The Sun.
London, England, 1854-11-17 00:00:00

(Front the Debats.)

The Cabinets of Paris and London made known in
thecae notes of the Sth August the four guarantees which
they consider as indispensable for the re-establishment
of good relations between Russia and Turkey ; without,
it is true, prejudice to, and under the ,express reserve of,
the special conditions under which each of them may
make peace with Russia. The Cabinet of Vienna made
known these general conditions of guarantee to the Ca-
binet of St. Petersburg, and invited it to accept them,
because a frank acceptance was the only chance which
remained of coming to a general understanding. On its
part, the Cabinet of Berlin associated itself to a certain
extent with the proceedings of the Cabine-. of Vienna.
Austria now demands that the Germanic Diet shall
completely adopt the four points, but Prussia op•
poses it. The Cabinet of Vienna does not believe itself
sufficiently guaranteed against the enterprises of Russia
—it foresees that it may find itself under the necessity
of taking an active part in the war, if, for example, the
armies of Russia should again penetrate into the Princi-
palities, or if they should not respect its territory. Be-
sides, Austria needs the re-establishment of peace, for
the existing war imposes on her sacrifices which she
cannot indefinitely support. Austria means, therefore,
to remain at liberty to make war on Russia, if she thinks
that her interests, which are those of Germany, prescribe
it to her, and she demands that the war shall be sup-
ported by all Germany; and she demands, also, that the
Diet shall at once admit that the situution is full of un-
certainty, and that the eventualities foreseen may be rea-
lised. She demands, likewise, that in case the Diet shall
decide on making war on Russia, it shall declare in ad-
vance that the war shall be common to Germany, and that
she in any case shall be obliged to defend Austria. Prussia
opposes this : in her opinion the war would not have
any interest for Germany unless Russia were to invade
the Principalities, or to take the initiative of an attack
on Austria and on the territory of Austria ; if, on the
contrary, Austria were to commence hostilities, Ger-
many, she thinks, ought not to intervene in the war.
It has therefore been admitted, in the conferences at
Berlin, that the discussion may be reduced to these two
points :—ls the Germanic Diet to adopt the four con-
ditions of guarantee in such a way that they may be
proposed to Russia, in the name of Germany, as the
bases of future negotiations ? Or, is the Diet to under-
take to give its co-operation and support to Austria in all
the cases under which war may break out between that
Power and Russia, or to restrict her engagement to
the sole case of war being excited by the enterprises of
Russia in the Principalities, or even in the territory of
Austria ? We believe that on the first point the
Cabinet of Berlin has consented to the wishes ofAustria,
provided the Cabinet of Vienna will consent to take the
engagement of abstaining from any attack on Russia.
Thus the four conditions of guarantee would be admitted
by Prussia with the same signification as Austria has
given them, the same effects and the same consequences ;
and war would consequently not be possible between
Russia on the one hand, Austria, Prussia, and Germany
on the other, unless Russia were to excite it in the
Principalities or on any point whatsoever of the
Austrian territory. We believe that M. de Pfordten
went from Berlin to Vienna with the mission of pro-
posing to the Austrian Government this result of the
Conferences at Berlin, in order that, if accepted at
Vienna, it may be made at an early period the object
of a common communication to the Diet, which would
be convoked to receive and deliberate on it. But will
the Cabinet of Vienna accept these overtures ? will it
consent to take the engagement demanded of it Some
daysago this was more doubted in QerrE any than believed
in ; these who doubted relied on the reiterated decla-
rations of M. de Buol. It is true that those declara-
tions are very formal, and that M. Buol has eagerly
seized every opportunity of renewing them, adding each
time to the energy of his expressions. They rely also
on the policy which Austria has followed towards Russia
during the last four months ; a policy of neutrality in
appearance, but in reality very active, since it has con-
strained Russia to evacuate the Principalities, and to
summon her armies behind the Pruth. Those on the
contrary who anticipate the consent of Austria remark
that her language is no longer the same, and that this
change cannot be explained, except by the desire of pre-
venting the scission with which the persistance of Prussia
menaces Germany. During the last few days this latter
opinion is in progress to judge from the newspapers , h.
lt
the
we have not yet received any direct information on
last resolution of the Court of Tienna.

THE CZAR AND TILE "FOUR POINTS."

(From Galignani's Messenger.)
Our readers will remember that. when Franco and
England brought forward the four points, they declared
that they would not enter into any negotiations for
peace, unless these points should be fully accepted be-
forehand, and that they reserved to themselves the right
of adding new conditions according to the circum-
stances of the war. Whether events have been such
as to place the allies in a position to lemand fur-
ther and large concessions from Russia may be
d a matter of opinion. There are mantyptersiotnswwouhlo
think that want of foresight has caused the loss
of many precious advantages, and that
be prudent to make peace now, if Russia would, accept
t
s. There are
others, and they are far the more numerous,
fully and unreservedly the four iluie
who think
h
e might have been dose with
proper
displayedo a. t a properiy reinforcements the
time and with pro-
pertat, although
energy nmch more
foresight, so as to keep
number of the Allied army up
till)e Crimea)
as to be numerically equal to the in such a way
auperior is diecourage,cipliue, Russians, as well as
And okill, The power of

the Allies has been already sufficiently shown to
warrant their demanding much more than the four
points ; and whatever difference there may be
as to what has been done, there is none as to
the means of the Allies to obtain brilliant and
important result in another campaign. There is
nothing, however, as yet, of an authentic character
to raise a question as to whether it would be prudent
to demand only the four points. The Emperor of Russia
may have consented, with the view of giving an appear-
ance of satisfaction to Austria and with the hope of de-
taching her from the Western Powers, to make the four
points the object of negociation ; for this he would lose
noting and would gain time. The neutrality of Ger-
many serves his purpose, and he will spare nothing in
diplomacy to prolong it. Even the occupation of the
principalities by Austria, which was at one time
regarded as
a grand point gained by the Western.
Powers,
turned to his advantage. It has
enabled
him to send large reinforcements to Sebastopol
owe rshas
still leaving in Bessarabia a sufficient force to resist any
attacks of the Turks, who have remained idle, when, by
sending a large force to the Crimea, they might have
hastened the fall of Sebastopol. It is impossible to es-
timate the advantage which the Czar has thus obtained.
What was Bessarabia in comparison to Sebastopol
Victorious in the Crimea, the loss of Bessarabia would
lbcaev the work and its recapture would have
Nnvosrckarocfel!m
the Turks may b.: in de`, nding f )1-tresses, they cannot
single campaign ; for, however brave
resist superior mas,es in the open field. It is not
surprising that the Emperor of Russia should continue
to hold out lures to prolong the neutrality of Germany.
It enables him to concentrate all his available force in

the Crimea, and he thinks probably, as many
persons are
forced to think, that the failure of the allies before Se-
bastopol would not be considered by the
.German
Powers as a cause for mourning, as it would in their
opinion afford them a plausible pretext for maintaining
their neutrailty, and for urging the Western Powers to
consent to a peace which would at the same time prevent
them from making sacrifices for war, and procure for
Russia more favourable conditions of peace.