The Sun.
London, England, 1854-03-22 00:00:00

TITE SUN,ZIOND-ON, WEDNESDAY F!)171:[1ING, ng, 1e64,

nation to support their Sovereign and her Ministers in
the 'demands which they might make. But I must re-
mind the house that within—l cannot say a few days, for
it is almost still a few hours, other documents connected
with those important transactions have also been placed
upon our table ; and, to say the least of them, they add
much important as well as increased information to that
which we already possessed as to the reasons which have
placed the country in the perilous position in which it now
finds itself. It was not in our power, however, to con-
sider those documents when we listened first to the finan
cial plans of the Minister. The financial plans of the
Minister, when, a fortnight ago or snore, they were pro-
posed for our consideration and acceptance, were founded
np6n a necessity which, so far as the House of Commons
was concerned, was only explicable by the papers which
were placed upon the table on the first day of the session.
Rat the important supplement to those papers has ap•
peared since that statement— in fact, within only the last
48 hours—and no one can read that important supplement
without feeling that its perusal must give rise to new con-
siderations, which could not have been open to us when
we listened to the reasons of the Minister for his extraor-

Binary proposition for increased taxation ; that that im-
portant supplement has given a very new aspect to the
circumstance which we supposed were entirely placed
before us, and that the opinion of Parliament must neces-
sarily be given upon that new matter thus unexpectedly
brought before our notice. (Hear.) I say this, Sir,
because I wish to guard myself in the course of which I
am taking to night from any approval of the proposition ;
which is brought forward by her Majesty's Ministers. It is
impossible that we can bring curselves to approve a propo-
sition for greatly increasing the direct taxation of the cowl-
try, unless we have a clear case of necessity proved to us ;
I say that we have not a clear necessity proved to us at pre-
sent, when we have two sets of papers before us which con-
vey to our minds different and distinct impressions. Nor can I
forget, sir, tb at it was not to theliberality, not to the generous
confidence of the Government—that we are indebted for
that additional and more important portion of this infor-
mation. (Hear, hear.) Xis, I will not say to an accident
but to circumstances of a very rare, if not anunprecedented
nature, that the House of Commons is indebted for being
acquainted with the real causes of the war in which we '
were invited to embark some weeks ago, upon a very dif-
ferent statement from that which probably will ultimately
be substantiated, and upon which we were asked greatly
to increase the burdens of the country. I am sure that I
gentlemen on both sides of the house must feel that this
subject requires discussion, which it cannot receive upon
the present opportunity ; that they must feel that before
we ultimately sanction this increase of our taxation we
must require from the Ministry a more clear account of
the causes which have brought about the present state of
affairs, and that Parliament, much more formally, muck
snore decidedly, and, I will even say, more solemnly must
sanction that policy and that increased taxation than it
has heretofore done. (Hear, hear.) So far, therefore, as
the main project is concerned, I shall treat all these stages
of the proceeding as merely preliminary and formal. I
guard myself from in any way or in any degree approving
thl) proposal which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has
brought forward. I will not admit that there is any ne-
cessity for increased taxation upon the present occasion,
and for this simple reason—that I myself am utterly at a
loss to know whether we are going to war—(" Oh, oh !")
—and, if we are going to war, what are we going to war
for? (Hear, hear.) Ido not want to invite any discus-
sion upon the subject. All I want is, that the Chancellor
of the Exchequer, or any other Minister, shall not say,
upon a subsequent occasion, such as the second reading of
the bill upon the income-tax, that we are precluded from
objecting to the polic.y which this bill wishes to bring
into action. I rose to-night because there were one or
two points connected with the financial policy of the right
hon. gentleman respecting which, on a former occasion,
there had been some discrepancy of opinion and
statement between him and myself in this house. Perhaps
the house will recollect that upon the evening that he made
his financial statement, and after it was made, there was
some conversational discussion in the committee between
the right hon. gentleman and myself upon matters of fact,
upon which there was a great difference of statement be-
tween us. But they were subjects which could not be
settled without reference to authentic documents not then
at hand. The right hon. gentleman upon a subsequent oc-
casion in a Committee of Supply, upon the Wednesday fol-
lowing, I think, took the opportunity of making a fresh
statement upon one of the points of controversy; but, as
the right t, on. gentleman rose very shortly before the house,
as it was Wednesday morning, was necessarily obliged to
adjourn, as it was impossible for me to reply to the right
hon. gentleman upon that occasion without entirely stop-
ping the course of public business; I expressed to the right
hon. gentleman that I dissented from his statement, but
that I would not, of course, at that moment intrude myself
upon the committee. It was then within a few minutes
of 6 o'clock, and it was distinctly understood between us
that upon a subsequent occasion I should notice the state-
ment which he then made. Now, when the right hon.
gentleman made his financial statement, upon which I at
the time offered no observations, so far as his main propo-
sition of increasing the taxation of the country was con-
cerned, reserving to myself the right of so doing upon a fit
opportunity—which unfortanately has not yet happened—
I did make some observations upon what I thought was a
very important feature of our financial condition. I thought
it my duty to call the attention of the Committee of Ways
and Means to a subject which attracted much of the pub-

..
lic attention, and occupied that evening a great portion of
the time of the house—namely, the state of the pub-
lic balances in the Exchequer. (Hear, hear.) I felt it
my duty to remind the committee upon that occasion,
that, when the Government of Lord Derby quitted
office at the beginning of January, 1853, they left a balance
in the Exchequer of nearly 9,000,000/.P and that, at the
commencement of the present year of 1854, the balance
of nearly 9,000,0001. was reduced to the sum of about
4,400,0001. I pointed out then to the committee the great
inconvenience and possible injury to the public service of
such a state of balances in the public Exchequer. I said
that, so far as I could form an opinion at the time when I
was speaking, which must have been somewhat about the
beginning of this month, the balances in the Exchequer
were not more than 1,500,0001., and that it was possible
that, by the end of the financial year which is now impend-
ing (the sth of April) the balances might be increased to
3,000,0001., which I thought, myself, a liberal estimate. I
have heard to-night from the high authority of a gentle-
man who is a political supporter of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, and who recently filled, and filled with great
efficiency, the high post of Governor of the Bank, that in
his opinion I rather understated my case. I said then "if
upon the sth of April you have 3,000,0001. balance in your
Exchequer, and upon that day or about it you have to pay
between 6,000,0001. and 7,000,0001. interest upon the
national debt, have to meet upwards of 2,000,0001.
more of your South Sea payments, and have also to supply
the usual expenditure of the country, it appears to me that
you are in a position of extreme difficulty—that even in
ordinary times it would be a perilous and imprudent one,
but that in times like the present, times of war and times
of great financial difficulty consequent upon war, your
position is not only wanting in prudence, but may even
be perilous." (Hear, hear.) I think that every gentleman
must feel, whatever may be his views upon the subject,
that it is a subject well deserving the attention of the
House of Commons. I think that every gentleman must
feel that a great change in the management of our pub-
lic policy is a financial feature which demands attention,
and requires considerable reflection. (Hear, hear.) Not
with any intention to dwell upon the financial schemes of
the right hon. gentleman—which, indeed, upon that occa-
sion I dwelt upon much more lightly and with much leas
detail than I might have done—but merely to explain the
reasons why that great metamorphosis had occurred, why
that burdened Treasury had suddenly been placed in the
position of being sustained by actual loans from the Bank,
as is proved by the returns upon our table, 1 touched upon
the causes of that great change—upon the causes which
had converted a balance, in January, 1853, of nearly
9,000,0001., into a balance, in January, 1854, of 4,400,0001.
