The Sun.
London, England, 1865-08-26 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE-PUBLIC JOURNALS.

TIMES.--Several events, both in the New and in
the Old World, have thrown so much light upon
engagements of a not very exact character and with-
out any very substantial guarantee, that we are be-
ginning to look upon them with more philosophy
and with less passion than we used to do. It is
found that under such circumstances an International
Treaty means nothing at all, and a Federal Consti-
tution has yet to be interpreted and defined. Our
present relations with our self-governing colonies—
the British American in particular—are just of that
sort, not knowing quite what they are, we are con-
tent to abide the decision of events. There are cer-
tain names that we know ; and there are certain
reciprocal duties, so we are told ; but there are
several untrodden regions of astronomical science
than an. Englishman is more likely to enter upon
that an inquiry into the connexion between Eng-
land and Canada. The general impression of the
British people, fostered, it must be admitted, by the
conduct of the colonies, is that the Canadians have
the entire responsibility of their own affairs. Our
fathers, or rather ourgrandfathers and grandmothers,
were content with nothing less than giving laws to
the ocean, constitutions to all countries, hard blows
to our neighbours, and minute rules, conceived in
the most motherly spirit, to our colonies. We have
had to unlearn all this, so now we are rather afraid
of our engagements with Canada and her colonial
neighbours. We have wholly shaken off the weak-
ness of pride, and are aware that if our existing con-
tract with our American Provinces is worth one half-
penny in the open market of the world, the colo-
nies will insist upon its surrender and upon the
substitution of another contract which shall not be
worth that one half-penny to us. It is only, then,
when the subject is positively forced upon us that
we can bring ourflelves to reflect on it. The
colonies insist on knowing what we mean, though
they have not the slightest idea what they mean
themselves, and have been trying to bring our Go-
vernment to the point—that is, if there be a point
in the question. So there has been a mission, and
negotiations, and a report to the Colonial Parlia-
ment; and the British public have no choice but to
look into the affair. After the above remarks, it is
almost needless to say that we have directed our
attention chiefly to the positive and definite guaran-
tees which the Canadian delegates have taken back
from the British Government. The first bit of hard
ground that we come to in their report crops up
rather abruptly. "In the course of these discus-
sions," they say, " the question of the Intercolonial
Railway came up as a necessary accompaniment of
Federation, when we sought and obtained a renewal
of the promised Imperial guarantee of a loan for
the construction of that work." The amount of the
loan is not stated, nor its proportion to the estimated
cost. We presume that this, and a good deal more,
will be known before the loan has the sanction of our
Parliament. Financial assistance, however, towards
a work of peace, though with a political bearing,
is a far less invidious proceeding than one for a
military purpose. All things considered, the British
public will enter upon this part of the question
without prejudice, but with a determination to
know all about it, and to have security that their
money shall not be quite thrown away. Passing
over some reflections of the delegates upon the
opinions expressed in the British Parliament and
elsewhere, we next come to dry land upon the de-
fences. The mood here used is conditional, and
we most heartily wish that the Canadians may so far
fulfil the condition annexed as to compel us to fulfil
our part of the engagement. " The result arrived
at was that, if the people of Canada undertook the
works of defence at and west of Montreal, and
agreed to expend in training their militia, until the
union of the Provinces was determined, a sum not
less than is now annually expended for that service,
Her Majesty's Government would complete the
fortifications of Quebec, provide the whole arma-
ment for all the works, guarantee a loan for the sum
necessary to construct the works undertaken by
Canada, and, in the event of war, undertake the
defence of any portion of Canada with all the re-
sources of the Empire." This is a considerable
engagement, but, as we observe, it is conditional,
and we are not quite sure that, even if its terms be
correctly stated, the Imperial Government will ever
have to pay one sixpence in virtue of it. So long as
the British provinces are really anxious to keep up
the British connexion, and prove that anxiety by
their conduct, the whole British people and the
Government at home will feel an equal anxiety, and
will be ready to make corresponding sacrifices. This
is the language of national feeling and of common
sense. Of course, too, we all feel at home that these
Provinces may be involved in war through no fault
of their own, but simply by following the fortunes
and sharing the quarrels of the Mother Country.
