The Sun.
London, England, 1862-09-23 00:00:00

"THE SUN, LONDON, TUESDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 23, 1862.

IRE KINGDOM OF ITALY.

(From the Times' Correspondent.)
TURIN, SEPT. 19.

The rumours, well or ill founded, of the intended
dissolution of the Chamber, or of the close of the
Parliamentary session, have led to the publication
of an unedited letter of Count Cavour, which pos-
sesses, in my opinion, sufficient interest to deserve
to be laid before English readers, not only as illus-
trative of the sound political views of that great
man, but also as pointing out the line of policy
which it will be wise for his successors to pursue.
The letter was written to a political friend in Tus-
cany, I believe the avvocato Vincenzo Salvagnoli
Turin, Oct. 2, 1860.
"My dear Friend,—l thank you for your letter of the
30th of October last, but I cannot accept the advice which
it conveys. To speak freely to you, I think it would be a
fatal proposal to ask Parliament to grant full powers to the
King, to be exercised till every Italian question has been
brought to a complete solution. You must, doubtless, re-
collfct how loudly the Engltsh journals reproached the
Italians for having put in abeyance their constitutional
franchise during the war of last year. To renew such a
disposition now, in a period of apparent peach, would have
the most fatal effect on public opinion in England, and on
all the liberals on the continent. As to the interior of the
State, such a measure would certainly not restore concord
in the great National party. The best means of showing
how far the country is from sharing Mazzini's views is to
allow Parliament the freest exercise of its censure and
control. The favourable vote which the Ministry may
obtain from a great majority of the deputies will give them
a moral authority far superior to any dictatarship. Your
advice would precisely tend to give effect to Garibaldi's
notion, for a great revolutionrry dictaiorship is what he
aims at—a dictatorship to be wielded by the King
without the control of the press, without individual or Par-
liamentary securities. I hold, on the contrary, that it will
not be the least title for glory to Italy to have it said that
she how to constitute herself into a nation without sacri-
ficing freedom to independence, Without passing through
the hands of a Cromwell without falling into a revolutionary
despotism. Now, this object can only be attained by seek-
ing in the co-operation of Parliament the only moral force
which may be able to overcome the secret societies (la Bette)
and to secure the sympathies of liberal Europe. To go back
to the committee of Public Safety, or, what would be tan-
tamount to them, to the revolutionary dictatorship of one
or more men, would be to kill that legal liberty which we
wish to go hand in hand with national independence.—Be-
lieve me, ever, &c,, " C. CAvoun."

The proclamation of the state of siege of Naples
and Palermo was already a sufficiently broad depar-
ture from the sound principles devoloped is this
short but most significant letter, and it is to be
hoped that M. Rattazzi will not dwell upon his de-
signs of a dissolution of Parliament, or even of the
close of the session, if he ever harboured them, as
the prolonged interruption of the labour of the
Chambers in the present disorder of the financial,
political, and administrative situation of the country
would be almost equivalent to a coup d'etat, and
would reveal an intention to govern the country
by at least a temporary dictatorship. As to the
South itself it would be difficult, indeed, to depre-
cate the continuation of the state of siege there for
a few weeks more, seeing that that measure, harsh
and illegal as it certainly was, was nevertheless
attended with good effects, and was hailed by the
Neapolitans especially as a most salutary provision.
These two Southern kingdoms, as I told you at the
time of their annexation, would have to be won
over again to the common country by sheer con-
quest. The populace of both Sicilies, as it came
out of the Bourbons' hands, was decidedly the
most corrupt and degenerate, not only of all Ita-
lian, but of all European races ; yet it is, at the
same time, perhaps, naturally one of the most re-
deemable and improvable. The first great object
with any man placed at the head of the Govern-
ment in these two kingdoms was, if, and must be,
to establish public security on a permanent basis ;
and this could not be done without an open war
to be waged against brigandage and the Camorra.
The power to carry on such a war is all that La
Marmora asked for at Naples, and Cialdini or his
successor, Brignone, in Sicily. The results of their
work are already seen in the hundreds of ruffians
who are torn by main force from the dens of vice
and infamy which disgraced those Southern cities,
and who are restored to the gaols and bagnios from
which they, in an evil hour, were let loose upon a
defenceless society. The whole of the old Bourbon
edifice of popular demoralisation must be pulled
down, by gentle or harsh means, before the basis
for a new fabric of rational freedom can be reared.
The task of regenerating that part of Italy will be
eventually found to be far less difficult and much
shorter than men conceive. Already we hear that
perfect tranquillity has reigned at Naples and
Palermo for this last score of days—a proof that
the mass is sound at heart, and only longed to be
rid of Hu, &To hold malefactors who tarrtn.,,a, ai.-
traded, and degraded it.

SEPT. 20.

