The Sun.
London, England, 1853-02-25 00:00:00

THE WAR WITH AVA.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH said he was afraid he
would find it somewhat difficult to attract their lordships'
attention to a question of Indian policy and war, after the
had been occupied with matters connected with the do-
mestic policy of this country. He must, however, endea-
vour shortly to explain the position in which the British
Government now stood with regard to the Court of Ava,
and before he put the first question of which he had given
notice—namely, whether her Majesty's Government had
any objection to lay before the house a letter from the
Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East
India Company to the Governor-General of India in Coun-
cil, dated in September, 1829, giving instructions as to the
line of operations in any future war with Ava, he thought
it right to state under what circumstances that dispatch
originated. At that time he was president of the Board
of Control, and various matters came before him connected
with the then recent war in Ava. He had occasion to be-
come acquainted with the great force employed, with the
great losses sustained, and with the enormous expense
incurred, which, according to the statement of the then
chairman of the Court of Directors, amounted, he be-
lieved, to something like 12,000,0001. All these matters
came before him, and he thought, considering that they
had obtained a very extended knowledge of the country,
of its resources, and of its geography, and that the
war had been one of so important a character that it was
extremely desirable, and indeed necessary, that he should
place all the information he possessed before the late Duke
of Wellington, who was then at the head of the Govern-
ment, and obtain that noble duke's authoritative instruc-
tions as to the line of operations which should be adopted
in the event of their being at any time forced to make war
upon Ava again. Accordingly he placed before the Duke
of Wellington all the information and papers bearing most
materially upon the subject. The noble duke considered
the matter, and was kind enough to communicate to him
(the Earl of Ellenborough) his opinion in detail, and that
opinion was conveyed to the Government of India in the
dispatch to which his question referred. He (the Earl of
Ellenborough) was not aware whether his noble friend
would consent to lay that dispatch before their lordships,
and therefore ho would not further refer to it ; but this he
thought he was at liberty to say, that the course of opera-
tions which had been lately adopted by the Government
of India was not the course described in the Duke of Wel-
lington's instructions. Another thing he thought he might
venture to assume, recollecting all that he had read of the
opinions of the late Duke of Wellington, and the many
conversations he had had with that noble duke, especially
in connexions with the war in China—namely, that it was
impossible the Duke of Wellington could have sanctioned
and approved of the course of operations which had been
adopted. He (the Earl of Ellenborough) said so on this
ground, that he thought it quite impossible that the Duke
of Wellington could have approved of a plan of operations
which involved the necessity of employing troops along the
internal waters of a great empire, at a considerable dis-
tance from their ships, without the assistance of animals,
and therefore without the means of movement upon the
land. He held it to be impossible that the Duke of Wel-
lington could have approved of such a system of opera-
tions, because he knew that if the noble duke had done so,
he would have given an opinion directly inconsistent with
every opinion he had ever heard from that noble duke.
Now, he would refer for an instant to the details they had
received the other day with regard to the operations for the
relief of Pegu, and it would at once be seen that those ope-
rations proved the impolicy of attempting to carry on a
war with troops destitute of animals, and, therefore, with-
out means of movement. A large number of troops, by the
orders of the general, were conveyed on board several steamers
to Pegu ; and in the course of two or three days he collected
twenty-five carts. The general applied the animals at his
disposal to drawing these carts with six days' provisions,
and had then no animals whatever loft to draw his guns.
The army proceeded, without guns, without animals, and
drove the enemy before them. In the course of three days
they marched twenty-four miles. The general had then done ,
the enemy little injury, for they constantly ran away and
avoided contact with his troops ; he had no means of fol-
lowing up the successes he had obtained, and the breaking
down of a cart laden with beef and biscuit crippled his re-
sources, and rendered it impossible for him to proceed.
Whatever might be the coolness under fire of that officer
—whatever might be the courage and discipline of his
troops, he (Lord Ellenborough) held it to be impossible,
with troops' so ill-provided, to subdue an Empire ; and yet
that was apparently the object of the Government of
India. What had happened at Pegu might happen else-
where • but let their lordships consider with how much
greater' loss, if the distance from our resources was greater
than on this occasion. He knew it would be recollected
by their lordships that we at last succeeded in obtaining
success in China, and compelling the Emperor of China to
submit to the terms which we dictated to him, and that
we effected that object by troops with very limited means
of carriage. No doubt we did, but observe the difference.
In the early stages of that war islands were taken, towns
were taken, armies wore defeated with great loss, and the
enemy suffered greatly, but no impression whatever was
produced on the Government of China until the whole
character of the war was completely changed—until our
resources were concentrated on one point and brought
to bear on the mouth of the Great Canal, so as
to interrupt all the great commercial operations of the
empire. When that was done we undoubtedly suc-
ceeded ; but had we the same means of success in the war
with Ava ? Was there any point on which it was possi-
-ble we could concentrate our forces so as to produce the
same effect ? Or, even if we could do so, could we expect
to produce the same result when dealing with a barbarous
usurper, acting at the head of a barbarous people, as when
we were dealing with the hereditary Sovereign of a civil-
ised and wealthy people? One of the great difficulties of
a war like this was, that a barbarous people did not act on
the ordinary- considerations which swayed the councils of
a civilised people. The former usually acted more from.
pi_ a
c4oirs onn thana tottdtlhy e
differentla t t e r.
system
u bfrt eo dlm y,
thatif we
whichh a bh ea edn
baecein-
prese resent war—if we had been resting,
we had been keeping open our communication with our own
ghave one,d on our provinces in Arracan,—if
had placed an army of 7,000 or 8,000 men
ans followedprovinces,woeought d u r i a
ton nd the
on the Irrawaddy, nearly at equal distances from Ava and
• our
Rangoon, with perfect means of moving 11troops, so
as to be able to effect any purpose required from them in
the war ; no doubt, if we had done that, we should
have had a better chance of success than we could possi-
bly have in contending with the enemy under such diffi-
culties as we had been doing. But that was not the
course which had been adopted. (Hoar.) Before he pro-
ceeded further, he begged to place before their lord-
ships, as far as he could, a statement of the present posi-
-Ith
oftion the
armthe y
eahtadwhtaakt ehne waspainsto
going to state was not far from the truth ; he calculated
ascertain facts, and
anpr the ofblenlideivaet. 11
that about the 4th of January. General Godwin would have
arrived at Promo. He would have there about 4,800 men
(of whom 200 would be cavalry), with 16 guns, of which he
believed not more than 10 were horsed and capable of being
moved. He could not find a trace of his having any ani-
mals whatever for the purpose of moving provisions or am-
munition. He regretted to say, too, that out of the 4,800
men, one-fifth were in the hospital. The men were dying
six, eight, and ten a day of cholera ; and no wonder. It
appeared that fora long time after they arrived they sub-
sisted entirely on salt provisions, and it was only when they
came to occupy the right bank of the river that they got
fresh meat supplied to them. On the left bank of the river
they were actually invested by the enemy. There was a
continued line of six miles of stockade, by which the ene-
my shut them in, with a jungle of two miles and a half be-
tween them 44 the stockade. Behind that immense line
of stockade there were three other stockades, all to be
attacked by the troops before they could meet the main