I said that the cause was the dealing—as I thought, the
injudicious dealing—of the right hon. gentleman with the,
interest of the unfunded and of the funded debt. (Hear,
hear.) I said that I could have traced to operations of his,
which I thought unauthorised, and which certainly have
been unsuccessful, the present state of the balances in our
Exchequer ; and that, therefore, to those operations ulti-
mately must be attributed the inconvenience and injury
which might possibly accrue from that state of affairs.
Now, sir, I said upon that occasion, dealing first of all
with the reduction of the duty upon the unfunded debt or
Exchequer-bills, that the right hon. gentleman, when in
February, 1853, he resolved to reduce the interest upon
the unfunded debt, took a course which was quite unau-
thorised—that there many indications at that time which
should have told the right hon. gentleman that he was
embarking in a very dangerous enterprise; and that I was
sure that in resolving to pursue it he was, in fact, acting
against the advice of the best authorities upon subjects of
this description. (Hear, hear.) I might have gone into
much detail to prove that position; but, wishing to avoid
it, and not being supplied at that time with the informa-
tion in an officia or authentic form, which was necessary to
substantiate that statement, which I thought would be un-
questioned, I said from memory that the price of the pub-
lic funds at the time might have been an indication to the
right hon. gentleman that a change was occurring in the
value of money. I said at the beginning of February—on
the Bth, I think— that there had been a continuous--not
to say a considerable—fall in the price of the funds in the
interval which had occurred from the retirement of Lord
Derby from the Government, and from the moment which
the right hon. gentleman had chosen to reduce the interest
upon Exchequer-bills, which had already been once re-
duced by his predecessor. (Hear.) I said that even six
weeks did not elapse between the time when we left office,
I and until the right hon. gentleman advertised the reduc-
tion of the interest upon Exchequer-bills, before there had
been that continual depreciation in the value of the Three
per Cent. Consuls, which alone ought to have made a pru-
dent man hesitate before he contemplated a reduction of
the interest upon the unfunded debt. (Hear, hear.) But
at the same time I begged the house to remark that I did
not pledge myself accurately to the truth of the details of
the numbers, but that the fall might be nearly described
by numbers such as these :—That the Three per Cents. in
December, when we left office, were 1011, and that the
Three per Cent. Consols at the time the right hon. gentle-
man reduced the interest on the unfunded debt—namely,
on the Bth of February—were about 99i. That was the
statement that I made, and which I dare say is fresh in
the memory of hon. gentlemen who now listen to me.
(Cheers from the Opposition.) Well, and what was the
answer of the Chancellor of the Exchequer? The right
hon. gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer seemed
quite offended that Thad presumed to speak of the state of
the balances in the Exchequer, (Cheers.) He treated it
quite as if I had made a personal attack upon him, but I am
not aware that either in my matter or my manner there
was anything to give rise to that suspicion. It seemed,
however, to the right hon. gentleman that my noticing the
state of the balances was a personal offence to him. I said
there had been a continuous, not to say continual, fall in
the public funds from the time that Lord Derby's Govern-
ment left office until the time that the right hon. gentle-
man reduced the interest on the Exchequer-bills, and I
said that this fall was a fall of Li per cent. in the Three per
Cents. between December and February. Why, the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer was not contented with denying
that fall in the Three per Cents.
The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER here made
an erbservation which was inaudible.
Mr. DISRAELL—I will tell you what the right hon.
gentleman said. He said, " There is a fall of 14 per cent.
in Consols, but I can explain it ; it is susceptible of easy
explanation. Is the right hon. gentleman ignorant that a
particular process is going on in the 3 per Cents, between
December and February—that a person holding 1001. stock
receives at that period 11.10 s. interest, which is exactly the
li per cent. which describes the continual fall in the funds."
There is not a gentleman who heard the Chancellor of the
Exchequer who must not recollect that statement—(cheers)
—there is not a gentleman who can forget that happy re-
tort, that triumphant repartee, or the enthusiastic cheers
which the right hon. gentleman received from the friends
around him. (A laugh.) Why, sir, I should have shrunk
into the ground unless I had hap ened to know that I
wasexactly right, (A, laugh,)l have here the au-

thoritative and official statement- of the price of the
'Three" per "Cent; Consors: 'Now, I must . °baffle that
the Chancellor of the Exchequer had made upon the even-
ing in question an amicable remark to his right honourable
colleague the President of the Board of Trade. I recol-
lect that he was the friend--the ,fides Acluttes, to use a
classical quotation—of the right hon. gentleman—(a
laugh)—and he it was who obtained the information for
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He disappeared ; he re-
appeared with a red book under his arm, and he

" No-

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER—
thing of the sort." (A laugh.)
Mr. DISRAELI -Well, -whether I am right or wrong
in this conjecture it has nothing to do withthe priceof Con-
sols. (Hear.) That is the question, and here I have the
authoritative return of the price of Consols in Decem-
ber and at the beginning of February. The right hon.
gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in answer to
my statement that there had been a continuous fall in the
price of Consols to the amount of 14 per cent., explained
that fall, as I have said, by stating that it was occasioned
by the payment of the dividend—(cheers)—that, of course,
as there was a payment of 14 per cent. in January, that
would explain the reason why the price in February was
le per cent. less than in December. (Hear.) Now, what
was I to do in order to ascertain whether my statement
was correct or not ? Why, 1 must obtain from the highest
authority the price of Consols in December, ex dividend,
and the price of Consols in February. Every gentleman
will agree that that was the proper way. (Hear.) Well,
I have got that. I have got the price of Consols upon the
unfortunate day on which, I believe, I resigned the seals.
I have got the price of Consols, ex. dividend, on the 27th
of December, and the price of Consols on the Bth of
February, the day on which the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer reduced the interest on the unfunded debt.
It appears that the price of Consols ex. dividend
on the 27th of December was 101, and that the price
of Consols on the Bth of February, ex dividend, was 994,
so that the fall in the Three per Cent. Consols, from the
end of December to the day when the right hon. gentleman
announced the reduction of interest on the unfunded debt,
was not 14 per cent., and which fall the right hon. gentle.
man explained by the payment of the dividend, but was
really 11 per cent. (Cheers.) But, besides the official re-
turns, I have a return here from a quarter not official, but
which in these days is as well-informed as any public office
in the kingdom, for it is the Times newspaper. (Laughter
and cheers from the Opposition.) Here I find in the Times
of the 27th of December, 1852, in the city article, written
on Monday evening—" There was not much business in
the English funds be-day, and, although the market opened
with firmness, the closing prices show a decline. Consols
were first quoted at 101 ex dividend, andtheyleft off at 1004
to i." Then on January 3, 1853, I find : ' The English
funds remain without the slightest variation. Consols for
the opening were quoted 1004 to f, ex. div. throughout the
day." In fact, Console had been sick throughout the
whole week—(a laugh)—and had been on a continuous de-
cline. On the 7th of January the Tinsel city article said :
" The English funds opened this morning at the lower
prices of yesterday, and experienced a further decline of
an eighth," upon an announcement to which I am going to
allude presently. " The first quotation of Consols for
money was 100 e to g, and they closed at 1008 to 4." And
so they went on falling, until we find them by the official
list upon the sth of February, 1853, as low as 994, a fall of
14. Now, let the house recollect, because they will sym-
pathise with me, that this is the only opportunity that I
have had for more than a fortnight to notice that extraordi-
nary statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—which
the right hon. gentleman said was not a statement—
and to show that that fall in the price of Consols between
December and February, and which I have proved was
caused by the imprudence of his conduct, was not really
occasioned by the payment of the dividend. The right hon.
