The Sun.
London, England, 1862-03-05 00:00:00

THE ITALIAN QUESTION.

M. Billault spoke as follows in the French Senate
yesterday :—The Government can very well under-
stand that a question, intimately connected with
religion and politics, should greatly occupy the
public
mind, but it can hardly conceive that reflect-
ing statesmen, in judging the present and anticipat-
ing what is to come, should not feel that the past
engages the present and foreshadows the future.
(Movement.) I will abstain from superfluous de-
tails, but will state what the Government thinks
possible under present circumstances, and first, I
will remark that the great Powers in the beginning
of last year recognised that, while opinions were so '
divided, and the public mind under such opposite 1
influences, negotiations would be useless; they also '
agreed that the employment of force was impossible. '
Now, a few words as to what has since occurred. I
often see the intention of the Government calnm- '
niated by attributing to it designs it never enter-
tained : not to change its principles or aims for ex-
ternal clamour is the characteristic of a strong
Government. It advances or halts as eventualities
may require. I only ask that the policy of the Go-
vernment Illhy bejudged by facts. It had resolved
to wait, while things remained unchanged, that is
the independence of Italy on the one hand, and the
independence and dignity of the Holy See on the
other. What had it done in these three great cir-
cumstances ? The first must be viewed in connection
with our engagements to the Holy Father. The
Emperor had said that the Pope might safely await,
at Rome, the issue of the crisis, and that France
would protect him there. The Emperor's intentions
are still the same. He has entered into no engage-
ments with any one, and the Pope is still defended
by the French flag. I now come to the first fact con-
nected with this subject; two Catholic Powers sug-
gested to the French Government the possibility
of an understanding and of common action to solve
the question. The Government took the proposition
into consideration, and did not, like an honourable
senator who alluded to the subject, see anything in
this simultaneous and identical communication at
all offensive to its dignity. I must add that, in all
her relations with us, Austria has acted in the most
straightforward manner, and that the offensive lan-
guage of a foreign journalist which had been quoted
cannot be imputed to the Austrian Government.
It is not the first time that the Emperor has been
fiercely attacked by Austrian journals, but the Aus-
trian Government and the Emperor himself have
always spontaneously offered reparation for such
insults. The proposition made by the two Govern-
ments was seriously considered, and our reply was
that we could not possibly take any part in the
creation of a sort of Catholic international law,
that in treaties the temporal power only eould be
mentioned, and that, if a Congress should meet to
examine the question, all the Powers, even those
not Catholic, would have a right to be present. We
then appealed to the principle of non-intervention,
which, applied to Italy, is the guarantee of the
peace of Europe; and lastly, we requested the two
Powers to consider whether their traditions and
their relationship to the exiled Italian sovereigns
were not hurrying them on, in spite of themselves,
towards ideas which might be antagonistic to our
principles. But, with these reservations, we agreed
with the two Powers on one point, that the senti-
ment of the Emperor's Government was the main-
tenance of the actual situation of the Papacy, and
that it could not adhere to any combination which
should not guarantee the independence of the Holy
See. (Hear.) The Powers admitted the force of
our arguments, and the Cabinet of Vienna declared
that it left the matter, with all confidence, in the
hands of France, and was ready to take part with
her in maintaining principles which were the safe-
guard of all civilisation. As to the recognition of
the Kingdom of Italy, it was brought about by
necessities of the highest order. We had blamed
several acts of the Piedmontese Government ; but
important interests induced us to take a resolution.
