The Sun.
London, England, 1862-04-18 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, FRIDAY EVENING, APRIL 18, 1862.

to the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and to
leave him a copy."
The following is a translation of a despatch from
the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the
Danish Missions at Berlin and Vienna, dated Co-
penhagen, March 12, 1862 :
"In the despatch of the Bth of last month, with
which you are already acquainted, the Prussian Mi-
nister of Foreign Affairs (Austrian Minister) dwells
upon the uselessness of recriminations and fruitless
polemics. I fully share his opinion in this respect,
and will prove that I do so by the present com-
munication. I will therefore try at once to bring
the negotiation back to what was its origin and
primary object. _ _

" The negotiation had its origin in the two Federal
resolutions of March 8, 1860, and Feb. 7, 1861. Its
object is to bring about an understanding as to the
meaning and realisation of the provisional state of
things prescribed for Holstein by the said Federal
resolutions. In connexion with this, these two re-
solutions refer to another Federal resolution of Feb.
11, 1858, stipulating in regard to a definitive ar-
rangement :--` That a state of things should be
brought about in the Duchies of Holstein and Lau-
enburg which conformed to the Federal legislation
and the promises that had been made, especially
securing the independence of the separate constitu-
tions and administrations, and the enjoyment of
equality of rights.'
" If therefore the present negotiation should fulfil
the general wish of preparing the way for a com-
plete, settlement of this long-pending dispute, it
would also have to embrace this other question, and
it would be the more desirable that it should do so,
inasmuch as we have hitherto been unsuccessful in
obtaining from the Confederation any definite ex-
planation as to what it understands by the inde-
pendence and equality of rights of the Duchies of
Holstein and Lauenburg.
" Such is, according to our view, the double object
of the negotiation which was opened last summer,
under the sanction of the Confederation, with the
two German Powers, but the actual commencement
of which we still await.

" We believe that we have made, in our despatch
of October 26, a practical proposition, and which
ought to have been satisfactory, at least, to the
Confederation. For we offered to join in an agree-
ment, by which the Holstein Estates would have
been endowed with a deliberative authority and a
right of voting the subsidies, such as the Diet had
claimed for the Estates, coupled alone with those
conditions which were indispensable if the exist-
ence of the Danish Monarchy should not be com-
promised, or the rights of the other territorial parts
of the Monarchy be trenched upon. On the other
hand, any change in that proposed state of things
would have been made dependent on the free
consent of the Estates, A common constitution,
embracing the German Duchies, and which his Ma-
jesty's Government still continues to hold out to
those Duchies, could not, therefore, be promulgated
without the assent of the Estates. Whether such
an arrangement be designated as provisional or de-
finitive is quite immaterial, for a constitutional
order of things would in this manner at any rate
have been brought about, and one that was not
limited to any defined period, nor susceptible of
being altered otherwise than with the consent of
the Estates themselves. The Estates of Holstein
would consequently have obtained so completely the
position claimed for them that the Confederation
could withdraw from all farther interference in the
matter, with the conviction of having secured to the
fullest extent for the two Federal territories all it
had in view, as the definitive object of the resolu.
tion of February 11, and even more than it had had
any right to claim.

" Instead, however, of submitting to a detailed
examination the proposals made in our despatch of
October 26, the Prussian Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs has preferred to set aside all consideration of
these proposals for the question, 'whether his Majes-
ty's Government regarded itself as still bound by
the declarations it had made in the negotiations of
1852 ?

" Though this question 11,1 s certainly surprised us
it is, nevertheless, some satisfaction to find that the
Prussian Government, on its side, adheres to that
agreement, and the considerations on which it was
founded; for we must confess that it had often ap-
peared to us quite impossible to reconcile the de-
mands of the Germanic Confederation with that
agreement. As for us, we do not hesitate to declare
that his Majesty's Government will, of course, con-
scientiously fulfil every engagement it has con-
tracted. The rule obtains, however, here, as well as
in every other international transaction, that neither
of the contracting parties can claim the right of
ascribing to any of the expressions contained in the
previous correspondence the same validity that
belongs to the stipulations of the final agreement,
which both parties had acknowledged, and that in
case of a difference of opinion, neither of the con-
tracting parties can claim an exclusive right of
interpretation as to the meaning and purport of
that compact, Only in so far as the question con-
cerns the internal affairs of the German Federal
territories is it to be referred to the forum of
the Germanic Confederation, and then only in so
far as it comes within the limits of the Federal law.
Beyond these limits, and especially in regard to the
constitutional relations of those territories to the
collective Danish Monarchy, the question bears
an international chartccr, and can only be
settled by negotiations and agreements, in respect
to which an appeal to the last resort—that of
force, in order to compel a one-sided interpretation
cannot assume the character of a Federal execution.