gentleman in replying to me was happy and affluent in un-
necessary taunts. He said I had remarked that the funds
had fallen 14 per cent. after the Government of Lord Derby
resigned office, and he wondered my modesty did not in-
duce me to connect cause and effect, and to tell the house
that it was in consequence of the resignation of Lord
Derby's Government that the fall in the Consols had taken
place. Well, sir, I have some modesty, I hope. (Much
laughter.) lam not prepared to say that it was absolutely
in consequence of the retirement of Lord Derby's Govern-
ment that that fall of 1A per cent, took place. But this I
have no hesitation in saying—that if the country had been
the least aware of what the retirement of Lord Derby's
Government would lead to—(hear, hear)—if it had been
possible to conceive what has occurred during the last six
months—(cheers)—and the position in which we are now
placed—l have no doubt that a fall of 14 per cent. would
have been but a very moderate and modest estimate of
what the opinion of the public would have been ; and the
present state of the funds is, I think, rather germane to
that point. (Cheers from the Opposition.) But when the
Chancellor of the Exchequer turns round and uses un-
seemly and discourteous taunts—and not only uses un-
seemly and discourteous taunts—but, as' I have shown,
makes statements which are quite unauthorised—when
he attempts to twist a reference to the price of funds
into a perversion for an unworthy object which served
his purpose that evening, I beg to ask whether the
state of the public funds was the only test that
as a prudent and cautious administrator of the
public funds he ought to have observed? (Cheers.) I say
that a more rash, a more improvident, and a more super-
ficial course was never taken; and that it was not the con-
duct of a wise and prudent man not to condescend to
notice a fall of 1j per cent. in the interval before adver-
tising the reduction in the interest on Exchequer-bills.
(Cheers.) But were there no other symptoms that ought
to have made you pause, and which would thus have pre-
vented you from coming forward now and saying that you
are the victim of circumstances that could not be foreseen,?
Why, on the 7th of January a significant circumstance
took place. On that day, when the Consols were very
sick, this was the alleged cause—namely, the raising of
rate of discount by the Bank. The rate of discount had,
up to that moment, remained unaltered since the 22d of
April, 1852, but it was raised from 2 per cent. to 24 per
cent. on the 7th of January. (Hear, hear.) Well, was
not that a significant symptom ? (Hear.) Was that a
sign to be disregarded ? Was not that a circumstance to
be taken in connection with the price of public funds?
(Hear.) But, is that all? The Bank of England raised
the rate of discount frotn 2 to 24 per cent. on the 7th of
January, while the Chancellor of the Exchequer was
making his great schemess for reducing the interest on the
unfunded debt. In the same month, on the 23d of Jan-
uary, what did the Directors of the Bank of England do ?
They again met and again raised the rate of discount from
2i per cent. to 3 per cent. Twice in the month did these
gentlemen, meeting in the Bank parlour, raise the rate
of interest, which had remained nearly a year at a fixed
rate. Were these not symptoms to be taken into ac-
count? (Hear.) After a continual depreciation of the
price of the funds, and after a rise in the rate of discount
twice in one month, is the Chancellor of the Exche-
quer to turn round and treat it as a matter of im-
pertinence that I should allude to the fact that there were
symptoms in' the state of the money market at that time,
which a wise man would not have disregarded. But is even
that all? I will not touch upon the subject of the Exche-
quer balances, because I know that is a subject upon which
the right hon. gentleman, although a great master of self-
control, does not so much keep his temper as a-public man
ought to do. (Cheers and laughter.) But the premium
upon Exchequer-bills, which as a great supporter of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the hon. member for Lam-
beth (Mr. Williams) had stated was at 70s. in December,
had declined to 555. at the moment when the right hon.
gentleman was determining to reduce the interest on Ex-
chequer-bills. It does seem to me the strangest thing when
Exchequer-bills, from being at 70s. premium in December,
had fallen to 555. in February, that the Chancellor of the
Exchequer should say the best thing we can do is to re-
duce the interest upon Exchequer-bills; and it really re-
quires one to be initiated into the mysteries of that high
finance of which we hear so much before we can appreciate
its adroitness. (Laughter.) It is perfectly open to finan-
ciers of the school of the hon. member for Lambeth to say
that, because Exchequer-bills are at 70e. premium, you
must immediately reduce the interest, and, if possible,
cancel so dangerous an instrument ; but, as ho has been, I
believe, told to-night, and ought to have been told long
ago, the interest of Exchequer-bills is no test or sign of the
real state of the interest which money commands, and that
in moments of exigency, when money becomes precious
and the interest high, men seek an investment in Exche-
quer-bills because they are doubtful what the future
will turn out to be, and because they can command a
capital for what they are risking. I say, sir, without go-
ing into the question whether 70s. is too high a premium
for Exchequer-bills to range at or not, which may be
a matter of controversy, that a Chancellor of the Exche-
quer, who commences reducing the interest upon the un-
funded debt when there has been a reduction in the pre-
mium of fully 15s, during the preceding six weeks, may be
most able, and may ultimately prove most successful; but
he is, in my opinion, a very daring Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer. (Cheers from the Opposition.) The right hon.
gentleman was indignant the other night, after his financial
shown
statement, because I made a passing observation that I
thought there wore symptoms at the time he commenced
reducing the interest on the unfunded debt which would
have
• the House that there were such symptoms—(cheers)—and
I think I have
it manthatpause. I think I have shown
the statement which I made
as to the fall of the Three per Cent. Consols was not that
ignorant and unauthorised statement which the Chancellor
of the Exchequer wished to impress upon the house that it
made a cautious
was, and which at tempt his immediate supporters so enthu-
siastically but so rashly cheered. (Hear.) I think, if, as
I have shown, the rate of interest was twice raised in the
Bank Parlour in the same month, that that was rather
an important symptom, and one which ought not to have
been disregarded, and if the interest or the premium of
his own Exchequer-bills were rapidly falling, that that
was another symptom, and such a one as ought not to
have been overlooked. (Cheers.) But, after all, we
come to graver circumstances than these—circumstances
which would have caused a prudent man to hesitate in
embarking in that singular campaign in which the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer commenced his career as a Minister
of Finance, but which career is not yet terminated. What
made Consols fall ? What made the premium on Exchequer-
bills decline ? What made the cautious but alarmed direc-
tors of the Bank meet twice in one month, after the rate
of interest had been fixed, and raise the rate of dis-
count? that is the question. But what, sir, was the gravest
of all symptoms—the symptom which ought always to
occupy the attention of a Minister of Finance, the symp-
tom which should not be -neglected by any individual who
lives in this country, having its cause at heart, and who is
interested in the industry of its people and in the main-
tenance of its grandeur? It was the state of the bullion in
the Bank. (Hear.) It was the alarming, the sudden, the
rapid deflux of the precious metals which produced all these
superficial symptoms, and which could not be neglected by
any one filling the high position of Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer, and acquainted with the real state of affairs as re-
garded the amount of bullion in the Bank. lam speaking
of this because it is a subject on which the Chancellor of
the Exchequer challenged my statement that there were
circumstances at the commencement of the year 18Z
which should have male him pause in the course which he
was taking of reducing the interest upon the unfunded
debt. Here is a return by which it appears that on Decem-
ber the 3d, 1852, the bullion in the Bank amounted to
22,206,000/. Now, bear in mind those numbers while I
ask you what it was on the 4th of February, a few days
before the Minister of Finance made that startling adver-
tisement to the commercial and manufacturing world that
he was going to reduce the interest upon the unfunded
debt ? The bullion in the Bank in December, 1852, as I
said before, was 22,206,0001., and on February the 4th,
1853, the bullion in the bank amounted to only 19,P00,000/.
