The Sun.
London, England, 1837-04-20 00:00:00

Noble Lord was in the House when I spoke. He was in his
place when I arraigned the Ministry, and then it was not half
past one.—(Loud cheers.) He had no excuse on account of
the lateness of the hour, for I concluded my speech at twelve
o'clock ; and the Noble Lord, after ten day's delay, thought
proper to reply to it at an hour and a quarter after the hour I
spoke. As the Noble Lord declined replying to any observa-
tions at the time, I will now repeat in his presence what I said,
and also tell him why I made such statements. And why did
I make.them ? The town was full of reports—(Laughter)_
said to be received from the highest authority, that it was the
intention of Government to resign. That was told every day,
and I did then say, and I now believe, that the Govern-
ment, seeing the embarrassments in which they were in-
volved „by both their foreign and domestic policy, would
be but -too glad to find a pretext for going out.—(Laughter
and cheers.) And I did that with a friendly warning ; I
said, beware on what grounds you rest your policy—the re-
signation may not be a sham or a fallacious resignation ;
and, depend upon it, if you go out under any pretext to
escape the difficulties with which you are surrounded, the spirit
and energy of the people of England would find men to supply
your place.—( Cheers.) The Noble Lord said I taunted him
because there was no government in France. I did nothing of
the kind—l stated the simple fact. I stated that it was uncer
tain whether there was any Government in three great countries
in Europe. It was my own declaration that there was no go-
vernment in England, and it was a well-known fact that there
were no governments in France and Spain ; but I did not sur-
mise that the Noble Lord had influence enough to establish a
government in France, or that it was owing to him that a go-
vernment did not exist in that country ; but what I said was,
that the quadruple treaty had not had the effect of cementing
a union between England and France. I said the quad-
ruple treaty had not had that effect. I referred also to the
Northern Powers, and I was justified in doing so after what
the Noble Lord had said about the Vixen. The Noble Lord
said he would give no answer on that subject because it
was under negotiation, and the question of international
law was referred to the legal advisers of the Crown ; but when
the report of that advice would be given to the public no body
could say, and on that ground I was justified in presuming that
our relations with Russia were not the most satisfactory. I
also adverted to the relations in which we stood with the three
great Northern Courts, and the Noble Lord must remember
that last Session it was his intention to send a representa-
tive of the British Government to Cracow—( Hear, bear,
hear)—but when the Noble Lord was questioned in Parlia-
ment on the point this Session, his reply was that greater diffi-
culties than he had anticipated had occurred, which, in other
words, meant that the three Northern Powers had refused to
sanation a step which the Noble Lord had announced in Par-
liament ; I did refer also to the embarrassment in the internal
state of the country. I referred also to the business before the
[louse, and did state that day after day new measures were in-
troduced, but no progress made; that you touched everything
with palsied hands, but settled nothing.—(Cheers.) And the
Noble Lord next proceeded to draw a comparison between ,
the affairs of the country now and in 1830 ; and also to a re-
mark
made, that peace could not be preserved for six months
but by a miracle. It appeared that one-half of the Noble
Lord's reputation as foreign Minister rested on an imprudent
speech made by a Noble Friend of mine, Lord Ashburton.
Now, I never participated in that part of my Noble Friend's
speech, or concurred in the sentiment that if an angel came
down from heaven to write protocols peace could not be pre-
served : yet the Noble Lord constantly dwells on that as if it
was his sole title to diplomacy.—(Hear, hear.) But the
Noble Lord says, compare the state of Belgium now with
what it was in 1830, when a great revolution had broken out
in that country in consequence of the revolution of July in
France ; and only three months before we were deprived of
office by an adverse vote of that House. If that was the sole
ground on which the Noble Lord rested his claims for merit in
settling the affairs of Belgium, he would only ask, was it won.
derful that the country should be more settled after a period of
six years than three months after a great revolution ? If Bel-
gium, therefore, was his only grounds of congratulation, his
topic must be narrow in the extreme. But what did the Noble
Lord mean by making an attack on the Duke of Wellington
for intimating an intention to recognise Don Miguel as King
of Portugal, when he ought to remember the opinion deli-
vered by Lord Althorp on that subject—by the Noble Lord
who was the leader of the House of Commons, and a colleague
with the Noble Lord in the Government? Lord Althorp
on that occasion displayed more wisdom when he stated
that the personal characters of sovereigns, whether they
claimed their right to the throne from legitimacy or the
choice of the people, was not a material point for considera-
tion, and that it was not wise in Governments to refer to the
personal qualities of a prince when he was a king de facto,
mid had sway ; and he further declared, that most probably a
time would come when Don Miguel ought to be recognised.
