Northern Times.
Liverpool, Merseyside, England, 1857-08-03 00:00:00

THE SIEGE OF DELHI.

De!hi is still in the possession of the insurgents.
According to the latest authentic accounts, which
were to the 16th of June, General Sir Harry Bar-
nard -Was waiting for reinforcements. Rumours
of the capture of the city had indeed been com-
municated on two occasions to the Bmnbasy
g .
government by their ascent 4. T_'..• gut e
_ - v AILIL, confirmed. The Bombay
government received on the evening of the
23rd of June the following electric telegraph
message from Colonel Durand from Indore,
dated the same day :—" There was a very general
report of the taking of Delhi, with great
loss to the rebels. The superintendent has not
received authentic news from Agra." The following
electric telegragh message from Indore, from Col.
Durand to the Bombay government, was received
on the 24th of June :—" News from Neemuch of
the 22nd state that Delhi was stormed and taken
on the 12th. Such of the mutineers as remained
alive took refuge in the palace." Notwithstanding
these telegraphic despatches, the city had not been
taken on the 16th of June. The accounts we have
of the operations of Gen. Barnard's force are
extremely imperfect, but some facts are ascertained.
On the Bth of June, at two .o'clock in the morning,
he arrived at Delhi, when the rebels who were
outside the city were attacked and driven from
the position which they had occupied. They
fled into the town, and the pursuit was so sharp
that the gunners threw themselves off their
harses, and left the field pieces standing in the
sand. " The heavy guns remained in position ;"
twenty-six guns in all were captured, 'and, in
addition, large quantities of ammunition and
entrenchment tools. The outposts were taken
possession of. We reget to say that Col. Chester,
Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant Russell 54th,
were among the killed. Our lose was about 150,
chiefly in the 75th Queen's regiment. The army
at the latest date was encamping in cantonments.
A message from Major Lake, at Juilundur, com-
municating this information to Sir John Lawrence,
at Lahore, adds;—" The mutineers had guns in
battery round the flagstaff, but we outflanked them
.on both sides. One column of ours marched
down the trunk road, and another through canton-
ments. We work away with heavy guns to-morrow.
This has been a brilliant affair. The guns of the
mutineers were very well served, and the fire was
very heavy. General Reed arrived just as the
columns moved off, but did not command on the
occasion.'

The following description of Delhi appears in
the Lahore Gozette.—

The city is surrounded by a h'gh crenelated wall, in a
deep ditch Ind glacis. At the Cashmeres gate only is
there anything of modern f atification ; here there is a
simple bastion with properly cut embrasures. It is
enclosed, and forms the main guard. The city measures
about two miles across, and is some seven or eight miles
in circumference; on the east side the walls are washed by
the Juana. The palace, as you perceive, is in a com-
manding position, and, though the walls are not calculated
to resist heavy artillery, yet the place -could scarcely be
taken without a breach being made in them, that is, if the
garrison sh Aced any skill in its defence. The capture of
such a place is a simple matter of time, and its fall might
be e,lculated to an heur; but everything of coulee
depends upon the plan of defence adopted by the
garrison. It is possible that they may risk a battle outside
the walls, in which case, after their defeat, they might
be follcwed into the city and into the palace, and so Delhi
might be taken by a rush,, but as our force is so very
small, and such mighty consequences hang upon the success
of our attack, the very greatest risk would be incurred by
having our men exposed to musketry fire from houses, for a
native's fire from a loophole is more than a match fur the
European in the open. If our force was large we might
make a dash at the place, and it is just possible that
events may even justify sach a measure ; but, writing as I
am at a distance, and only reckoning upon what might occer
if the garrison were ably commanded, and were themselves
resolved to fight to the last, I look upon it that a regale:
saige, which cannot well fail, would be preferable. You
see by the plan that the whole of the western• side is one
mass cf native houses. To scale the walls would be easy,
but no object would be gained by pouring our handful of
troops into a sea cf houses, with streets barricaded ;
heavy loss would unquestionably folio w. This mode of
attack would be absurd, and would certainly en.l in dis-
comfiture. There are two modes of attack, however,
which could not well fail, and I fancy that one or the
other must be adopted. The first is to attack the palace at
once from the river side, for the water until the end of the
month is so very low, and is little more than a stream
which is fordable, that would create no obstacle worth
mentionirg. The batteries could be erected on the sand,
and the camp being across the river would be safe. By
shelling the palace and breaking its new wall, an assault
could be made, and the fire of our guns would con-
tinue till our troops had fairly got in. The shelling
would have destroyed all cover, and probably would
have driven cut the defendants, so that there is little
doubt but that the assault would be successful. Having
got possession of the palace, the city falls at once. There
is, however, a chance of the river rising suddenly, when
the batteries would be destroyed, go that this attack en.
tirely depends upon the river end the probability ofats
rice. The next and safest mode of attack, and the one
that in all likelihood will be the one adopted, is to attack
near the Cashmeree gate , The advantage is this, that our
left would be prote ted by the t iver, a great consideration
in.a small camp. Our guns would soon render the tutu
guard untenable, and to make a practicable
breach in the wall between the Casemeree gate
and the river would be a very simple operation Our ad-
vance would then be made in the open, and with
little risk of loss from the fire of musketry
from houses, for owing to the explosion in the
magazine, it is probable that from the church
to the palace all has been levelled. Our object, then,
would be to breach _the palace in its north wall, mortars
all the time doing their work. To storms the palace would
close the proceedings. As the garrison have so few
artillerymen it does not seem likely that their defence is to
rest in their guns. They will trust to musketry fire from
houses ; in all probability they have undermined all the
gates, and their plan will be to inflict upon us as muchloss
as they can while gradually falling back, when they will
hope to escape with their treasure, dispersing in every
direction immediately they leave the walls. It is scarcely
to be expected th it anything like a vigorous or a
systematic defence will be shown, and for this very reason,
it would be most unwise to risk valuable lives, and run the
chance of success by the sacrifice of a thousand men, when
the same results can be obtained by a moderate delay, with a
loss of perhaps not one hundred. Thus you tee that while
it is possible that the place may be taken by a cotip de
main, it weuld be better to do it leisurely, and surely, and
therefore I think the public should have no apprehension of
failure if they do not hear
.of its being captured at first
sight, By proceeding deliberately on our part success