(Hear, hear.) There had been in this short, but memorable
period, a deflux of the precious metals to an amount ex-
ceeding 3,000,000/. (Hear.) Sir, should not that have made
a Chancellor of the Exchequer hesitate before he introduced
a series of alterations which, commencing with the reduction
of the interest of the unfunded debt, was to terminate by
the reduction of the interest of the whole funded debt of
the country ? Having been taunted, and more than
taunted - (hear, hear)—with the observation I ventured to
make at the time—that I thought the Chancellor of the
Exchequer should hesitate before he reduced the interest
upon the unfunded debt, I ask the House of Commons, I
ask hon. gentlemen sitting on both sides of the house
whether, after the statement I have UQW wade) supported

as. that statement is by authoritative documents, I was not
Justified in the opinionl then expressed—whether, if they
blame me at all, it is not rather for not having expressed
myself in stronger language, and wliether they think a
Minister of Finance ought to have chosen such a moment
to tamper with the interest of the unfunded debt of this
country? (Cheers from the Opposition benches.) A fall
in the stocks of Li per cent. !—a diminution of the bullion
in the Bank to the amount of more than 3,000,0001. !—a
reduction in the premium of Exchequer-bills of 15s. !
and twice in the interval an increase to the amount of
discount in the Bank parlour ! What rhetoric, what
sophistry, can overcome facts like these? (Hear, hear.)
Sir, having alluded to the policy or the impolicy of the
course pursued by the right hon. gentleman in reducing
the interest on the unfunded debt, I adverted to the loss
which had been occasioned by this most imprudent and
most injudicious enterprise. The right hon. gentleman
last year made a great budget, and one of the items of that
budget was the amount he had saved by his operations in
the reduction of the interest upon the unfunded debt. He
gave us an estimate of his savings.
The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEUQER, made an
observation across the table which was inaudible.
Mr. DISRAELI—I don't much care about being inter-
rupted.' One gains breath and sometimes collects one's
thoughts. (Laughter.) The right hon. gentleman, though
sometimes I think, he is an unfortunate financier, is a most
accomplished orator, and, although I don't for a moment
complain, I think he might, spars his observations for his
reply. (Hear, hear.) Well, lam under the impression the
right hon. gentleman told us he anticipated a saving by the
reduction of interest on unfunded debt to the amount of
65,0001.—that is my memory of it. But, having a natural
curiosity in the matter, and having the returns laid on the
table which I had myself moved for, I said you will find the
anticipated profit of 65.0001. will turn out an actual loss of
36,0001. making a difference of 101,0001. on the general
financial statement of 1853. This led to immense contro-
versy. The right hon. gentleman said it was no such thing.
and finally took up my own, returns, and, with an amenity
of manner which I am sure the house must have noticed,
laid them on the table, saying, " There are your own
figures, which prove that you really know nothing about it."
I naturally yielded to the Chancellor of the Exchequer
when he said I did not know my own figures. (Laughter.)
I am not going to weary the house with figures, as I dare
say I shall be able to make myself understood without them,
but if the house would be good enough to refer to one of
those numerous returns which we were obliged to trouble
the Government for—the return with reference to Exche-
quttabills—they will see what is the gain and what the loss
by the operations regarding those bills. Of course the gain
will go under the head of reduction, and the loss under
that of increase ; there are only two items, making toge-
ther 82,0001. ; and on the side of reduction the numerous
items giving a gain. I asked the right hou. gentleman
to take his column of profits, and, looking at the date of
the first item, which I believe was the most important
item, more than 35,0001., it was found to be dated June
10, 1852, and was profit occasioned by the reduction iu the
interest of Exchequer-bills, which I had the responsibility
of making, and consequently I took credit for it, and,
although the right hon. gentleman at first refused me the
credit, he afterwards, in the course of the evening, said
he had no objection to my doing so. There are six other
items entered as profit, but which are really imaginary
estimates of the saving effected by the paying off of Exche-
quer-bills which were at the time cancelled, and not re-
issued until some months afterwards, during which in-
terval of course no interest was paid. (Hear.) This saving
of interest is taken credit for as profit ; but how were
these Exchequer-bills paid off? (Hear, hear.) They were
paid off out of the balances in the Exchequer, and the
balances in the Exchequer were obliged to be repaid by
deficiency bills, on which the right hou. gentleman paid
interest. He cannot take credit, therefore, for the saving
of interest on Exchequer-bills, unless he tells us what
interest he has paid on deficiency bills, and as it certainly
was not less than the interest on Exchequer-bills, I put
one against the other. (Hear, hear.) Therefore, leaving
out these items, and the item of 35,0001. to which I have
already referred, instead of a gain of 65,000/. there is, in
fact, a loss of 36,000/. (Sear.) Ido not mean to say that
when we are doubling the income-tax, though only for six
months, because at the end'of six months it will probably
be something worse than that —(hear)—l don't mean to
say that these are very considerable items. But the House
of Commons is always of opinion that in matters of finance
it is just as well to be exact. (Hear.) No doubt, if you
have a minister of finance of very splendid ability, it may
be a matter of no consequence whatever whether you have
a balance in the Exchequer or not. (Hear, and a laugh.)
With his exuberant resources, he will always be able to
meet whatever emergency may arise—(laughter)---but if
his genius can find out no other resource than to double a
tax which is already felt to be most onerous, it is a gloomy
and a grinding future for this country. (Hear.) But, sir,
I have been contradicted on another point. The right hon.
gentleman having contradicted upon the point, I am
obliged to trouble the house with an appeal to a book to
which I very seldom apply except in my own private
library. lam unwilling to weary the house with quota-
tion; it is the right hon. gentleman, who, by that lively
temperament of his, which leads him so hastily to contra-
dict his opponent, even on a subject of no importance, now
forces me to refer to "Hansard." The right hon. gentleman
says, that he made no estimate of gain upon Exchequer-
bills ; he says that I was unauthorised to make a state-
ment to that effect. Bat in the corrected report of the
right hon. gentleman's speech, I find him saying thit there
would be a saving in Exchequer-bills, owing to the dimi-
nution of interest, amounting to about 65,0001. (Hear.)
Now, sir, I say this subject is not vast. It is not so im-
portant'as the first subject which I treated of—whether it
was wise and prudent in the right honourable gentleman
to commence a great experiment upon the credit of the
country, under the circumstances in which he did so in the
year 1853. But, sir, though it is not so important, the
house will recollect that these are circumstances, that these
are statements, the accuracy of which has been challenged.
(Hear.) The house will recollect that the right hon. gen-
tleman has absolutely computed a saving, and intended
to put it down to his own credit, and that because I re-
minded him that he was not entitled to it, he treated me
with scarcely Parliamentary courtesy. When, on the
Wednesday following, he came down, ho said that there
had been some misapprehension, and with a courtesy which,
as one does not always experience it, one therefore prizes
the more, gave me.this return, and said that he was sorry
to have been misunderstood. However, this statement
made it perfectly clear. It is a very significant statement,
the simplest in the world, the right hon. gentleman says.
It completely explains what the mysterious papers on the
table leave unintelligible. It settles the whole business.
