The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser.
London, England, 1809-04-22 00:00:00

WAR BETWEEN AUSTRIA and FRANCE.

War between Austria real France is no broils!,
tiotilitiul.—We lay bailtlre our readers the folios*
lug noble Proclamation of the Archduke Cherhess
just receited by Cosertiruent 7
" V I UM" as moan...
" The priatimeise Of oar country cells us to awn anothidts
As loo; as it was tamable to preserve peace by meet* d
4..,crifires, mid as lung se One, Neville*, were Nelallall,
wills the Ibuoutir of the Throe, with the security of the
state, and with the welfare of the demote, the heart of use
bountiful Sovereign suppressed every inlaid is oto
buee; bet when all cu.leaVosire to peewees, happy rodeptr
deuce from the insatiable asniatieo of a foreign Coaqueror
prove fruitless, alien natioes are falling around an, sad
when lawful suecreinus are tom freer flit harts d emir
sohjects, when in tine the drove of universcd sisloasallieu
threatens even the lir pp, States of Austria, sad Mawr peatew
aisle fortunate inhabitants ; then dies oar c.estry dimmend
its deliver:llea from us. and we stand forth in 14, defeard..
" On you, my dear brother soldiers. see axed the ewe
of the universe, and of all drum who skit feed lbs
twill honour mot ilatuniel prosperity. Yu• shall net she. y
the laser ace tif Irec.rienig the tours of reppr.:seron. Twa shall
not carry un the cudlesa wars 4 ambitioa order disetall
throes. Your blood shall never Ws/ tor 'whips retaresee
sad Fayette coyctusseesa not on volt shall the corm alight
to annihilate innocent nations; and over the belies of the
slaughtered defeuders of thew country to pave the wet Ar
• f...reigiier to the usurped throne. .4 happier lot aredui
you ; the liberty of 1:J/rope has taken refuge troller war,
batr.ers. Your victories wilt loose its fatten, and yaw too.
tie.. is Germany, yet in the ranks of the runny, let
their deliverance. bus are wageprd is a just cause, VON.
Wow I avoid net appear at y‘iar head.
Oa the Adds of Vies sad Marengo. whereof the
Si
lain reminded ye with ortestae suss pride, en Ohms=
will weaves, the gletiose deeds of Wortsburgb as/ Ctserash,
of Liptiseas ilitedtariti awl Zwick of 'coma, of Ole Tee&
his owl Nov/ We will compeer • Meting ram Ate we.
country ; lust the great cad ie as. to be attulaed without
crest names. t' ',modern/sal sehordiestims, WIN
Oise, pensvorisi caorege,_ and mushalten steadiers I. dew
nee, are the eompaaions of true fortitude. OOP • Mahan
• ai-H sad a joist co-operation of the whole load to sic-
tyry.
" Sty Severely@ end broths: has imaged me with els-
powers, to reward find be efeliab• I will be arti
where in the middle of rim, sod you *ball receive Ike
fret thank!. of yowl. eatery iresa your General on the held
of batik. The patrimeess of messy of the Aseerien Inn
batty has anticipated yews ueuM , this is a plaapsls the
fullest measure of thyrablig pada bIIII4I,I6IIININIIS
Audi alga,with jngesiM-riewir, led es every tunnel ad
duty ; Went shall matt with reward, sad afro* with sat:
I:advection, without distiactien of pursue sir rani ; branded
with distrate, droll the northing persou be cast ust to
vibes: Isle is dearer them his and ear bower. Adorned
with the aunt., ut public esteem will I pretest to owe Al..
the world, those brave into also have deserved
well of their courtly, and otiose eases I wilt ever carry se
me heart.
" 'niers remains erne consiorrafrett, while% I most pea
you in mind the soldier is only fonniirblit tribe cow
illy in won; civil induce most out be al.awp7la to Mast
out of the field of battle, towards the searisokeitierm sod
k=t, he is moderate, sompsuoutiate end Inamase : be
restlee evils of war, and binge, to Itglites elms" 1 trill
punish awry wanton excess with so each peen, severity,
as it is nut the intent;un of our Nissassit Is ippon set'.
b.iuriug countries, but to deliver them (nits Meir opprer
suira, said lit forin with thaw Prince, a powerfur Load in
order to bring about • lading peace, sad to meimeals the
feelersl welfare and security, Lou. will fatelp troops, in
Garet union with is, attack tie gunmen emsawn. Them,
brave companions in arms! honour sad support them as
your brother ; out by vain glorious high surds but manly
deeds w loch do honour bi the warrior ; by intrepidity liefore
the enemy you most skew youreelvee to be the Lest role. re
" Thus then sl.all I owe day lead you back to voer e..nrs
try, followed by the respect ssf the enemy, sad by *ha Pa-
titude of foreign nations, after haying secured by }our
arras an honourable peace, when the satisfoctiop of our
Monarch, the approbation of the world, the rewards ol
valour, the blessings of your fellow-chicane, and the cos-
scimuness of deserved repose, await you.
" CHARLES, Archduke, Genarali

IMPERIAL PAULIAMENT.

HOUSE OF

The Scotch Creditors' Bill was seed a third time, aid
passed.
PENALTIES OF REVENUE LAWS.
Lord Gate •Lit stated, proviimes to the manes he em
about to propose, that it was incumbent ma thee Lordships
to take into co "ides sans most entinoily the most., gcsesally
adopted when Acts of Parliament were (rained for the cutler-
tele of the tevasse. It was the meal prartire to insrit
glasses which htd • referetwe to former Acts of Paramecia
fur the same purpose, std thereby enacted fist all permitted
contained m those prow Acts Moaslet become be Extended
to the law then before the to gislature. It war. not proper
that pelialt:es should be thue laid opus the subject ;
resaltics in many cams trediag teen to the taking away a
life. He trusted the House would see the propriety
of r dlei. t.s alt these penalties referred to, &opened in
ariuus A• 's, s it redace them tato owe Art of Parliaineut.
Ou these groucd. his Lorddiip moved t• That there be pre•
pared in that House, a Bill fur reducing into one Act all
penalties respecting the Revenue Laws."—Agreed to.
A few words were said by the Earl of Lt 'avow., ro
'peeling the rattans laid on the table, of all the deserters
that collated tutu the Isaiah +limy in Spate mad Portegali
from whence it appeared that only tut% had been receket
tato um- nosy whilst in Portugal.
lawil ALCIILAND shortly unitervel, the mares Got kW
on their Leidships' table did out aerosol for the permed
state of our regionals alter et was alloyed upwards of Tom
had !pica lean is the campaign
AFFAIRS uh. SPAIN.
Earl Carr—•• My Lords, its undertaking a
bring under the consillerativ of the House tht
various uplifter% operation-4 of tile last satowier
Portugal and Spain. 1 feel that I have eliadvstalara
a teak to which I ant arrant my abilities will be
fantod inadequate. My Lords, to detail the IMAM,
of those transactions, the tryst character bad bears
asp of which are to be sought fur sod explored itt
• large aeries of efficial docantenN. w. •olonsiamses
and perplexed that they satin rather to reft.isead
• ,

