Northern Times.
Liverpool, Merseyside, England, 1859-03-22 00:00:00

the vessel. Means were taken to restore him if possible,
and the surgeon appeared to have given directions
to bathe his feet with water and to turn him
over, and at last he found that the man was
dead, and he had died of apoplexy. Evidence was
adduced as to that one form of apoplexy called sun-stroke.
It appeared that the man had died by sun-stroke on that
day, and that appeared by the evidence of Dr. Inman•of this
town, who he supposed was called because of his skilful
_
judgment. • Dr. Inman purposely abstained from giving any
more definite description than that the exposUre to the heat
under such circumstances would produce the effects of sun-
stroke, and cause one species of apoplexy. if he was so
exposed, he died of apoplexy. He was committed to the
deep, without any examination by the surgeon, and the
vessel proceeded. One would observe that the whole case
did not appear to have been looked after as it ought to have
been. The proper course would have been to have
had the case investigated immediately. The master did
not appear to have wished for the surgeon to have
an examination. But the matter oozed out, and pro-
ceedings had been taken to bring these persons
to justice, and those proceedings had eventuated in their
having been committed to trial for manslaughter. His
lordship had endeavoured to state only the material circum-
stances of the case—only those points on which it appeared t o
him the law of the case should be stated, and of which he felt
it his imperative duty not to omit to lay down the theory.
They were all aware, either by reading or personally as
passengers on board a vessel for foreign voyages, that the
authority of the master of a vessel was practically all but
absolute. The safety of the lives and limbs of all was in his
care. The limits of that authority it would be difficult
to define. They expanded with the occasion. He
was entrusted with the command of the vessel, to do
everything with prudence and caution, and whatever, in the
exercise of discretion on his part, it may turn out to be
necessary, for the safety of all concerned, both property and
life, His control over not only the crew, but all persons
who sailed with him, had been described to be like that of a
father over his family ; and it had been said -but only
figuratively—that no monarch was more absolute in his
dominions than the captain upon his deck. He had even
the power entrusted to him, by law, of correction and
punishment, where they might be justly called for. He
must exercise that power with reference to the circumstance
in each particular case, and he must be prepared to justify
himself when the vessel arrived in port, either in civil or
criminal cases —of being able to prove that the offence was com-
mitted, and the punishment was not more than was proportion-
ate to the offence. In cases of mutiny or disaffection amongst
the crew, of course the necessity which, it is said, exists,
displaces law, and here creates a law. The master ought to
repress the mutiny, or disaffection, and he ought to
interpose such correction as might have the effect which it
was necessary to produce. If mutiny actually broke out, he
and the officers and the well-effected part of the crew had a
right, if death was threatened, to protect life even to death.
Where, however, no such danger arose in ordinary
circumstances, as here : a smooth sea, no danger, the
vessel going forward without impediment—the master,
although he possessed the power, in point of law, to impose
punishment, provided it was moderate and reasonable, such
as a father might impose on his child, would do well to
consider, especially with respect to such offences as here
alleged, to think whether he ought not better to wait till he
came to a place where the Act of Parliament has pointed
out special sentences in a court of justice, or, in a court of
enquiry, special punishment for such offences. In the case
of the offence of the fireman, if it were proved, it would be
some weeks confinement and the forfeiture of his wages, if
any coming to him. But suppose he did not take that
course, although in accordance and in point of law he was
bound to do ; and if he proceeded himself to inflict
punishment, that punishment must be moderate and
reasonable - one such as a jury, when he returned, might
think so. It must not be a cruel or unusual punishment.
They were aware that he borrowed those words from the
constitution of the country. It was a principle of that upon
which the constitution mainly rested—the bill of rights—
that no cruel or unusual punishment should be inflicted.
No enquiry, however careful -no judgment, however solid
--no crime, however terrible—not even that which some
may suppose or suspect was committed here would justify
ibunal in England in inflicting such a sentence

