The Sun.
London, England, 1839-01-16 00:00:00

THE SUN, LONDON, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 16, 1830.

be obliged to him if he reminds me of it ; but before I sit down
I feel bound, in the discharge of my duty, to call
your Lordship's attention to this, that if there be any
informality in the return, of which I am not aware, this
is not a case in which your Lordships may discharge
the prisoner. It appears by the return that he is in cus-
tody on a charge of high treason, committed within the
dominions of her Majesty, for which, if this statute
of the Colonial Assembly be a nullity—if this conditional pardon
be a nullity, be is still liable to be tried. If he renounces
the Statute, he throws himself upon the general law of
the land ; and it appearing by this return that he is in
custody upon such a charge, I humbly submit, that being
indicted upon it, he is not entitled to be discharged ; for that
I refer your Lordships to the 16th section of the Habeas
Corpus Act itself. The 31st Charles 11., which enacts,
that if any person shall be committed for a cepita'
offence in Scotland, Ireland, or any foreign possessions
abroad where he ought to be tried, such person may be sent to
such place there to receive his trial. Therefore, my Lords, by
the Habeas Corpus Act, when a person is guilty of any capital
offence in any foreign possession, he may be sent to it to abide his
trial. lam now arguing on the supposition that, as my Learned
Friend asserted, the Colonial Statute is a nullity, and the
conditional pardon if a nullity, and that the party is in the
same situation as if he was merely indicted. I submit that
according to this Section, he is not to be discharged.
If the proceedings are irregular he is still amenable to
justice. I would regret that he should put him-
self in jeopardy by contending that this statute is
a nullity--and I would rejoice to see his sentence
mitigated, instead of his incurring any i.eril of re-
nouncing the benefit* conferred upon him. At the
same time, if he thinks fit to declare that all
these precedings are illegal and null, lie cannot, for that
reason escape the penalty of the law. I would refer our
Lordships to two cases on this point—the one is the case of the
King v. Kinverley, in 2d Strange, 148, where the defendant
was brought up from Wood-street Cornpter, to which he
had been committed on a charge of bigamy.
Mr. HILL—I submit that if there be any thing in what my
Learned Friend is now saying, it should come on in the shape
of a distinct motion. My Learned Friend in answer to my
objection, gave me a list of his answers, and this is not
among them.
The ATTORNEY- GENERAL.—I am making no distinct mo-
tion. lam meeting the motion of my Le (rued Friend, and
submitting why the prisoner ought not to be discharged, and
cite the case of the King v. Kinverley in support of that ar-
gument.
Lord DENMAN—This must be taken as a motion to discharge
the prisoner.
Mr. HILL—My argument is that the return is bad. Under
your Lordships' direction I sent a list of my objections, to
which my Learned Friend sent me a list of his answers, and
there was no surmise of the point he is how taking.
The ATTORNEY- GENERAL—I regret if my Learned Friend
was not aware of it. My object was to put him in possession
of all my answers, and I told him that I should move to amend
the return if it was necessary, which I do not anticipate.
The Learned Attorney-General then referred to the case of
the King and Kinverley, but was interrupted by
Mr. Justice COLERIDGE, who inquired if it appeared what
was set out upon the return ?
The ATTORNEY- GENERAL—I have read the whole report,
as it appears here.
Mr. Justice COLERIDGE—Perhaps the warrant of committal
vves produced.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL—That does not a; pear one way or
the other.
Mr. Justice COLERIDGE—You must make out that this man
has committed this offence.
The ATTORNEY- GENERAL—I am contending that there
is reasonable ground fur presuming that he has committed
this offence. The Act provides, that where a person has
committed an offence in Scotland, or Ireland, or abroad he
may be sent there for trial. You ore not to prove his guilt
before the Court. You are merely to prove that this charge
is depending against him.
Mr. Justice COLERIDGE—My question is, whether this re-
turn, not setting out the warrant, or any other instrument, is
enough.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL—My ground is that he has been
indic ed fcr high treason. There is another case of the
King v. Platt, in Ist Leache's Crown Cases. Then there was
a warrant of Mr. Abbingdon, a Magistrate of ,Middlesex, for
high treason, committed at Savannah in the State of
of Georgia, in North America. The prisoner was ecm-
mittcd to Newgate, and an application was made to the
Sedge that he might be tried or discharged. Upon
that application the prisoner was remanded, because there
was this warrant against him for high treason committed
in North America. I should have apprehended that a Mid-
dlesex Magistrate had, strictly speaking, no authority
to grant a warrant for treason committed in North
America. It appeared, however, that he was in
custody on that charge, and the Court refused to discharge
him. Now Watson has been indicted for high treason, and
that shows that proceedings are depending against him for it—
he may still be lawfully tried on that charge, and if that be so
according to the Habeas Corpus Act, and the authority of
these two cases, I submit that he is not entitled to his
discharge; but I believe, looking at this return, it is sub-
ject to no objection whatever. I appre bend that this is ae
Act of the Colonial Legislature of Upper Canada, which
they had a power to do. Under that Act the
Governor was empowered to grant a pardon, on condition of
transportation to Van Diemen's Land. I contend that that
was tantamount to a seri esnee of transportation, and might
lawfully be carried into effect. If that be so, your Lord-
