The Sun.
London, England, 1865-02-07 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 7, 1865.

peared. Upon the night of the 26th and during
the early morning of the 27th they took to their
boats, and this attack upon Fort Fisher, either by
land or sea, was at an end.
The memorable bombardment of Fort Fisher will
not be without profit to England, if it teaches her
the lesson first learnt at Sebastopol in regard to the
value of defensive works constructed of earth or of
sand. Upon Lamb's Mound, raised 60 feet above
the plateau of the beach, not a man was scratched,
or a gun dismounted, although it was subjected for
hours to one of the most terrific fires which ever
issued from mortal guns. Upon the more elevated
portion of Fort Fisher the damage sustained by the
garrison was insignificant, and the loss to which its
defenders were subjected was principally incurred in
the Columbiad battery, which stands at a much
lower elevation than the land face and a portion of
the sea face. So true is the remark of Sir Howard
Douglas that elevated batteries engage ships under
circumstances of great advantage to the battery,
whereas batteries on a level with the water, a Fleur
d'eau, never fail to sustain severe and damaging in-
jury. It remains also for England to weigh well the
advisability of her defensive stone forts at Portland
Breakwater, at Portsmouth, and elsewhere, and to
ask herself whether, commanding (as she does) any
amount of instantly available labour, and gallant
Volunteers in abundance to man works, it would not
be advisable to trust. most of the defences of her
shores to such scientific sand hills or earthworks as
have made the name of Fort Fisher memorable
throughout the civilised world.

