The Sun.
London, England, 1837-10-26 00:00:00

][irlE SUN, LON DON, T R,S DA V., OCTOB Elt 2G, 1831

kecords of theM, and; as ocinSiOri requires, search them to fin,
diem' the judges cannot resort to those records, ar.e.
thereiOre it is indeed ipPossible, roi A,A to judge matters c
privilege. It is 'Olio his imprisonment enquired into in thi
ourt ; but where it appears to be a commitment bg the Ilenior
of Commons, he must be remanded. The Judges in my Lor
Shafiesimry's case went upon their having no jurisdiction
the cause."
Pont; The Ceurt coild not judge of
the bel*aNe th ti Gil cdrimiii.!ed Iv ailother Liw, an
consequently we cannot discharge them by that law by %%Ili&
they were not committed. There is a lex Parliamenti, for th,
common law is not .the only law in this, kipgdom ; and th(
House of Common' d,d riot cdrOit 137 the common law,
but by she I'o* rarliament. He said this Court might judg,
of prit:ilege, but not contrary to the judgmrnt of the Zionse of
Commons. . . This is drawing the plea ad aliud examen.
and yet the House if Commons arc the syreme judges of theii
own privileges. 11,.1 said the Court of Perlis:merit
was a superior Collit to this, and though the King's Bencl
}the a power to prevent excesses of jurisdiction in Court!..
yet they cannot prevent such excesses in Parliament, because
that is a superior Court to this, and a prohibition was nevei
moved for to the Parliament. If the House of Lords should take
upon them to determine freeholds, this Court could not pro-
hibit them. There was a case lately wherein the Lords made
an order originally in a Cline, but the parties grieved could no:
have come here for relief. So Skinner's case was brough
originally in the House of Lords, and this Court could not
have helped them. . . . If they should discharge these
persons that are committed by the House of Commons for a
breach of privilege, this would be taking upon themselvm:
directly to judge of the privileges of Parliament. This want
of jurisdiction in the Court cures all the faults in the commit-
ment. . . . It is objected, that in bringing these actions
the prisoners have done nothing but what the Lords have ad-
judged they may do, and the House of Lords is the supreme
judicature of the kingdom. As to that, he said, that if this
commitment were for that reason an excess of jurisdiction,
this Court could not remedy it, but it ought to be remedied by
conference, and that was the proper remedy, where the Parlia-
ment assumes an excess of jurisdiction. Upon conferences the
reasons upon which the Houses act will appear, and if the
Commons have no reason for what they do, it is to be pre-
sumed they will never be chosen again ; and if the Lords are
in the wropfkae other Housa will not rest until all is set right
again.',l7
HOLT, Chief Justice, said :—" That the legality of the
commitment depended upon the vote recited in the warrant ;
and for his part he thought the prisoners ought to be discharg-
ed, though in this, his opinion, he was so unfortunate as to go
contrary to the Act of the House of Commons, and the opinion
of all the rest of the Judges of England, whose assistance
they had desired, and there had been a meeting for that
purpose."
The Chief Justice then argued at great length, and put
forth a variety of irrelevant propositions, which were quite
true as generals, but were inapplicable to the question. For
example, he said,
" If the House of Commons declare themselves to have
privileges which they have no legal claim to, the people of
England will not be estopped by that declaration."
This is most true, and most constitutional ; but the
Chief Justice falls into the same error that the three tailors
of Tooley-street fell into—he puts himself and his learned
brothers in the place of the people of England ! And,
being a Justice of the Crown, he pretends to protect the
commonalty from their representatives, who were presumed
to have been " freely chosen by and from among them-
selves," for the specific purpose of guarding their rights and
privileges from the encroachments of the Crown and the
Peerage.
In Murray's case, a commitment of the House of Com-
mons for contempt,
WRIGHT, Justice said—" It is insisted upon at the bar that
this is a bailable case, within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus
Act. To this I answer, that it has been determined by all
the Judges to the contrary ; that it could never be the intent
of that Statute to give a Judge at his chambers, or the
Kinces Beath, power to judge of the privileges of the House
of Commons. Tho House of Commons is undoubtedly a
high Court, and it is agreed on all hands that they have
power to judge of their own privileges. It need not appear to
us what the contempt was, or flit did appear, we could not
judge thereof."
Justice—" This Court has no jurisdiction in the
present case; we granted the Habeas Corpus, not knowing
what the commitment was, but now it appears to be for a con-
tempt of the privileges of the House of Commons. What
those privileges are we do not know, nor need they tell us
what the contempt was, because we cannot judge of it; for I
must call this Court inferior to the House of Commons with
respect to judging of their privileges. I give my judgment
so suddenly, because I think it a clear case, and requires no
time for consideration."