1 do not mean material interests, such as treaties of
commerce or navigation. I allude to the situation
of Italy, then exposed to all the efforts of demagogy,
which monarchical Governments find so difficult to
restrain; I speak of the immense void left by that
great, resolute, and able minister who had presided
at the birth of Italian liberty; I speak of the em-
barrassments to which the death of Count Cavonr
left royalty exposed; in fine, I speak of great poli-
tical and social interests. Italy was recognised, but
the French Government explained itself frankly. It
did not approve of what bad taken place, and gave
no encouragement to any undertaking contrary to
European rights. In the event of aggression on the
part of Italy, the Government promised neither
support nor co-operation. I will add that the ques-
tion of Rome was reserved. Italy herself under-
stood that state of things, and accepted it with
gratitude. Here is a third circumstance :—The
Italian Government sought for a combination to
escape from its embarrassments ; it desired that
Rome should become the capital of Italy in order to
disengage the word of the King and the votes of the
assemblies. I shall not revert to that proposition,
the terms of which are known to you; I shall merely
observe that the French Government had no direct
knowledge of it. It was afterwards communicated
to ns non-officially, and the French Government I
refused to make itself the intermediary of a pro-
position which it regarded as neither opportune nor
acceptable. (Hear, hear.) The Emperor has not
abandoned any of the principles which he has
hitherto defended ; he still wishes for the indepen-
dence of Italy, and for that of the Holy See. (Ap-
probation.) I am well aware that the solution of
the problem is difficult, and at the present time
almost impossible. It cannot be concealed that the
situation is full of peril. At Rome two days ago
there was in presence of French soldiers a silent but
important manifestation. I need not point out to the
Senate that a crisis exists there from which the most
regrettable and most formidable eventualities may
result. In Italy there is a subterranean and subver-
sive agitation which may one day break out in to a ter-
rible commotion. The mad hopes of the senseless
men who, but for the Emperor's assistance, would
have been annihilated by the Austrian armies, are
connected with the famous principle of " Italy doing
all by her herself:, They forget that they could
have done nothing except under the forward move-
ment of the French eagles. The Piedmontese are
doubtless brave, for they have proved themselves
so, but how could that army, even united to the
crowds, without organisation, whom many now
wish to bring on the field of battle, resist the regu-
lar taetics of a great army ? We are well aware of
the dangers which threaten Italy; we know that a
senseless man may embark in an expedition still
more senseless, and cause a conflagration which will
sPvead over Europe. We also know that in France
the
Public mind is excited, and that agitations of
this kind
aa impr are particularly dangerous in a country
how vv:s_icnable as ours. The question is to know
wish in may ward off so many perils. We did not
Court of Ti delicateurin negotiation to begin with the
and deferee:° were anxious to use considera-
tiontowards the Holy Father. We
have not, therefore
" regards Lome, drawn up a
system, but have
things
cannot
rec.:mit:lEl4u:: ourselves to saying
The greatest dangers threaten
state they now are.
vern men t ; we are free from any the Pontifical Ga-
do you wish us to do." Zen.gagement ; what
We arc, therefore, in rme,vend au absolute
refusal.
of the Pontifical Government absoillteiee_7 refusing,
on one side
Ministers,by and b
y
and on the other of a power Which the word of
t
its King, by the promise of its
the vote of its assemblies, has pledged itself
give Rome to Italy as her capital. This situation
°
places us between the most extreme resolutions.
What is to be done ? There are three plans :
Violent reaction for the restitution to the Holy
See of all the territory of which it has been dis-
possessed ; evacuation of Rome, leaving the Papacy
to all the eventualities which might result from
it ; an attitude consisting of neither being alarmed
at blind resistance nor immoderate pretensions,
and of waiting from public reason, from time, and
from Providence, who watches over human affairs,
for a solution which, be assured, will one day come.
(Marks of assent.) As to reaction, which would
consist in violently restoring to the Holy See the
territory of which it has been deprived, it needs
no discussion. After the Address of last year, and

the sanction given to the principle of non-interven-
tion, I think it would be a useless task. While
studying the past of the Roman question the other
day, I found that the doctrine of intervention was
proclaimed by Austria in a celebrated Congress, in
1821, and formally condemned and rejected by
France, by a minister of the elder branch, M. Pas-
quier, who characterised it as " not the childhood,
but the dotage of statesmanship." I will not insist
on this point, but if the solution which should con-
sist in forcibly restoring to the Holy Fathez the
whole of his territories is not practicable, do you
think that the other, which consists in the evacua-
tion of Rome, would be easier ? To evacuate Rome
would be abandoning our principles, and would lead
to events which might draw Europe to a forced in-
tervention in Italy. (Movement.) I listened most
attentively to the powerful arguments of the illus-
trious speaker who, on Saturday, advocated the
evacuation of Rome. The Prince said that the
Government of the Emperor would soon rally to
that idea. In spite of the contradiction of the
ministers without portfolio, he had a presentiment
that such was the Emperor's thought. But it is
we who express the Emperor's thought, and defend
it within these walls. (Movement.) I have this
day received a special commission so to do. (Hear,
hear.) It is needless for me to remind you of
all the antecedents which prove that the two
lines of policy bear no resemblance. (Loud ap-
probation.) The illustrious senator said that
the unity of Italy had always been the Empe-
ror's thought. Certainly, the Emperor is now
opposed to any reversal of what has been done
in Italy in the sense of unity—for the question
has become quite different; but it cannot be
truly asserted that at first he wished for Italian
unity as now understood by some persons. The
Emperor wished to see Italy free; he desired an
Italian Confederation under the presidentship of
the Holy Father. He wanted to see a great
nation, formed under the aegis of national indepen-
dence. In a proclamation, dated from Valeggio, he
said to his soldiers :—" A Confederation will join
in one common bond all the children of the same
family." That is the Emperor's real thought !
