The Sun.
London, England, 1854-04-01 00:00:00

THE OATHS BILL.

In reply to Mr. SPOONER,
Lord J. RUSSELL said it was not his intention to pro-
ceed with the Oaths Bill until after Easter. (Hear.)

WAR WITH RUSSIA.-ADDRESS TO THE
QUEEN.

The SPEAKER having read the proposed address to the
Queen,
Lord J. RUSSELL said—Sir, in rising to move an an-
swer to her Majesty's most gracious message, I have a deep
sense of the solemn, I may say the awful importance of the
motion that I am about to make. It is now more than half
a century since a message of a similar import was brought
to this house. It is nearly 40 years since this country has
been in the enjoyment of the blessings of peace. Those
blessings have been never more widely nor more extensively
felt. The privileges of the people have been increased, their
burdens have been diminished, and, with an increasing and
prosperous commerce, wealth has been diffused throughout
the country. We have had lately a n exhibition of the pride,
pomp, and circumstances of war ; but it is impossible to
think of war without thinking at the same time of the
bloodshed that it causes, of the prosperity that it inter-
rupts, of the misery that it induces. (Hear.) It is, there-
fore, sir, only from a paramount sense of the necessity that
we should engage in this war that I appear here to advise
this house to reply in terms of assent and encouragement
to her Majesty's most gracious message. (Hear, hear.) In
performing this task I will endeavour to avoid, as much as
I am able, consistently with doing justice to the subject,
—I will endeavour to avoid those questions which we have
discussed on former nights of debate—questions with re-
gard to the conduct of the Government—whether more or
less of protracted negotiations should have beau under-

taken—whether the tone which was adopted by the Go-
vernment at certain periods of that negotiation was the
best fitted to secure that honourable peace at which we
aimed. I shall endeavour rather to point to the course
which Russia has pursued, and to show that, unless we
are content to submit to the further aggrandisement of
that power, and, possibly, to the destruction of Turkey—
whose integrity and independence have been so often de-
clared essential to the stability of the system of Europe—
we have no choice left us but to interpose by arms. (Hear,
hear.) Sir, in referring in the first place to the affairs of
Turkey, I should beg the house to remark that a great
change has taken place in the internal position of Turkey
during the last twenty or thirty years. We are all ac-
quainted with the system of violence and misrule which
used formerly to prevail, and those who have watched the
conduct of Lord Stratford will be aware what has been the
advice which he has given, and what the beneficial effects
that have:flowed from it. (Hear, hear.) Long acquainted
with the affairs of Turkey, having deeply at heart the main-
tenance of that empire, he has constantly said (not yester-
day nor the day before, but during a long series of years),
" The independence of Turkey cannot be maintained with-
out the assistance of the other powers of Europe ; that
assistance cannot be maintained unless Turkey shall adopt
with regard to her subjects in general, and with regard to
her Christian subjects in particular, those general rules of
justice and fair treatment which are established by the
public opinion of Europe." (Hear, hear.) That advice,
though not immediately nor fully adopted, has yet been
so far followed that there has been a great improvement
in the treatment of the subjects of Turkey—that the
Christian subjects of the Porte, in particular, have de-
rived great advantages from those changes—that they have
enjoyed the:free exercise of their religion, that they have
prospered in their trade, and that their welfare has greatly
increased under the Government of the Sublime Porte.
(Hear, hear.) Sir, this is a very essential and important
part of this question ; because, if I am not mistaken
—and it is no new opinion of mine, for I have held it
at least from the commencement of the discussions
of last year—it is not the prospect of the decay of
Turkey, it fs not the fear of her immediate dissolution,
cwohinscihstehnast
withincited
her independence,theßuss
Russian Government
and t
vaernmeonatgtgoradnecTisein
andselt
subversive of her territorial limits—(Hear, hear)—but it
has been the fear that the old system of Russia, of making
progress gradually, of depriving Turkey of her dominions
one after another, of interfering more and more with her
internal government—(hear, hear)—would not be success-
ful—it has been the fear that the Ottoman Government,
instead of declining, has exhibited to Europe a Govern.