FOSTER, Justice---‘‘ The law of Parliament is part of the
law of the land, and there would be an end of all law if the
House of Commons could not commit for contempt. We
have no power at all in this case."

The next case is that of Brass Crosby, the Lord Mayor
of London. He was committed by the House. of Com-
mons for breach of privilege, and was brought up to the
King's Bench by Habeas Corpus.
Chief Justice DR GREY said---" If either myself, or any
of my brothers on the Bench had any doubt in this case, we
should certainly hare taken some time to consider before we
had given our opinions; but the case scorns so very clear to
us all, that we have no reason for delay This
Court cannot take cognisance of A commitment by the House
of Commons, because it cannot judge by the same law for the
law by which the Commons judge of their privileges is un-
known to us, . . The Lord Mayor is committed by the
law of Parliament, and yet he would have redress from the
Common Law ; the Law of Parliament is only known to
Parliament men—by experience in the House. The House
of Conzmons only know how to act within their own limits ; we
are not a Court of Appeal; we do not know certainly the
jurisdiction of the .House of Commons; we cannot judge of
the laws dnd privileges of the House, because we have no
knowlege of these laws and privileges. . . . The Coun-
sel at the Bar have not cited one case where any Court of this
Hall ever determined a matter of privilege that did not come
incidentally come before them The laws can
never be a prohibition to the Houses of Parliament, because by
law there is nothing superior to them. Suppose they should
abuse the powers which the Constitution has given them, there
is no redress—it would be a public grievance. The Constitu-
tion has provided checks to prevent its happening ; it must
be left at large ; it was wise to leave it at large; some per-
sons, some Courts, must be trusted with discretionary powers;
and though it is possible, it is in the highest degree improba-
ble, that such abuses should ever happen. . . . Courts of
Justice have no cognizance of the acts of the Houses of Par-
liament, because they belong ad aliud examen."
GOULD, Justice---" I entirely concur in opinion with my Lord
Chief Justice, that this Court has no cognizance of contempts
or breach of privilege of the House of Commons ; they are
the only judges of their own privileges. This Court cannot
know the nature and power of the proceedings of the House
of Contmons ; it is founded on a different law ; the lex et
consuetudo Paz liamenti is known to Parliament men only.
It is que this Court did, in the instance alluded to ( Wilkes'
case), determine upon the privilege of Parliament in the case
of a libel ' • but then that privilege was promulgated and known;
it existed in records and law-books, and was allowed by Par-
liament itself ; but even in that case, we now know that we
were mistaken, for the House of Commons have since deter.
mined that privilege does not extend to matters of libel."
BLACKSTONE, Justice—" I concur in opinion that we cannot
discharge the Lord Mayor; the present case is of great im-
portance, because the liberty of the subject is materially con-
cerned. The House of Commons is a Supreme Court, and
they are judges of their own privileges. . . . No other
Court shall scan the judgment of a superior Court, or the
principal seat of justice. . . . Tie objections that are
brought of abusive consequences prove too much, because they
are applicable to all Courts of dernier resort : et oh abuse ad
usum non valent consequentia is a maxim of law as well as
cf logic. General convenience must always outweigh partial in-
convenience. I know, and am sure, that the House of Com-

