The Sun.
London, England, 1865-03-11 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS

TIMES.—On the 22d of February the Federals
completed their series of successes against the sea-
port towns of their adversaries by the capture of
Wilmington. This place, which before secession was
only a third-rate port, having little foreign com-
merce, and hardly known in Europe, has for the
last two or three years been the point to which the
hopes of the Confederates and the speculations of
English traders havebeen principally directed. After
the entrance to Charleston was closed it was to Wil-
mington that the enterprise of the blockade-runners
was chiefly directed, and between the swampy banks
of Cape Fear River glided some of the fastest craft
which the spirit of gain or adventure ever sent
forth from these shores. This trade is now at an
end, for not only has Fort Fisher fallen, but the
town itself has, like Charleston, been evacuated
by the Confederates. General Scofield, at the
head of 8,000 men, was the Federal leader on
this occasion. His base of operations was Smith-
ville, at the mouth of the river on its western bank.
Between this place and Wilmington extends a deso-
late region of swamps for nearly 20 miles. In the
midst of this was placed Fort Anderson, strongly
fortified, and almost inaccessible on account of the
nature of the ground. His advance might have
been stayed by this obstacle, had it not been for the
efficient assistance given him by the fleet. Although
the wind and tide prevented more than four vessels
from joining in the engagement the fort was unable
to return the fire efficiently, and " was briskly
quieted down." The combat was renewed the next
morning by the whole of Admiral Porter's fleet, and
by 3 o'clock in the day the Confederate batteries were
silenced. Before daybreak on the 19th the place was
evacuated. The Confederate guns were probably of
no very great power, but such as they were their
shot was successfully repelled by the fleet. The
Confederate shot, it is said, made no impression on
the Monitor, although but a third of a mile from the
fort, while "the southern face of the fort was badly
disfigured." The capture of Wilmington is not only
important in itself, as putting an end to the foreign
supplies on which the Confederacy relied, but it is
likely to be attended with considerable advantage to
the Federals. The forces of both Generals are now
left at liberty to join the main armies of their respec-
tive Commanders-in-Chief in Virginia ; but that of
Scofield is the larger, and by his conquest he not only
becomes free himself, but enables Gen. Sherman to
operate with greater safety. This successful com-
mander was supposed to meditate another march
which would eclipse those by which he captured Sa-
vannah and produced the evacuation of Charleston.
The last accounts represent him as being at Wins-
borough, 30 miles north of Columbia, in the State of
South Carolina, and state that Beauregard was re-
treating before him. His movements are for the time
enveloped in secrecy, as the Richmond papers are
forbidden to publish anything relative to the two
armies; but it can scarcely be doubted that he was
meditating a march into North Carolina, in order to
cut Gen. Lee's communications with the South, if he
did not indeed purpose to cross the State entirely,
and join Gen. Grant in a final attack on the Con-
federate capital. This distance would not be greater
than he has marched already through the enemy's
country since he made his first movement towards
Atlanta. The chances of the North Carolinians being
able to resist him successfully are but small. It be-
comes more evident with each succeeding operation
that the Confederates, though still energetic in their
resistance, are exhausted of the first necessary of war,
a supply of men. The main army of Gen. Lee, though
terribly outnumbered, has been hitherto maintained
in discipline and courage by the genius of its com-
mander. The men have been among the best of
their respective States, who eagerly sought the op-
portunity of fighting under a popular chief in defence
of the principal city of the Confederacy. The
repeated victories which they have gained over
the invading armies of the North have given them
a confidence which even in this hour of general de-
pression may enable them to gain further advan-
tages. But the spirit which animates them, the discip-
line which strengthens them, the genius which directs
them, are not to be found in the other armies of the
South. Tne Georgians and Carolinians are, in com-
parison with the veterans of Lee, a mere militia ;
they have never received the care which has been
bestowed on the army which defends Richmond,
and they are probably very deficient in supplies.