body of the enemy. If they deducted the 800 or 1,000
men in the hospital, and at least 500 more who must re-
main to protect the hospital and such stores as they had,
General Godwin would not be able to move out with more
than 3,500 men ; and he believed, that with the exception
of having animals to move his guns, he had no means what-
ever of moving his forces. In the event of these forces
succeeding and taking the stockades,--which, if the enemy
fought at all, must be a work attended with severe loss,—
how was it to be expected that forces so limited in amount,
mid already so seriously affected by sic:mess, would be able
at last to march upon Ave, as was the dream of those who
looked at the subject from a distance ? In Arracan-there
were 500 men employed in making a road to. the top of the
pass which leads from Arracan to the Irrawaddy. The
officer commanding these men reported that he could not
make the road in less than three months, that there was a
steep mountain with a stockade which it was impossible to
take, and that there was not a single commissariat officer
to provide supplies for his troops. The consequence was,
that that officer was actually raising supplies on his own
credit. Such was the state of the force employed to make
the road by which animals were to get to the valley of the
Irrawaddy. That road was perfectly well known to
us. A regiment of Madras troops came back to
India by it. We were in possession of the most mi-
nute details respecting it ; and the fact was that there
was not the slightest difficulty in throwing troops over
army moveable
and occupying that pass on the very first day of the
war ; but, now that we had allowed the pass to be so
strongly fortified, it would be a matter of great difficulty
ds out
s,
animalsto take itot ;
manakde, eventhe rm
if wye wereoveahpieretpd
there were no troops to escort them. At Rangoon there
might be about 2,000 men, besides 1,100 to sweep the
thatsen pass,
country ; that was to say, there were less than 3,500 men
left below ; and, in consequence of the unfortunate mea-
sure of the occupation of Pegu, he did not think it pos-
sible, while that measure was adhered to, that one man
could be sent from the lower part of the river' as a rein-
forcement. And this was the moment—when our army
was in, this condition} before dyed at an ao. as to,
serious 'This on the enemy—Vhis was the moment
which had been selected to declare the annexation of the
province of Pegu, which we did not occupy, and of inti-
mating our intention, if our proposals were not acceded
to, of moving upon Ava ! That was a very grandiloquent
proclamation ; but, unfortunately, there did not exist
a force sufficient to enable us to carry it into execu-
tion. If General Godwin and the Government had
confined their attention in the Present campaign
to the possession of the province of Pegu, and had
attacked from the rear the Burmese who occupied the
pass at Arracan, so as to complete our communication
with our provinces on the Irrawaddy, he would not
say that in the following campaign it would not have
been a perfectly feasible measure, and that we could have
performed the operation of subjugating that power if it
were thought to be necessary. It not for him (Lord
Ellenborough), who knew the strength of the Indian army
and the resources of the country, to say that any measure
which was was ordered by the Government here was in-
capable of being executed there but, with a view to suc-
cess, in all military operations, time, previous preparation,
and much consideration were required, and no army what-
ever could effect great purposes in war which was not per-
fectly provided with the means of moving, and of these the
army to which he was now referring had literally none.
(Hear, hear.) And here he begged to ask whether it was
advisable that we should annex the province of Pegu at
all ? If the annexation of Pegu were possible, could we
stand there? The fact was, there was no frontier, no range
of mountains, not the slightest line of demarkation. Even
if it were possible for us to obtain possession of the coun-
try by treaty with the King of Ava, could we look forward
being able to maintain it without further conflict ? He
believed it was impossible for us in that case to avoid
further conflict. And to what would that lead us?
To the occupation of the whole of the kingdom,
and thus place us upon the internal frontier of China,
as well as to a considerable extent upon that of the King
of Siam. We had made, of late years, many annexa-
tions to the empire of India, but he had no hesitation in
saying that, while some of these had produced the greatest
possible advantage to us in a military point of view, they
had been of no material benefit to us in other respects, but
even the military advantageslwould be denied, as in the case
of Ava. In the case of the interior of India all the troops
at the various provinces could be easily available for the
protection of any one province that might require their ser-
vices, but from Ava it would be impossible to withdraw the
troops, which would be found necessary to keep possession
of it. Ava was out of India, and was altogether uncon-
nected with it. This was the first time the Government had
desired to extend the empire in that direction. We could not
occupy Ava without alarge military force, even if we confined
ourselves to the occupation of Pegu without a considerable
addition of force. Without this it would be impossible to
diminish the number of officers in the regular regiments by
appointing them, as we did now, to political and civil offices.
It would be necessary, therefore, to add several regiments
for the purpose of procuring more officers. Already during
the present war no fewer than 22 officers had been taken
from their regiments, and placed in political situations. At
least four European and eight native regiments would be
absolutely necessary, even if we confined ourselves to the
occupation of Pegu ; but we must go further—we must
occupy the whole kingdom
of Ava ; and, he had told their
lordships with what countries they would, in that case,
come into contact, and how great was the danger that some
apparent or pretended necessity would be found of going
yet further. There was another consideration which their
lordships ought not to dismiss from their minds,—that was,
the manner in which they would carry on the Government
of Ave. In the case of the previous annexations which
had taken place in India they could bring from any part of
the country persons conversant with the habits and lan-
guage of the people ; but the language of Ava was different
from any known in India, and how could they conduct the
Government of a conquered country with anything like
satisfaction to themselves, when they could not find a
single individual to assist them able to speak its language ?
(Hear, hear.) When he looked at the magnitude of the
operations in which we were now engaged, at the annexa-
tion of a province which we did not really occupy, at the
threat to occupy an empire and dethrone a Sovereign, if our
demands were not acceded to; when he looked at the expen-
diture which had been already incurred in the war—not less

