The Sun.
London, England, 1854-12-13 00:00:00

I lumber for Droitwich (Sir J. Pak ..ington) made an observa•
don about tents, and. the Secretor y of War dilated immensely
4022 the question of tents7—(a lau gh)—which was pretty well
dit ;posed of by the member ';or Aylesbury (Mr. Layard).,
tt the question is not of tents. (Hear, hear, hear.) It
rei lards the policy of the Ministry, in a war commence('
ci rcumtemeee_lhear, hear, hear)—
nn ler unprecedented
a war with the greatest military power, perhaps, in the world-
with the greatest moans—ender the most favourable elf,
ci reastances. (Hear, hear.) I will not argue the question ;on
ich miserable details as guise about tents. (Hear, hear.)
I revert to the charge. Fay, when you undertook so vast
an enterprise as the invasion of Russia with 25,000 men late
in the aut'amn—why ha.d you made no preparation to increase,
support, or sustain that force? (Loud cries of " hear, hear.")
'What is the answer of the Secretary at Wart Why, ho re-
.

plies, " We have done it," and he reads us a catalogue of re-
inforce ments that had arrived—after the event. (Hear, hear.)
The ery evidence he brings forward proves the charge against
him- -(hear, hear)—if, indeed, it were necessary to prove the
char ge—if sad and stern events, which have touched us all,
had not already proved it to the satisfaction of the nation.
If J eon are sending reinforcements now, why did yon not send
the ;ra before ? Why, in November and December, are you
de ,ing that which you might have done a year ago The Se-
ca.etary at War says, " It is easy to talk of sending men; but
'there are you to get them ?" Why, sir, if we are in the po-
sition of commencing a great war with a colossal military
power, and because the Secretary at War can count at his
fingers ends that 50,000 men have been sent out from first to
last, and that then we are to be told that the power of Eng-
land is exhausted, I say " Go on your knees to the Czar as
soon as you can." (Great cheering.) Acknowledge that you
have undertaken an enterprise to which you are not equal.
(Renewed cheering.) Tell him at once that you have not
inquired into the circumstances of the case ; tell him at
once that you have not given consideration to the position
you are in; tell him that the Ministry of England, for these
two years past, have been living from hand to month, and
leave not ascertained, contemplated, or calculated what may
:be the consequence of their conduct in this great affair,
(Great cheering.) Sir, that a Secretary at War should have
answered the charge of my right hon. friend (Sir J. Peking-
ton), a
charge deserving of notice, not merely because it
comes from his lips, but because it really is the echo of the
*voice of the whole country—(hear, hear)—that he should tell
him that we are at this moment sending out reinforcements
which could not be sent out before because we could net get
the men. Why, sir, I want to know if you are equal to the
petition you occupy—if you really comprehended the circum-
stances into which you had got—if you knew the stake at
lame, and that you had to deal with the solution of one of
the most important political problems of modern ages—
(cheers)—why did you not long ago recommend the measures
for which you now ask our confidence ? Why, long ago, did
you not have recourse to them on a larger scale ? (Hear.) The
militia is embodied—you have offered a sufficient bounty ;
but why was the militia not embodied 12 months ago ? Why
did you not offer a bounty when you declared war I (Hear.)
Why did you not tell the people of England that a death-
struggle was impending, in which the glory, the truth, and
the prosperity of the country were at stake ? (Cheers.) Not
a word ! All you wanted was to put off the Reform Bill
without compromising your eharacter—(a laugh)—and that
when peace was proclaimed, you would introduce a Reform
Bill a little smaller, or a little larger, as circumstances might
require. But, sir, at a time when the common strife of par-
ties is not commenced, and when all this is at stake, when
we have not merely a Parliament political but a nation poli-
tical—(hear)—when we ha-re the people of this country
thoroughly understanding the question at issue, such con-
duct ought not to be tolerated. (Cheers.) That the Min-
ister should call Parliament together suddenly—suddenly
to the house, sad suddenly to themselves—(hear' hear)
—and say, " You shall meet, but you shall discuss
nothing "—(hear and laughter)—" and if you persist
in discussing matters, we will stop the debates, as we
are so adroit in the management of the house that none of us
will speak”—(laughter)—l say that such tacticsare unworthy
of their position. (Cheers.) I ask the Government in what
position they have placed us by this mismanagement of the
war I have shown you, not what you have, but what you
have not done in the Baltic. Ido not think there is a gentle-
man on the Treasury bench who could hide a blush when he
contrasts the commencement of operations in the Baltic with
the miserable results which have occurred. (Hear, hear.) It
is very well, sir, for the Secretary at War to come forward
and make exaggerated allusion to an obscure port, and refer
to Bomarsand —(hear, hear)—but if you look to the Baltic
you see disappointment acknowledged by the Government to
be so grievous that you dare not propose a vote of thanks to
the fleet in thatesea. (Cheers.) Look, then, to the Danube.