ships will be of opinion that all that was necessary
for carrying that into effect became legal—that it was
lawful to transport him from Upper to Lower Canada,
and thence to Liverpool, and that it was lawful to detain
him there until, with all expedition, a ship was pre-
pared. My Lords, I have done. I have discharged
my duty, and I hope that I have not in any degree trans-
gressed the line of it. I have heard, I will sincerely say.
with great satisfaction your Lordships' judgment with respect
to the validity of the writ, but .1 confess I shall heal
with the deepest affliction any judgment from your
Lordships, holding that these proceedings are irregular and
invalid. I know you will come to that decision with the utmost
possible reluctance, because the most frightful cones.
quences may be anticipated from any such proceeding. But
I believe your Lordships will, without any difficulty
decide that all the proceedings have been legal—that the
prisoners are lawfully in custody, and may be lawfully sent to
the place of transportation. I hope that the prisoner may there,
upon reflection, sincerely regret the part he took in this rebellion,
and will really feel the penitence he expresses in his petition,
and I am sure that the utmost disposition exists to extend to
him every possible degree of lenity which the safety of the
state requires.
The SOLICITOR- GENERAL—I have the honour to appear
on the same side with my Learned Friend, the Attorney -
General, and I shall detain the Court but a very few
minutes, my Learned Friend haying stated very fully
the authorities by which he supported his arguments,
and I shall confine myself to a few observations by
way of explanation: The propositions for which I contend
to justify the returns are these—first, that it is within the compass
of the Colonial Legislature to enact transportation by way
of punishment for offences committed within the colony. Se-
cond, that the Act of the Colonial Legislature referred to—
the Act of the Ist of Victoria—does in substance impose tran-
sportation in certain cases there referred to. Third, that in
pursuance of the powers given by that Act, transportation,
or what wes tantamount, was passed upon Leonard Watson,
and in pursuance of that sentence he is now in the custody of
the gaoler of Liverpool, and all that appears upon the face of the
return. The only point upon which, at the first blush, any doubt
might be entertained on this chain of reasoning, appears to me
to be the first, via.: whether or not it was within the compass
of the Colonial Legislature to inflict the punishment of
transportation, and the doubt which, I confess, first pre-
sented itself to my mind arose from this, that the
competency of the Colonial Legislature is limited to the
colony itself, and that to enact punishments, taking them out
of the colony, was beyond any power they could possess.
Your Lordships could not come to the conclusion that that
power was possessed, from the mere fact of its being
universally exercised ; but when we find a power analogous to
it in the mother country exercised and recognised by the
Legislature as a subsisting power, your Lordships will
come to the conclusion that it must lawfully exist.
My Learned Friend, Mr. Hill, drew your attention
to the sth of George IV., the Transportation Act, which now
includes all the laws relating to the transportation of offenders,
and he grounded his two first objections on the 17th section of
that Act, which, he contended, did not authorise the Legisla-
ture to deal with any cases, except where the pasties were
convicts, and made convicts by Courts of competent jurisdic-
tion. Leonard Watson, he says, has not had a sentence
passed upon him by any Court. With great deference, I
submit, that my Learned Friend totally misconceives
the meaning of this clause. If the section had
enacted, that in order to have them transported
they should be brought to England, that would have
borne out the proposition of my Learned Friend ; but
the Legislature previously assumes that they may be brought to
England, and then points out the course to be pursued with
regard to them. The Learned Gentleman then read the clause
referred to in Mr. Hill's address. Your Lordships will bear
in mind that no British Act exists by which the punish-
ment of transportation can be awarded except in the United
Kingdom. In former times convicts were sent to America,
but after the American war had broken out, by the 24th of
Geo. 111., chap. 56, an Act was passed, authorising the
transportation to such places as his Majesty, by the advice
of his Privy Council, might think fit to direct of persons
convicted at Sessions of Oyer and Terminer and General
Gaol Delivery in England and Wales. In the next:year the
power was extended to Scotland, and although I have not looked
into the Irish Acts, I believe a similar power was extended to
that country. But there is no British Statute authorising
transportation from the Colonies, and if that be so, what is
the meaning of using the term " offenders convicted or liable
t i the punishment of transportation" in this provincial " Act?"
It must be because Acts have been passed in these colonies
authorising such punishments, and it is a legislative recog-
nition of that power. The clause goes on—" and there may
be no means to bring them." Now, the argument
of my Learned Friend is, that it should be lawful
to bring them to England. This shows that it was
the custom to bring them to England. Now in order to show that
this Act does not authorise what has been done, this should be
shown,_ not that these parties were in transitu, but that
they had been dealt with as convicts, and sent on the board
the hulks. The object of this Act was, that when a convict
came to England under sentence, it might Lot be necessary to
send him on board the hulks, where a particular discipline is
going on. All we are considering is the legality of a sentence.
I shall now shortly point out to your Lordships the extreme
importance of this clause as justifying the course pursued

