The Sun.
London, England, 1854-08-29 00:00:00

the three years 1841-2, was 2,840,000 cwts. ; and from
other countries, in thsamS three years, 585,000 cwts.
In 1851-2-3, from Risia, 2,266,000 cwts. ; and from
other countries, 1,1E,000 owts. So that, while the
Russian supply, in thiten years, fell off nearly 20 per
cent. the supply fron other sources increased by more
than 100 per cent.
With respect to povisions, the supply from other
sources has doubled, tile that from Russia has scarcely
increased.
On examining theseesults together it will be observed
that, as to five of th six articles (grain, hemp, flax,
tallow, and bristles), he supply from other sources has,
during_ the period in sew, been increasing faster than
the supply from Rust, and, consequently, that there
has been a proc,ressie diminution of the extent to
which we have been d:pendent upon that country for a
supply. It is also olvious that the increase, such as it
is, which has taken psce in the imports of all these ar-
ticles from Russia (extpting tallow) has tended to make
the producers of that country somewhat dependent
upon the consumption of this country for a remunera-
tive demand.
Let us now consider how the present war is likely to
affect a foreign commerce such as that we have de-
scribed.
Putting aside the tiling amount of commerce carried
on through the ports cf the White Sea and the Caspian,
we have seen that, speaking in round numbers, about
one-half in bulk of the exports of Russia pass through
her Baltic ports, andthe other half through the ports
on the Black Sea. It value, however, the amount or
the Baltic trade far exeeeds all the rest.
To take the Baltic ports first. Of these we need only
mention St. Petersburg, Riga, Revel, Windau, and
Liebau. And the twofirst mentioned are so much more
important than the rest for our present purpose, they,
too, may be passed over. The share of the trade taken
by St. Petersburg and Riga may be safely inferred from
,he following account of the entries of shipping in the
three last years for which the returns have just been pub-
lished :
Tonnage of shipping entered at the ports of St. Peters-
burg and Riga in each of the three years 1847, 1848,
and 1849 :
St. Petersburg, 1847, 449,338 tons; 1848, 313,617
tons; 1849, 323,252 tons.
Riga, 1847, 285,352 tons; 1848, 163,105 tons; 1849
228,983 tons.
The tonnage entered at all the Russian ports on the
Baltic in 1847 was 808,026, and in 1848 was 645,836.
It appears, then, that in both years St. Petersburg had
more than half the trade in point of bulk, and that Riga
had about two-thirds of what rprn.ined.
It will be here borne in mind that the chief localities
of Russian production are not, as in most other countries,
upon or near the coast where the produce is shipped.
The goods exported from St. Petersburg and Riga,
coming as they do chiefly from the central provinces be-
foresreferred to, have to pass a long distance through the
interior, but a distaigaskvhish, from the facility of land-
carriage during the ''''Sinter months, may be almost as
easily travelled in one direction as in another. What,
then, is the average distance thus intervening between
the place of production and the port of shipment ? I
conceive this may be estimated, in a manner sufficiently
accurate for the present purpose, by taking the distance
from about the centre of these provinces to the ports
in question.
Examination of the map, and of the figures before
given, lead us to the city of Moscow itself as probably
the most common centre that could be chosen for such a
purpose. The distance from Moscow to St. Petersburg,
in a straight line, is scarcely 400 miles. Practically, the
distance passed over between the two cities may be set
down at 480. The like distance between Moscow and
Riga appears to be about 630 miles ; but against the
distance of 150 miles further, by land, to Riga, is to be
set a saving of sea carriage of some 200 miles, in con-
sequence of Riga being so much nearer than St.
Petersburg to the entrance of the Baltic, which is to
be passed by nearly all vessels exporting the produce
of Russia.
So much for the export trade of the central districts
around Moscow. But there is, as vie have seen, another
great centre of production around Warsaw. And this
is very differently situated. Tt will be observed that Po-
land and the neighbouring provinces of Vilna and Grodno
are separated from the Baltic coast only by a slip of
Prussian territory, some 70 or 80 miles wide. Upon the
seaboard of this territory, and upon a line the extremi-
ties of which are not more than 200 miles apart, are four
Prussian ports, Dantzic, Elbing, Konigsberg, and Me-
mel. A fine navigable river (the Vistula) and its tribu-
taries penetrate the entire kingdom of Poland, and even
float tbitherward much of the produce of Russian Grodno
and Austrian Gallicia. And though, during the last 30
years, the Russian Government has done all in its power
and not without considerable success, to draw the pro-
duce of this district northwards, to ports within its own
territory (as Windau and Liebau), the natural course of
things is still so far maintained as to render these pro-
vinces of Russia mainly tributary, by their commerce, to
the ports of East Prussia.
It need scarcely be added that so long as Prussia re-
mains neutral, her ports will remain open, and the pas-
sage of Russian produce across her frontiers will be un-
obstructed. Hence it is to be expected that whatever
the Russians may wish to exchange for foreign goods,
and can afford to sell at a profit on the frontiers of Prus-
sia, they may continue to produce for exportation,
though every port they have on the Baltic be closely
blockaded.
Nor does it seem likely that the central provinces will,
in the event of a continuance of the war, find the Prus-
sian portg much less serviceable to them than they are
obviously fitted to be to Poland and the neighbouring
provinces in th.
We have already set down the average distance of
these central provinces from St. Petersburg at 480 miles,
and from Riga at 630 miles. On like data the distance
from Moscow to Konigsberg cannot be estimated at
more than about 800 miles. And against the additional
land-carriage of 320 miles (as compared with St. Peters-
burg) there is a distance of some 500 miles saved by sea
—Konigsberg being at
,least so much nearer to the
Sound than St. Petersburg:
It will also be observed, on consulting a recent map of

