The Sun.
London, England, 1853-03-26 00:00:00

BREAD.

The prices of wheaten bread in the metropolis are front
7d to &l; of household ditto, 5d to 6id. per 411, loaf.

NEWPORT.
Beef, from 2s 8d to 3s 8d; Mutton, 3s M to 4s 8d; Teal,
3s 6d to 4s 8d; Pork, 33 4d to 4s Cid per 81bs.

WHITECHAPEL.

Beef from 2s Gd to 3s 6d ; Mutton, 3s 6d to 43 6d ;
Teal, Ss 4d to 48 6d; Pork, 2s 8d to 4s Od per Blbs.
by the carcase.

BILLINGSGATE.

Turbots, 7s 0d to 12507;13;ii1;:i.;6a to 5s Od; Cod Fish,
4s Od. to 8s Od each; Salmon, is 6d to 2s per lb.; Soles, 8d
to 2s 3d per pair ; Eels, 6d to is per lb ; Lobsters, 8d to
2s Od. ; Crabs, 6d to la 10d. ; Whitings, 3s Od to 6s per doz.;
Doreys, Os Od to Gs Od; Mullets, Od to Os each ; Common
Oysters, 7s Od to 16s Od; Natives, 30s Od to 36s Od per
bushel; Mackerel, 4d to 8d each; Smelts, Os Od per dozen;
Scate, 4d to 7d per lb; Shrimps, is 6d to 2s 3d per gallon;
Bloaters, is td to 2s 3d per dozen; Fresh Herrings, is 04
to is 6d per dozen ; Haddocks, 6d to is Od each ; Salt
Fish, 2d to 5d per lb.

THE RAILWAYS OF THE UNITED STATES.

-
The followinz report has been presented to the United
States' Senate :

"The subject of legislation, with a view to prevent the
recurrence 0L e4:sun I, les, is necessarily so connected with
that of state supervision over all the departments of rail-
road management, and ipvolves so many important consi-
derations in reference to the greatest benefit and safety to
the public, that the committee have deemed it their duty
to give to it a somewhat detailed consideration.
The right of a people to have free access to each other,
for the various purposes required by the conditions of so-
ciety, is an inherent right, and the power of improving, or
in any way altering the means adopted for these ends, can-
not be taken from the public, except with their consent.
The roads or means of intercommunication of a country
are, therefore, a part of the general interest, and from the
earliest periods the sovereign power, under whatever form
it may have existed, has ever held the right of controlling
them for the general good. The practice which grew up of
intrusting their construction and management to associa-
tions formed for that purpose was only a delegation of its
powers, in order to secure in a greater degree the welfare
of the community. An irrevocable transfer of its powers
was never designed.

" In retracing the legislation of our State in reference to
such associations, it will be seen that the inherent powers
of the State have been distinctly asserted and carefully
guarded. _ . _

" The Legislature, acting for the general welfare, in
granting to them such privileges as might best meet the
public wants, has invariably reserved the right of modify-
ing and controlling their privileges in any way or manner
best calculated to secure those objects. When the projec-
tors of railroad enterprises first began to ask the necessary
privileges and immunities from the State, it will be seen
that these have been granted with well-defined limits and
conditions, reserving the right of altering or modifying
them from time to time, and of limiting the periods of
their corporate existence.

