The Sun.
London, England, 1863-10-01 00:00:00

threatening to commit suicide, end complaining of having
been violated. She was taken first to the workhouse, and
then before the magi,trates, by whom she was admonished
and discharged. Next, and last, she is found on the 19th
inst. in the streets of Wolverhampton by Policeman Tow.
In reply to the magistrates, the prisoner said she had no
urther statement ts, make than that she had never lived as
servant to her uncle, and she hoped their worships would
send her for three or four years to a reformatory school.

The Bench committed her to take her trial at the next
Staffordshire Quarter Sessions as an incorrigible rogue and
vagabond. _

While she was being taken to her cell she told the gaoler
that she was as glad as though she had had i:2O given to
her that she had been committed for trial.

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

TIMES.—We must again bespeak attention to the
experience now daily accruing on the important
question of Artillery and Fortifications. It has been
stated as a reproach to our authorities that we have
allowed no free competition between artillerists at
home, but the complaint, whether well or ill founded,
is of little importance, since all the requisite expe-
riments are conducted for us abroad. It Parrott and
Blakeley guns have had no trials at Shoeburyness,
they have had enough and to spare at Charleston,
and we can measure their merits and defects with
as much ease as if they were in use at Woolwich.
The question in fact resolves itself into a comparison
between the ordnance used by the Americans and
that used by ourselves. If what the Americans
have done and are doing is more than we are doing
or can expect to do, we are certainly in arrear of our
duties, but that as yet is by no means certain. Both
Federals and Confederates have got far bigger guns
both afloat and ashore than we have brought into
use, but it is not yet established that the biggest
guns are the beat. It is beyond doubt that Charles-
ton was shelled at five miles' distance—that is to
say. a few shells from the batteries did actually fall
into the town. But it is evident that the bombard-
ment was altogether ineffective, and our correspon-
dent in the Southern States has related a report
that after the first three or four rounds the projec-
tiles all fell short, owing to the damage suffered by
the guns. This account is all the more probable
from what we know of the final result—namely,

that after very short practice many of the pieces
actually burst. We are prepared, however, to ad-
mit that even these facts are not decisive of the
whole question. If a dozen 15-inch shells could be
thrown into a fort or arsenal at a five-mile range, it
might be well worth our while to purchase such a re-
sult at the cost of a gun. Better dis-
lodge an enemy and lose a battery than
keep a battery and leave the enemy unharmed. If
these heavy guns do really, before they burst,
. .

