The Sun.
London, England, 1865-03-28 00:00:00

_ - -
SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

TIMES.—The intelligence from America contained
in our impression this morning lifts the veil which
has so long hung over Gen. Sherman's movements,
and, indeed, opens up again the whole theatre of
the war. The news brought by the Canada is to
the 17th of March, and announces the receipt of
authentic intelligence from Sherman to as late a
date as 'March 12. Gen. Grant had received a letter
from him dated on that day at Fayetteville, a town
on the Cape Fear River, about 70 miles above Wil-
mington. All uncertainty, therefore, as to the main
direction of his movements is at length removed, and
we may expect him for the future to be as much
within the field of view as Gen. Grant. He is now,
in fact, in evident co-operation with the other Fede-
ral armies in Virginia and North Carolina. The
field of war is greatly narrowed, and the various
movements which we report to-day have all a more
or less close relation to each other. Before, how-
ever, we discuss these various operations, or con-
sider the nature of Gen. Sherman's present position,
it may be convenient to review the course of his
march, which is at length sufficiently ascertained.
Until the present intelligence we have known nothing
certain of him since he was at Columbia, in the
heart of South Carolina, about the middle of last
month. Neither Federals nor Confederates appeared
to know in what direction he would move from that
capital. It was pretty clear that he would advance
into North Carolina, but there were, two routes open
to his decision. He might either move along the line
of the railway which runs north from Columbia to
Greensborough and Danville, keeping on. the west
of Raleigh, the capital of North Carolina, or he
might move along the railway which runs nearly east
from Columbia to Wilmington. The Confederates
seem to have anticipated at first that he would take
the former course, and as he moved towards Wins-
borough he may have made a feint of doing so. It
would obviously have been exceedingly hazardous to
press so far into the interior of the country in face
of a hostile army, and if it might seem an advantage
that by this course he could sever the connexion
i
be-
tween Beauregard's force and Hood's late army n
Alabama, on the other hand any reinforcements
from this army would advance from his rear, and
might harass him. The substitution of Johnston for
Beauregard would not have diminished the dangers
of such a march. By the other course he moved to-
wards the sea, upon which he depended for his sup-
plies, and if he could establish communication with
Wilmington he might start from a fresh and secure
base for any further operations he might have in view.
The opportune capture of Wilmington greatly facili-
tated this plan, and ever since he left the neighbour-
hood of Winsborough he has been marching as
straight as possible in the direction of Fayetteville.
His line of march lay to the north of the Columbia
and Wilmington Railway and parallel to it, the
known points in its course being at the extremities
of branch lines which project from the main line—
Camden, Cheraw, and Laurel-hill. On the Bth he
sent a short despatch to his Government from the
latter place. On the 11th or 12th he was encamped
at Fayetteville. We have at present none but the
most meagre details of this march. As Sherman,
however, writes to Grant that " he had met with no
serious opposition," the rumoured battle with John-
,
ston on the Yadkin River, near Cheraw, must have
been an exaggeration of some slight skirmish. In-
deed, the only serious fighting that we have any ac-
count of is the attack made by Gen. Wade Hampton
on the 10th, and when Sherman, therefore, was near
Fayetteville, upon Gen. Kilpatrick's cavalry. Wade
Hampton seems to have hung upon the Federal rear
or flank and to have harassed their foragers, for we
have an account of threats and counterthreats of
retaliation upon their prisoners having passed be-
tween Wade Hampton and Sherman. Kilpatrick
was at first taken by surprise and routed, his can-
non, horses, train, and many prisoners falling into
the hands of the Confederates ; but he is said to
have subsequently recovered himself, and to have
recaptured nearly all he had lost. From Sherman's
own despatch, moreover, we learn that Hardee
keeps in his front " at a respectful distance," and is
acting, perhaps, as a sort of corps of observation,
while Johnston, as appears from other indications,
is concentrating his troops in the rear of his subor-
dinate, in order to meet Sherman's ultimate attack.
The march, then, having been thus successfully
accomplished, we may consider one campaign—that
in South Carolina—completed, and a new cam-
paign in North Carolina, entirely distinct from the
other, as about to begin. Sherman has compelled
the evacuationof Charleston, he has placed the whole
coast of South Carolina—though it seems nothing
more—in the command of the Federals, he has trans-
ferred his army to a new base, and is about to com-
mence a fresh series of operations, from Wilmington.
It is in connexion with these that the other move-
ments we report to-day are of importance. The new
theatre of operations is comparatively simple and
clearly defined. The backbone of it is the straight
line of railway which runs nearly due north and
south from Richmond to Wilmington, which is
crossed by three main transverse lines at three im-
portant junctions about equidistant from each other.
