The Sun.
London, England, 1865-05-25 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS

TIMES.—A very few words will suffice, after the
debate of Monday last, to place the public in full
possession of the question at issue in the case of
Lieutenant-Colonel Dawkins. The official explana-
tions of Lord Hartington and the independent re-
marks of General Peel have cleared the general
transaction of all obscurity, though the actual merits
of the case itself, as involved in the true deserts of
Colonel Dawkins, are by no means so completely
unravelled. Nobody can have forgotten that in the
reorganisation of our army after the Crimean War
the principles which should regulate the appointment
of commanding officers formed a prominent and
most important subject of discussion. The efficiency
of an entire regiment may depend on the fitness of
its commander for his place, and it was urged with
much reason that preferment of such importance
should not be determined by the mere accidents of
service. The ordinary operation of seniority and
purchase might place at the head of a battalion an
officer who, though not actually suffering under any
professional imputation, might still be incompetent
to fill that particular position with advantage to the
corps. The service, in fact, had notoriously suffered
from the incidents of promotion as thus determined,
and it was argued that the opportunity was now pre-
sented for effective reform. General P eel reminded the
House that it had been attempted to press upon the
Commander-in-Chief not only the approval, but the
actual selection of officers for regimental command ;
but that his royal highness had naturally declined so
invidious a duty. Nobody can wonder at the objection.
The difficultyandresponsibility of such selection would
be almost intolerable, especially under the probable
circumstances of erroneous or defective informa-
tion. There was still, however, an alternative re-
maining. If the Commander-in-Chief could not
be expected to pronounce an opinion upon the pro-
fessional competence of every officer succeeding
to the command of a battalion, he might, at any
rate, interpose his veto in cases of presumed incom-
petence brought specially under his notice. An
officer might have done indifferently well as subal-
tern br captain, and yet have given good reason for
supposing that he would do very ill at the head of
the corps. Why, then, should not the Commander-
in-Chief, when duly moved in such cases, interfere
to prevent mischief by barring the road to pro-
motion, and intimating to the officer concerned
that, for his own sake as well as that of the service,
it would be well for him to stop short of command,
and bring his professional career to a timely close?
The thing could be done without stigma or scandal.
The Major, instead of purchasing the Lieutenant-
Colonelcy, would retire, and nobody need be any the
wiser or any:the worse. There is certainly nothing
unreasonable in this ; and it is precisely what is
alleged to have happened in the case of Colonel
Dawkins. In the ordinary course of things the Co-
lonel would have succeeded to the command of a bat-
talion of the Coldstrean Guards, but the authorities
were moved to inquire into his competence for such a
post. So a Court of Inquiry was ordered ; it con-
ducted its investigations and made its report, and on
that report the Commander-in-Chief acted. His
Royal Highness " came to the conclusion that it
would be for the interest of the service that Colonel
Dawkins should be placed on half-pay, and he gave
Colonel Dawkins the opportunity of retiring." At
first sight of the case nothing could be more proper
or justifiable. The Guards form a corps and
it is of obvious importance that their actual efficiency
should correspond withtheir professional distinction.
It was not necessary to establish any grave charge of
misconduct against Colonel Dawkins, or to bring
him to a court-martial for trial. If it could be cer-
tified by any fair process of inquiry that the service
would suffer by his accession to the command of the
battalion, it was for the good of the army that he
should be debarred from that preferment. That is
exactly the aid which the service might expect from
the Commander-in-Chief, andfor which the country
might well be grateful. There is the case on behalf
of the authorities, and at first sight it is certainly
not a weak one. When we look, however, a little
further into it our satisfaction rapidly diminishes. It
is, to say the least, an extraordinary circumstance
that this discretionary power of the Commander-in-
Chief should have been invoked for the first time on
an occasion like the present. As far as our recol-
lection serves we have had no such case before, or,
at any rate, no case has acquired publicity. Yet it
is only reasonable to suppose that many an incom-
petent or disqualified man must have stood first
on the list for the Lieutenant-Colonelcy of a bat-
talion—many a man whose merits were represented
exclusively by the influence -of his family or the
contents of his purse. It is not too much to assume
that scores of officers must have merited the inter-
vention reserved for Colonel Dawkins. Such inter-
vention is admirable in theory, but it may become
questionable in practice. Here is the first instance
to the knowledge of which the public has been ad-
mitted, and it is impossible to deny that it is full of
suspicion. Not a single allegation is advanced
against Colonel Dawkins which will not bear an
interpretation unfavourable to his accusers. In point
of fact he is charged with nothing but unpopularity.
