The Sun.
London, England, 1837-05-04 00:00:00

tulatio;; the able statement made by the Attorney-Gene-
r,tl in 183-1. That Hon. and Learned Gentleman, now the
Noble and Learned Lords displayed upon that occasion
solid good 1.741:',E,'•, that true knowlcd-qe Of the subject,
which had made him, he believed; one of the most useful
i4r-all Chancellors this country ever saw. (Mr. O'Con-
nell) befieYed boatiiinously admitted by the profession
;hat 116 sttt ever filled the high office of Lot-d Chaneellor
with more credit to himself er rfteater itd'vantage to the
public than Lord eQttcoliairr. Wa§ stran-ge, indeed, that
this fact had nt,Wr before bleed noticed in that House, bet
nut of the 'loose Ire b'elie.'ed there was but one opinion
opoo the subj-da, that he not only exceeded hki predeces-
,ors in th duty of hearing 0ri"..;r.t.1 causes for the first
time, but that none had re g; been distinguished by r soun-
der know:edge R, ItiC law, or a stronger or 9.1,34\) r 1 my
'ti,Toat deal of evidence ocji:ore{tife ((...,!oin-
liAit.We appointed in :834. but; otilce'fturia'tA, tm report had
been brought . before the Douse, and Ithe oldice was not
printed Tn.:: Committee, in proved to be a perfect
abortierr---no record even bf its proceedings renrizitd—all
rise evidence give!). before it was lost. Vet there was no
person examined, no person who 00.)ke upon the subject,
who did not.admit that, tlee. kw of libel was in a most d'e.fec-
tive, nay, a most ind4onaible, state. The first question that
naturally suggested itself upon the :;nb:ject was—" what is
libel?" As the law at present stood, he defied any man to
limit the definition of a libel. Any thing was a libel. On
one occasion Lord Ellenborough held that the calling Lord
Hardwick a sheep-feeder from Lincolnshire was a libel ; yet
in the case of Mr. Perry, the then proprieterof the Morning
Chronick, the same Lord Ellenborongh insisted very serottey
that saying George 111. was not a Popular king. Was not
libellous. So that, in point of fact, the matter held to con-
stitute a libel was just what the Jude chose to determines
or a partisan Jury to insist. The only fixed rule upon the
subject was this : that Any thing was a Meet that hurt the
feelings of the person against whoui it was directed.
Ought there in England to be such a law as that? Ob-
serve the inconsistency of it. Scandalous words were used
viva voce—the same words were written or printed ; the
one was slander, the other libel, how did the kw deal
with these ? As regarded scandal there really was some-
thing definite and distinct in the law, because nothing waft
held to be scandalous but that which imputed crime, or
incapacity, or unfitness to a man in his trade or occupa-
tion. The law of slander, therefore, had its limits. But
if the same words were written er put .into print there was
no limit whatever. No anomaly, he thought, Could be
greater than that; because, if the words used were criminal
in themselves, they must be equally criminal whether
they were spoken or written. The nature of the offence
must be in the words themselves. It was a singular
'absurdity that a set of words which, if merely spoken,
should be held by the Judge to be perfectly harm-
less, should, if written or printed, be declared by the
same judge to constitute a crime. There was another ano-
maly in the law. 1 here were two modes of proceeding
against persons accused of libel—one to prosecute crimi-
nally, the other by civil action for damages. The mode of
proceeding criminally divided itself into three distinct
branches :—first, by filing a bill cx officio—that was, by an
indictment instituted by the Attorney-General himself ;
second, by criminal information ; third, by common indict-
ment. Thus there were three modes of proceeding in libel
as for a crime ; one mode of proceeding as for compensa-
tion. The moment the criminal proceedings were insti-
tuted, all the circumstances of the publication were taken
into consideration by
,the jury, to determine whether or
not the publicatioo were criminal—all except one. And
what was that ? The trifling circumstance of whether the
allegations contained in the publication were true or not.—
(Hear, hear.) One would think that the first thing to be
inquired into should be whether the allegations were true
or false. If false, it ought no doubt to be deemed cri-
minal ; but if true, ought it always to be held a fit sub-
ject for punishment ? But, as the law et present stood,
it mattered not how perfectly true the publication might
be. Its truth was the only immaterial circumstance con-
nected with it. It might be perfectly true in every par-
ticular, and yet conviction and punishment would follow.