at the present time, he apprehended, and from the com-
mencement of the war, than 130,0001. a month—remember-
ing the expense of the war in China, he might even say
150,0001. a month; when he considered that we had
already detached from India 15 regiments, besides artillery
—that we occupied the whole steam force of India, besides
a portion of that belonging to her Majesty ; when he looked
forward to the prospect of more extended operations being
necessary to carry into effect the great object to which we
had now pledged our honour by that unfortunate procla-
mation ; when he remembered that the original causes or
pretexts that had been put forward in its justification were
two little injuries inflicted on British subjects, the details
of which were adopted, according to the statement of the
parties complaining, without any inquiry whatever by im-
partial persons—two little insults, as they were called, in-
flicted upon those persons, who went to the Governor of
Rangoon with a letter from the Governor-General of India,
—the first provoked by the recklessness witli which they
acceded to the proposition to go two and a half miles in the
middle of the day to the Governor of Rangoon—a circum-
stance which would at all times be certain to call forth dis-
respect—and the second provoked and rendered necessary
by persisting in going to the Governor when he had dis-
tinctly told them that
.he would not receive the mission at
all ; when he considered that the whole amount of the ori-
ginal damage was said to be 900/. ; when he remem-
bered that we had seized a ship of 900 tons burden,
which was surely equal in value to the amount of
the damage ; when he considered how the presence of
five of our ships in their river might have been considered
by the Burmese as an injury and an insult, at least
equal to that which we said we received—when he remem-
bered
all these things, he confessed it was most painful to
see the great and lamentable consequences which had arisen
from a cause so small. (Hear.) This was not the first oc-
casion on which differences had arisen with the Burmese
Government from supposed injuries to British subjects, and
supposed disrespect to.the British flag; but on former occa-
sions the good sense of the Government had so acted as to
prevent the collision which had taken pla in the present
instance. It was well known that on this occasion the King
of Ava did not desire war, and that he had made no prepa-
ration for it—that, whatever injury or insult had been in-
flicted on us, the notion of acting hostilely towards us
never entered his head. When he remembered this—and
remembered also that on former occasions our disputes with
that Government had been settled in an amicable manner,
so as to avoid hostilities, he confessed it was with deep re-
gret that he had seen on this occasion a course pursued so
entirely contrary. The Government, he was aware, were
Rot answerable for the proclamation to which he referred.
They must, and we all must, adhere to it and abide by its
consequences; but at least he desired, if possible, to hear
from the noble lord what were his views of our position
with regard to the Government of Ava, and in what man-
ner we could best extricate ourselves. (Hear.)
The Earl of ABERDEEN—My noble friend asks us
whether we have any objection to lay before the house a
letter from the secret committee of the Court of Directors
of the East India Company to the Governor-General of
gwar with
instruc=
India
ai
sn
to Council,
thedatedne
of oinpoSreaptiteoomsber,
in aloBy2of,ug:.ure vin
Ava. Now, although I believe it has . scarcely ever been
customary to produce any dispatch from the Secret Com-
mittee, I am not disposed to withhold the dispatch which
is now asked for ; for, although it may be a document pos-
sessing some historical interest, I think it is one of little
practical utility. That dispatch was written 25 years ago,
on a supposed event which might take place, -viz., the re-
newal of a war with Ava. Now, your lordships will see
that in this lapse of time many events may have hap-
pened to render completely inappropriate' any line of
conduct prescribed in a dispatch of so old a date—
(hear, hear)—and therefore, although, as I have said, it
may be matter which may interest your lordships to pos-
sess the opinions of the illustrious man refeired to by my
noble friend, expressed as they are in the laiguage of my
noble friend who has just spoken, I still must consider it
a matter of mere historical curiosity, and no; one of prac-
tical utility. I have therefore no object* to produce
the dispatch. My noble friend has also asked whether
her Majesty's Government are prepared to lay before
the house any papers explanatory of the preient objects of
the war with Ave, and of the measures whieby it is pro-
posed to attain such objects. These paper, her Majesty's
Government are prepared to lay before the house, and
from them I believe my noble friend will obtain all the in-
formation lie requires. I believe that the pa ers now upon
the table bring down the operations to the'end of March;
and those which are about to be produced will include the
latest papers which refer to the annexation of the province
of Pegu, and the proclamation to which my noble friend has
referred. My noble friend has another motion upon the
paper to which he has not adverted—viz., to move for an
account of the expense already incurred lit the war with
Ava, and an estimate of the probable expense to be incurred
in the current year. That of course, will be complied with,
so far as it is in the power of the Government to do so.
e
My noble friend has entered into a very ,1, 4ii
- and minute