.With a view to that emergency we must wish to
prepare against attack on the St. Lawrence, as we
do at any other outlying and vulnerable part of our
Empire. But even this general principle is qualified
by some important considerations. We do not
think it necessary or prudent to defend every point
at which an enemy might land, or all the property
which he might be able to destroy. On the contrary,
at the outbreak of a war the belligerents always
select by professional rules and advice what they
will defend and what they will leave to the protec-
tion of that humanity which is the proper defence of
wholly indefensible positions in the immediate
power of a foe. It is by diversions and counter
operations on another element, most probably, that
the British provinces will have to be defended.
However, fortifications at Quebec, and even Mon-
treal, may be of some use, if only against surprises
and guerillas. It is an object, then, to the Imperial
as well as the Colonial Government, that those for-
tifications be made to a reasonable extent. Quebec
may be assumed to be the key of the St. Lawrence,
and has always been invested with an Imperial dig-
nity. Whether Montreal shall be fortified is more
a question for the Colony itself. But England
has money and credit. Canada and the sister
colonies complain that they have not much of
either, but plenty of that material wealth the
free and protected use of which is the true source
of capital. So England, as we understand, and if
the delegates have made no mistake, is to complete
the fortifications at Quebec, and provide the amount
necessary for the works there and elsewhere, and
guarantee a loan for the amount necessary for all
Canadian works, on the condition of Canada con-
tinuing her present training and other defensive
preparations. Canada, in other words, is to keep
up an army of some sort, and under some name, at
least up to her Awer. We need not revert to the
imperial engagement to defend Canada as far as
we can in the event of a war with the United States.
That engagement exists, and cannot be added to by
any fresh stipulations. Whatever else we may be,
we are at least allies, and must fight one another's
battles, as far as circumstances permit and require.
Bat the gist of the arrangement is that the Cana-
dians shall satisfy our military authorities that they
are keeping up their military organisation and
training on the existing scale, and maintaining an
army, without which works, whether of earth or of
stone, and armaments of the oldest or the newest
fashion, are equally a mockery. We wish to see
Canada armed in the most effectual way by an
habitual determination to defend itself. This is the
only defence to be relied upon. It is the only
strength that an enemy in the neighbourhood will
think worth taking into account. The United
States will not ask whether they can or cannot take
our provinces. They will ask how they are likely
to be encountered, and whether the chance of suc-
cess is worth the certain loss. So the defence of
Canada rests with the Canadians. We wish them
to act on this maxim ; and so long as a certain
assistance towards fortifications and armaments in-
duces
them to keep up their living defences, Parlia-
ment will be glad to vote money for the purpose in
moderate instalments. But as soon as it observesthat
their living defence is flagging, and everything isleft
to walls and guns, it will stopthe leak in the Imperial
Treasury.

POST.—It remains to be seen if the Austro-Prus-
Sian Convention, which has been officially commu-
nicated to the public by the Wiener Zeitung, will be
specially notified to the non-German Powers who
were parties to the European settlement made in
1815 ; but in so far as one of these Powers may be
concerned, it should be understood in Germany that
under a constitutional monarchy all political nego-
tiation is conducted by the responsible advisers of
the Crown. To prevent any misapprehension we
must be allowed to remark plainly that certain Ger-
man newspapers have taken unwarrantable liberties
with the name of an illustrious lady who happened
to be sojourning in their land while the Sovereigns
of Austria and Prussia were engaged in the contro-
versy now temporarily terminated by a compromise.
If the matters in dispute between the German
Powers require and admit of the intervention of
other Powers, it might be expedient to intervene for
the purpose of preserving peace. But it is perfectly
unnecessary to say that this entanglement peculiarly
demands the most punctilious observance of the
conditions on which governments mediate. It is not
an affair that can be managed with sentimental
compliments. The miserable Duchies of Schleswig
and Holstein are, to those who protested against the
dismemberment of Denmark, as pitch which cannot
be touched without defilement ; and to England
more especially is the subject odious and repulsive.
We object on principle to the introduction of topics
which are not strictly relevant to the issue, but it is
impossible to forget the near and dear tie which
exists between the despoiled monarchy and this
country. The. Germans must not take it amiss if
we advise them that reports which reflect upon
their national hospitality and courtesy are offen-
sive to the English people. They mislead no-
body, but they are nevertheless to be deprecated.

As 'regards the Convention, excepting the sale of
Lauenburg, it appears to us to conclude nothing.
