The Sun.
London, England, 1854-06-14 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, WEDNESDAY R, EVENING, JUNE 14, 1854.

the ballot. He would give his cordial support to the mo-. i third mode of bribery, the payment is contingent on the
tion. return of candidate A. The payment is therefore uncertain
Mr. FORSTER felt bound to repeat on this occasion the and depends upon an uncertain event, over which the intii-
vote which he gave last session. All legislation against vidual elector can have no control, except in the rare case
bribery, from 1831 down to the present time, had resulted of hiS vote being the casting vote of the election. Conse-
in failure, and the house might depend upon it that no quently, corrupt electors must prefer the first to the third
good would be accomplished until they adopted the bah mode of bribery; and it is evident, likewise, that a much
lot In France, during the troubled times of the revolu- smaller sum of money, to be expended in the payment of
tion, the ballot triumphantly prevailed, and if hon. mem- votes as soon as they are given, would be far more effica-
hers were sincere in their professions against bribery and cious in determining the votes of electors than the promise
intimidation at elections, they would not hesitate to vote of a much larger sum of money to be paid only in the un-
for the introduction of this bill. certain event of A being returned. Therefore the third kind
Sir J. FITZGERALD had witnessed so many scenes of of bribery would be much more expensive than the first,
oppression in Ireland arising out of open voting that he could only be practised by larger capitalists, and, conse-
felt constrained to support the motion. There the elec. quently, by fewer persons. It is supposed, however, that
tors were kidnapped, maltreated, and coerced by their bribery of the third kind would be much practised in the
landlords to vote according to their wishes, and that fact secret voting. Ido not believe that it would be. But if
alone should be sufficient to induce scrupulous minds to it were, my position is that with secret voting it would be
give the elector the protection of the ballot. Why, since much less efficacious and much less difficult of detection
his election he had received letters from some of his con- than the ordinary mode of bribery with open voting ; and
stituents imploring him to intercede with their landlords therefore that the ballot, by putting an end to every other
to prevent their being ejected, in consequence of their kind of bribery, would do mach towards arresting the pro-
having voted in his favour, while in many places in Ire- gress of corruption. To prove this position I must institute
land the landlords had had recourse to the aid of the mi- a comparison between the two kinds of bribery to which I
litary to compel electors to vote against their will. Surely, have just referred—viz., between the ordinary mode of
then, the best remedy for these abuses was the ballot, bribery with open voting, in which the bribe is paid to the
which he hoped this session to see carried. elector who has promised to vote for candidate A as ROOM
Mr. BRIGHT, in supporting the motion, said, that bri- as he has fulfilled his promise, and the supposed mode of
bery and intimidation, especially the latter, had greatly in- bribery under the ballot, in which the bribe would only be
creased of late, and that the difference between boroughs and paid to the electer who had promised to vote for candidate
counties was, that in the former the electors had just in- A when A. was returned. In the ordinary mode of bribery
dependence enough to insist on selling their votes, with open voting, the corrupt bargain is clear, simple, and
while in the latter they had not even that amount direct. " Vote-for A," says the briber to the corrupt elec-
of independence, and the landowners returned the mem- tor, " and you shall have a 5/. note ; vote for B, and you
hers. He declaimed vehemently against the Ministerial shan't have a farthingefrom us." But in the supposed
opponents of the ballot, and cited the names of such mem- mode of bribery under the ballot, the corrupt bargain
leers of the Administration as were inclined to it as evi- would be—" If Abe returned you shall have a 51: note,
deuce in its favour. He repudiated the leadership of whether you vote for or against him; and if Bbe returned
men who refused to the majority of that side of the house you shan't have a farthing whichever way you may vote."
the smallest concession, and he declared that those who Therefore, with open voting, the temptation to the elector
deemed this question of vital importance ought to apprise to vote for A is the certainty of obtaining a 51. note ;
Lord John Russell and Lord Aberdeen that they must with secret voting, the temptation to the elector to vote
take up the ballot and carry it, or else understand that for A would depend upon the elector's opinion of the
they were not to rely on the support of th© Liberal party, effect of his vote on the probability of A being returned.
Those who did not like this course were not doing their If the elector thought that the return of A would depend
duty to their constituents. After dilating upon the abso- upon the elector's own individual vote, then the temptation
lute necessity of the ballot, and contending that legislation to vote for A would be nearly the same as with open voting,
would be ineffective to repress bribery or intimidation, he and equal to the certainty of receiving a Si. note. But if
expressed his conviction that if the advocates of the ballot the elector thought that the success or failure of A. was in-
resolved to have it, they could succeed by the means he dependent of the- elector's 'own individual vote, then he
had pointed out.
would have little or no motive to vote against his convic-
Mr. WHITESIDE, in opposing the motion, said that time for A, because by the hypothesis in the elector's opie
the ballot would lead to the destruction of constitutional nion the return of candidate A, and consequently the pe-
freedom. He urged that in Ireland, even if the ballot pro- cuniary result to the elector, would be the same whichever
tected the voter against the landlords, it would not pro- way he voted. Now, as it rarely happens, even with open
tect him against the priests. He considered that the con- voting, that nn elector thinks that the result of a contest
stituency of the country was already large, intelligent, will depend upon his casting vote, I think that with secret
and upright enough to exercise the desirable influence. suffrage an elector acting singly and alone would be little
Sir W. MOLESWORTH next rose to address the house, influenced in his vote by the promise of a bribe to be paid
in the uncertain event of the bribing candidate being re-
and was received with loud cheers. The right. honourable tarried. It is said, however, that with secret suffrage dor-
baronet said—My hon. friend the member fur Manchester rupt electors would not act singly and alone, but in combi-
has appealed to me in courteous terms, and I cannot refrain nation, and that collective bribery would be substituted for