Well, sir, it does involve a most important matter. It is a
return of the Exchequer-bills paid off in March rind Juno
of the years 1853 and 1854. Now those of 1852 were paid
off in 1853 ; those of 1853 in 1854. Here is the principal
and interest of the Exchequer-bills of March and June,
1852, paid off in 1853, and for which lam responsible. It
is 17,742,0001. The interest paid upon them was 367,0001.
Then the bills for March and Juno, 1853, paid off in 1851.
The interest on them was but 347,0001., and the right hon.
gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer says directly,
there is your answer; there is a saving of 20,0001. (Hear.)
He says, I don't go into returns moved for by a political
opponent. I take a large and comprehensive view. (Laugh-
ter.) I will have the transactions of the whole year. The
Exchequer-bills in your year must be compared with
those of mine • the interest must be compared ; there is a
saving of 20,0001., and that is your answer." (Laughter.)
But now let us come to an analysis. There is not the
slightest doubt that the interest of Exchequer-bills, in the
one year, and in the other, was not the same. I call the
attention of the honourable member for Lambeth to this
subject. (Laughter.) I know that it is one that daily
and nightly engages his attention, and that no one enjoys
the details of an Exchequer-bill more than the honourable
member. Sir, it is perfectly true that there exists a dif-
ference ; that there was 20,0001 more interest paid in the
preceding year. Then, you will naturally say, what be-
comes of the fallacious estimate attributed to the Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer ?—what becomes of the loss said to
be incurred? I will explain. Look at the amount of the
Exchequer-bills .In 1852-53, Exchequer-bills, 17,700,0001.;
in 1853-54, Exchequer-bills, 16,000,0001. (Hear.) It is very
true that you paid 20,0001. more interest on the 17,700,0001.
than on the 16,000,0001. ; but what interest were you pay-
ing all this time on the 1,700,0001. not accounted for in the
second year? (Cheers.) How comes it that between the
two years there is a difference of 1,700,0001. in the amount?
(Hear.) I will tell you how it happens. Two-thirds of
that 1,700,0001. were paid off by money out of the consoli-
dated fund, which money was paid again by deficiency
bills. And then there was a payment by Exchequer bonds.
Do you think Exchequer-bonds do not pay interest?
There is a paper now on the table of the Lords, showing
the interest paid on Exchequer-bonds to be bat ween
11,0001. and 12,0001. per annum. Deduct the interest on
Exchequer bonds, take into the calculation these deficiency
bills, and all together I should like to know whether the
Chancellor of the Exchequer would not get off very well
if the loss on his Exchequer-bills were as low as I have
placed it, were 36,0001. (Cheers.) When I called the at-
tention of the house to the state of the balances in the Ex-
chequer) I adverted to the two causes which I believed had
brought about a condition of affairs so dangerous to the
country. One of those causes was the dealing with the
interest of the unfunded debt by the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer ; the other was his dealing with the interest of the
funded debt. Now, I wish for a moment very briefly to
touch on the second of these. I touch upon it because my
statement with regard to it has been controverted as to
fact, and utterly rejected as to opinion. (Hear.) We
must recollect that there was a cause for all those menacing
circumstances which ought to have induced the Chancellor
of the Exchequer not to have reduced the interest ou the
unfunded debt. There was a cause, and it is not a secret.
At least it is not a secret now. It is avowed. A year or
a year and a half ago a man might have been supposed to
have been professing some heterodox and unpopular opinion
if he had said that over-trading was this cause. But it is
perfectly admitted now—(hear, hear)—by every person who
has authority on such subjects. It has been admitted to-
night by a gentleman who was recently governor of the
Bank of England, that there was extensive overtrfuliug,
that that caused an influx of bullion, and that that mate-
rially affected the price of Consols and the premium on
Exchequer-bills. The Chancellor of the Exchequer did
not believe in that cause. (Hear.) Confident in the re-
sources of the country and in the success of the commer-
cial changes with which he is intimately connected, the
right honourable gentleman defied, or disbelieved, in the
overtrading which led to the disagreeable state of
circumstances that commenced the year 1853. (Hear,
hear.) Had anything happened besides the suspicion
Chancellor of the Exchequer C
or certainty of overtrading chem., hear) to have made the
right hon. gentleman the
more prudent, when, at a later period, he commenced
his greater speculation of dealing with the interest on the
funded debt ? (Hear, hear.) Overtrading, the effects of
over-speculation, of what may be called a surplus invest-
ment, had made themselves unmistakeably felt at the
commencement of the year 1853. As the year advanced,
there was another circumstance which made men grave.
We heard early in the spring that there was the prospect of
a bad harvest, (Hear, hear.) le there any gentleman who
did not hear that ? The seed time had been most unpro-
pitious. The consequences were unusually fatal. In ad-
dition to the over speculation that had already appeared,
we had a prospect of a bad harvest. Is that a circumstance
that should make a man grave ? Is it a possibility which
should make a minister of finance provident ? (Cheers) I
grant much to a distinguished free trader. I have often
heard the hon. member for Montrose express his anxiety
to see the day when England would not grow a grain of
wheat. (Cheers and laughter.) But I think the Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer would hardly go so far as that. If,
therefore, he was told that there was a prospect of a bad
harvest at that time I should have thought the probabi-
lity would have been that he would say, "As far as the
Exchequer-bills are concerned, lam infer it ; but we know
the worst ; we have got a large balance in the Exchequer,
which is a great blessing ; and we have got more than that
—we have the means of raising the interest on Exchequer-
bills." (Cheers.) But the right hon. gentleman, having
before him over-speculation and possible famine in the
vista, boldly goes to work ; and in the spring proposes a
great measure. (Hear.) I have been long enough in this
house to hear of " large and comprehensive measures"
very often. (Laughter.) And I recollect the right hon.
gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty once aayiugthet

he suspected all large and comprehensive measures. I
have lived to see him in a Cabinet distinguished for its
large and comprehensive measures. (Laughter.) How-
ever, the Chancellor of the Exchequer's was to be a large
measure, and was hailed with enthusiasm by the House of
Commons, with acclamation by tho nation, as a measure
absolutely to reduce the national debt. That was to be
the ultimate consequence of the elaborate and ingenious
but somewhat unintelligible project that was proposed to
us on the 18th of April. The Chancellor of the Exchequer
had that confidence in his resources that he determined—
notwithstanding the efflux of bullion, notwithstanding the
fall in the prices of public securities, notwithstanding the
more than menace of a bad harvest—to embark in this
enormous, this portentous affair. Was there nothing else
to warn and guide the Chancellor of the Exchequer besides
the state of the exchanges—besides the countenances of the
Bank directors—besides the visages of the farmers of
England at that moment when he was going to embark in
an undertaking of such immensity and of such possible
danger. (Hear, hear.) Why, I can fancy that the Chan-
cellor of the xchequer being extremely engaged, being
unrivalled for his devotion to affairs, being a public man
who does more than his duty to his country, who devoted
himself with an extreme ardour and unrivalled assiduity
to the labours of his office—l can fancy that the Chancellor
of the Exchequer at that time omitted to perform one of
his duties, and he may be pardoned. As a Minister of
the Crown, as a member of the Cabinet, it was his duty
to become acquainted with every despatch on foreign
affairs that arrives in this country. (Cheers.) Well,
sir, 1 make every admission to the Chancellor of
the Exchequer— I treat him with a fairness '
with which he has never treated me. (Hear.)