—(Hear.) Such was the state of the law as regarded
criminal prosecutions for libel. How did it stand with re-
spect to civil actions where the party aggrieved sought re-
dress in damages ? In civil actions, if the truth of the
publication could be proved, it was a complete and perfect
defence, no matter how malicious or injurious the publi-
cation might have been. He proposed to change the law
in these respects ; he proposed to make the law definite
and precise ; and, if it were not entering too_much into de-
tail, he would explain the means by which he proposed to
do so. It was his intention, if the House allowed the Bill
to be read a second time, to propose that it be referred to
a Select Committee up stairs to consider its provisions. He
proposed, in the first place, to make that definite which
was at present indefinite. He proposed to reduce ac-
tions of libel to the same limit as actions of slander.
He proposed also to define distinctly -what should be
held to be libel ; he proposed that no language should
be held to be criminal which was not in itself an in-
citement to crime. Any publication accessorial to
crime he would leave to be punished by -the criminal
law ; but any publication uncomfortable to the feelings
of private or public men, unless it imputed crimi-
nality to them, he would leave to be met by argument, or
to be rebutted by the same means as that by which it was
advanced. These were the two first principles of his Bill.
In the next place he proposed to deal with the criminal
modes of proceeding in cases of libel. These, as he had
already stated, were three. The first, the ex officio pro-
ceeding by the Attorney-General, he proposed to do away
with altogether. At present the Attorney-General could,
at his 'own caprice, indict any person for libel. Public
opinion, it was true, was a great protection in London
against an arbitrary or improper use of that power ; but
he doubted whether it would prove the same protection
in more distant parts of the kingdom. He did not think
public opinion so good a protection in Edinburgh as in
London, nor in Dublin as in Edinburgh. He thought that
the Attorney-General ought not to possess this privilege.
The only argument in its favour was, that in some cases
it might be necessary to proceed with great quickness and
dispatch in matters of libel. But proceedings ex officio
were not necessary to the attainment of that end, because
where would be the difficulty of sending up indictments
to the Central Criminal Court., to the
,Quartcr Sessions,
or to the other Criminal Courts which are almost per-
petually sitting. If expedition were required, it would
be easy at any time to issue a special commission, and
in forty-eight hours a special jury might be summoned,
and the indictment laid before them. In the next
place he proposed to take away from the Court of King's
Bench the power of granting c:iminal informations. He
knew that that was a favourite power with the profession,
and he had more than once quarrelled with his professional
brethren in opposing it ; but it always appeared to him to
be a most unsatisfactory as well as a most expensive mode
of proceeding. In the first place, an affidavit must be made
by the party complaining ; if the affidavit were false it must
be contradicted by a counter affidavit. There could not
be a worse system than that of proceeding by affidavit.
The last swearer had always a considerable advantage ; the
hardy swearer had a much greater advantage. A striking
instance of that fact had occurred within the last fifteen
mouths. Instead of these informations, therefore, he pro-
posed for the future that all criminal proceedings in cases
of libel should be by indictment, Ile should wish a Com-
mittee up stairs to discuss the details of this measure.
Next, with respect to criminal prosecutions, and allowing
truth to be given in evidence, he thought it better not
to allow the parties to go oot of Court free of expenses
because they had proved the truth. Then he took up an-
other point of the law of libel that related to costs. ,it
present, in nteions for slander, when the damegea were under
40s. the parties recovered no costs. In spoken libel, or
sle.cler, 40s. did not cArry damages, but is cases of written
j libel, if the sitilliages were laid at only one farthin, that
carried Costs. Thus, in the ono eiOd 110 costs were allowed;
whilst in the other enertlinUs Costs were imposed. Ile had
heard of several eases where -toot hal been the ainount of
costs of the plaintiff acid defendant, when only one farthing.