ment of internal concord within and of strength without
—it has been this fear which has impelled Russia to what
I believe will be found an unsuccessful, and what I be-
lieve Russia herself will consider a premature, attempt
against the Ottoman Empire. (Cheers.) If, sir, we look
to Russia, we shall observe that while all the powers of
Europe have been, during this interval of peace, with
more or less success, attempting to improve their internal
organisation—while they have considered questions of
commerce, questions of legislation, with a view to improve-
ment, with a view to the future welfare of their subjects,
it has been almost the sole object of the Government of
Russia to form and to maintain an overpowering army—
to complete her military organisation, and to be ready on
any occasion to throw the sword into the balance in her
transactions with the other powers of Europe. (Hear,
hear.) We have therefore, at the present moment, with-
out even the immense effort which has been made during
the past year—we have an immense military power on thee
part of Russia, prepared, and as we have heard within these
two days, already commencing an attack upon the terri-
tories and upon the existence of Turkey. On the other
side, if we have not at the present mometft the material
assistance, we have at least the moral approbation of all
Europe, approving of the efforts which have been made
to resist the aggression of Russia. (Cheers.) We have,
joined together in arms, to resist that attempt, the
most powerful sovereigns at the head of the civilised
nations of Europe, which have tested—by conflict
in arms, by rivalry in peace —the great qualities
which each possesses, and we have learnt from that con-
flict and that rivalry, the honour, the courage, and the
patriotism of both. (Cheers.) Sir, I will now proceed to
state, not in detail, because the house, having had the op-
portunity of studying the papers on the table, and having
debated the greater part of them on past occasions, is
fully informed with respect to those details—but I will no w
proceed to state the great outline of what has occurred
with respect to the question now under the consideration,
of the house. I may as well, however, just say first, that
in treating of this subject I shall keep wholly out of view
the dispute which has furnished, not a cause but a pretext
for the Emperor of Russia. (Hear.) I shall keep out of
view the question of the holy places. I will not touch
upon the silver star, or the key of the great gate, or the
key of the little gate, or any of those questions which were
put forward as a matter of dispute. All these matters of
dispute, whether they deserved the contention that took
place about them or not, were settled by the agreement of
all the powers concerned. What I have to treat of are
other questions and other matters. Now, sir, in referring
to the relations between Russia and Turkey, we must al-
ways keep in view that the Empress Catherine, after a
successful war, obtained from the Sultan an article which
is couched in these terms with respect to, the Christians
generally of the Sultan's empire. We must recollect, also,
that some territory was given up by the Empress by that
treaty of peace, and that she declared to her subjects that
the peace was glorious and successful because she had ob-
tained an assurance of protection for those who belonged
to the same religious community as herself. The seventh
article of the treaty of Kainardji runs thus :—" The
Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Chris-
tian religion and its churches, and it also allows the
Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia to make,
upon all occasions, representations as well in fa-
vour of the new church (which is spoken of in
Article 14) at Constantinople, as on behalf of its
officiating ministers." That is the 'whole of what is con-
tained in the seventh article of the treaty of Kainardji.
We perceive at once the promises that are made in the
former part of this article—first, that there is an assurance
that the Porte will protect the Christian religion of its
subjects. And if there had been any persecution of that
religion—if the Christians had been deprived of the power
of resorting to their places of Divine worship, if they had
been injured and slain because they held their religion, the
Emperor of Russia might justly have complained of? the
infraction of the treaty. But there is another thing like-
wise very obvious, namely, that there is no especial detail
with regard to any privileges or immunities which the
Christians held—no interference stipulated for with the
ordinary administration of the affairs of the Sultan in his
