The Sun.
London, England, 1854-02-21 00:00:00

TETE SUN LONDON, TLTESDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 21, 1854.

When did she get her troops away from Rome, or from
Algiers ? What was the war for ? Was it a war they were
about to fight on behalf of a balance of Power. and the
protection of Europe ? Was the time come when the great
contest of which they were told between Cossackism and
Republicanism was to be brought to an issue ? Was Eng-
land the only nation that was to make war for such a pur-
pose ? He thought the noble lord had rather broken down
in that part of his speech when he spoke of Russia being
the common disturber of Europe. It was very probable
that all the states of Europe, except France and England,
would remain neutral. (Hear, hear.) Let them take a
glance at the map of Europe, and they would find there
was between them and Russia, Austria and Prussia, and
all the German states, Belgium and Holland, Sweden and
Norway—countries possessing some 70,000,00,1 or so,coo,oao
of people, and having some 700,000 or 800,000 men under
arms. These nations had been for the last ten, or at least
five years almost constantly drilling, parading, and m anmuv-
ring troops. Every ante-room in every foreign court was
filled with uniforms either scarlet 1r blue. Every one
thought that it was to carry out the antiquated notion—the
venerable delusion of a resistance to the Huns and Goths
who were about to overrun Europe, and when they come
to analyse the matter, they found that England was about
to send some 20,000 or 30,000 troops over the backs, if he
might use the expression, of the Belgian, the Dutch, the
Swedes, the Austrians, and the Prussians, the most mili-
tary part of Europe, to fight battles for their safety.
(Hear, hear.) If, as the noble rd said, there was danger
to Europe—if all mankind had an interest in the question
—then he would say, above all things, it was a case in
which all those who were nearest the danger should be the
first to resist it. Instead of Prussia and Austria entering
into this quarrel they allowed England—and island inap-
proachable by land and impregnable by sea—to take up
their cause. Ho would say, that, so far from England be-
ing in danger, she might be said to be the only country in
Europe that was invulnerable. Without making any con-
dition that these countries should assist us, we were send-
ing 20,000 troops, who were cheered in going through the
streets, to be transported 1,500 miles in order to get be-
tween Russia, Austria, Prussia and the rest of Europe.
Was not that a specimen of the combativeness which was
called John Bullism ?—was not that a specimen of the
conduct which had led them to incur a debt heavier
than that of all the rest of the world put together?
They were going again to repeat the same game; their ap-
peals to the other states of Europe were in vain. They
had said, led us to take this opportunity of putting down
a monstrous evil. The answer of these states was—No, we
do not move. Why? Because we do not believe in the
danger —because we do not believe that Cossackism is
menacing Europe. They had a firm conviction that Eng-
land was fighting her own battles for her own commercial

interests. When he heard the hon. and learned gentleman
the member for Sheffield -and no one rejoiced to see him
there more than himself—(hear)—when he heard him
dealing unmeasured and unqualified invective upon a cer-
tain gentleman of the peace party—he said, "he is himself
again." (Great laughter and cheering.) It was said we
must fight Russia now, or we should have to fight her ulti-
mately, and that if we did, not only prevent her from
taking Constantinople, but also cut her off from the Cau-
casus, our Indian empire would be imperilled. Why this
was just the sort of language to induce the French people
to suppose that, after all, we were inspired only by selfish
feelings and for the sake of commercial superiority, instead
of the welfare of the world. It was just the way to arouse
the suspicions of our neighbours as to English "rapacity"
and " perfidy." And then if France left us we should
have no one to join us in our war. Was there no party in
that house who would contend that if we were to interfere
in it at all, it s ould be solely by our navy, and that we
should abstain from sending a miserable army of 20,000
meu to the banks of the Danube, while the great mili-
tary powers of Europe stood passive spectators of the
struggle ? (Hear, hear.) There were in this country
not only those who believed all war un-Christian, even in
self-defence, but those who, like the late Sir R. Peel,
thought it wis.? to allay the spirit of war by that of politi-
cal propagandism or agitation. He (Mr. Cobden) was a
supporter of that policy. He desire I to abate our martial
enthusiasm, and to allay our national combativeness. It
was a good quality ; he had it himself (a laugh), but he
did not like to see this nation for ever animated by a pre-
judice for some nation or another—now France, now
Russia, and for ever hurried on by such prejudices into
war. He declared that he desired to fall back on the
Vienna note. (Laughter.) He saw nothing objectionable
in it - -indeed, the four powers had agreed to it. And its
adoption would save the honour of the Sultan (if rid of
diplomacy) for that very reason— as it was not the note of
Prince Menschikoff, but of the four powers. As for any
reluctance diplomatists might feel at retracing their steps,
or contradicting th&r course, he did not care much for
that ; the credit of diplomacy in the transaction had been
so badly sustained that another inconsistency could not be
of any consequence. At all events, he gladly embraced
all the unpopularity that now belonged to an opposition
against this war, and he believed that before six months
had passed there would be none so unpopular as those who
supported it. (Hear, hear.)
Lord J. MANNERS trusted that the people of England
would never consider whether they were going to war on
behalf of the majority of the inhabitants of Turkey or not,
nor whether the balance of trade was in our favour or the
contrary, but whether the will of the Autocrat of Russia
was to overbear that of the free Parliament of England.
He thought great blame attributable to the Government
for mismanagement in the early stages of the negotiations,
Lord Clarendon having persisted to the last in believing
the amicable assurances of Russi s, and disregarding the
warnings of her deceitful policy which were addressed to
him by British agoras abroad. At the failure of Prince
Menschikeff's mission only did the English Government
determine to act cordially, in conjunction with France,
to check the monstrous pretensions of Russia. Had they
d one so at an, earlier period, was it credible that that
envoy would, on the lith of April, have received fresh
instructions to press his demands to the utmost? If their
course had been more firm, war might have been averted.
After the Turks had declared war, it was unjustifiable in
Government to hold out the renewal of the treaty of Kai-
nardji as a basis of negotiation and peace, that treaty
having furnished Russia with her pretexts for vexatious
interference. With reference to the demand of Ministers
for a vote of censure on the one hand, or unlimited con-
fidence on the other, he contended that the course taken
by the Opposition vrors the valy criercorapatrible-rrith a re-
solve to abstain from embarrasing the future action of her
Majesty's Government. They would vote men and money,
and Rapport any measures that might be necessary in the
situation in which the country was placed, but they must
express the opinions they had formed on the past con-
duct of the negotiations. He hoped that the efforts of
our arms in the coming contest would not be frustrated
and sacrificed by the blunders of our diplomacy.
Mr. HORSMAN thought it would have been better to
raise this question by a distinct motion than by an inci-
dental and desultory discussion. He must express his re-
gret at the tone of the speech delivered by the hon. mem-
ber for the West Riding, and his dissent from many of its
positions and arguments. The question now was nothing
more nor less than this—shall the Emperor of Russia be
Emperor of Turkey also ? The conquest of Turkey, fol-
lowed as it would be assuredly by that of Greece, implied
not only the extension of Russian dominion from the
White Sea to the Mediterranean, but dictatorship over
Europe, and the ascendency of a semi.barbaroas race over
the more civilized, intellectual, and enlightened nations of
the West The balance of power woulii be destroyed, the
commerce of England endangered, her Indian empire more
than threatened, and the liberties of Europe at an end.
