The Sun.
London, England, 1854-10-05 00:00:00

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

[This was written before the receipt of the pre-
ceding.]

The capture of Sebastopol has not as yet been
officially announced either at London or Paris,
and although there is no reason to doubt the fact
that the stronghold of Russia in the Crimea has
passed from her possession into that of the Allies,
considerable anxiety is very naturally entertained
to obtain an indisputable confirmation of the
pleasing intelligence, and also to learn the full
particulars of some matters still involved in

mystery. As we explained in our impression of
yesterday, there are persons who, for their own
private purposes, are desirous of keeping the public
mind in suspense by discrediting the accounts
already received, and depreciating the value of
the triumphs that had unquestionably been ob-
tained. The only wish of the worthy Bears is to
produce a fall in public securities, so that, in
place of being obliged to pay, they might have
large "differences" to receive. They are strenu-
ously supported by the habitual grumblers and
fault-finders—persons who are never satisfied un-
less when disparaging the exertions and censur-
ing the conduct of every public man. These
" croakers" would prefer the verification of their
gloomy vaticinations to the most important advan-
tages that could be achieved by the Allied
Armies—the pleasure of being enabled to say—" I
told you so," to the most brilliant triumphs of
their countrymen.

Both these classes are at present busily en-
gaged casting doubt on the great event that has
crowned the efforts of our gallant forces and their
equallygallant coadjutors in the Crimea, in suggest-
ing that the absence of a direct communication from
our own Ambassador proves the inaccuracy, if
not the total falsehood, of the statements that
have been circulated on high, although not ac-
tually official, authority. A little consideration will,
however, satisfy any disinterested person that we
could fy;arcely have received this official account be-
fore this very day, or possibly to-morrow. It must
not be forgotten that in every instance private
accounts of each remarkable event had been re-

ceived and widely circulated long before the offi-
cial intelligence. There are persons on the look
out, who forward to their correspondents any
important results. Nothing of any magnitude has
occurred without vague rumours having been circu-
lated for several days previously, at leas t four or five.
We also know that official information has in each
instance taken at least Lilue or ten days before
being communicated to the public. It was not
until the 25th ultimo that the tidings of the
landing of the Expedition on the 14th was an-
nounced, the Secretary-at-War himself having
only received the account at a late hour on Sun-
day night ; and Iyet the safe disembarkation of
the troops was known on the previous Wednesday

evening. Here, then, was a delay of five days
before the fact generally credited received official
corroboration ; and it was twelve days before the
landing •n the 14th was announced, and ten days
(from the 16th to the 25th inclusive) befoze the
official publication took place.
Again, on the 27th ultimo, it was positively
announced that " the Russian Embassy had re-
ceived a despatch of the 22d from the Crimea, of
which all that was known was that it contained
news unfavourable to the Russians." There can

now be but little doubt that this related to the

defeat at Alma, and, indeed, rumours of such a
defeat were generally circulated at the same time.
It thus appears that the intelligence was known
at Vienna within five days from the time of de-
spatch, while the Duke of NEWCASTLE did not

receive the official account from Lord STRATFORD
DE REDCLIFFE until a late hour at night OR the
30th, nor that from Lord RAGLAN until the Ist
inst.; or, in other words, eleven and twelve days
respectively, from the time of the glorious victory,
they were intended to communicate. From these

unquestionable facts, then, we argue :—.

Ist. That there is nothing very extraordinary
in the capture of Sebastopol being known at
Vienna, and, therefore, at Paris and London on
the Ist October, or even the 30th September.
2d. That there is not only nothing extraordi-
nary in not having received the official news, but
that we could not reasonably expect to have had
it before this time.

