The Sun.
London, England, 1854-05-29 00:00:00

tinople to Paris,' they look with less confidence to the
partition of the commercial prosperity of Great Britain.
" On the occupation of the Dardanelles disappears
the importance of our positions in the Levant—they
were only valuable because the Turks held these straits.
When Russia is there they are valueless, and will soon
be untenable ; although the expenses of harassing ob-
servations may greatly increase our internal embarass-
ments. S, -
" But Russia here also has views distinct from.ber,
allies. Our Indian possessions—shall we fight for thane'
in the Dnieper, as directing the whole Mussulman nae " •:
tion ;or shall we fight for them on the Indus, at Bag.- ' s
dad, or in Persia single-handed, close to the insurrec- •
tions she will raise in her rear, and when she le in pos-
session of Turkey ? In the Black Sea we 'have France
to support nee Russia, by her principles, her interests,
and her designs must wage war to the knife with Eng-
land and France. Having possessed herself of Turkey,
she can choose her time ; her power being manifold,
augmented, and being rendered invulnerable, she unites
indissolubly to her Austria and Prussia—she dissolves
the union of England and France by the fact of its use-
lessness ; she attaches the interests and influence of each
in detail, without the possibility of the one giving sup-
port to the other. England and France, by attacking
her now, cast upon her the mass of Ottomans—provoke
to independence the whole of the unwilling subjects she
has acquired since 1779—neutralise her now subservient
allies. England obtains the co-operation of France,
which would be impossible on the Indus.
" France obtains the co-operation of England, which
sho will not obtain on the Rhine. Russia's spirit of
conquest, which torments and menaces every corner in
Europe, will be extinguished—her banners arrested along
the 3,000 miles of their progressive movement, from the
Vistula and to the Arapes—her power lost in Europe—
her face for ever turned from the east and south.
" We have more than once repeated that the allies
of Russia united to her in Western policy, united to her
in the abandonment of the Ottoman empire, are neces-
sarily detached from her by the division of England and
France to restore the Turkish empire. To develope this
idea, which alone contains the solution of the whole
question, we must examine the interests and motives
which, under different circumstances, may determine the
policy of Austria. Of Prussia we need not speak.
o reserve
Removed from the scene of action, she is influenced by
andmany
besides, o f th as
she has t
considerations
which
herself
higher nature that claim her undivided attention, and
which make even her military power too necessary, too
dear to the maintenance of the territorial integrity of a
plain and intersected country to be expended on any
foreign quarrel whatever tha,tgdoes not compromise
and
increase that integrity.
"Austria, the old enemy of Turkey, has already beea
enriched by recovered Hungary, Livonia—Austriari Cr
tia wrested from that empire. A. hundred years ago
she was inspired with the hopes of the possession of
European Turkey and Constantinople ; but another
enemy of Turkey has arisen, another competitor of Aus-
tria—Russia has succeeded to these expectations.
"It then became Austria's policy to unite with Tur-
key to repress the Northern invader ; but the Bard
of the Polish partition reduced her to insignificance,
subserviency, and silence, Still, as the power of Russia
has increased, her indecision has diminished ; and•durineg •
the last war she was prepared to pour her armies into
Wallachia, and did not do so only because England was
engaged on the Side ofißussia. Give Turkey support ;
she too will support her. Leave her to her Russian
enemy, and Austria will seek to profit by the catastrophe
she has not been able to prevent.
" But her interest in the Turkish question is a portion
of many cases. Her first object is that of self-preserva-
tion. The first shot fired on the Rhine or in the west
of Europe will be levelled against her existence. Her
government is under the control of a high aristocracy—
an aristocracy in the great Sclavonic and Hungarian,
divisions of the empire, essentially feudal, without a
middle class between it and the serfs; whose position
is not far superior to those of Russia. But this system,
precarious as it is, has not the advantage of uniformity.
The supremacy of the Government and of the local aris-
tocracies depends on employing the military means of
one province to enforce submission in another ; and in
this precarious submission depends not only the unity
of the empire, but the existence of the aristocracy who
direct its policy. The preservation of peace is, there-
fore, the first of Austrian interests, which she must
maintain by the sacrifice of all external interests, if ne-
cessary. But if her political state loudly deprecates
every external collision, her financial state knot less im-
peratively demands repose. Her fiscal regulations can
suffer no violent disturbance, and the age and antece-
dents of Metternich and the Emperor render them
equally pacific.
" France, by her principles, alone endangers Austria,
and the system of government on which Austria de-
pends. The interests of France, moreover, are opposed
to the consolidation of Austrian supremacy in Germany
and Italy. The power of France, if she is powerful,
will deprive her of that supremacy, and expose it to an
attack in case of war. The principles of France, no less
hostile than her interests—no less dangerous than her
power—combine with both to render that supremacy
precarious, even under the most favourable despotism, of
the Government of France. But the Government of
France being popular, it is evident that neither the in-
terests nor the popular principles of the nation can in any
case be long excluded from action on her foreign policy.
A change of administration would follow, and bring
with it a violent reaction. Therefore, no compact, no '
treaty, ne alliance, no concession that is in the power of