individual bribery. • For instance, it is said that a body of
from addressing the house on this subject. (Hear, hear.)
electors, sufficient in number to decide a contest, would
The hon. and learned gentleman who last addressed the
combine together to be bribed ; that a bargain would be
house supposed that I had been converted by the speech of made with there to the effect that each of them should re-
my noble friend near me. I listened to that speech as in ceive a certain bribe—say 51.—in the event of candidate A
duty bound, but though I always admire anything that being returned ; that each of them would perceive that if
they acted together and voted together candidate A. would
comes from my noble friend, I must say I do not think
his argument against the ballot was very convincing,
be returned, and they would be paid. Thence it is inferred
that, they would act together and vote together, and that
(Cheers and laughter.) In fact, it was nothing more than their temptation to do so would be nearly equal to the cer-
the stock argument, which we have heard over and over tainty of obtaining aU. note a piece, or nearly equal to
again ad nauseam,. (Hear.) Since the period when my what it is in the ordinary mode of bribery with open vot-
ing. I will, for the sake of argument, assume the validity
friend, Mr. Grote, made his celebrated motions in favour
of these positions ; but I maintain that such collective
liable to detection, and much less very
lbersisbelriyk would be veely to escape detection than the ordinary mode of
o f the
eighteenyears ballot
question
hadthehas hboeneonu
repeatedlyseconding
and
r,
e,evtbriberyioeteed
fwowirit
tAhh onopiateinnyvovouet
tiningg.
shall
receive ForTh ehbo
firwivbeiesp
or
etbribeanyteis7o,
ably discussed in this house, and I think I must; have ,
heard every argument urged that can be urged either for
thegi ne
individual
ieevrl ieul lutyearlp,
or aainst secret suffrage. The result has been to strengthen Then when the day of election comes, the corrupt elector
conviction that ne measure ever can, or ever will be,
my goes to the poll, votes f •
or candidate A, receives a ticket
really effectual in checking either bribery or intimidation takes it to a stranger in a dark room in an out of the way
which does not contain a provision that the votes of street, and receives a five-pound note; there the transac-
electors shall be given in secret. (Hear, hear.) As I have tion ends. It needs only be known to the three persons
never heard any argument of any force in refutation of almost
in it, namelyethe briber, the bribed, and the
the position that the ballot is the only legislative measure
aranger ; and if they keep their own counsel detection is
we an which could could put an end to intimidation, I will confine my cret voting, p ossible
the promise ith
of theco b llectiribe mve usb vi
betmade,not
observations chiefly to thequestion of the efficacy of the bal- to individual electors separately, for I have shown that
lot in arresting the progress of bribery. (Hear.) This is an elector acting singly and alone would be little in-
an important question at present, for every one admits that fluenced by the promise of a bribe to be paid' in the un-
bribery has prevailed of late to such an extent as to coin- certain event of a bribing candidate being returned, but
promise the character of this. house, and to cast some dis- the promise must be made to the body of electors who are
credit upon the representative institutions of this country, assumed to be leagued together for bribery and combined
(Hear). Both Houses of Parliament have, therefore, in action. Each of them would therefore be aware that
reply to the Speech froni the Throne, declared that it is many electors besides himself were to be paid in the event
necessary to take new and more effectual precautions of candidate A being returned. - Now, it is evident that to
against corrupt practices at elections. (Hear, hear,) Now, procure any effect by this mode of collective bribery with
what ought those new and more effectual precautions to be? the ballot, the promise of a bribe must be made to a con-
Ought they to be analogous to Vee old ones, which, sidorable body of electors—considerable, I moan, in pro-
after so many amendments have proved unsucCessful or Portion to the numbers of a constituency. For with the
ought they to be of a new and different description? That ballot it would be•no use to promise a dozen or so of elec-
is the question at issue between the friends and the oppo- tors that they should be paid in ihe event of condidate A
nests of secret suffrage. My conviction that no measure being returned. At present, with open voting, even in a
will ever prove effectaal in checking bribery which does considerable constituency, an election may be gained in a
not contain the ballot is founded upon an examination of close contest by the judicious purchase of a small number
the reasons why the laws which have been passed against of votes. But with the .ballot nothing of the kind could be
bribery have failed. (Hear, hear.) That those laws have donee With the ballot the only effective bribery mast be
failed both sides of this house admit, for both sides have Wholesale and collective. A moment's reflection must con-
brought in a bill to amend those laws. (Hear.) Why viuce any hon. gentleman that if with the ballot he wish
have they failed ? I attribute their failure to the fact that effectually to bribe a constituency, he must promise to pay
they are merely penal enactments, the object of which is in the event of his return as many electors as, in addition
to deter persons from giving or accepting bribes through to those upon whose unbought promises he could con&
fear of the punishment to be inflicted in the event of de- dently rely, would constitute a majority of his constitu-
tection and conviction. Now, it appears to me that a errs. For instance, suppose the constituency to be bribed
penal enactment can only fail from'two causes—either from contained a thousand electors—suppose an hon. gentleman
the inadequacy of the punishment threatened, or from the could confidently rely upon the uu bought promises of 300
difficulty of detecting and convicting the offender. (Hear.) —thirty per cent. (a large proportion in a corrupt concti-
To which of these two causes is the failure of the laws tuency with the ballot)—then to secure his return the hon.
against bribery to be attributed? Not, certainly, to the gentleman would have to oroinise t , pay in the event of
inadequacy of the threatered punishments, for they are his return a body of at least 201. electors; in the same
severe, consisting of pecuniary penalties varying from 5001. manner, in a constituency 10,000 electors, the lion. mem-
toleoeol., accompanied by dt sfranchisernent or disqualifi-
ben would have to promise to pay, in the event of his
cation. If the severity of these punishments were to be return, a holy of at least 2,000 electors. Now a promise
increased, the public would probably consider them to be male to so many electors, and known by each of them to
