The Sun.
London, England, 1854-10-18 00:00:00

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LONDON, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1854.

No further news from the Crimea 1 That is to
say, nothing authentic, or on which any reliance
can be placed. Rumours are in abundance,
" thick as leaves on Vallombrosa," but they all
want confirmation, and many of them probability.
Thus we hear on one side of a reported defeat of
the Russians ; that a sortie had been made by
twenty thousand men from Sebastopol, and that
they were completely routed. We also hear of
letters from MENSCHISOFF being intercepted,
which con tain a candid confession that the quasi
invincible fortress is incapable of making a suc-
cessful resistance. Again, of a despatch from
Lord RAGLAN to 03IER. PAcHA, in which he de-
dared that the regular siege was to begin on the
sth instant, " and expressing an opinion that the
fortress would be taken in ten days." On the
other hand, we have the veracious productions of
the imaginative MBNSCHIYOPT, a rich fund in
themselves, while through German sources it is
announced that OSTZN-SACIZN is en route from
Odessa, at the head of 40,000 men, to reinforce
the Russian Army of the Crimea. These are some
of the innumerable reports that receive circulation
and some degree of credence, which is generally
yielded in accordance with the wishes and feelings
of the auditors.
Still, however, we are without direct intelli-
gence from Lord RAGLAN, and it is difficult to
account for the continued silence of the English
Commander. We know that he was making the
most energetic exertions to commence the bocci_
bardment, that the town was invested on the
South, that batteries of heavy guns had been
constructed, and that the Allied Armies had ad-
vanced their trenches within 1,500 paces of Se-
bastopol. put this was all accomplished by the
3d, and we might easily have trustworthy tidings
of fully a week later. AU that had occurred in
the Crimea up to. the 10th inclusive might now
be known in England, and nothing but some de-
cided change in the oPerationa would justify the
delay.

Now, we may obtain some slue to
the real facts
by considering the actual state
of affairs at the
time of the last despatch. After the brilliant
strategetical movement on Balaklava, and esta-
blishing it as the basis of their operations, the
Allied Armies menaced the town from the south,
holding a powerful position, where they could,
withstand the entire Russian force, even if all the
vaunted reinforcements had arrived and were
available for actual service. There they could
obtain ample supplies of Inca and provisions, and
there they would await the arrival of the reserve,
which could laud at Balaklava without difficulty
or impediment. Having thus established these
important paints, they would naturally be de-
sirous of cutting off all communication be-
tween mrscHmorr, who, as he himself
declare 3, had executed his flank movement on
Bakebi-Serai, and was very probably hovering

bout the Belbeck, and possibly in communication
with t le Norlh Fort, and the several forts on the
I.yeastern side of the bay of the harbour—Fort Con-
stantine, Are , Arx. Indeed we see no reason to
doubt it, eice-Ptbia own positive assertion that it

+t~ . .

was so. What, then, could be more probable
than that a portion of our gallant fellows and
their faithful allies—not those actually engaged
in pushing forward the entrenchments or con-
structing the batteries—may have sought a little
closer acquaintanceship with their Russian friends.
It ,would be desirable to cut off all the
communications, and to completely hem in
the defenders, and llbutsoinKovi, might in
his eagerness, have got himself into a
position from which he could not easily retreat.
Our troops would desire nothing better than an-
other conflict, where they would meet the adver-
sary on more equal terms, as to position, ac.,
than on the Alma. Should that desire be grati-
fied, we have no doubt but that they gave a good
account of the enemy. A victory, under such cir-
cumstances, would have a powerful effect in de-
pressing the defenders, so that their energies
would be completely paralysed when they saw the
,upport, on which they might have placed con-
siderable reliance, withdrawn—or rather disgrace-
fully drawn off. Many of the garrison might bo
tempted out to assist their compatriots. All the
operations and preparations for the siege would,
of course, be carried on without interruption by
the working division, while their fighting brethren
were otherwise actively engaged. No time would
thus be lost ; but, on the contrary, the great
object, the capture or destruction of Sebastopol,
will be materially accelerated.