The deliberation which took place in the Council
of Ministers with respect to the expediency of a
dissolution of Parliament at this crisis has given
great offence to the Minister of Grace and Justice,
the upright and good Raffaele Conforti, who has
tendered his resignation to the King. The resigna-
tion has not been accepted, and it is believed that
the opposition of his honourable colleague has stag-
gered M. Rattazzi in his resolution. The firm and
dignified behaviour of the loyal Conforti, however,
has given offence to men at the head of the adminis-
tration, whose semi-official organs are incited, or at
least allowed to fall foul of the Keeper of the
Seals to their heart's content. The King's Govern-
ment had sent a private circular to the Prefects,
especially of the Southern provinces, to ask their
opinion as to the probable results of a general elec-
tion. The Neapolitan Prefects almost unanimously
wrote in such a tone as to dissuade their chief from
a dissolution, seeing the present temper of the po-
pulation, under their rule, boded no good to the
present Cabinet. M. Rattazzi must, therefore, be
fain to put up with such a Chamber as he now has,
only putting off the evil day by a close of the
session, and prolonging the present recess at least
till November.

Not only the Opposition papers, but even some of
the organs moat heartily attached to the present
Ministry, as, for instance, the Gazetta del Popolo,
very bitterly, complain of the frequent seizure of
several journals, which has lately been of almost
daily occurrence. There is good brotherhood and
solidarity among the various members of the Italian
press, and all are ready to resent as a personal
offence any encroachment on the common right of a
free utterance of opinion. The attack which has
roused the greatest resentment is that which fell
upon the 'Vero, Opinione, and Gazetta dt Torino,
the first-named a stanch partisan of the Government,
the two others moderate and Conservative—all of
which papers were seized simply for reporting part
of a speech of Garibaldi, although all of these papers
accompanied their quotations with unqualified dis-
approbation. How, it is asked with great justice,
can we hope to be able efficiently to refute the
opinions of our adversaries if no allusion to their
sayings and doings is allowed? "The very defence
of the laws, of the King, of the Government, of the
army, &e.,would," says the Ministerial Gazetta del
Popolo, " become altogether impossible if one can-
not venture to make
known the thrusts which it is
our duty to parry." Rattazzi seems, above all
things, anxious to give proofs of great vigour, but
he should learn from Cavour that it is not by for-
cibly hushing np Parliament and the press that a
Minister may hope to sway the public mind. There
is no disposition in Italy, as far as I can make out,
to put up with this kind of incipient Imperialism.
-Professor Partridge has been received with every
demonstration of honour by Dr, Ripari and all the
medical men under whose care Garibaldi had placed
himself by his own choice. You are aware that
'Lipari, a Garibaldian doctor, was by the side of his
chief at the moment the latter fell wounded at As-
promonte. I believe he was at the head of the
Volunteer Medical Staff both in 1860 and this year.
Ripari and two of his colleagues, after dressing the
hero's wounds on the ill-omened field of battle, em-
harked with him on board the Duca di Genova,
landed with him at Spezzia, and stood by him
ir "
during the whole of the confinement at at e arig-
nano. On first hearing of Garibaldi's arrival the
most distinguished doctors were sent to wait
Upon
the General by onler of the Government
and of the
King himself, and leave was given, besides, to visit
him, to all the members of the faculty who proffered
their aid, and whom the illustrious captive wishcd
or consented to see, with the single exception of Ber-
t ani, whose political inktence over Garibaldi's mind

caused the Government some very pardonable un-
easiness. You may easily understand, unier such
circumstances, that no hindrance could b 3 made to
Professor Partridge's kind assistance. It was con-
sidered as a rare proof of the sympathy of the Eng-
lish with the Italian nation that so emii ent a practi-
tioner should have travelled all the way from London
to Spezzia at the suggestion of a liberal committee,
and at the expense of a whole legion of voluntary
contributors. The interest taken in the welfare of
a man whom Italy will always revere and love as
her greatest hero could not fail to be most accept-
able, in whatever manner it might choose to mani-
fest itself. It was only feared, and very reasonably
as I think, that the doctors about the person of the
wounded General might feel some qualms of pro-
fessional displeasure, as if the mission of the Lon-
don professor might be meant as an expression of
English mistrust in Italian skill. Such a mistrust
would have been ill-grounded, as, whatever may be
thought of the system of the medical schools in
Italy, there can be no doubt as to the excellency of
Italian surgical operators. The belief universally
prevalent in England, which I shared at the time,
and which I perhaps in some measure contributed
to spread and strengthen—that Cavour was killed
by the lancets of his physicians, undoubtedly gave
rise to the disquietude evinced in that country
about Garibaldi's fate. It should, however, be kept
in mind that the rage for bleeding, for which the
Turin doctors have won so sinister a reputation, is
as strongly condemned by their brethren of other
Italian provinces as by the most uncompromis-
ing enemy of the Sangrado practice in England.
The Italian surgeons, meanwhile, whatever their
real inner feelings might be, to all outward seeming
gave their much honoured visitor from distant
Albion the most cordial and gentlemanly reception,
and I have before my eyes long letters by Dr.
Ripari, most certainly giving no intimation of pro-
fessional jealousy and wounded feelings, and ex-
pressing on the contrary all the sense of the hon-
our that the presence of the English doctor re-
flected no less on Italy and Garibaldi than on the
professional attendants on the latter. For his own
part Professor Partridge awarded his most unqua-
lified approbation of the mode of treatment hitherto
followed with respect to Garibaldi's wounds, and
agreed with all that had hitherto been done or was
yet to be done towards the completion of the cure.
Garibaldi's news, to-day, are most favourable.
Zenetti came from Florence to consult with Part-
ridge.
The Court of Caseation at Milan has, it is re-
ported, come to the resolution that Garibaldi's trial
shall take place before the Court of Assizes at
Alessandria, M. Rattazzi's native city.

