The Sun.
London, England, 1865-11-18 00:00:00

LAW INTELLIGENCE.__Nov• 17.
_o_

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.
Sittings in Banco, Michaelmas Term, beforo Lord Chief
Justice Erie and Justices Willes, Ryles, and Keating.)
WIGAN T. STRANGE.

This was an appeal from the decision of Mr. Tyrwhitt,
the police magistrate, in the Alhambra case. On a former
occasion Mr. Horace Wigan, the appellant, of the Olympic
Theatre, laid an information against the proprietor of the
Alhambra for allowing stage representations and scenic
performances at the Alhambra, without the licence of the
Lord Chamberlain. The entertainment complained of was
called a ballet divertissement. The respondent's place of
amusement was licensed by the justices under the statute
10 of George 11., cap. 36, for the entertainment of music
and dancing, but it was contended by the appellant that

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the ballet divertissement of the defendant was a scenic re-
presentation and a pantomime which required the licence
of the Lord Chamberlain under the Stage Play Act, the Gth
and 7th Victoria, cap. 68. On that information the respon-
dent was convicted, but on appeal to the quarter sessions
the magistrates quashed the conviction. The appellant
then took out a further summons and laid a fresh informa-
tion on another representation, and the learned metropoli-
tan magistrate decided in accordance with the decision of
. _

--------
Lo Quarter Sessions, by which ho felt bound, that the re•

presentation was not a stage play, but stated that his own
opinion was different, and granted a case for the decision
of a superior court, whether in point of law the represen-
tation was a stage play requiring the licence of the Lord
Chamberlain. The case to-day came on far hearing.
Mr. Sergeant Tindal Atkinson (with whom was Mr.
Bosanquet) appeared for the appellant ; and Mr. Poland
(with whom was Mr. Hawkins, Q.C.) for the respondent.

The case stated that in the entertainment6o to 70 women
descended on the stage from a scenic representation of rocks,
dressed in the ordinary costume of ballet dancers, came
through an archway, and danced in two lines armed with
daggers. There was a scenic combat, in which the wounded
fell, gestures of triumph, and then other dancers with palm
leaves appeared, representing the triumph of peace over
war. The dance had been brought out at Drury-lane, and
had there been danced by Alma in an Egyptian scene.
For the appellant it was contended that there were cha-
racters in costume using gestures calculated to excite emo-
tion. In the midst of the dancers a woman came on the
stage with a bloody dagger in each hand, and went through
the gesture of stabbing. A person fell on the ground.
There was then a gesture of triumph, exhibiting some of
the worst feelings of our nature. Then a woman imitated
the figure of Fame, by putting her leg out at a right angle
—(laughter); and then there was a reconciliation amid
Eastern rocks. This, the learned sergeant contended, was
a dramatic entertainment, and required the license of the
Lord Chamberlain. Such performances might be of a very
lascivious character and highly immoral, and there was
only the license of the Lord Chamberlain provided to con-
trol them.

For the respondent it was contended that the performance
was a mixed entertainment of public dancing and music,
for which the fespondent had the magistrateelicenseunder
the 25th Geo. 11., cap. 36. This license applied to hired
dancers and:musicians employed to entertain the public, as
well as to dancing rooms, where the public went to dance.
The word " ballet" was omitted from the statute of Vic-
toria ; in one sense it was a dance ; but in the theatrical
sense it meant gesture and pantomime. This performanoo
had been defined to be a ballet divertissement, with a dagger
dance and gesture. In the dances there was gesture. The
lady bowed to the gentleman, and the gentleman to the lady.
This was beyond mere dancing, and, according to the conten-
tion on the other side, was a pantomime requiring the
licence of the Lord Chamberlain. The justices in the case
appealed against were of opinion that the representation
was nothing more than dancing, and the magistrate held
the same, though of a different opinion. The decision was
on a question of fact that it was merely dancing.
The Chief Justice, in giving judgment, said this was a
proceeding against the respondent for representing a stage
play without the licence of the Lord Chamberlain, and the
magistrate had refused a conviction, but had stated facts
that were in evidence before him, and had asked the opinion
of the Court whether on those facts he ought to have con-
victed, and, if he (night, to send the case back to him.
After having given the case the best attention he was cap- I
able of, it appeared to him that the question proposed to
him was a question of degree—was more a question of fact
than of law ; and, so far as he could understand the case,
ho inclined to the opinion, though with great doubt, that
the decision the magistrate had come to not to convict was
the right ono. But it was entirely a question of degree.
Where dancing ceased to be lawful, and became a stage
play, was a definition he was not at all prepared to offer
ae nd da t
shteargoe were several
tdefinitions
go f
fw
the
The early statutes required a licence for a representati
m
o
shouldgebopldaeyesm,
statute—tragedy, comedy, farce, opera, burletta, panto-
mime,llOthenoeei.GeTohrgeen,liln. athcaessee
must have and a
forth.o
Under
the n rtheChancellor's licence.
that came before Lord Kenyon, it seemed to have been
held that the Legislature allowed an entertainment
for persons who could not afford to attend the licensed
representations at houses of public resort of music
and dancing, provided there was a licence of the ma-
gistrates. The respondent had, in literal terms, con-
fined his entertainment to music and dancing, and
the question in contest is whether it was such an infraction
of a dramatic performance as made it come within the defi-
nition of a stage play. He had heard arguments offered
by those who pressed for a conviction as to the interests of
morality. But, so far as he could see, there was no interost
of morality at stake. The question was whether amusement
on cheap terms should be allowed to continue, or be put a
stop to, so that the very entertainment should be permitted
at the licensed theatres at a dearer rate. Dancing and music
were clearly lawful without the Lord Chancellors licence.
Stage playing was clearly not lawful without such licence.
A very minute detail was given in the case of women who
came down rocks and danced in two ranks ; another
woman came down and danced a superior order of dancing
alone. So far this was but dancing. Bat when a number
of women came down with daggers, and others with palm
leaves, and one stood over the other to represent a species
of triumph, that came very near a dramatic performance.
But the line must be drawn somewhere. The magistrate
had used terms of art, and said there was a ballet diver-
tissement in which there was no consecutive train of ideas,
where a number of persons grouped themselves and went
through various figures. On the other hand, there was a
ballet d'action, in which was intended to be represented a
regular dramatic story, which might give rise to all man-
ner of emotions, accompanied at the same time by graceful