The Sun.
London, England, 1865-04-08 00:00:00

Royal United Service Institution.

Captain C. C. Chesney, R.E., Professor of Military His-
tory, Royal Military College, Sandhurst., delivered a lecture
yesterday at this institution. His Royal Highness the Duke
of Cambridge was in the chair, and among those present
were Sir E. Cust, Lord Hotham, Lord F. Powlett, Sir F.
Nicolson, and Gon. Hamilton.
The subject of the lecture was "Lessons to be derived
from Gen. Sherman's campaigns."
Capt. CHESNEY commenced by. referring to a former lec-
ture delivered by him in which he had pointed out that the
recognised principle of war must be applied to campaigns
in America, as well as those in other countries, with due
allowances for the differences of the country, soldiery, and
means of communication. At that time, now two years
since, the rush of curiosity at the breaking out of the civil
war had died off, and the study of the campaigns of Fede-
rals and Confederates was unpopular, it being generally
supposed that their proceedings were a mere chaos of san-
guinary and indecisive engagements. No one of judgment
asserted this now, and the lecturer observed that it was a
lesson of caution to the public generally, who it could not
be denied, had been misled by a brilliant narrative of the
defeat of Bull's Run into supposing that Federal soldiers
could never be got to fight, forgetting that the early revo-
lutionary armies of France in 1792 and the Prussian sol-
diers in 1806 had been subject to the same kind of panics
which Mr. Russell's pen so keenly described. Such panics
only showed ill discipline and want of confidence in their
officers on the part of the men so behaving, and proved
nothing against the valour of a nation. The military les-
sons insisted on by the lecturer were two—first, the im-
portance of guarding your own communications ; and, se-
condly, the possibility of throwing this rule and others
aside on the part of a man of genius (for such Capt. Ches-
ney declared General Sherman to be) under peculiar and
favourable conditions. Little ram, observed the lecturer,
could not in these matters distinguish the difficult from the
impossible ; it required a genius for war to do so. Capt.
Chesney then described in detail the advance of General
Sherman from Chattanooga to Atlanta from May 6 to July
18, 1865, and observed that the delay of Sherman's advance
by the Confederate General (Johnston) was highly to the
credit of that officer, when it was borne in mind that ho
had been thwarted by two of his own lieutenants; that his
army was in number barely half of that of his adversary's,
and that he had been ill-supported by President Davis.
Capt. Chesney said that the actual rate of Sherman's ad-
vance was only ono mile and a-half a-day, and which was
gained by his continually using his superiority of numbers
by stretching out one flank, and working it in intrench-
moats to threaten the rear of the Confederate General John-
ston. The lecturer spoke of the retreat of Johnston being
in some parts of it a perfect masterpiece of successful cau-
tion, and ho observed that President Davis probably yielded
to a fatal impulse of private dislike in superseding Johnston
in July by appointing General Hood to the command. The
disastrous offensive movements before Atlanta by Hood
were then briefly referred to by Capt. Chesney, who showed
that Hood succeeded in maintaining the place a month
after ho had lost not less than 15,000 men, simply by re-
turning to Johnston's defensive policy. The lecturer also
gave a rapid sketch of the arrangements by which Sherman
secured every mile of the railroad from Chattanooga south-
ward, and, guarding it with 30,000 men, marched round
with a temporary supply of provisions to the south of

Atlanta, and forced the Confederate General Hood, who
was then too weak to take the field with any hope of suc-
cess, to quit the sought-for prize. Capt. Chesney then
proceeded to speak of General Sherman's subsequentmove-
month, and said that, in carrying out his second design,
Sherman found all tho conditions for marching without any
communications—namely, a fertile country teeming with
provisions, tolerable roads, and a total absence of defenders.

It'was told how Hood was decoyed away by the hope of
drawing Sherman back into Tennessee, and how Sherman
manoeuvred to encourage that hope, and waited till ho saw
Hood well on the way to Nashville before making his
plunge into Georgia. His march on Savannah was briefly
noticed, and the ingenious manner in which he solved the
problem of taking those coast cities was clearly pointed out.
Tho lecturer commented freely on Hood's errors, and men-
tioned his disaster before Nashville as ono of many in-
stances in which in this war troops had been successfully
attacked in their intrenched lines. Special explanations wore
given of the means used in those Georgian campaigns for
roughly intrenching, and of the means employed for de-
stroying permanently the railroads. Ho said the Federals
accomplished this last feat to perfection. Captain Chesney
concluded a most interesting lecture by some striking re-
marks on the demoralising effect of the system of obtaining
supplies for his army which was adopted by Gen. Sherman.
Ho believed it too probable that the atrocities lately reported
from the Carolinas were not much, if in any degree, exag-
gerated ; and he was afraid that groat evils would ensue
from the savage spirit excited in many of those who had
suffered so terribly on both sides. He instanced the case of
an officer of rank who was serving solely for the sake of re-
venge for the death of his only son.
The Duke of CAMBRIDGE expressed the gratification ho
felt at the interesting details which Captain Chesney had
given of the campaigns of General Sherman ; at the same
time he confessed his inability to follow with ease the course
of these American campaigns ; they were so extended in
their operations and so much disconnected with each other.
Ono thing had struck him very forcibly while listening to
the statements of Captain Chesney, and that was that the
spade would form a great element in all future campaigns.
It was quite clear that no movements could hereafter be
made either in the way of attack or defence without en-
trenchments. This now element in warfare would, no
doubt, bo greatly increased by improvements in artillery
and musketry. It had been said that cavalry had be-
come obsolete. Ho believed that to be a complete
fallacy. Ho never could understand what was meant
by saying that war could bo carried on without
cavalry. Nothing struck him more forcibly of the absolute
necessity of cavalry than what had resulted from their use
in the American campaigns. It might probably be justly
said that the system of heavy cavalry was exploded, but
with regard to light cavalry ho thought it must be apparent
to every one who had devoted his mind to the subject that
it was an arm of the service which could never by any pos-
sibility bo dispensed with.