The Sun.
London, England, 1863-01-05 00:00:00

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rho abbeittete at Interauttouai lbW ui iis sauction In Mb jiAttilie4,'
sense of the term, is a duty, in a certain sense, of perfect
obligation. In municipal law the sanction is perfect ; in
international law it is only in a sense perfect. The imper-
fection does not, however, destroy, for practical purposeot
or throw down the partition-wall, thin though it; may be,
which separates international morality from positive inter-
natiohal

These observations bear very materially upon the goes-
tion as to how far a neutral may, consistently with his
neutrality, furnish belligerents with the muniments of
war. A writei in the Macs, in a letter signed "Histori-
cus," has by no means dune full justice to M. Haute-
feuille, the adviser of the French Government, or to she
Queen's Advocate,in his criticisms on their discussion of this
delicate point. The manner in which NI. Hautefeuille treats
the, whole subject is, it is true, quaint, if it may not be
styled even priggish. Ile treats the questio ,in the first place
by what he call, the "primary or the divine law," and thEn
he c.,nsidcrs how far the "secondary law" is in seen/dance
with the requisition of the former. A very little observa-
tion will lead any one to see that, by the divine law,, he
means the dictates of international morality, and by the
secondary law, merely the customary usages of positive in •
tornational law. His method is sound, though excel tions
may often be taken to his positions. l3ut, it is idle to Auer
at the work of M. Hautcfcuille. It is an honest, careful,
and moat laborious product ion , the opinions of other
are stated by him with rotearkable fairness, Which of itself
is a great merit in a subject of so slippet y a nature as inter-
national law, and are discussed with extreme impartiality.
iPlato repository of all the learning on the
subject.llls oo isT a c
The failure of M. Hautefeuille, where he fails,
arises from the fact that ho attempts too much—from his
wish and endeavour to place international law upon as
scientific a basis as that on which municipal law rests. A
very slight acquaintance with the first principles on which
every system of jurisprudence is based, • is enough to show
that this is the aim of his work. If he fails it is because the
object is impossible ; for a system of law which hangs
its sanction on the cannon's month cannot well be (scientific,
He is, however, well entitled to respect km his learning,
and for the fearlessness with ishich'iliSWOseillis °Pin-
ions. At all events, he
quoted. Now, in the chapter as to Whetherit is -an mat
hs entitled tis.lassveltiii -opi:nion fairly
tral act in the neutral to sell muniments of War to the belli-
gerents, M. Hautefeuille does not say, as he is represented to
do by the writer in the :limes, that the neutral government
is bound to prohibit and prevent its private subjects
from selling, in its own territory, muniments of war to one
or both of the belligerents. What he says is, that, on the
ground of international morality, the sale on the
neutral territory of these articles by private subjects
is, in fact, a violation of the precepts of that higher
law ; and, being so, he concludes that a belligerent might
be justified theoretically, upon grounds; of international
morality, in regarding the breach a casus bell; but
he adds that, practically, a belligerent will, as a general
rule, in almost all cases, rather submit to an infraction of
the higher law than take this step and thereby bring upon
his shoulders another belligerent. More than this, M.
Hautefeulle does not say, nor is the deduction which has
been made from his remarks legitimate. His treatment of
the matter is a mere theoretical discussion ; he does not in-
culcate on the neutral Government the duty of preventing
its subjects from selling in its territory muniments of war
to a belligerent. -The motive of his discussion is the ques-
tion whether acts of the sort would, under any state of cir-
cumstances justify the other belligerent as a casus
We confess that, to our minds, the theoretical question is
somewhat, an idle one, though a writer who aims at a scien-
tific treatment of the subject could hardly have passed itby.
The Queen's Advocate discusses tho subject much
in the same manner as- M. Hautefeuille. What
is with the French writer the "divine or primary
law," is with the English jurist the principles of uni-
versal justice. A captious critic may perhaps think
that universal justice is rather a broad and sweeping term ;
but the Queen's Advocate, if he errs, errs in common with
a great man and a great judge, and uses language which has
been already employed by jurists and diplomatists. Lord
Redesdale, that great master of equity law, in defining the
limits of the jurisdiction of the Courts of Equity, says that
they are only bounded by the requisitions of universal jus-
tice; and the British Minister, Mr. Hammond, in discus-
sing with the American Minister in 1791, questiens of in-
ternational law, almost uses the same words. Probably we
should prefer the phrase "international morality ;" but the
Queen's Advocate, when he speaks of "univers it justice,'
means nothing more. In the few pages which he devotes
to this special_ subject he treats it, like M. Hautefeuille, on
the purest theoretical grounds of international morality; and
though he thinks with M. Hautefeuille, and with the com-
mentators of Valhi, that the sale of muniments of war is a
breach of that higher law,he does not in anypart of his book
assert, as he has been represented, that the sale of contraband
articles by the private individuals of a neutral nation as a
pure commercial venture to either or both of the bellige-
rents, is an act which the neutral Government ought to be
called upon to prevent. The distinguished position which
the Queen's Advocate occupies, as the chief adviser of the
