The Sun.
London, England, 1862-03-25 00:00:00

CONFEDERATE REPORT OP THE
BATTLE OF _FORT DONNELSON.

We find in the Atlanta (Georgia) Confederacy the official
report cf General Pillow, who commanded the Confederates
at Fort Donnehien. The report is very long and would fill
several columns of our paper. General Pillow took com-
mand at Fort Donnelson on the Bth of February, and he
says that he immediately set to work to improve its de-
fences. This was done under the supervision of Major Gil-
mer, chief engineer of General A. S. Johnston's Staff. Be-
fore the works were completed Pillow states General Floyd,
his senior in rank, arrived. He then says :
" I had placed Brig adier General Buckner in connuarA of
the right w:nr, and Brigadier-General Johnston in command
of the left. By extraordinary efforts we had barely got the
works in a defensible condition when the enemy made an
advance in force around and against the entire line of outer
works."

He then gives tho details of the fighting on the 12th and
13th (the gunboat fight included), all of which our readers
are familiar with, The General continues thus :—.

" On the 14th inst. the enemy was busy throwing his
forces of every arm around us, extending his line of invest.
ment entirely around our position and completely envelop-
ing us. On the evening of this day we ascertained that the
enemy had received additional reinforcements by steamboat.
We were now surrounded by an immense force, said by
prisoners to amount to 52 regiments, and every road and
possible avenue of departure was cut off, with the certainty
that our sources of supply by the river would soon be cut
off by the Enemy's batteries placed on the river above us.
At a council of the general officers, called by Gen. Floyd, it
was unanimously determined to give the enemy battle next
day at daylight, so as to cut open a route of exit for our
troops to the interior of the country, and thus save our
army. We had knowledge that the principal portion of the
enemy's forces were massed in encampment in front of our
extreme left, commanding the two roads leading into the
interior, one of which we must take in leaving our position.
We knew that he had mused in encampment another large
force on the Union Ferry road, opposite the centre of our
left wing, and another in front of the left of our right wing;
his fresh arrival of troops being encamped on the bank of
the river, two and a half miles below us, from which latter
encampment a stream of fresh troops was continually pour-
ing around us on his line of investment, and thus strength-
ening his general encampment on the extreme right. At
each of his encampments, and on each road, he had in posi-
tion a battery of field artillery, and 24-pounder iron guns on
siege carriages. Between these encampments on the roads
was a thick undergrowth of brush and black jacks, making
It Impossible to advance or manoeuvre any large body of
troops. The plan of attack agreed upon, and directed by
Gen. Floyd to be executed, was that with the main body of
the forces of our left wing I should attack the right wing of
the enemy, occupying and resting upon the heights reach-
ing to the bank of the river, accompanied by Col. Forrest's
brigade of cavalry ; that Brigadier-General Buckner, with
the forces under his command, and defending the right of
our line, should strike the enemy's encampment and forces
on the Winn's Ferry-road ; that the forces under Colonel
Heiman should hold his position, and that each command
should leave in the trenches troops to hold them. In this
order of battle it was easy to be seen if my attack was suc-
cessful, and the enemy routed, that his retreat would be
along his line of investment to wards Winn's Ferry-road,
and thence toward his reserve at the gunboats below. In
other words, my success would roll the enemy's force in
retreat over upon General Buckner, when, by his attack in
front and rear, we could cut up the enemy and put him
completely to rout. Accordingly, dispositions were made
to attack the enemy. At 5 o'clock a.m., of the 15th, I
moved out of my position to engage him. In less than
half an hour our forces were engaged. He was prepared to
meet me in advance of his encampment, and he did meet
me before I had assumed line of battle, and while I was
moving against him without any formation for the engage-
ment. For the first half hour of the engagement I was
much embarrassed in getting the command in position pro-
perly to meet the foe. Having extricated myself from the
position and fairly engaged him, we fought him for
nearly two hours before I made any decided advance
upon him. He contested this field most stubbornly. The
loss of both armies at this portion of the field was heavy;
the enemy's particularly, as I discovered by riding over the
field, after the battle, with General Floyd. The enemy
having been forced to yield this portion of the field
retired slowly towards the Winn's Ferry-road, Buckner's
point of attack. He did not retreat, but fell back
fighting us, contesting every inch of ground. The fight
was hotly and stubbornly contested on both sides, and it
consumed the day till 12 o'clock to drive him back as far as
the centre, where Gen. Buckner's command was to flank
him. , While my command was advancing and slowly
driving him, I was anxiously expecting to hear General
Buckner's command open fire in his rear, which not taking
place I feared some misapprehension of orders, and came
from the field of battle within the works to learn what was
the matter. I there found the command of Gen. Buckner
massed behind the ridge within the works, taking shelter
from the enemy's artillery on the Winn-road, it having
been forced to retire before the battery, as I learnt from
him. My forces were still slowly advancing, driving the