territories. (Hear, hear.) There is a protection stipulated
for, but it is a protection of an exceptional kind, and not
to be used without some special cause, some great neglect,
or some maltreatment of the Christian subjects of the
Porta. (Hear.) Now, sir, coming to the events which
took place last year, the house will have perceived that no
sooner was the question of the Holy Places settled than
further :demands, which had already been put forward,
were insisted upon by the ambassador of Russia. In the
first place, according to rumour, these proposals had taken
the shape of a treaty offensive and defensive. They after-
wards took the shape of a convention. After this there
was a formal document requiring the Sultan to give certain
pledges to Russia. Again, a note was insisted upon, but a
note which was to be an agreement with Russia, a stipula-
tion with Russia that the privileges and immunities which
the Christians held in the Turkish empire should be enjoyed
for the future without molestation. The Sultan's Ministers
had at first refrained from asking the opinion of her Ma-
jesty's charge d'affaires, and afterwards of her Majesty's
ambassador, with respect to these proposals. They had
been alarmed at the manner in which the proposals were
made, and the threats which were used in case the proposals
were not adopted. And here, sir, I cannot but refer to the
statements that were made at a particular date by Count
Nesselrode in a despatch written by him to Baron Brunow,
and which was communicated by the desire of the Rus-
sian Government to her Majesty's Government. On the
7th of April, after enumerating various other demands
which according to rumour had been made by Russia at
Constantinople, all of which Count Nesselrode denies, he
at length ends with saying, " that all the rumours relative
to the hostile and threatenine language held to the Porte
by our ambassador are not only exaggerated, but destitute
of any sort of foundation." On the 9th of April, two days
after that date, Lord Stratford writes, saying, with re-
spect to the Turkish Ministers, " This combination of
alarm, seeking for advice, and of reluctance to entrust me
frankly with the whole case, is attributable to the threat-
ening language of Prince Menschikoff, and to the character
of his proposals." (Hear, hear.) I cannot doubt that
Lord. Stratford's assertions were perfectly well founded
I cannot doubt that the language used to the Porte during
the whole of that mission of Prince Menschikoff was of a
threatening character—threatening, in the first place, in
case the proposals should be divulged, with, at the same
time, great and tempting offers of support —threatening,
in a later period of the mission, that in case the preposals
were refused, that great calamities would ensue. (Hear.)
Therefore, sir, in stating to Lord Clarendon, on the part
ho fo
stthi
lee Russianr
eGa
toevneirangml ea nn tg: u tahgae t
wasth e
ar ur me
port o thewh o
ll usey
d e os
.f
titute of any kind of foundation, Count Nesselrode did
but pursue twat system of deception and concealment
which has unfortunately been the character of Russia
in these negotiations. (Hear, hear.) But at the same
time that these proposals had been made at Constan-
tinople—proposals, as I have said, in the first instance
of a tempting character, and offering the ships and the
vvas of a very different
hear.) speaking
troops of Russia in aid of the Sultan, if the terms
of Russia were agreed to—the language held to her
majesty's minister atSt.Petersburg
character. (Hear, In of the conduct of
the Russian Government on a formes occasion, I certainly
used very strong language of reprobation. I do not now
think that that language was at all too strong. (Cheers.)
I cannot—although the words were uttered in debate—I
cannot, upon reflection, say that the terms I then used at
all exaggerated the character of the transactions to which I
grinhdiar
done
en me at
then alluded. (Cheers.) But these appear to have excited
the St. verygreat
Petersburg,
honours
a t hofe
ordering Emperor
of
Ii ueasstia
an
article to be inserted in the Journal of St Petersburg, in
which reference was made not very fairly, and certainly
very unexpectedly, to the confidential communications
which had taken place between the Emperor and the Bri-
tish Minister. Such was the nature of that article, that it
made an impreseion—an impression which was eagerly
seized by the abettors of Russia in the different Courts of
Europe—an impression that the English Government had
been some party to or had listened favourably to proposals
for the partition of the Turkish empire. It therefore be-
came necessary that we should lay before Parliament and
this country what really had taken place. (Hear, hear.)
