The Sun.
London, England, 1854-04-03 00:00:00

nt

1111,0

LONDON, MONDAY, APRIL 3, 1854•

It is impossible for any person to peruse calralY
and dispassionately the important debates in both
Houses of Parliament, on Friday evening, without
arriving at the conclusion that it is to Lord ABER-
DEEN, and to Lord ABERDEEN solely, that we are
indebted for the war into which, without any
sinister objects of our own to advance, without
any " motives of aggrandisement or designs of
ambition," we have been forced. The accession to
office of the "good and excellent" Earl was received
by his Imperial friend as the signal for putting
forward pretensions which had, nearly nine years
previously, been confidentially communicated to
the English Minister, and in no way discouraged
or repudiated by him. The CZAR decidedly thought
every impediment was removed out of his way, and
that the time had arrived for administering the coup
de grace to the " Sick Man," and distributing his
assets according to the " gentlemanly understand-
ing" arrived at with the pilot who controlled the
helm of the vessel of the English State. He had
no reason to doubt that he would have received
the sanction, or at least the tacit connivance
of one who had so well earned and was so ex-
ceedingly flattered by his " good opinion."
Russia and
England were, according to the UR-
derstandietg expressed in the memorandum of
1844, " to concert together the course that
they should pursue in common." The AUTO-
CRAT clearly and unequivocally expressed his be-
lief that the time had arrived for acting on that
agreement—that the patient was in a moribund
state, and that " the English Government was
deceived if it thought otherwise."' It was im-
possible for any person
(however credulous) who
was cognisant of
" the memorandum" to mis-
conceive his meaning, and it was the imperative
duty of Lord ABERDEEN to prevent the possibility
of mistake. Any doubtful objection, any trivial
opposition, must have led one so well versed in
" tortious" proceedings to consider that all was

as he desired, and that he would find only " a
show of coyness," that his yielding friend was
like a timid maid, who, while whispering
" I will ne'er consent, consented."

The overtures would never have been made,
the proceedings never initiated, but for the posi-
tion of Lord ABERDEEN as responsible adviser of
the British SOVEREIGN, as President of the Coun-
cil of Ministers. It was therefore doubly incum-
bent on him to lose no opportunity of undeceiving
the AUTOCRAT, of showing him that he was
" reckoning without his host" if he in any degree
calculated in obtaining the complicity of the
United Kingdom in his nefarious projects of
wholesale plunder. When MENSCHIKOFF went on
his audacious mission, adding by the haughtiness
of his manner to the insolence of his demand, England
should have spoken out. Had it done so, we should
not have witnessed the crossing of the Pruth or
the occupation of the Danubian Principalities by
the armed cohorts of the Northern Despot. By
our culpable silence and culpable inactivity we
tempted him into the adoption of measures into
which he would not otherwise have entered.
Once taken, his pride and ambition alike forbade
any retracing of his footsteps, nor did he then,
nor possibly does he even at this moment, fully
credit the sincerity of our resistance, and of our
determination to prevent the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire. How could he do so, when
the Prime Minister of England not only persisted
in the " policy of abstention,"Lin hoping
against all
hope that the CZAR would still abate his preten-
sions, and accept the satisfaction suggested by the
Vienna Conference ? How can
he yet do so when
that same Prime Minister,
in his place in Parlia-
ment, during the discussion on the commencement
of hostilities, expresses a decided opinion that
" the Emperor was always well founded in his ap-
prehensions as to the dissolution of the Turkish
Empire, and, acting on that belief, said nothing in
the Memorandum but what is wise, what is mo-
derate, and what is judicious?" Can the CZAR
think that we will now act with vigour and energy
when such. -views are unhesitatingly put forward
in Parliament ? Can the people of this country
believe that adequate securities will be taken
against the repetition of these pretensions under
more favourable circumstances, or that Lord ABER-
DERN should exhibit his own political blindness
by sustaining a Power which he believes on the
verge of dissolution ? Above all, can our new
but faithful allies, With whom we hope to
be ever en accord, believe that the man who,
while acknowledging that " France was treated
in a cavalier manner" by the EMPEROR of
Russia in that very Memorandum, yet de-
clares that he sees in it nothing but
" what is wise (!), what is moderate (! !), and
what is judicious (M), and which he looks upon,
and regards with great satisfaction ?" Surely his
sincerity may be more than doubted after such an
exhibition.