excessive and out of proportion to the moral turpitude of made to so many, could not be kept secret from the rest
the offence; then judges and juries would become more
unwilling to convict than obey are at present, and the re-
sult would be increased impunity. And, indeed, there is
reason to believe that the public consider that the punish- A being returned. Then in what a horrible dilemma an
ents at present attached to giving or taking bribes are hon. member would be placed who had obtained his return
' excessive because, though hon. gentlemen are sometimes
be
of the bribable claim of the constituency; and then not
only those who brie voted for A, but those wise had voted
for his antagonist, would demand payment in the event of
m
in this manner. (Hear, and laughter.) I ask any hon.
unseated by committees of this house for bribery by their gentleman who is conversant with this subject—(hear)—to
agents, set they are rarely convicted, and generally ac- put himself in the position of such an hon. member; to 1
quitted, of any knowledge of the bribery, and I do not fancy that he hail secured his return by a promise to pay a
remember any instance of an honourable member having large body of electors; that, having fulfilled his promise,
been convicted of bribery by a court of justice; yet 1 he received applications for payment from a large number
think there can be no reasonable doubt that, after every of other electors. What would you do? What would you
general election, there must be many hon. members in this say? You could not refuse payment teeny elector on the
house who are morally guilty of bribery. (Hear, bear.) ground that he had not voted for you, because with secret
I think the impunity which generally attends bribery suffrage you could not tell how he had voted. (Hear.) If
should be attributed to the difficulty of detecting the you were to refuse on the ground that he was not one of
offence and convicting the offender. That difficulty arises the body of electors whom you had promised to pay in the
from the peculiar nature of the offence of bribery, which event of your being returned, he would probably tell you
is very different from that of the great majority of offences. that it was strange that you had not promised him ; that he
Genet ally speaking, when an offence is committed, there was as ready to be bribed as may one • that he had voted
is some overt and patent act which manifestly inflicts sen- for you ; and as you were returned, that he had as good a
Bible wrong upon some person, as, for instance, when a right to be paid as his neighoonrs. If you still persevered 1
man is robbed or assaulted ; then the injured person knows in your refusal, you would make• an enemy who knew your I
that he is injured, feels that he is wronged, and is prompted secret, who had perhaps voted for you, who would be re-
by his knowledge and feelings to seek out the offender and venged upon you, and who would do his best to have you
to bring him to justice. Not so when the offence of bri- detected and convicted. On the other hand, if you paid
bery is committed. In that offence there is no overt nor him out of fear, you would have to pay every one of the
patent act which manifestly inflicts sensible wrong upon any bribable class of electors in the constituency ; therefore,
person. For the offence of bribery consists simply in the in some constituencies, you would have to pay all who had
transfer of money or money's worth from the briber to the voted for you and all who had voted against you—(hear)—
bribed ; that act need only be known to the two persons you would be ruined in consequence of the numbers whom
concerned in it, who are not injured by it, but who have you would have to pay, and in proportion to the numbers
strong motives to conceal it. strong in proportion to the whom you did pay would be the chance of your detection.
punishment threatened for it, and if they keep their coon- Therefore in all cases the chance of detection would be
sel, the person injured by the bribery can never know that much greater than at pre*nt—in many cases it would
he bas been injured nor feel that he has been wronged. amount to a certainty. Then you would be convicted, se-
(Hear, hoar.) This essential difference between bribery veroly punished, disqualified from sitting in Parliament;
and the generality of offences was clearly pointed out by your constituency ought to be disfranchised, a new and
my noble friend the Lord President when he introduced pure one substituted, and its purity would be preserved by
his bill to amend the laws relating to bribery, treating, the ballot. For one of the most beneficial consequences
and undue influence at elections. My noble friend justly which I should expect from the ballot would be the preser-
remarked that it was a very difficult task for the Legisla- vation of the purity of constituencies that with open voting
tare effectually to arrest the progress of bribery. I believe are in perpetual danger of being corrupted. I firmly be-
that the Legislature will never accomplish that teak by lieve that if the ballot had fennel part of the Reform
Bill
means of penal enactments alone. For we cannot by such —if it had then been adopted by Lord Grey's Governinent
enactments so alter the nature of the offence of bribery as —many constituencies which have since been a disgrace to
to render it less difficult of detection, and if we were to our representative system would have remained pure. For
endeavour to counterbalance the hope of impunity arising I have shown that the ballot would have put an end to
from difficulty of detection by threats of the severest every kind of bribery except wholesale and collective bri-
punishment, our Draconie laws could not be enforced, bery. Now, wholesale and collective bribery cannot be
and our threats would prove vain. (Hear.) Therefore, if introduced at once into a pure constituency. The adage,
we want to arrest the progress of bribery we must not rely " Nerno repente fit turpieduatis" is as true of constitnen-
only upon penal enactments to deter men from committing cies as of individuals. The history of corrupt constituen-
that offence, but must try to combine with such enact! cies shows that bribery has been gradually introduced into
meats measures calculated to take away the motives to them. I think such gradual introduction of bribery would
commit bribery, by diminishing its efficacy, and by ren- be impossible with secret suffrage. I will state my reasons
dering it less difficult of detection. I think the ballot is , for this opinion. If the history of those constituencies
a measure of this description. My position is, that it I which have been corrupted since the passing of the Reform
would diminish the efficacy of bribery, and put an end to Bill be examined, the origin of the corruption may be
every kind of positive bribery except that which is the traced either to a closely-contested election or to the bri-
least effectual and the least difficult of detection. (Hear, bery of unsuccessful candidates. In the case of a closely-
hear.) To sustain this position, I must observe that contested election the contest was generally decided to-
