The Sun.
London, England, 1863-12-02 00:00:00

BREVET.

Colonel Alfred George Goodwyn, retired fall-pay, Royal
Engineers, to have the honorary rank of Major •General.
The undermentioned officers of the Royal Artillery,
having completed the qualifying service with the rank of
Lieutenant-Colonel, to be Colonels under the Royal War.
rant of 14th October, 1858 :
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Parker Radcliffe.

Lieutenant. Colonel Thomas Knox.
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Wright Younghusband.
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Bruce Liamley, oh
the Supernumerary List.
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. Edward Thomas
Gage,
The following are the only bankluP s of commercial im.
S
BANIERW T
t
portance in the Gazette :
George Lawrence, builder, Luton
John Gibbs, shoemaker. Croydon
George Bolton, grocer, Bradford
Hugh Coulter, contractor, Liverpool
GjaemoregseC .Woodward,Tubby:
oiielvraenidlectiolourman,ham Islington.
Birmingames K. Hardy, drysalter, Dover-road
J
Henry Young, goal merchant, Llanelleth
John Thomas Stockterd, plumber, Birmingham
William Higgs, baker, Sandown, Isle of \\right
George Holmes, builder, Grosvenor-square
Charles Not van', carman, Russell-street, Bri
William xton-road
Charlesßawlingson, builder, ixton-road
Henry,.e mouth
Course of the Exchange_y.
esterday.

Short. 11 17 Amsterdam . 11 17t
Ditto .. 3 Menth-', P. 191
Rotterdam — 11 10i 11 191
.—.
Antwerp .......... •• 25 65 11 19
25 70
Brussels ...... — 25 65 25 70
Haroburgh --' 13 8 13 8i
Faris
Ditto .. 3 Months, 25 67i 25 72f
Marseilles
25 70 25 72j
Frankfort on Maine
.... 1191 119}
Vienna -
12 40 12 45
Trieste ........... . 12 40 12 55
fetersburgh
33 33/
Berlin — ........
Madrid ......... .••
Genoa . 48 48f
Cadiz 484
.............. 48
Leghorn .. 25 25 sm
•• • • 25 821. 25 87/
Milan .................. 25 82 25 871
...... '—
Naples ....... • .....
25 82/ 25 871
Pal Palermo....... • 25 82 25 Ei
Messina . . — 25 821 , 25
b2k al i
Lisbon — 621
Oporto . — 52/ 52/
L 3 17
r oz ......
Foreign Gold in Bars (Standard), pe
....
.::::_____.
Mexican Dollars ..... . ..... . ........................ 0 0 0
0 3l
Silver in Bars (Standard) ......... 0 0 0
South American Doublons ....

- _
Foreign Mail Packet List.

MAILS PUB.
Australia and Mauritius, via Southampton. ...... Dec. 19.
via Marseilles ......... Dec. 13.
Brazil and Cape Verds, by British packet. ....... Dec. 4.
Capo of Good Hope, Ascension, and St. lielen.Dec. 29.
China, Penang, and Singapore,via Southampton. Dec. 2.
via J!darseille s ...Dee. 13. ,

Falkland Islands ................ .
Gibraltar, via Southampton .. ................ Dec. 2.
India (Calcutta), and Ceylon, via Southampton 11ec. 2.
via Marseilles Dec. 13.
India (Bombay), via Southampton l.Ai„-)ec• 12,
via Marseilles n. ft.
Portugal.... ............................ Dec. -4.
Malta, Egypt, andoia ampton Dee. 2.
----_

