The Sun.
London, England, 1863-11-30 00:00:00

THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY.

(Fro;n the Special Correspondent of the 2w es.)
CONFEDERATE CAMP, NEAR
CHATTANOOGA, Oct. 19.
Ten days, utterly void of incident so far as these
two western armies are concerned, have flown since
the date of my last letter ; and before turning my
face again towards Virginia, I desire to record the
impression which after three weeks' residence on
the spot and after much thoughtful observation the
army of Gen. Bragg has produced upon my mind.
There are obvious and not unfreqnent occasions
when the chronicler of events on this continent,

although writing for the instruction of a neutral

nation which will read his words at a distance of

4,000 miles from the spot where they were penned, 1
is compelled to exercise far-sighted vigilance as to
his utterances, lest the great disparity of strength
already existing between the belligerents should be
still further augmented to the prejudice of the
weaker by indiscreet or thoughtless revelations.
Such revelations, it is obvious, could not be made
by anybody, however disposed to make them, who
writes from the North. They usually have refer-
ence to such matters as shortcomings in supplies
of war material occasioned by the blockade, and
which, at the commencement of this war, were so
grave and numerous, that astonishment as to the
possibility of successful Southern resistance grows
and increases in proportion to your knowledge of
Southern poverty and weakness during the first 12
months of the war. Many months have now flown
since the supply of saltpetre—the most important
ingredient of gunpowder—became so abundant as to
extinguish all apprehension in regard to the ability
of the gunpower mills at Charlotte, Columbia, and
Augusta, to work full time not only during the
present year, without an increase of supply, but
also far into the year to come. But there is a
second class of revelations with respect to which
reticence would not be necessary were it not for the
dangers which beset all such letters as this. There
would be no objection to my furnishing such infor-
mation about the movements, numbers, and de-
signs (so far as the immediate future is concerned)
of Confederate 'italics as would be not without in-
terest for the English public, were I assured that
my letter would not be read in the North until its
return thither from Englind. But no such cer-
tainty can be felt in reference to letters which
have to be smuggled through the blockade, and
which are liable to be overhauled and read in Wash-
ington within a few days of their being written.
There is a third class of revelations which demand
from a foreign correspondent no scanty exercise of
tact and discretion—those which exhibit weak

joints in the harness of the Southern Confederacy.
It is hardly necessary I should state, that the stran-
ger who can reside 12 or 14 months in a weak and

small community which is wrestling superbly with
a gigantic opponent—who can witness daily traits
and incidents of sublime heroism and nncomplain-

ing endurance in almost every household which he
visits—who is cognisant of the enormities committed
by an enemy more unscrupulous than the hordes of
Attila, and more larcenous than the bands of Wil-
liam de la Marck•—who can see the poor suffering

half-starved units which compose a Southern army
launched against an antagonist vastly superior in
number, in equipment, and in food, yet driving him
headlong from the field in nine battles out of ten—
and who cannot sympathise loyally and cordially
with the agony of a noble people—must be either
more or less than human. But although amicus
Plato, magis arnica veritas, and therefore, in the
belief that an honest opinion, emanating from a not
unfriendly observer, will in the end be advantageous
to the Confederacy, although possibly distasteful
to some whom I would not willingly wound, I will
frankly state my opinion of the prospects and
condition of Gen. Bragg's army, as I have now seen