The first is Petersburg, where Grant is held in check
by Lee. The second is Weldon, at the border of
North Carolina.
The third Goldsborough, on the Neuse River,
through which a line runs west through Smithfield
to Raleigh and east through Kinston to Newbern.
The latter is an established Federal base, and it
would seem. that as soon as General Sherman had
re-established his communications he despatched
General Schofield, who was in command at
Wilmington, to Newbern, with the view of
his advancing on Goldsborough through Kin-
ston. The Confederate Generals meanwhile, re-
treating gradually before Sherman, appear to
have fallen back towards Goldsborough. Sher-
man, again, at Fayetteville, is at about equal dis-
tances from Raleigh and from Goldsborough, and
threatens both places. The former, however, could
hardly be of more advantage to him than Co-

lumbia, and if he threatens it, or, as is not impos-
some place, such as Smithfield, between it and
Goldsborough, it will probably be with the view of
compelling the evacuation of Goldsborough. In-
deed, if Sherman can, without opposition, flank
that junction on the west, while Schofield ad-
vances successfully from the east, Goldsborough
must be very strongly fortified indeed if it can be
successfully held. It will be seen that the Confede-
rates under General Bragg have fought a sharp
action for the defence of Kinston, a loss of 2,000
being spoken of on each side. On the Bth General
Bragg attacked the Federal force, which was ad-
vancing from Newbern, and succeeded in driving
them back three miles and checking them apparently
for two days. He repeated the attack on the 10th,
but was then repulsed, and withdrew to the north
bank of the Neuse ; and two or three days after-
wards he evacuated Kinston and retired upon Golds-
borough, but whether with or without another
struggle is not clear. From the statement of the
prisoners captured at Kinston it would appear that
Johnston's army was expected in the neighbourhood,
and from Sherman's evident intention to march
northwards, it is probable that the next important
movements we shall hear of will centre round Golds-
borough. There are indications that the Confede-
rates attach considerable importance to the place,
and it is not impossible, therefore, that Johnston
may offer Skerman battle as .he advances from
Fayetteville. If in consequence of the fall of Kin-
ston and Sherman's strategy the Confederates
evacuate Goldsborough, they will, no doubt, retire
along the Petersburg Railroad upon Weldon ; and
the line of the Roanoke River, which it has been
frequently asserted General Lee has strongly forti-
fied, will witness the next great struggle. In short,
as matters at present stand, the whole issue of the
contest is fixed upon two extremities of the Rich-
mond and Wilmington Railway. At one extremity
are the armies of General Grant and General Lee ;
at the other those of General Sherman and General
Johnston. It is obvious that if the Confederates can
retain command of this railway it will give them a
great advantage that their two main armies should be
thus closely connected, and, as it were, placed back
to back. By mutual assistance they may coun-
terbalance the inequality of force which probably
exists, and as Johnston's army is pushed further
back along this common line it obviously gains
strength. The operations by General Sheridan, which
form the chief remaining feature in the news, may
possibly have an important effect upon the struggle
thus narrowed and defined. That General seems, with
an ease which the Federals had never previously ex-
perienced, to have overpowered or surprised the Con-
federate force in the Shenandoah Valley, and then
to have pushed rapidly over the Blue Ridge, and to
have inflicted immense damage throughout the
country to the north of the James River from Lynch-
burg to Richmond. After crossing the Blue Ridge
he rested two days at Charlottesville, where the
Virginia Central Railway is met by that from Lynch-
burg. Starting thence in several divisions he broke
up the railway from Charlottesville to Lynchburg,
and destroyed the works of the James River Canal,
which runs along on the north of the river from
Lynchburg to Richmond. He seems to have been
unable to cross the river, and consequently to attack
Lynchburg, and in retreating he did not retire again
through Charlottesville to the Shenandoah Valley,
but along the north side of the James towards
Grant's lines on the Pamunkey, destroying the
works of the canal on his way. His letter to Grant
is dated from Columbia, where the Rivanna River
falls into the James, and we hear of him still
further east than this, as having destroyed an
aqueduct of the canal at Beaver Dam, only about
20 miles from Richmond. The James Canal ap-
pears to have been one of the great channels by
which provisions reached Lee's army, and the ques-
tion of how to support their troops is becoming one
of the most critical for the Confederates. It might,
indeed, be the chief disadvantage of Johnston's fall-
ing back upon the same base that a double demand
would thus be made on the existing channels of
supply. At the same time the whole south-west
seems again open to the Confederates, and if they
can maintain the connexion of their armies with
Danville and Lynchburg they may find no insuper-
able difficulty from this source. If General Sheri-
dan's movement, however, could be repeated, the
effect might be very serious, and if Lee is unable to
detach a force sufficient o protect his rear effec-
tively against the attacks of the Federals from the
Shenandoah Valley there may be much truth in the
again repeated rumour that he contemplates the
evacuation of Richmond.
