The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser.
London, England, 1810-02-20 00:00:00

that a \ll rt of the farce @lmola ;melt Flushing, end that
the other pert should go ep the Scheldt and land a Sautv:let,
to accomplish the ulterior object of Use Expedition, to alr
tack Antwerp sod destroy the french fleet , but, as I hare
before stated, this force was diverted into smother channel,
owing to strew of weather, and in consommes of tlpe whole
armament going into !be Roompol, that part of the army
which was intruded to be lamb d at Sautvliet was landed
upon South Beeeland, and I do out think I ant competent to
RIISWer what were the reasons of the General for last order-
ing; to advance: I conceive, bower, that his Lordship waited
till them was a sufficient ismst force in the West Scheldt,
before he exposed the army by advancing too far into the
country, soil probably tic might lie infincncid by the pre.
vailivg reports of an armistice between France sad Austin',
it will, therefore, be very difficult for me to answer the imes-
tiott satisfactorily to the Committee soy further than as I
have does.

Was it a rut of the original plan that lo,noo nen should
go to Sant,lief, without taking possessiou of South Lim-
ited •••—:So ; it was always iotcnded to take possession of
South Iterelan.l—indeed it was nteessary to take possession
of South Develana, to destroy the batteries that cemniauded
the \Vast fcbcldt i the enemy had bettevies upon every
point guiug up that river, and the fort of Bulls: was a
very ronsiderable work of its kind, and if the sunny had
thought proper to hold out, it would have taken us up
aortae time before it could hare been carried.

What number of the twenty thousand men, of which yon
have spoken, do yon think would have been occupied in the
taking and keeping possession of South Beveland ":—Boath
&relied wan taken by the division under General Hope, I
think about seven thousand ince, sad I believe, but I cannot
speak positively, that it was the inteetion of Lord Chatham
to leave u,eno men on South Bereland.
Then t►e Committee is to understand that of the 20,004
men before referred to, e,OOO would have been diverted from
that number to keep possession of *oath Beveland be-
lieve it wan so intended, hut I cannot speak positively, as I
never conversed with Lord Chatham epos these subjects.

le the plan of the Expedition communicated to you, what
was the arrangement made try,whiefi the navy were to coope-•
rate is the attack open Aotwerp ?—Thrre was no arrange-
ment, It was left fur the Cominander in Chu( i and 1, for
my part, did sot thiuk it necessary to propose one until the
field was open to us, as no correct arrangement could be made
till we came upon the spot, and into action i what 1 mean
by action, is making • movement.
At what time did you think it was fit to make au arringe-
amid for • joie: attack open Antwerp!—Whenever it was
decided upon to lead the army at faatcliet, and foe the navy
to move to the attack of Liilo +ad Liefkeushoeik, the sr-
r%.• . r... r •,ild then have beta made fur the conjunct at.
A.ltiverp.
W... such arrangement for an attack on Antwerp
• i• the conversations situ Lord Chatham on the gall'
cif August, to which you have before alluded

W.,. ally eueh arrangement sat gested on the mith of An-
gust by you to Lurd Chatham --No, there um not.
Was any bitch arrangement suggested ►y you to Lord Chat-
ham) nu the e7th of August ?—No, heesu4e I did not consi-
der at necessary, nor could any arrangement be made WI af-
ter LiUo sod Lierkenshoeik were taken.

Is the Committee to understand, that the arrangements for
t►e joint operatives of the army and navy, in the attack on
Antwerp, were not to be made till t►e army and navy were
dope upon Awhile," ?--Certamly nest; because alien it wig
decided to lead t►e army at Sentvliet, and to attack the forts
of Liao and Lief kenshorik, the arrangement IlVald t►ee
►ave been made between t►e General and myself for t►e joint
attack Go Antwerp, for it was nut certain wbethvr we s►ouid
get to Antwerp or not; and ea I knew nolltiag of the de-
fences of Antwerp, an srraagement could nut have been made
till we had opened the way by taking Ulu and Liefken-
shoetk.

