The Sun.
London, England, 1865-02-03 00:00:00

FRANCE,

BOURSE, Feb. 2.—The market has been heavy
from the opening, and yesterday's prices are with
difficulty maintained. For the Account, Threes
were first done at 67f. 15c., and are now at 67f. 10c.
Mobilier remain nearly the same. The Railway
Shares Market has been tolerably firm, with scarcely
any variation in quotations. The following are
the last quotations :-
4 per Cents 95 75
Do. end month —
3 per Cents. 67 95
Do. end month 67 5
Credit Mobilier 955
Do. end month
Bank Shares 3560
Credit Foncier 1270
Roman 73

Italian Loan 64 90
Do. end month 64 85
Ditto Threes —
New Mexican
Russian —
Austrian
Spanish Threes
Home Debt
Deferred

RAILWAYS.

Cash. Acct.
Orleans
. ___ ••• _
____

Northern lOO5 ... 1006 25
Lyons and Mediterranean.' 940 ... 942 50
Southern 572 50 570
Western 540

Eastern
Sardinian 3OO ... 302 50
Austrian
Lombard 550 548 75
North of Spain 332 50 328 75
Saragossa 397 50 397 50
Ditto to Barcelona lBO

AMERICA.

(REUTER'S EXPRESS.)
(Per the steamer Edinburgh.)

IMPORTANT LETTER OF PRESIDENT
DAVIS ON THE QUESTION OF PEACE.
NEW YORK, Jan. 21, noon.
The following is the text of an important letter
addreseed by Jefferson Davis to several gentlemen :

llicumoND, Va., Nov. 17, 1864.
To the Honourable Senators of Georgia., Messrs. A. R.,
Wright, President Senate, J. L. Guerry, J.M.Cham-

hers, Thos. E. Lloyd, Fred. K. Nast, R. B. Nesbit.

Gentlemen,—l answered by telegram this morning your
letter of 11th inst., as requested, and now respectfully com-
ply with your desire that I should express my views on the
subject to which you invite my attention. In forwarding
to me the resolutions introduced into the House of Repre-
sentatives of Georgia by Mr. Stephens of Hancock, you
state that you are not inclined to favour the passage of these
or any similar resolutions, believing them to have conduced
to create divisions among ourselves, and to unite and
strengthen our enemies ; but that it is asserted in Milledge-
ville that I favour such action on the part of the States,
and would be pleased to see Georgia cast her influence in
that way. You aro kind enough to say that if this be
true, and if the passage of this or similar resolutions
would in the slightest degree aid or assist me in bringing
the war to a successful and speedy close, you will give
them your earnest and hearty support. I return
you my cordial thanks for this expression of
confidence, but assure you that there is no truth in the
assertions which you mention, and I presume that
you will already have seen by the closing part of my
annual Message, which must have reached you since the
date of your letter, that I have not contemplated the use of
any other agencies in treating for peace than that esta-
blished by the Constitution of the Confederate States.
That agency seems to me to be well adapted to its purpose,
and free from the injurious consequences that would follow
any other means that have been suggested. The objection
to separate State action, which you present in your letter,
appears to be so conclusive as to admit of no reply. The
immediate and inevitable tendency of such distinct action
by each State is to create discordant instead of united
counsels—to suggest to our enemies the possibility of a dis-
solution of the Confederacy, and to encourage them by the
spectacle of our divisions to more determined and united
action against us—they would readily adopt the false idea
that some of the States of the Confederacy are disposed to
abandon their sister States and make separate terms of
peace for themselves, and if such a suspicion, however un-
founded, were once engendered among our own people it
would be the destruction of that spirit of mutual confidence
and support which forms our chief reliance for success in
the maintenance of our cause. When the proposal of
separate State action was first mooted it appeared to me
so unpracticable—so void of any promise of good that I
gave no heed to the proposal—but upon its adoption by
citizens whose position and ability gave weight to the
expression of their opinions, I was led to a serious con-
sideration of the subject. My first impressions have not
been changed by reflection. If all the States of the two
hostile federations are to meet in convention it is plain such
a meeting can only take place after an agreement as to time,
place, and terms on which they are to meet. Now, without
discussing the minor, although not trilling difficulties, of
agreeing as to time and place, it is Certain that the States
would never consent to a convention without a previous
agreement as to terms on which they were to meet—the
proposed Convention must meet on the basis either that no
State should, against its own will, be bound by the deci-
sion of the Convention, or that it should be so bound—but
it is plain that an agreement on the basis that no State
should be bound without its consent by the results of the
deliberations, would be an abandonment on the part of the
North of its pretended right of coercion ; would be an abso-
lute recognition of the independence of the several States
of the Confederacy—would be, in a word, so complete a
concession of the rightfulness of our cause that the most
visionary cannot hope for such an agreement in advance of
the meeting of a Convention. The only other possible
basis of meeting is that each State should agree before-
hand to be bound by the decision of the Convention, and
such agreement is but another form of submission to
Northern dominion, as we well know in such Convention
we should be outnumbered nearly two to one on the
very threshold of the scheme proposed. Therefore we
are met by an obstacle which cannot be removed. Is not
the impracticable character of the project apparent ?
You will observe that I leave entirely out of view the sug-
gestion that a Convention of all the States of both Federa-
tions should be held by common consent without any pre-
vious understanding as to the effect of its decisions—should
meet merely to debate and pass resolutions that are to bind
no one. It is not supposed that this can really be the mean-
ing attached to the proposal by those who are active in its
support, although the resolutions to which you invite my
attention declare the function of such a Convention would
be fikarly to propose e, plan of peace with the celieent Of

