The Sun.
London, England, 1838-11-13 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

In the present state of our foreign relations it is impor-
tant to every Englishman who concerns himself in political
affairs to have correct and distinct notions concerning the
general state of the Russian empire, the character of its
policy, and the facilities which it possesses of carrying that
policy into effect. We fear, that the popular information
information on these points is very obscure and indefinite.
A general idea prevails that the people of Russia are
rude and its Government rapacious. There is a vague ap-
prehensioh of the vastness of its territory and the violence
of its tyranny, but this apprehension is clouded with much
error. There are many who connect the idea of Russian
vastness with that of an empire unwieldy and unmanageable.
Than this, no idea can be more incorrect. There is no Go-
vernment in Europe of which the minute details—so far as
relates to the safety and aggrandisement of the State
—are so strictly attended to. Russian policy may be
compared to some of the great mechanical engines
for which this country is so celebrated—engines of
which the enormous power is distributed by an almost end-
less variety of nice combinations, and with such infinite
precision that every plunge of the vast piston which threa-
tens to shake down the building where it works, gives an
impetus to the most intricate movements of the most deli-
cate machinery, and has its force divided and managed with
such admirable exactness that net a particle of it is lost.
The comparison may also in a very important respect be
carried further, for as in such vast engines as we have al-
luded to very little attention is necessary (such is the sim-
plicity of their principle) to the generating of the power
which does the work, and all the skill of the managers is
concentrated upon the application of that power with the
nicest ingenuity towards the production of the amplest
effect—so in the Russian empire the simplicity of its
internal concerns is such, that the whole energy,
vigilance, and talent of its political managers may
be fixed upon its external affairs. In a political
N iew , Russia resembles an army rather than a na-
tion. Its whole population is under discipline. In poli-
tical affairs the people move only by word of command, and
the commanding officer is the Government. There is no
such thing as popular opinion to be consulted before a
course is decided upon, nor have measures to be modified
according to the preponderance of the interests upon which
the power of Government depends. The physical resources
of the nation, such as they are, are at the disposal of the
Government, like money in a man's pocket-book, of which
the owner has only to consider when, where, and how lie
may lay it out to the best advantage. As a great help to
the understanding of how this comes to pass we shall here
quote a brief and masterly analysis of the political power
and political character of Russia, which appeared in the
Quarterly Review in February, 1836. It occurs in the
course of a paper of remarkable comprehension, vigour, and
intelligence, for which Sir John Walsh's " Chapters of Con-
temporary History" formed the text :
" The power and ambition of Russia had made her more
dangerous to the peace of Europe and the interests of Eng-
land than any other State. From the first moment in which
she had felt herself strong enough to ta'w a share in the
political affairs of Europe, she has directed all her efforts to
the acquision of territory—by whatever means, and in every
direction. Her weight is too great to be successfully re-
sisted by any one of the many States with which she is in
contact. Her ambition is too restless and lofty —it has been
too long indulged, and too successfully pursued, to jus-
tify any expectation that she will cease to be guided by
it. She, in any war in which she may be engaged,
believes that she hazirds no more than the number of
soldiers that cross her frontier. Her existence she con-
ceives, cannot be threatened by external
.free—and her popula-
tion is t,o ignorant to be under the influence of the Press or
the public assemblies of Europe. Occupying a position so
unattackable, and possessing an extent of territory far ex-
ceeding that which has ever been permanently possessed
by any European Crown—she has not addicted herself
to the arts of peace or the amelioration of her internal
condition, but availing herself of the facilities for com-
bination and secrecy in Council—for promptitude, unity
and rapid decision in action, which the autocratic form of go-
vernment affo-ds her, she preserves a perpetual dictatorship,
which—converting her whole institutions i,,to a military orga-
nisation—closes almost every path to fame, honour, or wealth,
except that only which may be opened by the sword; while,
defective in the higher classes of education and intelligence
amongst her own people, she has drawn frcm the intellec
tual resources of other countries instruments fitted to her
purposes, and has found means of attaching to her interests
some of the most profound aid skilful of modern statesmen and
diplomatists. With a moveable army of not less that two
hundred thousand men, and reserves equally numerous, she
is prepared to issue as from a fortress into the more genial
countries of Central and Western Europe—there to establish
—by force or fraud—the ascendancy which a bold counte-
nance, an imperious bearing, her military strength, and her
skilful diplomatic combinations, have secured to her in the
East. Profiting by the dissensions or weakness, from what-
ever cause arising, of the neighbouring nations, both in Eu-
rope and in Asia, she has found means to appropriate to her-
self in each of these divisions of the globe territories equal in
extent to the largest kingdoms—and she still longs for further
acquisitions." .
