The Sun.
London, England, 1863-03-24 00:00:00

'ERIAL PARLIAMENT

HOUSE OF LORDS—Last Evening.

Lord REDESDALE, in the a,,sence of the Lord Chancellor,
took his seat on the woolsack at the usual hour.
PRIVATE BUSINESS,

The Yarmouth Gas Bill was read a third time and passed
POLAND.

Earl VANE presented a petition from the county of
Durham in favour of Poland, and, in particular, praying
that England would use her influence to produce non-inter-
ference on the part of Prussia.
SALMON FISHERIES.

The Earl of MALMESBURY presented a petition pray-
ing for the pretection of fisheries and against the importa-
tion of salmon.
THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY.
Lord ST le AT HEDEN, in calling attention to the
question of the propriety of acknowledging, in concert with
other neutral Powers, the Southern Confederacy as an in-
dependent Mate, said he had not been able to state on an
earlier occasion the exact view with which this subject was
about to be submitted to their lordships, owing to the ab-
sence of the noble earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
whom he was glad to see now in his place. It was not his
intention to raise any question as to the past proceedings of
her Majesty's Government in reference to American affairs,
his preposition had relation altogether to the future, and to
facts well known. About the close of last session it was
generally:alleged, and no doubt with truth, that the Govern-
ments of France and England were acting simultaneously
and in concert with regard to the difficulties which existed
in America. Since that time the policy of the two Govern-
ments had in some degree diverged, or, in the memorable
phrase of a noble earl not now in his place (the Earl of
Derby), the two Governments had seemed to drift from one
another. In November last the Emperor of the French de-
sired to make a proposal, but was held back by the decision
of her Majesty's Government. In January the Emperor en-
tered upon another lino of action, framed with a view to
terminate hostilities, but the Government of this country
were again unable to agree with him. Neither of these pro.
positions having led to any practical result, all attempts al
intervention, mediation, and remonstrance were ex-
heusted by the reply of Mr. Seward to the despatch of M,
Drouyn de Lhuys. The French Government, however,
being still, as ever, anxious to bring the civil war to a close,
the question of recognising the independence of the Southern
States might an any moment come before this country, as
the question of obtaining an armistice came before it in
November. Were it not for the space which Poland now
occupied in the cares and councils of the world, the neces-
sity of giving a decision on the independence of the South
would probably have arisen ere this. Whenever the
moment arrived at which the Government of England must
act, it was to be feared that there would be found no definite
conviction either in Parliament or out of doors as to the
course to be pursued. We should then be taken at a disad-
vantage. It was with a view, therefore, to a distinct and
practical result that he had wished to give the noble earl at
the head of the Foreign-office an opportunity of expressing
his views on this subject. This object could not be attained
in any other manner, because a resolution or an address to
pledge the action of the Government would be resisted, and
its withdrawal would be thought disastrous by the 8,000,000
of men whose case he now brought before their lordships.
