The Sun.
London, England, 1854-02-21 00:00:00

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seven mouths of negotiation and (Alicia: responsibility, that
Lord Clarendon, the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, writes his s3l,inn opinion, that the active interfer-
ence of England and Frit'lce must ensure the irretrievable
ruin of Turkey. Now, I shall proceed, if the house will per-
mit me, to draw what I consider the inevitable conclusion
from the despatch to which I have called the particular at-
tention of the house. (Hear.) Remember that it spreads
over a period of seven mouths—remember that it notices
every principal incident—that in January the Russian army
was accumulated upon the Turkish frontier- -remember that
the Cabinet of Russia is announcing to her Majesty's minister
at the Court of St. Petersburg that his court is about to
demand measures of compensation in favour of the Greek
Church—remember that throughout this peried we have
no formal and pacific demand on Russia to express expli-
citly what are her intentions—remember that throughout
this period of seven moieties minister after minister sent
fruitless warnings to the Secretary of State—they came
from St. Petersburg—they came from Constantinople—
they are disclaimed and rejected when they come from a
charge d'affaires, they are confirmed and authorised by an
ambassador—armies are assembling, vague demands are
made, haughty, ostentatious missions are sent - the Primo
Minister of Turkey tells you that the independence of his
country is at stake, your diplomatic agents simultaneously
inform you that the balance of power is at issue ; and all
this time, in every form—in letters to Constantinople—in
despatches to St. Petersburg—in instructions to its own
ministers—in conversations with Baron Brunow and with
Count Walewski, there is no expression on the part of her
Majesty's Government, that there is no cause for alarm.
(Hear, hear.) If there be no cause for alarm, why have
you diplomatic agents—why should there be any ambas-
sadors—why should there be any despatches ? (Loud
cheers.) Why have you locked up in some secret cabinet
the despatch of the Emperor of Russia—why do you not
place it under your pillow and sleep in peace, though you
may be responsible for the safety of the world ; (Hesr.)
Let us try to find out then the cause of this war. What I
want in the first instance is that the House of Commons
will ascertain this—what is the motive that influenced the
Government during these seven months, and during their
observance of this strange conduct? (sear.) Lord Cla-
rendon talks in one of his letters of an alternative, and I
shall offer an alternative also—either the Government was
influenced by a degree of confidence which assumed the
morbid character of credulity, or they were influenced by
connivance. (Cheers, and cries of " hear," from the
Opposition benches.) I mean a policy which calculated
that it was better that the dissolution, in their opinion—
in the opinion of the Secretary of State and of the Prime
Minister—should receive the compliments of the Emperor
.of Russia—a policy that calculated that it was better, on
the whole, that the inevitable dissolution of the Turk-
ish empire should take place by the indirect means of
foreign interference, under those peculiar circumstances,
than that England and France should go to war to
maintain what are called the integrity and indepen-
dence of the Porte. Now, sir, that is the alternative
which it is most important to decide. Was it cordiality
or was it connivance ? And I beg the house to observe,
that on ascertaining that point depends our also ascertain-
ing what is the object of this war. I believe that the cause
of the war has been the conduct in these negotiations, dur-
ing these seven months, especially of her Majesty's Go-
vernment. If their conduct has been prompted by credu-
lity, they may carry on the war with success and spirit.
The fact that they are undevided by the word of an Empe-
ror is a mournful act. It is a lamentable circumstance,
but it is an incident to which generous minds may be
liable ; and the very fact that they are undeceived may
animate them to greater exertions, and to efforts which
will indicate their conduct to their country and to poste-
rity. (Cheers.) If this conduct of her Majesty's Govern-
ment during these seven months has been influenced by
credulity, it is possible that you may have a war—a long.
and a severe war -but it will be a war carried out for
great objects, and may end in great public benefit. Russia,
by her perfidious conduct—if it have been perfidious—may
have postponed a struggle which, perhaps, was inevitable.