mons are both able and arc well inclined to do justice. How
preposterous is the present murmur and complaint I • If any
persons may be safely trusted with this power, they must surely
be the Commons, who are chosen by the people, for their pri-
vileges and powers are the privileges and powers of the people.
There is a great fallacy in my brother Glynn's whole argu-
ment, when he makes the question to be, whether the House
have acted according to their rights or not? Can any good
man think of involving the Judges in a contest with either
House of Parliament; and yet this manner of putting the
question would produce such a contest. The House of Coin-
mons is the only judge of its own proceedings. Holt differed
from the other Judges in this point, but we must be governed
by the eleven and not by the single one. It is our duty to
presume the orders of the House of Commons, and their exe-
cution, are according to law."
NAREs, Justice--" I shall ever entertain a most anxious con-
cern for whatever regards the liberty of the subject. I have
attended with the utmost industry to every case and argument
that has been produzed, and most heartily and readily concur
with my Lord Chief Justice and my brothers."
The King v. Wright (1799).---A rule having been ob-
tained, calling on the defendant to show cause why a cri-
minal information should not be granted against him for
printing and publishing a libel on J. Horne Tooke—
Wright was a bookseller, and had published a copy of the
published Report of a Parliamentary Committee, without
the sanction or authority of the House.
Law, Gibbs, and Moore were now to have shown cause
against the rule ; but after producing an affidavit made by
the defendant, in which he stated that the libel on Horne
Tooke was a paragraph contained in the Report of a Com-
mittee of the House of Commons, a literal copy of which
he had published, and that he did not publish the Report
maliciously, the Court called on the Counsel for the prose-
cutor to support the rule.
Erskine and Warren argued in support of the rule, at
great length.
Lord KENYON, Chief Justice, said--" Whon the motion
was first made, I suggested to the Counsel for the prosecutor
e q u
Reportes ti en
fr et ahlel yHeo•uesreo
owflicatomitmpornos:
that if the publieatioofn
o
fiteswseodultdo bbee'warocnogpy to grant a rule to show cause ; but it not
being then admitted to be a true copy, and it being surmised
that the publication assumed a title that did not belong to it,
we granted a rule nisi; but as it now proves to be a true copy
of the Report, 1 think there was not the least pretence for the
motion. The application supposes that this publication is a
libel. But the inquiry made by the House of Commons was
an inquisition taken by one branch of the Legislature to enable

them to proceed further, and adopt sonic regtile.tititi3 for the
• kt, tter tieVVIVIIPpt of ,tbc coltritr'• It t*,,l impossible, for tls to
Ana that lltn, in.(itce(linas !If c4cr,ar, r Quad cr Parka-.
meet is a libel; and yet that is to 'De taken as the foundAloi.i,
,f this anplicatien, The case of R. V. Williams,•which was
irincipally relied upon, happened in the worst of times; but
:hat has no relation j.o the present ease. There the publica-
tion was the op d i:,.'cidU,il; and under pitteMe
,f the sanction of the I-I,use of Cottirlioiii di ilndiv.ldu,ll put-
'ished ; but this is a proceeding by one branch of the
tare, and therefore we cannot inquire into it. The Report in
iuestion, being adopted lig flit blot se at large, is a proceeding
,f those who, by the donstittitioni ate the, guardians of the
'ibertics of the Stibjeep; and„ We cannot say that any part of
that proceeding is d Heil. f anti therefore; clearly of opinion
chat this rule ought to be discharged."
GROSE, Justice--" This is a motion for leave to filo a eft,,

ninal information for publishing a supposed libel, but, in truth,
-'or publishing a proceeding of one branch of the Legislature
then thoy were acting for the sarety of the State. Now, on
looking into the judicial proceedings of this Court, I find no
,nstance of such an information as the present, The case of'
R. V. Williams is most like this case ; but it must be ramem,
tiered that that was declared by a great authority to be a dis-
grace to the country."
LAWRENCE, Justice—". The chief ground taken by the
prosecutor's Counsel is that, though the Report of the Rouse of
Commons cannot itself be considered as a libel, the defendant,
not acting under the authority of the Rouse, may be indicted
for publishing it with a view to general circulation. The pro-
3ecdings of Courts of Justice are daily published, some of which
highly reflect on individuals, but I do not know that an infor-
mation was ever granted against the puhl,shers of them. The
general advantage to the country in having those proceedings
made public more than counterbalance the inconveniences to
te private persons whose-conduct may be the subject of such
proceedings. The same reasons apply to the proceedings in
Parliament ; it is of advantage to the public, and even to the
legislative bodies, that true accounts of their proceedings should
be generally circulated ; and they would be deprived of that
uloantage if no person could publish their proceedings without
being punished as a libeller. Though, therefore, the defendant
was not authorized by the House of Commons to publish the
Report in question, yet as he only published a true copy of
it, I am of opinion that the rule ought to be discharged."
In Flower's case, which was a commitment by the Lords,
tad an application to the King's Bench to discharge the
prisoner out of custody,—
Lord KENYON, Chief Justice, said--" Having seen the re.