damages had bon returned. There had been cases in Li-
verpool and Devonshire where one farthing damages had
been awarded, but where 400 t. had beca the actual amount
of coess. Was this a state of the law which ono.bt to be al-
towed 10 Continue ? It was !natter or qweulation to many
attorneys in respect to certain libellous paragraphs being
copied from one paper into another. Many instances occurred
where attorneys speculated upon there being no more than one
farthing damages, and brought 15 actions afterwards against
each paper into which the libel might have been copied. He
might be told that the Judge might certify ; but who ever
heard of a Judge certifying under these circumstances ? If
a Judge so certified, it might be said it would deprive the
parties of costs. His opinion was, that no man who should
recover no more than 20/. damages should be.entitled to
costs ; or, that if the plaintiff obtained 50/, damages be
,should not recover more than that amount of costs. If the
damages exceeded .50/. the plaintiff to be entitled to full
costs, as between attorney and client. By this measure
he introduced two principles—the one giving the power
of retractation in criminal cases ; and, secondly, that the
prosecutor must serve notice on the party to retract.
The jury, moreover, were to be the judges whether bona
I fide this retractation was sufficient in criminal cases. This
clause did not go to interfere with actions in civil eases.
In the case of criminal prosecutions he had given the
power to the parties publishing- the libel to give up the
author. If he gave up the name 'of tire author, then no
action for damages would lie ; but if such person refused
to do this, then an action would lie. But in the case of
authorship not being proved, the publisher of the libel
was to pay all costs. This Bill also provided that in
criminal proceedings the parties should be allowed. to
prove that the libel was promulgated without his assent ;
though this was not to be admitted as complete evidence

0 the jury, but as mitigating circumstances, He pro-
eescd that this should apply only to cases of criminal pro-
ceedings, but should not extend to cases where civil ac-
tions were brought. He thotight it impossible for any
titan to say that the present state of the law was such as
should continue. After some further siliservstions, the Hon.
srel Learned concladed by saying, that all he
wished was, that this Bill should be read it second tithe,
upon the principle that the
.ekisting wascurl)es re,.
:;aired improvement'.lf this thetiall should be agreed to,
:Is should move for a Select Committee up stairs, to in-
quire into and report upon the question. He hoped that
his Majesty's Attorney-General weeld help in forming suds
Committee.
The ATTOlkNi;:\l.-Ci4.lEltAis said he felt himself an-
der ilitS necessity of opposing, the matiOa fdr the Si.;is.ead
reading of this ; bat h&I 0, on the ground that
the law did not i--).oo.irt's improvement, but that he appre-
hended tht.', promoter of the Bill must prove two things ;
first, that the law required improvement ; ands, secondly;
that this Bill was an improvement mice tlOs: eXistiiig law.
The first proposition the Hotiellrahle and Learned Gentle-
man had. denkonsttated t but in the second proposition he
seethed to him utterly to have failed. He (the Attorney-,
General) allowed that the present state of the law or libel
was defective, and if there were any prospect in the
present state of business of carrying through a Bill, he
%voidd undertake the task of introducing a measure for
the improvement t the law of libel ; but so lamentable
was the state of business, that he utterly despaired of
being able to do this.—(Hear, hear.) He had prepared
four or five Bills for the improvement or alteration of the
law of libe4. t hilt what encouragement was there for pro-
ceeding on this or other matters? On the first day of the
Session he had brought forward the measure for the abo-
lition of imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud,
and lie had done everything to forward it. He had, how-
ever, failed in earrying,it through a Committee, and why?
Because it pleased Honourable Members to spend their
time in speculative questioris, such as whether the con-
vocation of the Clergy should meet again, instead of aps
plying themselves to the real improvement of the law ;
and. oral a change should be made in that House with
respect to the mode in which Its time should be employed,
he utterly despaired of carrying through any great measure
for the improvement of the law. With respect to the
Bill of the Honourable and Learned Member for Kilken-
ny, he must say that considering his talent, he was quite
astonished to read his Bill, and he said this most un-
feignedly. He should have expected from his experience
a remedy for the evil which now prevailed. If this 13111
should pass into a law, the law would be in a worse po-
sition than it now stood in, He had given the House no
definition of the, law of libel. In, the-case of pleading the
truth as justification in evidence, various enactments were
suggested which would only lead to the most mischievous
consequences.—(Hear, hear.) This Bill provided that
ex officio informations should not be filed on account of
libels, Now he thought it would be fairer if the public
prosecutor would put the accused at once upon his trial.
