The British Press; or, Morning Literary Advertiser.
London, England, 1803-07-01 00:00:00

in the Ilegutitions of Friendly Soc m►ler tl.e
Aft of thessd of His present Majesty.

PARISH POOl.
Mr. ROSE also gave notice that he should to-
morrow move for kave to bring in a Bill, direaing
Overseers of Parishes to deliver in an Account of
the Number of Poor Persons relieved in their re-
&relive Parishes, together with the Amount of the
Sums expended for that purpose.
The Report of the Irish Salt-petre Duty Bill was
speed to, and the Bill ordered to be read a third
time to-morrow.
The House went through a Committee on the
liish Bank Note Bill, the Irish Militia Pay Bill, and
"the Irish Consolidation Duty Bill, the Reports of
which were severally ordered to be received to-
trstrrow.
The Crenmittee on the Irish Revenue Regttlaticm

was deferred till to-morrow.
gr. CORRY gave notice, that be should to-mor-
move for leave to bring in a Bill for the further
It.rilation of the Distilleries in Ireland.
The 8 ECREIARY at WA R moved for leave
•r, awing in a Bill, the objet of which would be the
hctter scenting the Military Discipline of the Coun-
try. That part of the Bill which was new, regarded
tome proviiiim to be made for the serjeants, drum-
rr.trc, tilers. and trumpeters of the Militia, and Yeo.
minry Cavalry, in order that they should receive
pay, be at all timt.s liable to be called upon, trained
together, &c. which was •n anted.
NATIONAL n: .FENCE.

The SFCRIKTARY at WAR moved the third
reading of the NU for raising -1.0,000 men as an /A r-
are of Reserve for that part of the United Kingdien
celled England.
Mr. JOHNSTONF. rose, and observed, that
there was no man in or nut of that House, better
disposed than himself to employ the most vigorous
efforts, and make the most important sacrifices,
that might be necessary for the support of the
honour and independence of the country, or who
would wish to use more strenuous measures, than he
would, to weather the enormous and overgrown
power of France. But, fully impressed, as lie was,
with these sentiments, and determined, as he ever
should be, in that disposition, he did not know that
any exertions, however great, or any sacrifices, how-
everlarge, could place the country in a greater. de-
greeof security, than it would have been maintained
in had the hoe peace been preserved. If there
should aper to be any force either in what he had
eaideor at he had yet to add, it would only lead
to give some effeecl to the mediation, which he un-
demote( to be now offered through the interference
of the Court of !lassie. Whet, he would ask, were
the o'ujeas which led to the war ? Ostensibly, as
l.e understood it, the °Nees were these—the
annexation of Piedmont, the invasion of Switzer-
land, the demand of the stsfrender of Malta, and
some other points, which however appeared to be
4.4 a subordinate nature. But, on a due considera-
tion, however conspicuous these points stood in His
Majesty's Declaration, he was convinced that the
two first at least were not the grounds of the present
tear. On the 29th -of January, it appeared, from
*e papers now on the table, that the Ministers re-
soles:4l to conform to the stipulations of the Treaty
of Amiens, argil considered the guarantee of Russia
sudiclent security for Malta. Nothing hap-
pened to alter their minds or shake their determina-
tsen, from that time till the 9th of April, except the
mission of Sebastiani to Egypt. He would not at
present argue, whether it was or was not that single
eitcuitistenee that changed their resolutions, nor
should he trouble the House with pursuing the
whole train of negotiation, as that was a ground
which had been very much travelled over already.
'lle Ministers had asserted, in round and unquali-
fied terms, th it the enemy have them no other al-
tereative but the cession of Malta or war. They
said, that 46 Malt:t or war," was the cry of the
French Ministeis ; bu;, notwithstanding these confi-
de= assertions, he had no hesit.ttion to maintain,
that etch was not the fan. In the French note, pre-
sented to our Ambassador, on the 9th or April,
France offered to consent to any arrangement that
would render Malta independent, both of England
and the French Republic ; and, on the :td of May,
it was proposed. et the part of the French Govern-
. meet, that the island should be placed in the hands
of Russia, Austria, or Prussia. It would be seen,
from lord Whitworth'e Correspondence, that the
French proposed to have this island surrendered to
Russia ; but it was a mioerial and important omis-
sion in that commur.ication, that no paper was pro-
tiered avowing the reasons which we assigned for
reinsing it. He did not 'indeed know, that any
other reason was assigned for reje:ting the proposal
of giving the place up to Russia, than, that it would
be incompatible with His Majesty's just pretensions.
This incompatibility. therefore, with the just pre-
tensione of His Majesty, he was authorised to con-
sider as the real and true ground of the war. should
this position be disputed, he would ask, whether,
is we had offered to give it up, at that time, to Rus-
eia, either provisionally or in perpetuity, that ar-
rangement might not have been concluded, and the
present ruptuie avoided? The distina offer was made
ea Pais, to give up Malta to the Emperor of
Russia, on the completion of which the French
troops would be withdrawn from Holland. Now,
tad the offer been accepted, and Holland evacuated
by the French troops, nothing was more probable,
. than -that things would remain in that state, at least
for agate time; and, should they continue out of
the country or two or three years, it was only
raananatile to conclude, that the spirit of the people
Would make it extremely difficult for them to re-en-
itaftnrwards. He would ask, what great dif-
fereuce it would mike, untier any circumstances,
whether Malta was in our own hands, or is those
of Russia ? Or, would it not be, even under every
point of view, better fir this country that Russia
s!it-ALId be the occupier of that Island ? The value
o: the Cape of Good Hope was considered to be
diminished on account of the- expence of retaining
its surely the - - would apply
more so is-
use of it,
xpence. There
, on that oc-
notice of His
f Ruseie had
:the affairs of
, though inef-
Sardinia, and re-
-es in the capi-
'_ that Bo- ,
himself is a