r

I

--~*--

-than to assist isseleiry—to produce these before your
Loidahips in such a manner as to enable you to
. pronounce that judgment which the importance of
toe case requires, cud the country expects, would ,
be for me, I fear, utmost impossible. I feel, there-
fore, the necessity, at the outset of what I am
silent to state, to solicit a more than usual portion
of your Lordships patience and indulgence,
while 1 endeavour to execute a task that 1 would
rioher have been counnitted to abler hands. But,
as no other Peer •lisle expressed an intention of
standing forward, I feel that I owe it to my coun-
try, in this its most ['entails state, nut to sutler the
consideration 9f such a subject to be any longer de- :
(erred. It cannot toe necessary to recut to the re-
collection of the House the universal sentiment
that prevailed on the first news of the resistance of
the people of Spain to an uaurpatioa which, whe-
ther on account of the violence #lltl injustice of the
act itaelf„ or- the fraud and perfidy with which it
was accompanied, it is impossible to describe. The
-1,.. ition mac universal ; one universal spirit broke
farili, without distinction of rank or party; and,
. vliat was far inure calculated to insure the ad-
vaustage of our assistance, was, that all the generous
I.;lllplithiew of the nation, that lose of liberty, hatred
of oppression, sentiments of the hlebsings we enjoy.
ed, and a forecast of the etruggleb we might have to
maintain them, all comipired to excite in the breasts
of Englishman', those feelings which I tract wo ne-
ver shall want when the.eouteat is between justice,
freerioniomd public iudepeudeuce de the one side,
and the highest atrocity and oppresaust on the
tither. Accordingly the feelings of the country in
favour of Spain, were universal, and the voice of
opposition ceased. A liberal iodulgence Woe given to
Ministers of what they pleased to demand. All was
given they asked under that responsibility which at-
tached to them fur the truth of the statement they
held forth to the public, and for the solidity of
the grOaattli on which they acted. Maier that re-
sponsibility every thing was granted fur the support
of that righteous cause in which the country has' so
cothusunitically emisarked. The day is now come
when we are hound to ask, in justice to ourselves
amid the country, what fruits have been derived from
those advalitugeti with which Ministers set out in the
cause of Spain. It is now to be alicem that what was
granted liberally has been employed wisely mid with
a vagour proptirtionate to the ineguitude of the trust.
We have a right to expect from Ministers this; first,
to 'thew us that they had sufficient and satisfactory
information to justify them in the hopes they held
out to us, to aid the resistance of the. Sponiali
; secondly, that hewing that information, and
being side to thew the grounds on which they
acted were solid, that their measures were proper.
tinned to the end, and that they acted with energy,
'firmness, promptitude, and caution ; that they
have been looking to the affairs of Spain wit:. the
eves of stetlismen ; it at their means were well
proportioned to the attainment of the object ; sad
that they acted with that happy won't' of energy .end
eattcon,so indispensthly necessary to ensure bocce**.
1-eas not of those, who. however inviting the pro-
' (sleet held out to us in the month of May, last year,
with respect to Spain, thought that the bituatiou
of His Majesty's Ministers was uut sutrounded
. with difficulite*-1 could not say, at that time,
that His Majesty's Ministers were placed upon a
bed of roses. I think their situation was *.situa-
tiou of great difficulty and danger y tequiriog the
utmost vigour, coercion, and wiodom, in preparing
the means by which this country web to atfc-d As
effectuel assibtance to Spain. I hope I than not be
charged with having a disposition to undervalue the
resource, of the country. Even after all our losses
Swifter the looses of the last campaign, great as
they *ere in treasure, in character, and honour—
Even after those losses, I am persimeled, and I
Use no vain boast when 1 say, that, under an ad-
ministration of prudence and wisdom, the country
is possesses] of ample 41116411$ to bring the contest in
which A is engaged to an honoursinle termination.
I trost .not be thought to talk the language
of despondency, when I hay, that, in order to
Swinton) the ultimate contest which is to decide for
over the power and independence of the country,
the true poll:ey of those who govern it must be to
pay a strict attention to economy, to be actuated
by a determination to conceutrate your means—
ant to endanger them in any specUlation in which
the event is doitlitful, but purening die economical
system of husbanding your resources, by which
alone you will enable yourselves to continue the
Contest, the cessation of which does not depeoll on
you, but moon the injustice of your enemy. 1 re-
meroberthis policy was much derided on a former
occasion ; but, notwithstanding the ridicule which
was thrown on it, I think the country will one day
know how to appreciate that system which Was
steadily roomed mud acted upon by the last Ail-
Ministration. lam not prepared to say that that
policy should be extended, so far as to prevent our
availing ourselves of a good opportunity of' apply-
ing ourresources upon occasions which bold out a
reasonable prospect of success. On the contrary,
I think that the adveatege of that system of policy
is, that while it enable* you to maintain a protract-
ed contest, it also enables you to tight the last hat-
tie which is to decide on the fate of the country.—
It is the concentretion of your means, and the
provensent of your resources, by which alone you
can have every thing ready to avail yourselves of
such an opportunity. I will not conceal front
.you
•hat I am one of those who thought such. CiiM
p was given to this country he the eteuts
esiicto took place in Spain hot year. I census/Iy,
without 'woo; to,, farmisrable an opinion sr hli-
porters, did Oyu them credit for their 'entities iu
a situation in which it behoved thins to guard
against popular delusions, as well as too excite [no
polar enthusiasm. in such a situation I gas- fluent
ereilit for this—that they would nut of themselves
willingly do any thing to excite those p.u.sinsis
Obich were necessary to be restrained, and, bast
of all, to hold out hopes which were out [wallies'
tos facts. And this leads UVy to the consideration
of the tire* iwint ors which His ?.lajesty's Nboi.terr
are boutol this day to give an account—Whether
they took means to obtain information with regard
to ji,oio, and whether the information they received
was that which
.joistitied the hopess they held out to
the public. We cannot forget the magnificent ac-
equate which were el rotated at the time, of the re-
solurces of Spain—of' the tothusiaam soul spi-
VI el the people—of the vast armies they had
collected, and with which it was everted