criticism of the objects of the war, and the detailed con-
duct of the operations which have taken place. Your lord-
ships are aware that her Majesty's present Government
are strangers to the whole of the policy and execution
of that war up to the present time. Her Majesty's late
Government, I apprehend, gave their general appro-
bation to that policy, and to the conduct of the war.
I am not disposed to dissent from that policy, or
to withhold the approbation which the late Government
expressed. My noble friend has animadverted upon the
annexation of the province of Pegu. My lords, have
great reliance upon the discretion, judgment, and expe-
rience of my noble friend the present Governor-General of
India, and I believe that he would not have adopted a
step of that description without very mature consideration
and a perfect conviction that he was acting in accordance
with his duty. That annexation, like many other of our
proceedings in India, has been reluctantly adopted. Ever
since I had a seat in this house I remember that every
Governor-General who has left this country has gone out
with professions of a most pacific policy, and a desire to
abstain from anything like war or aggrandisment of terri-
tory • yet I believe that there has not been a single Gover-
nor-General who has not found himself engaged more or
less in war. (Hear, hear.) In the present instance I have
no doubt that my noble friend has been led by the neces-
sities of the case to extend the sphere of his warlike opera-
tions, for, as your lordships know very well, an enterprise,
whatever may be its primary objects and intentions, ne-
cessarily undergoes great changes and modifications in the
course of its progress. My noble friend, opposite has also
referred to the various military operations of General
Godwin, and to the different movements of his army. I
am unable to form a judgment of the propriety, wisdom,
or military skill displayed by the officers and men en-
gaged in the war. I make no such pretensions. I
know perfectly well the ability and power of military
criticism , possessed by noble friend opposite, and very
likely- there may be some reason for the criticism.
in which he has indulged. Upon that I confess I
have no opinion, but I believe that the Governor-General
is fully as well able to form a just opinion of those proceed-
ings as my noble friend opposite, and, therefore, having
complete reliance upon his judgment and knowledge, I do
not feel inclined to come to any different opinion from
that which he expressed. As I said before her Majesty's
present Government do not feel called upon to engage
in any manner in discussing the propriety of the mea-
sures which have taken place. In general terms, I ac-
quiesce in the opinion which has been expressed by the
late Government upon the subject, and in the eulogies
which were passed by them upon the Governor-General.
(Cheers.)
The Earl of DERBY said his noble friend near him, and
the noble earl opposite, had both reminded him that her