the two belligerents, or in other words to act as negocia-
tors in treating for peace. This part of the scheme is not
intelligible to me—if the Convention is only to be held
with the consent of the two belligerents, that consent can-
not be obtained without negotiation—the plan then would
resolve itself into a scheme that the two Governments
should negotiate an agreement for the appointment of ne-
gotiators to make proposals for a treaty. It seems much
more prompt and simple to negotiate for peace at once than
to negotiate for the appointment of negotiators who are to
meet without power to do anything but make proposals. If
the Government of the United States is willing to snake
peace it will treat for peace directly; if unwilling, it
will refuse to consent to a Convention of the States.
The author of these resolutions and those who concur
in his views, appear to me to commit the radical error
of supposing that the obstacle to obtaining the peace
which we all desire consists in the difficulty of finding
proper agencies for negotiating, so that the whole scope of
the resolutions ends in nothing but suggesting that if the
enemy will treat, the best agency will be the State delegates
to a Convention ; whereas, the whole and only obstacle is
that the enemy will not treat at all or entertain any other
proposition than that we should submit to their yoke,
acknowledge that we are criminals, and appeal to tneir
mercy for pardon. After this statement of objections it
may appear superfluous to add others of less gravity ; but,
as you invite a full expression of my views, I will add that
history is replete with instances of the interminable diffi-
culties and delays which attend the attempt to negotiate
on great and conflicting interests where the parties to the
negotiation are numerous ; if this has been the case where
the partiest possessed full powers to conclude a treaty, what
can we hope from an assemblage of negotiators from 30 or
40 States, who, in the midst of an exasperating warfare,
are to meet without power to conclude anything. In the
history of our country we find that in a time of profound
peace, when the most cordial brotherhood of sentiment
existed, and where a long and bloody war had been brought
to a triumphant close, it required two years to assemble a
convention and bring its deliberations to an end, and another
year to procure the ratification of their labours. With
such a war as the present in progress the views of the large
assemblage of negotiators proposed would undergo con-
stant changes, according to the vicissitudes, according
to the struggle, and the attempt to secure concordant views
would soon be abandoned, and leave the parties more em-
bittered than ever, less hopeful of the possibility of suc-
cessful negotiations. Again, how is the difficulty result-
ing from the conflicting pretensions of the two.belligerents
in regard to several of the States to be overcome. Is it
supposed that Virginia would enter into a Convention with
a delegation from what our enemies choose to term the
State of West Virginia, and thus recognise an insolent and
violent dismemberment of her territory ? Or would the
United States consent that West Virginia should be de-
prived of her pretensions to equal rights, after having for-
mally admitted her as a State and allowed her to vote at a
Presidential election ? Who would send a delegation from
Louisiana, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri? The enemy
claim to hold the Governments of those States, while we
assert them to bo members of the Confederacy. Would
delegates be received from both sides? If so, there would
soon be a disruption of the convention. If delegates are
received from neither side, then a number of the States
most vitally interested in the result would remain unre-
presented ; and what value could be attached to mere re-
commendations of a body of negotiators under such circum-
stances ? Various other considerations suggest themselves,
' but enough has been said to justify my conclusion that
the proposal of separate State action is unwise, imprac-
ticable, and offers no prospect of good to counterbalance its
• manifold injurious consequences to the cause of our
country.—Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

