The Sun.
London, England, 1863-11-11 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIO JOURNALS.

TIMES.—HaIf a century ago, when Europe had
just given the fatal blow which made France recoil
to her capital, there seemed no other object before
the human race than to isolate and shut up the
common foe. All else, in this part of the world at
least, had learnt the blessings of order, legitimacy,
and submission to the powers that had always been.
Though there were smouldering signs of discontent
here and there, and personages not quite satisfied
with their territory and position, still these were
slight maladies that time would alleviate and even
wholly remove. A great inundation had been
checked ; the day of " enterprise" was over, " re-
volution" had been driven into its den, and all that
was to be done was to raise a sufficient barrier
between the sound and the unsound, the invaded
and the invader. Such was the view of things that
chiefly dictated the Treaties of Paris and Vienna.
It was assumed that Europe, caring for peace above
all things, and France, beaten into submission,
would long acquiesce in arrangements made really
in a moderate spirit, and generally with a con-
scientious regard to the public good. For fifteen
years the Treaty of Vienna was observed as sacredly
as if it had been written on the skies ; and it has
taken nearly fifty years altogether to abrade this
mighty landmark down to the level of history.
The sluggish stream of peace itself, however, has
undermined its own banks, and revolution or
accident has only intervened to consummate a
destruction all but done. The Treaty itself was
such as time could not but work against. There
was in it an element of weakness, unavoidable, re-
cognised, and resisted, but irresistible. In crushing
France it was necessary also to crush the national
sentiment and public opinion. France, like the
august captive in the old story, had to receive a
victorious, and now to her a foreign, lord. Her
hour of calamity was widely shared by those who
could not then move or speak. So when France
reasserted her independence, and shook off her
master, the example spread. The rent in the
Treaty ran from one nation to another. The hybrid
kingdom of the Netherlands, raised as a barrier
sgatnst French enterprise, wss shivered in a day,
though it took diplomacy three years to accept and
legalise the fact. There at once was gone, not only
the letter, but the spirit of the Treaty. Two neigh-
bouring nations had now chosen their own rulers,
and what, perhaps, neither Europe nor France at
first expected, these terrible outbreaks of national
self-will were found not incompatible with the
general peace. It must be concluded that immedi-
ate;y from the expulsion of Charles X. and the dis-
ruption of Holland and Belgium the Eastern Powers
had given up all hope of maintaining the Treaty of
Vienna, even if they desired it. Their occupation
of Cracow gave France itself an opportunity of pro-
testing in behalf of public law, and distinguishing
between its own natural right to choose its own
Government and the violent interference of one
State with another in the face of treaty obligations.
Since then the Treaty of Vienna has been like a
fortress overthrown, dismantled in its most vital
quarter. A parade of validity has been kept up,
but adequate force alone was wanted to destroy
what was left of it. When at last France had
elected a Bonaparte as her Emperor, the Treaty only
survived in a feeble jealousy of national indepen-
dence and French ambition. Italy saw its oppor-
tunity, and renewing a former struggle and a former
alliance, wrested Lombardy from Austria, and ab-
sorbed in a natural unity Tuscany, the " Two
Sicilies," Parma, Modena, and the Legations. Aus-
tria was thus the first of the great Eastern Powers
that was in a position to complain of broken treaty
rights. Russia and Prussia were apparently content
to let the Treaty go down the stream of time, and
to stand upon older grounds. But while his hand
was in, the Emperor of the French 'cook occasion
to rectify the line of frontier imposed by Europe
in 1814 and 1815, at a time when everything short
of a Chinese wall was erected between France and
other nations. He obtained Savoy and Nice and
something more on that coast, as well as the
territories of Faucigny and Chablis, the neutrality
of which had been expressly secured by the
great Powers. Besides a footing on the shore
of the Lake of Geneva he made a slight adjust-
ment of the frontier at Les Rousses. If his old pro-
tectors the Swiss are to be believed, he commands
their great lake and can penetrate at once into every
valley of the Confederation. The greatest of natu-
ral barriers has fared no better than the artificial;
and Switzerland and the treaty are both rent in
twain. Finally, England has given up the protec-
torate of the lonian Islands, and handed them over
to the new kingdom of Greece. But England and
all the great Powers of Europe are invited to a Con-
gress, the first act of which, it would seem, is to
accept all these facts as accomplished. The pro-
posed end of this recognition is to establish there-
from some as yet undiscovered basis for the settle•
ment of existing differences. It may be presumed
that this basis will be the right of nations to choose
their own Governments. But, unless the Congress
point to measures of a wariike nature or tendency,
no such basis of diplomatic negociation is required,
for there is no right so much admitted as that of
national independence, when a nation is strong
enough to assert its independence and maint ;in an
indefinite struggle with its former master. If Po.