Monitors and Ironsides were directed to take up the
fire during the night. The enemy had long ceased
to respond to our fire, and kept in his bomb-proofs.
I could see that our fire had damaged some of their
guns, and I determined that before the army went
to the assault there should be no guns within our
reach to arrest their progress. Having found that
the rebels could still bring some heavy guns to bear,
I determined to try another plan ; and on the
morning of the 14th ordered in all the small gun-
boats carrying llin. guns to fire slowly and try and
dismount the guns on the face of the works where
the assault was to be made. The Brooklyn was
ordered to throw in a pretty quick fire to keep the
rebels from working their guns. The attack was
commenced at 1 p.m., and lasted till long after dark.
One or two guns were fired this day from the upper
batteries, inflicting no serious damage on any of the
vessels except cutting away the mainmast of the
Huron and hitting the Unadilla once or twice.
These guns we always silenced when a rapid fire was
opened. The attack of the gunboats lasted until long
after dark, and one vessel was employed firing (an
hour each) throughout the night. On this evening
Gen. Terry came on board to see me and arrange
the plan of battle for next day. The troops had got
rested afterltheir long confinement on shipboard and
sea voyage, and had recovered from the drenching
they received when landing through the surf.
Having been long enough on their native element,
they were eager for the attack. It was arranged
between the general and myself that the ships should
all go in early, and fire rapidly through the day,
until the hour for the assault came on. The hour
named was 5 p.m. I detailed 1,600 sailors and 400
marines to accompany the troops in the assault, the
sailors to board the sea face, while the troops
assaulted the land side. Most all of the sailors were
armed with cutlasses and revolvers, while a number
had Sharpe's rifles or short carbines. I herewith
inclose the order of attack on the fort and the man-
ner of approaching it. There was a perfect under-
standing between the general and myself, and a
system of signals established (by the army code) by
which we could converse at our pleasure, though
nearly a mile apart, and amid the din of battle. At
9 a.m. on the 15th the squadron was signalled to
attack in three lines, or assume position marked on
the plan herewith inclosed. All the vessels reached
position about 11 a.m., and each opened fire as they
got their anchors down. The same guns in the
upper batteries opened again this day, with some
effect, as you will see by reference to the reports of
different commanders, but no vessel was injured
sufficiently to interfere with her efficiency. The fire
was kept up I furiously all day. The Mound Hill
battery kept up rather a galling fire with its two
heavy guns, but the rebels were driven away from
their works into their bombproofs, so that no vessel
was in the least disabled. At 2 o'clock I expected
the signal for the vessels to change the direction of
their fire, so that the troops might assault. The
sailors and marines had worked by digging ditches,
or rifle-pits, to within 200 yards of the fort, and
were all ready. The troops, however, did not get
into position until later, and at 3 o'clock the signal
came. The vessels changed their fire to the upper
batteries ; all the steam whistles were blown, and
the troops and sailors dashed ahead nobly, vieing
with each other to reach the top of the parapet : we
had evidently we thought injured all the large guns
so that they could not be fired to annoy any one.
The sailors took to the assault by the flank along
the beach, while the troops rushed in at the left,
through the palisades that had been knocked away
by our fire. All the arrangements on the part of the
sailors had been well carried out ; they had suc-
ceeded in getting up to within a short distance of
the fort, and laid securely in their ditches. We
had but very few killed and wounded to
this point. The marines were to have held
the rifle-pits and cover the boarding party, which
they failed to do. On rushing through the palisades
which extended from the fort to the sea, the head of
the column received a murderous fire of grape and
canister, which did not however check the officers
and sailors who were leading ; the parapets now
swarmed with rebels, who poured in a destructive
fire of musketry. :At this moment, had the marines
performed their duty, every one of the rebels would
have been killed. I witnessed the whole affair, saw
how recklessly the rebels exposed themselves, and
what an advantage they gave our sharpshooters,
whose guns were scarcely fired, or fired with no
precision. Notwithstanding the hot fire, officers
and sailors in the lead rushed on, and some even
reached the parapet, a large number having reached
the ditch. The advance was swept from the para-
pet like chaff, and notwithstafiding all the efforts
made by the commanders of companies to stop them.
The men in the rear seeing the slaughter in front,
and that they were not covered by the marines,
commenced to retreat, and as there is no stopping
a sailor, if he fails on such an occasion on the first
rush, I said the whole thing had to be given up. In
the meantime the troops were more successful on
their side. The rebels, seeing so large a body of
men coming at them on the sea side, were under the
impression that it was the main attack, and concen-
trated the largest part of their forces at that point,
and when they gave three rebel cheers, thinking they
had gained the day, they received a volley of mus-
ketry in their backs from our gallant soldiers who
had been successful in gaining the highest parapet.
Then commenced such a system of fighting as has
never been beaten. Our soldiers had gained two
traverses, while I directed the Ironsides to fire on
the traverses occupied by the rebels. Four, five,
and six traverses were carried by our troops in the
space of an hour. These traverses are immense
bomb-proofs about 60ft. long, 50ft. wide, and 20ft.
high, 17 in all, being on N.E. face. Between each
traverse or bomb-proof are one or two heavy guns.
The fighting lasted until 10 o'clock at night, the
the Ironsides and Monitors firing through the
traverses in advance of our troops, and the level
strip of land called Federal Point being enfiladed
by the ships to prevent reinforcements reaching
the rebels. General Terry himself went into
the fort, and I kept up constant communication
with him until three hearty cheers, which were
taken up by the fleet, announced the capture of Fort
Fisher. Finding that the General felt anxious about
the enemy receiving reinforcements, I directed the
sailors and marines to relieve the troops in the
outer line of our defences, and a large number of
soldiers were thus enabled to join our forces in the
fort. It will not be amiss for me to remark here
that I never saw anything like the fearless gallantry'
and endurance displayed by our troops. They
fought like lions, and knew no such word as fail.
They finally fought and chased the rebels from tra-
verse to traverse, until they reached Battery Lamb,
at the mound, a face of work extending about 1,400
yards in length. At this point the rebels broke and
fled to the end of Federal Point. Our troops fol-
lowed them up, and they surrendered at discretion.
Thus ended one of the most remarkable battles on
record, and one which will do mare damage to the
rebel cause than any that has taken place in this
war. 2,300 rebels manned Fort Fisher ; 1,900 were
taken prisoners ; the rest were killed or wounded.
I may have stated some inaccuracies with regard to
these military matters, which I will leave to General
Terry to supply. I have since visited Fort Fisher
and its adjoining works, and find their strength
greatly beyond what I had conceived. An enginere
might be excusable in saying they could not be
captured except by regular siege. I wonder even
now how it was done. The work, as I said before,
is really stronger than the Malakoff Tower, which
defied so long the combined power of France and
England ; and yet it is captured by a handful of
men, under the fire of the guns Of the fleet, and in
seven hours after the attack commenced in earnest.
I cannot say too much_ in praise of the conduct
of the fleet during the time we have been en-
gaged in these operations. I do not know an
officer in command who has not performed his
duty to the best of his ability. There may be
some who have done better than others, but,
after all, that may be a mere matter of opinion,
or a matter of prejudice and partiality ; all did their
best, and we can ask no more. To make invidious
distinctions in a report of this kind would be
causing matter for dispute, and I shall content my-
self with saying that the Government may well
be proud of those whom it has entrusted here with
the command of the vessels. I leave each comman-
der to tell what his subordinates have done, and

