The Sun.
London, England, 1863-08-18 00:00:00

THE LOSS OF THE PARIS.

On Saturday the ir quiry instituted by the Board of Trade
into the circumstances attending the total loss of the iron
steamer Paris, belonging to the Maples' Channel Line, off
Jersey, on the morning of the 28th July last, was resumed
at the Greenwich Police-court, before Mr. Traill, police
magistrate, and Captain Harris and Captain Baker, nauti-
cal assessors.
Mr, F. H, Hamel, barrister, attended on behalf of the
Board of Trade, the inquiry having been adjourned from
the previous day for the decision of the Court.
Mr. Traill said there would be no necessity to go further
into the case as regarded the loss of the vessel, as there was
sufficient evidence before the Court to come to a conclusion.
Before, however, he delivered the decision of the Court, he
desired to hear the opinions of the nautical assessors as re-
garded Capt. Hemmings's conduct in the matter.
Capt. Harris said that had there been loss of life he would
have viewed the case very seriously as affecting Captain
Hemmings, He ccnsidered his conduct very reprehensible
in having shipped the man De la Cour as pilot and one of
his crew, thus dividing the authority and responsibility,
and which he considered was a mere cloak or blind to save
pilotage dues. Had the Court been called upon to determine
as to claims for property, they, as the nautical assessors,
would have been compelled to give their decision against
the captain of the vessel; but, looking at the fact that the
authorities at Jersey had viewed the cause of the wreck to
have arisen from the negligence of the pilot De la Cour,
whose certificate had been taken from him, and there being
no direct evidence to show that the captain was to blame,
he (Capt. Harris) was disposed to give him the benefit of
the same, and to restore to him his certificate-
Captain Baker having expressed his opinion in similar
terms,

Mr. Traill said his view of the case was as strong, and
perhaps stronger, than those expressed by the nautical
assessors who had assisted him in the inquiry, and he was
anxious that the remarks he was then about making should
be well considered by Captain Hemmings and the owners
of the vessel. In the present inquiry there had been two or
three points to consider, the first being whether the captain
had employed such a person as pilot as would discharge him-
self from responsibility ; secondly, having appointed such a
person, whether he had interfered in any manner with the
orders given by the pilot; and another question was, sup-
posing the pilot had been employed in a legitimate manner,
whether the captain was not bound to take care that the ship
was properly navigated, because it might occur that gross
neglect might display itself on the part of the pilot. At 8.30
on the morning of the wreck, when seven or eight milesfrom
Jersey, it was shown that the captain had given directions
for the course of the ship to be altered to N.E. half N., a
course which would serve for either channel, and that he
then went below, leaving the pilot on the bridge in charge.
Ten minutes afterwards the captain returned to the bridge,
and remained there until the ship struck, going down about
10 minutes afterwards. That some one was grossly is fault
there was no doubt, but the question was which party, or
whether both were to blame; and in arriving at a conclu-
sion they must look at the respective statements of the parties.
The statement of the captain was that when he gave the
N.E. half N. course he considered ho had no further charge
of the ship, which from that time was under the charge of
the pilot ; that he did not give any further orders; that he
did not interfere in any way, except that when the pilot
asked him which channel he should take he replied, " I do
not care which, so that it is for the best," meaning thereby
that he wished to keep ahead of the steamer Wonder, then
in sight. The captain further stated that the pilot told him
he should take the Silliette passage, to which he made no
objection, and that he had no idea but that he was doing so
till he saw the ship close to the Grunot rocks, and before she
struck. The pilot's statement,'which had been taken on oath,
was to the effect that, though he considered the ship was
under his charge, his eiders were not attended to—that he
never said he intended to take the Silliette passage, but on
the contrary, when the master said he wished to (as he ex-
pressed it) "cut it short," he told him that the middle pas-
sage was the shortest and safest; that it had all along been
his intention to take that channel ; that the captain must
have known that was his intention ; that when he found
he was opening out the marks for the middle channel, and
too far to the northward, he gave orders to keep more to
the south ; that the captain did not comply, but ordered him
to steer for the Rovandiere, and, by so doing, the ship was
brought on the Grunot rocks ; and, that if the order to go
to the south had been observed, even to half the ship's
length, she would have been saved. Between the state-
ments so contradictory, and with little more confirmation of
the one than the other. it would perhaps he hard wholly to
deny the master the benefit of his plea, that the ship was
under the charge of the pilot, and not under his charge, so
as to make him responsible for the loss. At the same time,
supposing this plea was to be admitted, his inattention to
the dangerous course of the ship could scarcely admit of an
excuse. He was on the bridge before the ship struck, but
he did not appear to have had the proper marks for either
channel, and yet he suffered the ship to proceed at the rate
of 12 knots an hour, when he ought to have known of the
near approach to danger. All things considered, it seamed
not unreasonable to conjecture that the captain's desire to
cut it short had made him inattentive to the caution that
was necessary, if it did not (as the pilot alleged) actually

