The Sun.
London, England, 1863-07-27 00:00:00

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THE ROUPELL FORGERIES.

We gave on Saturday by electric telegraph the
ultimate result of the protracted trial of this ex-
traordinary case, that result being the discharge of
the jury by consent of tho parties at half-past 10
o'clock at night, after having been in deliberation
ever since half-past two; but as our report of the
case necessarily stopped at the time at which the
last train left Chelmsford--which was nine o'clock
—we have still to detail what took place after that
hour.

It will be remembered that the learned judge, at
the close of his Bumming up, propounded to the jury
certain questions in writing, which were as
follow :
"1. Was the deed executed by the testator in
the presence of two witnesses ?
"2. Was it executed at all by the testator R. P.
Roupell ?
" 3. Was the will of the 2d of September, 1856,
his will ?
"4. If not, was the estate by the will of 1850,
confirmed by the codicil of the 30th of August,
1856, devised to the plaintiff, Richard Roupei ?"
And it will also be remembered that shortly before
six o'clock they came into court to state that they
thought there was not sufficient evidence to enable
them to answer the last question, and could not
agree as to the second, which, of course, was the
main point in the case. But owing to their having
left the written paper behind them, the learned
Judge, not recollecting the precia order in which he
had written the questions, supposed that the one
on which they could not agree was the first—viz.,
whether the deed was executed by the testator in
the presence of two witnesses,—which was not ma-
terial to the main question, because attesting wit-
nesses were not necessary to make the execution
valid at all, though, as there was also a necessity
for an execution of a power of appointment in order
to give the deed a full effect as to same estate,
the attestation might not be wholly immaterial,
and it was therefore to the first, not the second,
qnestion his remark applied, that possibly it
might be waived by the parties. However, of
course the parties would not waive the second or
main question, on which it will be remembered the
jury could not agree; and although they were at
this time—when they first came into court, at 6
o'clock—agreed that the will of the 2d September,
1856, was not the testator's, it will be remembered,
and it is important to bear in mind, that the defen-
dants did not claim under nor set up either of the
wills, and had no interest in supporting the latter
will, and indeed objected to the introduction of any
evidence about it as being irrelevant, and the plain-
tiff's counsel only contended that it was relevant as
bearing on the main question as to the genuineness
of the deed of gift. As the jury could not agree as
to that, they were sent back, and were out of court
three hours longer. During this long interval,
however, they were, by consent of the parties, sup-
plied with "reasonable refreshment." About 9
o'clock the jury returned into court, and submitted
to the learned Judge a written paper, upon which,
looking at it,
The learned Judge said it appeared that they at;

could not agree as to the all-important question as
to whether the deed of gift was executed by the
testator. His lordship handed the paper to the
counsel on both sides, and it transpired that they
answered the question as to the deed of gift to the
effect that they could not agree upon it ; and they
added there was no hope of their agreeing upon

this.
Here ensued a discussion between the counsel on
both sides, in which it was understood that the
counsel contended that the onus of proof on the
main question was upon the other, and that there-
fore, as the jury were not satisfied, the party on
whom the onus of proof lay was not entitled to a ver-
dict. It appeared that the counsel for the plaintiff
contended that as his heirship was admitted, and the
father died in the receipt of the rents of the estate,
and so died seised, the plaintiff was entitled to the
verdict if the defendants failed to satisfy the jury
that the deed was genuine. On the other hand, the
counsel for the defendants contended that, as prima
facie proof had been given of the deed, and the
plaintiff undertook to prove that it was a forgery,
they were entitled to the verdict if
the failed to
satisfy the jury of the forgery. In result, it
will be seen, the learned Judge adopted the former
view, or that of the plaintiff, and in effect directed
the jury that if they were in doubt they ought to
find for the plaintiff, though there is some reason to
suppose that they did not understand this. Ulti-
mately, after great consideration,
The learned Judge said he should now withdraw
the written questions, and direct the jury for a
general verdict for the plaintiff or the defendants.
He explained to them that his object in propound-
ing to them these particular questions was to avoid,
if possible, the enormous expense to which the par-
ties would be put by a new trial, in the event of
any dispute as to the law ; and to enable the court
to determine any such question of law upon the
specific finding of the jury, without sending the
parties down to a new trial, which might be the
result in the case of a general verdict. As, however,
they were unable to agree as to the specific question,
which was, in fact, the main question in the cause,
he must now tell them that, in point of law, they
were not bound to answer any specific questions,
and were at liberty to give a general verdict either
for the plaintiff or the defendants, as the case might
be. In order to enable them, however, to do so, he
was bound to directs hem as to the law, and he now
proposed to do so ; dhe need not tell them that
though they were judges of the facts they were
bound to take the law from him, and if he were
wrong in the direction he gave them the court could
set it right. It is admitted (said the learned Baron)
that the plaintiff is heir-at-law ; and I am of opi-
nion that, on the assumption that his father died
seised of the estate, he would be entitled to recover,
unless his title as heir is displaced either by deed or
will. Now, it is displaced if the deed of gift of the
9th of January, 1856, was good and valid—that is,
a genuine deed. But lam further of opinion that,
the plaintiff's title as heir at law being admitted, the
onus of establishing that deed of gift so as to dis-
place the plaintiff's title as heir at law is on the de-
fendants. Therefore, prima facie, you must take
the case for the plaintiff as heir at law as establish-
ed, and you must then see whether the defendants
have sustained the onus of proof which rests upon
them to establish the validity of the deed, But if
they have done so, and have made out that the deed
was signed, sealed, and delivered by Richard P.
Roupell, then I am of opinion that they have dis-
placed the title of the plaintiff as heir at law ;
because then Richard Palmer Roupell had parted
with the estate by means of the deed of gift so
executed in his lifetime, and so did not die
" seised" of the estate, and so the plaintiff would
not be entitled to recover as heir. Then the question
arises whether, although there may be no displace-
ment of the title of the plaintiff as heir at law, by
reason of the deed of gift, on the ground that it
was a forgery, and so nut a good and valid deed, it
may be that the plaintiff's title as heir is displaced
upon the ground that there has been a devise of the
estate to some other person than the plaintiff • and,
if you are of opinion that there was a devise of the
estate by the will of 1859 to any one else than the
plaintiff; then his title as heir is displaced, unless
that will also was destroyed by the will of the 2d
of September, 1856; and if you are of opinion that
the latter will of the 2d of September, 1856, was a
forgery, then you will have to consider whether
you are satisfied that the will of 1850, confirmed as