I have myself rather a weakness for foreign politics, I like
to read despatches, and when in (Ake I often read des-
patches which did not concern my own department. But
I can quite exonerate the Chancellor of the Exchequer from
the tedious and unprofitable task of pottering over those
blue books —(loud cheers)—which were placed on our table
at the commencement of the session by the gracious com-
mand of her Majesty, and which one of her Maiesty's.chief
Ministers treated immediately with what I in my inexpe-
rience thought was unparliamentary derision, but which I
now find was deserved mockery. (Prolonged cheers.) 1
can easily conceive that the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
with great ideas, in a great position, full of youth and
genius, and energy, being determined to pay off the na-
tional debt —(a laugh)--was quite resolved not to waste his
anxious hours in reading those two volumes which have
recently been placed on our table in order to delude public
opinion. (Cheers.) I therefore make that liberal allow-
ance to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I say that the
Chancellor of the Exchequer was fully justified in not pots •
tering over those blue-books, but were there no ether do-
cuments, the perusal of which would have been most main-
tary to the Chancellorof theExchequerwhich were received
at that time ? (Hear.) I want to know from any gentle-
men here, who think they have a chance of being Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer—(a laugh)—what would have been
their feelings, if they read a despatch from the ambassa-
dor of the Queen at St. Petersburg, marked " secret and
confidential," soliciting a partition of the Turkish Empire.
—(Hear, and cheers)—and telling us if, on reflection, we
did not agree with it, the ingenious proposer was resolved
to have his way, by one mode or another, and most cer-
tainly he would have recourse to force? I want to know
whether the right hon. gentleman read those despatches ?
(Hear.) Are we to believe that the right hon. gentleman
did not read those despatches, and so believe that he is
unworthy of the confidence of his Royal mistress ? Oh, no,
not that. The right hon. gentleman must have read those
despatches. The bullion in the Bank, even the state of
the Exchequer-bills, could hardly have prevented his de-
voting some moments of his anxious day to the perusal of
those startling missives. (Cheers.) To believe that the
right hon. gentleman was ignorant of those State papers,
is to believe that ho is utterly unworthy of his posi-
tion. But to believe that having read them, with the
certainty that there had been an over-trading, with many
menaces of a bad harvest, with crimson war in the -vista of
uncounted years before him, he should come down with a
proposal to deal with the funded and unfunded debt, is
the most marvellous conception that ever entered into the
head of man—(hear, hear, and loud cheers)—the most
marvellous conception that ever yet occurred to the ad-
venturous spirit of a young Minister of Finance. (Re-
newed cheers.) What I say, sir, is, the right honourable
gentleman owes a grievous responsibility to this house upon
this subject. We must have explanations en this subject.
It is not in the position it was last year. The right hon.
gentleman cannot come forward now with the reasons,
the excuses, of last year. He must come forward and tell
us why he denied the over-speculation which the directors
of the Bank had recognised. (Hear, hear) He must
come forward and tell us why he neglected these menaces
of a bad harvest. He may come forward and give his ver-
sion of these circumstances, but he cannot come forward
and tell us that the possible or even the probable contin-
gency of war was not an element which occurred to him.
(Cheers.) And I ask the House of Commons to decide
upon the character which he arrogates to himself—which
he will not allow me to make the subject of an idle com-
ment even in conversation and in committee. I will ask
the house and the country whether a Minister of Finance,
with such evidence of over-speculation iu the cottutry, as
the circumstances of January, to which I have referred,
prove with the evidence, as Minister of Finance, he ought
to have possessed, as to the probable state of the harvest;
and above all, in the possession of that dark secret, which
is now clear, and manifest, and open to us all—(loud
cheers)—l say, was he justified in the course which he
took? Was he a prudent or provident man ? (Hear.) I
want to know whether you think that a judicious, wise,
and prudent course for the right hon. gentleman to
take, with the knowledge which no one but himself and his
colleagues could have possessed. which no critic in the House
of Commons could even have suspected. (Cheers.) I want
to know whether—in the possession of these facts—it is
your opinion that the right hon. gentleman ought to have
brought forward these vast schemes, which have involved
in their partial and mitigated failure groat perplexity and
embarrassment, but which, as Lord Monteagle truly ob-
served in another place, were happily not successful—
(cheers),—schemes which, had they succeeded, might have
placed this country in a position which the imagination of
no man can picture, and might have involved responsibili-
ties and engagements which would have thrown us back 10
years at the least. (Hear, and cheers). That I say ie
consideration—that is a state of affairs—which the house
can now judge of with some advantage, (Hear.) Weil, sir,
now, what was the scheme? I am not going to say a
single word on the groat scheme of the right hon.
gentleman. The great scheme of the right hon. gentle-
man has been touched on often, and I make only one re-
mark upon it, that I think if there had not been over-
speculation, if there had not been famine, if there had not
been war, the larger scheme of conversion of the right hon.
gentleman must have failed. (Hear, hear.) There was a
radical defect in it which secured its failure, which my
hon. friend the member for Suffolk has placed before the
house on this night and on previous occasions, and which
is not doubted by any person. (Hear, hoar.) It must
have failed irrespective of all those circumstances which
would have made any common financial scheme fail. If
we had had influx of bullion—if we had had a most abun-
dant harvest—if we had had, instead of the war in which
we are now engaged, that perpetual peace which the mem-
bers for the West Riding and for Manchester prophesied
almost to the last, I say the great scheme of conversion
must have failed, because it was founded on fallacious cal-
culations. But there was a portion of that scheme of a
much snore rigid, absolute, and commonplace character,
which did depend on circumstances which affect credit.
It was an engagement to pay off, speaking generally, a
portion of the public debt to the amount of ton millions.
That was an ,undertaking which depended upon the
weather, upon the harvest, upon the state of trade, upon
the state of the bullion, upon the temper of Emperors and
the resources of foreign nations. Now, sir, what was the
engagement which the right hon. gentleman undertook
under these circumstances ? The right hon. gentleman
undertook, with perfect evidence before him that there
•2 every cause in the distance which most disturbs 'the
ney market—he undertook to pay off at a hundred, ten
millions of the national debt, having no resources what-
ever for that purpose. (Hear.) Perhaps I should say in
my view with no resources, because I think his attack on
the balances was not a legitimate course. (Cheers.) I want
to know how has that ended ? We have had an estimate to
night of the loss. Tho hon. and learned member for Suffolk
has told us the loss is 720,0001. It is, perhaps, impossible ac-
curately to tell what has been the loss on this forced at-
tempt to convert ten millions of South Sea Stock because
the transaction is not yet finished. There is a cer-
tain degree of interest saved, of which the right hon. gen- '
tleman will no doubt inform us—there is the interest on
Exchequer-bills, which you have instead of fixed balances.
Put one against the other, and it is not at all impossible
the loss at this moment is 7,0001. or 8,0001. Ido myself
believe that it cannot be much less than that. But I will
not dwell on the amount of loss. What I think is of great
consequence, of vital consequence, of pressing importance,
which cannot be too much urged on the attention of the
house, because night after night it will recur, and, unless
you meet it boldly, depend upon it you will be landed in
financial disaster, is the consequence of thus tampering with
the interest of the funded and unfunded debt in the state
of your balances in the Exchequer. Now, sir, I havo ad-
verted to the state of the balances as far as they seem
concerned, and. therefore I need not touch upon them.
The right hon. gentleman delivered the other night some
extraordinary opinions. I entirely differ from the right
hon. gentleman. The member for Portsmouth has made a
protest in favour of balances in the Exchequer to-night.