The Noble Lord, by replying to the speech which I made
ten days ago, has endeavoured to divert the attention of the
House from the main question, and I shall, therefore, now ad-
dress myself to the prominent subject of the night, which
has made on the mind of every man of common sense, both
in the House and out of it, a deep impression. The question
was, not whether we were to fulfil the treaty with Spain, but
whether we were to put a forced construction on that treaty,
and impose on England the onerous duty of forcing on that
country_ a Government which, for any thing you know, may
he against the wishes of the people. The Noble Lord com-
plains of the time at which the question is brought forward.
But surely it is no very extraordinary thing to call the atten-
tion of the House to the policy of renewing the Order in
Council when it is so soon to expire. The Noble Lord says
we might have called attention to the subject before. Now,
I have at various times remonstrated against the Order in
Council, by which British subjects were allowed to enlist in
the service of a foreign country. But if the House of Com-
mons doubted the policy of guaranteeing the employment of
an armed force, either directly or indirectly, in the affairs of
Spain, the present is the proper time to take the subject into
consideration. The Noble Lord says we have some secret ob-
ject in view, and that object is to evade the treaty. Now, the
Noble Lord has had some experience on that head, because he
knows that my Noble Friend the Duke of Wellington, when
in office in 1934, acted fully up to the treaty ; and what right,
then, has he to say that we wish to evade it? I call the No-
ble Lord as a witness whether or not our policy has been con-
sistent with the treaty—l do not mean the policy of employing
Marines in a strictly military expedition, or the revoking of
an Act of Parliament by an Order of Council, and permitt'ng
a British corps to operate in Spain, but I mean the treaty it-
self, and contend that we have adhered to it, not only in the
letter, but the spirit. The Noble Lord, speaking of the Duke
of Wellington's policy on the occasion when he was Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, made use of the following words on the
24th of June, 1835 :—" What he had seen of the records
of the office over which he had the honour to preside, relative
to the manner in which the Duke of Wellington had acted,
in the execution of the engagements of the treaty of the
Quadruple Alliance, had only tended to convince him the
more that the Duke of Wellington had the interest of Spain at
heart. Those records had shown him that that Noble Duke
had acted with the strictest good faith, sincerity and honour
in the execution of that treaty, whatever might have been his
opinion on the policy of originally framing it." Now, though
the Duke of Wellington did not advise the Order in Council,
or direct a military corps to be sent to Spain, the Noble Lord
admitted that his Noble Friend had acted with sincerity and
good faith ; and it was, therefore, going too far to assume that
we are now inclined to evade the stipulations of the treaty.
If the maintenance of the Order in Council was essential to
the treaty, than how came it that General Evans had declared
his intention to return on the 10th June, because the period for
which the British Legion was enlisted would expire before
that time ? I doubted the original policy of the expedition. I
believe the same still, because I consider we ought not to inter-
fere in the civil contests arising out of the internal affairs of
other countries unless some great and urgent necessity esta-
blishes an exception and justifies interference. But when
that Treaty was signed the House and the country had no
doubt that the Government would stand by it ; and I trust
the House will pause before they sanction an indefinite exten-
sion of it, and destroy the very principle of it, by sending over
a military force in the pay of England, and under English
colours, who, instead of settling the contest might foment and
encourage the quarrel by their interference. The Noble Lord
says, that by the Treaty we are bound to supply military stores,
and assist Spain with British ships, and that by so doing we
assume a belligerent character, as much as by sending men.
admit that by sending stores and ammunition, or by ope-
rating in the contest with a British fleet, is tantamount to
assuming a belligerent character, but the result is very differ-
ent. By sending naval stores we do not directly mix in the
civil contest with one party or the other, and that, in my opi-
nion, formed the great objection to direct military interference.