7HE BATTLES IN VIRGINIA.

GENERAL POPE'S REPORT.

The following official report of General Pope has
been published:—
" Head-quarters, Army of Virginia, Sept. 3,1862.
" General,--I have the honour to submit the fol-
lowing brief sketch of the operations of this army
since the 9th of August. I moved from Sperryville,
Little Washington, and Warrenton, with the corps
of Banks and Sigel, and one division of M'Dowell's
corps, numbering in all 32,000 men, to meet the
enemy, who had crossed the Rapidan, and was ad-
vancing on Culpepper. The movement towards
Gordonsville had completely succeeded in drawing
off a large force from Richmond, and in relieving
the army of the Potomac from much of the danger
that threatened its withdrawal from the Peninsula.
The action of August 9, at Cedar Mountain, with the
forces under Jackson, which compelled his retreat
across the Rapidan, made necessary still fur-
ther reinforcements of the enemy from Richmond ;
and this time, it being apparent that the army of
the Potomac was evacuating the Peninsula, the
whole force of the enemy concentrated around Rich-
mond was pushed forward with great rapidity to
crush the army in Virginia before the forces eva-
cuating the Peninsula could be united with it. I
remained at Cedar Mountain, and still threatened to
cross the Rapidan, until the 17th of August, by
which time General Robert Lee had assembled
in my front, and within eight miles, nearly the
whole rebel army. As soon as I ascertained this
fact, and knew that the army of the Potomac was
no longer in danger, I drew back my whole force
across the Rappahannock, on the night of the 17th
and day of the 18th, without loss of any kind, and
one day in advance of Lee's proposed movement
against me. The enemy immediately appeared in
my front at Rappahannock Station, ana attempted
to pea. the et- or at that bridge, and the numerous
fords above and below, but without success. The
line of the upper Rappahannock, which I had been
ordered to hold, that the enemy might be delayed
long enough in his advance upon Washington
to enable the forces from the Peninsula to
land and effect a junction with me, was very
weak, as it could be crossed at almost any point
above the railroad bridge by good fords. By con-
stant vigilance and activity, and much severe fight-
ing for three days, the enemy was gradually forced
around from the railroad crossing to Waterloo-
bridge, west of Warrenton. Meantime my force
had been much diminished by actual loss in battle,
and by fatigue and exposure, so that although I had
been joined by a detachment under Gen. Reno and
the other division of M'Dowell's corps, my force
barely numbered 40,000 men. On the -- a heavy
rain fell, which rendered the fords impassable for
24 hours. As soon as I discovered this I concen-
trated my forces, and marched rapidly upon Sul-
phur Springs and Waterloo-bridge to drive back
the forces of the enemy, which had succeeded in
crossing at these points. This was successfully
done, and the bridges destroyed. I passed one day,
or rather part of one, at Warrenton and beyond.
The enemy still continued to move slowly around
along the river, masking every ford with artillery
I and heavy forces of infantry, so that it was impos-
sible for me to attack him even, with the greatly
inferier forces under my command, without passing
the river over fords strongly guarded in the face of
superior numbers. The movement of Jackson to-
ward White Plains and in the direction of Tho-
roughfare Gap, while the main body of the army
confronted me at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo-
bridge, was well known to me, but I relied confi-
dently upon the forces which I had been assured
would be sent from Alexandria, and one stray divi-
sion of which I had ordered to take post on the
works at Manassas Junction. I was entirely under
the belief that these would be there, and it was not
until I found my communication intercepted that I
was undeceived. I knew that this movement was
no raid, and that it was made by not less than
25,000 men under Jackson. By this time the army
of Heintzelman, about 10,000 strong, had reached
1 Warrenton Junction ; one division of
cita,le hu
thwiintk,oont
, the very day of the raid; but they came
artillery, with only 40 rounds of amunition to the
man,without waggons, and even the field and general
officers without horses. Fitz-John Porter arrived at
Bristow Station, near Rappahannock, with one of his I
divisions, 4,000 strong, whilst his other division was
still at Barnett's and Kelly's Ford. I directed that
corps, about 8,500 strong, to concentrate imme-
diately at Warrenton Junction, where Heintzelman
atihraetadly:k.:::
was
is was accomplished on the even-
ing of the —th. As soon as it became known to me
on, the railroad, it became ap-
parent that the upper Rappahannock was no longer
tenable. I could not detach a sufficient force to
meet Jackson, and at the same time attempt to con-
front the main body of the enemy. I accordingly
at once evacuted Warrenton and Warrenton Junc-
tion, directing MiDowell with his own corps and
Sigel's, and the division of Reynold's, to march
rapidly by the turnpike upon Gainsville, so as to
anecand ioinstgrusting Reno
rpironwyiigidiiep reinforcements; to Jackson
interceptt h
roug h
with his command, and Kearney with one division
of Heintzelman'e, to march on Greenwich, so as to
support Al 'Bowe!l in case of necessity, I moved back
along the railroad upon Manassas Junction. Near
Kettle Run, Hooker came upon the advance of i
Ewell's division on the afternoon of the 27th. A
severe action took place, which terminated at dark,
Ewell being driven from the field with the loss of
his camp and 300 killed and wounded. Tne unfor-
tunate oversight of not bringing more than 40
• rounds of ammunition became at once alarming.
l At n i•
ifietfell•Heoker tad .about five rounds to the