By an acknowledgment of Southern independence he meant,
is accordance with the authorities on public law; the send-
ing an ambassador to those States or receiving one from
them, the negotiation of a treaty, or the granting exequaturs
to Consuls. Such an acknowledgment ought not to be con-
founded with interference, intervention, mediation, or pro-
ceedings of that kind. The noble earl opposite (the Earl of
Malmesbury) had expressed an opinion that the acknowledg-
ment of the South would be attended by no material result
one way or another. But if the acknowledgment of South-
ern independence were wholly immaterial, how came it that
the South had never ceased to ask and the North to depre-
cate that acknowledgment ? How was ie that the Southern
Confederacy had sent envoys to the great capitals of Europe
to demand their recognition, and that the North had endea-
voured to intercept these envoys at the risk of war P He
had heard, and the statement might have reached their lord-
ships also, that the planters a year ago, looking to the pro-
bability of the acknowledgment of the South, began to sow
their cotton crop, and that they began to plough it up as
soon as that hope ceased. An acknowledgment by the Great
Powers of Europe would in the first place remove whatever
hope might still linger in Northern minds of bringing the
South into subjection, In the next place it would take
away from the Northern press the power of describing the
people of 11 great Southern States as rebels. The acknow-
ledgment of neutrals would remove the chance of conquest,
and the victories already achieved by the Southern armies
would be still more irresistible. Besides this a separate re-
sult would be obtained, for when neutrals had acknowledged
the belligerents to be in a position to negotiate it would put
an end to all claims to reconstruct the Union which might
prolong the war. It would also emancipate the Government
of Washington from the hard necessity of carrying on a
hopeless war, which at present weighed upon them. Their
lordships would remember the mode in which the diplo-
macy of France and England in 1609 succeeding in extin-
guishing the civil war between Spain and Holland, which
had lasted the greater part of half a century. If they would
remember what then took place they would know in what
form and by what means the present war in America might
be adjusted. That diplomacy would not have been attended
with such brilliant success if the European Powers had not
acknowledged the insurgents. He now approached the ardu-
ous task of pointing out the conditions under which neutral
Powers were entitled to acknowledge insurgent nations. At
the beginning of the sessicn their lordships had been told
that acknowledgment might happen with propriety in two
cases—where the recognising Power was about to give ma-
terial support to the insurgents, and where, through the pro-
longation of hostilities, arms had fallen from the exhausted
hands of the belligerents. Whatever might be thought of
the justice of that principle, it certainly was not one on which
the Powers either of the Old or the New World had acted ;
for a cessation of hostilities had generally followed, instead
of preceding, the acknowledgment by neutrals. The United
States acknowledged Nicaragua, under the government of
Walker, before hostilities had ceased; the United States
also acknowledged the independence of the revolted colonies
of Spain before the efforts of the mother country to reduce
them had ended ; and the same Power despatched an ambas-
sador to Hungary in 1848 or 1841, invested with large discre-
tionary powers, which he was to use or reserve according to
the progress of the insurrection. He would notdwell further
on examples taken from the New World, although he might
enlarge the illustration by referring to the conduct of Brazil,
which, from being placed in the midst of civil wars and
insurgent Governments during the last 30 years, had con-
stantly cases of this kind brought forward for its decision.
Passing to the Old World, he found that the French ac-
knowledged the independence of the British North Ame-
rican possessions long before the efforts of the mother
country to reconquer them had been exhausted. It was
idle to remark that Lord North, the Minister of the day,
went to war with France on that account; it was well
known that the cause provoking to war was very different.
But even granting that it were so, was a war denounced by
all who formed the glory of that epoch as wicked, which
marred the reputation of the Minister and depressed his
character, to be cited as an authority on international law
and public proceedings? Was the Minister of that day, in
conjunction with the reigning Sovereign, to be regarded as
the heir, virtute qfficii, of the influence and the wisdom of
Grotius and Vattel? Of the independence of the South
American Republics the acknowledgment had, no doubt,
been tardy, But that tardiness did hot entirely express the
judgment of the country, for it was reprobated by the
brilliant and enlightened Opposition of which the noble
lord, now the Secretary of State, was at that time no incon-
siderable ornament. Any one, not grossly ignorant of the
difficulties which at that time hampered our foreign policy,
must admit that there never was an occasion when acknow-
ledgment had been decided less in accordance with principle
or the dictates of public law and more entirely swayed by
views of prudence. There was another authority, surpassing
all others. and tallying in nearly every point with the ques-
tion now under consideration. In 1641, the independence of
Portugal was acknowledged by France, Great Britain, Swe-
den, and Holland, within 12 months after the Duke and
Dechoss of Braganza renounced their allegiance to Spain,
notwithetanding that a quarter of a century elapsed before
Spain herself consented to join in the recognition. At that
time Prussia bad not come into existence. Russia had not
begun to mingle in European affairs. Austria was leagued
with Spain by ties of kindred and of policy, so that the four
recognizing Powers might be said to form a general Euro-
pean tribunal. The decisive battle between the celebrated
Schomberg and Don John of Austria was fought in 1665,
but it was not till 1668 that the belligerents negotiated. He
bed examined all the great writers on international law to
discover whether there had been anything in the circum-
stances of the recognition of Portugal of which they either
expressed disapproval, or 'which would be reprobated by the
principles laid down in their works. He had these authori-
ties with him, but would not inflict theta on their lordships.
