The Sun.
London, England, 1862-10-20 00:00:00

7TITE SUN, LONDON, MONDAY EVENING, OCTOI3EII, 20, 1O

Austria formerly wielded there, to glorify the Em-
pire by the custody of the POPE and the possession
of Rome—this has been the policy of Louis NAPO-
LEON ; this will be his policy. He will persevere
in it unmoved by any considerations of international
right—unmoved by the vexation of the Italians, in
which, indeed, he rejoices—unmoved by the remon-
strances of England, whom he only seeks to please
when it suits his convenience. It is gratifying to
him, no doubt, to show that he can afford...it the
same time to flout England and the law of nations,
to which she consistently appeals. We entirely
believe with GARIBALDI that the noble and gene-
rous French people are grieved and annoyed at being
made the gaolers of the unfortunate Romans. Even
the national pride which would make them pleased
to beard England, should she dictate in a matter
which did not concern her, makes them ashamed of
a mean, arbitrary, and selfish policy while England
advocates a noble one. At this moment, we may rest
assured, that whatever uLkindly feelings still exist
in France towards England are due to our supposed
connivance with her Imperial oppressor for our own
selfish interests. Frenchmen would under an Em-
peror, as under a Republic, resent and resist Eng-
lish which seemed to exalt
the
aybovinegthat of France, but they
f idictation,ag
o f
England o or anything
also in their inmost hearts resent the thought that
we can supposa them to be only fit subjects for such
a tyranny as that under which they groan.
The EMPEROR'S letter to M. THOUVENEL, with
the accompanying appointments, quite settle all
doubts as to his policy in superseding him. Not
only is M. DROUYN DE L'Hules the acknowledged
representative of the anti-Italian policy, the man
who perhaps originated, certainly sustained the
scheme of seizing Rome in the days of the Repub-
lic—but M. TIiouVENEL is pretty plainly, though
politely, told that he is dismissed in the inte-
rest of the conciliation policy ; which means, in
fact, the policy of keeping Italy out of its capital.
LOUIS NAPOLEON well knows that no "conciliation"
on the basis of the POPE'S surrendering Rome is
possible with the Vatican. He equally knows that
none on the basis of the POPE'S retaining Rome
will be accepted by the Italian nation. He thus
announces that he means to hold Rome till an
impossibility is realised. He might as well an-
nounce his intention to hold it till the discovery
of perpetual motion. There is indeed an amusing
yet sinister compliment conveyed in the EMPEROR'S
language to his dismissed servant. "In the inte-
rest of the same policy of conciliation which you
have so loyally forwarded, I have judged it neces-
sary to replace you in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs ! " Riddle as this reads like to outsiders, we
may be sure it is none to M. THOUVENEL. He
quite understands the ironical compliment. He is
aware that it means " you forwarded the policy till
you felt it would be disgraceful to forward it any
longer—therefore I set you aside for a man who is
not ashamed that my Government should do by
violence what it cannot do with honour." Could M.
THOUVENEL and the world have doubted the
meaning of the letter, not only the name of. his
successor, but even still more that of M.
LAVALETTE'S successor in the Embassy at Rome,
was its easy interpretation. M. DE LA TOUR
D'AUVERGNE, is a well known ultramontanist, and
will give full effect to the settled policy of everlast-
ingly seeking an impossible reconciliation, and there-
fore an everlasting pretext for the violation of Ita-
lian rights, and those of the Roman people, by the
permanent occupation of their capital.
But what are the Italians themselves to do ? They
now see more than ever the loss they have sus-
tained in losing their CAVOUR. That able diplo-
matist has not left behind him the man whom the
BONAPARTES equally fear. RICASOLI is too honour-
able and unbending, he can be pushed aside as
impracticable. RATTAZZI is too timid, he has not
courage to confront the master of sixty legions.
The Italians have seen their Government made an
Imperial football. RICASOLI was kicked out and
RATTAZZI kicked in by the foreigner. The promise
was that we should see how the EMPEROR, who
would not yield to Right and RICASOLI, would
yield to cunning and RATTAZZI. Tne Italians know
the result—at home their own Government was
ordered to shoot their own National hero, and to
disgrace themselves before Europe. In Paris the
Minister who favoured an Italian policy is cashiered
for an anti-Italian member ; at Rome, itself, the
liberal Marquis de LAVALETTE is superseded by a
reactionary Ultratnontanist, and this is the sum of
the installation of RATTAZZI by the Grace of the
Emperor. He was to win Rome for Italy by
diplomacy—he has won the disgrace of Aspro-
naonte, and the dismissal of THOUVENEL and
LAVALETTE.

But what can the Italians do ? Nothing yet,
assuredly, nothing, in the military sense. It would,
in their present condition, be something like insanity
to go to war with France. Italy, now, has the
the French nation on its side. If in any way it
attacks the French flag, it would compel that
sensitive nation, however regretting it, to fight for
the honour of its flag. It would be madness to lose
the great French nation in an attempt to coerce its
EMPEROR—and so to compel the nation to sup-
port him. We do not see that they have any
weapons left them but moral weapons, but these
they are warranted to use to the full. They can
summon their Parliament immediately. They can
confess the failure of the policy of truckling to the
Tuileries. In calm but firm language they can
tell Europe, on the authority of the Italian Parlia-
ment, the light in which Italians view
the occupation of their capital by mere
brute force, without the shadow of
justification ; they can avow decidedly their de-
termination never to be split up into a Confederacy
to please any foreign Prince ; they can address
themselves to strengthening their military and
social position till events shall enable them to make
a successful use of it, and thus they can afford to
wait while the EMPEROR is degrading himself to
yet lower depths of baseness. If the Italians give
up coquetting with him, and treat him as what he
is—if, though they cannot resist his power, they
refuse to abase themselves to it—even he, heartless
as he is, cannot afford to he photographed to Europe
in the cold contempt of weaker Italy.

Mr. TRAIN, writing—from his dungeon, shall we
say ?—(his letter is dated " Police-station, No. 2,
Boston, Oct. 6th, 2.30 p.m.," so that we know pre-
cisely the time and place where this historical
document was penned)—Mr. IRAIN, writing from
" durance vile," has given the public at large on
both sides of the Atlantic, a very lively idea of
"ye manners and ye customs" of the Federals at
a great public meeting. Skipping all the preli-
minary part of Mr. TRAIN'S letter as nothing to the
purpose, plunging
after Horatian fashion in medias
res, we find him thus graphically describing the
ups and downs the tos and fros of that late Battle
of his upon a Boston Platform, at the close of which
vigorously-conducted contest the narrator was
entirely:worsted, being borne away overpowered by
numbers, " I stepped," he says, " upon the plat-
form, or rather jumped over the railing—as the
packed jury shoved me off the staircase and blocked
the way. Seeing angry eyes behind me, and hos-
tile demonstrations from the enslaved committee
Around Mr.Suurizu, and being
8010WhAt acquainted