" When we chiefly refer to general international
rules, which in point of principle cannot be disputed,
the reason for so doing is simply this—that the
question addressed to us has been put in such gene-
ral terms that it excludes all discussion of what was
the real purport of the agreement come to in 1852.
If such a discussion should be desired, we would be
authorised to expect that at least an attempt should
be made to point out' what are the obligations we
are supposed not to have fulfilled. We may take it
for granted that the Prussian Government does not
intend to make us responsible for those Federal
resolutions that have encouraged the Holstein Estates
in their determinate resistance to all and every com-
mon representation, and this in the most direct con-
tradiction with the agreement of 1852 ; for Federal
resolutions, which we have done our best to combat,
and to which we have finally only submitted under
the menace of a Federal execution, which we did
not deem it in the interest of the country to subject
it to.

" If this appeal to the transactions of 1852 should
have been occasioned by a wish to extend the present
negotiation to the affairs of the Duchy of Schleswig,
his Majesty's Government cannot accede to such a
wish. For the present negotiation regards alone a
dispute with the Confederation as to a German
Federal territory, while the affairs of the Duchy of
Schleswig in no wise concern the Confederation.
When the Prussian Minister, nevertheless, now
maintains that it would be only possible in that
manner to substitute a definitive arrangement for a
merely provisional one, I refer him to his own des-
patch, in which the demands made by the Federal
resolution of February 11, 1858, are described as
stipulations for a definitive arrangement,' though
no mention is made either in the said resolution, or
indeed in any other Federal resolution of the affairs
of Schleswig.
"If we cannot consent to give to the present nego-
tion another and a different direction from t hat
which properly belongs to it, we certainly cannot, on
the other hand,' prevent the Prussian Government
from bringing up the question it desires to have dis.
cussed in some other way. The Minister knows
what are our views on the subject from the corre-
spondence exchange in 1860, and the views thus
expressed by us we certainly continue to hold in all
essential points, nor have we any reason for desir-
Ing to avoid It renewed discussion of the subject.
An expression in the despatch of Feb. 8 obliges me,
however, at once to state that it is a complete mis-
take when the Prussian Minister believes to have
discovered in our despatch of Dec. 26 an admission
on our part that the question as to the treatment
of the two nationalities existing in the country had
in any manner whatever been the subject of nego-
tiations in 1851-52.

" It remains to notice the despatch of Feb. 14,
which was handed me at the same time as that of

Feb. 8, and to decline admitting the protest therein
set forth.

"It cannot have escaped the attention of the
Minister with how much solicitude his Majesty's
Government has proceeded in order to avoid any
steps that might in any way affect prejudicially the
pending negotiation concerning the constitutional
position of the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg.
If the Minister will continue to devote his attention
to the proceedings of the Government and Rigs-
raad, he will be convinced of the pains taken to
maintain intact the basis laid down by the Procla-
mation of Jan. 28,1852, in so far as the interference
of the Confederation has not rendered that impos-
sible. He will also notice that the wish expressed
on various sides that the special constitution of the
Duchy of Schleswig should be abrogated and an in-
corporation take place, by extending to the duchy
the constitution of the kingdom, has met with no
encouragement either on the part of the Govern-
ment or of the: Rigsraad. The fears of the
Minister are therefore ground'_ess. As ' the
Prussian Government can,' of course, lay claim
to no right of interfering in the internal affairs
of the Danish Monarchy, or to pronounce judg-
ment on the acts of the Government in such re-
spects,' I may, in conclusion, confine myself to the
remark that a recognition on the part of the Con-
federation of the Rigsraad, which represents only
those territories that do not belong to the Confede-
ration, neither has nor could be demanded, for the
Risgraad does not at all stand in need of such a re-
cognition.

"Having thus, as I believe, sufficiently answered
the question that has been put to his Majesty's Go-
vernment, I trust that the Prussian Minister of
Foreign Affairs will no longer find any reason for
delaying to inform us of his views as to the propo-
sition made in the despatch of October 26 last year,
and that he will especially, clearly and distinctly,
explain in what manner that proposition does not
satisfy the claims of independence and equality of
rights made on behalf of Holstein, and, if so, what
then is the exact position which the Confederation
claims for that territory.
"You will be good enough to bring this despatch
to the knowledge of the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, and leave with him a copy of the same.—l
have the honour, &c., " HALL."

LAW INTELLIGENCE.-April 17.

COURT OF CHANCERY.
(Before the Lord Chancellor.)

HILLS V. THE LIVERPOOL UNITED GAS LIGHT

COMPANY.