(Hear, hear.) I have challenged, I have dared any gentleman
sitting on the bench before me, to show that at any time
a sufficient collection of animals could have been got together
to have moved your army to any quarter. (Hear, hear.)
And now what is your position before this most important
place in the Crimea ? It might have been a question whether
it was expedient or wise to invade the Crimea and attack
Sebastopol ; but I think every man who sits in this house
will agree in this—that if the Crimea was to be invaded and
Sebastopol attacked, a winter campaign was the very last
time you should have chosen for your operations. (Hear,
hear.) But you have chosen your winter campaign, and what
have been your preparations? In November you gar, orders
to build huts. You have not yet sent out that winter clothing
which is adapted to the climate. My right hon. friend (Sir J.
Pakington) fell into a slight error (which I am sure he will
permit me to correct) in his allusion to the loss of the
Prince. He said that the warm clothing had been des-
patched by the Prince, and that the Government were
exonerated because that clothing was lost. The right hon.
gentleman (Mr. S. Herbert) speaks the truth, and frankly.
He seems to think there is nothing like a clean breast for a
Minister in a scrape, and he takes great credit for this specific
clothing for the Crimean climate; but the fact is, that the
cargo of the Prince did not contain any special winter
clothing. It was only the common warm clothing for the
troops,
anti not a cargo in any way occasioned by the winter
campaign, which your policy has rendered necessary. (Hear.)
You have invaded the Crimea ; you have attacked Sebasto-
pol ; but you have chosen to do so at the very worst period.
You have commenced a winter campaign in a country which
almost of all others should be avoided. You have commenced
a campaign (the greatest of blunders) without providing for
it (the next great blunder). The huts will arrive in January,
and the skins probably will meet the sun of May. (Cheers )
These are your preparations ! (Renewed cheers). But you
say that time is of the greatest consequence—that if you
delay the frosts will have to be encountered. Surely, how-
ever, when a Ministry has so managed the affair's of the
country as to bring it to such a condition that at last they
have to go to war with one of the greatest military powers in
the world, you will agree that the decision should be arrived
at not only after deep thought, but with the possession of the
most ample knowledge. Surely you would have thought
that statesmen who arrogate to themselves all the ability and
all the experience of this house would so have played their
cards that in trying this great issue they would have essayed
it under the most favourable circumstances, and not have
incurred risk with the most fearful odds. (Cheers.) It is
now two years since you were dallying with Russia with
your diplomatic overtures. (Hear, hear.) You may pos-
sibly have supposed that your negotiations would termi-
nate in peace. I believe the majority of you did ; because
I know that when a body of men of different opinions coun-
selling together have at issue the assumption of a most difficult
• cause and task—l know that whatever may be their individual
opinions—however they may differ on the main subject—
they always take refuge in the consolatory conviction that
they will not be called on to act. (Cheers.) I believe, then,
that this Cabinet of Coalitionists from the first flattered
themselves that the tremendous circumstances they had to
encounter, and which engage their most anxious thoughts by
day and night, would never be a part of their lives. The
First Minister of the Crown had never dreamt that, at the
termination of his career, he would be acting against that
Russia of which he was the cherished and almost the spoiled
child. And another Minister who has indulged in day-dreams
of what is called Liberalism, did not think that the latter
days of his eminent career would be spent on a subject so
widely apart from his earlier predilections. We know the
truth of this from the Chancellor of the Exchequer at Man-
chester and from his budget in the House of Commons. We
know that by your candid confession that not two of you are
of the same opinion ; that three of you cannot agree upon a
common result—(hear, hear)--but although therehave
been an arriere pence that between the Holy mayance
on the one hand and Red Republicanism on the other,
there would not be a war, it was your duty, as respell-
Bible men, to have formed a policy two years ago. You
appear to me not to have embraced any definite object or
pursued any definite system. If you had, you would not
have told us now that you are obliged to enter upon a
winter campaign in the Crimea, because the time is precious
and that another mouth's delay would have rendered it
impregnable. This I earnestly maintain—that the mi-
nistry which has involved this conntry in a war with
Russia, ought not to have taken such a course unless they
were prepared for all those consequences which men of
their experience, ability, and knowledge must have known,
unless they shut their eyes wilfully to those consequences,
must have ensued. I said just now that they had
called Parliament together unexpectedly ; but what I
object to in the Government is that they have done every-
thing unexpectedly in this great affair (hear, and a laugh),
they have done everything too late, and in all they have.
