The Sun.
London, England, 1837-08-28 00:00:00

Tltil SUN, LONDON, MONDAY, AUGUST 28, 1837.

a mintar; convinv:7, at the bottom of which was Jlie
Christino Commander-in-Chief, is but the realization
of a suspicion which we entertained from the moment
we heard of ESPARTERO'S sudden appointment to
the Presidency of the Council. We were therefore
quite prepared for the announcement of his treachery
made and substantiated in all the advices from Madrid
received this morning. The designs of ESPA RTERO
were no secret to the CALATRAVA Cabinet ;
and we have good grounds for inferring that
the QUEEN was well aware of them. The Mi-
nisters did what they could to save themselves.
They forbade ESPARTERO to enter the capital,
commanding him to march against the rebels at
Segovia ; at the same time stating that they were not
ignorant of the designs of his officers. They knew
well that he was at the bottom of the conspiracy to
oust them ; but as they had no force wherewith to
resist him, and as they dreaded the opposition they
might meet with from the REGENT, they deemed it
the best policy to feign ignorance of his participation
in the conspiracy of his staff. ESPARTERO'S answer
prepared them for the worst. He pretended not to
believe his officers capable of the designs attributed to
them—boasted of his influence over them--and acce-
lerated by forced marches his entrance into Madrid.
The result was an apparent conspiracy of the offi-
cers, without the knowledge of their General, to
overturn the Cabinet, and a refusal to march until

this demand should he complied with. ESPAR•
TERO affected to be in a violent passion—com-
manded the insurgents to quit the service, which
they, being previously so instructed, declared them-
selves ready to do—and to show they were in earliest
some seventy-six officers gave up their swords in a
body, when, as a matter of form, they were made pri-
soners. C ALA TRA VA seeing that the plot was in the
progress of development, and knowing what would be
the upshot, resolved with his colleagues to prevent all
civil commotion by an immediate tender of their re-
signations. The QUEEN feigned surprise, and affected
a repugnance to sanction such a resolution, but after
hearing a few words in explanation from her Ministers,
consented to their depositing at her feet the seals of
their respective departments. In the sitting of the Cortes
on the 18th the question of the agency by which the dis-
solution of the late Cabinet was brought about occupied
the Chamber for several hours. It was not denied by
any of the Deputies that the QUEEN had been coerced;
but it was generally contended that ESPA RTERO was
unacquainted with the designs of the conspirators.
This is not surprising, inasmuch as the Cortes doubt
their power to call the Commander-in-Chief to an
account, now that he is at the head of the Constitu-

tional army in Spain. But even in the Cortes the
veil that is drawn over the treachery of ESPARTERO
is so slight, that it requires but a breath to remove it.
We will here quote, as an instance, so much of
General SEOANE'S speech in the Cortes, on the 18th
instant, as relates to the facts connected with the dis-
solution of the CALATRAVA Cabinet—a speech in-
tended as an apology for ESPARTERO, by an officer
known to be his personal friend. We take the trans-
lation from the correspondence of the Chronicle :

