The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser.
London, England, 1809-02-25 00:00:00

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WNW with that precipitation that was nee's-
; lost no time in marching forward
M conspanions in mass io that part of the
w ' a French Emperor himself quitted his
•ac,
after declaring to his Legielutive Semite his
ioteatioos of sabjuguting Spain. Hemet the Etn-
taiiieritte Maisie at Erfurth, and no sooner were
the matters to be concerted betvegn them adjusted,
Mss be returned, and met his Legislative Body,
and repeated what he had said before to the Senate,
and on the sth of November, three days before the
English army had reached Salamanca, he set him-
self at the head of that army winch had come from
the shores of the Danube and the Vistula. What
was the cause of the feebleness of the one power,
compared with the energy and activity of the other?
I desire to know, why the most effectuul means
were trot taken to secure the immediate jutic-
tiun and co-operation of our force with that of
Spain? When it is well known that this eountry
euuuot furnish a military force at all equal in
point of number to the military force of France,
it appears the more necessary that when you are
to employ your force against her, that that force
should be kept as much assembled together as
possible, so that it should be foetid in one compact
consolidated body, not broken into freginente, nor
scattered here and there, but that the wisdom of
His Majesty's Ministers should At least attempt to
secure success by the means of an easy junction
of our armies previous to their being met by the
enemy. What were the consequences of the dif-
ferent plaits of 'action observed by the Euelisle
,end the French Goveraments? The g Unit General
told us that be considered the presence of the Bri-
tish army necessary to keep gyms union and co-mtera-
tios of the Sisunisa forces ; he conitnnuicated, I pre-
sume, that opinion to Ills Nlajesty's 'Ministers ; no
one can question it ; he is an Officer of too much
military science to have with-held from Ministers
the knowledge of that which was the most import-
nut point, perhaps, of any fur the success of the
reinforcements wilt from this country. If lie were
conscious of that, lie must also have known that
the sooner that army was there, the more chalice
was there of success, and the later the more likely
!to be defeated. On the tenth of November, the
Sea.,ish armies of Eetraursdura and Leon were
del-elite I and overthrown by the French. Upon
' the 12:1. of time wane month the armies commanded
by Roman] and by Blake were overthrown at Es-
',mete and Reynosa. There was not to be found
nu the lith of November ally Sounialt army that
deserved the name of a military force, mud on the
14th of the same month the English General and
iii 3 army arrived. What were the views of the
English arms; bat to produce union amid co-oper-
slimy anweget the Spaniards I Was this to be ef-
keted after their armies had been defeatedeto as that
tiothisig wailer' when the English tinny left S.:da-
mes:c.a. What del your army do ? lit what situ-
rition slid Sir David Baird till;i himself, in oiler to
effect hisjuncteit with Sir John Mooil!? lie found
nothing but inability to make • forward wove-
uncut at the time when it was landed. I have heard
that so destitute was it in smile respects, when.
permitted to land upon the Spanish coast, that
Sir David Baird had not even tnoueyenongh to defray
the necessary repulses of the arms. That in send--
lug au expedition by sea, it el iy be liable to some
accidents in regard to the ships that convey your"
ordnance and ausmoolitioa, I will admit; but that
you should amid ati officer with a force ander his
co:nu:arid, without even a few casks of money
to purchase provision', I scarcely could have
believed possible. 1 have heard, however, that
that gallant Officer had not even money enough to
obta;n a supp!y of necessary provisions, but had
to have recourse to obtai ' g that credit from pri-
vate iwlividuuls, which Government had neglected
to afford liiiu. The campaign went on as miliht
be expected : after the destruction of the Spanish
armies, I have mentioned. it was not difficult to
conceive that the army wider Cast:tuns. called the
Ariuy of the Centre, was very soon to follow ; and
accordingly, min the eed of November, it suffered a
defeat. Thus. Sir, those three armies iv hie:i we
ere to tiresome eve ready to unite with ours, were
severally overcome by the power of Franee: where-
as, if the army of England had been ready to
erect it junction, I the armies of the French
sight have bees defeated. and they might have
been saved the trouble of a few forret! marches.
These armies being beaten in the field, nothing 're-
' mained to the Spaniards but to defend the puss
, of the Sierra, but there too a defeat was sustained,
sod on the .30th of November it was forced. All this
time not a single British soldier had appeared in
action against the French. Celerity of movement.
quickness, dispatch, and promptitude of action.
appear to have been the only things that seemed
neoetwery to the galluut General : awl yet, from
what causes I know not, but from some causes hi-
therto unexplained, no British force found
its way into Spain, until all the Spanish armies
had beets overthtown, and Madrid had again
Capitulated to Bonaparte (liter! Hear! liter!)
Do not these circumstances demand inquiry? Is
it not necessary to know why the character of this
country has been traduced by our conduct in
Spain ? Is it not necessary to knew why out force
was or no use to our elites, no iujory to our rue-
sates, :mad that it could effect nothing, but nth' its
own character for bravery and intrepidity ?—ln this
situation Sir John Moore found himself in the
month of December, and it appears that it had
Men the ititeutioa both of Sir David Baird and.
Mr John Moore to retreat so soon as they learnt of
the eurrender of Madrid and the defeat of Castanets.
fee it was evidently imprudent to keep the field
against .such a force is the French Emperor could
bring:o;4l,Bst them. Orders, as I have been inform-
ed, were Actually issued for that retreat. and fortu-
nate I think It would have been had those order',
been persevered in, and that retreat commetwed at
that particalar time, if it omit, have been effected
without injury to thou. brave troops that oomposed
oar army, but the opinion of the Comu.ander-io-
Chief Agin n chaueed, and 'desire to know whet were
the cause,' that lit odureell the change.—(Hear !)
Why after the capitulation of Madrid, sod the
advancement of Bonaparte as victor, that retreat
was not adopted-1 think the House will desire
this itifermation. Was this spontaneous interfer-
ence of the General himself, or was it the officiol
interference of that at home ? I hive beard that
Sir John Moore did receive dispatches from the
Supreme Junta, and front Mr. Freres urging him •