I man left. As soon as I learned this I sent back
i orders to Fitz-John Porter to march with his corps
at 1 o'clock that night, so as to be with Hooker at
daylight in the morning. The distance was only
nine miles, and he received the despatch at 50
minutes past 9 o'clock, but did not reach the ground
until after ten o'clock next morning. He can pro-
bably explain better than I can the reason of this
delay. Fortunately Hooker had handled the
army so severely the evening before, and the
movement of M'Dowell had begun to be so ap-
parent, that the enemy, fearful of being sur-
rounded, had retreated precipitately from Ma-
nassas Junction, directing his retreat through
Centreville, as M'Dowell, Reno, and Kearney had
made the road through Gainesville impractica-
ble. I immediately pushed forward to Manassas,
and thence to Centreville, which was occupied by
Kearney, that night only a few hours after the
enemy had left it. Reno had reached Manassas
Junction, and Fitz-John Porter was immediately
ordered up from Broad Run, where he stopped.
M'Dowell's movement, conducted with vigour and
speed, had been completely successful, the enemy
being intercepted at Gainesville, and part of his
forces driven back through Thoroughfare Gap.
Late in the evening of the M'Dowell's advance
(Gibbon's brigade) met the force of Jackson retir-
ing from Centreville, and about six miles from that
place. A very sharp skirmish took place, ended by
the darkness, in which the brigade of Gibbon be-
haved very handsomely, and suffered heavy loss.
Si,,,el was close at hand with his corps, but did not
join the action. I instructed Kearney to move for-
ward at early day dawn towards Gainesville, closely
followed by Hooker and Reno, and engage the
enemy thus placed between M'Dowell and Sigel on
the west and Fitz-John Porter on the south. I
also instructed Fitz-John Porter with his own corps,
and King's division of M'Dowell's corps, which had
for some reason fallen back from the Warrenton
Turnpike towards Manassas Junction, to move at
daylight in the morning upon Gainesville, along
the Manassas Gap Railroad, until they communi-
cated closely with the forces under Heintzelman
and Sigel, cautioning them not to go further than
was necessary to effect this junction, as we might
be obliged to retire behind Bull Run that night for
subsistence, if nothing else. Heintzelman marched
early from Centreville towards Gainesville, closely
followed by Reno. Meantime, shortly after day-
light, Sigel's and Reynolds' division of M'Dowell's
corps had become engaged with the enemy, who
was brought to a stand, and he was soon joined by
Heintzelman and Reno, when the whole line be-
came actively engaged. Porter marched as directed,
followed by King's division, which was by this
time joined by Rickett's division, which had been
forced back from Thoroughfare Gap by the heavy
forces of the enemy advancing to support Jackson.
As soon as I found that the enemy had been brought
to a halt, and was being vigorously attacked along
the Warrenton Turnpike, I sent orders to M'Dowell
to advance rapidly on the left, and attack the enemy
on his flank, extending his right to meet Reynolds'
left, and to Fitz-John Porter to keep his right well
closed on M'Dowell's left, and to attack the enemy
in flank and rear, while he was pushed in front.
This would have made the line of M'Dowell and
Porter at right angles to that of the other forces
engaged. The action raged furiously all day,
M'Dowell, although previously in rear of Potter,
bringing his whole corps on the field in the after-
noon, and taking a conspicuous part in that day's
operations. To my surprise and disappointment, I
received late in the afternoon from Porter a note
saying that his advance had met the enemy on the
flank in some force, and that he was retiring upon
Manassas Junction without engaging or coming to
the assistance of our other forces, although they
were engaged in a furious action only two miles
distant, and in full hearing of him. A portion of
his force fell back towards Manassas, and he re-
mained, as he afterwards informed me, where he
was, looking at the enemy during the whole of the
afternoon of Friday and part of Friday night, pass-
ing
over in plain view to reinforce the troops under
Jackson without an effort to prevent it or assist us.
One at least of his brigades under General Griffin
got round to Centreville, and remained there during
the whole of the next day's battle, without coming
on the field, though in full view of the battle which
was raging, whilst General Griffin himself spent
the day in making ill-natured strictures upon the
general commanding the action, in the presence of
a promfarainne assemblage. Darkness closed the
action on Friday, tha ciaamy being driven back from
his positions by Heintzelman's corps and Reno, con-
cluded by a furious attack along the turnpike by
King's division of M'Dowell's corps, leaving his
dead and wounded on the field. I do not hesitate
to say that if the corps of Porter had attacked
the enemy in the flank on the afternoon of
Friday, as he had my written order to do, we
should utterly have crushed Jackson before the
forces under Leo could have reached him.
Why he did not do so I cannot understand. Our
men, much worn down by hard service and conti-
nuous fighting for many previous days, and very
short of provisions, rested on their guns. Our
horses had had no forage for two days. I had tele-
graphed and written urgently for forage and ra-
tions to be sent us, but on Saturday morning before
the action was resumed, I received a letter from
General Franklin, written the day before at Alex-
andria, stating to me that he had been directed by
General M'Clellan to inform me that rations and
forage for my command would be loaded into the
cars and available waggons as soon as I would send
a cavalry escort to Alexandria to bring them up.
All hope of being able to maintain my position
whether victorious or not vanished with this letter.
My cavalry was utterly broken down with long
and constant service in the face of the enemy, and
bad as they were could not be spared from the
front, even if there had been time to go back thirty
miles to Alexandria and await the loading of trains.
At the time this letter was written Alexandria
was swarming with troops, and my whole army
interposed between that place and the enemy. I at
once understood that we must, if possible, finish
what we had to do that day, as night must see us
behind Bull Run if we wished to save men and
animals from starvation. On Friday night I sent
a peremptory order to Gen. Porter to bring his
command on the field, and report to me in person
within three hours after he received the order. A
portion he brought up, but, as I before stated, one
of his brigades remained the whole day at Centre-
ville, and was not in the engagement. The enemy's
heavy reinforcements having reached him on Fri-
day afternoon and night, he began to mass on his
right for the purpose of crushing our left and occu-
pying the road to Centreville in our rear. His
heaviest assault was made about five o'clock in the
afternoon, when, after overwhelming Fitz John
Porter, and driving his forces back on the centre and
left, mass after mass of his forces were pushed
against our left. A terrific contest, with great
slaughter, was carried on for several hours, our men
behaving with firmness and gallantry under the
immediate command of General M'Dowell. When
night closed, our left had been forced back about half
a mile, but still remained firm and unshaken, while
our right held its ground. General Franklin,
with his corps, arrived after dark at Centreville, six
miles in our rear, whilst Sumner was four miles
behind Franklin. I could have brought up these
corps in the morning in time to have renewed the
action, but starvation stared both men and horses in
the face, and broken and exhausted as they were,
they were in no condition to bear hunger also. I
accordingly retired to Centreville that night in per-
fect order. Neither on Sunday nor on Monday did
the enemy make any advance upon us. On Monday
I sent to the army corps commanders for their effec-
tive strength, which, all told, including Sumner and
Franklin, fell short of sixty thousand men. Instead
of bringing up thirty thousand men, Franklin and
Sumner united fell short of twenty thousand ; and
these added to the force I had, already wearied out,
and much cut up, did not give me the means to do
anything else than stand on the defence. The enemy
during Monday again began to work slowly around
to our right for the purpose of possessing Fairfax
Court-house, and thus turning our rear Couch's
division and one brigade of Sumuer's had been left
the'. e, and I sent down Hooker on Monday after-
noon to take command and post himself at or in
front of Germantown, at the same time directing

