The Sun.
London, England, 1865-09-06 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

TIMES.—A very brief telegram which we publish
to-day will be generally received as a satisfactory
solution of a difficulty which was not the less annoy-
ing because it arose between ourselves and a bar-
barous African Power. Mr. Consul Cameron, who
has been so long confined by the Emperor of
Abyssinia, has been at length released. Mr. Rassam,
who was despatched in the first place to Massowah
to procure the freedom of the unfortunate captive,
has, after almost infinite delays, succeeded in effect-
ing the purpose of his mission. He has telegraphed
to the Foreign-office from Suez announcing his
arrival there, and the liberation of Captain Cameron
from his confinement. This happy result of his
labours will be welcomed by all, and by none more
than by the persons who were actually on their way
or were preparing to depart with the object of
seconding Mr. Rassam's negotiations. It is well
known that shortly before the rising of Parliament
arrangements were made with Mr. Palgra're, the
Arabian traveller, to proceed to Abyssinia, and so
to work upon the Emperor as to procure the release
of Consul Cameron from captivity ; and since the
dissolution a new movement has been projected with
the same object. Mr. Beke had voluntarily offered
to undertake a mission to the Emperor Theodore,
relying for success upon his knowledge of the coun-
try acquired in former visits, and upon his acquaint-
ance with the character of the Emperor. The suc-
cess of Mr. Rassam has made it unnecessary that
Mr. Palgrave should proceed any further with his
journey, or that Mr. Beke should start upon his
enterprise. They deserve, and we hope they will
receive,the thanks of the country and of the friends
of Consul Cameron for their intentions, a,lthough,
as the event has turned out, their good offices have
not been required. We are still in ignorance of the
motives which induced the Emperor Theodore to
terminate the long captivity of Captain Cameron,
but it fortunately happens with men of his fitful
character that an impulse of benevolence must
occasionally have weight as a reason of action.
The Emperor of Abyssinia is a personage with whom
we would much rather have to do in the world of
fiction than in actual life. He has the virtues and
the faults of Haroun al Raschid. He has vague
and wild aspirations, and lofty dreams of empire ;
his intentions are on the whole praiseworthy, his
abilities fair, and his courag,e indisputable; but he
has no subjects strong enough to check his errors,
no long course of constitutional traditions to re-
press any wilful outbreak. His own career-is more
like a page out of the " Arabian Nights" than, a
veritable history. Although he now claims to be of
the blood of the former Emperors of Abyssinia, and
to be a descendant of the great Suleyman, he was
of humble origin, and, if we remember rightly, was
the son of a porter. He managed, however, to in-
gratiate himself with a former King of Abyssinia,
to become his Vizier, and ultimately his successor.
When he obtained power he showed that he knew
how to use it. One by one he subdued his rivals,
until he acquired the sovereignty of nearly the whole
of Abyssinia. His rule became nearly coincident
with that of the early Christian Emperors of the
South, and as his power grew his claims also waxed
greater and greater. His ideas extended beyond
his own continent, and he sought the friendship of
the French Emperor aid of our own nation. He
sent a letter, accompanied by certain presents, to
the Queen, and his subsequent treatment of Consul
Cameron has been attributed to the delay in ac-
knowledging his communication. But in truth
there were more solid grounds, if not better rea-
sons, for his annoyance. Before Captain Cameron
had been appointed consul it would seem to have
been the practise of our resident agents to engage
freely in the domestic troubles of Abyssinia, and to
take part in any struggle for empire which might
happen. The immediate predecessor of Captain
Cameron had gone the length of supplying muskets
to a predecessor of Theodore, and had fallen in a
civil war which ensued. When Captain Cameron
himself was first appointed he was perhaps not un-
willing to support the pretensions of the Emperor
Theodore, until a despatch from the Foreign-office
warned him not to intermeddle with any questions
of domestic policy. The Emperor of Abyssinia did
not, however, understand the doctrine of non-inter-
vention, and resented the attitude of neutrality
which Captain Cameron maintained in pursuance
of the instructions which he had received. The
indifference of Consul Cameron to his quarrels,
coming on the back of the neglect of his mes-
sage to England, might have excited his in-
dignation, when a third cause of offence arose.
Some missionaries who had been sent by the Church
Missionary Society to Abyssinia had returned
for a season, as is not uncommon, nor, to tell the
truth, unnatural among missionaries, to England,
and, in reporting on the condition of the mission,
they spoke of certain acts of the Emperor Theodore
in a way which was doubtless just, but could not
be flattering to his sensibilities. Their comments
on his conduct reached the ears of the Abyssinian
Emperor, and when they returned to their work
they were charged with treason, and forthwith com-
mitted to prison. Captain Cameron, in pursuance
of his duty, remonstrated on their behalf, and in
his zeal for their welfare hurried to the Court from
his post at Massowah, to which he had been ordered
to confine himself. But he did so only to share the
fate of the captives. This last interference with his
will proved too much for Theodore, and Captain
Cameron was at once put into captivity, from which
he is now, as we learn, tardily released. The nego-
tiations for the release of Consul Cameron have
been tedious, and were not unnaturally the cause
of some exasperation against the Foreign-office,
and some censures on its management. They have
now, however, proved successful. Being successful
they will probably receive unmerited approbation,
just as when they were unsuccessful they received
unmerited obloquy. It is too much to expect that
those most immediately interested in the captive
should preserve a judicial calmness in discussing
the means adopted for his release. Dispassionate
observers may, however, be asked to consider the
difficulties of the position. Here was a semi-bar-
barous Prince, almost wholly inaccessible to arms,
who had got a British agent completely within his
power. Negotiating with him for the release of his
prisoner was like coaxing a cat to give up a mouse.
Any appearance of violence would be fatal, because
the victim 4 would be sacrificed before help could
arrive. On the other hand, the Emperor Theodore
was too well acquainted with the principles of
European government to be amenable to vague
threats which were not intended to be followed up
by action. Nothing was left but to try the effect
of remonstrances addressed to his reason by some
one sufficiently acquainted with the temper of the
East to be able to select the argument most fitted
to convince an Eastern potentate. In Mr. Rassam
such a person appears to have been found. He was
a British subject, and had, in fact, long held office
under the Crown ; at the same time his life had