" Thelast general enactment (the Railroad Law of 1850)
in addition to reserving the right of annulling or dissolving
any corporation formed under it, and of reducing the rates
of fare under certain conditions, has compelled all com-
panies to make, annually, a detailed statement under oath of
all their operations, both with regard to finance and manage-
ment, for the purpose of furnishing the State with reliable
statistical information for its guidance, whenever the public
welfare and safety should require additional legislation.
with regard to them. In no sense can railroad corpora-
tions be considered as placed beyond the control and super-
vision of the State. In granting them their corporate pri-
vileges, it was intended and designed that they should be
used with a view to the welfare and greatest possible benefit
to the community, and the sovereign power neglects its
duty if it does not guard against their being made subser-
vient to other purposes, or if it fails so to modify and
control them as to secure to the public the greatest possible
amount of benefit compatible with the full development of
so great an element of industrial progress. -
, lt is also worthy of remark, that, independently of the
right expressly reserved by the Legislature to modify, alter,
or repeal the railroad charters, their proprietors, as the
grantees of a public franchise to be exercised for the public
benefit, are liable to a liberal control, when necessary to
the public interest, by any future Legislature, whose power
over them is not to be limited by implication. (` Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,' 11 Peters' Reports, 420).
" Is it expedient to place railroads under the supervision
of the State, to insure greater safety to the travelling com-
munity, as well as to secure the greatest amount of public
benefit from them?

" A long and persistive course of legislative interference
with the various pursuits of commercial and industrial en-
terprise, and with the complex relations of supply and de-
mand, for the purpose of protecting the public interest,
has abundantly proved the fallacy of the principle upon
which it was bas3d. Enlightened public sentiment now
justly condemns aay restrictions, by legal enactments, upon
the free operations of traffic, and, in all that relates to
cheapness and facility of accommodation, the best security
for the public welfare will, as a general rule, be found in
the untrammelled and free competition of individual enter-
prise and capital.

" It therefore only remains to inquire whether this gene-
ral rule of competition, when applied to railroads, will
secure, to the greatest possible extent, the safety of the
travelling public and the general welfare, and whether,
with these objects in view, the State has done its whole
duty in granting to them the exclusive rights and privileges
required for their successful operation.
As regards intercommunication by railroads, as com-
pared with any other mode at present known, it requires
no argument to show that there can be no competition,
and that, until human ingenuity shall have developed some
new element applicable to such purposes, they are in pos-
session of an unapproachable monopoly, exclusive just in
proportion to their superiority. Tim same may be said
with regard to competition upon any single road or series
of roads under one control or management. At one time
it was supposed that the traffic upon them would be open
to competition, and that by this means the greatest pos-
sible benefit to the public would ultimately be secured ;
but it has long since become apparent that their indis-
criminate use by the community is impossible. The ac-
cidents that now so often occur from want of due regard
to time and minute regulations clearly demonstrate
how impracticable it would be to allow the running of
trains by rival parties, at various rates of speed, on the
same road, like competing stage-coaches on a public high-
way. The safe working of a railroad requires a unity
of action and perfect combination of arrangement, which
cannot be obtained without confining the management
of its carrying traffic within the limits of its general
control. Hence all companies have the exclusive manage-
ment of the entire business upon their roads ; and this
arrangement seems an absolute necessity, without which
the whole railroad system would soon become impractica-
ble, showing conclusively that the principle of competi-
tion is inapplicable, and can never be calculated upon as a
means of securing any additional safety or benefit to the
community.