What would be done iti Edinburgh ? There there was no
such thing us a Grand Jury. The Lord Advocate put the
acttised upon his trial at once ; and eurely the law was
better in the northern than it Waig In the southern parts of
-the island. He never yet had had occasion since he had
had the honour of holding the office of hiS Majesty's At-
torney-General—he had never filed an C °Pio informa-
tion ; but if he felt it his duty to do so at any time, he
would much rather file an ex officio information than bring
the matter before a Grand Jury. It was not intended by
the Hon. and Learned Member for Kilkenny to take 'away
the power of the Attorney-General in other cases. Then
the Bill next provided that there should be no such thing
as criminal informations by order of the Court of King's
Bench. Now, he thought this was not a wise or salu-
tary regulation ; because by the present practice they
gave to the party accused the opportunity to purge him-
self from the charge nude. He knew that Lord Erskine
held this, power to be a most salutary one, and Lord
Brougham had declared that thesCourt of King's Bench
was a Court of honour, and had a tendency to protect the
honour of individuals. The Bill proceeded to tell them in
what cases there might be public prosecutions for public
libels ; and the definition of the matter was this, that
" public libel shall be construed to include any matter,
written or printed, reflecting upon his Majesty's Govern-
ment or his Majesty's Ministers, or upon either or both
Houses of Parliament, or upon any constituted authority in
the State, or upon the conduct and 'management of public
affairs in any department in the • State, whether foreign or
domestic, or upon the administration of justice ; and shall
also include any matter, whether written or printed, that
may be accessorial to the commission of any felony what-
soever ; and that the words personal libel' shall be con-
strued to' include any matter reflecting or injuri-
ous to any individual whatsoover, whether in a
public or private station, or rank, or office, or employ-
ment, or trade, or profession, or business, or occupation."
Ile would ask whether it would riot be libellous to say that
the Government or the Admiralty had sent out transports
to sea with troops, which vessels were not seaworthy ?
Then, the Bill went on to say, that no indictment or action
for libel should lie, unless for words which, if spoken, would
be itsdictable. Now, by the law of England, to-say that a
man was a liar or a scoundrel, no indictment was to be
granted. These words were words of pique. Therefore,
according to the clause, if passed into a law, there might
be a paragraph in all the newspapers accusing a man of
being a liar, or a woman of being unchaste—no indictment
would lie. And this was intended as an improvement of
the present law. Then came the anomaly of spoken slander
as opposed to written slander. - Then, as to the admission
of truth as justification or evidence, he admitted that truth
should be admitted, not as forming a necessary vindication,
but as evidence to •go before a Jury.—(Hear, hear,
hear.) The House would recollect the well-known anecdote
of a young woman having a child in her youth, who became
afterwards a respectable matron and the mother of a family,
but against whom the charge of having given birth to a
child previous to her mrrriage, was made.' Truth was
there an aggravation of the libel, and all persons who would
rake up such by-gone circumstances merited the severest
condemnation. There was another provision of the Bill
which he conceived to be objectionable, that was, that upon
retractation there should be complete impunity—(No, no)
—complete impunity from all criminal proceedings. It was
gravely proposed that before any criminal prosecution for
libel should be instituted, that the prosecutor should give a
week's notice to the libeller, and then if the libeller should
retract, that that should constitute an acquittal. It must
be an acquittal, however scandalous, defamatory, or
degrading the libel might be, or however malicious
the motive of the party might be ; so that if a
personal enemy should s..t up a newspaper, and
publish against another the most horrible enor-
mities, yet that person would' go scot free, as far as a
criminal prosecution was concerned, if he should in a sub-
sequent paper publish a retractation ; and this was to go
on, totics polies, so • often as the libeller pleased to retract,
for there was no limitation, no qualification whatever. It
was further proposed, that if the author were given up, the
publisher should not be touched. He admitted that this
would be a proper provision where a libel had been published
in a newspaper, and the prosecutor had not much chance of.
