The Sun.
London, England, 1830-02-04 00:00:00

LIFE OF GALILEO.

Just published, Number 62, 63, and 67 of the Library of
Useful Knowledge, comprising
IMIE LIFE of GALILEO, with Illustra-
(rations of the Advancement of Experimental

Philosophy.
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The DUKE of WELLINGTON'S ACCOUNT

OF THE BATTLE OF ASSAYE.

(From Sir Thomas Munro's Lift.)

The following is General Wellesley's reply to a
letter in which Mr. Munro had questioned the wis-
dom of certain movements preceding the battle of
Assaye:— ,

" Camp at Cherikain, N0v..1,.1803„

" MY DEAR MUNRO,—As you are a judge of a
military operation, and as I am desirous of having
your opinion on my side, I am about to give you an
account of the battle at Asiaye, in answer to your
letter of the 19th of October; in which I think I
shall solve all the doubts which must naturally occur
to any man who looks at that transaction without a
sufficient knowledge of the facts. Before you re-
ceive this you will most probably have seen my
public letter to the Governor-General regarding the
action, a copy of which was sent to General Camp-
bell. That letter will give you a general outline of
the facts. Your principal objection to the action is,
that I detached Colonel Stevenson. The fact is, I
did not detach Colonel Stevenson. His was a sepa-
rate corps equally strong, if not stronger than mine.
We ►were desirous to engage the enemy at the
same time, and settled a plan accordingly for an
attack on the morning of the 24th. We separated
on the 22d—he to march by the western, I by the '
eastern road, round the hills between Budnapore and
Jalna; and I have to observe that this separation
was necessary—first, because both corps could not
pass through the same defiles in one day ; secondly
because it was to be apprehended that if we left,
open one of the roads through those hills the enemy
might have passed to the southward while we were
going to the northward, and then the action would
have been delayed, or probably avoided altogether,
Colonel Stevenson and I were never more than 12
miles distant from each other, and when I moved
forward to the action of the 23d, we were not
much more than eight miles. As usual, we de.
pended for our intelligence of the enemy's position
on the common hircarrahs of the country. Their
horse was so numerous, that without an army their
position could not be reconnoitred by an European
officer; and even the hircarrahs in our owm service,
who were accustomed to examine and report on
positions, cannot be employed here, as, being na-
tives of the Carnatic, they are as well known as an
European.
" The hircarrahs reported the enemy to be at
Bokerdun. heir right was at Bokerdun, which
was the principal place in their position, and gave
the name to the district in which they were en-
camped ; but their left, in which was their infantry,
which I was to attack, was at Assaye, which was
six or eight miles from Bokerdun.

" I directed my march so as to be within twelve
or fourteen miles of their army at Bokerdun, as I
thought, on the 23d. But when I arrived at the
ground of encampment, I found that I was not more
than five or six miles from it. I was then informed
that the cavalry had marched, and the infantry was
about to follow, but was still on the ground; at
all events, it was necessary to ascertain these
points; and I could not venture to reconnoitre with-
out my whole force. But I believed the report to
be true, and I detertnin ed to attack the infantry if it
still remained upon the ground. I apprised Colonel
Stevenson of this determination, and desired him to
move forward. Upon marching on I found not
only their infantry, but their cavalry, encamped in
a most formidable position, which, by the bye, it
would have been impossible for me to attack, if,
when the infantry changed their front, they had
taken care to occupy the only passage there was
across the Kaitna.

t, When I found their whole army, and contem-
plated their position, of course I considered whether
I should attack immediately, or should delay till the
following morning. I determined upon the imme-
diate attack, because it was clear that if I attempted
to return to my camp at Naulmah I should have
been followed thither by the whole of the enemy's
cavalry, and I might have suffered some loss; in-
stead of attacking, I might have been attacked there
in the morning; and, at all events, I should have
found it very difficult to secure my baggage, as I
did, in any place so near the enemy's camp, in which
they should know it was: I therefore determined
upon the attack immediately.
." It was certainly a most desperate one; but our
guns were not silenced. Our bullocks, and the peo-