And to the divulging of that which, out of regard for a
foreign Sovereign we had not before thought ourselves
justified in producing. We have no reason, sir, to regret
the publication of that correspondence. (Cheers.) From
that correspondence, it appears that the Emperoi of Russia
having in the year 1841 declared that the time might come
when the dissolution of the Turkish empire might take
place, and that in that case he should be anxious to learn
the desires and views of England upon the subject, in
1853, insisted, and insisted against all reason, that the mo-
ment of the dissolution of the Turkish empire was at hand
and that it was necessary that the English Government
should agree with him as to what was to be done in that
case. The answer which her Majesty's Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs gave to that overture is before the
world, and it is in substance that we could not be parties
to any project of the kind. But, at the time that that
correspondence was taking place, I took occasion, in this
house, because there were symptoms in this and in other
countries that men's minds were all tending in that direc-
tion, that the dissolution and fall of Turkey was at hand,
I took the occasion of declaring, in answer to a noble friend
near me (Lord Dudley Stuart), that to such a partition of
Turkey as might be imagined by those who had taken part
in other partions, England would never be a party. Lord
Clarendon, who succeeded 'no in the office which he now

ill; with so much ability, replied to the sameeffea In
spite of what then looked like an offer of part of the Turk-
ish territory for ourselves, he replied in terms as decided
that our policy was to maintain the Turkish empire, to
support her independence and her integrity, and that we
h*l no wish to share in her dowpial. (near, hear.) Now,

sir, it might be that the Emperor of Russia from his ob-
servation of Turkey, had arrived at the opinion that the
fall of Turkey could not really be prevented, and that it
was advisable, in order to prevent war, that some arrange-
ment should be entered into with the great Dower of Eu-
rope. That may have been his intention. But I think the
natural impression was that which Sir Hamilton Seymour
evidently derived from the conversations which he held
with the Emperor of Russia—namely, that if the Emperor
of Russia appeared to be so convinced that the fall of
Turkey was at hand, he contemplated that the fall of
Turkey should take place. But be that as it may, whatever
was the real meaning of the Emperor of Russia in these
conversations, her Majesty's Government had hoped that
when England entirely refused to be a party to any such pro-
ject it would have been relinquished by Russia, and that she
would certainly calculate the consequences of having all
Europe opposed to her in case she should proceed to an armed
aggression. (Hear.) I will now again refer to the mission of
Prince Menschikoff. Prince Menschikoff ended with a de-
mand for certain privileges and immunities for the Chris-
tians. The Turkish Minister, in alarm, had recourse to
the Ministers of the Four Powers at Constantinople, ask-
ing their advice and assistance. Lord Stratford was dis-
posed to agree with the Turkish Government, that these
demands were dangerous to the independence of Turkey.
But the four representatives came to the decision that it
was a question which so nearly touched the free action
and the dignity of the Porte, that it was not proper for them
in their then situations to offer any advice or instruction.
When that decision was communicated to the minister of
the Sultan, he declared that the Porte had already come
to a decision, and that that decision was adverse to the
claims put forward by Prince Menschikoff. Prince Men-
schikoff having, as I said, pronounced threats of the cala-
mities that would follow the rejection of his terms—threats,
by the bye, totally inconsistent with the language that he
had before held to her Majesty's Ambassador—Prince
Menschikoff having pronounced these threats, proceeded
with great state and ceremony to leave Constantinople,
and returned to the Russian territory. Upon this intima-
tion, her Majesty's Government, thinking that the time
had arrived when there was danger to the independence of
the Porte, directed that her Majesty fleet, then at Malta,
should proceed to the neighbourhood of Constantinople,
and her Majesty's Ambassador was directed, if it should
be necessary, to bring the fleet up to Constantinople. Now,
sir, I think that step was an irrevocable proof of the desire
of her Majesty's Government to support the independence
of the Sultan. (Cheers.) If terms had been obtained
which were honourable to the Sultan—which would
have maintained the independence of his authority and
the integrity of his dominions—the fleet would pro-
bably have returned to Malta ; but whilst de-
mands were insisted upon which could not be sub-
mitted to, while those demands were to be enforced by
arms, still more was it impossible for her Majesty and the
Emperor of France, in concert with whom her Majesty
ac ed, to withdraw their forces from the support of the
Sultan. (Cheers.) I lay the more stress upon this circum-
stance, because it was at the time a matter of inquiry in
this house. A fear was expressed—a fear in which I did
not participate—that a sudden invasion would take place,
directed immediately against Constantinople. Bat this at
all events was clear, that the house approved of the de-
monstration which was then made, and approved of the
declaration which I made at that time—that it was a proof
that her Majesty was determined to support the Sultan
against unjust aggression. (Cheers.) Sir, when the intel-
ligence arrived at St. Petersburg that the last demands of
Prince Menschikoff had been refused, it was decided that
a message should be sent, conveying a letter of Count
