The Sun.
London, England, 1865-01-06 00:00:00

THE WAR IN AMERICA.

(Front to Index)
We may congratulate our readers, after the loud jubila-
tions of the French organs during the past week, on the
important fact that Savannah is not taken, and that Hood's
army is not destroyed. No dOubt the escape of Sherman to
the coast is a misfortune, but is one which must have been
nicely calculated on and prepared for by the Richmond
authorities as soonag,the Bogerttl aaay. started_southward
from Atlanta; nor is it to be concealed that the defeat and
retirement of Hood from. Tennessee have caused a feeling
of deep disappointment amongst the friends of the South.
But it must be borne in mind that the Confederate army
in Tennessee was not so much defending territory invaded
by Northern hosts as endeavouring to recover a State
which has for more than two years been in Federal pos-
session; and that Sherman has simply exchanged a base of
operations in the heart of the cotton States, which, if he
could have held it, threatened at least the whole of Geor-
gia with the fate of Tennessee, for another on the seacoast,
which he might have taken up whenever it suited Grant
to despatch 25,000 troops; by sea to Georgia, and whence,
for months to come, he will have very little chance of in-
flicting any serious blow on the Confederacy. True, he has
devastated a vast tract of country, destroyed some 200
miles of railway, captured many negroes, and inflicted in-
calculable misery on many peaceful communities, but he
has failed to take Macon, Augusta, or Savannah. His army
has passed through Georgia like an arrow through the air;
the country which he purchased at the cost of a year's pre-
paration, a six months' campaign, and 50,000 men, has
escaped from his grasp; and he has to commence, de novo,
the conquest of Georgia by the siege of a strongly fortified
town, held by a powerful garrison under the command of
one of the ablest Confederate generals. If to the moral effect
produced by his comparatively unimpeded march through
one of the richest Southern States be opposed the fact that
he has called into being another Southern army, that the
whole of Georgia is in arms, the balance of gain will per-
haps be found to be not altogether on the side of the North.
We know not that the triumph which sent New York
into ecstacies three weeks ago was limited to the capture of
Fort M'Allister, a feat which Sherman describes as proudly
as if he had taken a town. But Fort M'Allister was gar-
risoned at the outside by 200 men, and the storming of a
position, however strong, held by such a force, is not a
wonderful exploit for an army of 50,000 men. The import-
ance of the capture lies in the fact that it placed Sherman
at once in communication with the Federal fleet, and
secured to him the supplies and material necessary for the
conduct of the siege operations against Savannah; otherwise

its possession by the Federals will not advance them one
inch towards the reduction of Savannah. The question re-

mains,What are the defensive capabilities of this threatened
city ? They are reported to consist of triple lines of forti-
fication on the land side, and these are not mere earth-
works. On the east and south the country round Savan-
nah is a network .of streams running through marshes
almost impenetrable to an army. On the north there is no
possibility of a lodgment being made; for the Confederate.
gunboats on the Savannah'River, and available reinforce-
ments from Charleston, can prevent the passage of the river.
What the direct eastern approaches offer in the way of ob-
stacle we are unable to say ; but we may rely upon it they
have not been neglected, and wo have very good'proof that
t .3- were effective in Sherman's march to the mouth of the
Ogeechee River. An army of A4o° men would not have.
been turned by Weak defences._ As to the sea approaches,
their strength has been dernonstrited by the unwillingness
of Federal naval commanders to encounter them, and we
believe they are quite as impassable as the fortifications at
Mobile and Wilmington. Of course Sherman's military
force may take them in the rear, but that will be a work of
time. Such swamps as protect Port Jackson and the river
batteries eastward of Savannah can be held with a very
small force. It has been said that Savannah is invested.
This is a mere assumption. Sherman cut the Charleston and
Savannah Railroad south of the Savannah, but there is still
communication with both Augusta and Charleston, and
through them with the whole Confederitcy. Sherman could
not get at the north bank of the river, and Foster and
Dahlgren had failed in their repeated attempts to cut the
Charleston Railroad. What is there, then, to prevent the
constant despatch of supplies ana reinforcements by both