with regard to this prisoner, and my argument is, that
the section recognizes the right of the colony to punish
by transportation, and as there is no power by and•
British Act, it must involve the right of the colonies
to punish in that way, and it recognises the right of the Co-
lonies to send prisoners in transitu to the place to which they
are transported.
Mr. Justice COLERIDGE—You say that this power is
analagous to the power of the Imperial Parliament ?
The SOLICITOR-GENERAL—NO: I say her Majesty may
order a prisoner to be banished to France.
Mr. Justice COLERIDGE—No, not to France—read the
clause.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL— A convict may certainly be
banished to Paris, and that may be called transportation, but
after he gets to Calais he cannot be dealt with as if he ea, in
the British dominions, but undoubtedly she can send him
wherever she pleases.
Lord DENMAN—That Act does not extend to Ireland.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL observed that banishment was
known as a punishment in Scotland.
The SOLICITOR-.GENERAL—This sort of punishment exer-
cised in the Colonies is a mercy there, as well as at home.
Such being the case, the second proposition for which I
contend is, that the Act set out in the return is an
act warranting transportation. I will not attempt to travel
one step out of so much of the Act as was set out in
the return, but I think it necessary to make a few obser-
vations upon that which is included in it. That Act
enacts that upon the petition of any persons charged
with high treason, committed within the province of the Lieu-
tenant-Governor, it should be lawful for him to grant a pardon
in her Majesty's name, on such terms and conditions as should
appear to him to be proper. Now, it is said that in the Statute
no mention whatever is made of transportation. That may be so,
my Lords, or it may not; but I submit that your Lordships
are not here to study the acts of the Colonial Legislature,
but to decide according to the facts presented before you.
Now here the party is charged with the highest crime known
to the law, and the law in such case says, that being so
charged before arraignment, it shall be lawful, under cer
tain circumstances, to grant a pardon under such condi-
tions as the Governor may think proper. My Learned
Friend, Mr. Hill, asked whether by such conditions we meant
that be might be mutilated—whether he might be subjected to
the rack—as a condition of pardon. I say certainly not, but
the provisions of the statute must 'be considered to mean
the terms and conditions usual in capital cases. My Learned
Friend seems to think that the terms contemplated by the sta-
tute are imprisonment for life, or that the prisoner should un-
dergo the antiquated and obsolete notion of losing his right ham'.
Such a proposition in my opinion would be extremely absurd.
The second proposition, my Lords, which I contend for, is
that by the enactment of the Statute it is within the compe-
tency of the Colonial Legislature to authorise transportation
instead of capital punishment. I was somewhat astonished, I
must confess, at the complaint of my Learned Friend of the
harshness of the present step. He surely could not have re-
collected when he made that charge, that the party was in-
dicted for high treason, and that if he did not choose to take
the pardon upon the terms offered, it was competent for
him to be placed upon his trial. I think, therefore,
that the terms harsh and oppressive were totally uncalled for
from my Learned Friend. Now I think, my Lords, that there
is plenty of reason why this should be dose before arraign.
ment. I rather think, under the statute of treason,
after the arraignment the party is entitled to have a
copy of the indictment. With the policy of that, however,
the Court has nothing to do. All that it has to decide is
whether the prisoner has been pardoned upon certain condi-
tions, by a competent tribunal. If your Lordships are satis-
fied that the Colonial Legislature had the power to make
such an Act as the one which has been adverted to, then the
question is whether Leonard Watson had brought himself
under the provisions of that Act. Now, that he has done
so, in my opinion, there can be little or no doubt,
because he has presented a petition under it, praying
that he might receive pardon under the conditions
provided by it. Then, my Lords, comes the question, does
it appear on the return that the sentence so imposed
has been properly carried into execution. Now with
respect to that the return states that Leonard Watson
was transported from the province of tipper Canada to that
of Lower Canada. Now my Friends say, with respect to that,
that the authorities of Lower Canada had no power is hat-
ever to do as they had done. I think with respect to