#

-...•101111k

I

r~

t

_ .
'they would drive the Freacli beyond est ta-
guy. I remember that it was stated, that
every thing but official documents justified
the statement of the amount of the Spanish
armies as cofisisting of upwards of fuer hundred
thousand men, esclusive of a body of reserve, con-
sisting of a million ; and both these exclusive of the
volunteers. We heard then of nothing but tlia spi-
rit and enthusitunu of the Spaniards. I, have looked
in vain to the documents presented by His Majes-
ty's Ministers—nothing of the kind. i find, on the
contrary, in the letters of every officer, of the
greatest character, amid whose erejit b taints highest
with this House, statements of a very dab-rent de-
scription. 1 tied Lord William Bentimk, soon
after his itrri‘ al at Madrid, sending accounts orthe
state of the army highly tomfavourable ; that the
greatest danger was to he aprehentlett from their
inability to contend with the French, and that they
were not prepared fur the reverses they had met
with. After the defeat of General Blake, I find
the uceounts received were still more unfavourable.
If I luuk to time letters of General Broderick, I

find thew 110 less discouregiug with respect to the
people of Spain. In the letters of September 10,
and November 5, you have accounts of the French
array, and of the Spain's!' army opposed to them,
which were calculated to encourage His Majesty's
Ministers in auy thing rather than in saliguine
hopes of success. In wine of the letters there are
.accounts of the total want of confidence in those
who ought to have setahe fire...example of heroism
and devotion to their country. By the letters of
General Baird and General Moore, we final that
spirit which was so *imposed to he itniveriol, mid
which to be successful must be persevering, had
wholly subsided. Sir John Moore-states, that he
heard of enthusiasm, but he had met with it no-
where—that the first reverses chequed it, and that
he lied not been able to collect auy grounds to
justify the sanguine hopes which had been formed.
I have fband it my duty on borne former occasions,
to stare my feelings of - disadvantage arising
from the want of at politicel correspondent as well
as a military one, and I have heard no satisfactory
reason for withholding that information I required.
If the enthusiasm of the people of Spain, excited
by their hatred towards the French, was what it
has been described, nothing could be to necessary
as that the Government established there ihoold
give a direction to that spirit. tiarely it was of
importance that political nems should have been
sent to that country, to co-operate aith its Go-
vernment ; but it has been remarked by my Noble
Friend, that there seems to have been a disunints
in the Government upon this occasion, and while
we have ample doenoneuts laid before us by the
Secretary of State, the political correspondence
of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has been with-
held, except some documents which it was impos-
sible to withhold. We have Mr. Freres letter of
Nov. 30, in which he complains of the want of es-
ertiou, and the want of the means of defeuree on the
part of the people of Spain. 1 have called your
Lordships' attention to this letter, borause it thews
by the admission of Mr. Frere that there was a de-
ficiency in those means which were necessary to en-
able the people of Spam to deletet themselves
agaiii.t the Attacks et the armies of Fraace. But
I fear this passage in Mr. Frere's letter is applica-
ble to a mach Ist ger deseription of country, than
General Moore could have passed. General Moore
could have seen nothing of Spain but what was to
Lassen on his march from Portugal to Salamanca.
But Mr. Frere describes a much larger portion of
country, and I suspect that there is an omission
this letter, that it may appear 1111rf slr. Frere was
writing not as to the small district between Leon
and Salamanca, but of the whole Leatiese. If
Mr. Frere should have expressed himself with re-
gard to such an extensive portion of country, stat-
ing, that throughout the whole of it there was a
want of energy and exertion, then I ask what credit
can lie given to His Majesty's Ministers, for deli-
berately holding out to the people of Eugland, such
unigniiie hopes of ultimate success of the exertion
of the people of Spain? I know not upon what au-
thority His Majesty's Ministers could have consi-
dered themselves as justified in the statements
they nride at the time ; conscious as they mast
have hven of the contents of the official docu-
ments which at: have before us. But their in-
formation was not confined to the statements
or British officers and agents; all the infor-
m:aims they received was of the same description.
I would refer you to the proclamations of the Go-
verntueuts of the two Castiles and Lent,, and the
proclamations of Gen. Artuanda, after the defeat of
Can. Blake, complaining of the want of every thing
necessary to enable hint to resist the enemy. I
would refer von also to the statement of Gen. Car
tailor, who gives the same accounts after the defeat
tit*Tudela, amid states the frequency of desertion in
his army. How strongly is this confirimel?—We
find that the whole united force of the principal
armies of Spain, the army of Gen. Blake, the army
in Estiousadent, sod thoarner of Anytime instead
of amounting to 400,000 men, was not equal to the
army with which the French began their attack in
August: and (shave authority for stating it never
exceeded 30,000; that the army in Estremaditra
was not more than 12,000—that the army of
Castanos, hick was said to moonlit to 60,000,
never exeeeded cloathed, and ill pro-
vided with even• riersessary to enable them to
keep the field—that these armies, including the
army of Amigos), did not exceed forty thousand,
■nd eoinpowil of men of all descriptions, deficient
of supplies, arms, aad accoutrements, anal la-
bouriog under all the disadvantages of new-rinsed
levies. ‘Vhen we Lute these things before us, are
we mint called on to exact a severe account from
Ministers, and to ohlige them to shew that they
had some better 111P1001 lac which they could expect
to oppose a successful resi:oance to the atnliittows
views of Framer, ilia% .:or of those of which we have
hitherto bran,. I ktollV I -hall he told that it
s+•:t+ by the.e ocw Eyries (:mart Dupont was
th-featet!--that seas de•feuded—that the
Freud' were repulsed from (;ollicia, ■nd Jo-
seph Bonaparte driven from Madrid : that an
ebullition of enthusiasts nod stiontaileous resist-
ance on the part of the peryle of Spain, broke out
at once, is lint to be dl•iptite.l ; Lout, it I stated Jul
the letters to time Secretary for the War )epartinent,
that it was not a smitten thollition of rage upon the
contieraance of wbirh we (emir' sot depend with
certainty, but that it visa a pereevering spirited feel-

..

ing of patriotism, which, is stalc,l inn letter to
Lord Csistlereagli, sus nut to be intituidute d by
threats or seduced by conipminise ; a spirit which
was calculated to curvy tie people through a hoar
and difficult contest ; certainly it was the existri•er
of such * spirit that could warrant His Majesty's
' Ministers iu risquing so large a proportion of the
remaining forces f this country. But let it be con-
sidered what was the iitinition of Affairs at the
beginning of the contest. Early in July, you have
General Dupout defeated ; towards the latter end
of July, Joseph Bonaparte rttired, and it um not
till November fullowiiig. that the French armies re-
ceived sot reinforcements. At the time the French
were behind the River Ebro, their force did nut
amount to more than forty thionsand men. if we
have these facts us existing at the tint insurrection,
we have also the proof, that the whole of the period
during which the French force 'vas there, there ens
a fatal inaction on thepart of His Majesty's Minis-
ters. as well au of those who had the conduct of
the offain of Sprit], which suffered the Ft each to
remain there unmolested until they had received
the reinforcements they expected. Now this must
havetwrisen from one of two causes ; either that
there was not that persevering spirit, or that these
heiag the elements of that spirit, there was not a
Goverinneut capable of giving a proper direction
to it; and, whichever of these two views you take,
in neither case is the conduct of His Majesty's
• Ministers exempt from blame. Either they had
information or they had not. if they lied not, they
stand charged with culpable negligence ; and if
they had information, and held out hopes which
that information slid not justify, they stand iii a
much higher degree responsible to the public for
their contact. I hove already said, it was not a
sudden ebullition that should have led us to de • art
from those principles of economy I have so often
recommended. His Majesty's Ministers should
have been satisfied, not only of the existence of a
proper spirit in the people. lot that there was a
government in that country which had • acquired
sufficient authority to give it the necessary energy.
If neither of these things existed, or if the one
exalted without the other, it was the very pitch of
madness in His Majesty's Ministers to lavish as
they have done the resources of this country. It
there was a spirit in the people, though acting
outlier the disadvantage of not having a proper
spirit in the Government, I do not any that assist-
ance should have been wholly withheld ; but we
certainly should not have sent ati army where we
had not the necessary Illeall% to afford supplies •to
that arm:, or effectual assistance to those it was
intended to protect : we ought rather to have given
our assistance by money, and by the welbapplied
exertions of our naval force on the coast of
Spain. Unless both these circumstances were
united—nnless, according to the best informatiou,
there were good grounds for believing there
was a persevering spirit in the Spanish nation,
and a spirit in the Government to give it a propel
direction, the Government of this country should
not have hazarded a British army. Now let us
consider what His Majesty's Ministers have done.
It may he said that though there was net in the
first instance a central Government to direct the
energies of the people of Spain ; yet, that every
body must be convinced of the uecesisity of giving
effect by our means to their exertions. It may be
said there were proofs of the existence of a consi-
derable spirit of enthusiasm, and with those proofs
it may be asked, would you wait till that spirit
had subsided, without taking any measures for
its support ? I say I would not—l would have
made preparations; but before I allowed my-
self to send an English army into Spain, I would
' have seen that there were reasonable grounds of
success.—'Then let us consider under these cir-
cunistatices, what we have done. Supposing the
I spirit of the people to have been as we wished it ;
and I confess I was among the most
• Let ns consider what measures have been taken