When you proposed to Lord Chatham atticking Lillo and
Liakenshotik, did you commuuicate to him what your fur-
sher plans would have bees, as to arrangements axiom Ant-
werp, lit t►e event of Lino and Liefkenshueik twin taken !
•_The conversation I had with Lord Chatham, anti the Gr.
neva tankers then present, went to the attacking of l.illo
and Idighenalsoeik, with a view of opening a held to further
enterprise, end oMalsisg more local knowledge than he pos-
sessed without ors. -using 'sure local knowledge than he
did, it would uut suave been possible to make any permanent
areasioneut for the conjuset attack upon Antwerp: l did
propose, wl.en Lillie and Lief kenshoeik were taken, to have
pushed the fl t;ates sad flotilla up the Scheldt, toward. A ut-
weep and oar further operations and success would have
depended upon circumstesces.
Did you consuluoicate t►at it was your intention to push
fiiromil the frigates and flotilla to Antwerp, to Lord Chat-
ham, on the 4;t11 of August?-1 do sat know whether
notintimed frigates exactly, hut I spoke of the skips of war,
aid petaled out the necessity of the army oecupyiug both
basks ef the river.

In what manse, did you promme to Lord Chatham to at-
tack Fort Llllo—With regard to the meaner of attacking
Wort lino on the land aide, I geoid make so prop...taloa to
his Lordship with propriety, an it was • military operation ;
but I did say, that the ships of war would attack the fort at
the same tune that the army did.
Did you form any idea what law* of time it might take
to get possession of fuel Lille could funs so judgment.
IV hat plan did you propose foe the attacking of Little*.
short!. ?—..t similar one to that .f attacking Lillo; we in-
leaded to have lightened two ships of the hoe' and placed
one against each of these fog ts, and, with 3 third and fourth
ship, to hive attempted to force the boom, but It would have
bees necessary to have a favourable ivied fur this purpose,
and the rivse is very winding about that part; bet I did sot
eider into this detail before Lord Chatham, it was only a
swatter of COUVeI salons with the sea officers: I barely men-
liaised to his Lordship that if the army attacked the forts,
be should have every naval assistance it was in my power to
offer.

lo the event of the ships not breaking the boom, was not
that boom so Constructed as to heme the ship stnntetbal..ly
wader the battery of Lieftettshoeik '-11 think it was, rod 1
think the netlevialtieg would have been very hazardous.
Does Fort Ulla COlLMlallti Fort Lieflienshuelk !—Ft um the
view ! have of tbe,n I cannot pusittiely say whether it does
or wet,lmet at appears to me to stand rattier btgher.
. .

De you know wlortlier Fort
LOW not kuuw.

Are there not dikes is the beaks of the Scheldt, on which
Pee might bare been placed to wintry or obstruct the pas-
sage of vessels ■p the Scheldt '—Yes; .ud it was fur that
reuse that I risked tbe at my le axe," both batiks alba
Scheldt.

Do Tow keno say thing of the works at the Tete de flow•
Ore.*. the left bask oldie Scheldt, opposite to Aotwery !
I do Sot.

If with the English beet you bad attempted to paw op
the Scheldt, might aid the Emrich fleet ►ave been canoed
above Antwerp'—Yes, I think they would ►ave carried their
ships above Antwerp.
la the event of the French de►t being carried above An-
twerp, do you think that wit► the English fleet yon could
have ventured to pass halve,. the citadel at Antwerp and
the works on the Tete de Elamite* '—l doubt whether we
should have done it wr not; bnt 1 canoe say whet I would
►ave done, till louse mai acidly titer to me whether it was
practicable.
What is the width of the Scheldt at Antwerp inward
sey ; 1 never was there.
la the ignorance of the width of the Aclielrit,and wit► the
aweertabity whether it would hate hews safe to pass between
thecitadel of Antwerp and the 'Fete de Flaorire, would you,
if Liefteashoe ik and Lillo had trees taken, hare still ventured
up tl.. Scheldt with the English fleet shalt have gone os
far up the Nelbekk as the army could hare rune to co-ope-
rate with at, and I should Lire take. no more ships with
OW the. was areemary ; and a I d ti ore,. d that it WWI cot
prortiodde wit► any provict of success to yss Antwerp and
the Teta de Flandre, 141101211 h.., ret.srn..ti luck sgAin.
Wham you talk of the liebl fat ful ibes enterprise that
would have been up►ued by taking Lain and licflienehoeik,
had you nay other of is view, than Ali attack un the slops
at Astwerp .—The capture Or dr structton of the enemies
&tills, and the ships that were below Ant.. ip, sail to doh.
&SIT whether thus was a probability ut success in going
bather ow.
Ca* you form any jaihrnient of the peol&fle loss of the
army I. its attack two the two forts ot Lino And
, Awaits %bask bah the army and navy mad have lust