On the first point, it is stated that the second
defeat had been sustained by the Russians at
Kalantai, on the 22d instant; and there have been
various accounts of the destruction of Fort Con-
stantine, some reporting it to have taken place on
the 23d, and others on the 24th, while the
surrender of Sebastopol- itself was fixed to
have taken place on the 25th. Now, judging
from what had previously octhirred, there would
be nothing extraordinary in hearing at Vienna
on the 30th what had occurred at Sebastopol on
the 25th. Besides, it seems tolerably certain that
private parties would send off the news the mo-
ment the matter had been virtually decided, when
the capture of the chief forts protecting the
entrance into the harbour, and the participation of
the Allied Fleets rendered the result an absolute cer-
tainty. Here, then, there would be six or seven days
(inclusive) for the receipt of the intelligence. No
such very extraordinary performance when we
look to what had previously been accomplished.
Besides, we learn of an extraordinary event that
materially accelerated the accounts. It was first
delivered by a Frencle frigate proceeding
from the Crimea to Constantinople to
another that had. nearly arrived at Varna.
A considerable delay, that should be calculated
on under ordinary was thus
circumstances,
averted, and we could scarcely look for better
authority than that of the officers and men actu-
ally present at the glorious events described, in-
forming their brethren in the same service of
what had taken place. Bat that was not all.
A " Tatar" arrived at Varna in due course
with despatches to Om = PAULA. The Turkish

General was absent, but the messenger told hi'
story, which completely corroborated that of the
crew of the French frigate, there being barely
such discrepancy as to the minor details, while
there was a complete agreement as to the
salient points, as would induce any person
accustomed to the investigation of evidence
to yield greater credence to accounts received
from two independent and perfectly trustworthy
sources. The "congratulations "of FRANCIS
JOSEPH may also be considered as

" Confirmation strong as proofs of Holy Writ."
So that, on the whole, we believe that implicit
reliance may be placed on the great fact—" The
Capture of Sebastopol."
On the second point we must recollect that the
contest had not been completely terminated. The
accounts received were to the effect that " MEN-
SCHIKOFF had retired to the inner part of the
harbour, and had declared that he would blow up
the rest of the fleet if the attack was continued ;
and that the Allied commanders had given
him six hours for reflection, and entreated
him to surrender in the name of humanity."
Now, the officials; despatches from the command-
ing officers would certainly not be despatched un-
til the victory was complete, and everything
brought to a conclusion. We cannot, therefore,
suppose that they were transmitted from the
Crimea until the 26th, and probably at a late
hour in the day. We could not, therefore, fairly
look for their arrival before this evening, or pos-
sibly to-morrow ; and that supposing that they
were communicated as rapidly as the news of the
battle of Alma, and that there had been no mis-
hap which might have detained them for hours,
if not days.
On the whole, then, we still feel unabated con-
fidence as to the glorious result ; and we trust the
public will believe that we have ample grounds
for our conviction.

The magnitude and importance of the events
in the Euxine have diverted public attention for
the time being from the Baltic. We would,
however, remark that the season has not as yet
terminated, and that it is by no means impossible
that the CZAR may have to deplore almost as
severe a blow in the North as he has already sus-
tained in the South, and that Sweaborg, or pos-
sibly Cronstadt itself, may share the fate of
Sebastopol before the termination of 1854. The
ice has not as yet set in. There is still a month
during which the fleet may operate, and we
should not feel greatly surprised if "gallant old
CHARLEY" yet " left his card" at some of the
Northern strongholds of the AUTOCRAT.
The prestige that formerly attached to the granite
fortifications has been completely overthrown—
first, by the speedy capitulation of Bomarsund; and,
secondly, by the no less summary capture of Sebas-
topol. The superiority of "wooden" over "stone"
walls has been; I early I emonstrated. ; and, late as
it is, there; every reason to hope that our recent
experience will not be altogether fruitless. It is
true that we had land forces both at Bomarsund
and Sebastopol—that the attacks on these for-
tresses were conducted simultaneously by land and
by water. It is no less certain that the French
troops had returned homewards, and it was there-
fore supposed that no great exploit would be at-
tempted in the absence of our faithful and effi-
cient allies.

