The Sun.
London, England, 1865-01-05 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS,

TIMES.—Lord Grey has republished his " Essay
on Parliamentary Reform," with the addition of two
chapters, in the first of which he treats of the rival
Reform Bills of 1859 and 1860, while the second
contains his own suggestions for another Reform
Bill. It is due to Lord Grey to say that the son of
the Minister to whom we owe the Reform Act of
1832 has discussed the question of an amendment of
his father's measure with candour and fairness, and
displayed great ingenuity and fertility of resource in
the suggestions he has made. In treating such a
subject it would be unreasonable to expect any very
striking novelty of criticism, but this is amply com-
pensated by the proposal of most startling innova-
tions. Lord Grey thinks very highly of the Reform
Act of 1832, but he admits that it contains. some
serious defects. In the first place, by abolishing a
number of Treasury boroughs and greatly popular-
isingso the system of representation, it has, he thin
materially weakened the power of the Executives
Government in the House of Commons, and has
far placed an obstacle in the way of
contemplates the efficient
working of our Constitution, which
that the Legislature should act under the control of
the Executive. By abolishing a great number of
nomination boroughs the Reform has.
also, he
thinks, diminished the facilities for bringing into
Parliament young men of talent but of moder ate re-
sources, and finding seats for able
and meritorious
statesmen who may either be deficient in electioneer-
ing ability or have incurred a temporary unpopu-
larity in the discharge of their duty.
The Reform
Act has not put an end to corruption, and it has not
diffused political rights as widely as might be desired.
The object of a Reform Bill, Lord Grey thinks,
should be to provide for the better government
of the nation and the welfare of the people at
large, not to gratify a love of change,, nor to
conform to abstract ideas. He prefers the Bill of
1859 to the Bill of 1860. The former he thinks
more complicated, but also more logical ; the
second more simple, but less consistent. The effect
of both would have been, he thinks, to prepare the
way for further changes ; to recognise the prin-
ciples of Democracy, which would be sure to
develope themselves as time goes on. He sees in
the very moderation of these bills a source of danger.
It is the nature of Democracy to establish itself by
degrees, and the possession of political power is not
of itself an advantage to the possessors, but only so
far as it contributes to secure the objects of good
Government. Having thus criticised his predecessors
with much justice, though, perhaps, not with tho-
rough completeness; Lord Grey proceeds to give
his neighbours the opportunity of subjecting himself
to a similar ordeal. He is in favour of a sweeping
measure, the main principles of which shall be en-
tirely in a Democratic direction. He would equalise
the borough and county franchise, sweep away
small boroughs as an indefensible anomaly, and re-
distribute the constituencies, if not into absolutely
equal electoral districts, at any rate into aggregates
approaching to equality. He does not propose to
lower the borough franchise, and certainly, if his
view be correct, that in boroughs in which the
Small Tenements Act has been adopted any person
who rents a single room for 2s. 4d. a week is, with-
out payment of rates and taxes, without continuous.
residence in the same house, provided he have re-
sided in the borough for a year, entitled to vote as a
ten-pound householder, there seems very little rea-
son for lowering the franchise in this direction,
unless on principles which would go the whole
length of universal suffrage. This being the outline
of his measure, Lord Grey sets himself to work to
correct the obvious tendency of the provisions we
have mentioned. He sees considerable evil in the
abolition of small boroughs—an evil which his re-
distribution of the constituencies will of course
greatly aggravate—and he proceeds to remedy this
evil by providing for the representation of minorities
and giving facilities for the introduction into Par-
liament of men whose merit is more solid than popu-
lar. The first expedient is the cumulative vote—
that is, the giving each voter as many votes as there
are seats to be filled up, and allowing him either to
spread thosevotes by giving each to a different candi,
date, or to consolidate them by giving them all to
one, in which case they would count in his favour,
not as now, for one vote, but for as many votes as
there are seats to be filled up. He proposes to in-
crease the number of .constituencies which are not of
a local character, to augment the representation of
the Universities; and to give to persons engaged in
particular trades, either as capitalists or labourers
the power of returning a member, forming them into
a sort of guild for the purpose. He would allow the
House of Commons to elect 15 members for life by
cumulative vote, no vacancy to be filled up till three
occur. These provisions seem meant to correct the
evils occasioned by the abolition of small boroughs.
In order to strengthen the Government, he proposes