Never in modern history had there been such a crime as the
Russian attack on Turkey, accompanied by aggravations so
revolting; and the pretext offered for it, the protection of
religion, added to its infamy. During the progress of hos-
tilities, the Turks had proved their moral superiority to
their enemies, and entitled themselves to the admiration
of Europe. Throughout the negotiations, the position
of Government had been one of great difficulty, and no
other course had been suggested which, if adopted by Min-
isters, would not have been equally doubtful at the time,
and probably more disastrous in its issue. The object of
the Government had been to reconcile the settlement of
great European questions with the warding off the calami-
ties of war. But if war was inevitable, as he believed it to
have been from the first, it was impossible we could have
been placed in a combination of circumstances so advanta-
geous to us giving life to our movements and union to our
councils. If England and France were true to their own
honour and interests, the Czar was now at their mercy,
and ho must accede to any terms they might dictate. He
wished, however, the noble lord the member for London
had comforted the house the other night by assuring them
that they were not going to war to re-establish the status
quo and the renewal of the old treaties. It was our duty
to take effectual guarantees for the future ; and, in order
that the aggression on Turkey might not be repeated, he
:rusted that one of the conditions of peace would be that
Russia should make indemnity for the expenses of the war,
or that Turkey should receive compensation in having the
territories of which she had been deprived restored to her.
Mr. H. D RUMMO ND had learned that ministers were
going to war, but could net imagine among which class in
the country, they could expect support. The manufac-
turers were ready to make arms for the enemy ; the tax-
payers would soon discover that every additional burden
must ultimately fall upon industry; and the Opposition,
though ready enough to pass votes which were soon to lead
the ministry into a mess, would infallibly turn every event
to account for the purpose of dislodging the Government,
whose members would then in their turn play the same
game against their successors. When the people of this
country were entering upon a war, it was right and proper
that they should be told why they ware going to war. He
confessed that, after all he had read in the blue book and
heard in that house, he did not know. But he believed
that we were entering upon another religious war—ano-
ther crusade for the tomb of Geoffrey de Bouillon, which
was already so broken th .t it was hardly perceptible, and
into doing that they had been led by the author of all mis-
chief—the Pope. (Laughter.) Upon England the re-
sult of the war could be only damaging—we should
have nothing but hard blows to get and heavy bills to pay.
This was the popular war into which the whole country was
anxious to plunge. The country was, no doubt, angry
with Russia; but he must say that no one had more con-
tributed to excite that anger than the hon. gentleman
behind him (Mr. Cobden), who even at one time talked of
" crumpling up" that Power altogether. If the hon. gen-
tleman would put that threat into execution now, it would
save a world of trouble. (Laughter.) Mr. Drummond then
referred to the primary cause of the dispute, arising from
the question of the Holy Places, and contended that the
war, instead of being waged, as pretended, on behalf of
the balance of power, was in reality a religious war
Lord J. Russell in one of his despatches said—" We
should deeply regret any dispute that might lead to con-
flict between two of the great Powers of Europe; but
when we reflect that the quarrel is for exclusive privileges
in a spot near which the heavenly host proclaimed peace on
earth and good will towards men—when we see rival
churches contending for mastery in the very place where
Christ died for mankind—the thought of such a spectacle
is very melancholy indeed. Your excellency will under-
stand, therefore, first, that into the merits of this dispute
her Majesty's Government will not enter. 2d, That her
Majesty's Government disapprove of every threat, and still
more of the actual employment of force. 3(1, That both
parties should be told that if they are sincere in their
professions of a desire to maintain the independence of the
Porte, they ought to abstain from the employment of any
means calculated to display the weakness of the Ottoman
empire. Above all, they ought to refrain from putting
armies and fleets in motion for the purpose of making the
tomb of Christ a cause of quarrel among Christians.
He thought these expressions were creditable to the writer,
to the Sovereign whom he served, and the Ministry of
which he formed a part. But still the question returned,
why was not the country told all this a year ago ? (Hear.)
They were told little, but it was said that much
din well, as a present to his
was being done. That reminded him of a story of a High-
lander, who, returning from abroad, brought with him a
parrot, which spoke exceedingly
lady-love. Another Highlander, determined to make a
similar present to his fair one, went to Edinburgh and
purchased an owl. He was reminded that it could not talk,
to which he replied, "Ay, but see what apower of thought
he has." (Great laughter.) It had been said, and chiefly
by gentlemen on that side of the house, that we interfered
a great deal too much with Continental matters. He had

himself often thought so, but not precisely on the same
grounds. In his opinion, there never was a time when we
could have so well escaped Continental meddling as the
present. But he now came to what was called the balance
of power. His noble friend said, the other sight, that
he was surprised that any one should speak slightingly
of the balance of power, for it was a subject which had
occupied the attention of the statesmen of Europe in all
times. It would, no doubt, ill become him (Mr. Drum-
mond) to speak with disrespect of anything which was
deemed so important; but, without venturing any opinion
against the opinions of greater and wiser men, he
would take the liberty of mentioning certain facts. They
all know the time when consternation seized every Minis-
ter of foreign affairs in Europe because a Bourbon was going
to mount the throne of Spain or Naples. Nov, in point
of fact, was France one whit more powerful after that
event than before? It was notorious that she was not;
nor did he believe that, if the intention of Catherine—an
intention shown by the fact of her christening her second.
son Constantine—of placing him on the throne of Constan-
tinople was fulfilled, Russia would be one whit more pow-
erful than she was at present; nor did he believe that, if
the Emperor succeeded just now in seating his 'erother on
that throne, we should be one whit the worse off. How
could we possibly uphold Turkey? We appeared to have
found out that the maintenance of the independence of
Turkey, our old, or, as she was more generally called, our
ancient ally, was necessary to the balance of power in
Europe. How ice the world had we never found out this
before, when we took away from her the whole kingdom
of Greece? How came we not to think of this before the
should
camebb
hhtuai
oeett
Helen'sutßwl ecalwe Ottoman 1
ckoekos:Neci?t
knocked
ooegevrlmdaowttrpfdhiawi noirrtnaliti
wsoc
oatecu(hfsroHpeturthaefihewi rliresldu.
wrong
wentteghhhs,
hpsnawittnoteessawrrtl
abtr
nweao.) ts
htswldee
Howendoe,
so under the pretence of upholding the balance of power.
He read, the other day, a remarkable passage in a speech of
Mr. Burke in that house, in 1791, in reply to some speaker
who alluded to the importance of the balance of power.
That distinguished orator showed the impolicy of our
espousing the cause of the Ottoman Power, observing that
the consequence of entering into war on her behalf would
be to involve us in great expense, and to reduce the people
of a Christian nation to the level' of heathens. (Hear.) He
would now ask, where were we going to war? He admitted
that matters had been managed with a great deal of
wisdom and discretion by the Government, La it was not
very long ago since, with great difficulty, they persuaded
the people of this country to look at the real defenceless
nature of its shores, and to allow them to put these shores
in a better, but by no means complete, state of defence.
It was then in fashion to cry up the Emperor Alexander,
and down with the Emperor Napoleon. This year we
turned about, and the Emperor Napoleon was metamor-
phosed into a faithful ally, whom we spoke of in pane-
gyrics, and who joined us in making war against the
tyrant Nicholas. And what were you doing ? You were
sending the elite of our army to the uttermost limits of
Europe, or rather into Asia, leaving the Emperor of France
to send his contingent—those reprobate troops—those con-
demned regiments of ' Algiers ; and when the noble lord
talked of t;ie horrors of Sinope, he wondered he did not
think also of the smoke in the case of General Palliser.