Government in matters of great difficulty, entitles him to
every courtesy. His work on International Law is to a de-
gree honest and laborious. Indeed, the authorities citedbY
Historicus" in favour of an opinion which- the Queen's
Advocate probably never meant to dispute, are almost all
derived from his pages. The sale of contraband to tho
behigerents by the neutral is perhaps of all the
questions of international law that in which the
line of demarcation between international morality and
the positive international law is the most obscure. It
does not follow, that because an act may be internationally
immoral, it ought, therefore, to be prohibited by posi-
tive international law. Slander and abusive language
are immoral, but they are not, except in certain cases, vi-
sited by the sanctions of positive municipal law. Similar
difficulties occur in international law in determining where
international morality ends and positive international law,
such as it is, begins. The actual conduct of nations is,
perhaps, the best test of the principles on which they act
in deciding this question. All jurists are, we believe,
agreed in the doctrine that the sale of muniments of war,
snch as powder, shot, ecc„ as a commercial adventure, is
not a violation of international law. M. Hautefeuille and
the Queen's Advocate, when they seem to disagree, only
do so upon the purest theoretical grounds. Their. argu-
ment refers, not to the practices during war as they aka, but
to the practices as they should be under a perfect- State of
things which is far from being realised. The want of power
in the neutral to prevent the sale, and the unreasonable-
ness of the demand on the part of the one belligerent in
requiring the neutral to prohibit the sale to the other belli-
gerent of muniments of war as a pure commercial adven-
ture, are the reasons which have led to the establish-
ment of the present doctrine. Questions convenience,
and a general balance of the conflictingrights, lie at the
bottom of the rule, which appears to lie now fixed upon
very reasonable basis.
Our citizens," said Mr. Pickering, in reply to the Bri-
tish Minister, Mr. Hammond, who had complained that a
French agent was buying up arms and military accoutre-
ments with the intent to export them to France, " have
always been free to make, vend, and export arms; it is the
constant occupation and livelihood of some of them. To
suppress their callings, the only means perhaps of their
subsistence, because a war exists in foreign and distant
countries, in which we have no concern, would scarcely be
expected. It would be hard in principle and impossible in
practice."—American. State Papers, 20th Jan., 1796.
The quotation which has just been made shows that such
questions are not new. A long corresponpence arose upon
this subject in 1794, when war broke out between France
and England, America beiag neutral, and was continued
during 1795 and 1796. Tho corresrondence, which lies be-
foret us in the American State Papers, is at the present
moment moment both amusing and instructive, now that thoge bel-
ligerent are turned, and the neutral of those daoyfe
ligerent of our own time. The belligerents those days
England de-
were not more modest and forbearing
it is the usual custom of belligerents t
tsoeiimh.orAsedsett,
id stop the sale of arms
mended that the United States;
oththeerErennge:
od that the United
in t hbee r demands than
to the French. France demanStates
from noticing any
other part of
should not allowm
lish. Our limits Prevettousa very Se
this correspondone!
thetierrdotfisSentasteto, important letter of Mr.
Pickering, th e Ina is so far
inister. Tkia important that it has been.
cited.
thogrealawyer Kent, as one of the letters which
_tawifb the rule that neutrals may lawfully sell at home
toe% hestigerent purchaser, or carry themselves to the bel-ligerent powers, contraband articles, subject to the right of
seizure in transitu." The juristby Mr. Pickering
cited
that letter at considerable length, and spoken of by him
in terms of respect, is Galiani, who, on the other hand, is
described by " Historicus" as " a mighty foolish" author.
M. Ades had, in his letter which called forth the letter of
Mr. Pickering, appealed to Galiani in favour of his own
position. Galiani therefore, has had the enviable and rare
distinction among international lawyers of being admitto
by France and America to be a decisive authority on a com-
plex and intricate point. It may not be out of place to say
that the writings of international lawyers are, with hardly
an exception, coloured by the sentiments and the prejudices
of the nation of which the writer is a member. Natives of
powerful maritime states are almost all in favour of ad-
vanced belligerent rights, while the natives of weak mari-
timerhe states are in favour of the rights of neutrals.
proof of this remark might be followed out without any
difficulty. We make it to prevent persons whohave not
looked closely into the subject from being led blindly along
by a string of authorities on any point of international law.
It must not be forgotten that international law, as wen
as
upon any other branch of law, ono good authority is better
than a dozen indifferent one. The difficulty, however, is
the determination of which is the good authority. Eac%
man is too apt to fly to the ono which supports his os.en
views and panders to his own prejudices, and to trvaupet
that one forth to the world as the embodiment of wisdom.
A better field for the exercise of this common proclivity of
human nature could hardly be found than is off b
ered
by in-
ernational law.

FATAL ACCIDENT.—On Saturday a young man
engaged in repairing the roof of a house in Daulby-
street, Liverpool, slipped his foot and fell. In falling ha.
alighted on the spikes of some railings in front of thin
i house, by which he was impaled. Death ensued alaY
immediately.