many men, as Lail seivices would Usee been eery mach

. .
exposed.
Supposing the army to have suffered very wucb, which
you think probetle, in its mania upon those two forts' would
it have bee. to a cnadition to bare IN -died Moog iither bank
of the Scheldt if the enemy bad • considerable force in Ant-
werp to oppisie them think it would nut have" been pro-
dent to hove advanced if runny toms were lost, and the enemy
were iu great force; but it is impossible to say whether many
rams would have hems lost or not, and it would have depended
a good deal upon the Gemini whether be thought be should
bejustified in running the end( of edemas-leg snug the dykes.
Have you not stated, that it was probable many men would
be lout in the military and naval service, as they would be
exposed to the fire from the enemy's feet !—Yes, I have al-
ready said so.
Year opinion was. that it was necessary the !British army
should occupy each bank of the Scheldt, and march along
each bank of the Scheldt as the British fleet advanced to at-
tack Autnerp; was I right is so understanding you !--Yes;
that was what I proposed in the course of our conversation ;
but it was more conversation with the Generals, than any re-
gular proposition. I am uot (mite positive that I beee been
peifectly Correct in every statement I hove lacule, beeline I
did not come prepared to answer many questions that More
lama put to me; therefor*, I hope I stout be indulged, if I
discover that I have been tasking misstatements, to correct
them, both with regard to dates and other matters..

You have stated that you would hare approached Ant-
werp with the ships, and that, if you had found it necessary,
you would have alibi/taco them again; whet is your opinion
as to the manner in which the Army, which was to have ac-
companied the fleet or both aides of the Scheldt, could nave
made its retreat, if the enemy had had a superior force at
Antwerp'—lt was upon the supposition that the enemy was
iu considerlde force, that I thonght the army should not eon-
haiiass itself by going too far inland; and that in case
it was likely to be assaildcd by a superior force, they could
always retreat from the dyke into the vessels that would ac-
company them up the river, and the army could be famished
with ammunition and provisions from the vessels going up
the river ; if the (k•neral thought it necessary to retreat, I
Amid, of course have gives him all the assistance that
was necessary, and fallen back with the army.
la the event of farts Liefkenshoick and Lillo being taken,
you have stated that it wan accessary (or the army to take
possession of both side: of the river before the *et could ad,
Vance to Antwerp; when you gave that opinion, were 3.011
aware that the part of the army oa the left balk would he
reposed to the %hole force the cutesy could collect in French
Flanders'—Yea, I was and I conelue, t►at that was one
of the reasons that Lord Chatham did nut agree to second
my proposition.
We you aware that the country between Antwerp and Lillo
could be inundated, and that the march of the army would
have been eunfineil to the dyke nod the hank aline river N..-•
Yes ; I think the country was inundated in part, sad there-
fore I thought the army could only co operate with the navy
by occupying the banks of the river.

Supposing it h.ol been practicable to land the army at
Saiitvbet at an early peri l aftur the wail in, attic Expedi-
tion, with its st..t,s, artillery, and equipments, would it
have been urLessary, in order to attack Antwerp, to have
taken Lillo and l.ierkenslineik at all !—I believe, when the
Coveranseut first thought of the Expedition to Antwerp, it
was lot moderator:l that Lille and 1-irfkenalsoeik were is
the state thej really are in, and theretl-re I imagine it was
intended that the army, upon being landed at Sauteing,
should push to Antwerp as rapidly as possible; but by such
a movement, and l.itlo and Lirfkenahoeik not being taken,
the army would have been separated from the navy all the
distance from Santvliet to Antwerp ; and, cunsideriug, as I
then did, and do now, that it was in the power of the enemy
to collect a very considerable force, I do not think it would
have been a wise season, and without the cmoperalkia of
the navy, I doubt whether the army would have succeeded
is taking or destroying the enemy** ships of war and there-
fore I considered the taking of 'Lillis and I.iefkenshoeik as
indispensable.
. _

