The Sun.
London, England, 1853-03-19 00:00:00

would scarcely affect those to whom a difference of
price would be an object. It might occasion a de-
mand for placards to be exhibited in the grocers'
windows as to " further reductions of duties,"
and " another fall of prices ;" but that
would be all. Neither the consumer nor the re-
venue would profit. A more decided course then
should be adopted. Let the proposed reduction take
place, but let it be immediate, so that the experi-
ment may be fairly tested, and that one additional
proof may be given of the accuracy of the finan-
cial aphorism, " that a large reduction of duty
does not produce a corresponding- diminution of
revenue ;" but that, on the contrary, " more
might be collected under a moderate than an
extravagant tariff."

Sir W. MOLESWORTH, Messrs. COBDEN and
BRIGHT, Mr. BEREFT:FIY, and all of us who are
steady advocates of free voting, are much obliged
to Lord BROUGHAM for the good character he gave
us on Tuesday night. We shall not fail to ca,..
him as a witness that we are " amiable and ex-
cellent people," should we have the misfortune to
be arraigned in some court of good manners or
morality. His Lordship, however, must excuse
us if we fancy that we have sound heads as well
as good hearts, and if we are as unconvinced by
his arguments as he is by ours. We agree with
him that neither "an extended suffrage nor secret
voting can •put down bribery ;" that is, put it
down absolutely and for ever. Our amiableness
does not go the extent of believing that anything
short of the highest conscientiousness in the breast
of each voter can do that. But when he broadly
affirms that " secret voting would not diminish
the amount of corruption," as thoughtful and
steady friends of the Ballot we must join issue
with him. The more so, because his Lordship
assigns his reason ; and though the reason is in
truth an old one.newly brushed up, we desire to
meet every reasonable objection when brought for-
ward in a way likely to influence public opinion.
If we thought any objection unanswerable, we
would frankly say so at once.
His Lordship's reason is, in truth, nothing
more nor less than the old one of " head-money,"
put into graphic language. Availing himself of a
fact on which we had recently occasion to com-
ment—that the bribable portion generally con-
sisted of some fourth or fifth the electors, who
could turn the scale between two large and
respectable portions of each constituency —he
observes, that " the candidate could say, through
his agent, to the voter, Let Mr. So-and-so be
returned, and there is 5/. for you ; " and that
thus each voter would be converted into an active
canvasser for the Member whose return would
secure him the bribe ; and his Lordship further
holds, that with " secret voting detection would
be impossible." But why so ? If his Lordship
will recal to mind much of the evidence given
before the Election Committees, he will find that
the bribery was not detected by the poll-book,
although in many cases it no doubt facilitated
discovery. The crack case at Derby would as
easily have been brought to light with as without
the Ballot.' The Chatham, Canterbury, Hudders-
field, and perhaps nearly all the cases yet
decided of bribery and treating, have furnished
sufficient evidence to unseat a member, irrespec-
tive of the side on which the elector voted. Sup-
' pose, then, we maintain the bribery and treating
laws in all their stringency, or even increase that
stringency, and suppose that, as now, we unseat
every Member who has been proved guilty of
bribery by himself or by his agents, detection
would be quite as sure, and the punishment as
severe as it now is.

'Again, bribery by head-money, to be success-
ful, must be on a large scale if the constituencies
were large. At Hull there were at least 1,000
" accessible in this way." At Nottingham and
Norwich there are quite as many. Some 600 or
800, at the very least, must be made sure of, if
the candidate was determined to succeed. More-
over, unless the whole of the purchaseable electors
were plirchased, a large number of disappointed
ones would be left behind to act as informers.
These would be invaluable detectives for the de-
feated candidate, on the good old principle of
" setting a rogue to catch a rogue." Many of
them, probably, would have been invited to enter
into the conspiracy, but having for some reason
held off and lost the cash, would revenge them-
selves for disappointment by disclosure. Indeed,
if the constituencies were large, and conse-
quently the number of purchaseable voters were
large too, it would be impossible that an extensive
system of head-money should long escape detec-
tion. Five hundred voters, say, with their wives
and relatives, could never keep the secret long,
and a clue once gained can generally be followed
up successfully.
Then, again, it would be fair always to presume
extensive bribery under the Ballot, even if but one
case or a few were detected, because, unless ex-
tensive, it would be useless ; hence it would be
reasonable to visit every such constituency with a
commission, permitting every elector to demand
that the oath should •be put to every suspected
man, and that he should be compelled to deny the
receipt or expectation of any bribe whatever, or
lose his franchise for life. Nor would the temp-
tation to perjury be very great. Few voters of
this class would, by confession, lose more than
their franchise, and the chance of a bribe another
time ; they would not be lowered in the eyes of
their fellows. On the other hand, several parties
must be cognisant of their having received money,
with whom they would lose character by false
swearing, as well as subject themselves to its
legal penalties. Suppose, at St. Albans, the voting
had been by ballot, EDWARDS could still have
gone through the register, telling what he
paid to each. . Suppose he had handed the
money to some meaner agent to distri-
bute. That agent must have been indicated by
EDWARDS, and he could have told each voter's
price. We cannot, therefore, admit the impos-
sibility of detecting bribing and treating, simply •
because the votes are given secretly. Head-
money itself, . indeed, - could be made a most
hazardous venture ; the member or the agents
who paid it could be visited with the severest and
well-deserved punishment. We are glad to see
Lord BROUGHAM fully concurs in this suggestion,
which we strongly urged a few days ago. It
must be remembered that head-money is almost
the only form of bribery possible with the Ballot.
Intimidation, carrying off voters, treating, and
payment to individuals after the poll, would be
all but annihilated, and when the danger was
reduced to unity, concentration of attention would
tend to reveal the mode of prevention. That it
must diminish bribery, to render useless the four
modes just mentioned, especially that favourite
one with the Landlords, intimidation, is unde-
niable, and we have shown that the remaining
plan, indicated by Lord BROUGHAM, might be ren-
dered a most dangerous. game. The Spectator, last
week, made an ingenious suggestion with regard
to the payment of "legitimate expenses" by the
candidate. It is confessedly difficult for him to
know what they are, and the payment of . the
expenses of candidates by the public would, of
course, insure an annoying supply of those con-
ceited orators who deem themselves fit for any
situation. Innumerable ROWOLIFFES would con-
test it with the PALMERSTONS. The writer pro-
poses that the candidates-should each lodge in the
hands of the returning officer a sum equal to his
share of the total legitimate expense. That
any_
and e
sum proved to have been spent by a member
eci
beyond that amount should be an unseating dis-
qualification ;
vte Lack the ehmir
sernhabreeras, and b
who were
elected should r
returned free of expense. As the defeated candi-
dates would have caused the additional expense,
they he regards it as fair that
should " pay lt and
this would, of course, prove
an adequate check
to
o on
candidates coming forward chieflyannoy. We
were pleased with the idea at first, but there is,
WO conceive, on.reflection, one fatal
objection
: it
would be worth a candidate's while, when the
polling ran close, to bribe at least to the extent
of his deposit, as if a few sovereigns or five-pound
the scale, he -would still
notes would turn
iflose no-
double the amount of his ditig. Indeed,de-
posit• ure the seat, it would cost him no
would ins
more than losing,
while he would have the seat
•
of a defeat. In this view
for his money, instead