it.
It will be necessary to carry your readers back for
some months. It will be remembered that when
Gen. Beauregard retreated silently and successfully,
some time after the battle of Shiloh, from Corinth,
leaving Gen. Halleck, who was then facing him, as
ignorant of his movements as was the red of the
North, he fell back with what remained of his army
to Tupels, in Mississippi. Shortly afterwards Gen.
Beauregard's health gave way. He withdrew to
some springs in Alabama, was relieved from his
command, and Gcn. Bragg took his place. Gen.
Bragg found the army, which had at one time been
the fittest force numerically which the Confederates
ever had in the field, reduced to 40,000 men in the
worst possible condition of discipline. deciminated
by desertion consequent upon Beauregard's long in-
action at. Corinth, and swept by disease. It was
an occasion for the display of many of the finest
qualities of a general, as a promoter of discipline,
and an organiser of imperfect or broken-down army
departments; and everybody cheerfully, and most
people gratefely, confesses that Gen. Bragg was
equal to the occasion. He exhibited much of that
firmness and indifference to popularity which are
so rare among republican generals, and, acting with
a lofty self-reliance, he took upon his own shoulders
the odium of causing some 12 or 15 men to be shot
without court martial ; and finally, by the total
expulsion of whisky from his camp, and by divers
otlier . salutary measures, restored his army to a
higher degree of discipline and efficiency than it had
over before attained. In the operations of the
autumn of 1862, Bragg manifested superiority over
Eta able Federal commander, Gen. Buell, whom he
drove out of Nashville and Tennessee, and whom he
eventually
forced up to Louisville, on the northern
border Of Re
strategy in Kentucky It is true that Gen. Bragg's
ticisin; but it has not escaped damaging cri-
moment Gettet:uist not, be forgotten that at a critical
General van
Darn
defeated the Confede-
rate3rn at Holly Springs, and thus
the
imposed upon
the West the necessity
army of the Confederates in
back. There is
abundant greund fsolrtYthof
assertion that up to the
battle of Mu rfreesboreouih:ithGeneral Bragg stood high
with his own army n
the country, and had
ehown himself deserving or
the
confidence of both.
But, it seems to me, that even
little
the battle of Mur-
freesborough he displayed
the energy and
tenacity against General nalstettleerat
against General
anz which he had
previously shown
/3 a 11 .e v
elnt n
in ow
e
well known, and not denied,'
North, that Rosencranz, after mhr
must have fallen back in 24 hours had not in
not Bragg
anticipated and relieved him by being the first to
retire; nor can any attentive observer be blind to
the fact that the spirit of the old proverb that,,
Brag
is a good dog, but fieldfast is a better," which is said
to be constantly in Rosencranz' mouth, strikingly
animates the whole of the Federal general's strategy
and s.rategy
and may possibly induce him at this moment to
cling so adhesively to Chattanooga, in spite of the
embarrassments and discomforts of his position there.
After the battle of Murfreesborough, the disaffection
which had so long slumbered among the rank and file
of Bragg's army, engendered by the Draconian se-
verity of his rule, extended to his generals of division
and to their subordinates, pervaded the officers of the
army, and became chronic and deep seated. It is tray'belief that from this moment General Bragg ceased to
be qualified efficiently to command an army of Re-
publicans animated by a spirit so high and haughty
as that which pervades his troops, who demand from
their..... commanding general qualities and personal at-
tributes which inspire not only respect, but also en-
thusiasm and affection. It is also my belief that the
motives which led Gen. Bragg to cling tenaciously
to his command,
to al l suggestions 8 command, and President Davis to turn a deaf
a
for his removal, were pare and
commendable.instances they Nevertheless, I think that in both
betterw were fouaded in error. Gen. Bragg
would hew;oeconsulted his fair fame had he
P
escaped from a
the narrow
where it was inevitable that
be would convert narrow fissure which separated
him from his army after Murfreesboro' into the wide
and gaping chasm
which now divides them after
Chicaraanga.
There is little difficulty in
Confederate
just mentioned. the gradual de-
terioration of the Western army be-
tween the two great battles lt is
not that Generals Polk, Cheetham,
Breckenridge,
Cleburne, and others, who have always been attached
to this army, are one whit less valiant and patriotic,
or have:lost a particle of their men's confidence ; but
it is that the harmony, homogeneity, and
enterprise
of the aggregate force have been constantly an the
decline, by reason of their growing dissatisfaction

