The Sun.
London, England, 1839-06-18 00:00:00

Mr. F. KELLY begged to ask the Noble Lord the
Secretary for the Home Department, whether it was
the intention of Government to bring forward during the
present Session any measure relative to the Church-
rate question. He had asked the Noble Lord in March
last, and he had then stated that be would be able to
reply in a week or ten days.
Lord JOHN RUSSELL said that no Bill would
be brought in during the present Session upon the
Church-rate question.
STOCKDALE v. HANSARD.—PRIVILEGE.
Upon the question of reading the Order of the Day
for taking into consideration the Report of the Commit-
tee on Printed Papers,
Lord JOHN RUSSELL said that, after having
been one of the Com:nittee of Printed Papers, he
thought it right to say that if there was any proposition
to be made to the House relative to the opinions of the
majority of that Committee, he thought such a proposi-
tion should be first brought forward, and after that he
should be ready to state the course he proposed to adopt.
Mr. W. W. WYNN said that whatever course
it might be ft to pursue, he apprehended that her
Majesty's Ministers who haci proposed the appointment
of the Committee, and who had hitherto moved all the
steps taken by the House on this subject, should ex-
plain the course they intended to adopt.
Lord JOHN RUSSELL had already stated that
he was ready to state the course which he thought ought
to be pursued by the House on the present occasion. At
the same time, he must be allowed to observe that it
was matter for the House to determine alone, as it re-
lated to the privileges and powers of the House of
Commons as the House of Commons, and not to the
conduct of her Majesty's Government.—(Hear, hear.)
He felt that it was necessary, under existing circum-
stances, that some course should be proposed without
any further lapse of time, because to-morrow a very im-
portant step would be taken with respect to proceedings
in the action of which the House was already in pos-
session of the details. If he did not feel it to be so ne-
cessary that some immediate decision should be come
to by the House, he should rather have refrained from
proposing any measure or resolution of his own, leaving
it to those who had more deeply studied the question
of privilege to propose to the House what they
would recommend, with greater fertility of argument,
and greater weight and authority ; but as it was ne-
cessary that some step should be taken, and as the
House, to whom the Report of the Committee was
now known, must feel that it was necessary to come to
some immediate decision whether they would or would
not take any further steps with respect to the action
upon which certain proceedings had been taken
against the Speaker of that House, he should
propose certain resolutions for its adoption.—(Hear.)
Before stating anything further he would put the
House in possession of the resolution he meant to pro-
pose, " That it is the opinion of this House, that under
the special circumstances of the case of Stockdale v.
Hansard, it is not expedient to adopt any further proceed-
ings for the purpose of staying the execution of the
writ. That the House, considering that the power of
printing and circulating the votes and proceedings of the
House is necessary for, and conducive to, the public
interest, it will enter into the consideration of such
measures as it may be advisable to take in consequence
of the proceedings in the case of Stockdale v. Hansard,
for the maintenance of that power, as soon as the
Committee have made that full and complete report
mentioned in their last." He should proceed to give
his reasons why he thought the House ought to come
to that practical decision, but without entering the
larger and graver question, which must be deliberately
considered by the House when that further Report was
made, or when any further proceeding was taken against
the printer of the House—when he proposed that the
House should not take any proceedings for staying the
execution of the writ, he was bound to state his own
impression, that nothing which had occurred in conse-
quence of a resolution of the House, which recom•
mended that the Attorney-General should appear and
plead in the action, had deprived the House of the
power to take instant proceedings in order to stop the
exeeution of the writ.—(Cheers.) The argument on
that behalf had been very clearly stated and put on
record in the Committee in an amendment which
had been proposed by an Honourable and Learned
Member. The Members connected with the law on
both sides of the House had recommended that course,
and the same course had been taken in a case which he
thought was much stronger than the present—in the
action brought against the Speaker by Sir F. Burdett ;
the Speaker acting under the advice, pleaded to the ac-
tion, and immediately proposed to commit the solicitor.
This was the course that had been adopted by the
House of Commons, and by the Government of that
day, and that course had been agreed in by Mr. Perceval
and had met his approval, and he (Lord J. Russell) con-
sidered that he was a great authority on this subject,
both from his studies, and from the situation he occupied.
