The Sun.
London, England, 1863-09-09 00:00:00

SPIRIT OF TIM PUBLIC JOURNALS.

TlMES.—Apart from the interest naturally excited by a
struggle so gallantly sustained, we find in the incidents of
the siege of Charleston many lessons of the utmost import-
ance to military and nalialeeienee. While we are theorising,
the Americans are practising. Our speculatione arid e*peri-
merits proceed side by side with the actual war across the
Atlantic, and it behoves us to lose no opportunity of testing
our conclusions by the results of the experience there ac-
quired. Unfortunately, this is not so easy a task as might
be supposed, The Americans, from the very beginning of
the war, have adhered to one particular sYsterd with little
deviation, and this system happens to have no parallel in
our experiments. The comparison fails, therefore, for want
of homogeneous quantities. The Americans have not tried
our model, and we have made to trial of theirs. Besides
this
impediment,
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we
scene of war details of such absolute accuracy as are required
for calculations
powers of attack and defence as exemplified in any
operation,particu-
lar
armament on one side and the protecting works on the other;
whereas it is usually uncertain what guns are employed, or
against what defences they are directed. We learn the re-
sults in general terms, but nothing more. Just now, how-
ever, we have received a report which, although leaving
much to be conjectured or inferred, does undoubtedly con-
vey a remarkable piece of intelligence. It is announced, on
the authority of the general in command of the besiegers,
that one of the Charleston forts—the famous Fort Sumter
—has been practically demolished by the fire of batteries at
a range of two miles or upwards, This is an extraordinary
feat, and as such, indeed, it seems to have been regarded
by the combatants on both sides. The Federal General
Gilmore makes a special report of it to his Govern-
ment, and communicates also an opinion of General
Beauregard—a most competent judge—to the effect
that the projectiles employed were the most destructive
missiles ever used in warfare. But we are not told what
these missiles were. Beyond the general compliment
to their efficiency we get little direct information. From
the terms in which they are spoken of we infer that they
were shells of some kind, and not solid shot, and we also
learn that the bombardment lasted seven days. We collect,
too, that some at least, if not all, of the batteries were armed
with 200-pounder Parrott guns, but it is not certain what
class or classes of ordnance are comprised in that designa-
tion, Of the number of pieces actually employed against
the fort from day to day we have no authentic return, and,
though we know that a powerful squadron took part in the
attack, we cannot tell exactly to what extent this co-opera-
tion was carried. Above all, we have no sufficient account
of the defences of Fort Sumter. We know that it was in
itself an old-fashioned piece of brickwork, and that it had
recently been Fitt engthened by all the additions and supports
which the ingenuity of the Confederate engineers could
devise. Still, though cotton bales and similar coverings
were doubtless useful, they could not turn a weak place
into a strong one, and the shells from the Federal batteries
appear to have pierced the walls through and through.
