The Sun.
London, England, 1839-02-23 00:00:00

Noble-Lords-to be quite cur" that no party motives were
really litsl.ing- at-the bottom of these-proceedings. When
he found that ve had, he would not say twenty-one sail of
the line, fur, as the Noble Lord had said, two out of those
ranked as fourth rates ; hut when we had nioeteen sail of
the line in commission, and were told of the weakness of
the fleet —of the danger to which our country was exposed_
' from the want of any protection against impending innova-
tions from ali (pesters ; and when it was recollected that in
is3s, when the Navy was in as extremely different state in
point of numbers ; but then he_ was not aware that the
Noble Lord had caused their Lordships to hear any_
thing of the complaints whiah he now brought
forward of the want of the British naval strength.
lie would now go into the, general statement of the Noble
Lord, and he believed the whole of his argument was
founded on that great error that they must keep a war
establishment in time of peace. They had then been told of
a want of preparation against invasion. It was true that
they were not prepared against invasion—they were not
prepared against it, nor did he Isnew when, in a time of
profound peace, that country had thought it necessary to
be so prep ired.—( Hear, hear.) II iwever, it seemed that
the Noble Lord thought that he ( Earl Minto) had been too
parsimonious, and had not applied to Parliament for the
assistance that would haye placed him in a different posi-
tion. Before he:4aroceeded to go over in detail the Noble
Lord's statements, he thought it might make the . subject
more intelligible to their Lordships if he stated shortly
what their naval force now was, and how it was disposed,
comparing it with their foree and its disposition at other
times. They had in the Mediterranean at the present mo-
ment 9 sail of the line, but that was from accidental cir-
cumstances, which occasioned there being one ship there
more than the usual number.; but even allowing that the
9 sail were permanently occupied there, they had 10 sail of
the line otherwise employed, of which one was a flag-ship
(and he begged to call the Noble Lord's attention to the
fa-t that he was exclu ling flag-ships from his statement),
one of which was the flag-ship of the officer commanding
on the West India station, and exclusive of that flag-ship
they bad 9 ships of the line disposable for home service.
That these ships were -not all at home at the present mo•
talent was perfectly true, 'out he conceived that there was
no use in having this disposable force lying idle and with-
out turning it to some account. That these ships were
disposable was proved from the fact that when occasion
did arise last. year which rendered -it necessary to embark
troops for the Colonies, no less than seven ships-of-the-
line were employed in the transportation of troops either
from that country to America, or from the West Indies to
America, or from one part of the American Colonies to
:mother. During the time these ships were so occupied,
undoubtedly they were not at horde, and formed no part of
their defence—.hat was if any foreign power sneditsted an
attack upon them—they had not those ships, there being
no likelihood of any such intention on the part of any
foreign Power. Having discharged that duty, they were
now stationed partly in America and the West ladies,
partly at Lisbon and partly in their own ports, and they
had at that moment a disposable force—they could at
hat moment lay their hands upon nine ships of the line,
besides those permanently employed at diffsrent stations
abroad. That was a force of which there was no
example at any former period.—( Hear, hear, bear.)
The Noble Lord said that when he had got down to
Portsmouth he saw nothing lying at Spithead. That
was very possible, and he (Earl Minto) was not desirous
that when ships were iu commission they should be lying
there. He held in his hand a return of the naval force
on the home station and on the north coast of Spain, with

the expAimental squadron which had been employed for
the four last years. There was, in the first place, per-
manently stationed at the different ports, three flag-ships,
and upon these he would say a word presently. In 1336
they had in port three ships of the line, in addition to these
flag-ships. In 1837, four ships of the line ; and in 1838,
four, making seven ; and at Lisbon there were two stationed
(and these were always considered as within reach), making
in the whole, nine. In 1836 they had also an experi-
mental squadron of five sail of the line. The Noble Lord
complained that they had not eight or nine guard-
ships for the protection of their ports. The system
upan which he (Earl Minto) proceeded since he came into
office was that it was better to have eight or nine active,
well equipped, well disciplined, well armed, and well
manned ships, fit for sea, than to have the same number
of half armed and half manned ships in the ports._