one of the limes' correspondents,
ust going on on the diseases of
truth of o the
f pi g
s,
a following
mong : thoircyh' —d (i 's leNalsyet
he did not know, broke out—one was
oolfdsofrmieenkdind' which
was buried ; a second died, and was
seised and died, and .
• third followed, and so on till the number
let la t Htl the
el lveltoeuin_eltlreEes :vbf
oearrdst yha
ej
great
also buried , a
dead buried got into the teens, and still others were
seized, and
until at lust my friend thought it was time to send
for the butcher to kill and dress all that were left alive.
The butcher, knowing all the circumstances, set to work
thoughtfully, for being a bit of a political economist
he could not help his thoughts running to the quantity of
meat lost to the State in the buried pigs, and the result was
this :—Having bought the pigs he killed, he proposedilt: my friend to buy the buried pigs also. What farmer cct
resist such an offer ? There were the bright sovereigns. and
were
there the buried pigs. Well, as I Jive, sir, thedpigou vitli
dug up, dressed, and sent to market. I will srbelng.
only
this a private voucher for its truth, or I feu- Y
°a
jolly good
a Londoner, won't believe it. My friend
:potation, or is
fellow—no one better; no one has a better
if occasion should
more trusted. Why, then, should notp
wrong in them
arise, send live oxen to market with nothing
but lung disease v".

THE POLISH INSURRECTION,

(From the. .Special Correspondent of the Times)

WARSAW, Nov. 16.

It is rather renarkable that the nomination of
Count Berg to the. Lieutenancy of the kingdom of
Poland appears ia the same number of the Journal
de St. Petersbourg as the rescript from the Emperor
to the Grand Dole Constantine, from which it may
or may not be inferred that the retirement of his
Imperial Highness is only temporary, and that after
the suppression of the insurrection he will return to
Poland and introduce a humane system of Govern-
ment. The foLlowi'ag is the passage in the rescript
which has attract'ad the most attention, and which
to the ordinary reader, would leave no doubt as to
the Grand DuY;e's ultimate return
But when, with the help'of God, the revolt is mastered ;
when, render ad accessible to the voice of duty and legality,
Day subjects, of the kingdom liberate themselves from the
violence e
.sercised upon them by the declared fosterers of
treason, 'And have recourse to my clemency; when the re-
establistarnent of order permits you to resume the work you
had c,ite.menced ; when circumstances render possible the
applics.tion of institutions which it is one of my most lively
and sincere desires to see in action, I have the agreeable
hors., that you will then take part in the execution of my
TIP, W 8 "&C,

One would naturally conclude from this that the
Emperor's brother must be playing the part of " the
absent Duke," while General Berg fulfils that of
Angelo, his severe deputy. It is said, however, on
the other hand, that the Grand Duke has had
enough of Poland, and that, even if he wished to
come back, the circumstances under which alone his
return would be thought desirable are not likely to
present themselves. The project of an address to
the Emperor has been attributed to the Poles for
some time past by the correspondents of the Russian
newspapors. It has even been suggested to Poles
who have had pardons or commutations of punish-
ment to solicit for their friends that the best thing
to do in the first instance would be to append their
signiViures to an address of repentance and submis-
sion.
But, though there is much to deplore, there is
nothing to apologise for. It was a duty the Poles
owed to their country, and not to the Russian Go-
vernment, to abstain from an appeal to arms. They
army,
rldl into
a srehvoew
every
the
are not likely to go down on their knees and beg
for mercy, nor is it likely that mercy w
to them. Every insurgent chietifsswiahr:
fallsoi
y
hands of the Russians is shot, every •
y nin-
surgent draughted into the it
suspected member of the National Government sent
to the east of Russia, every convicted member shot
or hanged. Nevertheless, if an address is really
wanted signatures of some kind might no doubt be
procured. I see that the peasants of the various
districts in the Government of Augustowo continue
to present their compliments to Mouravieff, and to
implore him to obtain for them the glorious privi-
leges of the newly-liberated Russian serfs. The
peasants of the kingdom in general might be made
ktoinpd:tand a
theirs
marks to a loyal petition of the same
the voice of the majority is now the
most
Important thing in Russia, next to Divine
right, the views and sentiments of the educated
Classes on the subject would, of course, be declared
unworthy of notice.