positive bribery may be divided into three kinds, accord- wards the close of the poll by the votes of a few &teeters
ing to the period when the payment of the bribe is made. who were bribed. In such a case parties were nearly equal
The first kind is, when the bribe is paid before the elector and animated by strong party feelings. When the day of
votes, on his promising to vote for the bribing candidate, election came the race between candidate A. and candidate
whom I call A. The second kind is, when the bribe is paid B was neck and neck—alternately the one, alternately the
after the elector has voted, and in consequence of his hay- other leading. Towards the end of the day nearly one-
ing voted for candidate A. The third kind is, when the half of the electors had voted from party feelings for
bribe is paid after the return of candidate A, and in con- A, and the other half from similar feelings for B. The 1
sequence of his return. The first kind of bribery, namely, constituency was nearly polled out, only a dozen or so
when the payment of the bribe is contingent only on the, electors remained unpolled—a number sufficient, however,
• •
of the corrupt elector, is rarely and never wit;
promise to decide the election ; they were the scum of the consti-
Jingly practised by skilful and experienced agents, even tuency; open voting made them the arbiters of the con-
withtest, and empowered them to determine who should be the
open voting ; for when the bribe has been paid before-.
hand, the briber has little security that the bribed will fulfil representative of the constituency; they were indifferent
to the merits of A or B; they might, perhaps, have been
his dishonourable engagement—(hear)—and not sell his'
-
vote for a second bribe to the opposite party ; in fact, the influenced by threats, but they were most easily acted
i
briber has no security except such as may arise from a upon by hopes of immediate gain. In the excitement of
feeling of false honour on the part of the bribed, or fear of, the contest such hopes were held out to them by some
being reproached for not keeping • his promise. (Hear.) It; friend, or agent, or partisan of A. A was returned, and
is evident that the strength of these feelings would. be very bribery was introduced into the constituency. Bribery•
once introduced; A's party could never be confident of sue-
secretmuch diminished, and in many cases entirely destroyed, by,
egat evititeert bribingethose whom they had bribed before,
suffrage. With the ballot corrupt electors would,' •
and B's party could never hope to defeat A without also
when they could, take bribes from both sides, and them
vote honestly according to their convictions. For corrupt! havtqg recourse to corruption. A corrupt struggle then
electors have frequently strong political opinions, for which; commenced ; each party ;strove to corrupt the electors of
they are willing to make considerable pecuniary sacrifices; the opposite party, and with each successive contest the
i
number of bribed electors increased. Both parties, being
and it is a well-known fact that corrupt electors will often-,
times vote for a popular candidate for a less bribe than for equally guilty of corrupthin, equally abstained from at-
t
au anti-popular one. (Hear.) I think, therefore, that with tempting to punish each other. Now it is evident that in
ascret voting the first kind of bribery, namely, paying be-I the first instance the motive which induced A's party to
and' bribe was founded upon an exact knowledge of the state of
fore the vote is given, will be rarel if ever practised,
when practised that the result will frequently be honest• the poll, and that the few votes of the unpolled electors
voting. (Hear.) The second kind of bribery which I have! would decide the contest. With the ballot such knowledge
mentioned is when the payment of the bribe is contingent
would not have been possessed, the motive to bribe would
011 the fact being ascertained that the coi • rupt elector has
not have existed, bribery would not then have been intro-
voted for the bribity,candidate. This I dandprotected by the ballot the •ht
( ace
of bribery, the ,
which the'le t most business-like and economical one, in: have remained pure. With regard to the corruption of
when it is r money goes furthest, for money is only paid constituencies by the bribery of unsuccessful candidates.
(Hear.) Thenn that votes have been actually given! In this manner many constituencies have been gradually
it must necessarily definition of this kind of bribery shows that corrupted since the passing of the Reform Bill. At first
last kind of bribe cte.a.seh with open voting. The third and these constituencies were very pure ; they prided them-
the payment of the W i.cli I would call attention is when selves upon returning their members free of expense. This
bribe is contingent conduct, however, was distasteful to some persons, who
the hieibinl
eaatii„,elt . nt upon the return of
bribery alight be practised wiitsh evident that this kind of had knowledge or experience of the profits of a contested
voting, but with this most im oBeCeet as well as with open election. They determined to get up a contest; then one
open voting, in the event of tiler‘Cibe t
difference, that with of their number—generally a low attorney—went to Lou.in canditia te being don•to search for a candidate; he haunted the purlieus of
returned, only those electors would be paid •
0 peel who had lil I the clubs till he found some person with more money than
filled their promise of voting for candidate 1- • •
A, but with I principle frequently some rich parvenu who aspired to the
the ballot the electors would have to be paid,
whether position of a
they hail performed their promises or not. It would seem will call the bribing candidate—was informed that there
on first thoughts that this kind of
bribery
would eq was an opening in such and such a borough for a candidate
the most advantageous )'or bribing
whenatheeandidate, for he 1 of opposite opinions to the sitting member; the was invited
would only have to payobject of his wishes wee Ito hold those opinions and to stand, and he was told that
accomplished, and return.,hisver
practiced; and obtained. Bat with with opei ibe might be returned for a few hundreds. The invitation
voting it is rarely, 1
llte holds out out far less temptationreason
is
to the I was acce •
obi , accepted; a contest ensued on the first opportunity;
vious on reflection.
—contest, large sums of money found their
than the ordinary mode of bribery, For in i way from, the
bribing candidate
corrupt esilector
corrupt elector is paid for having , through , pockets of the .
uug" mysterious channels, into the pockets of some
the ordinary mode the
and as the payment is contingent ,of the, electorswho hadmanifested their approbs-
voted for candidate A;
tare power of the elector, the payment Con of his .
Political opinions. In the ~first contest he
upon an act within .-6
- hother hand, •th ' w wille-it. Out he in ?.- as:, defeated, for the great, majority, of the elec. is certain if the elector
. . .. .
..,. - . ~. ..._ .
_.„ ..
, .