success in vindicating his character, unless he could get at
the author. So also would it be very well where the conduc-
tor of a newspaper had bona fide allowed a libellous paragraph
to be introduced into his journal. In such a case the author
ought to be punished, and not the innocent publisher. But
these were exceptions. A man of straw might be put up as
the author, and if not the proprietor of the paper, he might
be-made the scapegoat at all times. This man might be all the
while in gaol. He might consider the, gaol as his home ; and
and thus a publisher of a newspaper established for the
very purpose of propagating scandal might escape with im-
punity, and the author being already in Newgate, could be
punished no farther, and as to bringing a civil action against
the author for damages, that was entirely out of the ques-
tion, He would not allude to any journal by name ; but
let him suppose that the proprietor of any journal was a
man era woman of straw; (for women had been put forward
in such a character) end without a shilling in the world, the
only remedy against him or her would be by indictment, or
criminal information, for it would be idle to bring an action
againg them. The result would be that they would es-
cape with impunity. The next clause was equally objec-
tionable. The defendant was to be allowed, if he pleased,
to have a special jury, but the prosecutor could not, with-
out the consent of the defendant. Was there any justice
in this P Nay, the Honourable and Learned Member's
own object might be defeated by it. Suppose some
great aristocrat or some overbearing magistrate should
,poatrrioatg,aiannsdt
op
nu slt
actiona
were taog a ibnes t
some
The Hon. and Learned Member for Kilkenny would give
brought"a'eglia-imnsetantihnegm
sense such Sir Giles Overreach, what was to be done ?
this Sir Giles Overreach the opportunity of 'having a Spe-
cial Jury, probably among his own particular friends, who
would acquit him against the prosecutionofthe poor unbe-
_ King. The next
friended patriot. This was the kind of justice that was to
be meted out to the subjects of the
clause of the 13111 he admitted pointed out a grievance that
required a, rerneay-
recovered damages to the amount
words, unless the plaintiff
si At present in an action brought for
rtoeufenoPa
vte
eet
rltyei happened so more costs than damages, and
of 405., he could recover •;nst the plundering system
d
that was a very proper check lig.- • contrary, it unfor-
ng
efnaeardttitiotinhrngaetdyisan.maangßaeues:duoonnnlerostsrnolti,hb.e.el.
juitd:;..o"'eeeprtlla!!!iff:
be obtained his whole costs, He admittedptbalanttihfta.d
roeffeon:
,er Bill
ed?
20I1t.
damages
led to great injustice, and was an evil that ought to be
coasts plaintiff
Thistl
remedied. But what was the remedy proposed by
amsagproposed h that unless
auvnelensos
might in many cases work great injustice. A person in an
inferior walk of life might bring an action against another

THE SUN, LONDON, THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1837

• rerson in the sarire tahh rcever 181.
or ] pL, which, to such a person might he d
i•vipensation ; but according ig this Bill he would have
to,pay his earn cuts; which in all Frobability Would swallow
up the whole of the drmiages; if ribt. leave the injured plain-
t;ff a loser for see Ling a verdict to, justify his thai-acter.
Next came whit he (the AtterneOeneral) coasidered is
' most ektraerditiai.y n op jiVas Fropijsed to be
cnaticd that .the (_;Garl, grie ei itripriSen, and
not both ; and it was further proposed to limit the peridd
of imrisenincnt and the amount of the fine. It was fur-
ther
proposed la_
t the, term of imprison in kin -shou;,l never
e.,teettl . months: Ise admitted iliat very
Heavy and itnpidPer sentences for libel. BUt ho Corildconderi'e
a libel td lie ,Sri deStrdyirig the peaCe of
fariiilielt, rind eildangetlhg the socicfy to
be deserving ore. much more severe punishment than tilaity
felonious offl.nceS. But, according to this Bill, however
enormous the offence roia;lit lie; it was Utterly impossible
for the court to inflict a greater. degree of irttprionroent
than 5i geertidd id hiM grrite Capricious to fay
down any rule of this sort. .Theis it r+o.o pfopdged that no
greater fine than 1001. should be imposed ; so that it
millionaire chose to libel his neighbours he might do so to
the utmost, upon going round to those whom he libelled
and pitying them 100/. each. With respect to otl.q ether
provision of the Bill, he had always contended that it
should be open to the proprietor of a newspaper to show
that the libel Was inserted without his consent and against
his orders ; and if this could he 61-omi he had always
maintained that, although the proprietor was civilly, be could
not be made criminally responsible. He would not detain the
House further. He thought he had said enough to show
that, however defective the law of libel might be, it could
not be improved by the present Bill. He had hoped
that from the well-known ability of the Hon. and Learned
Member for Kilkenny they should have had a measure
more worthy of his high reputation. tie had hoped that
the reputation of the Hon. and Learned Gentleman would
have gone down to posterity with the names of Mr. Fox and
Lord Erskihe as the reformer of the law of libel, but in that
etpectation he had been grievously disappointed.