Majesty's present Government were not rosposible for tho
course of policy which had been pursued with reference to
the proceedings in Ava. He readily admitted to the noble
earl opposite, while he rejoiced that he did not differ in

opinion from the late Government, that for that policy and
course of proceeding the 'noble earl and his colleagues were
in no respect responsible, but that he (the Earl of Derby) and
his colleagues were alone distinctly and directly responsible
for that policy. They were not responsible, indeed, for the
commencement of those operations, or for the original cause,
since it had taken place previously to their accession to
office ; but he had no hesitation in entering into an exami.
nation of the justification which his noble friend the Gover-
nor-General had sent of his first proceedings, in sanctioning
the course which he had felt it necessary to adopt, and in
coming to the conclusion that, reluctantly as he had been
compelled to undertake hostile operations against Ava, the
amount of insult, if not the extent of individual injury
dhne to British subjects was such, that if it were felt ne-
cessary to maintain the prestige of the British character
in India, and to guard ourselves from future insult and in-
jury, they must not be allowed to pass unnoticed. His
noble friend had stated very truly that this was not the
first offence which had been offered by the Burmese. It
was not because a loss had been sustained by a British
merchant to the extent of 9001. that we had been com-
pelled to demand of the governor of Rangoon, first, and of
the King of Ave afterwards, reparation for the in-

suit and injury which had been inflicted upon a British sub-

ject ; but it was because, from the year 1826, a succession
of encroachments and insults had gradually deprived us of
all the benefits which had resulted from the last war with
Burmah, had driven our Minister from that post which he

had been directed to hold, and had gradually deprived us
of all the advantages which we had won. Each successive
. .

