The Sun.
London, England, 1839-05-10 00:00:00

medy which would, in my opinion, completely remove the
existing political disorders. It needs but to fellow out
consistently the principles of the British Constitution,
and introduce into the Government of these great Co•
lonies those wise provisions by which alone the working
of the representative system can in any country be ren-
dered harmonious and efficient. We are not now to con-
sider the policy of establishing Representative Govern-
ment in the North American Colonies. That has been
irrevocably done ; and the experiment of depriving the
people of their present constitutional power is not to be
thought of. To conduct their government harmoniously,
in accordance with its established principles, is now the
business of its rulers; and I know not how it is possible
to secure that harmony in any other way than by adminis-
tering the government on those principles which have been
found perfectly efficacious in Great Britain. I would not
impair a single prerogative of the Crown ; -on the con-
trary, I believe that the interests of the people of these
Colonies require the protection of prerogatives which have
not hitherto been exercised. But the Crown must, on
the other hand, submit to the necessary consequences of
representative institutions; and if it has to carry on the
government in unison with a representative body, it must
consent to carry it on by means of those in whom that re-
presentative body has confidence.
" In England, this principle has been so long considered
an indisputable and essential part of our Constitution, that
it has hardly ever been found necessary to inquire into the
means by which its observance is enforced. When a Mi-
nistry ceases to command a majority of Parliament on great
questions of policy, its doom is immediately sealed ; and
it would appear to us as strange to attempt for any time to
carry on a Government by means of Ministers perpe-
tually in a minority, as it would be to pass laws
with a majority of votes against them. The ancient con-
stitutional remedies by impeachment and a stoppage
of the supplies, have never, since the reign of William the
Third, been brought into operation for the purpose of re-
moving a Ministry. They have never been called for ;
because, in fact, it has been the habit of Ministers rather
to anticipate the occurrence of an absolutely hostile vote,
and to retire, when supported only by a bare and uncertain
majority. If Colonial Legislatures have frequently stopped
the supplies, if they have harassed public servants by unjust
or harsh impeachments, it was because the removal of an
unpopular Administration could not be effected in the
Colonies by those milder indications of a want of confidence,
which have always sufficed to attain the end in the Mother
Country.
' " The means which have occasionally been proposed
in the Colonies themselves, appear to me by no means cal-
culated to attain the desired end in the best way. These
proposals indicate such a want of reliance on the willing-
ness of the Imperial Goverment to acquiesce in the adop-
tion of a better system, as, if warranted, would render an
harmonious adjustment of the different powers of the
State utterly hopeless. An elective Executive Council
would not only be utterly inconsistent with monarchial
government, but would really, under the nominal autho-
rity of the Crown, dreprive the community of one of the
great advantages of an hereditary Monarch. Every purpose
of popular control might be combined with every advantage
of vesting the immediate choice of advisers in the Crown,
were the Colonial Governor to be instructed to secure the
co-operationiof the Assembly in his policy, by intrusting its
administration to such men as could command a majority ;
and if he were given to understand that he need count on
no aid from home in any difference with the Assembly, that
should not directly involve the relations between the Mo-
ther Country and the Colony. This change might be ef-
fected by a single despatch containing such instructions ;
or if any legal enactment were requisite, it would only be
one that would render it necessary that the official acts of
the Governor should be countersigned by some public func-
tionary. This would induce responsibility for every act of
the Government ; and, as a natural consequence, it would
necessitate the substitution of a system of representation,
by means of competent heads of departments, for the pre-
sent rude machinery of an Executive Council. The Go-
vernor, if he wished to retain advisers not possessing the
confidence of the existing Assembly, might rely on the
effect of an appeal to the people ; and, if unsuccessful, he
might be coerced by a refusal of supplies, or his advisers
might be terrified by the prospect of impeachment. But
there can be no reason for apprehending that either party
would enter on a contest when each would find its inte-
rest in the maintenance of harmony; and the abuse of the
powers which each would constitutionally possess would
cease when the struggle for larger powers became unneces-
sary. Nor can I conceive that it would be found impos-
sible or difficult to conduct a colonial government with
precisely that limitation of the respective powers which has
been so long and so easily maintained in Great Britain.
" I know that it has been urged that the principles
which are productive of harmony and good government
in the mother country, arc by no means applicable to a
colonial dependency. It is said that it is necessary that
the administration of a colony should be carried on by
persons nominated without any reference to the wishes of
its people ; that they have to carry into effect the po-
licy, not of that people, but of the authorities at home;
and that a colony which should came all its own admi-
nistrative functionaries, would, in fact, cease to be de-
pendent. I admit that the system which I propose,
would, in fact, place the internal government of the co-
lony in the hands of the colonists themselves ; and that we
should thus leave to them the execution of the laws of
which we have long intrusted the making solely to them.