enemy towards the battery. I directed General Buck-
ner immediately to move his command round to the
rear of the battery, turning its left, keeping in the
hollow, and attack and carry it. Before this move-
ment was executed, my force, forming the attacking party
on the right, with Forrest's regiment (cavalry), gallantly,
charged the battery, supported by a body of infantry, driv-
ing it and forcing the battery to retire, taking six pieces of
artillery— four brass and two 24-pounder iron guns. In
pursuing the enemy falling back from this position Gen.
Buckner's forces became united with mine, and engaged
the enemy in hot contest of nearly an hour with large forts
of fresh troops that had now met us. This position of the
enemy being carried by our j dint forces, I called off further
pursuit after seven and a half hours of continuous and
bloody conflict. After the troops were called off orders
were immediately given to the different collmands to
form and retire to their original position in the intrencb-
ments. The operations of the day had forced the
entire command of the enemy around to our right
wing, and in front of General Buckner's posi-
tion in the intrenchments, and when his command
reached his position he found the enemy rapidly advancing
to take possession of this portion of the work. He had a
stubborn conflict, lasting one hour and a half, to regain it,
and the enemy actually got possession of the extreme right
of his position, and held it so firmly that he could not dis-
lodge him. The position thus gained by the enemy was
a most commanding one, being immediately in the rear
of our river battery and fieldwork for its protection. From
it he could readily turn the intrenched work occupied by
General Buckner, and attack him in reverse or advance
under cover of an intervening ridge directly upon our
battery and fieldwork. While he held this position it was
manifest we could not hold the main work or battery.
Such was the condition of the armies at nightfall after
nine hours' conflict on the 15th inst., in which our loss
was severe, and leaving not less than 5,000 of the enemy
dead and wounded on the field. We left upon the field
nearly all his wounded because we could not remove them.
We left his dead unburied because we could not bury them.
Such conflict and courage has, perhaps, never before oc-
curred upon this continent. We took about 300 prisoners
and a large number of arms. We had fought this battle to
open the way for our army and relieve us horn an invest-
ment which would necessarily reduce us and the position by
famine. We had occupied the whole day to accomplish our
object, and before we could prepare to leave, after taking in
the wounded and the dead, the enemy had thrown around
us again in the night an immense force of fresh. troops, and
reoccupied hcuisttiuorgiginoffal pooursitirsontreinatih. ewlineehosfd investment,
thus tl,OO
h2usoagain
troops,
all told. A large proportion of these we had
lost in the three battles. The command had been in the
trenches night and day for five days, exposed to the snow,
sleet, mud, and ice water, without shelter and without
adequate covering, and without sleep. In this condition the
General officer held a consultation to determine what he
should do. General Buckner gave it as his decided opinion
that he could not hold his position one half-hour against
an assault of the enemy, and said the enemy would
attack him next morning at daylight. The proposition
was then made by several officers to again fight through
the enemy's line and cut our way out. General Buckner
said his command was so worn out and cut to pieces
and demoralised that he could not make another fight;
that it would cost the command three-quarters of its
numbers to cut its way through, and it was wrong to sacri-
fice three quarters of a command to save one quarter ; that
no officer had a right to cause such a sacrifice. General
Floyd and Major Gilmer I understood to concur in this
opinion. I then expressed the opinion that we could
hold out another day, and in that time we could get steam-
boats and set the command over the river, and probably
save a large portion of it. To this General Buckner replied
that the enemy would certainly attack him at daylight/ and
that he could not hold his position half an hour. The
alternative of the propositions was a surrender of their
position and command. General Floyd said that he would
neither surrender the command, nor would be surrender
himself a prisoner. I had taken the same position be done,. General
Buckner said he was satisfied nothing else could
and that, therefore, he would surreenwdeoruithdetpulrnaceoivnercotmh
mand. General Floyd said that b
commandoommaud.to
Thoimthiifs
Gheenecroalulvd
üboekuaol
Thereupon
rlouswerseedittott:nt withdraw his
hi.st
over
I 'swo ould neither agurl-
p Underr ner
these directedere
General Floyd turned the coin
. I
instantly to General Buckner, saying
render the command
his
sr
Colonel Forrest to cut
and sent
wmayys
out.e lf a
enemy for an armistice of six hours to
um-
a flag of truce to the
stances General Buckner accepted the
..command,
negotiate for terms of capitulation. Before this flag and
communication was delivered I retired from the garrison."

to uad Pasha's
mission
T mtursz RELIGION.—During FHE
Syria, a very ancient Arab book, relating to the
religionof the Druses, was discovered at Pilater, a large
village d
near Baalbak. it is said that Fnad Pasha has
bargeda one of his aides-de-camp, Major Chain Bey, to
_rge_
usLudate this work into the Turkish language. Very little
is known as to the origin
and foundation of the Drnse reli-
gion, and there is reason to hope that this old work may
throw some light on their superstitions and religious belief.
Galignatits