Yoru have spoken of taking or destroying the enemy's ships
of war; supposiog the enemy's ships of war to have gone up
above Antwerp, would it sot have beets a great object to
destroy the cluck-yard and the ships that were huddle.% at
Antwerp ?—Ycs, certainly; it was part of our instrartioris
to do so 1• and we should have attempted to do it, if it..bad
appeared practicable when we came **the place.
if the army hail boss able to take the town of Astwelp at
so early period, do you know of ;lay memo why the dock-
yard and ships huddles there, might nut have been destroyed
without the assistance of the navy !—No, certainly ; if the
army had take. Autwerp, the dock-yord and shipping might
have been destroyed without the smaistarice of the navy.
Supposing the army to have taken pomesaion of Cadsand,
in your upiniou, cook' the batteries of the islaud of Walehe.
ren hare opposed Kay obstacles to vessels passing up or down
the Scheldt !—No, they could sot.
From the brad of the river and the diagonal position of
the boom, are von of °pietism, that, with a leading wind, it
is probable your ships would have had headway sufficient to
have broken the boom'—We had always doubts whether we
should succeed in it or not.

When.you stated, that yen thought. in case of the snug
having possessive of Antoci-li, the stocks and arsenals might
have bees destroyed, did you mean the possession of the
Citadel of Antwerp ?-1 conceived that tke army conk! not
possess Antwerp without having possession of this citadel :
I believe tits cdadvl commands the duck-yard.
. .

Theo you think, tbat tbr dockyard and arsenal would
sot have berwilestroyed, if the citadel brit remained in poa-
semiou of the rummy am glut suracieutly acquainted
pith Antwerp to etre au opinion no this subject.

_ .
1/0 )110101 cowii.l.r tie weather to have b-en ettremely
tafaveaftble, pe, teularly to the ulterior übjrrtr of the Lt.
i thou how the time of your arrival oB IVolcLern !—..
I certainly au.

its not more unfavourable than at that ',aeon of the
year might have been reusonaldy exported ;—Most err.
laiuly; and /ruin the bail weather we i rl4 re, i 1 in the be-
ginning of the Expedition, the delay in procivding np time
be heldt arose.

Uoid it not been Our the unfairournlde *tate of the windier,
are eon not of opinion that the operation upon Cadeaud
would have succeeded think it would.

Flail the operation upon Culaand succeeded, would not
the passage np t►e Scheldt, coupled with the occupation of
Ssoth Beveland, have been open for the men of war and the
transports as fares Santeliet ,—Yes, it would.
Whet lefts& of time would it have taken to hewn carried
up the Fleet to Sassirliet, suppusiup Cadsand to bast hees
taken, and the wood reasonably fair ?—lf Cadmod had bees
token, end that divisiou of the fleet which was intended to
have guise up the Scheldt, had not tome onto the Romonot, It
might rely shortly have got up to fiantvliet : I think in four
days the whole armaii.ent might hairs ham up, allowing tbre
wind and weather to he favourable.

I t►ink you ►are already said, that t►e part of the arma-
ment, e Welt wee destioed to pu up the West Scheldt, going
into the Hissenpet, was owing tu the badness of the weather ?
n-1 hew ssW N.