(Hear, hear.) He (Mr. Drummond) would certainly be no
nnsntetgtoounttrlth.etawini remembered Lord St.
party to any vexatious vote which would tend to weaken
the Government of the country; but he should like to
know who was to be the Minister of War. (Hear, hear.)
Mr. Canning thought it of sufficient importance to insist
that Lord Castlereagh should not be such a Minister.
He (Mr. Drummond) asked this question, because all
saw enough to know that at the present moment there
was a fee.le hand at the helm—(cheers from the Oppo-
sition)—there was a trembling of the topsails, and a vibra-
tion throughout the hull, that showed he did not under-
stand how to avoid the breakers. He was also without a
chart or a compass for his guidance, and his crew was
not a particularly united one. (Hear, hear.) He (Mr.
Drummond) considered that the character of no general or
admiral was safe in the hands of the existing Ministry,
and he believed they were capable of sacrificing either of
them to place or to factions in that house. They, at least,
did not hesitate to do so in the case of Brooke, (Cheers.)
If, however, they were determined to go to war—if it were
true that it was to establish the balance of power—if it
were true that they were resolved to humble the Russian
and to support the Infidel—if they would compel Austria
and Prussia to stand true to their engagements, or make
them take the consequences—then he would say, "Go
where glory leads you." (Loud laughter.) Let them enter
upon that path upon which France had already entered—
enter upon the course to which the first Napoleon was
pledged, and the second Napoleon held himself responsible
to proceed in, and to fulfil the intentions of his predecessor
—and strike a blow at the heart of Russia, and not go
wasting their shots in the Black Sea. At least let them
do one act which will accomplish all objects, and at the
same time be but tardy retributive justice—proclaim the
re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland. (Cheers.)
Such an act would do more to bring these continental
despots to their senses than all our guns and taxes.
Mr. I. BUTT denied that this was a religious war. It
was a political conflict; but this was the first occasion on
which any Minister had come down to the house and asked
for a war supply, without clearly and distinctly stating the
grounds on which he asked for it. According to the theory
of our Constitution, as laid down by every political writer
of eminence, it was the right of that house to ask for ex-
planation, and the duty of the Ministers to give it. He
asked—are we at war with Russia, or what delays the de-
claration of war? By the law of nations such orders as
had been given to Admiral Dundas, which went to using
force, if necessary, against Russian vessels, could not be
justified. If Turkey was to place herself unconditionally
in the hands of England and France, and agree to any
terms they might propose, this would be a dishonourable
and degrading position for the Porte, and its independence
would be as completely sacrificed as by yielding implicitly
to the demands of Russia.

Mr. S. HERBERT said that her Majesty's Government
bad no cause to complain of the form which this debate
had assumed. It was true the Government was placed
between two fires. They were told by one party in the
house that they had arrived tardily at the right place, but
that they had taken the wrong road in doing so ; while an-
other • party told them that. thearAthak_ the. sight road at
first, but that they had arrived at the wrong place. These
two lines of argument had been maintained with extreme
skill and ingenuity ; and, if the Government had anything
to complain of on the part of hon. gentlemen who had
urged those arguments, it was not that they had criticised
the conduct of the Government unfairly,—at least, in
terms,—but that they were unanimous in having declined
to test the opinion of the house upon the force and merit
of the arguments they had maintained. The noble lord
the member for Colchester had said that it was all but
the unanimous opinion of the house and the country that
these negotiations had been mismanaged. Well, if that
were the unanimous opinion of the House of Commons,
why did not the noble lord ask the house to declare that
opinion? (Hear, hear.) The Government, he repeated,
were placed between two fires, and they could not get,
between those two hostile camps, any means of obtaining
what opinion the house itself really entertained upon the
question. The tactics of the Opposition showed with what
success blue-books might be used by judicious extracts be-
ing made from them. Having studied the policy of Russia
towards Turkey, they were ready to pay homage to her
superior diplomacy and to the skill of her proceedings iu
these negotiations. It was said that the last thing
which Russia sought or expected was the overthrow
of Turkey by Russian arms, but that her wish was
to weaken Turkey and finally betray her to her own
destructiOn. (Hear, hear.) Now, as it was the wish of
the house that the present debate should terminate
that evening, he promised scarcely to make any refer-
ence to the blue-books, and he certainly would not read
a single passage from them ; but he must say that the se-
lection of passages which had been made by hon. gentle-
men who censured the conduct of ministers displayedmore
ingenuity than candour. He did not believe it possible to
conduct lengthened negotiations concerning great interests
that were in danger anti where a great number of parties
were engaged in them as principals—he did not, he said,
think it possible that in a book containing such a mass of
papers, anti dealing with so many complicated questions,
any man who chose to peruse it with the mind of a special
pleader, prepared to force words from their plain meaning,
could fail to find many detached sentences upon which he
might fix his censure. As a specimen of this sort of criti-
cism, he might refer to what fell from the hon. member for
Aylesbury, who complained of the mistranslation of the
words beau role. But the hon. gentleman read the passage
from the French despatch in whiehthat expression wasilused
as if it was intended to apply to the conduct of the English
Government in reference to the invasion of the principali-
ties. Not at all; it referred to previous transactions
closed before the other question commenced ; it referred
to reports which had been made by our ambassador at
Constantinople respecting the conduct of France in regard
to the Holy Places, and which dispute he did succeed in
reconciling, and thereby brought into closer connection
Russia, Turkey, and France, who up to that time had been
the parties to the dispute. By that very success of Lord
countryichwahsadenbaeeblnedthtoe
ocalostehaaiti
alliance
easNivointh thisFr whancekeystone of our policy ever since. We certainly, as a Pro-
testant Stratford nation, had nothing to do with the disputes be-
tween two sets of monks at Jerusalem - we liad nothing to
do with that dispute until it threatened the peace of Ea-
rope. He thought the French nation had committed a
great diplomatic error in ever entering into that dis-
cussion originally, and that it showed great dignity in
abondoning it, and in enabling Turkey to resist the usur-
pation which arose out of it on the part of Russia. It had,
been stated that the whole mischief and all the difficulties
in which they were now placed arose entirely from the ne-
glect of the English Government to use vigorous measures
last autumn. He was almost afraid to attempt answering
that charge, lest he should weaken the force of the very
eloquent and argumentative speech of the hon member for
Stroud (Mr. Horsman). In the first place, the Government
did not wish to avoid discussion as to the details in which
they were engaged. But hon. gentlemen opposite had this
advantage. Tey came to facts—they were criticizing the
past ; but the Government had no facts to deal with; they
had only to speculate as to the future. And what was it
gentlemen opposite proposed? They said that if, when the
principalities were invaded, we had acted with vigour, we
should have had peace. What was the state of England at
that time ? We had no fleet in the Black Sea, nor any
fleet in the Baltic) ; while Russia had a large fleet—he be-
lieved 28 sail of the line. Turkey also at that time had no
army ; while the army of Russia was formidable, in num-
ber at least. Lord Stratford saw the danger of entering
into a war at that time. But what was the state of things
at the present moment? Turkey had organized and
trained and brought into the field an army of consider-
able power, and her aUiances were considerably more fa-
vourable now than then. They should recollect for how
many years Russia had been acting in close connexion
with Prussia, and allied to her by ties of blood ; and the
relation between Russia and Austria was that of a bene-
factor and a grateful friend. It required time io consent to
an alteration of such intimate relations between those two
countries. But since that time the manly language and
patriotic expressions of Prussia had shown that she knew
how to estimate the proper position in which she should
stand in Europe, while Austria now held a very different
tone towards that Power, evidently showing that she now
took a very different view of her own interests from what
she did a year ago. He (Mt. S. Herbert) was not one of
those who was inclined to ask the house to support the Go-
vernment upon the ground that they were entering into a
slight and paltry struggle, and when he heard it stated
that Russia was not to be feared, and that we need not
conceal our plans, because she was not formidable—because
no nation of slaves was ever formidable—he must say that
that was a delusion which the history of very great con-
quests in past times tended todisprove. It was disproved
by the Russian campaign in Italy, and also by her advance
into the heart of Europe during the last war; and to say
that she could not make great conquests was to forget the
history of Eur Ope during the last century. It Was most

impolitic for the mere purpose of depreciating the prowess
of Russia, to undervalue her capabilities of aggression and
to deny her such aggressive reputation, as her campaigns
in 1773 and 1804, as far as Austria and Prussia were con-
cerned, and her conquests in respect of the Turkish pro-
vinces in former years, justify her in claiming. Again, it
was by no means a tenable argument to adduce in favour
of the weakness of Russia, to say that she was a nation of
slaves, since all who knew anything about that country
know that, whatever the condition of the people might be,
the feeling predominant among them was one of intense
nationalism, and that this feeling aloue made them. strong.