these countries, that Cracow, at the southern extremity
of Poland, and Posen, but a short distance from the
western frontier of that country, are already within the
limits of the continental railway system. Goods reach-
ing either of those cities from Russia are in immediate
communication with Stettin, Hamburg, and all the
Dutch and Belgian ports ; and depots of foreign pro-
duce, formed at either city, and destined for Russian
consumption, might be rapidly supplied by steam transit
from any of the ports of England, France, Belgium,
Holland, or Prussia, and the goods easily placed en,
route for Warsaw, St. Petersburg, or Moscow.
When the projected lines from Dantzic to Posen, and

from Posen direct to Cracow, shall be completed, the
exportable produce of Poland and Gallicia must tend to
se-^k a railway, route to Dantzic or Hamburg, or even to
d'rend ; a tendency operating directly in proportion to
the Value and the portability of the produce. But
'whether this tendency of the German railway system to
draw. westward the trade now, by the imperial system of
Russia, drawn northward to Riga or St. Petersburg, or
southwards to Odessa, will be permitted to operate with
any degree of freedom, must depend much upon the
duration and the issue of the present system. That
while hostilities continue, and the Prussian frontier re-
mains passable, the more free and natural course of
trade will be admitted by the Czar for his own sake,
though to the detriment of the imperial system is obvi-
ous a benefit to the cause he fights against, which may,
for the present, reconcile us to the equivocal attitude of
one of the four powers.

So long, then, as Prussia remains neutral, the eastern
half of that country, as it obviously possesses the coast
line naturally appendant to the kingdom of Poland, and
to the Russian provinces immediately adjoining that
kingdom on the east, may be expected to afford a pas-
sage for the trade of these provinces, with all the ease
and all the willingness with which mercantile men, who
have long seen trade diverted from its natural channel
through their own hands, see it come back in conse-
quence of the temporary weakness of the disturber.
From the ports of the Black Sea the only regular sup-
plies we receive are of corn and seeds, with a small
quantity of wool and tallow, and a few articles of no im-
portance.
Corn, wool, and tallow, then, are the only articles
with regard to which an entire stoppage of our trade
with the Russian ports of the Black Sea would affect
this country. And how insignificant such a stoppage
would be to us may be inferred from comparison of the
quantity of each of these three articles imported thence
in the two years 1849 and 1850, with the quantity of
each imported into this country from all parts of the
world in the same year.
Assuming the trade, on an average of years, to be
fairly represented, the corn would form only about 6
per cent., the wool about 3 per cent., and the tallow
from 1 to 7 per cent. of all we have been accustomed to
import.

, w may
all the exportable produce of the coun-
hut, reverting to what has been said of the facilities
for interior carriage in Russia, and of the great distances
mo veenrt whiech nearlytry must be carried before it reaches the place of ship-
produce now shipped in the Black Sea would, were that
safely infer that the greater part of the
outlet closed to it for more than one season, find its way
to the shores of the Baltic. It is also to be borne in
mind that the Russian export trade of the Black Sea
is chiefly concentrated at Odessa ; that port is supplied
from the country west of the Dnieper, and drained by
that liver and the Bug and the Dniester ; and that this,
the most fruitful part of the Russian dominions on the
Black Sea, is at once most open to the means of transport
to the Baltic already in use for Gallicia, and Poland. and
is also the territory obviously most likely to be occupied
by the allies of Turkey in the event of a protracted con-
test, and an advance by the allies upon the most recently
acquired and most southern dominions of Russia.
This conclusion may be stated in a few words. It is
that, while Prussia remains neutral, the efforts we make
to put a stop to commercial intercourse between Russia
and the rest of the world will result in little more than
in transferring to Prussian ports the greater part of the
trade hitherto carried on through the ports of Russia.
The people of Russia would suffer from such a transfer
mainly in the annoyance and loss always incident to an
obstruction or disturbance of the ordinary channels of
traffic—the nobles or landowners in a lower price ob-
tained for their exportable produce, and a higher price
Paid far imported comforts and luxuries—and the
government in a
partial loss of the revenue derivtd
from trade, and such a restoration of the main commerce
of the country to its natural outlets as cannot but post-
pone, if it do not ultimately prevent, the realisation of
the despotic scheme which makes St. Petersburg, in
spite of nature, the capital city and chief port of the
empire,
The sufferings of the people will, at worst, be tempo.
rary Jur, could the transfer continue but a few years,
it w'll confer all the countervailing benefits of a mere
natural state of things ; while the damage done to the
artificicl system of the Government would be :ertain,

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