When the Emperor carried his standards into Italy,
it was not to raise the difficult problem of Italian
unity, but to deliver Italy from the Austrian yoke.
(Hear, hear.) The Emperor did not fully attain
his object, but, on his return from his victories, I
heard him say, in melancholy accents :—" Do you
think that I feel no regret at having stopped at the
Mincio ?" There was no question at that time of
Southern Italy : deliverance from Austrian domi-
nation, and federation of the Sovereigns in accord
with the with of the populations, was then the
whole Imperial thought. (Hear, hear.) If the Em-
peror did not succeed, it was because neither the
people nor the Sovereigns understood him. The
war in Italy must not be regarded as an enterprise
of which all the consequences had not been calcu-
lated. History will proclaim the civilising thought
which inspired it, which was, to join the Italian
peninsula in a unity of liberty far easier to realise
than the unity now desired. (Prolonged approba-
tion.) But, to return to the speech of the illustri-
ous senator whom we heard in our last sitting. He
said :—" What ought my Government to do ?"
A voice—" My Government 1"
M. Billault—Yes ; I remember the Prince said:—
"What ought my Government (or else, the Govern-
ment of my country) to do ?"
Numerous voices—That was it.

Prince Napoleon—You will note the interruption-
M. Billault, resuming his quotation :—" What
ought my Government to do ? To stipulate, in
the first place, so as to place it beyond debate,
everything necessary for the spiritual indepen-
dence of the Holy Father, for his honour, for his
financial and general independence. This done,
and these bases, I will not indicate here,
but leave them for statesmen to devise." I say,
for my part, that knowing the basis is not indif-
ferent, but the most essential point of the debate,
for the independence of the Holy Father is what
most occupies men's minds, this was not a case to
stop at generalities. The bases must be stated, and
I can affirm that they will not be those of M.
Ricasoli. I need not explain myself farther on that
point. (Hear, hear.) Let us now see -what was
said by the Prince :—" The Pope will then find
himself before his people ; we shall evacuate Rome,
and if, which God forbid, anarchical paSsions should
break out in the Eternal City—if any danger should
result to the person of the Pope, he will have the
assurance that Italian soldiers would know how to
afford him assistance when he asks for it." What
does that mean ? Are they Italian soldiers who
will defend the Pope and his situation, or will those
soldiers represent the Government of Victor Em-
manuel ? It is necessary to know that. If the
Pope is placed in the face of his people, insurrection
is certain in the state of agitation which now pre-
vails in Italy and at Rome. Some persons may
deny that, but there are facts which a fallen Govern-
ment cannot see. For a Government which knows
how to foresee the future, the tiara is only protected
at Rome by the flag of France; if Rome were eva-
cuated the temporal Government would fall, and
the spiritual would follow at the same time. The
Pope will then quit Rome. It is true that the
Prince adds, " if he quits Rome, it will be, I admit,
a cause of great trouble for certain Catholic minds.
It will be a great misfortune, but the unity of Italy
will come out of it triumphant." For my part I
doubt it. (You are right ! Hear, hear.) Suppose
that we quit Rome in a few days, or in a month,
without adopting propar precautions ; the
revolution will break out with its courages, but
with its violences, and perhaps with its virtues,
but
also with its crimes. I suppose, as the beau
ideal of that revolution, that the Holy Father and
his suite will escape without receivlng any in-
jury; but if those criminals who take part in all
popular movements were to strike the prelates of
the Roman Court, and if their hands were not to
stop before his Holiness himself, do you think
France and the Emperor would not incur the re-
sponsibility ? (Hear, hear, and loud applause.) Can
we, therefore, forget that we have replaced the
Pope on his throne; that for the last 10 years-10
years of ingratitude, it is true, on the part of the.
