The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser.
London, England, 1806-04-04 00:00:00

FRIDAY, APRIL 4, 1806.

' measure, must admit the inference, or at least
strongly the consciousue.s, that a great change was
necessar y ; and its imp mince certainly will not be
diminished, when we look to the present stare of
Europe and the world. as well as the relative situa-
tion of our own country. There is, I understand,
amongst military men, a phrase called ff chibenie the
datteliom," which means, throwing it into such a
state of confusion, that a General Officer world be
very much embarrassed by attempting to restore the
men again to regular order. The Gentlemen oppo-
site to me appear to have aided on this principle.—
They have completely clubbed the battalion—
they have thrown every thing into disorder and con-
fusion, and now, methinks, I see them rubbing their
hands, and grinning for j..y, at the bard and difficult
task which they exultingly think they have imposed
upon their successors. That is the task, Sir, which
now devolves tome ; bat. in endeavouring to exe-
cute it, I mean not to demclish, but to repair the mi-
litary vehicle, and to place it in a state of perma-
nent security.--I say, permanent security, bicause I
do not think it sufficient to follow the old plan. My
objeft is not merely to get rid of the present danger,
great and perilous as it may be, and trust to futu-
rity for such ulterior measures as the occasion may
require. Such temporary expedients suit not the
time in which we live, nor the circumstances in
which we are placed. The first objeCt then to be
considered, with this view, is the creation of an
army, and that army, to make it efficient, should,
according wilily conception, be regulated by distinct
and particular rules. entirely detached from every
other profession, and having no trade, no duty, but
war, to which it is to be woolly and exclusively de-
voted. I do not assert, that this country has not
unops of that description, but what I complain of
is, that they are but a comparatively small propor-
tion of our military system. We have, indeed, long.
professed to have the interest of the army at heart ;
but I apprehend, these professions did not tarn
out to be sincere. The House, it it true, has
toiled for year. at this objea, but has, I fear, toiled
is vain ; as all its measures have Joon...little er no
good for the real interests of the army. .Slne half.
at least, of our measures, went no tartlet- than
merely to provide substitutes for an army. Our
militia laws, our volunteer system, our I.lresemeer.
and defence bills, afforded us only the specious
calculations of having 900,000 men in arms; bat
surely no man will so far deceive himself, as to
think that they have the character or the efficiency
of an army. It any man delude himself with such
an opinion, he only entertains the puerile notions
of a child, oho puts a Ire slick in the ground, aad
thinks he has planted a 04.! - An army. without
true discipliue, is almost as great a solecism to
language, as is is solitary science'. Every Mee. '
much conversant with these subjeas, must know,
that oat of the coarsest and most gross materials, a
regular army may be trained and fotmed to all
military purposes, ail(' be capable of holding and
maintaining the purest principles of honour and of
military char.ler. When we talk of substitutes
for armies, and the power of what 'is called an
armed nadon. we should recalled, that in ancient
as well as modern times, it was detached bodies of
men, called armies, and not the united population of
a country, that always decided Idle fate of empires.
Armies are tie channels through which a nation
ads, and in which its vigour, energy, and power
are colleOed. Without referring to ancient hiss
tory, which furnishes innumerable proofs of the
truth of this position, I -need crily advert to two
modern battles, which had as great an influence
on the sle.tiny of empire., as perhaps any
that could well be quoted. I mean those of Ma-
rei.go and Austerbts. Lie event of either of these
will fully exemplify the faa, that an anion only is
fought, and an empire falls. The result of either
of these engagements was not decided by the
strength of population ; for, when we consider how
circumscribed was the spot, which was the scene of
operation, and the number of men engaged on either
side, how small a proportion do they bear to the
millions, whose fate del:if-faded on the vietory ! ? In
a military point of view, the people are no better
than the rough ore, or metal in a mire, which can
be convened to no useful purpose, nor made of any
value, until it is manufaftured. So it is with the
people, until a starient portion of them is trained
and disciplined into an army. The armies of Bo-
naparte and the Emperor of Austria, must have met
in confiid, or else the former m'est have proceed-
ed to Vienna as soon as he coup march there. for
any opposition or imp-dement that the people could
oppose to him. Every one knew and foresaw, that
atter General Mack bail surrendered with his army,
Bonaparte would have reached Vienna without op-
position. Will any one then suppose. that the peop!e
of these territories, through which he was to march,
wire not loyal, and more attached to their own legiu-
mare government, than to the dominion of strangers
and enemies ? Will it be thought, that the inhabitants
had sinews, muscles, strength and courage, equal
at least, it not superior. to those whom they knew
to be coming to oppress them ? Yes, Sir, they pos-
sessed all these. but they were not an army ; and
Bonaparte walked through the population, which
afforded him no more redstance than the air. I
assure you, Sir, that there is no man would rely
more theta I would do oa a zealous manifestation

of the loyalty and courage of the people of this
country, in case of ao invasion. So far, I have full
and confident reliance on them ; but I will not rest
upon it. Let us. for a moment, refer to as ex-
ample that as familiar to all of us. If ever there
were a couatry calculated by nature to be defended
by its populatioa. it was that of Swimerlat,J.—
They possessed a c•santry so strong. its:predicable,
and almost inaccessible to an enemy, that one nrght
have thought it could be del:rt.:ed by a race of pig-
mies. But, that was so far from being the case,
that the inhabitants were always resairk.eole r.yr
strength, hardihood, and viour, and their military
courage was so well kaown. and so renowned in
history, as to bCCGOSO ervvcri.z. No people were

