The Sun.
London, England, 1854-05-16 00:00:00

pamphlet appeared, we believe that ther, is
scarcely any one but will stand amazed at its pro-
phetic character.
Everything is prefigured in these wizard-like
vaticinations. The advance of the Russian AUTO-
CRAT upon the Turkish territories. The valiant
stand taken by the Mussulmen in defence of their
empire. The union of France and England in
support of the cause of Ottoman independence.
The appearance of their united armaments in the
Levant. The entrance of the Anglo-French fleets
through the Dardanelles into the sea of Marinora
—through the Bosphorus int) the Black Sea—on
towards the stronghold of the Crimea, the port, and
arsenal, and dockyards of Sebastopol. Not only
are these things foreshown, but others still more
marvellous in the display of prescience on the part
of their unknown writer. The hesitating atti-
tude assumed by the German Powers at the
commencement of the misunderstanding. Fol-
lowed ultimately by the defection of Prussia from
the cause of the Western allies of Turkey, and
the subordination of her councils to those of the
autocratic Northern Government. Whereas, Aus-
tria is decribed as ultimately breaking away
from the Russian alliance and co-operating with
the Anglo-French supporters of the SULTAN, ac-
cording to the daring previsions published twenty
years ago, namely, in 1834, by this anonymous
pamphleteer.

Listen, now, in proof of the accuracy of our
foregoing assertions. Hear how the writer of
this curious prophecy speaks, at page 105, of the
Anglo-French alliance : •
" England and France, in assuming the defence of
Turkey, stand forth in the majesty of their united power
and of obliged moderation, as advocates of the pubic
interests of the European community."
What does he observe as to the decoys thrown out
to the Cabinet of Vienna by the wilier Councils
of St. Petersburg ? Why, he speaks of the pos-
sibility of an Austrian occupation of Bosnia,
Servia, and Montenegro being tolerated by the
Muscovite ruler—referring to which bait, at page
102, he adds--
•' But what Austrian statesman can be blind to the
consequences, if Russia takes possession of Con-
stantinople ? If Russia occupy Constantinople,
what pretence of equivalent will Austria find in the
half-Russian provinces of Servia, Bosnia, and Monte-
nPgro ? It will be more profitable, eve❑ for Russia,
that they may ,be apparently possessed by Austris. She
looks to maintain acquaintance, and will gladly purchase
by so magnificent a cession the prolonged subserviency
of the Austrian Government."
Later on, however, this far-seeing writer re-
marks—the passage subjoined occurs, by the way,
between pages 105 and 197 inclusively—remarks,
we cannot but think, in the tones of a sooth-

sayer :
" Let the squadron of England and France appear in
the Black Sea, and the decision of Austria cannot lie
doubtful. The union of England with France is a gua-
rantee of the disinterestedness of the intentions of both.
Their power when combined on this arena is irresistible.
Their object not a war of propagandism, of revolutions,
but one of conservatism, of protection ; assuring not
only the independence of A.ustria against the north, but
elevating a power in the south to balance the influence
she dreads in the Mediterranean and in Italy. But the
first necessity of Austria is peace. If she cannot stand
between the belligerents and prevent a collision, her
next necessity is the prompt cessation of hostiliti.is—
which side, it forced to interfere, will she choose t Un-
doubtedly, inevitably that of the allies ; her combination
with the allies, and the quick decision of the contest,
can alone save for her Gallicia, can alone prevent the
spreading to other of her states of the spirit of revolu-
tion, to which she is exposed by any struggle in Europe.
"It is on the strength of these considerations that
we conclude, that if Russia is attacked in the Black Sea,

the affiance of France and England is established by
the combination of their action on a common
that the northern coalition is instantaneously di-solved,
its positions and defences turned, the materially and
ieally powerful members of that coalition brought over
. .

to our side, and the whole chances and danger—s
of war
consecrated on the head of that single power, which,
always aggressive, because nowhere assailable, has com-
plicated and embroiled the affairs of Europe, to open
to herself in the midst of the confusion a road to Con-
stantinople.
"This is a mere contest of dates. If Russia is first
at Constantinople, she combines necessarily all the re-
sources of the northern Governments; she developes a
naval power to which there can be no possible balance
in the Mediterranean ; Greece and Egypt become de-
pendencies ; no State can partake in the eastern com-
merce, save by her sufferance ; the possibility of all use-
ful union against her on the part of England and France
vanishes, and civilisation itself is threatened with a wore
dangerous eclipse than it suffered from the overflow of
the barbarians in 604.