But he might refer to the authority of Sir J. Mackintosh,
who in the year 1824, when
introducing the question of
acknowledging the South American
Re Publics, alluded with
satisfaction to the instance of Portugal a strengthening the
principle for which he was then contending. Sir James
Mackintosh, their lordships would remember, was the dis-
ciple, the successor, and the equal of those great writers
only thing
who moulded public law into a science., The •
required by Europe at that tine to justify recognition was
that there should be no hazard of reconquest. It was not
correct to say that according to the law of nations hostilities
must have ceased, and the last shilling must have been spent,
and the last drop of blood shed, before recognition could
take place. What indeed could be more cruel than thus
unnecessarily to prolong hostilities? The examples of the
civil wars between Switzerland and Austria, Spain and Hol-

land, Spain and Portugal, Great Britain and her North
American colonies, and Spain and her South American co-
lonies, all showed that you were entitled to acknowledge
insurgents when it seemed to you that no hazard of their
reconquest any longer existed. It might be asked could you
recognise a country while hostile armies were encamped upon
'to territory ? If you could not, neutral powers would be
co mpelled to withdraw their Ministers from any country
whi *sh became the scene of war, or of which the boundaries
were tiusettlod. We ought to have withdrawn our Minister

from Spain in 1822 ; but no one had ever contended for such
a construction of international law. He now canoe to th,
question, " Is the issue of this contest any long -r doubt-
ful ?" In discussing this part of the subject, he must first
refer to the extraordinary circumstance that within the last
few days the Confederacy had contracted in Linden, Am-
sterdam, and Faris a loan which now stood at the top of the
market. The loan rested upon the security of cotton, and,
as it was well known to the subscribers that that security
would perish if the invasion prospered, the position of the
loan must be regarded as an expression of the judgment
of the financial world that the issue of the contest is no
longer doubtful. What were the views of military men ?
In November last the Emperor of the French intimated to
the Government of Washington his opinion that the recon-
quest of the Southern States was impossible ; in the Revue
des Deux Mendes for the month of October there was an
article, supposed to be inspired by the Princes of the House
of Orleans who accompanied Gen. M'Clellan to the field,
adopting a similar view ; and,as far as our information went,
we did not know that any Northern general was of opinion
that reconquest was attainable. And supposing thit in the
t,bstract such a reconquest was possible, the question for
neutral Powers was,could it be attained by Mr. Lincoln and
his colleagues ? Because, as they had not in their armies any
man who, like the Duke of Wellington, was ;capable of con-
trolling and directing a Ministry, by them must it be accom-
plished, if it was to be accomplished at all. What proof of
capacity had this aggressive Government given to the world ?
Was it to be found in their choice of viceroys, in the super-
seding and replacing of commandero, or in their firm ad-
herence to a principle, and their opposition to slavery ? At
first they vaunted their steady disposition to maintain that
institutim ; then the slaves in the lower States were to be
free ; then emancipation was to be extended to all States
which resisted the Federal authority; then a bankrupt
Treasury would buy the slaves at an outlay equal to the pub-
lic debt of our country; and at last a servile war was indis-
pensable. Were these the means by which the broken frag-
ments of the Union could be welded, or 8,000,000 freemen
be reduced to submission. And who -was opposed to this
Government ? Far be it from him to join in the encomiums
on the Southern President to which heat or generosity had
led; but this much might be hazarded of that extraordi-
nary man--that, amply gifted by nature, he had made the
union of political and military excellence his object, and,
in a position of unusual danger, had displayed qualities
seldom united in the same individual. It should be
borne in mind that a new chapter would be opened
in the world's history if on the great theatre of war
in America those qualities to which men had ever pointed
with scorn should triumph over those which had hitherto
been always regarded with admiration. It became an im-
portant question for consideration, therefore, whether the
Government of Mr. Lincoln could conquer its opponents
when WI confidence in it had ceased to exist, and when it
pursued an enterprise in its capacity to bring which to a
successful issue no one had the slightest faith. What better
sign, he would ask, of the state of despair and despondency
to which it was reduced could be presented than the enlist-
ment of negro regiments ? After that and the other evi-
dence which was open to them noble lords on neither side of
the house would, he hoped, refuse to concur with the noble
earl the leader of the Opposition, with the capitalists of
Europe, and with military men generally, in the opinion
that the hazard of conquest in America remained no longer
matter of doubt. At that moment, he might add, and
throughout the war, Great Britain had consuls at the
Southern ports; among others, at Mobile and Charleston.