Everything indicates that General Beauregard, or
whoever is in command of the Southern army in
South Carolina, will be unable to offer a successful
resistance to the march of Sherman. If, then, the
latter decides upon crossing North Carolina the
capture of Wilmington may prove of the highest
importance to him. In the hands of the Federals it
may be made a basis for military operations in the
State, a place of retreat in case of any unforeseen
check. In a short time we shall learn the course
which General Sherman has taken, but we cannot
doubt that his aim will be to assist General Grant
either by a, march towards Virginia, or by opera-
tions which will draw off a part of the Confederate
armies. It was expected that President Lincoln
would take occasion, on the commencement of his
second term of office, to utter some conciliatory ex-
pressions with regard to the South. The temper of
the Confederates and their disposition to listen to
new overtures are not easy to determine. At Rich-
mond, and wherever the influence of the Government
and of the main army is paramount, nothing is to
be met with but defiance ; and it is wonderful how
stubbornly the Confederates still maintain their
policy and declare that they will have independence
or continued war. But at a distance from the seat of
Government and Congress, in districts where the
confidence imparted by a strong and constantly vic-
torious army does not exist, there may be a very dif-
ferent feeling. How far this may be worked upon by
the Federal Government will be disclosed probably
within the next few months. Even though the
army of Gen. Lee may be able to maintain its posi-
tion, the successes of Gen. Sherman will enable
President Lincoln to make the most of any disaffec-
tion which may exist in the States "south of Virginia.
Should the Confederate Government remain firm,
should there be no renewal of the conference of
Hampton Roads, the Northern Government will
probably endeavour to draw back the States singly
to its authority by negotiations with each one sepa-
rately. The success of any such attempt must mainly
depend on the conditions which President Lincoln
is willing to make with those who acknowledge his
authority. Should any great military advantage be
gained in Virginia the Confederate Government
may perhaps be less firm in purpose, but if General
Lee maintain his position the political action of the
Northern President will probably be directed to the
Legislatures and people of the individual States,
and to these he may show himself more conciliatory
than to the Cabinet and Congress of Richmond,
HERALD.—The precise relationship which should
exist between a colony and the mother country has
at all times been a matter very difficult to be deter-
mined ; but the difficulty becomes much enhanced
when, through the force of circumstances, the colony
becomes a source of weakness rather than of strength
to the State which has called it into existence. Now,
that is the precise position in which New Zealand
stands, and, for that matter, has always stood, to
Great Britain. We have never sensibly benefited by
that distant dependency except so far as it has served
as an inducement to draw from our shores a portion
of the surplus of our population; whilst, on the other
hand, we have contributed in no small degree to
secure for our colonists the position they have sought
to maintain in the midst of a hostile race. Without
stoppingto inquire into the truth of statements made
last evening by Mr. Cardwell in the House of Com-
mons, to the effect that colonisation does not of ne-
cessity mean dispossession, it is unquestionable that
it does imply a certain amount of jealousy, if not
of absolute enmity, on the part of the original in-
habitants towards those who, whether they will or
not, resolve on settling amongst them. It may be,
although it very rarely happens, that the two races
admit of amalgamation ; but, whether this be so or
not, the sole owner of property invariably regards
with repugnance him who (viewing the matter in
its most favourable light) insists on the enjoyment
of equal rights. This antagonism, then, being
inevitable, the question arises how far a State is
bound to afford to its colonists material assistance
in maintaining a struggle which, by their own enter-
prise, and possibly cupidity, they have forced upon
themselves. A political economist would solve the
problem by the simple test of utility, and would
have no hesitation in saying that unless some present
or prospective advantage furnished a ground for
intervention, the colonists should be left to their
own resources. But it is not possible for States to
regard these questions from a purely utilarian point
of view ; and as between individuals there are
obligations which, though resting on a purely moral
sanction, are equally binding with those imposed by
law, so there are duties imposed upon communities'