Charges of professional importance, which would be
tangible, are not so much as insinuated. On the
contrary, the testimony given to his merits in this
respect is quite remarkable :—" He is a man who
has passed through a long period of service with
unblemished honour," said an officer in the House
of Commons who had actually served under him.
" I have heard," said another speaker, " from many
quarters that he is an officer of great ability, and
that he greatly distinguished himself in the Crimea.
Indeed, no one, I believe, will venture to assert
that he is not an officer of the first-class ; and
the only charge, as far as I can see, against him
is that he has failed to make himself so agree-
able as he ought to do." That is, indeed, the
sum of the whole case. Now; it is not to be denied
that " infirmities of, temper," such as are alleged
against Colonel Dawkins, may really be serious
enough to disqualify a man for a position requiring
social tact as well as professional knowledge. A
man with whom nobody can get on is certainly not
the man for a commanding officer, but it will not
escape the notice of the public that this is precisely
the kind of charge under which personal or private
animosities might be concealed. We do not say,
nor do we mean it to be implied, that the case is so,
but it unfortunately happens that it easily might be.
If a set were made in any regiment against any par-
ticular officer, and it was desired to get rid of him as
an unpopular man, this is exactly the shape which the
proceeding would assume. Colonel Dawkins is
charged with " unfitness for command," though, for
all we can see, this may mean nothing more than that
certain officers do not want him to command them.
This is what gives the case its suspicious aspect. In
theory the transaction itself is unimpeaChable. It
would be for the interest of the public if the Com-
mander-in-Chief would intervene in every case to
remove an incompetent officer from the path to high
command. But it is very unfortunate that in the
single case brought prominently into notice there
should be so much room for imagining improper
motives. We have never heard of an officer of high
degree being told that it requires something .more
than lineage or wealth to qualify a man for com-
mand. All that kind of promotion seems to have
taken its course just as in former times, without any
invocation of the Commander-in-Chief's authority.
Not a word do we hear of such appeals until an
officer in the Guards is unfortunate enough to incur
the dislike of three or four other officers, and then
the guardian of discipline and efficiency is at once
called in. When called in he, of course, had no
option but to act on the report of the regular tri-
bunal ; but the case is so remarkable and the circum-
stances so suggestive that we should much like to
see the judgment of the Court of Inquiry subjected
to some careful revision.
POST.—There is one fact which, though it is no
where specifically stated in the recent news from
America, is nevertheless apparent on the face of the
intelligence which is brought by every succeeding
mail. This fact is, that though the war may be at
an end, the contest is just where it has been at any
time within the last four years. The war on this
side of the Mississippi, at least, has been closed for
a month. But we really search the news which has
come to hand since in vain for any of the usual
fruits of victory or peace. If the Federals had
been fighting with a foreign enemy, they might
have exacted the costs of the war or the cession of
territory, or both. They might have imposed con-
ditions profitable to themselves. They might even
have annexed the conquered country altogether,
and held it. But as the case stands they cannot
do any of these things. As the Federals have
all along proceeded on the assumption that the
Southern States are part of their country—part of
the United States—it follows that- to extort the
cost of the war from the Confederates would be
no gain at all in the long run. Whether the North
pay its own expenses itself, or whether it compel
the South to pay them, the money must come,
first or last, out of the wealth and capital of the
United States. In like manner, for the same rea-
son, the acquisition of territory is out of the ques-
tion. The conqueror has asserted throughout that
the South is part of his country. He has made good
his claim so far as the argument of force can pos-
sibly make it good. But, according to his own
showing, the possession of the South can be no gain
at all, simply because, as he contends, it always
belonged to him, and is part of his country. If he
succeeded in subjugating the South, and is now the
" monarch of all he surveys," from the Potomac to
the Gulf, and from the Mississippi to the Atlantic,
he has also succeeded in so effectually desolating it
that the conquest is a barren one ; and he might
truthfully say, with the ancient king, that " such
another victory would be his ruin." When a foreign
country is conquered and annexed it may be a gain,

even though it be desolated in the process of acqui-
sition. It may serve as a colony for surplus popu-
lation—it may possess valuable ports and harbours,
which, even though ruined for the time, may be
reinstated, and when so reinstated will be of great
value. It may be profitable in a variety of other
ways. But in the case of America the facts are quite
otherwise. Impartial spectators saw all this fro
the first, and took the liberty of freely pointing it
out. It has lately been much the custom of the
Federals and their European friends to talk of the
false predictions which have been made from time to
time as to the course of the war. But if, as it cer-
tainly appears, the war is only at an end in the sense
that the chief Southern armies on this side of the
Mississippi have laid down their arms, while the war
of principles and the antagonism of interests are just
as great as ever they were, it still remains to be seen
how far those predictions really are falsified. But
the expectation that the conquest would be a barren
one, and of no value to the victor, appears to be
confirmedby the telegrams which every vessel brings
to this country from New York. Of course twenty
millions of people can overpower less than a third
of their number if they have the obstinacy to per-
severe in a fruitless struggle, and this was always
foreseen and acknowledged; but the question is,what
are they to take by their conquest ? Will they find
their conquest worth having, or will they find it
worthless, and be compelled by the force of circum-
stances to abandon it ? Notwithstanding the con-
fident and sanguine utterances of the Federals and
their friends, it is by no means clear whether his-
story will have to answer these questions affirma-
tively or negatively. We would understate the case
rather than overstate it. It is mere rashness, un-
mindful of facts and experience, which would per-
suade us that the Union is restored, and that things
have returned, or are immediately about to return,
to their old channels. The work of reconstruction
not onlyhas to be done, but it has to be commenced.