that, and I trust your Lordships will go along with me
in that, that my Learned Friends have misunderstood
the Statute, and that it will be found that it has no bearing
upon:the subject to which they referred. The return then stated
that upon the party being brought to the province of Loner
Canada, and there being no mode of conveying Wao on to
Van Diemen's Land, in order to e arry out the sentence, without
first bringing him to England, that be was put on board a ves-
sel for that purpose, and landed at Liverpool, in order to go
out to Van Diemen's Land. The question was, was that
bringing of him to Liverpool lawful or not ? and I humbly
contend before your Lordships that the course adopted
was perfectly correct. Then, my Lords, it is said
that we do not show any warrant from the party in
whose custody he Wai on board the vessel to the gaoler
in Liverpool. I think, my Luls, that that assertion may
be answered by the case to which my Learned Friends
have adverted. If it is to be said that every tiling
has been conducted lawfully, with the exception of
removing the party from the ship to Liverpool, the consequence
would have been that Watson must have been tran-
shipped, and I think that the occurrences which
have taken place at Liverpool within the last week
have shown the impolicy of adopting such a course.
( Here one of the prisoners was taken ill, and was
allowed to leave the Court for a short time in the custody of
one of the gaolers.) The Solicitor-General concluded his
argument by submitting, that the return which h.ad
been made to the writ of habeas corpus was suf-
ficient ; and that the course that had been adopted was
'ully justified by the law.
Sir F. Poeeoce—My Lords, I appear on the same side
with my Learned Friends, the Attorney and Solicitor- Ge.
nerals, and, after the copious manner in which they
have argued_ the case, it is not my intention to occupy
the Court at any great length. I will not dispute the
proposition that where a person is bought before this
Court under restraint, it must be shown that that restraint
has been placed over him by a competent authority and
agreeably to the laws of the land. But I think
that where inquiries come before this Court relative to
to persons under restraint, it would be a sufficient return to a
writ of habeas corpus that the party was in custody under the
order of a competent jurisdiction. The question in the present
case is, is the party under restraint upon competent authority ?
and I think that looking at the transactions which have taken
place in a case now before the Court, no reasonable man
can doubt, that a proper exercise or authority has been
made by a competent authority. Now, supposing that
the occurrence had taken place in a colony not owing
dleeiance to the Crown of Great Britain—supposing that
it had occurred in a foreign state in alliance with this
country, and supposing that the prisoner had been brought to
this country in the lawful custody of an officer of that State,
I would ask your Lordships whether it could be said that this
Court, upon application being made to it, would instantly order
the release of that person. I should certainly say it would not,
and that the Court would deem it quite a sufficient return to the
writ if the French officer was called upon to say we have
kept such person under restraint, upon proper authority.
Lord DENMAN—You do not mean, do you, to make our
gaols a prison for prisoners convicted by the Inquisition ?
Sir F. PoLLocE.—Certainly not, my Lord ; but I say that
a person who is convicted in one country cannot be considered
as an innocent person if he is thrown upon the shores of another.
The only question in this case is, whether the persons who are
under restraint hare, are so by an authority which this Court is
bound to respect? Now, what is that authority? These persons
are on their way from a colony of this country, under, not a
sentence of transportation, but under a pardon, upon condi-
tion. Now, whether the Crown could grant a pardon upon
condition before sentence, where that condition involved trans
sportation, is a question for the consideration of the Court. I
must confess that I see no reason whatever to doubt the
power of the Crown to adopt such a course, because
if the Crown can pardon before trial, I see no reason why it
cannot annex a condition to a pardon. If it is necessary to
have authority upon that subject, we have here the Colonial
Act, which expressly says that persons may be pardoned upon
condition. It is quite clear, therefore, there can be no possible
objection whatever to detaining these persons in prison in the
manner in which they have been. In a case in the 2d Hawkins, it
is laid down that the King may extend his mercy in any terms
that he pleased. This Court, I should submit, does not sit