any tri

as* unquestionably was undergone by this man, and
if it had been ordered by the captain himself, the captain,
notwithstanding his authority, would properly stand at that
bar to answer for the consequences which have resulted.
But he had only been considering half the case, because the
captain is treated as a person to whom such authority may
safely be given in hand. The sailors and others on-board
owe to him a loyal obedience on the one hand, and
on the other hand, he owes to them that control over
himself which he seeks to impose upon others.
He ought to be moderate in temper, and decent in conduct.
His command and discretion he was not authorised to dele-
gate to another. No inferior officer of the vessel had any
such power in the slightest degree, except upon the judg-
ment in such a case exercised, of the captain, and by
his order no other person on board had otherwise
any right to touch the hair of the head of another.
If, then, the assuming of a power to inflict a vindictive and
cruel punishment, wholly foreign from the laws of the king-
dom to which the vessel belonged—for every vessel carried
the laws of the kingdom to which she belonged, as well as
she carried its commerce—if the assuming of such a power
could not be justified in the captain much less could such a
punishment he lawfully imposed by any inferior officer.
There were circumstances distinguishing the case of the one
person charged from that of the other. The chief engineer
is said, upon the evidence, to have ordered this to be done.
It would be observed that that order was in the alternative
—" tie him up if he will not work," and it
general order " tie him up ;" and probably some
question might arise upon the fact that he did not tell
where it was to be done, and only directed it to
be done, if the man did not do his work. All these
questions were in themselves inapplicable to that which was
in itself illegal and unjustifiable. It was a principle well
laid down, and most necessary for the repression of crime,
in order that principals should not evade justice, while
mere agents and tools were punished, that whilst lawful
orders were construed strictly, and the principal was only
held bound by what his agent did strictly within the -limits
of his authority ; on the other hand, authority to do an
illegal act was construed largely, and if a person gave
authority to another, by which he lent his countenance to
the doing of an illegal act, he was answerable for the
manner in which it was done, although the manner might
not have been commanded, or might even be contrary to the
command. This was pointed out by Bacon in his maxims,
observing that, if A commanded B to shoot another person,
and if B poisoned him instead of shooting him, it was not
to be supposes that A was to escape because the manner in
which the crime was committed was not that which he
had ordered. If the evidence in the present case could he
believed, the chief engineer actually saw where the man
was tied, and did not appear to have made any remonstrance
with the second engineer upon the subject. He appeared
to have given his directions to the inferior officer, and to
have left the inferior officer to carry them out in such a
manner as he might think fit. The orders seemed to have
been carried into effect to the death of the man. With
aspect to Mitchell, another question arose. It might be
sid that he acted by the orders of the chief officer,
was justified. His Lordship would
_ y upon that subject that the excuse of orders
riven by a superior officer would not avail, except in certain
s the case of acting in a hostile manner
_ _ .

was a

,amst foreigners in war, either authorised by her Majesty,
or which her Majesty might afterwards choose to ratify.
The order of her Majesty herself, if such a thing could be
conceived possible, would notjustify a party in such an act
as was described in this case. It might seem frivolous,
but for the importance and magnitude of the question, to
deal with such elementary propositions as that an act like
that of which he was now speaking could be justified by no
necessity, and by the orders of no superior. Another ques-
tion arose as to the character of the offence committed.
He observed that those persons were sent for trial
'slaughter. The causing the
_ illegal act apart from
And from any intention of grevious
Glad to see that what this case impera-
' been done and that the prosecution
was now in the hands of the ireasury. As it was to be a
Government prosecution he should give no directions as to
the shape it should assume, but he might permit himself,
and indeed he was bound to observe, that the malignity
which could command and which could carry into effect the
command to put a human being into a place where his life
was in danger from fire, and which assamed the illegal
authority oorturing a man because he did not do his work,
did, in his Lordship's opinion, stand for malice, both in fact
and in law—malice was that which, added to manslaughter,
made murder. He did not know what course it
might be considered proper to take with regard to
the conduct of the prosecution, but as it was in the
hands of the Government the prosecution would, no doubt
be well advised as to what steps should be taken,in the
future proceeding, but he made this observation in passing,
that if certain proceedings should be taken, which for aught
he knew might be taken, the facts as they appeared in the
evidence would seem to justify them. lie had now done
his duty. The grand jury would excuse him if lie had
occupied much of their time on that case. He had done so
because it was one of such gravity as to demand it, and lie
would only add, that he felt called upon to spare no exer-
tionsseepo r
and no time in exposing the circumstances and'in
el
ixgPhotul yn tit
trea the
ted, e law
seemed
very this
likelyeaso case,
whsiuebh;tiiftuptase sthede over or
of inferior ' officers for the responsible command of the
master—a state of oppression
for a state of dutiful obedience,
and cruelty for discipline. No further obse • tuna occurred"
to him upon that or any other case which made its appear-
ance in the calendar, and he would therefore dismiss them
to the performance of their duties. We may observe that

death of

r was an

any•

Irv:. He wa:

tively called, for had