Before we offer any remarks on the operations thus reported,
we wish to give some account of another event of the war
to which attention has not been sufficiently directed. A
month or two ago a new Confederate ironclad, called the
Atalanta, came out from Savannah to engage two of the
Monitors—the Weehawken and the Nahant—engaged in
the blockade of Charleston. The Atalanta was a larger and
heavier vessel than either of her opponents, and carried six
guns, whereas the Monitors carried but two each. But
the Atalanta's guns were only 6-inch and 7-inch guns,
mounted two on each broadside and two fore and aft, while
the guns of the Monitors, carried in turrets, were 15-inch
pieces, throwing solid shot of 4401 b weight. The Confe-
derate commenced the action confidently with her pivot-
guns, and fired three shots at the Weehawken, but to
little purpose. The Weehawken then replied with
with one of her monstrous cannon, and the first
shot, we are told, " virtually decided the action. '
It tore right through the Atalanta's side, and knocked
down forty of het crew. Four other shot followed, but at
the fifth discharge the Southerner ran up a white flag, and
the battle was over. It had lasted scarcely 15 minutes, and
was finished before the Nahant could get up to take part in
it: The incident is recorded not only with a natural grati-
fication on the part of the Federals, but as a convincing
preof of the efficiency_which has been somewhat stub-
bornly contested—of the Dahlgren gun. We cannot deny
that the story is a striking one ; but we happen, on this oc-
casion, to know something of its other side. The victors
gave a specification of the armament and defences of the
captured ship, and it turns out that the four inches of
wrought iron plating with which she was armed mean only
two layers of iron bars, two inches thick, placed one over
the other. In short, she was a second Merrimac, and though
creditable, we dare say, to the skill of shipwrights working
under difficulties, can hardly be regarded as an efficient
ironclad. To return, however, to the general question, we
find two great principles steadily preserved in American
practice. In artillery, the calibre of the gun and the weight
of the shot are made as great as possible ; in shipbuilding,
the turret pattern prevails over every other. These prin-
ciples, too, would appear to be in some degree connected, if
we are to assume—what has not yet been proved—that
only turret ships can carry very heavy guns. But neither
one principle nor the other has yet been recognised in this
country. We are building turret ships, it is true, among
other models, but we have not given them any preference,
while such a thing as a 400. pounder or 500-pounder gun
has not been conceived. Our artillerists, indeed, have ex-
plicitly condemned the very doctrine on which the Dahlgren
system of ordnance is based—that of throwing heavy pro-
jectiles with low velocities—and prefer to rely on velocity
rather than weight. It must be remembered, however, as
explanatory in some degree of the contrast between the
two systems, that the Americans are shaping all their
efforts according to the exceptional requirements of a ape.
cial emergency. They build their ships for coast work
and harbour service only. It is by no means certain that
any one of the ironclads engaged in the siege of Charleston
could be sent to sea with safety. They were intended only
for such work as they have been performing, when, the
conditions of our experiments are far more extensive.
Nevertheless, until our inquiries have been aided by further
evidence, it would be unwise to assume that we are right or
that the Americans are wrong. The ironclads were once
beaten off by the Charleston forts. They have now been
more successful, but it seems as if the shore batteries left
them only an inferior part in tha performance. Before we
can form, however, any safe conclusions it will be necessary
to ascertain with accuracy what means were employed on
each occasion on either side, and in what respects either the
attack or defence had improved or degenerated between the
first assault and the second. At present we see that the
assailants have not only gained considerable advantages,
but have achieved a very remarkable feat. If Fort Sumter
were a gJod specimen of a modern fort, we should say that
forts had been fairly beaten by guns ; but we know that the
fort was only a piece of patchwork, and we are by no means
sure that it was effectively armed. We therefore suspend
judgment, and content ourselves with indicating the suc-
cessive incidents which this war produces for our instruc-
tint and guidance.
POST.—While the tide of insurrection is apparently rising
in the interior provinces of the Russian empire, the Polish
question is gradually ceasing to present itself to Europe in
the light of a diplomatic and international question. A great
change has taken place in the character and bearing of the
revolutionary movement, which we have been watching the
last eight months, among the Slavonian subjects of the
Emperor of Russia. It may be fraught with still greater
danger to the Russian empire than when it was exclusively
restricted to the kingdom of Poland, but the progress of the
arrangements which are likely to be made for that part of
the Emperor's dominions at present renders the insurrection
a Russian, more than a European question. With the
internal condition of the Russian empire, properly so
designated, Europe has no concern. Her right of inter-
ference, arising under the Treaty of 1815, was strictly
limited to the Kingdom of Poland; and we have reason
to think that the French Government, as well as our
own, are likely to be satisfied if solid concessions are
made to the wishes of the Poles. It had become, indeed,
absolutely necessary to Russia to disembarrass herself of a
European question. The revolution, far from being limited
to " Congress Poland," is spreading in fresh provinces of
the Russian empire. It will have been observed in the tele-
grams which we published yesterday that it has broken out
in considerable force in the territory of the Ukraine. As
many as 25,000 peasants were declared to be in arms there.
