The Sun.
London, England, 1837-01-11 00:00:00

LAW INTELLIGENCE.

COURT OF CHANCERY, JAN. 10.
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL V. ASPINAL.
Mr. PEMBERTON, in support of the decision of the Mas-
ter of the Rolls on this demurrer, argued that the new Cor-
poration of Liverpool had no remedy except under the 97th
section of the Municipal Corporation Act, and having no
remedy except under that, they were bound to male out
that the sale or mortgage of the Corporation property had
been fraudulent or collusive before they could hope to set
it aside. It was not intended to be asserted that the Mu-
nicipal Act did not qualify the right possessed by the old
Corporation after the period when the Act passed, but that
qualification extended merely to the protection of the pro-
perty for the use of the new Town Councils, in such a
manner as that it could not be diverted to any but pure
municipal purposes. Now in the present instance the de-
claration of Lord Langdale in allowing the demurrer, had
in point of fact disposed of the case.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL replied, and re-stated his ar-
gument on the different clauses of the Act.
The LORD CHANCELLOR directed a copy of Lord Lang-
dale's judgment to be handed up, and rose at four o'clock.

VICE-CHANCELLOR'S COURT, JAN. 10.
DAVIS V. CLOUGH.

This case, which related to a breach of professional
confidence by a solicitor, stood for judgment this morning.
The principal facts of the case, with the arguments of
Counsel, have already appeared at considerable length.
His Honour commenced his judgment by briefly detailing
the facts. After further stating the nature of the affi-
davits filed in the Court of Common Law, where the costs
were taxed in explanation of the transactions in which
Humphrey Jones had been concerned for Mrs. Clough
and her late husband, his Honour proceeded to remark that
the question was, whether Mr. Humphrey Jones ought to
be permitted to act as the solicitor of the plaintiffs to
set aside the very transaction which had been brought to
maturity by himself, acting as the solicitor of Mrs.
Clough. He (the Vice-Chancellor) had not been able
to find any authority exactly in point, and he must, there-
fore, proceed upon some general principle ; and the cases
all
.appeared to afford this general principle—that all
Courts might exercise an authority over their own offi4
cers as to the propriety of their behaviour. Applications
had been repeatedly made to restrain solicitors who acted
on one side from acting on the other. Those applications had
failed or succeeded on their own particular grounds, but never
because the Court had no jurisdiction. The question, there-
fore, was, whether the circumstances of this case furnished
a ground for interference. For his own part, he (the Vice-
, Chancellor) could not consider anything to be a greater
breach of truth, and honesty, and common fidelity, than for
a solicitor, first of all the solicitor of one party, to carry on
a negotiation for the benefit of that party, and have it com-
pleted, and afterwards—not because lie was discharged, but
because he made an exorbitant demand, in which, after per-
severance, he was subsequently defeated, where he therefore
virtually discharged himself—that he should be permitted to
act as the solicitor for other parties, in order, by his own
personal interference, to defeat the very thing he had been
doing, for his client. It appeared to the Court such a mon-
strous and flagrant breach of propriety and common honesty,
and of that duty which a solicitor owed to his client, that
the Court was bound to interfere. There was another cir-
cumstance about the case to be observed. The bill was
filed by two persons of the name of Davis, who had osten-
tatiously put forth a statement that they had a right to re-
tain Humphrey Jones, and to use his assistance in the suit ;
and upon an insinuation in the defendants' affidavits, that the
plaintiffs had not retained Humphrey Jones, an affidavit was
made containing a pompous statement of the most enormous
retainer in writing by a client of a solicitor, his Honour had
ever seen. It seemed to his Honour that he had quite enough
of these disclosures before him, to make it his duty to direct
that the plaintiffs should be restrained from employing
Mr. Humphrey Jones and Mr. Fay as their solicitors in the
present suit, and that Jones should be restrained from com-
municating to the plaintiffs any information relating to the
agreements of 1832, which came to his knowledge confiden-
tially as the solicitor of Mrs. Clough ; and also that the
affidavit complained of should be taken off the file ; and it
must be part of the order that the plaintiffs should pay the
costs of the motions, because they must be taken to know
the circumstances of their own cause ; and as the Court
had great reason to believe that they were the puppets of
Mr. Humphrey Jones, and would be indemnified by him,
though in matter of form the plaintiffs would be resposible,
yet, if Jones had really undertaken to indemnify them, the
costs would in substance light upon the party who ought to
pay them ; and that is the order the Court makes in this
case.

In the course of a discussion upon the minutes, Mr.
Jacob alluded to the bearing of the order in case of an
appeal.
His HONOUR should be glad this judgment was reviewed.
He had thought about it very anxiously, and if he was
wrong, it was high time he should be set right.