France to make, can in any degree calm the alarms, or
soothe the hostility of Austria. But France at this
moment does exert an opposing influence in Gernany ;
she does hold Ancona. For three centuries the views of
Austria haVe been fixed on Italy. Her principal influence
in Europe depends on her possession of Lombardy, and
on her control over the remainder of the Peninsula.
Her Italian possessions furnish a large contingent to
her arms,
.and. a large portion of her revenue. Her
possessions on the Adriatic give -an - outlet to- her:
whole empire for its industry, and nourish that industry
by foreign produce. But they are so dependent on the
pressure of a strong body of Austrian troops, that Prince
Metteruich has declared that the principle of interven-
tion is a vital question for Austria ; so that, while
French intervention puts these possessions in the greatest
hazard, the recognition by France and England of the
principle of non-intervention is fatal to her posses-
sions, if she is obliged to conform to it ; while its mere
proclamation multiplies her difficulties and her dangers.
" While France maintains so large a military force on
foot, Austria must maintain her actual establishment,
disproportioned to her means, beyond the resources of
her treasury. Yet no combination can diminish this
necessity ; because, were France even to reduce her
standing army, she could not dismiss her National Guard,
become now a portion of her institutions—a vital part of
those principles already in their moral character so dan-
gerous to Austria. These considerations may so deeply
affect the mind of Prince Metternich, that he may con-
sider all remoter interests or apprehensions of little im-
-1 portance, when compared with the necessity of diminish-
ing the power of France, since he cannot expect to
modify her principles by anything short of a third occu-
pation.
The means of doing so present themselves in per-
'eating Russia to occupy Constantinople. From Russia
she has no moral danger to apprehend ; on the contrary,
she has to look to her alliance and her predominance
for support at home. The territorial aggrandisement
and the increase of the political power of Russia would
strengthen the influence of Austria over Germany and.
Italy, while Prince
balance them by additions to the territory of Austria in
Roumelia—additions which may furnish uncontaminated
nurseries of soldiers
to subdue revolutionary principles
in other provinces. There would certainly be no com-
parison between
the accession of the strength ofßussia
and ofAustria ,
• but Prince Metternich may be more
impresseddangers of an internal than of an exter-
nal with
kind ; and he may suppose that Russia having a new
field opened to her ambition, her views will be directed.
to the East, her energies and resources absorbed in the
pursuit, and all the dangers for Austria postponed to a
remote period—remote, and until the attainment of results
subject to many contingencies. That in the meantime
the animosity of Russia must be directed against France,
and Russia must be not only little inclined to quarrel
with Austria, but desirous to augment her strength, for
the furtherance of their common objects. Prince
Metternich will consider that Russia at Constantinople
would come into imniediate contact with France ; that
the animosity which had animated for so many years both
Governments, while the whole of Germany was inter-
posed between them, would necessarily be exasperated ;
so many interests, on which Russia can now exercise
a remote and uncertain influence, would thus be subject
to daily interference, control, and menace. Russian in-
fluence and commerce would become predominant in the
Mediterranean, in Egypt, in Greece, her navies threaten-
ing, and her Cossacks within reach of Italy, Spain, Corsi-
ca, and Algiers. Russia would then, at any moment, be
ready to attack France; her military establishment would
be rendered necessary to her own defence, instead of
being a source of alarm to Austria ; and under such cir-
' cutnstances, France would never venture send to a large
force into Germany or Italy.
"The hostility of Austriato Fr •
anee occasioned for cen-
turies by their common view on Italy and Germany, and,
latterly, by the opposition of their political principles,
has rendered Austria necessarily dependent on the mari-
time superiority of England to protect herself in her
commercial and other
interests exposed to the opera-
tions of the marine of France ; but the union of these
two powers renders their common principles more
dangerous, and takes from her all confidence, all possi-
bility of support in the maritime power of England
against that of France. But in the creationof the
naval power which Russia necessarily and nediatel
her Ybecomes possessed of, Austria finds relief from
de-
pendence on England. at this moment,
"It is in Prince Metternich 's power,
a the
possession
to grant te, or withhold from, e
He has,
therefore,
on which these results hinge. n
imme-
diately pressing upon bins the
conviction of great dan-
gerhonour ; and he
from principles he has in
hisrsonal
hands the destinies of
Europe. These sources o
has the feeling of holding
in
of alarm on one hand, and con-
fidence on the other, are, no
no doubt, ably worked upon
by Russia ; and Mett,
e raniA may think by one able stroke
annihilate the European commerce
to bridle France, to
evidently unchecked,land
dissolve a union
of England to arbitrate supremely in every Euro-
peanwill in a few years
the
and so strengthen northern combine-
interest, .
render it capable of exterminating with the
tion as to . .
towhich •
d the political institutions he is opposed,
saw
and of restoring and effectually securing the supremacy
of the absolute principle by the destruction of the press."

SCOTCH AGRICULTURAL STATIBTICS.—The Scotsman,
says that a vote of 6,0001. is to be proposed by Goyern-
ment for the obtaining of a complete system of agricul-
tural statistics in Scotland, to be carried out througla
the medium of th© Highland Society,

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