But there is now every reason to believe that
the combined navies of France and England could
alone have succeeded in both seas, and it is there-
fore by no means improbable that a determined
effort will be made in the Gulf of Finland to
cripple the " left" arm of the CZAR, now that his
" right" has been paralysed. We have taken a
most important post, the strength of which had
been loudly ♦aunted. Much treasure and labour
had been expended in rendering Bomarsund
" impregnable," making it, in fact, a second Sebas-
topol, from which the Capital of Sweden might be
perpetually menaced, as Constantinople was
threatened from the stronghold in the Crimea—
and yet its destruction was effected almost with-
out loss 1 It was scarcely attacked before the
success of the assailants was certain, and the mag-
nitude of the triumph was enhanced by the fact
that it was accomplished almost -without the loss
of a single life on the part of the victors.

When we consider these unquestionable facts,
and look to the position of the fleet at the Isle of
Nargen, and also the circumstance that the French
ships had been recalled, it seems more than pro-
bable that "something is in the wind," and the
Gulf of Finland will not, late, as it is, be permitted
to escape with impunity. The Baltic has already
witnessed many British triumphs. It may, ere
many days have elapsed, behold another that will
cast all preceding ones into the shade, and reflect
equal honour on the united Union-Jack and Tri-
colour to that which has been so nobly earned in
the Euxine.

But even should our sanguine anticipations
not be realised, should the frost set in without
the destruction of another Russian stronghold, we
should not be too exigeante or querulous at the
disappointment. We must recollect that we have
kept the powerful fleet of the AUTOCRAT skulking
beneath the batteries, where they were only safe,
because the shallowness of the water prevented
our men-of-war from " getting at them ;" and
also because we had not the peculiar class of gun-
boats required for such operations—that during
the entire season of 1854 the Russian eagles had
never once been displayed on what had previ-
ously been regarded as a Russian lake—that
the entire coast lay at our mercy, and that
if life and property were spared it was owing to
the forbearance and humanity, rather than to the
weakness or timidity, of the armaments of the
Maritime Powers—that we likewise captured with
almost incredulous facility one place reputed to be
of immense strength, and that the value and im-
portance of the exploit was Rly depreciated from
the singular ease with which it was accomplished.
Besides, the mission of the Baltic Fleet was not
solely offensive. It was likewise intended to pro-
tect the Neutral Powers abutting on the Baltic—
to guard Sweden, and Norway, and Denmark from
any aggression on the part of the infuriated
despot who would be well disposed to regard their
neutrality as a serious offence, which he would
gladly avenge if he had the power of so doing.
Nay, more, it was necessary to protect the
shores and the commerce of " the United King-
dom" from insult or injury. If through any
mischance, any unexpected casualty, the Russian
Fleet was enabled to show in the Northern Ocean,
there would have been no end to the reproaches
showered upon the devoted head of the " reck-
less" Admiral who had exposed Great Bri-
tain to such humiliation. We believe that
we could have succeeded in destroying the
Russian strongholds in the Gulf of Finland
as well as at the Isles of Aland. We believe that
we may yet inflict " a heavy blow and great dis-
couragement" on the AUTOCRAT in his most vul-
nerable quarter ; but we shall patiently await the
progress of events, certain that everything that
can prudently be attempted will be fully accom-
plished, and not depreciating the well-tried courage
of our Admiral because he has tempered it largely
with the discretion of which he was erroneously
supposed to be deficient.

Might not the Hannibal, Algiers, Cressy, and
other steamers, be sent at once to reinforce the
Baltic fleet with some thousand soldiers ? They
would reach the Gulf of Finland in ten days or a
fortnight, at most, in spite of all weathers.

DUTY.—No man's spirits were ever hurt by doing his
duty. On the contrary, one good action, one tempta-
tion resisted and overcome, one sacrifice of desire or in-
terest purely for conscience sake, will prove a cordial
for weak and low spirits beyond what either indulgence,
or diversion, or company can do for thou. And a suc-
cession and course of such action and self-denials, spring-
ing from a religious principle, and manfully maintained,
is the best possible course that can be followed as a
remedy for sinkings and oppressions of this kind...
Paley.