Such, then, is the nation with which Great Britain has to
manage a mighty warfare—a warfare perhaps of fleets and
armies—a warfare whose voice is heard in the cannon's
thunder—whose foot-prints are marked with blood—whose
triumphs are thrown into bright relief, by the deep shades
of death and destruction through which they must be
achieved—but if not this, at all events a warfare of in-
terests, a struggle for the mastery, by the exertion of politi-
cal energy and political skill. For either warfare how are
we prepared ? That is the point to be considered. We
are not to be content with measuring our strength, political
or physical, by loose abstractions or general analogies, but
by comparison with the power that we have to cope
withal. Nor are we to consider the one power alone, whose
resources, whose political state, and whose despotism we
have had under contemplation, but. also the probable
combinations which will have been arranged before
the contest proceeds much further. Enough has already
happened in Persia and in Turkey—at Herat and at Constan-
tinople—to satisfy every man in the country of the slightest
observation that, whether fighting shall shortly take place
between Great Britain and Russia or not, there must be
mutual jealousy and opposition of which the ultimatum
will doubtless be fighting, if by any circumstances Russia
shall find herself placed in a decidedly advantageous posi-
tion for striking a blow. Such circumstances may arise,
either out of our increasing weakness at home or Russia's
increasing strength abroad—either by the continued sinking
of our Government in consequence of its union with the he-
terogeneous riff-raff of the country, and the consequent dis-
gust of all who constitute its political solidity and force, or by
the union of Russia with France— of ambition with hatred—
of cool craft with long-cherished revenge—to humble the
pride and despoil the possessions of Great Britain. How, then,
is the country to provide against the occurrenceof these cir-
cumstances ? How are they to be averted? Is it reason-
able to presume that under the guidance of our present
Ministers they can be averted ? We fear that it is not.
This Administration is in too weak and too uncertain a
position—it is too much engaged in a painful and ignomi-
nious struggle for its own existence, to be able to devote
itself with energy to external affairs. And even if it
were not thus engrossed—even if it had leisure and talent
for preparing against foreign enmity, and possible aggression,
it would still be inefficient for that purpose, because it does
not possess the confidence of those classes in the empire
upon whom its moral and physical strength depends. How
can we expect vigorous action from an Administration
which has no support beyond a very slender majority of
the House of Commons, and that majority made up of
the most disreputable men in the whole empire ? Take
away from the Ministerial supporters in the Lower House
of Parliament, all such persons as are considered by
millions of British subjects to live in habits of legislative
perjury—all who would not be trusted by any London
tradesman with five hundred pounds—there would then
be no such thing as a Ministerial majority. Purge that
House of the Romanist Members from Ireland—men owing
their seats to an influence which is notoriously hostile to
British interests—and then the present Ministry would have
no majority either in the Commons or the Lords. That a
Ministry in this position—a Ministry distrusted and op-
posed by a large majority of the Nobility and Gentry, and
by almost all the Clergy of Great Britain, should present
the
the most discouraging front to
to external enemies
r ,suptpose.
of our nation, it is mere madness Under such an Administration as the
cannot have a cordial union, and frank co-eOpener'atiwone
of the wealth, strength, and intelligence of the country for
the common defence. The present Ministry is nothing
better than the dust and ashes of a revolutionary explosion.
wgirl ground,
ul
enadd,
The lava has rolled away and cooled down into Conserve-
mere rubbish still cumberiosnmeseh:
Conserva-
tive masses—the
and chokes the growth of wholesome English spirit. The
same cause which makes the stateitweaFkoareil
makeh
to foreign combinations against
alliances with those
have no such thitnee
in whom theythe have confidence, to
prejudice of, those in whom
as that which has
No firmly consolidated Contineyntal State can have
confidence in such a Government
or weakness,
for some years ruled Great Britain—a._. Government
which has been, either from wilfulness,
yet the tool of the European revolutionary party. While
the new Government of France was
King having
unconsoli-
dated, and required the support of revolutionary..
sentiment, France was with us. The French
se
struggled like a rational man to establish a settled Leo-
r4 liefiNseepc,rttOkhaving attained his object, very naturally
e-e-A. _ ,ts-lvienself and his power from the English patrons..
=' - -"jherar:tlista\ebance. The character of our Adminis-
(
/ ' es- 4raireen tiausWd, clrAnged before anything like real confidence
1-.. ~Te'i.ark itelenit4etwifttn any of the settled Continental G.o-
-,.. ec2ecserhirients ankivr own. True, there is no one man in
\-, , ,gdeope k. Thom' these Continental Governments would
(e,
c .
e! stie.sek,edily essereffe as in the Duke of Wellington, but
ip claw pot belong to our Government—be is in op-
-A,