The Sun.
London, England, 1854-02-07 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING-, FEBRUARY 7, 1854,

THE TU.,

SHARE MARK E,TS

(THIS DAY.)

Shr. Paid. RAILWAYS. Leasing Closing Prices Business
Compans, this day.
50 all Bedford and Loudon &
Bletchley.... N. West• •••
St. 100 Buckghanish. L.&N.W. 99 101
50 all ClydesdaleJc. Caledon 50 —52
St. 100 E. Lincoln gr.
6 per cent. Gt.Nrthn. L 39 141 141
25 all Glas. Barr. & Caldonian.
Neils. Direct ••• •••
25 all Do. N0w...... Do
25 all Olstr.&Dn.Fr Gt. Westn 30 32
100 all Eirtlpl. Dk. & Yk. Now.
Railway & Berw.
50 all gull & Selby Y. &NMd 107 109
25 all Do. A Shares. Do 54 55
12A all Do. ± Shares. Do 26A —27 A
13i all Lon.&Greenw S. Eastern 13* 13.1
20 all Do. Preference Do 2IA —25 A
20 100 Lowestoft gr.
4 per cent. Norfolk
20 LOO Do. 6 per ct.
5A all Manch. Bxtn. L&N.W.
and Matlock & Midld. 2i 3
50 all Middlesbro' & Stckton &
Redcar Darlingt.
100 all Midld.Bradfd Midland.. 97 99
50 all Northern and
Easternsp.c. E. Count. 59 61
50 LL Do. 6 per ct. Do
2550 piDo.e.sFt.inlvsyprse Do
&N.w
&Ln&Yk
12A 12 Do. A Shares. Do .
St. 100 Roystn.&Hit. GtNorthn 138 142
St. 100 Do.Shepth.St Do l3B 142
25 181 Shef.Roth.and riancaab&
Goole g. 5 p.c. Yorksh.
12 9A 3. Staffordsh. M.MClean 2#
50 all WearValleygi Stockt. &
6 per cent... Darlingt.
25 all Do Do 3O 21
St. 100 Wilts&Somrst GtWestn 95 _ 97

No. IV.—THE WAR.

BRITISH RAILWAYS.

RAIL`frATS.

Closing Prices

Business done 1 St.
this day. 50

39 - 41

6 7: ;72

75 - ii)
i -li p

16 - 18
16 - 18

''i 1.- lid

is -:
Vp

, . - ...

i
i. •.•
d

lap
35 37
-Ad= A P
p
13 —l4

departure of one French ambassador and the arri-
val of another."
On the 12th of January intelligence of the in-
tended expedition was communicated to the Russian
Government by our Minister at St. Petersburg,
who informed Count Nesselrode that " Her
Majesty's ships and those of the Emperor of the
French would enter the Black Sea, and would
require every Russian ship which they might meet
with to re-enter a Russian port."
On the very next day, however, as if to complete
the alternations of these transactions, a step which
had been almost decisive of war was counter-
balanced by another intended to be decisive of
peace. The " collective Note" and " Protocol"
above described as concerted by the European
representatives at Vienna, had been anticipated
(pp. 339-368) by certain arrangements concerted,
in the same view, by the European representatives
at Constantinople. Without entering into the par-
ticulars of this diplomatic episode, we may briefly
state that the Constantinole project was finally
" successful. Our proposals," writes Lord Stratford
(p. 362), "are formally accepted under the Sultan's
sanction, and it now remains with the Four Powers
to obtain the assent of Russia, and to set on foot
the negotiation which they have expressed their
desire to obtain, and which, if the Court of St.
Petersburgh be sincere in his professions, ought to
terminate at an early period in peace. These pro-
posals, being transmitted to Vienna, were adopted
by the Conference there sitting, as agreeing with
their own, and were by them duly signed on the
13th of January, the day after Count Nesselrode
had been apprised of the entry of the fleets into
the Black Sea. Thus was the double contest
resolved at length into a single one, by the
identification of the demands of Turkey with
those of Europe. The Porte, as was announced
by Redschid Pasha to the four representa-
tives, "is prepared to conclude a peace in the
manner pointed out to it by its allies ; and, if
intelligence is received that the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg likewise accepts the bases, the Porte
will name and send a Plenipotentiary to a congress
to be held in a neutral city, which shall be spe-
cified by the Four Powers, and at which delegates
of the Four Powers shall assist, for the arrange-
ment of affairs with the Plenipotentiary of the
Court of Russia • and thereupon, as is natural, a
temporary armistice for a fixed period will be con-
cluded."
The four representatives at Vienna acceded, in
the names of Great Britain, France, Austria, and
Prussia, to the terms here mentioned, and this is
the stage at which the papers before us conclude.
Our intelligence of yesterday supplied the comple-
ment of the story. The conditions thus devised by
the representatives of Europe at Constantinople,
accepted by the Sublime Porte, endorsed by the
representatives of Europe at Vienna, and trans-
mitted to St. Petersburg with these recommenda-
tions, have been, rejected by the Czar. It is with
Europe, therefore, that the Czar is now at issue,
and of this contest we await the results.

