The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser.
London, England, 1803-04-15 00:00:00

THE BRITISH PRESS.
LANDON,

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II

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tniy history of a people can be /has writter., whet
that people (if we may so say) brave cmitributed the
raaterials for their military, hist3ry, aa.! when -civil
causes have had a great influence nit the events of
war, or their miiitary history, particularly when
the means given by i:s civil causes have created a
new art, a new system of war, and a new mode of
ta&icr.
Whatever influences the charaaer of the History
it4ell, ought alco to influence its stile ; in describ-
ing certain epochs the historian must sometimes de-
scend from the liabitnal dignity of the stile of his-
tory ; and there are particular historical forms
which are requited by the epoch of the revolution.
The necessity of saying every thing, or, at least, of
saying a great deal more than in common histories,
bliges us to employ expressions which would not
erherwise be aJniitted, as it also compels us to
admit Etas which otherwise would be negleded.
I fistory would be like an inanimate canvas, if it did
not make its personages speak: it would he a paint-
ing without resemblance, if the language given them
was not characteristic. The ancient historians, in
admitting faftitions harangues, for which we are to
blame to reproach them, had for their (+lea to de-
velope the charaAers of those to whom they attri-
buted them. How much more necessary then it is
when events are often the result of words, and when
atfairs are influenced by speeches, to report, or at
least faithfully extract, those speeches, since the
ords and the .speeches form part of history.

F'!

i

WAR AND PE.IOE.

••11.1.••••

I. ARt:"':l.Nrs roa WAR.

The arguments which may he adduced, in favour
of an immed►ate war, are as follow :
1. That France was not prepared for the contest ;
a fad that seems more and more evident every day.
C. That it will take sonic time bcfiire it can he
prepared ; and indeed the extent of its empire is in
th►s resped a great disadvantage ; for, in order to
tarry on a war, wit la England, it must not only pre-
pare a formidable fleet, but ansange its troops, so
as to keep the countries dependant upon it, (which
are at present In a disturbed state,) under subjec-
tion ; and to be prepared against any attack which
may be made against it, by any of its neighbours.
5. That we can he prepared before it ; and it is
certain that we enjoy in this respea a great advan-
tage over France, as our Navy can he fitted out
sooner ; our East India possessions are in perfect se-
curity, and 'svc have only CHIT own coasts, and our
Vest India colonies to attend to.
4. That the commerce and industry of France is
reviving, but would be completely checked by ano-
ther war.

R

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5. That the revenue of France, in consequence
of the peace, has also been greatly encreased ; and
if peace continues for some years longer, its finances
mill be placed in such a situation, as may render it
a still more dangerous enemy to contend with.
G. That the greater part of the fleet of France
being at present in the West Indies, there is a fa-
vourable opportunity of destroying it ; and by de.
feating its attempts at St. Domingo, we may prevent
its ever becoming a formidable power to us in that
quarter of the globe.
That the insolence of France is insufferable ;
and that the manner in which it treats all other
countries, proves that it already considers itself mis-
tress of the universe.
8. That the ambition of France is boundless ; that
not satisfied with the predominant power and influ-
ence it has acquired in It'urope, it wishes also to
command in every other hemisphere. Hence its
seizing Louisiana and Florida in North America ;
its addition of some important distrkis to its settle-
ments in South America ; the plans it is said to have
in view, of taking possession of Macao and Cochin
in the East Indies, the Cape of Good Hope in
Africa, and it is said the Ntarea, or some other int-
portanr military post in the Turkish empire.
9. That it is inipossibie to keep peace any longer ;
and that the yielding of any point now, would only
lead to future demands, and to farther exaaions.

10. That no permanent peace can take place, un-
til France is perfealy convinced that in a just cause
sr. will not hesitate to c,arry on war with that coun-
try, single hard.
11. That though we cannot invade or conver
France, yet that we can do so much mischief to the
people of that country, that they must be anxious to
return to a state of amity with us.
it!. That many millions will he saved to this
country, now idly wasted by British travellers, to
the enriching of France, and to our own impoverish-
ment.

11. That the war mist r:in,:ipally be a contest at
in which we have everr prospea of success,
and which cannot he vt expensive.

,n... -rs-~w.