land or the Confederate States of America hold out
till the conflict itself becomes a worse public evil
than the risks we incur by full recognition, we cer-
tainly shad recognise the independence of both
peoples. What new basis, then, is wanted more
than that which virtually exists ? Nor is it easy to
see how the proposed basis will be stronger because
it is to be founded on a stronger approval—that is,
a more express and particular approval—of every-
thing that has been done in the face of the treaty.
This will be to purchase a little formality at the
cost of much conscience, and, in some cases, interest.
England has no interest in the fate of the treaty
except her common interest in order and peace.
Could she in honour and duty leave the Continental
Governments and peoples to settle the matter
among themselves, she can afford to do so. Nor
has she anything to sacrifice, except those con-
scientious convictions the retention of which
constitutes her great moral weight. If England,
while approving the self-emancipation of Italy, and
other acts running counter to the letter of the treaty,
does not approve the suppression of the Republic of
Cracow or the annexation of Savoy and Nice, or
the presence of a French army in Rome, why are
we to purchase our right to sit in this Congress by
renouncing our conscientious protests and belying
our recorded judgments P This is a certain loss,
while the gain is doubtful. We may, indeed, de-
clare our acceptance of some accomplished facts,
reserving our opinion upon others, much in the
same way that even Austria may possibly record
her resignation to her Italian losses. But Austria
may well consider what she is to gain, or what the
cause of peace and order is to gain, by the gratui-
tous rehearsal of her former humiliations. As for
Russia, she has not yet betrayed any superstitious
repugnance to deal with facts, and she has a logic
that can handle or evade any abstract proposition.
But, on the other hand, she has long since renounced
the treaty when it stands in her way; and there
begins and ends her part in this matter. But if
France and Austria are ready to show their respect
both for the treaty and for accomplished facts by
entering the proposed Congress, there can be no
reason why we should refuse to join them, so as we
do not begin by admissions fatal to our authority,
and in our case unnecessary.
POST,--Europe must be entering upon an entirely new
dispensation if it accepts and realises the Emperor Napo-
leon's idea of a Congress. It is a project so unprecedented
and of such a grand moral conception that we can only
regard it as an earnest of something to be here-
after—" appearing ere the times are ripe." There
have been Congresses for the partition of kingdoms, the
equation of spoil, and the inauguration of new dynasties,
but a Congress to enfranchise a nation crushed under an
excessive severity of repression—a Congress to revise treaties
which, whether right or wrong originally, are distinctly the
bases of the status quo—a Congress to take into considera-
tion the state of things in general and bring about a con-
sensus, if not a uniformity, of international policy—this is
indeed a project which no one but Mr. Cobden ever main-
tained to be feasible in this generation, and which no one
but the Emperor of the French would have had the bravery
to propound. Of its success, the utmost that can be favour-
ably said is that is not impossible. There is much against
the chances of a happy issue, but nothing in the nature of
things to ensure failure. There are immense difficulties in
getting a Congress together ; there will be still greater ones
in obtaining its successful action in the direction desired.