here to reverse the Acts of the Canadian Parliament; al

that it requires is, that it should be shown the pri-
soner is confined under proper authority, and was
brought before it upon her Majesty's writ of habeas corpus.
My Lords, there is a Statute by which a person may be tried
for treason in any county in the kingdom in which the Courts
may sit ;
.and from the return, which must be taken as true,

e
not only for the purpose of justifying the detention of the
prisoner, but informing the Court as to other matters, so that
what is in that return is judicially before the Court. I
submit the prisoner is not entitled to his discharge.
but that your Lordships ought either to keep him to be tried
under the statute of Henry VIII., in the county of Middle-
sex, for the offence of high treason committed in Canada—

or, under the 31st Charles, c. 2, detain him to be sent to
Canada to take his trial, as having refused his assent
to the condition of the pardon granted. But, my Lords,
I have no doubt you will nut be brought to such an
alternative ; but that, taking into consideration the
st'te of the return, as disclosing the Act of Parliament,
and the admission, and in consequence the pardon, and the
authority for sending him to Van Diemen's Land—that you
will consider that his detention here, as a matter of necessity,
comes under the lawful and the Legislative authority, sup-
ported by the prerogative of the Crown, for granting condi-
tional pardons, and by the particular condition under which
this pardon especially was granted.
Mr. WIGHTMAN—My Lords, I will take the liberty of saying
a few words on the same side. Leonard Watson claims to be
discharged, because there is no sufficient cause of detention on
the face of the return. That return states that before a

Icourt of competent jurisdiction,a bill of indictment was filed
for high treason against him ; it appears also that he admitted
he was guilty of that crime. My Lords, this further appears
upon the face of that return, that an act of grace in favour of
the prisoners passed the Colonial Legislature, which begins by
reciting, " that whereas there is reason to believe that among
the persons confined for joining in the late treasonable insurrec-
tion in the province, there may be some fit objects for the lenity
of the Governor, inasmuch as they had been seduced by the
artifices of designing men from their allegiance." My Lords,
I mention this because it has been stated as a hardship on
the prisoner, whereas it is an act of grace, which it
seems that this Watson by his petition was willing to
accept. My Lords, it appears that the otatute was passed