That when we are once engage.!, and prove
ourselves able to content! with France single handed,
the other powers in Europe will be roused to similar
exertions, and will no longer submit to be diaated
to by France in the moaner they have been.
1!,. That such a war, properly conduaed, may
be the means of enabling the unthrtunate countries
now groaning under the dominion of France, as
Spain, Portugal, llolland, Flanders, Switzerland,
Italy, and a great part of Germany, to throw off
its yoke, and to emancipate themselves from the
oppressions to which they are now subjeaed.
Lastly, That the war may even prove the
01 overthrowing the present Government of
France at home : that nothing but success gives it
any permanency ; and that if large bodies of troops
are assembled together, for the purpose of invading
England, or guarding the Frontiers of France, with-
out attually doing awi thing, they may possibly be-
ceme disposed to turn their arms against a govern-
ment, without real stability or any solid founda-
tion.
Such are the arguments in favour of War let us
sust konside: those which, may be adduced in sup-
port .of pew.e.
at. auGU'if ST% cO ?FACE.
1. That we pis much by peace, in regard to re-
venue, commerce, &c. and that the continuance of
p: ace must ever be the siucere wish of every vo.se

itt.
That nut only thic, bat all the other eonntries
in Eu-iipe, wool/ aectire additional strength by the
. prolongation eigeneriti tvaitgaillity, by which they
%souk* be ettabir4 sortie time hence, to vappott
ssith more trA!,tu aft % ith more vitiur, Anil to be-

come Metre independent of France, than possibly can
be thecase at present.
3. That if pcate continnes for some time lancer,
the Armies of Brake yin lose a large share of thTir
military still, spirit, and energy, and consequently
that that cuuutry must be proportionably weakened.

4. That if the existence of the present Govern-
ment of France is inconsistent with the safety of
England, or the independence of Europe, it is just
as likely to be overturned in time of peace, when the
people have nothing else to think ot, as in time of
war, when their attention must necessarily be occu-
pied with hostile operations.
5. 'flat the expense of the war, were it merely
naval, must be considerable, and that it will he very
dilficolt to raise supplies without injuring our pub-
lic credit, or of adopting an oppressive system of
taxation.

6. l'hat the war may have the efrea of diminish-
ing our commerce and revenue, and that the en-
crease of both, dining the late war, to so great an
extent, was almgether unprecedented.
7. That the grounds of the present dispute, so far
as they arc hitherto known, or even guessed at; do
not furnish a sufficient apology for the renewal of
war. That it is necessary at any rate to make the
real grounds of the present dispute so clear and ex-
plicit, that the enemy cannot possibly threw the
blame of renewing hostilities upon us.
- -

Lastly, 'That the risk we run is great, and the pro-
spec't of any advantage so extremely uncertain, that
nothing but the most urgent necessity, can justify
mu ras-hly plunging ourselves into so dreadful a ca-
lemity ; Nvllich may occasion scenes of horror and
bloodshed, of nn common magnitude and extent,
and which it is hardly possible to think of without
shuddering.
_

Whatever truth or justice there may be in these
observations in support of peace, there are two par-
ticulars which cannot he questioned. 1. That arty
procrastination in the negociatiun is extremely un-
favourable to the interests of England ; and t 2. That
if the negociation dons go or., it is essentially neces-
sary that every point at issue should he finally ar-
ranged, so as to prevent the renewal of any similar
dispute for some time to come, and to give Eurupe
some chance of lasting repose.

CONCLUSION.

• •A,..70ekr...`4

, .

FRIDAY, APRIL 15.

We yesterday received Paris papers of the 1 Ith
instant, but they arc as barren of intelligence as
any of those immediately preceding them, as well
with respe& to the negociation, as the preparations
making in the ports of France and Holland. The
Mini/cur, always labouring to impress the world
with an idea that the French influence is predo-
minant at the Ottoman Porte, could not neglea
the favourable opportunity of the presentation of
the French Ambassador, General BRUNE, to in-
dulge its favourite study. It accordingly details all
the particulars of the ceremony, with a degree of
accuracy and precision, never before attempted by
the official gazette of any nation.—The introduaion
of the Ambassador to the GRAND V tztER, was
upon the 1 tt.h of Feb. but his formal introduaion
to the GRAND SIGNIOR, did not take place until the
Vd of the same month. The style of the speeches
made upon these two occasions, would be pompous
and bombastic between any other two nations in
Europe, but between Turkey and France they may
lay fair claim to moderation, if not tameness.

