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ei a concerned ; but while their enmmercial eye
sy-45 open, unfortunately for themselves their politi•
cal eye was clased. They were not sagacious
coon th to an upon the jealous policy of the Chinese
and others. who were prudent enough to prohibit us
horn any territot iit establishments, and byth at means
averted the misfoi tunes which have fallen upon the In
dians. By various meansandopportunities,i,, theyear
176.5, we became possessors (A some extensive terri-
tories, and the wisest and hest informed men of that
day advised, that we should never attempt the ex-
tension of them. In this number was Lord Clive,
to whom, fur his vast -ervices and :achievements in
India, his country owed the highest obligations.
When, by the gallant exettion; of that gnat Officer,
we got possession of the dominions of Stqat Dowlah,
he advised not that we should keep them, but that
they should be restored, and a resolution in conse-
quence of that was passed on 'he 30th of Sep-
tember, 1765; that the company should abstain
from the ptirAnt of any increase of dominion.—
For a similar opinion I have also the high autho-
rity of Mr. Hastings and the Couixil in the year
1772, who wisely resolved that our object should be
to content ourselves with providing for the security
of what we already possessed, without engaging in
any war for conquest, or any other principle but
that of self-defence. This seemed, at that time, to

be the principle also of our Government at home;
And when I was sent out by Parliamentary appoint-
ment to Indi.i, my instrations were to do all in my
power to preserve the peace of the countr), and
comply with the fiesolation of th•• Court of Di-
reciors, which prohibited any further extension of
our territories. All this took place at the time that
the French were in Lull force in those countries, and
possessed of Pondicherry and many other important
places, which then were certainly dangerous to our
power in time of war. 11'firn the present Lord
Melville was Presidi.int of the Committee on India
Affairs, a tlesoltition was passed on the 2Scl of May.
1782, that all schemes of conquest or extension of
dominion were repugnant to the security of our in-
terests in India; the same decimation was repeated
in 1784. and afterwards, on the renewal of the
Compar I's Charter, in 1792. lam aware that the
construCtion which might be put upon these decla-
rations is, that they only want to prohibit any un-
just or aggressive wars; to which I answer, that
the justice of a war, and, most of all, of a war in
India, is matter t!iat cannot be easily decided.
Unfortunately for the cause of justice, it so happens,
that all the evidence we can have on that
imbjeCl is confined to the representation sent of it
by the Governor, who may pin what colour he
thinks proper upon it : and after that, if the war
chance to be successful, we know, by sad experi-
ence, that the success is generally allowed to stifle
every other enquiry, and operates as a justification
of the measure. In this remote country, we con-
fine sairselves to the most favourable statement for
the Government ; and the India Princes haveing no
Ambassadors or agents here, nor any mode of pub-
lishing their views: we can have no opportunity or
means of hearing the other patty. We had at first
what was called the Persian cases of discussion be-

