The Sun.
London, England, 1863-03-14 00:00:00

IRON SHIPBUILDING.

Mr. John Ford, Managing Director of the Thames
Ironworks and Shipbuilding Company, in a letter
to a contemporary, dated March 10, says :
A paper on the construction of ships for her Ma-
jesty's navy lies just been presented to Parliament
and printed.
It is signed by the Controller of the Navy, and
contains charges so grave, and at the same time, se,
unfounded against the contractors by wheat, our
iron-ca ed Ships have been built, and singles tso

we cannot pass it over in silence, and must reqtiest
the favour of your giving our reply a place in your
columns,

We are accused of " general slovenliness in the
work," of being " beset by great temptation to use
inferior and cheaper material," of taking advantage
of any alteration or improvement being desired to
enforce exorbitant terms for its execution ; and of
failing altogether, in common with all the other
contractors, to fulfil our agreements either as to
time or cost.

To all these accusations we give an indignant
and complete denial. We challenge the Controller
of the Navy and all his officers to produce a single
example of slovenliness in workmanship or infe-
riority in material. We appeal to the thousands
who have seen the Warrior, to every practical
man who has examined her (and where are those
who have not ?) as to her present condition after
more than a 12 month's trial through the worst
weather, and to the reports of her captain, as our
vindication against these charges ; and with the
great companies for whom we have built some of 1
the finest vessels afloat, with foreign Governments,
by whom we are largely employed, and with the
private firms for whom we have worked, we hope
that we have established a reputation which will
withstand even such a blow as one in the high posi-
tion, and armed with the authority of Controller
of the Navy, has thus sought to deal against it.
With respect to the charge of claiming exorbi-
tant terms for making alterations, we are able to
prove that in no instance have we received even
adequate remuneration. Such an accusation could
only have been made by those who, not having to
spend their own money, know little of, and care
less for, cost.

As to our failure to fulfil our engagements either
as to time or cost, we have specific facts to deal with.
The Controller states that we "agreed" to build the
Warrior " for £210,225, including extras."
We never made any such agreement, nor any-
thing giving even colourable ground forsuch a com-
plete misstatement. Our original contract sum
for the Warrior was £190,225. On March 16,
1861, six months be, ore the Warrior left the Thames,
we sent in to the Controller an account of extras
amounting to £40,808. intimating at the same time
that we had other large claims, and when all
was finished, we claimed, not the sum of £254,728,
as stated by the Controller, but £269,600, of which
we were paid only £251,646.

The changes and additions made in the Warrior
beyond her original design were, as these figures
will themselves show, enormous ; in fact, the ship as
built was, to a very great extent, different from the
ship as contracted for, and when she was finished
we took the following course:—We submitted to the
Controller that these additions and changes were so
extensive, our claim for extras so large and so diffi-
cult for the Admiralty officers to deal with, that the
fairest course would be for us to show the Admi-
ralty what the ship had really cost, and that they
should pay us that cost with a profit of 12,3- per cent.,
which, considering that all our resources had for
more than two years been placed at the disposal of the
Government, we did not consider unreasonable, nor
so much as we might have claimed in an extra
bill. The Controller of the Navy himself recom-
mended the adoption of this principle of settlement,
only reducing the profit to be allowed to us to 5 per
cent., or £12,000. All our books and accounts were
submitted to the closest investigation by the Ad-
miralty accountants, who verified their absolute
accuracy, and we consented to receive this settle-
ment, although really, as we now desire to state, it
gave us no profit as shipbuilders at all. Not con-
templating during the constructiou of the vessel the
possibility of such a mode of settlement, all the iron
and the armour-plates, which we manufacture our-
selves, were charged to the ship at little over their
prime cost, and at much less than the market prices,
or what, had we been shipbuilders only, we must
have paid ; and the £12,000 given us as profit lust
about represents this difference.

As to the question of time, the paper contains
an admission that " some" delay was occasioned in
the Warrior by the alterations made in the course of
building. This admission is made in such a manner
as to suggest that the delay so caused was trivial,
and that the principal delay was due to the miscal-
culation or dilatoriness of the contractors. In the
tabulated form the delay is put down as 17 months,
but between July, 1860, and October, 1861--the
dates given in the same table—is only 15 months,
and even in such a point as this there is the same
utter disregard of correctness in facts and figures
which characterizes this paper throughout. We
frankly admit, as we have before done, to the
Admiralty, that had we built the Warrior
without any alteration from the original design
our estimate of time would have been two or
three months too little ; but beyond that we
affirm that all the additional delay is due to the
changes made by the Admiralty and to the stop-
page of our work, and the additional work thereby
imposed upon us. This is not the occasion to de-
monstrate this in detail, but the amount claimed
and the sum actually paid by the Admiralty on this
account will show to the general reader the magni-
tude of these changes, and their consequent neces-
sary effect upon the time required for the comple-
tion of the ship. With lespect to our other engage-
ments with the Admiralty for the completion of