M'Dowell to take position along the turnpike from I
Centreville to Fairfax Court-house, about two miles I
west of the latter place. Heintzelman was directed
to post himself in rear and support of Reno, who
was pushed north of the road, at a point about two
and a half miles east of Centreville, and to cover
that road, it being my purpose, in the course of the
night, to mass my command on the right, in the
direction of Germantown, where I felt convinced
the next attack of the enemy would be made. Late
in the afternoon of Monday the enemy made his de-
monstration upon Geimantown, but was met by
Hooker at that place, and by Reno, reinforced by
Kearney, further west. The battle was very severe,
though short, the enemy being driven back a mile
with heavy loss, leaving his dead and wounded. In
this short action we lost two of our,most valuable and
distinguished officers, Gens. Kearney and Stevens.
By moving, the whole of my
.command was massed
behind a difficult creek, between Flint Hill and
the Warrenton Junction, with the advance, under
Hooker, in front of Germantown. With the ex-
ceptionLof Sumner, the commanders of the army
corps of the Army of the Potomac had continued to
inform me that their commands were and had been
demoralised ever since they left Harrison's Land-
ing—that they had no spirit and no disposition to
fight. The latter statement their conduct in the
various actions fully contradicted, but the straggling
in those corps was distressing. The full facts hav-
ing been reported, " on Tuesday afternoon, to
retire to the intrenchments near Washington,
which was accordingly done on that day and the
next, in good order and withoutithe slightest loss.
Banks, who had been left with the railroad trains
cut off at Bristol by the burning of the bridge, was
ordered to join me on Monday at Centreville, which
he did on the afternoon of that day. This brief
summary will explain sufficiently in detail' the
whole of the operations of the forces under my com-
mand, during 16 days of continuous fighting by day
and marching by night. To confront a powerful
enemy with greatly inferior forces, and fight him
day by day without losing your army—to delay
and embarrass his movements, and to force him, by
persistent resistance, to adopt long and circuitous
routes to his destination, are the duties which have
been imposed upon me. They are, of all military
operations, the most difficult and the most haras-
sing, both to the commander and to his troops.
How far we have been successful, I leave to the
judgment of my countrymen. The armies of Vir-
ginia and of the Potomac have been united in the
presence and against the efforts of a wary and vigo-
rous enemy in greatly superior force to either, with
no loss for which they did not exact full retribu-
tion. Among the officers whom I feel bound to
mention with especial gratitude, for their most
hearty, cordial, and untiring zeal and energy, are
Generals M'Dowell, Banks, Reno, Heintzelman,
Hooker, and Kearney, and many others of inferior
rank, whom I shall take great satisfaction in
bringing to the notice of the Government. The
troops have exhibited wonderful patience and cou-
rage, and I cannot say too much for them."