"If England anticipates Russia, she has with her
France—Prussia is left aside - Austria enters to hasten
the termination of the struggle, if necessary—the whole
Ottoman empire is called to arms, the troops and fleet
of Mehemet Ali united to them ; and the only result
that will then be worth accepting will be the retreat of
Russia behind the Dnieper, which moderate prudence
and sequence in the policy of the Cabinets of France
and England would never have permitted to traverse."
Speaking of the entrance of the allied fleets into
the Euxine the pamphleteer, at page 114, thus
continues :

" With the impulse given to Turkey, with the Black
Sea occupied by the allied squadrons, every point of
Russia is exposed. The destruction alone of her arsenal
of Sebastopol sends her back fifty years. How could
she suffice for such a defence, when the menacing body
may in a few days, or even hours, be transported from
place to place, while it would require weeks or months
for the defending corps to reach by land ?
" But when we consider that the whole of the Geor-
gian provinces await but a signal to throw off the yoke—
that many hundred thousand arm-bearing and brave in-
habitants of the Caucasus, either in a state of actual but
disunited independence, or in only seeming subjugation,
would instantaneously fall on whatever Russian troops
are within their reach—when we look at the state of the
Crimea, and even the provinces of Moldavia and Wal-
lachia, on the universal hatred that animates and unites
all races, all creeds, against Russia—it may be imagined
what difficulty she would have to maintain her position,
even without being attacked. The only movement she
could make would be against Routnelia. And what im-
pression would she be able to make on Turkey under
these new circunizitances ? And what are her means of
transport ? The famine of two years has drained her
treasury ; provisions are scarce, provender more so ; all
commithication become of extreme difficulty, because the
beasts of burthen have been in a great measure destroyed.
in the sontliern provinces. Besides, woutd she dare by
such a tuovemeut, and with England and France com-
mitted, venture to expose her flank to Austria ? Even
suppose she did push a
i couple of corps d'arrnee into Bul-
garia, supposing even t crossed the Balkans, would not
the rear he exposed ? Would not the allies dispose of
fifty or sixty sail of Turkish men-of-war, besides their
own, and of as many men as they chose, to effect a de-
barkation on any point to occupy Bessarabia, to carry
the Crimea, or to combine the tribes of the Caucasus
from the Euxine to the Caspian ?"

Atter which, at page 117, thus writes this won-
derfully prescient and sagacious pamphleteer :

" Russia, supposing even she had the power, that she
had consistency, that she had money, goods, troops, and
serviceable vessels, which she has not, to cope with a
European power would still necessarily be overwhelmed
if attacked ; for if circumstances favoured her, if she had
strength, she would not wait to be attacked. She would
attack, surprise, occupy. The chances are actually
against her for war—famine, poverty, weakness of defencea
at Sebastopol and elsewhere, contests in the Caucasus,
the union of France and England, irritation against her
in these nations, general discredit in Europe, power of
resistance in Turkey, unfitness of her navy, bad state of
her army, necessary loss of her allies, and peace in
Europe. All chances equally work for her in the main-
tenance of peace—gradual disorganisation of Turkey,
prolonged and exhausting mis-intelligence between Mehe-
met Ali and the Sultan, calming of the irritation in Tux,
key, of the irritation in Europe—slumbering of the
Turkish Question, and restored confidence on that sub-
ject—probabilities of confusion and conflict in various
places, of internal troubles in France and in England,
of dissention between them, even of general war in
Europe, cessation of famine at home, improvement of
finances, progress in preparatives, great and rapid im-
provement of her navy, levies on a scale beyond a war
establishment, active progress in defensive works—sub.
jugation of the coasts of the Caucasus render disposable
great numbers of men. These are the chances or the
progress offered her by every hour of nominal peace,
while she is permitted to keep a curb in the mouth of
Turkey, and place a load on its back, a spur in its flank.
If on Turkey the salvation of the whole European Ques-
tion depends, can this be endured I If not promptly
succoured, it must sink. The last few months have
hastened its exhaustion. Mouths, not years, if aban-
doned, will number its remaining career. And what will
this succour cost the two first nations of the globe, whose
colossal rivalry have for thirty years shaken and over-
thrown every institution, every throne, of Europe ?
United now happily in their objects, their interests, their
principles, and their might, it will cost them even yet
but to say, 'Let Turkey live.' While the Bosphorus is
still open, will they not say the word ? Their squadrons
anchored in the Bosphorus, they dictate their own terms
to Turkey. To Russia they proclaim, that from that
day they entered to arbitrate supremely between the
nations of the earth—their power is only limited by their
indecision."

Mark that, my Lord ABERDEEN ! Mark that,
people of England ! " Their power is only limited
by their indecision." There is no exaggeration
in these words—they were written twenty years
ago, as far back as 1834—and yet are strictly
true, and literally applicable nowadays, with the
alited !loots in the Black Sea, with Russia threat-
tiled. in the Euxine aed in the Baltic, with
France and England strengthened to irresistible
might by a cordial alliance between their Bove. J