refer the department to the report of divisional
commanders for an account of what they saw and
did. I will, howevei, make a special report of what
I consider due to those who have been engaged in
this contest, and have persistently fought for the
Union. I refer you to Lieut. Commander H. R.
Breese, who led the assault. The result was not
what I expected when I planned the attack ; but it
would have succeeded without severe loss had the
Marines performed their duty. As it is, we lost
heavily, and the country has lost some gallant offi-
cers, who fell on the enemy's ramparts. The suc-
cess is so great that we should not complain. Men,
it seems, must die that this Union may live, and the
Constitution under which we have gained our pros-
perity must be maintained. We regret our com-
panions in arms, and shed a tear over their remains ;
but if these rebels should succeed, we would have
nothing but regret left us, and our lives would be
spent in terror and sorrow. As soon as the forts
were taken I pushed the light draught gunboats into
the river—that is, as soon as I could find and buoy
out a channel and take up the torpedoes, which
were very thick. We found the wires leading to
many, and under-ran them with boats. We found
the torpedoes too heavy to lift with our ordinary
boats, and they must have contained at least a ton
of powder. The rebels seem disposed to pay us
back for the famous torpedo Louisiana, which ex-
ploded in their harbour and did them no harm. We
had some difficulty in getting the vessels across the
bar and into the river, as the channel is narrow and
the bar very shoal ; a few of them got stuck, but
were got off again with the tide. We all came to
the conclusion that we had. followed the right plan
to capture Fort Fisher, one in which the nautical man
of any sense will concur. After I got three of the
gunboats inside the bar and under the mound the
rebels prepared to evacuate Fort Caswell. Two
steamers near the fort, which I think were the Talla-
hassee and Chickamauga, were set fire to and blown
up after the rebels had set fire to the fort ; that blew
up last night with a heavy explosion, followed by
some minor ones. The barracks were apparently
in flames all night, and some little works between
this and Caswell blew up. I have sent vessels to
see what has been done, and shall be governed ac-
cordingly. I think they are burning up everything
in Wilmington, and are getting away as fast as
they can. In the meanwhile a large force of gun-
boats occupies the river between Caswell and Wil-
mington ; that place is hermetically sealed against
blockade-runners, and no Alabamas or Floridas,
Chickamaugas, or Tallahassees, will ever fit out again
from this port, and our merchant vessels will soon,
I hope, be enabled to pursue in safety their avoca-
tions. I send you a list of killed and wounded. We
have lost more than I first estimated. We expended
in the bombardment about 50,000 shells, and have
as much more on board. I feel much indebted to
the Bureau of Ordnance for so promptly supplying
us with ammunition and guns. I regret that some
one stopped our supply of coal (which should have
been doubly increased), for it came very near de-
feating this expedition. Had we not been sup-
plied by the army this expedition would have been
a failure. We shall move along carefully ; have no
vessels blown up with torpedoes, if I can help it ;
and I think we shall be in Wilmington before long.
We may rest satisfied, sir, that the gate through
which the rebels obtained their supplies is closed
for ever, and we can sit here quietly and watch the
traitors starve. I enclose you a number of reports
(dry, though necessary details), with which I will
not overload my report (already too long) on such
an interesting occasion. The number of guns
captured in these works amounts to 75, many of
them superb rifled pieces of very heavy calibre ;
all those facing the ships were dismounted, or
injured so that they could not be used, or the
muzzles were filled up with sand or dirt, which
rendered them useless. I only saw two that were
not rendered useless. I believe we have burst all
the rifled guns left in the fleet (one on the Susque-
hannah, one on the Pequot, one the Osceola),
and I think the reputation of these guns is now
about ruined. I shall take occasion in another de-
spatch to call your attention to those officers who I
consider worthy of the most praise, and the appro-
bation and notice of the department.
" I am, sir, very respectfully, your obt. servant,
" DAVID D. PORTER, Rear-Admiral.
"The I-lon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy."
The report of Fleet-Captain Breese, who led the
assault, is as follows :