Why, we ask, but for the pro-Russian ten-
dencies, and the " peace-at-any-price " determina-
tion of " the pupil of METTERNICH," should we
not long ere this have been prepared with an
armament on the Euxine shores, in advance of
Varna—aye, on the very Danube itself—so as to
cut off the invading army, and compel them to
accept any conditions we might have deemed it
expedient—anything would be justifiable to dic-
tate ? Why might we not have landed the united
troops of France and England on the Crimea,
taken possession of that teeming and fertile soil,
and attacked Sebastopol simultaneously by land
and by water ? Its capture would have required
little expenditure of men or money, and would
speedily have been followed by the fall of Odessa, and
the surrounding country, placing the Russians
between two fires and cutting off their retreat
through Moldavia and Bessarabia. What would
have been the effects of a policy so bold and de-
cisive ? How speedily might we have anticipated
the restoration of an honourable and an endur-
ing peace if such measures had been resorted to,
and in their absence might not the sincerity of
those influencing and directing the English/Coun-
cils have well been questioned ?
But is it too late yet to do so ? Cannot the
evil in some degree be remedied ? Most un-
doubtedly it can, if even at this moment we are in
earnest. Of course, from our own culpable tardi-
ness and remissness, the cost of men and money
will be much greater. The necessary " carnage
and destruction" will be much greater, but still
resolute action is of the utmost importance,
and may even yet materially diminish the
duration of the war. But we must not
temporise or show any symptoms of vacil-
lation. If the " woman who hesitates is
lost," much more so is the nation. It is that
hesitation of the "good and excellent'peace-loving
pro-Russian ABERDEEN" that has encouraged the
enemy, and paralysed our friends and allies. It
is that hesitation which the voice of public
opinion requires to be abandoned—that public
opinion which addresses the Premier in the lan-
guage of the poet of human nature—

" For the love of all the Gods,
Lets leave the hermit pity with our mother,
And when we have our armour buckled on

The venom'd vengeance, ride upon our swords,
Spur them to ruthful work, reiu them from ruth."
This is wholesome and salutary instruction, such
as modern experience has proved to be consis-
tent with true philanthropy. To bring war to a
speedy conclusion, we must " imitate the action
of the tiger," and
" Disguise fair nature with hard favour'd rage."

But it is not in the Euxine and its vicinity
only that we should wage war both by land and
by water ! Why should we not despatch an
Anglo-French land expedition to the shores of
the Baltic also. Courland and Livonia invite us,
and the troops could ably second the exertions of
the fleets. With undisputed command at sea,
and " CHARLIE NAPIER " is not the man we deem
him if we have not that very speedily, we might
harass the Russians by landing at different points,
and finally concentrate all our force by land
and by water on St. Petersburg. France has
something to avenge that would induce her eagerly
to join in the onslaught. Then should we—

- "conjointly bend
Our sharpest deeds of malice on the town !
By East and West, let France and England mount
Their battering cannons charged to the mouths,
Till their soul-fearing clamours have brawl'd down
The flinty ribs of this contemptuous city."
Then, indeed, should we have the game in our
own hands--then would we arrest the tide of
war, and turn it back on our unscrupulous oppo-
nents. Then would the charm of invincibility be
broken—the pretext to " infallibility" by the head
of " the orthodox faith" exposed, and " the god
of all the Russians" deprived of the blasphemous
adoration of his misguided serfs.
Acts like these would insure a permanent and
honourable peace. But can we hope for them
Certainly not. Therefore
now that that ,
under ABERDEEN ?
cc grim-visaged war" is at hand, it
istime that the peace-loving Minister should ab-
dicate the functions for which he is not only alto-
gether -unfitted, but totally disqualified—that he
should drop from his palsied grasp the helm which
he is no longer capable of controlling.

The orders in Council, authorising
on at
reprisals and
embargoes, were on Wednesday decided
Buckingham Palace, and subsequently published
in a second supplement to the Gazette. They are
in the usual form, and may be regarded as neces-
sary supplements to the previous declaration of
war. There is, however, an addition thereto,
affording certain indulgences to those who may
henceforth be termed the enemy—an addition
decisive as to the good intentions of the Allied
Powers (for France has issued a similar no-
tice), who, as we stated on Wednesday,
exhibit " a laudable anxiety to free warfare of one
of its many horrors." Six weeks' time, until the
10th of May, is allowed to Russian merchant ves-
sels, in any port or place in her MAJESTY'S do-
minions, for loading their cargoes and departing
therefrom ; and such vessels will be allowed " to
continue their voyage, if, on examination of their
papers, it shall appear that their cargoes were
taken on board before the expiration of the above
term." Certain cases are, however, noticed
which will not he allowed these privileges.
If the owners or commanders of these ships
should be so oblivious of their mercantile
()facers in the military or
character as to convey