with General Bragg. The army of General Lee in
Virginia has been constantly fighting, and the
reciprocal confidence of the meu and the c :11 mantl-
ing general in each other has never ceased to grow.
In the Western Army just the reverse tie s been the
case. They have hardly fought at a,!, t.nd, in con-
eevenee of their inaction and the frothy mendacity
of the Western Federal journals, the Confederate
morale has declined, and the reputation of General
Rosencranz and of the men -whom he leads has
gone up in proportion. You hear Western men
talking complacently of the manifest necessity of
30,000 Confederates retiring without fighting when
they found themselves confronted by 50,000 Fede-
ruis, forgetful apparently that General Lee has
fought such battles as Sharpsburg and Chancel-
lorsville, in the former of which 35,000 Confede-
rates fought evenly against (by MiClellan's own
confession) 105,000 Federals, and in the latter
43,000 Confederates fought and utterly worsted an
army variously estimated at from 120,000 to 150,000
Federals. In consequence of the extravagant and
formidable reputation of Rosecranz, General Bragg
seems, when at last he ventured upcn a battle, to
have had no other hope than either to crush a sec-
tion of the Federal army in detail, or to fight with-
out being worsted; consequently, the battle Chica-
mauga was fought without lien. Bragg's having
made such dispositions as would enable him to fol-
low up the victory which every general who ini-
tiates a battle should surely believe that he is about
to gain. Dozens of excuses have been put forward
in extenuation of Gen. Bragg's failure to profit on
the night of Sunday, the 20th, or on the morning of
Monday, the 21st Sept., by the enormous victory
which Gen. Longstreet had given him. To my mind,
these excuses only serve to render more incontro-
vertible the fact that such an opportunity as has
only occurred twice in the war was lamentably and
inexcusably flung away. On behalf of Gen. Bragg
it is said, " Oar supplies were at Dalton ; the men
could not advance without food." The manifest ane
swer is, "In that case, why did Gen. Bragg force
on a battle ?" Another excuse is, " Our men were so
wearied by incessant marching, from the morning
of the 14th to the night of the 20th, that they could
not pursue." The ready response is given that the
whole of M'Laws's division was up on Monday
morning, of which only a portion had previously
been engaged ; that Jenkins's fine brigade, over 3,000
strong, came:up that day fresh and fall of fight ; that
all the divisions of Longstreet and Backner,who had
been fiercely engaged on Sunday, were electrified
and aghast to find that they were robbed of the
fruits of their grand Sunday's victory by the inac-
tion of Monday. Anether excuse is urged, though
hardly by General Bragg himself, to the effect that
he did not know on Sunday night that a victory
had been gained. It is certain that other Confede-
rate generals knew it, and had they acted on their
own responsibility and forgotten the existence of
Gen. Bragg, the Federal army would not new be
lying within its lines at Chattanooga. Other excuses,
which have been plentifully advanced, to the effect
that it was necessary to stop and collect the scattered
small arms and artillery, and to bury the dead—
some of whom have not been buried to this hour—
are too puerile to be worthy of a moment's conside-
ration. The conclusion is irresistible that General
Bragg failed to convert the most headlong and dis-
ordered rout which the Federals have ever seen
since Bull Run into a crowning victory like Water-
loo. I have endeavoured, by using only the simplest
and baldest phraseology, to avoid even the sem-
blance of exaggeration which might attach to
warmer and more coloured expressions.
That the rout was all, and more than all, that I
have stated becomes more and more apparent as you
ride over the ground and hear the tales of the
country folk who witnessed it. One old man, who
lives in a shanty close to the final stand made by the
Federals on the edge of Missionary Ridge, found 15
Federal soldiers cowering in his garden, and upon
his telling them that the Confederates were be-
tween them and their haven, Chattanooga, they
stacked arms and declared themselves his prisoners.
He went out to search for some Confederates, and
\
upon his return in an hour or more with some of
Wheeler's cevalry, he found the Federals still there