The arguments in this part-heard appeal from
an order of the Vice-Chancellor Wood, relating to
an alleged infringement of the plaintiff's patent for
purifying gas, were this morning resumed. The
order complained of directed an issue at law to
ascertain whether the material used by the defend-
ants in the first instance for purifying gas was a
precipitated oxide, and also granted an injunction
restraining the defendants from making use of the
plaintiff's invention in renovating the materials used
by them for the purifying of gas, whether the same
be a precipitated or other hydrated oxide of iron, so
that they may be used over and over again to
purify the gas. It appeared that the material used
by the defendants for purifying the gas was " bog
iron ore," an oxide of iron, the use of which, the
plaintiff contended, was an infringement of his
patent. The defendants, on the other hand, insisted
that the material was a native or natural oxide, and
that the letters patent of the plaintiff only embraced
the use of artificial oxides. The question mainly
depended upon the meaning of the scientific terms
employed by the plaintiff in his specification as com-
pared with their universal or general sense.

Sir H. Cairns and Mr. Druce appeared for the
appellants (the defendants) ; Mr. Rolt, Mr. Grove
(of the common law bar), and Mr. Marten supported
the order of the Court below.

The Lord Chancellor, anterior to the reply, said
that the injunction in its present form could not
stand, as it was founded upon a misapprehension of
the plaintiff's patent,but whether another injunction
having the same effect ought to be substituted was
a question for grave consideration. He had no
hesitation, therefore, in dissolving the injunction,
and would suggest to counsel in his reply to direet
his arguments to what was the meaning intended
by the plaintiff in the phraseology of his specifica-
tion, and also whether it was within human power
and within the scope of human testimony to predi-
cate of the material used by the defendants, that ic
was a " precipitated oxide" within the meaning of
the plaintiff's patent. A third point also arose,
whether, by the revivyfying. process used by the
defendants, a " hydrated oxide" was not formed
within the meaning of that term as described in the
specification of the plaintiff, and therefore amounted
to an infringement of his letters patent.
Sir H. Cairns replied, and
The Lord Chancellor reserved his judgment on
the other part of the motion, and dissolved the in-
junction.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.
Sittings in Banco.
(Before Lord Chief Justice Cockburn and Justices
Crompton, Blackburn, and Mellor.)
BOOTE V. PORTER-MAINTENANCE OF A WIFE.

Mr. Sergeant Ballantine said this was an action
tried recently at Maidstone before the Lord Chief
Justice of the Common Pleas, when the jury re-
turned a verdict for the plaintiff, the amount of
damages to be considered, and settled by the learned
judge. There was no leave reserved to move the
Court, but execution was stayed. He (the learned
sergeant) now moved for a rule nisi for a new trial,
on the ground that the verdict was against the
evidence. The action was brought by the plaintiff
to recover for necessaries supplied to the defendant's
wife. The plea was never indebted, and the defence
was that the wife had committed adultery with a
Major Ross, a married man. The lady herself and
Major Ross were both examined on the trial. Both
of them denied the adultery, but they admitted cer-
tain facts in connection with their conduct. The
lady had left her husband's house on two or three
occasions in complicity with Major Ross, and had
gone to lodgings unknown to her husband, where
she was visited by Major Ross in a false name,
and who represented himself to be her at-
torney. Major Ross, it was proved, was in the
habit of constantly seeing the husband while the
I wife was absent, and he (Major Ross) was visiting
her at her lodging. The husband was extremely
anxious about his wife. He consulted Major Ross
with reference to her conduct, on which occasion
the latter professed to know nothing about her and.
expressed great concern for the husband, yet it ap-
peared he was constantly visiting her at her lodg-
ing. The learned judge in summing up to the jury
put the denial of these facts in an unfavourable
light, and told them that it ought not to have any
effect on their minds, and pointed out evi-
dence on the other side of a conclusive character
that ought to be taken into their consideration. The
summing up, he might say, was in favour of the
defendant, and from what he (the learned counsel)
could gather from it he had no doubt this application
would meet with the Lord Chief Justice's sanction,
The defendant's answer to the case was extremely
strong. There was no doubt that his affection for
his wife was genuine, and he induced her to again
live with him. She was labouring at this time
under a disease for which it was necessary she should
undergo an operation, and a nurse from one of the
hospitals, unknown to all parties, was called in.
The house in which they were lodging was occupied
by an elderly lady and two not very young maiden
ladies, and in consequence of the husband coming to
live with them a great deal of gossip went on, it
being the same lodging where the lady had been
visited by Major Ross; and the three ladies gave
such a detailed account of what had gone on between
the lady and Major Ross that, if true, it would lead
to the belief in the wife's adultery. The defendant i
was unable to account for the non-delivery of cer. I
tain letters which he expected, and on speaking
about it, the little girl said " Oh, mamma gets let-
ters every day." 'The husband then spoke to the
nurse, and it then came out that the wife was re-
ceiving letters from Major Ross through one of the
women, and the nurse further said to him that she
thought he had better not take a house in the coun-
try, as his establishment would soon be broken up.
He next spoke to one of the young ladies, and she
admitted that she was in the habit of receiving
letters under cover for the lady, which she handed
over to her. Her husband then determined to pos-
sess himself of the next letter that came, and accord-
ingly one morning he waited for the postman's arri-
val and got possession of a letter addressed by Maj or
Ross to his wife. The learned counsel read the
letter. It was the same impassioned epistle that
was read on the trial, and referred to the annoyance
it gave him to find that the brute her husband had
accompanied her to the volunteer review at Wim-
bledon. The same night that the husband obtained
possession of the letter the lady left her house, and
passed a greater portion of the night with Major
Ross in walking about the streets. Afterwards the
husband received a letter from his wife imploring
him to take pity on her—to see her if for the last
time, and to let her hear her fate from his own lips.
She also stated she was very ill and prayed him to
grant her that last favour. ;
The Lord Chief Justice said the court would com-
municate with the learned iudge who tried the ease .

