The Sun.
London, England, 1863-05-28 00:00:00

course with the Government of Scfferson Davis ; We
have refused to receive his agents, and yet we have
recognised the Southerners as belligerents. With
what appearance of consistency, after this, could we
ucturAllv enter into otgotiations with the Polish N. -
tional Government, and met refuse to recognise the
Poles as belligerents also ? We will not now enter
at length into other questions which would have to
be considered by the National Government in
.con-
nection with this subject. How could they
e
sure that the arrangements which might be ulti-
mately arrived at Nyould be satisfactory to them,
and, in the event of thi,ir declining to accept theca,
it, what position would they be to resume (de?'
sive operations ? The delay would be fatal to their
chances of success, while it would be all in
favour
of Russia. She would have had time to trample
out the flame in those more remote provinces into
which it is now insidiously extending itself. Every
day that passed would be a gain to her prestige lo
those parts of her empire which are now disaffected
and hesitating. There she would have time to
consolidate her power, and terrify into submission
those who are gaining courage by the protracted
resistance in Poland. In that country she would
not be idle; she would reorganise her new demo-
ralised army, and make use of the breathing-time
to imprison or exile those who were concerned in
the revolt. How would it be possible, unless the
first condition was the evacuation of Poland by the
Russian army, to prevent any excesses being com-
mitted upon the population ? How, during this in-
terval, are the insurgents to dispose of the arms it
has cost so much to tain ? Are they to hand them
over to the Russian authorities, or will the Western
Powers take charge of them, and give them back to
the insurgents in the event of the negotiations fail-
ing ? How are the Powers to guarantee the safety
of those who have been actively engaged against the
Russian army ? or how is either side to be made to
adhere to any condition which the Powers may lay
down. unless there is a foreign army of occupation ?
From whatever point of view we regard it the scheme
seems impracticable, and the proposal useless. We
must hit upon some other solution of the problem if
we wish to see the peace of Europe maintained. If
we underrated the forces at work in Poland at the
outset of the movement, let ns not remain in error
any longer. The terms which might have satisfied
them two months ago will do so no longer. Their
hopes are rising with every victory they gain, and
with every fresh province that revolts, The very
anxiety which is betrayed by foreign Governments
gives them confidence, for they see that the lute
rests of the great Powers are becoming involved,
and they hope more from interests than from synk
pat Ly. They have everything to gain, and nothing
to lose, by a European war ; and they are naturallq
endeavouring to excite one. If we want peace We
must buy it, and the Poles tell us that we can only
buy at the price of the reconstitution of their cowl'
try within its ancient limits, Meantime the armies
of Russia and the diplomatists of Europe are grog'
gling to obtain it without paying for it at all. We
have not much confidence in the success of either
the one or the other.