We have heard the opinion of a gentleman who was Gover-
nor of the Bank ; and I must say, in passing, I was quite
surprised that a gentleman like the member for Lambeth
—(a laugh)—should get up in place, after the speech of the
member for Peterborough, and say he takes a Bank view of
the question. Theold-fashioned ideas of Bank views of ques-
tions was very well 20 years ago, before the present charter,
and at that distant date when the member for Lambeth com-
menced his financial studies, and formed his financial mind
—(a laugh) —but I can tell him this :—All that the directors
of theißankof England want is, not to make a profit by a mi-
nistry, but to have a Minister who 'will leave them alone.
That is all they require. Instead of taking a Bank view
of questions, instead of viewing questions as to the interest
of the Bank, since the last charter, all the directors wish
is, that they should have a Minister who would leave them
alone to carry on business according to those commercial
principles which the late Sir Robert Peel says are the
only principles which ought to subsist between the Go-
vernment and the Bank. (Cheers.) Well, I say, we have
had protests by the hon. member for Portsmouth ; we have
had indignant expressions of feeling from the member
for Peterborough on the subject of balances in the public
treasury ; but I cannot conceive that it is necessary to
impress on any gentleman iu this house, unless he be a
finance minister without balances—(a laugh)—then I know
a man, as well as a fox, who has lost his tail has the pri-
vilege of the fable. (Loud laughter.) But I put it, the
course of a nation should be the same as that of an indi-
vidual ; and I will ask any gentleman in this house, sup-
pose he was about to embark in an expensive law suit,
' would or would he not like to have a balance at his
banker's ? We are going to embark in a very expensive
struggle, and I want to know whether you think it for
our advantage or not to have a balance at our banker's?
Sir, we have heard a great deal in speeches of late about
new, and philosophical, and enlightened principles of finance
that, being engaged in war, we are to raise the whole of
the supplies for the year in the year ; and, sir, that is a
very fine sentiment, anti if war 'does not last snore than
six months, I dare say we shall be able to maintain its
truth. But, sir, lam not so clear, when we come to prac-
tice, that we shall find it more than a sentiment. Meal.,
hear.) lam rot, however, going to touch upon that ques-
tion. If the right honourable gentleman retains the con-
viction that with his own resources, and the resources
of the country, such a result can be obtained, lot it be
so. What I want to impress upon the house and upon
the country is a much more serious affair. It may be a
very just--certainly, it is a very just—it is possible it may
be a practical thing, that you can raise in this country in
the year the supplies that are necessary to carry on the
war. Well, sir, it is a grand principle that this genera-
tion should bear the cost of its own achievements and not
burden posterity. All that I can understand. But what
' is the state and the practice of our modern finances under
the management of the right hon. gentleman ? The right
hon, gentleman is not only goipg to carry on the war—it

not only going to defray the expenses of the wet with the
taxes of the year—he is not only going to guard posterity
from the burden, but he is absolutely at the same time pur-
suing a system that is defraying the burden that was left
to us by our predecessors. No course can be snore contrary
to that which the right lion. gentleman says is hie srltord
of finance—that which he lays down as a principle, that vas
must not burden ourposterity—than hisschemo formaking
sacrifices to defray the debts left by our predecessors. Sir,
no country can stand it. No country can pay off the na-
tional debt—no country can attempt at the same time to
reduce old encumbrances and to bear the cost of a war
entirely from its own resources. (Hear, hear.) It is
very doubtful, as I think twenty-four men out of every
twenty-five in the house will admit, whetherin a continued
struggle we can raise the supplies in one year that are
necessary for the expenses of that year. That I say is
very doubtful. - It is possible that from an excess of pa-
triotism, from an exorbitant amount of resources, you may
do so. I, however, do not believe it. But it certainly is
possible. No man, however, can maintain for a moment
that you can carry on a war and raise supplies for ita oe.
pense at the same time that you are paying off ten millions
of debt. (Hear.) That is the position which the Chancel-
lor of the Excheceier has placed us in. The- right hon.
gentleman is working two systems exactlysontastry to each
other. He is coining forward animated by what- is a sound
principle for this eonntry— that we sliord7l, if we embark
in a war, not entail the cost of that %car upOnsposterity.
But, while he is asking 116 to make these unheard-of sacri-
tices —while he is appealing to us to accomplish this unpre-
cedented act of patriotism, of virtue, of philanthropy—
he is absolutely calling upon us to diminiell the debt which
our pralecessurs left us. Turn it and twist it as you like,
it is the most monstrous, the most impossible system of
finance that ever was carried on. It has been an immense
effort for Ministers to reduce the debt. Whenever there
has been a surplus, you have had a. thousand applicants.
It has been the popular opinion that you should diminish
taxation and not the debt. Von have been obliged to pass
special laws to insure the reduction of the debt. Yon '
have had special and stringent laws to effect that purpose.
But the Chancellor of the Exchequer comes forward and
says :—" Twill combine with my now system of finance the
features of both systems. absolutely not burden pos•
terity, and I'll defray the charges which our predecessors
left us." Now, in what can this system end ? It will end
in one of the largest loans that a minister of finance ever
proposed in this house. (Hear, hear.) The right hon. gen •
tleman said the other day that I wanted him to propose a
loan. (A cry of "Divide.") I have little more to say.
You shall have to hear the Chancellor of the Eichequer in
reply, and r dare say we shall hear him by and by. (Laugh-
ter.) We
to an Wy
e are asked here to increase the taxation of the
enormous extent from particular circum•
stances, and the very form in which the question is brought
before us must necessarily limit our consideration very
much, and here is an hon. gentleman who cries " Divide.
I do not think it necessary for us to divide just yet. (Laugh.
ter.) My object was to call the attention of the house to
the state of the balances, and I say the question of the
balances must be met. It is in vain for the Chancellor of
the Exchequer to say that I proposed that he should raise
a loan. If the right bean. gentleman bad raised a loan in
January, he could have raised it with greater advantage
than he is able to raise ft now. If he attempts to raise it
now, he will raise it at a greater advantage than he can
expect to do in July. lire may put the question off for six
months more, and he will' then raise it at a still greater ad-
vantage. It is evident that the right hon, gentleman lies
been, in a time of peace Red prosperity, or of fancied peace
and prosperity, tampering with the resources of the coun-
try ; he Must incur the cost of his conduct, and he must put
himself in a sound position. Von may rely upon it, that as
certainly as I our now speaking here, he will be forced to
raise a loan. There is no taxation—and he has tried it pretty
strongly—that can extricate him from the position in which
be has been placed. Well, it is a wise thing that a financier
should so manage when you are left with a balance of
9,000,0001., that he should at a moment of exigency be
forced to raise a loan ? I wish to impress upon the house
the very great importance of this point. (Hear.) There is
one point more, connected with the subject, upon which
must teach. (Cries of adjourn.) If the house wishes to
adjourn, lion. members will be able to go to evening parties
or to bed ; but I think they had much better remain here.
(Laughter.) The right hon. gentleman said the other night
that I held him responsible for raisin,-6 the rate of interest
which was occasioned by an acknowledged war and a bad
harvest. That I deny. Ido not blame the right hon.
gentleman for raising the rate of Exchequer bills. That
was inevitable. But he ought to have foreseen the einem-
, stances which prevented him from lowering the rate. The
right hon. gentleman urges one point which I feel to be a
great fallacy. That fallacy may be found in the Book of
Fallacies, by Bentham ; and as the members of the Govern-
ment are the disciples of Bentham and of Grote, they will
be able to correct me if Imake a mistake. The right hon.
gentleman says that it is very possible that ho has made a
very great error, but that be is not to be blamed for it ;
and he vindicated himself by accusing the person who
charges him with the error with expressing au erroneous
opinion. Bentham has noticed, in his Book of Fallacies,
that you, when charged with misconduct, exonerate your-
selves by imputing an erroneous opinion to your adversary.