Nesselrode's demanding in the most peremptory terms
that Prince Menschikoff 's note should be signed within
eight days, and announcing that, in default of such signa-
ture, the Principalities, part of the Sultan's territories,
would be occupied by Russian troops. It was quite im-
possible for the Sultan, with any regard to his honour, to
assent to such terms. The invasion by Russian troops im-
mediately took place. The question then arose, what was
the Sultan to do under these circumstances ? Lord Strat-
ford— as I have always said, the truest and best friend of
the Porte —(hear)—advised the Sultan not to exercise his
right of making it a cactus belli, but recommended him to
renew negotiations, in the hope that honourable terms
might be obtained, and in the mean time to strengthen
those places by sea and land the defences of which during
peace had been greatly neglected as well as greatly dimi-
nished. That advice was taken by the Porte. It was in
conformity with the opinion of the four powers, of Eng-
land, of France, of Austria, and of Prussia. Fresh nego-
tion accordingly took place. The Sultan sent, by the ad-
vice of his Ministers, fresh terms of peace. These terms
arrived at a moment when a note had been agreed upon
by the representatives of the four powers at Vienna,
and, therefore, the Sultan's terms were set aside,
and the other proposal was sent forward. The Sultan
agreed to those terms, with some modifications. lam not
going to enter into verbal niceties as to the question of the
Vienna note. But what is perfectly plain—thatlany one
who reads it will, I think, admit at once—is, that the
Vienna note, as modified by the Porte, as altered in some
respects by the Porte, conveyed to the Emperor every se-
curity he could have wished as to the privileges and im-
munities of the Christian subjects of the Porte. The Sul-
tan said that he considered it due to his own honour to
maintain unimpaired and unviolated the privileges and
immunities of his Christian subjects. He was ready to
make this declaration in a note to the Minister of the
Emperor of Russia. Therefore the sole difference, and yet
a difference upon which all these subsequent demands of
Russia have been made—the difference was this, that, ac-
cording to the proposal of the Sultan, the Christian sub-
jects of the Porte would have enjoyed all their privileges
and immunities—they would have had them under the
sanction of solemn documents, confirmed by the Sultan,
as their Sovereign ; they would have had them under the
sanction of a declaration that it was due to his own honour
to preserve them ; they would have had them under the
sanction of an assurance given to all the great powers of
Europe—to all the five powers of Europe—to Russia also,
but to Russia no more than to any other power. (Hear,
hear.) The Russian proposal, on the contrary, was, not
for increasing the immunities and privileges of the Chris-
tian subjects of the Porte—whose privileges and immuni-
ties had not been diminished, but increased of late years
—but that all those privileges and immunities should b.. 1
confirmed by a special treaty with Russia, and thereby the
Russian Minister would have had the power, on every
question of spiritual, nay, on every question of civil privi-
lege, of interfering between the Sultan and 12,000,000 of
his subjects. (Hear.) Therefore the question was not, as
the Russian Government has repeatedly put it, a question of
a religious desire on the part of the Emperor to protect the
Christians of his own community in the Sultan's domi-
nions. (Hear, hear.) That was not the question. That
security was afforded—that security was amply afforded.
But the question was, whether the sovereigi4y of these
12,000,000 of people should be transferred from their own
sovereign, the Sultan, to a foreign sovereign who possessed
an overwhelming force. (Hear, hear.) Sir, the position
which was taken by her Majesty's Government at that time
is stated so clearly in the circular of Lord Clarendon, dated
the 13th of June, that it is one of those few documents which
I shall take the liberty of reading to the house. My noble
friend says :—" The repeated assurances of the Russian
Government, given both to the Government of her Majesty
and to the French Government, that Prince Menschikoff's
mission to Constantinople bad reference solely to the Holy
Places, had led her Mejesty's Government confidently to
hope that the satisfactory arrangement of that long-pend-
ing question would have removed all grounds of difference
between Russia and the Porte. Bat, under the plea of
confirming ancient treaties, further demands were put for-
ward by the Russian ambassador, involving a protectorate
of the Greek Church in Turkey, not only as regards the
spiritual, but also the civil rights and immunities
of its members. Every concession which could be made
was offered by the Turkish Government, who, throughout
these trying negotiations, displayed a most moderate and
conciliatory spirit; but it would have been impossible for
them to have complied with these last demands without
derogating from the sovereign rights of the Sultan, and
virtually surrendering the independence of the Ottoman
empire ; and her Majesty's Government have, therefore,
entirely approved the advice given by Lord Stratford de
Redcliffe to the Porte. In these views and opinions there
is a complete agreement between her Majesty's Government
and the French Government ; and the English and French
fleets, which have been ordered to approach the Darda-
nelles, will act in concert under the orders of the respec-
tive ambassadors of the two countries. In taking this step
her Majesty's Government are actuated solely by the desire
to uphold the independence of the Turkish empire—an in-
dependence which the Great Powers are deeply interested
in upholding, and which has been acknowledged by them
as necessary to the balance of power in Europe." (Cheers.)