turn to the Habeas Corpus, we are bound to remand the de•
fondant to prison, because the subject belongs ad aliud examen.
Unless we wish to assist in the attempt that is made to overset
the law of Parliament and the Constitution, we must remand
the defen.clant."
" GROSE, Justice—" This question is not new ; it has fre-
quently been considered in Courts of Law, and the principles
discussed to-day and the cases cited were examined not many
years since, and the result is very ably stated by Chief Justice
De Grey. When the House of Commons (and the same may
be said of the. House of Lords) adjudge anything to be a con-
tempt or breach of privilege, their adjudication is a conviction,
and their commitment in consequence is execution. The
Counsel at the bar have not cited one case where any Court of
this Hall ever determined a matter of privilege which did not
come incidentally before them. Having stated this, I think I
need not add more in the present case."
The next case, Burdett v. Abbott, was an action of tres-
pass and false imprisonment brought by Sir Francis Bur-
dett against the Speaker of the House of Commons, under
whose warrant Sir Francis had been committed to the
Tower for sedition, He also brought an action against
Mr. Colman, the Sergeant at Arms, for excess in the exe-
cution of the warrant. Gentlemen could not understand
the feelings which urged Sir Francis to harrass Mr. Colman
with an action at law, when the only fault he had commit-
ted was an excess of courtesy, and for which he incurred
the displeasure of the Speaker. Mr. Colman, on receiving
the warrant, writes a polite note to Sir Francis Burdett,
requesting to know when it would be his convenience to
allow him to execute it. He then waited on Sir Francis.
Sir Francis refused to go with him, and on his retiring bar-
ricaded the door. Popular excitement having by this time
arisen to an alarming height, Mr. Colman was compelled to
bring a detachment of the military, who were obliged to
mash in the windows of Sir Francis's house in order to
effect an entrance. And this at a time, says Lord Ellenbo-
rough, "when on the Friday night previous there had been
such outrages committed, as have been stated, at the house
of a Noble Lord ; and at Reddish's Hotel, the supposed
habitation of Mr. Lethbridge ; when, on the Saturday and
Sunday, there were such tumultuous assemblies in the streets;
when the military were so much assaulted and ill•treated,
And in two instances soldiers were wounded." All this was
nothing to Sir Francis Burdett—he was determined to have
a row, and to be the darling of the rabble. It would not
suffice him to compel Mr. Colman to use gentle violence,
sufficient to make a case. No, nothing but the pioneers,
the guards, and an escort of dragoons, and a demonstration
of brickbats and bludgeons on the part of the mob, would
satisfy this raging demagogue—this champion of " An-
nual Parliaments al least —this modern Gracchus—this
dear friend of the Democracy. A vain-glorious love of pre-
eminence and distinction often induces men to espouse a
cause they detest. Could this have been the case with Sir
Francis Burdett ? But, to return to the case of Burdett v.
Abbott, which arose from the Tories having committed Sir
Francis Burdett to the Tower for sedition—in that case
Lord ELLE NBOROUGH observed, speaking of the privileges
of the House, and the power to commit, generally, for con-
tempt and breach of privilege :
" It is idle to contend, a* some have done, that as the House
of Commons is a body which has begun to exist separately
and substantively since the time of legal memory, and that as
they cannot on that account claim by prescription or Imme-
morial custom," [the absurdity of the people, by their repre-
sentatives, claiming by prescription against themselves is mani-
fest,] " any power of commitment, and that no Act of Parlia-
ment since that time has expressly given it to them, therefore
it cannot legally belong to them. lam glad that nothing of
that kind has been advanced in argument upon this occasion ;
but it is impossible not to have heard of its having been urged
elsewhere, and on other occasions." .