Had pun any Information of the numbe► of the twiny 's
loom at Cadessid, at the time it wan proposed to lead there ?
—Not wheel Expsditiva was formed, Codsisad was not
• part of it ; bet afterward, it was agreed, it was neeeseory
to tabs Ciadinod, fur the propose of passing up the Scheldt
wit► mom facility, sod not to wait for the capture of
Flushing; at first, • regiment was thought sufficient, after
that, a brigade waft mentioned, and, at last, it came to a
dieisioa of the army then our squadron was increased is
primertiou ; 1 do Out believe that the Government thonght
dm seem, could semi soy considerable force to Cadsaad
1 did net think so myself; and I thought that the force
that was orderer, foe Calmed, both ou the part of the
army and navy, fully atielciest fee the purpose; just be-
low t►e Expedition mailed, it struck me that there might
be a want of boats, snit them I ordered the division of Lord
Gardner to place itself in media,. 111 n•ut with ►is hosts
to insure the leading, and 1 rousiikned nt that time, and 1
wow do consider, that I made t►e mint ample provision for
that service, for I could not ronceive, with the intelimetire
that we had, that the ein my could collect such a fnni e as In
resat that which we sent against Cashiaad, and thrrefire
was much surprised when we mired in the !stone Deep, to
bear hum Commodore (►wen, that the enemy were in come-
de. able tune, and aa the weather was so very bail that we
were obliecil to go into the liwompot, from the appoliimsion
, that many of our transports would drive us 'burr, :oil that
I great port of our flotilla, if mot the whuk, might brannk ;

after consulting will Lord Chattato. It en agreed to d•
Consioodure Oren to aospeed his lauding ; tt,77„;
there were very few days, if those orders bad sot he,s
that the Coutmodore could have landed the troops. (4;
troops, ./tati oot tool those orders, and bad succeeded in land:4oops, and destroying the batteries upon Carlsand, 114
still hare found a difficulty in getting the tramiswt,
the East Scheldt into the West Scheldt, oil account of
td
wind blowing in, and generally blowing very first'. he
What were the reasons which induced Government mow
the force destined fir Cailsand, first from a recon.ct ts
brigade, nut then from a brigade to a tilvnit ,
et ot ?—lt saayt
the Government, it was the nof Lord thathmu &ad
self; oleo I say Lord Chtitham and myself, mom,
elude the Officers we trusted to.

Was that alteration made iu cunsequence of inhligss,
tidditional force having arrived, or heiag about to emit. s
Clutonnd ; it WAS iu consequence of our thinking
lal
sand of greater importance than it was at first thought. g
was ant intended, after the batteries were destragint,
the army should Female on Cadsaud, and they were torahs*
again directly, under certain circumstances of reguintio..
What induced Lord Chatham sod yourself to think that k
larger force ads necessary to take poseemion of cams 4
than you had originally considered iwersaary for thai
Mee !—lteeanse we thought that if the enemy hid Cinti,
entice of the Expedition, he might scud a force into Cadies.4
with a view of succouring Flushing, and we did am
lac o
eielkiect the force we sent against it to a repulse , we ass
to insure the execution of the service.
Supposing the fleet to have passed tip the Scheldt, tarn,
case of failure to have been forced to return, could it Mut
done so without a shift of wind f--No, it cuel4l mat, it sot
hare tided it down.

IVoolrl it have been possible to have moved the leafy
ordsanee and cavalry transports, that were an the aan,o,
Passage, and which were destined to set gallon di•tenls
into the West Scheldt, at any time before the serr.s.hr
of Flushing took place?—We wore endeavuuriag to de 1
front the time t►at we first lased in Waleberen. Inn
channel was so narrow, and the wiled blowing duetily
into it, prevented any member of vowels being got throsty,
and it was out till after the fall of Fleshing the whole
through all that was possible to be dose in this way !Ulm
was dune.

Had you not reason to expect stroag westerly •itels at the
time of year yuu went on the enemy's coast !—Ytv, aid a
was fur that reason that we thought of the Roeurpst, sag
made our amusement to go in there in case it Wee kart
whew we cause spun the coast ; this was decided apes a ilsy
or two before we left Veal, and we had sure caaverasha
with Lard Castkreals upon this subject.
Thew it most have struck you, as being extremely he
whoa to have reasaiuth with list elect of traasports sad
flotilla in such a sitatiou as to have left the I,Vei.; &Asia
open to yew, whilst the army obtained sufficient pi.newies
of its banks to enable you to run up ?wit did st,ils rue ilist
the Meet, and particularly tire smaller vessels, would he et.
posed to great hazard at author at the smooth of the Sri, Isl,
if it came ins to blow hard ; anti this consideration, si I hr.s
said before, 'tutored us to go into the Roompot arni i
lieve our going into the Ruomput at that time was IseLe
approved of by Lord Chatham, all the naval officer., 5,..4
must of the gears of the army.
Vise witness was directed to withdrss
[To be mellowed ]

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

ROUSE OF LORDS, MONDAY, Fin. 19.