the Valiant and the Minotaur, we are prepared to
prove that the delay in the former is in no respect
due to us as contractors, and, as to the latter, we
shall launch and finish her within an additional
time, less than is due to the alterations and delays
caused by the Admiralty themselves. The truth
is, that in building these vessels our interest is so
great in completing them quickly—the possibility
of profit depends so greatly upon this—that it is
one continued struggle an cur part to get on, in
spite of official delays. Nevertheless, we have
always admitted that the Admiralty were right
in seeking in every way to improve those vessels,
and that in the Warrior the improvements were
well worth all the time occupied in planning and
carrying them out ; at the same time, in our corre-
spondence with the Controller, we have protested,
and do protest, against their system of blaming the
contractor for the consequences of their own acts.
Having dealt with the private question between
the Controller and ourselves, we venture to make a
few remarks on the public question as to the build-

dura-
bility of iron over wood, but imputes to iron cer-
tainare opinions of which no
proof
disadvantages.
The paper admits the superior strength and
Th at the splinters from iron are more miscbieveus
Than from wood, or that iron ships can be pierced
below their armour more easily than wooden ones,
That plates of Iron can, in exceptional circum-
proof whatever is offered.
stoncee, be pierced more easily than wooden bottoms
we admit ; but tho example of the Great Britain
in Dundrum Bay, and many others that could be
referred to, show that iron ships may be stranded
wil li more safety end less damage than wooden ones,
The bulkheads and double bottom, which are
most disingenuously stet: d to be complicated
and costly arrangements, introduced to re-
medy local weakness, are in fact advantages
which cannot he overvalued, which exist only in
iron ships, Lind for which wooden ones possess
nothing equivalent. The Great Eastern struck
lately on a rock, and was saved by her double
bottom. Many vessels have been saved by their
bulkheads, and, indeed, if there were no other re-
commendation ()Ikon, this alone would be a reason
for preferring it to wood.
That a copper-bottomed ship will foul less rapidly
than iron bottom must be admitted; but better
dock accommodation and somewhat more frequent
cleaning will remedy this defect. Even copper
is not an absolute protection, and the fact that
the Warrior, having been nearly a twelvemonth
at sea without going into dock, came
home the .oihof ,day dopg, Channel 114

joule'

nearly keeping pace with the Royal- yacht, doing
131 knots with full boiler power, proves that this
is by no means so great an objection as the Con-
troller of the Navy maintains. The great feet,
however, that all onr large steam companies—the
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Com-
pany, the Royal Mail, the Cunard, &c.—have long
since abandoned wood and adopted iron, proves that
at least these drawbacks, be they what they may,
are more than counterbalanced by the advantages
of iron.

We are ignorant of the authority on which the
Controller announces that it is the opinion of M.
Duprez de l'Ome that wood is better than iron for
iron-cased ships, but we have very good reason to
believe that this gentleman employs wood only
because France possesses wood, but not iron, and
workmen in wood but not in iron, and uses the
means that he has at his disposal, although admit-
ting their inferiority, and we know as a public fact
that having begun in wood they are now resorting
to iron.

We could say much more on the question of the

time to be occupied in building in wood in the dock-
yards as compared with iron by the contractors, but
we are already trespassing too much on your space,
and we will only remark in conclusion on the com-
parison given as to cost, and the effect of one course
or the other on the navy estimates, -
The Controller gives the cost of an iron ship at
£214,000, as compared with a wooden one at
£187,000, showing a saving of £27,000 per ship.,
Without questioning these figures, which can-
not, however, be admitted as correct, we would ob-
serve that this is only the cost of the hull, and that

n each case is to be added, the cost being the same,

the machinery, say £50,000; the rigging and outfit
say £20,000 ; the armament, stores, &c., say £20,000
more. The real difference, therefore, is not between
£214,000 and £187,000, but between £304,000 and
£277,000. In other words, on the coat of five ves-
sels as proposed, out of a million and a half for iron
the country is to save £135,000 even on the Con-
troller's own showing, and that for the sake of

this difference it is " wiser and more economical to
supply the wants of the moment by a cheaper
and less durable structure." We do not believe in
the cheapness, but we only point out now how
small the economy is to be. _ _ _

That if these ships are built of wood in the dock-
yards " no more money will be required than what
already appears in the Navy Estimates, whereas if
built of iron by contract the whole of the money re-
quired to do so must be voted separately, in addi-
tion to the ordinary Navy Estimates, is a most ex-
traordinary statement.
Build these vesse:s as we may, the £50,000 for
machinery, the £40,000 for rigging, outfit, arma-
ment, &c., will alike have to be spent. If built of
wood in the dockyards, each ship will require above
1,000 tons of armour-plates to be purchased of
" contractors," which, with the expense of fixing,
will absorb some £50,000 out of the £187,000 put
down by the Controller as the cost of each ship. Of
the remaining £137,000, say roughly one-third in
wages, or £47,000, will be spent if the ships are
built in the dockyards, or saved if not; and of the
£90,000 balance, representing the material, ther©
will be timber, &c., in the dockyard worth the
money if remaining there, or capable of being soli
for the money to the contractors, or saving the
money in the next Estimates by continuing in
stock.