THE CIVIL WAR 1N AMERICA.

(From the New York Evening Post.)

Our military affairs are very much in the same
position now that those of the French Republic were
when it became necessary for France to meet the
combined armies of the continent. There had been
a vast and enthusiastic uprising of the people ;
armies of enormous magnitude were raised ; and
these armies were equipped as well as they could
be, by the joint exertions of the Government and
the nation. But they had to be officered, in the
outset, as all such improvised armies must be, by a
multitude of inexperienced and incompetent men,
who had generously rushed forward under an im-
pulse of patriotism, to proffer their services to their
country.

The consequence was, that wherever they en-
gaged the enemy, which was generally in detail,
they were either sadly beaten or put to rout. It
was soon seen by the authorities that, unless the
military administration was rendered more rigo-
rous, the cause of the country was lost. They ac-
cordingly adopted measures which, though arbi-
trary and extreme, speedily turned the scales of
fortune against the hitherto successful allies. The
first of these measures was the massing of the
troops, which prevented their being cut to pieces in
detail, and enabled them to move with vast momen-
tum and power upon given points of strategical
importance. But the second recourse was still
more effective, which vy.. to h,la epoii general
responsible, even to the extent of his life, for the
success of that part of the common operations in
which he was employe& Those who failed were
either banished, or imprisoned, or put to death, and
in a little while there was no tardiness, no mistakes,
no quarrels on the field, and no defeats that could
be by human means avoided.
We need some of this rigour in the management
of our own armies. There has not been, from the
beginning of the war up to this time, even so much
as an inquiry into the causes of our want of suc-
cess. I\l'Dowell failed ingloriously at the first
battle of Bull Run; he was never court-mar-
tialled or tried, but he was shortly afterwards
made a major-general and put over a large com-
mand. M'Clellan failed on the Chickahominy,
and the causes and reasons of the failure have
been left to the wranglings of the newspapers,
while itl‘Clellan, after a few weeks of temporary
obscuration, is again raised to high command. In
the same way the disastrous affairs at Great Bethel,
at Ball's Bluff, at Stono Inlet, and at a dozen
other places, were subjected to no other adjudication
than the superficial and often unintelligible com-
ments of the journalists. We do not now say that
the commanding generals were in either of these
cases at fault, for that is not the question ;
they failed, and for this failure they should have
been held to answer at the regular tribunals, until
which time others should have been put in their
places. In other words the government should
have made success the standing rule of merit, until
competent authorities had adjusted the degree of
praise or blame in disputed cases ; but so long as it
refrains from the exercise of this salutary rigour it
must expect disaster and defeat.

An army will not fight as well under a leader
who has been defeated as under one who has been
successful, and an American army in particular,
which is so largely composed of intelligent, think-
ing, and reflective men. It discerns at once the
weaknesses of generals, as we have seen in the case
of Pope; it loses confidence; and although every
individual man may be as brave as Julius Caesar,
and as patriotic as Washington, the body as a
whole cannot proceed with spirit, dash, and hope.
It is not assured that it is going to be led to vic-
tory ; it halts, it hesitates, and finally it breaks
away. Confidence is two-thirds of any battle; and
when confidence is lost you may, as the Russians
are sometimes said to do, whip your troops up to the
fire, but their fighting will be slow, indecisive, and
feeble. Give them on the other hand a leader who
to acknowledged skill and prudence adds chivalric
audacity and dash, and they will follow him to the
gates of death.
We trust, then, that our military authorities will
at once give us this first and indispensable sign of
renewed vigour in military management ; that they
will subject every commander who has failed to the
severest scrutiny and trial ; that they will advance
the men who have shown mastership in any line of
duty; that they will not allow any probable popu-
lar or military clamour to stand in the way of the
execution of their duty ; that they will regard no
political or personal considerations; and thus, while
they weed the incompetents or the misplaced from
the army, they will encourage both army and nation
by the conviction that a reign of energy has begun.
The rebels, who have shown better leaderships than
we, do not scruple in this respect. A year ago
Beauregard was the idol of the Southern troops and
Southern masses, but he decamped from Shiloh and
he is now not named. Floyd and Wise have shared
his fate, as others who will do not meet the one
essential point—success.