. V. 116•ZLET iiiiii WIIC.

Mr. Feweblasignie sod Mr. Mare were beard et considers%
length ter the Responetcnts. Further procecitings is.
'Roans►.

Leave was gives Is the Illommis of Ifitotiey to Mead the
Conswintee of the House of Corisioas' employed is she la.
quiry into um W auseememt of the Expeditiou to Moira,
Mr. Titanic', and several Members hem she MAW
COIIIIOIIIIII, brought up a MIMPPer., requesting leave for ti
Earl of Chatham to attend time t maim &primed to I,
spawn into the F:spedime to the Scheldt.
Upon the motion of Lord IVA the 31oretezev
wore called in, and iiillsnmed, that this Haw mond teessa
as sassier by 31(2.eugess of their eon.
WELLESLEY'a oiruser.

Upon the motion of t►e Vske of N w , this Bill vas
read She third time, sod yss.rd,

PUR FUGAL.

The Earl of Li TTTTT at. preeeeted a Copy of t►e Ir.
raageutsuto entered MOP between His Majesty sad the Prime
Regent of l'ortugal.--Ortimed to be laid en the table.
The Earl at Lt vantwoot. said, ►e rose, is cesieremenee
the indieposittua of his Noble Frieud (Marquis %Whitey)
sod the luctomeaieeee which would result to many haste
LurJa, to move, « That the Order for takieg HIS Mejevo's
Message into comaidevatiuse, this day, be doeharwed eel
that the rime be lard fir Thursday next., sad that the
Lords be summoned amerdincly."—Ovdered.
SCOTCH JL LOCATORS.

Lord Gaze vim., was desirous of calling the at-
!cation of that House to on. of the innumerable
instances of disrespectful conduct towards their
Lordships. It wont(' be recollected. that remit
Reports were to be rinds by the Commission,
appointed to investigate the.Jurispradeace of Sec
taint. It appeared, that these deports bad
length been returned. and subsequently laid before
the House of Commove, and bad afterwards bees
printed ; while no such Reports bad been prodeced
before that House, which was equally concerned
hating every information on tkis impottaat
ject. Bow His Majesty's Ministen came to art
towards that House with such want of reepeet,l
could not imagine ; but he thought it his duty
assure their Lordships, if UMW esplanation wt
not given, he would make a motion very early
the subject.
The Earl of Lnaawoot, said, he wis sorry it 111
so happened, that, by some inadvertence, these It
ports had not been laid before this House, at ti
same time with the other, but be had to assure thel
Lordships they should be produced the first uppo,
Unity.

APPIALS.
The Earl of LAVDEROAII concurred in the pr
priety of those observations which fell from his N,
ble Friend (Grenville,) and he had now to mo'
for information relative to one of the but effet
growing out of the syetibm of Jodicutere
Scotland. It woo notorious that the number
appeals before the House, ut this moment, were
many, that it was not possible they,null he le
ceeded ttitotwh for scv,:ral years. 1 here were
great many relative to leatieholds, concerning Chi
it was certain that the leases would be out lief'
the lipped' could be determined ; and agent,
were others, respecting legitimacy, wl ich could
be decided for seven or eight years to come, "lrl
whole families would remain in suspense all II
time, before they could ascertain wlotteor cert,
persons were the legitimate .iff.prilig of wares,
He should therefore move `•T hut there be had,
fore that House au account of the tottinbes
of
peals brought there for the last ten 'ears, from
let of February, 1800, to the lit of Fibrin,
1810." Agreed tee
C4VP,tIG7t.
The Marquis of LasisnowN observed. the I
would tefollret he had en a lorrsker orregi'.l
notice, that he should move for t e,t .%
leave to the general conduct poi

of Ills Msje;iy's Ministers in.!-4
He heel expected Chet it %geoid i•• •
to hive ptfactii his mction 11.`u"c