insult had been tamely acquiesced in, perhaps from neces-
sity, by the Government of the day. But it was the con-
tinued succession of those injuries and insults which had
at length made it incumbent upon the Governor-General
not to pass them over. Without discussing the merits of
this particular case, he did not hesitate to say, that when
the papers should be produced, they would completely bear
out the assertion that, unwilling as the Governor-General
had had recourse to hostilities, it was impossible for him to
have avoided them, and that, having entered upon them,
it was necessary to carry them vigorously forward. At
the commencement of these hostilities, the troops, with
very little difficulty and delay, occupied successively the
the forts of Rangoon and Martaban, and a further advance
made upon Pegu. Our troops were regarded by the po-
pulace, not as enemies, but as deliverers, come to
rescue them from an oppressive yoke. They were received
as guests and friends, and every necessary was supplied to
them. The period then arrived at which it was ne-
cessary for the Governor-General to come to a deter-
mination as to how far he should consider that suffi-
cient reparation had been taken from the King of
Ave, and what should be the further operations to
be undertaken. The Governor-General, in a dispatch,
which he presumed the noble earl would immediately lay
on the table of the house, entered very largely into the
various measures which it might be practicable for him to
pursue in order to obtain sufficient reparation for the past
and security for the future. There were three courses

which appeired to be open to the Governor-General, the
nature of which he transmitted for the opinion and advice

of her Majesty's home Government. The first was, with-
drawing from the advanced position which he then occu-
pied, and doing nothing more than taking possession of
Martaban and Rangoon, thereby occupying the forts at the

entrance of the two great rivers- , the Irrawaddy and the
Thaleain, and thus exercising a great and important in-
fluence over the commerce of the country. To that course

of proceeding several objections manifestly presented them-
selves. In the first place, according to the feeling of all
Indian nations, a retreat from a position once occupied was
never regarded as a proof of moderation, but as an evidence
of fear and inability to hold our own. A second objection
was, that the inhabitants of the town and neighbourhood
of Pegu, who had welcomed us as deliverers, would be,
when deserted by us, immediately exposed to the san-
guinary vengeance of the Burmese. The third objection
was, that the occupation of those forts of Martaban and
Rangoon would require as large an amount :of military
force as the occupation of the whole province, presuming
upon the friendly disposition of the inhabitants. That,
then, was the first course which was open. The second
course was the annexation of Pegue up to the town of
Promo, without seeking to have that annexation confirmed
or assented to by any treaty on the part of the King of
Ava. The third course was that of annexing that which
we had already occupied, insisting on the confirmation of
that annexation by a treaty with the King of Ave., and,
failing such treaty, then to proceed to ulterior measures,
even amounting to an advance upon the town of Ava
itself, or to Amerapoora. His noble friend stated that
for the operationt of that campaign no fitting provisions
had been made; that no proper force had ben brought
together; and, above all, that there were no means of
transport provided. All he (the Earl of -Derby) could
say was, that in the dispatch to which he had re-
ferred the Governor-General distinctly stated the amount
of force which he would require for the different opera-
tions, and added, that he had already given directions for
levying a sufficient force to be applied to either of the three
contingencies which her Majesty's Government should de-
termine upon having recourse to ; that it would not be ne-
cessary in the first instance to levy the whole of that force,
but that he should, in the first instance, levy sufficient to
secure the annexation and occupation of the province of
Pegu, and that he taken steps for the further levy of
forces, and for the supply of elephants and the proper
means of transport of the larger expedition, should the
home Government think it necessary to direct an advance
upon Amerapoora. Her Majesty's Government received
that dispatch, containing the views entertained by the
Governor-General and his Council, and the arguments pro
and con, about the 17th or 18th of August, and, inasmuch
as it was stated that no military operations could be taken
before the latter end of November, there was ample time
to receive instructions from home. He the more dwelt upon
this, because he had seen it industriously circulated, in
the Indian newspapers especially, that for any apparent
inaction or delay, which some persons were disposed to
charge upon the military authorities, her Majesty's late
Government and the Court of Directors and the Secret
Committee were mainly and exclusively responsible ; that
active measures had been pressed upon them by the Indian
Government, but that, they had been positively prohibited.
That was not only noti true, but was directly the reverse
of true. The dispatch in question he had already stated
had been received about the 18th of August, and, as the
Government then had fortunately for them the means
of referring to the advice and counsel of that great
authority to whom his noble friend had referred in terms
of eulogy, which he could only share with every man in
this kingdom, they took the opportunity of consulting
with that illustrious man as to the course of proceed-
ing which he would advise, and of submitting to his
consideration and judgment the whole of the papers, with
the suggested plan of operations which had been trans-
mitted by the Indian Government. That period was within
three weeks of the lamented death of that illustrious man,
and he believed that this memorandum upon this very sub-
ject was almost the last document which had been prepared
by him upon any public matter. It was addressed to him
(the Earl of Derby) upon the 24th of August, and contained
an explanation of the policy which he recommended to be
pursued He was sure, after the statement which his
noble friend had made, and his reference to the high au-
thority of the Duke of Wellington in 1829, that their lord-
ships would not think he was improperly trespassing on
their time and attention if he read to them that which had
been given to him in the form of a memorandum by the
noble and gallant duke,—now, alas ! no more. (Hear,
hoar.) In the first place his noble friend had commented
very strongly upon the insufficient cause and origin of the
war, and had contended that it had been unjustly and im-
properly engaged in. The first paragraph of the illustrious
duke's letter said,—" It appears to me that the war could
not be averted." It then went on,—
" That the operations fixed upon were judicious, have been
ably carried into execution, with great gallantry, by the
officers and troops ; and that a commencement has been made
to require from and enable the Government to consider of the
means to be adopted for the restoration of peace, and tho
terms on which peace should be restored. I concur with
the Governor-General in thinking that it will be absolutely
necessary to retain possession of all that has fallen into the
hands of the British troops 'that is, Rangoon, Martaban, and
even Bassein, Pegu an 4. the whole province so called. My
opinion that it vall be necessary to continue the prepara-

