The Sun.
London, England, 1853-09-27 00:00:00


<

:
-7
•
t`'
—4l
."„
-
-
, •
s,
firy
the 0-
i
Sr ' „ ,
,
( •,:4;
r% 4, 4 " , • . , _
for ea -a,
4,4 k ,I`,l +0
:.;Ar •c , }=2.,11 y 1,41,
'il -1-3.-A*o' •A" r•'''f4lllllL',. 111111 - \j‘:;!!‘.L., • Ivi,ne fr ,
5,00 3111-'4l DIEIIJ 44 „ in 4 g' e

r PRICE SD.

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.
( From the Morning Chronicle.)
The intelligence of the passing of the Dardanelles
by a portion of the combined squadrons, is, in
every point of view, of a most important character.
That attempts should be made to misrepresent its
bearing, and to draw an argument in favour of the
abandonment of their ally by the Western Powers,
even from the fact of their partial advance to a
position of more effective aid, can surprise no one
who has watched the course of the present trans-
actions, and the tone from time to time adopted
by some who have taken part in their discussion.
Instead of deducing inferences to the disadvantage
of the Porte, from the passing of the Dardanelles
by a portion of the fleet, it is more to the purpose
to consider the nature of the step itself. We are
not yet at war, and it is still possible that, if not
the moderation, the prudence of Russia—which is
at least capable of measuring material forces and
estimating chances—may stand between the world
and the calamities which would be due exclusively
to her criminal ambition. But the passing of the
Dardanelles, by an armed squadron, itself indicates
the non-existence of peace. It goes back for its
justification to the day when the Russian armies
crossed the Pruth. The invasion of the Princi-
palities created not merely a " casus belli," but a
state of war. All existing conventions between
the Porte and Russia, and which were participated
in by other Powers, were potentially determined
by that act of aggression. The Porte and the other
Powers who were parties to the engagements were
thenceforth absolutely free to consider what course
was demanded by their own interest and honour.
This was explicitly declared in the dispatches of
Lord Clarendon and M. Drouyn de Lhuys. It
is now declared even more explicitly by the act of
the Allied Powers. Ships of war, English and.
French, have passed the Dardanelles ; and the im-
mediate purpose or ultimate consequences of that
measure in no way affect its present importance.
If the next mail from the East should bring us in-
telligence that the whole of the fleet has sailed to
Constantinople, no feeling will be more general than
that of regret that the step was not taken earlier.
Such a feeling, however natural and general, never-
theless may not be well founded. But, in any
case, we can scarcely fail to profit by a forbearance
which has at least made manifest to the world the
contrast between the spirit that has actuated Russia,
on the one side, and the Western powers on the
other. It cannot be said that our Government
has been over forward to remove the mask with
which that Power now no longer affects to con-
ceal her purpose, and by leaving its removal to her
own hand, her unscrupulous violence has been
more effectually opposed. It was as well that every
argument on behalf of Russia should have been
exhausted, in order that she herself might answer
them all. It is not to be regretted that her advo-
cates should find themselves at last under the ne-
cessity of admitting the entire justice of the inter-
pretation put by all impartial men upon her
previous conduct. To those who, with ourselves,
appreciated from the beginning the importance of
the modifications suggested by the Porte in the
Vienna Note, it must be satisfactory to meet with
the elaborate proofs now, somewhat gratuitously,
volunteered, that the demands which those modifi-
cations were intended to bar are utterly inadmis-
sible. The reality of these exactions can no longer
be denied, when they are explicitely avowed and
maintained by the party demandinc, them. They
are such, it is now admitted, as the Porte cannot
concede.
What then follows ? It has been said that the
fanatical mob of Constantinople is highly excited
against the Frank residents, but it should be recol-
lected that such excitement has arisen solely from
the dread of an acceptance of terms equivalent to
the original Russian demand. The fanaticism
which might, • perhaps, call itself patriotism, is
roused against a conclusion so ignominious, that
even the detractors of the Porte do not consider it
as possible, now that all doubts as to its meaning
have been removed bythe explicit exposition of Count
Nesselrode. Now that the absolute justice of the
cause of the Sultan can no longer be disputed, the next