POST.—The Canadian Government have set to
work in earnest to carry out the system of defences
which their long frontier and their proximity to a
powerful military State demand. They have voted
$1,000,000 for permanent defences, and £350,000
for the formation of volunteer forces along theboun-
dary—in all about £300,000 of our money. This is
a good and substantial beginning; but the Cana-
dians can hardly disguise from themselves that much
more will be required before their work is complete.
We are glad to recollect that within another week
the inspiriting character of the late debate in the
House of Commons, and the bold declarations of
the First Minister of this country, will have reached
them. The assurances which this language will
convey cannot fail to increase their energy in mak-
ing those preparations which every nation is bound
to provide for its own security. The question of
Canadian defence as against the United States is
one which ought to be dealt with in the same spirit
and under the same principles with those which have
regulated similar questions in Europe. It is not
that either the Canadians or ourselves are really ap-
prehending an attack from the forces of the Federal
Government. When this country formed its militia
force in 1852, and its volunteer force in 1859, it was
not that we really thought that France had any in-
tention of attacking us. In the former case, we saw
a powerful and Imperial Government formed on the
other side of the Channel ; in the latter, we had just
witnessed the facility with which it had overthrown
some of the most formidable legions of Germany.
Those events struck us with the undue disparity be-
tween our own forces and those at the command of
our neighbour. Both the dignity and security of
this great country demanded that the means of de-
fence at its disposal should be equal to the means of
attack existing elsewhere. But there was no notion
of war between this country and France, although,
if equality-of position were to be preserved, it could
be done only by an equality of means. It was
a measure of prudence, even of necessity ; but
instead of provoking a war panic, it served to re-
assure the public as to the continuance of peace.
The same feelings ought now to prevail in Canada.
The fact of a preparation against the eventuality of
war is so novel in that country that it is no wonder
at the first moment to observe the difficulty that
seems to exist in distinguishiqg between actual
danger and prudent precaution. While these ques-
tions as to defensive measures continue in agitation,
there is of course some excitement observable in the
public mind. But we have no doubt that the passing
of the resolutions now proposed to the Canadian
Parliament will have the effect of quieting and re-
assuring the public mind in Canada. Such cer-
tainly was the result of our own defensive mea-
sures when they were once undertaken ;, and the
Canadians will feel in like manner that, having
adopted the course taken by the mother country in
circumstances to a certain extent analogous, they
may confide in their own precautions, coupled with
our alliance, without at the same time distrusting
the pacific intentions of their powerful neighbour.
It is only just now that the President of the United
States has announced the abolition of the passport
system on the two sides of the frontier, and the with-
drawal of his notice for the termination of the Treaty
of 1817. The Government of Washington has there-
fore rescinded the two declarations given at the
opening of the Congress in November last which
have been the immediate cause of so much disquiet
in Canada. Its fortunate change of policy ought
to contribute to the reassurance of the Canadian
people, when they have adopted the defensive
measures which their exposed situation requires.
The Canadian frontier, including that of New
Brunswick, is probably the longest and most de-
fenceless in the world for so inconsiderable a com-
munity to be charged with. It begins with the
Western corner of Lake Superior, about one thousand
miles from the mouth of the St. Lawrence. From
thence it runs eastward along the margin of the
five lakes—Superior, Huron, St. Clair, Erie, and
Ontario—and for a short distance down the River
St. Lawrence. But even the protection afforded
by these intervening lakes is not a uniform one—
whatever that protection may be worth where it
exists—for each lake is separated by a narrow strait,
which alternately forms the boundary with the lake
on either side of it. But where the boundary runs
away from the line of the St. Lawrence towards the
sea, it is an artificial and impracticable one, like a
great part of the frontier between France and Bel-
gium. There is, for the most part, not so much as
a stream or a ridge of hills to divide the English
colonies from the New England States. The cele-
brated Ashburton capitulation, under which Maine
was given up to the United States,! still further.in-
creases the difficulty of maintaining a line of efficient
defence ; because the territories of the States thus
object into the angle which they form between the
Canadian and New Brunswick frontiers. It seems,
however, to be so generally agreed that frontiers
will scarcely avail to stop well-appointed armies,
that perhaps the natural defencelessness of this part
of the boundary is hardly of so much importance as
its geographical extent. A population of four mil-
lions in a new world ought certainly not to be with-
out the means of assuring itself for its own safety.
Such a number -means a community of which six
or seven hundred thousand are capable of volunteer-
ing in the event of an invasion. If one-half of that