" Knowing how prejudicial it might prove for a number
of officers to enter Madrid whom I understood not to wish
to leave it, I informed the Government, who commissioned
me to write to Espartero, who was ignorant of what was
going on, and to inform him of the evil consequences which
might result from the arrival of the officers in the capital,
and stating to him at the same time that it would be more
prudent to proceed to the right of Madrid in search of the
enemy. In my letter I stated that it was the duty of the
Royal Guard to continue in the field as long as there re-
mained an enemy ; and that the officer who sought
a situation which would remove him from active ser-
vice deserved to be put in irons, and to meet with
public reprobation. Espartero, confiding in his influence
with the men and officers, and not suspecting the ear-
nest desire of the latter to enter Madrid, and to be
placed on duty at the palace, gave me and the Go-
vernment the most positive assurances that no bad re-
sults would follow from the entrance of the army into the
have vneat m two
or three
capital. That
.he was grossly deceived in his opinion the
Cortes are already aware, by a knowledge of the seanda-
lous fact of 60 officers who, converting themselves into
the
csir
Janizaries, have declared, We will not obey orders to
ma
march
hmess ministry
dozen of whory obe n changed:caely write Thus ii their
dared to dictate laws to the notion. In the city the es.
cl
tion is asked, Has the Conde de Luchana been con_
meted with the conspiracy for turning out the old and
placing a new Ministry in power ?' In my own justifi-
cation I must observe, that after hearing these questions,
but without believing them, I did not visit the Conde
de Luchana. On the day he was about to march he
sent for me, and asked me whether the Ministry was
popular or not, as he had heard some remarks on the sub-
ject in his division. With the honour and good taith of
friendship, with the affection with which one brother vould
address another, or a father his child, I told him that the
reason of these conversations was obvious, and were to be
found in the bayonets of an armed force which bad con-
spired against the Government. I told him more, that, as
he had introduced this topic, there was but one path for him
to pursue--to mount his horse, proceed to the encampments,
and the moment he heard a word of revolt to strike the first
offender on the head with his pistol to the ground. Esparte-
ro, in consequence of this advice, did proceed to the encamp..
ments, but he possessed not sufficient energy to punish every
tenth delinquent, to strip them naked, and have them
marched in chains through the streets of Madrid.
Were a shell suspended over my head I would hold the
same language. I know I have to die, and 'the time is 0.
matter of indifference to me ; but not so that a handful
of men should be permitted to endanger the prosperity of
Spain. In this event has there been one soldier or sergeant
who was not willing to obey? who has not remained sub-
missive and obedient ? With tears in their eyes the soldiery,
when addressed by their commander (Espartero) on this
subject, declared that they were all willing to follow him
wherever he went, and that they did not want officers. With
respect to the Ministry, some of whom have honoured me
with their friendship, it is necessary I should express my
opinion that they, not having been successful in their efforts
to put an end to the war, and it being impossible for them to
retain office at present in Spain without effecting this, ought
to resign ; and this is also the view of many of their friends."
This extract contains ample evidence of ESPAR-
TERO'3 participation in the plot, of which General
SEOANE seeks to throw the whole odium upon the
officers. Else why did he march upon the capital
when ordered officially to proceed against the enemy ?
Why, when informed beforehand of the designs of his
officers by the Government, did he recognise their
right to overturn the Administration, by accepting the
Presidency of the Council ? General SEOANE is of
opinion, that not having put an end to the war, the
CAL A TRA VA Cabinet were in duty bound to resign.
This depended upon the appearance of more enterpris-
ing and better men, willing to undertake the duties of
the Government. But it was no part of the duty of
CALA TR AVA and MENDIZABAL to resign their re-
spective Portffeuilles to such men as ESPARTERO
and PITo PIZARRO ; and unless Spain rouse herself
from the lethargy in which she is now steeped, Liberal
Europe may have cause to regret the success of one of
the foulest conspiracies that has yet disgraced the
annals of Constitutional Spain. Even were ESPAR-
TERO to content himself with the power now in his
' hands, and to act with the greatest fidelity towards the

QUEEN, he could not put an end to the civil war.
The, cause is obvious. He does not enjoy the confi-
dence c.,f the nation, and out of Spain he has no credit
whatever. His European reputation is that-of a pro-
crastinating, timid commander ; a shallow, pedantic
courtier ; a bungling, intriguing politician ; an igno
rant, self-caring financier ; and a self-styled official
jack-of-all-trades, whose performances are always in
an inverse ratio to the mighty magnitude of his R.)-
. mises. With such a man at its head no Cab.tiet Cul
be permanent—and yet its permanency, however short,
must outlast its utility.
On the 21st, ESPARTERO was at Torrelodo les.
where he had remained four days without moving a
Istep in any direction. In the interim he had allowed
the officers, whom he pre'eaded to put under arrest for