" Flagship Malvern, off Fort Fisher, North
Carolina, Jan. 16.

" Sir,—l have to report that in obedience to your
order I represented your flag in commanding the as-
sault on Fort Fisher, and beg leave to state as fol-
lows :—Lieut. S. W. Preston had charge of a force
of about 10 men from each ship, with shovels and
picks, and threw up, within 600 yards of the fort, a
well protected breastwork, and that gradually ad-
vanced to within 200 yards a succession of rifle pits,
which were most promptly occupied by a line of skir-
mishers composed of marines under Second-Lieu-
tenant L. E. Fagon. The manner in which this was
done reflects most creditably upon Lieut. Preston.
As the advance was made he came to me and reported
his work finished, and asked that he might be em-
ployed in any way. Lieutenant Preston's services
were most useful to me, and in his last moments he
attempted to send me word that he had carried out my
orders. The assaulting party was composed of about
1,600 seamen and 400 marines, divided into four lines
as follows :—First line composed of marines, Capt.
L. L. Dawson, commander; second line, composed of
the landing party of the first and fourth divisions of
the squadron, Lieut.-Commander C. 11. Cushman,
commanding ; third line, composed of the landing
party of the second division of the squadron, com-
manded by Lieutenant-Commander James Parker,
who most generously waived his seniority upon
reading your orders that I should represent you on
on shore ; fourth line, composed of the landing
party of the third division of the squadron, com-
manded by Lieutenant-Commander T. 0. Self-
ridge. The second, third, and fourth lines were of
about equal strength. It was intended that the men
should assault in line, the marines acting as sharp-
shooters, and the different lines were to charge
over them, but from the difficulty I had of inform-
ing myself of the time when the army was to assault
which was to guide our movements, that moment
found us too far off to move to the attack unless
under cover. When I discovered that the army was
moving to attack the fort, I ordered the men to ad-
vance by the flank, along the beach, hoping to be
able to form them for the assault under cover of
marines ; but 400 yards distant, exposed to a most
galling fire of musketry, threw a portion of the
marines into the first line, and the rest of them did
not take position as they should. The second and
third lines came along, and the heads of the three
lines joined and formed one compact column, which
filing up to the sea face of Fort Fisher assaulted to
within 50 yards of the parapet, which was lined with
one dense mass of musketeers, who played sad havoc
with our men. Although exposed to a most severe
fire from the enemy, the men were rallied three
times under the personal encouragement and expo-
sure of their commanding officers; but failed to gain
much ground. A few officers and men reached the
parapet. I don't know their names, but they will
doubtless be found in the reports of the officers ac-
companying the party. The marines having failed
to occupy their position, gave the enemy an almost
unmolested fire upon us. Men armed with Sharpe's
rifles and a few marines in the front opened the fire,
but it was to feeble too be of avail. Finding the rear
of the men retreating, I hastened toward it to form
them under cover, and have them use their rifles,
but they were too far distant for me to reach them,
and I accordingly returned to a position near the
works. As I did so, the remaining men, notwith-
standing all attempts to stop them, fled, with the
I exception of about 60, among whom were Lieuten-
ant Commanders James Parker, C. H. Cushman,
T. -O. Selfridge, and M. Sicard, and Lieutenants,
N. 11. Farquhar and R. 11. Lamson, the latter of
whom was wounded, and several volunteer officers,
whose names I unfortunately do not: know. The
fire of the enemy was so severe that the few men
remaining had to seek such cover as they
could, - and, there remained until dark, when
a demonstration upon the part of the rebels in-
duced all to make a fresh rush, and most succeeded
in escaping. The country will regret the death of
Lieut. S. W. Preston, acting as my aid in carrying