with a view to bring the powers of this country to
give the must effectual aid to the cause of Spain.—
In considering this subject, I shall first state
the different anodes of action, and then it will
not be necessary to do any thing more clean state
my objections to the plan upon which His Majesty's
Ministers resolved to act. I state that there were
four different ways by which this country might
have assisted Spain. We might have assisted Spain
lay sending/in army in the North ; in Catalonia and
the East. by the attack of the French army in Por-
tugal. and on the frontiers of Spain, or. it might
have lwen done by assembling an army on the
South of Spain. As to asiernbling an army on the
North, it has been stated by one Minister, that it
was a most chimerical project, that was not al-
ways his .tentitileut ; for in ono of his docu-
snesits, we find Gijon and St. Andern, as the beet
place to net in. Undoubtedly with respect to
the co-operation of an army as applicable to that
point, much depended on the time, unless it acted
in the month of August. it could aot act at all ; the
difficulties with respect to supplying the army with
provisions would have barn very great, in conse-
quence of its having been found necessary to supply
General Blake's army. When I look to the diffi-
culty of finding provisions; the disadvantages of
the debarkation and the insecurity of a retreat, I
am net inclined to say that that would have been an
athistable point. As to the East in Catalonia, I
should say that the time which would elapse before
you could assemble an army, would bean objection
to that point; the remaining quarters to which CO
army might have been directed, are Portugal u id
the 'South of Spain, the preference to the one over
the other depends upon the time--that which is of
the'greatest value in all military operations. If yon
could have been ready in August or September, it
might have been edveutageous to have collected an
army in the South of Spain. But, sine I um, if
von could have sent an army before the end of
September. there could he no question (for reasons
which t will not enter at large into,) that the pre-
ference ought to have heir given to the Smith, and
that the embarkation shouldl have been at Cadiz
instead of Commis. With respect to the advan-
tage of the lest mode of employing a Bri-
, fish army. I am inclined to 'agree with His
Majesty's Ministers that it was striking an import-
ant blow by the distraction of the French force in
Portage, and by its effects in giving encourage-
ment to the people in Portugal. and of availing
yourself f the whole population of that country in
addition to that of Spins. I have therefore no dd.-

.. __T ~.,

fealty in stating, that to commence ad attack on
the army in Portugal. provided that attack had
been properly conducted as a general iietiou, mud
lint as a separate movement, which ended, mr all
suet iiieusures tout feel, that would unquietion-
eddy •leive been the best mode. Let us consider
how Ills Majesty's Mionters found themselves
tolled 1)11011 to net. I have said, that of the four
plains they neglit have chosen any one ; but then it
true übsiolu tely necessary that they should have
had some plan. lemitpurte, in one of his plans,
states. that success military oteeratious depend*
oil liseetig a measles- plan : whether the plait they
might ailept uou Id have beet: the beet wise yet,
uhateier they clid„ cousidering the interests of
Spain, and the character of the sunny against
whoa they were to tee, is regular plan was merles
eery !Near a single movement war merle. I
leave
stated that the true policy or the mune): was to
huatesial its resources, and concentrate its Invites,
for a favuurable opp ortutsity—Now. let os See la
what eituation His Majesty's Miaistere ft11111(1 th 4•111.1
ItrlVell at the commencement of tile trauseet ions in
Seeiu. One eximethtion had been writ to iweeltie
under that gallant Officer, ever to be Issmented,
Sir JohreMoure, with eleven thousund men. If it
was not for pressing eireitmetances, 1 would stop to
*peek of that expedition, in %Inch 11,4000
were sent to assist the King of Sweden, attacked
from Norway, by Roselle by Frame, and liy Leis-
mark. To support this Mouateli, 11,ouu wee:
sent, without any knowledge 0r nay point on which
they were to act, or without tiny *Mug baviug here
previously concerted on the subject. It is ;mew-
sible to advert to whet pea. happened to Ss rtlrn.
without referring to a greet steal of al.st lots peso' d
this Lauer. We bed undsr our considelutimi the
tiu fortunate seteeb4 of t hut expientitin, in is%ltch the
Mulish tieiy sis debt toyed. It trusteed t the eafey
of Sweden was the object of that
now pay the penalty of that expedition by the state
of ruin to wheel the King of Sweden by our meet es
has been melt:ed.—His Majesty's Ministers think
they did their duty by sending elev.o thotieend
men under an officer who does trot know thseobjeut
for whiclehe is sent.—When it arrived there, it
seemed to be unexpected ; the King of Sweden i.
disappointed as to its employtreist, and we hare
the uiifnrtuuatc, vie:tens-twice of a British officer.
bring forced to emote in iiistp:iee.—Sir John
Moises had hero suet iis Seedea with eleven thou-
nand into, from whence he re; ereed in the manlier
I deeerilictl. About the mime time Genteel Wel-
heley was eeit to tittnek the French its ,Portrigal.
You had a. rm.,: tinder Sir Julio Motet of eleven
thousand nem ; an expedition of Geiteral %Veneto
ley el tee:ay-live thousand •i em and au esy.eiii-
lion under Genera Speurer of five thousand men.
Having such a force at their disposel, the tint
thing to he considered .Wes the plan of operation,
on which it was to he employed---they acted
on the same system Of thnughtleseuess they
had dune before. With all these inealis in their
hands, they embarked on a sea of difficulties with-
out chart or compass. Instead of comeitieieg one
Commander to direct the whole expedition, they
send Sir Arthur Wellesley under a roving commis-
sion, to act where aud bow he can. They send aii
order to General Speucer to 4es-operate with hint,
Sir Arthur Wellesley being instructed to
(ieueral Spencer, noel at the same titers
General Spencer a discretion by a hicil Ise
either to co-operate with Sir Arthur We
to go through the Straits of Gibraltar, where lie is
to act without tether thought or plata. I centred,
that when there was a general resistance on the part
of the people of Spent to the pvnver of France, the
first thing his Majesty's Ministers ought to have
done should have been to have collected the metres
adequate to the object, before they uudertnok to
net at all. I have said that the proper opportunity
was affisrolcd 'Portugal . but I have also said there
should have been a preliminury plan. How did His
ftliajeety's Minister, act.? I think alter the first at -
counts in May, au expedition was sent off for the
purpose of taking adventage of the disturbances in
pain. Sir Arthur Wellesley left Loudon after the
14th of June, with orders for Portugal, with a tall.
bability that eomething might occur to lead hint to
Spain. The Nolsie Lord opposite shakes his head,
and says,—No. I shall he glad to bear how Sir
Arthur Wellsoley's expedition was fitted out.
I know it ass sit out under the greatest dis-
advantages, detieient in horses and cavalry, unit
those things which were moat wanted for the ser-
vice on which lie was employed. i have stated that
there was an advanta4e arising from the expeditious
which His Majesty's Ministers had planned not
having been acted noon ; but there were also some
disadvantages. General Moore's force required
filar to recruit, awl Sir Arthur Wellesley's being
intended fora different service, was deficient in
what was most required. When it was that Minis-
ters first undertook to employ the army in Spain,
I cannot Gee. but it was subormeasst to the !lit of
June. Lord Castlereagh writes to Sir A. Welles-
ley that the accounts from Cadiz were bad ; but it
appears that he had an expedition in view. fur on that
day CoL Blown is ordered to collect information
with respect to the country. On the 30th of June
they seed their final instructions, and there are twit
separate itistitietions of the same date. In the
first, he is directed to proceed to the coast of Spline
to collect information with regard to any point on
which it may be possible to art_,- and by-another
letter, of the nine date, a second positive instruce
tion is sent (leering him to proceed off the Tops.
In the interval between the fine and second letter,
it appears that the intelligence came from Sir
Charley Cotton, representing the French force at
4,000 men : without wetting to hear from Col.
Brown, but acting open the intelligence of a Naval
Officer certainly entitled to every uttention, for his
gallant services, though, perhaps, not the fittest per-
son to be relied 011111 this instance, His Majtstta
Mististers changed their object, and directed Sir
Arthur Wellesley to pmeeed immediately. without
loss of time, to the Tastus. Hewes hardly clear of
the Channel, before Ministers received from Gen.
Spencer more accurate lICCOMOttie Gen. Spencer
stated it to be 20,000 men ;--then all was alarm
and confusion, end Ministers coutemplated 'endue;
out an expedition upon a more extensive scale, aud
they then thought flint ge,ooo men were hardly
sufficient. Whet' the fusee was ,sueinented by so
largc& a number, it appeared to His Masjesty's
Mieitters to he too large to lie entrusted to the coin:.
nosed of Sir Arthur Wellesley. It is seppe.ed

