The Sun.
London, England, 1801-11-06 00:00:00

40 have claimed' Piedmont for its Sovereign, but
rr)nicl we have obtiib&lStf? ',Could we have pro.
-ured its restoration unless- we could have disposed
the King.roft Errnria, unless weLeonid have the
,141 pine and.Ligprian Republich, and„ driven the
:-'ri-etich from the Mountains cdSwitzerland.?-41n..igsg.
we cotild„have done-all; this, it would have, been,
• vaine,to restore the King of Saainia to his
',III, surrounded as he wouldthave beep by the F'rencht"
by;their dependent at affiliated kepulilics.—
As to Portugal; eve'ry.bodyjfhruSr-iarnent er mis-
t:ortunct. But irit Was rightirt-,h'er-ro- ask to be re.
.eased from her engagements to- Us, and 'if it was:
tight in us to consent to it, then: clearly: we were
iihsolved from any Obligation 'because an ob_
ligation which is put au end to on the dne side, Can,-
upon no fair reasoning,- be said to Continue on the
other. As to the Cession of OliVenza, it Certainly
was not of any great importance-; bear much had been
said about the 'Territory which France had obtained.
fcqn Portugal in South America,'and.a considerable
degree of geographical knowlecigeliad been displayed
in tracing the coarse of river but Gen t me n ;should
lecolleki;that a South American antil aref: uropein 'river
Were materially different, tfn.r When yoltrwere talk;
2ng of the Banks of ii river in South Artericif it Vria•
.Veillaterl lit tie less thanthe c6asts, of an ocean.
It had been said, " You atfed to guarantee theln,
ttarity of Portugal, but it is 1y 'after France and
Spain have taken every thing they wished ,for.q
But this again was not corred. The Treaty of,
13"dajoz certainly did not give to• France all she
desired, because France, 'by a subsequent Treaty,
extorts another Cession of still greater importake
/0 her. What 114 ,pens then ? Portugal has given
up this second portion of her territory by force,.
when you interfere and cancel the Second Treaty,
and bring them back to the Stipulations in the first.
To you, then, Portugal owes this dilference in the
limits of her South American Empire, and to her
You have actednot only with good Faith, but .with
dignified liberality. The only remaining Ally was
!ue Prince of Orange ; from our antient connections,
irom our gratitude for, the services.of the House of
Orange at the period of the RevolutiOn, from his
onnexion with our Sovereign, we could not but
take a lively interest in his fate, and we had shewn
it by our conduCt ; he was not to be told of the
guarantee of the Constitution of Holland, without

re-calling to the recolleetion of the House, the efforts
we had made to defend, the unparalleled exertions
W had made to restore him to his dominions. tven

411.:the present occasion his interests had not been
tleglefted; we did interfere fbr him,' and we were.
;old that'his interests were at that time the subjed.
tits Negotiation, and dim he. would receive an '
'indemnity., Even if we were to take that upon
ourselves; it ought 'not to stand in -die way of a
,catPnationiti arrangement. Thus stood the case
With regard to our acquisitions and to our Allies.
ILit it has been said, that we ought 'to have ob-
tained more; 'that we ought to have obtained some-
ding to'balance the great increase of power tVhicli
Yrance had obtairie&--that we. have 'given France
means of increasing her maritime strength, and,
short, 'thfit we have signed the death-warrant df
tile Country. 'Now, in the first place, if we had
'retained all'our conquests; it would not have 'made
difierence to us in point of security. He did
not mean to say, he would not have retained them
4,1 i if he could, but they were no note' important
Than they would give us a little more or a little less
:41f colonial power, and only tended to promote our
6ecority by. increasing our finance. But would the
',:acquisition of all these Islands have enabled us 'to