( Hear, hear.) That was his opinion. The Noble Lord
seemed to think that nine guard ships were much more
efficient for the protection of the coasts, much wore
ready for any sudden call made on them, than the nine
which were ready to proceed to sea if they happened to
be in or near port, at a day or a week's notice. He would
now tel! the Noble Lord how their force actually stood on
the Ist of January and the Ist of July in each year on the
home station. In 1823 they had nine guard ships, or
half manned ships; in 1831 they bad nine guard ships and
one efficient ship, while on the Ist of July they had
only seven; in 1832 they had only two ships of the
line and one guard ship ; in 1833 they bad five
sail of the line and two guard ships ; in 1834 there were
three ships of the line in port ; in 1835 there was not one,
for in that year the guard ships were not sea going vessels,
they were not capable of proceeding to sea. There
was not one there either as a guard ship or
as a sea-going ship. In January, 1836, they had three
guard ships ; and in July, 1836, they had 10, of which
three were guard ships. In 1837 they had four ships of
the line and three guard ships. In 1833 they had four
ships of the lice; and in 1839 they had six sail of the line
and three guard ships. He (Lord Minto) did not attach
any value to these things, because the number in port was
merely accidental, and others might be cruising within such
limits as would enable them to obtain their services when
required. The result of the comparisons he had made was
this, that during the years 1821 to 1823, they had never
more than ten or twelve ships of the line in commission ;
that from 1824 to 1826, they had sixteen in conrnission, a
large proportion of which were guard hips; that in 1827
they had seventeen sail of the line that in 1828 there
were fifteen sail, of the-fine in commission ; that in 1830
there were eighteen' salt- of the line in commission; in
1831 there were fottiteeii.,elit, Of the, line in, commis-
sion; in 1832 there-Wet=e,,,eleiten r sail of -the line in
commission; in. 1t333 there were eleven sail of the line in
comrnision, three of them guard ships, in port.
In 1834 there were ten sail of the line in commis-
sion, and in 1835 there were eleven sail of the line in
commission, and he now came to the decline of their naval
force. In 1836 there were twelve sail of the line in com-
mission ; in 1837 there were twenty sail-of-the-line in
commissson ; and in 1838, excluding these three flag-
ships, there were nineteen sail-of-the-line in commission;
at the present moment they had nineteen sail-of-the-line
in commission, and of these nineteen ships-of-the-line nine
were entirely disposable to any service whatever. It was not
without the greatest difficulty that he had been able when
be first came to the Admiralty to keep up the Navy in its
efficient state. For many years past there had been a de-
mand for economy and retrenchment to so great an extent
that it was impossible for any Government to exercise quite
freely its own discretion. When he contrasted the present
state of things, as compared with the mech smaller expense
(he was enabled to infer) with former periods, there was
much matter for congratulation. He imputed no blame or
censure to those who went before him—he made the com-
parison merely for his own vindication, and to show that he
had some difficulty in raising the amount of expenditure that
was necessary. If Noble Lords looked at the annual esti-
mates, they would see what reductions had been made.
Every succeeding Government had taken credit to itself
for practising economy, and he felt that it was impossible
for him, nor would it have been prudent for him, to
make a great show of expenditure, but he carefully,
quietly, and efficiently applied himself to effect whatever
improvements were within his reach in all the different
naval departments. Taking into consideration the im-
paired resources of the country, and the reductions that
had taken place in all the naval establishments, in their
dockyards, in their votes for stores, and their votes for men,
and he believed it was about the year 1830, a very short
time before his Noble Friend opposite quitted the Admi-
ralty, it was resolved, and lie believed prudently, that con-
siderable reductions should take place in the establishment
of dockyards, and that the number of workmen should be
reduced to 6,000. The men were at that time employed
five days in the week, and it was intended, be believed,
that in effecting the reduction they should be
placed on the full six days' labour in the week.
There was also a system of task and job work,
which was undoubtedly (although he gave no opinion
in the abstract), as far as the work went, a much more
productive system. The question was entirely whether
they did not lose in the material, but there was no. doubt
gordthe the
tNhaevysysßteomard had produced a greatdeal
not carried that
was issued, and the reduction was accordingly made. The
number being reduced to 6,000 they were put upon five
days labour, and upon day's wages. They had therefore
one day less in the week and less productive labour. The
pllia n T into ore.
effect, Finding
an tn
fact of that reduction was seriously felt, and it became
barely possible to provide for the current demands of the
Establishment. The first circumstance which attracterl his
attention was the difficulty of finding cordage, the amount
of rope which it was possible to make in the year not
amounting to more than half a year's consumption.
He felt then that it was necessary to • put the
work upon a more efficient footing. Measures
were taken to relieve the shipwrights of a great deal of
the work not properly belonging to them. A great
number of additional labourers were employed. Arti-
ficers were hired to do the work of the yard, and in
the course of time a great advance was made in the
quantity of work obtained, and the quantity of stores pro.-
and in addition to the
believed at that moment
duced. But the demand increased also very rapidly, for
their Lordships must be perfectly aware that the demands
for seven additional ships of the line, must have formed a
very seriaue draft upsa their labours. Well, all these
demands had been supplied, the stores were supplied in
had demonstration ships,
they thirteen and about twenty-six
i ion requiring no •
other ships hi commission, repairs whatever.
There were now, in addition to the fleet at sea, stores,
tthweentnyl-oosnte ssaatiislfaocftotrhye
lminaen,
bowsprits, masts, rigging,. topsails, for more than thirty
sail of the line, besides a considerable. number of masts,
sets of sails, and general stores in reserve. He should now
words in reference to the
say a few blockade service he
", the suppression of the guard ships,
and on the adoption of a new system for the protection of
the revenue, it was supposed the Navy had lost an
iad-
vantagen
not having the services of the coast guard for
occasional duties. le believed the value of the coast
blockade, was very much overrated, it being estimated as
containing from 2,400 to 2.700 able seamen. But front Sir
J. Graham be understood tint when onthessuppression of that
force it was proposed to draft these men into ships in active
service, there were not mere than 800 whom the officers
wculd receive as able seamen. As for the CO tst guard lie
believed the Constitution did not give them a right over-the
services of the men. As affecting the interests of the Navy
this s) stern WAS disadvantageous; but with reference to the
protection of the revenue it was a service of great import-
ance ; for some time the Govertenent had had it in contem-
plation to create a new medium,av through which qddithrai
men might be supe N
lied to the Y, and the sytcrn would
, • The Government .h dno
a onger t ser-
soon ue testers, sss • - ,
,
vices of the caast blockade, ancl,S they Oontur.ot transfer the
is:en from the coast guard, they had adopted the substi.ute
of placing those ships hitherto in ordinary in comtnision.
Their Lordships perhaps were not generally ,aware that