
been your only consideration." (Hear, hear.) The right,
hon. gentleman seems to think nothing of the expedition
to Borearsund ; he says it was merely a blockade. Let
him recollect, however, that that expedition was directed
against islands that were almost inaccessible—(hear,
hear)—in which foundations were laid and fortresses
marked out for the purpose of establish* another
Cronstadt or Helsingfors. (Hear, hear, hear.) Now
that the place has been taken, the right. hon.
baronet thinks nothing of the brave soldiers and
sailors having risked their lives to capture it. He thinks
nothing of such small things. The Emperor of the French
differs from him ; he gave a marshal's baton to General
d'Hilliers. To come back, however, to the case of the
Alma, the right hon. baronet says the tents were not pro-
duced. I hope the explanation which I have given—it is
an explanation which must be obvious to every one—is
satisfactory to the house. (Cheers.) I do not imagine
that one iota of blame attaches to Lord Raglan on account
of that proceeding. (Loud cheers.) I believe that he did
what every man in his situation ought to do. He judged
of the circumstances as they then stood. He did not pre-
tend to prophesy success at, the Alma; he adopted every
means of insuring it. It is very easy to say now, " Your
success is certain ; you might have left men behind, and
brought the tents.', I mast here diverge for a moment to
meet a charge which the right hon. baronet has not made,
but which has certainly been made elsewhere. On that
subject I shall make a very frank statement to the house.
I have no wish to deceive them in any ono respect ; nor
will I defend what I think is indefensible, or condescend
for one moment to conceal what I think, with respect to
details which have, in my opinion, been unsatisfactory.
(Cheers.) Now, I recollect that last session we had a good
deal of discussion here as to the merits of the commissa-
riat. The commissariat ran the gauntlet of popular cri-
ticism. I believe the opinions which were then formed
with regard to that department were exaggerated opi-
nions, and not founded in fact; but I am not prepared to
say that at the end of along peace the commissariat or any
other department of the army was in as perfect a state as
experience and practice would make it. (Hear, hear.) I
have no doubt, therefore, that up to a certain point there
was ground for criticism on the part of those who were
determined to find fault. But, sir, the commissariat has
outlived criticism, and I believe it is now universally ad-
mitted that there never was an army better fed than
that of Lord Raglan's. (Hear, hear.) Their rations
have Wen increased ; the rations of meat are 50 per cent.
larger than those of any previous expedition. (Hear.)
When fears were entertained that the health of the men
would suffer for want of vegetables, supplies of vegetables
were immediately obtained from rieste and Smyrna for
their use ; and when the Government were informed that
these were to be sold I wrote to Lord Raglan that I thought
that whatever was necessary to make the soldier efficient
in the peculiar position in which he was placed, in conse-
quence of the nature of the service, ought toe be provided
at the expense of the public. (Cheers.) Sir, it has been
asserted that there has been great mismanagement with
respect to the medical department of the army during this
campaign. Now, lam very anxious that the house should
know the exact truth with regard to this matter, because
I think nothing- can be so detrime,etal to the public service
as for the public to imagine that our brave soldiers expe-
rience heartless and contumelious neglect at the very mo-
ment when they have just earned for themselves a right to
the utmost care and solicitude. Let me first state what
was the amount of the staff which was sent out. There
had not left the shores of England for a very long period
an army so large, or, I believe, so well appointed ; cer-
tainly none had left it under circumstances so important,
or to conduct operations so hazardous as those which were
entrusted to the army of Lord Raglan. When that
army was first organised the Government took the opinion
of a gentleman on a matter of detail. It was but a
matter of detail, and I refer to it only to show the
care and attention with which these things were attended
to. Mr. Guthrie, a surgeon of great eminence and talent,
and of high character, told us there was an error in the
organisation of the medical department. He said—" You
have but three surgeons to a regiment, though you have a
large staff The regimental surgeon has the strongest in-
terest in bringing men into a state of health as rapidly as
possible ; the staff surgeon has no interest in clearing the
hospital ; his interest is only to cure particular persons.
Do not, therefore, make any additions tothe staff, but give
a fourth surgeon to every regiment, and you will find the
service more efficient." On the other hand, Dr. Andrew
Smith, the head of the medical department, differed from
Mr. Guthrie on that point. He said —" If you give only
four surgeons to every regiment, the regiments which suffer
most will not have enough, and must depend upon the
staff." I consulted Lord Raglan as to which of these two
suggestionshe preferred. He said—" I think Mr. Guthrie's
right, and I prefer to have a fourth regimental surgeon."