recommended they have given signs of vacillation of
opinion and uncertainty of purpose ; and, necessarily,
feebleness of execution. These are little things - they
may be nothing—but the doctors came after the men
were wounded, and the nurses appeared always after
the wounded had expired. These things were never
thought of until the indignant sorrow of the nation called
upon you to exercise the dictates of ministerial humanity.
(Hear, hear.) But the same fate seems to await you in all
your course. Now it is your surgeons that are too late ;
after the battle your reinforcements arrive
' • and "gait
the storm and hurricane, that everyhsay.had hecal
youprictnaurevt,asior
ex-
pecting, comes at last and overwhelms
this does not appear to me an overcharged it is
founded upon fact. Does the house think it is judicious
that, under such circumstancee, Parliament should meet
sub sacral°, But even the resolution to call Parliament
together was taken too late. (Hear, and a laugh.) You pro-
rogued the Parliament to the 14th December, and then so
uncertain was your purpose—so vacillating your conduct
—so undefined your object, ' that, having assembled and
counselled the Sovereign to prorogue Parliament to the
14th. The same circumstances existed then as a few days after
when a different opinion was arrived at. This is no ordinary
occasion, and I want to know wky Ministers have
Changed their opinions. If is necessary now to provide
for an immediate increase of our forces, it was necessary
when they advised her Majesty to prorogue to the 14th. In
this deplorable state of things we are only sustained by the
remembrance of the unsurpassed heroism of our troops.
(Rear.) A .
If re. winter campaign would have been unnecessary
menu, however, s
had had more forethought and sagacity. It
that it :ever' from
a passage at the end of the speech
troops that not
w to our magnificent fleets, or our heroic
but a specific is to
are to look for a termination of the war,
has
collar be found in an alliance which her Ma-
jesty
which she anticipates with the Emperor of Austria, from
cause. I hope the noble advantages for,the common
andlord (J. Russell) will condescend
to address the house, would impress on him that the
house expects that on
(tHhisearsnl.)lsi;te he
a should speak with some
degree of frankness,
vigour re asked to assist her Ma-
jesty to prosecute the war wale
what means are necessary, maessw-e
halv_esaayemweeicdaean'etf
the
-
eide
assistance we are to have from our allies.,
cordial,he alliance is an
generous,
the vituperative tone
honest, sincergeenoenie.e—usprwehcieonusw,e
Nothing is more
lord the
athsescroary
nanedf sincere.
(Hear.) (Hear.) It is
in which the Emperor of the French was spoken
time ago. (Hear.)
ror and the French nation than that they have forgotten
E p
rgotter.'itheat-
and co-operated with us in this war.
of State was expelled by the nobledord the President of the
Council, because ho expressed confidence in the Character of
the Emperor Napoleon. (Hear, eal..) The
.First Lord of
the Admiralty engrafted on his manifesto against Lord Der-
by's Government a diatribe against the Em.peror Napoleon.
(H o.r, hear.) I remember another member of the Cabinet,
e., no t& illn right honoinablo
Z7'.s gentlemen, iind not only alku-; 'll tee Enif.)eeer,o;;;Jbmt„leintlriegzenet,
tZe eeetele ef F7ance. (Hear.., ) 11,
,‘•,,t
Govern,
r (7,3% t "
iv et:L:a t tH,..,
indecent haste in recognising the Emperor .Napinvou.
' But the illiance'Vance is based on higher grounds it is
411 elliaaenpfthse ple which required no re
irit
..x ado, 114 massacre of Sinope had laidsee
lotwartiele.
the spA
filmset& ;dirk:cued by the incapacity of the Government,
'4 ' •