carriers.

tions for carrying on the operations of the war till the Sove-
reign of Ave shall be convinced of the necessity of signing a
treaty by the provisions of which all these dominions will be
ceded to the British Government, or till the state of Ava
shall be destroyed. A mere military possession of these dis-
tricts would be but an inglorious and little sebum result of
these successful operations. I confess that lam inclined to
expect that the means adopted to cut off from Ava the sup-
plies of corn usually received by import by sea will have the
effect of producing efforts to obtain peace by negotiation ;
but, if not, the British Government ought to be in a state of
military preparation to advance upon Ava, to enforce the
abandonment of the canital, and even of Amarapoom. It
may be relied upon that the natives of the East are not better
prepared than we are to abandon their dwellings in the winter,
and to live in the jungles and mountains. The Government
suspected of intending to take such a course would be aban-
doned by all its followers. At all events, the military pos-
session and tenure of provinces and possessions upon the sea
coast would be considered in a very different light, the Go-
vernment of Ava being there seated in strength, as under
existing circumstances ; or being driven out and weakened
towards Ameerapoora, or further on in the mountains, as is
supposed iu the printed papers. I conceive, therefore, that
it will be necessary to assemble the large force proposed, even
though it should be determined to insist upon the cession of
all the maritime possessions 'of the state of Ava. These must
be ceded by the stipulations of a treaty of peace, or the State
must be destroyed. If, after all, the Sovereign should treat
for peace in order to save his State, he must be made to pay
the expenses of the war. The necessity for providing spe-
cially for the security of the people of Pegu, discussed in the
minutes of the members of Council, appears to me to be dis-
posed of; but it may be relied upon that that point will have
much effect in both houses of Parliament. It appears to me
that the people of Pegu have already, by their conduct, ac-
quired the right to claim protection by stipulations of treaty,
if the province should be restored to the Government of Ave,
however objectionable all such provisions of treaties, as lead-
ing to, and rendering necessary, interference in the internal
affairs of a foreign nation. The demand of the session would
certainly be preferable to restoration with a stipulation of
amnesty to the people of Pegu, of which it would be neces-
sary for the British Government to enforce the execution."
He had read this memorandum for the purpose of showing
that with a full knowledge of all the facts of the case—
with all the papers of every description before him—with
all his previous knowledge of Indian habits and manners
the Duke of Wellington came to these conclusions :—First,
that war could not have been averted ; next, that the ope-
rations proposed were judicious; next, that the measures
adopted were performed with great gallantry and success ;
and, lastly, that in honour to the inhabitants of Pegu, as
well as in policy, we were bound not to stop short, but,
unless the King of Ava ceded to us by treaty the territory
we had already adopted, to advance for those larger ope-
rations which had been indicated by the Governor-General.
He ought not, perhaps, to speak of the views entertained
by himself and the other members of his Government, but
he might venture to say that the advice so given by the
noble and illustrious duke,—by him who had been, he un-
derstood, so ludicrously spoken of as having in his latter
days been overcome with childish timidity and imbecility
of mind and purpose—that the advice thus given by the
noble and illustrious duke, so clear, so vigorous, entirely
confirmed the Government as to the course which it was
desirable and expedient for them to take; and they accord-
ingly transmitted those instructions to the Governor-Ge-
neral of India in consequence of which the annexation of
Pegu took place, and in further consequence of which,
unless an arrangement was made with the Sovereign of
Pegu, or unless contrary instructions were transmitted by
those who were now responsible for the management of
Indian affairs, a further advance into the Burmese terri-
tories would take place, with means and appliances he
was quite satisfied, from his knowledge and reliance
upon the Governor-General, amply adequate to all
the emergencies of the case. He was not prepared to
discuss with his noble friend the questions of military
tactics he had raised, or possible defects of judgment,
in any of the officers employed. He was not compement
and not called upon to do so ; but he must take the liberty
of saying, that he had heard with some astonishment the
statement of his noble friend that a large portion of our
army in the district was suffering from sickness. His noble
friend might have some later information on the subject
than he himself possessed ; but certainly up to the moment
when he quitted office it had been a source of most un-
feigned satisfaction to himself and his colleagues to receive,
by each successive mail, reports of the increasing good
health of the troops engaged in the service, and of the
singularly small proportion of invalids in the hospitals.
(Hear, hear.) Upon the information he himself possessed,
he had no hesitation in expressinc, the conviction that the
forces at the present disposal of the Governor-General
were quite adequate for the purpose of occupying that pro-
vince, which, with the good will of the great bulk of the
population, had already been annexed. Whatever the dis-
advantages of any extension of our Indian empire, it must
be admitted that this particular annexation would have the
good effect of facilitating the communication between our
provinces of Tenasserim and Arracan, and of strengthening
their frontiers, especially those of the latter district. With
reference to larger operations, should these be found neces-
sary, he had the fullest confidence that the Governor-
General would be quite prepared with all the means and
appliances for their vigorous and effective execution.
(Hear, hear.)
Lord 'NH ARNCLIFFE said the noble earl at the head
of the Government spoke of a treaty with the King of Ava
as a feature in the instructions sent out to the Governor-
General, but in the proclamation of the Governor-General
there was no mention made of any such treaty. Would
the papers to be produced by the Government comprehend
the despatches with reference to this treaty ?
The Earl of ABERDEEN replied in the affirmative.
The papers were then ordered to be laid on the table, and
their lordships adjourned at a quarter past seven o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—(YESTERDAY.)
The SPEAKER took the chair at four o'clock.
SOUTHAMPTON ELECTION.