tween the Government of Bengal, and the Indian
powers ; but even those have only come to us
through the medium of agents of our own, ap-
pointed for the management of such traasaCtion;.
Therefore, Sir, with respell to our first establish-
ment in India, and for the subsequent history of our
transactions with the native proven, I need only
refer the Honse to a list of these Princes, once splen-
didly circunispnced in that peninsula, and whose
very families have been extinguiched, while we re-
main in the possession of their territories. Of these
I shall first remind you of the Nabobs of Bengal,
Benares, and Oude, wlioce families are now sa-
tinet ; or, if any of the family of Oude be still
in existence, it must be in a state of obscurity and
insignificance. After these, there follow in pro-
cession the states of the Rohillas, the Nabob of
of Fenacahad, the northern Circars, and the Nabob
of the Carrfetic, who have now disappeared, and all
their territories taken and annexed to ours. The
great remaining ohjee after these, was the territory
of Misore, which has been also overthrown; and
from the language of the Marquis of Welleslev, it
will appear. that he considers the power and re-
sources of that country in the same light as our
own. Since that has been accomplished, the Sow-
badar of the Ocean, at the age of 100 years, has
been induced or compelled, under the pretence of
proteition, to admit a large British garrison into his
capital, and thus keep his people in complete sub-
jedion. The Gevik.r has been placed in a similar
predicament, under the pretext that he was a chief.
tain of too weak intellees for the administration of
the government. Having thus, at the conclusion of
the last century, got two thirds of the peninsula of
India into our possession, there was no other power
remaining but the Mahrattas, and the only reason
assigned, as far as I can see, by the Marquis of
Wellesley, for a war with them, intended, no
doubt, for their subjeCtion, is that he thinks the
d minution of their power necessary to the se-
curity of the British possessions in India. [ln
confirmation of his statements, Mr. Francis here
read several long extracts from the instrations given
to the Generals by the Marquis Wellesley, which
have already appeared in this paper, and which on
the present occasion we must content ourselves with
glancing at.] I must say that, for my own part,
I cannot conceive any security required for our do-
minions there more than we had already in our pos-
session, and I fancy that by a reference to the map,
every impartial man must entertain the same opi-
nion. The Noble Marquis expressed as apprehen-
sion that all the Mahratta States, of which the
Peshaw is the nominal master, might unite in a con-
federacy against us; and to guard against this, he
must have a subsidiary treaty with that Prince, the
conditions of which were, that he should receive a
perpetual garrison of British troops, and allot a large
portion of his terriroty for their maintenance. By
the constitution of that country, however, the Pc-
'haw is, in fact, no more than a kind of Prime Mi-
nister to the Rajah ; and, notivithstanding the rank
in which he stood, was only primers ',der pores.—
This Prince was compelled to subsidise an English
military force in perpetuity, and this proceeding
was to be represented to two neighbouringChiefrains,
Scindiah and Holkar, and to be considered by him
as a concession on the past of the British Govern-
ment. In reference to them, the Peshaw is little
moreghan an equal. Cul. Collins was instructed
to represent this new species of concession to the

1

Peshaw as the best safeguard for his own interests,
security, power, and prosperity; though in the same
document it was admitted, that the Prince in ques-

tion was so repugnant to such a meaoire, that no-
thing hut the tear of destruCtion could induce him to
submit to it. In the letter of Col. Close, it seemed that
the aversion the Prince had to admit of this assist-
ance was styled by our Government as a [roof of
selfish policy and ambitinn. From the rapacity And
lawless ambition ascribed to Scindia and another,

one would he inc!'ned to think that they were subtle
statesmen, bred in tne school of \lachiavel ; where-
as, by the g,ven of them in another
place, they are, as it turned out to be, no more than
two boys, and Sciri lia, particularly, " an inexpe-
rienced youth, not at all conversant with business."
The real clime of those people, therefore, is, that

. . -
they do not like such subsidiary treaties, as must
have the clfra of miking them slaves and vassals
to the English Government. The condu& even of
Tamerlane, in entering that country as a conque-
ror, was not more despotic than this, for he also
laid his hand upon his sword, and proclaimed to the
people, that if they would only submit, they would
remain hany under his Government. From the
little, in the wiy of amelioration, that has been
effesled in India by thu Government of the Noble
Marquis, so often alluded to, we ought to con-
clude, that to do good was the most difficult
thing in the world to be accomplished.—
In the documents before the House, it is evident that

every possible pretence has been ransacked in justifi-
cation of this war. The first was, that of defending
ourselves horn the influence and power which the
French are represented to possess over the native
powers. If such a faa had been ascertained, it
may, perhaps, afford some colourable ground for
. .