Their presence there was necessary to protection of British
interests; and the question was coming on for debate in
the Southern Confederacy how far consuls would be permit-
ted to reside in Southern ports who had taken their exequa-
tur from the Government of Washington. What, then, he
would ask, would be the position of this country if, in a few
months, she should be compelled by interests and conve-
nience to adopt the course which self-respect and justice
long ago demanded at her hands. The first ground, then,
on which Great Britain ought to exercise her power of ac-
knowledgment was that, unless she meant to withdraw her
consuls, honour called upon her to proceed in the course
which he advocated. The next ground on which he would
rely was that of humanity. His noble friend the Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, in his despatch in reply to Mr. Mason in
the autumn, had justly stated that the question which was
so much debated on both sides of the Atlantic—the ques-
tion of the right to secede—could not be determined by
foreign Governments ; but the inference which his noble
friend had drawn from that proposition was that we ought
not to acknowledge the insurgents. In that inference he
hoped their lordships would not be disposed to concur, be-
cause if they did so, they would then, in reality, be pro-
nouncing it to be their opinion that the insurgents had no
right to secede ; while, on the other hand, by acceding to the
appeal for recognition, they would be giving no positive de-
cision on the point in dispute. The new Government of
France had, he might further observe, been acknowledged
in 1848, but by doing so no opinion as to its title had been
pronounced. It could not be denied—and Mr. Davis in his
recent Message conspicuously explained—that the Confe-
deracy had suffered wrongs, perhaps unintentional and un-
designed, from Great Britain. The French Emperor was
deterred from a course which might have served them by
the influence of this country. We had forced the Confede-
rates to burn their prizes on the water, and had done away
with the chance of their raising privateers. What was even
more serious still, after engaging with the Confederacy by
our negotiator to maintain the principles laid down in the
Treaty of Paris upon public law, we had not, as regarded
the question of blockade, adhered to those principles. Our
partiality towards the Northern States had received an il-
lustration from the despatch of the noble lord dated March
27, 18E2, and which the Government of Washington had
given to the world. In that despatch, while manfully re-
sisting the extortionate demands of Mr. Adams, the noble
lord, as a kind of set •off to his austerity, reminded him that
allowances had been made to the United States in the ardu-
ous war in which they were engaged, and that the public law
had been liberally interpreted in their favour. Let it be
granted that the noble lord was then right in making every
allowance to the Government of Washington and liberally
interpreting the law of nations in favour of the stronger of
two belligerents. Still the inference which he drew was this,
that it now rendered necessary a policy of reparation in the
shape of a recognition of the Southern States. In his opinion
neutrality, so far from being a bar, was a ground of claim to
recognition. A further element in the consideration of the
question was the security of Canada. It was said by some
that whenever the war closed, and in whatever way it closed,
Canada would be invaded, If the Northern arms succeeded
Canada would be endangered by the drunkenness of victory,
and if they failed it would be assailed through the bitterness
of anguish. The security of Canada consisted in the danger
of attacking it, and it would be far more dangerous for the
Northern States to make that attack if they had in their rear
a power which was friendly to England. Canada might be
safe as long as this great civil war raged, but we had not the
power to prevent the close of the war. Other powers would
recognise the Confederacy, and peace would be restored.
From the moment that separation became inevitable it was
obvious we required an ally on the other side of the Atlantic.