• •.

tors were pure ; and being defeated, his corrupt practices,
though known, were not punished. Thus the seeds Of cor-
ruption were sown in the pure constituency ; they ger-
minated rapidly, and produced fruit. Those who had once
tasted the fruit of corruption longed to taste it again; they
communicated their longing to their neighbours. In a
second contest the number of electors willing to be bribed
increased, and the bribing candidate was defeated by a
smaller majority. So it went on • in each successive con-
test more electors were bribed, and the bribing candidate
was defeated by narrower and narrower majorities; finally
he obtained a majority, or the opposite party commenced
bribing in self-defence; in either case the constituency be-
came thoroughly corrupt. It is evident that this process
of seduction and corruption could not have gone on with
secret suffrage; for I have shown that the ballot would
put an end to every kind of bribery except that on which
the payment of the bribe would be contingent on the suc-
cess of the bribing candidate, and consequently it would
put an end to all bribery by unsuccessful candidates. I
have shown that the ballot would put an end to every kind
of bribery except that in which the payment of the bribe
would be contingent upon the return of the bribing candi-
date; that such bribery, to be effective, must be wholesale
and collective ; that wholesale and collective bribery would
be very liable to detection, and far less difficult of detection
than the ordinary mode of bribery with open voting.
Thence I infer that by the aid of the ballot the penal enact-
ments against bribery which, in consequence of the diffi-
culty of detecting bribery, have hitherto proved ineffica-
cious, would become effective in arresting the progress of
bribery—a progress which all friends of constitutional
liberty must deplore, as it casts discredit upon this house,
and saps the fouulatioes of our representative institutions.
As I have confined my observations chiefly to the question
of the efficacy of the ballot in arresting the progress of bri-
bery, I will only notice one objeetion to the ballot. It is
sometimes said that iu secret electors would vote contrary
to their known opinions from corrupt motives, who would
be so by the public opinion
agthatig the influence of public
deterrede,t
bribery,
and
denly
thusi doing
opinion against bribery would be weakened. It would
he easy to show that there is no validity in this objec-
tion to the ballot. But, omitting other answers to it,
I will content myself with expressing a strong doubt
whether the public opinion that influences the actions
of the bribable class of electors is hostile to bribery,
or ever will be hostile to bribery, as long as intimida-
tion
deYttermineshe upper class of electors. The
public the actions of particular
men is not the opinion of the whole community, nor of the
tmajority
p practised
opinionthee
tcho
munity,
nor of the respectable, nor of
the intelligent portion of the community but of the class
or section to whom the men belongs Now, the class to
whom the takers of money-bribes belong, especially in cor
rupt constituencies, do not look upon the taking of a bribe
as a blameable or discreditable act. If you converse on
this subject with an intelligent man of this class, he will
justify his co. duct by specious arguments difficult to refute.
He will cite the example of his betters—of his superiors in
station or in rank. He will say to you, " Why should
who am a poor man, refuse to make a few pounds by my
vote, for the benefit of myself, my wife, and my children ?
In taking a bribe, is my conduct more corrupt than that
of the shopkeeper, who votes against his conscience to se-
cure the custom of his customers, or that of the tenant,
thahhnfa
etdl
yyf eapedxeduepec an:
!neo e;
arect ob
who sees in his vote the means oicurrying favour with his
landlord, and procuring an abatement of his rent? It is
true that I desire to be rewarded for my political conduct ;
but so do many others, my superiors in station, wealth,
large
scoresquire,.landowner, s
o iho sinfluences
the whose
mill .
7rts
counted;s
owner, who can put the screw on a hundred ten pounders ;
so does the great territorial magnate, who intimidates a
o
whole county. If I desire money in return for my vote,
o ddboebesys
thett hh
ee
money's worth in return for their influence.
The squireen asks for his dependents petty places in the
Customs or Excise • the large landowner wants for his
younger sons a clerkship ie the Treasury or an attache-
ship to an embassy; the rich millowner aspires to gain a
social position to be called Sir John This or Sir Thomas
That ; the great territorial magnate desires a peerage, or a
step in the peerage—the lord-lieutenancy of his county, a
ribbon or a garter ; and if the expectation of any of these
worthies is disappointed, marvellous is the change that
sometimes comes over his political convictions at the next
general election." (Cheers.) It is very diffieult to persuade
the bribable class of electors of the fallacy of these argu-
ments ; in their eyes, intimidation is a graver offence than
bribery ; for, say they, the magnitude of an offence is in
proportion to the 'evil that it does to society, and the pain
that it inflicts upon individuals. The evil to society from
an elector voting against his convictions is the same,
whether he does so for the sake of gaining a 5/. note or
from the fear of losing one—whether he is seduced by a
bribe or intimidated by a threat; but to the individual
elector the difference between seduction and intimidation
is very great—all the difference between pleas:ire and pain.
An elector seelnced by a bribe feels that he is a free man, for
he does what he likes; an elector who is intimidated by a
threatfeels he is a slave, for he acts under compulsion. There-
fore, I repeat, in the eyes of certain classes, intimidation is
a far graver offence than bribery.- They ask, " Why should
one class be permitted;to reap the ruits of intimidation, and
another class be forbidden to enjoy the sweets of bribery ?
When you attempt to put a stop to the one, you ought
simultaneously to endeavour to put and end to the other."
For these reasons I am convinced that you can never pro-
duce a general feeling hostile to bribery until you have put
an end to iutirnitlation by the upper class s. I will not tres-
pass on the house by attempting to show that it would be
absurd and ridiculous to try to put down intimidation_ by
means of penal enactments. Yo cannot so define intimi-
dation as to constitute ita punishable offence. Intimidation
of the most potent kind may be conveyed by a nod, a wink,
a gesture, a seemingly casual expression of opinion, nay,
even by an invitation to a breakfast or a dinner. I have
heist of a numerous tenantry intimidate l by an invitation
to a breakfast. The breakfast was on the polling-day.
Those who partook of it, as a matter of course, accompanied
their landlord to the poll, and what tenant dared to refuse
the invitation ? It is said that intimidation has decreased
of late years. I find, however, much difference of opinion
on this subject, ono opinion being held by the intimidating,
the opposite by the intimidated classes. Ii you talk to one
of the intimidating classes, to a la.n llortl or to a millowner,