The following are the despatches mentioned
above :

" No. 332.
" LORD COWLEY TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.
(Received Dec. 18.)
(Extract.)

" Paris, Dec. 16, 1853.
" Late yesterday afternoon M. Drouyn do Lhuys made
me acquainted with the outline of a proposition to be laid
before your lordship this morning by Count Walewski in
the name of the Imperial Government, which has for its
object to prevent the repetition of such sanguinary
scenes as that lately enacted at Sinope, and to make the
Russian Government understand that France and England
are determined to hold possession of the Black Sea as an
equivalent for the Russian occupation of the Danubian
Provinces. This afternoon his Excellency read to me the
despatch on this subject, addressed to Count Walewski
for communication to your lordship. Whatever her Ma-
jesty's Government may think of the proposition itself,
they will do justice to the clearness and precision with
which M. Di ouyn de Lhuys has placed it before them.
"'Supposing, then, your lordship to be in possession of
this document, I abstain from offering any analysis of its
contents, and propose confining myself to a statement of
the arguments put forward by M. Drouyn de Lhuys in a
lengthened conversation in support of the plan of action
which he recommends.

"He first examined the abstract right of France and
England to interfere in the summary manner which he pro-
posed. He argued that, it being both their interest and
their duty to protect the Turkish territory from all aggres-
sive attacks on the part of Russia, motives of humanity
should impel them to prevent the repetition of such a car- ,
nage as must have accompanied the destruction of the
Turkish flotilla at Sinope. They had not, unfortunately, i
the means (he observed) of enforcing a suspension of hos-
tilities either upon the Danube or in Asia Minor ; but they
could enforce it in the Black Sea, and the interests of
peace and humanity not only gave them the right, but en-
joined them so to do. If the two Governments had not
sent their fleets into the Black Sea at an earlier period, it
was because they confided in the voluntary assurances of
Russia not to prosecute the war by offensive operations ;
and they were unwilling to meet so laudable a declaration
by any act of theirs which could imply distrust, or which
might give the Russian Government an excuse for taking
a less conciliatory course. Now, however, that Russia had
thrown off the mask, he saw no certain means of controll-
ing her action in the Black Sea but by sweeping that sea
of the Russian flag.
" But there were other considerations of hardly less im-
portance, which M. Drouyn de Lhuys said must be taken
into account in the consideration of his proposition. He
alluded to the material, moral, and commercial conse-
quences by which it must be followed, should the short-
sightedness of Russia give any permanence to its exe-
cution.
"1. As to the material effect which would be produced.
Besides the forced suspension of hostilities between Tur-
key and Russia within the limits of the Black Sea, the
latter would find it very difficult, if not impossible, to ad-
vance from the Principalities on Constantinople, unless
she had her sea communications with Odessa and Sebasto-
pol assured ; she would be equally unable to transport re-
inforcements, arms, ammunition, or provisions for the use
of the troops engaged on the Asiatic coast. On the other
hand, the various resources of water communication would
remain open to the Turks.
"2. As to the moral effect. At this moment the Rus-
sian flag of war was paramount in the Black Sea. In fact,
that sea was little better than a Russian lake. The races
which inhabited its shores believed, probably, that there
was no navy which could compete with that of Russia, or
dispute her maritime preponderance. They would now be
taught that there were other nations with superior naval
means at their disposal, ready to exert them for the pro-
tection of the oppressed. They would be encouraged to
rise against their hereditary enemies, and thus render the
position of the latter far more perilous,
"3. With respect to commercial effects. Vessels from
the combined fleets would visit every nook and corner of
the Black Sea, would sound its coasts and examine its
harbours and roadsteads. A more intimate knowledge
would thus be gained of the races which people its shores ;
of their wants, of their means, and of the productions of
L the countries which they inhabit. Foundations might
thus be laid for commercial intercourse of great future
value.