There is a well known mode, too, of forcing in-
habitants of towns to sign addresses. An exorbitant
tax is announced, and when the taxpayers venture
to remonstrate they are told to put their remon-
strances in writing and accompany them with be-
fitting expressions of loyalty. Thus the Jaws of
`Vilna were suddenly ordered by Mouravieff to pay
zip 20 per cent. of their incomes. " How could
they get off ? The tax was enormous—twice as
much as was required of the landed proprietors." It
was explained to the Jews that to get the tax re-
duced they must petition, and the result was the
-presentation of an address of loyalty from the
_Hebrews of \Vilna.

That the Polish nobility, however, or the inhabi-
tants of Warsaw, or any of the men of the insurrec-
tion will have recourse to the Imperial clemency is
not to be thought of. Putting all other considera-
tions on one side, it would not be safe to do so, and
the first man who made the experiment would feel it
necessary at the same time to make his will.

However, with or without an address, if the
Grand Duke were really to return, he would not find
his position here very tenable in the midst of men
who have been at war, not with his father's Govern-
ment, 'out with the system of government intro-
duced by himself. He would have nothing to offer
that Ives not offered unavailingly before; and any
conviction he may have entertained as to the possi-
bil'ay of reconciling the principal men in Poland to
the Government of Russia must now have been
:considerably weakened.
On the other hand, there would be some negative
advantages attached to his position should he return
after the total suppression of the insurrection and
the abandonment of all hope of foreign intervene
tion. The revolutionary party which directed the
attack on the Grand Duke's person, and which
begun the present insurrection and kept it up
until, encouraged by promises of foreign aid, the
wholecountry joined in it—this party will no longer
be able to show its head, and there would no longer
be any possibility of hesitating between positive
benefits, however slight, offered by Russia and the
vague, unmeaning sympathy of foreigners. The
4.(!evolutionary" party, as it loves to style itself—
the party which will hear of no compromise either
with the Russians or with those who can tolerate
theirtant
e%lnavernment —must have lost large numbers in
thafithat :8 well as by exile ; and it is not unlikely
men
wwnclea the moment of recrimination arrives the
known, 12;oald force on a rising, and who made
Duke ane,
thlat,e_ir attempts to murder the Grand
chiefly feared \ iorquis Wielopolski, that what they
an improved wassyst the pacification of the country by
upon by theera of government, will be looked
tidier
ever. If, however, they with more aversion than
too much blamed, those
who blame them mayeybare
; and
if an
reminded that they ended
by joining them
may foreigner lays too much
stress on this fact, he
any Jobe asked in his turn how
it was possible for
classes of Poles to
side actively, or even pcaaitvaer
with the Russians
against their own countrynicaY;
all, may be asked why they
were Foreigners, above
ot
wuncoct truly justi-
plauding an insurrection which
wasSO eager in ap-
s, but was
fiable because it had no chance
based only on that sort of right which
were culpable
the lamb pos•
the atorie,
sesses to attack the wolf.
any _wccauyrraeisdia.
Here, again, the Poles themselves
for it was from Polish sources that came
of risings having occurred
in Europe
in provinces which had not been in
importance of a move_
turbed, and of the military
went which, as far as regards numbers in the field,
was never very great. It was from Poland the hews
cP.tne that Langiewicz had a well-equippd army of
10,000 men, whereas the truth was (as I mentioned
long ago) that he had never more than 3,500, many
of whom were very badly armed. If we had known
from the first how strong the Russians were and
how weak the Poles, the insurrection would have
met with the sympathy of pity but not
of encouragement, and we should have ad-
mired the heroism of the Polish leaders without
counselling them to persevere as they have done
until now nearly every one of those who went
into the field at the beginning of the in-
surrection is in his grave. If we had seen from the
beginning that the Poles were sure to get the worst
of it we should, instead of cheering them on, have
entreated them, for their own sake, to desist. But
they would publish their stereotyped phrase—
familiar
rthensitoottriel: readers of the Opinione Nationale,—
would Lave t is increasing day by day ; " they
flying
to
aeritnts ion
that the whole of ancient Poland was
"frtom the Baltic to Bessarabia;"
they would speak ' the entry of every fresh detach-
mentt
its exit into the kingdom' without saying anything
abou ;they wouldl never allow that the in-
surrection had
,aboveal,aspeculative character, and
that it was kept up by
desperateort f
efforts in the hope
of ultimately obtaining support from abroad. In
fine, ;snowing that the power,,,
, they
C,antire more likely to
be assisted than the weak
fied their strength, and deceived tilhally magni-
eir
backers as to their capability of beating thfeorßeignus
sians, and were again deceived as to the chances of
being helped in the event, more or less expected,
of
the Russians proving, after all, too strong for them
A fine tragi-comedy ho been played en both sides

