The Sun.
London, England, 1862-10-08 00:00:00

ROME AND ITALY.

A letter from Turin, dated Oct. 5, says :--The
Italian papers publish a letter from Count Cavonr,
written to one of the leading statesmen in Tuscany
(probably Baron Ricasoli) at the time when the an-
nexation of Central Italy to Piedmont was an
achievement still beset with difficulties, and when
the settlement of Italian matters in general, and of
the Roman question in particular, suggested to the
great European Powers a line of conduct which
might perhaps be very profitably followed under
present circumstances :

"Turin, Feb. 1, 1860.

" I consider it my pressing duty to lay before you the
four propositions made by England to France, which were
officially communicated to me yesterday. With a view to
come to an arrangement of Italian affairs the following
terms should be come to

" 1. France and Austria should not interfere by force in
the internal affairs of the Peninsula, unless they were
asked so to do by the unanimous consent of the five great
Powers of Europe.

" 2. By virtue of this agreement the Emperor of the
French would come to opportune arrangements with the
Pope so as to withdraw the French troops from Rome. The
time and order of this withdrawal should be so contrived as
to give the Papal Government the chance of garrisoning
Rome with the troops of his holiness, and adopting such
precautions as might avert the dangers of disorder and
anarchy. England thinks that by such means and by pro-
per provisions the safety of his holiness will be entirely gua-
ranteed. Convenient measures shall also be taken for the
removal of the French troops from the North of Italy
within a reasonable time.
" 3. The internal Government of Venetia shall not be
made the subject of negotiation among the European
Powers.

"4. Great Britain and France will invite the King of
Sardinia to engage to send no troops into Central Italy be-
fore the various States and provinces which compose it have
solemnly expressed their veto as to their future destinies by
the organ of their national assemblies to be purposely
elected. In the event of such a vote resulting favourably to
annexation to Piedmont, Great Britain and France will no
longer object to the march of the Sardinian troops into the
abovementioned States and provinces. There are the pro-
posals of England, and they have been in their general
principle accepted by France. The Emperor of the French
only made a reserve on the article respecting Venetia, as he
intends to uphold and defend the cause of that province by
his good offices. It is the Emperor's wish, however, that
his intentions as to these proposals should not be made
public before he had sent to Vienna his suitable explana-
tions, and before he had time to invite the Courts of Berlin
and St. Petersburg to accede td them, so that the new
settlement of Italian affairs should be effected with the
sanction of the two great northern Powers. France also
warmly recommends that during these last and definitive
negotiations no act should be accomplished or even under.
taken which may in any way alter the present state of
things. The only condition of the annexation is a new vote
of the population, not consulted by universal suffrage, but
by the means of new asssemblies to be elected in that form
which will be deemed most expedient. As to their convo-
cation, the King's Government has made some opening at
Paris and London, of which I will in due time communi-
cate the results. It is not without deep emotion of my soul
that I forward these tidings to you, for they seem to me to
prove that the annexation may by this time be looked upon
as an accomplished fact, and that the aim of all our hopes
and wishes is well-nigh attained.
"Receive, &c., "C. CAVOUR."
This letter would always have great interest in
the eyes of all readers, merely as an historical docu-
ment and out of regard for the writer. Like other
posthumous publications of Cavour, it is calculated
to enhance the merits of that man, whose name
seems to gain upon public opinion at every step
the living generation takes from his grave.
But the letter has, besides, great intrinsic im-
portance, as it lays open some of the first trans-
actions of the great Western Powers, some of
the first steps taken towards the solution of the
Roman question. The Emperor Napoleon had put
forward that word " Non-Intervention" at Villa-
franca, and England took good care, so far as it
was in her power, that it should be no empty, un-
meaning phrase. The occupation of Rome by a
French garrison was as much a breach of .that
principle as the presence of Austrian troops at
Parma, Bologna, or Florence would have been. It
was as just that the Pope should reign by his own
unaided strength at Rome as that the Bourbon
should keep his seat by the same means at Naples.
The French Emperor had his own login driven
_
He
home to him, and would not draw back.
a
affected to consent; he declared himself
be could
to
-u
withdraw from Rome, but he thought to
ocZind
yet do something if he could only marougne., 5
had as
time, so he proposed to call to
which
Powers, Russia and Prussia,t:e
matter, and
yet by no means moved
in
with it, but by some
which had no right to meddleother
to be raised. He
of which, if consulted, unexpected
English scheme might
chance
onappeal to either of the
had not taken the trouble to ee objections to the
en
resolved upon war in
Northern Powers
from the Austrian empire
Litsomribcharedsyt now it was England who
the interests of Italian
was bent upon furthering
Napoleon sought his auxiliaries in
nationality, and f
European innovation. Not-
withstanding
par no
dv
er eewn- lel
t
the natural enemies o
motion
wa' d in the main. Central Italy was an.
S Carrie
this hindrance,. the English
an-
nexed, and of the whole scheme nothing remained
unfulfilled but the French evacuation of Rome.