We do not assert these matters as facts. We
simply put them forward as speculations respect-
ing the probable events that might naturally fol-
low the state of affairs with which we were pre-
viously acquainted. The disposal of MENSCHI-
KOFF'S army would absorb the attention of Lord
RAGLAN, so as to prevent him from sending the
despatches that would otherwise have been trans-
mitted. We should therefore feel by no means
surprised if we received something really worth
learning--announcing not merely the opening of
the bombardment, but another victory, not less
glorious than that of Alma itself, and even more
important than that splendid achievement.

In our impression of yesterday we readily gave
insertion to a letter from Dr. SMITH, Director-
General of the Army and Ordnance Medical De-
partment, on the interesting and important
subject of the alleged insufficiency of medical
attendants, and of medical stores and supplies,
with the Army and in the hospitals of the East.
It is but justice to the writer to say that he has
fully and completely exonerated himself and the
heads of the department over which he so effi-
ciently presides from any participation in the
alleged neglect of the sick and wounded. He has
pointed out that there were with the Army at the
Battle of Alma no less than 276 medical officers,
being one to every 97 of strength, while in the
Peninsula the number of medical officers with the
troops was only one to every 154 of strength. The
long list of materiel supplied, consisting of medicines
and medical materials and comforts, instruments,
surgical materials, and hospital stores, machines
for the conveyance of the wounded, dss.,
proved that everything that could be required was
abundantly supplied, and that so far as the seat
of war was concerned no just complaints could
be made against the preliminary arrangements,
all for which Dr. SMITH, or the medical officers
at home, could fairly be held responsible.
We are also told that the medical officers at
Scutari (Dr. &KITH believes 21 in number) have
at their command. everything necessary for the
treatment of the wounded soldier, and that there
are at this moment 30 more medical officers on
their way to Constantinople, and that 15 more
are waiting for embarkation. This is not quite
so satisfactory ; inasinueli as Dr. SMITH does not
speak positively, but merely on belief, as to the
number of medical officers at Scutari. Besides,
supposing the full number specified in attendance
—twenty-one persons—even of the greatest effici-
ency, would be incapable of affording the neces-
sary care and attention to so many sick and
wounded persons, said to amount to nearly 4,000
of all classes. It would seem, too, that the medi-
cal officers en route to, or under orders for, Con-
stantinople should have been earlier despatched.
From the time of the sailing of the expedition it
must have been known that a severe conflict, at-
tended with many serious casualties, was inevi-
table—that the return of numerous bodies of
sick and wounded, as well of our own troops as
of unfortunate prisoners, who ought to be treated
with equal care and attention, might speedily be
anticipated; and, therefore, that no considerations
of economy should be permitted to retard for a
single moment the despatch of a sufficient party of
medical attendants, not merely officers, but
dressers and nurses--to whom, by the way, Dr.
SMITH makes no allusion. The error may, how-
, ever, rest with parties on the spot, who looked
chiefly to the wants of the troops at the Crimea,
and thought too little of those who might be
sent home to the hospitals at Scutari. This seems
a very probable view of the ease, and, therefore,
there is at present no sufficient evidence to war-
rant any charge against Dr. SMITH, or the officers
of the medical department at home.
Two questions then arise which should receive
prompt and adequate answers. Are the state-
ments respecting the want of medical comforts
and surgical materials well founded, or gross
exaggerations of the actual facts ? We can scarcely
conceive that they can be pure inventions, or that
any persons would be base enough to fabricate
such vile calumnies unless there had been some
foundation, some groundwork of truth, on which
to rest the superstructure. On this point we have
very conflicting evidence. On the one side, many
persons come forward, on the authority of letters
from their sick friends or relations, to charge the
medical attendants, both on board the ship and at
Scutari, with gross incompetency or negligence—
or perhaps a little of both ; while, on the other
hand, we have unimpeachable witnesses, who
were actually present, and under the care
of these impugned officers, vindicating their
reputations, and passing high encomiums on their
skill and indefatigable attention. The natural
deduction follows that there is most probably a
mixture of truth and falsehood in the charge, so
that a strict inquiry should be instituted to ascer-
tain whether the complaints are sustained to any
and what extent ; and, secondly, if so, who
are the parties or party primarily responsible for
this serious evil.