resource of the friends of the Czar is to discourage
all sympathy for those who are admitted to be in
the right. Therefore is it that the advance of a
portion of the fleet is represented as a measure of
protection against ignorant and fanatical barba-
rians, scarcely less ready to shed the blood of their
friends than that of their enemies. Even if the
motive thus assigned for the advance of the ships
were the true one. tbo Question in dispute would
not be affected. Were it, mdeed, needful to in-
crease public indignation against the overbearing
injustice of the aggressive Power —against the
wicked and reckless selfishness which has hazarded
or wrecked the peace of the world—a fertile theme
for the purpose might be found in the charge
brought against the Turks, for if the lives and pro-
perty of English or French Christians have been
exposed to peril from fanatical violence, unpro-
voked and wanton aggression on an unoffending
neighbour is alone to blame. Some accounts speak
of the activity of Russian agency in fomenting
Mussulman excitement in the city of the Sultan.
We are not forced to attribute to the Russian
Cabinet the fiendish wickedness of deliberately pre-
paring the probable consequences of an outbreak,
although it would be a gross injustice to their fore-
sight to doubt that such a contingency has come
within their contemplation. Indeed, if the guilt
of such a deed were to be attributed to him who
would derive all the advantage of it, it would not
be difficult to discover the criminal. Were Chris-
tian blood to stain the streets of Constantinople,
that blood would be in all senses on the head of
him who would first and alone draw profit from
the lamentable occurrence. But there is, we hope,
no ground for anticipating such a gain to the side
of the evil-doer. The righteous indignation of the
Turks has been expressed with some violence, in-
deed, and precautionary measures have been wisely
taken. But the excitement prevailing has not in-
duced the Sultan to cut the knot of his perplexing,
position by any premature step. Whether his mo-
deration will be able to endure the terms in which
the rejection of the Emperor is conveyed, and the
reasons by which it is attempted to be justified, we
do not pretend to anticipate.
As the effect on the determination of the Sultan
and his advisers of the last Notes from St. Peters-
burgh will shortly be known, it is superfluous to spe-
culate on it. Should they find from the language,
and still more from the tone of these Notes, that
peace has become incompatible with the national
honour, we shall not waste words in proving that
their construction of the documents would be at
least excusable. Or should the Emperor not even
wait until the glove which he has thrown down is
lifted—should the reported movement of the Rus-
sians be really a commencement of operations on
the side of Servia—in either contingency it is not
improbable that our lengthened and persevering
efforts for the preservation of peace will have been
made in vain. The best chance of its maintenance
lies in the conviction of the Emperor that there are
rest of peace,--but limits to our forbearance, and consequently limits
to his power. For this reason, we shall, in the in-
terest of peace, gladly hear that the portion of the
joint fleet which has already sailed has been fol-
lowed by the remainder.
In a
l u thegh itsinterest
various andac e;—b
ru -ct vehng there
ig features
interests also. The elements of the question—
have now engaged general attention for seven
months, are simple, few, and comprehensible. Not
only are they comprehensible, but they are, to a
degree not unusual in foreign questions, fully ean are other
com-
prehended by the people of England. The Peace
Society, and those who have represented them, on
this occasion, on the one side, and the concealed,
or avowed, advocates of Russia, on the other, have
spoken, indeed, perseveringly, fully, loudly, and
without an echo. But, with these exceptions,
there has been but one feeling in this country upon
the subject. That feeling is a desire to maintain
intact the status quo—the rights of our ally and
our own—to defend our obvious interests and our
obvious honour : if it can be done, by peaceful
diplomacy—if not, " quocunque inodo." We are
not often of accord with Mr. Urquhart, but we
agree with him that the nation which adopts the
principle, of peace at any price paralyses, by that
principle its assertion of every other. There are
some things, though not many, better than peace.
If we betray fear or doubt respecting the mainten-
ance of what we declare to be right, it is nit on the
Bosphorus only that we shall soon have rights to
maintain or to abandon.

