The Sun.
London, England, 1853-06-04 00:00:00

efficient, or as regardless of the interests of the countrycom-
mitted to its charge. f fully admit that if we test the
merits of the Indian Government by the known principles
upon'which a government should be formed, it is as great
an anomaly as our Indian empire itself. I fully admit that
it is incredible, and almost fabulouisly true, that such an
empire should exist as our Indian empire, extending over
a territory of 2,000 miles in length, and upwards of 1,000
in breadth, and that 150,000,000 of people should be ruled
by a handful of foreigners of different religion' language,
and habits—that this mighty empire should be admin-
istered by less than eight hundred civil servants (for
that is the number)—and it has not increased with
the increase of our territories, but, on the contrary,
diminished—that a Governor-General should be sent
out there for five or six years, to exercise a power
greater than almost any sovereign in the world —that he
should be controlled and governed by a body of twenty-
four gentlemen elected by a body of men, not perhaps the
best qualified to judge of the merits of statesmen—and that
that body of men should be controlled by an Indian Min-
ister, who, in the arrangements of parties, is often put
into his place without any previous knowledge of the
country over which he is called to preside. No man could
soberly sit down now, and construct a government for such
a mighty empire as India, such as that which now exists.
The present form of government has, however, grown up
as our Indian empire has grown ; faults it may have, de-
fects it may have, but whatever faults it may have, that
government cannot be so badly administered under which
that empire has so greatly grown in extent, in pro-
sperity, and in the improved condition of the people.
That the government has been made fit for its task at va-
rious times, by repeated alterations, is a fact of which every-
body is aware, and the Government is not now what it
was 20 years ago, nor was it then what it was 20 years be-
fore. The time having now come when it is necessary for
us to deal with the Government of India, and to provide
for it after the 30th April in the next year, it becomes
our duty now to consider in what shape it is most advis-
able that such a Government should be framed in order
best to insure the welfare of the people of India, and,
which was inseparably connected with it, the interest of
this country. The Government of India must necessarily
be considered under the two distinct branches of the home
Government, and the Government in India. Various faults
have been found with the Government at home; it has been
stated in the first place that there is no responsiblity, and in
the earlier part of the session the house was told that
the Court of Directors were an obstruction to the
other portion of the Government, and later they had
been told that it was a mere fiction, and ought to be done
away with. Complaints have also been made with respect
to the mode of electing directors—of the existence of the
patronage in their hands—of the mode in which such pa-
tronage was exercised—and of the manner in which the
business in the various departments at home was conducted,
andwhich has been characterised as slow, tedious, and unne-
cessarily expensive. Under these heads may be included the
principal accusations which have been brought against the
home government of India. With respect to the first two of
these, they were contradictory and opposed to each other,
for it was impossible that the Court of Directors could be at
one and the same time an obstruction to good government,
and so complete a fiction as to be dispensed with as useless ;
and, as usual in cases of this kind, neither of the extreme
opinions were correct. The mistake into which the parties
appear to have fallen appears to have arisen not from
considering the Government of India in its practical cha-
racter, but as it might be • carried oa if each person con-
nected with it chose to t xercise to the utmost the rights
which belonged to him. Such a course would be as
absurd as to suppose that each part of the Legislature
may put an end to the proceedings in Parliament, or
that the business of this house could not be carried on
because, by the extreme exercise of his right, any
honourable member could put an end to the proceed-
ings upon any measure of importance. What we have
to deal with is the actual effect, the practical working
of the existing system of government for India,.
Upon this point little or no information can be
obtained from the examination of witnesses coming from
India, • who have never taken any part in transactions
connected with the Government. Noye the business of
the home Government may be divided into two distinct
parts; one, which may be called the political relations of the
government of India with foreign states—questions of
peace and war, which are transacted through what is called
the "secret committee of the India House," and for which
not the committee, but the Government of this country are
altogether and entirely responsible. Upon that point, there-
fore, there can be no doubt as to resfionsibility. The secret
committee merely act as the organ for conveying to India
those directions which are sent from the Board of Control,
and the President of the Board of Control is in that respect
only the organ of' the general Government, precisely as- a
Secretary of State is th organ of the general Government
in conveying instructions to any person to whom they may be
required to be sent. A good deal of unnecessary importance
had been attached to a declaration of a noble lord, that he
alontt was responsible for the order directing the army of
India to cross the Indus. The fact is, that he was no more
responsible for the order than the Secretary of State would
have been responsible for the order directing Wellington to
cross the Pyrennees. The Government of the country was
as responsible for the war in India as for any war which
might be carried on in Europe, Asia, or Africa. In addi-
tion to this there is the transaction of the ordinary busi-
ness of the administration of affairs in India, in which the
Court of Directors take a very considerable and important
part. Every dispatch is addressed to them, and sent by
them ; all questions bearing on the subject are in the first
instance considered by them ; they have the initiative in
every case. Grants of money cannot originate in any way
with the Board of Control. In patronage, except in some of the
higher appointments, they have an uncontrolled sway, but
in a great portion of their business they are liable to the
check of the Board of Control. The'dispatches are sent up
to the Board of Control, and alterations may be made in
them, and those who are sent back are carefully revised ;
and I must do the Court of Directors the justice to say
that, short as has been my experience, I have reason
to know that the most careful consideration has been
given to every important despatch. (Hear, hear.)