One marked distinction between Russia and Turkey, and
one great advantage in favour of the former country, was
this, that in Turkey the Government was Asiatic and the
people were European, while in Russia the Government
was European and the people Asiatic: Where a country
like Russia was subject entirely to the control of her
ruler in order to estimate her strength or her weakness
we must look to the character of the Prince who rules over
her, and in the present crisis, therefore, we must, take
into consideration the character and abilities of her
Emperor, who, previously to the commencement of these
present unhappy differences, was held in the estimation of
the world as a Prince of no mean ability, and may even
now be looked upon as holding, in the east of Europe,
much the same position as the Pope would hold in the west
if he were at the head of 500,000 men. (Hear, hear.) A
great deal had been said, and much had been made of the
progress and'civilization of Turkey, and it was very true
that that country had made great progress during the last
few years; but yet he could not in any way agree with the
theory that a country like -Turkey under the influence of
Mahomedanism could, under any circumstances, advance
in civilization and improvement in the same ratio as a
country under the influence of Christianity—(hear, hear)—
and it ought to be understood, in reference to this branch
of the question, that we were not inclined to bo embarked
in this war, so much for the purpose of defending Turkey
as of opposing Russia. (Cheers.) It was a fatal thing in
a question like this to intermix the slightest particle of
dictates of duty ; and to lead away the people of England,
like the lower branches of the press in many instances had
done, to think that we were influenced in favour of the
Turk% and their cruelties and barbarism, instead of being
urged on ag tinst Russia to resist her aggression—(hear,
hear)—and he protested against it being said that we were
not induced to take the part which we did in this matter
for the purpose of keeping up the balance of the Powers
of Europe and resisting the encroachment of Russia, but
out of a romantic feeling for Turkey. (Cheers.) He
had previously said that he considered it a fallacy to
suppose that, because Russia was what was called a nation
of slaves, that therefore, she was a weak nation ; but
there was another fallacy, also, still more incorrect, and
that was, to say that a nation of free men, like ourselves,
could not unite for war or combine for national pur-
poses, and that we could not make any sacrifices for
national advantages when such advantages were to be
secured by a necessary war. This fallacy, he felt bound
to say, the speeches delivered last year by the hon. member
for the West Riding of Yorkshire, in his opinion, contri-
buted to diffuse ; inasmuch as whatever he said had a
powerful influence upon Europe, as he was looked upon as
the great and successful advocate of a great question, and
the representative of the feeling of the largest class of the
people of this country. (Loud cries of " No, no," and
laughter, from the Opposition.) If not of the largest class,
the hon. member was a representative, at any rate, of a
great portion—(hear, hear)—of the working classes of this
country, and as such, no doubt, his opinions were canvassed
with great interest at St. Petersburg. (" Hear, hear," and
a laug.) In spite of any such false impression, however,
we should now have an opportunity of showing how for-
midable a nation of freemen could be, and how they would
exert every nerve to carry to a successful termination
what they thought it their duty to undertake. (Hear,
hear.) He believed that if last year we had plunged this
country into a war we should have been called to a heavy
account for having precipitately hurried on such a crisis ;
brit now, in his opinion, the people of England were im-
pressed with the conviction that Government had done the
best that could be done to protect the interest and the
rights and uphold the dignity and the honour of this
country. (Loud cheers.) It had been said that "England's
(Anger was Ireland's opportunity," and he thought that
both were present now. (Hear, hear.) That the former
would manfully and with success resist and surmount the
danger he had no doubt ; and that the latter would profit
by the opportunity there was ample proof, inasmuch as the
people of Ireland were already, with national and charac-
teristic feelings and patriotism, coming forward to show
upon this occasion, as they had done upon all others, how
deep and sincere was their loyalty to their Sovereign in
time of need, and unquestionable their bravery at all times.
(Loud cheers.) It was a matter of sincere satisfaction to
see the temper and unanimity with which all classes of
persons seemed determined to act upon this subject ; and
it was his firm belief that. the sword which we had been
obliged to draw in defence of public right and justice we
should, at any rate, sheath in honour. (Loud cheers.)
Mr. DISRAELI—Sir, I have always thought that one
of the causes of the prolongation of the last great Euro-
pean war was the ignorance of the people of this country
as to the origin and object of that struggle. Even to this
moment they are matters of controversy, whether the
French republic, for example, was an aggressive power;
or whether, on the contrary, if it had been left alone, it
was not a power essentially pacific—whether the ambition
of the first Emperor of France was an insatiable ambition ;
or whether, on the contrary, at a particular period of his
life a conservative policy was not the necessity of his
course? Why we went to war, whether it was to put the
Bourbons on the throne of France, or to reduce the limits
of France, or to establish a constitutional government in
France, are still subjects of controversy, though forty
years have passed, in the pages of our most eminent writ-
ers and our most popular historians. Now, Sir, I have
always felt that if ever this country were embarked again
in a war, which might be a war of magnitude and of ge-
neral character, if I were in a position, however humble,
which might in any way allow me to induce the people of
this country to understand the cause and the object of the
war in which they were engaged, I certainly would make
the attempt. (Hear.) I have always been of opinion that
every nation, and-this nation particularly, would be much
more prepared and much more willing to make the exer-
tion and to endure the burdens which a state of warfare
must induce and occasion, if they really knew why they
were going to war, and for what they were going to war,
than if they were hurried into a contest by inflammatory
policy or their passions, and carried on by an excitement
which at the first moment may be convenient to the mini-
ster, but which a few months after, followed by the ine-
vitable reaction of ignorance, and perhaps of ignorance and
disaster combined, no one would so much suffer from as
that person who is responsible for the administration of
this country. (Hear, hear.) Sir, there is another instance
which is peculiarly applicable to the present position of
affairs, and I confess it has always very much in-
fluenced me. Five and twenty years ago there was a con-
siderable war, and that a war between the two powers
which had now mutually declared war—Russia and Tur-
key. In that war the two great western powers, so often
referred to of late, took part ; but they took part on tile
side of Russia and not of Turkey. By their union with
Russia there was a slaughter at Sinope on a scale to which
the late event, which we so much lament, may be looked
upon almost as a miniature performance. (Hear.) The
present perplexed and the recent prostrate condition of
Turkey was entirely ascribable to the events of that war,
in which France and England were united against them.