whose obligatory force it would be difficult to de-
monstrate, but which, nevertheless, it would be im-
possible for them to ignore. A country is, to borrow
an ordinary expression, expected to " stand by" its
colonists, just as a parent ought to protect his
children ; and the worthlessness of the one any more
than that of the other affords no justification for
the neglect of this duty. To the broad question
propounded last evening—whether we ought to
throw on our colonists in New Zealand the sole re-
sponsibility and onus of establishing as best they
can their position in that country—there can, there-
fore, be but one answer. But, although admitting
our obligation to protect our colonists, it is needless
to add that on the latter is imposed the correlative
duty of meriting it, and of doing as much as lies in
their power to protect themselves. About
eighteen
months ago we were startled by the disagreeable in-
telligence that, in spite of all our endeavours to place

the New Zealand native and the English colonist 011
the same footing, a rebellion had broken out, and
we were compelled to vindicate our supremacy
by
force of arms. Into the circumstances which gave
rise to that revolt it is not necessary now to enter ;
it will suffice to say that they were far from credit:
able to the colonists. The insurrection is not yo
suppressed, and some persons affect to doubt whether
years must not elapse before peace will be reston
Under these circumstances, it has been ntooveu
whether it is not the duty of the Government, t°
have recourse to extreme measures, and to ereplo
all its strength to reduce to subjection, if 11°t all
exterminate, a race which our colonists have to e
appearances found it impossible to live on araia,Dlie
terms. If, it is argued, there exists an irreeoncilr
antagonism between the white man and the nat've'
the latter should give way. The New Zealander,
as Mr. Roebuck observed, seeks to retain in all their
primitive solitude the hunting grounds of Ilis„84:1
cestors ; the colonist seeks to utilise them. '-"" e
sation and progress go hand in hand, and therefOtrb
the colonist should be allowed to push his NvaY vvl,4
the
all the means at his command, and his succe-
though purchased by the annihilation of the nativteh's
should be accounted as a victory achieved r
cause of civilisation. This conclusion is, howeve '
by no means so obvious as some would have it a.P:
pear. The Maories stand pre-eminently wdist.:h
guished among the many barbarous races
en
which, in our character as colonists, we have be 3
brought in contact, and Mr. Cardwell rd%ess
generous tribute to the qualities which they P°s" re
and have on all occasions exhibited but Dr
especially in the course of the recent insurreetl.°o.
001
If not to be members of any recognised Polilislevi
community is to be barbarians, then the 0
Zealanders are so ; but if to be chivalrous, hratj;
generous to a captive foe, keenly sensible of hat
difference between right and wrong, between.,,w d
is honourable and what is base, is to be civiloe
then they are entitled to take their place anit
the nations of the world. There never was, for
Cardwell observed, a more fitting opportunlv 10f
effecting a union between an aboriginal and a e?
nising race than that afforded in the settlement' vs
New Zealand, and never would a Government ht
t
more justly exposed itself to opprobrium than 7r.
of this country if it had not attempted to aec;ievt
plish that end. The grant of a constitution to 40
Zealand, and the recognition of the political rig
of the native race, was a wise as well as a Illiraileh
measure, and, if the fruits have not been those "c"-to
were anticipated, the fault is attributable neither to
the Government which devised the scheme, 11°1.10..
those who were intended to benefit by it. Thetelcieg
nists treated with disdain the notion of p 1.,.
equality, and the natives were not sufficiently
iva 1113
barous to feel indifferent about being ign° • re-
short time arose a collision between'the two m
the
spect to territorial rights. The colonists assurued
power of adjudicating in their own cause, ajj+,oolls
insurrection was the consequence. We sent .1.
a?
to their assistance; but are we to do so allevt
The home Government reply, No. There are be.
Zealand all the materials for an amalga,matiolltary
tween the races ; and if, as the Colonial secretapd
pointed out, we give the colonists to undFrisi the
that they must make their own terms wiv
natives, and not rely on us to assist in externain‘ater
them, they will not improbably act with gr`ooo-
prudence for the future, and avoid exciting this
flicts the issue of which may be doubtful. 11,..1 wiD4
view, the Government intend gradually withcu3sal 0f
the troops which have been placed at the disP° t the
the colonists, and by this means it is hoped til3 self-
settlers will be taught the great lesson °f
reliance, and in time initiated in the first pi,—
of self-government.