All the House had done in effect, was to inform
the Court of Queen's Bench that this was considered
by the House of Commons as a question involving the
privileges of the House of Commons, a power which
they considered essential to the due performance of their
functions, they had therefore pleaded, in order to bring
correctly and formally before the Court of Queen's
Bench, that the House of Commons so coi?si-
sidered it. It was obvious that the pleading
to this cause, and placing this opinion before
Commons
eci
the Court could not prevent the House of emmops
from taking any course they thought proper after the
decision of the Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench ;
but although there could be no question as to the com-
petency of the House to interfere to stay the execution
of the writ, yet it was a question whether the House
should do so. The first question he would ask was,

would it be common justice so to do? He thought
that no person could be found who would
admit that it was. The House of Commons
having brought the question before the Court, the Judges
thought they could not merely accept this information
from the House of Commons, but considered that they
were not legally precluded from giving judgment in this
case, as in any other case which might come before them
in Courts of Law. This being the case they decided
that the defence was not sufficient, and gave judgment
for the plaintiff. After this a Sheriff's Jury sat and
assessed the damages at 100/. The Sheriff who bad
the execution of this judgment merely considered that
he had received a legal and sufficient authority for pro-
ceeding to execution. Neither the party who had insti-
tuted this action, nor the Solicitor who had brought it for-
ward, nor the Counsel who had appeared on behalf
of the plaintiff, nor the Judges who had decided the
case, had been declared guilty of a breach of the privi-
leges of the House of Commons, and when neither the
Plaintiff, nor the Solicitor, nor the Counsel, nor the
Court, had been visited with punishment from the
House, it would be hard that the executive officer
to whom, in the legal and usual course this writ
came for execution, should be committed to prison.
He thought this was against all notions of justice that
could be entertained on this subject. He would say
respecting the previous acts that the House of Com-
mons were perfectly right in directing the Attorney-
General to plead to this action, but at this stage of
the proceedings it would not be consistent with justice
that the Sheriff should be ordered not to proceed with
the execution of that writ, with a view to committing
the Sheriff to custody if he should disobey such order.
He also thought it would not be consistent with ex-
pediency—(Hear, hear)—because if they were to pro-
ceed on this question in a manner which would be
thought by the people of this country (as it appeared
to him) inconsistent with justice, there could
be no higher degree of inexpediency—there could
be no more decisive evidence of the inexpediency of such
a proceeding than the decision, that justice would not
be in its favour.—(Hear, hear.) He would therefore
not enlarge upon the impression that might be pro-
duced, or upon the feelings that might be created,
by a proceeding, on the part of the House
of Commons, which would excite general repugnance
and dissent. It was sufficient for him to say, that he
thought those feelings of repugnance and dissent
would be naturally excited, and therefore he
had come to the conclusion that it was not
expedient in this case to adopt any proceeding
for the purpose of staying the execution of the writ.
He thought it was competent to the House of Com-
mons to do so, and the House had not deprived itself
of the right to do so if it should be absolutely neces-
sary, but he did not think it would be considered that
the Sheriff was the person on whom the punishment
should be visited. Having said thus much in support of the
first Resolution, he would state with regard to the
second, that he thought it necessary to make some few
remarks in favour of the Resolution to which the House
had already come, and the substance of which was
stated in the Report, namely, that the House should
have the power of publishing such of its votes
and proceedings as it should deem necessary or we'
ducive to the public interests, and which it stated
to be necessarily incident to its constitutional rights and
privileges. The House would recollect an action was
commenced in the Court of Queen's Bench ; but they
did not think it proper without further knovvledge,
both on the part of the public and on the part of the
Judges, to order the commitment of any person who were
parties to that proceeding. The House decided that the
Attorney-General should appear and state that the
House of Commons considered this power necessarily
belonged to them, and it appeared that in so proceeding,
while it did not give up the rights of the House, that
the House acted with very great temper and modera-
tion. The Attorney-General had stated with very great
ability and with great learning and knowledge on this
subject, all the points which it was encumbent on him
to press on the attention of their Lordships. He (Lord
John Russell) would not enter into any of the argu-
ments used on that occasion, but he thought it necessary
to say a few words as to the nature of the decision of
the Judges upon this question. The Attorney-Gene-
ral had stated to the House the general effect of the
judgments. That statement was impugned at the
time, but what he had read since of the
opinions of the Judges confirmed him in that statement,
and had confirmed him (Lord John Russell) in his opi-
nion, that however right it might be in the House of
Commons not to proceed to any violent or extreme mea-
sure until they had submitted by pleading their
case to the Judges, that the Judges, however con-
scientiously they might decide the question, were not the
fit judges of the privileges of the House of Commons.