t stop at Purfleet.
all parts of London

to arrival of the fol-
t Station.

(From Ben's Weekly Messenger.)

The Czar, the Sultan, and the Pope are likely to
give the world some trouble. The affairs of the
latter have become unwieldy and uncertain. He
has meddled everywhere, and disturbed almost
every non-Romish country in Europe ; he may yet
live to experience the recoil of his desperate doings.
Need we refer to his interference in Britain, in
Prussia, or in Holland ? Or need we inquire by
what agency " the question of shrines" evoked the
ambitions rivalry of the Czar, and drew forth J 314

pretentious dent s upon the Sultan ? tit be
understood that we have no more sympathy with
\e Sultan than must necessarily be created by his
',nd gentlemanlike conduct throughout
the crisis in which he has become involved—con-
duct, let us add, infinitely superior to that of the
so-called civilised and Christian statesmen, who
fancy they have found it to be expedient for the
peace of Europe to play him false and leave him to
play him false and leave him to his fate.
But what shall we say of the Czar ? Why, we
will give him his just due, and say of him that he
is a man of progress. No one, we apprehend, who
will look at what has been done in modern times
for the aggrandisement of Russia, her interests, and
her territory, will deny him to be so. The Swede,
the Pole, and the Turk can all testify to his cha-
racter in this respect--albeit his policy is prohibi-
tory and himself an autocrat ; and if it is not un-
natural that France and Britain should just now
perceive that it was a grand mistake on their part
not to check the growth of his power, when the
outraged rights of Poland gave them a fair oppor-
tunity for so doing, it is all the more inexplicable
how France and Great Britain can at present de-
lude each other and themselves into the belief, that
it is at this moment expedient for the peace of Eu-
rope to allow this last opportunity to escape them,
and as with Poland so with Turkey, desert her at
her utmost need, and leave the Sultan to fight his
own battle.

Never was there an error more fatal to the peace
of Europe. We pass by all the demands of Russia,
upon the Sultan. We will go at once to the present
position of affairs, and we will take for granted that
in the vain and delusive hope that " the peace of
Europe " requires it, the end of these negotiations
will divulge to us, that the Sultan, having been
entrapped by Lavalette, bullied by Menschikoff,
cajoled by Aberdeen, befriended by Austria, and
sold and sacrificed at Vienna, is finally to be de-
serted by his friends " the Great Powers," and is
to be left to fight it out alone with the Czar.
Now we give it as our deliberate and thoughtful
opinion that, supposing this to be so, more war
will arise out of such perfidious and pusillanimous
conduct than could possibly happen, if the confer-
ring Powers at Vienna should boldly and at once
declare that on the Turkish side of the Pruth no
Russian soldier should remain. These Powers
would then be fully and fairly understood, they
would be pledged to united action, and the conse-
quence would be there would be no war ; or if it
should so happen that fight with Russia they must,
at most there would be only one war, and that
war neither protracted nor doubtful. But let
them retreat from their position as the allies of the
Sultan, and the game of Russia will be further
promoted. Coldness and division between the
Powers of the Conference will, if we rightly under-
stand the aspect of affairs, find a speedy stimulant
in fierce hostility between Austria and France.
Yes, " leave Turkey to fight her own battle," anti
does not Nicholas know that the French at Rome
are thorns in the side of Austria, and that the
influence of Austria with the Pope is gall to the
uncrowned Emperor of the French ? Well know-
ing this, the Russian Autocrat is gone to Olmutz.
He will meet there the Emperor of Austria. Nei-
ther of them have much love for a French military
despotism. Each of them has reason for remem-
bering a French Empire and a former Napoleon.
Need we draw the obvious inference, when these
two Emperors are to meet—the one desirous that
Turkey may be left to fight her own battle, while
the other wants no French soldiers in Italy ?
It is useless to disguise the state of European
affairs. It is far better to look the danger in the face,
and exercise, even in itspresence, that honestywhich
is ever the best policy. Had this been done in the
first instance, the question of shrines " would
not have become the question of peace or war to
Europe. Had it been done, even at second hand,
the course of Russia had ere now been checked, if
not effectually curbed. But now, at the eleventh
hour, the Czar perceives the advantages that are
his. " The Powers" are shaken, and the Auto-
crat—no man more so—is fully aware that France
has fallen back upon that form of government
whose only traditional glory is that of war and
conquest. If he can divert the hostility of France
from himself, and direct its force upon Austria
and upon the countries of the Rhine,*occupation
is at once found for the French ; Britain is drawn
into the vortex on behalf of Belgium ; Prussia will
have to maintain her own position, if she can ;
Austria (his future quarry 0 is hopelessly embroiled
and weakened, never again to recover strength ;
and the Sultan is left to fight his own battle with
the Czar.