Roman Court, but 10 years of grandeur for the
Sovereign of France—the Pope has been protected
only by our flag ? Suppose, moreover, that the
Papacy were in exile, do you think that it will re-
main inactive ? that it will not excite disturbances
in Europe, of which other people will endeavour to
take advantage of ? You will have thrown down
the brand of discord for perhaps a century. You
who think to have peace, you deceive yourselves,
for there are forces which you do not take into ac-
count. (Hear, hear.) I nevertheless, admit that
the Pope in exile would be powerless, be insensi-
ble to his own sufferings, and have no temptation
to disturb the peace of Europe. Will the Catholic
Powers, who have proposed to us to protect the
Pope, have abjured their convictions ? By what
right, after all, are we at Rome ? We are there in
violation of the principle of non-intervention. With
what grace could we therefore say to the other
Powers, " I no longer protect the Papacy, but I for-
bid you to do it." (Hear, hear.) The Emperor's
Government does not therefore think it so easy to
adopt a solution. It is liberal, but it to prudent ;
it wishes for modifications, but It cannot precipitate
parties, and says to them, "A compromise must be
come to even if it be necessary to wait for it." Is a
compromise impossible ? As to Piedmont she de-
clares formally that she will do nothing except in
accord with France, and she accepts all the nego-
tiations which shall be carried on under our influ-
ence. The obstacles which stand in the way of a
solution are certainly great; but nevertheless, if
statesmen should find a reasonable combination, I
do
not hesitate to think that the Italian Govern.
ment would accept it from the Emperor. The
people, in fact, are not ungrateful to those to whom
they owe their liberty. I think, therefore, that,
All one:
"sentteedillietasnlelof:at, an
. acceptable combination pre-
but it must not
ttheble difficulty would be soon solved,
is at Rome. letters
that the great obstacle
tenacity of that Gloveetters
temporal
point out the invincible
Holy Father, and
of Government.
ent. I do not speak of the
fortenm
dogma, but of the infallibility in matters of
of
ighrvernment and its
allibility for what
fallibilty. This mixture
is spiritual and fallibility
gives to the
a rigidity
statesmen of the Roman GoverPuniraeln't

which it is difficult to bend; but for that, will they
always be, more than the statesmen of other coun-
tries, deaf to the lessons of experience when we say
to them, see what your obstinacy has done for you!
The day after Solferino, a project of federation was
put forward, with the Pope for honorary President.
The offer was made to his Holiness with one single
condition, that of giving a lay administration to
the Legations wearied by fifty years of foreign occu-
pation, and wherein Count Rossi said that the Pon-
tifical sceptre should not be masked by Austrian
bayonets from the liberal populations. Is there not
reason to ask, why have you refused ? Events
marched on, and a second offer was made. If, said
we, you will abandon that portion of your States
which has thrown off your rule, the rest shall be
secured to you, Another refusal. Then came a
third proposition—that of the Vicariate, which is
not without analogy with the past. Still a refusal.
At last it was said—You cannot subdue the popu-
lations yourselves ; accept this arrangement, Aus-
tria and France will retire; the other Powers will
guarantee the independence of the Holy See; a
civil list, furnished by Catholic Powers, will secure
to the Father of the faithful a situation conforma-
ble to his dignity and mission. Accept this com-
bination. No, was again the reply. Is not this a
resistance obstinate, blind (if I may be allowed the
word) to generous, loyal, disinterested, and prac-
tical offers made by the French Government, and
made to statesmen whom it would be wrong to re-
gard as of only moderate ability ? But a retro-
speet on the relations of the Court of Rome
with France should inspire them with serious reflec-
tions, for since 1830 no Ministers of France at Rome
have differed in their appreciations of the Roman
Government. All have signalised, in the Papal
Government, the absolute immobility which is very
suitable to religious, but much less so to worldly
affairs; for the latter are by no means immoveable.
On July 28, 1847, Count Rossi wrote to M. Guizot
a despatch, in which he sketched the leading
features of the situation of the Roman States.
"Before 10, or perhaps 20 years," said he, "there
will not be a man, not a priest, not a woman that
is not animated with the national sentiment, and
he concluded by insisting on the necessity, for the
Holy See, of giving satisfaction for this sentiment.
The Minister said that he could cite 20 passages of
the correspondence of M. de Rayneval, wherein
that diplomatist made melancholy prophecies. In
one notable despatch, that of May, 14, 1856, he con-
cluded by saying that a catastrophe was inevitable,
that the temporal power was con lemned—
Prince NAPOLEON—Very good.
M. BILLAULT (continuing the phrase)—And that
the peril might be postponed, but not avoided.