Russia may be forced at the end of this struggle to a posi-
tion which may secure the independence of Europe, the
safety of England, and the safety of civilisation. You may
have a war that may restore Bessarabia to the Porte—you
may have a war that may convert the Crimea into an inde-
pendent country, destined to flourish under the guarantee
of the great powers—you may have a war that may make
the Danube a free river—(cheers)—and you may have a war
which will make the Eaxine a free sea ; bat all this is de-
pendent upon the somewhat humiliating bat pardonable
circumstance— the comparatively pardonable circumstance
—that her Majesty's Government has seen the consequence
of credulity. (Cheers.) But let us for a moment contem-
plate the results of the alternative. If it has been suggested
by connivance, you may have a war; but it will be a war
such as will be carried on by connivance—a tyrannous war
---a vacillating war—a war with no results, or rather with
the exact results which were intended. (Hear, hear.) It
is not a war which will place Russia where we think neces-
sary for the security of Europe and our country, bat it
is a war which will end with some transactions similar
to Prince Menschikoff's
.note, or to the arrangements of
the Vienna Conference. • Now, these are two results so
far opposed—so very different—one, I believe, is welcome
to the people of this country, the other is so entirely
satisfactory, that I think it does become—it is the
duty of this house, even if we " potter over blue-books"—
(a laugh), to try to ascertain the ti nth of these important
i facts. Sr, I must—late as the hour is I cannot refrain
from trespassing a little while on the house—l must do
my duty to this subject. (" Oh, oh," from the Ministe-
rial, answered by vehement counter cheers from the Oppo-
sition side.) I am not responsible for this debate having
been brought forward. On the contrary, I have endea-
voured to throw no obstacle in the way of the Government
obtaining those votes which, whatever may be the opinion
of this house, it is my conviction it is our duty to grant.
But I feel it my duty to complete a fair view of this ques-
tion ; and I must remind the house that I, along with my
noble friend, are almost the only members who have risen
on this side of the house to speak on a subject that for
twelve months has engaged the interest and for half a
rear has agitated the passions of this country. I cannot,
an spite of the groans of gentlemen on the backed of the
benches of the Treasury—(laughter and cheers)—l cannot
'brink from fulfilling a painful and a necessary duty. I
owe this, not so much to myself, but to those with whom
I have the honour and the happiness to act. (Cheers from
the Opposition.) I have taken for these seven months
important negotiations, ending with a despatch from a
etary of State, from which only one inference can be
drawn, namely, that under no circumstances ought we to
g° to war for the integrity and independence of Turkey.
I have offered
the stran you the only alternative which can explain
decide Nvt: conduct of the Ministry. I have asked you to
whether it is credulity or whether it is connivance.
of the is
a
But, there
passage which I must now call the at-
tentionsomeexplanatiiieoble lord to, because I think it demands
per-
mitted to touch upon You know last year we were not per-
sometimes a geeu,rn this question. You know last year
not without r
as ked, and the Ministry, perhaps
et‘so
think the noble lord is the
p
, I
the last person who ought to com-
plain of being troubled
inconve- question.
He must feel that if in wilteheasnquiries on this
evoul he told the. House of Com-
mons that it was
have
to answer questions, in
1254 the creditor
be ye:tthe right at least to ask
that the bargain should
is due to the country and thie'll'aio-v (Hear, bear.) It
he Government of which
the noble lord is a member that
hear),—which may assist as to a 1
tch itharomevgsooimn:
explanation over the circumstances to who
uld
namely, whether the 6onducst° solu-
tion refer—(hear,
n animated by emit&
suggested by connivance "7
has heated
lord who takes a great in foreign
affairs que:tionso
ttheiGovernmentof this
g
to hthoene
jenwthe-
ther it has been
25th April, 1853,
affairs in another place addressed
Secretary of State. The Marquis ofthCels.nricarde adverted
—to the alarm recently excited byh k
frannouncement of
peters-
burg by the French
the special mission of Prince Mensc o from St
burg to Constantinople, and Government
having considered this mission to be of such grave import_
ance as to induce them to send a portion of their fleet to
Salamis, circumstances which pointed to the great irn
nd France.
This
that could then be made,
portanee of a union between England a
was the most important inquiry
and second only to the interest of the debate which took
place at the end of the session, an the motion of Lord
Malmesbury. Lord Clarendon expressed a strong opinion
`.l- YespeFt to the obligation to themai,ntam independence
with
-ItAqf the Ottoman empire.
the_ 'salon of Prince M h
ensc -
He stated
'the
evernaie t having made to the
French' Govern-
/aain eoace 'ens which appeared to be inconsistent
in
ecewsiona- viously made to the Emperor of
tlio Emperoy f Russia, knowing the great ina-

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with revec
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inent ceii,4l
with c„„
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