If the war exhausted itself before we acknowledged the Con-
federacy, we might be in the humiliating position of finding
both belligerents finally estranged, and having to defend
Canada against the one and the West Indies against the
other. As it appeared to him, the most convincing reason
was that this country was bound by duty to acknowledge the
Southern States. He would not dwell upon the general and
abstract obligation upon neutrals to acknowledge an insur-
gent Power when the hazards of the contest were exhausted.
But in this case there were special circumstances which
ought not to be overlooked. The first was the Lancashire dis-
tress (so long endured and within the last two days meeting
with a more strenuous expression)—a distress which wasnot
likely to be remedied while the large stock of cotton in Ame-
rica prevented the investment of money to obtain a supply
from otherparts of the world. The Government of Washing-
ton above all others, considering the pledges it had given,
and the debts it had incurred, must find an enormous diffi-
culty in negotiating with the South. As well might we ex-
pect a man to perform an amputation on his own person as
ask the North to give up their claims on the South. If the
statesmen of Washington, before ordering the ad-
vance across the Potomac, had been able to
foresee the disgrace and the sacrifices which they
were about to bring on their countrymen, they
would certainly have accepted a bloodless peace when it
was offered to them. There could be little doubt that the
obligations of neutrality, of honour, and good faith would
have induced the people of this country to recognise the
South long ago had it not been for certain delusions on the
subject of negro slavery, which had recently been promul-
gated. The only issue, however, which the people had
really any call to take into their consideration was this,
which would be most conducive to the welfare of the negro
—separation or reconquest ? It could easily be shown that
reconquest would not be favourable to the noble cause with
which had so long been associated the names of such men
as Wilberforce and Buxton—whose descendants now
scorned to connect themselves with the machinery
which had been set up for prolonging the war, on one
side of the water, by spreading fictions and calumnies on
the other. In the event of separation negro bondage
must be confined within the limits in which it now existed
—there would be no Fugitive Slave Law, and the judgment
of the Southern men—hitherto too often inflamed to passion
by the violence of the North—would be calmly applied to
discover a solution for the question. In the event of recon-
quest—a servile war, with widespread murder and rapine,
must be the inevitable preface. What security had we that
the slave trade, to which the American flag had too often been
lent, would not be renewed ? It had always been impossible
for any British Government to obtain the right of searching
siraUStapeeedtiedateAl d ele
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only other sentiment which could stand in the way of re-
cognition was a vague belief that the cause of freedom would
be promoted by restoration of the ancient state of things.
But the reconquest of the. South would take a Coosar or a
Napoleon, and it could not be expected that a man of such
a character with the army at his back flushed with success
would consent peaceably to lay down the immense power
which he would then wield. Few men could resist the
temptation to take possession of the whole Government.
At the time of General M'Clellan's dismissal it was said that
he could easily have led his legions to Washington and de-
clared himself Dictator, and many censured him for not
taking that course, Whether the Qoverzuneut would adopt

the principle of recognition, or still hesitate as to taking so
decided a course, he should not be the less indebted to their
lordships for enabling him to show that the neutral Powers
had an indisputable title to acknowledge Southern indepen
dente, and that until they exercised that title the war in
America would never end. (Hear, hear.)
Earl RUSSELL—My lords, I suppose there is no member
of either house of Parliament who does not wish for a ter-
mination of a civil war in America. (Hear, hear.) It dis-
turbs commerce, it interferes with the peace of the world,
and it afflicts America herself (hear, hear) ; and if any-
thing could be usefully, and, I must add, justly done to
bring that war to a termination, I repeat there is no member
of either house of Parliament, there is no person in the
country, who would not gladly see such a consummation.
(Hear, hear.) But after having listened to my noble friend,
I must confess I remain in the same persuasion as before at
the present mement—and I speak only of the present mo-
ment—that there is nothing this country could do usefully
and wisely which would tend to the termination of the hos-
tilities on the other side of the Atlantic. (Hear, hear.) My
noble friend has somewhat mixed different topics, and he
has alluded to three different modes of intervention
in the affairs of other countries. One, which is the mini-
mum of interference, that of advice, good offices, and medi-
ation; another, the mode proposed by my noble friend,
that of recognition; and the third, one which we have
sometimes resorted to, and which other nations have more
frequently had recourse to—that of forcible intervention.
