The Sun.
London, England, 1854-10-06 00:00:00

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

A detachment of the Royal Horse Artillery, with ton
mou of the Foot Artillery, left the garrison yesterday
morning, and were played by the band of the regiment to
the dockyard, where they embarked on board the Faith
screw steam transport, for conveyance to the seat of war in
the East, as they aro required to fill up vacancies caused by
casualties in that branch of the service. They proceed in
charge of Sorjeant-Major Wilson. The embarkation was
superintended by Brigade-Major Bingham and Capt. Rid-
dell, Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster• General of Artillery.

THE SOLVENCY MUTUAL GUARANTEE
COMPANY.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SUN.
Sin,—ln your otherwise very impartial report of what
took place at Guildhall on Tuesday, when a Managing
Director of the Solvency Mutual Guarantee Company
appeared to answer a summons for omitting to make
certain (impossible 1) returns, &c., there occurs an inac-
curacy which I rely on your sense of justice to rectify. .
Mr. Ballantine, on behalf of the Company, is repre-
sented to have "repudiated the policy issued by the
Company, alleging, &c." It is evident that these words,
if understood literally, are calculated seriously to damage
this Company in public estimation, and spread un-
founded alarm among its members, whose transactions
to the amount of fifteen millions are comprehended by
the Company's already existini; guarantees.
Your reporter will, I am sure, allow that the purport
of Mr. Ballantine's objection had nothing to do with the
validity of the guarantee, but was merely a denial that
the document could be technically entitled a "deed."
I am, Sir, yours, obediently,
CHAS. STUART CANSDELL,
Resident Managing Director, Solvency Mutual
October 5, 1854. Guarantee Society.

THE GUN-BOAT SCUFFLE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SUN.