ounterbalance -the power which France -has ac- I
' lotted on the Continent, they would only give you
a little more wealth ;
.brit a littore wealth
11',_ eolit he badly purchased by a little more-war ;
should think SO, even if we could be sure.
that one year's more war would give it, to us ; i-
- l*lrtieularly 'when ifr.t was recolleCted how tnany.
tears we had now been engaged in this contest.
n speaking however about our resources, he would'
'Uke. upon himself to state (and he hoped the House
Gould give him-Credit for some knowledge upon the
414.ie61), that if any case of necessity should arise,
c: if our honour should, require another contest, we
ate far, very far indeed, from the end of our pe-
t 4111ary resources, Which, he ,was happy to say,
were greater than the Enemy, or' even the People
'..°.! this Country theMselves had an idea of. For the'
Puil''6se atili-feilee, or foi the Se-Cu ritY of Our honor,
,
..e hoe still resources in abundance, but they ought
t:
.° be Kept for these purposesiand-not lavished away'
24 vsaNinuing a contest, with the certainty of enor-
i ' 14"3 expellee. 'iou might sit down in a worse
relative situation than yen are at present, your ob.
2 IL":t not obtained, your 'security not effeeted.—As
.*-I,_'4be general point, we could..not now think of
ualancing the-Powers on the Continent ;• it was un-
! dGubtedly.right,
_that if the French had conqaered
- much, We Ought also to endeavour to retain-much ;
out in treating with France, -we were not to con-
--sider, what France, had. got from other Countries,
but what was the relative situation between us and
-'ranee. Gentlemen had talked of-the-iiti pssidetis,
but France had not insisted upon that principle. in
"Met' Treaties with the Powers 'on the Continent ;
the had 'not retained the possession of all she had
otlqueretl, and consequently we, could be justified
ik-insisting upon that principle. HeAdmitted, that if
a Country had increased in power and territory,fas ter
than its natural rival; for, without 'speaking hasti-
iY, he must consider France in that charatter, that
Light
justify. 'the engaging in a Confederacy to
bring him hack to his ancient strength; but if he
had been able to dissolve that Confederacy,, that
Why',
perhaps, he the worst reason in the world
wny, when we came to make Peace with him, we
were to expect the more favourable terms. It would
be but bad reasoning if one Power was to say to
• another, you are much too powerful for us; we-have
not the means of reducing that power by force, and
therefore you must cede to us a portion of your
territories in order to 'make us equal in point of
strength. Gentlemen might undoubtedly wish this,
but that which regulated wishes would not regulate
• z,_--'tierly -many things might be prayed for, but were
"tdly to be expeCled. • ,BUt he did not see that we
lvere giving to the Enemy all this Colonial wealth
"n l Maritime Power which had.been represented.
''''''at You give back is not only smaller .than what
* )-otr-reiain, but much of it-is in-a -ruined state-. . .fie
.- ' "3 therefore inclined to . think, that fur many

