The Sun.
London, England, 1865-05-24 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS

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TimEs.--,From the United States we continue to
receive much news as may be expected when a coun-
try is passing through the last throes of a great con-
vulsion. There is no very striking or important
event, ba everywhere there are agitation, uncer-
tainty, and change. The whole fabric of Southern
society has been broken up, and is being recon-
structed under the iron rule of the new President
and his military subordinates. Military power, in-
deed, is everywhere, for it is to this cogent instru-
ment that the Government trusts not only for the
final suppression of resistance, but for the mainte-
nance of civil order for some time to come, and the
carrying out of the great social changes connected
with emancipation. In the opinion of the President
the war is now so completely at an end that he may
look upon those who continue it as rebels and trai-
tors in a stricter sense than that in which the words
have been hitherto used. The Confederates will no
longer be belligerents either by land or sea ; they
will not receive the rights or courtesies of war when
found in arms within the limits of the States; they
must expect the harshest treatment if they perse-
vere in their depredations on the ocean. - For this
new resolve there is, of course, justification. The
war has virtually ceased in the country east of the
Mississippi ; the Confederate Government has aban-
doned its capital and is fugitive, without any of the
attributes of authority. Since the surrender of Lee's
army it has issued no proclamation, nor performed,
as far as can be learned, any of the functions of sove-
reignty. The Confederacy may therefore be looked
upon as at an end. The great Generals who fought
so bravely and skilfully for four years having been
compelled to yield, the not less energetic and astute
politicians who led the South politically have been
obliged to abdicate their functions. There is no
longer a Southern Government; and President Joh-
nson, in his Executive order to the Government of
the State of Virginia, intimates to the Southern people
the methods by which the States are to be brought
one by one under the full authority of the 'Federal
power. To set at naught not only the authority of
the late Confederate Government, but all the acts of
the State Governments performed during the time
the respective States were in resistance to Federal
power ; to treat their Governors as usurpers and
their legislatures as illegal; to make, in fact, the
period from' 1861 to 1865 a perfect interregnum,
much as the Restoration made the Commonwealth
in England, is the purpose of the new President.
Where there is a loyal Governor he will be sup-
ported by the military force ; where there is none
one will be appointed, or the General of the district
will combine to a certain extent military and civil
attributes. The President seems to apprehend some-
thing like a continued resistance on the part of the
vanquished population of the South—a sullen and
secret opposition, if not an open warfare. We hope
there is no ground for such an expectation. - The
Southern people have suffered so much from four
years of conscription, their numbers are so reduced
by incessant warfare, that there are simply not men
enough within their borders to make any efficient
resistance. Knowing the utter futility and folly of
what is called a guerilla warfare, they will, we trust,
submit to the arbitrament of the great contest which
has nalv virtually closed, and accept with frank-
ness, if not with goodwill, the re-establishment
of the Federal authority. To this result the chief
leaders throughout the Southern States have, with
the assent of their respective forces, reconciled
themselves. Though they might, doubtless, have
continued the contest a few months longer, they
have felt that after the surrender of General Lee it
would be a useless shedding of blood and a politi-
cal crime to continue the war. General Johnston
surrendered to Sherman on the same terms as Lee,
because he and his officers felt that all they could
claim would be the right to live in peace under
the restored Government. With the surrender of
General Dick Taylor, which is now announced,
opposition to the Federal Government ceases to
the east of the Mississippi, so far as depends on
armies in the field. This general commanded in the
neighbourhood of Mobile, and by his capitulation
the authority of the Union- is fully re-established in
the Gulf States. It is difficult to speak of the
threatened resistance to the west of the Mississippi.
While the United States' generals east of the Mis-
sippi are notifying to the Confederate soldiers who
remain in arms that they must surrender, or be
treated as outlaws ; while preparations are made for
a review on the vast scale of those by which the
Allies celebrated their final triumph over Napoleon,
it is announced that the army of Texas, with the
support of the people, declares its determination not
to lay down its arms. It may, indeed, be that a
population which has been as yet untouched by the
war, and has felt none of its evils, may conceive the
idea of resisting the power of the United States.