Perfectly aware of the value of our Colonial possessions,
and strongly impressed with the necessity of maintaining
our connexion with them, I know not in what respect it
can be desirable that we should interfere with their in.
tcrnal legislation in matters which do not affect their
relations with the mother country, The matters which
so concern us are very few. The constitution of the
form of government the regulation of foreign re-
lations, and of trade with the Mother Country, the
other British Colonies, and foreign nations,—and the
disposal of the public lands, are the only points
on which the mother country requires a control. This
control is now sufficiently secured by the authority of the
Imperial Legislature ; by the protection which the colony
derives from us against foreign enemies ; by the beneficial
terms which our laws secure to its trade ; and by its share
of the reciprocal benefits which would be conferred by a
wise system of colonization. A perfect subordination on
the part of the colony, on these points, is secured by the
advantages which it finds in the continuance of its con.
nexion with the empire. It certainly is not strengthened,
but greatly weakened, by a vexatious interference on the
part of the Home Government, with the enactment of laws
for regulating the internal concerns of the colony, or in
the selection of the persons intrusted with their execution.
The colonists may not always know what laws are best for
them, or which of their countrymen are the fittest
fur conducting their affairs ; but at least they have a
greater interest in coming to a right judgment on these
points, and will take greater pains to do so than those
whose welfare is very remotely and slightly affected by the
good or bad legislation of these portions of the empire.
If the colonists make bad laws, and select improper
persons to conduct their affairs, they will generally be
the only, always the greatest sufferers ; and, like the
people of other countries, they must bear the ills which
they bring on themselves, until they choose to apply the
remedy. But it surely cannot be the duty or the interest
of Great Britain to keep a most expensive military pos-
session of these colonies, in order that a Governor or a
Secretary of State may be able to confer Colonial appoint-
ments on one rather than on another set of persons in the
Colonies. For this is really the only question at issue.
The slightest acquaintance with these Colonies proves the
fallacy of the common notion, that any considerable amount
of patronage in them is distributed among strangers from
the mother country. Whatever inconvenience a conse-
quent frequency of changes amma* the holders of office
may produce, is a necessary disadvantage of free govern-
ment, which will be amply compensated by the perpetual
harmony which the system must produce between the
people and its rulers. Nor do I fear that the character of
the public servants will, in any respect, suffer from a more
popular tenure of office. For I can conceive no system so
calculated to fill important posts with inefficient persons, as
the present, in which public opinion is too little consulted
in the original appointment, and in which it i 3 almost im.
possible to remove those who disappoint the expectations
of their usefulness, without inflicting a kind of brand on
their capacity or integrity.
" I am well aware that many persons, both in the
Colonies and at home, view the system which I re-
commend with considerable alarm, because they distrust the
ulterior views of those by whom it was originally pro-
posed, and whom they suspect of urging its adoption
with the intent only of enabling them more easily
to subvert monarchical institutions, or assert the indepen-
dence of the colony. I believe, however, that the extent
to which these ulterior views exist, has been greatly over-
rated. We must not take every rash expression of disap-
pointment as an indication of a settled aversion to the ex-
isting. Constitution ; and my own observation convinces me,
that the predominant feeling of all the English population
of the North American Colonies is that of devoted attach.
mont to the Mother Country. I believe that neither the
interests nor the feelings of the people are incompatible
with the Colonial Government, wisely and popularly ad.
ministered. The proofs which many, who are much dis-
satisfied with the existing administration of the Govern
ment, have given of their loyalty, are not to be denied or
overlooked. The attachment constantly exhibited by the
people of these Provinces towards the British Crown and
Empire has all the characteristics of a strong national
feeling. They value the institutions of their country, not
merely from a sense of the practical advrntages which they
confer, but from sentiments of national pride ; and they
uphold them the more, because they are accustomed to
view them as marks of nationality, which distinguish them
from their Republican neighbours. I do not mean to
affirm that this is a feeling which no implicy on the part
of the Mother Cuntry will be unable to impair ; but I
do most confidently regard it as one which may, if rightly
appreciated, be make the link of an enduring and advan-
tageous connexion. The British people of the North Ame-
rican Colonies are a people on whom we may safely rely,
and to whom we must not grudge power. For it is not to
the individuals who have been loudest in demanding the
change, that I propose to concede the responsibility.
of the Colonial administration, but to the people them-
selves. Nor can I conceive that any people, or any consi-
derable portion of a people, will view with dissatisfaction a
change which would amount simply to this, that the Crown
would henceforth consult the wishes of the people in the
choice of its servants.
" The important alteration in the policy of the Colonial
Government which I recommend, might be wholly or in
great part effected for the present by the unaided autho-
rity of the CroWn ; and I believe that the great mass of
discontent in Upper Canada, which is not directly con-
nected with personal irritation arising out of the incidents
of the late troubles, might be dispelled by an assurance
that the government of the colony should henceforth be