The Sun.
London, England, 1863-02-06 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, FRIDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 6, 1863

cession of territory whatever, but merely a resignation of
I a protectorate which has been entrusted to us under the
treaty of 1815. Now this is very dangerous ground to take,
and we should pause before we accept a representation of
that kind. The treaty of 1815 entrusted the Jordan Islands
to England in almost the same manner as it did Paris to the
French people. How did we become possessed of the lonian
Islands ? We became possessed of them by conquest before
1815. Why were they conquered ? We did not conquer
them, I suppose, out of wantonness and for amusement.
We conquered them because the great men to whom we en-
trusted the duty of guarding British interests and main-
taining British power in these waters thought they were
must important ; and as they could not accomplish behests
of the British Government so long as these insular harbours
were in the power of our rival and enemy, they therefore
occupied the lonian Islands. The control—the injurious
control—which the French forces in these islands exercised
during the war on British shipping and interests was so
great that so eminent a name as that of Lord Collingwood
impressed upon the British Government the absolute neces-
sity of these harbours being taken. It has been said that
' Corfu was not seized in a military sense. Six of the islands,
including Cephalonia, which Sir C. Napier, a man of the
highest authority upon any subject connected with war, and
especially upon this question, said was of the utmost im-
portance, had been conquered. Corfu, which was not taken,
was an arrow in our side, but we strictly blockaded it, and
when Napoleon suddenly fell it was surrendered to us by a
military convention; and it was in every sense of the word
a military surrender. Therefore, when the congress of
Vienna had to deliberate upon- the settlement of Europe
we were in military possession of those islands, which we
had conquered and occupied, because when in the posses-
sion of an enemy they were injurious to our power and
interest. The noble lord now proposes that these islands
should be given to Greece. See what the effect of giving
them to Greece is. You are favouring that very policy
which on the 27th September of last year the noble lord
had denounced, as I think, with unnecessary warmth.
'You are increasing the resources, the wealth, and popu-
lation of Greece. And what interpretation the Greeks put
upon this cession you may see by what took place in Corfu,
where they used in regard to it an expression well known in
this country, that they would take it as an instalment. This
shows that the Greeks regard your policy as encouraging
them in their views against the integrity of the Turkish
empire. It may be right to do all this; but I do not
think this is the occasion to enter into that discussion.
Still, let the house understand that her Majesty's Govern-
ment have followed a different policy, and have changed
the view which they have always upheld in this house with
regard to the East ; that they are not pursuing that course
which the noble lord advocated in such burning terms in
his despatch to Prince Gortschakoff. (Hear, hear.) Well,
then, so much for its influence upon Greece. What is its
influence upon England ? I have shown the house that, as
regards England, these islands were taken by us because
their possession by the enemy was injurious to our interests,
and therefore it is quite absurd to maintain that their pos-
session by us is not conducive to our interests. It is said
that Government will not give up these islands without
conditions. The very fact that you are giving them up with
conditions attached proves that you ought n-it to give them
up—(hear, hear)—and that to surrender them without con-
ditions would be injurious. Then what security have you
got that your conditions will be fulfilled ? (Hear, hear.)
What are your conditions ? Your conditions are that Greece
shall have a constitutional monarchy, and at the same time
shall not disturb her neighbours. What is the result of
constitutional monarchy ? Constitutional monarchy pro-
duces party ; and is it not obvious that the Liberal party of
Greece will demand an expansion of territory and endeavour
to carry out the Greek idea? Thus the very condition of
the surrender will precipitate the very conclusion which the
noble lord wishes to be avoided. (Hear, hear.) Therefore,
so far as regards Greece, you have changed your policy, and
you are pursuing a policy which will necessitate the results
you yourselves have denounced. But as regards the power
of England, if these islands do conduce to it, why are they
given up ? And if they are not necessary to our power and
influence, why were they taken ? Some of the first men in
England have said that they were necessary ; therefore it is
idle to argue the case on mere technical grounds, and to say
that it is only a protectorate. By the treaty of 1815 Prussia
was made protector of the Rhine for the purpose of form-
ing a barrier against France. The Italian provinces were
entrusted to Austria for the common good of Europe; but
Prussia and Austria believed, and believe, that the posses-
sion of the Rhine and the Italian provinces contributed to
their power, or why would they retain them ? Are we, then,
to be told that we are only protectors, and the cession of a pro-
vince is to be settled by a special pleading and an argument
like that ? I am sure the House of Commons will never sanc-
tion such a proceeding. What has happened during the last
25 years ? Have you not practically changed your route to
India? And has it not been constantly alleged that the pos-
session of these islands is of the utmost importance in main-
taining that route ? lam perfectly aware that there is a
school of politicians who are hostile to every principle of the
'British empire —but I have to learn that her Majesty's Go-
vernment have adopted these wild theories which have be-
come so prevalent of late. Professors and mere rhetoricians
will find you systems for every contingency and principle
for every chance—but we are not going, I hope, to have the
British governed by such views and maxims. There may be
a question as to the best mode of acting, Some may be in
favour of protection to domestic and colonial interest—
may be in favour of commercial treaties and treaties of re-
ciprocity, which have become so modish nowadays—but
there can be no question in the country as to the best mode
of preserving our wealth. The best mode of preserving our
wealth is iby power—and you must get possession of the
strong places of the world if you wish to have this power.
As far as this question of Greece is concerned, I hope that
the arrangement is not a matured arrangement, and that
we shall have an opportunity of considering it before any-
thing is finally determined. I understand that by agreeing
to this Address we are not pledging ourselves to this policy
with regard to the session of the lonian Islands. This being
so I shall not propose an amendment to the Address—but
I thought it right to warn the house of the very dangerous
consequences of the proposal announced in the Speech from
the Throne, involving as it does the gravest considerations
that can possibly be discussed in this house. (Loud cheers.)