that thq House should have the power of electing for
the session some 30 or 40 members, not by cumula-
tive votes, but by majority, so that the stronger
party would gain for that very reason an increase
of strength, and he would abolish the law requiring
re-election on vacating office. He proposes, not very
consistently with this object, to extend the qualifica-
tion of revenue officers for voting. He is opposed
to the ballot, he seems to look favourably on voting
papers, and is inclined to lean to a plan of double
election, by which a limited number of electors, say
twenty, may be empowered to elect some person to
vote for them, thus abdicating the franchise they
possess, and putting on record in the most authentic
manner their own unfitness for its exercise. This
is the outline of Lord Grey's plan. It occurs to us
to ask, in the first place, why on his own showing
Lord Grey should desire to have any Reform Bill at
all. He does not pretend to say that the• pre-
sent state of things fails to provide, according to
his own requirement, for the good government
of the nation or the welfare of the people at large.
We nowhere find him expressing any confidence
that the changes he proposes would make things
really much better. There are serious defects, he
says ; the cry for Reform may revive ; even now
an active minority is at work, and it is wise to
make alterations which may correct these defects
while it is yet time. ' This looks very like that love
of change and idle search after abstract perfection
which Lord Grey himself denounces. We must
refer him to his own principles, and then the
question will be, does the present system work well,
and will any system that is likely to be adopted
work better? It appears to us that there is a con-
.

'union in this matter between means and ends.

There is the demand of a not very influential
minority for a reduced franchise and redistribution
of seats. Lord Grey proposes to comply with this
demand. But these things are not asked for their
own sake, but with the view of extending Demo-
cratic influence and giving greater power to mere
numbers as opposed to intelligence and property.
This is the very thing which Lord Grey sets him-
self to counteract, and he believes that those who

demand Reform will be satisfied with a measure so

!ramed as to take away in detail the very concession

which it purports to give in gross. We think very
differently. If the Democratic party in England are
weak and unimportant, there is no need to concede
a Reform Bill in order to conciliate them. If they
are strong and powerful, they will not be conciliated
by a Reform Bill carefully framed so as to appear to
comply with their wishes in form, and to elude them
in substance. The power that is able to compel a
bill is able to compel a bill in accordance with its
wishes. The agitators for Reform know what they
want, and will either have it or will not be satisfied.
It is also apparent that Lord Grey'S Conservative
safeguards are calculated not so much to correct the
evils of the existing system as that great aggravation
of them which his own creation of new electoral
districts and the reduction of the county franchise
would tend to create. The first division of mea-
sures consists of expedients for preventing the
natural result of electoral districts—the omnipo-
tence of the majority. The second is for the pur-
pose of correcting the increased weakness of the
Government, sure to arise from the same cause. Is
it worth while to let loose so much evil in order to
see if we can control it—to instal a majority in
absolute power, in order to see whether, bit by bit
we can filch it away? Has Lord Grey considered
whether the result of introducing such a measure as
he proposes would not be the adoption of the con-
cessions, and the omission of the safeguards with
which he seeks to counterbalance them? Has he
considered, even if the measure should pass, how
long the powerful majority would tolerate impedi-
ments expressly placed in its way, and submit to
restraints which may be almost termed self-imposed?
Is it possible to go back to the feudal ages, to re-
animate and invest with new power the narrow and
exclusive spirit of Guilds and Trade Corporations ?
Would the House of Commons, elected by the
people, long tolerate ameng. themselves the pre-
sence of members for life, or members for the Ses-
sion, claiming equality, if not superior, but having
no such origin? By what arts would these prizes
be obtained? What openings for the corruption of
members would they not create, what factions,
what heartburnings, what intrigues ! IS it worth
while to overthrow so much that has stood the test
of experience in order to try whether we cannot
invent something which will work almost as well as
what we have now ? Let it be proved that the ad-
mission of the working classes to the suffrage and
the equal or nearly equal distribution of electoral
power will be a substantial improvement to our Go-
vernment, and the thing will, no doubt, be done.
But let us not do what we believe to be wrong
merely because it is asked for, and because we
imagine that we are able by a number of subtle de-
vices altogether to neutralise and destroy the effect
of our own concessions.