The question of the succession to the Duchies of
Schleswig and Holstein has not been solved, and
while that is left open every other engagement must
be merely provisional. It is not easy to see what
Austria has gained beyond two million five hundred
thousand thalers, and time for any purpose to which
she can turn it. The money may be serviceable
but if Austria was compelled to part with her rights
she might have made a better bargain ; and as to
the time, its worth is exceedingly uncertain. It
must be observed, too, that Austria did not appa-
rently regard it as a gain, for, by all accounts, she
would have been glad to settle the business defini-
tively at Salzburg. The Gastein Convention, if it
meant anything, contemplated a protracted prod-
sorium, and yet, while it was being ratified, Austria
in effect desired to come to a decision which would
have rendered its provisions unnecessary. It is fair
to assume, therefore, that Prussia thinks the delay
is in her favour, and, looking at the terms of agree-
ment, this does not appear to be an unreasonable
conclusion. Kiel is to be made a Federal port under
the command of Prussia, Prussia is empowered to
fortify its harbour, and Prussia is allowed to con-
struct a canal uniting the German Ocean with the
Baltic. All these great operations are held to be
compatible with the provisorium, and it would have
been strange, indeed, if Prussia had not accepted and
adhered to such a convenient arrangement. Upon
the whole, then, it looks very much as if Austria
had signed the Convention under pressure. On no
other hypothesis may her conduct at Salzburg be
explained. It was most improbable that Prussia
would care to bring the negotiation to an end, and
while the Prussians are cutting their canal through
the Holstein territory Austria will probably have
small reason to congratulate herself upon the di-
vided occupation. But if, ultimately, Austria Sells
her right in Holstein as she has sold her right in
Lauenburg, what will Prussia have compassed? The
Power in command of the Federal navy, and of
better than half the Federal army, could of course
command the Federal Diet. There can be no doubt
about that. Prussia would wield the " sword of
Germany" over land and sea. Among all the Ger-
man potentates, great and little, there would be
none to say her nay. We will even suppose that, in
the fulness of time, the waters of the German Ocean
may flow into the waters of the Baltic. And what,
if all this were to come to pass, what would be the
upshot ? Would Austria dispose of her right in
Germany as she disposed of her rights in Lauenburg
and Holstein ? This is not simply an idle specula-
tion, for Austria seems bent upon selling or mort-
gaging almost any possession save that which will
eventually be wrested from her grasp. Given, how-
ever, that the King of Prussia virtually governed
the Fatherland, and what would result ? The an-
swer is written in the history of Prussia. There we
find it proved, line upon line, that the Prussian
policy has been from the beginning what it still is—
a policy of aggression and aggrandisement. And
hence, while the two great German powers are traf-
ficking with their rights, and deliberately ignoring
their responsibilities, other Powers cannot look on
with indifference. They may stand aloof, but they
keep within a distance that admits of observation.
They may decide that it is most expedient to let
things take their course, but in paying out the rope
they maintain their hold upon it. During the last
quarter of a century many reasons for maintaining
the Austrian empire, some good and some bad
enough, have been continually advanced, but Aus-
tria is now, so to speak, putting herself out of court,
and the question of the European equilibrium
would appear to be passing into quite another phase.
In one respect Austria may perhaps be more at ease
than Prussia can well be. The Hungarians can-
not be expected to deplore events the tendency
of which is to increase their power ; but the Prus-
sians, if they are not blinded by ambition, must
perceive that the saddle is being firmly girthed upon
their backs. If Herr Von Bismarck can dominate
in Germany he may reasonably hope to govern in
Prussia. But though the Liberal press supports his
German policy, the constitutional grievances are
kept warm. Long before the German Ocean and
the Baltic have been married, the rumours of a
coup d'e'tat in Prussia will be revived. The Prussian
Liberals know that there is a turning in their long
lane, and therefore they are patient, but they fail
to see that hereafter the decision they postpone may
pass into other hands. We do not believe that their
confidence will be betrayed, but it is obvious that
the foreign embarrassments which are presently
accumulating will weigh heavily on the future oc-
cupant of the Prussian throne ; and liberty, like
treaties, is commonly annulled by war. It may be
very well now to hold the King and his Govern-
ment answerable for all that they do or leave
undone, but it is by no means certain that such will
be the verdict of posterity. The Prussians may
exult over the humiliation of Austria, but their own
situation is; to say the least of it, anomalous. One
wrong does not excuse another ; but frequently the
political immorality of a Government is based upon
the almost equally immoral connivance of a nation.
The Prussians may approach their German idea,
but they can never realise it ; and, however they
may read their history, a policy that was made and
fashioned by the sword, which was promoted by
cupidity and carried out by fraud, will in the end
perish by the sword.