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quarrel .so neer rneghbottr as the Russian 1
Emperor meld then he, or that so powerful a mo-
narch would not it Malta have been a check upon
his enterprises. Nay, should Wance even renew its
attempts against Egypt, Malta would be of more
service to us in the hands of Russia, than in our own.
If it could for a- moment be snspeted, that Russia
would condescend to play an underhand game, and,
after getting possession of the place,.turn a against
us, there were numerous reasons, independently of
the high chartaer of that Monarch, to dissipate
suspicions so injurious and unfounded. If Russia
was disposed to assist the views of France against
our India possessions, it had it in its power to give
Bonaparte a more advantageous port in the Persian
Gulph, whence he could annoy us with more effea
than he possibly cotild from Malta. He, however,
denied, that FranCe could entertain these views on
India, which had been attributed to it. There was
nn part of the dominions of this country less amine-.
table, and more out of the reach, than our East In-
dia possessions. If Ene,land itself was not less ac-
cessible to the attacks of France, than our Oriental
territories ; if Bonaparte could succeed aeainst all
the dangers and obstruCrions that we should neces-
sarily oppose to him, in conveying sufficient troops,
stores, and ammunition, in safety, to some point of
attack, what reservoir, after all, could he find
against a disciplined and experienced army of
100,000 men, and a revenue of 19.,000,0001. annu-
ally ► To &ea all that successfully, would be bid-
ding defiance to all human calculation. The Ho-
nourable Geetlenran neet proceeded to specu-
late or argue on what was likely to be the.
result of the present war. France would. no
doubt, try all means in its power to shut us
out from all the ports of the Continent, and would
draw numerous and formidable bodies of troops to
its coasts, threatening us vtlth invasion. Of the
event of an invasion of this country, should the ene-
my be desperate enough to attempt it, he had not
the slightest fears ; but, having lost the affections of
one Fart of the people of Ireland. without conciliat-
ing the other, the situation of that country inay be
considered as dangerous and critical. Upon that
subject he should forbear to dwell, and would next
call the attention of the House to what were our
means of annoying France. It seemed to be agreed
on all hands, that a defensive war merely would
be ruinous to the nation ; and let him now ask, after
we shall have taken such ships as the enemy has now
at sea, and possessed of the colonies, what were our
further means of offensive operations ? An Hon.
(gentleman below him (Mr. Sheridan), who seemed
strenuous for the war, had not proposed any. But
a Noble Lord (Temple) who seemed still more san-
guine, pointed out three marks : Ist. A combination
of the Continental Powers; 2nd, a direa attack by
this country uenn France; and idly, the issuing of
a declaration against the French Government. He
would take the liberty of making a very few observa-
tions upon these three hopeful projects. As to the
first, the only Powers on the Continent by which a
confederecy could he formed, were Austria, Prus-
sia, and Russia. With regard to Austria, nothing
was more plain than that she dared not enter into
any such alliance. With broken and dispirited
armies, demolished fortifications, and deranged
finances, the consequence to her of a rupture would
be, that the Empet or would quickly beheld the
French in the heart of his dominions, perhaps in
possession of his capital, and imposing on him a
peace infallibly more galling, humiliating, and
disadvantageous than that which he was last com-
pelled to submit to. Prussia would never unite
cordially with Austria, and was as unable to con-