" When Greek nuts Creek,

Then conies the tle; of war."

What is there sublime in conception, that we
might not have expefted to hear, when the re-
presentative of the Envoy of God, the GRAND Vl-
men, and the Sublime SLAT As himself, had met
for the express purpose of praising each other.
What then must be oar disappointment, to see
their mutual adulation almost reduced to the cold
and narrow limits of the cardinal virtues ; and find,
isstead of divine attributes of glory and omnipo-
tence, nothing but French frankness, French mag-
nanimity, and French glory, ballanced in comparison
with the frankness, generosity, and magnanimity
of the subjeCts of the Ottoman Porte. BON .1-
P.VR it is true, is styled the " most high, the most
potent, and most magnanimous Fl RiT CONSUL ;"
the glory also which he attaches to the maintenance
of peace, the renown of his vielories and the weight
of the French Republic, in ballancing the destinies
of Europe, are carefully enforced ; but the GRAND
Stosiott, whose real hereditary and legitimate
titles afforded such an ample field for the most sub-
lime adulation, is thrown very much into the back
ground, and shorn of his most splendid beams.—
And yet we are told, that in the rhodomontade of
French good faith and friendship, " the :3ultan
SELINt seemed satisfied, and marked the parts that
flattered him by signs of approbation."—We must
presume, he was not thinking of the day when this

self-same faithful and friendly ally treacherously in-
vaded Egypt in time of peace ; when this self-same
magnanimous FIRST CONSUL surreptitiously landed
at Aboukir, to wrest from Turkey,an old and faithful
Ally, its richest province, under the false pretence of
coming to rescue the country from the tyranny of the
Beys. We must also presume that he forgot thc Sy-
rian Expedition, when the self-same magnanimous
Rtir CONq! I. set out for the purpose of carrying war
into the very capital of Turkey, and that he was on
the eve of accomplishing his purp-Jse when his pro,
greys was arrested at Acre, by the viaorious arm of
Sir SIDN SMITH, and his little band of British
heroes. But no ;we will not insult the memory of
the Grand Signior by supposing that he could so
soon forget these things. They are too import-
ant to be ever lost to his remembrance. He
smiled no doubt at the boast of French good faith
and friendship ton•:.rds Turkey, but it was not an
approving smile ; it was a smile of contempt for
French perfidy and selfish cunning.

The Elglish frigate Nivr, which arrived at Ge-
noa oa the hof March, in seven days, from Malta,
brought tl:e inzelligence that our troops had begun
to evacuate Egypt.

Z 1...

The sending of French troops to the Isle of Cad-
mind and to A..lushing, is mentioned in the French
Papers, but, it is announced, as a common occur-
rence of no importance. The Isle of Cadsand, being
pari: of Dutch Handers, was ceded to France by the
Treaty offensive and defensive, concluded at the
lingu., on the 15th of May, 1795.
Switzerland is far from being tranquil ; the Go-
vernment have been under the necessity of publi:l-
- a proclamation against the person.., who are en-
deavouring in the Canton of Berne to raise the inha-
bitants against the new Constitution.
A Prussian Messenger arrived in town with dis-
patches yesterday morning at ten o'clock.
The following is the state of the Eledion at the
India House for six new Diredors, on which occa-
sion the six highest in the following list of Candidates
were declared.
R,l.Chichlyr'ywden,FAci. IWO j John II tllestoo, Esq. T4I
('lda Mill,:, E5q.......1404 John Inglis, Esq. 6l:,
Al; Omni It••barts, Es-1367 George Tatenl, Esti• • • 7i ti
Simon Fra4er, Emu ......1187 Thoina: Reid, Eut ti7s
Thomas Parry, Esq.-- 1006 John 1.L.4)13, Esq. ;46
The scrutiny was not over until half- past four
o'clock yesterday morning, at which hour this
Paper was at press. The have ai.L. another Paper,
the state ('f whose sale permit.J.l dim to wait for
the conclusion, had, therefore, .1^ ilportunity to
anticipate ns. We notice this merely in justification
of gurselves, against any charge of negligence.
The public days at Larnb;th 1'; Lee will corn.
mcnce on Saturday, the Q3d instant.

