The Sun.
London, England, 1854-07-03 00:00:00

THE AUSTRIAN OCCUPATION.

And so we are to have another "occupation." In
answer to questions from Lord Dudley Stuart and Sir
Henry Willoughby on Thursday night, Lord John Rus-
sell stated that a convention had been concluded between
Austria and the Porte, to which France and England
were no parties, for the occupation of the Danubian
Principalities by Austrian troops, on the departure,
whether voluntarily or by force, of the Russians.
Every one is amazed by this announcement ; what to
make of it nobody knows. One thing only is quite clear,
and universally undetstood, namely, that Austria has quite
as much of the monomania of occupying as Russia.
That has been manifest from the first. Ever since the
commencement of the quarrel the Emperor Francis Joseph
has had but one wish, but one prayer. "Do let me
occupy," has been his continual cry. Now it was Mon-
tenegro ; then it was Albania, or Bosnia, or Servia ;
and never has some kind of reason or excuse been absent.
And here, at last, when there remains no longer the
shadow of a pretext for going to fatten on any of these
poor people, Austrian must fain take possession of the
Principalities. The Turks have fought for them, have
spent blood and treasure to recover them, have done deeds
of unexampled valour, and have fairly beaten the Rus-
sians. But the Turks are not to enjoy the fruits of vic-
tory. They are not to pursue the Russians, or to feed
on Wallachian rations. It would be too outrageous to
have them gall the kibe of the retreating Russians. It
would be too dangerous to give the opportunity
to England and France. So the Austrians kindly offer
to "occupy." The Times told us the other day that the
Austrian army in Gallicia and the Bukowina is so strai-
tened for provision that it cannot keep within its terri-
tory or find provision there. Well, then, we suppose
that it must " occupy" in order to live. We can add
that in Gallicia the peasantry are now dying by hun-
dreds of starvation. And just as Wallachia and Moldavia
were congratulating themselves on getting rid of the
hungry Russian, and on having a friendlier vi.it from
their liberators, the French and the English, who would
at least pay for what they might consume, lo! they are
informed that such cannot be the case. They have fed
the Russian, and now they must feed the hungrier Aus-
trian. Why ? They may well ask, why ? If English,
French, and Turkish armies advanced to the Pruth, as
they ought, what need of any occupation of the Princi-
palities ? Is it feared that they will be too liberal, that
Prince Ghika or Prince Stirbey would be too indepen-
dent ?

Really this ambition to prey upon one's neighbours,
yet not to fight for them, of which Austria offers such
notable example, is too bad. The Austrian army might
have long since put an end to Russian aggression. It
might have advanced and fought; and had it done so, uo
one would have objected to its occupying the camp and
cities that the Russians had vacated. But to run no
risk, to go to none of the expense and sacrifice of Eng-
land and France, and yet to bag the game, is most un-
fair, as well as most preposterous.
We write on the presumption that this new occupa-
tion will be solely in the interest of Austria, and that it
cannot be for the interest of any other power, except
indeed Russia herself. In this we shall be very glad to
find ourselves mistaken. The alleged motives or rea-
sons are as yet a mystery, no doubt, but the effect aimed
at we cannot help suspecting. At the moment when the
allied armies should have been advancing, Austria moves
to intercept them. According to Austrian notions, the
retreat of the Russians behind the Pruth terminates the
war, and, the war over, what need have England,
France, or Turkey, for pursuing or gett'ng closer to
the enemy ? The allies were welcome to take the
vanguard, as long as there was risk, but as soon as
risk is at an end, Austria steps in to cover Russia, and
intervene between her and her victorious foes. It is said
that Austria occupies the Principalities in order that the
French and English may attack Sebastopol. But if
they desired to attack Sebastopol, why did they not
land at once in the Crimea instead of loitering at Galli-
poli, and at Scutari They certainly were not prevented
from striking this decisive blow by their haste to reach
Silistria, where they will probably not arrive in time to
see the rear guard of the retreating Russian army. It
is notorious thnt Sebastopol was, up to the time when
the movement on Varna took place, open to a coup de
main on the land side. By the time, however, that the
united army can be for the fourth time embarked and
disembarked, preparations will probably be made for
their reception in the Crimea, and we shall be told that
nothing more can be done this year.
However, Austria prevents in any case an occupation
by the allies, and this was motive enough for the step
she has taken. There has been no greater fear at
Vienna, all along, than that the Western armies, and
1d ob therenerea
inli whatsnl.
Spain,
o n
einoculate British
hundred
theht o u
the world of ideas which are supposed to accompany
them, if carried bodily into the Principalities, would do
are suspected of having
country with the poison of
sand Anglo-French in the
Principalities has been a vision scaring the wits of
andT certainly Hungary would he
plague might spread over the
NArui esetreieasne
be-
come intolerable. What if such a force, really desirous
of humbling the power of Russia, were to penetrate into
dominions,statesie n.
the Polish provinces, which are far more easily reached
from the Danube and the Pruth than is generally
imagined ? Why, if they were to approach Gal-
licia and the Polish provinces, there would be an
end of the present state of thinks in the East-
ern part of Europe ! Such we believe to be the
fears of Austria, and they help to erplain her tortuous
policy ; but to what extent the allies have admitted
weight to the one, or extended toleration to the other,
is the riddle waiting explanation.
Lord John Russell says that Englaild and France are
no parties to the convention, but it is hardly conceiv-
able that it should have been entered into without their
permission. Turkey had placed herself in their hands,
and this position was incompatible with any separate
or independent arrangement of which the effect might
be to transfer the arbitrament of peace to another
power, which had borne no part of the burdens of
war. The terms of the convention, that Austria
was to drive out the Russians in case they refused to
retire, would imply that it rested on a basis of service
to the allies, and of hostility to Russia, which there is
no proof as yet that Austria has had any active intention
of rendering. If the condition has not been fulfilled,
will the convention be permitted to operate ? Is not
Austria, even at this eleventh hour, in a position to turn
against us, and are we to strengthen her hands for that
purpose, and etnbarrass our own future movements in
the east, by consenting to give effect to a treaty which
only makes her more powerful in an interest opposed to
our own ?

