The Sun.
London, England, 1863-02-26 00:00:00

French Mediation in the United States.

WASHINGTON, Thursday, Feb. 12,
The President to-day sent to the Senate the fol-
lowing despatches :

"MR. DAYTON TO MR. SEWARD.
(Extract, No. 255.)
" Paris, Jan. 15, 1863.

" Sir,—A despatch will shortly be sent by M.
Drouyn de Lhuys to M. Mercier, requesting him to
suggest to you on a suitable occasion the propriety
of appointing Commissioners to treat with the South
for peace, and for Union if possible; if not possible,
for such terms of separation as may be eventually '
agreed upon. This communication was submitted
by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the Emperor on the 9th
inst., and returned to him by the Emperor yester-
day. The despatch answers what is supposed
would have been the objections to a proposal for an
armistice or mediation.

"1. It proposes, it says, no interference of any
kind by a foreign Power.
_ _

" 2. It does not require or ask for any cessation
of hostilities pending the negotiations ; but, like the
negotiations of peace in 1783 between the United
States and Great Britain, permits everything to
proceed as if no efforts for a settlement were being
made.—l am, sir, your obedient servant,

" Wm. L. DAYTON.
" To his Excellency W. H. Seward,
Secretary of State, &c."

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS TO M. MERCIER.
(Translation.)
" Department of Foreign Affairs, Political Divi

sion, Paris, Jan. 9, 1863.
" Sir,—ln forming the purpose of assisting, by
the proffer of our good offices, to shorten the period
of those hostilities which are desolating the Ame-
rican continent, we have to be 'guided beyond all

by the friendship which actuates the Government
of the Emperor in regard to the United States. The
little success of our exertions might chill the kite-

rest with which we follow the fluctuations of this

contest, but the sentiment to which we have yielded

is too sincere for indifference to find a place in our
thought, or that we should cease to be painfully-
affected while the war continues to rage. We can-
not regard without profound regret this war, worse

than civil, comparable to the most terrible distrac.

tions of the ancient republics, and whose disasters
multiply in proportion to the resources and the
valour which each of the belligerent parties deve-
lopes. The Government of his Majesty have,
therefore, seriously examined the objections which
have been made to us where we have suggested the
idea of a friendly mediation, and we have asked
ourselves whether they are truly of a nature to set
aside as premature every tentative to a reconcilia-
tion. On one part has been proposed to us the re-
pugnance of the United States to admit the inter-
vention of foreign influence in the dispute; on the
other, the hope, which the Federal Government has
not abandoned, of attaining its solution by force of
arms.

" Assuredly, sir, recourse to the good offices of
one of our several neutral Powers contains nothing
incompatible with the pride so legitimate to a great
nation, and means purely international are not those
alone which furnish examples of the useful character
of mediation. We flatter ourselves, besides, that
in proffering to place ourselves at the disposal of
the belligerent parties to facilitate between them
negotiations,. the basis of which we abstain from
prejudging, we have manifested to the patriotism
of the United States all the consideration to
which it is entitled, now perhaps still more than
ever, after such new proof of moral force and
energy. We are none the less ready, amid the
wishes which we form in favour of peace, to take
into account all the susceptibilities of national feel-
ing, and we do not at all question the right of the
Federal Government to decline the co-operation
(concours) of the great maritime Powers of Europe.
But this co-operation, is it not the only means which
offers itself to the Cabinet of Washington to hasten
the close of the war; and if it believes that it ought
to repel any foreign intervention, could it not
honourably accept the idea of direct (pourparlers)
informal conferences with the authority which may
represent the States of the South ? The Federal
Government does not despair, we know, of giving
u more active impulse to hostilities. Its sacrifices
have not exhaused its resources, still less its perse-
verance and its steadfastness. The protraction of
the struggle, in a word, has not shaken its confi-
dence in the definitive success of its efforts. But the
opening of informal conferences between the belli-
gerent parties does not necessarily imply the im-
mediate cessation of hostilities. Negotiations
about peace are not always the consequence of
a suspension of warfare. They precede, on the
contrary, more often the establishment of a truce.
How many times have we not seen plenipotentiaries
meet, exchange communications, agree upon all the
essential provisions of treaties; resolve, in fine, the
question even of peace or war, while the leaders of
armies continued the strife, and endeavoured, even
to the latest moment, to modify by course of arms
the conditions of peace ! To recall only one memory
drawn from the history of the United States, the
negotiations which consecrated their independence
were commenced long before hostilities had ceased
in the New World, and the armistice was not esta-
blished until the act of the 30th of November, 1782,
which, under the name of Provisional Articles, em-

braced in advance the principal clauses of the defi

nitive treaty of 1783. Nothing, therefore, would
hinder the Government of the United States, with-

-...---- - -
out renouncing the advantage which it believes it
can attain by the continuation of the war, from en-
tering upon informal conferences with the Confe-
derates of the South, in case they should show them-
selves disposed thereto. Representritives or com-
missioners of the two parties could assemble at such
point as it should be deemed proper to designate,
and which could for this purpose be declared neu-
tral. Reciprocal complaints would be examined
into at this meeting. In place of the accusations
which North and South mutually cast upon each
other at this time would be submitted an argumen-
tative discussion of the interests which divide them.
They would seek out, by means of well-ordered and
profound deliberations, whether these interests are
definitively irreconcilable—whether separation is an
extreme which can no longer be avoided, or whether
the memories of common existence—whether the
ties of any kind which have made of the North and
of the South one solo and whole Federative State,
and have borne them on to so high a degree of pros-
perity—are not more powerful than the causes
which have placed arms in the hands of the two
populations. A negotiation, the object of which
would be thus determinative, would not involve any
of the objections raised against the diplomatic in-
tervention of Europe, and without giving birth to
the same hopes as the immediate conclusion of an
armistice would exercise a happy influence on the
march of events. Why, therefore, should not a com-
bination which respects all the relations of the
United States obtain the approbation of the Federal
Government? Persuaded on our part that it is in
conformity with their true:interests, we do not:hesi-
t.ate to recommend it to their attention, and not
having sought in the project of a mediation of the
maritime powers of Europe any vain display of in-
fluence, we would applaud, with entire freedom from
all susceptibilities of self-esteem, the opening of a
negotiation which would invite the two populations
to discuss, without the co-operation of Europe, the
solution of their differences.
cc I request you, sir, to give this assurance to the
Cabinet of Washington, while commending to its
wisdom counsels dictated ty most sincere interest
in the prosperity of the United States. You are,
moreover, authorised, if Mr. Seward expresses the
wish, to leave with him a copy of this despatch.
" Accept, sir, the assurance of my high conside-
ration, i' DROUYN DE LIIITYS."
" Mercier, Minister of Franco at Washington."
sEIVARD TO MR. DAYTON.
" (No. 297.)
" Department of State, Washington, Feb. 6, 1863.
" Sir,—The intimation given in your despatch of
Jan. 15 (No. 255), that I might expect a special
visit:from M. Mercier, has been realised. Ile called
on the 3d inst. and gave me a copy of a despatch
which he had just received from M. Drouyn de
Lhuys under the date of Jan. 9. I have taken the
President's instructions, and I now proceed to give