" May not these advantages be secured from the compe-
tition between rival lines running in similar directions, or
having the same termination ?
" The principal lines of road in this State passing, as
most of them do, through portions of country sparsely
populated, the resources of which are as yet but partially
developed, cannot be expected at this time to furnish in
their operations any statistics or reliable facts from which to
estimate the probable advantages the public are likely to de-
rive from their competion. It would seem, however, at pre-
sent, in reference to reduced rates of traffic or accomoda-
tion along their route, orregard for the safety of passengers,
that little, if any, increased amount of public benefit
has been attained; and it seems doubtful, even when these
shall have received their full capacity for business (many
of them being yet unfinished) and perfected in all their
various departments, whether the principle of compe-
tition will apply to them. It undoubtedly will not, except
in very populous districts, where the business is likely to
be enough to afford adequate incomes to rival lines ; but
even in such case it may be questioned whether the public
interest is enhanced by competition. Our large cities,
which may be the_ common termini of a great number of
roads, may, perhaps, derive.additional benefit from compe-
tition for the traffic that passes over the whole extent of
their routes, but the community along the intermediate
portions, where there is no competition for the way-busi-
ness, receive none of its benefits, but are, on the contrary,
often disproportionally taxed, and deprived of many of the
facilities which are their due, to enable the companies to
secure the through traffic.
" Taking it for granted that a large portion of the cost of
transportation consists of the amount of capital expended,
it is evident that an equal amount of business could be
done much cheaper with the same profit on one line than
if the same were divided between two, with an outlay of
twice the amount of capital : consequently, the general
welfare would be more effectually promoted by a single
road, properly restricted, than by competition between
rival companies.
" The ultimate effects of competition would be diminu-
tion of revenue, embafrassments in meeting current ex-
penses, inability to maintain the roadway and materiel in
an efficient and safe condition, and a proportionate dimi-
nution of the facilities of traffic and of the adequate means
of safety to the travelling public.*
" But, admitting the benefits of competition, there can
be no guarantee to the public that it will be continued.
The advantages to be derived from combination between
rival companies, having no competition to fear from any
other known mode of intercommunication are so obvious
as to leave little doubt that an amalgamation of their in-
terests in some manner would be the ultimate result. In
England, where the great number of railroads running
through a comparatively limited space of territory would
sooner test the question of competition than here, experi-
ence has abundantly proved the correctness of these views.
Close competition has been mair :Alined in reducing rates of
traffic and furnishing additional means of preventing
casualties ; and the community have for a time enjoyed
the consequent benefits. These contests, however, have
always ended, as they inevitably must, by combina-
tion, or some other arrangement, which has deprived the
community of all the advantages to be expected from com-
petition.
"As early as 1846, a select committee appointed by Par-
liament to inquire whether conditions might not be em-
bodied in railway acts, better fitted than those hitherto
in them, to promote and secure the interests of the pub-
lic,' expressed their opinion very decidedly as to the
hopelessness of looking to competition for the means of
securing the interests of the public ; stating the fact
that the more powerful companies had not only
obtained the control of railway lines from which com-
petition might be apprehended, but had also suc-
ceeded, by various means, in obtaining a control over
the canals, which, for a time, maintained competition
with them in tho carriage of heavy freight, and had thus
deprived the public of all the protection at one time anti-
cipated from this source. Nearly all the witnesses that
appeared before the committee, comprising gentlemen of
the highest character connected with railroads, gave it as
their opinion, that the public can never be benefited by
the competition of companies.' Mr. R. Stephenson was of
opinion that the power of supervision should extend to
vetoing the construction of competing lines, to protect the
public against the increased rates of traffic that would be
necessary to remunerate the additional capital employed
for that purpose.
" It would appear, therefore, that the principle of com-
petition cannot, as a general rule, apply to railroad corpo-
rations, and that the interests of the community should not
be left to its operation, as in ordinary business enterprises;
that they must, from their peculiar elements, be, in a greater
or loss degree, monopolies, and necessarily liable to the evils
of monopoly. These evils are not, probably, as great at
this time as they may be hereafter, when the system
becomes more- perfectly developed, and placed -under the
management of persons less disposed to show deference to
public sentiment ; nor are they as yet very perceptible to
the public, from the fact that they are not apparent in
any direct loss to the community, for railroads, under any
system, must be a great benefit, but consist rather in de-
priving it of the additional advantages itm wounuliditiotththheeartwitha
obtain. It is nevertheless due to the community
tendency of these evils should be checked, and,
views are correct, it is incumbent upon the State above
the whole system under such control and supervision
may be deemed necessary to secure the greatest amount of
public benefit compatible with a due raga rd to the pecu-
niary interests involved in the operations of railroads.
" It may be urged that it would be unjust to subject rail-
road corporations, which have done s o much for social ad-
vancement, to an interference which is not applied to other
industrial associations.
"It must be replied to this, that companies formed for
mercantile, mechanical, or commercial pnrPoses, are gene
rally private in their character, and their operations have.
but little effect upon the community beyond their inuiv`