before deciding whether or not they would grant a
rule.—Judgment deferred.

WELLS V. WEBBER.-LIBEL.

This was an action for libel tried at the last
Westminster after term sittings before the Lord
Chief Justice Cockburn, when the jury returned al
verdict for the plaintiff, damages £3OO. The plain-
tiff is an eminent practitioner, residing at the West-
end, and the defendant is a retired practitioner, re-
siding at Tunbridge Wells. The action was for
libel, contained in a letter written by the defendant
and published in the Medical Circular. The libel
had reference to a printed lecture, delivered by the
plaintiff at one of the London hospitals, relative to
fistula and ifs treatment, a copy of which he gave
to the boots of the hotel at Buxton, in Derbyshire,
with a request that he would take it to the defen-
dant's bedroom and give it to him. The boots, how-
ever, neglected to do so, and the consequence was
that it was left about on the letter shelf. The prin-
cipal objection to the exposure of the pamphlet was
that it contained engravings regugnant to decency,
and unfit for females and young persons' eyes.
Mr. Webber appeared in person, and moved for
a new trial, on the ground that the plaintiff's state-
ments on the trial were adverse to the facts of the
case.

The Lord Chief Justice said that could not be,
because no evidence was called for the defence.

Mr. Webber bitterly complained that his counsel
acted on the trial contrary to his (Mr. Webber's)
express directions. He tried all he could to induce
his counsel to call him, but he declined. Mr.
Webber then moved for a new trial on affidavits
and misdirection relative to no witnesses being
called for the defence.
The Lord Chief Justice said the letter was the
most malignant one man could pen of another. In
summing up the case to the jury he (the learned
judge) commented on the fact of the defendant's
absence from the witness-box to give any explana-
tions how the pamphlet got exposed to general view,
and the probable inference to be drawn therefrom.
Mr. Webber then proceeded at considerable length
to vindicate his conduct with reference to the writ-
ing and the publication of the letter complained of.
He had a duty to discharge both to society and the
profession in calling attention to the circumstances
connected with the publication of the pamphlet at
Buxton. He had witnesses in court at the time of
the trial—clergymen, members of the legal profes-
sion, and the servants of the hotel, who if called
would have completely altered the complexion of
the case. He had no fear of going into the witness-
<box and urged it with great interest, but his coun-
sel refused to call him or any of his witnesses, and
he (Mr. Webber) complained that he had not been
fairly treated by his counsel.
The Lord Chief Justice said the defendant was
asking the court to do what it had never done be-
fore; that was, when a learned counsel had chosen
to go to the jury without calling witnesses and the
verdict was adverse to him, for the court to grant a
new trial. The defendant in effect now said that his
counsel had betrayed his trust, and he therefore
asked for a new trial in order to open up the whole
of the question. That could not be done.
Mr. Webber said it was hard that he should suf-
fer for the acts of his counsel, especially when he
had acted contrary to express instructions. He
also complained that the learned judge's observa-
tions to the jury had the effect of inducing them to
give heavier damages than they otherwise would
done. The observation that he had not gone into
the box and explained his conduct he thought un-
called for under the circumstances. It was evident
that the plaintiff's desire was more to clutch
coin than vindicate his character, for almost im-
mediately after the trial execution was issued, and
the sheriff's men came to his (Mr. Webber's) house
to seize for the amount. He offered to refer the
matter to professional men, and abide by their
decision ; but Mr. Wells declined. Mr Webber then
proceeded to make a lengthened statement with re-
ference to the plaintiff's connection with the Medi-
cal Journal and other extraneous matters.
The Lord Chief Justice said that the defendant
was then showing by his address that the defen-
dant's counsel had exercised a wise discretion in
not putting him into the box, considering that his
conduct in the box would go to swell and aggravate
the damages.
Mr. Webber then handed in several affidavits,
which were read. They denied the plaintiff's state-
ment with reference to the publication of the pam-
phlet at Buxton.
After hearing the defendant at considerable
length,
The Court refused to grant a rule.
Rule refused.