it was by the codicil of the 30th of August, 1856,
devised this estate to the plaintiff, or to any other
person. But if the deed is not established, then his

title as heir will arise, unless there is a devise to
some one else. Consider, therefore, whether the
deed was a good and valid deed or not, by which, of
course, I mean, whether it was signed, sealed, and
delivered by Richard Palmer Roupell ; and next
consider whether or not there was any devise of this
estate to any one else than the plaintiff ; and hav-
ing considered those points, then find your verdict
aecording to the law as I have thus explained it to
you, either for the plaintiff or for the defendants.
The Foreman of the jury said they had very
carefully considered these questions already, and
with the utmost anxiety to save the parties, if pos.
sible, the expense of a new trial ; and he might as
well at once say that they were unanimously of
opinion that the deed never was intendedtobe
of them were of
made by the testator, though some
opinion that his signature to it had, in fact, been
obtained by the fraud of William Roupell.
The learned Judge said the question was, whether
it was signed, sealed, and delivered by Richard
Palmer Roupell as his act and deed.
The Foreman—We all agree that it was a fraud,
though some of us think that it was no even his
signature, and others of us think that it was.
The learned Judge said he could only repeat that
the onus of establishing that the deed was signed,
sealed, and delivered by Richard Palmer Roupell as
his deed was upon the defendants, and unless the
jury were satisfied, upon the whole of the evidence,
that the deed was so signed, sealed, and delivered
by Richard Palmer Roupell, they should find their
verdict for the plaintiff, because then, if the onus of
proof rests upon the defendants, they have not sus-
tained that burden of proof, and if they left it iu
the mind of the jury uncertain, then they ought to
find their verdict for the plaintiff—that is, that the
deed was not signed, sealed, and delivered by old
Roupell.
The Foreman again observed that they were not
likely to agree.
The learned Judge—Do you understand me ? The
question is, whether you find that the deed was
signed, sealed, and delivered by Richard Palmer
Roupell; and I tell you that the burden of proving
that it was so rests upon the defendants, and that,
if the defendants have not made out that it was so
signed, sealed, and delivered by him, then your
verdict must be for the plaintiff.
The Foreman—Then, my lord, I can tell you that
if we sat here till Doomsday we should never agree.
We all agree that the deed was obtained by fraud,
but we differ as to whether the testator ever actu-
ally signed it or not.
The learned Judge—Do I make myself under-
stood ? It is most important that I should do so in
order to avoid the necessity for coming down to a
new trial.
The Foreman—Which we are most anxious to do.
The learned Judge—With that view I put to you
specific questions; but as you could not agree, I now
tell you to find a general verdict either for the
plaintiff or defendant.
The Foreman--Which we are most ready to do if
we can, but I think we shall never agree.
The learned Judge—Never agree upon the bare
question for the plaintiff or the defendants !
The Foreman—How can we, my lord, when we
cannot agree upon the vital question on which it all
depends ? We all agree that the deed was a fraud ;
but some of us think it was a genuine signature by
the testator, and others that it was not so.
The learned Judge—But I don't think you
understand what I said, and I will state it to you
again. It is admitted that the plaintiff is heir-at-
law, and so is entitled to recover the estate if his
father died seized of it. If his father disposed
of his property in his lifetime he did not die seised
of it, and so he did not die seised of it if the deed
was signed, sealed, and delivered by him; and you
must understand that the defendants, as the burden
of proof rests upon them, are bound to establish that
the deed was signed, sealed, and delivered by him,
and if, though there is evidence on the one side or
the other, they have not established that to your
satisfaction they have failed to show that there was
a deed which would take the property out of old
Roupell and vest it in his son William. If you are
satisfied the deed was signed, sealed, and delivered
by old Roupell, then you need not trouble yonrselt
about the will, but if it was not, or if that fact was
is not made out to your satisfaction, then consider
whether there was any devise which took the estate
from the heir, and if not, find for the plaintiff, be-
cause to displace the heit's title you must be satisfied
that there was either a deed or a will which took the
estate away from him and gave it to some one else.
After the jury had conferred together in the box
a little time longer,
The Foreman said—Am Ito understand, my lord,
that we have to give a verdict for the plaintiff or
the defendants, one way or the other ?
The learned Judge—l should have preferred your
answering the specific questions I have put to you,
but I have no power to compel you to do so. And,
after having explained the law to you, I must now
ask you to take the law from me, and to give a ver-
dict for the plaintiff or the defendant, without an-
swering those specific questions.
The Foreman—My lord, our sympathy has been
throughout with the defendants,—
Several of the jurors here seemed eager to inter-
pose to disavow that this feeling had at all influ-
enced them, and one of them said, "The foreman
speaks for himself."