He will probably do so to his cost. Left to the
support only of his own people, his grand defiles
of the Balkan will be the graves alike of Mussul-
man and Cossack. Grim as the Khyber Pass,
their passage may be fiercely disputed against the
Russians on the north; but with the fleets of France
and Britain in other waters than those to the east
of the Bosphorus, where they ought to be, it is
not difficult to see that the Balkans may have to
be defended on the south as well as on the north,
and that with the country of the Don and the
Volga beyond the Crimea, and immediately in the
roar of the _ _Ructaigazi head-quarters, the Autocrat
may not only pour down his forces from the north
upon the Danube and the Balkan, but also from
the Crimea and the Sea of Azof upon Constanti-
nople itself. He may cross the Danube—he cannot
pass the Balkans—he cannot set foot to the south
of those passes—he cannot enter the Bosphorus—
he cannot attack Constantinople—unless they leave
Turkey to fight her own battle.

But once they do that, and Turkey may be gal-
lant, but she is doomed. Then may we attempt to
roll back Russia in vain. The Black Sea is then a
Russian lake, into which none but Russia may
enter. The Dardanelles is then Russia's own pecu-
liar channel, through which whatever she may
plan behind it will be developed in the Archipe-
lago and the Mediterranean. Egypt, Greece, and
Syria are then within his sight—the Khuban no
longer his boundary in Asia. What the Danube
is to him, the Euphrates may be, and most
probably will be. He is then far on his way to
British India, and the Persian Gulf will become to
him what the Black Sea has been hitherto—a new
nursery to rear his young brood of gigantic plans
on the future. Let Britain look to it. The worst
half of the overland journey will then lie beyond
the Isthmus of Suez, and to reach even that
isthmus may involve another question, and with
it, " the peace of Europe."
For the Czar is a man of progress. Mentschikoff
is his arbitrator, Nesselrode his negotiator, and
the Moscow school his Peace Society ! Tell us of
progress and talk of arbitration ? Why, this is
the age of gigantic Northern development and of
peddling pigmyism in the West. The progress of
Europe is monopolised. It is the progress of the
Man of the North upon the old Empire of Impe-
rial Rome, and the Sultan alone it is who has the
manliness to resist him !

(From the Edinburgh Flying Post.)
The Eastern question has advanced into a far-
ther stage of complication, the natural consequence
of the imbecile, if not treacherous, diplomacy of
the four powers, as evolved by the double-dealing
policy of Russia. It may be affirmed, with truth,
that out of the British Cabinet there are not ten
men in the country in any way surprised at the
incidents which have now transpired. On the part
of our Government there appear to be few, if any,
symptoms of a determination to meet the emer-
gency by adequate measures. The arguments of
the Times tend to the abandonment of Turkey to
its fate and we cannot perceive in the other
Ministerialjournals that any more decided course
is in contemplation. The whole of these, indeed,
have either sadly miscalculated pr been grossly
misinformed ; for the negotiations from which they
promised so much have ended in nothing, or rather
in aggravating the evils and dangers they were
designed to avert. We cannot, therefore, place
any faith in the speculations or vaticinations of
journals which have so conspicuously committed
the most palpable errors, and credulously listened
to the deceptive whisperings of a Government too
apt and ready to leave them in the lurch. What
matters it that Lord Palmerston, through the
columns of the Morning Post, indulges in such
" brave words" as these :—" The
.expedients. of
negotiation are exhausted, and the period of action
has arrived. Questions of words and disputes.
about formalities may be set aside as nothing to
the purpose. The point now at issue. is,. whether
Russia shall be successful in the design winch she cm
no longer hide, of forcibly seizing on the rights of
Turkey ; or, whether England and France, bound
as they are by obligations repeatedly avowed and
continually strengthened, shall prove that they
possess the will, as they undoubtedly have the
power, to reduce that design to the ignominy of
failure in attemptel crime.

THE CAIRNGORM CLIPPER.—This fine ship, built ex-
pressly by the Messrs. Hall, of Aberdeen, to compete
with the fastest of the American clippers, has made the
voyage to China in 72 days from Lisbon, or 77 from
London. This is the quickest voyage yet made to China.
The Cairngorm had the misfortune to lose her mainmast
on her passage out, and was obliged to refit at Lisbon ,•
when the weather was favour-
yet, notwithstanding this hindrance, she distanced all
miles an hour, and delivering her
ha
be
ire
,c oamt p
thee ti troLse,
os sailing, i n 4 g,
cargo in a most perfect state.
GLASS FOR RAILWAY STATIONS.—The economical
cost of glass, occasioned by the removal of the duty, has
induced the directors of the Birmingham, Woverhamp-
ton, and Dudley, and other railways centring in Bir-
mingham, to have the great station in New-street con-
structed of fluted glass, and the same covering is to be
generally adopted in the railway statioue botwoen
Madrid and Barcelona.

_