His Lordship thought the power and privileges of the
Douse of Commons, from the very nature of the assembly,
must be independent of any precedent. He confined him-
self so closely to contempts and commitments that few of
his remarks are applicable to the question now raised. His
extra judicial dicta, of course, are not to be noticed here.
He concluded by saying :
" First, it is made out that the power of the House of Com-
mons to commit for contempt stands upon the ground of reason
and necessity, independent of any positive authorities on the
subject : but it is also made out by the evidence of usage and
yofletghieslactioru'ertssanocftiLorat
wa,ndin raecolgonngiticoon,,irsaendofbywetlhle.
tsb
e
jud g practice,m en
established precedents and authorities. Secondly, That the
resolution of the House, that the plaintiff had been guilty of a
breach of its privileges, and that the order made for his com-
mitment for that offence, were in conformity to their power."
Mr. Justice BAYLEY—" It is said that the privilege of Par-
liament is examinable in this Court, and that it ought to have
been averred that this party was guilty of the contempt, stating
it as a traversable fact, which might be tried again elsewhere
against those who acted under the authority of the House of
Commons. If that were so, the fact would be examinable not
only in this Court, but in every inferior Court throughout the
kingdom, in which an action of trespass could be supported.
Then, as the Courts of Justice must be considered as standing
the same situation, in respect to their judgments, as the
House of Commons stands with respect to its own orders, it
must also be contended, that if this Court were to adjudge a
party to be guilty of contempt, and were to direct an attach-
ment to issue against him, and to commit him for that con-
tempt, any other Court, however inferior, might try the same
question again in an action of trespass; because it would be
said to arise incidentally, whether or not the party was guilty
of that fact of which this Court had adjudged him to be
guilty, and whether that fact was a contempt of this Court.
I cannot see how to stop short of going that length, if this
action can be supported The cases upon the Ha
liras Corpus Act were attempted to be distinguished from
this, by relying upon expressions made use of by some of the
Judges, that although they could not question judgments of
commitment by the House directly, yet, that when those judg-
ments came incidentally before them, they would have full
power to examine into them. And then it is assumed that in
this particular case the question arises incidentally. Now, as
it appears to me, the very object of this action is to make a
direct attack upon the judgment of the House of Commons,
and to bring that matter, and that matter only, into question :
and would it not be absurd to say, that though we cannot dis-
charge the party committed from his imprisonment, because
that would be directly arraigning the judgment of the House,
et that he shall have an opportunity of recovering by action
lull satisfaction for lying in prison ? And that in giving such
satisfaction the judgment of the House is left where it was.
But it seems to me that in giving the party full satisfaction for
his imprisonment is, in legal contemplation,_ to do away all the
punishment he has received; and if that be not bringing into
question again the judgment of the House, I cannot understand
how the point can be more directly brought into question."
Those remarks of Baron Bayley are particularly worthy
of attention, as being most applicable to the case of Stock-
dale v. Hansard. The question of privilege comes di/wily
before the Court, when an order of the House is pleaded
injustification, of the act complained of.
The last case is that of Sir John Cam Hobhouse. In
1820 a Tory House of Commons resolved, that a letter
published by Sir John was " a scandalous libel, and calcu-
lated to inflame the minds of the people to acts of violence,"
&e., &c. ; and ordered him to be committed to Newgate.
Sir John was brought up by Habeas Corpus to the Ring's
Bench, and prayed to be discharged. He urged the fol-
lowing objections to the return :
" First, That the House of Commons is not a Court of
.Judicature competent to decide on the alleged offence sug-
gested in the warrant. Second, That there is no adjudication
on the face of the return. Third, Supposing the House of
Commons to be a Court of Judicature, it has taken under its
cognizance that which cannot be considered as a contempt,
but as an offence at Common Law, and consequently punishable
by the laws of the country. Foul th, On the face of the
re-
turn, it does not appear that .the party accused has ever had an
opportunity of making his defence, which is against every
principle of English law. Fifth
Assuming the House of
Commons to be a Cottrt of Judicature, it cannot condemn an
P.nglighm. an to imprisonment. Sixth, That this Court has
power, by virtue of the Habeas Corpus Act, t 9 liberate a per-