Mr. H. HERBERT wished to state to the house that
the committee appointed to try the petition against the
return of the Attorney-General and Mr. Wilcox, the
members for Southampton, recommended that the in-
quiry should be postponed to the sth of March, in con-
sequence of the absence of a material witness.
The postponement was agreed to.
Several petitions were presented against the grant to
Maynooth, and against the opening -of the Crystal
Palace on Sunday.
_ _

Mr. PHINN presented a petition from the University
of London, praying that that university should be re-
presented in Parliament.

Several petitions were presented from various places
in favour of an augmentation of the salaries of the letter-

Mr. L. KING presented a petition from certain elec-
tors of Norwich, who had presented a petition against
the return of the sitting members for Norwich, complain-
ing that their petition had been withdrawn without their
consent, and praying that the order discharging the peti-
tion might be again put on the orders of the house.
The petition was read at the table.
Mr. H. DRUMMOND said that if Mr. Locke King
did not bring the subject matter of the petition before
the house, he would do so.

Sir J. PAKINGTON presented a petition from a
place in Worcestershire, against the admission of the
Jews into Parliament.

BLACKBURN ELECTION.
Mr. DEEDES brought up the report of the commit-
tee on the Blackburn election, and the report stated that
the committee were of opinion that bribery and treating
had been committed by the agents of Win. Eccles, Esq.,
the sitting member, and that the election was void.
Lord STANLEY gave notice that he would this day
fortnight make a motion with respect to colonial postage
reform.

Mr. OTWAY moved for copies of all dispatches, mi-
nutes, or other documents (not already laid before Par-
liament) relating to the attempts of Dhackjee Dadajee
to bribe the Bombay Government and its servants, &c.
Agreed to.

A. PELLATT gave notice that he should at an
early day move for a select committee to inquire into the
advisability of substituting declarations for oaths in
courts of law.

Lord STANLEY gave notice that he should on Tues-
day fortnight bring forward a motion with respect to
colonial postage.
Sir H. MADDOCK presented a petition from the
Hindoo inhabitants of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, for
themselves and the other Hindoo inhabitants of the said
provinces, complaining of the operation of an act passed
last year.