The Sun.
London, England, 1863-04-09 00:00:00

surprise, and we looked forward with anxiety to
the rest:lit of an extremely unequal struggle. We
i
expected that h the course of a comparatively
short time the authority of the Russian Govern-
ment would be once more vindicated.; and looked
from day to day for the official announcement that
order reigned in Poland. But when days grew into
weeks and weeks into months; when a few isolated
bands of unorganised despairing men developed
themselves into formidable bodies of armed soldiers ;
and when provinces whose area exceeded thousands
of square miles boldly threw off allegiance to the
Czar, we saw that Poland had drifted into a civil
war the duration of which would be extremely un-
certain. That war still rages, and, judging from
the accounts which reach us, in the majority of the
encounters between the insurgents and the imperial
troops the former are successful. Such successes,
however,
may produce but little, if any, material
advantages, as, owing to the preponderating force
opposed
to them. every loss which fails upon the
insurgents must tell heavily against t
em. We have
not lost our interest in the issue which is at stake,
no more than we have in the ultimate result of the
American civil war; but we are becoming habituated
in the one case as in the other, to the details which
constantly reach us of the varying fortunes of a
contest carried on in a country of which even the
best informed amongst us know comparatively little.
The loss of Langiewicz has evidently not exercised
insurrection.
This visible effect upon the course of the
This is not only manifested by the fact of engage-
ments between the Russians and the Poles being of
almost daily occurrence in nearly every province of
Russian Poland, but by the attempts which have
been made ty the authorities to give a false colour-
ing to the effect produced by the flight of the Dic-
tator. It is now ascertained that the reports so
diligently circulated by the Russian Government—
that the Revolutionary Committee had advised the
insurgents to lay down their arms—were false. It
struck us at the time as being extremely improbable
that the mere loss of a single individual should have
exercised so depressing an influence on the large
numbers of Poles who had taken part in the revolt
that their leaders should thereupon counsel no
further resistance. This useless attempt to de-
ceive the Polish people shows, however, to
what expedients the Russian Government has
been driven in the hope of speedily re-esta-
blishing its authority in the disaffected provinces.
The necessity for diplomatic intervention on the
part of the European Powers, at the Court of St.
Petersburg, in favour of Poland, has consequently
not been modified by recent events. It is now
some time since we apprised our readers that her
Majesty's Government would address a note to the
Russian Cabinet on this subject, and that a similar
course would probably be taken by France and
Austria. We also referred to the tenor of these
notes. The sole object which the European Powers
could have would be the regulation of his Polish
dominions by the Czar under such a system as would
prevent these frequent disturbances of the general
peace. Our Government, we pointed out, would
refrain from demanding from the Emperor of
Russia the adoption of a particular line of policy;
but, rather can tenting itself with pointing out the
necessity of reforming the government of Poland,
would leave to the Czar the choice of such means as
he considered adapted to that end. In the columns
of a French contemporary we see an announcement
that notes couched in a similar style have been
transmitted to St. Petersburg by the Cabinets of
Paris and Vienna. Remonstrances proceeding from
the three great Powers cannot but influence the
Russian Government, nor can any umbrage be taken
by the latter at this course. Though in unison in
their sentiments, England, France, and Austria
have wisely abstained from addressing a joint note
to Russia,
as such a step might have given rise to a
suspicion of intimidation It will be the more satis-
factory to learn that the Court at Vienna has inter-
posed in behalf of Poland, because some apprehension
was entertained lest, in the presence of the difficulty
of prescribing what ought to be the exact duty of
Russia, Austria might have declined to take part in
the intervention. This difficulty, however, is more
imaginary than real. What to one Power may
seem a constitutional form of Government may to
another seem little less than a despotism ; but no
doubt whatever can be entertained respecting the
means by which tranquillity can be restored to
Poland. With the interpretations of the stipula-
tions of the Treaty of Vienna the European Powers
need not care to trouble themselves, since their in-
tervention is not based on any intention to secure
respect for a compact which has for a long series of
years been systematically violated. It may be that
the Treaty of 1815 speaks of "constitutional institu-
tions regulated according to the mode of existence
which each of the respective Governments should
think fit to accord to their Polish subjects," Re-
garded from this point of view, the partitioning
Poevers would each estimate " constitutional insti-
tutions" by its own standard, and Russia would
doubtless m.intain that she had religiously observed
her engagement. A discussion on this point will
not, however, arise, since what is expected from
Russia is, not to give to Poland this or that form of
government, but to give such a one as will prevent
that kingdom continuing constantly in a state either
of chrcnic or of active insurreciion. It is so clearly
the policy of Russia to avoid adopting anything
even distantly approaching a constitutional form of
government in any portion of her dominions that it
is not astonishing that the redress sought for by the
Poles has been so long withhe,d. An empire of such
extraordinary immensity as that of Russia, and
inhabited by a semi-civilised race, can only preserve
its integrity under a despotic Government. Intro-
duce civilisation and an acquaintance with consti-
tutional rights to the Russian nation, and no one
for a moment supposes that the imperial ukases
would be submitted to without a murmur from the
Baltic to the Pacific. No one, we believe, is more
anxious than the present Czar to introduce reforms
into the Government both of Russia and of Poland;
but he is terrified, and not unreasonably, by the
possible consequences. If he creates a constitu-
tional State on the borders of Russia, he knows well
that the stream cf constitutionalism will not be
checked by the imaginary line which will constitute
the frontier of the constitutional State. Lord Pal-
merston truly observed in a recent debate in the
House of Commons, "It is a great misfortune to suc-
ceed to the inheritance of a triumphant wrong." The
partition of Poland was a crime, the consequences of
which have never ceased to press upon those who
participated in it. The possession of Poland places
Russia in the most perplexing of dilemmas. The
experiment of ruling Poland by means of a despotism
has been tried and has failed. To give her a consti-
tution, and at the same time still claim her alle-
giance, may be fraught with considerable danger to
the maintenance of the existing government in the
adjoining provinces of Russia proper. Might it not
be worth the while of Russia to consider whether
she would not gain more by abandoning a useless
possession, and, by granting to Poland perfect inde-
pendence, prevent any heartburnings which might
be occasioned by granting to some of her subjects
privileges which were denied to others ?