The Sun.
London, England, 1865-03-21 00:00:00

and after a short and bloody struggle drives them
headlong back along the beach. But while the at-
tention of the garrison is engaged in repulsing the
attack on the extreme left of the Federal line a body
of Gen. Terry's soldiers dashes forward along the
river bank on the Federal right, and before their
advance is noticed they occupy the sallyport which
enters the fort from the direction of Col. Lamb's
house. Not until Gen. Whiting, flushed with the
exertion of his hand-to-hand combat with the
marines, saw his enemy's flag mounted upon the
third traverse of the land face, did he recognise
his danger. In vain, with desperate courage did he
call upon his men to follow him, and rush forward
to tear down the hated ensign with his own hand.
In vain did Col. Lamb second his leader's efforts
with conspicuous gallantry. In a few minutes both
officers are carried bleeding to the rear ; all attack
on the part of the garrison ceases ; the Federals
hold the sallyport into which they have glided, and,
although their work of conquest is not completed
until 10 o'clock at night, at 3 p.m., the fort has vir-
tually ceased to be the property of the Confederates.
Those who, after reading this narrative, talk
sneeringly of the feebleness of the resistance offered
by the defenders of Fort Filer have probably little
experience of the tremendous strain to which both
body and mind are subjected when a man is ex-
posed for 60 or 70 hours, without the respite of a
moment, to such a fearful bombardment as was
hurled into Fort Fisher. It is not probable that
any wise man who has had experience of war
will presume to say of this garrison, " Had
I been in their place I should have done
other than what they did." Better explanations of
the fall of the fort than allegations of cowardice on
the part of its defenders may probably be found. I
do not deny that it is possible that 2,200 veterans, if
they had been bound together by an association of
many months within the fort, and had been ably
officered, might have successfully resisted the joint
attack at two different points of Admiral Porter's
Marines and General Terry's soldiers. But it must
be remembered that the 2,200 men in question were
a heterogeneous body, lacking cohesion and know-
ledge of each other, without officers of experience
with two exceptions, and with morale to a certain
extent sapped by the unparalleled bombardment to
which they were subjected. It is not wonderful that
after the fall of General Whiting and Colonel Lamb
all vigorous effort should have ceased ; but I am in-
clined to think that military critics will hereafter be
more prone to censure the inactivity of the Confe-
derates outside than the feebleness of those within
the fort. From the configuration of the ground it was
impossible for General Bragg to have interposed
with Hake's division between the assailants and Fort
Fisher without uncovering Wilmington and without
exposing his men to an enfilading fire from the sea.
But nothing is more certain than that great risks
must be run at times by commanding Generals ; and
the most cautious of great captains would have dared
greatly to save a work of such momentous import-
ance as Fort Fisher. There are other circumstances,
however, which in my judgment satisfactorily ex-
plain the fall of Fort Fisher, and among them I may
prominently mention the absence of any large guns,
and especially rifled guns, upon the land face. En-
couraged by his experience of the feebleness of the
fire from the 'land face upon Christmas-day, Ad-
miral Porter carried his ironclad vessels within 800
yards of the Confederate guns, and for three days
poured an incessant fire at short range into the
work, whereby 15 out of 16 guns were dismounted.
Experience has firmly established the fact that
against ironclad vessels any projectile which weighs
less than 100 pounds is altogether impotent. But
upon the land face of Fort Fisher the largest
smoothbore gun was a 68-pounder, and the largest
rifled gun, I believe, a 42-pounder. Your readers
will remember that in the attack upon Charleston
of April, 1863, the Keokuk was sunk at 900 yards
by a projectile from a rifled Brooke gun, which, I
believe, weighed about 1501 b. Two similar Brooke
guns upon the land face of Fort Fisher, or two such
Armstrong guns as were mounted upon its sea face
and at fort Caswell, would have made it impossible
for the Federal monitors to lie for three days within
800 yards of the fort, and would have preserved
Wilmington to the Confederates as a poit of entry.
But, in addition, the resistance of Fort Fisher
lacked one element which is essential to the defence
of all earthworks or sand forts. Unless the damage
done by day is repaired by night, such works must
crumble away to nothing, if pommelled long enough.
We know that upon Morris Island the little sand
fort called Battery Wagner resisted for 60 days,
although subjected to a terrible and almost incessant
fire from the Federal ships, solely because the gar-
rison worked vigorously by night, and repaired the
damages of the preceding day by cramming sandbags
and loose sand into the rents and yawning chasms
torn by the enemy's shot. It is true that the gar-
rison of Battery Wagner was constantly relieved and
recruited by fresh men ; but it is difficult to believe
that if the defenders of Fort Fisher had pos-
sessed practical experience in the defence of such
works they might not during the first night have
remounted some of the five guns dismounted
during the first day,in spite oftehvieouset
enemy'slte)
rfi it
sßeuemt,
s to aftermalle
t(haastltshae giidrne:y question for military previous
engineers to solve is how to casemate guns in an
earthwork which is meant to be permanent. It
is certain that ironclad vessels can resist the impact
of 100-pounder or 150-pounder smoothbore projec-
tiles long enough to give them a chance of dis-
mounting the guns that throw these projectiles,
unless protected by casemates. It seems desirable
not only that sand forts should be defended by very
heavy rifled guns, but also, in view of the constant
tendency to improvement in ironclad naval archi-
tecture, that the guns should be ensconced in case-
mates, wherever the earthwork they defend is de-
signed to be permanent.