The Foreman explained that what he meant was
that, whatever their feelings might be, one way or
the other, they would never be able to agree to a
verdict either for the plaintiff or the defendants.
Mr. Sergeant Shee submitted that after the an-
swers which the jury had already given to the ques-
tions, the plaintiff was entitled to the verdict; but
Mr. Bovill warmly contended to the contrary,
and

The learned Judge said he could not allow the
discussion to proceed, nor could he, as the matter
now stood, direct a verdict either for the plaintiff'
or the defendants. The jury must consider their
verdict.

The Foreman—We are not satisfied that Richard
Palmer Roupell ever executed any deed of gift to
his son William.

Mr. Sergeant Shee—That is a verdict for the
plaintiff.

Mr. Bovill—No, no. Some of the jury, as I
understand, are of opinion that the old man did
actually sign the deed.

Several of the Jury—Yes, yes.
The learned Judge repeated that he could not
allow this discussion to proceed. I must (said the
learned Baron) require the jury to consider their
verdict. I have no power by law to compel them to
answer specific questions; and as they are unable to
agree on the one essential question I cannot direct
a verdict to be entered one way or the other. I can
only require the jury to consider their verdict, and
find for the plaintiff or the defendant. And now,
gentlemen (said tae learned Judge, rising up, and
preparing to leave the court), I must leave you to
your own resources, and desire you again to retire
and consider your verdict. (Great laughter, amid
which the jury, with blank looks, it being now
nearly 10 o'clock at night, and expressions that they
should never agree, left the court, and were once
more " locked up.")

During all this time the court continued crowded
by parties interested directly or indirectly in the
result of the suit. The convict William Rougell also
had remained in court during all these long and
weary hours of waiting, and had now sat for nearly
eight hours awaiting the verdict. While this long
discussion was going forward he came forward to
the part of the barrier separating the back part of
the court, where he had sat, and seemed to watch
all that was going on with the most intense anxiety.
The parties whose money had been invested on the
security of this estate, and the representatives of
those who had a similar interest in other of his
transactions, evinced, as may be supposed, an anxiety
equally keen, and the aspect of the court during this
interval of suspense was somewhat exciting, and
such as is not often witnessed in a merely civil suit.
About half-past 10 o'clock, the learned Judge,
having conferred with counsel on both sides, Who
were satisfied that the jury would never agree, di-
rected them to be sent for, and on their coming into
court, said to them, d Gentlemen, are you agreed ?"
The Foreman—No, my lord, nor are we likely to
be so.
The learned Judge—ls it likely that any longer

time for consideration will lead; you to an agree-

ment ?

The Foretnan— No, my lord, 'it is not.
The learned Judg,`—Then, gentlemen, by the con-
sent of the parties I n:iseharge you.
The jury heard this with evident satisfaotion,
and quickly departed. St,' ended this extraordinary
case.

COUNTRY MA.REIITS.