ever more celebrated for their love of liberty, and
invariable attachment to their country ; but not
having a sufficient regular army, the population was
unable to defend it, and Switzerland, in spite id
every exertion, fell, unfortunately, under the yoke
of strangers. AVithout, therefore, wasting the time
of the House with any further argameat on what I
have to propose, I shall only request the House to
judge of the necessity of a regular army, by the
uniform experience of the world. It is not, by any
means, a theory I am advancing ; it, indeed, has
nothing less in it than theory. I am, however,
aware, that some of the Gentlemen opposite to
me, may be disposed to call it so, and place me in the
situation of the man in the French comedy, who was
speaking plain prose, all the time that his auditors
would insist he was addressing them in poetry. Dis-
missing, then, all theory, I fairly profess, that I Best
for seeutity on a Regular Army only. As things are
now constittned. I see, and I must own that I see
it with an apprehension bordering on terror, that it
the French were now to land in this country, we
should have, at least, 100,000 men to contend for
its fate. against troops, and such veteran and vido-
rious troops too, a 3 would probably be opposed to
them, who never before had seen a battle in their
lives. I have no hesitation in saying, that I should
not think the country secure, if its destiny and
its existence were at issue between regular
troops and a force of that description. Having
now, Sir, stated these prelim.nary oLservationi,
which I thought necessary for the h-tter elu •
cidation of the suhjet, I come next to submit the
rnratum, which l propose fir the Hoare to adopt.
and in which, though 1 do not exclude the preseut.
Ido not mean to rest there. I cannot content my-
self with providing only for the present emergency,
and discharging the future from my consideration.
In attempting tot he proqress by which a re-
gular army may be rendered more effidual, I as-
sure the House, that it is far from my intention to
arraign, in the slightest degree, the present discipline
of the Regulasc. I bel'eve. and indeed I may say
I know it to be as perted as their Constitution will
admit of. There are only two ways that I know of,
by which *regular army can be raised ; by force, or
by entice; compulsory means are unquestionably
the mo.tefficacitsus ; but that is a method, which
' the Constitution of this ccuntry, unhappily for that
object, but most happily for all others, never can ad-
mit of. This country must have laws, to which
every operation must he subordinate ; and these ail-
ing by a kind of fridion, weaken the force of military
measures. An arbitrary Covet nment has the means
of ailing, with repo./ to its military means, at its ow n
discretion. A German Prince, for instance, may
sek4 us many of has ethic /hi as he pleases, and it
them be env cumstneces-of a mat,. family, or si-
tuation, which may entitle him to an exemption from
that service, the Prince exercises his own discre-
tion; whether he will allow it to bun or not.--.
With• us, however, these resources of military
power are lost in the collision, as all men are equal,
and every thing must go according to the strid letter
the law. Such, as I said before, is the fortunate
situation- of this country. We have not the arbi-
trary power of compulsion, which is said to grind
the miller with as little compundinn as it doe. the
corn. We cannot here seted our objets for mill.
tary service, nor eon I have recourse to any oth-r
compulsion, than that of compelling the pur-
ple to pay the money which may be required for
the completion of the plan. The whole of our
Militia system goes upon this kind of compulsory
power, nod that compulsion serves to counter-
ed the voluntary service. The method that I ,
would propose for this objet ii, that the bar-
then wh.cli now falls only upon a third of the
population, should in future fall upon the whole.
—I
am pendently convinced, that if a rrullion
more were annually raised, and diffused over the
whole mass of .the population of this country, it
would fall upon the people as insensibly as the air
they breathe. I do not attempt to say, that the
necessities of the country may not possibly be, at
one time or other. such as to require the compulsion
of military service. Nothing is impossible to the
legislature. which the exigeucies of the state may
call fur—bat i centre. pria. feaninde," every riper'. I
rnent should be made, every expedient employed,
before we should apply ourselves to that last, and
most extreme resource. The question then comes
—can we, with the mean: we have, raise such an
army eel propose t and what are the methods by
whims it is intended to be accomplished ! My an.
swer is. that in order to accomplish this (Ned, you
must first put your army-in such a 'Uniting, as will
induce the people to enter voluntarily into it. If
you do not take means to accomplish this. my opi-
nion is, that you must give up all idea of voluntary
service.. My wish therefore is, to make the military
service so generally desirable amongst the mass of
the people, as to attract a considerable portion of the
inhabitants to embrace it. As the system has stood
hitherto, we did not put the army on such a footing as
to make it worth a man's while to enter into it. We
have been like merchants driving a false trade, and
offering commodities which were not worth what
we asked. When we propose to sell our goods
beyond their value. it is not much to be wondered at
that we should find only a few enuomers. We per.
sued a branch of bosicess which chiefly consisted of
deceiving, cajoling, juggling. and holding out false
colours. Tee officers employel in raising men for
the service, frequently represented, that they could
get none bat the careless, the idle, the dissipated, and
the extravagant ; men, urged to the service by their
temporary distresses, or lured to it by artifices, that
were far from doing honour to those who pia& sed
them. The un ice, which possessed no attraction in
itself, could only go on by the arts and tricks of re.
cruitiog ; but, we have, before this time, lost all
thane resources; an,l have exhausted ail the artifices
of delusion. For a long time past. boys have been
the meat des:rable objets of recruiting officers, and
the greatest resource of the army ;
not that bays are
now any ream, compact! to sun, than !tsi were