If, continued the Right Hon. Baronet, interference was con-
fined to naval operations, there would be no chance of Eng-
land being mixed up in the contest. But, said the Noble
Lord, England has engaged to furnish a naval force, and, as
a consequence, to employ a marine force on shore. The
Noble Lord had endeavoured to ascertain how far marines had
ever been marched into the interior of a country, and conceived
that we were bound to give the Queen of Spain equal co-
operation. He had gone back to the examples of Washington
and other expeditions for that purpose. If it were true that
the employment of marines in this manner was to be consi-
dered naval co-operation, the extent of that co-operation might
be rendered almost indefinite. And in fact the Noble Lord
began by taking the marines from Woolwich and other depots,
and supplying their places with troops of the line, and that he
called naval co-operation. If that were really .a. fulfilment
of the Quadruple Treaty, he (Sir Robert Peel) could see
no limits to the operation of that treaty. On former occa-
sions the Noble Lord had marked the distinction between a
Bill to permit foreign enlistment and the embarkation of
regular troops in the same cause. In June, 1835, the Noble
Lord said, " The Noble Lord had quoted also his ( Lord
Palinerston's) opinion in the case of 1823, that it would be
inexpedient, if we sent troops, not to send a large army.
But in that war was it merely 180,030 os 200,000 Frenchmen
that we should have had to encounter ? Did not the Noble
Lord recollect that the French army on that occasion was
merely the advanced guard of Eurpoe ; that the other Euro-
pean powers supported France on that occasion ; and that the
contest into which we should have been led would have been
a contest not with France alone, but with the other powers
of Europe ? The objection which he ( Lord Palmerston) had
taken, too, was to the sending of a British army into Spain
which should act under the orders of the King of England,
and not be subject to the orders of the King of Spain. No
such course had been pursued on the present occasion ; no
English army had been sent as an English army ; permission
had been simply given to British subjects to enrol them-
selves in the service of the Queen of Spain ; and the dig-
nity of the Crown of Spain was in nowise wounded by a mea-
sure such as that, because the levies so enrolled under that
permi'ssion were, for the time being, the troops of the power
whose pay they received, and whose colours they wore."
Ile (Sir R. Peel) should like to bear any one show him the
real distinction, with reference to this subject, between bat-

talions of marines and battalions of infantry. If we could
employ a battalion of 400 marines to defend, not forts or posts,
but the right wing of a Spanish army of 14,000 men—
if the employment of marines on such a service could be
vindicated, simply by the presence of a naval officer, not him
who had left his vessel for the express purpose—was not the
dignity of the sereign of Spain as much offended as if as
many infantry Ypad been employed in the same manner? If
it were justifiable and politic so to employ the royal marines,
why limit the number to 400? Why not increase it to
1,200 ? Why, when they once violated principle, shrink from
the best means of rendering that violation advantageous ?
Why hesitate in applying the description and amount of
force best calculated to answer the purpose in view ? Having
said thus much of the marines, he now cams to the question
of the Legion. No one could say that the employment of
the Legion was sanctioned by the treaty. The question,
indeed, was simply this : after an experience of two years
did it appear to be wise to sanction the continuance of the
Legion in Spain, or did it appear that the time had arrived
when it ought to be withdrawn ? In the course of his speech
the Noble Lord had made some observatioos which seemed to
lead to the inference that be thought the Legion ought to
be withdrawn. The Noble Lord's words were—" You blame
General Evans without having the means of estimating the
difficulties under which he laboured." Now, neither on that,
nor ,on any former occasion, did he (Sir Robert Peel) say
one word about General Evans. He estimated his talents, lie
admired his bravery; and if he had failed, there could be no
doubt that that failure was attributable to the difficulties in-
herent in the service in which he was employed. No reflec-
tion, therefore, could be cast on General Evans. But the
Noble Lord said, " You underrate, the difficulties with which
General Evans has been surrounded." Why, the greater the
difficulties the more cogent the reason for not exposing him
longer to them. The Noble Lord talked of the embarrassment
which must attend the command of nine or ten thousand
men, strangers to one another, and imperfectly dis-
ciplined. Certainly, nothing could be expected from such
troops but that which has occurred. "Of all the people
on earth," said the Noble Lord, " there are none so cruel and
bloodthirsty as the Spaniards, and we have no alternative but
retaliation." If this were so—if the Spaniards were the blood-
thirsty people described by the Noble Lord, was not that a
reason for withdrawing the English from all contact with so
sanguinary a race, that they might not fall into the habit of
similar atrocities, almost rendered necessary in self-defence ?