And I believe that certainly at that time there was not a
n
mpiltbinnhre
see;
yntebl
oonefaetfddonrhrodettophhrtfoiheenwftemihestaoeai
hrntsu
seroahetgea;ciaoosntonne:
isliiwrie,
its
ohelecsobovohl
joeefoer ekarcusirtauntll lydhgel
ohiytbsft
ooehit
(atht)udhthetnneeadltan—t
first
importance—clearlyar
syroa,,ei(
rsstohstit.
ttee:y,dwaaeniNrrhwdiaet,
hsayhoth as
tnwhy evooobeaewfteerrpseea)meill went
to war on that occasion, and what was the object which
t
we intended to accomplish when we levelled a blow at the
power of Turkey, which is indirectly the cause of the
dangers, of the perils, and the perplexing circumstances
which we are now considering. (Hear, hear.) Well,. sir,
my part I cannot understand how I am to obt'ain that
knowledge—first, as to the cause of the war—but by stu-
dyingcwihouicshl gra-
ciously hipnel
nsetgaaat
aet
go papers, al
wapyehriuse,ph
owanhfi
ec
wh
our hyteearabr
years
0
parlia-
mentary, are now called " blue books." (A laugh.) I know
no other source from which I can obtain any knowledge as
to the cause of a war ; and I know not any means by which
I can clearly arrive at what is the object of a war unless I
first ascertain what is the cause of the war. I therefore
sir, have listened with some dismay to the observations of
those honourable gentlemen who have preceded me in the
debate, who have more than once informed us that we have
no business to consider the past—that we are merely to
consider the actual position of the Government of the
country—and that we are not to inquire by what means we
have arrived at the position which we now occupy. I can-
not draw any coarse line of demarcation between the events
that have recently occurred, and the events that are occur-
ing at this moment with respect to those transactions. I
deny that you can distinguish at this moment the past from
the future of those events.% What is occurring at this mo-
ment is occasioned by the words written in these very de- •
spatches that are lying on our table. (Hear.) The policy
that is there developed is preparing that future which you
say is alone to absorb our attention, and is occasioning
those very events which, even at this instant, may be
giving a new colour to the future, which you say is alone
to be the object of our study. I therefore shall protest
against the doctrines of the First Lord of the Admiralty,
that we are to support the Government or to censure the
Government, and that there is no middle course for the
House of Commons to follow when her Majesty has an-
nounced from the throne that in a moment of danger she
appeals with confidence to our loyalty for her support—
that the country may be on the eve of war, and that we,
under these circumstances, are to offer no opinion, with all
the responsibility that devolves upon us—no opinion upon
those great public events, without being counted either
the servile adherents of the Government, or those who
have no object but to extract from the events of the mo-
ment the means of inconveniencing a ministry. (Hear.)
I therefore feel it my duty to attempt to ascertain the
cause and the object of the war before us. I don't think
that that is a mere critical object. I don't think that that
is a task which merely consists of makingobservationsupon
the papers on the table. The right hon. gentleman who
last addressed the house protested against the reading of
isolated passages of these despatches. He says that it is
unfair, and that it is a manoeuvre no minister can protect
himself against. Well, Sir, I cannot promise the house
that I will read the " blue books" entire. (Hear and
laughter.) But I will promise the house that I will read
very few extracts from these despatches, and far from
taking isolated extracts I will read these only with one
object—namely, to maintain a position which I wish to
establish to the house, and which I am sure cannot be
established by any manoeuvres in debate, or by having re-
course to garbled extracts or to isolated passages accom-
modated to the occasion. (Hear.) Sir, I want first of all
causelt
oha ito(1
thoiofenrhouse
this
language,
waar
Russell)n
to
e c and the
because
supposeeF arcountryif(tietarhy athet
night sl
vhe esupall
speech
ee
enotunderstand
think
ofi
t virtuallythe
isaffec-
tation noble
the
cause of this war, because after the speech of the noble
lord (Lord J. Russell) on Friday night I think it is aftsc-
war. (Hear.) Since the noble lord spoke we have had dan
authoritative statement that our last effort at negotiation
fboertuf.onresthoef
iiss hasthe
hhee failed.oo bajuescet
oloff t
th hithereforeew sahra,sihlaanal
acquire
endeavourgiutirise
a nonlye x
by
to ascertain t
obtaining
idea
d eaof whatwthhaathat
iss war. It will be then for the house to
on this discussion of to-night, but in
i he impendingthen
naturally thatudu te
house to decide whether the object is a worthy -object=
I
f
whether it is an adequate object—and if it be an adequate
dtt informationhhe ee countrydcoursedo willtntha ots
asweydebates
object, whether the means that the Government proposd
are capable of accomplishing it. (Cheers.) Now, sir, I
say, that it is the duty of the House of Commons so to
consider the papers that are laid on the table. I say that

it is for the advantage of the country that there should be
clear ideas on these all important subjects, and that if we
are to embark in a struggle which must without all doubt
cripple the industry of the country, which must burden the
people of the country, which must retard the progress which
we hear so frequently vaunted in the house—that there
should be as clear a conception as possible, not only in this
house, but throughout the land, why we are going to war;
and going to war, what we propose to accomplish by that
last and desperate resource. (Hear.) Now, sir, the relations
between Russia and Turkey have become of late years
so familiar to honourable gentlemen that our duties in de-
bate are extremely facilitated by the knowledge which ex-
ists upon this subject. I remember, when I first entered
Parliament, some sixteen or seventeen years ago, when
this subject—the relations between. Russia and Turkey—
was brought forward. The very subject itself was con-
sidered a project of some ingenious and eccentric mind.
The designs of Russia were a frequent subject of a very
small minority in this house. At that time the predomi-
nant opinion of the House of Commons and the country
was, that there was no subject on which there was so
much exaggeration as that which imputed a systematic de-
sign of territorial aggression to the Emperor of Russia.