Mr. JERVIS said that if the Hon. and Learned Mem-
ber for Kilkenny had proposed this Bill as a pe&ct measure
on the law of libel, and one which ought to be passed into a
law during the present session, he should have been disposed
to agree with the Attorney-General that it was too imper-
fect to be allowed to pass a second reading. But inasmuch
as. it was admitted on all hands that the present law of
libel was most defective, and inasmuch as the Hon. and
Learned Member for Kilkenny had laid down in the
Bill certain general principles as to that defective state
of the law, and as to the necessity of its reformation,
with a view that the Bill itself should be referred to a
Committee up stairs, he (Air. Jervis) thought that, as a nu-
cleus of a reform of the law of libel, the Bill ought to be
read a second time.—(Hear, hear.) It would be the com-
mencement of a reformation in the law, the necessity of
which was admitted by all. He would submit
,it to the
House, that the Hon. and Learned Member for Kilkenny
had not been very fairly dealt with by the Attorney-Gene-
ral. The Attorney-General, instead of discussing the prin-
ciple of the Bill, had confined himself to certain clauses of
it which he deemed objectionable—passing over other
clauses which he (Mr. Jervis) therefore assumed were not
objected to—and then argued that because some of the
clauses were objectionable the Bill ought to be thrown out
altogether. The Attorney-kieneral had even argued
against the Bill, because the blanks had beets filled up
in italics, with the words six months' imprisonment, and
only 1001. fine ; although he must have known that
those were matters peculiarly referable to a Committee
up stairs. Again, the Attorney-General complained that
ex officio informations were proposed to be abolished.
But, in his (Mr. Jervis) opinion, ex officio informa-
tions were bad things altogether, and the Attorney-
General well knew that a very strong feeling prevailed
against them among the members of the bar, The
Attorney-General did
,not contend for the propriety of
that species of process in other criminal cases. Why
then should he advocate it in cases of libel ? If it were
a good process in libel cases, it ought to be adopted in
every other case. It was his opinion that the power of
prosecuting by ex officio process was calculated to act with
great severity against the press. No man who had read
the excellent treatises written by Lord Brougham in re-
views and elsewhere, could deny that it was not only an
anomaly, but the greatest possible injustice, that in a
civil action for slander the truth might be given in evi-
dence, whereas in a criminal proceeding it could not be
given. The Attorney-General admitted that some of the
clauses of the Bill were good, and that the principle for
admitting the truth to be given in evidence in criminal
cases—not as a justification per sc, but as showing the mo-
tive of the defendant—was a sound principle. What, then,
was the objection of the Attorney-General to this clause ?
Why, because there was not added to it a proviso saying,
that in criminal proceedings the defendant should plead
speCially the truth of the libel.—(Hear, hear.) For
this reason it was that the Attorney-General would have
the whole Bill rejected.—(Hear, hear, hear.) If Bills
were to be rejected on the second reading for want of
provisos, he begged to inform the Attorney-General that
very few would ever be read a second time in that House.