these roads until 'both banks of the Savannah are occupied
by the Federals, and a real invelitment takes place ? The
strength of the garrison can only be guessed at. Sherman
estimates it at 15,000 men, and such a force ought to be
able to hold it against a coup' de main. But it can be
readily reinforced, if the necessity arises, even in the
not improbable event that Butler's 25,000 men and
Porter's fleet should finally find their way to Savannah.
For Wilmington will be relieved of all fear of attack ;
Charleston will have only her ordinary assailants to deal
with, and surely if Lee's army was strong enough to cope
with Grant's forces when Butler's 25,000 men who were in
the Federal lines before Petersburg, he can spare 10,000 or
15,000 men for the defence of Savannah. We do not pretend
to say that the town will not be taken ultimately. But we
have very liltle doubt, now that Sherman has declined to
risk an assaUlt, that the siege will be a very tedious one,
and that the Federal general's winter campaign will be far
costlier and longer than he intended. In commenting upon
the state of affairs in Tennessee we must premise that at
present no accounts have reached us from Southern sources
of the real character of the battles which have taken place,
or of the losses or condition of Hood's army. But we know
enough even from Federal reports to assert with confidence
that there has been the most disgraceful "lying" in the
Northern bulletins. We will cite two instances, and leave
our readers to draw their own inferences from them. At
the battle of Franklin the Federal losses were officially
fixed at 500 men ; they turned out to be at least 3,500 killed
and wounded, and 1,000 prisoners. In General Thomas's
report of the battle near Nashville, published with that
general's signature, and endorsed by Mr. Stanton, the
casualties of the Federal army are fixed at 300, and the
special interposition of the Almighty is suggested as the
cause of this unprecedented contrast between the results
attained and the lives expended. But a later despatch ad-
mits a most :desperate battle, and the loss of 3,000 men,
whilst private accounts estimate the wounded alone at
6,000. This would bring the total casualties to something
very like 8,000 men. On the other hand, it is admitted
by the North that the Confederates, in killed and wounded,
suffered less than heir opponents. We do not cite
these facts as negativing Hood's defeat, but we are at
least entitled to refuse our credence to the Federal
accounts until we learn something from the other side.
It would appear, indeed, that the great battle took place on
the 15th ult., and that the subsequent engagements were
merely the encounters of Thomas's pursuing columns with
the troops left to cover Hood's retreat. We are told that
Hood withdrew his forces from the immediate front of
Nashville on the 13th, two days before the attack, and took
up a strong defensive position. It was in the effort to drive
ethe following day,
him thence that the Federals suffered so severely, but they
utinred,oaund bte diltys succeeded.rearguar Hood'sattackd on
army was compelled to re-
seems to have lost heavily in prisoners and guns. As to
the condition of Hood's army, nothing can be known.
Since the commencement of the war there has never been
a Federal victory in which the Confederates were not de-
scribed as routed, demoralised, throwing away their arms,
and abandoning their leaders ; and, of course, at the pre-
' sent moment, the North is assured that Hood's army is de-
stroyed, and that there is nothing but the force behind the
defences of Richmond to fight with. This will deceive no
one who has watched the war. We have been told the same
thing half a dozen times of the south-western army, and
more than once of the army of Virginia. What is tolerably
certain is, that Hood had reached Pulaski ; that he had
been joined by Forrest with his force from Murfreesboro';
that he was some distance ahead of Thomas ; that he had
his pontoons ready for crossing the Tennessee, if it should
be necessary, and that there was every prospect of Thomas
being compelled to discontinue the pursuit. In the mean-
time, it is reported from Confederate sources that Chatta-
nooga and Bridgeport have been abandoned by the Fede-
rals, and that Burbridge has been beaten and driven out of
Western Virginia by Breckenridge. These events would
materially affect the situation in Tennessee, and if reports
prove true, then undoubtedly the advantage will be on the
side of the Confederacy, which will have wrested from the
Federals, in a two months' campaign, the results of two
years' hard fighting, and throw them back, so far as Ten-
nessee and Alabama and Northern Georgia are concerned,
to the position they held in the winter of 1862.