Such, sir, was the position taken up by the English and
French Governments. Now, when the note of Vienna,
modified in the manner-I have stated, reached St. Peters-
burg, the Emperor, who had agreed to the original note,
and had agreed to it even as altered with a view to
make the sense of it more clear to the Cabinet in London,
refused to accede to that modified note. Not long after-
wards there appeared that which the Russian Government
had declared to be a confidential despatch, but which
ought not to have been confidential, because it showed the
spirit in which the Russian Government were prepared to
agree to the Vienna note—it showed that, while they ac-
cepted every word of that note, they did not affix to it the
sense which was affixed to it by all the Four Powers—(hear)
—they did not affix to it the sense which the English Go-
vernment in particular had affixed to it--and therefore the
intention of the Russian Government clearly was, accord-
ing to their own explanation of their intentions, to accept
the terms according to one sense at Vienna—according to
one sense in London, in Petersburg, at Vienna, and at
Berlin—and afterwards to enforce them in another sense
at Constantinople. (Hear, hear.) Why, sir, I say that,
in agreeing to sign that note, if such was their intention,
they not only ought not to have made their explanation of
it confidential, but they should have told the powers with
whom they were treating, under whose sanction this note
was to be signed, what interpretation they put upon it.
(Hear, hear.) And, therefore, the proposition to sign that
note, knowing perfectly well, admitting themselves that they
and
another e s especially e c i
senseal l y
to
oyi thet
themselves, English
which
tGovernment,hey
knew, what was the sense affixed to it by the four powers,
proposition anythingto
afterwards—(hear,
less than what I described it to bo in
at eSpotelei
much blame has been attached—a
this interpetration war.• (Cheers.) I should say that
Neeselrode. It is said toghva
given in a cote signed by Count
written by a subordi-
nate in the Foreign-office
raburgh, but Count
Neeselrocle has assumed its res
Siriatai
u,
shouldt h e
b modi-
fiedbe
note having been thus rejected b
arose whether any further effort at leltgYitsiquestionfar from
r om
made. Even then the Sultan's Government were far
being adverse to a settlement of the question. But an
event occurred of the utmost importance. A step was
taken by Turkey from which she thought she could no
longer refrain—l refer to the declaration of war by Tur-
key. (Hear, hear.) Sir, it is always in the power of
tyrannical Governments to endeavour to impose upon
others unjust terms ; but it is not in their power to pre-
vent that attempt exciting the indignation and provoking
the anger of the party against which the attempt is directed.
Principalities,a_ainseffectof the • •
• t Turkey—such was the
(Cheers.) Such was the effect of the attempt of Russia
the Sultan. The fanaticism, if you choose to call it so—
containing. four. millions of the subjects of
the enthusiasm, as the Turks would call it, of their nation
was reused , they hastened to the standard of the Sultan,
and thousands of men appeared in arms on the banks of
the Danube to resist the aggression. The Sultan had from
the first moment of the entry of the Russians into the
Principalities a just cause of war ; encouraged and excited
by his subjects, he thought he could no longer—after this
first proposal of peace had been rejected, he thought he
could no longer refrain from a declaration of war. Well,
sir, it is hard for us to blame the conduct of the Sultan in
that respect. (Hear.) The wrong was with Russia ; the
wrong arose from the conduct of the Russian Govern-
ment. It might be imprudent in Turkey at any time
to resist that force of Russia; but, sir, it was an impru-
dence which we must all honour—it was an imprudence
which arose from a just sense of independence, and resent-
ment of the wrong which had been done. Sir, when that
war was declared, of course the negotiations become more
and more difficult; still, terms of great moderation And