Towards this latter object negotiations were carried
on between all the parties concerned, until, towards
the end of April, 1860, it had been definitively set-
tled that the French troops should leave Rome, and,
by his note of the 11th of May ensuing, Cardinal
Antonelli seemed to agree to that departure. La-
moriciere was then at the head of a mighty Papal
host, with which the Court of Rome not only felt
sure of its ability to keep its present subjects to
their allegiance, but even to aspire to the re-con-
quest of its lost provinces. The expedition of Mar-
sala, the fall of the Neapolitan Bourbon, and the
inroad of the Italians into the Marshes and Um-
bria changed the whole position of affairs. After
Castelfidaro the Pope would never have had
power to hold his own even at Rome; hence the
French Emperor, who deemed himself bound, at
least, to the personal protection of the Pontiff,
far from recalling his troops from the Eternal
City, only thought of adding to their num-
ber. Nothing, indeed, is easier for Napoleon than
to solve the question to his own satisfaction so far
as Italy and the Italians are concerned. He has
only to say "Do not stir !" and either gratitude or
fear, or any other feeling, is sufficient to paralyse
all movement on their part. But the Pope's own
position is greatly altered for the worse ; he no
longer has, in the early part of 1860, such a mili-
tary force as he then thought adequate to the sub-
jugation of his subjects. Pimodan lies buried ; La-
moriciere is un liomme manque, and in De Merode
a good priest has simply been spoilt to make a very
indifferent soldier. The Pope cannot be delivered-
up to his people without great immediate risk of an
immediate breakdown. It is necessary, therefore,
either to perpetuate the French occupation, or to
trust some other nation or Power with the defence
of the Vatican, or, finally, to build up again such
a Papal army as may screen the Holy See from
harm, with some hope of better success than has
hitherto crowned the efforts of Lamoriciere and
De Merode. Now it does not seem rational
for the Europe of our great generation to
put faith in any soldato del Papa, be he
even a Swiss, a Belgian, or an Irishman. It is not
easy for France, for Italy, or for England to tole-
rate an Austrian, a Spanish, or any other foreign
garrison at Rome. The Pope would not willingly
place himself at the discretion of the King and
people of Italy; consequently, unless it is meant
either that the Pope should quit Rome or that the
Papacy as a temporal Sovereignty should perish, it
is necessary that the old edifice should continue to
be, as it now is, propped up by French bayonets.
That being the case, I conceive it would be a great
gain for the Pope, for Italy, and for the whole
world, if the Emperor Napoleon, instead of setting
his semi-official organs by the ears, instead of quib-
bling and shuffling with Roman, Italian, English,
and other diplomatists, would freely speak out.
England, I should think, has nothing to tender
in this matter except her friendly offices. She ac-
cepted the French occupation of ,Rome in 1849 as
the choiee among many evils. There are no greater
reasons militating against the temporal power of the
Pope now than there were 14 years ago, than there
were three, or eight, or ten centuries ago. The
Romans have a very good right to object to it cer-
tainly, and the Italians the best titles to sympa-
thise with the Romans; but till they are strong
enough to make good by might of arms the justice
of their cause it is by no means likely that French
or English diplomacy will avait them much. The
Emperor Napoleon himself, to say nothing of his
real secret intentions, has put himself in an impasse
where no outlet is.