Ur

1

. .

there was a deal of dispute about who should coin- ,
mend it. A Noble Earl iu uly eye woe supposed
to have beau appointed to the command; wont *he
occasion was ( do not know, but Sir hew Dalrym-
ple was appointed. It is not my intention to iiii-
pute any blame, or cast the slightest reflection, on
the character of Sir Hew Dalrymple. As far as I
have had opportunities of knowing him, I should
oy he is as officer of considerable accutuplish-
meets ; but with regard to Sir Hew Dalrymple, it
has happened to him as it has happened to
many, this, be has risen in the service without
being mukh employed. His conduct in Spain
,hewed great discretion, and gave great *tans-
taction ; but it is not merely a general opiuiun
of a man's abilities, whatever they may be, but
his military experience, and ktiowledgo iu the
art of war, that capacitates him for such a corn-
:nand ; and there was a strong feeling. that
while there was such a man as Sir John Moore, it
'AMA ireproper to place over hint another officer. who
bad not the same degree of military experience.-...
Sr Hew Dalrymple is joined to the army with Sir
Harry Buirard. I have no personal objection to
Sir Harry Barrer& but it does seem us if His
Najesty'e Ministers had some object iu vita, to
make it impossible that General Moore should
have the command of that army which had been
entrusted to him in Sweden, mid that I suppose
induced them to give the command to General
Burrard, sending hiin out in the seine ship."—
Here the Noble Lord catered into a variety of de-
tails, till the handing of the expedition ut Monclegn
Baver.--" 1 have,' Ida Lordship stated, " said
what justice obliged use to say with regard to
General Daltymple. lam nut less willing in pay
to Sir Art hiit Wellesley that tribute which his high
sere.ces and talents deserve---I believe him, from
all I have heard of him, to he a deserving Officer,
of great merit and ..elities. In short, such at; Offi-
cer as the country its these filmy of difficulty may
look to w.th hope of the matt advantageous services;
but Sir Arthur Wellesley was platted in a situation
in which no offi..er ought to be placed. It was im-
possible that jar Arthur Wellesley should not have
felt ti considerable degree of irritation at the coin-
timid being tiikeii away from him, said if he fell
into an error upon this occasion, it was au error
into which evirry man of ardent zeal was likely to
fall—he saw rat opportunity of acting to the ho-
nour of his country by striking • successful blow.
against the ebeniy. On the 17th of August he
came into-contest with an advanced corps of the
French army, and then the battle of Viuietra took
place. Ido slot wish to cast ugly blame upon hita ;
but I think Cie situation in which Is, was placed
slid induce hint to incur is hazard which lie ought
tint to have done. He advanced with an army
little inure than Superior to Junot's, and he ha-
zarded this curtain consequence. that though his
success was n.r decisive. by defeat would have been
fatal, had the Urbane of the day been didareet, the
whole of the vtpedition must have failed. Oti nor
the .26th, Sir Harry Burrard laud* d ; Sir Harry
Barran' shewe d his high mind, he dechued to take
the command n yid he gen. to Sr Arthur Wellesley
all the merit : t lie battle of \boiler.* was gained with
010114 K to the tr. sops engaged 111 sr. I have no doubt
that with the ii Immunise* of rorteas further edventa.
was might have been obtaieed,by an immediate pule-
" mAtillen I stowed the reasons given hy Fur H. tiurrard,
are very subsist I•ial and sattsfact.wy.Whaterer preju-
dice may have arisen to the country from that event,
to be ascriberd to his Majesty's Ministers in having
so arranged, Ili at an officer snookd take the cunt.
mand of an ant iv in the midst of an action, and be-
fore he could h tea any opportunity of examming the
scene. It was mit to beexpected, thwt sin officer, with
so heavy a respveisibility should have acted otherwise
than he did.--*By the next day there were three
commanders wiethin the four and twenty hours.—
Then followed that which has been the subject of
so much dchant, I—the Convention of Cintra. A sah-
ject upon whit h the public are unanimous in their
opinion. His Majesty's Ministers have themselves
stated that it disepputun d the hopes and expectations
of the people. ; Its effects may he summed up by
stating, that Vie French Gentlel obtained the
tampon of his army with his artillery, six rowel&
of ammunition peed 800 horses equipped and read
fur tints, aw I obtained those ale:linage,' which
e ()obi have horn well purchased with the knee of
half his army. tl'e may appreciate its advantage.
by recollecting what happened at Coristina after
the distietrous t lefeat of the French troops, in the
little which wt are told was fought without hope
of ildvatibige. timid, that before our army could
embark, it lost 7000 met,, all the horses, stores,
arumnuition„ provisions, cud baggage : and that it
was in such a state of complete disorgattisation,
that at this inotnent it is not that 7000 men wily
are lost, but thee whole army are lost to the service
of the country, and must be so for months to come.
If such has bettn the effect of the retreat froni
la, *hat hem not the enemy to boast of fur the
retreat from Cintra ?"—The Noble Lord, after
stating many tither circumstances connected with
the Cintra Convention, expressed his opinion that
it was an act which, in very point of view, was inad-
visable; but the principal blame lie imputed to
His Majesty's Ministers, for that extraordinary isr-
roagement, by which they had appointed a socces-
sion of °Seen, equally ignorant of local circuin-
stences, and equally jealous of each .other; hot
above all he blamed them for not having instructed
there with regard to their ulterior views. " I am;'
said his Lordship, " no friend to fettering the dis-
cretion of a Geeeral Officer ;,havitig formed a plus,
aisd concerted his operations, l think as large a
power as powsible ought to be given to him; brit
surely it was not difficult to foresee, that with such
force as was employed iecainst the French, and with
the co-operatioi.whieh might be expected Iron the
tourageof theS pvnish armieu.soinettrins were likely
to be entered 'Lao with the enemy. His Majesty'*
Ministers ought, therefore, to have given such
general views of their sentiments and wishes as
would have enabled the Offiter corninandnio the
Expedition to have acted on those principles, ie'hich
if they had ucted upon they would not have had
to have said of the Convention that it had dhotis-
pointed the hopes and expectations of the country.
Here then is a strong ground for the coridemnati 0000
is His Majesty's Ministers, to whore for this, as
well as fur every part of the transaction• the chief
Islatne is to be imputed." The Noble Lord ar-
geed ut considerable length upon the gefterel inn-
polity of the conduct of Ilia Majesty's Miuwteri


