The Sun.
London, England, 1837-01-02 00:00:00

The experience of other nations admonished us to hasten
:be extinguishment of the public debt. But it will be in vain
that we have congratulated each other upon the disappearance
of this evil, if we do not guard against the equally great one
of promoting the unnecessary accumulation of public revenue.
No political maxim is better established than that which tells
us that all improvident expenditure of money is the parent of
profligacy, and that no people can hope to perpetuate their
liberties, who long acquiesce in a policy which taxes them for
objects not necessary to the legitimate and real wants of this
Government. Flattering as is the condition of our country at
the present period, because of its unexampled advance in all
the steps of social and political improvement, it cannot be dis-
guied that there is a lurking danger already apparent in the
neglect of this warning truth, and that the time has arrived
when the representatives of the people should be employed in
devising some more appropriate remedy than now exists to

avert it.
Under our present revenue system there is every probabi-
lity that there will continue to be a surplus beyond the want
of the Government ; and it has became our duty to decide
whether such a result be consistent with the true objects of our
Government.

Should a surplus be permitted to accumulate beyond the
appropriations it must be retained in the Treasury as it now
is, or distributed among the people of the States.
To retain it in the Treasury unemployed in any. way is im-
practicable. It is, besides, against she genius of our free in-
stitutions to lock up in vaults the treasure of the nation. To
take from the people the right of bearing arms, and put their
weapons of defence in the bands of a standing army, would be
scarcely more dangerous to their liberties than to permit the
Government to accumulate immense amoutits of treasure be-
yund the supplies necessary to its legitimate wants. Such a
treasure would doubtless be employed, at some time, as it has
been in Other countries, when opportunity tempted ambition.
To collect it merely for distribution to the States would
seem to be highly impolitic, if not as dangerous as the propo-
sition to retain it in the Treasury. The shortest reflection
must satisfy every one that, to require the people to pay taxes
to the Government merely that they may be paid back again,
is sporting with the substantial interests of the country, and
no system which produces such a result can be expected to
reeeivc the public countenance. Nothing could be gained by
sit, even if each individual who contributed a portion of the tax
:ould receive back promptly the same portion. But it is ap-
--prent that no system of the kind can ever be enforced which
Twill not absorb a considerable portion of the mone), to be dis-
tributed in salaries and commissions to the agents to be em-
ployed in the process, and in the various losses and deprecia-
tions which arise from other causes ; and the practical effect
of such an attempt must ever be to burthen the people with
taxes, not for purposes beneficial to them, but to swell the
profits of deposit banks, and support a band of useless public
officers.

A distribution to the people is impracticable and unjust in
other respects. It would be taking one man's property and
giving it to another. Such would be the unavoidable result
or equality (and none other is spoken of, or would be likely to
be adopted), inasmuch as there is no mode by which the
amount of individual contributions of our citizens to the public
revenue can be ascertained. Vie know that they contribute
unequally, and a rule therefore that would distribute to them
equally would be liable to all the objections which apply to the
principle of an equal division of property. To make the ge
tiara! Government the instrument of carrying this odious prin-
ciple into effect would be at once to destroy the means of its
usefulness, and change the character designed for it by the
framers of the Constitution.

