The Sun.
London, England, 1863-07-08 00:00:00

been determined to be, although the most
inviting, the most treacherous place along
the entire line of rebel defences. Our soldiers in
their charge found it to be filled with deep, narrow
gullies, too small to cover a large body of troops and
too large to make a passage over them even for in-
fantry barely possible. Horses are out of the ques-
tion and were not used at this point. These artifi-
cial ravines are completely covered with fallen trees
and vines, which are so arranged as to nearly obs-
cure them from sight, and to make an advance over
them a matter of extreme difficulty. In our charge
upon the enemy's lines at this spot it was impos-
sible for our soldiers to keep in regular order of
battle. Frequently whole squads of men would
sink out of sight only to be resurrected by the
assistance of their comrades. Down the right line
of the enemy's work) all approach to the fortifica-
tions is made exceedingly difficult by high bluffs
and deep irregular gullies. The enemy's rifle pits
are, although bearing the appearance of very wide
constructions, built upon the most approved modern
engineering skill. Here again fallen trees have
been so arranged as to make it impossible to move
artillery or troops in line of battle. The entire dis-
tance of rebel works presented for our reduction are
nearly eight miles in extent.
Last Saturday evening the order of attack was
determined on at the head-quarters, and communi-
cated to the generals who were to command the
assaulting columns. Most of the details were ar-
ranged by Gen. Grover. The point of attack was the
extreme north-easterly angle of the enemy's breast-
works. Five or six days previous to the assault
several pieces of the enemy's artillery, which had
been in position behind their fortifications imme •
diatoly in our front, were dismounted by our guns
and abandoned. Those still in position were ren-
dered useless to the rebels by our sharpshooters.
Rebel deserters and prisoners brought into camp
speak of our artillery practice as splendid, and say
that they were not able to fire a gun more than 5 or
6 times before they had to move it as the accuracy
of our range would work it certain destruction. As
before mentioned, we commenced preparations for
the attack while yet it was scarcely daylight. The
plan of the assault was briefly as follows :—The
75th New York, under command of Capt. Cray, and
the 12th Connecticut, led by the Lieut.-Colonel
Peck, were detailed as skirmishers forming a sepa-
rate command under Lieut.-Col. Balcock, of '7sth
New York. The 91st New York, Col. Van Zands,
commanding—each soldier carrying a five pound
hand grenade, with his musket thrown over his
shoulder—followed next in order. The skirmishers
were to creep up and lie on the exterior slope
of the enemy's breastworks, while the regiment
carrying the grenades were to come up to the same
position, and throw over the grenades into the
enemy's lines, with a view to rout them and drive
them from behind their works. The 24th Connec-
ticut, Colonel Mansfield, with their arms in like
manner to the grenade regiment, followed, carry-
ing sand bags filled with cotton, which were to be
used to fill up the ditch in front of the enemy's
breastworks, to enable the assaulting party the
more easily to scale them and charge upon the rebels.
Following these regiments came, properly speak-
ing, the balance of Gen. Weitzel's whole brigade,
under command of Colonel Smith, of 114th New
York. This command consisted of the Bth Vermont,
Lieut.-Col. Billing Lam ; the 114th New York, Ma-
jor Morse; and tho 116th New York, Lieut.-Col,
Van Patten. Next came Col. Kimble's and Col.
Morgan's brigade, the last of which, with another
brigade (the name of which I was unable to learn),
was under the general command of Col. Birge.
This force was held to support the assaulting column,
which was under the immediate command of Gen.
Weitz 'l, who made the attack on the right. (ion.
Emory's old division moved in conjunction with
General Weitzel on the left, forming a separate

column.
The two Divisions—General Weitzel's and Gene
ral Paine's—were under command of Gen. Grover,
who, as has been before stated, planned the whole
assault after General Bank's order to advance was
received by him. Hence the mcde of attack was
entirely his own. Gen, Weitzel's Division was
expected to make a lodgement inside of the enemy's
works, and in that manner prepare the way for
General Paine's Division. After the inside of the
enemy's fortification had been reached, skirmishers
were to push forward and clear the way, while
both columns were to be_deployed in line of battle
and move towards the town of Port Hudson, where
a grand citadel, which forms the last means of rebel
defence, is situated.
I have thus far been speaking of General Grover's
command exclusively, and the plan above given is
applicable only to his movements as determined on
at the time of its adoption.
About daylight the 75th New York, which had
been -slowly advancing, approached the enemy's
works sufficiently near to see his fire. Previously,
the columns of the main body of General Grover's
command were found in the woods skirting the
enemy's breastworks. The 12th Connecticut during
the night had lost its way in the woods, and the
91st New York was ordered by General Weitzel to
take the place that had been assigned to it, and
follow immediately in the rear of the 75th New
York. After the advance of the 75th and 91st
regiments. General Weitzel's entire command
commenced moving forward. several days previ-
ous our army engineers had been preparing a
covered way, which extended from the woods where
our troops lay to within about 150 yards of the
enemy's position. Through this covered way our
troops marched in single file up to the point where
the first line-of-battle was formed. It should be
remarked that the covered way spoken of was re-
lied upon as being sufficiently deep to afford pro-
tection to our soldiers. It turned out, however, to
be of no considerable consequence, owing to some
fault in its construction. After the advance had
arrived at the end of the covered way, they
began strongly to push over the innumerable
barriers that had been planted by the rebels to
obstruct their march. The difficulties I have
before spoken off concerning the open field
immediately facing the enemy's works were here
experienced. The deep gullies, covered over by
brush and creeping vines, were completely ob-
scured from sight, and were only known to exist
after our soldiers had plunged into them. Part
of our skirmishers deployed to the right while suf-
fering severely from the enemy's fire, and a portion
of the advance took up a position on the left of the
point to be attacked. They were immediately fol-
lowed by General Weitzel's column, General Paine
in the meantime advancing towards the enemyl'st
works with his command further on the left.
should be stated that our troops, as soon as they
had left the cover of the woods, which were scarcely
300 yards from the enemy's breastworks, were su
ject to the constant fire of the rebel infantry. A
portion of our artillery, which was
planted some
distance in the rear of our advancing
forces, kept
Captain
battery of
up a continuous fire on the rebel works.
ith his
Terry, of the Richmond,
wand
eight-inch Dahlgren guns,
did
good execution.
lin, Indian Artillery,
r Captain APLaf.
y much to protect
their
These batteries served
wveere advancing to the
our troops theyk.
attack. After our a irmishers
_had. p lava
.0 arils the enemy's
of the rebel
way up to within ti.bnut,thoe
expeeti
11' to he
works, they sprung into
able to shelters hemselves under cover
fortification, nd keep the enemy down
, should
work in driving
while the
the
regiment, with the hand grenades
The portion advance
and perform their part of the
the ditch of the 75th
rebels from their position.
which succeeded in reaching
imme-
diately repulsed, and nearly all of themNvere
or wounded. The ditch Was so enfiladed were killed
under the murderous fire
impossible for men to live that it was
of the enemy. The question
ore, but I have no
a may be asked why all
this was not known h
time to
comment.

Ia confiegtw-itee cf the repate or the portion