orders, who was killed in front, and of Lieut. B. H.
Porter, killed in the early assault at the head of the
column, and of several volunteer officers, seamen,
and marines, killed during the attack. Of Assistant
Surgeon Wm. Longshaw special mention should be
made, on account of his great bravery and attention
to the wounded under the hottest fire, until finally
he fell a victim in the very act of binding up the
wounds of a marine. I can but attribute the failure
of the assault to the absence of the marines from
position, as their fire would have enabled our
boarders to use their cutlasses and pistols most
effectively. By this I would imply the lack of pro-
per organisation, it being impossible in the short
space of time, on account of throwing so many
squads of men from the different vessels together in
one mass, lacking proper company formations, and
wholly unacquaintedwith each other, to secure such
organisation. This led to the confusion exhibited,
for it was not due to any want of personal valour
on the part of the officers or men. Although the
officers and men were exposed to a severe fire from
the enemy, to them of a novel character and upon
a novel element, which would have tried veterans,
yet they advanced nobly, and the survivors must be
satisfied that they contributed, in no small degree,
to the success of the army. The enemy believing,
as I am informed, that the main assault was to come
from us, we were much surprised upon looking to
their rear to find the army so far advanced in their
works. The medical officers sent on shore with the
landing party established their field hospital at a
work about a mile from the fort, where Assistant-
Surgeon B. H. Kidder took charge of the wounded
who were conveyed there, and their wants attended
to as well as circumstances would permit. As near
as I could estimate there were about 65 killed
and 200 wounded. Lieutenant Commander W.
R. Cushing, in the extreme front, finding no-
thing could be done, left with the retreating men,
and succeeded finally in rallying them, and at the
request of Gen. Terry occupied the lines near his
head-quarters, which enabled him to withdraw men
to reinforce his force in the fort. Being a witness to
the assault of the army after our repulse, I cannot
but express my admiration of the extreme gallantry
of its attack. Where one act of personal bravery
was displayed on the part of the enemy, a dozen or
more were conspicuous on our part ; and it was a
most imposing sight to see how splendidly our brave
soldiers did their work. In conclusion, I would say
that I may have omitted the names of officers who
have distinguished themselves by their gallantry, yet
I could not fail to mention those above-named who
came personally under my notice, and I trust that
the commanding-officers of the assaulting lines will
do justice to all. To Lieut.-Commander James
Parker, I would say that I was a witness to his
efforts to advance the men to the free exposure of
his person, and, although ranking me, he would let
no obstacle of that nature interpose and check his
endeavours to do his utmost to capture the fort. To
your secretary, Mr. C. P. Porter, acting as my aid,
lam very much indebted. Though frequently sent
in the rear with orders, he was promptly back, and,
at the assault, he was found at the front. Although
the assaulting party failed, I think it but due to
those who advanced, and to the memories of the
slain, to claim for them through their strong demon-
stration a correspnding resistance from the enemy,
and a weakening of the rebel defence towards our
army. I have been informed by the officers who
conversed with prisoners that the enemy .believed
ours to be the main assault, and concentrated
against us their main force. In saying this I would
not wish to be understood in the least to detract
from the splendid gallantry exhibited by our army,
which was worthy of the highest commendation that
can be bestowed.