At Devonport, the other day, a rat, which was
being chased by several persons, ran up a man's leg inside
his trousers. It laid hold of the man's leg with its teeth
and held its grip with such tenacity that the man's trousers
had to be cut, and the rat was ultimately taken off with a
piece of flesh between its teeth. The wound inflicted is
stated to be serious,

THE NEW GREAT WAR POWER.

(From the Spectator.)

There is a slight reaction perceptible in the
European enthusiasm for the South. Among the
many causes which have produced that strange aber-
ration of feeling, the principal has been an unavowed
half-conscious sense of relief. The American Re-
public, always prosperous and always exacting,
with resources as boundless as its vanity, and
courage almost equal to its irritability, had begun
to dismay politicians. Statesmen felt as if a power
were growing up with which single nations would
be incompetent to deal, and the popular annoyance
at repeated concessions was deepened into hate by
a feeling that such concessions were not altogether
without need. The division of the States was
therefore hailed as an event of good omen for the
world, a catastrophe which, however dreadful in its
circumstances, still, like the French Revolution or
the Irish famine, had its own compensations. To
make the sense of relief complete, however, it was
essential that the fragments of the great empire
should be politically manageable, should be reduced
to the point at which they could no longer safely
menace, and it begins to be doubtful whether this
requisite has been altogether secured. The South
is developing rapidly into a first-class fighting
power, and its admirers confess that, its indepen-
dence secured, they could see the tide of victory roll
back without very keen repugnance.
Were peace declared next week, the South would
remain immeasurably the strongest power on the
American continent. All the causes which led ob-
servers to believe in its military weakness have one
by one disappeard, and for the 50th time it has been
demonstrated that aristocracy, whatever its other
demerits, is the most effective of ruling powers.
From the very beginning of the contest, the action
of the South has been direct, coherent, and singu-
larly able. From among 300,000 slave-owners, all
accustomed to govern, and all, from the permanent
danger in which they live, imbued with the military
spirit, it was inevitable that really governing men
should immediately step out. Accident placed at
their head an organizing mind which there is rea-
son to believe one of consummate power, and in a
few weeks a Government, strong to the point of
despotism, had been brought into working order.
Supported by popular opinion,and the fear of losing
their property—a fear strong enough to make
Frenchmen, for example, submit to despotism—
the governing class were enabled to perform a feat
almost without a parallel. They drove the whole
of the non-propertied class into the ranks of the
army, officered it from their own numbers, and
in a war of combat drilled and disciplined a semi-
civilised race into effective soldiers. General
Jackson has an army which is able to march,which
he can carry away from his base of operations, and
which can act with the secresy and suddenness be-
longing only to regular troops. Compare ITC lellan's
march down the peninsula with the Southern in-
vasion of Maryland, effected at the rate of 20 miles
a day. There is nothing in their own organisation
to prevent the Southerners reaching Canada. Al-
most without support, dependent on the North for
powder and guns, cloth and food, the energy of the
leaders, and the inventiveness always developed in
the Anglo-Saxon race under the stimulus of danger,
supplied all deficiencies. Possessed as they were of
all property, the aristocracy being really in earnest
could not be checked for want of means. They
fought like Frederick the Great or the Committee of
Public Safety, devoted all property to the war,
taxed themselves practically in their whole incomes,
and gradually welded the whole population into
one fighting mass, This was the easier, because to
the mass of that population war was a direct relief,
The mean white, badly fed and incapable of labour,
accustomed to hardship and consumed by ennui, felt
a soldier's life, with its regular duties, and rations,
and plentiful excitement, a relief from its former
existence. The exceptional character of society
greatly favoured his conversion into a soldier. Ac-
customed to look up to the planters as the sole pro-
perty holders, he readily obeyed them as officers,
and fanatic for slavery, marched against Abolition-
ists with an almost religious zeal. Unused to labour,
his disappearance left the locality no poorer ; the
slaves, who had always worked, working on still
like machines. The labour-market could not be dis-
turbed, for the labourer was the one class from
which recruits could never be drawn. A systematic
despotism, probably at once lightened by the absence
of overseers and intensified by the free use of the
punishment of death, aa.:aeu because the
slave was valuable, crushed them into rank and
order, and society, as a mass, had organised itself
for war.

