The Sun.
London, England, 1838-04-19 00:00:00

ROLLS' COURT.-(THIS DAY.)

This was the general petition day, and the Master of the
Rolls took the unopposed petitions first.

lIOBSON V. BLACKBURN.
The petition in this case was that of the Treasurer of the
the Charity School of St. Bride's, Fleet-street ; the Trea-
surer of the National School of St. Matthew, rixton ; and
the Treasurer of the Deaf and Dumb Asylum ; and the peti-
tion prayed that apportionments in respect to the legacies
given by a testator of the name of Blades to these several
charities might be paid to the respective treasurers.—
Ordered.

QUEEN'S BENCH.-(THIS DAY.)

STANFIELD V. TRINITY HOUSE.

The ATTORNEY-GINERAL moved in this case, which was
tried at Guildhall before Lord Denman, for a rule to show
cause why the verdict obtained by the plaintiff should not be
set aside, and a new trial granted. Tho parties for whom he
appeared, the Learned Gentleman stated, had no personal in-
terest in the matter, having acted merely in the capacity of
trustees ; but they felt bound to resist the claim of the de-
fendant as unfounded, unjust, and unconscientious, and therefore
thought it their duty again to submit the question to their
Lordships, and he was much mistaken if the Court would
not concur with him in opinion that the verdict ought
to be set aside and a new trial granted. It was an action for
work and labour done, and the amount for which the verdict
had been given was 62/. 63. 2d. The labour done was the
removal of a bank or shelf in the river Thames, near the
Woolwich Docks, called Cooper's Shelf. His witnesses•
were his two sons, Henry and John Stansfield, who proved
that two of the elder brothers of the Trinity House came to
the office when Stansfield was at Woolwich, and asked him to
survey the bank in question, called Cooper's Shelf. That
Stansfield accordingly did so, and made a plan of the same,
and sent it to the Trinity House. A third witness was
called, to show that the demand was a reasonable one
for the work and labour in question. The two sons swore that
they never heard their father had made an application to the
Admiralty to bo paid for this work, although it turned out
that he had, and that the application was actually placed in
the hands of one of the sons so examined. The defence of
those persons for whom he (the Attorney-General) appeared
was, that he was at the time in the employment of Govern.
ment ; that in doing this work he was acting within the scope
of that employment, and that the Trinity House had been
acting on behalf of the Admiralty ; that Stansfield had made
an application to the Admiralty, and bad actually been paid
for doing this very work. The defeedants proved that plain-
tiff was, and had been for many years, in the employment of
the Admiralty ; and plaintiff's receipts, in his own handwrit-
ing, were produced, to prove the fact of his being so, and in
the receipt of a salary for the performance of his duties.—
Rule granted.

COMMON PLEAS.-(THIS DAY•)

Sittings at Nisi Prius.

BOYD V. THE LONDON AND CROYDON RAILWAY COMPANY.
This was an action brought against the defendants, for re-
moving a carriage-way without setting out another, and ob-
structing a public way, and tried before the Lord Chief Jus-
tice at the last Assizes at Kingston. A verdict was returned
for the plaintiff, the Court reserving the point, whether the ac-
tion was not barred by the 95th sec. of the Act incorporating the
Company (3th Will. 4th), which enacts that " for any thing done
under the Act no action could be brought against any person
without twenty days notice given." The point reserved
leave was given to move to enter a nonsuit, the Learned Judge
not deeming it clear, whether the word person was intended
in that clause to apply to the Company.
Mr. KENNEDY this clay moved for a rule to enter a nonsuit
on the point reserved, namely, that the plaintiff had not given
twenty days notice. The Learned Gentleman referred to the
second section of the Act (the interpretation clause), which
extended the ordinary application of words used in the Act,
as that words male or female should be understood to apply
to either sex, and that words singular should include many
persons or things ; the word man should be understood to
apply to houses, lands, buildings, as the case might be—
( Laughter)—and lastly, that the words he and she should in-
clude numbers of persons and Corporations.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE.—And corporations. You see
Mr. Kennedy, if there were no interpretative clause, there
would be no difficulty.—(Laughter.) In the 74th clause,
you will find the words "persons or corporations" opposed to
each other.
Mr. KENNEDY referred to other sections of the Act to show
that the words person and persons were so used, that they
must be understood as applying to corporations.
The COURT.—But you must take the whole Act, and make
it clear whether the interpretative clause had not the effect of
separating the corporation from the word person in the clause
for the limitation of action.
Mr. KENNEDY then referred to several passages in Black-
stone and Coke to show that the word person was always un-
derstood to include corporation; and in fact the present point
had been so decided in the case of Fisher v. The Thames
Junction Company, in which, as in all recent Railway and
Canal Bills, the interpretation and limitation clauses were
precisely the same as in this.—(A laugh.)
The COURT—They are very extraordinary. Take a rule
to show cause.

Mr. KINNEDY stated that a point had been raised as to the
admission of the Act in evidence, on the ground that it was a
private Act. But the last clause made it a public Act, re-
quiring every Justice to take judicial notice of it.
The CocaT--They add that clause now to every private
Act.