awaiting their captors. Everybody who lives along
, the main road which connects Chattanooga with
Lafayette echoes the same story of the panic, con-
fusion, and terror of the Federal flight. The same
-phrases were everywhere on the white lips of the
fugitives—a hurried entreaty for water, and an
eager inquiry as to the road and distance from
Chattanooga. One enthusiastic Southern matron
expressed her conviction that if the women who live
by the roedside had followed closely on the heels of
the Yankees upon Sunday night with loud and
shrill screams, the town of Chattanooga would have
been found evacuated on Monday morning. The
very correspondents of Northern journals testify to
the utter demoralisation of the army, and one of
them—the correspondent of the Cincinnati Com-
mercial—openly compares the rout to Buil Run.
let General Bragg lingered and hesitated at a
moment when, as cannot but be apparent to every
reasonable man, there was for the first time during
this war a chance of terminating it finally and for
ever at one blow. If the Federals had once been
driven out of Chattanooga, who can doubt that, out
of Itoseneranz's army of about 70,000 men, not more
than one-fourth would ever have reached Nashville ?
Oppressed with many such thoughts as to the
immense opportunity thrown away, I rode over the
field of be ttle. It is less interesting, by reason of
its enormous area and the dense and tangled forest
in which it was fought, than other siadiar sceens
I have witnessed. And yet, as it seems to me, there
is not ono reasonable and sober Northerner, how-
ever rabid a Unionist he may be, who could witness
the arena upon which one of these bloody debates
Las been conducted, and fail from that moment to
abandon ail hope that the Federal soldiers will,
Las i ofr an
occurred
whatever may be their numbers, ever vanquish their
opponents cn the field of battle. Take your stand
upon the ground occupied by the Federate, and face
in the direction towards which they faced—you
will see every limb and trunk of the trees in your
front pitted with bullets, like the marks of small-
pox on a man's face. It is evident that a perfect
tornado of iron hail must have rent these primaeval
forests, and were it not that the majority of the
bullet-marks tab at a height of 6ft. or more from
the ground, it would seem incomprehensible that
any human being could have lived and moved fur
five minutes, if exposed to the pitiless pelting of
such a deadly storm. Proceed next to take your
stand as it were in the Confederate ranks. A few
spare bullet holes, most of them excellently' aimed,
tell of, comparatively speaking, a handful of troops,
.firing little, but advancing rapidly with fearful
howls
011 te:dtoyells through the woods, and striving to
bring the debate to the bloody arbitration of the
which their opponents are never willing
mrw. 1t and submit it. It would be impossible for
osunpeeortiotratr or Mr. Seward himself to contemplate
erners fi
Chickamaua,
during
fought, geohutr. scenes and to dispute the enormously
are
°agree:ferocity with which the South..
Other sights, visible on the field of
, a
character
after the battle was
the last twelve
will not admit
They may be conceive
acter with which I have been
of
amonths but too familiar, and
conceived by
to your readers.
of
eboyri,,ththe,feader of the fu mous
which exhibit Alp
lines in the "Siege
/911\2011i:tan
onneviter.
abnedreitaliwseads
I observeds till two
unburied,or
shuddering at a sight
save by one who has
with regret and horror that
the field
three hundred bodies of Federals
affording to the most revolting beasts
and to the uncleanest of biarsdslolifttthlee
oppor-
tunity for such a banquet expected ever
to witness.
The most noticeable incident that has
since the date of my last letter has been the incle-
ment weather by which we have been visited. It
will be remembered by some of your readers that
when the battle of Chicamauga was fought the whole
of the States which line the Mississippi River had
been exposed to an almost unexampled drought of
two or three months' duration. With the Ist of
October came the much desired rain, and already
we are beginning to long again for the choking dust
in preference to the muddy adhesive paste which
makes camp life so distasteful. I have seldom seen
in any climate a more fearful night than that of the
14th of October. The rain, which had scarcely
ceased for three days or nights, descended as though