My noble friend says, and says truly, that since I had the
honour of addressing the house last summer there has
been some divergence between the views of the Government
of this country and that of the Emperor of the French. The
Government of the Emperor of the French canceived that it
might tend to the termination of the war if three Powers—
France, Great Britain, and Russia—were to propose a sus-
pension of arms with a view of negotiation between the two
belligerents. Her Majesty's Government, after carefully
examining that proposition, came to the conclusion that its
adoption by us would not be likely to lead to its acceptance
by the Government of the United States of America ;
while, by causing irritation, it would not increase but dimi-
nish the chances of our teeing a termination of the con-
test. The French Government has proceeded in accord-
ance with its views, and has actually proposed to the Go-
vernment of the United rotates to negotiate with the
Southern States. That proposition has not been adopted ;
and I think your lordships will judge from what has hap-
pened with reference to the proposals of France, and
with reference to suggestions thrown out in other countries,
that any interference on the part of this country would only
have tended to aggravate the evils of the present lamentable
state of affairs in America. (Hear, hear.) It does not
appear at the present moment that this contest would be
likely to be terminated by an offer of our good offices. I say
at the present moment, because it is impossible to say that,
in the course of events, a time may not come when both
the contending parties would be desirous of the good offices
or wise counsels of friendly Powers. Ido not see any pro-
bability of that at this moment, but I wish to guard myself
against being supposed to speak positively of the future.
(Hear, hear.) We come, then, to the course proposed by my
noble friend—namely, that of recognition. My noble friend
alluded to several cases—not very happy illustrations of his
argument, I think—in which the United States of America
have recognised insurgent countries which they believed
likely to be able to maintain their independence. One was
the revolted State of Hungary, whose independence had
sunk like the island in the Mediterranean. It had disap-
peared before the despatch. reached Vienna by which the
United States recognised it. Another instance referred to
by my noble friend scarcely comes within the category,
though it has been quoted by a gentleman who has written
some very able letters under the title of " Historicus"—l
mean the recognition of the United States themselves by
France two years after the war with this country had be-
gun. If anyone will examine that precedent, and the im-
portant documents which have lately come to light, he will
see that the French monarchy of the day had, most unfor-
tunately for itself, been exciting democratic passions in
America, and had been endeavouring to raise opposition
there to the Government of Great Britain. It had prepared
means of concert with those States; and even in the letter,
so courteous in appearance, but so exceedingly hostile and
bitter in its spirit, written by the French ambassador, it
was stated that the French Government had not only made
a treaty of commerce with the United States, but further,
that they had a right to carry that treaty into effect, if
necessary, even by force. This was a threat to take part
in the war between Great Britain and her revolted colonies.
But we know that besides this open threat there was a
secret treaty signed, by which France lent her support to
the revolted provinces, and the opposition of this country,
which was then as decided as ever any opposition was,
agreed that the threat was one of war, and that by war only
could it be met, This was not a case of recognition but a
case of interference. It was, I think, a case of most unjus-
tifiable interference, an interference for the purpose of
spreading those democratic principles, which afterwards re-
acted on France, and produced so many excesses and crime.
during the revolution. Well, then, with regard to the other
cases to which my noble friend has alluded, those of Por-
tugal and Holland, were cases of forcible intervention. There
is hardly more than one case in which the question was
limited to simple recognition,—that was the war carried on
between Spain and her revolted colonies, and went on from
1808 to 1822 or 1828 without any proposal for a recognition.
This case is one worthy of the attention of your lordships,
because it was illustrated by the mild wisdom of Lord Lans-
downe, by the profound research of Sir James Mackintosh,
and by the dazzling genius of Canning. We have there-
fore:upon this question of recognition as much light as can
possibly be thrown upon any subject. Now I beg to refer
your lordships to the words of Lord Lansdowne. He was
zealous for the recognition of the South American Pro-
vinces, he thought it would be a great advantage to this
country to recognise them, and he was entirely free from
any trammels of office or any obligation to consult the
interests of the Minister of the day. But with that
wisdom and forbearance which characterised every act
of his public life—(hear, hear)—he stated that the first
thing to be considered was the right, and he went on thus :
—" It will be my duty this night to point out to your
lordships the great advantages which may result from the
establishment of South American independence. I hope
I shall never stand up in this house to recommend your
lordships to adopt any course of policy inconsistent with
those principles of right which are paramount to all expe-
diency, and which compose that great law of nations any
departure from which, to answer a selfish and ambitious
policy, never fails to recoil upon its authors," (Hear, hear.)