son committod by the House of Commons. And, seventh,
I That thcro i§ Mil ntkieotion to the form of the warrant of
IcoMmitn:tent.'l
The CoVit.,' aftet co'nsiciering the CAR for ;ctll'' de-
livered their jUdgrtient ads fiilloWs
" Having conferred together uVon tee,. we are clearly
of opinion, that, sitting in this Court, we dt tioi authorised to
gtder into the discussion of any of the objections taken by the
gen"eniiiit on Me jlaot to his commitment. It has been settled
by many precedents, brought frotlt time to time before the
different Ccdurts of Westminster Hall, and tinSlly in the case of
Sir Francis Burdett v. Abbott, (which went by writ of error to
the Exchequer Chamber from this Court, and ultimately to the
House of Lords,) that it is competent for the tionse of Commons
to commit for a contempt of their privileges, and that they are
the jndges, AND TliE WaY3LIDGES, Of What is a contempt of their
privileges: . . The cases of Lord Shaftesbury and RV.
Patty, are det,isite authorities to show that the Courts of iVest-
minster Hall cannot jitclpß of any law, custom, or usage of Par-
liament. . . . It is tncontpelent for this Court either to ques-
tion the privileges of the House of Cotnntons, or a commitment
for an offence which they have adjudged to be a contempt o'
those privileges. . . . We cannot inquire into the form
of commitment, even supposing it is open to objection on the
ground of informality. We are of opinion that the prisoner
must be remanded."
Sir John was accordingly sent back to prison.
Having gone through all the cases and legal authorities,
From the earliest to the present time, let us now turn to
the Bill of Rights. In the 36 Car. 11., an information was
filed in the King's Bench for the publication of a , libel, to
which an order of the House of Commons was pleaded.
The plea was over-ruled, and judgment was prosecuted in
the reign of James 11. Accordingly the Bill of Rights de-
clared James, and his Justices, to have " endeavoured
to subvert and extirpate the laws and liberties of this
kingdom, by prosecutions in the Court of King's Bench,
for matters and causes cognisable only in Parliament."
And the ninth article declares, " That the freedom of
speech, and debates or proceedings in Parliament, ought
not to be impeached or questioned in any Court, or place
out of Parliament."
Yet in defiance of this host of legal authorities ; in de-

fiance of the Bill of Rights and the principles of the Con-
stitution ; and in utter, subversion of the rights and privi-
leges of the British people, my Lord Denman says—that
he is " not aware of the existence in this country of any
body whatever that can privilege any servant of theirs to
publish libels of any individual. Whatever arrangements
may be made between the House of Commons and any
publisher in their employ, I am of opinion, that the pub-
lisher who publishes that in his public shop, which may be
injurious to any one of the King's subjects, must answer
in a Court of Justice to that subject if he challenge him
for a libel." When some such insinuation as this, about
the House of Commons assuming a despotic power, was
urged before Mr. Justice Powys, ad captandzint vulqus, he
said—" This is a very foreign supposition, and what ought
not to be said by an Englishman. The House of Com-
mons are a great branch of the Constitution, and are
chosen by ourselves, and are our trustees ; and it cannot
be supposed, nor ought to be presumed, that they will ex-
ceed their bounds, or do anything amiss." And in
Flower's case Lord Kenyon observed, that " the good sub-
jects of this country feel themselves protected in their li-
berties by both Houses of Parliament. Government rests
in a great degree on public opinion ; and if ever the time
shall come when factious men will overturn the Govern-
ment of the country, they will begin their work by calum-
niating both Houses of Parliament."
The Examiner of the 4th June observed :—" Lord Den-
man is resolved to run his bead against the wall. He persists
in his attack on the privileges of the Commons, and, to give
a better grace to the matter, proposes to fight the battle over
11 again in the House of Lords l We have long observed that
Lord Denman seems ambitious of the character of a Tory
Judge, (which is a character much more easily obtained than
that of a learned and able Judge) ; but let him beware that in
making this enviable reputation he does not bring his office into
jeopardy."
In the debate on the' Lords Justices Bill," Lord BROUGH AVI
" objected to the insertion of the name of the Chief Justice
of the Queen's Bench among the list of Lords Justices. If
such a combination of offices were at all proper, no one, he
was sure, was so fitted to discharge the duties of them as his
Noble and Learned Friend. But he thought it contrary to
the principles of the Constitution to blend in one individual poli-
tical and judicial functions. Their Lordships should look at
the course of precedents, and mark how that which was ques-
tionable led to that which was bad, and that which was bad
led to that which was worse."
Lord Denman alluded to the fact of the late Lord
Ellenborough's having been in the Cabinet.
Lord ELLENBOROUGII—" Recollected his Noble Father say-
ing that lie consented to sit in the Cabinet, because Lord
Mansfield had done so before him, and because he understood
that such a step on his part would greatly facilitate the forma-
tion of the Government at the time. He had also heard his
Noble Father say, that if the thing was to be done again he
would not do it."