They had had two successive encounters with the Russians.
Worsted in the former, they were victorious in the latter ;
and it appears that they have captured extensive stores of
arms, which will serve to equip a fresh legion of the pea-
sentry. 1 hese events carry the revolutionary movement
into the heart of South-Western Russia. In the meanwhile
the insurrection appears to be advancing in Lithuania,
where the peasantry are declared to be contending with the
imperial troops on at least equal terms. They have become
facts of deep import to a Government which, hitherto
blindly secure in its own maladministration, had only sought
to impose its officious protectorate on its neighbours. The
struggle seems, therefore, to be involving considerations of
great magnitude to the Russian empire in Europe. In order
to give the Imperial Government the means of coping with
this extended danger, it has been found necessary to clench
and concentrate its energies upon the growing disaffection
in Russia Proper. There, the Court of St. Petersburg well
knew that no diplomatic representations and no foreign in-
terference were admissible. It has been found, therefore,
that even the most grasping policy rested, to a certain ex-
tent, in moderation; and that it would be more prudent,
for the ipresent at least, to close an international ground
of controversy than to allow a foreign and an internal
question to grow into dangerous magnitude together.
The Russian Government have therefore found them-
selves placed face to face with the question, what were
the terms in respect to Poland which would set them free
from the constant menace of European intervention, and
which might also disarm the fierce hostility of the Poles,
They have accordingly, as we are given to understand,
propounded their view of reverting to the constitt;stinal
system of 1815, if not only to a yet clearer distinction
tween "the Kingdom of Poland" and the Russian empire.
We believe that France, a moat strenuous champion of the No
Polish cause, is likely to be satisfied with a bona fide
tre-
sumption of the form of Government that had been guaran-
Caller On ma,
teed by the Congress Treaty of Vienna. Indeed, this was
fro a standstill, and pa.._
of the butcher ' s horse.
probably all for which the three Powers possessed any right The Shorts Handicap of 5 SO

to contend. But upon other grounds, readily intelligible,
it has been proposed by Russia to make common to the
Russian empire certain parts at least bf the constitutional
privileges to be assigned to Poland. The generdl tyrant of
constitutions is calculated to arrest the tendency to insur-
rection in other parts of the Czar's dominions. This, how-
ever, is a matter of municipal and not of international con-
cern, The acquieserce of Russia in the spirit of our terms
must terminate the "Polish question" or at the least post-
pone it for the next six months. But as the Russian Govern-
ment has to deal with domestic dangers which have sur-
tilted the importance of her international differences, it
has become fitatter of pave necessity to satisfy the Poles
themselves, as well as to defer to the contractors of the
Treat' of Vienna. The truth is, that Poland, as a part of
the Russian empire, has added little to its influence, while
she has incessantly added to its external danger. It would
really, therefore, not involve sO great a compromise of am-
bition as might at first sight appear, for Russia to acquiesce
in the devolution of the Polish crown on some other head
than that of the Czar; so long ss the King of Poland were
a member of the Imperial house. Such a course would in-
deed be more dignified to Russia than the continued spec-
tacle of a Polish revolution, which she cannot put down ;
for it is probable that it would meet with the concur-
rence of the Poles, as carrying with it the greatest measure
of liberty that they could reasonably expect to attain. Much,
of course, would depend on the choice of the prince. The
Duke of Leuchtenberg,wbom the Russian Government were
lately ready to put forward for the throne of Greece, is a
young man of a moderation and intelligence that might
render his name not unpopular among the Poles, and whose
close relationship with the Imperial family would secure the
concurrence of his foreign policy with the interests of
Russia. We are inclined to believe it by no means im-
probable that the Polish revolution may be attempted to be
closed by a concession of the crown to the prince we have
named ; and in that event we shall have the prospect of a
compromise which, if brought about in good faith and upon
liberal bases, might possibly prove to be an adjustment of
the difficulties by which the "Polish question " has been
beset.