he will tell you that he never intimidates his tenants, his
workmen, or his artisans, and that the ballot is not wanted.
But if you talk to one of the intimidated classes, you will
hear a different story. The shopkeeper, the tenant-farmer,
the workman, and the artisan will tell you, " We know too
well the opinions of our customers, of our landlords, of our
employers, to dare to vote against them, though they have
not positively threatened to punish us if we were to do so.
Yet we aro afraid to vote according to our consciences, in
opposition to their wishes without the protection of the
ballot." From these conflicting opinions I arrive at the
conclusion that the grosser and more outrageous forms of
intimidation have become less common, and in fact they are
condemned by public opinion, but that the milder and more
decent; and not less effective forms are practised to a great
extent ; and I doubt very much whether the real influence
of intimidation on the vote of electors has much dimi-
nished. It ie notorious that if in an agricultural district
you know the opinions of the chief landowners if in ama
nufacturing district you know the opinions of the chief
tuillowners, you can tell very nearly what candidate ill
have the majority of votes in the district. I was much
struck at the last general election by an instance of thistle-
scription with regard to the county which I inhabit—l
mean East Cornwall. I was toll just before the election
that the Free-trade candidate had a bad chance, that all the
farmers were Protectionists, and that my tenants would vote
against me to a man. I replied that I had no doubt they
were Protectionists, but how did their landlords intend to
vote? and I asked the intentions of So-and-So, mentioning
half a dozen of the chief landed proprietors of the division.
I was told they were with us. Then said I, "Never mind
the opinions of the farmers; we shall have a large majo-
rity," and so we had. (Hear.) But what amused me most
was to find that my tenantry, with one or two exceptions,
plumped for the free trade candidate. (Hear, and cheers.)
Now I did not use any intimidation. My tenants were only
aware of the fact, which every one knew, that I had always
been a most determined free trailer, and was a most zealous
supporter of the free trade candidate. The result of that
election showed that without the ballot the hon. gentle-
man opposite (Mr. Kendall) would not have the slightest
chance of being returned again for East Cornwall, if he be
opposed. (Hear, and laughter) It appears to me that
there are only three conceivable modes of preventing inti-
midation. Take, for instance, the case of a customer and a
shopkeeper. To prevent a customer from intimidating
shopkeeper you must either conceal from the shopkeeper
the opinions of his customer, or you must forbid the cus-
tom:it-from ceasing to deal with the shopkeeper in conse-
quence of his voting against the opinions of the customer;
or you
must concea from the customer the vote of the
shopkeeper. You cannot conceal from the shopkeeper the
opinions of his customer, unless you prohibit the customer
from ever expressing his opinions—an inconceivable prohi-
bition.eeasieg to d
eal Secondly,you could not prevent a customer from
with a shopkeeper in consequence of his
voting against his customer's opinions, unless you were to
pass an enactment forbidding any customer from ever ceas-
ing to deal with any shopkeeper who had evervoted against
his customer's opinions—an impossible enactment. There-
fore, there remains only the alternative of concealing from
the customer the vote of the shopkeeper, and that alterna-
tive is the ballot. Sitnilary in the cases of a millowner
and his workmen, of a landlord and his tenant. If you
wish to prevent a landlord from intimidating his tenant,
you must either conceal from the tenant the opinions of
his landlord, which would be impossible, or you must pre-
vent a landlord from ejecting any tenant who had ever
voted against his landlord, in which case the tenant who
had voted against his landlord would have a perpetual
holding; or you must conceal the vote of the tenant from
the landlord by means of the ballot. Therefore, it appears
to me that any serious attempt to put down intimidation
by means of penal enactments would give birth to laws of
such intollerable vexation and severity, that all the intimi-
dating classes Would cry aloud for the protection of the bal-
lot. But even if by means of penal enactments an end could
be put to intimidation by the upper classes, suchenactments
protect the elector from the violence and the intimidation
would not put down intimidation by the lower classes. To
of the mob you must conceal his vote from the mob.
It is said that there is one kind of intimidation which the
ballot could not put an end to ; that, for instance, a landlord
who suspected that with secret suffrage his tenants would
vote against his wishes would, prevent them from going to
the poll ; that this kind of intimidation would be much
practised in Ireland, where, in consequence of the wide dif-
ference between parties, it is more easy to foresee how elec-
tors would vote than in this country; that, for instance,
Protestant landlords would sometimes compel all their
Roman Catholic tenants to abstain from voting. Ido not
deny that acts of gross and outrageous intimidation of this
description might be practised under the ballot. ; but, in
consequence of 'their very grossness, they would be rare.
They would only be practised by the most unscrupulous
intimidators ; and, as I have already observed, public opi-
nion condemns the grosser forms of intimidation. I should
likewise observe that a landlord who with secret suffrage
would prevent his tenants from voting would, with open
voting, compel `them to vote against their convictions.
Now, it is a greater evil to the community, and a greater
pain to an elector, to be compelled to vote against his con-
victions, than to, be compelled to abstain from voting
alto-
gether.
Therefore, even if the ballot were not to put a stop
to this kind of intimidation, it would substitute a lesser
evil for a greater ono, and that would be tt, gain to the
community. Moreover, for a landlord to forbid his te.
nantry to vota, would, as I have already said, be an act
of gross intimidation of so outrageous a character, that if
any act of intimidation could or ought to be punished that
of making it is punishable offence. I should leave it to be
act could and ought. But I should doubt the expediency
put down by the force of public opinion, which, under the
fl
ballot, would become very strong against acts of gross and
agrant intimidation. For the ballot, by putting an end to
all the ordinary and mild modes of intimidation, would
much diminish the number of persons who could or would
intimidate. But only a few persons would possess the means
of intimidating and be unscrupulous enough to use them--
and only those few would approve of the employment of
such means in the outrageous manner iu question —and the
conduct of those who did employ such means would meet
with the condemnation of all the rest of the community, both
of the intimidated classes and of those who, in consequence
of the ballot,' had ceased to belong to the intimidating
-