by a competent authority. My Learned Friends on the
other side do not deny that it was. It also appears thet the
prisoner was indicted for the crime of high tr. ason, and that
he presented a petition to the Lieutenant-Governor, who,
with the advice of the Executive Council, was empowered
to grant a pardon on such terms as he might deem proper.
My Lords, there is a legislative enactment certainly, passed by
a competentauthority, which recognises the conditional pardon.
Mr. HILL—You have not recited that on the return.
Mr. WIGHTMAN—I beg pardon. I thought it was recited.
But it does not affect my argument, which I am now address
ing to your Lordships. What I am now pressing upon
you is this—that a colonial statute passed by compe-
tent legislative authority recognises the granting of a
conditional pardon, on such terms and conditions as
the Governor and Council may deem proper. An
my Lords, I say that this pardon or condition imposed
by the Lieutenant-Governor is such as may be legally made
and legally recognised, and if so the condition must be
carried into effect. The prisoner must not have the
power of accepting the pardon and rejecting the
condition annexed to it. Is there any thing in this condition
which is at all inconsistent with the English law, or such as the
Colonial Legislature might not have enacted in such a case?
The condition of pardon is transportation for a certain term
to the per al' colony of Van Diemen's Land. Is there
any law which prohibits such a condition ? I am
not aware of any. Might there not be a Colonial Statute enact-
ing that for certain offences persons should be transported? Does
not all the rest follow ? The Act of the Colonial Legislature
in fact, embodiss the conditions of the pardon, provided no-
thing is illegal in those conditions. I have already drawn
your Lordship's attention to English statutes recognising
the power of colonial tribunals to inflict the punishment
of transportation. Among others the Act of the sth
George IV., expressly enjoins that power, and there is
nothing in the law or Constitution prohibiting that
transportation. Suppose wa bring before your Lordships
statutes for which the ordinary punishment of persons
convicted should be transported. Here is a Statute passed
enacting that, for the crime of high treason, pardon may be
granted, on such terms and conditions as the Governor
and Council may think fit, and one of those condi-
tions is the punishment annexed to the lower degree of
crime in colonic s, that is transportation. Where is the ob-
jection to that ? My Lords, I would refer to the
c ise cf the King v. Saddis, and you will find it
laid down that the Court will not presume there has been
any defect in the jurisdiction of the inferior Court. My
Lords, another observation is, that if the condition be il-
legal pardon is discharged with the condition, and if it
he to suppose an application made to the Queen's Bench of
Upper Canada, upon the subject of a person who,
after the acceptance of the conditional pardon, was
iernoved to that Province, for the purpose of
being transported, the same question would arise,
if it is worth anything, and there would be an
application for the habeas corpus to discharge him.
Now, my Lords, if the sentence be legal, it must
be carried into execution. lam sure I need not
draw to your Lordships' attention cases to show that if
a sentence be legal it must he carried into effect by the
most reasonable and the ordinary course : and if it be lawful
to transport a person to Van Diemen's Land, he must be
conveyed there by the readiest and most reasonable means.
Now, my friends say the proceedings are illegal, and that
we can do nothing in furtherance of this condition. But
my Lords, I think you will find there is nothing illegal or
which you would presume illegal in the jurisdiction
or the sentence of the Court of Upper Canada,
in sending a person convicted or accepting a condi-
tional pardon to Van Diemen's Land, and it is said
there were no means of transporting this person from
Lower Canada. The case is the same as if a prisoner had been
en.barked in a vessel bound to Van Diemen's Land, and
had been forced to be put in at the Cape of Good Hope. The
observations of my friend would apply equally in that case,
yet it is not illegal, because it is necessary ; and this is not
pushing the doctrine of the necessity to the fullest extent,
for we say that it ought to be done in the readiest and
most reasonable mode. Now, my Lords, this stands
upon the case of King and Saddis, in which, though the case
was elaborately argued. nothing was said either by the counsel
for the prisoner or by the Court, to show that the mode in
which the prisoner got into the custody of the Governor of Ports-
mouth was cot perfectly regular, and yet that was more loosely
stated than in this case, for it was only said that the pri-
soner, having been sentenced to be sent to England in
such custody, tires by the Lieutenant delivered over to
the Governor. And what is there more stated in the re-
turn than that in order to carry this condition into effect
it was necessary to land the prisoner at Liverpool, so that he
might be transported to Van Diemen's Land ?
Mr. HILL—You do not state on the return that it was ne-
cessary to land him at Liverpool.
Mr. WIGHTMAN-We state what comes to the same thing.
Mr. Justice WILLIAMS-You don't object to the particular
custody—you object to the whole of the proceedings as being
irregular.
Mr. Wtoirretee—The argument on the other side is, that
the condit,on annexed to the pardon is void, and that
the moment this person was pardoned, he ought to have been
set at liberty by the authorities of Upper Canada. But,
my Lords, if he was transported from Canada to Van
Diemen's Land, it was necessary, to carry the condition
into effect, that he should be landed in England, and if so,
I think the question whether he should be landed at Liverpool
or some other place is a small matter, upon which your Lord-
ships will not, in such a momentous case, discharge a prisoner
against whom an indictment for high treason had been
filed, and who confessed himself guilty of the charge.
My Lords, if the condition be void, the pardcn is
also void—therefore this prisoner stands here as a party
who rejects the conditions upon which he was par-
doned. My Lord, it is not imperative for your Lordships
to discharge the prisoner. You may exercise your
discretion. I would refer your Lordships to the case of the
King against Platt, who was committed by a Magistrate to
Newgate on a charge of high treason committed in North
America, and he applied on a habeas corpus to be dis-
charged, but the CJunsel for the Crown stated that it was
by no means imperative up( n tie Court to discharge him.
Even if he was at liberty, e l that the pardon was de-
clared illegal, because of the condition annexed to it, then
he must be considered to stand on the floor of the Court
as one against whom a bill of indictment for high treason
had been found—as one who had confessed to that indict

