The Sun.
London, England, 1806-08-06 00:00:00

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I PRICE sncEßNez.

BATTLE OF ./lUSTERiITZ:

ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ, By i.:;

AUSTRIAN OFFICER,

(Continued fro"t our raper of Yesthrday.)
" The unique, and Inlay say the principal, force
of an Army does not 'consist in its numbers ; but
there are occasions and.situations in which a Com-
mander should avail himself of the advantages
that offer, otherwise numbers are of no utility : this
was the case here. The Allied Army marched for-
v ard, for reasons which we are, about to Mention.
If it had commenced its movements when tke'
Grand Duke came 'to reinforce it, and to fi-hi,
the reserve out of his centre ; if at this epoch it
bad manoeuvred With skill and rapidity ; if Generd
ESSEN'S Corps had been added to the Grand Duke.;
if they haddhought less of giving rest to an
Which dffer some days. of inactivity could have,
been no longer exposed to fatigue without risking
tiro chance of A battle ; parhaps means might hare
beensused to oblige the French to abandon their
position, by 'out-flanking them, and which, by
alarming their, apprehensions respe6ting their com-
munications, might have obliged them to move to=
wards Vienna or- BoheMia. The first step would
have been attended with danger. The Corps under
BERNADOTTE, which came 'fretri Iglau to reinforc-e
the Army before Brunt) on-the eve of the battle of
Austerlitz, had scarcely time to this move-
ment, so fatal in its consequences to the Allies._ If
they had a&ed in the'rnanner I have indicansd,
prudence' and vigour, we might certainly have 1:1
tt-
tered ourselves with the hope of seeing the Enemy
involved among the combined movements of the
Allies; and which, ,as they were calmly conceived,
should-have been executed with vigour.
But the Quarter-master General, as we have
already observed, though an Officer of great courage,
was deficient in mind, and by no means formed' to
give advice at the Head-quarters, where he ought
to have shewn consummate prudenee Regardless -
of that which laid him under restraints, he was too
easily prevailed upon to abandon his* own opinions,
and adopt those of other persons.
The astonishing rapidity with which the unfor-
tunate events of this disastrous 'War followed each
other; the excessive folly of MACK', which could
only be surpassed by the excess of his shame, and
which had for its consequence, a number of eillpable
aels of imprudence, which astonishe&Europe, -and
tended to calumniate a brave Army ; that fully of
never bestowing a thought upon the possibility of a
reverse, and of being unable, in consequence of that
presumption, to establish masazines in its rear; this
was,the 'cause of the Army's being alniost without
provisions at Olmutz. The Army had scarcely been
there a day before they were obliged to have recourse
to forced requisitions, which, by the disorder it oc-
casioned, added to the spirit of licentiousness Which
from that time insinuated itself into the Army. To
have gained time at that epoch .would have been• al- •
Most equatto the gaining of a battle, considering t
political situation of affitirs; and from-tile time that
manceuvring was given up, it would have been of
the highest importance to have remained in, and
supported, the, position of, Olmutz. Places still re-
mained from whence 'provisions were to be had ;'but
these places were at a distance, and it would lave
beep necessary for the transports to have made a
large circuit; and here was a disease-which required
a speedy remedy. The persons employed to pro-
cure provisions received orders repeatedly to establish
columns of transports, upon the high roads without
delay, but these people were waritingueither in acti-
vity or good-will; their systematic mode of think-
ing would not permit theth to exert themselves ac-
cording to circumstances, and, in ±h&, almost every
one was etnbarrasi,;ed, because the Russians would
not give up the horses of the country that ttad peen
taken to convey the transports. The bread on the
road was even seized by the detachments which
should have protedecLit, and by a number of vaga-
bonds that followed iii the rear. Under the 'idea
that the Army might perish with Illunger, the ne-
cessary' severity was not enforced. The relaxation
of discipline always brings on excesses, followed by -
licentiousness. Finding the Army was no longer
able 'to subsist before Olmutz, they determined upon
abandoning this position, and to attack the Enemy.

OFFENSIVE .MOVESIENTS of the ALLIED AR 1•1 Y

We have already seen- how M. Da KuTuzo:.l,-;
came to be uncertain with regard to the movements
and strength of the enemy, at the time when he de-
termined to resume the offensive. The ideas of the
country were contradictory, and his advanced posts
told him nothing. The first disposition which he
made to advance was not founded on an exaa know-
ledge both of the position of the enemy and of the
number he bad to combat, but was only adapted, to
the ground:between Ohnutt and \Vischau. The
disposition was given out to the Generals on the 2-4,th
of November. He wished to march on the‘2,slll,
but it was of essential moment to take with him
provisions'for two days, and these'provisions could
not arrive till next day. On the morrow there were
Generals who found that they had not sufficiently
studied their dispositions, and he thus lost still ano-
ther day. The enemy employed this interval AO ad-

. ,
vantage; on the evening .before the battle,. as has
already been said,-Marshal' BERNADOTTE, as Well AS

,part of the division of Marshal DAVOUST, reinforced
the Emperor NAPOLEON. It will be proper to re-
coiled these hEt3, which we shall again have occa-
sion in the sequel to remark. ,

•" On the 7th of November, at eight in the
morning, the Army began its march in five columns,
in order to approximate the advanced guardof Prince
8A4171.1.;0N, which QM this diy made no move-_
ment, that the enemy might not-discover this man-
cetivre. The obje6t was to concentrate their forces,
which, however, in their march werescattered anew.
The five roads by which the Army advanced were
parallel The two Q 011.111105 04 the right marched