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
" K. R. BREESE, Fleet Captain.
" Rear-Admiral David D. Porter, Commanding
North Atlantic Squadron."

Rear-Admiral Porter has also made an official
report on the conduct of the Monitors engaged
against Fort Fisher. It is as follows :
" North Atlantic Squadron, flag-ship Malvern, off
Fort .Fisher, North Carolina, Jan. 15.

"Sir,—My late experience with the Monitor class of ves-
sels under firo at sea and in riding out heavy gales justifies
me in making a special report in the matter. I feel the im-
portance of the Government's receiving accurate informa-
tion in relation to a class of vessels about which there has
been a difference of opinion, and of which we are building
quite a number.

"My experience has been with the Monadnock Saugus,
Mahopac, and Canonicus, all vessels of some difference of
construction, and built, I believe, by different contractors.
"Before leaving Hampton Roads, and while waiting for
the army to provide troops for the land part of this expe-
dition, I sent the monitors Canonicus, Mahopac, and Saugus
up the James River, to try what they could do with the
rebel batteries at Howlet's, and above that point. At
Howlet's the enemy had a heavy gun mounted (a 200-
pounder Brookes rifle) which was frequently fired at the
monitors, but seldom hitting them. One of their shells or
shot, however, struck the Saugus fair on the turret, and
knocked out and loosened 40 of the bolts.

" This was owing to the bolts being driven from inside
to out, instead of from outside to in. The turret was not
materially injured, and was repaired again in about two
weeks, and I have been using the Saugus here against
these works, where she has done effective service.

c, The Canonicus, Mahopac, and Monadnock left Hamp-
ton Roads on the 18th ult., the former two in tow of
steamers, the Monadnock going under steam with a steamer
in company. The weather was quite rough, and at times
the sea would go over the turrets and down the funnels, but
I passed them while at sea, and they wore making excellent
weather of it. On asking their commanders afterwards how
they got along, the answer was, Oh, quite well, sir ; only
a little damp.'

" On arriving at Beaufort, North Carolina, I filled them
up with coal and ammunition. I found a defect in a pump
on board the Canonicus centrifugal pump' they called
it), which did not fetch the water until there was a foot or
more in the vessel. This was a serious defect, and one for
which the constructors were very culpable. The Mahopac's
decks leaked considerably, and made the officers and crow
very uncomfortable.

" The monitors started from Beaufort on the 18th ult..
the Canonicus and Mahopac being towed, the Monadnock
declining such assistance. Indeed, she did not require it,
outrunning the largest vessels easily, and keeping ahead
of all, except the very fastest.
" On the 21st ult. it came on to blow hard from the south-
west, and a very heavy sea commenced rolling in. The
vessels were all anchored in 13 fathoms of water, with a long
scope of chain out. Most of the largo vessels dragged during
the gale. The Tuscarora and Juniata put to sea (I think
unnecessarily), while the monitors rode it out beautifully.
I was anchored quite near them, and witnessed their per-
formance. T at first thought I had been imprudent, and
had unnecessarily risked the lives of officers and men ; but
I wont to sleep the first night of the gale quite easy in my.
mind in regard to the monitors.
" I saw that they were making the best weather, and
riding easier than any of the other vessels in the fleet. All
the transports cut and run, though I think that was quite
unnecessary. After the gale I inquired of the commanders
of the monitors how they passed through the ordeal, and
they seemed to think they got along very well. The smaller
monitors, Mahopac and Canonicus, at times almost disap-
peared from view, and the commander of the former vessel
complained of discomfort owing to the decks leaking, but
the vessels were in no danger at any time. As to the
Monadnonck, she could ride out a gale at anchor in the
Atlantic Ocean. She is certainly a most perfect success so
far as the hull and machinery are concerned, and is only
defective in some minor details, which in the building of
these vessels require the superintendence of a •thorough
seaman and a practical, ingenious man,
" The Monadnock is capable of crossing the ocean alone
(when her compasses are once adjusted properly), and could
destroy any vessel in the French or British navy, lay their
towns under contribution, and return again provided she
could pick up coal) without fear of being followed. She
could certainly clear any harbour on our coast of blockaders
in case we were at war with a foreign Power. As strong and
thick as the sides of this vessel are, one heavy shot from
Fort Fisher indented the iron on her side armour, without,
however, doing any material damage. These vessels have
laid five days under a fire from Fort Fisher, anchored less
than 800 yards off, and though fired at a great deal they
were seldom hit, and received no injury except to boats
and light matter about decks, which were nearly well cut to
pieces. Compared with the Ironsides their fire is very slow,
and not at all calculated to silence heavy batteries, which
requires a rapid and continuous fire to drive men from the
guns, but they are famous coadjutors in a fight, and put in
the heavy blows which tell on casomates and bomb proofs.