, . .
it ; but, with the utmost attention and diligence
that I have been able to employ in the inquiry, I
cdonnt rind that they possessed any. I admit it, at

. .
the same time, to be good tv,licy not to allow
France to retain any power whatever in India, and
wi.h some provision for that purpose would be
made on the returr. of peace ; though I strongly ap-
prehend that such a condition will be unattainable.
I myself recollen, distindly, the statement made in
this House by the present Lord Melville, in the

year 1794, that the treaty then concluded with
fippoo would effenually eradicate all the power
of the French in India; notwithstanding which,
I was since that surprised to hear from the
Noble Lord (Castlereagh) opposite me, that Mr.
Perrot was at the head of a French army of
14,000 men in the Mahratta country. 1, however,
very much doubt whether M. Perrot's was not a
Native, instead of a French army; and upon the
whole, I cannot find that there have been any
more than twelve French officers in the service of

the Mahratta Princes. Even these, instead of pos-
sessing any extensive influence, appear to have
been objeas of jealousy and suspicion ; nor did
they seem to have any other end than to submit, as
they in fad did, to our arms, on the condition of being
allowed to carry off their riches. Besides these
French, there were a few straggling Portuguese, and
perhaps a few Austrian Officers in that service, but
the great majority of their European Officers were
undoubtedly 13, itish, but they wet e all objects of dis-
trust and not of power or influence with Scindia.
On the danger supposed to be consequent in French
Officers instruCting the native Mahrattas in the dis-
cipline of European taCtics, a much greater stress
has been laid than it adually deserves. Such taElics
do not at all suit the character of the Mahrattas,and I
am convinced that had they not dismounted from
their horses to fight upon a new method, instead
of adhering to the ancient system of their ca-
valry, they would have been able to make a more
formidable resistance. An illustration of this may
be found its the history of the wars of the ancient
Parthiens, upon whom all the approved discipline of
the Roman armies was incapable of making any very
serious impression : and a further example of it is to
tie found in the instance of so small a Pri.,cF• as Hol-
kar. who, by abandoning European dist ipline, and
adopting the old and desultory mode of the native
cavalry, had been successful in cutting off some of
our force, and gaining many advantages, though it
is very possible that he has been completely reduced
by this time. Great bodies of cavalry arc known
to have very great advantages in defensive opera-
tion, and in irregular and desultory warfare. Even
the dust which they occasion is very disadvan-
tageous to their enemy, as it disables them from
discovering the line of their immediate attacks and
operations: and, in support of this doctrine, I have
the authority of a very able man, Mr. Hastings,
whom I have myself heard expressing the same opi-
nion in Bengal. Even the Marquis Wellesley himself
has informed us, that the Mahrattas are not fond of
French, or any other European alliances, and have
always a great and natural aversion to enlisting into
them, or receiving any foreign force into their
country. I have before asserted, and I now again
repeat it, as a challenge to any man to contradict
me, when I say, that not one, of these Mahratta
states has at tacked, arranged, or committed, any ag-
gression against us. The only plea, therefore, for
the war, was, that in case of a confederacy amongst
them, they might become formidable to the British
power. The policy of the Marquis Wellesley, of
course, was, to use his own words, that measures
should be take to keep them disunited ; but, I hope
the sentiment of this House would be, that, in the ap-
preheasion of such a flame as may be produced by
their union, we are not justifiable in extinguishing
the people. Any man who looked at the map of In-
dia, may see and judge whether these states could
presume to become the aggressors. Our govern-
ment will there appear to have entered and ravaged
the heart of the possessions of the native Princes, to
prove upon them, in that manner, charges of rapa-
city and ambition. The number of miles our army
penetrated, will best explain where the charge of
rapacity should rest. We ailed upon the authority
of the subsidising treaty of Bassein, formed with the
Peshwa, against his inclination, and then caused it
to be proclaimed to all the other Princes of the
Mahratta States, that any impediment they may
throw in the way of tilt execution of that treaty,
would immediately be deemed an a& of aggression
and hostility. The very statement of such principles
and conduct, must, I think, preclude the necessity
of any argument in proof of its injustice, or to shew
that the existence of perpetual British garrisons, in
the heart of their country, must necessarily be dan-
gerous to their authority and independence. What
d:fference does it make to the justice of the case,