pie Mid were employed to draw them, were shot,
and they could not all be drawn on ; but some were,.
and all continued to fire as long as the fire could
be of arty .use.
" Desperate as the action was our loss would not
have-exceeded one-half of its present amount if it
had not
.been for a mistake in the officer who led the
picquets which were on thu `right of the first line.
" When the enemy changed their position, they
threw theirdeft to Assaye, in. which village they had
some infantry ; and it was surrounded by cannon.—
As soon as I saw that I directed 114 e officer com-
manding the picquets to keep 'Out -of shot from the
.village; instead of that he-led direr ly upon it; the
79th, which were on the right-of the first line, fol-
lowed the picquets, and the great loss we sustained
was in these two bodies. :Another evil-Which re-
sulted from this` mistake was -the ,necessity of intro-
ducing the cavalry into the cannonade and the ac-
tion, long befOreit was- time, by which that corps
lost many -men, and its utility. and efficiency, which
I intended to bring forward in a don pursuit .at`the
heel of the day. But it was necessary to Wring for-
ward the cavalry to save the remains of the 79th
and the picquets, which would otherwise.have been
entirely 'destroyed. -Another- evil from it
was, that we bad then no reserve lefl,:and a parcel
of straggling horse cut up our wounded ; and
straggling infantry, who had pretended to be dead,
turned their tuns upon our backs.
" After all, notwithstanding this attack upon
Assaye by our right and the cavalry, no impression
was made upon the corps collected there till I made
a movement upon it with some troops taken from
our left, after the enemy's right had been defeated;
and it would have been as well to have left it alone
entirely till that movement was made. However, I
do not wish to cast any reflection upon the officer
who led the picquets. I lament the consequences
of his mistake ; but 1 must acknowledge that it was
not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter
fire than he did the picquets on that day against
Assaye.
" After the action there was no pursuit, because
our cavalry was not then in a state to pursue. It
was near dark when the action was over ; and we
passed the night on the field of battle.
' Colonel Stevenson marched with part of his
corps as soon as he heard that I was about to move
forward, and he also moved upon Bokerdun. He
did not receive my letter till evening. He got en-
tangled in a nullah in the night, and arrived at Bo-
kerdun, about eight miles from me to the westward,
at eight in the morning of the 24th.
" The enemy passed 'the night of the 23d at
about twelve miles from the field of battle, twelve
from the Adjuntee Ghaut, and eight from Boker-
dun. As soon as they heard that Colonel Steven-
son was advancing to the latter place they set off,
and never stopped till they had got down the Ghaut,
where they arrived in the course of the night of
the 24th. After his difficulties of the night of the
23d, Colonel Stevenson was in no state to follow
them, and did not do so till the 26th. The reason
for which he was detained till that day was, that I
might have the benefit of the assistance of his stir.-
geons to dress my wounded soldiers, many of whom,
after all, were not dressed for nearly a week, for
want of the necessary number of medical men.
had also a long and difficult negotiation with the
Nizam's sirdats, to induce them to admit my wounded
into any of the Nizam's forts; and I could not
allow them to depart until I had settled that point.
Besides, I knew that the enemy had passed the
Ghaut, and that to pursue them a day sooner
or rt day later could make no difference.—
Since the battle Stevenson has taken Barham-
poor and Asseergur. I have defended the
Nizam's territories. They first threatened them
through the Caperhay Ghaut, and I moved to the
southward to the neighbourhood of Arungabad. I
then saw clearly that they intended to attempt the
siege of Asseergur, and I moved up to the north-
ward, and descended the Adjuntee Ghaut, and
stopped Scind:ah. Stevenson took Asseergur on the
21st. I heard the intelligence on the 24th, and
that the Rajah of Berar had come to the south with
an army. I ascended the Ghat on the 25th, and
have marched a hundred anal twenty miles since in
eight days, by which I have saved all our convoys,
and the Nizam's territories. I have been near the
Rajah of Berar two days, in the course of which
he has marched five times; and I suspect that he
is now off to his own country, finding that he can
do nothing in this. If that is the case I shall soon
begin an offensive operation there.
" But these exertions, I fear, cannot last ; and
yet, if they are relaxed, such is the total absence of
all government, and means of defence in this country,
that it must fall. It makes me sick to have any
thing to do with them ; and it is impossible to de-
scribe their state. Pray exeit yourself for Bistnapah
Pundit, and believe me ever your's most sincerely,
" ARTHUR WELLESLEY."