Strong men cropped up everywhere. Aristocracy,
incapable of some forms of genius—a great aristo-
cratic poet is still to seek—always, until worn down
with intermarriage, produces governing men; and
Jefferson Davis had able assistants. At least three
able generals, Beuregard, Lee, and Jackson, rose
successively to the top. A finance minister was
appointed who, whatever his system, succeeded in
finding without revenue all the required supplies.
A minister of marine was found who, as no navy
existed capable of contending with the foe, called
on science, used railway iron to make ships, and by
his first essay created profound alarm in every Go-
vernment in Europe. The Merrimac was destroyed,
but not till she had modified all men's thoughts on
the 'subject of naval warfare, and after her destruc-
tion the Secretary still regained by a similar device
the temporary control of the Mississippi, and is even
now alarming the Northern coast. New ships
were purchased in Europe. At least two captains
were discovered of the very first class for energy
and rapidity of movement; and the South, in the
teeth of every natural obstacle, was enabled to claim
an effective though still insufficient navy. For the
rest, the Government in whose territory the enemy,
with secret allies in the population, can obtain no
information, and no unbought supplies, must be
ably and zealously served. The South, to all out-
side appearances, acts as one man, a working mili-
tary despotism as efficient as that of France, and
far more terribly in earnest.
And now it would seem that the State, thus
organised and changed in its character, is about to
secure independence, and the communication with
the external world, which is all it needs to perfect
its military arrangements. Can any one seriously
doubt that it will be one of the most formidable
states of the earth ? The Southern leaders have
always had a floating idea that slave states should,
as Calhoun advised, be organised on a military
basis, and the planters are not likely to lose the
lesson they have acquired. The army, which
gives them importance abroad, will impart to
them also a new feeling of security at home. A
strong and most able despotism will direct a
regular army of 200,000 men, filled with unfailing
rapidity by the conscription, composed of soldiers
who have reached just that point of civilisation
at which men, without losing their instinctive
ferocity,become capable of action in coherent masses,
and governed by officers educated in command, and
trained in a terrible series of campaigns. The South
has no wooden fleet to abandon, and, with the sale of
one cotton crop, it can place a hundred Merrimacs,
manned and armed, on the water. The property of
the country is at its governor's disposal, and must,
therefore, be adequate to the support of the army,
while the expense of the year has accustomed the
governing class to severe and effective taxation. The
slaves, so far from a source of weakness, have proved
an element of strength, enabling the South alone
among the nations of the world, to make war with-
out in the smallest degree impeding the work of
production. Add to all this a geographical situa-
tion eminently favourable to expansion, and how is
Europe to restrain such a power if it chooses to de-
vote its energies to the foundation of an empire?
By invasion? A million of Angio-Saxons have made
the attempt in vain. By blockades ? No blockade
could equal in severity or duration that which the
South has survived. By naval warfare ? The South
can conquer Mexico without sending a ship to sea,
and move troops by thehundred thousand in regions
whither France could transport only tens. Without
mentioning the revival of the slave trade, which
Virginia may be able to stop, the South will cer-
tainly covet Cuba, which Spain cannot against such
a power defend. it will hanker for Hayti, which
Europe, not owning the island, will scarcely cake to
protect. It will long for the West Indies, whose

free blacks are a permanent menace to the first '
principle of its existence, and England may at any
moment be exposed to an enemy who can produce a
cotton crisis, and who is, at least, as formidable as
the United States ever were. The command of the
isthmus, the most important point on the American
continent, and almost indispensable to our vast pos-
sessions on the Pacific, must belong to the power
which, seated at once on the Atlantic, the Gulf, and
the Pacific, can at any moment transport 50,000
trained soldiers to Nicaragua, and which in *Walker's
expedition, indicated clearly the groove its am-
bition would select. To all human appearance
if the South succeeds, a grand military aristocracy
—brave, tenacious, and merciless, may enthrone it-
self on the continent from the Potomac to Panama,
everywhere ruling a subject race, reduced from a
state of more or less complete freedom to permanent
and degrading bondage. It may be, moreover, for
a time, one of the strongest of external powers, con-
testing our liberty in the Gulf and obliterating our
influence in the Pacific, with a mighty alliance to
offer to any European enemy, and an organisation
which no State based on freedom can permanently
hope to conciliate. That is the prospect before us,
and it is one which may make the most ardent sym-
pathiser with the South hesitate in his effusion of
friendship. He relied on two secret beliefs—that
the South must be exhausted, and that a slave
power must always be weak—and both are proving
fallacious. The South has lost many men, but
while it has enough for its army, its chiefs, who
want no mean whites to grow corn, will not feel
their power diminished. It has incurred a great
debt, but the governing class has lent the money to
itself, and is quite capable, if need be, of making a
holocaust of its bonds. It has two crops to sell, the
value of which will soon recoup all losses, and its
slaves will be worth at once more than their
highest value. As to slavery, while the slaves
obey, they are a source of military strength, and
the planters have learnt the secret of making them
obey. Rome armed her slaves with impunity, and
the men who fell at Therniopylte induced helots to
share their fate—and be forgotten. The slaves re-
lease the white men for war, and the South is, in
fact, a military despotism in which two millions of
males, governed by astute and determined chiefs,
stand ever prepared for battle. Is that the result
which those who accuse us of fanaticism, because
we support civil government and remain true to the
principle of human fre, dom, so anxiously desire ?