1 But the more extended and injurious consequences likely to
• result from a policy which would collect a surplus revenue for
the purpose of distributing it, may be forcibly illustrated by an
examination of the effects already produced by the present De-
posit Act. This Act, although certainly designed to secure
the safe keeping of the public revenue, is not entirely free in
, it= teedencies from many of the objections which apply to this
preesiple of distribution. The Government had, without ne-
ceselty, received from the people a large surplus, which, in-
stead of bring employed as heretofore, and returned to them
by means of the public expenditure, was deposited with sundry
Paths. The hanks proceeded to make loans upon this surplus,
mel this converted it into banking capital; and in this manner
it has aided to multiply bank charters, and has had a great
agency in producing a spirit of wild speculation. The pos-
,' sessien and use of the property out of which this surplus was
eseeted tseleng to the people; but the Government has trans-
ferred its possession to incorporated banks, whose interest and
;last it is to make large profits out of its use. This process
meal only be stated to show its injustice and bad policy.
And the same observations apply to the influence which is
produced by the steps necessary to collect as well as to distri-
bete such a revenue. About three-fifths of all the duties on
imports are paid in the city of New York, but it is obvious
that the means to pay those duties are drawn from every quar-
ter of the Union. Every citizen in every State, who pur-
chases and consumes any article which has paid a duty at that
putt, contributes to the accumulating mass. The surplus col-
lected there must, therefore, be made up of moneys er pro-
perty withdrawn from other points and other States. Thus
the wealth and business of every region from which those sur-
plus funds proceed must be to some extent injured, while that
of the place where the funds are concentrated, and are em-
ployed in he-king, are proportionably extended. But both in
making the transfer of the funds which are first necessary to
pay tit: duties and collect the surplus, and in making the
transfer which becomes necessary when the time arrives for
the distribution of that surplus, there is a considerable period
when the funds cannot be brought into use ; and it is manifest
that, besides the loss inevitable from such an operation, its
tendency is to produce fluctuations in the business of the coun-
try which are always productive of speculation, and detrimen-
tal to the interests of a regular trade. Argument can scarcely
be necessary to show that a measure of this character ought
not to receive further legislative encouragement.
By examining the practical operation of the ratio for dis-
tribution adopted in the Deposit Bill of the last session we
;shad discover other features, that appear equally objectionable.
Let it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that the surplus
moneys to be deposited with the States have been collected,
and belong to them, in the ratio of their federal representa-
tive population—an assumption founded on the fact that any
deficiencies in our future revenue from imposts and public
lands must be made up by direct taxes, collected from the
States in that ratio. It is proposed to distribute the surplus
say 30,000,000 dollars, not according to the ratio in which it
had been collected and belongs to the people of the States,
but in that of their votes in the colleges of electors of Presi-
dent and Vice-President. The effect of a distribution upon
that ratio is shown by the annexed table, marked A.
By an examination of that table it will be perceived that in
the distribution of a surplus of thirty millions dollars, upon
that basis, there is a great departure from the principle which
regards representation as the true measure of taxation ; and
it will be found that the tendency of that departure will be
found to increase whatever inequalities have been suppesed to
attend the operation of our federal system in respect to its
hearings upon the different interests of the Union. In
making the basis of representation the basis of taxation the
framers of the Constitution intended to equalize the burdens
which are necessary to support the Government; and the
adoption of the ratio, while it accomplished this object, was
also the means of adjusting other great topics arising out of
the conflicting views respecting the political equality of the
various members of the confederacy. Whatever therefore
disturbs the liberal spirit of the compromises which established
a rule of taxation so just and equitable, and which experience
has proved to be so well adapted to the genius and habits of
our people, should be received with the greatest caution and
distrust.
A bare inspection, in the annexed table, of the differences
produced by the ratio used in the Deposit Act, compared with
the results of a distribution according to the ratio of the direct
taxation, must satisfy every unprejudiced mind that the former
ratio contravenes the spirit of the Constitution, and produces
a degree of injustice in the operation of the Federal Govern-
ment which would be fatal to the hope of perpetuating it.
By the ratio of direct taxation, for example, the State of De-
laware, in the collection of thirty million dollars of revenue,
would pay into the Treasury 188,716 dollars ; and in a dis-
tribution of thirty millions, she would receive back from the
Government, according to the ratio of the Deposit Bill, the
sum of 305,122 ; and similar results would follow the compa-
rison between the small and the large States throughout the
Union, thus realizing to the small States an advantage which
would be doubtless as unacceptable to them as a motive for in-
corporating the principle in any system which would produce
it, as it would lie inconsistent with the right and expectation
the- large States. It was certainly the intention of that pro-
vision of the Constitution which declares "all duties, imposts,
and excise" shall be " uniform throughout the United States,"
to make the burdens of taxation fall equally upon the people
in whatever State of the Union they may reside. But what
would be the value of such an uniform rule, if the moneys
raised by it could be immediately returned by a different one,
-which will give to the people of some States much more, and
to those of others much less, than their fair proportions ?
Were the Federal Government to exempt, in express terms,
the imports, products, and manufactures of some portions of
the country from all duties, while it imposed heavy ones on
others, the injustice could not be greater. It would be easy
to show how, by the operation of such a principle, the large
States of the Union would not only have to contribute their
just share towards the support of Federal Government, but
alsa have to bear in some degree the taxes necessary to sup-
port the Government of their smaller sisters; but it is deemed
unnecessary to state the details where the general principle is

so obvious.
A system liable to such objections can never be supposed to
have been sanction by the framers of the Constitution, when
they conferred in Congress the taxing power ; and I feel
persuaded that,emature examination of the subject will satisfy
nvcryone that there insurmountable difficulties in the opera-
tion of any plan which can be devised of collecting revenue
for the purpose of distributing it. Congress is only authorized
to levy taxes " to pay the debts and provide for the common
defence and general welfare of the United States." There
is no such provision as would authorize Congress to collect
together the property of the country, under the name of reve-
nue, for the purpose of dividing it equally or unequally among
the States or the people. Indeed, it is not probable that such
an idea ever occurred to the States when they adopted the
(1,-Istitution. But, however this may be, the only safe side
us in interpreting the powers granted to the Federal Go-
.ment is to regard the absence of express authority to touch
eject so important and delicate as this is as equivalent to it
bition.
on if onr powers were less doubtful in this respect as the
ion now stands, there are considerations afforded by
-erience, which would seem to make it our duty to
,ort to such a system.
',admit that the simplicity and economy of the State
;fit mainly depend on the fact that money has to be
,ti, cuppert by thy, same men, or their agents,
'