A Washington despatch of the 20th says Francis
P. Blair, senior, left this afternoon on the Govern-
ment steamer Don for City Point. Thence he will
go on a flag of truce boat to Varina Landing, on
the James River, where a permit is waiting him to
return to the rebel capital.
The Cabinet were in session several hours to-day,
and it is understood that their conference related to
the movements of this gentleman. Nothing, how-
ever, is known of the powers, if any, with which he
is clothed, or the precise objects which it is ex-
pected he will accomplish.
General Sherman has issued the following
order :

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS—No. 12.
HEADQUARTERS.
Military Division of the Mississippi, in the Field
Savannah, Ga., Jan. 14, 1865.

It being represented that the Confederate army
and armed band of robbers, acting professedly under•
the anthority of the Confederates, are harassing
the people of Georgia, and endeavouring to intimi-
date them in the efforts they are making to secure
to themselves provisions, clothing, security to life
and properly, and the restoration of law and good
government in the State, it is hereby ordered and
made public :—First, That the farmers of Georgia
may bring into Savannah, Fernandina, or
Jacksonville, Fla., marketing, such as beef, pork,
mutton, vegetables ofiany kind, fish, &c., as well as

cotton in small quantities, and sell the same in open
market, except the cotton, which must be sold by
or through the Treasury agents, and may invest the
proceeds in family stores, such as bacon and flour,
in any reasonable quantities ; groceries, shoes, and
clothing, and articles not contraband of war, and
carry the same back to their families. No trade
store will be attempted in the interior, or stocks of
goods sold for them; but families may club together
for mutual assistance and protection in going and

coming. _Second. The people are encouraged to meet
together in peaceful assemblages to discuss measures
looking to their safety and good government, and
the restoration of state and national authority, and
will be protected by the national army when doing
so ; and all peaceable inhabitants, who satisfy the
commanding officers that they are earnestly labour-
ing to that end, must not only be left undisturbed
in property and person, but must be protected, as far

as possible, consistent with the military operations.
If any farmer, or peaceful inhabitant is molested by
the enemy, viz., the Confederate army, or guerillas,
because of his friendship to the National Government,
the perpetrator, if caught, will be summarily punished,
or his family made to suffer for the outrage, but if the
crime cannot be traced to the actual party, then re-
taliation will be made on the adherents to the cause
of the rebellion. Should a Union man be murdered,
then a rebel selected by lot will be shot ; or, if a
Union family be persecuted on account of the cause,
a rebel family will be banished to a foreign land.
In aggravated cases retaliation will extend as high
as five to one.
All commanding officers will act promptly in
such cases and report their action after the retalia-
tion is done.

By order of
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN.
L. M. Dayton, Assist.-Adjutant-General.
The other items of news have been anticipated by
the Express per Nova Scotian.