Still, there is much to be said in favour of it, because if it
can be made to work it is undeniably the best mode of work-
ing. Anything that will anticipate war by removing its
provoca • Lives—anything that will settle disputes by the voice
of reason—the sanctions of public law, and the bond of
mutual interests—anything that will preserve from waste
the blood and treasure which are the strength of nations,
ought to receive the warmest favour at the hands of all
civilised principalities and powers.
A Congress,if
thoroughly successful, would save men and money, would
prevent the bitterness and exasperation which war engen-
ders, would put the responsibility of public policy upon the
right shoulders, and woulodnbteh
eaotehtire handnedring thwrtness to the
and prevalence
brute
strength. o f moral B
counselsut, over physical prowess
such a Congress as that proposed would be a fatea
l failure
failure. o f
Any single Power successfully defying it would be only
stronger after its niisearriage than before; while untold

difficulties might arise in the way of future negotiations on.
public questions. Thus much on the general question
but this proposed Congress has difficulties of its own.
The ostensible object of it is the reconsideration of
certain treaties in their relation to the present condition
and necessities of Europe. The real one is to endeavour to,
effect a solution of the Polish question. It would be impos-
sible to fix upon a mote intricate topic wherewith to inaugu-
rate a new mode of dealing with international interests. The
American question is in a nutshell compared to that now on
the tapis. There is a proud and noble-hearted people un-
dergoing an oppression that is simply exterminating, in de-
fiance of a treaty that was intended to preserve to them their
liberties. The cruelties, the butcheries, and the profligate
outrages which they are daily enduring at the hands of their
nominal protectors, are a scandal to civilisation and hu-
manity, and a violation of the original compact. The hu•
manity of Europe revolts at the conduct of Russia. The
conscience of Europe condemns it; the earnest remon-
strances of three of the Powers have deprecated it in the
strongest terms admissible in diplomacy; while all European
statesmen out of Russia, unless it be Count Bismark, ace
only too clearly that the existence of such a grievance as
the Poles undoubtedly suffer is dangerous to the very root:
and principle both of royal authority and popular liberty.
The friends of revolution point to the tyranny of Russia as
a fair exponent of imperial government. The advocates of
the Divine right of kings retort that Poland is a specimen of
what popular liberty leads to. The case in favour of doing
something to rid Europe of this monstrous evil is not dis-
puted or disputable. But what is to be done ? That is the
whole question. A Congress, unless backed by ultimate
purposes of a co-active character—in case of the failure of
reason and moral suasion—is not likely to have much more
effect on Russia than the remonstrances already ad
dressed by the three Powers. Let us imagine a Congress
laying out a simple, just, and practicable scheme, and Russia
flatly refusing it—what then ? Is the Polish cancer to go on
festering, and Russia to be allowed to snap her fingers in the
face of the assembled Powers of Europe ? This is a ques-
tion which must be gravely entertained. Are the Powers
who may be favourable to a Congress prepared to go to war
for Poland, if more moderate counsels fail ? or, short of
war, to withdraw for a time their representatives l'rom St.
Petersburg, and put the oppressor of Poland out of the
comity of nations ? Either of these would be strong Elea'
sures which we can hardly conceive probable, but w.tlieh
must be forecast as possible. Before anything is done iu
any of these directions, the friends of Poland ought to marts
up their minds as to what they mean by justice to Poland',
and what result would satisfy them. before they agree on
terms which, if not accepted, must seriously compromise
the dignity and peace of Europe. If the Poles are a noble
and oppressed, they are also an impractcable, people. They
have never governed themselves well when they have had
the chance. They have moreover no frontier of their own.
If erected into an independent State of the old limits they
would have no way out of their own borders, but across the
territory of other Powers. They could, therefore, pursue
no independent policy in Europe, and must be aver at the
mercy of other Powers. Grand and beautiful as the vision
of an independent Poland may be in the abstract, it is full
of difficulty in reality; and, if we are to have a European
Congress, it must not be to agitate for beautiful dreams►
and all invited to it will do well to ponder on its prel:imi'
naries, and to settle definitively at what point its hula tions
are to terminate. We may otherwise find confusion WO/150
confounded than ever.