The Sun.
London, England, 1862-11-15 00:00:00

HOPS.

This was a special case stated for the purpose of
ascertaining whether certain hop grounds in the
parish of B instead were liable to the extraordinary
tithe or rent-charge on hops. The defendant had
distrained for the extraordinary rent-charge, and
the defendant had replevied. The plaintiff was the
owner and occupier of certain waste lands, which
were afterwards enclosed, and in 1855 were culti-
vated as hop grounds. The defendant became the
vicar of the parish in 1854, and was so now, and ho
claimed to be entitled to the extraordinary rent-
charge in lieu of tithes for the cultivation of the
land as hop ground.
Mr. Coleridge, Q.C., for the plaintiff, said the
tithes of the parish has been apportioned, and the
6th and 7th Wm. IV., chap. 71, the Tithe Commu-
tation Act, expressly enacted that in the case of
hops and market gardens there should be an extra-
ordinary apportionment during the time the land
was so cultivated. In this case the land paid no
tithe, and the learned counsel contended that no
additional or extraordinary charge could be
made ; that immediately after an apportionment
was made waste land could be brought into hop
cultivation without being liable to any additional
charge. The policy of the state in passing the
Tithe Commutation Act was to further the
breaking up of waste lands and their cultivation.
The learned counsel quoted the 40th and 42d sec-
tion, as applicable to the case, and on which it was
necessary their lordships should give their decision :
where nothing was paid there could not be an ad-
ditional charge.
Mr. Mellish, Q.C., for the defendant, urged the
liability of the land to the amount of additional
tithe claimed. There was a provision that where a
person ceased to grow hops the additional rent
charge should cease. The additional rent-charge
was so much as the land (though otherwise tithe
free from being waste land broken up) ought to pay
for the cultivation of hops, which was a very profit-
able cultivation.

After hearing the lengthened arguments of the
learned counsel,

The Lord Chief justice said he was of opinion
that the judgment should betfor the defendant. The
case turned upon the question whether the tithe on
the plaintiff's land, in respect of which this addi-
tional rent-charge was demanded, had been com-
muted under the Tithe Commutation Act. He was
of opinion that it had. The land at the time of the
commutation was waste land, but it had since been
applied to the cultivation of hops. The 42d sec.
specially applied to hops, and whilst it increased
the rent-charge, where the cultivation was changed
from the cultivation of general agricultural produce
to that of hops, it decreased to the original charge
when the growth of hops was discontinued. It was
admitted that the land was newly cultivated, and
the 42d section stated " That all lands the tithes
whereof shall have been commuted under this act,
and which shall be newly cultivated as hop grounds
or market gardens at any time after such commu-
tation, shall be charged with an additional amount
of rent-charge per imperial acre." The land at the
time of the apportionment of the parish did not pro-
duce any titheable production, and consequently
the commissioner in apportioning the tithe set the
figure "nought" against it, and it was said that
that was no commutation of the tithes. He thought
the term " apportionment" had been confounded
with " commutation." The land in question was
liable to tithe, if at that time it had produced any-
thing that was the subject-matter of tithe, That
liability to pay tithe had been extinguished, and in
that sense there had been, it appeared to him, a
commutation. In what sense did the act use the word
" commutation," in contradistinction to that of ap-
portionment P It spoke of the tithes of a parish
being commuted into a rent-charge, which was ascer-
tained with regard to the general titheable value of
land in a given parish, and that then the rent-
charge was to be apportioned according to the seve-
ral portions of land that were to be so charged.
That had been done in this case, and the tithes of
the parish had been for ever commuted into a rent-
charge, The liability of the land in question to pay
tithe had been extinguished by the commutation of
the tithe • and how then could it be said that the
tithe of the land in question had not been commuted?
This land did not remain liable to tithes, because
they had been commuted, and the reason why, in
apportioning the rent-charge, it did not pay any-
thing was because it had not paid anything for
seven years previous —not from any want of its lia-
bility, but simply because it had not produced any-
thing that was the subject of tithe. His judgment
was for the defendant.

Mr. Justice Wightman was of a contrary opinion.
The clause referred to an additional rent-charge.
Now, as there was no rent-charge on this land he was
unable to see how the section imposing an additional
charged applied. His judgment was for the
plaintiff.
Mr. Justice Blackburn and Mr. Justice Mellor
also gave judgment for the defendant.
Judgment for the defendant.
YOUNG V. MACRAE—LIBEL.

This was a demurrer to a declaration for libel
claiming special damages in the depreciations of the
plaintiff's paraffin oil, by the publication of a circu-
lar which stated, " I certify that I have carefully
tested the above oil, and find it a colourless and
somewhat aromatic liquid, while Young's Scotch
has a reddish brown and has a more disagreeable
odour,"

Mr. Millward supported the demurrer, contend-
ing that no action would lie.
Mr. Edward James, Q.C., opposed the demurrer.
The contents of the circular were disparaging, and
had injured the plaintiff in his business, which was
clearly libellous. It drew an unfavourable compa-
rison, both with regard to colour and smell, between
the plaintiff's oil and the defendant's.
The Lord Chief Justice said he did not consider
the circular libellous. It was very much like the
advertisements about cod liver oil. One recom-
mended his as being colourless and tasteless, and
another as brown cod liver oil. (Laughter.) Each
relied on his peculiar colour.,
Mr. James—Perhaps each libels the other.
(Laughter.) It was not to be assumed such adver-
tisements were not libellous because no actions had
been brought.
Mr. Justice Blackburn said the circular was no
more than saying "My wares are better than
yours."
The Lord Chief Justice said the judgment of the
Court was in favour of the demurrer. He was far
from saying that, if a man feloniously and
maliciously disparaged an article manufactured or
sold by another man (without casting any imputa-
tion on his personal or professional character), and
special damage arose, that an (ration would not lie.
A grievous wrong so inflicted on another ought not
to be without its remedy by means of an action.
This declaration did not allege facts sufficient to
support it.
The other learned Judges concurred.
Mr. James asked to be allowed to amend.
The Lord Chief Justice declined. The learned
counsel must bring another action_ The easiest way
to settle the question was for the plaintiff to get
another professor to give another report. (Laughter.)
Judgment for the defendant.
THE GUARDIANS OF THE SOCIETY OF KEELMEN OF