Lord BROUGHAM said—" After listening attentively to the
different arguments which had been urged, his own opinion
was confirmed, and not changed, by all that he had heard."
However, Lord Denman and the Hanoverians carried
their point. My Lord Denman having thus made provi-
sion for uniting in his single person the judicial, the legis-
lative, and the executive functions, it is not all wonderful
that he should assume to control the Legislature, and to
over-ride the Law of Parliament. Had he succeeded in
this coup, he might then, without presumption, have writ-
ten—" Ego et Rex mews." A political judge, like a poli-
tical priest, is a bad member of society.
Oh, my Lord Denman, my Lord Denman ! " Thou hest
vraxed feeble amidst the luredoms of Babylon—the red
harlot has taken possession of thy soul !" My Lord Den-
man !—You have fallen on an " ingenious device" fcr neutra-
lizing the effects of the Reform Bill ; and as the Commons
will no longer do the bidding of the Lords, you, a Lord,
have fallen on the device of taking cognizance of their pri-
vileges as a Judge ; by which means the power and privi-
leges of Ow Commons would ultimately be brought for de-
termination before the Lords. " The authority the Lords
wield," says Fenimore Cooper, " and the power by which
it is maintained, are the results neither of frank conquest
nor of legally-delegated trusts, but of insidious innovations,
effected under the fraudulent pretences of succouring liberty."

If an order of the wholeCommonsof the realm, in the
Supreme Court of Parliament assembled, were not a suffi-
cient justification for any act whatever before the Justices
of the Crown, we would be living under a species of Vene-
tian tyranny and degradation, which the whole people of
England, if necessary, should take up arms to resist.
In my next letter I shall enumerate the cases in which
the Justices of the Crown have assumed to decide ques-
tions of Constitutional or Parliamentary Law, and to con-
troul the Houses of Parliament—and I'll tell you what
became of the Judges.

A REFORMER.

SALE OF THE LATE KING'S STUD.

Everybody promised himself to be at Hampton yester-
day, to witness the dispersion of the magnificent stud. But
the morning was enough to throw a damp—at the least—
upon the most resolute intentions. It is not wonderful,
therefore, that the attendance was comparatively small anJ
unimportant, or that the people of rank actually present
were to use an illustration suggested by the fluidity of
the day— . . . .

" rari nantes in gurgite vasto."

Lord Chesterfield, Lord Siratibroke, Lord George Sey-
mour, Sir Gilbert Heathcote, Prince Lucien Buonaparte,
and a few others might be seen, cloaked, and clogged, and
segar-smoking, and soaked, and not apparently taking
any marked interest in the proceedings. This, however,
is not surprising, because it perfectly understood that
persons of a certain class who mean to buy do not seem
to be buyers ; the mechanical operation of bidding affords
no due to the discovery of the bona fide bidders.
None of the Fitzelarences, or those supposed to be
more immediately interested, were on the ground. All
that had previously been said or written about combina-
tions or companies for buying the Royal stud might or might
not, have been true, for aught that was obvious to the eyes
of the uninitiated. The only thing that can with cer-
tainty be averred is, that the stud sold, taken altogether, at
higher prices than had been anticipated. Of the foreign
purchasers so largely announced none were visible in propria
persona, save some score or so of be-whiskered and particu-
larly ill-dressed persons, who, from their observations, may,
very reasonably be supposed to know as little of a race-
horse as of a donkey. It is of course impossible to say
positively that these persons did not buy any of the stock,
but the general impression was that very few—perhaps not
more than two or three—of the more valuable animals arc
destined to leave the country.
The great lions of the day—if that be not a bull—were
proved by the prices obtained, to have bcenNanine, a brood
mare, and The Colonel, Actaeon, and the two celebrated
Arab horses. About the merits and points of the three
first there seemed to be no difference ; as to the Arabs,
however, such was not the case. The crowd of pseudo-
knowing people—the cockney-conpoisseurs—who always
abound on occasions like the present, were considerably di•
vided on the subject. On visiting the box of the black
Arab, some persons observed, notwithstanding his acknow-
ledged high caste, that he was too large for a high-bred
Arab. "Ah !" said stud-groom, " and when the three
mares were brought out, gentlemen said they were too small
for Arabs. So, you see, there's no pleasing everybody." In
plain truth, however, of the superior symmetry of these two
illustrious strangers there ought not to have been a mo-
ment's doubt. _ _ _

" Nanine" was reported to have been bought for the
Hon. Sidney Herbert, " Fleur-de-Lis" and " Wings" to
go abroad, and " The Colonel" is still a mystery. He sold
at by far the highest price obtained for anything, though at
less by half than had been previously talked of ; but at the
name of his new owner we have not the means even of
forming a guess. It is not our business to detail suspicions.
The equipages in waiting were sadly commoi place. De-
duct two or three teams, not remarkable for their appoint-