The Sun.
London, England, 1854-06-08 00:00:00

LONDON, THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 1854.

A mere suppression of the revolt in Thessaly,
Epirus, and Macedonia would be the infliction of
a vengeance altogether as inadequate in regard to
the Greek, as the arrangement of a peace upon
the proviso of the status quo ante bellum would
be in reference to the Russian Government. Un-
less some sufficient reparation be extorted from
King OTHO and the Emperor NICHOLAS, unless
those lawless and treacherous sovereigns be com-
pelled to expiate, in some measure at least, the
atrocities by which, through their military and
ministerial myrmidons, they have contrived to
disturb the tranquillity of Christendom with such
deplorable and sanguinary consequences—there
will be no security whatever for the future quietude
of Europe, and an indelible infamy will be
branded upon the otherwise glorious escutcheons
of the two great maritime powers at present
recognised as the champions of civilisation.
On the Ist instant the long-threatened Austrian
missive left Vienna for St. Petersburg—an intima-
tion requiring from the CZAR, in the name of
Germany, the immediate withdrawal of his forces
beyond the Pruth, the immediate evacuation of
the now sufficiently-devastated Danubian Princi-
palities. It is confidently asserted, moreover, by
those who are generally believed to have a sort of
demi-official connection with the ABERDEEN Cabi-
net, that this demand on the part of Austria, in
the name of Germany, will be treated by Russia
neither with contemptuous silence nor insolent
refusal. In other words, it is implied by the semi-
ministerial organs of the English Government
that the AUTOCRAT will concede to the German
what he has again and again denied to the Wes-
tern Powers—that he will speak where he was
formerly dumb, that he will consent to proposals ,
previously rejected, that confronted not only by
France and England, but, in addition to these,
likewise by the chief states of the Germanic Confe-
deration, he will sulkily retire within the bounda-
ries of Bessarabia, after having done all the damage
he could, there to recruit the strength of his some-
what exhausted forces, while occupying the atten-
tion of his numerous enemies by the renewal of
his interrupted and preposterous negotiations. Is
all this credible ? Is it conceivable that the States-
men of France and of England should be so utterly
blind to the consequences of any such disgraceful
trickery as to consent, under existing circum-
stances, to an armistice that could only, by
possibility, be advantageous to the designs of
the enemy's Government Let us avow at
once our belief that anything like this is little less
than absolutely impossible while men of known
sagacity and experience still hold within their
grasp the reins of administration over the desti-
nies of France and Great Britain. It is alto-
gether incredible that a man of keen penetration
like M. DROUYN DE L'Huvs, that a soldier of
undoubted bravery like General Varrtarrr, that a
potentate possessing the genius, the daring, and
the determination, for which the Emperor NA„.},O..
LEON 111. is now universally known to be so very
wonderfully distinguished—it is altogether incre-
dible that a great ruler, or that eminent states-
men like these should be so readily duped by any
such shallow devices, or any such transparent
machinations. It is equally incredible that pro-
jects so glaringly characterised by the superficial
evidences of their duplicity should at the same
time succeed in deluding the judgments of a Cabi-
net of All the Talents of a nation like England—
a Ministry numbering amongst its members ad-
ministrators as skilled as Sir JAMES GRAHAM,
patriots as earnest as Lord JOHN RUSSELL, states-
men as clear-sighted as the Earl of CLARENDON,
masters of diplomacy as eminent as Viscount
PALMERSTON. Again, we repeat—it is incredible,
utterly and altogether incredible. It is incredible
that men like those we have just enumerated ,
should be deceived so very easily by the intrigues
of the CZAR—particularly now that they recognise
him to be a Prince entirely untrustworthy—and,
above all that, knowing him to be such, they
behold his forces before their own at this moment
in every direction at a disadvantage. Military and I

maritime, in the Baltic and in the Euxine, in Asia
and in Europe, along the Danube and along the
Caucasus—everywhere, at this crisis, the Russian
forces are at a disadvantage. The boasted fleets of
NICHOLAS are still compelled to skulk for safety
under the shelter of the guns of Cronstadt and
Sebastopol. His soldiers have been defeated in
all directions in Circassian--Redout Kaleh has
been bombarded and taken—Anapa has been
evacuated. The enormous land-force under
GORTSCHA.KOFF has been compelled to retire pre-
cipitately from Lesser Wallachia to the Dobrud-
scha. That under PASKIEWITCH has failed to
disturb the head-quarters of OMER PACHA at
Schumla, and utterly and disgracefully failed to
' make any impression upon the heroic defenders of
Silistria. Precisely at this momentous juncture
—when the English contingent is at length
actually hastening from Scutari towards Varna,
and the French contingent from Gallipoli towards
Adrianople—we are told to prepare foran armistice
between the belligerents, because, forsooth, Russia
is about to yield to the demand sent by the
Austrian Cabinet, on the Ist of June, from Vienna,
that the CZAR should as quickly as possible with-
draw his troops from the invaded Principalities !
We would here laugh this assertion to scorn as an
absurdity, even though the Earl of ABERDEEN, the
fast friend for forty years of the Emperor NICHOLAS,
still unfortunately maintains his position at the
head of her Britannic MAJESTY'S Government.