Sir,—One of the latest phases of amateur strategy
consists in abusing the Admiralty for ordering several
of the new despatch gun-boats to the Black Sea. Now
I am humbly of opinion that small steamers will be of
infinitely more service there than in the Baltic. To
begin with facts. There are now (or were a few weeks
since) either at Kertch or at Yenikale, or cruising in the
Sea of Azoff, the following Russian vessels :—Taianro
Berdiansk, Mogouchii, Colchida, Boetz, Maladetz, Ar-
' gonaute—steamers averaging 120-horse power, and
chiefly mounting one 62 cwt. 68-pounder pivot
gun, and two 12-pounder carronades. There will also
be found, unless I much mistake, the schooner Ganetz,
at Kertch, the tender Struya, at Yenikale, and the
schooner Unilaya, at Taganrog. The name of the last
schooner which means " melancholy," would be more
significant if Admirals Hamelin and Dundas had at
their disposal a flotilla of screw gun-boats of light
draught. As it is, the Russian steamers and sailing
vessels, as well as the Cossack gun-boats belonging to
the Sea of Azoff, can retire to Taganrog, or even into
the mouth of the Don, and there nothing which draws
above 10 feet of water can follow them. I maintain,
therefore, that the Pelter, Scowler, Beagle, &e., are ur-
gently required in those waters.
It is tantalising to reflect what might have been al-
ready effected if the Black Sea fleet, in addition to the
three-deckers, which have never fired a shot, had in-
cluded an efficient squadron of screw gun-boats of 6
feet draught. It is tolerabiy certain that, with the aid
of a dozen such vessels as the Nix and Salamander,
armed with Lancaster's gun, we should have long since
knocked the old forts of Ochakoff and Kinburn into
powder, steamed up the Bug to Nicolaiev, and burnt
the dockyard there, which, till lately, was quite de-
fenceless, buoyed out a channel in the embouchure of
the Dnieper, and destroyed the immense military stores
collected at Cherson. Our command of the Sea of
Azoff would equally have enabled us to burn the vast
supplies of corn and war provisions accumulated at
Taganrog and Azoff for the use of the armies of the
Caucasus.
Impending operations make the presence of a light
steam gun-boat flotilla on the shores of the Crimea quite
indispensable. If we should desire to retain the Crimea,
we shall, of course, improve the old lines of Perecop, and
post a force there after the destruction or surrender of
Prince Menschikoff and the 50,000 Russian soldiers and
20,000 Russian sailors now in garrison at Sebastopol
and elsewhere in the peninsular. Any attack upon us
from the army of Bessarabia is, for the present year,
entirely out of the question ; and, looking to the pre-
sence of Orner Pasha on the Lower Danube—to the
danger of transporting a large force across the Dnieper
in the neighbourhood of a powerful enemy—to the diffi-
culty of marching troops in masses, and bringing heavy
stores and artillery over the steppes of Southern Russia
to the easily defensible nature of the series of positions
which may be occupied upon the Isthmus of Perecop—
I am strongly of opinion that, if once we obtain fair
possession, no attempt will be made by the Emperor
Nicholas to reconquer the Crimea, unless, indeed, he
were compelled to abandon the line of the Caucasus, in
which case it is likely enough that the 150,000 men
now scattered from the Kuban to the Kur would be
doomed to that undertaking. As this contingency does
not as yet even loom in the distance, it is not necessary
to discuss it. For all that it is clearly enough our
policy to present the boldest possible front towards the
north, and a few of Lancaster's guns floating in the Bay
of Karkinit would be an immense addition to the strength
of positions occupied at or near Perecop. And, although
I do not suppose that the experimentsof Marshals Lassy
and Scherbatoff, who led their troops into the Crimea
Along the strip of sandbank which separates the Putrid
Sea from the Sea of Azoff, will be repeated in our time,
yet there can be no doubt that steamers for the sur-
veillance of those unpleasant regions would be indis-
pensable—not to mention the advantages already
alluded to, which would still result from the possession
of the Sea of Azoff.
Nor must it be forgotten that the Russians have on
the Lower Danube three armed steamers (Pruth, Ordi-
naretz, and Meteor, mounting 36-pounder carronades)
and about 30 gun-boats. The value of small screws like
the Pelter, in co-operating with a laud force destined to
search for the enemy's craft, or for active operations
against the eßessarabiau shore of the Danube, would be
inestimable.,
For these reasons, and for many others, I maintain
that despatch of all the gun-boats to the Blacr. Sea would
be a very proper step, and that, as long as the war there
lasts, ono such craft will be worth a dozen line-of-battle
ships—the functions of which, by the way, are, perhaps,
by this time, altogether at an end. In the north of
Europe I cannot discover the use to which these gun-
boats can be put. A few eight-inch shells fired at a
long range into Archangel or Riga (supposing even it
were possible to steam up the two rivers Dwina, which
is doubtful), or Revel or Sweaborg will produce no
effect at all. Nor is Cronstadt to be burnt or taken in
this easy-going sort of manner. If we had 30 or 40 cf
the Pelters and Snappers, that would be a different
business ; but half-a-dozen of them can be of no service
whatever. That Fort Alexander and Fort Paul (lately
Risbank)—especially the latter—could be put hors de
combat in two or three hours, and that without any
great risk to the attaching ships is certain enough ; but
when this is accomplished, we are no nearer the Russian
fleet than before. Cronstadt, in fine, will never be taken
by these two horns ; yet the public need be under no
apprehension as to the ultimate fate of that place. When
once it is determined to destroy it, its fate is sealed,
which is all that it seems desirable to say for the present.
Why the necessary arrangements have not been pre-
pared and completed for the present campaign—why an
immense squadron of screw gun-boats, or, better still, a
lot of screw floating batteries were not ordered on the
outbreak of war— these are questions very easily asked ;
but, surely, it is a monstrous injustice to expect fore-
sight to come out of red tape. Instead of abusing
bureaucracy for not gaining victories, we ought to feel
thankful that its toils had net entangled our arms and
brought our fleets and regiments to destruction.
I have yet a word to say, and that respecting the ar-
mament of the Russian forts. I read from day to day
that our ships carry heavier metal than the Cronstadt
and Revel batteries. The contrary is the case. These
batteries, in addition to a proportion of 36-pounders, are
armed with two kinds of shell-guns. The largest (called
the 3-pond gun) has a bore of 10.75 inches diameter,
weighs 124 cwt., and, besides shell, can throw a solid
shot of labout 1601 b. The size (called 2 pood) is 9.65
inches in bore, and weighs 73 cwt. As far, then, as the
materiel of the artillery goes, the advantage on the
Russian side is immense. But as the effective range of
a gun depends in practice on the skill with which it is
pointed, our seeming inferiority in calibre is of little
importance. I am, S:r, your obedient servant,
September 15. Z. Z.