classes, and who would, therefore, be loudest in the con-
demnation of the exercise of a power of which they had
been deprived. It appears to me, therefore, that the bal-
lot, by diminishing the number of persons who could
bribe or intimidate, would tend to create a strong public
opinion both against bribery and intimidation. .For the
position of iluctibras that men
" Compound for sins they are inclined to
By damning those they have no mind to,"

is equally true of sins which men have no power to com-
mit. I have now stated my reasons for thinking that the
ballot will put an end to every kind of bribery except gross,
outrageous, and wholesale bribery, which might easily be
detected and punished ; and also that it would put an end
to every kind of intimidation except gross, outrageous, and
wholesale intimidation which public opinion would severely
condemn. I will refer briefly to one of the arguments of
my noble friend the Home Secretary. (Ironical cheers.)
He said the elective franchise is a trust (it is a very com-
mon objection to the ballot), that the elective franchise is
a trust confided to an elector for the public benefit—the
trust being to choose a representative. It is said that the
elector is responsible for the exercise of his tr.,- st, and
therefore that he ought to vote openly, in order that the
public may judge of and pronounce a judgment upon his
choice of a representative. Why so ? Tu affirm that an
elector ought to vote openly, in order that the public) may
pronounce a judgment upon a choice of a representative
means, if it means anything, that the elector ought to be
influenced in his choice of a representative by the opinion
of the public. (Hear, hear, from the Opposition.) But
for what reason ()light an elector to be so influenced? The
only reason that can be assigned must be that the public
are better judges of who ought to be chosen than the elec-
tor is. But if the public are better judges of, they are
fftter to 'choose, a representative ; and if they are fit
to choose, they ought to choose, and therefore they ought
to have votes. (Loud cheers.) But who are the public
whom you consider. lit to .cbooee a representative? The
whole community, or a portion of the community? If the
whole community are lit to choose a representative, then
they ought to have votes, and the suffrage should be uni-
versal. for to vote fur a candidate is so simple an act that
there is no reason why it should be done by a delegate or
representative. If, on the other hand, you consider that.
only a portion of the community are fit to choose a repre-
sentative, then you affirm that the other portion are unfit
to choose.• It is evident that only those who are fit to
choose ought to have the franchise, and they ought to be
able to choose freely ; therefore they ought to be protected
in their choice of a representative from the influence of
those who are unfit to choose, and the only means by which
they can be so protected is the b dlot. (Cheers.) There-
fore the arguments upon which the doctrin- of the respon-
sibility of the elector is based may lead to an extension of
the suffrage or to universal suffrage, but they are not in-
consistent with secret suffrage; on the contrary, they show
the use of the ballot in protecting those who are unfit to
choose one. (Hear, hear, and cheers.) My noble friend
used another argument which I have often heard pro-
duced before, which I shall hardly trespass on your time by
noticing. (Ironical Opposition cheers.) He says, if the
elector has the ballot you ought to vote by ballot in this
house. Icanuot discover any analogy whatever between the
two cases. (Cheers.) An elector selects as his representa-
tive the man whom, on account of his political oeinions,
he considers most fit to sit in this house. Therefore he
has a right to know whether by his votes his represen-
tative justifies that opinion, and if the representative
changes his opinions on any important question, it is his
duty to resign his seat. (Hear.) The elector has a right
to know whether his representative has fulfilled his pro-
mises, sad whether he is acting on the principles on which
he was returned ; but the elector has promised nobody, it
being his duty to choose, without fear of punishment or
hope of reward, a representative of his opinions in this
house. (Cheers.) The last argument of my noble friend to
which I shall refer is one which has been often used. The
ballot has often been denounced as a democratic measure.
Now the term " democracy " has two significations—one
good, and the other bad. In the good sense of the word
democracy simply means popular government; and in
this sense of the word I admit that the ballot will be a
most democratic measure, for I believe that it would con-
duce more to good popular government than any other insti-
tutional change—then any reform bill that can be devised.
(Cheers ) On the other hand, democracy in its bad sense
means the government of an ignorant and violent mob.
But in this case I maintain that the ballot would be a most
anti-democratic measure because it would protect the
elector in the exercise of his franchise from every kind of
intimidation; and especially from the intimidation of the
ignorant and violent mob. (Cheers.) In fact, if the term
conservative be used as the opposite of democratic in its
bad sense, the ballot would be a most conservative mea-
sure, for it would enable an elector to preserve his prin-
ciples whilst giving his vote. (Hear, hear, and cheers.)
In conclusion, I must say that my firm conviction, founded
upon the fact that your penal enactments against bribery,
though repeatedly amended, have always failed, is that
yon may patch and mend those enactments to all eternity,
you will never arrest the progress of, corruption or put an
end to intimidation till you try the experiment of the bal-
lot; and if, contrary to my expectations and convictions,
that experiment should fail, you will not be worse
off than at present, but you would have the satisfaction of
knowing that you had .tone your best to cure great and
crying evils, which, be assured, cast deep diecredit on this
house, and tend to sap the foundation of yeur representa-
tive system. The right hon. baronet resumed his scat
amidst loud and prolonged applause.,
Mr. I. BUTT condemned the ballot, as inadequate to
the repression of bribery or intimidation, as un-English,
anti as deteriorating tothe national character.
Mr. PHINN, amid continual interruption, took the con-
trary view from that of the last speaker, and declared that
the ballot must eventually be carried.
Mr.. KENDALL, iu answer to seine remarks of Sir W.
Molesworth, instanced his own election success on Protec-
tionist principles, and in opposition to free-trade landlords;
as evidence of the uselessness of the ballot.
Mr. BERKELEY made a few observations in reply, but
said that an answer from him was almost unnecessary, the
subject having. become a Cabinet question.
Mr. M.A.GUIRE, as a Roman Catholic, urged that the
ballot, by protecting the humble Irish voter, would pre-
vent the interference of the priests, by rendering their as-
sistance unnecessary.
The house divided, after about five hours and a-half of
debate, and the numbers were—
For Mr. Berkeley's motion ...
Against it
M.ijority against
IRISH CHURCH TEMPORALITIES.
Mr. Sergeant S HEE moved for leave to bring in a bi
to alter and amend the laws relating to the temporalities ob
the Church in Ireland,, and to increase the means of reli-
gious instruction and church accommodation for her Ma-
jesty's, Irish subjects. He declared himself bound over in
recognisance's taut to do anything detrimental to the Pro-
testant Church, and said that he cheerfully accepted that
restriction. He entered at excessive length into a discus•
sion of the question, his speech being interrupted by an
unsuccessful attempt at a count out. He proposed, by
various reductions of episcopal and other revenues, by
grouping benefices, and other economical arrangements,
to obtain an income with which he desired to improve the
condition of the Presbyterian and Roman Catholic clergy,
and he urged that he did not intend to injure the Estab-
lished Church, but to allay the differences and heart-
burnings which its existence in its present form occasioned.
Mr. P. URQUHART seconded the motion.
Mr. BROTHERTON moved the adjournment of the
debate.