Already the inconveniences of an "alliance" so extra-
ordinary and incomprehensible as this between Austria
and the Western Powers are becoming apparent. But
for the position of Austria we should hardly have had
the vehement advice which has lately been addressed
to us, to concentrate our forces and direct them against
Sebastopol, since there is nothing to be gained by
invading the southern provinces of Russia. It would
bo excellent advice, no doubt, if the allies could at
once have moved their armies, if the siege artillery and
preparations could have been extended instanter, and
thrown upon the Crimea in a week. But we well know
what time such movements take, even to venture upon,
far less to execute. We also know how impossible is
anything like secrecy in the present ago. Indeed, whe-
ther secrecy were observed or not, the Russians must
know that if we avoid to pass the Danube, we can have ,
no other aim or design than to take Sebastopol, But,

vance over the Lower Danube ? Pace Austria, we must
confess that we should be for making both attempts. If
occupation be found profitable and desirable by the armies
of Austria on the spot, why should we not try it our-
selves. Bessarabia is one of the finest provinces for the
support of cavalry, and why should not the thousands
of reaping-hooks which Marshal St. Arnaud has sent
into Adrianople he employed on the eastern bank of the
Pruth, instead of being plied upon the Turkish crops on
the boards of the Maritza ? Let Russia have a taste of
occupation. She has peopled her provinces with mili-
tary colonies formed for the very purpose of invading
Turkey, and surely these are the very, fields and farms
which invite such a retribution.
Bessarabia, we are to remember is one of Russia's
ill-gotten and ill-thriving gains. It was one of the
most prosperous of the countries on the Black Sea,
when it was independent, and when it could export
its produce to Constantinople. But Russian dominion
and the Russian custom-houses have reduced and
ruined it. So great is the weight of taxation, and so
heavy are the other disadvantages under which the inha-
bitants submit, that the price of land in Bessarabia
is about two-thirds less than in Moldavia. Not only
were the Danubian countries thus sacrificedto the great-
ness of Odessa, but even Bessarabia. The rivers on each
side of Bessarabia, the Dniester and the Pruth, are both
navigable, or might be rendered so. Both have seaports
that might be made most available. But the Russian
government has set its face against any improvement in
the navigation of these rivers, and compels all vessels
tradine, to the mouths of the Dniester. -to perform
quarantine at Odessa. In other words the trade and pro-
duce are all made to pass through Odessa. An invading
army would find as sincere welcome in Bessarabia as in
Moldavia, and although that part of the province next
the Danube is barren and thinly populated, the regions
to the north are rich and well capable of feeding an army.
If the country should not prove productive, the army is
as easily communicated with and supplied by the Pruth,
as it was at "Varna. The reduction of the fortresses
on the Dniester, neither of them strongly fortified,
would give the allies the protection of that river, and
with their armies in this position, threatening the Polish
provinpes as well as Odessa, the Russians could not con-
centrate the bulk of it at Sebastopol ; against which,
at the same time, an expedition from Bessarabia would
be quite as practicable and easy as from Varna.
There are other considerations, too, which ought to
be taken into account. One is, the decided deterioration
of the Russian soldier in the field or in offensive ope-
rations. Every military man knows the meaning of the
immense disproportionate loss of the Russians in ge-
nerals and officers. It is only to be explained by the
reluctance of the soldiers to do their duty, and the
necessity that officers and generals should sacrifice
themselves in order to overcome that reluctance. The
Russian soldier at Oltenitza, at Kalafat, and now at
Silistria, has shown himself decidedly inferior to the
Turk. But a demoralised army, which would not stand
an attack in the open field, or may make a rush over
grass entrenchments, may still fight valiantly behind
embrasures. It is precisely in such a place as Sebasto-
pol that the Russians might show, or be made to show,
most courage ; whereas- every experience leads to the
conclusion that they could not stand the allies in the
field. It is in the field, too, that great achievements or
great victories are gained. Days such as those of Ma-
storming a breach, but the result is not so decisive.
irse niugoor
ea nddarAi
daring
tsehrol iwt zu
,daesc iNclveoltlh
ase fatem roof
loss empires.suff
The capture of Sebastopol would in no respect compare
ereTdh, eirne
with the loss of a battle on the Pruth or the Dniester.
The Pruth, too, is of evil omen to the arms of Russia.
It was on the banks of that river that Peter the First
was overthrown by the Turks, and compelled to pur-
chase an inglorious retreat from the province which he
had entered as a conqueror.

But even if this were not so, and Sebastopol
were the only conquest essentially worth winning,
still, for the sake of being able to attack it
without tremendous odds against us, we should
say, let the allied armies pass. the Danube, and
menace New Russia, so as to compel the bulk of
the Russian army to remain on the south-west frontiers,
and not become in any considerable force concentrated
in the Crimea. We are not for surrendering our advan-
tages simply to give another advantage to Austria, and
render more easy and agreeable her occupation of the
Principalities.—Examiner.