It is quite true that the President of the Board of Control
has the power of overruling the Court of Directors, and I
fully admit that, so far as a single Minister is competent
to decide in his own department, I am responsible to
this house for every act of administration jnst in the
same manner as the Secretary of State for the Colonies is
responsible for the measures which he may recommend.
(Hear.) In substance there is not the slightest difference,
though there may be some difference in form. The respon-
sibility of the Government in connection with Indian affairs
is not a new qUestion. It has been stated, over and over
again, in debates upon this subject, and was well known to
everybody who thought it worth while to inquire into the
matter. Lord Grenville, in 1813, in language far better
than any I can use, said, speaking on this subject :—" The
law which passed in 1784, the source of all these benefits,
the very line of demarcation from which commences the
good government of India, did 'actually commit this whole
authority to commissioners appointed by the Crown. In
the public board, so constituted by the wise and necessary
interposition of parliament, and continued, with slight
variations, by succeeding acts has ever since resided a com-
plete and effective superintendence over every part of the
political affairs of India. That government has still
been exercised, indeed, in the name of the company,
as the company also has used the name of the Asiatic
powers, whose misrule it superseded; but both
the control and the responsibility of all political
measures are vested by law in the public servants of
the state. The commerce and the patronage of the com-
pany are alone excepted ; points of which I shall presently
speak ; but on all other matters which any way concern the
public interests in India, it is the office and the duty of the
King's commissioners, at their discretion, to exercise a com-
plete and unqualified political control. It is their function
to erase, to add, to alter, and, in the default of the direc-
tors, to originate those instructions, which, by law, the
public servants in India are bound implicitly to obey."
That seems to me to describe the same state of things now
as existed in 1813. The President of the Board of Control
appears to be the authority represented by the commis-
sioners, but, with that exception, I am responsible to Par-
liament for the affairs of India. Every person who is
acquainted with the course of public matters must know,
that although the head of every department is answerable
and responsible for the whole business of that department,
yet that in great matters he would consult his colleagues
in the Ministry ; that in other matters his decision, as
chief of his own department, would be sufficient ; and that
in minor matters, having confidence in the persons in his
department and under his authority, he, upon their repre-
sentation, issues the orders that may be necessary. But
there is a difference between the orders so issued by the
Secretary of State and those which may proceed from the
Board of Control. Before any dispatches are sanctioned
by the Board of Control they have been carefully sifted
and investigated by a body of independent gentlemen,
many of them intimately acquainted with the people of
India, and most zealous and unremitting in the transaction
of business. Now, it must be obvious to every one that
the power of originating dispatches must of itself give no
inconsiderable share of influence to that body. It is clear,
that if I could not issue • dispatches except upon matters
raised and communications issued by any hon. member of
this house, he would have no inconsiderable influence in
the decision, whatever that decision might ultimately be.
(Hear, hear.) Mr. Mill—than whom there could not be
a more competent witness—said, before the committee
of the House of Lords,- I do not think the present
system is fairly described as a fiction, since it is acknow-
ledged, that not dilly the Board of Control but the
Cabinet, when of a different opinion, sometimes think
it right to defer to the opinion of the Court of Directors ;
no doubt because they feel that the directors are more
competent to form an opinion than themselves." On this
statement I would remark that there can be no question
—first, as to the responsibility to this house ; and next,
that the functions of the Court of Directors are not that
absolute fiction which they are represented by some to be.
Mr. Mill said,-it was not true that the power of the Court
of Directors was o fiction. I do not believe that to be
the case myself ; and it is desirable, before we deal with
this questionrthat we should be in possession of the actual
circumstances of the case. The last imputation against the
Court of Directors that I shall notice is, that in conse-
quence of the communications which take place, and what
I may call the divided residence of the two authorities—
the Court of Directors and the Board of Control—lndian
business is slowly transacted. I admit that the tendency
of the mode of transacting business is that it is slow ; but
as to a large portion of Indian business dispatch is not of
the slightest importance. The principles upon which the
government of India is and ought to be conducted are laid
down here, but the government of India is and ought to be
administered in India. (Cheers.) Good men ought to be
carefully selected to carry out the orders of the Executive.
But then, when that is done, the more that is done in India
the better—(hear, hear)—and the object is, that whatever
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revising the acts of the Indian authorities, but that is not
business that requires much dispatch. Perhaps I should
not be far wrong in saying that nine-tenths of the Indian
business is to revise and to see whether the administration
of India is carried on consistently with the principles laid
down: There are cases, no doubt, and sometimes very dif-
ficult ones, when most important matters arise which re-
quire a more rapid transaction of business. In cases of
that kind communications, take place between the Board
of Control and what are called the " Chairs" of the East
India Company. lam happy to take this opportunity of
stating that my hon. Meiid the late chairman and the pre-
sent chairman and deputy-chairman of the East India
Company have always been most ready and willing to meet
me, and have afforded me every facility and assistance that
I could' possibly require. Whenever it was important to
obtain an early decision they would ask to see me, or
would send for them. A personal communication took
place without delay, and a dispatch was sent out imme-
diately. A month ago I thought it desirable that the Five
perCent.Loan should be paid off, in order that the interest
might be reduced. A dispatch was prepared by the Court
of Directors and submitted to me, and by the next mail a
dispatch went out to reduce the interest of the loan. .The
Finance Department reported a probable surplus of
500,0001., after paying for the Burmese war. I thought
this an opportunity not to be lost of diminishing the ex-
penditure by making a reduction in the rate of interest ;