But the utter useldsness of such an enterprise, the
misery it must bring on themselves, and the cer-
tainty that it must speedily end in complete failure,
should be enough to deter them. It is to be hoped
that the reported proclamation of Gen. Smith does
not point to anything more than obtaining fair terms
of surrender. If this be so the contest is not likely to
last long. " The terms due to a brave people" will
hardly be refused to the armies of Texas and Arkan-
sas, after being granted to the soldiers of Virginia
and Georgia. It may, we think, be expected that by
the end of the present year the Federal authority
will be restored throughout the whole country, and
that the attention of the world will be directed, not
to the means used by the government for maintain-
ing its power, but to the use which it makes of it
when established. The chief subjects of speculation
at present are the treatment which the Confederate
leaders are likely to receive if taken, and the rela-
tions which the American government will form
with the Mexican monarchy. As to the first, we
will not discuss it, simply because we do not believe
that any civilised and Christian administration
will put to death men who were called by millions
of their countrymen to exercise the functions of a
regularly established Government. The legal ques-
tion as to the right of Secession has always been
doubtful, the majority of American lawyers inclining
to the belief that if not allowed it was not prohi-
bited by the .Constitutional Compact. It would,
therefore, be the most glaring injustice to treat this.
Secession as an ordinary uprising against authority.
The good sense of the American people will, no
doubt, restrain them from the mistaken policy of
vengeance in such a case. The question of Mexico
is more serious. France has undertaken a difficult
and delicate task in planting a monarchy on Mexican
soil. The party of Juarez will probably be rein-
forced by a considerable number of the disbanded
soldiers of both North and South. The Washington
Government, we can well imagine, is honestly op-
posed to any scheme of " armed emigration," or, in
other words, enlistment for the army of the deposed
President. The United States have had enough of
war for the present. They require repose to recruit
their diminished population, to till their devastated
fields, to restore their shattered towns, and, more
than all, to carry out a great social and economical
change. The President and his Cabinet will pro-
bably give all the discouragement in their power to
filibustering schemes. Yet there is too much attrac-
tion in a Mexican campaign for the army of Juarez
to want recruits.

DAILY NEWS.—As to the fitness or unfitness of
Colonel Dawkins to command a battalion of the
Guards we do not presume to give any opinion,
thee being no available means of forming ,any
opinion on the subject. But unless there be one sort
of justice for soldiers and another for civilians, it is
tolerably clear that the treatment which Colonel
Dawkins has experienced at the hands of the Com-
mander-in-Chief and the Secretary of War is with-
out justification and almost without precedent. An
officer, whose character so far as the public records
go is unstained, is compelled by the Commander-
in-Chief to go upon half-pay. He demands to know
the ground upon which he is compelled to take this
step. He is told that a court of inquiry has sat
upon him, and has pronounced him unfit to com-
mand a battalion. But, replies the Colonel, " this
court of inquiry is a secret tribunal ; it sits with
closed doors, the evidence of the witnesses is not
given upon oath, and, after all, the officers selected
to sit upon it were not unanimous in their verdict.
I object to have my conduct investigated in the
dark. I protest against my professional character
being blasted by evidence which shuns the light,
and I insist upon my right to be tried by a court-
martial. Let my delinquencies or infirmities of
temper be stated in public ; let me be tried by my
peers, not by a clique of officers who . may be my
private enemies, and I will submit willingly to their
verdict." It is difficult to anticipate what answer
can be made to such a remonstrance as this. Most
certainly no answer has been made by the Under
Secretary of War, or indeed by the Prime Minister
himself. The House of Commons has been told
that the discipline of -the army is not a fit subject
to be discussed in Parliament, and that the Com-
mander-in-Chief must be alio-Ad to determine,
without appeal, when it is fit that an officer should
be tried by a court of inquiry, and when he ought
to be tried by a court-martial. But this is not the
theory which has been hitherto adopted by the
Secretary of War or by the Commander-in-Chief
himself. The Secretary of War in the person of the

late Mr. Sidney Herbert declared that he was re-
sponsible for the acts of the Commander-in-Chief,
nor has it ever been contended that the Minister of
War is not responsible to Parliament and the
country. -If any officer in her Majesty's service
thinks himself wronged by the act of the Com-
mander-in-Chief or of the Secretary of War he is
entitled to appeal to the Home of Commons for re-
dress. And, therefore, we cordially concur. with
what was said by Mr. Bright, that " the House of
Commons ought to be by all its members, and in
all times, a court to which the highest and the
humblest in this country can come for redress of
grievances." Fortunately, the Duke of Cam-
bridge delivered his opinion some years ago on
this very question, in the year 1857 ; unfor-
tunately, his conduct, in the case of Colonel Daw-
kins, is singularly inconsistent with his own Ow
ciples. Upon that occasion he stated that there
were cases of officers who were unfit to command
regiments, and who therefore ought not to be,
allowed to occupy such a position. And how dia.