They had been told of retaliation, and the Hon. and Learned
Gentleman opposite had said that we could not permit our
men to be murdered in cold blood without retaliation. All
these dreadful things were, no doubt, true ; but they were all
strong arguments against the continuance of a contest which
rendered it necessary to justify and palliate such crimes. The
Learned Gentleman, admitting that the Spanish Government
had shown the utmost neglect of the British troops—that they
had provided for them no hospital, and no convenience or com-
fort—had gone on to say, that from the nature of the case no
stipulation for such a provision could be made; so that
there was no difficulty to let 10,000 men go to Spain, but the
doctrines of Puffendorff did not justify any attempt to insist
on their being provided for there.—(Cheers and laughter.)
This was a degree of fastidious delicacy which could exist only
in the civil law. There was one important topic which the
Noble Lord had altogether omitted, and that was, the result
of the policy which he had pursued. He ( Sir Robert Peel)
doubted the policy of the original treaty; but he had the No-
ble Lord's own admission that he had faithfully executed it;
what was strictly naval co-operation he had provided. In that
respect it was too late to recede from the engagements into
which he had entered. The distinction which he (Sir Robert
Peel) drew was, between furnishing stores and affording
naval co-operation, and marching a battalion of Marines
seven miles into the country, who, on the same principle,
might proceed to the centre of Spain, and end their la-
bours by establishing one dynasty instead of another. He
deprecated extending intervention so far. At the com-
mencement of the French war what were the principles
which Mr. Fox professed ? He declared that no country was
justified in interfering will' the national dissensions of another
—he declared that it was not to the honour of Great Britain
to make war on any such ground, or for the purpose of
establishing in France any particular form of Government.
It might be said that Mr. Fox was jealous of any interfer-
ence with a Government of liberty, and that he would have
connived at that interference if the object had been the
destruction of despotism. But it was no such thing. Mr.
Fox's principle was universal in its application. It had re-
ference to popular as well as to despotic Governments. He
maintained as a principle, that the government of every State
ought to be settled by those who lived under it, and who
ought not to be subjected to foreign interference. The same
principle of non-interference was maintained by his lamented
friend the late Lord Londonderry. When the high powers
met at Verona, it was proposed that intervention should take
place with respect to Spain. This was remonstrated against
by Lord Londonderry, who expressed his apprehension that
any such measure would be attended with injurious conse-
quences. But the Noble Lord opposite seemed to be of opi-
nion that despotic principles were identified with Don Carlos,
and, therefore, that we were juttified in our interference
with Spain on the ground that despotic principles ought to he
opposed. That was the plea by which it had been attempted
at all times to justify intervention, but it was a plea which had
been repudiated by all the leading men in the councils of this
country. Unless some paramount necessity justified such in-
terference, it had invariably been deprecated. The instruc-
tions of the late Lord Londonderry to the Duke of Welling-
ton were rigidly to abstain from such interference. In 1833
France determined to interfere in Spain. She used the same
arguments which the Noble Lord now used. Indeed, the
Noble Lord seemed to have been searching the dispatches of
Chateaubriand for the reasons by which interference could be
justified. What said Mr. Canning on the subject? He re-
monstrated against the unprovoked intervention of France;
he contended that as long as Spain confined dissensions with-
in her own territories there was no plea for fereign inter-
ference. But supposing that the apprehensions of the Noble
Lord with respect to the proceedings in Spain were ,
such as to justify the measures Le had taken. What
had been the effect of those measures ? The Noble Lord
was fond of comparing positions : what was the position of Don
Carlos now compared with his position when the Noble Lord
began his operations? For the argument's sake be ( Sir R.
Peel) would admit that there were grounds for apprehension ;
but if the Noble Lord had done no good, if he had encum-
bered his friends with help, if he had aided those whom it was
his intention to demolish, that alone was sufficient to show the ,
expediency of terminating the present course of- policy. The
Noble Lord professed to be the greatest enemy to Don Car- ,
los. He ( Sir R. Peel) however, doubted, notwithstanding
all the Noble Lord's avowals, whether Don Carlos's greatest
friend was not the Foreign Minister of England.—(Hear.)