been spent between the Nile and the Euphrates, and
he knew the character of the man with whom he

had to deal by long intercourse with his fellows.
We receive the news of his success with unfeigned
satisfaction, not the less because the moral to be de-
rived from his negotiation is the old one of modera-
tion in criticism. It would be dangerous to remove
the Foreign-office from the influence of critics, but
their comments would not be less effective were they
oftener qualified by an appreciation of the difficul-
ties to be fought against. We trust it may be no
longer necessary for us to maintain Consular agents
in the territories of such a person as the Emperor of
Abyssinia, for they must be exposed to the vicissi-
tudes of his lawless will, and if ever they come
within the scope of his anger, tedious and proti acted
negotiations must almost inevitably precede their
release.

PosT.----Whether the rumours of a Northern al-
liance are or are not reliable, they serve to express
the feelings of uneasiness and distrust which prevail
more or less in every quarter of Europe. The Scan-
dinavian States may reasonably desire Coinsure their
integrity and independence, and they might be jus-
tified in making some sacrifices to that end. Den-
mark has experienced the necessity of such a gua-
rantee, and the intimate friendship existing between
the Courts of Copenhagen and St. Petersburg may
admit of a mutually advantageous political under-
standing. Russia would probably also be disposed
to come to an arrangement with Sweden on terms
which, under the circumstances, it might be thought
expedient to accept. But be this how it may,
there can be no doubt that, the title-deeds" of
Europe being virtually destroyed, the Powers of
the Continent feel called upon to adopt other
measures. International law having sunk into
a state of abeyance, they are compelled to appeal to
the law of self-preservation. " A nation coerced
by a superior Power loses that independence which
is the plea for its rights, and the guarantee of their
maintenance by mankind." This has been,. and
might be again, the case -of Denmark ; and it is by
no means clear that it does not in a n se se apply to
Germany and Austria. The high principle o f inter-
national policy which Lord Palmerston laid down
as a rule, is, however, equally in abeyance. A
laissez-faire policy is at present fashionable. If
there be an understanding between nations, it must
not be a cordial understanding. They may be on
excellent terms for the moment,
but their interests
cannot be identical, and all action in common is
entirely out of the question. If two countries are
compelled to contemplate war, and the colonies of
one happen to be bordering on the other, the con-
terminous dependency must not be defended, but
declared neutral ; and so, too, although it is proper
enough for neighbouring Powers to be friendly, yet
if their association be irritating to another Power it
is to be deprecated. These are the theories which
have superseded the grand practical ideas pro-
pounded by Chatham and Canning ; but it natu-