(Hear, hear.) Aftirwards, as the subject advanced, and
by the progressive result
iof frequent disenssione, but dis-
cussions always at long intervals and in thin houses, theta
grew up certainly an opinion adopted not by a majority
but by a respectable minority in the house, that there was
a systematic design on the part of Russia, among other
great objects, not only of possessing India, not only of
effecting other great objects, but of conquering and per-
manently possessing Constantinople; and so far as what
was then called the Eastern question —so far as the rela-
tions between Russia and Turkey were concerned, it was
always a question between those who believed that Russia
had no political design and those who were fully convinced
she had a direct and immediate purpose. to conquer the
Ottoman Empire. (hear.) Well, sir, this question has
gradually attracted the attention of the country—circum-
stances have developed it in the country—information has
been obtained, and that which I believe is the truth has
been adopted by many who are entitled to the character
and reputation of statesmen, namely, that Russia has
no intention whatever of forcibly conquering the Otto-
man Empire, but that by an adroit policy and by
indirect means she intended to obtain and exercise such
an influence over the population of the Turkish Empire,
who are subjects of the Sultan--Christian subjects of
the Sultan—that she would obtain all that authority which
would have been the result of her possessing perhaps the
seat of the Sultan; and that, I believe, has Ise9for some

years the received opinion of those who are well-informed
and capable of forming a correct and moderate opinion
upon this important subject. (Hear, hear.) Sir, I apprehend
that has been the opinion which has been adopted by those
who have held responsible positions in this country of late
years. I apprehend that that is the meaning which we
must ascribe to the frequent expressions of the Secretary
of State in the papers on the table, which refer to the de-
clarations—personal declarations of the Emperor—and
which I need not remind the house never appear in the
printed documents in our hands. (Hear, hear.) I appre-
hend that they have received from her Majesty's ambassa-
dors, or from other sources, such distinct declarations on
the part of the Emperor of Russia on this subject, namely,
that he did not contemplate, under any circumstances, an
invasion of the territorial integrity of Turkey; that her
Majesty's Government—the present Government like pre-
ceding Governments—have rested with confidence upon
that declaration. (Hear.) Sr, I don't think—if I may
for a moment, and I think I am bound to do so—if I may
for a moment read a passage from the despatches—l do not
know that the policy of Russia—and it is most important
that we should have a clear idea what the avowed policy of
Russia is before we come to any final conclusion upon our
own conduct—l do not know that the policy of Russie is
expressed in more accurate language than in a despatch of
Count Nesselrode at the beginning of January, 1853. It is
familiar to the house, and if I read it, it is because the
passage is but short, and in offering a statement to the
house it is of great importance with respect to these decla-
rations that the very language of the writer should be in the
ear'of the house at the moment that their opinion is asked
upon the topic. Count Nesselrode. on the 14th of January,
1853, says, speaking of his court:—" We have always desired
the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, as being, take it
all in all, the least mischievous arrangement for all European
interests, which would not fail to come into collision in
the East, if the gap existed." He proceeds to say :—" We
will accordingly use our utmost efforts to avoid to the last,
so far as depends upon us, without prejudice to Our honour,
whatever may be calculated still further to shake this
body, at once so feeble and so tottering, at the risk of fall-
ing into powder." He says, in another despatch—familiar,
I have no doubt, to every gentleman, and, therefore, I
will only briefly allude to it, but it is right, it is fair, in
order that we may come to an unimpassioned opinion upon
this all-important subject—it is right that we should see
that the case should be fairly stated for Russia as well as
for all—Count Nesselrode again says :—" There exists a
community of interest between fifty millions of the Rus-
sian population and twelve millions of the orthodox which
constitute the majority of the Sultan's subjects." And
he tells you in another despatch, so late as June, 1853,
that this claim of patronage over these twelve million sub-
jects of this foreign power the Emperor will defend to the
last extremity as an assertion of his inheritance. Now,
sir, I say, that at the outset of these negotiation the policy
of Russia is distinctly and explicitly expressed. Ascen-
dancy should be obtained over the Turkish empire, and
that ascendancy to be obtained, not by territorial conquest,
bat by exercising a peculiar influence over twelve millions,
the large majority of the Sultan's subjects. There is a
purpose distinctly expressed and a policy defined in de-
spatches which are addressed to her Majesty's Government.
Now it is not merely that the object is defined, but we are
no less candidly informed of the mode by which it is to be
attained. This influence is to be exercised over 12 millions
of the Sultan's subjects, not by conquest, which Russia
disclaims and always disclaimed, but by the stipulations of
treaties, by maintaining the treaties that exist, and by ex-
tending the spirit of those treaties. All this you see from
he very beginning of this important controversy. What
I may call the base of the diplomatic campaign was a
treaty, and that was the treaty which has been quoted
half a dozen times in this discussion, namely, the treaty
of Kainardji. Now, I will not presume to read the
treaty of Kainardji to the house, but I think the house
will agree that it is very expedient, when a particular
treaty is the foundation of transactions of this vast im-
portance, that we should have a clear idea of that treaty.
We have had great references made to the treaty of Kain-
ardji, and I think I can, without troubling the house, in a
moment place before it the essence and the peculiar cha-
racter of that treaty. In article 7 of the treaty of Kain-
ardji there is this clause :—" The Porte promises to pro-
tect the Christian religion ;and the minister of Russiato be
allowed to make representations"—now mark for what—
"to make representations in favour of the new church of
which mention is made in article 14 of this treaty." Now
article 14 of the treaty of Kainardji, the only other article
to which I need refer, is of this character :—The Court of
Russia is permitted, besides the chapel built in the mini-
titer's house, to build in the quarter of Galata, in the street
called Bey Uglu, a public church of the Greek rite, which
shall be under the protection of the Russian minister, and
free from all vexation and exaction. Now, observe what
is the treaty of Kainardji. The Christian subjects of the
Porte are, by that treaty, placed under the special protec-
tion of the Sultan ; and Russia, interpreting that treaty,
states that the Christian subjects of the Sultan are placed
specially under the protection of Russia. Under the treaty
of Kainardji representations may be made in favour of their
new church ; but so cautious is the Porte, that the very
street in which the new church is, is mentioned ; it is the
church in the street of Bey Uglu ; and the Russian inter-
pretation of that article of the treaty is, that because the
Porte consents that the minister of Russia shall interfere
in favour of a particular new church building in a particu-
lar street, she has the power of interfering in favour
of every church of that denomination in the country,
and of every community of the Christian faith in
the Sultan's dominions, which happen to be the
large majority of his subjects. Now, that is the treaty
of Kainardji, and these are the claims which are made
upon that treaty. I must for a moment call the atten-
tion of the house to an extract from a despatch, dated
January 8, 1853. It is from Sir Hamilton Seymour ; and,
as it has already been referred to in debate, and is familiar
to every gentleman, I shall state it very briefly. In that
despatch Sir Hamilton Seymour informs the noble lord the
present leader of the house (Lord John Russell) that Count
Nesselrode treated as exaggerated the apprehensions likely
to arise in Turkey and elsewhere from the appearance of a
Russian army on the Tin k-ish frontier. It was necessary
that the diplomacy of Russia should be supported by a
demonstration of force ; that a corresponding concession
should be made to the Greek Church for any new conces-
sion made to the Latin one. Count Nesselrode expressed
his belief that this alarming question would be satisfac-
torily concluded. On what did he rest his belief ! Now I
beg the house to mark this. He rested his belief in a satis-
factory solution of this question on the exertions of her
Majesty's Government at Paris and Constantinople to ad-
vocate the rights which the Russian Government were en-
titled to claim, and discountenance the pretensions of the
French. Now I beg the house to observe how clear and
transparent is the policy of Russia. Here is a great de-
monstration of force ; but what is it to do? It is to sup-
port the diplomatic movement. What is that movement ?
It is a movement to increase the influence of Russia over
the population of Turkey who profess the Greek religion.
And how is it to be affected—how is it to be peaceably
affected, that is the point ? Not by a demonstration of
force, but by the friendly exertions of her Majesty's Minis-
ters at Paris and at Constantinople. (Hear, hear.) Now,
you see then, we have at once a distinct declaration by
Russia of her 'policy. We have a distinct declaration that
her demonstration of force is only-a demonstration, but
that her object is to be attained—peaceably attained—by
tee exertions of the English Ministers at Paris and at Con-
stantinople. You know the power with whom you have to
deal. You have the policy of that power perfectly defined.