POST.—The events of the past month have
wrought so marked a change in the complexion of
affairs in America that it may not be out of place to
ascertain as nearly as possible what have been the
losses and gains of each of the belligerents, and to
determine how far they are likely to affect 'the
duration or the issue of the war. Hostilities have
been carried on in the American. States oh so
extensive a scale, the number of in,l..L'oendent
armies employed in different regiOns has teen BO
large, and the fortune of the combatants has been
so various, that it is scarcely possible. for a spec-
tator to appreciate at their proper value the
successes or the defeats which almost every week
the journalist is called upon to chronicle. If the
subjugation of Virginia were the sole object which
the Northern Government had in view; we might
content ourselves with watching the movements of
the vast army which for some months past has been
encamped on the banks of the James River ; or if
the occupation of Tennessee or of Georgia was the
end which the North alone sought to attain, we
might confine ourselves to following the operations
of the armies of Thomas or of Sherman. But, in-
stead of one, it is a large number of States which
the Federal Government seek to coerce into subjec-
tion,; and he who would form a conjecture regarding
the issue of the war must not only regard the results
of each particular campaign, but must estimate
their relative bearing upon each other. It also
happens that, from the number of the armies which
the belligerents have sent into the field, and from
the variety of places in which active hostilities are
simultaneously carried on, we are inclined to under-
rate, or even to lose sight of, operations which, if
they stood alone, would completely engross our at-
tention. There are few, for example; even of those
who have carefully watched the progress of the war
during the past three months, who are possibly
aware that an expedition has been projected with a
view to the seizure of a port on the coast of North
Carolina which bears comparison with that which
left the shores of Bulgaria in the autumn of 1854
for the invasion of the Crimea. That expedition
has actually sailed, and, if we are to trust the in-
formation brought by the last mail, has been. com-
pelled to abandon its object. The fleet which under
the command of Admiral Porter set sail for Wil-
mington as soon as Sherman's arrival at Savannah
had been ascertained, was composed of 65 vessels
of war and 85 transports, and conveyed an army of
upwards of 20,000 men. The allied fleets on leaving
Varna in September, 1854, consisted of 63 sail of
the line and war steamers, and close on 200 trans-
ports, and conveyed an army of 53,000 men. The
naval force in both was numerically about the
same, though the army destined for Sebastopol
was more than double that despatched to Wilming-
ton. The circumstance is worthy of notice, how-
ever, as illustrating the comparative ,linattention
with which we have learned to regard the isolated
operations of which the great war now waged in
America is composed. Yet on the success or failure
of these combined operations must ultimately de-
pend the issue of the war.. It is now admitted on
all hands that the removal of Hood's army from
Georgia, thereby uncovering the approaches to Sa-
vannah, was a mistake. After the defeat of Bragg
at Chattanooga a twelvemonth since, and the vir-
tual occupation of the greater portion of Tennessee
by the Federal troops, the invasion of Georgia was
determined on, and many months were expended-by
the Government at Washington in
.preparations for
an attack on Atlanta. The possession of this town,
it was supposed, would enable the North to inter-
cept the line of communication between the Caroli-
nas and the Western States, and by establishing a
formidable position in the heart of the Confederacy,
to paralyse the efforts of the scattered armies of the
Southern Republic. Atlanta fell, but the prize was
found to be almost worthless. Separated by a long
and comparatively undefended line of country from
the source of his supplies Sherman found that, with-
out inflicting any damage on his opponents,
ie was
compelled to maintain a huge army under difficul-
ties which might at any moment become insuperable.
It was open to him to retire into Tennessee, or to
penetrate still further into Georgia ; in 'the former
case having no foe to dread, in the latter being com-
pelled to cope with any force which the Confede-
rates might be enabled to employ against him. While
placed in this position the Confederate Government
resolved on the rash expedition of despatching into
Tennessee the army which had evacuated Atlanta,
and which might by its mere presence in Georgia
have deterred Sherman from advancing still farther
from his base of operations. It is not difficult to un-
derstand the motives which induced them to take
this step ; but the result proved that they under-
rated, the abilities of the general to whom they were
opposed, and the strength of the force which he
had left behind him for the defence of Tennes-
see. Relieved from all apprehensions of danger
in his immediate .front, Sherman abandoned At-
lanta and marched without opposition across
Georgia to the sea coast ; whilst Hood, after having