157
194

Mr. NAPIER begged that before the debate was re-
sunitd members would read the answer made by the Arch-
deacon of Meath to all Sergeant Shee's statements. He
considered the proposition unconstitutional, and contrary
to the oath taken by the learned sergeant.
Sir J. YOUNG announced that ou the resumption of
the debate he should meet the proposal with a decided
negative.

sir. NEWDEGATE charged Sergeant Shea with tak-
ing a course incompatible with the oath he had taken.
The late hour alone prevented a complete answer to his
speech.

Mr. J. FITZGERALD protested against Mr. Newde-
gate's interpretation of the Roman Catholic oath, and also
charged the " whips" with having tried to empty the
house.
Mr. LUCAS said that his complaint was, that Sergeant
Shee's proposal did not deal in a sufficiently sweeping
manner with the Irish Church, which had been endured
too long. He refused to accept the interpretation of the
Roman Catholic oath.

Sergeant SHEE denied that the book to which Mr.
Napier had referred contradicted his statements. He
warmly protested against being charged. with perjury, and
requested Mr. Napier to be civil.
Mr. WHITESIDE begged to say that when the learned
sergeant brought forward a motion he must expect to hear
it criticised, and argument met by argument. (Hear.)
With regard to the book which had been referred to by
his right hon. friend being a refutation of what had fallen
from the learned sergeant, he could only say that no man
who bad written a book was willing to allow that the facts
contained in it had been refuted.

The debate was adjourned to Monday next.
On the motion of Mr. BROTHEaTON, the house then ad
journed at 25 minutes past 12 o'clock.

sIIIPPING INTELLIGENCE.

NOTICES.
-RUSSIAN FLEET IN THE EASTERN SEAS.
(Extract of a letter dated Calcutta, April 28, 1854.)
" We beg to bring to thu notice of the committee for
managing the affairs of Lloyd's, the unprotected state of
the eastern trade. The British vessels of war in these seas
are few, and of small size. By tht last steamer from
Singapore we have intelligence of a Russian squadron of
considerable force being in the neighbourhood of that port,
awaiting, it is supposed, intelligence from Europe of a de-
claration of war.

"JAMES COwELL and Co.,
"Agents for Lloyd's, and the Liverpool
" Captain G. A. Hal Association of UnderivritArs.
sted, R.N., Secretary Lloyd's."

LIVERPOOL, June 13.—The schooner Albion, hence to
Banff, in beating out yesterday through Channel, missed
stays in a squall, and ran upon Great Burbo. She came
off on the flood, and shortly after sank in the fair way.—
The Wildfire, from Quebec, at this port, passed large quail. ties of ice from the 16th to the 23d ult.
STORNOWAY, June 7.—The Swallow, from Shields, for
Cape Breton, is at anchor in the Sound of the Island of
Taransay (west coast of Harris), having sprung a leak in
the Atlantic, on the 23d of May. She will have to un-
dergo repairs.
•
CROMARTY, June 10.—The William and Jane, of this
port, went ashore about a mile b ,yond the North Suton,
on the Bth of June, but was assisted off on the flood, with-
out damage.
CARTHAGENA, June 4.—The Nairns, of Shields, has put
back to this port, with considerable damage, having been
in contact with a foreign barque (name on quarter-deck
" Venus"), on the lst of June. Motril bearing S.W. by
S., distant 25 miles.
TERSCHELLING, June 6.—The Fortuna, from Hartlepool
for Oberndorf, is now on shore here ; crew saved. The
cargo (coals) will be lost.
PENANG, May 2.—The Helvellyn, sailed hence for Lon-
don on the 26th of April, has put back on the 28th, leaky.
ADELAIDE, March 10.—The schooner Thistle, at anchor
on the night of the 26th of February, was caught by a
heavy squall, capsized, and went down in three fathoms of
water ; crew and passengers supposed to be saved.
PARIS, June 12.—The Canteleu (lighter), from Havre
to Rouen, with sugar, cotton. and citrons, struck upon a
stake at the Grand Quai at Havre, and sprung a leak; she
discharged cargo, part of which was much damaged, and
has been laid on the Gridiron to repair.
NEW YORE, May 31.—The Thomas Wright, from Ma-
tanzas for London, with sugar, sprung a leak when four
days out, and, in making for Savannah, struck on a shoal
about 12 miles off Ossabaw Island, Georgia, on the 25th of
May, having about eight feet water in her hold, and re.
tnained ; the ship and cargo were expected to become a
total wreck.

Report of ship Nelows, from Melbourne 15,