whether these proceedings took place either in India
or in Europe? I am certain, that were I to state of
a power on the Continent now at war with us, such
proceedings, with regat d to his neighbours, I should
meet with the universal concurrence of the House,
in reprobation of it. Let me suppose, for instance,
such reverses to happen in the affairs of the Empe-
ror of Austria. as to enable his neighbouring Em-
peror of the French to demand that he should be
allowed to place a French garrison in Vienna, under
the pretence that it was necessary to his protec-
tion and prosperity, and also require that the king-
dom of Hungary or Bohemia should be given up
to him for the maintenance of his troops : I will
put it to any Gentleman whether he could conceive
that the Prussian, or the other EleCiorates of the
empire, ought to sit still and submit to it without
any alarm for the danger it would occasion to their
independence? and whether their submission to it
would not he considered as an all of baseness and
cowardice? So far from considering their confedera-
cy to oppose it as an aft of hostility and aggression
towards France, I am convinced there is nut a Gent
who hears me, that would not justify and applaud
it ; and, if this be so, surely the same reasoniog
must apply to the case of the Malirattas. It is sin-
gular to observe the Marquis of Wellesley declare,
that the best policy would he to secure to all the
Native Powers of India, their rights and independ-
ence, at the same time, when he made subsidiary
treaties, for perpetually occupying the heart of their
dominions, to represent it to them as a system
founded on principles ofequity, justice, and modera-
tion. He also made it a criminal and hostile proceed-
ing in them, to shew any jealousy of an arrangement
of this kind, which must infallibly place them in a
state of abject subjeltion. In speaking thus freely
of public proceedings, I would not be though: per-
sonally hostile to that Noble Lord, but I feel it a
call of duty to censure those proceedings which,
supposing the war to be ever so successful, must
eventually ex'-aust our resources both abroad and
at home. The effeft of those wars has been to leave
a great part of that peninsula wholly deprived of
cultivation, in so much that I am well informed
there is now an absolute famine raging in that
country. We never can have more than a preca-
rious conquest in those countries, as the dispersions
of our numerous posts through the vast extent of
land from Agra to Pnonah and Hydrabad, must
render the scattered divisions of our army unable to
support each other, and consequently liable to sur-
prises. It should also be considered that the great-
est part of our military force in that country is
composed of natives, whom the Mahratta Princes
would use every effort to seduce from our service,
and turn against ourselves, as nothing could
drive them to more desperate measures than to
find us in forcible possession of their capitals,
and even their palaces. The British European force
for the preservation of these acquisitions cannot be
less than about 25,000 men, and the extreme dif-
ficulty of recruiting them renders the lives of sol-
dies, seasoned to the climate, perfellly invaluable.
1, therefore, hold that it is but a very indifferent po-
licy to waste the lives of these men in unnecessary
wars, as has been done in the present. Now it ap-
pears that all the strong places stormed, were taken
principally by the exertions and valour of European
soldiers. To keep such a force always complete,
was AS expensive as it was difficult ; and. by erbAvo-
hag them, we diminish our only security against
any confederacy between the Princes, and our na-
tive Sepoys. Lord Melville has represented strongly
the danger of colonising India ; but we are now
doing it effectually, by thus encreasing the numoer
of European soldiers, a vety small number of
which are without women and children. Though
I disapprove of so many pacts of the Noble Lord's
administration, I am willing to give full credit for
his great ability and industry ; and, however great
the disorders which have been occasioned by-
his system, I am happy to rack that the ar-
paintreent of Marquis Cornwallis, which is a remedy
that probes the disease, will remove them, if it be
in the power of any man to do so." Mr. Francis
then spoke much in approbation of provisions made
for the Mogul, an aged Prince, who had for some
years been deprived of sight, by the cruelty of one
of his Ministers. He considered it as one of the
most disgraceful circumstance. of the French Revo-
lution, that no allowance was made for the support
of the Princes of the House of Bourbon, thought the
attention paid by Marquis Wellesler to the declining
race of Tamerlane highly honourable to himself and
to his country. The motion he shook' make was only
intended to induce the I louse to review its own pro-
ceedings relative to the iff sirs of India. Ile meant
not to criminate any one at present, though lie con-
sidered the conduit of Marquis Wellesley. in negl.:fl-
ing to send dispatches, as soon as the war broke out,
to explain the grounds and reasons of it, as a dire&
violation of his duty and the At of Parliament ; for
we, at present, knew no more of that war, than
that, by the direCtion of that Nobleman, it was com-
menced on the 16th of April. He then concluded
with moving a resolution—" That this House
hems to the principle recognised in its former
solutions of the 28th of May, i 780 ; and also in its
subsequent Resolutions, that any war commenced
for the extension of out dominion in India, is re-
pugnant to the interest and policy of this country."
Lord CASTLEREAGH, after claiming the in-
dulgence of the House, observed that as he had tie
honour to be principally concerned in Indian af-
fairs, he felt it necessary to go some length into
discussion. in answer to the Honourable Gentle-
man who had just sat down. It was rather extra-
ordinary that a Member of that !louse should so nar-
rate the history of that part of the world for so long
a period, as to seek to recal the ignominy of its
councils for the last chitty years; that he should
charge the Government of that country with ra-
pine, plunder, and oppression, at this time, atter
having sat quiet for so many years without making
one observation, or passing a single censure upon
the proceedings in that peninsula. The Honour-
able Gentleman had said lie abed with candour in
the manner of bringing forward this question, but
with respea to the voluminous papers then upon the
table, he confessed he thought nothing more unfair,
and it was impossible for him to meet the arguments
of the Honourable Gentleman in the manner which
he wished, as he did not know to what particular
points he would diregt his course, or over what
ground he intended to travel ; he therefore was not
prepared to say how he should conduct the argu-
ments, or what grounds it was necessary for