the end of which is that Poland is ruined, and that
now, when the snow is beginning to fall, the French
army is as far from Cracow as ever, and a nF w code
of instructions in force throughout the k.: gdom, by
which proprietors, mayors of villages, d chiefs of
peasant communes, are required to g,ve information
at the nearest military post of the arrival of insur-
gents on their estates, without summary judgment
by court-martial as the alternative in case of neglect.
Charges and counter-charges of deception will, no
doubt, be made plentifully before long ; but in the
meanwhile there has existed, on both sides, a de-
cided willingness to be deceived. People were so
glad to hear that the Poles, the representatives of
liberty, were beating the Russians, the representa-
tives of despotism, that they would not stop to in-
quire whether such really was the case; and the Poles
themselves looked upon every one as their enemy who
ventured to deny the astounding triumphs claimed
for their detachments, even when these detachments
were beaten instead of victorious. The approved
friend of Poland is the man who will have the igno-
rance or the effrontery to talk of 20,000,000 Poles
ready to fight for independence ; and these are the
" friends" who have misled the Poles as to the pro-
bability of their being assisted by foreigners.
It is said that positive promises were made by
France ; and it is certain that the Poles obeyed all
instructions received from the Emigration in Paris
with the most Implicit confidence; and that first the
taking of Puebla, then the election of a Sovereign
to the Mexican throne, were mentioned as occur-
rences after which the intervention of a French
army might be regarded as certain. I fancy, how-
ever, it would be very difficult to prove that any
direct promises were made on the part of the French
Government ; though persons supposed to be in the
confidence of the Emperor may have communicated
their own suppositions and hopes on the subject to
their correspondents in Poland; and thus ex-
pressions of sympathy
may, at last, have come
to be translated into pledges of assistance. How-
ever this may have been, the Poles had made up
their minds that the Emperor Napoleon must aid
them, and being once possessed with that conviction
they interpreted everything that took place in
France with reference to the Polish question in a
sense favourable to their desires. In England it
was imagined that M. Billault's speech did not hold
out to the Poles any great hope of French inter-
vention. The Poles, however, were ingenious
enough to discover in it a secret intention to come
to their rescue at the proper moment; and as with
M. Billault's speech so it may have been with the
promises, alleged to have been made by persons in
the confidence of the Emperor.

It is not creditable to the Russian Government,
but the fact is that the slightest shadow of a hint
from Paris has more effect upon the Poles than the
most solemn promises from St. Petersburg. In the
former case, to be sere, the longing for national in-
dependence is appealed to, whereas, in the latter,
the more that is done to improve the condition of
the Poles, the less chance is there that they wil I
throw themselves blindly into political enterprises
with the view of separating themselves from Rus-
sia. At the same time it is a fact, that the Russian
Government, by reason, in a great measure, of its
own past conduct, is unable to inspire the Poles
with the slightest confidence, though even if it
were the most sincere and truthful Government in
the world it would still find it difficult to establish
any lasting good relations with a nation which is
always looking for the help of foreigners.
The Poles can scarcely fail to derive some political
benefit from the present insurrection, ruined though
they already are by it in a material point of view.
If a new Polish kipgdom, on the model of the Po-
land of 1815, be not formed out of the present king-
dom, with or without the annexation of the city and
district of Cracow ; if the Poles should be unable to
obtain even such a result as this from their labours
and sufferings; it is just possible that they may at
last look upon themselves as altogether abandoned
by the West. Once really convinced of this they
would certainly not attempt any farther struggle
with a Power so immensely superior to them in re-
sources of all kinds as Russia. In that case it might
be the worse for the West of Europe, or at least for
Austria and Prussia ; but it would evidently be
better for the Poles to reckon with their despair, to
cease irritating theonly countryfrom w hichthey could
have anything to hope, and to enter into its projects
instead of perpetuallycounteracting them. If theking
dom of Poland is not saved this time, or failing that
result does not by a revulsion of feeling easy to un-
derstand throw itself into the arms of Russia, instead
of waiting for Russia to stifle it, then the Poles
must feel that they are destined only to be crushed,
for they will certainly not have another chance left
of preparing themselves even for the feeblest insur-
rection. " For some time to come,'' said a Russian