his Royal Highness propose to prevent such officers
being promoted ? In 1857 the power of stopping
an officer's promotion for unfitness existed, but was
not exercised. Theoretically there was such 3
power, practically there was not ; indeed, the Doke
of Cambridge distinctly stated that neither in his
own time nor in that of Lord Hardinge had 09
instance of interfering with an officer's promotion
occurred. Thus, in 1857, the Duke of Cambridge
thought that such a power could not practically be
exercised except upon one condition—that
should be backed up by public opinion." " an
in hopes," said the Duke, " that the Commander-in'
Chief will be informed by the Inspecting-General,
as I think it his duty to inform him, when a man is
from his temperament unsuitable for the command
of a regiment, and if such a report came to me as
Commander-in-Chief, I should have no hesitation
in saying, ' There is nothing against your character,
but you are unfit from natural defects, and there-
fore you cannot be promoted.' " Being still further
questioned as to whether "if the Inspectors' re-
turns were satisfactorily made there would be ne
difficulty in knowing whether an officer ought to be
stopped in his promotion or not," he answered, ~
see no difficulty whatever, but, as I said before, 11)
must be backed by public opinion, otherwise no„
man, in my opinion, could exercise this power.
According to the Duke of Cambridge, therefore,
Colonel Dawkins could not have been treated in the
year 1857 as he has been treated in the year 1865;
The Commander-in-Chief would not have ventured
to compel any officer to go upon half-pay simply
because he was considered unfit to command a bat-
talion. Nor, indeed; would he even now venture
to do so unless he was backed by public ()pink°
And how is public opinion to be brought to best
in the case of Colonel Dawkins ? Officers at the.
Horse Guards have singular notions on the subject
of popular rights ; but they must be even more oc‘
travagant than we imagined them to be, if they
suppose that " public opinion" will support such a
system as that of courts of inquiry. The Brit°
public have their own notions about justice and hi'
justice which they will not easily unlearn. If t/
citizen—soldier or civilian—is to be punished, or
even deprived of any ordinary privilege, the pro"
ceedings against. him must be conducted in the facv
of day. If Colonel Dawkins's unfitness for Cony
mand is proved by the reports of inspecting officers,
let these reports be published, if the Colonel requin,
their publication ; if his unfitness for command is
proved by the evidence produced before the cow
of inquiry, let the proceedings of the court of ill:
quiry be published also. For let it be observed that
even the Commander-in-Chief does not claim Oo
right to stop the promotion of Colonel Dawkios.S re
any other officer upon his own responsibility. Pe
declares that he is bound to inform himself by s°,l.l'd
evidence ; and he adds that he cannot be expeel•e
to act upon any opinion which he may have forond
without the support of " public opinion." Aceoluo
ing to the Commander-in-Chief, " public opiniell
must be consulted in such a case as that of Colcs!e',
Dawkins. And unless the Commander-in-Chi
has abandoned those principles which he professe't
before the Purchase Commission in 1857, he °lust
grant Colonel Dawkins the public inquiry which th:10
officer demands. It may be that publicity will ,0
the Colonel no sort of good. It may simply pro
,is
that the Colonel was unfit for command. But tulu
is beside the question. Colonel Dawkins denaa°'
publicity, and he is entitled to have it.