Now, what course did the Government adopt under these
circumstances ? One great authority was for a small staff
and a large regimental establishment ; the other was for a
large staff and a small regimental establishment. We said
to the one—" Take a large regimental establishment ;" we
said to the other—" Take a large staff." Again, Dr. An-
drew Smith, who devoted himself to his duties day and ,
night, assembled at his own house a largo number of medi-
cal men, who were engaged in the army during the last
war. These gentlemen drew up a report of what would
be the proper amount of stores for the use of the army ;
they recalled their recollections of the Peninsula ; they
calculated everything at so much per head, and
made a plan of •so much medicine, and so much
of everything. (Hear, hear.) Ah argument founded on
what was done in the Peninsula is not necessarily a sound
argument on account of the improvements which have been
made in the interval,' and I refer to these things to show
that it was our object to make the preparations far the army
as full' and efficient as possible. How many medical men
were appointed to this army? The number of staff medical
officers, in Turkey was '2BO, the number of regimental
officers 192, the number of ordnance medical officers l4,
haveultimately,
been
dwhende d since
thenum-
ber was
number27s.
of
making a total of 486. The staff of medical officers will
h have joined,
battle
ebfeAll9ms.e Upwardsh
ewhen
the of
ideefiroemfficethree
forjfcn:,hiteeur French
Imfiednarmyrn es c that
was
270, that being the number for the whole of the army sent
to Turkey and landing on the shores of the Crimea. If
we had chosen to limit the medical staff to the number en-
gaged in the Peninsula, we should have fixed it atone to
every 145 men; whereas the number was, in fact, one to
every 77 men. This wassthe largest medical staff ever sent
out with an English army. We had the greatest difficulty.
in collecting it. We had tb draw from the medical depots
all the men of the greatest experience, by which I mean
experience in war. If you trust to mere civilians to attend
upon troops, the result will be that they will attend to them
till such a case as that of cholera arises, and then having a
large number of patients claiming their services they -will
tell yon honestly that they can no longer attend to a regi-
ment. We had the greatest difficulty in getting surgeons,
and had to look for them in emigrant ships and merchant
vessels. We have taken civilians without number; given
them temporary rank in the army. We have not done
more, because they do not wish to remain permanently,
their only object being to obtain practice and experience.
I think you will do Me the justice to admit that so far at
least as numbers are• concerned, tne Government is not
fairly chargeable with having acted in a niggardly spirit.
Dr. Andrew Smith was indefatigable in his endeavours to
supply the men with every possible comfort and even lux-
ury which it was possible for them to have in hospital's. I
have here a list of the blankets, bedding, and sheets. There '
were 19,000 cotton sheets, and everything was on that
scale. Ido not know that it is worth while to trouble the
house by-reading it, but I wish to impress upon the house
and the right hon. hart. opposite (Sir J. Pakington), if he
is open, to conviction; that it has not been from heartless
indifference to their sufferings that the troops have been
exposed to privations. (Hear, hear.) Now the statement
to which I alluded was that after the battle of the Alma
a great deal of unnecessary suffering was inflicted upon the
troops in consequence of a bad arrangement of the medical
staff. will refer as little as I can to documentary evi-
dence ;1 but I think I could put the question to the house
in a menner which would convince them that there has
been gieat misapprehension and great exaggeration Of the
evils which have existed and which during war must
exist. It was stated that the wounded of the British
army Jay on the field of Alma for two or three
days ; that they' were brought down to the ships with
their wounds undressed ; that they were put en
board ship in such numbers as were not safe. I
believe that a great deal of this statement arose from
ignorance of what had happened in places beyond
the observation of thOse who made the allegations. The
French; army, composed of fewer men than our own, lay
next tile sea; their wounded, who were fewer in number
than our own, were carried immediately to the shipi. Our
troops were four or five miles, I believe, from the sea. A
field hdspital was established for them in some buildings
which tvere found near the spot. All those of the wounded
whose cases permitted them to be removed were removed
into it ; all those whose cases did not permit removal were
treated on the field, food being conveyed to them, their
wounds dressed, and as much covering being put over them
as couldibe obtained. I need not say that all the appliances
which 'could be obtained on the field of battle were not
sufficient for the comfort of the wounded men, but this is
one of the stern necessities of war. (Hear.) I have seen
evideneo which satisfies me that not a single man was al-
lowed to leave the hospital to be put on board ship with-
out, his hurts having been attended to or his wounds dres-
sed. It is quite true that the number of men placed on
board the Kangaroo was beyond that which she could pro-
perly be allowed to carry. The statement, however, that
1,700 persons were put on board that vessel was an exag-
geration to the extent of more than one-half. I believe
the number did not at any time exceed seven hundred,
and those whom the Kangaroo could not properly take
were Put on board another vessel. It has been
stated that hundreds of men died on board of cholera.
I believe the number of those who died on board the
Kangaroo was under 40, and I venture to assert thatelle
proportion of deaths to cases of sickness was far grater
during the last summer in many of the London hospitals.
I admit that the number on board was great, but it could
not be avoided without leaving the men on the field. Lord
Raglan was obliged to remain two or three days on the
his-
a h e left wounded
because he was aware
they would be massacred by the Cossacks, ant when the
board ship of courstheir sufferings
e
uien Were sect on
were ;rust. Ithad been. said th at their wounis were not
that
time
they were on hoard
dressed during the whole
by surgeonswho I -
On that, point I am infoTiet.. .
,la
e4sing of guu-shc,,, wounds, that no
accustcuned to the dr
such wounds for three
surgemi would think of redressing
or four days, and that, the wound a being covered with
lint, there should be great care at first not to disturb
them. Sir, I have dilated rather at 1 01J, tb this subject,

been