ment—under such circumstances the Court would
dis-
charge him. Would the courts of Upper Canada have dis-
charged him under such circumstances would the
courts in Upper Canada have discharged a confessed

traitor? They surely would not, and if they would,
the Court of Queen's Bench certainly would not. He
wculd not take up the time of the Court any longer, but
confideitly relied that their Lordships would send the prisoner
to his original destination.
Lord DENMAN inquired whether Mr. Hill would reply at
that stage of the proceedings, or would he reply when the
whole case was before the Court?

Mr. HILL thought it would be more convenient for both the
Court and himself, if be waived his reply until the whole cases
were before their Lordships.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL begged that their Lordships
would allow the whole of the Act of the sth George IV. to
he set out in the r, turn. There was only part of it now set
out, and he wished that the whole should be before their
Lordships.

Mr. HILL felt bound to object to the motion of the Attor-
ney- General. The return ought to have been complete in the
first instance, and nothing more ought to be added to it.
However, if the Learned Attorney General would consent
to put the whole of the citeuments upon the record,
upon the part of the whole of the prisoners he would
consent to the present app'ication. His Learned Friend
had spoken of an indictment—of a pardon—let them set them
forth, and, above all, why should not that most important
document, the alleged petition of the prisoners, be be-
fore their Lordships—the assent of the prisoners to the
sentence which had been pronounced upon them. All those mat-
ters should be before their Lordships ; and when he saw a spirit
of fairness actuating the opposite party, he would willingly
consent to anything ; but so long as they pursued the plan of
garbling documents, he trusted that the Court would be very
chary in the exercise of its discretion.
Mr. ROEBUCK hoped he might be allowed to add a few words
to what had fallen from his Learned Friend. He spoke to
the Attorney-General as a great law officer of the Crown :
he did not consider him in the light of an advocate in such a
cause. He wished to have set forth the Ist of Victoria,
but would be content to set forth the 7th of William
IV. The Court could not come to a fair decision on
the whole matter unless they knew the laws of Upper
Canada? These laws ought to be laid before the Court, and
if so, he for one would not object to the motion of the Attor-
ney- General.

Lord DENMAN—It appears reasonable that the Court should
have the fullest information before it that it is possible to have.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL was really not aware of any
Act which referred to, or was referred to by the Act of the
Ist of Victoria. He knew of no Act which at all affected
the conditional pardon.

Lord DENMAN—The Court thinks that the justice of the
case requires that the two Acts mentioned should be put into
the hands of the Attorney-General.

Mr. ROEBUCK—The Solicitor-General has them in his
hand at this moment, my Lords.—( A laugb.)
Lord DENMAN Then it is known what acts you refer to.
If the Attorney-General thinks proper to recite those two acts
along with the one he mentions, let it be done—the amendment
may take place, but it must be agreed to on both sides or
the Court thinks it cannot agree to either.
The ATTORNEY- GENERAL consented, and it was arranged
the return should be taken to have the whole of the three
Acts recited in it.

The further hearing of the case was then adjourned till to•
marrow.

DUELS IN TIIE COUNTY OF LIMERICK.--An
affair of honour occurred on Saturday morning, near Bal-
linaguard, county of Limerick, between Mr. Edward
Wynne and Captain Sanders. After an exchange of two
shots each, the gentlemen withdrew. The former v
attended by Mr. Lewis Wynne, the latter by Captain
Snow. Immediately after another affair took place between
Mr. E. Wynne and Captain Snow—two shots eaeh, with-
out injury to either party.

A tradesman, residing in High-street, Borough,
complained to the Magistrates at the Town-hall on Monday,
that on Friday evening a large square of plate-glass had
been broken in his window by a bullet, evidently fired frcm
a pistol or air-gun. It was stated that similar outrages had
been committed in the neighbourhood, and that the police
are endeavouring to +detect the offenders.