Well then, continued the Minister, when we shall
say to these statesmen, " Look at the consequences
of this obstinacy, of this refusal, of this closing the
eyes to what is traced out for them by Providence,
do you think that our counsels will always be mis-
construed and rejected ?" I should understand this
resistance were it sought to impose conditions on
the spiritual Power, but such is not the case. The
oath of enthronisation has been cited as justifying
the refusals of the Holy Father. People forget
under what circumstances the oath was first re-
quired. It was not fear of war; the evil for which
a remedy was sought was altogether different. The
patrimony had no need of being guaranteed against
the eventualities of war, bat against the allure-
ments of nepotism. (Sensation.) The Holy
Father can have no serious doubt as to the real
meaning of his oath of investiture. The Venerable
Pius VI, and Pius 'VII after him have ceded to poli.
tical necessities portions of their terrritory without
any revolt of conscience against this pretended viola-
tion of an oath. If this oath indeed had the effect
of putting a weapon of any sort in the hand of the
Holy Father, one might perhaps understand the
stress laid on this argument by the Roman Govern-
ment. But it is far otherwise, What has happened
since the beginning of the movement ? At first
complete inertia prevailed at Rome; then a certain
alarm was instilled into consciences; then the Holy
Father asked to be allowed to maintain himself by
means of his own troops combined with those of
Naples—with that army that so basely turned
its back on the troops of the Revolution some
little time after. Lastly, the Holy Father wished
to protect himself with his own army ; how he suc-
ceeded, and how the predictions of M. de Rayneval
were realised, is well known. In September, 1860,
the Father launched an encyclic to claim armed
assistance from the Catholic world, but no succour
was forthcoming. Since that time he is resigned,
and waits for events. It is very well to wait when
spiritual matters are in suspense; they can afford
to wait, as religion is eternal. Patiens quia
totems's! But it is bad to wait in temporal affairs ;
it is a great imprudence, because there is nothing
immutable in them ; temporal interests must be
defended by worldly means. (Applause.) I affirm,
then, that we cannot renounce the hope of seeing
the Pontifical Government yield to circumstances.
On this day the Senate is invited to make its senti-
ments known ; but it is necessary that these senti-
ments should tend to level, not to augment, the
difficulties of negotiation. Below the elevated
region where the Holy Father is placed, there is
the region of temporal Government, and it must be
confessed that in this region there is no sympathy
for France. Our influence has need of being forti-
fied and sustained. The reports of all our am•
bassadors have made us acquainted with the secret
winding passages of this subterraneous Rome, and
with the difficulties we should find therein. (Here
the Minister cited a despatch from the French
Ambassador at Rome relative to the effect pro-
duced in that city by the announcement of an
approaching French intervention in 1849. The
intelligence had, not caused much pleasure; there
was submission to an unsolicited co-operation,
but the succour of Naples and Austria would have
Ibeen preferred.) It is certain, added the honour-
able speaker, that the Camarilla, as it is called, was
not then well disposed towards France; a second
despatch, in 1851, showed the clerical party and
the Ultras counting in their number the majority
of cardinals and prelates. Certainly the Holy
Father is exalted above these regions, but he is
nevertheless subject to the influence of his entourage,
and of the Minister whose ill-will has been through-
out conspicuous. Well, then, in presence of these
sentiments, is not your duty traced out P It must
not be said at Rome that the great bodies of the
State in France are divided. It would be dange-
rous, and the result would be the maintenance of
the statu quo. It is the statu quo that is so easy
and so convenient ; it is so pleasant to repose even
in the midst of danger when there is some one
watching over you. Before the union of the great
bodies in France, it will be doubtless thought that
it is well to:yield to counsels which are given, not
only to protect the great Catholic interests, but to
maintain the Government of the Holy See. France
will perhaps again meet with ingratitude as the
reward of her devotedness. Did not Count de Ray-
neval write in 1849, "We shed our blood, and we
shall have no thanks for it ?" That must not dis-
courage us. We also know that we have many ob-
stacles to overcome. The Prince said the other day
that nothing could be obtained from the Court of
Rome unless their determination was shown. I will
not go so far as that ; but I will say that in the
diplomatic correspondence, I have found a proof of
the necessity of being rather sharp in order to obtain
anything. I have found more particularly in the
words of a Roman Cardinal—a good judge of the
policy of his Government—a passage which is
worthy of our attention. It is given in a despatch
of the Marquis de Sainte Aulaire of the 20th Decem-
ber, 1832, and makes known the opinion of Cardinal
Bernetti, then directing Minister at Rome. It
says :—" Secularisation is inevitable ; it will come
sooner or later, but the Pope will never with a
good will decree a measure which will be ruin
and humiliation for the Cardinals. Rather than
give such a proof of weakness he will prefer to re-
sist." In other words, the policy of Cardinal
Bernetti, in speaking of inevitable necessities, was
not to offer but to submit. The assent of a great
body like the Senate, whose sentiments are known,
will be a considerable fact. When it shall be
understood that the Senate, like the Emperor, sees
things more clearly than the temporal power at
Rome, and begs the Holy Father to compromise, it
will be of immense importance. The question, it '
has been said, must be settled, but the Emperor