years at least, we should have the Colonial trade,
and that too isacaeaAng- ioaexten4 and value.—
That we should not have been justified in ask.:
ing for more . he. did noa,rneara to assert, but that
we should havie -got more, or; that.iwe
;ought to
have continued
atheaWar to, increase our Posses-
sions, was a proposition to which he, coati' not give
his assent. Allusions had been made to former
diiihaidnS and l(dgeage a upon this aubjeCt he should
oAlye sly, ',that .;peace having laCen'res`tored be-
tween England aiod France, forbearance of lan-
guage, and terms of respe&, were proper, but
it would be -,affedation and hypocrisy in him to
say he had-or could change his opinion of the cha-
rader of the peeson presiding in France, until he
saw a train of condud which would justify that
change'. He would not now oceupy the attention of
the House by entering into adiscussion of the ori-
gin of the Ware the unjust aggression which was
Made upon:ais, was established by recent evidence,
but it was unnecessary to enter into it now, because
upon .that. subjett the opinion of the House and of
the Country was fixed. The great object of the
War on our .part was defence for .ourselves and for.
the: rest of the world, irea war waged against most.
Of
,thenations of Europe, but against us with par.
ticulatethalignity. Security was our great object ;
there were different means of accomplishing it with
better or worse prospects Of success, and according
to the different variations of policy, occasioned *by
aechange of circumstances, we still pursued our great
object,' security. In order to obtain it, we cer-
tiaoly didlook for the subversion of that Govern-
ment whiclfWas fotitided upon revolutionary prin.
tiples.. We never at any one period said, that as
a sine qua non we insisted upon the ,restoration of
the old Government of Franceaa—we,only said, there
was no Government with which We could treat :
this was our language up to 1796 ; but in no one
instance did we ever insist upon restoring the
Monarchy, though, he did not hesitate to acknow-
ledge. that it would have been more consistent with
the wishes of Ministers, and with the interest and
security of this Country. He, was equally ready to
confess, that he had given up his hopes with the
greatest reludance, and he should, to his dying
day, lament that there were not, on the part of the
Other Powers of Europe, efforts corresponding to
Our own for the accomplishment of that great work.
There were periods during the continuance of the
War in which they had hopes of being able to put to-
gether the scattered fragments of that great and vene-
rable Edifice ; to have restored the exiled Nobility
of France, to 'have restored a Government, cer-
tainly not free from defects, but built upon sober
and regular foundations, instead of that mad system
of innovation which threatened, and nearly accoin.
plished the destruCtion of Europe.
When this became unattainable he gave up his
hopes, but wehad the satisfafflon of knowing, that
we had survived the violence of the Revolutionary
fever) that we had seen the extent of its principles
abated :—We had seen jacobinism deprived of its
fascination *;' we-had seen it stripped of the name and
pretext of Liberty ; it had shewn itself to he ca-
pable only of destroying, not of building, and that
it. must necessarily end in a Military Despotism ;
he trusted this important 'lesson would not be
'thrown away upon' the world.—There were times
, doting the War in which Government hoped
to be able • to drive France within her ancient
limits, and even to make barriers against her fur-
ther incursions ; but in this they'were disappointed;
it became then necessary, with the change of cir-
'conistancea, to change our objects, for he did not
know a more fatal error, than to look only at one
objet`}, and obstinately to pursue it, when the hope
of accomplishing it no longer remained. If it be-
came impossible for us to attain the full ashjea of
oar wishes, wisdom and policy both required that
we should' endeavour to obtain that which was next
hest. In sayinethis, he was not sensible of incon-
sisteney, either in his former langUage or condud,
in refusing to treat with the person who now holds
the destinies of France, because, when he formerly
declined Treating with him, he then said, that if
events took the turn they had since done) he had
no objealon to treat with him. He would now
add, but very little more to what he had said—He
could not agree with those Gentlemen who seemed
to think that France had grown so much stronger
in proportion to what' we had, and these gloomy
apprehensions seemed to him to be almost
wholly without • foundation. This Country al-
ways was, and he trusted always would be, able
to check the ambitious projezis of France, and to
give that degree of assistance to the rest of Europe
which they had done upon this occasion, and he'
wished it-had been done with more effect. But when
the immense acquisitions which France had made
were taken into consideration on the one hand, it
was hut fair on the other, to consider what she had
lost in population, in commerce, in capital, and in
habits of industry ; the desolation produced by con-
vulsions such as France had ',undergone, could not
be repaired even by large acquisitions of territory.
Comparing therefore what France has gained with
what she has lost, this enormous increase of power
was nor quite so apparent as some Gentlemen on the
other side seemed to apprehend. When he.took into
consideration the immense: wealth of this Country,
and the naturaland legitimate growth of that wealth,
so much superior to the produce, of rapacity and plun-
der, he could ..not but entertain the hope, founded
in ,justice and -in nature, of its solidity. This hope
was strengthened by collateral considerations, when
he looked to the great increase of our maritime
power, when he contemplated the additional naval
triumphs we had obtained, when he looked to the
brilliant victories of our .Armies obtained over the
flower of the Troops of France, Troops which, in
the. opinion of many, were invincible—when lie
regaled upon these glorious ataievements, though
he could not but lament our disappointment in some
objeds, .he had the satisfaetioo ,of; thinking that we
had added ,strength to our security, and lustre to
our National Character. Since the Treaty which had
taken place at. Lisle, we had' increased in wealth and
commerce. But there were two important events
which had givon the greatest conaolidation to our
strength, he alluded destruction of the power
of. Tippoo Sultana in India, who had fallen a vidim
0 his attachment to prance find his perfidy to us
had_frequently..been observed„.that greaadangers
, frequently produced in Nations of a wanly cast of