These are words upon which this house may well reflect
—(hear)—and we may well consider upon what grounds
Lord Lansdowne founded the views which I have just
brought under the notice of your lordships. In the first
place, he stated it was necessary that a country which re-
quired to be recognised should had established its inde•
pendence. In the next plaoo, that it should be able to main-
tain that independence for the future ; and lastly, that it
should be able to carry on with all foreign nations those re •
lations of peace and amity which form the general interna-
tional law of the world. Now, examine the state of the re-
volted provinces of Spain at that time, as Sir James Mackin-
tosh and Mr. Canning did. We find that the greater part of
South America had been some 12 or 14 years entirely free
from the presence of Spanish armies. We find that with
regard to those provinces in which this was not absolutely
the case—namely, Mexico, where Vera Cruz alone was oc-
cupied by a Spanish garrison, and Peru, where there were
4,000 or 5,000 Spanish troops, although the cause of
Spain seemed hopeless, it was agreed that their recog-
nition should be deferred, and that only in the case
of Buenos Ayres and those parts of South America
which had clearly and for a number of years established
their independence would it be right for Great Britain to
proceed to the step of recognition ? Besides this, Mr. Can-
ning took care to inform the Spanish Minister that such
recognition would not be very long delayed, that if the
Spanish Government wished to recognise them they ought
to take that step, and that Great Britain was willing to give
time before proceeding to recognise them herself. (Hear.)
Well, here is a great precedent for our consideration—here is
a step taken by the Government of the day after consider

able care and examination; here is a course recommended
by the Opposition of the day, not in any harsh spirit, but
notwithstanding the conviction which this country gene-
rally entertained that the cause of Spain was hopeless and
that the independence of those provinces was firmly estab-
lished. Well, now, if we look to the present position of
North America and compare with it that of the States of
which Lord Lansdowne spoke, we find that the war in North
America is still carried on with the utmost vigour—l had
almost said with the utmost fury, We find some of those
provinces which were the first to proclaim their indepen-
dence--a great part of Louisianna, New Orleans, and the
banks of the Mississippi, occupied by the Federal armies.
There are very considerable Federal armies menacing cities
of the Confeieration, such as Charleston and Savannah.
So that no man can say it is a case of hopeless war. For
my own part, and speaking according to my limited vision,
I do not believe those efforts of the Federals will be success-
ful, But no man can say that the war is finally over, or
that the independence of the Southern States is establishei.
(Hear.) Well, then, what is the present state of the ease ?
Although great efforts have been made in vain, the great
Federal Republic seems unwilling to accept the decision of
events. So far from it, we find the last acts of the Congress
which has just expired are to place, by conscription, every
man fit to carry arms at the disposal of the President of the
United States, and to vote sums of money amounting to no

less than £180,000,000 sterling for the purpose of carrying
on the war. Well, then, in this state of affairs, I should
say that, looking to the question of right, it would not be a
friendly act towards the United States, it would not be to
fulfil our obligations to a country with which we have long
maintained relations of peace and amity—a great country,
which says it can still carry on the war—it would, I say,

be a failure of friendship on our part if at this moment we
were to interpose and recognise the Southern States. I
have endeavoured to guard myself by saying that I speak
new with reference to the present aspect of affairs. I
hardly know any moment in which my noble friend could
have brought forward his motion with less encouragement
from events. It may turn out that these immense efforts
which are being made shall be made in vain; that the
spirit of the South is unconquerable as their determination
never to be united again with the Northern States is final
and irrevocable, and that a time may come when the duty
of this country will be totally different from what it is at