The Sun.
London, England, 1854-11-17 00:00:00

THE CZAR AND THE "FOUR POINTS.'

( From Galignani's Messenger.)
Our readers will remember that when France and
England brought forward the four points, they declared
that they would not enter into any negotiations for
peace, unless these points should be fully accepted be-
forehand, and that they reserved to themselves the right
of adding new conditions according to the circum-
stances of the war. Whether events have been such
as to place the allies in a position
tthoatdemill fur-
therloac
think that want a
and large concessions from Russia may be
a matter of opinion. There are many persons wb
o f foresight
advantages, and caused haswouldtatheci
ofm many
yprecinus
be prudent to make peace now, if Russia
fully and unreservedly the four points.would, accept
others, and they are far the more nu There are
that, although much more mioitt havens, who think
proper energy displayed at a r been done with
per foresight, so as to keep proper time and with pro-
number of the Allied army the )3, reinforcements the
as to be numerically equal to Crimea in such a way
ouperior in discipline, the Russians, as well as
i COure,
gel and skill. The power of

the Allies has been already sufficiently shown to
warrant their demanding much more than the four
points ; and whatever difference there may be
as to what has been done, there is none as to
the means of the Allies to obtain brilliant and
important result in another campaign.' There is
nothing, however, as yet, of an authentic character
to raise a question as to whether it would be prudent
to demand only the feur points. The Emperor of Russia
may have consented, with the view of giving an appear-
ance of satisfaction to Austria and with the hope of de-
taching her from the Western Powers, to make the four
points the object of negotiation ; for this he would lose
noting and would gain time. The neutrality of Ger-
many serves his purpose, and he will spare nothing in
diplomacy to prolong it. Even the occupation of the
principalities by Austria, which was at one time
regarded as a grand point gained by the Western
Powers, has turned to his advantage. It has
enabled him to send large reinforcements to Sebastopol
still leaving in Bessarabia a sufficient force to resist any
attacks of the Turks, who have remained idle, when, by
sending a large force to the Crimea, they might have
hastened the fall of Sebastopol. It is impossible to es-
timate the advantage which the Czar has thus obtained.
What was Bessarabia in comparison to Sebastopol !
Victorious in the Crimea, the loss of Bessarabia would
have been scarcely felt, and its recapture would have
been the work of a single campaign; for, however brave
the Turks may be in defending fortresses, they cannot
resist superior masses in the open field. It is not
surprising that the Emperor of Russia should continue
tot
It
ehnoal
bdl
eosu
ht
im e
ts
ot oc prolong he r
atte
all his neutralityav ai
ao
bfforceGermany.
in
the Crimea, and he thinks probably, as many persons are
forced to think, that the failure of the allies before Se-
bastopol would not be considered by the German
Powers as a cause for mourning, as it would in their
opinion afford them a plausible pretext for maintaining
their neutrailty, and for urging the Western Powers to
consent to a peace which would at the same time prevent
them from making sacrifices for war, and procure for
Russia snore favourable conditions of peace.