The Sun.
London, England, 1808-10-21 00:00:00

THF,', PORTUGAL COM/ENRON.

The history of the country hardly manifests SO
Alive a spirit of prejudication, both as to the Policy
of this measure, and the conduct of its authors.—
Yet, violent as .the censures have blien, we do not
c Inem as -the voice of the public, but as
the clatuoi.irs.ol Party. •The public feel more of
tiue sold En.2.lish liberalist',---They are disposed to
say with the Poet,
" Heat all, and theft let justice hold the scale "
Such was the conduit of our ancestors, such will be
the coodna Of all wise and lionosi men in these and
ail times. The temperate forbearance and dignified
candour uttered 'in the' tniswer from the Throne,
will 'be echoed by the. voice of the Nation hi gene-
ral, in spite of the arts of ia6tion. ; and justice will
finally be heard, not withStauding the din of her base
ins:rumen ts. The inquiry may evince that this Con-
vention,• so prematurely reviled and condemned by
the less discerning and candid 'part of the Public, may
have been wise, or the reverse; whether it was the
one or the other,. must depend on all the circum-
stances of the case; and without an accurate know-
ledge of these, .tio just opinion cat, be formed on the
sub) ea.
Hitherto all has been conjeaure and injustice.
As tar as past-experience reaches the case, every coti;-
elusion is in favour 'of Sir ARTHUR WELLESLEY ;
and the presumption is strongly on hi's side, that, in
signing this Convention, whether' he approved, or Wis-
opprotyd of it,he tided wisely" and discreet(?). If it
was a Wise tneasure,• it requires no defence.; and if
it was the reverse, it was an act for which he is not
responsible, as he was otify the Military Agent to per-
feCt it on the part of his superior Officer, in whom
the power to make it lodged, and with whom the
duty to defend it rests. What Sir A. WELLESLEY
might have done to 1)i-event the necessity of any
such ConventiOn, bad 'he not been displaced 'from
the Counfiand of the Army, may be estimated (per.;
haps not unfairly) by what he did do in the short
but brilliant period while'he was at its head, and
that his brave and comprehensive Mind was "un-
fettered.

No one will deny, that in war, the delay of a mo-
ment may, often times so vary the relative stare of
two Armies oppbsed to each other, as to render that
adviseable which before was the reverse : it, is one
thing to follow up with victorious troops a -vanquish-
ed Arniy dispirited by 'defeat ;—it is, another, to al-,
low the 'enthusiasm of vi&ory to subside, mink. on
the Field of Glory, and to allow it time to recover
fr`oni 'its paniC, and strengthen its position. The Con-
vention, therefore, that would have been unwise iw
the moment of victory, might have been the reverse
when its fruits were blighted by not follo-wing up the
blow.

In viewing the Convention, the reversed state
of things, when Sir A. W. was no longer allowed
to pursue his successes, must equally be surveyed;
and.then arises-the question—Whether, for the pur-
pose of gaining, comparatively, a lesser advantage,
*shall an infinitely greater benefit apparently be sa-
crificed ? Teerealise and secure a permanent-good,
and to put great interests.as little as •-possible to ha-
-Aard, is a wis,6 axiom in the. affairs of human life :
-and in War,. where so much depends-on chance and
the fluctuations of fortune, this is peculiarly desira-
ble. Mai-shal TIIIIEN NE, alive to this sentiment
(and wit4l..deference:tO the great Military 'Heads of
;he Common Council of • LOndon), used to say—..
" I)ans la guei ra, it est soutrent bon de faire un poet
d'or pour one enentie hattue."
When, therefore, th-fruits of the Battle of. Vi-
rniera were in some degree impaired by the pause.
-*hick ensiled from the change of Commanders, and
that .4ipie'r was enabledto rally' his army and con-.
centrate his 'forces, he became placed in a situation,
from whence to drive him would have been the
Work of tn ,ntlis, attended with perhaps the destruc-
lion of "'Lisbon, 'protrakted sieges, great expenee,.
-Waste of time, loss of precious British blood, infinite
diffitailty in sUbsiSting., our army, much danger to
our fleet and transports from the season of the year:
on so-perilous a shore, and likewise (it must be ad-
mitted) with something of risk and uncertainty in.
the ultimate result. And as to the final object,
what was it ? To compel the French to surreto-r
themselves prisoners of war, and to captnre fire
Russian fleet, consisting of crazy vessels, some of
them scarcely sea-worthy ;-.--for, beyond this, it is
not maintained that _there was any ulterior objet.
At the rate of the risk here enumerated was this
advantage to be 'purchased. • Now comes the ques-
tion—Whether, if, in Substance, this be obtained, at
comparatively an infinitely less expence, it was not
wise, in the reverse state of things, to. make the
purchase ? And if so, what is wise can never be dis-
honourable. Ta redeem Portugal front the fangs
and bondage of France, to open her harbours to.our
fleets and trade, to pour abundance iuto.our camps,
liberate the Spaniards from their
,captivity,_ our
army froM *US confined position, to hold out to
Spain and Italy the prosper of early
ssuccours from
a triumphant.. army, to give to Europe the great
example of such a generous use of our military
power, to. invite general -insurreCtion in the sub-
jugated States of Europe by this ,monument of
our- strength,„ to reanimate the commercial inter-
course between Great Britain and Portugal ; and
leaving nothing to hazard in the state of affairs
in. Spain, and tempestuous season of the year,
finirlly to accomplish. the solid and grand ob-
jea of -the Expedition,. and that successfully ;
to commence the great work of the liberation
of .Europe; :and the overthrow of the colossal
power.-and tyranny .of BUONA PARTE j to perk&
-and realise so glorious an improvement in our poli-
tical situation,. add rebuild the throne and dominion
of our ancient, faithful, and expatriated Ally. What
was th; cost:of ail these precious benefits ? To al:
low of an army, in numbers not very inferior to our
own, in possession of the capital, the strung forts in
its neighbourhood, the Tagus, and capable, frOm the
chances of war, of farthe.r relief, in the event of any
di&isters in the North of-Spain, and abundantly sup-
plied with provisions and all the means of protracted
resistance-7-10 allow it to abandon its conquest, to
bow its eagles, and retire to its own shores,, to harry •
with it the tale or its defeat and losses to its itltu-
rime Master and dismayed Countrymen—serving
our own and the general cause wore, and at a less
expence, than if its &motel' had been concealed '
from the view of its fellow-citiZetd, by shte;tivg