view the affair,
But,we are
the in wrahoartee vc
nr
fi
rams peedc
t vi
is tehe view we origi-
nally took, not merely of the inutility, but the
inipolicy of attempting to supply alleged defi-
eioneies by the liberality of private individuals.
Such assistance must be absolutely useless to the
afflicted. Their welfare is, of course, the first
consideration, and if that could be promoted, or
their sufferings alleviated by suoh aid, we would
say GOD speed the movement, much as we might
feel bound to protest against its policy. But it
must be obvious that the duty is primarily im-
posed on the Government of the country, and
that they ac' nowledg,e and recognise the
rosponsibility. It seems equally plain that
they . have more ample means at their dis.
posal than any association of private iudivi-

duals, and that the thirty surgeons who are al-
ready on their way to Constantinople, and the
fifteen more under orders, must be on the spot,
and capable of rendering aid to the sick and
wounded, before the parties engaged by, or on
behalf of, the subscribers to the fund can be pre-
pared to leave the English shores. Resides, we
may feel well assured that the medical depart-
ment has long since received information of any
deficiencies, and have set to work to supply the
wants and exigencies long since reported, whereas
the kind-hearted subscribers must work in the
dark. Although they have " one of the most
trustworthy" of the Times' staff to act as almoner
they will probably send out that which is utterly
useless, and omit that which is urgently required.
Indeed, before any thing practical could be ef-
fected, the last of the wounded at Alma will either
have received military honours over his grave,
been invalided and sent home, or be in readiness
to rejoin his regiment. Of all the delusions
and humbugs we have witnessed—and we have
seen, and exposed a good many, the Times'
subscription for the wounded at Alma is decidedly
the greatest. As we have already stated, we
honour the motives of the subscribers, but we
cannot help smiling at their gullibility, while we
must protest against the impolicy of their inter-
vention. Would Lord RAGLAN manage his troops
better by having " Our own Correspondent" asso-
ciated in the command ? Would the Government
send out an- expedition in better condition, if
trusting for success to the exertions of private vo-
lunteers, who thought themselves at liberty to act
independently—or for supplies to the casual
bounty of individuals ? No ; let Government
discharge the duties for which it is fairly respon-
sible, without expecting to have its failings sup-
plied by others. We pay heavy taxes—we grant
liberal supplies, in order to have everything con-
ducted in the best manner. Let us have the
management in the hands to which our SOVEREIGN
has, with the assent of her Parliament, confided
it; and if the duty be not properly discharged, call
those responsible to a stringent account for their
culpable lashes.

Everybody is asking everybody what will be
the next step taken by the Allies after the fall of
Sebastopol, which everybody considers "un fait
accompli." Will the Allies keep possession of
the Crimea ? Will they destroy the batteries,
ships, and town, and then evacuate ; or will they
establish another, if not a new, dynasty—Turkish
or Tartar ? And if they do, ask the uninitiated,
what next will the Allied Army undertake to
do to distress or bring to his senses the obsti-
nate tyrant who has been the cause of so much
bloodshed ?

Everybody, or, at any rate, most people we
come in contact with, see nothing to make it either
hazardous or difficult to ferry a portion of our army
across the lake ; and in almost three days from
the time of embarking to bring it front to front
with Prince BEBUTOFF'S legions. There can be no
doubt that, next to the destruction of Sebastopol,
the driving out of GZORGIA, and, if needs must,
into the Caspian Sea itself, with the help of the
Turks from Kars and Erzeroum, and SCHAMYL
from his hills. This would go further to destroy
that prestige which has cost so much treasure,
so much bloodshed, so much diplomacy to
establish, and which had well nigh frighted
Europe from its propriety, than any other imme-
diate step the Allies could take, except perhaps
making Poland independent, which she yet must
be.

Oa this subject we were led to dilate from
having read Sir Wm. NAPl*a's " Conquest of
Scinde," published in 1845, ten years ago, when,
with a prescience and sagacity- almost wonderful,
he reviews the state of Russia and its power in
Asia.