The "Bears" have had another "tight
squeeze." They have been obliged to disgorge a
considerable portion of the gains accumulated in
the commencement of the panic. The fund-
holders and capitalists have displayed very lau-
dable firmness, refusing to yield to the intimida-
tion practised, or to sacrifice their property to
their unscrupulous assailants. The fundholders
have held firmly on, and few, if any sales, were
made, save from imperative necessity ; while
capitalists of all classes, from the millionnaire,
dealing in tens of thousands, to the small shop-
keeper or tradesman, drawing for his fifties or
hundred, came nobly forward to sustain the
national credit to the full extent of their hardly-
acquired savings. From an early period, many
months before the proclamation of war, it was
manifest that the " ursine fraternity" had specu-
lated far beyond their depth—that they had, in
fact, completely oversold themselves. The urgent
demand for stock just before the settling days, the
large " backwardations" allowed, clearly revealed
the true state of the market, and proved beyond
the possibility of doubt that there was a formid-
able " rod in pickle" for these reckless speculators.
They could not have continued the game so long
had it not been for the assistance afforded by
some of the large fundholders, chiefly bankers,
who, it is said, lent considerable amounts of stock
to enable the parties to carry out their projects.
The " Old Lady" herself is generally reported to
have afforded extraordinary aid to the " friends
of Russia," having supplied stock to the extent of
many hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of
pounds sterling.
We have so frequently denounced this suicidal
system that it is unnecessary to expatiate at any
length on its probable results to the great body of
fundholders. The Bank of England is, however,
placed in an exceptional position. Although
holding an immense amount of Government
Securities, it would not in any degree suffer
from their depreciation, inasmuch as, even if
obliged io sell, there would be an ample
equivalent for any temporary loss in the enhanced
value of the commodity in which it deals. But
the Directors would scarcely resort to " selling "
at the depreciated prices. Their operations have
been more in the way of " levding" stock to be
replaced at some future time, so that they could
not be affected by any temporary fluctuations, and
if the depreciation were considerable they might
become large purchasers, and thereby realise im-
mense profits. It will thus be seen that it may
be the interest of the quasi National Bank to use
the gigantic powers and exclusive privileges with
which it is entrusted by the Imperial Parliament,
not for the support of public credit, not for the
benefit of the industrial community, but rather to
depreciate the securities to the utmost degree, and
to paralyse the exertions of those straining every
nerve to discharge their duty to society. These
are considerations that cannot be lost sight of
when the question of the renewal of the Bank
Charter is ventilated in Parliament, a matter
which will not, or cannot, be very long deferred.
Notwithstanding, however, the extraordinary
buoyancy of the funds, the Exchequer Bonds,
the favourite security of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, from which so much was anticipated,
remain languid and uncalled for ; while Consols
move rapidly and decidedly upwards, the Exche-
quer Bonds remain stationary--.while the funded
debt is eagerly sought after, although making
due allowance for the dividend, yielding less than
31. Gs. per cent. per annum on the amount in-
vested, the bonds paying 41. per cent, are pal-
pably shelved. It is true that they are quoted
at a premium of it to f, but it is merely nominal.
A purchaser might be obliged to pay at that rate,
but vendors could not submit to very considerable
reductions if compelled to sell without reserve.
We have explained SOME of the causes of this
so-called " anomaly." We have pointed out the
probable increase in the value of permanent
funded securities, that would make the profit
during
.the next four years very much be-
yond the four per cent. that could be
obtained from London payable in 1858. But t
there is another element in the calculation that
must not be lost sight of, and which exercises no
trivial influence in keeping bonds out of the
market. We have already pointed out the diffi-
culties originally interposed—the notice that no
lender would be accepted for less than 1,0001.
the uncertainty as to the price that worild be ac-
cepted—and the payment in Exchequer-bills, or,
if in money, at a small premium of ls. per cent. ;
the latter provision of no practical utility, but
still likely to excite vague apprehensions in inex-
perienced minds, and to deter the general public
from competing for the new securities. Another
obstacle has since been created, for which Mr.
GLADSTONE is not responsible, but which may
probably be traced to the department over which
Lord MONTEAGLE presides. In the original con-
ditions of the loan it was stated that the " bonds"
would be issued for sums of 1001., 2001., 5001.,
and 1,0001. The obvious conclusion was that
the parties supposed that they would be permitted
to choose their own accounts within these limits.
If, as implied by the Ministerial organ, it was in-
tended " to sink into lower strata " to endeavour
to provide a tempting investment for " the smaller
accumulations " of the less wealthy classes, the
bonds should not be for more than 1001. Indeed,
as we recently explained, that even the " lowest
denomination" was much too high, and that a great
portion of the unequivocal success of the French
project arose from its adapting itself to the wants
of the community at large, and being issued for
so little as ten francs or eight shillings of dividend,
or, in round terms, about two hundred francs or
eight pounds sterling of capitalised value. These
sums were always available for any emergency.
They were just as good as savings banks for small
capitalists. Eight pounds would not be too much
to change, if a man were compelled to realise the
value of an investment. But here the issue has been
almost exclusively in the larger denominations.
The authorities tug/ not subdivide the subscrip-
tions into suitable amounts ; and therefore the
object of attracting small investments must be
altogether relinquished. We do not ascribe this latter
blunder to Mr. GLADSTONE. It may rather be
attributed to the red tapinn and habitual disre-
gard of the public convenience, exhibited by
officials. They will not undertake the slightest
degree of additional trouble to accommodate their
paymasters--the general public. The evil may
not even be occasioned by any deliberate design
to prevent these new securities from becoming
popular. But whatever may be the motive, the
effect is but too plainly perceptible. And if Mr.
edythe
GLADSTONE desire to give fair play to the bond-
holders, and tomakethe naetwepasectuoritriesem
popular,
he will take immediate
grievance, and to enablepaferrtiessminatlleerrestedtoex
ex-
change their large bonds
denomina-
tions, without being subjected to vexatious de-