The right houourable gentleman says, "It is all very well
you charging me with making a mistake, but in December
you yourself; occupying a responsible position, gave it as
your opinion that the rate of interest which was then
allowed, and which had not been raised at the Bank.
would, on the whole' be maintained." The right hon.
gentleman thinks that is his vindication. Now, consi-
tiering that the right hon. gentleman is not a follower of
mine, I cannot see how any opinion of mine can be a vin-
dication of his conduct. (Laughter.) But a greater fallacy
than any fallacy mentioned by Bentham is the right lion.
gentleman's mistaking the whole difference between .con-
duct and opinion. It is very true that in December I
gave it as my opinion that there were causes which had
occasioned, and which would, upon the whole, maintain
a low late of interest. Speaking generally on such
a subject, I cannot say that I ` see any great ground
for changing my opinion. That opinion, although
I am responsible for it in the house, and although
I did not give it after long thought, was not merely my
opinion, but the opinion of men who are second to none in
the country for experience in monetary &Wain. But it
was an opinion, like that opinion which has been referred
to in the course of the debate, which was expressed by the
right lion. gentleman in April last, to the clerk in Bir-
mingham, about low nrices. The right hon. gentleman
then entertained the opinion that low prices had been
created and would remain. I am snore charitable to the

right hon. gentleman than he is to mue. I believe there is
some ground for saying that, generally speaking, low prices •
will be maintained. Cut whether the right hon. gentle-
man was right in his view as to low prices, or lin any
view of a low rate of interest, these were two opinions .--
they were mere opinions, right or wrong—they were
opinions, and a public moan who has to give an opiniou
every night for six months will perhaps often 1):: in error.
lint I do not charge the right lion, gentleman with having
formed an erroneous opinion. What I say of the right
hon. gentleman is this—that his conduct has been inju-
dicious—that, hiving the best information at his command
—having before him all the circumstances which could
have influenced the opinion of a prudent man, and so in-
fluenced his conduct—l care not what opinion he formed
—he went and conducted himself improvidently, and in a
manner detrimental to the public interests. (Hear, hear.)
Ido not care for his opinion. I have no doubt that many
of his opinions are worthy of attention, coming as they do
from a man of his abilities ; but, after all, opinion is
opinion, rand conduct is a' fact, and his conduct is what I
blame, because it was conduct in defiance of experience,
and conduct, therefore, which ought not to be approved
of by the House of Commons. (Hear, hoar.) Sir, I have
ventured to make these observations in vindication of the
statement which I previously offered to the house, and
which I challenge to be controverted. I know there is a
retort to which I stn open. I have heard it already during
the session, and for aught I know, the right honourable
gentleman may jump up and ute it again. He may, per-
haps, get up and say, " Well, if that is your opinion, why
do yon not come forward boldly and propose a vote of
want of confidence in her Majesty's Ministers T' (Cries of
" hear, hear.") "Hear' hear," from .aentlemen whose
practice in cheering I Well uersbuid, remember that
the noble lord opposite and others hare called attention to
the retort that was made by the right hon. baronet the
member for Morpeth (Sir G. Grey) in answer to the re-
marks of my right hon. friend near me, the member for
Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington). I always listen to anything
which falls from the right bon. member for Morpeth with
attention, but I did not find that his retort contained that
profundity of thought or felicity of expression which jus-
tified the solemn tones of the noble lord, because I believe
the retort has already been made six times during the pre-
sent session, and probably not loss than six hundred times
in this and other Parliaments. But, sir, there are good
reasons why we should offer criticism on the conduct of
tae Ministry, or a branch of the Ministry, without being
answered as we were by the noble lord and the right hon.
bayonet the Secretary for the Admiralty (Sir J. Graham),
and why we do not come forward to propose a vote of no
cenfidence. There is a good reason why we should not do
this. There is no necessity for proposing. a vote of no eon?
fidence in the present Administration. I think it is a use-
less ceremony. (Cheers and laughter.) It is quite unne-
cessary , in my mind, for me to waste the time of the house
of Com mons—(hear, hear, and ironical cheers.) They cheer
who do not think I am wasting your tune, and therefore I
treat with all the courteous indifference Parliament will
opposite te me,
permit that derisive cheer. (Laughttr.) lam now an-
swering the words of groat men. Here it the leader of the
house--irs
t present unattached, but who
het. Lreiorids otfhetheexPeAdrinieinzellettly-311ineirteari.e these valuable
and valiant allies who are a
still have all the authority of ex-ministers, who have re-
peatedly„ frequently, and systematically, daring the pre-
. sent session, endeavoured to stop all debate and discussion
g
and cri -
we call upon you to propose a vote of
buyeisasey4i3nugr,,
co"
nldf
uycetu, do not agree with our policy,
no confidence in us. (li'ean) 1 say it is most preposterous,
mostunconstitutional, and most inconsistent withthesimul•
.esp
be at to foreign nations that at
respect taiteons declaration of the same Ministers, that it is of the
thegre reaptestsett in
importance
e
unanunity with i
there
should general expression of
in Parliament. (Hear.) But Ido not put it on
that pleat
I say it is unnecessary for me to thin
propose in
Louse any vote of want of confidence in the present Go-
-vernment, for this simple reason—that it is apparent, no-
torious, and proved to all, that they have no confidence in
each other. (Cheers and laughter.) Why, sir, let ns look
for a moment, and only for a moment, to those transactions
which have led to this vote—this vote, that is to be passed
ao idly that a few hours' discussion makes some hon. gen-
tionien call out " divide "
t as if the people of England
wanted the income tax to be converted ante 10,000,000/.
;sterling per annum without a word being said on the sub-
ject. Let us look a little at the conduct of our Ministers.
I shall treat the subject, whatever answer I may receive,
with fairness. I will not have recourse to any little test.
I will try them by a great test. I will try them not by-
any of the petty points that are brought forward in party
struggles--I will try them upon subjects which interest
men in the streets—upon subjects which, as Dr. Johnson
i said, any twelve men whom you could seize at Charing-
cross would take as tests. In deciding the question whe-
ther the present Government have confidence in them-
selves, I will take the greatest subject which we have at
the present moment—I will take the vast question of peace
or war. What confideucc, what possible confidence. can
this Cabinet, who have involved us in that ex-
.raordinarywe have in thecountrynow finds itself?:
position in which .
- ) Is there a luau among them who can tell us
tHeir, hear.
..,
to war about? Is there e. man among
, 'what we arc gem, •
o can toll us what is the object at this moment of
vI"1 wh• •• I ••ll not uote a single pereoit exee4
t heir councils r AN i
is
Ives "Why sir, there Mill' here the no e or( wio is not,
t house • . t
who generally sits opposite to rue—a Secretary State
tate
1 nit
helia.s declared his opinion upon this great subject of fo-
• politics. He told us at the end of the last session of
parliament, ill areip I lmost the only speech of ability and. spirit
which we have heard upon the subject, that we were going
to war, and what we were going to war for. He said, "Wet
are going to war because we believe the independence
and integrity of Turkey are assailed, and hecamse we
believe the interests of England to be involved in maintain-
big the independence and integrity of Turkey. ',We look
upon the independence and integrity of Turkey," said the
noble lord, " as facts, and our opinion is, that Otero is sa
wiloll vitality anal life iu Turiity Ai in other coup trio, our