him to take, in order to answer the
able Gentleman. If what should fall tram lane
in the course of the Debate did not go to a Coto-
plete answer upon the question, it proceeded
entirely from the mode the Hon. Gentleman had
taken ; and although he dealt liberally With the
persons constituting the Government of India, he
had not done so with their ads. With re•-pelt
to
the Hon. Gentleman's first proposition, that M be;
calling the attention of the House to the AR of
liament upon this subject ; he conceived the ikt,
Gentleman had put a construction upon the Ad,
which he could by no means sustain upon f Air :UK..
mint. That any extension of the British Empire la
India was a source of policy which, under 'basil.
cumstances whatever, should be resorted to, onis a
dodritie so futile and absurd, and so wholly u❑like
the wisdom of the British Constitution, that it could
not stand fur one moment. As well might it be
said, that a man WAS to be chained to his poi,
without the power of defence or attack, while wt.
rounded by enemies. There was another principle
equally absurd, and that was, that the Brit
Government in India were precluded from form;.,-,
any connections with the Princes of the East, and
that they were to pay the expences of a military
force in land, and not in motley. This clause in
the Ad most certainly never meant to rectiguir
such a power; it was the intention of the Glverm
ment merely to guard against the united effort. if
the Indian powers. His Lordship admitted, tha
when the Government should have travelled opt
of the fair line of policy, then there would be
a fair ground of charge against them; bat in the
present case, no charge whatever was establhh,-1
against the Councils, either at home or abroad. fa
enumerating the several princes who had h:..fa
broug' t under the British don.inion, and whote ft-
milies wete extinet, the Hun. Gentleman went ir.:s

prima facie evidence of their dissolution; bnt be.
fore he came to censure the Government—before he
came to call down the condemnation of the public
upon them, he should have brought his charge ow
some particular Rounds—on some specific instances
of oppression, and have taken the sense of Parlia-
ment upon them. Parliament could thencome to al
conclusion, either one way or the other. With re-
sped to the commercial interests being turned into
territorial interests, that was a measure necessarily
resorted to ; it had uniformly been the policy of
France to goad l.ngland in that quarter ; all her
efforts were directed against it, and it was her ma-
chinations which drove us to those measures ; if we
could have kept in existence our commercial in-
terests, without territorial possessions, it would have
been more politi: ; but in order to secure the oar,
we were obliged to obtain the other. The Hos.
Gentleman's proposition, therefore, upon this head,
did not admit of any qualification. As to the wars
. .

