The Sun.
London, England, 1808-09-21 00:00:00

ARMIES OF FRANCE.

It may be now. seen, by the measures to which
rtroNarattalehas had recourse for for-ming another
army in: Spain, to what circumstances 'we ought to
impute the tardiness, that has excited so much sur-
_ prize, in the arrival of his reinforcements there. As
a chemical process will separate and analyse the
component parts of a body subjected to it, so ihe oc-
caaiort of a war in Spain has tried, and ascertained
and shewn,. what are now the real materials of that
vast artily, whose numbers have so threatening an
amount, when compat'ed with arty other in Europe.
eWe-have it at last confessed, how disproportionate
the real French part of ties army is to the other parts,
compose of deaerters and conscripts from more than
halt the dares 'f Germany, of Poles, Italians, Prus-.
: e eiiioeers, ann Wilt %led Portuguece; for what,
et , ;Tenet diserueortion, should have rendered
In e:e'..ie al . : !fa -.eng an army in the northern pro-
' e;eseeetr::':. et, ski contiguous to his Empire, than
. e:- ',7l:::rlk.e. eiblishing former armies in the midst of.'
Yee , - 'r-•:*„.. and Piilled ? In the wars, which the
• , . ea , .-
--- - r:ei and Prussian people had.the misfoftone to
..,
„,,
~.-z : snppue waged only with their Sovereigns, the troops
of other countries, mixed in large numbers with his
own, might be trusted. In Moravia and Prussia they
had little temptation from the manners, or even
wishes, of the inhabitants, to desert his colours.—
_ But in a country like Spain, where there is not
only a strong opinion, but a most animated display.
, of it—where there are the groans of a people on
one side, and their plaudits on the other—where
every thing human Curses BUOSAPARTE, and calls
-for sympathies against him, there ahe foreign levies
are rather to be • watched thateemployed—there no-
thing can be, relied upon but genuine French cruelty
. - and rapacity, well held to their allegiance by . the-
merits of their Chief, who has given them blood and
rapme, wherever they have foll Owed him.
This then has been his difficult in bringing troops
to the new contest—the first he has carried on against
an armed people. He has had to pick out the less
French part from the greater foreign. part; to take
one French regiment from a town upon the Baltic,
another from , the interior of Poland, another from.
Silesia, and some even from Dalmatia and Naples.
Br these recalls, it would seem, that his authority
must be endangered in some of the oppressed coun-
tries, especially to the populous parts of Germany ;
but he has thought of an expedient, which he hopes
will both prevent this danger, and serve another pur-
• • pose. The troopS of the Rhenish Confederation,
that is, all the troops.not.French in the greater Ort
• of Germany,
.are to enter France, and to garrison
the town, quitted by French regiments. 'By this
anancenvre i' seems to hint, that, while he ..renciirst
it itnpossitle fur the German Princes to, revolt from
him to 4ustria, he station: a force in France better
for some of his purposes-than one really French, in-
asmuch as it may be less likely to coalesce with the
people. There is in this scheme something of that
complexity -which we have often' seen in his con-
trivances, which he has too often tifanaged with
wonderful skill, and in which long success may at
last make him delight even to fatuity. Yet there
may be some hope that it will be one of the causes
of hi: ruin: -

Let it .6e ob-erved, that many of the circumstances
under which the French have hitherto made war,
will be reversed by this measure. Since the year
17.94., but especially for the last five or six years, the
greatec part of their armies have subsisted itilforeign
territories, entirely supplied with provisions there,
and chiefly paid out of the contributions they have
levied. It has been a considerable evil -to raise the
number of men required by the Conscripti. ns ; but,
as a matterof expence, these armies have been little
'grevance to France, in comparison of their amount,
and still less as an incumbrance. The army, which
is now about to begin a campaign on the Southern .
base of the Pyrenees, must be entirely paid,pind -al-
moq. entirely pro isioned, fulfil France, until it shall
fight its way many a league into Spain. Instead of
having-French- troops subsisted in Germany, at least
seventy thousand Germans will he subsisted 'in
France, together with a considerable number of
Poles, Neapolitans, and Poiquguese, who are to be,
kept there merely that they may not be in their own
countries., Welhave seen by_the late French docu-
ments, that the increase of expence, occasioned by
this change, is already avowed ; and a ris: in the
price of provisions must as surely ensue. But. the
great effeti of it will be that upon the.AeMper of the
French and of the unwilling auxilihries thus brought
amongst them.. The French will soon perceive that
the Germans are placed where they' are, solely for
the pomp ,se of constraining them, while their coun-
trymed are sent to fight the battles of NAPOLEON in
Spain. The war will thus be odious for whatit in-,
troduces amongst them, as wull as for what it takes
away. The Gctrinans will be a continual memorial
to the Prvnch of the, extraordinary waste of troops,
made on the other side of the Pyrenees, made in a
war with a people, who, for a century, have
fought on- !heir side, and against whom they did not
hear a • word of complaint, until they refused to have
NAPOLEON'S brottler foi their King. If the mere
sense of constraint have but its natural etfea, it will
aggravate whatever di-wilt may arise from contrariety
of habits, an'd the garrisons ill be. upon as bad
terms 'Aid) the inhabitants as if the former were op-
pressors upon their own 'account, instead of being
instrumuLts of the French tyrant. This is what
BUONAPARTR has probably foreseen as an advantage.
Bat though, the Germans will -not be hostile to him
from any sympathy w ith the French people, they
will have-a much stronger motive for enmity to. him
-.than to his subjeds. The occasion of ,their,absence,
limn home they know arises merely from his per=
sonal views. If the war continue "long, they will
be...;in to consider these views as operating like a sen-
tence of bantshrnent. -I-laving no employment, no
hope, or fear, as they would have in a campaign,
their statious will become intolerable. . Will 'it be
wondertul -if the. overthrow of NAPOLEON- should
be as desirable to them as any other of his victims,
and it, thus feeling, their e'arrisons -should become
so, many rallying points for dea.ontented French.,
with whom., though not from any good-will, they
would uitiiugl3 ,act ag:eie,t their-greater-- enemy ?
We Allink Allis, highly piebable, anci. that the Ger-
mans nog. enteting France vfill be as hostile to him
as the Spania,-as arc before they leave it ; -it as hos-

LONDON : Printed by RICHARD & it' t, ot' 4,. Is/Intim-court, tiow-strent ; and Pundsned,py WILLIAM AIIMIGER SCRIPPS, 5 Mill Ntiolton. street, C insvenor-tqua re;
At gr CR No. rig Strand; wiaere ildvolisemenfts, Orders tor the Poiier, .I esters for the Editor, acc, (boss-paid) most 3 atidreped,,