in Tennessee to retire
d,e,..feated and forced
compelled the Federal arrn'Y
he first encoun-
tered resistance in his preVious adv. Ince.
brilliant the advance of Sherman th. rough
has been, it is needless to say that he 1. 'las gained no Georgia.,
substantial advantage by the mere aban'donment of
a town which he was at great pains to tak'"el
and the
substitution of a sea for a land base. A stip of lan
on the coast of Georgia is now in the possession of
the Federal troops, whilst every other pt rtion of the
State is in the hands of the Confederates. ma
be, however, that the possession of this ,stvip
land will enable him to secure advantages w.hic'
will more than compensate him for the loss, of t
lanta—and this brings us to consider the probabi-
lity of Savannah being captured, and made th' .
starting point of future expeditions into Georgi,
and South Carolina. Seven days have elapsed
since Sherman's arrival before the fortifications o
that town, and it is a significant fact that no at
tempt has been made to carry it by. assault. Th,
delay has probably been occasioned by a desire 0,
the .part of the general 'to obtain the assistance o
Admiral Dahlgre-n's fleet—but, nevertheless, it be,
tokens a want of confidence in his army to achiev,
unaided the capture of the city. We now learn the'
it is at least doubtful whether the fleet will be Al,
to co-operate with the land forces, and, if so, G en' •
Sherma'h's task has become even more difficult tha
it was on his arrival, as during the interval th,
Confederate Government have not neglected to re
inforce the garrison. The railroad connectin
Charleston with Savannah is perfectly unimpede
from the former town to the point where i
crosses the Savannah River, a few miles abov,
the besieged city; and it is needless to say tha
the Confederates have availed themselves of i
to despatch all the troops at their disposal to th,
assistance of the garrison. The fate of th,
beleaguered town cannot, therefore, be con
sidered, as the Federals would have us suppose
as sealed, and, until it falls, the march of Sherman,
through Georgia will be unproductive of results
If, however, Savannah shouldsbe taken, the Federa
General would unquestionably secure an excellent
base of operations for an advance eastwards oft
Charleston, northwards on Augusta, or westwar
on the towns in Georgia which he left on his rig",
flank when traversing the State. The failure of th
expedition against Wilmington may enable the Co
federates' to despatch a portion of its garrison
Savannah, and for the present, at least, the inters
tion of simultaneously attacking both towns wi
probably be abandoned by the Federal Governmen
On the whole, therefore, the strategic position
the belligerents in the South is not so unfavourabi
to the Confederates as many were at first incline
to suppose. As regards Hood, he has only lost th
ground which he previously gained ; and the late
official accounts show that he inflicted upon h.
adversary no less damage than he suffered himse ,
His advance into Tennessee was, however, unque
tionably a failure, for; besides weakening his armh
he afforded Sherman the opportunity of putting i
extreme jeopardy the strategically important to
of Savannah.

COUNTRY MARKETS.

... Al,.

HULL.-T UESDAY.

At our market to-day there was a large show of Englisl,
wheat, which sold at an advance of is per qr. The de
mand was principally upon dry qualities. Foreign whce
was also is per qr. dearer—the demand being confined t
fine reds and finest Baltic white. All feeding corn Sol
readily at the full prices of last week. Malting barley
slow sale.