with respect to the people and Govetnittent of
Portugal. The resoit of that conduct had been,
that instead of having an army on the frontiers of
Portugal, protecting the interior, we had been
obhge.l 1n retain* considerable portion of the army
to keep in ivilijectinn the people for whose delit er-
n dee they were beat. Tlll-se Kruunth he thought *a-
ncient to cell on the timbre to arraign the conduct
of Ili* Majesty's Mittistars. What a vissitr.i.st, the
Noble Lord observed, was the emulsive of Ilia Sla-

- - •
jesity's Ministers with that of the cosisuintnate Ge-
neral whine plans they had to oppusc !—Alu you
ever hear, said his Lordship, of Iloimparte ap-
pointing Marshal Nil, to cunimami an army,
iis the midst atm action, seiollug Genoral to
supersede him, and then, in the midst of a
battle, sending some other tjetierul ta supersede
hint ?—No.—Von have wen how diderently he
acts. You have 842e:1 how the moment affnrs
took a favourable two, he le: his armies in behind

the Ebro, where it might defy ettack, and wait for
reinforcemems. You find Imo as soon his pre-
parations are ready, currying pu one great and
aimulteueous operation. ‘Vhoever speaks of him,
it is nut possible should speak of hitn withont
sS-
imiring hint for his great abilities. in rapidity of
execution he Is only equalled hy his patience in pre-
paring the means—he has all the opposite qualities
of Fabius and Marcellus, whether you con oder the
country in which lie act., the people with whom lie has
to comen I, and the meats by which he is to subdue
them. He rivals !bombe! in the application of the
meting, and is exempt front his only fault—that of not
improving by pest experience. His Lordshitthaviug,
with great eloquence and force of argument, coin-
merited upon ell the cireuinstaliees connected With
the expeditions to Spain and Portugal, censured.
iii. Majesty's Ministers for their not having calcu-
lated sooner than they lied done upon the certainty
of Romaine te's sending considerable reinforce-
ments ? Could they imagine that he would make
no exertion to retrieve whet he had lost in Spain ?
—Did they imagine that the camp of the Ebro
was a camp of amusement only? It was im-
possible they could have formed such an opi-
nion of Bonaparte. It was impossible to con-
ceive he would not make great exertions, and
retrieve those losses which miexpeeteilly he had
imstained. They must have recollected, that as
early us the 16th of September he hail sent a mes-
sage to the Senate, iu which he had said, that he
was determined to carry on war with Spain with
the utmost activity, that lie would destiny the
armies which England had embarked; mill that
the future security and prosperity of a commerciel
and maritime peace must depend upon his doing
this. H. then was u declaration in the face of the
world, which Ministers must have known would
be carried into effect. His Lordship proceeded to
read several passages from French papers of that
period, all of there tending to .hew that Bonaparte
was snaking the utmost exertions .to recruit his
army, and send reinforcements
then adverted and expatiated lunch at large on the
utiaccountable delays which had taken place in the
expeditions fitted by his Majesty's Ministers; hie
contended, that et the tune the expedition com-
manded by Sat- John Moore was planned. it was
madness to direct the army to the north of Spain ;
they shout .1 have lauded at Cadiz insteed of Coyun.
nu, they villein hart got in behind the Tagus, ant
retired to the centre of Spain, where welt a great aid
active population ; he had not the least doubt hat
if proper measurer had been pursued, the campaigii
would have been attended with Nieves-, and at all
events a retreat might have been secured blithe Eng-
lish forts at Gibraltar, in which situation the Bri-
tish army might have been an army of reserve, to
enable the people of the Spanish provinces to rally,
and.with more security manifest their hostility to
their oppressor. Having proceeded to justify tine
conduct of Sir John Moore, At deteriunied
mat* to retreet, and having minutely related all
the circumstance* that led to that disposition, his
Lordship referred to the conduct of Mr. Frere,
with respect tollis correspondence with Gen. Moore.
Speaking of Mr. Frere his Lordship said, his con-
duct with regard to his correspondence, sheer+ him
to be a man unqualified for the situation he fills.
However harsh it may be, to use sock words monist
At person who is nut present to justify linuseif ; yet
I must ray, that his presumption and folly, render
it highly necessary, that he should be recalled. He
talks as if no reinforcements had been received by
the French Generals ; will it be believed, that ou
the 30th Nov. the fact which was known to Lord
Beittinek, that General Casten°, had been defeat-
ed, and that the French had received reinforce-
ment* which had raised their army to 130,000
men ; the British Abilister should have been
sending to procure information, that he should
hare thought the French armies were still confined
to 45,000 rnea, and that lie should talk of attack-
ing the French army before they received their re-
inforcements. lie talks of the weakuese to which
the French were reduced. I remember titet, be-
fore the battle of Austerlitz, and Jena, it was mint
the French were reduced to despair. How absurd
it is to state florae as reduced to weaker,, amid de-
spair, whom we find, immediately after those state-
ments, to possess the most ample means of Ml.'
quest ! It has been said, that persons who are in
the habit of telling falsehoods, believe iii the ni at
lad themselves. I haste>, Mr. Frere has been
employed is telling these strange stories of
the weakness and despair of the French. I re-
memle r the battle of Marengo wee preceded by
accounts in all the newspapers of the weak and re-
duced state of the French *ratite'. His Lordship
itiverted to the instructions of Lord Castlereagh
to Sir John- !More, stating. that he was to pay
every attention to Mr. Freer, who wise represented
as having MI authority only shirt at' ale...lute corn-
;naiad. Ile oS"..riael, that Fel Moore hid
received no cue Atii Deceintett au imiteursite sr its-
Irtellt of the French army in it letter from Mr.
• Frere, who, hi teens as 'bong as the English Lan-
guage could entivey, protested moistest the. retreat
of Sir jOllll Moore. His Lordship commented CM
the inctineistetice of Mr. Freres conduct. in speak-
ion an coufidently at one period of elle enthusiasm
of the people of Spain, mid in a few days aftetsle-
ecribiire their enthusiasm as totally extinct. His
Lonlrhiti eevercly censured the ilictetoriel tow
amnrised in this letter to Sir J. Moore, particn-
tarty when he enuselered the difference betweea
their relative si;tiation.i. IL. Lordship cosiaire,:
the colidwa of 11a. iirere,l4 senJiug this mid other