perform feats hitherto thought impracticable, and
calculated to secure some of the great objects of
warfare, we cannot discard them on account of their
short-lived powers. This drawback of sudden decay
must be taken into the reckoning, and we must pro-
vide for an expenditure of cannon as well as of
cartridges, and that is all. But this condition being
granted, it is not at all certain that the Americans
are ahead of us. A correspondent informed us on
Friday last that our 110-pounder Armstrongs could
make excellent practice; and without bursting, at a
range quite as long as that from which Fort Sumter
was bombarded. He added, too, that the smaller
Armstrongs had thrown their bolts more than twice
that distance with. a given elevation, so that the
larger pieces might be expected to do at least as
much as any American gun at Charleston. From
this it follows that the range of our artillery is
fully as great as that of the American artillery,
and if the calibre of our pieces is lighter their
strength is far more to be depended upon. As to
the heavier guns, we also have got some 300-poun-
ders, pronounced " effective," but our monster can-
non, like those of the Federals, are found, unfor-
tunately, apt to burst. The question, therefore,
must ultimately turn upon a balance of advantages
and disadvantages. If large guns cannot be made
powder-proof, we shall have to weigh their cost
against their service and decide accordingly; but
we must record as a piece of practical experience
that the 800-pounders of the Confederates have
already been condemned by General Beauregard
himself. That distinguished engineer, after making
trial of this enormous ordnance, has, it is said, re-
quested that no more such cannon may be sent to
him. Equally uncertain is the lesson to be drawn
from the contests between forts and batteries in
Charleston Harbour. We do know that Fort Sum-
ter was riddled with shot and shell at a range of two
miles and upwards, hut weals() know that the Confe-
derate flag was still flying over the work when the
last intelligence was received. We know, too, another
thing, and on Federal as well as Confederate autho-
rity. Though Fort Sumter was so shattered, Fort
Wagner resisted the same artillery with perfect im-
punity. Neither Parrott nor Dahlgren guns, neither
shot nor shell, produced the least effect on the de-
fences of this fort, which was abandoned only be..
cause the sappers had worked close up to it by the
rules of science, and which was found by the be-
siegers to be absolutely uninjured. When we ask
of what these bulwarks consisted, we learn that they
were formed of sandbags, so that defences which
could be extemporised on any seashore are disco-
vered to be proof against the heaviest artillery ever
yet brought into battle. It seems as if we should
never get to the end of the race between Forts and
Ships. Of the naval experience derivable from the
American War we can say at present but little,
owing to the peculiar character of the vessels em-
ployed. There is not one of these vessels, uieless it
be the Ironsides, the armour of which would be ree
garded in this country as fit even for an experimen-
tal target. Their very latest model, the Tecumseh,
which was launched the other day at Jersey City,
is protected only by five wrought-iron plates each
one inch thick. We know that such plating is
worthless, and that our artillerists would hardly be
at the trouble of trying a gun against it. The
Armstrong 110 pounder has smashed twelve such
plates in a mass, and the old 68 pounder would do
as much with equal ease. The truth is that no valid
comparison can be sustained between our iron-cased
ships and the American Monitors. We not only
forge our plates in solid sheets, but we scrutinise
every one of them with extraordinary minuteness,
and reject every month at our dockyards as much
iron as would arm a Monitor. The Americans, from
the very necessities of their position, adopt a rough-
and-ready practice, but with what results is per-
haps hardly yet known. The performances of the
Monitors at Charleston seem enveloped in mystery.
We certainly do not hear of their being sunk or
captured, but they appear to have received consi-
derable injury, and we know that the military
authorities have complained angrily of the ineffec-
tive co-operation of the fleet in the work of the
siege. But the relative inefficiency of the Confe-
derate guns is a mystery also. Unless our experi-
ments are delusive, we have guns which would to
a certainty pierce the sides of any vessel armed,
like the Monitors, with built-up plates, and yet,
though the Confederate batteries are said to
mount guns of our best manufacture, it is remark-
able that they perform no such complete service.
POST.—The cordial receptions which Admiral
Dacres and the officers and men under his command
have received from the inhabitants of the various
ports visited by the Channel fleet during its re-
cent cruise have been all duly chronicled, and it
is extremely gratifying to observe the pride and
interest which is taken by all classes in the ap-
pearance of these fine ships and their crews—a
result which is perhaps as much due to the re-
collection of the debt which the country owes to
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our
future position among nations depends upon our
maintaining the supremacy upon the ocean, for
the day on which Britannia relinquishes the task
of ruling the waves would most assuredly be the
day on which this nation would sink into the
position of a mere third-rate Power. Every one,
therefore, having the welfare of his country at
heart must view with peculiar interest the huge
iron monsters which are destined to take the place
of our old wooden walls. And it must be admitted
that such splendid triumphs of engineering skill
as the Warrior and her consorts represent are
well calculated to inspire all who gaze upon them
with confidence. Bat while indulging ourselves
with these feelings of satisfaction, it is impossible
—indeed it would be most unwise—to close our
eyes to the fact that these magnificent specimens
of naval architecture are after all but so many
experiments the value of which has yet to be
proved by the results, which can only be obtained
in actual war. It is well known that the im-
provements which have been made in artillery of
late years have compelled us to adopt a stronger
material than the one formerly in use for the con-
struction of our ships of war. The first plan of
giving protection to the vulnerable wooden hull by
means of a covering of iron plates has given way to
the system of constructing vessels entirely of iron,
while the third and last point consists in deter-
mining which is the form or model calculated
to produce the most formidable engine of
war out of the materials at our disposal.
On this point we are at direct issue with enter-
prising rivals upon the other side of the Atlantic.
Great Br;tain and America have been for the last
two years steadily pursuing directly opposite courses,
each fully satisfied of the correctness of their own
theory. And while we have had the benefit of much
leisure for calmly considering the merits presented
by either system, the Americans have had the ad-
vantage of experience in actual war for guiding
them in the conclusions which they have arrived at.
The chief characteristics of the two theories may be
summed up in the following words—few but very
heavy guns in strong and diminutive hulls, versus
well armed, large, and powerful ships. The fiat,