rally occurs to weak States that, in the absence of
a general agreement for maintaining peace, they
may become the prey of any strong State that covets
their possessions ; and if Denmark and Sweden act
upon this suggestion, it is not improbable that their
example will be followed. Nor can there be much
difficulty in conceiving another more formidable
alliance without consulting Germany, or presuming
to suppose that the interests of England are com-
patible with the interests of any other Power. If
what has been called the " balance of power" in
Europe be lost, it must be recovered in some
form, and if not by the common action which is
so . strenuously objected to, by the patchwork
policy which a Scandinavian union would repre-
sent. It may not be out of place, therefore, to
put the latter proposition in a practical light.
Three great European alliances are, we will say,
possible—the northern, the central, and the western,
which, of course, would not include England, nor
would Turkey, Greece, or Holland be included
either in the northern or the central. There would
be that space left for future operations. The ques-
tion, however, is not whether the peace of Europe
could be maintained on such conditions, but for how
long war might be averted. Now, it is obvious that
the western and the central powers must immedi-
ately come into collision on the Adriatic, and no one
could foresee where the conflict there commenced
would end. But, for the argument, it may be as-
sumed that the central alliance would be broken up,
and consequently that the efficiency of the northern
would be neutralised. In effect, then, more than
half Europe would be laid at the feet of one power,
and that not of its own choice, but simply by the
force of circumstances, and because the departure
from the principles of international law had led to
abnormal coalitions, like that concluded at Gastein,
and that of which we hear rumours from Sweden
and Denmark. This, we apprehend, is not only a
practical but a strictly English statement of the
case, and England, it must be observed, has paid
dearly to establish the " balance of power," though
it was, as we are now asked to believe, only a •
whistle. But without venturing to assume that the
result could prove detrimental to English interests,
we may perhaps be allowed to advert to the modifi-
cation of opinion it•would require. Once England
had 600,000 men in arms, and her navy was manned
by 200,000 sailors. A living statesman then declared
that the masculine energies of the nation were never
more conspicuous, and that the country never at any
period of its history stood in so proud and glorious a
position. Something of this enthusiasm may still
survive, though the England of to-day is expected
to submit to the capricious suspicions of other coun-
tries even in the matter of a naval review. But we
do not refer to that. When feeble powers seek pro-
tection in union with powers that are able to defend
them, they must to some extent relinquish their
freedom to obtain security ; and, to go no further,
if Englishmen do not like to think of Hesse and
Coburg as the bond-slaves of Prussia, they may not
like to see Denmark made the honoured vassal of
Russia. Those who profess to be the only autho-
rised interpreters of the public opinion of this
country do not appear to comprehend the sentiments
and the emotions of a free people. Nations and
Governments have obligations to fulfil which cannot
be avoided, responsibilities which must be met,
rights which they dare not surrender. This country
may act alone, or act in conjunction with other
countries ; but inaction is impossible. Fortunately,
it is not easy to drift into a false position when the
descent is opposed by facts which speak for them-
selves, and the English people are perfectly com-
petent to appraise their interests and to vindicate
the national honour. They do not need to be re-
minded of the German alliance which Canning dis-
solved, and they are not to be deceived by philoso-
phical essays which reveal their Teutonic inspira-
tion. The way of England is her own way. It was
so when she subsidised the bankrupt States of the
Continent, and it is so now when her flag is saluted
by Powers that are marching with her in the path
of civilisation and progress. The way has been
marked out by her own sense of truth and justice,
and, happily for the peace of the world, a cordial
understanding with England is desired by countries
that share her aspirations, and would co-operate in
compassing their realisation. It is not by segrega-
tion, but by union, that the complications which
hang like a dark cloud over Europe can be satis-
factorily adjusted. What is desiderated is, not so
many defensive alliances, but a general and distinct
determination to observe international
.la, and to
insist upon its observance. The sophistical expla-
nations of the Gastein Convention which are tran-
slated into the English language will mislead nobody.
It is not possible to dissemble the meaning or the
immorality of the transaction. The money may be
paid from one purse or another purse, and the
provisorium may be extended until the patience of
foreign Powers is exhausted, but by no equivoca-
tion can it be shown that this compact is other than
we have described it—an act politically infamous,
and a precedent which cannot be admitted,