,he other day, whose opinion on such a matter is of

importance, "we shall only be able to govern
Poland under a state of siege." " And after that ?"
he was asked. " Still the state of siege." " But at a
later period ?" "It will always be difficult to get
on without the state of siege," was the reply, and so
undoubtedly would it be it the Poles, after receiving
the most painful plod to the contrary, still per-
sisted in believing that the West of Europe was
anxious to rescue them from Russian dominion.

Hitherto the Poles have imen placed in a most
painful position, being just sufficiently protected by
the Western Powers to be able to persuade them-
selves that under favourable circumstances France
and England, or France alone, would assist them
against Russia. The fact that nothing was done for
them in 1831, and that they were scarcely thought
of during and after the Crimean war, has left no im-
pression upon:them. They are;always looking for
rescue to the West, and if the `Vest cannot help them
by armed intervention, it might, at least, render them
an important service by formally abandoning them,
instead of protesting on their behalf, and reserving
a perpetual right to interfere, which is never exer-.
cised otherwise than in words. The remark of an
ex-Minister, who speaks with authority on the sub-
ject—the remark of M. Guizot, that "every one has
made use of Poland, but no one has really assisted
her," ought never to be forgotten by the Poles.

"I will restore this noble nation to independence
if Russia does not agree to my projects ; if she does,
however, a slice more of the noble nation's territory
is at her service—that is the additional Napoleonic
language on the subject of Poland ; and it is not
astonishing, since Napoleon I. purchased Russia's
consent to the formation of the little Polish France,
entitled the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, by the ces-
sion of Bialystock, and her consent to its increase
by the cession of Sarnopol, that a similar project
should be attributed now to Napoleon 111.
The annexation of Cracow and a portion of
Western Galicia to a new and self-governing Polish
kti:gdom, and of Eastern Galicia to Russia, would
T 7 Only a renewal by Napoleon 111. and Alexander
1-00fitehoe policy in respect to Poland pursued by
But it
all Napoleon
and Alexander I. in 1807 and 1809.
eurepo'i\Tieftalaorleon 111. can do for Poland is to pro-
the purely polish
for the Kingdom, and to get
that is no
more portion of Galicia annexed to it,
than what every Austrian knows
was the infallible.
eo olicy nd of the p introduced by
the Marquis w
jel
nevertheless col4,Pre°,ls iit I, whom Prince Napoleon
n the French Senate to
Judas Iscariot. ‘4
If the present insurrection 1
in-
tervention on behalf of Polan7lB to no active ,
or expectant
real Judas in
future will
be any Sovereign
or nation, or political assembly thealtpectant Prince,
to mislead the Poles as to the prob:nb7
Y of their
endeavour
receiving someday that support from abroadt
which
hitherto, even under the most favourable circum-
stances, m
stances, has always failed them at the criticalu-
moment. If, after all, a war should serieusly be
undertaken with a view to an independent Poland,
and if this war should be seriously prosecuted and
Poland nut abandoned at the first opportunity for
making a profitable peace, than the Marquis Wick_
polski will have erred so greatly in supposing such a
war to be out of the question that his mistake will in
deed appear almost criminal. Should it on the contrary
turn out that all the blood that has been shed in the
present insurrection has been shed in vein, then the
real wrong-doers will evidently be, not those who
commenced the movement in a moment of despair,
but those who long befora had planned it; and
. above all, those who, by encozraging it with false
, hopes from abroad, led the whole country to take