tend with France without assistance as the Emperor
himself. And to allkhis, it must be added, that
the dark, crooked, and covetous policy of the Court
of Berlin, would rather induce it to forward than
oppose the ambitious designs of the First Consul.
There, then, only remained Russia which we could
possibly look to as our Ally ; but supposing the
Emperor of Russia ever so well disposed to co-ope-
rate with us, he could do but little unsupported by
those other Powers of Austria and P 111651.4 whose
dominions were between him and any point of con-
taa with France. And, after all, supposing that
difficulty to be removed, what has France to fear
from an army which must have 500 miles of a difficult
country to march, and many intervening obstacles
to surmount before it could come to the encounter ;
and the same embarrassment in the way of rein-
forcements? Thus then were we reduced to our own
military efforts against France. The lion. Secre-
tary at War said, that France had vulnerable
points. He would ask him where were those vul-
nerable points ?—(A laugh from the Treasury Bench)
—Gentlemen, he said, might divert themselves if
they pleased, but he believed they would find
themselves at a loss to describe any means we
could have of a direct attack. He would even de-
fy die Hon Secretary at War, supposing his 50,000
disposable men to be now in readiness, to find a sin-
gle point where he could place these troops, and not
wish immediately to have them back again.
What, let him ask, would be the purpose of
this war upon France, after its ships and co.-
lonies were captured ? It would, perhaps, be
said, that Bonaparte was unpopular. It might
be so ; he would be the list to become his panegy-
rist ; but didit follow dint he must be unpopular in
France, because he was an objea of terror to our-
selves ? (a universal and indi:pant* cry of No!-see!)
Was he not at least an object of otir apprehension
(the exclamation of Nu! no! reiterated on all sides.)
He might, perhaps, he said, have gone too far—but
though Bonaparte was a: least an objea of our ha-
tred, that did not preeeet the people of Prance from
being ready to obey Lim. He may be. and proba-
bly was, tEsliked by many persons—but the gene-
rality of the people were willing to support him, to
prevent the return of that anarchy, by which they
were so long and so grievously alliieted. It may
therefore be relied on, that the First. • Consul
would endeavour to keep this country in per-
petual alarm, and would continue to threaten
invasion, though he may never be aisle to effea it ;
but we shall continue to block up his ports, thought
we , may be unable Alter a while to do him any
farther mischief. The :evenue of France was now
`:2,0a),0001. net m0w...), all flowing from its inte-
rior, and out of which she received no more than
1,300,M)I. by sea.. So far from snaking any im-
pression on her finances, if experience had not
shewn that already to have been a very bad crite-
rion eif success, die war would rather relieve them ;
for instead of paying her troops from her own re-
gular resources, Bonaparte would take care as usual
to quarter them upon neutrals ; with us the case was
exceedingly different. This country depended on

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it ; but surely the same argument. wou
equally to the retention of Malta. and me
deed,. for we should then have the same
while .we were exonerated from the expence
Naas further a principle of policy, which, ni
. a.. ; casion, u&lt not to have escaped the notli
Majett)':.. Ministers. The. Lmperor of R
she. .1 a great dispovition to interfere in the
Itftlq he had before exerted himself; thi
fetaually, in behalf ef the King of Sardini
gained, till very lately, a body of troops in
sal of Naplc.,. It could be, he supposed,
weans would gratuitously involve him
ev,
r 4 ,