So much did he (Mr. Jervis) appreciate the clause admit-
ting the truth of the libel to be given in evidence, that lie
would vote for the second reading of the Bill if it were
only for the purpose of preserving that clause. He would
take the liberty of controverting another position of the
Attorney-General, who had said that in the case of a male
or female being put forth as a proprietor, who might be
only a man or woman of straw, or if the author of the libel
were a mere man of straw, and these parties were in prison,
there would be no means of proceeding against any of
them with a view to punishment, because they could not
pay damages. But could they not be imprisoned ? But
the Attorney-General had assumed the author of the libel
to be already in gaol ; even in that case, would it not be
in the power of the prosecutor to detain him there, and

would not that be a punishment ? There was another
clause in the Bill of which he highly approved ; it was the
clause which provided that if the proprietor of a paper should
give up the author of the libel, but should not furnish
the prosecutor with sufficient evidence to prove the an-
thorship, the proprietor should pay the costs. This was a
very salutary provision, and was alone amply sufficient to
call upon the House to read the Bill a second time. The
Hon. and Learned Gentleman concluded by again urging
the House to send the Bill to a Committee up stairs.
Mr. P. BORTH WICK said the Hon. and Learned At-

torney--Genenal, with reference to a motion he had brought
forward, had observed that the time of the House had been
taken up by the consideration of theoretical subjects of no
practical importance. He begged to sny that the motion
he had made related to a question which had occupied the
country for centuries, and the speech in which he had in-
troduced it had delayed the House not more than an hour
and about twenty minutes.
Sir F. POL LOCK entirely concurred with every gen-
tleman who had spoken on the subject, that the law of libel
was at present in a very unsatisfactory state. With respect
to the power of filing ex officio -informations, he thought it
a fair question of discussion whether it ought to continue to
exist as at present exercised, or whether it ought to be
allowed to exist at all. His opinion in this respect went
further than did that of his Hon. and Learned Friend
the Attorney-General. The power of the Attorney-General
to file an ex-officio information, to, hold a party to bail, and
to deprive him of his liberty, a power which was introduced
in 1810, was one that, in his opinion, ought no longer to
exist, at all events, to the present extent, and he was
willing to discuss whether it ought not to be entirely
abolished. He entirely agreed with the Honourable and
Learned Member for Kilkenny, that it was a monstrous
thing that in cases of slander a party who could recover no
more than a sum under forty shillings, was deprived of his
costs. Yet in case of libel the same amount of damages
would carry full costs. It must be admitted that the
Judges had the power of interfering by way of certificate,
but his experience told him that they did not interfere so
often as public opinion called on them to do.—( Hear,
hear.) He thought the sum of forty shillings should be
extended to a larger sum, but he could not agree to its being
as much as twenty pounds. This, however, was a matter
of detail Ivhieli might be settled in the Committee.
He thought the truth of the libel ought in some shape or
other to be receivable in evidence even in the case of an in-
dictment. One of the provisions contained in this Bill
was for the protection of persons when the publication of
the libel had taken place without their consent. Speaking
his private opinion, he should say that this was now the law
of the land ; it certainly ought to be ; but he was sorry to
say it was not the law as . decided.—(Hear, hear.) The
last time the case was argued it came before the Court of
King's Bench, when it was ruled that though a party was
utterly ignorant of the publication, ho was to be held cri-
minally responsible to any extent. A case had occurred in
which some books were brought to the shop of a person who
was in the, country. Before he returned one of them had
been sold ; but as soon as he did return, having examined
one of the remaining volumes, he dismissed the whole of
them from the premises. Notwithstanding this, for the sale
of that single copy he was prosecuted, found guilty, fined,
and sentenced to six months' imprisonment. He believed
that such was now understood to be the law of the
land ; and he thought that some Act of Parliament ought
to be passed to remove the disgrace from the Statute-book.
If it was the intention of the Hon. and Learned Member
for Kilkenny to get his Bill'read a second time, and then
1 it to Committee, he must say he could not consent to
he foresaw what the consequence would be :
the rest of this Session, and that
that eontiet ' t,P lost, because of the dis-
it would go to 40(4) 4_ ' which was objec-
which was beneficial in 4 woui“ of the
cussion which would take place as to thaw ••
tionable. He must say that there were many part
Bill which he considered highly objectionable. There mt,