make him countermand the order given by the pilot to keep
the ship more to the south just before she struck. He (Mr.
Traill) had been thus particular in this part of the case, be-
cause it was after much hesitation that they had come to a
conclusion so favourable to the captain ; but, in coming to
that conclusiotti he could not omit to notice the manner in
which the pilot laws bad been evaded in the case. Itappeared
that the pilot De la Cour had been hired at weekly wages
of 35s.—the object of which was alleged to be that of saving
time in looking out for pilots in coming into and going out
of Jersey, but it appeared to have been the practice of the
captain for five months at least, if not much longer, never to
take a Jersey pilot, but to pilot the ship himself, although
he had no licence for that purpose, and could not obtain
one, not being a native of Jersey ; and even so little did he
look upon De la Cour in that character, that he did not
avail himself of his services, although he was on board, from
Jersey to St. Male. By the employment of De la Cour at
355. per week there had been a saving of pilotage money to
the amount of 355. or 40s. per week, anti this in defiance of
one of the purposes of the pilot law. But there was a wot se
mischief still, as would appear by this case—viz., that by
thus employing a man who, as had been admitted, was
intended to be entered on the ship's articles as second mate,
it was quite clear that when the occasion occurred for his
acting as pilot he could not have properly the authority,
nor feel the responsibility of that office ; and at the same
time, while it did not prevent the master from exercising
his natural authority, as master, over hie subordinate
officer, it left him the opportunity of screening himself for
his own neglect or default under the plea that the second
mate, as pilot, had charge, and was answerable for loss
or damage. There was little doubt that the captain
looked upon De la Cour and treated him es a subordinate
for one of his crew and pilot to save expense, and that
therefore he was bound to see to the navigation of the
ship just as much as if there had been no pilot on board.
For these reasons, though the Court returned the
captain his certificate, they considered it their duty to
censure the proceeding by which he had been enabled to
make use of such a plea as highly irregular, and likely to
lead to very serious, and even dangerous consequences.
A gentleman connected with the company to which the
Paris had belonged said that Capt. Hemmings was the only
master in the company's service not possessing a pilot's
licence, but that prev.ous to the wreck he had taken steps
to secure his right to pass an examination for sucl a licence.
The inquiry then terminated.

SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

TlMEg.—There appears, we rejoice to say, a fair
prospect that the war which the natives have recom-
meuced in New Zealand will be conducted on our
part with greaier success than has usually attended
our military operati,zus in that country. The import-
ance of the proceedings ;Lie reported must not be
measured by the scale of the to:ees, engaged or the
dimensions of the victory actuelii; achieved. in
these respects the encounter still bears sOme resem-
blance to those combats in Caffraria wlaei*.e fifty
ambushed blacks would keep a battalion on I;``'e
alert for hours together, and retire at length with a
loss which could never be discovered. It shows the
difficult and harassing character of these wars when
we find that the enemy, against whom 650 excellent
soldiers with three Armstrong guns were earefully
and anxiously marched at midnight, consisted only
of about one-fourth of that number of savages, and
that it is regarded as a real exploit tohaveput a score
of these people hors de combat. But the truth is that
the colonists are justified in their rejoicings over the
success. Moderate as the achievement may appear to
us, it was substantial, timely, and full of promise.
The work was harder than we can imagine, and the
results are likely to bear more fruit than we could
anticipate. It was only on the 4th of May last
that the Maories provoked once more the anger of
the British Government by a treacherous massacre of
our soldiers. After this inauguration of a new rebel-
lion the people principally concerned in the crime
repaired to a strong position at no great distance
from the town of New Plymouth, and there estab-
lished themselves in the native fashion. These
savages are not only thoroughly masters of the
rifle, but adepts at field engineering. Their
cultivated instincts enable them to construct
works as defensible as the best European re-
doubts, and these extemporised fortifications they
hold with extraordinary courage. The band in
question, less than 200 in number, took post on the
spur of a hill, with a riser in front, and so plied
their spades that the ground all round them was
" literally honeycombed with zigzag rifle-pits."
Their tactics could be but too well conjectured. If
they were attacked with such a force or in such a
manner as to offer them any probable advantage, they
would fight from their hiding places to the death,
and leave us with the alternative of discreditable
retreat, or poor success purchased at exorbitant
cost. If threatened with a more formidable assault
they would decamp furtively, and leave us to come
upon an empty nest after a toilsome march, while
they establish themselves more strongly than
ever in a fresh position. It was necessary, there-
fore to advance against them in strength and yet
to take them by surprise, and this, notwithstanding
the perfection of their vigilance and information,
was actually done. On the 4th of June, exactly
one month after their murderous onslaught on our
unoffending soldiers, their "path" or fort was at-
tacked with'complete success, and it was thought a
remarkable event that twenty-four of the garrison
should have been killed before they could
effect their escape with the remainder. This un-
usual phenomenon has disconcerted the natives and
inspirited the colonists. A New Zealand war has
for once been commenced with vigour, expedition,
and success. A force of 200 is a large force for a
rebel army in New Zealand. The natives understand
better than to fight in great numbers. In these
wars the enemy is often in less strength than the
little detachment which under that designation em-
ploys the whole Aldershott camp on a field day.
Every Moari is a fighting man, but he fights on his
own principles, and it was really a piece of good
fortune to surprise 200 of these men together. More-
over, it was the first affair of the war, and it came
off within a week or two after the first challenge to
arms, giving good promise of despatch as well as
determination. The result is that the colony is full
of confidence, resolute to win, and bent on aaaking
sure work. The tactics of the savages have been bor-
rowed for the strife, and we no longer fight against
odds. The soldiers, like the natives, are divided
into small parties, and the rebels who have turned
out to kill get killed themselves. The sentries hold
no palaver with natives approaching their pests, but
fire on them at once. Volunteers and Militia are
all on the alert, and on the best of terms with the
regular troops. In short, what with the indignation
of the community at the recent outrage, the natural
exasperation of the soldiers, the vigour of the Gene-
ral in command, and the energy of the Governor,
the Maories are this time provided with an adver-
sary who will leave them with less reason than
before to be contented with the results of war. It is
in these features of the new contest that we must
seek for assurance as to the future. So far is the war
from being over that it is described in our corre-
spondence as only just commencing, and likely
to " exceed in extent and importance any of
its predecessors." We may hope that this
estimate will prove exaggerated, and that a
struggle which has been opened with such un-
wonted success will not be of very long duration.
It is clear, however, that between us and the
Maories there is no peace, nor can we say that we
are surprised at the fact. When one race encoun-
ters another under such conditions war is a natural
consequence. The Maories are martial, intelligent,
jealous, and ill-disposed to yield to the advances of
a more civilised population. Though so acute a
people can hardly be blind to our actual superiority
yet they have hitherto bad no great reason to dis-
trust their own chances in war. They have defied
our arms, if not with absolute success, at any rate
without discredit to themselves, and with the effect
of making us greatly disinclined to begin war again.
So they are not likely to succumb without resistance
to the fate before them. From that fate, put it how
we will, they can have no escape. We may regulate
land sales, and respect tribal rights, and protect
native interests to the best of our power, but we
con never stop the growth of a British colony, or
reconcile with that growth the claims of a barbarous
population to the lordship of the land. Three years
ago the colonists were as numerous as the natives,
and since that time the Europeans have rapidly mul-
tiplied under the attraction of the goldfields of Otago.
Does anybody imagine that these settlers will allow
small tribes of savages to forbid their natural ex-
pansion and confine them within a territorial pale ?
The New Zealander may be assimilated, or exter-
minated, or civilised off the land, but he will cer-
tainly never hold that land to the prejudice of a
stronger and superior race, whose title to occupy it,
even if based only upon conquest, would be as good
as his own. However, we need not at present carry
our speculations to this point. It is enough to an •
ticipate on this occasion, at any rate, a less costly
struggle than those of former years. General Came-
roil, who enjoyed the special confidence and esteem
of the late Lord Clyde, appears to have divined with
happy instinct the exigencies of the crisis. His
tactics have been justified by an early, signal, and
most opportune success. It is not, we trust, too much
to hope that he may go on as he has begun, in which
case we should soon see the end of one more New
Zealand war. That our liabilities would not be tbus
terminated may be true enough, but it will be an
infinite advantage t 3 this country if we can accept
and conclude these quarrels when they are forced
upon us without draining our army of thousands
or our Exchequer of millions.

PosT.—lt is now nine or ten months since the
question of a Greek dynasty. and a new Greek set-
tietnent came before us, consequence of the ex-
pulson of Otho. Something like half that time has
passed, since the nomination of Prince William of
Denmark, during the course of the preliminaries