in the Mysore country, particularly the two tot
wars,
i wars, f the /lon. Gentleman would have called is
question the Councils upon them, lie would have
seen that some, at lease, of the transaaions on that
subject, had never the finger of calumny pointed at
them This alone, his Lordship thought, would
go a great length in doing away the charges
made against them. I'he restoration of the Ilin-
doo Rajah and his family was a strong proof
of the moderation, lenity, and liberality of Go-
vernment; and a fristisaetion which, in itself, dis-
pelled touch of the calumny which had been
thrown upon the Councils tit that country. the
lion. Gentleman in his inchament had made gene-
ral charges: to this indictment he put in his plea,
which he contended was a good bar to the aftion.
The next point his Lordship came to, Was with to
sped to the territories of the Oude and the Carnatic,
as to the first of which, there were no papers upon
the table, by which diet louse could be guided, not
could it be --barged that the transactions relative to
those countries were an acqtrisition of territory. Is
the year 1765, both those became bound within the
power of the British empire, they were always sue
bordinaLl to, dependant on, and direeted by the
British Government and Council. Our cones boa
with the Nizam, the Hon. Gentleman considered
as a measure of reproach : that he should doge
th-s, his Lordship owned he was not; at all surprised.
for he did not mean to say but that the native powers
were much distressed by the conneaion ; they were
at war with other states, and were obliged to resort
to a foreign force for assistance, but th it the cou-
nt-C-6ml wish the British Government was so hor-
rible, so detestible to the native princes, was an as-
sertion wholly fallacious. The cha-ge also of the
Company's troops, consisting of 10,000 men, being
in the terri:or y or the Nizam, was another argument
equally futile. for it was to be remembered that they
were in possession of a long trait on the south v.te
of that territory. The question then CAW to the
nature of the conn, a. of the British Gov,m-
ment with the Marhattas this his Lords' rti
considered the most important cow, .I:q.ot
of the whole, and a question aliurtbar of
great difficulty; with respect to it transact
tine, and su.:lt ideas as eras' arise. from be itsunal
doubts upon this subje&. there were two questtors
upon this hen!: first, what description of people
were the MahrAttas, and what were the principles of
policy by which the British Councils were to be
guided ? Looking to the general charaCier of the
people, their customs, their wars, their dispositions,
and habits, it was certainly much better to keep
clear of them entirely. They were forrneriy COw
posed of a great number of small states, which were
frequently at variance with each other. If they
kept their old syst:m of warfare ; if they hal
continued in their ancient manners, without
taking in the aid of foreign councils In all sound
policy it would have been our best way to have kept
clear of 'hem; but afire the treaty of Bassein,
great number of French officers were introdocel into
their army. The policy of the Mahratta conneaut
then stood upon new grounds. Scindia And iltarr
were at variance, their armies becam: regular'
suppose then one power got the better of the other
both theu united and because organised undertone
head ; his Lordship asked, would not tnis coalition
be very formidable to the military power of tt;t1111
Britain in !mita ? it was to this Alteration ra the
military system, introdut:ed and dirtaed by I- roach
officers, that we were to look for changing dig
policy of the Brizish Councils,
non with the Marhattas. The Govetirnment of
Mysore consisted of a considt cable milaary lone.
which was also aided and directed by French orb'
cers ; the objeB, therefore, of Maiquis Welled -1
respecng coat
was to augment and strengthen the Peshwa,