" I have thought it my duty to caution M. Drouyn de
Lhuys against placing the occupation of the Danubian
Provinces by Russia, and the presence of the combined
fleets in the Black Sea, on the same footing of irregularity.
To do so would be to allow that the Euxine was a mare
claueum, and would be a dangerous admission to make.
True, our late treaties with th 9 Porte effectually shut the
Black Sea to our ships of war in time of peace; but the
exclusion was the effect and not the' stipulation of a treaty;
and it behoved us, in any negotiation on this matter, to
keep this distinction in, view.
" M. Drouyn de Lhnys agreed in this remark.
" It only remains for me to state that I have had an
opportunity of speaking to the Emperor on the subject of
this proposition, and that his Majesty partakes entirely
the sentiments of his Minister. He desired me to recom-
mend it in the strongest terms to the favourable conside-
ration of her Majesty's Government as a measure incum-
bent upon himself and them to take, avowing the disap-
pointment which he should feel if a difference of opinion
prevented its adoption."

" No. 333.

" M. DROUYN DE ',BUYS TO COUNT WALEWSSL—(COM
_3II7NIOATED TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON BY COUNT
WALEWSKI, DEC. 17.)
(Translation.)
" Paris, Dec. 15, 1853.
"M. le Comte,—The despatch which I have had the
honour to write to you under No. 159 has made known to
you the first impression of the Emperor's Government in
regard to the destruction of the Ottoman flotilla in the
roads of Sinope, and I entertain no doubt that it was
fully shared in by her Britannic Majesty's Government.
I
perceive by Lord Stratford's telegraphic despatch! :ehiP2
Lord Clarendon has had the goodness to communiac t to
you, that our representatives at Constantinstorple a
stantly understood the necessity for asd have
ov in
stantly
part of our naval forces in the Blackh eaemannd I am pleased
to think `that on the return a tate ;team vessela sent
Sinope itself, they
to reconnoitre at Bourg as,
will not have hesitated to senuda_norotuints.ofnitheeopeßosphorus the
ration which
greater portion of the two s ad
and which is that of which 1:3
sfiOarTri
they proposed to support,
Clarendon and myself had equahlilychthiteiisdheaeco, will 3..
ne
ecae
indication of the inspection w
to enforce on a coast where vro had nots ts.uppeptoerssebduthrghatatainn
aggression could so quickly t akopflraocme .
" In fact, our last information
represented Russia as disposed to treat, and as determined,
above all, to assume the offensive in no quarter. This con-
fidence explained why our fleets did not move. It appeared
to us that the presence of our flag in the waters of Omuta,.
tinople demonstrated our firm intention to protect that
capital against a sudden danger, and we were unwilling
that our premature appearance in quarters more in the
vicinity of the Russian territory should run the risk Jf
being taken for a provocation. The state of war douNiess,
rendered a collision possible by sea as well by land I.etween
the belligerent parties, but we had
fbeen autheitsed to in-
fer from the repeated declarations Russia that our re-
serve would be imitated by her, od
that, not misunder-
standingc the real object of our demonstration, she would
avoid, with the same care as ourselves the occasions of
collision, by absta • • ming from proceedin, to
aggressive
measures within the limits in which, if we could have sup-
posed her to be influenced by different intentions, our
action would have naturally taken effect concurrently with
her own.
"In a word, M. le Comte, we admitted, without, how-
ever, stating it, that the Sebastopol fleet should protect the
Asiatic coast of the Russian enapire, keep the approach to
it clear, and provision the garrisons, and in none of those
circumstances would we have had to interfere with its
movements. TO do so would have been to attack Russia ;
and we had passed the Dardanelles only to defend Turkey.
The expedition directed against. Sinope has, conse-
quently surpassed our anticipations ; that fact modifies, in
the same degree, the attitude which we should have wished
to have been able to maintain until the end.
" Instead of availing herself of the sea which we left
free to her, for the purpose of her own defence, Russia,
abusing as it were, her position, has availed herself of it in
order to attack our ally in his Ports, and, not satisfied