•
letters to. Sir Jubn Moore, as e puke..Ain whicir
lin terms of reprobation coma describe, and par-
ticularly that part of h;. letter iu oh., h he ri quest-
ed that the ',ester of it aright hr privately examined
before a Council of War—Mr. t tete thus euilus-
vourin • to take the eleniumid of the army out of
s the hands er Sir John Mom-,t, and place it iu the
hands of a Council of War. " It be supposed,"
said his Lordship, " that the bearer of this: Niter
was one of time.: illustrious pt rums who have cons-
:wowed the profess:Ma of arms 'Mice the French
Revolution, that it was General Moreau or some
other ilhitiuguirhed person. No ! It was a male
of whose conduct I camiot speak %%about disgust
and detestation—a man of the lowest origius who
had been sent out to St. Domingo, and who is ac-
cused, owl stiongly suspected of having been con-
cerned in the assassinatioa of is distinguished offi-
cer. It was pnucipidty from the niterested reprso
sentations of this main that Mr. Frere funned his
judgment of the forte of the French. armee.—
Were His Majesty's Ministers ignorant of the cha-
racter of this person, who had a regiment in His
:Majesty's serric....—did they not know that la- had
appeared ni the Courts of this kingdom, in einiee-
queuce of his participation in usurious tramine-
tions?—l believe they will find hint on the record.
of fraudulent bankruptcies. This was the man •
to whom Mr. Frere was appealing from the
superior know
of Sir John Moore.—Do
. they not know he is a person of the worst de-
scription ? our of those whom France has cast off
front herself, hut not without furiiisijog with the
melons of destruction. I feel the done to
the service by the employment of such a main boat
I feel even more the injury and insult offered to a
gallant o'ficer. God forbid that I should test -du
maple justice to the high, strict, and,chividrous
honour of Sir John Moore, who sacrificed every
thing for Ilia king and country. Thee are in the
circumstances of this transaction the stroogebt
reasons for believing from the conduct of this man,
who was sent by Mr. Frere, that he was actually.
employed by the enemy as a traitor and spy. Mr.
Frere says he had sent the letter by this nem, who
had just come from Madrid. II- having been at
Madrid on the id, is to be examined before the
Council of War, to induce Sir John Moore to ad-
vance. M. Marla writes over the 'Kline day, and
gives the account which 1 have detailed of the French
eriuies. In what situation was Madrid on the id
13er ember ? The French army was on the heights
of Madill. the Iteteiro had been taken the night
before, end the night before Morla had written to
Bonaparte; and this person, coming from Morla,
is the person selected by Mr. Frere to persuade the
march of General Moore. If General Moore had
advanced, you would have had to lament not alone
the loss of that gallant Officer, hut the loss of the
whole of the British army. I have stated that Mr.
Frere was to have all authority but positive
command. This represeutatioa male it diffi-
cult for Sir John Moore to do any thing but
what he del ; to ladvalice towards Coruims, and
create that diversion on the ground el' which
the Noble Lord will excuse the expedition.—
The Noble Lord then referred to the letter of Sir '
John Mriore to Sir David Baird, and contended
that the letter written by Mr. Frere hail produced
that luoveleanit which had brought ea such die-
-.
niters. The object of the person front whom Mr.
Frere received his information, was to draw the
thitish army into a situation where its destruction
might be insured. Had not Gen. Moore fortun-
ately received the information of the advance
of Bonaparte to Madrid. not a man of the
British army would hare escaped. in what
way this was to be justified, he knew not.—
Upon the whale, all the failures of the campaign
were attributable to the misconduct and mis-
management of his Majesty's Milliliters.
We arenow compelled, by the lateireasofthe hour,
to close this brief sketch of his Lordship's speech,
the delivery of which occupied four hours. Ilia
Lordship profess., d himself a candidate for prudeut
reform, and after urging a variety of other argu-
ments with reference to the expeditions to Spain
and Portugal, sod the conduct of them on the
part of His Majesty's Ministers; he concluded by

morieg—
.. That an bumble Address be preseuted to His ...tiniest!,
to represent to His 31ajestv, that we base cuissidered, with
attention, the various doettuients, incomplete as they are,
which have been laid bdure as, respecting the efforts made
by His Majiwiy, during the last campaign, in support of the
resistance of the people of Spain and Pus-tura' to the anjest
egression end usurpation of the Fisnch Government.
fleet we feel ourselves bound to represent to His Ma-
jesty, that, ow the result of this exammatios, we have seen,
with sourtificatiou and grief, the disgrace haught a His
Majesty's Councils, wail the injury siintateed by the Brittels
Empire, from the east of informatiou ad foresight which
has beta aimed is every part of the conduct of His Ma-
jesty's Ministers. That a rational plan of operatioa haa
at any time lowa fanned by them, either for the directime of
our own ClUlliiool, or for combining them with thine of the
Spaaish awl Purtnewse parlous , us jest view taken if the
political state of either country, our any due guano,* paid
to the supply of those swain which nose could base
enabled the British Arsine to act with i reasonable hope of
tiaras.
" That with such proofs lacibre us, it ovoid Dot be con-
sistent with our duty to withhold ,from His Majesty • de-
clisratosa or ear full coavictioo, Mat, °Mug to the manias
sad saisesaaagetseut of His Majesty's Minister., tbe hopes
which the abaci had beau led to entei tale base been disap-
pointed; • large lad treeless expesubture of the mesas and
resources of the country has been imurred; a great and
dangerous accession of petit teal, naval, and military strength
leis already been obtained by the enemy ; and above 7,uuo
if His .11wjesty's brave trnosps, tozetber with their ;idiom
Comirisisiller, have been sveisficed enema advantage in eu-
terprises without plan, combination, -or foremen, aid
equally ill-timed and iniehrectell."
The Earl of Idsverout—.• My Lords, the
question is now fully brought before the considera-
tion of this House, whether or not, hi the main 0!,-
jects attended to dosing the whole of the late rain-
' pingo% iii Spain and Portugal, llis Majesty's Nli-
ousters adopted such plans Its were wise end advis-
able, end executed them properly, nod with dile
energy. The Noble Earl oppo,in- has chosen this
fair ground of preferring his accusation,and to do lens
justice he certainly has, with great eloquence, en-
tererl most fully into the merits of that question.
At the same tune it hiss been allowed in the Noble
Lord's own statement to-night, that considerable
tlitriett;ties presented themselves to His Biejesty's
Mititateri at the period of iheir being called upon
to grant assistance to the Spanish nation. Such
were also the circultistanres conoected with their
first deliberations on the line of conduct tlwy had
to adopt, that it wits ant convenient or prudent to
britrir, the citestiOn before Parliament, therefore