You have the object avowed, which is ascendancy. over
Turkey. You have the methods described, which are infiil
ences over the Greek Christian population, and these
may effectedsay,
which, by Russian diplomacy—a diplomacy, of lo
without using the epithets which the noble lord the mem-
ber for the city of London (Lord J. Russelhlliouhsesl withwill nroet-
gard to foreign ministers—a diplomacy
call fraudulent, but which is a diplomacy.w with
certainly,
dto
which a man, if placed in contact with it, would
if he were a prudent man, be upon his guard. (A. laugh.)
Now, sir, I want to know, with this object expressed, these
means detailed, and this diplomacy to deal with, I want
to know how her Majesty's Ministers encountered such a
combination, and how can I obtain that information but
by studying the
on the table ? I think I shall be
able to show the - p
haouesresthat it is impossible for us to obtain
that which is at this moment the moat valuable informa-
tion for the House of Commons and the people of England
—namely, the object of the present war—unless we preli-
minary ascertain, and I hope I shall be able to do that
with extreme brevity, what has been the cause of the war.
It is therefore not to criticise the past - or what is I think
erroneously called the past—it is not to cavil with expres-
sions, it is not to garble despatches, it is not by quotations
here and misquotations there, to make a colourable case of
mismanagement against the Ministry, at a moment of na-
tional emergency like the present, that I am led to quota-
tion, but because I want the house clearly to understand
how we have been brought into this position, why we are
at war, or in danger of being immediately at war, because
that is the only mode by which the house and the country
can ascertain what is the object of this actual, of this me-
naced state of warfare. (Cheers.) Now, sir, it is unne-
cessary for me to touch upon the question, now exhausted
in debate, of the holy places. It was, in fact, virtually
soon settled at Constantinople. Even Count Nessel-
rode, at a very early period in these despatches, expresses
his surprise, but his satisfaction at, and his acknowledg-
ment of, the conciliatory spirit of the French. Nor would
I dwell upon this for a moment, had not the noble lord
(Lord John Russell) reminded me that I once was a
.minister of state, for he said it was the Government of
Lord Derby that was really responsible for this question.
Now, sir, whatever may have been the faults of the Go-
vernment of Lord Derby, they need not look back with
afty regret or remorse to their relations with these affairs.
(Hear, hear.) The question of the holy places was not
formally settled when we left office, but certainly it was
the strenuous and confidential exertions of Lord 14Ialmes-
bury that brought the French Government to the right

tone of viewing the conduct of M. Lavalette ; and I be.
lieve that had it not been for the preliminary stepS which
he took, the withdrawal by France of that envoy from.
Constantinople—I think under the circumstances a mag-
nanimous act—would never have taken place. But on
the question of the holy places, Count Nesselrode tells you
at au early period that he views with satisfaction, and
even with surprise, the conciliatory character of the con-
duct of France. Colonel Rose tells you at an early date,
in despatches familar to every gentleman, that he had con-
versed with the French ambassador at Constantinople, and
so far as France is concerned there never would be any
further discussion or difficulty on the subject. But all this
time the forces of Russia are accumulating on the frontier.
All this time Count Nesselrode is telling you that his Go-
vernment will seek an equivalent for the privileges which
the Greek Church has lost at Jerusalem, the settlement of
which his Government has resolved not to disturb. Even
the mission of Prince Menschikoff is at this timeoeumnetnNtieosnseed.i.
What does Sir Hamilton Seymour say ?
vagueness in
rode observed that there was necessarily some"
Prince Menschikoff 's orders, as it was hardly ascertained
to what extent the rights secured last year to the Greeks
had been infringed ; that as it is not meant to regain from
the Latins the privileges they have subsequently ac-
quired, the object to be sought was an equivalent to the
Greeks." Observe that, after that, we hear that the Em-
peror would insist on the promise made to him in favour
of the Greek Church being fulfilled. On a subsequent oc-
casion, in an important despatch from Count Nesselrode
to Baron Brunow, we hear that this was to obtain for the
Greeks some recompence for the wrong which has been
done them, and,
above all, to secure them from further in-
jury. Now, sir, I was very much surmised by the ob-
servation made by the noble lord (Lord John Russell) on
this subject the other night. The noble lord feels very
deeply—l speak with the leave of the house—he feels very
deeply on this subject of the conduct of Russia. It is not
merely that he is—l will not say overwhelmed, hut—over-
come by the responsibility, and it is an awful responsi-
bility, of a minister who has advised his Sovereign to go
tq war ; but the noble lord feels so acutely the conduct of
Russia, that on more than one occasion in his speech, and
in those discussions, he has indulged in the language of in-
vective, both towards the minister and his master. (Hear,
hear.) We were told the other night that the conduct of
Count Nesselrode was fraudulent. That is a very strong
expression. (Cheers.) It is easy to cheer, but Count
Nesselrode has for nearly fifty years sustained a great posi-
tion, and is supposed to be one who has administered
affairs with gteat moderation, with great wisdom, and
under circumstances of great difficulty, no doubt, with
great success ; but his conduct is described as fraudulent.
(Hear, hear.) The conduct of tlfe Emperor, we were
told the other night, was the conduct of a butcher—at
least, he had given orders for an act of butchery. Now,
mark this— I do not mention it without an object.
At present we have to deal with Count Nesselrode.
His conduct, the noble lord told us the other night,
is fraudulent. (Hear, hear.) " Nothing could be more
unsatisfactory than the conduct of Count Nesselrode.
He kept saying that his imperial master would seek an
equivalent for the Greek Church. He was constantly
repeating that his imperial master was determined to have
coins equivalent, or that some arrangement should be
made compensatory to the Greek Church for the privi-
leges which it had relinquished. But Count Nesselrode
never told us what he wanted." Wicked Count Nesselrode !
Infinite duplicity of the Russian statesman ! Bnt does
not it occur to the house, though it might not have oc-
curred to the noble lord, that if he wanted to know exactly
and precisely what Count Nesselrode meant, that he
should nut have waited for Count Nesselrode to tell him,
hut that he should have asked the question of Count Nee-.
selrode ? The first great complaint made by the noble
lord of the conduct of Count Nesselrode, which in the
end is denounced as fraudulent, is that he perpetually
went on harping on the determination of the Emperor of
Russia to obtain some compensation for the Greek Church
for the privileges it had lost; but he never told her Ma-
jesty's Government what he meant by what he said. But
why is Sir IL Seymour at St. Petersburg if he is not to ask
for that information ? Why are there envoys at the capi-
tal of Russia ?—why are there secretaries of state ?—why
are there protracted, and distracted, councils in Downing-
street—(laughter)—if the upshot of all these individuals,
all these ambassadors, all these ministers, all these delibe-
rations is, that the noble lord is to come to the house with
the country iu a state of war, that war having been occa-
sioned apparently by the intentions of the Emperor of Rus-
sia, and the great complaint of the noble lord being that
the Emperor of Russia never told them what he wanted,
the noble lord confessing, by that very observation, that he
never asked the Emperor of Russia the question ? Here is
the gist of the matter. At this stage of the proceedings
we ought to have said to Russia—" The affair of the rival
churches is settled, in which we never properly interfered
—why is there still this demonstration of force on the
frontier. You say you want an equivalent for the Greek
Church for the privilege you have lost. Define what you
want precisely and explicitly. If you continue to make
demonstrations when the object for which they were ori-
ginally made has already been settled ; if you go on an-
nouncing that you require equivalents and compensations,
and do not define what you mean by a compensation, then
we tell you that you cannot count on ,what you have de-
clared to be your great means of assistance for the peace-
able conclusion and attainment of your object, viz., the
friendly offices of her Majesty's Government at Paris and
at Constantinople. Now, I ask the house, was that ever
said ? Was it over said ? I can only say it does not appear
upon the papers which are upon the table. It never ap-
pears upon those papers that any formal or precise demand
was made upon the Russian Government of what they
meant by equivalents and compensations. Those who speak
after me will have an easy opportunity of confuting what,
I say, if they can refer to the documents and find wkat un-
fortunately lam not able. But Ido not wish to press the
noble lord (Lord J. Russell) unfairly upon this point. I
admit that the noble lord individually, not considering him
as a member of the Government, is almost free from ob-
jection in this point, because the noble lord in the brief
time during which he occupied office, made, I think, such
inquiry as he well could as to the assembling of troops
upon the frontiers, and other subjects of great importance.