He did not wonder that it should be so. He thought
it was consonant with the whole of our history that
the Judges, eminent in their own place, distinguished
with respect to the functions they have to perform,
were not and ought not to be the supreme judges of
the powers and privileges of the House of Commons.—
(Hear, hear.) It was a matter which naturally did not
come under their consideration, which did not attract
their daily attention, upon which it' was obvious they
were likely to come to a narrow and very exclusive
decision. He should take the liberty of referring to
some passages in the judgment of the Lord Chief
Justice. With regard to the particular case in ques-
tion, the case of a Report of the Inspectors of Prisons,
Lord Denman was of opinion that that statement on
the part of the Inspectors would have nothing to do
with the proceedings of the House of Commons. He
was not now questioning any legal act or proceeding,
but he was questioning the opinion of the Chief Jus-
tice of the Queen's Bench with regard to the functions
of the House of Commons. Lord Denman said that
a book found in the possession of a prisoner in
Newgate, could have no influence in determining
how prisons would be best regulated. Now, it might
so happen that matters of no very great public import-
ance might come before the House of Commons, but it
did so happen that the question under consideration
was one upon which Parliament might very fitly pro-
ceed, and upon which it had been called upon more
than once to proceed. He would mention that a Bill
had been introduced for the regulation of prisons about
three years ago in the House of Lords, and having
passed was sent down to the House. It was said by
an Hon. Member that the prison of Newgate was so
well regulated, and that it was so free from anything
like irregularity, that it ought to be exempted from the
inspection of the Inspectors. He (Lord J. Russell)
had been threatened with the loss of that Bill if he had
persevered in including Newgate. He had, however,
persevered, believing that Newgate was not wholly ex-
empt from irregularity.—(Cheers.) Now only conceive
any person—only conceive a Judge saying that the
regulation of the prison of Newgate had nothing to do
with legislation, when upon that very matter the whole
question turned.—(Loud cheers.) The very next year
a Committee was appointed to inquire whether a better
regulation might not be adopted for the prison of New-
gate, and the Committee reported in favour of that regula-
tion. And was he to be told that the regulation of the
prison of Newgate was not to come under the conside-
ration of the House•of Commons. It was no doubt a
most important question, which the Inspectors who had
been appointed by the Legislature were bound to con-
sider. Perhaps, considering it with regard to other
questions which they had to take into consideration it
was of minor importance. It was a part of their
business, small if they pleased, but still it
was a part of the business of the Inspectors.
Then it might be said that this should be the limit of
the House of Commons, and that it should not proceed
further. That course would be most unjust, because
he thought it was right that those who had the manage-
ment of the prisons should be made aware of the Re-
port, in order that they might be enabled to contradict
its allegations ; but if that House had ordered that
Report to be printed, any person who communicated
that Report to the Court of Aldermen, or any other
person not connected with the House, would be liable,
according to the Court of Queen's Bench, to vexatious
proceedings in that Court. The opinion of the Judges
in substance was, that though Members ought to have
papers, they ought not to communicate them to others.
Lord Denman was against even the power of printing
for the use of the House, and Mr. Justice Patteltn
had said that though papers, however defamatory, might
be printed for the use of Members,
their further circu-
lation could not be admitted, and that such defamatory
matter ought either to be destroyed, or not
communi-
cated to others. If such opinions were to be main-
tained, the House of Commons would become completely
powerless, and every Member might be applied to, to
.de-
stroy the copies of any Parliamentary papers he possessed
His Right Hon. Friend the Member for the Tower
Hamlets, in such a case, upon his retiring from_ Parlia-
ment on accepting the office of Judge of the Admiralty
Court, might have been called upon to destroy every
thattw o Id whateverbeote
no
pu
or course
copy in his library of any Parliamentary paper he
Judges
The opinionsof the
received.—( Hear, hear.)
tsiltieowHeodotsoe
mhiimg
high offices, because
No complaint could sible that the House could
hceonu lbde aecnqtueiretsacineeidn tuh,iotisie
regard to
h (Lordt k jfit to Russell)alop
give to the person
thetl e
iioremovaluse woofu
would
ynoofparson
complainth enabledli i holding g t
made against him.
As an instance of this, he would put the case of his
Friend the Member for the University of Oxford. He
had taken great interest with regard to the slave trade
attacked the copy
carried on under the flag of Portugal.might move for
some He
some despatches relative to that subject ; but it might
be said that those despatches contained some libel
against the captains of the vessels, or the Queen of Por-
tugal. An action might be brought and that House
would be unable to defend itself, because it would not
be allowed to tell the whole of the United Kingdom what
the case was with regard to the Slave Trade. He
(Lord John Russell) was ready to admit that it was pos-
! sible the House of Commons should exceed its due and
proper powers, but he did not think that those powers
could be interfered with in the manner proposed by the
Judges. Mr. Justice Coleridge, in giving judgment,
had put a most extreme case. He had stated that the
House of Commons, if it was to assume the pri-
vileges it had done, might order the execution of I