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i . ? 41M y history of % perfple can be tbus writter.. Whet: come metre haft ependent of France, than possibly can ,• • "---'2 -- - -°' •--
k - that people (if sic may so sax) beet contributed the be thecase at present.
thiam re e
risi
raaterials for their military history, aad when -civil
3. That if p
olofnth7;ei; aii"."a"
causes have had a
.great iatluence on the events of 1 the Armies 4- r some ace continues fur
„.ill lose a her
share
war, or their mihtary history, particularly when .
mih•tary skill, spirit, and energy, and consequently
the means given by is civil causes have created a
that that cuuutry must be proportionably weakened.
new art, a new system of war, and a new mode of
4. That if the existence of the present Govern-
taittics. meat of France is inconsistent with the safety of We :
i Whatever influences the charaaer of the History
England, or the independence of Europe, it is just
itself, ought also to iefluence its stile ; in describ- instant,
as likely to be overturned in time of peace, when the
iii,ectl-tain epochs the historian must sometimes de-
tsany of
people have nothing else to think of, as in time of
send from the habitual dignity 4 the stile of his-when their attention must necessarily be occu- with re
tory ; and there are partictdir historical forms war,
. . .
1 ' pied with hostile operations. making
which are requii ed by the epoch of the revolution.
f The necessity of saying every thing, or, at least, of 5. Tina the expense of the war, were it merely /mini',
!. •
? saving a great deal more than in common histories, naval, must beconsiderable, and that it will he very
with :u,
Mikes us to employ expressions which would not difficult to raise supplies without injuring our pub-
erherwise be admitted, as it also compels us to lie credit, or of adopting an oppressive system of minant
i l t admit Etas which otherwise would be neglected. taxation. the fai
1 fistory would be like an inanimate canvas, 11 it did 6. That the war may have the efFea of diminish- the Fr
not make its personages speak: it would he a paint- ing our commerce and revenue, and that the en- dII 1 . '
. ing without resemblance, if the language given them crease of both, during the late war, to so great an el
thea!
was not characteristic. The ancient historians, in extent, was altogether unprecedented. p
admitting faflitions harangues, for which we are to
That the grounds of the present dispute, so far accurst
i-' blame to reproach them, had for their objea to de-
as they arc hitherto known, or even guessed at; do the olli
velope the chart era of those to whom they antra-
eti bitted them. How much more necessary then it is not furnish a sufficient apology for the renewal of of the
war. That it is necessary at any rate to make the
when events are often the result of words, and when
real grounds of the present dispute so clear and ex- upon 1
affairs are influenced by speeches, to report, or at
plicit, that the enemy cannot possibly throw the to the
least faithfully extract, those speeches, since the
blame of renewing hostilities upon us,
words and the speeches form part of history. 122 d of
, __........._ - Lastly, That the risk we run is great, and the pro-
' .
of made 1
!VAR AND PE-ICE. specs any advantage so extremely uncertain, that
and be
nothing but the most urgent necessity, can justify
outrashly plunging ourselves into so dreadful a ca- Europ
I. A IWI'7II.N TA roa WA R. isenity ; which may occasion scenes of horror and lay fail
The arguments which may lie adduced, in favour
bloodshed, of nu common magnitude and extent,
of an immediate war, are as follow :
and which it is hardly possible to think of without
1. That France was not prepared for the contest ;
shuddering.
a fait that seems more and more evident every day.
Whate
rer truth or justice there may be in these «';ti
1 ' C. That it will take sonic time before it can be
• s
observations in support of peace, there are two par-
ticulars which cannot he questioned. 1. That any might
prepared ; and indeed the extent of its empire is in
this resped a great disadvantage ; for, in order to procrastination in the nc,,, ociation is extremely sus- presen
0 tarry on a war, wills England, it must not only pre- favourable to the interests-c% of England ; and t 3. That 7,1 E rt,
.
pare a formidable fleet, but arrange its troops, so if the negociation dons go or., m
it is essentially neces-
as to keep the countries dependant upon it, (which sary that- every point at issue should be finally ar- for d:
are at present In a disturbed state,) under subjec- ranged, so as to prevent the renewal of any similar N%'hat
. and to he nrenared against any attack which disoute for some time to come, and to give Europe their i