But at the time when the subject ought to have been
pressed to the inquiry to which I refer, the noble lord re-
linquished the seals of office, and another personage be-
came Secretary of State, and I am bound to say—and I
shall say nothing which I shall not at least attempt to
prove—l am bound to say that from that moment there is
a different character in the diplomatic proceedings. (Oppo-
sition cheers.) It seems acknowledged by Sir Hamilton
Seymour, in one of his despatches, that he is surprised
at the change in the tone of Count Nesselrode—and I
should say that it is evident that that new character
may be fairly described as a bias in favour of Russia.
I of course refer to the accession of Lord Clarendon to
office. Lord Clarendon is Secretary of State, mind you,
and the moment he is made Secretary of State, by a cu-
rious coincidence he is called upon to perform the most
important act that a Secretary of State under the circum-
stances could have to fulfil. For her Majesty's ambassador
was about to repair to the very scene of these important
transactions, and Lord Clarendon had to draw up the in-
structions of Lord Stratford. Sir, I have been rather sur-
prised that in the course of these discussions a more minute
reference has not been made to that which really is the
most important state paper on the table. The only person
who has made use of it is the hon. member for the West
Riding to-night, who has quoted a passage from this
despatch, and for what purpose ? To show that Lord
Clarendon at that moment, as proved by his instructions
to Lord Stratford, was totally ignorant of the resources of
the Turkish empire and the Turkish people. (Hear, hear.)
That was the argument of the hon. gentleman. It suited
the conclusion that he was endeavouring to impress upon
the house. His point is, that .the Turks are exhausted,
that they are incapable of any effort—that we are inter-
fering for a miserable minority of a people —that they are
a race who can achieve nothing ; and he says—" I prove
my case by the best evidence, and it is that of the Secre-
tary of State." Now I shall quote the language of the
Secretary of State for a very opposite purpose to that
which the hon. member for the West Riding had in view.
My answer to the hou. member for the West Riding—so
tar as the authorify of Lord Clarendon for his point goes—
is the passage of the Danube by Omer Pacha, the battle of
Oltenitza, and others which followed—the gallant conduct
of the Turkish people—(hear)—but let that pass. lam to
examine the conduct of a ministry whose policy is to support
the independence and the integrity of the Porte—who for
this great object have not hesitated to involve this country
iu war, and who are not justified in their course unless
they have confidence in the resources of the country,
in the character of the people ; and unless they believed
that the integrity and independence of Turkey were not
mere phrases, but palpable and real facts. (Hear, hear.
But, remember that you bad had the armies of Russia col-
lecting on the frontier of Turkey—you had had warnings
of these warlike preparations from the Russian Minister.
You had had the avowal from Count Nesselrode, that the
object of the mission of Prince Menschikoff was a vague
mission, but that, however vague might be his instructions,
there was one result that he was to secure, namely, a great
concession to the Greek Church—an equivalent, a compen-
sation. Yon had all these—you knew that the integrity
and independence of the Porte was at stake—the Secretary
of State was called upon to fulfil the most important func-
tion of a Minister under such circumstances, viz., to draw
airing to the seat of action. Now, w
up instructions for the Queen's ambassadotr, wasawrehothese
structions? in
re-
pha
I am sure the house will agree with me that
if we are to discuss this question we should endeavour to
yr that
memory. reason
wrehaadtaadreesptabtecsah
discuss
I d
o not
f a
ti riluys,t
to and
for
instructions of the Secretary of State of a Ministry who
uphold the integrity and the independence of the Porte,
and who, to maintain that independence and that integrity,
are "ing to war ? —Lord Stratford de Redcliffe is instructed
to tell the Porte, "with all frankness and without reserve,"
that "it is now in a position of peculiar danger." (A
laugh). He is to insist upon "the accumulated grievances
of foreign nations, which the Porte is unable or unwilling to
redress,' and "upon the increasing weakness of its executive
defendelts isa tdo
as
tureceivethe ourdev dictationeiop me ut
oafs
itst o
power." The Government whose independence we profess to
commercialandriemsopurcrovees-:
—" reforms
perseverance" it is told, "in its present course must
end in alienating
the sympathies of the British nation, and
in making it impossible for her Majesty's Government to
shelter it from the impending danger to which the Sultan
and his ministers have exposed it." The " exigencies of
Christendom" are then ascribed to—what ? To the ambi-
tion of Russia. Was that the cause of the exigencies of
Christendom and of the perilous position of Turkey which
are pointed out in the instructions of the Secretary of
State ? No • the cause which Lord Clarendon assigns is,
not the ambition of Russia, but "the unwise policy and
reckless mid-administration of the Sultan himself." Now
I ask the house, is this the way to maintain the indepen-
dence of a power menaced by the warlike legions of Rus-
sia ? Was it at this moment of its utmost need, of its
utmost exigency—was this the moment to lecture Turkey
about internal reforms and commercial reforms. (Oppo-
sition cheers.) And when these admonitions are coupled
with a significant intimation that at this moment the con-
duct of the Porte must be distinguished by the utmost
moderation and prudence— what is that but to say—what
is that but to hint, that the Porte should comply with the
demands of Russia? Demands of course (I will make this
concession to the Ministry)—demands of course consistent
with the independence of the Porte ; but the word inde-
pendence is to be interpreted is obvious from the insolent
character of our friendly dictation. (Hear, hear.
Now,s
sir, here we are. We have come to this point. )W
book
eek
even months are passing. You may examine a blue
tail allusion to a member on the Ministerial bench so a
,ug r.)
en-
gaged], but You will not change the facts.
(L hteof Russia
Weeks, and mouths are passing—still the arimiers
of
Russia
are collected on the frontier--still the Minister
tells you there is one thing that his
master
ation to have
aster will never
change about, and that is, in his determine
Church for
an equivalent—a compensation to thete w
the privilege which it has lost, and means by which a
security for these new rights shall be obtained. Still
• 'mon announced, with instruc-
you have that important mission
ofev
idence
that the slightesttittle
tions—and we have not
that her Majesty's Government m
Russia an explicit declarationshe
ever demanded fro
of what meant. (Rear
Mcnschikoff arrived at * °
hear.) Well, Prince but will very lista-
or slightly glance at
nople —I hurry over,
ciroutustances which familiar to every gentlemen in
are so