He doubted whether the Noble Lord did not

" Do good by stealth, and blush to find it fame."
What was the situation of Don Carlos in 1834, when the
English Government succeeded in expelling him from Portu-
gal? They had brought him to this country, and could hardly
believe their senses when they found he had got to Spain.
There he had ever since maintained himself. But, accor-
ding to the Noble Lord, his case was now entirely hopeless ;
all the great towns of Spain were formally against him, but
now the Noble Lord asserted that the Bascine Provinces we-e
against him. Here, then, was a person unppular in all the
great towns of Spain, unpopular even in his own peculiar
district, and yet it was necessary to continue a Legion and a
battalion of marines in Spain to oppose him. Had our inter-
vention been so fruitless as to increase his power ? Was that
attributable to the jealousy excited in Spain by the interven-
tion of foreign armies ? The Duke of Wellington, at a
time when he could not foresee the present state of affairs,
had advised the French Government not to attempt to support
principles in Spain by foreign force. The Noble Duke did
not hesitate, from his experience in Spanish affairs, to declare
that the Spanish nation, of all the nations upon the face of
the earth, was the least disposed to brook the interference of
foreign troops, and that any such interference was calculated
to produce dangerous and injurious cosnequences. The
Noble Lord had said that if the Spanish Generals had mani-
fested half the activity 'of Gsneral Evans, the dispute would
long since have been settled. What was the cause of their
apathy? It might arise from two causes ; from reliance on
the aid which they received, or from jealousy of that interfer-
ence, which would deprive them of the fame of triumphing
over their enemies, and of the credit of establishing their own
Constitution. If the latter were the real cause, his Ma-
jesty's Government, by their interference, had obstructed the
attainment of the object which they had in view. On these
grounds he supported the motion of his Right Honourable •
Friend, and he trusted that those who were adverse to any
extension of the ravages of war would consider what might be
the effect of sanctioning the course which his Majesty's Go-
vernment were at present pursuing. Men who differed in
opinion on the main question might, nevertheless, combine in
supporting his Right Hon. Friend's resolution. Those who
thought that when a great country like England interfered in
the affairs of another country, it ought to be by a military
farce, under the command of regular officers, and directed in
its operations by its own Government, might protest against
the Noble Lord's doBtrines. These who thougrlit with the •
highest authorities in Europe, that the cause of Liberal Go-
vernment could never be advanced in Spain by foreign mi-
litary interference, might protest against the Noble Lord's
policy. Those who agreed with the highest military au-
thority in France, Marshal Sot.tt, who deprecated the
employment of undisciplined armies might equally deprecate the
Noble Lord's proceedings. Those who entertained
still higher views, who thought that the subjects of no
nation were justified in wantonly destroying the lives of the
subjects of another nation—who thought that
" Reason frowned on wa?'s unequal game,
Where thousands bled to raise a single name,"
might condemn our interference in the Spanish contest.
Those who thought it unjust to send to Spain a military force
for the purpose of punishing the Basques for their fidelity to
the Sovereign—those who thought that we Englishmen had
no right to interfere in such a matter, and that our interference
was contrary to all sound principle—all these parties might
combine to deprecate the continuance of any armed inter-
ference in Spain, and the extension of the meaning of the
Quadruple Treaty, There were powerful reasons for ter-
minating the present course. It violated the principle that
no country was justified in dictating to another country
with reference to its internal aifair,, or in declaring who
was its legal Sovereign, or what should be it form o' Go-
vernment. There was the signal proof afforded of the
absence of wisdom in the policy of its utter failure. There
was the jealousy naturally excited among the inhabitants of
-Spain, and which led to the suspicion at them that no
Constitution could be stable, the foundations of which were
not laid by native hands.—( Hear.) There was the incontro-
vertible fact, that the public gorge in England was rising at
the continuance of the system. The people of this country
had recently had visible appeals made to their sympathy for
their unfortunate countrymen. It was painful to see the mill_
tar' uniform of English troops exhibited in such circumstance