It would seem difficult for the Italians to find
fault with, at least, the good intentions of England ;
but there are perverse reasoners enough in this
country—nearly all the political light that ever
dawns south of the Alps comes from Paris, so that
we have newspapers here fain to ascribe Villafranca,
Aspromonte, all the calamities of Italy, not ex-
cepting even the occupation of Rome, to the evil
influence of Great Britain. 1. Were it not for the
intolerab!e fuss that heretic England, out of reli-
gious bigotry and political jealousy, makes about
the Pope, the Emperor Napoleon would be but too
ready to let us go to Rome ; but, as it is, out of sheer
spirit of contradiction, he must needs abide where
he is. England knows it, but it suits her to goad
her neighbour out of all patience that some fine day
he may not be tempted to give in to the entreaties
of the Italians, when these latter will be too strong,
especially if allied to France, to allow the English
to lord it, as they now do, all over the Mediter-
ranean." Such stolid nonsense one may read any
day in the Turin Gazetta del Popolo ; and, " more-
over," says that extremely wise journal, "If Eng-
land has such deep sympathies with our cause, why,
instead of asking France to evacuate Rome, does
she not bid Austria take herself out of Venice ?"
This taunt will seem less gratuitous now when the
Italians learn by Cavour's letter that in February,
1860, England stipulated that "the internal Go-
vernment of Venetia should not be meddled with,"
while, on the contrary, " the French Emperor made
a reserve on the article respecting Venetia." Yet
the conduct of England, I need hardly say, was
very fair and consistent throughout. On the French
first crossing the Alps for the war of Lombardy in
1859, England thought, with the very best
reasons, that the proclaimed liberation of Italy
should, as it did in 1796, end in a substitution of
French instead of Austrian ascendancy over the pe-
ninsula. AfterVillafranca the first twinkling of hope
that Italy, or at least a large part of it, could actu-
ally belong to itself was hailed with the greatest
enthusiasm both by the English people and the Go-
vernment who then set up the cry of "Italy for
the Italians," and took the French Emperor to his
word about the non-intervention principle. It
at
certainly not England's fault if Napoleav 111• ,
Gaeta and at Rome broke through the trammels of
that self-imposed compact. As for Venice,
not only
did England not mean in 1860 that Austria should
retain possession of that province if
be helped, but both then, and at the
thing could
times, she
left not a stone unturned to convince Austria of
the expediency, nay, necessity, of looAse ustriathat did
ning
last hold she yet had of Italian soil.
not listen to the voice of the charnaer, charm he
never so wisely, and England certainly thought
venture on an
acted it would be rash for Italy to to
she
attack on the Mincio,
w
single-
handed, or relied on the support
war would have
been the inevitable result. of France. In
either case a general European
England dreaded the
issues of such a war,
for the welfare of Italy her-
self. The danger which
;8 indeed she justly apprehended
two years ago
present .
far from being averted at,
th
Russia,
nt. Should France,
e
and all Emurope bind themselves to keep the
peace--could fair play and open lists be obtained
for the con
tending parties, and Italy and Austria be
allowed to settle their dispute about Venice as at a
chivalrous tournament—the Italians might certainly
g 0 to war with England's best wishes. But it is
idle to reckon upon such contingencies. The ques-
tions of Rome and Venice are wound up with vital
European interests. All the Italians can do
towards the attainment of their object is to give
new proofs of that firmness, moderation, and pa-
tience which have so far enlisted European sym-
pathies in their behalf.

ERIOUS 'ROBBERIES AT ASIITON-UNDER-LYNE.
—A very daring robbery was committed at the Painters'
Arms, Old-street, Ashton-under-Lyne, on Saturday even-
ing. It seems that the funds of a club held at the house,
are kept in a tin box, in ono of the rooms on the third
storey. About a quarter-past five on Saturday afternoon
the money was seen all safe, but about half-past twelve,
it was found that the box had been robbed. £6O
in gold and silver was carried off, but a £2O Bank of Eng-
land note was left behind by the thieves. Sometime dur-
ing Sunday night, an entrance was made at the shop and
house of Mr. Wm. Gibson, china and earthenware dealer,
Market Avenue, Ashton-under-Lyne, and between £6O and
£7O in gold and silver stolen. A large amount of copper
was made up in five shilling papers, was left behind. As
far as wo can ascertain there is not the least clue to 010
perpetrators of either of these serious robberies.