----t,

•
lii Majesty's Miniserrs not possessing this tiepins.
tunity, and considering the spirit witch Jeweled
almost every XOl4ll in this country, mid the general
duipusititin in favour of the Opau:sh cram, I wilt . :
reeture • to say on adminietration were ever placc,l.
in greater difficulty. I would also observe. may
Lords, that it is 11(4 fair or right for M timer, tot
be placed in that situation in which they are thie,
night placed by the Noble Earl; their conduct might,
nut to be judged merely from the resutt id opcestetus
or the fate of the campaign ; but due ts,itsidere;
thin ought to be attached to the carcousstie.eui
mailer which they acted, when they were unites toe
ueceuity of determining upon measures witle:.o
knowing the coarse of subsequent events. 'lie
Noble hurl thinks 'Ministers ought to have waited
till some persevering effort had been matiifested •i..
by the people of Spain; hut what would hate.
been the consequence of pivoting stitch a hue of. 4'
cnduct ?—On that prisimple we 'eight have wait ii
from week to week, and from mouth to mouth ;
had we waited lii the matiuer that Noble Lord has
recommended, I sin persuaded the, present mil- ~
..
unnistration would have been justly entitled to the
reprobation of every honest man in the country.
My Lords. it is very remarkable that in the course
of what we have 'lrani from those oho have es-
incased their opposition to the conduct of His Ma-
jesty's Miuisters, every one asserts a plan'of iiiii
•
owo, which he st nes in his opinion would base
been the best or the only one proper to be adopted
by His Mojesty‘ Goverutoeut. and yet not woe of
them plans so reconitueuded will be found to pos-
sess an egieetuent with each other. In Liking a
view of the subject now under the consideration of
the House, I shall call your attention to the two
moot martial points of this dimussiun. The first
question is, whether under all the circumstances
attending the late operations in Portugal and
Spain, His Majesty's Nli,•isters have adopted a wise
and judicious plait. iind having so formed it, they s
afterwards vigorously curried it into etfect. The
other question; which I think worthy of your no-
tice, Is whether those plans which have been since
pointed out by those who condemn the measures •
of .adiniiiistration, have been such us ought to
have been adopted. Now, my Louis, I shall COP,.
sider the last question first, and by etym.:lig the
difficulty or inadequacy of the plane recommended;
I shall -afterwards, with greater facility, be enabled
to thew the first plan, which was that we acted
open, to have been advisable and prover, and II
that it was vigorously carried into effect.
It seems to have been thought by many, that it :•;.:1
would have been wise and propc.. to have scut one
forces directly into the center of the ipauish king-
dom .-.
•1
at the comruencemeat of the campaign, they '
have also been of opinion, our forces ought to have
been lauded somewhere iu the North West of that
country, as near Ili poilithle to the Pyrenees, 4 bet 0
they 'night have imitiediattly acted agiviist the
enemy. I ain fully aware, many have thelight we
but, my Lords, was not the reszurition of Portngal
to our uutieut ally ? was nut seudiug our troops
.:.
into the Tagus, and obtaining the possessor of
Lisbon, a measure of very great and serious import-
more ? In all expeditions, which may be sent fur
the purpose of aiding another country, for the pur-
pose of defending the country alluded to, or say
ether, I thick it is sieemeary in she dist plies
to take possession of some port, harbour, or
bay, where your transports may lie in safety. Ido
net say this is the conduct which, without excep-
tion, ought to be pursued. Cases may happen,
where it might be necessary to land forces on au
open beach, and march them immediately into
the country ; but in general, and particularly so
in regard to Spain, it was necessary to pursue a
widely different course of proceeding, bemuse the
coast of all that country is such, that at several pe-
riods of the year it is extremely dangeroim to ap-
proach, cud the province* adjacent, frOm their
own want of supple, did not possess the means
of furnishing provisions. The Spanish General,
themselves have expressed this opinion. % ould
not Romans, if he bad thought it policy, have given
directions for the English army being lauded at
the place nearest to the scene of action ; but he
gave on the contrary, directions totally different.
snd assigned the reason for so doing. at the time.
My Lords, the principle which I have here laid
down, and the principle upon which His Majesty's
Ministers acted, is a principle, the justice of which
you cannot deity, neither can you dray its probable
operation. With respect to the time which elaps-
ed behare it was thought adviseable to send forces
to co-operate with the patriots. I would cell your
Lordships attention to an observetion on that eat t
of the subject. It has been intimated too, by the
Noble Lord, that His Majesty's Miiiisters were
not duly informed of the extent of the zeal, sod
number of those who had name i• the contest.
But I have no hesitation in deolaritig there nese,
was so great and simtiltatteous a rising, us tieik
place among the Spamisis nation : one province iu-
stantanamsly succeeded another in the setae cause,
but it was not advileable to send mem, till there was
some kind of central goveretomit or authority
established. A groat deal has b: en urged for the
expedients, of sending. a greater number of cavalry,
anal that it was the particular
_ mini st of the Spelt-
hods themselves. We al• aware that a ileroaud of
10,000 was made for the defence of the Aston, :
but when it was understood to he a dektitte for e,
for the use of a single province, it might justly he
doubted if it did oot interfere with the general
plan of the campaign. On this subject, ' have no
hesitation in making good say assertino, that it w 's
not advisable to send a large forte of cavalry, Iw.
cause a great force of cavalry should, in my opi.
nion, never be sent abroad without a due peeper.
tom of iufaotry. It would, 1 ans eisoindetit, heye
been the worst plan which could hove been adopted
for the int, rest of Spain. It wend have drawn the
forces of • hat country from the mountains into the
Wails, and thereby have considerehly lessened their
*civic's, by reuderi rig uselesi their best mode of w tie
fare. Under all the circunistentos, it woo thought
proper at the COW I U ellternene Or our riittonsto
scud a certain force under the comma of Sir Ar-
thur ‘Vellesley, sod every circemispectilea was at.
triode Ito on the es:coition, used an Aker was see;
before, to ascertain the state of SRAM. The Noble,
Earl has said much shout this force, which way'
i previously tit routines* ; hot what would he have
said, if Miiiiitters, at the time. hod not had a force
prepared ? Besides, can it be mid, rending teal
12,000 turn, wider the command of Sir Artlitie

S

'~

'1

ti