" The smaller class of monitors, as at present constructed,
will always require the aid of a steamer to tow them and
take care of them. In smooth weather they ought to go
along by themselves, and when towed the tow rope should
never be lesi than 200 fathoms in length. It strains them
very much to have a short tow-line.
" I do not know yet what their real durability is, or
would be in a continuous fire against their turrets. Solid
11-inch or 200-pounder rifles are apt to break something
when they stride, and I should be much better satisfied my-
self to be behind wooden bulwarks and take what comes
than be shut up in an iron turret not knowing whether it

dice 0►
is properly constructed. This, though, is the Prer
a sailor, and should have no weight whatever. 6, st
" The commanders of the monitors seem to feel gal- 4t
home and safe in them, and apprehend no more dasger°Nt,
sea than in any other kind of vessel. Commander Par ;
of the Monadnock, remarked ho did not see any dafereilc
sfier
between her and anything else. The Saugus joined te round
the first day's fight, off Fort Fisher, and was towed 00
from Norfolk by the Nereus, in very rough
evessel leaked a good deal through her bows, and some 4ioo,
manses was felt for her on that account; but her OP
qualities were spoken of as good. The difficulty Wasties
mechanical one, and in no way detracts from the cinitil
of the vessel. There is of comfort 0
no great amountcodes, but
board these
vessels at sea ; that is conceded on all 81".,g
they are seldom at sea and only exposed when nu
niters
voyage. This is the first time, I believe, that the 111°-111 r
have ridden out heavy gales, in at ancd '
Weather.
an open seal 1,
though they have ridden out gales in Charleston 1ie,i3(0'0,,,
r
" I have only to remark that the principle is a -far of
if the vessels are all built like the Monadnock. The etho
these vessels continued with the fire of such vessels as
rt'
New Ironsides and heavy frigates is very effective, 1 onol or
larly against heavy plated vessels, bomproofs, and eoP
brick walls. I have never yet seen a vessel that°Us 05
to my idea of what is required for offensive OPerati°ll 04
much as the Ironsides. Sho combines very ilia'
qualities. The most important is the comfort with wnu
the people on board of her live, though she Davin orniord
match for the Mon,adnock in a fight, the latter ''
speed.
"-e th Itor
" The accuracy of fire is, I think, in favour turrets
sides, judging from what I I have seen here. That- uot•
get filled with smoke, and do not clear as quick stlegboill
sides, though that defect could be avoided by net
mine ste
guns so near together. These impressions of 03Tthi0
formed from a short experience with monitors, but pro'
they will be found correct, provided the monitors are '
perly built. olc'
•'I have the honour to be, very respeetfullYt 5°-
dient servant, Ado°l'
" DAvrn D. PORTER, Bear'
"lion. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Nall'

Washington, D.D."