As yet it has not even been begun • and it certainly
would appear as if the victors hardly knew how to
set about attempting it. So far as it is possible to
come to any certain or definite conclusion from the
vague and confused masses of news which reach us
from the North, it does not appear that the Federals
have any fixed or settled programme of reconstruc-
tion at all. They do not seem even to have decided
what to do with the Confederate leaders, should
these fall into their hands. Some are for clemency;
some are for what they call justice • others are for
vengeance, pure and simple. Then there is the
question of how the great mass of the Southern
white population is to be dealt with. On this point
we do not find very many suggestions, practical or
the reverse : we suppose for the reason that nobody
knows exactly what to suggest. With regard to the
blacks we certainly do find one suggestion, and that
owes its authorship to no less a personage than the
President himself. Mr. Johnson, in an address to
the. coloured population, tells them he trusted the
time would come when all the negroes would be
assembled in one country best adapted to their
condition, if it should appear that they could not
get on with the whites. He also declared that
man could not hold property in man.. If we ar°
to infer from this that the blacks are to be at
once emancipated, and are to remain in the South
until an uninhabited country has been found for
them, and they have been conveyed thither, it is
obvious that the difficulty which the Federals are
likely to experience from the negroes in the mean-
time may be considered, for all practical purposes'
as infinite. But a much more matter of fact and
business-like proposal has been published. It is
that these negroes, though unconditionally email"
cipated, shall by no means be allowed to be idle, but
shall be compelled to work to maintain themselves
and families. What difference there is between any
possible system of this kind and slavery will no doubt
be seen when it is carried into practice. There will
probably be less difficulty in finding negroes for
whatever work there may be to be done than in
finding work for the negroes. At present it seems
hardly too much to say that the South is in a state
of political and social chaos. It has been so
poverished and devastated that we cannot be so'
prised if the conquerors are sadly perplexed to know
how to set about the work of reconstruction, or
where to begin. Elaborate forms of oath are fog'
gested as the means of making the Secessionist a
stanch and loyal Unionist. This is a very compen-
dious method of reconstruction undoubtedly, but
men's principles, and feelings, and beliefs are not
changed by a formula of words uttered under pre'
sure and duress. The fact is that the South may
be now described as drifting. It has been drifting
ever since the main armies surrendered • and am;
rently it will continue drifting still. Where it will
drift to of course remains to be seen. That it will
ever of itself drift back into the " Union as it was'.
does not appear very 'probable. That the Federals
will be able to steer it back, or tug it back, does not
seem much more probable. Meanwhile it drifts.
Nothing is doing, nothing is attempted. We hear
of one more Southern general surrendering in this
place, while in that, other generals declare they will
maintain the Confederacy to the last on the other
side of the Mississippi. The Southern States, accord:
to a reported official statement, are to be governed
by military law until the inhabitants are reconciled
toimmediate emancipation. If the military rule of
the South is to be continued until this contingency
is realised, it would seem as if there was never to be
constitutional government within its confines again'
But what is to be done with the blacks until the
whites are thus reconciled ? We suppose they are to
be free, while the whites are to be under a
despotism. How this will work, and how the blacks
can be utilised and put to profitable employment, are
problems the solution of which must be left to the
future. One thing is certain—the real difficulties
of the situation do not appear to have been much
diminished by the military successes of the North.